Republic of the Philippines Court of Appeals Manila TWELFTH DIVISION INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE CO., INC.

, as represented by its Assistant Operations and Underwriting Manager, ELISEO FLORES, Petitioner, -versusHON. ALBERT R. FONACIER, pairing Judge of the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 22, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELICIANO ENRIQUEZ, Respondents. CA-G.R. SP No. 122021 Members: VELOSO, Chairperson LANTION, and PERALTA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated: FEBRUARY 28, 2013

xxx---------------------------------------------------------------------------xxx

DECISION
VELOSO, J.:

The Case
In this Petition for Certiorari1 filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioner Industrial Insurance Co., Inc., represented by its Assistant Operations and Underwriting Manager, Eliseo Flores (IICI), assails the Orders of Branch 22, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 1523-M-2007 for Estafa dated January 28, 20112 and July 28, 20113, which decreed: (1) January 28, 2011 Order
WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the motion to recall and set aside
1 2

Rollo, pages 3-27. Ibid., pages 28-30. 3 Ibid., pages 31-32.

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sheriffs notice of levy, writ of execution and judgment on the bail bond is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Furnish copies of this Order to bondsman and its counsel Atty. Lawrence Mijares, parties counsels, Office of the Clerk of Court of RTC Malolos City (Bulacan), Insurance Commissioner and Office of the Court Administrator. SO ORDERED.4

(2) July 28, 2011 Order

WHEREFORE, finding no new matters of substance that may warrant the reconsideration, much less the reversal, alteration or modification of the Courts Order dated 28 January 2011, the instant motion is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Furnish copies of this Order to bondsman and its counsel Atty. Archimedes Cano, parties counsels, Office of the Clerk of Court of RTC Malolos City (Bulacan), Insurance Commissioner and Office of the Court Administrator. SO ORDERED.
5

Petitioner likewise seeks to set aside the approval of the P36,000.00 IICI Bail Bond No. JCR (2) 010808 and to withdraw such bail bond from the record of the court a quo and/or to have the same returned to the bondsman.

The Facts
Briefly, the facts, culled from the records of this case, are as follows: Petitioner Industrial Insurance Company, Inc. is a non-life insurance company organized and existing under Philippine laws, with principal office address at Penthouse, Cuevas Tower Condominium, Taft Avenue cor. Pedro Gil Street, Malate, Manila. It is represented in this case by Eliseo S. Flores.6
4 5

Rollo, page 30. Ibid., page 32. 6 Ibid., p. 27.

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On June 4, 2007, an Information7 for Estafa was filed by the Provincial Prosecutor's Office against one Rowell Dela Torre (Dela Torre) before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 22, captioned as Crim. Case No. 1523-M-2007. The recommended bailbond was Thirty-six thousand pesos (Php36,000.00). On June 29, 2007, Application No. 434-June 20078 for surety bond amounting to Php36,000.00 was filed before the Office of the Clerk of Court by herein petitioner bonding company Industrial Insurance Co., Inc., (IICI). Asst. Clerk of Court Geronimo A. Santos found that said application complied with the formal requisites prescribed by laws and rules.9 The bailbond was signed on behalf of IICI by Feliciano G. Enriquez, Operations Manager, Judicial Bonds on Criminal Cases.10 On June 30, 2007, by Order11 of 2nd Vice Executive Judge Renato C. Francisco, the Application for Surety Bond of accused Dela Torre was approved. Thus, accused Dela Torre was allowed to enjoy his provisional liberty. On September 3, 2008, due to Dela Torre's failure to appear in the scheduled preliminary conference, Judge Candido R. Belmonte issued an Order12 confiscating his bond, ordering IICI to produce Dela Torre within thirty (30) days from receipt of said Order, and to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against his bond. In an Order13 dated October 29, 2008, judgment was rendered against Dela Torre's bond and IICI was ordered to pay the same to the government. Subsequently, on July 22, 2009,14 Pairing Judge Albert R. Fonacier ordered the issuance of a writ of execution against said bond.

7 8

Rollo, p. 44. Ibid., p. 46. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., p. 47. 11 Ibid., .p 49. 12 Ibid., p. 53. 13 Ibid., p. 54. 14 Ibid., p. 55.

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It is undisputed that on April 30, 2009, a Sheriff's Notice enforcing an attached Writ of Execution dated April 27, 2009 of the Judgment On The Bond dated March 13, 2009 was served on petitioner.15 Upon receipt of said Sheriff's Notice, petitioner IICI filed with the court below a Motion to Recall and Set-Aside Sherrif's Notice of Levy, Writ of Execution and Judgment on the Bail Bond16 based on the following grounds: (1) Approval of the Bail Bond by 2nd Executive Judge Renato C. Francisco [was] contrary to Sections 17 and 19 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure;17 (2) False and blank notarization of bond's Affidavit of Justification results in un-notarized Affidavit of Justification;18 (3) The Barangay Certification is signed by a mere Kagawad and not by the Barangay Captain, contrary to the OCC Evaluation Report and the Supreme Court Guidelines on Corporate Surety Bonds;19 (4) The location plan accompanying the barangay certification is also signed by the same kagawad and does not even show the accused's residence;20 (5) No prior produce order was sent to, nor received by the bondsman;21 and (6) The court sheriff of Malolos, Bulacan enforced the Court's writ without first seeking assistance of the Manila court Sheriff's Office.22

Ruling of the Trial Court

Denying the Motion to Recall and Set Aside Sheriffs Notice of Levy, Writ of Execution, and Judgment on the Bail Bond, the court a quo, in its first assailed Order23 dated January 28, 2011, explained:
In the instant motion, there were several grounds raised by bondsman IICI of which were summarized as follows: 1) the action by then 2nd Vice Executive Judge Renato C. Francisco approving the application for bail bond by accused De la Torre was in violation of Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court; 2) the notarization of the Bonds Notarial Certificate and Affidavit of Justification bearing the same registry number as well as a blank information on the
15 16

Rollo, pp. 9-10. Ibid., pp. 33-48. 17 Ibid., p. 33. 18 Ibid., p. 35. 19 Ibid., p. 36. 20 Ibid., p. 38. 21 Ibid., p. 39. 22 Ibid., p. 41. 23 Note 2, supra.

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jurat results in an unnotarized affidavit of justification; 3) the barangay certification dated 28 June 2007 was not signed by the barangay captain of Sta. Clara but a mere barangay counselor which was different from the evaluation list of the office of the clerk of court; 4) the location plan was signed also by a barangay counselor and does not show the residence of the accused, hence, false and misleading; 5) there was no prior produce order previously issued to the bondsman thereby confiscation of bond was premature; and 6) the court sheriff did not seek clearance from the Manila Court Sheriffs Office in the enforcement of the writ of execution. On the scheduled hearing of the above-cited motion, present was counsel of IICI who is Atty. Archimedes Cano as a collaborating counsel of Atty. Lawrence M. Mijares. The said motion was deemed submitted for resolution. Relative to the documents contained in the Evaluation of Application for Surety Bond by the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Guidelines on Corporate Surety Bond has mandated the Office of the Clerk of Court in a multiple sala to determine the completeness and authenticity of the bond and its supporting documents, more particularly the genuineness of the signatures of the authorized agents of the company. The determination of what constitutes the completeness and authenticity of the bond as well as its supporting documents lies in the exercise of judgment of the official mandated by law, in tis case the office of the clerk of court. Furthermore, the evaluation of bond by the office of the clerk of court was referred to the honorable judge at [B]ranch 22 where the instant case is pending and was duly approved and issued by then 2nd Executive Judge Renato C. Francisco in its order dated 30 June 2007 on the obvious authority that Judge Renato Francisco is a regional trial court judge and therefore had exercised authority vested to him by Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in the absence of the presiding judge. Accordingly, in a long line of cases, the actions of the clerks of courts and regional trial court judges being official functions, who were enjoined by law to exercise discretion in the evaluation and approval of applications of surety bonds enjoy the presumption of regularity in the discharge of its functions in the absence of any taint of irregularity. As held in the case of Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization, et al. vs. Court of Appeals that in the absence of any convincing proof to the contrary, the regularity of function must be upheld. Hence, in the case at bar, the issues raised by IICI involving the adequacy of the requirements, such as the bonds notarial certificate, affidavit of justification, barangay certification, location plan and approval by

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then 2nd Vice Executive Judge Renato Francisco, which according to them would have resulted to the nullification of the application of the surety bond are bereft of merit. On the other hand, assuming arguendo that there was no produce order furnished to the movant-bondsman, it cannot be denied that herein bondsman received on 18 September 2008 a Show Cause Order[,] wherein IICI was given thirty (30) days to produce the accused and explain why judgment should not be rendered against its bond. Nonetheless, despite due notice[,] herein bonding company failed to produce the accused and did not even file any explanation or justification to prevent the confiscation of its bond until on [sic] 29 October 2008[,] wherein this Court has finally rendered judgment against the bond of the accused in the amount of Php 36,000. Indeed, such order of confiscation of bond is in accordance with the rules of court which provides [sic] that[,] within the given period of thirty (30) days[,] the bondsman must (a) produce the body of their [sic] principal or give the reason for his non-production; and (b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so. Failing in the two requisites[,] a judgment may be rendered against the bondsmen for the amount of the bail. For such reason, this Court stands that the very intent of the law for issuing a produce order was satisfactorily complied with[,] upon issuance of the show cause order[,] wherein herein bondsman was given all the opportunities to salvage its bond from confiscation. Finally, anent the issue on the enforcement of the writ of execution by Branch Sheriff Ruben V. Hernandez[,] wherein the bondsman alleged that said sheriff did not seek assistance from [the] Manila Court Sheriff Office[,] considering the area of execution is outside of his jurisdiction. The said allegation of bondsman IICI serves scant consideration. Granting arguendo that there was no assistance sought by herein branch sheriff from [the] Manila Court Sheriff, it cannot be denied that what was executed was [a] mere notice to the IICI[,] attaching therewith a copy of the writ of execution[,] giving IICI fifteen (15) days within which to pay the amount of Php36,000[,] representing the forfeited bond. Moreso, alleged non-compliance by the branch sheriff[,] as averred by IICI[,] shall not render void or invalid[,] the subject writ of execution issued by this court. Hence, the writ of execution[,] subject of the instant motion[,] stands valid and enforceable.24

(emphasis Ours, citations omitted)

24

Rollo, pp. 28-30.

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When IICI moved for reconsideration, the same was denied on July 28, 2011 with the Court below explaining, viz.:
xxx. IICI alleges that the bail bond is void and should be cancelled as it was irregularly and illegally issued by Feliciano Enriquez, former general agent of IICI, for having executed beyond the scope of his authority and contrary to the explicit terms and conditions printed in the said bail bond in violation of Sections 226 and 361 of the Insurance Code. Relative thereto, IICI avers that said agent made material alteration of the terms and conditions and notices of the bail bond which was not accompanied by an endorsement duly approved by the Insurance Commission as required by the above-mentioned provisions. Hence, such alleged personal and unilateral alteration is a patent violation of the Insurance Code. It is worth stressing, that the subject surety bond application was filed before the Office of the Clerk of Court of which the same was duly evaluated by Assistant Clerk of Court Geronimo A. Santos. Upon evaluation of the required documents, the same was referred to then Judge Candido Belmonte for appropriate action having complied with the formal requisites prescribed by laws and rules. On 30 June 2007[,] an order by then 2nd Vice Executive Judge Renato C. Francisco was issued finding the application for surety bond by accused Rowell Dela Torre to have been sufficient in form and substance the same was approved, hence, the accused was allowed to enjoy his provisional liberty under said surety bond. The determination of what constitutes the completeness and authenticity of the bond as well as its supporting documents lies in the exercise of judgment of the official mandated by law, in this case the Office of the Clerk of Court. Accordingly, in a long line of cases, the actions of the clerks of court and regional trial court judges, being official functions, who were enjoined by law to exercise discretion in the evaluation and approval of applications of surety bond enjoy the presumption of regularity in the discharge of its functions in the absence of any taint of irregularity. Hence, in the case at bar, the issues raised by IICI involving their regularity and illegality in the application for surety bail bond caused by misrepresentation or abuse of authority allegedly exercised by its own agent cannot be later on employed as its ground to avoid liability in case of confiscation of bond due to patent disregard of the order of the court to produce the accused. Also, granting arguendo that such allegation of the movant-bondsman as to the illegality committed by its own agent is worthy of attention, the said bonding company should have appraised [sic] this court of such

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illegality at the earliest possible time and not only when the bond had already been confiscated in favor of the government.25

Hence, this petition.

Issues:
I. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RENDERED A FORFEITURE, JUDGMENT AND WRIT OF EXECUTION AGAINST THE SUBJECT BAIL BOND WITHOUT A PRIOR ORDER DIRECTING THE BONDSMAN TO PRODUCE THE ACCUSED ON A SPECIFIC DATE AND TIME[,] IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 21, RULE 114 OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. II. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE SUBJECT BAIL BOND IS VOID FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUED[,] IN VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 226 AND 361 OF THE INSURANCE CODE. III. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE BAIL BOND AND ITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS ARE FATALLY DEFECTIVE[,] WARRANTING OUTRIGHT DISAPPROVAL UNDER SECTION 13, RULE 114 OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND RETURN OF THE BONDS TO THE BONDSMAN[,] PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. 04-7-02-SC[,] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 2004 SUPREME COURT GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE SURETY BONDS.26

Our Ruling
Regarding the first issue, petitioner IICI alleges that the public respondent Hon. Albert Fonacier of Branch 22, Regional Trial Court of
25 26

Rollo, pp. 31-32. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

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Malolos, Bulacan, gravely abused his discretion when he rendered a forfeiture judgment and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution against the subject bail bond without a prior order directing the bondsman to produce the accused on a specific date and time.27 To support its position, petitioner IICI invokes Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, viz.:
SEC. 21. Forfeiture of bail. - When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. xxx

(emphasis Ours) It is petitioner's theory, therefore, that for a forfeiture of bail to be valid, the bondsman must be notified twice, i.e., once, before the accused jumps bail, i.e., under the first sentence of Section 21, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court; and, again, after said accused jumps bail, i.e., under the second sentence of the same Rules of Court provision. The argument is bereft of merit. There is no question that the above-quoted provision speaks of two notices, to wit: (1) a notice to produce the accused before the court on a given date and time preceding forfeiture; and (2) if the accused failed to appear as required, a notice to produce the accused within thirty (30) days and show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. In fact, in People vs. Peczon,28 cited by petitioner, the Supreme Court held that a bondsman who was not given notice of the date of hearing cannot be held liable for [his] failure to produce the person of the accused as required by the court and, hence, [his bond] cannot be forfeited on that ground.
27 28

Rollo, p. 12. 3 SCRA 280, 283 (1961).

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10

Nonetheless, this Court finds that despite the absence of a prior produce order, IICIs right to due process was not violated in a manner that would amount to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent RTC. For, as correctly pointed out in the first assailed order, even on the premise that there was no produce order furnished to the petitioner, it cannot be denied that when the court below issued the September 3, 2008 Order requiring IICI (1) to produce the accused within thirty days and (2) explain why judgment should not be rendered against its bond receipt of which had not been denied by herein petitioner still, IICI failed to produce the accused and did not even file any explanation or justification to prevent the confiscation of its bond.29 The pronouncement, therefore, of the High Tribunal that the rigid technical application of the Rules may be relaxed in order to avoid an absurd result consequently comes into play. Especially that the Rules of Court mandate that a liberal construction of the Rules must be adopted in order that their object be promoted and so as to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.30 We thus hold that to invalidate the confiscation of petitioner's bond on the ground that there was no compliance with the first sentence of Section 21, Rule 114 above, would be to rigidly apply the rules of procedure, an application that would result in absurdity. Here, it is clear that Dela Torre had already jumped bail such that, even after the thirty-day grace period given by the RTC to IICI ordering it to produce Dela Torre, IICI still failed to comply. The RTC's issuance of a prior produce order would just the same result in what transpired below the confiscation of IICI's bond. Especially that petitioner did not even bother to explain why judgment should not issue against its bond, despite the RTC's clear orders to do so in its September 3, 2008 Order. Petitioner IICI
29 30

Rollo, p. 29. China Banking Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 364 SCRA 638, 646-647 ( 2001).

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11

cannot therefore complain of denial of due process as its inability to fully air its position was due to its own inaction or negligence.31 Anent the second issue, petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion to public respondent RTC on account of its failure to rule that the bail bond is void despite alleged violations of Sections 226 and 361 of the Insurance Code of the Philippines, particularly on material alterations in the bail bond.32 Petitioner points out that the subject bail bond contains a printed statement, viz: Please send the notice of hearing to the IICI Head Office at 8 th Floor, Cuevas Tower Condominium, Taft Avenue corner Pedro Gil Street, Malate, Manila indicating the bond number for our reference.33 Yet here, when the bail bond was negotiated by private respondent Feliciano G. Enriquez, the same came with a stamped statement, to wit: Please send the notice/s of hearing to Suite 205 Jade Palace Condominium No. 33 Visayas Avenue, Project 6, Q.C.34 It is IICI's position, therefore, that since this material alteration violates the mandatory provisions of the Insurance Code of the Philippines, the issuance of the subject bail bond was therefore illegal and unauthorized.35 We are not persuaded. A material alteration of a contract must refer to a change in the terms of the agreement that either imposes some new obligation on the party promising or takes away some new obligation imposed.36 To be material, an alteration must change the legal effect of the original contract.37 Here, a perusal of the subject bail bond shows that the stamped address mentioned above is not a material alteration that would warrant a finding that the bail bond was illegally issued.

31 32

Caete vs. NLRC, 306 SCRA 324, 333 (1999). Rollo, p. 15. 33 Ibid., p. 104. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., p. 17. 36 Pacific Tobacco Corporation vs. Lorenzana, G.R. No. L-8086, October 31, 1957. 37 Ibid., citing New Amsterdam Casualty Co. vs. W.T. Taylor Cont. Co. 12 [2d] 972.

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12

First, We note that at face value of the bail bond, the address originally printed therein remained legible. In fact, the stamped address did not overwrite, much less erase or anyway alter the printed address. If at all, the same merely informed the court a quo that aside from the printed address in the bail bond, notices should also be sent to the stamped address. Besides, no allegation was made that the alteration in the bail bond made the obligation of IICI more onerous than that stated in said bail bond. Thus, aside from its not being material as to relieve the IICI from its liability under the bond, no iota of proof was presented evidencing that the argued deviation caused the IICI any loss or injury.38 Petitioner also relies heavily on Sections 226 and 361 of the Insurance Code of the Philippines, claiming that since the subject bail bond violated its mandatory provisions, the same must be declared void, creating no rights and obligations between the parties.39 Again, We are not persuaded. Sections 226 and 361 of the Insurance Code of the Philippines provide, respectively, that:
Sec. 226. No policy, certificate or contract of insurance shall be issued or delivered within the Philippines unless in the form previously approved by the Commissioner, and no application form shall be used with, and no rider, clause, warranty or endorsement shall be attached to, printed or stamped upon such policy, certificate or contract unless the form of such application, rider, clause, warranty or endorsement has been approved by the Commissioner. xxx Sec. 361. No insurance company doing business in the Philippines or any agent thereof, no insurance broker, and no employee or other representative of any such insurance company, agent, or broker, shall make, procure or negotiate any contract of insurance or agreement as to policy contract, other than is
38 39

Supra, Note 36. Rollo, p. 17.

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13

plainly expressed in the policy or other written contract issued or to be issued as evidence thereof, xxx. (emphasis Ours)

To reiterate, what are proscribed by the foregoing provisions are (1) policies, certificates or contracts of insurance issued or delivered within the Philippines without prior approval by the Insurance Commissioner; and (2) riders, clauses, warranties or endorsements that are attached to, printed or stamped upon such policy, certificate or contract without prior approval by the Commissioner. Here, petitioner would have Us nullify the entire bail bond just because of the alluded statement stamped therein by private respondent without, allegedly the imprimatur of the Insurance Commissioner. But, by petitioner's admission,40 it was established that the bail bond itself is a valid policy. We therefore hold that even on the assumption that the stamped statement is void for having been placed in the subject bail bond without the approval of the Insurance Commission, still, such does not necessarily invalidate the entire policy. The bail bond stands and so does petitioner's obligations therein. Finally, petitioner finds grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent RTC in: (1) failing to acknowledge that the bail bond and its supporting documents are fatally defective, warranting outright disapproval under Section 13, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, and (2) for failure to return the bonds to the bondsman pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 04-7-02-SC otherwise known as the 2004 Supreme Court Guidelines on Corporate Surety Bonds.41 The petitioner, in this regard, firstly claims that the Affidavit of Justification was not taken under oath before a judge. In reaching this conclusion, petitioner however merely alleges that the records neither show that the said Affidavit of Justification was taken under oath before a Judge nor an examination of the surety under oath was
40 41

Rollo, p. 16. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

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14

ever conducted to determine its qualifications;42 and secondly, petitioner challenges the said Affidavit of Justification due to the lack of sufficient identification of the affiant, claiming that under the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice, a community tax certificate is no longer recognized as proof of identity. As a result, there is no affidavit to speak of.43 Again, we are not persuaded. We note that the very bail bond which petitioner IICI claims to be fatally defective, appears in a standard form drafted and prepared including the jurat thereof solely by petitioner. It thus, according to existing jurisprudence, must be strictly construed against the party responsible for its preparation.44 In this regard, it appears from a perusal of the bail bond that all that was left for the accused and IICI's agent to do was to simply fill out the blanks therein. Petitioner cannot therefore challenge now said bail bond to avoid liability. In fact, because it was petitioner no less, which drafted said bail bond, any obscurity therein should be construed against it. Anent the allegation that there was no showing that the Affidavit of Justification was taken before a judge, it is enough that We quote here what respondent RTC held:
xxx, in a long line of cases, the actions of clerks of courts and regional trial court judges being official functions who were enjoined by law to exercise discretion in the evaluation and approval of applications of surety bonds enjoy the presumption of regularity in the discharge of its functions in the absence of any taint of irregularity. xxx Hence, in the case at bar, the issues raised by IICI involving the adequacy of the requirements, such as the bonds notarial certificate, affidavit of justification, barangay certification, location plan and approval by then 2nd Vice Executive Judge Renato Francisco, which according to them would have resulted to the nullification of the application of the surety bond are bereft of merit.45 (emphasis Ours)
42 43

Rollo, p. 18. Ibid., p. 20. 44 Prudential Bank vs. Alviar, 464 SCRA 353, 368 (2005). 45 Rollo, page 29..

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15

Moreover, it is worth stressing that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.46 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. the Court of Appeals,47 the Supreme Court explained that grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.48 Since We find no such grave abuse of discretion in this case, it becomes imperative that We deny the subject petition. WHEREFORE, this Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for want of merit. SO ORDERED. VICENTE S.E. VELOSO Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

JANE AURORA LANTION Associate Justice

EDUARDO PERALTA, JR. Associate Justice

46 47

Central Bank of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 49, 58 (1989). 409 SCRA 455, 481 (2003). 48 Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 460 SCRA 315, 338 ( 2005).

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CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. VICENTE S.E. VELOSO Associate Justice Chairperson, Twelfth Division