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Mathematical Necessity
Seminar on Logic and Necessity
Table of Contents
Table of Contents.................................................................................................................2
Abstract................................................................................................................................3
Rethinking Mathematical Necessity – An Exegesis............................................................7
The Unique Status of Logical Truths..............................................................................8
A Suggestion for a New Distinction................................................................................9
A Relative Notion of Truth.............................................................................................11
Unrevisability of Some a Posteriori Statements............................................................12
Giving Sense to Riddles.................................................................................................13
Speaking of Logic..........................................................................................................14
How a Change of Context Affects Statements...............................................................15
Is There Absolute Necessity?.........................................................................................17
The Need for Justification..............................................................................................18
Discussion..........................................................................................................................20
Revising Absolute a Priori.............................................................................................20
Conclusions .......................................................................................................................25
Works Cited........................................................................................................................27
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Abstract
A major concern of analytic philosophy in the last century has been whether or not we
can say that there are true statements that are necessary, and if so, on what grounds. It has
been argued that the notion of such absolute necessity is a dogma, and that statements that
we call a priori are more similar to empirical hypothesis. A reason for this can be given
by analogy; since historically some statements considered at one time to be necessary
were later revised, it is possible that some future experience will motivate us to revise
statements that we consider to be necessary today. But can we really make sense of the
notion of revising a statement such as "7+5=12"?
Hillary Putnam suggests that even though the notion of absolute necessity is
compromised by the argumentation offered against it, there are statements we consider to
be necessary relative to our "conceptual schema". Einstein's theory of relativity showed
that Euclidian geometry dose not correctly describe physical space. But in the 18 th
century statements of Euclidian geometry had an epistemic status quite different than that
of empirical hypothesis. By analogy, this may be the case with statements within our
present conceptual schema, for example - statements of arithmetic.
This essay begins with an historical introduction to the discussion of the analytic
synthetic distinction. The historical overview in the introduction is brief, and represents
one of several possible narratives. The introduction is followed by an exegesis of
Putnam's paper titled "Rethinking Mathematical Necessity". The arguments in that paper
are explained and major points are discussed in detail. Views, examples and opinions that
are not in the original paper or in other referenced works are remarked as my own. The
paper concludes with my own suggestion for an alternative view of the matter, and a
conclusion to the entire essay.
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Introduction
The discussion about the distinction between analytic and synthetic knowledge has its
roots deep within the history of Western philosophy. The very justification of a
philosophical discussion might be seen as one that depends on there being an analytic, a
priori way of knowing facts about the world. This paper deals with a narrow aspect of
this discussion - the status of mathematical knowledge. Understanding the issues at hand
requires an understanding of the context of the philosophical debate in which the issues
were introduced. In this introduction I hope to briefly explain this context, limiting the
discussion to the major views expressed in the Twentieth Century. It is important to note
that these views are based on earlier views which are also important, such as the
philosophy of Kant, which I will only discuss briefly.
Kant explained that truths of logic are analytic a priori and that they are trivial.
He explains that logical laws govern relationships between concepts. He also explains
that logic is the vary structure of thought. After Kant, the next important milestone was
the work that began with Gottlob Frege. Frege elaborated on the ideas of Kant by
identifying the logical structure of an ideal language with the nature of thought.
The status of mathematical truths, in terms of the analytic-synthetic discussion,
was up until this point controversial1. In his works, Frege showed that it is possible to
base all mathematical concepts on logical ones. This attempt was later improved in the
works of Russell and Whitehead and was called logicism. Showing that the truths of
mathematics are truths based on logic alone situated mathematics for the first time clearly
within the analytic domain, at least according the common view that considered logic to
be analytic. Logicism reinstated the analytic-synthetic discussion in the twentieth century.
For the first time it seemed possible to classify all truths as either analytic or synthetic.
The logical positivist movement attempted such a classification of truths. Rudolf
Carnap explains that "it became possible for the first time to combine the basic tenet of
empiricism with a satisfactory explanation of the nature of logic and mathematics"
(Carnap 1963). The positivist philosophers attempted to reduce all knowledge to a basis
1
Kant argued that there is a third realm of synthetic a priori truths to which mathematics belonged, while
Mill suggested that mathematical knowledge was empirical. Wittgenstein explained in his early writings
that all analytic truths are tautologies, but did not include mathematics amongst them.
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of certainty. For this task they chose to adopt a phenomenological language whose basic
sentences were about sense impressions. More complex sentences had to be reducible to
these simpler ones, and a statement was considered true if there was a viable method of
confirming it.
By formalizing language in such a way, the hope was to create a basis for sciences
to thrive on. Other than the class of empirical sentences and sentences that were reducible
to empirical claims, there was also a class of analytic sentences. The positivists explained
that analytic statements were true by virtue of convention or stipulation. As a result of the
adoption of logicism, the class of analytic sentences now included all of mathematics.
This attempt sharpened the analytic-synthetic distinction creating a large class of analytic
statements that were also thought to be a priori, and therefore immune from revision.
In 1951 Quine set out to criticize the views of Carnap and the positivists in his
paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (Quine 1951). The first dogma of which Quine
speaks is that the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements really exists. The
second dogma is that every meaningful sentence in our language is structured from
logical components that refer to immediate experience. The argument against the first
dogma is that the idea of analyticity rests on other notions, such as that of synonymy 2,
which are just as unclear as the notion of analyticity, and that any attempt at explaining
analyticity using these notions inherits this unclarity. What is implicit in Quine's
arguments is that not only is there no meaningful distinction, but that all statements
considered analytic are, in fact, synthetic3. Since Quine, like the positivists, identifies in
his writings the notion of analyticity with the notion of a priori, the conclusion is that no
statement is immune from revision.
As for the second dogma, Quine explains that only a holistic theory of meaning is
an adequate one. He draws a picture of what he calls our "web of believes"; our
knowledge about the world is organized so that some statements take a more central role
amongst our beliefs. Only statements in the periphery are statements about immediate
2
Quine refers to a linguistic notion of analyticity: A sentence is analytic if it can be obtained from a logical
truth by substituting synonyms for synonyms. A logical truth is one in which only words of formal logic
occur essentially.
3
Quine does agrees to one notion of analytic he calls "stimulus analytic". This is a relativised notion of
analyticity, much like Putnam's notion of quasi-necessity.
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experience and all other statements are logically constructed of peripheral ones. Any
statement in a language might be revised, even a central statement of the kind we call
logical laws. A revision of such a statement is likely to require us to make extensive
modification to our web of beliefs. Similarly, it is possible to hold a statement about
immediate experience immune from revision by altering neighboring statements or even
more central statements4.
Quine's account of the distinction triggered numerous responses. Some followed in
his footsteps while others objected to Quine's radical views. In a paper titled "In Defense
of a Dogma", Grice and Strawson (1956) argued that Quine's claim that we have not yet
clarified the distinction in a rigorous manner is also true of many other distinctions that
we use in philosophy and are not willing to reject. Hillary Putnam argues in his
philosophy that although there is a lot of sense to Quine's theses, its radical form misses
out on some important methodological distinctions. The claim that every statement is
revisable does not account well enough to the difference between empirical statements
and the statements once considered a priori. In this paper I will attempt to follow
Putnam's investigation of this matter, and towards the end introduce some views of my
own.
4
This can be done, as Quine suggests, by pleading hallucination.
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5
This line of thought is still noticeable in Wittgenstein's later works.
6
Tractatus: 3 – 3.13.
7
In an earlier section of the Tractatus Wittgenstein uses a different analogy when he explains that "A
picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it." (2.172)
8
This objectivity rests on certain assumptions that Kant must make, such as the unity of thought and the
existence of god.
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rational human activity. Therefore, there could not possibly be talk of anything illogical,
since this sort of talk would not be talk at all but rather meaningless mumbling.
Putnam explains that in his reading of Frege he identifies a tension between a
Platonist and a Kantian view. On the one hand there are many reasons why one may
claim that Frege takes the Platonist approach. It may be said that for Frege the laws of
logic are quantifications over all objects and concepts. On the other hand since Frege
identifies the structure of thought with the structure of an ideal language, and since the
laws of logic govern that ideal language, it seems that he also adopts the Kantian view
whereby the laws of logic have a different status than empirical laws. It is now easy to see
the similarities between the Kantian view, where there cannot be an illogical thought, and
Wittgenstein's claim that statements of logic have no sense but are not nonsense.
Interpreting Wittgenstein in this way allows Putnam to adopt an alternative
explanation to the necessity of logical statements than the one Quine attacked in "Two
Dogmas". Quine directed his attack towards the explanation of logical necessity provided
by Carnap. Carnap explained that logical statements are necessary because they are no
more than conventions. A change of the logical laws would be nothing more than a
change to the meaning of the words. Wittgenstein's view allows Putnam to claim that the
necessity of logical statements needs no explanation, nor could we ever provide such an
explanation, since they do not describe things in the world but only the way we think.
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We are now faced with two definitions of analyticity. The first is a narrow definition
which only includes logical truths and the second is a wider definition which also
includes sentences synonymous with logical truths. Putnam points out that Quine's
famous argument is only valid when referring to the wider definition. The narrow
definition escapes Quine's claws unharmed, but this is still not enough to establish that
logical truths are necessary and counter Quine's main theses regarding necessity. Even
with the narrow attempt at a definition of analyticity we are left with logical truths that
are "contextually a priori"9, a notion that is vary alien to the line of though of Kant and
Frege that Putnam is attempting to promote.
The notion of revising logical truths is a hard one to swallow, even for Quine himself.
After suggesting that the revision is possible, it seems like Quine attempts to defend the
special status of logical truths. He gives two arguments; the first is that even though
truths of logic are theoretically revisable, they are located at the far end of the continuum
of revisability. This continuum has, on its one end, empirical statements of the kind we
revise every day and on its other end statements like the truths of logic which we choose
to hold come what may. The second argument is that the revision of logical truths only
occurs during attempts at translation, and that in those cases it is only a change of
meaning and not a revision in a deeper sense10.
Putnam's dissatisfaction has to do with how Quine's arguments might be interpreted.
Quine describes the space between the synthetic and the analytic as a continuum rather
than a clear cut distinction. But it seems that for all intents and purposes he abandons the
traditional notion of analytic a priori in favor of classifying all statements as synthetic a
posteriori ones. The notion of "reluctance to give up" does not capture well the difference
between what makes logical truths true, and what makes empirical hypothesis correct.
To illustrate the matter, Putnam asks us to consider three sentences:
1. It is not the case that the Eiffel Tower vanished mysteriously last night and in
its place there has appeared a log cabin.
9
The term "contextually a priori" is not the original term used by Putnam. I use it regarding stamens that
we can revise, but do not know how to give sense to their revision. This is similar the class of statements
Putnam terms "quasi-necessary relative to a conceptual schema" or "necessary relative to a body of
knowledge". I think that the term captures well the problematic nature of such truths.
10
This type of revision is similar to Carnap's change in convention.
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2. It is not the case that the entire interior of the moon consists of Roquefort
cheese.
3. For all statements p, '~(p•~p)' is true11.
Putnam explains that the difference between the first two statements and the third one
does not only have to do with how much one is reluctant to give up each statement. It is a
real distinction that has to do with the fact that one knows how statements one and two
may turn out to be false, while one does not even understand what it means for the third
statement to be false.
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12
The term "quasi-empirical" is not in the original text.
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empirical discovery that one just made about who he really is, and say that he was
mistaken about his name. But from a subjective point of view, when such a fundamental
assumption about the world is lost, it makes just as much sense to think that the events
after the discovery are factitious as it is to think that past experiences are. When we are
faced with the discovery that a fundamental scientific assumption we have about the
world is false, we are collectively faced with a similar subjective situation.
An example of such a situation would be to discover that the statement "water has
boiled in the past" is false. Even though this is agreed to be an empirical statement, so
much of our other knowledge depends on it being true that the discovery of its falsity
causes language to loose its reference point. Such a discovery would require such
extensive modifications elsewhere to our web of believes that we would not know what
to keep constant and what to change. Putnam explains that what Wittgenstein's examples
show is that even though it is true that in a certain sense we can revise any statement
(even in a trivial way, by altering the meaning of words), in another sense there are cases
where it is not rational to do so.
13
In "Two Dogmas" Quine explains that this problematic nature has to do with the terms meaning,
synonymy and analyticity having interdependent definitions.
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intriguing is exactly that we do not know what sense to give to it. Only after we have
arrived at a solution do we understand the sense of the question. If the riddle-question had
only one clear sense, it would not be a riddle at all (or at least not an interesting one).
Putnam explains that prior to knowing the answer any attempt at a translation of the
riddle would be futile since the translator would be unable to preserve its intended sense.
Similarly, the sense of revising a contextual a priori truth is something that is only
understood after the fact.
Speaking of Logic
Looking back at the positions of Kant, Frege and early Wittgenstein described earlier,
there are several important distinctions to be made. The idea that logical truths are true by
virtue of the nature of thought is a metaphysical idea that Putnam would like to jettison.
Kant describes not two, but three types of knowledge; synthetic a posteriori, synthetic a
priori and analytic a priori truths. While the distinction between a priori and a posteriori
truths is clear, the distinction between the status of analytic and synthetic a priori is a
more subtle one. Synthetic a priori truths for Kant are true because they describe the
structure of reason. They do not say something about the world, but rather what they say
is that any experience is "filtered" according to the innate conceptual structures of reason
common to us all. Analytic truths on the other hand are true because they are a result of
the nature of thought. The difference between structure of reason and nature of thought is
an important one for Kant. Synthetic a priori truths are truths that we can rationalize
about, for example by explaining why they are necessary or by thinking of a world where
they do not exist. We cannot rationalize, negate or explain analytic truths precisely
because they are reason.
For Wittgenstein the opposition between synthetic a priori and analytic truths is no
longer a concern. In his view the opposition is between a posteriori (empirical) truths and
a priori truths. Wittgenstein follows Frege's footsteps in identifying the nature of thought
with the structure of an ideal language. The resulting view is that truths are either logical
truths, now identified with the structure of an ideal language, or they are about the world.
In the first case their revision is without a sense, just as they are unthinkable for Kant. In
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the second case the revision of judgments about the world is thinkable and subject to
confirmation.
What Putnam hopes to retain from the Kant-Frege-early Wittgenstein idea is not the
metaphysical principle that guarantees the unrevisability of logic due to it being the
nature of thought. What he hopes to retain is the notion that a revision of logic is
something that we cannot give sense to in principle at the time of the revision. It is not
the case that logical truths are absolutely unrevisable or absolute a priori. But it is the
case that they hold quite a different status than empirical hypothesis.
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15
The original example is taken from Donnellan (1962).
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Discussion
In the following section I would like to discuss some of my own thoughts on the issues
expressed in this seminar. These thoughts are concerned with the general discussion about
logic and necessity and not particularly with the subject of mathematical necessity. The
main works that I reference are Putnam's "Rethinking Mathematical Necessity" and "It'
Ain't Necessarily So", and Quine's "Two Dogmas".
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because they are absolutely necessary or because we have not discovered an alternative
yet16. Any attempt to give an answer to this question assumes an external point of view.
As a case study I wish to examine how Einstein's physics revised notions regarded as
necessary by Newtonian physics. For example, the notion of absolute simultaneity - that
the statement "either two events occur at the same time or they do not" is true. This is a
good notion to examine since even today laymen’s intuition is inconsistent with the way
such basic concepts are presented by the theory of general relativity. Let us briefly
describe a thought experiment17; in the diagram bellow the long arrow represents a train
traveling at velocity v in the direction of the arrow and the dashed line represents the
railway embankment. For people traveling aboard, the train is a frame of reference - they
regard all events in reference to the train. Every event which takes place along the
embankment also takes place at a particular point of the train. The definition of
simultaneity can be given relative to the train just as it can be given in respect to the
embankment.
V
M'
Train
Embankment
A M B
The following question arises: if two strokes of lightning emanating from points A
and B are simultaneous with reference to the railway embankment, are they also
simultaneous relatively to the train? Before the time of the theory of relativity it had
always been assumed in physics that a statement of time had an absolute significance, i.e.
that it is independent of the state of motion of the body of reference. But we can define
simultaneity in this case by saying that the two lightning strokes occur at the same time if
they both reach point M, located in the middle of the distance AB, at the same time (since
they both travel at the speed of light).
16
A reason for not discovering such an alternative maybe that we are incapable of conceiving it.
17
This thought experiment was originally described by Einstein (1920).
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Events A and B also correspond to positions A and B on the train. When the flashes of
lightning occur, point M' coincides with point M, but it moves towards the right in the
diagram with the velocity v of the train. An observer sitting in the position M’ in the train
is traveling towards the beam of light coming from B and away form the beam coming
from A. If the train is traveling vary fast, the observer will see the beam of light emitted
from B earlier than he will see that emitted from A. Observers who take the railway train
as their frame of reference must therefore come to the conclusion that the lightning flash
at B took place earlier than the lightning flash at A. The conclusion is that events which
are simultaneous with reference to the embankment are not simultaneous with respect to
the train, and vice versa. Every reference frame has its own particular time. Unless we are
told the frame of reference to which the statement of time refers, there is no meaning to a
statement about the time of an event.
Let us now discuss how the theory of general relativity was developed by Einstein.
Historically, it is said that the first time that Einstein's theory met with empirical
confirmation was at an experiment conducted by Sir Arthur Eddington at 1919. Critics of
that experiment claim that an empirical conformation of Einstein's theories was only
achieved at a later time. What I would like to point out is that before 1919 there was no
empirical confirmation for relativity. The significance of this fact is that it shows that the
methods used by Einstein when developing the theory of relativity must not have been
empirical methods18.
It is reasonable to say that the development of the theory of relativity was done
mainly by mathematical means. Sure, there were empirical observations involved and, as
a consequence of those observations, inconsistencies in Newtonian physics were
discovered. These inconsistencies were probably a major reason why an alternative
theory was needed. But we know that those observations alone do not account for the
development of the body of knowledge we call the theory of relativity. We know this
because it would not have been an issue to empirically confirming the theory of relativity,
even when it was first conceived, if its development was a result of empirical
observations.
18
Note that I use the terms empirical and non-empirical here as if a clear distinction exists between the two.
For now my intention is only to point out our linguistic behavior. I will return to this issue shortly.
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One more point for clarification: We have already suggested that the truths of logic
escape Quine's criticism. This is so because Quine's criticism is directed at the notion of
synonymy when it is employed to expand the class of logically true sentences into other
forms of analyticity. Logically true sentences19 are not dependant on any of the terms
Quine showed to be unclear. In the description I gave so far of how the development of
the theory of relativity caused the revision of statements considered to be a priori until
then, I have used the terms empirical and a priori as though there is a clear distinction
between them. I would now like to clarify my intentions.
Suppose that there really is a distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge.
Suppose also that a priori knowledge consists in its core of the truths of logic that have
escaped Quine's judgments. We can also suppose that a priori knowledge consists of the
entire class of mathematical statements in addition to statements of pure logic, but this is
not essential to the point. At some point in history, someone arranged the class of
statement considered a priori (according to the definition we have just supposed) by
some theory he conceived. How can we explain that later on a new theory was devised
and that class of a priori statement changed?
A simple, almost trivial, explanation is human error. During the course of time, a
person reviewing the notes left by past scholars may discover that they were wrong,
perhaps by employing some deductive method in an incorrect way. This might seem like
a weak explanation for the revision of a priori statements when the class of statements is
small. But the larger we allow the class of a priori statements to be the more sense it
makes. When that class contains the whole of mathematics, a revision of a priori
statements due to human error is a common event. The class of a priori statements
changes over the course of time because we continually correct mistakes in it.
If what Einstein did when he developed the theory of relativity was to review the
mathematical formulas governing Newtonian physics, correct and further develop them,
sometimes by devising whole new mathematical methods, then in a sense what he did
was to correct Newton's mistakes. The result of these mistakes was that some statements,
such as the one about absolute simultaneity, were included in the class of a priori
statements by mistake. When Lobachevski and Reimann developed alternative
19
For a definition of logical truth see footnote 2.
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geometries, they did not do so in order to correct a mistake in Euclidian geometry20. But
the development of alternative geometries alone was not enough to demonstrate how
space is non-Euclidean. That was only accomplished by the theory of relativity.
Can this explanation really account for the claim that every statement is revisable? I
think that the best we can say is that it does a good job at describing our struggle with
knowledge. It gives a reason for why we revise knowledge of any type, empirical or
other. The difference between this explanation and the other ones discussed in this essay
is that it allows us to keep our belief in the existence of a priori truths (relative or not)
and still explain the history of science. One problematic aspect of this explanation is that
calling the theory of Newtonian physics a mistake hardly does it justice. Perhaps the word
mistake (or error) is not the right one to use in this context.
But perhaps the gravity of the situation has to do with the immense changes that have
to occur to the scientific body of knowledge before someone can correct these
"mistakes". Maybe we have talked about revisions for so long that we have forgotten that
we are the ones making them. And the reason we usually have in mind for doing so when
we make them is that we do so to correct a mistake, no matter what type of knowledge we
are dealing with. It is possible that the truths of logic are the most basic laws there are. It
is also possible that the laws of logic describe the nature of thought. But as any student of
arithmetic or logic would testify, this does not prevent us from making mistakes when we
apply them.
20
When Lobachevski first published his theories he called his work "imaginary geometry".
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Conclusions
Quine introduced the notion of naturalizing epistemology in a paper called
"Epistemology Naturalized" (Quine 1969). He did so by both showing that traditional
epistemology has failed and arguing that natural science can succeed in its place. Quine
thinks of traditional epistemology as being a doctrinal project concerned with identifying
the foundation and deducting from it beliefs about the physical world. Quine also refers
to the conceptual project of Carnap and the logical positivists, which is concerned with
providing definitions for translating talk about physical bodies into talk about sense
impressions. Quine thinks that not only did Carnap fail; it is in principle impossible to
succeed (to prove this he describes a thought experiment about translation of the word
"gavagai" to "rabbit").
Quine asserts that the quest for certainty will not succeed. The alternative he provides
is for us to study the relation between sense impressions and theories about the world. He
feels that we should reject both the need for justification and the quest for certainty.
Rather we must study scientifically the natural phenomenon in the human brain. In
essence, he has removed normativity from epistemology.
In "Rethinking Mathematical Necessity" Putnam argues that Quine's account of
knowledge implicitly situates mathematics as empirical and as a result misses out on
some important distinctions. First, Quine's denial of a priori truths mistakenly classifies
all statements as empirical. The study of arithmetical statements shows that there is an
important methodological distinction between contextual a priori truths and empirical
truths. This distinction is evident throughout the entire history of scientific discovery. The
new distinction Putnam offers is not meant to be a new metaphysical device, a second
realm of truths. Instead the distinction offers a better description of scientific behavior.
The second point Putnam criticizes in Quine is the notion that the attempt at
justification is useless. The criticism goes much further than to say that we do not know
what sense to attach to the notion that logical truths are wrong. The criticism is that our
language (and in a deeper sense the way we think) cannot account for a revision of
logical truths. Normative notions dominate the way we speak about epistemology and
those notions cannot be naturalized, reduced to empirical means. Borrowing from Kant,
Frege and the early Wittgenstein Putnam argues that mathematics escapes the need for
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justification. Again, not meant as a metaphysical statement, but as a statement that better
describes our relation with knowledge.
From a different prospective, Putnam points out that a verificationist theory of
meaning fails at places where a theory of meaning as uses succeeds. The first reason for
this is that a verificationist theory of meaning fails to apply to many scientifically
decidable truths where verification is impossible due to technical reasons. We should not
be forced to give up scientific knowledge we can justify but cannot verify. Another reason
is that in some cases we do not grasp the meaning of certain statements until there is a
change in use. This was the case with the statements like "there are finitely many places
to go to, travel as you will" before Euclidian geometry was overthrown. Only when this
statement was actually used in scientific discourse we were able to give it sense. Realism
cannot be settled with a verificationist point of view; that was the problem with the
positivist project. But if we naturalize epistemology we miss interpret the history of
science; that is the problem with Quine's view.
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Works Cited
1. Carnap, R. (1963), The philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, P. A. Schilpp (ed.), pp. 44-
67; 868-877; 915-922.
2. Donnellan, K. (1962), "Necessity and Criteria", the Journal of Philosophy, LIX,
No. 2, pp. 647—58.
3. Einstein, A. (1920) "The Relativity of Simultaneity", Relativity: The Special and
General Theory. New York: Henry Holt, pp. 168; Bartleby.com, 2000.
http://www.bartleby.com/173/9.html.
4. Grice, H.P. and Strawson P.F. (1956), “In defense of a dogma”, Philosophical
Review, AP 1956; 65
5. Kant, Immanuel (1787), Critique of pure reason, translated and edited by Paul
Guyer, Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, 1998
6. Putnam, H. (1975), “It ain’t necessarily so”, Mathematics, Matter and Method
(Philosophical papers, vol. 1), Cambridge University Press.
7. Putnam, H. "There is at least one a priori truth", orig. published in 1978; reprinted
in Putnam's Realism and Reason, Philosophical Papers vol. 3 (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1983)
8. Putnam, H. (1994), “Rethinking mathematical necessity”, Words and life, J.
Conant (ed.), Harvard University Press.
9. Quine, W.V. (1948) “On What There Is”, The Review of Metaphysics 2, pp. 21-28.
Reprint in many places including Quine, From a Logical Point of View 2nd ed.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).
10. Quine, W.V. (1951), “Two dogmas of empiricism”, Philosophical Review JA
1951; 60
11. Quine, W.V. (1969), "Epistemology Naturalized" reprinted in Naturalising
Epistemology, ed. H. Kornblith, 1985. Cambridge MIT press pp. 23-24.
12. Wittgenstein L. (1922), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D.F. Pears
and B.F. McGuinness (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1961).
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