Randomness and God (2013)

Steven Dillon
I. Introduction This argument is based on the work of philosopher Klaas Kraay. [1] While it may not (directly) argue against Gods existence, in concluding that all of Gods actions would be random, it spells disaster for Theism. Could we reasonably say that God intentionally designed the constants, initial conditions or laws of nature for life? Not if all of his actions were random. Could God have intentionally caused the universe to exist? I mean, could he really explainanything at all? No. Thus, we couldnt say that God has any morally sufficient reason to permit evil and it goes without saying that Gods deliberate raising of Jesus from the dead would be off limits too. Belief in God would effectively become bankrupt of any evidential support whatsoever. There'd be no good arguments for God's existence, not from cosmology, not from religious experience, not from anywhere. Any floodgates restraining the problems of evil or hiddenness would burst, and Naturalism would gain decisive explanatory advantage over...everything. This is one of those arguments that could be a real game changer. By God I shall mean that individual which would be metaphysically necessary, omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect if it existed. II. The Argument

1. If there is no single best possible world, then God could not have a sufficient reason to actualize any possible world. 2. If God could not have a sufficient reason to actualize any possible world, then God would select which possible world to actualize randomly. 3. If God would select which possible world to actualize randomly, then all of Gods actions would be random. 4. There is no single best possible world. 5. Therefore, all of Gods actions would be random.

This argument is deductively valid, meaning if its four premises are true, its conclusion has to be true. But, are its premises true? Lets investigate them one by one. Premise (1): If there is no single best possible world, then God could not have a sufficient reason to actualize any possible world. Suppose that there is no single best possible world. It follows that there is either more than one best world or none at all. In either case, God would lack any reason which would suffice to explain why he selects any possible world for actualization. If there is more than one best possible world, they would have to differ from one another in trivial ways: if they didnt differ at all, theyd be the same, and if they didnt differ trivially they wouldnt equally be best. On this scenario, whatever reason God had for selecting best possible world W1, hed have just as good reason for selecting W2 (since they only differ trivially). In other words, his decision would inevitably be arbitrary. On the other hand, if there are no best possible worlds whatsoever, then there is an endless hierarchy of increasingly better worlds. Here, whatever reason God had for selecting a possible world, hed have even better reason for selecting a different one and therefore lack any reason sufficient to explain why he didnt select a world that he had better reason to select. And yet, God must make some possible world actual. Hed do so even if he chose to do nothing at all, for hed thereby make the world in which he does nothing actual. Premise (2): If God could not have a sufficient reason to actualize any possible world, then God would select which possible world to actualize randomly. Given that God could not have a sufficient reason to actualize any possible world and that hed have to actualize some possible world, it follows that hed have to do the actualization randomly. This is because God would not be irrational if he existed, and doing something that you have no sufficient reason to do is irrational unless it is done randomly. Premise (3): If God would select which possible world to actualize randomly, then all of Gods actions would be random. God would actualize a possible world whenever he performed an action, namely the world in which he performs that action. So, if he selects worlds randomly, his actions must be random as well. Otherwise, wed be faced with the most ridiculous of coincidences in

which the actions God intends to perform magically correspond with the actions God actually performs even though what God actually does is random! It'd be like rolling a handful of fair dice over and over again, and somehow getting exactly what you intended to roll every time: we want to infer that the rolls werent really random to avoid the dissonance. Premise (4): There is no single best possible world. If there was only one best possible world, and God existed, then God would make it the actual world: its axiological properties (such as beauty, happiness, peace or knowledge etc.) would either irresistibly woo him, or give him overwhelming reason to make it actual. But, clearly, the actual world isnt the best possible world (just think of all the improvements it could have, like eliminating cancer!). It would thereby follow that God didnt exist. For these and other reasons, its fairly standard among theists nowadays to accept that there is no single best possible world. III. Conclusion As I hope to have shown, these premises dont sound very implausible at all. Perhaps there is some reasonable rejoinder that provides an escape, but Im not privy to it. Given this plausiblealbeit briefargumentation, Ill tentatively conclude that this argument is sound and therefore that Gods actions would be random. It seems rather polite to say that this result makes it considerably more difficult to find belief in Gods existence rational. Is it even coherent to say that God is morally perfect but that all of his actions are random? I doubt it. But, even if it is, surely it's contradictory to say that the God of the Abrahamic faiths exists but that all of his actions are random. Thus, while a very bareand bizarreTheism might survive this conclusion, the great monotheistic faiths wouldn't. Notes: [1]: Kraay, Klaas J. "Can God Choose a World At Random ?" (2008). Philosophy Publications and Research. Paper 3.