T3 B8 Background Documents 1 of 2 FDR - Entire Contents - Handwritten Notes - Withdrawal Notices - Emails - Memos - Excerpts - Testimony (Powell - 1st PG Scanned For Reference) 977

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9/11 Classified Information
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RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

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FOLDER TITLE: Background Docs, for Hurley's Sect. 5.4 -loG
DOCUMENT DATE: 01/08/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Note/Notes
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SUBJECT: Jim Pavitt Interview
This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

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But spending money without a strategic plan can oftentimes be wasted. First thing I'm
going to do is ask the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan so we are making sure we're
not spending our money on political projects, but on projects to make sure our soldiers
are well-paid, well-housed, and have the best equipment in the world.
October 18.2000: Statement on the USS Cole (given by Governor Bush)
Eau Claire, WI
Today, America honors sailors from the USS Cole. We honor the men and women who
gave their lives.
These were professionals, in the best tradition of our military. But they were also sons
and daughters and spouses and friends. And they leave behind shipmates in shock, and
families in mourning, and parents who will bury the best part of their hopes.
These young Americans lived for a cause, and died with a purpose. They were patriots.
And we are deeply in their debt.
This tragedy is a reminder that peace is always fragile, and risk is always real, and hate,
in this world, does not sleep. We remain in a contest of will and purpose, with enemies
who hate America, and target those who defend her.
We must always be prepared. And those who attack our nation and its people must
always be punished.
This is a commitment shared by all Americans. We wish the president every success in
the advance of peace and the pursuit of justice. And we pray that every soul touched by
this tragedy will find a measure of God's peace.
Thank you.
October 27. 2000: "You Decide 2000" Fox News (statements by Governor Bush)
[Highlighted in index] I believe that the most urgent matter before any president is
American security itself. The next president must reverse the eight-year decline in
America's military power. Not since the years before Pearl Harbor has our investment in
national defense been so low as a percentage of our economy, yet rarely has our military
been so freely used. We will give our armed forces better pay, better treatment and better
training. We will improve housing for their families and schools for their children. We
will provide our troops a clear sense of mission. We'll protect American citizens and our
allies from terrorism and attack with a missile defense system. And we will build the
military of tomorrow, not just spending more, but spending more wisely.
43
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PERSONAL
December 26, 2000
MEMORANDUM
TO: Condi Rice
FROM: Steve Hadley and Philip Zelikow
SUBJ: Organization of NSC for Transnational Threats and Homeland Defense
The Present Organization
We have attached a photocopy of a briefing we received from Richard Clarke on December 22.
The second page of the briefing has a Venn diagram that nicely displays how several issues that
blend law enforcement and national security concerns have converged around the problem of
terrorism/transnational threats. Clarke is a Senior Director/Special Assistant with a small staff, a
modest budget, and no direct operational authority. Thus, as he puts it, "I can't tell anybody to
do anything." That may literally be true. But Clarke does prize the "clout" that comes from a big
title wielded with considerable bureaucratic skill. The title is National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism. Perhaps more importandy he sits as a member
of the NSC Principal's Committee (chaired by the President) when his issues are on the agenda.
Clarke chairs five interagency working groups that, when he is there, meet at the assistant
secretary/flag officer level. These groups significantly involve more than a dozen agencies,
talking about:
Counterterrorism. This includes all terrorism, whether foreign or domestic in origin, that
rises above being a local law enforcement concern because it threatens U.S. national
security. The domestic/foreign line is increasingly hard to draw - the targets and the
terrorists can be American or foreign. Americans were involved in the Nairobi
bombings; foreigners and Americans were involved in the World Trade Center attack.
Clarke believes he no longer needs to struggle with the foreign/domestic distinction
because he has concluded that his authorities extend to both.
WMD Preparedness. Diplomatic prevention is in the current Non-proliferation

directorate. Threat assessment overlaps that one and this one. Clarke's directorate
though has the special job of coordinating work to prepare at all levels of government to
deal with the consequences of a WMD attack either in the US or against American
interests overseas. This includes such things as BW protection programs, training local
responders, and nuclear emergency teams.
Continuity of Government. This is the new adaptation of an older set of contingency
programs. It is closely connected to the WMD preparedness task.
Critical Infrastructure. In 1998 a presidential directive (PDD-63) spotlighted the new

vulnerability to cyber attacks and added this coordination task to the duties of the
National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism. A good deal of progress has been made in
roughing out the first phase of government-industry collaboration in preparing against
this threat - with Commerce as the lead agency. A second collaboration phase has yet to
get under way. There is a large national security dimension here, well beyond our
government's work on offensive cyber warfare.
International crime. The transnational threats, and the involved agencies, spill over from
terrorism to Russian mafiyas smuggling arms, to Colombian drug trafficking cartels, and
the like. Transnational organized crime has acquired a new scale and has officially been
recognized as athreat to America's national security. Given the identity of many of the
players in the U.S. government, coordinating responsibility has also Men to the National
Coordinator.
The National Coordinator chairs the groups at the assistant secretary level. He claims that he, in
effect, chairs the deputies-level meetings too - bypassing the Deputies Committee because he
states that the relevant directives have him reporting only to the National Security Adviser. This
is an exaggeration - we found that PDD-62 on counter-terrorism expressly provides for review of
his issues by the Deputies Committee.
But as noted, Clarke is a member of the Principals Committee, sitting in with the National
Security Adviser on the discussions chaired by the President. He argues that this helps him
manage, with slight staff and little budget, a large and unruly collection of powerful agencies.
Here he does seem to have a point. Further, Clarke has done a good job of setting up a process
co-chaired with the #3 official hi OMB in order to help drive budget allocations for these
programs as a whole, above the turf fights of the individual agencies and their congressional
overseers. This process results in an annual report to Congress presenting a government-wide
picture of the effort against these threats. Funding is spread over 12 of the 13 appropriations
bills.
Possible Changes
We discussed various alternative organizational models with Clarke. Using the good metaphor
of a now promising adolescent which has been well nurtured but is now ready to go out into the
world, we stressed that any reallocation of this directorate's responsibilities would only be to
enhance the effectiveness of a new Administration's approach to these important issues. This
presentation of the issue is important. The conventional wisdom in Congress and in the public
generally strongly favors high profile centralization as the "right" approach to these issues,
-2-
however unnecessary or counterproductive it might prove to be in practice. So you and the
President will want to be attentive to the symbolism of any change, as well as its substance.
Clarke agreed that a feasible management alternative could have the following elements:
1. Keep the Senior Director's seat at the table for the Principals-level discussions, possibly
retaining the National Coordinator title. But also give the Senior Director a seat on the
Deputies Committee, so that we avoid separating our policy on terrorism from the rest of
our national security strategy.
2. Consider having this directorate's issues, like any others, go through the Deputies
Committee process en route to Principals (except where the process is telescoped during a
crisis).
3. Retain the directorate's responsibility for counter-terrorism, WMD preparation, and

continuity of government. The synergy among these functions is strong.
4. But break out international crime and move it either to the functional directorate on
Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations or to the International Economic
Affairs Directorate.
5. Break out cyber issues and move them into a new National Information Assurance
Institute or place them under a National Information Assurance Officer (an "NIAO"). We
need to grow the public-private partnership required to address these issues effectively,
and develop a laboratory for proving and publicizing 'best practices.' Enforcing these
guidelines could be done through private sector mechanisms, like insurance ratings for
example, rather than just through government regulation. Rather than create yet another
White House agency, and because of the necessary closeness of this entity to private
firms, the President might consider asking Don Evans to give a high public profile to
housing it in Commerce. Interagency work on critical infrastructure protection is already
being coordinated by the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), housed in
Commerce's Bureau of Export Administration. So this move could effectively move
CIAO out of that bureau and grow it into a national institute, like other effective national
agencies already housed in Commerce - NOAA, for example. On the other hand, we do
not want the national security aspect to get lost. Perhaps we need an NSC interagency
committee to support the "NIAO" or "Institute." Perhaps some dual-hatting with the NSC
is required. Dick Clarke is rather intrigued with these ideas and is going to put his
thoughts down on paper.
DOD and NSA will have their own set of cyber protection issues that they will not yield
to any other agency - and certainly not Commerce. Then there will also be the need to
coordinate offensive efforts. But NSC coordination of these can either be moved to the
Defense Policy directorate or left, in this more modest form, in the Terrorism/Homeland
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Defense directorate.
6. There is still a question of how Dick Clarke's office in a restructured fonn would relate to
the more traditional set of non-proliferation and counter-proliferation issues. These
issues are now located partly in the non-proliferation directorate and partly in the Defense
directorate. In some sense, they are different from the preoccupation of Dick Clarke's
Transnational Threats and Homeland Defense directorate, which focuses more on the
consequence of the failure of U.S. anti- and counter-proliferation efforts. We will be in a
better position to evaluate this question once we have interviewed the heads of the
Proliferation and Defense directorates.
-4-
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FOLDER TITLE: Background Docs, for Hurley's Sect. 5.4 -Iof2
DOCUMENT DATE: 10/08/2003 DOCUMENT TYPE: Memo of Conversation
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SUBJECT: Philip Zelikow

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Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Alexis Albion

Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 5:37 PM
To: Mike Hurley
Subject: FW: Bush-Cheney Reactions to the Cole
Alexis K. Albion
Professional Staff Member
9-11 Commission
aalbion@9-l lcommission.gov
Original Message
From: Warren Bass
Sent: Friday, April 23, 2004 4:54 PM
To: Team 3
Subject: Bush-Cheney Reactions to the Cole
Bush-Cheney Reactions to the Cole
CNN, Oct. 13, 2000

GOV. GEORGE BUSH (R-TX), PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE: "I hope that we can gather enough
intelligence to figure out who did the act and take the necessary action. There must be a consequence."
AP, Oct. 13, 2000

Dick Cheney urged "swift retaliation" against those responsible for the apparent bombing of a U.S.
destroyer, an attack that killed 17 sailors.
"Any would-be terrorist out there needs to know that if you're going to attack, you'll be hit very hard and
very quick," Cheney said after a speech at a senior citizens center [in Wisconsin]. "It's not time for
diplomacy and debate. It's time for action."
5/11/2004
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Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
April 13, 2004
First, this Commission has debated the nature of the covert action authorities directed at Usama Bin Laden
prior to 2001. In February 2001, shortly after becoming Attorney General, I reviewed these authorities.
Let me be clear: My thorough review revealed no covert action program to kill Bin Laden. There was a
covert-action program to capture Bin Laden for criminal prosecution. But even this program was crippled
by a snarled web of requirements, restrictions and regulations that prevented decisive action by our men
and women in the field.
When they most needed clear, understandable guidance, our agents and operatives were given the language
of lawyers. Even if they could have penetrated Bin Laden's training camps, they would have needed a
battery of attorneys to approve the capture. With unclear guidance, our covert action team's risk of injury
may have exceeded the risk to Usama Bin Laden.
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Bob Kerrey on Philip Z
Condi public hearing
Let me ask you, first of all, a question that's been a

concern for me from the first day I came onto the
Commission,
and that is the relationship of our executive director to
you.
Let me just ask you directly, and you can just give me --
keep
it relatively short, but I wanted to get it on the record.
Since
he was an expert on terrorism, did you ask Philip Zelikow
any
questions about terrorism during transition, since he was
the
second person carded in the National Security Office and
had
considerable expertise?
MS. RICE: Philip and I had numerous conversations about the
issues that we were facing. Philip was, in fact, as you
know,
had worked in the campaign and helped with the transition
plans.
So, yes.
MR. KERREY: Yes, you did talk to him about terrorism?
49
MS. RICE: We talked -- Philip and I, over a period of --
you
know, we had worked closely together as academics, of
course
talked about --
MR. KERREY: During the transition, did you instruct him to
do
anything on terrorism?
MS. RICE: Oh, to do anything on terrorism?
MR. KERREY: Yes.
MS. RICE: To help us think about the structure of the
terrorism -- Dick Clarke's operations, yes.
Gordon-Hagerty said that for the transition, to brief the incoming Bush administration
NSC officials, she prepared PowerPoint slides on Preparedness; al Qaeda and WMD;
WMD in general; and Renditions. The briefings conveyed her belief that al Qaeda had
nukes, she said, as well as noting that it had direct links to Pakistan's UTN and a
chem/bio development program.
12 BOB WOODWARD
What could they accomplish with air strikes? Not much, he thought.
Iraq was treacherous. When everything was weighed, Cohen pre-
dicted the new team would soon back off and find "reconciliation"
with Saddam, who he felt was effectively contained and isolated.
In interviews nearly three years later, Bush said of the pre-9/11
situation, "I was not happy with our policy." It wasn't having much
impact on changing Saddam's behavior or toppling him. "Prior to
September 11, however, a president could see a threat and contain it
or deal with it in a variety of ways without fear of that threat materi-
alizing on our own soil." Saddam was not yet a top priority.
5^ BUSH RECEIVED A SEf OND critical national security briefing a few

, A^ days later. CIA Director George Tenet and his deputy for operations,
James L. Pavitt, gave Bush, Cheney and Rice the so-called secrets
/ briefing. For two and one-half hours, the two ran through the good,
.v bad and ugly about covert operations, the latest technical surveil-
lance and eavesdropping, the "who" and "how" of the secret payroll.
When all the intelligence was sorted, weighed and analyzed,
Tenet and Pavitt agreed there were three major threats to American
I national security. One was Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terror-
ist network, which operated out of a sanctuary in Afghanistan. Bin
Laden terrorism was a "tremendous threat" which had to be consid-
ered "immediate," they said. There was no doubt that bin Laden was
to strike at United States interests in some form. It was not
fi, where, by what means. President Clinton had authorized
the CIA in five separate intelligence orders to try to disrupt and de-
stroy al Qaeda.
A second major threat was the increasing proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, WMD—chemical, biological and nu-
clear. This was of immense concern, they said. Third was the rise of
China, especially its military, but that problem was 5 to 15 or more
years away.
Iraq was barely mentioned. Tenet did not have an agenda for
Iraq as he did for bin Laden and al Qaeda.
34 BOB WOODWARD
on the NSC staff as a Russian expert during the presidency of Bush

senior. Rice, 46, was perhaps the person in the upper reaches of
Bush's national security team who was most alone. Her mother was
dead and her father had died a year ago. Following the attacks that
morning she called the only family she had, her aunt and uncle in
Birmingham, Alabama, to tell them she was all right, then went
back to work.
Beginning in the presidential campaign when she was Bush's
chief foreign policy adviser, Rice had developed a very close rela-
tionship with Bush. Tall, with near perfect posture, a graceful walk
P and a beaming smile, she had become a permanent fixture in the
presidential inner circle. The president and first lady had in a sense
become her family.
That night, she acknowledged to herself that she was in a fog.
She tried to focus on what had to be done the next day.
P
tl If it was bin Laden and al Qaeda—it almost surely was— there
rf was another complication. The questions would sooner or later
arise about what the Bush administration knew about the bin
Laden threat, when they knew it and what they had done about it.
J
ABOUT A WEEK before Bush's inauguration, Rice attended a meet-
ing at Blair House, across from the White House, with President-
elect Bush and Vice President-elect Cheney. This was the secrets
briefing given by Tenet and Pavitt.
For two and one half hours, Tenet and Pavitt had run through
the good, the bad and the ugly about the CIA to a fascinated
president-elect. They told him that bin Laden and his network were
a "tremendous threat" which was "immediate." There was no doubt
that bin Laden was coming after the United States again, they said,
but it was not clear when, where or how. Bin Laden and the network
were a difficult, elusive target. President Clinton had approved five
separate intelligence orders, called Memoranda of Notification
(MON), authorizing covert action to attempt to destroy bin Laden
B U S H AT WAR 35
iush and his network, disrupt and preempt their terrorist operations. No
:s of authority had been granted outright to kill or assassinate bin Laden.
•was Tenet and Pavitt presented bin Laden as one of the three top
that threats facing the United States. The other two were the increasing
:le in availability of weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological
went and nuclear, including weapons proliferation concerns—and the
rise of Chinese power, military and other.
•ush's In April, the National Security Council deputies' committee,
: rela- made up of the No. 2's in each major department and agency, rec-
Iwalk ommended that President Bush adopt a policy that would include a
in the serious effort to arm the Northern Alliance, the loose confederation
sense of various warlords and tribes in Afghanistan that opposed the Tal-
iban regime that harbored bin Laden.
. a fog. The CIA estimated that the Northern Alliance forces were out-
numbered about 2 to 1, with sbme 20,000 fighters to the Taliban's
-there roughly 45,000 military troops and volunteers.
ir later A CIA covert program of maintenance for the rebel forces of
he bin several million dollars a year was already in place. But worries
bout it. about the Northern Alliance abounded. First, it was not really an al-
liance, because the various warlords could probably with some ease
be bought off by the Taliban. The warlords flourished in a culture of
survival—meaning they would do anything necessary. Several were
a meet- if just thugs, serial human rights abusers and drug dealers. In addi-
esident- tion, the Russians and Iranians—who both supported the Alliance
: secrets /ith substantial amounts of money—had strong influence with
sme of the warlords.
through In the Clinton administration, the State Department had flatly
iscinated :>sed arming the Alliance because of these real concerns. It was
orkwere rd Armitage, Powell's deputy, who had agreed to lift State's
no doubt tions that spring. Armitage had checked with Powell, who had
:hey said, that bin Laden was a sufficient threat to justify arming the
a . lern Alliance on a large scale.
;networK
roved five iringjuly, the deputies' committee recommended a compre-
jtification jte plan, not just to roll back al Qaeda but to eliminate it. It
oin Laden plan to go on the offensive and destabilize the Taliban. Dur-
/kc
y^f- f^TA —^^
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1 Harry Truman, who was president when the CIA was created, began the custom of providing candidates
for the presidency with confidential briefings on foreign developments. In 1952 he authorized the CIA to
brief General Dwight Eisenhower and Governor Adlai Stevenson so that the successful candidate would be
as well informed as possible on the world situation when he took office. The briefings, which have
continued since Truman's day, also familiarized the eventual president and his new advisers with the CIA
and its capabilities. The briefings have included making the President's Daily Brief, CIA's premier
finished intelligence product, available to candidates. See John L. Helgerson, CIA Briefings of Presidential
Candidates 1952 - 1992, (Center for Study of Intelligence, 1996).
Harry Truman entered the Oval Office in April 1945 almost wholly ignorant of
intelligence matters. His determination that no future president should take office as
uninformed as he had been is partly responsible for the intelligence briefing offered to all
presidential candidates since 1952. Unlike Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower did not need
to be persuaded of the importance of intelligence. Ike was the first President since George
Washington already experienced in the use of intelligence when he took the oath of
office. He wrote after the Second World War that "intelligence had been of priceless
value to me...and, in no small way, contributed to the speed with which the enemy was
routed and eventually forced to surrender."
It was President Harry Truman, in whose administration the Central Intelligence Agency
was created, who instituted the custom of providing candidates for the Presidency with
confidential briefings on foreign developments. In 1952 he authorized the CIA to brief
Gen. Dwight Eisenhower and Governor Adlai Stevenson so that the successful candidate
would be as well informed as possible on the world situation when he took office. The
briefings would also position the CIA to develop a close working relationship with the
new president and his advisers. These two objectives have guided the Agency's efforts
during presidential transition periods ever since.
Through nine transitions since 1952, the CIA has provided intelligence support to
presidents-elect. This support, endorsed by each of the sitting presidents, has been
designed primarily to acquaint the incoming president with developments abroad that will
require his decisions and actions as president. A second goal has been to establish a solid
working relationship with each new president and his advisers so the Agency could serve
him well, once in office.
http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/briefmg/index.htm
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The Transition Begins — Officially
Statement of David J. Ban-am, Administrator of the U.S. General Services
Administration — 12/13/00
"This evening I have authorized President-elect George W. Bush to use the funds
appropriated for the transition. I have also made available the space prepared for the
transition team by GSA at 1800 G St. NW, Washington, D.C." -- SOURCE: U.S.
General Services Administration
Dec. 13: Gore speaks to the nation and offers his concession. Bush follows with an
address accepting victory 36 days after the election.
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Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
Written Remarks Submitted to: The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States
23 March 2004
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Commission, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you regarding the events leading up to and following the murderous
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
It is my hope, as I know it is yours, that through the hard work of this Commission, and
other bodies like it, our country can improve the way we wage the war on terror and, in
particular, better protect our homeland and the American people.
I am pleased to have with me today Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage. Secretary

Armitage was sworn in on March 26, two months into the Administration and he has been
intimately involved hi the interagency deliberations on our counterterrorism policies. He also
participated in National Security Council meetings whenever I was on travel.
Mr. Chairman, I leave Washington this evening to represent President Bush and the
American people at the memorial service in Madrid, Spain honoring the over 200 victims of the
terrorists attacks of March 11,2004. With deep sympathy and solidarity, our heart goes out to
their loved ones and to the people of Spain.
And just last Thursday, in the garden of our embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, I presided at
a memorial service in honor of two State Department family members, Barbara Green and her
daughter Kristen Wormsley, who were killed two years ago by terrorists while they worshipped
in church on a bright, beautiful spring morning.
I know that the families and friends of the victims of 9/11, some of whom are listening
today, grieve just as the Spanish are grieving and just as we at the Department of State did and
still do for Barbara and Kristen.
Mr. Chairman, I am no newcomer to the horrors of terrorism. In 1983,1 was working for
Secretary of Defense Weinberger when 243 Marines and Navy Corpsmen were killed in Beirut,
Lebanon.
Later, in 1985, four heavily armed Palestinian terrorists hijacked the Italian cruise ship
Achille Lauro carrying more than 400 passengers and crew. They shot 69-year-old Leon
Klinghoffer in his wheelchair, and threw him overboard, wheelchair and all.
I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1993 when the first bombing of the World
Trade Center took place.
In 1996,1 was out of government when the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia was bombed.
Khobar and all the other terrorist attacks over the years were very much part of my
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE

UNTIL DELIVERY
THURSDAY, APRIL 8, 2004
As Prepared for Delivery
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE

OPENING REMARKS
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
UPON THE UNITED STATES
Hart Senate Office Building

Washington, DC
April 8, 2004
I thank the Commission for arranging this special session.

Thank you for helping to find a way to meet the Nation's need to
learn all we can about the September 11th attacks, while
preserving important Constitutional principles.
This Commission, and those who appear before it, have a

vital charge. We owe it to those we lost, and to their loved
ones, and to our country, to learn all we can about that tragic
day, and the events that led to it. Many families of the
victims are here today, and I thank them for their contributions
to the Commission's work.
The terrorist threat to our Nation did not emerge on

September 11th, 2001. Long before that day, radidal"; freedom-
hating terrorists declared war on America and on the civilized
world. The attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983,
the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985, the rise of al-Qaida
and the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the attacks
on American installations in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, the
East Africa embassy bombings of 1998, the attack on the USS Cole
in 2000, these and other atrocities were part of a sustained,
systematic campaign to spread devastation and chaos and to
murder innocent Americans.
The terrorists were at war with us, but we were not yet at
war with them. For more than 20 years, the terrorist threat
gathered, and America's response across several administrations
of both parties was insufficient. Historically, democratic
societies have been slow to react to gathering threats, tending
instead to wait to confront threats until they are too dangerous
to ignore or until it is too late. Despite the sinking of the
Lusitania in 1915 and continued German harassment of American
shipping, the United States did not enter the First World War
until two years later. Despite Nazi Germany's repeated
violations of the Versailles Treaty and its string of
provocations throughout the mid-1930s, the Western democracies
did not take action until 1939. The U.S. Government did not act
against the growing threat from Imperial Japan until the threat
became all too evident at Pearl Harbor. And, tragically, for
all the language of war spoken before September 11th, this
country simply was not on a war footing.
Since then, America has been at war. And under President

Bush's leadership, we will remain at war until the terrorist
threat to our Nation is ended. The world has changed so much
that it is hard to remember what our lives were like before that
day. But I do want to describe the actions this Administration
was taking to fight terrorism before September 11th, 2001.
After President Bush was elected, we were briefed by the

Clinton Administration on many national security issues during
the transition. The President-elect and I were briefed by
George Tenet on terrorism and on the al-Qaida network. Members
of Sandy Berger's NSC staff briefed me, along with other members
of the new national security team, on counterterrorism and
al-Qaida. This briefing lasted about one hour, and it reviewed
the Clinton Administration's counterterrorism approach and the
various counterterrorism activities then underway. Sandy and I
personally discussed a variety of other topics, including North
Korea, Iraq, the Middle East, and the Balkans. .,,/'
Because of these briefings and because we had watched the

rise of al-Qaida over the years, we understood that the network
posed a serious threat to the United States. We wanted to
ensure there was no respite in the fight against al-Qaida. On
an operational level, we decided immediately to continue
pursuing the Clinton Administration's covert action authorities
and other efforts to fight the network. President Bush retained
George Tenet as Director of Central Intelligence, and Louis
Freeh remained the Director of the FBI. I took the unusual step
of retaining Dick Clarke and the entire Clinton Administration's
counterterrorism team on the NSC staff. I knew Dick to be an
^D,^(< C/f^ -h k HL
expert in his field, as well as an experienced crisis manager.
Our goal was to ensure continuity of operations while we
developed new and more aggressive policies.
At the beginning of the Administration, President Bush

revived the practice of meeting with the Director of Central
Intelligence almost every day in the Oval Office -- meetings
ich I attended, along with the Vice President and the Chief of
Staff. At these meetings, the President received up-to-date
intelligence and asked questions of his most senior intelligence
officials. From January 20 through September 10, the President
received at these daily meetings more than 40 briefing items on
al-Qaida, and 13 of these were in response to questions he or
his top advisers had posed. In addition to seeing DCI Tenet
almost every morning, I generally spoke by telephone every
morning at 7:15 with Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld. I also
met and spoke regularly with the DCI about al-Qaida and
terrorism.
Of course, we also had other responsibilities. President

Bush had set a broad foreign policy agenda. We were determined
to confront the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
We were improving America's relations with the world's great
powers. We had to change an Iraq policy that was making no
progress against a hostile regime which regularly shot at U.S.
planes enforcing U.N. Security Council Resolutions. And we had
to deal with the occasional crisis, for instance, when the crew
of a Navy plane was detained in China for 11 days.
We also moved to develop a new and comprehensive strategy

to eliminate the al-Qaida terrorist network. President Bush
understood the threat, and he understood its importance. He
made clear to us that he did not want to respond to al-Qaida one
attack at a time. He told me he was "tired of swatting flies."
This new strategy was developed over the Sprang and Summer
of 2001, and was approved by the President's senioVnational
security officials on September 4. It was the very first major
national security policy directive of the Bush Administration --
not Russia, not missile defense, not Iraq, but the elimination
of al-Qaida.
Although this National Security Presidential Directive was

originally a highly classified document, we arranged for
portions to be declassified to help the Commission in its work,
and I will describe some of those today. The strategy set as
its goal the elimination of the al-Qaida network. It ordered
the leadership of relevant U.S. departments and agencies to make
TESTIMONY OF U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DONALD H. RUMSFELD
PREPARED FOR DELIVERY TO
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
UPON THE UNITED STATES
MARCH 23, 2004
I. Introduction
Chairman, Commissioners — Thank you for undertaking this important work.
The Commission requested that we comment on preparations during the period from January 20th through
September 11, 2001, the events of September 1 1 , steps taken since September 11th, and any
recommendations for the future.
I request that the text of my testimony be made a part of the record, along with several attachments.
Let me first express my condolences to the people of Spain. The bombings in Madrid have been called
Europe's 9/11. For the Spanish people, March 11,2004 will leave their nation changed. I have no doubt
that, like September 11th, the fruits of those attacks will not, over the long run, be hatred, fear or self-doubt,
as the terrorists intended.
I am persuaded the attacks there will backfire on the terrorists as they have elsewhere — for example, as the
Istanbul bombings united Turks instead of dividing them; and as terrorist bombings in Riyadh spurred the
Saudis to crack down on terrorist networks in their country.
Families that lost loved ones on 9/11 - some of whom I am sure are listening today - must feel a special
bond with families in other countries who lost fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, sons and daughters
to terrorism. They understand the pain, and the heartbreak.
Nothing can shorten the suffering of the bereaved families whose loved ones perished, or fill the empty space
in their hearts.
The attacks by terrorists around the world are deadly reminders that our nation - and, indeed, the world's
free nations - are at war. It is a war in which we face dangerous enemies, that kilt innocent men, women and
children - enemies who are working to acquire weapons that would one day alf<5w,them to kill not hundreds,
as on March 11th in Spain, but tens of thousands.
So this Commission has an important opportunity. Those in government are, of necessity, focused on dozens
of issues. Commissions, however, can step back and focus on one thing, get it right, and provide insights
that can be of great value.
You have been asked to connect the dots - after the fact -- to examine events leading up to September 11th,
and consider whether events of that day might have been prevented - and, what lessons, if any, might be
taken from that experience to prevent future dangers. It isn't easy, even after the fact. And that's with the
We also developed a concept for new Defense Planning Guidance and a new Contingency Planning
Guidance. I found that many of the U.S. war plans were more than two years old. In some cases the
assumptions on which they had been built had not been adjusted for three or four years. In May of
2001, we began the process of modernizing the way the Department prepares its war plans - reducing
the time to develop plans, increasing the frequency with which they would be updated, and
structuring the plans to be more flexible and adaptable to the continuing changes in the security
environment.
• Following the incident in April where the crew of our EP-3 aircraft was taken prisoner by the
Chinese, we made adjustments in the Department's crisis management organization and process.
• We completed the Congressionally required Nuclear Posture Review, and adopted a new approach to
deterrence designed to enhance our security, while mandating historic reductions in our deployed
offensive nuclear strategic weapons.
We did all this, I would add, with a skeletal staff. It was not until nearly 6 weeks into the new
Administration that Deputy Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, was confirmed. For many weeks thereafter, he and I
were the only confirmed Presidential appointees in the Defense Department. For example:
• The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition was not sworn in until May 10th - almost four
months after the President took office.
• The Department's General Counsel and the Secretary of the Navy were not confirmed until May 24th.
• The Secretary of the Army was not confirmed until May 31st.
• The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy - the senior official responsible for many of the issues
discussed here - did not take office until July 16th, nearly 6 months into the new Administration.
• The DoD Comptroller, the Department's top budget official, was not confirmed until May 3rd.
• The Secretary of the Air Force and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness were
not confirmed until June 1st.
• The Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs was not confirmed until July 16th.
• The Deputy Under Secretary for Policy was not confirmed until July 25% .,...
• The Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy was not confirmed until August 6th.
For most of the period before 9/11 we were working in a building where many of the most senior officials
selected by the President had not been confirmed and were not available to help. So we were without their
help for many months. The current system from clearance to confirmation is better suited to the industrial
age and needs to be modernized to fit the 21st century.
10
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Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Alexis Albion

Sent: Friday, June 18, 2004 6:29 PM
To: Team 3
Subject: from Clinton autobiography
On other topics in the book, Clinton said he met with President-elect George W. Bush and told him that
the biggest threat to the nation's security was Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida. According to Clinton,
Bush said little in response, and then switched subjects.
6/20/2004
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TO: Condi Rice

FROM: Steve Hadley and Philip Zelikow

SUBJ: Organization of NSC for Transnational Threats and Homeland Defense

The Present Organization

WMD Preparedness. Diplomatic prevention is in the current Non-proliferation

Critical Infrastructure. In 1998 a presidential directive (PDD-63) spotlighted the new

3. Retain the directorate's responsibility for counter-terrorism, WMD preparation, and

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Bush-Cheney Reactions to the Cole

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AP, Oct. 13, 2000

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Let me ask you, first of all, a question that's been a

5^ BUSH RECEIVED A SEf OND critical national security briefing a few

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