1 ART 838 1) TESTATE ESTATE OF PILAPIL : FACTS: Father Eleuterio Pilapil was a parish priest in Muaboal, Cebu.

bu. He died in 1935. In the absence of a will, after his death, his brother Calixto filed a case for intestacy. After complying with the requisite publication and notices , the court heard the case and the estate was declared intestate. On March 4, 1939, just a few days after, a case was filed by Adrian Mendoza, a niece of the testator, for the probate of the last will and testament of Fr. Pilapil. In the said will, Mendoza was appointed administrator of the estate. In case, he would fail or be negligent, it was stipulated that he will be replaced by another niece of the testator, Jose Cabatingan. The probate of said will was opposed by the Pilapil and others, appellants to this case. The grounds on which they rely their opposition include the following: the documents contain erasures and alterations; it was not been proven that the decedent possessed knowledge of the Spanish language in which the documents were written; the provision that prohibits the probation of the will in the courts; that both documents had been prepared, signed and witnessed in accordance with the provisions of Article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is the presumption that the evidence raised at the trial court had already been appreciated. The testators knowledge of the language in which the will is written is presumed because he was a priest and while at the seminary, he must have learned not only Spanish but English as well. The disposition of the testator that his "last will and testament not be heard by the court" can not strip courts of their authority to determine whether the will is valid or not. The law requires, under penalty, that wills made by a testator should be delivered to the COurt, after the person dies, by the person to whom custody has been entrusted, so that the court can determine whether the will is valid and at the same time determine the disposition of the testator to dispose of their property as instructed on the same if the contract be declared that the testator died intestate, the will not being capable of legalization. In the probation of a will, some defects in the will and testament should not be allowed to obstruct the legal formalities x x x in consideration of wills and to frustrate the wishes of the dead solemnly expressed in their wills, as to the granting of which there is not even a shadow of bad faith or fraud.

NOTE: The important issue here is that whatever defects there are in the last will and testament of the testator, as long as there is substantial compliance of the basic requirements of the law, the same should be given effect in the absence of fraud. It can be gleaned in the poorly translated original text, that the testator has given instructions as to how his property should be disposed of. This could not be given effect unless the court has passed upon its validity in probate proceedings because of the provisions of ARTicle 838. When we took up ART 805, this case was also assigned to us. The issue there was that even if the attestation clause did not mention the numbe of pages in the will, it was still valid because this fact was mentioned in the body of the will. The important requirements of mentioning the

ISSUE: WON the will was valid ? HELD: The issue about erasures and alterations should have been raised at the trail court.

2 number of pages and the way it was supposed to be paged are found the will itself. 2) In re Estate of the deceased Gregorio Tolentino. ADELAIDA TOLENTINO, petitionerappellee, vs. NATALIA FRANCISCO, ET AL., oppositorsappellants. FACTS: Gregorio Tolentino, who had been married to Benita Francisco but predeceased him years ago, died at the age of 66 at the hand of the assassin. The pair had no children, and the generous instincts of Gregorio prompted him to gather around him in his comfortable and commodious home a number of his wife's kin. At one time Tolentino contemplated leaving his property mainly to the kin of his wife, the herein appellants. However, strained relations, resulting from grave disagreements, developed between Tolentino and the Francisco relations and he determined to make a new will in which, apart from certain legacies in favor of a few individuals, the bulk of his estate, worth probably about P150,000, should be given to Adelaida Tolentino de Concepcion, as his universal heir. To this end, Tolentino went to the office of Atty. Repide and informed him that he wanted to make a new will and desired Repide to draft it for him. After the necessary preliminary inquiries had been made, the attorney suggested to Tolentino to return later, bringing a copy of the will previously made of which Tolentino complied. Tolentino stated that he wanted the will to be signed in Repide's office, with Repide himself as one of the attesting witnesses and the two attorneys attached to the office as the other two witnesses but they were substituted by the names of Jose Syyap, Agustin Vergel de Dios, and Vicente Legarda. Adelaida Tolentino de Concepcion filed a petition for the probate of the will of Gregorio Tolentino. In the inception of the proceedings Eugene de Mitkiewicz was appointed special coadministrator, and he joined as coplaintiff in the petition. Opposition was made by the Franciscos, all cousins of the deceased. The trial court declared the will to have been properly executed, and allowed the probate thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the probate is proper. 3) ANTILANO G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO SANTOS, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondents. ROSARIO BASA DE LEON, ET AL., intervenors. FACTS: The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa which was admitted by the probate court. Almost three years later, the five intervenors moved ex parte to reopen the proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the court to probate the will and to close the proceedings Intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed a complaint against the petitioner for falsification or forgery of the will. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case claiming that the will alleged to have been forged had already been probated and, further, that the order probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution thereof. He further contends (1) that the probate of the will of his deceased wife is a bar to his criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will; and, (2) that he has been denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial. ISSUE: Whether or not the probate of a will bars criminal prosecution of the alleged forger of the probate will. HELD: When a will is contested it is the duty of the proponent to call all of the attesting witnesses, if available but the validity of the will in no wise depends upon the united support of the will by all of those witnesses. A will may be admitted to probate notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the subscribing witnesses do not unite with the other, or others, in proving all the facts upon which the validity of the will rests. (Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil., 380.) It is sufficient if the court is satisfied from all the proof that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law. In this case we feel well assured that the contested will was properly executed and the order admitting to it probate was entirely proper.

3 HELD: We hold, therefore, that in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of our Code of Civil Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction. SEC. 306. Effect of judgment. The effect of a judgment or final order in an action or special proceeding before a court or judge of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, or of any State or Territory of the United States, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows. Ernesto Guevara was appointed executor without bond. The testator executed a deed of sale in favor of Ernesto Guevara, conveying to the latter the southern half of the 259-hectare lot and expressly recognized Ernesto Guevara as owner of the northern half. Rosario Guevara, claiming to be a recognized natural child of the deceased Victorino, and on the assumption that he had died intestate, brought suit against Ernesto Guevara to recover 423,492 square meters of the tract covered by certificate of title No. 51691 as the portion that should correspond to her by way of legitime. Rosario Guevara then commenced a special proceedings for the probate of the will of Victorino Guevara. Ernesto Guevara appeared and opposed the probate while Pedro L. Quinto, counsel for Rosario in the former litigation, was allowed to intervene in view of his duly recorded attorneys lien.

1.

In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or relation of the person Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate.

ISSUE: Is the petition for probate of the alleged will of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara barred by the statute of limitations?

SEC. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution . SEC. 333. Conclusive Presumptions. The following presumptions or deductions, which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts, are deemed conclusive. 4) PASCUAL COSO v FERMINA FERNANDEZ DEZA (bisan unsaon nako pangita lain man mogawaskamo daw tryGR No. L- 16763, Dec 22, 1921)

HELD: The Statute of Limitations upon which the court below has relied, sections 38 to 50 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, Act 190, undertakes to fix limits for the filing of civil actions, but none for special proceedings of which probate is admittedly one. Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court: first, because the law expressly provides that no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with and substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to effectuate the testators right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees.

5) ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, Petitioner, vs. ROSARIO GUEVARA and PEDRO C. QUINTO,Respondents. FACTS: Victorino L. Guevara executed a will distributing assorted movables and a residential lot among his children and stepchildren.

6) LEONIDA CORONADO, FELIX BUENO, MELANIA RETIZOS, BERNARDINO BUENASEDA and JOVITA MONTEFALCON , Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and JUANA BUENO ALBOVIAS, Respondents.

4 FACTS: The property subject of this case is a parcel of land situated in Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing 277 square meters. Said parcel of land is being contested by Juana Albovias, herein private respondent, on the one hand, and Leonida-Coronado, Felix Bueno, Melania Retizos, Bernardino Buenseda and Jovita Montefalcon, herein petitioners, on the other hand. Juana Albovias claims that the property in question is a portion of a bigger lot referred to as Parcel G in the last will and testament executed in 1918 by Melecio Artiaga, grandfather of JUANA and that the bigger lot was inherited under that will by JUANA and others. She further claims that her property was included together with the two parcels of land owned by Dalmacio Monterola, which were sold by Monterola's successor-in-interest Leonida Coronado to Melania Retizos who in turn sold the lots, including that one being claimed by JUANA, to the spouse Bernardino Buenaseda and Jovita Montefalcon, now the present possessors thereof. Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners claim that the property in question was bequeathed to Leonida Coronado under a Will executed by Dr. Dalmacio Monterola, who was allegedly in possession thereof even before the outbreak of World War II. Said will was probated but was opposed by Juana together with her husband. As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in question, JUANA filed an action for quieting of title, declaratory relief and damages against CORONADO. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of JUANA. In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is entitled to legitime from Melecio Artiaga. The truth of the matter is that the record is bereft of any showing that Leonida Coronado and the late Melecio Artiaga were related to each other.

7) OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. CA ,PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondents. FACTS; Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his will alleging that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. The Court is convinced that Dr. De Santos is of sound and disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace and undue influence or fraud, and that he signed his Last Will and Testament on his own free and voluntary will. The will was signed in the presence of 3 witnesses who in turn signed in the presence of the testator and of each other and was duly notarized before a notary public. Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996. Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos. HELD:

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer for ownership was ineffectual since the will was never probated.

HELD: While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned will, however, may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time said document was executed by Melecio Artiaga in 1918. The said article read as follows: "Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 33 [1986])

5 In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.10 However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides: CIVIL CODE, ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator's death shall govern. Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court. 8) SPS. PASCUAL V CA Facts: The petitioner Consolacion Sioson Pascual, is the niece of the deceased Canuto Sioson who sold his shares of an undivided lot during his lifetime. These lots are now subject of a court action . When he died, his children confirmed this sale. REMEDIOS is the granddaughter of Canutos sister Catalina. She filed a complaint against CONSOLACION and her spouse Ricardo Pascual in the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 165, for "Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of Title] and Damages." REMEDIOS claimed that she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E because CATALINA devised Article 838 of the Civil Code states that "[N]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." The SC interpreted this provision to mean, "until admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder." these lots to her in CATALINAs last will and testament7 ("LAST WILL") dated 29 May 1964. REMEDIOS added that CONSOLACION obtained title to these lots through fraudulent means since the area covered by TCT (232252) 1321 is twice the size of CANUTOs share in Lot 2. REMEDIOS prayed for the cancellation of CONSOLACIONs title, the issuance of another title in her name, and the payment to her of damages. Trial court ruled in favor of Consolacion on the ground of prescription and her lack of legal standing. The CA reversed the judgment in favor of REMEDIOS.

ISSUE: WON prior to the probate of a will, a relationship of implied trust can arise. HELD: The action by REMEDIOS was dismissed for lack of cause of action. There was no implied trust . Will must be subject to probate proceedings and allowed before any property or right can pass. I

IMPORTANT POINTS RELATED TO WILLS AND SUCCESSION: REMEDIOS anchored her claim property on the devise of these lots to her under CATALINAs LAST WILL. However, the trial court found that the probate court did not issue any order admitting the LAST WILL to probate. REMEDIOS does not contest this finding. Indeed, during the trial, REMEDIOS admitted that Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 (for probate of the will) is still pending.

6 REMEDIOS anchors her right in filing this suit on her being a devisee of CATALINAs LAST WILL. However, since the probate court has not admitted CATALINAs LAST WILL, REMEDIOS has not acquired any right under the LAST WILL. REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of action either to seek reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to enforce an implied trust over these lots. of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

9) CAMAYA V PATULANDONG FACTS: On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein she devised, among others, Lot No. 288-A to her grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan (Mangulabnan) During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed a petition for the probate of her will before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Nueva Ecija where it was docketed as Sp. Pro. No. 128. By Order2 of January 11, 1973, the CFI admitted the will to probate. On June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying above-quoted paragraph five of her will in this wise:

Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the probate court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. The probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared the deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null and void, it having had the effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the property.

Issues: 1. WON the probate court can declare null and void and order the cancellation of the TCTs of petitioners and the deed of sale; and 2. WON the final judgment regarding a property in a civil case bar the allowance of the codicil. HELD: 1ST ISSUE: The SC declared the limited jurisdiction of a probate court A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list

SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law, petitioners titles cannot, under probate proceedings, be declared null and void.

2nd ISSUE: The final judgment regarding a property in a civil case cannot bar the allowance of the codicil. Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory as it was not appealed, it specifically provided in its dispositive portion that the decision was "without prejudice [to] ... the probate of the codicil. The rights of the prevailing parties in said case were thus subject to the outcome of the probate of the codicil.

ART 839

7 SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents For probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982. It was a contested will The RTC decided in favor of its probate The Court of Appeals reversed said decision and held that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as follows: Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions. Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature. It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent. Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases: (a) If not executed and attested as required by law; (b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution; (c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit; (e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto. In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads: Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases; (1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with; (2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution; (3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person; (5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud; (6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that: The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends,

8 any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded . For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code. In a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1)whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court held:

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code are essential to the probate of a holographic will. A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code. Art 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in