Aesthetics of Nature

Philosophy Compass 2/3 (2007): 358372, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00073.
The Aesthetics of Nature

Glenn Parsons*
Ryerson University
Abstract
The aesthetics of nature is a growing sub-field of contemporary aesthetics. In this article, I outline the view called Scientific cognitivism, which has been central in recent discussions of nature aesthetics. In assessing two important arguments for this view, I outline some recent thinking about key issues for the aesthetics of nature, including the relationship between nature and art and the relevance of ethical considerations to the aesthetic appreciation of nature.
The aesthetics of nature is a sub-field of contemporary aesthetics focused upon understanding our aesthetic responses to nature, in the broad sense of those objects and events whose character is not a product of human contrivance (Budd 24). In focusing on aesthetic responses to sunsets, animals and natural environments like mountains and meadows, nature aesthetics stands in contrast to most current work in aesthetics, which focuses upon responses to artworks. Nature aesthetics is often categorized as one branch of environmental aesthetics, a larger sub-field focused upon environments in general, including non-natural environments such as cities (Berleant and Carlson forthcoming).Though it is but one part of this larger sub-field, nature aesthetics has been the locus of most recent thinking in environmental aesthetics, with views on other environments being heavily influenced, if not determined, by views developed for the natural environment. Although consideration of the beauty of nature is common in the classic aesthetic writings of the eighteenth-century, contemporary discussion in analytic philosophy began with the publication, in 1966, of Ronald Hepburns essay Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty.The emergence of the field thus coincides with the rise of interest in environmental issues.These origins suggest that the aesthetics of nature is a hybrid discipline, concerned not only with the theoretical issues of philosophical aesthetics, but also with broader ethical and social issues concerning the natural world and our relationship to it.This view is supported by the fact that the recent growth of interest in the topic has come not only from philosophers working in aesthetics, but also from writers in related disciplines, such as geography, environmental philosophy, and landscape architecture (for a comprehensive review of work in nature aesthetics, see the introduction to Carlson and Berleant).
2007 The Author Journal Compilation 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
The Aesthetics of Nature . 359
In this article, I discuss two central debates in current nature aesthetics, each of which highlights one aspect of the fields dual nature.The first debate concerns the extent to which aesthetic judgements about nature can be thought of as objective. Since the objectivity of aesthetic judgement is traditionally one of the central issues in the philosophy of art, this debate brings out the fields connections with mainstream aesthetics.The second debate relates to the role of natures aesthetic value in arguments for the preservation of wild nature.Although closely related to the former debate, this issue focuses on the especially close connection to ethics that is characteristic of the aesthetics of nature. Recent discussion of these issues has centred on an influential conception of the aesthetic appreciation of nature that has been developed in detail by Allen Carlson.Thus, before considering the two debates mentioned above, I will briefly sketch some highlights of this view. Carlsons Cognitivism Carlson describes his view as follows:
to appropriately appreciate [natural] objects or landscapes...aesthetically...it is necessary to perceive them in their correct categories.This requires knowing what they are and knowing something about them. In general, it requires the knowledge given by the natural sciences. (90)
This view is sometimes referred to as Scientific cognitivism. In this description, the latter term suggests that, generally speaking, belief about the object of aesthetic appreciation can alter its aesthetic qualities. In other words, aesthetic appreciation is cognitive in the sense that our beliefs concerning the kind of object that we are perceiving can change the way the object looks or sounds to us, and hence can change the way it appears aesthetically to us.The term scientific expresses Carlsons view that scientific knowledge about natural things, such as that delivered by biology, geology and natural history, can produce this change, in effect shaping an objects aesthetic appearance for us. Carlson argues, for example, that in the absence of such knowledge, many natural environments look visually chaotic, lacking discernible pattern or order and, a fortiori, any positive aesthetic qualities. Knowledge of natural history and ecology, in such cases, may allow us to perceive the environment differently, as containing a pleasing order, pattern and visual coherence that would otherwise be hidden from us. It is important to emphasize that Carlsons view is a normative one: although we may, and often do, engage in aesthetic appreciation of natural things that is not shaped by scientific understanding of those things, Scientific cognitivism deems this to be less correct, or less appropriate, appreciation than aesthetic appreciation that is so shaped.Thus, to use another of Carlsons examples, one might find the flora of an alpine meadow visually uninteresting until one considers that it is subject to high-altitude conditions that constrain the possibilities available to its plant species.Without such knowledge,
2007 The Author Philosophy Compass 2/3 (2007): 358372, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00073.x Journal Compilation 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
360 . The Aesthetics of Nature
Carlson says, we might neither appreciatively note their remarkable adjustment to their situation nor attune our sense to their subtle fragrance, texture, and hue (xixxx).Aesthetic appreciation of the meadows flora that is uninformed by scientific knowledge, he maintains, is less appropriate appreciation.Another way to put Carlsons point is that scientifically informed aesthetic appreciation serves as a normative standard for the aesthetic appreciation of nature. In setting scientifically informed appreciation of nature as a normative standard, Scientific cognitivism goes against a long philosophical tradition. In this tradition, the aesthetic appreciation of nature is viewed as free of all normative constraints and so essentially subjective (for a review of this tradition, see Parsons, Freedom and Objectivity).This sets up a sharp contrast between nature and art, since aesthetic judgements of art are widely taken to be subject to at least some normative constraints. David Hume famously noted the strength of our intuition that some aesthetic judgements are more correct, or appropriate, than others. Whoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance between Ogilby and Milton, or Bunyan and Addison, Hume wrote,would be thought to defend no less an extravagance, than if he had maintained a mole-hill to be as high as Teneriffe, or a pond as extensive as the ocean. Many philosophers have agreed with Hume on this point, holding it highly implausible, at least in many cases, to think that conflicting aesthetic judgements about an artwork are equally well-justified. It is common, in other words, to accept the existence of a normative standard for the appreciation of art, or what Hume called a Standard ofTaste. When it comes to nature, however, the need for such a standard appears to vanish.Whereas conflicting aesthetic judgements concerning artworks can be evaluated as better and worse, analogous judgements about nature are all to be accepted as equally valid.As an illustration of this line of thought, consider the treatment of natural beauty by one of the more prominent figures in early twentieth-century aesthetics, Benedetto Croce. As regards natural beauty, Croce writes, man is like the mythical Narcissus at the fountain.This image is apt, according to Croce, because nature becomes beautiful only when we dress it with imaginative associations that bestow meaning upon it. But we are free to bring whatever imaginative associations we like to nature: as he puts it,
the same natural object or fact is, according to the disposition of the soul, now expressive, now insignificant, now expressive of one definite thing, now of another, sad or glad, sublime or ridiculous, sweet or laughable. (99)
When people disagree over the beauty of some natural thing, it is because they differ in the imaginative associations that they bring to it. But this is an irresolvable debate, since neithers imaginative associations are more correct than the others. They may dispute for ever, Croce tells us, but they will never agree, save when they are supplied with a sufficient dose of aesthetic knowledge to enable them to recognize that both are right. (99100)
This traditional view, then, holds a bifurcated account of aesthetic appreciation, accepting normative standards for aesthetic judgements about art, but rejecting them for nature.This view has much prima facie plausibility. For although we have strong intuitions that not all aesthetic judgements about an artwork are equally valid, as Hume noted, we seem to lack analogous intuitions concerning nature.This point is well-taken, but does not seem sufficient to support the traditional view. In the case of art, not only do we frequently appreciate artworks, but we also routinely compare our aesthetic evaluations of artworks with those of our friends, as well as with those of art critics.When it comes to nature, however, not only do we engage in aesthetic appreciation less frequently, we also spend less time evaluating our responses critically or comparing them to those of others. In short, it is possible that we find the idea of normative standards for natural beauty intuitively implausible only because we have, as yet, devoted insufficient attention to natural beauty.After all, as mentioned at the outset, it is only recently that the natural environment has attracted any widespread interest.Thus, we cannot rely solely on our intuitions here, but must also weigh the arguments for and against the acceptance of such standards.What grounds, then, might be given for accepting a view, such as Scientific cognitivism, that attributes normative standards to the aesthetic appreciation of nature, as well as to the aesthetic appreciation of art? Carlsons work suggests two arguments, the first of which I will call the analogy with art argument.This argument goes as follows: (1) Aesthetic judgements concerning artworks are subject to normative standards. (2) If accepting a particular view of aesthetic appreciation allows us to offer similar accounts of the aesthetic appreciation of both art and nature, then we have a reason to accept that view. (3) Scientific cognitivism holds that aesthetic judgements concerning nature are subject to normative standards. (4) Therefore, we have a reason to accept Scientific cognitivism. This argument can be viewed as following up on an idea just mentioned: the idea that, so far, the aesthetic appreciation of nature has been neglected in relation to that of art. Given that it is possible to develop the aesthetic appreciation of nature in a way analogous to that in which we have already developed the aesthetic appreciation of art, this argument says that we ought to avail ourselves of this opportunity. A second argument for Scientific cognitivism, which I will call the ethical argument, focuses not upon the relationship between nature and art, but on the ethical implications of aesthetically appreciating nature.Aesthetic appeal seems to be a powerful determinant of human behaviour toward the natural environment. For example, people travel long distances to see beautiful natural areas, pay more money for homes and cottages with scenic views, and often express their connection to particular locales in aesthetic
terms (O beautiful for spacious skies, and so on). However, environmentalists have often found aesthetic value an enemy rather than an ally in the struggle for environmental protection. For example, the developer wishing to turn a wild river valley into a golf resort may insist that it is merely a waste of boring trees with no aesthetic value.Aesthetically, he might maintain, it would pale in comparison to a carefully manicured landscape of dyed golf greens, stone bridges, and rustic lodges.The environmentalist will surely object, but on the traditional view of nature aesthetics, as articulated by Croce for instance, the developers judgement cannot be gainsaid. For on that view, in our aesthetic assessments we are free to conceive of nature in whatever way we please. So if the developer chooses to see the undeveloped river valley as an empty wasteland, rather than as a rich, intricate habitat, then this judgement apparently cannot be challenged or rejected as mistaken.Thus aesthetics may seem only to stultify attempts at wilderness preservation. Scientific cognitivism, however, yields a different picture, for it requires that appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature be guided and informed by scientific understanding. On that view, claims that this particular wild river valley is ugly, or of no aesthetic value, carry little weight if they are made by people who know nothing about that particular valley. Rather, it is to those knowledgeable concerning the flora, fauna and natural history of the area that we must look for a more accurate assessment of its aesthetic value. And it seems plausible to think that the aesthetic response of these observers to the undeveloped river valley will be a good deal more favourable. If so, then instead of thwarting environmentalist aims, aesthetic considerations might aid in realizing them.Thinkers concerned with ethical treatment of the environment, then, may find the following an appealing argument: (1) If accepting a particular view of aesthetic appreciation allows us to better fulfil our ethical obligations, then we have a reason to accept that view. (2) If we accept Scientific cognitivism, we will be better able to protect wild nature. (3) We have an ethical obligation to protect wild nature. (4) Therefore, we have a reason to accept Scientific cognitivism. My formulation of the ethical argument may raise the following concern: this argument suggests grounds for accepting Scientific cognitivism, but even if it does, what evidence does it give us to think it is true? It may seem, in other words, that the ethical argument prevents us from basing our aesthetics of nature on purely aesthetic considerations, requiring us to shape it in response to certain moral imperatives instead.This is clearly the attitude taken by proponents of the argument. Carlson, for example, writes that
this ethical line of argument does not by itself clearly establish that there are correct and incorrect categories in which to perceive parts of nature or natural objects...However, it does, I think, establish that there is ethical merit in regarding certain categories as correct. (67)
Saitos defence of a related argument is even more explicit. She writes:the appropriate attitude toward and appreciation of nature must be explained by reference to ethical considerations and not to aesthetic considerations (Is There a Correct Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature? 44).These authors clearly embrace ethical reasons in support of Scientific cognitivism, and, quite appropriately, they hesitate to couch their arguments in terms of the truth of that doctrine.The ethical argument, therefore, does seem to require a willingness to embrace at least some degree of moralizing in aesthetics (i.e. some willingness to let ethical considerations dictate aesthetic views). Is this a weakness of the argument?Whether one sees it as such or not depends upon ones view of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics.Without trying to settle this large issue here, it is worth noting that, unappealing as this position may be to philosophers attuned to notions such as artistic freedom and the autonomy of literary virtues, many environmental philosophers find the idea of allowing ethical considerations to inform aesthetics unproblematic (see, for example, the discussion of Hettinger, Allen Carlsons Environmental Aesthetics, below).And it is, of course, environmental philosophers who will be most strongly attracted to the ethical argument. The above concern, however, could also be applied to my gloss of the analogy with art argument. For despite the fact that it rests on theoretical, rather than ethical considerations, it too is phrased in terms ofacceptability, rather than truth. My reason for phrasing the argument this way pertains to a point that I emphasized earlier: our cultures lack of a tradition of sustained attention to natural beauty and, a fortiori, a body of solid intuitions about such beauty. For to phrase the issue in terms of Scientific cognitivism being true, rather than acceptable, suggests that we are asking whether Scientific cognitivism describes our extant normative practice: i.e. whether the appropriate judgements that we actually do make about nature are scientifically informed ones. Philosophers typically answer this sort of question, however, by consulting intuitions, which are based on, or shaped by, our past and current practices.Therefore, to put the issue in terms of truth is to, as it were, load the dice against Scientific cognitivism. For if our intuitions about natural beauty have been derived in a context where, as we already know, aesthetic responses to nature have not been a focus of attention or scrutiny, then it is very likely that these intuitions will contradict Scientific cognitivism. Perhaps a better way to put it, if we were to talk of truth, would be to ask whether Scientific cognitivism ought to be true, or whether theoretical consistency, or other factors, demand that we reform our practices in a such way that it becomes true. Scientific Cognitivism and Other Approaches to Nature Aesthetics In the view of proponents of Scientific cognitivism, the analogy with art argument and the ethical argument provide grounds not only for the
recognition of some normative standards in nature aesthetics, but also for the recognition of normative standards based on scientific knowledge.To see this, we can consider two alternative views that also claim to recognize normative standards for nature appreciation: an imagination-based approach and what Carlson calls the landscape approach. On the latter, correct or appropriate appreciation of nature is that which treats a natural area as a two-dimensional scene, or view, along the lines of a picture or landscape painting.To appropriately appreciate a natural area, on this view, is to attend to the layout of its visual qualities within an imaginary frame, attending to its formal qualities, such as its pleasing arrangements of lines, shapes and colours.This approach has had wide currency in empirical research on nature aesthetics, and holds out a normative standard for the aesthetic appreciation of nature. In light of our two arguments, however, this approach seems deficient relative to Scientific cognitivism. First, this approach effectively maintains a bifurcated conception of aesthetic appreciation, since the appreciation of art is widely held to extend beyond such purely formal considerations as the arrangement of line, shape and colour.Any attempt to justify the landscape approach using the analogy with art argument would therefore need to defend a robust formalism about art (for an attempt along these lines, see Zangwill, Defence of Moderate Aesthetic Formalism). Second, the normative standards established by the landscape approach do not seem likely to help fulfil any obligations to nature that environmentalists might want to canvass. In the example of the river valley given above, for example, proponents of development may well fulfil the conditions for appropriate appreciation, attending to the formal qualities of some view of the valley, which they find unimpressive. In sum, the brand of appropriate appreciation licensed by the landscape view appears too cognitively thin to draw support from the analogy with art and ethical arguments. On the other hand, if one resorts to normative standards that are more cognitively substantial, and that can draw support from these arguments, it becomes difficult to keep these standards from simply collapsing into the science-based standards urged by Scientific cognitivism.The approach to nature aesthetics defended by Emily Brady, for example, stresses the use of imagination to enrich our aesthetic responses by adding patterns, associated ideas and images, and meanings to what we perceive in nature.As suggested by the discussion of Croce above, this view typically results in a rejection of any normative standards for appreciating nature. Brady denies this implication, however, maintaining that not all uses of imagination are appropriate: rather, if we are to appreciate appropriately, she says, we must imagine well, using imagination skillfully and appropriately (158). Bradys approach, then, could draw support from the ethical argument, if the normative standards established by imagining well were to prove useful in fulfilling our ethical obligations to nature. However, if aesthetic appreciation based on imagining well is to be useful in fulfilling our ethical obligations to nature, it is hard to see what imagining well can mean other than
imagining that is based upon knowledge of what nature actually is (Eaton; Fudge). Since our understanding of what nature actually is comes from natural science, the imagination-based account, insofar as it can garner support from the ethical argument, must end by collapsing into Scientific cognitivism. These considerations suggest that the analogy with art argument and the ethical argument, to the extent that they establish normative standards in nature aesthetics, favour Scientific cognitivism over other alternatives.As such, these arguments have been the focus of much recent discussion within the field.The arguments are also important and interesting in their own right, however, since each touches on an issue that is fundamental for nature aesthetics: natures relation to art, as an aesthetic object, in the first case, and the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, in the second. In the following two sections, therefore, I review some recent critical discussion of these two arguments. Nature and Art as Aesthetic Objects As glossed above, the analogy with art argument has three premises.The first, as I have noted, is widely accepted. But what of the second?This premise implies that if some view allows us to avoid holding a bifurcated aesthetic theory, on which there are normative standards for the appreciation of art, but not for nature, then we have a reason to accept that view.Why would this be? A potential reason for advancing the second premise, in the context of the analogy with art argument, is that it is always desirable, in any sort of aesthetic practice, to have normative standards. However, this idea is certainly questionable. It is at least plausible to think that an absence of normative standards in nature appreciation might be welcomed, at least by some people, as a means of increasing our level of aesthetic enjoyment (this is pointed out by Saito,Aesthetics of Unscenic Nature 102). Normative constraints, after all, place upon us an obligation to critically scrutinize our aesthetic judgements, to go through the bother of acquiring whatever knowledge or skill is required to improve them, and possibly even to abandon them outright. In short, Scientific cognitivism challenges the common conception of natural beauty as a relaxing, carefree enjoyment requiring no work, and from a pragmatic point of view this challenge might be met with resistance. A better motivation for the claim that a bifurcated aesthetics is undesirable is the objectionable arbitrariness that would characterize this position. For the position assumes that we are to have normative standards for one, but not the other, of nature and art. But then why art, after all?Why is it that our initial, untutored aesthetic responses are generally assumed not to pass muster for art, where we accept that extra work is required for appropriate appreciation, but are taken as beyond dispute in the case of nature? Perhaps one factor here is that, as alluded to earlier, critical disputes in art arise
frequently and naturally, as when artists dispute criticism of their work. Nature, of course, cannot speak up in this way, and so disputes about natural beauty are apt to be less frequent. But however well this fact explains the lack of normative standards for the aesthetics of nature, it seems insufficient to justify it. One could hardly reject the existence of a normative standard for, say, our treatment of non-human animals merely by noting that, since animals cannot talk, disputes concerning their treatment have tended not to arise. In this case, the existence of normative standards ought to be addressed, as it usually now is, by considering the analogy between the treatment of animals and other behaviour that is subject to normative constraint (e.g. the treatment of humans). Something similar seems to be required in the case of standards for the aesthetics of nature. Correspondingly, critical commentary on the analogy with art argument has focused largely on its third premise: the claim that, through the application of knowledge from the natural sciences, we can have normative standards for nature that are analogous to those we have for art. Here critics have charged that the analogy between art and nature is simply too weak. In mounting the analogy with art argument, Carlson notes that philosophers who accept normative standards for the aesthetic appreciation of artworks typically view those standards as arising from the application of our understanding of art history and art theory. On this approach, we are in a position to determine the correct aesthetic judgements about an artwork only when we view it in terms of the art historical or theoretical categories to which it belongs ( Walton; Danto, Transfirguration of the Commonplace). For example, a painting may appear crude and ill-executed until we learn that it is, in fact, an abstract work, and not, as we mistakenly had thought, an amateurish depiction of a horse. In this case, we are apt to revise our assessment, and discard our initial aesthetic judgement as mistaken, or less correct. In such cases, it is art history and art theory that, by defining proper ways of regarding the work, ground the existence of normative standards for aesthetic judgement. Carlsons claim is that scientific knowledge can play the same role in the case of nature. But, as critics have pointed out, there are important differences between the categories of art and the categories of science. First, a given natural thing will fall under a myriad of different categories, some more general and some more specific (Budd 96). In the case of art categories, it seems natural to employ the more specific categories, as when we view cubist portraits as a certain kind of work (cubist, say), rather than simply as paintings in some more generic sense. Presumably, we do this, in large part, because this is how their creators intended them to be viewed. But in the case of nature, the matter is less clear: can we view a Venus Fly-Trap merely as a plant, or ought we view it as a very specific kind of plant (carnivorous), with specific needs, traits and environment? Second, any particular category of science fails to provide a specific mode of perceiving the object, in the way that a particular category of art does.To view something as an abstract painting,
for example, involves standing a certain distance away from it, in decent light, looking at its coloured surface rather than the back, and so on.To view something as a whale, or as a glacial valley, does not seem to involve such constraints: we are free to look at any part of the object we please, from wherever we please, whenever we please (Budd 108 9).Third, in appreciating nature, we seem free to group individual things in whatever way we wish. John Fisher makes this point with respect to the appreciation of sounds in nature, writing that:
Nature does not dictate an intrinsically correct way to frame its sounds in the way that a composer does.We can listen to the total ensemble of sounds or focus on some subset of the sounds, and I do not see how the nature of the sounds we are listening to dictates that one way of framing is more correct than another. (173)
In sum, these differences between artistic and scientific categories suggest that scientific knowledge is incapable of defining a normative standard for the aesthetic appreciation of natural things, since scientific knowledge cannot provide us with the correct way of appreciating those things. If so, then the analogy with art argument for Scientific cognitivism fails, even if it is theoretically desirable to have normative standards for both art and nature. In response to this line of thought, however, it can be said that it remains unclear to what extent the differences in question actually do undermine the ability of scientific understanding to provide a normative standard for aesthetic judgements about nature. For instance, the fact that none of the various scientific categories that apply to a natural thing are the ones intended for use in aesthetic appreciation does not entail that none of them can be identified as the one relevant for appropriate aesthetic appreciation. Other criteria, such as maximizing aesthetic merit, may be involved in determining which category is the correct one to employ (Parsons,Nature Appreciation).Also, although the lack of highly specific modes of perceiving, such as those associated with paintings, is an important feature of scientific categories, the upshot of this requires further consideration. For it is not clear that the choice among different ways of perceiving natural things is as arbitrary as Budd describes.As Ned Hettinger puts it,
Once we have settled on a particular natural object as the object of aesthetic attention, many of these supposed choices [as to how to perceive the object] are no longer arbitrary. One doesnt look for fish in the river with a telescope or a microscope.Aesthetically appreciating a cliff is not best done from an airplane six miles high or on a pitch black night. (Objectivity in Environmental Aesthetics 45)
Neither is it clear to just what extent the existence of different ways of perceiving a natural thing affects its aesthetic qualities.While viewing a mountain from different vantages and at different times may alter some aspects of its aesthetic appearance, such as the visual balance of its profile,
the mountain may well look majestic however it is viewed (Parsons, Freedom and Objectivity). Finally, the failure of scientific knowledge to determine that that one way of framing [natural things] is more correct than another has also been challenged. Hettinger (Objectivity in Environmental Aesthetics) offers the example of choosing which sounds to focus on in appreciating a wetland. Imagine that we know that one particular sound is a common alligator but another the call of an Ivory-Billed Woodpecker, a bird thought to be extinct for the past forty years. In this case, it does seem that the nature of the sounds strongly suggests, if it does not dictate, framing the natural sounds in such a way that the latter, rather than the former, is the focus of our attention. Natural Beauty and Environmental Preservation The ethical argument for Scientific cognitivism also aims to establish that there are normative standards for natural beauty, but approaches this project from a quite different angle.To recap, this argument is: (1) If accepting a particular view of aesthetic appreciation allows us to better fulfil our ethical obligations, then we have a reason to accept that view. (2) If we accept Scientific cognitivism, we will be better able to protect wild nature. (3) We have an ethical obligation to protect wild nature. (4) Therefore, we have a reason to accept Scientific cognitivism. In this section, I discuss three objections that are directed at premise two of this argument (I will not consider here more fundamental sceptical responses to the argument, such as questioning our obligation to preserve wild nature). The first two objections take the form of an attack on the assumption, implicit in the second premise, that a useful argument for wilderness preservation could be mounted based on aesthetic value.The upshot of these objections is that, even if Scientific cognitivism could establish that wild nature is aesthetically valuable, this will not help us to fulfil our ethical obligations toward nature, since preservationist arguments based on aesthetic value are nugatory. The first objection centres on a presupposition that is seemingly necessary for any such argument: that all, or almost all, of the natural environment is aesthetically good.This assumption, generally referred to as positive aesthetics for nature, or simply Positive aesthetics, is required because the argument that wilderness should be preserved because of its aesthetic value obviously is generally inapplicable unless any particular bit of wilderness possesses at least a substantial degree of positive aesthetic value. Furthermore, the extension of positive aesthetic value to nature generally is critical for the utility of this argument because those areas most in need of preservationist arguments are precisely those areas most often thought to lack aesthetic value, such as wetlands. However, many philosophers find Positive aesthetics
for nature implausible, and a number of counterexamples to it have been suggested. Budd, for example, notes that
living objects decline, are subject to illness or lack of nutrients that affect their appearance, lose their attractive colours and (if they possess the power of locomotion) whatever ease and gracefulness of movement they formerly possessed, and in so doing diminish in aesthetic appeal. (1001)
Defenders of Scientific cognitivism have argued that their view can justify the assumption of Positive aesthetics for all, or almost all, of wild nature (Carlson; Saito, Aesthetics of Unscenic Nature; Parsons, Nature Appreciation; Rolston). However, some of these arguments have been heavily criticized, and the thesis remains controversial. One interesting aspect of recent discussion is that the most prominent counterexamples to Positive aesthetics, such as the lacklustre creatures cited by Budd, come from the realm of living things, rather than inanimate nature.This suggests that the common failure to distinguish, in the philosophical literature, between different sorts of natural things may be thwarting an appraisal of Positive aesthetics. For the idea that everything, or almost everything, in nature is aesthetically good is much more plausible when applied to non-living natural things and environments, such as lakes, rocks and clouds, than it is when applied to the organic world.Though some aestheticians have begun to explore the aesthetic implications of ontological differences between living and non-living natural things (Zangwill, Formal Natural Beauty; Budd) these issues have been most extensively discussed in recent philosophy of science, where teleology has been a topic of major interest (Perlman). Whether Scientific cognitivism can ground a version of Positive aesthetics that is strong enough to be useful for wilderness preservation remains to be seen, but these recent explorations of teleology are a rich, though so far largely untapped, resource for exploring this question. A second objection to the ethical argument highlights a further assumption required by any argument that we should preserve some wilderness for its aesthetic value: the assumption that, generally speaking, the aesthetic value of human-developed land is less than that of wilderness. For even if wilderness has aesthetic value, as Scientific cognitivism holds, and even if that value is more or less everywhere positive (i.e. if Positive aesthetics for nature is true), we lack grounds for preserving wilderness from development unless its aesthetic value outweighs the aesthetic value associated with human development.This assumption has proven difficult to justify, however, as the grounds used to support Positive aesthetics for wilderness often turn out to support Positive aesthetics for human environments equally well. One of the main criticisms of Carlsons aesthetics by environmental philosophers, for example, is that his view attributes positive aesthetic value to the very human environments, such as suburban development and the industrial farm, that environmentalists oppose (Hettinger, Allen Carlsons Environmental Aesthetics).This objection suggests that the aesthetics of nature, at least in
the context of the ethical argument, cannot be analyzed independently of the aesthetics of the built environment. If either of the first two objections succeeds, then the ethical argument for Scientific cognitivism fails because an aesthetic argument for preservation is ultimately unworkable.A more radical objection, which has emerged recently, challenges the arguments second premise more directly. Proponents of Scientific cognitivism have generally assumed that possessing knowledge about the natural environment will make it appear aesthetically better, by revealing qualities such as balance, harmony, fittingness and so forth among the various elements of the environment (see the examples from Carlson discussed above).This general approach appears to be based on a familiar conception of ecology as characterizing nature in terms of discrete, stable and self-correcting ecosystems.This conception, however, is no longer an orthodoxy in the scientific community, with the recent emergence of a so-called new paradigm on which natural systems are held to be open-ended systems that are constantly in flux and do not possess a stable equilibrium (Botkin; Simus). If the knowledge about nature that is disclosed by ecology is of this kind, it becomes highly questionable whether adopting Scientific cognitivism will cause us to perceive nature as more aesthetically appealing. Instead of qualities such as balance, harmony and the like, it seems that scientifically informed appreciation of nature may reveal negative aesthetic qualities such as imbalance, disorder and disharmony. If this is true, environmentalists may want to abandon the ethical argument, at least as an argument for Scientific cognitivism.Along these lines, Ned Hettinger has suggested that aesthetic responses based on ecological ignorance and myth may sometimes be the best for aesthetic protectionism (Hettinger, Objectivity in Environmental Aesthetics). But such a move may be too hasty.Another option is to admit that ecology causes us to see imbalance, disorder and disharmony in nature, but to deny that these are negative aesthetic qualities. Jason Simus suggests we look to modern art and music to see how these qualities may be positive sources of aesthetic value, rather than forms of ugliness. More fundamentally, however, it remains unclear whether the shift in ecological understanding characteristic of the new paradigm actually does result in these particular qualities being manifested in our perception of nature. For instance, one of the implications of the new paradigm cited by Simus is that events such as erosion and wildfire are no longer construed as disturbances, or departures from the norm, but as essential parts of the inherent flux of nature. But if this is the case, then it would seem that appreciating nature in light of the new paradigm of ecology should cause it to appear less disorderly and disharmonious, given that these events have now become part of the normal processes of nature.To use an analogous case from the arts, cubist paintings looked chaotic and disorderly (hence, aesthetically poor) when those works were viewed by early critics using the traditional categories of representational painting.They ceased to look this way, however, when they were viewed
through the new paradigm of Cubist art theory, on which the exclusive use of geometric form was no longer a departure from the norm but rather standard practice.This point, like many of the others discussed above, reinforces the need to carefully assess how, and to what extent, differing scientific conceptualizations affect aesthetic perception when attempting to evaluate the viability of Scientific cognitivism. Conclusion In this article, I have focused upon recent debate concerning Scientific cognitivism.This focus has required omitting much that is of interest in the contemporary aesthetics of nature, including illuminating discussions of particular types of environment as well as investigations into important theoretical concepts, such as imagination and disinterestedness.This focus is justified, in part, by the cognitivist views close connection with the issues that seem most fundamental to the field. It is also justified in light of the views radical implications for aesthetics as a whole. Some philosophers have expressed the view that Art, after a 2500-year history, has, in some important sense, essentially run its course (Danto, Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art).The natural world, in contrast, seems to be only now emerging in our cultural consciousness, as the short history of environmentalism suggests. If Scientific cognitivism is correct, then nature represents a vast aesthetic realm that we have barely begun to explore, and whose guiding principles we have only started to comprehend. Short Biography Glenn Parsons received his Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of Alberta in Edmonton,Alberta, Canada. He has taught at the University ofToronto, Wilfrid Laurier University and the University of Guelph, and currently is a member of the Philosophy department at Ryerson University in Toronto. His main research interest is the role of scientific knowledge in the aesthetic appreciation of nature. His essays have appeared in the British Journal of Aesthetics, the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism and the Canadian Journal of Philosophy. He is currently writing a book on the aesthetics of nature. Acknowledgements Warm thanks to Allen Carlson, Ned Hettinger, Aaron Meskin and Jason Simus for helpful comments. Notes
* Correspondence address: Department of Philosophy, Ryerson University, 350 Victoria Street, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5B 2K3. Email: gparsons@arts.ryerson.ca.
Works Cited
Berleant, Arnold and Allen Carlson, eds. The Aesthetics of Human Environments. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, forthcoming. Botkin, Daniel. Discordant Harmonies:A New Ecology for the Twenty-First Century. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990. Brady, Emily. Aesthetics of the Natural Environment. Edinburgh and Tuscaloosa: Edinburgh UP and U of Alabama P, 2003. Budd, Malcolm. The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature: Essays on the Aesthetics of Nature. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002. Carlson,Allen. Aesthetics and the Environment:The Appreciation of Nature,Art and Architecture. London: Routledge, 2000. and Arnold Berleant, eds. The Aesthetics of Natural Environments. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2004. Croce, Benedetto. Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic.Trans. D. Ainslie. New York, NY: Noonday Press, 1922 [1909]. Danto,Arthur. The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art. New York, NY: Columbia UP, 1986. . The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1981. Eaton, Marcia. Fact and Fiction in the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (1998): 14956. Fisher, John Andrew. What the Hills are Alive With: In Defense of the Sounds of Nature. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (1998): 16779. Fudge, Robert. Imagination and the Science-based Aesthetic Appreciation of Unscenic Nature. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 59 (2001): 27588. Hepburn, Ronald. Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty. British Analytical Philosophy. Eds. Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966. Hettinger, Ned. Allen Carlsons Environmental Aesthetics and Protection of the Environment. Environmental Ethics 27 (2005): 5776. . Objectivity in Environmental Aesthetics and Environmental Protection. Presentation to International Society for Environmental Ethics, May 2005. Accessed 7 March 2007, URL http://www.environmentalphilosophy.org/Hettinger.pdf. Hume, David. Of the Standard ofTaste (1757). The Philosophy of Art. Eds. Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1995. Parsons, Glenn. Freedom and Objectivity in the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature. British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (2006): 1737. . Nature Appreciation, Science and Positive Aesthetics. British Journal of Aesthetics 42 (2002): 27995. Perlman, Mark. The Modern Philosophical Resurrection ofTeleology. The Monist 87 (2004): 351. Rolston, Holmes. Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World. Philadelphia, PA: Temple UP, 1988. Saito,Yuriko. The Aesthetics of Unscenic Nature. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (1998): 10111. . Is There a Correct Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature? Journal of Aesthetic Education 18 (1984): 3546. Simus, Jason. Aesthetic Implications of the New Paradigm in Ecology. Presentation to the American Aesthetics Society Annual meeting in Houston,TX, October 2004.Accessed 7 March 2007, URL http://www.environmentalphilosophy.org/Simus.pdf. Walton, Kendall. Categories of Art. Philosophical Review 68 (1970): 33467. Zangwill, Nick. Formal Natural Beauty. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 21 (2001): 20924. . In Defence of Moderate Aesthetic Formalism. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2000): 47693.

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Philosophy Compass 2/3 (2007): 358372, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00073.

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