Brandi Cruz History 220T Dr.

Jordine Guderian Precis Heinz Guderian, in Panzer Leader, recalls the development of the various campaigns of WWII. He discusses the creation and deployment of Blitzkrieg tactics. Within the book, he reinforces his argument of mixed divisions, concentration, surprise, and cooperation of air forces with ground troops. In his examination of the western campaign, Guderian reveals the ongoing struggles in the development of strategies against France and makes a point to give himself as much of the credit for the campaigns success as possible. In the shift from the Schlieffen to Manstein plan, Guderian demonstrates an ongoing fight between himself and the High Command. Guderian provides the examples of the war game exercises where he and Chief Halder debated how the panzer divisions would be deployed at the Meuse. Guderian argued that the essential was that we use all the available limited offensive power of our armour in one surprise blow at one decisive point; to drive a wedge so deep and widethen immediately to exploit any successes gained without bothering to wait for the infantry corps.1 In the end, General von Kleist was given command and Guderians Panzer Corps were to be the front line in the attack. To further highlight the difficulties experienced, Guderian goes on to state that with the exception of himself, Hitler, and Manstein no one else believed it would be successful.2 Utilizing this struggle over strategy, Guderian is able to highlight the importance of his own role in the creation and deployment of plans. Guderian contends that he did not receive orders of what to do after establishing a bridgehead at the Meuse and thus, writes that all of decisions, until I reached the Atlantic seaboard at Abbeville, were
1

Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, transl. Constantine Fitzgibbon, foreword B.H. Liddell Hart, intro. Kenneth Macksey (1952; repr., New York: Da Capo Press, 1996), 90. 2 ibid, 91.

taken by me and me alone. The Supreme Commands influence on my actions were merely restrictive throughout.3 Another incident that Guderian cites is the difficulty he had with General von Kleist in May over the panzer divisions continued push forward. Guderian wanted to continue fighting all the way to the English Channel but the High Command order him and the others to stop. Guderian writes I neither would nor could agree to these orders, which involved the sacrifice of the element of surprise we had gained and of the whole initial success that we had achieved.4 Both the concepts of surprise and taking advantage of a successful breach of the enemy line are a major part of Guderians argument for offensive movement. While von Kleists order to halt was issued it was not followed. As a means of maintaining his tactics, Guderian with ColonelGeneral List called for a Reconnaissance in force, which essentially meant that Guderian could circumvent the order and continue to push forward.5 To further overcome the difficulties he had with the High Command, Guderian had a wired communication setup so that OKH and OKW could not monitor his orders then thereby hinder them. The outcome also demonstrates the flexibility of the German military as opposed to the allies who have a strict top-down system that does not allow for lower ranking officers to implement tactics in direct opposition to an officer above them. Guderian utilizes various sources from different countries in his work. He references French arguments about the use of tanks in warfare, maps of military deployment and the Maginot line to create an astute observation of the enemys strategies and doctrine (i.e. their belief that the Germans would reuse the Schlieffen plan).6 He also cites military

3 4

ibid, 92. Ibid, 107. 5 ibid, 110. 6 ibid, 96.

communications to present the success of his tactics against the French as well as the difficulties he had with the High Command. In addition, Guderian uses his personal notes, memory, and photographs. He presents battle outcomes in order to validate his arguments for the importance of tanks and how they should be used by the military. If a battle was successful, Guderian often claims it is because they followed his plans. The way that Guderian relays the progression of events is convincing that he played an important role the successes of the German army; however, not all of the credit can be attributed to him. While Guderian does give some acknowledgement to others like Manstein, Hart, and List, he usually only does it as them being contributors to his greatness. The others, he mentions with praise, help him in some way but to Guderian it is ultimately his ideas or actions that brings about success.