“And Who is My Neighbor?

” Religion and
Immigration Policy Attitudes
Benjamin R. Knoll, M.A.
Department of Political Science
University of Iowa

CITATION: Knoll, Benjamin R. 2009. “And Who is My Neighbor? Religion and

Immigration Policy Attitudes.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 48(2):
forthcoming.

Abstract. This study explores immigration reform as a possible new “moral” issue upon which
American religious elites and organizations take public positions. It is argued that religion is a
key independent variable necessary for understanding the determinants of public attitudes
regarding immigration policy. Theoretical expectations are formed from the ethnoreligious,
religious restructuralism, and minority marginalization frameworks. Quantitative evidence is
presented which demonstrates that those who attend religious services more frequently more
likely to support liberal immigration reform policies. Members of minority religions, notably
Jews and Latter-day Saints, are also more likely to empathize with the plight of undocumented
immigrants and support liberal immigration reform measures.

Acknowledgements: Please direct all correspondence to Benjamin Knoll, Department of

Political Science, 341 Schaeffer Hall, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242. The author
can be reached by email at benjamin-knoll@uiowa.edu. Replication data are available from the
author upon request. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2008 Midwest
Political Science Association Conference in Chicago, IL and the 2008 Symposium of Religion
and Politics at Calvin College, Grand Rapids, MI. Many thanks to Rene Rocha of the University
of Iowa, David Campbell at the University of Notre Dame, and three anonymous reviewers for
their invaluable feedback, comments, and suggestions.
INTRODUCTION

Immigration reform has emerged as one of the more salient political issues in recent years. At

the urging of President Bush, Congress attempted to pass sweeping immigration reform

legislation in both 2006 and 2007. Proposals ranged from a “hard-line” mass deportation of all

undocumented immigrants to more “comprehensive” reform measures that would provide a path

to citizenship for those currently in the United States. These congressional debates provoked

heated and passionate discussion among the public which ultimately prevented representatives

from being able to reach a consensus on the issue, dooming the various reform proposals.

While several valuable studies investigating the determinants of attitudes toward immigration

policy have been published recently (see Citrin et al 1997; Hood and Morris 1998; Hood, Morris,

and Shirkey 1997, e.g.), religion as a key explanatory variable in these studies has been either

marginalized or ignored. There are important reasons, however, to predict that religion is

important to understanding immigration attitudes. Some of the more forceful and vocal

opposition to hard-line immigration measures has recently come from the leaders of various

American religious organizations. It has long been customary for religious leaders to take public

stands on “moral issues” like abortion and homosexual marriage. The involvement of these same

leaders and organizations in the immigration issue, however, has left observers and

commentators speculating as to whether or not immigration now qualifies as a “moral issue” as

well. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to address the virtual absence of religion in the

literature on immigration attitudes and investigate why and how religion might play a substantive

role in the formation of attitudes regarding immigration reform policy.

RELIGION AND POLITICS

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 Research has previously shown that at the most basic level, an individual‟s religious beliefs

can play an important role in shaping one‟s core values and “worldviews.” In turn, these can

affect political ideology and preferences (Feldman 1988). Welch and Leege (1988), for instance,

demonstrate that an individual‟s perception of the nature of God influences one‟s opinions on

various matters of public policy. Bolce and de Maio (1999) show that one‟s level of affect

toward evangelicals exerts an independent effect on one‟s partisan preferences. Along the same

lines, Kohut et al. (2000), Layman (2001), Leege et al. (2002), and Olson and Green (2006) all

provide evidence that religious factors are becoming decisive determinants of partisan

preferences in the United States. These same determinants have also shown to be significant in

studies investigating both political participation (Miller and Shanks 1996) as well as citizen

activism (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Furthermore, religion has also been shown to

strongly affect entire U.S. presidential elections (Campbell 2007; Green 2007; Green, Wilcox

and Rozell, 2006; Guth et al. 2006).

Other scholars have investigated the effect of religion on individual attitudes toward various

“moral” public policy issues. These issues have been further classified as dealing with either 1)

social-justice issues or 2) matters of personal morality (see Guth et al. 1997). Concerning

personal morality issues, studies have shown that religious conservatism and attitudes about

doctrinal orthodoxy are significant predictors of attitudes toward abortion (Leege 1983, e.g.),

homosexual marriage (Wood and Bartkowski 2004, e.g.) and euthanasia (Hamil-Luker and

Smith 1998). Research has also extended these findings into broader social-justice morality

issues and shown that attitudes toward the environment (Guth et al. 1995), the economy (Barker

and Carman 2000), and even the Israel/Middle East conflict (Mayer 2004) have all been

influenced by individual religious beliefs as well.

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 The current study seeks to contribute to this area of the literature. With the involvement of

religious elites in the public debate, as will be described in more detail, immigration may very

well now be classified as another social-justice morality issue, subject to individual religious

influences. What follows is a broad examination of how religion might exert this effect on

immigration policy attitudes.

ETHNORELIGIOUS DETERMINANTS OF IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES

The “ethnoreligious” perspective (Green 2007) is one lens through which the influence of

religion on individual attitudes can be understood. This theoretical perspective views particular

religious tradition as a key factor in the theoretical link between religion and individual attitudes.

If this view is accurate, religious tradition membership should be an important independent

variable that shapes policy attitudes. Indeed, Kellstedt and Green (1993) argue that there are

intrinsic “differences in belief, practice, and commitment, even for individuals with minimal

religiosity. Thus, [one] would expect denominational preference to influence political attitudes

and behavior” (55). Given that the religious affiliation of many Americans is now determined by

deliberate choice rather than early socialization (Green and Guth 1993), religious tradition

affiliation is even more likely to be associated with political policy preferences. Wald, Owen,

and Hill (1988) support this perspective by arguing that the ideology of a particular church

affects the individual political ideologies of its members (see also Jelen 1993).

One would thus expect particular religious tradition to make a difference on one‟s public

policy preferences, including immigration policy. One process by which this may occur is

through elite cues and direction from religious leaders on the matter. Several studies have

investigated the effect of the behavior of religious clergy on parishioner political attitudes and

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behavior. Djupe and Grant (2001), for instance, find that individual religiosity can lead to more

political participation not only through learning civic skills in one‟s church but also by being

specifically recruited by church leaders to engage in political purposes. Djupe and Gilbert (2002)

explore the nature of public political statements by clergy as well as their personal motivations

for making such statements (see also Djupe and Gilbert 2003 and Smidt 2004). More pertinent to

our current investigation, Campbell and Monson (2003) follow Zaller (1992) and demonstrate

that church members, specifically Latter-day Saints, adopt the policy preferences of their leaders

when there is consensus from those leaders on a particular issue.

It is thus possible that members of religious traditions and denominations whose leaders

officially and/or publicly endorse a certain type of immigration reform should be more likely to

support those same reform policies. An in-depth investigation was therefore conducted on public

statements regarding immigration by American religious elites. This investigation revealed that

the leaders of several major religious traditions have officially come out in support of liberal

immigration reform measures, specifically including an eventual path to citizenship for

undocumented immigrants. Consider the following examples:

Roman Catholic Church. The Catholic Church has taken perhaps the strongest stand on

immigration reform measures. The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops made an official

announcement in 2000 (as reported on their website):“We bishops commit ourselves and all the

members of our church communities to continue the work of advocacy for laws that respect the

human rights of immigrants and preserve the unity of the immigrant family....We join with others

of good will in a call for legalization opportunities for the maximum number of undocumented

persons, particularly those who have built equities and otherwise contributed to their

communities” (United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 2002). Furthermore, in 2006

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Cardinal Roger Mahony publicly denounced a punitive House immigration bill, HR4437, and

instructed the priests of the parishes under his jurisdiction to disobey the law were it to become

enacted (Pomfret 2006). Later that fall, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops sent a letter to

President Bush urging him to veto the Secure Fence Act (United States Conference of Catholic

Bishops 2006), which Congress passed after failing to agree on an immigration reform

compromise.

Evangelical Protestants. Richard Land, head of the Ethics and Religious Liberty

Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, announced in April of 2006 that although “we

have an obligation to support the government and the government‟s laws for conscience‟ [sic]

sake (Romans 13:7) … As citizens of the Lord‟s heavenly Kingdom and members of local

colonies of that Kingdom (congregations of Christians), we also have a divine mandate to act

redemptively and compassionately toward those who are in need” (Land 2006). He went on to

endorse a guest-worker program for the undocumented immigrants currently in the United States

with an option for earned citizenship at the end of a four-year period.

Mainline Protestants. The website of the Episcopalian Migration Ministries includes a

statement from the Presiding Bishop: “To make enforcement a central provision of our

immigration policy not only fails to honor our historic tradition of offering refuge to the

oppressed, but also denies the call of Christ to welcome the stranger as if we were receiving Him

as our guest” (Griswold 2006). A joint statement of the head of the Evangelical Lutheran Church

in America and Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service supports a plan to “provide a path to

permanence for individuals currently residing and working in the United States as well as their

families” (Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 2007). The websites of the United Methodist

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Church (Gilbert 2007) and the Presbyterian Church (USA) (Presbyterian Church (USA) Office

of Immigration Issues 2006) have similar policy statements.

As can be seen, there appears to be a general consensus among elites from dominant

American religious traditions favoring some form of earned legalization program. This

consensus involves elites representing nearly all major categories of religious traditions,

including both Evangelical and Mainline Protestants, whose membership makes up more than

seventy percent of the American population (a notable exception being the Black Protestant

tradition).1 If the ethnoreligious elite cues theory is valid, we should expect that membership in

these various religious traditions, the leaders of which have taken public stands in favor of liberal

immigration reform policies, should translate into support for comprehensive immigration

reform policies as well. This results in our first hypothesis:

H1: Mainline Protestants, Evangelical Protestants, and Catholics are more likely to

support liberal immigration reform policies than those of other affiliations or those with

no religious affiliation.

RELIGIOUS RESTRUCTURALISM DETERMINANTS OF IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES

The “religious restructuralism” perspective is a different lens through which religion could

affect immigration policy attitudes. In contrast to the ethnoreligious perspective, this view

predicts that individual religious commitment and behavior, not necessarily religious tradition,

are the more accurate mechanisms of the influence of religion on political behavior and attitudes

(Green 2007). Welch and Leege (1988), for example, provide evidence for this explanation in

showing that “devotional style”, including frequency of worship service attendance among

Catholics, is a significant predictor of attitudes toward a number of public policy issues and

6
political ideology. Wuthrow (1988) and Hunter (1991) both argue that there is a separation in

contemporary American religious behavior between “traditionalists” and “modernists” and that

traditionalists are more faithful in the “normative” religious practices, such as church attendance

and worship. Ammerman (1997) further argues that individual religious tradition has lost much

of its explanatory power, as Americans now move freely among the different denominations and

switch affiliations often throughout their lives. The behavioral view has also been supported by

Layman (1997) who argues that the distinction between more or less “religious” behaviors is just

as important as the distinction of denominational affiliation in explaining how faith is connected

to voting behavior. More recently, Green (2007) demonstrates that individual religious behavior

had more of an impact on vote choice in the 2004 presidential election than individual religious

tradition.

The previous section explored the possibility that individual religious affiliation might be a

significant independent determinant of attitudes toward immigration policy. It was established

that a majority of the leaders of the major religious traditions in the United States have publicly

supported liberal immigration reform in one form or another, often citing Biblical admonitions to

care for those in need and to welcome the “stranger among us.” Given the fact that a majority of

Americans do not support liberal immigration reform measures, it leads to the possibility that the

explanation must take into account the religious behavioral level of individuals within those

denominations.

Those who attend worship services more frequently are also likely to be those who hold

deeper religious convictions2 (see Lee 2002, e.g.) and thus are also more likely to value the

directions and endorsements of their church‟s leaders. These individuals may also be more likely

to follow elite cues (Zaller 1992) and internalize the policy positions of their church‟s leaders

7
when they make public pronouncements on immigration reform. This would result in the

adoption of more liberal immigration policy preferences. This theoretical prediction results in the

second hypothesis:

H2: Mainline Protestants, Evangelical Protestants, and Catholics who attend religious

services more frequently are more likely to support liberal immigration reform policies

than those who attend less frequently.

RELIGIOUS MARGINALIZATION DETERMINANTS OF IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES

An alternative theoretical link between religion and immigration attitudes is derived from the

“religious marginalization” perspective. This view hypothesizes that religious minority groups

have empathy for other minority groups and are thus more supportive of minority policies

(Allport 1979; Betz 1994). This is because groups that have been “marginalized” by society

through political or social discrimination feel a sense of shared experience with other

marginalized groups. This theory is supported by Fetzer (1998, 2000) who applies it specifically

to religion and ethnicity. He shows that in the United States, France, and Germany, members of

“minority” religions are more likely to support pro-immigrant governmental policies.

The minority marginalization perspective could also theoretically extend to American

attitudes toward immigration reform. Individuals affiliating with minority religions, who have

often been subject to both direct and indirect religious discrimination (both historically and

contemporarily), may be more supportive of liberal immigration policies. For the purposes of

this study, “minority religions” are defined as any religion with membership of less than five

percent of the United States population. These include Jews, Latter-day Saints, and “other”

which includes Hinduism, Buddhism, Pagan, Jehovah‟s Witnesses, Seventh-Day Adventist, and

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others.3 It is important to note that the leaders of many of these minority religions have not taken

official public stands on immigration reform legislation, and thus no predictions can be made as

far as elite cues and the religious restructuralism theories are concerned. Instead, members of

these religions may be more supportive of liberal immigration policies out of a feeling of “shared

marginalization” with undocumented immigrants.

The Jewish tradition, for example, represents one such minority religious group. The

American Jewish Committee has routinely and consistently taken public stands in support of

liberal immigration reform measures. Their website states that “[a]ccording to Jewish tradition,

„strangers‟ are to be welcomed and valued, as we were once „strangers in the land of Egypt‟”

(American Jewish Committee 2002). Also, Gideon Aranoff, president and CEO of the Hebrew

Immigrant Aid Society, has expressed support for comprehensive immigration reform and said

that the same anti-immigrant arguments being made today have traditionally been used against

Jews as well (Aranoff 2006). Furthermore, many LDS faithful today have served proselyting

missions during which they are often socially marginalized by the communities that they serve

in. As American citizens, they are also often marginalized by anti-Mormon sentiments that may

exist in their own communities or as reported in the national media. For instance, a recent Pew

survey found that nearly a third of Americans have an “unfavorable” view of Mormons and that

25% would be less likely to vote for a Mormon presidential candidate (Keeter and Smith 2007).

It follows that the marginalization hypothesis could lead members of these and other

minority faiths to be more likely to espouse higher levels of support for undocumented

immigrants. This then leads to the third hypothesis:

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 H3: Members of minority religions, specifically Jews, Latter-day Saints, and “other”,

are more likely to support liberal immigration reform policies than those of other

religious affiliations.

DATA, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND METHODOLOGY

To test the effect of religion on immigration policy attitudes, this study conducts a

multivariate analysis of data from the “2006 Immigration Survey” carried out by the Pew

Research Center and Pew Hispanic Center. This survey was conducted from February 8th

through March 7th, 2006 (see Table 1 for more information).

[ Table 1 about here ]

Dependent Variable. The survey asks respondents a series of three descriptive questions

which allow for a more nuanced view of the respondent‟s immigration reform preferences:

1. Should illegal immigrants be required to go home, or should they be granted some kind

of legal status that allows them to stay here?

a) If the respondent answers “required to go home” they are then asked: Should it be

possible for some illegal immigrants to remain in the U.S. under a temporary

worker program under the condition that they would eventually go home, or don’t

you think so?

b) If the respondent answers “granted some kind of legal status” they are then asked:

Should they be allowed to stay only as temporary workers who must eventually

return to their home countries, or should it be possible for them to stay in the U.S.

permanently?

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 From these responses, a three-level ordinal variable was created, assuming that the reform

measures could be conceptualized as being more or less “liberal”, mass deportation being least

liberal and earned legalization being most liberal.

0 - Respondent favors simple deportation (answered “required to go home” in

question 1 and “don‟t think so” to question 1a)

1 - Respondent favors a guest-worker program (answered “required to go home” in

question 1 and “temporary worker program” in question 1a; answered “granted some

kind of legal status” in question 1 and “temporary worker program … eventually

return” in question 1a)4

2 - Respondent favors an earned legalization (liberal/comprehensive) program

(answered “granted some kind of legal status” in question 1 and “possible for them to

stay in the U.S. permanently” in question 1b)

After dropping the missing values, which account for about 11% of the sample,

approximately 27% of the respondents favored mass deportation, 33% favored a guest-worker

program, and 40% favored earned legalization (see Table 1).

Independent Variables. The survey also includes measures of individual religious tradition

as well as frequency of worship attendance. The first hypothesis predicts that individual religious

tradition matters, and that Catholics, Mainline Protestants, and Evangelical Protestants should be

are more likely to report liberal immigration policy preferences. The second hypothesis predicts

that tradition matters, but it dependent upon frequency of worship service attendance; Catholics

and Protestants who attend more often should be more likely to support liberal immigration

reform measures. The third hypothesis predicts that those who affiliate with minority religions

will also be more likely to embrace more liberal immigration policy preferences.

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 The worship service attendance variable for H2 is a six-point ordinal variable (coded 1-6)

ranging from “never attending services” to “attending more than once per week.” The religious

tradition variables are dummy variables which indicate that the respondent claimed affiliation

either as a Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jew, Latter-day Saint, or “other” (which, when asked for

further specificity, included Hindus, Buddhists, Pagans, Jehovah‟s Witnesses, and Seventh-Day

Adventist, among others), (see Table 1). The Pew survey unfortunately did not separate out the

“Protestant” category into the commonly recognized Mainline/Evangelical/Black Protestant

divisions, so proxy variables were created for each by interacting the Protestant category with

“born-again” (for Evangelical Protestant) and also “black” race (for Black Protestant).5 Each

major religious tradition variable was then interacted with the frequency of worship service

attendance and included in the model to test H2, the religious restructuralism hypothesis.

Control Variables. The statistical analysis includes a number of control variables derived

from other studies investigating the determinants of attitudes toward immigration.

Several socioeconomic variables are included as standard controls, but many have shown to

be significant independent determinants in previous studies. For example, it has been

demonstrated that women (Hughes and Tuch 2003), younger individuals (Wilson 1996), and

those with higher levels of education (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Hoskin and Mishler 1983)

are more likely to view immigrants more positively. Also, as immigration is very much a racially

charged issue, dummy variables for Hispanic, African-American, Asian, and “mixed” racial

status are included. Two ordinal variables are included measuring both partisanship and

ideology. It is anticipated that due to the historical and contemporary emphasis that the

Democratic Party has placed on minority rights, liberals and Democrats will be more likely to

support liberal immigration reform measures (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Swain 1995).

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 A dummy variable is also included which measures whether or not the respondents specify

that they are not citizens of the United States. It is anticipated that these non-citizens are more

likely to support liberal immigration measures as they themselves would hope to benefit from

such policies. This variable is also interacted with the Hispanic ethnicity variable to examine the

attitudes of Hispanic non-citizens as well as non-citizens of other ethnicities.

The “economic competition” hypothesis (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Hood, Morris, and

Shirky 1997; Starr and Roberts 1982) posits that those with lower incomes, those who perceive

the economy negatively, and those concerned with protecting native jobs will be less likely to

support liberal immigration reform measures because it could increase competition for low-

income jobs and opportunities for employment. Variables are therefore included representing

total family income, membership in labor unions, and perception of both personal and national

economic conditions.

Four additional controls are included to test and control for the racial threat and social

contact hypotheses. The racial threat hypothesis (Giles and Buckner 1993; Hood and Morris

1998; Meier and Stuart 1991) predicts that higher levels of racial diversity will lead to increased

inter-racial tension and animosity. The social contact theory (Oliver and Wong 2003; Welch et

al. 2001), on the other hand, predicts that increased inter-group contact exerts the opposite effect

and that more contact leads to increased levels of familiarity and inter-group toleration. The

percent foreign-born population in the respondent‟s county (2000 census) will be included in the

model, as well as other indicators included in the survey of inter-group interaction. Respondents

were asked how often they come into contact with those who speak little or no English, how

many recent immigrants they perceive to live in their area, and whether or not they have friends

13
or relatives who are recent immigrants.6 These questions are able to provide a more nuanced test

of actual inter-group interaction and affinity towards immigrants.

Finally, a variable is included indicating whether or not the respondent lives in a U.S.-

Mexico border state, namely California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, as immigration attitudes

are likely to be different for those living along the border and experiencing the effects of

undocumented immigration first-hand on a daily basis.

Method and Interpretation. The level of analysis is the individual survey respondent.

Because of the nature of the dependent variable, the data will be analyzed using a generalized

ordered logit estimator7 (Williams 2006), weighted to account for the over-sampling of certain

geographic areas in the survey (see Table 1). Standard errors are also clustered by geographic

region due to the possibility that unobserved effects might create correlation among those who

live in the same major metropolitan area. Coefficients produced from the generalized ordered

logit model are interpreted the same as binary logit coefficients where the categories of the

dependent variable have been collapsed into two categories. The coefficients for Models 1 and 3

are thus the likelihood of preferring a guest-worker or earned citizenship policy over immediate

deportation, whereas the coefficients reported in Models 2 and 4 indicate the likelihood of

indicating a preference for earned citizenship over immediate deportation or a guest-worker

program. For brevity‟s sake in the discussion section, a positive coefficient in either category

will sometimes be referred to as “more liberal immigration policy preferences.” Finally, the

predicted probabilities of each variable are also reported, which represent the probability of

supporting a guest-worker or legalization proposal over an immediate deportation option

(Models 1 and 3) or for supporting an eventual legalization policy over a guest-worker or

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immediate deportation policy (Models 2 and 4), as the corresponding variables move from their

minimum to maximum values, holding all other variables constant at their mean.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

[ Table 2 about here ]

Table 2 indicates the results of the multivariate analyses on the effect of religion on

immigration preferences.8 Considering H1, the ethnoreligious hypothesis, Model 2 indicates that

Mainline Protestants, Evangelical Protestants, and Catholics are neither more nor less likely to

support an earned legalization or guest-worker option over a mass deportation, although they are

less likely to support an earned legalization option over the other two options.9 While these

results appear contrary to initial predictions, it should be kept in mind that because these

variables are also interacted with frequency of church attendance in the model, the coefficients

are interpretable only when the church attendance is zero. Substantively, this indicates only that

Protestants and Catholics who never attend worship services are less likely to have liberal

immigration policy preferences. Indeed, Models 1 and 2 indicate that born-again Protestants and

Catholics who attend religious services more frequently are more likely to report more liberal

immigration policy preferences. This partly confirms H2 and adds support to the idea that those

belonging to traditions whose leaders have publicly endorsed more liberal immigration policies

are more likely to internalize those preferences if they have higher degrees of religious

commitment. It should be noted, however, that the coefficients for Mainline Protestants are

insignificant, indicating that H2 holds for some traditions but not for others.

Model 1 also shows that black Protestants who frequently attend services are significantly

more likely to support an immediate deportation policy option over either a guest-worker or

15
earned legalization option, although they are ambivalent toward an earned citizenship option in

Model 2. This may correspond with the absence of official public stances on the issue by

religious elites from that tradition. This may also be attributable to inter-racial competition

between the African-American and Latino communities over zero-sum economic resources like

jobs (see Meier, et al. 2004).

Finally, there appears to be mixed support for H3, the minority marginalization hypothesis, as

Jews and Latter-day Saints are more likely to favor a guest-worker or earned legalization option

over immediate deportation. Model 2 also demonstrates that Jews are less likely to profess

preferences for an earned legalization program.

A high degree of caution should be exercised with these results, however, as a test for

multicollinearity reveals severe problems with these models as estimated. There is an

unacceptable amount of collinearity between the various religion variables, which calls the

integrity of these results into question. Indeed, the mean Variance Inflation Factor score of these

key independent variables is 22.99 with a range from 1.02 to 52.5.10

Consequently, Models 3 and 4 are more parsimonious and exclude the variables responsible

for the severe multicollinearity in Models 1 and 2. These models retain frequency of church

attendance and minority religious tradition membership, which still allows for a general test of

both H2 and H3 without the ambiguity created by multicollinearity in Models 1 and 2. The

remaining discussion will focus on Models 3 and 4 as these results are substantially more

reliable.

The coefficients for religious service attendance in Models 3 and 4 are both positive and

significant, indicating again that those who attend services more often are more likely to indicate

increasingly liberal immigration policy preferences. Furthermore, all else being equal, the

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likelihood of supporting a guest-worker or legalization proposal over an immediate deportation

option and for supporting an eventual legalization policy over a guest-worker or immediate

deportation policy increases by 7.3% and 5.2%, respectively, as individuals move from never

attending worship services to attending more than once per week. While this is not an

overwhelming magnitude, it is comparable to the average size of the effect of other important

demographic determinants such as education (6.1%) or age (10.1%).

Consistent with the predictions of the minority marginalization hypothesis, Jews are

significantly more likely to support increasingly liberal immigration policy preferences. Latter-

day Saints are also more likely to favor an earned legalization program over alternative

immigration proposals, although no more or less likely to disfavor immediate deportation

(although the variable does approach significance in a positive direction, p=0.121). It should be

kept in mind, however, that in addition to the marginalization hypothesis, these results for Latter-

day Saints are also likely at least partly attributable to the affinity that many LDS faithful

develop toward Latinos as a result of two-year mission experiences in Central and South

American countries, as well as to Latino immigrants in the United States. A calculation of the

predicted probabilities reveals that, holding all other variables constant at their mean values,

Jews are 13.8% more likely, on average, to support increasingly liberal immigration policies.

Latter-day Saints, for their part, are an average of 10.1% more likely to report more liberal

preferences.

The effect of minority religion membership on immigration policy attitudes is even more

notable when considering that its combined effect is outweighed only by ideology (which affects

immigration attitudes by an average probability of 30% as individuals move from being very

conservative to very liberal), the amount of foreign-born individuals living in one‟s county

17
(22.8%), and Hispanic ethnicity (Hispanic non-citizens 27.4%, Hispanic citizens 17.5%). Being a

Jew or Latter-day Saint has a higher impact on the difference in one‟s immigration policy

preferences than other well-known determinants such as education (6.1%) and gender (3.1%).

The effect is also higher than that of contextual determinants such as contact with non-English

speakers (7.3%) or having friends who are immigrants (8.8%).

CONTROL VARIABLES

The socioeconomic control variables in Models 3 and 4 reveal results in the expected

direction. As presupposed, those with higher levels of education, younger individuals, and

females are significantly more likely to support liberal immigration policies, as are both

Hispanics and non-citizen Hispanics. The interaction term gives the interpretation that non-

Hispanic non-citizens are neither more nor less likely to have a different preferences either way.

Additionally, liberals and Democrats are more likely to support measures to provide for a way

for undocumented immigrants to remain permanently in the country.11

The economic threat hypothesis receives support from these findings. Members of labor

unions and those who perceive both their own and the national economic situation poorly are less

likely to be supportive of liberal immigration reform measures. Family income does not achieve

statistical significance. Also, contrary to conventional wisdom, it appears that living in a border

state appears to have no effect on one‟s immigration policy attitudes when controlling for other

factors.

Finally, Branton and Jones (2005) argue that the inter-racial pacifying effects of the social

contact hypothesis come into play only when the contact is between individuals of similar

socioeconomic status. Their conclusion is supported by these results which show that those who

18
have friends (likely to be of similar socioeconomic status) that are immigrants are more likely to

support liberal immigration reform measures while those who perceive themselves as living in

areas with higher amounts of recent immigrants and have frequent contact with non-English

speakers are less likely to support liberal immigration measures. These findings are tempered,

however, by the finding that the percent foreign-born in one‟s county (holding these other

variables constant), increases one‟s likelihood for supporting an earned legalization policy,

which provides more general support for the social contact hypothesis. See Oliver and Wong

(2003) for a further discussion of the sometimes conflicting effect of various measures of inter-

racial contact in predicting racial attitudes.

ALTERNATIVE VIEWS CONSIDERED

The most obvious objection presented by these conclusions is that immigration policy

attitudes are indeed influenced by religious factors, but not through the elite cues mechanism as

previously developed. One could argue that the fact that a particular religious organization

publishes an official policy endorsement on its website does not guarantee that such

endorsements are echoed by individual congregational leaders and thus it is highly unlikely that

the average parishioner is even aware of his or her church‟s stand on immigration policy.

In response, it is admitted that the empirical results presented in this paper do not

conclusively prove a causal mechanism between elite cues and parishioner attitudes. Even

though we have herein demonstrated with confidence that religion exerts an independent effect

on immigration preferences, the argument for elite cues presented in this paper is merely implied

by these results.

19
 It could alternatively be argued that religious individuals may be more inclined to support

liberal immigration reform measures because they are simply more likely to be attempting to live

the Judeo-Christian value which teaches to “love thy neighbor.” While such a theoretical

mechanism is indeed possible, it is almost impossible to test empirically given the data and

methods employed in this particular study. Such an enterprise would require making several

assumptions about the “appropriate” political application of religious doctrine. Does “welcoming

the stranger among us” mean that the government should promote open borders, a guest-worker

program, or a path to citizenship? It could legitimately be argued that loving one‟s neighbor

includes encouraging him or her to be honorable in obeying immigration laws and procedures.

Objective analysts, however, are in no position to interpret religious doctrine for the individual

church member and/or to prescribe the “correct” policy position that should be taken.

It is thus argued that the elite cues mechanism discussed in this study, support for which is

implied, may be more objectively reliable because the official policy positions that religious

organizations have endorsed do not require any subjective interpretation on the part of the

analyst. Further research is certainly called for to illuminate further the causal relationship

between religious affiliation, level of religiosity, and immigration policy preferences.

CONCLUSION

This study has explored immigration reform as a new “moral” social-justice issue on which

American religious elites and organizations take public stances. It has been argued that religion

is a key independent variable necessary for understanding more comprehensively the

determinants of attitudes toward immigration policy. After discussing three distinct theoretical

frameworks through which religion may impact immigration attitudes (ethnoreligious, religious

20
restructuralism, and minority marginalization), quantitative evidence has been presented which

demonstrates that those who attend religious services more frequently have a greater likelihood

of possessing liberal immigration policy preferences. Members of minority religions, notably

Jews and Latter-day Saints, are also more likely to empathize with the plight of undocumented

immigrants and support liberal immigration reform measures.

One of the implications of this study for the field of religion and politics is that immigration

should be included among the “moral” issues12 typically analyzed and discussed by researchers.

Another is that there is now further evidence for the religious restructuralism theoretical

framework and support for the argument that religious elites may exert an impact upon American

public policy preferences. Furthermore, the results of this study provide support for the minority

marginalization theory which has not received a great deal of attention in the literature on either

religion and politics or race and politics. Lastly, this study provides evidence for the conclusion

that, contrary to conventional wisdom, individual religiosity can sometimes lead to more liberal

policy preferences. Religion and conservative public policies apparently do not always go hand

in hand.

For researchers studying the determinants of immigration policy preferences, and race and

politics more generally, the results of this study indicate that religious factors exert an

independent and significant effect on public policy opinions toward immigration reform. This

implies that religious variables are required, either as independent or control variables, in any

analysis of the determinants of attitudes on immigration policy or race and ethnicity. At the very

least, such studies should include control variables for frequency of worship attendance, which is

often available in public opinion surveys, and minority religion membership, if not specifically

Judaism and Latter-day Saints.

21
 Perhaps the most salient lesson learned from this study is that religion not only exerts an

independent effect on individual immigration policy attitudes, but that the effect is as strong as

other traditional determinants of immigration attitudes. Indeed, these results demonstrate that the

effect of religion is comparable in magnitude to other significant determinants of immigration

attitudes such as socioeconomic characteristics, economic perceptions, and racial/ethnic context.

It is not unreasonable to conclude that religion causes individuals to take into consideration

undocumented immigrants when they ask themselves the Biblical query: “And who is my

neighbor?”

22
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29
 Table 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND RELIGIOUS

AFFILIATION

Frequency of Church Immigration Reform

Attendance Religious Tradition Preferences
Weighted Weighted Weighted
N % N % N %

Never 670 12.1% Protestant 3,044 51.8% Deport all 1,422 27.3%
Roman
Seldom 865 14.9% Catholic 1,583 28.1% Guest worker 1,813 32.9%
Few times a Earned
year 1,094 18.7% Jewish 135 1.9% legalization 2,076 39.8%
Once or twice Don‟t
a month 905 15.7% Mormon 126 2.3% know/refused 692
Orthodox
Once a week 1,578 25.9% Greek/Russian 40 0.7%
More than
once a week 750 12.6% Islam/Muslim 35 0.7%
Don‟t
know/refused 141 Other 140 2.4%
No religion /
atheist 701 12.0%
Don‟t
know/refused 199

Data derived from the “2006 Immigration Survey” carried out by the Pew Research Center for The People & The Press,

conducted February 8 – March 7, 2006. N=6,003. The survey over-sampled metropolitan areas with higher Latino and

immigrant populations; Chicago, Las Vegas, Phoenix, Raleigh-Durham, and Washington, D.C. account for two-thirds of

the responses. Percentages are weighted to account for this over-sampling and exclude the “don‟t know/refused” category.

The Pew Research Center bears no responsibility for the interpretations presented or conclusions reached in this study.

30
 Table 2. RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES OF DETERMINANTS OF

IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES

MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4

R prefers R prefers R prefers R prefers
guest-worker / legalization over guest-worker / legalization over
legalization over guest-worker / legalization over guest-worker /
deportation deportation deportation deportation
B
B (Std.
Independent B Discrete B Discrete Discrete Discrete
(Std. Error)
Variable (Std. Error) change (Std. Error) change change change
Error)
Min  Min  Min  Min 
Max Max Max Max
0.722 0.006 0.165 -1.097
Constant
(0.620) (0.270) (0.353) (0.315)

Frequency of -0.180 -0.140 0.082** 0.073 0.044** 0.052

-0.136 -0.158
Church Attendance (0.129) (0.093) (0.027) (0.021)
“Born-again” 0.046 0.046
0.007 0.011
Christian (0.199) (0.225)
-0.579 -1.085**
Protestant -0.097 -0.220
(0.701) (0.426)
“Born-again” * -0.403 -1.557**
-0.065 -0.300
Protestant (0.580) (0.527)
0.524 -0.110
Black * Protestant 0.071 -0.025
(0.680) (0.484)
-0.393 -1.292***
Roman Catholic -0.063 -0.259
(0.352) (0.290)
13.650*** -14.652*** 0.720** 0.693**
Jewish 0.233 -0.411 0.105 0.171
(1.103) (1.230) (0.337) (0.267)
1.440** 0.271 0.499 0.502**
Latter-day Saints 0.140 0.063 0.078 0.124
(0.483) (0.449) (0.322) (0.186)
0.593 -0.172 0.223 0.363
“Other” religion 0.076 -0.038 0.037 0.089
(0.547) (0.382) (0.336) (0.273)
Protestant * 0.298 0.172
0.183 0.248
Attendance (0.192) (0.144)
“Born-again” * 0.270* 0.249*
0.184 0.354
Prot. * Attendance (0.143) (0.136)
Black * Protestant * -0.197* -0.078
-0.234 -0.098
Attendance (0.116) (0.120)
Roman Catholic * 0.248** 0.264**
0.169 0.376
Attendance (0.096) (0.104)

Controls
0.034 0.046 0.058** 0.041**
Education 0.032 0.062 0.062 0.059
(0.024) (0.035) (0.023) (0.020)
0.137* 0.131 0.152*** 0.146*
Female 0.021 0.030 0.027 0.035
(0.075) (0.092) (0.045) (0.095)
Age -0.003 -0.039 -0.009** -0.149 -0.002 -0.035 -0.009** -0.166

31
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
1.123*** 0.806*** 1.151*** 0.770***
Hispanic 0.132 0.193 0.160 0.189
(0.126) (0.158) (0.093) (0.148)
0.402 0.710*** 0.125 0.231**
Black 0.056 0.169 0.022 0.056
(0.268) (0.221) (0.143) (0.086)
0.629** -0.404 0.091 -0.526*
Asian 0.079 -0.085 0.016 -0.117
(0.289) (0.384) (0.271) (0.282)
0.140 0.241** 0.097 0.311**
Mixed ethnicity 0.021 0.056 0.017 0.076
(0.171) (0.117) (0.162) (0.146)
0.258 0.074 0.349 0.064
Non-citizen 0.037 0.017 0.057 0.015
(0.590) (0.779) (0.354) (0.516)
Hispanic * non- 1.533 1.358 1.535* 1.564**
0.150 0.327 0.180 0.367
citizen (1.028) (0.839) (0.945) (0.628)
0.017 -0.075 -0.060 -0.163
Republican 0.003 -0.017 -0.011 -0.039
(0.088) (0.163) (0.082) (0.128)
0.123* 0.110 0.165*** 0.143**
Democrat 0.019 0.025 0.029 0.034
(0.071) (0.099) (0.051) (0.072)
0.293*** 0.337*** 0.296*** 0.419***
Ideology (liberal +) 0.176 0.301 0.206 0.385
(0.054) (0.072) (0.058) (0.081)
-0.022 -0.049 -0.020 -0.023
Family income -0.027 -0.089 -0.029 -0.044
(0.026) (0.031) (0.021) (0.034)
-
-0.264*** -0.297** -0.232**
Labor union -0.043 -0.064 -0.043 0.304*** -0.070
(0.061) (0.129) (0.100)
(0.092)
National economic 0.252*** 0.146*** 0.249*** 0.152**
0.111 0.100 0.128 0.109
perception (better +) (0.057) (0.036) (0.072) (0.055)
Personal economic 0.146** 0.186** 0.122** 0.141**
0.067 0.125 0.065 0.100
perception (better +) (0.062) (0.073) (0.050) (0.065)
Foreign-born in 1.738* 2.897*** 1.491 2.738***
0.118 0.346 0.121 0.334
county – 2000 (0.899) (1.070) (0.048) (0.607)
0.215 0.108 0.113 0.067
Border state 0.032 0.025 0.020 0.016
(0.134) (0.101) (0.053) (0.085)
-
Contact with non- -0.179*** -0.076** -0.076*
-0.075 -0.053 0.184*** -0.090 -0.055
Eng. Speakers (0.030) (0.039) (0.042)
(0.034)
Friends who are 0.423*** 0.440*** 0.406*** 0.440***
0.061 0.102 0.069 0.106
immigrants (0.084) (0.073) (0.992) (0.052)
-
Perceived -0.120* -0.136** -0.080**
-0.053 -0.094 -0.042 0.110*** -0.079
immigrants in area (0.070) (0.045) (0.135)
(0.033)

Pseudo R2 0.0877 0.0813

N 3,511 4,188

* p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.001

Models estimated via generalized ordered logit estimators, using both weighted values and clustered standard errors by
geographic region. Robust standard errors are also used to account for heteroskedasticity in the models. The discrete
change values indicate the change in probability of supporting each policy proposal as the corresponding variable
moves from its minimum to maximum value, holding all others constant.

32
1
Note: The statistics on religion and immigration attitudes cited in this study are derived from

the 2006 Pew Immigration Survey described in Table 1. Sampling weights are also employed

throughout to account for over-sampling of several metropolitan areas in the survey.

2
There are, of course, several other (and arguably superior) ways that individual religiosity can

be measured. Frequency of church attendance was unfortunately the only question asked in the

survey employed in this study to measure individual religious behavior. Mockabee, Monson, and

Grant (2001), however, provide evidence indicating that church attendance or scripture reading

are normally adequate proxy variables for religious commitment.

3
Although qualifying by this criterion, Muslims and Greek/Russian Orthodox members will be

excluded from this study due to the shortage of respondents in the survey (see Table 1). Without

more respondents, any results would be largely idiosyncratic.

4
As a sensitivity test, alternative models were estimated using a four-point ordinal dependent

variable in which the two “temporary guest-worker” options were not combined as they are in

the “1” variable category. The coefficients of the key independent variables were not appreciably

altered in either significance or direction.

5
These proxies are obviously imperfect, as not all Evangelical Protestants describe themselves as

“born-again,” nor do all black Protestants consider themselves Black Protestants. It is believed to

be the best option available, however, given the limitations of the data.
6
It should be noted that there is a possibility of endogeneity between individual contact with

non-English speakers, having friends who are immigrants, and immigration policy preferences.

Removing these variables from the models, however, does not appreciably alter the results of the

key independent variables in significance, direction, or magnitude.

33
7
The models were originally estimated with a standard ordinal logit method, but the models

failed a test of the ordinal logistic proportional odds assumption, resulting in the use of a

generalized ordinal logit estimator. As explained in Williams (2006), this method can “estimate

models that are less restrictive than the proportional odds/parallel lines models … but more

parsimonious and interpretable than those estimated by a non-ordinal method, such as

multinomial logistic regression.”

8
Despite the relatively large size of the sample analyzed herein (N=6,003), many respondents

refused to answer several demographic questions regarding their income (N=728), partisanship

(N=370), ideology (N=363), or religion (N=199). Additionally, a full 692 respondents declined

to indicate their immigration policy preference. These missing cases all contributed to produce

the truncated N of 3,511 and 4,188 analyzed by these models.

9
These results hold when excluding the church attendance variables from the model (results not

presented).
10
Despite this uncertainty, the presence of multicollinearity increases the magnitude of the

standard errors in the model, decreasing the likelihood of finding statistically significant results.

The fact that the key independent variables retained their significance is further evidence of the

strength of the results presented herein. Also, the severe multicollinearity would seem to account

for the unusually large and inconsistent coefficients of the Jewish religion variable in Models 1

and 2.
11
Because of the traditional correlation between religious service attendance and political

conservatism, Models 3 and 4 were re-estimated excluding partisanship and ideology. The results

produced similar results, with the key independent variables maintaining their significance and

34
direction. The exception is church attendance losing significance and the “other” religion

variable gaining positive significance in Model 4.

12
By concluding that immigration reform is a “moral” issue, it is not meant to imply that

immigration should be considered exclusively as a moral issue, as it obviously is an issue that

also has many cultural, economic, and social ramifications. It is also not implied that this study

has subjected the “morality” of the immigration issue to empirical evaluation. Rather, it is argued

that immigration should now be considered as a “moral” issue in that religious leaders have

begun to speak out publicly and frequently on the topic and that religion exerts an independent

and significant effect on immigration attitudes in the American public. This is similar to the

effect that religion exerts on attitudes toward more commonly-accepted “moral” issues such as

abortion and homosexual marriage.

35