Mike Hurley

From: wbass@9-11commission.gov
Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2003 11:12 AM
To: Team 3
Subject: Cohen 1999 op-ed

This seems to be the SecDef Cohen piece that Rudman mentions.

Copyright 1999 The Washington Post

The Washington Post

July 26, 1999, Monday, Final Edition

SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. A19

LENGTH: 1217 words

HEADLINE: Preparing for a Grave New World

BYLINE: William S. Cohen

BODY:

In recent months, the eyes of the world have rightly focused on the threat
to
American interest and values in the Balkans. At the same time, we cannot afford a national
case of farsightedness that precludes us from focusing on threats closer to home, such as
the potential danger of a chemical or biological attack on U.S. soil.

The United States now faces something of a superpower paradox. Our supremacy in the
conventional arena is prompting adversaries to seek unconventional, asymmetric means to
strike our Achilles' heel. At least 25 countries, including Iraq and North Korea, now have
-- or are in the process of acquiring and developing -- weapons of mass destruction. Of
particular concern is the
possible
persistence in some foreign military arsenals of smallpox, the horrific infectious virus
that decimated entire nations down the ages and against which the global population is
currently defenseless.

Also looming is the chance that these terror weapons will find their way
into
the hands of individuals and independent groups -- fanatical terrorists and religious
zealots beyond our borders, brooding loners and self-proclaimed apocalyptic prophets at
home.

This is not hyperbole. It is reality. Indeed, past may be prologue. In 1995 the
Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo used sarin gas in its attack on the Tokyo
subway
and also planned to unleash anthrax against U.S. forces in Japan. Those behind the 1993
World Trade Center bombing were also gathering the ingredients for a chemical weapon that
could have killed thousands. In the past year, dozens of threats to use chemical or
biological weapons in the United States have turned out to be hoaxes. Someday, one will be
real.

What would that day look like? A biological agent would sink into the respiratory and
nervous systems of the afflicted. The speed and scope of modern air travel could carry
this highly contagious virus across hemispheres in
hours.
Indeed, the invisible contagion would be neither geographically nor numerically limited,
infecting unsuspecting thousands -- with many, in turn, communicating the virus to
whomever they touch.
1
Mike Hurley
From: wbass@9-11commission.gov
Sent: Wednesday, Novem ber 19, 2003 11:14 AM
To: Team 3
Subject: More on Cohen (esp. for Bonnie)

And speaking of Cohen, here's an Outlook piece from him three days after the
1998 reprisals on Afghanistan and Sudan after the embassy bombings. The
rhetoric's pretty tough. The policy? Bonnie, you tell me. Might be worth
stealing a sound bite or two.

Warren

Copyright 1998 The Washington Post

The Washington Post

August 23, 1998, Sunday, Final Edition

SECTION: OUTLOOK; Pg. C01

LENGTH: 761 words

HEADLINE: ABOUT LAST WEEK . . . The Policy: We AreReady to Act Again

BYLINE: William S. Cohen

BODY:

The U.S. strike against terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan should not be
seen simply as a response to the Aug. 7 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, but as the long-
term, fundamental way in which the United States intends to combat the forces of terror.

Just as those advocating terror have been relentless in their efforts, so shall we be
relentless in ours. We have had compelling evidence that Osama bin Laden and his
associates are continuing to plan terrorist acts against American facilities and American
citizens around the world. In response to that
evidence,
we have been enhancing security at diplomatic posts and military facilities as required.

But terrorists should know that we will not simply play passive defense. America will
defend itself and its interests through active measures such as
the
strikes last Thursday. As always, we will work with our friends around the
world
where we can, but we are also ready to act unilaterally when circumstances require.

For example, the bin Laden network of terror and murder is intimately connected with
the Khost training facility in Afghanistan against which we conducted operations.
Sometimes referred to as "Terrorist University," this is the largest Sunni terrorist
training facility in the world. At these
facilities,
terrorists from around the world receive paramilitary training that ranges from target
practice to improvising explosive devices to training on tanks and other armored vehicles.
In recent months, there has been an expansion of these facilities, including construction
of new buildings, which indicates that an increase in training activity was planned. These
facts helped shape our
decision
to strike at these facilities.
 Martha Crenshaw is the Colin and Nancy Campbell Professor of
Global Issues and [)emocra.ic Bought in the Department ol Gov-
ernment. Wesleyan University.

Hie United States

and Coercive Diplomacy Coercive Diplomacy and
edited by Robert J. Ait
the Response to Terrorism
and Patrick M. Cronin MARTHA CHENS HAW

I
KHKOIiISM ||\ I'|«>\KI) TO UK A IKKFICI ill TKST lor coercive
diplomacy. ILS. counlcrlerrorism policy cannot routinely meet
the basic requirements ol the strategy. When coercive; diplo-
macy is applied, the conditions that would make it successful are
rarely met. \\hile the United States has sometimes been effective in
changing the policies of slates (hat instigate or assist terrorism, it has
not found an appropriate mix of threat and reward that could con-
strain (he behavior of nonstate adversaries.
This chapter focuses on (he U.S. response to terrorism from 1993
to (he "war on terrorism" launched in 2001. ft first outlines the gen-
eral contour? of the threat as it developed alter (he Cold War. 'flu's
overview is followed by analysis of (he general concept of coercive
diplomacy in relation to terrorist strategies. The propositions thus
generated are then tested against the instances of post-Cold' War
counlerterrorism policy that most closely lit (lie definition of the con-
cept of coercive diplomacy. 'Iliesc cases, when military force was used
or (hrealened. provide the best basis for evaluating (he success or fail-
ure of (lie; slrategy. They include the retaliatory strike against Iraq in
1993, threats against Iran following (he bombing of U.S. military facil-
ities in Saudi Arabia in 1996, cruise missile attacks against Sudan and
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE PRESS
Afghanistan in !99Ji. and efforts to compel (ho Taliban to yield Osama
Washington, D.C.
 United States General Accounting Office
f^ AO Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations,
and Emergency Management, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives

April 6, 2000
COMBATING TERRORISM
Issues in Managing
Counterterrorist Programs
Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director
National Security Preparedness Issues
National Security and International Affairs Division

GAP
Accountability * Integrity * Reliability

GAO/TNSIAD 00-145
December 20, 2002 10:23 a.m. EST

PAGE ONE

December 20, 2002

Friend or Foe: The Story Of a Traitor to al Qaeda Divided Allegiances in Yemen Undo
The Betrayer, Who Himself Is Betrayed

By ANDREW HIGGINS and ALAN CULLISON Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL

SANAA, Yemen — Fed up after two decades of Islamist plotting, the veteran Egyptian
militant decided to jilt the jihad. In early 1998, he walked into the heavily guarded
offices of Yemen's intelligence agency, the Political Security Organization, with a
startling proposal: He could help unravel Osama bin Laden's network.

He disclosed the hiding places in Yemen of foreign terrorists, including one who would
shortly become Mr. bin Laden's chief lieutenant. He described the extremists'
weaponry, security and violent plans for the future. He revealed the locations of al
Qaeda encampments in and around Marib, a desert region scattered with ruins of the
biblical kingdom of Sheba.

But instead of cracking down on the militants, members of Yemen's security service
tipped them off. Mr. bin Laden's acolytes grabbed their turncoat, grilled him about his
treachery and made plans to send him to Afghanistan to be killed. What should have
been a triumph in a shadowy struggle against terrorism became an intelligence coup for
the terrorists. Safe in Yemen, they went on to launch a string of attacks there, from the
bombing of the USS Cole to an assault on a French oil tanker, the Limburg, this fall.

On Nov. 3, more than four years after the warning about camps in Marib, the desert
region was targeted for a lethal assault - not by the Yemenis but by the Central
Intelligence Agency. Monitoring satellite-telephone chit-chat, the CIA tracked two
Toyotas carrying suspected al Qaeda members across the desert. An unmanned U.S.
spy plane then fired a Hellfire missile that incinerated six people, including Qaed Salim
Sinan al-Harethi, a Yemeni suspected of helping organize the Cole attack.

The missile strike blew a hole in a diplomatic facade, as well. After Sept. 11, President
Bush gave the world a simple choice: "Either you are with us or you are with the
terrorists." Yemen — Mr. bin Laden's ancestral homeland - and other hotbeds of
Islamist sentiment such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia declared themselves "with us."
Their leaders pledged unequivocal support for the struggle against al Qaeda. But within
these nations' bureaucracies, not to mention their citizenries, the lines of loyalty are
fuzzy.

The U.S.-Yemen relationship is unusually delicate today, after the U.S. asked Spain's

U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland
wrong. The idea underlying all of our scenarios was that martial law would
be a gradual escalation." (Which was certainly not what Kuklinski had been
describing.) According to the press accounts in the immediate aftermath of
the crackdown, virtually all other U.S. officials willing to comment on the
issue said that the Reagan administration had been poised to confront a Soviet
invasion, but had not developed plans on how to deal with martial law.8
l.'hat Was Hissing?
From what is now known of the information available to the CIA at the
time, it is clear that the failure was not in the intelligence "gathering," but
rather in the use—or nonuse—of the information that had been "gath-
ered." This is illustrated in the following chronological summary of infor-
mation that had been obtained by CIA analysts during the two months
preceding Kuklinski's escape from Poland, and was thus available in the
aggregate over a month before martial law was imposed. Because most of
what Kuklinski reported, as well as evidence that may have been obtained
from other sensitive human or technical sources, has not to date been declas-
sified, the information in this chronology represents the minimum that was
known at that time.
• 4 September: In a speech aired in the Polish media, Kania for the first
time personally declared the regime's willingness to impose a "state
of emergency" (universally understood to mean some form of mar-
tial law) "to preserve the socialist system in Poland." This statement
was given the day before the scheduled opening of Solidarity's first
national congress. Earlier that same day the Soviets announced major
exercises of their army and naval forces around the borders of Poland.
• 5-10 September: Solidarity held the first session of its national con-
gress, and took steps that even some sympathetic Western observers
described as going too far. The union challenged party dominance in
management of the economy and in political control of the parlia-
ment, and—most dramatically—publicly urged workers of the other
Soviet bloc countries (including the USSR) to follow Solidarity's exam-
ple in forming independent unions.
8. For the "senior State Department official," see "U.S. Calls for Release of Walesa," WP,
19 December 1981, Ai. The comments from the former member of the interagency working
group is in Rosenberg, Haunted Land, 206.
Caught Off Guard 217
• 9 September: At the same time Solidarity was putting forward this
program, the Chief of the Polish General Staff informed a small group
of military officers who were preparing the martial law plans that the
regime was moving toward implementing the plans. According to a
source with direct access to this group, the Chief of Staff said the procla-
mations that would be distributed to the public when martial law was
declared were being printed in the Soviet Union. He assured the offi-
cers that Moscow would provide military assistance if it were needed.
• 13 September: The Polish National Defense Committee, the body of
military and political authorities responsible for major decisions on
strategic military affairs, held a special meeting to address the imple-
mentation of martial law. Jaruzelski, in his dual capacities of head of
the government (prime minister) and head of the military (minister
of defense), serves as both chairman and vice chairman of this com-
mittee. The committee also includes the minister of the interior (a
military officer appointed by Jaruzelski) and other high level military
and civilian officials. A CIA source was told by one of the officers who
attended the meeting that nearly all participants favored carrying out
martial law.
Although the party first secretary is not a regular member of this com-
mittee, Kania attended the meeting, the first time he has done so. He report-
edly was surprised by the tenor of the meeting. He did not question that
a military crackdown would ultimately be required, according to what the
source was told. He did argue, however, for first pursuing additional polit-
ical means to constrain Solidarity's growing challenge, and said that after
these were demonstrated to be unsuccessful, forceful repression could then
be adopted.
After the meeting, working groups were formed to refine the martial law
implementation measures. The basic plan is for martial law to begin at mid-
night on a night before a day when industrial plants will be closed (either
Saturday or a Friday before a work-free Saturday). Roughly six hundred
union officials and prominent dissidents are to be arrested in Warsaw alone;
the arrests are to be carried out by the internal security forces while army
units are deployed to seal off major cities.
• 15 September: The party Politburo met to discuss the martial law plan
submitted by the military authorities. According to various accounts,
including some reported in the press, the meeting continued until
The First Home-Front Battle in the War on Terror ~ Ivo H. Daalder Page 1 of 2

Fpieignp.oJicy_Stydies || Back ||
[Printer-friendly format]

The First Home-Front Battle in the War on Terror

The New York Times, October 16, 2003

Ivo H. Daalder, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies

One of the many nightmares that followed the Sept. 11 attacks was the thought that more terrorists might be
hiding in the United States, ready to strike at a moment's notice. The possibilities were endless—and frightening.
Millions pass through America's open doors every day, many disappearing without much of a trace. After the
attacks the F.B.I, discovered that no fewer than 70,000 Saudi men, their ages ranging from 18 to 35, had entered
the United States between December 2000 and August 2001. None were likely to pose a threat, but how could
you really know?

To reduce the chance of another attack, thousands of foreigners were detained on minor immigration violations.
Many were kept incommunicado until they were deported. The president ordered the Pentagon to set up military
tribunals as a swift means to bring terrorists to justice. The F.B.I.'s mission changed from catching those who had
committed crimes to preventing those who might attack from doing so. Congress passed the USA Patriot Act,
giving the federal government sweeping new powers, not least by breaking down the wall between intelligence
information gathered overseas and law enforcement here at home.

Armed with these new powers, the federal authorities scoured the land in search of terrorist sleeper cells. The first
seeming success came a year after the twin towers were brought down, when the Justice Department announced
that it had "identified, investigated and disrupted a Qaeda-trained terrorist cell on American soil." Six Americans of
Yemeni descent were arrested in Lackawanna, N.Y., a small town just south of Buffalo. They were charged with
training with a terrorist organization.

President Bush hailed the arrest months later as proof that America was winning the war on terror. "We have
broken Al Qaeda cells in Hamburg, Milan, Madrid, London, Paris, as well as Buffalo, N.Y.," he told the nation last
January in his State of the Union address.

The story of the Lackawanna Six, as the young men became known, is the subject of tonight's edition of
"Frontline" on PBS. Based on joint reporting with The New York Times (which on Sunday published a 10,000-
word article on the case by Matthew Purdy and Lowell Bergman), "Frontline" takes us into the complexities of the
fight against terror at home. Through interviews with top government officials, the F.B.I, agents who worked on
the case and with one of the men charged, the report recounts how the Muslim Americans fell prey to a Qaeda
recruiter in Lackawanna, set off for training in terrorist camps in Afghanistan, met with Osama bin Laden when he
hailed martyrdom missions, and then returned home in the summer of 2001, apparently to resume their normal
lives.

The matter-of-fact exposition of how Al Qaeda recruits and trains is sobering. But the "Frontline" report is more
than a chilling tale. It is above all a careful account of the quandary that confronts the United States as it seeks to
prevent another 9/11: how to thwart an attack without curtailing the freedoms all Americans now take for granted.

The Lackawanna six are Americans. They were born here and went to local schools, and some were married with
children. In the months just after the F.B.I, received an anonymous letter in May 2001, saying that the men had
gone to Afghanistan to train at Qaeda camps, the bureau failed to substantiate the charges. When asked, the
men said they had gone to Pakistan for religious training and denied any connection with Al Qaeda. Their story
did not change after the Sept. 11 attacks, and without more evidence, there was nothing the F.B.I, could do.

"Inside the borders of the United States, there is the rule of law," Peter Ahearn, the special agent in charge of the

http://www.brookings.edu/printme.wbs?page=/pagedefs/5192f82424e3ff3d3d77309aOal4... 10/21/2003
 Page 1 of 2

Mike Hurley

From: Warren Bass

Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2003 1:12 PM
To: Team 3
Subject: FW: I'm sure you've seen this, but just in case you haven't...

FYI.

—Original Message—
From: Mike Jacobson
Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2003 1:03 PM
To: Warren Bass
Cc: Scott Allan
Subject: I'm sure you've seen this, but just in case you haven't...

November 11, 1998

Taliban Cautions U.S. Regarding bin Ladin Indictment
The Afghan Taliban militia has issued a statement to the effect that the United States could endanger
its citizens by attempting to prosecute Osama bin Laden. The U.S. Supreme Court has indicted bin
Ladin and his top military commander, Mohammed Atef on 224 counts of conspiracy to commit
murder on the background of the August bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
The Indictment covers over a decade of terrorist activity
Also named in the indictment were four of bin Ladin's operatives--Wadih El Hage, Fazul Abdullah
Mohammed, Mohamed Sadik Odeh and Mohamed Rasheed Daoud Al-'Owhali. In addition to the
embassy bombings, the indictment accuses bin Ladin of a long list of terrorist activities. Among these
are:
• The October 1993 attack in Mogadishu, Somalia, that killed 18 U.S. soldiers,
• Cooperation and joint activities with terrorist groups such as AI-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (The
Islamic Group), Hizballah, and the Egyptian al-Jihad.
• Assistance to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in weapons development.
• Cooperation with representatives of the government of Iran in planning operations against
the United States.
• Planning and/or executing a wide range of terrorist attacks against American citizens and
the citizens of other nations,
• Attempting to obtain the components of chemical and nuclear weapons.
The Taliban, in an official statement read over the its official radio, warned that the U.S. Supreme
Court's indictment could set off a violent popular response: "all that the Americans will gain is a storm
of hatred against them—in this region, and in the whole Muslim world. It will cost them hundreds of
millions of dollars and hundreds of years to find any friends here."
Five million dollar reward may find no takers
U.S. officials have offered a $5 million reward for information leading to capture of either Osama bin
Ladin or Mohammed Atef. Some have questioned the effectiveness of offering a monetary reward for
someone who is regarded as a hero by just about anyone likely to have any concrete knowledge of
his doings.
In any case, extricating bin Laden from his fortress in the remote Afghan mountains would be no
easy task. The terrain, the close-knit structure of his organization, and the esteem in which he is held
by his compatriots, all make a covert mission to capture him extremely risky and unlikely to

12/18/2003
Op-Ed Contributor: Saddam Is Ours. Does Al Qaeda Care? Page 1 of 2

y t i m e s COm srowtweo

December 17,2003

OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

Saddam Is Ours. Does Al Qaeda Care?

By BRUCE HOFFMAN

W ASHINGTON — While President Bush was careful to remind Americans that even with
Saddam Hussein behind bars, "we still face terrorists," the White House and Pentagon have
characterized the arrest as a major victory in the war on terrorism. But is Iraq really the central
battleground in that struggle, or is it diverting our attention while Al Qaeda and its confederates plan for
new strikes elsewhere? There's strong evidence that Osama bin Laden is using Iraq the way a magician
uses smoke and mirrors.

News reports that Al Qaeda plans to redirect half the $3 million a month it now spends on operations in
Afghanistan toward the insurgency in Iraq lent credence to the view that it is turning Iraq into center
stage for the fight against the "Great Satan." That might actually be good news: Iraq could become what
American military commanders have described as a terrorist "flytrap."

But there's a better chance that Osama bin Laden is the one setting a trap. He and his fellow jihadists
didn't drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan by taking the fight to an organized enemy on a battlefield of
its choosing. In fact, the idea that Al Qaeda wanted to make Iraq the central battlefield of jihad was first
suggested by Al Qaeda itself. Last February, before the coalition invasion of Iraq, the group's
information department produced a series of articles titled "In the Shadow of the Lances" that gave
practical advice to Iraqis and foreign jihadists on how guerrilla warfare could be used against the
American and British troops.

The calls to arms by Al Qaeda only intensified after the fall of Baghdad, when its intermittent Web site,
Al Neda, similarly extolled the virtues of guerrilla warfare. In urging Iraqis to fight on, the site invoked
prominent lessons of history — including America's defeat in Vietnam and the Soviet Army's in
Afghanistan.

But as useful as Iraq undoubtedly has been as a rallying cry for jihad, it has been a conspicuously less
prominent rallying point, at least in terms of men and money. The Coalition Provisional Authority may
be right that thousands of foreign fighters have converged on Iraq, but few who have been captured
have demonstrable ties to Al Qaeda. Nor is there evidence of any direct command-and-control
relationship between the Qaeda central leadership and the insurgents.

If there are Qaeda warriors in Iraq, they are likely cannon fodder rather than battle-hardened
mujahedeen. In the end, Qaeda's real interest in Iraq has been to exploit the occupation as a propaganda
and recruitment tool for the global jihadist cause.

While America has been tied down in Iraq, the international terrorist network has been busy elsewhere.
The various attacks undertaken by Qaeda and its affiliates since the occupation began have taken place

http://www.nytimes.conV2003/12/17/opinion/17BRUC.html?pagewanted-print&position= 12/18/2003
 /ashingtonpost.com: Chemical, Nuclear Arms Still 'Major Threat,1 Cheney Says Page 1 of2

washingtonpost.com T*OVl«f ISiHG

Chemical, Nuclear Arms Still 'Major Threat,'

Cheney Says
Vice President Decries 'Cheap Shot1 Journalism

By Mike Allen
Washington Post Staff Writer
Who has time
Wednesday, December 17, 2003; Page A15 for dial up?
Vice President Cheney warned this week that "the major threat" facing the
nation is the possibility that terrorists could detonate a biological or nuclear Activate your
weapon in a U.S. city. high-speed Internet
access and get a
Cheney told commentator Armstrong Williams that the war on terrorism is
"going to go on for a long time" and that U.S. soil remains vulnerable to al free modem*.
Qaeda, the network behind the Sept. 11,2001, attacks. The vice president said click for details
one of his biggest worries is "the possibility of that group of terrorists
acquiring deadlier weapons to use against us ~ a biological weapon of some
kind, or even a nuclear weapon."

"To contemplate the possibility of them unleashing that kind of capability ~ of

that kind of weapon, if you will, in the midst of one of our cities -- that's a
scary proposition," he said. "It's one of the most important problems we face
today, because I think that is the major threat."
*orter does not apply to
Cheney also criticized what he considers a proliferation of "cheap shot Cablevision customers
journalism" about the administration. "People don't check the facts," he said.

Cheney's language about threats was similar to previous admonitions. He

made the remarks in response to a question about what scares him as vice
president. He said part of his job is "contemplating sort of worst-case
scenarios for attacks on the United States."

Cheney said in the 35-minute interview, taped Monday and made available to The Washington Post
yesterday, that he believes "we're winning now" in the war on terrorism.

"We've seen, just recently, of course, the wrap-up of Saddam Hussein, one of the worst offenders in the
20th century," Cheney said. "We've wrapped up a large part of the al Qaeda organization, but there are
still a lot of folks out there." He cited an estimate that training camps in Afghanistan in the late 1990s
produced at least 20,000 terrorists.

Cheney has often been the subject of critical news coverage, including his prewar allegations about the
arsenal of unconventional weapons that Hussein might possess, his refusal to release records of his
energy policy task force, and his connection to the Halliburton Co., which has been paid $5 billion on
government contracts for rebuilding Iraq and has been accused by a Pentagon audit of overbilling the
Army by $61 million for gasoline.

Cheney called the free press "a vital part of society," but added: "On occasion, it drives me nuts." When
Williams asked what drives him nuts, Cheney said, "When I see stories that are fundamentally

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A6345-2003Decl6?language=printer 12/18/2003
Mike Hurley
From: Warren Bass
Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2003 3:58 PM
To: Team 3; Team 1; Team 1A
Subject: 1998 fatwa

Thought you might be interested in this--a brief Bernard Lewis analysis of UBL's Feb. 1998
declaration, published in "Foreign Affairs." (If it's badly written, blame me; I was the
editor on the piece.)

Warren

Copyright 1998 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc,

Foreign Affairs

November, 1998 / December, 1998

HEADLINE: License to Kill;

Usama bin Ladin's Declaration of Jihad

BYLINE: Bernard Lewis; BERNARD LEWIS is Cleveland E. Dodge Professor Emeritus of Near
Eastern Studies at Princeton University. His books include The Arabs in History, The
Emergence of Modern Turkey, and, most recently, The Middle East: A Brief History of the
Last 2,000 Years.

BODY:

On February 23, 1998, Al-Quds al-Arabi, an Arabic newspaper published in London,

printed the full text of a "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the
Jews and the Crusaders." According to the paper, the statement was faxed to them under the
signatures of Usama bin Ladin, the Saudi financier blamed by the United States for
masterminding the August bombings of its embassies in East Africa, and the leaders of
militant Islamist groups in Egypt, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The statement -- a
magnificent piece of eloquent, at times even poetic Arabic prose -- reveals a version of
history that most Westerners will find unfamiliar. Bin Ladin's grievances are not quite
what many would expect.

The declaration begins with an exordium quoting the more militant passages in the Quran
and the saying of the Prophet Muhammad, then continues:

Since God laid down the Arabian peninsula, created its desert, and surrounded it with
its seas, no calamity has ever befallen it like these Crusader hosts that have spread in
it like locusts, crowing its soil, eating its fruits, and destroying its verdure; and this
at a time when the nations contend against the Muslims like diners jostling around a bowl
of food.

The statement goes on to talk of the need to understand the situation and act to
rectify it. The facts, it says, are known to everyone and fall under three main headings:

First -- For more than seven years the United States is occupying the lands of Islam in
the holiest of its territories, Arabia, plundering its riches, overwhelming its rulers,
humiliating its people, threatening its neighbors, and using its bases in the peninsula as
a spearhead to fight against the neighboring Islamic peoples.

Though some in the past have disputed the true nature of this occupation, the people of
Arabia in their entirety have now recognized it.

There is no better proof of this than the continuing American aggression against the
Iraqi people, launched from Arabia despite its rulers, who all oppose the use of their
1
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Angeles Times on November 12, 2000.
Deputy Director
WASHINGTON -- When Bill Clinton leaves Tania Coderre
office in January, he can claim credit for Amanda Gaylor
having done more than any other Paige Parham
president to ensure that the United States
is prepared to counter the threat of Congressional Inquiries
terrorism. Overall spending on Washington External
Affairs Office
preparedness and response measures Shirley Ruhe, Director
nearly doubled, and terrorism was (703)413-1100x5632
elevated to the top of the list of security wea @ ra n d , o rg
threats confronting the United States.
Yet, despite all this progress, last month's RAND Policy Experts for
attack on the USS Cole tragically Media Interviews
demonstrates that U.S. capabilities to Search Alphabetical List of
defend itself against terrorism, and to Experts
preempt or respond to attacks, remain
inchoate and unfocused. Constructing an Search by Area of Expertise
effective counterterrorism policy is not a Arts and Cultural Affairs
question of more attention, bigger budgets Civil Justice System
and increased staff. Rather, it requires
Defense and National Security
greater focus, a better appreciation of the
Economics and Business
problem and understanding of the threat,
and, in turn, the development of a clear, Education and Child Policy
cohesive strategy. Energy and the Environment
Health
This is not simply an intellectual exercise. Homeland Security and
It is the very foundation of any effective Terrorism
counterterrorism policy. The failure to International Affairs and .Regions
develop such a policy has undermined Labor
counterterrorism efforts of the U.S. and Population and Demographics
other democratic nations before,
Public Safety and Criminal
producing frustratingly ephemeral, if not Justice
sometimes negative effects. In some Science and Technology
Welfare and Poverty
terrorism.
For example, as satisfying or cathartic as
retaliating against terrorism may be, it can
have the opposite effect: provoking an
escalation rather than curtailing terrorist
attacks. The 1986 U.S. airstrike on Libya is
12/16/2003
 9-11 COMMISSION DAILY PRESS CLIPS
for December 18, 2003

***HEADLINES***

1 . 9/11 Chair: Attack Was Preventable (CBS News)

2. Kean: 9/1 1 report to detail who and what failed U.S. (Star-Ledger)
3. Kean: We could have halted 9/1 1 (NY Post)
4. Could have foiled 9/1 1 , Kean says (NY Daily News)
5. 9/1 1 Commission Set to Blame Bush, Clinton Gets a Pass (NewsMax)
6. Kerrey says 9/1 1 panel's aim is 'trust' (The Villager)
7. Dubious Link Between Atta and Saddam (Newsweek)
8. Hussein Enters Post-9/1 1 Web of U.S. Prisons (NYT)
9. Yemeni Official Indicted (Newsday)
10. U.S.: AI-Qaeda has resources to run Saudi Arabia bombings (AP)
1 1 . Final Member of Lackawanna Six Sentenced to 9 1/2 Years in Prison (AP)
12. Bush Should Have Found Bin Laden, Clark Says (WP)
13. Australian at Guantanamo in 'Legal and Moral Black Hole,1 Lawyer Says (WP)
14. Spies: More Than Two Years After 9/1 1 , the Dots Remain Farther Apart Than Ever (CQ)
15. Is state license system vulnerable to terrorism? (AP)
16. When Bombers Are Women (WP)

***FULL TEXT***

1. 9/11 Chair: Attack Was Preventable

CBS News

For the first time, the chairman of the independent commission investigating the Sept. 1 1 attacks
is saying publicly that 9/1 1 could have and should have been prevented, reports CBS News
Correspondent Randall Pinkston.

"This is a very, very important part of history and we've got to tell it right," said Thomas Kean.

"As you read the report, you're going to have a pretty clear idea what wasn't done and what
should have been done," he said. "This was not something that had to happen."

Appointed by the Bush administration, Kean, a former Republican governor of New Jersey, is
now pointing fingers inside the administration and laying blame.

"There are people that, if I was doing the job, would certainly not be in the position they were in at
that time because they failed. They simply failed," Kean said.

To find out who failed and why, the commission has navigated a political landmine, threatening a
subpoena to gain access to the president's top-secret daily briefs. Those documents may shed
light on one of the most controversial assertions of the Bush administration - that there was never
any thought given to the idea that terrorists might fly an airplane into a building.

"I don't think anybody could have predicted that they would try to use an airplane as a missile, a

PRESS CLIPS FOR DECEMBER 18, 2003 1

r
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http://www.rand.org/commentary/! 11200LAT.html
Page 1 of4
need Search | Publication.Search
Commentary Office of External
Communications
(703)413-1100x5117
Terrorism — A Policy Behind the Times (310) 451-6913
By Bruce Hoffman oec@ra_ncLgrg
David Egner
Director
This opinion article appeared in the Los
Warren Robak
Angeles Times on November 12, 2000.
Deputy Director
WASHINGTON -- When Bill Clinton leaves Tania Coderre
office in January, he can claim credit for Amanda Gaylor
having done more than any other Paige Parham
president to ensure that the United States
is prepared to counter the threat of Congressional Inquiries
terrorism. Overall spending on Washington External
Affairs Office
preparedness and response measures Shirley Ruhe, Director
nearly doubled, and terrorism was (703) 413-1100 X5632
elevated to the top of the list of security wea@rand.org
threats confronting the United States.
Yet, despite all this progress, last month's RAND Policy Experts for
attack on the USS Cole tragically Media Interviews
demonstrates that U.S. capabilities to Search Alphabetical List of
defend itself against terrorism, and to Experts
preempt or respond to attacks, remain
inchoate and unfocused. Constructing an Search by Area of Expertise
effective counterterrorism policy is not a Arts and Cultural Affairs
question of more attention, bigger budgets Civil Justice System
and increased staff. Rather, it requires
Defense and National Security
greater focus, a better appreciation of the
Economics, and Business
problem and understanding of the threat,
and, in turn, the development of a clear, Education and Child Policy
cohesive strategy. Energy and the Environment
Health
This is not simply an intellectual exercise. Homeland Security and
It is the very foundation of any effective Terrorism
counterterrorism policy. The failure to International Affairs and Regions
develop such a policy has undermined Labor
counterterrorism efforts of the U.S. and Population and Demographics
other democratic nations before,
Public Safety and Criminal
producing frustratingly ephemeral, if not Justice
sometimes negative effects. In some Science and Technology
cases, it actually increased the threat of
Welfare and Poverty
terrorism.
For example, as satisfying or cathartic as
retaliating against terrorism may be, it can
have the opposite effect: provoking an
escalation rather than curtailing terrorist
attacks. The 1986 U.S. airstrike on Libya is
12/16/2003
r
1 A WORKING GROUP PROJECT
.HPSCI-SSCI Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I: Statement of Eleanor Hill: September ... Page 1 of 26

Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I

Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff
September 18,2002
Foreword

Chairman Graham, Chairman Goss, before I proceed with my statement, I want to make
clear to you and the members of these two Committees that the information I am going to
present has been cleared for public release. As you know, much of the information the Joint
Inquiry Staff has been examining is highly classified. Over the last two months, we have
been working with the Intelligence Community in a long and arduous process to declassify
information we believe is important to the public's understanding of why the Intelligence
Community did not know of the September 11 attacks in advance. By late last night, we
were able to resolve all but two issues.

The Director of Central Intelligence has declined to declassify two issues of particular
importance to this Inquiry:

• Any references to the Intelligence Community providing information to the President

or White House; and

• The identity of and information on a key al-Qa'ida leader involved in the September
11 attacks.

According to the DCI, the President's knowledge of intelligence information relevant to this
Inquiry remains classified even when the substance of that intelligence information has been
declassified. With respect to the key al-Qa'ida leader involved in the September 11 attacks,
the DCI declined to declassify his identity despite an enormous volume of media reporting
on this individual.

The Joint Inquiry Staff disagrees with the DCI's position on both issues. We believe the
American public has a compelling interest in this information and that public disclosure
would not harm national security. However, we do not have independent authority to
declassify intelligence information short of a lengthy procedure in the U.S.Congress. We
therefore prepared this statement without detailed descriptions of our work in these two
areas.

Introduction

Chairman Graham, Chairman Goss, members of this Joint Conunittee, good morning. I
appreciate the opporftunity to appear here today to advise the Committees, and the
American public, on the progress to date of the Joint inquiry Staffs review of the activities

http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/091802hill.html 12/31/2003