Pioneers of European Integration Citizenship

Pioneers of European Integration
A Cosimo e Giovanni, veri pionieri
Pioneers of European Integration

Citizenship and Mobility in the EU
Edited by
Ettore Recchi
University of Florence, Italy
Adrian Favell
Aarhus University, Denmark
Edward Elgar
Cheltenham, UK Northampton, MA, USA
Ettore Recchi and Adrian Favell 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2009930859
ISBN 978 1 84844 659 5 Printed and bound by MPG Books Group, UK
Contents
List of contributors Acknowledgements 1 Pioneers of European integration: an introduction Adrian Favell and Ettore Recchi 2 The demographics of movers and stayers in the European Union Michael Braun and Camelia Arsene 3 Deciding to move: migration projects in an integrating Europe Oscar Santacreu, Emiliana Baldoni and Mara Carmen Albert 4 The social mobility of mobile Europeans Ettore Recchi 5 Living across cultures in a transnational Europe Antonio Alaminos and Oscar Santacreu 6 More mobile, more European? Free movement and EU identity Nina Rother and Tina M. Nebe 7 EU movers and politics: towards a fully-fledged European citizenship? Anne Muxel 8 A common information space? The media use of EU movers Damian Tambini and Nina Rother 9 Internal and external movers: EastWest migration and the impact of EU enlargement Adrian Favell and Tina M. Nebe References Appendix A: Methodological notes Michael Braun and Oscar Santacreu Appendix B: EIMSS questionnaire Appendix C: External movers experiences of migration and integration into the EU15: interview guideline Index vi vii 1
26 52 72 98
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156 179
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224 241 255 289 297
Contributors
Antonio Alaminos, Universidad de Alicante Mara Carmen Albert, Universidad de Alicante Camelia Arsene, University of Warwick Emiliana Baldoni, University of Florence Michael Braun, Zentrum fr Umfragen und Methoden Analysis (ZUMA), Mannheim Adrian Favell, Aarhus University Anne Muxel, CEVIPOF (Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po), Paris Tina M. Nebe, UNFPA, Geneva and Rabat Ettore Recchi, University of Florence Nina Rother, Bundesamt fr Migration und Flchtlinge (BAMF), Nrnberg Oscar Santacreu, Universidad de Alicante Damian Tambini, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
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Acknowledgements
When we are older and talk to our grandchildren, how will we describe the age in which we lived? Perhaps we shall say that we saw the collapse of the Berlin wall and the almost simultaneous and perhaps not unrelated disappearance of century-old borders dividing nation states in Europe. EU citizenship and EU enlargements offering the inherent possibility of unrestricted geographical mobility within an expanding Union have transformed Europe forever. The notion of a frontierless continent would have been a utopia only a generation before us. Still, we have had the good fortune to experience it. The free movement of EU citizens is the immediate and most visible sociological consequence of this political and peaceful (r)evolution arguably the noblest, bravest and most popular achievement of the process of European integration so far. The human dimension of this phenomenon is the focus of this book and the project it presents. We started thinking and talking about the book in the gloomy Christmas of 2001, over a telephone line between Madrid (Ettore) and Los Angeles (Adrian). Ettore was about to submit a comparative research proposal to the European Commission to carry out a quantitative-oriented study of moving Europeans, while Adrian was in the middle of his own ethnographic investigation of the same groups of people in Amsterdam, London and Brussels. We became aware of each others converging interests through Damian Tambini, another former classmate of ours from a place that was the seedbed of this common focus the Department of Social and Political Sciences of the European University Institute, Florence in the early 1990s. Eventually, the proposal was generously funded by the European Commission within the scope of its Fifth Framework Programme of research, and became the PIONEUR project: Pioneers of European Integration From Below: Mobility and the Emergence of European Identity Among National and Foreign Citizens in the EU (contract HPSE-CT-2002-00128). Ettore served as coordinator of the project at the Centro Interuniversitario di Sociologia Politica (CIUSPO, University of Florence); Antonio Alaminos (OBETS, Universidad de Alicante), Michael Braun (ZUMA, Mannheim), Anne Muxel (CEVIPOF, Paris) and Damian Tambini (CSLS, Oxford University) directed the four other partner institutions. In one way or another, all contributors to this volume were intensively involved in the different stages of the project. The
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successful implementation of PIONEUR was possible also thanks to the following persons: Giulia Amaducci in DG Research of the European Commission; Emanuele Lepri, Matteo Abbate and Nicoletta Baistrocchi at the University of Florence; Maxime Vanhoenacker, Ccile Riou and Viviane Le Hay at CEVIPOF in Paris; Joshua Hatton at Oxford University; Kristin Surak at UCLA; Miriam Baumgrtner and Lena Voecklinghaus at ZUMA in Mannheim, as well as Frank Faulbaum and his team at SUZ (University of Duisburg). PIONEUR is the primary, but not the sole, basis of the evidence and ideas contained in this volume. As said, Adrian brought the insights gained in his fieldwork, published in 2008 as Eurostars and Eurocities: Free Movement and Mobility in an Integrating Europe (Favell 2008a). Cooperation with DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities during the European Year of Workers Mobility offered the chance to collect additional information used in the first chapter of this book. In DG Employment, we are particularly grateful to Christoph Maier, while Letizia Mencarini and Francesca Francavilla helped in the analysis of Eurostat data. Over the years, we had many occasions to discuss the concepts, methods and findings of our study with numerous colleagues and friends, whose comments spurred us on to improve the work. In particular, we would like to mention Martin Kohli, Yossi Shavit, Gloria Pirzio Ammassari, Massimo Livi Bacci, Max Haller, Moshe Semyonov, Hiroshi Ishida, Vittorio Cotesta, Louise Ackers, Riccardo Scartezzini, Juan Dez Medrano, Neil Fligstein, Simon Hix, Sophie Duchesne, Anja Weiss, John Salt, Phil Rees, Russell King and Claire Wallace. Gianfranco Bettin encouraged this line of research from the beginning with his unique spirit and thoughtfulness. In the editorial stage, Letizia La Barba helped us assemble the bibliography. Finally, we are grateful to Catherine and Edward Elgar for their support, and to Jenny Wilcox and David Fairclough for assisting us in the publication process. Ettore Recchi and Adrian Favell Firenze and Aarhus, January 2009
1.
Pioneers of European integration: an introduction

Adrian Favell and Ettore Recchi
INTEGRATING EUROPE FROM BELOW: THE ROLE OF FREE MOVEMENT

The European Union stands as a unique economic, political, legal and social experiment in transnational regional integration. The world we live in may still be one primarily organized by and for territorial nation states, but if one empirical example is to be sought of how a post-national or cosmopolitan polity and society might be built, the EU is the only actually existing institutional example. Built on a regional territorial logic, its complex structures are also the best guide to the way a progressive and governable political order might be constructed from the economic free-for-all of globalisation. In no other part of the world have sovereign nation states bonded together to voluntarily relinquish large aspects of their sovereign control of economy and polity to a set of common supranational institutions. And in no other part of the world have such institutions created a form of post-national citizenship within a transnational regional political order. Arguably the most fundamental part of the traditional nation states claim to sovereignty is its claim of territorial jurisdiction over the member citizens that live within its borders (Torpey 2000). Yet at the heart of the European Union lies the principle of free movement: of the capital, goods and services that oil the wheels of international trade and business, but also of persons who, within its realm, now have the right to move, travel, study-work, settle and retire anywhere within its member states. EU citizens can move and demand equal treatment to that of all nationals of the same territory in every dimension of work and public life. This revolutionary principle has existed within European law since the Treaty of Rome in 1957; with the expansion of the EU to 25 members in 2004 and 2007, it now extends the notion of European citizenship and potentially of a single European society all the way from the Atlantic to the Urals and the borders of the Black Sea (European Commission 2002).
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Curiously, though, scholars have been slow to explore the social effects of European integration. EU studies are dominated by policy and legal studies, the sweep of intergovernmental and functionalist theories, macroeconomic models of monetary union and the detail of diplomatic history. There is much less work on the consequences or, indeed, the sources of the integration process, in the lives and activities of the almost 500 million citizens who now make up this extraordinary experiment (Favell 2006a). Freedom of movement, in fact, is the core right of European citizenship: it is the right most often cited by Europeans as the single most valuable benefit of that membership (European Commission 2006).1 As a social phenomenon, then, cross-border movement within Europe the spatial mobility of European citizens ought to be seen as one of the key dimensions of European integration. Indeed, when thought of more broadly, it is a key indicator of the very possibility of post-national global or regional integration at the individual, human level. Many European citizens are using these rights to move to other countries of the EU. Large numbers of southern workers used newly minted freedom of movement accords in the 1950s and 1960s to migrate north to the expanding industrial economies of the north. This worker-based migration still continues in modified form. Now, though, many other categories of mover are also visible, particularly among the citizens of the EU15 member states, who have enjoyed these rights for decades. From 1987 to 2005, 1.4 million European students benefited from Erasmus and Socrates programmes to spend up to two years at a foreign university. Likewise, 12 000 advanced researchers and scientists have received support to move and work abroad.2 Major cities like London, Amsterdam, Paris, Milan, Barcelona and Munich have become dynamic hubs of the intra-European mobility of young workers, who choose to look for work on an individual basis. These possibilities have particularly impacted the life and career choices of provincial and peripheral citizens of the EU frustrated with their national opportunities, and of young women or those with unconventional lifestyles, such as homosexuals, who have used international mobility as an avenue to self-liberation. Furthermore, an ever-increasing number of retirees and near-to-retirement citizens from the north of Europe are deciding to pack up and buy a house in the south. There is, as Russell King calls it (2002), a new map of European migration. All of these potential avenues to European freedom are now, or will be at some point, accessed by new European citizens from new member states since the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 (Favell 2008b). These are, simply put, extraordinary movements. For Europe is a continent better known for low levels of cross-national, even cross-regional movement, and very high expectations of sedentary regional and national identification.
Perplexingly, these on-the-ground social shifts are not always seen in the statistics. These sometimes frame the story in a different way. Debate about freedom of movement of workers focuses on the surprisingly low levels of intra-state resettlement, particularly when compared to the dynamic crossstate and regional movements of Americans (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2006; see also Recchi 2005 and 2006). The USA remains a potent federal model of how a United States of Europe might look, and its economic dynamism in these terms is the inspiration for the EUs own adherence to notions of mobility and free movement. In fact, when looking at statistics, fewer than one in 50 Europeans lives outside their nation of origin. Around 4 per cent meanwhile have some experience of living and working outside their country of origin. These are figures that suggest the population of EU movers, as we call them, is a marginal, if not statistically insignificant counterpoint to the vast majority of EU stayers, those people who stay living and working in their own country. However, the symbolic importance of the moving EU population is not lessened by the numbers. Movement and mobility have huge effects on those involved, both those who move and those who encounter movers. In each and every one of these lives, the hopes and aspirations of the architects of the European integration process are inscribed. EU movers are the prototypical Highly Europeanized Citizens. They are the human face of European integration, from whom we might learn what it means to be a European. Their lives and experiences are the best guide to finding out how easy it is to shift ones identity or horizon to a post-national or cosmopolitan level, and of the practical benefits, insights, barriers and failings of a life lived outside the place where you historically belong (see also Favell 2008a). Pioneers of European Integration sets out to explore the new Europe being built by these individuals. It represents the first systematic, quantitative attempt to study the impact and consequences of European freedom of movement of persons. Drawing on a multi-headed international research project, with a large scale original survey the European Internal Movers Social Survey (EIMSS) at its heart, it presents findings and evidence on all the big questions posed by the movement of European citizens within a relatively static continent. The project, funded by the European Commission (Fifth Framework Programme of research, 200306) was titled Pioneers of European Integration From Below: Mobility and the Emergence of European Identity Among National and Foreign Citizens in the EU, and was directed by Ettore Recchi. It was best known by its acronym PIONEUR.3 EIMSS surveyed movers from the five most populous EU15 member states (Germans, French, British, Italians and Spanish) to the five most
populous EU15 member states (Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Spain). It was conducted in 2004. One of the largest-ever comparative migrant surveys, EIMSS surveyed a total of 5000 European citizens who settled abroad in EU member states after 1973.4 The questions were designed to allow for the highest possible comparability with the European Social Survey (ESS) and Eurobarometer (EB), in order to highlight the specificities of EU movers versus EU stayers. For more technical information, we include a methodological appendix at the end of the book (Appendix A). EIMSS permits a vast range of questions to be asked. Who are the EU movers? Where do they come from regionally and socially, and where do they go? How well do they acclimatize to their new settings, and how do they self-select? Why did they move? How do their values, orientations and identifications compare to the EU stayers? What are the consequences of their political participation and media consumption as cross-national European citizens? Are these migrants somehow building a new European identity for themselves, if not for the continent? And how do movers from the pre-2004 EU15 member states compare to the new movers that we will see taking up these rights from the A12 member states who joined the EU in 2004 and 2007? If nothing else, the backgrounds, experiences, social trajectories, careers and (perhaps) transformations of these prototypical EU movers will contrast sharply with the more stable and familiar patterns of class, values and participation of the majority European population of EU stayers, who remain spatially attached to their nations, regions and localities. EU movers behaviour and experiences are also a good indicator of new forms of mobility that deviate from the norms of international and regional migration. The subject may also offer the key to new thinking in social mobility research, if spatial mobility in Europe is linked as can be hypothesized to upward social mobility. Researchers have struggled to transcend the methodological nationalism that is inherent in social stratification tied to comparison of social mobility within national societies (Breen and Rottman 1998). Cross-national spatial mobility has been recognized as a key area for testing new avenues of social mobility potentially linked to global and regional economic processes (Breen 2004), and EIMSS allows us to do this. Pioneers of European Integration answers these questions with systematic evidence and analysis. In the remainder of this introduction, we provide some background to the project. First, we sketch the history of free movement rights in terms of European law and its evolution. Second, we consider briefly the underlying economic and political rationale for their expansion. Then, in the third section, we offer an overview of existing
statistics on migration within the EU, drawing on various international sources. Finally, there is an introduction to the chapter-by-chapter empirical analyses that follow in the book.
A SHORT HISTORY OF FREE MOVEMENT RIGHTS

The origins of free movement rights in the European Union date back to the early 1950s. Free movement was in fact first introduced by the pioneer supranational organisation of shared economic interests, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) formed in 1951, to facilitate specialised workforce recruitment across national borders. Among the six founding states of the Community (Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy), Italy was particularly keen to support this goal, in order to lower domestic unemployment and underemployment, as well as to improve the living conditions of nationals who had already migrated abroad (Romero 1993; on the development of free movement rights, see also Wiener 1998; Maas 2007). The ECSC Treaty limited free movement to workers who are nationals of member states and have recognized qualifications in a coalmining or steelmaking occupation (article 69), but the right of free movement was generalized in the founding Treaty of the European Economic Community signed in Rome in 1957. Article 48 of this Treaty affirmed the right to accept offers of employment made in another member state and to move freely within the Community, as well as to reside and remain in another member state after having been employed. In its original version, however, the Treaty limited the right to move to workers rather than citizens. At this stage, Community law openly treated migrants as production factors rather than persons tout court, in line with the market-oriented view of European integration. While bilateral agreements between national governments within Western Europe had been established soon after World War II, and extended later to more peripheral countries such as Portugal and Yugoslavia, the EEC treaty built a more solid legal framework for an intra-European mass migration system of its age. In short, free movement met the interests of both would-be foreign workers in Italy and potential employers in Germany, Benelux and France. However, the legal enactment of free movement proceeded at a slow and discontinuous pace (for more detail on the EUs legal evolution and jurisprudence, see especially OLeary 1996; Guild 1999; White 2004; De Bruycker 2006). For more than a decade, in spite of the Rome treaty, citizens of EEC member states who intended to work in a different member state continued to be subject to national immigration laws. They had
to apply for work and residence permits, which could be discretionarily denied just like any other immigrants. According to article 49 of the Treaty, free movement was a fully intergovernmental policy left to decisions taken in the Council of Ministers. Central and Northern European EEC member states resisted the interference of supranational regulations on their sovereign power to control aliens. More specifically, in these countries it was often argued that free movement would have given some competitive advantage to Italians over other southern European migrants, making them less disposable as guest workers. The real implementation of free movement was thus postponed to 1968, when Council Regulation 1612/68 and Council Directive 68/360 abolished movement and residence restrictions on member state workers and their families in the entire EEC territory. On the one hand, Regulation 1612/68 made illegal all nationality-based discrimination between workers of member states, in terms of work conditions, salary and unemployment benefits. Furthermore, it established the foreign workers right to the same social and tax benefits as national workers, including access to training in vocational schools and housing benefits (where existing). Family members of foreign workers were entitled to reside with them and to be allowed access to any kind of employment in the host country. On the other hand, Directive 68/360 reduced the bureaucratic formalities of moving within the EU considerably, recognising the workers and their families rights to enter a different member state by simply showing an identity card or valid passport, without being forced to obtain a visa. Migrants within the EU were also entitled to a residence permit, with a validity of at least five years and an automatic renewal, by presenting an employment certificate. In addition, permanent residency thereafter in the host country was also guaranteed, as the residence permit could not be withdrawn in the case of involuntary unemployment. Neither could being unemployed justify expulsion. The 1968 provisions thus represented a turning point. They ended the transitional regime set by article 49 of the Treaty, and created the conditions for a full exercise of free movement rights. In the following decades, admission, residence and equal treatment of foreign residents from other member states were dealt with by a vast secondary legislation. Community law and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have increasingly widened the matter and scope of the right to free movement originally contained in the Treaty. In particular, since the 1970s, the ECJ has played a key role in widening the scope of free movement. It has systematically shifted its focus from the free movement of workers to the free movement of persons that is, movement independent of an individuals capacity as an economic actor. Following high-profile cases brought by citizens, the
Court was able to broaden interpretation of the Treaty, emphasising the citizenship dimension of free movement. According to the ECJ, the right to equal treatment implies a fully-fledged integration, not only in the job market, but in the whole of society, including social, cultural and educational aspects of workers and families lives. With the decisive contribution of the ECJ jurisprudence, laws on free movement were extended in the 1970s to foreign self-employed workers, and in the 1980s to foreign EU nationals who take up a paid apprenticeship, those who enter university in a member state different from their own after having taken up a job activity, and to seasonal workers. It can also be noted, though, that the controversial position of posted workers workers who are temporarily sent to another member state to perform services there and who return to their country of origin after completion of their work was clarified only 20 years later, with Council Directive 96/71. The Single European Act of 1986 aimed at creating an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured. A logical consequence of this was the step taken in 1990, when freedom of movement and residence was now explicitly extended to non-economically active categories (as well as their families): students, pensioners and the unemployed. The legal bases of these changes are to be found in Directives 90/364, 90/365 and 90/366 (this last was then replaced by Directive 93/96). Such arrangements are still subject to two conditions from which workers are exempted: students, pensioners and the unemployed must have sickness insurance, and they must have sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the national health systems or social assistance of the host member state. Another collateral advance was the adoption of the Schengen system, which took place progressively in the 1980s and 1990s, to eliminate passport controls between EU national borders. Symbolically, however, the most spectacular step in the process took place with the Treaty on the European Union, signed in Maastricht in 1992, and which entered into force on 1 November 1993. The Maastricht Treaty introduced citizenship of the European Union to reinforce the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its member states. Concretely, EU citizenship consists of a set of rights allowing all European nationals to vote and stand as candidates in elections of the European Parliament in the member state they reside in, regardless of their nationality; to submit petitions to the European Parliament and appeal to the EU Ombudsman; to be protected by the consular authorities of another member state in third countries that lack diplomatic representation of ones state; and to move and reside freely in the territory of any of the EU member states.
The first three provisions are small in scope compared to the last. For the ordinary EU citizen, access to diplomatic protection in third countries is an extremely unusual event and petitions to the European Parliament or the Ombudsman look like quite remote options. Meanwhile, to vote as a foreign resident for the European Parliament has proven of little political relevance, with high abstention rates. Local voting rights are more widely used. But it is the rights to free movement and settlement in the entire EU territory that form the most potent cornerstone of EU citizenship. In more recent years, Commission Directive 2004/38 consolidated the residence rights of EU movers throughout the Union territory. This Directive not only unifies pre-existing scattered legislation on free movement, but also incorporates some key tenets of the jurisprudence of the ECJ. In particular, it acknowledges the right to permanent residence of EU citizens after five years of stay in any other member state without additional formalities (such as a carte de sjour), as well as the host states responsibility for the social welfare of movers. Overall, this Directive defines three categories of mobile EU citizens short-term movers (less than three months), long-term (between three months and five years), and permanent (over five years) whose social welfare rights in the host country are correspondingly graduated. Apparently the only remaining limits to the universalisation of free movement rights in the EU are the ability to vote in the general elections of the host country which remains the ultimate seal of acquiring national citizenship; the unconditional access to state-based social benefits inactive movers still need to have their own sickness insurance; and (more often than not) the non-cumulativeness of pension benefits gained in different member states. These are significant but not necessarily unsurpassable barriers to the achievement of some form of post-national citizenship in the EU. And inasmuch as free movement rights are associated with welfare rights that are insensitive to nationality, they foster the transnationalisation of social solidarity in Europe the potential construction of a fully harmonised if not unitary welfare system. While the process is controversial and contested, it clearly goes a long way from a conception of the EU as a mere network of intergovernmental relationships. If only for this, free movement undermines the intergovernmentalist description of the European Union. The potential of free movement of persons for the deepening of the process of European integration can thus hardly be underestimated. One has only to be reminded that the full right to travel was not established as a constitutional citizenship right in the US before the 1940s, and that when it was, it was taken to be a fundamental step towards the creation of a fully-fledged federal state.
The EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 again put citizenship mobility at the top of the political agenda in Europe. Heated media debates for example on the possible invasion of Polish plumbers into France drew big headlines. As in previous enlargements that is, when Greece (1981), Spain (1986) and Portugal (1986) joined the European Union the movement rights of the new European citizens were subject to temporary restrictions. Notably, though, Britain, Ireland and Sweden all opened their doors to the new citizens, and saw substantial in-migration. In 2006 and 2007, the mobility restrictions for citizens from the so-called A10 new EU member states (those who joined in 2004) were mostly lifted in all other member states, with the exception of Germany and Austria. These countries, which have had some of the largest numbers of informal migrants from Central and Eastern Europe, announced that they would maintain national measures until April 2009. For workers of the two new member states joining the EU in 2007 Romania and Bulgaria only Finland and Sweden among EU15 states granted full mobility rights from the start. But progressive openings took place elsewhere quite rapidly on a piecemeal basis, with eased conditions of access to job permits for workers from these countries.5 To sum up, the free movement of persons across national borders within the EU a key aim of the overall European integration process has, step by step, become an everyday feature of European economy and society. The two major legal steps in this process were the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence for workers of member states and their families in 1968, and the introduction of EU citizenship in 1992, alongside the less visible but decisive actions of the European Court of Justice. The Court has stood as a bulwark against all attempts to maintain privileges rooted in pre-existing or re-emerging nationality-based pieces of legislation. Migrant workers as they were called in the ECSC treaty of 1951 have become EU movers, as they are now usually referred to in EU documents.
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RATIONALES FOR FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

As we have seen, free movement represents a constant and quintessential concern of the European Union. But why has the EU (and its earlier incarnations) always insisted on promoting free movement? Both economic and political rationales have been advanced. In this section, we review them briefly (see also Recchi 2008). Generally speaking, in the collective imagery of advocates of European integration, cross-border migration within Europe whatever its shifting
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political boundaries is framed and sustained as the sociodemographic counterpart to international trade in an unrestricted single market. Together, a single market and a free movement area would be the triggers of an ever closer Union. In this respect, the project of European integration anticipates the globalisation of the last decades of the 20th century. Indeed, it might be said that the EU constitutes a world-regional variant of globalisation (Castells 1998; Favell 2003). In somewhat more technical terms, economists conceive of intra-EU migration as the labour market complement to monetary union. Workers mobility is required in an optimally functioning single currency area. Typically, it is said to absorb local economic shocks to employment which might follow from the collapse of production in any particular local or national context. This argument won Robert Mundell (1961) the Nobel prize for economics in 1999, and stands as the major theory-based justification for the continuing support for free movement of market-oriented pundits and policy makers (see also Belassa 1961; Mattli 1999). Another economic argument has come to the fore more recently: mobility as an autarchic response to demand at the higher end of the labour market. Mobility is particularly productive when it equates with brain circulation. While the free movement doctrine was born of the need to facilitate working-class migration from the south in the 1950s, in the last decade or so it has been re-focused on encouraging the knowledge economy through a more efficient use of the educated and highly skilled workforce. The ambition is to promote an increased use of European human capital within Europe as a means to make the EU the worlds most dynamic and competitive economy, as stated in the EUs Lisbon Agenda of 2000. This would especially require the expansion of supranational research and development structures in both the public and private sectors, as part of the global struggle for competitiveness (see Sapir et al. 2004). From a political viewpoint, on the other hand, free movement is frequently perceived as an instrument to deepen European integration at the societal level. The Action Plan for Skills and Mobility (European Commission 2002) makes it clear that individuals who have tasted free movement rights are expected to better appreciate European citizenship and endorse European unification more wholeheartedly than the rest of the population. This point is taken up again by the most recent legislation consolidating and expanding free movement rights:
Enjoyment of permanent residence by Union citizens who have chosen to settle long term in the host member state would strengthen the feeling of Union citizenship and is a key element in promoting social cohesion, which is one of the fundamental objectives of the Union. (Directive 2004/38)
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In other words, movers are expected to contribute to overcoming national differences, fulfilling the vision of Euro-enthusiast intellectuals like Vclav Havel. It evokes also certain cosmopolitan antecedents in Europe, as Havels commentary makes clear:
If regulations on the movements of citizens disappear, we will see the sort of blending produced in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy before the First World War. Subjects came and went, married all over the place, tried their luck at many things, without any of the preceding impeding development of national cultures. (Havel 1998, 119)
In this scenario, the fusion of European societies would be greatly facilitated by burgeoning mobility. Such an emphasis on mobility does not go uncontested. In particular, scholars in the Marxist tradition contend that all efforts to create a Europe of flows (Hajer 2000) are functional to the expansion of capitalism that is, to the rise of exploitative social relations, the disruption of community life, and negative psychological consequences (for these general arguments, see also Deleuze and Guattari 1980; Harvey 1982; Sennett 1998). The European Year of Workers Mobility of 2006 thus increasingly sought to focus its efforts on also managing the downsides and social dysfunctions linked to the promotion of mobility. Nonetheless, even critics acknowledge that European integration has become organized around a principle of spatial governance within a frame of seamless mobility, with mobility the defining feature of contemporary Europe (Jensen and Richardson 2004, 3).
MOBILE EUROPEANS IN EU STATISTICS

The next set of questions concerns numbers. How many EU movers are there? Who are they? How are they distributed spatially in terms of origins and destinations? Are their numbers growing? Unfortunately, differences in national systems of registration of residents and freedom of movement itself make it hard to count EU movers in a consistent and systematic way (on these measurement issues, see Poulain et al. 2006). Nevertheless, in this section, we describe our population of reference on the basis of the Eurostat Dissemination Database (EDD), as well as data from the EU Labour Force Survey. The bulk of figures in this section refer to population stocks in EU15 between 1987 and 2004.6 Flows have not varied dramatically from the mid-1990s on, but do show a rising trend: from 0.6 million in 1997 to 1.1 million persons in 2003
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(excluding inflows into Greece, France and Ireland). Interestingly, 64 per cent of EU15 movers are returning migrants. Germany, Britain and Spain receive the largest numbers of intra-EU movers yearly. About four out of ten of these movers are in the 2539 age bracket. British, German, French and Italian citizens (in that order) form the largest nationality groups resettling abroad in the EU. Regarding stocks, during the period 1987 to 2004, while the overall number of foreign residents grew from 14.4 to 21.4 million (148.7 per cent), the stock of EU movers rose at a slower pace from about 5.2 to 6.3 million people (121.1 per cent). The number of EU15 non-national residents increased in all member states particularly in Britain (1443 000), Germany (1207 000) and Spain (1181 000) with the exception of Sweden, France and Italy. In fact, the relative size of EU non-national citizens among foreigners varies considerably from country to country. Intra-EU movers are a majority among foreigners in Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland. In all other EU member states, there are more nonEuropean immigrants than foreign European residents. There are often three to four times more immigrants than EU movers, and Italy has the lowest proportion of EU movers among its alien residents: only 9.9 per cent. Since the mid-1980s, Germany, France and Britain have continued to be the countries hosting the largest numbers of EU citizens living abroad. On the other hand, Italians and Portuguese continue to be the largest communities of Europeans residing in another EU member state. However, the size of the Italian and Portuguese communities has oscillated only slightly over these two decades. Interestingly, the fastest growing communities of Europeans abroad are not formed by southern Europeans as they were traditionally in the 1950s1970s but rather by central and northern Europeans. Between 1987 and 2002, the number of Germans living outside their native country in the EU nearly doubled (196 per cent), while the growth of expatriate French (159 per cent), Belgians (151 per cent), British (142 per cent) and Dutch (132 per cent) is also remarkable. Only the Spanish and Finnish communities abroad have shrunk in this period, albeit modestly. In 1987, the single largest community of EU non-nationals in a EU member state was formed by the Portuguese in France (649 000 persons), where they made up almost half the EU mover population. Their number declined, however, to 555 000 persons in 2002. Therefore, in the early 2000s the single largest community of EU movers is formed by Italians in Germany: 644 000 persons, representing 36.6 per cent of EU non-national residents in that country. Their number has increased modestly but constantly from the mid-1980s onwards. This could be due to both continuing
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net migration flows from Italy to Germany and the expansion of secondgeneration Italian migrants living in Germany. These same reasons can equally account for the growth in the number of Portuguese citizens living in Luxembourg, which doubled between 1987 and 2002. The importance of geographical and cultural proximity for intra-EU mobility is attested by the high proportion of British citizens in Ireland and of the Irish in Britain, of Finns in Sweden and Swedes in Finland, and Germans in Austria. The number of Austrians in Germany, even though representing 77 per cent of Austrians abroad in the EU, is overshadowed by the larger presence of southern European migrants in Germany. Overall, including citizens of the accession countries already residing in another EU member state, European citizens living abroad in the EU amount to (only) 1.6 per cent of the EU25 population in 2004 (Table 1.1). Although data on gender are incomplete, apparently there is a slight prevalence of men, with the notable exception of four EU15 member states where women exceed men among EU non-national residents: Italy (65.6 per cent), Greece (59.9 per cent), Ireland (51.6 per cent) and Portugal (51.5 per cent). In 2002, the 2534 age group was the biggest in six out of the 12 member states for which this information is available. People aged 25 to 44 formed from one-third to half the total of EU nonnationals in each country (ranging from 34 per cent in France to 48 per cent in Italy). The educational level of intra-EU movers varies considerably from country to country. The proportion of EU15 non-national residents with a post-secondary degree ranges from 11.8 per cent in Spain to 61 per cent in Lithuania (where absolute numbers are very low, though). Generally speaking, traditional receiving countries of intra-European migration, like Germany, Sweden and France, host a less-educated workforce (EU movers with a tertiary-level degree are 14.4 per cent, 22.4 per cent and 25.2 per cent respectively). In this regard, the difference between Germany and Britain is striking, as in the latter country one-third of EU non-nationals have tertiary-level credentials. These individuals are probably taking jobs in the high-skilled sectors, whereas Germany tends to offer employment opportunities to intra-EU movers in mainly low-end occupations. Gender differences also deserve some attention. In Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal, as well as in all Eastern European countries, among EU15 nonnationals it is men who have higher educational qualifications. The reverse is true in France and Sweden. As is well known, education is expanding all over the world. But, as migrants represent a select population, this general trend is not necessarily reflected in their educational level. In particular, when labour markets demand low-skilled workers, immigrants tend to be negatively selected
Table 1.1
% of total population EU15 movers % of total foreigners EU10 movers % of total foreigners TCN
Stocks of foreign population in EU25 member states (2004)

% of total foreigners
Total population
Total foreigners*
14
Austria Belgium Britain Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Netherlands
8 032 926 10 239 085 58 395 594 689 565 10 203 269 5 397 640 1 370 052 5 219 732 58 513 700 82 440 309 10 934 097 10 116 742 3 978 880 56 995 744 2 319 203 3 445 857 451 600 16 258 032
753 528 853 369 2 760 031 179 154 271 211 107 003 3 263 186 7 334 765 130 109 215 473 1 334 889 33 344 174 200 702 185
9.4 8.3 4.7 1.8 5.0 2.0 5.6 8.9 1.3 5.4 2.3 1.4 38.6 4.3
106 173 562 975 1 268 616 32 214 9 832 54 310 1 410 16 656 1 194 135 1 767 302 46 897 10 718 133 436 132 067 703 534 139 691 201 557
14.1 66.0 46.0 5.5 20.0 15.6 36.6 24.1 8.2 61.9 9.9 2.1 80.2 28.7
57 031 11 476 241 101 479 38 409 8 811 2 603 12 836 41 991 250 563 32 110 6 690 8 455 40 948 2 060 1 223 1 096 10 206
7.6 1.3 8.7 21.4 3.2 12.0 1.3 3.4 5.1 3.9 3.1 6.2 0.6 1.5
590 324 278 918 1 250 314 130 913 208 090 77 511 2 027 060 5 316 900 112 701 73 582 1 161 874 30 581 33 413 490 422
78.3 32.7 45.3 73.1 76.7 72.4 62.1 72.5 86.6 34.1 87.0 91.7 19.2 69.8
15
Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden Total
38 230 080 10 356 117 5 379 455 1 996 433 42 197 865 8 975 670 452 137 647
700 329 238 746 29 855 45 294 2 772 200 476 076 22 492 417
1.8 2.3 0.6 2.3 6.6 5.3 5.0
12 350 49 343 1 282 1 218 360 192 180 191 6 283 802
1.8 20.7 4.3 2.7 13.0 37.8 27.9
2 041 855 10 491 201 25 240 24 039 830 955
0.3 0.4 35.1 0.4 0.9 5.0 3.7
685 938 188 548 18 082 43 875 2 386 768 271 846 15 377 660
97.9 79.0 60.6 96.9 86.1 57.1 68.4
Notes: 1. *Total foreigners: Czech Republic, Ireland, Portugal, Slovakia, Britain (2003); Poland, Italy (2002); Belgium, Austria (2000); France (1999). TCN5 Third-country nationals. 2. Data for Malta is missing.
Source:
Eurostat Dissemination Database (domain: Population and Social Conditions)
16
on education (Borjas 1989). Therefore, a diachronic analysis of intra-EU movers education is informative of the kind of occupational incorporation to which this particular fraction of the migrant population is channelled. Table 1.2 shows that the education of EU non-nationals has improved constantly and markedly from 1995 to 2005. If in the mid-1990s only 14.3 per cent of intra-EU movers had a tertiary degree, by 2005 this is the case for almost a quarter of them. But the most significant finding is the following: while in 1995 the proportion of national residents with a tertiary-level education was higher than that of EU movers, the situation was reversed in 2005. In other words, the upgrading of the educational level of EU movers has exceeded that of the general population. EU movers are now a positively selected population in terms of education. The education differentials between EU non-nationals and nationals are at their peak in Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria, Spain and Portugal. In all these countries, the share of tertiary-educated EU movers is about twice as large as that of nationals. There can be few doubts that geographical mobility within the EU spreads human capital across the labour market, although the size of the population at stake varies considerably from one country to another. Over time, intra-EU movers are also redefining their position in the workforce (Table 1.3). In terms of sectors of employment, EU citizens living abroad are less likely than nationals and also third-country nationals to have a job in agriculture. More significantly, their involvement in the industrial sector is declining at a faster pace than that of nationals. Indeed, in 1995 the proportion of industrial workers among EU movers was still well above that of nationals (55.8 per cent versus 50.9 per cent); after 2000, the two are about the same. Finally, we can distinguish two separate categories in the broad service sector: a low-level sector (mainly including personal service activities) and a mid-high level sector (in which non-manual activities are the rule). In the low-level service sector, EU15 non-nationals are more frequently employed than nationals, but less than third-country nationals. The growth of this sector of employment from the mid-1990s onwards has been almost entirely fed by immigrants from outside the EU. As far as mid-high service jobs are concerned, EU nonnationals are following the path of nationals. Although they still lag behind national workers in relative terms, they are employed in increasingly larger numbers in this more privileged occupational sector.
A GUIDE TO THE VOLUME

We can now turn to the organisation of the book itself. The volume draws together a number of different analyses by members of the PIONEUR
Table 1.2
1995 Med. 56.6 11.4 High Low Med. High Low Med. 2000 2005
Nationals and EU non-nationals by educational level, 19952005 (row %, individuals aged 15 and over)
COR
Nationality
Low
High
AT
BE
36.6 19.7 37.9 51.9 55.5 30.0 26.4 29.5 11.4 20.8 17.3 20.5
57.5 55.5 55.9 29.9
5.9 24.8 6.1 18.2
32.0 18.3 33.1 49.2 56.3 50.0
17 44.9 26.8 53.6 27.0 15.5 22.6 15.5 19.1 10.3 28.8 10.4 12.7 30.3 12.9 31.4 16.9 31.3 56.2 20.7 55.9 65.9 39.2 65.5 48.6 51.3 48.6 31.9 53.5 32.1 16.5 28.0 16.7
DE
DK
52.6 24.6 45.3 26.6 35.8
29.6 57.1 40.6 55.6 45.2
17.8 18.3 14.1 17.8 18.0
EL
ES
National EU25 Non-nat. Total National EU25 Non-nat. Total National EU25 Non-nat. Total National EU25 Non-nat. Total National EU25 Non-nat. Total National EU25 Non-nat. Total 20.0 31.8 20.1 11.9 25.8 12.0 17.6 32.8 17.8
35.9 62.9 17.6 62.6 71.8 47.1 71.6
27.9 14.0 29.0 44.1 49.8 44.8 25.6 40.2 27.7 29.7 20.0 29.9 50.0 18.0 49.9 60.2 29.5 59.0
58.0 59.3 56.9 32.6 26.3 31.9 54.7 42.3 53.0 45.2 29.0 44.6 34.8 61.4 35.1 18.0 29.0 19.0
14.1 26.7 14.1 23.3 23.9 23.3 19.7 17.5 19.3 25.1 51.0 25.5 15.2 20.6 15.0 21.8 41.5 22.0
Table 1.2
1995 Med. 39.3 16.2 High Low Med. High Low Med. 2000 2005
(continued)
COR
Nationality
Low
High
FI
44.5
FR
32.5 37.0 32.6 46.3 67.7 47.6
40.5 42.4 40.4 36.1 18.8 35.1
27.0 20.6 27.0 17.6 13.5 17.3
GB*
18 29.2 19.8 26.2 11.5 14.8 12.5 11.9 12.1 8.1 8.0 39.0 50.1 43.3 41.0 36.7 41.6 82.4 60.6 82.2 48.0 31.7 41.9 39.7 35.3 39.2 11.1 19.3 11.2
44.6 48.1 70.5 49.4 48.2 64.1 48.9
39.3 37.0 19.6 36.0 32.3 19.6 31.7
16.1 14.9 9.9 14.6 19.5 16.3 19.4
IE
LU
59.3 65.4 61.3
NL
PT
National EU25 Non-nat. Total National EU25 Non-nat. Total National EU25 Non-nat. Total National EU25 Non-nat. Total National EU25 Non-nat. Total National EU25 Non-nat. Total National EU25 Non-nat. Total 13.0 18.2 14.8 19.3 28.0 19.2 6.5 20.1 6.6
80.1
79.8
34.5 38.0 34.7 42.6 58.3 43.6 14.8 16.7 15.1 43.7 24.3 42.4 33.0 39.2 35.1 37.1 17.7 37.2 77.5 46.5 77.1
39.8 42.1 39.8 37.5 22.8 36.6 58.7 58.2 58.7 34.3 37.3 34.4 50.5 32.9 44.1 38.3 50.1 38.4 13.3 29.0 13.5
25.7 19.9 25.5 19.9 18.9 19.8 26.5 25.1 26.3 22.0 38.4 23.2 16.5 27.9 20.8 24.6 32.2 24.4 9.2 24.5 9.4
SE
35.1
43.0
21.9
EU15
National EU25 Non-nat. Total National EU25 Non-nat. Total 42.9 37.8 30.0 37.4 22.0 16.0 14.3 15.8
35.1 46.2 55.7 46.8
29.2 32.2 29.4 39.7 47.2 40.4
45.5 40.0 45.1 41.2 32.2 40.6
25.3 27.8 25.5 19.1 20.6 19.0
23.7 22.3 23.9 36.6 37.1 37.2
51.7 45.7 51.1 42.4 39.3 41.9
24.6 32.0 25.0 21.0 23.6 20.9
19
Notes: 1. Educational levels defined according to ISCED classification. * Figures with low reliability. Row totals for each year 100%. 2. Data for Italy is missing. 3. Low5levels 02; Medium5levels 34; High5levels 56 of ISCED. On ISCED, see http://www.uis.unesco.org/TEMPLATE/pdf/isced/ISCED_A.pdf
Source:
Labour Force Survey, spring data
20
Table 1.3
Employed nationals, EU15 non-nationals and third-country nationals by sector of employment in EU15, 19952005 (row %, individuals aged 15 and over)
Agriculture Industry Service (low level) 9.16 17.11 14.88 9.49 9.51 18.38 18.00 9.97 9.83 18.01 23.53 10.62 Service (mid-high level) 34.90 25.44 23.00 34.36 37.01 31.16 25.15 36.51 39.82 33.51 24.65 39.01 Total
1995
2000
2005
Nationals EU non-nationals TCN Total Nationals EU non-nationals TCN Total Nationals EU non-nationals TCN Total
5.04 1.61 1.73 4.87 4.31 1.43 2.45 4.19 3.71 1.85 3.35 3.65
50.90 55.83 60.39 51.29 49.17 49.03 54.40 49.33 46.65 46.62 48.48 46.73
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: NACE activities are grouped as follows: Agriculture 5 A. Agriculture, hunting and forestry; B. Fishing. Industry 5 C. Mining and quarrying; D. Manufacturing; E. Electricity, gas and water supply; F. Construction; G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods; I. Transport, storage and communication. Low level services 5 H. Hotels and restaurants; O. Other community, social and personal service activities; P. Private households with employed persons. Mid-high level services 5 J. Financial intermediation; K. Real estate, renting and business activities; L. Public administration and defence; compulsory social security; M. Education; N. Health and social work; Q. Extra-territorial organizations and bodies. TCN5Third country nationals. Source: Labour Force Survey, spring data
group, each using the basic EIMSS dataset. Some pose questions in relation to existing European survey sources, such as Eurobarometer (EB) or the European Social Survey (ESS), others derive questions in relation to established studies of migration or immigration. In total, the chapters add up to a comprehensive and unique portrait of the social effects of the EUs extraordinary free movement regime. Chapter 2 by Michael Braun and Camelia Arsene offers an overview of the mobile population of EU movers surveyed by the EIMSS. Relatively little is known about the population of intra-EU movers, aside from crude figures on stocks and flows in different European countries. First, it details
21
the social background and age of migrants, the duration of migration, geographic origins, and the cross-national marriage patterns of movers. Then, breaking down the population in terms of periods of migration and age at migration, it derives a preliminary typology of EU movers. Four clusters emerge: late traditional migrants, continuing the classical labour migration from south to north; pure retirement migrants, who are moving from north to south to settle after ending work; pre-retirement migrants, who are middle aged, affluent movers who move as part of a lifestyle decision; and finally Eurostars, a new highly mobile class of younger professionals and others using European mobility opportunities. Classic migration theory focuses on the motivation, timing and patterns of migration, and on the social organisation of migration systems. Intra-EU migration can be viewed in these terms, but it also suggests the emergence of new forms of mobility within the evolving transnational space of the European Union. In Chapter 3, Oscar Santacreu, Emiliana Baldoni and Mara-Carmen Albert analyse the complex motivations of intra-EU movers, and the way such migration often builds on successive experiences of mobility within and outside Europe. They focus on the subjective motivations, personal networks and family support that structure these movements, both as separate factors and in combination. It turns out that intra-EU migration is not just driven by economic factors. In fact, the lure of cross-national romance, leisure and lifestyle opportunities (that is, quality of life), and adventure against the new European background outweigh purely economic motivations. Significant gender differences also emerge, especially within the category of romance migration, as cross-national partnerships take on specific cross-cultural forms. Sexuality also features in European migration, given higher than average mobility among gays and lesbians. Together with the previous chapter, the analysis begins to draw a new map of migration within Western Europe. In Chapter 4, Ettore Recchi then tackles the crucial issue of social mobility as it might be related to spatial mobility in the EU. Traditional migrants typically move spatially in order to be mobile socially, particularly across generations. Opportunities for work, education, career and the bettering of lifestyles have, in highly fluid societies, led spatial mobility to be a kind of escalator up the social ladder, often associated with moves from periphery regions to core cities. This has always held for internal migration within European nations, but European integration poses the question of whether spatial mobility within and around the new European space may offer new possibilities to ambitious social climbers on an international scale. EIMSS permits a systematic comparison of social mobility patterns of movers with stayers, using ESS as a reference. Recchi offers a detailed analysis that checks for a number of potential hypotheses of
22
inter-generational and intra-generational social mobility. Contrary to some of the hopes associated with European integration, he finds that there is not a substantial structural mobility effect. EU movement opportunities tend to be more used by middle- and upper-class Europeans, and the bulk of movers stay fixed in the same occupational class they belonged to before moving abroad. A large part of traditional immigration studies focuses on processes of acculturation, assimilation or integration (depending on the model) of immigrants into national host societies, according to a series of indexes regarding language use, cultural adaptation, family life and social practices. EIMSS was set up to enable the evaluation of acculturation processes of foreign resident Europeans in their destination countries, and does so for different countries and different nationalities, across cohorts, gender and social classes. In Chapter 5, Antonio Alaminos and Oscar Santacreu highlight the discrepancies between the social and cultural integration of EU movers, showing that these distinctly transnational migrants in Europe differ substantially from typical immigrants in how they combine the pull of their home culture with the challenges of the new country of residency. Lack of language proficiency proves to be no great barrier to effective integration of migrants in the host society, even though it limits networks that take them out of their own national milieus. Chapter 6 by Nina Rother and Tina Nebe pushes this line of inquiry deep into the question of European and national identity. Much of the European Commissions justificatory commentary on freedom of movement stresses the positive impact of mobility on the emergence of European identity. Movement is meant to establish a more solid foundation for the EU, through positive, affective identification with the European project. Referring to the large body of data and existing research based on regular Eurobarometer surveys measuring support for European integration, territorial attachment and the hierarchisation of national, local and transnational identity, EIMSS repeats these questions for the EU movers. These individuals might indeed be considered the prototypical Highly Europeanized Citizens (HECs), benefiting the most from the European integration project. Nebe and Rother create a typology of movers on the basis of distinct patterns of identification with country of origin, country of residence and the EU. Elaborating the social psychology literature, they find that one potential for European identity is that it reduces the cognitive dissonance felt by movers caught between strong national identifications. A European identity in this way is not incompatible with existing national identities. In Chapter 7, by Anne Muxel, the big political questions about European citizenship are asked. Much of the literature on European
23
citizenship has focused on the opportunities European nationals have to participate as EU citizens abroad in local and European elections. Our survey took place at the time of the 2004 European elections, and so was well placed to gauge this participation amongst a representative sample of such citizens. As expected, movers do participate more than stayers, but rates are not impressive. It is necessary, therefore, to go beyond voting and compare the importance of this to other forms of political involvement. The chapter also analyses data for the first time available on the left/right political orientation of EU movers and their attitudes on liberalisation and state intervention. These prototypical beneficiaries of a more liberal, open European market, paradoxically tend at the same time to be more supportive of state intervention. A closer look shows that the social class background and education of EU movers matter more to participation than national differences. A further essential area of inquiry on the question of an emergent European transnational space is, of course, the media. A large body of literature on migration and media studies has emerged in recent years discussing the possibilities of transnational media in the context of European integration and beyond, and of new diaspora media and new channels of communication associated with innovative technologies. Europe however is also characterized by a very weak public sphere beyond nation-state contexts, given the modest success of attempts to create print or visual media for a European market. Chapter 8 by Damian Tambini and Nina Rother shows that EU movers are consumers of transnational and European media where available, and they show a strikingly low use of television media compared to print media and the internet. However, a more accurate classification would see their media consumption in terms of combinatory approaches that also often involve appreciation and use of local (host country) media alongside international sources. They also underline that emerging transnational patterns are linked to the availability and quality of media in different countries, findings that are relevant to attempts to construct a more effective European media space. Finally, in Chapter 9, Adrian Favell and Tina Nebe push the questioning of PIONEUR out into the effects of EU enlargement. As well as offering a systematic survey of West European intra-EU migration, PIONEUR took up the challenge of comparing findings on intra-EU migration with what might be expected from new member states which joined the EU in May 2004 and which were about to join in 2007. A series of 40 qualitative in-depth interviews were thus conducted with higher and lower end labour migrants from both Poland and Romania (the two largest accession countries) in the five selected Western member states. Similar questions to EIMSS were posed, bearing in mind that the features of intra-EU
24
migration borderless mobility, no technical barriers, minimal prejudice are certainly not a given for movers from any East-Central European country. The life stories of these new pioneers in fact speak more to a traditional immigrant experience. They face discrimination and barriers not apparent to Western EU movers, while also seeing Western Europe as a place to advance career aspirations or opportunities for their children. The chapter points towards new research on the future of the regional migration system in Europe, as EastWest migration comes to more resemble the intra-EU migration within Western Europe surveyed by EIMSS.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The study of European integration has been slow to incorporate sociological analyses. Pioneers of European Integration represents a key empirical contribution to an emerging sociology and human geography of the European Union (for an overview of existing contributions see Bettin Lattes and Recchi 2005; Favell and Guiraudon 2010). Migration and mobility have long been recognized as important dimensions of the European project, but systematic empirical studies have been scarce. Some studies have tackled dimensions of this new mobility (King et al. 2000; Favell 2008a), and there has been much reflection on the significance of European citizenship (Magnette 1999; Bellamy et al. 2006) and European identity (Hermann et al. 2004; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Fligstein 2008). It is the first time, however, that systematic, representative data on spatial mobility and its social effects within and across Western Europe have been presented and analysed in this form. Europe is unfinished but the freedom of movement of persons has wrought dramatic social change. Much of this is not yet fully visible. Some of the most dramatic examples can be found in the lives and experiences of those who took up most enthusiastically their new rights of European citizenship, and decided to give it a go living and working in another member state. Successful movement and resettlement is far from a given. But, as we show in this book, Europe will never be the same again: neither for the EU movers, nor for those stayers now getting used to their foreign neighbours as colleagues, friends and partners. The pioneers of European integration are also, perhaps, the pioneers of a better, brighter Europe for all.
25
NOTES
1. The claim is based on data from Eurobarometer 64.1 of 2005. The question is: Which of the following statements best describe(s) what the European Union means to you personally? It was also asked in 1997, 1998 and 2001. 2. Figures for mobile students and researchers are taken from European Commission reports, available via: http://ec.europa.eu/education/index_en.htm. 3. See the PIONEUR website: http://www.obets.ua.es/pioneur/. 4. In most original random large-scale surveys such as the Labour Force Surveys the number of migrants surveyed is usually a very small percentage of the overall population. EIMSS differed by devising a names-based telephone methodology for identifying migrants who are a very small part of the overall population in sufficient numbers. Our survey is comparable to ones made in Israel and Australia, among the few countries where different immigrant groups can be identified in sufficient numbers to survey comparatively (see Appendix A for more details). 5. An overview of the issue and the changing national measures can be found on the EC website: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catid5466&langid5en?/free_movement/enlargement_en.htm. 6. Data and tables presented in this section are taken from Recchi et al. (2006), which also contains more fine-tuned analyses.
2.
The demographics of movers and stayers in the European Union

Michael Braun and Camelia Arsene
INTRODUCTION
Who are EU movers? Do they have some common demographic and background features? Are they different from the general population of the country they leave? And how do they compare to the population of the country they have settled in? These basic questions are addressed in this chapter. In it we describe the sociodemographic characteristics of the EU movers sampled by the PIONEUR project in 2004. First, we offer a brief summary of the methodological strengths and weaknesses of the quantitative EIMSS survey, outlining some challenges we faced in our analysis. Then, starting with an overview of the social and geographical background of movers, the development of migration over time, and the age at migration, we use the last two variables to arrive at a classification of migrants into four groups according to their duration of sojourn in the country of residence and their age at migration. We then go on to portray the four migrant groups with regard to a variety of other variables.1 The EIMSS survey defined its population of interest as all migrants from Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain the five largest EU15 member states who had moved to one or other of these same countries from 1974 through 2003, were adults at the time of migration, and have been living in their respective country of residence in 2004 for at least one year. From each country of origin/country of residence combination we sampled some 250 individuals, for an overall survey size of 5000 cases. A survey of this kind has never been done in Europe before. In fact, it stands as a unique contribution to migration research anywhere in the world, which is often fatally undercut by the fact that migrant populations are normally too small in general population surveys to be identified and analysed as a distinct population. Moreover, once a means for identifying the EU mover population has been set up, it is then possible to systematically compare it to what we know from other surveys about the average European population the non-moving EU stayers in our terminology.
26
The demographics of movers and stayers
27
EIMSS is thus set up to plug in directly to existing European Social Survey and Eurobarometer data. Most of the data gathering was done by traditional telephone survey techniques. Much has been written in recent years about the limitations of this approach, yet in most locations it proved a viable way of locating respondents. Where the survey represented a bold innovation was in the development of a new names-based telephone directory sampling technique, which identified foreign populations in each country through probability calculation on first and family names. This worked remarkably well. One typical problem in telephone research as set up the underrepresentation of women married to nationals of the country of residence was rectified by the use of a small network component in our survey. In one case Britain where mobile phone use had perhaps already rendered landline telephone sampling unreliable by 2004, we also supplemented the telephone survey with snowball sampling of respondents (see Appendix A for more details). A number of caveats and limitations about our survey, however, must also be pointed out. One limitation is that we cannot analyse return migration with a cross-sectional sample, nor account for the potential selectivity in our sample due to early remigration of migrants who might have special characteristics. However, an act of return migration or an intention to return to ones home country should not be assumed to be negative selfselection. In the end, this really depends on the original intentions of the migrant. If migration was intended to be temporary to begin with, return migration might even demonstrate success. It should also be noted that, with a cross-sectional design, the duration of the sojourn in the country of residence and the period of immigration cannot vary independently, as all migrants with a given duration of stay have by design necessarily arrived in the same year. Furthermore, as with most migrant surveys, when considering how results can be interpreted in the different domains covered, the differing self-selectivity of the national groups surveyed has to be taken into account. A key question is whether and to what extent the various groups sampled that is, the country of origin (COO) and country of residence (COR) combinations are comparable. Individuals do not move at random from the different countries of origin to the different countries of residence. Rather there is substantial self-selection by different personal characteristics. For instance, if we want to find out whether Italians in France fare better than in other countries of residence, we have to take into account whether Italian migrants vary according to the different destinations that they select to begin with. Initial characteristics might differ according to important variables such as age, social background
28
and educational qualifications, depending on whether an Italian migrant has moved to France, Germany or Britain. These must all be allowed for. In addition to these differences which are measured by our survey questions, there might also be unobserved heterogeneity which was not measured or is in principle not measurable. Countries of residence differ with regard to which people they attract the most: labour, study or retirement migrants. Traditional labour migrants are one group we might find in different places, but not all. They are unlikely to be equally represented across destinations. A second obvious group might be retirement migrants. Again, it is not hard to imagine that these will have special features according to where they are coming from and where they are going mainly of a geographical kind. Another self-selected group are those free movers (Favell 2008a) that we identify as an emergent part of EU internal migration. Again, different variables will come into play for this group. In contrast to traditional migration by unskilled labour, free movers might be assumed to migrate because of individual choices (that is, the importance of chain migration and formal recruitment arrangements is reduced), and differences regarding the economic level between countries of origin and countries of residence should be of less importance. Methodologically, the problem is that if both the traditional migrant and the free-mover types are not equally represented in the different groups across countries, then this has to be taken into account when considering the evidence found by the various chapters that follow. For example, although our data at first might suggest this, it might not be possible to conclude that, say, Britain is more open for migrant integration than, say Germans, simply on the basis of a straightforward comparison of Italians in Britain with Italians in Germany. This is because the Italians in each country might, for the self-selective processes mentioned above, differ substantially in terms of their social characteristics to begin with. Italians might be mostly free movers in Britain, and traditional guest workers in Germany: this will impact all their other measurable behaviour. Throughout the volume then we carefully allow for the self-selective nature of the groups assessed to avoid coming to such nave conclusions, and rather put the accent on looking to see how and why Italian migrants (for example) differ in different locations. These considerations apply in principle to all international comparative migration research, as long as fixed-number samples of migrants from similar countries of origin or countries of residence are selected for investigation. However, given the basic diversity of the movers included in the EIMSS survey, we are especially alert to this issue. Besides illustrating the basic sociodemographic traits of respondents to our survey, this chapter
29
will thus give an evidence-based idea of the way self-selectivity has worked out in the sample and why EU movers are so diverse. Moreover, since we sampled an equal number of migrants from each country of origin/country of residence combination, our results have to allow for the fact that there are quite different totals of migrants by nationality in each of these combinations in reality. That is, our sample of Italians in Germany is a much smaller relative proportion of the total of Italians in Germany than, say, our sample of Italians in Spain. This too demands special care in the analysis: the size of the overall migrant population by nationality may have important effects on the characteristics and dynamics of that population. For this reason, our next step should be to indicate the official figures of migration for our country of origin/country of residence combination, in order to give a sense of the proportion of the migration we studied relative to the overall picture of present-day migration in Europe.
INTRA-EU MIGRANTS IN THE PIONEUR COUNTRIES

At the time of the EIMSS survey in 2004, Germany had the highest number of (legal) resident foreigners with 7.3 million, followed by France (3.3 million), Britain (2.9 million), Spain (2.8 million) and Italy (1.3 million). Since the early 1990s, there had been sizeable differences across the five countries in the development of the numbers of foreign nationals both from third countries (that is, non-EU members) and those from other EU15 countries (Table 1). With regard to all foreigners irrespective Table 2.1 Stocks of all foreigners and EU15 non-nationals, 1990 and 2004 (in thousands)
1990 Foreigners Germany France Britain Italy Spain 4 845.9 3 596.6 2 416.0 490.4 398.1 EU 1 516.8 1 321.5 910.0 140.8 245.8 % EU 31.3 36.7 37.7 28.7 61.7 Foreigners 7 334.8 3 263.2 2 760.0 1 334.9 2 772.2 2004 EU 1 767.3 1 195.5 1 268.6 132.1 360.2 % EU 24.1 36.6 46.0 9.9 13.0
Source: Eurostat New Cronos Database and Eurostat Dissemination Database (see Recchi et al. 2006); data for France from 1999, for Britain from 2003, for Italy from 2002
30
Table 2.2
Stocks of movers from EIMSS countries, 2002

Germans French 86 696 96 281 29 313 46 894 British 99 587 75 546 19 957 94 862 Italians 644 955 200 632 107 244 36 815 Spanish 115 818 160 194 54 482 12 327
Germany France Britain Italy Spain

Source:
76 882 266 136 35 091 78 020
Eurostat Dissemination Database (see Recchi et al. 2006)
of geographic origin, for France, in the 1990s, there was a slight decline, probably linked to the relatively high number of naturalizations during this period, whereas in Britain the numbers rose slightly (by 14 per cent) and in Germany substantially (by 51 per cent). The numbers in Italy and Spain, however, grew dramatically during the same period. In Italy, the number of foreign nationals nearly tripled, and for Spain it increased nearly sevenfold from 1990 (see also Mnz and Fassmann 2004; Salt 1997 and 2005; and the annual SOPEMI reports). EU15 foreigners are a minority among foreigners in all five countries in 2004, ranging from 1.8 million in Germany to 132 000 in Italy. Moreover, the number of EU15 nonnationals since the early 1990s declined in France and Italy and increased modestly in Germany (16.5 per cent) with larger increases in Britain (39.4 per cent) and Spain (46.5 per cent). When we look at country of origin/country of residence combinations in 2002, the single largest group are Italians in Germany with more than 600 000 people, followed by Germans in Britain with more than 260 000, and by Italians and Spanish in France with some 200 000 and 160 000 respectively (Table 2.2). The smallest groups are found in Italy, where no national group of the four surpasses around 35 000 (Germans), and the Spanish immigrants constitute the smallest with some 12 000. In 2004, no national group in Germany had less than 100 000 persons (Eurostat 2006). These stocks reflect both the legacy of traditional guest-worker migration (movement exclusively from South to North) as well as, in the case of growing numbers in Spain, more recent trends (movement increasingly also from North to South). In line with this last observation, the sharpest increases can be found for Germans and British in Spain and France, while at the same time the number of Spanish in Germany and France and of Italians in France has decreased (Recchi et al. 2003). While the two decades before 1974 were characterized by guest-worker migration from the South to the North, there was hardly any migration from the North to the South
31
in those years. From 1974 on, the year when guest-worker recruitment stopped, family reunification became the main type of migration (Bauer and Zimmermann 1996; Zimmermann 1995). In sharp contrast to the other traditional guest-worker populations, Italians were not affected by the end of active recruitment of foreign labour: Italy was a member of the European Community, and Italians could continue to move. However, labour migration from Italy to the North was largely discouraged due to the paucity of available jobs. On the other hand, migration to Britain has continued to increase for all our Western European nationalities from the 1970s onwards. These figures are compatible with a general decline, observable across Europe, of low-skilled labour migration and family reunification, and increases in highly-skilled labour and retirement migration (King 2002). Britain, in fact, emerges as the target of highly-skilled labour migration among our five countries, a result in line with past research (Salt 1992), while Spain becomes the target of retirement migration.
BASIC SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF EU MOVERS

In this section we illustrate the social background, education and employment status of movers, their age and duration of migration, geographical aspects of mobility, marriage status and the national origin of partners. Then we will focus on the migration process over time, and in more detail on age at migration and its change over the different time periods. Having identified these two key variables, we will then use multilevel analysis to show how age at the time of migration varies in the different periods considered and how this variable is linked to other individual characteristics of the EU movers. We will also introduce one higher-level variable which seeks to capture the essence of the country of origin/country of residence combinations. Finally, we use age at migration and duration of stay to classify groups of migrants, which we will then describe using additional variables. The goal is to move towards identifying specific clusters or types of migrants within the overall group of movers. When appropriate, we will also compare movers to the corresponding stayer populations, as is done in the following chapters of this book. For this, we use principally the first wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) as a reference survey. Social Background A first finding is that, when measured by parental education, migrants from Southern Europe stem from a lower social background than migrants from
32
Table 2.3
Respondents education (lower-secondary qualification or less) by country of origin and country of residence (in %)
Country of origin French 56.9 18.2 10.6 12.5 23.8 Germans 38.2 70.0 15.6 33.2 60.8 British 18.5 31.5 56.5 20.1 43.4 Italians 33.2 72.6 23.9 56.1 39.4 Spanish 28.4 50.8 25.6 26.0 66.7
Country of residence France Germany Britain Italy Spain

Notes: Source:
Stayer population is indicated in the main diagonal (shaded). ESS 2004 and EIMSS, N5 13 839
the other countries. This is particularly the case for migration to Germany. However, it is also the case for migration to Spain from nearly all countries (with the partial exception of the French); this is partly but not entirely due to the higher age of the migrants. With very few exceptions, movers come from a higher social background than stayers, of whom more than 75 per cent have fathers with a lower level of education. The exceptions are Italians and Spanish in Germany and Germans in Spain; these groups have a lower social background than the respective stayer populations. For Germans in Spain this is due to their higher age; however, this is not the case for Italians and Spanish in Germany, who have come at lower ages. The majority of EU movers are highly educated. However, in Britain and especially in Germany, migrants from Spain and Italy have a lower educational background than migrants from the other countries (Table 2.3). This also applies to German and British migrants to Spain, when compared to Germans and British in the other countries. Movers differ also on this dimension from stayers, 5570 per cent of whom have a lower secondary education or less. In fact, almost all groups of movers have a higher education than the corresponding stayer populations. This even applies for the British and Germans in Spain, though the differences from the stayer populations are not as pronounced as for other mover groups. There is only one clear exception: Italian movers settled in Germany have a noticeably lower education than the Italian stayer population overall. Regarding their present occupation, British and German nationals living in Spain and Italy are more likely to be self-employed if they are still working at all. For respondents working full- or part-time, the percentages are similar for most of the migrant groups, with the exception
33
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 D
Year of birth
GB I E
F GB I E
D F
I E
D F GB
D F GB I
France
Germany
Britain
Italy
Spain
Note: Countries of origin (first row below graphic): D 5 Germans, F 5 French, GB 5 British, I 5 Italians, E 5 Spanish. Source: EIMSS, N54901
Figure 2.1
Distribution of year of birth dependent on country of origin and country of residence
of Spain as country of residence, where the biggest percentages exist for retired Germans and British. The percentage of retired people among the stayer populations ranges from slightly below one fifth in Italy and Spain, to around one fourth in Germany and Britain and 28 per cent in France. Thus, leaving aside pre-1974 guest-worker migration or possible return migration since, intra-EU migration since 1974 has in fact increased the active population in Germany and Britain particularly, but increased the inactive population in Spain. Age of Migrants and Duration of Migration A second key dimension concerns the age of migrants and the duration of their stay. Germans and British living in Spain are the oldest migrants in the sample, which reveals a dominant pattern of retirement migration to that country (Figure 2.1). This can be seen even more clearly in their
34
100
Age at migration
20 D
40
60
80
GB I E
F GB I E
D F
I E
D F GB
D F GB I
France
Germany
Britain
Italy
Spain
Note: Countries of origin (first row below graphic): D 5 Germans, F 5 French, GB 5 British, I 5 Italians, E 5 Spanish. Source: EIMSS, N54 901
Figure 2.2
Distribution of age at migration dependent on country of origin and country of residence
age at the time of settlement (Figure 2.2): British citizens were on average 51 years old when they came to Spain, while Italians and Spanish who moved to Germany (in order to work or to join their partners) were on average in their mid-20s. The mean year of birth for stayers ranges from 1953 in Britain and 1954 in Spain to 1956 in France, Germany and Italy. Averaged over all countries of destination, German and British movers are older than the respective stayers, and Spanish movers are younger, while there is no age difference between French and Italian movers and stayers. However, there is some variance for the single country of origin/country of residence combinations. On average, intra-EU migrants have lived in their destination countries for nearly 15 years at the time of the interview. Overall, movers from Italy have stayed somewhat longer and those from Britain somewhat less time than average. The extreme cases are Italians and Spanish in Germany on the one hand, and British in France and Spain on the other. Between the
35
Table 2.4
Country of residence France Germany Britain Italy Spain
Respondents coming from a big city or the suburbs (%)

Country of origin French 35.9 43.1 51.9 53.6 57.4 Germans 44.2 33.1 41.5 53.4 66.4 British 37.2 44.4 29.4 50.4 44.0 Italians 46.3 19.3 41.8 17.6 52.8 Spanish 42.3 35.5 36.7 52.6 29.9
Notes: Big city and suburbs of big city are self-assessed by respondents. Stayer population is on the main diagonal (shaded) Source: ESS 2004 and EIMSS, N513 985
former and the latter, there is a difference of almost nine years, showing the role of Germany as a traditional immigration magnet for these two Southern European countries and the emergence of new patterns of shorter-term migration in other cases. Geographic Mobility Table 2.4 shows the proportion of migrants coming from big cities and the suburbs, with the main diagonal showing the corresponding figures for the stayer populations. As the percentage of stayers who live in a big city or a suburb ranges from less than one-fifth in Italy to roughly one-third in the other four countries, one can conclude that international movers come especially from urbanized areas. This is particularly the case for those who move to Italy and Spain. There is, however, one notable exception to this rule: again, Italian migrants in Germany. The proportion here from urban areas corresponds to the Italian stayer population as a whole. At the same time, movers seem to be attracted by the metropolitan regions in the countries of residence, and are more frequently found there than the respective stayer populations of these countries. This is especially the case for migration to Britain, especially due to a London effect (on the appeal of Britains capital for EU movers, see Favell 2006b). Spain and France are partial exceptions here as destination countries. This can be explained by the fact that these countries are prime targets for retirement migrants. Though there are many retired people living in Italy as well, EU movers living in Italy have to a greater degree moved there for other reasons, be it work or love, before they eventually retired (see King
36
and Patterson 1998). However, there is one characteristic that intra-EU migration to Italy and France seems to have in common: a trend to counter-urbanization, which consists in resettling deserted rural areas by refurbishing existing housing stock (see also Buller and Hoggart 1994; Hoggart and Buller 1995). National Origin of Partners A fourth key question is cross-national intermarriage. The two Southern European countries are positioned at opposite ends with regard to their EU movers having a partner from the country of origin: In Italy, relatively few have co-nationals as partners, whereas in Spain the vast majority does. For intra-EU migrants to Britain, having a partner from their own national community is not very common. The very low proportion of Italians in Germany having a German partner might be due to the large number of Italians in this country from which these people can choose. Our result is in sharp contrast to results for binational marriages in Germany of first-generation migrants (Schroedter 2004), which show that Italians and Spanish are the most inter-married of the traditional guestworker populations in this respect. However, these other analyses do not include immigrants from France and Britain and put a special emphasis on the low integration of Turks in Germany. In addition, they are based on a different definition of first-generation migrants, which includes all those who migrated to Germany after the age of six. Given the fact that the Italian migrants in our sample came to Germany at an average age of 26, it is obvious that they had a high probability of marrying or at least getting a partner from their home country before they arrived.
MIGRATION OVER TIME

We will now look in greater detail at how intra-EU migration has developed over time. Three periods are distinguished here: from 1974 to 1983, 1984 to 1993 and 1994 to 2003. The first period, from 1974 to 1983, followed immediately the end of the active recruitment of foreign labour in the Northern industrial countries in the aftermath of the mid-1970s oil crisis. The formal restrictions to free movement which were established at that time affected only Spanish movers. The second period, from 1984 to 1993, was somewhat transitional, with the noticeable fact that Spanish citizens were granted free movement rights in 1993. The last period is characterized by decisive improvements in the mobility potential of intraEU migrants resulting from the Maastricht Treaty, while at the same time
37
economic incentives for emigration from Southern Europe were much weaker than in earlier periods. Figure 2.3 shows the number of migrants for the different periods of the groups defined by country of origin (represented by the rows) and country of residence.2 It can be seen that some of the groups have moved fairly recently, such as Germans to France, French to Germany, and British to France and Spain. In contrast, other groups moved in larger numbers relatively early, for example Italians and Spanish to Germany. We have broken down the number of migrants arriving during each of the three migration periods by country of residence and whether they have ever worked in their present country of residence (see Figure 2.4, that specifies the case for women). Each of the columns corresponds to one country of residence. The first row includes respondents who have never worked in the country of residence, and the second represents the corresponding information for those who have worked in the country. The numbers of migrants to France, Italy and Spain who have never worked in these countries sharply increases with recency of migration in Spain, it is high for all periods of migration reflecting the growing importance of these countries as targets for retirement migration. There are two additional possible reasons why the number of movers who have never worked in the country of residence might increase with the recency of migration. Migrants who have come for study reasons may not have entered the labour market (yet), and recent movers might not yet have been successful in finding a job, something most likely to have affected particularly family members of labour migrants. The differences between migration periods are less pronounced for those who have indeed worked in the country of residence. Gender differences are relatively small, although there is a consistently higher number of women who have never worked in the country of residence for all periods of migration. There are women accompanying or following at a later time their labour-migrant husband, without starting a work career abroad on their own. However, among those who came in the earliest period under investigation, there is not an especially high number of women who have never worked in the country of residence. This is presumably so because these women had a longer time-frame for getting a job where they moved to. Of particular interest are the changes in the formal educational level of the different groups of migrants over time (Figure 2.5). Corresponding to trends in all countries in recent decades, most migrant groups include proportionally smaller numbers of less-educated individuals in the more recent periods. Two developments, however, deserve attention. The first concerns labour migrants. While Spanish and Italians in Germany start
100 200
100 200
100 200
7483 8493 9403 100 200 100 200 100 200 French, in Britain French, in Italy French, in Spain
7483 8493 9403
7483 8493 9403
100 200
Germans, in France
Germans, in Britain
Germans, in Italy
Germans, in Spain
7483 8493 9403
100 200
French, in Germany
7483 8493 9403 100 200 100 200 100 200 British, in Germany British, in Italy
7483 8493 9403
7483 8493 9403
7483 8493 9403 British, in Spain
Frequency
100 200
British, in France
7483 8493 9403 100 200 100 200 100 200 Italians, in Germany Italians, in Britain
7483 8493 9403
7483 8493 9403
7483 8493 9403 Italians, in Spain
100 200
7483 8493 9403 100 200 100 200 Spanish, in Germany
7483 8493 9403
7483 8493 9403 100 200 Spanish, in Britain
100 200
7483 8493 9403
7483 8493 9403
7483 8493 9403
38
Migration period
Italians, in France
7483 8493 9403 Spanish, in Italy
Spanish, in France
7483 8493 9403
Source:
EIMSS, N 5 4 902
Figure 2.3
Period of migration dependent on country of origin and country of residence
400
400
400
400
200
200
200
200
74 74
400 400 400 400 0 200 work, in D work, in GB work, in I
3 3 3 8 49 40 8 9 74
3 3 3 8 49 40 8 9
3 3 3 8 49 40 8 9
3 3 3 8 9 0 74 84 94
200
400
no work, in F
no work, in D
no work, in GB
no work, in I
no work, in E
3 3 3 8 9 0 74 84 94
work, in E
Frequency
200
400
work, in F
200
200
74
3 3 3 8 49 40 8 9 74 74
3 3 3 8 49 40 8 9
3 3 3 8 49 40 8 9
200
39
3 3 3 8 9 0 74 84 94 3 3 3 8 9 0 74 84 94
Migration period
Source:
EIMSS, N 5 4 876
Figure 2.4
Period of migration dependent on country of residence and whether they ever worked there (women)
90
80
70
60
Percent
50
40 Germans French British Italians Spanish

7480 8190 9103 7480 8190 9103 7480 8190 9103
30
40
Germany Britain Italy
20
10
7480 8190 9103 7480 8190 9103
France
Spain
Source:
EIMSS, N 5 4 850
Figure 2.5
Migrants with lower secondary education or less dependent on period of migration, country of origin and country of residence (%)
41
with a high level of less-educated migrants in the first period (80 per cent), the percentage is down to 30 per cent for the Spanish in the third one. For the Italians, on the other hand, it still hovers above 65 per cent. Germany thus continues to attract poorly educated Italians, perhaps to cater for the thriving sector of Italian restaurants, as well as other ethnic-based activities for the large and long-established Italian community there. The second concerns retirement migration. The proportion of less-educated Germans in Spain is 70 per cent in the first period and reduces by only 10 percentage points, yet the proportion of their British counterparts actually increases by nearly 20 percentage points to almost 50 per cent. A similar but not as dramatic tendency can be seen for both migrant groups in France, while for movers living in Italy (pre-)retirement migration comes closer to the idea of elite migration if we take education as a proxy of social status.
AGE AT MIGRATION
Age at migration is a crucial variable in migration research. It implicitly tells us a lot about the motives of migrants and it is also paramount in the discussion of different aspects of integration. We will now look at the age distributions of movers from both the perspective of the countries of origin and the countries of residence. Then we will explore the changes of age at migration over time. Finally we will analyse the determinants of age at migration by using a series of multi-level models. Descriptive Analysis Figure 2.6 shows that the French, Italians and Spanish predominantly leave their country of origin at younger ages, while the Germans and especially the British leave later. For movers from Britain, and to a lesser degree also from Germany, the age distribution has actually become bimodal. This hints at two distinct migration types which are determined by different processes and for which different consequences are likely to be revealed. It has to be noted that migration when older is not just pure retirement migration, but in fact includes a high proportion of preretirement migration, which might also entail labour-force participation in the country of residence, whether or not this was the main driving force behind the move. Also characteristic is the dip observable for people in their late 40s and early 50s. This might be related to the presence of children in the household, which discourages both explicit labour- and pre-retirement migration.
42
Germans 60 60
French
40
20
20
40
60
80
0 20
20
40
40
60
80
Italians 60 Frequency 60
Spanish
40
20
20
40
60
80
0 20
20
40
40
60
80
British 60 0 20 20 40
40
60
80 Age at migration
Source:
EIMSS, N 5 4 901
Figure 2.6
Age at migration dependent on country of origin
Figure 2.7 shows the frequency of different ages at migration for immigration into the five countries of residence. For Germany, Britain and Italy, it is predominantly the younger people who come, while for Spain it is the older age groups. France is in-between. But how do the ages at
43
100
50
20 100
40
60 Italy
80 100
50
100
France
Germany
20
40
60
80
Spain
Frequency
50
20 100
40
60
80
0 20
50
40
60
80
Britain
0 20
Source:
50
40
60
80 Age at migration
EIMSS, N 5 4 901
Figure 2.7
Age at migration dependent on country of residence
migration to the different countries of residence vary across the three periods we study? Most telling are the figures for Spain, showing that older immigrants become increasingly dominant. France is on the way towards a bimodal distribution of age at migration, with growing numbers of older
44
people coming to this country in conjunction with a net increase of migrants, particularly in the latest period. In Italy, the age distribution of the newly arrived has not changed so much over time. In Germany and Britain, the traditional labour-migration pattern remains intact with mostly young people moving in. Nevertheless, comparing age at migration between the last and the first period in Germany, there is no doubt that the number of very young migrants has dropped. Correspondingly, migration from Britain develops a clear bimodal distribution of age at migration over the three periods, and in the last period Britains emigrating when relatively older have actually become the majority. The same tendency is visible for Germans, but it is less pronounced. The French, Italians and Spanish, however, continue to migrate at relatively young ages. Multivariate Analysis In this section we estimate a series of multi-level models that help us explain statistically a key aspect of mobility choices that is, the age at which migrants leave their country of origin, our dependent variable. Multi-level or hierarchical linear models (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) are appropriate when variables pertain to two levels, an individual level (in our case, the individual migrants) and a group level (in our case, the country of origin/country of residence combinations). Usually, a series of models is estimated beginning with a so-called empty or variancecomponent model. This model will show how much of the variance in the dependent variable (age at migration) is located within groups (that is, individual variance around the group means) and how much between groups (that is, the variance of the group means around the grand mean for all groups). A second model typically includes the individual-level variables, as in a normal OLS regression. A comparison of the variance components of both models shows how much variance these individual-level variables are able to explain at both levels. The explanatory power of the individuallevel variables with regard to the group-level variance is related to a composition effect: that is, the part of the differences between groups that can be explained by taking into account the individual-level variables alone. A third model usually estimated is one which, in addition to the individuallevel variables, also includes one or more variables at the group level. As explanatory (independent) variables here we use period of migration, gender, education, motives for migration, previous work experience in the country of origin and previous sojourns of three months or more in the country of residence or a third country. Period of migration is entered as two dummy variables, with the first period as the baseline: that is, the effects are estimated for the 198493 and the 19942003 periods. Gender
45
Table 2.5
Random intercept models for age at migration

Model 1 Empty model Model 2 Individual-level variables 34.5 3.1 7.9 21.8 23.0 23.2 25.9 24.8 (20.2) 28.7 2.7 1.0 2.1 Model 3 1 group-level information 32.2 3.1 7.9 21.8 23.0 23.2 25.8 24.8 (20.1) 28.7 2.7 1.0 2.1 7.5 101.0 14.9 4 807
Fixed effects Constant Migration 19841993 Migration 19942003 Women Secondary-level education Tertiary-level education Work as motive Family/love as motive Quality of life as motive Study as motive Work experience in COO Sojourn in COR Sojourn in third country NorthSouth migration Random effects Level 1: residual variance Level 2: random intercept N
Note: Source:
34.9
123.4 52.4 4 807
101.0 26.8 4 807
Insignificant values in parentheses. EIMSS, N 5 4 807
is entered as a dummy variable with male respondents as the baseline: that is, the effect pertains to women. Education is transformed into two dummy variables with migrants with less than university-entrance qualification as the baseline, so the effects refer to respondents with a universityentrance qualification and those with a university degree respectively. Four dummies for migration motives are entered with miscellaneous motives as the baseline category; thus, the effects pertain to the pure motives of work, family/love, quality of life and study. Previous work experience in the country of origin and previous sojourn of three months or more in the country of residence or in a third country are entered as three dummy variables with respondents lacking such experiences forming the baseline category. Table 2.5 shows the three models, a variance-component model without any explanatory variables, a model which includes the individuallevel variables and a model which additionally includes information on
46
whether the migrant belongs to one of the six COO/COR groups moving from the North (Britain and Germany) to the South (France, Italy and Spain). Model 1 shows that the grand mean of age at migration for all migrants is nearly 35 years. Of the variance of age at migration 29.8 per cent is related to national COO/COR group membership and 70.2 per cent is attributable to within-groups individual differences. The group-level variance is extremely high, indicating that we can predict nearly one-third of the variation of the age of migration alone by group membership, without taking any individual characteristics of the migrants into account. Model 2 introduces effects at the individual level, results which can be interpreted as averages for all migrant groups. Most marked are the differences between the three periods. The migrants of the second period are three years older than the migrants in the first period and those of the third period nearly eight years older, controlling for all the other independent variables. Women moved on average nearly two years earlier than men, and both the intermediate and the highly educated migrants came three years earlier in their lives than the less-qualified. Age at migration also varies considerably by migration motives. While the quality-of-life migrants do not differ from those who came for miscellaneous motives, if work was the only motive, migrants came about six years earlier, if study was the only motive about nine years earlier, and those for family or love reasons five years earlier. Migrants with previous work experience in their country of origin, that is, those who were sojourners abroad before they finally migrated to their present country of residence, moved on average three, one and two years later in their lives, respectively. Note that the different effects are independent of each other. Together these sociodemographic and behavioural variables explain 18.2 per cent of the individual-level (residual) variance of age at migration. They have an even higher impact at the group level, where they explain more than 50 per cent of the variance between groups. This comparatively high value is due to the large compositional differences between the COO/ COR combinations. Controlling for individual-level characteristics of the migrants, we can thus reduce these compositional effects. Though half of the variation of the random intercept is explained by individual-level variables, the variance component is still highly significant. This indicates that the means of age at migration in the different COO/COR combinations are very different from each other, even after compositional differences between these combinations have been taken into account. Finally, in model 3 a dummy variable for NorthSouth migration is entered referring to British and German migrants to the other three
47
countries. The dummy variable shows that the NorthSouth migrants are seven and a half years older than all the other migrants, over and above what is already explained by individual-level variables. The individuallevel effects remain unaffected by the inclusion of this group-level variable, with the only exception being the intercept, which changes in interpretation: now it refers to all migrants with baseline-category values on all individual-level variables who are not members of a NorthSouth migrating group. There is again a marked change in the size of the random intercept, as this declines by 44 per cent (compared to model 2). This decline in unexplained variance at the group level is entirely due to the explanatory power of the NorthSouth origin dichotomy we have constructed. We can thus expect that older migrants from Northern Europe can be singled out as a type of movers with highly distinct characteristics.
A SIMPLE CLASSIFICATION OF MIGRANTS

In this final section, we will go on to present the results of a simple cluster analysis, building on the multivariate analysis. We use only age at migration and the duration of the stay in the country of residence as clustering variables and require four clusters to be computed by the KMEANS4 procedure. The idea behind this analysis is to get something similar to a crossclassification of age at migration and the length of the stay in the country of residence. The resulting clusters are then described by additional variables which were not used in the definition of the groups (Table 2.6). Cluster 1 (1539 movers) consists of migrants who moved on average when they were 26 years old and have already stayed in their countries of residence for an average of 24 years. We label them late traditional migrants. Three-quarters of these migrants came in the first period and none in the last. This group is not too unevenly distributed with respect to the country of origin (only 16 per cent of this group are Germans, versus 25 per cent Italians), but it is with regard to the country of residence (only 10 per cent of this group are in Spain, but 30 per cent in Germany). Only one-third of this group has a university degree. Nine out of ten have worked in the country of residence. The dominant migration motive was love, but work was also important. Half of them has a country of residence partner. Cluster 2 (916 movers) has an average age at migration of 44 years and 13 years of stay in the country of residence. We label them pre-retirement movers. These migrants have moved mainly during the last two periods. There is a particularly strong representation of Germans and a weak one of Spanish. France and especially Spain are overrepresented as countries
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Table 2.6
Description of the four clusters

Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Eurostars Pure Late Preretirement traditionals retirement movers movers
Age at migration Years of stay Migration from 197483 (%) Migration from 198493 (%) Migration from 19942003 (%) COO: Germans (%) COO: French (%) COO: British (%) COO: Italians (%) COO: Spanish (%) COR: Germany (%) COR: France (%) COR: Britain (%) COR: Italy (%) COR: Spain (%) Gender (%), female (%) University entrance qualification (%) University diploma (%) Ever worked in COR (%) Migration motive: Work (%) Migration motive: Love (%) Migration motive: Quality of life (%) Migration motive: Study (%) Partner from COO (%) Partner from COR (%) Partner from third country (%) Number of migrants
Source: EIMSS, N 5 4 901
26 24 75 25 0 16 20 18 25 21 30 14 21 25 10 51 26 34 89 27 42 18 10 27 50 6 1539
44 13 17 37 46 30 19 23 19 10 11 26 14 19 31 50 21 43 54 23 28 38 4 55 19 8 916
28 8 0 31 69 17 23 13 21 27 25 21 25 19 11 55 27 55 81 31 32 16 17 35 37 11 1721
60 8 3 19 77 29 15 40 12 4 3 26 4 17 51 42 22 36 18 6 14 69 4 60 9 9 725
of residence. Four out of ten migrants have a university degree. Only half of them have ever worked in the country of residence. The dominant migration motive is quality of life, though half of them have also moved for work or love reasons. Only two out of ten have a partner from the country of residence. Cluster 3 (1721 movers) has moved on average at the age of 28 (close to
49
the late traditionals), but have stayed for an average of eight years only. We call them Eurostars, as they seem to embody the ideal type of Favells (2008a) study of European free-moving professionals. Two-thirds of them have arrived in the last period, and the remaining one third in the intermediary period. British (and German) nationals are underrepresented in this group and the Spanish are overrepresented. As for the destinations, the picture is reversed: Britain and Germany are overrepresented and Spain underrepresented. More than half hold a university degree, a proportion higher than in any other cluster. Eighty per cent of them have worked in their country of residence. In addition to love and work, study motives were important for nearly one out of five, more than in any other group. More than one-third have a partner from the country of residence. Individuals in cluster 4 (725 movers) migrated at an average age of 60 and stayed for eight years. We call them pure retirement movers. Nearly eight out of ten came in the last period. There is a particularly strong representation of British and Germans, and a particularly weak one of Spanish. France and especially Spain are overrepresented as countries of residence (actually, half of the cluster is located in the latter country), while only very few in this group have gone to Germany or Britain. While the gender distribution for the other groups is balanced, only 40 per cent are women in this group. The proportion of migrants holding a university degree is one-third that is, as low as among late traditionals. Seven out of ten name quality of life as their migration motive. Less than 10 per cent have a partner from the country of residence. A caution should be added here in particular with regard to the proportions of country of origin migrants in the four groups. For reasons mentioned earlier, the figures refer to the EIMSS sample and do not reflect the relative numbers of different nationalities we would find if we were to sample proportionately to the number of foreign nationals in the country. That is, the results should not lead us to conclude definitively that there are far more Spanish Eurostars out there than German and British ones. This is because the huge numbers of German and British pre-retirement and retirement migrants we found in Spain and France technically set an upper limit to the number of Eurostars we could sample there.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has offered a preliminary description of the sample of EU movers we surveyed with EIMSS, as well as a preliminary multivariate and cluster analysis. It shows how this migration has changed over time, becoming a better educated and more diversified movement. With very
50
few exceptions, which can be related to the remnants of the typical guestworker migration, geographically mobile Western Europeans now tend to come from higher social backgrounds and have a higher level of education themselves than the respective stayer populations. Economic and labour market differences between the five countries under investigation have largely vanished in recent decades. In addition, the supply of low-qualified labour from these five countries has declined with the expansion of education and with the rising immigration of third-country nationals filling up the bottom of the labour market. Thus, the migration of Western unqualified labour has become dependent on the existence of ethnic niches which provide a relatively protected labour market as is especially the case for Italians in Germany. One major finding of these analyses is that geographical mobility within the EU embraces a variety of social types. In addition to the remnants of the typical guest-worker migration and the ensuing family reunification (which are represented best by the late traditionals type of our classification based on age at migration and duration of stay), we find increasingly retirement migration and study migration but also a free mover kind of migration, what we call the Eurostars. The latter is characterized by individualistic motives and migration strategies, beyond formal recruitment and chain migration. This type also encompasses growing student migration, which has its own dynamics. There is also a trend towards movement at older ages. This is driven by the increase of retirement (the pure retiree type) and part-time work (or pre-retirement) migration, but also by highly qualified labour migrants crossing borders more frequently. This heterogeneity of intra-European movers has to be taken into account when making descriptive statements or testing hypotheses in migration research in Europe. What can we learn from this about possible future trends of intraEuropean migration? We surmise that for migration inside EU15 countries, the trends observed here will persist in the future. There is likely to be a further reduction in the number of unqualified labour migrants and their families (with the only exception being ethnic niches such as the Italians in Germany), and a rise in retirement, study and highly skilled migration. Age at migration will thus increase, unless study migration gets additional momentum. Such an increase in study migration would, as a consequence, also lead to an influx of young highly qualified workers, further slanting migration in Western Europe towards the higher social end. The situation with regard to the new accession countries citizens, who are beginning to get unrestricted access to EU15 member states (with variation as to which countries open their doors and when), will nevertheless, at least for the next decade, remain different. Push and pull factors will
51
remain intact for A12 nationals, as long as the economic development of the bulk of these countries still lags behind that in the West. Thus, a considerable supply of unqualified labour can still be expected from Eastern Europe. Given the stronger economic growth in this area compared to the EU15, however, the time frame might be very short. The patterns of migration which we observe for the EU15 now may well eventually be generalizable to the entire EU27.
NOTES
1. For further details on sampling and other features of the survey, please refer to Appendix A. 2. This and the following figures use frequencies instead of percentages. This should increase readability of those figures in which the information is broken down by more than one independent variable. 3. This is computed as the variance component at the group level divided by the total variation, that is, 52.4/(52.41123.4). 4. KMEANS is the standard algorithm for calculating clusters.
3.
Deciding to move: migration projects in an integrating Europe

Oscar Santacreu, Emiliana Baldoni and Mara Carmen Albert1
INTRA-EUROPEAN MIGRATION IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

The aim of this chapter is to describe the motivations, social organisation and previous mobility experiences that characterize intra-EU migration within the EU15. We thus focus on the subjective motivations, the history of migration, the personal networks and the family support structures of mobile citizens from Spain, Italy, France, Britain and Germany. As other migration scholars have pointed out (most notably King 2002), current migration patterns can no longer be captured within a traditional labour migration paradigm. Rather, they reflect emerging characteristics of European societies more generally: privileging flexibility in time and space, alternative modes of consumption and leisure, and a search for healthier environments, self-fulfilment, new lifestyles and a better quality of life. We provide answers to the following questions. Why do EU15 citizens migrate? How are their motivations distributed among the five countries under scrutiny? Do men and women share the same motivations? What is the role played by human capital? How do family, relationships and personal networks influence the migration decision-making process? Are migrants within the EU a supermobile population? What is the part played by previous mobility experiences? Do movers retain the same motivations in subsequent mobility experiences? Is mobility within the EU international or internal? The first part of this chapter looks at migration within the EU15 in the context of other studies on international migration, particularly the more widely available research on the EU10 new member states admitted in 2004, as well as other recent attempts to capture the diversity of migration in Europe today. The second part is a descriptive analysis of the socioeconomic reasons for migration (that is, work) in relation to other motivations such as study, family/love, or quality of life. The final section focuses
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Deciding to move
53
on previous mobility experiences of mobile European citizens and their connection with current experiences. Despite the potential interest of new forms of mobility associated with the EU as a unique experiment in regional integration (Favell 2008a), studies of international migration within and among the EU15 member states that constituted the EU until 2004 have been rare. International migration research, rather, typically focuses on classic forms of immigration into clearly delineated national political units; it considers only standard forms of migration motivations such as economic push/pull factors or asylum seeking; and it draws a firm line between international migration and forms of internal migration within nation states (Massey et al. 1998; Portes 1999; Castles and Miller 2005). All of these staple distinctions in migration research are challenged by the emergent new forms found within the EU. Distinctions with classic migration can immediately be found in terms of motivations. Here, a certain number of previous studies do exist. These include investigations carried out by Eurostat (Eurostat and European Commission 2002) and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2006) based on the analysis of data from the 2001 and 2005 Eurobarometers regarding the mobility of EU citizens. According to Eurostat, which only takes into account short-distance mobility, the main reasons for migration are family/personal reasons (54 per cent), followed by housing (18 per cent), and work-related reasons (15 per cent) (Eurostat and European Commission 2002, 16). The 2005 Eurobarometer (EB 64.1) also considers long-distance mobility, that is, moving from one region to another, or to another country within the EU. Here, among the most frequent reasons for moving cited are firstly those associated with the labour market (new job or job transfer, 34 per cent), and secondly those involving family or partners (change of marital situation, 18 per cent), or following the partner to a different location (14 per cent) (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2006, 1819). However, these studies are limited because the Eurobarometer did not pay attention to the category quality of life, or offer the finer distinctions between motivations that were built into our study. A far broader resource for considering these questions is provided by the more numerous studies on migration that have focused on analysing EastWest mobility intentions and flows, before and after the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 (Bauer and Zimmermann 1999a; Brcker 2003; Gorny and Ruspini 2004; Kelo and Wchter 2004; Krieger 2004; Krieger and Fernndez 2006; Favell 2008a). Many of these studies suggest that intentions to move outnumber the actual number of movers, and
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the best guide to future EastWest migration from new member states remains the limited and often circular trends established by the previous Mediterranean enlargements of the EU involving Spain, Portugal and Greece (Kupiszewski 2002). However, the latest data from Eurobarometer 2005 (Krieger and Fernndez 2006) have suggested that there is an upward trend in mobility intentions in some of the new member states (especially Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania), particularly linked to the increasing reliance on Eastern workers to fill low-level or skilled service-sector jobs in the West (Favell and Hansen 2002). In a study for the International Organisation for Migration, Wallace (1998, 2728) points out the influence of several economic factors of EastWest migration that can still be classified according to classic pushpull theories. Among the pull factors are better living conditions, higher salaries, other peoples (positive) migration experiences, better job prospects and more personal freedom. On the other hand, only two salient push factors are identified: ethnic problems and the economic conditions in the country of origin. Following the push-pull approach, Kelo and Wchter (2004, 71) show that EastWest movements are indeed more pulled than pushed. The traditional push factors, such as famine, war, persecution, ethnic and racial discrimination, and racism among others, are hardly present at all within Europe, even at its Eastern extremes. There are however strong pull factors in terms of job prospects, higher income or family connection. Mobility intentions are based mainly on the search for job opportunities, higher earnings and, as the third main reason, a change in marital status. Krieger (2004, 367) concludes that, despite the importance of economic reasons, there are significant differences between countries, as well as different sets of motivations and expectations among the citizens of the new member states. In this sense, economic and financial motivations are more important in Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, whereas family reasons appear to be more significant in Malta and Cyprus. Moreover, there seems to be a pattern that combines economic, financial and family reasons in the Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovenia. Despite some variations, then, economic motivations do still prevail within EastWest migration, something which further underlines the potential distinctiveness of intra-EU mobility within the old Europe. The starting point for our analysis is work by human geographers such as King (2002) and Lazaridis and Williams (2002), who have begun to chart a new map of migration in the integrating space of the new Europe that was already emerging before the enlargements of 2004 and 2007. They seek to identify the new motivations for migration within Europe, drawing a distinction between traditional migration and the emerging types of spatial mobility: travel, tourism, circulation and commuting. These have
Deciding to move
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been much more marked among the older member states of the West. Clues to these characteristics are provided by various forms of migration that are typically marginal to mainstream migration studies: that is, highskilled migration, student migration and retirement migration. All play an important part in the new intra-EU migrations. Global and regional economic integration have made high-skilled migration an ever-more relevant category of spatial mobility (Salt 1992; Iredale 2001; Mahroum 2001; Smith and Favell 2006). Within Europe, certain destinations have certainly become privileged in terms of their attractiveness as hubs in the global economy. For example, research funded by the British Department of Trade and Industry shows that among the main reasons why high-skilled migrants choose Britain as a destination are knowledge of the language and an assumed familiarity with the countrys culture salaries are not necessarily the main factor in their decision. On the other hand, the reasons deterring people from moving to Britain include climate, distance from family and friends, the standard of public services and, finally, difficulties in obtaining a work permit. The fact that among high-skilled migrants from developing countries prospects for economic improvement are significant, but not a dominant factor, indicates that such migrants surveyed in this context can be considered knowledge migrants rather than economic migrants per se (Pearson and Morell 2002, 12). Mahroum (2001, 29) in turn puts forward the differences between employment sectors, and also considers personal aspirations and scientific curiosity to be more significant than salary conditions. Favells study (2008a) on the mobility of young professionals living in large European cities points out that the motivations of these EU citizens are basically related to ambitions that include adventure and personal self-fulfilment more than just income as such. Drawing on previous research on the mobility of highly skilled workers in different employment sectors, Ackers (1998 and 2005) analyses the mobility of scientists within the EU from an economic and personal perspective. Ackers highlights above all gender differences in their motivations. For women, the decision to migrate is a complex issue that is not based on a single factor. Womens intra-EU mobility does not fit in with the traditional male breadwinner family model. Instead, in the first stage of their migration, mobile women are mostly single and their motivations are associated with the search for career opportunities. However, in what is called post-migration, the traditional male breadwinner model is suitable, since women pair off with men from the destination countries, and this leads them to have mobility motivations linked with their partner (that is, family/personal reasons). Within the new map of European migration, students are also
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increasingly important actors of mobility. Despite the difficulty of finding reliable data (Poulain et al. 2006), there is no doubt that student exchange and mobility, both internal and international, is ever more significant. As King reminds us (2002, 989), this is quite an important form of European mobility, promoted by the European Commission through the Erasmus and Socrates programmes, as well as the traditions of some EU countries that encourage students to leave their homes when they go to college. Its relevance as a form of mobility is established by a study of the characteristics of young students of the University of Sussex who took part in an international mobility programme (King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003). According to the authors of the study, the motivations of the students in exchange programmes relate to three aspects: linguistic self-improvement, the cultural experience of living in another country, and general personal development. All these reasons have, in the opinion of the students, allowed them to improve their employment and career opportunities, but they clearly cannot be reduced only to economic motivations. As King argues, it is possible to view student migration as a subset of youth migration, motivated by a mix of education goals and the combination of experience and pleasure-seeking facilitated by travel and forms of casual or temporary work (King et al. 2004, 99). Finally, research on the migration of European retirees has grown significantly over the last few years. The main thesis of these studies is that mobile retirees go in search of healthier environments, where weather and the quality of life are essential. Among these retirees we also find what we could call part-time retirees, that is, workers who decide to spend part of the year in southern European countries, who give up part of their income in exchange for a better quality of life. Many of these studies of the migration of retirees have examined the Spanish case, particularly the settlements on the Mediterranean coast (Rodrguez et al. 1998; OReilly 2000; Casado-Daz 2005; Huber 2004; Huber and OReilly 2004; Kaiser and Friedrich 2004). Other studies have explored this phenomenon by comparing Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain and Portugal) (King et al. 1998 and 2000; Casado-Daz et al. 2004). According to Casado-Daz et al. (2004), although the search for a better quality of life (through the climate) remains the main motivation to move, other reasons are increasingly relevant: economic advantages (lower cost of living), the Mediterranean lifestyle, social life and, finally, easy and cheap communication with the migrants country of origin thanks to low-cost flights. Again, pure economic motivations are hard to isolate. Nevertheless, there are differences when it comes to choosing a destination. Climate is more important on the Costa del Sol (southern Spain), whereas the environment and the landscape are the main aspects in Tuscany (Italy). The fact that international
Deciding to move
57
retirees living in Tuscany enjoy a higher socioeconomic status means that the cost of living is not an important motivation in their decision to move, whereas it is a noteworthy reason in Spain, Malta and Portugal (King et al. 1998, 100101).
REASONS FOR INTRA-EU MOBILITY

Migration Motivations In this section we can now pose a series of key questions that will enable us to better characterise intra-EU mobility based on the migration projects of respondents to the EIMSS survey. This draws on the findings of existing studies about the motivations and various types of migration within the new Europe, but allows a much more detailed and representative breakdown of these factors. We ask whether and how since 1973 the mobility of workers has lost its predominant role, how this varies by country of origin or destination, and whether other factors identified in the general migration literature such as the feminization of migration or the growing role of human capital are also shaping these mobility choices within Europe. A first overview of the reasons for migration uncovered by the EIMSS survey reveals above all the importance of the affective sphere (see Table 3.1). 29.2 per cent of the answers given refer to reasons of a sentimental nature (to live with partner/spouse/children), with a further 6.2 per cent indicating reasons linked to the family of origin (to live together with members of the family). People in Europe, first of all, move because of love and family. This is particularly striking in terms of mobility to Italy (44.2 per cent), dwarfing economic, educational and quality of life reasonings there. Obviously, more needs to be said about migration for love. We might indeed speculate about the cultural impact of mixed couples, considering their strategic role as laboratories of re-elaboration of bi-national identity and the construction of new meanings, languages and styles of social interaction. Examining the nationality of partners, it becomes evident that 36.2 per cent of the respondents who have mentioned love as their reason to move have a partner of the same nationality, while as many as 61.6 per cent are married or live with a citizen of the country of destination. A new characterization of the EU-mover for love who leaves the country of origin mainly to form a new family with a citizen of the country of destination would seem therefore to prevail over the traditional migrant story of moving for love, where a spouse follows a partner of his/her own nationality, either leaving their country of origin together or in order to reunite a family. It is interesting to observe that the two
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Table 3.1
Main reasons for migration to the country of residence (COR) of EU movers (%)
France Germany Britain Italy Spain Total 7.3 13.4 1.2 4.2 0.2 0.4 2.2 1.8 25.5 19.7 0.4 8.2 0.6 1.2 2.7 1.4 14.2 22.4 1.1 5.1 0.9 0.9 3.3 2.8 5.1 14.6 0.5 6.5 0.4 2.3 2.0 1.4 2.1 6.1 3.2 1.7 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.8 10.9 15.2 1.3 5.2 0.6 1.1 2.0 1.6
Reasons Work To look for a job To accept a job offer To start a business Because of my occupation Education To study in secondary school To participate in a study exchange programme To study at university level (undergraduate) To study at graduate/ postgraduate/specialisation level To do an internship To learn the language Quality of life To gain new experiences To live in a better natural environment To live in better/healthier weather, enjoy climate Love/family To live together with members of family To live with partner/spouse/ children
1.1 4.6 10.1 21.9 9.0
1.1 3.6 7.0 1.8 1.0
0.6 12.2 11.1 4.8 0.3
0.8 1.9 6.6 12.3 8.9
1.0 6.2 12.6 37.4 49.3
0.9 5.6 9.4 15.7 13.7
4.2 29.6
7.4 31.7
4.2 30.9
4.5 39.7
10.5 13.8
6.2 29.2
different types present distinctive specific traits. Same-nationality couples are mentioned mainly by interviewed women and among those of Italian nationality. In contrast, mobility to live in the country of the partner is mentioned especially by male respondents (82.4 per cent versus 49 per cent of the women), and is not especially related to nationality. The second reason for moving most often mentioned is to live in a better natural environment (15.7 per cent), closely followed by to live in better/ healthier weather, enjoy climate (13.7 per cent). Underlining the centrality
Deciding to move
60
59
50
40 COR France COR Germany COR Britain COR Italy COR Spain
30
20
10
0 Work Study Family/Love Quality of life Misc. reasons
Source:
EIMSS, N 5 4 706
Figure 3.1
Reasons for movement to the country of residence of EU movers (index) (%)
of forms of mobility free from purely material considerations, both these motivations are considerably prevalent in France and Spain. It is only at this point that economic factors begin to have weight. The third ranked reason for mobility is to accept a job offer(15.2 per cent), followed by to look for a job (10.9 per cent). The migration of workers with a job offer is most common in Britain (22.4 per cent), whilst the riskier option of job search is more frequent in Germany (25.5 per cent). A minority of people interviewed (5.2 per cent), moreover, stated that they had moved because of my occupation, in this case, most likely as a result of intra-firm mobility within multinational companies. These are directed mostly to Germany and in a smaller degree to Italy. Finally, learning the language of the country as a reason to move there is mentioned by only 5.6 per cent of respondents, while to participate in a study exchange programme is mentioned only by 1.1 per cent of respondents. It is worth noting that Erasmus grants, in spite of their overall success in other terms, may thus have been of fairly marginal importance with regard to definitive or long-term migration. In Figure 3.1, all these detailed reasons for migration have been collapsed into an index composed of four pure categories, which counts those who have indicated only one motive for migration or two motives which fall within the same category)2, as well as an additional category including multiple motives which refer to different categories (miscellaneous reasons).
60
The reduction in categories helps clarify the findings. The category love/ family (29.8 per cent) prevails over reasons regarding jobs (25.3 per cent) and quality of life (23.9 per cent), while reasoning related to study (study reasons) applies to only 7.1 per cent of the sample. These findings suggest three points. First of all, no truly dominant reason for moving emerges. This suggests the need for finer-grained distinctions among countries. As we see here, work reasons prevail in Germany, family/love in Italy and quality of life in Spain. However, in terms of the overriding economic focus of most forms of international migration studied, it is clear that intra-EU migration shows a much greater tendency towards affective factors, which by no means always stem from the classic pattern of reuniting families. Equally, far more significant are choices about living in a better environment, meant as either a natural environment (a healthy climate, beautiful countryside and so on) or in seeing migration as a social space in which to explore or achieve personal lifestyle ambitions. Thirdly, the presence of a relevant number of respondents who indicate two fundamentally different reasons for mobility (13.9 per cent) proves that migration projects are often complex and multi-dimensional actions. Country, Period, Gender and Human Capital Effects Although intra-EU mobility does not appear to be guided by a single predominant reason, the analysis by country of residence and country of origin clearly identifies different types of migration. Work-driven movements are still the prevailing form of migration from southern Europe (in our survey, Italy and Spain) towards central and northern Europe (Germany, France and Great Britain) (Figure 3.2). Of particular note are the 64.8 per cent of Italians in Germany who resettled there to improve their employment situation. This type of migration has deep historical roots: in the period between 1946 and 1970, Italy was the most common origin and West Germany the most common destination of all the flows towards Central-Northern European industrial areas (Pugliese 2002, 212). Italians in our sample have also mostly moved for work reasons in Britain (37.9 per cent) and in France (35.1 per cent). More generally, as already shown in Figure 3.1, mobility for work represents the main form of migration into Germany (42.3 per cent) and Britain (31.7 per cent). This finding confirms the persistence of the classical SouthNorth route of intra-European mobility. However, there is also a noticeable proportion of work-related French (31.8 per cent) and British migrants (29.7 per cent) in Italy, British in Germany (43.7 per cent) and Germans in Britain (38.2 per cent).
Deciding to move
70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 France Germany Britain Italy Spain Country of residence (COR) Source: EIMSS, N 5 1 186 COR France COR Germany COR Britain COR Italy COR Spain
61
Figure 3.2
Labour mobility by country of residence (COR) and country of origin (COO) (%)
In Spain, on the other hand, mobility for quality of life reasons is clearly predominant (56.5 per cent). The climate, the weather and the natural beauty of Spain have a great attraction for respondents of all nationalities, but above all for British (70.3 per cent) and Germans (69.4 per cent). Quality of life constitutes the main motive for migration also for the German and British respondents in France (40.3 per cent and 61.4 per cent respectively) and for Germans in Italy (39.9 per cent). The love/ family dimension has priority for Spanish respondents in Italy (56.4 per cent), France (47.9 per cent), Germany (41.5 per cent) and Britain (32.1 per cent). Love/family reasons, meanwhile, were mentioned by 45.7 per cent of French migrants in Italy and 40.8 per cent of Italians in France. Love/family reasons play a fairly important role also in Britain, next to reasons for work, especially among French (36.2 per cent) and German respondents (33.5 per cent). Study is a more common reason to migrate to Britain than to any other of the countries under inquiry (mainly for French and Spanish movers, 17.4 per cent and 15.4 per cent). Finally, miscellaneous reasons have been indicated above all by Germans living in Spain (22.3 per cent), France (21.6 per cent) and Italy (16.6 per cent). Viewed in terms of periodisation of migration over the three decades (1974 to 2003) covered by our sample, reasons for mobility have in fact
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undergone significant evolutions. On the whole, the love/family reasons, which prevailed in the 20 years following the immigration stop policies enacted in West European countries in the early 1970s, have progressively lost momentum, while quality of life has been on the rise. Work-related migration has ever picked up as expected by European institutions, despite the continued attempts to uphold directives and laws easing the mobility of workers. In the most recent decade, it has shown only a slight increase as compared to the previous period. After a significant increase at the beginning of the 1980s, mobility for study has also remained substantially stable. However, significant differences are found according to the country of destination. Taking into consideration the whole period, work mobility dropped in France and in Spain. In Italy, on the contrary, it increased, while in Germany it remains more or less constant at high levels. Mobility for family/love reasons has declined, leaving room for an increase of movements for quality of life, especially in Spain (59.7 per cent) and France (42.3 per cent) in the last decade. In this more recent period, migration for mixed reasons peaked in Germany (20.4 per cent), perhaps as an effect of the transnational movements of families who settled there in the years of industrial migration. Gender differences are also noteworthy. In the literature, the so-called feminisation of migration is well documented, understood not only as an increase in the quantity of migrating women, but also as a change in the reasons for mobility, that is, an effect of the increased level of female education and the transformations of womens roles in society (Kofman 1999). For some women, the experience of migration seems to have assumed therefore an aspiration to better job opportunities and personal self-fulfilment, independent of family ties (Ackers 1998). In our sample, however, a quite classic pattern of mobility, which sees men emigrating mainly for economic reasons (33.1 per cent) and women for reasons of love/family (37.4 per cent), is confirmed (Krieger 2004). But also for women, differences in motivations are linked to the destination they choose. In particular, in Germany and Britain, Italian women have migrated more for work than for love/family reasons (53.8 per cent and 35.9 per cent respectively). This same country-based logic applies to male movers. Work mobility is particularly widespread among Italian men migrating to Germany (74.3 per cent of them mention work and only 9.6 per cent love/family). On the other hand, in the case of Italian men in Spain and Spanish men in Italy, family reasons prevail significantly over work reasons (21.9 per cent against 13.7 per cent and 30.9 per cent against 25.9 per cent), whilst for the Germans, Italians and Spanish in France, for the Germans in Italy and the French in Spain, the number of labour-related and love/family-related
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movers are substantially the same (no more than three percentage points of difference). An intriguing association between sexual orientation and the reasons for migration is revealed by our data. In our sample, a full 6 per cent of respondents declared that they had a partner of the same sex. This is a quite considerable proportion, given the intrusive nature of the question and the instrument used to pose it (an impersonal phone call). While the nature and the scale of the survey does not permit a deeper investigation of the link between mobility and sexuality, we have to note that for the majority of this group of respondents the main reasons for mobility are either miscellaneous or quality of life, responses which might contain some hint that mobility has been used to better enable these people to fulfil their own sexual orientations. Neo-classical economic theories of migration (such as Harris and Todaro 1970) underline the centrality of human capital as the trigger of geographic mobility. At the micro level, these approaches treat migration as an investment increasing the productivity of human resources, an investment which has costs and returns (Sjastaad 1962, 83). In particular, it is usually assumed that higher levels of education offer increased income returns for specific segments of the labour market (Krieger 2004). Other scholars, instead, reject this assumption given the prevalence of low-skilled jobs for migrants in many destination countries (Bauer and Zimmermann 1999b). Starting from these theoretical considerations, the survey explored the possible links between forms of mobility and two fundamental aspects of human capital, measured in terms of education and age at migration. On the whole, the reasons for migration do not seem to be significantly associated with levels of education, not even controlling for gender. It can be noted that 63 per cent of labour migrants in our sample, in the most recent decade (19942003), were in fact highly educated. This confirms the rise of highly skilled mobility involving not only multinational corporations, the banking and the finance industry, but also sectors such as research, IT, tourism and marketing (as has been discussed inter alia by Salt 1992; Rodrguez-Pose 2002; Ackers 2005; European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2006; Favell 2008a). While in Germany about half of the respondents who immigrate for work (the greater part of which are of Italian nationality) possess a lowmedium education level, high-skilled individuals form the majority of mobile workers in all the other countries analysed. In particular, in Germany there is a large presence of high-skilled English workers (44.5 per cent); in Britain and France the largest numbers of high-skilled workers are Italians (37.1 per cent and 34.2 per cent); in Italy 35.6 per cent
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of high-skilled movers come from Britain and 34.9 per cent from France; while in Spain, besides the French (43.8 per cent) there is a significant quantity of high-skilled Italians (31.3 per cent). High-skilled mobility in the EU is both centrifugal and centripetal, without a neat distinction between sending and receiving countries. However, Germany and Britain do stand out as the prevailing destinations of European high-skilled workers in our survey. It must also be noticed that among love/family and quality of life movers as well, the majority of French and British respondents have a tertiary education (56 per cent and 43.3 per cent respectively for the first type; 54.4 per cent and 44.3 per cent for the second). In contrast, more than half of the German interviewees who emigrated for quality of life have a vocationally oriented secondary level degree (53.1 per cent). The effect of education on the inclination to move is controversial because it also interacts with the influence of age (Kalter 1997; Bauer and Zimmermann 1999b). Generally speaking, though, the young show a higher tendency for migration than people over the age of 40. From an economic point of view, the idea is that the older the potential migrant, the fewer the number of years (s)he has to cash in on human capital investment (Krieger 2004, 84). In other words, older workers have a lower economic incentive to move, as the amortisation period for their investment is shorter. However, such a conclusion overlooks the impact of the non-monetary factors that have emerged as so important in the EIMSS survey. In our sample, then, the respective ages of migrants who moved for work and those who moved for love/family reasons is revealing. Labour-related movements in our sample took place when respondents were on average 31 years old not as young as might be expected. Yet among all nationalities, work migrants leave their home country earlier than average migrants as a whole. Movers for love/family reasons packed their luggage slightly later, on average when they were 32 years old. At the opposite end of the scale, migrants in search of a better quality of life left when they were on average 45 and a half. Given their age, we can hardly reconcile their movement with a theory that understands this only in terms of human capital investment, even if indirect. Other returns such as psychological and physical well-being need be taken into account to make sense of their choice. Families, Friends and Migration Choices Our overview of migration motivations is complemented by information about the family and social support available at the time of migration. Even in a relatively mobility-friendly political space like Western Europe,
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migration is a brave decision which is pondered and sometimes opposed by parents, spouses and friends. Among our respondents, slightly more than half the families of migrants (51.8 per cent) are reported to have favoured mobility, while 35 per cent were neutral and one out of six opposed it. No significant deviation emerges when these figures are differentiated by motives for migration or country of origin. One interesting fact that did emerge however was that Italian parents were more likely to support daughters than sons when they moved an anomaly which might be interpreted either culturally as an expression of the possessiveness of Italian mothers over their sons, or structurally in the light of the particular hardships of the labour market for young women south of the Alps. The central role of migrant networks in aiding and even explaining migration via the effects of social capital is amply documented in the classic literature regarding migration, for instance between Central America and the US (Massey 1999). Other peoples experience with migration is usually considered as one of the main pull factors of mobility (Wallace 1998). In our study, the existence of a social network as a possible incentive for migration was examined by asking respondents if they knew co-nationals already residing in the country of destination before moving. More than one-third answered positively, with some significant differences among all nationalities. In particular, as shown in Figure 3.3, a pre-existing network of national acquaintances was mentioned mainly by the Italian and Spanish respondents who are resident in Germany (37 per cent and
40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 France Germany Britain Italy Spain Country of residence (COR) COO Germany COO France COO Britain COO Italy COO Spain
Source:
EIMSS, N 5 1 899
Figure 3.3
Co-national acquaintances before settling by country of residence (COR) and country of origin (COO) (%)
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31.1 per cent) and by Spanish and Germans in France (33.2 per cent and 32.3 per cent). No significant statistical association emerges between the existence of such a network and the gender, age, education and reasons for migration of respondents.
PREVIOUS MOBILITY EXPERIENCES

Intra-EU mobility can clearly be considered a form of long-distance mobility, in that it at least entails the crossing of a national state border. However, this type of mobility should not be considered as an isolated form, but rather as simply one aspect of peoples varied mobility options throughout their lives (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2006, 7). The idea of taking into account the mobility history of each individual poses the question of whether people with more mobility experiences in the past will be more mobile in the future. Data from Eurobarometer 2005 (EB 64.1) certainly show that people who moved in the past have a higher propensity to move in the near future. This is especially so for people who have made long-distance moves. Plausibly, one migration experience trains them to move again in the future. Overall, respondents to the EIMSS are indeed individuals with considerable mobility experiences. Approximately half of them reported that they had lived outside their country of origin for at least three months before resettling in the country where they now live. This may mean having lived already for a short period in the current host country (that is, for a study period) before going back to the home country for some time; or that people have circulated across different countries, having therefore lived in at least three different nations in their lives (in fact, a full 11.7 per cent of the sample). What is the profile of this high-mobility population? Some studies suggest that there is a relationship between age and previous mobility in that the older you are, the more probable it is that you have lived in another country or in another region (Krieger and Fernandez 2006, 6). However, we could not find a significant effect of age on the existence of prior movements in our sample. The same is true of gender. Men are in slightly larger numbers, but this difference is not significant. However, our data do confirm that highly educated persons have a high level of mobility compared to those with low or average levels of education in the EU overall, as Krieger and Fernandez (2006) claim. In fact, 56 per cent of movers with a tertiary level degree have some other migration experiences in their background. Considering all possible combinations of past
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Table 3.2 Previous migration experiences and higher education (column %)

Higher education No Previous experience Multiple experiences Lived in third country Lived in COR before Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 40.3 59.7 8.1 91.9 26.4 73.6 22.2 77.8 Yes 56.1 43.9 13.3 86.7 43.7 56.3 25.8 74.2
Source:
EIMSS, N (minimum) 5 4 838
migrations, education makes a difference (Table 3.2). Super-movers, as we dub them, are boosted by an edge in human capital, which can manifest itself in a number of different ways either in terms of labour skills, language proficiency, capacity to retrain themselves, or sheer curiosity and passion for other cultures. The nature of previous experiences of migration can vary enormously. First, we find a type of migration we could call direct: individuals opt for a given country and settle down there. For instance, the large majority of English and German respondents living in Spain, and English respondents in France did not report previous experiences in other countries. What they have in common is that quality of life was their main reason for moving abroad. This pattern of low previous mobility to third countries can also be found among Italians in Germany (mainly labour migrants), and Spanish citizens living in Italy, who reported family/love reasons as their main motivation. The case of British nationals living in Spain and France, who are mainly low-skilled workers and retirees, is strikingly different from that of the British in Germany and Italy, who in fact report the highest levels of plurinational mobility. The international prevalence of the English language is a plausible explanation for their strong propensity to move and keep moving after all, language is possibly the tallest cultural barrier inhibiting mobility (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2006, 11). It should be remembered that, generally speaking, in the EU mobility is still largely an intra-national, or at best inter-regional, phenomenon. According to Eurostat and the European Commission (2002, 16), only 5 per cent of EU citizens who, over the last ten years, have changed their
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Table 3.3
Relationship between reasons for previous and current migration to COR (%)
Reasons for current migration to COR Work Study 4.0 20.1 4.4 3.4 Quality of life 13.5 19.6 65.2 16.8 Family/ Love 28.9 34.7 23.8 67.8
Reasons for 1st migration to COR
Work Study Quality of life Family/love
66.0 42.1 19.4 24.0
Notes: Row totals add up > 100 because they refer to the total number of answers, not to respondents. Source: EIMSS, N 5 1 200
place of residence, have moved to another country within the European Union. Approximately the same percentage has moved to countries outside the EU. Perhaps not surprisingly, EU movers deviate dramatically from this general pattern. In our sample, 61.9 per cent of respondents have had previous mobility experiences in at least another EU15 country, mainly France (12 per cent), Germany (11.3 per cent), and Britain (10.6 per cent). Significant shares of movers have also lived in the United States (15.3 per cent), non-EU15 European countries (14 per cent, of which 3.6 per cent in the A10 countries), and other non-European countries (35.4 per cent).3 Super-movers are predominantly work-related movers both in the past and in the current period of migration. However, mobility driven by education was equally important in the past for them. And, noticeably, former students in a given country tend to move back to that same country at a later stage of their lifecourse. The fact of having studied in a foreign country helps to bring down the cultural barriers associated with learning a new language and new customs, and also helps to strengthen enduring personal networks there. Past experiences as students create stronger roots to a given country than other forms of migration. How do these reasons for mobility evolve over time? Are super-movers persistent in their migration decisions? Or do they opt for different countries over time following differing life plans? Our data allow us to answer these questions, distinguishing people who have migrated repeatedly to the same country (Table 3.3) and others who have rather come from a third country (Table 3.4). In a sense, Tables 3.3 and 3.4 constitute mobility tables of spatial mobility. The entries on the diagonal correspond to the proportion of
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Table 3.4
Relationship between reasons for previous migration to third countries and current migration to COR (%)
Reasons for current migration to COR Work Study 6.0 19.3 12.2 7.2 Quality of life 30.2 23.9 45.7 25.2 Family/ Love 29.4 29.4 30.6 52.7
Reasons for 1st migration to 3rd country
Work Study Quality of life Family/love
46.3 40.5 25.7 24.7
Notes: Row totals add up > 100 because they refer to the total number of answers, not to respondents. Source: EIMSS, N 5 1 852
respondents who reported the same motivation in their current and previous migration experiences. We can see at a glance that figures on the diagonal of Table 3.3 are higher than on the diagonal of Table 3.4. This suggests that the reasons behind previous and current migrations are more likely to be similar when both events take place in the same country rather than in third countries. In other words, people who are more open to circulate across different countries tend to select their destination on the basis of varying criteria, rather than fine-tuning their initial choice. Study is the most versatile motive in facilitating a later mobility experience to the same country: respondents who had already lived in a foreign country for education-related reasons moved back mostly for other reasons, especially professional ones (42.1 per cent), although motives related to family/love (34.7 per cent) or the search for a better quality of life (19.6 per cent) are also significant. Presumably, this mobility path describes the destinies of many Erasmus students who started putting their roots down abroad after their EU-funded exploration time in that country either for emerging career prospects or for blossoming personal relationships.
CONCLUSIONS
Over the last 30 years, three main motivations characterize intra-European mobility: work-related mobility, which dominated the European area after World War II and until the 1970s; migration related to affective reasons that has been present throughout; and the wish to live in a better social and
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natural environment, which has grown in importance. Within the EU15, the reasons for setting up residence in another country are not only associated with an economic factor (that is, work), but also with important non-economic reasons such as family/love and quality of life. Work-related migration has Germany and Britain as its main countries of destination, Italy being the main country of origin. This form of mobility has followed two main routes. On the one hand, migrants have kept moving from southern Europe to Northern and Central European countries. On the other hand, migration flows between Northern-Central European countries have gained momentum. One of the most significant findings of our survey is that family/love and quality of life are increasingly important motivations of mobility within the EU. With respect to the family/love variable, it is worth noting that love (that is, usually joining a partner already living in the destination country) is a much more significant reason than family (that is, usually following a partner moving to that country) in all the countries we have studied. There are only two exceptions: Spanish nationals residing in Germany, among whom we find a small difference between the two dimensions, and Italian citizens in Spain, for whom family is definitely a more important reason than love. In fact, English and German movers are mostly drawn by quality of life wherever they settle down, but particularly in Spain and France. In addition to these heterosexual patterns of migration, our survey also suggested that a remarkable number of gay people have used mobility strategies as part of their lifestyle choices. Finally, reasons related to studying deserve to be mentioned, even if they do not appear to be widespread. The Erasmus programme seems to have had a marginal quantitative importance as the direct reason behind current migration decisions: only 1.1 per cent in our sample settled down for good abroad as an immediate consequence of Erasmus. However, having studied in a given country, even for a few months, facilitates subsequent movements towards the country where it took place, since it apparently tears down (at least in part) the cultural barriers associated with learning a foreign language and new customs, and helps to strengthen social networks which can be re-activated at a later stage in the destination country. Our findings thus show the relevance of previous mobility experiences, as about half of respondents have migrated before settling down where they live at the moment of the interviews. Past reasons for mobility tend to be different from current ones, especially when prior migrations took place in another country. To conclude, the motivations for intra-EU mobility seem to come close to the reasons for changing residence noted in broader surveys on spatial mobility (Eurostat and European Commission 2002), where family/
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personal reasons or motives associated with quality of life turned out to be as important as work-related reasons. For citizens who dare cross the frontiers of nation states, moving to another country within the EU is a decision essentially comparable, in terms of motivation, to moving within ones own country. In this sense, then, in terms of the motivations of the actors involved, EU mobility is being redefined as something very different from classic migration, in which economic rationality prevails. Rather, intra-EU mobility begins to look more like a form of internal migration, something which in itself can be seen as a step forward in the process of building an integrated Europe from below.
NOTES
1. Sections 1 was written by Albert, 2 by Baldoni, and 3 and 4 by Santacreu. 2. In the questionnaire it was possible to mention two possible prevalent reasons for mobility. 3. Since mobility experiences are not necessarily confined to a single country, these percentages add up to more than 100.
4.
The social mobility of mobile Europeans

Ettore Recchi
SPATIAL AND SOCIAL MOBILITY: BETWEEN SPECULATION AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Social mobility is arguably the major spur for the spatial mobility of human beings. While it is true that some people relocate across borders regardless of occupational or economic reasons (be it to escape a war or retire in a sunny place), the bulk of migrants decide to move in order to improve their position in the social structure. Upward social mobility is the rationale for most migration projects. This chapter examines the intergenerational and intragenerational class mobility of EU movers. In particular, it is meant to outline the opportunities for social mobility in an almost completely open migration regime, such as the one created by free movement policies in the European Union. As Chapter 3 shows, intra-EU migration is driven by a wider canvas of individual strategies than social class advancement. People also move to join partners, follow spouses and enjoy a more peaceful or thrilling life. Yet such motives are no impediment to socioeconomic changes. And this is an even more plausible outcome for those who move in search of more rewarding jobs and careers. At least as a null hypothesis, the experience of EU movers might be assumed to conform to the baseline immigration story that classically finds a tight association of social and spatial mobility. Eventually, whether they fit in this story or not will help us assess the novelty of their migration pattern. Traditional migrants insertion into the social structures of destination countries does not unfold linearly. Many studies indicate that migrants seldom fulfil their aspiration to upward social mobility soon after their arrival. In fact, they tend to be subject to downward trajectories in the early stages of their occupational life in the host society (Piore 1979; Evans and Kelley 1991; McAllister 1995; Bauer and Zimmermann 1999b). This is particularly true during periods of saturation of the receiving labour market (Raijman and Semyonov 1998). The demand for foreign workers
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is usually concentrated in so-called 3D jobs, involving dirty, dangerous and dull tasks, that are unlikely to generate upward mobility.1 Still, migrants take these jobs, and are normally gratified by one basic improvement over their experience at home: a higher income. Even if placed at the bottom of the pay ladder, the average migrant experiences a significant increase in income due to the earnings differentials between origin and destination country. Moreover, the migrant career achievements are expected to be U-shaped, progressing with the passing of time in the host society (Chiswick 1979). To a certain extent, this expectation compensates for the possible decline of occupational status in the early stages of immigration. Nonetheless, downward status mobility is something many migrants have to cope with.2 In spite of all strategies for handling the status inconsistency that so frequently marks migrants lives, the aspiration to full-fledged social mobility entailing an ascent in both income and status remains at the heart of the immigration experience. But, while it is sometimes noted that migrants are more occupationally mobile than natives (for example, Bauer and Zimmermann 1999b), there is surprisingly little systematic research on the intergenerational class mobility of migrants (for a significant exception, see Yaish 2002). It is usually assumed that the social mobility dream tends to be fulfilled by second and third generations that is, by means of postponement or projection on to the children and grandchildren of first movers (Gordon 1971). A peddler to plumber to professional upward trajectory is idealized thereafter (Perlmann and Waldinger 1997, 894). However, even in the US and Canada, the prototypical countries of social mobility opportunities for migrants, fine-grained evidence on the mobility patterns that substantiate such a linear intergenerational assimilation of migrant minorities in the social structure is quite scant (Boyd and Grieco 1998; Portes and Rumbaut 2005). In Europe, so far, information is limited to a dated German longitudinal study (Seifert 1997), a comparison of the early labour market experiences of young Turks and Moroccans in six countries (Cruel and Vermeulen 2003), an inquiry into the occupational achievements of Turkish, Moroccan and Portuguese second generations in France (Simon 2003), and a more recent analysis of British longitudinal data showing sharp differences of career trajectories by ethnic group (Platt 2005). Overall, however, speculation seems to prevail over evidence. For sure, no firm generalization has been made on the basis of comparative empirical analyses of migrant populations in European societies. In fact, it is not the lack of scholarly interest but the limits of existing surveys of the general population in most countries that explain the paucity of quantitative-oriented research focused on migrant social mobility. In nations where immigrants amount to less than 10 per cent of residents, their
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number simply ends up being too small in average-size random samples. Not by chance, the more detailed studies in the field so far have been conducted in Israel, a country where over half the Jewish population was born abroad (Raijman and Semyonov 1998, 292). This permits the use of microcensus data for significant comparisons of natives and immigrants. An alternative strategy is to carry out surveys of immigrants parallel to surveys of the general population such as, for instance, the Multicultural Australia Survey of 198889 (McAllister 1995). This is exactly the strategy adopted by our European Internal Movers Social Survey (EIMSS). This chapter tries to fill this gap for that specific share of the mobile population EU movers who are simultaneously migrants and European nationals. The key question of the analysis is: does EU citizenship status make movers social mobility patterns akin to stayers? The next section discusses hypotheses about immigrant mobility in such a social and institutional context. In section 3, the class compositions of EU stayers and movers are contrasted. The final two sections of the chapter illustrate and discuss findings on intergenerational and intragenerational mobility respectively.3
EASIER MIGRATION, EQUALIZED OPPORTUNITIES? THE IMPACT OF THE EU FREE MOVEMENT REGIME ON INTRA-EU MIGRANTS SOCIAL MOBILITY
Immigrants face many disadvantages in their host societies. Economic theory imputes immigrants disadvantages to their normally worse command of country-specific labour skills (like language and social norms), while sociological perspectives stress discrimination in the access to jobs, housing and public services (in particular, due to institutional discrimination such as exclusion from citizenship rights). The two views are not mutually exclusive. Lack of market-valued resources (relative to natives) and discrimination can definitely combine to impair the social and economic achievements of immigrants. In an ideal world where both factors could be removed, differences in the chances of upward social mobility between immigrants and natives should disappear altogether. Is this the case in the EU? How does free movement designed by the European Union for the cross-border mobility of citizens of its member states that is, a quite special migration regime affect the social mobility regime of intra-EU migrants? Does being a EU citizen with the same rights as natives cancel out the impediments to upward social mobility usually suffered by immigrants? Some hypotheses can be formulated.
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H1. As the elimination of barriers to mobility and settlement for EU citizens within the Union has made migration costs negligible (compared to the costs of resettlement of other world migrants), intra-EU migration has become more accessible to all social strata. While it is often found that migrants disproportionately originate from the middle class, who can afford the travel and opportunity costs of international resettlement (for example, Yaish 2002, 456; Fielding 2007, 123), in principle the lowering of migration costs for EU citizens should encourage mobility from one country to another irrespective of class origins. Therefore, H1 posits that the class origins of EU movers and EU stayers do not differ significantly. H2. Since discrimination against EU migrants is almost non-existent institutionally but also culturally, as social distance among Europeans has largely waned (see Dez Medrano 2003) EU movers should not face glass ceilings and should enjoy career prospects similar to stayers. At the same time, since wage differentials between EU15 member states tend to level out4, workers migration should be driven by opportunities for upward class mobility rather than by the allure of higher salaries in status-degrading jobs (as is in fact typical of migrants from less-developed countries). In other words, it seems plausible that EU movers might replicate the kind of spiralist trajectories of spatial mobility aimed at class mobility that are found in studies on internal migration (for example, in Britain, Fielding 1992 and 1995; the idea of spiralism dates back to Watson 1964). New European movers might use their unusual opportunities for international movement to out-flank social mobility regimes that remain limiting at a national level. Therefore, H2 posits that EU movers are more frequently found in upper class destinations than EU stayers. H3. As cross-border mobility nonetheless remains an investment-like business, implying the endorsement of stronger risks in the labour market than in home countries, it can also be posited that, in spite of the decrease in the costs of intra-European migration, EU movers are more likely than stayers to change social class over their lifecourse. Thus, H3 posits that EU movers are more socially mobile than stayers both upwardly and (possibly) downwardly. H4. Opportunities for absolute social mobility are contingent on the economic structure of the countries where people live. Therefore, individuals moving from relatively backward (that is, with a higher number of blue-collar jobs) to more service-based economies are more likely to experience upward social mobility. In the geographical area under scrutiny, France, Germany and Britain are known to have a larger proportion of the workforce in white-collar occupations
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than Italy and Spain (Breen and Luijkx 2004a, 74). Hence, H4 posits that Italian and Spanish migrants have higher rates of upward social mobility than their French, German and British counterparts. The analyses that follow will determine the extent to which these ex ante suppositions describe the real trajectories of class mobility of intra-EU migrants. The dataset used in this chapter merges EIMSS and ESS for Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Spain. However, as the focus of this chapter is on social mobility achieved through occupations in a foreign country, EU movers without any job experience in the host country such as students, non-working spouses and pensioners are left out of the analysis, except when otherwise noted.
THE CLASS COMPOSITION OF STAYERS AND MOVERS

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 describe the class positions of EU stayers and movers by country of residence (COR) and country of origin (COO), allowing for a first test of the hypotheses about the social origins and destinations of our sub-populations. Even at a rapid glance, Table 4.1 reveals the markedly more privileged family background of intra-EU migrants. In all countries, the proportion of movers from working class families is lower than that of natives of the host country, with the only exception being Italians and Spanish in Germany. On the other hand, more than one-quarter of respondents among movers to the country, but only one out of six among natives, originate from the bourgeoisie or the salariat (classes III of the EriksonGoldthorpe schema). Again, the Italians and Spanish in Germany (the latter also in Britain) are an exception. Nonetheless, in all the communities of Spanish abroad, and in four out of five of those of Italians, the proportion of movers with upper class origins is higher than among Spanish and Italian stayers respectively. In sum, the experience of resettling across EU borders is more frequent among the children of better-off families. It might be suspected that a spurious correlation with age intervenes here, given the lower age profile of working movers (on average they are 46, while stayers are 50). However, the class origins of natives and movers below and above 45 in fact reproduce approximately the same pattern (analysis not shown). Thus, intra-EU migration seems far from being uncorrelated with social origins, and appears to be skewed towards the middleupper class. At the country level, the overall pattern of movers privilege can be found among EU movers residing in Britain, France, Spain and Italy. In the last country, the difference with the native population is at its apex
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Table 4.1
Class origins of EU stayers and movers by country of residence and nationality (column %)
Country of residence Nationality DE 19.0 26.7 12.4 20.7 21.2 GB 26.0 28.8 12.0 13.5 19.7 Germany FR IT 33.2 28.2 13.4 13.9 11.4 Britain FR 35.6 23.1 20.7 12.0 8.7 France FR 16.1 14.3 20.4 14.3 35.0 Italy FR 37.4 24.0 18.4 3.9 16.2 Spain FR 25.9 30.9 3.3 5.2 31.0 4.8 55.7 ES 13.4 8.8 32.4 10.6 34.7
Class of origin Bourgeoisie (III) Routine non-manual (III) Petty bourgeoisie (IV) High-skilled manual (VVI) Low/non-skilled manual (VII)
Nationality Class of origin Bourgeoisie (III) Routine non-manual (III) Petty bourgeoisie (IV) High-skilled manual (VVI) Low/non-skilled manual (VII)
DE 52.7 22.3 9.8 7.1 8.0
GB 20.8 16.5 14.3 20.4 28.1
IT 28.5 11.3 31.2 7.2 21.7
ES 18.4 13.5 27.0 8.5 32.6
DE 30.2 28.1 19.8 13.5 8.3
GB 34.7 23.8 14.9 12.9 13.9
IT 22.0 10.4 28.6 9.3 29.7
ES 22.9 13.1 24.6 11.4 28.0
DE 34.0 31.9 12.1 15.6 6.4
GB 40.7 27.3 16.3 8.6 7.2
IT 8.3 15.5 35.6 9.2 31.4
ES 22.5 17.5 34.3 8.1 17.5
Nationality Class of origin Bourgeoisie (III) Routine non-manual (III)
DE 17.0 34.0
GB 23.7 22.0
IT 20.4 12.4
ES 8.3 8.8
78
Table 4.1
(continued)
Country of residence
Petty bourgeoisie (IV) High-skilled manual (VVI) Low/non-skilled manual (VII)

Notes: Stayers data in italics. Source:
21.3 14.9 12.8
30.5 10.2 13.6
18.5 12.3 12.3
29.9 10.2 27.0
29.7 9.6 43.6
ESS 2004 and EIMSS, N 5 11 727
more than 60 per cent of movers stem from classes I, II and III, whereas less than one quarter of Italians have a similar origin. Although movers in the EIMSS sample only include people who work or have worked in the host society, leaving out Goethe- or Stendhal-likes living for extended periods south of the Alps, EU residents in Italy seem to embody an elitebased immigration.5 Yet they are not as distant from the native population as EU movers in Spain. In particular, almost 35 per cent of the European migrants working in Spain are self-employed or owners of small businesses some of them possibly trying to combine work and sunshine on the basis of prior professional experiences and savings. The situation is reversed in Germany, where there is a much higher proportion of movers with working class roots. Germany still qualifies as a country of traditional migration, offering economically rewarding opportunities to lowerclass migrants from the rest of Europe. This is in stark contrast also with Britain, which attracts a more select population of intra-EU migrants a higher number originating from the upper class, as well as with higher educational credentials (see Recchi et al. 2006). In turn, the British economy seems to reward migrants from the other side of the Eurotunnel more than any other to the point that 45 per cent of movers to Britain end up in the salariat. Since the bulk of European migrants in Britain live in the capital,6 Fieldings (1992) argument about the London area as an escalator region is corroborated on an international scale. But it is not only in Britain that privilege in class origins carries over to class destinations. Migration does not thwart the access of mobile Europeans to the higher ends of the social ladder. EU movers are overrepresented in both the salariat and the self-employed middle class (Table 4.2). The only exceptions to this picture are Italian and Spanish migrants in Germany and France, who are more likely than natives to take working class jobs (and are also less likely to get middleupper class occupations in Germany). This is the outcome of two different processes: the recruitment of Southern European workers in industrial occupations (diminished but
79
Table 4.2
Class destinations of EU stayers and movers by country of residence and nationality (column %)
Country of residence Nationality DE 27.5 27.1 8.4 17.0 19.9 GB 42.3 19.1 12.7 9.5 16.4 Germany FR IT 40.7 32.5 9.1 8.1 9.6 Britain FR 43.7 35.2 13.6 5.2 2.3 France FR 28.0 23.2 9.1 21.9 17.8 Italy FR 44.9 24.0 15.0 3.0 13.2 Spain FR 38.6 22.9 3.5 11.1 12.4 17.7 55.3 ES 23.9 15.7 7.4 12.6 40.4
Class of destination Bourgeoisie (III) Routine non-manual (III) Petty bourgeoisie (IV) High-skilled manual (VVI) Low/non-skilled manual (VII)
Nationality Class of destination Bourgeoisie (III) Routine non-manual (III) Petty bourgeoisie (IV) High-skilled manual (VVI) Low/non-skilled manual (VII)
DE 65.5 16.1 10.8 4.0 3.6
GB 29.2 28.2 8.7 9.1 24.7
IT 35.2 23.2 13.0 7.0 21.7
ES 32.2 20.3 14.7 14.0 18.9
DE 52.6 25.6 9.0 9.0 3.8
GB 53.1 16.3 13.3 5.1 12.2
IT 34.9 18.3 13.1 12.0 21.7
ES 37.7 20.5 7.3 9.3 25.2
DE 44.3 32.8 16.4 2.5 4.1
GB 49.5 17.3 28.4 2.4 2.4
IT 18.4 20.9 25.0 9.0 26.6
ES 36.0 22.8 16.2 6.6 18.4
Nationality Class of destination Bourgeoisie (III) Routine non-manual (III)
DE 35.7 19.6
GB 31.7 30.0
IT 22.2 19.3
ES 20.6 11.1
80
Table 4.2
(continued)
Country of residence
Petty bourgeoisie (IV) High-skilled manual (VVI) Low/non-skilled manual (VII)

Notes: Source: Stayers data in italics.
30.4 5.4 8.9
23.3 6.7 8.3
25.3 8.4 4.8
37.8 5.2 15.6
16.3 13.4 38.5
not terminated after 1973), and the prospering of ethnic niches, attracting a job-specific workforce of co-nationals (such as Italian restaurant and ice-cream businesses).7 Intra-EU migrants from Southern Europe are found in all social classes in greater numbers in the working class among movers of the 1970s and 1980s, more in the middle-upper classes subsequently. In contrast, not only retirement migrants, but also workers heading to the south of the continent constitute a select population among which the highly skilled are overrepresented. In particular, German citizens on the move to other EU countries get predominantly upper-class employment. More than 50 per cent of German respondents to the EIMSS belong to the salariat, while less than 5 per cent have a non-qualified manual job. The class profile of British and French movers is similar, although not so skewed towards the upper end as that of Germans.
INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY: CROSSING STATE BORDERS, REPRODUCING CLASS BOUNDARIES?

From this section on, I shift to an individual-based analysis of social mobility, decomposing absolute intergenerational mobility into different typical paths. In particular, four basic trajectories are distinguished: (1) Immobility: individuals who belong to the same social class as their dominant parent (that is, the parent in the highest social class); (2) Upward mobility: individuals who have moved hierarchically between social classes, from a lower to a higher class; (3) Downward mobility: individuals who have moved hierarchically between social classes, from a higher to a lower class; (4) Non-vertical mobility: individuals who have moved across classes but not hierarchically (Table 4.3).8 The results of this recode are presented in Figure 4.1, which compares
81
Table 4.3
Origin
Social mobility outcomes in a 5 3 5 mobility table

Destination III III Down Imm Nonvert Nonvert Up IV Down Nonvert Imm Nonvert Up VVI Down Nonvert Nonvert Imm Up VII Down Down Down Down Imm
III III IV VVI VII

Notes: Source:
Imm Up Up Up Up
Imm 5 Immobile; Nonvert 5 Non-vertical Recode based on Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992, 124 and sparsim)
the proportion of intergenerationally mobile respondents (of the different kind) between subpopulations. A strong similarity between stayers and movers emerge. In both samples, the intergenerationally mobile amount to two-thirds of the total a result very close to what is found in existing research on social mobility in our reference countries (Breen and Luijkx 2004a, 48). Among these mobile individuals, as with stayers, slightly less than half have gone up the social ladder, while about 30 per cent have gone down and 20 per cent have experienced non-vertical class mobility. This finding counters one of our initial expectations: in an intergenerational perspective, movers are not more socially mobile than stayers. At the country level, Spain appears to be the only labour market in which European working migrants enjoy a significantly higher mobility rate than natives. However, this is almost exclusively due to a higher rate of nonvertical mobility (in particular, 28.9 per cent of working Germans in Spain experience this form of movement in the social structure). Differences in such short-haul mobility are also the cause of the especially high intergenerational mobility rates of the Spanish abroad (but noticeably in Britain 43.7 per cent of them are upwardly mobile) and Germans at home. Overall, no consistent difference between movers and stayers shows up, suggesting only a loose, if any, relation between spatial and social mobility. Still, the possibility that this finding is spurious, as other exogenous factors mask the real impact of migration on intergenerational mobility, cannot be ruled out by the analysis undertaken so far. The similarity of the mobility paths of movers and stayers could be only apparent and in fact stem from their differing biographical profiles. A logistic regression of intergenerational class mobility (dichotomized) was therefore run to control for other likely determinants of social mobility such as age, gender, education, and class origin (Table 4.4). Two models are compared,
100%
90%
80%
70% DN mobile UP mobile NV mobile Immobile
60%
50%
40%
82
GB IN FR IT IN FR ES IN FR DE IN GB FR IN GB GB IN GB IT IN GB ES IN GB DE IN IT FR IN IT GB IN IT IT IN IT ES IN IT
30%
20%
10%
0%
DE IN ES FR IN ES GB IN ES IT IN ES ES IN ES Total
DE IN DE
FR IN DE
GB IN DE
IT IN DE
ES IN DE
DE IN FR
FR IN FR
Source:
ESS 2004 and EIMSS, N5 10 463
Figure 4.1
Mobility rates decomposed into upward (UP), downward (DN) and non-vertical (NV) mobility by nationality and country of residence
83
Table 4.4
Logit models predicting intergenerational class mobility in the pooled ESS-EIMSS dataset
Model 1 B Std Error 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 B 20.02** 0.00 20.09* 0.81** 1.08** 0.49** 0.18 0.22 0.43* 0.08 0.26 0.25 20.01 0.08 20.28 21.00** 20.07 0.61** 0.66** Model 2 Std Error 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09
Age Age squared Gender Male Female Education University degree University entry qualification Upper vocational secondary Primary/lower secondary Nationality German French British Italian Spanish Country of residence Germany France Britain Italy Spain Migration status Mover Stayer Class of origin Bourgeoisie (III) Routine non-manual (III) Petty bourgeoisie (IV) High-skilled manual (VVI) Low/non-skilled manual (VII) Class of origin by migration status (mover) Bourgeoisie (III) Routine non-manual (III) Petty bourgeoisie (IV) High-skilled manual (VVI) Low/non-skilled manual (VII)
20.02** 0.00 20.09* 0.80** 1.07** 0.47** 0.11 0.16 0.34 0.05 0.33 0.34 0.11 0.06 20.16 21.09** 20.01 0.71** 0.71**
20.43* 0.50* 0.88** 0.60
0.21 0.25 0.25 0.33
84
Table 4.4
(continued)
Model 1 B Std Error 0.22 B 0.45 9 814 23 0.12 Model 2 Std Error 0.22
Constant 22 Log Likelihood Degrees of freedom Pseudo R-square
0.45 9 850 19 0.12
Notes: ESS: only respondents with work experience; EIMSS: only respondents with work experiences in country of residence. Reference category for dependent variable: class immobility. * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%. Immobility 5 0; Mobility 5 1. Source: ESS 2004 and EIMSS, N 5 8 426
the second controlling also for the interaction of class origin and migration status. In both models, the migration status of respondents (that is, being movers or stayers) does not affect respondents odds of intergenerational social mobility significantly. In the pooled ESS-EIMSS dataset, as could be expected, education, and especially upper-secondary qualifications, enhance the probabilities of social mobility considerably. In fact, country contexts and nationalities make no big difference, although British citizens tend to be slightly more socially mobile than their continental counterparts. Moreover, younger respondents and women have higher chances of absolute intergenerational mobility including downwards, which is relatively more frequent for these social categories. Finally, and most importantly, odds of intergenerational mobility are contingent on class origins, being higher for lower middle class offspring. In particular, sons and daughters of the petty bourgeois self-employed and high-skilled manual workers qualify as the most likely candidates for intergenerational mobility, while people from the top of the class hierarchy are in fact more often bound to stay put in their class of origin. By introducing an interaction term of class and migration status, model 2 intends to control whether the effect of family class on the odds of intergenerational mobility varies for EU movers. While the main effect does not cease to be significant, the interaction term shows that the odds of being intergenerationally immobile are even higher among EU movers from the upper class than among their stayer counterparts: in the EIMSS, 59.1 per cent of them are immobile as opposed to 48.7 per cent in the ESS. Equally, the odds of intergenerational mobility are higher than average for individuals from classes VVI, but even more so for EU movers with such
85
a family background in the EIMSS 89.1 per cent of them are socially mobile as opposed to 80.7 per cent in the ESS. This means that crossnational migration in the EU, far from levelling out the odds of social mobility of individuals from different backgrounds, in fact amplifies existing, class-based divergences. The findings suggest that the free movement regime of the EU seems to offer additional opportunities of social closure for the European upper class, as well as extra chances of (mostly upward) mobility for children of the lower-middle class. At the start of this chapter it was argued that EU movers from Italy and Spain could be more intergenerationally mobile than their counterparts from Central-Northern Europe, since the social structures of their countries of origin one generation ago had a larger number of blue-collar workers (including peasants) than those of Germany, France and Britain. Moreover Germany, France and Britain still have a much higher number of jobs in the salariat. Therefore, the absolute intergenerational mobility for Italian and Spanish migrants should be boosted by both the backwardness of parental occupations when respondents were adolescents and todays more upgraded occupational structure of the host countries. This hypothesis is tested in the logistic regressions of the odds of intergenerational mobility (and more precisely of upward, downward and nonvertical mobility) on a set of independent variables, including nationality and country of residence, in Table 4.5 (analysis limited to EU movers, both workers and non-workers). In fact, Italian and Spanish citizens living abroad in the EU are not significantly more mobile than the other nationalities of movers considered. However, a Spain effect is worth mentioning. Spain is significantly more likely to host socially mobile European migrants, especially compared to Germany. In particular, the chances of non-vertical mobility are significantly higher for EU citizens who settle in Spain than anywhere else. Shifts to self-employment (class IV) are noticeably frequent. This social class is home to 31.4 per cent of working EU movers interviewed in Spain, some of them being semi-retirees who take (or keep) some part-time job during el buen retiro under the Spanish sun. Far from being a means to improve individual economic conditions, intra-European spatial mobility is perhaps often a benefit in itself or a side-effect of an already golden career (like, typically, for expats and their families: see Wagner 1998). Among all other predictors included in the model, the impact of education is strong and in line with what could be expected: the lowest level of credentials puts at stake the chances of upward mobility and heightens tremendously the risk of downward mobility among EU movers just as it does in the rest of the population. The effect of class origin is highly significant as well. For all EU movers, regardless of their working status,
Table 4.5
Mobility vs immobility B 20.02 0.00 20.17 20.10 20.12* 0.54** 0.71** 0.27 20.00 0.16 0.19 20.16 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.23 20.06 0.14 20.05 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.15 1.93** 1.18** 0.56** 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.05 0.44** 0.08 20.33** 21.92** 21.21** 20.95** 20.50** 20.09 20.14 0.38* 0.12 0.10 20.41** 20.17 0.12 0.10 0.18 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.06* 0.00 0.02 0.00 20.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 Std error B Std error B Std error B 20.05 0.00 0.02 20.18 20.37** 20.39 0.07 0.22 20.06 0.03 20.05 20.20 Upward vs others Downward vs others Non-vertical vs others
Logit models predicting intergenerational class mobility in the EIMSS dataset (only EU movers)
Std error 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17
86
Age Age squared Period of migration 197483 198493 19942003 Gender Male Female Education University degree University entry qualification Upper vocational secondary Primary/lower secondary Nationality German French British Italian Spanish
0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.57 23.03 3 693 18 0.17 0.60 1.17 3 191 18 0.13 0.64 0.11 0.11 20.21 0.13 20.07 0.89 2 482 18 0.04
0.02 0.25 0.30* 0.11 0.07*
0.14 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.03
0.26 20.05 0.15 0.22 20.08*
0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.04
20.48** 20.38* 20.33 20.45** 20.04
0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.04 0.14 0.72
87
Country of residence Germany 20.42** France 20.24 Britain 20.12 Italy 20.18 Spain Knowledge COR lang. at migration 20.05 Working status Never worked in COR 0.03 Works/worked in COR Class of origin Bourgeoisie (III) 21.57** Routine non-manual (III) 20.29* Petty bourgeoisie (IV) 0.73** High-skilled manual (VVI) 0.72** Low/non-skilled manual (VII) Constant 1.34 22 Log Likelihood 4 423 Degrees of freedom 22 Pseudo R-square 0.19
Notes:
* Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%
Source: EIMSS, N5 4017 (model 1); 2963 (model 2, excluding respondents from class III); 3170 (model 3, excluding respondents from class VII); 2113 (model 4, excluding respondents from classes III and VII)
88
the probability of changing class as adults depends heavily on the class in which they were born. Children of the service class cross national borders almost only if they can preserve their original class location, while everybody else moves spatially with a view to some status upgrading. However, Table 4.5 (first column) indicates that the capacity of upper class movers to be intergenerationally immobile is considerably higher than that of migrants from all other social classes to be mobile.9 Perhaps intra-EU migration projects are more easily accessible to individuals from the upper class who are bound to stay in that same class than to others aiming at a class upgrade by resettling abroad. On the other hand, it is true that more recent movers have higher probabilities of upward mobility. This may well be a sign of growing equalization of opportunities in a time perspective. However, a significant gender gap shows up, with men enjoying 1.5 times higher odds of moving upwardly in the social ladder than women, who are, in fact, more commonly found among intra-EU migrants who experience non-vertical intergenerational mobility in the social structure.
INTRAGENERATIONAL MOBILITY: MAKING A CAREER IN ANOTHER COUNTRY?

Among scholars of social stratification, intergenerational mobility is more widely studied than career mobility (Morgan 2006, 7).10 Using crosssectional data, the only viable analytical strategy consists in identifying individuals work positions at key stages of their life course. In our case, three different points of migrants work histories are held to be critical to their intragenerational mobility: the last job held in the country of origin (Coo0), the first job in the country of residence (Cor1) and the final job in that same country (Cor2).11 The following possible combinations of work trajectories can be found: a. Job immobility (Coo0 5 Cor1 5 Cor2); b. Job mobility at migration (Coo0 Cor1 5 Cor2); c. Job mobility after migration (Coo0 5 Cor1 Cor2); d. Recurrent job mobility (Coo0 Cor1 Cor2). In our sample, the two extreme cases (a and d) are relatively more frequent, accounting for almost two-thirds of work trajectories: 31.7 per cent of respondents who have worked in both the sending and the receiving country are occupationally immobile migrants, while 31.9 per cent have changed job upon their arrival in the country of current residence and also at a later stage in that same country. In fact, 23 per cent of respondents
89
changed job only at the first one of the two transitions considered (that is, when resettling abroad), whereas 13.4 per cent changed only at the second possible transition. These options are contingent on a number of different factors operating at different levels (Table 4.6). At the macro level, history shapes opportunities and work trajectories markedly. Intra-EU migrants who left their home country between 1974 and 1993 are definitely more likely to have experienced some job mobility than movers of the last period considered. Of course, they have also had a longer time to shop for job switches, but these movers also have significantly higher probabilities of having changed occupation at their first employment in the host country (that is, of falling into the always mobile category). Contexts count, too. Job mobility after migration is overall more frequent for movers to Central-Northern European countries. Germany and Britain also offer significantly higher opportunities for changing jobs at both transitions. Of the individual characteristics studied, gender and education can be seen to play a relevant role. Women change job at migration, and possibly also at a later stage, much more commonly than men. This might reflect the dependency of their migration choice on their male partners work choices a tied-mover effect which emerged in a Dutch study on internal migration (Van Ham 2001). In other words, women who migrate following a first-earner partner are likely to be less demanding of the labour market and thus be willing to leave their former occupation. But a higher propensity to face migration as an international career detour that is, to start a new career on the part of women cannot be ruled out on the basis of this evidence. What is for sure, is that women associate geographical mobility with job mobility more than men in the EU. A similar interpretative conundrum about the nature of career changes at migration seen as outcomes of involuntary constraints or first-order preferences emerges when considering the influence of education. Movers with secondary school credentials (or higher) are less likely to change job at and after migration. This is all the more so for EU movers who had a service-class job or were self-employed in their country of origin. Occupational mobility tends rather to be the story of the labour market integration of lowskilled European migrants. Thus, stronger socioeconomic resources (like gender, education and prior class positions) seem to be used to safeguard occupational stability when moving across national borders in Europe. In other words, it turns out to be the weakest workers who change employment as a consequence, or simply after, relocating in another country. Nationality does not make a real difference. But language knowledge does. Interestingly, not proficiency at migration but current fluency in the host country language is a better predictor of job mobility after migration
Table 4.6
Mobile at migration B 0.01 0.00 20.11 0.03 20.43** 20.36 20.63* 20.47 20.15 20.25 20.03 20.31 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.31 0.31 0.30 20.08 20.09 20.17 0.42 0.23 0.17 20.05 0.14 20.11 0.17 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.16 1.07** 0.56** 0.26 0.21 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.00 20.06 0.00 0.83** 0.51** 20.63** 20.45 20.48* 20.55 20.03 0.13 20.07 20.15 Std Error B Std Error B Mobile after migration Always mobile
Multinomial logit predicting trajectories of job mobility among EU movers
Std Error 0.04 0.00 0.21 0.17 0.10 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.19
90
Age Age squared Period of migration 197483 198493 19942003 Gender Male Female Education University degree University entry qualification Upper vocational secondary Primary/lower secondary Nationality German French British Italian Spanish
20.23 20.42* 20.12 20.22 20.01 0.19*
0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.06 0.09
0.67* 0.70* 0.70* 0.12 20.05 0.38**
0.34 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.07 0.12
0.72** 0.30 0.65** 20.04 20.07 0.63**
0.25 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.05 0.10
91
Country of residence Germany France Britain Italy Spain Knowledge of COR language at migration Knowledge of COR language at interview Class in COO Bourgeoisie (III) Routine non-manual (III) Petty bourgeoisie (IV) High-skilled manual (VVI) Low/non-skilled manual (VII) Constant 22 Log Likelihood Degrees of freedom Pseudo R-square 21.10** 20.43 20.83** 20.38 1.61 5 198 66 0.16 0.24 0.23 0.32 0.25 1.21 20.96** 20.41 20.99* 20.64* 21.02 0.27 0.27 0.40 0.30 1.59 21.24** 20.23 20.92** 20.31 3.13**
0.22 0.22 0.31 0.24 1.14
Notes:
Reference category for dependent variable: job immobility. * Significant at 5%; * Significant at 1%.
Source:
EIMSS, N 5 1 956
92
Table 4.7
Paths of intragenerational class mobility of EU movers (%)

Transition 2 Immobile NV mobile 1.8 0.9 0.5 0.4 3.6 UP mobile 5.8 0.6 0.2 6.1 12.7 DOWN Total mobile 1.7 0.1 1.1 0.1 3.0 71.3 5.8 8.5 14.3 100.0
Transition 1
Immobile NV mobile UP mobile DOWN mobile Total
62.1 4.2 6.7 7.7 80.7
Source:
EIMSS, N 5 2 180
and both at and after migration. In fact the opposite causeeffect relation seems more plausible: job mobility trains language skills. Perhaps the propensity of the highly educated movers to be occupationally immobile can lead them to live more secluded lives in expat circles, while less-educated movers are forced to improve their knowledge of the host country language as they transfer from one workplace to another. Job-to-job mobility forms the basis of movements between social classes inasmuch as occupations are taken as proxies of class belonging. Of course, job mobility does not automatically lead to shifts from one class to another, as each class comprises several different occupations. Therefore, intragenerational class mobility rates are inherently lower than job mobility rates in any given population (Mayer and Carroll 1987). Indeed, 71.3 per cent of respondents to the EIMSS did not change social class when taking up their first job after migration. Moreover, 80.7 per cent held the same class position in the transition between first and current job in the host country. As might be expected, the work-with-migration transition can bring about downward mobility (this is the case for 14.3 per cent of respondents, while 8.5 per cent are in fact upwardly mobile), but the subsequent career in the host country is more likely to be on the upside (12.7 per cent) than on the downside (3.0 per cent). A cross-tabulation of class mobility patterns at each transition (that is, Coo0 to Cor1 and Cor1 to Cor2) helps describe all the possible career paths across these three points of intra-EU migrants work histories (Table 4.7). Some of these intragenerational mobility patterns are quite unusual. In particular, only two respondents (less than 0.1 per cent) experienced downward mobility both at migration and in the following step of their career. But an extremely successful career (upward class mobility at both transitions) is equally exceptional (five cases, 0.2 per cent of the sample).
93
Class immobility at both transitions, regardless of migration and possible subsequent career moves, is overwhelmingly the rule, reported by 62.1 per cent of respondents. For the sake of simplicity, these 16 possible combinations of transitions are grouped into two broad typical class trajectories: immobile and mobile paths (respectively, pale grey and dark grey cells in Table 4.7). The effects of the usual series of contextual and individual characteristics on the log odds of being intragenerationally mobile rather than immobile are estimated in Table 4.8. The findings are not dramatically different from those concerning job mobility. Again, time and space effects are noteworthy. Migrants of the earlier periods (that is, those who moved before the introduction of European citizenship in 1993) are more likely to have experienced some career mobility. Where individuals move to affect the chances of facing intragenerational class mobility as well, with Britain and Italy exposing them to higher risks of class shifts, perhaps for opposite reasons Britain due to a relatively more volatile labour market that does not inhibit upward and downward job spells, and Italy to a tighter labour market forcing newcomers into underemployment. But once again, the lions share of the accounted variance is explained by respondents premigration social class. Quite straightforwardly, low/non-skilled manual workers are much more likely than other EU movers to experience class mobility necessarily upward, given their starting point when resettling abroad, net of all other effects. Since most of the working class intra-EU movers belong in the older cohorts of migrants, the association between spatial and intragenerational class mobility in Europe turns out to be on the decline at a time of easier movements across national borders. The higher accessibility of international job trajectories in Europe does not bring about a higher rate of class mobility by default.
CONCLUSIONS
Traditional migrants move in space in order to move in the social structure, particularly across generations. In highly fluid societies, opportunities for work, education, career and the bettering of lifestyles have led geographic mobility to be a kind of escalator up the social ladder, often implying moves from periphery regions to core cities. This has always held for internal migration, but European integration poses the question of whether geographical mobility within the unified space of the EU may offer new possibilities to ambitious social climbers escaping entrenched national social hierarchies. Moreover, in a social stratification perspective, the process of European
94
Table 4.8
Logit models predicting intragenerational class mobility among EU movers

B Std Error 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.04 0.17 0.16 0.26 0.18 0.86
Age Age squared Period of migration 197483 198493 19942003 Gender Male Female Education University degree University entry qualification Upper vocational secondary Primary/lower secondary Nationality German French British Italian Spanish Country of residence Germany France Britain Italy Spain Knowledge COR language at migration Class in COO Bourgeoisie (III) Routine non-manual (III) Petty bourgeoisie (IV) High-skilled manual (VVI) Low/non-skilled manual (VII) Constant 22 Log Likelihood Degrees of freedom Pseudo R-square
20.04 0.00 0.38* 0.40** 20.24* 20.08 20.10 20.08 20.29 20.04 0.16 20.14 0.29 0.35 0.58** 0.48* 20.03 21.29** 20.59** 21.31** 20.43* 1.45 2 482 21 0.12
Notes: Reference category for dependent variable: immobility. * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%. Immobility 5 0; Mobility 5 1. Source: EIMSS, N 5 2 154
95
integration adds a further potential challenge to the association between class structures and national states (Breen and Rottman 1998, 16). European citizens who take jobs abroad in another EU member state, enjoying EU-based rights and facilities (like the recognition of foreign diplomas and free access to national health services), ought to be found on the cutting edge of the transnationalization of social mobility patterns. These people thus form a strategic population for researchers interested in the globalization of systems of social stratification (see Weiss 2005; Berger and Weiss 2008). The European Internal Movers Social Survey (EIMSS) permits a systematic comparison of the social mobility patterns of EU movers and stayers, using the European Social Survey (ESS) as a reference. At the beginning of the chapter, four hypotheses were formulated. In brief, it was posited that the class origins of movers do not differ substantially from those of stayers (H1); in regards to their destination, movers are disproportionately represented in the upper class (H2); movers experience higher intergenerational mobility than stayers (H3); and Southern European movers are more likely to be upwardly mobile than their Northern European counterparts (H4). With the exception of H2, no hypothesis stands our empirical testing. Analyses presented in this chapter found that EU movers are overrepresented in the upper class and underrepresented in the working class, both in their family of origin and in their current situation, contradicting H1 about class origins and confirming H2 about class destinations. On the other hand, this finding matches fairly closely those of studies on interregional migration in countries like Britain (Fielding 2007) and the US (Lin and Christiadi 2002). Contrary to H4, nationality does not affect either intergenerational or intragenerational social mobility significantly, once personal factors are controlled for. H3 is falsified as well. Perhaps the single most important finding of this chapter is that the overall intergenerational mobility of movers does not significantly differ from that of stayers in European societies. However, such a finding needs to be qualified. While upper class movers show a higher propensity than upper-class stayers to maintain their family class position, lower class movers are in fact more intergenerationally mobile than their stayer counterparts. Thus, the free-movement regime of the EU is an alternative route to social mobility for the less privileged young who are ready to leave their home countries, working also as an additional means of class reproduction for the transnational fraction of the European bourgeoisie. The latter group deserves closer scrutiny in future research. Whether migration across Europe serves the purpose of improving the prestige and income of upper-class cadets, or that of defending their ascribed privilege,
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is an emerging question that needs to be addressed with some fine-tuning of career movements and occupational rankings (see work in progress by Le Gals and Andreotti 2006). For the time being, social mobility tables inform us that one-fifth of working movers in the EIMSS circulate within the upper class. To this number one must add middleupper class pensioners who have migrated to the south of the continent 36.5 per cent of the retirees in our sample (see also King et al. 2000). As a result, a sizeable proportion of EU movers embody a world-regional variant of the global, cosmopolitan upper class. In conclusion, while it cannot be denied that intra-continental free movement is a unique historical experiment with potential far-reaching effects in the long run, so far it has not reshaped the social structure of the EU. Much to the dismay of EU institutions and economic gurus who have long conceived of the European free-movement area as grease in the wheels of the continents labour markets (see Recchi 2006 and 2008), cross-state mobility in Western Europe turns out to be quite weakly associated with job-to-job mobility, and even when this is the case, it does not seem to bring about dramatic shifts across class boundaries.
NOTES
1. 2. Even high-skilled migrants, if not in top managerial positions, are likely to experience some status downgrading in the workplace as they move from less-developed to developed countries (Alarcon 1999; Cornelius and Espenshade 2001). Indeed, one of the functions of immigrant ethnic communities lies in the safeguarding of migrants original prestige in social relations outside the workplace in the face of occupational degradation. Co-ethnics acknowledge migrants real status that is, the one they had in the local communities from which they came. Unfortunately, while forms and determinants of intergenerational mobility can be studied comparing movers and stayers, data availability only permits a focus on the intragenerational mobility of movers. The process of price and salary homogenization in the EU is still under way. In 2004, when EIMSS was carried out, the median hourly cost of labour in the private sector was 32 euros in Denmark and 10.3 euros in Portugal; within the five countries of our survey, the average worker in Germany earned 28.2 euros and his/her counterpart in Spain 16.3 (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2007). But even between these two extreme poles of the spectrum of Western European wages, migration flows are apparently insensible to variations in income and unemployment differentials (see Mouhoud and Oudinet 2004; Puhani 2001). Demographically, Italy is the country where the number of EU15 movers is the lowest of the four examined, and the presence of foreign-born workers from other EU15 countries the lowest in the entire EU15 (0.11 per cent of the workforce: Van Houtum and Van der Velde 2004, 102). It is estimated that about 40 per cent of all Europeans living in Britain are in fact in London, gravitating around its global city economy (Piracha and Vickerman 2003). Ethnographic accounts of the careers and prospects of EU movers in the City and other highly qualified sectors of the London economy can be found in Favell (2008a).
3. 4.
5.
6.

7.
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8. 9. 10. 11.
Notoriously, Germany hosts significant numbers of another category of intra-EU movers: posted workers from fiscally less onerous countries (for instance, workers in the construction sector from the UK). However, at least legally, posted workers in the EU are entitled to no more than a six-months stay, and are therefore excluded by the EIMSS sampling criteria (at least one year of permanent residence). The hierarchical arrangement of social classes that generates these four types follows Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992). More precisely, the odds of intergenerational immobility for upper class movers are 2.5 times those of mobility for movers originating from classes IV and VVI. However, it is true that the spread of longitudinal studies and the development of event history analysis have revived research on intragenerational mobility in connection with life course approaches (for an overview, see Mayer 2005). EU movers who never worked in the destination country are excluded from this analysis, as well as those who took their first job in life only after they migrated, as it is impossible to assess the impact of migration on their career mobility. Moreover, due to a lack of comparable data, findings presented in this section refer to EU movers only.
5.
Living across cultures in a transnational Europe

Antonio Alaminos and Oscar Santacreu
ACCULTURATION OR INTEGRATION? THEORETICAL PREMISES

As other chapters have documented, resettling to another country entails various degrees of mobility, both in terms of time and previous movements. Some migrants decide to remain indefinitely in the destination country, while others keep alive the wish to return to their country of origin as soon as possible. Some have had significant mobility experiences before, with long stays in several countries. For others, migration is in fact a new and one-shot experience. Whatever, the case, for all migrants, moving internationally is a cumulative and dynamic life choice that can lead to great changes in the individuals and (cumulatively) in the societies where they choose to settle. These questions can best be approached with reference to the well-developed literature in immigration studies on acculturation or integration. Before tackling the data revealed by EIMSS as regards this issue, however, we need first to clarify the key concepts used in this chapter. Acculturation According to a classic definition:
acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups. Under this definition, acculturation is to be distinguished from culture change, of which it is but one aspect, and assimilation, which is at times a phase of acculturation. (Linton et al. 1936, 1456)
In an updated version of this perspective, the most well-known contemporary theorist of acculturation, John W. Berry (1997), outlines that the acculturation process is associated with psychological and physical changes
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in immigrants due to adaptation to a new diet, climate and housing, and the conventions of social interaction, rules and values of the new society. It is important to highlight the differences between acculturation and assimilation. Assimilation is not the inevitable consequence of acculturation. For instance, in certain circumstances, such as when migrants are spatially concentrated, assimilation will hardly be a result of acculturation. On the other hand, acculturation takes place both on an individual and a group level. This means that, even among individuals from the same cultural group living in the same geographical area and with similar socioeconomic characteristics, the acculturation process can produce different outcomes because of differing personal experiences (Kelly et al. 1994). A key formulation such as Hofstedes acculturation curve model (2003) is premised on such an individual perspective. The psychological states experienced by migrants during their acculturation tend to follow a fourstage sequence. The first stage is usually short, and it is characterised by a state of euphoria: the excitement of travelling and living in a different society and culture. The second stage is the period of culture shock, when real life starts in the new environment. The third stage is a period during which migrants slowly begin to function in the new context, learn some local values, find increased self-confidence, and choose their own lifestyle in the new social environment. The acculturation process can have different outcomes that lead to a fourth stage. During this last stage, migrants adopt a stable psychological disposition that may be different from the one they had in their society of origin. Some might find it difficult to live with locals in their new society. In other cases, however, foreign residents over-assimilate and become happy natives. The acculturation process entails, to a great extent, the acquisition of intercultural competences. The first approaches to this basically distinguished three areas: affective (attitudes), knowledge (cognition) and skills (behaviours) (Bloom 1956). Awareness was later recognised as another important element for migrants to be able to develop an adequate intercultural competence. Stevens (1971), Curle (1972) and Gattegno (1976), amongst others, mention self-awareness and awareness of others as keys to being able to interact adequately in another culture. More recent models of intercultural competence consider these five dimensions of learning to be relevant: awareness, attitudes, skills, knowledge and linguistic competence in the language of the host society. In any case, intercultural competence does not develop in a synchronic or integrated way, both in the number of dimensions it comprises and the degree of competence achieved. Acculturation also raises significant measurement issues. Empirical scales to measure acculturation are often plagued by the pitfall of unidimensionality. Generally speaking, linear unidimensional scales conform to
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an assimilationist approach: the more American a, say, Pakistani migrant becomes, the less Pakistani he or she is. This means that the acquisition of new cultural competences is associated with the loss or weakening of the original ones. Many linear unidimensional scales have been constructed, such as those by Marn et al. (1987), Ghuman (1991), Cortes et al. (1994), Landrine and Klonoff (1994), Cuellar, Arnold and Maldonado (1995), Dawson et al. (1996) and Hofstede (2001). However, measurements over just one continuum impose unnecessary theoretical restrictions since this reduces culture to a single dimension. Several researchers responded by developing multidimensional orthogonal scales (Berry 1970; Zak 1973; Teske and Nelson 1974; Clark et al. 1976; Garca and Lega 1979; Padilla 1980; Szapocznik et al. 1980; Snchez and Fernndez 1993; Suinn et al. 1995; Ryder et al. 2000). Multidimensionality allows us to understand the acculturation process as a hybridisation process in which the acquisition of intercultural competence does not necessarily imply accepting the new culture (language, values, food, clothes, and so on) as a single and indivisible package. Some authors have observed that unidimensional scales tend to be more successful in the United States. The assimilation literature in the social sciences from Gordon (1964) to Alba and Nee (2004) has clearly conceptualised this process as one that measures structural convergence with middle and upper class norms (of education, housing, social mobility, and so on). However, in the Unites States there has been a normative tendency to blur this process with cultural issues of becoming American, where political, cultural and ethnic proofs of assimilation to the dominant white majority are considered a goal whether positively or coercively for migrants. In Canada, though, scales tend to be multidimensional, in accordance with public immigration policies and what is considered socially acceptable (see Berry 1984; Taylor and Lambert 1996). As with the concept of assimilation, disagreements on the concept of acculturation thus revolve around the best way of operationalizing it, basically because this involves a political stance regarding what is expected from migrants. Our view is that there are various ways of living abroad, which can hardly be captured by unidimensional scales, and that a first step consists in defining the critical dimensions of acculturation. Berry (2003) suggests a double dimensionality, based on orientations towards ones group and towards other groups (that is, the host society), as expressed in social contacts and collective actions. The importance of Berrys approach lies in the fact that it ascribes a strategic action to migrants. Padilla (1980) also proposes two dimensions. One dimension, called ethnic loyalty, considers the migrants cultural orientation, according to their preference for the culture of origin or the culture of the society of destination. The other dimension is cultural awareness, which takes into account the cultural
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competence of migrants from the viewpoint of both the culture of origin and the culture of destination. The first dimension is psychological. The second one considers the intercultural competence of migrants that is, their knowledge of both cultures (origin and destination). In this sense, Padilla introduces a qualification about migrants ability (their intercultural competence) to adjust preferences and actual behaviours. Berrys and Padillas scales are clearly complementary. Both share a dimension that refers to preferences or cultural orientations, and include a second dimension social participation for Berry, and intercultural competence (knowledge of language, norms, values and so on) for Padilla. These may be interdependent formulations, although Berrys emphasizes behaviour as the basis for measurement, while Padillas highlights knowledge of the environment. Both these alternatives are important. It is difficult to have an intense social participation in the society of destination without an acceptable knowledge of its language and social codes. Intercultural competence encompasses several skills, some of which are harder to achieve than others, for instance, the command of etiquette, when to bring a present, congratulate or greet, appropriate clothing or language tones. Learning the underlying values or interpreting situations or behaviours correctly is much more difficult. Feeling disoriented about those meanings can cause acculturation stress (uncertainty, anxiety and depression), which may lead to hostility towards the new social environment and cultural rejection. In this sense, intercultural competence is essential in order to facilitate participation or create a preference for a different lifestyle. Integration Although there are parallels in the application of these concepts to the immigration process, a distinct line of approach to the same questions is taken if the concept of integration is adopted. For example, Schoorl (2005) prefers to use this concept when referring to the process through which migrants become part of the social, cultural and institutional fabric of the society that hosts them. The concept of integration thus pays attention not only to migrants adaptation, as does acculturation, but also to the structural effects on the society in which they reside and its more or less welcoming orientations. Schoorl identifies four significant forms of integration: socioeconomic integration (structural), social integration, cultural integration and identification. The structural integration dimension refers to immigrants equal access to services and institutions: education, labour market, housing, political system and health care (equality versus discrimination). Social integration refers to the degree of interaction
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between immigrants and the local population (segregation versus mixing). Cultural integration refers to the degree to which different groups share the same norms, values and preferences (homogeneity versus heterogeneity). Finally, from the viewpoint of integration, the identity dimension refers to the degree to which immigrants identify with the society in which they live, on the one hand, and, on the other, the degree to which immigrants are accepted by that society (inclusion versus exclusion). Inclusion does not necessarily mean at first the loss of identification with the culture of origin. Obviously, there is not a synchrony between these different dimensions of integration. Socioeconomic integration or cultural integration can be interdependent, but this is not necessarily the case. Again, overlaps in these distinctions can be detected with the dominant US paradigm of assimilation. Thus, the segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001) suggests that a high degree of structural (socioeconomic) integration can coexist perfectly with a strong orientation towards ones own ethnic or cultural group. Time also plays a paramount part in the dynamics of the immigration process. OReilly (2000) classifies migrants into ideal types taking into account two dimensions: orientations towards ones country of origin and the duration of residence in each country. He applies this model to intra-European migrants, particularly residents in Spain. This classification model shows several limitations, which come from the combination of two highly interdependent dimensions. Migrants orientation towards the country of origin and the country of destination change over time. Moreover, the time factor should include not only the past (the time an individual has been living in the country), but also migrants expectations regarding the future. The (explicit or implicit) intention of returning to the country of origin has frequently been used to explain the persistence of ethnic differences or the unwillingness to integrate into the new social environment (for example, Bonacich 1973; Anwar 1979; Anthias 1992; Uriely 1994). Starting from the theoretical models that we have just reviewed, we will adopt the integration rather than the acculturation terminology, while using some tools from the acculturation literature. In our view, there are two dimensions that adapt particularly well to the reality of intra-European migration. The first dimension refers to what we think of as social integration. It takes into account Berrys and Schoorls notions of social participation and Padillas view of intercultural competence. In short, it looks at migrants social networks, as well as their ability to coexist effectively with the local population. This dimension is operationalized by measuring on the one hand the number and nationality of friends, and linguistic competence on the other. Both indicators are closely correlated; the preponderance of
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friends from the country of residence implies a higher level of linguistic competence. Among the different dimensions of intercultural competence, we consider linguistic skills to be basic and fundamental. The possibilities of integrating into the everyday life of the new social environment are seriously impaired by language weakness. The second dimension that can be used to conceive how migrants live in and perceive their new country of residence is that of cultural integration. It includes a widespread idea in the literature reviewed above: that is, the preference for the culture of origin or the culture of destination makes a difference in immigrants strategies for dealing with the new society of residence. Together with the possible cultural discontent or well-being of migrants, it is also important to bear in mind their expectations of future mobility. The way migrants experience a new social situation depends on their expectations or wishes to stay in it. Those migrants wishing or expecting to return soon to their country of origin will show more indifference towards the society they live in. Preferences for life in the country of origin or that of destination and the wish to return to the country of origin are the indicators used in our analysis. These two dimensions characterize differently the way European migrants live in their new social environment, and constitute a satisfactory synthesis of existing theoretical models. As stated above, the immigration process whether conceptualized as acculturation, assimilation or (as we do) integration is an opaque process, the pace of which depends on the individual, that cannot be seized clearly in a single survey. However, the distinctiveness of EU movers as regards other kinds of migrant raises intriguing questions about the kind and degree of social and cultural integration they experience in the society in which they have chosen to live.
LINGUISTIC COMPETENCE AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

Language is one of the critical issues of living in a foreign society, as it mediates almost every daily life situation. EU movers command of the language of their country of destination is overall quite poor. English is the only language in which practically all migrants groups show a high level of competence. Particularly noteworthy is the modest knowledge of the host-country language shown by German, British and French nationals upon their arrival in Spain or Italy, and the equally weak control of German declared by the Spanish, Italians and British moving to Germany. See Table 5.1 for full details. Quite surprisingly, in the light of the changes in social composition and
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Table 5.1
Knowledge of COR language of EU movers at time of migration (row % )

Almost as well as native language 6.7 12.2 5.6 5.7 10.4 23.5 2.4 4.0 7.2 3.1 4.0 1.2 15.7 0.8 3.2 15.4 6.8 0.8 5.1 2.4 Quite well Just soand-so Poorly No knowledge
Country of origin and country of residence French in Germany French in Britain French in Italy French in Spain Germans in France Germans in Britain Germans in Italy Germans in Spain British in France British in Germany British in Italy British in Spain Italians in France Italians in Germany Italians in Britain Italians in Spain Spanish in France Spanish in Germany Spanish in Britain Spanish in Italy
Source:
22.7 44.5 15.7 8.5 14.0 47.8 11.6 3.2 16.8 11.8 11.6 3.7 21.0 2.8 28.7 12.6 15.2 5.9 25.5 15.2
17.6 20.2 10.4 17.1 30.0 20.0 18.4 8.0 21.6 9.4 10.8 11.0 10.9 2.8 23.9 12.2 13.2 9.5 29.3 12.0
16.9 12.6 12.9 26.0 25.2 7.8 32.0 18.1 35.6 24.8 17.1 40.8 18.1 11.8 19.9 23.2 22.0 15.4 19.1 23.6
36.1 10.5 55.4 42.7 20.4 0.8 35.6 66.7 18.8 50.8 56.6 43.3 34.3 81.9 24.3 36.6 42.8 68.4 21.0 46.8
EIMSS, N 5 4 901
education levels of the population at stake, more recent migrants are not significantly more proficient in the language of the destination country than their predecessors. Only the Spanish and Italians who moved to Britain in the 1990s and after fare linguistically better than older cohorts of co-nationals crossing the Channel. Nevertheless, EU movers of all generations are a select group also in terms of their original linguistic competence: the proportion of them claiming to have had a good command of the language of the place where they have resettled is definitely higher than that of their compatriots at home (Table 5.2). With regard to the current knowledge of the language of the country of residence, British nationals show the lowest level of knowledge of foreign languages. However, we should bear in mind that English is the most widespread language, which reduces the impact of this lack of knowledge.
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Table 5.2
Stayers and EU movers knowledge at migration of other EU languages by country of residence (quite well or almost as well as native language) (%)
Language French German 29.4 7.0 24.4 12.0 36.7 11.0 24.0 14.0 22.0 8.0 English 56.75 34.0 71.3 51.0 31.9 29.0 Italian 21.3 4.5* 14.0 2.1* Spanish 14.2 10.0 7.2 2.5* 28.0 4.0 4.9 3.2*
French Germans Italians British Spanish
Movers Stayers Movers Stayers Movers Stayers Movers Stayers Movers Stayers
3.6 3.0* 14.9 6.0 6.7 1.0*
30.6 20.0
15.6 1.6* 17.6 1.3*
Notes: This is the main language spoken in the COR of EU movers in each column (i.e., 24.4% in the first column refers to the proportion of German movers living in France speaking French well when they migrated, compared to 12% of the German population with a similar knowledge of French). Source: Data on movers are from EIMSS. Data on the general population are taken from Eurobarometer 63.4; * from Eurobarometer 55.1, N 5 4 997
Particularly noteworthy is the low level of knowledge of the Spanish language shown by British and German residents in Spain; a relatively modest proficiency in French is also the norm among Germans living in France (Table 5.3). The duration of stay abroad, in these groups of EU movers, makes little difference: German and British residents in Spain who admit to not speaking Spanish at all average 13 years of residence in this country. As a matter of fact, British and German residents in Spain are the migrants who least improve their linguistic competence. In contrast, Spanish and Italian nationals are the migrants who most actively seek to improve their linguistic competence in all countries of destination. In all groups, there is a marked improvement of linguistic competence over time. Another key aspect of social integration has to do with the friendship relations of movers (Table 5.4). The general trend is for the percentage of migrants with friends of a different nationality to be noticeably higher than those with friends of the same nationality. In contrast, German and British residents in Spain have the highest number of friends of the same nationality, confirming OReillys (2000) evidence. A similar case of an ethnic segregation of personal networks is found among Italian residents
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Table 5.3
Knowledge of language at time of survey (row %)

Almost as well as native language 42.4 72.3 59.8 25.6 30.0 83.5 37.6 12.4 25.3 34.6 49.4 7.7 53.6 15.0 57.4 57.7 37.3 18.7 54.1 42.4 Quite well Just so-so Poorly No knowledge
Source:
32.9 23.9 30.1 41.9 28.0 14.5 32.8 18.9 36.5 40.6 34.3 20.3 35.9 51.2 38.2 26.4 38.6 40.9 40.8 43.2
14.1 3.4 6.4 18.7 28.4 2.0 22.4 33.7 28.9 17.7 11.6 43.9 8.5 24.8 2.8 9.8 14.9 29.8 3.8 11.2
7.5 0.4 2.8 11.0 10.8 0.0 6.4 24.9 8.4 6.7 3.2 23.6 1.6 8.3 0.8 2.0 6.4 9.9 1.3 3.2
3.1 0.0 0.8 2.8 2.8 0.0 0.8 10.0 0.8 0.4 1.6 4.5 0.4 0.8 0.8 4.1 2.8 0.8 0.0 0.0
EIMSS, N 5 4 899
in Germany. On the other hand, the EU movers with the highest number of friends from their country of residence are Italians living in Spain and Britain, and Spanish and French residents in Italy. Overall, linguistic competence and the density of the network of friends in the country of destination show a very significant covariation, indicating their commonality in expressing the degree of social integration of EU movers in the host societies.
NATIONAL ORIENTATION AND MOBILITY EXPECTATIONS

Which society that of origin or that of destination do EU movers prefer? We would hypothesize that those movers who feel closer to their
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Table 5.4
Density and nationality of network of friends (row %)

Many more from COO 2.4 1.7 1.2 0.8 1.2 0.8 2.4 20.2 0.8 1.2 2.0 6.6 1.2 2.8 2.8 0.0 2.0 3.2 0.6 0.0 More from COO 16.2 12.2 3.2 17.3 16.4 9.1 17.6 25.8 10.4 16.5 6.4 38.3 13.8 35.8 21.9 6.7 25.3 22.7 14.0 9.2 Same from both countries 35.6 37.6 24.7 35.8 22.8 24.4 20.8 41.1 47.8 21.7 26.3 39.9 34.8 41.3 33.1 24.2 22.9 29.9 35.7 20.5 More from COR 22.9 29.1 34.0 34.2 37.2 46.1 37.6 9.7 31.7 32.3 39.0 14.0 36.0 18.5 31.9 55.0 30.9 33.1 32.5 40.6 Many more from COR 22.9 19.4 36.8 11.9 22.4 19.7 21.6 3.2 9.2 28.3 26.3 1.2 14.2 1.6 10.4 14.2 18.9 11.2 17.2 29.7
country of origin will find it more difficult to integrate into the society they live in. The four response categories in Table 5.5 correspond to the acculturation strategies put forward by Berry (1997): assimilation, integration, segregation and marginalization. First of all, we find that the most frequent national orientation is twofold: towards the country of residence and the country of origin. Going into detail we see that a predilection for the country of origin is highest among Spanish nationals living in any country of destination, followed by Italians in any country of destination except Spain, and French citizens living in Germany or Britain. On the other hand, the highest level of preference for the country of residence can be found among British residents everywhere. Sympathy with the country of residence is also high among German residents in Italy and France, and among French and Italian residents in Spain. Generally speaking, EU movers from the south of the continent appear to stick
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Table 5.5
National orientation of EU movers (row %)

Towards COR 8.3 9.8 13.8 20.4 20.1 17.8 24.9 9.3 36.3 18.2 24.7 34.2 5.3 6.7 7.6 16.5 6.5 7.1 10.3 4.5 Either 67.9 66.2 69.6 68.6 67.9 60.9 62.9 76.6 57.7 58.1 64.1 57.1 72.0 73.4 62.0 75.3 74.6 66.8 63.2 75.3 Towards COO 20.2 17.1 7.3 4.5 5.2 13.0 5.7 10.1 2.8 12.6 7.6 4.6 18.7 17.1 26.0 4.9 14.5 22.5 23.2 17.8 Neither 3.6 6.8 9.3 6.5 6.8 8.3 6.5 4.0 3.2 11.1 3.6 4.2 4.1 2.8 4.4 3.3 4.4 3.6 3.2 2.4
to their roots more than their counterparts from Central and Northern Europe. Expectations regarding the future are also a component of cultural integration into the host society. Migrants who wish to return to their country of origin as soon as possible convey considerable indifference towards the society they are currently living in. Table 5.6 shows how nostalgia is higher among Southern Europeans. A strong wish to return is also shown by French residents in Germany and Britain, and British in Germany. As we have just seen, there is a close relationship between these two measures, in the sense that a preference for life in the country of origin or the country of residence is associated with the wish to return to the former or remain in the latter. Almost 80 per cent of migrants who prefer their current country of residence do not expect to move in the future. On the other hand, 69 per cent of those preferring life in their country of origin nurture the idea of going back home.
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Table 5.6
Wish to return to the country of origin of EU movers (row %)

Wish to return No Indifferent 9.4 10.9 7.2 8.9 9.2 18.0 11.6 14.9 8.4 7.5 11.2 9.3 7.3 7.9 10.4 14.2 11.6 7.5 13.4 6.0 Yes 59.2 51.3 46.6 27.6 30.0 38.0 25.2 33.7 16.4 40.6 36.3 9.8 53.2 68.5 56.6 20.7 51.2 71.1 60.5 73.6
French in Germany French in Britain French in Italy French in Spain Germans in France Germans in Britain Germans in Italy Germans in Spain British in France British in Germany British in Italy British in Spain Italians in France Italians in Germany Italians in Britain Italians in Spain Spanish in France Spanish in Germany Spanish in Britain Spanish in Italy
31.4 37.8 46.2 63.4 60.8 43.9 63.2 51.4 75.2 52.0 52.6 80.9 39.5 23.6 33.1 65.0 37.2 21.3 26.1 20.4
CULTURAL AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION: TWO LATENT DIMENSIONS

A factor analysis of the indicators illustrated so far shows that they revolve around two independent dimensions.1 These can be thought of as the latent dimensions that we conceptualize in terms of integration. We name the first cultural integration. It measures the degree of affinity of individuals with their cultural environment that is, their acceptance of values and lifestyles different from those of their country of origin. The other dimension, which we name social integration, deals with participation, through meaningful social relations, in the host society. Both dimensions enable us to profile how migrants live in the society of residence. An important aspect to bear in mind is that social integration shows only a weak correlation with cultural integration. In other words, both dimensions, although associated, act independently.
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Social integration, as measured by the factor scores of this analysis, is very low among German and British residents in Spain. Italians and Spanish in Germany also have difficulties in integrating socially. On the other hand, a particularly high level of social integration is found among movers to Italy whatever their nationality. Germans and French show a fairly good social integration in Britain as well. Cultural integration encompasses important elements of psychological closeness. Unlike social integration, which emerges through objective indicators of social participation and intercultural competence, cultural integration has to do with strongly subjective orientations. The weakest cultural integration, or psychological closeness, is found among Spanish migrants in any of the countries analysed in this study. Italian migrants also show low cultural affinity with all host societies except Spain. A slightly higher level of cultural integration can be found among French migrants, particularly those who live in Germany and Britain. Southern Europeans are especially at odds in Northern Europe, whereas German and British movers are more at ease with the countries they have migrated to. Integration takes place on different levels, which are not necessarily parallel. The two dimensions we have taken into account help us understand situations that would at first appear to be contradictory. Thus, we can find high integration in social terms (good intercultural competences and networks of friends from the country of destination) coupled with low cultural integration (that is, detachment from the values and culture of that country). Some groups of migrants are poorly integrated, both culturally and socially. This is the case for Italians and Spanish in Germany. Their migration is basically work-related and, in this sense, forced by the search for better living conditions. In fact, the integration of British and German residents in Spain and France offers an interesting paradox in that it is strong culturally but weak socially. The situation of British residents in France is similar, although not so polarized. In these categories of movers, we find a positive subjective perception of belonging to the places where they live, but with a limited participation in their social life. The reverse situation is the rule in Britain: all groups of movers (except Germans) show good social integration together with the lowest levels of cultural integration. We may ask ourselves how some movers can feel culturally integrated if they cannot speak the language or do not have friends among the locals. A first answer is that it is a question of awareness that is, of recognition of the depth and nuances of a culture. Migrants can achieve basic competences in the lifestyle of the country of residence, such as dress and eating codes or greeting formulas. However, they do not acquire cognitive

Spanish in Italy Spanish in Britain Spanish in Germany Spanish in France Italians in Spain Italians in Britain Italians in Germany Italians in France British in Spain British in Italy British in Germany British in France Germans in Spain Germans in Italy Germans in Britain Germans in France French in Spain French in Italy French in Britain French in Germany 1.5 1 0.5 Social integration 0 0.5
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Cultural integration
Source:
EIMSS, N 5 4 880
Figure 5.1
The social and cultural integration of EU movers: averages of factor scores
competence in the values and meaning of what happens around them. That is part of the acculturation process. The result is a superficial coexistence. Figure 5.1 shows the group differences on these two dimensions of integration. Bars growing in the same direction show coincidence (towards high or low levels of integration) between social and cultural integration that is, high participation and competence together with affinity and psychological closeness. Bars growing in opposite directions show situations in which social and cultural integration do not coexist. It is worth mentioning the lack of symmetry in cultural integration (Table 5.7). One might think that the poor adjustment of Italian residents in Germany would imply reciprocity that is, low integration of German residents in Italy. However, that is not the case. Thus, for instance, we find that British migrants in Germany do not on average feel comfortable, whereas German migrants in Britain do. This might have to do with the particular national environments that migrants find themselves in; or with the kinds of migrants who choose to move to particular countries.
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Table 5.7
Mean scores for the cultural integration dimension

Cultural Integration Cultural Integration Germans in Italy Germans in Spain British in Italy British in Spain British in France Italians in Spain Germans in France French in Italy French in Spain Germans in Britain 0.33 20.04 0.16 0.50 0.73 0.25 0.43 0.05 0.23 0.11
Italians in Germany Spanish in Germany Italians in Britain Spanish in Britain French in Britain Spanish in Italy French in Germany Italians in France Spanish in France British in Germany
20.44 20.42 20.41 20.29 20.26 20.25 20.23 20.20 20.16 20.12
In order to better understand the complex interplay between cultural and social integration, we need to know not only how migrants feel, but also how they feel they are perceived by the society around them. Even in Western European societies, where cultural distance is not dramatic (that is, there is no strong ethnic prejudice against other fellow Western Europeans), EU citizens living abroad may still feel discriminated against (Table 5.8). Such perception of being discriminated against seems to depend on two key elements: intercultural competence (being able to perceive the nuances of social reality), and social interactions from which the occasion to perceive oneself as being discriminated against could arise. We found that those EU movers who claim to have a good knowledge of the language report to a greater degree that they feel discriminated against, and vice versa. In particular, British and German migrants in Spain, who are less proficient in the local languages, might be said to feel more culturally integrated in Spain because they do not feel discriminated against by the society in which they live. Researchers who study the migration flows from Northern Europe towards Spain or other Mediterranean countries stress the fact that these migrants tend to live in secluded areas. This is the actual situation of a proportion of the British residents in Spain. It is a free choice, yet their lifestyle in a foreign country seems not to cause conflicts, especially because they do not have the perception of being discriminated against by Spanish society. All this leads to their high cultural integration on these measures together with their modest level of social interactions with locals. On the other hand, Spanish migrants with high social integration do feel
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Table 5.8
Perception of being discriminated against because of nationality (row %)

Feels discriminated against because of nationality No Yes 34.5 37.6 25.0 23.2 21.6 31.0 19.6 7.6 28.0 35.4 40.2 15.9 33.1 24.9 27.5 20.8 37.3 37.1 35.7 23.2
65.5 62.4 75.0 76.8 78.4 69.0 80.4 92.4 72.0 64.6 59.8 84.1 66.9 75.1 72.5 79.2 62.7 62.9 64.3 76.8
discriminated against in Germany, Britain and France, which affects their cultural adjustment. The subjective perception of discrimination is a relevant factor in understanding the degree of satisfaction with the life migrants lead in a foreign country. Interestingly, there is some correspondence between the perception of discrimination and societal resistance to immigration from other EU member states, as measured by Eurobarometer. Data from EB53 of 2000 show that, among the countries included in our survey, those with less resistance to intra-European mobility are Spain (55 per cent) and Italy (54 per cent), where public opinion considers that there should be unrestricted freedom of mobility. In France, most of the public (51 per cent) is in favour of mobility with some restrictions, whereas in Germany and the United Kingdom 6062 per cent of citizens state that they would like to see restrictions placed on mobility between European Union countries. Hence,
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there appears to be some objective basis for the subjective impressions of European migrants.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ADAPTATION
Taking a lead from the acculturation literature, we shall now examine the concept of psychological adaptation to assess the quality of life achieved by migrants in their country of destination on the basis of the integration strategies they have adopted. An important gauge in assessing the well-being of foreign residents is how satisfied they feel with their life as a whole. In this sense, we have chosen a direct approach and taken into account movers own assessment of their quality of life. Then, we have looked more thoroughly into their emotional situation through an indirect approach based on the notion of homesickness. Satisfaction with Life On a scale from 0 to 10, satisfaction with life as a whole was measured among the general public by the European Social Survey of 2004. In Spain and Britain, the average score was 7; it was 6.9 in Germany and Italy and only 6.4 in France. Generally speaking, the mean level of satisfaction reported by EU movers, regardless of the country of residence or origin, was higher than the level indicated by the public opinion in their country of origin. The lowest satisfaction, with a mean of 7.3, was reported by Spanish residents in Germany. The highest level was reported by British in France (8.3) and Spain (8), and by Germans in France (8.2). Satisfaction with life has a direct and very important relationship with cultural integration (Table 5.9). It seems reasonable to assume that higher psychological closeness results in higher levels of satisfaction with life in that social environment. Indeed, the satisfaction of movers who report lower-than-average levels of cultural integration in the destination country is even lower than the satisfaction of stayers in their country of origin. On the other end of the cultural integration scale, migrants who report higher cultural integration or affinity with the host society reach very high means of satisfaction with their life: between 8 and 9 points, which is practically a ceiling effect considering that this is a mean. While satisfaction with life among movers is clearly associated with cultural integration, it has hardly any relationship with social integration. Table 5.10 shows the mean satisfaction of migrants according to their level of social integration that is, the density and nationality of their network of friends, and the linguistic ability to get to know and communicate with
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Table 5.9
Mean satisfaction with life and levels of cultural integration of EU movers (010 scale)
Total Low Cultural Integration MediumLow 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.1 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.9 7.2 7.7 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.4 MediumHigh 8.5 8.2 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.5 8.3 8.0 8.2 8.1 8.8 8.7 8.4 8.4 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.5 High 8.8 9.1 9.2 8.6 9.6 9.4 9.3 9.6 9.1 9.1 9.1 8.9 9.6 9.5 8.9 9.0 9.6 9.5 9.2 9.5
7.61 7.47 7.65 7.70 8.21 7.95 7.96 7.62 8.30 7.25 7.52 8.02 7.91 7.43 7.54 7.99 7.60 7.34 7.57 7.60
5.7 5.5 4.4 4.2 4.5 5.5 4.2 5.5 5.2 4.9 4.4 4.2 5.9 5.2 6.3 4.9 5.2 5.3 5.7 4.9
their social environment. No clear-cut pattern can be detected. In fact, a higher satisfaction with life is associated with lower social integration only among German and British residents in Spain. Overall, satisfaction with life is a subjective feature that is strongly associated with cultural integration (0.77**), and poorly correlated (and negatively) with social integration (0.07**).2 Such a negative association, where the increase of intercultural competence and high social presence is associated with lower satisfaction with life, is particularly noticeable in certain groups of migrants: Germans in Italy (0.27**), French in Italy (0.14*), French in Germany (0.27**) and British in Spain (0.14*). Both dimensions are clearly differentiated, as we can see below. Living in another country is a very special situation that enables migrants to compare their experiences and their knowledge of the country of origin
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Table 5.10
Mean satisfaction with life and the social integration of EU movers (010 scale)
Total Low Social Integration MediumLow 7.5 7.3 7.9 7.8 8.5 7.7 8.2 7.6 8.4 7.5 7.8 8.3 7.7 7.3 7.3 7.9 7.6 7.3 7.2 7.4 MediumHigh 7.7 7.5 7.7 7.7 8.4 8.2 7.9 8.3 8.4 7.5 7.6 7.5 8.1 7.4 7.7 8.1 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.9 High 7.0 7.7 7.3 7.3 8.1 7.4 7.2 7.7 7.9 6.3 7.1 6.3 7.3 6.5 7.6 7.7 6.9 7.4 7.9 7.2
7.61 7.47 7.65 7.70 8.21 7.95 7.96 7.62 8.30 7.25 7.52 8.02 7.91 7.43 7.54 7.99 7.60 7.34 7.57 7.60
8.4 8.3 7.9 7.7 7.5 8.6 8.4 7.5 8.0 7.0 7.8 8.0 8.1 7.7 7.7 8.1 7.8 7.0 7.8 7.3
with their experiences and knowledge of the country of destination. In our survey, we asked respondents to compare the quality of different dimensions of life in the countries of origin and destination: education, bureaucracy, health care services and public safety. Two scales have been built from the number of times a service or institution is believed to be better in the country of origin and the number of times it is said to be better in the society of the country of residence. Cultural integration shows a positive correlation with a preference for the services and institutions of the country of residence (0.04**). The correlation is negative in the case of preference for services and institutions in the country of origin (0.09**). Thus, cultural integration is associated with a higher preference for services in the destination country. However, when it comes to social integration, the trend is quite the opposite. As the level of social integration increases, the preference for services and institutions in the country of residence lowers
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(20.04**), and the preference for those in the country of origin rises (0.12**). This trend emerges in all groups of migrants consistently. Homesickness and Integration To conclude, we examine another indicator of psychological adaptation: homesickness. Any novel or folk song on migrants revolves around this feeling nostalgia is the psychological outcome of migration par excellence. Here we shall consider homesickness as a multidimensional phenomenon. Our analysis of open answers to the question: What do you miss the most from your country of origin? shows that there are three main dimensions of homesickness. Firstly, there is the yearning for primary groups: family, friends and food. The last seems to be a common element in the social act of meeting with family or friends. Secondly, there is the yearning for the civic culture of the migrants country of origin, that is, the social norms (for instance, how things work, how people respect you), the way the civil service deals with citizens, and so forth. Finally, there is culture as such, the yearning for lifestyles (traditions, customs, folklore, celebrations). Each of these three dimensions is more or less important according to different groups of migrants and their social or cultural integration. EU movers that report feeling more yearning for their primary groups are Spanish residents in any country of destination, Italian residents in Germany and Spain, and British and French residents in Spain. When it comes to the longing for lifestyles and traditions, Spanish migrants in any country again show the most yearning for their home, followed by Italian migrants in Germany, France and Britain. In contrast, the lifestyle and way of life in Mediterranean countries are valued positively by German and English movers to the south of the continent, which is in fact one of the main reasons for migrating. A contrast of the means representing the yearning for home civic culture reported by EU movers shows two main aspects. First of all, Italy has the least valued or longed-for civic culture, according to French, British and Germans living in Italy, as well as Italian residents in other countries. The second aspect is the non-transitive nature of the ordered sequence of civic cultures. The British are nostalgic for their civic culture when they live in Germany, Germans when they live in France, and the French when they live in Britain. In this sense, it is not possible to order the desirability of different civic cultures using the comparison established by residents from other countries. However, neither Italian nor Spanish nationals long for their civic culture when they reside in other countries. Different forms of homesickness are also clearly related to cultural and social integration. The higher the social integration is, the lower is the
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yearning for the primary groups of the country of origin. However, the higher the social integration, the higher the yearning for the civic culture of origin. This means that having more social contact and knowledge of how everyday life works in the country of destination makes movers critical of that country. In fact, the higher cultural integration is, the lower the yearning for the primary groups and the lifestyles of the home country. Cultural integration thus testifies to a neat psychological detachment from migrants roots. Overall, higher levels of integration mean less homesickness, with the exception of the aspects of civic culture we have just discussed. Degrees and forms of homesickness vary also on the basis of individual differences. Thus, the longing for primary groups is slightly higher among movers who expect to return soon to their country of origin (0.06**) and among women (0.08**). The period of time spent in the country of destination also shows an effect. The migrants who have lived there the longest are less affected by this type of homesickness (0.07**). With regard to civic culture, homesickness is higher among the oldest migrants (0.03*), men (0.04*), and those who are less satisfied with their life in the country of residence (0.05**). The longer migrants have lived abroad, the more they yearn for their civic culture (0.05**). The yearning for lifestyles affects more those who expect to return soon (0.08**), especially the younger they are (0.07**). Therefore, the length of time migrants spend abroad reduces their homesickness regarding family and friends but increases their yearning for social aspects like civic culture or lifestyles.
CONCLUSIONS
Living in a different society is the only experience shared by all the populations studied in this book, who differ in many other ways. In spite of their individual diversity, EU movers (like all migrants) have the same, everyday concern: that is, how to adapt to a new social and cultural environment. In other words, they may have followed completely different paths taking them to live abroad, but all of them must adjust to a changed milieu. Their past, present, and especially their future, play an important role in the ways they choose to organize their existence. In many regards, EU movers differ quite notably from more familiar types of immigrants. Taking account of the existing literature on acculturation and integration, we sought to make sense of their distinctively patterned strategies of adjustment by devising two indexes on the basis of a series of attitudinal and behavioural items. These two indexes refer to what we call social and cultural integration. Basically, the first index relies
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on the nationality of friends and the linguistic competence of respondents; the second on their preference for the country of origin or destination and their wish to return to the home country (or not). Overall, EU movers personal networks comprise a larger number of non-nationals than nationals. Their command of the language of the country of destination is fairly good almost three out of four movers know the language quite well or almost as natives. Still, this was not the case at migration, when 40 per cent of movers did not speak a single word of the host-country language. Even though their linguistic skills were overall higher than those of the general population in the country of origin, knowledge of the COR language is far from being a necessary condition to move within Europe. This, in turn, does not jeopardize their overall sense of well-being. EU movers cultural integration as captured by our indicators is more nuanced. Movers appear to be happier than stayers, and this happiness with their life is even higher when it goes hand in hand with the conviction of preferring the place where they actually reside over their home country. But, to be more precise, the bulk of respondents skipped the simple and perhaps simplistic alternative between the home and the host country as ideal places, preferring to indicate both as plausible and partially agreeable locations where they would spend their lives. Equally, EU movers express homesickness in a quite elaborate form, making sense of different pros and cons of their mobility choice. At the end of the day, all this works to single out EU movers as a discerning transnational population (see also Chapter 8 on their transnational media consumption), trying to capitalize on European citizenship to get the best of both worlds as much as this is possible.
NOTES
1. Confirmatory factor analysis, with orthogonal and non-orthogonal rotations, has been used. The extraction of two significant, differentiated dimensions has been the result of this analysis. As a second method of analysis, we have used non-metric scaling. The results also show two dimensions, differentiated and significant, and group together the indicators considered to be theoretically representative of each dimension. 2. [**] Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (bilateral). [*] Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (bilateral).
6.
More mobile, more European? Free movement and EU identity

Nina Rother and Tina M. Nebe
FREE MOVEMENT AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY: WHICH RELATIONSHIP?

European citizens who live in an EU country other than their native one come in closer contact with many of the EUs policies than those who stay at home. These EU movers, as we have called them, can benefit from their French health insurance in Germany, shop with the Euro in a wide range of countries and pay reduced home-student tuition fees at British universities. Movers can experience European integration first-hand, be it at the dinner table with friends in the country of residence, at the workplace, or in everyday interaction in a supermarket or at a bus stop. Experiences related to European Union policies or contact and exchange with other EU citizens if experienced as positive may affect pro-European attitudes and identities.1 Movers, in short, might differ from stayers regarding their level of Europeanness. But is this necessarily true? Couldnt positive experiences and contacts in Italy simply make a German Italophile rather than pro-European? Much has been written about the absence of Europe in the lives of ordinary EU citizens (Shore and Black 1994; Meinhof 2004). Maybe moving from Germany to Italy simply makes movers feel at home in two societies, without them developing a new tier of identification with a supranational entity. Maybe movers shop with the Euro and use the health insurance of their country of origin while resident elsewhere, yet stay unattached to the European Union that claims to have made these things possible. On the other hand, developing a European identity might be a convenient way around the tensions and clashes possibly associated with holding two distinct territorial or national identities. In this chapter, we will adopt a social-psychological approach to answer three interrelated questions. First, do movers position themselves differently towards the European Union than stayers? Do they know more about the EU? Do they have a more positive image of the EU? Do they
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More mobile, more European?
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feel more European and less Spanish, Italian or British? Are they more attached to the European Union than those who have stayed in their country of origin (COO)? Second, what kinds of territorial identities do movers hold? Do most movers identify with their country of residence (COR) and with the European Union on top of their COO identity? How many movers assimilate entirely and lose their COO identity? Do movers tend to become bi-cultural, holding COO and COR identities, but feeling no attachment to the European Union? Does a bi-cultural COO and COR identity constitute the best base for Europeanness? And third, which factors are conducive to the development of European identities in movers? What is the impact of education, professional status, language knowledge or contact with COR nationals on the European identities of free movers? Before we provide empirical answers to these questions, we will consider their theoretical underpinnings. Despite enduring criticisms of the European Unions supposed democratic deficit and the lack of identification with the EU among European citizens (Scharpf 1999; Siedentop 2001), ambitious research on the emergence of European identity has continued to appear (Gabel 1998; Duchesne and Frognier 2002; Diez Medrano 2003; Herrmann et al. 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Bruter 2005; Gillespie and Laffan 2006; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009). Other scholars are sceptical of the very concept of European identity, pointing to the often absurd proliferation of ways of talking about identity or operationalizing the concept in research (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Favell 2005). Yet, whether or not European identity has an empirical base or is merely a matter of Bruxellois propaganda is an empirical question. It is the question this chapter seeks to answer for the population of European internal movers. We ask if these movers have a stronger attachment to the EU compared to stayers as a relative question, independent of absolute levels of European attachment. By defining precisely what it is we are studying, by being explicit about our methodological assumptions and simplifications, and by staying clear of any kind of partisanship, we hope to avoid the European identity trap. The usage we shall make of the term identity for the purpose of this chapter will only contain a small and well-defined fraction of its potentially manifold meanings. We take identity to refer to the contextual and dynamic part of the individuals self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership (Tajfel 1981, 255). In other words, we are not interested in the essence of individuals, but rather in changing perceptions of group membership that are induced by changes in the social context in which the actor moves. Identity then is a dynamic process, not a profound and hidden part of the self, a
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definition and redefinition of the boundaries between us and them in particular situations. It follows that identity is multiple (it differs according to context), relational (only because we are not they, we know who we are) and social (it refers to the group membership of individuals). The actors self-defined identity is in constant interaction with the group membership attributed to the actor by others (internal versus external identification: Jenkins 2000). Via the act of identification, the group is defined and thus invented or reinvented (Brubaker 2004). European identity then is linked to the awareness of ones feeling of belonging to an imagined category of Europeans.2 Note that European identity does not designate that feeling of belonging or attachment itself but rather the awareness of it. While attachment is affective, carried out by what G.H. Mead (1934) calls the I (the active part of the Self), identity is reflexive and linked to Meads Me. For example, I can be attached to the fate of the pygmies in Papua New Guinea without identifying with them. A more complex case would be to identify as an Alsatian but not be particularly attached to Alsace. We can say that, all in all, attachment is somewhat easier to achieve than identity. De facto, attachment and identity often overlap even if they are analytically distinct. In most cases, the psychological process of ingroup favouritism (Turner 1978) makes us evaluate the ingroup higher than any outgroup and produces some form of affect towards it (or value and emotional significance according to Tajfel). For the purpose of this chapter, it is important to remember that identity is more reflexive and hence potentially less widespread than affect, but affect is the best proxy available to measure the complex concept of identity. Much has been written about the different ways in which European identities and national identities can co-exist (Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Marks 1999; Kohli 2000; Citrin and Sides 2004; Risse 2004). The most common argument is that territorial identities are potentially additive: one can be aware of belonging to Wales, the United Kingdom and the European Union without experiencing any conflict between these identities. Herrmann and Brewer (2004, 8) propose three configurations summing up how multiple identities work: 1. Nested Identities: The Matruska doll or onion model conceives of identities as co-existing one inside the other. That is, I can simultaneously be Basque, Spanish, European and a global citizen. According to this configuration, all European citizens could hold a European identity on top of their existing territorial identities. This model is praised as something akin to the subsidiarity principle on the level of identities; it is particularly widespread in the neofunctional literature.
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2.
3.
Cross-Cutting Identities: Here, the idea is that some, but not all members of one identity group (say French citizens) also feel they belong to another identity group (say Jewish people). In turn, some members of the latter group (Jewish people) identify with professional categories (such as doctors) rather than with Frenchness. If European identity functions according to this principle, some but not all people in Europe might subscribe to a European identity; Europeanness could then overlap with being Protestant, Catholic or Muslim, male, female, gay, lesbian or straight and so on. Political scientists hold that crosscutting identities are a precondition for democracy (Lijphart 1999); nested identities in contrast do not allow for political opposition to develop. Separate Identities: This final configuration is a special case as the level of analysis is the individual not the group. Although an individual can hold two or more identities without problem, there is no group that shares both of these exact two identities. Imagine an Italian teacher in France whose friends are all either teachers or Italian but not both. In this example, there is no cross-cutting group of Italian teachers. If Europeanness took this form, it would not overlap with national identities.
All in all, the debate about multiple territorial identities leaves little room for potential conflict between two or more identities. Research has consistently shown that identities concerning different levels of territorial attachment do not clash with one another; European, national, regional and local identities are not experienced as being in competition. However, little is known about possible inconsistencies between two or more territorial identities that operate on the same level (for example, Tuscan versus Sicilian identity, German versus British identity). When it comes to the territorial identities of internal migrants in the European Union, it is precisely this problem that arises: how do migrants go about feeling both German and British? Can two identities on the same territorial level co-exist? A further point is that perceptions of reference and membership group affiliation are altered when the social context changes. If a revolution occurs in my country, I have to redefine who I am with and position myself and my group vis--vis the new set-up. Likewise, if I move from one context to another, I have to adjust to a changed environment and find my place and my ingroup within it. This process of adaptation and redefinition is known as psychological acculturation (Graves 1967). It can be understood as a kind of resocialisation as it generally entails not only identity changes but also modifications in attitudes and values as well as the acquisition of new social skills and norms (Berry 1992 and 1997). Adapting Berrys (1997, 10)
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Table 6.1
Four ideal types of migrant identities

Are the cultural characteristics and identities of the country of origin maintained? Yes No Assimilation: COR identity only Marginalization: Loss of identity
Are the cultural characteristics and identities of the country of residence taken on?
Yes No
Hybridization: Bi-cultural identities Segregation: COO identity only
famous model of interethnic integration to the question of migrant identities, four ideal-typical scenarios arise (see also the use of this typology by Alaminos and Santacreu in Chapter 5). As ideal-types, they momentarily fix otherwise fluid and changing identities for the sake of clarity. In everyday life, a migrant can hold both a COO and a COR identity in the workplace but experience strong COO identification when watching a football match. Likewise, a progression over time is probable: we can expect COO identification to decrease over time in most cases but gain momentum in certain crucial periods (for example, homesickness in the first months, on Christmas day, in hard times and so on). To simplify matters analytically, let us consider the ideal-types shown in Table 6.1. As this table shows, migration within the EU can lead to four distinct responses regarding the migrants territorial identity. Far from mirroring the consensual additive models found with EU, national and regional identification, conflict is an option when it comes to two national identities. Here, we have to distinguish between identities that are experienced: 1. in terms of conflict, as a zero-sum game, that is, the more French I become, the less Italian I am or the more Italian I stay, the less French I can become (top right and bottom left); as additive and non-conflicting, that is, leading to bi-cultural French and Italian identities (top left cell); as losing a sense of belonging through the migratory experience (bottom right cell).
2. 3.
Let us look at the likelihood of conflicting and non-conflicting identities in turn. The foundations of national identities have always been forged in opposition to the Other (often the neighbours) throughout European history. It is likely that such oppositional thinking still exists among some
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Europeans despite the existence of the EU. Now imagine it were part of my Spanish identity not to be French. I eat different food, I speak a different language, my culture is distinct and all my friends are Spanish. By moving to France, a conflict is built up between my Spanish identity and my everyday life where I have to interact with French society, at least to some degree (speak French, eat French food and so on). Thus, segregation and assimilation of identities occur when the group membership proposed by the country of residence is in dissonance with the values, attitudes and identities the actor has been socialized into in his/her country of origin. According to Festingers Cognitive Dissonance Theory, individuals suffer from unpleasant psychological tension (dissonance) when two pieces of knowledge or cognitions are experienced as discrepant (Festinger 1954): How can I be Spanish (hence not French) yet behave as if I were French? People prefer cognitions that fit together and dislike dissonant cognitions. Indeed, psychological dissonance has drive-like properties that are much like those of hunger and thirst: the actor wants to get rid of it. One way of overcoming dissonance is to change cognitions: a migrant might simply deny his/ her COR values, identities and attitudes and harden his/her position on the COO cognitions. In this case, the migrant would feel Spanish only and reject everything French leading to a segregation of identities. The same scenario is possible with COO values, identities and attitudes being rejected and only COR cognitions being kept an assimilation of identities. On the other hand, it is also possible that the mover does not experience conflict between the COO and COR identities. In that case, the actor acculturates to the country of residence while keeping the links to the country of origin a hybridization. The migrant thus develops a new, bicultural, mixed identity (for example, SpanishFrench). Both Spanishness and Frenchness are now part of the individuals self-concept, s/he is aware of his/her identification with French and Spanish people alike and attaches emotional significance to both memberships. The question then becomes: under which conditions are movers likely not to experience cognitive dissonance between the COR and the COO identities? Here, two aspects are relevant. On the one hand, the availability of and access to COR identity; on the other, categorical markers having to do with the migrant herself. First, according to Festinger, dissonance increases as the degree of discrepancy among cognitions increases and as the number of discrepant cognitions increases. In other words, if COR and COO identities are experienced as rather different (say, Spanish versus British as opposed to Spanish versus Italian), dissonance is higher and hybrid bi-cultural identities are less likely to occur. Furthermore, sociodemographic markers that can be expected to facilitate the hybridization of COO and COR identities are: knowledge of the COR language; sustained, non-hierarchical contact
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with COR citizens (for example, partners and friends, also colleagues and neighbours); level of education (linked to the ability to see overarching similarities); and the year of migration (COO identification is likely to decrease over time) (Recchi and Nebe 2003, 1617). In sum, we suspect that conflict is likely to occur where (perceived) differences between the COR and the COO countries are great, and where the migrant has arrived only recently, lacks contact with the country of residence and its citizens, is poorly educated and lacks COR language skills. These two configurations regarding the interplay between national identities the conflict and the hybridisation models open up two very distinct possibilities for the creation of a European third layer of identification. Another possibility is one in which the experience of two cultures leads to a loss of identity with both a marginalization of the individual from both societies. This completes the typology of possible psychological outcomes. Of special interest to us, though, is the possibility of an emergent Europeanness. If heightened levels of European identity in movers are indeed connected with the experience of moving from one European country to another, such Europeanness must be connected with the development (or transformation) of the COR identity. The (potential for a) COR identity is thus what distinguishes stayers from movers. We will argue that there are two potential paths that lead to the development of a heightened European identity in movers. According to the cognitive dissonance model, the COR identity is in conflict with the COO identity, and one of the two or both must be transformed to develop a European identity. In contrast, the interculturation model holds where bi-cultural COO1COR identities have been accepted. Here, Europeanness can emerge as a tertiary identity that encompasses both national identifications. Let us look at the models in some more depth. The cognitive dissonance model proposes to resolve or reduce the incompatibility between a migrants COO and COR identities by adding a new cognition (Festinger 1954). In other words, when the clash between feeling Spanish and feeling French becomes unbearable, a new cognition, feeling European, can alter the relative weight of what it means to be Spanish versus. French. This process is different from the segregation/ assimilation model (see above) where one of the two or more dissonant cognitions were simply denied. Where dissonant identities are however transformed, several distinct outcomes are possible: 1. European identity 1 COO or COR identity: When a European identity is added to the COR and COO identities and is given a higher relative weight than either of them, the degree of dissonance experienced by
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2.
the individual may be reduced. This is so because European identity does not clash with national identities as it is inclusive by definition and constructed on a different level of abstraction. If the European identity is more important than the COR identity, the individual will experience a feeling of belonging to the COO and to Europe. If the European identity is more important than the COO identity, the individual will chose the COR and European identities. European identity only: It is theoretically possible that European identity is used to reduce the valence of both the COO and the COR identities. The two discrepant cognitions are weakened until cognitive dissonance is no longer experienced. The newly-formed European identity can then be said to have replaced both national identities.
According to the interculturation model, tertiary multi-cultural identities are developed on the basis of existing positive relationships with both national cultures when the individual does not have to choose between them (LaFromboise et al. 1993, 131). The concept of interculturation has been developed in order to understand the ethnogenesis of new cultural identities that cannot be explained with bi-directional models (such as the one proposed by Berry 1997). Examples for such tri-directional or tripartite identities are Chicano or Asian American identities in the USA that are based on bi-cultural Mexican/Asian and US-American identities, supplemented by an overarching umbrella identity that encompasses both national identities. In other words, people who already hold hybrid, bi-cultural identities will find it easier to open up to further tiers of identification. Identification here is a cumulative enterprise, a matter of learning: the individual feels part of several universes and finds it easy to add on others because (perceived) conflict is absent. We are then left with two questions that ultimately require empirical answers but can be raised here. First, in which cases do bi-cultural, nonconflicting identities take on the extra European tier and in which cases do they simply stay bi-cultural? Second, which national identity (COR or COO) is likely to prevail in the case of conflict? Which identity is more likely to be rejected or replaced by an EU identity when cognitive dissonance arises? Scenarios that might lead to interculturation and the development of a European identity could be: (a) a migration history that involves several European countries or; (b) having a partner from an EU country other than ones own and living in a third EU country. While a bi-cultural BritishItalian identity is probably still manageable, a quatri-cultural BritishItalianSpanishCzech identity might be more demanding. Here, an EU mover might simply prefer to refer to herself as European. Regarding the relative strength of COO versus COR identities, we
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suspect that the COR effect will be overall weaker than the COO effect. This means that: (a) where an identity clash occurs between two national identities, the COR identity is more likely to disappear than the COO identity; and that (b) in terms of attitudes towards the EU, movers attitudes will be similar to stayers attitudes in the country of origin, not those in the country of residence; that is, Italians in Germany will be more similar to Italians in Italy than to Germans in Germany. In other words, primary socialization can be expected to have a stronger impact on identities than psychological acculturation as a consequence of the migration experience. Where one comes from will be more pertinent than newly experienced identities, even if these are explicitly chosen by intraEU migrants. However, once again, the characteristics of the country of residence and its migration regime will have an impact here. Concretely, the strength of the COR effect will depend on: (a) the Europe-orientation of the country of residence (that is, moving to a pro-European country makes one more highly Europeanized, moving to a country with higher levels of Euroscepticism decreases feelings of belonging to the group of Europeans); and (b) the assimilation pressure of the receiving society (that is, where assimilation is fostered, COR effects are stronger, where segregation is tolerated, COR effects are weaker). Bringing together all the models reviewed in this section, we are therefore left with eight options of identity development for the internal EU migrant (Table 6.2). Essentially, these are equivalent to Berrys categories with an additional layer added to them, that is, whether or not the migrant has also developed a European identity. The -ing form is employed to signal our dynamic and relational reading of identity as identification. Our hypothesis is that most intra-EU migrants will be found in the first three categories (integrating European, assimilating European, self-segregating Table 6.2 Eight identity outcomes of internal migration in the European Union
COO 1 COR attached EU attached Integrating European Not EU attached Integrating non-European COO not attached 1 COR attached Assimilating European Assimilating non-European COO attached 1 COR not attached Self-segregating European Self-segregating non-European COO 1 COR not attached Selfmarginalising European Selfmarginalising non-European
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COO-identity
COR-identity
COO-identity
COR-identity
Self-segregating European Self-segregating Non-European Self-marginalising European
Assimilating non-European Assimilating European Self-marginalising non-European
Integrating European
Integrating Non-European
Figure 6.1
Models of European identification depending on conflict or compatibility between COO and COR identities
European). The integrating European is the person with bi-cultural identities who develops an interculturated European identity in the absence of any tension between COO and COR identification. The assimilating European is the migrant who experiences cognitive dissonance between the COO and the COR identity and resolves it by adding a new non-conflicting cognition (European identity) to swallow the COO identity. The opposite scenario (the COR identity is absorbed by the newly-developed European identity) is the case for self-segregating Europeans (Figure 6.1).
DIFFERENCES IN EUROPEANNESS AND TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES BETWEEN MOVERS AND STAYERS

We will now try to answer the first of our three questions: whether movers position themselves differently towards the European Union and their countries of origin and residence than stayers do. We will therefore compare stayers and movers attitudes towards the EU and their territorial attachments. While we will use the EIMSS to obtain measures for movers, for stayers here we refer to Eurobarometer results.3 Attitudes Towards the EU The first important variable measuring attitudes towards the EU is the image the EU has in the eyes of respondents.4 Figure 6.2 shows how many movers and stayers indicated that they associate the EU with something positive, allowing for different levels of comparison. First, we note that movers have a far more positive image of the EU than stayers. Movers more often hold very positive images of the EU, regardless of their country of
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40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Germany
Movers - COR Movers - COO Stayers (EB) Average movers
Average stayers
Italy
Spain
France
Britain
Notes: The graph must be read as follows: the left bar refers to movers living in Germany, the central bar to Germans living abroad, and the right bar to Germans living in Germany (stayers). Source: EB 61.0 and EIMSS, N 5 10 901
Figure 6.2
EU-image: very positive by COO and COR (%)
origin and their country of residence. This pattern holds for each and every country as well as for the category positive image (not shown here). Second, out of all groups of stayers, Spanish and Italians have the most positive image of the EU while Germans have the least positive image. By their country of origin (COO), French and Spanish movers think most highly of the EU. British movers least often associate the EU with something positive. Looking at movers by country of residence (COR), it is movers to Spain that have the most positive image of the EU. These very impressive differences between stayers and movers also apply to self-perceived knowledge of the EU: movers overall and in every country say they know more about the EU than the respective group of stayers.5 Either because they are a self-selected group (that is, more informed people are more likely to move) or, more plausibly, because moving and the greater exposure to the EU and its policies make them more knowledgeable, movers are more aware of the role of the EU and its institutions. Territorial Identities and Attachments When it comes to territorial identities and the feeling of national and/or European identity, a slightly different pattern emerges.6 Again, the percentage of movers feeling European only is higher than that of stayers. This is true in each country: while about 5 per cent of all stayers feel European

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 Movers - COR Movers - COO Stayers (EB)
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Average movers
Average stayers 5 0 Germany Italy Spain France Britain
Figure 6.3
National versus European identity: European only by COO and COR (%)
only, almost 30 per cent of all movers do (Figure 6.3). The gap between stayers and movers is especially large among French and Germans: about 25 percentage points. Breaking down our figures by country of residence, the differences are not as large as between countries of origin. Movers going to Germany and Britain feel least often European only (about one in four) in contrast to almost 40 per cent of movers going to Spain. Apart from looking at the percentages of respondents feeling European only, it is also worth having a look at the percentages of respondents feeling that they are a home country national (HCN) only (Figure 6.4). The percentage of movers feeling HCN only is smaller in all countries than that of stayers. This is again especially true for British and German stayers and movers. Whereas 62.1 per cent of British stayers say that they feel British only, this is only true for 18.7 per cent of British movers. The question is whether the moving experience makes British feel more European or whether those British who feel European are more likely to leave their country. Unfortunately, only panel data would permit us to adjudicate between these two possibilities. By COO, 20.2 per cent of Italian movers feel Italian only, but only 9.9 per cent of German movers. Hence, it might be assumed that feeling German is a less stable feeling than feeling Italian and can easily be influenced by the moving experience. In fact, by COR, it turns out that movers
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65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
Movers - COR Movers - COO Stayers (EB)
Average stayers
Average movers
Germany
Italy
Spain
France
Britain
Notes: The graph must be read as follows: the left bar refers to movers living in Germany, the central bar to Germans living abroad, and the right bar to Germans living in Germany (stayers). Source: EB 61.0 and EIMSS, N5 7 859
Figure 6.4
National versus European identity: Home country national only by COO and COR (%)
going to France are the least likely to show high nationalist feelings (8.7 per cent); this is a more common experience for intra-EU migrants living in Germany (22.2 per cent). The next battery of questions asks for the respondents attachment to their COO and COR and to the EU.7 These questions have the big advantage of not asking for a ranking of single attachments but for a separate rating of each item. They will therefore be central for all the following types of analyses. When comparing EU attachment between stayers and movers, we again find very clearly the heightened Europeanness of all groups of movers (Figure 6.5). Only 10.3 per cent of all stayers taken together feel very attached to the EU whereas 24.5 per cent of all movers taken together feel so. Out of all groups of stayers, British citizens say least often that they feel very attached to the EU (5.0 per cent); Italian (14.4 per cent) and French stayers (13.0 per cent) on the other hand say it most often. These differences still prevail when the category fairly attached is considered apart from very attached. Movers from Britain, which has traditionally posted high levels of Euroscepticism in surveys, show the least attachment to the EU (only 17.5 per cent feel very attached), while the other four groups of movers show about the same level of attachment to the EU. In terms of COR, however, no big deviations across countries can be found, which makes us assume that the effect of the country of origin is somewhat stronger on

30 25 Movers - COR Movers - COO Stayers (EB)
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Average movers 20 15 Average stayers 10 5 0 Germany Italy Spain France Britain
Notes: The graph must be read as follows: the left-wing bar refers to movers living in Germany, the central bar to Germans living abroad, and the right-wing bar to Germans living in Germany (stayers). Source: EB 61.0 and EIMSS, N 5 10 928
Figure 6.5
Feelings of attachment to EU: very attached by COO and COR (%)
Europeanness than that of the country of residence a hypothesis that will later be tested in more detail. Apart from EU attachment, having a look at COO and COR attachment is also worthwhile. As movers have not lived in their country of origin for at least one year, one might assume that stayers who still live in their country of origin feel more attached to this country than movers. In general, however, it turns out that the experience of moving does not decrease the level of movers attachment to their countries of origin. Out of all groups of stayers, Italians and French are those who feel most attached to their country of origin 57.9 per cent and 54.1 per cent are very attached to their COO in contrast to only 39.5 per cent of Spanish stayers (Figure 6.6). But Italian and French movers are very attached to their countries of origin, too. British movers feel least attached to Britain (29.4 per cent), followed by German movers (32.7 per cent). These rather low values are understandable when the migration motives of British and Germans primarily quality of life (for example, weather and food) are taken into account. Figure 6.6 further shows that 60.2 per cent of Spanish movers feel very attached to Spain but only 39.5 per cent of Spanish stayers do. The hypothesis that leaving Spain makes Spanish feel even more attached to Spain fits very
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65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Germany

Movers - COR Movers - COO Stayers (EB)
Average stayers Average movers
Italy
Spain
France
Britain
Figure 6.6
Feelings of attachment to COO: very attached by COO and COR (%)
well into the stereotype of the proud Spanish, but it is also very possible that Spanish stayers (in contrast to Spanish movers) prefer to indicate a strong regional attachment instead of a national attachment. When looking at COR differences, it is evident that movers going to Germany continue to feel very attached to their country of origin. Germans in Spain feel more attached to Germany than German stayers, which might be due to strong German communities on the Spanish coasts, where most of the German retired movers settle. Apart from attachment to their country of origin, movers were also asked to rate their attachment to their country of residence. However, comparisons between stayers and movers are not easy because the stayers country of origin and residence have always been the same. Figure 6.7 shows that, as expected, stayers feel more attached to their country of residence than do movers to their target country with the exception of movers to Spain. A high percentage of British movers in general feel very attached to their COR, whereas only few Italian movers feel so. Breaking figures down by country of residence, it is movers to Spain who feel most attached to Spain (41.6 per cent), whereas only 23.0 per cent of movers going to Britain feel very attached to this country. Movers living in Germany also indicate low feelings of attachment to Germany. Clearly, movers have by far more positive attitudes towards the EU and a higher attachment to the EU than stayers. We also saw that the experience of

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Germany Italy Spain France Britain Movers - COR Movers - COO Stayers (EB)
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Average stayers
Average movers
Notes: The graph must be read as follows: the left-wing bar refers to movers living in Germany, the central bar to Germans living abroad, and the right-wing bar to Germans living in Germany (stayers). Source: EB 61.0 and EIMSS, N 5 11 241
Figure 6.7
Feelings of attachment to COR: very attached by COO and COR (%)
moving influences attachments to COO and COR two important moderating variables which themselves influence EU attachment. The question now is whether such a heightened Europeanness can be found among all movers or whether different types of movers exist with regard to their territorial attachments and attitudes towards the EU. For all of these probably existing mover groups, it would then be interesting to find out which variables influence territorial attachments and EU attitudes. In other words, which variables affect whether a mover feels attached to COO, COR and the EU? Is it more (or only) context effects like the socialization effect of the country of origin or the influence of attitudes in the new country of residence? Or is it more (or only) individual variables like gender, age, year of migration, marital status or daily contacts? This is what we will now analyse, changing our focus from the comparison of stayers and movers to movers only.
A TYPOLOGY OF TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES OF MOBILE EUROPEANS

As elaborated above and summarized in Table 6.2, our theoretical considerations led to identifying eight possible different identity outcomes
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Table 6.3
Eight identity outcomes of internal migration in the European Union (%)

COO 1 COR attached COR attached 1 COO not attached 9.8 [G3] 5.4 [G4] 15.1 COO attached 1 COR not attached 6.9 [G5] 5.4 [G6] 12.3 COO 1 Total COR not attached 2.5 [G7] 2.6 [G8] 5.1 68.9 31.1 100.0
EU attached 49.7 [G1] Not EU attached 17.7 [G2] Total 67.5

for internal movers. From an empirical point of view, however, some of these possible configurations might not actually occur in movers. We will now try to answer our second question: the kinds of territorial identities that movers hold. To address this question, we will again use the EIMSS dataset and analyse movers ratings of their attachment to their COO, COR and the EU, using attachment as a proxy for identity. As the question battery for COO, COR and EU attachment offers only four alternative answers and no middle category, a split into attached and not attached movers can be realized quite easily by assigning very and fairly attached movers to the attached category and not very and not at all attached movers to the non-attached category. Table 6.3 shows the resulting empirical distribution of this typology. It turns out that about two-thirds of our movers feel attached to both COO and COR and thus have developed (at least) bi-cultural identities without feeling conflicts emerging from this multiple identity (G11G2). However, about 27 per cent of movers (15.1 per cent and 12.3 per cent respectively) did feel an identity conflict and dissonance when faced with two different national identities. How did they resolve this conflict? While one group (G31G4) assimilates to the COR identity and drops their COO attachment, another group (G51G6) rejects the COR identity and sticks to COO attachment only. Interestingly, even if the difference between the two groups is small, more people adapt their identity to their entourage rather than thinking in terms of their roots. This finding clearly contradicts our hypothesis that COO effects would be larger than COR effects. Only 5.1 per cent of movers feel attached to neither COO nor COR (G71G8). Marginalization thus seems to apply to only a small minority. Table 6.3 also speaks to the interculturation hypothesis cited above: the development of EU attachment is more common when movers do not have to chose between COO and COR attachments but feel at ease with both of them. Almost half of our movers belong to the group of
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integrating Europeans (G1) and feel attached to COO, COR and the EU. Europeanness for them thus serves as an overarching umbrella identity that encompasses both national identities. It is therefore very likely that the heightened Europeanness of movers in comparison to stayers is indeed due to the confrontation with a second (perhaps third or fourth . . .) national identity. We will develop this in the next section. The second most common identity type is integrating non-Europeans (G2): 17.7 per cent of movers prefer to feel attached to both COO and COR, but not to the EU. The question posed in the theory section comes into play here: why do some bi-cultural movers develop a sense of Europeanness while others do not? In our sample, the 5.4 per cent who were assimilating non-Europeans (G4) and the 5.4 per cent self-segregating non-Europeans (G6) resolved their feeling of identity conflict and cognitive dissonance by reducing the valence of either the COO or the COR identity and only felt attached to either the COR or the COO. Another 9.8 per cent were assimilating Europeans (G3) and 6.9 per cent self-segregating Europeans (G5); they reduced their feeling of dissonance by adding a new cognition, namely EU attachment. As types 3 and 5 movers with EU attachment are more frequent than types 4 and 6 movers without EU attachment it seems to be easier for movers to reduce dissonance by adding new cognitions than by reducing the weight of existing ones. But this point is for experimental psychologists to develop further. Overall, in any case, it is most likely for internal movers in the European Union to develop a non-conflicting bi-directional identity with EU attachment as an additional umbrella identity.
ACCOUNTING FOR DIFFERENT TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES AMONG MOVERS

It remains to determine which factors are conducive to the development of EU attachment in movers. In other words, which contextual and individual factors make it more likely that a mover will develop one out of the eight theoretically possible identity outcomes? Do our hypotheses hold in different social contexts: that is, do variables like the COOs Europeanness and individual variables like education or language knowledge influence movers territorial identities? In order to single out important predictors for affiliation to one of the eight types, we conducted a multinomial regression analysis with selfsegregating non-Europeans (type 6) as the baseline against which all other types will be contrasted. Using this type of analysis, we will be able
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to conclude which independent variables differentiate best between each type and type 6. Concerning the list of independent variables, three classes can be distinguished. The first class consists of contextual variables the country of origin and the country of residence. For both variables, Spain serves as a baseline. As typical socio demographic variables, we included age at migration date, length of stay, gender with female being the baseline, education level with all degrees less than a university degree as baseline, and marital status with no partner as baseline.8 The third class of variables consists of individual variables related to the movers character or behaviour: the movers migration motive (that is, work, study, family and love reasons, quality of life, or others), past migration experience (whether the respondent has lived in the COR or a third country prior to the last move), daily contacts (whether she has friends from the COO, the COR or third countries), and language knowledge (good or bad, upon arrival in the COR and at the time of interview). Table 6.4 shows the B-coefficients and their significance as well as the pseudo-R-square for the multinomial regression model. Although the pseudo-R-square remains relatively low and suggests that other variables such as the movers personality may also play a role in predicting territorial identities, several important predictors can be singled out. Table 6.4 thus shows what makes movers most likely to belong to one of the eight types and not to another. This needs to be done by contrasting the different types with a baseline, that is, we learn how type 1 to type 8 movers differ from type 6 movers, which constitute the baseline. As we can see, this baseline category consists mainly of recently arrived labour migrants who feel attached to their COO but not to the COR and to the EU. They can therefore be seen as the most traditional type of immigrants, less likely to experience the distinctive effects of being a free-moving European. Each of the eight types of movers will be now described in detail. We correspondingly offer eight labels to identify these types, which might be compared and contrasted to the four basic clusters identified earlier in the book (see Chapter 2). Type 1 (Integrating Europeans) the Euromasters Integrating Europeans (49.7 per cent of our sample) are not only the most frequent but also the most ideal from a pro-European integration perspective kind of internal migrants in the European Union: they feel attached to their country of origin, to their country of residence and to the European Union without experiencing any conflict between these identities whatsoever. They are model Europeans who seem to live the slogan unity in diversity. Understanding what distinguishes type 1 movers from
Table 6.4
Characterization of identity types 1 (integrating Europeans) to 8 (self-marginalising non-Europeans) in contrast to type 6 (self-segregating non-Europeans): multinomial regression analysis (B coefficients)
Type 1 vs. type 6 0.009 20.002 0.001 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.026* 0.011 20.161 0.002 0.511** 0.155 0.378* 0.194 0.030 20.033 0.438* 0.326 0.295 0.515 0.639 0.238 20.014 0.181 0.182 0.256 0.346 0.900* 20.012 0.033** 20.364 20.051 0.032 20.002 0.001 0.142 0.579** 20.034 20.007 20.006 0.770** 0.454 20.093 Type 2 vs. type 6 Type 3 vs. type 6 Type 4 vs. type 6 Type 5 vs. type 6 Type 7 vs. Type 8 vs. type 6 type 6 20.003 0.010 0.430 0.173 20.319 20.302 0.457
139 20.142 20.045 20.403 0.264 20.123 20.011 0.256 0.704*** 0.140 0.515* 0.575* 20.069 20.176 20.276 0.468 20.412* 0.031 0.154 0.542*** 20.042 0.358 0.513* 20.461 20.232 20.700* 0.649* 0.110 20.014 20.184 1.203*** 0.143 0.140 0.667** 20.126 0.079 20.493 0.765* 20.335 0.009 20.002 1.213*** 20.182 0.298 0.104
Age at migration Years of stay Gender (0 5 female) University diploma Partner from COO (0 5 no partner) Partner from COR (0 5 no partner) Partner from 3rd country (0 5 no partner) Migration motivation Work Study Personal reasons Quality of life Miscellaneous Lived in 3rd country before Lived in COR before Several friends from COO Several friends from CO R Several friends from other countries Language knowledge at migration date Language knowledge now 20.113 20.219 20.161 0.218 0.259 20.154 0.296 20.236 0.183 0.401 0.520* 0.470 20.057 0.335 0.849 0.044 20.358 20.053 0.874** 0.425 0.415 0.562
0.119 0.581 0.467 1.036* 20.164 0.169 0.059 0.556* 0.143 0.171 0.567
Table 6.4
Type 1 vs. type 6 20.036 0.015 20.099 20.120 20.866** 20.270 0.549 12 918.877 182 0.201 20.390 20.733* 20.027 20.310 20.105 20.901** 20.418 21.415 20.495 20.599 20.425 21.129 0.787 1.208 0.756 21.414 0.306 0.608* 1.079*** 1.733*** 0.479* 20.043 0.799* 0.019 2.040*** 20.256 0.534 0.128 Type 2 vs. type 6 Type 3 vs. type 6 Type 4 vs. type 6 Type 5 vs. type 6
(continued)
Type 7 vs. Type 8 vs. type 6 type 6 1.184** 1.667*** 0.546 0.079 20.351 0.107 23.768 0.882* 1.206** 0.284 20.085 20.129 20.096 22.707
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Country of Origin France Britain Italy Spain Country of Residence France Britain Italy Spain Constant 22 Log Likelihood Degrees of freedom Pseudo R- square (Cox and Snell)
Notes: Reference category for dependent variable: type 6. * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; *** Significant at 0.1%
Source:
EIMSS, N 5 4 458
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other kinds of internal EU migrants is central to our analyses. Why do some movers construct identities according to this politically desirable scheme COO1COR1EU? And why do others not develop the EU tier or reject one of the national identities? Several variables help to explain the emergence of this tripartite attachment: out of the sociodemographic variables, the length of stay in the COR, the education level and having a partner from the COR have a highly significant impact and make type 1 differ from type 6 movers. We can assume that the longer the mover has already lived in the COR, the more s/he feels attached to it especially when the partner is a COR national. Holding a university degree may increase a persons ability to see what unites the countries of Europe and what the abstract EU construct is all about and therefore foster the development of an umbrella identity. Feeling attached to COO, COR and Europe in comparison to the baseline category is furthermore strengthened when the mover has several friends from the COR and when s/he had and has a good command of the CORs language. Having COR friends and being able to communicate right from the start seem to be key for taking on the COR identity. The COO attachment however is not reduced by this strong link to the COR society; these movers still have several friends from the COO (although the coefficient of the analysis does not reach a significant level). On the contextual level, we clearly see an impact of the country of origin as well as of the country of residence. In comparison to our baseline category type 6, type 1 movers are more likely to be from Germany than from Spain. Moving to Britain and Germany (in comparison to moving to Spain) on the other hand has a negative effect on the EU attachment of movers a clear COR effect as both countries are typically seen as Eurosceptic. Apart from territorial attachments, it would also be interesting to know what attitudes towards the EU are held by type 1 movers, as well as if they can be regarded as successful movers in terms of a high life satisfaction. Integrating Europeans have the second highest knowledge of the EU as well as the second most positive image of the EU of all of the eight types of movers. Regarding their life satisfaction, however, type 1 movers come only third although the mean differences here are relatively small and the general level of life satisfaction is quite high. The following quote, taken from qualitative interviews conducted with internal movers, illustrates how Euromasters feel about their national and European identifications. It is from a French mover in Germany.
Interviewer: Do you sometimes think about where you belong to, I mean, what your national identity is?
142 Jean: Interviewer: Jean:
Pioneers of European integration Yes, often. [quickly and spontaneously] And do you think you are more French or . . . Im more French. But sometimes I think, uh, could I live at all without any involvement of Germany? I mean, um . . . When I was in France for that short period, I missed Germany a lot, I mean, I missed it. I tried, uh, to find a job, in which I was able to talk German, in which I have contact with Germany. And I think I would miss that most definitely. And do you feel a little bit German? [Pause] Or . . . [Jean interrupts] Some parts . . . That is some parts of Germany I simply like. And do you also feel as a European, sometimes? Yes, Hmhm. So, I, I could, if I was offered a great job, in Italy, I would go at once.
Interviewer: Jean: Interviewer: Jean:
INTEGRATING EUROPEANS . . .
(a) have lived in COR for a longer time (b) are highly educated (c) have COR and COO friends (d) have a COR partner (e) spoke and speak the COR language (f) typically left Germany and moved to Spain (g) are not movers to Germany and Britain (h) know a lot about the EU and have a very positive image of the EU the Euromasters
Type 2 (Integrating Non-Europeans) the Bi-cultural Movers The second type of movers are the integrating non-Europeans (17.7 per cent of all movers) who feel attached to their COO and their COR but not to the EU. Regarding their sociodemographic profile, integrating non-Europeans differ from type 6 movers only in terms of their length of stay in the COR. Movers are more likely to belong to type 2 than to type 6, the longer they have already lived in the host country. When it comes to the character and behaviour of type 2 movers, we see that the variable lived in a third country before has a strong negative impact. Thus movers who have never lived in a third country before are more likely to develop attachments to two countries only. Type 2 movers also tend to be more integrated into the COR in terms of having friends from that country. When it comes to the impact of contextual factors on the affiliation to type
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2 versus type 6, it turns out that integrating non-Europeans are mainly British, German and Italian movers. Hence, an early socialization effect of the two more Eurosceptical COOs (Britain and Germany) is again salient. Again, as with type 1 movers, type 2 movers are likely not to settle in Britain and are more likely to settle in Spain. As may have been expected, the integrating Non-Europeans attitudes towards the EU are less positive than those of integrating Europeans. Note also that the life satisfaction of type 2 movers which differ from type 1 movers only by the fact that the latter do not feel attached to the EU is somewhat smaller.
Charles: Ill never be a perfect German or a . . . Perfect meaning hundred percent German. Ill never speak Bavarian [smiles], like my colleagues here are speaking [smiles]. And, ah, you always keep your accent and your way of thinking. On the other hand, ahm, you notice, youre not as French as your friends who stayed home. But . . . You notice it and it . . ., it either it bothers you or it doesnt. And after that I would say, for me, the question is: Am I happy or not? And if you say Im happy, because I have a job, I have, a home . . . I have everything I need. Then it doesnt bother you. Interviewer: So would you say that you are first, European and then French and then German? Or if you . . . would put those three words in an order, what would you say? Or are they all on the same level? Is this possible, do you know that? Charles: Ah . . . [pause]. So . . . Somehow you . . . I do have the impression is a mix between French and German. Or you would say that what you have to start, you know, think, ah, European. European no. I mean Ive never lived in Spain or lived in Italy or somewhere else. I mean thats what really, ah, Euro(!)-pean meaning than everywhere. In fact I could only really compare those two countries.
NON-INTEGRATING EUROPEANS . . .
(a) have lived in their COR for a longer time (b) have not lived in a third country (c) have COR and COO friends (d) speak the COR language (e) typically come from Germany, Britain and Italy (f) are not movers to Britain (g) have the least positive image of the EU the Bi-Cultural Movers
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Type 3 (Assimilating Europeans) the Lifestyle Movers Almost 10 per cent of all internal movers feel attached to the COR and the EU but not to their COO anymore. Basically, they have taken on the COR identity and transformed their clashing COO identity into a European one, according to the dissonance model. These movers are also different from type 6 movers regarding their length of stay and their education level. Type 3 movers are more likely to have lived longer in the new country and to have a university diploma. Regarding their migration motives, friendships and language knowledge, assimilating Europeans are also different from type 6 movers. Type 3 movers mainly moved to the COR to improve their quality of life, which results in the combination of a high COR attachment and low COO attachment as movers might want to forget the unpleasant COO and feel happy where they live. They probably also feel attached to the EU as the EU made this winwin migration possible. Thus assimilating Europeans reduce their identity conflict by giving up their COO attachment and adding a new attachment to the EU. Type 3 movers seem to comprise both retirement migrants as well as young, adventure-seeking pioneers. Regarding their friendships, a clear picture arises: the COO attachment stays low as assimilating Europeans tend to have only a few friends from the country they left. But then again the fact that they have several friends from the COR explains the high COR attachment. Rather unsurprisingly, type 3 movers have a quite good command of the COR language now in comparison to type 6. Again this good language knowledge might thus be a reason for a strong COR attachment. When looking at the contextual variables explaining the affiliation to type 3, we see a strong effect of the country of origin: it is either Germans or British abroad in contrast to Spanish who tend to assimilate to the COR, but also feel European. Assimilating Europeans have very positive attitudes towards the EU, their self-perceived EU knowledge comes in second place and their EU image in third place. But apart from having positive attitudes towards the EU, type 3 movers are also most satisfied with their life as a whole. Hence, having gone through the identity conflict by resolving it with a reduction of COO attachment and adding EU attachment seems to make movers most satisfied with their present life.
Interviewer: Guillermo: Does it happen to you to think of yourself as Italian? Of course! I am . . . Ive been here for almost nine years. I dont know whether I will ever take the Italian citizenship because I am not interested in it . . . I dont believe in nationalities, I think they are an add-on, a matter of chance. Whether you are
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Interviewer: Guillermo:
French, Spanish, Italian or English doesnt depend on you. I would like to have, one day, a European identity card or a European passport. Thats what I would like! What do you think you share with other Spanish? The lived experiences, childhood, the cultural background . . . Up to a certain point, obviously. For other things, I dont think it depends on nationality to be able to share something with another person; indeed, the only thing I share is the imprint of the first years, the childhood, weve had similar trajectories, thats the only thing. What in contrast do you think you share with Italians? With Italians . . . Everyday life, from politics to economic life. I even get angry when certain things happen in Italy, I am puffed up . . . It makes me slightly bitter to not be able to participate in political elections, because for better or worse, I am involved in Italian politics in the sense that whatever the Italian state decides will concern me . . . Hence, everyday life: public transport that doesnt work, garbage that maybe doesnt get picked up every day . . . What do you think you have in common with other Europeans? This culture that belongs to all of us. The European institutions . . . Ive always been a Europe-fan, thats why I always identify a lot with the institutions. The fact of having a fixed reference point in Brussels that protects you from injustice . . . The fact of having for better or worse the same problems in everyday life, the same money . . . And then this cultural process that influenced everyone, from Greece via Rome to the European Enlightenment of the 18th century.
ASSIMILATING EUROPEANS. . .
(a) are highly educated (b) tend to be older at migration date (c) have many COR friends (d) speak the COR language (e) moved for quality of life reasons (r) typically come from France, Germany and Britain (t) typically moved to Spain (h) are most satised with their lives the Lifestyle Movers
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Type 4 (Assimilating Non-Europeans) the Carefree Movers Assimilating non-Europeans constitute our fourth type of internal movers and comprise only 5.4 per cent of all movers. This type can be characterized by a high COR attachment and low COO and EU attachments. Thus movers of this type have dealt with their feeling of cognitive dissonance by assimilating more or less completely to the new country without adding a new supranational identity. The sociodemographic profile of type 4 movers again shows that, in contrast to type 6 movers, they have stayed longer in the COR, which explains their attachment to it. Although not significant, we can see a tendency for type 4 movers to be younger and less educated than type 6 movers. It seems that leaving ones COO relatively early also means that a COO attachment has not yet been fixed and can easily be given up, especially when the mover is perhaps not familiar with other means of dealing with cognitive dissonance due to the lack of a higher education. To give in to external pressure and assimilate into the new context is also the easiest way to deal with identity conflict. It also turns out that assimilating non-Europeans left their COO mainly for a higher quality of life, which again explains a high COR attachment. The same mechanism should be true for the high number or COR friends that type 4 movers have. As for the typical COOs and CORs of type 4 movers, we find a clear COO effect for the British: movers from the other side of the Channel are likely not only to belong to type 3 but also to type 4, so whether a British person develops an EU attachment or not depends on other factors. But movers from Germany and France are also more likely to belong to type 4 than the Spanish. Movers to Germany, on the other hand, are less likely to develop a strong attachment to Germany than movers to Spain.
ASSIMILATING NON-EUROPEANS . . .
(a) have lived in COR for a longer time (b) tend to be younger and less educated (c) have many COR friends (d) moved for quality of life reasons (e) typically come from France, Germany and Britain (f) are not movers to Germany (g) are very satised with their lives the Carefree Movers
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Assimilating non-Europeans hold less positive attitudes to the EU. Their life satisfaction, however, is almost as high as that of assimilating Europeans. Being able to reduce ones attachment to the COO thus seems to be a crucial factor for a satisfied life without regrets and homesickness and external pressures in the new country. Type 5 (Self-Segregrating Europeans) the Homesick Movers The fifth type of internal movers was labelled Self-segregating Europeans and is formed of 6.9 per cent of our movers. Type 5 consists of movers with a high COO and EU attachment but a low COR attachment. The multinomial regression analysis shows that type 5 movers have a high level of education as do all other types of migrant identities that include a European dimension. However, type 5 movers do not differ from the baseline, the type 6 movers, regarding their migration motivation or individual variables, the only exception being their current command of the COR language. Although (statistically) not significant, it seems that many self-segregating Europeans have lived in a third country before an event that probably leads to higher EU attachment as the pool of collected European experiences is larger. However, having lived in another EU member state does not foster COR attachment as the new country might be regarded as being just another one on the list (which will perhaps even be expanded later on in their life course). Unsurprisingly, self-segregrating Europeans have very positive attitudes towards the EU, both for EU knowledge and EU image. Hence, they do not differ much from the other European-oriented types of movers. Regarding their life satisfaction, clearer differences from the first four types can be found: movers not attached to the country they live in feel less satisfied with their life as a whole.
Alberto: Interviewer: Alberto: Um, I think, I am, I am a European. I feel extremely . . . I have this European identity. Um, I feel I am a European. An Italian European. Thats all. European but with a link to Italy. How do these things fit together? Um, Its like a, Matrioska, its like Chinese boxes. You have the world, you have Europe, you have Italy, you have Lombardi, you have Como, you have Montrasio. You know, its . . . I . . . identity can live together. Its not, ahm, I dont see. I think, nationalism is over. Its not over, but it should be over. Yes. You can be Italian and European. Why not?
Interviewer: Alberto:
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SELF-SEGREGATING EUROPEANS . . .
(a) are highly educated (b) speak the COR language (c) have COO friends (d) moved for miscellaneous reasons (e) are not movers to Spain (f) hold positive attitudes towards the EU (g) are least satised with their lives the Homesick Movers
Type 6 (Self-Segregating Non-Europeans) the Recent Labour Migrants The sixth type Self-segregating non-Europeans, 5.4 per cent of all movers feel highly attached to their COO, but not attached to the COR or the EU. This group cannot be described in a statistically detailed way as it served as the baseline category for the multinomial regression analysis. However, when comparing the results for the other five types, it can be assumed that type 6 movers are very likely to have lived in the new country for only a short time. It is possible therefore that these movers simply have not yet had enough time to develop a strong COR attachment maybe because they still feel homesick and are concerned by that. As for the migration motives, it seems that type 6 movers mainly came for work or personal reasons rather than for lifestyle reasons. Their command of the COR language is quite poor, explaining why their attachment to the COO still prevails. Lastly, type 6 movers have more friends from the COO than any other types of movers, again explaining the low COR attachment. It also turns out that self-segregating non-Europeans, like all other nonEuropean types, have a less positive image of the EU and also show the least knowledge of the EU. Similar to self-segregating Europeans, their life satisfaction is in relation to the other types rather low. Feeling attached to the COR and (also but with a smaller impact) to the EU can thus be seen as a relevant component of a high life satisfaction.
Guido: I feel as an Italian in any case. Ive been, ah, in Italy for 27 years. Ive . . . I was born there, I grew up. There are also some things that simply belong to my culture. Ahm, but, ah, I have to say, if I say now where I belong to, I say I belong to here, to my, yes, ah, since I . . ., ah, live here in Germany. Not something that I left in Italy.
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Interviewer: Do you sometimes also feel as a European? Or rather less? Guido: Yes . . . Actually . . . Yes, less I would have said. Yes. Also because I have the feeling that you get a bit less of something, that is somehow a European, ah, feeling, here in Germany. For example I was quite often in Belgium, ahm, in Brussels, where a friend of mine lives. There you get a much better impression of what it means to be European. And therefore . . . Here in Germany it is a bit less, yes.
SELF-SEGREGATING NON-EUROPEANS . . .
(a) are less educated (b) did and do not speak the COR language (c) have COO friends (d) moved for work and personal reasons (e) are not movers to Spain (f) know least about the EU (g) are less satised with their lives the Recent Labour Migrants
Type 7 (Self-Marginalising Europeans) the Cosmopolitans The seventh type of movers consists of individuals who identify neither with their COO nor with the COR, but only with the EU. These movers thus choose a rather strict way to deal with the identification problems resulting from two opposed national identities they deny both of them. This type was therefore labelled self-marginalising Europeans and is the smallest group in our sample as it consists of only 2.5 per cent of all movers. The sociodemographic profile shows that in contrast to all other types discussed before, self-marginalising Europeans are mainly male and have a partner from a third country, which arguably may have weakened the importance of national identities. Interestingly, for this group of proEurope movers, education does not play a significant role, which is in contrast to all the other pro-Europe types. We can also see that no special migration motive is dominant for this group in comparison to the baseline of type 6. The distribution of friends, however, is special for this group as they tend to have no friends from the COO but many from the COR and although not significant from third countries as well. Thus it seems that, for this type of movers, personal connections to other countries are quite important. In sum, they look like
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transnational migrants. In this sense, self-marginalising movers are not marginalised at all. Rather, these cosmopolitans most closely resemble the denationalised Eurostars described by Favell (2008a) in his study of free moving professionals in European metropolies. Regarding the national background of type 7 movers, we face a clear NorthSouth difference: cosmopolitans come mainly from the three northern countries but do not necessarily move southwards; they can be found in all of the other countries, underlining that the quality of life in terms of better weather is less important for this group than for types 3 and 4. In line with the picture established by sociodemographic and contextual variables, analyses show that type 7 movers hold the most positive attitudes towards the EU and have the highest knowledge of the EU. We can assume that the concentration on one single identity the European one makes movers of this type feel so positive about the EU. When it comes to life satisfaction, however, they can be found somewhere in the middle of all types.
Interviewer: Arthur: Interviewer: Arthur: Interviewer: Arthur: And . . . What are your . . . your thoughts about that? Do you . . . do you think of yourself more of German or more of English or more of . . .? I think of myself as rather displaced. Aha. Do you think of yourself as European? Yes. More. . . more than you think of yourself as either German or English? Yes.
Type 8 (Self-Marginalising Non-Europeans) the Individualists
SELF-MARGINALISING EUROPEANS . . .
(a) are male (b) have COR and third country friends (c) have a partner from a third country (d) typically include movers from France, Germany and Britain (e) exclude movers from Spain (f) can be found in all countries (g) have the most positive image of the EU (h) know most about the EU the Cosmopolitans
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The self-marginalising non-Europeans constitute the last type of movers. Type 8 movers can be seen as the opposite of type 1 movers as they feel neither attached to their COO nor their COR, nor do they feel attached to the EU. Thus the rule here is to resolve cognitive dissonance by withdrawing from all kinds of national or supranational identification. However, this strategy is not a very common one as this type of movers is only 2.6 per cent of the sample. The analysis of the sociodemographic profile shows that self-marginalising non-Europeans do not differ significantly from the baseline, the type 6 movers. The only exception is a non-significant prevalence of men. Regarding their migration motivation, however, a clear difference arises as type 8 movers leave almost exclusively for quality of life reasons. Like type 7 movers, type 8 movers are also well integrated into the new country as they have a lot of friends from the COR. What is more, the same distribution of origins arises: the bulk of self-marginalizers come from the three northern countries included in our analyses. However, they tend to settle in Spain rather than in any of the other four countries. Out of all non-European movers, type 8 movers are those with the most positive image of the EU and also the highest knowledge of the EU. There is perhaps a rationalised, instrumental understanding of the benefits of the EU, rather than an identity-based one. Taking all of these rather scarce findings together, it can be concluded that no clear pattern can be found in this group but that individual motivations or lifestyles prevail. These individual choices tend to cancel themselves out so that no clear profile of this group can be constructed. Thus, individuality is the common characteristic of this group.
SELF-MARGINALISING NON-EUROPEANS . . .
(a) are more likely to be male (b) have COR friends (c) moved for quality of life reasons (d) include movers from France, Germany and Britain (e) include movers to Spain (f) hold relatively positive attitudes towards the EU the Individualists
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we posed the question of what happens to internal EU migrants and their group identification when they move from one
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country to another. In order to study the possible mixing or conflict between two or more identities due to a change in context (that is, moving away from ones country of origin to a country of residence), two relational identity models were constructed. Model one assumes that cognitive dissonance is likely to occur wherever two national identities have to be brought into unison, especially if these two identities are dissimilar and if the actor is not positively disposed towards changes of residence (for example, little COR language skills, few COR friends). The second model argues that bi-cultural identities will emerge where assimilation pressures are not too high (loss of COO identity) and not too low (segregation), and where the migrant interacts with the country of residence. Both identity models (conflict versus consonance) present different paths to the development of European identities. Where conflict is the starting point, Europeanness may become a surrogate identity, something that helps transform one or both of the inconvenient national identities. Where bi-cultural identities are taken up, Europeanness is developed as a new, overarching tier of belonging that encompasses the well-entrenched two national identities. More concretely, this chapter answered three questions. First, do internal migrants in the EU hold more pro-European attitudes and identities than stayers? Second, how do movers juggle and combine the three potential attachments that are available to them: that is, attachment to the country of origin (COR), to the country of residence (COR) and to the European Union? And third, which factors explain the different identity configurations of EU movers? Our findings strongly confirm the hypothesis that EU movers are more highly Europeanized than stayers. Movers know more about the EU, have a more positive image of it, often have European identities and feel more attached to the EU than stayers do. Indeed, almost half of our sample of free movers fall into the category of those holding tripartite identities, that is, strong COO identities, strong COR identities, and strong European identities. They are the group of perfect Europeans who do not experience conflict between COO and COR identities and who find it easy to develop an interculturated European identity layer on the basis of their bi-culturalism. For these movers, identities are additive and consonant. Migrants who fall into this group of highly Europeanized citizens tend to hold a university diploma, speak the COR language, engage in political discussions and, most importantly, have several friends from both the country of origin and the country of residence. The other half of our sample divides up into three blocks that are roughly equal in numbers: (a) those who are attached to both the COO and the COR but not to the EU; (b) those who hold European identities
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but only one national identity (COO or COR); and (c) those who hold one identity only (be it COR, COO or EU) or no identity at all. All of these three groups are likely to have experienced some kind of identity conflict (cognitive dissonance) and to have chosen between unharmonious identities. Although sharing the experience of a conflict, these groups differ in many ways: age at migration, length of stay, gender and migration motives; most significantly, discrimination and integration experiences as well as language knowledge play important roles in predicting movers ways of dealing with identity conflict. Finally, in terms of the individual factors that account for heightened Europeanness among EU movers, we note the following: COR versus COO effects. The primary socialization one has received usually has a larger effect on movers identities and national or European attachment than the psychological acculturation undergone in the country of residence. However, it is precisely this COR acculturation that makes free movers special (that is, different from stayers), and that accounts for the development of a European identity in about 60 per cent of them. British effect. Migrants from Britain are a special kind of European movers. On the one hand, they are unlikely to develop a tripartite identity with a strong European element. Feeling British and feeling European seem to exclude one another. On the other hand, they are most likely to assimilate to the country of residence either with or without nurturing a feeling of Europeanness. Education. The fact that those intra-EU migrants who identify with the EU are also the most educated ones leaves one wondering about the nature of Europeanness. Is European identity a civic and elitist rather than affective and accessible concept that addresses the minds rather than the hearts of Europeans? The role of contact in the form of friends or partners. The best indicator for the development of a COR identity in addition to the COO one (and with it, increasing ones chances for developing an interculturated European identity) is contact with COR citizens. As we know from Allports contact hypothesis (Allport 1954), not just any contact (say with shopkeepers or bosses) will do. Rather, only personal and non-hierarchical relationships that take place at regular intervals are conducive to decreasing identity conflict and enhancing affect for the COR. Having friends or a partner from the COR country is thus the deluxe road to bi-cultural identities. Our results have several implications for EU policies which aim at an amplification of the identification with Europe of EU citizens. We showed that those Western Europeans who live in a European Union country other than their native one identify more strongly with the EU, know
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more about it and feel more attached to it. This implies that in order to strengthen identification with Europe and the EU, policies promoting free movement (Erasmus/Socrates, transferability of welfare benefits, recognition of diplomas and so on) should indeed be reinforced and promoted further. Identification with the EU can be considered at least partly a spillover effect of such policies. Furthermore, our analysis showed that there are different ways of developing a feeling of belonging to the European Union. Therefore, the Commissions message regarding the possible co-existence of regional, national and supranational forms of belonging should be strengthened. Research, on the other hand, should focus more on the different ways and predictors of co-existing identities than on the question of whether identities are exclusive or not. Concerning possible predictors of the development of a European identity we also found that less-educated internal European migrants showed lower levels of attachment to the EU than highly skilled movers. The European Commission should therefore consider promoting a European identity that is based on affect (a feeling of solidarity, shared cultural heritage and so on) rather than on civic elements only (institutions, flag, European passport and so on), that presuppose a certain level of knowledge. A more affective, culture-based European identity might be more easily accessible to all tiers of European society.
NOTES
1. We are arguing here that behaviour influences attitudes and identities. When we are unsure of attitudes, we infer them from behaviours (Bem 1972), not least as a function of legitimation of past activities (Jost and Major 2001). Note however that other research has brought evidence that causality runs from attitude to behaviour rather than vice versa (Ajzen 1991). Along these lines, one could maintain that those EU citizens who are most positively disposed towards the European Union are also those who move to live and work in European countries other than their native ones. 2. According to the context in question, Europeans can of course be variously defined as European Union citizens, Western Europeans, or those living within geographical Europe (Wallace 1990). The kind of attachment measured in the EIMSS is attachment to the European Union. 3. EB 61.0 from 2004 or EB 58.1 from 2002 when items were not included in EB 61.0. 4. Question text: In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive (1), fairly positive (2), neutral (3), fairly negative (4) or very negative (5) image? 5. Question text: Using this scale, how much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions? (Scale 010). 6. Question text: In the near future, do you see yourself as . . .? 1. ([COO] Nationality) only; 2. ([COO] Nationality) and European; 3. European and ([COO] Nationality); 4. European only. 7. Question texts: How attached do you feel to the European Union? Very attached (1), fairly attached (2), not very attached (3), not at all attached (4). How attached do you feel to [COO]? Very attached (1), fairly attached (2), not very attached (3), not at all
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attached (4). How attached do you feel to [COR]? Very attached (1), fairly attached (2), not very attached (3), not at all attached (4). 8. Although important, we decided not to include the respondents social class in our analyses for statistical reasons as this variable showed a high multicollinearity with educational level.
7.
EU movers and politics: towards a fully-fledged European citizenship?

Anne Muxel
INTRODUCTION
As an economic, social and cultural entity, the European Union has made much progress in recent decades, becoming a visible and objective reality in both the representations and practices of the inhabitants of its member countries. Nevertheless, Europe as a political space is not so well advanced. The political construction of the EU has not only encountered formal and institutional obstacles such as the referenda rejections of European constitutional reform in France, the Netherlands and Ireland but also problems of recognition by its own citizens. In the space of 20 years up to 2004, while the powers and prerogatives of the European Union have not ceased to expand, the abstention rate in European elections has gone up by 17.3 points on average in all countries and, in many of them, comprise half the electorate. This paradox clearly reveals how difficult it is to implement the idea of European citizenship and mobilize the genuine consciousness of a European political space. Research devoted to European citizenship which reports on national public opinion concerning Europe shows a fairly sizeable imbalance between, on the one hand, the relative acceptance of the Union and the largely positive image it enjoys; and on the other, the weakness of effective practices in this new field of civic expression and intervention (Cautrs and Reyni 2001; Duchesne and Frognier 2002). The European Union has suffered a democratic deficit from the beginning of its history (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Siedentop 2001; Dloye 2005). Time has not reduced this situation. On the contrary: Europeanized national elites continue to drive European integration with little input from mass publics (Haller 2008). For some years now, scholars have been developing two major types of hypothesis to interpret the apparent disaffection of European citizens towards the EU. The first suggests a kind of cognitive deficiency. European institutions are misunderstood, and this hampers any possibility of giving concrete expression to the immediate and familiar exercise of citizenship
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EU movers and politics
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through political action. Thus, political Europe remains an abstract, remote entity that enables citizens neither to engage collectively nor raise their level of consciousness. The second type of hypothesis emphasizes the persistence of national identities and idiosyncrasies. The citizens realm of political involvement is first and foremost national and the identified interests or aims of contention even if they have a supranational dimension of preoccupation pass first through the filter of the nation and the political power struggle that prevails there. This strong nationalization that generally weighs heavily on all European ballots, and shapes all political discourse about Europe, clearly results from the difficulty of constructing and establishing stakes that are specific to the European political context alone (Koopmans and Erbe 2004; Perrineau 2005; Schmidt 2006). European elections are above all used as second-order elections and midterm national contests, which first and foremost reflect domestic political concerns (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Marsh 1998; Schmitt 2005). More recently, some political scientists have shown a more consistently distinctive EU voting, more related to European than national politics (Carruba 2001; Tillman 2004). Nevertheless, the preoccupation with the democratic deficit remains. Some commentators have argued that the EU is as democratic as it could or should be and that there is no real problem of democratic legitimacy (Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002). Multi-level governance, pluralism in the policy process, growing non-state interest representation and the sophisticated system of comitology within EU institutions, can all be underlined to suggest how there are other ways than electoral participation to gain power and influence at the European level, as at the national ones, and also to gain more acceptance among the European citizens themselves (Schmidt 2006). But there remains a legitimacy problem. Perhaps the EU requires, as Follesdal and Hix (2006) have suggested, a more open contest for political leadership and more parliamentary control to reliably ensure that European policies are responsive to European citizens preferences and requests. There has been a great deal of literature on European citizenship in terms of political and legal theory (see for example, Meehan 1993; Wiener 1998; Magnette 1999; Bellamy et al. 2006), but there is still a relative lack of studies on European citizens political attitudes and behaviour. Comparative studies undertaken in Europe particularly those produced using Eurobarometer have made it possible to isolate significant factors in the inventory of attitudes and behaviours of Europeans, which follow their development over several years and identify certain specific national characteristics (Herrmann et al. 2004). But these studies cannot capture European citizenship in action because the contours are generally always
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perceived and evaluated from within a national context (see also Brchon and Cautrs 1997; Favell 2005). Our study of EU movers allows us to assess the possible emergence of a European citizenship in a very different fashion from conventional studies. From the outset, the study proposes a transnational context a new European social space and in doing so throws a novel light on an experimental population that has chosen migration within Europe. Their mobility, as Rother and Nebe explore in depth in Chapter 6, enables a directly experienced and possibly interiorized assimilation of the European project. So are these European citizens like the other nationalized ones, or does their relationship with politics have specific characteristics? And are they less encumbered by the overcautiousness that characterizes their national counterparts in recognizing and expressing European citizenship? The aim of this chapter is, on the one hand, to draw a political portrait of these mobile European citizens, whom we expect to be close to a transnational view of politics; on the other, to grasp the possible premises of their Europeanization here understood in the sociological sense of the term (see also Koopmans and Erbe 2004; Fligstein 2008) on the civic and political level. In order to understand EU movers relationship to politics we will test two hypotheses. The first is related to classical sociological factors which explain political participation, such as education levels and social status, as well as political ones, such as the ideological position of respondents. Are these factors once again decisive? That is, do we find the usual correlations between social integration and political integration, or do we find a specific effect of the experience of mobility? The second concerns political socialization and the specific impact of national political cultures. Do EU movers share particular political attitudes and behaviours, or do we recognize traces of their distinct national origins and identities?
A POLITICAL PORTRAIT OF EU MOVERS

To draw the political portrait of our respondents we have used a set of classical indicators on political attitudes and behaviour. Our basic results for EU movers show a high level of interest in politics but a poor level of political participation. A large majority (56 per cent) in all countries and of all nationalities admits being interested in the politics of their country of origin; 24 per cent are even very interested. Almost one-third of them frequently discuss politics within their circle (29 per cent). Men are more interested than women, and older more than younger people. Two out of ten have already contacted a politician or signed a petition. Yet only 15
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per cent have taken part in a demonstration. Membership is weak: 8 per cent belong to a trade union, 3 per cent are members of a political party. Taken aggregately, EU movers are thus politically concerned but not so active. This is the first picture we get. The consistency of their political participation is not so different from the rest of the population in Europe and in relation to some aspects, even appears weaker. The comparison, of course, has to be taken carefully given the nature of the EIMSS sample. EU movers are more interested in politics, demonstrate a little bit more, belong more often to a trade union, but have less often signed a petition, and vote less at general elections. These differences are not significant. A comparison of their electoral involvement, however, shows significant discrepancies depending on the type of election. Only 40 per cent took part in the last national general election in their country of origin while, according to official statistics, an average of 70 per cent of stayers took part.1 However, their participation in European elections is equivalent to, or even slightly higher than, that of stayers (51 per cent versus 49 per cent), a sign that may reveal a certain Europeanization of their political involvement. We shall return to this in the last part of this chapter. Studies in political sociology often highlight the importance of the relationship between individuals conditions of social integration and their attitudes and political behaviour. In particular, the level of education is one of the most determining factors. This holds for EU movers. The more qualified our respondents are, the higher their level of interest. Of those with university degrees, 68 per cent say they are very interested in politics, whereas only 30 per cent of those with no qualifications say the same thing. A similar difference can be found when we look at the impact of professional status: 69 per cent of those in the upper-class category show a high level of interest, whereas the same applies to only 56 per cent in the routine white-collar group, 54 per cent of the petty bourgeoisie, 44 per cent of the qualified blue-collar group and 35 per cent of the non-qualified working-class group. To make an overall measurement of EU movers relationship with politics, we constructed a synthetic politicization index from seven variables concerning both the level of political interest and the type of personal involvement (Table 7.1).2 Though the level of political interest is relatively high, movers effective involvement in political activities is relatively modest. In fact, only 16 per cent of the EIMSS sample possessed between three and seven of the attributes, 20 per cent had only two, 33 per cent one, and 32 per cent none. Thus, nearly two-thirds of respondents are scarcely involved in political life at all and their participation is virtually non-existent or extremely low. In sum, EU movers are more interested in politics, and somewhat more
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Table 7.1
Participation variables for EU movers and stayers ( %)

EU movers Interest in politics*: very much Contacted politician Signed petition Took part in lawful public demonstration Trade union: participated Political party: participated Voted in last general elections 24.2 19.0 19.2 15.3 8.1 3.0 40.1 Stayers (general population) 11.7 14.7 30.0 11.8 3.2 2.1 80.8
Participation variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Notes: Source:
* For EU movers: Interest in politics in COO. ESS 2004 and EIMSS, N (minimum) 5 13 950
familiar with traditional modes of participation (like taking part in demonstrations or affiliating with unions and parties); but they are much less likely to vote or sign a petition. Consequently, it is not that EU movers are less political: rather, they are not consistently participative. The most politicized are also the most qualified, and those who belong to the categories at the top of the professional hierarchy. Thus, of movers with university degrees, 23 per cent have between three and seven politicization attributes, whereas this is true of only 6 per cent of those without qualifications. Likewise, 22 per cent of our respondents in the upper class have this level of politicization, but only 6 per cent in the working class. Conversely, a total absence of politicization appears more widespread among unqualified people and among movers belonging to the working class: 49 per cent and 47 per cent, respectively, have no politicization attributes. In the upper class, and among those with university degrees, about half those percentages have no politicization attributes: only 24 per cent and 23 per cent respectively. A logistic regression enables us to control for social and political factors that account for EU movers level of politicization (Table 7.2). Four factors are particularly influential. The first one, the most significant, is the ideological position. Leftist EU movers are more disposed to be highly politicized than the others. The second one is the country of origin. It confirms the impact of certain national origins and identities which continue to condition the EU movers political attitudes and behaviour. We will come back to this aspect in the next section. The third one concerns the social and educational profile of our respondents. A high level of politicization
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Table 7.2
Logistic regression on high level of politicization among EU movers

B Wald 15.478 54.052 57.333 22.549 67.759 44.534 0.400 7.770 0.976 16.277 32.590 6.376 3.497 3.983 6.836 29.153 8.279 12.017 3.200 5.557 0.341 3.914 1.557 24.489 1.896 8.740 5.918 Signif. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.527 0.005 0.323 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.061 0.046 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.074 0.018 0.560 0.048 0.212 0.000 0.169 0.003 0.015 Odds ratio 0.364 0.407 0.401 0.113 1/OR
Left-Right position Centre Rightist Dont answer Dont know Ref.: Leftist Country of origin Germany Britain Italy Spain Ref.: France Country of residence Germany Britain Italy Spain Ref.: France Territorial identity No territorial identity Integrated non-European Assimilated European Assimilated non-European Separated European Separated non-European European Ref.: Integrated European Education level No qualification Secondary education completed University Ref.: University entrance qualification Class based on last occupation Bourgeoisie Petty bourgeoisie High-skilled manual Low/non-skilled manual
21.011 20.900 20.914 22.180
2.749 2.458 2.494 8.843
0.092 20.419 0.147 0.568
1.097 0.658 1.158 1.764
0.912 1.521 0.863 0.567
20.379 20.264 0.271 20.433
0.685 0.768 1.312 0.648
1.460 1.302 0.762 1.542
20.998 20.476 20.285 20.561 20.095 20.461 0.302
0.369 0.621 0.752 0.571 0.909 0.631 1.352
2.712 1.609 1.329 1.753 1.100 1.585 0.739
20.351 20.471 0.270
0.704 0.624 1.311
1.420 1.602 0.763
0.316 0.098 0.105 20.507
2.197 7.694 0.409 0.281 6.254
0.000 0.006 0.522 0.596 0.012
1.371 1.103 1.111 0.602
0.729 0.907 0.900 1.660
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Table 7.2
(continued)
B Wald Signif. Odds ratio 1/OR
Ref.: Routine non-manual Type of settlement Urban area Rural area Ref.: Small/Medium-sized town Constant
0.262 20.122 21.010
12.665 6.169 0.963 24.610
0.002 0.013 0.326 0.000
1.299 0.885 0.364
0.770 1.130
Notes: Coefficients for age, gender, religious affiliation, marital status, length of migration experience, migration experience, EU-image are not significant. Source: EIMSS, N 5 4 612
is more widespread among educated and qualified EU movers. Lastly, the importance of territorial identity and location has to be underlined. EU movers who feel European are more likely to be politicized. Urban areas count also more politicized people than rural ones. These results, however, are not so different from those we would usually obtain in standard studies on political participation in Europe. What does stand out from this first sketch of the EU movers is that their favourable disposition towards politics characterized mainly by a high level of political interest remains detached from a real politicization involving active and sustained participation. One specific feature of EU movers relationship to politics that deserves further analysis is where they sit on a leftright scale (on this scale, see Jaffr and Muxel 1997; Muxel 1997). In fact, we find a certain leaning of EU movers to the left: 40 per cent classify themselves as left or centreleft; 22 per cent classify themselves as right or centre-right; fewer classify themselves as centre (17 per cent), but more (21 per cent) do not classify themselves at all either because they refuse to respond (8.4 per cent), or because they do not know how to respond (12.6 per cent).3 The comparison with stayers is striking: in the ESS sample only 33 per cent locate themselves left or centre-left, and in the European Values Study (1999) only 26 per cent. Among those EU movers who are not highly qualified, the absence of positioning between left and right is more marked: 45 per cent of those without qualifications do not position themselves, compared to 29 per cent of those with a secondary-school qualification and only 13 per cent of those with a university degree. On the other hand, the higher the qualification, the more marked the leaning to the left: among our respondents with university degrees, slightly fewer than half classify themselves
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as leftist (49 per cent), compared to 28 per cent of those with secondaryschool qualifications and only 22 per cent of those with primary-lower educational credentials. The prevalence of leftist affiliations among the higher social classes appears to be very clear: 47 per cent of EU migrants belonging to the upper class category position themselves to the left, as well as 41 per cent of the routine white-collar group, many less among qualified blue collars (32 per cent), and only 26 per cent of the non-qualified working class. It is, therefore, within groups at the top of the social and professional hierarchy, as well as in a significant proportion of the middle classes, that leftist affiliation is most significant. In the EU general population, an increased transfer of support to the left has been observed for approximately the last 15 years. The left has lost ground with working-class levels of society but clearly gained ground with the higher and culturally privileged classes (Grunberg and Schweisguth 1997). In this, our respondents appear to be fairly representative of the far-reaching ideological recomposition of the European political landscape and of the changes in electoral and partisan power struggles that are taking place. This preference for the left is accompanied by a certain reticence towards economic liberalism: 44 per cent of EU movers express disagreement with the idea that the state should withdraw from intervention in the economy.4 They also reveal themselves to be distinctly open and permissive with regard to individual liberty and respect for private life, and the higher the level of qualification, the more this is true: 48 per cent agree that homosexuals should be able to live their lives as they please.5 In sum, EU movers are not only more mobile and more open towards Europe, but they also hold universalistic values and a fairly pronounced leftist sensibility. A certain anti-free market attitude in matters of the economy is relatively common ironic, perhaps, given the EUs strong librale reputation on the continent. However the latter is not always true and, within the left, is subject to differentiated positions on economic questions. In order to explore these ideological nuances among intra-EU migrants, we further differentiated within the 40 per cent who are on the left between those who are hostile to economic liberalism (22 per cent), those who accept it (9 per cent), and lastly those who do not take a position on the subject (8 per cent). Leftist affiliation within our population of migrants is split, therefore, into two types of adherence. One is fairly traditionally hostile to economic liberalism (22 per cent). The other is more permeable and open to the values of a market society and unites those who declare themselves to be explicitly in favour of economic liberalism (9 per cent) and those who appear relatively indifferent, or at least not hostile to
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Table 7.3
Ideological position according to sociodemographic and political characteristics (%)

Men <40 years 39 Bourgeoisie 46 University High level of degree politicization* 57 31
Leftist against economic liberalism Leftist for economic liberalism Indifferent leftist Rightist Centre No position Entire sample
49
58
23
41
50
21
44 51 54 42 49
37 27 25 30 31
42 41 38 22 38
48 44 39 28 44
18 12 10 6 17
Notes: * 37 attributes. Source: EIMSS, N 5 3 882
the question (8 per cent): this group represents 17 per cent of those who position themselves on the left. The three types of leftist affiliation match up with fairly differentiated sociological profiles (Table 7.3). Those against economic liberalism are clearly younger (39 per cent of them are under 40 years of age, compared to only 23 per cent of those for), and they also have a level of professional qualification that is higher than average (46 per cent of those against belong to the upper class, compared to 41 per cent of those for). Of those who belong to the second type the free market left there are more men than women (43 per cent versus 42 per cent), but their level of education is slightly lower than that of the first type (50 per cent have a university degree as opposed to 57 per cent of those against economic liberalism). Lastly, the leftist respondents who do not take a position on this economic question are also relatively young (37 per cent are under 50) and are more often women than men (56 per cent versus 44 per cent men). Among those who classify themselves as leftist, the level of politicization is highest. But it is mostly among the anti-free market leftists that it is strongest (31 per cent have between three and seven politicization attributes). On the other hand, among those who define themselves as rightist, politicization is distinctly weaker: only 12 per cent have a high level of politicization.
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What stands out from this political and ideological portrait of EU movers is a certain number of contrasted traits. We clearly observe the prevalence of a certain leftist tendency, marked by universalistic values and a relatively high level of interest in politics. However, this is rarely given concrete expression through action-based politicization and active participation. A leftist culture prevails, but it is anchored more in values than in practice particularly anti-establishment protest. This gap between attitudes and behaviour might be due at least in part to the fact that opportunities to participate are more difficult as a foreign resident.
EU MOVERS AND THE PRISM OF NATIONAL DIFFERENCES

We have thus far shown a general political portrait of EU movers, but the picture needs to be completed and qualified. Indeed, country of origin, country of residence and type of migration affect political attitudes and behaviours noticeably. German movers show the highest level of interest: 72 per cent say they are very much and somewhat interested in politics. Their Spanish counterparts are also very concerned (60 per cent say the same), while Italians (44 per cent) are the least concerned (Figure 7.1). The fairly widespread interest in politics among EU movers is, as we have seen, only accompanied by a moderate level of political participation among all groups of EU movers (Table 7.4). However, there is a strong contrast between two populations: Spanish and British movers. The former stand out particularly through a distinctly higher degree of politicization. Spanish migrants are, in fact, more likely to engage in protest. A quarter of them (26 per cent) have already demonstrated (only 13 per cent of Germans, 15 per cent of French, 14 per cent of Italians and 10 per cent of British migrants have already taken part in a demonstration). Conversely, British migrants appear less politicized (only 11 per cent reach the threshold of high politicization in our index). If we observe what happens with greater subtlety by taking into account both the country of origin and the country of residence, two fairly significant profiles emerge from among the most politicized migrants: the Germans residing in France and Italy on the one hand, and the Spanish residing in France, Britain and Italy on the other (Table 7.5). The particularly politicized Germans in France tend to be active, highly qualified men. Politicized Germans in Italy are more likely to be retired and relatively
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80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Germany
France
Britain
Italy
Spain
EU movers by COO Source: EIMSS, N 5 4 874
EU movers by COR
Figure 7.1
The political interest of EU movers: very much + somewhat (%)
highly qualified women. As such, the Germans high level of politicization concerns a population which though it does not share the same migrant experience or type of activity nevertheless has a relatively privileged educational level and lifestyle. On the other hand, the high politicization of Spanish migrants results from a completely different profile, regardless of whether their country of residence is France, Britain or Italy. These are fairly young migrants with few qualifications. They are active in the labour market, and often come from modest class backgrounds. Yet it can be observed that Italian migrants while sociologically and culturally fairly similar to Spanish migrants are a good deal less politicized: 42 per cent of them have no politicization attribute while the same is true of only 25 per cent of the Spanish. Do we find these same differences and national particularities when we look at our respondents ideological leanings? A leftist tendency does apply in the same way to all movers, no matter what their nationality, being particularly marked among German and Spanish movers. The anti-free market left choice is equally widespread, and especially among Spanish (31 per cent; it is shared by 22 per cent of Germans and French,
Table 7.4
Petition M 20 21 22 14 20 31 35 40 17 24 13 15 10 14 26 11 18 4 11 17 7 8 6 9 10 3 3 3 5 2 3 3 2 4 3 S M S M S M Demonstration Trade Union Party S 4 2 1 2 2
Political interest and forms of political participation among EU movers (COO) and stayers (%)
Vote M 47 43 25 36 51 S 85 75 73 89 78
Interest S 13 18 18 12 12
Politician
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Germans French British Italians Spanish
72 54 50 44 60
64 32 52 32 28
22 19 23 12 19
Source:
ESS 2004 and EIMSS, N (minimum) 5 13 950
Table 7.5
High level of politicization Left 1 centre left 52 33 45 56 38 37 17 40 62 44 45 44 50 41 49 40 14 8 16 4 14 10 13 10 31 24 26 27 24 27 24 30 16 31 19 20 20 20 23 16 9 9 5 8 20 19 9 27 31 22 13 11 25 13 60 30 3 11 23 18 17 31 14 30 18 7 11 8 21 18 26 38 22 30 25 16 7 13 21 18 Free market left Anti-free market left
Different political characteristics of EU movers by COR and COO (%)

No position Participation in Right 1 centre (neither left nor demonstration right) right 11 8 18 34 6 6 6 21 18 12 13 19 17 20 16 29
COR/COO
No politicization
19 31 31 17 11 7 8 15 19 17 15 25 23 25 17 23
25 12 16 26
168
31 44 55 27
France Germans British Italians Spanish Germany French British Italians Spanish Britain Germans French Italians Spanish Italy Germans French British Spanish
26 37 34 31
16 22 34 27
169
Spain Germans French British Italians Entire sample 8 10 7 7 16 27 31 20 32 40 10 6 4 7 9 12 20 8 17 22 26 29 32 21 22
28 37 43 46 32
18 19 18 27 21
6 20 9 18 15
Source:
ESS 2004 and EIMSS, N (minimum) 5 11 954
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19 per cent of Italians and 17 per cent of British). The pro-free market left choice is clearly more strongly expressed among German migrants than among others (14 per cent, as opposed to 9 per cent of British and Italians, 8 per cent of French and 7 per cent of Spanish). As we can notice, our respondents ideological positions represent the two dominant and contrasting leftist models of European political systems. The differences observed between German and Spanish movers are interesting and even more significant in that they do not always tally with class allegiances. Among German migrants, the pro-free market left seems to dominate, but this is first and foremost in the working-class category (21 per cent of blue collars versus an average of 14 per cent of all German migrants belong to the liberal left). Among Spanish migrants, the contrary situation applies: it is among upper-class movers that one finds the most left and anti-free market people (40 per cent versus an average of 31 per cent for all Spanish migrants are left-leaning and anti-free market). The rightist tendency is fairly low among Spanish movers. Among British and French movers one finds the largest number of individuals who acknowledge that they belong to the right (27 per cent for both). Rightwing French migrants living in Germany and Britain tend to be young, active and well-qualified. Rightist British movers in France are generally retired and well-qualified. Overall, and on average, retired German, French and British people in Spain have more rightist leanings than other EU movers. A sizeable proportion of our respondents have no ideological position. It is in the Italian migrant population which, moreover, is the least politicized, the least participating, and the least qualified that the absence of a position on the leftright scale is most pronounced (33 per cent). In sum, though EU movers have common features a relatively high interest in politics, low participation and a pronounced leftist tendency they also bring with them intrinsic differences linked to the particular national characteristics of their countries of origin. Some traits appear more or less marked and draw differentiated political profiles. Thus German migrants seem more politicized, more participating and more marked than the others by leanings that are both leftist and liberal. Spanish migrants are also politicized and participating, but they favour an anti-market leftist tendency. British migrants are scarcely politicized, participate little and tend to be more rightist. Italian migrants are the furthest behind in political involvement, and the group least likely to express ideological preferences. Lastly, French migrants appear not to be very politicized and adopt rightist political positions more frequently than others.
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EUROPEANIZING CITIZENSHIP: WHAT ARE THE PREMISES?

The experience of intra-EU mobility is shaped by the interaction of at least two spheres of socialization that of the migrants original national context and that of the country of residence. How are these two spheres connected in political terms? Can one observe, through this singular experience, a special relationship to politics and an expression of citizenship that might take the European context more into account an emergent European citizenship perhaps? The time spent in the country of residence makes a difference. The longer migrants have lived in their current host country, the higher their interest in that countrys political life and, conversely, the less their interest in the politics of their country of origin. Thus 29 per cent of EU movers who settled before 1983 say they are very interested in the politics of their country of residence. Of those who migrated recently, between 1994 and 2003, only 19 per cent say the same. Correspondingly, 21 per cent of those with the longest migrant experience continue to take a strong interest in the political life of their country of origin, while the same is true of 28 per cent of those who migrated more recently. One can observe, therefore, a slight socializing effect of the country of residence on political predispositions. Furthermore, those who have interiorized a feeling of belonging and attachment to Europe always develop a higher degree of interest in politics at the European level than the others. Thus 37 per cent of our respondents who say they are very attached to the European Union declare a high degree of interest in European Union politics (whereas this is true of only 9 per cent of those who feel no attachment at all). Now, what is the effect of political interest on electoral participation? This question is, normatively, at the heart of European citizenship although in reality European citizenship practices have mostly remained limited to the exploitation of free movement rights (Wiener 1998; Favell 2008a). Some political theorists argue that the full exercise and recognition of this citizenship, and thus the construction of a European political space, will depend on effective political participation (for example, Maas 2007). So do EU movers, at least, make use of their right to vote in European elections? Do they participate more or less than stayers? Are their participation in general elections in their country of origin and their participation in European elections connected? The participation of EU movers in general elections in their own countries is 40 per cent that is, very low compared to an average of 70 per cent for stayers (Figure 7.2). Those who participate the most in these elections are Spanish (50 per cent) and German migrants (47 per cent), but this
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90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Germany
France EU movers by COO
Britain
Italy Official rate
Spain
EU movers by COR
Source:
EIMSS, N 5 4 855
Figure 7.2
Voting in national general elections (%)
percentage is much lower than the national participation rate recorded in these two countries (69 per cent and 79 per cent, respectively). British migrants are the furthest behind: only a quarter of them (25 per cent) say they voted in the last parliamentary elections in Britain (as against an average of 59 per cent among stayers). Differences also emerge between the countries of residence. The rate of participation is highest among migrants residing in France (46 per cent) while in Britain and Germany EU migrants vote the least (37 per cent for each). EU movers participation in European elections, however, is much more lively. Half of them have voted (51 per cent) that is, a similar proportion, or even slightly higher, than that recorded within the general population (49 per cent), and this despite the difficulties that can block active participation as a foreign resident. So EU movers make use of their citizens rights more at the European than at the national level. Should one see in this difference in participation the premises for a Europeanization of their political participation an emergent European citizenship? Before examining this hypothesis more closely, let us recall some important information. In 1992, with the Maastricht treaty, each EU citizen got the right to vote in local and European elections in the country where he or she resides, as well as eligibility to run for office in these elections. This obligation concerns all countries, but for some of them this measure was not new.
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Furthermore, a lot of variations can be observed among the EU15 countries. The rhythm and procedures are very different and reveal national particularities which have an impact on the practice of European citizenship within each national context (Strudel 2003). Though foreigners political rights are now admitted, procedures are very diversified and depend on the competence and jurisdiction of each country. Some allow their nationals outside the country the right to vote for the lists of candidates at home while others do not. These votes can be cast by proxy, by mail, by voting at consulates or embassies, or not. There is no harmonization or consistency of these rules established by each member state autonomously. Europeanization is still limited and remains contained within the national framework. This fact has, of course, an impact on the political and electoral behaviour of European citizens, especially among EU movers. The number of such people registered on the European electoral lists gives some idea of the use of European citizenship among EU migrants. In 2004, there were around 5.7 million people who might vote as resident European citizens (the entire European electorate was 338 million people). So intra-EU migrants as voters represented less than 2 per cent of the whole electorate. And, out of those, only 12 to 15 per cent were in fact registered on the electoral lists to vote in their country of residence. That is very few, but it was still more than in 1999 (9 per cent), and even more than in 1994 (6 per cent) (Strudel 2005). This puts into context the participation of the 51 per cent of our sample who say they have voted as foreign residents. Of course, these numbers do not include people who vote in their country of origin or who vote by proxy, at the consulate or embassy, for candidates in their countries of origin. It is still very difficult to appreciate the exact numbers of such voters because they are usually not identified as foreigners on the electoral lists. Statistics can never be totally exhaustive, but it can be observed that the number of people registered on the electoral lists for each European election is growing all the time. Our data do not enable us to evaluate the registration rate of EU movers on electoral lists, nor does it tell us the exact conditions and circumstances of their votes in the 2004 European elections.6 What we do have is the declaration of those questioned after the date of the European elections that they actually voted, or that they intended to vote if they were questioned before the date of the election.7 To ensure the comparability and reliability of responses, we only take into account those who were questioned after 13 June, that is, real voters (or non-voters) (Figure 7.3). The number of Italian and German migrants who declared that they voted is the highest: 58 per cent and 57 per cent respectively. German movers even participated noticeably more in European elections than stayers (114 percentage points). The same applies to French and Spanish migrants who voted
174
80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Germany
France
Britain
Italy Official rate
Spain
EU movers by COO
Notes: Only people registered on electoral lists have been taken into account. The data only cover movers to France, Britain and Italy. Source: EIMSS, N 5 2 139
Figure 7.3
Electoral participation in European elections (June 2004) (%)
more than their co-nationals at home (17 points and 15 points respectively). Once again, the British appear to fall behind: only about a third voted (29 per cent), even fewer than British stayers who, of all nationalities, are those who participate the least. Older people voted more than the young, as did migrants with university degrees and those in the upper social class. Thus 52 per cent of EU movers with higher education qualifications took part in the election, as against only 44 per cent of those without qualifications; 55 per cent of EU movers in the upper-class category as opposed to 44 per cent of the working class. The highest electoral participation was among those who position themselves to the left: 59 per cent of them voted, but only 46 per cent of those who place themselves to the right or centre-right, 46 per cent of those in the centre and 40 per cent of those who have no position. A positive image of Europe promotes participation: 58 per cent of those who have a very positive image voted, as opposed to 38 per cent of those who have a neutral image and only 30 per cent of those who have a negative image. If we reconstruct the voting trajectories of EU movers taking into
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account their participation in the last general elections in their countries of origin and their participation in European elections three groups of electors can be distinguished. The largest group (39 per cent) includes sporadic voters, namely those who voted in one of the two elections (25 per cent who voted only in European elections and 14 per cent who voted only in national general elections). Next comes the group of constant abstainers (35 per cent), those who voted in neither of the two elections. The last group represents a quarter of the sample (26 per cent) and is made up of constant electors, namely those who voted in both elections. Slightly more of the younger migrants have voted only in general elections, whereas more older migrants have voted only in the European elections. There are also more constant abstainers among less qualified migrants at the bottom of the social and professional hierarchy: 39 per cent of migrants without qualifications and 44 per cent of working-class migrants voted in neither of the two elections (versus 32 per cent of migrants with a university degree and an equal 32 per cent of upper-class movers). What stands out from these voting trajectories is that only a minority of EU migrants do not participate in the elections since a little more than a third of the sample did not vote in either of the two elections. Furthermore, participation in European elections seems to be a much more widespread activity than participation in general elections in the country of origin. These results constitute an initial justification of the hypothesis that citizenship is indeed becoming Europeanized for EU movers. Three other analytical factors support this view. The first relates to the length of the migration experience. This appears to be decisive. The EU movers who participate most frequently in European elections are those who have lived in the country of residence for a long time. A majority (56 per cent) of those who migrated at least 15 years ago participated in European elections, whereas the same is true of only 46 per cent of recent migrants. Above all, the longer the migrant experience, the less frequent the participation in national general elections back home. With the passage of time, citizenship takes firmer root in the reality of the country of residence and finds it easier to express itself at the European level (Figure 7.4). The second sign of the Europeanization process that citizenship is undergoing is also visible in the differences noted in certain countries between the participation of intra-EU migrants and the participation of national populations. While not the case in Italy, where a particularly high participation rate is traditionally recorded, on each occasion in Britain and France, EU movers voted in greater numbers than nationals (51 per cent versus 43 per cent in France, 59 per cent versus 39 per cent in Britain).
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60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Young/Long Stay
Old/Long Stay Vote EU parliament
Young/Short Stay Vote general election
Old/Short Stay
Notes: Young/Long Stay 5 35 or less, arrived in COR before 1990; Young/Short Stay 5 less than 35, arrived after 1990; Old/Long Stay 5 more than 35, arrived before 1990; Old/ Short Stay 5 more than 35, arrived after 1990. Source: EIMSS, N 5 2 139
Figure 7.4
Age, duration of migration and electoral participation of EU movers (%)
This additional mobilization clearly indicates a more marked investment in the supranational electoral arena than among stayers. A last significant factor is migrants search for information about voting rights in their country of residence as European Union citizens. Half our sample (51 per cent) said that they had taken this step. Germans (58 per cent) and French (55 per cent) did this more commonly; the Spanish, on the other hand, were less concerned (41 per cent). The highest number of migrants to take this step were in Britain and Spain (58 per cent and 60 per cent, respectively). Here too, movers educational level appears decisive: the higher it is, the more frequently information is sought. The same goes for professional status: 57 per cent of the upper class sought this information as against only 40 per cent of the working class. Those who are most interested in politics are also most favourably disposed to request information about voting methods in the country of residence: 60 per cent of those interested in politics in their country of origin, 64 per cent of those interested in politics in their country of residence, and 65 per cent of those interested in politics at the European level. Lastly, a leftist position and a feeling of belonging to Europe favour taking this step. On the other hand,
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the length of the migration experience does not really seem to be relevant. Thus, a significant proportion of intra-EU migrants feel concerned by the exercise of civic rights on a European scale.
CONCLUSIONS
As this political portrait of EU movers reaches its conclusion, our attention is held by the specificity and diversity of this population, which results from migratory characteristics unique to each country of origin and country of residence. The singularity of EU movers is marked by the combination of their relatively high interest in politics and leftist tendency on the one hand, and a certain antipathy to economic liberalism combined with a commitment to cultural liberalism and universalistic values on the other. As far as their diversity is concerned, the higher politicization level of German and Spanish migrants stands out: the latter assert themselves as the most radical and likely to engage in protest as part of their participation. Furthermore, we found some signs of Europeanization of citizenship in the very experience of mobility, particularly noticeable through our respondents participation in the elections for the European Parliament. In so far as it can be judged from our survey, a political Europe, therefore, seems to be timidly developing in the awareness and practices of EU movers. They, at least, have explicitly and actively placed the European reality at the heart of their personal experience, even though they do not tend to translate this experience into openly political behaviour. On the whole, their political participation is low, and despite their remarkable political interest and their participation in EU elections, they generally stay away from other kinds of political involvement.
NOTES
1. The participation rates in the parliamentary elections that preceded our survey were as follows in the five countries: 79 per cent in Germany in 2002, 60 per cent in France in 2002, 59 per cent in Britain in 2001, 81 per cent in Italy in 2001 and 69 per cent in Spain in 2000. 2. The constructed politicization index is made up of seven attributes. The more the positive responses given by people to these different items, the more their politicization attributes and the higher their level of politicization are. We considered that to have between three and seven attributes constituted a high level of politicization. 3. The question was as follows: In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Which of the following positions best describes your political outlook?: left/centre left/ centre/centre right/right/dont answer/dont know.
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4. The questionnaire item was the following: The less the state intervenes in the economy the better it is for the country. The item does not distinguish between national and supranational levels of intervention. 5. The questionnaire item was the following: Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives as they wish. 6. We did not have any questions in our survey concerning either the place where our respondents have voted (COO or COR) or the way their votes have been cast. 7. The survey fell on different sides of the European elections of 13 June 2004, depending on the country. Declared participation is more reliable for the analysis than intentions. We therefore chose to study specifically the people who were questioned after the European election day (declaring an effective vote or not), and consequently to retain only the countries for which numbers were sufficient. Unfortunately, for this question we could not take Spain into account because the whole sample was interviewed before the elections. Likewise, only 53 people in Germany were interviewed after the elections. That being the case, they do not constitute a sufficiently large corpus to allow for reliable statistical analysis. Therefore, the results presented in Figure 7.3 rely only on the three countries with enough declared participation in our results (France, Britain, Italy).
8.
A common information space? The media use of EU movers

Damian Tambini and Nina Rother
INTRODUCTION
In the relationship between mobility, integration, identity and citizenship, cultural and educational institutions loom large. Classic studies of nationalism, for example, show how earlier media such as poetry and literature played a key role in national identity construction (Anderson 1983). Others outline the interdependence between national identity construction, media structures, national policy frameworks and individual identity construction (Collins 1998; Price 1995; Schlesinger 1991). While technological change is never entirely deterministic, it is undeniable that communications media understood broadly structure and condition the links between migrant, host and home populations, and are crucial to the construction of the proverbial imagined community to which migrants feel a sense of belonging (Elkins 1997). As with other questions about intra-EU migration explored in this book, little systematic research has been carried out into the media use patterns of EU movers. Our goal here is thus to build up a picture of their media use, and highlight its role in their integration and citizenship practices. Many claim that the communication processes which make up the national public sphere are being decoupled from national geography, as older distribution technologies are displaced by new transnational networks. We know very little, however, from research to date, about the empirical detail of this shift in communication patterns. If such a transnational information space was emerging, we would expect EU movers to be among its first inhabitants. Given the new abundance of media available, to what extent do these movers use the media of their country of origin? Does it facilitate adaptation to the new host context? Or, on the contrary, do recent developments in communications media lead to less-integrated migrants, who remain in the sphere of influence of their country of origin? In sum, what are the consequences for the marketplace of loyalties (Price 1995), in which recent developments in satellite, cable and internet media
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see states competing for the publics attention with foreign-origin mass communication providers? While definitive answers to these questions are beyond our scope, we map patterns of media consumption among EU movers, focusing on the use of country of origin (COO) and country of residence (COR) media. One focus is on the conditions that make movers turn to either COO or COR media. The younger EU movers are particularly interesting in this regard, as they are the first generation with a genuine choice between using home-country media and residence-country media. Migrants to the industrializing North of Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth century were largely illiterate. Newspaper markets were tiny and broadcasting non-existent and therefore the resources necessary to maintain daily or weekly contact with information, culture or news from the country of origin were simply not available. More recently, mass availability of new technology has been transforming the communications opportunities open to migrants. The current policy framework at the EU level aims to construct a common information space by 2010. The Television Without Frontiers Directive (TWF, Directive 97/36/EC) and the International Convention on Transfrontier Television are under review. TWF is the instrument that ensures that media services can be freely available across national boundaries in Europe, and which sets quotas for the availability of European (rather than, say, US) programming in national broadcasts. Though it is based in competition law and the internal market-building powers of the European Commission, many have commented that the Directive has other cultural objectives within a broader vision of European integration. For example, there is an obligation on European broadcasters to deliver a quota of European-produced content in addition to national quotas. This cultural impact of the Directive is under-researched, but key authors such as Collins (1998 and 2002) and Schlesinger (1991) have seen the previous version of the directive as part of a broader cultural politics of European integration. The existing literature on media and migration comprises the following main types of study: (i) studies of single diaspora groups within single host nations (for example, Zhou and Cai 2002; Georgiou 2001; Sreberny 2000); (ii) studies of the impact of new technology on diaspora networks, particularly the internet and satellite TV (Panagakos 2003; Morley and Robins 1995); and (iii) studies of the market, legal and policy contexts that shift the availability of international and diaspora media (for example, Price 1995; Schlesinger 1991). One of the key claims explored in this literature is that migrant identity construction is shifting due to new technologies and internet use (Georgiou 2005; Dayan 1999). However, rarely are any detailed quantitative data regarding the actual levels of use of different
A common information space?
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media offered. Some authors simply assume that those immigrants who are heavy users of media from their countries of origin will automatically be less well integrated into the host society. However we might equally posit that the sense of belonging or identity is inversely related to the opportunities for cultural immersion. It may be that migrants starved of their home culture tend to feel a stronger sense of attachment as a result something that would be equivalent to the radical cultural nationalism common to nineteenth century migrants (Thomas and Znaniecki 1927). Some studies claim that there is a generational effect and an effect of time, with initial reliance on home-country media fading over time. According to Camaur (2003, 52), commenting on Sweden, the often-discussed question as to whether the media in minority languages contribute to integrate or to isolate people is wrongly asked. This author argues that minority groups contain a great diversity within themselves and it is clear that segments within them such as the elderly or those who do not master Swedish almost exclusively use these media. On the other hand, second-generation immigrants, for instance, have media habits which largely parallel those of native Swedes. Camaur goes on to show how many first-generation minority members are also bilingual and bicultural, with their use of media in both languages involving them in ongoing comparative projects where events as well as media contents and forms are assessed against each other (ibid.). In this sense, minority media contribute to a multiplication of what he calls points of reference. Other studies posit the question of whether new media, particularly the internet, are having an impact on identity construction (Zhang and Xiaoming 1999). In the age of cyberspace, the role of ethnic media in fortifying the cultural traits of ethnic immigrants may be relevant. As a result of using the internet to maintain contacts, ethnic groups are more likely to be assimilated into the mainstream culture without losing their own cultural roots and ethnic identity. Research on diaspora/migrant media use has tended to draw on two main types of data: media metrics (in order of reliability: broadcast audience figures, circulation figures of diaspora print media, hit rates, and page impressions of websites); and secondly, ethnographic studies of migrant groups. Some studies have incorporated content analysis of diaspora media (Zhou and Cai 2002). In general, though, there is a dearth of good quality quantitative survey data on migrant media use. Some questions have been included in small sample surveys of diaspora groups (Panagakos 2003), but the data presented in this chapter are rare in that there is little large survey data available on migrants media habits. This chapter thus examines the evidence provided by the EIMSS, which describes the overall rates of use of home-country and host-country media
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by EU movers. After reviewing some secondary data on the availability of various media in the countries we are studying, in the following sections we outline the key findings of our survey.
MEDIA MARKETS IN EUROPE: WHAT CAN EU MOVERS ACCESS?

Europe did not lurch suddenly from a situation of media scarcity for migrants to the current situation of abundance. As broadcasting markets developed, there was a period in which some migrants benefited from basic public service provision of diaspora broadcasting and newspapers began to be more accessible. National and local broadcasters, particularly public broadcasters, attempted to serve immigrant communities at least those that achieved a critical mass in terms of numbers with basic public service content in many European countries. Raiser (2002) examines the case of Germany, where from the 1960s until the late 1980s immigrants media use concentrated on the weekly guest worker programmes on German radio. From the 1990s, satellite and pay TV started to replace these programmes. Raiser goes on to argue that these new media directly impact on links to the homeland, especially in the Turkish community, with the increasing use of homeland-based TV channels. Currently there are only a few small radio or TV stations run by migrants of the third and fourth generation. It can be seen that the attempt to provide for immigrant communities within national public broadcasting services was undermined and then replaced by foreign services as new technologies came on the market. In addition to these services the transnational public service broadcasters such as the BBC World Service and Deutsche Welle provided some radio news, but not compelling entertainment and sport schedules. In this section we outline some basic indicators of contemporary patterns of foreign media availability in European countries. We can assume that home countries newspapers are potentially available to all migrants, either via a postal subscription or (more often) over the internet. Because television is reported in most major surveys to be the medium that is used most, in terms of time, we focus particularly on television channels. On paper, in the five countries included in our study, and for our reference population, most households should, at the time of the survey, have been able to access a major television channel from their home country as long as they were willing to purchase the technology and necessary subscription. However, the picture is not so simple. There remain significant barriers of cost and availability of television services. Cable may be unavailable outside major metropolitan areas in some countries such as
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Table 8.1
Number of TV channels made available as part of the offer of main cable operators and satellite packagers in the European Union (as at February 2004)
National channels Foreign channels 56 0 43 14 27 22 10 5 3 22 Total 136 28 101 66 120 97 72 130 134 128 % Foreign channels 41.2 0.0 42.6 21.2 22.5 22.7 13.9 3.8 2.2 17.2
DE ES FR
GB IT
Kabel Deutschland Premiere ONO Digital1 Noos Canal Satellite TPS NTL Sky Sky Italia
C S C S C S S C S S
80 28 58 52 93 75 62 125 131 106
Notes: C 5 Cable, S 5 Satellite Source: European Audiovisual Observatory, www.obs.coe.int/oeu_publ/yb/yb_volumes.html
Britain and Italy, and planning restrictions can limit satellite availability. Where services are available, the dominant satellite and cable providers will tend to carry only popular channels, so it can be estimated that significant minorities do not have access to satellite television from their own home countries. Where there are widely dispersed populations or low numbers in any one area, there may be no economic incentive to provide diaspora media as part of a satellite or cable package. It is also worthy of note that while our five countries are likely to be well served, it would be much more difficult to access country of origin broadcast TV for migrants from smaller countries like Luxembourg, Hungary or Ireland. In these cases, internet rather than TV could be the main link to the homeland. It is also worthy of note that smaller countries tend to be much more permeable to foreign television broadcasts (Table 8.1). Migrants are best served where a national group is numerous in the country of residence, particularly in smaller countries with a more internationalized broadcasting space. Turning to the EIMSS data, in the next section we examine the evidence about the overall rates of use of home-country and host-country media by our population. To outline the key findings of the survey, we use indicators that are familiar in studies of news media: asking respondents where they search for news when there is an event of major significance, and also
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their overall rates of use of television, newspapers and the internet. As in other chapters of this book, we have compared EU movers and stayers mainly using data from the European Social Survey (ESS). In designing our survey we used some of the same questions as the ESS with a view to comparing across these groups.
EU MOVERS AND TELEVISION

First, we will look at the overall time spent watching TV. Second, we take a look at the split between COR and COO channels among movers and determine which movers watch COO or COR TV. Third, we take a closer look at the TV-watching pattern of movers and try to find out what makes movers watch only COO media, only COR media or both types. Figure 8.1 reports the overall pattern of TV watching among movers and stayers by country of origin and residence. This variable has been constructed for movers out of TV usage in COO and COR. The general pattern is that there are more heavy viewers among movers, especially movers from Spain and Italy and movers to Spain, France and Germany. However, movers from and to Britain tend to watch less than British national stayers. It is also interesting to note that some very high figures are reported: for example, 60 per cent of Italian movers to Spain watch TV more than three hours per day, and 15 per cent of French movers to Germany never watch TV, which is a lot more than the average of 7.2 per cent. The question remains: what determines overall TV usage in other
60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Germany Italy Spain France
Movers - COR Movers - COO Stayers (ESS)
Britain
Source: ESS 2004 and EIMSS, N 5 13 971
Figure 8.1 Overall TV watching: % for more than 3 hours by COO and COR
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words, who is a heavy user and who is not? A regression analysis (not shown) outlines that overall TV usage can be explained quite well by basic sociodemographic traits. Age and education are key predictors of TV watching. Further, an older age at migration, a long stay in the COR, being male, having a partner from the COO in comparison to not having a partner and being unemployed lead to more intensive TV use. Education seems the single most important factor here: having a university degree as well as having moved in order to study significantly lowers the intensity of watching TV. In addition, which country individuals originate in and migrate to seem to have a strong relationship to the amount of television watched: overall, German and French movers watch less TV than the average mover. But what of the central issue of watching television from the country of origin? Are EU movers watching television broadcast from their countries of residence, or do they choose to remain in the television space of their home countries? There is a lot of variation between countries on this point. For example, almost 65 per cent of movers to Britain (and more than half of all movers to Italy) do not watch their home country TV channels at all. Whilst this may be due to availability and affordability, it may equally be explained by reference to the socioeconomic make-up of the body of EU movers in each country. More than half of all Spanish movers do not watch COO TV, and especially low proportions of Spanish in Italy and Britain watch it. Generally speaking, more educated work migrants are keener to integrate and learn local languages and therefore on some assumptions might be assumed to be less likely to watch COO TV. Clearly the segments of our population where retirement migration is significant have a particularly high level of heavy COO viewing: only 9.6 per cent of German movers to Spain do not watch German TV in Spain. But this is not only about retirement: only 14.6 per cent of Italian movers to Germany do not watch Italian TV. A regression analysis (not shown) indicates that levels of exposure to COO TV are strongly associated with older age, having a partner from the COO and not having a university degree. In addition we see that education again has a crucial impact: having migrated to study and having a university degree lower the intensity of COO TV usage. From the point of view of the overall level of social integration of EU movers, it is interesting to note that having friends from the COO as well as speaking the CORs language alter the intensity of COO TV usage, though not with a high degree of significance. We should remember that availability of COO TV does vary, and that this may explain some of the differences. More data on availability would be necessary to analyse the detail of this effect. This is a complex issue, because availability often depends on demand and is also fast changing. Many of the large number of respondents who spend no time at all using COO media are likely to be
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45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Germany Source: Movers - COR Movers - COO
Italy
Spain
France
Britain
EIMSS, N 5 4 866
Figure 8.2
COR TV watching: % for more than 3 hours by COO and COR
those who do not have the necessary satellite or cable reception. In Britain, for example, large numbers of viewers on terrestrial platforms have no access to foreign broadcasts at all. It is worth noting that in the future this barrier is likely to decline in significance with the rise of on-demand, IPH based services delivered over broadband. Even allowing for the fact that the numbers presented do not control for the absolute size of the movers group in each country, some countries do seem to be much more successful in integrating EU movers into their local media space. There is a wide variation in the numbers of people who do not watch any COR TV at all. More than a quarter of all movers to Spain do not watch Spanish TV, whereas less than 10 per cent of movers to Britain do not watch British TV. On the other hand, movers from Germany watch the TV of their new country least often. The distribution of heavy COR viewers as shown in Figure 8.2 complements the picture. Spanish citizens, who already have high levels of TV viewing at home, continue to watch heavily as movers, but now by watching the television stations of their residence country. Spanish movers abroad watch COR TV heavily, especially Spanish in France (61.4 per cent watch French TV more than three hours a day). The opposite is true for Germans, and especially Germans in France, where none at all claimed to watch French TV for more than three hours per day. Movers to Italy, in general, tend not to watch Italian TV for more than three hours a day. Whether this is due to the nature of the migrant group or the quality of the TV offering is not clear.
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We can, however, delve more deeply into our data in order to address the question of what determines COR TV usage, and who is a heavy user and who is not. A regression analysis (not shown), with an R2 of 0.25, sheds light on the determinants of the levels of COR TV usage. Of the sociodemographic variables, a longer stay, being male, as well as having no university degree, all lead to a higher consumption of COR TV. Having migrated for work or personal reasons also leads to more COR TV usage. TV usage also seems to be a result of other indicators of integration such as whether the partner is from the COO or the COR. Of the individual variables, having friends from the COR as well as having a good command of the new language alter the intensity of COR TV usage, though the relationship of language is unclear. Movers often watch TV in order to improve language, but at the same time, it may be that their language competence influences them to remain with COO services. And there are huge country differences. German movers in general, French movers to Germany and Italy and British in Italy watch less COR TV than Italians in France; however, Spanish movers and Italians in Spain watch more COR TV than the baseline category of Italians in France. Almost half of all Spanish movers only watch COR TV. On the other hand, it is mainly German and British movers who watch only COO TV abroad. As noted, it is likely that those who migrate to retire are more likely to opt for the channels of their country of origin, whilst those who migrate to work are more likely to reject the available COO TV. Overall, more COO than COR TV is watched by German, Italian and British movers. No big country differences exist for movers who watch more COR than COO TV and those who watch COR as often as COO TV, but the non-watchers are skewed towards certain countries: More than 10 per cent of French movers watch neither COO nor COR TV (especially French movers to Germany). By conducting a multinomial regression analysis, the impact of sociodemographic background as well as of origin and destination on TV usage preferences can be analysed. Therefore, we distinguished six categories: only COR TV, only COO TV, more COR TV, more COO TV, same amount and no TV, with the last one as baseline category. Concerning the list of independent variables, three different classes of variables exist. The first class consists of contextual variables, that is, the country of origin and the country of residence. Spain serves as baseline for both variables. As typical sociodemographic variables, we included age at migration date, length of stay, gender with being female as baseline, education level with all degrees less than a university degree as baseline and the origin of the partner, with no partner as baseline. A third class of variables is composed of individual variables: migration motivation, past migration experiences,
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daily contacts, and language knowledge upon arrival and at the time of interview. Table 8.2 shows what makes movers most likely to belong to one of the five types contrasted to people who do not watch TV. The first column refers to people who only watch COR TV, among whom respondents with a partner and many friends from the COR are significantly more frequent. After controlling for sociodemographic and individual variables, it is more likely that British movers will watch only COR TV. Among people who only watch COO TV (second category), there is a prevalence of movers without a university diploma, with a partner from the COO or a third country, who have not lived in a third country before, have no friends from the COR and have a bad command of the COR language. Thus, they lack the resources and opportunities to watch COR TV. These movers mainly come from France, Britain and Italy; Spain is the destination most strongly associated with this. The third category, those movers who watch more COR TV than COO TV, resemble the COR TV only watchers. Whats more, they often have a partner from a third country, tend to be older than those who do not watch TV and have lived in the COR before. Thus, a longer time for establishing this habit as well as opportunities through friends and family makes movers watch more COR TV. These movers cannot be found among movers from Germany and France and movers to Germany. Respondents who prefer COO TV over COR TV (the fourth category) again show a pattern that is characterized by experience and opportunities. They are more likely to be older and have no university diploma. In addition, there are more males among this group and they tend to have a partner and several friends from the COO. To move in order to study was not their migration motive, and this is also reflected in their usually bad command of the COR language. Concerning the origins and destinations of these movers, we find them among movers from Italy but not from Germany and not among movers to Germany and Italy always in comparison to Spain. The last category of equal TV watchers consists of movers who lived in the COR for a longer time in comparison to those who never watch TV, have no university diploma and did not come to study. These movers mainly originate from Spain or go to Spain. We can draw four major conclusions from these analyses. First, there is a strong education effect: the more educated, the less TV is watched. Second there are important country differences: norms, habits but also availability may play a role in COO TV watching. Third, contact plays a big role: whether your partner and friends are from the COO or the COR has a strong impact on TV habits (that is, preferring COO or COR channels). Finally, language knowledge also determines the choice of COO or COR stations.
Table 8.2
Multinomial regression analysis of TV watching preferences

Only COR TV Only COO TV More COR TV More COO TV Same amount vs vs No TV vs No TV vs No TV vs No TV No TV 20.012 0.019 0.234 20.481*** 20.041 0.470** 0.560* 0.119 20.079 20.364 0.079 20.283 20.055 0.209 20.169 0.290* 20.212 0.218 0.220 0.057 20.465 0.054 0.189 20.371* 0.265 0.275 20.361* 20.261 20.422 21.038*** 20.314 20.486 20.002 20.391 20.243 0.430* 0.086 0.622*** 20.351* 20.025 0.094 0.108 20.908** 0.441 0.200 20.198 0.250 0.457** 0.064 20.168 20.244 20.491* 0.011 0.012 20.007 20.724*** 1.284*** 0.246 1.008** 0.082 0.021* 0.032*** 0.275 20.744*** 0.385 1.012*** 0.788** 20.015 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.494*** 20.678*** 1.046*** 0.402 0.445 0.238 0.015 0.036*** 0.299 20.634*** 1.046*** 0.702*** 0.754** 20.127 20.140 21.039*** 0.132 20.150 20.048 0.203 0.165 0.162 20.148 0.119 0.017
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Age at migration Years of stay Gender (0 5 female) University diploma Partner from COO (0 5 no partner) Partner from COR (0 5 no partner) Partner from third country (0 5 no partner) Employment status (1 5 unemployed) Migration motivation Work Study Personal reasons Quality of life Miscellaneous Lived in third country before Lived in COR before Several friends from COO Several friends from COR Several friends from other countries Language knowledge at migration date Language knowledge now
Table 8.2
(continued)
Only COR TV Only COO TV More COR TV More COO TV Same amount vs vs No TV vs No TV vs No TV vs No TV No TV 20.368 20.729** 0.644* 20.440 21.148*** 21.214*** 20.216 20.282 1.973*** 13 028.634 135 0.386 20.873*** 20.069 21.362*** 20.851** 20.203 20.872** 20.071 0.281 20.521 20.366 0.235 1.469*** 1.115*** 1.055*** 20.890*** 21.138*** 20.400 0.039 20.581* 0.158 0.019 0.824** 20.741** 20.004 20.489 20.824*** 20.879 20.640** 20.654** 20.512* 0.106 20.898*** 20.741** 21.051*** 21.044*** 0.562
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Country of origin Germany France Britain Italy Spain Country of residence Germany France Britain Italy Spain Constant 22 Log Likelihood Degrees of freedom Pseudo R-square (Cox and Snell)
Notes:
Reference category for dependent variable: no TV. * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; *** Significant at 0.1%.
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EU MOVERS AND NEWSPAPERS

Television is of course only one of the mass media used by EU movers. In this section we will deal with three aspects of newspaper usage: first, the overall amount of newspaper reading in comparison with stayers; second, how EU movers divide their time between COO and COR newspapers, and third, we will focus on the COO or COR newspapers themselves. Figure 8.3 shows that movers in general also use this media significantly more intensively than stayers, perhaps in part because collectively they use both country of origin and country of residence media. The number of movers who read newspapers for more than one hour per day is always higher than the respective number of stayers, no matter where they are from and where they moved to. There are no big differences between countries of residence. Movers from Italy and Spain read newspapers most intensively, whereas German movers do not read newspapers a great deal. But what determines overall newspaper consumption, who is a heavy user and who is not? From a regression analysis (not shown) we can gain further insights into the pattern of media use and the relationships between other variables and media use. The results indicate that the R2 is not as high as for the overall TV usage and thus that our explanation of differences will not be as good as for TV. Sociodemographic variables show a slightly different pattern from that for television: an older age, being male, having a university degree and having a partner from the COR
60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Germany Source: Italy Spain Movers - COR Movers - COO Stayers (ESS)
France
Britain
Figure 8.3
Overall newspaper reading: % for more than 1 hour by COO and COR
192
30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Germany Source:
Movers - COR Movers - COO
Italy
Spain
France
Britain
EIMSS, N 5 4 865
Figure 8.4
COR-newspaper reading: % for more than 1 hour by COO and COR
are associated with a higher level of newspaper reading. Having moved for quality of life reasons also affects positively the overall level of newspaper reading. Of the individual variables, having lived in a third country before, having friends from the COO and other countries as well as having a good knowledge of the COR language lead to more newspaper reading. Country differences are not so important as for TV, which may reflect the fact that the press tend to be available more widely (particularly over the internet) than television signals. Italians and British in Spain are the most intensive newspaper readers, presumably reflecting the longer leisure time available to these movers. In fact, movers to Italy tend to read less COO press than movers to other countries. Movers from Italy and Spain maintain high levels of COO newspaper reading, whereas Germans abroad tend to abstain from it. Trying to shed light on what determines COO newspaper consumption, we carried out a regression analysis (not shown), but with little success. Only two sociodemographic variables appear to be significant: an older age at migration and a higher education lead to more COO newspaper reading. Spanish abroad as well as British and Italians in Spain tend to read more COO newspapers than the baseline category of Italians in France. As for COR newspaper reading, Figure 8.4 shows that almost onequarter of all movers to Spain read the Spanish press for more than one hour per day, whereas only 7.3 per cent of movers to Italy do so. Movers from Spain read COR newspapers intensively, whereas most Germans
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abroad only read newspapers for less than half an hour per day. A regression analysis (not shown) outlines that an older age at migration, a long stay, being male and having a partner from the COR are associated with higher levels of COR newspaper reading. Having migrated to work, for quality of life reasons or for personal reasons also alter the intensity of COR newspaper reading in comparison to movers who came for miscellaneous reasons. Having friends from the COR and other countries and currently having and having had a good command of the COR language at the time of migration also lead to a higher time spent reading COR press. Again the Italian and Spanish movers tend to read COR newspapers very intensively, perhaps reflecting a desire to learn the language and integrate. There are no large variations between countries in the number of movers who never read a newspaper. Neither are there large differences between countries in terms of respondents who only read COR newspaper. However, on average, the number of movers reading only COR newspapers is higher than the number of movers who only read COO newspapers. German and British movers tend to only read their home newspapers, especially when they live in Spain. We can hypothesize that this may be due to the higher proportion of retirement migrants among them. In fact, Italian movers are more inclined to read COR rather than COO newspapers. In comparison to other countries, movers to Britain spend more time reading British newspapers and almost 40 per cent of all respondents residing across the Channel read British newspapers only, about 20 per cent read more COR than COO press and less than 5 per cent read only COO newspapers. The message is clear: British newspapers come first, perhaps for reasons of language and a capacity (among quality newspapers at least) to cater for an international audience. In contrast, EU movers living in Spain and Germany on average concentrate more on their home newspapers. At any rate, with the exception of movers settled in Spain, a clear pattern emerges: EU movers prefer COR newspapers. To try to explain differences in forms of newspaper consumption among movers, a multinomial regression analysis was conducted (Table 8.3). The categories are similar to those for TV watchers: only COR newspapers, only COO newspapers more COR newspapers more COO newspapers, same amount and no newspaper. The latter serves as the baseline category. The same independent variables are entered into the regression. The resulting pseudo-R2, showing the explanation power of the model, is not as high as for TV watching but still high enough to draw the conclusion that important predictors of newspaper choices can be singled out. The first column focuses on movers who only read COR newspapers. Their profile is as follows: they tend to live in the COR for a longer time,
Table 8.3
Only COR newspapers vs No newspaper 0.007 0.017** 0.221* 20.044 20.133 0.245 0.278 20.249* 20.800*** 20.322 20.640*** 20.379* 0.095 20.249* 20.204 0.452*** 0.058 0.192 0.678*** 20.034 0.274 20.322 0.109 0.202 20.289* 0.284* 20.413*** 20.153 20.196 20.195 20.741*** 20.354 20.708*** 20.600** 0.245* 0.121 0.195 0.289* 0.333* 0.171 1.192*** 20.208 20.113 20.460* 20.124 0.134 20.333* 0.508*** 20.145 0.493*** 0.305 0.297 0.020*** 20.005 20.061 0.466*** 0.159 20.003 0.393 20.155 0.013* 0.022** 0.345** 0.443*** 0.036 0.489** 0.309 20.264 0.015* 20.007 0.190 0.612*** 0.195 0.273 0.340 20.237 Only COO newspapers vs No newspaper More COR newspapers vs No newspaper
Multinomial regression analysis of newspaper reading preferences

More COO Same amount vs newspapers vs No newspaper No newspaper 0.008 0.009 0.152 0.578*** 0.148 0.304* 0.244 20.346** 20.388* 20.159 20.448* 20.274 0.229* 20.091 0.299** 20.085 0.376** 0.294* 0.780***
194
Age at migration Years of stay Gender (0 5 female) University diploma Partner from COO (0 5 no partner) Partner from COR (0 5 no partner) Partner from third country (0 5 no partner) Employment status (1 5 unemployed) Migration motivation Work Study Personal reasons Quality of life Miscellaneous Lived in third country before Lived in COR before Several friends from COO Several friends from COR Several friends from other countries Language knowledge at migration date Language knowledge now
20.476** 20.241 20.091 20.080
20.596** 0.266 0.013 20.322
20.809*** 20.233 20.711*** 0.099
21.153*** 20.557* 20.771*** 20.288
20.486** 0.159 20.184 0.076
195
Country of origin Germany France Britain Italy Spain Country of residence Germany France Britain Italy Spain Constant 2 Log Likelihood Degrees of freedom Pseudo R-square (Cox and Snell) 0.138 0.256 0.836*** 0.145 20.180 14 420.696 135 0.242 20.226 0.723*** 20.335 20.005 20.647 20.387 0.286 0.573** 20.019 21.992*** 20.176 0.140 20.231 20.136 21.018*
20.237 20.238 20.233 0.097 20.583
Notes:
Reference category for dependent variable: no newspaper. * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; *** Significant at 0.1%.
Source:
EIMSS, N 5 4 545
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they are male, with a job, did not move for just one reason, and have not lived in the COR before but have several friends from the COR and a good command of the COR language. These movers are not likely to come from Germany but tend to go to Britain. In contrast to this type of movers, those movers who only read COO newspapers are highly educated, do not have friends from the COR and were older when they migrated. But again, these movers usually do not come from Germany and are commonly settled in France. The next category, movers who read more COR than COO newspapers, resembles the COR newspaper only readers: they tend to be male, to have moved for more than one reason, and to have several friends from the COR (and third countries) and a good knowledge of the COR language. Thus, they have the resources to read the COR press. However, they are also older, with a university diploma, a partner from the COR and have lived in third countries before more frequently than non-readers. Germans and British are underrepresented among them, while movers residing in Britain are overrepresented. The group of movers who read more COO than COR newspapers can be characterized with the following attributes: they were usually older when they migrated, they have a university diploma and did not move for personal reasons, they have not lived in the COR before and have several friends from the COO and third countries. Thus contact and opportunities again play a role in the prediction of who belongs to this category. Finally, in this group Spanish are in large numbers. The last group consists of movers that read the same amount of COR and COO press. In comparison to movers who never read newspapers, these readers have a university diploma, have a partner from the COR, are employed, did not move to work or for personal reasons, tend to have lived in a third country before and have several friends from the COO and third countries. They also had and have a good command of the COR language and are thus able and have the opportunity to read both type of newspapers. In sum, the analysis of the patterns of newspaper usage shows that education and language knowledge are important predictors for the reading of COR press. Contacts also play a big role in the decision of which newspapers are read. A Britain effect is also found: movers to Britain read British newspapers more than any other group of movers read COR press, including after controlling for other relevant variables. German movers in general tend not to read a newspaper at all, again after controlling for other variables. In any case, other variables not analysed here (for example, the availability of foreign press) may also be of relevance for the prediction of newspaper usage patterns.
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EU MOVERS AND THE INTERNET

In the following section we investigate the use of the internet by EU movers. Firstly we will describe usage patterns, including a comparison with stayers, and secondly we will again seek to account for these patterns through regression analyses. One clear finding is that movers are a lot better connected than stayers. For instance, in 2004 about 65 per cent of Spanish residents did not have access, whereas only 13.4 per cent of the EU movers living in Spain (the least wired in our sample) are without access. Movers residing in Britain and movers of Italian origin are the best connected of all movers. There are larger numbers of heavy users of the internet among movers than among stayers no matter in which country (Figure 8.5). By conducting a regression analysis, we aimed to identify the conditions that lead to a more intensive use of the internet among movers. The model we specified has a high R2, explaining almost 40 per cent of the variance. The results in Table 8.4 show that internet use can be predicted very well. A strong age effect emerges: the younger at migration and the more recent the migration, the more internet is used. Being male and highly educated, having a partner and being employed lead to a higher internet usage, too. Having lived in a third country before, as well as having friends from the COR and other countries and a good command of the COR language also enhance access to the web. There are significant country effects: movers from and to Britain show a higher usage of the internet, while Italians in Germany are particularly aloof from cyberspace.
65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
Movers - COR Movers - COO Stayers (ESS)
Germany Source:
Italy
Spain
France
Britain
Figure 8.5
Internet use: % for every day by COO and COR
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Table 8.4
OLS regression of internet use of EU movers

Beta
Age at migration Years of stay Gender (0 5 female) Education dummy Partner from COO Partner from COR Partner from third country Respondents current working situation (15unemployed) Reason of migration: work Reason of migration: study Reason of migration: quality of life Reason of migration: family/love Lived in third country before Lived in COR before Friends from COO Friends from COR Friends from other countries Language knowledge at migration date (15good) Language knowledge now (15good) Germans in Italy Germans in France Germans in Spain Germans in Britain French in Germany French in Italy French in Spain French in Britain Italians in Germany Italians in Spain Italians in Britain Spanish in Germany Spanish in Italy Spanish in France Spanish in Britain British in Germany British in France British in Italy British in Spain R2 adj.
20.277*** 20.294*** 0.056*** 0.216*** 0.046** 0.057*** 0.043** 20.104*** 0.015 0.025 20.019 20.003 0.055*** 20.006 20.012 0.038** 0.038** 0.010 0.058*** 0.017 0.056*** 0.036 0.126*** 0.048 0.027 0.002 0.083*** 20.114*** 20.008 0.059*** 20.009 20.009 20.007 0.064*** 0.099*** 0.107*** 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.371
Notes: Baselines are Italians in France; no partner; migration motive: miscellaneous ** Significant at 1%; *** Significant at 0.1%. Source: EIMSS, N 5 4 755
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WHAT IF? INFORMATION-SEEKING ABOUT IMPORTANT WORLD EVENTS

As it is methodologically not possible to construct an overall indicator for media usage, we instead take a closer look at the preferences movers have when they look for information on an important world event as a means of getting at this question.1 This variable thus seeks to seize some kind of a quintessential preference for either COO, COR or third-country media. Replicating the analytical strategy adopted so far, in this section we will firstly describe the reported usage patterns and secondly look at the different profiles of respondents with different options through regression analysis. This question does not reveal differential levels of access to press, radio, television or the internet. It is likely that many of those accessing COO media are doing so via the internet. The flow of internet traffic after 9/11 and other recent terrorist crises suggests that the web is the first means of information access for many, particularly in the workplace. It is very significant that roughly equal numbers of people reported that they would look first at COO media, particularly given the finding that many do not have access to COO television. This suggests that when people do have access to COO media, they use it at these sensitive moments. The distribution of preferences regarding where to search for information about important world events shows that 47.2 per cent of all EU movers report that they would use COR media, compared with 43.8 per cent who would use COO media. Only a very small percentage would be likely to use media from a third country (3.8 per cent). Thus, we cannot find a clear tendency towards COR or COO media at first sight. However, on a second look, we find that there are major differences between groups from the various countries of origin. The British are more likely to turn to British media when looking for information. German movers also show a slight tendency towards German media, especially if they live in Spain, where 80 per cent prefer German media. In fact, there are major differences between countries of residence. EU movers living in Britain are more likely to use COR media in order to find information regarding the latest news, especially Spanish and French movers. Movers to Germany, Italy and Spain on the other hand are more likely to use COO media. A multinomial regression analysis allows us again to measure the impact of contextual, sociodemographic and individual variables on the choice of COR, COO or third-country media and to predict what determines whether a mover turns to home- or host-country media or to media from a third country. The choice of third-country media in case of important world events serves as baseline. Table 8.5 shows the B-coefficients and their
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Table 8.5
Multinomial regression analysis of media choice in case of important world events

COR-media vs third country media COO-media vs third country media 20.018 0.005 20.052 20.624*** 0.976*** 0.206 20.619* 0.209 20.456 0.252 20.317 0.147 20.312 0.222 0.492* 20.178 20.742*** 0.322 20.380 20.189 20.400 20.291 20.331 20.757* 0.107 20.101 20.472 4.004***
Age at migration Years of stay Gender (0 5 female) University diploma Partner from COO (0 5 no partner) Partner from COR (0 5 no partner) Partner from third country (0 5 no partner) Employment status (1 5 unemployed) Migration motivation Work Study Personal reasons Quality of life Miscellaneous Lived in third country before Lived in COR before Several friends from COO Several friends from COR Several friends from other countries Language knowledge at migration date Language knowledge now Country of origin Germany France Britain Italy Spain Country of residence Germany France Britain Italy Spain Constant 2 Log Likelihood Degrees of freedom Pseudo R-square (Cox and Snell)
20.016 0.030** 20.054 20.790*** 0.683** 0.476* 20.640* 20.011 20.688* 0.321 20.405 0.096 20.313 0.218 0.143 0.135 20.779*** 0.522* 0.196 20.136 20.797** 20.709* 20.305 20.486 20.320 0.499 20.817* 3.801*** 6 389.496 54 0.174
Notes: Reference category for dependent variable: third country media. * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; *** Significant at 0.1% Source: EIMSS, N 5 4 360
201
significance as well as the pseudo-R2 for the multinomial regression model. The pseudo-R2 remains on a modest level, suggesting that the selected variables do play a role in predicting media choice but also that other variables not included in the model are indeed potentially important. Table 8.5 shows that those movers who prefer COR media in comparison to movers who prefer third-country media tend to have stayed in the COR for a longer time, usually have a partner from either the COO or the COR but not from a third country, did not migrate for work reasons, and had a good command of the COR language at migration. These movers tend to come from Spain, and are relatively less likely to live in Italy. On the other hand, movers preferring COO media over third-country media have a partner from COO, many friends from the COO, and are not likely to live in Germany. All in all, the following pattern emerges: educated people tend to use third-country media more this may be people using global television stations such as CNN or the BBC. The nature of primary contacts (partners and friends) again plays the biggest role as well as the ability to understand COR and third-country media and determine the choice of media origins. This is not too surprising as media use is a quite social event, carried out mostly in the physical or virtual company of partners or friends.
EU MOVERS AND MEDIA SPACES: CONNECTED, CONVERGING OR TRANSNATIONAL?

When the Tambini family migrated from Italy to Wales in the 1930s, they were not able to bring much of their culture with them. As they settled in an area in which Italian immigrants were too few and far between to support a newspaper distribution network, they were largely disconnected from news from the country of their origin. The Tambini grandfather eventually bought a wireless set, and the family would crouch around occasional crackly, whistling, distant transmissions in Italian. Most news of the rise of Italian Fascism came via letters, relayed through base stations of cafes, churches and summer picnics by new migrants in person. The link to Italy was fragile. Shortly after Italy entered the Second World War, the wireless set was confiscated. It was seen as a threat to national security. The current generation of intra-European movers, in contrast, have abundant opportunity to remain connected to their countries of origin when they move to another EU member state, and are confident that this will remain the case. Improved international radio services, electronic distribution and local printing of newspapers, together with satellite and cable
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television and more recently the internet create a situation in which news, culture and information from home is easy to reach. The key channels of mass communication are no longer delivered exclusively through national networks of analogue transmitters with a very limited number of national and local channels. The analysis in this chapter has sought to interrogate exactly what EU movers are doing given this abundance of choice. Todays migrants are increasingly in a situation in which they are free to consume media from a variety of national contexts. They are indeed using this freedom. The country that they are currently resident in still has a strong bearing on their choice, but media markets are more porous than ever before. In this context, movers are choosing to consume home media in very large numbers. In comparison to stayers and to past generations of migrants, this alone is a huge shift. In the most general terms then, it is clear that our sample of migrants cannot be seen to be wholly integrated within either a COO or a COR media space. They spend more time in total using the media than stayers and they appear for the most part to remain in contact with both the COO and the COR. Intra-EU movers are heavy users of the media in comparison with stayers. In general they read more newspapers, use the internet more, and (with some exceptions) watch TV more than the general population. A significant proportion of this large amount of time devoted to the media is spent accessing information from the country of origin. The factors that were strongly linked in our data with use of COO media were in particular whether friends and partners are from the COO or the COR. Those who have partners from the COR are as we might expect more likely to watch COR television. Older and retired migrants tend to be heavier users of COO media, and the more educated read newspapers more. Another interesting effect is that of a longer stay in the country of residence. However, this effect is not so clear, as the length of stay in the COR is confounded with the age at migration and the age at the time of the survey. The following pattern emerges when analysed carefully: regardless of whether TV, newspaper or general media usage is concerned, the variable age influences COO media usage, in the sense that the older the mover is, the more s/he is likely to use COO media. On the other hand, the variable years of stay influences COR media usage, in the sense that the longer the mover lives in the COR, the more likely s/he is to use COR media. All this said, COR media use continues to be very important, in most cases prevalent, even where COO media are easily accessible. This indicates that the further expansion of access to COO media will not simply lead to migrant groups seceding entirely from the host media space. Clearly there remain significant reasons to use COR media. Indeed, COR
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mass media (both television and the press) remain pre-eminent among migrants media choices. After all, the numbers who report that they only watch COR television and use COR newspapers is far greater than those who only use COO newspapers and television. Because so many factors affect migrants media choices (education, age, social networks to name but three), there appears to be no simple linear relationship between increasing availability of COO media and their use by movers. COO media simply are not migrants first choice, and the data seem also to indicate some potential hypotheses why this might be the case. Clearly media use plays a central role in the process of movers adjustment to the COR. The high level of use of COO media by retirees and those with partners from the COO may even indicate that media use is one of several threshold issues that can tip the balance in integration processes in favour of further integration with host, or enduring links to home society. The decision to use COO media may be linked to broader strategic or habitual behaviours. Whereas in the past the chance to remain virtually attached to the homeland via the electronic media was simply not available, todays migrants can and in some cases do make the positive choice to remain virtually at home. This choice seems to be affected by relational and cultural determinants (for example, whether the partner is from the COO) as well as by structural ones such as education and position in the labour market. With that in mind, it is clear that those movers who have fewer needs to integrate (needs for political information, language, public services) are more likely to use COO media. Some countries are relatively more successful in including intraEuropean migrants in the national audience for television. Almost 60 per cent of movers to Britain said they did not watch any COO television, and a further 19 per cent reported that they watched more COR than COO media. A mere 2 per cent of movers residing in Britain reported that they watched only television from their country of origin. Conversely, some countries are more successful at using media to maintain links with their diaspora, and Britain is a leading case in this regard. We can hypothesize that this is due to some combination of: difficulty of accessing foreign channels in the UK, ease of access to British channels abroad, the sociodemographic make-up of the migrant group, and arguably other subjective factors related to the perceived quality of media offer (for example, the prestige of the BBC). In our survey questions we did not ask for detailed responses on what material was accessed on the internet, and whether internet access was opening up significant links to home-country news and information, but we did ask to which media migrants turn when they seek news on a significant world event. Here the response is clear. COR media are not the first
204
place to turn for most EU movers in Spain, Italy and Germany. Equally, it appears that migrants from some EU countries primarily Britain and Germany feel a stronger pull from their home-country media when it comes to major historical events. Whilst it is ultimately impossible to disaggregate the role of different factors in these outcomes (availability, language, partner, media trust and preference), EU movers of this generation are actively constructing a media diet from the growing array of sources. The fact that third-country media score relatively low is of note: the battle for the media loyalties of migrants is really ultimately between the local concerns of origin and destination countries, not between a canvas of global media players. Whether the official European Commission support for a Common European Space will have an impact will not be clear for some years. The i2010 policy was launched in 2005. But the data outlined in this chapter confirm that the information space inhabited by the pioneers of European integration is already at least a co-national one. The evidence suggests that EU movers are early adopters of communications technology such as the internet, and where new communications possibilities exist, they are quick to use them. Intra-European movers settle into a transnational media framework: whereas in the past links to home countries were often symbolic and required acts of deliberate and sustained construction of identity by migrants, new media such as the internet and satellite TV in particular offer the means by which migrants can maintain strong knowledge of and engagement with both country of origin and country of residence. This transnational hybrid existence has for some time been posited as a feature of current migrants, but the precise consequences for the marketplace of loyalties have not been fully explored in the study of immigrant integration (Bakir 1996). Our survey is perhaps the first of its kind to lay out the empirical detail of that engagement in Europe.
NOTE
1. Question text: If you heard about an important world event, where would you first look to find out more information? 1) [COR] media, 2) [COO] media, 3) third country media.
9.
Internal and external movers: EastWest migration and the impact of EU enlargement
Adrian Favell and Tina M. Nebe
THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF EASTWEST MIGRATION

The growing intra-EU mobility of West Europeans, that is the principle focus of this book, has been a largely unremarked if not almost invisible phenomenon in most countries of residence. This is decisively not the case with migrants and movers from East and Central Europe. In the run-up to the two EU accessions of 2004 and 2007, there was a great deal of media coverage of these other pioneers of European integration, in often very hostile terms. EU enlargement, of course, notionally changes the migration/mobility relationship of East and Central European citizens to the West, from external migrants to internal movers. Supposedly, some day, Polish or Romanian movers (for example), should simply become indistinguishable from their mobile West European counterparts, in rights and opportunities, if not in reality. For the moment, this outcome has been stalled, despite the twin accessions, by the maintenance of certain transitional limitations on mobility to most of the older member states, although one by one the barriers are coming down. Initially only three countries Ireland, Sweden and Britain opened their borders with no transitional barriers to the new A8 members in 2004. This included Poland, with the largest population of potential movers. From May 2006, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Finland followed suit. Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy also reduced barriers for the first wave of new members, with only Germany and Austria saying they would maintain them for the duration of the transitional period (until 2011). However, led by the decision of Britain and Spain two of the primary recipients of EastWest migrants to keep doors shut, transitional barriers remained in place for workers from the two new member states that joined in 2007, Bulgaria and
205
206
Romania. But formal barriers do not mean that doors are really shut. All new member states now enjoy visa-free tourist travel. And by themselves, legal barriers do not prevent much of the migration, which has been and remains mostly informal in nature, such that bringing down formal barriers is, in effect, a form of regularization of migrant status (see also Jileva 2002; Lavenex and Uarer 2002). Despite these realities on the ground, crude fears in the West about EastWest floods have not abated. The spectre of the Polish plumber played a significant negative role in the rejection of the EU constitution in France in 2005; hostile reports about the people smuggling of Roma and Slavic migrants, or crime associated with them, still fill the tabloid press in Britain and Italy. Notwithstanding upbeat theories about a wider European integration following enlargement, there is still a growing anxiety across all of Western Europe, and in both economic and cultural terms about the consequences of free movement from East and Central Europe. Early in the design of the PIONEUR study, it was decided to take advantage of the timing of the research (around the years of the accession), and the burning topicality of EastWest migration in Europe, to ask questions parallel to the EIMSS of comparable EastWest movers. Practically all the reputable scholarship, and most of the advocacy on immigration and free movement policy, suggests that there is little to fear from a full opening of Western Europes borders to the East (Hille and Straubhaar 2001; Wallace and Stola 2001; Favell and Hansen 2002). Indeed, most studies extol the dramatic economic and political benefits of this integration, while chastising the negative attitudes of politicians and public opinion (see for example the reports by ECAS 2005 and 2006 and Kelo and Wchter 2004, as well as the arguments advanced during the European Commissions 2006 European Year of Mobility). In this view, flows are likely to be increasingly governed by supply and demand forces; East and Central Europeans pose few questions of cultural and racial difference from their host societies; and their increasingly temporary and circular migration patterns remove the probable longer-term costs to welfare states that some immigration is thought to bring. In sum, European integration is likely to lead to a new and stable continent-wide European migration system, in which EastWest mobility is likely to be no more or less significant than current intra-West EU mobility, as well as filling gaps in the labour market that would otherwise have to pull in non-Europeans to the continent. If we are to believe such Panglossian-sounding predictions, the patterns and experiences of the intra-West EU movers surveyed in this book should be the best guide and forerunner to the present and future patterns and
Internal and external movers
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experiences of EastWest movers. This should apply as much to quantitative forecasts as to the qualitative experiences of migrants, and the kind of reception they are likely to receive in new host countries. The most convincing scholarship on EastWest migration has indeed specifically suggested that this particular enlargement should be no more dramatic or difficult in its impact on free movement/migration than previous enlargements to Spain, Portugal or Greece and hence should over time follow the same demographic and social trajectory (see especially Kupiszeski 2002). But this is certainly not how most member states are evaluating the scenario politically. That most member states have ignored the combined weight of scholarship and advocacy the facts and arguments as they have been presented above and maintained cautious barriers as well as a hostile political stance, shows that the political calculus at stake here is being governed by other reasons. Perhaps these governments argue correctly that support for further integration is so fragile that it cannot sustain this particular extension of free movement, regardless of how beneficial or benevolent the economic consequences of open borders can be. Perhaps, too, there are other sociological aspects to this question that might be thought of in terms of exclusion and/or exploitation that are not reflected in the theories of economists or findings of demographers on which the upbeat scholarship and policy prescriptions are founded. Our chapter then sets out to evaluate which of the scenarios in fact applies to the new intra-EU migrants from Central and Eastern Europe. Are their experiences qualitatively comparable to the kinds of experiences, documented elsewhere in the volume, that West European movers have? Or do their experiences in fact point to a persisting differentiation in their access, treatment and experiences as migrants in the West? Our interviewsbased data allow us to ask these questions through the eyes of EastWest movers themselves. Though perhaps fulfilling economic expectations by moving West, they also bear the brunt of negative social and political reactions to their presence in new host countries. If their experiences are not positive, then the EU integration process after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements as theorised by the Commission and scholars alike is not likely to run as smoothly as predicted. For they are as are the internal movers surveyed in the rest of the book the real life, flesh and bone avatars of the broad macro-processes of European integration theorized by others. Their similarities to and their differences from the West European intra-EU movers will thus provide a very good guide to the prospects of intra-EU movement in a wider, more inclusive Europe (see also Favell and Elrick 2008).
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METHODS AND DATA

In Autumn 2004, 40 in-depth interviews were carried out with Polish and Romanian migrants in the five PIONEUR countries. Poland is the largest new accession country, and a major net supplier of labour to the West; Romania was at that moment the largest of the candidate countries (excepting Turkey), and had signed a number of pre-accession and visa-free travel agreements. These rights were particularly seen as worrisome for the West, because of Romanias large Roma population and slow adaptation to the EU acquis. The worries have not abated with Romanias eventual accession as a full EU member in 2007. The migrants interviewed were residents with a legal work contract who had been residing in the host country for at least one year and no longer than ten years at the time of interview. Eight interviews were conducted in each country: four with Poles, four with Romanians. In each setting, one high-skilled woman and one high-skilled man (with university/college degree) as well as one low-skilled woman and one low-skilled man were included in the sample. For internal comparative purposes, the sample was deliberately skewed towards high-skilled movers: in fact, more than half of the population in Poland and Romania do not hold university/college degrees. In several of the models, though, it is assumed that higher-skilled talented people are more likely to move (Borjas 1999; Csed 2008). Respondents were found through a mixed range of snowball strategies: through expatriate associations, Polish/Romanian churches, online networks, consulates and personal networks. These loose procedures were in fact needed to fill all the categories in question; it was deemed important to get hold of interesting, individual cases who might exemplify and embody some of the archetypal experiences or mechanisms at work in this migration. Interviews were almost all conducted by native speakers and co-nationals at the interviewees home, workplace or in public, lasting between one and two hours, and were fully transcribed and translated into English for analysis. Questions were asked about the same wide range of issues as for West European movers. What will concern us here are the migrants subjective experiences of moving, their motivation, the barriers they encountered, their employment, their experiences of housing, bureaucracy and public services in the host country, their self-reported assessment of their own mobility in relation to their initial aspirations and expectations, and their experience of the host population in terms of reception, integration and discrimination. The questionnaire followed a broadly similar pattern to the qualitative pilot study interviews done
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with Western EU movers, although in practice it was more loosely structured (see Appendix C). A contrast and comparison can be made between these interviews. It was initially thought that some kind of systematic content analysis might be viable, but the interviews offered a more varied, uneven set of findings that made this impractical and counterproductive. In fact, with semi-structured interviews that sometimes go off in highly interesting yet personalised directions, it makes as much sense to focus on them as individualized narratives or voices, illustrating and embodying broader trends that could be found across and within the populations in question. Individual examples are particularly good for identifying case-specific mechanisms producing certain outcomes that may add up in aggregate terms to a structural pattern or trend. The work done here is broadly analogous to the interviewing and analysis strategy used by Favell (2008a) in his study of internal West European professional migrants, minus the more city-focused context and interview selection procedures. The sample allows therefore for interesting contrasts and comparisons across class and education, gender, nationality and age. The goal here essentially is to typologize, identifying archetypes in which particular variables might be relevant to certain examples of migrant. The chapter should be read as a pilot study, offering pointers to future research on the new pioneers in Europe.
EXCLUSION AND EXPLOITATION: STORIES OF THE NEW PIONEERS

The analysis of our findings leads to a mass of quite complicated observations about the subjective experiences and objective social trajectories of the migrants in question. Here we group some of the most salient findings under a number of headings, before in each case offering a broader discussion of their significance. Crossing Borders is Easy but Settlement Abroad is Hard, and Discrimination is Perceived by Many For all the EastWest migrants, the main barriers to integration in the country of residence are formal papers, that is, formal residence and work permits. The problem lies in finding a place to stay and a job rather than in crossing borders. Many migrants entered legally (for example, on a tourist visa) but went into illegality for varied periods. Prior to EU enlargement, there was no great difference here between Poles and Romanians, and the
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incomplete accession procedures in the majority of member states has left it that way. Due to continuing restrictions on free movement for Poles, the difference between Poles and Romanians in terms of their perceived difficulty of settling in are not pronounced. It should be noted that all the informants moved to the PIONEUR countries before enlargement, but the interviews took place after May 2004. The problems shared by our Polish and Romanian interviewees over formal procedures centred on difficulties reported in association with the respective national bureaucracies that is, getting papers of all sorts and finding a regular job. Also, in most countries, they encountered specific regulated labour markets in varied sectors where Eastern European diplomas are not recognized. The formal EU enlargement as yet makes no difference to the perceived relative value of East European education, even if in many cases it compares favourably in quality to that of Western Europe. The differences here with intra-EU West European migrants are thus still striking. Let us look at Marias trajectory that is representative of many others to breathe life into these findings. Maria is a 26-year-old who came to Italy after finishing business school in Poland. When she could not find a job with Andersen consulting or any other large multinational corporations in Warsaw, she decided to move to Bologna as an au pair to improve her language skills. During that year she met her fianc. When it became clear that there was still no amazing job awaiting her in Warsaw, she decided to move in with him in his native Southern town. And then the hard part began, she says, about the professional path that followed. Her first job was doing some office work in a call centre.
Maria: The job was really great, well paid and very interesting. Yes, they were interested in my working for them, because of my education, foreign languages, skills etc. But it came out that employing me wasnt that simple. I didnt have a residence permit. I just didnt have it. Thats why I couldnt be employed. Interviewer: So you were on a tourist visa . . . Maria: I was still on a tourist visa then, of course. Well, what to do? The circle closes. As you dont have a residence permit, you cant be employed. You cant be employed as you dont have a residence permit. You wont get a residence permit, if youre not employed.
So after just one month, it turned out that Marias new employers couldnt keep her. The immigration quotas for secretaries and translators were exhausted, and Maria could not regularize her situation. She then found a position in the sewing room of a garment factory.
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The whole thing started once again. Do you have a tax code? This is the equivalent of Polish NIP. I didnt. [. . .] No, we cant do it this way. We can take only the foreigners who already have a residence permit. So I say But how can I get a residence permit, if nobody wants to employ me, goddammit?! I dont know, but were a cooperative and we cant take you, because we have controls here all the time. If they found you, you know, with your situation . . . I cant employ you. Im really sorry, because youre a good worker. When you have a residence permit, please come back. If I have a residence permit, I will surely work as a needlewoman. I thanked him, took my salary and I was left out in the cold again.
Maria next took on a job as an in-house carer for an elderly noblewoman. This time it was her who left the job after a few weeks: The countess started to be really troublesome. I even started to fear for my health. Soon her boyfriend arranged work in a restaurant with a bowling alley for her, still without a work contract. When Maria attempted once more to regularize her situation under Italys lenient regularization campaigns, asking her employer to apply for the necessary papers, he said: What for? Youll be soon in the European Union, so you wont need a residence permit.
It was difficult to convince him, but in the end he filled in the application form. I had to pay 800 euros. It was a fee an employer had to pay for an employment, but in reality no employer did it. If a foreigner wanted a job, he wouldnt eat to have the money to buy his freedom. Like in the apartheid, like in the slavery. You were buying your freedom for 800 euros. So I paid it with the rest of the money I had, the savings I brought from Poland . . . It was horrible in that job. I was humiliated, I was treated like an inferior being . . . I was treated in a horrible way, including sexual harassment [pause] . . . in a workplace. But as I really wanted to get that residence permit, I had to endure it.
After having waited for almost one year continuing to work under terrible conditions, no weekends, no holidays and an unpleasant workplace Maria found out that her employer had simply ignored the letter he had received from the questura. He didnt want to retrospectively pay the taxes for those ten months Maria had already been working with him illegally. After several fights and much back and forth, Maria finally signed a part-time contract with her bosss wife (to work full-time of course), and received her work permit. Now she says:
At this moment I swear Im happy. Im a happy person . . . At this moment Im consistently going ahead. My main goal now is to find a better job, with a higher salary, to improve a little my standard of living, to find a bigger apartment, to have a normal family. Because everyone wants that.
Marias case shows how difficult it can be for these external movers to obtain a work/residence permit, even when they are highly skilled. In
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general, there are stark differences among the EastWest movers in the difficulties they experience when trying to get their papers together, finding housing and trying to find a regular job. These depend clearly on educational/skill level. Moving and settling is much easier for better-educated or higher-skilled people, regardless of whether they are Polish or Romanian. Net of this factor, moving and settling is easier for Poles, and easiest in Britain. However, (perceived) discrimination is a factor everywhere, even for the Poles. It appears strongest in Italy, followed by Spain and France (where they are more likely to be viewed as clandestine). The majority even among Poles feel they are the second-class citizens of Europe, as one Polish high-skilled woman put it. We are . . . a lower race, second category . . . We are just Poles, workers, says another, who is in a lowskilled category. They report encountering discrimination in finding jobs and housing, verbal attacks and strange looks, and talking behind their back.
Maybe if I were English, they wouldnt have treated me like that. If I were German. Generally Poles are treated worse. Poles, Albanians, Romanians, Russians, Ukrainians. These are lower nations. These are poor nations that migrate for economic reasons, to better their standard of living. Englishmen dont need to do it. Dutch and other so-called rich nations neither. Thats why the attitude towards us is very racist, very discriminatory in many situations. [High-skilled Polish woman in Italy] The worst thing is . . . I have realised how [pause] . . . xenophobic are the people here. I did not wait [expect] that . . . Not so much in professional life, but I say to you also in private life. [High-skilled Polish woman in Spain]
There is, on the whole, less discrimination perceived in Britain (where migrants feel more valued) and Germany (where they are often recognized as legitimate co-ethnics). Note that many Polish and Romanian migrants in Germany in fact hold Aussiedler status.
I honestly tell you that I was never hurt since I have been here. I often said . . . I dont know, I hear so many negative issues, so many things . . . [but] I was never hurt. Not at work, not here where I live . . . If in the morning, if I had a very high temperature and I gave Mrs X [her landlady] a call and she came upstairs . . . And I had backache she immediately called the doctor on call, he came, gave me an injection into my back. Things like that. [Low-skilled Romanian man in Germany]
It is interesting to note that feeling discriminated against comes with a certain level of cultural acquaintance and language skills. Once you know your way around, and are able to interact, you are more likely to notice
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things. For many of those who have little or no connection with the host society, they note only the superficial friendliness of the host community.
Respondent: Me personally . . . maybe if I understood the language I am sure I have been in such a situation before [a discriminatory situation] but I simply did not understand. Interviewer: But in such ordinary situations, when you go shopping do you feel that you are treated differently? Respondent: No, no. [Low-skilled Polish woman in Britain]
The fact that jobs pull in migrants regardless of the EU governance structures suggests a more informal labour market governed process than one controlled by a well-managed EU migration system. It is interesting to note, however, that this free market scenario perhaps does not persist over time. Migrants can experience exclusionary reactions from the host society, and inclusionary mechanisms linked to the EU status of the sending country can become more relevant over time, particularly in the difficult settlement process faced by migrants. The EastWest migration system is thus a short-term market-based system, limited by longer-term political and sociological effects. Discrimination is a factor of sociological exclusion, but it is arguably a secondary phenomenon. Whatever the case, this is certainly not free movement in a unified European space, and nor is it free movement in a policy vacuum: the distinctions in labour market regulation and effects of sociological exclusion between countries of reception suggest that national differences continue to be more important over time than the general EU frame. Negative experiences vary a lot across the sample, although higher-skilled migrants are clearly better off in this respect. Not all External Movers Move for Economic Reasons; Few Experience Upward Social Mobility and Many Experience Downward Mobility The inclusion of East and Central European movers in a wider Europe poses questions about the political economy of such migration of the following kind. How does the market work to select people to fill jobs, and what difference do certain policies make? Are they the proverbial brightest and best, or are they mismatched to the jobs they find? Is their move a success? And who reaps the net benefits the country of origin or country of reception, or both? These questions may help us work out whether the market-governed system in question tends to be more exploitative or liberational in its character. For the market to work (according to theory), migrants have to move with economic motives that is, calculating in economic terms to reap certain benefits. On the whole, all the Poles, without exception, seem to
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have moved on this basis: to buy a house back home, to support their family, to have a better life and so forth. A Polish driver in Britain says:
Interviewer: Respondent: Why did you decide to move abroad? What were the reasons? Above all, money. One says: money cannot bring you luck, but without it the situation was just tragic. Especially when you have a family to support, having no money is terrible. Unfortunately, the situation in Poland was simply awful and it was getting even worse. Therefore I was forced to migrate. [Low-skilled Polish man in Britain]
Among Romanians, only the less-educated could be said to have moved with these kinds of clear material motivations uppermost. Romanians instead reported that they moved: (a) to escape the political situation at home:
Respondent: We left, left immediately after the revolution. Thus, I could say that there had been political problems before the revolution. You couldnt, could not say what you were thinking, during that time before the revolution. Well, you could not dare to say what you wanted to say because there were . . . You would have immediately been sent to prison. And this was a reason to say: let us leave? [Pause] Was this important? Ahm [pause] . . . In the first place for my husband. Because he was of Romanian origin and he, ahm . . . had problems, some political problems because he often said things which you were not allowed to say and they interrogated him then. He was ordered to come to the police a few days afterwards, and they interrogated him about some issues, you did not know where, ahm, they have heard it from . . . You worked with your colleagues and maybe you said something which for you . . . you didnt notice . . . Those issues werent so important, not big ones, but the Securitate was very harsh . . . especially with Saxons. Such it was. This is the truth. [Low-skilled Romanian woman in Germany]
Interviewer: Respondent:
or (b) for romantic reasons:

I came here to get married. I met somebody from here and we considered that it would be better for both of us to come and live here. [Low-skilled Romanian woman in Britain]
or (c) or to claim the Aussiedler status in Germany:

It is very clear that if my wife was not, ahm, a German, and we went to any other country, it would be more difficult for us. Well, ahm, what Germany did, well, at least for the Aussiedler, but even for others, too . . . I think that there
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are not many countries doing this. I think so! And, ahm, you had to understand some issues because nobody was waiting for you with open arms. I told you at the beginning, as a Romanian I actually didnt have great expectations. It was much harder for the Germans from Romania. Thus, they were, ahm, Germans in Romania and here they are Romanians. [High-skilled Romanian man in Germany]
For high-skilled movers from both countries of origin, the utilitarian reasons for migration were thus often supplemented by secondary motives such as having new cultural experiences, learning a new language, having an adventure and so on. The migrants thus generally actively chose a particular country of reception (that is, there were additional cultural reasons for migrating to one or other PIONEUR country). Low-skilled migrants often ended up in a host country by chance (especially in France), via agencies (especially Britain), because of special citizenship provisions (Germanys Aussiedler policy), or because an acquaintance provided them with a job (for example, in Spain, where it is perceived to be easy to get by as an illegal immigrant and ultimately get legalized).
I knew that it is Europas only country where it is possible to do . . . the residence, out of [apart from] Italy. In Italy it is possible to do the same thing. They do the papers to you . . . Since there I had the possibility . . . I knew a few friends and I was thinking that I was going to have great help of their part . . . [Highskilled Romanian man in Spain]
In all these cases, where a strict economic match is not taking place between the migrants expectations and the receiving host countrys labour needs, we can expect distortions in the labour market outcomes that will be seen in various negative outcomes, either in terms of the net benefits on either side of the migration, hostility in the host countrys reactions, or negative experiences among the migrants. One indication of these outcomes is the prevalent downward social mobility experienced by migrants. Very few have had clear personal betterment in employment status through their migration, even if they are positive about other aspects such as salary. A Romanian woman who previously held a skilled job in Romania now works as a kitchen help in an old-peoples home. She says:
I had, ahm, had, ahm, worked at a comprehensive secondary school and a technical veterinary school in Romania. I had a good job. But here I had the possibility to, to send my children to school, each of them to gain a profession. [. . .] It is much better than in Romania. Well, with the salary you get here, you can afford to live, to pay the rent . . . Of course, we, ahm, are working much
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more, ahm, with mechanical instruments. Thats it [laughs]. But, ahm, with the salary you earn you can afford to live a much better life [pause] . . . To afford much more than at the time . . . ahm, with the respective salary you got there in Romania. [Low-skilled Romanian woman in Germany]
There are many stories of diplomas not being recognized, and of higherskilled movers especially women taking up unskilled jobs in EU15 countries, such as care for the elderly, working as a kitchen helper and the like. Our very first example above, Maria, is a graphic case. In addition, relative to where they came from, Poles seem more fond of their home country than Romanians and often also more disappointed with the moving experience.
In Polish culture . . . Poland as a value. Poland as my blood . . . Do you understand? Poland . . . for me the white eagle is the white eagle. I have it always in a jacket label. These are things . . . I feel Polish. I was born Polish and I will die Polish. [High-skilled Polish man in Italy]
Several migrants reported being resigned to Western European class structures, and their inability to move up within them. Having rejoiced over higher pay (compared with Poland or Romania) in the beginning, they soon realized that the cost of living is also higher in the West, and that society is also more stratified than in Central and Eastern Europe (that is, the formerly communist societies they knew). Many migrants thus seemed to experience discrimination not due to their nationality but due to their class position.
I changed a couple of jobs, but I cannot complain. Of course, the prices are much higher here, but one gets also decent money. You cannot do many things with the money that you get, but at least you have a normal life . . . Ehh, you know these things, of course. Nobody tells you to your face, they are not crazy, come on. [But] You see them . . . I guess . . . They look at you as if you were a piece of shit. I do not know . . . You know how these things go . . . Or maybe not [to the interviewer] Cause you are student, you are dottore [short giggle] . . . You are dottorato, isnt it? [Low-skilled Romanian man in Italy]
Conversely, the success stories are found among the highly skilled, particularly where they hold Western university degrees. Below, we cite a Romanian medical doctor in the UK with a PhD from Oxford. Similar statements were made by a Polish man who holds a French engineering degree, and by a Romanian with an MBA from Cyprus.
I found relatively easy a job in a good hospital because, maybe, I had already a PhD degree awarded by the University of Oxford, but I think that it would have
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been different if I would have only my Romanian diploma. I also had to pass a test, called PLAB, in order to have my medical degree recognized here. I am convinced that although the system tries to be impartial, the candidates from the UK are preferred, and even among them there is a hierarchic preference system regarding the school of medicine they graduated. I wanted to find a position in a certain specialisation [plastic surgery] but this was achieved with a lot of effort because a candidate from a foreign country has to be two times or three times better than a candidate from this country. [High-skilled Romanian woman in Britain]
But upward social mobility is also reported by some of those married to a EU15 country national or by some who worked their way up:
So, weve achieved . . . Today, I can say that weve achieved things we would have never achieved in Poland, you understand? [High-skilled Polish man in Italy]
Some do feel recognized in the country of reception:

In France we are taken into consideration because we are a good working force, arent we? They need us. We dont have health assurance; we arent paid for holidays, for vacations and so on. So we are very good workers. And if you make them some problems, they can send you home. So for these reasons, I think we are taken into consideration here. [Low-skilled Romanian man in France]
These findings indicate that the free labour market is working, but in biased ways cultural affinities and non-economic motivations introduce distortions in the matching process. The system will be inefficient if only the Western educated are successful. It will also be a big problem for the Panglossian ideal promoted by the European Commission if these most talented dont go back, along the lines of the dreaded brain drain outcome. Those who are Eastern educated are most liable to be blocked, undervalued and thus exploited when they move especially in highly regulated labour markets. For example, to be a plumber in Germany you need several professional exams and membership of the guild of plumbers, and you cannot just open your own company, even with 20 years of work experience. Similar problems exist in other countries.
Interviewer: Respondent: Do you believe that . . . that your qualifications has served you to find work here? No, not for nothing . . . To obtain something, I need to be employed at two low works do you understand? And I cannot work as electrician. I know how to do many things, know masonry, know painting, gardening, plastering . . . many things. Many things. But I cannot work. [High-skilled Romanian man in Spain]
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High-level skills alone are not enough: having the right (Western) diplomas is a very heavy burden. The disappointment and frustration experienced among the better placed and qualified (such as our first case, Maria) suggest that the matching process is not so efficient. Their downward mobility suggests that much talent and human capital is being wasted. EastWest migrants are more likely to find themselves in exploitative scenarios, rather than ones in which they fully benefit from their move, even in an integrated EU. Cultural Affinity is no Guarantee of Low Discrimination We might expect that perceived cultural similarity (affinity, that is, between Latin countries) would tend to lead to less experience of discrimination. Decades of sociopsychological research on the so-called similarityaffinity hypothesis have supported this claim. However, this is not the case with the Polish and Romanian migrants interviewed for the PIONEUR project. Cultural similarity between migrant and host population is not a good predictor of levels of perceived discrimination. As noted above, levels of perceived discrimination were highest in Italy and Spain. Yet the perceived (cultural) similarity of Poles and Romanians is also highest in these countries.
I am not sure . . . With Italians, well, they are a little bit like us . . . I do not know, I mean, Latins, you know, not cold and rigid like the Nordics . . . maybe. They are more open, Italians, Latins . . . and then they like football, like us. [Low-skilled Romanian man in Italy]. Spanish people [have] . . . an extraordinary similarity with the Romanian personality . . . They are Europa extremes and so similar as the attitude in front of the life. [They are both] fighters, proud . . . but open minded, the same thing! Its for this reason so many Romanians come here, because they feel very good . . . Not like France . . . The mentality [here] is identical. The temperament. [Highskilled Romanian woman in Spain]
Yet the feeling of discrimination expressed in both Spain and particularly Italy is a constant refrain.
People look at us as if we grew up in Africa. . . . Romania is like . . . bananarepublic . . . and they are scared that we are some kind of savages and that we are going to cheat on them . . . Let me give you an example. For instance when we were looking for a flat. You are from Romania? No, thank you, there are no flats for you. [Low-skilled Romanian man in Italy]
On the other hand, considerable cultural differences are perceived to exist between Romanians and Poles and the Germans or British, with France somewhere in-between.
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Interviewer: Perhaps you tell something about these cultural differences. How is it? Are Polish and German mentalities different or are they similar? How do you see it? Respondent: Different I think. Poles are more open-minded I think. And Germans are more closed and concentrated on themselves and not that spontaneous either. [. . .] Thats a barrier. Interviewer: Are there still other cultural differences? Respondent: [After a pause] . . . There are cultural differences, when church is the point. At our place in Poland church belongs to the everyday life of an average Pole I would say. I dont say every Pole but average Pole. But here it looks differently. Ah, you know in the church . . . Who goes to church here? Nobody. And young people . . . not at all. [High-skilled Polish woman in Germany] Englishmen are nice but its very shallow and I dont like that. For me its too cold and thats why its difficult to integrate. [High-skilled Romanian woman in Britain]
Yet less discrimination at work and in private life is consistently reported in Britain and Germany, as mentioned above. A possible explanation for this phenomenon can be found in social identity theory (Tajfel 1981). Once a respondent feels that his/her in-group (say Poles) and his/her out-group (say Spanish) are similar, an automatic psychological mechanism called in-group favouritism comes into play. The in-group strives to distinguish itself from the out-group and evaluate its own group favourably in order to gain a positive group identity. Where groups are perceived as different, they dont even bother comparing one another. Among our interviewees, there was none of the hostility reported in connection with competition over jobs with existing ethnic and immigrant minorities in post-colonial countries like France or Britain, something that has been picked up in other studies (Garapich 2008). One peculiar finding from the data, however, was a Britain effect: external movers in Britain are, in line with the native population, more sceptical of the EU. Circular Mobility is on the Rise Many of our interviewees especially among the Poles stated that they would like to return home after some years in the COR. Once they have earned enough money, they plan to buy a home there, or be with their families. There could be a connection with the finding that Poles also seem to be more fond of their home country than Romanians:
Well, every Pole builds himself a house in Poland and were building one as well . . . Yes, its almost finished, but sometimes we wonder if we need it. Our children were born here . . . [Low-skilled Polish man in Italy]
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Now everything is a little bit different . . . In fact, I am already here for so long but the whole time I am missing my home and . . . practically I have decided that ahm [pause] . . . that I wont stay here for good, that I just want return to Poland and simply live there. I want to live there because, because I cant imagine to stay here, ahm [pause] . . . and all the time and to miss Poland and my home. [High-skilled Polish woman in Germany]
The main element that makes a move back home feasible seems to be economic development at home. Here, it is clear that the Polish and Romanian migrants are talking of different time spans:
Probably in Poland the things go better in five years. [Things] are going to change and we will be able to return. [High-skilled Polish woman in Spain]
Conversely Romanians, who face a disadvantaged mobility scenario, and are not likely to necessarily be the brightest and best (because of distortions in market selection), are more likely to stay. Many Romanians are not considering going home at all or at least not in the near future.
If the life level is like here, I will return in Romania, of course. But it is not possible for the moment I think. Maybe after ten years, even more . . . [Low-skilled Romanian woman in France]
Yet the migrants dream of quickly making money abroad in order to then go home and be able to afford a better life can be found in our data too (see also Anghel 2008).
I do not know now [who are] the Romanian people who come, but I imagine that they do not come to remain. They come to work and to go away, return to Romania. For what I hear this way, that I know of Romania, they all go away to work, the house to be done, for . . . to fix up, I what I know, but not . . . to remain, none. [High-skilled Romanian woman in Spain]
Also, circular mobility across borders (for example, Poland/Germany) is a well-documented phenomenon. Many Poles living near the border work in Germany for several months a year in order to be able to stay at home. Mobility of this kind is now becoming a routine feature of the European migration systems for both Poles and Romanians (see also Oklski 2001; Morawska 2002).
How do you imagine this work? To work for a month and then return and then again work for a month isnt it? [High-skilled Polish woman in Germany] I and my wife think that nowadays we have to be ready to move, not to stay in the same place for long time. For example, next year we will probably have to go to Brussels because of her job. [High-skilled Romanian man in France]
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There are counter-examples of classic immigrants, however: movers who clearly want to stay in the COR, generally to grant their children a better education/future.
I came for another motive, principally for my son. That I want that he has a free life and there he is not going to have it . . . in a hundred years possibly [laughs] or less, I do not know it but already I will not have age to see it [laughs] . . . I prefer that my son lives through a life . . . normally. There he is not going to have it, at the moment. In the economic sense he had it very well in Romania, very well . . . but not a better future. [High-skilled Romanian woman in Spain]
Many migrants see the price of their mobility as too high, and they eventually want to go back home. There is a high level of dissatisfaction on the topic of the enlargement and all the official rhetoric about becoming European again. Migrants only did it for their families, or to save up for a better life when they come back home. For these reasons, few admit to regretting the choice, and a strong work ethic keeps them going. The idea is to shut up, do your work, and leave as soon as you can. These findings emphasize the increasing development of a circular system of mobility in Europe, rather than one-way immigration; it is more pronounced for Poles than for Romanians. Circular mobility, however, appears to be far from the optimistic predictions envisaged by the European Commission. Rather it appears driven by the short-term exploitation in the West of this labour force, reinforced by formal and informal barriers to settlement that persist and the sense that it will be better for all if they do not stay in the long run. The idealized scenario of a larger and more open labour market appears to be unconvincing in the light of the mismatch of talent to jobs. However, longer-term developmental benefits might be accruing to the sending country because of the return mobility of migrants and their financial circulation. This is less the case for Romania, where it is more likely to be a case of brain drain. Overall, these new migrants find themselves in an exploitative relation with Western Europe, rather than one that benefits both sides as mainstream economists and EU policy makers have hoped.
CONCLUSIONS
Theres a kind of clich here about the foreigner who profits, whos not fair to the game, and so on. So, if we can show that we have 100 000 Euros [in our pocket] to spend on a car and a big house, we do it. Without any hesitation. To show my Polishness. . . Id even put a flag on my car! In that way, I hope Ill be able to put out of my head the fact that somebody who hears my accent thinks Im some kind of parasite. A crook and so on. If I could bring something to
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this country. Hire two, three people, or even more . . . So I must prove something. When I prove it, Ill probably feel better about myself. This is what has happened to me in my professional life. Maybe Ive tried to prove too much. I suspect this willingness to . . . to show that Im better, didnt help me in my professional career. [High-skilled Polish man in France]
The voices of these Eastern movers do not sound much like those of Western intra-EU movers resonating in the rest of this book. While also differing from classic non-European migrants, both Romanians and Poles seem relegated still to secondary roles in the European labour market, that belie the formal EU citizen rights that they now have, or will have one day soon. The new EastWest migration system in Europe appears, in the short term at least, to be market-led, permitting short-term entrance and circular mobility, and to be operational regardless of EU attempts to govern it. It was well established before the first accession of May 2004, and operates for countries both inside and outside the EU (see also Dvell 2005). This applies as much to the highly skilled and educated, although for them very different channels of movement and recruitment may apply. But it is an incomplete market of free movement, that does not resemble the well-governed scenario of EU theorists and policy makers, largely because sharp national differences persist in the reception of migrants, and longerterm barriers of exclusion both institutional and informal still come into play. Where a more openly governed free market does exist (such as in Britain), the economy still offers little incentive for long-term stay and settlement; it takes, gives only short-term benefits to migrants, then spits them out. Britain, as always, offers an alternative in the European context, that works because of its economic asymmetry with the rest of the continent. Others achieve similar outcomes by different means: they maintain more obvious formal barriers, while cashing in wherever possible on informal labour markets (which are more formally recognized than in Britain) such as agriculture, domestic work, construction, small and medium-sized enterprises and low-end service sector work (see Samers 2004; Favell 2008b). There is a kind of equilibrium here, maintaining a stable system. In both Britain and other countries, it is generally an exploitative market, rather than a nakedly exclusionary one except perhaps in the South of Europe, where other cruder kinds of discriminatory mechanisms are used to keep large numbers of new informal migrants out of society. On the other hand, circular migration is taking hold, and it has some positive developmental aspects. But the likelihood is that Western European economies are going to continue to enjoy the benefits of an ethnically orientalized concentric and hierarchical system relating East to West populations, even for those who are now full formal members
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of the Western club, with the same free movement rights and opportunities on paper. There are short-term benefits to be had by national economies from this system, but the mismatch and waste of East and Central European talent and human capital that is encouraged to move, but then kept in secondary labour market positions risks being of dubious utility to Europe as a whole in the long run.
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Appendix A: Methodological notes

Michael Braun and Oscar Santacreu
OVERVIEW OF PROJECT COMPONENTS
The PIONEUR project is based on a mix of methods: primarily, a telephone survey of intra-EU movers, the European Internal Movers Social Survey (EIMSS), coupled with secondary analysis of existing surveys and qualitative interviews with EU internal movers (that is, migrants from Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain who moved to one of the other four countries) and external movers (nationals of Poland and Romania having migrated to the five Western countries included in the PIONEUR study). The methodological approach of the PIONEUR project is innovative in several respects, although certain limitations could not be avoided and should be taken into consideration when interpreting the results. The function of this appendix is thus to outline both the strengths and the weaknesses of the different empirical phases of the project. Several aspects of the project which pose limitations are described further below. In the following we will first give a succinct overview of all the project components and then describe the central part, the EIMSS survey, in more detail. We then conclude by pointing to the main strengths of the project design. The first step of the PIONEUR project consisted of secondary analyses of existing surveys such as the International Social Survey Programme, the Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey. Its aim was to characterize the respective stayer populations and make a list of questions which could also be used for the movers survey. As a second step, in each of the five countries, two qualitative interviews with EU internal movers of each nationality were conducted, that is, with nationals of each of the other four countries who migrated there (giving a total of 40 interviews). The duration of the interviews was mostly between one and one and a half hours. The aim was to get in-depth knowledge of migration experiences and to find out which questions should be asked in the survey. Most of these interviews were conducted by project staff members in either the country of residence language or in English. In addition, in each of the five countries, eight qualitative interviews with external movers were conducted. We selected Polish and Romanian
241
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nationals who had migrated to Western Europe, because these are the only nationalities which represent relatively big groups in all of the five countries where the interviews were conducted. In addition, we wanted to cover respondents from one country which shortly before the interviews became a new member state of the European Union and from one accession candidate country (at that time). A total of 40 interviews were conducted. The duration of the interviews was again mostly between one and one and a half hours. The aim was to get in-depth knowledge of the migration experiences of external movers and to compare them with those of EU internal movers. These interviews were conducted in the Polish or Romanian language by bilingual interviewers who had been especially trained for this purpose by project staff members. The main part of the PIONEUR project consisted of a quantitative survey of EU movers, the European Internal Movers Social Survey (EIMSS), based on a random sample. In each of the five countries, 250 telephone interviews were conducted with nationals of each of the other four countries who had migrated there. This target was reached for all groups but Spanish migrants in Britain, where finding Spanish migrants was particularly difficult for the reasons analysed below. A standardized questionnaire was administered by bilingual interviewers. The average duration of the interviews was slightly less than half an hour. The aim was to collect quantitative information on migration motives and experiences, attitudes towards European identity, political behaviour, media usage and other relevant questions (see Appendix B below).
THE EUROPEAN INTERNAL MOVERS SOCIAL SURVEY (EIMSS)

In the following we will sketch some important methodological decisions in designing and implementing the EIMSS survey and their consequences in more detail, also discussing available alternatives and their potential problems. Defining the Population We defined the population of interest as all migrants from Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain who had moved to one of the other countries between 1974 and 2003, were 18 years or above at the time of migration, and were still living in their respective country of residence in 2004. Thus, it was possible to include migrants who had acquired the citizenship of the country of residence, although our linguistic screening
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of names in constructing the sample (see below) attempted to restrict the sample to those migrants whose original linguistic identity corresponded to their country of origin. Therefore, we excluded the longer-standing Germanic minorities in Italy and France as well as former migrants and their offspring who had returned to the home countries of their parents or grandparents. The population as defined above represents a self-selected stock. Thus, with the collected data, we cannot analyse return migration and we cannot even explicitly account for potential selectivity in the sample due to early return or further migration (to a third country) of migrants with special characteristics when interpreting the results. When we speak about the number of migrants who migrated in a given time period, we thus refer only to those who were still in the countries of residence at the time of the interviews. Moreover, as we have made only one cross-sectional survey, the duration of the sojourn in the country of residence and the period of immigration are necessarily confounded. These facts pose certain limits on the interpretation of the results. Even in official statistics there are characteristic differences in the definition of who is an immigrant (Dumont and Lemaitre 2006; Poulain et al. 2006). Some countries base their figures on the number of people with foreign citizenship. This might include people born in the respective countries to parents with a different citizenship but exclude those born abroad if they have acquired the citizenship of the country of residence (regardless whether that had already happened before, at the time of migration, or later). Other countries identify migrants by place of birth. This includes citizens who lived abroad. The definition used for our study is somewhat in-between these two concepts. Sampling the Population There were a variety of sampling alternatives to begin with. In order to make transparent the decisions finally made, we will briefly discuss some of them before we describe the option selected for the study. As sampling alternatives usually cannot be discussed without reference to the survey mode, we will combine both aspects here. There are different sampling frames that surveys of migrants can be and are typically based on: drawing a sample from a population register; using a random-route procedure with screening for migrants in conjunction with face-to-face interviews; using telephone books or random-digit-dialing procedures or their modern alternatives, the latter again with screening for migrants; and finally, network sampling. We will discuss each of the alternatives in turn.
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Drawing a sample of communities in each country and selecting respondents from the official registers brings with it different disadvantages. As a rule, such registers document citizenship, but not country of origin. As a consequence, naturalized respondents would not have been covered by the survey. While this might perhaps be regarded as a minor problem, given that the incentives for members of the population investigated to become citizens of their countries of residence are relatively low (as they all enjoy nearly full citizenship rights as members of the European Union), the unavailability of registers for migrants in the UK was a major problem for the project and finally led to the exclusion of this option. Random-route strategies seem to be adequate for arriving at a sample of migrants when combined with a screening procedure. However, there is a characteristic drawback with such a strategy, in addition to the immense costs of the screening procedure. Random-route procedures typically select communities as the sampling units at the first stage and use weighting by the number of inhabitants. Unfortunately, there is no reason to assume that the migrant groups we are interested in are distributed proportionally to the entire population of the countries of residence. For surveying the general population, the use of telephone interviews (based on either random-digit-dialing procedures or their modern alternatives), combined with a screening procedure for migrants, might be seen as a better solution. While for some relatively big migrant groups, for example, the Italians in Germany, this might indeed have been a feasible procedure, for tiny groups, such as Spanish in Italy, it would have been extremely costly and time consuming. In this case, more than a 1000 screening interviews would have been necessary to reach one member of the target population. In previous studies, network sampling has been used as a strategy in restricted geographical areas and with only one migrant group in focus. King and Patterson (1998), for instance, used members of churches, social clubs and cultural institutes of the country of origin as middlepersons. However, such a strategy might overrepresent people still strongly connected to their country of origin community. These problems multiply if network sampling is used on a larger scale, using members of the country of origin community as go-betweens, because migrants still integrated in country of origin networks have a higher chance to be selected. Rejecting these other options, the strategy finally selected was combining telephone registers with linguistic information on names. Only telephone entries of private households were considered, excluding firm or organisational addresses. The linguistic information relates to the probability of a name belonging to a given nationality. For this purpose, a statistical analysis of the telephone data from the CD-Roms of national
245
telephone directories was performed. Starting with the telephone directories of the countries of residence, linguistic units that is family and Christian names were ordered by frequency. The different distributions of frequencies between different geographical regions were taken into consideration. However, some problematic regions were excluded, such as Alsace and Lorraine in France and Trentino-Alto Adige in Italy, due to their high number of names not immediately identifiable linguistically with the host country. Only names which appeared with relatively high frequency were considered in the following. For each country, these most frequent names were determined by high frequency in at least one of the regions. The resulting list was manually checked by experts in each of the five countries, to reduce the probability of picking up names not immediately associated with the national country of origin (for example, Turkish names in Germany or Italian names in France). For all of the country of origin/country of residence sub-samples, names were eliminated if they were also frequent in the other countries (for example, Maria, which is very frequent in Spain, Germany and Italy). Probabilities of belonging to a given ethnicity were calculated for each telephone entry, taking into account the occurence of first names and family names in the country of origin. If one of the linguistic units, that is, first names and family names, is also associated with other countries than the country of origin, the probability attached is correspondingly lower. Admittedly, this strategy has its own problems. First, undercoverage problems result from the fact that only those individuals for whom there is an entry in a telephone directory could be included in the sample. Unfortunately, those not listed might not be so at random. One important group which might be particularly underrepresented are women migrants married to male nationals of the country of residence. We tried to mitigate this effect by including a small additional network-sampling component in our design, asking respondents for telephone numbers of women married to male nationals of the country of residence. This procedure is warranted, as alternative sampling frames would all have posed more severe problems for the countries of residence selected. Fortunately, analysis of the data we have collected also suggests that women from our migrant groups often do have a (joint) entry in the telephone directory. Questionnaire Development, Translation and Pre-Tests Questionnaire construction was based on the results of the secondary analysis of existing data bases, and on the results of the qualitative interviews with EU movers. The secondary analysis indicated a number of theoretically important and technically not especially problematic items
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from the Eurobarometer surveys and the European Social Survey. At the end of the qualitative interviews, a larger number of closed questions were administered in the form of a paper-and-pencil questionnaire, and those questions which fulfilled their purpose were considered for inclusion in the survey. Sociodemographic items were mainly taken from the ESS in order to increase comparability at the analysis stage. However, several demographic questions had to be constructed specially for the survey, as did the larger part of the attitudinal and behavioural questions. The latter were suggested by the results of the qualitative interviews. Questions were discussed, tinkered with and decided upon at two meetings of the project group. In designing the questionnaire as a strictly collaborative effort we also made sure that the questions we asked our respondents were relevant and comprehensible to all groups of migrants in all of the countries involved. Translations of questions and items taken from the Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey were taken unchanged from the respective national versions, even if their formulations could have been improved. The potential it gave us for comparing the mover to the stayer populations was too important to compromise. Translation of the remaining items followed a committee approach recommended in the most recent literature on translation of survey instruments, which in most cases involved bilingual survey experts but not professional translators. Back-translation was avoided due to its dubious record of securing equal understanding of meaning. Translations were rather double-checked by project partners in different countries. Pre-tests were conducted in all countries with members of all migrant groups. The results of these pre-tests led to some modification of the questionnaire, in particular in the introductory part (for example, approaching the household and respondent selection). Fielding The survey was scheduled to start in early May 2004 and should have been concluded by the date of the European election on 10 June 2004. Ideally all institutes should have started at the same time. Due to problems with some field institutes, this could not be achieved. In particular, considerable problems were encountered by the French field institute which was commissioned to do the survey in Britain. These problems probably had a variety of reasons. First, the quality of the telephone directory for Britain was obviously lower than those in other countries, due to the structure of the telecommunications market there. Second, Britain seems to have attracted a much higher number of migrants with Spanish names, but
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who did not originate in Spain (that is, in Britain many Spanish names belonged in fact to people from South America). Third, some of the interviewers might not have had the necessary proficiency in English, which could cause problems during the contact phase with non-native household members answering the phone. As a consequence, the field institute was changed, and the institute in charge of the interviews in Germany was commissioned to conduct the remaining interviews in Britain. These were then successfully achieved. In addition, the institute ran short of addresses for migrants in Britain. Therefore, additional respondents had to be recruited via network sampling outside of the telephone interviews. A total of 62 (out of 1000) interviews were realised with this alternative source of telephone numbers. Gender quotas should have been filled by recruiting additional respondents (that is, women married to male nationals of the country of residence) via network sampling in telephone interviews. However, in all of the countries, only a handful of interviews were in the end based on the network sample. In fact, there was generally no difficulty in filling the gender quotas in the regular course of conducting the telephone interviews. Therefore, we might be confident that we avoided two problems: underrepresenting women married to male nationals of the country of residence, as well as overrepresenting women. While the field period of the German survey ended in the second half of June, in France, Italy, and Spain this was achieved in August or September, and the British survey was only finally completed in early 2005. Evaluating the Sample Non-response bias in EIMSS is nearly impossible to quantify compared to population surveys where one can assume that the vast majority of those who refused belong to the target population. In our case, the target sample was much smaller than the contacted sample, even where the screening of national linguistic identities had worked perfectly. The reasons are that we restricted our population to those who came to their respective country of residence after 1973 and were 18 or older at the time of settlement, which is a much smaller group. Consequently, as we do not know who among the contacted persons was actually a member of our population, there is no straightforward way to measure response rates. Both potential respondents who could not be contacted and those who refused (including household members refusing on behalf of the migrant) might not be part of our population at all. If we assume that those who eventually refused did this relatively early during the contact phase of the interview, it might be that they did not even reach the point where we informed them of our definition of the population.
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Under this optimistic assumption, we only need to consider as nonresponse a proportion of those who could not be contacted or who refused. This proportion could be determined by the number of those who explicitly gave the information that no member of the household fitted our definition of the target population. Unfortunately, the field institutes used different accounting and reporting schemas, and there are huge differences in the detail provided. Comparison of the German EIMSS Data with Data from Official Statistics Another possibility for evaluating the quality of the EIMSS data is to compare distributions of demographic variables to official statistics. In Germany the EIMSS data can be compared to the anonymized 70 per cent sub-sample of the microcensus 2004 (ZUMA-File). Since the information of the time of migration was voluntary, there is only a limited number of cases which can be used for this comparison. Overall, 19.8 per cent of the migrants possessing British, French, Italian or Spanish citizenship did not reveal the year in which they came to Germany. In addition, the microcensus is administered in German only, which might contribute to the lower quality of the data for migrants. In the following, we compare the distributions of gender, marital status, age, age at migration, migration period, education and employment status between the EIMSS study conducted in Germany and the German microcensus data. Table A.1 compares the gender distributions of EIMSS and microcensus 2004 data. Presented here are three columns per nationality. The first column shows the percentages of men and women in EIMSS, the second one the official data of the microcensus (MZ). It turns out that there are only slight differences, except for the case of Spanish in Germany. In this case men are overrepresented by 13.9 percentage points in the EIMSS data. The second variable used to evaluate the quality of the sample is marital status (Table A.2). For most national groups there is a general overrepresentation of the married and an underrepresentation particularly of the never married in the EIMSS sample. This former difference is especially pronounced for Spanish (12.7 percentage points) and Italians (9.1 percentage points). The comparison between the age distributions of the EIMSS and the microcensus shows an overrepresentation of Italians and Spanish in the 4059 age group (12 percentage points for the Italians and 20.3 percentage points for the Spanish) as well as an underrepresentation for 1839-yearolds of a comparable amount (Table A.3). No notable deviation from the microcensus was found for the British and French in EIMSS.
Table A.1
English EIMSS 63.4 36.6 59.5 40.5 3.9 23.9 53.9 46.1 59.0 41.0 25.1 5.1 52.6 47.4 MZ Diff. EIMSS MZ Diff. EIMSS MZ 38.7 61.3 Italian Spanish
Comparison between EIMSS and microcensus: gender
French
EIMSS
MZ
Diff.
Diff. 13.9 213.9
Male Female
45.9 54.1
42.8 57.2
3.1 23.1
Source:
Microcensus and EIMSS, N 5 6 109
249 English Diff. 5.2 22.4 20.1 22.7 67.3 9.8 1.6 21.3 67.0 8.4 3.5 21.1 0.3 1.4 21.9 0.2 EIMSS MZ Diff. EIMSS 84.3 2.8 1.2 11.8 Italian MZ 75.2 6.2 2.3 16.3 Diff. 9.1 23.4 21.1 24.5 EIMSS 69.7 5.2 2.0 23.1 Spanish MZ 57.0 7.5 1.1 34.4 Diff. 12.7 22.3 0.9 211.3
Table A.2
Comparison between EIMSS and microcensus: marital status
French
EIMSS
MZ
Married Divorced Widowed Never married
57.2 7.2 1.6 34.0
52.0 9.6 1.7 36.7
Source:
Table A.3
English Diff. 34.6 59.1 6.3 34.4 58.1 7.5 0.2 1.0 21.2 31.1 63.8 5.1 42.4 51.8 5.8 EIMSS MZ Diff. EIMSS MZ Italian Diff. 211.3 12.0 20.7
Comparison between EIMSS and microcensus: age

Spanish EIMSS 38.3 56.9 4.7 MZ 59.1 36.6 4.3 Diff. 220.8 20.3 0.4
French
EIMSS
MZ
250
1839 4059 601
54.5 43.1 2.4
55.0 43.2 1.7
20.5 20.1 0.7
Source:
251
Concerning age at the time of migration, the congruence between the EIMSS sample and the microcensus is good, especially for the British and the French (Table A.4). The mean deviations for the Italians and Spaniards are some 5 percentage points on average, showing a slight overrepresentation of the younger (29 years old at time of migration). Concerning the period of migration, Table A.5 shows that the French and the British in the EIMSS sample match the microcensus data very well. However, there is an overrepresentation of Italians and Spaniards who migrated between 1974 and 1983, as well as an underrepresentation of these groups in the most recent period (19932003). The variable education shows a slight overrepresentation of people with a higher education in the EIMSS data, especially for the French (Table A.6). With regard to employment status, Table A.7 shows very small differences for the French and intermediate differences for the Italians, while the overrepresentation of working respondents in the EIMSS data is more considerable for the Spanish (11.7 percentage points). The remaining divergence between the EIMSS sample and the microcensus could be due to the method of collecting the data, to the quality of the telephone books used in the respective countries of residence and to the processes dealing with lack of availability and non-response, which are to be considered in telephone surveys generally. Santacreu, Rother and Braun (2006) discuss this in more detail.
THE METHODOLOGICAL STRENGTHS OF THE PROJECT

There are a variety of strengths of the PIONEUR project which might warrant characterizing it as path-breaking. First, we used random samples of the respective migrant populations, whereas the vast majority of migration studies are qualitative and pay little attention to representativity. Second, we conducted our study in different countries, whereas most previous migration research has been restricted to one country of residence only. Thus, after applying the necessary caution, we can analyse questions such as whether migrants originating from the same country fare better in some than in other countries of residence, or whether migrants from some countries in general fare better than others. Third, and more importantly, we analysed the same migrant groups in the different countries of residence in a comparable way: we used random samples of the respective migrant populations drawn according to the same sampling schema, used the same questionnaire and the same kind of interviewers (bilinguals in
Table A.4
English EIMSS 52.8 33.1 9.8 4.3 53.7 31.7 9.7 4.8 20.9 1.4 0.1 20.5 78.0 15.7 3.9 2.4 69.1 21.0 6.8 3.0 8.9 25.3 22.9 20.6 71.5 23.3 4.3 0.8 MZ Diff. EIMSS MZ Diff. EIMSS MZ 62.4 32.3 2.2 3.2 Italian Spanish
Comparison between EIMSS and microcensus: age at migration
French
EIMSS
MZ
Diff.
Diff. 9.1 29.0 2.1 22.4
< 29 3039 4049 501
69.0 24.3 5.1 1.6
69.9 24.5 3.9 1.7
20.9 20.2 1.2 20.1
Source:
252 English Diff. 7.1 26.2 20.9 30.7 28.7 40.6 30.0 31.3 38.8 0.7 22.6 1.8 EIMSS MZ Diff. EIMSS 46.5 32.3 21.3 Italian MZ 29.9 37.5 32.5 Diff. 16.6 25.2 211.2 EIMSS 41.9 22.9 35.2 Spanish MZ 24.7 18.3 57.0 Diff. 17.2 4.6 221.8
Table A.5
Comparison between EIMSS and microcensus: period of migration
French
EIMSS
MZ
197483 198493 199403
26.3 23.1 50.6
19.2 29.3 51.5
Source:
Table A.6
English Diff. 29.4 210.5 19.9 31.5 17.1 51.4 38.0 17.8 44.1 26.5 20.7 7.3 72.6 21.0 6.3 79.1 11.8 9.1 26.5 9.2 22.8 50.8 17.5 31.7 EIMSS MZ Diff. EIMSS MZ Diff. EIMSS MZ 43.5 16.5 40.0 Italian Spanish Diff. 7.3 1.0 28.3
Comparison between EIMSS and microcensus: education
French
EIMSS
MZ
<High school High school >High school
18.2 13.8 68.0
27.6 24.3 48.1
Source:
253 English Diff. 21.5 1.5 78.7 21.3 73.6 26.4 5.1 25.1 EIMSS MZ Diff. EIMSS 73.6 26.4 Italian MZ 66.0 34.0 Diff. 7.6 27.6 EIMSS 75.1 24.9 Spanish MZ 63.4 36.6 Diff. 11.7 211.7
Table A.7
Comparison between EIMSS and microcensus: employment status
French
EIMSS
MZ
Working Not working
71.4 28.6
72.9 27.1
Source:
254
the country of origin and country of residence languages) and the same interviewer instructions. Fourth, we used the qualitative study of EU internal migrants both for the preparation of the quantitative survey and for the comparison with the external migrants. Fifth, we included migrants who have acquired citizenship of the country of residence, as this is a potentially important indicator of integration.
Appendix B: EIMSS questionnaire (English version)

NOTE: INTERVIEWERS ARE REQUIRED TO READ ANSWERS ONLY WHEN INDICATED AFTER THE QUESTION
SECTION 1:
SCREENING QUESTIONS
1.0) Good morning/afternoon/evening! My name is xxx. Im calling from [university/research centre/survey institute]. We are conducting a research project for the European Union on [target home country nationals] living in [destination country]. I would like to talk to a person in your household who has or had [target home country] citizenship and came to [destination country] as an adult between 1974 and 2003. Do you or does anybody in your household belong to this group? yes, just me 1.1 yes, more persons 1.0a no exit formula 1.0a) Could I talk to the person who had his/her birthday most recently? not me, but person is coming 1.1a its me 1.1 not available now set appointment not available within fieldtime refuses doesnt understand no one belongs to this group no private household
255
256
1.1) We would like to ask you about your opinions on life in [destination country] as an EU citizen who is living here. Could you spare a few moments to take part in our interview? start in COR language start in COO language 1.1a) Good morning/afternoon/evening! My name is xxx. Im calling from [university/research centre/survey institute]. We are conducting a research project for the European Union on [target home country nationals] living in [destination country]. We would like to ask you about your opinions on life in [destination country] as an EU-citizen who is living here. Could you spare a few moments to take part in our interview? start in COR language start in COO language no start . . . 1.2) In which year did you settle in [destination country]?
Interviewer: If asked, specify that respondent is eligible if s/he has his/her principal or secondary residence in [destination country] and lives in [destination country] on a permanent or regular basis (at least 6 months a year) _____________
(source: new)
FILTER (AUTOMATIC): If respondent came to [destination country] before 1974 or after 2003 ASK: I am sorry, Sir/Madam, but you are not part of our target group but is there anybody else in your household who has or had [target home country] citizenship and settled as an adult in [destination country] after 1973 and before 2004? Yes No Could I talk to this person please? 1.1a I am sorry but no one in your household is part of our target group. Have a nice day/evening!
Appendix B: EIMSS questionnaire
257
1.3) In what year were you born? _____________

(source: ESS F3)
FILTER (AUTOMATIC): If respondent is born after 1985 or did not come to [destination country] as an adult. EXIT FORMULA: I am sorry, Sir/Madam, but you are not part of our target group but is there anybody else in your household who has or had [target home country] citizenship and settled as an adult in [destination country] after 1973 and before 2004? Yes No Could I talk to this person please? 1.1a I am sorry but no one in your household is part of our target group. Have a nice day/evening!
SECTION 2:
FAMILY ORIGIN AND MIGRATION HISTORY
We would first like to know something about your family and personal history. 2.0) What citizenship do you hold now? multiple answers possible
Interviewer:
German British French Spanish Italian Citizenship of other EU country US citizenship Other (Dont know)
(source: new)
258
2.1)
What citizenship or citizenships does or did your father hold? Multiple answers possible
Interviewer:
(source: new)
2.2)
What is the highest level of education your father has achieved?
Not completed primary education Primary education GCSEs A or AS Levels GNVQ or Apprenticeship Bachelors Degree Post-Graduate Degree (Dont know)
(source: ESS)
2.3)
When you were 14, was your father . . . Read out list 2.4) 2.4) 2.5) 2.5) 2.5)
Interviewer:
An employee Self-employed Not working NOT TO BE READ: Father died/absent when respondent was 14 NOT TO BE READ: (Dont know)
(source: ESS F46)
259
2.4)
What was the name or title of his job then?
Interviewer: If not mentioned, ask for details on content of job (performed activities) and position in the workplace (organizational rank). Eg: not teacher, but teacher of maths in high school; not clerk, but cashier in a bank; not soldier, but sergeant of infantry; not blue-collar worker, but building foreman _____________________________________________
(source: ESS F12)
Interviewer: English French German Italian Spanish 2.5)
Tick the language of job description
What citizenship or citizenships does or did your mother hold? Multiple answers possible
Interviewer:
(source: new)
2.6)
What is the highest level of education your mother has achieved?
Not completed primary education Primary education
260
GCSEs A or AS Levels GNVQ or Apprenticeship Bachelors Degree Post-Graduate Degree (Dont know)
(source: ESS)
2.7)
When you were 14, was your mother . . . Interviewer: Read out list 2.8) 2.8) 2.9) 2.9) 2.9)
An employee Self-employed Not working NOT TO BE READ: Mother died/absent when respondent was 14 NOT TO BE READ: (Dont know)
(source: ESS F46)
2.8)
What was the name or title of her job then?
(source: ESS F12)
Interviewer: English French German Italian Spanish
261
2.9)
How would you describe the area where you lived for the longest time in [home country]? Was it . . . Interviewer: Read out list
. . . a big city . . . the suburbs or outskirts of a big city . . . a town or a small city . . . a country village . . . a farm or home in the countryside (Dont know)
(source: new)
2.10) What is the highest level of education you have achieved? Not completed primary education Primary education GCSEs A or AS Levels GNVQ or Apprenticeship Bachelors Degree Post-Graduate Degree (Dont answer)
(source: ESS)
2.12) 2.12) 2.12) 2.11) 2.11) 2.12) 2.12) 2.12)
2.11)
Did you ever study at university or any other higher education institution?
Yes No (Dont answer)

(source: new)
2.12) Had you lived in [destination country] before [year of arrival, introduced automatically after 1.3)] for at least three (or more) months? Yes No (Dont answer)
(source: new)
2.12a) 2.13) 2.13)
262
2.12a) Why did you move there? Interviewer: Tick no more than first two mentioned. If respondent is vague, identify general category (left-hand column) and propose alternatives within that category (right-hand column)
WORK
To look for a job To accept a job offer To start a business Because of my occupation (already employed) To study in secondary school To participate in a study exchange program (eg, Erasmus) To study at university level (undergraduate) (regular, not exchange) To study at graduate/post-graduate/specialization level (regular, not exchange) To do an internship To learn the language of the host country To gain new experiences To live in a better natural environment, enjoy natural beauty To live in better/healthier weather, enjoy climate To live together with members of family of origin (eg, parents) To live together with partner/spouse/children Other: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
EDUCATION
QUALITY OF LIFE
FAMILY/ LOVE
(Dont know)
(source: new)
2.13) Apart from [home country] and [destination country], have you lived in another country for three or more months? Yes No (Dont answer)
(source: new)
2.14) 2.15) 2.15)
263
2.14) Which country/countries? Interviewer: Tick all countries mentioned France Germany Italy Spain United Kingdom Austria Estonia Finland Greece Hungary Ireland Latvia Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Sweden Other Non-EU European country USA Other (Dont answer)
Belgium Czech Republic Cyprus Denmark

(source: new)
Lithuania Luxemburg Malta Netherlands
2.14a) Why did you move there?
Interviewer: Tick no more than first two mentioned. If respondent is vague, identify general category (left-hand column) and propose alternatives within that category (right-hand column) If more than one country mentioned in Question 2.14
WORK
To look for a job To accept a job offer To start a business Because of my occupation (already employed) To study in secondary school To participate in a study exchange program (eg, Erasmus) To study at university level (undergraduate) (regular, not exchange) To study at graduate/post-graduate/specialization level (regular, not exchange)
EDUCATION
264
To do an internship To learn the language of the host country QUALITY OF LIFE To gain new experiences To live in a better natural environment, enjoy natural beauty To live in better/healthier weather, enjoy climate To live together with members of family of origin (eg, parents) To live together with partner/spouse/children Other: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Dont know)
(source: new)
FAMILY/ LOVE
2.15) Did you ever work BEFORE you moved to [destination country]? yes no 2.15a 2.16
(source: new)
2.15a) What was the name or title of the LAST occupation you had BEFORE moving to [destination country]?
(source: ESS)
265
2.16) Before settling in [destination country], did you know any [home country nationals] living in [destination country]? Yes No (Dont know)
(source: new)
2.17) Why did you decide to settle in [destination country]?
Interviewer: Tick no more than first two mentioned. If respondent is vague, identify general category (left-hand column) and propose alternatives within that category (right-hand column)
WORK
To look for a job To accept a job offer To start a business Because of my occupation (already employed) To study in secondary school To participate in a study exchange program (eg, Erasmus) To study at university level (undergraduate) (regular, not exchange) To study at graduate/post-graduate/specialization level (regular, not exchange) To do an internship To learn the language of the host country To gain new experiences To live in a better natural environment, enjoy natural beauty To live in better/healthier weather, enjoy climate To live together with members of family of origin (eg, parents) To live together with partner/spouse/children Other: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
EDUCATION
QUALITY OF LIFE
FAMILY/ LOVE
(Dont know)
(source: new)
266
2.18) Overall, did your parents consider your decision to settle in [destination country] to be . . . Interviewer: Read out list
A good thing A bad thing Neither a good nor a bad thing NOT TO BE READ: They had diverging opinions NOT TO BE READ: Parents were dead or not in touch with respondent (Dont know)
(source: new)
2.19) How well did you speak [language of destination country] when you arrived to settle? Interviewer: Read out
Almost as well as native language Quite well Just so-so Poorly No knowledge (Dont know)
(source: new)
2.19a) And how well do you speak [language of destination country] now? Interviewer: Read out
Almost as well as native language Quite well Just so-so Poorly No knowledge (Dont know)
(source: new)
267
2.20) Have you ever been working in [destination country]? yes 2.20a no 2.21
(source: new)
2.20a) Was the first occupation you had in [destination country] the same you had when you left [home country]? yes 2.21 no 2.20b
(source: new)
2.20b) What was the name or title of the FIRST occupation that you had in [destination country]?
(source: ESS)
2.21) Which of these descriptions best describes your CURRENT situation? Interviewer: Read out underlined words
In full time paid work (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed, working for your family business)
2.22)
268
In part time paid work (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed, working for your family business) In education, even if on vacation (not paid for by employer) Unemployed Retired Doing housework, looking after children or other persons Other (Dont know)
(source: ESS F8)
2.22) 2.24) 2.24) 2.24) 2.24) 2.24) 2.24)
2.22) In your main job are you NOW . . . Interviewer: Read out list An employee Self-employed Working for your family business (Dont answer)
(source: ESS F12)
2.22a) Is the occupation you have NOW the same that was your FIRST occupation you had in [destination country]? yes 2.24 no 2.23
(source: new)
2.23) What is the name or title of your main job NOW?
(source: ESS F12)
269
2.24) If you could significantly improve your work or living conditions, how willing or unwilling would you be to move back to [home country]? Interviewer: Read out list Very willing Fairly willing Neither willing nor unwilling Fairly unwilling Very unwilling (Dont know)
(source: new)
2.25) If you could significantly improve your work or living conditions, how willing or unwilling would you be to move outside Europe? Interviewer: Read out list
Very willing Fairly willing Neither willing nor unwilling Fairly unwilling Very unwilling (Dont know)
(source: ISSP)
2.26) In which country do you think you will live 5 years from now? [Destination country] [Home country]
270
Somewhere else Other (eg, split time between two places) (Dont know)
(source: new)
2.27) In which country would you like to live when you reach retiring age? [Destination country] [Home country] Somewhere else Doesnt matter Other (eg, split time between two places) Already retired (Dont know)
(source: new)
2.28) What do you miss most from [home country]? Interviewer: Tick no more than first two mentioned Family Friends Traditions, folklore, celebrations Lifestyle Weather, nature, landscape Food Art, monuments Sport, other leisure activities Social norms (eg, the way things work, how people respect you) Legal norms, public organization (eg, national health system, civil service) Nothing Other: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Dont know)
(source: new)
271
SECTION 3:
EUROPEAN IDENTITY
We would now like to know your views on the European Union and on some related issues. 3.1) Using a 1 to 10 scale, how much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions (where 1 is the lowest and 10 the highest point)? Score: ______________
(source: Eurobarometer)
3.2)
Did you ever search information on the rights of European Union citizens in relation to . . .?
Interviewer: Read out one by one Yes Employment Social security (health, pensions, etc.) Recognition of educational/ professional certificates Voting rights other
(source: new)
No
(Dont know)
3.3)
In general, does the European Union conjure up to you . . .
Interviewer: Read out list A very positive image A fairly positive image A neutral image A fairly negative image A negative image (Dont know)
272
3.4)
How attached do you feel to . . .
Interviewer: Read out one by one Very Fairly Not very attached attached attached The city/town/village where you have lived most of your life in [home country] The city/town/village where you live now [Home country] [Destination country] The European Union
(source: Eurobarometer 58)
Not at all attached
(Dont know)
3.5)
Do you consider yourself as being . . .
Interviewer: Read out [Home country national] only [Home country national] and European European and [home country national] European only (Dont know)
3.6)
When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters . . .
Interviewer: Read out list
273
Frequently Occasionally Never (Dont know)

(source: Eurobarometers)
3.7)
How interested are you in . . .
Interviewer: Read out one by one Very much Politics in [home country] Politics in [destination country] Politics of the European Union
(source: new)
Somewhat
A little
Not at all
(Dont know)
3.8)
During the last 12 months, have you ever . . .
Interviewer: Read out list one by one Yes Contacted a politician, government or local government official Signed a petition Taken part in a lawful public demonstration
(source: ESS)
No
(Dont know)
3.9)
BEFORE June 13: Do you plan to vote in the elections of the European Parliament this June?
Yes No (Dont know)

(source: new)
274
AFTER June 13: Did you vote in the last elections of the European Parliament held this month? Yes No (Dont know)
(source: new)
3.10) Did you vote for the last general elections in [home country]? [Note: to be adapted by country] Yes No (Dont know)
(source: new)
3.11) In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. To which side do you feel closer? Interviewer: Read out list Left Centre-Left Centre Centre-Right Right (Dont answer) (Dont know)
(source: ESS, adapted for phone interview)
3.12) To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Interviewer: Read out one by one
275
Agree strongly
Agree
Neither Disagree Disagree (Dont agree nor strongly know) disagree
The less the State intervenes in the economy, the better it is for a country Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives as they wish
(source: ESS)
SECTION 4:
QUALITY OF LIFE
We would now like to ask you some questions about your daily life experiences. 4.1) Using a 0 to 10 scale, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays all things considered (where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied?) Score: ________________
(source: ESS)
4.2)
How many times did you travel to [home country] in the last 12 months? ____________________________
(source: new)
276
4.3)
How frequently do you communicate (by phone, mail or e-mail) with family members in [home country]?
Every day Several times a week Once a week Several times a month Once a month Less than once a month Never I do not have any family member in [home country] (Dont know)
(source: new)
4.4)
And with friends in [home country]?
Every day Several times a week Once a week Several times a month Once a month Less than once a month Never I do not have any friends in [home country] (Dont know)
(source: new)
4.5)
Of your circle of friends where you live, wed like to know how many are from [home country], how many from [destination country], and how many from other countries
Interviewer: Read out list one by one Several Now, how many are from [home country]? And how many are from [destination country]? And from other countries?
(source: ESS, partially)
A few
None
(Dont know)
277
4.6)
How often do you use the internet whether at home or at work for your personal use?
Every day Several times a week Once a week Several times a month Once a month Less than once a month Never use No access at home or work (Dont know)
(source: ESS)
4.7)
If you heard about an important world event, where would you first look to find out more information?
Interviewer: Read out [Destination country] media [Home country] media Third country media (Dont know)
(source: new)
4.8)
On an average weekday, how much time, in total, do you spend watching television stations from [home country] and [destination country]? [Home [Destination country] country] No time at all Less than hour hour to 1 hour More than 1 hour, up to 1 hours More than 1 hours, up to 2 hours More than 2 hours, up to 2 hours More than 2 hours, up to 3 hours More than 3 hours (Dont know)
(source: ESS)
278
4.9)
And how much time reading newspapers from [home country] and [destination country] on an average weekday? [Home [Destination country] country] No time at all Less than hour hour to 1 hour More than 1 hour, up to 1 hours More than 1 hours, up to 2 hours More than 2 hours, up to 2 hours More than 2 hours, up to 3 hours More than 3 hours (Dont know)
(source: ESS)
4.10) Have you claimed any of the following benefits since you arrived in [destination country]? Interviewer: Read out one by one Yes Assistance with housing costs Unemployment benefits Any other benefits (eg, for health care)
(source: new)
No
(Dont know)
4.11) For each of the voluntary organisations I will now mention, please tell me whether you have participated in its activities in the last 12 months. Interviewer: Read out one by one Yes A sports club or club for outdoor activities An organisation for cultural or hobby activities No (Dont know)
279
A trade union A business, professional, or farmers organisation A religious or church organisation A political party An association of co-nationals Any other voluntary organisation
(source: ESS)
4.12) Nowadays, do you think the following things are better in [destination country] or in [home country]? Interviewer: Read out list one by one [Home country] [Destination country] The same (Dont know)
Health system Education system Housing Earnings Crime control State bureaucracy Politics
(source: new)
4.13) Have you ever felt discriminated against in [destination country] because you are foreigner? Interviewer: Read out list No, never Yes, sometimes Yes, frequently (Dont know)
(source: new)
5.1) 4.13a) 4.13a) 5.1)
280
4.13a) In which kinds of situations did you feel discriminated against? Interviewer: Tick no more than two first choices On the job Applying for a job In public offices or with civil servants In shops, banks Renting/buying a house With neighbours Other (Dont know)
(source: new)
SECTION 5:
5.1)
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination? 5.1a) 5.2) 5.2)
Yes No (Dont know)

(source: ESS)
5.1a) Which one? Christian no denomination Roman Catholic Greek or Russian Orthodox Protestant Other Christian: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Buddhist Jewish Islam/Muslim Other non-Christian: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Dont know)
(source: ESS, adapted)
281
5.2)
How would you describe the area where you live now? Is it . . .
Interviewer: Read out list . . . a big city . . . the suburbs or outskirts of a big city . . . a town or a small city . . . a country village . . . a farm or home in the countryside (Dont know)
(source: ESS F5)
5.3)
Are you registered as a resident in [destination country]? UK ONLY, REPLACED WITH: Have you registered for a national insurance number?
Yes No (Dont know)

(source: new)
5.4)
What is your current marital status? 5.7) 5.5) 5.5) 5.5) 5.5) 5.5)
Married Separated (but still legally married) Divorced Widowed Never been married (Dont answer)
(source: ESS F58, wording adapted, scale identical)
5.5)
Do you currently have a romantic partner? 5.6) 5.13) 5.13)

(source: new)
282
5.6)
Is your partner male or female?
Male Female (Dont answer)

(source: new)
5.7)
Are you currently living together with your partner in the same household? 5.8) 5.7a) 5.8)

(source: ESS F61, slightly adapted)
5.7a) In which country does your partner live? Germany Great Britain France Spain Italy Other EU country USA Other (Dont answer)
(source: new)
5.8)
Which citizenship does your partner hold?
Interviewer: Multiple answers possible German British French Spanish Italian Citizenship of other EU country US citizenship
283
Other (Dont know)

(source: new)
5.9)
What is the highest level of education your partner has achieved?
Not completed primary education Primary education GCSEs A or AS Levels GNVQ or Apprenticeship Bachelors Degree Post-Graduate Degree (Dont know)
(source: ESS)
5.10) Which of these descriptions best describes your partners situation (in the last seven days)? Interviewer: Read out underlined words In full time paid work (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed, working for your family business) In part time paid work (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed, working for your family business) In education, even if on vacation (not paid for by employer) Unemployed Retired Doing housework, looking after children or other persons Other (Dont know)
(source: ESS F8)
5.11) 5.11) 5.13) 5.13) 5.13) 5.13) 5.13) 5.13)
5.11) In his/her main job your partner is. . . Interviewer: Read out list
284
An employee Self-employed Working for his/her family business (Dont know)

(source: ESS F12)
5.12) What is the name or title of your partners main job?
(source: ESS)
5.13) Do you have any children? Yes No (Dont answer)

(source: new)
5.13a) 5.14) 5.14)
5.13a) How many children do you have? _____________________________________________

(source: new)
5.13b) Which language do you speak with your children most of the time? [Home country] language [Destination country] language
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Other language (Dont know)

(source: NIS, slightly different)
5.14) Are you male or female? Interviewer: ASK ONLY IF NECESSARY BUT TICK IN ANY CASE Male Female
(source: ESS)
*************** OPTIONAL 5.15) Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or disagree strongly Interviewer: Read out statements one by one I see myself as someone who ... . . . is reserved . . . is generally trusting . . . does a thorough job . . . is relaxed, handles stress well . . . has an active imagination . . . is outgoing, sociable Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Cant agree agree disagree choose nor disagree
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. . . tends to find fault with others. . . . tends to be lazy. . . . gets nervous easily. . . . has few artistic interests.
(source: BFI)
*************************
SECTION 6:
CONCLUSION
FINAL 1) Our interview is finished, but I would like to ask for your help in finding people who might be left out of our survey. It has been hard for us to identify [home country national] women married to [destination country] nationals as they are generally not listed in the phone book. Can you help me find any of them? Yes No Final 4
FINAL 2) Could you call this person in the next few days and ask her if I can interview her as I did with you? Yes No Final 4
FINAL 3) So, I will call you in a few days from now and ask you for the name and phone number of this lady. Thank you. FINAL 4) The interview is finished. Thanks again. Your answers will be taken into the greatest consideration in view of a better understanding of the opinions and problems of EU citizens resident abroad.
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************************************************************** _________________________________________________________ CATI SYSTEM SHOULD RECORD TIME OF START AND TIME OF END OF INTERVIEWS; OTHERWISE INTERVIEWER SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO RECORD THEM Time of start: . . . . . . . . . . . . . Time of end: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . INTERVIEWER THEN ANSWERS SECTION BELOW I.1) How many contacts with this phone number were needed to achieve the interview (including the final call)? ........................ I.2) Did the respondent ask for clarification on any questions? Never Almost never Now and then Often Very often I.3) Did you feel that the respondent was reluctant to answer any questions? Never Almost never Now and then Often Very often
I.4) Overall, did you feel that the respondent understood the questions? Never Almost never Now and then Often Very often
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I.5)
Overall, did you feel that the respondent was interested by the interview? Very much Quite a lot Not so much Not at all If you have any additional comments on the interview, please write them in the space below.
I.6)
______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________
Appendix C: External movers experiences of migration and integration into the EU15: interview guideline
Background: European Union-financed research project on mobility in Europe Interviews with EU citizens moving from one EU country to another and with citizens from accession countries moving into the EU (Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Italy) How do migrants make sense of their migration experience? Which are the barriers hindering successful migration and integration? Interview Objectives: To understand external movers rationales for migrating into the EU To gain insight into what successful and unsuccessful migratory experiences might look like To get an idea of the issues furthering or hampering integration of external movers into EU host societies To trace migrants problem-solving strategies, be it with regards to institutions, the labour market or private life To explore issues relating to migrant identity, especially identification with Europe and the European Union To assemble cues for policy-advice on making migration more successful (match expectations with reality, provide institutional support for integration, etc.)
A NOTE ON THE SELECTION OF INTERVIEWEES
The selection of interviewees is carried out by the interviewers via Polish/Romanian cultural associations, expat magazines, websites,
289
290
churches and so on. Friends and family of the interviewer are not eligible for interview. Before carrying out the interview, the interviewers have to discuss the profile of the selected individuals with the local PIONEUR team and get their ok.
INTERVIEWEE PROFILE
Four Polish nationals and four Romanian nationals who are legal residents of one of the PIONEUR host countries (France, Spain, Britain, Germany, Italy) have been permanently residing in host country for at least one year and no longer than ten years (that is, commuters excluded) are legally employed (NB: diplomats and students are not eligible; a migrant who is legally employed but registered on a student visa is eligible if you are 100 per cent sure he/she never intended to attend university) are in the 30 to 50 age range For each nationality group (Polish/Romanian) we are looking for one male with higher education (university) one female with higher education 1 if possible, get one highly educated respondent in upper status occupation, one in lower status occupation 1 if possible, avoid academics and clerics; under no circumstances select more than one academic and/or more than one cleric one poorly educated male (not higher than vocational/low-level school) one poorly educated female Interviews can be carried out wherever convenient for the interviewer (that is, the interviews do not have to be carried out in two different cities)
BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEWS, MAKE SURE YOU FULLY UNDERSTAND THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWING STRATEGY SET OUT IN THIS APPENDIX. THE INTERVIEW SHOULD LAST NO LONGER THAN 90 MINUTES.
Appendix C: External movers questionnaire
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PART 1
1.

Introduction Introduction of interviewer (include affiliation and commissioning agency) Introduction of research project Assure anonymity and confidentiality Explain use of tape-recorder and ask for permission Warm-up (demographics)

2.
Tell me a little bit about yourself (citizenship, mother-tongue, family married/children) How long have you been living in host country? (Which city? Did you know host country before coming here? . . .)
Besides double-checking some basic information regarding the informant (that should already be known from sampling), the aim of this section is to make the respondent familiar and comfortable with the interview situation.
PART 2
3.

Reasons for migration/life before migration Why did you decide to move to host country? (reasons, expectations, fears, etc., why did you chose host country?) How was life back home? (probe for full picture of economic, family, social situation and perspectives or lack of them at home as well as for ideological/political aspects that made life difficult)
To understand the respondents motivations for moving, to gain insights into what was wrong with her/his economic and social position back in the home country or with the political system he/ she previously lived in.
292
4.
Expectations fulfilled? Does your life here in host country correspond to the expectations you had before moving? (probe until you get a full picture of why/ why not, which are the aspects that turned out better/worse than expected) In which way have you readjusted your expectations since you arrived in the host country? What are your plans for the future (go back, stay . . .)
To get a summary of the migration experience to understand the frame of mind or vantage point from which all subsequent specific sections will be answered.
PART 3
5.

Getting started in the host country How did you experience the initial period of getting organized, following arrival in the host country? When it came to practicalities, what was your experience dealing with host country administration, the health/social security system, the housing market, schooling for your children, etc.? Probe fully but dont just let the respondent talk: What exactly was your problem? How did you solve it? Who helped you get by? (friends/host country administration/others)
To get a picture of the institutional barriers to beginning a new life in a EU country and the possibilities of overcoming them.
6.
Labour market How did you go about finding a job? (adapt to people who already had a job lined up before moving, those who didnt seek employment, etc.) probe for strategies, networks, etc. Were you able to find employment in the field you had specialized in back home? (collect information on respondents educational level,
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work experience, etc.; understand whether diplomas and work experience from home country were acknowledged in host country) How do you experience working life in host country? (colleagues, bosses, daily routines, etc.) Which aspects of your professional life were better in home country? Which ones are better in host country? (pay, atmosphere, responsibility . . .)
To understand how easy or difficult it was for the respondent to integrate into the host country labour market and whether or not previous experience was adequately valued.
PART 4
7.
Social and cultural life Was it easy for you to find friends in host country (understand whether friends are from home/host nationality, job-related, from associations, etc.) What are the sorts of things you do in your spare time? (hobbies, TV, associations, church community, participation in host country high culture (e.g. theatre) or popular culture (e.g. football games)) How do you stay in touch with your friends and family at home? (use of phone, internet, etc.) How often do you visit your home country? (when, why?) Do you sometimes send home money or material goods? (how often, how much, when, why?)
Is the informants social life organised along ethnic/nationality lines? Or does he/she integrate in the host country cultural and social activities? Does the migrant stay connected with friends and family at home via communication, visits, sending goods or money?
8.
Everyday life Would you say you can express yourself fully in the host country language? Which are the sorts of situations when you feel limited?
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Do you feel you are respected in the host country? Which are the situations where you feel not respected? When you go shopping or make a phone call, do you feel people treat you differently for being a foreigner from your home country? Examples . . . Would you say you are integrated in the host country? (probe for full definition of integration). In which respects, if any, would you like to be more integrated? Which are the aspects of life that you prefer to handle your way?
To gain insights into the informants personal perception of whether she/he is integrated, what integration is, for which aspects it is a good or a bad thing. To understand whether or not the respondent feels discriminated against in daily life in the host country.
9.

European identity Would you say you feel European? (why, why not?) What does feeling European mean to you? (probe fully) What do the people of Europe share? (probe fully) Would you say that these characteristics describe both home and host country citizens equally well? (why, why not?) In what sorts of situations do you feel European? When dont you? Is European Union membership a good or a bad thing for your country? (why, why not?)
To understand the meaning of Europeanness from the external migrants point of view: Does it involve a shared heritage (culture/ religion/ethnicity/etc.) or a shared way of doing things (parliamentary democracy/market economy/welfare states/etc.)? Does it involve being part of a geographical or a political entity?
10. Political life

Are you interested in politics from your home/host country? Do you follow the news from home/host country? Why/why not? Are you involved in political life at home or in host country? (voting, discussing politics, taking initiatives . . .). Why/why not?
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Do you feel the concerns of people like yourself are adequately taken care of in host/home country politics? Why/why not?
To comprehend whether the respondent sees herself/himself as part of the system or someone forgotten by it.
PART 5
11.

Your advice If a junior family member (say your niece) told you she also wants to move to host country, would you encourage her to do so? Why? Which advice would you give her? (probe fully for why this advice is necessary or useful) Would you allow her to stay with you until she finds a place of her own? Would you lend her money if she needed any? (And if it were a friend of your niece, would you still have him/her over and lend money?)
To get an insight into the functioning of network migration/solidarity among external movers. To understand according to the informant which of the problems previously discussed can be generalized/apply to anyone holding the informants citizenship. To gain information on things the EU or the host country could do to ease transition for external movers.
Index
accession countries migration 9, 205, 212, 213, 21417, 21819, 220 see also individual countries Ackers, L. 55, 62, 63 age and electoral participation 174 and media use of EU movers 188, 193, 194, 196, 197, 200 age at migration 417 and migration duration 335, 479 Ajzen, I. 154 Alaminos, Antonio 98119 Alarcon, R. 96 Alba, R. 100 Albert, Maria Carmen 5271 Allport, G. 153 Anderson, B. 179 Andreotti, A. 96 Anghel, R. 220 Anwar, M. 102 Arsene, Camelia 2651 Australia, Multicultural Australia Survey 74 Austria education levels 16, 17 immigration 13, 14 immigration restrictions 9, 205 Baldoni, Emiliana 5271 Bauer, T. 31, 53, 63, 64, 72, 73 Belassa, B. 10 Belgium education levels 17 as founding state 5 immigration 14 immigration of A8 members 205 migration 12 Bellamy, R. 24, 157 Bem, D. 154 Berger, P. 95 Berry, J. 989, 100, 101, 102, 107, 1234, 127, 128 Bettin Lattes, G. 24 bi-cultural movers and EU identity 3940, 1423 Black, A. 120 Bloom, B. 99 Bonacich, E. 102 Borjas, G. 16, 208 Boyd, M. 73 Braun, Michael 2651, 24154 Brchon, P. 158 Breen, R. 4, 76, 81, 95 Britain age at migration 334, 414, 46 age of stayers 34 assimilating Europeans (lifestyle movers) 140, 145 assimilating non-Europeans (lack of EU attachment) (carefree movers) 140, 146 British effect 153, 219 cable services, limited 1823 country of origin, feelings of attachment to 134 country of residence, feelings of attachment to 135 cross-national intermarriage 36 discrimination and societal resistance to discrimination 113 education levels 13, 18 electoral participation 172, 174, 175 EU attachment 1334 EU-image 130 EU15 non-national residents 12, 2930 and integrating Europeans 140, 141 integrating non-Europeans (lack of attachment to EU) (bi-cultural movers) 143 internet access 197, 198 intragenerational class mobility among EU movers 94 297
298
Pioneers of European integration and world events, seeking information on 199, 200 Britain, migration 12, 13, 30, 37, 389, 41, 469, 67 and class composition 778, 7980 cultural integration 110, 111, 112, 115 education levels 32, 634 and employment opportunities 32, 60, 80 family support 65 friendship relations 107 and homesickness 117 job mobility 90 and language competence 103, 104, 105, 106 national orientation and mobility expectations 107, 108, 109 and newspaper reading 191, 192, 193, 195, 196 and quality of life 61, 67 and social integration 110, 111, 113, 116 and social mobility 756, 824, 86 TV use 187, 188, 190 and world events, seeking information on 199, 200 Brubaker, R. 121, 122 Brcker, H. 53 Bruter, M. 121 Bryk, A. 44 Bulgaria migration, economic motivation 54 migration restrictions 9, 2056 Buller, H. 36 cable availability 1823, 186 Cai, X. 180, 181 Camaur, L. 181 Canada acculturation measurement 100 social mobility for migrants 73 career prospects see job mobility carefree movers and EU identity 128, 13940, 1467 Carroll, G. 92 Carruba, C. 157 Casado-Diaz, M. 56
leftist tendencies and politicization levels amongst movers 170 London as escalator region 78 national versus European identity 1312 non-integrating Europeans 140, 143 politicization levels 161, 16570 retired people in stayer population 33 rightist tendencies among movers 170 self-marginalising Europeans (cosmopolitans) 140, 150 self-marginalising non-Europeans (lack of attachment to EU) (individualists) 140, 151 spiralist spatial mobility 75 TV watching, overall 184 voting rights information search by movers 176 Britain, immigration 9, 12, 13, 14, 2930, 31, 389, 479, 59, 68 and A8 countries 205, 212, 213, 214, 215, 21617, 218, 219 and class composition 768, 79 cultural integration 110, 111, 112, 115 education levels 32, 40, 78 and employment opportunities 59, 60, 61, 62 family connections 61, 65 friendship relations 107 and geographic mobility 35 and homesickness 117 job mobility 89, 91, 93 knowledge migrants 55 and language competence 55, 104, 105, 106 main reasons for and against 55 national orientation and mobility expectations 107, 108, 109 and newspaper reading 192, 193, 195, 196 and satisfaction with life 114, 115, 116 and social integration 110, 111, 113, 116 and social mobility 73, 87 TV use 185,187, 190
Index Castells, M. 10 Castles, S. 53 Cautrs, B. 156, 158 Checkel, J. 24, 121 Chiswick, B. 73 Christiadi, C. 95 Citrin, J. 122 Clark, M. 100 class composition and career prospects 92 class origin and education 857 intergenerational mobility 808 and migration 7680, 94 Collins, R. 179, 180 Cooper, F. 121 Cornelius, W. 96 Cortes, D. 100 cosmopolitans, and EU identity 128, 13940, 14950 cross-culturalism in transnational Europe 98119 acculturation 98101, 111 acculturation and assimilation, differences between 99 acculturation, measurement issues 99100 acculturation, operationalising 1001 cultural awareness 1001 cultural and social integration 1014, 10914, 115, 11618 discrimination and societal resistance to discrimination 11314 ethnic loyalty 100, 101 friendship relations of movers 1056, 107 homesickness and integration 11718 integration 1013 linguistic competence and social networks 1036, 112 migration patterns 110, 111, 112, 115 national orientation and mobility expectations 1069 psychological adaptation 11418 and satisfaction with life 11417 Crul, M. 73 Csed, K. 208 Curle, A. 99 Cyprus immigration 14 migration, family reasons 54 Czech Republic immigration 14 migration, economic and family reasons 54
299
Dawson, E. 100 Dayan, D. 180 De Bruycker, P. 5 Deleuze, G. 11 Dloye, Y. 156 Denmark education levels 16, 17 immigration 14 labour costs, median hourly 96 Dez Medrano, J. 75, 121 discrimination perceptions by migrants and EastWest migration 20913, 217, 21819 societal resistance to 113 Duchesne, S. 121, 122, 156 Dumont, J. 243 EastWest migration and EU enlargement see EU enlargement and EastWest migration economic liberalism, attitudes towards 1634 economic reasons for moving and social mobility 21318, 2212 education levels 1316, 17, 18 and class origin 857 and EastWest migration 208, 210, 212, 21618, 221 and electoral participation 174 EU identity and free movement 141, 145, 146, 147, 148, 153 and European citizenship, movement towards 159, 1602 European integration and free movement 1316, 1719, 378, 46, 49 and immigration 32, 3741, 40, 61, 634, 78 and job mobility 89, 92 and leftist affiliations 164
300
Pioneers of European integration family relationships 214 fears over 206, 207 and labour market regulation 210, 211, 217 and language ability 21213 methodology and data 2089 EU identity and free movement 12055 and acculturation 1256, 128 assimilating Europeans (lifestyle movers) 128, 13940, 1445 assimilating non-Europeans (lack of EU attachment) (carefree movers) 128, 13940, 1467 and cognitive dissonance theory 125, 1267 country of origin, feelings of attachment to 134, 136, 153 country of residence, feelings of attachment to 135, 136, 153 cross-cutting identities 123, 128, 13940, 1489 and education 141, 145, 146, 147, 148, 153 emergent identity in country of residence 126 EU, attitudes towards, among movers and stayers 128, 12930, 1334, 136 EU knowledge among movers and stayers 130 Europeanness and territorial identities 12935 and family ties 141, 153 and friendship 141, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153 identity and attachment, connections between 122 and identity conflict 1246, 1278, 129, 137 identity, definition used 1212 identity outcomes of internal migration 1289 ingroup favouritism 122 integrating Europeans (Euromasters) 128, 13842 integrating non-Europeans (lack of EU attachment) (bi-cultural movers) 128, 13940, 1423 interculturation 127, 128, 1367 and knowledge of EU 141
and media use of EU movers 185, 188, 189, 194, 196, 197, 200, 201 and migration 32, 3741, 61, 634 and migration projects in integrating Europe 58, 59, 60, 62, 634, 667, 68, 70 see also students electoral participation 1714 see also voting rights Elkins, D. 179 employment opportunities 59, 60, 624, 67, 68, 7880, 85 see also job mobility Erbe, J. 157, 158 Erikson, R. 76, 81, 97 Espenshade, T. 96 Estonia education levels 17 immigration 14 mobility intentions 54 EU cross-culturalism in transnational Europe see cross-culturalism in transnational Europe International Convention on Transfrontier Television 180 labour costs, median hourly 96 migration projects in integrating Europe see migration projects in integrating Europe social mobility of mobile Europeans see social mobility of mobile Europeans Television Without Frontiers Directive 180 Year of Mobility (2006) 206 EU enlargement and EastWest migration 534, 20523 benefits of 2067 bureaucratic difficulties 210, 211 circular mobility, rise of 21921 cultural affinity and discrimination levels 21819 discrimination perceptions by migrants 20913, 217, 21819 economic reasons for moving and social mobility 21318, 2212 and education levels 208, 210, 212, 21618, 221 exclusion and exploitation 20921
Index and language 141, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148 and life satisfaction 141, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 151 multiple identities, workings of 1223, 127 nested identities 122, 123 non-integrating Europeans (bicultural movers) 13940, 1423 and primary socialisation 128 and reference group affiliation and adaptation 123 retirement migration 144 self-marginalising Europeans (cosmopolitans) 128, 13940, 14950 self-marginalising non-Europeans (lack of EU attachment) (individualists) 128, 13940, 1501 self-segregating Europeans (homesick movers) 128, 13940, 1478 separate identities 123, 128 territorial identities among movers, accounting for 13754 territorial identities and attachments of movers and stayers 1305 territorial identities of internal migrants 1234, 128 territorial identities of mobile Europeans, typology of 1357 tripartite identities 127 see also European integration and free movement EU movers, media use of 179204 and age 188, 193, 194, 196, 197, 200 cable availability 1823, 186 and Common European Space 204 continuing importance of 2014 and education levels 185, 188, 189, 194, 196, 197, 200, 201 and family connections 188, 189, 193, 194, 197, 198, 200, 201 and friendships 188, 189, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 200 and gender 197, 198 and habit and availability 188 home-country media, diminishing reliance on 181
301
and i2010 policy 204 internet access 1978 internet and identity construction 181 and language competence 187, 188, 189, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201 and length of stay in country of residence 188 media markets accessibility 1824 and migration motivation 189, 194, 196, 198, 200 newspapers 1916 and quality of life 189, 192, 193, 194, 200 satellite availability 183, 186 technology and migrant identity construction 1801 television use 18490, 201 and world events, seeking information on 199201 Euromasters 128, 13842 European citizenship, movement towards 15678 age and electoral participation 174 age and leftist affiliations 164 and cognitive deficiency 1567 and country of origin 160 and democratic deficit 157 and economic liberalism, attitudes towards 1634 education and electoral participation 174 education and leftist affiliations 164 and education levels 159, 1602 education and political leftright standing 1623 election voting patterns 159, 175 electoral participation and political interest, relationship between 1713, 174 EU movers and prism of national differences 16570 gender and leftist affiliations 164 and leftist affiliations 1623, 1645, 16670 leftist tendencies and electoral participation 174, 1767 and migrants country of residence 171
302
Pioneers of European integration Schengen system and passport control elimination 7 and seasonal workers 7 and Single European Act (1986) 7 spatial mobility and upward social mobility, links between 4 and students 7, 556 students and Erasmus and Socrates programmes 2, 56, 59, 69, 70 and Treaty of Rome, Article 49 5, 6 and unemployed 7 voting rights 7, 8 and welfare rights 7, 8 worker-based migration 2, 3, 5 European integration demographics 2651 age at migration 417 age of migrants and migration duration 335, 479 basic sociodemographic characteristics 316 and cross-national intermarriage 36 future trends 501 geographic mobility 356 intra-EU migrants 2931 migration over time 3641 simple classification 479 social background 313 survey limitations 279 European integration and free movement citizenship appreciation 1011 and competitiveness 10 Council Directive 68/360 6 Council Regulation 1612/68 6 criticism of 11 economic and political rationales for 911 and education levels 1316, 1719, 378, 46, 49 and Eurostars 49, 50, 150 history of 59 and knowledge economy 10, 13, 31, 55 role 15 statistics of mobile Europeans 1116 workforce position 16, 20, 37, 46 see also EU identity and free movement
national identities, persistence of 157 and political activity involvement 15960, 162 and political attitudes 1578, 1602, 171 and political ideological position 160, 1623, 164 and political leftright standing 161, 1623 political portrait of EU movers 15865 premises for 1717 and professional status 159, 1602 professional status and political standing 1623, 164 registered voters among EU movers 173 and rightist tendencies 170, 174 rightist tendencies and electoral participation 174 social class and political standing 163 and territorial identity and location 162 voting rights information search and country of residence 1767 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 67, 8, 9 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 53, 63, 66, 67 European integration A10 members, temporary movement restrictions of 9 Action Plan for Skills and Mobility 10 citizenship over worker dimension 67 and citizenship rights 7 diplomatic protection 78 foreign workers rights, establishment of (1968) 6 and Lisbon Agenda 10 and Maastricht Treaty (1992) 7, 36 and monetary union 10 national immigration laws, early 56 and pensioners 7 residence rights of movers 6, 8, 10 and retiree relocation 2, 31, 49
Index European Internal Movers Social Survey (EIMSS) 34 fielding 2467 German EIMSS data and official statistics data, comparison of 24851 methodological strengths 2514 methodology and design 24251 population defining and sampling 2425 questionnaire 25588 questionnaire, demographic information 2806 questionnaire development 2456 questionnaire, European identity views 2715 questionnaire, family origin and migration history 25770 questionnaire, quality of life 27580 questionnaire, screening questions 2557 sample evaluation 2478 European Year of Workers Mobility 11 Eurostars 49, 50, 150 Evans, M. 72 family support and EastWest migration 214 family ties and EU identity 141, 153 and media use of EU movers 188, 189, 193, 194, 197, 198, 200, 201 and migration projects in integrating Europe 646 and reasons for migration 57, 60, 613, 64, 656, 67 and reunification 31, 34 Fassman, H. 30 Favell, Adrian 125, 35, 49, 53, 55, 63, 96, 121, 150, 158, 171, 20523 Fernndez, E. 53, 54, 66 Festinger, L. 125, 126 Fielding, A. 75, 78, 95 Finland education levels 18 immigration 9, 13, 14, 205 migration 12, 13 Fligstein, N. 24, 158 Follesdal, A. 157 France
303
age at migration 414, 46 age of stayers 34 assimilating Europeans (lifestyle movers) 140, 145 assimilating non-Europeans (lack of EU attachment) (carefree movers) 140, 146 country of origin, feelings of attachment to 134 country of residence, feelings of attachment to 135 cross-national intermarriage 36 discrimination and societal resistance to discrimination 113 education levels 13, 18 electoral participation 172, 174, 175 EU attachment 133 EU Constitution rejection 206 EU-image 130 EU15 non-national residents 12, 2930 as founding state 5 and integrating Europeans 140, 1412 internet access 197, 198 intragenerational class mobility among EU movers 94 leftist tendencies and politicization levels amongst movers 16670 national versus European identity, movers and stayers 1312 non-integrating Europeans 140, 143 politicization levels 161, 16570 retired people in stayer population 33 retiree migrants 67 rightist tendencies among movers 170 self-marginalising Europeans (cosmopolitans) 140, 150 self-marginalising non-Europeans (lack of EU attachment) (individualists) 140, 151 voting rights information search by movers and country of residence 176 France, immigration 12, 13, 14, 2930, 37, 389, 469, 59, 68 and A8 countries 205, 212, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220, 2212
304
Pioneers of European integration free movement see EU identity and free movement; European integration and free movement Friedrich, K. 56 friendship relations and cross-culturalism in transnational Europe 1056, 107 and EU identity and free movement 141, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153 media use of EU movers 188, 189, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 200 Frognier, A. 121, 122, 156 future research migrant media use 181 social mobility for less privileged young 956 technology and migrant identity construction 1801 Television Without Frontiers Directive, cultural impact of 180 Gabel, M. 121 Garapich, M. 219 Garcia, M. 100 Gattegno, C. 99 gender and job migration 89 and leftist affiliations 164 and media use of EU movers 197, 198 and migration projects in integrating Europe 55, 62, 66 Georgiou, M. 180 Germany age at migration 414, 46 age of migrants and immigration duration 334 age of stayers 34 assimilating Europeans (lifestyle movers) 144, 145 assimilating non-Europeans (lack of EU attachment) (carefree movers) 146 country of origin, feelings of attachment to 134 country of residence, feelings of attachment to 135 cross-national intermarriage 36
and class composition 768, 79, 94 cultural integration 110, 111, 112, 115 education levels 32, 40, 41, 61, 63 and employment opportunities 60, 61, 623, 78 family reasons for 57, 60, 61, 623, 65, 66 friendship relations of movers 107 and geographic mobility 35, 36 and homesickness 117 job mobility 91 and language competence 104, 105, 106 national orientation and mobility expectations 107, 108, 109 and newspaper reading 192, 195, 196 and quality of life 59, 61, 62, 67 and satisfaction with life 114, 115, 116 and second generation migrants 73 and social integration 87, 110, 111, 113, 116 TV use 185, 187, 190 and world events, seeking information on 200 France, migration 12, 37, 389, 478 and class composition 778, 7980 cultural integration 110, 111, 112, 115 education levels 61, 64 and employment opportunities 60, 80 family support 61, 623, 65 friendship relations 107 and homesickness 117 job mobility 62, 90 and language competence 103, 104, 105, 106 national orientation and mobility expectations 107, 108, 109 and newspaper reading 191, 192, 195 and social integration 756, 824, 86, 110, 111, 113, 116 TV use 184, 187, 188, 190 and world events, seeking information on 199, 200 Franklin, M. 157
Index discrimination and societal resistance to discrimination 113 education levels 13, 17 electoral participation 1714 EU attachment, feelings of 1334 EU-image 130 EU15 non-national residents 12, 2930 as founding state 5 and integrating Europeans 141 integrating non-Europeans (lack of EU attachment) (bi-cultural movers) 143 internet access 197, 198 labour costs, median hourly 96 leftist tendencies and politicization levels amongst movers 16670 movers and EU citizenship interest 165 national versus European identity, movers and stayers 1312 non-integrating Europeans 143 politicization levels 161, 16570 retired people in stayer population 33 rightist tendencies among movers 170 self-marginalising Europeans (cosmopolitans) 150 self-marginalising non-Europeans (lack of EU attachment) (individualists) 151 self-segregating Europeans (homesick movers) 148 self-segregation non Europeans (lack of EU attachment) 149 Turks, low integration of 36 voting rights information search by movers and country of residence 176 Germany, immigration 1213, 14, 2930, 37, 389, 479, 59, 62, 68 and A8 countries 212, 21416, 217, 21819, 220 and class composition 76, 77, 78, 79, 94 cultural integration 110, 111, 112, 115 education levels 32, 3741, 63
305
and employment opportunities 59, 60, 61, 62, 78 family support 61, 656 friendship relations 1056, 107 and geographic mobility 35 and homesickness 117 job mobility 89, 91 and language competence 103, 104, 105, 106 media markets accessibility 182 national orientation and mobility expectations 107, 108, 109 and newspaper reading 192, 193, 195 and quality of life 67 restrictions 9, 205 and satisfaction with life 114, 115, 116 and social integration 87, 110, 111, 113, 116 TV use and country of residence 184, 187, 188, 190 and world events, seeking information on 199, 200, 201 Germany, migration 12, 13, 30, 37, 389, 41, 469, 67 and class composition 778, 7980 cultural integration 110, 111, 112, 115 education levels 32 and employment opportunities 32, 623, 80 family support 61, 623, 65, 66 friendship relations 107 and homesickness 117 job mobility 62, 90 and language competence 103, 104, 105, 106 national orientation and mobility expectations 107, 108, 109 and newspaper reading 191, 1923, 195, 196 and quality of life 61, 64, 67 and social integration 756, 81, 824, 86, 110, 111, 113, 116 TV use 184, 187, 188, 190 TV use and country of origin 185 and world events, seeking information on 199, 200 Ghuman, P. 100 Gillespie, P. 121
306
Pioneers of European integration Italy age at migration 414, 46 age of migrants and migration duration 34 age of stayers 34 assimilating Europeans (lifestyle movers) 140, 1445 cable services, limited 1823 country of origin, feelings of attachment to 134 country of residence, feelings of attachment to 135 cross-national intermarriage 36 discrimination and societal resistance to discrimination 113 electoral participation 1712, 173, 175 EU attachment, feelings of 133 EU-image 130 EU15 non-national residents 12, 2930 as founding state 5 and free movement of workers, early competitive advantage 5, 6, 31 integrating Europeans 140 integrating non-Europeans (lack of EU attachment) (bi-cultural movers) 143 internet access 197, 198 leftist tendencies and politicization levels amongst movers 170 movers and EU citizenship interest 165 national versus European identity, movers and stayers 1312 non-European immigrants 12 non-integrating Europeans 140, 143 politicization levels 161, 16570 retired people in stayer population 33 retiree migrants in 567 self-marginalising Europeans (cosmopolitans) 140, 150 self-segregating Europeans (homesick movers) 140, 148 self-segregation non Europeans (lack of EU attachment) 140, 149 Italy, immigration 12, 13, 14, 2930, 37, 389, 469, 59
Goldthorpe, J. 76, 81, 97 Gordon, M. 73, 100 Gorny, A. 53 Graves, T. 123 Greece EU membership 9 immigration 13, 14, 54 immigration of A8 members 205 migration from 54 Grieco, E. 73 Grunberg, G. 163 Guattari, F. 11 Guild, E. 5 Hajer, M. 11 Haller, M. 156 Harris, J. 63 Harvey, D. 11 Havel, V. 11 Herrmann, R. 24, 121, 157 Hille, H. 206 Hix, S. 157 Hofstede, G. 99, 100 Hoggart, K. 36 homesick movers and cross-culturalism in transnational Europe 11718 and EU identity 128, 13940, 1478 Hooghe, L. 121 Huber, A. 56 Hungary immigration 14 migration, economic motivation 54 television broadcasts for immigrants, limited availability of 183 individualists and EU identity 128, 13940, 1501 internet access 181, 1978 Iredale, R. 55 Ireland education levels 16, 18 immigration 9, 13, 14, 205 immigration of A8 members 205 migration 13 television broadcasts for immigrants, limited availability of 183 Israel, immigration and social mobility 74
Index and A8 countries 205, 21011, 212, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219 and class composition 768, 79, 94 cultural integration 110, 111, 112, 115 education levels 634 and employment opportunities 32, 59, 60, 61, 62 family reasons for 57, 60, 61, 623, 65, 67 friendship relations 107 and geographic mobility 356 job mobility 91, 93 and language competence 103, 104, 105, 106 migrant retirees in 56 national orientation and mobility expectations 107, 108, 109 and newspaper reading 192, 195 and quality of life 61 and satisfaction with life 114, 115, 116 and social integration 87, 110, 111, 112, 113, 116 TV use 184, 185, 187, 190 and world events, seeking information on 199, 200, 201 Italy, migration 1213, 30, 31, 37, 389, 41, 479 and class composition 76, 7780 cultural integration 110, 111, 112, 115 education levels 32, 3741, 63 and employment opportunities 60, 623, 7880 family support 61, 623, 656 friendship relations 1056, 107 and geographic mobility 35 and homesickness 117 job mobility 62, 90 and language competence 104, 105, 106 national orientation and mobility expectations 107, 108, 109 and newspaper reading 191, 192, 193, 195 and quality of life 67 and social integration 76, 824, 85, 86, 110, 111, 112, 113, 116 TV use 184, 187, 188, 190 and world events, seeking information on 200
307
Jaffr, J. 162 Jenkins, R. 122 Jensen, O. 11 Jileva, E. 206 job mobility and career prospects 8893 and education 89, 92 and gender 89 and immigration 89, 91, 93 labour market regulation and EastWest migration 210, 211, 217 and language 8992 and migration 62, 90 see also employment opportunities; workforce position and European integration Jost, J. 154 Kaiser, C. 56 Kalter, F. 64 Katzenstein, P. 24, 121 Kelly, J. 99 Kelo, M. 53, 54, 206 King, R. 2, 24, 31, 356, 52, 54, 56, 244 knowledge of EU 141 migrants 55 Kofman, E. 62 Kohli, M. 122 Koopmans, R. 157, 158 Krieger, H. 53, 54, 63, 64, 66 Kupiszewski, M. 54 labour market regulation and EastWest migration 210, 211, 217 see also job mobility Laffan, B. 121 LaFramboise, T. 127 Lambert, W. 100 language ability barrier and migration projects in integrating Europe 67 and EastWest migration 21213 and EU identity and free movement 141, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148 and job mobility 8992
308
Pioneers of European integration Marks, G. 121, 122 marriage, cross-national intermarriage 36 Marsh, M. 157 Massey, D. 53, 65 Mattli, W. 10 Mayer, K. 92, 97 Mead, G. 122 media use of EU movers see EU movers, media use of Meehan, E. 157 Meinhof, U. 120 migration projects in integrating Europe 5271 and age 64 country of residence and origin, effects of 60 East-West mobility flows and EU enlargements 534 and education levels 58, 59, 60, 62, 634, 667, 68, 70 and employment opportunities 59, 60, 62, 634, 67, 68 EU 15 intra-European migration and international migration, distinctions between 527 family reasons for migration 578, 59, 60, 612, 64 and family and social support 646 and gender 55, 62, 66 and global and regional integration 55 and human capital 63, 67 intra-EU mobility, reasons for 5766 language barrier 67 migration motivations 5760 and previous mobility experiences 669 and quality of life 589, 60, 62, 64, 67 and retiree migration 567 and sexual orientation 63 and student population 556, 59, 60 traditional and emerging reasons for migration, motivations for 545 Miller, M. 53 Moravcsik, A. 157 Morawska, E. 220 Morgan, S. 88 Morley, D. 180
and media use of EU movers 187, 188, 189, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201 and migration 55, 103, 104, 105, 106 social networks 1036, 112 Latvia immigration 14 migration, economic and family reasons 54 Lavenex, S. 206 Lazardis, G. 54 Lega, L. 100 Le Gals, P. 96 leftist tendencies and electoral participation 174, 1767 and politicization levels amongst movers 16670 see also politicization levels; rightist tendencies Lemaitre, G. 243 lifestyle movers and EU identity 128, 13940, 1445 Lijphart, A. 123 Lin, G. 95 Lindberg, L. 156 Linton, R. 98 Lithuania education levels 18 educational levels 13 immigration 14 migration, economic motivation 54 Luijkx, R. 76, 81 Luxembourg education levels 16 as founding state 5 immigration 13, 14 immigration of A8 members 205 television broadcasts for immigrants, limited availability of 183 Maas, W. 5, 171 McAllister, I. 72 Magnette, P. 24, 157 Mahroum, S. 55 Majone, G. 157 Major, B. 154 Malta, migration, family reasons 54 Marin, G. 100
Index Morocco, migration and social mobility 73 Morrell, J. 55 Mouhoud, E. 96 Mundell, R. 10 Mnz, R. 30 Muxel, Anne 15678 Nebe, Tina M. 12055, 20523 Nee, V. 100 Nelson, B. 100 Netherlands education levels 18 as founding state 5 immigration 14 immigration of A8 members 205 migration 12 newspaper reading 1916 Oklski, M. 220 OLeary, S. 5 OReilly, K. 56, 102, 105 Oudinet, J. 96 Padilla, A. 100, 101, 102 Panagakos, A. 180, 181 Patterson, G. 356, 244 Pearson, R. 55 Perlmann, J. 73 Perrineau, P. 157 PIONEUR project 3 and EIMSS see European Internal Movers Social Survey (EIMSS) interview guideline 28995 interviewee profile 2905 interviewee selection 28990 overview 2412 Piore, M. 72 Piracha, M. 96 Platt, L. 73 Poland circular mobility, rise of 21920, 221 cultural affinity of migrants and discrimination levels 21819 immigration 15 migration 205, 208 migration and discrimination 20913 migration, economic reasons for 21314, 216, 217, 2212 mobility intentions 54
309
politicization levels 161, 16570 activity involvement and European citizenship, movement towards 15960, 162 Portes, A. 53, 73, 102 Portugal education levels 16, 18 EU membership 9 immigration 13, 15, 29, 54 immigration of A8 members 205 labour costs, median hourly 96 migrant retirees in 56 migration 12, 13, 54, 73 Poulain, M. 11, 56, 243 Price, M. 179 professional status and political standing 1623, 164 psychological adaptation 11418 Pugliese, E. 60 Puhani, P. 96 quality of life and EU identity and free movement 141, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 151 and immigration 59, 60, 61, 62, 67 media use and EU movers 189, 192, 193, 194, 200 and migration 61, 64, 67 and migration projects in integrating Europe 589, 60, 62, 64, 67 see also satisfaction with life Raijman, R. 72, 74 Raiser, U. 182 Raudenbush, S. 44 Recchi, Ettore 125, 2930, 7297, 126 Reif, K. 157 residence rights of movers 6, 8, 10 retired people Reyni, D. 156, 158 EU identity and free movement 144 migrants 567, 67, 85 relocation 2, 31, 49 in stayer population 33, 36 Richardson, T. 11 rightist tendencies 170, 174 see also leftist tendencies; politicization levels Risse, T. 122 Robins, K. 180
310
Pioneers of European integration migration, economic and family reasons 54 Smith, M. 55 social class and political standing 163 social integration and immigration 87, 110, 111, 11213, 116 and migration 756, 81, 824, 85, 86, 110, 111, 113, 116 social mobility of mobile Europeans 7297 class composition and career prospects 92 class composition of stayers and movers 7680 downward status mobility 73 and economic reasons for moving 21318, 2212 education and class origin 857 education and job mobility 89, 92 and EU free movement regime 746 EU movers and social mobility 756 EU movers in upper class destinations 75 foreign workers in 3D jobs 73 gender and job migration 89 intergenerational immobility 845, 88 intergenerational mobility and class boundaries 808 intragenerational mobility and career prospects 8893 language and job mobility 8992 resettlement costs 75 second and third generation 73 spiralist spatial mobility 75 wage differentials 75 Spain age at migration 414, 46 age of migrants and migration duration 334 age of stayers 34 assimilating Europeans (lifestyle movers) 140, 1445 assimilating non-Europeans (lack of EU attachment) (carefree movers) 140, 146 country of origin, feelings of attachment to 134
Rodriguez, V. 56 Rodriguez-Pose, A. 63 Romania circular mobility, rise of 21920, 221 cultural affinity of migrants and discrimination levels 218, 219 migration, economic motivation 54, 21417 migration restrictions 9, 206, 208, 212 Romero, F. 5 Rother, Nina 12055, 179204 Rottman, D. 4, 95 Rumbaut, R. 73, 102 Ruiz-Gelices, E. 56 Ruspini, P. 53 Ryder, A. 100 Salt, J. 30, 31, 55, 63 Snchez, J. and Fernndez, D. 100 Santacreu, Oscar A. 5271, 98119, 24154 Sapir, A. 10 satellite availability 183, 186 satisfaction with life, and crossculturalism 11417 see also quality of life Scharpf, F. 121 Scheingold, S. 156 Schlesinger, P. 179, 180 Schmidt, V 157 Schmitt, H. 157 Schweisguth, E. 163 Schoorl, J. 1012 Schroedter, J. 36 Seifert, W. 73 Semyonov, M. 72, 74 Sennett, R. 11 sexual orientation, and migration projects in integrating Europe 63 Shore, C. 120 Sides, J. 122 Siedentop, L. 121, 156 Simon, P. 73 Sjastaad, L. 63 Slovakia immigration 15 migration, economic motivation 54 Slovenia immigration 15
Index country of residence, feelings of attachment to 135 cross-national intermarriage 36 discrimination and societal resistance to discrimination 113 education levels 13, 16 electoral participation 172, 174 EU attachment, feelings of 1334 EU membership 9 EU-image 130 EU15 non-national residents 12, 2930 free movement rights 36 integrating Europeans 140 integrating non-Europeans (lack of EU attachment) (bi-cultural movers) 143 internet access 197, 198 intragenerational class mobility among EU movers 94 labour costs, median hourly 96 leftist tendencies and politicization levels amongst movers 16670 movers and EU citizenship interest 165 national versus European identity, movers and stayers 1312 non-integrating Europeans 140 politicization levels 161, 16570 retired people in stayer population 33 retiree migrants in 56, 67, 85 rightist tendencies among movers 170 self-marginalising Europeans (cosmopolitans) 140, 150 self-marginalising non-Europeans (lack of EU attachment) (individualists) 140, 151 self-segregation non Europeans (lack of EU attachment) 140, 148 voting rights information search by movers and country of residence 176 Spain, immigration 12, 13, 15, 2930, 37, 389, 469, 54, 59, 67 and A8 countries 205, 212, 215, 217, 218, 220, 221 and class composition 768, 7980 cultural integration 110, 111, 112, 115
311
education levels 32, 40, 41, 64 and employment levels 323, 789 and employment opportunities 323, 61, 62, 789, 85 family support 623, 65 friendship relations 107 and geographic mobility 35 and homesickness 117 job mobility 91 and language competence 103, 104, 105, 106 national orientation and mobility expectations 107, 108, 109 and newspaper reading 192, 193, 195 and quality of life 59, 60, 61, 62, 67 and satisfaction with life 114, 115, 116 and social integration 110, 111, 113, 116 and social mobility 81, 85, 87 TV use 184, 185, 187, 188, 190 and world events, seeking information on 199, 200 Spain, migration 12, 30, 37, 389, 479, 54 and class composition 76, 7780 cultural integration 110, 111, 112, 115 education levels 32, 3741, 61 and employment opportunities 60, 623, 7880 family support 61, 623, 656, 67 friendship relations 107 and homesickness 117 job mobility 62, 90 and language competence 104, 105, 106 national orientation and mobility expectations 107, 108, 109 and newspaper reading 191, 192, 193, 195, 196 orientation towards country of origin 102 and social integration 110, 111, 11213, 116 and social mobility 76, 824, 85, 86 TV use 184, 185 and TV use 184, 187, 188, 190 and world events, seeking information on 199, 200, 201
312
Pioneers of European integration EU migrants in 68 inter-regional migration 95 social mobility for migrants 73 tripartite identities 127 Van der Eijk, C. 157 Van der Velde, M. 96 Van Ham, M. 89 Van Houtum, H. 96 Vermeulen, N. 73 Vickerman, R. 96 voting rights 7, 8, 1767 see also electoral participation Wchter, B. 53, 54, 206 Wagner, A. 85 Waldinger, R. 73 Wallace, C. 65, 206 Wallace, W. 154 Watson, W. 75 Weiss, A. 95 welfare rights, and European integration 7, 8 White, R. 5 Wiener, A. 5, 157, 171 Williams, A. 54 workforce position and European integration 16, 20, 37, 46 see also job mobility world events, seeking information on, and media use of EU movers 199201 Xiaoming, H. 181 Yaish, M. 73, 75 Zak, I. 100 Zhang, K. 181 Zhou, M. 102, 180, 181 Zimmermann, K. 31, 53, 63, 64, 72, 73 Znaniecki, F. 181
Sreberny, A. 180 Stevens, J. 99 Stola, D. 206 Straubhaar, T. 206 Strudel, S. 173 students and Erasmus and Socrates programmes, European integration 2, 56, 59, 69, 70 and European integration 7, 556 see also education levels Suinn, R. 100 Sweden education levels 13, 19 EU15 non-national residents 12 immigrants and media use 181 immigration 9, 13, 15, 205 immigration of A8 members 205 migration 13 Szapocznik, J. 100 Tajfel, H. 121, 122, 219 Tambini, Damian 179204 Taylor, D. 100 Teske, R. 100 Thomas, W. 181 Tillman, E. 157 Todaro, M. 63 Torpey, J. 1 Turkey migration, economic motivation 54 migration and media markets accessibility 182 migration and social mobility 36, 73 Turner, J. 122 TV use 18490, 201 Uaner, E., 206 US acculturation measurement 100 assimilation distinctions 102 cross-state and regional movement 3, 8

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Pioneers of European Integration

A Cosimo e Giovanni, veri pionieri

Pioneers of European Integration

224 241 255 289 297

Pioneers of European integration

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MOBILE EUROPEANS IN EU STATISTICS

Pioneers of European integration

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Stocks of foreign population in EU25 member states (2004)

Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden Total

1.8 2.3 0.6 2.3 6.6 5.3 5.0

1.8 20.7 4.3 2.7 13.0 37.8 27.9

2 041 855 10 491 201 25 240 24 039 830 955

0.3 0.4 35.1 0.4 0.9 5.0 3.7

97.9 79.0 60.6 96.9 86.1 57.1 68.4

Eurostat Dissemination Database (domain: Population and Social Conditions)

Pioneers of European integration

A GUIDE TO THE VOLUME

57.5 55.5 55.9 29.9

5.9 24.8 6.1 18.2

32.0 18.3 33.1 49.2 56.3 50.0

52.6 24.6 45.3 26.6 35.8

29.6 57.1 40.6 55.6 45.2

17.8 18.3 14.1 17.8 18.0

35.9 62.9 17.6 62.6 71.8 47.1 71.6

32.5 37.0 32.6 46.3 67.7 47.6

40.5 42.4 40.4 36.1 18.8 35.1

27.0 20.6 27.0 17.6 13.5 17.3

44.6 48.1 70.5 49.4 48.2 64.1 48.9

39.3 37.0 19.6 36.0 32.3 19.6 31.7

16.1 14.9 9.9 14.6 19.5 16.3 19.4

59.3 65.4 61.3

35.1 46.2 55.7 46.8

29.2 32.2 29.4 39.7 47.2 40.4

45.5 40.0 45.1 41.2 32.2 40.6

25.3 27.8 25.5 19.1 20.6 19.0

23.7 22.3 23.9 36.6 37.1 37.2

51.7 45.7 51.1 42.4 39.3 41.9

24.6 32.0 25.0 21.0 23.6 20.9

Labour Force Survey, spring data

Pioneers of European integration

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Pioneers of European integration

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Pioneers of European integration

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The demographics of movers and stayers in the European Union

The demographics of movers and stayers

Pioneers of European integration