BRITISH SOUTHERN CAMEROONS

Email: BSCliberationFront@gmail.com

PRESS RELEASE GOVERNMENT OF THE BRITISH SOUTHERN CAMEROONS

Released and authorized by the British Southern Cameroons Liberation Front (BSCLF) as the Restoration Government. The President of the Republic or his delegated representative(s) shall be the only person(s) to speak for or on behalf of the BSCLF. The BSCLF calls on all citizens of British Southern Cameroons, the International Community, AU, and UN to recognize and support this British Southern Cameroons Restoration Government unconditionally as we say NO to annexation and recolonization by defending our rights to Self Determination in accordance with UN Article 76 B & UN Article102 par. 1 & 2., UN RES 224-111 of 18 November 1948, UN RES 1514 of DEC. 1960, AU Constitutive Act 4(b) , Article 20 of African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights , and in conformity with International law and protocols.

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THE PRESIDENCY

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC Prof. Carlson Anyangwe VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC Dr. Emil Mondoa MINISTER OF STATE SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE PRESIDENCY Dr. Martin Ayim ASSISTANT MINISTER OF STATE SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE PRESIDENCY Mr. Valentine Eben MINISTER OF STATE IN CHARGE OF CIVIL CABINET Dr. Nfor Ngalla Nfor MINISTER OF STATE IN CHARGE OF PROTOCOL Mr. Maxwell Oben DEPUTY MINISTER OF STATE IN CHARGE OF PROTOCOL Ms. Vivian Mafor ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC Barrister Blaise Berinyuy -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

SENATORS
HRH CHIEF AYAMBA ETTE OTUN Dr. KEVIN GUMNE HRH FON GORJI DINKA MOLA NJOH LITUMBE Mr. SONA ISAAC Mr. LUC AYABA Mr. JOHN MBAH FOMUNYOH JUSTICE NYOH WAKAI JUSTICE ALOYSIUS N. MBU DR. STEPHEN SHEMLON

11. PA. JAMES SABUM 12. PRINCE HITLER MBINGLO 13. PROFESSOR CHIA ATEH 14. MRS FRIDA NGWA 15. Mr. BENEDICT NWANA 16. MR. VINCENT FEKO 17. DR. TAYOBA NGENGE 18. Mr. ALEX MUCHUO 19. AMBASSADOR HENRY FOSSUNG 20. MRS KALTOUMA LUMA 21 PA JOSEPH TITA NKWENTI 22. Mr. MISODI CHRISTOPHER 23. MS MELISSA NABANGI ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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HONOURABLE MINISTERS

1. MINISTER OF DEFENSE Mr. Ebune Baresta Ngundue 2. MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS Mr. Eric Tita Moh-Takwi 3. MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS Mr. Wesley Tiku 4. MINISTER OF COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS Mr. George Ekontang 5. MINISTER OF FINANCE & ECONOMY Professor Nfor Susungi 6. MINISTER OF EDUCATION Dr. Christopher Atang 7. MINISTER OF POST AND TELE-COMMUNICATION Mr. Thomas Moture 8. MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE Dr. Tatah Mentan 9. MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORT Barrister Harmony Mbuton 10. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES Mr. Andrew Edimo 11. MINISTER OF WOMEN AND GENDER EQUALITY Ms. Victoria Ndando 12. MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT AND TOURISM Mr. Thomas Nwachan 13. MINISTER OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY Mr. Augustine Ndangam 14. MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE Dr. Menten-Kumbongsi 15. MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL SECURITY Mr. Moses Nkuo Tabe 16. MINISTER OF HEALTH Dr. Arnold Yongbang 17. MINISTER OF YOUTH AND SPORTS Mr. Charles Mbide 18. MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND KEEPER OF THE SEALS Justice Frederick Ebong 19. MINISTER INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE Mr. Ebenezar D.M. Akwanga ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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DEPUTY MINISTERS
Dr. John Fobanjong Mr. Mola Jimmy Jackai Mr. Fonong Fevant Fon Mr. Jonas M. Tiku Barrister Emmanuel Nkea Mr. Ntemfac Ofege

1. DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE 2. DEPUTY MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS 3. DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 4. DEPUTY MINISTER OF FINANCE & ECONOMY 5. DEPUTY MINISTER OF EDUCATION 6. DEPUTY MINISTER OF POST AND TELE-COMMUNICATION

7. DEPUTY MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE Mr. Martin Yembe 8. DEPUTY MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORT Mr. Peter Njang 9. DEPUTY MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES Mr. Nasako Besingi 10. DEPUTY MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT AND TOURISM: Fai Emmanuel Visha 11. DEPUTY MINISTER OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY Mr. Edwin Ngang 12. DEPUTY MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE Mrs Anna Nju 13. DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL SECURITY Mr. Stephen Konsor 14. DEPUTY MINISTER OF HEALTH Dr. Valentine Mbepson 15. DEPUTY MINISTER OF YOUTH AND SPORTS Mr. Valentine Nke 16. DEPUTY MINISTER OF COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS Mr. Justice M. Mbuh 17. DEPUTY MINISTER OF WOMEN AND GENDER EQUALITY Mrs. Dioh Winifred Bonana 18. DEPUTY MINISTER OF JUSTICE Barrister Charles Taku ------------------------------------------------END--------------------------------------------------------------------

Copyrights: BSCLF 2007 for the People of the British Southern Cameroons.

Victoria, Tiko, Buea, Mutengene, Buea, Bakassi, Kumba, Ikondo Titi, Isangele, Tombel, Mundemba, Nguti, Mamfe, Eyumojock, Fontem, Widikum, Batibo, Bali, Oshie, Mbengwi, Bali, Bamenda, Santa, Wum, Nkambe, Ndu, Kumbo, Oku, Jakiri, Ndop ,Fundong

BACKGROUND LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF A RESTORATION GOVERNMENT

A Trust Betrayed: The Transfer of British Southern Cameroons to a Successor Colonialist by Professor Carlson Anyangwe, PhD* University of Zambia School of Law
In 1858 the British Baptist Missionary Society claimed for Britain a coastal enclave at the Bight of Biafra and named it Victoria after Queen Victoria. The area together with its hinterland became British and, after years of historical vicissitudes, was named in 1922 as the British Southern Cameroons. One hundred and fifty years on, that territory is still under colonial rule. The territory was British from 1858 to 1888 when Britain transferred it to Germany. From 1889 until the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Germany administered it as part of its contiguous Kamerun colonial protectorate acquired in 1884. The territory became British again from 1914 until October 1961 when it tragically came under the colonial rule of the neighbouring French-speaking state of Cameroun Republic and has remained so since then. During the second period of British rule the territory was constituted into an administrative union with Nigeria, and administered from 1922 to 1945 as part of the League of Nations Mandated Territory of British Cameroons and from 1946 to 1961 as part of the United Nations Trust Territory of the same name. The British Southern Cameroons achieved internal autonomy in 1954, became fully self-governing in 1958, and, in 1960 was endowed with a Westminster- type Constitution meant to pave the way for the territory emergence as a sovereign independent state. This development was consistent with Article 76b of the Charter of the United Nations, which imposed on Administering Authorities the obligation to lead Trust Territories to self-government or independence. It was also consistent with undertakings given in 1958 by the British Government before the UN General Assembly and also with guarantees in the same year by the UN itself, to the effect that the British Southern Cameroons would achieve independence in 1960. Having already achieved full self-government status, the next and ultimate status the British Southern Cameroons was expected to emerge into could only have been that of independent sovereign statehood as contemplated by Article 76b of the Charter of the UN and by the binding UN 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. But, in a melancholic twist of fate and for reasons difficult to comprehend, the UN imposed on the people of the territory a plebiscite to achieve independence by joining either Nigeria or Cameroun Republic. The political authorities of the British Southern Cameroons and those of Cameroun Republic held a series of pre-plebiscite talks which resulted in signed undertakings given by Cameroun Republic that if the vote went in favour of joining Cameroun Republic the joining would take the form of a two-state federal association. The plebiscite result went in favour of joining Cameroun Republic. United Nations Resolution 1608 of 21 April 1961 endorsed that result and, in its operative paragraph 5, invited Britain, the Government of the British Southern Cameroons and the Government of Cameroun Republic to finalize before 1 October 1961, the arrangements by which the agreed two-state federal association was to be implemented. The mandated finalization never took place.

Instead, on 1 September 1961 the National Assembly of Cameroun Republic boldly enacted a piece of legislation that was in effect an annexation law but passed off as a so-called federal constitution. By that piece of legislation Cameroun

Republic claimed entitlement to the British Southern Cameroons as part of its territory returned to it by the UK and the UN. The long title of that document so proclaimed. At the time this annexation law was promulgated the British Southern Cameroons was still a UN Trust Territory under UK Administration. But both the UK and the UN maintained a studied silence in the face of such a baseless and clearly expansionist claim by Cameroun Republic. What is more, on 30 September 1961 the UK proceeded to transfer sovereignty over the British Southern Cameroons to Cameroun Republic, a foreign country that had nothing with the Trust over the British Cameroons, and then hurriedly withdrew from the territory, leaving it defenceless. Opportunistically, Cameroun Republic occupied the land. It has remained in armed occupation ever since, exercising a colonial sovereignty over the territory. In 1972 the political leadership of Cameroun Republic staged a pretended referendum, the pre-arranged results of which they claimed authorized them to abolish peremptorily the 10-year old informal Cameroon federation. In reality the ploy was a farcical quest to legitimize its Germano-Austrian Anschloss-type annexation of British Southern Cameroons. The resultant controversial conflated entity was first denominated United republic of Cameroun and then, twelve years later, as Cameroun Republic, the very name and style by which French Cameroun achieved independence from France on 1 January 1960. THE BETRAYAL OF TOO TRUSTING A PEOPLE The people of the British Southern Cameroons had absolute faith in the UN and trusted the Administering Authority, believing that both would always act in the best interest and for the wellbeing of the territory. This turned out to be a monumentally misplaced faith. In breach of the legal, moral and human rights foundations at the root of the trusteeship system, in breach of obligations assumed under the Charter of the UN, and in breach of the undertakings in the Trusteeship Agreement for the British Cameroons the UK betrayed the people of the British Southern Cameroons. The UN itself failed to stand up for the people of the trust territory. The Betrayal by the UN The UN failed to secure statehood for the people of British Southern Cameroons. By this failure the UN acted in breach of its own Charter (Article 76 b), in breach of its own 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and in breach of the right of self-determination of peoples. The plebiscite and its timing were a UN imposition. The political leadership of the territory requested its deferment to 1962 but the request was ignored. The plebiscite questions, framed with the greatest opacity, in effect demanded the hapless people of British Southern Cameroons to choose between colonial rule by Nigeria and colonial rule by Cameroun Republic, the UK Government having indicated it was no longer prepared to continue to assume responsibility for the administration of the territory. The plebiscite was in fact uncalled for and the alternatives presented to the people amounted to a violation of the right of all peoples to existence. A people cannot achieve independence by offering themselves for domination and their territory for annexation, by another country. The British Southern Cameroons had already achieved full self-government status and was poised for and had the right to accede to the ultimate status of independence as a sovereign state. Given this fact the plebiscite was unnecessary. The phraseology of the plebiscite question was itself a gross deception and an unconscionable fraud on an essentially illiterate population who, as the Plebiscite Commissioner rightly pointed out, may not have fully grasped the full implication of what they were invited to vote on. Further, the UN did not present the people with the internationally recognized self-determination political status option of emergence as a sovereign independent state. There was, and there can be, no good reason why this option was withheld from the people. The very representative conference of all stakeholders held in Mamfe Town had resolved that given the UNs insistence on a plebiscite in the territory the questions to be put to the people should be the following

clear, sensible and straightforward questions: Do you want integration into Nigeria? Do you want secession from Nigeria? The British Southern Cameroons though internationally a separate territory from Nigeria was at then still administered by the UK as if it was an integral part of Nigeria. The questions therefore made great sense. There was no need bringing in French Cameroun into the equation as that country was foreign land. It was clearly understood by all the stakeholders at the Mamfe conference that a vote for secession from Nigeria would necessarily entail the emergence of the British Southern Cameroons into statehood. Mr. JN Foncha, Premier of the British Southern Cameroons, painstakingly outlined to the UN the proceedings and outcome of the Mamfe conference. But for reasons that have never been stated the UN ignored all of that and went ahead to impose an unwarranted plebiscite with vaguely framed questions and dead-end alternatives. It is still a mystery how the UN could have believed and taken the attitude that the destiny of the people of the British Southern Cameroons was necessarily tied to that of either of its two neighbours. The UN betrayal did not end there. The Organization even failed to see to it that the very process of what it called independence by joining and which it had initiated was carried to its completion. It did not call for four-party talks (UN, UK, British Southern Cameroons, Cameroun Republic) to satisfactorily iron out any outstanding issues and to ensure that there was indeed genuine de-colonization of the British Southern Cameroons. It did not participate in any postplebiscite talks, whether bipartite between British Southern Cameroons and Cameroun Republic or tripartite between the UK, the British Southern Cameroons and Cameroun Republic. It did not even bother to ensure that any such talks took place under its auspices in the same way the plebiscite had been conducted under its auspices. It did not ensure that the Administering Authority participated effectively, meaningfully, in good faith, and in the best interest of the British Southern Cameroons, in any talks or dealings with Cameroun Republic that had a bearing on the future of the people and territory of British Southern Cameroons. Resolution 1608 of 21 April 1961 failed to include safeguards designed to show conclusively British Southern Cameroons as a de-colonized territory. The resolution was in fact a dangerously watered down version of the robust resolution earlier recommended by the Trusteeship Council for adoption by the General Assembly. The Trusteeship Council resolution had called for the UN involvement in the post-plebiscite decolonization process and for the UN to make available to the Government of the British Southern Cameroons administrative, financial and constitutional expertise. The UN should responsibly have done so, but it failed to. The assistance to British Southern Cameroons recommended by the Trusteeship Council would have, on the reckoning of the UN Secretary General, cost a mere US$46, 000. Discriminatorily, the UN considered that paltry sum too large an amount to spend in order to secure and safeguard the integrity of the territory of the Southern Cameroons, however spatially small, and the dignity and worth of its people, however demographically small. It would seem the UN even appeared to have adopted the suspect attitude that the British Southern Cameroons was a returned part of the territory of Cameroun Republic. The Betrayal by the UK Government As far back as 1922 the UK Government formally decided to administer British Southern Cameroons as an integral part of Eastern Nigeria. The opinion of the people was never sought as to whether or not they wished to be administered as a part of Nigeria. But the UK later claimed entitlement to administer the territory as part of Nigeria apparently in virtue of a permissible provision under the mandates/trusteeshi p agreements allowing for the constitution, by the colonial power, of its contiguous colonial territories into an administrative union. This administrative union of British Southern Cameroons and Nigeria had disastrous political and economic consequences for the former. The territory became a mere backwater to developments in Nigeria. It remained backward in every aspect of human development and was commonly referred to as a colony within a colony. Much of the struggle by the thirteen British Southern Cameroons parliamentarians in the Eastern Nigerian House of Assembly at Enugu focused on freeing the British Southern

Cameroons from the Nigerian gridlock. There can be no doubt that had the UK administered the territory separately and directly from London rather than indirectly from Lagos as a part of Nigeria the focus of the territorys politicians would have been on securing statehood for the territory. The albatross by way of Nigeria or Cameroun Republic would hardly have appeared on the scene. The UK Government was well aware that a strong majority of the people of the British Southern Cameroons did not want to join either Nigeria (the Southern Cameroons having just fought and secured its separation from Nigeria) or Cameroun Republic (a strange and unknown land steep in the throes of a bloody terrorism). Yet it insisted that it was in the best interest of the British Southern Cameroons to constitutionally become a part of Nigeria, even though there was nothing palpable to show for after nearly half a century of the Nigerian connection. In fact, the UK Government actively set out to hush up the clear wish of the people for statehood. It went out of its way to prevent the emergence in the territory of any organized body of opinion in favour of independence. Sir Andrew Cohen, the UK Representative at the UN, uppity, ruthless and autocratic, sent a confidential memo to the Commissioner of the Southern Cameroons in which he declared: I think that HMGs position should be made abundantly clear to Foncha [Premier of the Southern Cameroons] in an effort to scotch tendencies towards the third question of outright independence. The UK Government peddled at the UN the economic non-viability propaganda as the excuse for its selfish opposition to the independence of British Southern Cameroons. Economic viability or non-viability had and still has nothing to do with independence for a colonial territory. Britain knew this only too well. If there was any doubt on the matter that doubt was dispelled by the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence which made it very clear that economic nonviability is irrelevant to the question of independence and cannot be used to delay it. Thus in 1960 France launched its African territories as independent states, hopping from one colonial capital to another lowering the French flag and hoisting independence flags. But hardly any of these new states were economically viable; all of them relied heavily on French subsidies. France did not make a song and dance over this. The question of the independence of the Southern Cameroons was eminently one for decision by the people of the territory alone and not by Britain, the Administering Authority. The real reason for the British Government presuming to oppose independence for British Southern Cameroons was the UK Governments erroneous belief that the territory had no economic resources that could possibly be of benefit to Britain. Worse, since the territory, as the UK Government thought, was economically not viable, Britain would then, as former colonial power, be at least morally constrained to provide aid to an independent Southern Cameroons. Since the territory, as the UK Government thought, was poor, there was nothing Britain could possibly gain from the territory in return for the subsidy it would have to provide. Mr. CB Boothby, Head of the African Department at the British Foreign Office, in a confidential dispatch confessed egoism as the explanation of the British attitude: We are not attracted to the idea of an independent Southern Cameroons because it would certainly not be able to pay its way and we are not at all anxious to have to do so on its behalf. We cannot expect to gain any advantage from being foster mother to an independent Southern Cameroons and it is clear that it would have to be fostered by somebody. This piece of rationalization by the UK Government was as wicked as it was egoistic. Since the UK Government saw British Southern Cameroons as economically not valuable to Britain and as a potential future liability to the Bank of England, one would have thought that Britain would, to say the least, leave the territory to rot in its presumed poverty. But the UK Government chose to adopt a policy that consisted in throwing the territory to the dogs. The Colonial Secretary, Mr. Iain Macleod, informed his listeners of the UK transfer of sovereignty over British Southern Cameroons to Cameroun Republic. Several confidential Colonial Office memoranda emphasized the UK handover of British Southern Cameroons to Cameroun Republic. Indeed, the British Under-Secretary of State for the

Colonies, Mr. Hugh Fraser, in a formal statement to the House of Commons on 1 October 1961 informed a somewhat perplexed but resigned House that British Southern Cameroons had already been transferred by the UK to Mr. Ahidjo, President of Cameroun Republic. Evidently, the UK Government showed no concern for the fate of the people and territory of British Southern Cameroons entrusted to its care by the international community. For all it cared, the territory could be grabbed by whoever wanted to and its people exterminated. Lord Perth, the British Minister of State in an unexplained outburst of frightening hostility and murderous hatred sneered: the Southern Cameroons and its inhabitants are undoubtedly expendable. There is therefore overwhelming evidence that neither the British Government nor the United Nations acted in the best interest of the people and territory of British Southern Cameroons over whom they had assumed obligations under international law. Both betrayed the sacred trust of civilization assumed by them in respect of the people of British Southern Cameroons.

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BRITISH SOUTHERN CAMEROONS INTERNATIONAL INTEREST MEETING JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA, NOVEMBER 25th, 2007 INDEPENDENCE RESTORATION RESOLUTION
Mindful that British Cameroons was a UN TRUST administered by the United Kingdom; Mindful that British Cameroons is documented as having exited the British Empire in 1961 as Independent territory (British Empire Archives); Mindful that British Southern Cameroons was a self governing entity between 1954-1961, had a different political future and conducted the first democratic elections in Africa in 1958; Mindful and respectful of United Nations Articles & Resolutions related to Preparation of Trust Territories towards self governance and Independence ( UN article 102 par 1 & 2, UN Article 76 (b), UN RES 1514 of DEC 1960, UN RES 224-111); Mindful that 2001-2010 is United Nations decade of decolonization and the British Southern Cameroons is still being annexed and recolonized by another African Former UN Trust territory of the same Category B status; Mindful of the Non-implementation of the UN Post Plebiscite RES 1608(XV) and the absence of the UN and UK at the Foumban masquerade in 1961; Mindful of the violation of the International boundary of the British Southern Cameroons by La Republique du Cameroun (French Cameroun) without any Act of Union deposited with the United Nations Secretariat; Mindful of Article 20 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights; Mindful of AU Constitutive Act 4(b) concerning boundaries attained at Independence; Recognizing all the efforts made and names proposed for the British Southern Cameroons, towards restoring Independence peacefully since 1985 to no success (New Social Order (1985), AAC 1 & II (1993-1994), Washington DC Summit (2001), Minnesota Conference(2004), Dallas Conference (2007), UK Conference 2007,Abuja Lawsuit (2002), Banjul lawsuit (2005), Geneva lawsuit (2006); and Drawing strength from the Mandate by Citizens of British Southern Cameroonians through the Signature Referendum of 1995 which was in favour of Independence and Sovereignty:

RESOLUTION
We, Citizens of British Southern Cameroonians, convening in Johannesburg, South Africa during an International Interest Meeting, November 24th-25th, and being aware of our rights to self determination and our political past as a selfgoverning entity recognized by the United Nations between 1954-1961; Resolve to act in defense of our territorial boundary to the East with La Republique du Cameroun (French Cameroun), and to restore the Unconditional Independence and Sovereignty of our territory as British Southern Cameroons. DONE ON THIS DAY NOVEMBER TWENTY-FIFTH, TWO THOUSAND AND SEVEN Drawn and approved by Consensus. Signed: The Organizing Committee -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Victoria, Tiko, Buea, Mutengene, Buea, Bakassi, Kumba, Ikondo Titi, Isangele, Tombel, Mundemba, Nguti, Mamfe, Eyumojock, Fontem, Widikum, Batibo, Bali, Oshie, Mbengwi, Bali, Bamenda, Santa, Wum, Nkambe, Ndu, Kumbo, Oku, Jakiri, Ndop ,Fundong

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