VILLABER vs.

COMELEC Case Digest

VILLABER vs. COMELEC 369 SCRA 126 Facts: Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Cagas filed with the COMELEC, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latters certificate of candidacy, alleging that Villaber was convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. COMELEC issued the resolution declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, which would disqualify Villaber as a candidate for and from holding any public office. Held: COMELEC believed it is, applying Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code that any person who has been sentenced by final judgment for any offense for which he has been sentenced for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. There was no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions.

LABO vs. COMELEC Case Digest

LABO vs. COMELEC 176 SCRA 1 Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. He was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen. Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines. Held: The petitioners contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other

allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship.

Lonzanida vs COMELEC 311 SCRA 602

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011 (Local Government, Disqualification: Exception to the 3 term limit rule) Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an election protest. The court rendered a judgment declaring the results of the said election last May 8, 1995, as null and void on the ground that there was a failure of election. In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio and was proclaimed winner. Prior proclamation, His opponent timely filed a petition to disqualify him from running on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition for disqualification Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. The private respondent maintains that the petitioners assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections. Issue: WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials. Held: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule, that: No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.

Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

Abundo vs COMELEC GR No. 201716 Velasco

Abundo ran for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes in the years 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010. He was proclaimed winner of the 2001 and 2007 elections. In the 2004 election, however, Jose Torres was proclaimed the winner of the electoral race and mayor of Viga, performing the functions of the office. Abundo protested Torres election and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest. He assumed office from May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007. As a result of the reversal, the court declared Abundo eligible for another term as mayor to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and immediately reinstated him to such position. Emeterio Tarin and Cesar Cervantes were also ordered to immediately vacate the positions of mayor and vice mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively, and to revert to their original positions of vice mayor and first councilor, respectively, upon receipt of this decision which is immediately executory. The court likewise lifted the temporary restraining order (TRO) it issued on July 3, 2012 to restrain the Comelec from enforcing the above-mentioned resolutions. Both the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code provide that the three-term limit rule constitutes a disqualification to run for an elective local office when an official has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and has fully served those three consecutive terms. In the Courts 35-page decision by Justice Presbitero Velasco Jr., the tribunal held that Abundo did not serve three consecutive terms as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes due to an actual involuntary interruption during the 2004-2007 term. This was because he assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served a little over one year and one month only. Thus, the two -year period which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption which effectively removed Abundos case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule, ruled the court. The court further ruled that the Comelec erred in applying Aldovino Jr. v. Commission on Elections which held that service of the unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is considered as service for one full term within the contemplation of the threeterm limit rule as the doctrine refers to a situation where the elected official is under preventive suspension and is only temporarily unable to discharge his functions yet is still entitled to the office as compared to the situation of Abundo where he did not have title to the office. The court emphasized that pending the favorable resolution of Abundos election protest, he was relegated to being an ordinary constituent and private citizen since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. While awaiting the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the constituents of Viga and cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner.

It stressed that Abundos case differs from other cases involving the effects of an election protest because while Abundo was the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constitutents.

Chavez vs Comelec Case Digest

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 211 SCRA 315 Facts: On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in GR No. 104704, disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private respondent therein, from running for the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate through the fastest available means this Courts Resolution dated May 5, 1992 to all regional election directors, provincial election supervisors, city and municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, the six (6) accredited political parties and the general public; and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez. On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued Res. No. 92-1322 which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all Chavez votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates. Issue: Whether or not the law allows pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of the members of the Senate. Held: A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives. Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides: For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no preproclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.

Penera vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), et al. G.R. 181613 11 September 2009
Facts: The COMELEC disqualified petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera (Penera) as a candidate for mayor of the Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for unlawfully engaging in election campaign before the start of the campaign period for the 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa 881 (the Omnibus Election Code). The COMELEC found that Penera and her party-mates, after filing their Certificates of Candidacy (CoCs), conducted a motorcade through Sta. Monica and threw candies to onlookers, aboard trucks festooned with balloons and banners bearing their names and pictures and the municipal

positions for which they were seeking election, one of which trucks had a sound system that broadcast their intent to run in the 2007 elections. COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented. He emphasized that under Section 15 of Republic Act 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is now considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Thus, before the start of the campaign period, there can be no election campaign or partisan political activity because there is no candidate to speak of. Accordingly, Penera could not be disqualified for premature campaigning because the motorcade took place outside the campaign period when Penera was not yet a candidate. Sarmiento posited that Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369, has practically made it impossible to commit premature campaigning at any time, and has, thus, effectively repealed Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Penera filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court to nullify the disqualification. She argued that the evidence was grossly insufficient to warrant the COMELECs ruling. She maintained that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned, and the supporters merely joined her and the other candidates. Issue: Whether or not Penera should be disqualified for engaging in election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period. Holding: (A) The Supreme Court En Banc dismissed Peneras Petition and affirmed her disqualification because: (1) Penera raised a question of fact. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence.

(2) The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. Evidence presented to the COMELEC, including Peneras own evidence and admissions, sufficiently established that Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs x x, participated in a motorcade which passed through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the public, and threw candies to the onlookers. With vehicles, balloons, and even candies on hand, Penera can hardly persuade the Court that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned. (T)he conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on [h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate[.] x x The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to introduce the candidates and the positions, to which they seek to be elected, to the voting public; or to make them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their names in the minds of the voters come election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no other purpose than to promote the election of a particular candidate or candidates. Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits any person, whether a voter, a candidate or a party, from engaging in any election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period

(except that political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates within 30 days before the campaign period and 45 days for Presidential and VicePresidential election). And, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate declared by final decision to have engaged in premature campaigning shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Said candidate may also face criminal prosecution for an election offense under Section 262 of the same Code. Thus, Penera, who had been elected Mayor of Sta. Monica before the COMELEC rendered its decision, was disqualified from holding the said office. The proclaimed Vice-Mayor was declared her rightful successor pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code which provides that if the mayor fails to qualify or is removed from office, the vice-mayor shall become the mayor.

(B) The Supreme Court disagreed with COMELEC Commissioner Sarmiento, saying that Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and applicable despite Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. The Court gave the following reasons:

(1) Republic Act No. 9369, which amended Republic Act No. 8436, did not expressly repeal Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. An express repeal may not be presumed. Implied repeals are disfavored, absent a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in character. When confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, courts should endeavor to reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other. (2) There is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibits premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give effect to both, to wit: (a) Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits any person, whether or not a voter or candidate from engaging in election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period. Thus, premature campaigning may be committed even by a person who is not a candidate.

Accordingly, the declaration in Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 164858; 16 November 2006) that (w)hat Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits is an election campaign or partisan political activity by a candidate outside of the campaign period, is erroneous. (b) It is true that under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, a person is not yet officially considered a candidate before the start of the campaign period, even after the filing of his CoC. Nonetheless, upon the filing of his COC, such person already explicitly declares his intention to run as a candidate. When the campaign period starts and he proceeds with his candidacy,

his intent turning into actuality, act/s constituting election campaign or partisan activity under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (holding rallies or parades, making speeches, etc.), which he may have committed after filing his CoC and before the campaign period, can already be considered as the promotion of his election as a candidate, constituting premature campaigning, for which he may be disqualified. Conversely, if he withdraws his CoC before the campaign period, his act can no longer be viewed as for the promotion of his election, and there can be no premature campaigning as there is no candidate to begin with. Thus, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his becoming a candidate (prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity. However, it is only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning.

(c) While a proviso in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, provides that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period, this does not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed during the campaign period. Nowhere in the said proviso was it stated that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful. If the Court were to rule otherwise, not only will the prohibited act of premature campaigning be officially decriminalized, the significance of having a campaign period before the elections would also be negated. Any unscrupulous individual with the deepest of campaign war chests could then afford to spend his/her resources to promote his/her candidacy well ahead of everyone else, thus, undermine the conduct of fair and credible elections. Such is the very evil that the law seeks to prevent. Our lawmakers could not have intended to cause such an absurd situation.

Ponente: J. Minita V. Chico-Nazario

SWS vs Comelec Facts: Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. Issue: Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional? Ruling: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.