Strict Liability

A. Possessor of Animals Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.

Vestil v. IAC GR 74431, November 6, 1989

F: Theness Tan Uy, a 3 year old, was bitten by Andoy the dog inside a house while she was playing with a child of SPS VESTIL, who denies that they have anything to do with the dog or that they are owners of the house. Shortly after being bitten, Theness died. The UYS sued SPS VESTIL on the rounds that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of Andoy the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. SPS VESTIL claim that the dog belongs to the deceased Vicente Miranda, and that PURITA VESTIL cannot be considered the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father Vicente because this estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property, that it was a tame animal, that the death certificate states that Theness died of bronchopneumonia, and not the dog bite, and that in any case no one had witnessed Andoy bite Theness. The lower court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the decision was reversed in favor of the UYS. I: Whether or not SPS VESTIL were in possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the dog or of the house? H: Yes; Petition DENIED R: The Supreme Court applied and discussed Article 2183.

The Court declared that Article 2183 holds the possessor liable even if the animal should escape or be lost and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as SPS VESTIL contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tames ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, SPS VESTIL forget that Theness was only 3 years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal. According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause (Sangco, Torts and Damages, 1978 Ed., p.227). In the case at bar, there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence to establish that SPS VESTIL were in fact in possession of the house and of the dog at the time of the incident. Thus, SPS VESTIL must be held liable. The Court reduced the medical and hospitalization expenses but affirmed the challenged decision. B. Things thrown or falling Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. C. Death or Injuries in the course of employment Article 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics, or other employees even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if 1

the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employees own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employees lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced. Article 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow-worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow-workers intentional or malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiffs fellow worker. D. Product Liability Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death and injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. R.A. 7394 Articles 50 52, 97, 99, 106-107 R.A. 3720 Section 11

Coca-Cola Bottlers PHL, INC v. CA GR 110295, October 18, 1993

F: Lydia Geronimo (GERONIMO) was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen. Some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained foreign substances or particles. Upon hearing these complaints, she herself checked the unopened bottles and seeing the presence of foreign substances, submitted

them to the Regional Health Office of the Department of Health. The DOH informed GERONIMO by letter that the bottles had been polluted by the foreign substances. As a result, sales of soft drinks severely plummeted, and not long after, she had to close shop, became jobless and destitute. Thus, GERONIMO filed this complaint, demanding the payment of damages from Coca Cola Bottlers PHL, Inc (COCA COLA). COCA COLA on the other hand, moved to dismiss the complaint for failure of GERONIMO to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription, claiming that the complaint is for breach of warranty under Article 1561 of the Civil Code, and that the bottles should have been brought within six months from the delivery of the goods, pursuant to Article 1571. In her Comment thereto, GERONIMO alleges that the complaint is for one of damages which does not involve an administrative action and that her cause of action is based on an injury to her right which can be brought within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code. The RTC granted COCA COLAs motion to dismiss, agreeing with the contention of COCA COLA. The trial court also stated that the complaint is based on a contract and not a quasidelict, because there exists pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. The CA annulled the orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings. The Court of Appeals based its decision - first, on the truism that in legal procedure, what determines the nature of an action are the facts alleged in the complaint and not those averred as a defense in the defendants answer; and second, that despite the literal wording of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the existence of contractual relations between the parties does not absolutely preclude an action by one against the other for quasi-delict arising from negligence in the performance of a contract. I: Whether or not the action for damages in the case at bar should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty against hidden defects or merchantability, as claimed by the manufacturer, or as a complaint for damages under quasidelict? 2

H: The complaint is one for quasi-delict; Petition DENIED R: The Supreme Court found no merit in COCA COLAs petition. The Court found the Court of Appeals decision proper in concluding that the cause of action was founded on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146, it prescribes in four years is supported by the allegations in the complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption. The vendees remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. Under the law on obligations, responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations and any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from negligence is also demandable in any obligation, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. Those guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay in the performance of their obligations and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages. The vendor could likewise by liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176, and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasidelict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the act which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. The Court cited Singson vs. BPI, which in turn cites Air France vs. Carrascoso, wherein the Court held although the relation between the passenger and a carrier is contractual both in origin and nature the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual

relations. Thus, the Court found it sufficient that the same is applicable in the case at bar. E. Interference with Contractual Relations Article 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.

Gilchrist v. Cuddy, GR 9356, February 18, 1915

F: CUDDY was the owner of the film Zigomar, and on the 24th of April, he rented it to GILCHRIST for a week for P125, and it was to be delivered on the 26th of May, the week beginning that day. A few days prior to this CUDDY sent the money back to GILCHRIST, saying he had made other arrangements with his film. These other arrangements were the rental to ESPEJO, et.al., for P350 for the week. As a result, GILCHRIST asked the court for an injunction against CUDDY, ordering him to deliver the film to GILCHRIST as agreed on in their contract, and one against ESPJEO et.al., prohibiting them from showing the same film for the week beginning the 26th of May. The trial court found that there was a contract between CUDDY and GILCHRIST; that ESPEJO admitted he knew that CUDDY was the owner of the film; and that ESPEJO et.al. must necessarily have known at the time they made their offer to CUDDY that the latter had booked or contracted the film for six weeks from April 26. Therefore, the inevitable conclusion is that ESPEJO et.al. knowingly induced CUDDY to violate his contract with another person. But there is no specific finding that ESPEJO et.al. knew the identity of the other party. ESPEJO et.al. claim that they had a right to do what they did, that they had a right to compete with GILCHRIST for the lease of the film, and that the right to compete is a justification for their acts. ESPEJO also claim that the prohibitive injunction was an error of law. I: Whether or not ESPEJO et.al. were liable for interfering with the contract between GILCHRIST and CUDDY, they not knowing at the time the identity of one of the contracting 3

parties? Whether or not the right to compete justifies their actions? Whether or not the prohibitive injunction was proper? H: Yes; No; Yes; questioned Decision AFFIRMED R: As to the defense of the right to compete the Supreme Court rationed that if there had been no contract between CUDDY and GILCHRIST, the defense of the right to compete may be tenable, but the mere right to compete could not justify intentionally inducing CUDDY to take away the contractual rights of GILCHRIST. Chief Justice Wells in Walker vs. Cronin (107 Mass., 555) said If disturbance or loss come as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with. The Court also referred to the principle that the ground on which the liability of a third party for interfering with a contract between others rests, is that the interference was malicious. In the case at bar, the only motive for the interference with the GILCHRIST-CUDDY contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with the contract and causing its breach. It is therefore clear under the above authorities, that they were liable to GILCHRIST for the damages caused by their acts, unless they are relieved from such liability by reason of the fact that they did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee (GILCHRIST) of the film. As the propriety of the prohibitive injunction - The Court applied the general doctrine of injunction, found in Devesa vs. Arbes (13 Phil Rep., 273). An injunction is a special remedyforcases where there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, which will not be granted while the rights between the parties are undetermined, expect in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be done, which cannot be compensated in damages, and where there will be no adequate remedy, and which will not, as a

rule, be granted, to take property out of the possession of one party and put it into that of another whose title has not been established by law. Applying the Devesa doctrine, the Court established that GILCHRIST was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits by reason of the fact that ESPEJO, et.al. had induced CUDDY to rent to them the film GILCHRIST had counted upon as his feature film; that it is quite apparent that to estimate with any degree of accuracy the damages which GILCHRIST would likely suffer from such an event would be difficult if not impossible. If GILCHRIST allowed ESPEJO, et.al. to exhibit the film in Iloilo, it would be useless for GILCHRIST to exhibit it against, as the desire of the public to witness the production would have already been satisfied. In this extremity, GILCHRIST applied for and was granted, a mandatory injunction against CUDDY, requiring him to deliver the film to GILCHRIST, and a preliminary injunction against ESPEJO, et.al., restraining them from exhibiting that film in their theater during the week GILCHRIST had a right to exhibit it. These injunctions saved GILCHRIST from damages due to the unwarranted interference of ESPEJO, et.al., as well as the difficult task which would have been set for the court of estimating them in case ESPEJO et.al. had been allowed to carry out their illegal plans. Thus, as to the preliminary injunction issued against ESPEJO, et.al., the Court is of the opinion that the circumstances justified the issuance of that injunction in the discretion of the court. CONCURRING OPINION OF Moreland, J., : The court seems to be of the opinion that the action is one for a permanent injunction; whereas, under my view of the case, it is one of specific performance. The contract was actually specifically performed before the action was tried.

So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals GR 120554, September 21, 1999

F: In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co. (TEK HUA TRADING), entered into lease agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc (DCCSI). The contracts each had a one-year term. They provided that should the lessee continue to occupy the premises after the term, the lease shall be on a month-to-month basis. When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, but TEK HUA continued to occupy the premises. In 1976, TEK HUA dissolved. Later, the original members of TEK HUA including Manuel C. Tiong (TIONG) formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. (TEK HUA ENTERPRISING) So Pek Giok (GIOK) managing partner of TEK HUA TRADING, died in 1986. GIOKs grandson, SO PING BUN, occupied the warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing, (TRENDSETTER). In 1989, DCCSI sent letters to TEK HUA ENTERPRISING, informing the latter of its intent to increase the rent. Enclosed in these letters were new lease contracts for signing. DCCSI warned that failure of the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall be deemed as lack of interest on the lessees part, and agreement to the termination of the lease. TEK HUA ENTERPRISING and TIONG did not answer any of these letters. Still, the lease contracts were not rescinded. In 1991, TIONG sent SO PING BUN a letter, advising him to vacate all his stocks at the warehouse. SO PING BUN refused to vacate. In 1992, SO PING BUN requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI in favor of TRENDSETTER. DCCSI acceded to SO PING BUNs request, and lease contracts were thereafter executed. In a suit for injunction, TIONG pressed for the nullification of the lease contracts between SO PING BUN and DCCSI. The trial court ruled in favor of TIONG and TEK HUA ENTERPRISING. The Court of Appeals upheld the RTC. I: Whether or not SO PING BUN may be held liable for tortuous interference of contract? H: Yes; PETITION DENIED

R: The Court rationed that the issue essentially involves the correct interpretation of the applicable law on tortuous conduct, particularly unlawful interference with contract. The Court began its rationale by discussing certain fundamental principles on torts and damages. Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; (b) the invasion is substantial; (c) the defendants conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; and (d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules. The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse. In the case at the bar, TRENDSETTER asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result, SO PING BUN deprived TEK HUA ENTERPRISING of its property right. Clearly, and as correctly viewed by the CA, the elements of tort interference are present. The Court cited its ruling in Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, wherein it held that where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind ones conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on SO PING BUN. The Court acknowledged and affirmed that the lower courts did not award damages, but only because the extent of damages were not quantifiable. Lack of malice precludes damages. But it does not relieve SO PING BUN from the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The CA correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and TRENDSETTER. 5

F. Liability of LGUs Article 2189. Provinces, cities, and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works under their control or supervision.

prove that the City of Dagupan had control or supervision over Perez Blvd. I: Whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in effect, binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with Article 2189 of the Civil Code? Whether or not the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over a national road as an ex-officio Highway Engineer of the Ministry of Public Highway exempts the City from liability? H: Yes; No; Petition GRANTED R: The Court reiterated that the liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in Article 2189 of the Civil Code. The Court explained that it is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city, or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. The same charter also provies that the laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located. The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries sustained by persons or property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the charter, can not be used to exempt the city, as in the case at bar (Jimenez v. City of Manila No. 71049). The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other hand, Article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from defective streets, public buildings and other public works. Further, the salary of the City Engineer from the city government substantially exceeds the honorarium he receives from the Ministry of Public Highways as an ex-officio Highway 6

Guilatco v. City of Dagupan GR 61516, March 21, 1989

F: GUILATCO, a Court Interpreter of Branch III, CFI Dagupan City, while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located on Perez Blvd. (A National Road, under the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell into a manhole located on said sidewalk, causing her right leg to be fractured. As a result thereof, she had to be hospitalized, operated on, and confined. The existence of the manhole on the sidewalk, which was partially covered by a concrete flower pot, leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 feet wide was confirmed. Alfredo Tangco, City Engineer of Dagupan City and admittedly ex-officio Highway Engineer, City Engineer of the Public Works and Building Official for Dagupan City, admitted the existence of said manhole along the sidewalk on Perez Blvd, admittedly a National Road. He also admitted that said manhole is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd are also owned by the National Government. But as City Engineer of Dagupan City, he supervises the maintenance of said manholes or drainage system and sees to it that they are properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his subordinates. In his Answer to GUILATCOs complaint, he expressly admitted that in his capacity as ex-officio Highway Engineer for Dagupan City, he exercises supervision and control over National roads, including Perez Blvd where the incident happened. The lower court found in favor of GUILATCO. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the lower courts findings on the gound that no evidence was presented by GUILATCO to

Engineer. In his official capacity as City Engineer of Dagupan, his supervision over streets, public buildings, and other public works is coursed through two officials who are, though employees of the National Government, detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer. There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control and supervision over the public works in question. Hence the liability of the city to GUILATCO under Article 2189 is clear.

to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Ruiz v. Secretary of Natl Defense GR L-15526, December 28, 1963 1) Breach of Promise to Marry, Seduction, and Sexual Assault Wassmer v. Velez GR L-20089, December 24, 1964 Tanjanco v. CA GR L-18630, December 17, 1966 Bunag, Jr v. CA GR 101749, July 10, 1992 Constantino, et.al. v. Mendez GR 57227, May 14, 1992 2) Malicious Prosecution Magtanggol Que v. IAC GR 66865, January 13, 1989 Drilon v. CA GR 107019, March 20, 1997 Lao v. CA GR 47013, February 17, 2000 3) Public Humiliation

VIII. Intentional Torts

A. Abuse of Rights Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Albenson Enterprises Corp, et.al. v. CA GR 88694, January 11, 1993

F: ALBENSON delivered to GUARANTEED, the mild steel plates it had ordered. As part payment thereof, ALBENSON was given a Pacific Banking Corporation Check against the account of E.L. WOODWORKS. When ALBENSON presented the same check for payment, it was dishonored for the reason Account Closed. Thereafter, ALBENSON, through counsel, traced the Barons Marketing Corp v. CA GR 126486, February 9, 1998 University of the East v. Jader GR 132344, February 17, 2000 Amonoy v. Sps Gutierrez and Fornilda, GR 140420, February 15, 2001 B. Acts contra bonus mores Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary

Grand Union Supermarket, v. Espino, Jr GR L-48250, December 28, 1979

F: On the morning of August 22, 1970, Jose J. Espino, Jr., (ESPINO) a civil engineer and an executive of Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc., and his wife and their two daughters went to shop at the Grand Union Supermarkets (GRAND UNION) South Supermarket in Makati. While with his wife and children, ESPINO found a cylindrical rat tail file which he needed for his hobby and had been wanting to buy, ESPINO picked up that item from one of the shelves and put it in his front breast pocket of his shirt with a good part of the merchandise exposed. 7

After paying for his wifes purchases which amounted to P77.00, and forgetting to pay for the file, he exited the supermarket. However, as he was leaving, a uniformed guard approached ESPINO, stopped him and pointed to his left front breast pocket. Suddenly reminded of the file, ESPINO turned back toward the cashier to pay for the file but was stopped again by the guard and led him instead to the rear of the supermarket. ESPINO was thereafter detained and interrogated by uniformed guards who shouted at him, made him pay a fine, and threatened to call the police all in the presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket, which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment. ESPINO filed a complaint founded on Article 21 in relation to Article 2219, and prayed for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, costs of the suit and the return of the P5.00. After trial, the CFI dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed and set aside the appealed judgment, granting the damages. I: Whether or not GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET, INC willfully caused loss or injury to ESPINO in a manner that was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy? H: Yes; Petition DENIED; Damages Modified R: The Supreme Court in this case agreed with the Decision of the Court of Appeals that upon the facts and under the law, ESPINO has clearly made the cause of action for damages against GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET, INC. GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET, INC willfully caused loss or injury to ESPINO in a manner that was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, making them amenable to damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. ESPINO was falsely accused of shoplifting. A remark made by Nelia Santos Fandino an employee of GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET made in the presence of ESPINO and with reference to the incident report with its entries, was offensive to ESPINOs dignity and defamatory to his character and honesty. The

fine which was to be given as an incentive to the guards who apprehend pilferers clearly proved that FANDINO branded ESPINO as a thief which was not right nor justified. The false accusation charged against ESPINO after detaining and interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner in which he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine, threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment, sufficiently rendered GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET, INC liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219. The Court ruled that under the facts of the case at bar, GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET INC willfully caused loss or injury to ESPINO in a manner that was contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. It is against morals, good customs and public policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy, and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code). And one must act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith (Article 19, Civil Code).

Patricio v. Leviste, GR 51832, April 26, 1989

F: Rafael Patricio (PATRICIO) is an ordained Catholic priest and actively engaged in social and civic affairs in Pilar, Capiz where he is residing, was appointed Director General of the 1976 Religious and Municipal Town Fiesta of Pilar, Capiz. Bienvenido Bacalocos (BACALOCOS) is the President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Pilar, Capiz. At a benefit dance, near the gate of the public auditorium, BACALOCOS, in a state of drunkenness, struck a bottle of beer on the table causing an injury on his hand, which started to bleed. BACALOCOS then approached PATRICIO in a hostile manner, asked PATRICIO if he had seen his wounded hand, but without waiting for PATRICIO to respond, BACALOCOS, without 8

provocation, hit PATRICIOs face with his bloodied hand. A criminal complaint for Slander by Deed was filed by PATRICIO, which was later dismissed. Subsequently, a complaint for damages was filed by PATRICIO. The trial court initially ruled in favor of PATRICIO, holding BACALOCOS liable for moral damages as a result of the physical suffering, moral shock and social humiliation caused by his act of hitting PATRICIO on the face in public. Included in the contentions of BACALOCOS is that he cannot be made liable for his act because there was no bad faith on his part, having been in a state of drunkenness. On a motion for reconsideration filed by BACALOCOS, however, the court reversed its initial decision and dismissed PATRICIOs complaint, on the ground that there was no proof of compensatory damages. I: Whether or not there is merit in PATRICIOs complaint for moral damages against BACALOLOS? H: Yes; Petition GRANTED R: The Court ruled that there is no question that moral damages may be recovered in cases where a defendants wrongful act or omission has caused the complainant physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury (Article 2217, Civil Code). An award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. It was established before the court that there was an existing feud between the families of PATRICIO and BACALOCOS and that BACALOCOS slapped PATRICIO without provocation in the presence of several persons. The act of BACALOCOS hitting PATRICIO on the face is contrary to morals and good customs and caused PATRICIO mental anguish, moral shock, wounded feelings and social humiliation. BACALOCOS has to take full responsibility for his act and his claim that he was unaware of what he had done to PATRICIO because of drunkenness is

definitely no excuse and does not relieve him of his liability to PATRICIO. The Court applied Article 21 of the Civil Code in relation to par. 10 of Article 2219 of the same Code, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The fact that no actual or compensatory damage was proven before the trial court, does not adversely affect PATRICIOs right to recover moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded in appropriate cases referred to in the chapter on human relations of the Civil Code (Articles 19 to 36), without need of proof that the wrongful act complained of had caused any physical injury upon the complainant. It is clear from the report of the Code Commission that the reason underlying an award of damages under Art. 21 of the Civil Code is to compensate the injured party for the moral injury caused upon his person. 4) Unjust Dismissal

Medina v. Castro-Bartolome GR L-59825, September 11, 1982

F: On December 20, 1977, Cosme de Aboitiz (ABOITIZ) acting in his capacity as President and Chief Executive Officer of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc went to PepsiCola Plant in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and without any provocation, shouted and maliciously humiliated Ernesto Medina (MEDINA) and Jose G. Ong (ONG) with the use of slanderous language and other words of similar import uttered in the presence of subordinate employees. On January 9, 1978, MEDINA and ONG filed a joint criminal complaint for oral defamation against ABOITIZ. After conducting a preliminary investigation, the complaints were dismissed. However, the Deputy Minister of Justice issued a resolution reversing the decision of the Provincial Fiscal and directing him to file against ABOITIZ an information for Grave Slander. In May, 1978, MEDINA and ONG filed a complaint against ABOITIZ and PEPSI at the 9

Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that PEPSI through its president, ABOITIZ, dismissed and slandered MEDINA and ONG in the presence of their subordinate employees although this could have been done in private; that ABOITIZ enjoyed the act of dismissing MEDINA and ONG and planned to make their dismissal as humiliating as possible; that ABOITIZ did not really have a strong reason for publicly humiliating MEDINA and ONG by dismissing them on the spot; that ABOITIZ and PEPSI were moved by evil motives and an anti-social attitude. ABOITIZ and PEPSI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that the complaint for civil damages is clearly not based on an employer-employee relationship but on the manner of MEDINAs and ONGs dismissal and the effects flowing therefrom. The trial court reiterated in its decision that it has already been settled by jurisprudence that mere asking for reinstatement does not remove from the CFI jurisdiction over the damages. The case must involve unfair labor practices to bring it within the jurisdiction of the CIR (now NLRC). While trial was underway, ABOITIZ and PEPSI filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint because of amendments to the Labor Code immediately prior thereto. The trial court agreed with ABOITIZ and PEPSI that the complaint of MEDINA and ONG alleges unfair labor practices which under Article 217 of the Labor Code, as mended by P.D. 1691, has vested original and exclusive jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters, and Article 248 thereofwhich may include claims for damages and other affirmative reliefs. Under the amendment, therefore, jurisdiction over employee-employer relations and claims of workers have been removed from the Courts of First Instance. The trial court dismissed the case on the grounds that the case would not have arisen if MEDINA and ONG had not been employees of PEPSI, and that the alleged defamatory remarks were said in the court of their employment and were dismissed from employment. Hence, this appeal by MEDINA and ONG to the Supreme Court.

I: Whether or not the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs? H: No; Petition GRANTED; trial court is ordered to proceed R: The Court held that it is obvious from the complaint that MEDINA and ONG have not alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by ABOITIZ and PEPSI. Such being the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. It results that the orders under review are based on a wrong premise.

Singapore Airlines v. Pao GR L-47739, June 22, 1983

F: In 1974, Carlos E. Cruz (CRUZ) was offered employment by Singapore Airlines as Engineer Officer with the opportunity to undergo a B-707 conversion training course, which he accepted. An express stipulation in the letter-offer required a bond to be entered for a period of 5 years, and that a list of sureties be given to Singapore Airlines. CRUZ also entered into an Agreement for a Course of Conversion Training at the Expense of Singapore Airlines Limited which stipulated among others, that The Engineer Officer shall agree to remain in the service of the Company for a period of five years from the date of commencement of such aforesaid conversion training if so required by the company. It then listed scenarios, in the event of which, the Engineer Officer may be held liable to pay the Company liquidated damages. It also listed instances wherein the Engineer Officer may be exempted from liability. CRUZ signed the Agreement with B.E. Villanueva as surety. Thereafter, claiming that CRUZ applied for leave without pay and had gone on leave without approval of the application during the second year of the period of five years, Singapore Airlines filed suit for damages against CRUZ and his surety for violation of the terms and 10

conditions of the aforesaid Agreement. Singapore Airlines sought liquidated damages, overpayment of salary, cost of uniforms and accessories supplied by the company, cost of a flight manual, and an amount corresponding to vacation leave which he had availed of but to which he was no longer entitled, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs. In his Answer, CRUZ denied any breach of contract contending that in no time had he been required by Singapore Airlines to a straight service of five years under Clause 4 of the Agreement, and that he left the service on valid compassionate grounds stated to and accepted by the company so that no damages may be awarded against him. CRUZ counterclaimed for attorneys fees. The surety, Villanueva, contended that he was merely one of two guarantors and not that of surety. He filed a cross-claim against CRUZ for any damages he may be held liable for. Judge of the lower court issued an Order dismissing the complaint, stating that the case involves a money claim arising from an employer-employee relation or at the very least a case arising from employer-employee relations which under Article 216 of the Labor Code is vested exclusively with the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission. I: Whether or not this case is properly cognizable by Courts of justice or by the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC? H: The Civil Courts; Order set aside; remanded to the lower court R: The Court held that upon the facts and issues involved, jurisdiction over the present controversy must be held to belong to the Civil Courts. Singapore Airlines claim for damages is grounded on the wanton failure and refusal without just cause of CRUZ to report for duty despite repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence without pay. This, coupled with the further averment that CRUZ maliciously and with bad faith violated the terms and conditions of the conversion training course agreement to the damage of Singapore Airlines removes the

present controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it within the purview of Civil Law. Clearly the complaint was anchored not on abandonment per se by CRUZ of his job as the latter was not required in the Complaint to report back to work but on the manner and consequent effects of such abandonment of work translated in terms of the damages which Singapore Airlines had to suffer. The Court referred to its decision in Quisaba v. Sta. Ines Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc, The right of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and article 21, which makes a person liable for damages if he willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral damages, is provided in Article 2219, no. 10 (Cf, Philippine Refining Co. vs. Garcia, L-21962, Sept. 27, 1966, 18 SCRA 107). Stated differently, Singapore Airlines seeks protection under the civil laws and claims no benefits under the Labor Code. The primarily relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of contractual obligation. The items claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute. Additionally, there is a secondary issue involved that is outside the pale of competence of Labor Arbiters is the liability of Villanueva one of suretyship or one of guaranty?

IX. Other Torts

1) Dereliction of Duty Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just case, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without 11

prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

Amaro v. Sumanguit GR L-14986, July 31, 1962

F: Jose Amaro (AMARO) was assaulted and shot near the city government building of Silay. The following day, he and his father went to the office of the Chief of Police, SUMANGUIT, who, instead of assisting them in their complaint, allegedly harassed and terrorized them. AMARO claims that only upon advice of the City Mayor did SUMANGUIT conduct an investigation of the incident. After the investigation, SUMANGUIT has allegedly been harassing AMARO, and is threatening to arrest AMARO in order that he may obtain their signatures for an affidavit exempting the police from any dereliction of duty in their case against the perpetrator of the crime. AMARO filed a suit for damages in the Court of First Instance against SUMANGUIT. The complaint is predicated on Article 21 and/or 27 of the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to state a cause of action. I: Whether or not the complaint was properly dismissed by the lower court? H: No; Order Reversed; Case Remanded R: The Court was of the opinion that the facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction on SUMANGUITs part in light of Article 27 of the Civil Code. AMAROs claim for relief is not based on the fact of harassment and terrorization but on SUMANGUITs refusal to give them assistance, which it was his duty to do as an officer of the law. The complaint is without doubt imperfectly draft. It suffers from vagueness and generalization. But all that the Rules require is that there is a showing, by a statement of ultimate facts, that the plaintiff has a right and that such right has been violated by the defendant. An action should not be dismissed upon mere ambiguity, indefiniteness or un

certainty, for these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss. The fact cited by the court below in the order subject to review, that AMARO has another recourse (in connection with the crime of illegal discharge of firearms supposedly committed against one of them) as by filing their complaint directly with the city attorney of Silay or by lodging an administrative charge against SUMANGUIT herein, does not preclude this action for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code and hence does not justify its dismissal. 2) Unfair Competition Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive, or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage. 3) Violation of Human Dignity and Privacy Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar act, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence; (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

St. Louis Realty Corporation v. CA GR L-46061, November 14, 1984

F: In an advertisement placed in the issue of the Sunday Times, St. Louis Realty Corporation misrepresented that the house of Dr. Conrado J. Aramil (DR. ARAMIL) belonged to Arcadio S. 12

Arcadio. The advertisement appeared in more than one issue. DR. ARAMIL, noticing the mistake, sent St. Louis Realty a letter or protest. The letter was received by an officer of St. Louis Realty who contacted DR. ARAMIL and offered his apologies. However, no rectification or apology was published. ARAMILs counsel demanded actual, moral and exemplary damages from St. Louis Realty. In its Answer, St. Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake and that if DR. ARAMIL so desired, rectification would be published in the Manila Times. St. Louis Realty published a new advertisement with the Arcadio Family and their real house, but it did not publish an apology to DR. ARAMIL or an explanation of the error. DR. ARAMIL filed his complaint for damages. The following month, St. Louis Realty published in the issue of Manila Times a Notice of Rectification. The judge of the lower court observed that St. Louis Realty should have immediately published a rectification and apology. He found that as a result of St. Louis Realtys mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, DR. ARAMIL suffered mental anguish and his income was reduced. Moreover, there was violation of DR. ARAMILs right to privacy (Art 26, Civil Code). The trial court awarded DR. ARAMIL damages. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning out that St. Louis realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to DR. ARAMIL who, naturally, was annoyed. Hence, this appeal by St. Louis Realty. I: Whether or not St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26? H: Yes; Petition DENIED R: The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. St. Louis Realtys employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mixup. It just contended itself with a cavalier rectification. Persons, who know the residence

of DR ARAMIL, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.

Concepcion v. CA GR 120706, January 31, 2000

F: Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of Florence Concepcion, angrily accosted Nestor Nicolas, husband of Allem Nicolas, at the Nicolass apartment, accusing him of an adulterous relationship with Florence. To clarify matters, and upon a dare by Rodrigo, Nestor accompanied him to see some relatives of the Concepcion family who denied that they knew of the rumor. Prior to the incident, Florence and Nestor had been partners in a business venture. Florence agreed to provide capital, whilst Nestor supplied government agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a cash or credit basis. Rodrigos insinuations led to Florence backing out of the business venture, which resulted in the Nicolas spouses to become unable to cope with their commitments to their clients and customers. Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could no longer face his neighbors. To make matters worse, Allem Nicolas started to doubt Nestors fidelity, which resulted in bickerings and quarrels wherein Allem would express a desire to leave her husband. Spouses Nicolas filed a civil suit against Rodrigo for damages. Rodrigo denies that he maligned Nestor by accusing him publicly of being Florences lover, that he was merely protecting the name and reputation of the Concepcion family. He also claims that the award of damages was without legal basis, arguing that the alleged act imputed to him does not fall under Articles 26 and 2219 of the Civil Code.

13

I: Whether or not the act of Rodrigo falls under Articles 26 and 2219 of the Civil Code? H: Yes; Petition DENIED R: The Court affirmed that the factual findings of the case provide enough basis in law for the award of damages by the Court of Appeals. The incident charged of Rodrigo Concepcion was no less than an invasion of the right of Nestor Nicolas as a person. The philosophy behind Article 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a persons dignity, personality, privacy, and peace of mind. The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a persons dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language. Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. There is no question that Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of Rodrigo Concepcions abusive, scandalous, and insulting language.

Civil Action
A. Violation of Civil and Political Rights Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: (1) Freedom of religion; (2) Freedom of speech; (3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication; (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; (5) Freedom of suffrage; (6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; (7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use; (8) The right to the equal protection of the laws; (9) The right to be secured in ones person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; (10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same; (11) The privacy of communication and correspondence; (12) The right to become a member of associations or societies not contrary to law; (13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances; (14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form; (15) The right of the accused against excessive bail; (16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf; 14

Torts with Independent

(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness; (18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and; (19) Freedom of access to the courts. In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendants act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted) and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Lim v. Ponce de Leon No. L-22554, August 29, 1975

F: In 1961, Jikil Taha (TAHA) sold a motor launch to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya. A year later, Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that TAHA forcibly took away the motor launch from him. Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon (FISCAL DE LEON) filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan, an information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against TAHA. Upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, FISCAL DE LEON wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan, requesting him to direct the

detachment commander in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch. FISCAL DE LEON reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, Delfin Lim (LIM), cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. Upon order of the Provincial Commander, Detachment Commander Orlando Maddela (MADDELA) seized the motor launch from LIM and impounded it. LIM and TAHA filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan, a complaint for damages against FISCAL DE LEON and MADDELA, alleging that MADDELA entered the premises of LIM without a search warrant and took away the motor launch without his consent, and that FISCAL DE LEON ordered the same knowing full well that his office was not vested with authority to order the seizure of private property. LIM and TAHA claim that as a consequence of the unlawful seizure of the motor launch, its sale did not materialize; and that because of exposure to the elements while it was impounded, the motor launch had become worthless and beyond repair. For the alleged violation of their constitutional rights, LIM and TAHA pray that FISCAL DE LEON and MADDELA be ordered to pay them jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. As defenses, FISCAL DE LEON and MADDELA claim that the seizure and impounding of the motor launch was proper for being the corpus delicti of the robbery; that MADDELA merely obeyed the order of his superior officer; and that FISCAL DE LEON and MADDELA acted in good faith. The trial court rendered its decision, upholding the validity of the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that the authority to impound evidences or exhibits or corpus delicti in a case pending investigation is inherent in the Provincial Fiscal who controls the prosecution and who introduces those exhibits in the court. The complaint was dismissed and LIM and TAHA were ordered to pay FISCAL DE LEON and MADDELA actual damages, attorneys fees and exemplary damages. Hence, this appeal. 15

I: Whether or not FISCAL PONCE DE LEON had the power to order the seizure of the motor launch? Whether or not FISCAL PONCE DE LEON and MADDELA are civilly liable for damages allegedly suffered by LIM and TAHA, granting that the seizure of the motor launch was a violation of their constitutional rights? H: No; Yes; Petition GRANTED R: FISCAL DE LEON and MADDELA admitted that when MADDELA entered the premises of LIM and impounded the motor launch he was not armed with a search warrant; that he effected the seizure of the motor launch in the absence of and without the consent of LIM. There can be no question that without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. And since in the present case FISCAL DE LEON and MADDELA seized the motor launch without a warrant, they have violated the constitutional right of LIM and TAHA against unreasonable search and seizure. The Court discussed Article 32 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual or moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded. To be liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of LIM and TAHA and it is not required that FISCAL DE LEON and MADDELA should have acted with malice or bad faith. Jorge Bocobo, Chairman of the Code Commission gave the reasons why absence of malice or good faith is not exempt from liability under Article 32. The statement was made during the public hearings of the Joint Senate and House Committees, why good faith on the part of the public officer or employee is immaterial: The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is unnecessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat

the main purpose of Article 32, which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the U.S. this remedy is in the nature of a tort. Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles introduced in the New Civil Code to implement democracy. There is no real democracy if a public official is abusing and we made the article so strong and so comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual rights even if done in good faith, that official is liable. As a matter of fact, we know that there are very few public officials who openly and definitely abuse the individual rights of the citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of desire to enforce the law to comply with ones duty. And so, if should limit the scope of this article, that would practically nullify the object of the article. Precisely, the opening object of the article is to put an end to abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith, which is in most cases the plea of officials abusing individual rights. However, the Supreme Court ruled that MADDELA could not be held accountable because he impounded the motor launch upon the order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may be held liable for executing unlawful orders of his superior officer, there are certain circumstances which would warrant MADDELAs exculpation from liability. The records show that MADDELA was reluctant to impound the motor launch despite repeated orders from his superior officer. It was only after he was furnished a copy of the reply from FISCAL DE LEON to the letter of the Provincial Commander, justifying the necessity of the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that the subsequent sale of the launch to LIM could not prevent the court from taking custody of the same that he impounded the motor launch. MADDELA was led to believe that there was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch. Then came the order of his superior officer to explain the delay in the seizure. Faced with possible disciplinary 16

action, MADDELA was left with no alternative but to seize the vessel.

Aberca, et.al. v. Ver, et.al. No. L-69866, April 15, 1988

F: This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of ABERCA, et.al., by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct preemptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila. That complying with said order, elements of TFM raided several places, employing in most cases, defectively issued judicial search warrants, confiscated a number of purely personal items, made arrests without proper warrants, interrogated ABERCA, et.al, through the employment of threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions, among others. That all violations of the constitutional rights of ABERCA et.al, were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from them, and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by VER, et.al., ABERCA, et.al, sought actual/compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. A motion to dismiss was filed by VER, et.al, alleging that (1) The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus prevents judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention; (2) VER, et.al are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against VER, et.al. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. I: Whether or not VER et.al, may be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code? H: Yes; Petition GRANTED; Case Remanded

R: The Court found the petition meritorious and decided to give it due course. At the heart of the complaint filed by ABERCA et.al is Article 32 of the Civil Code. The Court declared that it is obvious that the purpose of Article 32 is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear: no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view, which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the community. Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls. The Court found the invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit by VER, et.al., totally misplaced. The cases invoked by VER, et.al actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties within the ambit of their powers. VER et.al claim that they were merely responding to their duty in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion. This cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untrammelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress the rights or liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the 17

supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times. Article 32, which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein does not exempt VER et al from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. As to the contention that the suspension of privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars the cause of action of ABERCA, et.al the Court found that it does not destroy the right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. And even assuming that it may suspend the right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of the confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment. As to the contention that respondeat superior does not apply in this case thus superior officers cannot be made liable, the Court agreed in part. The Court agreed that respondeat superior is inapplicable. However, by construing the language of Article 32, the Court ruled that the law speaks of an officer or employee or person directly or indirectly responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may superior officials relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and

liberties of the citizen. Article 32 makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon ABERCA, et al violative of their constitutional rights.

MHP Garments, Inc et al v. CA GR 86720, September 2, 1994

F: MHP Garments Inc (MHP) was awarded an exclusive franchise by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, MHP was given the authority to undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies, upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law. In October, 1983, MHP received information that private respondents were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without authority. An employee of MHP undertook the necessary surveillance and submitted a report to the Philippine Constabulary. Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondents stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed respondents. A criminal complaint for unfair competition was filed against private respondents. The Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents and ordered the return of the seized items. Private respondents filed a suit against MHP for sums of money and damages. The trial court granted their petition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In their defense, MHP contends that they cannot be held liable due to 18

the fact that it was the Philippine Constabulary that committed the act of confiscation. I: Whether or not MHP may be held liable to private respondents under Article 32 despite the fact that they did not commit the act of confiscation? H: Yes; Petition DENIED R: In the case at bench, the seizure was made without any warrant, which is contrary to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which protects our people from unreasonable search and seizure. The law provides for incidents when a warrantless search may be valid, but the evidence in this case did not justify a warrantless search and seizure of private respondents goods. Despite the sufficiency of time, MHP and the PC raiding party did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods. There was no probable cause for the seizure. Clearly, the search and seizure in this case was illegal. MHPs deflection of their liability with the argument that it was the Philippine Constabulary that conducted the raid and their participation was only to report the alleged illegal activity of private respondents is without merit. While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for violation of private respondents constitutional rights, still, the omission does not exculpate MHP. In the case of Lim v. Ponce de Leon, the Court ruled that recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or private individual may be had through Article 32, and Article 2219 of the Civil Code. In Aberca v. Ver, the Court explained the liability of persons indirectly responsible. Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. MHP was indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. First, it was upon MHPs instance that the PC soldiers conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. PC soldiers immediately turned over the seized merchandise to MHP. Second, the Memorandum Agreement which they are bound to expressly requires that

MHP report the unlawful peddling of scouting goods for the proper application of a warrant. And thirdly, if MHP did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the raiding team for any contribution or any other relief. They did not. There can be no doubt that private respondents must have suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings due to the tortious raid caused by MHP. B. Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of the evidence. Article 353. Definition of Libel. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Article 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it shown, except in the following cases: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. Article 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, 19

phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematogaphic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party. Article 356. Threatening to publish and offer to present such publication for a compensation The penaly of arresto mayor or a fine of from 200 to 2,000 pesos or both, shall bei mpsoed upon any person who threatens another to publish a libel concerning him or the parents, spouse, child, or other members of the family of the latter, or upon anyone who shall ofer to prevent the publication of such libel for a compensation or money consideration. Article 357. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of official proceedings. The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine of from 200 to 2,000 pesos or both shall be imposed upon any reporter, editor, or manger of a newspaper, daily or magazine, who shall publish facts connected with the private life of another and offense to the honor, virtue, and reputation of said person, even though said publication be made in connection with or under the pretext that is necessary in the narration of any judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have been mentioned. Article 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is a serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos. Article 359. Slander by deed. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine raning from 200 to 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall perform any act not included and punished in this title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person. If said act is not of a serious nature, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.

Marcia v. CA GR L-34529, January 21, 1983

F: On December 23, 1956, a passenger bus operated by Victory liner and driven by its employee, Felardo Paje (PAJE) collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latters death and in physical injuries to Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap (MARCIA and YAP). A criminal complaint was filed against Felardo Paje for homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. An action for damages was filed by MARCIA and YAP alleging that the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of PAJE in driving the passenger bus. While the civil action was in progress, the criminal action proceeded, eventually leading to PAJEs acquittal by the Court of Appeals. The CAs decision held that the criminal negligence was wanting and that PAJE was not even guilty of civil negligence. The case was that of a pure accident according to the Court of Appeals. As a consequence of the CA decision, Victory Liner and PAJE moved for the dismissal of the civil case filed by MARCIA and YAP based on Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which states that when the extinction of the penal action proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise, the same extinguishes civil liability. The trial court dismissed the complaint of MARCIA and YAP. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The heirs of Clemente Marcia instituted a separate civil action against PAJE. The complaint was dismissed by the trial court. I: Whether or not the civil liability was extinguished when PAJE was acquitted from the penal action? H: Yes; Petition DENIED R: An acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the 20

filing of an independent civil action if it is based on the crime. As held in Corpus v. Paje, reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code. The article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by MARCIA and YAP alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. Further Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that (c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. The charge against PAJE was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide and physical injuries suffered by MARCIA and YAP. They are not one of the 3 crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, and therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.

I: Whether or not the suit for damages may proceed independently from the criminal action in the case at bar? H: Yes; Petition GRANTED R: The Court held that the pertinent provisions are Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code. Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of the evidence. (Rule 111, Rules of Court) Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code) There are at least two things about Article 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely: 1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions criminal action and criminal prosecution. This conclusion is supported by the Code Commissions comments. 2. The term physical injuries is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injures but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. In Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94, 9696 [1955], the Court cited the Code Commissions recommendations that the civil action for physical injuries by similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law. Thus, if the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery as the 21

Madeja v. Caro GR L-51183, December 21, 1983

F: Dr. Eva Japzon was accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The widow of Cleto, Carmen L. Madeja (MADEJA), filed the criminal complaint. MADEJA reserved her right to file a separate civil action for damages. The criminal case still pending, MADEJA sued Dr. Japzon for damages. She alleged that her husband died because of Dr. Japzons gross negligence. The respondent judge granted Dr. Japzons motion to dismiss invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. According to the respondent judge, the instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. The instant petition seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge.

Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death. Corpus v. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result. In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently of the criminal action against her. Concurring, Aquino, J. : The term physical injuries in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an independent civil action (Dyogi v. Yatco, 100 Phil 1095). The rule in Corpus v. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence is not included in article 33 of the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by only five justices. Four justices concurred in the result.

against MORALES, et.al. for damages, claiming that on account of the grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting ARAFILESs reputation and character were injured and deferred his promotion. MORALES et.al. prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, bolstering the freedom of the press. The RTC found in favor of ARAFILES, on the grounds that the article did not hint that it was merely based on an interview, and that as it turned out, ARAFILES had an alibi for the incidents in question. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC, citing Borjal v. CA, which held that In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistake, as long as it might be reasonably inferred from the facts. The CA held that ARAFILES was not able to prove by a preponderance of evidence that MORALES, et al were motivated by a sinister intent to cause harm and injury to ARAFILES. I: Whether or not the publication of the news item was not attended with malice and thus frees respondents from liability for damages? H: Yes; Petition DENIED R: The complaint by ARAFILES is one for damages under Article 33 of the Civil Code, which contemplates a civil action for recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, are Articles 19 and 21. In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous 22

Arafiles v. Philippine Journalists, Inc GR 150256, March 25, 2004

F: This case stems from a complaint filed by Emelita Despuig (EMELITA), an employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), against a NIAS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape before the then on-duty Patrolman Benito Chio at the General Assignments Section of the Western Police District Headquarters, in the presence of Romy Morales (MORALES), a reporter of Peoples Journal Tonight. MORALES personally interviewed EMELITA for the purpose of reporting her complaint in the next issue of Peoples Journal Tonight. That same day, Morales report appeared as a headline. A year following the publication, ARAFILES instituted a complaint before the RTC

material must be examined and viewed as a whole. ARAFILES anchoring of his complaint for damages on a charge of malicious sensationalization of fabricated facts fails. The presentation of the news item subject of ARAFILES complaint may have been in a sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. In determining the manner in which a given effect should be presented as a news item and the importance to be attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion. Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of word. (Italics supplied) (Quisumbing v. Lopez, 96 Phil 510) 1) Defamation MVRS Publications, Inc v. Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines, Inc GR 135306, January 28, 2003 F: The Islamic Dawah Council of the Philppines, Inc, a local federation of more than 70 Muslim religious organizations and individual Muslims filed in the RTC of Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of Muslim members nationwide against MVRS Publications, etc arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid. The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage Muslims and

Islam as a religion in this country, in violation of law, public policy, good morals and human relations, and that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world, especially every Muslim individual in nonMuslim countries. MVRS Publications et.al in their defense, contend that the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages, and that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims. The RTC dismissed the complaint holding that the Islamic DaWah Council failed to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified. The CA reversed the decision. I: Whether or not MVRS Publications, Inc et. al may be held liable for damages to the Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines? H: No; Petition Granted R: The Court, in applying the elements of libel and ascertaining whether or not the respondents have established the right to institute a class suit, ruled that MVRS Publications, Inc. cannot be held liable to Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines for the article in question. The Court defined Defamation as that which includes libel and slander, meaning the offense of injuring a persons character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrespute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. The Court stressed the fact that the 23

language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself. Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press under the Bill of Rights. In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identified, there are not individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged. Private respondents must have a cause of action in common with the class to which they belong to in order for the case to prosper. The Court applied the principle of two important public policies: 1) where the group referred to is large, the courts presume that no reasonable reader would take the statements as so literally applying to each individual member; 2) the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and expression, as well as of the press, effecting a sound compromise between the conflicting fundamental interests involved in libel cases. The Court held that the Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who among the Muslims were particularly defamed. Further, the Court held that for recovery in defamation cases, it must appear that the plaintiff is the person with reference to whom the statement was made. This principle is of vital importance in cases where a group or class is defamed since usually the larger the collective the more difficult it is for an individual member to show that he was the person at whom the defamation was directed. As to the contention that what is involved in the present case is an intentional tortious act causing mental distress and not an action for libel the Court disagreed. Primarily, an emotional distress tort is personal in nature, i.e. it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to

personal attacks on his character. It has no application in the instant case since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the article, assuming there was any, falls under the principle of relational harm which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. In their complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the standing of Muslims in the community, especially to their activities in propagating their faith in Metro Manila and in other non-Muslim communities in the country. The Court referred to the Second Restatement of the Law, which states that to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that: (a) the conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (c) there was a causal connection between the defendants conduct and the plaintiffs mental distress; and (d) the plaintiffs mental distress was extreme and severe. Extreme and outrageous conduct means conduct that is so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society. The defendants actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass, or frighten plaintiff. Emotional distress means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin. The plaintiff is required to show, among other things, that he or she has suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it; severity of the distress is an element of the cause of action, not simply a matter of damages. In determining whether the tort of outrage had been committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of criticism, rough 24

language, and to occasional acts and words that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is no enough. The Court cited Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, an intentional tort causing emotional distress must necessarily give way to the fundamental right of free speech. The Court acknowledged that in said case, Falwell was considered a public figure but that the case is still applicable because Falwell was an individual particularly singled out or identified in the parody appearing on Hustler Magazine. The position of the Court is clear that the conduct of petitioners was not extreme or outrageous. Neither was the emotional distress allegedly suffered by respondents so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. There is no evidence on record that points to that result. As to the Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines seeking to represent not only Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world, the Court ruled that they obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers to represent such a global group; neither have they been able to demonstrate the identity of their interests with those they seek to represent. The greater danger in our society, according to the Court, is the possibility that it may encourage the frequency of suits among religious fundamentalists. This would unnecessarily make the civil courts a battleground to assert their spiritual ideas, and advance their respective religious agenda. Courts must be viewpoint-neutral when it comes to religious matters if only to affirm the neutrality principle of free speech rights under modern jurisprudence, where all ideas are treated equal in the eyes of the First Amendment even those ideas that are universally condemned and run counter to constitutional principles. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. Dissenting Opinion, Carpio, J:

Justice Carpio dissented not because the newspaper article in question is libelous, but because it constitutes an intentional tortious act causing mental distress to those whom Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc represents. Petitioners acknowledge that private respondents cause of action is based on tortious conduct when petitioners state in their Petition that plaintiffs rely heavily on Article 26(4). Clearly, the instant case is not about libel which requires identification of the plaintiff in the libelous statement. Both the trial and appellate courts found the newspaper article in question insulting and humiliating to Muslims, causing wounded feeling and mental anguish to believers of Islam. The issue in this case is not whether or not the wrongful act by petitioners constitute libel, but if it is a case of damnum absque injuria or an actionable tort under paragraph 4, Article 26 of the Civil Code? Justice Carpio referred first to why Article 26 of the Civil Code was enacted, by quoting the Code Commission: The penal laws against defamation and unjust vexation are glaringly inadequate. Religious freedom does not authorize anyone to heal obloquy and disrepute upon another by reason of the latters religion. To a certain extent this is inevitable, from the nature of the social make-up, but there ought to be a limit somewhere, even when the penal laws against defamation and unjust vexation are not transgressed. Such tampering with human personality, even though the penal laws are not violated, should be the cause of civil action. Thus, the intent of the Code Commission is quite clear: Article 26 specifically applies to intentional acts which fall short of being criminal offenses. Article 26 itself expressly refers to tortious conduct which may not constitute criminal offenses. In short, to preserve peace and harmony in the family and in the community, Article 26 seeks to eliminate cases of damnum absque injuria in human relations. Justice Carpio stated that where the tortious act humiliating another because of his religious beliefs is published in a newspaper, the 25

elements of the crime of libel need not be satisfied before the aggrieved person can recover damages under Article 26. In intentional infliction of mental distress, the gravamen of the tort is not the injury to plaintiffs reputation but the harm to plaintiffs mental and emotional state. What is material is the disturbance on the mental or emotional state of the plaintiff who is entitled to peace of mind. The offensive act or statement need not identify specifically the plaintiff as the object of the humiliation. The fact that the statement was made publicly in fact makes matters worse because the mental or emotional distress caused on private respondents would even be aggravated by the publicity. This merely illustrates that the requirements of libel have no application in intentional torts under Article 26 where the impression of the public is immaterial while the impact on mind or emotion of the offended party is all-important. Further, as to the majoritys opinions reliance on Hustler, the doctrine in the same case applies only to public figures. Justice Carpio invoked the constitutional guarantee of Full Respect for Human Rights. Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that [any] advocacy of xxx religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law. The Covenant, being an international treaty to which the Philippines is a signatory, is part of the countrys municipal law. Paragraph 4, Article 26, of the Civil Code makes civilly liable any person who humiliates another because of his religious beliefs. Since our ratification of the Covenant in 1986, the Philippines has not enacted any special legislation to enforce the provisions of the Convenant, on the ground that existing laws are adequate to meet the requirements of the Covenant. There is no other law, except paragraph 4, of Article 26 of the Civil Code that can provide a sanction against intentional conduct, falling short of a criminal act, advocating religious hatred that incites hostility between Muslims and Christians in this country. If were are to comply in good faith with our treaty obligations under the Covenant, as the Constitutional expressly mandates the Philippine

Government, we must give redress under Article 26 to the outrageous profanity suffered by private respondents. The blatant profanity contained in the newspaper article in question is not the speech that is protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. Profane utterances, like asserting that Muslim worship the pig as their God have no social value meriting constitutional protection. As to the majority opinions concern that cases will swamp the courts all over the country if profanities against religious groups are made actionable under Article 26, Justice Carpio made the recommendation that the Court, pursuant to its rule making power can require that in actions like the instant case, the plaintiffs must bring a class suit. Finally, Justice Carpio acknowledges that in our country, there has been a long festering and bloody Muslim secessionist movement in the South, fueled not only by poverty but also by the palpable feeling among Muslims that the Christian majority is not treating Muslims fairly. Private respondents have placed their trust and faith in our courts, knowing and insisting that they are entitled to a just remedy under Article 26(4). It is time to breathe life to this long dormant provision of the Civil Code, to give even just a token redress to religious minorities who suffer mental and emotional distress from mindless profanity committed by irresponsible persons belonging to the religious majority. Dissenting Opinion, Austria-Martinez, J.: Petitioners are liable for damages under Articles 33 and 26(4) of the Civil Code. 2) Fraud Salta v. De Veyra GR L-37733, September 20, 1982 F: SALTA was an employee of PNB as Manager of the Malolos branch. As such, his duty was, among others, to himself grant loans, or only to recommend the granting of loans, depending on the amount of the loan applied for. 26

There are three actions relevant to this case. First, the PNB filed a complaint claiming that SALTA indiscriminately granted certain loans, in a manner allegedly characterized by negligence, fraud, and manifest partiality, and upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. Second, PNB also filed a civil action to recover losses the bank suffered. Third, a criminal case was filed by the PNB against SALTA for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Court of Appeals acquitted SALTA in the criminal case. As a result, SALTA filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases, based on Section 3(c), Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: (c) extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist Judge de Veyra and Judge Purisima took diametrically opposing views towards the motions to dismiss filed by SALTA. Judge de Veyra denied while Judge Purisima granted the motion to dismiss in the respective cases. I: Whether or not a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to dismiss a separate civil action filed on the basis of the same facts as alleged in the criminal case, which is for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act? H: It does not; Petition DENIED R: To begin with, the filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code (see p.19). The criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which is fraud, one of the kinds of crime mentioned in Article 33. Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed, the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred in the complaints. If petitioners civil liability is, alleged in the complaint, based on negligence, apart from the averment of fraud, then on the strength of the aforesaid ruling, the

civil action can be maintained regardless of the outcome of the criminal action. The Court declared that when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal case, to be filed separately and to proceed independently even during the pendency of the latter case, the intention is patent to make the courts disposition of the criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the separate case. This must be so because the offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned, that they may be made subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of action. The wisdom of the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code is to be found in the fact that when the civil action is reserved to be filed separately, the criminal case is prosecuted by the prosecuting officer alone without intervention from a private counsel representing the interest of the offended party. It is but just that when, as in the present instance, the prosecution of the criminal case is left to the government prosecutor to undertake, any mistake or mishandling of the case committed by the latter should not work to the prejudice of the offended party whose interest would thus be protected by the measure contemplated by Article 33 and Article 2177 of the Civil Code. As to Section 3(c), Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court, relied upon by Judge De Veyra who denied SALTAs motion to dismiss, it provides that in order for the decision of the Circuit Criminal Courts not to bar the civil action, the same must not positively state that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. The Court questioned the validity of this rule, as it would affect a matter of jurisdiction, which is substantive in character, considering the constitutional rule-making power of the Supreme Court, said rules should not increase or diminish substantive rights. 3) Physical Injuries

Capuno, et.al. v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling GR L-19331, April 30, 1965

27

F: This case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred on January 3, 1953 in Apalit, Pampanga, between a Pepsi-Cola (PEPSI) delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi (ELORDI) and a private car driven by Capuno. Capuno and his passengers, spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras died as a result of the collision. On January 5, 1953, ELORDI was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence. The information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims. On October 1, 1953, while the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against PEPSI and ELORDI. On June 11, 1958 the parties in the civil action for damages, which was instituted in October entered into a Compromise and Settlement. The Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case. On September 26, 1958, the heirs of Capuno filed a civil action for damages against PEPSI and ELORDI. On April 15, 1959, ELORDI was acquitted of the charges against him in the criminal case wherein he was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence. ELORDI and PEPSI filed a motion to dismiss the civil action filed by the heirs of Capuno in September. The grounds upon the same is based are: 1) that the action had already prescribed; 2) that ELORDI and PEPSI had been released from the claim for damages by virtue of the compromise they had agreed to with the Buan Estate which included payment to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmens Compensation Act of the sum of P2,623. I: Whether or not the action had already prescribed? H: Yes; Petition DENIED R: There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasidelict, which action must be instituted within 4 years. The Heirs of Capuno originally sought to enforce their claim ex-delicto, that is, under the

provisions of the Penal Code, when they intervened in the criminal case against ELORDI. The information therein, it may be recalled, was amended precisely to include an allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs of the victims of the accident for which ELORDI was being prosecuted. But the Heirs of Capunans intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal from the Courts order to the effect. And when they commenced the civil action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still pending, showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code, for otherwise that action would have been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. In filing the civil action as they did, the Heirs of Capunan correctly considered it as entirely independent of the criminal action, pursuant to Article 31 and 33 of the Civil Code. The term physical injuries in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death (Dyogi v. Yatco). In other words, the civil action for damages could have been commenced by the Heirs of Capunan immediately upon the death of their decedent and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or after the lapse of more than five years. In the case of Diocosa Paulan, et.al v. Zacarias Sarabia, this Court held that an action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to the question of when the prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run, that is from the day (the action) may be brought, which means from the day the quasidelict occurred or was committed. The foregoing considerations dispose of the contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against ELORDI as they had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such reservation was not then necessary; without having it they could file as in fact they did a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case; and consequently as held in 28

Paulan v. Sarabia, the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasidelict, because the civil action on quasi-delict is entirely independent of the criminal action pursuant to Article 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.

was a case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for damages? H: Yes; Petition DENIED R: The Court discussed Article 33 of the Civil Code, which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action, that is, of an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence. Said article mentions only the crimes of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. The Court clarified that though in the case of Dyogi v. Yatco, the term physical injuries used in article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide, it is to be born in mind that the charge against PAJE was for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not for homicide and physical injuries. In the case of People v. Buan, the Court explained that the offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the RPC lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, there is no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in connection with said offense. Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved his right to institute a separate civil action. In the language of the Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec. 3) the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the criminal action charged against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages based upon the same act. Assuming, arguendo, that the cause of action was based on quasi-delict, the trial courts finding that on that basis the action had prescribed is correct. The four year prescriptive period began to run from the day the quasi-delict 29

Corpus v. Paje GR L-26737, July 31, 1969

F: A passenger bus of the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., driven by Felardo Paje (PAJE) collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia (MARCIA), resulting in the latters death and in physical injuries to two other persons. An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against PAJE. The heirs of MARCIA reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages. The trial court convicted PAJE who appealed the decision. While PAJEs appeal was pending, MARCIAs heirs instituted a separate civil action for damages based upon the criminal act of reckless imprudence against PAJE and VICTORY LINER. The Court of Appeals acquitted PAJE, finding that the reckless imprudence charged against him did not exist, and that the collision was a case of pure accident. PAJE and VICTORY LINER filed a motion to dismiss the civil action on the ground that the action was barred by the acquittal by the Court of Appeals of PAJE in the criminal action. The motion was denied. At the pre-trial of the case, PAJE an VICTORY LINER asked the court to rule on their special defense that the cause of action based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought four years and eleven months after the collision. The RTC agreed with PAJE and VICTORY LINER and dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal. I: Whether or not the acquittal of PAJE in the criminal action on the ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged against him did not exist and that the collision

was committed, or from December 23, 1956, and the running of said period was not interrupted by the institution of the criminal action for reckless imprudence (Paulan v. Sarabia) Capistrano, J. (Footnotes): This and the following footnotes express my opinion on certain controversial articles of the New Civil Code, which was drafted when I was a member of the Code Commission. (A) The holding in the case of Dyogi v. Yatco that the term physical injuries used in Article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide or murder, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the law. According to the Code Commission, physical injuries is to be understood in its ordinary meaning and does not include homicide or murder, the reason for the law (namely, to give the injured party personally the initiative to demand damages by independent civil action) ceases, for the reason that a dead person can no longer personally, through is lawyer, institute an independent civil action ford damages. The two crimes are distinct from each other. (B) Article 32 is also intended insofar as it provides for an independent civil action, to educate the Filipino by going immediately to the courts to file a civil action for damages in vindication of his constitutional rights and liberties enumerated in the article in case of violation of any of them. (C) Article 34 is intended for the same purpose First. Article 31 of the Civil Code does not provide for an independent civil action. Second. Article 2177 does not provide for an independent civil action in crime. Third. The proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to the correctly cited Articles 32, 33, and 34 is contrary to the letter and spirit of said articles, for these are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section

1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law.

Dulay v. Court of Appeals GR 108017, April 3, 1995

F: On December 7, 1988 an altercation between Benigno Torzuela (TORZUELA) and Atty. Napoleon Dulay (ATTY. DULAY) occurred at the Big Bang sa Alabang, Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which TORZUELA, the security guard on duty at the said carnival shot and killed ATTY. DULAY. Petitioner is the widow of ATTY DULAY, who filed an action for damages against TORZUELA and Safeguard Investigation and Security, Inc., (SAFEGUARD) and/or Superguard Security Corp. (SUPERGUARD), alleged employers of TORZUELA. TORZUELA is an employee of SAFEGUARD and SUPERGUARD and at the time of the incident complained of, was under their control and supervision. The petitioner insists that TORZUELAs act of shooting ATTY DULAY constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioner also contends that SUPERGUARD AND SAFEGUARD are primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees, and that this liability is independent of the employees own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner also invokes Article 33 of the civil Code and Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. SUPERGUARD and SAFEGUARD claim that Article 2176 is inapplicable in the case at bar, contending that the provision is limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. They also claim that Article 33 is inapplicable, contending that the provision is limited to intentional acts. I: Whether or not Article 2176 of the Civil Code covers not only acts committed with negligence 30

but also acts which are voluntary and intentional? Whether or not Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death? H: Yes; Yes; Order REVERSED and SET ASIDE; REMANDED to RTC for trial on the merits. R: Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 of the Civil Code covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. The Court cited its previous rulings in Elcano v. Hill and Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both (Laguyan v. IAC, 167 SCRA 792 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). As to the applicability of Article 33 in this case, the Court held in the affirmative. The term physical injuries in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co of the Philippines 121 Phil. 638, [1965]). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the RPC. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted, however, that TORZUELA, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies. In applying the abovementioned doctrines then, the Court rationed that it is enough that the complaint alleged that TORZUELA shot ATTY DULAY resulting in the

latters death; that the shooting occurred while TORZUELA was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was TORZUELAs employer and responsible for his acts. Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it would be more just to allow them to present evidence of such injury. C. Neglect of Duty

Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render air or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action. D. Action for damages where no independent civil action is provided

Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendants motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.

The Defendants
A. Concurrent Negligence or Acts 31

1) Joint Tort-feasors Article 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.

Worcester v. Ocampo GR 5932, February 27, 1912

F: On January 23, 1909, WORCESTER, is a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Philippine Islands, filed a complaint for damages against OCAMPO, et.al., alleging that defendants, in publishing a libelous article, have done damage to him and his reputation. WORCESTERs complaint alleges that OCAMPO, et.al, are the owners, directors, writers, and editors and administrators of a certain daily newspaper which enjoys a large circulation in the Philippines; that the newspaper has been maliciously persecuting and attacking his honesty and reputation; that an editorial entitled Birds of Prey was published in said newspaper containing malicious and false statements, and that of all of these have resulted in damage to his reputation. OCAMPO, et.al., contend that they cannot be held liable because: 1) the editorial does not identify WORCESTER by name, and 2) that assuming WORCESTER is identifiable as the subject of the editorial, none of the defendants, except Teodoro M. Kalaw is responsible for the writing, printing, or publication of the alleged libelous article or the damage resulting to WORCESTER thereof. I: Whether or not defendants are considered joint tortfeasors and thus may be held liable along with Teodoro M. Kalaw? H: Yes, except for Lope K. Santos. R: The Court reiterated the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasors is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. If several persons jointly commit a tort,

the plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately because the tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. It may be stated as a general rule, that joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person injured may sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with that of others. Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them, except among themselves. A payment in full of the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any claim which might exist against the others. The release of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement, generally operates to discharge all. Of course the courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tort feasors are liable and that others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true even though they are charged jointly or severally. 2) Motor Vehicle Mishaps Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. 32

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.

Chapman v. Underwood No. 9010, March 28, 1914

F: J.H. Chapman was struck from behind and run over by the automobile owned by James M. Underwood, being driven at the time by his chauffer. Chapman filed a complaint against Underwood. The trial court ruled in favor of Underwood. I: Whether or not Underwood may be held liable for the negligence of his driver? H: No; Decision Affirmed R: The Underwoods driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over Chapman. The Court reiterated its decision in Johnson v. David (5 Phil Rep., 663), the driver does not fall within the list of persons in article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts Underwood would be responsible. The Court applied the rule that the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally therefor. The act complained

of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his drivers act his own. In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the time the automobile took the wrong side of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to correct the act of his driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearness that interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge Underwood with the negligence of the driver.

Caedo et.al v. Yu Khe Thai GR L-20392, December 19, 1968

F: As a result of a vehicular accident in which Marcial Caedo (CAEDO FAMILY) and several members of his family were injured, they filed this suit for recovery of damages from Yu Khe Thai (THAI), the owner of the automobile and Rafael Bernardo (BERNARDO), THAIs driver. The trial court ruled in favor of the CAEDO FAMILY, ordered THAI and BERNARDO jointly and severally, to pay damages to the CAEDO FAMILY. I: Whether or not THAI may be held liable if BERNARDOs negligence was the proximate cause of the collision? H: No; Decision MODIFIED R: There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to BERNARDOs negligence and that he must be held liable for damages suffered by the CAEDO FAMILY. In determining the issue of the case at bar, the applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code. Under Article 2184, if the causative factor was the drivers negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as law for the first time in 33

the New Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman v. Underwood. The basis of the masters liability in civil law is not respondeat superior but rather the relationship of pater familias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. In the case at bar, the Court did not see that such negligence may be imputed. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for THAI to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that had entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune. The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. The test of negligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tell him he should do in order to avoid the accident. B. Vicarious Liability Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when the acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article hall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. Article 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardians, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. P.D. 603 The Child and Youth Welfare Code Article 58. Torts. Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the Civil Code. Article 218. (Family Code) The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.

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Article 219. (Family Code) Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. Article 221. (Family Code) Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. Article 236. (Family Code) Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases. Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one. Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Article 100 (Revised Penal Code) Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Article 101. (Revised Penal Code) Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. - The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of article 12 and in

subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules: First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part. Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or control or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law. Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received. The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable. When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations. Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution. 35

Article 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. - In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees. Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees. R.A. No. 9344 Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act Section 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. 1) Parents

Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court GR 70890, September 18, 1992 I: H: R: Tamargo v. CA GR 85044, June 3, 1992 F: I: H: R: 2) Guardians Article 216 (Family Code) Article 218 (Family Code) 3) Teachers and Heads of Institutions Soliman, Jr. et. al. v. Tuazon GR 66207, May 18, 1992 I: H: R: St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos GR 143363, February 6, 2002 I: H: R: 4) Owners and Managers Philippine Rabbit Bus Line et. al v. Philippine American Forwarders, Inc GR L-25142, March 25, 1975 I: 36

H: R: 5) Employers Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez, GR 132266, December 21, 1999 I: H: R: LRT Authority v. Navidad GR 145804, February 6, 2003 I: H: R: 6) State City of Manila v. Teotico GR L-23052, January 29, 1968 I: H: R: Sps. Fontanilla v. Maliaman GR 55963, 61045, February 27, 1991 I: H: R:

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