Speech Act Theory

I hereby divorce you.

In Muslim cultures, the consecutive uttering of this sentence for three times by a married man constitute a divorce.

Table of contents

Performatives vs. constatives

How to do things with words by Austin (lecture 1-7)

Speech act theory

How to do things with words by Austin (lecture 8-12)

By Searle

Indirect speech acts

Philosophical background

Logical positivism (pervasive in philosophical circles in the

1930s):

Unless a sentence can, at least in principle, be verified (i.e. tested for its truth or falsity), it was strictly speaking meaningless.

Ordinary language philosophy (represented by J.

Austin) studying actual linguistic usage, highlighting in descriptive terms the complexity and subtlety of meanings The total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating. (1962:147)

Performatives vs. constatives

Some ordinary language declarative sentences are not apparently used with any intention of making true or false statements.
Happy birthday. I name the ship Queen Elizabeth. Compared with --- Its cold outside. I pour some liquid into the tube.

Statements can be classified into two categories: Constatives: those that can be judged as true or false those that are used to describe things Performatives: those that do not report or constate anything and are not therefore true or false, but rather that the uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, an action. those that are used to do things

Felicity conditions

Conditions to be met to produce an appropriate performative:

A1. there must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances; A2. the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. B. the procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and completely.
I hereby divorce you. I bet you 3 dollars on

Felicity conditions

C1. Often the persons participating in and so invoking the procedure must have the required thoughts, feelings and intentions. C2. Often if consequent conduct is specified, then the relevant parties must do it. When A or B is violated, the intended act is void, not achieved, or without effect, known as misfire. Whereas a violation of C will result in an abuse of the procedure.

Rethinking on the felicity conditions

Too restrictive Only some performatives require a conventional procedure to be executed correctly and completely. wilt thou have this woman to thy wedded wife and, forsaking all other, keep thee only unto her, so long as ye both shall live? yes, I will. Ritual performatives I promise I give my word

How to identify performatives

Performatives have three characteristics:

They are performed in saying something. They cannot be performed unless language is used. Performatives are first person, indicative, active sentences in the simply present tense.
I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth. She names this ship the Queen Elizabeth. Can you name this ship the Queen Elizabeth? This ship is named the Queen Elizabeth. I am naming this ship the Queen Elizabeth.

Rethinking on the 3rd criterion

the present tense, first person singular subjective, indicative mood, active voice
The pattern can also be applied to constatives. I now beat the eggs till fluffy. Performatives can take forms other than that pattern as well. You are hereby authorized to pay for the purchase. We promise to clean the room afterwards. You did it. Im denying that Guilty!

The modification of the criterion

Performatives are identifiable because they have the form of 1st person indicative active sentences in the simple present with one of a delimited set of performative verbs as the main verb.

How to identify performative verbs

Criterion 1(the syntactic one):

hereby can be inserted in verb phrases which contain performative verbs without oddity.
I (hereby) promise to pay you $500. * I (hereby) love you.

Criterion 2 (the functional one):

Substituting a performative verb in the schema IN SAYING I x, I was x-ING yields a true statement. In saying I promise, I was promising. * In saying I run, I was running.

Rethinking on the criteria

hereby---too narrow * I hereby plead * I hereby commiserate with you. IN SAYING I x, I was x-ING---too broad In saying I think, I was thinking.

The asymmetric relationship between performatives and performative verbs

Performatives do not correspond with performative verbs. I. The same performative can be represented by several performative verbs.
I order you to shut the door. I command you to shut the door. I ask you to shut the door.

The asymmetric relationship between performatives and performative verbs

II. The same performative verb can represent different performatives. I promise I will come. I promise I will come and kick you to the hell.

The asymmetric relationship between performatives and performative verbs

III. Not every performative has a corresponding, custom-made performative verb of its own.
The act of pronouncing a jurys finding To render a verdict * to verdict

The asymmetric relationship between performatives and performative verbs

IV. Performative verbs can be used nonperformatively.

I believe in God. I believe that the earth is flat.

The asymmetric relationship between performatives and performative verbs

V. Some performative verbs deny the actions they are supposed to perform or do the actions they explicitly deny. I insult you Im not threatening you, but if I ever see your face again around these parts

The asymmetric relationship between performatives and performative verbs

VI. Perfomatives can be made without performative verbs. I order you to shut the door. Shut the door! You will shut that door.

One shift of the original view on performatives

All the above leads to the collapse of the performative hypothesis. Shift from the view that performatives are a special class of sentences with peculiar syntactic and pragmatic properties to the view that there is a general class of performative utterances that includes both explicit performatives (the old familiar class) and implicit ones. Explicit performatives: those that have performative verbs to make explicit the act a speaker intends to perform by uttering the sentence. Implicit performatives: those that do not contain an linguistic expression naming the act.

Reapproaching the performative/constative dichotomy

Based on the dichotomy of explicit and implicit performatives, we can classify the only kind of utterances that are not doing actions, i.e. statements or constatives, into implicit performatives, to report.
There is clearly no real incompatibility between utterances being truthbearers and simultaneously performing actions. I warn you the bull will charge. Sometimes the truth or falsity of a constative is difficult to tell too. France is hexagonal. Oxford is forty miles from London. The dichotomy between statements, as truth-bearers, and performatives, as action-performers, can no longer be maintained.

The other shift of the original view on performatives

The above leads to the cancellation of performative-constative dichotomy. I state that I am alone responsible.

A shift from the dichotomy performative/ constative to a general theory of speech acts.

Speech act theory

The second phase of Austins thinking on speech acts Statements, i.e. constatives, are merely one kind of speech act. Any statement, if only they are uttered in appropriate circumstances, may be regarded as implicit performatives. Metalinguistic performatives: I say John is a liar. John is a liar. To say something is to do something. (speakers intention)

Composition of a speech act

Austin concludes that in issuing an utterance a speaker can perform three acts simultaneously:
Locutionary act: the utterance of a sentence with specific sense and reference; Illocutionary act: the making of a statement, offer, promise, etc. in uttering a sentence, by virtue of the conventional force associated with it; Perlocutionary act: the bringing about of effects on the audience by means of uttering the sentence, such effects being special to the circumstances of utterance.

Locution
The act of verbally saying something To describe the noises he makes, the grammatical construction these noises are in, and their meaning. Sense and reference I promise to come to dinner. Im hungry.

Illocution
The intended act behind saying something The force with which the sentence is employed. Im making a promise. I want/request you to bring me some food.

Perlocution
The effect of an illocutionary act The certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons. To cheer you up. You go to get some food for me.

The locution of an utterance is actually its literal meaning. The illocution of an utterance is the speakers communicative intention or the function it is intended to perform. The perlocution of an utterance is the real effect achieved by the utterance.

Rethinking on the trichotomy

The trichotomy is not crystal-clear.

The locutionary/illocutionary distinction
I warn you theres a bull in that field. (the meaning of the locutionary act is the same as the illocutionary force) Explicit performatives

The illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction

IN SAYING X, HE DID Y. In saying I promise to come, he made a promise. (determinate) BY SAYING X, HE DID Y. By saying I promise to come, he cheered her up. (indeterminate)

I suggest you go abroad. (the perlocutionary effect of the verb is intentional, as opposed to accidental, which any sort of verb may have.)
The perlocution of an utterance can be as the same as the illocution when it is recognized and satisfied, or very different from it when it is not recognized or when it is ignored.

 The

interactional emphasis in Austins work has unfortunately been neglected in later work in speech act theory.

Classification of (illocutionary) speech acts

a. verdictives (point to the giving of a verdict, by a jury, arbitrator, or umpire, including also estimating, reckoning, appraising, etc.) b. exercitives (involve the exercising of powers, rights, or influence, i.e. appointing, voting, ordering, urging, advising, warning, etc.) c. commissives (are essentially acts of promising or other undertaking that commit one to doing something, including also declaring, announcing, etc.) d. behabitives (are characterized by the expression of attitudes and social behavior, covering apologizing, congratulating, commending, condoling, cursing, challenging, etc.) e. expositives (refer to those speech acts of expounding ones views, conducting arguments, clarifying usages and references, etc.)

Illocutionary force indicating devices (IFIDs)

Searles development of the illocutionary act theory

These are supposed to be elements, or aspects of linguistic devices which indicate that the utterance is made with a certain illocutionary force. In English, the interrogative mood is supposed to indicate that the utterance is (intended as) a question; the directive mood indicates that the utterance is (intended as) a directive illocutionary act (an order, a request, etc.); the words "I promise" are supposed to indicate that the utterance is (intended as) a promise. Possible IFIDs include: word order, stress, intonation contour, punctuation, the mood of the verb, and performative verbs.

Revision of felicity conditions

Felicity conditions are not only dimensions on which utterances can go wrong, but are actually jointly constitutive of the various illocutionary forces.

Revision of speech act classification

Revision of felicity conditions

Austins felicity conditions are confined to those for institutionally-based illocutions, while Searles is based on communicative intention in a general sense. A. general conditions
Interlocutors can understand the language being used and they are not play-acting or being nonsensical.

B. propositional content condition

The state of affairs portrayed in an utterance; e.g. an expressive that performs congratulation must point to a past act of the hearer.

Revision of felicity conditions

C. Preparatory conditions
Preconditions; e.g. for a directive statement to perform ordering, the speaker must have authority over the hearer and the hearer must recognize that authority.

D. sincerity condition
It relates to speakers state of mind; e.g. for a commissive statement to be taken as a promise, the speaker must intend to do X.

E. essential condition
The relevant intention of the speaker; The utterance must be recognizable as instance of particular illocutionary act.

A comparison of felicity conditions on request and warning

Conditions REQUEST
Propositional content Preparatory Future act A of H 1. S believes H can do A 2. It is not obvious that H would do A without being asked S wants H to do A

WARNING
Future event E 1. S thinks E will occur and is not in Hs interest 2. S thinks it is not obvious to H that E will occur S believes E is not in Hs best interest

Sincerity

Essential

Counts as an attempt to get H to do A

Counts as an undertaking that E is not in Hs best interest

Speech acts reclassified

Austins classification is made based on the taxonomy of performative verbs, which is theoretically problematic and practically vague; while Searle seeks some more abstract scheme based on felicity conditions. Searles criteria for the reclassification: Illocutionary point (having to do with the purpose or intention of the speaker; essential condition) Propositional content Psychological state expressed or propositional attitude towards the propositional content (sincerity condition) Direction of fit between the words and the world (whether the propositional content of uttered words for some acts like assertions matches the world, or the opposite)

Assertives:
I think the film is moving Im certain that he had got it.

I- B(p)
The illocutionary point: to commit the speaker to the truth of something. I- : assertives : direction of fit is words to world. B: the psychological state is belief. p: the propositional content

Directives:
I order you to leave the room. I beg you to give me some advice. ! W (H does A) The illocutionary point: to get the hearer to do something. ! : directive : direction of fit is world to words. W: the psychological state is want or wish. (H does A): the propositional content is that the hearer does some future action A.

Commissives:
I promise to come tomorrow.

C I (S does A)
The illocutionary point: to commit the speaker to some future action. C: commissives : direction of fit is world to words. I : the psychological state is intention. (S does A): the propositional content is that the speaker does some future action A.

Expressives:
I apologize for stepping on your toe.

E (P) (S/H + property)

The illocutionary point: to express the speakers psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content. E: expressive : presuppose an existent fit between words and world. P: the psychological state is a variable ranging over the different possible psychological states. (S/H + property): the propositional content ascribes some property to either S or H.

Declarations:
You are fired. I name this ship the Elizabeth. I declare the meeting open.

D (p)
The illocutionary point: to bring about immediate change in the existing state of affairs. D: declaration : the direction of fit is both words to the world and the world to words. (the saying of sth. Causes sth. to become reality) : no personal attitude is involved. No psychological state. p: the propositional content is a variable, depending on the illocutionary point.

Indirect speech act

Indirect speech act is another major contribution Searle made to the development of speech act theory. Indirect speech acts refer to those sentences that perform one illocutionary act indirectly by performing another.
Can you pass the salt, please? A question about the hearers ability to pass the salt (the literal illocutionary force, secondary illocutionary act) A request of him to pass the salt (the non-literal force, primary illocutionary act)

Two kinds of indirect speech acts

Conventional indirect speech acts are those which are customarily and standardly used to make indirect speech acts, for the speaker and the hearer may not be conscious of the literal illocutionary force in those illocutionary acts.
Could you be a little more quiet? N.B. this does not mean that the literal illocutionary force is eliminated. The appropriate context of situation will bring it about. Can you swim? (uttered at the side of a swimming pool) (uttered in a bedroom)

Two kinds of indirect speech acts

Non-conventional indirect speech acts are more complicated and indeterminable than the conventional ones in that they depend much more on the mutually shared background information and the context of situation. A: lets go to the movie tonight. B: I have to study for the exam.
Nonconventional indirect illocutionary acts may sometimes lead to the incongruence between the speakers intended illocutionary force and the hearers perceived or understood illocutionary force, and the reason is the lack of linguistic IFIDs. Its cold.

Questions raised

How does the hearer understand the conventional indirect speech act? Inferential model: CP short-circuited implicature conversational postulates Idiom model

It is suggested that in cases like this much is relied on the shared background information and the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer. The illocutionary acts will be predictable from general considerations of rationality and co-operative principle.

Searle proposes a program for the analysis of indirect speech act performances:
Step 1: Understand the facts of the conversation. Step 2: Assume cooperation and relevance on behalf of the participants. Step 3: Establish factual background information pertinent to the

conversation. Step 4: Make assumptions about the conversation based on steps 13. Step 5: If steps 14 do not yield a consequential meaning, then infer that there are two illocutionary forces at work. Step 6: Assume the hearer has the ability to perform the act the speaker suggests. The act that the speaker is asking be performed must be something that would make sense for one to ask. For example, the hearer might have the ability to pass the salt when asked to do so by a speaker who is at the same table, but not have the ability to pass the salt to a speaker who is asking the hearer to pass the salt during a telephone conversation. Step 7: Make inferences from steps 16 regarding possible primary illocutions. Step 8: Use background information to establish the primary illocution (Searle 184).

What is the common feature of conventional indirect speech acts? Felicity conditions

Can you pass me the salt? Will you call Lucy a taxi?

Questions raised

Why is an indirect speech act used?

Politeness

Questions raised

Are speech acts influenced by culture?

Culture-specific speech acts
(divorce in Muslim culture )

Different responses to the same speech act in different cultures

(compliment in English and Chinese cultures)

Different speech acts performed in the same situation

receiving a present in Japan(apology), America(appreciation) and China(blaming) Stepping on ones toes (apology vs. sympathy in west Africa) The focus is on the person to whom the bad thing has happened rather than the one who has caused the bad thing

Questions raised
Speech act and interlanguage How a particular type of speech act by nonnative speakers in a given interlanguage? What are the similarities and differences in the realization patterns of given speech acts between native and non-native speakers?