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Toward Cooperative Security

January 8,2003
By Michael R. Fenzel and Lee S. Wolosky

When President Bush announced to the nation and the world that the United States would "fight
and win this war" on terrorism, he put forward a new orienting principle for American foreign
policy. That principle is no less ambitious than was the containment of Communism. But over one
year later the Bush Administration has yet to put forward a coherent long-term counter-terrorism
strategy.

By every indication, the administration is appropriately focused on the war against terrorism. The
President maintains that going to war with Iraq will not set back efforts to fight the campaign
against Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations with global reach. This may well be true, but
only the development and articulation of a credible, comprehensive strategy will clarify for the
American people and the international community how we intend to proceed as the military
campaign in Afghanistan winds down. A coherent long-term counter-terrorism strategy should be
developed before a war in Iraq distracts the attention of senior officials and the Congress.

Much work needs to be done. The basic tenets of U.S. counter-terrorism policy have remained \s
virtually unchanged since their introduction more than twenty years ago. But the strategic
environment has changed dramatically since their introduction during the Reagan Administration.
The transnational nature of modern terrorist organizations enables their members to slip through
the cracks of national enforcement efforts. This frustrates the efforts of states with even the best-
developed intelligence and law enforcement capabilities. And since their membership is comprised
of religious fanatics seeking violence and long-term destabilization, adherents of these groups are
both undeterred by the prospect of criminal prosecution and unsatisfied by near-term political
concessions.

The extent to which the United States should act alone in defense of its vital interests constitutes
the starting point in the debate over reformulated counter-terrorism policies. To most Americans,
the sheer horror of 9/11 compelled a decisive, immediate and comprehensive U.S. response-
multilateral where possible, unilateral if necessary. But over the long-term, unilateralism cannot
sufficiently and holistically address root causes, buttress our defenses, and combat attacks.

This reliance on the efforts of others extends to other critical, non-military fronts in the war on
terrorism. Alone, the United States has extremely limited capabilities to act abroad to build secular
education systems, create hospitable political and economic environments, put forward a
compelling public diplomacy and coordinate international law enforcement actions, among other
steps that can effectively counter terrorism.

A unilateralist approach to countering terrorism would entail more of what we have already seen.
U.S. military actions would predominate. The United States will be constantly involved in
suppressing insurrections at the far fringes of the civilized world, from the Philippines to the
Pankisi Gorge. Without other forms of constructive bilateral engagement, perceptions of
imperialistic impulses will harden, and comparisons to a declining Roman Empire will be
inevitable.

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