NY B5 PA Request FDR - Commission-Port Authority Correspondence 728

Page 1 of 1
James Miller
From: Begley, James Obegley@panynj.gov]

Sent: Thursday, February 26, 2004 4:13 PM
To: James Miller
Subject: RE: Phone call
In answer to your question the only handout at the three meetings with FDNY was a CD of the audio recordings
and a Confidentiality agreement was entered into. FYI, There is a 1994 letter from FDNY at the time the repeater
was installed stating that during their radio coverage tests "the system worked exceptionally well" and asking that
the repeater remain off when FDNY was not using it as it could cause interference with their other radio
operations. If I haven't provided your office with a copy, I will do so.
James M. Begley
Deputy General Counsel
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

225 Park Avenue South, 13th Floor
New York, NY 10003
(212)435-3502
This e-mail (along with any attachments) is intended only for the use of the named addressee(s) and may contain legally
privileged and/or confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that
any dissemination, distribution or copying of this e-mail (and any attachments) is strictly prohibited. If you received this e-
mail in error, please notify me immediately, permanently delete this e-mail (along with any attachments) and destroy any
printouts.
—Original Message
From: James Miller [mailto:jmiller@9-llcommission.gov]
Sent: Thursday, February 26, 2004 3:00 PM
To: Begley, James
Subject: Phone call
Jim: Please set up any meetings you are able to over the next week or two
I am very flexible until March 12,2001
Thanks Jim
7/28/2004
James Miller
Sent: Wednesday, March 03, 2004 1:36 PM
To: James Miller
Subject: Tenant List Info
FYI. I will see what we have in addition.
CNN has detailed list of tenants, floors, sq ft, that they developed from listing service
Costar that tracked signed deals so it is not accurate with respect to PA but it is an
excellent start, here is weblink.
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/tenantsl.html
James M. Begley
New York, NY 10003
(212) 435-3502
This e-mail (along with any attachments) is intended only for the use of the named
addressee(s) and may contain legally privileged and/or confidential information. If you
are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that any
dissemination, distribution or copying of this e-mail (and any attachments) is strictly
prohibited. If you received this e-mail in error, please notify me immediately,
permanently delete this e-mail (along with any attachments) and destroy any printouts.
James Miller
From: Begley, James [jbegley@panynj.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, March 03, 2004 5:05 PM
To: James Miller
Subject: WTC Tenant Lists
FENANTLISTJUSTBETENANTLISTABOVE WTC Tenant List

OWANDABOVEIMP.1PACTBOTHTOWER Note.doc (89 K...
As requested.
«TENANTLISTJUSTBELOWANDABOVEIMPACT.xls»
«TENANTLISTABOVEIMPACTBOTHTOWERS.xls» «WTC Tenant List Note.doc»
James M. Begley

New York, NY 10003
(212) 435-3502
James Miller
Sent: Thursday, March 04, 2004 10:29 AM
To: James Miller
Subject: WTC Tenant Lists
WTC Tenant List NISOTTWOWTCTENTENANTLISTABOVE

Note.doc (65 K... NTLISTBELOW74.X.1PACTBOTHTOWER
Pis disregard the prior e-mail with the tenant list
attachments. I've been provided these instead.
«WTC Tenant List Note.doc» «NISDTTWOWTCTENANTLISTBELOW74 .xls»

«TENANTLISTABOVEIMPACTBOTHTOWERS.xls»
James M. Begley

New York, NY 10003
(212) 435-3502
Page 1 of 1
James Miller

Sent: Friday, March 05, 2004 12:09 PM
To: James Miller
Subject: RE: Information request
We do not have a compilation of that information according to PAPD. They said it would have to be constructed
by beginning with both the handwrittens, as your doing, and the radio transmissions. I was told that besides WTC
command, PATH ESU happened to be present at the WTC that morning when the attack occurred.
James M. Begley

New York, NY 10003
(212) 435-3502
printouts.
Original Message
Sent: Friday, March 05, 2004 11:13 AM
To: Begley, James
Subject: Information request
Jim:
Attempting to come up with some numbers based on response of PAPD.

Is there a document which details the number of PA PD personnel who responded to WTC prior to collapse
of WTC 1.
Would also like to know from which commands these personnel responded.
I have attempted to use the statements provided by your office and the injury reports to come up with
numbers.
Hopefully, they would be consistent with the numbers you might have but I am afraid there are some who
did neither a statement or completed an injury report.
Yes, even if you do not have the information I expect to share with you the numbers I come up. Should
have these numbers by Wednesday
As to additional request for interviews I will be in a better position to respond after an internal meeting we
are having on Monday.
Again thanks for the help.
Jim
7/28/2004
James M Begley
Law Department
Port Authority of NY & NJ
225 Park Avenue South, 13th Fl
New York, NY 10003
/9/11 First Responder/Family
/Privacy
March 19,2004
Dear Sir:
The 9-11 Commission respectively, request the following individuals

be made available for interviews with Cortimission staff members in
the near future: /
Officer!
Officer
Detective!
Lieutenanl
Officer
Sergeant
Officer
Officer
Officer
Office rl
Sergeant]
Captain]
Officer
Detective
Elevator FNl
The commission would like to have all interviews completed by April

22,2004 if at all possible.
I can be reached at 212- 264 -1505 or on cell phone 201 264 6164.
Sincerely,
James R Miller
9-11 Commission Staff
Page 1 of3
....-•••""•19/11 First Responder/Family

i >«-ii --""" /'Privacy
James Miller i
From: Joseph Morris \_

Sent: Friday, May 07, 2004 2:44 PM / j
To: James Miller / I
Subject: Re: Autobio / I
Tom, / I
I don't have any questions to be submitted, I'm prepared to testify on the pAPp actions. I certainly would expect
them to be adept at what they are doing, they have been charged to complete^ a great deal.
Joe / ;
— Original Message — / I
From: JjJmes.Mj!!er / j
To: Joseph Morns . I
SentfFriday," May 07.2004 10:25 AM / !
Subject: RE: Autobio / i
Joe: In addition to your personal observations of 9/11,1 believe, the commissioners will ask questions related to
Incident Command Systems, inter agency communications, liaisons with either first responder entities, lessons
learned and how these lessons were addressed by the PAPD po6t 9/11. Questions present as briefing material
to the commissioners should be returned to me by Monday. Just want to linake sure you understand these are
questions referred to the commissioners but the commissioners ban ask anything they feel will add to their
understanding of the 9/11 events. In fact in other hearings they/have developed questions based on the
testimony provided on the day of the hearing. They are very adept at whejt they do.
—Original Message—
From: Joseph Morris [mailtof
Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2004 9:31 PM
To: James Miller
Subject: Re: Autobio
OK
— Original Message —
From: James Miller
To: Joseph Morris
Subject: RE: Autobio
Thanks Joe.
Talk with you early next week
Original Message
From: Joseph Morris
To: James Miller
Subject: Re: Autobio
Joseph Morris
Port Authority of NY & NJ Police Department
Chief of the Department (Retired)
7/28/2004
Page 2 of3
Chief Morris began his law enforcement career on May 8, 1972 when he joined the
Port Authority Police Department (PAPD). His facility assignments as a police officer
included the Lincoln Tunnel Command and PATH Command as well as special
assignments to Police Headquarters, Criminal Investigations Unit and the Police
Academy.
He was promoted to the rank of sergeant in August 1982. His facility assignments
included the Port Authority Bus Terminal, NJ Marine Terminals and Newark
International Airport. While a sergeant he also worked assignments at the PATH
Command and World Trade Center Command.
In April of 1987 he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. His assignments included
the Lincoln Tunnel Command and Police Headquarters where he worked in the
Absence Control Unit, Inspectional Services and Civilian Complaint Investigations
Unit.
In February 1993 he responded to the World Trade Center Bombing from Police
Headquarters in Jersey City to take part in the rescue and recovery efforts. He
remained at the World Trade Center Complex as an onsite PAPD Commander and
Department's Inter -Agency Liaison for the recovery, investigation, security and
reopening operations. During this time period he interacted with the numerous local,
state and federal agencies.
In April of 1993, following the completion of his World Trade Center assignment he
was promoted to the rank of captain. As captain, his command assignments included
the Holland Tunnel, Special Investigations Unit, George Washington Bridge, Criminal
Investigations Unit and Labor Relations Unit. While with the Criminal Investigations
Unit he directed the PAPD investigative efforts in the TWA Flight 800 Investigation.
During November 1997 he was promoted to the rank of Police Inspector remaining
with the Labor Relations Unit. In November of 1998 his was rank was changed to
inspector. As an inspector he remained at Police Headquarters till reassigned in May
of 1999 to be the Western Zone Commander. The Western Zone command oversight
responsibilities included the Holland Tunnel, NY Marine Terminals, PATH and
World Trade Center Commands. During this period his responsibilities included the
development of planning and operations for the Millenium/Y2K and OP/Sail 2000
Events. This assignment included being the Department's Liaison to the New York
and New Jersey local and state government agencies as well as the numerous federal
government agencies.
In January 2001 he was reassigned to be the Commanding Officer of LaGuardia

Airport. On September 11, 2001 he responded to the World Trade Center after they
were attacked to take part in the rescue and recovery operations of that morning.
Upon his arrival he provided leadership and direction to the mobilized police
personnel from the other PAPD Commands that responded to the PAPD Mobile
Command Post. The Mobile Command Post had set up in the southbound lanes of
West Street just north of the Vesey Street intersection moments prior to the collapse of
the South Tower. His decision making at the scene has been credited with saving a
number of PAPD officers' lives.
That afternoon he was designated the World Trade Center Site Commander for the
7/28/2004
9/11 First
Responder/Family Page 3 of3
Privacy
PAPD in its rescue and recovery efforts. On September 11th 37 members of the force
were killed during their heroic rescue efforts at the World Trade Center. Those killed
included Fred Morrone, the Director of Public Safety and Chief James Romito, the
senior Operations Chief.
On September 26,2001 Joseph Morris was promoted to the rank of Chief of the
Department. He remained in that position until his retirement on January 9, 2004. He
is currently employed by ManTech Security Technologies Corporation.
----- Original Message —
From: James Miller
To:1 I
Sent: Wednesday, May 05, 2004 9:55 AM
Subject: Autobio
Mr. Morris: Based on the interview you had with Sam Casperson, I composed a short
biographical sketch for your review.
This sketch will be provided to the Commissioners so they have some insight into who they
are interviewing.
If you could review and add = subtract anything you feel needs to be amended or format it
as you see fit.
If after 9/11 you attended any symposiums or appeared at any law enforcement functions
pertinent to 9/11 activities I think we should add these appearances.
As to questions, you may want to have the Commissioners ask you please send to me
ASAP
Information which can be brought out through direct questions allows you to have some
advance notice about what may be coming and allows you to be prepared.
I will also be composing 15-20 questions which you will have as soon as they are finalized.
Some of these will have to do with command structure and communications.
Your letter from DC has been forwarded down to headquarters for revision and an official
signature.
If you have any questions please call me at 212 264 4627 or on my cell phone 201 264
6164.
Thanks
Jim
7/28/2004
Page 1 of3
James Miller
From: John Farmer

Sent: Friday, May 28, 2004 8:58 AM
To: Jonathan Stull; Al Felzenberg
Cc: James Miller
Subject: RE: port authority police
Al, Jonathan: As we discussed last night, I think in general we should (1) remind him that we have
invited those whose views differ from ours to come forward, but (2) emphasize that our report was based
on review of PA documents and police reports from 9/11, extensive discussions with PA officials, and
interviews of responders, and that (3) our report was shared with PA in advance of the hearing, and they
were given the opportunity to show us where we were wrong. There were no surprises here. I leave the
specifics for Jim to comment on. John
Original Message
From: Jonathan Stull
Sent: Thu 5/27/2004 6:11 PM
To: Al Felzenberg
Cc: John Farmer; James Miller
Subject: FW: port authority police
From Graham Rayman of Newsday. Below are what he claims are the PA's on-record responses to
excerpts from our staff statements. He wants comment from the Commission. As you'll see, they take
issue with many of our claims. Not for deadline tonight, but we need something for him tomorrow.
Jonathan
—Original Message
From: Graham.Rayman@newsday.com [mailto:Graham.Rayman@newsday.com]
To: Jonathan Stull
Subject: police authority police
These are the on-record responses from the Port Authority regarding the staff report's entries on
PAPD. You'll see excerpts from the report followed by PA responses./gr 718-575-2614.
1. The Port Authority Police Department lacked clear standard operating procedures to
guide personnel responding from one command to another during a major incident.
INCORRECT. The PAPD deployed a full mobilization plan at the time of the incident as
plans and past practice called for with an orderly notification process. The Central Police
Desk and commands through Tour Commanders or Commanding Officers made contact. At
that time, the Tour Commanders or Commanding Officers dispatched however many
officers and commanders they could to the World Trade Center. As these events with
national ramifications were unfolding, it was vital to retain deployment at the airports,
tunnels, bridges, PATH rapid-transit rail system and ports. Officers and commanders
responding were told to report to the police desk at the World Trade Center, and then to the
Mobile Command Unit parked on West Street. Our estimations are that approximately 200
officers and commanders from the Port Authority Police Department responded to the scene
before the first tower collapsed.
7/28/2004
Page 2 of3
2. At 9 am, the Port Authority Police commanding officer ordered an evacuation of

civilians in the World Trade Center complex because of the danger posed by highly flammable jet
fuel from Flight 11. The order was issued, however, over a radio channel, which could be heard
only by officers on the Port Authority WTC command channel. There is no evidence that this
order was communicated to officers in other Port Authority Police commands or to members of
other responding agencies. INCORRECT. Captain Anthony Whitaker (now Chief Whitaker)
was the Commanding Officer at the time. Whitaker gave the evacuation order to the police
desk, they in turn notified the Central Police Desk. Due to the extreme chaos of the event
that day, the Central Police Desk's communication may NOT have been received by the
officers and commanders in the field.
3. At 9:11 a.m., Port Authority workers at the 64th floor of the North Tower were told by
the Port Authority Police desk in Jersey City to stay near the stairwells and wait for assistance.
CORRECT
4. The Port Authority Police Department lacked clear standard operating procedures for
coordinating a multi-command response to the same incident. It also lacked a radio channel that
all commands could access. Many officers remained on their local command channels, which did
not work once they were outside the immediate geographic area of the ir respective commands.
INCORRECT. As I stated earlier, PAPD are told to respond to the police desk or Mobile
Command Unit. Officers and commanders communicated on Channel A until parts of that
channel were rendered inoperable when the North Tower was ablaze. Their command
channels were kept clear for critical incident communication.
5. Many Port Authority Police officers from different commands responded on their own
initiative. By 9:30 a.m. the Port Authority's central police desk requested that responding officers
meet at West and Vesey and await further instructions. In the absence of predetermined leadership
roles for an incident of this magnitude, a number of Port Authority inspectors, captains, and
lieutenants stepped forward at West and Vesey to formulate an on-site response plan. They were
hampered by not knowing how many officers were responding to the site and where those officers
were operating. Many of the officers who responded to this command post lacked suitable
protective equipment to enter the complex. PARTIALLYINCORRECT. With regards to the
first part of the question, officers and commanders were mobilized as I explained earlier.
They were requested by 9:30 a.m. by the Central Police Desk, which further illustrates that
there was a cohesive operating plan and procedures. You are correct regarding the issue of
leadership and commanders. Certain commanders like Inspector Joseph Morris, who was
the Commanding Officer of LaGuardia Airport assumed control as other commanders like
Superintendent Fred Morrone, Chief James Romito, Inspector Anthony Infante Jr. and
Captain Kathy Mazza were inside the Towers attempting to rescue those trapped. As far as
protective gear, many of the officers were equipped with "bunker gear" and "Scott Packs"
and the Emergency Services Units on hand also were equipped with extra gear.
6. After the collapse of the South Tower there is no evidence that Port Authority Police
officers from outside the WTC command ever heard an evacuation order on their radios. Some of
these officers in the North Tower determined to evacuate, either on their own, or in consultation
with other first responders they came across. One Port Authority Police officer from the WTC
command reported that he heard an urgent evacuation instruction on his radio soon after the South
Tower collapsed. It is difficult to say that officers from outside the WTC command did NOT
hear the evacuation. PAPD Sgt. Robert Kaulfers, who was killed that day, issued a mayday
when the South Tower collapsed.
7/28/2004
Page 3 of3
7. The Port Authority's response was hampered by inadequate communication. For

example, although the FDNY commanders at the North Tower advised Port Authority police and
that tower's building personnel to evacuate the South Tower, shortly before 9:00 a.m., there is no
evidence that this advice was communicated effectively to the building personnel in the South
Tower. A vital few minutes may have been lost and, when that tower did make its announcement
to evacuate at 9:02 a.m., it was the ambiguous advice that everyone may wish to start an orderly
evacuation if warranted by conditions on their floor. We do not feel that the communication
was "inadequate," but rather, the communication on Channel A was destroyed when the
towers were afire. Tenants were physically evacuated by emergency personnel and tens of
thousands were able to make it out alive due to the heroics of PAPD, FDNY, NYPD and
other uniformed personnel and civilians.
8. The Port Authority's Jersey City Police desk was also unaware of the evacuation
decisions when, at 9:11 a.m., it advised workers on the 64th floor of the South Tower to stay near
the stairwells and wait for assistance. In general it was the practice of the Port Authority's
differing commands to use localized frequencies. When officers reported from the tunnels and
airports, they could not hear the commands being issued over the WTC command frequency.
Please see the answers to numbers two and seven.
7/28/2004
James Miller
From: James Miller
Sent: Monday, July 26, 2004 8:23 AM
To: 'Begley, James'
Cc: Sam Caspersen; Madeleine Blot
Subject: RE: 9/11 Report Page 320 Comment
Jim: As to the updates on training and other steps taken they have been added to the
Monograph this day.
Original Message
From: Begley, James [mailto:jbegley@panynj.gov]
Sent: Friday, July 23, 2004 8:34 PM
To: James Miller
Cc: Dan Marcus; 'sdunne@9-ll.gov'; Sam Caspersen; Reiss, Alan; Trucillo, Christopher;
Madeleine Blot
Subject: 9/11 Report Page 320 Comment
Jim :
On pg 320 of the report there is a statement that " While significant problems in command
and control of the PAPD were exposed on September 11, it is less clear that the Port
Authority has adopted new training exercises or major incident protocols to address these
shortcomings." We've probably received hundreds of e-mails from the Commission staff in
the last few months, many phone calls (including those seeking information the Commission
staff couldn't get a timely response from primary sources) and requests for
impromptu meetings with PA staff. All were immediately and substantively
responded to. For its part, the PA in my view went way over and above any reasonable
expectation in providing timely and complete information, often responding with even
more information than the Commission had asked for. However, I do not recall even one
occasion where the Commission staff called to explain to us in detail what these
"significant problems" were, or to explore what initiatives the PA had undertaken in the
Police and Emergency Management areas during the last three years.
First, we need to understand better the basis for the 'significant problems' statement. I
repeatedly suggested that you interview senior officers at the scene, which as far as I
know you did not, ( if you did we would have liked to have been so informed) and we even
offered to reach out to those who retired. We also made every PA staff member, whom you
requested, available to you, except for the few who were not medically cleared because of
their 9/11 experience. However, the only senior officers that I recall the Commission
interviewing were Joe Morris, the CO at LaGuardia on 9/11 and Tony Whittaker the CO at the
WTC on 9/11. You weren't at the original interviews of either. While you may have later
talked with Chief Morris, I don't recall that you talked to Chief Whittaker. The point
being that I don't recall anything in the interviews or conservations with either that, in
my view, would support the assertion of "significant problems", and certainly not in the
context of all the circumstances of 9-11. The other interviews of police staff didn't
give us an understanding of this conclusion either. In light of this, I would have
expected the common professional courtesy of being apprised of what specifically it is
that the Commission was referring to and the source(s) on which the conclusion was based.
However, there has been absolutely no contact with either Karl Lunan or I on this. On the
other hand, we've had innumerable contacts, (often at all hours of the day and night, on
weekends, holidays and during vacations) from Sam Casperson and especially Madeleine Blot
(even repeatedly today through late this afternoon). I don't like to complain, but I
simply find this hard to excuse, especially when the report's criticisms of PAPD are in
my view completely out of context and seem to ignore what the Commission was given and
told about emergency plans and training, including incident command, and
told regarding standard procedures. The compulsion to be critical, if
simply based on a view of the need for a written mobilization plan, or criticism of
supervisors at the scene, shortly after their arrival, from a review of radio
communications, don't in my view necessarily serve anyone well, if we're not given the
substantive rationale for the conclusions. It certainly doesn't help us to assess and
understand whether there was actually "significant problems" that day, other than the
unprecedented, horrific and chaotic terrorist devastation, which the first responders
confronted, and the swiftness with which the events unfolded. But if it was deemed
necessary to make those findings, then it might have been helpful to have heard from you,
our point of contact in this area, so that we could address the comment on page 320.
Second, I would have also expected the opportunity to provide the Commission with an
understanding of what initiatives the PA, as an agency, and PAPD in its public safety and
emergency response functions, had undertaken since 9/lland is planning to undertake
Therefore, for your information, here are just some of the things that I am aware of.
Subsequent to 9/11 the Port Authority has revised its Emergency Procedures Manuals for all
facilities and included an annex on WMD. It created an Office of Emergency Management in
2002. The Police Division senior management functions were enhanced in areas such as
terrorism. All officers in the field received special masks as part of their standard
equipment, in the event they are faced with certain WMD events. The Chief of the
Department recently issued an Interim Order--2004 Mobilization Response, which we would
have told you was being issued had the Commission asked. We enhanced police radio
interoperability and continue to work on that area, which as you know, due to the nature
of technology, is still a work in progress. We rebuilt and increased our police force
strength. In addition, this year the PA created executive management position of Chief of
Public Safety and Emergency Management to which the Public Safety (Police) Department and
the Office of Emergency Management report in order to better integrate and coordinate
their respective functions. We built a new and greatly expanded agency Emergency
Operation Center, which I believe will be fully operational this year and PAPD central
police desk is relocated there. (I believe that I offered to show it to you and I believe
we showed your staff it in the early stages of construction). Operation centers at our
various facilities have or will be augmented. There was also a full multi-interagency
field exercise/ drill involving response to a WMD incident
last fall at Port Newark. Since this is not something that the Commission
raised until it saw fit to make critical comment in the yesterday's report, I am sure that
there are many, many other PA initiatives, including in training areas, already
undertaken and/or in planning that I am unaware of. We would have surely given as much
information as you needed--and more--had you asked as part of the innumerable exchanges
during the last few months.
We've met with Madeleine Blot for a number of hours yesterday and have given her more
information in response to her numerous e-mails last night and today so that she can issue
an accurate monograph. Since, we haven't heard anything from you, despite the referenced
negative statement in the report, I think this needs to be a two way street as a matter of
fairness. Accordingly I would ask that the monograph at least make some attempt to correct
the record at page 320; indicating that the PA has apparently undertaken a significant
number of post-9-11 initiatives in the Police and Emergency Management areas would seem to
be the least that should be done.
James M. Begley

New York, NY 10003
(212) 435-3502
Page 1 of2
James Miller
From: Begley, James [jbegley@panynj.gov]

Sent: Monday, July 26, 2004 12:15 PM
To: James Miller
Cc: Sam Caspersen; Reiss, Alan; Trucillo, Christopher
Subject: RE: Monograph
Thank you; enclosed is the Interim Order. I have given this further thought to this and, for the record, I don't think
this necessarily completely corrects the record. The command and control critique is not in any context and we
don't have any understanding of what is being characterized as "significant". If it's the radio and written SOP
point, then can it also be clarified in the monograph so that it will not be construed as being directed toward
particular individuals?
More specifically, I sat in when Chief Joe Morris was interviewed by George Del Grasso and Sam Casperson. As
I recall, it was perfectly clear that Chief Morris, who had been trained in the national incident command system,,
took immediate control of the scene at the mobile command bus as the ranking officer when he arrived .
Thereafter he was the epitome of professionalism and responsible leadership through the collapse of both towers
and throughout the day in his direction and coordination of the recovery and response efforts. To the extent the
report's comments could be read as a criticism of his actions, it does a disservice to his valiant efforts.
The same holds true with respect to the other PAP commanders. While,]_ I the commission
did not have access to Sgt. Al Devona, the incident commander at the fire command desk in Tower One, it
elected not to interview the ranking officer in the lobby, tnspectol ^ Yet, when he was
interviewed by NIST, it was perfectly clear that Insoi lalsp displayed professional and responsible
leadership in the coordination and direction of PAPD response throughout the day. Hi& actions too were valiant
and beyond reproach. I am not aware that the commission interviewed other senior PAPD command officers who
fi on the nrnund. other than then Caot. Tonv Whittaker. who agreed to be tnte
N,,,, rvi
... ewed J I
'""9/11 First
James M. Begley Responder/Family

New York, NY 10003
(212)435-3502
printouts.
—Original Message -----

Sent: Monday, July 26, 2004 9:19 AM
To: Begley, James
Cc: Sam Caspersen
Subject: Monograph
Enclosed is the update to the monograph

Subsequent to September 11, 2001, the PAPD has worked to address problems encountered. The
portable ultra high frequency (UHF) radios are now programmed with all PAPD UHF
7/28/2004
Page 2 of2
frequencies. The PABT command radios were up graded to an UHF frequency. The PAPD has
continued to review new radio technologies.
The PA has revised Emergency Procedures Manuals for all facilities. These manuals include an
annex on weapons of mass destruction. The PAPD has purchased special masks which have been
issued to all officers as standard equipment. In order to define procedures for emergency response,
the Chief of the Department has issued an interim order dealing with mobilization response.
The PA created the executive management position of Chief of Public Safety and Emergency
Management. This position was developed to coordinate and integrate the PAPD and Office of
Emergency Management functions. The PA has also built a new Emergency Operations Center
with the PAPD central desk relocated to the center.
Would like to have the Mobilization order sent to the office or emailed so I can have it included in paper
work
Thanks
Jim Miller
7/28/2004

NY B5 PA Request FDR - Commission-Port Authority Correspondence 728

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Page 1 of 1

From: Begley, James Obegley@panynj.gov]

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

FYI. I will see what we have in addition.

FENANTLISTJUSTBETENANTLISTABOVE WTC Tenant List

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

WTC Tenant List NISOTTWOWTCTENTENANTLISTABOVE

«WTC Tenant List Note.doc» «NISDTTWOWTCTENANTLISTBELOW74 .xls»

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

From: Begley, James Obegley@panynj.gov]

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

Attempting to come up with some numbers based on response of PAPD.

The 9-11 Commission respectively, request the following individuals

The commission would like to have all interviews completed by April

....-•••""•19/11 First Responder/Family

From: Joseph Morris \_

In January 2001 he was reassigned to be the Commanding Officer of LaGuardia

From: John Farmer

2. At 9 am, the Port Authority Police commanding officer ordered an evacuation of

7. The Port Authority's response was hampered by inadequate communication. For

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

From: Begley, James [jbegley@panynj.gov]

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

—Original Message -----

Enclosed is the update to the monograph

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