^CLASSIFIED

Leaaon* from the War in Af<hani*tan

Part I. Introduction

Purpoae

(U) Thi* *tudy provide* le**on* derived from the Soviet war
in Afghani*tan which may be applicable to the training of US Army
•oldier* and unit*, tvery effort wa* made to addre** low-level
tactical problem*, although the intelligence *ummarie* and other
account* published during the cour*e of the war tended to focu*
on higher level matter*. Still, in order to appreciate the
problem of fighting the Soviet Army at the tactical level, there
1* much to be learned from the*e account*.

Background
"You know you never defeated u* on the
battlefield,' aaid the American colonel.
The Vorth Vietnameae colonel pondered thi*
remark a moment. "That may be *o," he
replied, 'but it i* al*o irrelevant."
.(Barry a. Summer*. OH STRATEGY).

"Mo Soviet garrieon or major outpoat wa*

ever overrun."
'"' ' .'"• '. *'
•(General-Lieutenant Oromov,
la*t commander of-the Soviet
40th Army in Afghanistan) '
(U) By 15 February 1989, the Soviet Union had withdrawn it*
la*t combat force* from Afghani*tan, bringing to an end nine
year* of combat experience. Thi* wa* for the USSR a "Low
Intensity Conflict," a 'foraign internal d*fon*e* againat a
"looaely organised insurgency.*
(U) After the Afghan communist coup in April 1978. uprisings
against the new government occurred in several areas of .the .
country. Soviet economic and military aid became a major *ource
of Afghan government support. By the Fall of 1979, however, it
became clear that government fp,reeiuwerer unable to overcome the
growing insurgency in the eountrycide. ' Although aeveral thousand
Soviet military advisor* {and'llim»T%(e1nh.aVvupits) were already in
Afghaniatan by late 1979. the introduction of major Soviet unit*
in late December of that year marked the beginning of what wa* to

TBIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

become for the Soviet* their first major military campaign
outside the Warsaw Pact bloc singe 1045. and the longest war in
Soviet history. <

(9) Th« Soviets installed in power a new Afghan communist

leader, Babrak Xarmel, and hoped to shore up th« Democratic
Bepubllc of Afghanistan (later renamed the Bepublie of
Afghanistan) military to the point where it eould control the
insurgency. What was clearly perceived by the insurgents as a
foreign invasion, however, further inflamed the situation. What
had earlier been a disjointed 'Jihad' (Holy War) against the
communist government in Kabul, now took on greater urgency and
served as the strongest unifying factor for the insurgents. As
one Soviet news commentator remarked in the newspaper XZYZSTXYA
in late 1086, *Tne Afghan people now had invading infidels
against whom to unite." Due to this, and the continuing
ineffectiveness of the Afghan Army, the Soviets were compelled to
go over to the offensive. But no Soviet textbook had prepared
them for the tactical problems of counterinsurgency (COIM)
warfare.
(17) While the Insurgency reflected the classic threat--no
fixed battle lines; low technology insurgent warfare; small,
short duration insurgent targets—several factors gave the Soviet
campaign in Afghanistan a unique set of characteristics. For
one, the Kremlin obviously imposed limitations on the sixe of the
Soviet force deployment. There would be no significant build-up
in force strength. The Soviet name for their forces in
Afghanistan, 'Limited Contingent,' was as real as it was
propagandistic. This had a significant effect on the conduct of
operations: insufficient forces were available to expand
appreciably 40th Army's area of physical control, or to identify
and attack many insurgent targets at the same time. When major
operations were conducted in one part of the country, forces had
to be drawn from other areas, leaving those areas vulnerable to
insurgent activities. Moreover, early in the war, especially
 UNCLASSIFIED
after Brezhnev's death, Soviet leaders apparently assigned a high
priority to minimizing personnel and equipment losses. This in
turn caused Soviet operations to exhibit an unusual degree of
caution and lack of boldness when employing troops at the
tactical level.
(U) Other factors influencing the nature of the Afghan War
were:
- Geographic proximity to the USSB, with direct access
to well-developed and secure Soviet internal LOCs
- Bugged, desolate terrain where movement was limited to
a few established routes and often difficult to
conceal
- Deep-rooted religious and tribal/regional divisions
among both the client and insurgent forces in an
environment where there was no we11-developed
traditional sense of nationalism.
- Primitive nature of the Afghan economic infrastructure
and extremely limited LOCs
(U) These objectives and characteristic* created a combat
environment very different from the European war scenario against
NATO which the con*cript-ba**d Soviet Armed Force* were trained
and equipped to fight. Afghanistan was not a high-intensity war
fought by large armored and air forces, with massed formations
penetrating deep into enemy rear areas to strike a crippling blow
at the enemy's ability to resist. Instead, the 40th Army settled
into bases along the primary LOCs and near key cities and towns.
It found itself in a protracted war, albeit often Intense and at
a high tempo, fought at the tactical level, where two-thirds of
its forces were committed to resupply or defensive security
missions. The elusive Insurgents were dispersed throughout the
country. With no railways, logistic support for 40th Army and
the Afghan economy depended primarily on the sparse, exposed road
network, creating a constant, but unavoidable Soviet
vulnerability.

Applicability of the Lessons

(U) As a consequence of the special nature of the Soviet war

in Afghanistan, lessons derived from the conflict fall into three
categories:
Insurgency
Since we recognise that the support of insurgencies is
sometimes in the interests of the United States, lessons from the

iii\ir.l ASSIF1ED
 UNCLASSiFIEI
Mujahideen experience can be applied by U.S. organization* and
unit* which support and train in*urfent force*.
Count •rin«ur<.eney

Many le«*on* from the Soviet COXY experience will appear

very familiar to atudent* of the 0.8. involvement in Vietnam.
They represent many of the taotieal dilemma* found in any COX*
operation. Soviet failure to learn from the U.S. and other
applicable CO I If experience* oau*ed them to make many of the *4
error*.

Soviet Arnv in Combat

I'NCUSSIFB
 UNCLASSIFIED
Part ii. Inaurdenev

MuJahtdeen Strength*

(U) Many Mujahideen atrangth* were co n to moat insurgent

movement*. Theee included:
• Familiarity with the terrain
• Tactical Mobility
• Ability to achieve surprise
• Ability to operate at night
• Large manpower pool to maintain their number*
To these must be added the faot that the Mujahideen were
unusually rugged and highly motivated fighter*. This motivation
•temmed from the hietorie dlelike for foreign occupier*, a* well
a* from the religiou* fervor accompanying the 'Jihad' declared
fir*t against the communi*t Afghan government, and then again*t
the Soviet invader*. The Mujahideen had *anetuarie* in Pakistan
and Iran and received significant outiide material support. For
the mo«t part, they enjoyed the support of the Afghan people,
although tbi* wa* *ometime* only local. (Some village* in*i«ted
on remaining neutral in order to avoid having their home* and
field* become battle ground*. Other* were actively in league
with the communiflt government.)

Mujahideen Weakneaae*
(U) The moat glaring weakne**e* in the in«urgency were:
• Ho unified leadership or *trategic planning
• Sporadic outbreaks of intergroup violence (which
subsided somewhat during the course of the war)
• Marginal training base
• Limited firepower
• Difficult logistics
• Limited communication*
Mujahideen group* often associated themselves with political
organisations in Pakistan or Iran, primarily for the purpose of
acquiring weapons, supplies, and intelligence, or as a mean* for
appealing to international sources of assistance. Regional and
tribal loyalties, however, complicated these relationships.
(U) Paradoxically, some of what we might perceive to be
strategic weaknesses became strengths at the operational and
tactical levels. For example, the Mujahideen's dicunified

IRIS PAGE IS
 UNCLRSSiFlEB
political leadership often worked to keep the Soviet* from
infiltrating and eliminating their leadership. Likewise,
disorganization in planning turned out to be a strength of sorts:
the Soviet* eould not intercept Mujahideen plan* because they
simply did not exist, except for local, short-range one*.
Flamboyant individual action*, di*per*al into *mall element*,
decentralised leader*hip and *pontaneou* operation* decreased
tactical predictability and pre*ented few large-scale target* for
the Soviet* and the government army.
(U) Although the Mujabidoen were inclined to attack any
nearby target, regardlec* of it* *ignificanoe, and often tended
to fight only within their local area*, there were *ome notable
(albeit rare) exception*. The legendary commander in the
Panjcher Valley. Ahmet Shah Macood, finally gave up attempt* to
defend hi* valley. Zn«tead, he organized and trained Mujahideen
group* to attack *trateglcally vital approache* throughout the
Hindu-Ku«h mountain*. According to *om* eyewitne****, Ma*ood
wa* *killed in the u*e of *peed, *urpri«e and deception. Hi* men
were reportedly *o experienced in *uch tactic* that they were
more than a match for the Soviet elite troop* who frequently made
foray* into the mountain area*.

(U) It i* important to k*ep in mind throughout thi* *tudy

that the term Muhahideen i* * name given to all the fighter* in
the Jihad. It doe* not imply that there were 'Mujahideen
tactic*,' or even way* of circulating among all the insurgent
group* le**on* learned from the on-going struggle again*t the
Soviet force* in their country. Where a tactic proved
•ucce**ful, it may have been *ucc***ful only to the group u*ed in
the example. And thi* *uce*** may have been the re*ult of the
individual commander'* *kill*. When a tactic failed, it may have
been due to bad intelligence or ju«t plain bad luck.
Additionally, many of the account* of combat between Mujabideen
and the Soviet/government force* come to u* *econd or third-hand
and are occasionally exaggerated or colored by political
motive*. Likewi*e, we do not or cannot always Identify when
 UNCLASSIFIED
certain combat action* occurred. Obviously there were
improvement* on both aide* a* the war progressed. Mujahideen
•uoce** wa* oloiely linked to the amount and type* of weapon* and
ammunition they had at their di*po*al. Thie varied considerably
in different area* and at different time*, tfonethele**. the
Mujahideen validated *overal ba*ic tenet* of insurgency warfare
against overwhelmingly superior conventional force*.
(U) Many of the le**on* given below apply to icenario* where
traditional guerrilla tactic* mu*t be u*ed against conventional
force*. US Army advi*or* or training team* supporting an
insurgency may find them relevant when working with fiercely
independent, basically uneducated peasant or urban fighter* in a
diverge ethnic or political environment.

Tactical Le**on* from the lluJahideen Experience

LESSON! Do not provide COIH force* with large. lucrative
tar<et«.
(U) A* the number of insurgent* increase, leader* may be
tempted to organize them into larger unit*, with larger and more
permanent base camp*. Although thi* present* certain obvious
advantage* in command and control (C2) and logistics, it
diminishes one of the principle strength* of an insurgency;
namely, dispersal into small and mere mobile targets. One would
think this is not a lesson which needs to be learned over and
over. But in dealing with insurgent leaders who have no
professional training, or who have no previous experience against
large conventional forces, learning this lesson early will avoid
needless losses.
Example*

8
 WCUSSiFIED

LESSOH: Know the enemv** tactic* and routine*.

(U) Strict adherence to doctrine or even repetition of
innovative tactic* i* a common characteristic of conventional
force* with little experience in CO I If war far*. Insurgent fore**
can exploit thi* w*akn*** if tb*y ar* familiar with th*
conventional doetrin* or COIV fore* praetic**. Such knowledge
can provide advance warning of COZV fore** intention* and allow
insurgent* to predict COIM tactic*.
Example

LESSON: Be ai of ner*onal and tfroup rivalrie* and conflict*.

(U) Zn many in*urg*ncie* there are likely to be conflict*

between the goal* of variou* fighting group*, or between their
leader*. Although they may often cooperate again*t a common foe,
it 1* likely that each group or leader will *eek way* to maximize
hi* own interest* while minimising the** of hi* opponent*. Thi*
can lead to, at a minimum, tenuou* C2 relationship* between
variou* group* combined for combat.
Kxamcle
 JIMP! (!<|<y!:irn

Convov A&ibu*he*

(U) Although aabuabe* »r« ooaaMn to aoit ln*ur|«nei««, th«

Mujahid««n had ••v«r*l distinct *dv*ntM««* Fir«t, tho torrain
oft«n pr«««nt«d poor off-road tr*ffieability. 3«condv th«r« ««r«
no railroad*, «Alch l«d to th« Sovltt practic« of u«ing ground
convoy* for ao«t of thoir supply offort*. Thi*. combined with th«
traditionally poor aarch di«clplin« of Soviet driver*, presented
the Mujahideen with frequent and lucrative ambufh target*.
Sucoe**ful tactic* employed by the Mujahideen were a* follow*:

Example*

aOI fl£li£S/\Bl fin IFORFtGJL

Fr
 UNCLASSIFIED

Intelligence and Security

LlSSQHt Take full advantage of the cultural and lin<ui*tie

idenjfcitie* bett^en in*ur<ent And Government peraonnel.

(0) In Boat incurgeneie*, tb« eoamon ethnic *nd linguistic

background* of both «id«« pr«««nt« groat opportunities for
Infiltration of tb« onoay fore*. Tbe Mujabideen bad a large
number of informant* in tbe government army trtio provided
information ueed for botb defensive and offensive operation*.
(Zt va« more difficult for government agent* to infiltrate tbe
Mujabideen, a* tb* insurgent* operated in email group* and
generally knew eacb otber pereonally.)

~0. if 11.v^m-.-.-..-;-^^

13
MOT RCLCASABie TO FOREIGN MATlQ>i<M f.

UNCLASSiFlfn
 UNGLASSTIEO

Air Dmtfnfe

(V) Defence again*t Soviet air attack* wa* of critical

importance to the insurgent*. Attack helicopter e*eort* and
quick reaction fixed-wing *trike* eau*ed great damage to the
Mujahideen. The incurgent* found it nece**ary to move in *mall
group*, and at night. For the firct several year* of the war, in
addition to limited u«e of the SA-7 and heavy machine gun* (HMO),
there were «ome effective pa**ive countermea*uro* again*t Soviet
air: di*per*al, cover and knowledge of the terrain.
LESSQg; P0alt*on ba*e eanaa <e aa to reduce the effeetiveneo of
air attack^.
Ixamale
(0) In the Jagdalek Valley a typical baee camp would be
tucked into a crea«e between two ridgee of a mountain with eteep
•lope* rifling on three eldee. Heavy machine gune were placed
near the creete of eurrounding bill* in emplacements ebleeled out
of the rock, with bomb •belter* to protect gunner*. There were
more emplacement* than gun* *e that the gun* could be moved to
different poeition*. The ba*e camp typically bad an ammunition
bunker and bomb *belter*, ehieeled out by portable jackbammer*.
(U) If an air*trike came over the mountain ridge, bomb* and
rocket* which had to be released after clearing one hill. mo«t

UNCUSSiFIcO
 UNCLASSIFIED
m
likely would drift over the site at the bottom of the crease and
hit the side of the opposite hill. Zf a jet or helicopter tried
to fly up the crease between the ridges, it bad to fly broadside
past the machine guns. Even if a helicopter used a stand-off
weapon system, considering that the base camp was dug
perpendicular into the side face of the crease, a direct hit that
would produce extreme damage was very unlikely.
(U) Zf a ground assault accompanied an air attack, the
Soviets would have to fight uphill on foot towards insurgents in
concealed positions. The Soviets were reluctant to pay the costs
of this kind of ground sweep. A more favored Soviet tactic was
to air-assault troops onto the best available landing cone
(frequently a mountain top or ridge line), surround a base camp
and fight downhill. The Mujahideen could counter this tactic by
having many small base camps rather than one large one in an
area. Zf the Soviets surrounded any one camp, the remaining
camps were able to. counterattack the Soviets. Zf the Soviets
conducted a truly massive ground sweep, or if the Mujajideen
found themselves without adequate weapons or ammunition, they
simply exfiltrated.
L2SSOH: Know the effects of terrain on m.ir reeee.
Example

(U) A particularly gutsy act on the part of the Mujahideen

demonstrated their knowledge of'the terrain. The broken surface
and mixture of colors of the terrain sometimes made observation
from the air of small features very difficult. Air
reconnaissance often relied en movement to sight targets on the
ground. Thus, the Mujahideen in the Jagdalek Valley developed
the tactic of freezing whenever aircraft flew over. They had
disciplined themselves to become Immediately still at the first
sight of an aircraft, even when in the open and very near cover.
LISSOM; The use of lisht-we^nht. easily operated surface-to-air

usually char act eristic of CO III foreee.

KxamDles

UNCLASSIFIED
 REGRET UNCLASSIFIED
Part III. Counterin«ur<enev

Soviet Objectives
(U) Rather than being an 'invasion,' th« introduction of
Soviet combat forces in December 1070 was an 'intervention* in a
COIN effort which had begun shortly after th« Afghan Communist
Party coup in April 1076. Th« USSB sent its forces into
Afghanistan primarily for the purpose of takinf over security
responsibilities, «o that govornmont forc«« oould ooneontrat* on
putting down th« «v«r-gro«ring in«urg«ncy. Thu* th« initial
Soviet objective* were to:
- Control the cities and towns
- Secure the major lines of communications (LOO
- Train and equip government forces
(0) As the insurgency expanded and the Afghan Army proved
inadequate to the task, the Soviet "Limited Contingent* in
Afghanistan foon found itself enmeshed in full-fledged COIN
operations. Thus, by mid-1080, the Soviets acquired the
following additional missions:
- Eliminate insurgent centers
- Separate insurgents from the population
- Deny by interdiction outside aid and sanctuary
nonetheless, this 'low-intensity conflict' was to be conducted
with a minimum of losses in personnel and equipment. As pointed
out above, there would be no significant troop buildup, nor great
expansion of the logistics and transportation infrastructures.
The Soviets partially succeeded in only the first three of the
above missions.

22
O.CUAQADLC JQ.
 UNCLASSIFIED

Battlefield Operating 8vgtem§

(U) Tbi« faction on COIK le««on« it organized around tbe US

Army'* Battlefield Operating Syeteme (BOS), Tbe BOS *r« th«
major «y«t«m» * eoaaandor and hi« ataff otuat «ynebroniz« in all
typ«* of combat. A« d««erib«d in PM 100-15 (Coordinating Draft.
January 1968). tb« BOS appear moat appropriate to corp«
operation*. However, to the extent they are reepontive to lower
level commander*, BOS al»o make up the eeeential element* of
planning and execution for division, brigade, battalion and
company level combat.

23
)f RELCASADLE JO fORClGN

SffiRFT UNCLftSSiFiEO
 -SOT UNCLASSIFIED
LKSSON^ Decentralize plannin< and execution of low-level
operation*.
Example

LES SOI?; Train battali and ataf f* to operate with

eo ml f ar>e«

(U) Soviet •*forte to pl*c« thoir force* At *n «dv«nt*g«

ov«r th« Muj»hid««n «WP« fraught with *li th« limitation*
*«*ociat«d with • l*rf«. m«eh«nlc«d aray facing a low-t«ch
incur|«ncy. Moreover, maneuver of combat force* in Afghani*tan
wa* severely restricted by terrain and limited road network*.
Baaed on the Soviet*' experience, we can draw the following
le**on*:

UNClASSIFIfc!
 SOT UNCLASSIFIED
identify
and de«trov antitank ambti»he*.

j_ Constantly review and reaaaeaa the effeetiveneaa of

tactic* bein< applied atfainat in«ur<ent foreea.

LESSON; CTae •moke >«_ _ > defensive wh«n eau<ht in an

ambuah .

(U) Soviet unit* often carried «aoke grenade* with then

which were u«ed to «creen e«oape during Mujahideen ambu>be«.

Fire Support

20
 UNCLASSIFIED
Helicopter*

(17) The ao*t aignificant development in air support for

Soviet ground operation* in Afghani*tan wa* their u*e of armed
helicopter*.
LESSON: Helicopter operation* at ni<ht require extensive
training and familiarity with the terrain.

31-

„ UNCLASSIFIED
R£L£ASflBI E JO EQRfeJGN fHAllO'WUi

SECIHT
 V>i^
UNCLASSIFIED

(0) According to several Soviet sources, logistic support in

Afghanistan was unsatisfactory. In any ease, th«y seem to have
n«v«r run out of ammunition or POL. although th«r« ««r« vany
shortfall* in various combat ««rvic« support items. On* of their
biggest problems was transportation. Afghanistan has a vary poor
transportation infrastructure. There are no railroads or
waterways which can be used to transport supplies. Roads are
bad, cross very rugged terrain (sometimes allowing only one-way
traffic), and the Mujahideen frequently ambushed surface convoys.
LESSOB; Use air transport whenever possible.
Example

MOT RELEASABI.E ftf FOREIGN riATIQNALL

w-IP
 •Bounces on LIVO.V.

Air Defense
x

(U) There was no air throat to Soviot forces in Afghanistan,

Chemical

LESSQK; Develop count epmeasupes and train to do fond asainst

chemical *<>nt« undor apoelAl eondj,tiona (o.M. Mountain . dmmmrt.
arctic terrain) .

• (U) Attack* with chomical/toxin woapon* *g«inct tho

Mujahidoon in Afghanistan WOPO roportod a« oarly a« 0 nonth*
boforo tbo Soviot invasion on 27 Docombop 1076. FOP tbo popiod
froa tbo •unmop of 1070 until tbo «uaaop of 1061, tbo US
govopnmont pocoivod popoptg of 47 gopapato toxic agont attacks
with a doatb toll of mopo than 3000. MOPO pocont circumstantial
ovidonco indicated tho Soviets may havo continued tbo selective
use of toxic agents in Afghanistan. A variety of agents and
delivery systems WOPO reportedly used. Fixed-wing aircraft and
helicopters usually were said to be employed to disseminate

ONCUSSiRED
 JSESREf UNCUSSW
agent* in rocket*, bomb* and apray*. Landmine* containing toxic
agent* al*o were reported. However, none ol tbeae report* can be
•ub*tantiated.

LESSOR; Target Soviet ehenieal defenae equipment.

Example
(U) Soviet decontamination equipment i* mounted on truck*
and thu* present* a *oft target.
LS^SOIf; Prepare to encounter flame/ incendiary w>pon*.
Example
 UNCLASSIFIED
Part IV. Soviet Army in Combat/ Conclusion

(U) What general conclusion* can be drawn from the Soviet

Army experience in Afghanistan? What will be the effect on the
Soviet Army of the combat experience gained by thousand* of
Soviet ioldier«? How well did the Soviet* adju«t to the special
conditions of their war? Bow well did the Soviet floldier
perform? The Soviet officer? Bow will the Soviet* approach the
'leeeon* learned' from their War?

Limited Limited

38

UNCLASS'.PltO
 _SE8RfT UNCLASSIFIED

(V) Soviet officer* are very highly trained in their

branches and specialties. One of the most important obligations
placed on a Soviet officer is that of being able to train
subordinates, fllaanoat. or 'openness,' which im very real in
Soviet society, baa penetrated the Soviet Army. There are
numerous account* of younger veteran officer* *peaklng out
againflt training practice* which do not accord with their own
real combat experience*. We must conclude, then, that for the
next several year*, the combat experience gained by Soviet
officer* in Afghanistan will have a significant impact on the
quality of .training in the Soviet Army. Although Soviet doctrine
may not reflect major change* ba*ed on the experience in
Afghanistan, tactical skills, a* well a* organisational and
specialised skill* in combat *upport and combat service *upport
area*, should be enhanced.

Adaptability

30

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

(tJ) Still. tb«r« «•!»• in«t«ne«« in Afghanlflt*n wbar*

tactical command*r« d«mon«tr*t«d quick thinking. For «xaapl«. on

40
bfrfO

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
a raid to de«troy a Mujahideen ammunition ctorage area. wbo*e
location deep in the mountain* had been revealed by an Afghan
informer, a Soviet battalion commander discovered that hi* Afghan
guide wa* apparently lo«t. Bemembering that a abort distance
back, *ome rocket* had been fired at hi* unit, but apparently had
been very wide of the mark, the Soviet commander decided to
return to the impact area. Re rea«oned that the rocket* were
probably pre-regi*tered on the route to the ammunition *torage
area, when he arrived back at the rocket impact area, hi* guide
became reoriented and the mi**ion continued in the right
direction.

Soviet Le**on« Learned

41
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

a. (U) Initially the Mujahideon were forced to

fight with only *mall arm* and machine gun* up to
12.7mm.

c. (U) By the middle of the war, the Mujabideen

poeeeeeed RPQ-2 and 7. 62am mortar : 73mm recoilleee
rifle, and 107mm and 122mm free rocket*.