Sitchon vs.

Aquino (City Engr of Manila) Doctrine The duties vested in the district health officer in case of nuisances may be placed upon other officers as may be designated by special provision of law.

Facts There are 6 different suits in this petition. All of the petitioners occupied parcels of land without the consent of authority. They paid concession feeds or damages for the use of land with an agreement it shall be without prejudice to an order to vacate. The city engineer demanded petitioners to vacate the occupied streets. Unheeded, he threatened to demolish the houses. Petitioners contend that by virtue of arts. 700 and 702, the power to remove public nuisances is vested in the District Health Officer, not in the City Engineer.

General rule is that everyone is bound to bear the habitual or customary inconveniences that result from the proximity of others, and so long as this level is not surpassed, he may not complain against them. BUT if the prejudice exceeds the inconveniences that such proximity habitually brings, the neighbor who causes such disturbance is held responsible for the resulting damage, being guilty of causing nuisance. The test is whether the rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds. The determining factor, however, is not just intensity or volume. It must be of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities. A noise only becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of the reasonable adjustment to the conditions of he locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener. The noise brought Velasco annoyance and irritation affecting his sleep. Meralco was ordered either to transfer the facilities or reduce the produced sound to around.

Issue 1. 2. Held WON there a public nuisance WON the City Engineer have authority to cause the abatement of the nuisance Iloilo Ice vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo Doctrine City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination. Facts

1.

YES. This falls under art 694 (4) a nuisance the obstruction of free passage of any public highway or street. It is public because it affects a community or neighbourhood. The constructions in fact constitute nuisances per se, obstructing at all times the streets. As such, the summary removal of these may be authorized by statute or ordinance. Aquino, as City Engineer, is vested with authority to effect the abatement of the nuisances through demolition. By virtue of the Revised Charter of Manila, such duty, among others, was placed upon him. Arts. 700 and 702 must yield to this provision not only because it is later law but also because of the principle that special provisions prevail over general ones. Moreover, an ordinance authorized the action sought to be taken by respondent.

2.

Iloilo Ice owns an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby residents made complaints regarding the smoke that the plant emits saying that it was very injurious to their health and comfort. The municipal council made investigations and later on passed a resolution which demands that the smokestacks of the said factory be elevated or else the factory operations will be closed or suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing for injunction.

Issue WON the municipal council had the power to abate the nuisance. Held- NO (factory not nuisance per se) Nuisances per se Nuisance under all and any circumstances

Velasco vs. Meralco Doctrine Noise may constitute a nuisance but it must be of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities. FACTS:

Velasco bought 3 adjoining lots and sold 2 to Meralco and left one for himself as his residence. Meralco constructed a sub-station at a distance of 10-20 meters away from Velascos house. The sub-station was used to distribute electricity. Merlaco built a wall at the sides of the sub-station and a fence on the boundary with Velasco. An unceasing sound emanates from the substation, caused by transformers. Such, appellent contends, constitute a nuisance which has worsened his health condition and has lowered the value of his property. Several witnesses came forth but their testimonies were vague and imprecise. Resort was made to a sound level meter. The audible sound from different areas in Velasos property was measured in terms of decibels. It was found that the sound exceeded the average intensity levels of residences. The sound exceeded about 28-32 decibels more than average.

Can be abated by private individuals Those which affect health, or interfere with the safety of property or person or are tangible obstructions to streets and highways under circumstances presenting as emergency

Nuisances per accidens Nuisances only because of the special circumstances and conditions surrounding them Needs a determination of the facts which is a judicial function

Issue WON noise is an actionable nuisance. Held- YES

If no compelling necessity requires the summary abatement of a nuisance, the municipal authorities under their power to declare and abate nuisances, dont have the right to compel the abatement of a particular thing or act as a nuisance without reasonable notice to the person alleged to be maintaining or doing the same of the time and place of hearing before a tribunal authority to decide whether the thing is a nuisance or not. The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the established courts of law or equity alone, and that the resolution of officers, or of boards organized by force of municipal charters, cannot, to any degree, control such decision.

City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination. In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry, beneficial to the people and conducive to their health and comfort. The resolution by the municipal council is obviously not enough to abate the property of the plaintiff.

Held- YES Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property or anything else which: hinders or impairs the use of the property. Article 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be equal. Article 699 provides for the following remedies against public nuisance: 1. A prosecution under the penal code or any local ordinance 2. civil action 3. abatement without judicial proceedings In the present case, the municipality chose to file a civil action for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the private respondents. Under the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an ordinance before the municipality may summarily abate a public nuisance. However, private respondents have a pending cadastral case in another RTC over the same land. The issuance of the writ of possession and demolition issued by the trial court judge was premature. o Considering the facts in the complaint is true then the writ of possession and writ of demolition would have been justified. A writ of demolition would have been sufficient to eject the private respondent. o In the event Medina is declared owner, they will be entitled to just compensation. Otherwise, they would not be entitled to compensation. Subido vs. Ozaeta Doctrine Facts Petitioner was the editor of the Manila Post, who sought the inspection of real estates sold to aliens and registered with the RD. He was denied to do so which prompted him to file a petition for mandamus. Issue WON petitioner is allowed to have a copy of the list of lands sold to aliens. Held- YES

Hidalgo vs. Balandan Fasts Petitioner is the owner of an ice plant, who had 2 tanks filled with water (9 ft deep). The ice plant was gated but people could go easily in without being noticed. The 8 year old son of respondents went inside the plant and played and swam inside the tank. The boy drowned inside the tank. Respondents are claiming for damages against petitioner saying that petitioner is liable for damages due to the doctrine of attractive nuisance. Issue WON the tank is an attractive nuisance. Held- NO The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that one who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. Reason- There is always the danger of drowning in lurking in water. Children are early instructed that it is dangerous thus they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger. In the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall under such doctrine thus the petitioners cannot be held liable for Marios death. Tamin, municipality of Dumingag zamboanga del sur vs. CA, Medina, Rosellon Doctrine

Facts Petitioner municipality represented by its mayor Real filed in the RTC a complaint for the ejectment of respondents. It is alleged that the municipality owns a parcel of residential land located in Zamboanga del Sur and the said parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under PD 365 and that the municipality leased the area to the defendants subject to the condition that they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes and the defendants paid the rentals religiously until 1967. They refused to vacate the said land despite the efforts of the government since money is allocated for the construction of a municipal gymnasium within the public plaza and such construction could not continue because of the presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants.

Sec. 56 of Act No. 486 as amended by Act No. 3300 states that all records relating to registered lands in the office of the register of deeds shall be open to the public subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by the chief of the general land registration office with the approval od the secretary of justice Public is a comprehensive all conclusive term. To say that only those who have a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character in the particular information sought are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction. Except when it is clear that the purpose of the inspection is unlawful, it is not the duty of the registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, purposes, and objects of the person seeking to inspect the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before the public gaze. Newspapers publish information for the benefit of the people. The people have the right to know the status of real estate in the country.

Issue WON the municipality has a cause of action for the abatement of public nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code.

Lyceum vs. CA, other schools with Lyceum Doctrine Facts Petitioner instituted before the SEC to compel private respondents, which are also educational institutions, to delete word Lyceum from their corporate names and permanently to enjoin them from using such as part of their respective names. The hearing officer that the word Lyceum was capable of appropriation and that petitioner had acquired an enforceable right to the use of that word. In an appeal, the decision was reversed by the SEC En Banc. They held that the word Lyceum to have become identified with petitioner as to render use thereof of other institutions as productive of confusion about the identity of the schools concerned in the mind of the general public. Petitioner went to appeal with the CA but the latter just affirmed the decision of the SEC En Banc.

Fredco Manufacturing vs. Harvard Doctrine Facts New York Garments, Fredcos predecessor-in-interest, registered the trademark Harvard under class 25. Fredco Manufacturing Corporation (Fredco) filed before the Bureau of Legal Affairs of the Philippine Intellectual Property Office a Petition for Cancellation of Registration No. 56561 issued to President and Fellows of Harvard College (Harvard University) for the mark Harvard Veritas Shield Symbol under classes 16, 18, 21, 25 and 28. Fredco claimed that Harvard University had no right to register the mark in class 25, since its Philippine registration was based on a foreign registration. Thus, Harvard University could not have been considered as a prior adopter and user of the mark in the Philippines. Fredco explained that the mark was first used in the Philippines by its predecessor-in-interest New York Garments as early as 1982, and a certificate of registration was issued in 1988 for goods under class 25. Although the registration was cancelled for the non-filing of an affidavit of use, the fact remained that the registration preceded Harvard Universitys use of the subject mark in the Philippines. Harvard University, on the other hand claimed that the name and mark Harvard was adopted in 1639 as the name of Harvard College of Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. The marks Harvard and Harvard Veritas Shield Symbol, had been used in commerce since 1872, and was registered in more than 50 countries. The Bureau of Legal Affairs ruled in favor of Fredco and ordered the cancellation of Registration No. 56561. It found Fredco to be the prior user and adopter of the mark Harvard in the Philippines. On appeal, the Office of the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office reversed the BLA ruling on the ground that more than the use of the trademark in the Philippines, the applicant must be the owner of the mark sought to be registered. Fredco, not being the owner of the mark, had no right to register it. The Court Appeals affirmed the decision of the Office of the Director General. Fredco appealed the decision with the Supreme Court. In its appeal, Fredco insisted that the date of actual use in the Philippines should prevail on the issue of who had a better right to the mark.

Issue WON Lyceum is entitled to a legally enforceable exclusive right to use the word Lyceum in its corporate name. Held- NO Petitioner claims that the word has acquired a secondary meaning in relation to petitioner with the result that the word, although originally generic, has become appropriable by petitioner to the exclusion of other institutions. The doctrine of secondary meaning is a principle used in trademark law but has been extended to corporate names since the right to use a corporate name to the exclusion of others is based upon the same principle, which underlies the right to use a particular trademark or trade name. o Under this doctrine, a word or phrase originally incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article in the market, because geographical or otherwise descriptive might nevertheless have been used for so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to this article that, in that trade and to that group of purchasing public, the word or phrase has come to mean that the article was his produce. o The doctrine cannot be made to apply where the evidence didn't prove that the business has continued for so long a time that it has become of consequence and acquired good will of considerable value such that its articles and produce have acquired a well known reputation, and confusion will result by the use of the disputed name. Petitioner didn't present evidence, which provided that the word Lyceum acquired secondary meaning. The petitioner failed to adduce evidence that it had exclusive use of the word. Even if petitioner used the word for a long period of time, it hadnt acquired any secondary meaning in its favor because the appellant failed to prove that it had been using the same word all by itself to the exclusion of others. Doctrine of secondary meaning can be extended to corporation name but must comply with the requirement that it has been used so long and so exclusively by one and that the said name has come to mean that it is referred to as that corporation.

Issue Who has right over the trademark Harvard? Held- Harvard University Sec. 37 RA 166- where a trademark has already been registered in a foreign country that is a member of the Paris Convention, the requirement of proof of use in the commerce in the Philippines for the said period in not necessary. o Sec 20 it must have been used in commerce less than two months in the Philippines prior to filing of the application for its registration except those that fall under sec 37 At the time of filing of the cancellation before the BLA of the IPO, Fredcos registration was already cancelled when it failed to file the required affidavit of use/non-use for the 5th anniversary of the marks registration. Fredcos petition must fail: o It falsely suggests that they are connected with Harvard University (violation of sec 4 RA 166). Fredcos garments are not from the US and not established in 1936. It sought to connect to the prestige and good will of the university, o Both the US and the Philippines are signatories to the Paris Convention wherein

the Philippines is obligated to assure nationals of the countries of the convention that they are afforded an effective protection against violation of their intellectual property rights in the Phils in the same way that their own countries are obligation to accord similar protection to the Phil nationals. Harvard is entitled to protection even without registration in the philippines Directive of ministry of trade o To reject all pending application for the Philippine registration of signature and other world famous trademarks by applicants other than their original owners To be protected it must be a well know mark RA 8293 Sec 123.1 (e)- a mark which is considered by the competent authority of the phillipines to be well known internationally and in the Philippines, whether ot not it is registered here cannot be registered by another in the Philippines. Rule 102- criteria to be considered a well known mark Harvard University has been using Harvard since 1638. It is a well known mark of the school and its good will is known worldwide in more that 50 countries including the Philippines. It is one of the leading educational institutions in the world.

discrimination. Standard Philips only contains one word, Standard, different from that of PEBV. The 2 companies products are also the same, or cover the same line of products. Although PEBV primarily deals with electrical products, it has also shipped to its subsidiaries machines and parts which fall under the classification of chains, rollers, belts, bearings and cutting saw, the goods which Standard Philips also produce. Also, among Standard Philips primary purposes are to buy, sell trade x x x electrical wiring devices, electrical component, electrical supplies. Given these, there is nothing to prevent Standard Philips from dealing in the same line of business of electrical devices. The use of Philips by Standard Philips tends to show its intention to ride on the popularity and established goodwill of PEBV.

Fruit of the Loom vs. Ca, General Garment Corp Doctrine

Philips Export vs. CA, SEC, Standard Philips Corp Doctrine A corporations right to use its corporate and trade name is a property right, a right in rem, which it may assert and protect against the whole world. Facts

Facts

Philips Export B.V. (PEBV) filed with the SEC for the cancellation of the word Philips the corporate name of Standard Philips Corporation in view of its prior registration with the Bureau of Patents and the SEC. However, Standard Philips refused to amend its Articles of Incorporation. PEBV filed with the SEC a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, however this was denied ruling that it can only be done when the corporate names are identical and they have at least 2 words different. This was affirmed by the SEC en banc and the Court of Appeals thus the case at bar.

Issue Whether or not Standard Philips can be enjoined from using Philips in its corporate name Held- YES A corporations right to use its corporate and trade name is a property right, a right in rem, which it may assert and protect against the whole world. According to Sec. 18 of the Corporation Code, no corporate name may be allowed if the proposed name is identical or deceptively confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or to any other name already protected by law or is patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law. For the prohibition to apply, 2 requisites must be present: o (1) the complainant corporation must have acquired a prior right over the use of such corporate name and PEBV adopted the name Philips part of its name 26 years before Standard Philips o (2) the proposed name is either identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or to any other name already protected by law or patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing law the test for the existence of confusing similarity is whether the similarity is such as to mislead a person using ordinary care and

Petitioner is a corporation in the USA and registered the trade mark fruit of the loom in the Philippine patent office. Private respondent is a Philippine corporation and registrant of the trade make fruit for eve. Botha re in the business of garments. Petitioner filed a complaint for infringement of trademark and unfair competition against private respondent alleging that: o Private respondents trade mark is confusingly similar to theirs o That the hang tags used by private respondents is a colorable imitation of those of the petitioner Private respondent alleged that there was no confusing similarity between the trademarks At the pre-trial, the following admissions were made: a. That the registered trademark Fruit for Eve bears the notice Reg. Phil. Pat. Off. while that of Fruit of the Loom does not. b. That at the time of its registration, the plaintiff filed no opposition thereto. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, permanently enjoining private respondent from using the trademark Fruit for Eve. Both parties appealed to the former Court of Appeals: a. Petitioner questioned the lower courts failure to award damages in its favor. b. Private respondent sought the reversal of the lower courts decision. The former Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the lower courts decision and dismissing the petitioners complaint. The petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issue WON the private respondents trademarks fruit for eve and its hang tag are confusing similar to petitioners trade mark fruit of the loom and its hang tag so as to constitute an infringement of the latters trademark rights and justify the cancellation of the former. Held- NO There is infringement of trademark when the use of the mark involved would be likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the public or to deceive purchasers as to the origin or source of the commodity. The discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the predominant words but also on the other features appearing in both labels in order that he may draw his conclusion where one is confusingly similar to the other. The similarities of the competing trademarks in this case are completely lost in the substantial differences in the design and general appearance of their respective hang tags.

We have examined the two trademarks as they appear in the hang tags submitted by the parties and We are impressed more by the dissimilarities than by the similarities appearing therein. We hold that the trademarks Fruit of the Loom and Fruit for Eve do not resemble each other as to confuse or deceive an ordinary purchaser. The ordinary purchaser must be thought of as having, and credited with, at least a modicum of intelligence to be able to see the obvious differences between the two trademarks in question. Fruit of the loom Fruit for eve Hang tag is round with a base that looks like a per rolled few inches in both ends Trademark is a written in almost a semi circle; has apple and grape in the center of tag; apple is dark red Color brown Hang tag is plain rectangle Straight line; apple in the center of tag; apple light red pink

Issue WON there was infringement of trademark and unfair competition. Held- YES Section 22 of R.A. No. 166, otherwise known as the Trademark Law, provides: Any person who shall use, without the consent of the registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of any registered mark or tradename in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods, business or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as to the source or origin of such goods or services or identity of such business... Sec. 29 of the same law states as follows:Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having established such goodwill... To arrive at a proper resolution of this case, it is important to bear in mind the following distinctions between infringement of trademark and unfair competition. Infringement of trademark sec 22 Unfair competition sec 29 unauthorized use of a trademark the passing off of one's goods as those of another fraudulent intent is unnecessary fraudulent intent is essential prior registration of the trademark is a registration is not necessary prerequisite to the action In determining whether two trademarks are confusingly similar, the two marks in their entirety as they appear in the respective labels must be considered in relation to the goods to which they are attached; the discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the predominant words but also on the other features appearing on both labels. The ordinary buyer does not usually make such scrutiny nor does he usually have the time to do so. The question is NOT whether the two articles are distinguishable by their label when set side by side but whether the general confusion made by the article upon the eye of the casual purchaser who is unsuspicious and off his guard, is such as to likely result in his confounding it with the original. The court therefore should be guided by its first impression because the imitator will always try to create enough differences to confuse the Court but enough similarity to confuse the public. Here, although there are particular differences, such are only manifest when you conduct a thorough comparison. We also note that the respondent court failed to take into consideration several factors which should have affected its conclusion, to wit: age, training and education of the usual purchaser, the nature and cost of the article, whether the article is bought for immediate consumption and also the conditions under which it is usually purchased. It has been aptly observed that the ultimate ratio in cases of grave doubt is the rule that any doubt should be resolved against the newcomer inasmuch as the field from which he can select a desirable trademark to indicate the origin of his product is obviously a large one. As Sunshine's label is an infringement of the Del Monte's trademark, law and equity call for the cancellation of the private respondent's registration and withdrawal of all its products bearing the questioned label from the market. With regard to the use of Del Monte's bottle, the same constitutes unfair competition; hence, the respondent should be permanently enjoined from the use of such bottles.

Del Monte , Phil packing corp. vs. CA, Sunshine sauce Doctrine In making the comparison to determine similarity, the question is NOT whether the two articles are distinguishable by their label when set side by side but whether the general confusion made by the article upon the eye of the casual purchaser who is unsuspicious and off his guard, is such as to likely result in his confounding it with the original. The court therefore should be guided by its first impression because the imitator will always try to create enough differences to confuse the Court but enough similarity to confuse the public. Facts Petitioner Del Monte Corporation is a foreign company organized under the laws of the United States and not engaged in business in the Philippines. Both the Philippines and the United States are signatories to the Convention of Paris of September 27, 1965, which grants to the nationals of the parties rights and advantages which their own nationals enjoy for the repression of acts of infringement and unfair competition. Petitioner Philippine Packing Corporation (Philpack) is a domestic corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines. Del Monte granted Philpack the right to manufacture, distribute and sell in the Philippines various agricultural products, including catsup, under the Del Monte trademark and logo. Del Monte authorized Philpack to register with the Philippine Patent Office the Del Monte catsup bottle configuration, for which it was granted Certificate of Trademark Registration No. SR-913 by the Philippine Patent Office under the Supplemental Register. Del Monte also obtained two registration certificates for its trademark "DEL MONTE" and its logo. Respondent Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing Industries was issued a Certificate of Registration by the Bureau of Domestic Trade to engage in the manufacture, packing, distribution and sale of various kinds of sauce, identified by the logo Sunshine Fruit Catsup. The product itself was contained in various kinds of bottles, including the Del Monte bottle, which the private respondent bought from the junk shops for recycling. Having received reports that the private respondent was using its exclusively designed bottles and a logo confusingly similar to Del Monte's, Philpack and Del Monte filed a complaint against the private respondent for infringement of trademark and unfair competition. Sunshine alleged that its logo was substantially different from the Del Monte logo and would not confuse the buying public to the detriment of the petitioners.

Asia Brewery Inc vs. CA, San Miguel Corp Doctrine Nobody can acquire any exclusive right to market articles supplying the simple human needs in containers or wrappers of the general form, size and character commonly and immediately used in marketing such articles.

Facts San Miguel Corp. (SMC) filed a complaint against Asia Brewery Inc. (ABI) for infringement of trademark and unfair competition regarding SMCs BEER PLASE PILSEN and ABIs BEER NA NEE. RTC dismissed the complaint finding that ABI has not committed trademark infringement or unfair competition. The CA reversed the decision finding that ABI is guilty of trademark infringement and unfair competition thus the case at bar.

enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods. The scope of a copyright is confined to literary and artistic works which are original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain. Patentable inventions refer to any technical solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an inventive step and is industrially applicable. Facts

ISSUE: Whether or not ABI infringes SMCs trademark and as such constitutes unfair competition HELD: NO Infringement is determined by a test of dominancy. If the competing trademark contains the main or essential or dominant features of another and confusion and deception is likely to result, infringement takes place. A closer look at the trademark of both companies will show that the dominant features of each absolutely bear no similarity to each other. SMCs dominant trademark is the name of the product, San Miguel Pale Pilsen written in white Gothic letters with elaborate serifs at the beginning and end of the letters S and M on an amber background while ABIs is the name Beer Pale Pilsen with the word Beer written in large amber letters, larger than any of the letter found in SMC label. The word pale pilsen on ABIs trademark does not constitute trademark infringement for it is a generic word descriptive of the color of a type of beer. No one may appropriate generic or descriptive words for they belong to the public domain. ABI is likewise not guilty of unfair competition for unfair competition is the employment of deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which a person shall pass off the goods manufactured by him for those of another who has already established goodwill for his similar goods. The universal test for this is whether the public is likely to be deceived. Actual or probable deception and confusion on the part of the customers by reason of defendants practices must appear. However, this is unlikely to happen in the case at bar for consumers generally order beer by brand. Also, the fact that ABI also uses amber-colored steinie bottles cannot constitute unfair competition for ABI did not copy SMCs bottle. SMC did not invent but merely borrowed the steinie bottle from abroad. Likewise, amber is the most effective color in preventing transmission of light thus providing maximum protection to beer. 320 ml is likewise the standard prescribed under Metrication Circular No. 778. The fact that it is the first to use the steinie bottle does not give SMC a vested right to use it to the exclusion of everyone else. Nobody can acquire any exclusive right to market articles supplying the simple human needs in containers or wrappers of the general form, size and character commonly and immediately used in marketing such articles. There is no confusing similarity between the competing beers therefore ABI neither infringed SMCs trademark nor did it commit unfair competition. Dissenting Opinion of J. Cruz:Side-by-side comparison is not the final test of similarity because average buyers do not make minute scrutiny of label details. The average shopper is usually in a hurry and does not inspect every product on the shelf is if he were browsing in a library. Pearl & Dean (Phil) vs. SM, NEMI Doctrine Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that cannot be interchanged with one another. A trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods or services of an

Pearl and Dean is a corporation in the manufacture of advertising display units also known as light boxes, which were manufactured by Metro Industrial Services. A copyright Registration was obtained in 1981. These were marketed in the name of "Poster Ads". They also applied for a registration of trademark with the Bureau of Patents in 1983, but was only approved in 1988. In 1985, petitioner had an agreement with respondent Shoemart Inc (SMI) to install these light boxes in their Makati and Cubao branch, Only the Makati branch was able to sigh the agreement. In 1986, the contract was rescinded unilaterally by SMI, and instead contracted with Metro Industrial Services. They installed these lightboxes in different SM city branches, including Cubao and Makati, with association with North Edsa Marketing Inc (NEMI), SMI's sister company. Petitioner requested SMI and NEMI to put down their installations of the light boxes, and payment of compensatory damages worth P20M. Claiming that respondents failed to comply, they filed a case for infringement of trademark and copyright, unfair competition and damages. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but CA reversed.

ISSUES: 1. Whether there was a copyright infringement 2.Whether there was a patent infringement3. Whether there was a trademark infringement 4. Whether there was unfair competition Held- NO 1. Copyright is a statutory right, subject to the terms and conditions specified in the statute. Therefore, it can only cover the works falling within the statutory enumeration or description. Since the copyright was classified under class "O" works, which includes "prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags and box wraps," and does not include the light box itself. A lightbox, even admitted by the president of petitioner company, was neither a literary nor an artistic work but an engineering or marketing invention, thus not included under a copyright. Copyright fot he technical drawing. Book of medicine- copyright but the medicine itself must be patented. 2. Petitioner was not able to secure a patent for its lightboxes, and cannot legally prevent anyone from manufacturing or commercially using the same. Patent has a three-fold purpose: a) to foster and reward invention; b) promotes disclosures of invention and permit public to use the same upon expiration; c) stringent requirements for patent protection to ensure in the public domain remain there for free use of the public. Since petitioner was not able to go through such examination, it cannot exclude others from manufacturing, or selling such lightboxes. No patent, no protection. 3. The certificate of registration issued by the Director of Patents gives exclusive right to use its own symbol only to the description specified in the certificate. It cannot prevent others to use the same trademark with a different description. Good referred to were only stationaries such as letterheads, envelopes, calling card and newsletters. 4. No unfair competition in copy right only in trademark. "Poster Ads" is a general term that cannot be associated specifically to Pearl and Dean, thus it cannot be considered to use such term to be unfair competition against the petitioner. Doctrine of second meaning not applicable- a word or phrase originally incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article in the market, because geographical or otherwise descriptive might nevertheless have been used for so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to this article that, in that trade and to that group of purchasing public, the word or phrase has come to mean that the article was his produce.