Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

1 China DA

Chinese Influence Disad

Chinese Influence Disad.....................................................................................................................................................................1

Chinese Influence Disad......................................................................................................................................1

1NC.......................................................................................................................................................................................................3

1NC....................................................................................................................................................................... 3
1NC.......................................................................................................................................................................................................4

1NC....................................................................................................................................................................... 4
***Links...............................................................................................................................................................................................5

***Links............................................................................................................................................................... 5
South Korea.........................................................................................................................................................................................6

South Korea..........................................................................................................................................................6
Japan....................................................................................................................................................................................................7

Japan.....................................................................................................................................................................7
South Korea/Japan.............................................................................................................................................................................8

South Korea/Japan..............................................................................................................................................8
South Korea/Japan.............................................................................................................................................................................9

South Korea/Japan..............................................................................................................................................9
***Uniqueness...................................................................................................................................................................................10

***Uniqueness....................................................................................................................................................10
Uniqueness Wall................................................................................................................................................................................11

Uniqueness Wall.................................................................................................................................................11
Uniqueness Wall................................................................................................................................................................................12

Uniqueness Wall.................................................................................................................................................12
***Impacts.........................................................................................................................................................................................13

***Impacts......................................................................................................................................................... 13
Heg Impact Thayer........................................................................................................................................................................14

Heg Impact Thayer.........................................................................................................................................14

2NC Heg AT: Military Dominance .............................................................................................................................................15

2NC Heg AT: Military Dominance ..............................................................................................................15

2NC Impact Taiwan.......................................................................................................................................................................16

2NC Impact Taiwan........................................................................................................................................16

2NC Impact Capitalism.................................................................................................................................................................17

2NC Impact Capitalism................................................................................................................................. 17

2NC Impact Japan ReArm..........................................................................................................................................................18

2NC Impact Japan ReArm..........................................................................................................................18

2NC Module South China Sea......................................................................................................................................................19

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

2 Seniors China DA 2NC Module South China Sea.......................................................................................................................19

South China Sea Impact Econ......................................................................................................................................................20

South China Sea Impact Econ.......................................................................................................................20

South China Sea Impact Econ......................................................................................................................................................21

South China Sea Impact Econ.......................................................................................................................21

South China Sea Impact Heg........................................................................................................................................................22

South China Sea Impact Heg.........................................................................................................................22

***Aff.................................................................................................................................................................................................23

***Aff..................................................................................................................................................................23
AFF WITHDRAWAL GOOD .....................................................................................................................................................24

AFF WITHDRAWAL GOOD ......................................................................................................................24

AFF Japan Checks.........................................................................................................................................................................25

AFF Japan Checks..........................................................................................................................................25

AFF Deterrence Checks.................................................................................................................................................................26

AFF Deterrence Checks.................................................................................................................................26

AFF No China Rising.....................................................................................................................................................................27

AFF No China Rising..................................................................................................................................... 27

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

3 China DA

1NC
US influence in region is stable now---removal of troops gives China a go-ahead message into East Asia Scobell, 10 [Dr. Andrew Scobell February 4, 2010- Associate Professor of International Affairs and Director of the China
Certificate Program. Testimony before U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Chinas Activities in Southeast Asia and the Implications for U.S. Interests, http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2010hearings/written_testimonies/10_02_04_wrt/10_02_04_scobell_statement.php]
This statement examines the Peoples Republic of Chinas geostrategic thinking since the end of the Cold War and where Southeast Asia fits into the calculus. The author suggests that Southeast Asia might best be thought of as a backyard laboratory where China first tests new

ideas and experiments with new approaches in its foreign and security policies. Southeast Asia was deemed fertile ground for such experimentation because there was no regional hegemon nor was the subregion totally dominated by any great power. Moreover, the subregion is of considerable importance to China. While the United States has been the most significant external security actor in Southeast Asia, its footprint has shrunk as a result of the withdrawal of military bases in the Philippines in the early 1990s. Furthermore, the United States does not completely dominate economically or diplomatically. Indeed, it is Japan that has been the most important external economic actor but Japan has not dominated diplomatically nor had any military presence. Thus, Southeast Asia proved to be a valuable location where China has tested multilateral diplomacy and experimented with other soft and hard
power initiatives. Moreover, the Soviet collapse heralded the end of a bipolar world and the emergence of regional multipolarity. By 1992, the global system was no longer dominated by two superpowers. The system had been replaced by a chaotic situation in which power in Asia was becoming more diffuse and world politics more complicated and confusing. Beijing, long a proponent of multi-polarity, suddenly confronted the adage of be careful what you wish for, and scrambled to adapt to the new reality. Although the emergence of a multipolar Asia appeared to be an unmistakable trend, global

unipolarity was the overarching reality because of the preponderance of American power. For China this meant the greater salience of a U.S. threat to China. Another core concern was the perpetuation of economic growth and prosperity. As a result, in 1992, ageing patriarch Deng Xiaoping sought to personally reinvigorate the reform effort and ensure there was no turning back from the course he had set the country on more than a decade earlier. Thus, Deng launched what became known as the
Southern Tour (nanxun) on which he urged Chinese to embrace energetically reform and opening.

The situation forced Beijing to rethink its foreign policy outlook and Chinas own neighborhood suddenly loomed much larger in its thinking. Securing regime stability and national borders required greater attention to neighboring countries. Countering the greater perceived challenge of a hostileor at least unfriendlyUnited States meant serious efforts to build a network of relationships with other states, especially within Asia. This impulse was reinforced, in Beijings view, by the transformation of the United States from a prime catalyst for Chinas economic trade and investment to a key obstruction to Chinese growth. Thus, Beijing began to seek commercial opportunities elsewhere. In short, China awakened to its geographic realitiesit was first and foremost an Asian power.

Withdrawal increases Chinese influence, and causes an arms race Kelly, 9 (Robert E, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science & Diplomacy, Pusan National University, Should the US
Pull Out of South Korea (2): No, Asian Security Blog, http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-ofsouth-korea-2-no/, NJ)
1. If we leave, everyone in Asia will read it as a sign that we are weak and that we are leaving Asia generally. Yes, this is the credibility argument straight out of the Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan debates. But the world sees US power today as wavering; we are the tottering giant, especially in Asia. If we leave during the GWoT, that image will be confirmed, and the Chinese will push hard in Asia. A US departure will touch off an arms race as regional uncertainty rises . Asia is not where Europe or Latin America are in terms of regional amity. The US presence is more needed in this region, and it earns the US the friendship of the local democracies. It is

hard to see how a spiraling arms race, as Japan and China openly start competing for regional leadership, plus perhaps India and China, would help the US. The US could very well be pulled back in later. A US departure from Korea (and Japan next?) will be read as a clear victory for China in the Sino-US regional competition.

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

4 China DA

1NC
And, lack of US presence causes China rise, which kills heg and causes nuclear war Mauro, 7 (Ryan, geopolitical analyst for Tactical Defense Concepts and for the Northeast Intelligence Network, founder of
WorldThreats.com, national security advisor to the Christian Action Network, and an intelligence analyst with the Asymmetrical Warfare and Intelligence Center (AWIC), The Consequences of Withdrawal, Front Page Magezine, http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=496, NJ) Asia may appear far removed from the military theater, but even there the consequences of premature withdrawal may make themselves felt. The perception of American weakness could lead to a struggle for supremacy among rival Asian powers. With China ascendant, Japan would have no option but to develop nuclear weapons. Two scenarios could then arise: China would dominate the Pacific and Americas status as a superpower would quickly recede; or there would be a region-wide nuclear stalemate involving Burma, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and possibly Taiwan and Australia.

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

5 China DA

***Links

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

6 China DA

South Korea
Troops in South Korea key to deter Chinese aggression. Oh, 8 (Kongdan, specialist in East Asian affairs at the Brookings Institute, USROK: The Forgotten Alliance, Brookings
Institute, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/10_south_korea_oh.aspx, NJ)
As an additional facet of its global war on terror, the George W. Bush administration has adopted a policy of strategic flexibility, whereby U.S. forces must be prepared to respond to conflicts anywhere they are needed, not just in the neighborhood in which they are located. U.S. troops in South Korea are no longer stationed there simply to prevent a North Korean invasion, but might be used, for example, to respond to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. If such were the case, South Korea, which is working hard to develop good relations with China, would find itself hosting troops that are attacking its friend. The Koreans refer to this strategic flexibility policy as a water ghostwhich will drag anyone who pursues it into deep water. In February 2008, a new South Korean administration was inaugurated under the leadership of President Lee Myung-bak of the opposition political party. President Lees new foreign policy is one of pragmatism, which translates into a more confrontational approach toward North Korea, which for its part has always believed that South Korea should extend the North unlimited aid for the good of the Korean nation without requiring anything in return. From the first days of the Lee administration, the North Korean press has routinely called President Lee a Korean traitor. President Lee is also committed to repairing weaknesses in the U.S.-ROK alliance. North Korea remains a threat, but not so much because of its capability to launch a second invasion of South Korea, which would ultimately fail. China and even Russia pose more existential threats to Korea.

US withdrawal prevents Chinese influence AP, 4 (Associated Press, U.S. plans to reduce troops in S. Korea, AP, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5155285/, NJ)
China, a major regional power that has preserved its traditional alliance with North Korea while developing close economic ties with South Korea, might also view a withdrawal of troops as an opportunity to expand its influence on the peninsula. The U.S. delegation in
Seoul, led by Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless, told the South Koreans the troop reduction would not affect U.S. defense capabilities in the theater because the United State plans to bring in more modern weapons systems, according to Kim Sook, head of the South Korean Foreign Ministrys North American bureau. The U.S. troop cut would include some 3,600 soldiers already earmarked for redeployment this summer from South Korea to Iraq, the statement said. Details are being worked out as the process of consultation with the Republic of Korea continues, the statement said. South Koreas 650,000-member military is a modern, well-equipped force that routinely conducts joint training with its U.S. counterparts. Most of the combat-ready troops are concentrated close to the border or around Seoul. Seoul has talked of strengthening its military to make up for the sizeable U.S. withdrawal, but no official plans have been made public.

Troop Withdrawal is a reversal of ROK-US alliance results in Chinese adventurism China Hand 10 ("China Hands" came to refer to a group of American diplomats, journalists, and soldiers who were known for their knowledge of
China and influence on American policy,

http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Analyses_12/It-s-Official-America-Has-a-ChinaContainment-Policy_printer.shtml ) China is absent from both exercises, and that's no oversight. Many nations in the eastern Pacific, including Australia, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and Vietnam, have been encouraging the U.S. to push back against what they see as China's increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea. And the U.S. military remains concerned over China's growing missile force - now more than 1,000 - near the Taiwan Strait.
The Tomahawks' arrival "is part of a larger effort to bolster our capabilities in the region," Glaser says. "It sends a signal that nobody should rule out our determination to be the balancer in the region that many countries there want us to be." No doubt Beijing got the signal. If, after all that, anybody believes that the joint US-ROK exercises in the Yellow Sea are primarily a response to the Cheonan sinking or, for that matter, part of an effort to deter the apparently undeterrable North Koreans, well, I have in my possession a stately edifice spanning the swelling bosom of the East River to link the County of Kings to the Island of the Manhattoes, available for purchase exclusively by such trusting souls. The South Koreans get it, and Chosun Ilbo weighed in with an uncharacteristically cautious editorial on July 6: These developments are showing signs of creating a Cold War atmosphere where South Korea, the U.S. and Japan face off against China and North Korea. The U.S.-South Korea alliance forms the cornerstone of the South's national security and diplomacy. But China is South Korea's largest trading partner, and it also has a huge influence on peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula. The time has come for Seoul to factor into its diplomacy and security policies both China and its intensifying

competition with the U.S. The code word for "containment" in the Asian press, by the way, is "Cold War atmosphere".

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

7 China DA

Japan
Withdrawal from Japan increases Chinese influence Shirashi, 9 (Takashi, visiting professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo and president of the Institute
of Developing Economies of the Japan External Trade Organization, Japan-U.S. ties crucial for East Asia community, East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/11/10/japan-u-s-ties-crucial-for-east-asia-community/, NJ)
Two things are crucial. First, all East Asian countries have formulated their security policies with the Japan-U.S. alliance as a given. If the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance were to come under question, security in East Asia would become unstable. In the worst-case scenario, the United States would withdraw its military forces to the Guam-Hawaii line and shift its strategy from the current forward defense to an offshore balancing act. Japan will then be forced to allocate far greater resources for its defense than it does now. If Japan chooses to strengthen its defense capabilities, China likely would further accelerate its military growth, with South Korea and Vietnam following suit. When East Asian countries have no choice but to prioritize defense expenditure over economic growth, the common political will to build an East Asian community will be lost . Keeping the current system in place heightens the predictability that security will be maintained. The government should bear this in mind as it decides on the kind of assistance it will extend to Afghanistan and Pakistan in their nation-building efforts, and on the issues of cooperation with Washington on its military realignment plan and relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station in Okinawa Prefecture.

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

8 China DA

South Korea/Japan
Military presence in East Asia key to prevent Chinese influence Marquardt, 3 (Erich,Senior Editor with the Combating Terrorism Center, China's Distant Threat to U.S. Dominance in Asia,
Information Clearing House, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article4654.htm, NJ)
This realization has preoccupied members of the Bush administration, in addition to select members of the U.S. Congress, who consistently talk of the need to contain China. These individuals are pushing for an increase in military ties with various Asian states, such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines. They have also advocated the positioning of U.S. military bases and forces on China's western flank in Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan. In countries such as Taiwan and Japan -- which are dependent on U.S. economic and military aid -- these officials have called for allowing these two countries to further develop their military programs in order to act as a bulwark against the powerful China of the future. These policies are controversial as Japan previously had hegemonic ambitions in Asia. Supplying boosted amounts of military aid to Taiwan is also a divisive issue, as any such aid is an obvious threat to the Chinese leadership which considers Taiwan part of the mainland. U.S. officials are aware that China's future economic and military might is inevitable. This is part of the reason why there are roughly 41,000 U.S. troops in Japan, 37,000 in South Korea, and 19,000 on naval vessels in East Asia. Yet as China's power grows, the U.S. will likely have to increase its military might in order to continue to rival China. But since U.S. troops are usually stretched thin, augmenting current U.S. forces in Asia to keep a growing China in check may not be feasible. Therefore, by building up the strength of U.S. allies in Asia, the United States can attempt to contain China's potential power projection without actually having to commit and risk U.S. forces. However, there is plenty of time before China would be able to rival the United States in power in Asia.

US Troop Presence in East Asia contains China withdrawal allows China to seek territorial goals such as Taiwan
Joseph F. Cheney

99 (China: Regional Hegemon or Toothless Tiger? Joseph F. Cheney, Lt Col, USAF A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty at Maxwell Air Force Base www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/99-079.pdf ) A clear definition of hegemony is critical to the debate over Chinas future goals. To illustrate, a recent US Department of Defense (DOD) report commented that China does not seek hegemony in Asia or elsewhere, although its leaders hope to achieve a position where Asian countries and those with interests in Asia take no actions which conflict with Chinas interests. This comment, while at first dismissing hegemony as a Chinese goal, then goes on to contradict itself by asserting Chinas desire to achieve what is in effect peace by hegemony as described by Aron. Such confusion over the meaning of hegemony is common. China does not seek empire, it seeks hegemony in East Asia. This is a situation where China
would have complete freedom to peruse its interests, including territorial goals in Taiwan and the South China Sea. For this reason, China fights against any attempt to build bilateral or multilateral defense alliances in East Asia. The Chinese hope to create a situation where they can dominate any other state in East Asia on a bilateral basis . The key factor that currently prevents them from achieving this goal is the powerful presence of the US military in East Asia, supported by bilateral defense alliances. This arrangement keeps the East Asian system in equilibrium and has fostered regional development. Since
China has clearly benefited from this equilibrium, the next question to ask is Why would China want to upset this stable system to seek hegemony?

US Military Presence in East Asia is the only barrier against Chinese domination of East Asia
Joseph F. Cheney

99 (China: Regional Hegemon or Toothless Tiger? Joseph F. Cheney, Lt Col, USAF A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty at Maxwell Air Force Base www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/99-079.pdf) Hegemony is a product of power. This power is drawn from many required sources including geopolitical strength, economic strength, military strength and power projection capability, and political stability. Analysis of all these factors will show that China has made incredible progress developing some of the required elements of hegemony. In other areas, it has made painfully little progress. In short, China is years away from credibly exerting East Asian hegemony in the face of continued American military power and regional influence. On the other hand , Chinas potential
power in the future cannot be overlooked. The lack of strong multilateral security alliances makes it possible that China could divide and dominate the rest of East Asia if the US were to withdraw its military presence . Analysis of the required elements of hegemony reveals not only the extent to which Chinese power has increased in the past 20 years, but also the degree to which China is still a weak and divided state.

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

9 China DA

South Korea/Japan
Troop Withdrawal Causes East Asian arms race
Joseph F. Cheney

99 (China: Regional Hegemon or Toothless Tiger? Joseph F. Cheney, Lt Col, USAF A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty at Maxwell Air Force Base www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/99-079.pdf) The key to long term stability in East Asia is a continued policy of US military presence in East Asia . Policy must be developed, therefore, to cope with the changing East Asian environment. As this paper has continually stressed, the abdication of US presence in East Asia
would create a vacuum that only China has the power and desire to fill. As Robert Ross clearly expresses, U.S. strategic retrenchment would do far more to alter the Sino-American bilateral balance of power and the regional balance of power than any combination of Chinese military and economic policies.3 Japan and other East Asian states would have to rearm in the face of Chinese hegemony. The Japanese-US military alliance is critical to containing Chinese designs for hegemony. Japan and the US must work
together to cooperate on trade and financial issues, not only to create a 39 stable trading relationship, but to create continued support for US military forces in Japan. The US should not encourage Japan to expand its military influence outside of its own self defense region. East Asia is still not ready for an expanded Japanese military presence. US policymakers must also plan ahead for a reunified Korea and the prospects for continued

US military presence on the peninsula. Can and should the US presence on the Korean peninsula continue after reunification? If US forces must leave Korea, can they be redeployed to another location in East Asia? These options should be studied now and
decisions must be made considering the vital importance of the continued US military presence in East Asia.

Reduction in US Military Presence in East Asia is the only counterbalance to Chinese regional hegemony.
Paul H.B. Godwin

04 ( China as Regional Hegemon? Professor of International Affairs at the National War College, Washington, DC, Graduate of Dartmouth College (1960) and received his M.A. in Asian Studies (1963) and Ph.D. in Political Science (1967) from the University of Minnesota.
http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Godwin,%20China%20as%20a%20Regional%20Hegemon.pdf ) In maritime Asia, the United States functions as the countervailing power to China. With alliances and access to military facilities along Asias littoral from South Korea and Japan in the north, down to Australia in the south and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, the United States performs the role of offshore balancer to Chinas continental dominance. Certainly from the US perspective, the United States with its alliances and access maintains the current continental-maritime military balance in East Asia.4 As long as there is a second regional great power in Asia, by definition China cannot become the regions hegemon. With its strong alliances and access to naval and air facilities along Asias periphery together with its diplomatic and economic influence within the region, the United States is in an extremely robust offshore position. In this sense, as Robert Ross has suggested, East Asia has become bipolar; China and the United States share the regional balance of power.5 The question therefore becomes whether Chinas regional security objectives have as their ultimate purpose the removal of the United States as Asias other great power. This question becomes important when it is recognized that Chinas principal objection to the current distribution of global and regional power is focused on the role of the United States. China resents the manner in which the United States employs the dominant military, economic and diplomatic power it achieved with the Cold Wars end in global as well as regional affairs. Before evaluating Beijings perceptions of the United States, however, it is necessary to assess Chinas security priorities.

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

10 China DA

***Uniqueness

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

11 China DA

Uniqueness Wall
US influence in east Asia prevents China from becoming regional hegemon Godwin 3 [Paul H. B. Godwin, 2003- Senior Fellow, retired as professor of international affairs at the National War College,
Washington, D.C. China as a regional hegemon? http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Godwin,%20China%20as%20a% 20Regional% 2 0Hegemon.pdf]
In maritime Asia, the

United States functions as the countervailing power to China. With alliances and access to military facilities along Asias littoral from South Korea and Japan in the north, down to Australia in the south and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, the United States performs the role of offshore balancer to Chinas continental dominance. Certainly from the US perspective, the United States with its alliances and access maintains the current continental-maritime military balance in East Asia.4 As long as there is a second regional great power in Asia, by definition China cannot become the regions hegemon. With its strong alliances and access to naval and air facilities along Asias periphery together with its diplomatic and economic influence within the region, the United States is in an extremely robust offshore position. In this sense, as Robert Ross has suggested, East Asia has become bipolar; China and the United States share the regional balance of power.5 The question therefore becomes whether Chinas regional security objectives have as their ultimate purpose the removal of the United States as Asias other great power. This question becomes important when it is recognized that Chinas principal objection to the current distribution of global and regional power is
focused on the role of the United States. China resents the manner in which the United States employs the dominant military, economic and diplomatic power it achieved with the Cold Wars end in global as well as regional affairs. Before evaluating Beijings perceptions of the United States, however, it is necessary to assess Chinas security priorities.

American military presence is necessary to balance Chinas growing power Fillingham 9 [Zachary Fillingham December 9. 2009- a foreign policy analyst for geopolitcalmonitor.com. Geopoliticalmonitor.com is an
open-source intelligence collection and forecasting service. They provide research, analysis and up to date coverage on situations and events that have a substantive impact on political, military and economic affairs.http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/us-military-bases-a-glob al-footprint- 1/]
While the American

basing footprint in East Asia may find itself shrinking due to American decline and the nebulous nature of many post-Cold War international threats, just how big this reduction will end up being very much depends on Chinese military power and its neighbor perceptions. It is no secret that with every passing year, the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) are expanding their operational capacity. If Chinas neighbors are convinced that Chinas rise will be a relatively benign one, and the government in Beijing is going to play by the rules of international society, then there will be a growing tide of political pressure in South Korea and Japan to reduce Americas permanent military presence. If however Beijing is unable to convince other East Asian countries that its rise will remain a peaceful one, other East Asian countries will desperately seek out an American commitment to balance out Chinas growing influence.

China is on the fast trackUS military presence key to prevent rise in influence Marquardt, 3 Erich Marquardt 09/08/03 Senior Editor with the Combating Terrorism Center. He is also the editor-in-chief of
the CTC Sentinel, a leading counter-terrorism journal. Prior to his work at CTC, Mr. was the head of Global Terrorism Analysis at The Jamestown Foundation, currently based in Washington. ''China's Distant Threat to U.S. Dominance in Asia'' The Power and Interest News Report (http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=87,)
09/08/03: (PINR) A country that borders thirteen others with a population of 1.3 billion people, China stands to be a major power force in Asia. Though currently a relatively weak country, China is on a fast track toward economic modernization as its economy

continues to rapidly grow. If China is able to continue its economic modernization program without any major obstructions, it will become the richest and most powerful state in the world -- at least from a statistical point of view -- surpassing even the projected economic and military power of the United States. While exciting for Chinese leaders and the Chinese population, this destiny has resulted in the opposite effect for American policymakers and the American population, who are very wary of this emerging great power. Moreover, the current U.S. leadership has articulated quite clearly in their National Security Strategy that the United States will take actions to stymie China's power ascension and work to prevent the massive country from equaling or surpassing U.S. power. Indeed, this policy
paper argues that "in pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness." The paper further states, in an indirect reference to China, that the U.S. "must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge."

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

12 China DA

Uniqueness Wall
US hegemony in east asia is not threatened by China in the squo. CRS 8 [Congressional Research Service August 15, 2008 Comparing Global Influence: Chinas and U.S.Diplomacy, Foreign Aid,
Trade, and Investment in the Developing Worldhttp://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL34620.pdf] Despite Chinas growing influence, the United States retains significant strengths, including latent reserves of soft power, much of which lie beyond the scope of government. Furthermore, by some indicators, Chinas soft power has experienced some recent setbacks, while the U.S. image abroad has shown signs of a possible renewal. The United States exceeds the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in global trade, although the PRC is catching up, and far surpasses China in GDP and foreign direct investment. It continues to be the dominant external political and military actor in the Middle East and political and economic influence in Latin America. The United States maintains formal alliances in Europe and Asia, and far outweighs the PRC in military spending and capabilities.

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

13 China DA

***Impacts

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

14 China DA

Heg Impact Thayer

Hegemony is the only guarantor of international stabilitythe alternative is nuclear wars worldwide Thayer, 6 (Bradley A., Prof of Defense and Strategic Studies @ Missouri State University, In Defense of Primacy., National
Interest; Nov/Dec2006 Issue 86, p32-37)
THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power . Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages

followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until
you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. / Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.( n3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States.

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

15 China DA

2NC Heg AT: Military Dominance

Military dominance is irrelevant presence in Asia is key White, 9 (Hugh, Head, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, Custom Search Control
The geostrategic implications of Chinas growth, East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/08/13/the-geostrategicimplications-of-chinas-growth/, NJ)
Of course America will continue to enjoy a significant advantage over China in many other aspects of power, including the soft power of culture and the hard power of armed force. It will be a long time, if ever, before China could emulate Americas position in recent decades as the worlds leading military power. But China does not have to replace the US as the global hyperpower in order to overturn the US-led global order of recent decades. China does not need to compete with the US globally in order to erode US primacy in Asia. And to do that China does not need to equal the US in military capability, but simply limit US options. In both these respects, the military-strategic competition between the US and China is asymmetrical, in ways that benefit China. The shift is already underway. American capacity to project power in Asia is slipping away as China develops the capacity to deny important areas of the Western Pacific especially those closest to China to

the US Navys surface fleet.

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16 China DA

2NC Impact Taiwan

Presence key to prevent ChinaTaiwan war Christensen, 1 (Thomas J, Associate Professor of Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Posing Problems Without Catching Up, International Security, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v025/25.4christensen.html, NJ)
Even if the Chinese

programs have only limited effect against more technologically advanced foes, they may still pose a future security challenge to Taiwan and the United States. If Beijing elites believe that they are in a protracted war of wills over an issue that they care about much more than do the Americans, such as Taiwan, those elites might still be emboldened by the perceived capability--however limited--to increase costs to American and Taiwanese forces and to reduce costs to mainland assets in such a struggle. This problem is only exacerbated by
any perceptions that Chinese elites might have about America's supposed limited willingness to fight such protracted wars and to suffer casualties.Implications and Prescriptions for U.S. Strategy If the analysis above is correct, preventing war across the Taiwan Strait

and between the United States and China is much more difficult than a straightforward net assessment of relative military power in the region might suggest. To deter China from launching attacks against Taiwan and escalating crises and conflicts by attacking American assets in the region, the United States must do more than demonstrate an ability to prevail militarily in a conflict ; it must also demonstrate American resolve and, perhaps, the ability to protect its forces not only from defeat but also from significant harm. On the other hand, if
Beijing believes that Taiwan is moving toward independence, it might be impossible to deter, regardless of the degree and nature of American military superiority. So the United States must take actions not only to deter China but also to reassure it that Washington has no intention of backing Beijing into a corner by supporting Taiwan's legal independence now or in the future. 68

Taiwan war goes nuclear

Lee J. Hunkovic 08 ( The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America American Military University http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf ) A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and
United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

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17 China DA

2NC Impact Capitalism

Increased Chinese influence collapses capitalism, causing extinction Li, 3 (Minqi, Assistant Professor of Political Science at York University, THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE DEMISE OF THE
CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY:EXPLORING HISTORICAL POSSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, http://www.networkideas.org/featart/mar2004/Rise_of_China.pdf, NJ)
As Arrighi and Silver discuss the possibility for the China-centered civilization to lead the transformation of the existing world system, they also point out that: Since the mid-1980s, China has been the key site of industrial expansion and new working-class formation. Given past experience, we should expect a vigorous workers movement to emerge in China as well. And given the size and centrality of China in the East Asian region and globally the trajectory of this movement will have a tremendous impact on the trajectory of the transition as a whole (Arrighi and Silver 1999: 286). If the prediction turns out to be accurate, what exactly will be the nature of this vigorous workers movement? It is very likely that the movement will force a substantial re-distribution of income and wealth within China. Further, given the arguments presented in the previous sections, it is unlikely that, from the point of view of capital and the elites, the re-distribution can be compensated by an upward mobility within the world system. In this case, what now appears to many as the least likely outcome a socialist-oriented workers revolution may emerge as the only viable solution. What will happen next? One possibility is that the revolution will turn inwards and try to build socialism in one country. The historical experience of the 20th century suggests that, under persistent military and economic competition from more powerful capitalist states, and excluded from the possibility of upward mobility, such an approach is a recipe for eventual defeat. The other possibility is that the revolution will and has to lead to the transformation of the world system. By the mid-21st century, not only most of the production of energy and raw materials, but also most of the manufacturing industries may be located in the periphery and the semi-periphery. The concentration of the bulk of the material production facilities and the organized working classes in the South may provide these countries with an unprecedented bargaining leverage against the North. Will China, India, and other Southern countries manage to effectively use the leverage, imposing a massive global re-distribution on the North and transforming the world system from a capitalist world-

economy based on extremely unequal exchange and large, monopolistic profits into a socialist world market economy based on production for use and a more egalitarian exchange system? Will the socialist world market economy succeed in providing system-level
solutions to the system-level problems left by the capitalist world-economy? Will the world market economy allow its member communities to be sufficiently freed from the drive towards endless accumulation and deal successfully with the global environmental crisis? Or, if it fails, will the resolution of the global environmental crisis eventually require the development of a world socialist government? Will the worlds incumbent hegemonic power U.S. imperialism accommodate these developments? If it tries to resist with all of its weapons of massive destruction, will humanity prevail in its struggle against the most powerful, most destructive imperialism the world has ever seen ? Or will the struggle end up with the mutual destruction of both sides? Will humanity, realizing the impossibility of defeating the U.S. imperialism, choose to give in, and pave the way for the American world empire? Will the end of capitalist history turn out to be the end of all history ? Or, as Marx put it in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, it will only bring to a close the prehistory of human society?9 All of these questions will have to be answered by real historical actions.

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

18 China DA

2NC Impact Japan ReArm

Chinese Military action sparks Japanese Nuclear Rearmament Hunkovic, 8 (Lee J, The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United
States of America American Military University http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf )
From a national security standpoint, Marquand (2004) states that Chinese military action could also destabilize Asia, giving nationalist factions in Japan every excuse they need, according to one Japanese scholar, to develop the nuclear weapons capability that many

in Tokyo are already in favor of. He lists another economic liability of invasion as the possibility that the Japanese would do everything in their power to redirect the markets of Asia, including their own, away from China, even at the expense of losing their own money in trade. A further economic and national security risk that Marquand (2004) notes is the possibility that Russia could use Chinese aggression as an excuse to sell oil exclusively to Japan, as Russia is not desirous of China developing quickly into a superpower and China reportedly [as of then] only has a 20-day reserve and is 75 percent reliant on Middle Eastern oil, which could have disastrous repercussions. Additionally, he notes that China has no desire to destroy its relationship with the U.S.

Rearm causes nuclear war Ratner, 3 (Ellen, news analyst on the Fox News Channel, Engage North Korea!
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=30541) Experts predict that with Japan's high-tech, industrial economy, they could assemble a full nuclear arsenal and bomb delivery systems within three years. This would be a disaster. Not only would it trigger a new, intra-Asian arms race for who could doubt that if Japan goes nuclear, China and North Korea would be joined by South Korea and even Taiwan in building new and more weapons? Likewise, given the memories, who could doubt that such a scenario increases the risks of a nuclear war somewhere in the region? By comparison, the old Cold War world,
where there were only two armed camps, would look like kid stuff.

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19 China DA

2NC Module South China Sea

Troop Withdrawal undermines US security umbrella in the South China Sea and its commitments to friends and allies in the region.
Ralph A. Cossa

98 (president of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, Hawaii. Senior editor of the Forums quarterly electronic journal, Comparative Connections. Board member of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the ASEAN Regional Forum Experts and Eminent Persons Group, Founding member of the Steering Committee of the multinational Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Cossa,%20Security%20Implications%20of
%20%20Conflict%20in%20the%20S.ChinaSea.pdf ) The clearest and most effective symbol of America's commitment to regional stability and the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea is the continued forward presence of U.S. military forces in Asia. The U.S. protective umbrella over Asia not only protects the security interests of regional friends and allies, it also protects and promotes America's political, economic, and security interests as well. U.S. forward-deployed forces help promote regional stability while guarding against unilateral acts of aggression, they increase the U.S. ability to respond to crises throughout the region, they demonstrate a U.S. commitment to friends and allies, they serve as a hedge against uncertainty, and they avoid a "power vacuum" that others who do not necessarily share our interests might be tempted to fill.

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

20 China DA

South China Sea Impact Econ

South China Sea Confrontation results in loss of sea lanes
Ralph A. Cossa

98 (president of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, Hawaii. Senior editor of the Forums quarterly electronic journal, Comparative Connections. Board member of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the ASEAN Regional Forum Experts and Eminent Persons Group, Founding member of the Steering Committee of the multinational Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Cossa,%20Security%20Implications%20of
%20%20Conflict%20in%20the%20S.ChinaSea.pdf )
As stressed earlier, the proximity

of the Spratlys to South China Sea shipping lanes adds an important strategic element to the dispute. A threat to freedom of passage through the South China Seas would severely disrupt regional economies. If, during any military action in the Spratlys--or, for that matter, in the course of defining its claim over the currently occupied or coveted territory--any nation threatened to inhibit the free flow of maritime traffic along these critical SLOCs, the U.S. would almost certainly become involved since America's economic growth and security depend upon continued freedom of navigation for both merchant and military shipping. Other nations heavily dependent on maritime commerce could be expected to at least
endorse, if not actively participate in, any U.S.-led enforcement of freedom of navigation along the South China Sea's heavily-travelled sea lanes.

Key to global economic growth Tangredi, 2 (Sam J., Captain United States Navy and Editor Globalization and Maritime Power, December,
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/01e_intro.htm)
These changes in international security may be most evident in the direct and indirect effects of globalization on the maritime environment and on the military forces that operate in and from the maritime environment. Such changes become readily apparent due to the nature of the maritime world: through the historical evolution of international law, the oceans have effectively been globalized for over a centurythat is, their use as what Alfred Thayer Mahan would call the great common has been open to all nations with the desire, access, and resources to master it. (A discussion of this historical evolution is found in chapter 12.) The maritime world can also be seen as a primary sourcein recent parlance, a root causeof globalization because it is the medium by which 90 percent of world trade (when measured by weight and volume) is transported. Without the method of oceanic trade, the barriers to global commerce would be insurmountable, and the history of the world would have been vastly different. E-commerce and the Internet may be the symbols of the most modern version of globalization, but historically the symbols have been the ever-increasing size and speed of ships and the shrinking cost of commercial transport. Ultimately, the open ocean is still the prime medium and symbol of globalizationfor the thoughts transmitted along the Internet must be translated into products, which must in turn be transported to far markets. Even the financial flows that might travel along the wires and fiber-optic cables of todays information network have the eventual purpose of producing goods that are sold and consumed. If these goods are to be sold and consumed in somewhere other than a localized, domestic market, they are likely to be transported by sea. Effects on the maritime environment have very practicalthough easily ignoredconsequences for U.S. national security and economic well-being. That over 90 percent of international trade travels by sea is a fact taken for granted; the dependence of the global economy on maritime transport is hardly remarked upon because, like oxygen, its existence is primarily evident in its absence . Most would agree that seaborne trade is the linchpin of global economic developmentdevelopment that is ultimately fueled by the transfer of raw materials from sources of supply to manufacturing centers to markets. It is also acknowledged that, although the transfer of investment and financial services can be done by electronic means and personnel and light products can be transferred by air, the most practical and lowest-cost method of transferring durable goods is by water. Clearly, any substantial interference on seaborne commerce would thus have a severe effect on the global economy, including its leading national economythat of the United States. But few can contemplate a drastic disruption or absence of such a critical economic element.

Nuclear war Bearden, 2k (T.E. Bearden LTC U.S. Army (ret) Director of Association of Distinguished American Scientists and Fellow
Emeritus, Alpha Foundations Institute for Advanced Study, The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve It Quickly, 6-24-2K, http://www.seaspower.com/EnergyCrisis-Bearden.htm)
History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China, whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States, attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

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21 China DA

South China Sea Impact Econ

[CONTINUED, NO TEXT REMOVED] has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the
biosphere, at least for many decades

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

22 China DA

South China Sea Impact Heg

Likely PRC action in the South China Sea risks US Credibility Loss
Ralph A. Cossa

98 (president of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, Hawaii. Senior editor of the Forums quarterly electronic journal, Comparative Connections. Board member of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the ASEAN Regional Forum Experts and Eminent Persons Group, Founding member of the Steering Committee of the multinational Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Cossa,%20Security%20Implications%20of
%20%20Conflict%20in%20the%20S.ChinaSea.pdf ) The U.S. has generally maintained a policy of neutrality when it comes to conflicting territorial claims , be they in the Spratlys or
elsewhere. Washington has also pointed out that the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty does not automatically cover the Spratlys since they are disputed territory which were not even claimed by Manila until after the Treaty was signed. For this reason, the PRC's encroachment into uninhabited Mischief Reef in 1995 did not automatically invoke the Treaty--although it did launch endless speculation and complaints from the Manila press that the U.S. was a "faithless" ally. A PRC military action against a Philippine occupied reef or islet is a different matter, however, as would be a

PRC hostile act against Philippine naval vessels within recognized territorial waters or the high seas--perhaps even within contested waters in close proximity to the Philippines as well. In all probability, either the Treaty would be invoked under such circumstances or some other means would be found to provide U.S. support to its Philippine ally . Treaty considerations aside,
in my view--and in the opinion of several senior U.S. diplomats and military officers interviewed on a not-for-attribution basis--a serious military action by the PRC in the Spratlys, particularly (although not necessarily only) if it were against Philippine-occupied territory, would most likely necessitate a strong U.S. response. If the U.S. is serious about continuing its leadership role in Asia, it could not ignore a blatant PRC act of provocation any

more than it could have ignored the threatening PRC missile tests and military exercises opposite Taiwan in March 1996. A failure to respond would undermine U.S. credibility and call into question the value of America's bilateral alliances in Asia.

Resolve and credibility are key to heg---weakness invites revisionist powers to challenge U.S. dominance Fettweis 4 Christopher Fettweis, Professor at the U.S. Army War College, December 2004, Resolute Eagle or Paper Tiger?
Credibility, Reputation and the War on Terror, online: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67147_index.html The credibility of a state forms the basis of its reputation, which is little more than an impression of fundamental national character that serves as a guide for others trying to anticipate future actions.12 The loss of credibility can lead to reputations for weakness, fecklessness, and irresolution, which, the thinking goes, emboldens enemies and discourages the loyalty of allies. Credibility can be damaged in many ways, depending on the situation and the observer, but perhaps the surest is to fail to rise to a challenge or to pursue a goal with sufficient resolve. By doing so, a state may earn a reputation for irresolution, which can encourage more aggressive actions by revisionist powers.13 Threats made by a state without credibility may not be believed, inspiring the aggressor to press his advantage, which may lead to a challenge to an interest that is truly vital making a major war unavoidable. Thus the credibility imperative is also intimately related to the post-war American obsession with appeasement , which is of course a code word for a
show of weakness that inadvertently encourages an aggressor.

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

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23 China DA

***Aff

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

Seniors

24 China DA

AFF WITHDRAWAL GOOD

Presence in Asia causes China war Chan, 10 (John, Writer for the San Francisco Gray Panthers, US-China tensions the result of rise of Chinas power, SFGP,
http://mlyon01.wordpress.com/2010/02/01/us-china-tensions-the-result-of-rise-of-chinas-power/, NJ)
These remarks sought to send a message that the US would not allow Beijing to use its economic power to exclude the US from the region, and would contain China militarily. Clinton was more explicit in comments to reporters on Monday, declaring: Everyones aware that China is a rising power of the 21st century. But people want to see the United States fully engaged in Asia, so that as China rises the United States is there as a force of peace. Far from being a force for peace, the US military build-up raises the dangers of conflict between the two powers. As its economic power has waned, Washington has increasingly used its military might to further its interests. Its alliances in Asia form part of a longstanding US strategy of encircling China with allies, strategic partners and military bases. As planned in 2006, the US will deploy 6 of its 11 aircraft carriers and 60 percent of its submarine fleet in the Pacific this year, shifting from its previous strategic focus on the Atlantic. The Pentagon is acutely aware of Chinas rising military strength. A recent assessment by the US Office of Naval Intelligence estimated that Chinas naval expansion would be at its height in the next 1015 years, with one or more aircraft carriers and 75 submarines operating beyond Taiwan and South China Sea to protect Chinas vital sea lanes, particularly to the Middle East and Africa. The growing rivalry between the US and China is reverberating throughout the region. Every government has been compelled to try to balance economic relations with China against concerns to maintain relations with the US. Those issues would certainly have dominated Clintons discussions in Australia, which relies heavily on exports of minerals and other raw materials to China, but depends on its military alliance with the US, not least to back its interventions in neighbouring island states.

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

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25 China DA

AFF Japan Checks

Japanese Regionalism sufficiently contains China Garret and Glaser, 97 (Banning Garrett, Director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Council and Bonnie Glaser, Director of
the Atlantic Council's South Asia Center, 97, Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645655) The Chinese thus fear that the U.S.-Japan alliance will no longer be a force containing Japan as it has been in the past . The
director of a leading foreign policy institute in Beijing indicated that he and other experts are primarily worried "about a stronger Japan under less and less control of the United States."'0 Many Chinese analysts and commentators predict that if the Defense Guidelines are modified to

allow for regional wartime cooperation, there will be new pressure in Japan to accept the right of collective self- defense, which would allow Japanese forces to come to the defense of allies under attack . Chinese analysts privately raise the question of whether the revised Defense Guidelines-to be issued in Fall 1997-will call for Japa- nese forces to cooperate with U.S. forces in combat roles. Even a logistics role for Japan is viewed as potentially involving combat. A senior PRC Ja- pan expert and former military attache to Tokyo contended that a logistics role is not only a significant contribution to combat forces but could lead Japanese forces into direct combat. If a Japanese ship supporting U.S. forces is attacked, he asked, "how should Japan respond? Should it retaliate?" An- other Chinese Japan specialist suggested that Tokyo could face a similar di- lemma in the event that Japanese military aircraft were shot down attempting to rescue Japanese citizens in Taiwan during a cross-strait military conflict. The
analyst noted that there was a historical precedent for Japan using such a tactic to justify military intervention. "After World War I, the Japanese government invaded Shandong under the excuse of rescuing its citizens," the analyst added. This enduring suspicion of Japan's intentions underlies

Chinese concern about the possibility that Japan will revise its Constitution to allow for the right of collective self-defense.
Revision of the Peace Constitution would be seen by the Chinese as a dangerous watershed in Japanese post-World War II history. People's Daily asserted that the Peace Constitution, which re- nounces war forever along with Japan's right to retain armed forces, "repre- sents a demarcation line," and noted that "once this demarcation line is broken through," there will be reason to worry that Japan will move toward remilitarization.1 Chinese experts maintain

that "rightist forces" in Japan- the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Shinshinto-have been seeking to amend Japan's Constitution to allow for a broader security role for Tokyo.

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

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26 China DA

AFF Deterrence Checks

China is deterred from attacking Taiwan Multiple reasons Office of the Secretary of Defense 09 (ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China 2009
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf )
Several

factors may deter China from taking military action against Taiwan. First, China does not yet possess the military capability to invade and conquer the island, particularly when confronted with the prospect of U.S. intervention. Moreover, an insurgency directed against any PRC presence could tie up PLA forces for years. A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would also affect the interests of Japan and other nations in the region that advocate a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait dispute, and would likely result in a fundamental re-ordering of the East Asian security architecture. Beijing would also have to factor in its calculus the potential political and economic repercussions of a military conflict with Taiwan. Chinas leaders recognize that a war could severely retard economic development. Taiwan is Chinas single largest source of foreign direct investment, and an extended
campaign would wreck Taiwans economic infrastructure, leading to high reconstruction costs. International sanctions could further damage Beijings economic development. A conflict would also severely damage the image that Beijing has sought to project and would undermine

the goodwill Beijing has attempted to build through its Harmonious World campaign leading up to and following its successful hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. A conflict could also trigger domestic unrest on the mainland, a contingency that Beijing appears to have factored into its planning. Finally, Chinas leaders recognize that a conflict over Taiwan involving the United States would lead to a long-term hostile relationship between the United States and China a result that would not be in Chinas interests.

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010

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27 China DA

AFF No China Rising

China will not threaten US power now-- focus on economics China Daily 10 [China Daily: Renowned Chinese politics journal. China's reemergence as a major power doesn't challenge US
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-05/07/content_9822621_2.htm]
Some American

experts worry that its leaders' sense of vulnerability could cause China to behave rashly in a crisis. Or as President Bill Clinton put it in 1999, while most people worry about the challenge of a strong China, "let us not forget the risk of a weak China, beset by internal conflict, social dislocation and criminal activity; becoming a vast zone of instability in Asia." A China that cannot control flows of migration, environmental effects on the global climate, and internal conflict poses a serious set of problems. As long as China's economy does grow, it is likely that its military power will increase, thus making China appear more dangerous to its neighbors. Official Chinese reports of military expenditure do not include many items that are listed in the
American defense budget, but regardless of its composition, from 1989 to 2010 China's official military budget increased by double digits every year. The Gulf War in 1991, the tensions over Taiwan in 1995-96, and the Kosovo campaign of 1999 showed Chinese leaders how far China lagged behind in modern military capabilities, and as a result they nearly doubled military expenditures over the course of the 1990s. Deng Xiaoping once told the UN General Assembly in 1974 that "China is not a superpower, nor will it ever seek to be one." The current generation of Chinese leaders,

realizing that rapid economic growth is the key to domestic political stability, has focused on economic development and what they call a "harmonious" international environment that will not disrupt their growth. Even if this were an accurate assessment of China's intentions, it is doubtful that China will have the military capability to make this possible. Moreover, Chinese leaders will have to contend with the prices imposed by other countries, as well as the constraints created by their own objectives of economic growth and the need for external markets and resources. Too aggressive a Chinese military posture could produce a countervailing coalition among its neighbors in the region that would weaken both its hard and soft power. But generations change, power often creates hubris, and appetites sometimes grow with eating. Martin Jacques argues that "rising powers in time
invariably use their newfound economic strength for wider political, cultural and military ends. That is what being a hegemonic power involves, and China will surely become one."

Chinas military power will not challenge US Thaindian 10 (Thainidian News March 4, 2010 Chinas military development will not challenge US: PLA Major General
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/chinas-military-development-will-not-challenge-us-pla-majorgeneral_100329548.html0)
Beijing, Mar 4(ANI): A Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) Major General and member of Chinas

top political advisory body has said the countrys military development will not challenge the United States. China is the only permanent member of the United Nations Security Council that has not achieved territorial integrity, The China Daily quoted Major General Luo Yuan, a member of the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and senior researcher with the Academy of Military Sciences, as saying. We need to think more on how to preserve national integrity. We have no intention of challenging the US, he added. Luos remarks came in response to
Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu, who recently said in his newly published book that China should build the worlds strongest military. Meanwhile, Zhao Qizheng, spokesman for the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), said that Chinas military power does not

threaten other countries. Chinas defense spending was just about 1.4 or 1.5 percent of the countrys GDP in recent years. US defense spending was more than 4 percent of its GDP, which is three times as big as Chinas , Zhao said. Chinas military budget
in 2009 was 70 billion dollars, while US military spending, by contrast, was about 494 billion dollars.