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Regulation Theory, Post-Marxism, and the New Social Movements Author(s): George Steinmetz Reviewed work(s): Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Jan., 1994), pp. 176-212 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/179331 . Accessed: 13/02/2012 16:45
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Regulation Theory, Post-Marxism, and the New Social Movements

GEORGE STEINMETZ
University of Chicago

The new social movements pose a direct challenge to Marxist theories on what should be their most secure terrain-their ability to identify the main lines of social division and conflict and to explain the broad contours of historical change in the advancedcapitalist world. Many writers have seen Frenchregulationtheoryas promisinga reinvigorated Marxismthatavoidsthe of false totalization,and class reductionism pitfalls functionalism,teleology, while simultaneouslyofferinga convincing analysisof phenomenasuch as the new social movements. Yet Germananalyses of the new social movements as responses to the contradictionsand crises of the Fordistmode of regulation reveal not only the strengthsbut also the limits of the regulationperspective. In contrastto the abstractpresentationsof their own perspective, regulation theoriststend to interpretsocial formationsand historicalchange in terms of all-encompassingtotalities. The regulationapproachcan remainrelevantfor conflict and change in contemporary understanding capitalistsocieties only by such ambitions. More relinquishing totalizing generally, Marxism can only remainviable if it allows its centralconceptualmechanismsto coexist with a rangeof heterogeneoustheoreticalmechanisms,thatis, if it acknowledgesthe difference between the levels of theory (abstract)and of explanation (concrete). My argumentis presented in four parts. The first sketches the specific problemsposed by the new social movementsfor traditionalMarxisttheory. The second section discusses the major attemptsto analyze the new social movements in terms of revised versions of traditionalMarxism. The most convincing of these approaches,regulationtheory, is discussed in the third part. Here I focus on the work of JoachimHirschandRolandRoth, especially
their book, Das neue Gesicht des Kapitalismus (1986), which presents an

of the developmentof the new social movementsin West Gerinterpretation manybetweenthe 1960s and the 1980s. In section four, I sketchan alternative of the German new social movements, suggesting that they interpretation
I am gratefulto JuliaAdams, JuliaHell, Doug McAdam,Moishe Postone, membersof the CSST seminarat the University of Michigan, and an anonymousreviewerfor comments on an earlier version of this paper. 0010-4175/94/1769-0500 $5.00 ? 1994 Society for Comparative Study of Society and History 176

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were conditioned by culturaland historical factors that cannot be subsumed under the Fordist mode of regulationor the processes of its breakdown.
I.

The collapse of the state-socialistregimes in eastern Europe has occasioned only the latest in a century-oldseries of "crises of Marxism." Against this of mood, however, many Marxistshave counteredthat the "commodification everything"(Wallerstein1983:11) has only been acceleratedby this collapse, makingMarxisttheorymorerelevantthanever (Ruccio 1992:11-12; Jameson 1992). The crisis of Marxist theory is depicted as a fabricationof the mass media or as the triumphant battle cry of victorious capitalism. Others have acknowledgedthe psychological and political costs for Marxistsof the failure of the "socialist experiment," without, however, rejecting Marxism out of as genuhand (Therbor 1992). These writersembracewhat they understand ine Marxism, of course, ratherthan the official doctrineof the East European regimes, which had long been dismissed by WesternMarxists. The danger in this currentdiscussion is that an even more serious set of challenges to (Western)Marxismwill be forgotten,namely those linked to the new social movements (NSMs) of the past two decades. Even if Marxism were to survive as an adequatetheory of capitalismas an economic system, the broaderattackson its claims as a social theoryand guide for emancipatory political practicewould remain. The new social movementshave been crucial both as a phenomenonthat apparentlycannot be explained within a Marxist frameworkand as the source of post-Marxistand poststructuralist theoretical discoursesthat presentthemselves as incommensurable with Marxism. Chantal Mouffe is not alone in her view-expressed before the collapse of state socialism-that "it is unlikely thatMarxismwill recoverfrom the blows it has suffered"(1988:31).
THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: WITHOUT CLASS REVISITED CLASS STRUGGLE

The new social movements have been paradoxicalfor traditionalMarxism. Most importantly, Marxistcategoriesof social class have not been able to map the frontiersof social conflict nor the social compositionof the movements' supportgroups or membership.Nor have the movements'goals been framed in terms of benefits for specific social classes. Although these movements have vigorously opposed many of the same forces of power, property,and privilege as the old labor and socialist movements, the form of their opposition has differedin almost every respect. Wherethe socialist and communist
1 Without using the phrasenew social movements, ReinhardMohr (1992) develops a similar contrastin political goals, styles, theories, and culturesby comparingthe German"generationof 1968," which he depicts as emulating the "old social movements" in many ways, and the "generationof 1978."

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movements were concernedwith mobilizing the proletariat and allied social and classes state effect a to and groups power major redistributionof gain resources, the new movementseschew these same goals. In western Europe, the new social movementshave tendedto spurnthe "social movement entrepreneurs"central to traditionalMarxist understandingsof politics and to evade such formal"social movementorganizations" as parties. They have not sought to gain control of parliamentary power and have had a problematic relationshipeven to Green parties whereverthe latter have been electorally successful.2 The new social movements often claim to abjure power altomovementin WestGermany gether, as in the popularslogan of the alternative duringthe 1970s: "keineMachtfiirNiemand' (no power for nobody). Instead, the new movementsaim to preventthings from happening,such as constructing nuclear power plants or completing censuses (Nelkin and Pollak 1981; Kitschelt 1986; Taeger 1983); to secure social spaces that are autonomous from both marketsand the state; and to directly implement and exhibit an alternativeform of social life. Which conflicts fall into the category of new social movements? Strictly speaking, a coherentdefinitionof any phenomenon,includingthe NSMs, can only be made from within a theoreticalframework.In later sections I will arguethatregulationtheorypermitsthe theoreticaldefinitionand delimitation of the new movementsby singling out their specific determinants (in termsof their relationshipto modes of regulation).For the moment, however, I will presenta more consensualdefinitionbased on a cross section of the literature on the NSMs.3 This definition takes the form of a cluster of characteristics, many of them specified throughimplicit or explicit contrastwith the historically precedingmodel of social movements. Accordingto these accounts, the new social movements * focuson goalsof autonomy, life chances, andqualitative self-realization, identity, andresources;4 benefits rather thandivisible material * are as muchdefensive toward andareoftendirected as offensivein orientation whichallowlittleor no negotiation; limiteddemands ormeta* areless oriented formal toward theories, political social-utopian projects, of progress; narratives
2 Most researchers distinguishbetween the Greenpartiesand the NSMs, althoughthe boundaries are certainlyfluid. Duringthe early years the GermanGreen Party-with its insistence on to preventcentralization,its refusal of coalition poliof parliamentary "rotation" representatives tics, and its uncompromising oppositionto nuclearpower, toxic chemical products,and membership in NATO (and violence and militarismin general)-was much closer to the NSMs. See Schroeren(1990), interview with PetraKelly. 3 This list builds on the following articles: Offe (1987), Brand et al. (1986), Raschke (1985:254-66, 322-36, 411-36), Cohen (1985), Roth (1989), Hirsch and Roth (1986), and Melucci (1980, 1981b, 1989). 4 It follows from this that the NSMs often look more like subculturesthan movements. They can be considered movements, insofar as they challenge existing social structures,have some and demondegree of organization(even if it is informal,in the sense of Me!ucci's "networks"), strate some congruenceof grievances, aims, and identities.

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* do not appeal or mobilize along class lines but cut across them. In the NSMs, socio-economic categories begin to lose their subjective salience and give way to identities that are either more permanentand ascriptive(i.e., "natural") than class or else more flexible, fleeting, partial, and voluntary; * prefer organizationalforms that are non-hierarchicaland undifferentiatedwith directdemocracyas a regulativenormif not a reality; respectto roles, with unmediated * rely on temporaryor part-timemembershipand informalor submergednetworks, resulting in individual patterns of shifting but continuous involvement in various movements that are only partially differentiatedfrom one another (Melucci 1989: 61, 78); * work mainly outside of the parliamentary political system, employing unconventional means, such as direct action; * politicize aspects of everyday life formerly seen as lying outside of politics; * can be seen as at least partiallyunified throughtheirsharedoppositionto a system that is itself perceived as monolithic, even if they are fragmentedand diversified in terms of issues, ideology, and organizationalbase (Raschke 1985:412). The final characteristic concerns historical periodization: The NSMs have appeared since the 1960s in the advanced capitalist countries (and in the core sectors of the periphery and semi-periphery; see Escobar and Alvarez 1992). Thus, these movements have been quite literally new, in the sense of being contemporary. The label new also suggests to some readers that these movements are historically unprecedented, however; and this notion has stimulated a barrage of criticism. Tarrow (1988) points out that earlier social movements, especially in their beginning phases, shared some of the features of the NSMs. Focusing on the repertoires of collective action used by French social movements over the course of a century, Tilly (1986:349) finds little novelty in the most recent wave of protest. A small academic cottage industry has grown up around the project of proving that the new social movements were really not so new after all (see, for example, Kivisto 1986 and Tucker 1991). But as Dieter Rucht (1982:278) acknowledges, the new movements "cannot be specified in their totality by their form, their varying contents . . . nor their constituency. Due to the historical parallels, every attempted definition in this direction will run into boundary problems." This line of critique misses the contextual significance of the term new, which is intended to emphasize the specific difference between the dominant patterns of social conflictuality before the 1960s and thereafter, not to signal that the specific forms of contention were unique in any world-historical sense.5 It is a term of periodization or "ancient."6 analogous to such expressions as "early modernm"
5 Whether the NSMs are now giving way in Europe to a new patternof social movements based on racism and nationalismis a differentquestion that I will turn to in the conclusion. 6 Although the adjective new before social movements is not necessaryto make the historical point, I will continue to use it because it is widely understoodas referringto a common set of phenomena and is less clumsy than the alternatives.It is necessary to define the period more precisely, of course, and to addressproblemsof cross-nationaldifferencesin periodization,as the NSMs do not appear simultaneouslyeverywhere in the capitalist core and since they appearto have had longer staying power in some areas than others. But such periodizationproblems can

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This definitiondiscouragesefforts to create an inventoryof discrete movements that fall into the NSM category (for example, Vester 1983). The new movements, given that they abstainfrom parliamentary politics and assume forms that look from the outside like subculturaldeviance, may not even recognize themselves as social movements. Ostensibly unified social movements often contain heterogeneous conflicts and logics (Melucci 1989:28; also Melucci 1980, 1981). A case in point is the contemporarywomen's movement, which is sometimes counted among the NSMs. Identity-based politics which assert difference as well as equality (Scott 1988) seem to be partof the new politics, as do consciousness-raising groupsand "takeback the marches. Strands of the women's movement that focus on attaining night" and market electoral political equalitythrough politics and centralizedorganization, however, are closer to the political paradigmthat Habermas calls "bourgeois-socialistliberationmovements."7 These examples also raise questions about the new social movements' stakes and goals. Clearlythe NSMs cannotbe specified simply by pointing to their novel aims, as these could also have been addressedby old-style movements. Indeed, establishedpolitical parties, such as the GermanSPD, have tried to appropriatethemes, such as environmentalprotection, from the NSMs. So the real difficultyfacing any theoryof the new social movementsis to explain the appearanceof a cluster of novel forms of political action, recruitmentpatterns, and political stakes at a specific moment in history (1960s throughthe 1980s), as well as the articulationof these differentelements.
II.

Alongside the challenge from the new social movementsto the Marxistbelief in the importance of class and to the traditional Left's political strategies,there has been a rise in populartheoreticaldiscourses critical of Marxism.8While Marxism has typically focused on relationsof exploitation, that is, relations
of the new social movements. Partof only be resolved on the basis of a model of the determinants the confusion stems from the differentexplanatorymodels used by adherentsof the term new social movements. Inglehart'stheory (1990), for instance, virtuallyrequiresthat the NSMs are historicallyunprecedented. 7 Another example of inadequacyof common-sense definitions of social movements is the forms peace movement of the 1980s. It in many respects assumed centralizedand bureaucratic (Rochon 1988:21, 210) but also encompassed groups that emphasized localized actions, antiand Hopkins of new forms of social life (Hartford statistpolitics, and the practicaldemonstration tendencies 1984; Liddington1991:197-286). Bagguley (1992:31) concludesthatthe traditionalist for the distinctivenessof the NSMs. in the peace and women's movementsunderminearguments and concrete-empirical levels of analysis, If one retainsa distinctionbetween abstract-theoretical however, it is easy to see how a single social movementmay exemplify more thanone theoretical logic. 8 The relationshipbetween theoreticaldiscoursescriticalof Marxismand participation in new social movementsis illustratedby individualssuch as Foucault,Touraine,and E. P. Thompson.

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involving transfersof (surplus)value, many of the post-Marxistsocial theories have moved relations of domination into the center. Foucault is most strongly associated with a view of power and dominationas ubiquitousand not centeredin capitalismor social class (cf. Foucault 1978:94-95; 1980:60, 89, 122). Other damaging critiques of traditionalMarxism have retained a materialistsociology but have insisted on the prominenceof non-class actors, identities, and interests in social conflict, involving race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, and religion. Class is not at the core of such antagonisms,either way (see Beck 1986:121phenomenologicallyor in any immediatestructural 30; 1989). Other theories permit social class to coexist peacefully alongside but with no claims to preeminence. other forms of oppressionor stratification These approachesrange from dualistic feminist theories of class and gender (Hartmann1981), through tripartiteschemes of "class, status, and power" (Weber1947 [1921-22]; Wiley 1970), to schemes in which the bases of social differentiationare potentially infinite. Taken to its logical conclusion, for instance, Bourdieu's sociological theory allows for the constructionof an infinite numberof new fields with their specific forms of distinction, capital, dynamics of conflict, and irreduciblestakes.9 theories Finally, there is a disparatebody of culturalistor poststructuralist associated with the new social movements and often referred to as postMarxist. Most influentialare the elaborations of Gramsci'snotion of hegemony associated with Mouffe and Laclau. Hegemony, in the broadest sense, representsa specific type of discursive and political practice in which one social groupor class orientsthe perceptionsand actionsof another.According to Showstack-Sassoon(1982:13-14), Gramsciuses hegemony in thesenseof influence, moral andconsent, rather than thealternative and leadership, of domination. Ithasto do withthewayone socialgroup influences opposite meaning other certain withthemin order to gaintheirconsent for groups, making compromises its leadership in societyas a whole.Thusparticular, sectional interests aretransformed andsomeconceptof the general interest is promoted. Hegemonic discourseprovides a weapon with which dominationcan be chalthemselves and lenged, but it also limits the ways in which actorsunderstand imagine theiropponents.Hegemony in this view differsfrom otherdiscursive logics in that it implies a relatively unified, encompassingdiscursive formation, and one which is actively constructedby a set of leading actors or intellectuals.In discussing the relationsof these hegemonizingintellectualsto the groups they attemptto shape, Gramsci makes it clear how his position differs from Leninist understandings of the role of ideological leadership in social conflict (Laclauand Mouffe 1985:55, 65-71). The ideal-typicalLeninist strategyis in this respect indistinguishable from classical Social Democra9 See Bourdieu(1977, 1984). In his more abstracttheoreticalstatements,however, Bourdieu limits the numberof forms of capital to three or four (cf. Bourdieu 1986).

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groupswith the cy: The party'sgoal was to align workersand non-proletarian rather than construct new identity of the to some Weltanschauung proletariat, and world view for both the leaders and the led. In the radically antiessentialist readingof Gramsci, social agents transcendtheir earlieridentities when entering a hegemonic formation, and the hegemonizing class is also its original class identitywhen constructingthis formaseen as transcending tion. Hegemony thus entails the discursiveconstructionof hegemonized and of Gramsciputs it, "the subhegemonizing agents alike. As one interpreter of at the level their discursive constitutionwill not of jects hegemonicpractice
necessarily have a class character . . . to hegemonize as a class would imply

a limited or unsuccessful attempt"(Rosenthal 1988). Successful hegemonizing agents must abandontheirsectional interests,whetherthey try to align the interestsof dominatedgroups with those of the economically dominantor to orchestratea counter-hegemonic project which coordinatesthe resistance of subordinategroups. In some post-Marxisttheory, social structuredoes not figure even as constraint;conflict becomes entirely intra-discursive.Laclau and Mouffe begin with Althusser's notion of overdetermination,which underscores the role of contingency, unique constellationsof events, and non-simultaneousperiodicities in the determinationof historical outcomes. Yet their radical verbreaks with any vestige of materialstructuration. sion of overdetermination When actors adopt new goals or identities, they are constrainedmainly by previous discursive formations. Not only is there no "logical and necessary relationbetween socialist objectives and the positions of social agents in the relations of production"(Laclau and Mouffe 1985:86), but social-structural positions are not related to specific forms of consciousness or interest.10 Hegemony in Gramscianpost-Marxismthus representsa form of discourse that straddlesstructuraldivisions in the process of forging social collectivities; some post-Marxistsdeny the very existence of structuralstratification outside of discourse. Hegemony is an inherentlyconflictualprocess in which there is a continualstruggleamong contendingefforts to define reality. Radical theories of hegemony question the ability of any sociological theory, includingMarxism,to explainphenomenasuch as the new social movements.
ATTEMPTS OF REVISED TO EXPLAIN CLASS NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN TERMS CONCEPTS

have tried to Ratherthan rejectingclass analysis altogether,some researchers revised class new movements the of for by using explain patterns support have been The social movements new ones). (often concepts quasi-Weberian middle class the new of of the interests as an (Brand outgrowth explained
10 In a somewhatless radicalcritiqueof objectivism, Bowles and Gintis (1986:149) arguethat collective actors are created by political discourse and that "no naturalboundaries to group exist. membership"

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1982:14; Kitschelt 1985:278) or new class (Martin 1988)11;the state-sector middle class (Cotgrove and Duff 1980; Mattausch1989:50-52, 84-85); the service class (Lash and Urry 1987:195); the old and new petite bourgeoisie locationsbetween proletariat (Eder 1985); and classes located in contradictory and bourgeoisie (Wright 1985; Kriesi 1989).12 At least one author (Wilde 1990:67) has described the new social movements as "protest movements within the working class" but without offering any evidence to supportthis claim. For Vester (1983), the new movements representthe reemergenceof traditionallylower-classresistanceamong the "new plebeians,"characterized as those who are highly educated but blocked in their chances for upward mobility.Accordingto Offe (1987), at least threedifferentgroupsconstitutethe new movements' social base: the old and new middle classes, and economically peripheralized(decommodified) strata, such as the unemployed and underemployed,housewives, and students. Other putative characteristicsof participantsin the new conflicts which can be linked more or less closely to social class include youth, high levels of education, and employmentwithin the culturalsector (Kriesi 1988). All such attemptsto accountfor the new movementsin termsof social class run into difficulties. First, recent studies indicatethat the NSMs' social composition is much more diversethanany of the class-basedapproachessuggest; there is evidence that even non-active supportersof the new movements are drawnfrom the various social classes in approximately representative proportions (Roth 1989:29). Public opinion polls on environmentalissues and patternsof electoral supportfor Greenpartiesindicatedduringthe second half of the 1980s that the distributionof sympathizerswas flattening out (Huilsberg 1988:68; Brand et al. 1986:248, 281). According to a study of the Netherlands, the "strongsympathizersfor the peace movement," if not the particicross section of the Dutch population" pants, "forman almost representative (Kriesi 1989:1101). The same appearsto have been true of the West German peace movement of the 1980s (Brandet al. 1986:263). This raises a second questionaboutthe class approaches.Even if the thesis that the "new middle class" is over-represented could be supportedempirireflect its for this might greaterproclivity cally, protest participation,rather than its inherentlystrongerinterestin the new grievances. Ratherthan being affectedby the new social problems, the new middle class disproportionately be able to perceive and to mobilize against them. The better may simply
1 See also Bell (1973) and Inglehart(1990), both of whom correlatesupportfor the NSMs with populations resembling the new class, a term used by Bell in this context (1973:479). Inglehart also discusses the "new class" as a bearer of "postmaterial"values-his central concept-but also as one cause of the NSMs (1990:331-2, 371-92). 12 class analysis, using Bourdieu'scategory Althoughhe actuallyclaims to reject"objectivist" of habitus to mediate between objective and subjective class position, Eder (1985) ultimately derives the putativepetty-bourgeois attraction to the new social movementsfrom their intermediate position between upper and lower classes.

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in many "old" social movements middle classes were also overrepresented are Such (Bagguley 1992). dynamics ignoredby class-theoreticalapproaches, which typicallyposit a directrelationship betweenengagementin a movement and relevant structural interests. The lack of class distinctiveness of the NSMs' base might be seen as forms of deprivareflecting the relative classlessness of many contemporary new grievances (nuclear tion and domination. Most of the paradigmatically power and energy, state penetrationof civil society and the life-world ) do not affect the new middle classes-or any other classes for that matterAccording to an influentialGermanstudy originally pubdisproportionately. lished in 1983, "thepopulationof those who are immediatelyaffected [negatively by the modernizationprocess] cannot be pinned down according to clear categories of class and stratum, in contrast to other cases of social (Brandet al. 1986:33). As a result, "one should not expect to disadvantaging" social camps alongside the find sharply differentiatednew social-structural of class society" new lines of conflict, comparableto the class contradictions (Brandet al. 1986:43). Ulrich Beck's notion of a shift from a class society to elaboratesupon this idea: "Thegeneralization risk society (Risikogesellschaft) of modernizationrisks unleashes a social dynamic that can no longer be grasped and understoodin class categories" (Beck 1986:52; see also Beck 1989, 1991; Lau 1991). Beck concludes that "need is hierarchical,smog is democratic"(Beck 1986:48).
NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS EXPLAINED CHANGES IN CAPITALISM IN TERMS OF STRUCTURAL

Even if social class were able to map patternsof membershipin the new movements, there would still be the problemof explainingthe emergence of novel social problems, stakes, and forms of conflict. To addressthese issues, certain versions of Marxismhave examined large-scale changes in the structure of capitalism, attributingto them the ability to generate new social contradictionsand, ultimately,social movements. The early work of Manuel Castells (such as 1977, 1978) representsone such approach.Concernedspecifically with urbansocial movements, Castells emphasizedcapitalaccumulationratherthan social class, analyzingthe urban space under capitalism primarily as the site of the reproductionof labor power. According to Katznelson'ssummaryof Castells, as "capitalconcentrates the working population,"it "requirescollective goods that the private market is unable to provide" (1981:211). The result is an increase in the collective (that is, socialized) consumptionof goods and services, such as culturaland educationalfacilities, and welfare. The housing, transportation, of collective consumptionare especially severe (and visible) in contradictions the city and increasingly define the nodal points of urban social conflict (Castells 1983:94, 1978:15-36). In contrastto relations of production, the

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relations of collective consumptiondefine structural positions that cut across boundaries of social class. The users of public transportation come from diverse social class positions, for example, yet their interestsconverge with respect to crises of the transportation system. The basic dynamics of social can be nonetheless provision explained in terms of the logic of capital accumulation. Urban public transportation systems, for Castells, are designed to of needs meet the primarily capital. Castell's early work thus retaineda Marxistanalysis of political economy and macro-social development and analyzed certain new social movements without reducing them to expressions of social class. He did not focus on contradictionsand grievances unrelatedto collective consumption,including those-militarism, patriarchy,and environmentalpollution-often seen as centralto the NSMs. Nonetheless, it is possible to extend Castells' logic and remainsthe mainspring of advancedsocieties, arguethatcapitalaccumulation even if the sociologically defined working class is declining in size (Offe 1984), and thatthis process will continueto define the mainpositions in social conflict. Castells recognized that his early work ignored the autonomous cultural determinantsof urban social movements, especially the role of the defense of culturalidentity (Castells 1983: xviii).13 The problemis to account not just for the emphasis on identity in the new social movements (Cohen 1985) but for the entire set of rejectionsof the older form of politics.
III.

Regulation theory presents itself as having remedied many of the shortcomings of older versions of Marxism without abandoningMarxist theory altogether.14Regulationtheoryfocuses on political economy ratherthanclass and avoids teleology and functionalism. The figure of historical necessity is exchanged for an emphasis on contingency and accidents. The only historical constantin the regulationistview is the recurrence of capitalistcrisis, but the outcomes of such crises are always the productof multiple forces and wills the intersectingin unpredictable ways. The type of crisis outcomethat attracts most attentionis the temporarilystabilized"mode of regulation,"which creates orderly social arrangementsthat permit furthereconomic growth and capital accumulation. But regulation theory offers no guaranteethat an ordered resolution to crisis will be found. Social formationsare not the correlates of specific stages of developmentof the productiveforces, nor do they automatically result from economic crisis. Social movements, finally, are
13 Anotherproblemsingled out by Katznelson(1981:211-212) is thatCastells did not discuss the conditions that turnthe structural possibility for social protestinto its actualization.Castells' approachbegan to change considerablywith The City and the Grassroots (1983). 14 Severaldifferentbranches of regulationtheoryarediscussed in Jessop (1990b). Each regulationist differs in emphasis, with some closer to traditionalMarxism than others. The version discussed in this section is closest to Jessop's. I am also grateful to Bob Jessop for discussing some of the ideas in this section with me.

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interpretedin the light of interests and grievances defined by waning or nascent modes of regulation. Despite its willingness to acknowledge contingency, the regulation approach is not totally amorphous.It operates with concepts at two different levels of abstraction.At the moreempiricallevel are specific modes of regulation, such as Fordism. These models are realized in differentways in various national (and subnational)cases, with distinct emphases, subtractions,and additions. Regulationtheory also proposes more abstractconcepts, such as regulationitself. The notion of a Fordistmode of regulationis ideally suited for a presentationof regulationtheory because it has been discussed most extensively and illustratesthe relationshipbetween the abstractand concrete levels of analysis. It is also seen as generatingthe new social movements.
FORDISM AS A MODE OF REGULATION

Theorists associated with the theory of Fordismas a mode of economic and social regulationinclude Michel Aglietta (1987), RobertBoyer (1982, 1990), and Alain Lipietz (1987) in France;JoachimHirsch (1980, 1983, 1988) in West Germany;and Bob Jessop (1983, 1989, 1990b;Jessop et al. 1991) and David Harvey (1989) in Britain. Much of this work draws on the original insights of Antonio Gramsciin his essay, "Fordismand Americanism"(1971 [1929-35]). Gramsci had analyzed with a mixtureof admirationand abhorrence the social and economic changes in the United States duringthe 1920s, at a time when American industry was searching for ways to combat the throughthe reorgafalling rate of profit and to radicallyincreaseproductivity the of and mechanization nization productionprocess (Gramsci 1978b:112Americancapitalism, this of In 3). Aglietta's (1987) study twentieth-century involved a shift from a strategyof extensive accumulationand absolute surplus value to reliance on intensive accumulationand relative surplus value. Aglietta interpretsthe Fordist productionprocess as a radicalizationof the Tayloristsystem, the latter referringto the "sum total of those relations of productioninternalto the laborprocess thattend to acceleratethe completion of the mechanicalcycle of movements on the job and to fill the gaps in the working day" (1987:114). Fordism applied the Tayloristprinciple of fragmentingthe laborperformedby the deskilled individualworkerto the collective labor process.15 The key was productionon a semi-automaticassembly line, which was at first used especially for producingmass-consumer goods in of long productionruns and was later extended upstreamto the manufacture intermediatecomponentsfor the productionprocess. standardized The second signal featureof Fordism, the formationof a social consumption norm, resulted from the lowered costs of the means of reconstituting labor power. A historicallyunprecedented working-classwage level was the
15 Gramsci distinguishes Fordism and Taylorismas "two methods of productionand work" (1978:112); see also Maier (1987).

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quid pro quo for the intensificationof work;indeed, the higherliving standard was necessary to "maintainand restorethe strengththat has been worn down by the new form of toil" (Gramsci 1971 [1929-35]: 310). In addition, employers had to pay high wages in orderto capturethe workerswho were "best adaptedto the new forms of productionand work from the psychotechnical in the core mass-production industriescould (1978:113). Workers standpoint" now purchasethe commoditiesthey produced.The generalizedresult, Gramsci predicted,would be "a largerinternalmarket" and"a more rapidrhythmof accumulation" Fordism was thus foundedupon (1971 [1929-35]:291). capital a particularcombinationof high wages and high productivity. Gramsci stressed Fordism'sneed for a "new"man who would be psychologically and physically adapted (with heightened physical and muscularnervous efficiency) to the new productionprocesses. Although Fordist laborerswere relativelydeskilled, they needed systematicwork habits:A single unreliableworker could wreak enormous damage in the interconnectedand inflexible Fordistlabor process. The new Fordistmethodsof work were thus linked to efforts to rationalizesexual, emotional, personal, and family life. Gramsci pointed to American crusades against the "exaltationof passion," of nervous energies in the disorderlyand alcoholism, and the "squandering stimulatingpursuitof occasional sexual satisfaction,"and in favorof workingclass monogamy (Gramsci 1971 [1929-35]:304-5). He interpretedthese campaigns as tools for the creation of workers suited for the "timed movements of productivemotions connected with the most perfected automatism" (Gramsci 1971 [1929-35]:305). Creatingthe Fordistsubjectwas a hegemonic project, most successful if "proposedby the workerhimself, and not imposed from the outside" (Gramsci [1929-35]:303). A related process only touched upon by Gramsci, but which played a centralrole in latertheorizationsof Fordism,was the state's growing involvement in maintainingconsumerdemandfor mass-produced goods. A panoply of social insuranceprogramssupportedaggregatelevels of populardemand. This legislation originatedin the nineteenthcenturyin Europeand duringthe 1930s in the United States, but social insurance benefits did not begin to approachwage-replacementlevels until after 1945. Gramsci also discussed the political effects of Fordism on the labor movement: Struggles between labor and capital over the wage rate became institutionalizedin the form of collective bargaining(Aglietta 1987:116). A neo-corporatist productivistbloc between industrial workers and managementwas "destined to resolve the problem of the further development of the Italian economic apparatus" (Gramsci 1971 [1929-35]:291). The prescience of Gramsci's observations is underscoredby the rise of neo-corporatismduring the post-1945 period (Schmitterand Lehmbruch1979; Panitch 1986). The more recent writings by regulationtheoristscharacterizeFordismas a specific mode of regulationarticulatedwith a particular regime of accumula-

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tion, which is defined as a set of rules determiningthe distributionand allocation of the social productbetween investment, accumulation,and consumption.Regulationrefersto the mannerin which social relationsare reproduced despite (what is assumed to be) their conflictual and contradictory nature. A mode of regulationis a set of "rules and procedures, of norms, institutions, procedures, and modes of calculation throughwhich the accumulation regime is secured. It comprises all of the institutionalforms and norms which secure the compatibilityof typical modes of economic conduct" (Jessop 1989).16In additionto clearly economic institutionsand norms, such as money, the mode of regulationtypically encompassesaspects of the state, culture, and mechanisms of initial socialization, sex and gender relations, family forms, and so forth. As a regime of accumulation, Fordism is characterizedby a systematic relation between mass production and mass consumption. As a mode of regulation, Fordism signals a broad range of changes. According to Jessop (1989, 1990b), Fordistregulationis characterized by the following economic features (listed in approximately declining level of prominence): * thecentrality of thewageas themainmechanism forsecuring thereproduction of laborpower; * collectivebargaining over wage rates and workingtime; monopolistic price regulation; * thepredominance of massconsumption of standardized commodimass-produced ties andof collectiveconsumption of goodsandservicessupplied by the state; * the encouragement of techniques such as of mass consumption by a number advertising; * the importance of creditfor validating full employment levels of demand. Productivismand consumerismconstitute the prevailingcultural forms, the societal goals and way of life, under Fordism (Hirsch and Roth 1986). An is combined in a potentiallycontradictoryway ideology of individualization with the homogenizationof personallife-style orientations.Cultureis instituand the Keynesian tionally centeredaroundthe mass media. Neo-corporatism welfare state, finally, represent the related political forms. According to Hirsch and Roth (1986:37), Fordistpolitics are based on social-democratic, bureaucratic societalization,strongunions, reformistpartiesof mass integraof class contradictions,and Keynesian tion, corporatistinstitutionalization state interventionism. the modes of regulationas automatRegulationtheory does not understand ic, functionally determinedresponses to crisis. The only assumption about for capitalist accumulationrehistorical change is that social arrangements peatedlyfall apartand profit rateseventuallydecline, leading to a franticand
16 An example of such a regulativeinstitution,money, representsthe recognitionof the labor containedwithin an exchangedcommodity and of the commodity-owner's right to an equivalent share of social labor (Scherrer 1989). Jessop proposes a third concept, "hegemonic project," which he distinguishesfrom modes of regulation, while Hirsch (1988:46) equates the two.

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uncoordinatedsearch for solutions by diverse social actors.17The outcome is always uncertain and differs from prior blueprints. Each regulatory mode reflects the historicalpeculiaritiesof the nation (or region) and their location in the world capitalistsystem and world time. Muddlingthroughand suboptimal solutions are as likely as successful resolutionsof crisis. Fordism itself resulted from a combination of uncoordinatedplanning efforts and pure chance.18Once the Fordistmodel had been invented, it was reproducedand copied, because it seemed to work. But the general model of Fordism was instantiatedin differentways and varied enormouslyin each national setting (see Jessop 1989). The more recentformulations by regulationtheoristsdescribethe rudiments of Fordism as taking shape in the United States during the interwarperiod, with full-blown Fordism taking root during the post-WorldWar II years in western Europe and the United States. It is frequently argued that Fordism began to unravel during the 1970s and that the advanced capitalist world is currentlyin the midst of a transitionto some still vaguely defined post-Fordist mode of regulation (see Jessop et al. 1991; Harvey 1989; Bonefeld and Holloway 1991). Different writers disagree on the precise periodizationof Fordism, and their judgments depend to some extent on their implicit reference to (or familiaritywith) specific nationalcases. Fordism is an abstractmodel describingthe general, dominantfeaturesof the advancedcapitalistworld in a certainperiod. It is not a concrete description of specific countries, an essence that is instantiatedin each case. The nationallyspecific form of Fordistregulation,which Jessop calls the "national form of growth" (1989), depends on preexistent national conditions; thus Britainexhibits a weaker form of Fordismthan West Germany,whose Fordism was in turnless pronouncedthan Sweden's (Jessop 1991:137-42). Even though several of the central elements of Fordism were pioneered in the United States (mass production in consumer goods based on semi-skilled labor, scientific organizationof work, high wages, and mass media and advertising), Fordism was less complete in the United States than in many other countries. The welfare state and neo-corporatism were underdeveloped,and vast sectors of society were not encompassedby even the partialversion of Fordism that did exist. Fordism does not create the institutionsand social practices that it brings under its sway, nor does it fully control them. Figure 1 attemptsto illustrate Fordismas a historic bricolage of componentsfrom the diverse social arenas which preexist and survive it (see Figure 1). The horizontallines in the figure
17 Wright(1978:111-80) allows capitalistcrises and their resolutionsto vary historicallybut suggests that some sort of resolutionwill always be forthcoming:"Insuch situations[of structural accumulationcrisis], typically, the forms of accumulationare themselves restructured in basic ways" (1978:165). 18 Weir and variationsand contingencies involved in Skocpol (1985) detail the international the diffusion of Keynesianism, one of the key elements of the Fordistensemble.

---->

------->

>

--

------------------- United States international hegemony -------------------mass consumerism---------------------------------------------------------------------- mass culture -----------------------------------------Taylorism--------------------- Fordism --------------------------- Keynesian welfare state -----------------------------neo-corporatism --> -- generalization of nuclear family

--->

-br

FORDISM

bureaucratized parties > ------------ centralizedlabor movement ------------family wage ----------------------- official nationalism ------------------------> ----> ----> ---- >

- centralizedstate apparatus ---------------

------

modernism

p 1930s-1940s

Time: Late 19th century

of the uneven history of the various strandsmaking up the Fordist 1. Hypotheticalrepresentations FIGURE Figure 1, can be found on p. 191.

REGULATION,

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represent the historical development of various social fields. The general column in bold-face type; descriptionsof the fields are given in the right-hand the specific forms they assume in differentperiods are representedby labels within the horizontallines. The placement of a phenomenon, such as mass consumerism,within a time line representsthe hypotheticalmomentat which it became prominent.(The historicalplacementof these phenomenais merely suggestive, of course, since the chartdoes not refer to a specific case.) Each of the strandsdevelops non-synchronouslyand in partialautonomyfrom the other fields. Our central concern here is with the formation representedby the box labelled Fordism. Fordisminterrupts the strandscontainingthe elements that it articulateswithin its specific mode of regulation.The arrowsthat are only to it; their post-Fordist partiallyinterrupted by Fordismwere more peripheral development should also be less strongly shaped by the Fordistera. Strands that continue uninterruptedly, such as religion and the fine arts, were less centralto Fordism(even if they were influencedby the Fordistmode, which is a separateissue). The sharpvertical lines aroundthe Fordistformationmisleadingly indicate a sudden birth and an equally abrupt disappearance;it would be preferableto representan uneven congealing on the left marginand an equally incrementaldissolve on the right. Finally, the figure only attempts to show the approximateplacement of one regulatorymode, Fordism;other regulatorymodes might be indicatedboth before and after. Figure 1 suggests that Fordismis a provisionalhistoricalconstructionthat relies on and is shaped by its own raw materials,even as it partiallyrecasts them. This is a hypotheticalexample thatdoes not representa specific national case. Not just the form of Fordism,but the timingof Fordistdevelopmentin each nationalcase will depend on the preexistingdevelopmentof each of the components.

THE

NEW

SOCIAL AND

MOVEMENTS ROTH

AND

FORDISM

IN THE WRITINGS

OF HIRSCH

Hirschand Roth arguethatFordismhas determined the mainbases of interest, and in the societies where it grievance, existed, and that as a result oppression it has structuredthe main social surfaces, forms, and themes of social conflict.22The new social movementsare seen as a responseto the contradictions

19 Bob Jessop deserves credit for the term Toyotism. See Chopraand Scheller (1992) for an overview of changes in marriageand the family in what they call "late-modernsociety." 21 "Official nationalism,"accordingto Anderson(1983), arose in the late nineteenthcentury. 22 See Hirsch (1980, 1981, 1983), Hirsch and Roth (1986, 1987), and Mayer (1988, 1991). Critiquesof Hirsch and Roth are presentedby Hiibner(1987), Wagnerand Stahn (1987),
20

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GEORGE STEINMETZ

and the crisis of Fordismbut are also understoodas contributing indirectlyto of a new "post-Fordist" the elaboration mode of regulation(Roth 1989; Hirsch 1988:54; Hirsch 1991). This contemporaryphase is of less concern in the presentcontext than the etiology of the NSMs duringthe era of Fordismand its dissolution. A few key aspects of Fordismshould be retainedin orderto understand its supposed contributionto social movements. Fordismwas based on the centrality of industrial labor as producer and consumer. Male workers were relatively well-paid, and the welfare state propped up consumer demand during slack periods. The social movement sphere was monopolized by the official labormovement, centralizedand bureaucratized laborunions; closely connected were social-democratic or labor partiesengaged in neo-corporatist relationswith employers'organizationsand the state. In orderto stabilize the Fordistformation,the old class actors, especially militantextraparliamentary or integrated.Yet the Fordistsystem soon labor,had to be eithermarginalized to new of areas conflict. Just as the neo-corporatistlabor began generate movement correspondsto Fordism, so the new social movements signal (and help induce) Fordism'sbreakdown.Indeed, the most obvious feature shared by the new social movements is their rejectionof the Fordistmodel of societalization. Examination of the cultural, economic, and political sides of Fordismreveals its negative relationshipto the new conflicts. Fordismas a regime of accumulationinvolved the productionof a hitherto unknown level of wealth. Due to the labor-capitalaccord and the welfare state, the workingclasses received a slightly largeramount(in per capita, not proportionalterms) of this wealth than had previously been the case. The movementschallengingthe Fordistsystem were also closely tied to the social wealth producedby that very system. Fordismincreasedlevels of education, income, social security, and free time, allowing the proliferationof "postmaterialist values" (Hirsch and Roth 1986:195; see also Inglehart 1977, 1990). These values led in turn to a heightenedconsciousness of the Fordist model's shortcomings,especially the homogenizationof cultureand consumer goods. Sandwichedbetween the era of Fordistmass cultureand the current breakdownof distinctionsbetween high and low postmodernist(post-Fordist) culturewas a period in which new social movementsrejectedboth the culture
and Jessop (1988). As will become evident, I am more interestedin Hirschand Roth's treatment of the connectionsof Fordismto the NSMs thanin theirdiscussionof Fordismper se, which is the main focus of these criticisms. The critics are probablycorrectin arguingthat Hirsch and Roth's and that it understates the version of regulationtheoryis overly functionalistand "state-centered" difficulties involved in constructingFordism,especially the non-stateaspects of regulation.The critics also examinevariousways in which the WestGermancase deviatesfromthe generalmodel of Fordism. Harvey (1989) concentrateson the relations between models of regulation and culturalchange, and includes only a few pages on the NSMs; Epstein (1990) includes a short section on Hirsch and Roth but does not discuss Das neue Gesicht and their other work in German.

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industry and official elite culture.23Such challenges varied between subculturalretreatismand openly oppositionalmilieux. The evidence of cross-class recruitmentinto NSMs cited above makes it impossible to rely uniquely on postmaterialvalues as an explanatoryfactor, however. The new movements also responded in part to the leveling class connotationsof mass culture. Rejection of the culture industrywas to some extent an attempteddistinction strategy(Bourdieu)by arrive carriersof culturalcapital, themselves the productof the Fordistexpansionof the educational system. Hirsch and Roth suggest that attackson mass culture were aimed and lower-middle-class not just at its producersbut also at its core proletarian audience (1986:198). One factor driving student protest was the traditional of the cultural arena and the lettered classes' refusal of the "degradation" downgradingof university credentials. Of course, the expansion of higher education also led to struggles against a curriculumthat valorized exclusionary,classical forms of culturalcapital-struggles thatare visible in the current Americanculturewars.24The important point is thatthe Fordistexpansionof mass culture and education set both forms of studentunrest in motion. The new movements also rejected the Fordist model of individualization and socialization. The emphasis on the politics of identity within the NSMs responded to Fordism's enforced conformism. Family and gender relations were subjectedto massive criticism. The importanceof the nuclearfamily as an agency of consumptionand socializationin Fordismhad severalcontradictory consequences. The women's movement(s) and social movements organized aroundalternativesexualities and life styles rejectedthis model.25The nuclearfamily was undermined by the commodificationof the family's role in of laborpower and by the sweeping entryof women into the the reproduction labor force. Fordism's cultivation of a hedonistic, consumerist, narcissistic personalityform (Bell 1973; Lasch 1978) createda furtherculturalprecondition of the NSMs. Spiritualmovements oriented towards the recovery and as responsesto the lowered supersolidificationof identitycan be interpreted of self entailed minimization the control and by the narcissisticFordist ego form of subjectivity. The NSMs opposed not only the culturaland subjectiveaspects of Fordism
23 The 1978 announcement of the 1978 TUNIX ("Do-Nothing") meeting of the "spontaneous left" in West Berlin appealed to everyone who was sick of the "Coca-Cola-Karajan-culture" et al. 1978:93). (Hoffmann-Axthelm 24 This is not an of the traditionalcurriculum, argument(a la Allan Bloom) for the superiority but a commenton the sociological basis of strugglesagainstit. See Delale and Ragache(1978) for the argumentthat the French studentprotests of May 1968 involved anger by "proletarianized" students about false promises of social mobility. 25 Bagguley arguescorrectlythat feminism as a new social movementcan only be understood in termsof "changesin the structure and form of patriarchy," specifically the shift fromprivateto and not in termsof class structure (1992:27, 42-45). But while genderrelations public patriarchy, certainly cannot be subsumed under regulatorymodes, a more subtle analysis of changes in capitalism might also permit one to draw certain finer distinctions in forms of patriarchy.

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but also its negative material externalities. The clearest example has been environmentalist protestagainstthe Fordisttenet of the unlimitedexploitation of nature (Hirsch 1988:47). The automobile was the very centerpiece of Fordist mass productionand consumption(Roth 1989). The collective irrationalities of reliance on individual automobiles provided the impetus for demands for cities free of automobiles, reduced speed limits, better mass and so forth. Labor and managementhave often been on the transportation, same side of the Fordist "productivistcartel" in opposition to movements against environmentaldestruction.26 In other respects, the new social movements respond to the specifically political aspects of Fordism. Hirsch (1980) argues that the Fordist state assumes the form of a security state-a termthatresonateswith both the social and the police connotations of security. By deepening its penetrationinto citizens' everydaylife, the stateprovokesdefensive reactions.Citizen opposition preventedthe Netherlandsfrom carryingout a nation-widecensus after 1971 (Vieten 1983); in WestGermany,the census originallyplannedfor 1983 was delayed until 1987 and widely boycotted(Hubert1983). A more extreme case involves groups like the German Autonomen (autonomous groups), whose attacks have been directed especially against representativesof state power (but also againstprivateorganizationsand actorsin civil society, from computer and genetic engineering firms to middle-class gentrifiers in the Kreuzbergdistrictof Berlin).27 The Keynesianwelfarestatealso has contradictory effects. On the one hand, of it awakensnew needs or confirmsa sense of entitlementto a certainstandard life. Writers on boththe RightandLeft in the 1970s claimedthatthey detecteda system overloadcausedby widespreadfeelings of welfareentitlement.But the andprofits since the early 1970s meantthatthe fiscally decline in productivity strappedwelfare statecould no longer meet such needs fully (Hirschand Roth 1986:71, 89). Moreover, the Keynesian welfare state ascertainsand serves disablingway (Lasch 1978:154-7, 223-31; peoples' needs in an authoritarian, Illich et al. 1977; Fraser1987). Many new conflicts focused thereforeon deandlocally (Handler mandsfor social servicesadministered n.d.). democratically and the corThe dominantneo-corporatist system of interestrepresentation or official political parties(Poulantzas1980:232) respondingmass-integrative
26 A recent exampleconcernsbattlesover proposedanti-smogcontrolsin Los Angeles, which were opposed by an "unlikely"coalition between labor and industry(cf. "PoliticalFallout from Smog Blurs Futurefor Los Angeles," New YorkTimes, nationaledition, April 30 1989, p. 15). 27 Lashing out against the extensions of the securitystate, the violence of the Autonomenhas sometimesbeen depictedas symptomatically replicatingthe practicesof theirpresumedadversary (Kramer1988), althoughthe Autonomenthemselves dismiss the notion of such a mirroreffect (Lecorte 1992). Most recently some of the GermanAutonomenhave startedto attackneo-Nazis as an anti-state and to defend foreignersagainstright-wingassaults. This can also be interpreted activity, to the extent that the ChristianDemocratic government has promoted anti-foreigner activities by focusing debate on restrictingthe right to political asylum, paying for the returnof Vietnamese guest workers and Romanian gypsies, and failing to quickly repress right-wing attacks.

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provided a final impetus to the new social movements (Kitschelt 1986). As Hirsch and Roth argue, neo-corporatismsystematically marginalizedgrievances and themes that did not fall under the purview of the peak interest organizations. This resulted in a surplus of peripheralgrievances that the political system could not address(Offe 1980). Rejectingthe rigid bureaucratic form of the "mass-integrative politicalparty,"the NSMs assumedinformal, non-hierarchicalstructures (Hirsch and Roth 1986:68; Benton 1989). As Melucci (1984:829-30) suggested, "the normal situationof today's 'movement' is to be a network of small groups submerged in everyday life. . . . The new organizational form . . . is a goal in itself . . . the form of the move-

ment is a message, a symbolic challenge to the dominantpatterns."

IV.

Hirsch and Roth's analysis is more solidly anchoredin historicaland cultural context than most contendingapproaches.28 They can better account for the issues, forms, and actionsdistinguishingthe new social movementsfrom their has some of the same limitationsas predecessors.Yet the regulationapproach earlierversions of neo-Marxism.It is of little help in explainingthe individual motivationto join a social movement,the mobilizationof resourcesfor collective action, and the course of social conflicts.29Regulationtheory seems best
28 In additionto the perspectivesdiscussed here, it would be necessaryto considerthe theories of late capitalism (Mandel 1978), programmedsociety (Touraine1977), and Postone's (1993) of society thesis of a contradictionin contemporary capitalismbetween the ongoing structuring form of value analyzedby Marx and the diminishingimportanceof accordingto the labor-based labor inputs in the economy. 29 In all the theoriesdiscussedherethe emphasisis on explainingvery broadchanges in patterns of social conflict, such as shifting ideologies, goals, forms of activity,and bases of recruitment. None of these approachesaddressthe problemwhich is centralto "resourcemobilizationtheory" (RM), namely, accountingfor differencesbetween contendingsocial movementorganizationsin recruitmentsuccess and between individuals in their proclivity to join a movement. The RM approaches, by contrast, are ill-equipped to illuminatethe form and content of the new social conflicts, especially the specific natureof their grievances, as well as upsurges and declines in grievances must only be taken protest. The often expressed notion that a surplusof ever-present advantageof by effective organizerswith sufficientresourcescompletely ignores the relationship between evolving social problemsand changingidentities.How can the massive increasein peace movementactivityin Europeandthe UnitedStatesbetween 1979 and 1983 (Wittner1988:277-86) be understoodwithoutattendingto the developmentsin the Cold Warandthe nucleararmsrace at that time? The more micro-economicversions of the RM approachmust also bracketthe central motives symbolic, expressive, and moralaspectsof the new movementsand the non-instrumental which lie behind much participation.Selective incentives, a central explanatorydevice in the armoryof RM theory,certainlycould not havebeen operativein motivatingmillions of Europeans to demonstrateagainst nuclear missiles and other weapons and nuclear power plants duringthe 1980s. Most participantsin the NSMs do not even belong to an organizationthat could provide arenearlyinvisible at largedemonstrations themwith side benefits, andindividualparticipants (see Mohr 1992:27-31 for a vivid descriptionof the sense of anonymityof a participantin protests and againstthe WestGermanBrokdorfnuclearpowerplant).The sheersize of thesedemonstrations of side benefits for most the absence of any single centralizedorganizerprecludedthe distribution as a reinforcements groupof friends.Describingsuchsmall-group people, exceptfortheirimmediate sortof psychologicalside benefitnotonly vitiatestheconceptbutalso begs the moreimportant quesin preciselythissortof movement. tion of why so manyprimary social groupsvalorizedparticipation Of course there is anothervariantof RM representedby Tilly, Klandermans,and others. This

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suited for understanding the patterningof grievancesand the emergence and disappearanceof potential collective actors. But even here the regulation approachis problematic. Despite their rejectionof teleology and functionalismand their insistence on contingencyand variation,Hirschand Roth's ideal still seems to be the allencompassing, totalizing form of analysis familiar from earlier versions of Marxism (and criticized by Althusser in his discussions of the notion of Hirsch and Roth do not simply present a theoretical "expressivetotality").30 in it which would be acceptableto mobilize only a single theoretiargument, cal system; instead, they proposea historyof concretesocial conflicts in West Germany. Here they elide the distinction between theory and explanation. Nowhere in their text do they indicate that diverse theoreticalsystems with their particularcausal mechanisms might be jointly involved in determining the concrete. Contingencyis admittedto this regulationistuniverse, but this does not mean that diverse causal mechanisms combine in producing an empirical outcome. Rather, contingency here only means that Marxism is unable to explain certain aspects of reality and that those aspects simply remainuntheorized.The implicit message is that aspects of the real-concrete, such as social movements, are either fully determinedby the causal mechanisms central to Marxist theory or underdetermined. My aim is not to condemn the regulationistsbut ratherto take the antireductionisttone of their programmatic statementsto its logical conclusion. Althoughit is beyondthe scope of this essay to proposea complete alternative analysis of the new social movements, this final section will make some suggestions about the sorts of additionalhistorical and cultural factors that would need to be consideredin a more adequateaccount. I will first discuss the general importanceof grantingmore autonomyto historical subjectivity and culture in explaining the NSMs; then I will review some of the ways in which the Nazi past shaped the GermanNSMs.
SUBJECTIVITY AND THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

For Hirsch, Roth, and other regulationtheorists, the Fordistregulatorymode is dialectically coupled to its own demise, producingnew needs and values that lead to a rejection of its basic premises. The problematicimplication,
variant does not focus exclusively on the choices of maximizing rational individuals but also and the effects of a wide varietyof resources, including considerspolitical opportunitystructures on mobilization(see Perrow 1979:199-200; Tilly 1978; Klandermans preexistinginfrastructures, and Tarrow 1988). To the extent that Tilly (1986) also is able to account for the historical and stateformaemergenceof new intereststhroughthe combinedprocessesof proletarianization tion, he goes beyond other RM approaches.I would argue, however, that a modified version of the regulationperspectivemight provide a more fine-grainedanalysis of changes in interestsand of collective action"). forms of social protest (Tilly's "repertoires 30 See Althusser (1977) for a discussion of the concept of expressive totality. As Althusser (1970:91-119) makesclear, teleology is one form of expressivetotality,specifically one in which historical change is explained in terms of a single underlyingprinciple. Regulationtheory does not engage in this particularkind of totalizing thought.

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however, is that all forms of subjectivityrelevantto the NSMs are partof the Fordistsystem, that is, Fordismprovidesthe sufficientculturalpreconditions for the NSMs. Consider Hirsch and Roth's claim that the NSM focused on identitypolitics in reactionto the homogenizationof Fordistmass cultureand the penetrationof the life world by the neo-corporatist securitystate. Fordism condition for new a the been have paradigm,but it necessary political may was not a sufficientone. The turnto identitypolitics in responseto perceived psychological leveling depended upon prior definitions of the subject that could then be violated. In a socio-culturalsetting with differentpreexisting constructionsof individuality,autonomy,or the categoryof the person, Fordism might not have incited the specific reassertionof subjectivityand individuality seen in the NSMs. The specific ideological framing work of social to the negative interpretamovementleadersand intellectualsalso contributed tion of mass culture (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988). Differences in the NSM activities of the advancedcapitalistcountriescannot be attributedto variationsin the constructionof Fordism. In the United States and Great Britain, new social movements have been less prominent than in Europe;and there has been less resistanceto working within the state and cooperating with authorities.The regulationistapproachwould tend to explain such differencesby referringto the variationin the modes of regulation, pointing for instanceto the differingimportanceof the centralstate as a coordinatinginstance in each nationalvariantof Fordism. The fragmentation of social movements in the United'States would then reflect the relatively decenterednatureof AmericanFordism. Yet a more deeply rooted factor that cannot be assimilatedto Fordismis the historicalweakness of a folk concept of the state in the United States and Britain, as compared to continental Europe (d'Entreves 1967:33-34; Badie and Bimbaum 1983:125-30). The example of the census boycott in West Germanyduringthe 1980s throws an the interestinglight on this contrast.The regulationapproachwould attribute surprising success of this boycott to the key role of the intrusive state in GermanFordism. This begs the questionof why the state was experiencedas overly intrusive. The specific framing of the census as an issue of state intrusionwas not an automaticresult of Fordismbut probablyhad to do with the salience of the folk concept of the state in Germanyas all-powerful and pervasiveand with the negative coding of this concept. This image of the state of the collective memory can be understoodin termsof a specific construction ratherthan a popularmovement-a of Nazism as an omnipotentdictatorship constructionwhich has little to do with Fordism.31
31 This self-exculpatingview of the Nazi stateis being reinforcedin today's reunifiedGermany The view of by an image of the GDR as a dictatorshipwith many victims and few perpetrators. the strongintrusivestate may also be relatedto older images of an omnipotentPrussianabsolutist state. CentralEuropeanabsolutism, guided by Cameralistdoctrine, obsessively collected every and its inhabitants,with the avowedgoal of social possible shredof informationaboutthe territory discipline (Maier 1980; Foucault 1989, 1991; Pasquino 1991). Regardlessof the actualextent of informationgatheringin the absolutiststates where cameralistdoctrine was taught, these states

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More generally, Hirsch and Roth assume, ratherthan carefully trace, the linkages between structuralconditions and subjective responses, material grievances and consciousness. Considertheir claim that the Fordistprogram of universalprosperityawakensnew needs, such as the expectationof a long and healthy life, but that the economic growth model itself seems to undermine the very possibility of realizing such needs (through environmental threatsto health, and so forth), thus inciting opposition. Fordismcannotbear the weight of accountingfor the definitionof subjectiveexpectations,percepof responsibilityfor grievances, notions tions of empiricalreality,attributions of justice, and assessmentsof the value and effectiveness of opposition. Why did citizens believe the Fordistpromises of the good life in the first place? Why did they understandthese promises as having been broken? How did destructionand see it as an unacpeople become cognizantof environmental ceptable risk? Why did they attributethis destructionto the social system These are elementaryquestionsfor any invesratherthan, say, humannature? tigation which takes seriously problems of ideology and the creation of hegemony, ratherthan deriving culture from externalmaterialconditions.
THE PRESENCE OF THE NAZI PAST

It is importantto consider the diverse ways in which the "peculiaritiesof German history" (Blackbournand Eley 1985) continue to influence many aspects of Germansociety, including the NSMs. When contemporaryhistorians discuss the GermanSonderweg, they are typically referringto a period stretching backwards from 1933 to the nineteenth century or even to the Reformation(see, for example, Dahrendorf1967; Wehler1985). In this view, This model dis1945 marks the end of (West) Germany'sdeviant history.32 tracts attentionfrom the continuingeffects of Nazism on the political culture of the FederalRepublicafter 1945.33Indeed, one could arguethatthe German Sonderweg began with the unparalleledevents between 1933 and 1945 and that since that time it has become impossible for Germanyto be just another The exceptionalismthesis might make more sense if its Europeancountry.34
openly announcedtheir intentionto scrutinizeand regulatethe most minute aspects of society. 32 For an explicit statementof the end of the Sonderwegthesis, see Kocka 1990:495-9. 33 When the historians of Germanexceptionalismwarnedin 1989 and 1990 againstthe revival of the GermanSonderweg, they were referringnot to a possible revival of Nazism, but ratherto the supposeddangersof retaininga second Germanstatein the East. This shows how deep-seated the notion was that "good"democraticWest Germanyhad overcome Germany'speculiarlegacy (see Winkler 1990: 9; Kocka 1990). (Of course the same view of West Germany is equally widespreadamongconservativeopponentsof the exceptionalismthesis: ThomasNipperdey,"Die Deutschenwollen und diirfeneine nationsein," Frankfurter AllgemeineZeitung, no. 160 [13 July 1990], p. 10). 34 As Blackbournand Eley (1985) and othershave shown, pre-1914 Germanywas not insuffifeaturesreflected the power of the indusciently bourgeois;in fact, many of its anti-democratic trialbourgeoisiein stateand society. Laborrelations,economic policies, even the militarywere in many ways more modernized and more in conformance with capitalist interests in Imperial Germanythan in neighboringcountries(cf. Grebing 1986; Fischer 1987; Steinmmetz 1990).

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chronology were completely reversed, projectingGermany'sSonderweg forward from 1933 ratherthan sequesteringit in the distantpast. If one ignores the peculiaritiesof twentieth-century Germanhistory, it is impossible to understandnot just the NSMs but also the way in which Nazi ideas and slogans could have been revived and diffused so rapidly in Germany since the late 1980s, fueling the resurgenceof the latest mass social movement(see below). The pronouncedanti-authoritarianism of the German NSMs is rooted as much in the nationallyspecific historyof Nazism as in the role of the stateand centralizedpolitical partiesand tradeunions underFordism.35 The Nazi generationwas fully discreditedin the eyes of many of its children.The theme of rejectingthe parentsis especially strong in the literatureof the 1968 generation (Schneider 1981).36Many younger Germansgeneralizedthis sentiment, turningtheir backs on West Germansociety as a whole. This repudiationwas facilitatedby the continuingpresence of many formerNazis within the West Germanpower elite. Most important,the Holocaust made it impossible for many Germansto develop a positive nationalidentity.This peculiarityof Germanidentitypolitics had manifold effects on the NSMs. Many Germans have hesitated to embracea positive Germannationalidentity.This has been a steadycomplaint of conservativesand establishmentfigures, culminatingin the Historikerstreit of the late 1980s and the attackson opponentsof Germanunificationin 1989 and 1990.37One resulthas been an overwhelminglyright-wingcoding of popular Germannationalism, making it even more taboo for non-conservatives. For the new social movementmilieux, the focus on identity seems to respond to a vaguely felt subjective deficit that national feelings cannot fulfill. The NSMs often projecteddesires for positive identity onto non-Germangroups, such as in the movement of "urbanIndians"(Stadtindianer)during the late 1970s, the ongoing fascinationwith Italian social movements, the Bhagwan cult of the 1980s, and alternativetourism. With the revival of regional German folk music and dialects in the 1970s and 1980s, even the internalGerman other became an importantsite of counter-identification. Anotherset of influences on the WestGermanNSMs thatcannotbe assimi35 Radical anti-authoritarianism has been most clearly expressedin the movement-milieuxof the so-called Spontis (spontaneousleft) of the 1970s and early 1980s and the Autonomen(Brand et al. 1986:174-6; Hoffmann-Axthelm et al. 1978). It is also strikingthat the earliestand biggest autonomousmovement arose in Italy, anothercountry with a fascist past. 36 The Green party leader, Antje Vollmer (1992), even hints at a connection between the partial acceptance of Willi Brandt by the 1968 generation and his role as a fatherless grandfather (ratherthan father) of the Germans. The question of women in Nazi Germanyseems to have been discussed and psychologically workedthroughin very differenttermsby the post-war generation. 37 Otherappeals to this identitydeficit include the Norddeutscher Rundfunk'stelevision series "Wir Deutschen"(1991-92) and Edgar Reitz's successful series "Heimat"(1980-1984), which proposed a nostalgic relationshipto the German past and "a gratifying identification with the victims, and with oneself as victim" (Elsaesser 1989:278).

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lated to Fordismis relatedto the unusualsituationof the old Left. Especially here is the state's repressiveorientationtowardsextraparliamentary important opposition and the unusual situationof the CommunistParty.In contrastto most otherEuropean countries,WestGermanyhad no viable or legal Communist Party to absorb some of the new conflict issues. The Nazis eliminated most of the Communists: WestGermanythen bannedthe KPD in 1956. Even after the CommunistPartywas legalized and refoundedas the DKP in 1968, its close association with the GDR made it extremely unattractive to critical West Germans.38 The FRG government'sinitial success in banningthe KPD also created a state precedent of overreactingto supposed "threatsto the constitution"from the Left, best illustratedby the Radical Law and professional interdictionsof the past two decades. West Germany's geopolitical position on the front line of the Cold Warsystematicallyreinforcedits hardline approachto left-wing domestic opposition. Such official alarmismin turn heightenedNSM alienationfrom the state. The conflictoryand ambivalentGermanrelationshipto the United States is yet anotherinfluenceon the GermanNSMs indirectlyrelatedto the Nazi past. To some extent this highly charged relationshipto the United States is a characteristicof Fordism in general as an international phenomenon. When the United States assumedthe role of hegemon in international relationsafter 1945 (Krasner1983), it assureda periodof relativefree tradeand held the line against insurgencies world-wide. This benefited the other Fordist national economies. America's role as world gendarmeand its political and military leadershipin Europedecisively influenced both United States and European social movements in the post-war period. The Vietnam War triggered startlingly simultaneous social movements around the globe (Arrighi et al. 1989:97-115; Katsiaficas 1987:29-35). United States (and Soviet) nuclear policy again became the focus of a series of social movementsacross Europe during the early 1980s. Alongside the perceived nuclear threat, affronts to nationalsovereigntyhelped catalyzepeace movementsin the NATO countries in which U.S. missiles and troops were stationed. German alternativemovements were shaped by Germany's particularly intensive relationshipto the United States, a relationshipthat cannot be fully subsumedunderthe aegis of Fordism.Americanmovies, music, fashion, and popularculture swept over West Germanyduringthe 1950s, resocializing a whole generationof youth (Maase 1992). While such culturalAmericanization was not uniqueto Germany,it was coupled in the FRG with the humiliations of denazification (despite the limitations of the actual denazification program)and the formal Allied occupation, followed by continuing limitations on German political sovereignty until 1990. Denazification was not
38 While the presenceof the GDR weakenedconventionalLeft partypolitics in WestGermany, collective war guilt towardsthe Soviet Union seemed to contributeto the strengthof the peace movement duringthe 1980s.

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invented in Washington, of course (Bark and Gress 1989:74 if.); but the leading Americanrole in West Germanpolicy and the NATO alliance tended to focus attention on the U.S.39 Most Germans ostensibly accepted their country'sjunior partnershipwith the United States. The NSMs themselves, with their informality and their use of civil disobedience tactics from the American civil rights movement, representeda certain Americanizationof Germanpolitical culture.40Yet undercurrents of resentmentwere always evident, and sweeping rejections of the United States were common in the German NSMs.41 Commentatorsprobably overstated the extent of antiAmericanism and nationalismin the West Germanpeace movement during the 1980s (for example, Berman 1981; Pohrt 1982:116-7; Hollander 1992:377-83; Herf 1991:227). On the other hand, Germanpeace movement supportersdid pay less attentionto the Germanand Soviet role in the arms race than to the U.S. side. The most direct influence of Nazism on social movements in Germany, finally, has become especially evident since the late 1980s, with the rapid growth of an extreme right-wingmovement and less open expressions of farrightsentiment.On the one hand, this movementcould be construedas partof a European-widephenomenonof neo-racism (Balibar 1991; Link 1992) and traced to the rise of a new mode of regulation (post-Fordismor flexible accumulation,see Steinmetz 1994). Several general aspects of post-Fordism could be seen as giving rise to new forms of racistmobilization:the decline of well-paidunionizedjobs in the metropoles,the exportof basic production jobs to the non-Europeancountries, the opening of national borders to foreign productsand workers, and the generalloss of the guaranteed living conditions characteristic of the Fordist-Keynesian welfare state. Yet even if post-Fordism plays a role in these newest Europeansocial movements, Germanneo-racism is sui generis. German Nazi ideology provides a specific ideological grid connecting a variety of disparateenemies into an overarchingcategory of the
For a discussion of the limits on Germansovereignty in West Berlin, see Tergeist(1984). The late Petra Kelly, co-founder of the Green Party and the most familiar symbol of the NSMs in Germanyand abroad,embodied this ambivalentrelationshipto the United States with her American and German parentage, her university education in the United States, and her continuing emphasis on the positive sides of Americansociety. 41 These statements are based mainly on my own observations within the German peace movementbetween 1981 and 1985 (see also Schmitt 1990:249-59). I would not argue, however, thatthese left-wing Germanattitudesareequivalentto right-wingGermannationalistrejectionsof the United States, as the lattercontain unmistakable racist and anti-Semiticelements. Considera GermanRepublicanpartyleader, FranzSchonhuber: typical statementby the extreme-right-wing I am strugglingagainsta "foreignization" leading to a situationin which we lose (Uberfremdung) our national identity; that is the decisive point for me. I am struggling against the permanent Americanization[of Germany] . . . we are on the way to becoming a Coca-Cola Republic. We are takingover slogans from the Americans. ... If you turnon the radio nowadaysyou have the and Riverside (sic)." feeling you're driving somewhere between Manhattan (Interview with Schonhuberin the television documentary,"Mord von Rechts: Wer stoppt die Gewalt?," on the GermanZDF network, November 25, 1992).
39 40

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other. Thus the recent targetsof Germanneo-Nazi attackshave included not just immigrants seen as taking jobs away from Germans but also Polish tourists, homeless men, left-wing squatters,handicapped people, and Jews.42 Although furtherresearchis needed to clarify the exact ways in which such ideologies are reproducedand propagated(compare Butterwegge and Isola 1991; Schrdder 1992), one condition for their particularresonance in Germany is their enhanced realism. As StuartHall has argued, ideology must contain at least partial truth if the masses are to accept it (Hall 1983:82, 1988:45). The partial truth for German neo-Nazis is that their ideas have actually been put into practice and that they worked. The peculiarhistory of Germany since 1933 continues to influence even the newest of its social movements.
CONCLUSION

This articlehas reflectedon the challengesto Marxisttheoryposed by the new social movements and on some of the theoreticaldiscourses associated with these movementsthat are sometimes groupedtogetheras post-Marxist.Many analysts have been led to proclaimthe obsolescence of Marxisttheory on the basis of the new social movements'aims, form, andheterogeneousclass base, togetherwith the waningof working-classidentification,the labormovement, and class differencesin political behavior(Niethammer1979; Mooser 1983; Offe 1984; but compare Weakliem 1991). I examined regulation theory, a specific form of neo-Marxismthat rejects functionalismand teleology, and tried to answersome of the othercritiqueswithoutabandoningwhat it sees as Marxism'score: the analysis of capitalaccumulation,its crises, and the social arrangementsthat allow it to continue.43Given the role of the new social movements in generatingthe critiques of Marxism, explaining these movements within the revised Marxist approachtakes on an obvious importance. Because Hirsch and Roth have presentedthe most extended analysis of the NSMs from a regulationistperspective,theirwork deserves a serious appraisal. They argue that historically stabilized social formations for regulating accumulationstructurethe actors, stakes, resources, and likely outcomes of social conflicts. Many of these grievances, needs, and actorscut across social class boundaries. The problem with this analysis lies in its ambition of at42 In 1991 skinheadsin Berlin reportedlydraggeda young Polish visitor into the bushes of the Tiergarten,anesthetizedhis tongue, and cut off the end of it with shears. Whetheror not this insidious form the argumentabout the new incident is apocryphal,it illustratesin a particularly racism being less about biological heredity than "the insurmountabilityof cultural differences . . . the incompatibilityof life-styles and traditions" (Balibar 1991:21). There are specific Germanelements at work here too, includingthe long Germantraditionof repressingthe speakpeople during 1992 have been accompanied ing of Polish. The numerousattackson handicapped by slogans explicitly echoing the eugenic ideology (and policy) of the Nazis. See Steinmetz (1994). 43 For an critiqueof the regulationapproach,see Brennerand Glick importantintra-Marxist (1991; cf. also Graham(1991).

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temptingto explain the new movementsentirelyin termsof regulatorymodes. Arrangementsfor capital accumulationmay not be the sole determinantsof patternsof social antagonismor even necessarily the crucial ones. Marxists must accept that actors' identities, perceptions, and interests may also be shapedby discursiveformationsand loci of conflict and oppressionthat have littlerelationship to capitalaccumulation. Thereshouldbe no pressureon Marxists to explain everythingin termsof the mechanismscentralto its own theory. My own understandingof Marxism is that it is an abstract theoretical system existing at a very differentlevel than explanationsof historicalevents and concrete processes. To clarify this we need to distinguish theories and explanationsand to attend to the relationsbetween what Roy Bhaskarcalls mechanisms and events.44Realism in the philosophy of science assumes an ontological distinctionbetweenevents as they areobservedandthe underlying mechanisms that produce those regularities. Scientific theories, including social theories, are ultimatelyaboutcausal mechanismsand are not concerned with explaining specific empirical and historical occurrences. Examples of such mechanismsincludethe unconsciousin psychoanalysis,naturalselection in evolutionarytheory, and modes of productionor capital accumulationin Marxisttheory.Science also tries to produceexplanations,which have as their object concrete outcomes or events in the world. Bob Jessop's (1990a) term, "contingentnecessity", nicely expresses the relationshipbetween theory and explanation. As he notes, is a logical conceptand concerned with theoretical "contingent" indeterminability, is anontological andrefers to determinacy in therealworld.Thus "necessity" concept means "indeterminable within theterms of a singletheoretical it "contingent" system"; canproperly bejuxtaposed to thenotion of "necessity," whichsignifies theassumption that"everything thathappens is caused" underpinning any realistscientificenquiry 12). (Jessop1990a: Jessop's so-called method of articulation,inspiredby Poulantzas'distinction between modes of productionand social formation,entails a movement from the abstractto the concrete and from the simple to the complex (compare Mahon 1991). An empiricalphenomenonis explainedas the resultof multiple chains of causation. Explainingthe effects of the 1989 Californiaearthquake, for example, might requireknowledge of a variety of differentmechanisms: plate tectonics, highway and building constructiontechniques, traffic patterns, and American conceptions of nature, culture, and civilization.45 The arguments advanced here clash with the standardideal in most of
44 See especially Bhaskar (1978, 1979, 1986); also Erik Olin Wright'sdiscussion of these issues in Wrightet al. (1989:57-63). 45 It would be possible to combine varioustheoretical systems into a new "compound" theory for every empirical analysis, thus avoidingthe distinctionbetween theory and explanation. This would provide only a temporarysolution, however, as each empirical case would require the elaborationof a new compound theory. The result would be an endless proliferationof highly specialized theories with ridiculouslylimited ranges of applicability,thus hollowing out the very meaning of theory.

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Marxism(and in muchof the social sciences) of attainingparsimoniousexplanationsthroughtheoreticalstatementsthatare maximallycapacious. Marxists have felt compelled to encompassthe entiretyof reality in theirtheory. "Vulgar"Marxismsimply collapses across levels of abstraction,discoveringfleshand-bloodsocial classes or neatly delineatedmodes of productionexisting in forms of Marxism respect the distinction reality. The more "sophisticated" between the simple and abstractand the complex andconcretebut assumethat both could be understoodwithin an entirelyMarxistconceptualuniverse. The Althusseriansin particulardifferentiatedbetween the abstractmode of production and the more concrete social formation,itself a complex articulation of modes of production.The Althusseriansalso assimilatednon-Marxistconcepts, such as in Poulantzas'use of mainstreampolitical science and Macherey's employmentof Russianformalism,not to mentionthe importanceof in Althusser'sown thought. Freud, Lacan, Bachelard,and othernon-Marxists But the whole process took place within the homogenizing frameworkof Marxism. "Bourgeois"concepts were changedinto Marxistones, as in Poulantzas' discussion of state bureaucracies (1978:331-59).46 The social formation may have been an articulationof diverse structures,but all of these hadto be categorizedas modesof production.And the economic was structures in the last instance," even if that "lonely hour"never came.47 "determinant Where does this leave us? Marxismis an abstracttheorythat operateswith simple objects (such as mode of production, social class, and perhaps now mode of regulationand accumulation regime), but it cannotclaim a monopoly on explanationsof the empirical and historical.48Marxismmust respect the integrityand boundariesof theoreticalsystems, including its own. This selfis perhapsthe best definitionof post-Marxism.Only where the understanding theoreticalcore of Marxismis retaineddoes it make sense to speak of postMarxist, ratherthan non-Marxist,theory.I recognize the existence of varying of the term post-Marxism.Some authorssee post-Marxismas interpretations synonymous with a "thoroughcritique of modem civil society" (Cohen 1983:2), but this ambition is hardly unique to Marxism. For others, postan (auto)biographical Marxistseems to be primarily description(Wright1987; compareLaclauand Mouffe 1985). But in practice,a post-Marxistorientation
46 An exception to this was Althusser's acceptance of the unconscious as a specific object requiringits own theory (see Althusser [1971]). 47 It may seem unfair to single out Marxists for criticism, as they were undoubtedlymore sophisticatedwith respect to these issues than many others. After all, sociologists and political variscientists are more frequentlyaccused of throwingtogethera hodgepodge of "independent ables" in theirregressionequationswith little attentionto the theoreticalsystems from which the variablesare derived-an approachthat eliminatestheory altogether,ratherthanjust collapsing the levels of theory/mechanismand explanation/event. 48 This does not mean that Marxism is a regional theory in the Althusserian sense, for example, a theoryof the economy. The questionof which regions exist and how they are defined is historicallyvariable, and an empiricalobject, such as the economy, may also be co-determined by non-economic regions, such as the state.

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seems to be one that continues to provisionally accept the usefulness of Marxist theory-however Marxism may be understood-while embracing a more diversified explanatory strategy that accepts a multiplicity of theoretical systems on an equal basis. It is no paradox to argue then that post-Marxism is Marxist in theory but post-Marxist in its explanatory strategies.
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