Why did war break out in 1914?

With the exception of the United States, the great powers were organized loosely into a system of
alliances. Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy formed the Triple Alliance. France and Russia, fearing
the growth of German power, had entered into an alliance in 1892. Russia maintained its close
traditional ties with its fellow Slavs in Serbia. Britain increasingly feared the German naval build-up. In
1904, Britain and France entered into the Entente Cordiale, an informal arrangement less binding than a
mutual defense pact. After Russia's alarming defeat in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, Great Britain
aligned itself with Russia to help preserve the European balance of power.

Each of these alliances was somewhat obscure, for the precise obligations of the alliance partners were
sometimes spelled out only in secret documents and, other times, not at all. The Anglo-French Entente
was especially shrouded in ambiguity. During the years preceding the 1914 crisis, the British and French
General Staffs consulted frequently to develop war plans in the event of an outbreak of hostilities with
Germany. The British and French navies also cooperated extensively. Nevertheless, the idea of an anti-
German alliance was unpopular in Great Britain, a sentiment which compelled British politicians to
declare periodically that Anglo-French military collaboration implied no obligation to assist France in a
war against Germany. In fact, during the last weeks before the outbreak of war, Foreign Secretary Sir
Edward Grey frequently stated in Parliament that the Entente would not restrict Britain's "freedom of
action" in a crisis. This lack of clarity in British policy may have contributed to the fatal miscalculation
by the German leadership who assumed that Great Britain would remain neutral.

Few imagined that the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne by Serbian nationalists
on June 28, 1914, would precipitate a world war. The murder of the Archduke in Sarajevo presented
Austria-Hungary with an opportunity it had waited for. Yet the threat of war was not taken very seriously
throughout the fateful month of July. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff and his generals stayed on
holiday, as did most European leaders, and German intelligence did not indicate the chance of war.
Serbia provided the pretext for invasion by rejecting Austria-Hungary's demands for compensation.
After receiving several declarations of support from its German ally, Austria-Hungary mobilized half of
its divisions and prepared to attack Serbia. Though Russia had backed down during similar Balkan crises
in 1908 and 1912, Czar Nicholas II felt assured of France's support. The Czar declared that Russia
would defend the Serbians and, in late July, ordered full mobilization. Germany followed suit, and war
could no longer be stopped.

In order to prevent a two-front war of encirclement, German war plans dictated that the army would first
attempt to rout the French forces on the western front before turning eastward to face Russia's
formidable but less wieldy forces. If Paris did not fall immediately, Russia would bring its full weight to
bear in the east, and the opportunity for a quick victory would be lost.

The German Kaiser and his General Staff, therefore, clearly hoped that Great Britain would not help
France shore up the western front. They believed that a quick defeat would reinforce British reluctance
to become involved in a European land war. Faced with a fait accompli, the British government would
likely renounce any obligation to assist France. This expectation was no doubt due in part to the
ambiguity of the Anglo-French Entente.

In accordance with the war plans, German forces surged west on September 4, 1914. Since a quick
victory was essential, the German army bypassed the heavily fortified defenses on the Franco-German
border, and attacked through neutral Belgium. This act was a flagrant violation of the Belgian Neutrality
Treaty of 1839, which all of the European powers had signed. The invasion of Belgium inflamed anti-
German feeling in Great Britain, and served as a convenient pretext for the British entry into the war. In
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a decisive error, the Kaiser allowed the tactical advantages of invading France through Belgium to
overwhelm the overriding strategic interest in keeping Great Britain out of the war. Parliament declared
war on Germany, the German offensive stalled along the Marine, and World War I became a horrifying
war of attrition.

Historians continue to debate the causes of World War I. Scholars often maintain that the origins of
World War I lay in the rapid ascendance of Germany, the naval competition between Great Britain and
Germany, the decline of the traditional order, or in the clash of ideologies and national ambitions. While
these and other interpretations may explain why Europe was ripe for war in 1914, they cannot identify
why war broke out that year rather than a year or a decade later or, indeed, why war had to occur at all.
In fact, the Kaiser's miscalculation of Great Britain's response provided the spark that culminated in the
conflagration of a world war which no doubt would have been avoided had Great Britain expressed a
clear intention to assist France in a European war. In a broader context, the leaders of Europe in July
never fully calculated the impact of their moves, for [as we know] most of them, including the German
generals, went on holiday [when news of the archduke’s murder reached them].

(The essay is an excerpt from a piece by David Abshire and Brian Dickson, from The Center for
Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Washington
Quarterly, 1983 Autumn.)