Environment and Security Author(s): Thomas F. Homer-Dixon and Marc A. Levy Source: International Security, Vol. 20, No.

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F Homer-Dixon Correspondence Thomas

Environment and Security MarcA. Levy

TotheEditors:
of published severalcritiques University has lately Professor MarcLevyof Princeton Security.' He oneinInternational security, including recent scholarship on environmental project on "Environmental to theresults of a majorresearch givesparticular attention Studies Program at sponsored by thePeace and Conflict Changeand AcuteConflict" As thelead and theAmerican and Sciences. Academy ofArts theUniversity ofToronto ofseveral and itssuccessors, and as thesole or lead author researcher forthisproject I respond here. articles that to hiscomments Levycites,2 as a use "security" I largely thatmanycommentators agreewithLevy'scontention on "security," abouttheimpact ofenvironmental problems rhetorical device: bytalking market for seemlikebigissuesin a highly public competitive makethese they problems I have generally In mywritings, avoidedusingtheword and policymaker attention. environmental stress andviolence. between and instead focused on thelinks "security,"3 and measure; thisfocus Violence is easierto define, helpsboundourresearch identify, effort. core I also agreewithLevythat change couldendanger ozone depletion and climate interests.4 Unfortudirect threats to U.S. security American values and are therefore thattheseare unlikely to be acknowledge nately, though, Levydoes not adequately probthreats whereasmanyregional environmental near-term to the UnitedStates, scarcity, and depletion of watersuppliesand fuelwood lems-including land scarcity,
is Assistant of thePeace and Conflict Professor ofPoliticalScienceand Director ThomasF. Homer-Dixon and lead researcher at theUniversity From1990 to 1993, he was co-director StudiesProgram ofToronto. on Environmental Changeand AcuteConflict. oftheProject at Princeton Marc A. Levyis Instructor Affairs University. ofPoliticsand International and SecurityScholarship?"Environmental 1. Marc Levy,"Time fora ThirdWave of Environment Issue 1 (Spring 1995), Woodrow Wilson Center,pp. 44-46; and Project: Report, Changeand Security Vol. 20, No. Security, a National SecurityIssue?" International Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 35-62. 2. Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: EnvironmentalChanges As Causes of Acute BoutVol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991), pp. 76-116; Homer-Dixon,Jeffrey Security, Conflict," International American, Vol. Scientific Change and ViolentConflict," well, and George Rathjens,"Environmental 268, No. 2 (February 1993), pp. 38-45; Homer-Dixon, "EnvironmentalScarcities and Violent Vol. 19, No. 1 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-40. Security, Conflict:Evidence fromCases," International and Demographic Threatsto Cana3. Two exceptionsare Thomas Homer-Dixon,"Environmental Boutwelland Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 1994),pp. 7-40; and Jeffrey Policy, dian Security," CanadianForeign and U.S. Policy," in Charles Thomas Homer-Dixon, "EnvironmentalChange, Global Security, Hermann, ed., AmericanDefenseAnnual, 1994, 9th ed. (New York: Mershon Center,Lexington Books, 1994), pp. 207-224. 4. Levy, "Is the Environment a National SecurityIssue?" pp. 46-47.
Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter1995/96),pp. 189-198 International Security, of Technology. i 1995 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and the MassachusettsInstitute

189

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International Security 20:3 | 190

fish stocks-aretodayaffecting thecorevaluesofhundreds ofmillions ofpeopleinthe developing world. is parochial. Levy'sexclusive focuson U.S. security interests In theAcuteConflict and itssuccessors, we recognize an impoverproject thatsucha focus wouldproduce ishedresearch program. to themany Moreover, Levy'sagendawouldbe unacceptable in developing to ourwork.Wetherefore address the experts countries who contribute linksbetween in thedeveloping environment and violent conflict as countries mainly thosecountries, they affect notas they affect theUnited States. Therearefour points where I sharply withLevy. disagree First, Levy claimsthatour research findings from theAcuteConflict Project simply repeat conventional wisdom. The project's he writes, identical results, "arevirtually to theconventional wisdomthatprevailed before theresearch was carried out."5 Morethenullhypothesis thatenvironmental stress over, by aiming to refute does notcause violence, ourresearch project "losttheability to say anything morethan'theenviron. . . we knewbefore ment thisworkwas undertaken."6 matters,' something we beganourresearch, Levyis wrong. Before conventional wisdomdid not holdthat environmental stress was an important in developing contributor toviolence countries. Therewas verylittle literature prior to our workthatanalyzedthelinkages between and conflict. and in thefirst fewfootnotes environment Levycitesa CIA report; ofmy I citealmostall therestof therelevant 1991article "On theThreshold," post-World WarII literature. Whilesomeofthismaterial was very of good,nonewas at thecenter or policydiscourse in developing research on causesofconflict the countries. Instead, vastbulkofpast analysis focused on thegeo-strategic sources of conflict in thedevethesuperpower lopingworld, mostly arising from rivalry and in somecases from the machinations of regional powerssuchas SouthAfrica and India.If theconventional wisdomhas longbeenthat environmental cause conflict, where is theliteraproblems turereflecting thiswisdom? In fact, ourpreliminary findings partly contradict thoseofthemostprominent work of thelast decades linking and conflict-Nazli resource Choucriand Robert scarcity in Conflict.7 North's Nations Whereas Choucri and North that internal resource suggest willincrease scarcities thechances ofresource warsamong ourwork countries, suggests thatthisis nottruein thecase of renewable and Northdid not resources (Choucri between renewables and non-renewables). clearly distinguish Moreover, manythoughtful ourfindings. There have peoplehave actually disputed been seriousattacks on our workin thepress.8 Earlyon in theproject, some senior
5. Levy,"ThirdWave," p. 45. 6. Ibid. Levy refers here to the null hypothesis, which guided our initialresearch,thatenvironmentalscarcity does not cause violentconflict. See Homer-Dixon,"Environmental Scarcities," p. 7. 7. Nazli Choucri and RobertNorth,Nationsin Conflict: NationalGrowth and International Violence (San Francisco:Freeman,1975). 8. For example,see Marcus Gee, "Apocalypse Deferred,"Globeand Mail, April 9, 1994,pp. D1-D2; my reply appeared as Homer-Dixon,"Is AnarchyComing? A Response to the Optimists,"Globe and Mail, May 10, 1994, p. A21.
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM

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Correspondence I191

evidenceof a connection between scholarswere adamantthatwe had foundlittle and economists stress and conflict.9 Similarly, senior U.S. demographers environmental have attacked that"resources aren't veryimportant anymore" our findings by saying to amongresources), so they areunlikely (becauseofthemodern ability to substitute be a keysourceofconflict. Ifthere between environment and conflict, is a conventional wisdomaboutthelinks about sciencescholarsconcerned it existslargely within narrowcirclesof political more matters. thatthisconventional wisdomis becoming environmental To theextent be a function ofresearch projects suchas ours. widelyheld,it mayactually is whatpeople usuallyfight aboutin Levyfurther claimsthataccessto resources theroleofnatural almost alwaysconsider developing countries, that analysts therefore is thusanalytically uninterresources in regional conflict, and thatmostsuchconflict
esting.10

in developing countries thatdo notinvolve Butthere are obviously manyconflicts renewable sense thattheconflict is over resources, exceptin perhapstheperipheral Theseare struggles ethnic or thatincludes oversecession, territory cropland. survival, renewable when control of thestate. do notmention resources Analysts quiterightly in cases discuss these becauseresources arenotcentral factors. Moreover, they conflicts, itis rarefor to conflict, ourresearch showsthat where resource scarcities do contribute from the over resources. Violenceusuallyarisesindirectly people to fight directly and institutional dislocation causedby resource stress. economic theseconflicts areinteresting becausethey indications We arguethat represent early themselves are new: of worse to come.We do not claimthatthe typesof conflict and rebellion areancient forms ofviolence. Wedo, however, ethnic insurgency, clashes, in the is worsening, we can expect an increase stress claimthat becauseenvironmental If thatis notinteresting withan environmental to of conflicts component. frequency then whatis? security analysts, has notproduced useful In addition, thatour research knowledge." Levycontends in in myrecent article He largely thefindings identified Again,he is wrong. ignores Here, International which theresults ofourfirst stageofresearch. Security, summarizes in short are six: form, on the social impacts of environmental The keyindependent variablein research butthescarcity There is notenvironmental ofrenewable resources. stress degradation decreasedsupplyof are threeimportant sourcesof this "environmental scarcity": demanddue to populathe resource due to depletion and degradation, increased and unequal resource tion growth consumption, or increased per capita resource
ErnstHaas wroteto me thatalthoughhe felttheremight 9. For example,in August 1992,Professor "I continueto be a candidate forpersualinkagesin the future, be important environment-conflict linkage in the past." about a significant sion thatsomethingvery tellingcan be demonstrated elitesfight over renewableresourcesforthesame reason thatWillySutton 10. "Developing country neglectnatural robbed banks: thatis where the moneyis." "[Few] good studies of regionalconflict a National SecurityIssue?" pp. 56-57 resources as central factors."Levy, "Is the Environment and 37. has failed to generatenew 11. "The researchon environmental degradationand politicalconflict more anecdotes,but not more understanding."Ibid., p. 56. findings.... [The research]offers

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International Security 20:3 | 192

environmental rather thanexclusively scarcity on environmental degradation. (Levy apparently missedthispoint, sincehe refers to environmental degradation throughout his critiques ofourwork.) Environmental scarcity's most pernicious socialeffects result from interactions among its three sources. Two interactions seemto be particularly common: resource capture and ecological marginalization.13 Institutions suchas thestatearevulnerable to environmental scarcities.14 The capacity of societies to adapt to environmental scarcities and population pressurescan be undermined by thescarcities themselves.15 Environmental scarcities areunlikely tocauseinterstate "resource wars."Rather, most of theconflict thatarisesfrom will be diffuse, and environmental scarcity persistent,
subnational.16

distribution.12 Researchers and policymakers shouldfocuson thegeneral problem of

scarcities are not wholly endogenous to political,economic,and social Environmental factorswithinsociety.17 Some of these points are entirely new, while some have been made individuallyby otherscholars. However, beforeour project,no one had broughtthemtogether into a single, integratedanalysis, nor provided detailed supportingevidence and argument. If these six findingsdo not add to our understanding, then Levy is imposing such a also fails high thresholdfor"new" knowledge thatthe work of most politicalscientists to add to our understanding.
INTERACTION

interact factors Levy suggeststhatour projecthas neglectedto note thatenvironmental with many non-environmental factorsto cause violentconflict.18 This is a misrepresentation of our work. We have been acutely attentiveto non-environmental factors.We have never claimed-as he implies-that thereare mechanismsproducingconflict that In fact,we wrote that "it is importantto are "purely and discretelyenvironmental." is but one variablein a seriesofpolitical,economicand social note thatthe environment in both of myInternational factors thatcan bringabout turmoil."19 Furthermore, Security and interacting articles,I devote many pages to discussing a range of key intervening
factors.20 12. Homer-Dixon,"Environmental Scarcities,"pp. 8-9. 13. Ibid., pp. 10-16. 14. Ibid., p. 25. 15. Ibid., pp. 16-17. 16. Ibid., pp. 18-20. 17. Ibid., pp. 35-36. 18. "Better research"will grow out of "an understanding thatenvironmental factors interact with a varietyof otherfactors a National Security to spawn violentconflict." Levy,"Is the Environment Issue?" p. 58. 19. Homer-Dixon,Boutwell,and Rathjens,"Environmental Change and ViolentConflict," p. 38. 20. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold," pp. 85-88; Homer-Dixon, "EnvironmentalScarcities," pp. 20-21 and especially pp. 25-28.

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| 193 Correspondence

FOCUSING ON THE APPROPRIATE VARIABLE

thanfocusing Levyarguesthatrather on theenvironment as a cause of conflict, we shouldturn our attention to thefullrangeof causes of regional conflict. "Wedo not knowmuchabouttheroleoftheenvironment in causing conflict," he writes, "because we do notknowmuchaboutwhatcausesregional conflict overall."'21 Levyis caught in a contradiction. On one handhe saysthat theconnections between and conflict, environmental as we have identified are conventional pressures them, On theother wisdom. hand,he saysthat we do notknowmuchabouttheconnections. he is entirely Actually, wrongon bothcounts:manyof our findings do not repeat in our understanding. conventional wisdomat all, and theyrepresent real progress Thanksto our research and thatof others, we actually do knowa fairamount about theconnections environmental and conflict. between pressures But Levy's main pointhereis thatwe should focusour research efforts on the I strongly dependent variable rather thanon theindependent variable. As I disagree. have arguedelsewhere,22 environment-conflict research does notaimto determine the whole rangeof factors thatcurrently cause changesin the value of the dependent variable (theincidence ofviolent conflict). Rather, itseekstodetermine ifa hypothesized inparticular independent variable (environmental scarcity) can be an important cause in thedependent of changes variable. in a Thisfocusis reasonable whentwoconditions hold:first, thevalue ofa variable in is changing or is thought to change complex system significantly likely significantly the future; and second,researchers want to know if this changewill affect other variables that interest them. Theseconditions applyhere:evidence envisuggests that ronmental is getting worse rapidlyin manypartsof the world; and the scarcity to manyresearchers. incidence ofviolent conflict aroundtheworldis ofinterest divert in directions researchers resources that Levywouldhaveenvironment-conflict arelargely irrelevant to their interests and inappropriate thenature ofthesubject given an unnecessarily matter. He is advocating sterile rigidand often approachto social
science.

thatrather thanselecting cases forstudythatappear to show a link Levy suggests environmental stress and conflict, we shouldhavecompared "societies between facing but exhibiting different levelsof violent conflict."23 similar environmental problems in detailelsewhere,24 I makeonlya fewquick thisargument SinceI have addressed here. points thestrategy does notaccord with usualscientific First, Levysuggests procedure: Levy and varying thedependent advocates theindependent variable constant variholding
21. Levy,"Is the Environment a National SecurityIssue?" p. 37. 22. Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Strategiesfor Studying Causation in Complex Ecological-Political AmericanAssociation Systems,"Reportof the Projecton Environment, Population,and Security, forthe Advancementof Science,June1995. 23. Levy,"Is the Environment a National SecurityIssue?" p. 57. 24. Homer-Dixon,"Strategies."

CHOICE OF CASES

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International Security 20:3 | 194

able,whereas an experimental or quasi-experimental approach would varytheindein thedependent and thenexamine variable. pendent variable subsequent changes in Second,since,I would argue,such experimental approachesare unworkable research on complex ecological-political systems, there is somemerit to theapproach to make It wouldbe grossly inefficient Levysuggests. Butthere is an important caveat. research to study"null" a largeinvestment of resources earlyin environment-conflict Before stress is present butconflict doesnotoccur. casesin which environmental closely oftheboundary needa good understanding conditions suchcases,analysts examining an understanding aboutenvironment-conflict that can governing their hypotheses links, best be gained froman exacting studyof the causal processesin cases in which environmental scarcity appearsto lead to conflict. of processtracing. In violation of the strict This is the well-known methodology canonsofconventional cases areselected on boththeindepolitical science, explicitly if the independent variables. The aim is to determine and pendentand dependent are actually linked dependent variables causally and,ifthey are,to derive inductively and thekey from a closestudyof manysuchcases thecommon patterns ofcausality thatcharacterize theselinks.25 Processtracing intermediate and interacting variables often involves downone or morelevelsofanalysis to developa morefinely dropping ofthecausalstepsbetween textured and detailed understanding theindependent and dependent variables. ina newfield, During early research especially ifthesubject matter is highly complex, scholars can use research resources to bestadvantage cases thatappear, by examining to demonstrate on prima facie, thecausal relations hypothesized-that is, by selecting theindependent and dependent variables. Thisnarrow focuswillallowtheresearcher in the early to identify errors and basic empirical weaknesses conceptual efficiently as thehypotheses become refined andunderstanding ofboundhypotheses. Later, more moretextured, can be subjected to morerigorous aryconditions they testing. The approach I would argue, is mosteffective-indeed, can onlybe Levysuggests of progressive effective-at laterstagesof research as partof a process refinement of and their conditions. research has hypotheses boundary Perhaps environment-conflict now reacheda stage whereLevy's approachwould be fruitful; we have, in fact, includedthe "null" case of Indonesiain our latestroundof case studies.But it is thatour earlyresearch to generate new findings" nonsense to suggest "failed because ofthewaywe selected ourcases.Ifwe had followed Levy'sstrategy early on,we might of methodological but have produced a studyacceptable to thedefenders orthodoxy, we wouldhave farless to show, in terms ofsubstantive forourefforts. findings, -ThomasF Homer-Dixon Toronto

25. Alexander George and TimothyMcKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," in RobertCoulam and RichardSmith,eds., Advancesin Information Processing Vol. 2 (London: JAIPress, 1985), pp. 24-43. in OrganiZations,

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Correspondence 1195

TheAuthor Replies:
I welcome thechance to reply Homer-Dixon's to Professor thoughtful and impassioned response to myarticle. As I said in that article, I consider theenvironment and security to suffer from low level of critical literature a starkly debate.I learnedthings from in his other Homer-Dixon's response thatI had notappreciated writings, and I take thatas at least prima evidence thatmoredebateis better; thatis ultimately for facie others to judge,however. I takeup Homer-Dixon's Before mainpointsindividually, let me statethatI did notintend myarticle to be an attack on Homer-Dixon as a scholar. My comments on hisresearch program werepartofa sweeping review oftheentire genre. In placesmy toneor choice ofwordsmayhavebeena bitextreme, and whileI stand bymyanalytiI apologizeif I created In fact, I concal conclusions, of disrespect. any impression siderHomer-Dixon to be a model scholarwho sets veryhighstandards worthy of emulation. maincriticisms; Now I willaddress Homer-Dixon's myheadings areslightly different thanhisbutI have tried to reply to eachmajorpoint. Homer-Dixon saysthatmyfocuson U.S. security interests is parochial and dismissive ofthehundreds ofmillions ofpeopleinthedeveloping worldwhofaceserious security ifI argued problems engendered byenvironmental change. He wouldbe right that U.S. saidtheopposite. wereall that butI explicitly for security mattered, Myreason focusing whenitcomesto policyrecommendations, all on theUnited States was that, virtually toarguing for a major oftheenvironment and security comesaround writing eventually If reorientation ofU.S. policies, financial manyofwhichhave significant implications. theUnitedStatesis evergoingto engagein suchmeasures, it is reasonable to expect totheUnited States that willresult. From someexplicit rationale thebenefits delineating a globalist itmaybe unfortunate, butitremains that to point outthat perspective true, in developing mass violence countries a particular aid packagemight foreign prevent I argued willnotguarantee itcleansailing that theU.S. government through Congress. Third World violence to U.S. security is unlikely to be movedbyarguments connecting runany fare better in theshort butthatother interests, appealsmight (though surely at all rests on shaky optimism grounds). to his workfor new ground, Homer-Dixon says I do notgiveenoughcredit breaking wisdom. thatit arrives at conclusions identical to theprior conventional by claiming oftheconventional wisdom is infact He saysmycharacterization true onlyofa narrow in the I maysuffer from bandofenvironment scholars. Perhaps. having goneto college in departments and anthrolate1970s, ofgovernment, whencourses sociology, history, out quiteexplicitly theconto environmental pology(in addition studies)all pointed and violent in thedeveloping world. nections resource conflict amongnatural scarcity
WILL THE REAL CONVENTIONAL WISDOM PLEASE STAND UP? IS U.S. SECURITY AN INAPPROPRIATE ANALYTICAL FOCUS?

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International Security 20:3 | 196

vu.1 YetI confess to beingshocked workitseemslikede6ja WhenI readHomer-Dixon's witha leadingscholar thathe citedto help makehis at the private correspondence view of theconventional wisdom whichI acknowledge does reveala different point, thattheyare If Homer-Dixon's workhelps persuadesuch scholars thanI averred. a great deal ofcredit. thenhe indeeddeserves wrong, have made thesepoints In theend,mycritique does nothingeon whether others tothenullhypothesis, because itis possible tofind serious adherents orwhether before, madein theresearch to datearetooshallowtobe I also arguethat thepoints program useful. which tried summarizes hiskeyresults better thanI did in myarticle, Homer-Dixon a muchbroader thanjusthis work.His six findings to examine rangeoftheliterature are statedclearly readers to judge whether theyadd up to "a enoughforinterested us to new intellectual terrain. My pointis that that carries single, integrated analysis"2 orpractically. arenotspecific tobe ofmuch use either these analytically enough findings and are likely to trigger thesedynamics Theydo nottellus whatkindsof conditions worse to dampen whatkinds ofstrategies makethings them, whatconditions arelikely vulnerable and whatkindsofstatesare especially and whatkindsmakethem better, contingent, butthecontinThe conclusions areall highly whatkindsespecially robust. thing to a categorical elaborated or explored. The closest genciesarenotsatisfactorily conclusion-that interstate resource warsare unlikely-isalso theone thatwas made mostclearly Weareleft withclaims that sometimes environmental work.3 byan earlier violent conflicts butnotknowing whatconditions matter mostand scarcity produces that we did notknow evenifitweretrue whatintervention points aremostpromising; that itnow does notseemall that helpful. before, knowing are shallowexplains theapparent contradiction ofwhich My viewthatthefindings the conventional Homer-Dixon accuses me, when I say both thathe has recreated generally becausewe wisdomand thatwe need morestudyof thecauses of conflict do notunderstand it adequately. The conventional wisdomon theroleoftheenvironviolence mentin sparking violence is rather shallow;we need moreworkon regional and contingencies that because it is not deep enoughto understand theinteractions of recreating a shallow cases. I am accusingHomer-Dixon help explainindividual conventional wisdom instead ofdeepening ourunderstanding ofconflict that processes; is nota contradiction. matter: ifreaders gainnew Butultimately, whatthisworkadds up to is an empirical then from theseresults thatin turn lead them to generate useful knowledge, insights Homer-Dixon is right and I will gladlyconcedethispoint.In private communication
1. The BrundtlandCommission report, prepared in 1986 and published in book formin 1987,has an entirechapterdevoted to demonstrating stressis both a cause and an effect that"environmental of political tensionand military WorldCommission on Environment conflict." and Development, Our Common Future(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 1987), p. 290. This reporthad politicaland intellectual influencethatwas too widespread to qualifyit as "narrow." 2. Homer-Dixonletter, p. 192. 3. Ronnie D. Lipschutz,When NationsClash:Raw Materials, Ideology, and Foreign Policy(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1989).

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| 197 Correspondence

he has sharedcompelling evidencethatthissortof dynamic is occurring. I remain aboutthelongrun,though, skeptical forreasons that are primarily methodological.
WHAT METHODOLOGICAL

Homer-Dixon arguesthat thecase studies carried outin his project "provided detailed I disputed and argument" forhis findings.4 thisin myarticle supporting evidence by arguing that theselection ofcasesconstrained theanalysis, especially becauseall cases had bothserious and serious environmental scarcity problems political violence problems.5 Homer-Dixon says thismethodis appropriate fordetermining whether environI agreethat mental is an important cause ofpolitical violence. scarcity6 process tracing of the sortHomer-Dixon and his colleagueshave carriedout is a good way for in complex causal pathways socialsystems. Butwhenit comesto identiascertaining fying whether thesecausal pathways are "important," I think theselection of what amount a fundamental To labela cause to most-likely case studies imposes constraint. as "important" is to saythat ithas somecombination ofexplanatory powerand policy thatis high,relative to othercauses. But it is veryhard to supportsuch a utility withevidence whenall thecases werechosen becausethey werethought to judgment have strong environment-conflict links. Forexample, to labelenvironmental scarcity an important cause ofconflict is to say aboutitspowerrelative to political institutions as causesofconflict.7 What something ifone held a hypothesis that, in thecases ofviolent conflict studied by Homer-Dixon and his colleagues, weak political institutions weremore"important" as causes than environmental scarcity? (Such a hypothesis might be trueeven if it turnsout that In principle, exacerbates institutional thisis a testable scarcity weakness.) proposition, butin practice Homer-Dixon's case studies do notpermit thetest tobe carried out.Yet variables theclaimthatenvironmental are "important causes" makesa judgscarcity aboutwhatthattest ment wouldreveal. it is highly Whenprocesstracing is done right, sensitive to counterfactuals: how if political institutions a givencase of scarcity have evolveddifferently were might closerto theSingapore or Costa Rica model,say,thantheBangladesh model?Such ofspecific ourquestfor theimportance variables questions helpsharpen understanding Butcounterfactual in explaining a particular case,especially whencases are complex. a grounding in reliable either theoretical or empirical, to analysis requires knowledge, be valid;ifwe ask how things would havebeen different underSingaporeor Costa
4. Ibid. 5. The number of case studies is also a limitingfactor. Some of his conclusions are empirically grounded in only one or two cases. 6. Homer-Dixon faultsme forreferring to environmental "degradation" ratherthan "scarcity."I did not mean the termdegradationto rule out scarcity; to me scarcity is one formof degradation. Ground water resources can be degraded, for example, by becoming scarcer in quantity, or by fromexcessive fertilization. becoming contaminatedwith salts resulting 7. The most thoroughtreatise on variationin politicalinstitutions as an explanationforvariation in political conflict in the developing world is Samuel P. Huntington, PoliticalOrderin Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).

STRATEGIES ARE LIKELY TO BE MOST PRODUCTIVE?

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International Security 20:3 1198

Rica-like institutions, we haveto knowsomething aboutSingapore and CostaRica.In thephenomena of interest it seemsclearthatbetter use of counterto Homer-Dixon, factuals in making willrequire ofcaseswhere causalarguments empirical investigation in theimportant there is morevariation variables. Otherwise, assertions aboutcertain variables' importance amount to guesswork. I wantscholars to do nothing but strictly Homer-Dixon seemsto think controlled case studies. couldbe further from thetruth. Elsewhere quasi-experimental Nothing and I havearguedstrongly in a spirit mycolleagues for methodological pluralism that Homer-Dixon will,I think, findhospitable.8 Yet methodological pluralism does not mean doingwhatever of techniques is likely to have you feellike,and any mixture is right some flaws.WhileHomer-Dixon thatthe research he pursuedhad strategy from thelimits I haveidentified. many merits, that does notmeanitdoesnotalso suffer Let me concludewiththe methodological the most pointthatI think respresents intheresearch I recommend serious difference between us: whether engaging strategies in a direction irrelewould constitute a diversion ofresources thatwouldbe "largely vant" to scholars interested in environment and conflict.9 I feelquite strongly that thefocusto conflict thanenvironmentally would shifting perse,rather causedconflict, be moreappropriate for and humanitarian bothintellectual reasons. My arguments on intellectual aresummarized above.My reasoning grounds on humanitarian grounds is Environmental is butone causeofpolitical we fairly straightforward. scarcity violence; do notdisagree aboutthat at all. Political violence is a very serious on itsown problem bothfor thepeopleaffected and those others a variety ofreasons terms, directly whofor areconcemed aboutpreventing I cannot suchviolence that we disagree (again, imagine it is theviolence aboutthat).On humanitarian not grounds, perse thatis important, whether it was caused by environmental Therefore we would be making a scarcity. ifwe did nottacklehead on themultiple violence. gravemistake causes of political Whatifthere are morefeasible or relevant meansofpreventing violence than political in the environmental through intervening domain?Or what if some environmental interventions willgetoverwhelmed ifthelatter by other factors arenotaddressed too? to presume that we willevercompletely environAnd,sinceitwouldbe folly prevent mental do we nothavean obligation to study for scarcity problems, measures respondI think ingto violence whenthey breakout?Forthesereasons moving to whatI have wave"10 of environment in whichpolitical called a "third and security scholarship, violence causalagents, occupiescenter stageand theenvironment joinsa castofother in helping would go furthest us achievetheimportant goalswe share. -Marc A. Levy Princeton, N.J.
8. Marc A. Levy,Oran Young,and Michael Zuern, "The Studyof International Regimes,"European Journal ofInternational Relations, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall 1995), pp. 267-330. 9. Homer-Dixonletter, p. 193. 10. Marc A. Levy, "Time fora Third Wave of Environment and SecurityScholarship?" Environmental Changeand Security No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 44-46. Project,

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