Remrev Withaddtionalcases

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, et.al.vs. MENDEZ G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994
FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso Quezon, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code. Subsequently, the municipal district gained the status of a municipality, beginning 01 July 1963. On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC Branch 62, of Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of EO 353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. The petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner argued, the officials of the Municipality of San Andres had no right to office. In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way of affirmative defense, that petitioner municipality should be deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality; that because the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be assailed; and that, considering the petition to be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor General. On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed anew a motion to dismiss alleging that the case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, citing Section 442(d) of the law, reading thusly: Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. xxx (d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.
Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. The motion was opposed by petitioner municipality, contending that the LGC is inapplicable to the present case whose mode of creation had been void ab initio. On December 2, 1991, the lower court dismissed the petition since accordingly, the defect in the creation has already been cured by the enactment of the LGC of 1991. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not a quo warranto proceeding shall prosper in a case assailing the constitutionality of a de facto local government considering the special circumstances surrounding the case HELD: No. Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years , or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise." When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit proceeding. It must be brought "in the name of the Republic of the Philippines" and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed by the President of the Philippines ..." Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and upon the relation of another person" with the permission of the court. The Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another." While petitioners concede that enactment of the LGC may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they, however, contend
1
that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of EO 353. In the meantime the Municipality, of San Andres, continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Granting that the EO 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case offers no choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own that of a de facto municipal corporation. At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the 12 municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code, which considers the present subject as regular municipality, as a Curative law, which in essence is retrospective, and aimed at giving validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded; the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. [G.R. No. 111243. May 25, 1994.] JESUS ARMANDO A.R. TARROSA, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL C. SINGSON and HON. SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ III, respondents. SYLLABUS: REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; QUO WARRANTO; PROPER PROCEEDING TO RESOLVE QUESTION OF TITLE TO OFFICE; WHO MAY COMMENCE ACTION; CASE AT BAR. The instant petition is in the nature of quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Such a special civil action can only
be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another." We have held that a petitioner, who did not aver that he was entitled to the office of the City Engineer of Cabanatuan City, could not bring the action for quo warranto to oust the respondent from said office as a mere usurper. Likewise it had been held that the question of title to an office, which must be resolved in a quo warranto proceeding, may not be determined in a suit to restrain the payment of salary to the person holding such office, brought by someone who does not claim to be the one entitled to occupy the said office. It is obvious that the instant action was improvidently brought by petitioner. To uphold the action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental machinery. FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as a taxpayer, questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the performance of his functions as such official until his appointment is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments and respondent Salvador M. Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management, from disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson. The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides: Sec. 6. Composition of the Monetary Board. The powers and functions of the Bangko Sentral shall be exercised by the Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, hereafter referred to as the Monetary Board, composed of seven (7) members appointed by the President of the Philippines for a term of six (6) years. The seven (7) members are: (a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be the Chairman of the Monetary Board. The Governor of the Bangko Sentral shall be head of a department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Whenever the Governor is unable to attend a meeting of the Board, he shall designate a Deputy Governor to act as his alternate: Provided, That in such event, the Monetary Board shall designate one of its members as acting Chairman . . .
2
In their comment, respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. ISSUES: Did Congress exceed its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral? HELD: The petition is dismissed. The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral, a special civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another. It is obvious that the instant action was improvidently brought by petitioner. To uphold the action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental machinery. Its capstone having been removed, the whole case of petitioner collapses. Hence, there is no need to resolve the question of whether the disbursement of public funds to pay the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson can be enjoined. Likewise, the Court refrains from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653 in deference to the principle that bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case. WHEREFORE, the petition pronouncement as to costs. LOTA vs CA G.R. No. L-14803 June 30, 1961 SYLLABUS 1. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; QUO WARRANTO DISTINGUISHED FROM MANDAMUS. Quo warranto is the remedy to try the right to an office or franchise and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, is DENIED. No
while mandamus only lies to enforce clear legal duties, not to try disputed titles. Hence, where there is usurpation or intrusion into an office, quo warranto is the proper remedy. But, where the respondent, without claiming any right to an office, excludes the petitioner therefrom, the remedy is mandamus, not quo warranto. 2. ID.; QUO WARRANTO; WHO MAY BE MADE PARTIES. Any person claiming to be entitled to a public office may bring an action of quo warranto without the intervention of the Solicitor General or the Fiscal and only the person who is in unlawful possession of the office, and all who claim to be entitled to that office, may be made parties in order to determine their respective rights thereto in the same action. Ponente: Felipe Natividad FACTS: 1. Moises Sangalang was the cemetery caretaker from 1951 until he was extended a new appointment by the Local Health Officer. 2. Flaviano Lota, then mayor of Taal appointed Jose Sangalang as cemetery caretaker, thus taking Moises place. 3. Moises filed a complaint against Mayor Lota, Jose and the municipal treasurer. 4. The CFI of Batangas rendered in favor of Moises. 5. Mayor Lota appealed. He claimed that the trial court erred in not dismissing complaint on the ground that the real party in interest, which is the municipality of Lipa was not made party-defendant; and the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint on the ground that appellee was not validly appointed to the post of municipal cemetery of Taal. 6. CA rendered a decision declaring Moises to continue in the office as cemetery caretaker. 7. Lota contended that the CA erred in holding that the present action is one of quo warranto; in not dismissing the action for failure of the Moises to join the Municipality of Taal, Batangas, as party defendant; and in declaring that respondent Moises Sangalang is entitled to hold, and continue in the office of caretaker of the municipal cemetery of that municipality.
3
ISSUES: 1. WON the CA erred in holding the action is one of a quo warranto. 2. 2 WON the CA erred in not dismissing the action for failure of the plaintiff to join the Municipality of Taal, Batangas, as party defendant. RULING: 1. No. The claim that the instant action is one of mandamus, not quo warranto, is devoid of basis. While quo warranto and mandamus are often concurrent remedies, however, there exists a clear distinction between the two. The authorities are agreed that quo warranto is the remedy to try the right to an office or franchise and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus only lies to enforce clear legal duties, not to try disputed titles, that where there is usurpation or intrusion into an office, quo warranto is the proper remedy and that where the respondent, without claiming any right to an Office, excludes the petitioner therefrom, his remedy is mandamus, not quo warranto. The instant action is clearly one of quo warranto, although mandamus is also invoked therein as an ancillary remedy. It appears that Moises Sangalang alleges in his complaint that he had the right to the possession and enjoyment of said office to which he had legally been appointed, and asks that Jose Sangalang, who is occupying it unlawfully, be ousted. The present action, therefore, is one whose purpose is to try the right or title to a public office and oust he alleged unlawful holder from its enjoyment. Such proceeding and remedy could only be litigated in a quo warranto action according to the authorities. 2. No There is no merit in the claim that the action should have been dismissed by the respondent Court for failure of the plaintiff to implead the municipality of Taal. According to the jurisprudence, any person claiming to be entitled to a public office may bring an action of quo warranto, without the intervention of the Solicitor-General or the Fiscal and that only the person who is in unlawful possession of the office, and all who claim to be entitled to that office, may be made parties in order to determine their respective rights thereto in the same action. The municipality of Taal does not claim that it wanted and had the right to occupy and enjoy the office of caretaker of its own municipal cemetery its pretension, as voiced by its
mayor, is that Jose Sangalang is the party who had the right to occupy said office. It is not necessary for that municipality to appropriate funds for the payment of Moises Sangalang's salary and salary differentials; there already existed funds appropriated for the purpose, and what remained to be done was for the municipal treasurer to disburse them in accordance with law. The municipality of Taal, therefore, is not an essential, nor even a necessary party, to this action. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRICK F. GINGOYON (Expropriation) Facts: The Government and PIATCO entered into an agreement whereby PIATCO was authorized to build NAIA 3, as well as a franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period of 25 years. In the case of Agan v. PIATCO promulgated in 2003, the court nullified the "Concession Agreement for the BOT Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III" as well as the amendments and supplements thereto. The contracts were nullified, among others, that Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO, did not possess the requisite financial capacity when it was awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement was contrary to public policy. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. On 21 December 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay RTC. The Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. On the same day that the Complaint was filed, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to "take or enter upon the possession" of the NAIA 3 facilities. Citing the case of City of Manila v. Serrano, the RTC noted that it had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession upon the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and upon deposit made by the government of the amount
4
HON.
equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. The RTC found these requisites present, particularly noting that "the case record shows that the Government has deposited the assessed value of the NAIA 3 facilities in the Land Bank of the Philippines, an authorized depositary. On 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to supplement its previous Order and the Writ of Possession. First, it directed the LBPBaclaran, to immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO. Second, the Government was directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third, the Government was directed "to maintain, preserve and safeguard" the NAIA 3 facilities or "perform such as acts or activities in preparation for their direct operation" of the airport terminal, pending expropriation proceedings and full payment of just compensation. However, the Government was prohibited "from performing acts of ownership like awarding concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other parties. The RTC denied the Governments Urgent Motion for reconsideration and Motion for Inhibition. Hence the present petition. Issue: WON the Government may take possession of the property by mere deposit of the assessed value of the property? Held: No, in expropriation proceedings, entitlement of writ of possession is issued only after direct payment of just compensation is given to property owner on the basis of fairness. The Petition is GRANTED in PART with respect to the orders dated 4 January 2005 and 10 January 2005 of the lower court. Said orders are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: 1) The implementation of the Writ of Possession dated 21 December 2005 is HELD IN ABEYANCE, pending payment by petitioners to PIATCO of the amount of Three Billion Two Million One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P3,002,125,000.00), representing the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities; 2) Petitioners, upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, are authorized to start the implementation of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport Pasenger Terminal III project by performing the acts that are essential to the operation of the said International Airport Passenger Terminal project; 3) RTC Branch 117 is hereby directed, within sixty (60) days from finality of this Decision, to determine the just compensation to be paid to PIATCO by the Government. The Order dated 7 January 2005 is AFFIRMED in all respects subject to the qualification that the parties are given ten (10) days from finality of this Decision to file, if they so choose, objections to the appointment of the commissioners decreed therein. The Temporary Restraining Order dated 14 January 2005 is hereby LIFTED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. NPC v. Manubay FACTS: NPC commenced its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project. o In order to carry out this project, it is imperative for the transmission lines to cross over certain lands owned by private individuals and entities. o One of these lands is owned by the respondent Manubay. Petitioner filed it complaint for expropriation against the respondent to acquire an easement of right of way over the land of the latter. The court issued an order authorizing the immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the subject land. Subsequently, the court directed the issuance of a writ of condemnation and for the purposes of determining the fair and just compensation, the court appointed three commissioners o Based on the reports of the said commissioners, the RTC approved the recommended amount of P550 per square meter as just compensation o RTC also held that it was not bound by the provision cited by petitionerSection 3-A of RA 6395. This law prescribed as just compensation for the acquired easement of right of way over an expropriated property an amount not exceeding 10% of market value of the property.
5
CA affirmed the decision of RTC Hence, this petition o Petitioner contends that the valuation of the expropriated property -- fixed by the trial court and affirmed by the CA -- was too high a price for the acquisition of an easement of a mere aerial right of way, because respondent would continue to own and use the subject land anyway. Petitioner argues that in a strict sense, there is no "taking" of property, but merely an imposition of an encumbrance or a personal easement/servitude under Article 61410 of the Civil Code.
used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is "that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably undeveloped, raw agricultural land. But a dominant portion thereof has been reclassified by the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Naga -- per Zoning Ordinance No. 94-076 dated August 10, 1994 -- as residential, per the August 8, 1996 certification of Zoning Administrator Juan O. Villegas Jr.20 The property is also covered by Naga City Mayor Jesse M. Robredos favorable endorsement of the issuance of a certification for land use conversion by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on the ground that the locality where the property was located had become highly urbanized and would have greater economic value for residential or commercial use.21 The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner.22 All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.23 In fixing the valuation at P550 per square meter, the trial court had considered the Report of the commissioners and the proofs submitted by the parties. These documents included the following: (1) the established fact that the property of respondent was located along the Naga-Carolina provincial road; (2) the fact that it was about 500 meters from the Kayumanggi Resort and 8 kilometers from the Naga City Central Business District; and a half kilometer from the main entrance of the fully developed Naga City Sports Complex -- used as the site of the Palarong Pambansa -- and the San Francisco Village Subdivision, a first class subdivision where lots were priced at P2,500 per square meter; (3) the fair market value of P650 per square meter proffered by respondent, citing its recently concluded sale of a portion of the same property to Metro Naga Water District at a fixed price of P800 per square meter; (4) the BIR zonal valuation of residential lots in Barangay Pacol, Naga City, fixed at a price of P220 per square meter as of 1997; and (5) the fact that the price of P430 per square meter had been determined by the
6
ISSUE: WON THE COMPENSATION OF THE SAID PROPERTY TO BE EXPROPRIATED IS JUST AND REASONABLE. HELD: We are not persuaded. Petitioner averred in its Complaint in Civil Case No. RTC 96-3675 that it had sought to acquire an easement of a right of way over portions of respondents land -- a total area of 22,961.71 square meters.11 In its prayer, however, it also sought authority to enter the property and demolish all improvements existing thereon, in order to commence and undertake the construction of its Power Transmission Project. In other words, the expropriation was not to be limited to an easement of a right of way. In its Answer, respondent alleged that it had already authorized petitioner to take possession of the affected portions of the property and to install electric towers thereon. 12 The latter did not controvert this material allegation. True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.16 Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word "just" is
RTC of Naga City (Branch 21) 24 as just compensation for the Mercados adjoining property, which had been expropriated by NPC for the same power transmission project. The chairperson of the Board of Commissioners, in adopting the recommendation of Commissioner Bulaos, made a careful study of the property. Factors considered in arriving at a reasonable estimate of just compensation for respondent were the location; the most profitable likely use of the remaining area; and the size, shape, accessibility as well as listings of other properties within the vicinity. Averments pertaining to these factors were supported by documentary evidence. On the other hand, the commissioner for petitioner -City Assessor Albeus -- recommended a price of P115 per square meter in his Report dated June 30, 1997. No documentary evidence, however, was attached to substantiate the opinions of the banks and the realtors, indicated in the commissioners Report and computation of the market value of the property. The price of P550 per square meter appears to be the closest approximation of the market value of the lots in the adjoining, fully developed San Francisco Village Subdivision. Considering that the parcels of land in question are still undeveloped raw land, it appears to the Court that the just compensation of P550 per square meter is justified. Under Section 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the court may "accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts, or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners, or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; x x x." In other words, the reports of commissioners are merely advisory and recommendatory in character, as far as the courts are concerned.28 Thus, it hardly matters whether the commissioners have unanimously agreed on their recommended valuation of the property. It has been held that the report of only two commissioners may suffice, even if the third commissioner dissents.29 As a court is not bound by commissioners reports it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure for the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of the latters right of condemnation; and for the defendant, just compensation for the property expropriated. For that matter, the court may even substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the evidence on record.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the General Manager of the PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY (PIA), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF LUIS SANTOS as herein represented by DR. SABINO SANTOS and PURIFICACION SANTOS IMPERIAL, respondents. TOPIC: Expropriation FACTS: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), took over the premises after the previous lessee, the Voice of America, had ceased its operations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued an order to pay the defendants the just compensation for said property which is the fair market value of the land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until fully paid. It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision, such that a little over five years later, or on 09 May 1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution served on the plaintiff, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, for the implementation thereof. When the order was not complied with, respondents again filed a motion urging the trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them the amount of P72,683.55, a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The trial court, in its order of 10 July 1984, granted the motion. In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA. This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. On 01 March 2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the assailed order, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 and declaring it to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription . Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals but the petition was outrightly denied. It would appear that the denial was based on Section 4, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. At all events, petitioner has a valid point in emphasizing the "public nature" of the expropriated property. The petition being imbued with public interest, the Court has resolved to give it due course and to decide the case on its merits.
RULING: The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use, and second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. o In determining public use, two approaches are utilized - the first is public employment or the actual use by the public, and thesecond is public advantage or benefit.
ISSUE: Was the taking proper? How much compensation must be made?
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose.
The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under Republic Act No. 7160 cannot be understood as being the pervasive and allencompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be. The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred. The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and took the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only
authority left to it being to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully paid. [G.R. No. 152230. August 9, 2005] JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, respondent. FACTS: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located. Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. The municipality decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-SQM property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho which is abutting E. R. Santos Street. The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance stated that the property owners were notified of the municipalitys intent to purchase the property for public use as an access road but they rejected the offer. The municipality filed a complaint against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the property. The plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, of its intention to construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same portion. The Cuancos averred that the property has been sold to petitioner as early as February 1993. The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based on the latest tax declaration covering the property. o RTC issued a writ of possession over the property.
9
The plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of the JILCSFI which had purchased the property. o Thereafter, plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three meters; the road was called Damayan Street. JILCSFIS CONTENTION: It has been denied the use and enjoyment of its property. There was no valid and definite offer made to the owner of the property. RTC issued an Order in favor of the plaintiff. There was substantial compliance with the definite and valid offer requirement of 19 of RA 7160 and that the expropriated portion is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid. JILCSFI elevated the case to the CA. However, the CA affirmed RTCs Order: o The letter of Engr. Reyes, inviting Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to a conference to discuss with him the road project and the price of the lot was a substantial compliance with the valid and definite offer requirement. o There was constructive notice to the defendants of the expropriation proceedings since a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of the title. JILCSFI filed a MR, alleging that the CA erred in relying on the photocopy of Engr. Reyes letter to Cuanco because the same was not admitted in evidence by the trial court for being a mere photocopy. JILCSFI also averred that no inspection was ever ordered by the trial court to be conducted on the property, and, if there was one, it had the right to be present thereat since an inspection is considered to be part of the trial of the case. The CA denied the MR for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Findings of fact of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. Where it is shown that the conclusion is a finding grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures or where the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, the Court may reexamine the evidence on record. Eminent Domain: Nature and Scope The RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN is understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. The nature and scope of such power has been comprehensively described as follows: o It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare. The right of eminent domain appertains to every independent government without the necessity for constitutional recognition. Our own Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clauses act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental power. Strict Construction and Burden of Proof The EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights. o When the sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given against the agency asserting the power. o The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor. When the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained. o The condemnor (respondent), has the burden of proving all the essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation. The grant of the power of eminent domain to LGUs is grounded on 19 of RA 7160. The REQUISITES FOR THE VALID EXERCISE of the power of eminent domain by a LGU must be complied with: (1) An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain
10
ISSUES: Whether or not (1) The respondent complied with the requirement, under 19 of the LGC, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint NO (2) Its property which is already intended to be used for public purposes may still be expropriated by the respondent YES (3) The requisites for an easement for right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the NCC may be dispensed with YES RULING: The petition is meritorious. At the outset, it must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by the Court in petitions for review on certiorari.
or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. (2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. (3) There is payment of just compensation, as required under 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. (4) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. Valid and Definite Offer Respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property before filing its complaint and the rejection thereof by the latter. It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the complaint. An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract. The offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract. The PURPOSE OF THE REQUIREMENT OF A VALID AND DEFINITE OFFER to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court action. It is to give the owner the opportunity to sell his land without the expense and inconvenience of a protracted and expensive litigation, a substantial right which should be protected. It permits the landowner to receive full compensation, and the entity acquiring the property, immediate use and enjoyment of the property. A reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, to acquire the property for a reasonable price must be made to the owner or his privy. A single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice. In this case, the RESPONDENT FAILED to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its compliance with 19 of the LGC is the photocopy of the letter of Engr. Jose Reyes to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. o The letter only proved its desire or intent to acquire the property for a right-of-way.
The document was not offered to prove that the respondent made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property. o Moreover, the RTC rejected the document because the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the original copy thereof. o The respondent failed to adduce evidence that copies of the letter were sent to and received by all the co-owners of the property. Even if the letter was received by the co-owners, the letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the price that may be mutually acceptable to both parties. There is no legal and factual basis to the CAs ruling that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of petitioners TCT No. PT-92579 is a substantial compliance with the requisite offer. o A notice of lis pendens is a notice to the whole world of the pendency of an action involving the title to or possession of real property and a warning that those who acquire an interest in the property do so at their own risk and that they gamble on the result of the litigation over it. Moreover, the lis pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of the title only on November 26, 1993, long after the complaint had been filed in the RTC against the Ching Cuancos. Neither is the declaration in one of the Whereas clauses of the ordinance that the property owners were already notified by the municipality of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a municipal road, a substantial compliance with the requirement of a valid and definite offer. The Sangguniang Bayan relied on the erroneous premise that the letter of Engr. Reyes reached the co-owners of the property. In the absence of competent evidence that the respondent made a definite and valid offer to all the co-owners of the property, aside from the letter of Engr. Reyes, the declaration in the ordinance is not a compliance with 19 of R.A. No. 7160. o Public Necessity We reject PETITIONERS contention that its property can no longer be expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place for religious worship and a school for its members. As aptly explained by the Court in Manosca v. Court of Appeals, thus:
11
As society advances, its demands upon the individual increases and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devotedfor whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. However, it is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. The constitution in at least two cases determines what is public use: (1) One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. (2) The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use.
However, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioners property and not elsewhere. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial and even if the trial court conducted an ocular inspection, the petitioner was not notified thereof. Therefore, the petitioner was deprived of its right to due process. It must be stressed that an OCULAR INSPECTION IS PART OF THE TRIAL AS EVIDENCE is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. The petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no probative weight. Therefore, the findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must be rejected.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the CA are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling thereof. LIMPIN & Sarmiento vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FACTS: Involved in this conflict resulted from the mortgage and subsequent sale to different persons of the same real property, and the execution sale thereof at a still later date to another party. On February 28, 1973, four lots were mortgaged by the spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino to Guillermo Ponce and his wife Adela (deceased) as security for a loan. The mortgages were registered on March 1, 1973. Two of the lots, were afterwards sold in 1978 by the Aquinos to Butuan Export Corporation, which caused an adverse claim to be annotated on the certificates of title on February 24, 1978. In 1979, Gregorio Y. Limpin, Jr. obtained a money judgement against Butuan. To satisfy the judgment, the lots were levied and sold at public auction to Limpin on October 6, 1980. The covering titles were cancelled and subsequently issued to Limpin. On November 21, 1981, Limpin sold the two lots to Rogelio M. Sarmiento, from which the titles were cancelled on November 4, 1983 and placed in Sarmiento's name. On September 2, 1980 (a day before Limpin's levy on the two lots), Ponce filed suit against the Aquino spouses for judicial foreclosure of the mortgage over the Aquinos' four lots in the CFI of Quezon City. On
12
Easement of Right of Way The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the NCC. Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice.
June 8, 1982, judgment was rendered in favor of Ponce. After the judgment became final, the Trial Court, in an order dated September 13, 1983, directed the sale at public auction of the four (4) mortgaged lots to satisfy the judgment. On October 12, 1983, the four lots were sold to Ponce himself as the highest bidder. On the same day, the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered. Ponce then moved for the confirmation of the sale and the issuance of a writ of possession in his favor covering the four lots. But the Trial Court, by order dated October 26, 1983, confirmed only the sale of two of the lots, refusing to confirm the sale or issue a writ of possession in regard to the other two lots, on the ground that those titles had already been cancelled and new ones issued to Limpin, by order of the CFI of Davao in February 16, 1982. Ponce sought corrective relief by filing an action for certiorari and mandamus in the Appellate Court, impleading Limpin and Sarmiento, Limpin's vendee, as private respondents; wherein the Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and ordering said Court to confirm the same and issue a writ of possession to Ponce, subject to Sarmiento's equity of redemption. Petitioners argue that the Appellate Court erred in according superiority to the mortgage rights of Ponce over the levy and sale in favor of petitioner Limpin and the subsequent sale of the property to petitioner Sarmiento. Hence, this petition for review, filed by Limpin and Sarmiento. ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the parcels of land by owners to Butuan Corporation and the subsequent transfers of interest involving Limpin and Sarmiento were proper, considering an earlier registered mortgage in favor of respondent Ponce HELD: No. The petition should be denied. The Appellate Court correctly ruled that the rights and interests of petitioners Limpin and Sarmiento to the property in question are subordinate to those of respondent Ponce, who holds a prior and senior lien. The registration of the lands, first in the name of Limpin and later of Sarmiento, was premature. At most what they were entitled to was the registration of their equity of redemption. Moreover, the superiority of the mortgagee's lien over that of a subsequent judgment creditor is now expressly provided (Rule 39, Section 16) in the Rules of Court, which states with regard to the effect of levy on execution that it shall create a lien in favor of a judgment creditor over the
right title and interest of the judgment debtor in such property at the time of the levy, subject to the liens or encumbrances then existing. It is well settled that a recorded mortgage is a right in rem, a lien on the property whoever its owner may be. The registration of the mortgage in this case put the whole world, petitioners included, on constructive notice of its existence and warned everyone who thereafter dealt with the property on which it was constituted that he would have to reckon with that encumbrance. Hence, Limpin's subsequent purchase from Butuan Corporation, as well as the sale of the same to Sarmiento on November 21, 1981, were both subject to said mortgage. On the other hand, Ponce's purchase of the lots mortgaged to him at the foreclosure sale on October 12, 1983, was subject to no prior lien or encumbrance, and could in no way be affected or prejudiced by a subsequent or junior lien, such as that of Limpin. Effects of the foreclosure sale retroact to the date of registration of the mortgage i.e., March 1, 1973 in the present case. WHEREFORE, the petition is denied, with costs against petitioners. *Nota Bene: As correctly held by the CA; the effect of the failure to implead a subordinate lienholder or subsequent purchaser or both is to render the foreclosure ineffective as against them, with the result that there remains in their favor the "unforeclosed equity of redemption." But the foreclosure is valid as between the parties to the suit. This means that the sale to Ponce, as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the two lots in question should have been confirmed, subject to Limpin's equity to redemption (now Sarmiento's as subsequent transferee).
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION, * ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA, * HILARIA A. FIGURACION, FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, QUINTIN FIGURACION and MARY FIGURACIONGINEZ, respondents. Ponente: Corona, J. Facts:
13
Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion (now both deceased) had six children: petitioner and respondents Elena Figuracion-Ancheta (now deceased), Hilaria Figuracion, Felipa Figuracion-Manuel, Quintin Figuracion and Mary Figuracion-Ginez. When Leandro died, he left behind two parcels of land, a portion of Lot 2299 and 705 in Urdaneta, both of which he inherited from his deceased parents. Another parcel of land, Lot 707, was inherited by Carolina and her half-sister Agripina when their father Eulalio Adviento died. Agripina then executed a quitclaim over the one-half eastern portion of the lot in favor of petitioner, Emilia, who died single and without any issue. Before her half-sisters death, however, Carolina adjudicated unto herself, via affidavit under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court the entire Lot 707 which she later sold to respondents Felipe and Hilaria. The latter two immediately had OCT No. 15867 cancelled, on December 11, 1962. A new title was then issued in the names of Felipa and Hilaria for Lot 707. Petitioner and her family went to the United States where they stayed for ten years. When she returned, she built a house made of strong materials on the eastern half-portion of Lot 707.Sometime later; petitioner sought the extrajudicial partition of all properties held in common by her and respondents. On the other hand, respondents took the position that Leandro's estate should first undergo settlement proceedings before partition among the heirs could take place. And they claimed that an accounting of expenses chargeable to the estate was necessary for such settlement. The Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, upon a complaint filed by petitioner, rendered judgment nullifying Carolinas affidavit of selfadjudication and deed of absolute sale of Lot 707. The RTC, however, dismissed the complaint for partition; reconveyance and damages on the ground that reliefs prayed for cannot be granted without any prior settlement proceedings. The CA upheld the dismissal of petitioners action for partition for being premature but reversed the decision with respect to the nullification and the deed of absolute sale. Hence, this present petition. Issue: Whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandros intestate estate (that is, an
accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment of expenses and liabilities and taxes, etc.) before the properties can be partitioned or distributed. Yes
Held: The right to an inheritance is transmitted immediately to the heirs by operation of law, at the moment of death of the decedent. There is no doubt that, as one of the heirs of Leandro Figuracion, petitioner has a legal interest in Lot 2299. But can she compel partition at this stage? There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2 1and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6. Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedents estate. While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real property's income (rentals and profits) in the course of an action for partition, 13 there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which property belonging to the decedent's estate may be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion's only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that "certain expenses" including those related to her father's final illness and burial have not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father's estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition. In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses for which the estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties may take possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned on the payment of the estate's obligations.
14
Co v. Militar FACTS: A land was formerly owned by Dalida Dalida mortgaged the property to the petitioner for a loan and upon his default, the petitioner caused the foreclosure of the mortgaged property o The petitioner acquired it through a foreclosure sale petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 75, against respondents Rizal Militar and Lilia Sones, who were in possession of the land. o In their answer, respondents claimed that they are the owners of 198 square meters each of the disputed land, having bought the same from Burgos L. Pangilinan and Reynaldo Pangilinan who were the ownersdevelopers of a residential subdivision project called "Immaculate Conception Village", and whose ownership was covered by TCT No. 13774. Respondent Militar further claimed that his occupancy of the property could not be by tolerance of petitioner for the following reasons: one, he constructed his house way back in June 1966, long before petitioner acquired title thereto on October 10, 1983; Metropolitan Trial Court, claiming that it had no jurisdiction over the case as the proper action should have been an accion reinvidicatoria filed before the Regional Trial Court.8 MTC ruled in favor of petitioner RTC reversed MTC decision CA dismissed the petition Hence, the instant petition
summary in nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.12 In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.13 Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner. As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of his ownership. Respondents argument that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value and was guilty of bad faith in having the subject land registered in his name is a collateral attack on the title of petitioner, which is not allowed. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.16 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED UNIDA VS HEIRS OF URBAN TOPIC: Forcible entry and unlawful detainer. FACTS: ALLEGATIONS: o About ten (10) years ago, more or less, without the knowledge or consent of the owners, the defendants[-herein petitioners], without any legal right whatsoever, entered the premises of the land which is the subject of this suit and cultivated the same as their own, not giving any share to the owners;
15
o He also assailed the jurisdiction of the
ISSUE: WON THE PETITIONER HAS BETTER RIGHT THAN THE RESPONDENT OVER THE DISPUTED PROPERTY HELD: We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is
Because the location of the land was then infested by the New Peoples Army at the time of the instrusion of the defendants, the owners did nothing but to tolerate their (defendants) stay and cultivation over the land in question;
remedy of the plaintiff-herein respondent was to file an accion publiciana or reivindicatoria before the proper RTC. Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated that of the MTC. In reversing the RTC decision, the appellate court held that the subsequent execution of an SPA in favor of Lucio Cabaddu cured the defect in the filing of the complaint. o And the appellate court agree[d] with the Municipal Trial Court that [the plaintiffherein respondent] had established [its] right of possession as owners of the [property]. Furthermore, the appellate court held that an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient for one alleging that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
In their Answer, the defendants-herein petitioners denied, among other things, having any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief regarding the authority of Lucio Cabaddu to represent the plaintiff and concluded that he has no right and/or personality to represent the alleged [H]eirsplaintiff. On the merits, petitioners asserted that petitioner Crispina Unida has possessed Lots 298 and 616, and that petitioner Nancy Unida has possessed Lot 299, both in the concept of owner, personally and through their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial, and that the title to the property subject of the complaint, OCT No. P-48306, was fraudulently obtained by respondents. MTC, resolving in the affirmative the issues of 1) whether the plaintiff impliedly tolerated the defendants act of cultivating the land, and 2) whether the plaintiff is the lawful owner of the land, accordingly rendered judgment against the defendants-herein petitioners. RTC of Cagayan reversed the MTC decision, it holding that although Lucio Cabaddu was given a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) subsequent to the filing of the complaint, the SPA did not contain a specific authorization for him to institute the complaint. On the substantive issue, the RTC held that since the complaint itself asserted that petitioners entry into the property was unlawful from the very beginning, respondents alleged toleration thereof cannot be considered as toleration in contemplation of law in unlawful detainer cases, hence, the action for unlawful detainer was improper. Neither was forcible entry the proper remedy, added the RTC, as the entry of petitioners was not by means of force, violence, threats, intimidation, stealth or strategy. The RTC suggested though that the
ISSUES: a) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SUBSEQUENT SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY CURES THE DEFECT IN THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE SUCH CONCLUSION WAS GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATION, THE INFERENCE MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, AND THE JUDGMENT WAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS. b) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS CRISPINA UNIDA AND HUSBAND ANTONIO MABALOT AND EUGENIO UNIDA MARRIED TO NANCY UNIDA ARE THE OWNERS OF THE LAND IN DISPUTE HAVING POSSESSED THE SAME SINCE PRE-WAR TIME AND INHERITED SAID LAND FROM THEIR FATHER LUIS UNIDA WHO OWNS SEVENTY TWO (72) HECTARES BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR. RULING:
16
From the earlier quoted material paragraphsallegations of the complaint, petitioners entry into the property was, by respondents own information, unlawful from the very beginning. Respondent, nonetheless, claimed that it merely tolerated petitioners presence in the property. Clearly, an unlawful detainer action does not lie. For to justify an action for unlawful detainer,the permission or tolerance must have been present at the beginning of the possession. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer or forcible entry, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case. It is in this light that this Court finds that the RTC correctly found that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint. Parenthetically, it was error for the RTC to find the complaint dismissible also on the ground that Lucio Cabaddu was not the real party in interest. A final note. Since the RTC found that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case, it should have followed the mandate of Sec. 8, Rule 40. If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. BABY ARLENE LARANO vs. SPS. ALFREDO CALENDACION FACTS:
Petitioner owns a parcel of riceland situated in Barangay Daniw, Municipality of Victoria, Laguna. petitioner and respondents executed a Contract to Sell whereby the latter agreed to buy a 50,000SQM portion of petitioner's riceland for P5Million, with P500K as down payment and the balance payable in nine installments of P500K each, until September 2001. Pending full payment of the purchase price, possession of the riceland was transferred to respondents under the CONDITION that they shall account for and deliver the harvest from said riceland to petitioner. However, RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PAY the installments and to account for and deliver the harvest from said riceland. Petitioner sent a demand letter to vacate the riceland within 10 days from receipt thereof, but the demand went unheeded. Consequently, she filed on an unlawful detainer case respondents before the MTC. Respondents allege that: (a) a Contract to Sell was executed but deny that it contains all the agreements of the parties; (b) petitioner has no cause of action because the 3-year period within which to pay the purchase price has not yet lapsed; (c) MTC has no jurisdiction over the case because the complaint failed to allege that a demand to pay and to vacate the riceland was made upon them. MTCS RULING: Vacate the premises and pay the amount of P365K for the use and occupation of the property. RTCS RULING: Upon appeal, RTC affirmed the decision and modified the amount to P400K. CA RULING (PetRev): Set aside RTCs Decision and dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer. The CA nullified the proceedings before the MTC for want of jurisdiction on the ground that the main issue extend beyond those commonly involved in unlawful detainer suits, but one incapable of pecuniary estimation, placing it under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, not the MTC. o According to CA, the issues in the case pertain to WON: (a) there was a violation of the Contract to Sell; (b) such violation gives the petitioner the right to terminate the contract and consequently, the right to recover possession and the value of the harvest from the Riceland PETITIONERS CONTENTION: CA should have dismissed outright the petition since it contains no verification as required by the Rules; and that the CA, in finding that the complaint before the MTC was not one for unlawful detainer but for specific
17
performance, did not limit itself to the allegations in the complaint but resorted to unrestrained references, deductions and/or conjectures, unduly influenced by the allegations in the answer. RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: Verification is just a formal requirement and petitioner waived her right to question the defect when she failed to submit her comment; that the CA correctly pointed out that the present case involves one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation since the crux of the matter is the rights of the parties based on the Contract to Sell. complaint is one for
ISSUE: Whether the unlawful detainer NO
RULING: The petition is bereft of merit. Jurisdiction in Ejectment Cases Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. It cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant and it cannot be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties. The TEST FOR DETERMINING the sufficiency of those allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff. The facts upon which an action for unlawful detainer can be brought are specially mentioned in 1, Rule 70 (see ROC) In UNLAWFUL DETAINER, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess. Hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive because in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendants right to continue in possession. In present case, petitioner must comply with TWO REQUISITES for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit: (a) there must be failure to pay the installment due or comply with the conditions of the Contract to Sell ; and (b) there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in 2 of Rule 70 (15 days in case of land and 5 days in case of buildings). o FIRST REQUISITE: Refers to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer o SECOND REQUISITE: Refers to the jurisdiction requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued. BOTH DEMANDS to pay installment due or adhere to the terms of the Contract to Sell and to vacate are necessary to make the
vendee deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be filed. It is the vendor's demand for the vendee to vacate the premises and the vendee's refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of the possession. Such refusal violates the vendor's right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer. However, prior to the institution of such action, a demand from the vendor to pay the installment due or comply with the conditions of the Contract and to vacate the premises is required under the rule. Thus, mere failure to pay the installment due or violation of the terms of the Contract to Sell does not automatically render a person's possession unlawful. The giving of such demand MUST be alleged in the complaint; otherwise, the MTC cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Complaint failed to Constitute a Case of Unlawful Detainer Petitioners allegations in the Complaint failed to constitute a case of unlawful detainer. Petitioner alleged that respondents had violated the terms of the Contract to Sell. However, the Complaint failed to state that petitioner made demands upon respondents to comply with the conditions of the contract. The 10-day period granted respondents to vacate even fell short of the 15-day period mandated by law. When the complaint does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC does not have jurisdiction to hear the case. An allegation of a violation of a contract or agreement in a detainer suit may be proved by the presentation of competent evidence, upon which an MTC judge might make a finding to that effect, but certainly, that court cannot declare and hold that the contract is rescinded. The rescission of contract is a power vested in the RTC. The rescission of the contract is the basis of and a condition precedent for the illegality of a party's possession of a piece of realty. Without judicial intervention and determination, even a stipulation entitling one party to take possession of the land and building, in case the other party violates the contract, cannot confer upon the former the right to take possession thereof, if that move is objected to. Clearly, the basic issue raised in the complaint of petitioner is not of possession but interpretation, enforcement and/or rescission of the contract, a matter that is beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and determine. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 13, 2003 of the CA is AFFIRMED.
18
RAMON D. MONTENEGROvs.MA. TERESA L. MONTENEGRO FACTS: In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner Ramon D. Montenegro seeks the reverse the order of the RTC of Bacolod City, holding him guilty of indirect contempt for his repeated failure to appear at the scheduled hearings for his examination as judgment obligor and imposing on him the penalty of three (3) months imprisonment and a fine of twenty thousand pesos. On 14 June 1994, respondent Ma. Teresa V. LizaresMontenegro, as mother and guardian of her two minor children Antonio and Isabel, filed with the trial court a complaint for support against her husband, Ramon. 4 years after the filing of the complaint, petitioner and respondent Teresa executed a compromise agreement, approved by the court on 13 October 1998 which became final and executory as between the parties. Under the terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner was obligated to (1) pay the respondent the amount of P1M representing her share in their conjugal partnership of gains, (2) establish a trust fund worth P3M in favor of his children Antonio and Isabel within 60 days from the approval of the compromise agreement, and (3) obtain an educational or investment plan to cover matriculation fees of his children within 1 year from the approval of the compromise agreement. Petitioner failed to comply despite the lapse of the periods provided therein. Respondent Teresa filed a motion for the execution of the judgment. The trial court granted the motion and issued a writ of execution on 15 February 1999. Subsequently, a second writ of execution and a notice of garnishment, issued on May 2001 were returned unsatisfied. In several conferences called by the trial court, petitioner admitted his failure to comply but alleged that he was no longer in a position to do so as he was already insolvent. On 14 March 2002, respondent Teresa filed a motion to examine petitioner as judgment obligor under Sections 36 and 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, with urgency as the latter was about migrate to Canada, which the court granted on March 22, 2002. Repeated demands were subsequently made ordering his appearance in court but to no avail. Thus on 8 November 23, 2002, the trial court issued an order citing him in contempt, and imposed the penalty of imprisonment for 3 months and ordered him to pay a fine of P20,000. His motion for reconsideration of the Order having been denied by the trial court in its Order of 3 January 2003,
petitioner filed the present petition. ISSUES: a) Whether, based on the facts found by the trial court, the latter erred in holding the petitioner guilty of indirect contempt for willfully disobeying the orders of the trial court requiring him to appear for purposes of examination as a judgment obligor b) Whether or not the penalty of imprisonment is correct under the given circumstances, which are civil in nature HELD: a) Yes b) No The totality of petitioners acts clearly indicated a deliberate, and unjustified refusal to be examined as a judgment obligor at the time the examination was scheduled for hearing by the trial court. His acts tended to degrade the authority and respect for court processes and impaired the judiciarys duty to deliver and administer justice. Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. It is defined as "disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity." The Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely, direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, and includes disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates particular acts which constitute indirect contempt, thus: (a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, xxx; (c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this
19
Rule; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; (e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority; (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. Section 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court also provides that "a party or other person may be compelled, by an order or subpoena, to attend before the court or commissioner to testify as provided in the two preceding sections, and upon failure to obey such order or subpoena or to be sworn, or to answer as a witness or to subscribe his deposition, may be punished for contempt as in other cases." This provision relates specifically to Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Indirect contempt may either be initiated (1) motu proprio by the court by issuing an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or (2) by the filing of a verified petition, complying with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings. In the present case, the trial court initiated the proceedings for indirect contempt by issuing two orders directing the petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished for indirect contempt. Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the nature and effect of the contemptuous act. Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect." On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made . If the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil. In the present case, the contemptuous act was the
petitioners refusal to attend a hearing for his examination as judgment obligor, upon motion by the respondent Teresa. It must be pointed out that the purpose of Section 36 of Rule 39 is to provide the judgment obligee a remedy in case where the judgment obligor continues to fail to comply with its obligation under the judgment. Petitioners refusal to be examined, without justifiable reason constituted indirect contempt, which is civil in nature. Under Section 7 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person found guilty of contempt of court against a Regional Trial Court may be punished with a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. The penalties imposed herein of imprisonment for three months and a fine of twenty thousand pesos are within the allowable penalties the trial court may impose, albeit not for civil contempt. The purpose of incarceration in civil contempt proceeding is to compel a party to comply with the order of the court. This may be resorted to where the attendant circumstances are such that the noncompliance with the court order is an utter disregard of the authority of the court, which has then no other recourse but to use its coercive power. The reason for indefinite incarceration in civil contempt proceeding is that it is remedial, preservative, or coercive in nature. The punishment is imposed for the benefit of a complainant. Its object is to compel performance of the orders or decrees of the court, which the contemptor refuses to obey. In effect, it is within the power of the person adjudged guilty of contempt to set himself free. In the present case, however, the act which the trial court ordered the petitioner to do has already been performed, albeit belatedly and not without delay for an unreasonable length of time. As such, the penalty of imprisonment may no longer be imposed despite the fact that its non-implementation was due to petitioners absence in the Philippines. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The order of the RTC of Bacolod City is modified. As the penalty of imprisonment is deleted therefrom, while the penalty of fine of P20,000 is affirmed. [G.R. No. L-66371. May 15, 1985.] ARMANDO ANG, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO, Regional Trial Judge, Branch LXXXIV and HON, JUDGE JOSE P. ARRO, Branch CIII, both of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, and ASSISTANT FISCAL NARCISO T. ATIENZA of
20
Quezon City, respondents. Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Corpuz and Padlan for petitioner. DECISION RELOVA, J p: FACTS: Petitioner, through the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, lodged with this Court an administrative complaint against respondent judge for ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable negligence, incompetence, manifest partiality, grave abuse of discretion, grave misconduct, rendering unjust decision in Civil Case No. Q-35466 and dereliction of duties in not resolving his motion for reconsideration of the adverse decision in said civil case. Upon learning of the administrative case filed against him, respondent judge ordered petitioner to appear before him, and to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court, for malicious, insolent, inexcusable disrespect and contemptuous attitude towards the court and towards him. Respondent judge found petitioner guilty of contempt of court, sentenced him to suffer five (5) days imprisonment and ordered his arrest for his failure, despite notice, to appear on the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge against him. Petitioner filed his notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction in the contempt charge but the same was denied by the respondent judge in an Order. Meantime an alias warrant was issued, in view of the fact that said Armando Ang has remained in hiding and has been eluding the officers of the law in serving the original warrant for his arrest. Thereafter, respondent judge instituted before the Office of the City Fiscal of Quezon City a criminal complaint against herein petitioner for using malicious, insolent and contemptuous language against him in his letter-complaint filed before this Court. Hence, instant petition. ISSUE: WoN petitioner HELD:
Upon a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, SC found that the alleged malicious imputations were not uttered in the presence of so near respondent Judge Jose P. Castro as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before him; rather, they were contained in the pleadings and/or letters-complaint filed by petitioner before the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs and before this Court in the aforementioned administrative case filed by petitioner against him. Section 3, particularly paragraphs (b) and (d), Rule 71 of the New Rules of Court, provide: "SEC. 3. Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing. After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt: xxx xxx xxx "(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; xxx xxx xxx "(d) Any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; Respondent Judge Castro, in his comment, argues that failure of petitioner to appear, despite notice, on the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge for the use of derogatory language in his two letters addressed to the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs and to his Court in an administrative complaint against him, constitutes direct contempt as the acts actually impeded, embarrassed and obstructed him in the administration of justice. SC do not agree. The Rules of Court cannot be any clearer. The use of disrespectful of contemptuous language against a particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Stated differently, if the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in
21
the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Considering the aforecited provisions, petitioner's conduct if at all, constitutes indirect contempt and if found guilty, he may appeal pursuant to Section 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which reads: "SEC. 10. Review of judgment or order by Court of Appeals or Supreme Court; bond for stay. The judgment or order of a Court of First Instance made in a case of contempt punished after written charge and hearing may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, but execution of the judgment or order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person in contempt, in an amount fixed by the Court of First Instance, conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or order. The appeal may be taken as in criminal cases." Anent the ancillary action for prohibition, Court find the same meritorious, considering that the basis of the libel case (Criminal Case NO. Q-31587) filed against petitioner before the respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, Quezon City was a communication addressed to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court which was coursed through the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, complaining against respondent judge's ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable negligence, incompetence, disregard for the Supreme Court administrative order, grave misconduct, rendering an unjust decision and dereliction of duty. It is manifest that as held in the case of Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil. 922, "a communication made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the party making the communication has an interest or concerning which he has a duty is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest of duty, although it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter which without the privilege would be libelous and actionable; . . . that parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or relevant to the case." Records show that the libel case had already been instituted in court when the restraining order was issued by Us. Nonetheless, considering the privileged character of petitioner's communication to the Chief Justice barring a prosecution for libel, it is proper that the injunction against respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, Quezon City, from proceeding with the hearing of Criminal Case No. Q-31587, be made permanent pursuant to the restraining order and established doctrine against the use of the strong arm of the law as an instrument of arbitrary and oppressive prosecution.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition with respect to the action against respondent Judge Jose P. Castro of the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXXIV, Quezon City is granted and said respondent judge is hereby ordered to elevate the records of Civil Case No. Q-35466 to the Intermediate Appellate Court at once for disposition in accordance with the terms hereof. Respondent trial judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the libel case (Criminal Case No. Q-31587). The temporary restraining order issued on February 20, 1984 enjoining respondent Judge Jose O. Castro from enforcing or carrying out the warrant of arrest issued in Civil Case No. Q35466 is made permanent. SO ORDERED. ADDITIONAL CASES: (HINDI NAKA-ARRANGE PASENSYA NA, MAY EXAM KAMI BUKAS.. )
CANDELARIA DAYOT VS SHELL CORPORATION COMPANY FACTS: On April 20, 1982, Panay Railways, Inc. (PRI) executed a real estate mortgage contract over six parcels of land located in Lapuz District, Iloilo City in favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) for purposes of securing its loan obligations to TRB. PRI failed to pay its loan. As a consequence, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold at public auction to TRB as the highest bidder. PRI failed to redeem the foreclosed properties. Hence, TRB consolidated its ownership over the subject parcels of land and, thereafter, certificates of title were issued in its name, all of which canceled TCT No. T-58200. Thereafter, TRB filed a Petition for Writ of Possession with the RTC of Iloilo City, docketed as LRC CAD. REC. NO. 1 ILOILO CITY and LRC CAD. REC. NO. 9616ILOILO CITY. In its Order dated October 22, 1990, the trial court granted the petition and ordered the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of TRB. However, the writ was not fully implemented. On November 20, 1990, TRB sold to spouses Edmundo and Candelaria Dayot (Spo
22
uses Dayot), by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, five parcels of land which are portions of Lots 3834, 1-A and 6153. Subsequently, on February 5, 1991, Candelaria Dayot (petitioner) filed a Supplemental Pleading before the RTC of Iloilo City, praying that she, being the transferee of all the rights and interests of TRB over the parcels of land subject of the Petition for Writ of Possession filed by the latter, be substituted as the new petitioner in LRC CAD. The trial court granted petitioner's prayer in its Order dated March 12, 1991. On April 1, 1991, the RTC issued an Alias Writ of Possession in favor of herein petitioner. On August 24, 1994, the spouses Dayot filed with the RTC of Iloilo City, a complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Annulment of Documents, Cancellation of Titles, Reconveyance and Damages against TRB, Petron Corporation (Petron) and herein respondent Shell Chemical Company (Phil.), Inc. (Shell), praying that Shell be directed to vacate the portion of Lot No. 6153 which it actually possesses and for both Petron and Shell to surrender ownership and possession of portions of parcels of lands covered separately by TCT Nos. T-47484 and T94116. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 21957. On August 21, 1997, while Civil Case No. 21957 was pending resolution, herein petitioner filed in LRC CAD. REC. NOS. 1 and 9616 an Amended Supplemental Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession, praying that Shell be ejected from the portion of Lot 6153 which it actually possesses. Shell lodged an Opposition to petitioner's Amended Supplemental Motion arguing, among others, that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping as it seeks the same relief being sought in Civil Case No. 21957 and that the parcels of land sold to petitioner do not include the portion of Lot 6153 being possessed by Shell. On May 7, 1999, the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 30 issued an Order denying herein petitioner's Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, insofar as Shell is concerned.
Despite the issuance of the above-mentioned Order, petitioner filed two successive motions praying for the issuance of an alias writ of possession. Shell opposed these motions. Wherefore, let an Alias Writ of Possession issue on the affected portions of Lots 3834, 1-A and 6153, all situated in the City of Iloilo, with a total land area of 14,940 sq. meters occupied by Shell and 17,000 sq. meters occupied by Petron and to place and install petitioner Candelaria Dayot in possession thereof. On even date, the Sheriff served upon Shell a Notice to Vacate. Thereafter, Shell and Petron moved for the reconsideration of the January 8, 2002 Order of the RTC but the trial court denied it via its Order dated April 12, 2002. Shell then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA praying for the nullification of the January 8, 2002 and April 12, 2002 Orders of RTC Iloilo, Branch 29, as well as the Alias Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate both dated January 10, 2002. The petition also sought to permanently enjoin the RTC from enforcing the assailed orders and processes and from acting and conducting further proceedings in the subject case. CA: Petition is GRANTED and the questioned four (4) rulings of the court a quo are hereby declared NULL and VOID. No costs. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 23, 2002. Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari, anchored on the following grounds:
ISSUES: 1. THAT RESPONDENT IS BARRED FROM FILING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS, ASSAILING THE AMENDED ORDER DATED JANUARY 8, 2002 OF HON. RENE B. HONRADO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ILOILO CITY, BRANCH 29, AFTER RESPONDENT LOST ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL BECAUSE A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI IS NOT AND CANNOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR A LOST OR EXPIRED APPEAL
23
THUS, THE DECISION PROMULGATED JULY 30, 2002 AND THE RESOLUTION PROMULGATED DECEMBER 23, 2002 OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WERE ISSUED CONTRARY TO PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE AND THAT SAID COURT DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. 2. THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION OF THE ENTIRE LOTS 3834, 1-A, 6153, 6156, 6158 AND 6159 INCLUDING THE AREA OF 14,940 SQ. METERS OCCUPIED BY RESPONDENT WHICH AREAS ARE PORTIONS OF LOTS 6153, 3834 AND 1-A, OCCUPATION THEREOF BY RESPONDENT BEING THAT OF MERE INTRUDER OR TRESSPASSER. RULING: The Court finds the petition bereft of merit. It bears to emphasize at the outset that the present petition for review arose by reason of the special civil action for certiorari filed by respondent Shell with the CA questioning the January 8, 2002 Amended Order, Alias Writ of Possession, Notice to Vacate and the April 12, 2002 Order issued by the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 29. Accordingly, any discussions on the issues raised as well as rulings by this Court in the present petition apply only insofar as the claim of respondent Shell is concerned. As to the first assigned error, it is true that as a rule while certiorari as a remedy may not be used as a substitute for an appeal, especially for a lost appeal, this rule should not be strictly enforced if the petition is genuinely meritorious. It has been held that where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules. The Court has given due course to petitions forcertiorari although appeal is the proper remedy where the equities of the case warranted such action,
mindful that dismissals based on technicalities are looked upon with disfavor. In the present case, the Court finds no error on the part of the CA in giving due course to the petition for certiorari filed by respondent as its case is genuinely meritorious for reasons that will be discussed forthwith. The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to resjudicata in the other.[24] On the other hand, the elements of res judicata, also known as bar by prior judgment, are: (1) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
It bears to note that the proceedings conducted subsequent to the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession are ex parte and summary in nature. The order for the issuance of the writ is simply an incident in the transfer of title in the name of the petitioner. Hence, such order cannot be said to be a judgment on the merits, i.e., one rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case. Thus, in the present case, any order or decision of the RTC in LRCCAD. REC. NOS. 1 and 9616 cannot be considered as determinative of the merits of Civil Case No. 21957. Moreover, the aforementioned cases cannot be said to be identical as the basic issue in LRC CAD. REC. NOS. 1 and 9616 is possession while in Civil Case No. 21957 the issue raised is essentially that of ownership of the disputed lots.
24
Nonetheless, the Court finds that under applicable laws and jurisprudence, respondent cannot be ejected from the property by means of an exparte writ of possession. o Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.
a writ of possession pursuant to its alleged right as purchaser of the properties which had been extra-judicially foreclosed. The Court cannot sanction this procedural shortcut. To enforce the writ against herein respondent, an unwitting third party possessor who took no part in the foreclosure proceedings, would be tantamount to the taking of real property without the benefit of proper judicial intervention. Hence, it was not a ministerial duty of the trial court under Act No. 3135 to issue a writ of possession for the ouster of respondent from the lot subject of this instant case, particularly in light of the latter's opposition and claim of ownership and rightful possession of the disputed properties. Furthermore, registration of the lots in petitioners name does not automatically entitle the latter to possession thereof. As discussed earlier, petitioner must resort to the appropriate judicial process for recovery of the properties and cannot simply invoke its title in an ex-parte proceeding to justify the ouster of respondent, especially in view of the fact that the latter also has in its possession a Transfer Certificate of Title over the subject properties. The court cannot just ignore the claim of herein respondent, who is in actual possession of the subject properties, that it has been the owner thereof since 1975 and, therefore, has the better right to possess them. Neither can the RTC rely on the Surveyor's Report dated August 3, 1997 because respondent was not given the opportunity to refute it, the same being submitted in the ex-parte proceedings for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Dayot. Due process dictates that herein respondent cannot simply be ejected on the strength of the subject Surveyor's Report without giving it (respondent) the opportunity to present its own evidence. All of these issues must be ventilated and resolved on the merits after a proper hearing. Finally, it is expressly stipulated in the Additional Stipulations of Real Estate Mortgage executed by PRI in favor of TRB that it excludes those areas already sold to Shell Co., Inc. with total area of 14,920 sq. meters, known as Lot No. 6153-B and portion of Lot No. 5.
25
Under the aforequoted provision, one who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The term judicial process could mean no less than an ejectment suit or reivindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated. In the present case, petitioner had already complied with this procedure by filing Civil Case No. 21957 Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property at the time of levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. (emphasis supplied) It bears emphasis that an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act 3135, as amended. It is brought for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or consent by any person adversely interested. In the case at bar, it is not disputed that herein respondent had been in possession of the subject lots since 1975 and that it has in its premises bulk plant and fuel storage facilities for the purpose of conducting its business. In this respect, the Court agrees with the findings of the CA that petitioner had knowledge of respondent's prior possession of the disputed properties. Yet, instead of pursuing Civil Action No. 21957 where respondent will be given a chance to substantiate its claim of ownership, petitioner still insists on obtaining
This is not the proper forum to determine who between the parties is entitled to ownership of the disputed lands, as the issue in the present case is merely limited to the propriety of the issuance of a writ of possession relating to foreclosure of mortgage. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 30, 2002 and December 23, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 70696 are AFFIRMED insofar as respondent Shell Chemical Company (Phils.), Inc. is concerned. G.R. No. 129704 September 30, 2005 ULPIANO BALO, et al. vs. CA
She requested for the properties fair and equal partition, but petitioners refused her proposal.
In lieu of an Answer, petitioners filed a MTD on the following grounds: (1) Failure to state a COA for failing to allege that she is a legitimate child and to allow her to inherit from the estate in representation of her father would be to permit intestate succession by an illegitimate child. (2) The complaint does not show that the estate of the spouses Eugenio and Maria Balo have been settled and its obligations have been paid. (3) The properties enumerated in the Complaint were proceeded against by way of execution to satisfy a judgment against Eugenio and Maria Balo. Subsequently, defendant Ulpiano repurchased the said properties and has been, together with his children, openly, exclusively and adversely in possession of the real estate properties in question.
FACTS: A complaint for Judicial Partition of Real Properties and Accounting with Damages was filed by private respondent Josefina Garrido against petitioners before the RTC. She alleged in her COMPLAINT that: o Private respondent and petitioners are the coowners of undivided parcels of land located at Mayorga, Leyte. The described parcels of lands were originally owned by the spouses Eugenio Balo, Sr. and Ma. Pasagui-Balo and they were survived by their 2 children: Ulpiano, Sr. and Maximino (deceased); The lands were inherited into two (2) equal shares by their 2 children; Plaintiff is the daughter of the late Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao, who after her fathers death, had inherited her fathers share of the inheritance; Ulpiano Balo, Sr. aside from being the son of Eugenio Balo, Sr., is married to Felicidad Superio, and is the father of all the other defendants in this case; Immediately upon the death of Eugenio Sr., petitioners took possession of the properties without her knowledge and consent. o
The RTC denied the MTD for lack of merit. o No evidence may be alleged or considered to test the sufficiency of the complaint except the very facts pleaded therein. It would be improper to inject into the allegation, facts not alleged and use them as basis for the decision on the motion. The Court is not permitted to go beyond and outside of the allegations in the complaint for data or facts. Therefore, the allegation of illegitimacy and claim of absolute ownership are modifications and unreasonable inferences. If there is doubt to the truth of the facts averred in the complaint, the Court does not dismiss the complaint but requires an answer and proceeds to hear the case on the merit.
COURT OF APPEALS RULING (PetCert): CA accordingly dismissed the same because:

26
An order denying a MTD is basically interlocutory in character and cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. The proper procedure is to proceed with the trial and if the decision be adverse to the movant, the remedy is to take an appeal from said decision, assigning as one of the errors therefore the denial of the motion to dismiss.
for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. EXCEPTION: The denial of the MTD must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion. By "grave abuse of discretion" is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law. o Specific instances whereby recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate: (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case
CA denied the MR. Hence this petition for review under Rule 45 of the ROC.
ISSUES: Whether or not (1) The dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari is valid NO (2) The failure to allege the nature and extent of plaintiffs title in a petition for partition is fatal to its cause of action NO, proof of legal acknowledgment is not a prerequisite before an action for partition may be filed. (3) The action for judicial partition and accounting has prescribed, was waived, or was otherwise abandoned NO RULING: Dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari is Invalid [COMMENTO: The SC stated in this case that the petitioners have alleged GAD thats why the SC discussed the merits of the petition. However, I did not find that in the facts (PROMISE!!!).] The CA should not have dismissed the petition outright as the same alleges grave abuse of discretion. It should have determined WON the trial court did commit grave abuse of discretion as alleged by the petitioners. The Court of Appeals having failed in this regard, it behooves upon this Court to discuss the merits of the petition to put to rest the issues raised by the petitioners. GENERAL RULE: An order denying a MTD is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the denial of a MTD cannot be questioned in a special civil action
In a MTD for failure to state a cause of action, the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. Moreover, the inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint. 1, Rule 8 provides that the complaint needs only to allege the ultimate facts upon which private respondent bases her claim. The rules of procedure require that the complaint must make a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. The allegations of Private Respondent in her complaint show SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE with the formal and substantial requirements of a Complaint for Partition as required under 1, Rule 69.
27
1: A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.
If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the action for partition should not be dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy was availed of, but because no basis exists for requiring the defendant to submit to partition. On the other hand, the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may and should order the partition of the properties in the same action.
Proof of Legal Acknowledgment is not a Prerequisite BRIZ vs. BRIZ: Proof of legal acknowledgment is not a prerequisite before an action for partition may be filed. There is no necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. A natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition (proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his co-heirs and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother. o There is no need for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings, the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
Issue of Prescription On the matter of prescription cited by the petitioners as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint, it is noteworthy that the MTD filed by the Balos did not ipso facto establish prescription. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a MTD only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed; otherwise, the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a fullblown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere MTD.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA, affirming the Order of the RTC dated 12 September 1996, is AFFIRMED. This case is ordered remanded to the court of origin which is directed to resolve the case with dispatch. [G.R. No. 148448. August 17, 2004.] RUSTICO A. ARDIENTE and ASUNCION PALOMAARDIENTE, petitioners, vs. PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON and PENINSULA DEVELOPMENT BANK, respondents. CARPIO MORALES, J: FACTS: The spouses Rustico Ardiente and Asuncion Paloma obtained a loan in the amount of P100,000.00 from the Peninsula Development Bank (the bank), to be amortized in six years, on account of which they executed a Promissory
28
In PARTITION PROCEEDINGS, dismissal prior to answer is premature because in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks: o First, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties and Second, the conveyance of his lawful shares.
The CA correctly held, an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determine portion of the properties involved.
Note in the same amount. To secure the payment of the loan, the Ardientes executed in favor of the bank a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land situated at Mabutag, Cawa, Buenavista, Quezon and three (3) parcels of land situated at Cadlit, Guinayangan, Quezon. Out of the proceeds of the loan, the Ardientes purchased a mini bus costing P81,875.00. After the bus was in operation for several months, it met an accident, as a result of which it sustained heavy damages and rendered the Ardientes unable to meet their obligation to the bank. Demands for the payment of their obligation to the bank notwithstanding, the Ardientes failed to settle the same. The bank thus extra judicially foreclosed the mortgage and the parcels of land covered thereby were sold at public auction to the bank which was the highest bidder. The bank later notified the Ardientes by letter of February 24, 1984 4 that they had one (1) year from November 11, 1983 or up to November 11, 1984 to redeem the foreclosed mortgage. Subsequently, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court a complaint for annulment of the auction sale based on two grounds: 1) that it was the bank who violated the real estate mortgage; and 2) that they were not notified of the intended extrajudicial foreclosure. The trial court nullified the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged properties, noting the absence of documentary evidence to show strict compliance with the statutory requirements on publication of notice of the extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision after finding that the lack of required notice and publication of the extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage was not averred in the complaint, hence, cannot be the basis of an adverse judgment. Petitioners then filed the present petition for review before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/N THE EXTRA JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE WAS VALID? YES HELD: In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held that what the petitioners were questioning in their complaint was the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the basis of lack of notice to them as mortgagor. According to the Court, it is settled that personal notice to the mortgagor in extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary, hence, not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale. The Court also agreed with the appellate court's ruling that the issue of lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure was never raised by petitioners in the trial court; hence, the same could not be raised for the first time on appeal. SYLLABUS: REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE; STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING PUBLICATION OF NOTICE OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE SALES MUST BE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH. It is a well-settled rule that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and the sale at least voidable. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE THEREOF CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. The issue of lack of publication of notice cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Calleja v. Panday FACTS: Respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC-Br. 58 of San Jose. Camarines Sur) for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners. o They alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition, they had been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the incorporators and stockholders of
29
said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to Respondents. o RTC issued an Order transferring the case to RTC-Naga pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the action for quo warranto should be brought in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents resides and since the respondents in this case are residents of Naga City. o RTC-Naga refused to receive the case stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case. o Hence, RTC-BR. 58 proceeded with the case. RTC-Br. 58 issued an order remanding the case to RTC- Naga o Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss is among the prohibited pleadings. On the otherhand, the Supreme Court under Administrative Order 8-01 has directed the transfer from the regular courts to the branches of the Regional Trial Courts specially designated to try and decide intracorporate dispute. Hence, this petition
an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as amended)."11 However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows: 5.2. The Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing IntraCorporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated. 2ND ISSUE: Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is undisputed that the principal office of the corporation is situated at Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus, pursuant to A.M. No. 0011-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, it is the Regional Trial Court designated as Special Commercial Courts in Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto filed by herein Respondents. Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents petition for
30
ISSUE: WON THE ACTION FOR QUO WARRANTO IS PROPER WON THE RTC-BR. 58 HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE QUO WARRANTO CASE HELD: 1ST ISSUE: It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the offices, powers and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a case for an intra-corporate controversy.9 Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting Justice Jose Y. Ferias view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals 10 that Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is "limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated," while "[a]ctions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who usurp
quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC. Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction [G.R. No. 159882. November 23, 2007.] SPOUSES RUBEN and VIOLETA SAGUAN, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS and COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), respondents. NACHURA, J p: FACTS: [Petitioners] spouses Ruben Saguan and Violeta Saguan obtained a loan of P3 Million from [respondent] Philippine Bank of Communications. To secure the obligation, they mortgaged five parcels of land, and improvements therein. Because [petitioners] defaulted in the payment of their mortgage indebtedness, [respondent] extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage. In the auction sale on 05 January 1998, [respondent] was the only and highest bidder for P6,008,026.74. As [petitioners] failed to redeem the properties within the one-year period ending on 18 February 1999, TCT were issued in the name of [respondent] in lieu of the old ones. Thus, [respondent] consolidated ownership of the properties in its favor. Since the parcels of land were in physical possession of [petitioners] and other persons [copetitioners in the petition before the CA], [respondent], after due demand, filed a petition for writ of possession with Branch 31, Regional Trial Court, Tagum City. Petitioners filed an Opposition. In their Opposition and Reply, petitioners argued that a writ of possession should not issue considering respondent's failure to return the excess or surplus proceeds of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale based on theruling in Sulit v. Court of Appeals. In refutation, respondent points to petitioners' remaining unsecured obligations with the former to which the excess or surplus proceeds were applied. RTC issues a writ of possession. The CA affirmed
respondent's entitlement to a writ of possession as a matter of right, the latter having consolidated its ownership over the parcels of land upon expiration of the redemption period. It emphasized that the issue on the failure to return the excess or surplus proceeds of the auction sale had been squarely met by the respondent, and therefore, the case was distinguishable from Sulit v. Court of Appeals. In all, the CA upheld the general rule that the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function of the court. Hence, this recourse. ISSUES: 1. Whether the RTC erred in issuing a writ of possession considering respondent's failure to remit the excess or surplus proceeds of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. (NO) 2. Whether respondent may unilaterally apply the excess or surplus proceeds of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale to petitioner's remaining unsecured obligations. 3. Whether the RTC should have granted petitioners' motion to dismiss the petition for writ of possession based on respondent's failure to comply with the RTC's Orders on the filing of a formal offer of evidence. HELD: A writ of possession is an order enforcing a judgment to allow a person's recovery of possession of real or personal property. An instance when a writ of possession may issue is under Act No. 3135, 15 as amended by Act No. 4118, on extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. 16 Sections 6 and 7 provide, to wit: Section 6. Redemption. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power herein before referred to, the debtor, his successorsin-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at anytime within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
31
Section 7. Possession during redemption period. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in [the] form of an ex-parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Number Four hundred and ninetysix, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately. From the foregoing provisions, a writ of possession may be issued either (1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond. Within the redemption period the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession by filing for that purpose an ex-parte motion under oath, in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property covered by a Torrens title. Upon the filing of an ex-parte motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the court is expressly directed to issue the order for a writ of possession. On the other hand, after the lapse of the redemption period, a writ of possession may be issued in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale as the mortgagor is now considered to have lost interest over the foreclosed property. Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. 20 In this regard, the bond is no longer needed. The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchaser's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the
purchaser's right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function. Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion. Therefore, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent in this case is proper. We have consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession in such instances is ministerial, and the court may not exercise discretion or judgment. The propriety of the issuance of the writ was heightened in this case where the respondent's right to possession of the properties extended after the expiration of the redemption period, and became absolute upon the petitioners' failure to redeem the mortgaged properties. 1. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the petitioners insist that respondent's failure to return the excess or surplus proceeds of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale converted the issuance of a writ of possession from a ministerial to a discretionary function of the trial court pursuant to our holding in Sulit v. Court of Appeals. The Court is not persuaded. A careful reading of Sulit will readily show that it was decided under a different factual milieu. In Sulit, the plea for a writ of possession was made during the redemption period and title to the property had not, as yet, been consolidated in favor of the purchaser in the foreclosure sale. In stark contrast, the herein petitioners failed to exercise their right of redemption within the one-year reglementary period provided under Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended, and ownership over the properties was consolidated in, and corresponding titles issued in favor of, the respondent. We emphasize that the proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex-parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without need of notice to any person claiming an adverse interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted even without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. By its very nature, an exparte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding authorized under Act No. 3135, as amended. Be that as it may, the debtor or mortgagor is not without recourse. Section 8 of Act No. 3135, as amended, provides:
32
in the case of Sulit, viz.: Section 8. Setting aside of sale and writ of possession. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not later than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with the summary procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; and if it finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal. Thus, a party may file a petition to set aside the foreclosure sale and to cancel the writ of possession in the same proceedings where the writ of possession was requested. However, in this case, petitioners do not challenge the validity of the foreclosure nor do they wish to set aside the foreclosure sale. It appears that the only remaining bone of contention is the disposition of the excess or surplus proceeds of the foreclosure sale. In short, petitioners do not question the consolidation of ownership in favor of the respondent, but simply demand the payment of the sum of money supposedly still owing them from the latter. Article 427, 25 in relation to Article 428, 26 of the Civil Code provides that ownership may be exercised over things or rights, and grants the owner of property a right of action for recovery against the holder and possessor thereof. Thus, even as we rule that the writ of possession was properly issued in favor of respondent as a consequence of its confirmed ownership, we are not unmindful of the fact that the issue of the excess or surplus proceeds of the foreclosure sale remains unsettled. 2. Respondent's stance, as sustained by the CA, is that petitioners have remaining unsecured obligations with respondent and the excess or surplus proceeds of the foreclosure sale were validly, albeit unilaterally, applied thereto. This argument is unacceptable. We have elucidated on the import of surplus proceeds In case of a surplus in the purchase price, however, there is jurisprudence to the effect that while the mortgagee ordinarily is liable only for such surplus as actually comes into his hands, but he sells on credit instead of for cash, he must still account for the proceeds as if the price were paid in cash, and in an action against the mortgagee to recover the surplus, the latter cannot raise the defense that no actual cash was received. Surplus money, in case of a foreclosure sale, gains much significance where there are junior encumbrancers on the mortgaged property. Jurisprudence has it that when there are several liens upon the premises, the surplus money must be applied to their discharge in the order of their priority. A junior mortgagee may have his rights protected by an appropriate decree as to the application of the surplus, if there be any, after satisfying the prior mortgage. His lien on the land is transferred to the surplus fund. And a senior mortgagee, realizing more than the amount of his debt on a foreclosure sale, is regarded as a trustee for the benefit of junior encumbrancers. Given the foregoing pronouncement in Sulit, we cannot countenance respondent's cavalier attitude towards petitioners' right to the surplus proceeds. To begin with, the foreclosure of petitioners' properties was meant to answer only the obligation secured by the mortgage. Article 2126 of the Civil Code unequivocally states: Art. 2126. The mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. We need not expound on the obvious. Simply put, even if petitioners have remaining obligations with respondent, these obligations, as conceded by respondent itself, were not collateralized by the foreclosed properties. Furthermore, under Section 1 28 of Act No. 3135 as amended, the special power of attorney authorizing the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage must be either (1) inserted or stated in the mortgage deed itself; or (2) the authority is attached thereto. Thus, petitioners' supposed remaining obligations which were not secured by the mortgage cannot be made subject, or even susceptible, to the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. However, petitioners' remedy lies in a separate civil action for collection of a sum of money. We have previously held that where the mortgagee retains
33
more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but simply give the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus. 30 In the same case, both parties can establish their respective rights and obligations to one another, after a proper liquidation of the expenses of the foreclosure sale, and other interests and claims chargeable to the purchase price of the foreclosed property. The court can then determine the proper application of compensation with respect to respondent's claim on petitioners' remaining unsecured obligations. 31 In this regard, respondent is not precluded from itself filing a case to collect on petitioners' remaining debt. 3. Anent the third issue, we agree with the CA that there was no grave abuse of discretion in the trial court's liberality in giving ample time and opportunity for respondent to complete the presentation of its evidence. It was a liberality that carried no taint of partiality. Despite the ex-parte nature of the proceedings, the RTC also allowed petitioners to file pleadings to oppose the petition for the issuance of the writ of possession. Clearly, petitioners were not denied due process, and the trial judge acted accordingly in admitting respondent's uncontroverted evidence. Finally, we note petitioners' incorrect remedy of certiorari before the CA, which the latter and both parties have apparently overlooked. A special civil action for certiorari may be availed of only if the lower tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Ineluctably, the RTC issued the writ of possession in compliance with the express provisions of Act No. 3135. It cannot, therefore, be charged with grave abuse of discretion as there is no showing that, in the exercise of its judgment, it acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Absent grave abuse of discretion, petitioners should have filed an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for certiorari. The soundness of the order granting the writ of possession is a matter of judgment with respect to which the remedy of the party aggrieved is ordinary appeal. An error of judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as "grave abuse of discretion." Errors of judgment are correctible by appeal, while those of jurisdiction are reviewable by certiorari. Nonetheless, we have allowed this procedural lapse to pass without incident, and have resolved the issues
raised.
SacTCA
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The writ of possession in favor of respondent Philippine Bank of Communications is hereby AFFIRMED without prejudice to petitioners' separate remedy for recovery of the excess or surplus proceeds of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. SEPULVEDA, substituted by SOCORRO S. LAWAS vs.ATTY. PELAEZ FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 from a decision of the CA, affirming the decision of the RTC of Danao City. On December 6, 1972, respondent Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed a complaint against his granduncle, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., with the CFI of Cebu, for the recovery of possession and ownership of his one-half (1/2) undivided share of parcels of land; his undivided one-third (1/3) share in several other lots; and a share in the proceeds of sale between the defendant and the City of Danao; and for the partition thereof among the co-owners. The lots were among the 25 parcels of land which the private respondents mother, Dulce Sepulveda, inherited from her grandmother, Dionisia Sepulveda under the Project of Partition dated April 16, 1937 submitted by Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. as the administrator of the estate. Under the said deed, it appeared that the respondents mother Dulce is legally entitled to a share of the property, representing her mother Dionisia, as the co-owners along with Pedro and Santiago, of the eleven other parcels of land, each with an undivided one-third (1/3) share thereof. Respondent Atty. Pelaezs mother Dulce died intestate in 1944, survived by her husband Rodolfo Pelaez. Dulces grandfather Vicente Sepulveda died intestate on October 25, 1920 when she was only about four years old. From that time, Atty Pelaezs grandmother Carlota repeatedly demanded the delivery of her mothers share in the eleven (11) parcels of land, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. who was then a Municipal Mayor of a nearby town refused. Dulce, likewise, later demanded the delivery of her share, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. still refused, claiming that he needed to reap the produce therefrom as payment of the realty taxes on the subject properties. The private respondent alleged that he himself demanded the same but to no avail.
34
His granduncle Pedro executed an affidavit on November 28, 1961, stating that he was the sole heir of Dionisia, thus claiming adverse possession as against the interest of his other co-heirs. Thus, respondent Pelaez filed the present action assailed before the SC. Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. in his affirmative defense admitted having executed a deed of sale in favor of Danao City, but averred that the latter failed to pay the purchase price thereof; further he claims that he never received any demand for the delivery of Dulces share of the subject properties, from the latters mother Carlota, or from the private respondent. During the trial, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. died. His daughter, petitioner Socorro Sepulveda Lawas, substituted him in 1986 after she was appointed administratrix of his estate back in July 1976. On June 7, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondent Pelaez. The trial court ruled that the private respondents action for reconveyance based on constructive trust had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed; that he was entitled to a share in the proceeds of the sale of the property to Danao City; and that the partition of the subject property among the adjudicatees thereof was in order. The petitioner appealed to CA, which affirmed the appealed decision with modification. The petitioner now comes to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC, as affirmed by the CA correctly held giving due course to private respondents complaint in an action for partition. HELD: No. The petition is granted for the sole reason that the respondent failed to implead as parties, all the indispensable parties in his complaint. It appears that when the private respondent filed the complaint, his father, Rodolfo Pelaez, was still alive. Thus, when his mother Dulce Pelaez died intestate on March 2, 1944, she was survived by her husband Rodolfo and the private respondent. Under Article 996 of the New Civil Code, Rodolfo Pelaez, as surviving spouse, is entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children who has not received any betterment. Under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code the surviving spouse is a forced heir and entitled to a share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse. The spouse may waive it but the waiver must be express.
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants. Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.- A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the other persons interested in the property. Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties. The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the co-ownership between him and the respondent does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject property; and, second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper. In either case, whether the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the partition ordered by the court. In that event, partition shall be effected for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second phase may also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded the opportunity to be heard thereon. In the present action, the private respondent, as the plaintiff in the trial court, failed to implead the following indispensable parties: his father, Rodolfo Pelaez; the heirs of Santiago Sepulveda, namely, Paz Sepulveda and their children; and the City of Danao which purchased one of the properties involved. Rodolfo Pelaez is an indispensable party he being entitled to a share in usufruct, equal to the share of the respondent in the subject properties. There is no showing that Rodolfo Pelaez had waived his right to
35
usufruct. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads: SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed. Absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Without the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of the private respondent. To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. The petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in and of the Regional Trial Court are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
Allas appealed to the CA but it was dismissed for being moot and academic since Allas was promoted by Pres. Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. Decision became final and executory. Mendoza filed Motion for execution of its decision but it was denied since the contested position vacated by Allas was being occupied by Olores, not a party to the quo warranto petition. Mendoza filed mandamus with the CA but was denied by CA. Hence this petition. Issue: WON Mendoza may be reinstated in his position as Director III? Held: NO. Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision. Petitioner has apprised this Court that he reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on November 13, 1997. Reinstatement not being possible, petitioner now prays for the payment of his back salaries and other benefits from the time he was illegally dismissed until finality of the trial court's decision. Respondent Allas cannot be held personally liable for petitioner's back salaries and benefits. He was merely appointed to the subject position by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his constitutional power as Chief Executive. Neither can the Bureau of Customs be compelled to pay the said back salaries and benefits of petitioner. The Bureau of Customs was not a party to the petition for quo warranto. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. SO ORDERED.
36
Mendoza vs. Allas (Quo Warranto) Facts: Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He held various positions, the last of which before the institution of this case was as Director III of the CIIS. In 1993, Mendoza was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector of Cagayan de Oro City. In his place, Allas was appointed as Acting Director III of the CIIS. Despite the new assignment, Mendoza continued to receive the salary of the position of Director III. In 1994, Mendoza received a letter from the Deputy Customs Commissioner informing him of his termination from the BOC in view of Allas appointment by Pres. Aquino as Director III. Mendoza filed quo warranto against Allas. The court ruled in favor of Mendoza and ordered the ouster of Allas.
Valdes vs. CA Facts: Spouses Valdes filed an unlawful detainer case against Spouses Fabella. The complaint alleges these material facts: 1. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lot denominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19 located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. Sometime [i]n November 1992 by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex "A" and the xerox copy of the Torrens Certificate of Title in her name marked as Annex "B"; 2. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot by building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession thereof; 3. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants to peacefully surrender the premises to them, but the latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they unlawfully occupied; 4. That despite plaintiffs referral of the matter to the Barangay, defendants still refused to heed the plea of the former to surrender the lot peacefully; 5. That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein defendants to settle the case amicably, the Barangay Captain was forced to issue the necessary Certification to File Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs in order that the necessary cause of action be taken before the proper court, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex "C"; 6. That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and unfounded refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender the premises in question, the herein plaintiffs were constrained to engage the professional services of counsel thus incurring expenses amounting to TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing acceptance fee and additional ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) per appearance, who on July 12, 1994 sent a formal demand was likewise ignored, (sic) copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "D";
7. That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender the said premises in question, plaintiff[s] suffered serious anxiety, sleepless nights, mental torture and moral erosion; The MTC ruled in favor of Spouses Valdes. The RTC affirmed the MTC decision. On appeal by the Spouses Fabella, the CA reversed the RTC decision. Spouses Valdes filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence this petition. Issue: WON the complaint makes out a case for unlawful detainer? Held: No. In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how respondents entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.27 It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Note: There are three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria. Accion interdictal- comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico). The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the
37
date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession. Accion publiciana- is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.12 It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. Accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.
38

Remrev Withaddtionalcases

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Remrev Withaddtionalcases

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

o He also assailed the jurisdiction of the

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

ISSUE: Whether the unlawful detainer NO

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

COURT OF APPEALS RULING (PetCert): CA accordingly dismissed the same because:

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

REMREV: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL CASES

You might also like