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September 26, i/-i/-v-i
2003

The Honorable Douglas Feith


Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We appreciate the testimony you provided at the Committee hearing held on


July 10. 2003. The Committee has prepared question for the record based upon
review of this testimony.

Please provide unclassified responses to each of the questions by October 3,


2003. If classified material is needed to fully explain your unclassified response,
please provide that information in a separate annex. Please have your staff contact
Rebecca Farley or Adam Harris at (202) 224-1700 if your staff have any questions.
Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Roberts John D. Rockefeller IV


Chairman Vice Chairman

Enclosure

NCT0058340
Questions for the Record

1. fntelligence vs. Policy Analysis

a, During your briefing to the Committee, you indicated that the analysis
your staff performed was for the purpose of formulating policy. Therefore, it
would have been inappropriate to ask the CIA or the DIA to perform this function.
Please provide examples of the policy recommendations, if any, that were
produced as a result of this analysis.

b. In your June 28, 2003 letter to the Chairman, referring to the two-person
cell, you state, "It was not involved in intelligence collection." Please define
intelligence collection as used in your letter.

2. Personnel Issues

a. Who were the two full-time individuals who comprised the so-called
"cell" to which you refer in the fourth paragraph of your letter of June 28, 2003?

b. Your letter states that other Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
staffers periodically worked with team members on matters related to terrorism.
Who were the other staffers?

c. What function did Mike Maloof perform for you at OSD?

d. Did Michael Pillsbury perform counter terrorism or weapons of mass


destruction analysis on your behalf?
*

e. Were consultants used by USD(P) to augment full time staff on matters


related to Iraq, terrorism or related issues? If so, please provide the names of the
consultants.

NCT0058341
3. Documents

a. Please provide a list of the participants at each of the meetings described


in the third paragraph on page five of your statement.

b. Were any actions taken as a result of the meetings?

c. In testimony before the Committee, you explained that Defense


Department staffers "discovered a set of reports on the relationship between Iraq
and al-Qa'ida which were not reflected in finished intelligence products. In other
cases, some older reports gained new significance in light of information obtained
by debriefing detainees." Please provide the reports that were used for these
assessments.

NCT0058342
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
20OO DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 2O3O1-2OOO

POLICY CCT 27 2003

The Honorable Pat Roberts


Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 205 10

Dear Chairman Roberts:


Enclosed are answers to the questions for the record posed in your letter of
October 1, 2003. Please note that the attachments include classified information.

1 hope you find this information useful.

With best wishes, 1 am


Yours truly,

DouglasJ.Feith

Enclosure
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 2O3O1-2OOO

POLICY

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV


Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 205 10

Dear Senator Rockefeller:

Enclosed are answers to the questions for the record posed in your letter of
October 1 , 2003. Please note that the attachments include classified information.

1 hope you find this information useful.

With best wishes, ] am


Yours truly,

Douglas J. Feith

Enclosure
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 20 oct 03
1400

Answers to SSCI questions

la. The work of the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG)
members and other staff members were inputs into the policy formulation process.
These inputs contributed to policy formulation on issues such as:

• DoD response to the presence in Iraq of the al-Qaida affiliated Ansar al-Islam
terrorist group.
• DoD response to the presence in Iraq of al-Qaida operative Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi and his CBW network.
• Helping to formulate requirements for the debriefings of al-Qaida fighters
detained at Guantanamo and Bagram.

Ib. By "intelligence collection," I meant the collection of information by means


of any of the recognized "ints" that are specific to intelligence agencies, such as
humint, sigint, imint, etc. All government officials are engaged in what could be
called "open source" information gathering (e.g., reading of newspapers, meetings
with foreign officials and experts); I do not include that in "intelligence
collection."
2a and b. We are not providing the names of the staff individuals who performed
these duties. To do so may make it difficult for our senior leaders to obtain candid
advice and analysis from our staff in the future. Higher-level officials, especially
those who are confirmed by the Senate, have the responsibility to answer to
Congress for the work done in the Department. I am happy to meet with you
again if you have questions that were not covered in my prior testimony to the
Committee or in my answers today.
2c. Mike Maloof is a staff-level civil servant in the Department of Defense. He
is an expert in the analysis of illicit networks and has provided advice in that
capacity.
2d. No. Michael Pillsbury was a consultant to OUSDP. He was not assigned to
perform counter terrorism or weapons of mass destruction analysis. In his
personal capacity, he attended some conferences on ideological issues regarding
Middle Eastern terrorism. Following those conferences, he organized a meeting in
which experts on this topic from other government agencies discussed it with
some DoD officials.
2e. OUSDP routinely uses consultants in various areas of its work, to obtain
specialized expertise and to gain immediate access to the services of individuals
who are in the process of being hired for staff positions.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NCT0058345
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 20 oct 03
1400

For the reason mentioned above, we are not providing the names of individual
consultants.
OUSDP currently has five consultants on the books who deal or have dealt with
"Iraq, terrorism or related issues." Three of them are in the process of being hired
as full-time staffers, and one was brought on as a consultant upon leaving a full-
time position.
In addition, since January 2001, OUSDP had eleven other consultants who dealt
with "Iraq, terrorism or related issues." Eight of these were subsequently hired as
full-time employees of the Department. Seven of the eleven individuals served in
Baghdad, either when they were consultants or after having been hired as full-time
employees.
3a. The meetings referred to are:
- Secretary of Defense briefing (August 2002)
- DCI briefing (August 2002)
- Discussion among two OSD staffers and a number of CIA and DIA
analysts (August 2002)
- Briefing for NSC and Office of the Vice President staffers (September
2002)
3b. The purpose of the briefing to the Secretary of Defense was to inform his
thinking on various sources of support for terrorism. As a specific result of the
briefing, arrangements were made to give the briefing to the DCI. Then there was
the discussion between the OSD staffers involved and analysts from the
Intelligence Community. I am not aware of any actions resulting from the DCI
briefing, the staff-level discussion or the briefing to staff members of the NSC and
the Office of the Vice President.
3c. I preface my answer with a word on how the reports you asked about came to my
attention.
An OUSDP staffer, in the course of routine duties, discovered (in March 2002) some
CIA reports on the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida which had not been reflected
in recent finished intelligence products. The staffer continued to research special
HUMINT information on the issue - Iraq and al-Qaida connections - without having
been requested to do so. No one higher up in the staffer's chain of command was aware
of this early endeavor. In April 2002, the staffer brought some of the material to the
attention of the DIA's Terrorism Center, the office of the J-2, and the DIO for the
Middle East.
The staffer prepared a report and passed it up the chain of command, eventually to
me in July 2002. It included information on Iraq and al-Qaida and consisted mostly
of CIA reporting; a few other reports, from FBI and NSA, were also included. The

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NCT0058346
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 20 oct 03
1400

information in the report became part of a briefing to the Secretary of Defense.


Virtually all of the oral part of the briefing dealt with the material from the original
report. (The written part of the briefing has already been provided to the
Committee.) The staffer gave the same oral briefing at the three sessions identified in
3 a. above.
A summary of the intelligence reports that the staffer used is included in the classified
annex at Tab A. (This annex is current and thus also includes information obtained
since the final briefing last year.) Tab B includes the specific reports (from information
available at that time) that the staffer presented at the August 2002 analyst discussion,
with the recommendation that CIA duly take them into consideration.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NCT0058347
WITH DRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148
Box: 00008 Folder: 0002 Document: 45
Series: Team 1 Files

Copies: 1 Pages: 20

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: UBL - AQ -- Iraq -- Feith Memo


Document Date: 09-26-2003
Document Type: Report
From:
To:

Subject: Classified attachments to Feith responses to Senat


e Select Committee on Intelligence follow-up quest
ions

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.

NND: 281
Withdrawn: 04-14-2008 by:

RETRIEVAL #: 281 00008 0002 45


1

Original Message
From: Philip Zelikow
Sent: Wednesday, April 28, 2004 7:37 PM
To: Doug MacEachin; Yoel Tobin
Cc: Front Office
Subject: FW: further on Dd DR#51 documents

Let Dan and Steve know how you want them to proceed.

9/11 Closed by Statute I


Sent: Wednesday, April 28, 2004 5:31 PM
To: Front Office _
Cc: Dan.LevinQusdoi,^-1.1. closed bv statute
Subject: further on DCI DR#51 documents

I've reviewed the documents specifically requested in DCI DR#51. Below are my
findings broken down into 4 categories:

Documents Previously Provided:

Letters t, v & y are all the same document, This document was provided to the
Commission on October 8, 2003 as bates number 1500099
Letter u. was provided to the Commission on July 2, 2003 (pre-bates stamping)
Letter w. was provided twice to the Commission, the first time on July 9, 2003
(pre-bates stamping) and then again on October 8, 2003 as bates number 1500100

Documents out of the scope of the Commission's mandate in that they report
information relating to 2002 operations and have nothine at all to do with 9/11. AO
evolution or the ore 9/11 context ofAO's relationship with Iraq:

• Letters e, q, x & ee.

Not vet located for evaluation:

• Letters a., b., p., z., aa., bb., cc. & dd.

The remaining documents I find to be within the scope of the Commission's mandate and
will make available if this is still what the Commission wants of this document request.
Please advise.
WITH DRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148
Box: 00008 Folder: 0002 Document: 46
Series: Team 1 Files

Copies: 1 Pages: 2

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: UBL - AQ -- Iraq -- Feith Memo


Document Date: flfr-2fr-2003 on - zo z^eH
Document Type: Letter
From:
To:

Subject: DCI Document Request #51

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.

NND:281
Withdrawn: 04-14-2008 by:

RETRIEVAL #: 281 00008 0002 46


'Iraqi Intelligence Service - IIS [Mukhabarat] - Iraqi Intelligence Agencies Page 1 of6

FAS | Intelligence | World Agencies | Iraq | Mukhabarat IIS/GID


Index I Search I Join FAS

A Resource
S Program
&—«/

Iraqi Intelligence Service - IIS [Mukhabarat]


The Mukhabarat has a staff of about 4,000. Although there is a surprisingly detailed literature on the
internal organization of the Mukhabarat, these sources diverge as to the precise nomenclature and
subordination of these entities.

Directorate 1. The Private Office


The office of the director of the Mukhabarat is situated in its own building at the main entrance of the
Mukhabarat complex in the Mansour district of Baghdad. All instructions and directives flow from this
office, and the director's meetings with his senior staff take place here. The current Director of the
Mukhabarat is Rafi' Dahham Al Tikriti, former director of the Fourth Directorate of the Mukhabarat and
former Iraqi Ambassador in Turkey. He assumed his present position on July 1,1997. The Director up
to June 30, 1997 was Mani' Abd Rashid Al Tikriti. The Manager of the Director's Office is Col. 'Aayed
Al Douri (Abu Tayseer), from Dour, and the Director's secretary is Capt. Muthana Al Tikriti (nephew of
Mani' Abd Rashid).

Subdivisions of Dl:

The Secretariat
Audit
Security
Salaries
Electronic equipment
Reception and appointments
Internal and external co-ordination

Political Bureau

The Political Bureau is probably the most important branch of the Mukhabarat. It includes a number of
Directorates.

http://www.fas.org/irp/worlQViraq/mukhabarat/org.htm 3/26/2004
WITH DRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148
Box: 00008 Folder: 0002 Document: 47
Series: Team 1 Files
Z
Copies: X Pages: 1

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: UBL - AQ - Iraq -- Feith Memo


Document Date:
Document Type: Chronologies
From:
To:

Subject: Events re: al Qaeda

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.

NND:281
Withdrawn: 04-14-2008 by: h

RETRIEVAL #: 281 00008 0002 47

i
^

C(
WITH DRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148
Box: 00008 Folder: 0002 Document: 48
Series: Team 1 Files

Copies: 1 Pages: 39

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: UBL -- AQ -- Iraq -- Feith Memo


Document Date: 01-28-2003
Document Type: Intelligence Report
From:
To:

Subject: CIA intelligence report re: Iraq

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.

NND: 281
Withdrawn: 04-14-2008 by:

RETRIEVAL #: 281 00008 0002 48

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