The following ad supports maintaining our C.E.E.O.L.

service

Modernity,DemocracyandSocialEngineering
Modernity,DemocracyandSocialEngineering
byDieterMisgeld
Source:
PRAXISInternational(PRAXISInternational),issue:3+4/1987,pages:268285,onwww.ceeol.com.
MODERNITY, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL
ENGINEERING
Dieter Misgeld
Twenty years ago Juergen Habermas initiated a debate between her-
meneutics and critical social theory which many judge to have come to an end.
Those who make this judgment either argue that Hans-Georg Gadamer's
metacritical objections to Habermas' critique of his position are conclusive or
at least carry enough force to regard the outcome as open-ended; others
believe that Habermas has clearly identified the limits of the hermeneutical
claim to universality and that he has shown, for the area of social theory, that
hermeneutics cannot have the last word.
1
Recently, however, Richard Rorty
and Richard Bernstein have entered the debate introducing American prag-
matism as a participant in it.
2
Thus it becomes once again worthwhile to
examine this influential debate, by taking account of the changed constellation
of arguments.
Rorty's and Bernstein's interventions have picked out features of the debate
between hermeneutics and critical social theory, which played a less signifi-
cant role in its earlier phase. In this paper I shall address some of these new
considerations and reinterpret the debate with reference to them.
(1) Cultural Pessimism, the Iron Cage and Modernity
It is often forgotten that critical social theory and hermeneutics share some
common cultural background. From the Lukacs of Soul and Form to the
Dialectic ofEnlightenment Frankfurt school social thought has been influenced
by German 'Kulturkritik' since Nietzsche, and the skepticism about moder-
nity characteristic of it.
3
And since the Heidegger of Being and Time twentieth
century hermeneutics as it developed in Germany can hardly be understood
without some reference to this cultural milieu. Both traditions also have made
philosophy the centerpiece of their diagnosis of the times and of the crisis of
modernity.
In a variety of ways Kulturkritik saw modern society as a decline of
European civilization. For it, the 'West' (i.e. Western Europe) had succum-
bed to mechanistic thought, materialism and individualism.
4
A general state
of uprootedness, of the diremtion of cultural and spiritual roots and connec-
tions, was seen as the consequence of massive and accelerated industrializ-
ation, democratization and urbanization. The development of natural science
and technology were placed into this socio-cultural context. The Frankfurt
school has had a highly critical relation to Kulturkritik, but it has also
incorporated some of its features into its critique of twentieth century mass
societies.
5
But apart from any specific links between his earlier philosophy and the
Praxis International 7:3/4 Winter 1987/8 0260-8448 $2.00
Praxis International
269
themes of Kulturkritik it matters more to recognize, in Heidegger's case, that
his preference for poetry over technical philosophy, his partially critical
interpretation of 'das Man' in Sein und Zeit and his general neglect of social
and political philosophy, as well as of the social sciences reflect the perspective
of Kulturkritik, which rested upon the separation, in Germany, of the
humanistic and historical disciplines from the new social disciplines and
scientific and technological education.
6
It is the strength of Heidegger's
philosophy to have given coherent expression to the entire amalgam of
thoughts and intuitions attempting to break out of the iron cage of occidental
rationalisation (Weber) as it developed in Germany since Nietzsche and to
have rethought it in the face of the classical tradition of philosophy. With
Horkheimer/Adorno he has the view in common, that Greek metaphysics (its
sense of the ideal), Cartesian epistemology and Kantian idealism have been
formative in occidental history. This holds, even if Horkheimer/Adorno (in
the Dialectic of Enlightenment) attempt to undermine the dominance of these
traditions by sidestepping them, while Heidegger makes them encompass all
of Western history. But in either case the history in question is a history of
reason confronted with unreason or reason's other. 7 The subversion of reason
typical of German critiques of modern culture since romanticism is something
like the background story to the philosophical drama in question.
Hans-Georg Gadamer takes a more moderate view of these matters. But
even he is deeply formed by a culture of academic learning which looks for
satisfactions beyond the profane daily realities of modern life. Culture largely
consists in the knowledge of those educated in the humanistic disciplines,
classical learning and in the arts. The favoured model of communication is one
of cultured and leisurely conversation, securely grounded in a sense of the
continuity of cultural traditions. It is on the background of this experience
that the 'problems of men' (John Dewey) in modernity are seen. Pessimism
comes in from the edges, so to speak. That is: Wherever we can perceive
cultured conversation to no longer be a force or possibility. This is where
technological and scientific manipulation prevail or the tyranny of social
engineering experts unschooled in the modes of liberal discourse and tolerant
and open-minded communication available to those initiated into a long
history of philosophical, literary and artistic erudition.
Juergen Habermas begins from a very different position. He responds to
the other side of German social and cultural thought since the 1920's. In the
German-produced split between culture and civilization he takes the side of
civilization, where the others primarily took the side of culture. He responds
to the interest in 'Realwissenschaft' , first introduced by Max Weber into social
thought.
8
Realwissenschaft is, after all, something like the sociological
response to the unromantic side of Hegel. It has found philosophical
expression in Nietzsche,9 just as much as the aesthetic/romantic side of 19th
century German intellectual culture. And it is part and parcel of Heidegger's
thought on technology, influenced by Ernst Juenger. The essense of this
'realistic' approach to culture and society can be assembled in one phrase:
Mastery of technology as a moraVpolitical necessity of modern civilization, no
matter what the moral and political price. 10
Access via CEEOL NL Germany
270 Praxis I ntemational
Habermas responds to the immoralism and 'antihumanism' implicit in the
will to mastery first expressed by Max Weber, and since Max Weber
accompanied by fatalism or pessimism. It is on this background, that one
needs to reappraise the debate between hermeneutics, critical theory and
neopragmatism.
Largely, the interpretive moves suggested by Bernstein and Rorty liberate
the debate from the constraints of the German cultural situation in the early
20th century and, beside various specific concerns regarding the contem-
porary philosophy of science, they transport it into a new environment:
American pragmatism. Two features of it surface in the debate:
(a) American pragmatism at its core is a theory of democracy. Its very
raison d'etre is the furtherance of democracy, John Dewey is its central
figure. Despite his frequent criticisms of twentieth century American society
John Dewey had an unbroken confidence in the potential of this society to
become increasingly democratic. By developing the employment of human
intelligence in action it was expected to constantly extend the range of social
communication. Deweyan pragmatism represents the belief that common
sense, the development of science and the realization of aesthetic values can be
made to converge, in the organization of a richly diverse, yet efficient civic
culture capable of mastering the problems of modernity. Democracy consists
in the building of a culture which can fruitfully combine these elements. As
such it becomes social democracy. 11 Neither Rorty nor Bernstein repudiate
this Deweyan vision so antithetical to German neomarxist or conservative
cultural theory emerging during the very decades in which Dewey wrote.
They also regard themselves as Deweyan social democrats.
12
(b) The world of pragmatism or neopragmatism is a world in which
technology is not feared. Rather, technology is often seen as a plausible means
for solving or redressing human and social problems, even when it takes the
form of a controlled regulation of social practices. It is this controlled
regulation which we call social engineering, itself deriving from the
dominance of problem-solving as an attitude to life.
Rorty regards both aspects of North-American pragmatic culture as equally
important. Bernstein primarily emphasises democratic culture, and interprets
two Germans (Gadamer, Habermas) and one German Jewish emigre (Arendt)
to have made clearer for us, how the concerns of social engineering are not
easily integrated with those of civic democratic culture. 13
Bernstein separates democracy from technology and social engineering. A
community of interests in Dewey's sense cannot be engineered or created in
administrative action. If democracy is to create 'a freer and more humane
experience in which all share and to which all can contribute' , this formulation
of Dewey's quoted by Bernstein points in the direction of 'furthering the type
of solidarity, participation and mutual recognition that is founded in dialogical
communities' .14
By building on Gadamer, Habermas and Arendt, Bernstein introduces the
classical distinction between praxis and techne into the discussion of the
relation between science, technology and democracy in the contemporary
world.
Praxis International 271
Rorty is not interested in the praxis and techne distinction nor the idea of
the polis. While he favours conversation just as much as the three philoso-
phers who for Bernstein champion these ideas more than anyone else, he does
not regard conversation as exclusive of technology or science. The nature of
conversation depends on the issues at hand, processes of inquiry as they
develop in their specifics, and the links to practical life in the society which
they may variously possess.
Therefore the debate can be given a sharper focus, I believe, if we avoid
blurring the differences between Gadamer, Habermas and Rorty. This is the
opposite of Bernstein's procedure who has them all express a vision of
dialogical communities. For Bernstein, Rorty also appears to favour the values
which the mentioned Europeans share. For Rorty displays an affinity to the
literary culture and its notions of conversation, which Gadamer has identified
as our guide for the interpretation of texts and of the cultural tradition of the
West. IS
Bernstein minimizes cultural and historical differences which stand in the
background of the philosophies discussed. American pragmatism and social
science have in common, that they regard social experimentation and
problem-solving as a dimension of public debate or the other way around.
This is one of the contexts for the pursuit of more dialogue on Rorty's part.
However, the understanding of culture derived from nineteenth century
German historicism and fin de siecle antiidealist stirrings in Germany which
Gadamer's work resonates with, has other preoccupations: There can be no
greater contrast for it than the one between the great works of the past and
modern technological production geared toward mass-consumption. 16
Therefore civilized conversation, conversation as the love of historical erudi-
tion informs Gadamer's understanding of dialogue.
Habermas' position is quite different. For him a reflection on history is
needed, which transcends the boundaries of both problem-solving and of
cultural conversation, connecting both with the defense of and an argument
for the further development of democracy. In his case, the issue is not so
much the creation of dialogical communities, rather the institutionalisation of
dialogue as a principle in all the relevant dimensions of modern societies.
Habermas responds to the traditions of democratic socialism in Western
Europe. 17 By failing to trace these differences Bernstein does not address the
absence of democracy as a theme in the thought of Heidegger or Adorno,
Gadamer or Lukacs. Primarily they do not regard democracy as a significant
dimension of modernity. When democracy moves to the centre of the
interpretation of modernity, as it does with Habermas and Rorty, the relation
between democratic civic culture and problem solving as an attitude of
practical mastery becomes central. If Bernstein and Rorty begin from the
assumption, that philosophy cannot be disengaged from the civic culture of
democracy, German cultural pessimism and the disdain with modernity,
coupled with the fatalism which it expressed-from Weber to Heidegger and
Gadamer-tends to regard poetry, philosophy or masculine individual her-
oism as the opponents of mass-democracy. 18 Modern democracies do not
possess the civic culture nor the civic virtues of (for example) ancient Greece
272 Praxis International
or Rome. They are suffused with the spirit of social engineering. Democracy
and technology coalesce into one system of domination and control, as for
Adorno and Heidegger. Philosophy must seek ways to escape from this cage
or to live in it without being of it.
If Gadamer increasingly learns to accept modernity and contemporary
liberal democracy, 19 he is still far from endorsing struggles for the realization
of political and social freedoms. But he also learns to accept that having these
struggles may not be a loss. If Rorty fuses democracy with problem solving,
and sees social engineering both as a danger and a promise,20 he is still far
from the doubts about modern societies which inform the German philoso-
phers mentioned. Even Habermas perceives a deep division in modern society
between the culture of discourse and technological/administrative progress.
Therefore he can hardly welcome more instrumental knowledge as part of the
solution, as Rorty still is inclined to do.
21
If German philosophy (of the kind discussed) raises the broadest questions
conceivable about the future of the West, a world civilization and its nature,
pragmatists such as Rorty favour questions, which can be practically
addressed, which are answerable on those grounds. This entails thinking less
of philosophy and more of social practice (to speak with Rorty).
The lesson to be learned from these criss-crossing observations weaving
together different cultural histories and philosophies, different societies in the
abstract, so to speak, is that we need to ask broad and far reaching questions
about modern civilization and its practices, without being certain that our
theories can provide answers to these questions. Nevertheless, keeping these
questions alive is important. It may help us develop the social visions
22
required for the future. And, for the time being proceeding this way allows us
to employ hermeneutics and critical theory on the one hand, neopragmatism
on the other, as each correcting a onesidedness of the other.
This is what Bernstein has begun to do and similar clues can be elicited
from Rorty's treatment of Gadamer as a critic of epistemology, as well from
his attempt to split the difference, as he says, between Lyotard and
Habermas.
23
And, as far as Gadamer and Habermas are concerned, they have
transformed the critique of modernity engaged in by Heidegger and, respect-
ively, Adorno; in their hands questions of the broadest possible range
encompassing the entire history of Western societies have been refashioned to
address uncertainties about the future of modern societies in such away, that
we can at least understand them as looking for practical answers, thus meeting
Rorty and his neopragmatism mid-way.
(2) Social Engineering and Discourse
Pragmatists, neopragmatist philosophers as well as social scientists and
sociologists influenced by pragmatism do not share the general abhorrence of
social engineering so typical of some of their European interlocutors primarily
influenced by the classical traditions of philosophy on the continent and by
traditional humanism.
Where philosophers from Nietzche to Heidegger or Adorno and a
Praxis International
273
sociologist such as Weber recoil from the idea of the rational regulation of
society advocated by either Comte or Durkheim, pragmatists think that
rational regulation maybe a good idea, as long as it is made to be compatible
with democracy, i.e. the extension of social communication. 24
But what if in the course of the historical development of methods for the
regulation of work, and leisure, of private and public life, the democratic form
of experimenting with education and community-organization has given way
to the prevalence of time-motion studies and the organization of work in
assembly-lines? If it has led to the massive growth of advertising in contem-
porary culture, the systematic attempt to harness needs, desires and phan-
tasies to a gigantic machinery of wish-fullfilment using scientific technologies
in the organization of behaviour?
The historical changes in question demand an analysis of the transformation
of democracy, especially in the United States. While American democracy
may once have been rooted in the local community and in face-to-face social
relations (as Dewey always stressed, perhaps making too much of this) it is
now organized more abstractly into media-bound plebiscitary forms. In short,
a theory of late capitalism is needed to take account of these changes. It is
central to recent critical theory. This theory also addresses the theme of the
transformation of community-based types of morality into instrumentalist
hedonism and into a widespread materialist ethics linked with the
consumption-patterns of late capitalist societies. These developments take us
far beyond the social vision of Deweyan pragmatism, no matter how much
Dewey expressed doubts about the development of American capitalism and
democracy in some of his writings.
2s
And neopragmatist social philosophers such as Rorty or Bernstein have not
even begun to elaborate a social vision reaching beyond that of classical
pragmatism. They have not developed its critique of American society. Bernstein
implicity favours Gadamer's Aristotelianism and Arendt's revolutionary
political humanism and her philosophy of 'praxis' over Dewey's social
democratic reformism, thus blunting the modernist and progressive intent of
the pragmatism which he still retains, or the links between it and Habermas'
radically democratic ethos.
26
Rorty is more concerned than Bernstein to
defend the emancipatory elements of American culture and to keep it apart
from European social thought. He endorses social engineering and the
possible increase in instrumental knowledge which it may provide as achieve-
ments transcending the limits of traditional European culture. With him and
Dewey one may interpret socially engineered forms of social regulation as
modes of practical deliberation. They entail the controllability of sequences of
action in specific situations and with respect to particular goals. Growth in
social engineering techniques, from advertizing to educational psychology and
mental health programmes, certainly is not an unmixed blessing, but it also
may not merely be a disaster. It is a part of a process of the intellectualisation
of culture, a phenomenon on which Dewey and Weber agreed. For Dewey (as
now for Rorty) this process is all for the better; thus education-as the
conscious development of intelligence in society-was said by Dewey to be the
chief vehicle of social reform.
27
For him America already was past the point of
274 Praxis International
defending the status quo, represented by the older European civilizations.
Intellectualization, the widening of a culture's grasp of the practices constitu-
tive of its organization, is for the better, insofar as it allows for the constant
readjustment of practices. Under suitable conditions it could even mean the
widening of experience in the earlier mentioned sense. For Dewey experience
could become more social, and inclusionary, culture less aristocratic and more
open to popular participation, if the spirit of experimentation and the
communal process of inquiry practiced in the sciences could be extended to all
of culture. Rorty's metaphilosophical arguments point into the same
direction.
However, Dewey's overall optimism was sustained by assumptions, which
made him regard nature, history and culture as one continuous whole. He did
not see human societies as standing outside nature, but as organized systems
of responses to their environment. Some of these responses could include, of
course, the making over of nature, adjusting it to human purposes, especially
in modernity.
Not so for a neopragmatist like Rorty. There is a gap between nature and
society, even if there is no deep metaphysical divide between methods of
inquiry applying to both.
But culture is sustained in conversation, modes of inquiry geared toward
problem-solving are not. Social policy may be, must be oriented to problem-
solving. But culture is not. Edifying discourse is about interesting ways to
think of ourselves and to speak accordingly. Natural scientific inquiry and
public policy are there for coping with whatever imposes the requirement on
us to be coped with.
As interesting as these suggestions are, however, they fail to respond to the
deeply rooted tendency in modern societies (especially in American society),
to regard all action as designed and designable, as forms of "techne", to speak
with Gadamer, Arendt and Bernstein. Dewey's vision of education as the
development and creative application of intelligence in social experience is
itself preparatory of these tendencies, because he regards the broadening and
enriching of social experience as being of one piece with an increase in
capacities for instrumental mastery. For him (possibly for Rorty as well) social
institutions have not kept pace with the progress of knowledge in science.
28
Already at the time of th publication of Dewey's "Democracy and
Education" attempts were made in the U.S. to (for example) organize
education just like factory work. Education was separated from the process of
interpreting and transforming cultural meanings. The mastery of bits of
information became the hallmark of behaviorist redesigns of school and
college cirricula. 29
Neopragmatists have failed to address these phenomena. Were they to face
these developments, they would notice, that democratic civic culture primarily either
goes with the preservation and creative rearticulation of cultural meanings or with
social engineering conceptions, the myth of ever more efficient action. They would
have to take on the industrial model of activity first developed in conjunction
with liberal economics, then fused with conceptions of scientific inquiry in
early pragmatism, and finally generalized by Dewey to become a general
Praxis International
275
model of social cooperation. This model still responds to ideas of social
cooperation as a strategic coordination of perceptions, ideas, and needs. It
does not sufficiently recognize cultural tradition as the horizon for the
transformation of social values, thus failing to account for this process as one
of interpretation an.d reflection. 30
Were neopragmatists to pursue these critical inquiries into their own
tradition, they could no longer simply opt for the strengthening of dialogical
communities (as Bernstein does) without considering the conditions which
make this aim difficult to achieve, even to understand. They could no longer
sidestep the difficlllties contained in Dewey's vision of a society uniting
efficient action with cultural and aesthetic creativity as Rorty does, by relying
on the old liberal distinction between the public domain of policy-making and
the private sphere of aesthetic fulfilment. 31
Therefore, Rorty's tentative affinity to European skepticism and its sense of
cultural malaise, aIld Bernstein's more explicit incorporation of Habermas,
Gadamer, Arendt into one conception of civic democratic culture do not face
the issues.
But Rorty may still be right in believing that a view of social practices as
designed to help us cope, looking at them as if they are, is the essence of what
is good about the I)ragmatist vision. In his view we need not look for some
basic epistemological rationale, with reference to which we can say, once and
for all, that human action relevant to the coordination of social behaviour is of
either one conceptu.al kind or another. We need not look for some basic set of
explanatory or even descriptive terms, which identify the meaning of action in
some conclusive way.
Rather the point is, that given certain kind of social and cultural history,
actions of any kind which contribute to the coordination of social behaviour
can be taken to be designed, deliberately constructed, whenever we find it
useful to look at them this way. That North-American societies have a longer
history of social engineering than other societies simply means, that members
of these societies find it more natural to look at social behaviour in these
terms.
Under the historical conditions mentioned it therefore becomes natural to
believe that social customs, conventions and long accepted beliefs are no more
than habits of thinking and doing. They have been found to work, till
challenged by some other way of doing things. Thus Rorty need not challenge
social engineering as a fundamentally misguided practice of organising social
behaviour. It just doesn't happen to be good or useful for all we want to do
and can do. And he can also argue that social engineering need not be what the
social sciences primarily endeavour to do. 'If we get rid of traditional notions
of "objectivity" and "scientific method" we shall be able to see the social
sciences as continuous with literature-as interpreting other people to us, and
thus enlarging and deepening our sense of community' .32 The social sciences
can bring the poor, the disadvantaged, the handicapped closer to the educated
members of the middle classes.
When reaching this point or a similar crossroads as mentioned earlier, one
wonders, of course, whether Habermas has not expressed the same views
276 Praxis International
more cogently. Habermas argues, after all, that as long as we operate with
concepts of technically controllable action as our primary model of social
action, we can only adopt policies toward the poor and disadvantaged, which
are inspired by concepts of social engineering. They have the consequence
that aiding the poor and handicapped becomes indistinguishable from
controlling them. Social work can become a form of policing, as it often is,
and Skinnerian behaviour modification or sociological systems-theory, for
example, can be used as a blue print for a technocratic utopia, in which all
human and social practices, all institutions are seen as designed.
In that event, everyone's capacities and competencies will be registered
objectively and a giant apparatus of objectifying methods results, which
undermines the sources of social solidarity and conscious reflection.
Habermas also believes, with Weber, that modern societies are inescapably
subject to the pressures of rationalization. People in modern societies cannot
but tend to regard all practices and conventions as redesignable. This is the
force of the economic, administrative and military apparatus to which we all
are subject.
33
But we should also strive to get out from under this pressure of rationaliz-
ation, so that it does not merely compel us onward, as if we were driven by a
natural force. We should learn to identify possibilities for a more conscious
appropriation of cultural practices, which permit their regulation through
discourse. Discourse and argumentation are regarded as the alternative to
social engineering, which helps us keep it under control.
Thus the poor, disadvantaged and handicapped are thought of as having a
rightful claim to better treatment. Practical discourses about respective
entitlements ensue, which only makes sense from a position, which accepts
the equality of all as a principle, as well as the principle of the liberty of all to
engage in discourse.
Here the Kantian distinction between practical and theoretical reason
returns, and with it the primacy of practical reason, which Gadamer defends
as well.
Pragmatism and sometimes neo-pragmatism as well, lack the persua-
siveness of this position, because they do not sufficiently recognize in-
principle differences, the discontinuity between the designing processes
engaged in by social engineers, and practical discourse as deliberation about
principles of fair treatment. Thus pragmatism, taken by itself, cannot defend
the civic culture of modern democratic societies with sufficient force. It fails to
even notice how the terrain has changed in the relevant kind of societies, since
the emergence of the welfare state, and the refinement of techniques of
administration, managerial supervision and policing (although even Rorty and
certainly Bernstein are aware of these developments). Thus pragmatists
cannot face the fact, that the theoretical employment of reason often takes the
form of designing methods for the organization and reorganization of life,
which are divorced from the cultural understandngs formative for our social
and cultural existence.
For Habermas, there cannot be a significant diagnosis of our times which
does not take account of deep divisions in modern cultures and societies.
Praxis International
277
Modernity, a term evocative of the transformations having taken place in
Western-Europe and North-America since the 18th century (at least), has
emerged through repeated resolutions to profound conflicts, in struggles for
democracy and social emancipation, often (and increasingly in our times) in
the face of increasingly powerful economic and administrative systems.
Questions about the relations between the future of civic culture in modern
societies and social engineering therefore cannot be posed without an
examination of this history as a whole. 34
Neopragmatism also needs to be confronted with a culturalist view of
history, such as Gadamer's. This view has its bearings in a conception of
education resting on grounds neither geared toward the production of
efficiency in action as the primary goal nor mastery knowledge.
Indeed, Gadamer's work is so important, because it is one of the few
conclusive constructions of this conception of education. It reflects forms of
cultural learning connected with those spheres of social communication,
which do not appear as economically or administratively regulated forms, at
least not primarily. They are the background to Gadamer's rehabilitation of
practical philosophy in the face of the modern preoccupation with techni-
que.
35
(3) Modernity, Discourse and Practice
Is practical rationality still in a position to cope with the progressively
forceful rationalisation of social practices due to the employment of social
technologies?
Habermas and Gadamer share the assumption that practical reason and
practical rationality are endangered. Practical reason represents social soli-
darity. Solidarity is sustained in communication. Whatever regulates social
action without recourse to deliberative practices sustained in communication,
is a danger for those practices.
Any regulation of social action without such recourse can only engineer
consent to decisions already taken. It is indifferent to the cultural grounds for
making consent recognizable as consent or to its democratic realization.
Members of modern societies therefore become subject to the application of
technical rules and strategies, which ignore their self-understanding as
practical subjects.
Developments of this kind may endanger personal identity and the identity
of cultures. The critique of utilitarianism and individualism, or of materialist
civilization, which took shape in various European countries since the 18th
century and was very strongly expressed in Germany since Hegel and German
romanticism, furnishes an ambivalent background to this critique of social
engineering. Gadamer and Habermas differ in their respective evaluations of
this background, but they agree that resistance to social engineering can only
arise from domains of culture and society which never will be (Gadamer) or
have not yet been subject (Habermas) to the corresponding of
rationalisation. Yet there are important differences: For Gadamer progress
278 Praxis International
always only means technological progress, even if he concedes that the
acceptance of the freedom of all as a principle is indeed a historical gain. But
this insight remains without consequence due to the absence of a theory of
democracy in his work.
36
For Habermas the continued democratisation of
knowledge claims and social remains a central aim; it requires the
overcoming of obstacles to the development of discourse, including the
obstacles resulting from a one-sided growth in technical, administrative and
economic rationality. Therefore his theory has forms of domination (and their
critique) as a theme, while Gadamer fails to address them, as Bernstein has
noted.
37
But this difference mostly concerns the mode of legitimation of domination:
For Habermas th power of instrumental rationality legitimates new forms of
domination in modern societies. They require analysis beyond the critique of
techne engaged in by Gadamer in his frequent references to the tyranny of
experts. Habermas also differs from Gadamer insofar as he has little
confidence in the power of phronesis as an antidote to the power of technical
reason. Phronesis may have been a living force in small communities of
like-minded citizens (the utopia of conservatives). But modern societies are far
removed from this state.
38
The prudent application of general norms to
particular cases thus hardly seems to be sufficient as a counterforce to the
predominance of techne or social engineering. Rather, a new interpretation of
the pragmatist idea of problem-solving has to be given, which helps us identify
the entire conceivable range and the possible types of social learning. The
critique of domination must be located in this domain.
Gadamer cannot raise the issue of domination as Habermas does, because he
shares Max Weber's skeptical (or even desperate) antiutopianism: There are
no human societies, ancient or modern, in which power is not a problem. The
question is whether much can be done about it and whether attempting to do
much might not lead to more domination. The answer is that little can be done
other than to curtail the abuse of power. But domination in one form or
another will not go away. Moderation in practice and in its theoretical critique
is integral to Gadamer's position.
Hermeneutical anti-utopianism disciplines cultural pessimism and trans-
forms it into conservatively cautious pragmatism, not far removed from ideas
of crisis management applicable under conditions of an emerging planetary
civilization. This is the hard edge of Gadamer's position neglected by
Bernstein
39
(and other American commentators). It reveals another side of
Gadamer's notion of dialogue, less inspired by Plato and German romanticism
than by the political realism implicit in Hegel's conservative legacy. Therefore
one needs to distinguish two tendencies in Gadamer's thought:
(a) He argues at times, as if cultural traditions, historical languages,
customs or institutions (e.g. the "family") are constitutive features of our
lives, just like distinctions between "public" and "private" or "art" and
"science". They therefore cannot be called into question at all, as they
underlie any question we may raise about them. The ontological shift of
hermeneutics
40
seals such (supposedly) fundamental realities into permanent
dimensions of human life, even if what they mean to us will change
Praxis International
279
historically. Thus these terms are treated at times as if their meaning was
fixed, once and for all. 41
(b) But Gadamer also believes that it is practically dangerous to believe
that inherited customs, traditions or institutions can no longer provide
guidance with respect to the present.
These two arguments are not compatible. The ontological argument of
hermeneutics places institutions and practices beyond the realm of practical
appraisals and beyond social contestation. But these are the domains in
which their significance is discovered. The warnings against the neglect of
historical awareness really should have their place in a debate about the
viability of institutions and practices, as we know them, i.e. as modern ones.
It follows that Habermas has done greater justice to this issue. By studiously
avoiding ontology he has made room for discourse and a public process of
debate, in which the various appraisals made in modern societies of
inherited institutions and practices can be challenged. It follows that he is
right when he argues that only the conscious pursuit of agreement can lead to
acceptable resolutions of conflict. Gadamer retreats from this solution by
only arguing, in general terms, for the need to compromise in all matters of
major public concern. Indeed compromise, cautious management of conflicts
becomes the essence of politics for him, or a version of enlightened
"Realpolitik". Thus Gadamer grants indirectly that tradition, authority, the
family no longer have an uncontested meaning, beyond the meaning given to
these terms in the course of their publicly negotiated interpretation. But like
others of his generation he is misled by doubts about modernity into
adopting the belief, that there are great traditions of civilization reaching
beyond modernity which can still be known to us. Even if he was right, we
would need accounts of them as they might enter into modern life through
our practical appraisals of present-day institutions and practices. Otherwise,
one can only fail to comprehend the force of this conservative vision critical
of the present.
So far hermeneutical philosophers have not given such accounts, other than
by appealing to phronesis, conversation and discriminating judgment in very
general terms. In the face of this, theories addressing the self-transformative
potential of modernity (such as Habermas's) seem to have the upper hand.
Contrary to hermeneutics, pragmatists and neopragmatists alike are quite at
home in modernity as the terrain in which new forms of social cooperation
already have been and may yet be worked out in the future. By arguing for
more conversation in the present (as Bernstein and Rorty do) they avoid the
conflict about the relation between our historical past and a conceivable
future, which lies at the centre of the argument between hermeneutical
philosophers and critical theorists. His neopragmatist endorsement of
Dewey's concern with the daily detail, the every-day practice of inquiry and
social reconstruction, locates Rorty in particular beyond the struggles for the
meaning of modernity as a whole which philosophers such as Habermas or
Gadamer can never ignore, embroiled as they are in deep conflicts between
socialist-avantgarde, liberal-democratic, and conservative/aristocratic social
and cultural traditions. With Bernstein and Rorty American consensus
280 Praxis I ntemational
politics is sanctioned as a principle of debate even for the articulation of
intellectual differences. 42
Neopragmatists depend on liberal democracies in their existing state. Their
vision of the future of modernity relies on it. Comprehensive theories of
modernity which critical theorists favour have the advantage that they enable
us to look beyond liberal democracies in their existing state. This is a step
which neither Rorty nor Gadamer take. But it is doubtful, on the grounds
provided by hermeneutics and neopragmatism, that comprehensive theories
of modernity can ever amount to more than narratives addressing the future,
the details of which can only be articulated in the course of practice and in
confrontation with specific issues of the times. Certainly one such issue is
social engineering and the possible atrophy of capacities for normative and
practical deliberation. The philosophies discussed all agree that what matters
in the end is how things are worked out in practice. Yet they differ with
respect to the nature and meaning of practice. Critical theory, hermeneutics,
and neopragmatism will meet their final test in a confrontation with socially
consequential contemporary forms of practical knowledge. These encompass
policy studies and applied social science as well as the interpretive knowledge
of daily life.
In this confrontation cultural pessimism and the reserved acceptance of
modernity by hermeneutics need to be transformed into detailed practical
skepticism informed by a profound appreciation of the historical dimensions
of human life.
By comparison critical theory represents a theory of modernity primarily
referring to its conceivable future. Its appraisal of the past always also takes
the form of a defense of modernity coupled with its critique. Among the
theories in question it is the only one providing the conceptual means for
acquiring a comprehensive understanding of all possible dimensions of social
progress.
Once again turning to neopragmatism one can easily grant it the last word:
Social visions of any kind need to be worked out in practice. But taken by
itself, this last word embodies a truism. It only gains its force vis-a.-vis
comprehensive reflections on the historical past and the societal future.
Hermeneutics and critical theory engage in this reflection. Both have the
critique of instrumental reason as their central theme. So far neopragmatists
have not been able to fully incorporate this critique. They lack the determi-
nation to either continue or reject Dewey's defense and critique of North
American culture, their assimilation of the European thinkers mentioned
notwithstanding.
43
NOTES
1. Habermas's review of Gadamer's Wahrheit und Methode, originally published in 1967 and republished
in his Logik der Sozialwissenschaften (Frankfurt: 1970 and 1982, Sukrkamp), pp. 89-330, initiated the
debate. The text has appeared in English translation in R. Dallmayr, Th. A. McCarthy, Understan-
ding and Social Inquiry (Lafayette, ind.: 1977, University of Notre Dame Press) pp. 335-363. The
next phase of the debate is well documented in the collection Hermeneutik und I deologiekritik
Praxis International 281
(Frankfurt: 1971, Sukrkamp). J. Habermas's "Interpretive Social Science vs Hermeneuticism" In N.
Haan et aI, Social Science as Moral Inquiry (New York: 1983, Columbia University Press) is the last
explicit contribution to the debate either by him or by Gadamer.
2. Cf. R. Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror ofNature (Princeton: 1979, Princeton University Press), and
R.J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia:
1983, University of Pennsylvania Press), as well as his Philosophical Profiles. Essays in a Pragmatic
Mode (Philadelphia: 1986, University of Pennsylvania Press). Rorty's Consequences of Pragmatism
(Minneapolis: 1982, University of Minnesota Press), makes clear how deeply he is influenced by
Dewey's pragmatism, more so than one could have expected when reading his earlier work. He even
says somewhere that his formulations appear to him at times to be mere restatements of Deweyan
views. However, R. W. Sleeper's critical comments make one doubt the plausibility of his modest
self-characterization. Cf. R.W. Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism (New Haven: 1986, Yale
University Press).
Pragmatism is hardly mentioned at all in R. Bernstein's Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, apart
from his discussion of Rorty's neopragmatism. But his Philosophical Profiles contain a recent essay on
Dewey (cf. "John Dewey on Democracy, The Task Before us." pp. 260-272). And his instructive
essay "What is the Difference that Makes a Difference? Gadamer, Habermas, and Rorty" (1986, pp.
58-93) exemplifies the pragmatic strategy of minimizing theoretical differences for the sake of giving
profile to a common theme, that of a "non-foundational pragmatic humanism", which may "enable us
to cope with the darkness of our times and of our praxis" (p. 93). In one instance he even makes
Gadamer and Dewey speak with one voice (p. 92) while also noting, that Gadamer has never come to
terms with the American pragmatic tradition (p. 91). My own essay is meant to oppose this tendency
toward the levelling of differences, which Bernstein practices, despite the promise contained in the
title of his study.
3. Cf. Habermas' account of Lukasc's and Horkheimer/Adorno's dependency on Weber's theory of
occidental rationalization in Theory ofCommunicative Action, Vol. 1 (Boston: 1984, Beacon Press), pp.
339-402. In Der philosophische Diskurs dec Moderne (Frankfurt: 1985, Suhrkamp), pp. 153-158, he
argues that the Dialectic of Enlightenment interprets cultural modernity on the background of
Nietzsche's critique of modernity. Kulturkritik even shapes the structural relation between Adorno's
Negative Dialektik and his Asthetische Theorie. Aesthetic modernity becomes the guide for the critique
of morality and science.
4. Heidegger's affinity to Kulturkritik has been analysed sociologically by Pierre Bourdieu in his
"L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger." Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, Nr. 5-6, 1975.
H.G. Gadamer takes exception to Bourdieu's "sociological reductionism". But otherwise he grants
the correctness of Bourdieu's historical reconstruction. Cf. his review in Philosophische Rundschau,
1979, Nr. 3, p. 143. In Gadamer's own case, one needs to take note of his relation to Stefan George
and his circle. Cf. Philosophische Lehrjahre. Frankfurt, 1977, Klostermann, p. 16/17. Adorno's
relation to Kulturkritik is balanced by his commitment to avantgarde art and to the defense of cultural
modernity. However, in his important book Kritik dec Macht (Frankfurt 1985, SUhrkamp) Axel
Honneth mentions resemblances between the Dialectic ofEnlightenment and a theme to be found in L.
Klages' work (cf. p. 54 and note 25 to Chapter 2). Klages was an important representative of
Kulturkritik influenced by Lebensphilosophie, he decried the destruction of life or the 'soul' by the
analytically oriented intellect. For further information see the fascinating book by R. Wiggershaus,
Die Frankfurter Schule. Geschichte. Theoretische Entwicklung, Politische Bedeutung, (Munchen: 1986,
Carl Hanser).
5. Adorno's metacritique of Kulturkritik notwithstanding Cf. Prisms (Cambridge: 1981, MIT Press), pp.
17-34. The term 'mass' is used quite naively in the Dialectic ofEnlightenment. Adorno's discussions of
the culture industry and his use of the notion of affirmative culture (even in his Asthetische Theorie)
assume the frictionless integration a of large section of the population in late capitalist societies into
imposed patterns of the consumption of culture. This view has never gained much ground in
Anglo-American social criticism. It presupposes the perspective of German Kulturkritik.
6. Cf. J. Herfs interesting book Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and
the Third Reich (Cambridge: 1984, Cambridge University Press). It contains a chapter on the ideology
of engineers and its relation to the German system of higher education.
7. For a recent revival of the theme of 'Vernunftkritik' in a socially critical context cf. Dieter Misgeld
"Kritische Theorie und Postmoderne", in; Soziologische Revue, 1987, No, 4.
282
Praxis International
8. Cf. Hans Freyer, Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft, (Leipzig: 1930), and H. Schelsky's essay,
"Sociology as a Science of Social Reality" in V. Meja, D. Misgeld, N. Stehr (eds.), Modern German
Sociology, (New York: 1987, pp. 119-137). See also R. Wiggershaus, as cited, pp. 639-641 and pp.
647-657.
9. Nietzsche's interpretation of science as an expression of 'Wille zur Macht' entails a rejection of the
belief in the realization of reason through progress in the development of knowledge. By insisting on
the sobriety of the social scientist's calling and thus making social scientists subject to the ethos of the
natural sciences rather than to their methods, Max Weber has continued the Nietzschean project
critical of idealism. This is the basis of 'Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft'. Cf. my introduction
to Meja, Misgeld, Stehr, Modern German Sociology, pp. 1-30, in which I illustrate how this
conservative legacy of German social theory is the background to Habermas's efforts to integrate a
theory of the social sciences into a theory of democracy, i.e. a theory of discursive will-formation and
of the public sphere.
10. Nothing is more indicative of this position than Ernst Juenger, Der Arbeiter. Herrschaft und Gestalt
(Hamburg: 1932).
11. Cf. the comprehensive study by J. T Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory. Social Democracy and
Progressivism in European and American Thought. 1870-1920 (Oxford: 1986, Oxford University Press).
Especially important for Dewey's views on social democracy are pp. 329, 349-352, as well as pp.
373-394. In a novel interpretation Kloppenberg places Max Weber among the progressives. Cf. also
John Dewey, Freedom and Culture (New York: 1939, A Paragon book), and Liberalism and Social
Action (New York: Capricorn Books, 1935).
12. Cf. Rorty's recent paper "Thugs and Theorists: AReply to Bernstein," Political Theory, forthcoming.
As far as I can see Bernstein does not call himself a social democrat. But he has clearly aligned himself
with a Deweyan conception of democracy, cf. note. 2. Rorty's paper also comments very favourably
on Habermas's political writings.
13. Cf. R. Bernstein, 1983, as cited in Note 2, p. 214. And elsewhere.
14. Ibid. p. 231, and p. 206.
15. I regard this affinity to be central, because Rorty replaces the scientist as the cultural hero of classical
pragmatism (Peirce, Dewey) with the poet. Cf. Bernstein 1986 as cited in Note 2, p. 85. Rorty does
not put literary culture above science, as a matter of principle; but he values it more cf. his recent
"contingency of self', London Review of Books, May 8th, 1986, p. 11.
16. Gadamer's Wahrheit und Methode presupposes and reaffirms the integrity, accessibility and the
continued value of classical Greek philosophy. He fails to note that this 'tradition' is an artifact of
highly specialized forms of erudition hardly shared by most members of modern societies.
17. Cf. J. Habermas, Die Neue Unubersichtlichkeit (Frankfurt: 1985, Suhrkamp), pp. 59-78, 41-166.
18. Here one may also think of Weber's charismatic politician resolutely facing the implications of his
commitment to an ethics of responsibility, and of Heidegger's 'Eigentliches Selbstsein'.
19. Certainly Habermas's challenge has helped Gadamer along in achieving this subtle and hardly fully
articulated transformation of his thought. Cf. J. Habermas/H.G. Gadamer, Das Erbe Hegels
(Frankfurt: 1979, Suhrkamp),p. 16 for a characterization of Gadamer which beautifully captures the
modern ethos of Gadamer's emphasis on classical humanism: "Gadamer is far from being a Prussian
and most certainly a civilian". One only needs to think of Heidegger's "Rektoratsrede" of 1933 to
recognize the difference in attitude between Gadamer and his teacher Heidegger. Bernstein has
discussed the change in Gadamer's work in Bernstein, 1983, as cited, pp. 163-65 and 1986, pp.
63-72. But cf. notes 36 and 41 for a critical discussion of this interpretation. I do not believe, as
Bernstein does, that there is a "radical" strain in Gadamer's thinking. Gadamer never accepts, for
example, Habermas's argument that we need to adopt an hypothetical attitude toward everyday
certainties sanctioned by tradition.
20. Cf. R. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, as cited, pp. 203.
21. R. Rorty: "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity", in R. Bernstein (ed.), Habermas and Modernity
(Cambridge: 1985, The Mit Press), p. 174.
22. I agree with Bernstein, that it is useful to apply this term to comprehensive analyses of the kind
alluded to here.
23. Cf. Rorty, in Bernstein 1985, as cited in note 21.
24. Cf. Hans Joas, Praktische Intersubjektivitiit. Die Entwicklung des Werkes von G. H. Mead (Frankfurt:
1980, Suhrkamp, especially, pp. 195-209.
Praxis International
283
25. Cf. J. Dewey, Freedom and Culture as cited in note 11; and J. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems
(New York: 1927, Henry Holt).
26. On Arendt cf. Bernstein 1983, as cited in Note 2, pp. 207-223. Of course, Bernstein is fully aware
that lIabermas has always favoured pragmatism as a progressive, radically democractic philosophy.
He also identifies a 'pragmatic voice' in Habermas's theory of communicative action, to be
distinguished from a transcendental voice. cf.p. 184. But his juxtaposition of Habermas, Arendt,
Gadamer conceals Habermas's much greater proximity to Dewey or Mead as theorists of social
communication and of democracy than to Arendt or Gadamer.
27. Cf. J. Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed" (1897) in R.D. Archambault (ed.), John Dewey on Education
(Chicago: 1964, The University of Chicago Press), p. 427.
28. Cf. J. Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: 1935, Capricorn Books), p. 72: 'The crisis in
democracy demands the substitution of the intelligence that is exemplified in scientific procedure for
the kind of intelligence that is now accepted'. He adds that the "engineering mind" is to be emulated
in social planning. He thus contributes to the technocratic philosophy of New Deal progressivism. Cf.
also, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: 1957, Beacon Press), pp. XXIV and XXV. Here Dewey
argues that morals lag behind science and need to be updated accordingly by themselves becoming
'scientific' .
29. Cf. D. Misgeld "Education as Cultural Invasion: Critical Social Theory, Education as Instruction and
the Pedagogy of the Oppressed," in J. Forester (ed.), Critical Theory and Public Life (Cambridge:
1986, The MIT Press), pp. 77-121. I refer to literature detailing reforms of American education
derived from skills training in the trades and in the military around world-war one.
30. Cf. J. Dewey, 1935, as cited in note 29: 'The habit of considering social realities in terms of cause and
effect and social policies in terms of means and consequences is still inchoate.' Scientific method and
engineering are to define the meaning of intelligence in politics, not merely discussion and persuasion.
For a compelling critique from a perspective similar to Gadamer's, yet rooted in American traditions
of civic humanism cf. W.M. Sullivan, "The Humanities in the Civic Conversation: John Dewey's
Public Philosophy Reconsidered". Philadelphia 1986, MS. Department of Philosophy, LaSalle
University. Cf. also, R.N. Bellah et. aI., Habits of the Heart. Individualism and Commitment in
American Life (New York: 1986, Harpr and Row), pp. 256-271.
31. In an essay entitled "Nineteenth Century Idealism and Twentieth Century Textualism," The Monist
64(1981) p. 173. Rorty indirectly grants this point: 'A full-scale discussion of the possibility of
combining private fulfillment, self-realization, with public morality, a concern for justice' seems to lie
beyond the scope of his thought at least for the time being. He fails to notice that calling "fulfillment"
private already places happiness outside the domain of what is attainable in some employment of
public policy.
32. Cf. Rorty, 1982, as cited in note 2. p. 103. Cf. D. Misgeld "Modernity and Social Science: Habermas
and Rorty" for a comparison of the different theories of social science at issue here. In Philosophy and
Social Criticism, 11,(4), pp. 335-372 (1986).
33. Cf. J. Habermas: Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns 2. (Frankfurt: 1981, SUhrkamp), pp.
480-488, 521-547. Habermas argues that the communicative practice of everyday life in contem-
porary developed societies is subverted by systems-imperatives which fragment it. As a consequence
everyday-consciousness is assimilated to planning processes which refashion it without respect for its
own integrity. This dynamic requires the regeneration of every-day communication in a process of
reflection, provoked by social movements which attempt to counteract the force of systems-rationali-
sation. Habermas discusses the 'new' social movements from this perspective.
34. For this reason the sections in Habermas, 1981, referred to above are most significant (cf. pp.
420-594).
35. Cf. Berstein, 1986, as cited in note 2 p. 63/64: He notes that during the past twenty years Gadamer has
been concerned primarily with 'exploring the consequences of hermeneutics for praxis.'
36. Bernstein has drawn attention to Gadamer's endorsement of Hegel's view of modernity. 'The
principle that all are free never again can be shaken.' And 'has not history since then been a matter of
just this, that the historical conduct of man has to translate the principle of freedom into reality?' Cf.
H.G. Gadamer "Hegel's Philosophy and Its After effects until Today," in Reason in the Age ofScience
(Cambridge: 1981, MIT Press), p. 80. Cf. Bernstein 1983, p 164. Bernstein argues that during the last
twenty years Gadamer has become increasingly radical, that 'the depth of his critique of all forms of
doglnatism and fanaticism' even has a subversive quality (cf. p. 252, note 66). Bernstein is mistaken.
284 Praxis International
Gadamer is only radical in his insistence on moderation. His is a liberal position in the best sense.
However, his liberalism becomes conservative when it opposes any form of egalitarian radicalism, no
matter how undogmatic and carefully considered it is. This is the weakness in Gadamer's opposition
to the utopian elements in Habermas's position. Bernstein suppresses this aspect of Gadamer's
consistent rejection of 'Ideologiekritik', his unwillingness to enter into a full dialogue with the
'critique of instrumental reason'. Despite Gadamer's endorsement of freedom as a principle there is
no indication that he (a) appreciates or could even begin to advocate processes of democratisation, no
matter how reasonably such projects are put forward, that (b), he has a grasp of modern political
history a history also formed by emancipatory social movements, and (c), that he has even given credit
to social democracy in Germany as the major force defending liberal democracy before the Nazis. As
far as I can see, he has never accepted the overcoming of structures of domination as a central political
project for the future.
37. Cf. Bernstein, 1983, pp. 156.
38. Ibid., p. 157/158.
39. Cf. H.G. Gadamer, "Notes on Planning for the Future" in, Daedalus, 95 (2), pp. 574--589, 1966.
Beside once again displaying Gadamer's magnificent sense of moderation and tolerance as a virtue of a
civic culture (cf. p. 588), the essay also illustrates how little Gadamer expects there to be space in
modern societies and modern history for the emergence of a more rational politics. Cf. 'To be
awakened to consciousness' (to be awakened from the technological dream and the expectation of a
politics mastering problems-D. Misgeld) 'could also mean to become aware of how little things
change, even where everything appears to be changing.' Ibid, p. 589. Politics is an art practiced by
statesmen oriented toward maintaining or restoring equilibrium. It is a kind of piloting or steering.
Ibid., p. 582. There is no direct concern here with identifying the achievements of modernity, much
more with a reconciliation between the structures of modernity and older traditions. Many of the
questions covered in this essay have been discussed in detail with Hans-Georg Gadamer during July
1986, in extensive interviews conducted by Graeme Nicholson and myself. In one case Gadamer
beautifully expressed his attitude toward politics by saying: The only available choice is between one
evil and another. Prudently choosing means to choose the lesser evil. One can hardly have a less
disillusioned view of the prospects for social change through politics than the one which he expresses
here.
40. Cf. Truth and Method (New York: 1975, The Seabury Press), p. 345. Language, institutions, customs
are beyond criticism, so to speak, whenever in understanding them "we are drawn into an event of
truth and arrive, as it were, too late, if we want to know what we ought to believe." Ibid, p. 446. This
sentence expresses the ontological shift of hermeneutics quite well.
41. Gadamer often argues, that human beings generally accept some exercise of authority in their lives
and that this happens as a matter of course. Most people grow up in families and accept their parents'
authority, for example, prior to reaching maturity. He then argues that it is false to denounce any and
every exercise of authority as authoritarian. The acceptance of authority thus becomes a regular
feature of human life. This argument fails, of course, when measured by the standards of theories
critical of domination and authority, from Marx and critical theory to contemporary feminism. All of
these theories want to explain, why and how people so frequently fail to distinguish between their
blind acceptance of authority and a critical attitude toward it. But they need not claim, that there
never are good reasons for accepting authority. Gadamer implicitly relies on Hegel's judgment, that
the institutions of the bourgeois age (family, law, state) are here to stay; regardless of the radical
challenges issued to them since the major social movements of the 19th century.
42. Bernstein's and Rorty's methods of discussion differ, of course. Bernstein hardly ever highlights
differences to the point of incompatibility, Rorty refashions differences ironically, thus giving them
additional profile, but only in order to offer a pragmatic synthesis in the end which glosses the
differences.
Rorty has a well preserved awareness of the distance of American thought from the major
'Continental European' traditions. As a transatlantic diplomat of the first order he employs ironic
self-characterization and provocative challenge to get the transcultural conversation going. Bernstein
acts as the gentle emissary to foreign territories, who brings the news back home that some foreigners
are not so terribly foreign afterall and that we (North-Americans) can even learn from them. He is
elusive as a critic, but highly persuasive as a mediator between prima facie incompatible points of
view.
Praxis International
285
43. One only needs to consider that German philosophers from Scheler and Horkkeimer, to Adorno and
Heidegger have been explicitly hostile to pragmatism. Cf. especially (written before 1928), M.
Scheler, Erkenntnis und Arbeit (Frankfurt: 1977, V. Klostermann), and M. Horkheimer, Eclipse of
Reason (New York: 1947, Oxford University Press). Adorno and Heidegger assimilate "blindly
pragmatised thought" (a phrase used in the Dialectic ofEnlightenment) either to instrumental reason or
the thoughtless surrender to the technical-scientific worldview.
Gadamer has always regarded Dewey as a philosopher holding views opposite to his own; he could
hardly agree with Dewey, that our social institutions, as they are, are insufficiently rational, because
they predate the development of modern science, or that the practice of morals and politics have to be
grounded in attitudes originally tried out in scientific experimentation and engineering. Habermas's
relation to pragmatism is primarily mediated by his interest in Peirce's epistemology. Hitherto his
possible affinity to Dewey has remained unexplored.