The epistemological theory of Lakatos.

Roberto Jimnez Mndez. 2013.

Seminar: Wissenchaftphilosophie in der 20 Jahrhunderst.

The refined methodological falsificationism of Lakatos.

Lakatos takes as his starting point the criticism of Kuhn to Popper, noting that the author of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions had not directed his criticism to the real Popper but to the interpreted by some of his critics and promoters. According to Lakatos, often attributed erroneously dogmatic falsificationism, as Popper's thesis stands better in the context of methodological falsificationism Lakatos believes improvable, opting for sophisticated methodological falsificationism, which will be his main proposal in philosophy of science. For Lakatos, as if to Kuhn, a scientific theory is never refuted by observation or by a crucial experiment, but for other rival theory. As we said, Lakatos accepted various of the theses of Kuhn, as the existence of anomalies in all scientific theory and the importance of history to the study of epistemology. However, the canonical version of Popperian falsificationism found that science advances through "bold conjectures cleared by hard refutations". Such refutations, or falsifications, are conducted through observation statements, or basic propositions, Popper called potential falsifiers of a theory. These potential falsifying, referring to experience likely be, in turn, be testable by an experimental method realizable. If there is any conflict between a theory and a reproducible observation or empirical falsification, the theory must be abandoned by the scientific community. Lakatos says, however, that it is not possible to test theories falsifiables nor from an empirical falsification as described and performs this claim based on two reasons: first, because there is no clear or realistic psychological demarcation between propositions observational and theoretical propositions (critic of the analytic / synthetic distinction, as indicated Hanson and Quine in different ways), and second, because "no factual proposition can be tested by experiment" (The methodology of research programs scientific)

demonstration since all carries a logical deduction and these can only be made from propositions, not events. These approaches, psychological and

logica, allowed to Lakatos to refute the thesis of logical empiricism and popperism of theory testing with experience. In turn, Lakatos is based on the classic example of the Michelson-Morley experiment to eliminate also the thesis of the crucial experiment somewhat refuting a theory ipso facto. It should say about it, at least, that crucial experiments are arguments refuting only a posteriori, because there is always the possibility of ad hoc reforms theories to fit them into the framework of a measurement provided by an experiment. In fact, Lakatos had a surprising thesis in epistemology far to argue its refined falsificationism "most admirable theories do not ban any observable event". To show the truth of their position, proposed an imaginary example worth reproducing: "The story concerns an imaginary case of anomalous behavior of a planet. A physical-era mechanics preeinsteinian combines Newton's law of gravitation (N) with the initial conditions accepted (I) and calculated by including the route of a small newly discovered planet, p. But the planet deviates from the planned route. . Consider our physical that the deviation was forbidden by Newton's theory and that, therefore, such a route once confirmed, refuted the theory N? No. He suggests that there must be a previously unknown planet p 'which perturbs the path of p. Calculate the mass, orbit, etc.., Of that hypothetical planet and asks an experimental astronomer contrasting his hypothesis. The planet p 'is so small that even the largest existing telescopes could observe: the experimental astronomer applies for assistance to research to build one even bigger. Three years later the new telescope is now available. If the discovery of the unknown planet p ', it would be hailed as a new victory of Newtonian science. But it is not so. . Abandon our scientific theory of Newton and his ideas about the perturbing planet? No. He suggests that a cloud of cosmic dust hides the planet us. Calculate the location and properties of the cloud and for aid to the investigation to send a satellite in order to compare their calculations. If satellite instruments (possibly new, based on a theory recently proven) record the existence of the conjectural cloud, the result would be heralded as a great victory of

Newtonian science. But the cloud is not discovered. . Abandon our scientist Newton's theory with the idea of the perturbing planet and the cloud that hides? No. He suggests that there is a magnetic field in that region of the universe that no use of satellite instruments. It sends a new satellite. If you find the magnetic field, the Newtonians hold a service sensational victory. But this does not happen. It is believed this made a refutation of Newtonian science? No. Or proposes another ingenious auxiliary hypothesis or ... whole story is buried in the dusty volumes of journals, and never mentioned again. " This is elegantly illustrated the fact that the impossibility of a theory prohibits observable event because there is always the possibility that some external factor not contemplated influencing earlier this observation, it is only necessary to propose an appropriate ad hoc hypotheses created safeguard such theory. This question connects to the debate generated around the DuhemQuine thesis, formulated by Quine in some time in the following terms:

"Every statement can be considered true in any case whenever we strong enough adjustments elsewhere in the system ... Conversely, and by the same token, no statement one immune to revision".

The means for this are various, and Lakatos study this variety of ways around the refutation in several of his works, and finally ends in the protective belt concept, one of the hallmarks of refined falsificationism. This is central to the argument of Lakatos's theory, namely, any part of the entire science can be modified or replaced with the only condition involving science progress, namely, leading to discovery of new and unexpected facts. Every appeal of modifying a theory driven only safeguard own theory without incurring turn prediction made from any such modification is not scientifically acceptable, according to Lakatos.

So we come to the main thesis Lakatos refined falsificationism: scientific theories cant be refuted by observations or by crucial experiments but only by rival theories. Given Kuhn told by two rival paradigms as a prelude to the whole scientific revolution, Lakatos attempted to synthesize popperian

falsificationism with this idea coming to the conclusion that there may indeed be falsification of theories but only by a complex theoretical structure previously prepared. Lakatos made a clear proposal, attempted to overcome the shortcomings of Popperian falsificationism with reformulation, thesis maintained in the rest of his works:

"The naive falsificationism differs refined both in its rules of acceptance (demarcation criterion) and its falsification or requried rules".

For naive falsificationism any theory that can be interpreted as experimentally falsifiable scientific is acceptable. For refined falsificationism is acceptable theory, or scientific, only if it is corroborated excess empirical content compared to his predecessor (or rival). This condition can be decomposed into two parts: that the new theory has excess empirical content (acceptability 1) and that some of that excess contents being verified (acceptability 2). The first requirement can be confirmed quickly with a priori logical analysis, the second can only empirically tested and this may require an indefinite time. For a theory is naive falsificationism falsified by an observation statement (reinforced) that conflicts with it (or you choose to play as if it conflicts with her). For falsificationist refined scientific theory T is falsified if and only if another theory T 'has been proposed and has the following features: 1) T 'has excess empirical content with respect to T, ie predicts new facts, improbable or even excluded by T.

2) T 'explains the previous success of T, ie all content unchallenged T is included in the content of T'. 3) A part of the excess content of T 'is corroborated.

As we see, Lakatos sopport within the tradition of empiricism, its still the referentiality to experience the decisive factor between different theories, but his criterion of demarcation, very novel in twentieth-century philosophy, is based on the comparison of theories, and therefore is a conceptual approach. One theory, conjecture as its, will always end up being replaced by another one, but not by any of all proliferating in the crisis phase of the paradigm, but one that, first, essentially includes the above, and then exceeding, understood as the establishment of new empirical predictions that may be even surprising for advocates of the above theory, but then are confirmed experimentally. The factual continues to play a vital function in science: scientific only what predicts new facts hitherto unknown, but by itself does not refute empiricism to theory, simply guides the choice of scientists from one theory to another, whenever there is a rival theory that another, as in the case of not, the experience only indicates the imperfection, known a priori, of any scientific theory.

Scientific progress in Lakatos. The use of ad hoc hypotheses in science is a known fact for centuries epistemologists. Some of them, like Duhem and Popper, reflected on what might be the appropriate metodologic resources to avoid such schemes. However, not all these adjustments Lakatos and resources are illegitimate because some ultimately lead to new discoveries. Scientists who advocate a theory always try to preserve the refutation of what Lakatos called hard nucleus, and for this build around a set of auxiliary hypotheses, we could conceive of second rank because it allows modification, which is the protective belt. This perspective helps to explain the existence of anomalies in scientific theories as Kuhn said. So, those anomalous events that do not affect the center of theory are insufficient to refute it, allowing to be made to adjustments around the theory adapt the experience while allowing the development of new discoveries. Lakatos falsificationism is more tolerant than Popper and it is precisely for this reason, so you can take criticism which Kuhn made to the methodology falsificationist. The resulting conclusion is that then a theory cant be evaluated independeiently of the results it produced with these antifalsacionists strategies. The immediate consequence of this assertion is that the basic units for logical analysis are no longer the theories, or even less their confrontation with experience, but a combination of theories, that is, the programs of scientific. Each theory implicitly contains a development that response, at least, to the succession of attempts to save her from the corresponding refutations. This system of the theories which evolve is that must be evaluated in the epistemological analysis because it can sometimes cause major changes which lead to a substantial improvement of the initial theory and can produce, ultimately, new theories better than their historical predecessors. The history of science should be studied from this perspective, research programs, where theories happen and where such development leads to new knowledge. In turn, it is necessary to distinguish in these research programs that are progressive, and those that do not offer any advantage over previous

theories, Lakatos called regressive research programs. Of course, a research program may, at any time, be progressive and regressive turn, and vice versa. Ultimately, all theories are intended to be abandoned by other conceptions, even away from the original, which predict unexpected events by its precedent, as indicated Popper and Kuhn. With this description that Lakatos's methodology of science are encompassed the concepts of normal science, crisis paradigm and scientific revolution in the epistemological framework refined falsificationism. This is a summary of basic concepts Lakatos between Popper and Kuhn. It is also important to point out two very important consequences Lakatos's contribution to the philosophy of science. On the one hand, we see the close relationship between the ideas of science and progress. From this view, the demarcation between science and non-science is not in the experimental falsifiability, but rather on theoretical and empirical progress that science generates in its development over time. As a theory provide new discoveries, never affect any anomalies that are, as scientists will not leave the possibility of opening new roads and improve the routes. Only when a theory fails to provide solutions or questions and be stop in the anomalies, they affected it so that is unsustainable defense of the theory in question.

Fundamental concepts in Lakatos: positive / negative heuristic and internal / external history.

In Lakatos's theory of scientific research program is not only characterized by the empirical content that it has at one time, but also for its heuristic potential. The heuristic of a research program consists of a series of techniques for solving scientific problems. Viewed in a broader perspective, the heuristic is constructed through a set of methodological rules, perhaps very general or even primarily philosophical. Lakatos distinguishes two types of rules: some positive and some negative. The negative heuristic tells us what kind of ways of research should not be followed. The positive heuristic, meanwhile, indicates which of them should be developed. The first prevents modus tollens applies to hard nucleus of the research program. The second, however, prevents the researcher confused amalgam of anomalies in offering a solve set of tasks that involve, or may involve some other program enlargements. From the point of view of the relations between philosophy of science and the history of science, Lakatos continues the work of Kuhn, giving great importance to detailed historical studies. The methodology of science historians can provide normative criteria of what is a theory, its internal structure and on rules for evaluating theories, understood by historians that the subject matter covered in their research. On the other hand, the epistemological reconstructions normativism and philosophers of science must be confronted with historical data that historians give to check their plausibility. So, the history of science is set to something like the empirical or content of the philosophy of science. In turn, for Lakatos is essential to make intelligible the history of science, going beyond mere description to develop some kind of rational reconstruction of the data available for the development of scientific research. The epistemologist should try in his study of the theories themselves, their evolution, changes and conflicts in terms of factors internal

to the theories themselves. This is what Lakatos called internal history, which differs from the external history is not strictly scientific aspects but an essential influence on the development of science. The development of this inside story includes economic conditions of the research carried out by scientists as well as social, political, ideological, psychological, etc. Of course, the development of the internal history must be completed with the internal history, making an effort to understand scientific research in all its breadth, and cultural development characterized by a specific type of evolution but in turn developed in community. The internal history, like it or not depends on the different philosophical approaches that guide the work of prioritizing epistemologist certain kind of rational reconstruction, and always underlie the work of the historian. Not the same search the archives and documents a series of crucial experiments, changes in the axiomatizations and presentations of theories in search of simplicity, or rival research programs. The historian is always your choice is selective and theory-laden (as indicated Hanson). If you also intend to do a rational reconstruction of historical events, it is necessary to propose a radically different exposure thereof. In any case, no theoretical bias history is impossible. Hence a history of science that abstracts gotten the theoretical debates in philosophy of science is, according to Lakatos, inadequate. Historians and philosophers of science have to work together, but their roles are different. The philosophical attitude that prevails in Lakatos is, as it is easy to observe, the criticism. All claims must be studied both in their formulation and in their conclusions as to their relationship with other statements of the same type. The greatest example of his critical attitude can be found in his proposal of a metafalsacionist criterion, according to which they can be set based on empirical conditions which would be necessary to abandon the falsacionism as epistemological canon: "... if a demarcation criterion is inconsistent with basic assessments of the scientific elite, should be rejected".

Epistemology: philosophy or science?

Bunge has argued that the scientist is one who is best equipped to discuss epistemological problems. It noted that, unfortunately, today there are epistemologists who have no scientific training and only studied philosophy. He lamented the fact that currently is populated epistemology "scholastic", namely, people not from science but of philosophy. They are people who have never had contact with a particular science. This professionalization of epistemology has a serious flaw, as it has nurtured people who "talk about what they do not know", that is, are people who "play by ear". If today we want to talk about space and time, two essential philosophical themes, we should to know the theory of relativity of Einstein. If we wish to comment on the matter constituting reality, first we have to listen to what they say quantum theories. I think is possible that epistemology itself is going through a bad time and that it is precisely for the damage that caused the professionalization of epistemology. Especially from the 60s was professionalized to the point of having followers who never had contact with a particular science. Directly they study philosophy of science, or technique. In this way the production is very superficial, does not address the problems that arise every day in a specific investigation but questions that troubled sometime other epistemologists. This marks a very scholastic course and, again, very professional in the bad sense of the word. This position is not new. Lakatos found by Watson in 1967 stated: the spirit of physics is given us by physicists who reflect upon it, do experiments, examine it, write about it and teach it. This is the only spirit worth owning. The rest is kind of morbid pathological prevents man learn from nature, and discourages actual participation in the creative process. In a state of good health, this is not natural. Philosophy, as Wittgenstein once observed, should free ourselves from the idea that there is a kind of doctor can do for academic physicists and other scientists things that they are unable to do .

(WH Watson, cited by Lakatos, Mathematics, science and epistemology, p.313) However, is necessary a philosophical approach of science for question what is the true nature of that, his dimension, his limits, how it make knowledge and understand his possibilities. The science born together to the philosophy, and they always walked together, although someone try separate them, for dont understand well one and other.