Chapter1 GLOBALIZATIONANDGOVERNANCE:DEFINITION,VARIATION, ANDEXPLANATION MilesKahlerandDavidA.

Lake

Contemporarydebateoverglobalizationcastsitspoliticaleffectsasboth revolutionaryandcontradictory.Inapowershiftofhistoricproportions (Mathews1997),someanalystsclaimthatweareenteringanageofthevirtual state(Rosecrance1996).Globalization,theyargue,drainspoliticalauthority fromnationstates,longthedominantformofpoliticalorganizationinworld politics.Thestatesmonopolyoffamiliargovernancefunctionsisending,as governancemigratesuptosupranationalorganizations;downtonewly empoweredregions,provinces,andmunicipalities;andlaterallytosuchprivate actorsasmultinationalfirmsandtransnationalnongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs),thatacquirepreviouslypublicresponsibilities.Inthisview, globalizationnotonlytransfersgovernanceinconflictingdirections,italsoforces aconvergenceofstateinstitutionsandpolicies.Inexercisingtheirresidual authority,statesareconstrainedtolookandactalike.Althoughatransferof governancetosubnationalunitsmayincreasedemocraticaccountability,these governancechangesandtheaccompanyingpressuresforconvergencearemore oftenseenasathreattotheabilityofsocietiestocharttheirowndemocratically determinedcourses. Skepticscontesteachofglobalizationsallegedeffects.National governmentsjealouslyguardmanytraditionalspheresofgovernance, particularlydefense,criminaljustice,andimmigration.Ratherthanpromoting newformsofpoliticalorganization,groupswhodemandselfdetermination definetheirclaimsaspossessionofanationstates.Ifthenationstateisa beleagueredandineffectualfossil,itsenduringpopularityatthedawnofthe newmillenniumisbaffling.Askepticalviewofderegulationregardstheaward ofenhancedauthoritytoprivateactorsaspartiallyorwhollyoffsetbypublic interventioninnewareas,suchastheenvironmentalorconsumerprotection.In Seattle,Washington,D.C.,andGenoa,newtransnationalpoliticalmovements protestaderegulatedandintegratedinternationalmarket.Althoughsomepress forreformedandtransformedinternationalinstitutions,others,somewhat paradoxically,relyonnationalgovernmentsforpolicychangeorurgethose governmentstowithdrawfrompromarketinternationalorganizations(OBrien, etal.,2000).

2 Sortingthroughthesecontradictoryclaimsrequirescarefuldefinitionof globalizationandgovernance,identificationoftherangeanddimensionsof variationinboth,apreliminarysurveyofchangesingovernancethatappearto resultfromincreasingglobalization,andatheoreticalframeforexaminingmore systematicallythelinksbetweenglobalizationandgovernance.Webeginthese tasksofdefinition,identification,andexplanationinthisintroductorychapter. Eachauthorinthevolumebuildsonthecommondefinitionsdevelopedhere. Theauthorsalsoshareacommonbaseline:anincreaseinglobalizationthatsets thelastfourdecadesapartfrombothanearliereraofglobalization(thedecades before1914)andtheperiodofeconomicdisintegrationproducedbydepression andworldwar.Theauthorsdevelopandrefineexplanationsfortheeffectsof globalizationongovernanceusingtheactororientedtheoreticalapproach outlinedinthefinalsectionofthischapter. Collectively,thechaptersinthisvolumefindthattheeffectsof globalizationongovernancearemorecomplexandcontingentthanmany observersclaim.Globalizationexertsaprofoundeffectoneconomicandpolitical life.Importantshiftsinthelocusofgovernancehaveoccurredinallthree directionsupwards,downwards,laterally.Somemeasureofconvergencecan beobserved.Thesetrendsareneitheruniversalnoruniform,however. Variationoccursfromissueareatoissuearea.AsCohendescribesinChapter3, authorityovermonetarypolicyhasinsomecasesbeendelegatedtoother governmentsandtoregionalentities.Ininternationalfinancialregulation, however,Eichengreen(Chapter4)describesthepersistentdominanceofnational authorities.Someimportantpoliticaleffectsappearunrelatedtotheadvanceof globalization.AsVanHouten(Chapter7)describes,internationaleconomic integrationdoesnotseemtobeanimportantinfluenceondemandsforincreased regionalautonomyinEurope.Privateformsofgovernancemayincrease,but theyareoftendependentonnationalpoliticalauthoritiesfortheireffectiveness. Inaddition,althoughgovernmentsappeartoconvergeonpoliciesofeconomic openness,thereappeartobefewpressuresforconvergenceonotherpolicies andfewgoodtheoreticalreasonsforexpectingsuchconvergence.Finally,there aremultipleformsofaccountability.Althoughtraditionalmechanismsof democracymaynotapplyattheinternationalleveloutsideoftheEuropean Union,othermeansofmonitoringandconstrainingauthoritiesremain important. Theissueareasexaminedinthisvolumearenotasystematicsample. Generalconclusionsaboutthechangingnatureofglobalpoliticalauthorityare thereforeimpossible.Nevertheless,thechaptersthatfollowshowclearlythat neitherglobalizationnorgovernanceishomogenous.Rather,international economicintegrationitselfdifferentiatedandunevenisproducinganew fabricofglobalgovernancethatdisplaysmanyvariationsandshadings.

3 Toexplainthisdiversity,theauthorsadoptanexplicitlyactororiented politicaltheoryofglobalization.Globalizationisoftenportrayedasan inexorable,impersonalsetofmarketforcesthatcompelspassivestatestocomply withitsdictatesanenvironmentalconstraintthatstatesignoreonlyiftheyare willingtobeleftbehindinthenewglobalcompetition.Incontrast,theauthorsin thisvolumeemphasizeglobalizationseffectsongovernancethroughpolitical actors.Globalizationchangesthepolicypreferencesofsomeactors,increasesthe bargainingpowerofothers,andopensnewinstitutionaloptionsforstillothers. Inthisway,weseektoreintroduceagencyandchoiceintothestoryof globalization.Fortheseactors,themostimportanteffectofglobalizationontheir environmentoftenliesinitseffectsonotherpoliticalactors,theirstrategies,and theinstitutionalsettingsinwhichtheyinteract.Usingthisapproach,weprovide foundationsforexplainingthegovernancechangesthatareproducedby globalization. GLOBALIZATIONANDGOVERNANCE:DEFINITIONANDVARIATION Globalizationdefined Globalizationisoftendefinedexpansivelyasnetworksofinterdependence thatspanintercontinentaldistances(KeohaneandNye2000a,105)Assuch,the termincorporatesahostofprofoundchangesinworldpolitics:growing politicallinkagesatthegloballevel,erosionoflocalspaceandtimeasstructures ofeconomiclife,andhomogenizationofsociallifethroughglobalstandards, products,andculture.Typically,thesebroadtrendsareattributedtofalling communicationandtransportationcosts.Conceivedinthisway,globalizationis anumbrellaterm,coveringawidevarietyoflinkagesbetweencountriesthat extendbeyondeconomicinterdependence.Nosinglevolumecouldcoherently examinehowglobalization,thusdefined,affectsgovernance.Equallyimportant, thisbroaddefinitionincludeselementsofgovernancewithinit,andthusrisks confoundingthetwocrucialvariablesofthisvolume. Wethereforefocusonacentralaspectofglobalization,economic integrationatthegloballevel.Thereductionofbarrierstoeconomicexchange andfactormobilitygraduallycreatesoneeconomicspacefrommany,although thatprocessisfarfromcomplete.Mosteconomistsandmostauthorsinthis volumeadoptthismeaning.Althoughheattachesprofoundsystemic significancetoglobalization,Friedman(1999,78)alsoadoptsthismeaningwhen hedefinesglobalizationastheinexorableintegrationofmarkets,nationstates andtechnologiestoadegreeneverwitnessedbeforeinawayenabling individuals,corporationsandnationstatestoreacharoundtheworldfarther, faster,deeperandcheaperthaneverbefore...Thisdefinitionhasanimportant, ifimplied,politicaldimensionaswell.Althoughfacilitatedbylower communicationandtransportationcosts,globalizationrestsonthedecisionsof nationalgovernmentstoopentheirmarketstoothersandtoparticipateina

4 globaleconomy.Itisthispoliticaldimension,weargue,thatiscrucialfor understandingglobalizationanditseffectsongovernance. Variationinglobalization Thosewhodefineglobalizationbroadlyoftenportrayitschangesas revolutionaryandunique,incomparabletoanyprevioushistoricalperiod. Economichistorians,endorsingthenarrowerdefinitionofglobaleconomic integration,begtodiffer.Theydonotviewglobalizationaseitheraninexorable trendorasasharprupturethatdividescontemporaryhistoryfromthepast. Instead,historiansfindsubstantialvariationineconomicglobalizationoverthe pastcenturyaswellassimilaritiesbetweenthepresentandthedecadesbefore 1914.Formany,thatearliererarepresentsahigherdegreeofintegrationthathas beensurpassedonlyrecently,ifatall.SachsandWarner(1995),forexample, portraythecontemporaryglobaleconomyasreestablishingaprocessof integrationthathadbeendisruptedinmidcenturybydecadesofwarand depression. Claimsofcomparabilitybetweenglobalizationthenandnowareinturn qualifiedbymoredetailedinvestigationofthepre1914worldeconomy.Simple measuresofgrosseconomicflowsandotherstandardmeasuresofeconomic integrationmaynotcapturethegreaterdepthanddiversityoftradeand capitalmarketintegrationtoday(Irwin1996,45).Manufacturesplayamuch largerroleintradetoday,andalargershareoftheeconomy,particularly services,isexposedtointernationalcompetition(BaldwinandMartin1999, Bordo,Eichengreen,andIrwin1999).Capitalmarketsalsodiffer.Shortterm capitalflowsarefarmoreimportantthantheywerebefore1914;theenormous contemporaryforeignexchangemarketdidnotexistintheearlierperiod.In addition,borrowingbytheprivatesectorandbyfinancialinstitutions, particularlyinthethenemergingmarkets,wasfarlessimportantthanlongterm publicborrowingforinfrastructuredevelopment(Bordo,Eichengreen,andIrwin 1999;Obstfeld1998).Foreigndirectinvestmentisstrikinglydifferentinthetwo periods.Investmentbymultinationalcorporationsbefore1914wastypicallyin theagriculturalandminingsectorsthroughfreestandingcompanies; multinationalinvestmenttodayismorelikelytobeinmanufacturingandto displaythecharacteristicsoftheglobalfactoryparcelingoutproductionchains acrossjurisdictions(PrakashandHart2000,2;Feenstra1998).Anabilityto disaggregatetheproductionprocessacrossnationalborderswasimpossiblein thetechnologicalconditionsofacenturyago. Ontheotherhand,laborwasclearlymoreglobalizedinthepre1914era. Indeed,levelsoflabormigrationwerestaggeringbymodernstandards (BaldwinandMartin1999).MigrationflowedfromEuropetotheUnitedStates andotherterritoriesofsettlement;italsoflowedamongcolonialandquasi colonialterritories,expandingtheChinesepopulationsinSoutheastAsiaand

5 IndianpopulationsintheCaribbeanandPacificislands.Atthesametime, immigrationprovidedthefirstevidenceofbacklashagainstglobalization,asthe firstrestrictionswereimposedintheUnitedStatesandelsewhereduringthe 1880s(Williamson1998;ORourkeandWilliamson1999,ch.10). Onecriticaldifferenceunderliesthismorenuancedanddisaggregated portraitofoldandnewglobalization:information.Althoughtradeingoodswas spurredbyfallingoceantransportcostsinbothperiodsofglobalization,radical andpersistentreductionsinthecostsofcrossbordercommunicationarefar moresignificantinthesecond.Thosecostreductionsshrinktheinformation asymmetriesthathadhindereddevelopmentofmorediverseandtransparent internationalcapitalmarketsbefore1914(Bordo,Eichengreen,andIrwin1999). Reducedcommunicationcostsopenthewaytonoveltechniquesoforganizing productionacrossborders,whetherverticallyintegratedglobalfactoriesor loosercrossborderproductionnetworks(Borrus,Ernst,andHaggard2000). Sharplyreducedcommunicationcostsandtechnologicalinnovationalsoaffect culturalintegrationthroughtradeindigitizedimages,absentbefore1914.The costsofcrossborderpoliticalorganizationhasalsodeclined,although transnationalpoliticswomenssuffrage,peace,laborrightsalreadyflourished attheturnofthelastcentury(KeckandSikkink1998). Globalizationbefore1914differedfromcontemporaryglobalization.The interveningdecades,however,broughtasharpretreatfromglobalizationofall kinds.Between1914and1945,theglobaleconomydisintegrated.Barriersto capitalmobilitysuspensionofthegoldstandardandimpositionofforeign exchangecontrolsincreasedduringtheGreatDepressionofthe1930s. InternationalcapitalmobilityreacheditslowestpointduringWorldWarIIand theimmediatepostwaryears(ObstfeldandTaylor1998,381).Sectoraltrade protectionism,whichhadexistedinpre1914EuropeandAmerica,also intensifiedandspreadduringtheyearsofdepressionandwar.Relativelyclosed tradingblocs,typicallybasedoncolonialempires,becamethenewnorm. Restrictionsonimmigrationproliferated,stranglingthepreviouslyrobust movementoflabor(ORourkeandWilliamson1999,185186). After1945,thistrendtowardclosuregraduallyreverseditselfamongthe industrializedcountries.Beginninginthe1950s,therichcountriesremoved exchangecontrols,reducedtariffsandothertradebarriersthroughmultilateral negotiations,and,asthepostwarboomtightenedlabormarkets,relaxed restrictionsonimmigration.Ashifttoflexibleexchangeratesintheearly1970s, however,ledtoagradualremovalofcapitalcontrols,atrendthatwas encouragedbytechnologicalchange,particularlyarapidreductioninthecostsof computingandcrossbordertelecommunications.Bythe1980s,preWorldWarI levelsofeconomicintegrationhadbeenmetorsurpassedintheindustrialized world.

6 Globalization,however,requiredaswelltheembraceofeconomic opennessbydevelopingandformersocialisteconomies.Thatintegration occurredlaterandwaslesscomplete;itsresultswerealsomorecontroversial. Althoughsomedevelopingcountrieshadpursuedinternationaleconomic integrationsinceindependence,mostdistancedthemselvesfromliberalized tradeandfinancialflowsafter1945.Onlyinthelasttwodecadesofthetwentieth centurydidpoliciesofeconomicopennessgainglobalpopularity.Inchapter11, SimmonsandElkinsproposealternativeexplanationsforthisremarkably uniformshifttowardliberalization.Onanumberofmeasures,integrationof developingandtransitionaleconomiesintothetradeandfinancialsystemshas beenstriking.Theshareofdevelopingcountriesinworldtradegrewfrom23 percentin1985to29percentin1995;thirtythreedevelopingcountriesreplaced relativelyclosedtraderegimeswithopentraderegimesinthesamedecade(IMF 1997,7273).Capitalflowstodevelopingcountriesincreaseddramaticallyafter thedebtcrisisofthe1980s.Thoseflows,withtheexceptionofforeigndirect investment,weresubjecttoequallymarkeddisruptionsinthewakeoffinancial crisesthatcontinuedtoaffectemergingmarketsduringthe1990s(Kahler1998). Labormigrationalsogrewduringthesedecades,althoughneverreachingthe heightsofthelate19thcentury.Thenewmigration,however,liketradeand investment,brokewithastrictlyNorthSouthpattern,producingthe globalizationofinternationalmigration(CastlesandMiller1993). Globalizationhasvariedacrossthetwentiethcentury.Eachoftheauthors investigatesthelatestturntoglobalization,whichoccurredinthesecondhalfof thecentury,asacentralindependentvariablethatmayaccountforchangesin governance.Althoughthiscommonunderstandingofglobalizationisshared acrosschapters,severalqualificationsshouldbenoted.Globalizationremains unevenacrossmarketsforcapital,goods,andlabor;acrosseconomicsectors;and acrossregions.Evenamongtheindustrializedcountries,whereintegrationis deepest,globalizationhasnotcreatedaborderlessworldortheendof geography.HighlyintegratedfinancialmarketsinEuropeandtheUnitedStates displaymuchlowerlevelsofcapitalmobilitythanoccurswithinnational economies(Obstfeld1995).Bordereffectsarealsopowerfulininternational trade:politicalunitswithinanationaleconomystilltradeatafarhigherratethan unitsacrossnationalborders(Helliwell1998).Inmeasuringtheadvanceof globalization,thebenchmarkisallimportant:theworldismoreglobalizedthan itwasthreedecadesago,butnationaleconomies,atleastintheindustrialized world,remainfarmoreintegratedthantheglobaleconomy. Governancedefined Likeglobalization,governancecanbeconceivedbroadlyornarrowly. Mostgenerally,theCommissiononGlobalGovernance(1995,2)definesits subjectasthesumofthemanywaysindividualsandinstitutions,publicand

7 private,managetheircommonaffairs.Itisacontinuingprocessthroughwhich conflictingordiverseinterestsmaybeaccommodatedandcooperativeaction maybetaken.Similarly,KeohaneandNye(2000b,12)definegovernanceas theprocessesandinstitutions,bothformalandinformal,thatguideandrestrain thecollectiveactivitiesofagroup.Assuch,governanceisnearlysynonymous withpatternedsocialinteraction,similartoGrotianconceptionsofinternational regimes(Krasner1983,10).Governancecanalsobeunderstoodmorenarrowly asthatsubsetofrestraintsthatrestsonauthority,whereauthorityitselfisa socialrelationshipinwhichA(apersonoroccupantofanoffice)willsBto followAandBvoluntarilycomplies(ScheppeleandSoltan1987,194).Inother words,governanceischaracterizedbydecisionsissuedbyoneactorthatare expectedtobeobeyedbyasecond.1Mostofthepapersinthisvolumefocuson thisnarrowermeaningofgovernance. Itisimportanttorecognize,however,thatundereitherconception governanceisnotgovernment.Manysocialandpoliticalunitsamongthem familiesandclans,firms,laborunions,alliances,andempiresgovernsocial interactionsandcanpossessauthority,atleastinregardtotheirmembers. Nationstatesassertsovereignauthorityandclaimamonopolyoverthe legitimateuseofforcebuttheyrepresentonlyonetypeofgovernancestructure. Corporations,NGOs,internationalstandardsettingbodies,andmanyother entitiesallactauthoritativelywithintheglobalsystem.Inotherwords,allcanbe partofinternationalgovernance. Ininvestigatingthelinksbetweenglobalizationandgovernance,three analyticdimensionsofgovernanceareparticularlyimportant:centralizationor dispersalofthesitesofgovernance(acrosslevelsofgovernanceorbetween publicandprivategovernance);thedegreetowhichgovernanceultimately respondstothewishesofthosewhoaregoverned,thedimensionofdemocratic accountability;andconvergenceordivergenceamongtheformsofgovernance andtheirpolicyproducts.Wediscusseachofthesedimensionsinturn. Governancevariesinthecentralizationofauthority.Authoritycanbe highconcentratedvestedinasingle,hierarchicalentitywithclaimstoexclusive jurisdiction,asintotalitariannationalstatesorthetransnationalRomanCatholic
1

ScheppeleandSoltanrefertothisastheparadigmaticdefinition,whichtheycontrastwiththeir ownalternative.Threecharacteristicsofauthorityareworthyofnoteinourdiscussionof governance.First,powermaybeafoundationofauthority,butauthoritydoesnotitselfrelyupon theexerciseofcoercion(Peters1967,924).Second,althoughtheclaimtoauthoritymayneedto bejustifiedbyappealstodivineright,tradition,popularsupport,andsoon,Asauthoritative commandsdonotthemselvesneedtobejustified.Thisdistinguishesauthorityfrommoralor scientificcommands(Peters1967,945).Finally,thestrengthofauthorityismeasuredbythe maximumdivergencebetweenAscommandandBspreferencesunderwhichBwillstillcomply voluntarily.AisweakwhenitislimitedtowillingonlythatwhichBwoulddoanyway.Atthe sametime,authorityisneverwithoutlimit.ThereisalwayssomecommandthatAcouldissue thatBwoulddefy.Onauthority,seeFriedrich1958andPennockandChapman1987.

8 Church.Governancecanalsobewidelydispersed,withindividualnodes exercisingonlyalimitedjurisdiction.TheexemplarheremighttheUnitedStates, adecentralizedfederalstatewithalargesphereofprivateactivity. Understandingthisdimensionrequiresidentificationofthesite(s)orlocation(s) ofauthority.Moresitesofauthorityproduceamoredecentralizedsystem. Internationalanarchyasystemofsovereignstatesconsistsofactorswithout anyoverarchingauthorityand,thus,constitutesahighlydecentralized governancestructure.Subsidiarity,atermthatoriginatedintheEuropean Union,impliesanormativebiastowarddecentralizedgovernance.Governance atthelevelclosesttotheultimateprincipalstheelectorsinademocracyis preferred(CenterforEconomicPolicyResearch1993).Anothertermforsuch decentralizedsystemsismultilevelgovernance(seeHoogheandMarks2001). Sitesofauthorityareoftendifficulttoidentify,sincemoderngovernance structuresaretypicallycomposedofchainsofdelegatedauthoritywith,ateach level,moreorlessagencyslack(seeKiewietandMcCubbins1991).2Whennot carefullymonitored,authoritythatisdelegatedcanbelosttransferred, permanentlyifunofficially,toagents.Delegationsandtransfersofauthoritycan beobservationallyequivalent,andthusitcanbedifficulttodistinguishwhohas authorityincomplexpatternsofgovernance.Thisisacentralquestioninthe literatureontheEuropeanCourtofJustice,forinstance(Alter1998).Unless mechanismsofoversightarecarefullycraftedandvigilantlymaintained,even democraticallyelectedlegislatorsmaybegintoactontheirowninterestsrather thanthoseoftheirconstituents.Insuchcases,whetherauthorityisactually vestedincitizensortheirrepresentativescanbehardtodiscern. Debatesoverglobalizationseffectsongovernanceoftenhingeonthe samedistinctionbetweendelegatedandtransferredauthority. 3Whenstates createinternationaldisputesettlementprocedures,forinstance,theymay delegateauthoritytothenewentity,allowingittoactontheirbehalfonlyso longasdecisionsarecompatiblewiththeirinterests,or,morerarely,theymay
2

Authorityisalsohardtoidentifyforasecondreason.Inequilibrium,voluntaryandcoerced compliancecanbeobservationallyequivalent.Inrelationsbetweenthestrongandweak,the formeroftenneednotutterexplicitthreatstocompelthedesiredbehaviorbythelatter.Theweak appeartofollowthewishesofthestrongoftheirownaccord.Insuchunequalrelationships,the powertocoerceislatentbutnonethelesscentraltotheobservedbehavior.Onlywhensubjugated peoplestesttheirchainsbytryingtoescape,protest,orrebeldotheirshacklesbecomeevident.If thestrongarepowerfulenough,theweakseldomwanttotesttheirlimits,buttheircomplianceis strictlyafunctionofconstraints.Sincecoerciondoesnotappeartoplayasignificantrolein contemporarychangesingovernance,evenasalatentforce,wedonotdevelopthissecond measurementproblem. 3 Delegationandtransfersofauthorityarebestdescribedbyclose,detailedstudyofinstitutional rulesandpractices,ontheonehand,andcarefulattentiontooutofequilibriumbehaviorsuchas whenagentsattempttoexercisetoomuchslack,ontheother.InAmericanpolitics,thisis phrasedasdelegationv.abdication.Forcloseinstitutionalanalyses,seeKiewietandMcCubbins 1991andLindsay1994.

9 transferpreviouslysovereignpowerstoanentitythatcannowexpect compliancewithitsrulings.Globalizationmayleadtogreaterdelegationof authoritytoagreaterrangeofentities,butstatesmaystillretaintheabilityto revokethisauthorityatwill.Stateswouldthenremaindominantpoliticalactors. Ontheotherhand,ifglobalizationproducesrealtransfersofauthorityfrom statestoothertypesofunits,afundamentalchangeinworldpoliticsmaybe underway. Thequestionofdelegationiscloselyrelatedtotheseconddimensionof governance,democraticaccountability.Broadlydefined,accountabilitycanbe understoodastheslackbetweentheprincipalsandagents.Theadditionof democracyraisesafurtherquestion,however:towhichprincipalsaretheagents responsible?Democracyisanambiguousandcontestedterm,particularlywhen appliedoutsidetheconfinesofdomesticpolitics.Nearlyalldefinitionsof democracyhaveattheircoretheideaofrulebythepeople.Suchastandardhas inturnthreerequirements:themembersofaparticulargrouporthose compelledtocomplywiththerulesandnormsofagrouphavetheabilityto communicatetheirpreferencestothosewhoactontheirbehalf,insurethattheir preferencesareweighedequallyintheformulationofpolicy,andremoveleaders whofailtosatisfyatleastamajorityofthemembers(Dahl1971,2). Whethersuchabenchmarkcanbeappliedtointernationalgovernanceisa controversialissue.Inchapter14,KeohaneandNyearguethatdemocracystops attheboundariesofthenationstate;accountability,ontheotherhand,doesnot. Caporaso(Chapter15),drawingontheexperienceofEuropeanintegration, claimsthatdemocraticstandardsmaybeappliedtotheinstitutionsproducedby economicintegration.Althoughdemocraticaccountabilityismostcontentiousin contemporarydebateoverglobalinstitutions,suchastheWTOortheIMF,its applicabilitytoothernonstateactorsiscentralinassessingglobalgovernance. InsomeNGOs,forexample,leadersorboardsofdirectorsappointtheirown successors.Membersmaychoosetoexittheorganization,butotherwisethey havelittlevoice.OtherNGOstakeamoreclassicallydemocraticform,with memberselectingsomeorallofthedirectorsorleaders.Althoughthegrowthof NGOsisoftentakentoimplyamorevibranttransnationalcivilsociety,their emergenceneednotimplygreaterdemocracyinpractice.Onceagain,the meaningofdemocraticaccountabilityoutsidethecontextofnationalpoliticsisat issue. Athirdandfinaldimensionofgovernanceconvergenceordivergencein formsofgovernanceandinresultingpoliciesliesatthecenterofglobalization debates.Globalizationmaynothollowoutthecoregovernancefunctionsof states,butitmayproducenationstatesalikeininstitutionsandpolicies.Critics ofglobalizationcontendthatcompetitiveeconomicpressureswillproduce institutionalandpolicyhomogeneityovertimeinadirectionfavoredbythe mostmobilefactorsofproductionfootloosecapital.Itisfurtherassumedthat

10 thesemostmobilecapitalistswillpreferlaxregulationandlessgovernment intervention.Inthisview,thewelfarestateisplacedatrisk,andgovernments arenolongerfreetoadoptpoliciesthatrespondtotheneedsoftheirsocieties, callingintoquestiontheirowndemocraticaccountability.Rogowski(chapter10) claimsthatglobalizationprovidesincentivesfordivergenceingovernanceand policy,notincreasinghomogeneity.Insomecircumstances,globalizationmay produceacompetitioninregulatorystringency(Vogel1995;Guilln2001).Both thefactswhetherconvergenceingovernanceandpolicyhastakenplaceand theexplanationwhetherthepatternofconvergenceordivergenceisexplained byglobalizationareacentralpartoftheinvestigationthatfollows. Globalizationandvariationingovernance Thesedimensionsofgovernancecentralization,democratic accountability,convergencechangedinidentifiabledirectionsduringthepre 1914andpost1945erasofglobaleconomicintegration.Thesimilaritiesand differencesingovernanceacrossthetwoperiodsprovideaninitial,incomplete testofthepoliticalconsequencesofglobalization. Ratherthanpoliticalfragmentation,whichhasproducednearlytwo hundredsovereignunitsintodaysglobalsystem,largescaleunitsdominated worldpoliticsandtheinternationaleconomyinthedecadesbeforeWorldWarI. Thosestatesandempireswerereluctanttodelegatepowerstointernational institutionsbutwereoftendecentralizedinternally.Politicalintegrationbefore 1914occurredthroughterritorialannexation(theUnitedStates,Russia), extensionofhierarchicalimperialorquasiimperialrelationships(Britainandthe otherEuropeancolonialpowers),andcreationoflargefederalstates(Canada, Australia).By1914,ahighlyintegratedcapitalisteconomywaspopulatedby relativelylargepoliticalunits.Politicalintegrationandeconomicintegration movedintandem. Thisoutcomeisanomalousinlightofmodels,discussedinthefollowing sectionofthischapterandsubsequentchapters,thatassociateanopenworld economywithpoliticalfragmentationandabiastowardsmallerpoliticalunits. Globalizationappearstoproduceincentivesforlargescaleterritorialgovernance inoneeraandnotintheother.Threeexplanationscanbeofferedforthis divergence.Peripheralsocietiesintheearlierperiodwereattimesunableto maintainthelevelofgovernancerequiredforsuccessfuleconomicintegration. Wheneconomicexchangeproducedpoliticalturbulence,outsidepowers extendedtheirgovernance(Hopkins1973).Capturebyparticularinterestsor sectorsthatdemandedmoreintensive,territorial,orcompliantgovernancebest explainsothercasesofterritorialexpansion.Finally,thepatternmaynotbe explainedbyglobalizationatall:militarycompetitionmayhavedriven governmentpolicy.Today,thesemotivationsforexpansionofdirectgovernance overotherpoliticalunitsdonothold.Inaddition,governancecostshave

11 increasedoverthecentury,intermsofboththecapacityofpopulationstoresist unwantedalienrulersandtheexpectedlevelofpublicgoodsprovision. Asecondkeydifferenceingovernancebetweenthetwoperiodswasthe scarcityofinternationalinstitutionswithdelegatedauthorityabovenationstates orempiresbefore1914.Governmentscreatednarrowlydefinedfunctional organizationsrelateddirectlytospilloversfromeconomicintegration(e.g.,the ITU),aswellasseveralcurrencyunions.Thedegreeofdelegationtothese institutionswaslow,however.Nationalandimperialpolitieswithlargeinternal marketsmayhavereducedtheneedfordelegationupwardtointernational institutions. Despitethesedifferences,thetwoperiodsofglobalizationsharea commonbiastowarddecentralizedgovernancebysubordinateunits.Caremust betakeninmeasuringcentralizationofgovernance:manyfederationsareshams, whatevertheirconstitutionaloutlines.Nevertheless,nearlyallofthesuccessful federationsformedaftertheUnitedStateswereconstructedinthelatenineteenth century.Althoughamalgamation,ratherthandevolutionfromanexistingstate createdthem,theseweregenuinefederations,withsignificantpowersvestedin subnationalunits.EventheBritishEmpire,largestoftheera,wascharacterized bysubstantialdecentralization.Argumentsoversubsidiaritytheappropriate assignmentofgovernancefunctionstodifferencelevelswereaconstantin intraimperialrelations(DavisandHuttenback1986).Today,significant devolutionhasappearedacrosstheadvancedindustrializedstatesandbeyond (documentedinHoogheandMarks2001,esp.191212andJunandWright1996). Hiscox(Chapter5),GarrettandRodden(Chapter6),andVanHouten(Chapter 7)examinethescopeofcontemporarydecentralizationanditspreciseconnection toglobalization. Democraticaccountability,aseconddimensionofgovernance,createsa sharpdistinctionbetweentheintegratedworldofacenturyagoandthe globalizedworldoftoday.Boththelocationofgovernanceandpolicy convergencewereinfluencedbythisdifference.Before1914governmentsdid notrespondtothemediancitizenintheirsocieties,sincethatindividualwas oftendeniedthevote(womenandoftenalargeshareofthemalepopulation). Limiteddemocracywascoupledwithalargeawardofgovernancetotheprivate sectorthatpermittedaccommodationtothedemandsofglobalization.In addition,thebenchmarkforgovernmentpolicywasradicallydifferent:few believedthatthegovernmenthadbroadresponsibilitiesineconomic management.Inthelatetwentiethcentury,governancemaybeshiftingtowarda morecircumscribedpublicdomain(oraleastonethatisdefineddifferently),but thecontemporarybenchmarkisalevelofgovernmentactivismsetatmid centuryduringaperiodofeconomicclosure. Weakdemocraticaccountabilitypermittedpolicycapturebyeconomic interests,whichcreatedbothpolicydivergenceandconvergence.Policywasless

12 consistentlysupportiveofeconomicopening.Tariffpolicyafter1870shifted towardincreasedprotectionofagricultureandmanufacturingineveryEuropean countryexceptBritainandDenmark(ORourkeandWilliamson1999,ch.6).The mostimportantinstanceofstrongpolicyconvergencewasthegoldstandard, whichwassupportedbydomesticcommitmentsandinstitutions,reinforcedby thecentralplaceofBritaininthemidcenturyinternationaleconomyandthe networkexternalitiesofacommoncurrencystandard(Eichengreen1996,ch.2) Convergenceinotherdomains,suchascorporategovernance,occurredmuch moreslowly,eveninfundamentalssuchasaccountingstandards.(Bordo, Eichengreen,Irwin1999).Ofcourse,policyconvergencemayhavebeenless importanttoglobaleconomicintegrationinanerainwhenthescopeof governmentregulationwasfarnarrowerthanitwouldbecomeinthetwentieth century. Policycredibilityunderthegoldstandardmayhavebenefitedfroman absenceofdemocraticgovernance,sincetheworkerswhosufferedmostfrom hardtimeswereillpositionedtomaketheirobjectionsfelt(Eichengreen1996, 31).Ontheotherhand,thefailureofpre1914nationalorinternational governancetoaddressthedistributionalconsequencesofeconomicintegration underminedtheglobalizedsystem.Politicalbacklashwascreatedthatwould supportinternationaleconomicclosureinthe1920sandbeyond.Theriseof workingclassrepresentationanduniversalsuffrageweakenedeffortstore establishthegoldstandardandclosedtheworldtolargescalemigrationwell beforethecrisisoftheGreatDepressionandWorldWarII(ORourkeand Williamson1999). From1914to1945thedoublecrisisofwaranddepressionbrought economicdisintegration.Changesinthescaleofpoliticalunitsdidnotappear relatedtoeitherthatdisintegrationortheresumptionofinternationaleconomic integrationafter1945.GeorgeOrwells1984andWilliamT.R.Foxsconception ofthesuperpowerssuggestthatmanyforesawacontinuingtrendtowardlarge politicalscaleafterWorldWarII.Inthelatterhalfofthetwentiethcentury, however,economicintegrationresumedamongtheindustrializedeconomies andwithintheSovietblocwithlittlechangeinscaleofnationstates,which remainedtheprincipalpoliticalunits.Economicliberalizationandthecreation ofaEuropeancommonmarketreducedpressuresforpoliticalamalgamation.In therestoftheworld,economicdisintegrationandthenglobalizationwitnessed thecreationoflargenumbersofsmallscalepolities,instrikingcontrasttothe earliereraofglobalization.Beforethe1990s,effortsateconomicintegration withinthedevelopingworlduniformlyfailed;largefederalsuccessorstatesfell apartrapidly. Theeraofinternationaleconomicdisintegrationfrom1914to1945was alsocharacterizedbycentralizationofgovernancefunctionsatthelevelof nationstates.TheNewDealintheUnitedStates;HitlersGleichshaltung,which

13 eliminatedthefederalcharacterofGermany;StalinismintheSovietUnion; PeronisminArgentina;andVargasEstadoNovoinBrazilwereallexemplarsof thistrend.After1945,thedevelopingworld,underconditionsofpolicyinduced economicdisintegration,washostiletoanymodelofgovernanceotherthanthe sovereign(littledelegationtointernationalorregionalinstitutions),centralized (littledevolutiontosubnationalunits)nationstate.Intheindustrializedworld, however,successivewavesofdevolutionaccompaniedgrowingeconomic integration.Fiscalcentralizationpeakedaround1950(Oates1998).Beginningin the1970s,regionalgovernments,somebasedonethniccleavages,werecreated intheindustrializedcountries,anddevolutiondisplayedsomenewmomentum outsidetheindustrializedworld. Delegationofgovernancefunctionstointernationalandregional institutionswasalsoarrestedinthedecadesofeconomicclosure.Althoughthe LeagueofNationssystemhadcreatedanumberofnewinternational organizations,fewfunctionedasdesignedinaneraofeconomicdisintegration. Post1945internationalinstitutionsalsoremainedtightlyconstraineduntil currencyconvertibilityandtradeliberalizationfosteredgrowingeconomic openness.Outsidetheindustrializedcorethatdominatedthekeyglobal institutions,renewedeconomicintegrationproducedawaveofregional institutionbuildinginthe1980sand1990s.Unliketheearliergenerationof regionalinstitutions,theseweredelegatedamodestincrementofgovernanceby theirmembers.Developingcountriesalsomarkedlyincreasedtheirlevelof participationinglobaleconomicinstitutionsinthelastdecadesofthetwentieth century. Economicdisintegrationinmidcenturywasaccompaniedbybotha failureofmarketdrivenpolicyconvergenceandadeclineindemocratic accountability.Economicclosurewasenactedinparttopermitawidearrayof policyexperimentsinthefaceofdepressionandinternationalinsecurity.That permissiveenvironmentcontinuedafter1945amongthedevelopingcountries; theindustrializedeconomies,ontheotherhand,begantoconvergeonamodel ofembeddedliberalism(Ruggie1982)thatcombinedliberalexternalpolicies andinterventionistinternalpoliciesinsupportofinternationaleconomic integration.Thispolicymixenableddemocraticgovernanceandeconomic opennesstocoexistinastableequilibriumthathadbeenbeyondreachbefore 1914.Convergenceowedmoretothepolicypreferencesofthedominantpower andtointernationalinstitutionsthanithadbefore1914,butthosefactorsdidnot stopthespreadofsocialisteconomicplanning,importsubstituting industrialization,andcapitalcontrolsthroughoutmuchoftheworld.The reasonsforglobalpolicyconvergenceonfullinternationalliberalizationafter 1980remaincontroversial,asSimmonsandElkinsdescribeinchapter11. Thisexaminationofglobalizationseffectsonchangesingovernanceover thepastcenturyhighlightsatleastoneanomalyeconomicintegrationhasbeen

14 associatedwithbothlargeandsmallscalepoliticalunits.Globalizationalso appearstobeassociatedwithotherdimensionsofgovernance.Economic integrationappearstofavorpoliticaldevolutionwithinnationstatesandmodest delegationtointernationalinstitutions.Thedecadesofeconomicclosureatmid centurysawthegreatestconcentrationofgovernancefunctionsatthelevelofthe nationstate.Policyconvergencehasoccurredunderconditionsofeconomic integration,butithasappearedindifferentdomainsandhasresultedfroma varietyofpoliticalandinstitutionaldynamics.Finally,democraticaccountability, thatbrightlinethatseparatesthetwoerasofglobalization,hasambiguous consequencesthatarereflectedincontemporarydebatesoverglobalization. Governmentsthataremoreaccountablefortheeconomicwelfareoftheir electoratescanconstructasounderpoliticalfoundationforinternational economicintegration.Ontheotherhand,policiesthatsupportglobalizationmay notbeabletowithstandthebacklashproducedbyitsdistributionalconsequences andreadilyexpressedindemocraticpolities. EXPLAININGTHEEFFECTSOFGLOBALIZATIONONGOVERNANCE Thisinitialprobeofglobalizationandgovernancehasproducedmany interestingquestionsandpuzzlesbutitisnotitselfanexplanation. Contemporaryscholarship,inturn,hasyieldedonlyapartial,unsystematic,and ultimatelyinconclusivebodyoftheorizingontherelationshipbetween globalizationandgovernance.Inthissection,wereviewfunctionalistand efficiencybasedtheoriescommonlyfoundineconomicsandthenoutlinean actororiented,politicalframeworkthatlendsameasureofcoherencetothe existingliteratureanddirectsfurtherinquiry.Wedonotofferasingle, comprehensivetheoryofglobalizationseffectsongovernance.Theorybuilding isapragmatictaskinwhicheachauthormusttailorherassumptionsand propositionstothephenomenonunderstudy.Weleavethisexercisetothe subsequentchapters.Ourpurposehereistoprovideageneralframeworkthat canunifythespecifictheoriesoffered.4 Economicexplanations Mostcurrentexplanationsofglobalizationandgovernanceare,inone formoranother,functionalistorefficiencybased.Functionalismexplains outcomesbytheiranticipatedeffects.Efficiencybasedexplanationsexpect outcomestotrendtowardthosethatproducethegreatestnetwealth;inmost cases,thisisassumedtoentailaheavyrelianceuponmarketexchange.These modelsdominatepopularandeconomicdiscussionsofglobalization,whichtend toseeinternationalmarketsasforcingstatestoputonwhatFriedman(1999) hascalledthegoldenstraitjacketasetofneoliberalpoliciesthatinclude internationalopenness,alimitedroleforthegovernmentinmanagingthe
4

ThisframeworkdrawsheavilyuponLakeandPowell(1999)andtheessayswithinthatvolume.

15 economy,andfullreintoprivateinitiativeandinvestment.Evenmorescholarly worksincludingthemagisterialworkofHeldetal.(1999),astudytheechoes manyofthemorenuancedconclusionsofthisvolumeandrecognizesthatstates retainalargemeasureofchoiceevenwithinaglobalizedeconomynonetheless seeglobalizationasalteringthecostsandbenefitsofalternativeactionsinan environmenttowhichstates,throughapoliticalprocessthatisleftunstated, necessarilyrespond. Inmostfunctionalistaccounts,globalizationtendstoproduceanupward shiftinthesiteofgovernancetotheregionalandthesupranationallevels.Efforts tosolvetransnationalproblems(crossborderspillovers)generateaprocessof expandingsupranationalauthority,ofwhichtheEuropeanUnionisthe exemplar(Haas1958;KeohaneandHoffman1991;Mattli1999).Solvingone transnationalproblemcanalsochangetheincentivesofthepartiesinasecond areathroughissuelinkagesorthroughtheselfinterestedactionsofpoliticiansin thenewsupranationalentities.Pressuresforyetgreaterexpansionsof internationalauthoritysteadilybuildandeventuallyleadtonewformsof governance.Thisapproachawardsacentralroletobothregionalinstitutions behavingstrategicallyanddomesticinterests,governmentalandnon governmental,thatmayforgetransnationalalliancestoforwardtheirgoals (MattliandSlaughter1998).Whileearlierfunctionalistmodelsemphasizedthe problemsolvingvaluetogovernmentsoftransferringordelegatinggovernance functionstoregionalandglobalinstitutionsinaneraofeconomicintegration, currentmodelsofneoneofunctionalismcomplicatethecalculusbyincreasing thenumberofrelevantgovernmentalandnongovernmentalactors. Efficiencybasedexplanationsarequitesimilarinstructure.Inthis approach,governancerespondstoshiftingcostsandbenefitsofmarket integration.Inthisvein,economistshavedevisedaseriesofmodelsinwhichthe sizeandshapeofstatesareexpectedtoconformwiththeleastcostlymeansof deliveringgoodsandservicestoconstituents.5Inaseriesofrelatedmodelsthat havereceivedwideattention,CasellaandFeinstein(1990),AlesinaandSpolaore (1997),BoltonandRoland(1997),andAlesina,Spolaore,Wacziarg(2000)posita tradeoffbetweenthebenefitsofeconomicintegration,intheformoflower transactioncostswithinasinglemarket,andthecostsofpoliticalintegration, particularlypolicieslessreflectiveofindividualpreferences.Whenbarriersto internationaltradearehigh,thebenefitsofnationaleconomicintegrationare relativelylarge.Inthosecircumstances,stateshaveanincentivetoexpandtheir internalmarketbyincreasingtheareaandpopulationtheycontrol.When barrierstointernationaltradefall,thebenefitsofnationaleconomicintegration decline,relativetootherpoliticalgoals,andthestatecanbeexpectedtoshrink. Accordingtothesemodels,increasedinternationaleconomicopennessmay
5

ThesemodelsarewelldescribedbyMartin(Chapter2)andHiscox(Chapter5).SeealsoMarks andHooghe2000.

16 explainincreaseddemandsforregionalautonomyintheadvanced industrializedstates:withasingleEuropeanmarketandanintegratedglobal economy,forinstance,Catalans,Scots,andotherregionalgroupsnolongerneed theircurrentnationalmarkets. Economicapproachesnotonlymakepredictionsaboutthesitesof governance,theyalsohaveimportantimplicationsfordemocraticaccountability. Unfortunately,theirpredictionsmayconflict.Functionalistandmarketbased explanationsseestatesashavinglittleoptionbuttodelegateauthorityto supranationalentities,whichmayormaynotbedemocratic,ortoprivateactors (firmsorevenNGOs).Suchdelegationimpliesadeclineinstatecapacitythe abilityofgovernmentstocontroltheirownfatesandaccountability,asfaceless bureaucratsdowhatisnecessarytosatisfythedictatesofinternationalmarkets ratherthanwhatlocalcitizensprefer.Atthesametime,manyefficiencymodels predictthatglobalintegrationreducesthebenefitsoflargenationalscaleand enhancespressuresforsmallerscaleunitsthatwillprovidepublicgoodscloser totheidealpointsoftheircitizens.Inaddition,smallerscaleunitsaremore likelytoallowimprovedmonitoringandcontrolofagentsbytheirprincipal citizens,enhancingaccountability.Inallofthesemodelsonekeydeterminantof accountability,institutionalvariation,isleftaside. Finally,claimsthatglobalizationinducesconvergenceingovernanceand policiesFriedmansgoldenstraitjacketarealsobasedonassumptionsof competitionandefficiency.Abenignversionofthecompetitiveprocess,as envisagedbyCharlesTiebout,permitsdiversebundlesofpublicgoodstobe producedformobilevoters(consumers)orfirms(seeRogowski,Chapter10). Criticsofglobalizationviewconvergenceinalessfavorablelight,arguingthat competitioninduceslowerlevelsofnationalregulationthatarenotdesiredby thevotersofanycountry.Althoughseldomspecifiedprecisely,thesemodelsare basedonstrategicbehavioramonggovernmentsthatmaybemoreattunedto(or capturedby)particularinterests,ratherthannationalelectorates.Firmsinsuch models,highlysensitivetodifferencesinnationalpolicyregimes,increasetheir bargainingpowervisvisgovernmentsbyusingacrediblethreattoexitthe nationaljurisdiction. Theseeconomicexplanationsforvariationingovernanceinducedby globalizationdisplaythreeshortcomings.First,theirpredictionsdonotalways matchtheempiricalregularitiesthatarefoundinthehistoryofglobalization. Theytendtoimplyuniformchangesingovernancewhenactualpatternsare morevaried.Inaddition,largescalepoliticalunitsduringthelatenineteenth centuryruncountertomodelspredictinganassociationbetweeneconomic opennessandreducedscaleofunits.Assignmentofgovernancefunctionsoften doesnotmatchthesemodelseither:itisdifficulttoexplainaCommon AgriculturePolicywithintheEuropeanUniononthebasisofefficienciesinthe productionofpublicgoodsorthescopeofexternalities.Immigration,whichcan

17 havelargeexternalities,remainslargelyinthehandsofnationalpolicymakers, evenintheEuropeanUnion. Second,explanationsbasedonthesemodelsaretypicallyunder determined.Eachhighlightsaneedthatiscompatiblewithalternative governancestructuresand,therefore,eachfallsshortofexplainingtheparticular institutionsthatareactuallyobserved.Scaleeconomies,forinstance,area necessarypartofnearlyallexplanationsofunitsizeandform.Thebenefitsof poolingresourcesandeffortswithothersprovidesastrongincentivetocreate andmaintainlargerunits.Atthesametime,scaleeconomiescanberealizedin manydifferentwaysthroughthecooperativeeffortsofseparateand independentunits,longtermpartnershipslikealliancesorcustomsunions, confederationsandsupranationalinstitutionsthatpoolsovereignty,or hierarchiesintheformofstatesandempires(Lake1999).Thejointmaximization oftaxrevenuesontradedoesnotrequireaunitary,integratedstate,onlythatthe localjurisdictionscoordinatetheirextractionsanddistributetherevenues accordingtosomeagreeduponrule.Economicexplanationsarepowerful,but theyoftenpointtomultipleinstitutionalsolutions. Finally,theconceptionofpoliticsthatliesatthecoreofthesemodelsis underdeveloped.Groupsorstatesmaydemandchangesingovernance,but actorsdonotalwaysgetwhattheywant.Newgovernanceformsmaybemore efficient,butevencasualobserversofpoliticsknowthatthemostefficient institutionisnotalwaysadopted.Missingfromfunctionalistandefficiency basedexplanationsareactorswithcompetinginterestsandanunderstandingof howtheybargainoverthoseinterests.Surmountingthislimitationrequiresa shiftfromproblemsandsolutionstoactorsandtheirstrategicenvironment. Politicalexplanations ToparaphraseClausewitz,webeginfromthepremisethatgovernanceis politicsbyothermeans.Asisnowwellknown,economicintegrationproduces distributiveoutcomesthatfavorsomegroupsanddisadvantageothers.Those economicchangesaresometimesapparenttoallparticipants;inothercases,they areprospectiveanduncertain.Inlightofthosechanges,politicalactorswill formdistinctpreferencesoverpolicyinthefirstinstance,policiestoward globalizationitself(moreorlesseconomicopening),inthesecond,policiesto redistributethebenefitsofglobalization.Sinceinstitutionsshapethepoliticsof choiceandtheoutcomesobserved,concernedpartieswillattempttoshape governancestructurestoalignwiththeirinterests.Thatis,thepoliticsof designing,building,andoverturninginstitutionsofgovernanceatalllevelsis reallyaboutpolicychoices.Thus,debatesaboutsupranationalism, decentralization,therespectiverolesofpublicandprivatesectors,and accountabilityareoftenstrugglesoverinstitutionsthatwillproduceresults favoringsomegroupsorinterestsattheexpenseofothers.Contestsover

18 governancearecontestsoverpolicy.Asaresult,wecanusemanyofthetoolsof strategicchoicetoexplaingovernancedebatesandchoices(seeLakeandPowell 1999).Webeginwiththepreferenceofactors,andthenturntoinstitutionsas mechanismsforaggregatingpreferences. Preferences Globalizationasinternationaleconomicintegrationhasrelatively predictableeffectsonthepolicypreferencesandinterestsofpoliticalactors. 6It mayalsohomogenizepreferencesacrosscountrieswithimportantimplications fornationalloyaltiesandbargainingbetweenstates.Globalizationleadstoa moreefficientuseofresourcesbyexpandinginternationalmarketspermitting greaterspecializationandamoreextensivedivisionoflaborandbreaking downlocalmonopolies.Greaterwealthistypicallycreatedattheglobalandthe nationallevel.Suchargumentssimplyrestatethetraditionaleconomicargument forfreetradeingoodsandfreeflowsoffactorsofproduction(capital,human capital,labor)acrossnationalboundaries.Althoughtheremaybewinnersand loserswithineachcountryaswellpainfuladjustmentcostswheneconomic actorsshiftfromlessprofitabletomoreprofitableactivities,thepotentiallylarge aggregatebenefitsofglobalizationopenupthepossibilityofParetoimproving, compensatorybargainswithin(andbetween)countries.Boththeaggregate benefitsofglobalizationandtheparticularcostsmotivategroupconflictas globalizationproceeds. Aggregatebenefitsofglobalization,inturn,aredistributedacrossgroups withincountriesinpredictableways,creatingrelativelyclearlinesofcleavage withinsocieties(summarizedinFriedenandRogowski1996).UsingtheStolper Samuelsontheorem,forinstance,Rogowski(1989)hasdemonstratedthatfree tradewillgenerallyincreasethewelfareandpoliticalpowerofabundantfactors ofproductionanddecreasethewelfareandpoliticalpowerofscarcefactorsof production.Whenassetsarespecifictoparticularoccupations,ontheotherhand, theinterestsofthefactorsemployedinthatsectorwillbedeterminedbythenet tradepositionoftheindustrycapitalandlaborwithinthesteelindustry,for instance,willfavorsimilartradepolicies.Factormobilityacrossoccupations withincountrieshasvariedsystematicallyinthepast,therebycreatingdistinct politicalerascharacterizedbyinternationallyinducedcleavages(Hiscox2001).7 Inadditiontoitsdistributiveeffects,globalizationmayalsoincreasethe numberofactorswithpreferencesoverparticularpoliciesandgovernance structures.Aseconomicintegrationexpands,newgroupsaremobilizedinto politicsbecauseoftransnationalspillovers,includingenvironmentalists,
6 7

Onpreferences,strategies,andchoices,seeFrieden1999. Onthedistributiveeffectsofglobalization,seeScheveandSlaughter2001,Robinson2000, Garrett2001.Ontheeffectsofinternationalcapitalmobilityoninterests,seeFrieden1988and HaggardandMaxfield1996.

19 consumers,andotheractivistswhoareincreasinglyconcernedwithnotonly wherebutalsohowgoodsareproduced. Winnersandlosersfromglobalizationwillpursuetheirinterestsintothe politicalarena.Loserswillseektoimpedegreaterintegration,ifpossible,or presswinnerstosharetheirgainsthroughredistributivepolicies. 8Winners,on theotherhand,willseektosolidifyintegrationandretainasmuchofthegainsas possible.Theoutcomeofthisstruggledependscruciallyupontheinitialstarting pointalthoughwinnersbecomemorepoliticallypowerful,theymaystill remainaminorityforceandonthepoliticalinstitutionsinwhichtheycompete. Nonetheless,economictheorycanbeusedtoidentifythedistributional consequencesofglobalization,atleasttoafirstapproximation,andtohelpus identifyhowincreasedeconomicintegrationislikelytoaffectthepreferences andinterestsofimportantgroupswithinsociety. Astheirinterestschange,groupsmayseektomovegovernancefunctions totheregionalorgloballevel,ontheonehand,ortoprivatehands,ontheother, dependingonwhichforumpromisestobemostconducivetotherealizationof theirinterests.Thisisaformoftheinstitutionalcaptureargument,apoint stridentlymadebyopponentsofglobalizationintheircriticismofexistingglobal institutionsandtheprivilegedaccessthattheyareallegedtooffertocorporate interests.Morebroadly,actorswilltrytoshapegovernanceinstitutionstoreflect theirchangingpreferences. Simplepoliticaleconomymodelsofthiskindcarryacompleteaccounting forpreferencesonlysofar.Asmanyofthepapersinthisvolumedemonstrate, actorsmayhavesignificantpoliticalpreferencesthatcannotbecapturedina simpleproglobalization(oropenness)orantiglobalizationdimension.Oftenof greaterinterestarethepreferencesofactorsoverbothawiderrangeofpolicies andthesitewherepolicywillbemade.Considerthechoicebetweenclosureand harmonization.Althoughopponentsofglobalizationaresometimesattackedas disguisedprotectionists,argumentsforharmonizationmayprovidean alternativetoclosurethatcanreducepoliticallypotentfearsofregulatory competitionwhilemaintaininghighlevelsofeconomicopenness.(Incertain domains,theEuropeanUnionhaspursuedacourseofharmonizationwithin widerornarrowerparameters,whileallowingnationalpolicychoicesto dominateinothers.)Harmonizationcanalsobeapolicychosenbythe proponentsofglobalization,aimingtoleveldomesticpolicydifferencesthat impedecrossborderexchange(Kahler1996). Actorsmayalsohaveclearpreferencesforthesiteofgovernancethatare difficulttoexplainwithasimplepoliticaleconomylogic.Forexample,many NGOsinfavorofsocialregulation(environmental,labor,andconsumer protection)intheUnitedStatespreferthenationallevelofpolicymakingtoeither subnational(state)orinternationalpolicyarenas.Thosepreferencescanchange
8

Onwhoprotestsagainstglobalization,seeLichbachandAlmeida2001.

20 overtime,however,andaccordingtoissuearea.Stategovernmentswereatone pointthelaboratoriesofregulatoryexperimentationforsuchgroups,andmany heldgreathopesforinstitutionssuchastheInternationalLaborOrganization andstillmobilizeinfavorofinternationalenvironmentalregimes.Asinthecase ofcorporationsthatfavoreconomicintegration,theprobabilitythataparticular institutionalarenawillamplifypoliticalinfluenceandreducethatofones opponentsisclearlyacentralcalculation.Predictingchoiceofforummaybe difficult,however,particularlywhentheinstitutionsthemselvesarethesubjects ofpoliticalconflicts. Modelsofconvergenceaswellastheexpansionofprivategovernance(or delegationofgovernancetoprivatesectoractors)dependonassumptions regardingactorpreferences.Criticsofglobalizationarguethatfootloosecapital prefersselfregulationandashrunkenroleforthestate.Theconditionsunder whichthebeneficialmodelofjurisdictionalcompetitionistransformedintoan undesirablecollectivemovementtowardregulatorylaxityarealsobasedinpart onassumptionsregardingthepolicypreferencesoffirms.Bothbenignand malignmodelsrelyonfirms(orholdersofcapital)thataremobileandsensitive tovariationinregulatoryconditionsacrossjurisdictions.Pressurestoward regulatorylaxityarebuiltonanassumptionthatfirmsuniformlydesireless stringentregulation.Yet,suchanassessmentrequiresempiricalverification. Sinceregulatoryregimesareverylikelytoreflectinparttheinterestsofthose regulated,itisimportanttotakeintoaccountboththecostsandbenefitsof regulationfromthepointofviewofthefirm. Globalizationmayhaveafinaleffectonpreferencesandconvergence beyondchangingresponsestogreatermarketintegration.Inatleastsomeareas, globalizationappearstoleadtoahomogenizationoftastes.Globalizationisoften portrayedasaninexorableforceerodingtraditionalandlocalcultures. Globalizationmayalsocreateorreinforcecertainnormsacrosssocieties,suchas marketcompetitionordemocracy.Equallysignificantforthemodelsof governanceconsideredhere,preferencesforpublicgoods,suchaseducation, socialregulation,orsoundlegalsystemsmayalsobecomemoresimilaracross nationalborders.Suchhomogenizationinnormativepreferencesandpreferences overpublicgoods,ifitoccurs,couldsharplyreducethetradeoffbetweenmore centralizedandefficientpolicyspacesontheonehandandthedemandfor policiesthatreflectlocalizedpreferencesoverpublicgoodsontheother. Institutions Institutionsaggregatethepreferencesofgroupsintopoliciesor,inthe caseofinterstateagreements,bargainingpositionsthatmayeventuallybecome jointpolicies(GarrettandLange1996).AsRogowski(1999)hasshown, institutionsaffectpolicybias,thecredibilityofcommitments,thecoherenceand stabilityofpolicy,themobilizationandprojectionofpower,andoverthe

21 longerterm,atleastthestrategicenvironmentoftheactorsthemselves. 9Thus, institutionscanbeimportantandmaybedecisiveindeterminingobserved policyoutcomes.Ingeneral,weunderstandtheeffectsofinstitutionsbetterin stabledemocracies,wherescholarshavedevotedsubstantialattentionto institutionaldifferencesandtheirpolicyconsequences(Cox1997,Shugartand Carey1992,Tsebelis2000).Nevertheless,institutionsmatterinalltypesof polities,exertingaprofoundeffectonwhetherandhowpreferencesare translatedintopolicy.Institutionsalsomatterattheinternationallevelinsimilar ways,shapingstrategicinteractionsbetweenactorsandaffectingoutcomes. Themoststraightforwardeffectofinstitutionsonthelinkbetween globalizationandgovernanceistheirabilitytoamplifyordilutepolicy preferences.Globalizationstrengthenspoliticalactorsfavoringeconomic openness;thoseactorswilldesigninstitutionstoensurethattheirpreferencesare translatedintopolicy.Ifadominantpoliticalcoalitionfavorseconomicopenness andcreatesinstitutionstoenhancethecredibilityofsuchpolicycommitments,a backlashagainstglobalizationmayonlychangethosepolicieswithdifficultyor afterconsiderabledelay.Forexample,thegoldstandard,amajorpropfor internationaleconomicopennessbefore1914,wasembeddedinnational legislationthatcreatedbarrierstochange.Americanpopulistsdiscoveredits domesticresilienceintheirprotestsduringthelatenineteenthcentury.Regional interstateagreements,suchastheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement (NAFTA)haveservedasimilarinstitutionalpurposeforthosepromoting economicopeningagainstdomesticoppositioninthe1990s.Ontheotherhand, moredecentralizedinstitutions,whichmayhavebeencreatedforotherpurposes entirely,canimpedetheprogramofeconomicopeningthatispromotedby internationalists(Verdier1998). Thesiteofgovernancemayalsobechosentoenhancepolicycredibility overtime.Forexample,nationalgovernmentsthatlackaconvincingtrack recordofstableeconomicpolicy(orworse,possessalongrecordofvolatile policies)willsufferfromacredibilitydeficitwithexternalinvestors.These perceptionsmaybereinforcedbydomesticpoliticalinstability.Undersuch conditions,institutionalratherthansimplepolicychoicemayberequired: nationalinstitutionsthataddpolicycredibility(independentcentralbanks)and regionalandglobalinstitutions(EUorWTO)thatbindgovernmentsandtheir successorsthroughtreatyobligations.Suchexternalobligationsarereinforced whennegotiatedwithricherormorepowerfulneighbors,asignificant motivationforMexicosaccessiontoNAFTA(MansfieldandMilner1999). Decentralizationorfederalismmaybeanalternativemeansofenhancing governmentpolicycommitmentsthroughinstitutionalconstraints.Barry Weingasthasarguedthatmarketpreservingfederalismprovidesameansfor governmentstocommitcrediblytorulesthatsustainamarketeconomy.Thekey
9

Onthelongtermeffectsofinstitutions,seeKahler1999.

22 isreplacingamonopolyovereconomicpoliciesatthecenterwithjurisdictional competitionthatstimulatesadiversityofpolicychoicesandexperiments (Montinola,Qian,andWeingast1995). Finally,institutionsmayalsoaffectthesiteofgovernancedirectly.For example,democraticpoliticalinstitutionsarepredictedtoproducesmaller politicalunitsunderglobalizationthanauthoritariangovernments.Following theeconomicmodelsdescribedearlier,astradeexpandsandthebenefitsofa nationalmarketdeclinerelativetothoseofaninternationalmarket,voterswill electtoformseparatestatesthatmorecloselyreflecttheirpreferences. 10Since separatistsineachregiondonotinternalizethenegativeexternalitiesof secession(lostbenefitsofeconomicintegration)imposedonothers,democratic voterswilltendtoproducetoomanystates(relativetoabenignsocialplanner) (AlesinaandSpolaore1997;BoltonandRoland1997).Similarly,Martin(Chapter 2)arguesthatcountrieswithfederalinstitutionsaremorelikelytodecentralize controlovertourismpolicy. Institutionsalsofigureprominentlyinanalysisofglobalizationseffectson thedimensionsofpoliticalaccountabilityandconvergence.Criticsof globalizationseeastarktradeoffbetweenefficiencyandaccountability. Globalizationinduces(corporate)pressureforupwardtransferofkey governancefunctions.Externaldemandsforpolicycredibilityleadtoan enhancedroleforinstitutions,nationalandsupranational,thatcanavoid democraticoversightoftheirpolicymaking.Optimisticobserversofglobalization emphasizeotherconsequences,inparticularincreaseddemandsfortransparency thatarebestservedbyandstrengthendemocraticoversight. Confusionarisesindefiningaccountability,whichcandescribethe principals(theelectorateasawholeoranarrowersetofinterests)orthe relationshipbetweentheprincipalsandtheiragents(degreeofagencyslack).In challengingcollusiveinstitutionalarrangementsatthenationallevel,global economicactorsandmultilateralinstitutionsmayinfactincreaseaccountability. (ManyarguedthatthiscouldbeoneconsequenceoftheAsianeconomiccrisis.) Anytradeoffbetweenglobalizationanddemocraticaccountability,ifsucha tradeoffexists,ishighlydependentoninstitutionaldesign.Martin(1999) suggeststhatthecreationofstronglegislativeoversightcommitteesinsome Europeanparliamentsactuallystrengthenedbothefficiencyandaccountability. Asthesiteofgovernancechangesundertheinfluenceofeconomicintegration, suchcompensatingmeasuresmayappearatthenationallevel. Inargumentsaboutthescopeanddegreeofconvergenceunder conditionsofglobalization,institutionalassumptionscombinewithchangesin preferencesdescribedearlier.Fordownwardpressureonregulatoryregimesto occur,forexample,nationalgovernmentsmustrespondtofirmsandtheirthreat
10

Conversely,thesemodelspredictthataspreferencesbecomemorehomogenous,thesizeofthe statewillincreasetocapturefurtherbenefitsofaninternalmarket.

23 ofexit,expressedortacit.Ifgovernmentsmovefurtherfromthepreferencesof theelectorateasawhole,themodelismorelikelytobetransformed.Distance fromtheelectoratespreferencesishighlydependentonpoliticalinstitutions. Finally,foraregulatorycompetitiontowardlaxitytotakeplace,governments mustbehavestrategicallyvisavisthepolicychoicesofothergovernments. Whatlimitedempiricalevidenceexistsonthispoint(allfromwithinnational federalsystems),suggeststhatstrategicbehaviorisdependentonissuearea. 11 Ifthestruggleovergovernanceis,atitscore,astruggleoverpolicy,then thepreferencesoftheactorsandtherulesofexistinginstitutionswillbe importantdeterminantsofthesestruggles.Whichvoicesgetheardwithinthe IMFwilldependupontheinterestsofvariousdomesticgroupsasarticulated throughnationalpoliticalinstitutionsandthennegotiatedthroughthecurrent rulesoftheinstitution.Weexpectsuchnormalpoliticstocomprisethe majorityofcasesofgovernancechangeininternationalpolitics.Inthesecases, thetoolsavailabletopoliticalscientistscanbeveryusefulinexplainingthe strategiesandchoicesoftheactorsandtheoutcomesobserved.Ontheother hand,preferencescanbequiteconflictedanddiffuseand,onaparticularissue, thewinnersandlosersfromalternativepoliciesmaynotbeknownpreciselyin advance.Decisionsmaybereachedinanenvironmentofthinorfew institutionsand,thus,noclearrulesofgovernancemayexist.Inthesecases, politicalnormsandphilosophiesaboutwhatisrightorjustmaybemore influentialandoutcomesthemselveslesseasilyexplained(Gourevitch1999,156 9). Itispreciselybecauseimportant,politicallypowerfulgroupsdislike outcomesproducedbyexistinginstitutionsthattheinstitutionsofgovernance becomecontestedandchange.Sincewhogetstodecideandhowdecisionsare reachedmatters,thesiteandnatureofauthoritybecomesanobjectofpolitical conflict.Knowingwhattheconflictisabout,whoseinterestsareatstake,and howexistinginstitutionsshapepoliticalcompetitioncanhelpusunderstand wheregovernancegetssited,howaccountablethegovernorsare,andtowhom theyareaccountable.Together,afocusonpreferencesofactorsandthe institutionswithinwhichtheystruggleprovidethefoundationforapolitical theoryofglobalizationandgovernance. OUTLINEOFVOLUME Thechaptersthatfollowareorganizedintothreebroadsections,each focusingonadimensionofgovernanceidentifiedabove.SectionIaddressesthe changinglocationofgovernance.Beginningwitheconomictheories,Martin (Chapter2)examinestheroleofpoliticalinstitutionsandsocialnormsand assessesoneinternationalizedindustry,tourism,thatisalsoaprimemoverof globalization.
11

TheseargumentsareelaboratedinKahler1999.

24 Cohen(Chapter3)andEichengreen(Chapter4)examineforcesfor supranationalgovernanceintheareasofmoneyandfinance,theleadingedgeof globalization.Cohenoutlinesthetrendtowardcurrencyregionalizationand assessestheroleofvariouseconomicandpoliticalfactorsdrivingthecreationof currencyhierarchies.Eichengreenanalysestheproposalsforfinancialreformin thewakeoftheEastAsianfinancialcrisisandeffortstoregulatethehighly leveragedhedgefundsconsideredbymanytobeprimarycontributorstothat crisis.Hefindslimitedmovementtowardsupranationalgovernancehere,and outlinestheprincipalimpediments. Hiscox(Chapter5),GarrettandRodden(Chapter6),andvanHouten (Chapter7)thenanalyzethelinksbetweenglobalizationandpolitical decentralizationorthetransferofauthoritytosubnationallevelsof governance.LikeMartin,Hiscoxbeginswitheconomictheoriesbutemphasizes thedistributiveeffectsofglobalizationitstendencytocreatewinnersandlosers andtestspropositionsontherelationshipbetweensitespecificassetsand demandsforpoliticaldecentralization.Contrarytoconventionalwisdom,Garrett andRoddenpredictandfindstrongevidenceforgreaterfiscalcentralization withglobalization.VanHoutenalsochallengesthelinkbetweenglobalization anddecentralization;hefindsnorelationshipbetweenimportsandexportsasa percentageofregionalGDPandwhathecallsregionalassertiveness. Mattli(Chapter8)andHaufler(Chapter9)examinemovestowardprivate governance.Mattlisurveysthegrowthofprivateindustrystandardsandthe complexinterplayofpublicandprivateactorsinsettingindustryregulations. Highlightingtheroleoftransnationalpressuregroups,Hauflerexaminesthe trendtowardindustryselfregulationontheenvironment.Together,they suggestthatpublicauthorityremainsimportantdespitethegrowthofprivate sitesofgovernance. SectionIItakesupissuesofconvergencewithintheglobaleconomy. SimmonsandElkins(Chapter11)findasignificantconvergenceinpolicieson financialliberalizationwithinregionsandamongcountriesthatsharethesame dominantreligion.Althoughacknowledgingtheimportantroleofeconomic competitionanddomesticpoliticalinstitutions,theyattributetheseeffectsinpart tosocialemulation.Conversely,Rogowski(Chapter10),Gourevitch(Chapter 12),andMcNamara(Chapter13)seeglobalizationasentailingalogicof specializationanddivergence.Rogowskidevelopsaformalmodelofpolicy choiceundercapitalmobilityandpredictsthat,underabroadrangeof conditions,countriesarelikelytoadoptmoredissimilarratherthansimilar stancestowardcapital.Gourevitcharguesthatcorporategovernancestructures areembeddedintolargerorganizedandliberalmarketeconomicsystems,that thesemarketsystemshavedifferingadvantagesanddisadvantages,andthat bothareconsistentandcanflourishwithinaglobaleconomy.McNamara,in turn,examinesfiscalpolicyinEuropeanstatesintherunuptomonetary

25 unification.Inthismostlikelycaseforconvergence,wherestatesneededto harmonizepolicytosustainaunifiedcurrency,shefindsthatalthougheach countrybroughttheirfiscaldeficitsundercontrol,asrequired,theydidsoin verydifferentways.Althoughglobalizationdoesconstrainstatesinsomeways, italsoallowsthemconsiderableroomtomaneuverwithintheinternational economy. ThechaptersinSectionIIIaddressproblemsofdemocraticaccountability withinaglobalizedeconomy.KeohaneandNye(Chapter14)addressdifferent typesofaccountability.Arguingthattraditionalconceptionsofdemocratic accountabilitythatrelyupondirectelectoralrepresentationarenottheonly meansofconstrainingpower,theyshowhowhierarchy,legalrules,reputations, andmarketsalsocreateformsofaccountabilityandcanbeusedinaglobal economybothtogivepublicsmoreinfluenceonpolicyandtoenhancethe legitimacyofinternationalgovernance.LikeMcNamara,Caporaso(Chapter15) takesEuropeasatestcaseforargumentsabouttheeffectsofglobalization.After surveyingissuesofgovernancewithintheEuropeanUnion,heprobesdifferent conceptionsofaccountabilityonebasedondemocracyandtransparency,a secondonrightsandtraceshowdemandsforgreateraccountabilityhave grownwithincreasesintheoutputandimportanceofrulesandthedeepeningof marketintegration. Inaconcludingchapter,wereturntothethemesofthisintroductionand volume,summarizethekeyfindingsofthevariouschaptersandthecollectionas awhole,andsketchoutissuesforfutureresearch.

26

References Alesina,Alberto,andEnricoSpolaore.1997.OntheNumberandSizeofNations. QuarterlyJournalofEconomics112:102756. Alesina,Alberto,EnricoSpoloare,andRomainWacziarg.2000.Economic IntegrationandPoliticalDisintegration.AmericanEconomicReview90,5 (December):127696. Alter,KarenJ.1998.WhoAretheMastersoftheTreaty?European GovernmentsandtheEuropeanCourtofJustice.InternationalOrganization 52,1(Winter):12147. Baldwin,RichardE.andPhilippeMartin.1999.TwoWavesofGlobalisation: SuperficialSimilarities,FundamentalDifferences.NBERWorkingPaper 6904. Bolton,PatrickandGerardRoland.1997.TheBreakupofNations:APolitical EconomyAnalysis.QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,112:105790. Bordo,Michael,BarryEichengreen,andDouglasA.Irwin.1999.IsGlobalization TodayReallyDifferentthanGlobalizationaHundredYearsAgo?NBER WorkingPaperNo.W7195. Borrus,Michael,DieterErnst,andStephanHaggard,eds.2000.RivalryorRiches: InternationalProductionNetworksinAsia(forthcoming). Casella.A.andJ.Feinstein.1990.PublicGoodsinTrade:OntheFormationof MarketsandPoliticalJurisdictions.TheHooverInstitution,Stanford University,WorkingPaperinEconomicsE9212. Castles,StephenandMarkJ.Miller.1993.TheAgeofMassMigration:International PopulationMovementsintheModernWorld.NewYork:TheGuilfordPress. CenterforEconomicPolicyResearch(CEPR).1993.MakingSenseofSubsidiarity. London:CenterforEconomicPolicyResearch. CommissiononGlobalGovernance.1995.OurGlobalNeighborhood.NewYork: OxfordUniversityPress. Cox,GaryW.1997.MakingVotesCount:StrategicCoordinationintheWorlds ElectoralSystems.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Dahl,RobertA.1971.Polyarchy:ParticipationandOpposition.NewHaven:Yale UniversityPress. Davis,LanceE.andRobertA.Huttenback,1986.MammonandthePursuitof Empire:ThePoliticalEconomyofBritishImperialism,18601912.Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. Eichengreen,Barry.1996.GlobalizingCapital:AHistoryoftheInternational MonetarySystem.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. Feenstra,RobertC.1998.IntegrationofTradeandDisintegrationofProduction intheGlobalEconomy.JournalofEconomicPerspectives12,4:3150.

27 Frieden,JeffryA.1988.CapitalPolitics:CreditorsandtheInternationalPolitical Economy.JournalofPublicPolicy8,3/4(JulyDec.). Frieden,JeffryA.1999.ActorsandPreferencesinInternationalRelations.In StrategyChoiceandInternationalRelations,ed.byDavidA.LakeandRobert Powell.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. Frieden,JeffryA.andRonaldRogowski.1996.TheImpactoftheInternational EconomyonNationalPolitics:AnAnalyticalOverview.In InternationalizationandDomesticPolitics,ed.byRobertO.Keohaneand HelenV.Milner.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Friedman,ThomasL.1999.TheLexusandtheOliveTree.NewYork:FarrarStraus Giroux. Friedrich,CarlJ.,ed.1958.Authority:NOMOSI.Cambridge,MA:Harvard UniversityPress. Garrett,Geoffrey.2001.TheDistributiveConsequencesofGlobalization. Manuscript:YaleUniversity(January). Garrett,GeoffreyandPeterLange.1996.Internationalization,Institutions,and PoliticalChange.InInternationalizationandDomesticPolitics,ed.byRobert O.KeohaneandHelenV.Milner.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Gourevitch,PeterAlexis.1999.TheGovernanceProbleminInternational Relations.InStrategyChoiceandInternationalRelations,ed.byDavidA. LakeandRobertPowell.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. Guilln,MauroF.2001.TheLimitsofConvergence:GlobalizationandOrganizational ChangeinArgentina,SouthKorea,andSpain.Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress. Haas,ErnstB.1958.TheUnitingofEurope:Political,Social,andEconomicForces, 19501957.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress. Helliwell,JohnF.1998.HowMuchDoNationalBordersMatter?Washington,D.C.: TheBrookingsInstitution. Held,David,AnthonyMcGrew,DavidGoldblatt,andJonathanPerration.1999. GlobalTransformations:Politics,EconomicsandCulture.Stanford:Stanford UniversityPress. Hiscox,Michael.2000.Classv.IndustryCleavages.InternationalOrganization55, 1(Winter):146. Hooghe,LiesbetandGaryMarks.2001.MultiLevelGovernanceandEuropean Integration.NewYork:Rowman&Littlefield. Hopkins,A.G.1973.AnEconomicHistoryofWestAfrica.London:Longman. InternationalMonetaryFund.1997.WorldEconomicOutlook.Washington,D.C.: InternationalMonetaryFund.May. Irwin,DouglasA.1996.TheUnitedStatesinaNewGlobalEconomy?A CenturysPerspective.AmericanEconomicReview,86:4146.

28 Jun,JongS.andDeilS.Wright,eds.1996.GlobalizationandDecentralization: InstitutionalContexts:PolicyIssues,andIntergovernmentalRelationsinJapan andtheUnitedStates.Washington,D.C.:GeorgetownUniversityPress. Kahler,Miles.1996.TradeandDomesticDifferencesinSuzanneBergerand RonaldDore,editors,NationalDiversityandGlobalCapitalism(Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversityPress:298332. Kahler,Miles.1999.ModelingRacestotheBottom.Unpublishedpaper. Keck,MargaretE.andKathrynSikkink.1998.ActivistsBeyondBorders:Advocacy NetworksinInternationalPolitics.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress. Keohane,RobertO.andStanleyHoffman,eds.1991.TheNewEuropean Community.Boulder:WestviewPress. Keohane,RobertO.andJosephS.Nye.2000.Globalization:WhatsNew?Whats Not?(AndSoWhat?).ForeignPolicy,118:10419. Keohane,RobertO.andJosephS.Nye.2000.Introduction.InGovernanceina GlobalizingWorld,ed.byJosephS.NyeandJohnD.Donahue. Washington,D.C.:BrookingsInstitution. Kiewiet,D.Roderick,andMathewD.McCubbins.1991.TheLogicofDelegation: CongressionalPartiesandtheAppropriationsProcess.Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress. Krasner,StephenD.1983.StructuralCausesandRegimeConsequences:Regimes asInterveningVariables.InInternationalRegimes,ed.by.StephenD. Krasner.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress. Lake,DavidA.1999.EntanglingRelations:AmericanForeignPolicyinitsCentury. Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. Lake,DavidA.andRobertPowell,eds.1999.StrategyChoiceandInternational Relations.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. Lichbach,MarkI.AndPaulAlmeida.2001.GlobalOrderandLocalResistance: TheNeoliberalInstitutionalTrilemmaandtheBattleofSeattle. Manuscript:UniversityofCalifornia,Riverside(March). Lindsay,JamesM.1994.CongressandthePoliticsofU.S.ForeignPolicy.Baltimore: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress. Mansfield,EdwardD.andHelenMilner.1999.TheNewWaveofRegionalism. InternationalOrganization,53:589628. Marks,Gary,andLiesbetHooghe.2000.OptimalityandAuthority:ACritiqueof NeoclassicalTheory.JournalofCommonMarketStudies38,5 (December):795816. Martin,Lisa.1999.Delegation,Accountability,andEfficientGovernance. MemorandumpreparedforthemeetingonGlobalizationand Governance,UCSD. Mathews,JessicaT.1997.PowerShift.ForeignAffairs76,1:5066.

29 Mattli,Walter.1999.TheLogicofRegionalIntegration.Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress. Mattli,WalterandAnneMarieSlaughter.1998.RevisitingtheEuropeanCourtof Justice.InternationalOrganization,52:177209. Montinola,Gabriella,YingyiQian,andBarryR.Weingast.1995.Federalism, ChineseStyle:ThePoliticalBasisforEconomicSuccessinChina.World Politics48:5081. Oates,WallaceE.1998.AnEssayonFiscalFederalism.Unpublishedpaper. OBrien,Robert,AnneMarieGoetz,JanAartScholte,andMarcWilliams.2000. ContestingGlobalGovernance:MultilateralEconomicInstitutionsandGlobal SocialMovements.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Obstfeld,Maurice.1995.InternationalCapitalMobilityinthe1990s.InPeterB. Kenen,editor,UnderstandingInterdependence:TheMacroeconomicsofthe OpenEconomy.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. Obstfeld,Maurice.1998.TheGlobalCapitalMarket:BenefactororMenace? JournalofEconomicPerspectives12,4:930. Obstfeld,Maurice,andAlanM.Taylor.1997.TheGreatDepressionasa Watershed:InternationalCapitalMobilityovertheLongRun.National BureauofEconomicResearchWorkingPaper,#5960. ORourke,KevinH.andJeffreyG.Williamson.1999.GlobalizationandHistory: TheEvolutionofaNineteenthCenturyAtlanticEconomy.Cambridge:MIT Press. Pennock,J.RolandandJohnW.Chapman,eds.1987.AuthorityRevisited: NOMOSXXIX.NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress. Peters,R.S.1967.Authority.PoliticalPhilosophy,ed.by.AnthonyQuinton.New York:OxfordUniversityPress. Prakash,Aseem,andJeffreyA.Hart.2000.CopingwithGlobalization.NewYork: Routledge. Robinson,JamesA.2000.WhereDoesInequalityComeFrom?Ideasand ImplicationsforLatinAmerica.OECDDevelopmentCentre,Paris (December). Rogowski,Ronald.1989.CommerceandCoalitions:HowTradeAffectsDomestic PoliticalAlignments.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. Rogowski,Ronald.1999.InstitutionsasConstraintsonStrategicChoice.In StrategyChoiceandInternationalRelations,ed.byDavidA.LakeandRobert Powell.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. Rosecrance,Richard.1996.TheRiseoftheVirtualState.ForeignAffairs75,4:45 61. Ruggie,JohnGerard.1982.InternationalRegimes,Transactions,andChange: EmbeddedLiberalisminthePostwarEconomicOrder.International Organization36(2):

30 Sachs,JeffreyandAndrewWarner.1995.EconomicReformandtheProcessof GlobalIntegration.BrookingsPapersonEconomicActivity,1. Scheppele,KimLaneandKarolEdwardSoltan.1987.TheAuthorityof Alternatives.InAuthorityRevisited:NOMOSXXIX,ed.by.J.Roland PennockandJohnW.Chapman.NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress. Scheve,KennethF.andMatthewJ.Slaughter.2001.Globalizationandthe PerceptionsofAmericanWorkers.Washington,D.C.:Institutefor InternationalEconomics. Shugart,MatthewSobergandJohnM.Carey.1992.PresidentsandAssemblies: ConstitutionalDesignandElectoralDynamics.NewYork:Cambridge UniversityPress. Simmons,Beth.2000.TheLegalizationofInternationalMonetaryAffairs. InternationalOrganization,54,3. Tsebelis,George.2000.VetoPlayersandInstitutionalAnalysis.Governance13: 44174. Verdier,Daniel.1998.DomesticResponsestoCapitalMarketInternationalization UndertheGoldStandard,18701914.InternationalOrganization52,1 (Winter). Vogel,David.1995.TradingUp:ConsumerandEnvironmentalRegulationina GlobalEconomy.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress. Williamson,JeffreyG.1998.Globalization,LaborMarketsandPolicyBacklashin thePast.JournalofEconomicPerspectives12,4:5172.