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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

78164 July 31, 1987

TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in their behalf and in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges during the school year 1987-88 and future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled tile National Medical Admission Test (NMAT). petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT (CEM), respondents. FELICIANO, J.: The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied

said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this Court to set aside the Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner: Section 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. (Underscoring supplied) The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which is composed of (a) the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, as Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or his duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his duly authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly authorized representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the College of Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges, as members. The functions of the Board of Medical Education specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following: (a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine; (b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical facilities of colleges of medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances, laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating and delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and others, used for didactic and practical instruction in accordance with modern trends;

(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum qualifications of teaching personnel, including student-teachers ratio; (d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum leading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine; (e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical curriculum in a medical school that has exceptional faculty and instrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum may prescribe admission and graduation requirements other than those prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional students shall be enrolled in the experimental curriculum; (f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education; (g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments of the hospitals for training which comply with the minimum specific physical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b) hereof; and (h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the proper implementation of the foregoing functions. (Emphasis supplied) Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools: Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.

xxx

xxx

x x x (Emphasis supplied)

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: 2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of elegibility for admission into the medical colleges. 3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education, each medical college may give other tests for applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate of eligibility for admission that will yield information on other aspects of the applicant's personality to complement the information derived from the NMAT. xxx xxx xxx

8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or admitted for enrollment as first year student in any medical college, beginning the school year, 1986-87, without the required NMAT qualification as called for under this Order. (Underscoring supplied) Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted NMATs for entrance to medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987, respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the school year 1987.1988.
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Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute and administrative order. We regard this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute or administrative order has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the statute or order assailed. 1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as follows: (a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect of human rights. " (b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs." (c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to promote total human liberation and development. " (d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. " (e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."

Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the administrative order they assail collide with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is relatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their case, even a prima facie case, and we are not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional provisions pointed to by the petitioners. Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the contrary we may note-in anticipation of discussion infra that the statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education " accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. " 2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education. The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both

flows from the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three great departments of government,1 must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission:2 One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegate potestas non potest delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 3 The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4 The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads. 5 We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and

regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the nondelegation principle. 3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again, petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added on top of the admission requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission requirements established by internal regulations of the various medical schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority: this Court has neither commission or competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative regulation. Those questions must be address to the political departments of the government not to the courts. There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote an the important interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general community.6 An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.7 Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method

of protecting the health and safety of the public.8 That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.9 Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.10 What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT]11 and quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of the MECS Order which provides that the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every-year by the Board of Medical 11 Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. (Emphasis supplied) infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The force of this argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year; the number of places available in medical schools during the current year; the average score attained during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may wen result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition. WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur. Footnotes
1

See People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) and Pelaez v. Auditor general, 15 SCRA 569 (1965).
2

70 Phil. 221 (1940). 70 Phil., at 229; underscoring supplied. 35 SCRA 481 (1970).

35 SCRA, at 497; underscoring supplied. At this point, Mr. Justice Fernando dropped a useful footnote of the following tenor: "This Court has considered as sufficient standards, "public welfare," Municipality of Cardona v. Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 (I 917); "necessary in the interest of law and order," Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 (1919); "public interest," People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 (1939); and "justice and equity and substantial merits of the case," International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602 (1940). " In People v. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125 (1957), Mr. Justice J.B. L. Reyes said: "It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it imprac ticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law," that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes-." (101 Phil. at 1129; underscoring supplied).

E.G., U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910); Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967) and Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968).
7

E.G., Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256 (1913); People vs. Witte, 146 NE 178 (1925) and Lorenzo v. Director of Health, 50 Phil. 595 (1927).
8

Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 US 442, 98 L.Ed. 829, 74 SCT. 650 (1954); Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Beatty, 220 La. 1, 55 So2d. 761 (1951) and Reisinger v. Com., State Board of Medical Education and Licensure, et al., 399 A2d 1160 (1979).
9

Dent v. West Virginia, 129 US 114, 32 L.Ed. 623, 9 SCt. 231 (1889); State v. Bair, 112 Jowa 466,84 NW 532 (1900).
10

People v. Love, 298 Ill 304, 131 NE 809, 16 ALR 703 (1921); Collins v. Texas, 223 US 288, 56 L.Ed. 439, 32 SCt. 286 (1912).
11

See, e.g., McDonald v. Hogness, et al., 92 Wash. 431, 598 P. 2d. 707 (1979).

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 127930 December 15, 2000

MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JASPER BRIONES, JEROME GOMEZ, RELLY CARPIO, ELIZABETH VALDEZCO, JOSE MARI RAMOS, CAMILLE PORTUGAL, JOEL TAN and GERALD GARY RENACIDO, respondents. KAPUNAN, J.: "Obscene," "vulgar," "indecent," "gross," "sexually explicit," "injurious to young readers," and devoid of all moral values."1 This was now some members of the Miriam College community allegedly described the contents of the September-October 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14) of Miriam College's school paper (Chi-Rho), and magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho). The articles in the Chi-Rho included: . . . a story, clearly fiction, entitled 'Kaskas' written by one Gerald Garry Renacido . . . Kaskas, written in Tagalog, treats of the experience of a group of young, male, combo players who, one evening, after their performance went to see a bold show in a place called "Flirtation". This was the way the author described the group's exposure during that stage show: "Sige, sa Flirtation tayo. Happy hour na halos . . . he! he! he! sambit ng kanilang bokalistang kanina pa di maitago ang pagkahayok sa karneng babae na kanyang pinananabikan nuong makalawa pa, susog naman ang tropa. ". . . Pumasok ang unang mananayaw. Si 'Red Raven' ayon sa emcee. Nakasuot lamang ng bikining pula na may palamuting dilaw sa gilid-gilid at sa bandang utong. Nagsimula siya sa kanyang paggiling nang tumugtog na ang unang tono ng "Goodbye" ng Air Supply. Dahan-dahan ang kanyang mga malalantik at mapang-akit na galaw sa una. Mistulang sawa na nililingkis ang hangin, paru-parong padapo-dapo sa mga bulaklak na lamesa, di-upang umamoy o

kumuha ng nektar, ngunit para ipaglantaran ang sariling bulaklak at ang angkin nitong malansang nektar. "Kaskas mo babe, sige . . . kaskas." Napahaling ang tingin ng balerinang huwad kay Mike. Mistulang natipuhan, dahil sa harap niya'y nagtagal. Nag-akmang mag-aalis ng pangitaas na kapirasong tela. Hindi nakahinga si Mike, nanigas sa kanyang kinauupuan, nanigas pati ang nasa gitna ng kanyang hita. Ang mga mata niya'y namagnet sa kayamanang ngayo'y halos isang pulgada lamang mula sa kanyang naglalaway na bunganga. Naputolputol ang kanyang hininga nang kandungan ni 'Red Raven' ang kanyang kanang hita. Lalo naghingalo siya nang kabayuhin ito ng dahan dahan . . . Pabilis ng pabilis.' The author further described Mike's responses to the dancer as follows (quoted in part): . . . Nagsimulang lumaban na ng sabayan si Mike sa dancer. Hindi nagpatalo ang ibong walang pakpak, inipit ng husto ang hita ni Mike at pinag-udyukan ang kanyang dibdib sa mukha nito. "Kaskas mo pa, kaskas mo pa!" Palpakan at halagpakan na tawanan ang tumambad sa kanya ng biglang halikan siya nito sa labi at iniwang bigla, upang kanyang muniin ang naudlot niyang pagtikim ng karnal na nektar. Hindi niya maanto kung siya ay nanalo o natalo sa nangyaring sagupaan ng libog. Ang alam lang niya ay nanlata na siya." After the show the group went home in a car with the bokalista driving. A pedestrian happened to cross the street and the driver deliberately hit him with these words: "Pare tingnan natin kung immortal itong baboy na ito. He! He! He! He! Sabad ng sabog nilang drayber/bokalista." The story ends (with their car about to hit a truck) in these words: . . . "Pare . . . trak!!! Put . . .!!!! Ang Magasing Pampanitikan, October, 1994 issue, was in turn, given

the cover title of "Libog at iba pang tula." In his foreword which Jerome Gomez entitled "Foreplay", Jerome wrote: "Alam ko, nakakagulat ang aming pamagat." Jerome then proceeded to write about previous reactions of readers to womenwriters writing about matters erotic and to gay literature. He justified the Magazine's erotic theme on the ground that many of the poems passed on to the editors were about "sekswalidad at iba't ibang karanasan nito." Nakakagulat ang tapang ng mga manunulat . . . tungkol sa maselang usaping ito . . . at sa isang institusyon pang katulad ng Miriam!" Mr. Gomez quoted from a poem entitled "Linggo" written by himself: may mga palangganang nakatiwangwang mga putang biyak na sa gitna, 'di na puwedeng paglabhan, 'di na maaaring pagbabaran . . ." Gomez stated that the poems in the magazine are not "garapal" and "sa mga tulang ito namin maipagtatanggol ang katapangan (o pagkasensasyonal) ng pamagat na "Libog at iba pang Tula." He finished "Foreplay" with these words: "Dahil para saan pa ang libog kung hindi ilalabas?" The cover title in question appears to have been taken from a poem written by Relly Carpio of the same title. The poem dealt on a woman and a man who met each other, gazed at each other, went up close and "Naghalikan, Shockproof." The poem contained a background drawing of a woman with her two mammary and nipples exposed and with a man behind embracing her with the woman in a pose of passion-filled mien. Another poem entitled 'Virgin Writes Erotic' was about a man having fantasies in his sleep. The last verse said: "At zenith I pull it out and find myself alone in this fantasy." Opposite the page where this poem appeared was a drawing of a man asleep and dreaming of a naked woman (apparently of his dreams) lying in bed on her buttocks with

her head up (as in a hospital bed with one end rolled up). The woman's right nipple can be seen clearly. Her thighs were stretched up with her knees akimbo on the bed. In the next page (page 29) one finds a poem entitled "Naisip ko Lang" by Belle Campanario. It was about a young student who has a loveselection problem: ". . . Kung sinong pipiliin: ang teacher kong praning, o ang boyfriend kong bading." The word "praning" as the court understands it, refers to a paranoid person; while the word "bading" refers to a sward or "bakla" or "badidang". This poem also had an illustration behind it: of a young girl with large eyes and sloping hair cascading down her curves and holding a peeled banana whose top the illustrator shaded up with downward-slanting strokes. In the poem, the girl wanted to eat banana topped by peanut butter. In line with Jerome's "Foreplay" and by the way it was drawn that banana with peanut butter top was meant more likely than not, to evoke a spiritedly mundane, mental reaction from a young audience. Another poem entitled "Malas ang Tatlo" by an unknown author went like this: 'Na picture mo na ba no'ng magkatabi tayong dalawa sa pantatluhang sofa ikaw, the legitimate asawa at ako, biro mo, ang kerida? tapos, tumabi siya, shit! kumpleto na: ikaw, ako at siya kulang na lang, kamera." A poem "Sa Gilid ng Itim" by Gerald Renacido in the Chi-Rho broadsheet spoke of a fox (lobo) yearning for "karneng sariwa,

karneng bata, karneng may kalambutan . . . isang bahid ng dugong dalaga, maamo't malasa, ipahid sa mga labing sakim sa romansa' and ended with 'hinog na para himukin bungang bibiyakin."2 Following the publication of the paper and the magazine, the members of the editorial board,3 and Relly Carpio, author of Libog, all students of Miriam College, received a letter signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College Discipline Committee. The Letter dated 4 November 1994 stated: This is to inform you that the letters of complain filed against you by members of the Miriam Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five student have been forwarded to the Discipline Committee for inquiry and investigation. Please find enclosed complaints. As expressed in their complaints you have violated regulations in the student handbook specifically Section 2 letters B and R, pages 30 and 32, Section 4 (Major offenses) letter j, page 36 letters m, n, and p, page 37 and no. 2 (minor offenses) letter a, page 37. You are required to submit a written statement in answer to the charge/s on or before the initial date of hearing to be held on November 15, 1994, Tuesday, 1:00 in the afternoon at the DSA Conference Room.4 None of the students submitted their respective answers. They instead requested Dr. Sevilla to transfer the case to the Regional Office of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) which under Rule XII of DECS Order No. 94, Series of 1992, supposedly had jurisdiction over the case.5 In a Letter dated 21 November 1994, Dr. Sevilla again required the students to file their written answers. In response, Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, lawyer for the students, submitted a letter6 to the Discipline Committee reiterating his clients' position that said Committee had no jurisdiction over them. According to Atty. Valmonte, the Committee was "trying to impose discipline on his clients on account of their having written articles and poems in their capacity as campus journalists." Hence, he argued that "what applies is Republic Act No. 7079 The Campus Journalism Act and its

implementing rules and regulations." He also questioned the partiality of the members of said Committee who allegedly "had already articulated their position" against his clients. The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte. Thereafter, the Discipline Board, after a review of the Discipline Committee's report, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the students, thus: 1. Jasper Briones

Expulsion. Briones is the Editor-in-Chief of Chi-Rho an year student; 2. Daphne Cowper suspension up to (summer) March, 1995; 3. Imelda Hilario suspension for two (2) weeks to expire on February 2, 4. Deborah Ligon suspension up to May, 1995. Miss Ligon is a 4th year s and could graduate as summa cum laude; 5. Elizabeth Valdezco suspension up to (summer) March, 1995; 6. Camille Portugal graduation privileges withheld, including diploma. She Octoberian; 7. Joel Tan suspension for two (2) weeks to expire on February 2, 8. Gerald Gary Renacido Expelled and given transfer credentials. He is a 2nd ye student. He wrote the fiction story "Kaskas"; 9. Relly Carpio Dismissed and given transfer credentials. He is in 3rd y wrote the poem "Libog"; 10. Jerome Gomez Dismissed and given transfer credentials. He is in 3rd y wrote the foreword "Foreplay" to the questioned Antho Poems; and 11. Jose Mari Ramos Expelled and given transfer papers. He is a 2nd year s and art editor of Chi-Rho.7 The above students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction/restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City questioning the jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam College over them. On 17 January 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, presided by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr., issued an order denying the plaintiffs' prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order. It held: There is nothing in the DECS Order No. 94, S. 1992 dated August 19, 1992 that excludes school Administrators from exercising jurisdiction over cases of the nature involved in the instant petition. R.A. 7079

also does not state anything on the matter of jurisdiction. The DECS undoubtedly cannot determine the extent of the nature of jurisdiction of schools over disciplinary cases. Moreover, as this Court reads that DECS Order No. 94, S. of 1992, it merely prescribes for purposes of internal administration which DECS officer or body shall hear cases arising from R A. 7079 if and when brought to it for resolution. The said order never mentioned that it has exclusive jurisdiction over cases falling under R.A. 707.8 The students thereafter filed a "Supplemental Petition and Motion for Reconsideration." The College followed with its Answer. Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order dated 10 February 1995 granting the writ of preliminary injunction. ACCORDINGLY, so as not to render the issues raised moot and academic, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the defendants, including the officers and members of the Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary Board, or any similar body and their agents, and the officers and members of the Security Department, Division, or Security Agency securing the premises and campus of Miriam College Foundation, Inc. from: 1. Enforcing and/or implementing the expulsion or dismissal resolutions or orders complained of against herein plaintiffs (a) Jasper Briones; (b) Gerald Gary Renacido; (c) Relly Carpio; (d) Jerome Gomez; and (e) Jose Mari Ramos, but otherwise allowing the defendants to impose lesser sanctions on aforementioned plaintiffs; and 2. Disallowing, refusing, barring or in any way preventing the herein plaintiffs (all eleven of them) from taking tests or exams and entering the Miriam campus for such purpose as extended to all students of Miriam College Foundation, Inc.; neither should their respective course or subject teachers or professors withhold their grades, including final grades, if and when they meet the requirements similarly prescribed for all other students, this current 2nd Semester of 1994-95. The sanctions imposed on the other plaintiffs, namely, Deborah Ligon, Imelda Hilario, Elizabeth Valdezco, Camille Portugal and

Daphne Cowper, shall remain in force and shall not be covered by this Injunction: Provided, that Camille Portugal now a graduate, shall have the right to receive her diploma, but defendants are not hereby prevented from refusing her the privilege of walking on the graduation stage so as to prevent any likely public tumults. The plaintiffs are required to post an injunction bond in the sum of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) each. SO ORDERED.9 Both parties moved for a reconsideration of the above order. In an Order dated 22 February 1995, the RTC dismissed the petition, thus: 4. On the matter raised by both parties that it is the DECS which has jurisdiction, inasmuch as both parties do not want this court to assume jurisdiction here then this court will not be more popish than the Pope and in fact is glad that it will have one more case out of its docket. ACCORDINGLY, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the parties going to another forum. All orders heretofore issued here are hereby recalled and set aside. SO ORDERED.10 The students, excluding Deborah Ligon, Imelda Hilario and Daphne Cowper, sought relief in this Court through a petition for certiorari and prohibition of preliminary injunction/restraining order11 questioning the Orders of the RTC dated 10 and 24 February 1995. On 15 March 1995, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for disposition.12 On 19 May 1995, the CA issued a resolution stating: The respondents are hereby required to file comment on the instant petition and to show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should be issued, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, and the petitioners may file reply thereto within five (5) days from receipt of former's comment.

In order not to render ineffectual the instant petition, let a Temporary Restraining Order be issued enjoining the public respondents from enforcing letters of dismissal/suspension dated January 19, 1995. SO ORDERED.13 In its Decision dated 26 September 1996, respondent court granted the students' petition. The CA declared the RTC Order dated 22 February 1995, as well as the students' suspension and dismissal, void. Hence, this petition by Miriam College. We limit our decision to the resolution of the following issues: (1) The alleged moot character of the case. (2) The jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the petition for certiorari filed by the students. (3) The power of petitioner to suspend or dismiss respondent students. (4) The jurisdiction of petitioner over the complaints against the students. We do not tackle the alleged obscenity of the publication, the propriety of the penalty imposed or the manner of the imposition thereof. These issues, though touched upon by the parties in the proceedings below, were not fully ventilated therein. I Petitioner asserts the Court of Appeals found the case moot thus: While this petition may be considered moot and academic since more than one year have passed since May 19, 1995 when this court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing the dismissal and suspension on petitioners . . .14 Since courts do not adjudicate moot cases, petitioner argues that the

CA should not have proceeded with the adjudication of the merits of the case. We find that the case is not moot. It may be noted that what the court issued in 19 May 1995 was a temporary restraining order, not a preliminary injunction. The records do not show that the CA ever issued a preliminary injunction. Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to perform to refrain from performing a particular act or acts.15 As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard.16 A preliminary injunction persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction. The basic purpose of restraining order, on the other hand, is to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction.17 Under the former 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended by 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge (or justice) may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty days from date of issue.18 If before the expiration of the 20-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary order would thereby be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said 20 days, the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.19 In the instant case, no such preliminary injunction was issued; hence, the TRO earlier issued automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of the Rules of Court.20 This limitation as to the duration of the temporary restraining order was the rule prevailing when the CA issued its TRO dated 19 May 1995.21 By that time respondents Elizabeth Valdezco and Joel Tan had already served their respective suspensions. The TRO was applicable only to respondents Jasper Briones, Jerome Gomez, Relly

Carpio, Jose Mari Ramos and Gerald Gary Renacido all of whom were dismissed, and respondent Camille Portugal whose graduation privileges were withheld. The TRO, however, lost its effectivity upon the lapse of the twenty days. It can hardly be said that in that short span of time, these students had already graduated as to render the case moot. Either the CA was of the notion that its TRO was effective throughout the pendency of the case or that what is issued was a preliminary injunction. In either case, it was error on the part of the CA to assume that its order supposedly enjoining Miriam from enforcing the dismissal and suspension was complied with. A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.22 To determine the moot character of a question before it, the appellate court may receive proof or take notice of facts appearing outside the record.23 In the absence of such proof or notice of facts, the Court of Appeals should not have assumed that its TRO was enforced, and that the case was rendered moot by the mere lapse of time. Indeed, private respondents in their Comment herein24 deny that the case has become moot since Miriam refused them readmission in violation of the TRO. This fact is unwittingly conceded by Miriam itself when, to counter this allegation by the students, it says that private respondents never sought readmission after the restraining order was issued.25 In truth, Miriam relied on legal technicalities to subvert the clear intent of said order, which states: In order not to render ineffectual the instant petition, let a Temporary Restraining Order be issued enjoining the public respondents from enforcing letters of dismissal/suspension dated January 19, 1995. Petitioner says that the above order is "absurd" since the order "incorrectly directs public respondent, the Hon. Jaime Salazar, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City not to dismiss or suspend the students."26 We do not agree. Padua vs. Robles27 lays down the rules in construing judgments. We find these rules to be applicable to court

orders as well: The sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by its substance rather than its form. In construing a judgment, its legal effects including such effects that necessarily follow because of legal implications, rather than the language used, govern. Also, its meaning, operation, and consequences must be ascertained like any other written instrument. Thus, a judgment rests on the intent of the court as gathered from every part thereof, including the situation to which it applies and attendant circumstances. (Emphasis supplied.) Tested by such standards, we find that the order was indeed intended for private respondents (in the appellate court) Miriam College, et al., and not public respondent Judge. In dismissing the case, the trial judge recalled and set aside all orders it had previously issued, including the writ of preliminary injunction. In doing so, the trial court allowed the dismissal and suspension of the students to remain in force. Thus, it would indeed be absurd to construe the order as being directed to the RTC. Obviously, the TRO was intended for Miriam College. True, respondent-students should have asked for a clarification of the above order. They did not. Nevertheless, if Miriam College found the order "absurd," then it should have sought a clarification itself so the Court of Appeals could have cleared up any confusion. It chose not to. Instead, it took advantage of the supposed vagueness of the order and used the same to justify its refusal to readmit the students. As Miriam never readmitted the students, the CA's ruling that the case is moot has no basis. How then can Miriam argue in good faith that the case had become moot when it knew all along that the facts on which the purported moot character of the case were based did not exist? Obviously, Miriam is clutching to the CA's wrongful assumption that the TRO it issued was enforced to justify the reversal of the CA's decision. Accordingly, we hold that the case is not moot, Miriam's pretensions to the contrary notwithstanding. II

"To uphold and protect the freedom of the press even at the campus level and to promote the development and growth of campus journalism as a means of strengthening ethical values, encouraging critical and creative thinking, and developing moral character and personal discipline of the Filipino youth,"28 Congress enacted in 1991 Republic Act No. 7079. Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION OF CAMPUS JOURNALISM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"29 the law contains provisions for the selection of the editorial board30 and publication adviser,31 the funding of the school publication,32 and the grant of exemption to donations used actually, directly and exclusively for the promotion of campus journalism from donor's or gift tax.33 Noteworthy are provisions clearly intended to provide autonomy to the editorial board and its members. Thus, the second paragraph of Section 4 states that "(o)nce the publication is established, its editorial board shall freely determine its editorial policies and-manage the publication's funds." Section 7, in particular, provides: A member of the publication staff must maintain his or her status as student in order to retain membership in the publication staff. A student shall not be expelled or suspended solely on the basis of articles he or she has written, or on the basis of the performance of his or her duties in the student publication. Section 9 of the law mandates the DECS to "promulgate the rules and regulations necessary for the effective implementation of this Act."34 Pursuant to said authority, then DECS Secretary Armand Fabella, issued DECS Order No. 94, Series of 1992, providing under Rule XII that: GENERAL PROVISIONS SECTION 1. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) shall help ensure and facilitate the proper carrying out of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7079. It shall also act on cases on appeal brought before it. The DECS regional office shall have the original jurisdiction over

cases as a result of the decisions, actions and policies of the editorial board of a school within its area of administrative responsibility. It shall conduct investigations and hearings on the these cases within fifteen (15) days after the completion of the resolution of each case. (Emphasis supplied.) The latter two provisions of law appear to be decisive of the present case. It may be recalled that after the Miriam Disciplinary Board imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the students, the latter filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Regional Trial Court raising, as grounds therefor, that: I DEFENDANT'S DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE AND DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF DEFENDANT SCHOOL HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.35 II DEFENDANT SCHOOL'S DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE AND THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD DO NOT HAVE THE QUALIFICATION OF AN IMPARTIAL AND NEUTRAL ARBITER AND, THEREFORE THEIR TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE AGAINST PLAINTIFFS WILL DENY THE LATTER OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.36 Anent the first ground, the students theorized that under Rule XII of the Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of R.A. No. 7079, the DECS Regional Office, and not the school, had jurisdiction over them. The second ground, on the other hand, alleged lack of impartiality of the Miriam Disciplinary Board, which would thereby deprive them of due process. This contention, if true, would constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. These were the same grounds invoked by the students in their refusal to answer the charges against them. The issues were thus limited to the question of jurisdiction - a question purely legal in nature and well within the competence and the jurisdiction of the trial court, not the DECS Regional Office. This is

an exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. As the Court held in Phil. Global Communications, Inc. vs. Relova.37 Absent such clarity as to the scope and coverage of its franchise, a legal question arises which is more appropriate for the judiciary than for an administrative agency to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction calls for application when there is such competence to act on the part of an administrative body. Petitioner assumes that such is the case. That is to beg the question. There is merit, therefore, to the approach taken by private respondents to seek judicial remedy as to whether or not the legislative franchise could be so interpreted as to enable the National Telecommunications Commission to act on the matter. A jurisdictional question thus arises and calls for an answer. However, when Miriam College in its motion for reconsideration contended that the DECS Regional Office, not the RTC, had jurisdiction, the trial court, refusing to "be more popish than the Pope," dismissed the case. Indeed, the trial court could hardly contain its glee over the fact that "it will have one more case out of its docket." We remind the trial court that a court having jurisdiction of a case has not only the right and the power or authority, but also the duty, to exercise that jurisdiction and to render a decision in a case properly submitted to it.38 Accordingly, the trial court should not have dismissed the petition without settling the issues presented before it. III Before we address the question of which between the DECS Regional Office and Miriam College has jurisdiction over the complaints against the students, we first delve into the power of either to impose disciplinary sanctions upon the students. Indeed, the resolution of the issue of jurisdiction would be reduced to an academic exercise if neither the DECS Regional Office nor Miriam College had the power to impose sanctions upon the students. Recall, for purposes of this discussion, that Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act prohibits the expulsion or suspension of a student solely on the basis of articles he or she has written. A.

Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.39 The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: (1) Who may teach, (2) What may be taught, (3) How it shall be taught, and (4) Who may be admitted to study.40 The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy. Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property.41 Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach." Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty. All educational institutions shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and

spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.42 In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to carry out its responsibility to help its students "grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community."43 Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges. Thus, in Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong,44 the Court upheld the expulsion of students found guilty of hazing by petitioner therein, holding that: No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent students who have been investigated and found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to do. More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.45 Tracing the development of academic freedom, the Court continued: Since Garcia vs. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the

academic institution. "For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools." Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of the rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival. Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, In Hohfeldian terms, they have the concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school. . . . It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; may, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man. In essence, education must ultimately be religious - not in the sense that the founders or charter members of the institution are sectarian or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is 'an education which inculcates duty and reverence.' It appears that the particular brand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila University has been lost on the respondent students. Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo de Manila University as their own a minute longer, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them.
1avvphi1

Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperilled, if, under the circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to the student body." Thus, the decision of petitioner university to expel them is but congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds.46 B. Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the State's power to regulate educational institution: The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions. As may be gleaned from the above provision, such power to regulate is subject to the requirement of reasonableness. Moreover, the Constitution allows merely the regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights. C. In several cases, this Court has upheld the right of the students to free speech in school premises. In the landmark case of Malabanan vs. Ramento,47 students of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, believing that the merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture would result in the increase in their tuition, held a demonstration to protest the proposed merger. The rally however was held at a place other than that specified in the school permit and continued longer than the time allowed. The protest, moreover, disturbed the classes and caused the stoppage of the work of non-academic personnel. For the illegal assembly, the university suspended the students for one year. In affirming the students' rights to peaceable assembly and free speech, the Court through Mr. Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, echoed the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines School District.48 Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the

citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.' While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level there is persuasive force to this Fortas opinion. "The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only inevitable part of the educational process. A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and substantially interfering with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding with the rights of others. . . . But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.49 The Malabanan ruling was followed in Villar vs. Technological Institute of the Philippines,50 Arreza vs. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation,51 and Non vs. Dames II.52 The right of the students to free speech in school premises, however, is not absolute. The right to free speech must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.53 Thus, while we upheld the right of the students to free expression in these cases, we did not rule out disciplinary action by the school for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - which materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."54 Thus, in Malabanan, we held:

6. Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the student leaders. That there would be a vigorous presentation of view opposed to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture was to be expected. There was no concealment of the fact that they were against such a move as it confronted them with a serious problem ("isang malaking suliranin.") They believed that such a merger would result in the increase in tuition fees, an additional headache for their parents ("isa na naman sakit sa ulo ng ating mga magulang.") If in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances extremely critical at times, even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid, different types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. They may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."55 It is in the light of this standard that we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act. Provisions of law should be construed in harmony with those of the Constitution; acts of the legislature should be construed, wherever possible, in a manner that would avoid their conflicting with the fundamental law.56 A statute should not be given a broad construction if its validity can be saved by a narrower one.57 Thus, Section 7 should be read in a manner as not to infringe upon the school's right to discipline its students. At the same time, however, we should not construe said provision as to unduly restrict the right of the students to free speech. Consistent with jurisprudence, we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such article materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

IV. From the foregoing, the answer to the question of who has jurisdiction over the cases filed against respondent students becomes selfevident. The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning.58 That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. We therefore rule that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.
1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Miriam College is ordered to READMIT private respondent Joel Tan whose suspension has long lapsed. SO ORDERED. Footnotes
1

Rollo, p. 66. CA Rollo, pp. 41-44.

Jasper Briones, Editor-in-Chief; Jerome Gomez, Associate Editor, Deborah Ligon, Business Manager; Imelda Hilario, News Editor Elizabeth Valdezco, Lay-Out Editor; Jose Mari Ramos, Art Editor; Camille Portugal, Asst. Art Editor; Joel Tan, Photo Editor; Gerald Gary Renacido, a member of the literary staff; and Daphne Cowper, Asst. Literary Editor.
4

CA Rollo, p. 59. Id., at 60. Id., at 62. Rollo, pp. 19-20.

CA Rollo, p. 29. Id., at 48-49. Rollo, p. 89-90. Docketed herein as G.R. No. 119027. CA Rollo, p. 76. Id., at 78. Rollo, p. 24. Golangco vs. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 493 (1997).

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Asso., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 220 (1996).
17

Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 400 (1992).
18

Carbungco vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 313 (1990). Board of Transportation vs. Castro, 125 SCRA 411 (1983).

19

20

Johannesburg Packaging Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 439 (1992).
21

Under 5, Rule 58 of the present Rules of Court, a TRO issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof shall be effective for sixty (60) days from notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined.
22

Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals and Romeo Barilea, 291 SCRA 271 (1998).
23

4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error 40.

24

Rollo, p. 125. In their Rejoinder, private respondents attached a "Joint Affidavit" stating: xxx

4. That the claim of the petitioner, that we have not employed the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals in filing for reinstatement or gaining entry into the campus premises, is completely false and misleading. The truth of the matter being that members of our group had initially tried to gain admittance into the school premises but were barred from doing so by the guards who claimed it was for security reasons, as mandated on them [sic] by the petitioners. xxx 6. Except for the two [referring to Jose Mari Ramos and Elizabeth Valdezco], we have stopped schooling and we are waiting for the case to be resolved to continue our studies and finish the courses we started. We need only a year or two to do it. xxx 8. We respectfully petition the court to admit this affidavit as proof against the petitioners [sic] false manifestation. We hope that the facts we have provided will help clear the cloud of confusion intentionally raised by the petitioners through their allegations. We also hope that they be held in contempt of their attempt to intentionally mislead the honorable court. And we also pray that the court grant the speedy resolution of the case in our favor, thereby facilitating in [sic] our long-awaited vindication. On October 21, 1998, the Court resolved to require the petitioner to file a Sur-Rejoinder within ten (10) days from notice, directing the petitioner to address in particular the above statements of private respondents in their "Joint Affidavit." Petitioner, however, never filed the required Sur-Rejoinder and we resolve to dispense with the same.
25

Id., at 157. Reply, p. 2. 66 SCRA 485 (1975). Section 2, Republic Act No. 7079.

26

27

28

29

Also known as the "Campus Journalism Act of 1991." (Section 1, Id.)


30

Sec. 4. Student Publication.-- A student publication is published by the student body through an editorial board and publication staff composed of students selected by fair and competitive examinations. Once the publication is established, its editorial board shall freely determine its editorial policies and manage the publications funds.
31

Sec. 6 Publication Adviser.- The publication adviser shall be selected by the school administration from a list of recommendees submitted by the publication staff. The function of the adviser shall be limited to one of technical guidance.
32

Sec. 5. Funding of Student Publication.- Funding for the student publication may include the savings of the respective schools appropriations, student subscriptions, donations, and other sources of funds.
33

Sec. 10. The Tax Exemption.- Pursuant to paragraph 4, Section 4, Article XIV of the Constitution, all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used actually, directly and exclusively for the promotion of campus journalism as provided for in this Act shall be exempt from donors or gift tax.
34

Sec. 9. Id., at 95. Id., at 96-97. 100 SCRA 254 (1980). 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts 93. Tangonan vs. Pan, 137 SCRA 245, 256-257 (1985).

35

36

37

38

39

40

Isabelo, Jr. vs. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc. 227 SCRA 591, 595 (1993), Ateneo de Manila University vs. Capulong, 222 SCRA 643, 660 (1993), Garcia vs. the Faculty Admission Committee,

Loyola School of Tehology, 68 SCRA 277, 285 (1975). The above formulation was made by Justice Felix Frankfurter in his concurring opinion is Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263.
41

Angeles vs. Sison, 112 SCRA 26, 37 (1982). Section 3 (2), Article XIV Constitution. Supra, at 37. 222 SCRA 643 (1993). Id., at 659-660. Id., at 663-665. 129 SCRA 359 (1984). 393 U.S. 503 (1968). Id., at 367-368. 135 SCRA 706 (1985). 137 SCRA 94 (1985). 185 SCRA 523 (1990).

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

Healy vs. James, 408 US 169, 33 L Ed 2d 266, 92 S Ct 2338, citing Tinker vs. Des Moines, supra.
54

Malabanan vs. Ramento, supra, at 368. See also Arreza vs. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, supra, at 97-98, and Non vs. Dames II, supra, at 535.
55

Id., at 369; Underscoring supplied. Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634, at 643 (1945).

56

57

Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 US 198, 202, 100 L ed 199, 76 Ct 273 (1955).

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 169391 October 10, 2012

GO, and Minor EMERSON CHESTER KIM B. GO, Petitioners, vs. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, REV. FR. EDWIN LAO, REV. FR. JOSE RHOMMEL HERNANDEZ, ALBERT ROSARDA and MA. TERESA SURATOS, Respondents. DECISION BRION, J.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated May 27, 2005 and the resolution3 dated August 18, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80349. The CA decision reversed and set aside the decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC') of Caloocan City, Branch 131, awarding civil damages to the petitioners. The CA resolution denied the petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration. The petitioners claim that respondents Colegio de San Juan de Letran (Letran), Rev. Fr. Edwin Lao, Rev. Fr. Jose Rhommel Hernandez, Mr. Albert Rosarda and Ma. Teresa Suratos should be held liable for moral, exemplary, and actual damages for unlawfully dismissing petitioner Emerson Chester Kim B. Go (Kim) from the rolls of the high school department of Letran. The respondents claim that they lawfully suspended Kim for violating the schools rule against fraternity membership. Factual Background In October 2001, Mr. George Isleta, the Head of Letrans Auxiliary Services Department, received information that certain fraternities were recruiting new members among Letrans high school students. He also received a list of the students allegedly involved. School authorities started an investigation, including the conduct of medical examinations on the students whose names were on the list. On November 20, 2002, Dr. Emmanuel Asuncion, the school physician,

reported that six (6) students bore injuries, probable signs of blunt trauma of more than two weeks, on the posterior portions of their thighs.5 Mr. Rosarda, the Assistant Prefect for Discipline, conferred with the students and asked for their explanations in writing. Four (4) students, namely: Raphael Jay Fulgencio, Nicolai Lacson, Carlos Parilla, and Isaac Gumba, admitted that they were neophytes of the Tau Gamma Fraternity and were present in a hazing rite held on October 3, 2001 in the house of one Dulce in Tondo, Manila. They also identified the senior members of the fraternity present at their hazing. These included Kim, then a fourth year high school student. In the meantime, Gerardo Manipon, Letrans security officer, prepared an incident report6 that the Tau Gamma Fraternity had violated its covenant with Letran by recruiting members from its high school department. Manipol had spoken to one of the fraternity neophytes and obtained a list of eighteen (18) members of the fraternity currently enrolled at the high school department. Kims name was also in the list. At the Parents-Teachers Conference held on November 23, 2001, Mr. Rosarda informed Kims mother, petitioner Mrs. Angelita Go (Mrs. Go), that students had positively identified Kim as a fraternity member. Mrs. Go expressed disbelief as her son was supposedly under his parents constant supervision. Mr. Rosarda thereafter spoke to Kim and asked him to explain his side. Kim responded through a written statement dated December 19, 2001; he denied that he was a fraternity member. He stated that at that time, he was at Dulces house to pick up a gift, and did not attend the hazing of Rafael, Nicolai, Carlos, and Isaac. On the same day, Mr. Rosarda requested Kims parents (by notice) to attend a conference on January 8, 2002 to address the issue of Kims fraternity membership.7 Both Mrs. Go and petitioner Mr. Eugene Go (Mr. Go) did not attend the conference. In time, the respondents found that twenty-nine (29) of their students, including Kim, were fraternity members. The respondents found substantial basis in the neophytes statements that Kim was a senior fraternity member. Based on their disciplinary rules, the Father

Prefect for Discipline (respondent Rev. Fr. Jose Rhommel Hernandez) recommended the fraternity members dismissal from the high school department rolls; incidentally, this sanction was stated in a January 10, 2002 letter to Mr. and Mrs. Go.8 After a meeting with the Rectors Council,9 however, respondent Fr. Edwin Lao, Father Rector and President of Letran, rejected the recommendation to allow the fourth year students to graduate from Letran. Students who were not in their fourth year were allowed to finish the current school year but were barred from subsequent enrollment in Letran. Mr. Rosarda conveyed to Mrs. Go and Kim, in their conference on January 15, 2002, the decision to suspend Kim from January 16, 2002 to February 18, 2002.10 Incidentally, Mr. Go did not attend this conference.11 On even date, Mrs. Go submitted a request for the deferment of Kims suspension to January 21, 200212 so that he could take a previously scheduled examination.13 The request was granted.14 On January 22, 2002, the respondents conferred with the parents of the sanctioned fourth year students to discuss the extension classes the students would take (as arranged by the respondents) as makeup for classes missed during their suspension. These extension classes would enable the students to meet all academic requirements for graduation from high school by the summer of 2002. The respondents also proposed that the students and their parents sign a pro-forma agreement to signify their conformity with their suspension. Mr. and Mrs. Go refused to sign.15 They also refused to accept the respondents finding that Kim was a fraternity member. They likewise insisted that due process had not been observed. On January 28, 2002, the petitioners filed a complaint16for damages before the RTC of Caloocan City claiming that the respondents17 had unlawfully dismissed Kim.18 Mr. and Mrs. Go also sought compensation for the "business opportunity losses" they suffered while personally attending to Kims disciplinary case. The Ruling of the RTC Mrs. Go19 and Mr. Go20 testified for the petitioners at the trial. Mr. Rosarda,21 Fr. Hernandez,22 and Fr. Lao23 testified for the

respondents. The RTC24 held that the respondents had failed to observe "the basic requirement of due process" and that their evidence was "utterly insufficient" to prove that Kim was a fraternity member.25 It also declared that Letran had no authority to dismiss students for their fraternity membership. Accordingly, it awarded the petitioners moral and exemplary damages. The trial court also held that Mr. Go was entitled to actual damages after finding that he had neglected his manufacturing business when he personally attended to his sons disciplinary case. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor of plaintiffs-spouses Eugene C. Go and Angelita B. Go, together with their minor son Emerson Chester Kim B. Go, as against defendants Colegio De San Juan De Letran, Fr. Edwin Lao, Fr. Jose Rhommel Hernandez, Albert Rosarda and Ma. Teresa Suratos, and they are hereby ordered the following: 1. To pay plaintiff Eugene C. Go the amount of P 2,854,000.00 as actual damages; 2. To pay each plaintiff, Eugene C. Go and Angelita B. Go, the amount of P 2,000,000.00 for each defendant, or a total amount of P 20,000,000.00 as moral damages; and P 1,000,000.00 for each defendant, or a total amount of P 10,000,000.00 as exemplary damages, or a grand total of P 30,000,000.00, to be paid solidarily by all liable defendants, plus prevailing legal interest thereon from the date of filing until the same is fully paid; 3. To pay plaintiffs 20% of the total amount awarded, as attorneys fees, to be paid solidarily by all liable defendants; and 4. The cost of suit.26 The Ruling of the CA On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. It held, among others, that the petitioners were not denied due process as the petitioners had been given ample opportunity to be heard in Kims disciplinary case. The CA also found that there was no bad faith,

malice, fraud, nor any improper and willful motive or conduct on the part of the respondents to justify the award of damages. Accordingly, it dismissed the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. C-19938 for lack of merit. The petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but the CA denied the motion for lack of merit;27 hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. The Issue Based on the petitions assigned errors,28 the issue for our resolution is whether the CA had erred in setting aside the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. C-19938. The Courts Ruling We deny the petition and affirm the CA decision. Preliminarily, we note that the disciplinary sanction the respondents imposed on Kim was actually a suspension and not a "dismissal" as the petitioners insist in their complaint. We agree with the CA that the petitioners were well aware of this fact, as Mrs. Gos letter specifically requested that Kims suspension be deferred. That this request was granted and that Kim was allowed to take the examination further support the conclusion that Kim had not been dismissed. Further, the RTCs statement that Letran, a private school, possesses no authority to impose a dismissal, or any disciplinary action for that matter, on students who violate its policy against fraternity membership must be corrected. The RTC reasoned out that Order No. 20, series of 1991, of the then Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991),29 which the respondents cite as legal basis for Letrans policy, only covered public high schools and not private high schools such as Letran. We disagree with the RTCs reasoning because it is a restrictive interpretation of DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991. True, the fourth paragraph of the order states: 4. EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER, FRATERNITIES

AND SORORITIES ARE PROHIBITED IN PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS. PENALTY FOR NON-COMPLIANCE IS EXPULSION OF PUPILS/STUDENTS. This paragraph seems to limit the scope of the orders prohibition to public elementary and secondary schools. However, in ascertaining the meaning of DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991, the entire order must be taken as a whole.30 It should be read, not in isolated parts, but with reference to every other part and every word and phrase in connection with its context.31 Even a cursory perusal of the rest of DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991 reveals the education departments clear intent to apply the prohibition against fraternity membership for all elementary and high school students, regardless of their school of enrollment. The orders title, "Prohibition of Fraternities and Sororities in Elementary and Secondary Schools," serves to clarify whatever ambiguity may arise from its fourth paragraph.32 It is a straightforward title. It directs the prohibition to elementary and secondary schools in general, and does not distinguish between private and public schools. We also look at the orders second paragraph, whereby the department faults an earlier regulation, Department Order No. 6, series of 1954, for failing to ban fraternities and sororities in public and private secondary schools. With the second paragraph, it is clear that the education department sought to remedy the earlier orders failing by way of DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991. Finally, we note that the order is addressed to the heads of private schools, colleges, and universities, and not just to the public school authorities. For this Court to sustain the RTCs restrictive interpretation and accordingly limit the prohibition in DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991 to students enrolled in public schools would be to impede the very purpose of the order.33 In United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc., where the Court construed an executive order,34 we also stated that statutes are to be given such construction as would advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits the statute

intended. There is no reason why this principle cannot apply to the construction of DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991. Incidentally, the penalty for non-compliance with DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991, is expulsion, a severe form of disciplinary penalty consisting of excluding a student from admission to any public or private school in the country. It requires the approval of the education secretary before it can be imposed.35 In contrast, the penalty prescribed by the rules of Letran for fraternity membership among their high school students is dismissal, which is limited to the exclusion of an erring student from the rolls of the school. Even assuming arguendo that the education department had not issued such prohibition, private schools still have the authority to promulgate and enforce a similar prohibition pursuant to their right to establish disciplinary rules and regulations.36 This right has been recognized in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which has the character of law.37 Section 78 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations of Regulations for Private Schools, in particular and with relevance to this case, provides: Section 78. Authority to Promulgate Disciplinary Rules. Every private school shall have the right to promulgate reasonable norms, rules and regulations it may deem necessary and consistent with the provisions of this Manual for the maintenance of good school discipline and class attendance. Such rules and regulations shall be effective as of promulgation and notification to students in an appropriate school issuance or publication. The right to establish disciplinary rules is consistent with the mandate in the Constitution38 for schools to teach discipline;39 in fact, schools have the duty to develop discipline in students.40 Corollarily, the Court has always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions on students who violate disciplinary rules.41 The penalty for violations includes dismissal or exclusion from re-enrollment. We find Letrans rule prohibiting its high school students from joining fraternities to be a reasonable regulation, not only because of the reasons stated in DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991,42 but also because of the adult-oriented activities often associated with fraternities.

Expectedly, most, if not all, of its high school students are minors. Besides, Letrans penalty for violation of the rule is clearly stated in its enrollment contracts and in the Students Handbooks43 it distributes at the start of every school year.44 In this case, the petitioners were notified of both rule and penalty through Kims enrollment contract for school year 2001 to 2002.45 Notably, the penalty provided for fraternity membership is "summary dismissal." We also note that Mrs. Go signified her conform to these terms with her signature in the contract.46 No reason, therefore, exist to justify the trial courts position that respondent Letran cannot lawfully dismiss violating students, such as Kim. On the issue of due process, the petitioners insist that the question be resolved under the guidelines for administrative due process in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.47 They argue that the respondents violated due process (a) by not conducting a formal inquiry into the charge against Kim; (b) by not giving them any written notice of the charge; and (c) by not providing them with the opportunity to cross-examine the neophytes who had positively identified Kim as a senior member of their fraternity. The petitioners also fault the respondents for not showing them the neophytes written statements, which they claim to be unverified, unsworn, and hearsay. These arguments deserve scant attention. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,48 the Court held that Guzman v. National University,49 not Ang Tibay, is the authority on the procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases. In Guzman, we laid down the minimum standards in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, as follows: It bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and crossexamination is not, contrary to petitioners view, an essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.50 These standards render the petitioners arguments totally without merit. In De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,51 where we affirmed the petitioning universitys right to exclude students from the rolls of their respective schools52 for their involvement in a fraternity mauling incident, we rejected the argument that there is a denial of due process when students are not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them in school disciplinary proceedings. We reject the same argument in this case. We are likewise not moved by the petitioners argument that they were not given the opportunity to examine the neophytes written statements and the security officers incident report.53 These documents are admissible in school disciplinary proceedings, and may amount to substantial evidence to support a decision in these proceedings. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,54 where the private respondents were students dismissed from their law school after participating in hazing activities, we held: Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. [Emphasis ours.]55 Since disciplinary proceedings may be summary, the insistence that a "formal inquiry" on the accusation against Kim should have been

conducted lacks legal basis. It has no factual basis as well. While the petitioners state that Mr. and Mrs. Go were "never given an opportunity to assist Kim,"56 the records show that the respondents gave them two (2) notices, dated December 19, 2001 and January 8, 2002, for conferences on January 8, 2002 and January 15, 2002.57 The notices clearly state: "Dear Mr./Mrs. Go, We would like to seek your help in correcting Kims problem on: Discipline & Conduct Offense: Membership in Fraternity."58 Thus, the respondents had given them ample opportunity to assist their son in his disciplinary case. The records also show that, without any explanation, both parents failed to attend the January 8, 2002 conference while Mr. Go did not bother to go to the January 15, 2002 conference. "Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot [thereafter] complain of deprivation of due process."59 Through the notices, the respondents duly informed the petitioners in writing that Kim had a disciplinary charge for fraternity membership. At the earlier November 23, 2001 Parents-Teachers Conference, Mr. Rosarda also informed Mrs. Go that the charge stemmed from the fraternity neophytes positive identification of Kim as a member; thus the petitioners fully knew of the nature of the evidence that stood against Kim. The petitioners nevertheless argue that the respondents defectively observed the written notice rule because they had requested, and received, Kims written explanation at a time when the respondents had not yet issued the written notice of the accusation against him. The records indicate that while Kims denial and the first notice were both dated December 19, 2001, Kim had not yet received the notice at the time he made the requested written explanation. We see no merit in this argument as the petitioners apparently hew to an erroneous view of administrative due process. Jurisprudence has clarified that administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in the strict judicial sense.60 The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.61 Thus, we are hard pressed

to believe that Kims denial of his fraternity membership before formal notice was given worked against his interest in the disciplinary case. What matters for due process purpose is notice of what is to be explained, not the form in which the notice is given. The raison detre of the written notice rule is to inform the student of the disciplinary charge against him and to enable him to suitably prepare a defense. The records show that as early as November 23, 2001, it was already made plain to the petitioners that the subject matter of the case against Kim was his alleged fraternity membership. Thus, by the time Mr. Rosarda spoke to Kim and asked for his written explanation in December 2001, Kim has had enough time to prepare his response to this plain charge. We also note that the information in the notice the respondents subsequently sent is no different from the information that they had earlier conveyed, albeit orally, to the petitioners: the simple unadorned statement that Kim stood accused of fraternity membership. Given these circumstances, we are not convinced that Kims right to explain his side as exercised in his written denial had been violated or diminished. The essence of due process, it bears repeating, is simply the opportunity to be heard.62 And Kim had been heard. His written explanation was received, indeed even solicited, by the respondents. Thus, he cannot claim that he was denied the right to adduce evidence in his behalf. In fact, the petitioners were given further opportunity to produce additional evidence with the January 8, 2002 conference that they did not attend. We are also satisfied that the respondents had considered all the pieces of evidence and found these to be substantial. We note especially that the petitioners never imputed any motive on Kims costudents that would justify the claim that they uttered falsehood against him.
1wphi1

In Licup v. San Carlos University,63 the Court held that when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right, and the court should not review the discretion of university authorities.64 In San Sebastian College v. Court of Appeals, et al.,65 we held that only when there is marked arbitrariness should the court interfere with the academic judgment of the school faculty and the proper authorities.66 In this case, we find that the respondents observed due process in

Kims disciplinary case, consistent with our pronouncements in Guzman. No reason exists why the above principles in these cited cases cannot apply to this case. The respondents decision that Kim had violated a disciplinary rule and should be sanctioned must be respected. As a final point, the CA correctly held that there were no further bases to hold the respondents liable for moral or exemplary damages. Our study of the records confirms that the respondents did not act with bad faith, malice, fraud, or improper or willful motive or conduct in disciplining Kim. Moreover, we find no basis for the award of actual damages. The petitioners claim, and the RTC agreed,67 that the respondents are liable for the business opportunity losses the petitioners incurred after their clients had cancelled their purchases in their plastic-manufacturing business. To prove the claim, Mr. Go testified that he neglected his business affairs because he had his attention on Kim's unlawful dismissal, and that his clients had subsequently cancelled their purchase orders when he could not confirm them.68 His testimony on the reason for the clients' cancellation, however, is obviously hearsay and remains speculative. The respondents' liability for actual damages cannot be based on speculation. For these reasons, we find no reversible error Ill the assailed ('A decision, and accordingly, DENY the present petition. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM the decision dated May 271 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80349. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

JOSE PORTUGAL P

Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice ATTESTATION

Associate Justic

I attest th3t the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assig11ed to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article Vlll of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO Chief Justice Footnotes
1

Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp.3-37.

Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa; Id. At 40-51.
3

Id. At 53-55. In Civil Case No. C-19938, dated August 18, 2003; id. At 81-93. RTC Records, p. 540. Id. at 545. Id. at 548. Id. at 502.

TSN dated June 30, 2003, p. 657. Id. at 658. TSN dated May 19, 2003, p. 399. TSN dated June 17, 2003, p. 542. RTC Records, p. 503.

10

11

12

13

14

TSN dated June 17, 2003, p. 507; and TSN dated June 30, 2003, p. 663.
15

RTC Records, p. 552. RTC Records, p. 7. Including Letran High School Principal Ma. Teresa Suratos. RTC Records, p. 15. TSN dated January 31, 2003. TSN dated February 5, 2003 and March 31, 2003. TSN dated May 19, 2003. TSN dated June 17, 2003. TSN dated June 30, 2003. Judge Antonio J. Fineza, presiding. Rollo, pp. 90-91. Id. at 93. Id. at 55. Rollo, p. 19. The present petition assigned the following errors: ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT I DUE PROCESS ATTENDED THE SANCTION IMPOSED BY RESPONDENTS ON PETITIONER KIM JUST BECAUSE THEY REQUIRED HIM TO EXPLAIN IN WRITING (WITHOUT ANY WRITTEN CHARGE INFORMING HIM OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM) HIS MEMBERSIP [sic] IN FRATERNITY, WHICH HE DID BY DENYING IT, ALTHOUGH THE SANCTION IS BASED MERELY ON CONFIDENTIAL, UNDISCLOSED, UNVERIFIED OR UNSWORN STATEMENTS OF HIS CO-STUDENTS AND, WORSE, ON CONFIDENTIAL, UNDISCLOSED, UNVERIFIED AND DOUBLE HERESAY [sic] REPORT OF RESPONDENT SCHOOLS DETACHMENT COMMANDER. II WHEN IT CLEARED RESPONDENTS OF ANY LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES.
29

DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991 reads: PROHIBITION OF FRATERNITIES AND SORORITIES IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS

To: Bureau Directors Regional Directors School Superintendents Presidents, State Colleges and Universities Heads of Private Schools, Colleges and Universities Vocational School Superintendents/Administrators 1. Recent events call attention to unfortunate incidents resulting from initiation rites (hazing) conducted in fraternities and sororities. In some cases, problems like drug addiction, vandalism, absenteeism, rumble and other behavior problems in elementary and secondary schools were found to be linked to the presence of and/or the active membership of some pupils/students in such organizations. 2. Although Department Order No. 6, s. 1954 prohibits hazing in schools and imposes sanctions for violations, it does not ban fraternities/sororities in public and private secondary schools. 3. Considering that enrolments in elementary and secondary schools

are relatively small and students come from the immediate communities served, the presence of fraternities/sororities which serve as socializing agents among pupil/student-peers is not deemed necessary. On the other hand, interest clubs and co-curricular organizations like the Drama Club, Math Club, Junior Police organization and others perform that same function and in addition develop pupil/student potentials. 4. Effective upon receipt of this order, fraternities and sororities are prohibited in public elementary and secondary schools. Penalty for non-compliance is expulsion of pupils/students. 5. Wide dissemination of and strict compliance with this Order is enjoined. (Sgd.) ISIDRO D. CARIO [emphasis ours]
30

See Judge Leynes v. Commission on Audit, 463 Phil. 557, 573 (2003).
31

See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc., 205 SCRA 184, 188.
32

See Government of the P.I. v. Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634, 636 (1915).
33

Paragraphs 1 and 2, DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991. We also note that the intent of the DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991 has been further clarified by the Department of Education itself in a 2006 issuance titled "REITERATING THE PROHIBITION OF THE PRACTICE OF HAZING AND THE OPERATION OF FRATERNITIES IN SORORITIES IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS." Department of Education Order No. 7, s. 2006 explicitly states, and we quote: "DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991, meanwhile, prohibits the operation of fraternities in public and private elementary and secondary schools."
34

G.R. No. 133763, November 13, 2002, 391 SCRA 522, 533. See also Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc. v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 172029, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 284, 294.

35

Section 77, 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. Tan v. Court of Appeals, 276 Phil. 227 (1991). Espiritu Santo Parochial School v. NLRC, 258 Phil. 600 (1989). CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Section 3(2).

36

37

38

39

Jenosa v. Delariarte, G.R. No. 172138, September 8, 2010, 630 SCRA 295, 302.
40

See Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 431, 456 (2000).
41

Alcuaz v. Philippine School of Business Administration, 244 Phil. 8, 23 (1988), citing Ateneo de Manila University v. Court of Appeals, No. L-56180, October 16, 1986, 145 SCRA 100; and Licup v. University of San Carlos (USC), 258-A Phil. 417, 424.
42

Supra note 29. RTC Records, pp. 536 -537. TSN dated May 19, 2003, p. 348. RTC Records, pp. 538-539. TSN dated May 19, 2003, p. 350. 69 Phil. 635 (1940). G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993, 222 SCRA 644, 656. 226 Phil. 596 (1986). Id. at 603-604. G.R. No. 127980, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 22, 52-53.

43

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46

47

48

49

50

51

52

The students were enrolled at the De La Salle University and the College of Saint Benilde.

53

These documents were later formally offered in Civil Case No. C19938 as Exhibits "7," "8," "9," "10," and "11" RTC Records, pp. 541546.
54

Supra note 48. Id. at 657-658. RTC Records, p. 15. TSN dated January 31, 2003, Record, pp. 116, 118, 123. Records, pp. 548-549.

55

56

57

58

59

De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 51, at 51.


60

Gatus v. Quality House, Inc., G.R. No. 156766, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 177, 190.
61

Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 110, 123.
62

Gatus v. Quality House, Inc., supra note 59, at 190, citing Phil. Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 87353, July 3, 1991, 198 SCRA. 748; see also Audion Electric Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 106648, June 19, 1999, 308 SCRA 341.
63

Supra note 41. Ibid. 274 Phil. 414 (1991).

64

65

66

Id. at 424, citing Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, No. L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277, 289.
67

See the RH' Decision, p. 92. TSN dated February 5. 2003, pp. 242 to 243.

68

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 97238 July 15, 1991 JULIA L. TAN and JAMES L. TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Antonio M. Nuyles for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p This is a petition to review the decision as well as the resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the order dated June 16, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88 in Civil Case No. Q89-2357 convicting petitioners Julia L. Tan and James L. Tan of indirect contempt and sentencing each of them to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) days and to pay a fine of P500.00 each. Petitioner Julia L. Tan is an 84 year old widow who is the Principal of Grace Christian High School offering both elementary and secondary courses while petitioner James L. Tan is the Administrative Consultant of the school. This case arose from the refusal of the petitioners to admit and enroll certain students for the school year 1987-1988 because heated controversies, acts of misbehavior, and a refusal to dialogue with the school administration led the school authorities to believe that it would be best for all concerned if these children enrolled in other schools. Two separate petitions for mandamus with prayers for preliminary mandatory injunction were eventually filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The first case docketed as Civil Case No. Q-

51039 was assigned to Branch 79 of the court. The second case which led to the present petition was docketed as Civil Case No. Q89-2357 and was assigned to Branch 88. The latter case was filed by Vicente Luy and his daughter Vonette Luy, who were also petitioners in Civil Case No. Q-51039. On July 1, 1987, Branch 79 in Civil Case No. Q-51039 issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The school and the petitioners were ordered to allow enrollment of the subject children. While the two cases were pending in court, the children were enrolled and continued their studies. During the enrollment period in May, 1989, however, the petitioners refused the enrollment in the first year high school of Carmella Ang See, Michael Robert Ang, Karen Gay Dipasupil and Vonette Luy on the ground that the school was under no legal duty to still accept them in the high school after graduating them from the elementary course. On May 23, 1989, Vicente Luy (father of Vonette Luy) together with other parents Josefina Ang, Teresita Ang See and Teresita Dipasupil filed in Branch 79, a motion to hold in indirect contempt the petitioners for refusing to enroll their children in alleged disobedience of the writ of preliminary injunction issued on July 1, 1987. On May 25, 1989, Branch 88 issued an order in the second case granting the prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordering the petitioners to enroll Vonette Luy in the first year high school. In the meantime, the herein petitioners challenged in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 13179) the order granting the writ of a preliminary mandatory injunction by Branch 79. On June 26, 1989, the Court of Appeals set aside the order prompting the respondents to file a petition for certiorari with us. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 90063. In a resolution dated December 12, 1989, we dismissed the petition for lack of merit and resolved "that . . . the children here affected shall be allowed to finish the current school year (including the summer

term if any), as the questioned order of the Court of Appeals shall take effect only as of the beginning of school year 1990-1991." Meanwhile, the case in Branch 88 continued its independent course. Thus, on June 16, 1989, the trial court upon motion of Vicente Luy issued the questioned order. This order is now challenged by the petitioners in this case. The facts of the controversy which led to the two cases against the petitioners are stated in this Court's Resolution in G.R. NO. 90063, "Yap Chin Fah, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.", December 12, 1989 as follows: Sometime in 1986, private respondent Grace Christian High School ("Grace Christian") applied with the then Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) for a tuition-fee increase of fifteen percent (15%) for the School Year (SY) 1986-87. Private respondent Grace Christian had applied for, and been granted, yearly increments in tuition fees from SY 1973-74 (except for SY 1983-84) until SY 1985-1986. On 18 December 1986, Grace Christian received a notice from the MECS that its fee-increase application had been definitely approved on 10 November 1986. Meanwhile, a group of parents whose children are enrolled in Grace Christian, allegedly alarmed by what they perceived to be the deterioration despite the periodic fee increases in academic standards and physical facilities of the school, formed the Grace Christian High School Parents-Teachers Association ("Association"). The Association, composed of a majority of the parents (despite its name, no faculty member sits on the executive committee) demanded: (a) recognition as an organization; and (b) representation in Grace Christian's policy-making process, viz., faculty selection and improvement of the physical plant. Feeling that their demands had been largely ignored, the Association in October 1985 asked for a formal dialogue with the school administration. During a heated exchange in this dialogue, one of the petitioners herein, William Tiu, stood up and pointed a finger and shouted at Grace Christian's viceprincipal, and later spat on the latter. On 23 September 1986, Grace Christian had been granted

provisional authority by the MECS to impose a fifteen percent (15%) increase in tuition fee for SY 1986-1987. Thereupon, some of the above-mentioned group of parents lobbied with the other parents urging non-payment of the fee increase. During the enrollment period for the second semester of SY 1986-1987, a number of parents, among them petitioners (comprising nine [9] members or officers of the 19 member executive committee, of the Association) refused to pay the incremental fee: Grace Christian in turn refused to receive these parents' payment of regular (i.e., the fee before the fifteen [15%] increase) tuition fee for that semester. On 16 December 1986, Grace Christian reminded the parents about the payment of the approved increased tuition fee for the second semester. From 23 February to 5 March 1987, a group of parents, petitioners included, staged a rally outside the school gates. Banners and placards critical of the school administration were set up. The latent animosity between the Association (or some members thereof) and Grace Christian began to flare up. Petitioners first came out with statements in the print and broadcast media attacking Grace Christian's periodic fee increases and allegedly deteriorating academic standards. Some of the petitioners, armed with videocameras, forced their way into the school premises and interrupted a class in session, urging students therein to speak using the allotted class hour against school policies. Some of the students walked out of their classrooms to join their parents in the rally outside. On 27 February 1987, the Association through a letter asked Secretary Quisumbing of the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) to reconsider the 23 September 1986 (as well as the 10 November 1986) order granting the school's application for a fee increase. On 12 March 1987, the Association obtained a "freezeorder" from the DECS, enjoining Grace Christian from imposing the already approved fifteen percent (15%) fee increase, until the DECS shall have received proof that sixty percent (60%) of the increase had been apportioned to salaries of Grace Christian's faculty. After submission by Grace Christian of proof of payment of salary increases to the faculty, the DECS in an Indorsement dated 16 March 1987 lifted the "freeze-order," thereby allowing the school to resume collection of the fifteen percent (15%) fee increase.

Meanwhile, the already adversarial relationship between Grace Christian and the Association further deteriorated when the school administrators overheard several of the Prep (pre-school) students chanting slogans against the school and its teachers, indicating that their parents had imbued them with hostility or at least disdain and scorn for the school. During the period 14-18 April 1987, petitioners were individually and personally informed through a letter by the principal of Grace Christian that, as they were severely critical of the school's policies, it would be best for all concerned if their children enrolled in some other school. On 25 May 1987, the first day of the enrollment period for SY 1987-88, petitioners were informed that as their respective children were in the list of "referral" cases, the school principal would confer with them either in the afternoon of 29 May 1987, the last day of enrollment, or on 30 May 1987. Petitioners felt that their children were being singled out by the school and decided not to see the principal and instead proceeded to the DECS for advise. The DECS in a lst Indorsement dated 1 June 1987 ordered private respondent School to enroll petitioner's children. The latter however refused to enroll these students, prompting petitioners to file an action for mandamus in court. The trial court on 11 June 1987, to maintain the status quo between the parties, ordered the temporary enrollment of petitioner's children. (Resolution-GR No. 90063, pp. 1-4) While Civil Case No. Q-51039 was being considered on appeal by the Court of Appeals and later the Supreme Court, the proceedings were also going on in Civil Case No. Q-89-2357, which had been filed by Vonette C. Luy and her father Vicente Luy and assigned to Branch 88 on April 26, 1989. The Luy petition alleged: xxx xxx xxx . . . [T]hat during the school year 1989-1990 appellants unjustifiably refused to admit her in the High School Department, despite the fact that she was given a reservation slip which she was instructed to fill up and "return not later than April 15, 1989 together with report card for this year." Before April 15, 1989, she submitted the reservation

slip to the school principal, but the principal informed her that she would no longer be admitted because her father was very vocal against certain school policies and activities. As the school principal refused to allow her to enroll in the High School Department, her father wrote a letter complaint dated April 7, 1989 to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). The Department indorsed the letter to the school for immediate comment and/or appropriate action (Exhibits "E" and "D"). In reply, the lawyer of the school wrote the DECS to reiterate the school's decision not to enroll Vonette Luy in its High School Department (Exhibit "E"). (Rollo, pp. 40-41) The school and herein petitioners Julia and James Tan opposed the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on the grounds that: xxx xxx xxx . . . (a) the right of a student to enroll in a private school is not absolute; (b) Vonette C. Luy failed to exhaust all administrative remedies; and (c) there is no clear legal basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. (Rollo, p. 41) On May 25, 1989, Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco issued the writ, stating In view of the foregoing, the petitioner has clearly established her right to be admitted to the First Year, High School Department, Grace Christian School, Quezon City and the unmitigated duty of respondents to admit the petitioner to the aforesaid High School Department. The Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction is hereby GRANTED and the respondents are ordered to allow the enrollment of petitioner in the High School Department, Grace Christian High School, Quezon City, after posting a bond of Five Thousand Pesos of compliance to this Court within three (3) days from receipt hereof. (pp. 73-74, Records.) (Rollo, pp. 41-42) A motion for reconsideration was filed followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration. The petitioners stated that the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports had decided their administrative case upholding the right of the school to refuse enrollment in the first

year high school of Vonette Luy as well as the other students similarly situated. (See Annex "D", Rollo, pp. 52-53) Significantly, the petitioners also pointed out to the court that Vicente Luy and his daughter were engaging in forum shopping because Civil Case No. Q-51039 had been filed earlier by Mr. Luy himself and various other parents. There was pending exactly the same cause of action on contempt and both cases were raising the same issues. As earlier stated, the first case on the grant of mandatory injunction was at that time already with the Court of Appeals. On June 9, 1989, Vicente Luy filed a motion to declare the petitioners in contempt of court for refusing to enroll Vonette Luy in high school. We note that on this same date, June 9, 1989, the other court presided over by Judge Godofredo Legaspi denied the similar motion for contempt filed by Mr. Luy, Josefina Ang, Teresita Ang See, and Teresita Dipasupil. On June 13, 1989, Judge Tirso Velasco ordered the petitioners to comply with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction or he would act on the motion for contempt. The petitioners opposed this order stating that Judge Legaspi had just denied the similar motion for contempt in the other case (Civil Case No. Q-51039). In this opposition, the petitioners again charged Mr. Luy with forum shopping contending that the first case he filed with others should take precedence over Civil Case No. Q-89-2357 pending before Judge Velasco's court. On June 16, 1989, Judge Velasco issued the order questioned in this petition, stating: IN VIEW HEREOF, and for continuously defying not only the writ of this court but also the three Orders of June 7, June 13 and June 15, 1989, the Court finds the two respondents Julia L. Tan and James Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of indirect contempt and hereby sentences each of them to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) days and to pay the cost. They are likewise fined P500.00 each. The Court orders that a warrant of arrest be immediately issued and

served upon them to start service of sentence. The Court will determine whether, during this period of time, petitioner Vonette Luy shall have been enrolled in respondent school for if not a determination shall be made whether respondents shall be continuously held in custody until compliance by them of the court's writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. (Rollo, p. 57) Only ten (10) days later, on June 26, 1989, the Court of Appeals set aside the writ issued by Judge Velasco which had commanded the herein petitioners to enroll the protesting school children. It lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it had issued. A motion for reconsideration was denied. The parents went to our Court. We initially issued a status quo order, enjoining the parties to maintain the situation existing before the decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered. On December 12, 1989, however, we decided the controversy in favor of herein petitioners and the school. The Court in G.R. No. 90063 declared the petition of the parents and their children unmeritorious. We stated: ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for lack of merit. However, the children here affected shall be allowed to fill the current school year (including the summer term, if any), as the questioned Order of the Court of Appeals shall take effect only as of the beginning of SY 1990-91."(Padilla, J., took no part, Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on official leave)." (at p. 7) The petition in this case is impressed with merit. Our ruling in Yap Chin Fah et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. was already long final when the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals rendered its October 22, 1990 decision practically ignoring and rendering naught the ratio decidendi which impelled us to dismiss the earlier petition. This cannot be countenanced. We stressed in Ver v. Quetulio (163 SCRA 80 [1988]), citing Ang Ping v. Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 40 (154 SCRA 77 [1987]): As early as 1922, this Court declared in Shioji v. Harvey (43 Phil.

333) that "the only function of a lower court, when the judgment of a higher court is returned to it, is the ministerial one of issuing the order of execution. A lower court is without supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher court." This is especially true where it is a Supreme Court decision or resolution which states with finality how the particular case before it has been resolved. We ruled in Tugade v. Court of Appeals (85 SCRA 226): Respondent Court of Appeals is really devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is a simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera (34 SCRA 98 [1970]). "The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit." (Ibid, 107). The opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: "Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: "Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. (Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI, 23 SCRA 948, 961). (Emphasis supplied) The respondent Court of Appeals should have been aware that in the related case (G.R. No. 90063), we had already set aside the writ of preliminary injunction similar to the writ from which emanated the contempt order directing that the petitioners be imprisoned and made to pay fines. If this Court had already found a preliminary injunction

invalid and sustained the school's position that there was no unmistakable and indubitable right to enroll the petitioners' children, any lower court's decision to the contrary is not only unenforceable and ineffective, but certainly cannot be the basis for a contempt order. Our ruling in the related case of Yap Chin Fah, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., states: As the Court of Appeals pointed out, petitioners here failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before resorting to court action, as they had failed to: (a) see the principal of Grace Christian on 29 May 1987, their scheduled conference date; (b) wait for the resolution of the letter of reconsideration/clarification of lst Indorsement dated 1 June 1987 filed by Grace Christian with the DECS Assistant Regional Director; and (c) appeal to the DECS Secretary to finally resolve their disagreements with Grace Christian, the right to appeal from the decision of a subordinate officer to a superior one constituting "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" within the meaning of the Rules of Court. The Education Act of 1982 vests in the DECS the primary authority to hear and resolve disputes by and among members of the educational community similar to those between petitioners and Grace Christian. Moreover, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction lies only when the right sought to be enforced is clear, unmistakable and indubitable (Rivera v. Florendo, 144 SCRA, 643 [1986]). In the instant case, no such clear right was shown. It is true that private schools not unlike public utilities and other private corporations whose businesses impinge on the public interest are subject to reasonable regulation and supervision of the State (Const., Art. XIV [4] [1]). At the same time, however, private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right to establish and enforce reasonable rules and regulations extends as well to parents and parent-teacher associations, as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools. In the instant case, since petitioners have failed to comply with the conditions and prerequisites for admission, i.e., registration within the prescribed dates, payment of duly-approved

tuition fees, and compliance with school rules and regulations, Grace Christian cannot be regarded as having acted arbitrarily or capriciously in refusing to re-enroll petitioners' children. xxx xxx xxx Lastly, where relations between parents and students on the one hand, and teachers and administrators upon the other hand, have deteriorated to the level here exhibited, a private school may, in the interest of the rest of the student body and of the faculty and management as a whole, and of the children of the parents affected, require the affected children to be enrolled elsewhere. The maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperiled if, under the circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioners' children and to reintegrate them to the student body. It may even be argued that petitioners' children have been innocent victims in a deplorable confrontation between some parents and respondent School, but the situation here finds some analogy in labor cases where, because of pre-existing and supervening strained relations, reinstatement is not always a feasible solution. (G.R. No. 90063, December 12, 1989, pp. 5-6; 7) The issue before us was the right to enroll in high school of students who graduated from the elementary department of the same institution. Exactly the same issue is raised in the case which gave rise to the contempt order and to the present petition. Under the common facts of the two cases, both the DECS and this Court have found the petitioners' position valid. We cannot close this case without deploring the action of Vicente Luy and his counsel for filing Civil Case No. Q-89-2357 in 1989 when exactly the same issues were already before Branch 79 in Civil Case No. Q-51039 filed by, among others, Mr. Luy in 1987. This results not only in unnecessarily clogging the heavily burdened dockets of our courts but also in the unseemly sight of two Branches of the same trial court and two Divisions of the Court of Appeals issuing contradictory decisions one in favor of the school and the other in favor of the students and their parents. This problem of forum shopping is now before our Committee on the Revision of the Rules

of Court. Pending any amendment of the Rules or a circular remedying this problem, lawyers and litigants alike are warned to be more candid with courts of justice and not engage in forum shopping through deliberate splitting of actions or appeals in the hope that even as one case is dismissed, another would still be open. The Court of Appeals in this case was also misled. It ruled: It is important to note that Civil Case No. Q-51039 was filed for the purpose of requiring appellants to maintain the eight (8) students in the roll of students in the Elementary Department. This prayer was granted when the court issued the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction asked for. Herein appellants thereafter complied with the said order. It was only when the school refused to admit the eight (8) students in its High School Department that they filed the motion for contempt. Said motion was denied because what the initial petition prayed for was for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to maintain the enrollment in the Elementary Department of the students and not their admission in the High School Department of said school. Therefore, the right of the students to be admitted in the High School Department was not in issue hence, the court was correct in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to declare the appellants in contempt of court for the act complained of, thereby dismissing the charge without considering its merits. (Rollo, pp. 45-46) Civil Case No. Q-51039 was filed by Vicente Luy and other parents not only to continue enrolling their children in the elementary department but also to compel the enrollment of their other children in the high school department of Grace Christian School. As pointed out by the petitioners, there were eighteen (18) students involved in Civil Case No. Q- 51039, not eight (8) as stated by the Court of Appeals. Vonette Luy had two sisters, Vivian Luy and Virna Luy who were high school students and who joined in the petition. The case involved not only elementary grade but also high school students. No thinking person can dispute the fact that our country is suffering from the effects of a serious deterioration of academic and other standards in our educational system. This Court is disturbed by the

big number of candidates taking the bar examinations who, after six (6) years in the elementary grades, four (4) years in high school, and eight (8) years in college appear to be functionally semi-illiterate judging from the answers they give to bar examination questions. The same is true of other disciplines, professions, and occupations. A drastic upgrading of educational standards especially in the elementary and high school levels is imperative. It is for the above reason that Government should uphold and encourage schools and colleges which endeavor to maintain the highest standards of education. We have consistently sustained the rights of students to legitimately address their grievances both to school authorities, media, and the general public to the extent of sometimes countenancing uncivil and rowdy behavior. However, we have not hesitated to strike down violence and anarchy when certain students and their inevitable supporters misuse the grant of "ordered liberty" mandated by the Constitution. Educators who insist on high standards and who enforce reasonable rules of discipline deserve support from courts of justice and other branches of Government. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned DECISION and RESOLUTION of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioners are ACQUITTED of the offense of indirect contempt of court. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. Gancayco, J., is on leave. Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting: I have reservations about the ponencia insofar as it suggests that if the parents are not satisfied with the policies of the school, they are free to enroll their children elsewhere. It is not as simple as that. The school is not a strictly private business or an exclusive club admission to which is entirely discretionary in its officials or membership. It is an enterprise affected with public interest and as such does not have full freedom in defining its policies. The school has a missionary and visionary purpose. That purpose transcends personal animosities and idiosyncrasies like those involved in the case before us. The policies of the school are not its concern alone but also that of the parents who have entrusted to it the education of their children. No less than the Constitution recognizes the natural right and duty of the parents in the rearing of the youth for civil efficiency and the development of moral character. The mere fact that the parents have enrolled their children in the school does not mean they have surrendered to it full authority in the pursuit of the said objectives. The education of the youth is a collaborative effort between the parents and the school, and neither can deny the other its assigned role in this endeavor. The parents should have the right to examine the policies of the school and to demand a higher quality of education for their children. The method must, of course, be lawful. But refusing the children readmission simply because their parents have incurred the displeasure of the school is to me an arbitrary decision that this Court should not condone. The ponencia cites our earlier resolution in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals, where we said that the strained relations between the parents and the school might justify the refusal of the latter to reenroll the students, in the interest of all concerned, including the students themselves. The analogy was there made of labor cases, where reinstatement may not be considered a "feasible solution" because of strained relations between the employee and management.

While I do not disagree with the ruling as a general principle I think it should be applied on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular attendant circumstances, especially the reason for the strained relations. Conceivably, these may have been caused by the school itself, and not always innocently. Where, say, the school is run by an authoritarian who obstinately refuses to listen to others, or it enforces clearly whimsical or arbitrary policies, or it deliberately provokes the parents precisely to cause the strained relations, I do not think the parents should be faulted for protesting. The doctrine would clearly be inapplicable in such cases notwithstanding the strained relations. At any rate, there should be no question that not every complaint of the parents is per se unreasonable. It should not follow that because their complaints have strained their relations with the school, their children can on that score alone be denied re-enrollment. I am also thinking of another situation that could perhaps cause us more serious concern unless we define narrow perimeters for the doctrine. We have said often enough, most recently in Non v. Dames, 185 SCRA 523, that the enrollment of the student does not connote the forfeiture of his constitutional rights, which he does not leave at the "gateposts of the school." My fear is that in exercising such rights, he may offend the sensibilities of the school and consequently become persona non grata. Shall we, following the said doctrine, sustain the school when it refuses him re-admission for the sake of peace on the campus? I submit that in this and similar cases including the case at bar the academic freedom of the school to choose its students should not be stretched beyond its constitutional limits. It is so easy to say that the parents may enroll their children elsewhere if they do not like the school, and good riddance to all concerned. But there are other considerations that in fairness, and to be realistic, should not just be disregarded. In the particular case of Grace Christian High School, it may be that it is the nearest school that can offer a Protestant upbringing to the children and their transfer to another school of the same religion may entail more expense of time and money, not to mention the psychological trauma of rejection and dislocation they may suffer. Such involuntary transfer may not be

the most feasible solution. In such circumstances, I suggest that the Court, instead of recognizing the belligerency, as it were, should encourage an amicable arrangement that will allow the children to re-enroll while at the same time according the school and the parents another opportunity to sit down and reason together (and in the process provide an example to the students). I venture the hope that the strained relations deplored by the Court in the said resolution, which was promulgated on December 12, 1989, almost one and a half years ago, may not be as acrimonious now as they were then and that the tension between the parties may have sufficiently loosened by now to allow mutual accommodation. It is worth noting that the school has graduated the children from its elementary department, which would suggest that they are eligible by its own standards for admission to its high school department. I agree with the ponencia that education in this country must be improved, but it is not the academic proficiency of the students that is the issue in this case. The preliminary mandatory injunction issued by Judge Solano was merely preliminary, subject to the results of the trial on the merits. There was no deliberate defiance of the resolution cited because the reason for the strained relations between the parents and the school, and the degree of their hostility, was a legitimate inquiry that had yet to be made. Pending the decision of Civil Case No. 051039, the petitioners were obliged to comply with the mandate of the court in the interest of the orderly administration of justice. I am not prepared to agree that the preliminary mandatory injunction was a patently unlawful order that the petitioners could simply ignore on their own inofficious decision that it was invalid. That judgment was not for them to make. They should understand that, as litigants, they cannot reverse the judge; only a higher court may do that. The writ being a presumably lawful process of the trial court, the petitioners should have dutifully obeyed it, without prejudice to their right to challenge it later in the appropriate proceedings. I vote to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and to dismiss the

petition.

Separate Opinions CRUZ, J., dissenting: I have reservations about the ponencia insofar as it suggests that if the parents are not satisfied with the policies of the school, they are free to enroll their children elsewhere. It is not as simple as that. The school is not a strictly private business or an exclusive club admission to which is entirely discretionary in its officials or membership. It is an enterprise affected with public interest and as such does not have full freedom in defining its policies. The school has a missionary and visionary purpose. That purpose transcends personal animosities and idiosyncrasies like those involved in the case before us. The policies of the school are not its concern alone but also that of the parents who have entrusted to it the education of their children. No less than the Constitution recognizes the natural right and duty of the parents in the rearing of the youth for civil efficiency and the development of moral character. The mere fact that the parents have enrolled their children in the school does not mean they have surrendered to it full authority in the pursuit of the said objectives. The education of the youth is a collaborative effort between the parents and the school, and neither can deny the other its assigned role in this endeavor. The parents should have the right to examine the policies of the school and to demand a higher quality of education for their children. The method must, of course, be lawful. But refusing the children readmission simply because their parents have incurred the displeasure of the school is to me an arbitrary decision that this Court should not condone. The ponencia cites our earlier resolution in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals, where we said that the strained relations between the parents and the school might justify the refusal of the latter to reenroll the students, in the interest of all concerned, including the students themselves. The analogy was there made of labor cases,

where reinstatement may not be considered a "feasible solution" because of strained relations between the employee and management. While I do not disagree with the ruling as a general principle I think it should be applied on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular attendant circumstances, especially the reason for the strained relations. Conceivably, these may have been caused by the school itself, and not always innocently. Where, say, the school is run by an authoritarian who obstinately refuses to listen to others, or it enforces clearly whimsical or arbitrary policies, or it deliberately provokes the parents precisely to cause the strained relations, I do not think the parents should be faulted for protesting. The doctrine would clearly be inapplicable in such cases notwithstanding the strained relations. At any rate, there should be no question that not every complaint of the parents is per se unreasonable. It should not follow that because their complaints have strained their relations with the school, their children can on that score alone be denied re-enrollment. I am also thinking of another situation that could perhaps cause us more serious concern unless we define narrow perimeters for the doctrine. We have said often enough, most recently in Non v. Dames, 185 SCRA 523, that the enrollment of the student does not connote the forfeiture of his constitutional rights, which he does not leave at the "gateposts of the school." My fear is that in exercising such rights, he may offend the sensibilities of the school and consequently become persona non grata. Shall we, following the said doctrine, sustain the school when it refuses him re-admission for the sake of peace on the campus? I submit that in this and similar cases including the case at bar the academic freedom of the school to choose its students should not be stretched beyond its constitutional limits. It is so easy to say that the parents may enroll their children elsewhere if they do not like the school, and good riddance to all concerned. But there are other considerations that in fairness, and to be realistic, should not just be disregarded. In the particular case of Grace Christian High School, it may be that it is the nearest school

that can offer a Protestant upbringing to the children and their transfer to another school of the same religion may entail more expense of time and money, not to mention the psychological trauma of rejection and dislocation they may suffer. Such involuntary transfer may not be the most feasible solution. In such circumstances, I suggest that the Court, instead of recognizing the belligerency, as it were, should encourage an amicable arrangement that will allow the children to re-enroll while at the same time according the school and the parents another opportunity to sit down and reason together (and in the process provide an example to the students). I venture the hope that the strained relations deplored by the Court in the said resolution, which was promulgated on December 12, 1989, almost one and a half years ago, may not be as acrimonious now as they were then and that the tension between the parties may have sufficiently loosened by now to allow mutual accommodation. It is worth noting that the school has graduated the children from its elementary department, which would suggest that they are eligible by its own standards for admission to its high school department. I agree with the ponencia that education in this country must be improved, but it is not the academic proficiency of the students that is the issue in this case. The preliminary mandatory injunction issued by Judge Solano was merely preliminary, subject to the results of the trial on the merits. There was no deliberate defiance of the resolution cited because the reason for the strained relations between the parents and the school, and the degree of their hostility, was a legitimate inquiry that had yet to be made. Pending the decision of Civil Case No. 051039, the petitioners were obliged to comply with the mandate of the court in the interest of the orderly administration of justice. I am not prepared to agree that the preliminary mandatory injunction was a patently unlawful order that the petitioners could simply ignore on their own inofficious decision that it was invalid. That judgment was not for them to make. They should understand that, as litigants, they cannot reverse the judge; only a higher court may do that. The

writ being a presumably lawful process of the trial court, the petitioners should have dutifully obeyed it, without prejudice to their right to challenge it later in the appropriate proceedings. I vote to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and to dismiss the petition.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 134625 August 31, 1999

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS, CHANCELLOR ROGER POSADAS, DR. EMERLINDA ROMAN, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, DR. ISAGANI MEDINA, DR. MARIA SERENA DIOKNO, DR. OLIVIA CAOILI, DR. FRANCISCO NEMENZO II, DEAN PACIFICO AGABIN, CARMELITA GUNO, and MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE, respondents. MENDOZA, J.: For review before the Court is the decision of the Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42788, dated December 16, 1997, which granted private respondent's application for a writ of mandatory injunction, and its resolution, dated July 13, 1998, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The antecedent facts are as follows: Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a Philippine visitor's visa. Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City. After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, private respondent went on a two-year leave of absence to work as Tamil Programme Producer of the Vatican Radio in the Vatican and as General Office Assistant at the International Right to Life Federation in Rome. She returned to the Philippines in July 1991 to work on her dissertation entitled, "Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines." On December 22, 1992, Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P. Department of Anthropology, wrote a letter to Dr. Maria Serena Diokno, CSSP Associate Dean and Graduate Program Director,

certifying that private respondent had finished her dissertation and was ready for her oral defense. Dr. Rolda suggested that the oral defense be held on January 6, 1993 but, in a letter, dated February 2, 1993, Dr. Serena Diokno rescheduled it on February 5, 1993. Named as members of the dissertation panel were Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri Skandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and Isagani Medina, the last included as the dean's representative.
1wphi1.nt

After going over private respondent's dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo Joaquin-Paz that there was a portion in private respondent's dissertation that was lifted, without proper acknowledgment, from Balfour's Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern and Southern Asia (1967), volume I, pp. 392-401 (3 v., Edward Balfour 1885 reprint) and from John Edye's article entitled "Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the Island of Ceylon for their Coasting Navigation" in the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal, volume I, pp. 114 (1833).2 Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation on February 5, 1993. Four (4) out of the five (5) panelists gave private respondent a passing mark for her oral defense by affixing their signatures on the approval form. These were Drs. Manuel, Quiason, Skandarajah, and Teodoro. Dr. Quiason added the following qualification to his signature: Ms. Arokiaswamy must incorporate the suggestions I made during the successful defense of her P.D. thesis.3 Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form but added the following comment: Pipirmahan ko ang pagsang-ayon/di pagsang-ayon kapag nakita ko na ang mga revisions ng dissertation.4 Dr. Teodoro added the following note to his signature: Kailangang isagawa ang mga mahahalagang pagbabago at ipakita sa panel and bound copies.5

In a letter, dated March 5, 1993 and addressed to her thesis adviser, Dr. Manuel, private respondent requested a meeting with the panel members, especially Dr. Medina, to discuss the amendments suggested by the panel members during the oral defense. The meeting was held at the dean's office with Dean Paz, private respondent, and a majority of the defense panel present.6 During the meeting, Dean Paz remarked that a majority vote of the panel members was sufficient for a student to pass, notwithstanding the failure to obtain the consent of the Dean's representative. On March 24, 1993, the CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private respondent's graduation pending submission of final copies of her dissertation. In April 1993, private respondent submitted copies of her supposedly revised dissertation to Drs. Manuel, Skandarajah, and Quiason, who expressed their assent to the dissertation. Petitioners maintain, however, that private respondent did not incorporate the revisions suggested by the panel members in the final copies of her dissertation. Private respondent left a copy of her dissertation in Dr. Teodoro's office April 15, 1993 and proceeded to submit her dissertation to the CSSP without the approvals of Dr. Medina and Dr. Teodoro, relying on Dean Paz's March 5, 1993 statement. Dr. Teodoro later indicated his disapproval, while Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form.7 Dean Paz then accepted private respondent's dissertation in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the doctorate degree in Anthropology. In a letter to Dean Paz, dated April 17, 1993, private respondent expressed concern over matters related to her dissertation. She sought to explain why the signature of Dr. Medina was not affixed to the revision approval form. Private respondent said that since she already had the approval of a majority of the panel members, she no longer showed her dissertation to Dr. Medina nor tried to obtain the latter's signature on the revision approval form. She likewise expressed her disappointment over the CSSP administration and

charged Drs. Diokno and Medina with maliciously working for the disapproval of her dissertation, and further warned Dean Paz against encouraging perfidious acts against her. On April 17, 1993, the University Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation for the second semester of school year 1992-1993. The list, which was endorsed to the Board of Regents for final approval, included private respondent's name. On April 21, 1993, Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, requesting the exclusion of private respondent's name from the list of candidates for graduation, pending clarification of the problems regarding her dissertation. Her letter reads:8 Abril 21, 1993 Dr. Milagros Ibe Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs Unibersidad ng Pilipinas Quezon Hall, Diliman, Q.C. Mahal na Dr. Ibe, Mahigpit ko pong hinihiling na huwag munang isama ang pangalan ni Ms. Arokiaswam[y] William Margaret Celine sa listahan ng mga bibigyan ng degri na Ph.D. (Anthropology) ngayon[g] semester, dahil sa mga malubhang bintang nya sa ilang myembro ng panel para sa oral defense ng disertasyon nya at sa mga akusasyon ng ilan sa mga ito sa kanya. Naniniwala po kami na dapat mailinaw muna ang ilang bagay bago makonfer ang degri kay Ms. Arokiaswam[y]. Kelangan po ito para mapangalagaan ang istandard ng pinakamataas na degree ng Unibersidad. (Sgd.) CONSUELO JOAQUIN-PAZ, Ph.D. Dekano Apparently, however, Dean Paz's letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time, because the next day, April 22, 1993, the Board approved the University Council's recommendation for the graduation

of qualified students, including private respondent. Two days later, April 24, 1993, private respondent graduated with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology. On the other hand, Dean Paz also wrote a letter to private respondent, dated April 21, 1993, that she would not be granted an academic clearance unless she substantiated the accusations contained in her letter dated April 17, 1993. In her letter, dated April 27, 1993, private respondent claimed that Dr. Medina's unfavorable attitude towards her dissertation was a reaction to her failure to include him and Dr. Francisco in the list of panel members; that she made the revisions proposed by Drs. Medina and Teodoro in the revised draft of her dissertation; and that Dr. Diokno was guilty of harassment. In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, dated May 1, 1993, Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn.9 On May 13, 1993, Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee, composed of faculty members from various disciplines and chaired by Eva Duka-Ventura, to investigate the plagiarism charge against private respondent. Meanwhile, she recommended to U.P. Diliman Chancellor, Dr. Emerlinda Roman, that the Ph.D. degree conferred on private respondent be withdrawn.10 In a letter, dated June 7, 1993, Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her.11 On June 15, 1993, the Ventura Committee submitted a report to Dean Paz, finding at least ninety (90) instances or portions in private respondent's thesis which were lifted from sources without proper or due acknowledgment. On July 28, 1993, the CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondent's doctorate degree and forwarded its recommendation to the University Council. The University Council, in turn, approved and endorsed the same recommendation to the Board of Regents on August 16, 1993.

On September 6, 1993, the Board of Regents deferred action on the recommendation to study the legal implications of its approval.12 Meanwhile, in a letter, dated September 23, 1993, U.P. Diliman Chancellor Emerlinda Roman summoned private respondent to a meeting on the same day and asked her to submit her written explanation to the charges against her. During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private respondent of the charges and provided her a copy of the findings of the investigating committee.13 Private respondent, on the other hand, submitted her written explanation in a letter dated September 25, 1993. Another meeting was held on October 8, 1993 between Chancellor Roman and private respondent to discuss her answer to the charges. A third meeting was scheduled on October 27, 1993 but private respondent did not attend it, alleging that the Board of Regents had already decided her case before she could be fully heard. On October 11, 1993, private respondent wrote to Dr. Emil Q. Javier, U.P. President, alleging that some members of the U.P. administration were playing politics in her case.14 She sent another letter, dated December 14, 1993, to Dr. Armand Fabella, Chairman of the Board of Regents, complaining that she had not been afforded due process and claiming that U.P. could no longer withdraw her degree since her dissertation had already been accepted by the CSSP.15 Meanwhile, the U.P. Office of Legal Services justified the position of the University Council in its report to the Board of Regents. The Board of Regents, in its February 1, 1994 and March 24, 1994 meetings, further deferred action thereon. On July 11, 1994, private respondent sent a letter to the Board of Regents requesting a re-investigation of her case. She stressed that under the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, it was the student disciplinary tribunal which had jurisdiction to decide cases of dishonesty and that the withdrawal of a degree already conferred was not one of the authorized penalties which the student disciplinary tribunal could impose.

On July 28, 1994, the Board of Regents decided to release private respondent's transcript of grades without annotation although it showed that private respondent passed her dissertation with 12 units of credit. On August 17, 1994, Chancellor Roger Posadas issued Administrative Order No. 94-94 constituting a special committee composed of senior faculty members from the U.P. units outside Diliman to review the University Council's recommendation to withdraw private respondent's degree. With the approval of the Board of Regents and the U.P. Diliman Executive Committee, Posadas created a five-man committee, chaired by Dr. Paulino B. Zafaralla, with members selected from a list of nominees screened by Dr. Emerenciana Arcellana, then a member of the Board of Regents. On August 13, 1994, the members of the Zafaralla committee and private respondent met at U.P. Los Baos. Meanwhile, on August 23, 1994, the U.P. Diliman Registrar released to private respondent a copy of her transcript of grades and certificate of graduation. In a letter to Chancellor Posadas, dated September 1, 1994, private respondent requested that the Zafaralla committee be provided with copies of the U.P. Charter (Act No. 1870), the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, her letter-response to Chancellor Roman, dated September 25, 1993, as well as all her other communications. On September 19, 1994, Chancellor Posadas obtained the Zafaralla Committee's report, signed by its chairman, recommending the withdrawal of private respondent's doctorate degree. The report stated:16 After going through all the pertinent documents of the case and interviewing Ms. Arokiaswamy William, the following facts were established: 1. There is overwhelming evidence of massive lifting from a published source word for word and, at times, paragraph by paragraph without any acknowledgment of the source, even by a mere quotation mark. At least 22 counts of such documented liftings were identified by the

Committee. These form part of the approximately ninety (90) instances found by the Committee created by the Dean of the College and subsequently verified as correct by the Special Committee. These instances involved the following forms of intellectual dishonesty: direct lifting/copying without acknowledgment, full/partial lifting with improper documentation and substitution of terms or words (e.g., Tamil in place of Sanskrit, Tamilization in place of Indianization) from an acknowledged source in support of her thesis (attached herewith is a copy of the documents for reference); and 2. Ms. Arokiaswamy William herself admits of being guilty of the allegation of plagiarism. Fact is, she informed the Special Committee that she had been admitting having lifted several portions in her dissertation from various sources since the beginning. In view of the overwhelming proof of massive lifting and also on the admission of Ms. Arokiaswamy William that she indeed plagiarized, the Committee strongly supports the recommendation of the U.P. Diliman Council to withdraw the doctoral degree of Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William. On the basis of the report, the University Council, on September 24, 1994, recommended to the Board of Regents that private respondent be barred in the future from admission to the University either as a student or as an employee. On January 4, 1995, the secretary of the Board of Regents sent private respondent the following letter:17 4 January 1995 Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William Department of Anthropology College of Social Sciences and Philosophy U.P. Diliman, Quezon City Dear Ms. Arokiaswamy William: This is to officially inform you about the action taken by the Board of Regents at its 1081st and 1082nd meetings held last 17 November and 16 December 1994 regarding your case, the excerpts from the minutes of which are attached herewith.

Please be informed that the members present at the 1081st BOR meeting on 17 November 1994 resolved, by a majority decision, to withdraw your Ph.D. degree as recommended by the U.P. Diliman University Council and as concurred with by the External Review Panel composed of senior faculty from U.P. Los Baos and U.P. Manila. These faculty members were chosen by lot from names submitted by the University Councils of U.P. Los Baos and U.P. Manila. In reply to your 14 December 1994 letter requesting that you be given a good lawyer by the Board, the Board, at its 1082nd meeting on 16 December 1994, suggested that you direct your request to the Office of Legal Aid, College of Law, U.P. Diliman. Sincerely yours, (Sgd.) VIVENCIO R. JOSE Secretary of the University and of the Board of Regents On January 18, 1995, private respondent wrote a letter to Commissioner Sedfrey Ordoez, Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, asking the commission's intervention.18 In a letter, dated February 14, 1995, to Secretary Ricardo Gloria, Chairman of the Board of Regents, she asked for a reinvestigation of her case. She also sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by President Javier, in a letter dated June 2, 1995. On August 10, 1995, private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24690 and assigned to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.19 She alleged that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process. She prayed that petitioners be ordered to restore her degree and to pay her P500,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages and P1,500,000.00 as compensation for lost of earnings. On August 6, 1996, the trial court, Branch 227, rendered a decision dismissing the petition for mandamus for lack of merit.20 Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on December

16, 1997, reversed the lower court. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:21 WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed and set aside. Respondents are ordered to restore to petitioner her degree of Ph.D. in Anthropology. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend: I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RESTORE RESPONDENT'S DOCTORAL DEGREE. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTORAL DEGREE GIVEN RESPONDENT BY U.P. CANNOT BE RECALLED WITHOUT VIOLATING HER RIGHT TO ENJOYMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TO JUSTICE AND EQUITY. III THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS OF THEIR RIGHT TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.22 Petitioners argue that private respondent failed to show that she had been unlawfully excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which she is entitled so as to justify the issuance of the writ of mandamus. They also contend that she failed to prove that the restoration of her degree is a ministerial duty of U.P. or that the withdrawal of the degree violated her right to the enjoyment of intellectual property.

On the other hand, private respondent, unassisted by counsel, argue that petitioners acted arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion in withdrawing her degree even prior to verifying the truth of the plagiarism charge against her; and that as her answer to the charges had not been forwarded to the members of the investigating committees, she was deprived of the opportunity to comment or refute their findings. In addition, private respondent maintains that petitioners are estopped from, withdrawing her doctorate degree; that petitioners acted contrary to 9 of the U.P. Charter and the U.P. Rules and Regulations of Student Conduct and Discipline of the University, which according to her, does not authorize the withdrawal of a degree as a penalty for erring students; and that only the college committee or the student disciplinary tribunal may decide disciplinary cases, whose report must be signed by a majority of its members. We find petitioners' contention to be meritorious. Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.23 In University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan,24 this Court ruled that the writ was not available to restrain U.P. from the exercise of its academic freedom. In that case, a student who was found guilty of dishonesty and ordered suspended for one year by the Board of Regents, filed a petition for mandamus and obtained from the lower court a temporary restraining order stopping U.P. from carrying out the order of suspension. In setting aside the TRO and ordering the lower court to dismiss the student's petition, this Court said: [T]he lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower court's finding that the implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and

consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job." Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances, clearly of his own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher learning. From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.25 In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondent's petition precisely on grounds of academic freedom but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that private respondent was denied due process. It said: It is worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College Assembly culminating in its recommendation to the University Council for the withdrawal of petitioner's Ph.D. degree, petitioner was not given the chance to be heard until after the withdrawal of the degree was consummated. Petitioner's subsequent letters to the U.P. President proved unavailing.26 As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, various committees had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if any criticism may be made of the university proceedings before private respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that there were too many committee and individual investigations conducted, although all resulted in a finding that private respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree. Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side of a controversy or a

chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.27 A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.28 In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her29 and afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation, which she forwarded on September 25, 1993.30 Private respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.31 It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice.32 It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.33 Nor indeed was private respondent entitled to be furnished a copy of the report of the Zafaralla committee as part of her right to due process. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,34 we held: Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. . . In this case, in granting the writ of mandamus, the Court of Appeals held: First. Petitioner graduated from the U.P. with a doctorate degree in Anthropology. After graduation, the contact between U.P. and petitioner ceased. Petitioner is no longer within the ambit of the disciplinary powers of the U.P. As a graduate, she is entitled to the

right and enjoyment of the degree she has earned. To recall the degree, after conferment, is not only arbitrary, unreasonable, and an act of abuse, but a flagrant violation of petitioner's right of enjoyment to intellectual property. Second. Respondents aver that petitioner's graduation was a mistake. Unfortunately this "mistake" was arrived at after almost a year after graduation. Considering that the members of the thesis panel, the College Faculty Assembly, and the U.P. Council are all men and women of the highest intellectual acumen and integrity, as respondents themselves aver, suspicion is aroused that the alleged "mistake" might not be the cause of withdrawal but some other hidden agenda which respondents do not wish to reveal. At any rate, We cannot countenance the plight the petitioner finds herself enmeshed in as a consequence of the acts complained of. Justice and equity demand that this be rectified by restoring the degree conferred to her after her compliance with the academic and other related requirements. Art. XIV, 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution35 and the 1973 Constitution36 likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia vs. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,37 it is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of the students." If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates. Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of

such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private respondent's case began before her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have been allowed to graduate. Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the constitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, "is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion." Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the Philippines.38 It has the power confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council.39 If follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has granted without violating a student's rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a university's highest academic degree upon an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the university's concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity. While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their educaiton, the USC as an educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.40 In the case at bar, the Board of Regents determined, after due investigation conducted by a committee composed of faculty members from different U.P. units, that private respondent committed no less than ninety (90) instances of intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. The Board of Regents' decision to withdraw private respondent's doctorate was based on documents on record including her admission that she committed the offense.41

On the other hand, private respondent was afforded the opportunity to be heard and explain her side but failed to refute the charges of plagiarism against her. Her only claim is that her responses to the charges against her were not considered by the Board of Regents before it rendered its decision. However, this claim was not proven. Accordingly, we must presume regularity in the performance of official duties in the absence of proof to the contrary.42 Very much the opposite of the position of the Court of Appeals that, since private respondent was no longer a student of the U.P., the latter was no longer within the "ambit of disciplinary powers of the U.P.," is private respondent's contention that it is the Student Disciplinary Tribunal which had jurisdiction over her case because the charge is dishonesty. Private respondent invoke 5 of the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline which provides: Jurisdiction. All cases involving discipline of students under these rules shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the student disciplinary tribunal, except the following cases which shall fall under the jurisdiction of the appropriate college or unit; (a) Violation of college or unit rules and regulations by students of the college, or (b) Misconduct committed by students of the college or unit within its classrooms or premises or in the course of an official activity; Provided, that regional units of the University shall have original jurisdiction over all cases involving students of such units. Private respondent argues that under 25 (a) of the said Rules and Regulations, dishonesty in relation to one's studies (i.e., plagiarism) may be punished only with suspension for at least one (1) year. As the above-quoted provision of 5 of the Rules and Regulations indicates, the jurisdiction of the student disciplinary tribunal extend only to disciplinary actions. In this case, U.P. does not seek to discipline private respondent. Indeed, as the appellate court observed, private respondent is no longer within "the ambit of disciplinary powers of the U.P." Private respondent cannot even be punished since, as she claims, the penalty for acts of dishonesty in

administrative disciplinary proceedings is suspension from the University for at least one year. What U.P., through the Board of Regents, seeks to do is to protect its academic integrity by withdrawing from private respondent an academic degree she obtained through fraud. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur. Footnotes


1

Per Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero and concurred in by Associate Justices Jorge S. Imperial and Eubulo G. Verzola.
2

Stated as 1883 in the Petition for Certiorari. Records, p. 26. Ibid. Supra, note 3. Dr. Manuel Teodoro was absent during the meeting. Records, p. 173. Records, p. 39. Rollo, pp. 201-202. Id., p. 133. Records, p. 346. Id., p. 179.

10

11

12

13

Records, p. 49. Id.; p. 409. Id., pp. 403-406. Rollo, p. 137. Records, p. 192.

14

15

16

17

18

Commissioner Ordoez sent a letter to the Board of Regents requesting it to defer action on private respondent's case until the latter had been given the opportunity to be heard. U.P. President Emil Q. Javier responded with a letter, dated February 17, 1995, assuring Commissioner Ordoez that the decision on private respondent's case was arrived at after compliance with the requirements of due process.
19

It appears that the case was later transferred to Branch 227. Rollo, pp. 83-97. Id., p. 56. Rollo, pp. 33-34.

20

21

22

23

RULES OF COURT, RULE 65, 3; Anchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, 268 SCRA 301 (1997).
24

227 SCRA 342 (1993). Supra, at 361-362. Rollo, pp. 54-55.

25

26

27

Helpmate, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. 112323, July 28, 1997; M. Ramirez Industries v. The Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. 89894, January 3, 1997.
28

Naguiat v. National Labor Relations Commission, 269 SCRA 564 (1997).

29

Records, pp. 48-49. Id., pp. 50-58. Id., pp. 59-65; 79-80. National Federation of Labor v. NLRC, 283 SCRA 275 (1997). University of the Philippines v. Ligot-Telan, 227 SCRA 342 (1993). 222 SCRA 644 (1993). Art. XIV, 5. Art. XV, 8 (2). 68 SCRA 277 (1975). Act No. 1897, 4. Id., 9. Licup v. University of San Carlos, 178 SCRA 637 (1989). Records, p. 192. RULES OF COURT, RULE 131, 3 (m).

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. Nos. 90010-11 September 14, 1990 CAGAYAN CAPITOL COLLEGE AND LAUREANA S. ROSALES, petitioners, vs. THE HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, VIRGILIO P. VILLEGAS AND LEONOR PAGAPONG, respondents. Casimiro B. Juarez, Jr. for petitioners. Francisco D. Alas for private respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.: The propriety of the reinstatement of private respondents as faculty members of petitioner college is the issue submitted in this petition. Private respondents Virgilio Villegas and Leonor Pagapong were teachers on a probational basis of the petitioner college. Villegas was initially hired as an instructor in the Nautical Science Department of said petitioner and was extended an appointment on a ten-month contractual basis which ended on March 31, 1982. Upon expiration of said contract he re-applied and was given a new contract commencing on June 1, 1982 and ending on March 31, 1983. Thereafter he re-applied for employment and was given a contract for a fixed period starting June 1, 1983 up to March 31, 1984. Upon mutual agreement the contract was extended to include the summer of 1984 up to May 31, 1984 which is still part of the school-year 1983-1984. Upon expiration of said period he sent a letter re-applying for employment with the petitioner. His application, however, was turned down because of various

complaints from his students borne out by the report of his superiors who investigated the matter. 1 Thus, he filed a complaint in the Regional Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Cagayan City for illegal dismissal with reinstatement, payment of backwages, moral damages and attorney's fees. Included in the complaint were claims for underpayment of salary, allowances, wage orders and his share in tuition fee increases per Presidential Decree No. 451. It was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-C-0513-84. On the other hand, respondent Pagapong was initially hired as a probationary instructor in the High School Department of petitioner college on June 15, 1981 on a contractual basis to end on March 31, 1982. Upon re-application her contract was renewed for another fixed period covering June 1, 1982 up to March 31, 1983. Her employment was on a probationary basis. Similarly, a third contract was executed by the petitioner college covering the period starting June 15, 1983 and ending on March 31, 1984. Upon the termination of the said third contract respondent Pagapong wrote to petitioner seeking reemployment. Her application was accompanied by a clearance. However, her application was denied upon the recommendation of her immediate superiors who considered her inefficient. Thus, she filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with reinstatement, with backwages, moral damages and attorney's fees. She also included claims for underpayment of wages, allowances, wage orders and non-payment of shares in tuition fee increases per Presidential Decree No. 451. It was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-C-0560-84. The cases of respondents Villegas and Pagapong were jointly heard upon agreement of the parties, the issues and facts being identical. In their position paper, private respondents Villegas and Pagapong alleged that they were dismissed by petitioners without valid grounds and that they were deprived of their constitutional right to due process and security of tenure. They also raised the issue of non-compliance with presidential decrees and wage orders pertaining to the payment of emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) and their basic

salary, including non-payment of their shares in tuition fee increases under Presidential Decree No. 451. Petitioners, on the other hand, filed their position paper and supplemental manifestations wherein they denied that private respondents were illegally dismissed. They maintained that the private respondents alleged employment contracts on a probation basis expired and that the same were not renewed because their performances were considered unsatisfactory while they were on probation. Petitioners further contended that private respondents, as probationary employees, did not qualify for tenureship as their services on probation, upon evaluation, did not reach the standard prescribed for probationary employees. Petitioners also denied that private respondents are entitled to backwages, since they were not illegally dismissed and asserted that they have been paid their wages, allowances and their shares in tuition fee increases and that they were not entitled to moral damages and attorney's fees. On August 8, 1985, a decision was rendered by Executive Labor Arbiter Ildefonso G. Agbuya dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal based on the following disquisition:
From the above-quoted portion of the parties' position paper it is undisputed that Complainants were hired on a ten (10) months contractual basis as faculty members for a period of three (3) consecutive contracts of employment (school year). Based on these facts alone, the complaint for illegal dismissal should be dismissed because it is judicial knowledge that probationary period of instructors or faculty members of any particular school pursuant to the rules of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports is for three (3) years. Since the employment of Complainants fall (sic) within the probationary period of three (3) years, it is therefore management's prerogative whether to renew the same for permanency or stop the relationship as what happened in this particular cases (sic). We are limiting the basis of our opinion on the probationary period provided for by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports and need not discuss the merits as argued by both parties in their respective position paper (sic). (pp. 211-212, Records). 2

Private respondents appealed said decision to the NLRC which rendered a decision on May 30, 1989 modifying the appealed decision in this manner:

After a careful review of the records and based on the foregoing facts, we find and so hold that the Labor Arbiter committed reversible error. It is an undisputed fact that complainant Virgilio Villegas worked with respondent Cagayan Capitol College for six (6) consecutive regular semesters, as college instructor, while complainant Leonor Pagapong worked with the same respondent for three (3) consecutive years as classroom teacher. In this regard, the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools expressly provides that . . . probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than ... six (6) consecutive regular semesters for those in the tertiary level'. (Section 102 of the Manual, 7th Edition, 1984). The same Manual also provides that 'full time teachers who have rendered three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service shall be considered permanent' (Section 75, Ibid.). Based on this Manual of Regulations of Private Schools both complainants obtained permanent status in their appointment with the respondent Cagayan Capitol College and cannot be dismissed except for cause. The non-renewal of their employment contract with the respondent is therefore tantamount to illegal dismissal. Hence, complainants are entitled to reinstatement with backwages and other benefits. As regards the claim for moral and exemplary damages, we concur with the findings of the Labor Arbiter that the same is without basis. We likewise adopt the award of attorney's fees of 10% out of the total monetary award that complainants may receive. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED, declaring respondents guilty of illegal dismissal and ordering respondents to reinstate complainants to their former position or any equivalent position with three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction. Respondents are likewise ordered to pay 10% of the total award as attorney's fee.

The claims for moral and exemplary damages are dismissed for lack of merit. 3

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners but this was denied by the public respondent in a resolution dated July 28, 1989. 4 Hence this petition wherein petitioners assail the said decision of public respondent based on the following grounds: I THAT THE HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE MANUAL OF REGULATIONS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOLS, 7th EDITION, 1970, THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE BY RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE ACQUIRED PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND CANNOT BE DISMISSED EXCEPT FOR CAUSE. II
THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE INTERPRETATION OF EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE BY RULING THAT THE ACT OF PETITIONERS IN NOT RENEWING THE TEACHING CONTRACTS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IS TANTAMOUNT TO ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AND IN CONSEQUENTLY ORDERING THEIR REINSTATEMENT WITH BACKWAGES. 5

In the same petition is a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the public respondent from enforcing the questioned decision dated May 30,1989 pending resolution of the petition. In sum, the petitioner prays for the annulment of said decision dated May 30, 1989 and the resolution dated July 28, 1989 promulgated by the NLRC. Acting on the petition, the Court, on October 4, 1989, without giving due course to the petition, required the respondents to comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice and issued a temporary

restraining order enjoining the public respondent from enforcing the questioned decision and resolution and further required petitioner to file a bond in the amount of P20,000.00 within forty-eight (48) hours from notice. After careful deliberation on the petition, the comment thereto of respondents and the memoranda of the parties, the Court finds that the petition is impressed with merit. There is no question that private respondents were probationary teachers. Thus, they are covered by the policy instructions issued by the Department of Labor and Employment that the probationary employment of professional instructors and teachers shall be subject to the standards established by the Department of Education and Culture. Said standards are embodied in paragraph 75 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, as follows: 75. Full time teachers who have rendered three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory services shall be considered permanent. In University of Sto. Tomas vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 6 this Court in interpreting the foregoing rule, held that the legal requisites for a teacher to acquire permanent employment and security of tenure are as follows: (1) The teacher is a full time teacher; (2) The teacher must have rendered three (3) consecutive years of service; and (3) Such service must have been satisfactory. There is no question that private respondents have been employed for three (3) consecutive years as teachers at petitioners' college and on a full time basis. However, they do not automatically become permanent unless it is shown that their services during the probationary period were satisfactory. The contention of respondents that upon termination of the three-year probationary period the teacher automatically becomes permanent is not quite correct. It must be conditioned on the compliance with the

third requisite that the services of said teacher during the probationary period was satisfactory. The employer is the one who is to set the standards and determine whether or not the services of an employee are satisfactory. It is the prerogative of an employer to determine whether or not the said standards have been complied with. In fact, it is the right of the employer to shorten the probationary period if he is impressed with the services of the employees. This prerogative of a school to provide standards for its teachers and to determine whether or not these standards have been met is in accordance with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy which give educational institution the right to choose who should teach. 7 At the start of their employment, private respondents were duly furnished the Faculty Manual expressly stating among others, the duties of teachers and the grounds for termination of employment or non-appointment to permanent status of a probationary employee. In the case of respondent Villegas, it appears that there were complaints of students during his last year of service and that these complaints were duly investigated by the Acting Dean of the Nautical Department who came up with the report of the acts complained of. 8 Thus, his performance was considered unsatisfactory and was not renewed by petitioner college after the third year. That he was made to teach in the summer of 1984 appears to be prompted by the fact that the summer sessions were still part of the third probationary period which started in July of the first semester of school year 198182. Similarly, respondent Pagapong was found to be inefficient due to her absences. The Court thus finds and so holds that private respondents were not illegally dismissed by petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the questioned decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission

dated May 30, 1989 and July 28, 1989, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE and another decision is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaints filed by private respondents. The restraining order issued by the Court on October 4,1989 is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED. Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes 1 Annexes D, D-1, and D-3 to petitioner's position paper; page 76, records. 2 Page 129, Rollo. 3 Pages 21 and 22, Rollo. 4 Annex B, pages 25 to 27, Rollo. 5 Page 7, Rollo. 6 G.R. No. 85519, promulgated February 15, 1990. 7 Dizon, Law on Schools and Students, pages 289 to 292, citing Wilsons Institutional Academy. 8 Annexes D, D-1, D-2, and D-3 to the Petitioner's Position Paper; page 76, records.

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