ESPIRITU VS CIPRIANO Case Digest ESPIRITU VS CIPRIANO FACTS: For resolution is the problem of whether RA No.

6126 may be held applicable to the case at bar. For convenience we reproduce the pertinent provisions of law in question: Section 1 no lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which anothers dwelling is located shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed between the lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed 300php a month. Section 6- This At shall take effect upon its approval. Approved June 17, 1970 ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 6126 will have retroactive effect at the case at bara Held: It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar is covered by the aforecited law. We rule, otherwise. Established and undisputed is the fact that the increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January, 1969, while the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals had been effected. Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may. Therefore given retroactive effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction therefore is in order. Article 4 of the civil code ordains that law shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that

where the law is clear. Our duty is equally plain. The law being a temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation, it has limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that no lessor of a dwelling unit or land shall during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this act. Hence the provision against the increase in monthly rental was effective only from March 1970 up to March 1971. Outside and beyond that period the law did not by the express mandate of the Act itself, operate. The said law did not, by express terms, purport to give retroactive effect. We therefore rule that R.A. No. 6126 is not applicable at the case at bar. As the language of the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly says.

2. Case of Regalado vs. Yulo No. 42935 15February1935 FACTS OF THE CASE: This case was brought about by the action quo warranto to determine the respective rights of the petitioner Felipe Regalado and one of the respondents, Esteban T. Villar, to the office of Justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay. Felipe Regalado qualified for the office of justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay on April 12, 1906. On September 13, 1934 Regalado became 65 yrs old. As a consequence thereafter the judge of first instance of Albay, acting in accordance w/ instructions from the Sec of Justice,

designated Esteban T. Villar, Justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay. Regalado surrendered the office to Villar under protest.

supply a meaning not found in the phraseology of the law.)

ISSUES OF THE CASE: Whether or not under the provisions of section 203 of the Administrative Code, as amended by the Act No. 3899, the Justices and auxiliary justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act No. 3899 who reached the age of 65 yrs after said Act took effect shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of 65 yrs. No, Because justices appointed prior to the approval of the act and who completed 65 yrs of age on September 13 1934, subsequent to the approval of the Act which was on November 16 1931 and who by law is required to cease to hold office on January 1, 1933 is not affected by the said act. HELD: RESPONDENT ESTEBAN VILLAR BE OUSTED FROM THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF MALINAO, ALBAY, AND THAT THE PETITIONER FELIPE REGALADO BE PLACED IN POSSESSION OF THE SAME. STAT CON LESSON: The intent of the law is to be ascertained from the words used in its construction. (If legislative intent is not expressed in some appropriate manner, the courts cannot by interpretation speculate as to an intent and

7. G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992 Lydia O. Chua Vs. The Civil Service Commission, the National Irrigation Administration and the Department of Budget and Management. Facts: In line with the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, R.A.6683 was enacted to provide for the early retirement and voluntary separation of government employees affected due to reorganization, those who may avail were regular, casual, temporary and emergency employees, with rendered service minimum of two years. Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration Authoruty (NIA) for over 15 years as a coterminous employee of 4 successive NIA projects. She availed of the above mentioned law only to be denied as the CSC who deemed her unqualified, being a coterminous employee. She was instead offered a severance of monthly basic pay for each year of service. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was entitled to avail of the early retirement benefit as a coterminous employee. Held: It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant like casual and emergency employees, because of that they are entitled to the same benefits as long as they complied with the requirements of the

law, which in this case, was done by Linda Chua. On that note, the court believes that the denial of petitioners application for early retirement benefits by the NIA and CSC is unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive due to the fact that she is entitled to the benefits of the same law because she served the government not only for two (2) years which is the minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen (15) years. In four (4) governmental projects. Wherefore, the petition is granted. -Statutory ConstructionSTAT CON chapter 4 Significance of the Case In this landmark case, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that backwages due an employee on account of his illegal dismissal should not be diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal. This case finally abandoned the Mercury Drug rule and deduction of earnings elsewhere rule then prevailing at that time. Historical Backdrop Prior to the present case, SC had applied different methods in the computation of backwages. Backwages under RA 875. Under RA 875, the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) was given wide discretion to grant or disallow payment of backpay (backwages) to an employee, it also had the implied power of reducing the backpay where backpay was allowed. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the CIR can increase or diminish the award of backpay, depending on several circumstances, among them, the good faith of the employer, the employees

employment in other establishments during the period of illegal dismissal, or the probability that the employee could have realized net earnings from outside employment if he had exercised due diligence to search for outside employment. This method caused undue delay in the disposition of illegal dismissal cases. Cases are usually held up in the determination of whether or not the computation of the award of backwages is correct. Mercury Drug Rule . In order prevent undue delay in the disposition of illegal dismissal cases, the SC found occasion in the case of Mercury Drug Co vs. CIR, 1974, to rule that a fixed amount of backwages without further qualifications should be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee. In subsequent cases (adopting the proposal of Justice Teehankee), backwages equivalent to three years (unless the case is not terminated sooner) was made the base figure for such awards without deduction, subject to deduction where there are mitigating circumstances in favor of the employer but subject to increase by way of exemplary damages where there are aggravating circumstances (e.g. oppression or dilatory appeals) on the employers part. On 1 November 1974, the Labor Code of the Philippines took effect. Article 279 of the said code provides: [...] An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his back wages computed from the time his compensation was was withheld from him up to the time of his reinstatement.

The above provision nothwithstanding, the rule generally applied by the Court after the promulgation of the Mercury Drug case, and during the effectivity of P.D. No. 442 was still the Mercury Drug rule. In effect, this qualified the provision under P.D. No. 442 by limiting the award of backwages to 3 years. Deduction of Earnings Elsewhere Rule. When RA 6715 took effect on 21 March 1989, the pertinent portion of Article 279 of the Labor Code was amended to read as follows: [...] An employee who unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. In accordance with the above provision, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to his full backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Despite the amendment, however, in a subsequent case, Pines City Educational Center vs. NLRC, 1993, the Court returned to the rule prior to the Mercury Drug rule that the total amount derived from employment elsewhere by the employee from the date of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, if any, should be deducted from backwages. The rationale for such ruling was that, the earning derived elsewhere by the dismissed employee while litigating the legality of his

dismissal, should be deducted from the full amount of backwages which the law grants him upon reinstatement, so as not to unduly or unjustly enrich the employee at the expense of the employer. Issue Whether or not the income derived by the employee elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal should be deducted from the award of backwages. Ruling Conformably with the evident legislative intent of RA 6715, backwages to be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee, should not, as a general rule, be diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal. The underlying reason for this ruling is that the employee, while litigating the legality (illegality) of his dismissal, must still earn a living to support himself and family, while full backwages have to be paid by the employer as part of the price or penalty he has to pay for illegally dismissing his employee. The clear legislative intent of the amendment in RA 6715 is to give more benefits to workers than was previously given them under the Mercury Drug rule or the deduction of earnings elsewhere rule. Thus, a closer adherence to the legislative policy behind RA 6715 points to full backwages as meaning exactly that, i.e., without deducting from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal. In other words, the provision calling for full backwages to illegally

dismissed employees is clear, plain and free from ambiguity and, therefore, must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. Index animi sermo est (literally speech is the index of intention). Chua vs. CSC and NIA [G.R. No. 88979. February 07, 1992] 15Aug Ponente: PADILLA, J. FACTS: Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980, or almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her position is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari. ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683. HELD: YES. Petition was granted. RATIO: Petitioner was established to be a coterminous employee, a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable maxim in this case is the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. [T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioners application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.

8. Manuel de Guia vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 104712. May 06, 1992] 15Aug Ponente: BELLOSILLO J. FACTS: [C]ongress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars, Resolution No. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and Resolution UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating the aforementioned resolutions, and maintained that election of Sanggunian members be at large instead of by district. ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct in assailing the aforementioned COMELEC Resolutions. HELD:

NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit RATIO: Spirit and purpose of the law The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861, and that respondent COMELEC is cognizant of its legislative intent. No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute. The true import of Par. (d) is that Sangguniang Panlungsod of the singledistrict cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remained single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166. 9. Vera vs. CuevasGR L-33693-94, 31 May 1979 First Division, De Castro (J): 4 concur, 1 took no part Facts:

Consolidated Philippines Inc., General Milk Co. (Phil.) Inc., and Milk Industries Inc. are engaged inthe manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk products throughout the Philippines. The Institute ofEvaporated Fulled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines is a corporation organized to uphold and maintainthe highest standards of local filled milk industries, of which the companies are members. The Commissionerrequired the companies to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear theinscription required by Section 169 (Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk) of the Tax Code within 15days from receipt of order with explicit warning of prosection for non-compliance. The companies filed anaction for prohibition and injunction. Issue: Whether Section 169 of theTax Code can be enforced against the companies. Held: With Section 141 (specific tax imposed on skimmed milk) and Section 177 (penalty on sale ofskimmed milk without payment of specific tax and legend required in Section 169) repealed by RA 344 andRA 463, respectively; Section 169 has lost its tax purpose, and thus the Commissioner necessary lost his Taxation Law I, 2004 ( 22 )

kind of enforcement amounts to an unconstitutional denial of the equalprotection of the laws, for the law, if not equally enforced to persons similarly situated, would offend againstthe Constitution. 10. Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals No. 2 Case Digests: Statutory Construction Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals 248 SCRA 590 G. R. No. 93833 September 25 1995 Facts: A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of RA 4200, entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication, and Other Purposes."

Digests (Berne Guerrero) authority to enforce the same. Further, Section 169 applies to skimmed milk, which is different to filled milk.F u r t h e r m o r e , Section 169 is only being enforced against the respondent companies nad not a g a i n s t manufacturers, distributors or sellers of condensed skimmed milk such as SIMILAC, SMA, BREMIL,ENFAMIL, and OLAC. Such

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense particularly a violation of RA 4200. The trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner. From the trial courts Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the CA. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial courts order null and void. Issue: W/N RA 4200 applies to taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a conversation. Held: Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all parties to any private communication, to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of qualifier any." Consequently, as respondent

CA correctly concluded, even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of RA 4200. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Stat Con Principle: Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute. Legal Maxims: Verba Legis (the statute must be interpreted literally if the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity) RAMIREZ V CA 7Nov G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought

damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void and denied the petitioners MR, hence the instant petition.

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of R.A. 4200. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent courts conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.

Issue: W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Held: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes, provides:

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed. Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning to share or to impart. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures) These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of meanings or

thoughts which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latters office. Any doubts about the legislative bodys meaning of the phrase private communication are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms conversation and communication were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill. 12. National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC

National Federation of Labor vs. National Labor Relations Commission G.R. No. 127718 (March 2, 2000) Facts: Petitioners are employees of the Patalon Coconut Estate in Zamboanga. With the advent of the RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the government sought the compulsory acquisition of the land for agrarian reform. Because of this, the private respondents who are owners of the estate decided to shut down its operation. Petitioners did not receive any separation pay. Now, the petitioners pray, with the representation of their labor group, claiming that they were illegally dismissed. They cite Article 283 of the Labor code where an employer may terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation. Issue:

Whether or not the Court should apply the legal maxim verbal legis in construing Article 283 of the Labor Code as regards its applicability to the case at bar. Held: Yes, the legal maxim is applicable in this case. The use of the word may, in its plain meaning, denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only. Also, Article 283 of the Labor Code does not contemplate a situation where the closure of the business establishment is forced upon the employer and ultimately for the benefit of the employees. The Patalon Coconut Estate was closed down because a large portion of the said estate was acquired by the DAR pursuant to the CARP. The severance of employer-employee relationship between the parties came about involuntarily, as a result of an act of the State. Consequently, complainants are not entitled to any separation pay. Reasoning: Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Policy: Article 283 of the Labor Code applies in cases of closures of establishment and reduction of personnel. The peculiar circumstances in the case at bar, however, involves neither the closure of an establishment nor a reduction of personnel as contemplated under the article. 13. SANTIAGO VS COMELEC Nature: Petition for prohibition; the right of the people to directly propose amendments

to the constitution through the system of initiative. Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, Ma. Isabel Ongpin petitioners Jesus Delfin, Alberto & Carmen Pedrosa (PIRMA), COMELEC respondents Raul Roco, DIK, MABINI, IBP, LABAN petitioners/intervenors Facts: Atty. Delfin filed with the COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution by Peoples initiative. His proposal is to lift the term limits of elective officials and thus amending Sections 4 and 7 of Art VI, Section 4 of Art VII and Section 8 of Art X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In his petition, Delfin asked the COMELEC to issue an order (1) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) cause the publication of such order in newspaper of general and local circulation; and (3) instructing municipal election registrars in all regions of the Philippines to assist him and his volunteers in establishing signing stations. The COMELEC then issued an order directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition and set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC. Thereafter, Senator Santiago, et al., filed a special civil action for prohibition before the Supreme Court. Issues:

The issues in the instant petition are the following: (1) Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. (2) Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefore, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative. (3) Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. (4) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution. (5) Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.

Rulings of the Court: The Supreme Court held that: (1) The instant petition is viable despite the pendency in the COMELEC of the Delfin Petition. The COMELEC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by Delfin and that it becomes imperative to stop the COMELEC from proceeding any further. The SC said that despite the pendency of the Delfin Petition in the COMELEC, the SC had jurisdiction over the Defensor-Santiago petition because the petition may be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, given the Roco motion filed with the COMELEC seeking dismissal of the Delfin petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. (2) RA 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative to amend the constitution because while Sec 3 mentions initiative on the Constitution and Sec 5 restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of registered voters needed for a proposal, the law does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution; while there are subtitles for national and local initiatives, there is no subtitle for the initiative on the Constitution; thus, the law is incomplete, and this inadequacy cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate implementing rules and regulations. (3) It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is

misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests. (4) Santiagos petition contend that the people's initiative is limited to amendments to the constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative. Delfin in his memoranda contend that the lifting of the limitation on the term of office of elective officials provided under the 1987 constitution is not a "revision" of the constitution. It is only an amendment. "Amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific provisions of the constitution. Revision contemplates a reexamination of the entire document to determine how and to what extent it should be altered. The Office of the Solicitor General opined that extension of term of elected officials constitute a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a revision thereof. In its amended petition in intervention DIK and MABINI contend that the Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to

amendments. (5) COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition. It was held that COMELEC is without jurisdiction to entertain the Delfin Petition because it did not contain the signatures of the required number of voters as required by the Constitution. The petition therefore is granted; R. A. No. 6735 is declared inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and for failure to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation; Those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution is declared void; and the Commission on Elections is ordered to dismiss the DELFIN petition. Word of the Day: Initiative is a form of direct legislation by the people consisting of two parts: petition and election. It does not become effective until passed by voters and its availability does not remedy the denial of the right to referendum. 14. THE UNITED STATES vs LUIS TORIBIO, G.R. NO. L-5060, January 26, 1910 (15 Phil 85) Facts: Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the violation of sections 30 & 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. Evidence sustained in the trial court found that appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality where it was slaughtered. Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the

animal but was not given one because the carabao was not found to be unfit for agricultural work which resulted to appellant to slaughter said carabao in a place other than the municipal slaughterhouse. Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under Act No. 1147 which states that only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be slaughtered. Held: The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the State may order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passersby; the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the

legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court. From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected. Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this "general police power of the State, persons and

property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned." US v. Toribio G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910 Facts: In the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, the animal was slaughtered and there is no municipal slaughterhouse. The appellant slaughtered carabaos for human consumption, and the said is in violation of the Act No. 1147 An Act Regulating the Registration, Branding, Slaughter of Large Cattle. Counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of the Act do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure. Counsel for appellant contends that the statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption as food, without first obtaining a permit which can not be procured in the event that the animal is not unfit for agricultural work or draft purposes, is unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902), which provides that no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Issue: Whether Act 1147 applies in the case of the petitioner? Held: The Act primarily seeks to protect the large

cattle of the Philippine Islands against theft and to make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or stolen. In order to make it difficult for any one but the rightful owner of such cattle to retain them in his possession or to dispose of them to others. But the usefulness of this elaborate and compulsory system of identification, resting as it does on the official registry of the brands and marks on each separate animal throughout the Islands, would be largely impaired, if not totally destroyed, if such animals were requiring proof of ownership and the production of certificates of registry by the person slaughtering or causing them to be slaughtered, and this especially if the animals were slaughtered privately or in a clandestine manner outside of a municipal slaughterhouse. Sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer. Comendador v. De Villa G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991 Facts: These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related issues arising from the same incident. 1. The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in

the failed coup d etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989. 2. The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). 3. Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court Martial were formed. During their trial, petitioners invoked their right to peremptory Challenge. The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that the right was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential Decree. The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. Issue: 1. Whether petitioners were denied of their right of due process due to the investigation was resolved against them in failure to submit a counter affidavit? 2. Whether GCM No. 14 has a legal ground denying the petitioners their right of peremptory challenge? 3. Whether denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection? Held: 1. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena sent them that failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence. They chose not to heed the warning. As their motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in

referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights. 2. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul. Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge. 3. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and do not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians. RUFINO LOPEZ & SONS, INC., v. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS G.R. No. L-9274 February 1, 1957 Facts: 1. Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the

corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular and supplies invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released. Subsequently, however, and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment, additional customs duties were levied and imposed upon petitioner. 2. On May 23, 1955, a motion to dismiss was filed at the Court of Tax Appeal but was dismissed on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, creating said tax court Issue: Whether Section 11 of RA 1125 allows the respondent court to review decisions of the Collector of Customs? Held: The court holds that under the law, particularly, the Customs Law and Republic Act No. 1125, the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the Collector of Customs. The Commissioner of Customs is purely administrative, whereas, appeal to the Court of Tax Appeal is manifestly judicial. And it is a sound rule that before one resorts to the Courts, the administrative remedy provided by law should first be exhausted. In the second place, the two remedies suggested by the petitioner would result in confusion because a person adversely affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs could not be sure where to seek the remedy, whether with the Commissioner of Customs or with the Court of Tax Appeals, and it might even be difficult for him to decide because, if he took the appeal directly to the Tax Court,

that would ordinarily cut off his remedy before the Commissioner of Customs for the reason that, should the Court of Tax Appeals decide against him, he may not appeal said decision to the Commissioner of Customs because the Commissioner as an administrative officer may not review the decision of the Court. On the other hand, if the person affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs took his appeal to the Commissioner of Customs, and there receives an adverse decision, he may yet appeal wherefrom to the Court of Tax Appeals. In the third place, even if the person affected by an adverse ruling of the Collector of Customs took his appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, as advocated by counsel for the petitioner, under the literal meaning of section 11, the Tax Court may refuse to entertain said appeal, as was done in the present case, on the ground that under section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, it had no jurisdiction to review a decision of the Collector of Customs, section 7 clearly limiting its appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v YU HAI alias HAYA G.R. No. L-9598 August 15, 1956 Facts: 1. Yu Hai alias Haya having acted as maintainer of the game of panchong or paikiu and of hazard was accused in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan of a violation of Article 195, sub-paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused moved to quash the information and was sustained on the theory that the offense charged was a light offense which, under Article 90 of the

Revised Penal Code, prescribed in two months. Issue: Whether the sustainment granted on the motion quashing the information was proper? Held: Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. As it would be more favorable to the herein accused to apply the definition of light felonies under Article 9 in connection with the prescriptive period of the offense charged, being a light offense, prescribed in two months.

accused moved to quash the information on the ground that it charged more than one offense and that the criminal action or liability therefore had already been extinguished; and the Justice of the Peace of Court, in its order of December 24, 1954, sustained the motion to quash on the theory that the offense charged was a light offense which, under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, prescribed in two months. ISSUES OF THE CASE: Did the court err in considering the offense

Statutory Construction- People vs. Yu Hai alias HAYA Statutory Construction - Headnotes and Epigraphs - Construction to avoid Absurdity

committed as a light felony? No, since the light offenses as defined in art 9 of the R.P.C states that an offense which penalty arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." The argument of the SolGen on the matter is erroneous since the basis for his argument of classifying the

Case of People of the Philippines vs. Yu Hai alias HAYA GR Nos. L- 9598, 38216 15August1956 FACTS OF THE CASE: On October 22, 1954, the accused was charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan of a violation of Article 195, subparagraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, for having allegedly permitted the game of panchong or paikiu, a game of hazard, and having acted as maintainer thereof. The

offense committed as a correctional penalty, is Art 26 of the RPC which classifies fines not offenses. Also, if the SolGens interpretation of the law is accepted then it will lead to and absurd situation wherein a light felony as defined by Art 9 will have 2 prescriptive periods, and 1 peso will mean the difference of 9 years and 10 months, and there is no reason for a law-maker to raise the

prescriptive period for certain light offenses over other light offenses Therefore it is more sensible and to apply Art 9 over Art 26 since we are discussing the prescription of a crime not the penalty. An as this construction is more favorable to the accused, it should be the one to be adopted. HELD: THE DECISION IS AFFIRMED WITH COSTS DE OFICIO. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON: Headnotes or epigraphs- When a statute is divided into several subjects or articles, having respective appropriate headings, it must be presumed that the provisions of each article are controlling upon the subject thereof and operate as a general rule for settling such questions therein. Construction to avoid absurdity- If the words of the statute are susceptible of more than one meaning, the absurdity of the result of one construction is a strong argument against its adoption, and in favor of such sensible interpretation as will avoid such result.