26th European Photovoltaic Solar Energy Conference, Hamburg, Germany, Sept.

2011
H. Haeberlin, Luciano Borgna and Ph. Schaerf:

PV and Fire Brigade Safety:No Panic, but Realistic Assessment of Danger and Possible Countermeasures

PV and Fire Brigade Safety: No Panic, but Realistic Assessment of Danger and Possible Countermeasures
Heinrich Haeberlin, Luciano Borgna and Philipp Schaerf Bern University of Applied Sciences (BFH-TI), Division of Electrical- and Communication Engineering Laboratory for Photovoltaics, Jlcoweg 1, CH-3400 Burgdorf, Switzerland Phone: +41 34 426 6811, Fax: +41 34 426 6813, Mail: heinrich.haeberlin@bfh.ch, Internet: www.pvtest.ch
Abstract: Recently it was reported in several media that some fire brigades do not dare any more to fight against fires at houses with PV, as at such PV plants even at night under faint illumination (e.g. the light of the full moon or the searchlight of the fire brigade) there would be a lethal electrical shock hazard due to high DC voltages. This is exaggerated and based on a lack of knowledge of the properties of PV plants and the hazard due to the DC currents present in such plants. In this contribution we try to supply the necessary information for a realistic assessment of the danger that actually exists in such plants. Technical solutions for a reduction of this danger and their consequences for the operation of PV plants are also discussed. By marking all houses with PV plants with a special identification plate and by special training for officers of the fire brigade, an appropriate assessment of the effective danger and an appropriate fight against the fire should be possible.

KEYWORDS: 1 : PV system , 2 : Safety , 3 : Fire Brigade

1.

Basic considerations concerning effective electrical threat

At low voltage (AC: V 1000 V, DC V 1500 V) the cause for lethal accidents is not the voltage itself, but the current flowing through the heart (excitation of cardiac fibrillation in case of exceeding certain limits) [IEC/TS 60479, [1]]. Currents below these limits can already cause involuntary contractions of muscles and at AC muscle cramps that make impossible to let go the conductor touched. However, DC is by a factor of 4 to 5 less dangerous than AC, does not cause muscle cramps and thus does not impede to let go something [1]. By another factor 2 less dangerous are currents flowing from hand to feet. Therefore dangerous accidents are much rarer with DC and lethal accidents occur only in exceptional cases. During deployment of a fire brigade, mainly the limits for continuous touch are relevant (see table 1):
Limits for hazard by continuous electrical currents (IEC 60479-1, Current from feet to left hand)
Range 1 Range 2 Range 3 Range 4 AC < 0,5 mA 0,5 - 5 mA 5 - 35 mA > 35 mA DC < 2 mA 2 - 25 mA 25 - 150 mA > 150 mA

impressive voltage, in most cases the current can not reach dangerous values and the voltage rapidly collapses under load. Experiments (at some modules Siemens M50) have shown that in the light of the full moon VOC is typically below 2% of VOC-STC and ISC is typically below 0.0002% of ISC-STC. During the night, in the light of searchlights or a fire higher irradiance values are possible, but as these are still much lower than during daylight and not evenly distributed over the whole plant, the possible short-circuit current from the PV generator itself is still much lower than ISC-STC. In a series connection of PV modules, the total current at higher voltages is mainly determined by the current of the modules with the lowest irradiance. In order to examine this problem in practical operation, in the evening of October 27th, 2010, in co-operation with the fire brigade of the city of Burgdorf, extended experiments with measurements of I-V curves of PV generators of 5 kW and 21 kW in the floodlight of two searchlights of 1 kW in close vicinity were performed (situation see fig. 1 and 2, results see fig. 3 to 6).

Table 1: Limits for hazard by electrical currents Range 1: Possibly noticeable, no physical reaction Range 2: Muscle contractions possible at touching and loosing Range 3: Strong involuntary muscle contractions possible Range 4: With increasing current cardiac fibrillation possible DC current direction hand to feet: About twice these values possible [1]!

2.

Actual danger under faint illumination during the night

Some people claim that at PV generators even under very low illumination (e.g. at full moon!) lethal voltages may occur. This is nonsense and does not take into account, that PV generators are not voltage sources, but current sources (current proportional to irradiance). Therefore at very low illumination, despite a possibly already

Fig. 1: Situation at the PV generator of sub-plant West of the PV test plant of BFH-TI under illumination by two floodlights of 1 kW on Oct. 27th, 2010 by the fire brigade of the town of Burgdorf (minimum distance 7 m). At the modules very close to the floodlights the illumination in the module plane is quite high (up to 150 Lux). At the modules and arrays in higher distances it is much lower.

26th European Photovoltaic Solar Energy Conference, Hamburg, Germany, Sept. 2011
H. Haeberlin, Luciano Borgna and Ph. Schaerf:

PV and Fire Brigade Safety:No Panic, but Realistic Assessment of Danger and Possible Countermeasures
open circuit voltage VOC will be 60% of VOC-STC and the highest possible short circuit current ISC will be 0.1% of ISC-STC.
I=f(V) and P=f(V) of a PV array with P = 5.3kW und VOC = 518V at STC
20 Distance to floodlights 14m 18
Measured curves

2.0

I2 = f(V)
16 Current I in mA 14 12 10 8 6 4 2
I1 [mA]

P2 = f(V)
Floodlights 21000W

1.8 1.6 Power P in W 1.4 1.2

P1 = f(V)

1.0 0.8

I1 = f(V)
Floodlight 1000W
I2 [mA] P1[W] P2[W]

0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 350

Fig. 2: Closer view during illumination of the PV generator of sub-plant West of the PV test plant of BFH-TI under illumination by two floodlights of 1 kW. Despite the use of two strong floodlights beaming in two slightly different directions, it is relatively difficult to obtain a somewhat homogenous irradiance into the array plane. Fig. 3 to fig. 6 show some I-V-curves of PV arrays measured during these illumination experiments. In fig. 3 to 5 an array of 5.28 kW with 96 modules Siemens M55 was tested, consisting of 4 parallel strings with 24 modules in series (fig. 3 and 4) and 2 parallel strings with 48 modules in series (fig. 5).
I=f(V) and P=f(V) of a PV array with P = 5.3kW und VOC = 518V at STC
60 Distance to floodlights 7m and 14m 50
I14 [mA] I7 [mA] P14[W] P7[W]

0 0 50 100 150 200 Voltage V in V 250 300

PV Laboratory BFH-TI, Prof. Dr. H. Hberlin

Fig. 4: I-V- und P-V-curves of a PV-array of 5.3 kWp consisting of 96 modules Siemens M55 (4 strings of 24 modules in series, ISC-STC = 13.6A) under illumination by one or two halogen floodlights of 1 kW at a distance of 14 m. As expected, ISC is roughly proportional to the power of the floodlight at the same distance. With 1 kW at 14 m, the voltage is already below 50% of VOC-STC.
I=f(V) and P=f(V) of a PV array with P = 5.3kW und VOC = 1036V at STC
10 Distance to floodlights 14m 9 8 7 Current I in mA
Converted Curves

2.0 1.8

I = f(V)

P = f(V)
Foodlights 21000W

1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 Power P in W

6 5

P = f(V)
4 3 0.8 0.6

Current I in mA

Power P in W

40

I7 = f(V)

P7 = f(V) Floodlights 21kW / 7m P14 = f(V)

Measured curves

I = f(V)
2 1 0 0 50 100 150 200 250

Floodlights 1000W
I1 [mA] I2 [mA] P1[W] P2[W]

0.4 0.2

30

20

0.0 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 PV Laboratory BFH-TI, Prof. Dr. H. Hberlin Voltage V in V

I14 = f(V)
10 1

Floodlights 21kW / 14m

0 0 50 100 150 0 200 250 300 350 400 PV Laboratory BFH-TI, Prof. Dr. H. Hberlin Voltage V in V

Fig. 3: I-V- und P-V-curves of a PV-array of 5.3 kWp consisting of 96 modules Siemens M55 (4 strings of 24 modules in series, ISC-STC = 13.6A) under illumination by two halogen floodlights of 1 kW at a distance of 7 m and 14 m. As at 7 m the unevenness of the illumination is higher due to greater variations in distance and incident angle (unavoidable in close vicinity of floodlights), ISC at 7 m is only about 3 times the value of ISC at 14 m, somewhat less than what you would theoretically expect (4 times, see explanation below).

Fig. 5: I-V- und P-V-curves of a PV-array of 5.3 kWp consisting of 96 modules Siemens M55 (2 strings of 48 modules in series, ISC-STC = 6.8A) under illumination by one or two halogen floodlights of 1 kW at a distance of 14 m (calculated from measurements of fig. 4 for this case). Voltages are twice as high, but currents only half as high as in fig. 4.
I=f(V) and P=f(V) of PV generators of P = 5.28 kW and P = 21.12 kW at STC
70 Measured curves 60

2 floodlights of 1000W Distance to closest array 6.2m PV plant 21.12 kW, VOC-STC = 690V (12 strings of 32 modules M55 in series)

7 6 5 4
I1 [mA] I2 [mA] P1[W] P2[W]

I = f(V)
50 Current I in mA

40

I = f(V)
30 20 10 0 0 50 100

P = f(V)

3 2 1

The illumination from a floodlight is proportional to its power and inversely proportional to the square of the distance. Therefore, based on the measurements of fig. 3 to 5 (tests with the fire brigade at plant sizes typical for single family houses), it can be concluded, that in the night under artificial illumination of a disaster location, by maintaining a certain minimum distance from the PV array (e.g. 12 m for a floodlight of 1 kW and 17 m for 2 kW), the highest possible

PV-plant 5,28 kW, VOC-STC = 518V (4 strings of 24 modules M55 in series)

150

0 200 250 300 350 400 PV Laboratory BFH-TI, Prof. Dr. H. Voltage V in V

Fig. 6: I-V- und P-V-curves of a PV-array of 21.1 kWp consisting of 384 modules Siemens M55 (12 strings of 32 modules in series) under illumination by one or two halogen floodlights of 1 kW at a distance of 6.2 m in comparison to fig. 3 and 4.

Power P in W

P = f(V)

26th European Photovoltaic Solar Energy Conference, Hamburg, Germany, Sept. 2011
H. Haeberlin, Luciano Borgna and Ph. Schaerf:

PV and Fire Brigade Safety:No Panic, but Realistic Assessment of Danger and Possible Countermeasures
In addition in fig. 6 some further measurements with a larger array with 12 parallel strings consisting of 32 modules in series were performed. As in each string a part of the modules (at least 8 or more) are farther away from the floodlights, compared to fig. 3 only ISC increases a little bit, but VOC remains nearly constant despite the higher number of modules per string. For larger PV arrays it is hardly possible to produce a sufficiently homogenous irradiance in the array plane. Therefore the danger increases by far not proportional to installed PV power. Thus it can be concluded that in the night under artificial illumination of a PV array alone (without connection to a PV inverter!) the danger of a significant electrical hazard is relatively low. Also the possible currents are so low, that an ignition and maintenance of an electrical arc is hardly feasible. Similar results were also obtained during a similar test campaign during the night in France [5]. However, in an operational grid-connected PV plant (with closed DC disconnect switch at the inverter!) the input capacitor of the inverter (up to a few 1000 F at single phase inverters) can be charged to a certain voltage. But due to the load of the input voltage monitoring circuits of the inverter, the voltage will be even lower than the VOC voltage of the PV array, which is already significantly reduced due to the very low illumination (details about the problems created by inverter input capacitors see chapter 3). As mentioned before, the currents in the light of floodlights in the night are very low. If the DC side is switched off by a serial fire brigade switch SFB at the PV array, between the array and SFB there is still the voltage V and current I according to the I-V-curve of the PV array under the actual irradiance conditions. By opening of additional switches SFBS in the strings it is possible to reduce the voltage of each substring to < 120 V. If SDC is closed and without a diode (green) at the inverter input, there is the voltage on the input capacitor CI on the DC line at the inverter side of SFB. After opening of SFB and/or SFBS the DC input monitoring circuit DC-IM slowly discharges CI. This may last a few seconds to a few minutes, during which there is still a certain, slowly decreasing voltage VL on the DC line, which may still be a certain danger in the beginning. There is also a technical solution: If there is a diode at the input (or if SDC or an inverter input relay is opened at the same time), after opening of SFB the voltage VL on the DC line immediately drops to 0. In case of a fire or another catastrophic event, some manufacturers want to short-circuit the modules directly at the module with switches SSCM. This solution may work at PV plants with only a few parallel strings without a connection to an inverter. However, in a PV system with an inverter, these short-circuit switches SSCM (especially the last one which closes in a string!) will be stressed and probably be damaged by a very high impulse discharge current iC from capacitor CI (and possibly also by reverse currents from neighbouring strings which are not yet short-circuited). The energy released can be significant (e.g. stored energy on a capacitor charged to 700 V: 490 J!). A remedy is possible by means of a diode (green) at or in the inverter, by means of a simultaneous opening of SDC, an inverter input relay or input contactor or a string diode in each string.

3 Technical solutions to reduce PV voltages in case of deployment of a fire brigade

In an operational PV plant (with closed DC disconnect switch at inverter input) in most cases there is an input capacitor CI directly at the input connectors (depending on inverter architecture, up to a few 100 F in 3-phase-, up to a few 1000 F in 1-phase-inverters), which is charged to the operating voltage. In parallel to this CI there is in most cases a DC-input monitoring circuit (DCIM). Fig. 7 shows the principal schematic of a PV plant with different possibilities to reduce the voltage in case of a fire. With the same schematic, the influence of CI on the situation on the DC line can be examined.

3.1 Typical time dependent behaviour of the voltage VL at the input capacitor CI (and possibly at the DC line)
As already mentioned, after switching off the DC side by means of a fire brigade switch SFB, there is still a voltage VL on the DC input of the inverter during a certain time, because of the charge stored on the input capacitor CI. In order to get some practical experience concerning this problem, appropriate tests at seven inverters from different manufacturers and different inverter architectures (single phase and three phase, with and without transformer) were performed in our laboratory. Several tests were carried out (case 1 to 3 with rated power): (1) Disconnection of the utility grid before opening of fire brigade switch SFB (delayed opening of SFB) (2) Simultaneous disconnection of utility grid and opening of SFB (3) Opening of fire brigade switch SFB alone (disconnection of utility grid later) (4) Simulated switching off at night under strong illumination by floodlights (ISC = 60 mA) Fig. 8 shows a schematic diagram of the test circuit used for these tests.

iSCM SSCM SFBS Fire brigade switch iSCM SSCM SFB DC-Line iC SDC VL DC disconnect switch

DC
iDC CI
DCIM

SAC

AC disconnect switch

AC

Utility grid

Fig. 7: Principal schematic diagram of a PV plant with different possibilities to reduce the voltage on the DC side in case of a fire. Opening of the DC separation switch SDC interrupts the current on the DC side, extinguishes possible DC arcs and separates CI from the DC line. However, on the DC line there is still a voltage V (and under load also a current I) according to the I-V-curve of the PV array under the actual irradiance conditions.

26th European Photovoltaic Solar Energy Conference, Hamburg, Germany, Sept. 2011
H. Haeberlin, Luciano Borgna and Ph. Schaerf:

PV and Fire Brigade Safety:No Panic, but Realistic Assessment of Danger and Possible Countermeasures
Convert 6T (three phase, no transformer) from Sputnik AT5000 (single phase, no transformer) from Sunways IG 40 (single phase, with transformer) from Fronius SMC 8000TL (single phase, no transformer) from SMA

Fig.8: Test circuit used for tests of switching-off behaviour. Thus besides theoretical deliberations also an assessment based on practical measurements, how long owing to the remaining charge on input capacitors dangerous voltages may still be present. In case (1), upon disconnection of the utility grid the inverter immediately shuts off and CI is practically charged to VOC. After opening of SFB in fig. 7, capacitor CI is slowly discharged by the DC input monitoring circuit (DC-IM in fig. 7, at high voltages mostly somewhat slower, at low voltages somewhat faster). If the input monitoring circuit is powered by a relatively efficient DC-DC buck converter and needs only a few Watts of power, an estimation of the duration of such a feed period from the input capacitor is possible. For a stored energy of 500 J and a power consumption of 5 W the maximum possible duration is < 100 s (CI can not be discharged completely). In case (2), upon disconnection of the utility grid the inverter immediately shuts off and discharge of CI starts at the voltage VMPP < VOC, where the inverter was operating immediately before disconnection, because SFB opened simultaneously with the AC disconnect switch. In case (3), upon disconnection of the utility grid the inverter still runs on for a short time and discharges CI to the minimum possible DC operating voltage, before the inverter shuts off. Afterwards capacitor is again slowly further discharged by the DC input monitoring circuit (DC-IM in fig. 7). This case seems to be ideal in most cases for a rapid discharge of CI to safe voltages. In case (4), the inverter is not yet running in most cases and only checks from time to time, if the voltage across CI (considerably reduced due to low illumination on the PV generator) can be sufficiently loaded in order to start normal operation. Therefore in this case the discharge of capacitor CI starts from a lower initial voltage and takes not such a long time. From the inverters still available at the PV laboratory of BFH-TI, a total of seven inverters from different manufacturers were used, which were not in use in longterm monitoring projects: - Solarmax 15MT (three phase, no transformer, pilot production model) from Sputnik - Solarmax 6000C (single phase, no transformer) from Sputnik - Sunny Boy 3800 (single phase, with transformer) from SMA

Due to space limitations it is not possible to indicate all test results. Therefore as typical examples only the measurement results of the three phase inverter Solarmax 15MT and of the single phase inverter SMC8000TL are presented. Three phase inverters need only a relatively small input capacitor CI, whose main task is the equalisation of remaining unbalances of the power injected into the different phases. The input capacitor is usually discharged quite rapidly and the voltage at them drops down to uncritical values within a few seconds (see fig. 9 to 11, 15 and 16). Most single phase devices with simple internal architecture need much higher input capacitors. If the input capacitor CI is too small, the MPP tracking efficiency MPPT is compromised [2], [4]. Therefore the SMC8000TL with a rated power of 8 kW has a quite large input capacitor. Thus at this inverter much more time is needed (up to 90 s) until the voltage at CI has dropped to uncritical values (see fig. 12 to 14 and 17). Fig. 15, 16 and 17 show the situation under simulated low illumination during the night (e.g. by means of floodlights, see chapter 2). In all these cases, the inverters do not inject power into the grid, but only check from time to time if the available power from the array is high enough to start operation.

Fig. 9: Case (1): Disconnection of utility grid and delayed (10s) disconnection of SFB at a three-phase inverter SolarMax 15MT at an operating voltage of 650 V, VOC = 810 V and ISC = 25 A. CH1: DC-voltage [200V/div] (upper curve); CH2: Trigger signal [10V/Div] (lower curve); Time scale: 5s/Div. At this inverter with a relatively low CI the DC voltage at CI has dropped already after 6.8s to values below 120 V after opening of the fire brigade switch SFB.

26th European Photovoltaic Solar Energy Conference, Hamburg, Germany, Sept. 2011
H. Haeberlin, Luciano Borgna and Ph. Schaerf:

PV and Fire Brigade Safety:No Panic, but Realistic Assessment of Danger and Possible Countermeasures

AC switch and switch SFB off

Fig. 10:
Case (2): Simultaneous disconnection of utility grid and fire brigade switch SFB at a three-phase inverter SolarMax 15MT at an operating voltage of 650 V, VOC = 810 V and ISC = 25 A. CH1: DC-voltage [200V/div] (upper curve); CH2: Trigger signal [10V/Div] (lower curve); Time scale: 1s/Div. Both switches (SFB and SAC) in fig. 7 are opened when the trigger signal drops to 0. It takes only about 4.8 seconds, until the voltage at CI has dropped to 120 V.

Fig. 12: Case (1): Disconnection of utility grid and delayed (10s) disconnection of SFB at a single-phase inverter SMC8000TL at an operating voltage of 525 V, VOC = 656 V and ISC = 16 A. CH1: DC-voltage [100V/div] (upper curve); CH2: Trigger signal [5V/Div] (lower curve); Time scale: 20s/Div. In this big single phase inverter a high input capacitor CI is needed. Therefore it takes about 89 s until the DC voltage at CI has dropped to values below 120 V after opening of the fire brigade switch SFB.

Fig. 11: Case (3): Disconnection of fire brigade switch SFB while the utility grid is still connected (SAC closed) at a three-phase inverter SolarMax 15MT at an operating voltage of 650 V, VOC = 810 V and ISC = 25 A. CH1: DC-voltage [200V/div] (upper curve); CH2: Trigger signal [5V/Div] (lower curve); Time scale: 2s/Div. Only the fire brigade switch SFB in fig. 7 is opened when the trigger signal drops to 0. It takes about 8.5 seconds, until the voltage at CI has dropped to 120 V.

Fig. 13: Case (2): Simultaneous disconnection of utility grid and opening of SFB at a single phase inverter SMC 8000TL (8 kW) at an operating voltage of 525 V, VOC = 656 V and ISC = 16 A. CH1: DC-voltage VL [100V/div] (upper curve); CH2: Trigger signal [5V/Div] (lower curve); Time scale: 20 s/Div. Both switches (SFB and SAC) in fig. 4 are opened when the trigger signal drops to 0. It takes about 87 seconds, until the voltage at CI has dropped to 120 V.

26th European Photovoltaic Solar Energy Conference, Hamburg, Germany, Sept. 2011
H. Haeberlin, Luciano Borgna and Ph. Schaerf:

PV and Fire Brigade Safety:No Panic, but Realistic Assessment of Danger and Possible Countermeasures

Switch SFB off

Fig. 14: Case (3): Disconnection of fire brigade switch SFB while the utility grid is still connected (SAC closed) at a single-phase inverter SMC 8000TL (8 kW) at an operating voltage of 525 V, VOC = 656 V and ISC = 16 A. CH1: DC-voltage [100V/div] (upper curve); CH2: Trigger signal [5V/Div] (lower curve); Time scale: 20s/Div. Only the fire brigade switch SFB in fig. 7 is opened when the trigger signal drops to 0. It takes about 40 seconds, until the voltage at CI has dropped to 120 V.

Fig. 16: Case (4): Evolution of inverter input voltage VL during simulated operation under low illumination during the night at a three-phase inverter SolarMax 15MT. At first the AC disconnect switch SAC is opened, then 30 s later the fire brigade switch SFB. PV generator data: VOC = 500 V, but ISC = 20 mA. The inverter does not inject power into the grid. Due to the smaller ISC and the load of the DC input monitoring circuit, VL is considerably lower than VOC. CH1: DC-voltage [100V/div] (upper curve); CH2: Trigger signal [5V/Div] (lower curve); Time scale: 10s/Div. At this three-phase inverter with a relatively small CI, in this case it takes only about 1 s, until the voltage at CI has dropped to 120 V.

Fig. 15: Case (4): Evolution of inverter input voltage VL during simulated operation under low illumination during the night (e.g. by means of floodlights) at a three-phase inverter SolarMax 15MT. At first the AC disconnect switch SAC is opened, then 30 s later the fire brigade switch SFB. PV generator data: VOC = 500 V, ISC = 60 mA. As the available power is too low, the inverter does not inject power into the grid. Due to the load of the DC input monitoring circuit, VL is a little lower than VOC. CH1: DC-voltage [100V/div] (upper curve); CH2: Trigger signal [5V/Div] (lower curve); Time scale: 10s/Div. At this three-phase inverter with a relatively small CI it takes only about 2 s, until the voltage at CI has dropped to 120 V.

Fig. 17: Case (4): Evolution of inverter input voltage VL during simulated operation under low illumination during the night at a single-phase inverter SMC 8000TL. At first the AC disconnect switch SAC is opened, then 30 s later the fire brigade switch SFB. PV generator data: VOC = 328 V, ISC = 60 mA. The inverter does not inject power into the grid. Due to the load of the DC input monitoring circuit, VL is a little lower than VOC. CH1: DC-voltage [100V/div] (upper curve); CH2: Trigger signal [5V/Div] (lower curve); Time scale: 10s/Div. At this big single-phase inverter with a high CI it takes still about 34 s, until the voltage at CI has dropped to 120 V.

26th European Photovoltaic Solar Energy Conference, Hamburg, Germany, Sept. 2011
H. Haeberlin, Luciano Borgna and Ph. Schaerf:

PV and Fire Brigade Safety:No Panic, but Realistic Assessment of Danger and Possible Countermeasures

3.2 Fire brigade switches in series connection

At PV plants with inverters a fire brigade switch SFB with undervoltage activation (UA) can be placed in close vicinity to the PV array (see fig. 18). It will open upon operation of a special disconnect button or after switching off the AC line in the building by the fire brigade. Devices presently on the market need a manual reset after each (even short) outages of the line (e.g. during thunderstorms). At least short outages should not activate these switches. In order to avoid problems with overvoltage at nearby lightning strokes, the control line must be placed immediately at the DC line [2]. A good idea would be to combine a fire brigade switch with an arc detector [2], [3] (fig. 19). Retrofits at existing PV plants would also be possible.
Fire brigade switch
(e.g. SOL30-Safety from EATON)

3.4 Power optimisers / special module monitoring devices at module level

Several manufacturers offer so called power optimisers, which try to get the maximum possible power out of the PV array even under partial shading conditions. They communicate with a special inverter or control device (e.g. with PLC or wireless) and short the modules with short-circuit switches SSCM in case of a problem (fig. 7). However, as mentioned before, this can cause problems because high impulse current from these capacitors may destroy these SSCM-switches. Other manufacturers produce special module monitoring devices with similar features (but without the power optimising function) with special control lines, which may also cause problems in case of a nearby lightning current [2]. To overcome the problems with short-circuit switches, possibly string diodes would be needed. A significant problem is that you have to rely completely on the very manufacturer of power optimiser or the monitoring device. Testing, maintenance and long-term reliability of such a PV plant is much more difficult. In case of problems with the plant, who is responsible and deals with them: The module manufacturer, the manufacturer of the power optimiser, the installer or the inverter manufacturer and how do they test such a plant to fix a problem?

(1000 V, 30 A)

Fire brigade switch

UA is activated even during short line outages, afterwards manual reset!

+ + Auxillary contacts
Undervoltage activation (UA)

+ -

DC AC

V<

(230 V AC)

Inverter

Remote activation for fire brigade

Fig. 18: Situation in house with PV protected by fire brigade switch close to PV generator.

Situation during deployment of fire brigade

Idea: Fire brigade switch + arc detector

+ + +

Unlike ordinary people, firemen have efficient protecting cloths (gloves, heavy boots). Moreover, PV arrays are not directly grounded, but over a resistor with a relatively high resistance. The water jet has also an additional resistance. Fig. 9 shows the situation of a fireman touching a part of a PV array that is (accidently or intentionally) grounded (at left real situation, at right electrical schematic).
RAG RGT IB IB RT V=f(I) IB RB IB IB V=f(I) VT RT (0,8 - 2 k) RB RAG RGT

AD
Auxillary contacts
If current I rises into the region of short circuit current ISC, which is proportional to irradiance G, V drops down quickly!

IB =

V RAG+RGT+RT+RB

V<
Undervoltage activation (UA)

(230 V AC or 24 V DC)

Fig. 19: Fire brigade switch with integrated arc detector

3.3 Module inverters

If module inverters are used, no DC wiring with high voltages is needed, there is only a usual AC wiring, which is deenergised immediately upon disconnection of the AC line. In this case an important issue is long-term reliability of the devices used and the long-term maintenance of such plants will probably be more difficult.

Fig. 20: Situation if a fireman touches a PV array V Voltage at PV array RAG Resistance of connection to PV array (including internal resistance of PV array and resistance array to ground) RGT Resistance of gloves and tools RT Total resistance of body and extremities (typical 800) RB Resistance of boots and earth resistance IB Body current In addition to the total body resistance RT of the fireman other resistances are connected in series, which limit the body current IB. With appropriate protecting cloths and correct proceeding also for voltages, which are considerably higher than 120V, no real danger should arise. Discussions with responsible officers of the

26th European Photovoltaic Solar Energy Conference, Hamburg, Germany, Sept. 2011
H. Haeberlin, Luciano Borgna and Ph. Schaerf:

PV and Fire Brigade Safety:No Panic, but Realistic Assessment of Danger and Possible Countermeasures
professional fire brigade of the city of Bern have shown that they often fight fires in buildings without prior disconnection of the AC lines 230V/400V without significant hazard to the firemen. It is clear that firemen have to use their standard protecting cloths. As DC is about 4 to 5 times less dangerous than AC and does not impede to let go a conductor touched [1], it can be concluded that as far as electrical shock hazard is concerned, a deployment of a fire brigade in the building with a PV plant with DC voltages up to 900V to 1000V is comparable to a deployment in a building with live 230V/400V line. If fires are extinguished by means of water, with the recommended distance for low voltage up to 1 kV AC and 1.5 kV DC (1 m with spray jet, 5 m with full jet) there is even an additional safety margin. As mentioned in chapter 4, it is always possible to extinguish fires with water if the minimum distances for low voltage according to the safety standards are respected (1 m with spray jet, 5 m with full jet). It is important that always proper protecting cloths, gloves and tools with long insulated handles are used. Of course the remaining non-electrical risks have also to be considered (e.g. sudden glass breakage, PV modules sliding down from roofs or falling from faades). In the night the risks are much lower even in the remaining light of floodlights illuminating the PV modules. Moonlight alone is harmless. Another, rarer danger, which must also be considered, occurs in case of floods: At inverters in inundated rooms especially during daytime there is a higher risk by eventually still energised DC lines of the PV plant. At bare metal parts (e.g. clamps, damaged conductors) the water may be dissolved by electrolysis. Thus gasses are generated (oxyhydrogen) and locally the conductivity of the water is increased. For such cases a disconnection possibility by means of a fire brigade switch SFB close to the modules would be very useful. Inundated areas should not be acceded and a sufficient distance to the inverter or energised clamps should be maintained unless the AC side and the DC side were disconnected by switched outside the inundated zone.

5. Conclusions
With the technical solutions presented in chapter 3 it is possible in principle to increase safety for fire fighters, if in case of a catastrophic event (e.g. after many years or even decades!) the technology used actually does its job as planned (in the heat caused by the fire and despite the damage that might have been caused by it at the protecting equipment itself!). This long-term reliability problem might be critical especially for electronic solutions in the modules. But also with mechanical solutions it can not be guaranteed, if a fire brigade switch damaged by heat is able to disconnect all electric lines in a safe manner or if there will be remaining connections that originated accidentally. As a first step to reduce the risk it would make sense to mark all buildings with PV plants in a suitable manner (e.g. at the house connection box, where electric AC lines enter the building), because a danger, of which you are aware of and take the necessary precautions, is much less threatening. In order to minimise the remaining risk, suitable means of a reduction of the danger should be used (e.g. by opening the DC disconnect switch SDC directly at or near the inverter and also a possibly available fire brigade switch SFB in fig. 7). However, electronic or mechanical switches for short-circuiting modules should only be used after disconnection of DC switch SDC or if (string) diodes are used (problem explained in the beginning of chapter 3). If only a fire brigade switch SFB could be disconnected, but not the DC input switch SDC and in case of missing input diode(s), it would make sense to wait especially at large single phase inverters during 2 to 5 minutes, during which the voltage at input capacitor CI can decrease to sufficiently low values. Especially at small PV plants on single family houses (e.g. up to 10 kW), during a correct procedure of the fire brigade crew (use of proper protection cloths) even without special protection measures, there is no increased risk of an electrical shock hazard than if there is a deployment in a building without disconnected 230 V / 400 V electric AC power supply. According to officers of the professional fire brigade of the city of Bern this creates no problems for well trained professional members of the fire brigade.

Important Notice
Information contained in this paper is believed to be accurate. This paper was written with great care based on our very long experience with PV systems technology and contains the actual state of knowledge of the authors about this topic. All presently available documents in our laboratory about electrical safety, contacts with PV researchers in Germany and recommendations of fire brigades for deployments at PV plants and discussions with responsible representatives of fire brigades were considered. However, errors can never be completely excluded. Therefore any liability in a legal sense for correctness and completeness of the information or from any damage that might result from its use is formally disclaimed.

Acknowledgements
Thanks go to all the institutions that gave financial support for these projects. The work described in this paper was funded by Swiss Federal Office of Energy (BFE), BKW, Bern, the office of water and energy (WEA) in Bern, PSEL (Projekt- und Studienfonds der Elektrizittswirtschaft), GMS, c/o BKW, Bern and Localnet AG, Burgdorf. Thanks go also to the local fire brigade in the town of Burgdorf, who came with a special vehicle and their usual floodlights for realistic tests at the PV plant on the building of our division of electrical engineering in the evening of October 27th, 2010. The illustrative measurements under realistic conditions described in chapter 2 in this paper would not have been possible without their equipment and their valuable help.

26th European Photovoltaic Solar Energy Conference, Hamburg, Germany, Sept. 2011
H. Haeberlin, Luciano Borgna and Ph. Schaerf:

PV and Fire Brigade Safety:No Panic, but Realistic Assessment of Danger and Possible Countermeasures

References
[1] IEC/TS 60479: Technical Specification: Effects of current on human beings and livestock General aspects (Ed. 4.0, 2005-07). Heinrich Hberlin: "Photovoltaik - Strom aus Sonnenlicht fr Verbundnetz und Inselanlagen". VDE-Verlag, Berlin, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8007-3205-0 (in German, English edition should be available from Wiley publishers in late 2011 / beginning of 2012). H. Hberlin, M. Real: "Arc Detector for Remote Detection of Dangerous Arcs on the DC Side of PV Plants ". 22nd EU PV Conf., Milano, Italy, September 2007. H. Hberlin, L. Borgna, M. Kmpfer, U. Zwahlen: "Total Efficiency tot A new Quantity for better Characterisation of Grid-Connected PV Inverters". 20th EU PV Conf., Barcelona, Spain, June 2005. Grard Moine, Anne-Marie Serve: "Compte Rendue dEssais Campagne de tests nocturnes sur la plateforme photovoltaque Qualiphoton de Transenergie". Internal report in October 2010 from the engineering company Transenergie, F-69130 Ecully, France, www.transenergy.fr, e-mail: sun@transenergy.fr. No known publication about these tests yet, received by personal contacts in March 2011.

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Further information about other PV activities of the PV laboratory of BFH-TI: http://www.pvtest.ch (German and English).