Azcuna Digests

Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions
POLITICAL LAW
BAYAN, KARAPATAN, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), GABRIELA, et. al. v. EDUARDO ERMITA, et. al. GR No. 169838, 25 April 2006 FACTS: All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 8801, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy recently announced. CPR, on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacaang dated September 21, 2005 STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. In Jacinto v CA, the Court said: It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater, the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising. In Primicias v Fugoso, the Court said: The exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils enact ordinances for purpose. In Reyes v. Bagatsing: It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted
On Unlawful Mass Actions

In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to inflame the political situation, sow disorder and incite people against the duty constituted authorities, we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a no permit, no rally policy, disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of the land as well as ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations. The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of the national community. Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of law-abiding citizens have the right to be protected by a vigilant and proactive government. ISSUES: 1. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a) and 14(a) thereof: (a) Are these content-neutral or contentbased regulations? Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? NO
SEC. 4 of the Consitution. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
For the complete text of BP 880, pls see end of this digest.
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to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes. The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes . It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It is a contentneutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies. A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither are the words opinion, protesting and influencing in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words petitioning the government for redress of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (b) Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness? Contrary to petitioners claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions. Public does not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known. Websters Dictionary defines it as an organized body of people; a group of people distinguished by common interests or characteristics. Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place. So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings. Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. (c) Do they constitute prior restraint? There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. [That is all the Court said regarding this issue.] (d) Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors? As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time. [Please refer to the text of BP 880 at the end of this digest.] The Solicitor General stated during the oral arguments that, to his knowledge, only Cebu City has declared a freedom park Fuente Osmea. That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has since been converted into a golf course, he added. If this is so, the degree of observance of B.P. No. 880s mandate that every city and municipality set aside a freedom park within six months from its effectivity in 1985, or 20 years ago, would be pathetic and regrettable. The matter appears to have been taken for granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose from the peaceful revolution of 1986. Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential part of the laws system of regulation of the peoples exercise of their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the Court is constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, no prior permit may be required for the exercise of such right in any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of the law. For without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect be to deny the right. Advance notices should, however, be given to the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings. 2. On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR):
The Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term should now be discontinued, since it does not mean anything other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. The Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance, and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance under BP 880. There is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do not act on applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application duly filed on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed
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following the procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by the law. SUMMARY: In cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny. For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, maximum tolerance is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally permits is valid because it is subject to the constitutionallysound clear and present danger standard. In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayors office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities. Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT [AND] FOR OTHER PURPOSES social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances. The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances; Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed. The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227. (b) Public place shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access. (c) Maximum tolerance means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. (d) Modification of a permit shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes. SEC. 4. Permit when required and when not required.-- A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a governmentowned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act. SEC. 5. Application requirements.-- All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines: (a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used. The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.
Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled:

SECTION 1. Title . This Act shall be known as The Public Assembly Act of 1985. SEC. 2. Declaration of policy. The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law. SEC. 3. Definition of terms. For purposes of this Act: (a) Public assembly means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or
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(b)

(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly. Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building. (e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. (f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying if in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory. (g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank. (h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. (i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed. SEC. 7. Use of Public throroughfare. Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade. SEC. 8. Responsibility of applicant. It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted
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(d)
SEC. 6. Action to be taken on the application. (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. (b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. (c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter. (d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.

peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following: (a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit; To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent nondemonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly; To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held peacefully; To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit; and To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly. their uniform and must observe the policy of maximum tolerance as herein defined; (b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards; (c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance; If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed; If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not
SEC. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times. SEC. 10. Police assistance when requested. It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines: (a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of
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(b)
(c)

stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse; (d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public assembly may be peacefully dispersed. provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf; (c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf; (d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly; (e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public assembly; (f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof; (g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof: 1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like; the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like; the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares; the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit; the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
(e)
SEC. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed. SEC. 13. Prohibited acts. The following shall constitute violations of the Act:
(a) The holding of any public

assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly; (b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the
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2. 3.
4.
5.
SEC. 14. Penalties. Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding section shall be punished as follows:

(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months; (b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years; (c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866; (d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days. SEC. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable freedom park or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit. In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act. SEC. 16. Constitutionality.Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby. SEC. 17. Repealing clause. All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly. SEC. 18. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved, October 22, 1985. ENCARNACION E. SANTIAGO v. COA & DIR of COA G. R. No. 146824, June 15, 2006 Facts: The COA examined the cash and accounts of Municipal Treasurer Santiago and Municipal Accountant Ortua and found that Santiago fell short of her accountability totaling Php 3.5M and that the two officials manipulated books of accounts of the municipality. Due to Santiagos failure to submit all the liquidating documents, she was relieved from her duties and responsibilities as MT and criminal cases were filed against her after she admitted that there were said shortages. The State Auditor directed the mayor to withhold payment of the salary and other emoluments due Santiago and apply said withheld amounts in satisfaction of the shortage pursuant to Sec. 37 of the Govt Auditing Code of the Phils:
Sec. 37. Retention of money for satisfaction of indebtedness to government. When any person is indebted to any government agency, the Commission [on Audit] may direct the proper officer to withhold the payment of any money due such person or his estate to be applied in satisfaction of the indebtedness.
Because of this, Santiago was not able to collect her salary, which, were used to pay her cash shortage. She then requested reconsideration of the directive alleging that there is no valid basis for the application of her salary, without her consent, to the unconfirmed accountability, and that there is no final judicial order that she incurred such accountability. Her request was denied by the COA. ISSUE: WON the salary of a govt employee be ordered withheld, retained and applied to the payment of public funds allegedly embezzled under the employees care on the basis of an audit report and the filing of administrative and criminal (malversation of public funds) cases against the employee. HELD: YES. Under Par 8 of the COA Guidelines, the examiner/auditor is authorized to direct the proper officer to withhold the payment of any money due the accountable officer, except retirement pay or gratuity due her/him, as soon as the cash shortage is ascertained and is not contested. In this case, Santiago never disputed the demand letters informing her of her cash shortage. Hence, the directive of State Auditor del Rosario to withhold petitioners salary was in order. The State Auditors finding of cash shortage against Santiago, which has not been satisfactorily disputed is prima facie evidence against her. The prima facie evidence suffices for the withholding of her salary, in order to safeguard the interest of the Government. However, it must be stated that although State Auditor properly directed the Mayor to withhold Santiagos salary and other emoluments, she incorrectly directed that the same be applied or set off against Santiagos cash shortage. As ruled in Villanueva v. Tantuico, before set-off can take place under Sec 21 of the Administrative Code of 1987, a persons indebtedness to the government must be one that is admitted by him or pronounced by final judgment of a competent court. In this case, the indebtedness was not admitted by Santiago and a competent court has not yet pronounced final judgment thereon. As a result, the amount of Santiagos salary remitted to the local govt treasurer as payment of Santiagos cash shortage should be considered merely withheld until final resolution on her indebtedness. In the event that petitioner is found not liable for the cash shortage, the withheld salary and other emoluments will be released to her; otherwise, it will be applied in payment of her indebtedness. The petition was partly granted. The COA is authorized merely to withhold Santiagos salary but not to apply it to the alleged shortage for which her liability is still being litigated.
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DIMAYUGA v. OMBUDSMAN GR No. 129099, July 20, 2006 Facts: Petitioners Dimayuga, Inumerable and Aguinaldo were employees of the Traffic Regulatory Board (TRB) of the DPWH. In June 1992, an anonymous complaint was filed against petitioners concerning certain transactions of the TRB from 1989 to May 1992. Consequently, a special audit was conducted by the Special Audit Office (SAO) of the Commission on Audit (COA). As a consequence, certain irregularities were uncovered, in which petitioners were implicated. The SAO report recommended appropriate action against petitioners. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of said report was denied by the COA Chairman. Petitioners filed a Memorandum on Appeal before the COA Chairman. Meanwhile, the audit report was forwarded to the DPWH Secretary, who then indorsed the same to respondent Ombudsman for appropriate action. Accordingly, petitioners were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law or Republic Act 3019. Respondent Ombudsman required state auditors of the COA-SAO Team to submit their sworn complaint on the basis of their report for purposes of initiating the preliminary investigation. In view of this, petitioners filed a Motion for Suspension of Preliminary Investigation. In said motion, petitioners argue that the SAO report was not yet final, considering that their appeal with the COA Chairman had not yet been resolved. Respondent, however, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by respondent. Hence, this petition for certiorari with a plea for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. Issue 1: Whether or not the investigation of the charges in the complaint filed by the SAO-COA against petitioners is premature Held: NO. Although the COA report may aid the Office of the Ombudsman in conducting its preliminary investigation, such report is not a prerequisite. Both the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 state that the Office of the Ombudsman may undertake an investigation on complaint or on its own initiative. Therefore, with or without the report from COA, the Ombudsman can conduct a preliminary investigation. This Court has declared that the findings in a COA report or the finality or lack of finality of such report is irrelevant to the investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman in its determination of probable cause. It should be borne in mind that the interest of the COA is solely administrative, and that its investigation does not foreclose the Ombudsman's authority to investigate and determine whether there is a crime to be prosecuted for which a public official is answerable. The finding of probable cause does not derive its veracity from the findings of the COA, but from the independent determination of the Ombudsman. Issue 2: Whether or not respondent ombudsman violated petitioners constitutional right to equal protection of the laws, in not affording petitioners the same relief it afforded to the public official involved in COA v. Gabor. Held: NO. The Office of the Ombudsman has been granted virtually plenary investigatory powers by the Constitution and by law. Thus, as a rule, the Office of the Ombudsman may, for every particular investigation, whether instigated by a complaint or on its own initiative, decide how best to pursue each investigation. This power gives the Office of the Ombudsman the discretion to dismiss without prejudice a preliminary investigation if it finds that the final decision of COA is necessary for its investigation and the future prosecution of the case. In another case with similar factual antecedents, it may pursue the investigation because it realizes that the decision of COA is irrelevant or unnecessary to the investigation and prosecution of the case. Since the Office of the Ombudsman is granted such latitude, its varying treatment of similarly situated investigations cannot by itself be considered a violation of any of the parties rights to the equal protection of the laws. HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES PEDRO S. PALANCA AND SOTERRANEA RAFOLS VDA. DE PALANCA VS. REPUBLIC GR 151312, August 30, 2006 Facts: The heirs of Pedro Palanca filed an application to bring the pieces of land they allegedly own under the Land Registration Act, alleging that they acquired the properties from Pedro, who in turn had been in possession of the land in concept of an owner 39 years before the filing of the application. In a civil suit, these heirs were also declared as the rightful possessor of the land. Verbal oppositions by were made by the (1) Provincial Fiscal, in behalf of the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands and the Department of Agrarian Reform, (2) some inhabitants and (3) Alfonso Guillamac. These verbal oppositions did not ripen into formal oppositions. The pieces of evidence presented by the heirs are: plans and survey certificate of the land approved by the Bureau of Lands, tax declarations over the land, testimonies of neighbors saying that they recognize Pedro as possessor of the land for at least 30 years, testimony of overseer of coconut plantation established over the properties, testimony of agents of the Bureau of Lands to the effect that they surveyed the land and issued the certification that the properties were available for an application. After trial, the Court of First Instance declared the heirs as the owners in fee and simple of the two parcels of land and ordered the issuance of an Original Certificate of Title in favor of the heirs. After almost 23 years, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment, cancellation of decree of registration and title and reversion upon the ground that the properties are of public domain as forest reserves and that the properties are still unclassified. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, the heirs are now before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The Supreme Court will dismiss the petition of the heirs. Issue 1: Whether or not the action of the Republic has prescribed. Held: No, the action of the Republic has not prescribed. An action for reversion filed by the State to recover property registered in favor of any party which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation never prescribes. Non-disposable
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public lands registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time and defenses of res judicata would not apply as courts have no jurisdiction to dispose of such land of the public domain. Issue 2: Whether or not the land can be registered under Sec.48(b) of the Public Land Act. Held: No, the land cannot be registered under Sec.48(b) of the Public Land Act. Although the applicants have complied with the requirement under Sec.48(b) that they have been in possession and occupation of the land for at least 30 years, they have not met the requirement that the land sought to be registered is a public agricultural land, an essential requirement that cannot be disposed with. Issue 3: Whether or not a public forest or forests reserve are alienable lands. Held: No, public forests or forests reserves are not alienable lands. Possession over public lands cannot ripen into ownership until and unless the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to the effect that it may form part of the disposable lands of the public domain. When the land is still unclassified, whatever possession applicants may have had, and however long, still cannot ripen into private ownership. PCGG v. DESIERTO G.R. No. 135123, January 22, 2007 Facts: Herminio T. Disini, a personal friend and golfing partner of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos, gave to the latter shares of stock of Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation (VIMC) and The Energy Corporation (TEC) worth P40,000,000 and P25,000,000, respectively, which shares of stock were in the name of Herdis Group, Inc. (HGI for short), a local corporation controlled by Disini. The stock certificates covering the above mentioned shares of stocks were among the documents found in Malacaang in the possession of the late President when he fled to Hawaii sometime in February 1986. Velayo submitted an affidavit, alleging therein that, since the complaint and its annexes refer to a transaction involving the Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation, The Energy Corporation, the Herdis Group, Inc., Mr. Herminio Disini, and the late President Marcos, the same does not in any way concern him. PCGG dismissed the complaint, saying the evidence was hearsay and denied reconsideration of the dismissal. Issue: WON the Ombudsman act without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the assailed resolution and order. Held: YES. The Ombudsman has ignored vital evidence submitted by petitioner consisting not only of the stock certificates of VMC and TEC found in Malacaang when the late President Marcos fled the country but also the affidavit executed by private respondent Manahan stating that there was a divestment plan to turn over those certificates to the late President. Notwithstanding these, he found no probable cause to charge private respondents with violation of, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The wide latitude in determining the existence of probable cause or the lack of it cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The Ombudsman must weigh "facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence x x x. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance.""A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and, definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt."A finding of probable cause "is not a pronouncement of guilt." It is well settled that as long as substantial evidence supports it, the Ombudsman's ruling will not be overturned. Courts should not interfere with the "exercise of the Ombudsmans powers based upon constitutional mandate. However, where there appears to be a grave abuse of discretion, as there appears to be here, the Court will so declare and direct that the proper complaint or information be filed. The resolution of dismissal is not based on the evidence presented and is not warranted by the facts thus far available to public respondent. The case is REMANDED for the filing of the proper information.
LABOR LAW
PLDT v. IMPERIAL G.R. No. 149379, June 15, 2006 Facts: Imperial, a PLDT lineman, was ordered by PLDTs Senior Line Foreman to drive the service vehicle of the group of Foreman Buenaventura, Barroga, and Cruz to recover cable wires in Taguig. The cable wires, about 457 ft cut into 3 rolls, were recovered by the group. But on their way back to the warehouse, the service vehicle allegedly had a mechanical malfunction (initially Imperial, Barroga and Cruz said that vehicle sustained sliding clutch; later, they said that the heavy weight of cable wires caused the unloading; Finally however, in a report filed by Barroga, he said that the only defect of the vehicle was the muffler!) which prompted Foreman Buenaventura to order the unloading of 254.3 ft of recovered cable wires valued at P26900 to another PLDT employee Flores house nearby. More than a week later, PLDT retrieved from Flores the 254.3 ft of cable. Prosecutor recommended information for Qualified Theft be filed against Imperial, Buenaventura, Barroga, Cruz and Flores, which was approved by provincial prosecutor and filed before RTC. RTC acquitted the accused for insufficiency of evidence. However, PLDT already terminated employment of all the accused. Imperial filed complaint for illegal dismissal before DOLE against PLDT. Labor Arbiter held for PLDT, believing Imperial was dismissed for just cause: 1) Imperial was one of those who unloaded the cable wires and then stored it in Flores house; 2) he presented a questionable affidavit of Cable
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Recovery which claims that Buenaventura already delivered the cable wires to the warehouse when the cables were found in Flores house; and 3)the inconsistent statements given by the accused employees. On Appeal, Imperial raised the defense of being acquitted in the criminal case and that he was merely a driver assigned to the group. However, NLRC also held for PLDT. Imperial did not file a MFR and filed a Petition for Certiorari w/ CA. The petition was initially dismissed but was reinstated by the CA, and held in favor of Imperial, arguing that the failure of Imperial to disobey the orders of Foreman Buenaventura to unload the cables was not enough ground for his termination, and evidence presented not enough to show theft or dishonesty on part of Imperial. Imperial was held to be dismissed without just cause. Issue 1: WON the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC are subject to judicial review by CA. HELD: Yes. The Court of Appeals, in view of its expanded jurisdiction over labor cases elevated to it through a petition for certiorari such as in this case, may look into the records of the case and re-examine the questioned findings if it considers the same to be necessary to arrive at a just decision. xXx Further, when the circumstances so warrant, the Court of Appeals can disregard the factual findings of the NLRC. While as a rule, factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions such as the NLRC are accorded not only respect but even finality, and that judicial review of labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence on which the labor officials findings rest; more so when both the labor arbiter and the NLRC share the same findings, such as in the present case, the Court cannot affirm the decision of the NLRC when its findings of fact on which the conclusion was based are not supported by substantial evidence. By substantial evidence, we mean the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion. Based on the foregoing, for want of substantial basis, in fact or in law, the factual findings of an administrative agency, such as the NLRC, cannot be given the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to it, as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt form judicial review when so warranted. Issue 2: WON failure to file an MR of the NLRC resolution is a fatal procedural defect. HELD: No. While a motion for reconsideration under the Rules of Court is required before a petition for certiorari is filed, the rules admit of certain exceptions, among which is the finding that under the circumstances of the case, a motion for reconsideration would be useless. xXx Likewise, we have ruled that with regard to procedural errors committed by a party to a case, fundamental consideration of substantial justice persuades us to decide the case on the merits rather than to dismiss it on a technicality. In so doing, we exercise our prerogative in labor cases that no undue sympathy is to be accorded to any claim of procedural misstep, the idea being that our power must be exercised according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the controversy. RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ G.R. No. 165088, March 17, 2006 Facts: Potenciano Ramirez sued Ma. Cecilia Ramirez (his daughter) for annulment of Deed of Donation, Waiver of Possessory Rights and Transfer Certificates of Title for 2 lots. Petitioner claims that Cecilia caused the execution of the Deed of Donation and Waiver of POssessory rights to acquire ownership over the land and improvements thereon. The Deed of Donation was used to cancel the TCT and issue new TCTs in Cecilias name. The Waiver of Possessory Rights were used to cause the Office of the City Assessor to transfer to Cecilia the tax declarations on the improvements in the land. Allegedly, the Deed of Donation and Waiver of Possessory Rights were executed by Potenciano and his wife. But the death certificate of the wife showed that she died before the date of the execution of the alleged documents. Potenciano also denied the signatures appearing in the documents (saying there is forgery). Cecilia, in her answer, said that it was Potencianos idea to cause the preparation of the Deed of Donation and Waiver of Possessory Rights to save on expenses for publication and inheritance taxes RTC: signature of Dolores (the mom) on the deed of sale was a forgery but on the waiver of possessory rights was genuine. Potencianos signatures are genuine. Also found that Potenciano and Cecilia are in pari delicto, as participants to the forgery, hence bear the consequence of their acts without cause of action against each other, applying Art. 1412 of the Civil Code. CA: even Dolores signature on the Waiver of Possessory Rights is a forgery. Also said both parties are in pari delicto. Issue: WON Potenciano and Cecilia are in pari delicto? Held: YES. Donations are governed by Title 3, Book III of the CC. Donations inter vivos are governed by general provisions on oblicon in all that is not determined by the title governing donations. Rule on pari delicto under general provisions of contracts is applicable in the present case. But court said the TC erred in applying Article 1412 of the CC which provides:
ARTICLE 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed: (1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking; (2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he has given without any obligation to comply with his promise
Article 1412 does not apply coz it refers to a situation where the cause of the contract is unlawful or forbidden but does not constitute a violation of the criminal laws. This case involves a criminal offense so the applicable law is Article 1411 of the CC.
ARTICLE 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no
CIVIL LAW
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action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted. Moreover, the provisions of the Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the things or the price of the contract. This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty; but the innocent one may claim what he has given, and shall not be bound to comply with his promise.
complaint for accion publiciana considering that it had been filed before the lapse of one year from the date the last letter of demand to respondent had been made. Issue 1: WON RTC is without jurisdiction to hear case, making the entire proceeding null and void. Held: The allegations of a complaint determine the nature of the action as well as which court will have jurisdiction over the case. The complaint would be deemed sufficient if, on its face, it shows that the court has jurisdiction without resorting to parol testimony. Since ejectment proceedings are summary in nature, the complaint should contain a statement of facts which would bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy. Petitioners complaint could fall under two kinds of ejectment suits, the first being for unlawful detainer cognizable by the MTCs under Rule 70 and the second being for accion publiciana cognizable by the RTCs. An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied. This summary action should be filed with the municipal trial courts within one year after the occurrence of the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. Beyond the one-year period, the real right of possession may be recovered through the filing of an accion publiciana with the RTC. Respondent insists, that the one-year period must be reckoned from the date of the second demand letter to vacate. Considering that petitioners complaint was filed within days from this date, respondent contends that the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case. Demand or notice to vacate is not a jurisdictional requirement when the action is based on the expiration of the lease. Any notice given would only negate any inference that the lessor has agreed to extend the period of the lease. The one-year period is thus counted from the date of first dispossession. Subsequent demands which are merely in the nature of reminders or reiterations of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year period within which to commence the ejectment suit considering that the period will still be reckoned from the date of the original demand. Moreover, it is too late for respondent to invoke the defense of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the action was filed before the lapse of one year from the date of last demand. Based on the records, respondent never pursued this line of argument in the proceedings before the trial court and even in his appeal to the CA. A partys active participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, which includes invoking the courts authority to grant affirmative relief, effectively estops such party from later challenging that same courts jurisdiction. Issue 2: WON respondents appeal had become moot and academic with the expiration of the lease contract upon his appeal rested. Held: By respondents own claim, the term of the alleged written lease contract expired several months before the decision of the CA was rendered. The CA should have taken
The case at bar involves forgery. (Cecilia does not deny the allegation of forgery of Dolores signature). It is punishable under Sec. 4, Title IV of the RPC. But petitioner argues that the object or cause is the transferred real properties and there is nothing illegal about them. The Court said that object and cause are two separate elements of a donation, and the illegality of either element gives rise to the application of the doctrine of pari delicto. Object: is the subject matter of the donation Cause: is the essential reason which moves the parties to enter into the transaction.2 In the case at bat, the donated properties, being the object, are legal. But the cause which moved the parties to execute the documents (the motive behind the forgery) is the desire to evade the payment of publication expenses and inheritance taxes, which became due upon the death of Dolores, which is undeniable an illegal cause. Hence, Article 1411 applies. Both Potenciano and Cecilia, being in pari delicto, have no cause of action against each other. Court will leave them as they were at the time the case was filed. GERMELINA TORRES RACAZA AND BERNARDITA TORRES PARAS VS. ERNESTO GOZUM G.R. No. 148759, June 8, 2006 Facts: The plaintiffs are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land with a 2-storey, 3-door apartment, which was formerly owned by their father. Defendant leased the back portion of the property and continued to occupy the same even after the death of plaintiffs father. Plaintiffs thereafter sent a letter of demand to vacate the premises. An ejectment case was filed but was dismissed due to technicality. Almost two years thereafter, plaintiffs sent a new a formal demand letter to vacate on the ground that the verbal contract of lease over the property had already expired and the same has not been renewed and since then, defendant had discontinued paying the monthly rentals. When demand was not heeded, a complaint for recovery of possession or accion publiciana was initiated before the RTC. RTC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Respondent appealed to the CA, relying on the contract of lease to justify his continued possession. CA reversed and set aside decision of RTC, holding that RTC had no jurisdiction over the
2
The cause is the immediate, direct and proximate reason which justifies the creation of an obligation through the will of the contracting parties (Tong Brothers Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court , G.R. No. L-73918, December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 726).
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cognizance of this material fact considering that the statement is binding upon respondent and is an admission which renders moot the issue of who has a better right of possession. CARLOS DE GUZMAN V. TOYOTA CUBAO, INC. GR 141480, Nov. 29, 2006 Facts: On November 27, 1997, petitioner purchased from respondent a brand new white Toyota Hi-Lux 2.4 SS double cab motor vehicle, 1996 model, in the amount of Php508, 000. Petitioner made a down payment of Php152, 400, leaving a balance of Php355, 600 which was payable in 36 months with 54% interest. The vehicle was delivered to petitioner 2 days later. On October 18, 1998, petitioner demanded the replacement of the engine of the vehicle because it developed a crack after traversing Marcos Highway during a heavy rain. Petitioner asserted that respondent should replace the engine with a new one based on an implied warranty. Respondent countered that the alleged damage on the engine was not covered by a warranty. On April 20, 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent with the RTC. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that under Art. 1571 (NCC), the petitioners cause of action had prescribed because it was filed more than 6 months from the date the vehicle was sold and/or delivered. RTC granted respondents motion to dismiss and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari Held: Petition should be denied. 1) On procedural grounds: petition violated hierarchy of courts. When petitioner received a copy of the order denying his motion for reconsideration from the RTC on January 18, 2000, he had 15 days from receipt within which to appeal to the CA by filing a notice of appeal under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 41, from an order of the RTC issue in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The appropriate remedy petitioner should have taken was to file a notice of appeal fro the RTC to the CA, not a petition for review on certiorari directly with the SC. Although petitioner intended his petition to be one filed under Rule 45 and he filed it within the 15-day reglementary period, the same was in effect a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and is therefore dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts under Sec. 4 thereof. Petitioner failed to show that special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances exist to justify a direct filing of the petition with the SC likewise; petitioner cannot find refuge in the argument that he was raising pure questions of law. The sole matter petitioner assails in this action is the RTCs order of dismissal of his complaint for damages on the ground of prescription which was tantamount to adjudication on the merits. Petitioner contends that the dismissal on the ground of prescription was erroneous because the applicable provision is Art. 169 of RA 7394 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines) and not Art. 1571 of the Civil Code. Petitioner specifies that in his complaint, he neither asked for a rescission of the contract of sale nor did he pray for a proportionate reduction of the purchase price. What he claims is the enforcement of the contract (i.e. that respondent should replace either the vehicle or its engine with a new one). In this regard, petitioner cites Art. 169 of RA 7394 as the applicable provision, so as to make his suit come within the purview of the 2-year prescriptive period. Tangentially, petitioner also justifies that his cause of action has not yet prescribed because his present suit, which was an action based on quasi-delict, prescribes in 4 years Petitioners argument is erroneous. Art. 1495 (NCC) states that in a contract of sale, the vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and to deliver the thing that is the object of sale. Corollarily, the pertinent provisions of the Code set forth the available remedies of a buyer against the seller on the basis of a warranty against hidden defects (see Arts. 1561, 1566 and 1571). Under Art. 1599 (NCC), once an express warranty is breached, the buyer can accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages. In the absence of an existing express warranty on the part of the respondent, the allegations in petitioners complaint for damages were clearly anchored on the enforcement of an implied warranty against hidden defects (i.e. that the engine of the vehicle which respondent sold to him was not defective). By filing this case, petitioner wants to hold respondent responsible for breach of implied warranty for having sold a vehicle with defective engine. Such being the case, petitioner should have exercised this right within 6 months from the delivery of the thing sold. Since petitioner filed the complaint on April 20, 1999, or more than 19 months counted from November 29, 1997 (date of delivery), his cause of action had become time-barred. Petitioner contends that the subject motor vehicle comes within the context of RA 7394, thus relying on Art. 68 (f) (2) in relation to Art. 169 of RA 7394 but even if complaint is made to fall under RA 7394, the same should still be dismissed since the prescriptive period for implied warranty thereunder, which is 1 year, had likewise elapsed. BERNARDINO S. ZAMORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA MERCADO ZAMORA G.R. No. 141917, February 7, 2007 FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City. They lived together after the marriage but the union did not produce any child. In 1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as a nurse, she returned to visit periodically, leaving again in 1974 and becoming a U.S. citizen in 1989. Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on the alleged "psychological incapacity" of private respondent, as provided for under Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of having children as evidenced by the fact that she had not borne petitioner a child. Also, private respondent allegedly abandoned him by living in the U.S. and becoming a citizen; and that throughout their marriage they lived together for not more than 3 years.
2)
Petition should be denied for lack of merit.
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Private respondent denied these allegations. She also faulted her husband for the breakup of their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful. He allegedly had two affairs with different women, and he begot at least three children with them. The TC dismissed the complaint. It said that plaintiff consented to defendants trip to the US in 1974, so she could earn and help him build a house. She seldom saw her husband because of his infidelity. He himself admitted that he had children by other women. Nothing in the evidence shows that the defendant suffered from any psychological incapacity or that she failed to comply with her essential marital obligations. There is no evidence of psychological incapacity on the part of defendant so that she could not carry out the ordinary duties required in married life. Neither has it been shown that there was an incurable defect on the part of defendant. The CA affirmed the TCs ruling. It cited Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals3 and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina4 to say that the appeal does not fall in the category of psychological incapacity. The mere refusal of the appellee to bear a child is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, since even if such allegation is true, it is not shown or proven that this is due to psychological illness. In this appeal, petitioner argues that there is nothing in Santos v. CA, upon which private respondent relies, that requires as a condition sine qua non the presentation of expert opinion of psychologists and psychiatrists in every petition filed under Article 36 of the Family Code. This Court merely said that "[t]he well-considered opinions of persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable." However, no expert opinion is helpful or even desirable to determine whether private respondent has been living abroad and away from her husband for many years; whether she has a child; and whether she has made her residence abroad permanent by acquiring U.S. citizenship. Among the essential marital obligations embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the same Code is to have children which is the basic end of marriage. The marriage had existed for twenty four years but throughout this period, private respondent deliberately and obstinately refused to comply with the essential marital obligation to live and cohabit with her husband. ISSUE: WON there can be a declaration of nullity in this case, based on psychological incapacity HELD: No. It is true that Santos v. CA did not specifically mention that the presentation of expert opinion is a vital and mandatory requirement in filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. Even in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina which laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36, examination of the person by a physician in order for the former to be declared psychologically incapacitated was likewise not considered a requirement. Marcos v. Marcos ruled that what is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
3
establish the partys psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. Also, Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (03/15/2003), states that a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged (d) What to allege). Facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented, considered in totality, should be sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party concerned. Petitioner herein failed to substantiate his allegation that private respondent is psychologically incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to bear a child was strongly disputed, as the records undeniably bear out. Furthermore, the acts and behavior of private respondent that petitioner cited occurred during the marriage, and there is no proof that the former exhibited a similar predilection even before or at the inception of the marriage.
TAXATION
BICOLANDIA DRUG CORPORATION vs. CIR G.R. No. 142299, June 22, 2006 Facts: Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 7432 (Senior Citizens Act) and RR 2-94, Bicolandia Drug Corporation (BDC) granted to qualified senior citizens a 20% sales discount on their purchase of medicines covering the period from July 19, 1993 to December 31, 1994. Upon filing its corresponding corporate annual income tax returns for 1993 and 1994, it claimed as a deduction from its gross income the amounts representing the 20% sales discount it granted to senior citizens. On March 28, 1995, however, alleging error in the computation and claiming that the aforementioned 20% sales discount should have been treated as a tax credit pursuant to R.A. No. 7432 instead of a deduction from gross income, it filed a claim for refund or credit of overpaid income tax for 1993 and 1994. HELD: The 20% sales discount cannot be deducted from gross income. The term cost in Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 refers to the amount of the 20% discount extended by a private establishment to senior citizens in their purchase of medicines. This amount shall be applied as a tax credit, and may be deducted from the tax liability of the entity concerned. If there is no current tax due or the establishment reports a net loss for the period, the credit may be carried over to the succeeding taxable year (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation). The law expressly provides that the
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage." 4 "mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
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discount given to senior citizens may be claimed as a tax credit, and not a refund. CIR vs.CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION, G.R. No. 148512, June 26, 2006 Facts: From January 1995 to December 1995, in conformity to the mandate of Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432, Central Luzon Drug Corporation (CLDC) granted a 20% discount on the sale of medicines to qualified senior citizens amounting to P219,778. Pursuant to Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 implementing R.A. No. 7432, which states that the discount given to senior citizens shall be deducted by the establishment from its gross sales for value-added tax and other percentage tax purposes, CLDC deducted the total amount of P219,778 from its gross income for the taxable year 1995. For said taxable period, it reported a net loss of P20,963 in its corporate income tax return. As a consequence, respondent did not pay income tax for 1995. On December 27, 1996, claiming that according to Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432, the amount of P219,778 should be applied as a tax credit, CLDC filed a claim for refund in the amount of P150,193. CTA denied the tax credit and ruled that there can be no tax credit in this case when there is no tax liability or the amount of the tax credit is greater than the tax due. In the latter case, the tax credit will only be to the extent of the tax liability. CA granted the tax credit. It concluded that the 20% discount given to senior citizens which is treated as a tax credit pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 is considered just compensation and, as such, may be carried over to the next taxable period if there is no current tax liability. Held: Discounts given under R.A. No. 7432 should be treated as tax credits, not deductions from income. Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 explicitly employed the word tax credit. Nothing in the provision suggests for it to mean a deduction from gross sales. Thus, the 20% discount required by the Act to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not a deduction from the gross sales of the establishment concerned. As a corollary to this, the definition of tax credit found in Section 2(1) of Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 is erroneous as it refers to tax credit as the amount representing the 20% discount that shall be deducted by the said establishment from their gross sales for value added tax and other percentage tax purposes. Accordingly, when the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the amount -when claimed shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability. The law cannot be amended by a mere regulation. 229 of the Tax Code does not apply to cases that fall under Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 7432 because the former provision governs exclusively all kinds of refund or credit of internal revenue taxes that were erroneously or illegally imposed and collected pursuant to the Tax Code while the latter extends the tax credit benefit to the private establishments concerned even before tax payments have been made. The tax credit that is contemplated under the Act is a form of just compensation, not a remedy for taxes that were erroneously or illegally assessed and collected. Prior payment of any tax liability is not a precondition before a taxable entity can benefit from the tax credit. The credit may be availed of upon payment of the tax due, if any. Where there is no tax liability or where a private establishment reports a net loss for the period, the tax credit can be availed of and carried over to the next taxable year. It must also be stressed that unlike in Sec. 229 of the Tax Code wherein the remedy of refund is available to the taxpayer, Sec. 4 of the law speaks only of a tax credit, not a refund. The tax credit benefit granted to the establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use. The privilege enjoyed by the senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the private establishments concerned.
REMEDIAL LAW
PAL vs FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP) G.R. No. 143088, January 24, 2006 Facts: 1. FASAP and Bhagwani filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against PAL before the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC. 2. Ruling in favor of Bhagwani on the issues of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal, PAL was ordered to pay damages thereof. 3. NLRC later modified the decision by setting aside the finding that PAL was guilty of ULP but affirmed the rest of the decision. 4. When PAL filed a petition for certiorari against the decision with the Court of Appeals, it was accompanied by a Certification of Non-Forum Shopping executed by Cesar R. Lamberte and Susan Del Carmen, Vice-President Human Resources and Assistant Vice-President Cabin Services of PAL, respectively, who are not parties to the case. 5. The certification, however, was without proof that the two affiants had authority to sign in behalf of petitioners. 6. As a result, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case for failure to show the authority of affiants to sign for PAL and for failure of the other petitioners to join in the execution of the certification. 7. A motion for reconsideration was filed with a Secretarys Certificate attached evidencing that affiants Cesar R. Lamberte and Susan Del Carmen have been authorized by Board Resolution No. 00-02-03 to initiate and/or cause to be filed on behalf of PAL petitions and pleadings in all labor-related cases. 8. As to the other petitioners, it was argued that they are mere nominal parties so that their failure to execute the certification does not justify dismissal of the petition. 9. Despite this submission, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. 10. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Doctrine: The required certification of non-forum shopping must be valid at the time of filing of the petition. An invalid certificate cannot be remedied
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by the subsequent submission of a Secretarys Certificate that vests authority only after the petition had been filed. Issue: Was the dismissal proper? Held: YES The power of a corporation to sue in any court is generally lodged with the board of directors. The board, in turn, can delegate the physical acts needed to sue, which may be performed only by natural persons, to its attorneys-in-fact by a board resolution, if not already authorized under the corporate by-laws. Thus, only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of a corporation. In addition, the Court has required that proof of said authority must be attached. Failure to provide a certificate of non-forum shopping is sufficient ground to dismiss the petition. Likewise, the petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatorys authority. In the case at bar, the petition filed had a certification of non-forum shopping executed by Lamberte and Del Carmen. The certification, however, was without proof of authority to sign. When a motion for reconsideration was filed, a Secretarys Certificate was submitted as proof that the board of directors of PAL had authorized the two to execute the certificate. Nonetheless, the Court finds that this belated submission is an insufficient compliance with the certification requirement. Although the Court has allowed the reinstatement of petitions that were dismissed due to lack of proof of authority to sign the certification upon its subsequent submission, saying that this amounted to substantial compliance on the rationale that the signatories, at the time of execution of the certification, were in fact authorized to sign, albeit proof of their authority was lacking. In the case at bar, the Secretarys Certificate submitted reveals that the authority to cause the filing of the petition was granted on February 15, 2000. The petition, on the other hand, was filed on January 24, 2000 and was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on January 31, 2000. This means that at the time the certification was signed, Lamberte and Del Carmen were not duly authorized by the Board of Directors of PAL and, consequently, their signing and attestations were not in representation of PAL. This effectively translates to a petition that was filed without a certification at all as none was issued by PAL, the principal party to the case. YEE v. BERNABE G.R. No. 141393, April 19, 2006 Facts: Catherine Yee was charged with violation of RA6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) for allegedly stealing an Isuzu Elf chiller in Benguet. Yee filed a motion for reduction of bail bond and voluntary surrender with the RTC. RTC granted the motion. Thereafter, Yee filed a motion to conduct preliminary reinvestigation, which was treated by the RTC as a motion for preliminary investigation. Yee said that she was never informed of the prelim investigation and submitted a certification that the subpoena for the proceedings had not been served upon her. Despite admitting the fact that there was no notice to Yee, RTC denied the motion to conduct preliminary reinvestigation (this was the challenged order in the case at bar). Motion of reconsideration also denied. Yee, before the Supreme Court, filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the RTC order. Issue: Whether the proper action brought by Yee before the Supreme Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 or a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65? Held: Neither. Yee should have elevated the case to the Court of Appeals and not directly to the Supreme Court. The remedy taken by petitioner, that is, an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, brings up for review errors committed by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction amounting to nothing more than errors of judgment. This mode of appeal involves the review of judgments, awards or final orders on the merits where only questions of law are raised. Only judgments or final orders that completely dispose of the case or a particular matter can be the subject of such review. Appeal is not allowed against interlocutory orders which are merely provisional and decide some point or matter but are not a final decision of the whole controversy In the case at bar, the assailed orders denying petitioners motion for preliminary reinvestigation are merely interlocutory and may be questioned not at this stage of the proceedings but rather as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. The orders do not finally dispose of the proceeding or of any independent offshoot of it and there has been no adjudication on the merits nor any definitive pronouncement as to the guilt or innocence of petitioner with respect to the crime with which she is charged Special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court cannot also be brought by Yee. Petition does not allege grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is the ground for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It is only upon showing that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that an interlocutory order such as that involved in this case may be impugned. Be that as it may, it must be emphasized that this practice is applied only under certain exceptional circumstances to prevent unnecessary delay in the administration of justice and so as not to unduly burden the courts Yee should have filed with the CA the petition, following the rule on the hierarchy of courts. As a matter of policy, direct resort to this Court will not be entertained unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and
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exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as in cases involving national interest and those of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction Petition does not raise any special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance that would justify direct recourse to this Court. Consequently, the failure of petitioner to strictly adhere to the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal of the present petition.
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Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions

On Unlawful Mass Actions

Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions

Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions

Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled:

Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions

Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions

Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions

(a) The holding of any public

Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions

Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions

Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions

Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions

Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions

Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions

Petition should be denied for lack of merit.

Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions

Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions

Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions

Digests of Selected 2006- 2007 Azcuna Decisions

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