Myanmar: A Pre-Election Primer Prepared for the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum by Richard Horsey1 18 October 2010

I. Introduction With the Myanmar election only three weeks away, this paper aims to give a concise overview of the state of play: the constituencies, political parties and candidates. It also attempts to predict the range of possible outcomes of the ballot. Any such prediction is extremely difficult, but it is possible to sketch certain plausible scenarios, and rule out certain others. Thus, it is clear that a repeat of the 1990 democratic landslide is statistically impossible. It is also difficult to say whether there will be systematic irregularities on election day that would influence the outcome. However, while there will undoubtedly be some irregularities, a fraudulent vote count is on balance unlikely both because of the decentralized and semi-public nature of the count, and because the odds have already been stacked in favour of the military/USDP. The analysis provided in section IV suggests that there can be no democratic majority in either house of the national legislature, but that, unless there is major ballot fraud on election day, the military/USDP bloc is also unlikely to have a majority in either house. The most likely outcome is that the National Unity Party (NUP) will hold the balance of power between the two dispensations. This would give the NUP a powerful role, and it is unclear how it will use its legislative influence. The party is undoubtedly part of the political establishment, but its policies are unlikely to coincide with those of the present regime on all issues it would not be surprising if it decided to push for one of the presidential nominees to be drawn from its ranks, for example. If the NUP does end up holding the balance of power in the legislatures, this may mean that lawmaking is dominated by a conservative, authoritarian-leaning nationalism; but it would certainly not be merely a facsimile of the present regime in civilian clothing. II. Constituencies The Election Commission designated a total of 1163 constituencies for this electoral cycle,2 as follows: Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House): Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper House): 14 State/Region legislatures: 330 constituencies 168 constituencies 665 constituencies (636 township constituencies,3 plus 29 special ethnic constituencies)

1 Richard Horsey is an independent political analyst and a former ILO liaison officer in Myanmar; he is fluent in the Burmese language. 2 For a detailed analysis of constituencies, see Richard Horsey, Countdown to the Myanmar Elections, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum Briefing Paper, 24 August 2010.

On 16 September 2010, the Election Commission announced that elections would not take place in certain ethnic areas of the country as they are in no position to hold free and fair elections. Most of these places are insecure or conflict areas. According to these announcements, no voting will take place in four whole townships (controlled by the United Wa State Army ceasefire group) and some 300 village-tracts. These areas are spread across thirty-two townships. This means that only six constituencies have been affected in toto: the four lower house constituencies corresponding to the excluded Wa townships (no State/Region constituencies were designated for these townships), and two State/Region constituencies in Kachin State (Ingyangyang 2 and Sumprabum 2). Therefore, on 7 November elections will take place in 1157 constituencies, as follows: Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House): 326 constituencies Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper House): 168 constituencies 14 State/Region legislatures: 663 constituencies In terms of population, the 300 excluded village tracts have at most 190,000 eligible voters.4 The four excluded Wa townships have at most an additional 150,000.5 Together, this represents about one percent of all eligible voters in the country. In terms of ethnic exclusion, the refusal of the Election Commission to register the three Kachin parties, and its subsequent rejection of independent candidates linked to these parties, is a far more serious issue (in the case of the Wa, it was not so much that the Election Commission excluded them; rather, the United Wa State Army indicated that, due to its rejection of the 2008 constitution, and in particular the provisions for the Wa region, it would not allow elections to take place in the areas under its military control). In 1990, the areas that were excluded from the ballot for security reasons were much more extensive. At that time, elections did not take place in seven out of 492 constituencies. However, much larger geographical areas (and hence populations) could not participate due to security reasons, since at that time, significant swathes of the borderlands were under the territorial control of armed opposition groups, and were therefore never designated as separate constituencies.

That is, two constituencies per township, except that no State/Region constituencies were designated for the eight townships of Naypyitaw (which are Union territory under the direct administration of the president) or for the four townships in Shan State under the control of the United Wa State Army ceasefire group (which may also be declared Union territory on grounds of security). There are 330 townships in Myanmar, so the total State/Region constituencies is (330 8 4) = 318 x 2 = 636 constituencies. This is the number listed in Union Election Commission Notification No. 88/2010 (11 August 2010). 4 The total number of village tracts/wards in the country is 16,000, so 300 represent less than two percent. These are mostly remote, mountainous, conflict affected parts of the country, with a population density far below the national average. Assuming the population density is one-third of the average, the number of eligible voters would be ((300/16,000) x 30,000,000)/3 = 188,000. 5 The population of the Wa special region (six townships) is about 450,000 (UNODC, 2006). Assuming even population density, the four excluded townships would have a population of 300,000. Assuming eligible voters make up fifty percent of the population (the national average), that would give 150,000 voters.

III. Political parties and candidates A total of thirty-seven political parties will compete in the elections (see list in appendix 1). Ten of the forty-seven parties who applied to the Election Commission for registration6 were not approved: 1. Kachin State Progressive Party 2. Northern Shan State Progressive Party 3. United Democracy Party (Kachin State) 4. People's New Society Party 5. All National Races Unity and Development Party (Kayah State) 6. Mro National Party constituencies 7. Myanmar Democracy Congress 8. Myanmar New Society Democratic Party 9. Regional Development Party (Pyay) 10. Union Kayin League Not approved by Election Commission Not approved by Election Commission Not approved by Election Commission Not approved by Election Commission Failed to complete registration process Failed to complete registration process Failed to contest minimum 3 constituencies Failed to contest minimum 3 constituencies Failed to contest minimum 3 constituencies Failed to contest minimum 3 constituencies

Of the thirty-seven political parties that will compete, most are small regional parties which have nominated few candidates. The list in appendix 1 gives details on how many approved candidates each party will field. These numbers are based on information provided by the parties themselves, and are incomplete, since the Election Commission has never published a consolidated list of approved candidates for the country as a whole. It can be seen that most parties have fielded relatively few candidates. The Union Solidarity and Development Party and the National Unity Party are each contesting almost all constituencies, and each have more candidates that all other parties combined. This means that there will be very few constituencies where the USDP runs unopposed. However, in many constituencies particularly rural regional constituencies in central Myanmar the choice will be between two candidates representing the party linked with the current regime (the USDP) and the party linked with the pre-1988 socialist regime (the NUP). In the absence of an official national list of the candidates running in each constituency, it is impossible to give a definitive analysis. However, an unofficial list of candidates for the upper, lower and local seats in Yangon Region is available, and can give some idea of how things are playing out in the most important political region. Yangon Region candidate distribution: Total seats: 149 (12 Upper House, 45 Lower House, 92 Region legislature) Total candidates: 454 (48 Upper House, 195 Lower House, 211 Region legislature) Parties contesting: 14 Independent candidates: 26 Seats with only one candidate: 1 (no ballot; candidate wins by default) Seats with only USDP and NUP candidates: 63 (only in Region legislature)
6

See list in appendix 1 of Countdown to the Myanmar Elections, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum Briefing Paper, 24 August 2010.

This is the part of the country where political competition is most intense. Even here, though, voters will have only a choice of a USDP or an NUP candidate in two-thirds of the seats in the Region legislature. For upper and lower house seats, however, there will be considerably more choice, with a candidate from at least one of the main democratic parties (the Democratic Party and the National Democratic Force) standing in nearly all of these constituencies. A full breakdown is given in appendix 2. By the numbers: comparison with 1990 2010 Number of constituencies:7 Number of constituencies in which elections held: Number of parties applied: Number of parties contesting: Total number of candidates: Average number of candidates per constituency: Total number of eligible voters: Voter turnout (incl. invalid votes) IV. Possible outcomes It is clear that in the run-up to the elections, the playing field has been tilted strongly in favour of the USDP. Beyond this, it is impossible to know how much manipulation of the vote will occur on election day. It is very likely that there will be individual instances of intimidation, manipulation and fraud. But it is quite conceivable that there will be no systematic attempts to rig the count in favour of the USDP, for two main reasons. First, the numbers are already stacked heavily in favour of the regime: twenty-five percent of legislative seats are reserved for military appointees, the USDP is contesting almost all constituencies, and the main democratic parties are contesting less than half. This means that a repeat of the embarrassing 1990 democratic landslide is statistically impossible. Second, the election laws provide for counting of the votes at each individual polling station, in the presence of candidates or their representatives and members of the public. This makes it rather difficult to carry out a major manipulation of the count of the kind witnessed in the 2008 referendum. The most obvious opportunity for manipulation is with absentee voting, but it remains to be seen whether the number of such votes will be large enough to significantly alter the outcome of the election as a whole; prima facie, it seems unlikely. In the absence of opinion polls or other reliable ways to quantify voter sentiment, it is impossible to attempt any detailed predictions of the election outcome. However, it is possible, on the basis of certain reasonable assumptions, to sketch two scenarios a best and worst case, from the perspective of the democratic parties and the establishment parties. The numbers in what follows are rough approximations. Although the Election Commission has released no official candidate lists, it is known that the USDP and NUP
7

1990 492 485 235 93 2296 4.7 20,800,000 72.6%

1163 1157 47 37 c. 3153 2.6 c. 30,000,000 ?

There are 1171 constitutionally-mandated constituencies. However, the Election Commission did not designate eight Shan State Hluttaw constituencies for four townships in the Wa area, giving a total of 1163 for this election cycle.

will compete in almost all constituencies, and most of the other parties have made the lists of their own candidates available. Taken together, this information can allow some general conclusions to be drawn. Scenario 1: Democratic maximalist This scenario assumes that the USDP and NUP will be systematically punished by voters: in any constituency where there is a third choice, that candidate will win. In those constituencies where there are only USDP and NUP candidates, each party is assumed to have an equal chance of winning, with the choice coming down to the reputation of the individual candidate. On this scenario, the approximate division of national legislative seats will be as follows: Upper House (Amyotha Hluttaw): Military 25%; USDP 14%; NUP 11%; other parties 50% Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw): Military 25%; USDP 19%; NUP 18%; other parties 38% This could give other parties a wafer-thin majority in the upper house, assuming that they won every seat where a third-party candidate was contesting (unlikely) and assuming that all such candidates would vote as a bloc (also unlikely). Note, however, that the military and USDP together also fail to have a majority in the upper house. This implies that on this scenario, the NUP would be likely to hold the balance of power. In the lower house, it is statistically impossible for the other parties to obtain a majority. On the assumption that the USDP and NUP equally share the seats where only they are contesting, and win no other seats, the military and USDP together will also fail to reach a majority. Again, the NUP would hold the balance of power. On the important question of choosing presidential nominees and electing the president, the situation is slightly different. Recall that according to the constitution, three nominees are selected one by the elected representatives of the upper house, one by the elected representatives of the lower house, and one by the military appointees of both houses. The other parties would therefore require a simple majority of elected seats in each house (that is, not including military appointees) in order to choose the presidential nominee of that house. On the present scenario, the other parties would have two-thirds of the elected seats in the upper house, but less than half of the elected seats in the lower house. Therefore, they have a good chance of being able to choose the upper house presidential nominee, but not the lower house nominee, for which the NUP will hold the balance of power. As for the electoral college itself, which will elect the president from among the three nominees, what is important is the total proportion of seats held by each bloc in the bicameral legislature as a whole. On the present scenario, the breakdown would be: Presidential electoral college: Military 25%; USDP 17%; NUP 16%; other parties 42% The NUP would therefore hold the balance of power in electing the president.

Scenario 2: Equal shares This scenario assumes that in each constituency there is an equal chance of the USDP, NUP and other party candidates being elected. This is probably the best that the USDP and NUP can hope for, short of vote rigging. The approximate division of national legislative seats would be as follows: Upper House (Amyotha Hluttaw): Military 25%; USDP 30%; NUP 27%; other parties 18% Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw): Military 25%; USDP 33%; NUP 30%; other parties 12% This would give the military and USDP together a small majority in both houses. However, they would not have a majority of the elected seats in either house, meaning that for the selection of presidential nominees, the NUP would hold the balance of power in both houses. In terms of the presidential electoral college, the breakdown would be: Presidential electoral college: Military 25%; USDP 32%; NUP 29%; other parties 14% On this scenario, the military and the USDP together would have a comfortable majority for electing the president. Both of these scenarios are extremes, and the outcome is likely to be somewhere in between the two. The following general conclusions can be drawn. 1. The other parties will not have a majority in either house. They can expect 18 50 percent in the upper house, and 12 35 percent in the lower house. 2. These figures probably overstate the size of any democratic bloc, since they include a diverse range of democratic, ethnic and other parties (and a few independent candidates) who may not vote together and may include (a few) parties or candidates whose sympathies are closer to the establishment parties than to the democratic parties, or who might be co-opted. 3. Unless the vote-count is rigged, it is unlikely that the military and USDP together will have a majority in either house. It is likely that the NUP will hold the balance of power in both houses. 4. The other parties have a reasonable chance of being able to select one of the three presidential nominees (the upper house nominee). It is unlikely that the USDP will have enough seats to be able to choose the lower house nominee. It is very likely that the NUP will hold the balance of power in selecting the lower house presidential nominee, and possibly the upper house nominee as well. (Under the constitution, the third nominee will be chosen by the military bloc.) 5. The NUP may also hold the balance of power in electing the president from among the three nominees. However, there is a reasonable chance that the USDP will secure enough seats so that it, together with the military, will be able to make that choice.

V. Conclusions It is impossible to accurately predict how voters will vote on 7 November. Any analysis is also frustrated by the fact that the Election Commission has not published consolidated lists of approved candidates for the country as a whole. However, the distribution of candidates can be determined to a reasonable approximation due to the fact that the two largest parties (the USDP and NUP) will contest nearly all constituencies, and most of the other parties have made their candidate lists available.8 Given that in a large number of constituencies, only two candidates are standing one from the USDP and one from the NUP it is possible to make some general predictions about the result of the elections in the national legislatures. The National Unity Party (NUP) The NUP is the successor to the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), which was the sole political party of Ne Wins pre-1988 socialist one-party state. The NUP was the establishment party in The most important point to come out of 1990 not a proxy of the military, but the analysis is that the NUP will probably hold certainly the party it was most the balance of power between the comfortable with. But despite the military/USDP and the other parties, in massive organizational resources and multiple ways: in the lower house, and possibly party lists inherited from the BSPP, it the upper house as well, and likely in several gained only 21 percent of the vote and regional legislatures. The NUP will also hold just 10 seats. While it has tried to the balance of power in selecting one or further distance itself from the regime perhaps two of the three presidential in recent years, it still represents the nominees. And it may even hold the balance of political establishment, and is nonpower in electing the president (although there threatening to the regime. However, is a good chance that the military/USDP will this does not imply that all its policies have enough seats to determine this). coincide with those of the military. It should be recalled that the current The standard assumption in most regime took over from the BSPP during commentaries and analyses of the elections has the 1988 uprising, immediately began been that the NUP is just another proxy for the dismantling the BSPP legacy, and regime, like the USDP. If that is the case, then subsequently arrested Ne Wins family. the present conclusions are of little interest, Ne Win himself died under house since they imply that the military and its USDP/NUP proxies will easily control most of the important levers of power after the elections. But the pivotal position that the NUP might occupy should at least prompt some speculation about what would happen if the standard assumption were wrong. In fact, while the NUP is certainly not a natural ally of the National Democratic Force and other democratic parties, there are reasons to believe that it is much more independent of the regime and the military than is commonly assumed. In particular, on social and economic issues its policies could diverge significantly from those of the military/USDP. And if the party does end up holding the balance of power, it should come as no surprise if it were to demand significant concessions in terms of policy and influence in return for its support to the military/USDP bloc.
8 For profiles of all the political parties, see Richard Horsey, Overview of registered political parties in Myanmar, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum Briefing Paper, 15 June 2010.

Appendix 1 Political parties contesting the election List ordered by total number of approved candidates for all legislatures.
Party Union Solidarity and Development Party National Unity Party National Democratic Force Shan Nationalities Democratic Party Democratic Party (Myanmar) Union of Myanmar Federation of National Politics Rakhine Nationalities Development Party Kayin People's Party 88 Generation Student Youths (Union of Myanmar) Chin Progressive Party All Mon Regions Democracy Party Modern People Party National Development and Peace Party Chin National Party National Democratic Party for Development Rakhine State National Unity Party, Myanmar Phalon-Sawaw [Pwo-Sgaw] Democratic Party Taaung (Palaung) National Party Kayan National Party National Political Alliance Pa-O National Organization Democracy and Peace Party Lahu National Development Party Mro or Khami National Solidarity Organisation Peace and Diversity Party Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State Kaman National Progressive Party Inn National Development Party Wunthanu NLD (The Union of Myanmar) Kayin State Democracy and Development Party Wa National Unity Party Ethnic National Development Party Khami National Development Party Union Democratic Party Kokang Democracy and Unity Party United Democratic Party Wa Democratic Party Independent candidates Candidates a1100+ 999 163 157 47 46 44 41 39 38 34 30 25 23 22 20 18 16 13 13 10 9 9 9 7 7 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 ? ? ? 82

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

Estimate.

Appendix 2 Yangon Region constituencies (all legislative levels) For profiles of these parties, see Richard Horsey, Overview of Registered Political Parties in Myanmar, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum Briefing Paper, 15 June 2010 Township 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Ahlone Bahan Botahtaung Cocokyun Dagon Dagon Myothit (East) Dagon Myothit (North) Dagon Myothit (Seikkan) Dagon Myothit (South)

Pyithu Hluttaw
USDP, NUP, NDF, NPA, 88 USDP, NUP, NDF, DPM USDP, NDF, IND USDP, NDF USDP, NUP, NDF USDP, NUP, NDF USDP, NUP, NDF, DPM, 88 USDP, NUP, 88 USDP, NDF, DPM USDP, NUP, NDF, DPM, 88, IND USDP, NUP, NDF, DPM USDP, NUP, NDF, 88, INDx2 USDP, NUP, UDP, MPP, 88, INDx3 USDP, NUP, NDF USDP, NUP, DPM, KPP USDP, NUP, NDF, 88 USDP, DPM, NPA, DPP, 88 USDP, NUP, NDF, DPM, 88, IND USDP, NUP, NDF, MPP USDP, NUP, NDF, IND USDP, NUP, NDF USDP, NUP, NDF, DPM, WNLD, PSDP, 88 USDP, NUP, NDF USDP, NUP, NDF, PDP, 88 USDP, NUP, NDF, DPM, 88, INDx2 USDP, NUP, NDF USDP, NUP, NDF, DPP, 88

Region constituency 1
USDP, NUP, DPM USDP, NUP, DPM USDP, NUP USDP [default win] USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP, IND USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP, NPA, 88 USDP, NUP USDP, NUP, DPM, KPP USDP, NUP, MPP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP, MPP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP

Region constituency 2
USDP, NUP, KPP USDP, NUP, DPM USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP, KPP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP, MPP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP, IND USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP

Amyotha Hluttaw
USDP, NUP, DPP, NDF, IND USDP, NUP, NDF, 88 USDP, NUP, NDF, DPM USDP, NUP, NDF, DPM USDP, NUP, NDF, 88 USDP, NUP, NDF, 88, IND USDP, NUP, NDF USDP, NUP, NDF USDP, NUP, KPP, MPP USDP, NUP, NPA, DPP, DPM USDP, NUP, NDF, 88 USDP, NUP, NDF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

10 Dala
Dawbon Hlaing Hlaingtharya Hlegu Hmawbi Htantabin Insein Kamaryut Kawhmu Kayan Kungyangon Kyauktada Kyauktan Kyeemyindaing Lanmadaw Latha Mayangone

28 Mingaladon 29 Mingalartaungnyunt 30 North Okkalapa 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 Key

88 DPM DPP IND KPP MPP NDF Pabedan Pazundaung Sanchaung Seikgyikanaungto Seikkan Shwepyithar South Okkalapa Taikkyi Tamwe Thaketa Thanlyin Thingangkuun Thongwa Twantay Yankin

USDP, NUP, NPA, PDP USDP, NUP, DPM, NDPD, IND USDP, NUP, NDF, 88, IND USDP, NUP, NDF, NDPD, DPP, IND USDP, NUP, NDF, IND USDP, NUP, NDF, DPM, 88 USDP, NUP, NDF USDP, NUP, NDF USDP, NUP, DPM, 88, IND USDP, NUP, NDF, DPM, IND USDP, NUP, NDF, IND USDP, NUP, UDP, DPP, 88, IND USDP, NUP, NDF, 88 USDP, NUP, NDF, DPM USDP, NUP, NDF, DPP USDP, NUP, NDF USDP, NUP, NDF, KPP USDP, NUP, NDF

USDP, NUP, NPA USDP, NUP, NDPD, DPM USDP, NUP, NDF

USDP, NUP, NPA USDP, NUP, NDPD

USDP, NUP, NDF, IND USDP, NUP USDP, NUP, NDPD USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP, KPP, IND USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP, NDF, IND USDP, NUP USDP, NUP, NDF USDP, NDF USDP, NUP USDP, NDF USDP, NUP, KPP, MPP USDP, NUP, KPP USDP, NUP USDP, NUP

88 Generation Student Youths (Union of Myanmar) Democratic Party (Myanmar) Democracy and Peace Party Independent candidates Kayin People's Party Modern People Party National Democratic Force

NDPD NPA NUP PDP PSDP UDP USDP WNLD

National Democratic Party for Development National Political Alliance National Unity Party Peace and Diversity Party Phalon-Sawaw [Pwo-Sgaw] Democratic Party Union Democratic Party Union Solidarity and Development Party Wunthanu NLD (The Union of Myanmar)

10