7 15 13 0204 61383 Declaration Coughlin Support Motion To HOld in Contempt All Those Herein Detailed WCSO Burglaries Per Within 24 Hours Summary Eviction Lockout Horders NRS 40.253 (5) (A) 13-20581

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
Z COUGHLIN
APPELLANT
V.
state bar oI nevada,
respondent; Matt Merliss, Reno Justice Court
Second Judicial District Court, Washoe
Legal Services, et al
)
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Supreme Court No: 62337, 61383, 61901,
63041, 60317, 60302, 62104, 60838,
62821, etc.
DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
HOLD IN CONTEMPT ALL THOSE HEREIN DETAILED AS DESERVING AND FOR
EXTRAORDINARY INTERVENTION
COMES NOW, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ., and hereby swears under
penalty oI pejury that the Iollowing is true and based upon his Iirst hand knowledge:
Due to the Iraud oI the OBC's King and Peters Coughlin was nearly shot in the head at
a range oI Iour Ieet on 3/8/13 by RPD OIIicer Waddle, incident to his violating protocol and
pulling his gun and proceeding in violation oI Coughlin's rental agreement into a Ienced
backyard area prior to making any announcement oI his presence as law enIorcement or
otherwise issuing a single command or instruction. Coughlin's law license should be
reinstated immediately. Judge CliIton et al are using its temporary suspension as a
mechanism to prevent Coughlin Irom utilizing subpoenas, where the RJC is goign so Iar as to
reIuse to provide Coughlin with even clerk issued subpoenas.
52 Am. Jur. 2d Mandamus 409: Court`s right to ignore characterization of
pleadings-Appeal as petition Mandamus 154(2)
An appellate court may have the discretion to treat a purported appeal Irom a
nonappealable order as a petition Ior writ oI mandate,1 iI (1) the brieIs and record beIore the
court contain all the elements prescribed Ior an original mandate proceeding 2 and (2) unusual
circumstances justiIy the exercise oI the court`s discretionary power.3 Other authority has
declined to set out a bright-line test Ior determining when a particular Iiling will be treated as
a mandamus petition and when it will be treated as a notice oI appeal.4 Reviewing courts
have treated as petitions or complaints Ior mandamusan attempted appeal of a
nonappealable order denying a request Ior a trial and instructing a special master to continue
meeting with the parties.8 an attempted appeal Irom a denial oI mandamus.9 The Iederal
courts also hold that a court without direct appellate jurisdiction nevertheless is
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DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN
Electronically Filed
Jul 15 2013 09:17 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
Clerk of Supreme Court
Docket 61383 Document 2013-20581
state
OF EMERGENCY IN WASHOE COUNTY WCSO TRESPASSED AGAINST COUGHLIN INCIDENT TO AT
LEAST THREE EVICTIONS (11/1/11, 3/15/12, 6/28/12) REFUSING to abide by Nevada
law, which requires 24 hours to pass from the posting of a lockout order, instead
sheriff posts and breaks into Coughlin's rental in one trip (just hours after the
hearing on 3/15/12, which Judge Beesley found to be evidence of Coughlin's lack
of fitness, its easier to demonize a solo attorney than recognize the misconduct
of law enforcement, obviously.
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empowered to treat an appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus or motion for leave
to file a petition,10. Likewise, the decision oI a court oI appeals to sua sponte treat an
improper appeal oI a nonIinal order as a petition Ior a writ oI mandamus is discretionary.12
However, a court oI appeals treats an appeal as a writ oI mandamus only in extraordinary13
or exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power, or where a clear
abuse of discretion will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.14
Observation: Where a Iederal court determines that it lacks appellate jurisdiction but
that a petition Ior writ oI mandamus is appropriate, the better course is to treat the appeal as a
motion Ior leave to Iile a petition Ior writ oI mandamus, rather than as a petition Ior writ oI
mandamus, in order to aIIord an opportunity Ior response by the respondent district judge.17
(NOTE: arguably Coughlin's 10/26/11 attempted submission in CV11-03051, and the Court
oI Appeal would treat employee`s appeal Irom order compelling arbitration as a petition Ior
writ oI mandate; issue oI whether arbitration agreement was unconscionable was one oI law
based on undisputed Iacts and had been Iully brieIed, the record was suIIicient to consider the
issue and it appeared that the trial court would be only a nominal party, and any reversal oI
the order would come in a post-arbitration award aIter the substantial time and expense oI
arbitrating the dispute such that dismissing the appeal would require the parties to arbitrate
nonarbitrable claims and would be costly and dilatory. Compton v. Superior Court, 214 Cal.
App. 4th 873, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 413 (2d Dist. 2013). |END OF SUPPLEMENT| Footnotes 1
Moore v. Strickland, 54 So. 3d 906 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010); Sheller v. Superior Court, 158 Cal.
App. 4th 1697, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 207 (2d Dist. 2008), as modiIied on denial oI reh`g, (Feb. 6,
2008). 2 Angell v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 4th 691, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 657 (4th Dist.
1999). 3 In re Marriage oI LaIkas, 153 Cal. App. 4th 1429, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 100 (2d Dist.
2007). 4 Ex parte Burch, 730 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 1999). 5 State ex rel. Luedtke v. Bertrand, 220
Wis. 2d 574, 583 N.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1998), decision aII`d, 226 Wis. 2d 271, 594 N.W.2d
370 (1999). 6 Township oI East Taylor v. Spanko, 128 Pa. Commw. 24, 562 A.2d 962 (1989).
7 Clark County Liquor and Gaming Licensing Bd. v. Clark, 102 Nev. 654, 730 P.2d 443
(1986). 8 Ramirez v. Rivera-Dueno, 861 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1988). 9 State ex rel. Johnston v.
Luckenbill, 975 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1998). 10 Korea Exchange Bank, New York
Branch v. Trackwise Sales Corp., 66 F.3d 46 (3d Cir. 1995). 11 Mangold v. Analytic
Services, Inc., 77 F.3d 1442 (4th Cir. 1996). 12 McClendon v. City oI Albuquerque, 630 F.3d
1288 (10th Cir. 2011). 13 Z-Seven Fund, Inc. v. Motorcar Parts & Accessories, 231 F.3d
1215, 47 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1434 (9th Cir. 2000). 14 Rodriguez v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 627
F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 2010). 15 Simmons v. City oI Racine, PFC (Police and Fire Com`n), 37
F.3d 325, 29 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1176 (7th Cir. 1994). 16 McClendon v. City oI Albuquerque,
630 F.3d 1288 (10th Cir. 2011). 17. In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litigation, 35 F.3d 637 (2d
Cir. 1994).
Bankruptcy judge's ruling upon issue oI his disqualiIication is interlocutory and is
technically not appealable until Iinal judgment has been entered, but it is reviewable by way
oI petition Ior mandamus, and, iI interlocutory appeal is Iiled, reviewing court will treat
appeal as petition Ior writ oI mandamus. In re Olson, D.C.Neb.1982, 20 B.R. 206.
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Summary 1udgment; Mandamus, review Supreme Court would deny petition Ior
mandamus challenging district court's denial oI summary judgment, even though the
opposition to the summary judgment had not been supported with any aIIidavits or other
documents, where the court could perceive no substantial issue oI public policy or
precedential value in the case. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56. Poulos v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court
oI State oI Nev. In and For Clark County, 1982, 652 P.2d 1177, 98 Nev. 453 . Mandamus 51
Denial oI summary judgment is reviewable by proceedings in mandamus. Rules oI Civil
Procedure, Rule 56(c); Rules oI Appellate Procedure, Rule 3A(b)(5). Lapica v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court In and For Clark County, 1981, 624 P.2d 1003, 97 Nev. 86. Mandamus
51 A writ oI mandamus will issue to compel entry oI a summary judgment when there is no
genuine issue as to any material Iact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oI law.
NRCP 56(c); NRAP 3A(b)(5). Sandler v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court In and For Clark
County, 1980, 614 P.2d 10, 96 Nev. 622. Mandamus 51 Denial oI summary judgment is
reviewable by proceedings in mandamus. NRAP 3A(b)(5). Sorenson v. Pavlikowski, 1978,
581 P.2d 851, 94 Nev. 440, 2 A.L.R.4th 277. Mandamus 51 Fact that iI judgment were
rendered against petitioners aIter a trial they could appeal and have denial oI their motion Ior
summary judgment reviewed did not preclude issuance oI writ oI mandamus requiring
dismissal. N.R.S. 34.160, 34.170; NRCP 56(e). Dzack v. Marshall, 1964, 393 P.2d 610, 80
Nev. 345. Mandamus 4(3)
Really, Coughlin's
52 Am. Jur. 2d Mandamus: " 408. Court`s right to ignore characterization of
pleadings Mandamus 154(2)
In determining whether a writ oI mandamus should issue, courts generally are not
limited by the denomination of the relator`s pleadings.1 II a pleading, by its allegations
and the relieI requested, discloses an action in mandamus, it will be so treated.2 Courts
recognizes a suit Ior injunctive relieI as a pleading Ior mandamus.7 Courts have treated a
variety oI documents as a pleading Ior mandamus, including a petition Ior a writ oI
prohibition.9 petition praying that a judge be compelled to do an act.12 Observation: It has
been held that the determination on a petition in the nature oI mandamus brought by a pro se
petitioner shoula not be maae on technical proceaural grounas with respect to the form of the
petition,13 and that deIects as to Iorm oI the petition, while not to be condoned especially
where papers are prepared by an attorney, (NOTE: where the justice court and NNDB Panel
both continually denied suspended attorney Coughlin the right to issue subpoenas (much to
his detriment in 62337 despite the Iact that the NNDB/Panel/SBN Clerk oI Court/OBC
indicated Coughlin had the right to do so under SCR 105(4), whereupon NNDB Panel Chair
Echeverria, where not such jurisdiction is accorded the Panel Chair, ruled on Coughlin's SCR
110 subpoenas, quashing them on an ex parte basis on 11/7/12 incident to an ex parte 11/2/11
Motion by the SBN's OBC's King) may be overlooked by the court in its discretion.14
Nevertheless, beIore recharacterizing a petition Ior mandamus, a trial court must (1) notiIy the
petitioner oI the court`s intent to recharacterize the pleading, (2) warn the petitioner oI the
consequences oI the proposed recharacterization, and (3) provide the litigant an opportunity to
withdraw the pleading or to amend it.15
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Footnotes 1 Martinez v. State, 110 N.M. 357, 796 P.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1990). 2
Martinez v. State, 110 N.M. 357, 796 P.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1990). 7 Rizzo v. Terenzi, 619 F.
Supp. 1186 (E.D. N.Y. 1985). Sanctioned litigant`s motions and appeals challenging a district
court`s reIusal to accept Ior Iiling papers that were submitted in violation oI an antiIiling
injunction would be construed as petitions Ior mandamus. Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155
(2d Cir. 2005). 9 State ex rel. Beirne v. Smith, 214 W. Va. 771, 591 S.E.2d 329 (2003). 10
Revere v. Reed, 675 So. 2d 292 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1996). 12 Parker v. Saline County, 288
Ark. 108, 702 S.W.2d 7 (1986). 13 Sackinger v. Nevins, 114 Misc. 2d 454, 451 N.Y.S.2d
1005 (Sup 1982).
Even iI a direct appeal by the State is not proper, a court may have the discretion to treat an
appeal Irom an order lacking judicial support as iI it were brought on a petition Ior a writ oI
certiorari.State v. Rowe, 374 Ark. 19, 2008 WL 2447461 (2008); State v. Hernandez, 875 So.
2d 1271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2004)."
"In Anvui (Case No 48467) the 12/11/06 Docketing Statement contains, at page 11, the
summary eviction order appeal which lends credence to Coughlin's position that Nevada law
requires, merciIiully, the posting oI any such summary lockout or removal order, then the
passing oI 24 hours, prior to the sheriII or constable eIIecting a lockout (such was already
required by NRS 40.253(5)(a), but became even more requisite upon the passing in 2011 oI
NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2)). The Order in Anvui contains the Iollowing on its last page (something
noticeably missing Irom the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE Coughlin appealed to the District Court):
"ALL OCCUPANTS: YOU AND ALL OF YOU ARE HEREBY 'ORDERED TO VACATE
THIS PROPERTY AFTER RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER. THE CONSTABLE OF LAS
VEGAS TOWNSHIP WILL RETURN TO PREMISES AND REMOVE, YOU. AND ALL
OF YOU TO THE STREET PURSUANT TO THIS COURT ORDER CONSTABLE LAS
VEGAS, NV...Eviction will take place on NOV 28 2006. THIS IS WITHIN 24 HRS" (page 2
oI such Order does contain the "within twenty-Iour (24) hours aIter receipt oI this Order"
language required by NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2),(5)(a) that the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE at issue in
the case at bar lacks, where such Anvui Order read: "THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJ1JDGED AND DECREED that that the Constable, within twenty-Iour (24)
hours aIter receipt oI this Order , using all necessary Iorce as may be required , is hereby
authorized to enter upon the Subject Property and Premises known generally as 1050 South
Rampart Boulevard , Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 and legally described Lot 1, Block 1 oI the
Peccole Ranch Town Center, also reIerred to as Clark County Assessors Parcel No. 138 -32-
412-024 , and to summarily remove PlaintiII ANVUI, LLC dba" while the 10/27/11
FOFCOLOSE tenant Coughlin appealed merely reads: "That the sheriII...be, and hereby is,
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directed to remove each and every person found upon the rental unit at 121 River Rock, ...,
by no later than October 31, 2011 at 5 pm. Landlord is hereby awarded the right oI
possession oI the premises."
This goes to the NRAP 38 basis Ior awarding a monumental attorney Iee award to
Coughlin, against Merliss and his attorney's Baker and Hill (though, NRS 7.085, in
incorporating NRCP 11, given NRS 40.400, may not actually allow Ior such personaly
liability Ior the meritless litigating done by Merliss's attorneys, whom successIully obtained a
$42K attorney Iee award against Coughlin (though, such does not speciIically Iind such is
entered against Coughlin personally, in his role as his own attorney, thereby oIIering Iurther
prooI that such 6/25/12 Order awarding attorney's Iees was not a "sanction" or otherwise
prooI oI any Iinding that Coughlin engaged in any sanctionable behavior (as does also the
8/28/12 Order in 03628, which indicates that the 2JDC had yet to Iind Coughlin committed
any Irivolous conduct...and all that is on top oI the Iact that the judge entering such did not
report Coughlin to any authorities (or even talk to Coughlin directly), as NCJC Canon 2 Rule
2.15
would require, so, uh, Asst. Bar Counsel King, that whole trying to apply as a collateral bar
(in the Iormal disciplinary proceeding resulting in a recommendation to permanently disbar
Coughlin by an egregiously negligent and derelict NNDB Panel consisting oI John
Echeverria, Michael K. Johnson, Clark Vellis, Stephen Smiley Kent, and Karen Pearl, whom
all should be completely ashamed oI themselves and voluntarily surrender their law licenses
Ior no less than two years each, a period oI time during which they should all oI them spend
taking one gigantically long good hard look in the mirror, at which point they should take oII
their shoes and socks and go and put their Ieet in the river or something suitably
transIormative, lyrical, and spiritually potent enough to address idious character deIects
within each oI them that have resulted in each oI them becoming the shameIul men they one
and all are, and may well have always been. Patrick O. King too.) Judge Nash Holme's void
2/28/12 or 3/12/12 Orders in that "simple traIIic citation" trial stemming Irom the traIIic ticket
given Coughlin outside Richard G. Hill, Esq's oIIice aIter the RPD told him to leave upon Hill
insisting on continuing to possess the Iurther the property he stole Irom Coughlin (what else
do you call it when Hill goes into another attorney's law oIIice and takes his laptops, hard
drives, smartphone, keys, wallet, and his clients Iiles until Coughlin Iinally Iorced the justice
court to order it returned six weeks later?) ("NCJC Canon 2, Rule2.15(B),(D)Responding
to ... Lawyer Misconduct: "...(B)A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a
violation of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question
regarding the lawyer`s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects
shall inIorm the appropriate authority.... (D)A judge who receives inIormation indicating a
substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation oI the Nevada Rules oI
ProIessional Conduct shall take appropriate action. COMMENT |1|... Ignoring or denying
known misconduct among one`s judicial colleagues or members oI the legal proIession
unaermines a fuages responsibility to participate in efforts to ensure public respect for the
fustice system." (so, where Judge Flanagan did not such reporting, either nothing Coughlin did
in 1708 or 03628 is a violation oI Nevada's RPC, or this is Coughlin's reporting Judge
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Flanagan's Iailure to so report Coughlin's own alleged misconduct, either or) |2|A judge who
does not have actual knowledge that ... a lawyer may have committed misconduct but receives
inIormation indicating a substantial likelihood oI such misconduct, is required to take
appropriate action under paragraphs (C) and (D). Appropriate action may include, but is
not limited to, communicating directly with the judge who may have violated this Code,
communicating with a supervising judge, or reporting the suspected violation to the
appropriate authority or other agency or body. Similarly, actions to be taken in response
to information indicating that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Aevada Rules of
Professional Conduct may include but are not limited to communicating directly with the
lawyer who may have committed the violation or reporting the suspected violation to the
appropriate authority or other agency or body."
Judge Flanagan did not make any report concerning Coughlin to the SBN. Further,
thanks to the genius or Richard G. Hill, Esq., it is Iurther known that Judge Flanagan did not
Iind Coughlin vexatious , by virtue oI the 6/24/13 letter Hil sent the AOC, which he copied
Coughlin on, which read: "Re: Zachary B. Coughlin, State Bar No. 9473 (suspended) Judge
Flanagan: As you may be aware, Supreme Court Rule 9.5 was recently amended. It
requires the reporting oI individuals cited by courts as vexatious litigators to the
Administrative Office of the Courts. On August 28, 212, you entered an order in the case
oI Coughlin v. Merliss (CV11-03628) sanctioning Mr. Coughlin as a vexatious litigator. I
triea reporting your finaing to the Administrative OIIice oI the Court. They rejected my
notice and told me that the court is required to make the report to: Administrative OIIice oI
the Courts... Sincerely, /s/ Richard G. Hill, Esq....cc: Mr. Coughlin, Dr. Merliss"
NVB Judge Beesley (whom the OBC's King Iraudulently Iailed to identiIy as a witness
by constructive notice under NRCP 6(3) until the day beIore Coughlin's 11/14/12 Iormal
disciplinary hearing, testiIied as to Coughlin appearance beIore him on 3/15/12 in Cadle Co.
v. Keller, an adversary proceeding hearing held at 2:30 pm that day, where the WCSO, with
Sue King, the property manager Ior Park Terrace Townhomes (which was represented by
Gayle Kern, Esq. at the 8:30 am summary eviction proceeding in RJC Rev2012-000374,
where Kern Iailed to Iile any "landlord's aIIidavit" prior to such hearing, and saw Coughlin
walking into the courtroom as she was leaving it, having just obtained a wrongIul summary
eviction order that the WCSO would compound by trespassing into Coughlin's Iormer home
law oIIice at 1422 E. 9th St. #2 with guns drawn, having Iailed to identiIy themselves as law
enIorcement, or in any way, prior to utilizing the services oI a locksmith to break into
Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice, whereupon Sue King, whom was standing by watching
this with her associate Jared Scalise, neither oI whom have a law license, then proceeded to
trespass into Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice, whereupon a great deal oI property damage
was done in a willIul manner, King have the vast majority oI Coughlin's property removed
Irom the premises beIore the 24 hours notice period would even pass.
Judge Schroeder took the 374 case out oI the order he had planned to take the case on
his docket, as indicated on the records (Irom the JAVS audio transcript) upon his clerk
suggesting that he do so to get a quick deIault against Coughlin. Judge Schroeder and the
clerk saw Coughlin enter the courtroom immediately aIter Gayle Kern, Esq. leIt it, and
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witnessed Coughlin sit patiently watching Washoe Legal Services Marc Ashley do his
Washington Generals routine as a "landlord tenant law attorney" Ior "legal aid provide"
Washoe Legal Services (Ashley reIuses to argue Ior set oII or damages Ior his clients unless
they provide receipts, though he Iails to object when landlords provide only verbal testimony
on similar matters). RJC Judge Schroeder lacked jurisdiction to enter any such order where
Park Terrace had Iailed to comply with NRS 40.253(6)'s requirement that such hearing shall
only take place "upon the Iiling" oI the aIIidavits by the parties. Coughlin Iiled his with an
extensive pre-hearing brieI and claims or counterclaims on 3/7/12 (with Kern Iraudulent
shiIting oI the basis Ior seeking an eviction upon reading Coughlin's 3/7/12 Pre-Hearing BrieI,
which detailed the extent to which Glazier prohibits or make substantially more diIIicult and
complicated the use oI such summary procedures against Coughlin's sub-lessors where Parke
Terrace admits to having agreed to a sort oI employment relationship with Christopher
Allaback in exhange Ior allowing him to reside therein (against whom he had obtained
domestic violence protection order in FV12-000187, 188, though Judge Jordan was Iar more
interested in attempting to take Coughlin's deposition at the extension hearing as to landlord
tenant matters than anything related to domestic violence). Additionally, NRS 40.254 bars
the use oI the summary procedures in NRS 40.253 against Coughlin whom was using the
'premises" as, again, both a "dwelling place" and a "solo law oIIice", which his lease
expressly allowed Ior (NRS 118A.160).
It is particularly interesting to note how dubious RJC Judge Schroeder's jurisprudence
was in this case, upon reviewing the lack oI jurisdictional prerequisites Ior him to enter the
3/15/12 Lockout Order that he entered, then to consider his subsequent 5/2/12 Order denying
Coughlin's motion Ior new trial, in which Schroeder writes:
"ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, OR PLED IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
THE SUMMARY EVICTION ORDER AND THE ORDER FOLLOWING HEARING ON
MOTION TO CONTEST PERSONAL PROPERTY LIEN, TOLLING THE DEADLINE TO
FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL FOR ALL ORDERS On or about March 23, 2012, Pro Se
Attorney Litigant/Tenant, Zach Coughlin ("Coughlin") Iiled his Motion Ior Reconsideration,
or Pled in the Alternative, Motion Ior New Trial and or Motion to Alter or Amend the
Summary Eviction Order and the Order Following Hearing on Motion to Contest Personal
Property Lien, Tolling the Deadline to File a Notice oI Appeal Ior all Orders ("Motion"). Park
Terrace Townhomes Association ("Park Terrace") Iiled an Opposition to Coughlin's Motion
on Apri1 9, 2012. On April 30, 2012, Coughlin's Motion along with Park Terrace's
Opposition was submitted to the court Ior decision.
The Court has review and considered Coughlin's Motion and Park Terrace's
Opposition, together with exhibits attached thereto. The Court has Iurther considered the
papers and pleadings on Iile herein, together with any attached exhibits, and the applicable
law.
Based upon its review, the Court finds that there is no legal or factual basis for
Coughlin's Motion. Coughlin was properly evicted from the Park 1errace premises by
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virtue of this Court's March 15, 212 Order, and the subsequent March 22, 2012 Order
allowed suIIicient time Ior Coughlin to retrieve his personal property Irom storage, at no cost
to Coughlin. Coughlin to retrieve his personal property Irom storage, at no cost to Coughlin.
No personal property lien currently exists. To the extent any oI Coughlin's personal property
remains in storage, all he need do is make prompt arrangements to retrieve such property.
GOOD CAUSE APPEARING THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Coughlin's Motion is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Coughlin make arrangements with Park Terrace
within ten (10) days Irom the date oI this Order to retrieve any remaining personal property
Irom storage. AIter the expiration oI ten (10) days Irom the date oI this Order, should any oI
Coughlin's personal property remain in storage, Park Terrace may, at its option, charge
Coughlin a reasonable storage Iee Ior each day thereaIter, in accord with Nevada law.
Dated this 15th day oI May, 2012. /s/ Jack Schroeder, Justice oI the Peace
The undersigned, pursuant to NRS 239B.030, does hereby aIIlrm that this document
does not contain the social security number oI any person. DATED this 11th day oI May,
2012.
Kern & Associates, LTD. /s/ Karen M. Gejaslieg (possibly an attorney in "Karen M.
Ayarbe", but, possibly not) Ior Gayle A. Kern, Es.q Attorneys Ior Park Terrace Townhomes
Association".
Coughlin was never provided any such proposed Order that Kern somehow submitted
to Judge Schroeder. The RJC did not mail out such 5/15/12 Order to Coughlin either, and
such lacks any CertiIicate oI Service thereto. Kern's 5/2/12 Request Ior Submission indicates
such Request was mailed to Coughlin, the the "PO Box 60952" was no longer valid Ior
Coughlin, which Coughlin apprised Park Terrace oI on 4/16/12. The Iailure to send Coughlin
such 5/15/12 Order, the placement oI an invalid address Ior Coughlin on the 5/2/12 Request
Ior Submission and the RJC's Iailure to Iile stamp in an transmit Coughlin's 3/19/12
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 9:8 to 11:5) "MR. KING: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Beesley, the panel consists oI John Echeverria -- I'm not pronouncing the name -- but
there's Iive panel members. JUDGE BEESLEY: John Echeverria. You have not spent
enough time in Aevada. MR. KING: That is correct. Thank you Ior that. Across Irom me is
sitting Mr. Coughlin, Zachary Coughlin. And in the room also is a court reporter. There's no
one else in the room other than some court security. (NOTE: okay, King, iI you want to called
2JDC Judge Linda Gardner's BailiII Deputy Kirkham "security", whatever) So what I'm going
to ask you, Judge Beesley, iI you could explain to the panel your knowledge oI Mr. Coughlin
relative to the Aevada Rules of Professional Conduct related to -- MR. COUGHLIN:
Objection. Relevancy. ...BRUCE BEESLEY Having been Iirst duly sworn, testiIied as
Iollows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KING: Q Judge Beesley, can you explain to
the panel your knowledge in this relevant time Irame 2011-2012 regarding Mr. Coughlin and
his conduct in your court? A Mr. Coughlin appeared in my court a couple oI times, at least
two or three times. (NOTE: Coughlin appeared beIore Judge Beesley on exactly three
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occasions, once Ior Gessin in 11-05078, 05077 in early April 2012, an Ior Keller (10-05104)
in January 2012, March 15th, 2012, (all other appearances were extremely short an related to
withdrawing Irom those cases in light oI the temporary suspension in 60838) The Iirst time I
recall him coming to my court (NOTE: Beesley is reIerring to the 3/15/12 2:30 pm hearing in
Cadle Co. v. Keller 10-05104 where Coughlin appeared minutes aIter Irantically grabbing
what hard drives and client's Iiles he could incident to Kern's "associate" WNM's King and
the WCSO criminally trespassing into Coughlin's home law oIIice, guns drawn, and
"removing" him prior to an posting oI the 24 hour lockout notice statutorily required by NRS
40.253(6) (the WCSO readily admits that it does not Ieel making two trips (one to post, and
another 24 judicial hours later to eIIect the lockout noticed in such posting) it required oI it,
unlike the sheriII an or constable oI every other county in Nevada) he came in, he was
wearing, I think, a 1-shirt and a tie, and no jacket. And he indicated that he had been
evicted from his residence or his office, indicating it was not because of not paying the rent,
and that that was why he wasn't what I would consider appropriately dressed. I apologize. I
don't have my letter in front of me. But my recollection is that he had Iiled a pleading on
behalI oI his client in regard to some aspect oI a bankruptcy case, and that the pleading was
lengthy, didn't make any sense, and just sort oI rambled through a great deal oI irrelevant
stuII. I had him a couple other times in my court and had the same experience, that -- he was
dressed appropriately the other times I had him there, and he was very polite and appeared to
be a very intelligent man."
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 22:10 to 25:15) (Coughlin):" Q What review did you
undertake oI my work product and Iilings in your court to come to your opinions? A I
looked through two or three pleadings that you had Iiled in, I think you had one or perhaps
two cases, and read them. And I observed you arguing in court. Q When speciIically? A I
don't recall. Q Was your testimony earlier today that the first time you recall being aware
of me was when I appeared at the March 15th hearing in Cado Company v. Keller at 2:3
P.M. shortly after being evicted at gunpoint by the Washoe County Sheriffs -- A I actually
think you had appeared in Iront oI me one time beIore that. (NOTE: that is true, an
appearance Ior Keller to ever so brieIly argue that Cadle Co. should not be permitted to
amend its Complaint...Coughlin was permitted to speak by Judge Beesley Ior less than 75
seconds and essentially recounted the arguments in the attached Iiling oI 11/23/12 in 10-
05104) But that was my Iirst strong recollection oI you appearing in Iront oI me. Q And it
was that brief interaction whereupon you formed your opinion that I wasn't fit to practice?
A Ao. I thought it was odd, but I do understand that people have adversity in their lives
sometimes, which happens -- Q You took it to be adversity rather than misconduct by the
sheriff? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you interrupted the witness. (NOTE: typically,
such an assertion would be made in the Iorm oI an objection by opposing counsel, not the Iact
Iinder) MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, Judge. THE WITNESS:
And I believe that you had filed some pleading in that case. And I went to the pleadings,
and they frankly didn't make any sense. (NOTE: so, theoretically, Coughlin's pleadings prior
to 3/15/12 in 10-05104 should support Judge Beesley's contentions, though Coughlin's
3/14/12 Iiling ought be measure in the context oI Coughlin having an impending wrongIul
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summary eviction hearing on 3/15/12 in RJC Rev2011-00374), having only received on
3/12/12 (and responding to the SBN in writing that day) the SBN's correspondence dated
2/14/12 (FHE 6) (due to the USPS Golden Valley Station reIusing to let Coughlin have a key
to his own mailbox at his Iormer home law oIIice and the USPS's peculiarly inconsistent
treatment oI Coughlin's mail during that period oI time, wherein some was delivered, but a
great deal was aIIixed with a yellow "return to sender" sticked, including some orders Irom
the RMC), NV Energy and WNM having conspired to turn oII the electricty to Coughlin's
Iormer home law oIIice Ior seven days in late February 2012 (even where Coughlin attempted
to pay Ior the electricity and have it put in his name where domestic violence victim
Coughlin's Iormer sublessors moved out, Coughlin's oIIice computer became inIected with a
terribly burdensome Zone Alarm anti-virus issue that essentially took a week to sort out (one
is not allowed to remove Zone Alarm anti-virus without a great deal oI pain)...NV Energy
(and the USPS Golden Valley Station, by the way) reIuse to countenance Nevada law under
NRS 118A.160) And I think you subsequently Iiled pleadings in other cases which also didn't
make any sense, and I became concerned. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q At what point did you --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. Coughlin. Quit interrupting the witness. MR.
COUGHLIN: I thought he was done, sir. I'm sorry. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, Judge.
THE WITNESS: I became concerned, and I undertook Iurther inquiry with Mr. Swobe
Iollowing that. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Your Honor, I would like to narrow it down. When
did you Iirst contact the State Bar about me? ... A I think it was perhaps a month or six
weeks after my first recollection of you appearing, my first recollection of you appearing
in front of me after you had been evicted. Q You would be reIerring to the T-shirt and tie
incident? A Yes. Q With a suit jacket on though? A Yeah. And your apology was
satisIactory, although I thought your appearance was odd. Q Do you recall a hearing prior to
that in that same Cado Company v. Keller wherein Cado sought to amend their adversary
proceeding charges, and there was maybe a five- to ten-minute hearing on that incident to
which I submitted about a 15-page motion addressing the salient points of law in that
setting? A I cannot place it in the context oI that case. But I do remember you submitting a
motion describing some points oI law on something, and I didn't think that that was competent
work, Irankly. Q You're reIerring to which motion? A I don't know. I don't have any motion
in Iront oI me. Q So you have a fairly strong opinion on it, yet you don't recall any
specifics. Would that be an accurate assessment of your testimony? A What I recall is that
your appearance in court was odd, and your pleadings were not truly comprehensible, and
that and further inquires made me concerned that you were having some difficulties that
prevented you from serving your client appropriately."
Due to King and Beesley's pronouncement at the start oI the hearing, that this surprise
witness would only be available Ior questioning between 9:00 am and 9:30 am (and the
hearing was noticed Ior 9:00 am and constructive notice under NRCP 6(e) incident to some
11/7/12 Order by the Panel hardly supports a view that the hearing was to start at 8:45 am.
Coughlin, oI course, was not only prejudiced by the the OBC's King's Iailure to timely
identiIy or supplement his witness list (not to mention his speciIication oI the Iacts and
subject matter such witnesses were to testiIy to) as to Beesley or Elcano, but also where
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Coughlin was not able to question Beesely as to these "Iurther inquiries" he brieIly alluded to
beIore Chair Echeverria insisted the judge could testiIy no more.
Did these "Iurther inquiries" include gossiping with Beesley's 1977 McGeorge School
oI Law classmates with an ax to grind and or agenda, WLS's Elcano (whom Coughlin was
wrongIully terminated by (2JDC Judges Adams (60302, which the NSCT reversed in part
due, seemingly to the same dubious lack oI recognition oI Buckwalter as to a Declaration oI
Service oI Process used in lieu oI an aIIidavit, especially where such was on the 2JDC's own
Iorm Ior such, directing the use oI such declarations....consider Judge CliIton's dubious
reIusal on 12/11/12 to comply with NRS 1.235 in light oI his assertion that Coughlin's Motion
to DisqualiIy him was not notarized, but only had a Declaration, even where Coughlin then
cited to NRS 53.045...add to that then ChieI Jduge Steinheimer's 11/8/11 Orders seemingly
deny, at least in part, Coughlin's IFP Motions in CV11-03126 (a qui tam action against Hill,
landlord Merliss, the WCSO (which would on no less than three occasions since 11/1/11
trespass into property Coughlin was renting and assisting in allowing landlord's or their
unauthorized practinioners oI law in doing the same and more) and the Iirst in time appeal oI
the Judge SIerrazza helmed initial summary eviction Irom Coughlin's Iirst home law oIIice
(see 61383) in CV11-03051, Iiled on 10/19/11, making the subsequent, and NRAP 10 and 11
violating Iiling by the RJC oI the ROA Ior that very summary eviction in another case number
(CV11-03628), indicating, to some, perhaps, that the RJC or someone else (Hill?) might
preIer to have Judge Flanagan on that appeal) and Elliott (60317...Rule 2.15 requires action be
taken with respect to Elliott's Iailing to disclose his Presidency oI CAAW's Executive Board
where he presided over Coughlin's lawsuit against CAAW and WLS, same with Sattler's
Iailure to disclose his membership on WLS's Board upon inheriting such case Irom Elliott)
pulled out every stop (probably why ChieI Judge Hardy, on 6/11/13, transIerred all oI
Coughlin's cases to Judge Stiglich (except, curiously MH12-0032, where Judge Breen
removed Coughlin Irom the Mental Health Court where the MHC's Biondo and Dollarhide,
not to mention the WCPD's Rains Iraudulently proceeded in having Coughlin removed
thereIrom Ior taking a medication which Coughlin was told he woudl be permitted to continue
taking and which is not even in any class oI medications that the MHC contract and program
materials identiIy as prohibited) aIter Judge Flanagan again committed an extremely dubious
"judicial act" in striking Coughlin's 5/20/13 Emergency Amended Notice oI Appeal (see
61383) (2JDC Judges strike a whole lotta things, with Judge Elliott's last day in oIIice 3/8/13
witnessing his use oI such dubious tactics in the appeal oI the iPhone matter reIerred to in
King's 8/23/12 Complaint), and Elliott's successor, Iormer WCDA criminal division
prosecutor now Judge Sattler striking Coughlin's Emergeny Mandamus Petition oI 4/2/13,
covering Ior his Iormer co-workers now RJC Judge Pearson and CliIton's egregious violations
oI NRS 178.405, and a host oI other sins incident to the trial oI the matter reIerred to in King's
8/23/13 Complaint as an "abuse oI emergency 911 services" arrest) (the pleadiincident to FHE
3, 2JDC Judge Linda Gardner's laches ridden 4/13/09 Order AIter Trial (see 53833 and 54844
Ior Coughlin's appeal oI such NRS 7.085 attorney Iee award (Iunny, Judge Gardner (whom
did not report Coughlin's "conduct" to the SBN or any authority disciplinary authority thereby
demonstrating under NCJC Rule 2.15 that nothing Coughlin did in that matter supports
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anything in the 12/14/12 FOFCOL..Iurther, and Coughlin provided the Panel and OBC this,
L. Gardners 6/19/09 FOFCOL and Decree oI Divorce subsumes her 4/13/09 Order AIter
Trial, and actually admits that Coughlin's Iailure to cajole his client IorceIully enough into
accepting John Springgate's chimera oI a settlement wherein she would waive her change to
seek alimony in exchange Ior his client agreeing to be solely responsible Ior approximately
$20,000 oI unsecured third party credit card debt Ior which he was the sole signatory...any
Siragusa jurisdictional reservation is premised upon the view that, say, a Tonopah Iormula
application to the alimony analysis certainly render Coughlin's positions as NRS 7.085
violation Iree, and ultimately in the 6/19/09 Final Decree, Judge L. Gardner was Iorced to so
rule, though Springgate and WLS did their best to prevent Coughlin Irom Iinding that out (the
CertiIicates oI Service oI the various Iilings subsequent to WLS summarily removing
Coughlin Irom the case on on 5/12/09 reveal a distrubing Iailure to copy Coughlin on a
number oI such Iiling, or to serve him such...and it was classic Paul Elcano bullying and
phoniness attempting to Iorce Coughlin to spend the limited period oI time in which he could
mount a challenged to such FHE 3 with instead, spending his time doing that which Elcano
wished to see done (which, inevitably beneIits Elcano above all else), with Elcano and WLS
going so Iar as to obstruct Coughlin's access to materials necessary the preparation oI his
post-Order Iilings) whom partners with the WCDA in a Sixth Amendment desecrating ECR
program, and where the WCDA hired Elcano's daughter Tyler Elcano, Esq. as an attorney
during the pendency oI such program) RMC Judge Nash Holmes (awIully odd how Beesley
Iailed to note Coughlin's 3/30/12 Iiling in Cadle Co. v. Keller 10-05104, which detailed the
warrantless conIiscation not connected to any search incident to arrest oI Coughlin oI his
smartphone, a micro sd data card, and a Ilip style cell phone and electric razor, which were
retrieved Irom the Washoe County jail on 2/28/12, according to what WCSO Deputy Hodge
admitted to Coughlin on 3/19/12 with local attorney Pam Willmore within speaking distance,
that the City oI Reno Marshals were given such property by the jail upon presenting to the jail
and requesting it ("it would just be easier Ior you to get it back Irom them, that's why we
released it to them" said Deputy Hodge, a claim the jail subsequently completely changed,
Deputy Iver insisting the items oI Coughlin's that werer booked into Coughlin's "secured
property" at the time oI Coughlin's booking on 2/27/12 at 4:45 pm incident to the
reprehensible 5 day summary incarceration oI a practicing attorney servicing clients where
Judge Holmes knew oI such prejudice sure to inure to such clients and denied any stay
whatsoever to Coughlin.
Really, it is beyond ridiculous what occurred in RMC 11 TR 26800. Coughlin got
about one sentence into his case in chieI, indicating "Sargent Tarter lied when he...", and
Judge Nash Holmes immediately Iound Coughlin in contempt, then, apparently her Marshals
(Marshal Joel Harley and Scott Coppa, with Reno City Attorney Don Christensen obstructing
justice in counseling them not to obey such subpoenas) lied to her some, or she lied or was
egregiously negligent in testiIying as to what such Marshal (whom should be held in contempt
by whatever "District Court judge" that NNDB Board Chair Susich reports such Iailure to
comply with Coughlin's 11/6/12 SCR 110 subpoenas on various RMC Marshals/RMC
employees (the 11/7/11 Order quashing Coughlin's subpoenas based upon an Emergency Ex
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Parte Motion by King was not within Panel Chair Echeverria's jurisdiction to enter pursuant to
SCR 110(3)-(4).
Beesley reIerencers some murky, shadowy gossip/agenda sessions with some judges
he knows: HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 12:1 to 12:5) "...That's really all he told me. And it
became apparent to me that over a period oI a couple months at least and I also learned of
some other odd behavior in some of the courts with judges that I knew." (NOTE: Perhaps
Judge Beesley is reIerring to his Iellow Iormer State Bar oI Nevada President Judge
Flanagan? Indeed, it was Judge Beesley's Presidency oI the SBN in 2004 during which a strip
club owning (Spearmint Rhino, Kevin Kelly, Esq.) Character and Fitness Committee Member
was permitted to run roughshod over an applicants rights in a disgraceIul display)
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 13:5 to 13:8) "...but based on the discussions I had, and the
information I got from other people, it became apparent to me that there wasn't a program
that was going to --"
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 25:11 to 25:15) "A What I recall is that your appearance in
court was odd, and your pleadings were not truly comprehensible, and that and Iurther
inquires made me concerned that you were having some diIIiculties that prevented you Irom
serving your client appropriately."
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 19:9 to 20:13) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge Beesley,
did you testiIy on behalI oI Stephen R. Harris recently? MR. KING: Objection. Relevance.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: The relevance, Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: I didn't hear Judge
Beesley again. MR. ECHEVERRIA: That doesn't matter. MR. COUGHLIN: It doesn't
matter that Pat can hear him, but I can't hear him? MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. I can't hear the
judge either, because you interrupted him. MR. COUGHLIN: Just now? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Yes. There's an objection as to relevancy as to whether or not what
relevancy -- MR. COUGHLIN: I objected. I didn't interrupt him. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I
asked you to explain the relevancy. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. I'm trying to remember the
question. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The question was did he testiIy on behalI oI Mr. Harris. The
relevance oI that issue in this proceeding? MR. COUGHLIN: Well, I think it provides a basis
Ior me comparing Judge Beesley's response to me being evicted to his response to Mr.
Harris's issues. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled -- I'm sorry, sustained. Next question,
please."
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 22:20 to 23:18) Q Was your testimony earlier today that
the Iirst time you recall being aware oI me was when I appeared at the March 15th hearing in
Cado Company v. Keller at 2:30 P.M. shortly aIter being evicted at gunpoint by the Washoe
County SheriIIs -- A I actually think you had appeared in Iront oI me one time beIore that.
But that was my Iirst strong recollection oI you appearing in Iront oI me. Q And it was that
brieI interaction whereupon you Iormed your opinion that I wasn't Iit to practice? A No. I
thought it was odd, but I do understand that people have adversity in their lives sometimes,
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which happens -- Q You took it to be adversity rather than misconduct by the sheriff? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you interrupted the witness. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, Judge. THE WITNESS: And I believe that you had Iiled some
pleading in that case. And I went to the pleadings, and they Irankly didn't make any sense.
And I think you subsequently Iiled pleadings in other cases which also didn't make any sense,
and I became concerned." (NOTE: Judge Beesley's contact page on at www.nvbar.org
indicates he is a "creditor's rights specialist").
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 6:9 to 15:6) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Let the record reIlect
that it's now 9:02, and Mr. Coughlin has joined the hearing. Mr. Coughlin, we're waiting to
connect with Judge Beesley who is the Iirst scheduled witness to appear between 9:00 and
9:30. MR. COUGHLIN: I object to him appearing. He wasn't noticed until Iar too close in
time -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: I didn't hear. Can you speak louder? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes,
sir. I don't believe he was appropriately noticed oI the hearing, this hearing. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King? MR. KING: As the record reIlects, Mr. Coughlin was served a
copy oI the complaint to the address that he is mandated to provide to the State Bar. MR.
COUGHLIN: I don't believe that's correct. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please don't interrupt, Mr.
Coughlin. Go ahead. MR. KING: Subsequently, Mr. Coughlin Iiled, immediately aIter we
mailed the complaint via certiIied and regular mail, Mr. Coughlin Iiled a motion to dismiss
the complaint. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I think his argument here is that he wasn't notiIied that
Judge Beesley would be a potential witness. MR. KING: We sent a supplemental notice to
Mr. Coughlin that we intended to call Judge Beesley. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm sorry. II I can
just interject quickly. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: -- beIore the
proceeding -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Please don't interrupt. MR. COUGHLIN: May I record the proceedings?
MR. KING: I'm handing, with the chairman's permission, a copy oI the supplemental notice.
In addition, as I indicated, the purpose oI calling Mr. Beesley is to assist the panel to
understand Mr. Coughlin's conduct in his court, and also as a potential rebuttal witness.
UnIortunately, Judge Beesley is in Las Vegas and is only available between 9:00 and 9:30. So
what I would ask the panel to do is to allow, as an oIIer oI prooI, allow Judge Beesley to
testiIy. And then iI the panel subsequently determines Ior some reason that it's not
appropriate, rebuttal testimony -- MR. COUGHLIN: I'm sorry. I need to enter, this is a
special -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: -- I need to submit that Ior
the record. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please don't interrupt. MR. COUGHLIN: I need to submit
that Ior the record. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You'll get your opportunity. MR. KING: Judge
Beesley, my name is Patrick King. I represent the State Bar oI Nevada in a disciplinary
hearing involving Zach Coughlin. Did you understand that that was the matter in which you
were going to testiIy to this morning? JUDGE BEESLEY: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Just a
second, Mr. King. Let me state on the record that because oI the time constraints, I'm going to
rule that we can take the testimony oI Judge Beesley, subject to Mr. Coughlin's later
objection. He does have an objection. Given the time constraints, he has not had an
opportunity to put on the record his objection. I'd like to take the testimony oI Judge Beesley,
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and then listen to Mr. Coughlin's objection. MR. COUGHLIN: I did Iile a -- MR. KING:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Judge Beesley, the panel consists oI John Echeverria -- I'm not
pronouncing the name -- but there's Iive panel members. JUDGE BEESLEY: John
Echeverria. You have not spent enough time in Nevada. MR. KING: That is correct. Thank
you Ior that. Across Irom me is sitting Mr. Coughlin, Zachary Coughlin. And in the room also
is a court reporter. There's no one else in the room other than some court security. So what I'm
going to ask you, Judge Beesley, iI you could explain to the panel your knowledge oI Mr.
Coughlin relative to the Nevada Rules oI ProIessional Conduct related to -- MR.
COUGHLIN: Objection. Relevancy. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. King. We
probably should administer the oath to Judge Beesley. MR. KING: Judge Beesley, the court
reporter will administer you the oath. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm going to object on relevancy
grounds. BRUCE BEESLEY Having been Iirst duly sworn, testiIied as Iollows: DIRECT
EXAMINATION BY MR. KING: Q Judge Beesley, can you explain to the panel your
knowledge in this relevant time Irame 2011-2012 regarding Mr. Coughlin and his conduct in
your court? A Mr. Coughlin appeared in my court a couple oI times, at least two or three
times. The Iirst time I recall him coming to my court he came in, he was wearing, I think, a T-
shirt and a tie, and no jacket. And he indicated that he had been evicted Irom his residence or
his oIIice, indicating it was not because oI not paying the rent, and that that was why he
wasn't what I would consider appropriately dressed. I apologize. I don't have my letter in Iront
oI me. But my recollection is that he had Iiled a pleading on behalI oI his client in regard to
some aspect oI a bankruptcy case, and that the pleading was lengthy, didn't make any sense,
and just sort oI rambled through a great deal oI irrelevant stuII. I had him a couple other times
in my court and had the same experience, that -- he was dressed appropriately the other times
I had him there, and he was very polite and appeared to be a very intelligent man. But his
pleadings didn't make any sense. His arguments didn't make any sense. And I became
concerned that he was suIIering Irom alcohol or drug abuse or had some sort oI mental issues
which were preventing him Irom being able to represent his client. I talked to -- I made some
inquiries oI the court and State Bar iI there was anything -- the Iederal court Iirst, iI there was
anything that I had authority to do to try and get Mr. Coughlin some help and learned that I
could not. I then talked to, I think I talked to Coe Swobe, who is Lawyers Concerned Ior
Lawyers -- MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. Relevancy. This wasn't noticed either or -- no -- or
mentioned in the DOSEAL, which you didn't serve appropriately, and you're violating SCR
102 -- 1052(c). MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. THE WITNESS: I talked to Mr. Swobe
who indicated that the State Bar did have some services available, and that he had been in
contact with Mr. Coughlin. That's really all he told me. And it became apparent to me that
over a period oI a couple months at least and I also learned of some other odd behavior in
some of the courts with judges that I knew. MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. Hearsay. THE
WITNESS: But based on -- MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. Can I get a ruling on my objection
beIore you continue testiIying? MR. KING: I'm going to ask the chairman to direct Mr.
Coughlin not to shout or make speaking objections. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm going to do
that. You can do it -- I appreciate being able to be heard, but we can do it at a lower level, Mr.
Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: You didn't seem to hear me. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Madam
Reporter, would you please read back the answer to which Mr. Coughlin was objecting.
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(Record read by the reporter.) MR. ECHEVERRIA: The objection is hearsay. Mr. King?
MR. KING: The judge was just about to testiIy as to the action he took based on the
inIormation he received, and that is the purpose oI the inIormation is to show why he took the
action he did. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. MR. KING: Thank you, Judge. THE
WITNESS: I'm not quite sure where I was in my testimony, but based on the discussions I
had, and the information I got from other people, it became apparent to me that there wasn't
a program that was going to -- MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. Foundation. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King? MR. KING: The testimony is clear. He's explaining the actions
he took relative to Mr. Coughlin's conduct, which is the purpose. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Overruled. MR. COUGHLIN: He was speciIying -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin.
MR. COUGHLIN: -- no Ioundation Ior what he was asserting. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
Coughlin, I've overruled your objection. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Please proceed, Judge. BY MR. KING: Q I apologize, your Honor, Ior the interruption. But
you were just about to testiIy as to what action you took with respect to the inIormation you
learned. A What I did was I wrote a letter to the State Bar explaining what had occurred with
Mr. Coughlin, indicating, I believe, that I thought that in his current state he was not able to
represent his clients adequately, and that the State Bar should look into it. I think that was the
extent oI what I did in summary. BY MR. KING: Q Based on your actual personal
knowledge oI Mr. Coughlin, would you believe that he has violated Nevada Rules oI
ProIessional Conduct? MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. Calls Ior an expert opinion. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Overruled. MR. COUGHLIN: I said objection, Pat. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. Settle down. You do not need to yell in this proceeding. BY
MR. KING: Q Would you be oI the opinion -- MR. COUGHLIN: I said objection, Pat. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: Can we get a ruling Irom the judge? Can
we have some due process here, Pat? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, do not raise your
voice again in this proceeding. MR. COUGHLIN: II this is a proceeding, it needs to be
handled like a proceeding according to the rules oI evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's
true. And that's what we're doing. MR. COUGHLIN: No, it's not."
The 12/14/12 FOFCOL, as to Beesley and such March 2012 matters indicates:
There is no way the summary eviction hearing oI 3/15/12 tested "the truthIulness and
suIIiciency oI the" "landlord's aIIidavit" and notices required under NRS 40.253(6) and NRS
40.254(2) as the JAVS recording oI the summary eviction hearing indicates it started at 8:33
am and lasted all oI two minutes, where the "UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit" that Kern Iiled
aIter the hearing, and had the RJC's Bonnie Cooper Notarize Ior her (though it bares an
unidentiIied signature, that may be that oI Sue King oI WNM) bares a Iile stamp time
stamping oI 8:39 am, and was thereIore Iile and submitted after the hearing. NRS 40.253(6)
requires that such hearing only be held "upon the Iiling" oI such a "landlord's aIIidavit", so
there is less basis to enter a deIault against Coughlin (and really, where Coughlin Iiled on
3/7/12 an extensive Tenant's AIIidavit with claims or counterclaims there is more oI a basis
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Ior granting Coughlin a deIault victory where Kern had yet to even Iile any aIIidavit, which
practice deprives tenant's oI due process's notice and the ability to prepare Ior one's
opportunity to be heard. Further, NRS 40.253(6) does not permit what Judge Schroeder did in
holding a minute and a halI hearing that consisted solely oI asking Gayle Kern, Esq. "is that
Iair" to And while the Notice that Kern and Park Terrace purported to served Coughlin was a
30 day No-Cause Termination Notice to Vacate under NRS 40.254(2), it has become
apparent, Irom a review oI the NRS 4.240 docket entries in the RJC that Kern or the RJC,
perhaps noting the deIiciency in the 30 Day Notice in that it Iailed to identiIy anyone by name
but was rather addressed to "John Doe", and or perhaps in light oI the bar to the use oI NRS
40.254(2) against the mixed use residential comercial tenancy premises Coughlin was
permitted to engage in under his lease, that the docket indicates: "03/15/2012 AIIidavit oI
Landlord Ior Non Payment oI Rent Filed"
Further, Kern failed to file in a Landlord's Affidavit prior to the 3/15/12 summary
eviction proceeding, which was noticed for 8:30 am, but to which the Kockout Order had a
Iax header indicated the Order was Iaxed to the WCSO Civil Division at 8:24 am (indicating,
perhaps in reIerence to Judge Nash Holmes 3/14/12 allusion that she had "heard he might be
living in his car somewhere" (maybe Judges Beesley, Holmes, Schroeder, Flanagan, and
Elliott conIerred with Judge CliIton about his 2/27/12 Order Ior Competency Evaluation oI
Coughlin that he entered aIter he mysteriously had such case transIerred to his department
Irom Judge Lynchs? (remembering that between 2/27/12 and 3/2/12 (conveniently Ior Hill,
during the time Coughlin would have otherwise used to craIt and Iile a Reply BrieI to Hill's
associate's Iraudulent, lie Iilled 2/24/12 Answering BrieI in the matter now beIore the NSCT
in 61383) Coughlin was serving the inordinately intemperate Iive day summary incarceration
Ior civil contempt (NRS 22.100, though by citing a plenary civil contempt statute Judge
Holmes only Iurther reveals the extent to which he approach could use some reIining in that
regard), Coughlin did have a 3/23/12 and 3/26/12 hearing on the 2/8/12 Order to Show Cause
Hill was able to obtain Irom Judge Flanagan (odd, Coughlin's entire appeal did not get one
hearing, but Hill's Motion Ior OSC received two). (Coughlin also had a camera punched into
his Iace, breaking the view Iinder thereon upon it colliding with Coughlin's mouth and nose,
by a Iormer WCSO Deputy on 3/28/12 incident to that person breaking an entering the
temporary location Coughlin moved his home and oIIice to (see Coughlin v. Nichols in the
RJC Rev2012-075658) and otherwise wrongIully locking Coughlin out thereoI by Iorce). As
such, in consideration oI the dictates oI NRS 40.253(5)-(6), the 3/15/12 Lockout Order is void
pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(4) Ior lack oI jurisdiction given that the summary eviction hearing
was held prior to Kern Iiling a Landlord's AIIidavit.
At the 3/15/12 summary eviction hearing wherein Gayle Kern, Esq., violate RPC
3.5A (probably why RJC Judge Schroeder asked, upon the topic oI taking a deIault against
Coughlin coming up: 'Is that Iair?), Kern Iurther stated that she was seeking 'a Writ
granting possRestitution must Iollow NRS 118A.360, which requires putting up a bond Iirst,
which Kern Iailed to do:
NRS40.300Contents of complaint; issuance and service of
summons; temporary writ of restitution; notice, hearing and bond...
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(b)That the temporary writ of restitution shall not issue until the
court has had an opportunity to ascertain the facts sufficiently to
enable it to estimate the probable loss to the defendant and fix the
amount of a bond to indemnify the party or parties against whom
the temporary writ may be issued.
The 3/15/12 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit by some unnamed employee oI "landlord
Park Terrace", which Iails to contain all (or pretty much any of that required by NRS
40.254(2) (not to mention NRS 40.253(5), though in light oI the Iact that no 5 Day Non-
Payment Notice was ever served/posted by Park Terrace, the vagueness and ambiguity in
slickster Gayle Kern, Esq's chosen aIIidavit is really no surprise, nor is the Iact that a google
search oI Kern's name reveals a multitude oI allegations oI Iraud by members oI homeowners
associations), where such unattributed "aIIidavit" (much like the practices oI Nevada Court
Services, such aIIidavit lists and entity and then contains a scribble "signature" with nothing
more to identiIy just whom is making such sworn assertions) reads:
"Park Terrace Homeowners, Landlord/Petitioner c/o Western Nevada Management
(apparently Kern recognizes the RPC 3.7 issue attendant to a landlord's attorney signing such
NRS 40.254(2) aIIidavit) 804 Mill St., Reno NV 89502 Zach Coughlin Tenant (its not really a
"caption" per se on such aIIidavit) 14 22 E. 9th St. #2, Reno NV 89512...'UnlawIul Detainer
AIIidavit
The undersigned petitioner. being Iirst duly sworn. deposes and says:
1. That your aIIiant, in compliance with NRS 118A, is the landlord oI certain dwellings or
apartments within the jurisdictional conIines oI Reno Township, Washoe County. Nevada.
2. That your aIIiant rented a certain dwelling or apartment to Zachary Coughlin located at
1422 E. 9th St. #2 Reno on November ?, 2011 with periodic rental payments reserved by the
month or Ior a shorter period oI time, and a cleaning or rental deposits paid in advance $0.00
in excess oI the Iirst month's rent.
3. That the periodic rental agreement has not been waived or altered by a written agreement oI
any kind.
4. That more than thirty/seven days have elapsed since the service oI the notices attached
hereto but the above-named tenant has reIused, and still reIuses, to vacate and quit the above
named premises.
WHEREFORE. your aIIiant prays Ior an order oI this court, directed to the SheriII oI
Washoe County, ordering the above named tenant Irom the above mentioned premises, as
provided in NRS, Chapter 40.
/s/ (what appears to be the signature oI someone whose initials are S.K. (WNM's Sue King,
perhaps?))?
There is, oI course, no reIerence in such aIIidavit to any oI that required by NRS
40.280, NRS 40.251, NRS 40.253(3), etc. and when Coughlin attempts to access such Iile
Irom the RJC to review it BailiII's Medina and Reyes (whom unilaterally amend the
"Administrative Order 2012-01" that the RJC has now recharacterized as a criminal case
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RCR2013-071437 (incident to which now stems the charges Ilowing Irom the wrongIul
obstructionist arrest by Reyes oI Coughlin on 5/23/12 (goons and goblins, indeed), including
on the Iinal day Ior Coughlin to Iile a Motion Ior New Trial in the matter which King's
8/23/12 Complaint reIers to as the "misuse oI 911 emergency services" arrest oI 1/14/12,
Heibert (whom ripped in halI a document Coughlin submitted Ior Iiling with the RJC, with
Heibert taking the Medina and Reyes approach oI halIway attributing such Iiling oIIice
rejections to Christine Erickson and Robbin Baker/Cathy Wood, though Reyes readily admits
that he has made the decision that where Coughlin presents to Iile document with the RJC
IiIteen minutes prior to the RJC's closing time, Reyes is entitled to reIuse to allow them Iiled,
but instead drop a bunch oI I-bombs in a ridiculous, glowering display oI machismo and
neanderthalia resplindent with "oII his medications" Reyes and his every present gun and
angry demeanor noticeably present), ChieI BailiII Sexton, and Ramsey (whom threw in the
garbage the attached 5/22/13 submission by Coughlin in Rev11-001708, RCR11-063341,
etc.) (the one whom through Coughlin around in the courthouse lobby on 5/23/13 (then
proceeded to behave in exactly the manner his ex-wiIe described in her 5/2/12 TPO
Application against him (alleging he suIIers Irom depression and is oII his medications,
controlling in a manner that utilizes unjust means to achieve that which he intends, and
violent...Reyes overcharged Coughlin incident to that completely wrongIul arrest (which
occurred minutes aIter Coughlin Iiled a request with the RJC (see attached) to review
materials that relate to the multitude oI judicial and court employee misconduct committed by
the RJC against Coughlin since September 2011)...Reyes stack Iour baseless charges atop
each other in his 5/23/12 Arrest Report and Probable Cause sheet making Coughlin's bail a
ridiculous $16,000, something would be WCDA Chris Hicks (a year ahead oI Coughlin at
Boyd School oI Law as a member oI its inaugural class, though Coughlin passed (in the
summer Iollowing his second year oI law school) the same bar exam Hicks took Iollowing
Hick's third year at Boyd) only managed to damage his own standing in signing a criminal
complaint on 5/30/13 in RCR2013-072675 which makes allegation connected to the RJC
Judges usurpation oI the executive branches charging Iunctions and prosecutorial discretion
whee such involves Reyes allegation that Coughlin Iailed to obey his command to go wait in
the lobby outside the metal detectors in connection with that Reyes alleges was required by
the 12/20/12 "Administrative Order 2012-01" that then ChieI Judge SIerrazza entered, and
which current ChieI Judge Pearson cosigned (Coughlin called the RJC prior to being served
with such 12/20/12 Order seeking an Emergency TeleconIerence with the SBN regarding the
onerousness oI the 12/20/12 Workplace Harassment TPO that Judge Pearson entered, which
Iorbid Coughlin to even send the SBN a Iiling in the mailing, the USPS mail, despite the
proximity oI the 12/14/12 FOFCOL in NG12-0204 attached to the SBN's TPO application
(the RJC has some pretty questionable approaches to limiting the access to justice oI those
whose aims Iail to align with either that which is convenient or politically expedient to the
RJC, or its owns objectives). Such is made worse by these ChieI Judges misstating the type
oI courts to which Article 6 Sec 6 applies (hint..."District courts" are diIIerent than "limited
jurisdiction justice courts". Judge Pearson denied Coughlin verbal motion under NRS
33.270(9), despite that Reno City ChieI Criminal Deputy Attorney Wong insists that his
prosecution oI Coughlin Ior an alleged violation oI the TPO the SBN received in RJC RCP12-
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00607 (where on the tenth judicial day Ior Coughlin to Iile a Motion Ior New Trial, or NRCP
52/59, Reconsideration Motion, etc. in connection with the 12/14/12 FOFCOL in NG12-0204
(62337) Coughlin is accused oI having a "courier" deliver just such a Motion to the SBN Ior
Iiling (oI course Iraudulent Clerk oI Court Laura Peters called the police instead oI IulIilling
her duty to the legal system...much like her adding Coughlin to her blocked email senders list
upon Coughlin's emailing her in her "Investigator" role with too much evidence oI the
criminal misconduct by Hill, Baker, Kern, Wong, Hazlett-Stevens, Pamela Roberts, Esq.,
etc.... Wong also reIuses to discipline or supervise the misconduct oI those such as Deputy
City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Esq. whom violated SCR 123 in citing to an
unpublished decision Irom Tennessee in State v. Lovins to obtain his sham/Iraudulent
criminal trespass conviction where Hill and Baker testiIied, now at issue in 61901, 61383, and
asserted as a basis Ior permanently disbarring Coughlin in 62337.
RJC Justice oI the Peace Jack Schroeder's 3/15/12 "Lockout Order" in Park Terrace v
Zach Coughlin RJV REV2012-000374 diIIers markedly Irom the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE in
REV11-001708, as that in 374 reads:
"UPON APPLICATION auly ana regularly maae by Park Terrace Townhomes,
Landlord, and prooI thereon being supported by a sworn affidavit on the date hereinafter
mentioned, and good cause appearing thereIore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: That the SheriII oI Washoe County, or one oI their duly
authorized agent, are hereby directed to remove each and every person found upon and
within those certain premises located at 1442 E 9th ST Reno NY 89512, Reno Washoe
County, Nevada within 24 hours after receipt of this order. DATED on this the 15th day oI
March, 2012 /s/ Jack Schroeder, Justice oI the Peace"
Schroeder's Order Iails to list the unit # (1422 E. 9th St.
Again, with the Iorms. Exhibit D Irom the 10/25/11 "Trial" in 1708 starts with the
alleged 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit by landlord Merliss, which Iails to contain all required
by NRS 40.254(2), and which does not appear to be Iile stamped, and its not clear that it was
Iiled in the RJC when Baker's 10/19/11 Declaration indicates it was. It reads:
'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit
1. That your aIIiant, in compliance with NRS 118A. is the landlord oI certain dwellings or
2. That your aIIiant rented a certain dwelling or apartment to Melissa Ulloa and Zachary
Coughlin located at 121 River Rock, Reno, NV 89503 on March 1, 2010....- with periodic
rental payments reserved by the month or Ior a shorter period oI time, and a cleaning or rental
deposits paid in advance $700.00 in excess oI the Iirst month's rent.
any kind.
named premises.
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WHEREFORE. your aIIiant prays Ior an order oI this court, directed to the SheriII oI Washoe
County, ordering the abovenamed tenant Irom the above mentioned premises, as provided in
NRS, Chapter 40.
/s/ (what appears to be the signature oI Matthew Merliss, though there is no typed out name,
or even a handwritten name to indicate to whom the signature belongs beyond an allegedly
attached notary certiIicate with a handwritten 'subscribed and sworn to (or aIIirmed) beIore
me on this 10 day oI October, 2011, by Matthew Merliss, proved to me on the basis oI
satisIactory evidence to be the person who appeared beIore me. OPTIONAL
INFORMATION
The jurat contained within this document is in accordance with CaliIomia law. Any aIIidavit
subscribed and sworn to beIore a notary shall use the preceding wording or substantially
similar wording pursuant to Civil Code Sections 1189 and 8202, A jurat certiIicate cannot be
aIIixed to a document sent by mail or otherwise delivered to a notary public, including
electronic means, whereby the signer did not personally appear beIore the notary public. Even
iI the signor is known to the notary public. The seal and signature cannot be aIIixed to a
document without the correct notarial wording. As an additional option an aIIiant can produce
an aIIidavit on the same document as as the notarial certiIicate wording to eliminate the use oI
additional documentation.
NRS 40.254(2) required Merliss's 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit (which doesn't appear
to have even been Iiled prior to the 10/13/11 hearing, or even at that 10/13/11 hearing, but
only became part oI the record upon being admitted as an exhibit halIway through the
10/25/11 "Trial", in violation oI NRS 40.253(5)-(6)) to contain:
'...2.The aIIidavit oI the landlord or the landlord`s agent submitted to the justice court or
the district court must contain:
(a)The date when the tenancy commenced, the term oI the tenancy, and, iI any, a copy oI
the rental agreement.
(b)The date when the tenancy or rental agreement allegedly terminated.
(c)The date when the tenant became subject to the provisions oI NRS 40.251 to 40.2516,
inclusive, together with any supporting Iacts.
(d)The date when the written notice was given, a copy oI the notice and a statement that
notice was served in accordance with NRS 40.280.
(e)A statement that the claim Ior relieI was authorized by law.
So, basically, Merliss's 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit lacked all required under NRS
40.254(2). Baker appears to have Iraudulently attempted to ameliorate his earlier reliance on
Iorms in his 10/19/11 Declaration, but to the extent that purports to be based upon inIormation
and belieI, it does not qualiIy (to hear Panel Chair Echeverria tell it) as 'veriIied (particularly
where its not even Merliss signing the Declaration, but his out oI state attorney, also out oI
County as Baker's 10/19/11 Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq. Pursuant to NRS 40.254(2)
indicates) under NRS40.370VeriIication oI complaint and answer.The complaint and
answer must be veriIied. Additionally, and this is Iurther evidence oI the Iraud oI Merliss and
Baker, even during his 'testimony during the 10/25/11 'trial Merliss and Baker continued
to attempt to hoodwink the court, particularly in attempting to assert that Merliss himselI,
rather than Baker, had, upon the admission thereoI oI his 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit on
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10/25/11 and some rather Iraudulent questioning by Baker, thereaIter submitted and or
testiIied to all that which is required under NRS 40.254(2). However, aside Irom Ialsely
testiIying about iI the lease had 'expired or terminated, and Ialsely stating a date oI
expiration or termination oI the lease as Iound within the lease, and being twelve months aIter
February 20th, 2012 Merliss Iailed to, at any point, testiIy or sign an AIIidavit stating that his
claim Ior relieI was 'authorized by law. And Judge SIerrazza made clear that Baker would
not be allowed to make such veriIied statement Ior him. And Baker successIully avoided
eliciting such a statement Irom his client (why he didn't isn't clear, because, clearly, it wasn't
to prevent his client Irom lying, as Merliss already did upon his testiIying that the lease
expired by its terms on February 20th, 2011, even reIerencing some alleged date oI expiration
within Paragraph 2 oI the lease, where, clearly there is none). While such a statement Irom
Merliss that his 'claim Ior relieI was authorized by law would have been a lie (Ior his claim
to have been 'authorized by law pursuant to the statutory section under which he proceeded,
NRS 40.254 (which provides Ior summary evictions under a no cause basis (ie, where the
lease has expired pursuant to its terms or where a landlord has successIully terminated a lease
where such was still in eIIect under either a contractual holdover provision or suych holdover
provision Iound NRS 118A.470) Merliss would have had to be able to truthIully say that
either the lease had expired by its terms (on its Iace, the lease had not expired, as there was no
'deIined termination date listed in the lease, but there was a provision expressly providing
that the lease would last Ior 'no less than 12 months and that terminate the lease, then serve
such notice in accord with NRS 40.280, then Iile Ior a
Hill demonstrates his own RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 violations where he Ialsely
characterizes the "reasons" Judge Flanagan provides Ior entering the attorney Iee award oI
6/25/12 in CV11-03628 (FHE 2): "HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 40:25 to 41:4) I have provided
Mr. King with a copy of Judge Flanagan's orders in which he sets Iorth the reasons Ior such
an extraordinary award, being Mr. Coughlin's behavior, and the quality oI the work that he
was Iiling."
Actually, as Hill and King (see King's inclusion oI such 8/28/12 Order in his 8/30/12
email to Coughlin) well know, Judge Flanagan's 8/21/12 and 8/28/12 Orders in 03628 clearly
contradict Hill's assessment that Judge Flanagan's 6/25/12 Order in 03628 "sets for the the
reasons for asuch and extraordinary award, being Mr. Coughlin's behavior, and the
qualiity of the work that he was filing...". Rather, Judge Flanagan's 8/28/12 Order in 03628
makes clear:
"...Coughlin's Motions here attempts to re-litigate substantive issues this Court has
already decided, or frivolous claims this Court has previously ignored.."
MROA1406:
MROA 1405-1415: In 1708, Baker's 11/21/11 Opposition to Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien; Joinder in Motion to Set Aside or Vacate Attorney Fee Award, reads:
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'OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO CONTEST PERSONAL PROPERTY; JOINDER IN
MOTION TO SET ASIDE OR VACATE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD
PlaintiII/landlord, MATT MERLISS, through counsel, RICHARD G. HILL,
CHARTERED and CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ., opposes deIendant's motion to contest
personal property lien. DeIendant has been given every opportunity to retrieve his belongings,
but is simply reIusing to pay the statutorily permitted storage Iees. Plaintiff joins in
defendant's motion to set aside or vacate attorney fees award entered on November 9,
2011, and asks the court to vacate the entire awara.
This opposition and joinder are based on the points and authorities below and all
papers and pleadings on Iile herein.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; FACTS
1. Merliss is the owner oI the real property located at 121 River Rock Street, Reno, Nevada
(the "PROPERTY").
2. On or about March 1, 2010, Merliss rented the Property to Coughlin and his then-girlIriend.
3. On August 22, 2011, Merliss properly and lawIully terminated Coughlin's month-to-month
tenancy pursuant to NRS 40.251, by serving the statutory No-Cause Termination Notice to
Vacate NRS 40.251(1) upon him.
4. On September 27, 2011, Merliss properly served Coughlin with a Five-Day Notice oI
UnlawIul Detainer For Failure to Vacate Rental Unit - NRS 40.251 (No-Cause Termination)
and Notice oI Summary Eviction - NRS 40.254.
5. On October 27, 2011, aIter all due and proper notice and opportunity to be heard had been
given to Coughlin, this court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Granting Summary Eviction. A true and correct copy oI the reIerenced order is attached
hereto as EXHIBIT 1.
6. EXHIBIT 1 was served on Coughlin on November 1, 2011 by the Washoe County
Sheriffs Department, by posting same on the front door of the property in the manner
customary for evictions in Washoe County. The locks to the premises were changed at that
time, thereby ejecting and dispossessing Coughlin oI possession oI the Property. Mr.
Coughlin was not present, but the notice was posted and the locks were changed.
7. ThereaIter, Mr. Coughlin unlawIully, and without any right to do so, reentered upon, and
took possession oI, oI the Property.
8. SpeciIically, on November 13, 2011, Mr. Coughlin was Iound to be living in the basement
oI the Property. Coughlin was arrested and charged with trespassing at that time.
ReIerence is made to plaintiIIs Motion Ior Order to Show Cause, Iiled herewith and
incorporated herein by this reIerence, Ior Iurther particulars regarding the discovery and
arrest of Mr. Coughlin on that date.
9. Beginning on November 2, 2011, plaintiffs counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., began
sending emails to Coughlin on an almost daily basis, asking Coughlin to contact Mr.
Hill's office to make arrangements to retrieve Coughlin's belongings from the property.
See Declaration oI Richard G. Hill, Esq., attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2. Copies oI the
reIerenced emails are authenticated in and attached to Mr. Hill's declaration.
10. Mr. Coughlin would not respond directly to Mr. Hill's emails, claiming that he did not
receive them. Coughlin Iirst claimed that he was having "technical diIIiculties" and that
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"some emails appear blank or black". Now, Coughlin claims that he did not receive those
emails because he had added Mr. Hill's email address to his "blocked senders list".
Coughlin eventually responaea airectly to Mr. Hills emails, but still has not proposed any
plan Ior paying the storage Iees he owes and retrieving his belongings.
11. On November 10, 2011, the undersigned sent three emails to Mr. Coughlin, one oI which
included a letter regarding Mr. Coughlin's debt to Dr. Merliss. See Declaration oI Casey D.
Baker, Esq., attached hereto as EXHIBIT 3. Copies oI the reIerenced emails are authenticated
in, and attached to, Mr. Baker's declaration.
12. Mr. Coughlin claims that the undersigned's letter dated November 10, 2011 somehow
authorized him to remain living at the property after the eviction. He is simply wrong. See
EXHIBIT 1 to Mr. Baker's declaration. Nowhere in that letter is there any authorization
for Mr. Coughlin to trespass and squat at Dr. Merliss' property.
13. Coughlin did not attempt telephone contact with Mr. Hill's oIIice until approximately
11:00 p.m. on Saturday, November 12, 2011, at which time he leIt two voice messages.
14. ThereaIter, Coughlin placed several telephone calls to Mr. Hill's oIIice, during which he
harassed Mr. Hill and his staII. On November 15, 2011, Coughlin showed up at Mr. Hill's
oIIice unannounced, and barged in and created a scene, interrupting a deposition in the
process. provide property the end collect beIore property nghtIully
LAW
1. ReIerence is made to NRS 118A.460(1)(a), which provides in pertinent part as
Iollows: "1. The landlord may dispose oI personal property abandoned on the premises by a
Iormer tenant or leIt on the premises aIter eviction oI the tenant without incurring civil or
criminal liability in the Iollowing manner: (a) The landlord shall reasonably Ior the saIe
storage oI the Ior 30 days aIter abandonment or eviction or the oI the rental period and may
charge and the reasonable and actual costs oI inventory, moving and storage releasing to the
the tenant or his or her authorized representative claiming the property within that period. 1he
landlord is liable to the tenant only for the landlord's negligent or wrongful acts in storing
the property." NRS 118A.460(1)(a) (emphasis added).
See also the oIIicial Nevada Supreme Court Form #15, entitled Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien and For Return oI Personal Property, attached hereto as EXHIBIT 5,
at paragraph 4 ("I understand that the landlord may charge and collect the reasonable and
actual costs oI inventory, moving and storage oI my personal property beIore releasing it to
me ... ")
ANALYSIS The second and Iinal day oI the summary eviction hearing in this matter
was Tuesday, October 25, 2011. At the conclusion of that hearing, the court announced its
findings of fact, and specifically granted the eviction, all on the record. Coughlin was
present in court, and knew, at that moment, that he had until October 31, 2011 to vacate the
property, or he would be locked out. (NOTE: strange, wouldn't that mean Baker knew better
than to submit a proposed FOFCOLOSE that called Ior the sheriII to eIIect such lockout "no
later than October 31"? Further, iI the Legislature wanted NRS 40.253(5) to read "the court
may then make it so that the tenant in court (to say nothing oI any subtenants or cohabitants or
coworkers) knows that they have until x date to vacate the property...", however, what that
subsection actually provides is that "The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
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sheriII ... oI the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order."
Baker knows this very well, how else could he manage to incorporate exactly all other aspects
oI the language he needed Ior his quasi-landlord's aIIidavit (Declaration oI Casey D. Baker,
Esq. Pursuant to NRS 40.254(2) oI 10/19/11, which violates RPC 3.7, not to mention
demonstrates clear cut Iraud by Baker in mistating a material element as to both the lease and
NRS 40.254(2)(a)-(e)'s requirements. ("...2.The affidavit of the landlord ... submitted to the
justice court or the district court must contain):
NRS 40.254(2)(a) "term oI the tenancy, and, iI any, a copy oI the rental agreement"
NRS 40.254(2)(b) " date when the tenancy or rental agreement allegedly terminated"
NRS 40.254(2)(c) " date when the tenant became subject to the provisions oI NRS
40.251...together with any supporting Iacts"
NRS 40.254(2)(d) "date when the written notice was given, a copy oI the notice and a
statement that notice was served in accordance with NRS 40.280"
NRS 40.254(2)(e): " A statement that the claim Ior relieI was authorized by law"
As to (2)(b),(c),(e) the landlord would need to have some right under the lease to
terminate the tenancy, but he does not have such a right upon a reading of the lease, with
special attention to Paragraphs 2, 3, and 20, noting the lack oI any "deIined termination date"
(despite Para.20 indicating such may be Iound in Para.2), and the Iact that the right to
terminate the lease set out in Para.3 belongs to the tenant only.
Despite RPC 3.7 preventing Baker Irom acting as a witness (he kind oI had to given
the landlord Iailed to appear Ior the 10/13/11 proceeding) and his duty oI candor to the
tribunal and oI Iairness to opposing counsel, and to bring claims with merit (see RPC 3.1, 3.3,
3.4), and despite the lease, plainly, on its Iace, not saying what Bakers indicates it say, on
10/13/11 Baker asserted:
"Plaintiff: Yes, sir. I have provided the court with copies oI the notices the 30 day and the
Iive day. I have a copy oI the lease. Mr. Coughlin is a month-to-month tenant and we
activated the 3-day no cause right to terminate the lease. The lease is terminated....
Plaintiff: Your Honor under NRS 118A.510 the burden is on Mr. Coughlin to show
retaliation, he has not done that. He has not oIIered any prooI that there is any sort oI
retaliation here. The parties, the whole purpose oI the 30 day notice and the statute and then
the lease is Ireedom oI contract Your Honor. Once Mr. Coughlin is a month to month tenant
the landlord is Iree to terminate the lease with 30 days notice Mr. Coughlin is Iree to move
out with 30 days notice. II we Ilip it around and Mr. Coughlin had given 30 days notice and
we had come down here tried to stop him Irom moving this doesn`t make any sense Your
Honor. There has been no prooI put Iorward that there is any retaliation here.
1udge: Well actually I have no prooI so Iar that the lease is over or anything else. I don`t
even have a copy oI the lease. ...
" Also, the 9/27/11 Notice Iails to comply with NRS 40.253(3)(b)(1) in that it does not
list the court with jurisdiction Ior a couple reasons...one, the district court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Nev Const 6 Art 6 where title to property is reasonably at issue, and it clearly is
here, as Coughlin introduced at the 10/25/11 "Trial" the Washoe County Assessor/Recorders
printouts showing it was not Matthew J. Merliss who own the property in question, but "The
Matthew J. Merliss Living Trust" that does...Iurther, jurisdiction is not necessarily in the Reno
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Justice Court here, especially where Coughlin's claims under NRS 118A.390(1),(5)(a),(b) are
arguably well in excess oI $10,000 (Iurther, where Merliss's attorney's sought $18,000 in
attorneys Iees in the justice court, arguably as "damages", then the jurisdictional limit gets
met real quick....concurrent jurisdiction, the 9/27/11 Notice just indicates the tenant is to Iile
an aIIidavit with the "Reno Justice Court", and thus arguably Iails to comply with NRS
40.253(3)(b)(1). Maybe don't use Iorms oII the internet to try to summarily evict a patent
attorney Irom his home/law oIIice, then ask Ior a attorney Iee award oI $18,000 in justice
court and a whole 'nother $42,065 just Ior the appeal in district court? Or, at least, get a Iew
things right.
The thing is, Baker's 8/22/11 and 9/27/11 Notices, and his 10/19/11 Declaration
Pursuant to NRS 40.254(2), and the testimony he elicted Irom his client, Merliss on 10/25/11,
are all contradictory, especially with regard to a very material element oI his summary
eviction action, ie, the
NRS193.0235'Real property deIined.'Real property includes every estate,
interest and right in lands, tenements and hereditaments, corporeal or incorporeal.
NRS 10.075 'Real property deIined. 'Real property is coextensive with lands,
tenements and hereditaments.
Another problem is the Iact that the landlord's 8/22/11 and 9/27/11 Notices purport to
comply with NRS 40.251 (and must under NRS 40.
'NRS40.251UnlawIul detainer: Possession oI property leased for indefinite time aIter
notice to quit; ...person with a disability entitled to extension of period of possession upon
request.
1.A tenant oI real property, ...Ior a term less than life is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer
when having leased:
(a)Real property,... Ior an indefinite time, with monthly ... rent reserved, the tenant
continues in possession thereoI... without the landlord's consent aIter the expiration oI a
notice oI:...(2)....30 days;...
(b)A dwelling unit subject to the provisions of chapter 118A of ARS, the tenant
continues in possession... without the landlord`s consent after expiration of: (1)The term
of the rental agreement or its termination and... the expiration oI a notice oI:...(II)...at least
30 days Ior all other periodic tenancies;
NRS 40.251(1)(b) does not read "a dwelling unit or premises subject to the provisions
oI chapter 118A..."...It just speciIies "a dwelling unit subject to the provision of chapter
118A of ARS...". But...part oI Coughlin's mixed used residential/commercial tenancy is the
portion oI the "premises" (see NRS 118A.140) not used as a "dwelling unit" (see NRS
118A.080). One can see why Merliss was so very unhappy that the lease in question, at
Paragraphs 10 to 11, speciIically allows Ior such mixed used residential/commercial tenancy
by Coughlin. Judicial estoppel does not apply to a tenant and lease that are both so versatile.
In both the landlord's 30 Day No Cause Notice to Vacate oI 8/22/11 (Exhibit B at
10/25/11 trial in 1708) and in the 9/27/11 5 Day Notice oI UD Ior Failure to Vacate, 40.254, it
is alleged that 'your rental agreement expired as oI February 28, 2011. NRS 40.251(1)(b)(1)
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(II). However, that simply is not true. Beyond demonstrating a lack oI candor to the tribunal
and paucity oI Iairness to opposing counsel, it belies the Iact that Baker never provided
suIIicient notice oI termination oI the lease, as such, the 30 days required prior to any such
termination, by the lease, was not satisIied. Additionally, where Baker alleges that the 'rental
agreement expired as oI February 28, 2011 when, in Iact there is no such 'deIined
termination date in the lease.
To that Iorm based 9/27/11 Notice Baker attached his own 'CertiIicate oI Service,
which read: ' Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certiIy that I am an employee oI RICHARD
G. HILL, CHARTERED, and that on the 27th day oI September, 2011, I personally handed at
the hearing in the above-reIerenced matter, a true and correct copy oI the Ioregoing Five Day
Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer Ior Failure to Vacate Rental Unit - NRS 40.251 (No-Cause
Termination) and Notice oI Summary Eviction -NRS 40.254 to: Zachary Coughlin: 121 River
Rock Street Reno, Nevada 89503.
Further, such 'notice is clearly insuIIicient under NRS 40.280. Additionally, even
had Baker's attaching his own 'CertiIicate oI Service to any purported 'UnlawIul Detainer
AIIidavit that Merliss signed beIore a notary on 10/11/11 been suIIicient to somehow satsiIy
the requirements in NRS 40.254(2)...there is not indication or assertion by Baker that he
submitted to the Court, much less Iiled, said 'CertiIicate oI Service, and Judge SIerrazza
made clear at the hearings that no 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit by Merliss had been Iiled
prior to Baker having such admitted as 'PlaintiII's Exhibit B at the 10/25/11 'trial, which is
entirely too late to satisIy the subject matter jurisdiction prerequisites in NRS 40.254 (which
incorporates the "upon the Iiling oI the aIIidavits...the court shall hold a hearing..." language
in NRS 40.253(5).
Further, Baker's practice oI checking oII both blanks '2, and '5 in his use oI 'Form
#1 Ior the August 22nd, 2011 'NO-CAUSE TERMINATION NOTICE TO VACATE NRS
40.251(1) is a patent violation oI the requirement that such notices be clear and unequivocal.
NRS 40.251(1)(a) is inapplicable in that Coughlin did not lease 'Real property as
used in this subsection, especially when noting the distinct terminology oI a 'dwelling unit
used in NRS 40.251(1)(a) makes inapplicable to Coughlin's tenancy NRS 40.251(1)(a) where
such tenancy was permissibly used as a home law oIIice/mattress business.
and his lease was not 'Ior an indeIinite time with monthly or other periodic rent reserved, the
tenant continues in possession thereoI, in person or by subtenant, without the landlord`s
consent aIter the expiration oI a notice
The problem Ior Baker is that his 8/22/11 and 9/27/11 Notices both state that 'your
rental agreement expired as oI February 28, 2011. However, the 'Standard Lease
Agreement between Merliss, Ulloa, and Coughlin simply does not state that it will be
'expired as oI February 28, 2011.
Baker's 8/22/11 'No-Cause Termination Notice to Vacate (utilizing a pre-printed N.
S. Ct. "Form #1") with just a couple things changed by way of placing ~Xs over the pre-
preinted ~or terminated part of option check blank #5 and adding a "d" to the end of
the word "expire" therein to create "expired)) reads (notice the ambiguity in and
equivocal nature oI the landlord's Notice checking two diIIerent option blanks, detailing
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Iundamentally diIIerent purported basis Ior the alleged right to terminate the tenancy, the
Iailure to speciIy :
"No-Cause Termination Notice to Vacate NRS 40.251(1) ...PLEASE TAKE NOTICE
that you must surrender and vacate the rental unit ...You are entitled to a period oI:...
X 2. Thirty (30) calendar days aIter service oI this notice to vacate and leave the rental unit
(because you have a periodic tenancy which is not week-to-week). NRS 40.251(1)(a)(2). ...
(because your tenancy is subject to Chapter 118A oI the Nevada Revised Statutes and your
rental agreement expired as oI February 28, 2011. NRS 40.251(1)(b)(1)(11). (Applies to all
other periodic tenancies.)...
Landlord Merliss's 9/27/11 5 Day Notice oI UD Ior Failure to Vacate, Notice oI
Summary Eviction 40.254 provided that: 'PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to NRS
40.251, you are in unlawIul detainer Ior Iailing to vacate and continuing in possession oI the
rental unit located at: 121 River Rock Street. Reno. Nevada 89503 aIter having been served
the Iollowing notice which has now expired:
-(blank is marked with an 'X) Thirty (30) calendar days notice to vacate and leave the rental
unit (because you have a periodic tenancy which is not week-to-week). NRS 40.251(1 )(a)(2).
unit (because your tenancy is subject to Chapter 118A oI the Nevada Revised Statutes and
your rental agreement expired oI February 28, 2011. NRS 40.251(1)(b)(1)(II). (Applies to all
other periodic tenancies.)
The 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE highlights the extent to which the landlord Iailed to prove
he met the preponderance oI the evidence standard required with respect to NRS 40.251(1),
40.253(3)(b)(1)-(3), and NRS 40.280(1),(3) where it Iails to actual speciIy just which, exactly,
section oI NRS 40.251(1) (ie, which oI the boxes that were checked on that 8/22/11 slightly
modiIied "Form #4" satisIied his burden...doing so would get into the messy issues oI the
mixed use tenancy, the bar to utilizing summary proceedings against a commercial tenant per
NRS 40.254, and the extent to which, under NRS 40.254(2)(a) the "term of the tenancy" was,
on the Iace oI the lease itselI, patently other than that which Merliss and his attorney
represented it to be, under oath, and, per NRS 40.254(2)(c) ("date when the tenant became
subject to the provisions of ARS 4.251 ...together with any supporting facts") just when,
exactly, and how, that requirment was satisIied.
Where the landlord and his attorney so brazenly misreprent material terms oI the lease,
Ior NRS 40.254(2)(e) ("(e)A statement that the claim for relief was authorized by law") to
have any bite, there must be repercussions Ior their conduct here.
This is particularly true where a review oI the lease (Paragraphs 2, 3, and 20) reveals
the landlord had no right to terminate the lease on a no-cause basis (that right belongs solely
to the tenant under Paragraph 3, with Paragraph 20's alleged utility to the landlord being
vitiated by the lack oI the "deIined termination date" such Paragraph indicates one can Iind in
Paragraph 2, where there is no such "deIined termination date" in Paragraph 2...meaning,
Coughlin was a tenant oI a "dwelling unit" that was part oI a "premises" (per NRS 118A.140)
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that Coughlin used as a commercial tenant which had an "indeIinite term" given the lack oI
any "deIined termination date" in Paragraph 2 oI the lease or anywhere else therein, coupled
with the language in Paragraph 2 speciIiying that the lease was Ior "not less than 12 months"
(it becomes clear why Merliss and Baker Ielt the need to lie to the court in testiIying that the
term oI the lease was Ior "12 months",...so whereas NRS 40.251(1)(a) (one oI the boxes the
landlord check in the 8/22/11 "Form #1" 30 Day No-Cause Termination Notice to Vacate)
would allow Ior the landlord to simply serve a 30 day notice to vacate (oI course, that is
assuming Paragraph 3 oI the lease did not speciIy such right belongs solely to the tenant), the
problem is that such section only applies to "real property"...and Coughlin's mixed used
tenancy (residential and commercial) does not qualiIy as real property) under the various
deIinitions oI "real property" Iound in the entirety oI NRS, and by virtue oI the Iact that the
legislature Iound it necessary to distinguish "real property" in 40.251(1)(a) Irom "a dwelling
unit" in 40.251(1)(b). So, necessarily, though the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOS Iails to speciIy
which oI the NRS 40.251(1) options the landlord's notice satisIied, such must have been
40.251(1)(b)...the problem there is that such subsection only applies to "a dwelling unit", not
to "a dwelling unit or premises", meaning that, even had Paragraph's 2, 3, and 20 oI the lease
made clear that the landlord did not have any no-cause termination right under the lease,
Coughlin's commercial use oI the premises not only barred the landlord's use oI NRS 40.254,
but also made insuIIicient the 8/22/11 30 Day No-Cause Termination Notice to Vacate where
such Iails to apply to the "premises" portion oI the "type oI property" that Coughlin utilized as
a law oIIice. Further, such notice Iails in light oI the Iact that the lease, on its Iace, does not
have an "expiration" date, and thereIore was not "expired", in addition to the Iact that the
landlord does not have any right to terminate the lease Ior no-cause upon a plain reading oI
the lease terms (particularly Paragraphs 2, 3, and 20) where NRS 40.251(1)(b) requires that
Coughlin have continued in possession "without the landlord's consent" (the landlord's
consent is maniIest Irom the terms oI the lease, and any attempt to contradict that in the
8/22/11 notice is legally inoperative) ... after expiration oI: (1)The term of the rental
agreement or its termination". In short, the "term of the rental agreement" ( per 40.251(1)
(b)) and 40.254(2)(a)'s "the term of the tenancy, and, iI any, a copy oI the rental agreement"
was indefinite upon the passing oI 12 months Irom the date such "commenced", as the lease,
in Paragraph 2 speciIies that agreement provided "for a period of not less than 12 months
tenancy, commencing on the 1st day oI March, 2010".
However, the landlord and his attorneys Iraudulently misrepresented such to the court,
and Coughlin was prejudiced in his ability to deIend against such where the justice court
allowed the 10/13/11 proceeding to take place absent any Iiling oI a "landlord's aIIidavit",
prior to such proceeding (and NRS 40.253(6) makes clear that such hearing may only occur
"upon the Iiling... oI the.... aIIidavits", ("the justice court or the district court shall hold a
hearing...to determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided
for in this section...") though the justice court ruled that it was permissible to Iile (as an
Exhibit) the "landlord's aIIidavit" midway through the 10/25/11 "Trial") thereby depriving
Coughlin of the due process requirement that he have some notice and opportunity to be
heard in opposition as to the basis for the landlord's claim for relief. Such basis is
certainly not clear Irom either the 8/22/11 or 9/27/11 Notices, particularly where they not only
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misrepresent the "period" or "term oI the tenancy" or "term oI the rental agreement", but also
where such are equivocal in that two aifferent boxes are checked in each (judicial estoppel
much? on one hand the landlord says the lease is "indeIinite" by checking box or blank #2 in
both Iorms, while, in a completely contradictory stance, by also checking box #4 the landlord
claims that the lease had "expired").
Further, even iI one overlooked the RPC 3.7 violation attendant to the 10/19/11 Iiling
by the landlord's attorney oI the Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq. Pursuant to NRS
40.254(2), such declaration does not meet the "suIIiciency" standard in NRS 40.253(6), and
the landlord should not be permitted to attain an advantage by hiding the basis and speciIics
oI his claim Ior possession until midway through the second proceeding/"Trial" on 10/25/11.
The 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE reads: "2. The tenancy at issue (NOTE: odd, Baker Iails
to speciIy which oI the "types oI property" (ie, commerical? residential? "low income
housing"?) to which NRS 40.254 may apply is involved here...) commenced on March 1,
2010, and was for a term of 12 months. (NOTE: was that really proven "by a preponderance
oI the evidence" where the record on its Iace reveals that the lease was "Ior not less than 12
months" per Paragraph 2 thereoI?).
3. The rental agreement terminated by its terms on February 28, 2011. (NOTE: odd, the
8/22/11 30 Day No-Cause Termination Notice to Vacate indicates that the lease "expired" on
2/28/11, and speciIically crossed out Irom such "From #1" the word "terminated" in the two
diIIerent boxes checked (which only goes to support to view that such purported "notice" was
Iar Irom unequivocal, and certainly Iailed to "terminate" such "rental agreement"...telling a
tenant "to vacate" is Iar diIIerent than noticing them in writing as to the landlord's election to
"terminate" the lease or tenancy (and here, even had the landlord correctly done so, the
combined import oI Paragraphs 2, 3, and 20 oI the lease in question does not aIIord the
landlord any such "right") ThereaIter, Coughlin became a month to month tenant pursuant to
NRS 118A.470 and paragraph 3 oI the parties' rental agreement.
4. Coughlin became subject to the provisions oI NRS 40.251 to 40.2516, inclusive, at the end
of the stated term of the rental agreement (NOTE: Paragraph 20 of the lease, in
reIerencing some supposed "deIined termination date" in Paragraph 2 (which does not contain
any such "deIined termination date") results in circumstances where there can be no "Iinding"
by "a preponderance oI the evidence" that any such "stated term" had met its "end"),
whereupon he became a month-to-month tenant, as noted above.
5. On August 22, 211, Merliss properly and lawfully terminated Coughlin's month-to-
month tenancy pursuant to NRS 40.251, by serving the statutory No-Cause Termination
Notice to Jacate NRS 40.251(1) upon him, which notice was admitted into evidence at the
hearing. The court speciIically Iinds that service oI that notice was proper pursuant to, and Ior
all purposes contemplated under, NRS 40.280.
6. Coughlin Iailed to vacate the Property vvithin 30 calendar days oI being served with the
notice to vacate, and was thereIore in unlawIul detainer oI the Property as oI September 27,
2011, at the latest. 7. On September 27,2011, Merliss properly served Coughlin with a Five-
Day Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer For Failure to Vacate Rental Unit -NRS 40.251 (No-Cause
Termination) and Notice oI Summary Eviction -NRS 40.254, which notice was admitted into
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evidence at the hearing. The court speciIically Iinds that service oI that notice was proper
pursuant to, and Ior all purposes contemplated under, NRS 40.280.
8. Merliss' claim for relief of possession of the premises was authorized by law. (NOTE: it
is clearly a maniIest abuse oI discretion and irregularity, not to mention an example oI lacking
a jurisdictional prerequisite, Ior this 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE to so Iind where, the record, on
its Iace, reveals that Coughlin notice-pled a mixed residential and commercial use oI the
premises, the lease speciIically allows Ior such mixed use, and that Coughlin, at page 6 oI his
10/17/11 Iiling, speciIically cited to the jursidictional bar presented by his approach to using
the property, which the lease speciIically allows, as to the portion oI the "premises" to which
Coughlin put to a commercial use, where NRS 40.254 precludes the use oI such summary
procedures against just such a "type oI property")."
NRS 40.280 requires, at the very least, a declaration oI mailing the Notices, even iI
personal service is alleged (and no personal service was eIIected as to either notice here) Ior
both the notice required by NRS 40.251(1)(a) or (1)(b) oI 8/22/11, and the 9/27/11 Notice that
purports to comply with NRS 40.253(1).
Davidsohn v. Doyle, NRS 40.253(3)(b)(1)-(3) missing Irom 9/27/11 5 day Notice and
Mikohn Gaming v. Espinosa, 122 Nev. 593, 598, 137 P3d. 1150, 1154 (2006) makes
clear that NCS's Durden's checking box 3 (Ior both the 8/22/11 and 9/27/11 (3:11 pm, no
indication as to whether placed with the USPS, or Fedex or whoever, or iI it was Durden who
placed it or a secretary at NCS's oIIice, nor whether such would be picked up and or going out
that day or whther the mailman had already come and gone...) Notices) renders such prooI oI
service insuIIicient under NRS 40.280, where Durden's "Declaration oI Service" Iails to
indicate that he was actually placing such 9/27/11 Notice in the mail such that it would
actually be picked up that day or whom it would be picked up by or whom it was placed with
Ior mailing.
Further, Braham, 103 Nev. 644, and Cheek, 112 Nev 1249, make clear that it was
Hill's OIIice and the WCSO trespassing on 11/1/11 and 11/13/11 (and the other times Hill
admits to having trespassed during his 6/18/12 sworn testimony at Coughlin's criminal
trespass trial) where NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2),(5)(a) requires "24 hours" to pass Irom Coughlin's
"receipt" oI the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE beIore such lockout takes place (its not a rendition
standard, especially where that announced in court at the conclusion oI the 10/25/11 "Trial"
departs markedly Irom that entered in the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE), and Braham makes clear
that (especially where WCSO Supervisor Stuchell admits that "the residence was unoccupied
at the time" (revealing the extent to which Hill lied to the RPD during the 11/13/11 custodial
arrest Ior criminal trespass oI Coughlin when he indicated that Coughlin "ran away when they
posted it on the door..." despite Baker testiying that Hill was not even present at the time)
"receipt" where no actual receipt is even alleged requires 5 days plus 3 Ior mailing....
The justice court's 10/13/11 "Eviction Decision and Order" committed reversible error
where it applied NRS 118A.355(5) even where Coughlin expressly indicated he was not
pursuing any such deIense and where the landlord admitted he was not seeking rent, but rather
pursuign a no-cause eviction, his attorney later violating RPC 3.7 in Iiling on 10/19/11 his
Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq. Pursuant to NRS 40.254(2). That 10/13/11 order
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mandated Coughlin make an enormous rent escrow deposit to have any right to litigate his
NRS 118A.510(a)-(g) deIenses, even those that did not involve habitability in any way (not
to mention that Coughlin was prohibited Irom bringing claims pursuant to NRS 118A.390(1),
(5)(a)-(b), or NRS 118A.490), reading: "DECISION: Tenant's Motion to Continue Denied. II
tenant posts rent oI $2,275.00 by 9:00 am, Monday October 17, 2011 a trial will be set Ior
OCTOBER 25, 2011 AT 10:00 am. II tenant does not post the monies, eviction GRANTED at
9:00 am. October 17, 2011."
From the 10/13/11 proceeding:
"1udge: What does that have to do with the rent though, sir? Because what we are here today
on is the Iailure to pay rent.
Defendant: Your Honor, the statute to me is complicated and conIusing but my
understanding oI it is that Mr. Merliss` or Dr. Merliss` Iailure to assert that he was owed rent
Ior a good, it seems like three months, takes this case out oI the purview oI the sections
requiring a depositing oI a rent escrow amount and his Iailure to cure the habitabllity issues
within 14 days.
1udge: Okay. Regardless oI that have you paid the rent or not, Iirst oI all?
Plaintiff: Your Honor, may.
1udge: I'm sorry?
Defendant: Your Honor, that`s a factual determination. I think that would need to be made
upon viewing evidence.
Plaintiff: Your Honor, may I please. We are not here on a non-payment oI rent. Your
Honor, I want to be very clear.
1udge: But you said a Iive-day notice.
Plaintiff: We`re here on a no-cause termination to vacate. Mr. Coughlin was a month-to-
month tenant since March 2011. We served a 30-day no cause termination notice to vacate.
1udge: I`ll have two Iiles.
Plaintiff: Yes, sir. That was Irom the previous the non-payment oI rent we had a hearing a
couple oI weeks ago. Those were dismissed. Gone, they`re gone.
1udge: So, which case number is still pending?
Plaintiff: This, Your Honor, this case is ends in 1708.
1udge: Right. So, 1492.
Plaintiff: Dismissed a couple oI weeks ago.
1udge: Fine. That was dismissed by the landlords. "
"1udge: Well I do have a question though; the court previously ruled that he needed to
deposit the rent which he disputed. But what`s your position in respect to the requirement to
deposit rent on the alleged habitabllity.
Plaintiff: Your Honor I think the court got it exactly right last time requiring Mr. Coughlin to
deposit the rent into an escrow account, that`s what the Rules and the statutes I believe
provide. In this case though Your Honor the only issue is possession based on a no a cause
termination oI the lease. Mr. Coughlin owes rent but we are not here to seek rent today. II
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there is going to be claims Ior rent that`s a separate civil action it is not a summary
procedure.
Defendant: Objection Your Honor it`s unduly prejudicial Ior Mr. |David| to be able to
interject all these accusations and then run and cry wolI when it comes time to support them
as he has done in his pleadings as you say, opposing parties concedes this point when nothing
oI the sort was done. He says Mr. Coughlin outright lies in his pleadings he is making this
allegation about a licensed member oI the Nevada Bar and he provides absolutely no support
Ior it.
1udge: Sorry he didn`t say that just now, so I know the only Objection but is there anything
else?
Plaintiff: Your Honor Mr. Coughlin`s burden to show retaliation is under NRS 118A.510, he
has the burden to show that, that my client acted in retaliation, he has not done that, he has
not pointed to any speciIic piece oI evidence that will show that. In order to hang his hat on
the habitabllity he has to Iall under some category in NRS 118A.290 he has not shown that.
He has not shown that the property substantially lacks anything. He has shown that he had an
issue with some weeds or an issue with a broken window."
"Defendant: I will do a slide show Your Honor iI that will be alright. And there is a short
video where the issues oI the property damage are essentially admitted by the Green Action
Lawn service.
Plaintiff: No, I`m going to Object to any video oI anything.it has no relevance to possession
oI property today and I have never seen it.
Defendant: You were provided a copy oI it counsel.
1udge: Well I am going to look at your pictures not the video so.
Defendant: Okay, Your Honor.
1udge: I do have a question Mr. Baker the rent was last paid when?
Defendant: Your Honor I would have to check, my recollection is maybe but I don`t know,
again we are not seeking rent today.
1udge: No, I`m understanding that but I believe it is integral to the defenese you have
|inaudible
0:43:21| how much rent is owed.
Defendant: I`m not sure |inaudible 0:43:29| sir but.
1udge: Well because I believe he needs to deposit the rent less any amount that he is entitled
to credit Ior.
Defendant: Yes, Your Honor I agree with you.
Plaintiff: You can go to the next picture in that order |inaudible 0:43:44|. |OFF MIC
CONVERSATION|
Plaintiff: June 1 the rent was due sir.
1udge: There was Iive months.
Plaintiff: June, July, August, September, October and I believe there is a, there should be a
credit Ior 350.
Defendant: For the amounts my co-tenant paid?
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1udge: No, Ior what he is saying is undisputed is the weeds.
Defendant: I believe he is reIerring to |inaudible 0:44:39| who you all paid to the landlord Ior
June Your Honor.
Plaintiff: We can make it Iive Iull months Your Honor.
Defendant: This goes to the Rule 11 issues I am speaking oII Your Honor. Complainants and
attorneys blindly Iiles motions against |inaudible 0:44:52| without doing reasonable
investigations as to whether or not their plans are based on fact or law. Can they just churn
and burn landlord/tenant claims through the courts, collect money Ior them without knowing
whether or not it`s proIessional to do so.
Plaintiff: I am happy to address to the joint obligation in Mr. Coughlin and Mr. |inaudible
0:45:24| under the lease Your Honor.
Defendant: Your Honor the pictures oI the carpet being leIt in the street and on the sidewalk,
that`s how Mr. Merliss` employees leIt the carpet. It was installed in a manicured manner.
They came on and Ior some reason he decided to pay both me and his crew oI landscapers to
do the same job. One wonders iI he is so well oII as a neurologist that he can aIIord to have
the same job done twice, or he doesn`t just accept my oIIer to have the window Iixed Ior
$100.
Plaintiff: Objection relevance. It`s a hissy Iit by him indeed.
1udge: Alright so I will give you one last chance to add anything else.
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor I believe the retaliation argument a prima facie case has
been made speciIically with regard to habitabllity issues, the habitabllity includes saIety.
The crumbling stair rises clearly presented a situation where that was an issue. habitabllity
includes windows being broken that was clearly supported in writing by the attached emails.
1udge: Alright, sir. I am going to rule now because Iirst oI all I find under the NRS iI you
want to make a habitabllity claim you have to deposit the rent and iI it wasn`t clear in my
order previously I am going to make it very clear today.
Defendant: Your Honor.
1udge: But now sir I am going to give you credit Ior your alleged habitabllity issues. The
rent that is due as oI today will be 4,500. I`m going to give you credit Ior the stairs oI 1250,
weeds oI 350 weeds oI 350 twice. The garbage disposal 125 and the window 150 which
comes out to 2225. In addition I`m going to give you 500 credit Ior the mold abatement,
which is 2725. So the 4500 minus 2225 is 2275. I will continue this till tomorrow at 9:00 AM
Ior you to deposit the 20. It won`t be tomorrow it will be Monday.
Defendant: Your Honor |inaudible 0:48:25| $1,000 claim Ior damage to the landscaping
installation iI you wouldn`t mind.
1udge: I am not going to do anything Ior that, but it has nothing to do with the landlord so Iar
as I am concerned at this point that is a third party claim which you can proceed against the
third party.
Defendant: Your Honor the lease is .
1udge: That is not habitabllity sir, that has nothing to do .
Defendant: But the lease says he is liable Ior damage done on my lawn.
1udge: Who said?
Defendant: The lease says that subsection 28.
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1udge: Well.
Defendant: Clearly.
1udge: Not by third parties.
Defendant: It does Your Honor, it says by his agents or employees he is responsible.
1udge: Yeah and |inaudible 0:48:58| that they are his agents I find they are in independent
contractor and so iI you deposit the rent by Monday at 9:00 o`clock with the court in the
amount oI $2275 I will continue this Ior trial on the merits to determine whether or not there
really is a habitabllity issue. II the rent is not deposited then there will be no continuance the
eviction will be granted Iorthwith on Monday morning at 9:00 o`clock. And Iurthermore the
court is now making any Iinding other than that you have made an argument about
habitabllity and that you are entitled to trial on that issue iI you deposit the rent. Alright but
you are not entitled to trial iI you don`t deposit the rent. "
A new "trial" should be declared where such a prejudicial impact resulted Irom the
wrongIul order to deposit a rent escrow oI $2,275 where the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE Iailed to
Iind that Coughlin asserted any NRS 118A.355(5) based deIense:
"9. Coughlin alleged, as a legal deIense to the summary eviction, retaliatory conduct by
Merliss under various subsections oI NRS 118A.510. Coughlin's alleged deIense was Iurther
based, in part, on what he identiIied as "habitability" issues, (NOTE: this is plainly untrue
Irom the record, as it would be a legal nullity to even suggest that Coughlin pled a defense of
"habitability" to a no-cause summary eviction (indeed, the only instance oI the word
"deIense" in the entirety oI NRS 118A occurs within NRS 118A.510(2) (which Coughlin
pled) and in NRS 118A.355(5) (which Coughlin speciIically indicated he was not pleading,
and its only is some extremely suspect attempt to glom NRS 118A.355(5) onto Coughlin's
pleading a deIense under NRS 118A.510(2) incident to a no-cause summary eviction under
NRS 40.254 that the justice court ruled, on 10/13/11, impermissibly, that Coughlin would be
evicted, and would not get a "trial" unless he deposited such oII base NRS 118A.355(5) rent
escrow deposit (meaning, instead oI applying the law to the extent permissible, ie, ruling that
Coughlin "does not have a deIense to an eviction under" NRS 118A.355(1)(d) had he even
pled such a deIense, the justice court rather, ruled that Coughlin would not be entitled to his
day in court to "test the truthIulness and suIIiciency oI " his and the landlord's aIIidavits per
NRS 40.253(6) even where Coughlin pled a retaliatory eviction deIense only under NRS
118A.510(2) (to whatever extent Coughlins NRS 118A.390(1), and or (5)(a) Iiling oI 10/6/11
went unrecongized)...
It was particularly wrongIul to require such a NRS 118A.355(5) rent escrow deposit
where the justice court also reIused to allow Coughlin to pursue his claims under both NRS
118A.390(1),(5)(a),(b) and NRS 118A.490. Baker's 2/24/12 Answering BrieI conIuses the
point: "7. The trial Court's Application of NRS 118A.490 Coughlin complains that it was
reversible error Ior the "trial court" to apply NRS 118A.490. He does not cite to anywhere in
the ROA to support his allegation that that statute was ever applied by the court.53 CI.,
Schuck. In Iact, it never was. The justice court applied NRS 118A.355(5). This "argument" is
oI no moment." MROA 2651.
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Actually, such argument is oI great moment, especially where the lease at subsection
23 provides Ior a "reduction in the rent" Ior just the sorts oI things that Coughlin complained
oI in writing to the landlord on 5/20/11 regarding the damage to the premises.
From the 10/13/11 proceeding: "Defendant: But the lease says he is liable Ior damage
done on my lawn. 1udge: Who said? Defendant: The lease says that"
The lease, as Paragraph 23 provides: "23. DAMAGES TO PREMISES: If the
premise are damaged by time or through any other cause which renders the premises
untenantable... Owner will promptly repair the premises and there will be a proportionate
reduction of rent until the premises are repaired and ready for 1enant's occupancy. 1he
proportionate reduction will be based on the extent which repairs interfere with 1enant's
reasonable of the premises."
MROA 209: "The Lease Agreement involved here clearly spells out that Merliss is to
be liable Ior intentional or negligent damage he causes to Coughlin's property. Merliss and his
counsel caused to be Iiled the various No Cause/Summary Eviction/UnlawIul Detainer
Notices that contain allegations unsupported (MROA 209) by law or Iact, including an
allegation that some over $2,800 oI rent was owed where Merliss himselI had speciIically
assented to deductions Irom that rent in writing. 11. All the materials and arguments
contained in Coughlin's original tenant's Answer and Motion for Sanctions and Motion
for Clarification are hereby incorporated by reference and apply to any and all actions
brought by Merliss or his counsel, whether Summary in nature or not, whether No Cause in
nature or not, whether UnlawIul Detainer themed or not. 12. Merliss entered into a Lease
Agreement with Coughlin, attached here as Exhibit 1, along with Exhibit 2 (a collection oI
photographs supporting Coughlin's contentions and a cd with a video oI Green Action Lawn
Service's manager explaining that he would not have his men return Coughlin's property to its
rightIul place and undue the damage they did, and that Darlene Sharpe had, essentially, told
them that was okay to do), and Exhibit 3 an email Irom Darlene Sharpe, a Dickson Realty
Realtor and individual acting as a sort oI property manager and or rental agreement broker Ior
Merliss. Exhibit 4 is the door placard left by NV Energy when they, without providing
Coughlin notice, turned off the electricity to Coughlin's home law office. An expensive
mountain bike worth approximately $700 was stolen from Coughlin's back yard on the
day NV Energy came onto the property Coughlin rents and went into the back yard and
turned off the power. 13. The Lease Agreement applicable to this action and entered into
in writing and signed by both Merliss and Coughlin states, in subsection 23. that
~Damages to the Premises. IF the premises are change by fire or from any other cause
which renders the premises untenable......Owner will promptly repair the premises and
there will be a proportionate reduction of rent until the premises are (MROA 210)
repaired and ready for Tenant's Occupancy. The proportionate reduction will be based
on the extent which repairs interfered with tenant's reasonable use of the premises. ... 15.
Subsection 28 in the Lease Agreement 'LIABILITY states that 'Management shall not be
liable Ior any damage or injury to Resident, or any other person, or to any property, occurring
on the premises or any part thereoI, or in common areas thereoI, unless such liability is based
on the negligent acts or omission oI Management, his agent, or employee, ... (emphasis
added). 16. Subsection 13 oI the Lease Agreement 'UTILITIES states that 'Utilities not
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payable by the Resident will be paid by the Management. Merliss maintained the NV Energy
bill in his name Ior several months, apparently, aIter Coughlin's previous Co-tenant took her
name oII the account. Coughlin, upon inIormation and belieI, believes that this NV Energy
was not 'payable in that it was in Merliss's name and contained Merliss's private inIormation
and data and access to the account would require, in all likelihood, Merliss's social security
number at the least. Merliss enjoyed the control he maintained by having the account in his
name, and there is a price Ior that. Further, Subsection 13 mentions an 'attach transIer oI
account addendum that was not attached and Ior which Coughlin has never seen or been
privy to." (MROA 211) . From Coughlin's 10/11/11 Motion Ior Continuance in 1708,
which is the Iunctional equivalent oI a supplemental to his 10/6/11 Iiling.
As such, NRS 118A.360's "under the rental agreement", NRS 118A.390(1),(5)(a)-(b),
and NRS 118A.490 all provided a basis Ior Coughlin to both litigate those damages (he was
denied such opportunity) and a basis to oII-set any "rent escrow" deposit the justice court Ielt
was required (again, though, where the "landlord's aIIidavit" is made "Pursuant to NRS
40.254(2)" and Coughlin's deIense to that "no-cause" eviction (beyond the Iact that the lease
did not grant the landlord any such right, and that the notices (under NRS 40.251(1) and NRS
40.253(3) were not only insuIIicient, but also were not served in accordance with NRS
40.280, especially were Aikins requires the landlord "strictly adhere" the the statutory
requirements (Davidsohn makes them "jurisdictional prerequisites") was based soley on NRS
118A.510(b)
II Coughlin's retaliation deIense was "based on habitability", then the landlord's no-
cause summary eviction was "based on non-payment", especially where the justice court
indicated, ultimately:
It becomes exceedingly clear Irom a review oI the proposed 10/27/11 FOFOCOLOSE
that Baker managed to get the justice court to sign (with a couple interlineations) Ior a while
(until he amended it on the record on 11/7/11, in addition to the extent to which his
announcing such order on the record on 10/25/11 contains some material inconsistencies
arguably eIIective an amendment to the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE particularly where such has
so many conclusions oI law packed into the Iindings oI Iact (as Baker so arranged his
proposed FOFCOL in hopes oI having some "clearly erroneous" "based on substantial
evidence" standard oI review applied to the FOF by the district court rather than Anvui's "de
novo review" (and its
35B C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure 1221: "XVII. Judgment; RelieI Irom Judgment C.
Summary Judgment 3. Proceedings b. Hearing, Determination, and Subsequent Proceedings
(1) In General Topic Summary ReIerences Correlation Table 1221. Findings and
conclusions West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Federal Civil Procedure
2556 Findings oI Iact and conclusions oI law are not required in rendering summary
judgment. As a general rule, a summary judgment presupposes that there are no triable issues
oI Iact and, accordingly, Iindings oI Iact and conclusions oI law are not required in rendering
summary judgment,|1| but, in many cases, Iindings are extremely helpIul to a reviewing
court.|2| The Federal Rule oI Civil Procedure requiring the court to make Iindings oI Iact|3|
applies only to a case on Iinal hearing and submission, and does not apply to a ruling on a
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motion Ior summary judgment.|4| However, the court may make Iindings oI Iact and law with
or without a request,|5| and the court should make Iindings as to Iacts indispensable to its
jurisdiction to hear or determine the case.|6| Furthermore, the court has the burden oI stating
its reasons Ior granting a summary judgment somewhere in the record when its underlying
holdings would otherwise be ambiguous or inascertainable.|7| It may be necessary or proper
Ior the court to make detailed Iindings only on questions raised by the record as it stood at the
time the motion Ior summary judgment was Iiled and not on matters presented by the record
subsequent to the Iiling oI the motion.|8| |FN1| U.S.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2297, 4 Fed. R. Serv.
3d 1041 (1986); Grossman v. Berman, 241 F.3d 65, 37 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 136 (1st Cir.
2001); Couveau v. American Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078, 47 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 303 (9th Cir.
2000). Testimony not heard Where no testimony was heard or considered, no Iindings were
required in support oI a summary judgment entered in Iavor oI the deIendants. U.S.Radio
Corp. oI America v. U.S., 95 F. Supp. 660 (N.D. Ill. 1950), judgment aII'd, 341 U.S. 412, 71
S. Ct. 806, 95 L. Ed. 1062 (1951). |FN2| U.S.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2297, 4 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
1041 (1986). Judicial eIIiciency A summary judgment order that Iails to disclose the district
court's Iindings runs contrary to the interest oI judicial eIIiciency by compelling the appeals
court to scour the record in order to Iind evidence in support oI the district court's decision.
U.S.Couveau v. American Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078, 47 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 303 (9th Cir.
2000). |FN3| Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 52(a). |FN4| U.S.Pen-Ken Oil & Gas Corp. v. WarIield
Natural Gas Co., 2 F.R.D. 355 (E.D. Ky. 1942). |FN5| U.S.Gurley v. Wilson, 239 F.2d 957
(D.C. Cir. 1956); Wehrle v. Brooks, 269 F. Supp. 785 (W.D. N.C. 1966), judgment aII'd, 379
F.2d 288 (4th Cir. 1967). |FN6| U.S.Albert v. Brownell, 219 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1954).
|FN7| U.S.Couveau v. American Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078, 47 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 303
(9th Cir. 2000). |FN8| U.S.Pen-Ken Oil & Gas Corp. v. WarIield Natural Gas Co., 2 F.R.D.
355 (E.D. Ky. 1942)." 35B C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure 1221
Summary Judgment, 5 AMJUR TRIALS 105: "However, strictly speaking, the
existence or non-existence oI a genuine issue oI material Iactthe crucial inquiry in
proceedings Ior summary judgmentis a question raised by prooI adduced in support oI, or
in opposition to, the motion Ior summary judgment. Accordingly, iI proper evidence is
adduced in support oI a Iact, the controverting thereoI in a pleading by the opposite party does
not require denial oI the motion Ior summary judgment. In order to justiIy denial oI the
motion Ior summary judgment, Iactual allegations supported by competent prooI must
ordinarily be controverted either in the prooI oI the opposite party, or by Iacts oI which the
court may take judicial notice, or as a matter oI law. However, even though there is no dispute
as to the Iacts evidenced by the prooI, iI diIIerent inIerences can be drawn by a reasonable
man Irom those Iacts, an issue oI Iact is considered to exist and summary judgment must be
denied. On the other hand, iI the evidence is such that reasonable men could draw only one
inIerence thereIrom, the issue is then to be classiIied as an issue oI law. A determination as to
the genuineness oI an issue as to a material Iact may involve the element oI motive or oI
credibility; where this element exists, the summary judgment procedure is generally not
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appropriate. For example, alleged antitrust violations which involve motive and intent Ior that
reason are ordinarily considered not suitable to disposition on motion Ior summary judgment.
See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System (1962) 368 US 464, 7 L ed 2d 458, 82 S Ct 486,
in which the court stated: "We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in
complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the prooI is largely in
the hands oI the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when
the witnesses are present and subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the weight
to be given their evidence can be appraised." But see Dyer v. MacDougall (1952, CA2 NY)
201 F2d 265 where unusual circumstances existed. Materiality oI a Genuine Issue oI Fact A
Iact is material when its existence is indispensable to (1) establishing the cause oI action or
claim sought to be enIorced (2) establishing the deIense interposed or (3) justiIying the relieI
sought. ManiIestly iI there exists a dispute oI a Iact which is material as above deIined, a
summary judgment cannot be ordered. It also Iollows that denial oI a motion Ior summary
judgment is unwarranted iI the dispute is over a Iact that is not material under this deIinition.
The question whether a disputed Iact is material or immaterial obviously depends upon the
asserted cause oI action or deIense and the relieI sought in a particular case. In the instant
matter, there is clearly a genuine issue oI material Iact as to whether or not the landlord's
8/22/11 and 9/27/11 notices satisfied the requirements of NRS 40.251(1) and NRS
40.253(3), respectively, (and whether they were "served in accordance with NRS 40.280,
and whether, by a "preponderance of the evidence" the "truthfulness and sufficiency"
(per NRS 40.253(6) of those notices was established such that there existed no
unresolved genuine issue of material fact) and whether the various attempts to cull
together a landlord's affidavit by Merliss and his counsel satisfy the requirements of
NRS 40.254(2)(a)-(e) and NRS 40.253(5) (specifically as to whether, by a
"preponderance of the evidence" it was established that there exists no genuine issue of
material Iact as to whether such landlord's aIIidavit were "truthIul" and "suIIicient" per NRS
40.253(6) as to
Burden's oI prooI and presumptions thereIore are very relevant to this analysis:
"1udge: Mr. Coughlin what are you going to do, it`s been Objection that your cross
examination is limited to the scope oI the direct and since this is not relevant to the direct
examination you will have the right to call a doctor on your case in chieI but at this point I`m
going to sustain your Objection. So unless it has to do with the notices or the lease itselI or
testimony it was presented on direct, then the Objection will be sustained.
Plaintiff: Thank you, sir.
Defendant: Yes, sir, Your Honor. As Iar as my recollection, (with respect to what direct
consisted oI: it was aIIirming what was placed in Mr. Baker's aIIidavit, recognizing the lease
and the terms oI the tenancy and not much else)...
1udge: That`s correct.
Defendant: So, at this point I wouldn`t have anything Iurther. We could.
1udge: Alright, that`s being the case do you have any other witnesses?
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Defendant: Your Honor, I will have (rebuttal witnesses) |37.32|
1udge: Well.
Defendant: I believe that the landlord has made its initial burden, to shift the burden to.
1udge: Alright.
Plaintiff: Mr. Coughlin at this point.
1udge: Okay, Mr. Coughlin, as I had indicated as I indicated upIront your defense as I
understand it is the and what we allowed was retaliatory conduct by the landlord and that`s
defined as NRS 118A.520 and that`s what you will need to establish Ior the court. You had
many things that you argued previously but they will not be retaliation so, (NOTE: by
this it is clear that the justice court Iails to recognize Coughlin's deIense under NRS
118A.510(1)(b) where the landlord clearly "threatened to bring" and did bring an "action Ior
possession" in retaliation Ior Coughlin's "complaining to the landlord oI a violation of this
Chapter (NRS 118A)" with the temporal proximity oI Coughlin's reIusing to assent to
modiIications oI the lease (would it not be a "violation oI this chapter" pursuant to NRS
118A.510(c) Ior landlord Merliss to retaliate against Coughlin (vis a vis Merliss's liability
under Paragraphs 23 ("23. DAMAGES TO PREMISES: II the premise are damaged by time
or through any other cause (NOTE: this is quite a pro-tenant provision here, and its
improtant to recognize, as such does not even require that the "Damages to Premises" be the
landlord's Iault, or a result oI his negligence, or somehow due to the acts oI his "agents or
employees" or even subside should any such negligent or intentional torts to the premises by
done by "independent contractors"...and time can cause stairs to crumble, weeds to grow,
windows to break, garbage disposals to cease working, insulation to Iall Irom the ceiling in
the quasi-basement to the vapor barrier-less Iloor, where it developed mold, and mold in the
floorboards right by the toilet, likely due to a broken wax ring on the toilet) on which
renders the premises untenantable,"...but. to be clear, under Paragraph 23, Merliss was
required to pay to "repair the premises" no matter whether such damage was cause by his
employees, agents or "independent contractors" (landscapers and realtor Sharpe) or by "any
other cause", and Merliss clearly indicated in his correspondence in response to Coughlin's
5/25/11 letter reporting the damage and 28, (speciIically with respect to the damages to the
premises inherent to the moldy insulation and as to Merliss's responsibility Ior those utilities
"not payable by the resident will be paid by the Management" in Paragraph 13 (Merliss's
"standing order" with NV Engergy resulted in Coughlin being unable to pay such bill where it
was in Merliss's name given NV Energy's privacy policies)
Clearly, per Paragraph 23 oI the lease Coughlin was entitled to a "proportionate
deduction oI rent" Ior the "damages to the premises"
Its not entirely clear iI the lease says, in Paragraph 23 "by time or through an other
cause" or iI it says "by Iire or through any other cause", but the "any other cause" part makes
the distinction rather irrelevant. What is clear is that Paragraph 23 provides that where the
"premises are damaged by time or through any other cause which renders the premises
untenantable... Owner will promptly repair the premises and there will be a proportionate
reduction of rent until the premises are repaired and ready for Tenant's occupancy. The
proportionate reduction will be based on the extent which repairs interfere with
Tenant's reasonable use of the premises" Coughlin was using the "premises" as the situs oI
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his "law oIIice", and the "damages to the premises" that Coughlin detailed in his 5/24/11 letter
to Merliss reveal that such did "interIere with Tenant's reasonable use oI the premises"...and
Merliss's response (including his written correspondence with Coughlin oI 5/24/11 and
8/11/11) (combined with the relayed messages to Coughlin Irom Merliss's quasi-property
manager Sharpe and the landscapers) revealed that Merliss Iailed to comply with Paragraph
23 oI the lease. Upon Coughlin seeking the "proportionate reduction oI rent" he is entitled to
thereunder, Merliss engaged in textbook NRS 118A.510(1)(b),(I) retaliation in that Coughlin
asserted his rights under the lease (see NRS 118A.360, 118A.390, Ior an oII-set, and Merliss's
reIusal to such is arguably "a violation oI this chapter" (NRS 118A), and under NRS
118A.360, in addition to later asserting his rights under NRS 118A.510(1)(b),
ironically...also, where Coughlin reIused to just eat the loss, and waive his rights under the
lease as to Paragraph 23 and 28 (and later where Coughlin"Iailed or reIused to give" consent
to a waiver oI the 48 hour notice requirement under the lease prior to any entry by the
landlord or his agents), Merliss violated NRS 118A.510(1)(I): "The tenant has Iailed or
reIused to give written consent to a regulation aaoptea by the lanalora , aIter the tenant enters
into the rental agreement,...". The "regulation adopted by the landlord" consisted oI Merliss's
insistence that he be allowed to "regulate" out oI the lease those portions he did not Iind to his
liking, as they just weren't "germane", to his way oI thinking. (MROA 2507-08) ("The
landlord also retaliated here based upon the Appellant asserting his express writes under the
Lease Agreement with respect to the notice required prior to an 'inspection or entry by the
landlord into the tenant's lease hold....'(I) The tenant has Iailed or reIused to give written
consent to a regulation adopted by the landlord, aIter the tenant enters into the rental
agreement, which requires the landlord to wait until the appropriate time has elapsed beIore it
is enIorceable against the tenant; or I reIused to consent to a unilateral changed in the 48
hours written notice requirement prior to inspection sought by Merliss.") See, MROA 112,
179, 222, 234, MROA 1214 ("(I) The tenant has Iailed or reIused to give written consent to a
regulation adopted by the landlord, aIter the tenant enters into the rental agreement, which
requires the landlord to wait until the appropriate time has elapsed beIore it is enIorceable
against the tenant; or I reIused to consent to a unilateral changed in the 48 hours written
notice requirement prior to inspection sought by Merliss.")
MROA 184: "Should the exact Motion Ior Sanctions have been required to be served 21
days prior to its Iiling, Coughlin Iiled the same based on a reasonable desire to see the law
interpreted by reading 'motion to mean some writing alerting the opposing (MROA 184)
attorney oI the gist oI the beeI involved, especially where it is something so obvious as an
email from the landlord agreeing to the rent deduction and subsequent emails from the
tenant asserting it. ""
From 10/25/11 "Trial":
"MROA 767: "DeIendant: I asserted a violation oI a code or a criminal law or some -- and
one oI the codes would be habitability. II I in -- iI I alleged that and the landlord subsequently
retaliates me -- retaliates against me by evicting me on the basis oI that, that's protected by the
law. SpeciIically, to wit, my."
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MROA 772: "DeIendant: Your Honor, I do have some emails here. In the interest oI time and
judicial economy, I would just like to testiIy as to what they say. At this point, I can produce
them again. PlaintiII: Objection, hearsay. Judge: Well, I don't even know what the purpose oI
the emails is, sir. The emails Irom who? DeIendant: There are statements against interest so
there's a-- Judge: From who, though? DeIendant: From the landlord to the tenant that's about
habitability issue. Judge: Who -- identiIy who the emails are Irom."....MROA 774:
"DeIendant: Yes, sir. I can claim to Mr. Merliss in writing Fair Housing violations, Reno
Municipal Code violations, and Criminal Law violations, all oI which are protected under
7510. Judge: It may be protected, but there has to be a Ioundation Ior them, sir. DeIendant:
Well, I'm an attorney testiIying as to that so that's-- Judge: No, I -- no, no. We're talking about
something -- two diIIerent things. I'm talking about there has to be a Ioundation in Iact Ior
them. I understand what you're saying. DeIendant: |INDISCERNIBLE 40:59| 52 is the
Ioundation oI that. I'm -- you do not believe it, but it is evidence-- Judge: Okay. That`s what
I'm saying. I have to believe it by a preponderance oI the evidence"...MROA 776: Judge: Sir,
are you going to raise an issue about the power? DeIendant: There has been a lot oI things that
shocked the conscience, Your Honor, that have happened. Judge: Well, are you going to raise
an issue about power? DeIendant: Yes, sir your Honor, the interruption oI essential services
during the Iive-day period in which I have to respond in a summary proceeding. Yes, I am
going. Judge: Okay. And that was okay. So we know that . DeIendant: To the extent I
can, Your Honor. Judge: Do we assert, do we know that date that you`re raising the issues
Ior? DeIendant: The date I'm raising it, Your Honor? Judge: You said it was the Iive-day
period in which you had to respond. DeIendant: I believe it was the same day Mr. Baker
showed up Ior an inspection with a videographer. I believe that was October 4th , was it Lee?
In my response |INDISCERNIBLE 3:53|. Judge: Well, you have a you know when the Iive-
day Notice was so let`s hear the testimony so we can get this out oI the way. PlaintiII:
PlaintiII calls Ior Miss Tsuda Irom NV Energy, Your Honor. Judge: You`ll come up here,
maàm. We`ll try and do this as quickly as possible. Up to -- the stand is right over here. And
. DeIendant: Your Honor, just to clariIy the Objection. |INDISCERNIBLE 4:43| I believe
you, you indicated that I would have no opportunity to raise -- to bring in third parties or
make counter claims in this summary. Judge: This is not a third party counterclaim. This is a
witness presumably with respect to allegation you`ve made that the landlord cut-oII the
power....MROA 781: "Miss Tsuda: The service was put back into the name oI Mr. Merliss.
He has what we called as Standing Order so when a tenant moves in it goes out oI his name
when a tenant moves out it goes back into Mr. Melissa`s name automatically."
On the denial oI NRS 118A.360, .390, and .490 claims or counterclaims:
MROA 331: It seemed as though, in Court
today,Tenant/Coughlin/Counterclaimaint/Crossclaimant was either barred Irom asserting the
counter and cross claims and adding oI third parties or real parties in interest, or interpleading.
However, the authority directly above, in West, seems to clearly contemplate doing so, even
in an 'unlawIul detainer action, and thus the claim that the 'summary nature oI the
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proceeding somehow prevents Coughlin Irom asserting him rights to make counterclaims,
crossclaims, interplead third parties or real parties in interest, seems to be counter to existing
authority. Admittedly, this is all pretty darn confusing. At least the warp speed Summary
Eviction process does not involve something extremely primal and integral, like the roof
over one's head or the office one uses to make a living and therefore does not require the
plenary status accorded to such important matters as a business dispute over, say, some
widgets. Oh, wait, the Summary Eviction process does involve the roof over one's head
and the office they use to make a living..."
"is seems to me that a dispute will arise ... Further, there is the matter of property damage
done by Darlene's crew. It took me a fair amount of time and money ($...) to return my
residence to where it was prior to Darlene's crew taking my personal property and
placing it in the street and repeatedly refusing to put it back in its entirety... It is my
position that this crew should not be allowed to remove my personal property from the
yard, place it out in the street, and refuse to return it or do the necessary labor to return
my personal property to anywhere near the state is was originally in...I intend to pursue
compensation for my time and damages to my personal property. At this point it is not
entirely clear whom should pay, but its seems clear the correct party will be either
Darlene, Darlene's crew, or you as the owner of the real property... especially in light oI the
$350 agreement and the $... oI property damage done...""
"MROA 784. Defenaant. Obfection, Your Honor. I think theres probably some
privacy basis on which I can ascertain to have, you know, account recoras whether or not I
was a tenant in place. certainly NJ Energy is fona of asserting even if someones not on the
bill, oh you live there. You cant ao this or that. Well, can that person assert a privacy basis
for not having....Miss Tsuaa. There was an interruption of service for a aisconnection of
non-payment on October 4th. Juage. October 4th. Miss Tsuaa. When it was in the name of
Mr. Merliss. Juage. Ana that was -- for what perioa of time was it interruptea? Miss Tsuaa.
Less than 24 hours. It was turnea back on on October 5th . Defenaant. Can we get an exact
time on that? Miss Tsuaa. I ao not have an exact time on when it was turnea back.
Defenaant. Well, then how can you say its less than 24 hours? Plaintiff. Your Honor, is he
cross-examining or what? Juage. Alright. Im fust trying to ask but I fust prior...MROA 787.
"Defenaant. That woula be post-eviction Notice retaliation, is that relevant? Juage. You were
the one who saia it was, sir. Defenaant. I was alreaay servea an eviction Notice by the time
this occurrea. Juage. Yeah, ana you saia in retaliation they shut off the utilities. Defenaant. I
saia Im entitlea to $1,000 statutory aamages because that happenea ana maybe aamages
from NJ Energy because they aiant Notice the resiaence. Ana if someboay was on life
support in there, ana further Ia like to know why you say its less than 24 hours. Ana then
you say you cant tell us when it happenea. How ao you know? Miss Tsuaa. Because theres
a aate on the reconnect oraer [INDISCERNIBLE 17.24{. Plaintiff. [INDISCERNIBLE 17.25{
I want to make sure [INDISCERNIBLE 17.27{. Okay, if its his turn to cross-examine Im
happy to have her answer questions. If its not his turn Ia ask him to follow protocol of airect
examination followea by cross-examination. Juage. I think, is there anything he says this is
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not an issue. So Im going to excuse her ana going to fine that the post-eviction retaliation is
irrelevant to these proceeaings. Plaintiff. Thank you, sir. Juage. Ana youre free to go.""
MROA 788: "DeIendant: Just to preserve, Your Honor. I'm not withdrawing any
counterclaim I have towards NV Energy. Judge: That`s a separate case. You are and you have
now. So Iar as this court is concerned indicated that it is irrelevant to these proceedings the no
cause eviction as to whether or not there was a retaliatory post Iiling landlord retaliation
subsequent to the Iiling oI the eviction. You said that clearly, alright. DeIendant: I'm not
conceding that, Your Honor. I'm just saying the way you`re characterizing this hearing I'm
Objecting on the basis that iI I'm not allowed to serve counterclaims, permissive, compulsory
or otherwise, and iI this is not a Trial, iI this is a summary proceeding. Judge: I didn`t say
you`re not allowed to assert counterclaims. What I said is, sir, in this proceeding and just so
we`re clear on this, we`re talking about a no cause eviction. And I said the only relevance is
whether or not the no cause eviction itselI was retaliation. You`re saying that this shut oII
occurred subsequent to the no cause eviction and thereIore was irrelevant. You Objected to it.
I agree with you. She is Iree to go. PlaintiII: Thank you, Your Honor. Third party: Your
Honor, thank you Ior the court |INDISCERNIBLE 19:23|."
But, previous to that: "Defendant: Your Honor, iI I can just interject. We are here on a
retaliatory eviction basis also I`ve made those claims and the Justice Court Rules do allow
Ior counterclaims joining third party defense. In the same action that stems Irom the same
|INDISCERNIBLE 8:29|.
1udge: Well, I don`t see a counterclaim here, sir. I just see an answer, motion Ior sanctions
and attorneys Iees.
Defendant: our Honor, there`s a language within that ask Ior that makes claims in damages
against Mr. Merliss, the landscaping crew, there`s Exhibits that support those claims.
1udge: But, getting to the 30-day no cause and putting the counterclaims aside Ior a minute,
do you have what`s your defenese to the no cause? "
"1udge: Well Iirst oI all as to the third party complaint I`m going to rule as I indicated earlier
that there is a speciIic statutory procedure in this case which is applicable under Chapter 40 oI
the NRS. ThereIore you are governed by that statutory procedure which does not allow Ior
counterclaims to be heard. At the same time you can Iile a separate independent action as
indicated by counsel Ior the.
Defendant: NRS 40 you say Your Honor does not allow Ior third?
1udge: Chapter 40 in a summary proceeding such as this does not allow Ior counterclaims to
be Iiled in the same action, iI they are Iiled as separate action. That`s under Rule 81 oI the
justice court Rules oI civil procedure. "
"1udge: What they did is they dismissed the action Irom nonpayment oI rent. So they
are not evicting you based on nonpayment oI rent. That doesn`t mean and you were talking
about a counterclaim today which you wanted me to address Ior retaliatory eviction. And I`m
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trying to find out what the retaliation was Ior. You are saying it has nothing to do with rent
then that`s Iine. What is the retaliation about?
Defendant: Subject to NRS 118A.510 the retaliation applies because it occurred aIter written
notice by the tenant to the landlord oI both items. Both matters in statutes such as noxious
weed ordinates as well as complaining about habitabllity issues and.
1udge: retaliation is Ior complaining about noxious weeds?
Defendant: Noxious weeds, property damage done by the landscaping crew and Iailure to
cure habitabllity issues and the landlord`s parts aIter 14 days written notice in pass.
1udge: Okay so you have noxious weeds, landscaper damages and what was the third?
Defendant: All these various, please Iix it landlord types oI written notices.
1udge: That`s not habitabllity; habitabllity is speciIically defined by statutes. So
speciIically what was the habitabllity issue, lack oI heat or?
Defendant: Your Honor I believe the insulation matter with its attended, mold problems it
comes within the essential services. I have seen some authority that seems to suggest
insulation is an essential service. There is saIety issues with regard to .
1udge: Insulation is an essential service.
Defendant: Or at least I believe so in some situations or at least it speaks to habitabllity,
insulation does. There is a window that`s remained broken with exposed shards oI glass held
in by the |inaudible 0:24:30| in the window, that presents a hazard. The stairs, the crumbling
stair rises my mailman has complained about that to the extent it looks bad, it`s not that saIe.
The wood deck to the Iront entry way seems rotted out.
1udge: And these were not preexisting conditions when you moved in?
Defendant: So sir Your Honor.
1udge: So all this happened since you lived there? The stairs rotting out.
Defendant: The concrete stairs they were patched up in a manner that seemed to suggest that
they were done by an amateur, when I moved in they subsequently the patches Iell. So not
just every.it seemed like every day another rock would be crumbling and we would sweep
them away. The riser is the part the toe would kick and not step on and windows are
crumbling they just keep crumbing just like pulling a thread out oI a sweater. So no they were
not pre-existing.
1udge: So what you are saying is because you complained about these Iour things the
landlord might have had to evict you?
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor.
1udge: It had nothing to do with the nonpayment oI rent?
Defendant: I believe it had to do with invoking the statutory right to deduct rent.
1udge: So. Okay so prior to your exercising your statutory right to deduct rent and you
determined that the Iirst eviction was |inaudible 0:26:37| because I think you claim
retaliatory eviction based on the Iirst eviction did you not? (NOTE: that passage relates
directly to NRS 118A.510(1)(e)).
Defendant: Yes.
1udge: So your retaliatory eviction was basea on these things ana not your failure to pay
rent?
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Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor including that...complainea of the property aamage by the
third party agency oI the landlord and his employees or agency.
1udge: Cross-examinations. "
"To zachcoughlinhotmail.com, starssoItcom.net From:Matt Merliss
(magundaaol.com) Sent: Tue 5/24/11 4:39 PM To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com Cc:
starssoItcom.net sorry about the stress zach... i approvea the work by darlene's crew .
i will Iorward this to her, matt"
"rent? 8/11/11 To :achcoughlinhotmail.com, melissa.l.ulloagmail.com From. Matt
Merliss (magunaaaol.com) Sent. Thu 8/11/11 10.06 PM To.
:achcoughlinhotmail.com.... paying your rent does not depend on the alleged
damage you sustained as this is an insurance issue and is not germane...if i aont receive a
check in a timely fashion ... im afraia i will have no choice but to pursue legal recourse."
"Subject: property damage by Darlene Sharpe's crew oI landscapers 5/24/11 Zach Coughlin
To magundaaol.com From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Tue
5/24/11 11:03 AM To: magundaaol.com
Dear Mr. Merliss, I am writing to let you know about what may be a dispute that has
arisen regarding the yard and work done at 121 River Rock St. Your email below indicated
to me your approval oI my making arrangements oI my choosing to have the weeds taken care
oI this year Ior $350. ... Yesterday the same landscaping crew that weeded both the Iront and
back oI the neighboring pink house arrived very early at my residence and made quite a
mess of my personal property. I inIormed them that I doubted anyone with the requisite
authority had approved their working on the yard in light of the agreement you and I
recently came to. They refused to return the personal property in the yard to its previous
state, in fact, they left some of the personal property they had taken from the yard out in the
street in front of the house. I inIormed them that this may be somewhat criminal but they
still refused to put my property back. They indicated they had approval from Darlene to
work on my residence. Darlene inaicatea that she haa receivea approval FROM THE
LABORERS to work on my resiaence, especially because someone Irom my residence had,
last week while the pink house was being worked on, "inquired whether the laborers would be
working on 121 river rock as well." Darlene indicated that she considered this to be
tantamount to an order for services on 121 River Rock. I mentioned to her that it sounded
much more like a question rather than an order Ior services. She said "well, whatever, whats
the difference between "are you guys going to be working on this property and will you
guys perform work on this property." ... II not, is seems to me that a dispute will arise ...
Further, there is the matter of property damage done by Darlene's crew. It took me a fair
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amount of time and money ($...) to return my residence to where it was prior to
Darlene's crew taking my personal property and placing it in the street and repeatedly
refusing to put it back in its entirety... It is my position that this crew should not be
allowed to remove my personal property from the yard, place it out in the street, and
refuse to return it or do the necessary labor to return my personal property to anywhere
near the state is was originally in...I intend to pursue compensation for my time and
damages to my personal property. At this point it is not entirely clear whom should pay,
but its seems clear the correct party will be either Darlene, Darlene's crew, or you as the
owner of the real property... especially in light oI the $350 agreement and the $... oI property
damage done..."
starssoItcom.net sorry about the stress zach.. i thought that aIter you paid the 350 Ior
weed removal there was still some residua so i approvea the work by darlene's crew . i will
Iorward this to her, matt "
"Subject: garbage disposal jammed? 6/02/11 Zach Coughlin To magundaaol.com
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Thu 6/02/11 11:21 PM To:
magundaaol.com Hi Matt, The garbage disposal is jammed. It is only making a
humming sound win Ilicked on. I can have this Iixed Ior $..., or iI you preIer, please let me
know how or it will be fixed as I wish to be home while any work is being done...Also,
the front steps have crumbling cleaves, or holes in several places. I have photos oI those too.
They just keep crumbling more and more. I can have the crumbling places patched Ior $...,
otherwise, I would like it fixed as it is dangerous given one can trip on the stairs. I think it
would be wise to make the repair soon so more and more crumbling does not cause
further problems."
"Subject: Re: garbage disposal jammed? To zachcoughlinhotmail.com From:
Matt Merliss (magundaaol.com) Sent: Tue 6/07/11 4:40 PM To:
zachcoughlinhotmail.com
zach just get 2 estimates, choose the cheapest and take it off the rent. thanks. matt"

"Subject: Re: status and rent? 8/11/11 Zach Coughlin To Matt Merliss From: ZC
(zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Thu 8/11/11 6:43 PM To: Matt Merliss
(magundaaol.com) ...no one has compensated me for the damage done to my property by
the landscaping crew. 1he damage and labor required to repaie it was at least $1,. Ms.
Sharpe admitted the crew. Knew oI the existence oI any issues related to lthe weed pullin.g
prior to submitting a bid, then they put my careIully installed proprty in the street and reIused
to put it back. I suggested to you in writing that you not pay them till my damages were
adressed. Same with sharpe, who was particularly blase and negligent in my opinion. wrote
you about the fallen insulation in the downstairs and the exposed mold both in the floor
board and the insulation. You never responded. Please do."
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"rent? 8/11/11 To zachcoughlinhotmail.com, melissa.l.ulloagmail.com From:
Matt Merliss (magundaaol.com) Sent: Thu 8/11/11 10:06 PM To:
zachcoughlinhotmail.com.... paying your rent does not depend on the alleged
damage you sustained as this is an insurance issue and is not germane.Please keep open
communication with me and allow workers and darlene to enter the house , iI communication
Ialls apart, iI i don't receive a check in a timely Iashion or iI darlene or workers are not
allowed to enter and help you, i'm aIraid i will have no choice but to pursue legal recourse."
"RE: rent? 8/12/11 Zach Coughlin To magundaaol.com From: Zach Coughlin
(zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Fri 8/12/11 1:03 AM To: magundaaol.com Dear
Matt, No one, other than me is to enter the house absent the requisite statutory
notification period and even then, only in my presence. I cannot overstate that enough.
Your records do not reIlect all that mine do. There were a number of aeauctions taken for
repairs ana work aone. For instance, you approved $350 oII oI May Ior my arrangement with
respect to the weeds. ... Then those same workers came and damaged my property and cost
me money. I provided you, Darlene, and the workers the statutory notification. I think you
will Iind that Nevada's landlord tenant law does coordinate payment of rent with a
failure to cure certain problems within a 14 day period when the landlord is informed in
writing... Additionally, please check your records of our communications as there are other
repairs that you approved that were done (the disposal, crumbling concrete, problems with
steps, etc...). ... I do not know what you are reIerring to when you mentioned insurance.
Whose insurance? Has there been some payment and to whom with respect to insurance and
the damage done to my property and the time and labour costs involved in putting it
back to the state in which it was. Please review the lease, very, very carefully, as it
speaks to damages and your liability ..."
"From: zachcoughlinhotmail.com To magundaaol.com From: Zach Coughlin
Matt, ...I appreciate your consideration and eIIorts to educate me with respect to the laws oI
landlord tenant. I have developed some physical reactions to the mold issues that I alerted you
oI earlier and request that you respond to my written requests and inquiries in that regard.
Sincerely, Zach Coughlin, Esq. Attorney at Law 121 River Rock St. Reno, NV 89509 775-
338-8118 Licensed in the State oI Nevada From: zachcoughlinhotmail.com"
"Re: status and rent? 8/14/11 To zachcoughlinhotmail.com From: Matt Merliss
(magundaaol.com) Sent: Sun 8/14/11 10:29 AM To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com
zach, i empathize with your problems but it has nothing to do with paying what you owe
for rent. my intentions were to help you and get landscaping done. the issues you have are
with the landscaping crew. i am sorry but if i don't receive immediate payment for what you
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owe me(i have detailed this in a prior email) i will have to send a notice and commence
eviction proceedings... Matt"
"To Matt Merliss From: zachcoughlinhotmail.com Sent: Sun 8/14/11 10:53 AM To:
Matt Merliss (magundaaol.com) Ars says its does have soemthing to do with paying
rent. Ur liability stems from responaeat superior....u havent responded speciIically regarding
what is okwed, been received, and the recent crumbling stairs, disposal, and other approved
deductions."
"From: zachcoughlinhotmail.com (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent: Sun 8/14/11 10:56 AM To: Matt Merliss (magundaaol.com)
Well since melissa and u already worked something out ab out her halI od june $450, why not
say $900-$350 - the disposal, crumbling stairs, inoperable sprinkler system repairs you
approved..."
"To zachcoughlinhotmail.com From: Matt Merliss (magundaaol.com) Sent: Sun
8/14/11 8:25 PM To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com
zach, ...there was no other formal request for lowering of the rent for any work you
allegedly did....you will receive a 5 day notice"
"Re: rent? To Matt Merliss From: ZC (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Sun
8/14/11 8:46 PM To: Matt Merliss (magundaaol.com) You will be suea for retaliatory
eviction...."
"Re: status and rent To Matt Merliss From: zachcoughlinhotmail.com
(zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Sun 8/14/11 10:04 PM To: Matt Merliss
(magundaaol.com) Ana i am having physical reactions to the mola issue i previously wrote
you about, to which you never addressed, the lease speaks to your liability on these and
similar claims. ...claims i currently hold Ior the various torts (mold negligence, two diIIerent
landscaping charges oI $350 each, ie last seasons and this seasons, totalling $700, the lease
and noxious weed ordinances places this burden upon you and i never received
compensation for last seasons despite repeated written notices, you agreed to this seasons,
the $... in various repairs recently see emails, disposal, stairs, the potentially vast damages
for the proeprty damage done by your landscaping crew and realtor, thin skulled plaintiff
lost wages missing client obligations due to emergency situation created by your crew...."
"From: ZC (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Mon 8/15/11 7:52 AM To: Matt
Merliss (magundaaol.com) 1he sprinkler system isn't working. Please have it repaired .
1his is stautory rent withhold notice. Trees are dying. I planted $.... worth oI nutrient tablets
and it took 2 hours."
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"Matt Merliss To zachcoughlinhotmail.com, starssoItcom.net From: Matt Merliss
(magundaaol.com) Sent: Mon 8/15/11 11:44 AM To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com
Cc: starssoItcom.net
zach can you give us a time today for the handyman please? also at 33 pm
tomorrow nash's pest control will be coming to look at your alleged mold issues. please get
back to me and to darlene . her email is starssoItcom.net."
"To Matt Merliss From: ZC (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Mon 8/15/11 12:29 PM
To: Matt Merliss (magundaaol.com) 1odays no good. Look up statutory notice nrs
inspection landlord tenant."
To: Matt Merliss (magundaaol.com) ...Your whole "get two estimates for fixing the
stairs or disposal or whatever choose the cheapest and deduct from rent..." how much do
you think it costs to Iix the crumbling stairs? To have a guy come out and do work?
Seriously, $...? Am I supposed to arrange cheap black market labor for you? ...The
mailman even is pissed about the steps. 1hey are crumbling...its a liability thing ...The area
above the stairs is in disrepair. The green strips of gripping material are coming up. Its
a hazard and annoying. I could fix it for $... You might feel uncomfortable having me fix
stuff but try finding somebody else to do it for that legally. This is youhr statutory notice
requesting a fix of these peeling green grip strips. Also, the front window on the right
side of the house is broken, one of the 2 layers in the double paine.....I have written
about this window at least 3 times. This is your staturoty withhold rent notice again."
"From: Matt Merliss (magundaaol.com) Sent: Mon 8/15/11 5:29 PM To:
zachcoughlinhotmail.com zach, i am happy to see that you are receiving and
sending prolific emails. ...your appointment to show the pest man all your troubles will take
place at 33 pm tomorrow... regarding my paying you to do any repair work there - i
refuse...."
"From: ZC (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Mon 8/15/11 7:23 PM To: Matt
Merliss (magundaaol.com) You need to provide appropriate statutory notice, in form,
content, and length of time, see ARS. I don't know why you say you don't have to Iollow
Nevada law, CaliIornian arrogance I guess. If someone comes over prior to that they will be
turned away and your money will be wasted. What's the plan with the window repair and the
grip strips on the stairs? What?"
"From: Matt Merliss (magundaaol.com) Sent: Tue 8/16/11 4:18 PM To:
zachcoughlinhotmail.com Cc: rhillrichardhillaw.com
zach, send all further communication to my attorney, richard hill. his email is
rhillrichardhilllaw.com"
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and I will read those out just so we`re clear. Right, this, that`s the wrong section.
Defendant: I think it`s .510.
1udge: 510, correct. And what those are are the Iollowing: the tenant has complained in good
Iaith oI a violation oI a building, housing, or health code applicable to the premises and
aIIecting health or saIety though a governmental agency charge with responsibility Ior
enIorcement oI that code. That is one that you alleged, I believe. B, the tenant has complained
in good Iaith so landlord or a law enIorcement agency oI a violation oI this chapter or the
speciIic statute then imposes a criminal penalty." MROA 810.
Retaliatory eviction. A landlord's retaliation against a tenant Ior the tenant's assertion
or exercise oI rights may be a deIense to eviction.| 15| However, where the landlord rebuts a
presumption oI retaliation by establishing a nonretaliatory motive Ior an eviction, there is no
bar to issuance oI a writ oI possession.|16| The retaliation deIense to an eviction is not limited
to situations where the landlord acts illegally since a retaliatory motive may taint an action to
evict tenants that would otherwise be lawIul.|17| |FN15| Cal.Fisher v. City oI Berkeley, 37
Cal. 3d 644, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682, 693 P.2d 261 (1984), judgment aII'd, 475 U.S. 260, 106 S.
Ct. 1045, 89 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1986). IdahoWright v. Brady, 126 Idaho 671, 889 P.2d 105 (Ct.
App. 1995). Assertion by month-to-month tenants AlaskaVinson v. Hamilton, 854 P.2d 733
(Alaska 1993). Report oI housing code violation Wis.Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389,
173 N.W.2d 297, 40 A.L.R.3d 740 (1970). |FN16| Me.Perreault v. Parker, 490 A.2d 203
(Me. 1985). Not applicable upon termination oI Iixed-term lease Mich.Frenchtown Villa v.
Meadors, 117 Mich. App. 683, 324 N.W.2d 133 (1982). |FN17| D.C.Comez v.
Independence Management of Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276 (D.C. 2009). CJS
LANDLORD 1546
Further, it is not at all clear under Nevada law whom has the burden oI prooI and what
the presumptions are incident to a NRS 118A.510(1)(a)-(g) retaliation deIense to a summary
eviction.
MROA 831: "Judge: I understand that those were alleged. But the question is, were
they repaired, number one. And number two, you were evicted because oI those things.
DeIendant: Yes and I think that on the tenure all the you`re entitled type comments and the
proximity and time we`re talking about literally like a week aIter Dr. Merliss what I kind
oI conIuse this is. Judge: Are we here to what, sir? DeIendant: Well, it`s like he Iinally
came back Irom being out oI the country Ior three months Notice he haven`t been paid rent.
And I don`t know iI also knows he had a bunch oI emails built up over a year asking him to
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Iix habitability issues that he never did. And then he paused his whatever takes up his time
and imagine he`s busy medical practice he pause that and turn to me and wanted all his rent.
And he didn`t want to Iix any oI the issues and he wanted it right then and he was going to
evict me iI he didn`t have like then right away. And that`s retaliatory eviction. |1.19.40| the
sections oI the statutes 118A that allowed me to do rent deductions when he. Judge: Sir,
where is the 14-day Notice? And. DeIendant: Exhibit 8, is at the |1.19.52| over. (MROA
832)...Judge: And this was written on May 14, 2010? DeIendant: Yes, sir. Judge: So, it`s
hardly retaliatory eviction Ior something that occurred in May that`s. DeIendant: Well, the
occurrence oI the nonpayment or the rent deduction didn`t occur until very close in time oI
the retaliatory eviction. At this point I was still being a good tenant who doesn`t to want to
cause ways. (MROA 833)...then Dr. Merliss alerts me, hey, you`re however, much behind in
May. And I alerted him hey I`ve been sending you 14-day Notices to clear Ior the last year
you`ve done nothing. I`m working my Iingers to the bone around here. Judge: And so, okay.
DeIendant: I`m not -- just I`m not making this up, Your Honor. I didn`t start oII this way. I
got to my limit, well, I was tired being the handyman. I was tired being taken away Irom my
law practice...(MROA 834)...DeIendant: I believe a retaliatory eviction stem also in part Ior
my asserting that I was, I guess, accepting I would complain about things like the broken
disposal Dr. Merliss would be in Thailand or somewhere. He may send me an email and get
two estimates, take your time and eIIort to go be my property manager, get two estimates and
deduct the cheapest one. Yeah, and then when I do that then all oI a sudden there would be a
lot oI resistance and then pretty quickly it was an eviction. (MROA 835)...DeIendant: He
wrote me an email about it, hey, what`s up with this? Judge: What date was the email?
DeIendant: That would be, it looks like August, August 11th and the Iirst eviction was August
22nd, so it was less than 12 days. Judge: Well, let`s see 12 days. DeIendant: From when it
would seem he Iound out. Judge: Most people evict within Iive days. DeIendant: Okay, but
it`s not like six months went by Ior me. Judge: What about where, what date, which page?
DeIendant: Page 25, Your Honor. (MROA 836) ...DeIendant: He`s Magundaaol, Matt
Merliss. Judge: 8-11-11, according to my records Melissa paid $600 on 5-6. DeIendant: Yeah,
counsel.taking about. Judge: That leaves $300 Ior May, $900 Ior June, July, and August Ior
a total oI $3,000. Please let me know as soon as possible when this will be paid. II the
payment is marked (MROA 837) beIore 8-18, I will not charge you a penalty otherwise, I will
charge you a penalty Ior late payment. And paying a rent does not depend on the alleged
damage you sustained as this is an insurance issue and it`s not Ior me. Please keep up with
communication with me and allow workers and Darlene to enter the house. II communication
Ialls apart, iI I don`t receive a check in the timely manner, Iashion or iI Darlene or workers
are not allowed to enter and help you I`m aIraid I will have no choice but to pursue legal
recourse. I hope it does not come to that. II necessary please talk to Melissa and decide how
you will divide the rent. DeIendant: And it will be in Iive days and attorneys retain until the
direct all communications are |1.29.45| Judge: Alright. DeIendant: That email |1:29:52| on
page 31 at the bottom. So, within Iive days it went Irom, hey you owe me some rent, no I`m
not going to deduct anything, I don`t have to Iix anything. Hey you`re in Nevada, that keeps
tenants || over there. I heard that`s why I bought houses. Judge: And you wrote back within
one day that no one other than me is to enter the house. DeIendant: Absent prior Notice. Yes,
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absolutely. Judge: No, I understand. But it was not a conciliatory tone at all. DeIendant:
Well. Judge: You`re blaming him Ior being. DeIendant: The tone oI our previous
correspondences would suggest that Dr. Merliss would probably assume that he could just
have somebody walk in my law oIIice. Judge: Alright. DeIendant: And just quickly Ior the
record, Your Honor, I Iind it troubling that Counsel (MROA 838) PlaintiII:: seemingly was
aware and didn`t care he was unaware that his client had admitted to receiving $600 in that
email I believe. And Counsel Baker still send me, you know, you owe three grand in rent
Notice on August 22nd. |1.31.12|, you know. The duties reasonably diligently investigate
beIore using process and Iinally, Iinally going to the claims. Judge: So, you`re saying you did
not owe $3,000 as oI August 22nd? DeIendant: No, and there been |INDISCERNIBLE| Ior
the stairs or at least spent $350 Ior the weeds and...." (MROA 839).
MROA 2476: "Genuine issue oI material Iact as to whether landlord's eviction oI
tenant Ior Iailure to pay rent was in retaliation to tenant's Iiling oI a Iair-housing complaint
with Department oI Housing and Urban Development (HUD) precluded summary judgment
in landlord's unlawIul-detainer action. Fair Housing Act, 818, 42 U.S.C.A. 3617; 24
C.F.R. 100.400(c)(4, 5); Code 1975, 35-9A-501. In YW Housing's summary-judgment
motion, it did not make any argument or present any evidence regarding the issue oI
retaliatory eviction. 'A summary-judgment movant does not discharge his initial burden to
challenge the suIIiciency oI the evidence oI a nonmovant's claim by simply ignoring the
claim. White Sands Group, LLC v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So.2d 1042, 1055 (Ala. 2008); Tiller v.
YW Housing Partners, Ltd. 5 So.3d 623, (Ala.,2008); (See, West Headnotes section: 228
Judgment 228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 228k181 Grounds Ior Summary
Judgment 228k181(15) Particular Cases 228k181(24) k. Landlord and Tenant Cases) Issue"
Note, Merliss did just what the court in White Sands Group, indicated would not
"discharge his initial burden to challenge the suIIiciency oI the evidence oI a nonmovant's
claim by simply ignoring the claim. Coughlin repeatedly identiIied the "type oI property" at
issue in the lease as being utilized Ior both residential and commercial purposes, and the
landlord simply never countered that claim by Coughlin (Coughlin at MROA 376 even
pointed out the jurisdictional deIect incident to so proceeding under NRS 40.254(2), and,
noticeably, the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE Iails to identiIy the "type oI property" involved, but
rather vaguely notes that the justice court had "jurisdiction".
Besides a multitude oI instances where Coughlin identiIied the property in his
pleadings and the transcripts oI the 10/13/11 and 10/25/11 hearings as his "oIIice"
"home/oIIice", "law practice", "law oIIice", "oIIice stairs", etc., Judge SIerrazza even said
"I'm not going to let you live there, or use the office without paying rent" (MROA 762).
MROA 376 (Coughlin's 10/17/11 MOTION TO STAY, SET ASIDE, VACATION
SUMMARY EVICTION ORDER HEARING, CONTINUE
POSSESSION): "In most cases, the landlord can choose whether to Iile a summary or Iormal
eviction action. However, there are circumstances under which summary eviction cannot be
used. For instance, summary eviction is not available for. 2) Eviction of commercial tenants
for other than nonpayment of rent (See NRS 40.254) Using location for a "commercial" law
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practice, you filea a no cause, ie, "for other than nonpayment of rent, not basea in law or
fact, Rule 11, plus this escrow thing gets put asunaer. NRS 40.254 UnlawIul detainer:
Supplemental remedy oI summary eviction and exclusion oI tenant Irom certain types of
property. Lease allows for use for commercial purposes. Joid, void, void! A1CRCP 59,
..."
Never once did Merliss or his attorney challenge Coughlin's claim that he was using
the premises as both his dwelling place and Ior the commercial use oI practicing law out oI
his solo practice law oIIice (indeed, it was Coughlin's email to Merliss oI
MROA 111:9-21 (also at MROA 177:20-25): "All the materials and arguments
contained in Coughlin's original 1enant's Answer and Motion for Sanctions and Motion for
Clarification are hereby incorporated by reference. Coughlin obtained the directed estimates
Ior the repair oI the crumbling stairs/steps/risers at the home/office's entryway steps.
Following Merliss's instructing yielded a cost oI $1,250 Ior the repair oI the stairs. A $350
rent deduction Ior one seasons oI noxious weed ordinance was agreed to in writing by
Merliss, another was agreed to implicitly Ior a total yard work rent deduction oI $750. This is
all detailed in painstakingly clear emails to and Irom the landlord and tenant attached to the
original Tenant's Answer. Similarly, the disposal repair came to $125. Coughlin's law
practice, and liIe in general, has been adversely impacted a great deal by Merliss's misdeeds
as a landlord. Somehow, however, globe trottin' CaliIornian Merliss thinks Coughlin has
exhibited an 'attitude oI entitlement in this situation. NRS 118A.510"
MROA 170: (Coughlin's 10/6/11 "TENANT'S ANSWER/AFFIDAVIT TO 30 DAY
NO CAUSE EVICTION; MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND A
ATTORNEY'S FEES; COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES) "Tenant Iurther moves Ior
sanctions against landlord, Matt Merliss ('Merliss) and his attorney Casey Baker, Esq.
('Baker), pursuant to NRS 7.085, Ior the attorneys' Iees tenant has needlessly incurred due to
Merliss and Baker's reckless uses oI this court's processes, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF
THE RECENT BAD FAITH ATTEMPTS TO INSPECT WITH RECORDING
EQUIPMENT PLAINTIFF'S HOME LAW OFFICE HOURS AFTER HAVING THE
POWER SHUT OFF AT PLAINTIFF'S HOME LAW OFFICE WHERE LANDLORD
HAD, APPARENTLY, A DELINQUENT UTILITY BILL ASSIGNED TO THE
PROPERTY TENANT RENTS, AND WHERE NO NOTICE WAS PROVIDED TO
TENANT OF THE IMPENDING INTERRUPTION OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES,
CAUSIAC A11ORAEY 1EAAA1 COUCHLIA'S LAW PRAC1ICE DAMAGES."
MROA 177: "All the materials and arguments contained in Coughlin's original
Tenant's Answer and Motion Ior Sanctions and Motion Ior ClariIication in the recently
dismissed case between Merliss and Coughlin are hereby incorporated by reIerence. Coughlin
obtained the directed estimates Ior the repair oI the crumbling stairs/steps/risers at the
home/oIIice's entryway steps. Following Merliss's instructing yielded a cost oI $1,250 Ior the
repair oI the stairs. A $350 rent deduction Ior one seasons oI noxious weed ordinance was
agreed to in writing by Merliss, another was agreed to implicitly Ior a total yard work rent
deduction oI $750. This is all detailed in painstakingly clear emails to and Irom (MROA 177)
the landlord and tenant attached to the original Tenant's Answer. Similarly, the disposal repair
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came to $125. Coughlin's law practice, and liIe in general, has been adversely impacted a
great deal by Merliss's misdeeds as a landlord. Somehow, however, globe trottin' CaliIornian
With a Trust Fund Merliss thinks Coughlin has exhibited an 'attitude oI entitlement in this
situation. Merliss has curiously reIrained Irom holding all non white males at all involved in
this action accountable Ior their acctions, including Iormer co-tenant Melissa Ulloa, Green
Action Lawn Service, and Darlene Sharpe. This may entail a housing discrimination claim.a
23. 22. On October 4, 2011 at approximately 10 am the electrical power at Coughlin's
home/law oIIice was shut oII by NV Energy absent an prior Notice that this would be done to
Coughlin. NV Energy then inIormed Coughlin that is would require a copy oI the Lease Irom
Coughlin and a written statement by Coughlin indicating how long Coughlin had lived at 121
River Rock St. and that, iI Coughlin had lived there during any period Ior which Merliss's
current past due electrical bill was incurred, Coughlin must pay Merliss's utility bill,
essentially adding Coughlin to the contract between Merliss and NV Energy, and, apparently,
providing Iurther evidence oI Merliss's habit oI expecting his tenants to be a de Iacto pro bono
property manager and personal secretary Ior Merliss." (MROA 178).
MROA 529 (10/25/11 Motion Ior Summary Judgment/Pre-Trial Statement by
Coughlin): "The Green Action crew admitted to Coughlin (and Coughlin was prevented
from submitting video and audio recordings into the record by 1udge Sferrazza, despite
the salient importance to Coughlin's counterclaims any statements they made would have
as to whether Dr. Merliss is responsible Ior or ratiIied the property damage to Coughlin
careIul wool green law carpet installation, which was laid, cut, and notched around the house
and exterior Ience in a very exacting manner, only to be converted by the Green Action crew
and leIt in the street and sidewalk near the house, creating a theIt hazard and exigent situation
in which the undersigned's law practice suIIered economic damages and Coughlin was
required to take immediate action to mitigate the damages. If the Reno 1ustice Court wants
to implement something similar to 1ustice Court Rule 44 of Las Jegas, it must first have
the rule approved by the Supreme Court of Nevada. See, Nevada 1CRCP RULE 83."
MROA 2474: "As such, the import oI Section 20 is vitiated in light oI Section 3 and
the retaliatory conduct oI the landlord. That being the case, NRS 40.360(3)'s dictates that 5
days elapse Irom entry oI order (Ior leases that have not terminated by their terms) made this
order and the lockout void and present reversible error, as well as a lack oI subject matter
jurisdiction"
MROA 2474: "The only problem is that landscaping crew damaged Appellant's personal
property and cause lost business, proIits, and consequential damages, all supported by
testimony and documentary evidence. And the Lease Agreement makes Respondent liabile
Ior such, or at least suIIicient ambiguity exists in that regard to preclude the summary
judgment on that issue the Trial Court made: '23. DAMAGES TO PREMISES: II the premise
are damaged by time or through any other cause which renders the premises
untenantable, ...... Owner will promptly repair the premises and there will be a proportionate
reduction oI rent until the premises are repaired and ready Ior Tenant's occupancy. The
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proportionate reduction will be based on the extent which repairs interIere with Tenant's
reasonable use oI the premises. (MROA 2474-2475).
zii
NRS 118A.490: "Actions based upon nonpayment oI rent: Counterclaim by tenant;
deposit oI rent with court; judgment Ior eviction.
1. In an action Ior possession based upon nonpayment oI rent or in an action Ior rent
where the tenant is in possession, the tenant may deIend and counterclaim Ior any amount
which the tenant may recover under the rental agreement, this chapter, or other applicable
law...."
MROA 123-124: "is attempting to say Coughlin will be unable to litigate the
habitability issues should he Iail to deposit 'something into the 'escrow account. However,
that is a gigantically over broad application oI NRS 118A.355(5) to all oI NRS 118A, rather
than to the one section Ior which NRS 188A.355(5) is intended to apply, which would be
NRS 118A.355(1)(d), which is a puny little section oI a very long statute that merely concerns
itselI with whether a tenant can ' Withhold any rent that becomes due without incurring late
Iees, charges Ior notice or any other charge or Iee authorized by this chapter or the rental
agreement until the landlord has remedied, or has attempted in good Iaith to remedy, the
Iailure. And, given that the Lease Agreement speciIies a rather small late Iee per day, that is
not even that big oI a concern. But what it certainly does not do is preclude Coughlin Irom
litigating habitability issues at all in the instant case. To say it does is very bad Iorm
indeed."...So, whether Merliss is charged a rent deduction according to his proIIered 'be my
pro bono property manager/personal secretary while I am trotting the globe and get two
estimates then deduct the cheaper one Irom the rent dictate, or being charged a rent
deduction equal to one month's periodic rent, $900,NRS 118A.360, there still is no 'deposit
into the court's rent escrow account mandate applicable. Indeed, Merliss's dictate oI
gathering two estimates and deducting the cheapest Irom the rent." MROA 123-124, 193-
194, 245. And, arguably, Coughlin's claims or counterclaims contained therein add up to more
than $10,000, preventing the RJC Irom excercising jurisdiction.
The 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE is commits not just reversible error but is suIIiciently
irregular to justiIy the intervention oI an extraordinary writ, and Iurther, both exceeds and
Iails to embrace the jurisdiction required: "10.4 Coughlin Iailed to present any evidence that
he had "complained in good Iaith to the landlord, a government agency, an attorney, a Iair
housing agency or any other appropriate body oI a violation oI NRS 118.010 to 118.120,
inclusive, or the Fair Housing Act oI 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., or ha|d| otherwise
exercised rights which are guaranteed or protected under those laws" as required by NRS
118A.510(1)(g). (NOTE: the email oI 8/14/11 where Coughlin includes the 121 River Rock
address next to his name, Iollowed by the designation "Esq" certainly supports a view that a
"preponderance oI the evidence" demonstrates that Merliss both threatened to and did bring
"an action Ior possession" "in retaliation"...)
11. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that the Property was at any time not
habitable, as that term is deIined in NRS 118A.290, or otherwise, with respect to any oI the
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alleged deIiciencies identiIied by him. Those alleged, but unproven, deIiciencies included, but
were not limited to, the Iront and back steps, any broken window, any allegea mola, 2.any
falling insulation, the garbage disposal, and any weeds on the Property. "
So...
NRS 118A.180 Applicability. 1.... this chapter applies to, regulates and determines
rights, obligations and remedies under a rental agreement, wherever made, Ior a dwelling unit
or premises
The problem Ior Merliss, though, is that his 8/22/11 and 9/27/11 Notices spelled out
the Iact that he was not entitled to terminate the tenancy under the lease (grown man, signed
the lease, stuck with it). It is very interesting the distinction made between "real property"
and "a dwelling unit" in NRS 40.251(a),(b), especially when considering the Iact that the "or
premises" part oI NRS 118A.080, 118A.140, 118A.180, NRS 40.254, NRS 118C.040
Judge SIerrazza's 10/27/11 FOFOCOLOSE reads: "...FINDINGS OF FACT ... 2. The
tenancy at issue (NOTE: odd, Baker Iails to speciIy which oI the "types oI property" (ie,
commerical? residential? "low income housing"?) to which NRS 40.254 may apply is
involved here...) commenced on March 1, 2010, and was for a term of 12 months. (NOTE:
was that really proven "by a preponderance oI the evidence" where the record on its Iace
reveals that the lease was "for not less than 12 months" per Paragraph 2 thereoI?).
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procedures against just such a "type oI property")..."
Agreement between Merliss and Coughlin simply does not state that it will be 'expired as oI
February 28, 2011.
The landlord's attorney's 10/19/11 Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq. Pursuant to
NRS 40.254(2) misstates the materials aspects oI the lease and the notices he used and
purportedly had served, where it reads:
'8.1. The tenancy at issue commenced on March 1, 2010, and was Ior a term oI 12
months. A true and correct copy of the rental agreement is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 1.
ARS 4.254(2)(a).
8.2. The rental agreement terminated by its terms on February 28, 2011.
ThereaIter, Mr. Coughlin became a month to month tenant pursuant to NRS 118A.470 and
paragraph 3 of the rental agreement. ARS 4.254(2)(b).
8.3. The tenant became subject to the provisions of ARS 4.251 to 4.251,
inclusive, at the end of the stated term of the rental agreement, whereupon he became a
month-to-month tenant, as noted above. NRS 40.254(2)(C).
8.4. Copies oI the written notices pursuant to ARS 4.254(2)(d) are attached to
Dr. Merliss' affidavit, previously filed herein. (NOTE: that is a misrepresentation Ior Baker
to swear that such "Dr Merliss' aIIidavit" was "previously Iiled herein" where it is maniIest
Irom the record that such was only made part oI the record upon being admitted as an exhibit
midway through the 10/25/11 "Trial".) In addition to the 5-day notice attached to Dr.
Merliss' affidavit, which was hand-delivered to Mr. Coughlin by me at the hearing on
September 27, 211, an additional 5-day notice was served on Mr. Coughlin by Aevada
Court Services on that same date. A true and correct copy oI that notice, together with the
certiIicate oI service, has also been provided to the court. An additional copy is attached
hereto as EXHIBIT 2. ARS 4.254(2)(d). (NOTE: NRS 40.254(2)(d) actually requires the
aIIidavit contain: "... the date when the written notice was given, a copy oI the notice and a
statement that notice was served in accordance with ARS 4.28 ."; owing to Baker's
knowledge that he had Iailed to actually have such notice "served in accordance with NRS
40.280", Baker sidestepped the requirement in NRS 40.254(2)(d) that any such "landlord's
aIIidavit" contain "a statement that notice was served in accordance with NRS 40.280", as
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neither his Declaration, nor the "Exhibit 2" attached to it contain any such statement...Baker's
Declaration indicates that "the 5-day notice ... which was hand-delivered to Mr. Coughlin by
me at the hearing on September 27, 211," and "an additional 5-day notice was served on
Mr. Coughlin by Aevada Court Services on that same date." One has to look closely, but a
thorough inspection will reveal the extent to which Baker purposeIully avoid declaring, under
oath, that which is required by NRS 40.254(2)(d), ie, "a statement that notice was served in
accordance with ARS 4.28". That is important, as Baker's 10/19/11 Declaration merely
indicates such 9/27/11 Notice was "hand-delivered to Mr. Coughlin by me at the hearing on"
9/27/11 (Baker knows that even iI this was true, NRS 40.280 requires that such also be mailed
to the tenant (ie, alleged personal service is not enough where NRS 40.280(3)(1) requires the
tenant and a witness to indicate in writing that the tenant was served in their presence) so he
8.5. Coughlin was a month-to month tenant, whose tenancy had been properly terminated
pursuant to NRS 40.251(1). ThereIore, the claim Ior relieI oI possession oI the premises was
authorized by law. NRS 40.254(2)(d).
Its very telling that in paragraph 8.5 Baker avoid speciIying just which sub-section oI
40.251(1) such claim was authorized.
(Baker's 11/21/11 Opposition to Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien; Joinder in
Motion to Set Aside or Vacate Attorney Fee Award, continues): "...In Iact, Coughlin even
asked the court Ior an opportunity to prepare and submit his own version oI the court's
Iindings, but, predictably, Iailed to do so. Then, on October 27, 2011, the court entered its
written order, a copy oI which is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 1. That order was served on
Coughlin by the Washoe County SheriIIs Department on Tuesday, November 1, 2011, a Iull
week aIter the hearing in which Coughlin was Iirst given notice, on the record, that an
eviction had been granted. The order was posted to the Iront door in the customary manner oI
evictions perIormed in Washoe County, and the locks on the Iront and back doors were
changed at that time. 4 !
Even though he had a week to do so, Coughlin did not remove his personal belongings Irom
the property prior to the lockout. In Iact, he did not even remove himselI Irom the property.
Unbeknownst to Merliss or his counsel, Coughlin continued to live in the basement oI the
property until he was discovered squatting there on November 13, 2011 -
nearly two weeks aIter he was legally locked out. Coughlin had barricaded himselI, his dog,
and some oI his presumably more cherished possessions in the basement. When Coughlin
reIused to emerge Irom the basement aIter being ordered to do so by the police, Merliss was
Iorced to kick down the door to gain access to his own property. Coughlin was arrested and
charged with trespassing. Due to Coughlin's criminal activities, the security oI the house was
compromised. As a result, Merliss was Iorced to incur costs in the amount oI $1,060.00 to
secure the property in order to protect it and Coughlin's belongings. A true and correct copy
oI the bill Irom the contractor is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2.
Now, unbelievably, Coughlin asks the court to exercise its equitable powers to reduce
or eliminate Merliss' statutory right to recover the reasonable costs oI storing Coughlin's
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property. Under no circumstances should Coughlin be granted any relieI at this juncture,
equitable or otherwise. Coughlin continued to illegally live in the basement, without
permission, aIter he was evicted. He had a bed set up, Iood, water, computers, televisions, and
even a pet (which was deIecating on the Iloor). The walls were (and are) lined with bags and
boxes oI
A. Merliss is Entitled to Charge and Collect a Reasonable Fee for Storage of
Coughlin's Property Before Releasing it.
NRS 118A.460(1)(a) controls. Coughlin was evicted and the locks were changed.
Coughlin had known Ior an entire week that he would be getting locked out, but he leIt the
main level oI the house essentially Iull and untouched, as though he never intended to leave
(in Iact, he never did leave). Photographs showing a "lived in" and Iully Iurnished residence,
which was obviously not in the process oI being vacated, will be provided at the November
21, 2011 hearing. 5
what can only be described as "junk". Every nook and cranny oI the space was, and is, taken
up with some thing or another. In addition to the main living area and the basement, Coughlin
has managed to literally stuIIthe attic Iull oI even more junk. Photographs oI the basement
and attic will be provided at the November 21, 2011 hearing. Mr. Coughlin's personal
property did, and does, Iully occupy the entire house.
Under NRS 118A.460, Merliss is obligated to store Coughlin's belongings Ior 30 days
beIore he can lawIully dispose oI them. Under normal circumstances, it might be cost
eIIective to inventory and move a household Iull oI goods to a storage unit Ior those 30 days.
But here, it is simply not economical. Coughlin has Iilled the house with so much trash and
other worthless debris, that to inventory, pack, and move it, together with Coughlin's
belongings that may have some value, would not only require a herculean eIIort, it would be a
colossal waste oI resources. By leaving the Coughlin's property in the house and charging him
the Iair rental value Ior storage ($900.00 per month), Merliss is actually mitigate the costs
Coughlin is statutorily required to bear. Coughlin should be thanking Merliss, not stalking and
harassing his attorneys.
Mr. Hill and the undersigned, have made numerous eIIorts to coax Mr. Coughlin into
arranging to retrieve his belongings. See EXHIBIT 3 and EXHIBIT 4, hereto. Instead oI
responding to those eIIorts in a civilized, reasonable, or even rational manner, Coughlin has
instead chosen to resort to his usual game-play, pretending to have never received counsel's
communications. Except this time, Mr. Coughlin has elevated his antics to include threatening
and stalking behavior toward Mr. Hill and his staII. Why Mr. Coughlin Ieels it is necessary to
video-record the license plates oI Mr. Hill's staII members is beyond the grasp oI this writer.
Perhaps Mr. Coughlin will be able to explain this tactic at the hearing. In any event, it is
painIully obvious that the reason Mr. Coughlin never responded to Mr. Hill's inquiries
regarding the removal oI his personal belongings beIore November 13, 2011, is because
Coughlin was illegally living in the property the whole time.
Only now, aIter the property has been secured, and Mr. Coughlin released Irom jail
without 6
his wallet, cell phone, or computer, does he even approach what can be considered a sincere
request to remove his things Irom the house. UnIortunately Ior Mr. Coughlin, he has Iully
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committed himselI to his gamesmanship. He cannot seem to bring himselI to deal with the
reality oI the situation: that he must pay those costs Merliss was Iorced to incur as a direct
result oI his prior bad decisions, beIore he can retrieve his belongings. NRS 118A-460.
Instead, Coughlin continues to pretend that he is not receiving Mr. Hill's emails, even though
he obviously has, and he has now Iiled yet another unsupported motion Ior sanctions against
Hill and Baker. Despite all oI this, Mr. Hill has repeatedly oIIered to retrieve Mr. Coughlin's
wallet and his "client Iiles" Ior him without any requirement Ior payment in advance. For
some reason, Coughlin would rather argue with Mr. Hill than take him up on that oIIer.
Coughlin's abuse oI this court's processes must be stopped. He continues to Iile
baseless and Irivolous motions and other papers, even though he has appealed this case to the
district court. He continues his pattern oI sending late-night email rants to counsel, which
serve only to drive up Iees Ior Merliss and Iurther destroy whatever shred oI credibility
Coughlin may still possess. He has harassed, cursed at, and abused Mr. Hill's staII, and, on
one occasion, barged into Hill's oIIice unannounced, creating a scene and interrupting a
deposition. Enough is enough. It is time Ior Mr. Coughlin to Iace Iacts and move on. This
court must not tolerate any Iurther ravings Irom Mr. Coughlin, and should order hill), once
and Ior all, to comply with the law.
B. The Attorney's Fee Award Should be Vacated.
Although there is no case-law on the matter in Nevada, Coughlin may be right about
one thing. Based on the language oI the statute, NRS 69.030 may not authorize attorney's Iees
and costs to a prevailing party in a summary eviction action. Merliss does not concede the
point, but simply does not wish to deal with the matter on appeal. Merliss has oIIered to
stipulate with Coughlin to vacate the award, but, despite having sought the same relieI Irom
the court by Iiling this motion, Coughlin has Iailed to respond to that oIIer. Merliss joins in
Coughlin's request to vacate the award oI Iees and costs entered herein on November 9, 2011 .
CONCLUSION Merliss is entitled to charge and collect a reasonable storage Iee Irom
Coughlin beIore releasing his property to him. NRS 118A.460. Counsel Ior Merliss have gone
out oI their way to make the process easy on Coughlin, and to let him know what he needs to
do to get his belongings, despite Coughlin's constant harassment oI counsel and their staII.
Coughlin reIuses to cooperate, and only wants to Iight. His gamesmanship and criminal
behavior should prevent this court Irom awarding him any equitable or other relieI
whatsoever. II Coughlin want his things, he needs to pay as required under the statute.
WHEREFORE, plaintiII prays that the Coughlin take nothing by way oI his motion to contest
personal property lien; that same be denied in its entirety; and that Coughlin be required to
pay storage Iees under NRS 118A.460 in the amount oI $30.00 per day Irom November 1,
2011, plus $1,060.00 Ior costs incurred to secure the property, beIore he be allowed to
retrieve his belongings; that, in the event Coughlin pays as required, that he be ordered to
remove and properly dispose oI all oI his belongings at the property; that the court's order
awarding attorney's Iees and costs entered herein on November 9, 2011 be vacated; and Ior
such other, Iurther and additional relieI as seems just to the court in the premises.
AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030 The undersigned does hereby \ aIIirm that the
preceding document does not contain the social security number oI any person. DATED this
21st day oI November, 2011. /s/ Casey D. Baker, Esq. '
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Arguably, upon some oI the emails even between Irom Couglin to Merliss, and then to Hill
and Baker Irom Coughlin, which could easily be characterized as Litigation Demand Letters
(and thereIore invoking the protections oI NRS 118A.510(e)), Couglin had already 'instituted
or deIended against a judicial or administrative proceeding...and, similarly , with the May
20th-24th, 2011 Green action Law Service debacles and complaints to Merliss invoking NRS
118A.510(b) ('(b) The tenant has complained in good Iaith to the landlord or a law
enIorcement agency oI a violation oI this chapter or oI a speciIic statute that imposes a
criminal penalty:).
So, it becomes rather important, what is meant by 'terminate a tenancy, reIuse to
renew a tenancy, Especially 'reIuse to renew a tenancy
"This whole business about 'The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
sheriII or constable oI the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the
order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary Eviction was
signed by October 27th, 2011. That language is only Iound in situations inapplicable to the
current one. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the only sections oI NRS 40
where this 'within 24 hours language occurs, and those situations only apply where, in:
40.253(3)(b)(2): ' 3. A notice ...must: ...(b) Advise the tenant: .. (2) That iI the court
determines that the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer, the court may issue a summary
order Ior removal oI the tenant or an order providing Ior the nonadmittance oI the tenant,
directing the sheriII or constable oI the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after
receipt of the order
and,
40.253(5)(a): '5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the
landlord`s agent may apply by aIIidavit oI complaint Ior eviction to the justice court... The
court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriII ... to remove the tenant within 24
hours after receipt of the order. The way these summary eviction proceedings are being
carried out in Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates Nevada law.
There is not basis Ior eIIectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in this
case.
Interestingly, an employee oI "an arm oI" this Court, the SBN's OIIice oI Bar Counsel's
Patrick O. King, Esq. Iiled a SCR 105 Complaint in SBN v. Coughlin on 8/23/12 that
contained the Iollowing:
Hill's associate Baker's 12/1/11 Iiling in 1708 reads: "OPPOSITION TO, AND
RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO OPPOSE ON THE MERITS, ALL PAPERS FILED OR
SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANT ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER 23, 2011 PlaintiII, MATT
MERLISS, through counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, CHARTERED and CASEY D. BAKER,
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ESQ., opposes all papers Iiled or submitted to the court by deIendant, ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN, on or about November 23, 2011. ThIS oppositio;n is primarily based on the
apparent Iugitive nature oI the papers that were actually delivered to Merliss' counsel, and the
impossibility oI any merit-based opposition by Merliss at this time due to those papers'
illegibility, as discussed below. However, Merliss also reserves his right to oppose any oI the
reIerenced papers on the merits in the event the court elects to so consider them. . The papers
at issue, which, on inIormation and belieI may have been Iiled or submitted to the court by
Mr. Coughlin on or about November 23, 2011, include: 1) Order Ior Hearing; 2) Motion to
Set Bond and Stay Eviction; 3) Designation oI Record and Statement oI Points on Appeal and
Notice oI Intent to File BrieI; 4) AIIidavit/Declaration in Support oI Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien and Ior Return oI Personal Property Iiled; 5) CertiIicate oI No
Transcript; 6) Notice oI Appeal; 7) Statement oI Proceedings (2); 8) Notice oI Posting and
Acceptance oI Supersedeas/Cost Bond on Appeal; and 9) Tenant's AIIidavit/Declaration
(Other than Nonpayment oI Rent -Private Housing) (delivered by Coughlin, but no
corresponding document reIerenced on the court's docket.) PlaintiII Iurther reserves his right
to oppose any other document Iiled or submitted by Coughlin which may not have been
served on plaintiII. This opposition/reservation is based on the points and authorities below
and all papers and pleadings on Iile herein. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES PlaintiII believes
the court to be Iamiliar with the substantive and procedural Iacts oI this case, and will not
needlessly repeat them here. The pertinent Iacts Ior purposes oI this opposition are as Iollows:
1. On the morning oI Friday, November 25, 2011 (Family Day, the day aIter Thanksgiying)
Richard G. Hill, Esq., counsel Ior Merliss, arrived at his oIIice to Iind a Iootball-sized wad oI
crumpled papers that had been stuIIed through the Iront-door mail slot by Mr. Coughlin. 1.1
True and correct copies oI photographs taken oI Mr. Coughlin's documents are attached
hereto as EXHIBIT 1. 2. Because Mr. Hill's oIIice was closed on that day, which is a court
holiday, the original papers were not untangled and reviewed until Monday, November 28,
2011, when the undersigried, Casey D. Baker, Esq., returned to the oIIice. 3. What the
undersigned discovered is what appears to be nine separate, incomplete documents, all oI
which appear to be landlord/tenant Iorms published by the Nevada Supreme Court, which
have been partially, but incomprehensibly, Iilled out and signed by Mr. Coughlin. 4. The
documents were crumpled into a large ball. See EXHIBIT 1. They are all missing their Iinal
page (presumably, a certiIicate oI service). None oI the documents were stapled. None oI the
documents were paper clipped or attached in any way. None oI the documents were in order.
Some oI the documents were duplicates. One oI the documents was literally one-halI oI a torn
page. It took the undersigned and a member oI his staII approximately 20 minutes to un-
crumple and sort through the pile oI papers just to organize and identiIy what Mr. Coughlin
had delivered. Even then, because there were duplicates, counsel is not sure that all oI the
pages have been appropriately placed with the correct document. The stack oI papers then had
to be leIt under heavy books Ior two days to Ilatten them out, just so they could be reviewed
and placed into a Iile. 5. Importantly, each oI the documents appears to be an original. That is,
each document contains original ''handwriting'' in blue ink. Further, none oI the documents
are Iile-stamped, and none oI them contain a certiIicate oI service. As such, the undersigned
has no idea whether or not the documents served on his oIIice were ever Iiled with the court.
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Upon a review oI the court's docket, it appears that the same or similarly captioned documents
were Iiled by Mr. Coughlin on November 23, 2011, but without reviewing the court's actual
Iile, there is no way to know Ior certain whether those documents are the same as what was
served on counsel. 5.1. True and correct copies oI the documents Mr. Coughlin stuIIed
through counsel's mail slot are attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2. Given the manner oI "service",
the condition oI the documents, and the history oI this case, it is highly likely that these
doc.uments are not the same as the documents Mr. Coughlin actually Iiled with the court,
even though the Iorms appear to bear the same or similar names. Thus, Merliss speciIically
reserves his right to a reasonable and real opportunity to oppose all papers that were actually
Iiled by Mr. Coughlin on or about the time the documents in EXHIBIT 2 were served. 6. Even
more importantly, virtually all oI the "handwriting" on all oI the documents is completely
illegible. Merliss cannot be expected to intelligently respond to unintelligible scribbles.
Ironically, one oI the only legible entries by Mr. Coughlin: is his admission on page 5 oI 6 oI
his (apparently unIiled) Tenant's AIIidavit/Declaration that his request Ior a stay is moot.
Why, then, does Mr. Coughlin Ieel it is necessary to continue to move this court Ior that relieI
(CI., NRS 7.085. CI., NJCRCP 11. 7. ReIerence is made to the Declaration oI Casey D.
Baker, Esq., attached hereto as EXHIBIT 4, Ior authentication or all exhibits. LAW AND
ANALYSIS Proper service under NJCRCP 5(b) requires that a copy oI any Iiled document be
delivered to counsel Ior the opposing party. That is to ensure that the opposing party receives
exactly what has been Iiled with the court, so he has a real and meaningIul opportunity to
respond to it. As a practicing attorney, Mr. Coughlin must be presumed to be aware oI this
most basic procedural requirement. Nevertheless, here, Coughlin's "service" consisted oI
shoving a wadded-up pile oI original, incomplete, unsorted, unstapled, unclipped, illegible,
hand-scribbled documents through counsel's door in the middle oI the night on a holiday. Not
only are the documents illegible and completely unintelligible, Merliss has no way to know
whether those documents are the same as what was Iiled with the court two days earlier, since
they all appear to be originals. CI., NJCRCP s(b). As such, Merliss cannot reasonably be
expected to respond to whatever inIormation Mr. Coughlin has actually presented to the court
in the papers he actually Iiled. It is important Ior the court to note that it is Mr. Coughlin's
obligation to properly serve Merliss, pursuant to the rules oI civil procedure, with an actual
copy oI whatever he Iiled. It is not Merliss' responsibility to chase down the true contents oI
whatever illegible, original, Iugitive documents Coughlin may deliver to counsel's oIIice
under cover oI darkness. At the emergency hearing on November 7, 2011, this court
admonished Mr. Coughlin, an attorney, about his Irivolous Iilings. In Iact, at that hearing, the
court speciIically instructed the undersigned not to oppose any motion Ior new trial Coughlin
might Iile, citing the massive amounts oI attorney's Iees Mr. Coughlin's Irivolity has already
caused Dr. Merliss to incur in this case.1 (Inl oI course, the time Ior Coughlin to Iile such a
motion has long since passed, and any request Ior that relieI is now time-barred as a matter oI
law. NJCRCP 59(b). Coughlin's antics continue to cause Merliss to needlessly incur attorney's
Iees.) ( By Iiling opposition, Merliss is speciIically reminding the court oI that prior
admonishment, and reserving his right to proper service, actual notice, and a real opportunity
to respond, on the merits, to anything Iiled herein by Mr. Coughlin. this In the event the court
deems it necessary to address the merits oI any oI the papers recently Iiled by Mr. Coughlin,
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other than to strike them or simply deny Coughlin any relieI, Merliss asks Ior notiIication,
clean copies oI whatever was actually Iiled, and a real opportunity to oppose same. (NOTE:
this is a completely Iraudulent statement by Baker, as, actually, SIerrazza indicated the RJC
was divested oI jursidiction and said nothing about Coughlin making any "Irivolous" Iilings).
Merliss Iurther reminds the court that Mr. Coughlin had, but elected to squander an
opportunity to have a hearing on his November 16, 2011 Motion to Contest Personal Property
Lien. That hearing was to have taken place on November 22, 2011. But instead oI pressing
Iorward with his motion in good Iaith, Coughlin chose to evade the court's and counsel's
eIIorts to contact him to conIirm that hearing. (another Iraudulent statement by Baker where
Coughlin wrote both the RJC and Merliss on 11/21/11, copying both with an email that
included Hill's email to Coughlin inIorming him to contact the RJC as to the 11/22/11
hearing, which is exactly what Coughlin did...Hill and Baker just didn't Ieel like showing up
on 11/22/11). Further, Mr. Coughlin was made aware, prior to November 22, 2011, that
counsel Ior Merliss would not be available Ior any hearing in this matter Irom Thanksgiving
until late December. See EXHIBIT 3 hereto, which are true and correct copies oI emails
between Mr. Hill and Mr. Coughlin, and the undersigned and Mr. Coughlin. (NOTE: must be
nice to be able to get the RJC to legislate away NRS 40.253(8)'s requirement that such
hearing be held "within 10 days" oI Coughlin 11/16/11 Iiling). In any event, Coughlin's
Motion To Contest Personal Property Lien, and Merliss' Motion Ior Order to Show Cause,
Iiled on November 21, 2011, have not been Iully brieIed.
(NOTE: really? there was the Opposition to Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien oI
11/21/11...) Merliss will ask the court to consider the matter oI Coughlin's contempt oI court
pursuant to NRS 22.020, as outlined in his motion Ior order to show cause, at any hearing set
in this matter. In Iairness to Mr. Coughlin, he should have the opportunity to oppose that
motion in writing beIore any hearing on it, presuming he can bring himselI to do so within the
bounds oI the rules oI civil procedure. CONCLUSION: Merliss is unable to intelligently
oppose any oI Coughlin's recent papers, because they are almost entirely illegible. (NOTE:
Merliss admits the consist oI Nevada Supreme Court approved Iorms...that are typed,
consisting mostly oI checkboxes Ior interlineations). Merliss does not know whether the
apparently original, but incomplete and incomprehensible, documents recently served on his
counsel are, in Iact, the same documents Coughlin Iiled with the court. Coughlin was
previously admonished about his Irivolous Iilings, (there is no indication Irom the record or
even the JAVS transcripts oI any hearings that this assertion is true) and Merliss' counsel was
instructed not to oppose the only motion Coughlin was given permission to Iile. (see
transcript oI 11/7/11 hearing in 1708). ThereIore, Merliss reserves his right to proper service,
actual notice, and a reasonable opportunity to oppose, on the merits, (NOTE: interesting that
Merliss's 4/19/12 Motion Ior Attorney Fees, premised upon NRS 69.050, and his 4/3/12
Memorandum oI Costs (premised upon NRS 18.005(17) et seq) not only seek Iees and costs
Ior subject matter occurring aIter the tenancy ended (when the only issue on appeal was that
oI Coughlin's right to possession per NRS 40.253(6)) still managed to seek some $x in Iees
Ior craIting this "Opposition" which he admits Iailed to "oppose, on the merits" Coughlin's
Iilings...must be nice to cry "holidays" and "reserve his right to" later "oppose, on the merits"
that which is entirely legible in the attachments to such 12/1/11 Iiling by Baker...iI Coughlin's
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11/23/11 Iilings are legible where Baker attached them to his 12/1/11 Opposition, then how
does Baker's illegibility cries carry any weight? "under cover oI darkeness", and "on a
holiday"? As iI either oI those circumstances have anythign to do with the rules relative to
service, much less the Iact that there is absolutely no requirement that Coughlin serve a "Iile
stamped" copy oI any such Iilings) any paper actually Iiled by Coughlin in this matter, in the
event the court elects to consider any such paper. WHEREFORE, Merliss prays that Coughlin
take nothing by way oI any motion or other paper Iiled by him on or about November 23,
2011, or attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2; that same be stricken or denied in their entirety; or
that, in the event the court elects to consider the merits oI any such motion or other paper,
that Merliss be provided proper service, a clean copy oI the actual document under
consideration, and a real opportunity to respond to same; that any hearing in this matter be
postponed until the week oI December 19, 2011, at the earliest; and Ior such other, Iurther,
and additional relieI as seems just to the court in the premises. DATED this 1st oI December,
2011 /s/ Casey D. Baker, Esq. EXHIBIT INDEX: Ex. 1 Copies oI photographs taken oI Mr.
Coughlin's 3 pages; Exh. 2 Copies oI the documents Mr. Coughlin stuIIed through counsel's
mail slot 51 pages; Exh. 3 Copies oI emails between Mr. Hill and Mr. Coughlin, and Mr.
Baker and Mr. Coughlin 18 pages; Exh. 4 Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq. 2 pages"
please incorporate by reIerence herein the arguments and authority Iound in the attached
handwritten Iilings in cv11-03051 and cv11-03628. Coughlin apologizes Ior the state in
which this is submitted, but he has to go check in with probation at the RJC in a minute and
never knows when they are going to arrest him Ior something or other, whereupon he would
again be at the mercy oI the washoe county jail and its deprivation oI the access to justice or
means oI Iiling anything that idigents like Coughlin Iace therein:
61383 is not moot at all. Coughlin could still receive tremendous beneIit Irom it, even
beyond the consideration oI the collateral consequences in 62337 and 61901 and the spectre
oI the $42K attorney Iee award at issue in 61383 (where such was never a "case" arising the
the justice court, necessarily, as it was premised upon an application oI nrs 69.050, which
relates to atty Iee awards Ior appeals oI JUDGMENT by justice courts, and it would be
consitutionally violative to subject coughlin to such with no right to review theroI oI any sort
(ie, such was necessarily not a decision by the justice court, ie, the atty Iees Ior the work done
just on appeal, and thereIore could not be said to have "arisen" in the justice court.
hatley 231 se 2d 633, 634-35. in re ak 628 se 2d 753, 755.
as to Waugh alleged bar, see Zamarripa 747 p.2d 1386 nevada case provides exception
allowing this Court to consider appeal in this matter, and Waugh's reliand on "must not be
tried anew and citioation to njcrpc 72-75 is distinguished Irom Anvui's "de novo" review2
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standard per Mackie 329 p.2d 448, as such RJC not an 'inIeriro tribuanl' as de novo review
precludes such an interpretiation and the 3/30/12 and and 8/21/12 8/28/12 orders in cv11-
03628 rule on constitutional and validity oI nrs 40.253(5)-(6) and nrs 40.385.
Iurther,the RJC "proceeding" appealed is not a "case" and was not one "arising in" as the RJC
lack jurisdiciton to even hold the 10/25/11 "Trial" therein given the lack oI a complaint being
Iiled or 20 days accorded to Iile an answe rper njcrcp rule 109
pluas waugh is called in to doubt by kjb 2jdc 103 nev 473
This court's three Justice Panel's 5/28/13 Order indicates Article 6 Sec 6 is an issue, but I
have some thoughts on that...or maybe a Mandamus Petition would be better route to go.
judge Ilangan's 5/29/13 order in cv11-03628 struck Coughlin's 5/20/13 emergency amended
notice oI appeal and Coughlin's arrest in by the rjc bailiII's oI 5/23/13 prevented his Iilign the
motion/notice/surreply he intended to that night...
dist ct has no pwoer to strike notice oI appeal lils 414 I.2d 612 plus paul v armstrong may
allow Ior cert 1 nev 82 Iurther waugh relies on a repealed statute in nrs 40.410, also, where
merliss did not himselI hold title to the property, but rather, his living trust, art 6 sec 8 may
retlate to the title issues making the RJC inappropriate Iorum thus not 'arising in" 29 nev 181
also, Coughlins' 12/30/11 motion in cv11-03628 whas A MOTION FOR STAY PER NRS
40.385, WHICH KEEPS GETTING MISCHARACTERIZED AS ONLY A MOTION FOR
TRO. AND RJC'S REFSUAL TO RULE ON SUCH NRS 40.385 MOTION (KEPT SAYIGN
MUST ASK DIST CT FOR STAY AND CHANGES TO NRS 40.385 CIRCA 10/1/11, MAY
OR MAY NOT APPLY, IF THEY DO NRAP 8 NECSSARILY IMPLIES SUCH A
MOTION NO 'ARISING IN ' RJC AND SHOUDL THEREFORE NOT FACE AN ART 6
SEC 6 BAR.
SEE OEENL
rough sketch as to why Waugh doesn't apply...see 6 10 13 Iiling in CV11-03628 Ior idea oI
what Petition Ior Rehearing may be Iocused on...NRS 40.386 is not discretionary, I don't
think...plus Waugh was an appeal oI a plenary UD action, not an appeal oI a de novo review
by the Dist Ct oI an Justice Court decision..
Also, wherre Dist Ct basis its decision on second prong oI NRCP 56(c) (ie, genuine issue oI
Iact part) wherre NRS 40.253 limits jurisdiction to, essential, the "no legal deIense" second
prong oI NRCP 56(c) (Anvui says summary eviction appeal are review based on the standard
applied to review oI summary judgment, as "they are analogous", but clearly, under NRS
40.253(6), they aren't identical, as "no legal deIense" is all that is contained therein, nothing
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about "genuine issue oI material Iact", which is what Flanagan hung his hat on in denying
appeal.
I think exception to nev const article 6 sec 6 bar involves where dist court exceeds jurisdiction
or Iails to embrace jurisdiction (the Iailure by Ilanagan to grant a stay under NRS 40.385
where such is not discretionary (ie, plunk down $250, you get your stay, period) is a Iailure to
embrace his jurisdiction, and basing the denial oI my appeal on the "genuine issue" prong oI
nrcp 56(c) when Nrs 40.253(6) clearly does not contain such a standard, exceeds jurisdiction,
Iurhter, the 6/25/12 award oI attorney's Iees based on nrs 69.050 exceeds jurisdiction in that
such statute only applies to judgments, which necessarily stem Irom civil actions, ie, plenary
trials, not summary evictions...so, more exceeding jurisdiction exception to article 6 sec 6 bar.
IV. To the extent Coughlin trying appeal decision, is to the district court's this court has
no jurisdiction.
A review oI Coughlin's opening brieI reveals that he thinks his appeal(s) somehow
include a review oI the district court's decision on the merits oI his appeal Irom Reno Justice
Court.
The Nevada Constitution vests Iinal appellate jurisdiction over decisions in the justice
courts in the district court. Nevada Constitution Art. 6 6. NRAP 3A(b) sets Iorth what orders
and acts by a district court are within the appellate jurisdiction oI this court. Unless authority
is provided by a statute or a rule, this court has no jurisdiction. Kokkosv. Tsalikis, 91 Nev. 24,
25,530 P.2d 756 (1975). Here, to the extent that either oI Coughlin's notices oI appeal could
be construed to include the district court's order oI March 30, 2012, denying Coughlin's
appeal Irom Reno Justice Court, this court has no appellate jurisdiction.
5/28/13 Order: "The district court has Iinal appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising in
justice courts. Nev. Const. art. 6, 6; see also Waugh v. Casazza, 85 Nev. 520, 521, 458 P.2d
359, 360 (1969). Although NRAP 3A(b)(3) authorizes an appeal Irom an order reIusing to
grant an injunction, and NRAP 3A(b)(8) authorizes an appeal Irom a post-judgment order
awarding attorney Iees, see Winston Prods. Co., Inc. v. DeBoer, 122 Nev. 517, 525, 134 P.3d
726, 731 (2006) (recognizing that an order awarding attorney Iees and costs is substantively
appealable as a special order aIter Iinal judgment), because the orders challenged in this case
arose Irom the district court's exercise oI appellate jurisdiction over an appeal Irom a justice
court decision, the district court's orders were ostensibly rendered Iinal and are not appealable
to this court."
The Justice Court never considered whether NRS 69.050 allowed Ior an award oI
attorney's Iees. Rather, only NRS 69.030 was considered therein (decided wrongly, given
NRS 69 only applies to "judgments" in plenary matters). The key distinction here is whether
Nevada Const. art. 6 sec. 6 applies to "cases arising in Justice Courts" or, rather over
"decisions in Justice Courts", because, clearly, the Justice Court here, the RJC, made no
"decision" as to whether attorney's Iees on appeal oI a summary eviction were available or in
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order here. The same could be said with respect to whether an NRS 40.385 stay would be
granted, as Judge SIerrazza repeatedly indicated that he Ielt he had been divested oI
jurisdiction to rule on that (see his 12/1/11 and 12/8/11 Orders in 1708).
The Justice Court never ruled on whether Couglhin could get a stay under NRS 40.385,
or upon the posting oI a supersedeas bond pursuant thereto oI $250. As such, Iinall appellate
jurisdiction as to such where there was no "decision in" the justice court as to those issues,
does not lie with the District Court, but, rather, it was the Order in District Court denying
Coughlin's 12/30/11 Motion Ior Stay pursuant to NRS 40.385 that was the Iirst decision
thereon, and as such was a "decision in" or matter "arising in" the District Court and
appealable to the Nevada Supreme Court.
and his own true and correct transcription oI the video recordings oI 11/13/11 by Hill and
Merliss as propounded to Coughlin Irom the Reno City Attorney's oIIice, Coughlin's
recording oI and interview ith rpd Sargent Marcia Lopez on 1/13/12 at a time when she was
aware such recording was being made, rpd OIIicer Carter's 11/15/12 Police Report (including
the written statement oI Richard G. Hill, Esq.), and Hill's associate, Casey D. Baker's Iilings
oI 11/20/11 in the reno justice court summary eviction proceeding in rev11-1708 and oI
1/21/12 in the appeal thereIrom (which both include sworn Declarations by Hill), and the
8/23/12 Complaint by the SBN against Coughlin in NG12-0204, and the 5/31/12 SCR 117(2)
Petition by NNDB Chairman Susich in 60975, and a document that Coughlin has obtained
which may be the letter Hill sent to the SBN on 1/12/12 resulting in NG12-0204 (King Iailed
to admit any such letter into evidence, curiously, severely weakening his case with respect to
the allegation that Coughlin Iailed to reply or appropriately respond or cooperate with
disciplinary authorities incident to the 'enclosures that King reIerenced (but, again, did not
included) in King's 2/14/12 letter to Coughlin.
NRS40.400Rules of practice.The provisions oI NRS, Nevada Rules oI Civil Procedure
and Nevada Rules oI Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials, so
Iar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions oI NRS 40.220 to40.420, inclusive, apply
to the proceedings mentioned in those sections.
|1911 CPA 661; RL 5603; NCL 9150|
Given that Baker appeared Ior Merliss while employed by Richard G. Hill, Esq. in RJC
Rev11-001708 (beyond what was mailed to Merliss personally, and in addition to Merliss and
Hill's indications as to whom Coughlin should serve what in August 2011 and thereaIter),
service oI the 10/19/11 Notice oI Appeal in CV11-03051, appealing the 10/13/11 and
10/17/11 Orders in Rev11-001708 satisIies NRAP 3(d). Why neither Hill nor Baker ever
Iiled anything in that case is unclear.
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MROA 408: Baker keeps his lying streak going in a Declaration oI October 18th,
2011: "4. On September 22, 2011, on behalI oI Dr. Merliss, I dispatched Randy Fisher, a '
local handyman, and a representative oI A-I Electric, to 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada, to
inspect, and, iI possible, repair, two issues identiIied to my oIIice by Mr. Coughlin as
"habitability" issues. 4.1. The issues to addressed at that inspection were one or more
allegedly broken windows, and ODe or more light Iixtures that were allegedly "dangling" 10
Irom the ceiling. 11 5. Mr. Coughlin was given more than 48 hours notice Ior the reIerenced
inspection. 6. I am inIormed and believe that Mr. Coughlin was not present when Mr. Fisher
and A-I Electric arrived at the property at the scheduled time, and that, Ior that reason, the
inspection did not take place. 16 6.1. Attached her"
Also, in the ROA sent to the 2JDC by the RJC on 12/21/11, Volume 1 page 86 to 96
therein is Merliss's Exhibit B, and neither the 8/22/11 30 Day Notice nor the 9/27/11 5 Day
Notice have a USPS CertiIicate oI Mailing included therewith, and neither have any
photocopy, even, oI some envelope NCS purportedly aIIixed postage to and mailed to
Coughlin. While Merliss's 10/27/11 Memorandum oI Costs does have one such quasi-
CertiIicate oI Mailing (it saves them $1.20 on the USPS CertiIicate oI Mailing, but Iails to
satisIy NRS 40.280 requirements, which are jurisdictional).
MROA 533-34 Coughlin's 10/25/11 Motion Ior Summary Judgment Pre Trial
Statement Furthr, does 40.280 require landlord to Iile a certiIicate oI mailing in addition to
when a process server veriIies that the notice was taped to the door vis a vis NRS
118a.190(2)? II so, this proceeding must be dismissd as the summary eviction nature is held
to strict adherence to procedural, notice, and service requirements.
The AOC Landlord Tenant Iorms on the NVSCt's website included the Iollowing in
instructions to "From #9": "II the service was made on someone else other than the tenant at
the tenant`s residence or business and a copy was mailed to the tenant, make sure that you
attach a United States Postal Service CertiIicate oI Mailing to the AIIidavit/Declaration oI
Service to prove that a copy was mailed to the tenant. If service was made by posting a copy
at the residence and mailing a copy to the tenant, make sure that you attach a United
States Postal Service Certificate of Mailing to the Affidavit/Declaration of Service to
prove that a copy was mailed to the tenant. Failure to give lawful notice may result in the
dismissal of the eviction and require that a new notice process begin again."
MROA 757: "Judge: Well, I accept that you did and that's why we're having the Trial
today. DeIendant: And that's -- I'm glad you bring that up. You said Trial, Your Honor. You
didn`t say summary eviction, you didn`t say summary execution. You said Trial, plenary--
Judge: Trial on a retaliatory nature oI the eviction. I assumed you made a prima Iacie case on
that as there's no Trial on the issue. It is summary as to whether or not you were given Notice
served, which the court Iinds you were, with a Notice to terminate your lease. DeIendant: II I
can just quickly interject Ior the record, Your Honor-- Judge: Unless you had -- unless you
have a lease to show that you're not there at will at this point. DeIendant: There -- Ior the
record, there was no certificate in my name, US Postal Service certificate mailing on file
with respect to a Aotice. In the context oI summary eviction proceedings, courts are directed
to adhere very strictly to the notice requirements given the summary nature of it. 1hat's one
safeguard that is insisted upon. A right to a jury Trial is granted by the United States
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Supreme Court Irom -- in summary -- in eviction cases. Jury Trial is an absolute right Ior all
citizens in the United States. I said it's a 1970s case. I think it might be called Pearson. I
believe I cite to it in my case. I don't know that a certificate of mailing is required whereas
Mr. Baker did. He had apparently a process server, post something on the door and contest to
that. I think that might be a |INDISCERNIBLE 12:40| Supreme Court to clariIy the statute at
some point. I know I spent too much time on that, Your Honor, but when you say Trial, it's --
well, the most important thing, Your Honor, to get across Irom my point oI view, is that
40.253(6) says that when the court, as you just indicated you did imply that there is a material
issue oI Iact, it's a pause--"
MROA 795: "DeIendant: Your Honor, iI I can just quickly interject an Objection Ior
the record, I`m trying |7:26| knowing with the Objections but. It is in the statute, it was Iairly
speciIic but unclear to me whether a USPS CertiIicate oI Mailing is required. You know,
process here was involved so maybe it`s not |7:41| but when I was review Iiles downstairs, in
many cases, they attached that USPS certiIicate oI mailing. Judge: That`s when you post them
that. PlaintiII: Which is attached here, sir. DeIendant: It`s part oI the services |7.50| Judge:
Well, I don`t know iI sir, I haven`t even want that it, right now all I`m doing is having the
Exhibits marked. PlaintiII: Your Honor. Judge: II it was served by posting and mailing then it
is required that they be mailed in this certiIicate oI mailing. II it were served in person then
it`s diIIerent....Defendant: Just, just |8.10| Your Honor there might be negative |authority to
try to some -- | because it seem like maybe iI they have a process how to do it, we didn`t have
that |8:19| mailing. But I don`t know and certainly.
1udge: Right.
Defendant: |8.23| your knowledge and expertise are.
1udge: I haven`t thought to that yet, so what ---
Plaintiff: Your Honor, this Exhibit 1 and 2 goes to the landlord`s aIIidavit. For some reason
it`s tackled with these I don`t think we did, I think that`s a court`s Iile, the court`s order and
things.
1udge: Well, everything has got mixed up in here, so.
Plaintiff: I`ve got Iresh copy with just Exhibits iI you want to have |8.50|
1udge: It looks like this is the lease.
Plaintiff: Yes, that was introduced at the hearing. The only thing that goes with the
landlord`s aIIidavit is Exhibit 1 and 2 which were the two Notices that you have in your hand
there. And what I will point out.
1udge: Alright, wait a second. No need to point it out. So, Exhibits 1 and 2 go with ---
Plaintiff: The landlord`s aIIidavit.
1udge: Which is ---
Plaintiff: It was right here.
1udge: Here?
Plaintiff: Yes, sir."
MROA 798: 'PlaintiII: There are two oI those documents. I just want the court to be
clear. On September 27th at our hearing I personally hand delivered one oI those to Mr.
Coughlin. I don`t know which one you have in your hand. Judge: Well, this one --- PlaintiII:
The |13:00| service will say. Judge: --- is, I don`t know who it`s signed by, to see you have to
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come up and look at it. It says |J. Dortmund 13.16| PlaintiII: Okay, that`s, that`s |13:19| what
happened, Your Honor, was on September 27th I handed one oI these to Mr. Coughlin at the
hearing. When I get back to the oIIice I thought perhaps that`s not appropriate you better have
it served as well. So, we had it served this well. The court has the correct one. Judge: Alright.
Well, this one shows service by J. Dortmund. PlaintiII: Yes. Judge: And it indicates by
posting a copy. PlaintiII: And mailing, sir. 1udge: Where is the US certificate postal service
mailing? (MROA 798:14-16) PlaintiII: Your Honor, I have the original here. I`m going to
see what these. Judge: I do have a copy oI them |14.40| envelope. PlaintiII: That`s generally
what we get back Irom them, sir. Judge: But the certiIicate oI mailing is a little Iorm. PlaintiII:
Well, Your Honor, these the aIIidavit declaration oI service which is page 4 or 5. And this is
US Supreme Court Iorm. This is what they Iilled out when they posted in mail. Generally they
will give us a photocopy oI the envelope as well. But I don`t see that on this. Judge: So, the
envelope`s here I have. PlaintiII: Okay. Judge: But not there is the United States Postal
Service certiIicate oI mailing. However, the statement signed by the tenant and the witness
acknowledging the tenant received the Notice (MROA 798)...or B, a certiIicate oI mailing
issued by the United States Postal Service or C, the endorsement oI a sheriII constable or
other process server stating the time and manner oI service. So --- PlaintiII: That`s what we
have here, sir. Judge: And that`s what the deIendant was arguing with ambiguous but I have
ruled previously that iI it is a licensed process server, the certiIicate oI mailing is not required
iI they Iill out the aIIidavit as they have done in this case. And, so, to the extent that that is
your Objection I am going to hold that the Exhibit C meets the statutory requirements. And
Exhibit C is Iurther incorporated and Exhibit D does contain the which is Exhibit 1 attached
to Exhibit D has the envelope showing the postage and mailing on August 22nd to Zachary
DeIendant: so, and towards any doubt about it I do Iind it the proper certiIicate has been
Iurnished to the court. That means the requirements Ior the Iive-day Notice and Iive-day
Notice was given. It appears more than 30 days aIter the Exhibit B the August 22nd which
was the 30-day no cause. And then we have September 27th actually I think I was told
about the wrong document around here. September 27th was the when I talk about the
Iiveday Notice previously and the envelope I was actually reIerring to the August 22nd 30-
day Notice. The Iive-day Notice was served more than 30 days aIter the 30-day Notice so,
that meets the statutory requirements. Then we have I`m going to mark as Exhibit do we
have Exhibit E where the okay, Exhibit E is going to be the lease agreement. PlaintiII: Your
Honor, may I --- Judge: Well, go ahead. PlaintiII: I have such point out sir, the landlord`s
aIIidavit Exhibit D is on the Iorm provided by this court. The US Supreme Court has, as you
know, we have these Iorms, the eviction (MROA 799)...Notice Iorms. However, they don`t
have an aIIidavit Iorm Ior |19.26|. So, we submitted the UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit Exhibit
D signed by Dr. Merliss. However, going back and just looking at the stature there`s a make
sure were covered NRS 40.254, I, as the landlord`s agent Iile a declaration on October 19th
which addresses the items in NRS 40.254 sub 2. I have just one point to have to the court ---
Judge: No, I don`t have that I don`t believe. Where is that? PlaintiII: That was Iiled on
October 19th, sir. DeIendant: |20.04| Objection as to not having the landlord making that
declaration and hopeIully that iI service needs to be eIIected in a Iuture litigation that you will
be his agent Ior purposes oI service. |20:14|. Judge: Well, I`m not ruling whether or not that
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meets the requirements but the affidavit can be filed at the hearing, (MROA 800:14-16) the
landlord's aIIidavit. (NOTE: SIerrazza's position evinces reversible error where NRS
40.253(6) indicates that only "upon the Iiling" oI such aIIidavit "shall" the justice court hold a
hearing (ie, the statute does not allow Ior the the landlord to Iile such aIIidavit a couple hours
into the "Trial" on 10/25/11, where a ninety minute "summary eviction proceeding" preceded
it on 10/13/11...how ridiculously devoid oI notice (say, oI the various speciIics NRS
40.254(2)( or any reasonably opportunity to prepare to be heara would such an approach be to
a tenant such a Coughlin, in a holdover proceeding, especially where NRS 40.254(2) is quite
clear in requiring the landlord "or landlord's agent" (notice the statute does not excuse a
licensed attorney Irom RPC 3.7, though) to swear to a Iew things, and such things were rather
material and disputed here, including: just what was the "term" oI the
The Iollowing JCRCP rules make clear that Judge SIerrazza's position ("Judge: ...but
the affidavit can be filed at the hearing, (MROA 800:14-16) the landlord's aIIidavit.") is
incorrect, even beyond the jurisdictional (Gasser v. Jet CraIt) predicate presented in NRS
40.253(6) (only "upon the Iiling" oI such aIIidavit, "shall" the justice court hold such a
hearing), where:
RULE101.NOTICE REQUIREMENTS Notices required Ior summary eviction
under NRS 40.253 and NRS 40.254 must be specific when alleging any ground for the
existence of an unlawful detainer. (both the 8/22/11 and 9/27/11 Notices here are ambiguous
on their Iace, with Baker checking multiple boxes, invoking inconsistent subsections oI NRS
40.251 (in one
RULE102.FILING OF SUMMARY EVICTION CASES: A summary eviction case
shall be deemed filed with a justice court upon the timely filing of an affidavit by a tenant
and the payment oI the required Iiling Iee by the tenant or upon the Iiling oI an aIIidavit by
the landlord with an application Ior an order oI summary eviction, together with the payment
oI the required Iiling Iee by the landlord.
Rule 102 would seem to intersect with the analysis attendant to NRS 118A.510
(especially subsecution (e) in light oI the language therein related to whether Coughlin
"instituted or deIended against" a "judicial proceeding", to which the question arises as to
what qualiIies as "instituting or deIending against" a "judicial proceeding" and in involved
where a landlord does "bring or threaten to bring" "an action Ior possession" (interestingly,
Baker and Coughlin's rapid volley sanctions motions and the oppositions thereto in 1492 shed
some light on this, speciIically with respect to whether Merliss's having the 8/22/11 and or
9/27/11 notices purportedly "served" on Coughlin could be subject to NRCP 11 ) vis a vis
whether Merliss did, "bring or threaten to bring" (and it must be either to "bring or threaten to
bring", as tenant's must not be limited to the "threatening to bring" that serving notices would
apparently amount to in the analysis as to whether Merliss's purportedly having served on
8/22/11 (or even one oI his mid-August 2011 emails to Coughlin) suIIices as a temporal
rebuttal to any inIerence that Merliss did so "threaten to bring" such "action Ior possession"
"in retaliation" Ior Coughlin's "instituting or deIending" against "a judicial proceeding"
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(which brings to mind the question oI just when a "proceeding" can be said to be "institutded
or deIended against" and whether that analysis implicates JCRCP 102's indications as to when
a "summary eviction case shall be deemed Iiled"...but, nonetheless, Coughlin could still meet
the NRS 40.253(6) standard to show within a hearing "to test the truthIulness and suIIiciency
oI" the aIIidavits oI both landlord and tenant that Coughlin had a "legal deIense" to such
summary action Ior possession, by demonstrating that Merliss did "bring" (as such whether
Merliss did "threaten to bring" an "action Ior possession" at some previous point in time
should not operate to preclude Coughlin Irom showing that Merliss did "bring" and action Ior
possession subsequent thereto (apparently, depending on there determination oI just when it is
one can be said to "bring" an action-Rule 102 at least indicates a "case shall be deemed Iiled"
(as in 1708, on 10/6/11) "upon the timely Iiling oI an aIIidavit by a tenant..."...ie, the mere
Iact that one might view Merliss as having "threatened to bring" such an action prior to such
time (say in mid-August 2011) does note necessarily preclude a Iinding that he subseqeuent
thereto did " "bring" such an action" in retaliation" where Coughlin "instituted or deIended
against a judicial proceed" an "action Ior possession" or Ior any conduct by Coughlin
protected by subsections (a)-(g).
Such matters necessarily involved a close inspectio oI matters related to motive and
intent and Couglin cited to Gomez in the trial court Ior the position to such circumstances are
ill-suited to disposition by summary judgment (even more so where summary evictions
typically involve less oI an opportunity Ior discovery, which, necessarily, is quite important,
particularly iI, as Baker argued, Torreable is to apply wholesale to summary evictions).
Nonetheless, a close analysis oI the emails Coughlin attached to his 9/7/11 Tenant's
Answer in 1492 (and Coughlin, unlike Merliss, did "incorporate by reIerence all oI his Iiling
in 1492 into 1708, including his argument therein that the lease had not "expired", suIIicient
to make any allegation that such operated to "terminate" his tenancy, invalid, and to vitiate the
alleged validity oI the 8/22/11 Notice, particularly in light oI the Iraudulent misstatements
contained therein (such Iraudulent approach only augmented by the Declaration oI Casey D.
Baker, Esq. Pursuant to NRS 40.254(2), and Merliss's own "UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit",
neither oI which, Irom the ROA, appeared to have been "Iiled" but rather admitted as Exhibit
B, and Exhibit G, respectively, about one third oI the way through the 150 page transcript oI
the 10/25/11 "Trial" (bringing to mind the question oI whether such an irregularity, where the
landlord had the initial burden oI prooI, yet does not get around to admitting such exhibits or
oIIering testimony thereto, until a third oI the way through approximately six hours oI "Trial"
on 10/25/11), and again in his 10/11/11 Motion Ior Continuance in 1708, and again a third
time as Exhibit 8 in the 10/25/11 "Trial".
The covenant oI quiet enjoyment means that a tenant may not be disturbed or evicted.
Cartyv. Blanth 169 Cal. 713 147 P.949; Lost Key Mine v. Hamilton 109 Cal. App.2d 569 241
P.2d 273. Lessor's covenant oI quiet enjoyment is breached by an act oI molestation aIIecting
possession oI tenant to his prejudice. Levitzky v. Canning 33 Cal 299; Black v. Knight 176
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Cal 722 169 P. 382 (1917); Guntert v. City oI Stockton 55 Cal App. 3d 131, 127 Cal Rptr.
602. "A lessor's unlawIul lockout oI one with a right to possession is a breach oI the implied
covenant oI quiet enjoyment." Olin v. Carter, 694 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wash.App. 1985) (citing
Aldrich v. Olson, 12 Wash. App. 665, 667, 531 P.2d 825 (1975). In the Olin case there was no
intention oI abandonment,s o the lockout was unlawIul. Olin, 694 P .2d at 1132. In Iact,t he
tenants had continually expressed their desire to continue possession oI the premises. Id The
court precluded the landlord Irom Iurther rents and made him liable Ior his "selI-help
eviction." Id There can be no question but that the existence of the landlord-tenant
relationship does not of itself preclude possible prosecution of a landlord for burglary.
Courts in other jurisdictions have so held. See, e.g., Bradley v. State, Orig. Op. Page
12]] 244 Ind. 630, 195 N.E. 2d 347 (1964), as follows: ". . . it is well established . . . that a
landlord (the owner of the property) can be guilty of burglarizing the premises of his
tenant (the possessor of the property) by breaking and entering without the permission
of the tenant." (Citations omitted.) Moreover, that conclusion of the Indiana court
proceeds upon the same reasoning as was used by our supreme court in State v. Klein,
195 Wash. 338, 80 P.2d 825 (1938), which holds that occupancy or possession, as well as
actual ownership, is protected against burglars or unauthorized intruders. This brings
us, then, to the statutory presumption in RCW 9.19.030, supra, which requires a person
accused oI burglary, where he or she has broken5/ and entered a building, to bear the burden
oI establishing that the entry was not made with criminal intent. We do not believe that mere
prooI that an intruder charged with burglary was the landlord oI the tenant whose premises
were unlawIully entered would be suIIicient to overcome this statutory presumption oI
criminal intent. In other words, the presumption is applicable even in a landlord-tenant
situation. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the natural inIerences which can be
drawn Irom the existence oI that relationship could well increase the chances Ior a successIul
deIense to a burglary charge and Ior that reason inIluence a prosecutor's decision concerning
the Iiling oI such a criminal charge.
554 Landlord's trespass and tenant's remedies View Entire Section Go to Parallel ReIerence
Table Go to Supplement An unauthorized entry or intrusion by the landlord constitutes a
trespass to the same extent as an entry or intrusion by a stranger, and the tenant may maintain
an action oI trespass against a landlord as well as against any other wrongdoer. 51 ThereIore,
a landlord's attempted intrusion into the tenant's apartment without invitation Irom the tenant
constitutes a trespass absent a showing that the landlord has reserved a right oI entry into a
leased apartment. 52 A tenant may enjoin threatened continuous or repeated trespasses on the
part oI the landlord, 53 and a preliminary mandatory injunction has oIten been granted a
lessee to compel the lessor to restore a tenant to possession oI the premises, upon allegations
oI wrongIul deprivation by the lessor. 54 On the other hand, the rule that an injunction will
not be granted to restrain a trespasser merely because he or she is a trespasser has been held
applicable to trespasses committed by a landlord, where the tenant may have a Iull and
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adequate remedy in an action at law on the implied covenant oI quiet enjoyment. 55 Further,
it has been held that the Iact that the tenant's right to an injunction against the landlord's
interIerence with the tenant's enjoyment oI the premises terminates, pending suit, by the
expiration oI the term will not prevent equity Irom retaining the suit to assess damages. 56
Since during the term oI a lease the tenant is the owner oI the property, the tenant, while in
possession under the lease and during its term, may also maintain ejectment or other proper
action against the landlord, as against any other person who takes possession oI the property
without his or her consent. 57 Practice Aids: Notice to landlordFrom tenantRequest to
discontinue trespass. 17 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Trespass, 249:7. Footnotes Footnote 51.
Bert v Rhodes (Mo App) 258 SW 40; Peterson v Vak, 160 Neb 450, 70 NW2d 436, 51
ALR2d 1221, amd on other grounds 160 Neb 708, 71 NW2d 186, 51 ALR2d 1221. As to
actions against a third party Ior trespass, see 545. Footnote 52. McGuire v Corn (Lucas Co)
92 Ohio App 445, 50 Ohio Ops 35, 110 NE2d 809. Footnote 53. Winchester v O'Brien, 266
Mass 33, 164 NE 807, 64 ALR 895 (criticized on other grounds as stated in Rahman v
Federal Management Co., 23 Mass App 701, 505 NE2d 548). Footnote 54. Quinn v Fountain
Inn, 218 Ill App 260; Hartley v Brady (Tex Civ App) 114 SW2d 406; Obets & Harris v Speed
(Tex Civ App) 211 SW 316, writ dism w o j. Annotation: Mandatory injunction prior to
hearing oI case, 15 ALR2d 213 24. Footnote 55. Deegan v Neville, 127 Ala 471, 29 So 173.
As to a tenant's implied warranty oI quiet enjoyment, see 601 et seq. Footnote 56.
Winchester v O'Brien, 266 Mass 33, 164 NE 807, 64 ALR 895 (criticized on other grounds as
stated in Rahman v Federal Management Co., 23 Mass App 701, 505 NE2d 548). As to the
measure oI a tenant's damages, see 561-563. Footnote 57. Walker v CliIIord, 128 Ala 67,
29 So 588. As to ejectment by a tenant generally, see 25 Am Jur 2d, Ejectment 35. As to
possessory or other remedies which a lessee who has never been able to obtain possession
may maintain against a landlord, see 484. (b). Disturbance oI Tenant's Personal Property
|555-560| 555 Generally. Where a landlord wrongIully intrudes upon a tenant and takes
possession oI the personal property on the premises, this will ordinarily render the landlord
liable Ior a conversion; and where the landlord wrongIully intrudes and places another tenant
in possession oI the premises and the eIIects oI the Iormer tenant, the landlord will be held
liable Ior a conversion oI such eIIects although the landlord does not personally interIere with
them. 58 A property owner who, aIter leasing the property, enters into a party-wall agreement
with the adjoining owner, by which the latter is authorized to reconstruct the wall oI the
boundary line, is liable to the tenant in tort Ior injury to the tenant's property by the Iall oI the
wall as a result oI excavations under it in the perIormance oI the work, where, Irom the
condition oI the premises, the landlord must have known that the perIormance oI the work
would greatly endanger the tenant's property. 59 Footnotes Footnote 58. Independence Flying
Service, Inc. v Abitz (Mo) 386 SW2d 399, mod on other grounds (Mo) 409 SW2d 628;
Quong v McEvoy, 70 Mont 99, 224 P 266. A tenant's evidence, in an action against her
landlord Ior wrongIul conversion oI personal property, that she owned the personal property
in question at the time she was locked out oI a one-room, Iurnished unit, that deIendant's act
in locking her out was unauthorized, that it was inconsistent with her right oI possession and
ownership, and that she was damaged to the extent oI the value oI the personal property,
which the landlord took and never returned, was suIIicient to make a case oI conversion.
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Jackson v Engert (Mo App) 453 SW2d 615. As to the availability oI punitive damages, see
563. Forms: Complaint, petition, or declarationLandlord's conversion oI tenant's personal
propertyFor damages. 16A Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Forms 321,
322. Complaint, petition, or declarationLandlord's Iailure to give Iormer tenant proper notice
oI right to reclaim abandoned personal propertyFor damages. 16A Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms
(Rev), Landlord and Tenant, Form 452. Footnote 59. Weinman v De Palma, 232 US 571, 58
L Ed 733, 34 S Ct 370. 556 Landlord's duty to protect tenant's personal property The
landlord-tenant relationship does not in itselI impose a duty upon the landlord to protect a
tenant's property Irom theIt, 60 and it has been said that a landlord's responsibility may be
limited to providing reasonable security against theIt. 61 Furthermore, it has been held that
although a public housing authority owed tenants no duty to guard against a Iirst burglary, it
did have a duty to guard against second and third burglaries when the tenants have notiIied
the housing authority oI the unauthorized use oI vacant apartments on either side oI their
apartment and the housing authority was aware oI the means used in eIIecting burglary. 62
Footnotes Footnote 60. Teall v Harlow, 275 Mass 448, 176 NE 533; McCappin v Park Capitol
Corp., 42 NJ Super 169, 126 A2d 51, 58 ALR2d 1285. Footnote 61. Brichacek v Hiskey
(Iowa) 401 NW2d 44 (where there was a dispute as to the reasonableness oI the landlord's
conduct concerning Iront door locks). As to a landlord's duty to protect tenants, generally, see
551. Annotation: Landlord's tort liability to tenant Ior personal injury or property damage
resulting Irom criminal conduct oI employee, 38 ALR4th 240. Landlord's obligation to protect
tenant against criminal activities oI third persons, 43 ALR3d 331 10. Landlord's liability
arising Irom theIt oI tenant's property, 58 ALR2d 1289. Footnote 62. Stribling v Chicago
Housing Authority (1st Dist) 34 Ill App 3d 551, 340 NE2d 47. 557 Landlord's liability in
negligence Ior theIt oI tenant's personal property, generally View Entire Section Go to
Parallel ReIerence Table A landlord may be liable to a tenant iI the landlord is guilty oI
negligence in some respect proximately causing the tenant a loss by theIt, 63 and may be
liable where evidence supports the conclusion that robbery oI a plaintiII's apartment was a
Ioreseeable consequence oI the landlord's negligence. 64 ? Practice guide: Issues as to a
landlord's negligence are questions Ior the jury. 65 Footnote 63. McCappin v Park Capitol
Corp., 42 NJ Super 169, 126 A2d 51, 58 ALR2d 1285. Annotation: Landlord's liability arising
Irom theIt oI tenant's property, 58 ALR2d 1289 ( 4 superseded by Landlord's tort liability to
tenant Ior personal injury or property damage resulting Irom criminal conduct oI employee,
38 ALR4th 240, and 5 superseded by Landlord's obligation to protect tenant against
criminal activities oI third persons, 43 ALR3d 331) 2. Footnote 64. Braitman v Overlook
Terrace Corp., 132 NJ Super 51, 332 A2d 212, aIId 68 NJ 368, 346 A2d 76 (where the tenants
had reported a broken deadbolt lock several times and the landlord Iailed to repair the lock,
and where the slip lock on the door could be opened without a key and entry was probably
eIIected by slipping the lock). A landlord has been charged with notice oI unsaIe conditions
and a Iailure to correct them even though the notice was given to an employee who was in
Iact the thieI. Maron v Swig, 115 Cal App 2d 87, 251 P2d 770. Footnote 65. Demarest v
Moore, 201 Ga App 90, 410 SE2d 191, 102-181 Fulton County D R 14B.
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Coughlin's Exhibit 8 (MROA 692-708) and the photographs in support thereoI in
Exhibit 2 (MROA 673 to 684) go a much longer way towards establishing a "legal deIense"
(to whatever extent Nevada law then places the burden oI prooI upon Coughlin to do so) than
did Merliss and Baker's attempts at a "landlord's aIIidavit" and Merliss's unbelievably
contradictory and implausible testimony, which, by the way, both are patently inconsistent
with the lease and notices, and prooIs oI service oI such notices that were attached to such
attempts to satisIy the requirement Ior a "landlord's aIIidavit" under NRS 40.254(2).
Consider where such emails read:
One who thus comes upon the premises upon the invitation oI the tenant, although
expressly Iorbidden to do so by the landlord, is not guilty oI a criminal trespass. . State v
Lawson, 101 NC 717, 7 SE 905. See RCR 2012-067980 and RJC Rev2012-001048.
MROA ?? emails between landlord and his attorney's and tenant Coughlin
demonstrating NRS 118A.510 retaliation:
The interpretation as to just what the language in NRS 118A.510 means where it
provides that: "... the landlord may not, in retaliation, terminate a tenancy, reIuse to renew a
tenancy, increase rent or decrease essential items or services required by the rental
agreement or this chapter, or bring or threaten to bring an action for possession."
NRS 118A.510 Retaliatory conduct by landlord against tenant prohibited; remedies;
exceptions....: "... 2. II the landlord violates any provision oI subsection 1, the tenant is
entitled to the remedies provided in ARS 118A.39 and has a deIense in any retaliatory
action by the landlord Ior possession.
It was clear error Ior the justice court to apply NRS 118A.355(5), particularly where
the landlord's own alleged aIIidavit speciIically cites to NRS 40.254(2), especially where the
justice court reIused Coughlin his right to withhold any rent is Iound was owing (which, it
would be ridiculous to Iind any rent was owed in light oI the landlord withdrawing its non-
payment summary eviction in the precursor case Irom September 2011 in 1492, and given its
repeated assertion that it was "not seeking rent" in 1708) in light oI the statutory right to do so
(which, by the way, does not contain any oI the rent escrow depositing purportedly required
by NRS 118a.355(5), a subsection which the justice court wrongIully applied to any instance
where the word "habitability" is at all mentioned or connected to any deIense under the
various sections oI NRS 118A.510, despite the Iact that NRS 118A.355(5)'s alleged
requirement Ior a "rent escrow" desposit applies to one narrow situation only, ie, that where a
tenant deIends against a non-payment summary eviction action (under NRS 118A.510(1)(d)
"where rent becomes due") by indicating a "withholding" is being undertaken until such time
as the landlord makes the requested repairs....the justice court made the ridiculously
overreaching application oI applying the "rent escrow" deposit contemplated in NRS
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118A.355(5) to any and every instance where the tenant asserts any sort oI deIense that in any
manner whatsoever might even begin to relate, however tenously, to the concept oI
"habitability" (ie, NRS 118A.510(b) where the tenant "complains to the landlord" oI "a
violation oI this Chapter" (ie NRS 118A, and, speciIically, NRS 118A.290's habitability
provisions...which brings to light in inequity in the justice court Iailing to even make any
Iinding that Coughlin asserted such a deIense (ie, the justice court continually sought to steer
Coughlin away Irom the Iirst prong oI NRS 118A.510(b) in continually "misreading" that
subsection to only speak to where the tenant complains to "law enIorcement" or the landlord
oI a "speciIic criminal statute"...problem is, the landlord's own attorney admitted in his
closing argument that Coughlin pled and argued a deIense asserting NRS 118A.510(b)'s
complaing "to the landlord" oI "a violation oI this Chapter"...
"NRS 118A.480 Landlord`s recovery oI possession oI dwelling unit. The landlord
shall not recover or take possession oI the dwelling unit by action or otherwise, including
willIul diminution or interruption or causing or permitting the diminution or interruption oI
any essential item or service required by the rental agreement or this chapter, except: 1. By
an action Ior possession or other civil action or summary proceeding in which the issue oI
right oI possession is determined;..."
It was reversible error to reIuse Coughlin his right, under NRS 118A.355(1)(b) to
"recover actual damages" stemming Irom the landlord's Iailure "to maintain dwelling unit in
habitable" condition to the extent Coughlin was Iorced to make a "rent escrow" deposit under
NSR 118A.355(5) (apparently landlord Merliss is able to selectively plead no-cause summary
eviction in Iiling (however deIicient and by committee in violation oI RPC 3.7) a "landlord's
aIIidavit" pursuant to NRS 40.254(2), then mid stream assert non-payment oI rent, but only
suIIicient to invoke and application oI NRS 118A.355(5) (even where Coughlin made
explicilty clear in his pleadings and Iilings that he was not asserting any deIense based upon
NRS 118A.355(1)(d)...).
MROA 112: "provided in ARS 118A.39 and has a deIense in any retaliatory action by
the landlord Ior possession... Lost profits, lost goods, such as food, and the benefits of lost
services, such as advertising, are examples of losses that may constitute "actual
damages" for illegal eviction. 14 M.R.S.A. 6014(2) (A). Degenhardt v. Ewe Ltd.
Partnership, 2011 ME 23, 13 A.3d 790 (Me. 2011). Being an attorney is hard enough
without dealing with all of Merliss's malfeasance. Perhaps if Baker ever gathers up the
gumption to hang out his own shingle he will more fully appreciate that."
"NRS 118A.360 Failure oI landlord to comply with rental agreement or maintain
dwelling unit in habitable condition where cost oI compliance less than speciIied amount.
1. II the landlord fails to comply with the rental agreement or his or her obligation to
maintain the dwelling unit in a habitable condition as required by this chapter, and the
reasonable cost oI compliance or repair is ... an amount equal to one months perioaic
rent...the tenant may recover damages for the breach or notify the landlord of the tenant's
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intention to correct the condition at the landlord's expense. II the landlord Iails to use his or
her best eIIorts to comply within 14 days aIter being notiIied by the tenant in writing or more
promptly iI conditions require in case oI emergency, the tenant may cause the work to be
done in a workmanlike manner and aIter submitting to the landlord an itemized statement, the
tenant may deduct Irom his or her rent the actual and reasonable cost or the Iair or reasonable
value oI the work, not exceeding the amount speciIied in this subsection...
4. The landlord`s liability under this section is limited to ... an amount equal to one
month's periodic rent... within any 12-month period."
"Recovery by tenant oI damages Ior physical injury or mental anguish occasioned by
wrongIul eviction, 17 A.L.R.2d 936; 5 Am. Jur. ProoI oI Facts 3d 375, Tenant's Rights and
Remedies Against Retaliatory Eviction by Landlord. 99 Am. Jur. Trials 289, Retaliatory
Eviction Claims. Evidence supported Iinding that landlord's eviction oI tenant was retaliatory
Ior her complaints concerning persistent plumbing problems and condition oI common areas.
N.R.S. 118A.510. Paullin v. Sutton, 1986, 724 P.2d 749, 102 Nev. 421." MROA 112. "NRS
118A.380 is a similar law that allows you to withhold rent. However, NRS 118A.380 deals
with essential services and the landlord`s willIul or negligent Iailure to supply essential
services...you do AO1 have to deposit the rent into escrow when you file your affidavit".
MROA 121.
NRS 118A.355 Failure oI landlord to maintain dwelling unit in habitable condition.
1. ...iI a landlord Iails to maintain a dwelling unit in a habitable condition as required by
this chapter, the tenant shall deliver a written notice to the landlord speciIying each Iailure by
the landlord to maintain the dwelling unit in a habitable condition and requesting that the
landlord remedy the Iailures. ... II the landlord Iails to remedy a material Iailure to maintain
the dwelling unit in a habitable condition or to make a reasonable eIIort to do so within the
prescribed time, the tenant may:
(a) Terminate the rental agreement immediately.
(b) Recover actual damages.
(c) Apply to the court Ior such relieI as the court deems proper under the circumstances.
(d) Withhold any rent that becomes due ... until the landlord has remedied, or has
attempted in good Iaith to remedy, the Iailure...
5. Justice courts shall establish by local rule a mechanism by which tenants may deposit
rent withheld under paragraph (d) oI subsection 1 into an escrow account maintained or
approved by the court. A tenant does not have a defense to an eviction under paragraph (d)
of subsection 1 unless the tenant has deposited the withheld rent into an escrow account
pursuant to this subsection."(Added to NRS by 2007, 1281)
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NRS 118A.510: "...2. If the landlord violates any provision of subsection 1, the
tenant is entitled to the remedies provided in NRS 118A.390..."'
Am1ur: 883. Liability oI landlord Ior wrongIul eviction
The speciIication Ior attorney's Iees in a special, very limited circumstances in NRS
40.254(3) obviously supports the conclusions that NRS 69.030, and by extension NRS
69.050, do not provide authority Ior an award oI attorney's Iees outside the circumstances
speciIically set out in NRS 40.254(3).
Were such not the case, Coughlin's moving Ior attorney's Iees in his 9/6/11 Iiling in
1492 should have met with an award given teh alleged "landlord's voluntary dismissal".
Also, the landlord's Iailure to reIer to any basis Ior or seeking oI attorney's Iees in the
"complaint" or "unlawIul detainer aIIidavit" (or even, really, in the 2/24/12 Answering BrieI
(its either "a motion once made cannot be made again" (or some NRAP corollary iI there is
one), upon a Iinding that Merliss had sought Iees previous to his 4/19/12 Attorney Fee
Motion, or the alternative set out Iormerly here) (Shipley v. Major, 44 A.2d 540 (Mun. Ct.
App. D.C. 1945), but to then only seek such aIter the appeal was decided (3/30/12 ) in a
4/19/12 motion, should result in a denial oI such a motion (beyond the Iact that NRS 40.400
makes NRAP 38 applicable, not NRS 69.050/NRS 7.085, and that the 8/28/12 Order in 03628
establishes a collateral bar to any assertion now made that such 6/25/12 Order awarding
attorney's Iees was in the nature oI a sanction suIIicient ot invoke the only jurisdiction
permitting any such award oI attorney's Iees on appeal, ie, NRAP 38).
AmJur: "6. Landlord's Possessory Remedies b. Summary Possessory Actions (1) In
General (d) Landlord's Right to Damages Topic Summary Correlation Table ReIerences
855. Attorney's Iees LLTk291(14), 310(1) DeIinition: A "prevailing party" is one in whose
Iavor the decision or verdict is rendered and the judgment entered.|FN1| A party who prevails
on a summary-eviction claim is not entitled to an award oI attorney's Iees where there is
neither contractual nor statutory authority Ior an award.|FN2|... In a number oI jurisdictions,
statutes provide that the prevailing party is entitled to attorney's Iees in evictions or summary-
possessory actions.... Similarly, a trial court may award Iees to both parties where the landlord
received a judgment Ior possession but the tenant prevailed in part by obtaining a reduction in
the amount oI a utility bill due the landlord.|FN8| The Iirst appropriate opportunity Ior a
tenant to allege a right to attorney's Iees in a Iorcible-entry-and-detainer action is when the
tenant makes his or her Iirst court appearance pursuant to a statutory summons.|FN12| On the
other hand, Iees have been denied where the landlord does not reIer to attorney's Iees in the
complaint but Iirst demands Iees only when judgment is about to be entered.|FN14| |FN1|
Keal v. Day, 164 Ohio App. 3d 21, 2005-Ohio-5551, 840 N.E.2d 1139 (1st Dist. Hamilton
County 2005). |FN2| Hamilton v. William Calomiris Inv. Corp., Inc., 461 A.2d 466 (D.C.
1983); Satellite Gateway Communications, Inc. v. Musi Dining Car Co., Inc., 110 N.J. 280,
540 A.2d 1267 (1988); H-T Enterprises v. Antelope Creek Bison Ranch, 2005 ND 71, 694
N.W.2d 691 (N.D. 2005); City oI Gahanna v. Eastgate Properties, Inc., 36 Ohio St. 3d 65, 521
N.E.2d 814 (1988). |FN8| Chang v. Louis & Alexander, Inc., 645 A.2d 1110 (D.C. 1994) (the
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lease entitled the prevailing party to recovery oI any and all reasonable expenses in the event
oI any breach or threatened breach.) |FN12| OakleaI Mobile Home Park v. Mancilla, 189 Or.
App. 458, 75 P.3d 908 (2003), review denied, 336 Or. 376, 84 P.3d 1080 (2004). |FN13|
OakleaI Mobile Home Park v. Mancilla, 189 Or. App. 458, 75 P.3d 908 (2003), review
denied, 336 Or. 376, 84 P.3d 1080 (2004). |FN14| Shipley v. Major, 44 A.2d 540 (Mun. Ct.
App. D.C. 1945) (the lease provides Ior the tenant's payment oI attorney's Iees in the event oI
the tenant's deIault). |FN15| Dawson v. Temanson, 107 P.3d 892 (Alaska 2005). AMJUR
LANDLORD 855
An unlawIul-detainer action may only be used when the tenant is unlawIully holding
over.|FN6| Since an action in an unlawIul detainer involves a IorIeiture oI the tenant's right to
possession, the landlord must plead and prove that the tenant remains in unlawIul possession
oI the premises.|FN7| |FN6| Thornton v. Butler, 728 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Ala. 1990). As to
re-entry upon a tenant's abandonment oI the premises, see 833. |FN7| Briggs v. Electronic
Memories & Magnetics Corp., 53 Cal. App. 3d 900, 126 Cal. Rptr. 34 (2d Dist. 1975); Rubin
v. Josephson, 478 A.2d 665 (Me. 1984); Mac-Du Properties v. LaBresh, 392 N.W.2d 315
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Village Bridge Apartments v. Mammucari, 239 N.J. Super. 235, 570
A.2d 1301 (App. Div. 1990). In a summary process action, the party seeking possession has
the burden oI prooI. Pine Grove Village, Inc. v. Cardullo, 2001 Mass. App. Div. 234, 2001
WL 1563688 (2001).
"While the plaintiII is entitled to every Iavorable inIerence that may be legitimately
drawn Irom the evidence, and has the same right to submit a weak case as a strong one, the
plaintiII must still sustain the burden oI prooI on the contested issues in the complaint and the
deIendant need not present any evidence to contradict it." Lukas v. New Haven, 184 Conn.
205, 211 (1981).
However, Coughlin did contradict the landlord's assertion that the lease had "expired"
and that the landlord even had any right to terminate the lease. To any extent Couglhin did
not make the latter such argument as clearly and IorceIully as might have been done, the
procedural deIiciencies and due process deprivations in the justice court, and even in the
district court on appeal, should operate to excuse any such Iinding. Regardless, the record on
its Iace, particularly the notices, the lease, and the landlord's testimony, all plainly show no
such right exists in the lease allowing the landlord to terminate the lease on a no-cause basis.
The general burden oI prooI in civil actions is on the plaintiII, who must prove all the
essential elements oI their cause oI action by a Iair preponderance of the evidence. Gulycz v.
Stop & Shop, 29 Conn. App. 519, 523, cert. denied. 224 Conn. 923 (1982). Failure to do so
results in judgment Ior the deIendant. Id. "
"While the plaintiII is entitled to every Iavorable inIerence that may be legitimately
drawn Irom the evidence, and has the same right to submit a weak case as a strong one, the
plaintiII must still sustain the burden oI prooI on the contested issues in the complaint and the
deIendant need not present any evidence to contradict it." Lukas v. New Haven, 184 Conn.
205, 211 (1981). The general burden oI prooI in civil actions is on the plaintiII, who must
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prove all the essential elements of their cause of action by a Iair preponderance oI the
evidence. Gulycz v. Stop & Shop, 29 Conn. App. 519, 523, cert. denied. 224 Conn. 923
(1982). Failure to do so results in judgment Ior the deIendant. Id. "
The 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE seems to view "all the essential elements" oI the lanldord's
summary eviction action as including only those Iound in NRS 40.254(2), skipping past the
Iact that NRS 40.254 requires a showing that the "certain types oI property" to which such
application is allowable are involved, speciIically, showing that a "commercial premises" is
not the subject oI the action. Here, Couglhin clearly pled that it was and provided prooI to
support such a position, and citation to NRS 40.254 with explication oI the argument that a
no-cause summary eviction may not be brought against a tenant using the rental in part as a
"commercial premises".
Further, none oI the "iI its implied Irom the pleadings or FOFCOLOSE" exceptions
apply here, particularly where Coughlin so expliclty pled his position, and where the justice
court rendered an Order on 11/7/11 barring Coughlin Irom Iiling an NRCP 52 Motion to Alter
or Amend such erroneous FOFCOLOSE...
NOTICE TO QUIT , Generally, summary process procedure is, oI course, based upon
the issuance oI a notice to quit. Sandrew v. Pequot Drug, Inc., 4 Conn. App. 627, 631 (1985).
"The notice to quit under the statute is the basis Ior the inauguration oI an action at law."
O'KeeIe v. Atlantic ReIining Co., 132 Conn. 613, 622 (1946), citing Webb v. Ambler, 125
Conn. 543, 552 (1939).
Such view is relevant to any argument that NRS 118A.510's "bring or threaten to
bring" analysis vis a vis the "instituted or deIended against" language in NRS 118A.510(e)
(especially when considering the extent to which both Coughlin's 9/7/11 in 1492 and 10/6/11
in 1708 Iiling could be viewed as complaints or veriIied complaints Ior expedited relieI under
NRS 118A.390, or Iunctional equivalents thereoI, rather than "Tenant's Answers".
The notice to quit serves as an unequivocal manifestation by the lessor that he
terminates the rental agreement. Messinger v. Laudano, 4 Conn. App. 162, 163 (1985). It
must convey a clear intention to the tenant that his lease has been terminated. Zitomer v.
Palmer, 38 Conn. Sup. 341, 343 (1982).
The problem Ior landlord Merliss is that in his and his attorney's Iraudulent zeal to
avoid the terms oI the lease, but, rather, to declare that it had "expired" as oI 3/1/11 (in some
hopes oI having the more Iavorable deIault provisions oI landlord tenant law replace those
paragraphs in the lease that Merliss retaliated against Coughlin upon his reIusal to assent to
modiIication oI such (the liability provisions in Paragraph 23, the utilities "not payable by the
resident" part, the weeds analysis incident to Paragraph 22, the Paragraph 13 express
allowance oI Coughlin's using the rental in part as a "commercial premises" (with Merliss
hiring an attorney almost immediately aIter Coughlin's 8/13/11 correspondence to him
identiIied Coughlin as an attorney using the address Ior his law oIIice's place oI business), and
landlord Merliss's insistence that the 48 hours notice requirement in the lease was not
something he would put up with (immediately aIter Coughlin asserts his right to 48 hours
notice prior to any "inspection" (and Merliss continually reIerred to the visits by his agents as
"inspections", with his attorney taking care to mention that actually "Iixing" anything may not
occur the same day as any such "inspection"). So, to set up the argument that such lease
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terms were no longer operative, Merliss prejuidiced his own 8/22/11 30 Day No Cause
Termination Notice to Vacate, as, given the language therein, there is nothing to indicate that
Merliss was "terminating" the lease, but rather...that it had already expired (which was clearly
not the case Irom a plain reading oI the lease)...as such, that 8/22/11 Notice merely served to
operate as a Notice to Vacate (which, given the valid claim oI right to possession Coughlin
continued to have, was pretty much pointless), and not as a Notice oI Termination. Fittingly,
there was a down side to Baker and Merliss's Iraudulent characterization oI the lease as
"expired", that being, that the 8/22/11 Notice Iailed to "terminate" the tenancy...indeed, Baker
crossed out the word "terminated" on the "From #1" he utilized...so certainly, such 8/22/11
Notice did not "terminated" the lease.
A proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional requirement in a summary process action and
a deIective notice to quit deprives the court oI subject matter jurisdiction. Lampasona v.
Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724, 729 (1989). A notice to quit must be unequivocal under Connecticut
General Statutes 47a-23. An equivocal notice to quit deprives the court oI subject matter
jurisdiction. Equivocation may arise Irom the language in the notice to quit or based on
conduct oI the landlord subsequent to service oI the notice. Pinehurst 154 Realty, LLC v.
Zuni, Superior Court, Judicial 4
562 Business injuries; loss oI proIits View Entire Section Go to Parallel ReIerence Table
Copyright 1998, West GroupOn the question whether the remedy oI a tenant includes a
right to damages Ior injury to a business, where the tenant has been using the property Ior
business purposes, the decisions have oIten been ambiguous as to whether the loss oI proIits
is an independent item oI damages or only evidence oI impairment oI the rental or usable
value oI the property Ior business purposes. While the Iormer view appears to have been
taken in some cases, 81 the true rule would seem to be that the tenant cannot recover Ior the
loss oI proIits as such, Iigured as a separate item oI consequential damages, but is conIined to
the remedy Ior impairment or loss oI the tenancy valued as such, evidence oI proIits being
admissible only as bearing on that issue. The amount oI business done, any diminution in
proIits, the cost oI removal iI that is involved, the cost oI renovations made Ior the business
which were lost by removal or depreciated by the trespass, and any peculiar advantages in the
particular location, together with a comparison oI rents with those to be paid elsewhere, are all
evidence to aid the trier oI Iacts in valuing the possessory interest. 82 Under traditional rules
oI landlord-tenant law, a tenant not yet in possession oI demised premises may not recover
proIits which the tenant allegedly would have earned iI not Ior a breach by the landlord
preventing the tenant Irom taking possession. 83 Footnotes Footnote 81. Weinman v De
Palma, 232 US 571, 58 L Ed 733, 34 S Ct 370 (holding that where an injury to a party wall
interrupted the plaintiII's occupancy and business, the deIendant was liable to him Ior
damages, including reasonable compensation Ior his loss oI Iuture proIits); Alden v MayIield,
164 Cal 6, 127 P 45 (supporting the proposition that damages Ior a wrongIul interIerence with
a plaintiII's tenancy "may be predicated on a loss oI prospective proIits"); Best MIg. Co. v
Peoria Creamery Co., 307 Ill 238, 138 NE 684. Annotation: Remedy oI tenant against
stranger wrongIully interIering with his possession, 12 ALR2d 1192 33. Footnote 82.
Weber & Heilbroner v Holbrook, Cabot & Rollins Corp., 192 App Div 93, 182 NYS 466
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(obstructions in street); Fox v Corbitt, 137 Tenn 466, 194 SW 88. Annotation: 12 ALR2d
1192 34. Footnote 83. Whitmier & Ferris Co. v BuIIalo Structural Steel Corp., 66 NY2d
1013, 499 NYS2d 386, 489 NE2d 1288 (noting that this rule oI law has been widely
criticized)
883. Liability oI landlord Ior wrongIul eviction
A holdover tenant's damages are limited to those damages suIIered as a direct result oI the
landlord's use oI the improper procedure. Deroshia v. Union Terminal Piers, 151 Mich. App.
715, 391 N.W.2d 458 (1986).
Both a landlord and its counsel were liable Ior wrongIul eviction on an invalid warrant,
whether the eviction was deliberate or inadvertent. Mayes v. UVI Holdings, Inc., 280 A.D.2d
153, 723 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 2001).
It was reversible error to rule Coughlin's 10/6/11 Iiling in 1708 as a mere tenant's
answer, and particularly where the justice court reIused to allow Coughlin to make his case
under NRS 118A.510(2)'s incorporation and augumentation (aIter all, .510(2) allows Ior the
remedy in .390 where a violation oI .510 occurs, which could consist oI the landlord
"threatening" to evict Coughlin "in retaliation" Ior his complaining "to the landlord" about "a
violation oI this Chapter" (which could include any number oI things, including NRS
118A.360 vis a vis either viewing the landscaper drama as "weeds" habitability by virtue oI
the UniIorm Residential Code, or the "strewn about" Iaux lawn carpeting as either a
requirement under the lease or some violation oI the "debris" or landlord's liability Ior acts oI
his "agents or employees".
"24. POLICIES: Resident agrees to abide by any and all rules and policies including, but not
limited to, rules with respect to noise, odors, disposal oI reIuse, pets, parking and use oI
common areas. Further, Resident does not agree to abide by all amendments and additions to
these rules aIter due notice oI any such amendments or additions. " Such implicates NRS
118A.360, perhaps, as to "services", and NRS 118A.510(I).
MROA 323 (implicates NRS 118A.360, NRS 118A.390(5)(a)-(b)Defendant: But the
lease says he is liable Ior damage done on my lawn....
Further, as to the NRS 118A.355(5) rent escrow issue, Paragraph 23 oI the lease provides
Coughlin a bargained Ior basis Ior "a proportionate reduction oI rent" and it was reversible
error Ior the justice court to reIuse to entertain such issue:
"23. DAMAGES TO PREMISES: II the premise are damaged by time or through any other
cause which renders the premises untenantable, either party will have the right to terminated
this Agreement as the date on which the damage occurs. Written notice of termination will
be give to the other party within fifteen (15) days after occurrence of such damage....II
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this Agreement is not terminated, then Owner will promptly repair the premises and there
will be a proportionate reduction of rent until the premises are repaired and ready Ior
Tenant's occupancy. The proportionate reduction will be based on the extent which
repairs interfere with Tenant's reasonable of the premises."
The justice court's summary Iinding that the landscapers were "independent
contractors" and thereIore not lanldord Merliss's "agents or employees" (and really, where the
lease uses those terms in the alternative, what could an "agent" be other than an "independent
contractor", really?)...
"Defendant: Your Honor |inaudible 0:48:25| $1,000 claim Ior damage to the landscaping
third party.
1udge: Who said?
1udge: Well.
Defendant: Clearly.
amount oI #2275 I will continue this Ior trial on the merits to determine whether or not there
really is a habitabllity issue."
28. LIABILITY: management shall not be liable Ior any damage or injury to Resident or any
other person or to any property occurring on the premises or any part thereoI, or in common
areas thereoI, unless such liability is based on the negligent acts or omission of
management, his agent, or employee, but Resident will not agree to hold management
harmless Irom any claims Ior damages iI caused by the negligent acts or omissions oI the
Resident or his guests.
Also, Merliss's argument that the language in Paragraph 2 oI the lease limits the use to
a residential purpose only (an argument which Merliss never did raise or make prior to the
10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE being entered (really not until 12/19/11 did Merliss make such
arguments, or later, not sure): "Management does hereby rent to Tenants and Tenant hereby
rents Irom management for resiaential purposes only those certain premises aescribea at: 121
River Rock St., Reno, NV 89503, located at: 121 River Rock St., Reno, NV 89503 Ior a
period oI not less than 12 months..."
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The more reasonable reading oI the phrase: "for resiaential purposes only those
certain premises aescribea at: 121 River rock..." takes the use oI the word "only" to attache to
"those certain premises" in meaning, rather than "Ior residential purposes only" given the
extent to which the sentence lists "only" "certain premises" thereaIter Iollowing the colon.
Regardless, Merliss was the "draIter" oI the contract according to him, as he indicated
he provided it to Coughlin, and as such, ambiguity must be held against him, but really, there
is not any amibiguity given Paragraphs 10 and 11 really drive home the point that Coughlin
was entitled to use the "premises" Ior as residential or commercial premises, or both, period:
"Resident further may use the premises for any commercial enterprise...
11. OCCUPANCY: Occupancy oI the premises is limited to 2 adults ... and shall be
used Ior a residence and for other purposes." Also, Gasser v. Jet CraIt present mandatory
authority in Nevada deIending against Merliss's contention that any technical nicety as to
zoning or business licenses (which are Iar Irom proven, quite the contrary, actually) would
operate to invalidate as "unlawIul" Coughlin commercial use oI the "commercial premises".
Further, as to Paragraph 22: " Tenant will irrigate and maintain any surrounding
grounds, including lawns (check to see iI actual lease says "laws" or "lawns" and shrubbery,
iI they are Ior the tenant's exclusive use..." One, the term "yard" does not appear therein, yet
the justice court continually reIerred to a "yard", two, "surrounding grounds" implied an area
other than that which is the premises subject to the lease (one need not read such language to
mean "ground surrounding the structure used as a dwelling place", rather, "surrounding
grounds" could mean the areas between the sidewalk and the curb oI Court Street, rather than
the interpretation the justice court seemed ot take (oI course, with out even a summary level
oI due process accorded to the issue, much the same as the short shriIt given the issue oI
whether Dickson's Sharpe (the quasi-property manageer "Management" in "Paragraph 28.
Liability: "negligent acts or omssion oI management, his agent, or employee," or the
landscaper Iit within the purview oI such suIIicient to inure liability to the landlord or some
necessary third party "management" (no property manager inIormation was provided by this
out oI state landlord despite a requirement Ior such in NRS 118A).
"NRS 118A.390 UnlawIul removal or exclusion oI tenant or willIul interruption oI
essential items or services; procedure Ior expedited relieI.
1. II the landlord unlawfully removes the tenant from the premises or excluaes the tenant
by blocking or attempting to block the tenants entry upon the premises, willfully interrupts
or causes or permits the interruption of any essential item or service required by the
rental agreement or this chapter or otherwise recovers possession oI the dwelling unit in
violation oI NRS 118A.480, the tenant may recover immeaiate possession pursuant to
subsection 4, proceed under NRS 118A.380 ...and, in addition to any other remedy, recover
the tenant's actual damages, receive an amount not greater than $2,5 to be fixed by the
court, or both.
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2. In determining the amount, iI any, to be awarded under subsection 1, the court shall
consider:
(a) Whether the landlord acted in good Iaith;
(b) The course oI conduct between the landlord and the tenant; and
(c) The degree oI harm to the tenant caused by the landlord`s conduct...
4. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 5, the tenant may recover immediate
possession oI the premises Irom the landlord by filing a verifiea complaint for expeaitea relief
for the unlawful removal or exclusion of the tenant from the premises, the willIul interruption
oI any essential item or service or the recovery oI possession oI the dwelling unit in violation
oI NRS 118A.480. (NOTE: see Coughlin's 11/2/11 and 11/17/11 Iilings in 1708 oI just such
"complaints Ior expedited relieI" upon the illegal lockout oI 11/1/11).
5. A veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI:
(a) Must be Iiled with the court within 5 judicial days after the date of the unlawful act by
the landlord,...
(b) May not be Iiled with the court if an action for summary eviction or unlawful
detainer is already pending between the landlord and tenant, but the tenant may seek similar
relieI beIore the judge presiding over the pending action.
6. The court shall conduct a hearing on the veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI not later
than 3 judicial days aIter the Iiling oI the veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI. BeIore or at
the scheduled hearing, the tenant must provide prooI that the landlord has been properly
served with a copy oI the veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI. Upon the hearing, iI it is
determined that the landlord has violated any oI the provisions oI subsection 1, the court may:
(a) Order the landlord to restore to the tenant the premises or essential items or services, or
both;
(b) Award damages pursuant to subsection 1; and
(c) Enjoin the landlord Irom violating the provisions oI subsection 1 and, iI the
circumstances so warrant, hold the landlord in contempt oI court.
7. The payment oI all costs and oIIicial Iees must be deIerred Ior any tenant who Iiles a
veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI. AIter any hearing and not later than Iinal disposition
oI the Iiling or order, the court shall assess the costs and Iees against the party that does not
prevail, except that the court may reduce them or waive them, as justice may require.
(Added to NRS by 1977, 1340; A 1985, 1417; 2003, 426; 2011, 238)"
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"From: zachcoughlinhotmail.com To: rhillrichardhillaw.com Subject: RE: Lease property
damage liability provision Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2011 22:59:38 -0700 Hi Rich,
HopeIully Matt has copied you on all our previous correspondences...but knowing
Matt, he probably has Iorgotten about them or doesn't realize they were ever delivered, etc.
Anways, I probably have copies oI all oI them, many oI which are notices to Iix things, etc.
Recently I made him a Settlement Proposal which included changing possession to Matt oI an
evaporative cooler I bought and installed that makes this house much more livable in the
summer without costing $1 an hour in ac bills. Here is an insightIul article in that regard:
http://money.msn.com/saving-money/keep-cool-without-pricey-ac.aspx?gt133026
We are both attorneys and I wish to do my part to avoid getting into court and looking like we
haven't done the leg work necessary to pin down the areas oI contention and eliminate doubt
with regard to things that are easily established, such as the written notices I have sent Matt
that have gone unresponded to, Ior things like, a broken window, broken sprinkler system,
Iallen insulation, etc. Further, Matt approved things like repairing the crumbling Iront steps,
etc. He provided directions such as "get two estimates and choose the cheapest one and
deduct it Irom the rent..." Well, repairing crumbling steps is not super cheap. Matt seems to
have Iorgotten about these written deals entirely. Lets say it cost $600 to repair steps, well,
where does that leave Matt's estimate oI what I owe? The steps have been repaired. As has
the garbage disposal and other items. The window is still broken, Matt never responded to
requests Ior the cost oI noxious weed ordinance Iine avoiding landscaping the previous season
(I wouldl, Ior now, take the same $350 I agreed to this season, which is surely less than Matt
paid the crew oI 4 men to service the neighboring house Ior 8 hours recently) with jagged
edges oI glass exposed, and an entryway with grip strips and wooden planks that are in
disrepair. I have a law oIIice to run and cannot both pay rent and be the pro bono handyman
Ior the absentee landlord while he is oII travelling to Amsterdam and Bangkok. I made a very
reasonable oIIer to Matt to Iix it. I made an incredibly reasonable oIIer to Matt to have the
seasonal noxious weed ordinance Iine avoiding weeding taken care oI Ior $350, which he
enthusiastically agreed to, then a landscaping crew promptly came and ripped up a Iaux grass
installation that had cost me a great deal oI time and money to put in place, then reIused to put
that personal property back on my rental property at all, leaving it on the sidewalk and in the
street. 700 square Ieet oI Iaux grass (actually high density woolen green carpet that is Iar
more expensive than simple "astroturI") is not something you want to just leave out in the
street, and it is deIinately somethign you don't want to have to move and install twice,
especially while your landlord is apparently so well oI that he can agree to a a $350 rent
deduction Ior the exact same thing he later hires a landscaping crew to do while he is in the
Phillipeans, again.
Sincerely, Zach Coughlin"
"From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Tue 9/06/11 1:13 PM
To: rhillrichardhilllaw.com; cdbakerrichardhillaw.com
Dear Dick and Casey,
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Hi, I think its been almost 21 days since the August 17th, 2011 written
correspondences I sent you requesting that you withdraw any demands Ior that which you
demanded until you Iound some basis in Iact Ior the amounts your were alleging were
owed....So, NRCP 11(c)(1)(A). II you try to Iorce me to pay $2850 into some court rent
escrow account, please see the NRCP motion I will be Iiling against you and your client.
NRS 7.085. Wow, thats a big oIIice you guys got Ior two attorneys. Your legal assistant told
me that it was mostly room to house the voluminous staII you guys hire to push paper, er,
practice law. I sure hope its the attorneys who are practicing the law and only taking up 10
oI the space in that oIIice building oI yours. Anyways, nice Targa. I guess it might depend
what qualiIies as a "motion" under NRCP 11(c)(1)(A), but you guys were sent something
around 21 days ago that request that you reIrain Irom being all vexatious, especially regarding
rent deductions already agreed to in writing by your client. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin, Esq.
What Iollows is a review, with some redactions Ior privacy sake, oI written
communications between Merliss and Coughlin:
MROA 694: 'From: Zach Coughlin zachcoughlinhotmail.com~
To: magundaaol.com
Sent: Fri, May 14, 2010 2:32 pm
We tried the key for the house in the back door again, and even used some graphite dust, but
it still appears to not be the right key Ior the door. We could take care oI this in exchange
for a ... discount off one months rent. I am attaching some pictures oI what has become,
rather suddenly, quite a weed problem. (MROA 676-677 pictures)...How about this, we could
handle the weed problem Ior a ... discount oII one month's rent?...Lastly, when we moved in,
there was a number of insulation batts that had fallen from the ceiling in the basement,
and rested on the dirt ground...portions touching the ground became very infested with
mold, The ground did not have a vapor barrier,... we don't feel comfortable having them
remain in the basement. MROA 694, pictures at MROA 675-679) There also appears to be a
mola issue on the ceiling/unaersiae of the floorboara in the part of the house that seems to be
near the wall separating the front bearoom from the bathroom. (MROA 684 pictures in Exh
2 Irom 10/25/11 "Trial") ...Please see the attachea photos in these regaras....We could
replace and install new r19 insulation ... Additionally, we could spray some anti-mold
products on the effected ceiling parts for $... OI course, we are only oIIering ways to address
these matters. ...PS. the photos are attached ...
MROA 695: "To magundaaol.com From: (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 11/23/10 12:47 PM Hi Matt, Could you have Alejandro or someone put back
up the insulation that had fallen down at the time we moved in. I sent you pictures
about this some time ago. I believe spraying with bleach or something may be good for
the mold spots. Some of the insulation appeared to have mold growing on it....I don't
want to crawl around stapling them back up along with their mold and up into moldy
Iloorboards... for free. "
MROA 696: "Hello, theres a toilet issue...To magundaaol.com
From: (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Tue 2/15/11 10:03 PM
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To: magundaaol.com Hi Matt, ...I am writing because there seems to be an issue with the
toilet.
(NOTE: Merliss's testimony oI 10/25/11 became extremely shaky and contradictory where he
indicated that Coughlin had "lost a lot oI credibility" with him upon sending him "extremely
conIusing, incoherent emails" about the "problem with the toilet" which included "waxing
eloquent about urine crystals" (MROA 860: Merliss: when you Iirst started to send me e-
mails they were very unclear the language was unclear I couldn't tell iI you were complaining
or iI you wanted help there were very ambiguous you later sent an e-mail about the toilet
about urine that went on Ior three or Iour e-mails that was completely bizarre I couldn't
understand it and I even sent Antonio there he couldn't Iind anything wrong with the toilet...
with that e-mail you lost a lot of creaibility you were waxing elegance about urine crystals
and things like that I couldn't really Iollow you Irom there are on..."
MROA ???: "DeIendant: yes with respect to the broken wax ring on the toilet were in
the urine sluage was pulling behina the toilet for months on ena (see pictures at
MROA ???)... PlaintiII: I see it on page 21 Your Honor this is the e-mail to which Dr. Merliss
is reIerring to as just too confusing ... ...DeIendant: and Your Honor iI you'll just note that
approximately line 17 is one of the first mentions of this broken window in February
(MROA ???)...DeIendant: did Antonio ever come over to Iix the toilet? ... Merliss: yes
DeIendant: did he Iix it? Merliss: he came over and then he told me that there wasn't a
problem...DeIendant: are you aware that he told me there was a problem and that he would be
back in a week and he never returned? ...did he indicate to you that he told Melissa and
myselI that he would be back in a week or so to Iix it and that approximately a couple weeks
went by and we never heard Irom him? Merliss: the only conversation I had with Antonio is I
asked him how the toilet was what's the problem ... couldn't understand the e-mail he said that
there wasn't a problem it's fixed there isn't a problem"
OI course Antonion told Merliss "its Iixed", because upon more than 14 days passing
Irom when Coughlin Iirst wrote Merliss oI the habitability issue regarding the "plumbing"
under NRS 118A.290, and Antonio coming out to the home oIIice, looking at the issue with
the leaking wax ring, and indicating he would return in a week to Iix it, but Iailing to,
Coughlin Iixed the wax ring himselI, whereupon Coughlin then called Antonio and upset him
by indicating that the toilet was "Iixed" already, another oI several "Iix and deduct" instances
under NRS 118A.360 that Merliss retaliate against Coughlin in light oI in mid-August when
he became upset that Coughlin was asserting his right to such deductions.
MROA ???: "DeIendant: okay I ask you to we get back to this year and e-mail I'm
reading this this sounds like a coach and description to a to a landlord oI a problem but the
toilet can you speciIically tell me what is so surreal or obtuse about this e-mail to you Dr.
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Merliss and Baker Your Honor I am going to interpose an objection at this point Mr.
Coughlin has identiIied what he said were habitability issues again the court has now ruled on
it twice that that his case is conIined to those issues these bringing up new stuII on Coughlin
Junction Judge: well the toilet is part oI that but I don't believe it's habitability it's not deIined
plumbing is DeIendant: outlets plumbing Judge: so iI you establish serve the it was leaking
but the e-mail doesn't establish that is just establish is you complained about it the smell oI
urine PlaintiII: the e-mail doesn't establish that there is urine sludge building up? How Judge:
well you yourselI said in the e-mail that you don't know what it is PlaintiII: in the introductory
there several e-mails the e-mail is saying look we've got this pulling disgusting smell oI urine
sludge behind the toilet...
DeIendant: yes or Dr. Merliss can you Iollow the chain oI e-mails with respect to the nine
issue urine issue and tell me that aIter the conIusing e-mails the ones that you describe is
conIusing there was a Iollow-up e-mail was there on page 22 Merliss: it's hard to understand
your questions Mr. Coughlin Judge: he read those two e-mails Sir is there 30 mouth? Mr.
Coughlin? Coughlin PlaintiII: there is an e-mail oI 215 Judge: okay on page PlaintiII: to 16
Judge: on page 21 there is an e-mail dated to 15 RA then there is a response on to 16 at 7:57
AM to you that says all San Antonio over next week then on page 22 on 217 there is an e-mail
dated 2/16/11 PlaintiII: why on 3/14/11 Dr. Merliss to you suddenly send an e-mail talking
about to estimates is that in relation to the toilet and had Antonio not between 2/16/11 3/14/11
had he not Iix the toilet and why did you send him over iI he said there was no issue PlaintiII:
objection compound question Judge: okay Iirst oI all let's start I don't know that the 3/14/11 is
related to that I just assume that it it was your the one who put together this chain oI e-mails
so I don't know iI there's any e-mail between 2/16/11 and 3/14/11 DeIendant: my recollection:
is that Melissa Lee Ella had to call Dr. Merliss Judge: Sir you're not testiIying the question is
is there another e-mail between 2/16/11 and 3/14/11 PlaintiII: that's my question Ior Dr.
Merliss Judge: RA well all right will all let him Merliss: on which page please PlaintiII: on
page 22 with the 2/16/11 e-mail and the 3/14/11 e-mail Judge: 2/16/11 e-mail is Irom the
deIendant to you it's at the top oI page 22 Merliss: okay to 16 and 3/14/11 Judge: 3/14/11
purports to be Irom you to him Merliss: well I don't see anything between 2/16/11 and 3/14/11
on this paper DeIendant: do you know why you would've written me on 3/14/11 out oI the
blue to say get two estimates enter deduction do you know whether it was related to the toilet
been Iixed Merliss: iI there is a maintenance issue oI any kind Mr. Coughlin because just to
make it easy Ior you any kind oI a maintenance issue that you have anything you need to get
to estimates save the receipts take that the take the most recent DeIendant: does it say save
the receipts Sir? Does this case saved the receipts in your e-mail? Merliss: no."
MROA ???: "Judge:: go ahead you can read it Merliss: will be out oI the cut I will be
out oI the country until the end oI March iI there is a maintenance issue please get to
estimates choose the most reasonable take it oII the next rental check I will be a valuable by
e-mail thanks....
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DeIendant: do you see approximately line 16 where it says wrote quote wrote you about the
Iallen insulation downstairs in the expose mold exposed mold both on the Iloorboard and
insulation you never responded please do, and quotations do you see that part? Merliss: yes.
DeIendant: did you is that correct had you not responded to some written notice oI mold and
insulation Merliss: this came aIter I asked you to pay the rent. I was we were discussing the
rent payment and all oI the sudden none oI this came up beIore the PlaintiII:: you had never
been alerted oI the mold issue prior to that? Merliss: no. DeIendant: ROK okay Willis is go
back to page 19 Sir where there is talk oI I believe it's actually age that well where there's
talks oI bats be a TTS early are on earlier on yet page on okay on page 19 so you're saying
you'd never heard oI that beIore Irom that August e-mail to hear back in May write about
mind 10 DeIendant: did you just ignore it when you got it ready in Thailand or what Merliss:
no DeIendant: know what Merliss: I wasn't sure exactly what you wanted DeIendant: did you
right back seeking clariIication Merliss: I don't know iI I did or didn't DeIendant: you don't
know? Whether you did or did not address a problem with potentially toxic mold and in the
home which somebody was paying you money Ior Merliss: we send somebody over there and
he wouldn't let the men. PlaintiII: when was that was that close in time to this may 14th notice
Merliss: this was a Iew weeks ago we sent over Nash DeIendant: so was at a good 14 months
later new line Merliss we sent over Nash and Mr. Fisher to have a look DeIendant: is that
within the 14 days to 14 days called Ior to Iix in this statue or did the statutes not apply to you
PlaintiII: objection calls Ior legal conclusion Judge: wait a second mummy rule on the
objections please also sustain the objection go ahead with your next question DeIendant: so
does this establish your earlier testimony that the Iirst time this insulation issue was ever
brought up was right aIter you mentioned hey you owe me rent he said that about 5 min. ago
and that was Irom this August 11 e-mail and then your testimony is seemingly contradicted is
meant by this may 14th issue may 14th e-mail wherein the mold issue is clearly set Iorth in
writing to you or is that not right? Did you just contradict yourselI? Judge: will wait a second
the question is conIusing me now PlaintiII: okay I brought up the I went to the dnouement
the untying oI the not the end oI the play where in August when things started to get a little
heated between us and I said what what did you do August 2011 when I wrote you about the
insulation August 11 and Dr. Merliss said he you only brought that up when I asked about the
back rent and I said all had and I brought it up earlier? Judge: I recall that but the question is
what is your question DeIendant: well you said that August was the Iirst time that that was
brought up now we see a may e-mail did you just Iorget about that earlier were you not
remembering in were you being untruthIul? Merliss: when you read this e-mail Mr. Coughlin
ICU describing something you are describing no vapor barrier 8 x 6" mold inIested bats you
have some deal that she wants but you haven't really asked Ior anything you're saying we are
only oIIering ways to address these matters I don't really know what you're asking Ior and
that's how a lot oI these e-mails are Mr. DeIendant: I don't know exactly what you want
DeIendant: so is it just kind oI a just don't really respond or do anything see iI they just give
up? Merliss: no it's not that Mr. Coughlin (MROA ???)..."
MROA ???: Merliss's testimony becomes even more contradictory an unreliable
where he continues to point to the series oI "incoherent" toilet sludge urine leaking wax ring
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emails as a basis Ior not trusting Coughlin, even as to Iixing the modly insulation/basement
ceiling, oIIice Iloorboard issues, despite the Iact that the toilet emails are Irom February -
March 2011 and the moldy insulation, ceiling and Iloorboard emails are circa May 2010 and
November 2010. Time and time again, when Merliss gets caught in a contradiction, he shiIts
gears and Iocuses on how "conIusing" he Iound the emails because the were not "clear" as to
whether Coughlin was "just looking Ior money to do a project" or asking his landlord to Iix a
habitability issue:
"PlaintiII: so you get this may 14th (NOTE: the email is dated 5/14/2010 MROA ???) e-mail
and you read it and you say that I see he's quoting me some Iigures he's saying ways to
address this matter he's saying something about mold and health issues and inIested and no
vapor barrier and Iell Irom the ceiling I I just so I don't really see any impetus to do or
respond to this in any way is that kind oI your thought process this is the kind oI your thought
process there and then to do something ...Merliss: Mr. Coughlin iI you had said to me I'd like
somebody to look at this issue I would send them out right away I would send them the next
day to look at it PlaintiII:: and you didn't take that e-mail as a request to have the issue
addressed? Merliss: after that urine e-mail (NOTE: the "urine emails" were dated
(MROA ???) 2/15/11 to 3/17/11) I wasnt sure what to think about you Mr. Coughlin
DeIendant: But, sir, that urine e-mail ... came after the insulation e-mail Merliss: these
other e-mails DeIendant: so now it's kind of not adding up what you're saying Merliss:
these other e-mails, Mr. Coughlin. DeIendant: What other e-mails? Merliss: they are unclear
DeIendant: what other e-mails this insulation the e-mail is from May 2010? Merliss: I
testified I had problems understanding if you're complaining whether you want
something or whether you're trying to get some money see you could do a project I can't
it's hard for me to understand"
MROA ???: "Merliss: I just explained it I can't tell whether you're asking Ior
something complaining or iI you are trying to get me to pay some money Ior something you
want to do the work in make money I can't tell what you want they have never been clear they
are not submitted clearly there is always a tone oI some sort oI bargaining I don't understand
what you want Irom me...Merliss: I don't know I was told that you didn't even do the weeding
DeIendant: by whom? Merliss: I was told that I paid you $350 and then that you didn't do
anything DeIendant: by who? Merliss: I by Darlene. DeIendant: when Merliss: a Iew months
ago that is why I had to pay a Iew thousand dollars Ior extra weeding DeIendant: Ior the
property I rent? Merliss that's right DeIendant: you paid a Iew thousand dollars on top oI the
$350 you agree to to have the property I rent weeded Merliss that's correct DeIendant: okay iI
we go to June you agree to a $350 rent deduction iI I would take care oI the weeds and you
used three exclamation marks to To say alright Merliss: good DeIendant: so how long aIter
you writing that e-mail where you agreed to that did it take Ior Darlene to say he didn't do it
and then Ior you to say I'm good to go pay somebody to grant to two grand Merliss: when the
landscapers came I asked how the weeds looked over at your house said I don't even think he
did anything let's do the other house...Judge: I'm good at Europe right now because I've
already ruled that we debate as I read the statute is not habitability like DeIendant: it's a
noxious weed or its complaining about a noxious weed or its Judge: complained to who you
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are not talking about complaining now PlaintiII: I believe I called the city oI Reno Reno direct
about it Judge: oI K DeIendant: and I know I told Dr. Merliss Judge: okay I'm good with
prepaid Iurther questioning along these lines at this time because it's clear to me that you
complained the landlord about noxious weeds I perjured testimony that maybe you
complained the city oI Reno PlaintiII: I'm not asking about weeds not I'm going to credibility
and Dr. Merliss continually says one thing and then gets cornered somewhere and then has to
switch oI the story and it don't care about the weeds right now what I care about is Judge: well
I do because I have been here Ior the better part oI Iour or Iive hours listening to this
DeIendant: yes or Judge: and is coming to answer PlaintiII: is Your Honor it iI I can Iinish
this last line oI inquiry with respect to the inconsistencies and Dr. Merliss a statement then I
will arrest Judge: okay PlaintiII: PlaintiII: Dr. Merle us is it Iair to say that you agree to our
$350 rent deduction Ior the weeds Coughlin Merliss: and oIIered that to DeIendant: you
oIIered that oI the blue were Merliss: I oIIered that in response to DeIendant: you oIIered it to
me in response to my e-mail to you Zach correct Merliss: yes DeIendant: okay and then house
soon thereaIter did you in Darlene have this conversation about I don't think he did anything?
Merliss: I don't remember DeIendant: would use it was a month later? Merliss: I don't
remember. DeIendant: okay how soon aIter you agreed to the rent deduction wherein you
wrote hi Zach the 350 seems okay please take it oII the rent thank you and then you put three
exclamations points how soon aIter that did the green action law crew, aIter an essentially
attempt to do the same weeding on the same property? Merliss: I don't remember DeIendant:
okay well I can see in these e-mails where it's within Iour days so that would imply that
Darlene are your same Darlene said we should spend a couple grant sending green action
back over there because Iour days has passed since you agreed to a $350 deal with Zach?
Judge: Sir you're making a statement. What is the question DeIendant: Your Honor the
question is how does that make sense? Judge: you can argue that you got the e-mail Steve can
argue that to me DeIendant: okay my question is you only let Iour days go by Irom when you
paid one guy $350 to do a job to where he said he didn't do a good enough I am going to
spend two grand hiring this other crew guys to do the same job? Does that make any sense?
Merliss: I am not sure how this is relevant Your Honor he got paid Ior the weeds and he's
objecting to me hiring somebody else to do the weeds I don't understand that rate Judge:: well
whether you understand it or not the question is was it Iour days? Merliss: I don't know.
Judge: all right. DeIendant: so iI you sent this e-mail on Saturday, May 21, 2012 saying great
sounds good let's do it three $5350 and then on may 24 2012 three days later you get the e-
mail Irom me wherein I detail the conversion and larceny and property destruction to my
property that's three days so I guess you are saying in the span oI three days Darlene called to
in complained that I haven't done the weeding good enough and you say yes let's wrote $2000
that that? PlaintiII:objection relevance Mr. Coughlin got his $350 credit what is the problem
DeIendant: it's nonsensical it goes to his credibility. Judge: okay well I've heard enough oI the
so I'm going to sustain the objection"
Merliss: I just explained it I can't tell whether you're asking Ior something complaining or iI
you are trying to get me to pay some money Ior something you want to do the work in make
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money I can't tell what you want they have never been clear they are not submitted clearly
there is always a tone oI some sort oI bargaining I don't understand what you want Irom
me...Merliss: I don't know I was told that you didn't even do the weeding DeIendant: by
whom? Merliss: I was told that I paid you $350 and then that you didn't do anything
DeIendant: by who? Merliss: I by Darlene. DeIendant: when Merliss: a Iew months ago that
is why I had to pay a Iew thousand dollars Ior extra weeding DeIendant: Ior the property I
rent? Merliss that's right DeIendant: you paid a Iew thousand dollars on top oI the $350 you
agree to to have the property I rent weeded Merliss that's correct DeIendant: okay iI we go to
June you agree to a $350 rent deduction iI I would take care oI the weeds and you used three
exclamation marks to To say alright Merliss: good DeIendant: so how long aIter you writing
that e-mail where you agreed to that did it take Ior Darlene to say he didn't do it and then Ior
you to say I'm good to go pay somebody to grant to two grand Merliss: when the landscapers
came I asked how the weeds looked over at your house said I don't even think he did anything
let's do the other house...Judge: I'm good at Europe right now because I've already ruled that
we debate as I read the statute is not habitability like DeIendant: it's a noxious weed or its
complaining about a noxious weed or its Judge: complained to who you are not talking about
complaining now PlaintiII: I believe I called the city oI Reno Reno direct about it Judge: oI K
DeIendant: and I know I told Dr. Merliss Judge: okay I'm good with prepaid Iurther
questioning along these lines at this time because it's clear to me that you complained the
landlord about noxious weeds I perjured testimony that maybe you complained the city oI
Reno PlaintiII: I'm not asking about weeds not I'm going to credibility and Dr. Merliss
continually says one thing and then gets cornered somewhere and then has to switch oI the
story and it don't care about the weeds right now what I care about is Judge: well I do because
I have been here Ior the better part oI Iour or Iive hours listening to this DeIendant: yes or
Judge: and is coming to answer PlaintiII: is Your Honor it iI I can Iinish this last line oI
inquiry with respect to the inconsistencies and Dr. Merliss a statement then I will arrest
Judge: okay PlaintiII: PlaintiII: Dr. Merle us is it Iair to say that you agree to our $350 rent
deduction Ior the weeds Coughlin Merliss: and oIIered that to DeIendant: you oIIered that oI
the blue were Merliss: I oIIered that in response to DeIendant: you oIIered it to me in
response to my e-mail to you Zach correct Merliss: yes DeIendant: okay and then house soon
thereaIter did you in Darlene have this conversation about I don't think he did anything?
Merliss: I don't remember DeIendant: would use it was a month later? Merliss: I don't
remember. DeIendant: okay how soon aIter you agreed to the rent deduction wherein you
wrote hi Zach the 350 seems okay please take it oII the rent thank you and then you put three
exclamations points how soon aIter that did the green action law crew, aIter an essentially
attempt to do the same weeding on the same property? Merliss: I don't remember DeIendant:
okay well I can see in these e-mails where it's within Iour days so that would imply that
Darlene are your same Darlene said we should spend a couple grant sending green action
back over there because Iour days has passed since you agreed to a $350 deal with Zach?
Judge: Sir you're making a statement. What is the question DeIendant: Your Honor the
question is how does that make sense? Judge: you can argue that you got the e-mail Steve can
argue that to me DeIendant: okay my question is you only let Iour days go by Irom when you
paid one guy $350 to do a job to where he said he didn't do a good enough I am going to
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spend two grand hiring this other crew guys to do the same job? Does that make any sense?
objecting to me hiring somebody else to do the weeds I don't understand that rate Judge:: well
whether you understand it or not the question is was it Iour days? Merliss: I don't know.
Judge: all right. DeIendant: so iI you sent this e-mail on Saturday, May 21, 2012 saying great
sounds good let's do it three $5350 and then on may 24 2012 three days later you get the e-
mail Irom me wherein I detail the conversion and larceny and property destruction to my
property that's three days so I guess you are saying in the span oI three days Darlene called to
in complained that I haven't done the weeding good enough and you say yes let's wrote $2000
that that? PlaintiII:objection relevance Mr. Coughlin got his $350 credit what is the problem
DeIendant: it's nonsensical it goes to his credibility. Judge: okay well I've heard enough oI the
so I'm going to sustain the objection...PlaintiII: I have some brieI redirect or excuse me cross
Your Honor Dr. Merliss I'm handing you one has been pre-marked Ior identiIication purposes
plaintiII's exhibit H do you recognize this? Merliss: yes PlaintiII: okay is this an e-mail Irom
well it looks like an e-mail Irom Darleen to you at the bottom is that right? Merliss: yes
PlaintiII: okay I want to Iocus on TUC where it says your name map Merliss,
magundaaol.com wrote:? Merliss: yes PlaintiII: okay below that is that an e-mail to you
Irom Zach is that marked PlaintiII: oh outside witnesses the original Judge: okay yeah what a
nice switch it out and let Baker would you please read your e-mail to Zach Coughlin plays
Merliss: Zach can you give us a time Ior the handyman please also at 330 tomorrow Nash's
pest control will be coming to look at your alleged mold issues please get back to me and to
Darlene her e-mail is starssoItcom.net PlaintiII: and what was Mr. Coughlin's response?
Lopez: I don't see in here PlaintiII:: it's just above where your name is Merliss: oh: two days
no good look oI statutory notice NRS section landlord tenant. PlaintiII: can you tell the date
oI Mr. Coughlin's response? For less is just above his message it is just above his message
Merliss: August 15, 2011 PlaintiII: why did you arrange to have Nash's pest control to look at
the alleged mold issue? Merliss: because he complained about Judge: okay exhibit H will be
admitted DeIendant: Your Honor objection do we have a duty why is there no date Ior when
the date bias or no date Ior when Mr. Merliss sent the e-mail Judge: what you can get your
copy and show it PlaintiII: I'm not sure iI I have a copy Your Honor Judge: wanting have a
copy scenario copy oI every other e-mail Sir PlaintiII: I'm not that conIident oI that Sir
DeIendant: but it does seem as though it's kind the same day notice that the applied Ior
inspecting law oIIice inspecting the law oIIice Judge: well it's a day beIore super DeIendant: I
don't see that Your Honor Judge:: wall on the molds it is the other part is the handyman can
come over to look at the supposed Iallen insulation issue this aIternoon but the other one is Ior
the next day DeIendant: okay and the lease calls Ior 48 hours. Judge: all right will you said it
was a major problem DeIendant: eight months prior yeah eight months prior it had been a
major problem Judge: I don't know how was eight months PlaintiII: okay well it was the Iirst
issue oI mold coming up I believe was Judge: you said it was made but PlaintiII: Judge: she
said it was may PlaintiII: I believe it may have been prior but all right I could go with may all
right so these months go by and all the sudden it's we need to get in there today Judge: Sir you
have a witness your understand is been examined by another attorney and you are testiIied
like Coughlin I understand that sorry PlaintiII: Dr. Merliss was due to stay on exhibit H Ior
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one second please the date and time oI Mr. Coughlin's response August 15, 2011 12:29 PM do
you see that on H exhibit H Merliss: page 106 PlaintiII: excuse me page 107 Merliss: 12:29
PM the date PlaintiII: okay I want to go look it up I exhibit I do you recognize this document
Merliss: okay exhibit I okay PlaintiII: would you agree with me Sir this is the same document
with the exception oI a new response Irom Mr. Coughlin? Merliss: yes PlaintiII: okay what is
the date and time oI Mr. Coughlin's response in exhibit I Merliss: 1233 PlaintiII: p.m. so 4
min. later is that correct Merliss: yes PlaintiII: and what does Mr. Coughlin say? Coughlin
Merliss: e-mail is not a reliable means oI getting all hold oI me Ior the time being best talk
provide notice/correspondence via traditional means. PlaintiII: okay did you in Iact have Mr.
Nash Irom Nash pest control go out to the property to inspect the mold issue Merliss: yes we
did PlaintiII: and what happened? Merliss: he said he was there he saw movement through the
window and in he knocked on the door tried to get in knocked and knocked and nobody
would let amend would let him in. Judge: okay exhibit I is admitted as well PlaintiII: thank
you sir PlaintiII: Your Honor that's all I have on cross Judge: cross limited to this issue Sir
DeIendant: yes or Your Honor new Dr. Merliss are you aware that in the lease agreement
inspections call her inspections or any entry into the property require a 48 hours written
notice? PlaintiII: Your Honor Sir exhibit or something Iirst seat asking this question
DeIendant: yes or Your Honor I believe Exhibit 1 lease is entered and I believe that
subsection's only two pages I believe it's 23 or 28 Judge: well I will give him my copy and
exhibit E you will hang on Sir exhibit E. Where in exhibit E do you want him to look
DeIendant:
six is titled inspection Merliss: one number please? DeIendant: I'm sorry ma'am trouble
locating I believe maybe 1323 or 20 Merliss: 13 is utilities 23 his damages Judge: I have 13 is
utilities 14 his pets 23 his damages inspection 25 resident agrees to permit management to
ensure the premises at all reasonable times and Ior all reasonable purposes including showing
to prospective residents buyers, loaners, blah, blah, blah with lawIul business and Ior lease
one maintenance inspection each month in accordance with NRS requirements management
agrees to give resident twice the 24 hour nap notiIication requirement Ior entry. DeIendant:
did you know what that requirement my Intel and held twice a requirement might entail and
how that related to your request Ior a same-day inspection PlaintiII: I'm going to object to a
compound question and him calls Ior a legal conclusion as well Judge:: alright well the thing
is it does not prohibit anyone Irom asking to iI to inspect the premises even one hour ahead
Sir DeIendant: Irom asking? Judge: yet Irom asking DeIendant: okay but does it prohibit
going in hiring an attorney the next day iI someone doesn't let you? And in seeking an
eviction Judge:: that's the arguments are DeIendant: well it's this is August 15, 2011 on
August 16, 2011 I got an e-mail Irom Richard Hill Richard G Hill Esquire attorney-at-law
Judge: okay sir your testiIied anything else your testiIied anything else in terms oI questions
DeIendant: why did you go in higher Richard Hill seemingly within 10 hours aIter this or had
you already hired him? No I'm sorry: question compound. Why did you hire Richard Hill
seemingly immediately aIter this e-mails? Merliss: Mr. Coughlin your behavior is an example
oI that I did the right thing DeIendant: is that responsive? Why did you do that? Merliss: it is
responsive. DeIendant: okay why? Judge: he said your behavior Sir Merliss: because oI your
behavior Mr. Coughlin you are unreasonable DeIendant: because I asserted by rights to
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notice Ior an inspection under the lease? Merliss: no it was because you alter the documents
DeIendant: what documents did I alter Sir? Merliss: this one. DeIendant: what? Merliss: you
change 24 to 48 hours. DeIendant: when? Merliss: you also change the DeIendant: well that's
a Merliss: you also change $3.30 dollars a day Judge:: can I see that Merliss: you also change
the pet cause Mr. Coughlin didn't you? DeIendant: what are you reIerring to Merliss: to the
lease Mr. Coughlin. DeIendant: you're not asking questions or Merliss: the deceptively
altered the lease Mr. Coughlin Coughlin Merliss: you're asking why DeIendant: objection non
responsive Merliss: you're asking why hired Richard Hill DeIendant: objection non
responsive Judge: Merliss: he's playing DeIendant: he's playing lawyer on the witness stand
Judge:: I heard him respond to your question but he said because you altered the lease.
DeIendant: I am going to move to strike his deIamatory accusations unless he has some bases
Ior making such sweeping deIamatory or libelous statements about a licensed member oI the
number oI the bar what you mean by altered do you mean you sign the lease and then
somebody changed it aIter you signed it? Is that what you mean Sir? Merliss: in a deceptive
way. DeIendant: so wait are you saying somebody changed the lease aIter it was signed by
both parties? Merliss: no DeIendant: okay so what are you saying Merliss: I am saying that
you did not notiIy me he did not bring it to my attention clearly you did not write you did not
attach a sticky you didn't verbally inIorm me that she were going to change the pet rule that
you are going to change $30 the day late Iee to three dollars the day and that you were going
to change 24 hours to 48 hours inspection notice DeIendant: on what basis are you making
these accident accusations what prooI do have Merliss: because I saw the him or the original
boilerplate lease DeIendant: did you see it beIore you signed? Merliss: I sign this lease with
your changes I signed it because I didn't notice that you had alternate altered it DeIendant: so
are you saying you were kind oI inattentive and not too detail oriented much is you were as a
landlord Merliss: that's what I'm saying PlaintiII: objection argumentative Judge: okay were
done were done were done any other questions Sir? DeIendant: Your Honor I mean if
somebody and asserts they have rights to notice for inspection and then somebody gets an
eviction notice an attorney litigation demand letter 1 hours later ...
PlaintiII: okay thank you Your Honor with respect to plaintiII's burden the plaintiIIs plaintiII
has introduced evidence that the lease terminated by its terms at the end oI February 2011
thereaIter Mr. Coughlin was a month-to-month tenant pursuant to NRS 40.251 or Coughlin
was properly served with a no cause termination notice to vacate on August 22 as exhibit B
exhibit C is the Iive day notice oI unlawIul detainer based on Mr. Coughlin's Iailure to vacate
the premises aIter his tenancy was terminated the aIIidavits and testimony presented here
today and Iorm conIorms with the statute conIormed with the Iorm promulgated by the
Nevada Supreme Court and with the Iorm provided by this court plaintiII has met its burden
to show that Mr. Coughlin was a month to month tenant in August 2011 when the termination
notice was properly served the eviction notice was properly served Mr. Coughlin now bears
the burden Your Honor it shiIts to him to present and substantiate a legal deIense now the
legal standard Ior summary judgment in Nevada which is what were doing dealing with here
is that Mr. Coughlin must again transcend his allegations oI his pleadings and show by
admissible evidence that there is a disputed issue oI Iact that he has a legal deIense as a matter
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oI law he has not done that Your Honor he has identiIied only a couple oI things and despite
great latitude by the courts to to present evidence and establishes legal deIense he has Iailed to
do so NRS 118A.510 that is the retaliatory eviction statutes now Mr. Coughlin chose to Iocus
on subsection 1B a complaint that he complained in good Iaith to the landlord or law
enIorcement agency Ior a violation oI this chapter or oI a speciIic statute that imposes a
criminal penalty...
Mr. Coughlin identiIied one e-mail which he admitted on a cross examination does not
identiIy a speciIic statute that imposes a criminal penalty and I think we need to be extremely
clear. With this statute the statute requires the tenant has complaint in good Iaith to the
landlord oI a speciIic statute that imposes a criminal liability he did not do that he did not
identiIy a statute he alleged something about some landscapers damaged the carpet he's read
on the lawn that does not satisIy the statute Your Honor moving down the statute to sub EEE
the tenant has instituted or deIended against judicial or administrative proceeding or
arbitration in which the tenant raised an issue oI compliance with the requirements oI this
chapter respecting habitability oI dwelling its. That cannot be. He notices the Iirst no cause
termination notice to vacate exhibit B was served on August 22, 2011 Mr. Coughlin did not
institute or deIendant any proceeding on any habitability issues until aIter those notices were
provided Dr. Merliss can't retaliate Ior something that is going to happen in the Iuture that
has not happened yet Mr. Coughlin cannot proceed under that statute to the extent Mr.
Coughlin is complaining about this small business Iirst oI all the may e-mail in Exhibit 8 does
not qualiIy in or satisIied the statutes regarding notice to a landlord about a habitability issues
and Dr. Merliss drove this point home when he testiIied that he didn't understand what Mr.
Coughlin was asking Ior I mean iI you look through these e-mails what Mr. Coughlin does is
he identiIies something he claims is some sort oI problem and then he tries to bargain some
money oII oI the rent Ior he has not produced to mean he does not say in then they e-mail this
is my notice to you under NRS 118 A .355 I am going to withhold this rent unless you Iix this
he just says we've got this issue he is later come Ior the court and he has told it that he Iixed it
to the tune oI $500 well he is not produced in receipt is not produced a bit or invoice Irom
contractor he hasn't produced anything Iurthermore Your Honor under NRS 118 A355 so to
the tenant may not proceed under this section iI the landlord's inability to adequately remedy
the Iailure or use his best eIIorts to remedy the Iailure within 14 days is due to the tenant's
reIusal to allow lawIul access to dwelling unit as required by the rental agreement or this
chapter Dr. Merliss testiIied that he tried to send Zach Nash out there he tried to send Randy
Fisher the handyman out there they weren't allowed in nine Your Honor iI the court is I have
this gentleman ready to testiIy sooner to that eIIect nevertheless Mr. Coughlin he cannot
proceed under the statute he has no deIense iI he doesn't let them in to Iix. What is more Your
Honor Mr. Coughlin wants to Iocus on this 48 hour notice under the lease iI Mr. Coughlin is
the one making a complaint the complaints about these alleged it dishes came all being one oI
them which we have no prooI oI that there is more than the house but let's just say Ior
arguments sake he makes the complaint then he is waived the right to hide behind the notice
provision oI the lease or at the very least should be a stop Irom asserting it it's his request
that's what were running into and that's what we see here on exhibits a through I Your Honor
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here. He here he is Mr. Coughlin makes a complaint about mold and insulation and here is Dr.
Merliss immediately saying hey I'll get somebody out there will get this Iixed note lookup
statutory notice NRS inspection landlord tenant. Mr. Coughlin should be a stop Irom the Irom
hiding behind the notice provision in the lease with respect to Randy Fisher Your Honor I was
not able to put him on the stand today but Mr. Coughlin was provided with substantial notice
more than 48 hours Ior Mr. Fisher to go inspect the window issue there was an electrical lied
that's Mr. Coughlin identiIied. Mr. Coughlin cannot proceed under the retaliatory under the
habit to excuse me under the habitability statutes iI he doesn't allow lawIul access to the
property in any event Your Honor nothing that Mr. Coughlin as not even made an attempt
much less a showing to to have any oI the issues that he identiIied as habitability type issues
the Windows the stairs the weeds the mold he is not made any attempt to have those Iit under
the habitability statute
1udge: well I tend to agree that under subsection see or EM sorry oI 118A.510 one he he has
to have instituted or deIended against a judicial or administrative proceeding based on
habitability which that is diIIerent than complaining about habitability which he can interests
through a separate lawsuit
Plaintiff: yes
1udge: so I simply. Simply complaining about habitability issues does not satisIy the
retaliatory conduct provision
Plaintiff: that is exactly right Your Honor and in any event Mr. Coughlin has not shown as is
his burden to do that any oI his complaints were in good Iaith under that statute or that Dr.
Merliss acted in a retaliatory Iashion Dr. Merliss said I didn't evict you because oI these
things you didn't pay your rent we tried to help you you would let us that's not retaliation
Your Honor he's Mr. Coughlin is attempting to make logical leaps between him threatening to
sue Ior retaliation and Dr. Merle is hiring our oIIice that that is you know per se retaliatory
well what are you supposed to do when you're tenant threatens to sue you you gotta get a
lawyer it's just simply not relevant in the logical leave is not their Sir. Your Honor the only
issue beIore the court today his possession oI the property in the court notice this and we've
gone over this Mr. Coughlin has gone on and on and on about potential claims..."
Contempt Disobedience oI Order Validity of Order In re Kleinsmith, 2005-NMCA-136,
44 NMSBB No. 51. Under the "collateral bar rule," an order oI a court having personal and
subject matter jurisdiction must be obeyed until the order is set aside. A party who disobeys
an order may not collaterally attack its validity in an appeal Irom a judgment holding the party
in contempt Ior violating the order. The collateral bar rule thus applied in attorney's appeal
Irom judgment oI contempt aIter reIusing to obey district court's order appointing him to
represent child committed to mental health Iacility, where the order was within the court's
jurisdiction under the Children's Code.
Contempt Show Cause Order - Jerification In re Kleinsmith, 2005-NMCA-136, 44
NMSBB No. 51. Order to show cause why attorney appointed by court to represent child
detained in mental health Iacility should not be held in contempt Ior Iailure to comply with
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order oI appointment was not void Ior want of verification where the inIormation supporting
the order was contained in the records oI the district court.
RMC Judge Howard's apparent, purported conviction oI Coughlin in RMC 11 CR
22176 resulting on Coughlin's current temporary suspension in 60838 and used to support the
recommendation to disbar Coughlin now on appeal in 62337 is itselI void Ior denying
Coughlin the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment (much less the continuance
required by RG Hill withholding unlawIully, in violation oI NRS 118A.520, exculpatory
materials, not to mention the exclusionary application required by any Iruits oI the poisonous
tree upon the tribal police violating NRS 171.1255, not to mention NRS 171.136.):Since the
Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the assistance oI
counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite
to a Iederal court's authority to deprive an accused oI his liIe or liberty. When this *468 right
is properly waived, the assistance oI counsel is no longer a necessary element oI the court's
jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence. II the accused, however, is not represented
by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth
Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him oI
his liIe or his liberty. A court's jurisdiction at the hearing oI trial may be lost 'in the course oI
the proceedings' due to Iailure to complete the court--as the Sixth Amendment requires--by
providing counsel Ior an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently
waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose liIe or liberty is at stake. |FN22| II this
requirement oI the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has
jurisdiction **1025 to proceed. The judgment oI conviction pronounced by a court without
jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus.
Johnson v. Zerbst 58 S.Ct. 1019 U.S. 1938.
As to the 6/14/12 5 Day UD Notice's listing the wrong Iorum to Iile Coughlin's
Tenant's Answer in RJC Rev12-001048: "IV. FORM AND REQUISITES OF SUMMONS D.
EIIect oI DeIective Summons 3. Particular DeIects Curable By Amendment Topic Summary
Correlation Table ReIerences 93. DeIects as to court or place oI hearing West's Key
Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Federal Civil Procedure k551 to 555 West's Key
Number Digest, Process k152, 161, 162, 163 Generally, an error or omission regarding the
court, the judge, or the place oI the court's convening in a summons or other process making
the writ void cannot be amended, since, being void, it is a nullity and there is nothing to
amend;|FN1| however, where such an error or omission makes the writ merely voidable and
not void, the error or omission may be cured by amendment.|FN2| A summons or other
process which was voidable because oI such an error or omission might be amended,
provided the omission or error was not such as would be apt to mislead the person served or
as would Iail to provide suIIicient inIormation to enable the deIendant to comply with the
process.|FN3| An error or omission in a summons or other process in naming or describing
the court, the judge, or the place oI the court's convening is curable by amendment, provided a
complaint or petition served with the process correctly states the Iacts in that regard.|FN4|
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|FN1| Lowrey v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 83 Ga. 504, 10 S.E. 123 (1889); Land v.
Christenson, 109 Neb. 101, 189 N.W. 838 (1922); Jackson v. U.S., 138 F.R.D. 83 (S.D. Tex.
1991); Ferrito v. Dickson, 148 Misc. 2d 101, 559 N.Y.S.2d 627 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1990);
Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965). |FN2|
Kostrob v. Riley, 105 N.J.L. 37, 143 A. 863 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1928); James River Nat. Bank v.
Haas, 73 N.D. 374, 15 N.W.2d 442, 154 A.L.R. 1005 (1944). Designation oI the incorrect
county on a civil summons is not a jurisdictional deIect 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process 93 which
renders the summons void but is an irregularity in Iorm correctable by amending the
summons. Leak v. Hollar, 340 N.C. 99, 455 S.E.2d 157 (1995). |FN3| W. T. Rawleigh Co. v.
Watts, 68 Ga. App. 786, 24 S.E.2d 213 (1943); Kostrob v. Riley, 105 N.J.L. 37, 143 A. 863
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1928); James River Nat. Bank v. Haas, 73 N.D. 374, 15 N.W.2d 442, 154
A.L.R. 1005 (1944). |FN4| Kostrob v. Riley, 105 N.J.L. 37, 143 A. 863 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1928);
Sivaslian v. Akulian, 166 N.Y.S. 535 (Sup 1917); James River Nat. Bank v. Haas, 73 N.D.
374, 15 N.W.2d 442, 154 A.L.R. 1005 (1944). As to aider by complaint served with deIective
process, generally, see 87. AMJUR PROCESS 93"
"What Iollows is a review, with some redactions Ior privacy sake, oI written communications
between Merliss and Coughlin:
MROA 694: 'From: Zach Coughlin zachcoughlinhotmail.com~
To: magundaaol.com
Sent: Fri, May 14, 2010 2:32 pm
We tried the key for the house in the back door again, and even used some graphite dust, but
it still appears to not be the right key Ior the door. We could take care oI this in exchange
for a ... discount off one months rent. I am attaching some pictures oI what has become,
rather suddenly, quite a weed problem. (MROA 676-677 pictures)...How about this, we could
handle the weed problem Ior a ... discount oII one month's rent?...Lastly, when we moved in,
there was a number of insulation batts that had fallen from the ceiling in the basement,
and rested on the dirt ground...portions touching the ground became very infested with
mold, The ground did not have a vapor barrier,... we don't feel comfortable having them
remain in the basement. MROA 694, pictures at MROA 675-679) There also appears to be a
mola issue on the ceiling/unaersiae of the floorboara in the part of the house that seems to be
near the wall separating the front bearoom from the bathroom. (MROA 684 pictures in Exh
2 Irom 10/25/11 "Trial") ...Please see the attachea photos in these regaras....We could
replace and install new r19 insulation ... Additionally, we could spray some anti-mold
products on the effected ceiling parts for $... OI course, we are only oIIering ways to address
these matters. ...PS. the photos are attached ...
MROA 695: "To magundaaol.com From: (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 11/23/10 12:47 PM Hi Matt, Could you have Alejandro or someone put back
up the insulation that had fallen down at the time we moved in. I sent you pictures
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about this some time ago. I believe spraying with bleach or something may be good for
the mold spots. Some of the insulation appeared to have mold growing on it....I don't
want to crawl around stapling them back up along with their mold and up into moldy
Iloorboards... for free. "
MROA 696: "Hello, theres a toilet issue...To magundaaol.com
From: (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Tue 2/15/11 10:03 PM
To: magundaaol.com Hi Matt, ...I am writing because there seems to be an issue with the
toilet.
Continuation oI email in Coughlin's 10/25/11 Exhibit 8: . MROA ??: ...There is a strong urine
smell near the toilet ...It seem that a bit oI water is consistently pooling behind the toilet, and
that it has a watered down urine color and smell to it. ... a need to replace a wax ring at the
base of toilets... One other thing. The inside glass on one of the front windows in the front
bedroom developed a crack that spread for over one foot. The window is cracked all the
way through
1hank you for your attention to these issues.
"...2/16/11 To zachcoughlinhotmail.com From: magundaaol.com Sent: Wed
2/16/11 7:57 AM To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com i'll send antonio over next week zach.
Thanks."
"Subject: Re: Hello, theres a toilet issue 3/14/11 To zachcoughlinhotmail.com From:
magundaaol.com
Sent: Mon 3/14/11 11:53 PM To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com
will be out oI country... if there is a maintenance issue please get 2 estimates, choose the
most reasonable and take it off the next rental check... thanks, matt"
"Subject: Noxious weed ordinance? To magundaaol.com From: Zach Coughlin
(zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Fri 5/20/11 1:24 PM To: magundaaol.com Hi
Matt, Hope all is well with you. The weeds have returned with a vengeance. I can have the
weeds taken care of for this year for $35, off rent or via a check or whichever. The crew oI
six or so guys worked all day on the pink house next door, and aside Irom breaking down
some leItover Iurniture, the took care oI the weeds. They did not take care oI our weeds.
Please let me know whether the $350 bids is suIIicient or iI and when a crew will come take
care oI our yard. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin cell 775 338 8118 or email works"
"Re: Noxious weed ordinance? 5/21/11 To zachcoughlinhotmail.com From:
magundaaol.com Sent: Sat 5/21/11 3:26 AM To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com hi
zach. the 35 seems ok. please take it off the rent check. thank you!!!"
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"Subject: property damage by Darlene Sharpe's crew oI landscapers 5/24/11 Zach
Coughlin To magundaaol.com From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent:
Tue 5/24/11 11:03 AM To: magundaaol.com
Dear Mr. Merliss, I am writing to let you know about what may be a dispute that has
arisen regarding the yard and work done at 121 River Rock St. Your email below indicated
to me your approval oI my making arrangements oI my choosing to have the weeds taken care
oI this year Ior $350. ... Yesterday the same landscaping crew that weeded both the Iront and
back oI the neighboring pink house arrived very early at my residence and made quite a
mess of my personal property. I inIormed them that I doubted anyone with the requisite
authority had approved their working on the yard in light of the agreement you and I
recently came to. They refused to return the personal property in the yard to its previous
state, in fact, they left some of the personal property they had taken from the yard out in the
street in front of the house. I inIormed them that this may be somewhat criminal but they
still refused to put my property back. They indicated they had approval from Darlene to
work on my residence. Darlene inaicatea that she haa receivea approval FROM THE
LABORERS to work on my resiaence, especially because someone Irom my residence had,
last week while the pink house was being worked on, "inquired whether the laborers would be
working on 121 river rock as well." Darlene indicated that she considered this to be
tantamount to an order for services on 121 River Rock. I mentioned to her that it sounded
much more like a question rather than an order Ior services. She said "well, whatever, whats
the difference between "are you guys going to be working on this property and will you
guys perform work on this property." ... II not, is seems to me that a dispute will arise ...
Further, there is the matter of property damage done by Darlene's crew. It took me a fair
amount of time and money ($...) to return my residence to where it was prior to
Darlene's crew taking my personal property and placing it in the street and repeatedly
refusing to put it back in its entirety... It is my position that this crew should not be
allowed to remove my personal property from the yard, place it out in the street, and
refuse to return it or do the necessary labor to return my personal property to anywhere
near the state is was originally in...I intend to pursue compensation for my time and
damages to my personal property. At this point it is not entirely clear whom should pay,
but its seems clear the correct party will be either Darlene, Darlene's crew, or you as the
owner of the real property... especially in light oI the $350 agreement and the $... oI property
damage done..."
starssoItcom.net sorry about the stress zach.. i thought that aIter you paid the 350 Ior
weed removal there was still some residua so i approvea the work by darlene's crew . i will
Iorward this to her, matt "
"Subject: garbage disposal jammed? 6/02/11 Zach Coughlin To magundaaol.com
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Thu 6/02/11 11:21 PM To:
magundaaol.com Hi Matt, The garbage disposal is jammed. It is only making a
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humming sound win Ilicked on. I can have this Iixed Ior $..., or iI you preIer, please let me
know how or it will be fixed as I wish to be home while any work is being done...Also,
the front steps have crumbling cleaves, or holes in several places. I have photos oI those too.
They just keep crumbling more and more. I can have the crumbling places patched Ior $...,
otherwise, I would like it fixed as it is dangerous given one can trip on the stairs. I think it
would be wise to make the repair soon so more and more crumbling does not cause
further problems."
"Subject: Re: garbage disposal jammed? To zachcoughlinhotmail.com From:
Matt Merliss (magundaaol.com) Sent: Tue 6/07/11 4:40 PM To:
zach just get 2 estimates, choose the cheapest and take it off the rent. thanks. matt"

"Subject: Re: status and rent? 8/11/11 Zach Coughlin To Matt Merliss From: ZC
(magundaaol.com) ...no one has compensated me for the damage done to my property by
the landscaping crew. 1he damage and labor required to repaie it was at least $1,. Ms.
Sharpe admitted the crew. Knew oI the existence oI any issues related to lthe weed pullin.g
prior to submitting a bid, then they put my careIully installed proprty in the street and reIused
to put it back. I suggested to you in writing that you not pay them till my damages were
adressed. Same with sharpe, who was particularly blase and negligent in my opinion. 8 wrote
you about the Iallen insulation in the downstairs and the exposed mold both in the Iloor board
and the insulation. You never responded. Please do."
"Re: status and rent? 8/11/11 Zach Coughlin To Matt Merliss From: ZC
(magundaaol.com) ... no one has compensated me for the damage done to my property by
the landscaping crew. 1he damage and labor required to repaie it was at least $1,... they
put my careIully installed proprty in the street and reIused to put it back. ... wrote you about
the fallen insulation in the downstairs and the exposed mold both in the floor board and
the insulation. You never responded. Please do."
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deductions."
"From: zachcoughlinhotmail.com (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent: Sun 8/14/11 10:56 AM To: Matt Merliss (magundaaol.com)
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approved..."
eviction...."
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refuse...."
zag
The Standard Rental Agreement entered into between landlord Merliss and co-tenants
Coughlin and Ulloa read as Iollows:
"STANDARD RENTAL AGREEMENTThis AGREEMENT entered into on the 20th day
of February, 2010 b
Total rent for the period of March 1, 2010 to February 28, 2011:..
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2. TERMS: Management does hereby rent to Tenants and Tenant hereby rents Irom
management Ior residential purposes only those certain premises described at: 121 River
Rock St., Reno, NV 89503, located at: 121 River Rock St., Reno, NV 89503 for a period of
not less than 12 months tenancy, commencing on the 1st day of March, 2010...
3. HOLDOVER: Under Nevada law this Rental Agreement and any changes
properly agreed to will remain in effect on a monthly basis after the initial term . A 30 day
written notice to vacate must be issued by the Resident prior to vacating anytime during or
aIter the initial term oI this agreement. II improper notice or no notice to vacate is given by
Resident, Resident is liable Ior prorated rent ...
5. SECURITY DEPOSIT: THE SECURITY DEPOSIT HELD BY THE OWNER,
WILL SECURE THE PERFORMANCE ON TENANTS OBLIGATIONS. OWNER SHALL
APPLY ALL PORTIONS OF SAID DEPOSIT ON ACCOUNT OF TENANT'S
OBLIGATIONS. ANY BALANCE REMAINING UPON TERMINATION WILL BE
RETURNED TO TENANT...
10. ... Resident further may use the premises for any commercial enterprise, ...
11. OCCUPANCY: Occupancy oI the premises ... shall be used for a residence and
for other purposes. ...
13. UTILITIES: ...Utilities not payable by the Resident will be paid by the
Management....
19 WAIVER OF RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS: Nothing contained in this agreement
shall be construed as waiving any oI the Resident's or management's right or obligations
under the laws of the State of Aevada.
20 1ERMIAA1IOA: This Agreement and the tenancy hereby granted may be
terminatea by either party within 30 aays of the aefinea termination aate (refer to Paragraph
2), or any time thereafter by giving the other party not less than thirty (30)day prior notice in
writing or as otherwise allowed by the laws oI the State oI Nevada (ReIer to Paragraph 1 and
9 Ior monetary liabilities)... (NOTE: there is ambiguity as to the language in section 20 as to
termination and that Iound in section 3 as to "holdover" where section 3 can certainly be read
to provide only the tenant with a right to terminate the lease, ("3. HOLDOVER: Under
Nevada law this Rental Agreement and any changes properly agreed to will remain in
effect on a monthly basis after the initial term. A 30 day written notice to vacate must be
issued by the Resident prior to vacating anytime during or aIter the initial term oI this
agreement...") especially where section 20 reIers to a "deIined termination date" (to be Iound
in Paragraph 2, so mentions Paragraph 20) that is not very deIined at all upon a reading oI
Paragraph 2). Further, Merliss testiIied that he provided the lease, and even iI a trier oI Iact
takes Merliss's testimony to be true with respect to Coughlin allegedly having altered the "pet
rule" "late Iee" and "notice requirement Ior inspection", such would amount to a collateral bar
to any argument by Merliss that the other Paragraphs oI material relevance here should not be
interpreted strictly against Merliss as the "draIter" or party provided the lease agreement to
Coughlin. Obviously Coughlin was prejudiced by the extent to which Merliss Iailed to
comply with the requirement oI NRS 40.254(2), as the basis Ior Merliss's claim Ior a no-cause
summary eviction hinges closely on the terms oI the lease, as does whether or not his "claim
Ior relieI is authorized by law" and Merliss completely Iailed to provide any oI the
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"supporting Iacts" required by NRS 40.254(2), and what assertsion Merliss did make prior to
the 10/25/11 hearing were patently untrue, something he only augmented with his Iraudulent
testimony and knowing assent to his counsel's Iraudulent conduct.
NRS 40.254(2): "The aIIidavit oI the landlord or the landlord`s agent submitted to the
justice court or the district court must contain: (a) The date when the tenancy commenced,
the term of the tenancy, and, iI any, a copy oI the rental agreement. (b) The date when the
tenancy or rental agreement allegedly terminated. (c) The date when the tenant became
subject to the provisions oI NRS 40.251 to 40.2516, inclusive, together with any supporting
Iacts. (d) The date when the written notice was given, a copy oI the notice and a statement
that notice was served in accordance with NRS 40.280. (e) A statement that the claim Ior
relieI was authorized by law...", Further where NRS 40.254 speciIies that "the landlord is
entitled to the summary procedures provided in NRS 40.253..." and Merliss so utilized those
procedures, Merliss should be held to complying with the requirments oI NRS 40.253(5)(a),
which require:
"NRS 40.253(5)(a): "...The landlord or the landlord`s agent may apply by aIIidavit oI
complaint Ior eviction to the justice court oI the township in which the dwelling, apartment,
mobile home or commercial premises are located or to the district court oI the county in
which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever
has jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriII
or constable oI the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order. The
affidavit must state or contain: (1) The date the tenancy commenced. (2) The amount oI
periodic rent reserved. (3) The amounts oI any cleaning, security or rent deposits paid in
advance, in excess oI the Iirst month`s rent, by the tenant. (4) The date the rental payments
became delinquent. (5) The length oI time the tenant has remained in possession without
paying rent. (6) The amount oI rent claimed due and delinquent. (7) A statement that the
written notice was served on the tenant in accordance with NRS 40.280. (8) A copy oI the
written notice served on the tenant. (9) A copy oI the signed written rental agreement, iI any."
reIerencenvcourts.nv.gov.
RespectIully Submitted to Whom it May Concern,
My name is Zachary Barker Coughlin, I am an attorney whose law license in Nevada is
currently temporarily suspended (Bar #9473, see 60838, another Iallout oI such wrongIul
eviction (at issue directly in 61383), in addition to 61901 (the SCR 111(4) Petition reporting
the criminal trespass conviction incident to the wrongIul arrest at Coughlin's Iormer home
law oIIice shortly aIter the illegal lockout thereIrom on 11/1/11) and the appeal oI the NNDB
Panel's ridiculous recommendation to permanently disbar me in 62337).
I am writing to indicate some issues I have noticed with the "standardized Iorms" (most oI
which are oI a 2006 vintage, despite signiIicant changes or additions to NRS 118A and NRS
40 by the Legislature since then).
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Please let me indicate at the outset the respect I have Ior those creating and providing the
Iorms, they have likely pushed the development oI landlord tenant law in Nevada Iorward
immeasurably.
One can certainly take the position that the Iorms are not intended to supplement existing
black letter law, nor that they purport to even be an accurate statement thereoI. Certainly the
attorneys whom wrongIully obtained a summary eviction removing me Irom my Iormer home
law oIIice (Casey D. Baker, Esq. and Richard G. Hill, Esq.) incident to an illegal lockout oI
11/1/11 should not be entitled to rely (in a deIense to a proIessional malpractice sense, or as to
their own criminal trespass/breaking and entering) on such Iorms (nor assert to a court that
they somehow carry the weight oI law any more than "the usual and customary practices" oI
the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice purportedly obviate the requirement in NRS 40.253(3)(b)
(2) that no "order directing the sheriff...to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt
of the order" (the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE (also a jurisdictional prerequisite per NRS
40.253(5)(a), and even in the Anvui case the lockout order attached as an exhibit therein
result in a lockout being eIIectuated prior to the passing oI at least 24 hours Irom the receipt
oI any such order (whether NRS 40.400's invocation oI NRCP 6(e) results in such "receipt"
requiring the passing oI three days Ior mailing where personal service cannot be had, or
whether the sheriII posting such order to a tenant's door (again, assuming no personal service)
immediately starts the running oI the "24 hours" does not seem to be a decided point oI law in
Nevada)).
SpeciIically, those attorney's utilized Iorms #1 and #4:
Form #1 No-Cause Termination Notice to Vacate (NRS 40.251)
Form #4 Five-day Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer Ior Failure to Vacate Rental Unit (No-Cause
Termination) (NRS 40.251) and Notice oI Summary Eviction (NRS 40.254)
Both Iorms indicate a dating oI August 2006 in their Iooter.
The 2011 revisions added or modiIied the relevant law as Iollows (likely not an
exhaustive list, but...):
"a Iunctioning door lock" and "essential item" to NRS 118A.380 (which, actually, did not
even exist in 2006).
The 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE not only lacked the jurisdictional requirement that it
contain the language required by both NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2) (the justice court was limited to
entering and order that provided "Ior removal oI the tenant or an order providing Ior the
nonadmittance oI the tenant, directing the sheriII or constable oI the county to remove the
tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order") and NRS 40.253(5)(a)(such order must
direct the "sheriII or constable oI the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt
oI the order") it Iurther was not in compliance with Nevada Law inasmuch as it called Ior
execution oI the eviction within 24 hours oI service oI smite. NRS 40.360 states that "When
the proceeding iI Ior an unlawIul detainer aIter the deIault in the payment oI rent, and the
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lease nr agreement under which the rent is payable has not by its terms expired, execution
upon the judgment kiljapt be issuedun amArgsntcyoI the judemer4...." Because the Order
calls Ior execution within 24 hours rather than 5 days, an emergency ex parte stay pending
appeal is necessary.
NRS 118A.390: "or otherwise recovers possession oI the dwelling unit in violation oI NRS
118A.480" (which would seemingly cover the Soldal, Russell v. Kalian, and Mayes
violations by the landlord in 61383)..and the $1,000 previously speciIied was amended to:
"recover the tenant`s actual damages, receive an amount not greater than $1,000] $2,500..."
Alos, NRS 118A.390(6) was amended in a manner that may, arguably, shed some light
on the NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2) "within 24 hours oI receipt" disagreement that Coughlin has had
with the landlord's attorneys, the sheriII, and the police department, where "6. The court shall
conduct a hearing on the veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI within] not later than 3
judicial days aIter the Iiling oI the veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI."
Revisions or additions to NRS 40.253 since the promulgation oI most oI the
standardized Iorms in 2006 included: (2009, 1966; 2011, 235, 1489) "2011 Statutes oI
Nevada, Page 235 (Chapter 56, AB 226)"
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Statutes/76th2011/Stats201102.html#Stats201102page235
The legislature was very careIul (Nevada is, aIter all, pro-business, even as to those
businesses that the "premises" portion oI a "structure" that is not the "dwelling place" (used as
a residence or sleeping place) portion thereoI....As such NRS 40.254 excised the term "or
premises" Irom the "certain types oI property" to which a landlord my bring a no-cause
eviction leveraging the summary procedures Iound in NRS 40.253 (noting, that, along with
such leveraging came the, unIortunate Ior the landlord, inclusion oI the jurisdictional
prerequisites (Davidsohn, Paul, etc.) added in NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2)-(3).
NRS 118C is apparently to inapplicable Coughlin's hybrid home law oIIice/mattress
business tenancy and use oI the "premises" here (but regardless, no 5 Day notice as required
thereunder as to any alleged delinquent rent was ever posted, especially given the collateral
bar inherent to the approach in RJC Rev2011-001492 as to any purported 8/22/11 non-pay
notice) given:
NRS 118A.140 'Premises deIined. 'Premises means a dwelling unit and the
structure oI which it is a part, Iacilities, Iurniture, utilities and appurtenances therein and
grounds, areas and Iacilities held out Ior the use oI tenants
NRS 118C.040: 'Commercial premises means any real property other than premises
as deIined in NRS 118A.140"
NRS 40.254 limits its application to "when the tenant of a dwelling unit which is
subject to the provisions oI chapter 118A oI NRS..." (and thereaIter laundry lists the other
"types oI property" to which it applies, noticeably missing thereIrom is the "commercial
premises" mentioned in NRS 40.253(1),(5)(a)) which phraseology noticeably departs Irom
that used in the applicability provision oI NRS 118A: "...Applicability.1. ... this chapter
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applies to, regulates and determines rights, obligations and remedies under a rental agreement,
wherever made, Ior a dwelling unit or premises ...". Legislature looking out Ior the Mom and
Pop bed and breakIasts and the solo lawyers toiling away in their home/law oIIices.
While the landlord here might Iind it tough that tenant Coughlin seemingly is getting
the best oI both world in some settings (ie, as to his tenancy being mix, containing parts both
residential and commercial, though, given the mixed nature oI such NRS 118C does not apply
per NRS 118C.040), in reality, the prejudicial impact oI Merliss and his attorney's Iraudulent
approach in seeking to gain a quick draw due process deprivation advantage via the summary
procedures oI NRS 40.253 was doubly burdensome to one such as Coughlin, given both his
home and place oI business was implicated. Further, Merliss certainly had the ability to
negotiate a lease with diIIerent terms than those contained in the one at issue, and neither he,
nor his counsel opposed the multitude oI written and transcript based sworn representations
(ie, "evidence" per NRS 40.253(6)) as to his use oI the property being, at least in part, that oI
a commercial tenancy, making at least a portion thereoI the sort oI "premises" that the
Legislature speciIically excluded Irom the "types oI property" to which NRS 40.254 could be
utilized to pursue a summary eviction under NRS 40.253. Instead, Merliss, Lanldord Merliss
is a grown man making hundreds oI thousands oI dollars a year owing to his proIession
(which required quite a bit oI training and would certainly preclude any assertion that these
parties were too unevenly matched to keep intact the concionability oI such lease) whom
gleeIully exclaimed to Coughlin: "your're going to be arrested, Zach!" during the 11/13/11
criminal trespass arrest (and subsequent conviction at issue in 61901 and 62337) during which
Merliss and his attorney, Hill, in a Iurther dispaly oI the Iraudulent bad Iaith conduct the have
displayed throughout this matter (relevant to the NRS 118A.390 analysis) lied to the Reno
Police Department (or, perhaps, its more accurate to say they went along with the gag, pretty
much (interestingly, the NNDB and OBC desperately do not want the Nevada Supreme Court
to consider the videos Hill and landlord Merliss themselves took oI that 11/13/11 custodial
arrest oI Coughlin Ior criminal trespass...and City oI Reno ChieI Criminal Deputy Wong does
not either (and his henchman, er, Deputy Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Esq. has some
'splainin' to do about citing to an unpublished decision in the trial that led to that criminal
trespass conviction now being cited as a basis Ior permanently disbarring Coughlin (SCR 123,
and all where Hazlett cited to a TN case in Lovins,). Regardless, landlord Merliss is stuck
with the lease he signed, which speciIically allowed and contemplated just such a mixed used
tenancy by Coughlin in which the "premises" could be parts residential and commercial,
where such reads (and this Iurther explains the Iraudulent attempts oI the landlord and his
counsel Baker in their 8/22/11 30 Day Notice to mischaracterize the language in the lease
(which is plain on its Iace) as having "expired" when, quite clearly there is a world of
difference between "for not less than 12 months" and "for 12 months starting from
3/1/10, for a total of 1 year at which point the tenancy will expire..."....especially when
the only right oI termination mentioned within Paragraph 3 oI such lease speaks to that
possessed by the "resident", and Paragraph 20's import is vitiated by the lack oI any real
"deIined termination date" in Paragraph, which it reIerences..... So, to whatever extent
landlord Merliss wishes he had accorded more attention to detail with respect to negotiating
he lease in question, he is stuck with the allowance oI just the sort oI mixed used
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tenancy/premises characterization that the Iollowing lease terms expressly allow Ior (and all
the concomitant NRS 40.254 headaches and void Ior lack oI jurisdicational predicates,
wrongIul eviction headaches that come along with it: "...10... Resident further may use the
premises for any commercial enterprise, ...11. OCCUPANCY: Occupancy oI the premises
shall be used Ior a residence and for other purposes."
Merliss's attorney Baker's 2/24/12 Answering BrieI in one oI the appeals oI the
10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE reads: "He Iirst raised this argument in his "opposition to motion Ior
order to show cause," which he Iiled on December 5, 2011, six weeks aIter the eviction was
granted.31 ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 253-261. Merliss addressed it in his reply Iiled the Iollowing
day. 32 See, "Supplemental Justice Court Appeal Proceedings," at 2, Iiled herein on January
4, 2012. Merliss' reply is identiIied as item number 4. For reasons unknown, copies oI those
documents were not made available to Merliss through the court's electronic Iiling system.
First, Coughlin has the law wrong. Summary evictions are available against a tenant oI any
property that is subject to NRS Chapter 118A, which Merliss' property unquestionably was.
33 NRS 40.254. Second, Coughlin aIIirmatively waived any argument that NRS Chapter
l18A does not apply by basing his entire deIense (retaliation/habitability) on what he alleged
were violations oI that chapter. 34 See FFCL&O beginning at ,9. See, also, ROA, Vol. I, pp.
238-266. Moreover, because the court adopted Coughlin's position and ruled on that basis, he
is judicially estopped Irom changing his theory now. 35 Marcuse v. Del Webb Communities,
123Nev. 278, 163 P.3d 462 (2007). Additionally, since Coughlin never timely raised the
argument below, it cannot Iorm the basis Ior any relieI on appeal.36 Schuck. The lower court
recognized as much at the December 20,2011 hearing on Coughlin's motion to contest
personal property lien. For that hearing, Merliss had subpoenaed Darlene Sharpe, the real
estate agent who had Iacilitated the rental oI the property to Coughlin, to testiIy in the event
the court was going to allow Coughlin to belatedly argue this issue. ROA, Vol. VI, p.183. At
that hearing, Judge SIerrazza appropriately recognized that Coughlin was improperly
attempting to relitigate the eviction based on previously unraised arguments, and did not let
the parties address or present any evidence on the matter. Ms. Sharpe was prepared to testiIy
that (1) Coughlin never mentioned that he was an attorney, or that he had either a "law
practice" or a "mattress business," (2) that Coughlin had represented himselI on his rental
application as a "selI-employed researcher," and (3) that Coughlin had surreptitiously altered
the lease to allow Ior "commercial" use oI the property. See, Reply in Support oI Motion Ior
Order to Show Cause, identiIied as item number 4 in the Supplemental Justice Court Appeal
Proceedings, Iiled herein on January 4, 2012. In any event, Coughlin has not cited to
anywhere in the ROA that would support this new argument, and neither this Court nor the
court below are or were obligated to siIt through the record in search oI some Iact which
might support his claim.37 Schuck. Finally, even iI Coughlin were running one or more
unlicensed businesses out oIt he property, he does not explain how that would take this matter
out oI NRS Chapter l18A. "
Baker should be estopped Irom making argument and citation, in his 2/24/12
Asnwering BrieI as to 12/19/11 'Reply in Support oI Motion Ior Order To Show Cause
where such was not 'Iiled herein but rather, merely listed amongst the '21 documents in
the 'Appeal Receipt on page 2 oI the 1/4/12 Supplemental, where Baker wrote in an
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'endnote (which brought the actual length oI his brieI to over Iourteen pages: '32.(2) that
Coughlin had represented himselI on his rental application as a "selI-employed researcher,"
and (3) that Coughlin had surreptitiously altered the lease to allow Ior "commercial" use oI
the property. See, Reply in Support oI Motion Ior Order to Show Cause, identiIied as item
number 4 in the Supplemental Justice Court Appeal Proceedings, Iiled herein on January 4,
2012.
As to Baker's 4/19/12 Motion Ior Attorney's Fees in the appeal in 03628, the attached
as Exhibit 1 "Activity Reports" (the Iew entries not redacted pursuant to some specious
"attorney-client privilege" assert (really, how many powwows between Baker, Hill and
Merliss relating to their Iraudulent attempts to get Merliss out oI the lease he signed, and to
perpetuate the Iraud upon the court an opposing counsel incident to their mistatments in the
8/22/11 Notice, 9/27/11 Notice, and 10/19/11 Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq. Pursuant to
NRS 40.254 and "UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit" admitted as Exhibit B oI Merliss at the
10/25/11 "Trial" do they need to redact?) reveals an interesting entry: "11/3/2011 ROH
emails wi cdb; reviewing today's ravings by ZC 0.30 $110.00
11/4/2011 ROB review 46 pages oI drivel Iaxed Irom RJC -look Ior disbility motion -none
Iound 0,40 $140.00 "
MROA 1857-1858, the landlord's attorney Baker's 12/19/11 "REPLY IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE" reads: A. Coughlin's Arguments Regarding
a "Commercial" Lease are Untimely, Have Been Waived by Him, and are InIirm as a Matter
oI Both Law and Fact, and he Should be Judicially Estopped From Raising Them.
It appears that Coughlin may have opposed this motion in his "motion to vacate", Iiled
herein on December 5, 2011. In that paper, he takes the new position the lockout was
impermissible because he had a "commercial lease". For the court's reIerence, a true and
correct copy oI the Iully executed lease, which was entered into evidence at the eviction
hearing as Exhibit A, is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 1.
First, it is clear that Coughlin has not read NRS 40.254, the statute upon which his
eviction was based. Instead, he is seeking to apply, as law, the general statement in the
landlord/tenant handbook that summary evictions are not available Ior the eviction oI
commercial tenants Ior other than the nonpayment oI rent. That is an overgeneralization oI the
law, and, in any event, does not apply here.
NRS 40.254 speciIically provides that summary evictions are available "when the
tenant oI a dwelling unit | | is subject to the provisions oI chapter 118A oI NRS . .. "
(emphasis added). Coughlin tries to Iocus on calling the lease" commercial"instead oI
"residential", but that tactic is misguided. That argument is meaningless in light oI the plain
language oI the controlling statute. The proper Iocus is on whether or not the lease was
subject to NRS Chapter 118A. So long as it was, summary eviction was allowed. Not until
aIter the eviction was complete, did Coughlin make this argument. Further, Coughlin has not
made any showing that Chapter 118A did not apply. In Iact, throughout the eviction
proceedings, he speciIically argued that it did apply, and the court ruled on that basis.
Coughlin's two positions are totally inconsistent, and he is judicially estopped Irom changing
his deIense now. See, lyIarcuse v. Del Webb Communities, 123 Nev. 278,163 P .3d 462
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(2007), which provides as Iollows: Judicial estoppel applies when the Iollowing Iive criteria
are met: jurisdiction will appeal' through
The problem with these arguments is that Schuck did not make them when he opposed
summary judgment in the district court. While this court gives a de novo review to a district
court's decision to grant summary judgment, a de novo standard oI review does not trump the
general rule that '|a| point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes to the oI that court, is
deemed to have been waived and not be considered on . ... a district court is not obligated to
wade and search the entire record Ior some speciIic Iacts which might support the nonmoving
party's claim. Schuck at 544-545 (internal citations omitted). Even iI Coughlin's current
Iabricated argument that the lease was" commercial" could somehow be considered
jurisdictional, Coughlin aIIirmatively waived that argument by choosing his deIenses based
on NRS Chapter 118A. He never raised the issue, and the court was not obligated to Iind it
and raise it Ior him. Schuck. Further, even iI Coughlin were running one or more unlicensed
businesses out oI that property, he still has not shown how that removes the matter Irom NRS
Chapter 118A .
In Iact, Coughlin continues to Iile motions based on provisions oI NRS Chapter 118A,
including the motion that gave rise to the December 20, 2011 hearing, and in which he argues
that the lease was "commercial." As a Iactual matter, any assertion that the lease was anything
but a residential lease is simply not true. Paragraph 2 oI the lease provides that the premises
was rented to Coughlin and his girlIriend Ior "residential purposes only". The paragraph that
Coughlin is relying on is paragraph 11 oI the lease. In the executed lease, that paragraph
provides in part that the property "shall be used Ior a residence and Ior other purposes." See
EXHIBIT 1. In the event the court is inclined to hear argument on the matter, Merliss will
present evidence at the December 22, 2011 hearing that paragraph 11 in the original lease
document provided to Coughlin, that paragraph stated "shall be used Ior a residence and Ior
no other purpose". Merliss will Iurther present evidence that Coughlin surreptitiously altered
that language beIore he signed and returned the lease. The court will recall that Dr. Merliss
testiIied at the October 25, 2011 hearing about other provisions in the interest oI mitigating
the already staggering amount oI Iees and costs that Coughlin has caused Merliss to incur on
what should have been a simple eviction, Merliss has not subpoenaed the City oI Reno, but
reserves his right to do so in the event the court elects to entertain any argument or evidence
put Iorth by Coughlin in support oI this Iallacy.In1 (In1 The court is asked to recall that at the
October 25, 2011 eviction hearing, a representative Irom NV Energy had only just begun
testiIying when Mr. Coughlin withdrew his argument about some retaliatory interruption oI
his electrical service, rendering that testimony unnecessary. The witness was then dismissed
aIter having wasted an entire morning on this matter. The NV Energy attorney, who had
Ilown up Irom LasYegas Ior the hearing, had wasted a trip. It is this type oI perpetual
nonsense by Coughlin, an attorney, that has Iorced Merliss to incur tens oI thousands oI
dollars in Iees and costs in this matter.)
CONCLUSION
Coughlin is in contempt oI this court. He does not deny it. Instead, he wants to raise
untimely, untrue, infirm, and unsupported arguments about some non-existent, unlicensed
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businesses he may have been illegally operating out of the property. .../s/ Casey D. Baker,
Esq."
Coughlin's 10/17/11 Motion to Stay reads: "'What defenses might a tenant raise in response
to a "no cause" eviction notice?
2. That your landlord is evicting you Ior retaliatory or discriminatory reasons. A landlord
may not evict a tenant in retaliation Ior the tenant making a good Iaith complaint about the
violation oI a housing code, a health code, a criminal law, or the Fair Housing Act to either a
governmental agency, the landlord or law enIorcement or has sued the landlord Ior such
violation. PLEASE NOTE: In addition to raising the above issues as a deIense in an eviction
action, you may also sue Ior actual damages and punitive damages Ior up to $1,000.00. See
NRS 118A.510.
Coughlin asks that this Court award him the $1,000 damages he is allowed under both
118a.510 and 118a.390Ior a total oI $2,000.
also complained about the workers he was hiring, noxious weed ordinance, mold inIestation,
window is essential service, saIety hazards, oh, and the landscaping crew came on my
property and committed the taking and carrying away oI property which was mine, that is
arguably tantamount to theIt, so I complained oI a criminal law. Hiring unlicensed and or
undocumented workers is similarly a violation. Insulation is an essential service and a
habitability issue.
NRS 40.254 UnlawIul detainer: Supplemental remedy oI summary eviction and exclusion oI
tenant Irom certain types oI property. Except as otherwise provided by speciIic statute, in
addition to the remedy provided in NRS 40.251 and in NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when
the tenant oI a dwelling unit which is subject to the provisions oI chapter 118A oI NRS, part
oI a low-rent housing program operated by a public housing authority, a mobile home or a
recreational vehicle is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer, the landlord is entitled to the summary
procedures provided in NRS 40.253 except that:
Nevada law requires a landlord to maintain a habitable dwelling unit. 'Habitable
generally means livable or capable oI allowing an average person to adequately live in the
premises.
Your lease and NRS 118A.290 speciIically set Iorth the landlord`s responsibilities.
Pursuant to NRS 118A.290, a rental unit is not habitable iI it violates provisions oI housing or
health codes concerning the health, saIety, sanitation or Iitness Ior habitation oI the dwelling
unit or iI it substantially lacks:
1. EIIective waterprooIing and weather protection oI the rooI and exterior walls, including
windows and doors. the broken window, the lack oI insulation, the moldy insulation
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2. Plumbing Iacilities which conIormed to applicable law when installed and which are
maintained in good working order. the disgusting urine sludge leaking Irom the Iailed wax
ring under the toilet
4. Adequate heating Iacilities.
5. Electrical lighting, outlets, wiring and electrical equipment. Coughlin alleged the lighting
Iixture complaint in writing to the landlord.
8. Floors, walls, ceilings, stairways and railings maintained in good repair.
Coughlin alleged in writing to Landlord oI disrepair oI both the stairs and the porch
leading into the Iront door.
3. A landlord may also not seek to evict a tenant based upon race, religious creed, color,
national origin, disability, ancestry, Iamilial status or sex, and a tenant has a deIense in an
eviction action iI the landlord is evicting Ior discriminatory reasons. See NRS 118.115.
I alleged the discriminatory reasons in my pleadings....reverse discrimination applies.
In most cases, the landlord can choose whether to Iile a summary or Iormal eviction action.
However, there are circumstances under which summary eviction cannot be used. For
instance, summary eviction is not available Ior:
2) Eviction oI commercial tenants Ior other than nonpayment oI rent
(See NRS 40.254)
Using location Ior a "commercial" law practice, you Iiled a no cause, ie, "Ior other than
nonpayment oI rent, not based in law or Iact, Rule 11, plus this escrow thing gets put asunder.
NRS 40.254 UnlawIul detainer: Supplemental remedy oI summary eviction and
exclusion oI tenant Irom certain types oI property. Lease allows Ior use Ior commercial
purposes. Void, void, void! NJCRCP 59, 60...
NRS 118A.050 'Building, housing and health codes deIined. 'Building, housing and
health codes include any law, ordinance or governmental regulation concerning: 1. Health,
saIety, sanitation or Iitness Ior habitation; or 2. The construction, maintenance, operation,
occupancy, use or appearance, oI any premises or dwelling unit....
Coughlin demands a jury trial.
NRS 118A.390 UnlawIul removal or exclusion oI tenant or willIul interruption oI essential
services; procedure Ior expedited relieI. (NOTE: cited in its entirety) ...
I demand a jury. I sustained significant damages incident to the shut off of
electricity...."
ny or anything else, one must consider the RJC Clerk's Iailure to transmit in either the ROA or
Supplementals on Iile with the District Court in the appeal, all oI the most important Iilings
related thereto. Really, it's rather curious what is missing, especially given Judge Flanagan's
curious Iootnot on page 5 oI his 3/30/12 Order (and considering some oI the other Orders that
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came out on 3/30/12 related to Coughlin by Judge Nash Holmes, and Judge Elliott), especially
upon a review oI some oI the, uh, peculiarities attendant to the 12/20/11 Hearing on
Coughlin's 11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien (or the subsequent 12/5/11
second Motion Ior such by Coughlin), the 12/21/11 Order Resolving such, the complete
omission oI Coughlin's 12/22/12 Notice oI Posting Supersedeas Bond Where is My Stay (and
the concomitant depositing by Couglin oI $250 with the RJC, and Couglin's 12/21/11 Notice
that Any Order Following Hearing oI 12/20/12 Was Just That, and Order, and That No
Settlement or Agreement Was Entered Into By Coughlin..."
Couglin's 12/5/11 Motion to Vacata in 1708 reads: "
http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/viewdocumentsandIorms/Iunc-startdown/5158/
That is a link to the Nevada Supreme Court's website's "Landlord Tenant Handbook". It
spells out the prohibition on the use oI summary eviction proceedings against commercials
tenants where an eviction is not based on the non payment oI rent. In this case, REV2011-
001708, HIll and Baker made very clear they were not alleging any rent was owed, and the
No Cause Eviction Notice made that clear as well. It is not up to the court to plead Ior Baker
and Hill what JCRCP 11 prevents them Irom pleading themselves. As such, the Summary
Eviction ORder in this matter is void Ior lack oI jurisdiction, under JCRCP 59 and 60, ans
possession oI the premises should be restored to Coughlin immediately, and damages Ior thsi
wronIul eviction should be awarded to Coughlin, Iurther, that SchiII case in the Nevada
Supreme Court (seaIood distributor, wrongIull eviction, value oI the business as damages,
punitives, $300K, etc...may prove rather instructive). The Lease Agreement anticipates and
allows such a commercial use, and to whatever extent the law practice doesn't cut it, the
mattress business does. Furhter, a Howard Patrick Jackson has recently alleged that the
"owner oI the house" was giving away a mattress Irom the house, a Ioam mattress.
Anyways, the 'Landlord Tenant Handbook linked to above contains the Iollowing:
'LANDLORD-TENANT & EVICTIONS
Table oI Contents
Overview oI the Eviction Process: (Landlord)
Choosing Whether to File A Summary Or 'Formal Eviction Action ..... 3
How to File A:
Summary Eviction Action ................... 6
'Formal Eviction Action ................... 9
Maybe some 'inIormed consent time Ior the neurosurgeon landlord would have been a good
idea to prevent this 'wrong site legal surgery which excised the patent attorney (who is
really more oI a gp trying to pay the bills type attorney) our oI his home law oIIice/mattress
business. And the neurosurgeon actually reIerred to the tenant as 'malignant, and
'nettlesome to boot.
The 'Handbook (and the Las Vegas Justice Court's website) goes on to say:
'Choosing Whether to File A Summary or 'Formal Eviction Action
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In most cases, the landlord can choose whether to Iile a summary or Iormal eviction action.
However, there are circumstances under which summary eviction cannot be used. For
instance, summary eviction is not available Ior:
1) Evictions Iollowing the Ioreclosure sale oI a rental property (See NRS 40.255)
2) Eviction oI commercial tenants Ior other than nonpayment oI rent
(See NRS 40.254)
3) Eviction oI a tenant oI a mobile home park Irom the park
(See NRS 40.253(10) and NRS Chapter 118B)
The beneIits oI summary eviction are:
1. It is easy to Iile on your own without the assistance oI an attorney; and
2. You are likely to get the tenant out oI your property in a shorter time period than with
the Iormal eviction process.
The drawbacks to summary eviction are:
1. You cannot get a money judgment as part oI your action (but you can sue in a separate
action);
2. II there is a genuine dispute over material Iacts, the court must dismiss the action
(although you can re-Iile a Iormal eviction action); and
3. The tenant may be able to Iile an appeal, and remain in the unit until the appeal is
heard by posting a bond with the court that may be cheaper than that required in the Iormal
eviction process.
I kind oI got the best oI all world's, the RJC kept my $2,275, then made a 'money
judgment to the Landlord out oI it (lucky me, I got to put in a 40 hour unpaid work week
getting that set aside, all while being locked out oI my oIIice and home and having an
unlawIul rent distraint thrown at me and my clients!), then, instead oI getting to pay the
customary $250 Ior a stay oI execution Io the Summary Eviction Order, the court decided to
make my NRS 40.385 bond be about 10 times that amount!, and on top oI that, still DID NOT
GRANT ME A STAY! THEN THE COURT DENIED A MOTION TO HAVE THE
TRANSCRIPTION DONE AT PUBLICE EXPENSE, CITING THE FACT THAT THE
COURT FINALLY GAVE ME BACK THE $2,275 RENT ESCROW DEPOSIT IT
INSISTED UPON, IN CONTRAVENTION OF NRS 40.253(6), EVEN THOUGH THE
COURT WAS INFORMED WHEN IT TOOK THAT $2,275 THAT IS WAS PRETTY
MUCH ALL THE MONEY I HAD IN THE WORLD, FINALLY THE COURT BASED ITS
DENIAL OF THE PUBLIC EXPENSE TRANSCRIPT MOTION ON THE IDEA THAT
THE TRANSCRIPTION OF THE 5 HOURS OF 'TRIAL/SUMMARY EVICTION
PROCEEDING COULD BE PAID FOR OUT OF THE $2,275, DESPITE THE COURT'S
TRANSCRIBER LIST YIELDING ESTIMATES OF $1,000 FOR THE TRANSCRIPTION
(WHICH WOULD AMOUNT TO ABOUT $80 AN HOUR GIVEN THE TYPICAL 2.5
WORK HOURS TO TRANSCRIBE FOR HOUR OF COURT PROCEEDINGS THAT IS
THE INDUSTRY STANDARD).
I am taking a page out oI the Richard G. Hill/Casey Baker, Esq. playbook (please see the
attached Iaxed letter to Judge CliIton Irom Casey Baker requesting and "emergency"
inspection, replete with Iactual inaccuracies about reIusal to allow "inspection", etc.,
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etc...Why Baker chose Judge CliIton to write to is not clear, or why Baker and Hill Ieel so at
home in the RJC, what with the Iax requests to get orders Ior emergency inspectiosn oI law
oIIices, is similarly a mystery to me. I am writing to inquire whether any hearing is, has, or
will be set in relation to my Motion to Return Personal Property and Contest Landlord's Lien.
The NV S. Ct. Iorm and, perhaps, NRS requires a hearing within 10 days oI the Iiling oI that
Motion. It is an extremely exigent situation, my law practice equipment, equipment incident
to my other business, and my client's Iiles are being withheld Irom me, much to the peril oI
the legal proIession's reputation and with great prejudice potentially to my clients. Further,
Irom what I have gleaned Irom NRS and Nevada Law, a Summary Eviction Proceeding that is
not based on the non-payment oI rent, is impermissible Ior a tenant under a commercial lease.
My Lease Agreement allowed Ior my using the property Ior a variety oI purposes, including
commercial purposes, and Ior the property, I had multiple commercials uses. Not only did I
have a law practice at the property, I also ran another business at 121 River Rock St. and,
apparently, some oI the inventory is being given away by the owner oI the real property or his
agents, allegedly.
Regardless, in Nevada, the law provides that there are summary eviction processes Ior the
Iailure to pay rent and nonmonetary tenant deIault when commercial leases are at issue. A
review oI the Lease Agreement on Iile with the Court in this matter and my pleadings,
wherein a commercial use oI the premises is clearly alleged and supported by evidence, when
combined with the Iact that a No Cause Notice oI Eviction is the only basis Ior Rev2011-
001708, and opposing counsel indicated on numerous occasions that "no back rent is
alleged due or sought", certainly would seem to auger towards vacating the Summary
Eviction Order and, perhaps, some damages owed to me.
Further "This sentence states that your landlord has renewed the lease. II your lease expired,
but the landlord accepted rent or entered into a new agreement aIter it expired, then your lease
may have been renewed or extended as a matter oI law. II you checked Number 7, Iill in the
date." Certainly, the Lease Agreement did not call Ior an 18 month lease, as such, I argue that
the Lease was not terminated or expired, and that the Landlord's conduct, and perhaps, the
language in the lease, renewed the lease or augers towards a Iinding that the lease was till in
eIIect, ie, not terminated or expired. II Iact, in the No Caucse notice, Mr. Baker or Nevada
Legal Services, or whoever Iilled out the Iorm, seems to have scratched out the word
"expired" Iorm the Iorm....Why Mr. Hill's Law OIIice chose to use Iorms Irom the Nevada
Supreme Court's website that indicate they are Ior "apartments" in not quite clear, nor is Mr.
Baker's admonishing Mr. Coughlin in open court during the hearings Ior Coughlin's Iiling a
Tenant's Answer/AIIidavit and other pleadings that Coughlin himselI constructed, rather than
using "Iorms". Mr. Baker actually chastised Mr. Coughlin in open Court Ior Coughlin's Iailin
got to use a Iorm (much less the wrong "Iorm" as Mr. Baker and Mr. Hill appear to have done
in seeking to Iile a No Cause Summary Eviction Proceeding against a commercial tennant,
under a Lease Agreement that allows Ior such a commercial use, where no Iailure to pay rent
or other breach oI the lease was alleged, pled, or subsequently argued beIore the court, and
where no non-monetary deIault by the Tenant was alleged either. As such, a Summary
Eviction Proceeding was impermissible here, to say nothing oI the rent escrow the
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undersigned was Iorced to deposit. JCRCP 59 and 60 allow my Iiling this Motion to Vacata,
and JCRCP 83 prevents the RJC Irom, in Judge SFerrazza's words, having a rule preventing
tenants Irom Iiling more than one Motion to Vacate, like JCRLV has.
I am not attempting to delay the proceedings by Iiling this motion, nor am I Iiling it Ior
Irivolous reasons.My rent is not subsidized by a Public Housing Authority. 15. I also request
that the Court Stay the pending eviction until a decision is made on the Motion to Vacate.I
believe in good Iaith that I have a meritorious deIense to the eviction, namely: I am not sure I
was "served" an Eviction Order, or that such service was appropriately made, nor that
"receipt" oI any such Order was made or shown or that days Irom mailing under NRCP are
not required, non judicial days, that is, and as such, any lockout occuring on November 1,
2011, would have come beIore the allotted and required time Ior mailing in the abscence oI
personal service or "receipt" oI any Summary Eviction ORder. JCRRT 2 makes inapplicable
to landlrod tenant matters all oI the JCRRT, as such, I believe the time, manner, and service
rules in NRCP apply, ie, non judicial 3 days Ior mailing, etc...."
Baker's 10/12/11 'LANDLORD'S OPPOSITION TO TENANT'S
ANSWER/AFFIDAVIT TO 30 DAY NO CAUSE MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGESLandlord, MATIHEW
MERLISS, through counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, CHARTERED and CASEY D. BAKER,
ESQ., opposes the answer/aIIidavit, motion, and countercl,aim Iiled by tenant, ZACHARY
COUGHLIN, in this matter. This opposition is based on the points and authorities below and
all papers and pleadings on Iile herein. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES On August 22, 2011,
Merliss caused a 30-day no-cause notice oI termination 25, to be served on Mr. Coughlin. The
above reIerenced "aIIidavit" Iiled by Mr. Coughlin is his response to that notice. A hearing in
this matter has been set Ior Thursday, October 13, 2011, at 8:15 a.m. it an is is the Mr.
Coughlin's "aIIidavit" is deIective Ior several reasons, which include, but are not limited to,
the Iollowing:
1. The "aIIidavit" is not sworn or acknowledged as required by NRS 53010. Neither is it
properly in the Iorm oI a veriIied pleading. See NRS 15.010. Neither does otherwise meet the
IOrIn required oI an unsworn declaration to be used in place oI aIIidavit. See NRS 53.045.
Mr. Coughlin's answerlaIIidavit is a Iugitive document, deIective as a matter oI law, and
cannot serve to satisIy his burdens under the summary proceedings set Iorth in NRS 40.254(1)
and NRS 40.253(6). Mr. Coughlin's "aIIidavit" Iurther deIective because it contains extensive
and substantial argument, which prohibited by JCRRT u(E).
2. The only issue beIore the court at the hearing oI this matter is possession oI the property. In
that regard, the court's sole Iocus at the hearing is "to determine truthIulness and suIIiciency
oI any aIIidavi.. or notice provided Ior in this section", in order to determine whether there is
a legal deIense as to the alleged unlawIul detainer. NRS 40.254(1). NRS 40.253(6). Since Mr.
Coughlin has not provided any aIIidavit, there is nothing Irom him Ior the court to consider,
and he has not shown any evidentiary basis to support a legal deIense to the no-cause
eviction. Further, to the extent Mr. Coughlin seeks any aIIirmative relieI in his "aIIidavit",
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any such request is not properly beIore the court. Id. Dr. Merliss's aIIidavit, as required by
NRS 40.253, and on the Iorm provided by the court, is Iiled herewith.
3. With the exception oI the caption, some oI the introductory material, and perhaps some oI
the "Iacts" set Iorth in Mr. Coughlin's "aIIidavit", it is essentially the same document that Mr.
Coughlin Iiled in previously dismissed case number REV2011-001492. As such, the
arguments presented by Mr. ,Coughlin here, which pertain joosely) to papers Iiled in that
previous case, are simply nonsensical and irrelevant. The only possible meaning that could be
given to Mr. Coughlin's document is that he is attempting to renew those arguments already
heard and disposed oI by the court in the prior case. Mr. Coughlin has neither sought, nor
obtained, leave oI the court to rehear that matter. As such, arguments must not be considered.
See JCRRT 11(G).
4. Mr. Coughlin is an attorney representing himselI. As such, he is not entitled to recover
attorney's Iees as a matter oI law, because he has not incurred any. Sellers Fourth Judicial
Dist. Ct., 119 Nev. 256, 71 P.3d495 (2003). This matter was brieIed by the parties in the
previous case, and the court so ruled.
5. To the extent Mr. Coughlin denominates his paper a "counterclaim", procedure is incorrect.
No complaint has been Iiled. Thus, there can be no answer, and that , answer cannot contain a
counterclaim. NJCRCP 7. II Mr. Coughlin wants to Iile a lawsuit against the parties he
purports to add to this summary eviction proceeding, he is Iree to so; but, he must comply
with the rules oI civil procedure. See, e.g. NJCRCP 3.
6. Despite what Mr. Coughlin's "prooI oI service" might say, he has never served his paper on
Merliss' counsel in any manner whatsoever. It is unclear, in any event, how Mr. Coughlin
could have eIIected service on September 4, 2011, when his paper purports to have been
signed on October 4,2011. None oI Mr. Coughlin's arguments are properly beIore the court,
and none require a response by Merliss. Merliss reserves the right to Iully oppose Mr.
Coughlin's Iugitive Iiling, iI and when it is ever properly served.
WHEREFORE, Merliss prays that Coughlin take nothing by way oI answer/.aIIidavit,
motion, and counterclaim Iiled herein on or about October 6,2011, and that same be denied in
its entirety; that the court grant Merliss a summary eviction pursuant to NRS 40.254 and
immediate possession oI the premises at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada; and Ior such other,
Iurther and additional relieI as seems just to the court in the premises. /s/ Casey D. Baker,
Esq.
'OPPOSITION TO EMERGENCY EX PARTE MOTION
Landlord, MATT MERLISS, through counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, CHARTERED and
CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ., opposes the emergency ex parte motion Iiled herein by tenant,
ZACHARY COUGHLIN ("COUGHLIN"). Coughlin has not shown any Iactual or legal basis
to modiIy the court's order entered aIter the hearing on October 13, 2011. This opposition is
based on the points and authorities below and all papers and pleadings on Iile herein. POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES This is a no-cause summary eviction proceeding. At the hearing on
October 13, 2011, Coughlin alleged, as his deIense to the eviction, that Merliss was
proceeding in retaliation Ior Coughlin's complaining about alleged habitability issues with the
prop..rty, and Ior withholding rent Ior same. AIter allowing Coughlin to present evidence ..nd
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argument Ior approximately 90 minutes, the court speciIically Iound that "\, Coughlin had
alleged, but not substantiated, his deIense. At that point, having determined that Coughlin had
not met his burden to establish a legal deIense to the summary eviction, the court could have
issued a lockout order. NRS 40.253(6). Nevertheless, the court elected to give Coughlin yet
another opportunity to establish his deIense. To that end, because Coughlin's alleged, but
unsubstantiated, deIense is based on his allegation that Merliss Iailed to maintain the dwelling
unit in a habitable condition.. the court ordered that any rent withheld by Coughlin Ior any
"habitability" issues must be deposited into the court pursuant to NRS 118A.355(5). The court
stated that iI Coughlin deposits the rent as required by that section, it would hold another
hearing on those issues, presumably to allow Coughlin to substantiate them with additional
evidence. II he does not deposit the rent, then the lockout order will issue. Coughlin does not
argue that the court's order requiring him to deposit rent pursuanUoNRS u8A.3SS(S) is
inappropriate. In Iact, he calls it an" eIIicient and pra..tical" order. Instead, Coughlin claims
that the amount required to be deposited should be reduced to the diIIerence between what
Coughlin alleges is the total rent due, and the amount Coughlin claims to be withholding.
That is not the Iormula set Iorth in the statute. Coughlin does not identiIy any reason the court
should adopt a new Iormula now. NRS 118A.355(5) clearly states that "the withheld rent"
must be deposited. Based on Coughlin's own testimony, and the Iigures he provided to the
court (without any evidentiary support), "the withheld rent" in this case is $2,275.00. Under
the plain language oI the statute, that is the amount that must be deposited with the court
beIore Coughlin can even attempt to set up a habitability based deIense. This makes sense,
because iI Coughlin does not have the rent, and Iails to prove his case, the court has, in eIIect,
improperly enjqined the landlord's use oI his property. Coughlin's arguments regarding any
rent payments allegedly made by his Iormer roommate, Miss Ulloa, are irrelevant. The statute
is plain on its Iace regarding what must be deposited, and the court's order is based on Iigures
provided by Coughlin directly. 2 D:.-t,L...01l. In any event, Coughlin's and Ulloa's
obligations under the parties' lease are joint and several. See paragraph 33 oI the lease, which
was introduced into evidence at the October 13,2011 hearing. As such, Coughlin, who is in
sole and exclusive possession oI the property, must still pay rent whether or not Merliss
attempts to recover any sums Irom Miss Ulloa. Coughlin's concerns about claim preclusion.
against some third-party deIendants he improperly attempted to add to this summary
proceeding are not well Iounded. The issue here is possession. Damages will be the subject oI
Iuture litigation. See G.C. Wallace, Inc., v. Dist. Court, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 64, P.3d (October
6,2011). WHEREFORE, Merliss prays that Coughlin take nothing by way oI his emergency
ex parte motion; that same be denied in its entirety; and Ior such other, Iurther and additional
relieI as seems just to the court in the premises. AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby aIIirm that the preceding document does. not contain the social
security number oI any person. Dates 17th oI October, 2011 /s/ Casey D. Baker, Esq.
Baker's 10/17/11 Opposition Iails to counter Coughlin's pleading at page 6 oI his
10/17/11 Emergency Motion Ior Stay that Nevada law bars utilizing a no cause summary
eviction against a commercial tenancy such as Coughlin's law oIIice. Baker's Opposition
reads: 'OPPOSITION TO EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY, SET ASIDE, VACATE
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EVICTION HEARING ORDER Landlord, MATT MERLISS, through counsel, RICHARD
G. HILL, CHARTERED and CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ., opposes the emergency motion to
stay, set aside, vacate eviction hearing order Iiled herein by tenant, ZACHARY COUGHLIN
("COUGHLIN"), on October 17, 2011. This opposition is based on the points and authorities
below and all papers and pleadings on Iile herein. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES This is a
no-cause summary eviction proceeding. Coughlin has already Iiled one emergency motion
regarding the court's order aIter the hearing on October 13, 2011. In that Iirst motion,
Coughlin did not oppose the substance oI the order. Rather, he took issue with the Iormula set
Iorth in NRS 118A.355(5) regarding how much rent he must deposit with the court in order
to be allowed to seek to establish a legal deIense to the summary eviction under that statute.
Now, Coughlin argues, without any analysis or authority, that he should not be required to
deposit any rent at all. Merliss incorporates, as though Iully set Iorth at this point, the points
and authorities contained in his Iirst opposition Iiledberein on October 17, 2011. Coughlin is
attempting to establish a legal deIense based on habitability issues. .. NRS 118A.355(5)
provides the mandatory escrow deposit that Coughlin must make in order to proceed under
that statute. Since Coughlin Iailed to substantiate his deIense at the hearing, the court could
have is shed the lockout order at that time. It declined to do so, however, and instead elected
to give Coughlin yet another chance to establish his deIense by admissible evidence, subject
to the requirements oI NRS 118A.355(5). Coughlin has not shown why that continuance,
which worked in his Iavor, was inappropriate or impermissible under Nevada law. Instead, he
simply concludes that the court was without author,ity to issue the order it issued, without
citation to any authority Ior that proposition. As pointed out in Merliss' previous opposition,
Coughlin's arguments about claim preclusion are simply wrong. See G.C. Wallace, Inc.,
v.Dist. Court, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 64, P.3d (October 6, 20n) . Moreover, Coughlin has not
properly served his latest motion on Merliss' counsel, despite what his certiIicate oI service
might say (counsel received the motion only by email) CI., NJCRCP s(b). As such, no
opposition is required. Nevertheless, Merliss opposes the motion here in an abundance oI
caution. ReIerence is again made to Merliss' opposition Iiled herein on October 17, 2011. ..
WHEREFORE, Merliss prays that Coughlin take nothing by way oI his emergency motion;
that same be denied in its entirety; and Ior such other, IurtPer and additional relieI as seems
just to the court in the premises. III III 2 AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030 The
undersigned does hereby aIIirm that the preceding document does not contain the social
security number oI any person. DATED this 17th day oI October, 2011. RICHARD G. HILL,
CHARTERED /s/ Casey D. Baker, Esq.
12/14/11 IN 1708 Iiling by Coughlin reads:
Landlord Merliss Iiled only a No Cause Notice oI Eviction in REV2011-001708 on
Commercial 1enant Zach Coughlin, Esq.'s law oIIice. As such, a Summary Eviction
Proceeding is impermissible given the requirement oI NRS 40.253 that the Notice alleged
non-payment oI rent to allow the landlord to proceed under the Summary Eviction Proceeding
section, NRS 40.253. Further, Judge SIerrazza was precluded Irom ruling on anything other
than possession oI the premises pursuant to NRS 40.253(6), Anvui, and Glazier. Further, the
tenancy did not terminate under the Lease Agreement, it was renewed.
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ervice oI notices to quit; prooI required beIore issuance oI NRS 40.254 UnlawIul
detainer: Supplemental remedy oI summary eviction and exclusion oI tenant Irom certain
types oI property. Except as otherwise provided by speciIic statute, in addition to the remedy
provided in NRS 40.251 and in NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when the tenant oI a
dwelling unit which is subject to the provisions oI chapter 118A oI NRS, part oI a low-rent
housing program operated by a public housing authority, a mobile home or a recreational
vehicle is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer, the landlord is entitled to the summary procedures
provided in NRS 40.253 except that:
1. Written notice to surrender the premises must:...(e) A statement that the claim Ior relieI
was authorized by law.
As such, the too early lockout brings into play the following:
'NRS 118A.390 UnlawIul removal or exclusion oI tenant or willIul interruption oI essential
services; procedure Ior expedited relieI."... I declare under penalty oI perjury and veriIy that
all Iactual assertions I make herein in this Iiling are true and correct to the best oI my
knowledge. I did not receive any oI the emails allegedly sent to my Irom Richard Hill's email
address, rhillrichardhillaw.com between August 18th, 2011 to November 17th, 2011, and
certainly none Irom rhillrichardhillaw.com during the period between the illegal lockout at
4:30 pm November 1, 2011 and the trespass arrest oI November 13th, 2011 which allegedly
spoke to my being provided access to the property Ior the purpose oI my removing my
belongings, despite my numerous calls and written requests, which outlined the exigencies
inherent to my being precluded access to my client Iiles incident to an unlawIul and
improperly notice and too early occurring lockout by the WCSO. I and my business have
been damaged greatly by these acts. Further, I had repeatedly sent both Baker and Hill notice,
in writing, that I did not consent to service or notice oI anything via electronic means. Further
NRS 118A.190 does not speak to 'notice oI a legal Iinding, but rather to 'notice oI a Iact.
As such, I was not appropriately served notice oI the Order oI Summary Eviction, and an
illegal lockout occurred, as such no criminal trespass charge can stand. Further, now, Casey
Baker writes the undersigned and reports a burglary has recently occurred. 'RE: 121 River
Rock From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Wed 12/14/11 3:43 PM To:
cdbakerrichardhillaw.com; knielsenrichardhillaw.com; sgallagherrichardhillaw.com
Dear Mr. Baker, I drove by the property recently and saw you had added boarding up the
Iront door on very, very recently. UnIortunately, your client and your Iirm, despite billing up
some $1,060 Ior "securing" the property on top oI charging $900 Ior storage Ior what could Iit
inside a 10x20 Ioot storage shed, never once providing an inventory, and contributing to a
wrongIul arrest and deIamation causing me and my clients great damage, Iailed to take even
basic steps to secure the property, despite my making numerous written requests that you do
so, including, but not limited to, taking the damn window unit air conditioner out oI the
window Iacing the sidewalk on the side oI the house very close to the damn Lakemill Lodge,
or even putting a strong stick in between the bottom sliding window pain and the top oI the
sill to prevent someone Irom simply pushing in the window unit air conditioner and pushing
the window up to gain access. Further, a blanket that was on the orange circular couch is
clearly in the Ilower bed in Iront oI the house. Additionally, there are reports that someone
with your oIIice gave someone a mattress Irom the inventory oI Coughlin Memory Foam (a
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Nevada licensed business located at the property) and an expensive mattress platIorm has
clearly been damaged and placed in the Ilower bed as well, in addition to one oI the wooden
porch shades being removed Irom the Iront porch. You and your client are, oI course, liable
Ior all oI this. (email Irom Coughlin to Baker, attached as Exhibit 3 along with the Iollowing
email Irom Baker reporting the burglary to Couglin):From: cdbakerrichardhillaw.com To:
zachcoughlinhotmail.com CC: rhillrichardhillaw.com Subject: 121 River Rock Date:
Wed, 14 Dec 2011 13:50:02 -0800 Mr. Coughlin: The River Rock property has been broken
into. We believe the break-in occurred sometime on Monday, December 12, 2011. There
appear to be items missing, including the TV in the living room, perhaps a computer monitor,
and perhaps some stereo equipment. I can`t tell what else. The contents oI the residence
appear to have been riIled through. I am providing you with this inIormation as a courtesy.
This email does NOT constitute permission Ior you to go to the River Rock property. Casey
D. Baker, Esq. See Exhibit 3.
Also, attached to this at Exhibit 1 is a collection oI documents related to some Iaxes,
Proposed Orders, Ex Parte Emergency Motion Ior Inspection, AIIidavit oI Due Diligence by
Process Servers ostensibly claiming the ability to see through walls, etc., and one interesting
copy oI a Iax received Irom Casey Baker, Esq by the Reno Justice Court with a handwritten
note on the Iax dated 10/20/2011 that appears to be Judge SIerrazza's signature and
handwriting wherein the Iollowing notation is made: ...NRS 40.310 Issue oI Iact to be tried
by jury iI proper demand made. Whenever an issue oI Iact is presented by the pleadings, it
shall be tried by a jury, iI proper demand is made pursuant to the Nevada Rules oI Civil
Procedure or the Justice Court Rules oI Civil Procedure
Actually, a lot oI people seemed conIused regarding the '24 hours lockout thing. The
only appearance in either NRS 118A or NRS 40, in the provisions applicable to Summary
Eviction Proceedings oI anything related to '24 hours is in NRS 40.253(5), which only
speaks to a situation where the Tenant does not Iile a Tenant's Answer or Tenant's AIIidavit,
which is clearly inapplicable here, as the Tenant did Iile such a Opposition to the No Cause
Eviction Notice:
'5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the landlord`s agent may
apply by aIIidavit oI complaint Ior eviction to the justice court oI the township in which the
dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located or to the district court
oI the county in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are
located, whichever has jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order
directing the sheriII or constable oI the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter
receipt oI the order. The aIIidavit must state or contain...
So, absent some statutory provision allowing the Order oI Summary Eviction to result in
a lockout by the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice prior to the 3 days Ior mailing where
personal service oI the Order oI Summary Eviction was not eIIectuated, despite what WCSO
employee may have incorrectly (or Ialsely) asserted in the WCSO's John Machem's AIIidavit
oI Service Irom, Iile stamped November 7, 2011 (especially where it is timestamped 4:30 pm,
November 1, 2011, especially where the Order oI Summary Eviction explicitly reads that no
such lockout shall occur prior to 5:00 pm on November 1, 2011). See, NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-
iii), NRCP 6(e).
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Interestingly, Richard Hill knows his case is toast under NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii), NRCP
6(e), in addition to NRCP 11. That is why in Richard Hill's November 21, 2011 Motion Ior
Order To Show Cause, on page 2, Hills resorts to literally grasping at straws, imagining that
what the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice customarily does is somehow automatically codiIied
into mandatory precedent black letter law. To wit, Richard Hill wrote in his Motion For
Order To Show Cause that: 'FACTS SHOWING CONTEMPT OF COURT 6. EXHIBIT 1
was served on Coughlin on November " 2011 by the Washoe County SheriIIs Department, by
posting same on the Iront door oI the property in the manner customary Ior evictions in
Washoe County. The locks to the premises were changed at that time, thereby ejecting and
dispossessing Coughlin oI possession oI the Property. Further, therein Richard Hill admits
that the lockout occurred at 4:30 pm, as indicated in writing in the WCSO's Machem's
AIIidavit oI Service, contra to the mandate oI Judge SIerrazza's Order oI Summary Eviction
requiring any lockout to occur aIter 5:00 pm, November 1, 2011.
Indeed, in a December 8th, 2011 letter to Landlord, Irom Tenant, Iurther issues Ior the
appeal an auguring Ior a Temporary Restraining Order or Injunction:
'the Court has decided to set another hearing in that Regard Ior December 20th, 2011 at 9:45
am. However, and very, very curiously (again!) the RJC could only set the hearing (despite
the statutory requirement in NRS 40.253(7)-(8) that is occur within 10 days oI the Iiling oI
my Motion To Contest Personal Property Lien) Ior December 20th, 2011 at 9:45 am. As
such I am leIt in the untenable situation oI allowing your artiIicial deadline to pass, at which
point you will, according to your own written words, Iiresale mine and my client's property,
do the same with property at 121 River Rock which belongs to others, and just generally
destroy heirlooms, keepsakes, oIIice equipment, mattress business equipment and other
materials. I AM HEREBY REQUESTING IN WRITING A WRITTEN STIPULATION
FROM YOU AGREEING TO EXTEND THE PERIOD YOU LAID OUT IN YOUR
DECEMBER 2, 2011 LETTER TO ME BY WHICH YOU ASSERT, AT PAGE 2
PARAGRAPH 1, THAT THE 'FINAL DAY ON WHICH YOU WILL BE ALLOWED TO
ENTER ONTO THE RIVER ROCK PROPERTY PURSUANT TO THIS OFFER IS
MONDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2011... Please agree to retract your artiIicial December 19,
2011 deadline and place any new deadline out at least 5 days aIter any ruling on the Motion to
Contest Personal Property Lien by the Reno Justice Court, pursuant to the hearing on that
Motion currently set Ior December 20th, 2011 at 9:45 a.m. I FURTHER RESERVE ALL
MY RIGHTS TO CONTEST OR PURSUE MY RIGHTS UNDER THE DEFAULT THAT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ORDERED AGAINST YOU PURSUANT TO YOUR FAILUR TO
APPEAR AT THE NOVEMBER 22ND, 2011 HEARING PREVIOUSLY SET IN THIS
MATTER AND FURTHER RESERVE ME RIGHT TO SEEK REDRESS FOR THE FACT
THAT (ASIDE FROM WHATEVER THE NOVEMBER 22ND, 2011 HEARING WILL BE
DEEMED) THE RENO JUSTICE COURT FAILED TO HOLD A HEARING IN
RESPONSE TO MY MOTION IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE SPECIFIC DICTATES
FOUND IN NRS 40.253(7)-(8), INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, HAVING THE
SHERIFF AFFECT SERVICE OF NOTICE OF SUCH HEARING.
I received your shameless December 2, 2011 letter in the mail "Re: Disposal oI personal
property leIt at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada". I dispute all contentions or allegations it
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contains. As I have previously indicated, though, I am under no duty to do so, given your
propensity to attempt to bury the truth in lies and all the time sapping that would have on me
should I agree to register my contentions or disagreements with your attempts to practice law.
You have Iailed to provide any prooI oI any "inventorying" done on your part or any
itemization oI charges incurred in relation to such inventorying. Further, you have been
served a Iiling ready NRCP 11 motion incident to your pernicious attempts to include the
contractor's bill oI $1060 (which includes an entry Ior "Iixing leak in the basement",
something Ior which, there is no reasonable nexus to NRS 40.460's dictate calling Ior
reasonable costs Ior "inventorying, moving, and storage). Given that you have already sent
me written bills and demands Ior rent, starting November 1, 2011 (something Ior which
Richard Hill lied to the RPD OIIicers about at the time oI the arrest Ior alleged trespass on
November 13th, 2011, OIIicer Carter, RPD, etc.).
Further, I showed up to the hearing pursuant to NRS 40.253(7)-(8). You Iailed to. There is
not issue as to staleness, but rather why a deIault judgment should not have issued in my Iavor
pursuant to your Iailure to appear Ior the hearing. Further, the 10 days called Ior in NRS
40.253(7)-(8) (I would cite it here Ior you, but preIer to see iI you can be bothered to actually
look up and read that section Ior the Iirst time all by yourselI) certainly are calculated in a
diIIerent way than however it is you came to the determination that My Motion to Contest oI
November 16, 2011 was "stale".
Further, as Iound on page 2 oI your December 2, 2011 letter, "the terms and conditions Ior
you to enter...are the same as those terms contained in Mr. Hill's email to you dated
November 25, 2011...." So, under NRS 40.253(7)-(8) even should your "stale" argument hold
water, I still have 20 days Irom the date you provided written itemization oI your charges to
move Ior another hearing to contest your unlawIul rent distraint attempt on a commercial
business where you Iiled only a No Cause Notice oI Eviction (oops!), using a damn Iorm, no
less, while billing $20,000 to your client, er, I mean to contest your dubious personal property
lien.
THE 21 DAY SAFE HARBOR PERIOD IS DUE TO EXPIRE SOON WITH REGARD TO
YOUR MAINTAINING THIS EVICTION UNDER NRS 40.253 DESPITE YOUR
EXPRESS WRITTEN ADMISSION THAT IT INVOLVES A COMMERCIAL LEASE
AND MERELY A NO CAUSE NOTICE OF EVICTION/UNLAWFUL DETAINER. THE
LAW IS CLEAR IN THIS REGARD, HOLDING THAT NO CAUSE EVICTIONS ARE
NOT PERMISSIBLE AGAINST COMMERCIAL TENANTS WHERE FAILURE TO PAY
RENT IS NOT ALLEGED. ALERT THE COURT TO YOUR TRANSGRESSION
IMMEDIATELY OR PREPARE TO DEFEND AGAINST YOUR VEXATIOUS TACTIS.
FURTHER, PLEASE PROVIDE PROOF THAT YOU RECEIVED YOUR MD CLIENT'S
"INFORMED CONSENT" WITH RESPECT TO THE VARIOUS RISKS YOU WERE
DRAGGING HIM THROUGH INCIDENT TO YOUR "WRONG SITE SURGERY" OF A
LEGAL NATURE, ie, seeking a No Cause Eviction against a commercial tenant, asking Ior
attorney's Iees and running up a $20,000 attorney's Iees bill within a type oI proceeding, a
Summary Eviction Proceeding a la NRS 40.253, that is expressly included amongst those
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matters in Nevada's Justice Court (JCRCP 3) that do not allow Ior a prevailing party award oI
attorney's Iees.
Further, you have apparently been giving away commercial property oI mine, including
materials related to the mattress business located as 121 River Rock St. Do you want to
guess whether or not I have a video tape oI anyone attesting that you did, in Iact, give them a
mattress, or do anything else? You know, under SchiII, you, and your client, can be held
valuable Ior the entire value oI either business in damages under the wrongIul eviction and
other tort/contract based theories oI recovery that will be included in the lawsuit against you,
as resulted in the wrongIul eviction oI a seaIood distributor in SchiII, to the tune oI some
$300,000, iI memory serves. That may extend to personal liability with respect to your
various employees. FURTHER, YOU ARE ALLEGEDLY BOTH WITHHOLDING AND
DENYING MY ACCESS TO ITEMS MAILED TO ME, MY LAW PRACTICE, OR MY
MATTRESS BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, A VIOLATION
OF FEDERAL LAW. I DEMAND YOU MAKE THESE ITEMS AVAILABLE TO ME AT
ONCE.
You are allegedly withholding items addressed to me that were sent in the United States
Mail. Some oI these pieces oI mail involve important and exigent client matters.
Additionally, your oIIice reIused to return my state issued driver's license Ior the entire period
between November 15th, through November 22nd, which is another criminal law violation, I
believe. I do not believe you have any basis Ior a lien on these items. Further, you are
withholding items oI mine that were not at the property at the time oI your illegal lockout.
You have been inIormed as to what these items are, and I believe you are guilty oI a criminal
law violation Ior withholding them. Please make them available to me at once. Please do not
attempt to make phone calls or voice mails to me. Please communicate to me only in
writing.
Judge SIerrazza apparently made an Order on 10/27/2011 which, essentially, converted
to the Court all the money I had available to me, then, shortly thereaIter, he made an another
Order denying a request Ior Publication oI Transcript at Public Expense, claiming that the
11/7/2011 Order returning the money reclassiIied at that point as a Supersedeas Bond (iI the
court is holding a Supersedeas Bond, doesn't that mean Stay must be in place, as such,
wouldn't a trespass charge be a legal Iiction?). NRS 40.253(6) explicitly prevents this (and
the RJC will need to enact and get approved its own version oI Las Vegas's Justice Court Rule
44 iI it wants to order tenants in a Summary Execution, er, Summary Eviction proceeding to
pay monies into the court or otherwise reclassiIy previous order Ior rent escrow and deem
monies previously submitted as 'Appeal Bonds or other types oI Bonds. Simply put, the
RJC must return the $2275 I was improperly Iorced to deposit into the court as rent escrow.
Further, the IFP granted in this case should apply to the Appeal Bond or any other Iees or
bonds required by this or any other court. This is also a whistle blower and or Qui Tam
action, as the Justice Court should not be leveraged as a club to bash tenants senseless just
because attorney's like Richard Hill, Esq. and Casey Baker, Esq. Iind it proIitable. Quit
having Iiling oIIice employees bully tenants into coming down and being served notices by
the Iiling oIIice that they law in Nevada requires landlord or landlord's attorney to service and
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Iile prooI oI. Don't act like JCRRT allow it, see Rule 2 oI JCRRT, basically, JCRRT doesn't
apply to landlord tenant action and quit acting like the RJC gets to apply 'house rules,
without getting them printed Ior the public and approved by the Supreme Court oI Nevada.
See Rule 81 and 83 oI the State oI Nevada's Justice Court Rules oI Civil Procedure. ..."
From the 11/14/12 disciplinary hearing at issue in 62337: "MR. COUGHLIN: The
mitigation. MR. ECHEVERRIA: -- the Iactors -- let me ask this question. Do you believe that
any oI the issues that you have described impair your ability to practice law and adequately
represent clients? MR. COUGHLIN: I believe when I'm not under such -- getting arrested,
spending six days in jail, getting out, Iinding an eviction notice on my door. An eviction
which I would maintain is against the law, a summary eviction, where nonpayment oI rent is
not pledged against a commercial tenant. There's laws against that Ior a reason, because it can
murder your business, and it's a huge Iallout personally. So I get arrested. Spend six days in
jail. I maintain it's a wrongIul arrest. I might not have done everything perIect, but I do
believe iI you look at it, look at the criminal law, you might agree with me the arrest was
wrongIul. Page 291 MR. ECHEVERRIA: My question was not whether that arrest is valid or
invalid, but whether or not the conditions that you described you Ieel you suIIer Irom impair
your ability to practice law and/or represent, adequately represent clients? MR. COUGHLIN:
No. No. And I think iI you had been with me through all this you would be impressed -8 MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Do you have -9 MR. COUGHLIN: -- by my dedication to my clients and the
level oI work product I churn out, especially considering the remuneration I've received Irom
those clients. I have basically worked Ior minimum wage doing people's custody, people's
Ioreclosure deIense, adversary proceedings in bankruptcy. And there was a noncompete case I
think -- I'm not happy with how my liIe has gone. I'm not happy with all this drama and
problems with the courts. But -18 MR. ECHEVERRIA: While we're on that. Do you
recognize any symptom oI validity in some oI the language used by Judges Gardner, Judge
Nash Holmes, and their orders in which they Iind you in contempt? Do you recognize that
there may be some validity in what they say? MR. COUGHLIN: I think it is important to
know Page 292 when to just accept what the judge says Ior the dignity oI the court, and to
know that Iine line between standing up Ior what you think is right, and not continuing to
push past the point where it's -- my own best interests or where it damages the standing or
appearance oI the legal proIession in general. "
"
attach as an exhibit the 11/27/12 "Motion Ior Extension oI Time to Pay Filing Fee oI Show
Good Cause Why Hasn't Been and or Apply Ior IFP Fee Waiver NRAP 24" in 62104,
Couglhin v SBN that details (in addition to laying out with speciIic (that could still be
supplemented) all the Iilings wherein Coughlin expressly pled a commercial tenancy
suIIicient to make Hill's testimony on 6/18/12 in 26405 and on 11/14/12 in NG12-0204
displaying his own lack oI candor the the tribunal (RPC 3.3) and lack oI Iairness to opposing
parties (on top oI the police report to the RPD where Hill displays a lack oI truthIullness in
statements to a third party, the RPD, where he indicates, in an attempt to prejudice the RPD
against Coughlin, that Coughlin is "accusing" Hill oI bribing the RPD and oI the RPD oI
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accepting bribes)...the :"Just like clockwork, immediately aIter teh 11/25 and 11/23/12 emails
to Judge Gardner, Garin, Elcano, the NNDB, Bar Counsel and the Panel, comes the ORder
dismssing 60317: coughlin has had two trials in last week, request short bit oI time to Iill
title's oI documents actions.
"Subject: RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" AIIidavit oI 11/1/2011
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 11:40:39 -0800
From: LStuchellwashoecounty.us
To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com
CC: mkandarasda.washoecounty.us
Mr. Coughlin,
Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was personally served by Deputy
Machen by posting a copy oI the Order to the residence. The residence was unoccupied at the
time.
Liz Stuchell, Supervisor
WCSO Civil Section"...also, awIully relevant on the NRS 40.251(4) issue and the
Russell/Mayes criminal trespass by the landlord issue:
request Ior 30 days additional to stay in possession disability?
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 11/03/11 4:34 PM
To: cdbakerrichardhillaw.com
Dear Mr. Baker,
I need another 30 days due to disability see Motion to Continue in Possession. ADA privacy
rights asserted with respect to disability disclosure.
thanks,
Zach Coughlin, Esq." Further, the entry in Exh 1 to Exh 3 oI Baker's 4/19/12 Motion Ior
Attorney's Fees clearly indicates a knowledge oI an issue as to a Motion to Stay citing a
disability Ior the entry oI 11/3/11and a "stack oI motions" Irom the RJC no less oI 11/7/11:
Exhibit 1 to Baker's Declaration in Exhibit 3: Activity Reports
11/3/2011 ROH emails wi cdb; reviewing today's ravings by ZC 0.30 $11)~.00
11/4/2011 ROB review 46 pages oI drivel Iaxed Irom RJC -look Ior disbility motion -none
Iound 0,40 $140.00
11/6/2011 CB Prepare Ior hearing re: deposit and inspection. 2.00 $450.00
11/7/2011 ROB email to client multiple drivebys over the weekend 0.25 $87.50
11/712011 ROB to & Irom house -video #3 0040 $140.00
11/7/2011 CB Attend hearing. 8:00 -10:00. Email to client. 2.00 $450;,,00
11/7/2011 ROB phone wi PI & setting up tomorrow; emails to & Irom client 0.33 $115.50
11/7/2011 CB Receive and review stack oI new motions. 0.50 $112.50
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and the ROA Iiled by the RJC on 12/21/11 certainly contains a Motion For Stay citing a
disability oI 11/3/11 at MROA...also, despite NRAP 38 controlling, Baker thinks NRS 69.050
entitles him to an award oI Iees "in the appeal" Ior work done in the trial court, Ior matters
occurring aIter the priod oI time (ie, pre 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE) at issue on appeal (where
such appeal only addresses the "de novo review" oI the "action Ior possession"...that is,
possession only at issue both in the trial court, and appeal oI such 10/27/11 trial court
FOFCOLOSE....talk about RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 violations. "12/18/2011 CB Prepare reply
in support oI motion Ior order to show cause.1.00 $225.00 "
Baker's 1/3/12 Iiling reads: OPPOSITION TO AMENDED EMERGENCY MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER reads: "C. Coughlin is Not Entitled to A Stay
Coughlin claims to have deposited $250 with the justice's court pursuant to NRS
40.385, although he has not provided any prooI in support oI his claim. Attached hereto as
EXHIBIT 10 is a true and correct copy oI the justice's court's docket as oI December 19,
2011. That docket shows that Coughlin paid a Iiling Iee Ior his appeal on December 12, 2011,
in the amount oI $216.00. It is entirely unclear Irom the Iollowing entries oI that docket
whether or when Coughlin ever paid an additional $250.00 under NRS 40.385. II he ever did
so, it was not until on or around December 14, 2011, well aIter he had been locked out and
appealed, and well aIter his motion(s) Ior a stay had already been denied weeks earlier. See
also EXHIBIT 4.
This inIormation should be part oI the appeal record with this court as well, and can be
veriIied by the court in that manner. Even iI Coughlin eventually paid some amount toward an
appeal bond, it was not in time to stay the eviction during this appeal. (NOTE: here, Merliss
himselI admits that Coughlin's 12/30/11 Iilign was a Motion to Stay seeking to "stay the
eviction", not just some "disposal oI personal property" incident to the 12/21/11 Order
Resolving Coughlin's 11/17/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien"...Iurther
underscoring the extent to which the 5/28/13 Order Dismissing Coughlins' appeal is
appropriately corrected via NRAP 40 where it contains material mistake with respect to that
issue oI Iact (on top Io the error oI law where it alleges "Iinal appeallate jurisdiction" lies with
the 2JDC even where Coughlin, to the portion oI the "premises" he utilized as a commercial
tenant, pursued a stay under NRS 40.385 (actually, Coughlin pursued mutliple stays on
multiple ground, both as a residential tenant and as a commercial tenant, and there is not
judicial estoppel argument to bar that where Coughlin's lease speciIically allowed Ior such a
mixed use tenancy). To do that, a proper motion must be made and granted, and the bond
posted, prior to the lockout. The lockout here occurred on November 1, 2011. By the time
Coughlin managed to Iind that statute and pay any money to the court, he had been locked out
oI the property Ior six weeks. As such, any request Ior a stay was, and is, moot. At this point,
Coughlin does not have any rights in either the real or personal property, and there is nothing
to stay. Coughlin is not entitled to that relieI under any analysis. Fn2 (In2 Coughlin has since
Iiled a motion with the justice court seeking a return oI his
bond, which he claims to have paid on December 22, 2011, but Iails to mention that here.
A true and correct copy oI Coughlin's motion is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 11.)"
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The SBN OBC's King's 8/23/12 SCR 105 Complaint (which itselI violates the
jursidictional prerequisite inherent to SCR 111(8) and the NSCT's 6/7/13 Order in 60838 to
hold a hearing limited to determining the nature and extent oI punishment at to the matters
notice-pled in such SCR 111(6) Petition...not backdoor a motion to consolidate outside oI
Coughlin's presence in an ex parte bull session with the NNDB), reads, in relevant part:
"10. Respondent was arrested on November 13, 2011 by Reno Police Department and charged
with trespassing, a misdemeanor, Ior which he was later convicted.
11. The circumstances leading to the above-mentioned arrest are as Iollows: at an
hearing Justice oI the Peace Peter SIerrazza ordered that Respondent vacate the home
(NOTE: actually, the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE merely reads: "IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED...That the sheriII... Reno Township... be, and hereby is, directed to remove each
and every person found upon the rental unit ... by no earlier than October 31, 2011 at 5
pm"'; as such, the FOFCOLOSE lacks the language required by NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2),(5)(a),
and, in any event, such FOFCOLOSE certainly does not contain any language suIIicient to
"warn" Coughlin to "leave the property and not return" suIIicient to support the criminal
trespass conviction at issue in 61901 and 62337, particularly where NRS 40.251(4) provides
Coughlin "5 days Irom entry oI" any order denying his 11/2/11 Motion to Continue in
Possession asserting a disability, and that is beyond the extent to which a "claim oI right"
deIense precluse and Iinding that Coughlin violated either NRS 207.200 or RMC 8.10.010 to
support a criminal trespass conviction where any such "lockout" was conducted prematurely,
and premised upon a FOFCOLOSE that lacked the language required to be included therein
prior to the exercise oI any such jurisdiction to order said FOFCOLOSE, and where such
lockout was premature, given "24 hours Irom receipt oI the order" had yet to pass where the
"sheriII" showed up and (especially given the 2/7/12 admission by WCSO Supervisor
Stuchell that Deputy Machen's indication in his 11/7/11 "AIIidavit oI Service" as to having
"personally served" Coughlin meant only that he posted to FOFCOLOSE on the door while
neither Coughlin, nor any other occupant or resident thereoI was present) he was renting
eIIective November 1, 2011. AIter the locks were changed and the notice was posted on the
Iront door the owner, Dr. Merliss, discovered that someone had broken into the home and was
barricaded in the basement. The Reno Police tried to coax whoever was in the basement to
open the door. Dr. Merliss was Iorced to kick open the door where the Reno Police Iound
Respondent. Respondent had broken into the home and living in the basement. Respondent
was arrested Ior criminal trespass and was subsequently convicted oI that charge.
12. Respondent, representing himselI as co-counsel, Iiled a 36-page motion to dismiss
on March 5, 2012. The motion was denied by Judge William Gardner and was determined to
be without merit. The motion, on its Iace, demonstrates that Respondent lacks competence to
practice law. (NOTE: iI spotting the Russell v. Kalian and Mayes issues in such situation is
not competent legal work, what is?)
13. Once Respondent was evicted, an order was obtained to remove his belongings
Irom the home. Respondent interIered with the contractor who was hired to remove
Respondent's personal belongings. The police were called and aIter talking with Respondent
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they recommended that he Iind something else to do. Respondent reIused to their advice and
was subsequently arrested by the Reno police. "
(see Coughlin's 10/24/12 Iiling in 61901 and also, in that matter, the 7/8/13 Iiling,
which Coughlin actually submitted on 11/7/12 to the NVSCT...meaning, some might say,
landlord Merliss, his attorneys Hill and Baker, and NNDB Panel/SBN OBC Patrick O. King,
Esq. and Clerk oI Court Laura Peters...that that Iiling marinated Ior quite a while with the
Court...plenty oI time to check out what Coughlin was saying, see iI it makes sense, etc.,
etc....so what does it mean that it was approved Ior Iile stamping on 7/8/13? Some might say
it means its time to pull yourselves up to the settlement table, no? The key diIIerence
between those two Iilings is the admission by RPD Sargent Lopez as to whether any "warning
to leave" was issued to Coughlin prior to his custodial arrest Ior trespass on 11/13/11) The
Iraud oI the WCSO, RPD, City Attorney and others prevented Coughlin Irom having an
appropriate chance to Iile as complete and thorough a Motion Ior New Trial as he intended,
including a wrongIul arrest on June 28th, 2012, the WCDC denying Coughlin even a phone
call Ior no reason Ior 20 hours, until aIter the RMC had closed on Friday, June 29th, 2012,
and then another wrongIul arrest on July 3rd, 2012 by the RPD, with an impermissibly bail
increase by the same Judge William Gardner whom should have recused himselI Irom the
June 18th, 2012 Trial in 11 CR 26405 in the RMC, violating oI most provision Iound in the
NRS related to bail.
Transcript oI video taken by Hill and Merliss propounded to City Attorney: Zach's
arrest 010.mp4
RPD OIIicer Carter (Carter): Come on, get on up here, this is stupid. Come on,
okay, well bring your dog with you. (Carter and Sargent Lopez walk Irom the
stairway to the "basement", up the stairs through the back door oI the house,
through the kitchen, past Hill, whom is Iilming with his handheld video camera,
Iollowed by Coughlin holding his Pekingnese dog (Ieatured in the December 2012
Nevada Lawyer Animal Law issue) where a sitting landlord Merliss is on the couch
in the living room, whereupon Coughlin is directed to sit in the chair next to the
couch and the police begin questioning Coughlin as Hill joins them in the living
room.
Carter: Why are we going through all this headache? Huh? This is where you say
something!
Coughlin: What do you want to know?
Carter: Why are you still here?
Coughlin: I don't agree to be Iilmed, Rich.
Richard HIll (Hill): Nobody asked you.
Coughlin: I'll have to talk to my lawyer
Sargent Lopez: Do you have some place or body to take the dog?
Coughlin: Yeah.
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Lopez: somebody we can call Ior the dog?
Coughlin: Why?
Lopez: Because, you are gonna probably go to go to jail.
Coughlin: Why? For what?
Lopez: Trespassing.
Coughlin: Where?
Carter: Here.
Lopez: Here, you have been evicted.
Coughlin: hhhhhmmnI.
Carter: hhhhmmmnI.
Hill: You also have breaking and entereing...
Carter:No...we have trespassing, that's all we have.
Coughlin: Well, iI you Ieel I am trespassing, couldn't you just tell me to leave?
Carter: We tried....we actually Ieel that your are playing games...
Lopez: You were told not to come back....um, uh RETURN!, uh, um..and that's
, that's ....when, um, you were told to leave and not to come back
Hill: I told you.
Coughlin: Who told me to leave?
Hill: Me.
Coughlin: When?
Merliss: We told you to leave, Zach! I deserve some eye contact, Zach!
Carter: You sittin' over there splittin' hairs? (to Coughlin).
Hill: We changed the locks!
Merliss: You sorry about all oI this?
Coughlin: I am sorry that you are upset, Dr. Merliss.
Merliss: You are sorry, Zach? You know how much you have cost me, Ior
nothing? $20,000! You are going to be arrested!
Hill: You're gonna be arrested!
Coughlin: Excuse me, I'm sorry, I don't believe that they have established that I was
warned or served...
Carter: I don't believe that we need to establish that...we are not in court anymore!
M'kay?
Coughlin: Well, you have to have probable cause to arrest me...
Carter: I do have probable cause to arrest you, and iI you don't like it my name will
be on your arresting sheet..
Coughlin: I understand, sir.
Carter: Okay, why don't you stand up and put your hands behind your back.
Lopez: What can we do with the dog (reIering to Coughlin's dog, Jackson
Pawluck).
Merliss: I have two dogs, Zach.
Coughlin: What are you talking about taking him back to Chico?
Merliss: Yeah.
Coughlin:I would rather just my Iamily get the dogs.
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Merliss: Okay, then call your Iamily Irom jail! This isn't your dog's Iault, Zach!
You did this! Your dog is not responsible Ior this!
Carter: (whispering in the background to Richard Hill while Merliss hold
Coughlin's Pekingnese dog in his hands, standing two Ieet Irom Coughlin's Iace)
breaking and entering is (unintelligible)
Hill: No, breaking and entering would be better because its a Ielony...
Carter: Look, Rich, come on...he's trespassing...
Hill: Alright, let's start with that...
Carter: That's all we have...
Hill: Well, you can't blame a guy Ior trying...I don't do any criminal work...
Sargent Lopez gets caught trying to play along with the lie that Merliss and Hill try to
get over, and all oI this is reiterated by Carter's statement that "we actually Ieel that you are
playing games"...which suggests that Merliss, Hill, and the RPD are playing a game oI their
own...And Carter's other statement to Coughlin ("you're sittin' over there splittin' hairs"
certainly betrays the Iact that Carter knows Coughlin has a point here, ie, that the RPD is
making a very, very suspect arrest Ior trespassing where neither the RPD, nor Hill, nor
Merliss told Coughlin to leave or warned him against a trespass charge at any time on that
day, and that they only other "warnings" Hill or Merliss could possibly argue here relate to
civil eviction notices that were not served appropriately, and that do no warn one against a
criminal trespass charge (and Hazlett's reinterpretation oI the October 27th, 2011 Order
attempts to mislead the court in his tortuous eIIort to make the language therein say
something it simply does not) one where they want to arrest an attorney who has either
angered them by complaining oI police misconduct recently (Coughlin Iiled a complaint with
the RPD on September 7th, 2011, and more shortly thereaIter) or by contesting a summarey
eviction oI a commercial tenant where the non-payment oI rent was not plead (Ior good
reason, Merliss's case was really bad on retaliation, habitability issues, and all the set-oIIs or
Iix and deducts that had acrued, not to mention the property damage caused by his negligence
in agreeing to a weed maintenance arrangment with Coughlin (that Coughlin chose to address
through articial grass coverings oI the dirt lawn) while also, apparently, agreeing to a deal
with Green Action Lawn Care (which came to the law oIIice and tore up the articiIical grass
installation Coughlin had spent at least 3 days and hun...
(From pages 9-10 oI Coughln's 7/8/13 Iiling in 61901): "...1.1 January 13th, 2012 RPD
Sargent Marcia Lopez and OIIicer Travis Warren and OIIicer Avila respond to a call Ior help
regarding a domestic disturbance Irom Zach Coughlin relating to the attacks by his
housemates, Christopher "Erin" Allaback and Laura Foreshee Ior which Coughlin ultimately
received two Orders oI Protection in FV12-00187 and FV12-00188. Sargent Lopez subjected
Coughlin to a custodial arrest Ior criminal trespass in Reno Municipal Court case 11 CR
26405, on November 13th, 2011 (which resulted in Coughlin being convicted Ior criminal
trespass Iollowing the June 18th, 2012 Trial wherein Richard Hill testiIied as Iollows:
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The admission by Sargent Lopez was captured on a high 8mm video camera (NOTE:
oI course in 62337 the ROA will demonstrate that the OBC's Patrick O. King, Esq. and the
Panel desperately sought to avoid the admission (and subsequently, Iailed to transmit such
along with the ROA despite a proper Motion made by Coughlin per NRAP 10, 11, and
incident to the Reno City Attorney's specious prosecution oI Coughlin Ior alleged violation oI
the even more specious TPO/EPO against Workplace Harassment that the SBN obtain in
SBN v. Z. Coughlin RJC RCP2012-000607, the SBN and its "Clerk oI Court" (they owe the
NVSCT better, consider, Waters and all "arm oI the Court" status (looking at you David
Clark, Esq.) that Coughlin bought Irom a thriIt store Ior Iive dollars aIter his then housemate
ruined his digital smart phone video recorder by throwing hot coIIee on it an Coughlin.
Coughlin then transIerred the tape Irom that high 8mm to a digital version by Iilming a
television with a digital video camera later obtained, while it was playing that high 8mm tape.
The Iile ( was name "0201 cropped Carter Lopez 26405.wmv, and the Iollowing represents
and accurate transcription thereoI, in relevant part: Coughlin: Sargent Lopez are you going to
arrest Nevada court services Ior trespass? Lopez: I'm not going to arrest them Ior trespass.
Coughlin: but you arrested me Ior trespass. Lopez: because you were squatting in the
property. Coughlin: why do you say that you have any evidence of that? (5 seconds of
silence is Sargent Lopez's response) did you announce that you were Reno PD prior to
kicking the door in? Lopez: I didn't kick the door in. Coughlin: did you announce that
you are Reno PD prior to anybody kicking the door in? Lopez: I aiant have to.
Coughlin: so nobody announced that they were Reno PD? Lopez: because the guy who
kicked it in had to kick in his own door because you were squatting in his place. Coughlin:
so you are admitting that you guys didn't announce that you were Reno PD. Lopez: you
are wearing my patience thin, Sir, okay. I am trying to come here to help you, and I
bring a specialized officer (motioning to RPD Officer Travis Warren, whom has been
described as some sort of RPD Officer with some specialty in "mental health" related
areas). Coughlin: thats interesting, you aamit that you ana Officer Carter never announcea
that you are Reno PD, ana that you never askea me to leave, aia you, prior to the aoor being
kickea in? Officer Travis Warren: She didn't have to do anything like that. Coughlin: you
didn't have to! 1hat's great, but that means you didn't either. Warren: hold on Zach. You
asked us to come here because you needed help now you are being conIrontational. Coughlin:
no I'm not, no not. Anybody who asked you a question is conIrontational, I guess, huh?
Warren: Zach, let's try to stay on topic. Coughlin: On topic? I'm not on the topic you want me
to be on...." (pages 9-10 oI Coughln's 7/8/13 Iiling in 61901).
'Further evidence oI the Iraud the RPD, Merliss and Hill were successIul in perpetrating this
wrongIul arrest is Hill's statement: "we changed the locks!" in response to Coughlin querying
him as to who warned him against a trespass charge and when? To the extent the RPD,
Merliss and Hill then (in sworn testimony, Carter's Supplemental Declaration, and other
materials, including Hill's November 21st, 2011 Declaration and Baker's Opposition to
Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien that Declaration is an exhibit to) Iraudulently assert
that they identiIied themselves as law enIorcement and issued a lawIul order or warning to
leave prior to the door being kicked down, they should Iace criminal prosecution. Its either
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them or, some might say, somebody else here should be Iacing some misconduct
allegations...And please be sure to remember that Reno City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens had all
these videos and still put on all that perjured testimony....And, a review oI Coughlin's Motion
to Dismiss and the Criminal Complaint signed by Hill reveal that the inIormation in the
Complaint does not support a probable cause analysis to satisIy Hazlett's RPC 3.8 duty, and
should have been dismissed. There is no mention oI an "warning" legally suIIicient to
support a criminal trespass prosecution. That Complaints rads "That said deIendant on or
about Nov. 13, 2011 in the City oI Reno, State oI Nevada at 121 River Rock st. the deI. Iound
on the properly aIter being evicted, all oI which is a violation oI 8.1 oI the Reno Municipal
Code. I thereIore request that said DeIendant be dealt with according to law. I hereby declare
upon inIormation and belieI under penalty oI perjury pursuant to NRS 171.102, that the
Ioregoing is true and correct to the best oI my knowledge". And it is signed by Richard Hill,
Esq., oppossing counsel in a summary eviction matter that was then on appeal in CV11-
03628. Why didn't RPD Carter or Lopez sign it, especially iI what Carter asserts in his
unsworn Supplemental Declaration is true? Regardless, Carter nevers avers that he issued
Coughlin a warning to leave, and the City Attorney's certainly did not want Carter or Lopez
showing up to be cross-examined, Ior they would have been completely exposed. Upon
inIormation and belieI, the licensed attorney had served on Carter and Lopez an attorney's
subpoena, that was or should have been served upon them by Coughlin having it delivered to
the Iront desk oI the RPD downtown headquarters. Coughlin moved Ior a continuance upon
their Iailure to show, and one should have been granted. Regardless, the Iact that RPD Carter
had Richard Hill sign the Complaint says it all... Carter and Lopez know they did not issue
Coughlin as lawIul order to leave, or provide Coughlin any such chance to heed such a
warning, nor did they identiIy themselves as law enIorcement prior to Merliss kicking the
door down ("we think you are playing games" "you're splitting hairs over there" and the Iact
that these RPD knew they weren't on solid enough ground to be kicking anything down says it
all). Further, Carter's probable cause sheet lies where it indicates "DeIendant was Iound
inside the house aIter being serve". Coughlin was "under" the house in an enclosure that
never had a lock and that is not technically even a "basement" given the 5 Ioot ceiling and the
Iact that it has one exit door, and had a dirt Iloor beIore Coughlin laid a vapor barrier and
carpet down there (there was a bed there, a nice Tempurpedic one Ior over a year, the whole
things was decked out, and HIll admits as much, there was 14 luxury sedan 14 way power car
seats, Coughlin is a tinkerer patent attorney and its nobody's business what he collects, and he
is no more a "hoarder" than Richard Hill with his Iourteen Porsches). Further, upon
inIormation and belieI, prosecutorial misconduct was committed by the City Iailing to turn
over exculpatory dispatch logs, audio tapes oI dispatch calls and 911/rpd calls by Hill and
between teh oIIicers and dispatch/emergency services, particularly to the extent they shed
light on Hill and Merliss' lies regardin their having warned Coughlin to leave that day.
Let's compare Hill's assertions in the video above, with his written witness
statement in the police report, and Hill's November 21st, 2012 Declaraton (attached to
Baker's equally suspect Opposition to Coughlin's Personal Property Lien of that date in
R1C Rev2011-001708, and with Hill's 1anuary 14th, 2012 grievance letter against
Coughlin to the SBN:
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-1/14/12 greivance against Coughlin in Letter to Patrick King, Esq. 1anuary 14, 2012
Page 3: "Someone had been in there since I had last been in several days before. Dr.
Merliss discovered that the baselnent door was barricaded (not locked) fronl the inside.
The Reno Police Department was summoned. They tried to coax whoever was in the
basement out, without success. After Dr. Merliss had to kick the door down, it "vas
discovered that Mr. Coughlin had broken in and was in the basement. He was arrested
and is presently facing criminal trespass charges in Reno Municipal Court. See case no.
11 CR 26405 21."
Transcript oI video: Zach's arrest 011.mp4:
Carter: (continuing his conversation with Hill) Rich, when and where was he
served the paperwork?
Hill: Um...on November 1st, I believe...
Coughlin: Where was I served?
Hill: They put it on the Iront door because you ran away (odd, given Baker
testiIied Hill was not there on November 1st with the WCSO Deputies conducting
the lockout, and Coughlin was at the Washoe County Law Library)
Carter: The paper was leIt on the 1st?
Coughlin: Sir, OIIicer, I don't believe you've established that I was served...
Carter: That doesn't matter.
Coughlin: Or that I receivea any Lockout Order.
Hill: (chortle, chortle) Note taken.
Carter: So, October 1st, you believe?
Hill: No, November 1st.
Coughlin: By who?
Hill: Washoe County SheriII...
Coughlin: Was it in person?
Lopez; It doesn't need to be in person, actually...
Hill: You knew you were evicted! You were in Court!. You heard what the Judge
said!
Carter: They just tape this stuII to the Iront door...
Hill: And you took it down oII the Iront door!
Carter: Allegealy...
Coughlin: I am not corroberating anything you are accusing me oI.
Hill: That's Iine,
Carter you don't need to....When was he supposed to be out?
Hill: by the 1st...(at this point Dr. Merliss takes the video camera Irom Rich and
starts doing some weird zoom in close up camera work oI Coughli's wrists and
hands in handcuIIs, with an inescapable homeoerotic bondage type physician
control Ireak air to it all)
Carter: (to Hill) come on, we'll do that in the car....
Carter: Hey, Rich, do you have his social security number?
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Hill: Yeah, out in my car. (Coughlin then makes a phone call by having Sargent
Lopez hold a phone up to his head, trying to arrange Ior someone to care Ior his
dog)
Merliss: You need to call her, Zach, about the dog!
Coughlin: You aren't an OIIicer, are you Dr. Merliss?
Merliss: I am not going to take care oI your dog?
Coughlin: (to Carter) its kind oI disrespectIul Ior him to be jumping in where an
oIIicer...
Carter: Well it's disrespectIul Ior you to be here. You are not the victim, here!
Hill: Ha!
But, actually, the United States Supreme Court, in Soldal v. Cook County, might beg
to diIIer with Judge Carter's analysis...Russell v. Kalian, 414 A.2d 462 R.I.,1980 Where
execution, which was issued on May 23, specified that it was valid for 20 days, landlord
and constable acted unlawfully in evicting tenant on the execution on 1une 13, and
landlord and constable had thereby subjected themselves to liability for trespass.State v.
Fanger, 665 A.2d 36 Vt.,1995 There was suIIicient evidence to prove that deIendant, an
apartment manager, entered tenant's residence knowing he was not licensed or privileged to
do so to sustain trespass conviction, although deIendant stated he entered tenant's residence to
make sure heat was on, given tenant's testimony that deIendant's only acts with respect to the
heat was to disconnect the heat, deIendant made clear he was there to evict tenant, and
deIendant pushed open door while tenant was attempting to keep it shut, knocking over her
child in the process.
And it is in OIIicer Carter's Supplemental Declaraton where his lying really shines
through, especially aIter viewing the videos Iilmed by Merliss and Hill, which Iorm a nice
counterpoint to the remixed chronology oI events and statements (with a tough oI just Ilat out
imagining things by Carter) Iound in that writing oI Carters, which reads in relevant part:
"Matthew has been to the house several times over the past week and has observed evidence
oI someone coming and going. Today he was at the house and Iound the basement door to be
locked Irom inside. Matthew contacted Richard who responded and called the police. Sgt
Lopez and I knocked on the basement door and announced loudly "Reno Police" and called
out for Zachary to open the door. We were met with no response. Matthew decided he would
kick the door open, and did so. I entered the doorway oI the basement and Iound Zachary
standing at the rear oI the room holding a small dog. He was hesitant to come out and
eventually did so. Zachary came upstairs and instantly started arguing his legal standing in the
house, asking me "hypothetically speaking" type questions. He then told me I was making a
Ialse arrest due to the Iact that I am on Richard Hill's payroll and he was going to sue me. I
tried to explain to Zachary that he was served eviction papers and he asked me what I could
do about it iI he hypothetically didn't get them. He then told me that he had worked a deal
with Matthew to continue paying rent and that the legal eviction was no longer valid. I
again tried to explain to Zachary that a judge had signed an order Iorcing him to leave the
property and all he did was cite civil case law to me (I'm unsure iI any oI the cases he was
rambling on about even exist) and tell me that I was making a bad arrest. Due to Zachary not
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believing he has done anything wrong that the Iact he believes he still has standing there is
reasonable grounds to believe Zachary will return to the house. ThereIore he did not qualiIy
Ior a misdemeanor citation. Richard completed a statement on Matthews' behalI and signed a
criminal complaint."
The appellate court also may remand or remit the case Ior the making oI Iindings on an
unresolved issue|5| and the entering oI conclusions oI law and a judgment to conIorm to such
Iindings.|6| The judgment oI the trial court in summary dispossession proceedings will not be
reversed on a conIlict oI evidence Ior errors that appear to have been without prejudice.|7|
|FN5| IdahoPearson v. Harper, 87 Idaho 245, 392 P.2d 687 (1964). N.Y.Denton v.
Connolly, 10 A.D.2d 876, 200 N.Y.S.2d 647 (2d Dep't 1960). Remand required Colo.
Beeghly v. Mack, 20 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2001). |FN6| IdahoPearson v. Harper, 87 Idaho 245,
392 P.2d 687 (1964). |FN7| Cal.Knowles v. Robinson, 60 Cal. 2d 620, 36 Cal. Rptr. 33,
387 P.2d 833 (1963). IowaMcElwee v. DeVault, 255 Iowa 30, 120 N.W.2d 451 (1963).
CJS LANDLORD 1577
Judge SIerrazza's Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law, and Order Ior Summary Eviction oI
10/27/11, reads:
"FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION
This matter having come on regularly Ior an evidentiary hearing pursuant to NRS
40.254 and NRS 40.253(6) on October 13, 2011, and continued on October 25, 211, beIore
the Honorable Peter J. SIerrazza, sitting without a jury; the plaintiII/landlord, Matt Merlis;
("Merliss"), having been present, and represented by counsel, Richard G. Hill, Chartered and
Casey D. Baker, Esq., and deIendant/tenant, Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq. ("Coughlin"),
having been present and having proceeded in proper person; the parties having oIIered
evidence, called witnesses and having oIIered argument; the matter having been submitted to
the Court Ior a decision; the Court being Iully inIormed in the premises and good cause
appearing thereIor; the Court herewith enters its Iindings oI Iact, conclusions oI law and order
Ior summary eviction:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court Iinds the Iollowing Iacts:
1. Merliss is the owner of the real property located at 121 River Rock, (NOTE: not according
to the record on its Iace, as the "Matthew J. Merliss Living Trust" is the owner oI record per
the exhibit Coughlin had admitted Irom the County Recorder showing as much...issues oI title
belogn in the District Court per Nev Const. Art. 6 Sec. 4 and 6) Reno, Nevada (the
"Property").
2. The tenancy at issue (NOTE: odd, Baker Iails to speciIy which oI the "types oI property"
(ie, commerical? residential? "low income housing"?) to which NRS 40.254 may apply is
involved here...) commenced on March 1, 2010, and was for a term of 12 months. (NOTE:
was that really proven "by a preponderance oI the evidence" where the record on its Iace
reveals that the lease was "Ior not less than 12 months" per Paragraph 2 thereoI?).
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procedures against just such a "type oI property").
9. Coughlin alleged, as a legal deIense to the summary eviction, retaliatory conduct by
based, in part, on what he identiIied as "habitability" issues, (NOTE: this is plainly untrue
Irom the record, as it would be a legal nullity to even suggest that Coughlin pled a defense of
"habitability" to a no-cause summary eviction (indeed, the only instance oI the word
"deIense" in the entirety oI NRS 118A occurs within NRS 118A.510(2) (which Coughlin
pled) and in NRS 118A.355(5) (which Coughlin speciIically indicated he was not pleading,
and its only is some extremely suspect attempt to glom NRS 118A.355(5) onto Coughlin's
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pleading a deIense under NRS 118A.510(2) incident to a no-cause summary eviction under
NRS 40.254 that the justice court ruled, on 10/13/11, impermissibly, that Coughlin would be
evicted, and would not get a "trial" unless he deposited such oII base NRS 118A.355(5) rent
escrow deposit (meaning, instead oI applying the law to the extent permissible, ie, ruling that
Coughlin "does not have a deIense to an eviction under" NRS 118A.355(1)(d) had he even
pled such a deIense, the justice court rather, ruled that Coughlin would not be entitled to his
day in court to "test the truthIulness and suIIiciency oI " his and the landlord's aIIidavits per
NRS 40.253(6) even where Coughlin pled a retaliatory eviction deIense only under NRS
118A.510(2) (to whatever extent Coughlins NRS 118A.390(1), and or (5)(a) Iiling oI 10/6/11
went unrecongized), where both NRS 11 and his alleged complaints regarding same.
Coughlin Iurther alleged that Merliss acted in a discriminatory manner toward him based on
Coughlin's race, national origin, and sex.
10. The court Iinds that Coughlin Iailed to present any evidence that Merliss acted in any
prohibited, discriminatory, or retaliatory Iashion as alleged by Coughlin, or otherwise.
SpeciIically, the court Iinds:
10.1. Coughlin Iailed to present any evidence that he "complained in good Iaith oI a
violation oI a building, housing or health code applicable to the premises and aIIecting health
or saIety to a governmental agency charged with the responsibility Ior the enIorcement oI that
code" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(a).
10.2. Coughlin Iailed to present any evidence that he "complained in good Iaith to the
landlord or a law enIorcement agency oI a violation oI |NRS Chapter 118A| or oI a speciIic
statute that imposes a criminal penalty" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(b).
10.3 Coughlin Iailed to present any evidence that prior to being served with the
reIerenced termination and eviction notices, Coughlin had "instituted or deIended against a
judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which |he| raised an issue oI
compliance with the requirements oI |NRS Chapter 118A| respecting the habitability oI
dwelling units" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e).
10.4 Coughlin Iailed to present any evidence that he had "complained in good Iaith to
the landlord, a government agency, an attorney, a Iair housing agency or any other appropriate
body oI a violation oI NRS 118.010 to 118.120, inclusive, or the Fair Housing Act oI 1968,
42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., or ha|d| otherwise exercised rights which are guaranteed or
protected under those laws" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(g).
11. Coughlin Iailed to present any evidence that the Property was at any time not habitable, as
that term is deIined in NRS 118A.290, or otherwise, with respect to any oI the alleged
deIiciencies identiIied by him. Those alleged, but unproven, deIiciencies included, but were
not limited to, the Iront and back steps, any broken window, any alleged mold, 2.any Ialling
insulation, the garbage disposal, and any weeds on the Property.
11.1. With respect to any weeds on the Property, the court Iurther speciIically Iinds
that the maintenance oI the surrounding grounds, incl uding weed control, was th.. sole
responsibility oI Coughlin under paragraph 22 oI the parties' rental agreement.
12. Coughlin Iailed to present any evidence that he complied, or that Merliss Iailed to comply,
with any requirement set Iorth in NRS 118A.355 and NRS 118A.360, which statutes address
the withholding oI rent Ior alleged "habitability" issues.
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12.1. As such, the court Iinds that Coughlin was not entitled to withhold any rent based
on any alleged "habitability" issue, or otherwise, and that all sums heretoIore deposited by
Coughlin pursuant to the Court's order dated October 13, 2011, rightIully belong to Merliss as
and Ior past due rent.
13. II any Iinding oI Iact above is, in Iact, a conclusion oI law, it should be regarded as such,
and its validity should not be aIIected by where in this decision it is located.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court concludes the Iollowing as the controlling law in this case:
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter oI this case. Venue is
appropriate in this court.
2. The ultimate issue beIore the court at the reIerenced hearing was the right oI the
landlord, Merliss, to immediate possession oI the Property. NRS 40.254. NRS 40.253(6).
3. The purpose oI the hearing was to "determine the truthIulness and suIIiciency oI the
tenant's and the landlord's aIIidavits," to determine whether there is any "legal deIense as to
the alleged unlawIul detainer," and whether "the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer".
NRS 40.253(6).
. 5. "|A|n order granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6) should be review..d
on appeal based upon the standard Ior review oI an order granting summary judgm..nt under
NRCP 56 because these proceedings are analogous." Anvui) LLC v. C.L. Dragoil) LLC) 123
Nev. 212, 215, 163 P.3d 405 (2007). 6. "To successIully deIend against a summary judgment
motion, the nonmoving party must transcend the pleadings and, by aIIidavit or other
admissible evidence, introduce speciIic Iacts that show a genuine issue oI material Iact."
Torrealba v. Kesmilis, 124 Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716 (2008). 7. Coughlin Iailed to show that any
genuine issue oI material Iact remains Ior trial. As such, Coughlin Iailed to meet his burden oI
prooI to establish any legal deIense to the summary eviction. Anvui. Torrealba. 8. As no
issues oI Iact had yet been presented to the court to warrant a trial, Coughlin was not entitled
to have the summary eviction hearing heard by ajury. NJCRCP 38. NJCRCP 39. NRS 40.310.
Any demand by Coughlin Ior a jury was untimely, in any event. NJCRCP 38. 9. Pursuant to
NRS 40.253(6), Merliss is entitled to immediate possession oI the property.
ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION
Landlord, MATT MERLISS, having applied by AIIidavit Ior an Order seeking
summary eviction oI the above-named Tenant and it appearing Irom the record on Iile herein
that the statutory requirements have been met and that the Tenant, aIter notice, unlawIully
detains and withholds the rental unit, and the Court being Iully advised and Iinding good
cause, thereIore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
That the sheriII/constable oI Reno Township, or one oI their duly authorized agents be,
and hereby is, directed to remove each and every person Iound upon the rental unit at 121
River Rock, Reno, Washoe County, Nevada, by no earlier than October 31, 2011 at 5 pm.
Landlord is hereby awarded the right oI possession oI the premises.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS
FOLLOWS:
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The sums currently on deposit with the Court, in the amount oI $2,275.00, are the
property oI the landlord, Matt Merliss, but shall not be immediately released to him. Instead,
those sums shall serve as Coughlin's security Ior costs on appeal, pursuant to NJCRCP 73, in
the event Coughlin timely and properly appeals this order. In the event Coughlin Iails to
timely and properly appeal this order, those sums shall be immediately released to Merliss or
his counsel oI record. These sums shall not, in any event, operate to stay enIorcement oI this
order and the surrender oI the right oI Coughlin to possess the Property. Nothing in this order
shall prevent this court or an appellate court Irom releasing the deposited Iunds to Merliss or
his counsel prior to or aIter any appeal is perIected, or Irom increasing the amount oI any
security to be posted by Coughlin Ior any reason, or both, either upon its own motion or upon
motion by Merliss.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
NRS 118C Iurther provides: "4. II a landlord or a landlord`s agent changes the door
lock of commercial premises leased to a tenant who is delinquent in paying rent, the landlord
or agent must, Ior a period oI not less than 5 business days, place a written notice on the Iront
door oI the commercial premises stating the name and the address or telephone number oI the
person or company Irom which the new key may be obtained. The new key is required to be
provided only during the regular business hours oI the tenant and only iI the tenant pays the
delinquent rent.
5. II a landlord or a landlord`s agent violates this section, the tenant may:
(a) Recover possession oI the commercial premises; and
(b) Recover Irom the landlord an amount equal to the sum oI the tenant`s actual damages,
one month`s rent or $500, whichever is greater, reasonable attorney`s Iees and court costs,
less any delinquent rents or other sums Ior which the tenant is liable to the landlord.
6. A rental agreement supersedes this section to the extent oI any conIlict.
Sec. 15. 1. II a landlord locks a tenant out oI commercial premises that are subject to a
rental agreement in violation oI section 14 oI this act, the tenant may recover possession oI
the commercial premises as provided by this section.
2. A tenant must Iile with the justice court oI the township in which the commercial
premises are located a veriIied complaint Ior reentry, speciIying the Iacts oI the alleged
unlawIul lockout by the landlord or the landlord`s agent. The tenant must also state orally
under oath to the court the Iacts oI the alleged unlawIul lockout.
3. II a tenant has complied with subsection 2 and iI the court reasonably believes an
unlawIul lockout may have occurred, the court:
(a) Shall issue an order requiring the tenant to post a bond in an amount equal to 1 month
oI rent; and
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(b) Upon the posting oI the bond, may issue, ex parte, a temporary writ oI restitution that
entitles the tenant to immediate and temporary possession oI the commercial premises,
pending a Iinal hearing on the tenant`s veriIied complaint Ior reentry.
4. A temporary writ oI restitution must be served on the landlord or the landlord`s agent in
the same manner as a writ oI restitution in a Iorcible detainer action. A sheriII or constable
may use reasonable Iorce in executing a temporary writ oI restitution under this subsection.
5. The court shall hold a hearing on a tenant`s veriIied complaint Ior reentry. A temporary
writ oI restitution must notiIy the landlord oI the pendency oI the matter and the date oI the
hearing. The hearing must be held not earlier than the Iirst judicial day and not later than the
IiIth judicial day aIter the date on which the court issues the temporary writ oI restitution.
2011 Statutes oI Nevada, Page 1488 (Chapter 271, AB 398)
Couglin deIinitely complied with the requirements oI NRS 40.385 in his various
motions Ior stay:
40.385 Upon an appeal Irom an order entered pursuant to NRS 40.253:
1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay oI execution may be obtained by
Iiling with the trial court a bond in the amount oI $250 to cover the expected costs on
appeal. In an action concerning a lease oI commercial property or any other property Ior
which the monthly rent exceeds $1,000, the court may, upon its own motion or that oI a party,
and upon a showing oI good cause, order an additional bond to be posted to cover the
expected costs on appeal.] A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction oI the appellate
court and irrevocably appoints the clerk oI that court as the surety`s agent upon whom papers
aIIecting the surety`s liability upon the bond may be served. Liability oI a surety may be
enIorced, or the bond may be released, on motion in the appellate court without independent
action.A tenant of commercial property may obtain a stay of execution only upon the
issuance of a stay pursuant to Rule 8 of the Aevada Rules of Appellate Procedure and the
posting of a supersedeas bond in the amount of 1 percent of the unpaid rent claim of the
landlord.
NRS 40.400 makes NRCP and
However, 'the meaning oI a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be
drawn Irom the context in which it is used. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993)
(noting that the word 'conviction has many meanings, 'all but one oI |which| is ordinarily
eliminated by context.); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132
(2000) ('In determining whether Congress has speciIically addressed the question at issue, a
reviewing court should not conIine itselI to examining a particular statutory provision in
isolation. The meaningor ambiguityoI certain words or phrases may only become evident
when placed in context.); B & G Const. Co., Inc. v. Director, OIIice oI Workers'
Compensation Programs, 662 F.3d 233, 264 (3d Cir. 2011) (Hardiman, J. concurring)
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('|R|eading a statute in a vacuum is improper, and we must consider the context oI each
statute we interpret.).17 Consistent with the principles oI statutory construction discussed
above, section 12(c)(3) must be read in the context oI the entire statuteincluding section
12(c)(5). Deal, 508 U.S 132; Ki Se Lee, 368 F.3d at 223.
The Court must interpret the statute to give meaning to all oI its words. Birdman, 677
F.3d at 176....|T|he text oI a statute must be considered in the larger context or structure oI the
statute in which it is Iound. Alli v. Decker, 650 F.3d 1007, 1012 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations and
internal quotations omitted); see also Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)
('Ambiguity is a creature not oI deIinitional possibilities but oI statutory context.); Deal, 508
U.S. at 132. 'Where the literal reading oI a statutory term would compel an odd result, |a
court| must search Ior other evidence oI congressional intent to lend the term its proper
scope. Public Citizen v. United States Dept. oI Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (internal
quotations omitted); GriIIin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) ('It is true
that interpretations oI a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided iI
alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.);
Southeastern Penns. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) ('We also consider the
overall object and policy oI the statute . . . and avoid constructions that produce odd or absurd
results or that are inconsistent with common sense.) (internal quotations omitted) (citing
Public Citizen v. United States Dept. oI Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) and United States
v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1994)); In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328,
338 (3d Cir. 2006) ('|C|ourts should interpret a law to avoid absurd or bizarre results.)
(citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991)).
Also, with respect to the Iailure oI the 9/27/11 Notice to contain the jurisdictional
predicate enacted by the legislature in 2009 ("NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2):"That if the court
determines that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary
order Ior removal oI the tenant or an order providing Ior the nonadmittance oI the tenant,
directing the sheriII or constable oI the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter
receipt oI the order; and), the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE Iails to to contain such language, and
where the legislature requires landlord's to place it in the 5 Day UD Notice, the Iailure to
include in the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE any language whatsoever "directing the sheriII to
rmove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order..." makes such order void as well.
Baker and Merliss were in such a grand hurry (ironic given one Iully year passed beIore
Merliss re-rented the premises) to have a lockout done (apparently owing to their hopes that a
motion Ior stay would become "moot" aIter such occurs?) that Baker, in craIting the proposed
FOFCOLOSE that Judge SIerrazza signed (apparently viewing Baker's allegedly providing it
to Coughlin and the court at noon on 10/27/11 as providing suIIicient time Ior Coughlin to
"review" it and object to its contents, which is odd, given a FOFCOL is typically Iound in a
plenary setting, and in a plenary setting Coughlin would get some 5 judicial days to conduct
such a review...just another example oI the "worst oI both worlds" (summary and plenary)
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that both the justice and district court subjected Coughlin to). Despite Baker's proposed
FOFCOL being remarkably IaithIul to most every other verbatim passage oI NRS chapters
118A and 40, the little bit about "24 hours" needing to elapse Irom the time oI the SheriII's
posting such order to Coughlin's door (at least according to the Order in Anvui) Baker
careIully excised, which is too bad Ior him, his Iirm, the SheriII (thought the SheriII, per the
May decision, can sue the law Iirm now), and the landlord, given Russell v. Kalian and its
ilkage (see Coughlin's correspondence with the NNDB and SBN's OBC speciIically citing to
such line oI cases vis a vis the Iact that it was actually Hill and Merliss, the WCSO, and RPD
doing the trespassing, not Coughlin. Proper notice to quit has also been described as a
jurisdictional necessity. HUD/Willow Street Apartments v. Gonzalez, 68 Conn. App. 638,
792 A.2d 165 (2002); Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Morgan, 155 Ohio App. 3d 189,
2003-Ohio-5671, 800 N.E.2d 64 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 2003), appeal allowed, 101 Ohio
St. 3d 1487, 2004-Ohio-1293, 805 N.E.2d 538 (2004) and judgment rev'd on other grounds,
104 Ohio St. 3d 445, 2004-Ohio-6554, 820 N.E.2d 315 (2004). ).
The 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE Baker managed to get the justice court's SIerrazza to sign
read: "That the sheriff... be, and hereby is, directed to remove each and every person found
upon the rental unit at 121 River Rock, Reno, Washoe County, Nevada, by no earlier than
October 31, 2011 at 5 pm." Now, Judge SIerrazza did intineate "no later than" in place oI "no
earlier than", but, the real problem is that NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2) is what it is. The legislature
works hard on this stuII, and makes these laws Ior good reason, and they are not to be
selectively applied and gerrymandered to Judge SIerrazza's heart's content, Ior whatever
reason it is he so chose to here. As he did with respect to the "USPS CertiIicate oI Mailing"
requirement in NRS 40.280(3)(b) (at the very least such subsection required the 9/27/11 to
"be served" by mailing it (whether NRS 40.280(3)(c)'s requirement that "beIore an order to
remove a tenant is issued"..."the landlord shall Iile...a prooI oI service" oI the 9/27/11 notice,
which "must consist oI" one oI the three options set Iorth in subs. (a)-(c) therein may be read
to require that the "other process server" must provide an "endorsement" "stating the time and
manner of service", with such "service" (as deIined in NRS 40.280(1)(a)-(c)) carrying a
requirement that the "mailing" (which is absolutely required per the record on its Iace in the
instant matter) be represented by a simple indication in the "prooI oI service" required by
NRS 40.280(3) that such was mailed, or whether a USPS CertiIicate oI Mailing is also
required, even where such posting was purportedly done, as here, by a "licensed process
server" is unclear. What is very, very clear is that, at the very least, the landlord was required
to mail a copy oI that 9/27/11 notice to Coughlin, and that Coughlin preserved his objection to
the landlord's Iailure to do so, and that such is not waivable by Coughlin or the justice court.
While a deIiciency in a prooI oI service, per NRCP 4 may not normally render service that
actual did comply with the requirements therein invalid, where a statutory dicate is involved,
such as in NRS 40.280(1)(a), which provides that an order "shall not issue" until compliant
prooI oI service is Iiled by the landlord, and subsequent assertio that Merliss would now make
that (in contrast to MROA 655, where NCS's prepaid postage/stamped Pitney Bowes
envelope addressed to Coughlin was attached to that 8/22/11 Notice (Iound attached as
Exhibit 1 in "Exhibit D", Merliss's deIicient "UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit"), no such envelope
(and certainly not and USPS CertiIicate oI Mailing) is evidence by the record as to the
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9/27/11 5 Day Notice Iound at MROA 662 (Exh. 2 to Exh D.), which consists oI Baker's
"CertiIicate oI Service" indicating he "personally handed at the hearing in the above reIerence
matter" such 9/27/11 notice, but then completely Iails to indicate any mailing thereoI was
done. Even iI Baker's violation oI courthouse sanctuary rule/atty deIendant immunity Irom
service while attending court was overlooked, NRS 40.280(3)(a) is still quite clear in
requiring the signature oI a witness thereto (in addition to the attestation oI the server) and the
tenant acknowleding such service) as such Baker's CertiIicate oI Service at MROS 662 needs
more to comply. Which requires an analysis oI the "CertiIicate oI Service" at MROA 640 by
the "licensed process server Ior NCS, and a determination as to whether such satisiIies NRS
40.280(3)(c)'s:"The endorsement oI a sheriII, constable or other process server stating the
time and manner oI service." There would seemingly be an argument that such is compliant,
where it not Ior the Iact that the court indicated an "envelope" (like that associated with the
8/22/11 Notice at MROA 655)
21. Generally West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Federal Civil
Procedure k415, 416 West's Key Number Digest, Process k117 to 120 Litigants, their
attorneys, and witnesses are immune Irom service oI process while attending court.|FN1| The
basis Ior this rule, sometimes known as the "Courthouse Sanctuary" rule, is that parties should
be allowed to contest jurisdiction without submitting to it.|FN2| Process immunity is not Ior
the convenience oI the person seeking it but is Ior the convenience oI the court, and should be
made available only to Iurther the administration oI justice.|FN3| The test is whether the
privilege, iI allowed, would so obstruct judicial administration in the cause Ior the protection
oI which it is invoked as to justiIy withholding it; this depends on the nature oI the proceeding
in which the service is made and its relation to the principal suit.|FN4| Because the privilege
is designed Ior the court's convenience, it is not automatic, and the party must aIIirmatively
show that it is in the court's own interest in the Iurtherance oI the administration oI justice to
quash the summons.|FN5| Once the plaintiII makes a prima Iacie showing oI jurisdiction, the
burden shiIts to the deIendant seeking immunity Irom the service oI process to produce
evidence establishing immunity by showing that he or she was attending a judicial
proceeding.|FN6| |FN1| Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76 L. Ed. 720 (1932);
Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192 (1916); Moreo v. Regan, 140
A.D.2d 313, 527 N.Y.S.2d 547 (2d Dep't 1988); Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. District
Court oI Fourteenth Judicial Dist. In and For Tulsa County, 1980 OK 3, 605 P.2d 1323 (Okla.
1980). |FN2| North Fork Bank v. Grover, 3 Misc. 3d 341, 773 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Dist. Ct. 2004).
|FN3| Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76 L. Ed. 720 (1932); Page Co. v.
MacDonald, 261 U.S. 446, 43 S. Ct. 416, 67 L. Ed. 737 (1923); Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S.
128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192 (1916); ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455
(10th Cir. 1995). |FN4| Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76 L. Ed. 720 (1932).
|FN5| ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1995); Republic
Productions, Inc v. American Federation oI Musicians oI U S and Canada, 173 F. Supp. 330
(S.D. N.Y. 1959). |FN6| LaRose v. Curoe, 343 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 1983). AMJUR PROCESS
21
MROA 640 consists oI NCS process server Durden's Declaration oI Service on "Form
#4" (which has a "revised April 14, 2006" Iooter, explaining the Iailure oI such to contain that
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which became required in 2009, pursuant to NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2)-(3)), which reads: "Because
the place oI residence or business could not be ascertained, or a person oI suitable age or
discretion could not be Iound there, by posting a copy in a conspicuous place on the property,
delivering a copy to a person there residing, iI the person could be Iound, and mailing a copy
to the tenant( s) at the place where the property is situated. (Attach United States Postal
Service Certificate of Mailing)."
The Iact that the "Form #4" utilized by Durden contains nothing to indicate Durden Ielt
the language contained in the "option 3" that he checked with respect to the apparent directive
to "Attach United States postal Service CertiIicate oI Mailing" did not apply to him as a
"process server" vitiates any such declaration where not only did Durden's Declaration Iail to
attach the very USPS CertiIicate oI Mailing that the checking oI option 3 therein would seem
to attest to (thereby vitiating the utlity oI such Declaration), but, to make matters worse, the
practice oI attaching a photocopy oI the stamped, addressed envelope used by the process
server as done with the 8/22/11 Notice (a practice to which Judge SIerrazza made some
commentary indicating that his approach has been to avoid an requirement Ior a USPS COM
where such an envelope accompanies a simple declaration oI service) was not followed (ie,
there is no such stamped addressed envelope aIter the Declaration at MROA 640. That,
combined with the justice court Judge SIerrazza's indications that such is required, and the
extent to which the language in option 3 oI "Form #4" that Durden adopted by checking such
is arguably only operative where the very USPS CertiIicate oI Mailing reIerenced therein
actually accompanies such Declaration amounts to a Iailure to comply with the jurisdictional
predicate Ior any such eviction order Iound in NRS 40.280(3).
The transcript reads:
PlaintiII's Exhibit F at the 10/25/11 'trial, the 10/19/11 Iile stamped :
'DECLARATION OF CASEY D. BAKER. ESQ. PURSUANT TO NRS 40 reads: 'CASEY
D. BAKER, ESQ., being Iirst duly sworn, deposes and under penalty of perjury avers:
1.... This declaration is based on my personal knowledge, except those matters stated on
information and belief, and as to those items I believe them to be true. This declaration is
made in my capacity as the lanaloras agent, pursuant to ARS 4.254(2), and represents
my testimony if callea on to present same in court...
4. Dr. Merliss submitted (NOTE: this does nto say "offered into evidence", or "had
admitted" or, even "Iiled in open court") his landlord's affidavit in this matter at the time
of the hearing on October 13, 211...
8. In that regard, and without waiving the attorney-client privilege Ior any
communications between my oIIice and Dr. Meriiss, I state the Iollowing on information and
belief:
8.1. The tenancy at issue commenced on March 1, 2010, and was for a term
of 12 months. A true and correct copy oI the rental agreement is attached hereto as EXHIBIT
1. NRS 40.254(2)(a).
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8.2. 1he rental agreement terminated by its terms on February 28, 211.
paragraph 3 of the rental agreement. NRS 40.254(2)(b).
8.3. The tenant became subject to the provisions oI NRS 40.251 to 40.2516,
inclusive, at the ena of the stated term of the rental agreement, whereupon he became a
month-to-month tenant, as noted above. NRS 40.254(2)(c).
8.4. Copies oI the written notices pursuant to NRS 40.254(2)(d) are attached to
Dr. Merliss' affidavit, previously filed herein. In addition to the 5-day notice attached to Dr.
Merliss' aIIidavit, which was hana-aeliverea to Mr. Coughlin by me at the hearing on
September 27, 2011, an aaaitional 5-day notice was served on Mr. Coughlin by Nevada
Court Services on that same date. A true and correct copy oI that notice, together with the
certiIicate oI service, has also been provided to the court. An additional copy is attached
hereto as EXHIBIT 2. NRS 40.254(2)(d).
8.5. Coughlin was a month-to month tenant, whose tenancy had been properly
terminated pursuant to NRS 40.251(1). ThereIore, the claim for relief of possession of the
premises was authorized by law. NRS 40.254(2)(d).
9. I declare under penalty of perjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct. DATED
this 19th oI October, 2011 /s/ CASEY D. BAKER, as the landlord's agent pursuant to NRS
40.254(2), and pursuant to NRS 15.010 because the client is absent from the county in
which the attorney resides.
The record absolutely reveals that Coughlin contested any assertion that the lease had
"expired" or terminated" and that Coughlin Iully disputed the landlord's alleged right to a no-
cause eviction, especially where based upon some allegation that the lease had "expired or
terminated".
MROA 177: "All the materials and arguments contained in Coughlin's original
Tenant's Answer and Motion Ior Sanctions and Motion Ior ClariIication in the recently
dismissed case between Merliss and Coughlin are hereby incorporated by reIerence." Irom
Coughlin's 10/6/11 Tenant's Answer in 1708.
Additionally, at MROA 50, Coughlin clearly raised the issue that a holdover
proceeding was not availing to the landlord given that the lease had yet "expired": "4. I
received a notice directing me to vacate my rental premises but did not list a reason why I am
being asked to leave. I disagree with this notice Ior the Iollowing reasons: My lease
agreement has not expired and will not expire until a later time, more discovery is
necessary to determine ."
MROA 210: "11. All the materials and arguments contained in Coughlin's original
tenant's Answer and Motion Ior Sanctions and Motion Ior ClariIication are hereby
incorporated by reIerence and apply to any and all actions brought by Merliss or his counsel,
whether Summary in nature or not, whether No Cause in nature or not, whether UnlawIul
Detainer themed or not." (Irom Coughlin's 10/11/11 Motion Ior Continuance).
"Additionally, at MROA 1640-1642, Coughlin's 12/5/11 Motion to Vacate and or Set
Aside and or Motion to Stay in 1708, Coughlin made and preserved Iurther the argument that
a holdover proceeding was not in order due to the Iact that the lease had not "expired" and as
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such the termination notice was deIicient, especially in light oI his being a commercial
tenancy:
""Regardless, in Nevada, the law provides that there are summary eviction processes
Ior the Iailure to pay rent and nonmonetary tenant deIault when commercial leases are at
issue. A review oI the Lease Agreement on Iile with the Court in this matter and my
pleadings, wherein a commercial use oI the premises is clearly alleged and supported by
evidence, when combined with the Iact that a No Cause Notice oI Eviction is the only basis
Ior Rev2011-001708, and opposing counsel indicated on numerous occasions that "no back
rent is alleged due or sought", certainly would seem to auger towards vacating the Summary
Eviction Order and, perhaps, some damages owed to me. Further "This sentence states that
your landlord has renewed the lease. II your lease expired, but the landlord accepted rent or
entered into a new agreement aIter it expired, then your lease may have been renewed or
extended as a matter oI law. II you checked Number 7, Iill in the date." Certainly, the Lease
Agreement did not call Ior an 18 month lease, as such, I argue that the Lease was not
terminated or expired, and that the Landlord's conduct, and perhaps, the language in the lease,
renewed the lease or augers towards a Iinding that the lease was till in eIIect, ie, not
terminated or expired. II Iact, in the No Caucse notice, Mr. Baker or Nevada Legal Services,
or whoever Iilled out the Iorm, seems to have scratched out the word "expired" Iorm the
Iorm....'
Further, the 9/27/11 "Five-Day Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer Ior Failure to Vacate
Rental Unit NRS 40.251 (No-Cause Termination) and Notice oI Summary Eviction NRS
40.254" is clearly deIicient where it is both equivocal and inaccurate as to whether the lease is
"expired" (see MROA 197-198) as oI "February 28th, 2011" (which, a perusal oI the lease
agreement reveals is clearly not the case given such lease provides in sections 2, 3, and 20
that the lease is to begin on March 1, 2010 and continue Ior a period oI "not less than 12
months" with section "20. Termination" reIerencing a "deIined termination date (reIer to
Paragraph 2)" that is not present in section/Paragraph 2, other than an indication therein that
the tenant is renting the premises Ior "a period oI not less than 12 months tenancy". MROA
253, 620-630.
Subject-matter jurisdiction may be dependent on the service oI a proper notice to quit,
which is a condition precedent to a summary process. Conn.City oI Bristol v. Ocean State
Job Lot Stores oI Connecticut, Inc., 284 Conn. 1, 931 A.2d . 837 (2007).
6. Landlord's Possessory Remedies b. Summary Possessory Actions (1) In General (b)
Notice to Quit and Demand Ior Possession AmJur Landlord and Tenant 848. Requisites;
suIIiciencyA notice that seeks rent in excess oI the amount due is invalid and will not support
an unlawIul-detainer action, Levitz Furniture Co. v. Wingtip Communications, Inc., 86 Cal.
App. 4th 1035, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656 (1st Dist. 2001). By analogy, where Merliss's 9/27/11
No-Cause Termination Iraudulently stated that the lease had "expired" on February 28th,
2011, when it is patently clear Irom a reading oI Paragraphs 2, 3, and 20 oI the lease that such
is not the case, such Notice oI 9/27/11 is deIicient.
Plenary review oI suIIiciency oI notice to quit
Conn.Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 973 A.2d 1229 (2009).
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The landlord must comply with all conditions precedent to the maintenance oI
summary proceedings Ior the recovery oI possession oI the premises Irom the tenant. In order
to bring a summary proceeding, the landlord must comply with all conditions precedent to the
maintenance oI a summary proceeding Ior the recovery oI possession oI the premises Irom the
tenant.|1| When required by statute|2| or by a provision in the lease,|3| notice oI an election
by the landlord to terminate the tenancy is a condition precedent to institution oI summary
proceedings Ior possession oI leased property.|4| However, a landlord ordinarily need not
terminate the lease as a condition precedent to bringing an illegal use eviction proceeding.|5|
A statement terminating a lease may serve as the condition precedent to a summary process
action only iI it substantially complies with the Iormat or substance oI a statutory notice to
quit.|6| . |FN1| N.M.Kuykendall v. Ulibarri, 56 N.M. 43, 239 P.2d 731 (1952). N.Y.
Hampton v. Smith, 3 Misc. 2d 460, 148 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Mun. Ct. 1955). S.D.Grosz v.
Conser, 73 S.D. 553, 45 N.W.2d 734 (1951). |FN2| N.Y.Mosapp v. Reddy, 119 Misc. 438,
197 N.Y.S. 222 (Mun. Ct. 1922). Written demand to surrender as prerequisite Ariz.Alton v.
Tower Capital Co., Inc., 123 Ariz. 602, 601 P.2d 602 (1979). |FN3| N.Y.Koss v. United
Stores Realty Corp., 147 Misc. 44, 263 N.Y.S. 474 (App. Term 1933). Option to terminate
Where a lease gives the landlord an option to terminate the tenancy, exercise oI the option is a
condition . precedent to summary proceedings brought beIore the expiration oI the term by
lapse oI time. . La.Canal Realty & Imp. Co. v. Pailet, 217 La. 376, 46 So. 2d 303 (1950). .
|FN4| N.Y.Full v. Dydo, 86 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Term 1949). . Termination notice required
by statute Me.Perreault v. Parker, 490 A.2d 203 (Me. 1985). . Or.Ostlund v. Hendricks,
289 Or. 543, 615 P.2d 327 (1980). . As to notice to perIorm conditions or covenants, see
1543. . |FN5| N.Y.Hudsonview Co. v. Jenkins, 169 Misc. 2d 389, 645 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1996). . Notice required only Ior nonpayment proceedings Mont.Rasmussen
v. Lee, 276 Mont. 84, 916 P.2d 98 (1996). Notice to discontinue objectionable behavior not
required N.Y.Excel Associates v. Morales, 114 Misc. 2d 279, 451 N.Y.S.2d 620 (City Ct.
1982). |FN6| Conn.Waterbury Twin, LLC, v. Renal Treatment Centers-Northeast, Inc., 292
Conn. 459, 974 A.2d 626 (2009). As to when a notice to quit is required, 1544.
a proper notice to quit is a condition precedent to a summary process action|2| and, iI
deIective, deprives the court oI subject-matter jurisdiction.|3 |FN2| Conn.Waterbury Twin,
LLC, v. Renal Treatment Centers-Northeast, Inc., 292 Conn. 459, 974 . A.2d 626 (2009). .
Mass.Bech v. Cuevas, 404 Mass. 249, 534 N.E.2d 1163 (1989). |FN3| Conn.City oI
Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores oI Connecticut, Inc., 284 Conn. 1, 931 A.2d 837
(2007).|A statement terminating a lease may serve as the condition precedent to a summary
process action only iI it substantially complies with the Iormat or substance oI a statutory
notice to quit.Conn.Waterbury Twin, LLC, v. Renal Treatment Centers-Northeast, Inc., 292
Conn. 459, 974 . A.2d 626 (2009).
Service oI Notice to Quit Issue:
Coughlin preserved his argument that service was not proper oI the 9/27/11 5 Day
Notice in that one, Baker violated the rule oI courthouse sanctuary (which he essentially
admitted was improper to do; MROA 798:3-9: "PlaintiII: Okay, that`s, that`s |13:19| what
happened, Your Honor, was on September 27th I handed one oI these to Mr. Coughlin at the
hearing. When I get back to the oIIice I thought perhaps that`s not appropriate you better have
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it served as well. So, we had it served this well. The court has the correct one." MROA 663)
by attempting to serve such to Coughlin in court in the related 1492 on 9/27/11, and two,
Merliss's process servers at Nevada Court Services/Baker Iailed to include a certiIicate oI
mailing or a copy oI the stamped envelope allegedly utilized to mail such 5 Day Notice oI
9/27/11 to Coughlin (where, noticeably, such a photocopy oI the stamped envelope NCS used
Ior the 8/22/11 Notice was admitted into evidence at the 10/25/11 hearing/"Trial"). MROA
201, MROA 798-799.
An essential prerequisite Ior a successIul summary process is the proper delivery oI a
suIIicient notice as required. An essential prerequisite Ior successIul summary process is the
proper delivery oI a suIIicient notice to quit.|1| Thus, service oI a notice to quit in the
prescribed manner is, unless waived, a condition precedent to a landlord's suit Ior possession.
|2| The governing statute may provide speciIic procedures Ior the service oI notice to quit,|3|
and accordingly, service oI a demand Ior possession or notice to quit must be made in
accordance with the method prescribed by statute.|4| Under some statutes, the requirements
must be strictly complied with in order to enIorce the obligations imposed by the statute.|5|
|FN1| Conn.Zitomer v. Palmer, 38 Conn. Supp. 341, 446 A.2d 1084 (Super. Ct. Appellate
Sess. 1982). |FN2| D.C.Russell v. Dept. oI Housing and Urban Development, 836 A.2d
576 (D.C. 2003). |FN3| La.Grammatas v. Peveto, 12 So. 2d 14 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1943).
. UtahOsguthorpe v. WolI Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29, 232 P.3d 999 (Utah 2010).
. |FN4| Ill.Northern Trust Co. v. Watson, 310 Ill. App. 263, 33 N.E.2d 897 (1st Dist. 1941).
. La.Grammatas v. Peveto, 12 So. 2d 14 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1943). . OhioBarr Hotel
Co. v. Lloyd MacKeown Buick Co., 104 Ohio App. 69, 4 Ohio Op. 2d 157, 146 N.E.2d . 879
(3d Dist. Allen County 1957). . Service by mail Wash.Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash.
2d 365, 173 P.3d 228 (2007). Service on president oI corporation Cal.FiIth & Broadway
Partnership v. Kimny, Inc., 102 Cal. App. 3d 195, 162 Cal. Rptr. 271, 7 A.L.R.4th 580 (2d
Dist. 1980). Notice to tenant's attorney suIIicient Ga.ProIIitt v. Housing Systems, Inc., 154
Ga. App. 114, 267 S.E.2d 650 (1980). |FN5| UtahOsguthorpe v. WolI Mountain Resorts,
L.C., 2010 UT 29, 232 P.3d 999 (Utah 2010).
"A contract is ambiguous when it is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation. Anvui, 163 P.3d at 407; see also Shelton v. Shelton, 78 P.3d 507, 510 (Nev.
2003). 'The best approach Ior interpreting an ambiguous contract is to delve beyond its
express terms and examine the circumstances surrounding the parties` agreement in order to
determine the true mutual intentions oI the parties.` This examination includes not only the
circumstances surrounding the contract`s execution, but also subsequent acts and declarations
oI the parties. Shelton, 78 P.3d at 510.
Clearly, there was at least ambiguity as to the lease agreement involved herein,
particularly with respect to whether the lease had "expired" and to what degree, iI any, the
landlord had any right whatsoever to "terminate" the lease Ior anything other than non-
payment oI rent (a close review oI the record, on its Iace, particularly paragraphs 2, 3, and 20
oI the lease in question, at the very least, indicate a high degree oI ambiguity as to whether
the landlord had any such no-cause right to terminate the lease: (consider the import oI the
ambiguity inherent to the Iollowing paragraphs, collectively): "...2. TERMS: Management
does hereby rent ... Ior a period oI not less than 12 months tenancy...3. HOLDOVER: Under
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Nevada law this Rental Agreement and any changes properly agreed to will remain in eIIect
on a monthly basis aIter the initial term. A 30 day written notice to vacate must be issued by
the Resident...(NOTE: there is no language within Paragraph 3 to support any view that the
landlord has any right to terminate the agreement Ior anything other than non-payment)...20.
TERMINATION: This Agreement and the tenancy hereby granted may be terminated by
either party within 30 days of the defined termination date (reIer to Paragraph 2), or any
time thereaIter..." (NOTE: there is no "deIined termination date" to be Iound in Paragraph 2,
thereIore, while Paragraph 3 clearly provides "the Resident" with a clear right to terminate the
tenancy in the holdover context", Paragraph 20 does note where it essentiall indicates the
landlord has such a right within 30 days of never. Its the same thing as agreeing to pay
someone within 3 days of never. Its a three page lease, the landlord is a neurologist who
chose to allegedly pay Hill and Baker, $60K just to litigate through the Iiling oI their Motion
Ior Attorney Fees on 4/19/12. He is Iar Irom lacking in the intelligence or means to read a
three page lease and voice any objection to the contents thereoI. The contents oI the lease
were actually litigated, and the only aspects therein that Merliss alleged Coughlin made a
counter oIIer to which Merliss Iailed to notice concerned "the pet rule", the "late Iee" Ior
delinqunet rent", and the number oI hours required be given Ior "notice oI an inspection".)
(Additional ambiguity exists in the lease, but 1708 was, were convenient Ior some, at
least, a mere summary eviction proceeding, but where Coughlin alleged retaliation, especially
as to the unlawIul shutoII oI essential services, the lease became and issues, especially where
the "not payable by the tenant" language concerning the utlities became at issue given NV
Energy's reIusal to allow anyone to pay a bill unless they have personally identiable
inIormation Ior the account holder, which, given the "standing order" NV Energy's Tsuda,
testiIied to, reverting the account to Merliss's name upon Ulloa transIerring service out oI her
name, such account was "not payable by" Coughlin, and thereIore the landlord was required
to maintain such service, and the interuption oI such on the very day Coughlin's Tenant's
Answer was due or close thereto, speaks volumes as to the retaliatory animus here...Iurther,
the landscapers whom destroyed Coughlin's property and damaged his business were "agents"
oI Merliss and whether, thereIore, Merliss was responsible Ior such damages pursuant to
sections 23 and 28 oI the lease (not to mention Merliss's quickly retaliating against Coughlin's
so pointing that out in his August 2011 email to Merliss).
MROA 559, 561, Coughlin "transcended his pleadings" more than well enough to
make disputed "a genuine issue oI material Iact" (and Judge SIerrazza ruled that the insulation
mold issue was "clearly" a "habitability" issue")..."(noxious weed ordinance, insulation
requiremeents, porch landing safety issues). International Residential Code 2006 as adopted
by City oI Reno Charter"m
MROA 547, Coughlin clearly made his NRS 118A.510(b) argument with respect to
complaint "to the landlord" Merliss, about a violation oI a "housing code, a health code" ("A
landlord may not evict a tenant in retaliation Ior the tenant making a good Iaith complaint
about the violation oI a housing code, a health code, a criminal law, or the Fair Housing Act
to either a governmental agency, the landlord or law enIorcement or has sued the landlord Ior
such violation. NRS 118a.510...". Further, NRS 118A.510 covers "a violation oI this
Chapter", which would included NRS 118A.335, which may be read to go in line with
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Coughlin's discrimination complaints. "Reno City Charter reIerence Authority to adopt
uniIorm codes, 2.110. Sec. 14.04.100. - International Residential Code....uniIorm codes,
NRS 268,012; city building codes, NRS 268.413, 278.580 (noxious weed ordinance,
insulation requiremeents, porch landing saIety issues). International Residential Code 2006 as
adopted by City oI Reno Charter with 2011 weed height amendment: '302.4 Weeds. All
premises and exterior property shall be maintained Iree Irom weeds or plant growth in excess
oI 8 inches in height. All noxious weeds shall be prohibited. Weeds shall be deIined as all
grasses, annual plants, and vegetation, other than trees or shrubs provided,; however, this term
shall not include cultivated Ilowers and gardens. Insulation mold: a. The minimum R-value
Ior ceilings is Iurther based on a minimum 6-inch (151 mm) heel height to allow the ceiling
insulation to extend over the top plate. b. The minimum R-value Ior basement wall to be
applied at the time oI Iinishing the basement. c. R-values are minimums. U-Iactors and SHGC
are maximums. R-19 insulation shall be permitted to be compressed into a 2 6 cavity. d. The
Ienestration U-Iactor column excludes skylights. The solar heat gain coeIIicient (SHGC)
column" (MROA 548).
Clearly, Couglhin made numerous complaints to the landlord under NRS 118A.510
that concerned "a violation oI" NRS 118A, including section 118A.290. The complaints with
respect to the toilet's broken wax ring and pooling urine slude between February 2011 to
March 2011 are within the 6 month time Irame that some states apply in some manner as
creating a presumption oI retaliation. However, it is upon reviewing the email oI 6:43 pm oI
8/11/11 by Coughlin and the retaliatory conduct just a scant three and halI hours later by
Merliss that the temporal connection between Coughlin's engaging in protected conduct (NRS
118A.510(b)) is met with retaliatory conduct by Merliss. To wit:
MROA ??" "Re: status...8/11/11 Zach Coughlin To Matt Merliss From: ZC
(zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Thu 8/11/11 :43 PM To: Matt Merliss
(magundaaol.com)......no one has compensated me for the damage done to my property
by the landscaping crew. The damage and labor required to repaie it was at least $1,.
Ms. Sharpe admitted the crew. Knew oI the existence oI any issues related to lthe weed
pullin.g prior to submitting a bid, then they put my carefully installed proprty in the street
and refused to put it back. I suggested to you in writing that you not pay them till my
damages were adressed....wrote you about the fallen insulation in the downstairs and the
exposed mold both in the Iloor board and the insulation. You never responded. Please do."
The above correspondence reiterates Coughlin's NRS 118A.290 habitability
complaints as they relate to the weeds (which, contrary to Judge SIerrazza's Iinding,
absolutely involved NRS 118A.290 in light oI NRS 118A.050's deIinition oI such code's, and
the City oI Reno's adoption oI the International Residential Code, particularly where the
sections Coughlin made complaints with respect to concern: the health, safety, sanitation or
fitness for habitation,", but, on top oI that, also relate to the extent to which the "dwelling
unit" portion oI the premises "substantially lacked" that which is set out under NRS
118A.290(a)-(h)
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: see MROA 673 to 684 (photographs transcending the pleadings) and 693 to 707 (emails
between the tenant and landlord and landlord's attorney's going way beyond a scintilla):
(a):cracked Iront window, and insulation issues; MROA 33, 39-40, 54, 57, 67, 172, etc...
(b) Plumbing Iacilities: broken wax ring on toilet causing pooling urine slude behind toilet,
MROA 209
(c) A water supply approved under applicable law, which is: (2) Furnished to appropriate
Iixtures; and (3) Connected to a sewage disposal system approved under applicable law and
maintained in good working order...MROA 209, 375,
(d) Adequate heating Iacilities...(insulation issues)
(e) Electrical lighting, outlets, wiring and electrical equipment...dangling/Ialling light
Iixture in oIIice: MROA 375
(I) ...The landlord shall arrange Ior the removal oI garbage and rubbish Irom the
premises...(arguably the landscapers tearing up Coughlins' Iaux grass installation and leaving
it strewn about the property, sidewalks, and surrounding streets qualiIies; MROA 39, 54, 143,
173, 208 1201)
(g) Building, grounds, appurtenances and all other areas under the landlord`s control at the
time oI the commencement oI the tenancy in every part clean, sanitary and reasonably Iree
Irom all accumulations oI debris, Iilth, rubbish, garbage, rodents, insects and vermin.
(arguably the landscapers tearing up Coughlins' Iaux grass installation and leaving it strewn
about the property, sidewalks, and surrounding streets qualiIies; MROA 39, 54, 143, 173, 208
1201)
(h) Floors, walls, ceilings, stairways and railings maintained in good repair.: Coughlin
complaint to the landlord on numerous occasions regarding the mold in the ceiling and Iloor,
and the crumbling steps in the Iront and back oI the premises: MROA 40, 54, 102, 143, 172,
177, 207, 307, 311, 312, 322, 527, 546.
"written notices I have sent Matt that have gone unresponded to, Ior things like, a
broken window, broken sprinkler system, Iallen insulation, etc. Further, Matt approved things
like repairing the crumbling Iront steps, etc. He provided directions such as "get two estimates
and choose the cheapest one and deduct it Irom the rent..." Well, repairing crumbling steps is
not super cheap. Matt seems to have Iorgotten about these written deals entirely....written
notices I have sent Matt that have gone unresponded to, Ior things like, a broken window,
broken sprinkler system, Iallen insulation, etc. Further, Matt approved things like repairing
the crumbling Iront steps, etc. He provided directions such as "get two estimates and choose
the cheapest one and deduct it Irom the rent..." Well, repairing crumbling steps is not super
cheap. Matt seems to have Iorgotten about these written deals entirely.... The steps have been
repaired. As has the garbage disposal and other items. The window is still broken, Matt never
responded to requests Ior the cost oI noxious weed ordinance Iine avoiding landscaping the
previous season (I would, Ior now, take the same $350 I agreed to this season, which is surely
less than Matt paid the crew oI 4 men to service the neighboring house Ior 8 hours recently)
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with jagged edges oI glass exposed, and an entryway with grip strips and wooden planks that
are in disrepair. I have a law oIIice to run and cannot both pay rent and be the pro bono
handyman Ior the absentee landlord while he is oII travelling to Amsterdam and Bangkok. I
made a very reasonable oIIer to Matt to Iix it. I made an incredibly reasonable oIIer to Matt to
have the seasonal noxious weed ordinance Iine avoiding weeding taken care oI Ior $350,
which he enthusiastically agreed to, then a landscaping crew promptly came and ripped up a
Iaux grass installation that had cost me a great deal oI time and money to put in place, then
reIused to put that personal property back on my rental property at all, leaving it on the
sidewalk and in the street. 700 square Ieet oI Iaux grass (actually high density woolen green
carpet that is Iar more expensive than simple "astroturI") is not something you want to just
leave out in the street, and it is deIinately somethign you don't want to have to move and
install twice, especially while your landlord is apparently so well oI that he can agree to a a
$350 rent deduction Ior the exact same thing he later hires a landscaping crew to do while he
is in the Phillipeans, again.
Further, on approximately August 26th the Iirst oI numerous phone calls were made to
Richard G. Hill, Esq. And Casey Baker, Esq. On September 6, 2011 a writen motion was sent
by the undersigned the attorney's Baker and Hill, included with a letter again requesting these
attorney's withdraw and attempt at a summary eviction proceeding or enIorcement oI any
requirment that the undersigned be required to pay into the Justice Court escrow account so
inIlated a past due rent Iigure as that included by Casey Baker, Esq. The 5 day Notice to Quit/
Notice oI Summary Eviction and the improper retaliatory nature oI the NO Cause
Termination Notice to Vacate., thereby satisIying NRCP 11(c)(1)(A). A True and Correct
copy oI the August 17, 2011 correspondence and the September 6, 2011 correspondence is
attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Landlord has violated NRS 118A.290 in his Iailure to repair,
well aIter 14 days oI written notice, items such as a broken Iront bedroom window (complete
with jagged exposed edges oI glass), Iallen insulation that has appeared to resulted in the
creation oI potentially toxis mold when it came in contact with the ground below, which
lacked a vapor shield, a toilet with a deIective was ring, the Iront stairs to Tenant's
home/oIIice came to a state oI disrepair, replete with crumbling risers that presented a saIety
hazard and liability issues. Landlord agreed to a signiIicant rent deduction in exchange Ior
arranging to have the work done and paying Ior the work itselI, yet now Landlord seems to
have Iorgotten these written correspondences, etc. Landlord agreed to a variety oI rent
deductions, including those related to the crumbling concrete steps at the entry door to the
house. At least $1,000 is to be deducted Irom any rent owed and counsel Iiled pleading which
completely ignored the Iact that Landlord agreed to such a deduction. Similar deductions oI at
least $... are due Ior disposal repair and other matters. Basic inquiry would have revealed to
Landlord's counsel and Landlord himselI that Landlord clearly agreed in writing to a $350
deduction Ior seasonal weeding/yardwork, and another $350 is owed in rent deductions Ior
the prior seasons weeding/yardwork as well (all requisite notice was provided in writing) 57
Am. Jur. ProoI oI Facts 3d 127, Commercial Tenant's Remedies Where Landlord Fails to
Keep Premises in Condition Fit or Suitable Ior Commercial Use. 25 Causes oI Action 2d 493,
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Cause oI Action Ior Breach oI Implied Warranty oI Habitability in Residential Lease. "
MROA 40.
NRS 118A.050: "'Building, housing and health codes deIined. 'Building, housing
and health codes include any law, orainance or governmental regulation concerning:
1. Health, saIety, sanitation or fitness for habitation; or
2. The construction, maintenance, operation, occupancy, use or appearance, oI any
premises or dwelling unit."
NRS 118A.290 Habitability oI dwelling unit.
1. The landlord shall at all times during the tenancy maintain the dwelling unit in a
habitable condition. A dwelling unit is not habitable if it violates provisions of housing or
health codes concerning the health, safety, sanitation or fitness for habitation of the
dwelling unit or iI it substantially lacks:
(I) ...The landlord shall arrange Ior the removal of garbage and rubbish from the
premises unless the parties by written agreement provide otherwise.
(h) Floors, walls, ceilings, stairways and railings maintained in good repair."
MROA 1210-1215:
"All I need do at "trial" in this summary proceedign was show a legal deIense under a prima
Iacie summary judgment standard. That requires the Judge to assume all my assertions are
true, and iI assumed true, whether they could reasonably provide a deIense. Clearly they do.
Some kind oI prooI beyond a reasonable doubt standard was impermissibly applied to
everything I asserted...NRS 118A.290 Habitability oI dwelling unit. 1. The landlord shall at
all times during the tenancy maintain the dwelling unit in a habitable condition. A dwelling
unit is not habitable iI it violates provisions oI housing or health codes concerning the health,
saIety, sanitation or Iitness Ior habitation oI the dwelling unit or iI it substantially lacks: (a)
EIIective waterprooIing and weather protection oI the rooI and exterior walls, including
windows and doors. yep, complained about and provided HD pictures oI gnarly cracked
exposed windows paine caulked in knives oI glass sticking out saIety hazard, pointed to Reno
Municipal Code, which adopts the International Residential code, particular provisions cited
to in the record. Additionally, the moldy insulation problems and evidence apply to this
section, as due the (b) Plumbing Iacilities which conIormed to applicable law when installed
and which are maintained in good working order. yep, urine sludge toilet disaster area Merliss
couldn't be bothered with applies here, written evidence was provided at trial and testiomony
on direct and cross examination put into evidence as well (c) A water supply approved under
applicable law, which is: (1) Under the control oI the tenant or landlord and is capable oI
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producing hot and cold running water; (2) Furnished to appropriate Iixtures; and (3)
Connected to a sewage disposal system approved under applicable law and maintained in
good working order to the extent that the system can be controlled by the landlord. (d)
Adequate heating Iacilities which conIormed to applicable law when installed and are
maintained in good working order. (e) Electrical lighting, outlets, wiring and electrical
equipment which conIormed to applicable law when installed and are maintained in good
working order. yep, provided notice oI the electrical issues, lack oI outlets per walls, Iallen
overhead ceiling light Iixture, pictures oI, etc.testimony on direct and cross examination at
"trial" was introduced into evidence. (I) An adequate number oI appropriate receptacles Ior
garbage and rubbish in clean condition and good repair at the commencement oI the tenancy.
The landlord shall arrange Ior the removal oI garbage and rubbish Irom the premises unless
the parties by written agreement provide otherwise. Green Action Lawn Services actions in
destroying property and leaving it strewn about bring this section into play into play. Media
evidence and testimony and written documention introduced in evidence at trial is herein
incorporated. (g) Building, grounds, appurtenances and all other areas under the landlord's
control at the time oI the commencement oI the tenancy in every part clean, sanitary and
reasonably Iree Irom all accumulations oI debris, Iilth, rubbish, garbage, rodents, insects and
vermin. yep conversion theIt destruction oI green woolen carpet Iaux lawn Green Action
Lawn Services actions in destroying property and leaving it strewn about bring this section
into play. Media evidence and testimony and written documention introduced in evidence at
trial is herein incorporated. (h) Floors, walls, ceilings, stairways and railings maintained in
good repair. yep, complained oI and provided pictures oI Iloor in Iront oI Iront door (rotted
deck, peeled grip strips), and crumbling stairs leading to Iront door entrance additionally, the
moldy insulation Iits within this section, written notice May 14, 2011, HD pictures provided
to Merliss (i) Ventilating, air-conditioning and other Iacilities and appliances, including
elevators, maintained in good repair iI supplied or required to be supplied by the landlord.
moldy insulation may come under this section, too, considering the respiratory problems
incident to mold spores Also written complaint oI a back door lock was introduced into
evidence at trial and within pleadings on Iile. 2. The landlord and tenant may agree that the
tenant is to perIorm speciIied repairs, maintenance tasks and minor remodeling only iI: (a)
The agreement oI the parties is entered into in good Iaith; and (b) The agreement does not
diminish the obligations oI the landlord to other tenants in the premises. Yep, landlord
welched on the agreements though then retroactively tried to apply all these documentation
requirements and other retaliatory attempts to weasel his way out oI the deals pleadings on
Iile testiony at trial introduced into evidence incorporated hererin. 3. An agreement pursuant
to subsection 2 is not entered into in good Iaith iI the landlord has a duty under subsection 1
to perIorm the speciIied repairs, maintenance tasks or minor remodeling and the tenant enters
into the agreement because the landlord or his or her agent has reIused to perIorm them. this
may be applicable too! all evidence introduced in pleadings or at trial incorporated herein, this
includes photos, emails, and testimony at trial (Added to NRS by 1977, 1336; A 1999, 1229;
2007, 1284) NRS 118A.510 Retaliatory conduct by landlord against tenant prohibited;
remedies; exceptions. (MROA 1213) 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, the
landlord may not, in retaliation, terminate a tenancy, reIuse to renew a tenancy, increase rent
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or decrease essential services required by the rental agreement or this chapter, or bring or
threaten to bring an action Ior possession iI: (a) The tenant has complained in good Iaith oI a
code; complained oI "noxious weed ordinance" and indicated that tenants seems to remember
calling Reno Direct about it....prima Iacie showing, must assume assertions to be true, not
make ruling on whether or not they are....void judgment, may have contacted legal aid
attorney about the matter (b) The tenant has complained in good Iaith to the landlord or a law
enIorcement agency oI a violation oI this chapter or oI a speciIic statute that imposes a
criminal penalty; yep, lots oI violations evinced in email correspondences to landlord, toilet,
window, stairs, deck Iloor, back stairs, patio Iloor in back, ceiling light, disposal, moldy
insulation, broken slat oI wood on back deck, tesimony on direct and cross at trial, pleadings
on Iile incorporated by reIerence herein. (c) The tenant has organized or become a member oI
a tenant`s union or similar organization; MROA 1214). (d) A citation has been issued
resulting Irom a complaint described in paragraph (a); (e) The tenant has instituted or
deIended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the tenant
raised an issue oI compliance with the requirements oI this chapter respecting the habitability
oI dwelling units; well, this will be interesting, now, do you recall whether I Iiled or argued
authority to support the contention that "instituted" and or "arbitrated" Iit nicely with the Iacts
in the present case? Check your records. Your guy both brought and threatened to bring an
action against me, I deIended against that threat and instituted my own by sending a litigation
demand letter to him... (I) The tenant has Iailed or reIused to give written consent to a
regulation adopted by the landlord, aIter the tenant enters into the rental agreement, which
requires the landlord to wait until the appropriate time has elapsed beIore it is enIorceable
against the tenant; or I reIused to consent to a unilateral changed in the 48 hours written
notice requirement prior to inspection sought by Merliss. (g) The tenant has complained in
good Iaith to the landlord, a government agency, an attorney, a Iair housing agency or any
other appropriate body oI a violation oI NRS 118.010 to 118.120, inclusive, or the Fair
Housing Act oI 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., or has otherwise exercised rights which are
guaranteed or protected under those laws. yep, I complained in writing to Merliss, the Beverly
Hills High School Neurosurgeon landlord about his discriminating against me Ior being
entitled and his clear pattern and practice oI preIerring docile Hispanic tenants and workers.
documentary evidence and testiomony introduced at trial and in the pleadings on Iile in this
and the associated REV2011-001492 are incorporated herein by reIerence. Further, Judge
SIerrazza clearly made the impermissible and inaccurate statement that the discrimination
laws, such as Fair Housing violations, do not apply to me becaue I am a "white male".
Clearly, the do, as they laws are required to be applied in a "Iacially neutral" manner by,
amongst other authority, the Equal Protection Clause oI the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Consitution. 2. II the landlord violates any provision oI subsection 1, the tenant
is entitled to the remedies provided in NRS 118A.390 and has a deIense in any retaliatory
action by the landlord Ior possession...." (MROA 1215).
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MROA 1209 Couglin's MOtion to Continue in Possession implicating the disability
provision in NRS 40.251(4).
A landlord may not evict a tenant in retaliation Ior the tenant making a good Iaith complaint
about the violation oI a housing code, a health code, a criminal law, or the Fair Housing Act
to either a governmental agency, the landlord or law enIorcement or has sued the landlord Ior
such violation. NRS 118a.510: Retaliatory Conduct prohibited: Complaints retaliated against
Ior: NRS 118A.335 Landlord prohibited Irom employing certain persons without work card
under certain circumstances; requirements governing issuance and renewal oI work card;
exceptions. Noxious weed ordinance: Reno City Charter reIerence Authority to adopt
uniIorm codes, 2.110. Sec. 14.04.100. - International Residential Code. The 2006...(MROA
547) Edition oI the International Residential Code including Appendix Chapters G and H
Copyright 2006 by the International Code Council marked as "Exhibit C"; together with such
changes to the Residential Code, as are necessary to make the same applicable to the
conditions in the city which are marked "Exhibit B"; all oI which is adopted by reIerence and
incorporated herein and made a part hereoI as iI set Iorth in Iull. (Ord. No. 6092, 3, 2-11-09)
(109) State Law reIerence Authority to adopt uniIorm codes, NRS 268,012; city building
codes, NRS 268.413, 278.580 (noxious weed ordinance, insulation requiremeents, porch
landing saIety issues). International Residential Code 2006 as adopted by City oI Reno
Charter with 2011 weed height amendment: '302.4 Weeds. All premises and exterior property
shall be maintained Iree Irom weeds or plant growth in excess oI 8 inches in height. All
noxious weeds shall be prohibited. Weeds shall be deIined as all grasses, annual plants, and
vegetation, other than trees or shrubs provided,; however, this term shall not include
cultivated Ilowers and gardens. Insulation mold: a. The minimum R-value Ior ceilings is
Iurther based on a minimum 6-inch (151 mm) heel height to allow the ceiling insulation to
extend over the top plate. b. The minimum R-value Ior basement wall to be applied at the
time oI Iinishing the basement. c. R-values are minimums. U-Iactors and SHGC are
maximums. R-19 insulation shall be permitted to be compressed into a 2 6 cavity. d. The
Ienestration U-Iactor column excludes skylights. The solar heat gain coeIIicient (SHGC)
column (MROA 548)...applies to all glazed Ienestration. e. R-5 shall be added to the required
slab edge Rvalues Ior heated slabs. For SI: 1 Btu/hr (hr-Ieet2F) 5.68 W/meters2 K; one
(hrIoot2 F)/Btu 0.176 meters2 K/W Exception: QualiIying buildings which have installed
therein either a high-eIIiciency gas Iurnace having a minimum 90 AFUE rating, or high-
eIIiciency heat pumps having a minimum 8.0 HSPF and 13 SEER, shall be permitted to apply
the high eIIicient trade-oII listed below Ior exterior above grade walls, basement walls, slab
perimeter insulation, and crawl space walls. All other Iactors remain the same: (MROA 549).
Couglin's 10/25/11 Motion Ior Summary Judgement/Trial Statment made clear the
extent to which both the mold and insulation issues implicated NRS 118A.290 habitability.
MROA 555: "2. Reno City Charter reIerence; Reno Municipal Code (20 pagcs)- Authority to
adopt uniIonn codes, 2.110. Sec. 14.04.100. - International Residential Code. The 2006
Edition oI the International Residential Code including Appendix Chapters G and H
Copyright 2006 by the International Code Council marked as "Exhibit C"; together with such
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changes to the Residential Code, as are necessary to make the same applicable to the
conditions in the city which are marked "Exhibit B"; all oI which is adopted by reIerence and
incorporated herein and made a part hereoI as iI set Iorth in Iull. (Ord. No. 6092, 3, 2-11-
09)"
See, also, MROA 559, where Coughlin attached the applicable provisions oI the Reno
Municipal Code
Further, leaving the Iaux grass installation strewn about the property, sidewalk, and
street implicated the prohitibation against "debris" in .290.
For some reason Judge SIerrazza continually seemed really, really unaware oI NRS
118A.510(b)'s Iirst prong: "(b) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord or a
law enforcement agency of a violation of this chapter ...", but Coughlin clearly pled such a
deIense, and his emails to Merliss, and the materials he submitted demonstrating that there are
indeed
From the Iace oI the record, it was only upon Couglin sending Merliss an email at 6:43
pm on 8/11/11 making complaints that including those covering habitability issues pursuant to
NRS 118A.290, and indicating the rent deductions under NRS 118A.360 pursuant to
Coughlin's correspondences with Merliss (on top oI that which is not necessarily a NRS
118A.360 rent deduction situation, but merely Coughlin approaching the resolution oI his
habitability complains via the mechanisms Merliss agreed to in writing, ie "get two estimates
and pick the cheapest one, deduct it Irom the rent"...), Merliss then engaged in per se
retaliation per NRS 118A.510 by "threating to bring" an "action Ior possession" immediately
aIter Coughlin asserted his rights under the various sections oI NRS 118A (NRS 118A.290,
118A.360, NRS 118A.510(b),(e),(I),(g) )
MROA ??" "Re: status...8/11/11 Zach Coughlin To Matt Merliss From: ZC
(zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Thu 8/11/11 :43 PM To: Matt Merliss
(magundaaol.com)......no one has compensated me for the damage done to my property
by the landscaping crew. The damage and labor required to repaie it was at least $1,000.
Ms. Sharpe admitted the crew. Knew oI the existence oI any issues related to lthe weed
pullin.g prior to submitting a bid, then they put my carefully installed proprty in the street
and refused to put it back. I suggested to you in writing that you not pay them till my
damages were adressed....wrote you about the fallen insulation in the downstairs and the
exposed mold both in the Iloor board and the insulation. You never responded. Please do."
Coulg
MROA ??: "...To zachcoughlinhotmail.com, melissa.l.ulloagmail.com From:
Matt Merliss (magundaaol.com) Sent: Thu 8/11/11 1: PM To:
zachcoughlinhotmail.com ...paying your rent does not depend on the alleged
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communication with me and allow workers and darlene to enter the house , iI
communication Ialls apart, if i don't receive a check in a timely fashion or if darlene or
workers are not allowed to enter...i'm aIraid i will...pursue legal recourse..."
Further ambiguity in the lease relates to Paragraph 22 therein, as to whether Coughlin
or Merliss was to be responsible Ior "taking care oI the weeds". Whereas the lease mentions
only the "lawn and surround grounds", Merliss himselI apparently Ielt such language
suIIiciently ambiguous as to the "dirt yard" as to assent to a $350 rent deduction on May 17th,
2011 in exchange Ior Coughlin "taking care oI the weeds". However, on May 23rd, 2011,
Merliss also arranged Ior the Green Action landscapers to also address the weeds, and in the
process, they damaged Coughlin's personalty and business. It was only upon Coughlin
complaining oI both the City oI Reno code violation presented by the weeds (which is, thus, a
per se habitability issue) and oI the criminal activity attendant to Green Action taking, and
carrying away Coughlins' property and thereby destroying it or maniIesting an intent to
permanently deprive Coughlin thereoI (the green woolen Iax carpeting that Coughlin had
installed over the "dirt yard" suIIicent to "take care oI the weeds" via presenting an
impediment to photosynthesis was removed by the landscapers and throw on the street and
surrounding sidewalks, with Green Action reIusing to even assist in returing such personalty
to Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice, much less installing such in the careIully ordered and
notched manner in which Coughlin had taken the preceeding three to Iour complete days
doing himselI.
See also, MROA 2475-76: "-2. Whether the tenancy was 'expired or 'terminated
such that NRS 40.360(3) would be implicated? The Lease Agreement is actually strongly in
support oI a Iinding contrary to that made by Judge SIerrazza, where, at Subsection 3 it reads:
'3. HOLDOVER: Under Nevada law this Rental Agreement and any changes properly agreed
to will remain in eIIect on a monthly basis aIter the initial term. A 30 day written notice to
vacate must be issued by the Resident prior to vacating (NOTE: it does not say "by the
landlord prior to" Iorcing a tenant, whom the landlord is not alleging Iail to pay rent, and
whom is using a portion oI the "premises" as a "commercial premises" precluding the use oI
NRS 40.254) anytime during or aIter the initial term oI this agreement.
The 10/25/11 Transcript reads:
"Your Honor, Ior -- when last you saw me on October 17th, I listened to the hearing
and it seemed like I wasn`t getting to what you wanted me to get to, which was the most
important thing, to establish material issue oI facts, to make a prima facie case that I have a
legal defense to the --
1udge: Well, I accept that you did and that's why we're having the Trial today.
Defendant: And that's -- I'm glad you bring that up. You said Trial, Your Honor. You didn`t
say summary eviction, you didn`t say summary execution. You said Trial, plenary--
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1udge: Trial on a retaliatory nature oI the eviction. I assumed you made a prima facie case
on that as there's no Trial on the issue. It is summary as to whether or not you were given
notice served, which the court Iinds you were, with a notice to terminate your lease.
Defendant: II I can just quickly interject Ior the record, Your Honor--
1udge: Unless you had -- unless you have a lease to show that you're not there at will at this
point.
Defendant: There -- Ior the record, there was no certificate oI mailing, US postal service
certificate mailing on Iile with respect to a notice. In the context oI summary eviction
proceedings, courts are directed to adhere very strictly to the notes requirements given the
summary nature oI it. That's one saIeguard that is insisted upon. A right to a jury Trial is
granted by the United States Supreme Court Irom -- in summary -- in eviction cases. Jury
Trial is an absolute right Ior all citizens in the United States. I said it's a 1970s case. I think it
might be called Pearson. I believe I cite to it in my case. I don't know that a certificate of
mailing is required whereas Mr. Baker did. He had apparently a process server, post
something on the door and contest to that. I think that might be a |INDISCERNIBLE 12:40|
Supreme Court to clariIy the statute at some point."
"1udge: The notice oI termination, no-cause termination is B; the Iive-day notice unlawIul
detainer Ior Iailure to vacate is C.
Plaintiff: Okay. Your Honor, with ---
1udge: BeIore we get into that though I`m trying to straighten up this Iile. I`m going to put
my orders on the leIt so I can find them. Okay. service must be pursuant to 40.250 and
40.280 sets the method oI service. Okay, so you`re on Exhibit C, Exhibit C is the Iive-day
notice.
Plaintiff: Go on.
1udge: Yes.
Plaintiff: There are two oI those documents. I just want the court to be clear. On September
27th at our hearing I personally hand delivered one oI those to Mr. Coughlin. I don`t know
which one you have in your hand.
1udge: Well, this one ---
Plaintiff: The |13:00| service will say.
1udge: --- is, I don`t know who it`s signed by, to see you have to come up and look at it. It
says |J. Durden 13.16|
Plaintiff: Okay, that`s, that`s |13:19| what happened, Your Honor, was on September 27th I
handed one oI these to Mr. Coughlin at the hearing. When I get back to the oIIice I thought
perhaps that`s not appropriate you better have it served as well. So, we had it served this well.
The court has the correct one.
1udge: Alright. Well, this one shows service by J. Durden.
Plaintiff: Yes.
1udge: And it indicates by posting a copy.
Plaintiff: And mailing, sir.
1udge: Where is the US certificate postal service mailing?
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Plaintiff: Your Honor, I have the original here. I`m going to see what these.
1udge: I do have a copy oI them |14.40| envelope.
Plaintiff: That`s generally what we get back Irom them, sir.
1udge: But the certificate of mailing is a little Iorm.
Plaintiff: Well, Your Honor, these the affidavit declaration oI service which is page 4 or
5. And this is US Supreme Court Iorm. This is what they Iilled out when they posted in mail.
Generally they will give us a photocopy oI the envelope as well. But I don`t see that on this.
1udge: So, the envelope`s here I have.
Plaintiff: Okay.
1udge: But not there is the United States postal service certificate of mailing. However, the
statement signed by the tenant and the witness acknowledging the tenant received the notice
or B, a certificate of mailing issued by the United States postal service or C, the
endorsement oI a sheriII constable or other process server stating the time and manner oI
service. So ---
Plaintiff: That`s what we have here, sir.
1udge: And that`s what the deIendant was arguing with ambiguous but I have ruled
previously that iI it is a licensed process server, the certificate of mailing is not required iI
they Iill out the affidavit as they have done in this case. And, so, to the extent that that is your
Objection I am going to hold that the Exhibit C meets the statutory requirements. And Exhibit
C is Iurther incorporated and Exhibit D does contain the which is Exhibit 1 attached to
Exhibit D has the envelope showing the postage and mailing on August 22nd to Zachary
Defendant: so, and towards any doubt about it I do find it the proper certificate has been
Iurnished to the court. That means the requirements Ior the Iive-day notice and Iive-day
notice was given. It appears more than 30 days aIter the Exhibit B the August 22nd which
was the 30-day no cause. And then we have September 27th actually I think I was told
about the wrong document around here. September 27th was the when I talk about the Iive-
day notice previously and the envelope I was actually reIerring to the August 22nd 30-day
notice. The Iive-day notice was served more than 30 days aIter the 30-day notice so, that
meets the statutory requirements. Then we have I`m going to mark as Exhibit do we have
Exhibit E where the okay, Exhibit E is going to be the lease agreement.
Plaintiff: Your Honor, may I ---
1udge: Well, go ahead.
Plaintiff: I have such point out sir, the landlord`s affidavit Exhibit D is on the Iorm provided
by this court. The US Supreme Court has, as you know, we have these Iorms, the eviction
notice Iorms. However, they don`t have an affidavit Iorm Ior |19.26|. So, we submitted the
UnlawIul Detainer affidavit Exhibit D signed by Dr. Merliss. However, going back and just
looking at the stature there`s a make sure were covered NRS 40.254, I, as the landlord`s agent
Iile a declaration on October 19th which addresses the items in NRS 40.254 sub 2. I have
just one point to have to the court ---
1udge: No, I don`t have that I don`t believe. Where is that?
Plaintiff: That was Iiled on October 19th, sir.
Defendant: |20.04| Objection as to not having the landlord making that declaration and
hopeIully it serve as |20:14|.
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1udge: Well, I`m not ruling whether or not that meets the requirements but the affidavit can
be Iiled at the hearing. The landlord`s affidavit so.
Plaintiff: Yes, which it was the last time.
1udge: Huh?
Plaintiff: Which it was the last time. I just want to be sure that his court`s Iorm that the
statutory requirements. So, when we look at NRS 40.254, it authorizes an affidavit the
landlord or the landlord`s agent, I signed the affidavits or the ---
1udge: But I do not find in that affidavit that`s what I`m trying to say. You Iiled that on what
date?
Plaintiff: October 19th sir, at 3:41PM.
1udge: Okay, I have a letter Irom you.
Plaintiff: All I have is my Iile stamp copy.
1udge: I have the notice oI appeal to district court which was notice oI entry oI order dated
October 18th. And I have this declaration is that what you`re talking?
Plaintiff: Yes, declaration oI Casey Baker.
1udge: Alright. I`ll have that marked as Exhibit F. So, we have so, let me look at Exhibit F.
Defendant: And just I quickly state Ior the record Your Honor, the authority Ior strictly
construing the proper notice requirements I know you will |22.35| but just preserve it |22:40|
1udge: Well, I`m aware oI that but what you`re Iinding was not compliant with the, I mean,
what you`re arguing was not compliant with strict Rules.
Defendant: That |22.50| with respect to iI a licensed process server || he also have to go and
spend money to certificate of mailing to me it was, in a little bit.
1udge: The |23.00| licensed process server because they are required to meet certain
standards |23:09| get license.
Defendant: No.
1udge: Yes, the presumption is licensed process server is less likely |23.14|
Defendant: I guess just Irom my point oI view some oI the things I had experienced recently
with.
1udge: Well, sorry I`m overruling your Objection because I do find that it meets the strict
requirements oI the statutory.
Defendant: I`ve just heard details oI process servers going to |23.30|
1udge: Alright, sir. But that`s not evidence in this hearing either.
Defendant: And |23.38| statements about |23:41|.
1udge: You have the opportunity to subpoena the process server in this case. Okay, let`s just
so your affidavit sir, I do need someone to testiIy us to what`s contained there and about the
lease etc.
Plaintiff: Okay.
1udge: Since we are doing a hearing here, I do have Exhibit E and you are the counsel so I
would preIer to have your client do the actual testimony on the.
Plaintiff: That`s Iine, sir. The affidavit was submitted pursuant to statute as the landlord`s
agent and.
1udge: No, I know but you are not going to be testiIying today, right?
Plaintiff: I don`t think so unless we get to that.
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1udge: Alright. So, the issue beIore me is what`s alleged in your affidavit at least that portion
which starts at the, I think it`s page 2, starting at paragraph 8, iI we can.
Plaintiff: Yeah.
1udge: And you can remain there iI you wish, Doctor, iI you will please raise your right
hand. Do you swear under penalty oI perjury to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth? Doctor: I do.
1udge: Alright. Please be seated. Would you proceed then with examinations?
Plaintiff: Okay. Your Honor.
1udge: Maybe we can reIer to Exhibit E which is or whatever or you want the landlord`s
here`s.
Defendant: Well, what I need is.
1udge: . Exhibit D and E which has all the documents iI you need.
Defendant: Yes, sir. Okay, one moment, it thought we had covered it. The last hearing so,
just trying to find my own copies.
1udge: Wow, why don`t you use the court`s copies so we can expedite this, I`m just trying to
make sure we have a record because I do not remember precisely what was covered at the last
hearing. I do not think that we had your affidavit wasn`t even Iiled |26.16| at the last
hearing.
Defendant: That`s correct but the landlord`s affidavit was.
1udge: Yeah, I understand but the landlord`s affidavit didn`t have everything in it that you
allege in your affidavit.
Defendant: I understand, sir.
1udge: Alright.
Defendant: Doctor Merliss, will you please state your name as spell your last name Ior the
record?
Dr. Merliss: Matthew Joel Merliss, M-E-R-L-I-S-S.
Plaintiff: Thank you. And you are the owner oI 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada? Dr. Merliss:
Yes.
Plaintiff: Okay. |26.46| what`s been marked Ior identiIication purposes as plaintiII`s Exhibit
E. Do you recognize this, doctor?
Dr. Merliss: Yes.
Plaintiff: Okay. What is it?
Dr. Merliss: It`s the altered lease agreement.
Defendant: I`m sorry, Objection did I get copy oI this, |27.16|. Was I able to use the court`s
records to because I`m |27:20|.
1udge: I did say you could use the court`s records. I said, you had to come get the documents
Irom me. I couldn`t find the documents they were in your court record, sir.
Plaintiff: That`s good.
1udge: That`s the diIIerence. I mean, I would have used your copies.
Plaintiff: I was Irom the old case, my mistake, Your Honor.
1udge: Okay. Proceed, sir.
Plaintiff: Is this the lease agreement with Mr. Coughlin and Ms. Ulloa Ior 121 River Rock,
Reno, Nevada?
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Dr. Merliss: Yes.
Plaintiff: |27.55| admit plaintiII`s Exhibit E, Your Honor?
1udge: Any Objections, sir?
Defendant: No, sir, Your Honor.
1udge: E is admitted.
Plaintiff: Thank you, sir. I want you to take a look at Exhibit E, please. Can you tell me, sir
Irom looking Exhibit E when the tenancy commenced?
Dr. Merliss: February 2010.
Plaintiff: Okay.
Dr. Merliss: February 20th.
Plaintiff: I want you to take a look at paragraph 2, Iourth line down. It says,
excuse me.
Defendant: I`m sorry, Objection. I was authorizing the copy?
1udge: OI the lease? You have a copy oI the lease. But iI you don`t come up here, I`ll give
you one.
Defendant: As long as it Your Honor, when I submit documents I can say well, you got a
copy oI that || summary judgment || no problems || the right one but I`m || reIerred Counsel
Baker said.
1udge: Here, please come up, sir. And this.
Plaintiff: I have a copy, Your Honor. In the Iile.
1udge: Well, wait a second. This was Iurnished to you in last.
Plaintiff: Last hearing.
1udge: .this is I do want you to come up, I do want you to come up, sir, and look at this. II
you do not have this then I will stop and we`ll make copies.
Plaintiff: Yes, sir. I have it. It`s just, when it comes time Ior me to give |29.30| I want. || I
might need to say.
1udge: As long as he has them we will.
Plaintiff: Okay.
1udge: We will accommodate you but iI the court doesn`t have a copy I have direct copy.
These were in the court Iiles. Alright? Okay.
Plaintiff: Thanks.
1udge: Proceed, Mr. Baker.
Plaintiff: Let me just rephrase my question. Dr. Merliss, please look at paragraph 2 oI the
lease Exhibit E.
Dr. Merliss: terms?
Plaintiff: Yes. Do you see on the Iourth line where the lease states commencing on the Iirst
day oI March 2010, do you see that?
Dr. Merliss: Yes.
Plaintiff: Okay. Is that your understanding when the lease began?
Dr. Merliss: Yes.
Plaintiff: And what was the term, how many months?
Dr. Merliss: That`s for 12 months.
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Plaintiff: Okay. So, iI the terminal lease was 12 months and it began on March 1, 2010 when
it would have ended?
Dr. Merliss: Yes, March 1, 2011.
Plaintiff: Well. One year, right?
Dr. Merliss: Yes.
Defendant: Objection, |30.52|
Dr. Merliss: Yes, would be one year.
1udge: The Objection is sustained but the answer is one year, so.
Plaintiff: Thank you.
Dr. Merliss: Would be one year.
Plaintiff: Alright, thank you. So one year would be February 28, 2011, is that correct? Dr.
Merliss: Yes.
Plaintiff: Will you please go to the next paragraph, paragraph 3, and titled hold over, do you
see that?
Dr. Merliss: Yes.
Plaintiff: Will you read the Iirst Iull sentence in that paragraph? How about the.
Dr. Merliss: |31.20| agreement or any changes |properly agreed | to will remain in the fact
on a monthly basis aIter the initial term.
Plaintiff: Thank you. Your Honor, this point Dr. Merliss has already authenticated the
service oI the eviction notices and I believe that covers everything in my affidavit that was
diIIerent Irom his.
1udge: Alright. Then I will admit B, C, D, E, and F.
Plaintiff: Thank you, sir."
NRS 40.400 makes NRCP 4(e)(3) applicable: "(3) Statutory Service. Whenever a
statute provides for service, service may be made under the circumstances and in the manner
prescribed by the statute". There is nothing
Further establishing the wrongIulness oI the criminal trespass arrest and conviction
(such charge was a legal impossibility as there still has yet to be "entry oI order" denying
Coughlin's 11/3/11 Petition) and all the NRS 118A.460 misconduct thereaIter (and the
overabundance oI redactions oI billing entries in the "Activity Reports" by Merliss's attorneys
is telling, though they did have an entry making mention oI such a disability stay motion,
so...) 2....iI a tenant with a periodic tenancy...has a physical or mental disability, the tenant
may request to be allowed to continue in possession ... by submitting a written request...and
providing prooI oI the tenant`s age or disability. ...
4.... the tenant may petition the court Ior an order to continue in possession (Coughlin's
11/3/11 Motion Ior Stay did just that)...II the tenant submits proof to the court ...II the court
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denies the petition, the tenant must be allowed to continue in possession for 5 calendar days
following the date of entry of the order denying the petition."
So, the gerrymandering away oI Coughlin's rights, Ior those counting at home, includes
those in NRS 40.251(4), RMC 8.10.010, NRS 40.253, .254, .280, .385, NRS 118A.355(2). .
360, NRAP 10, 11, 30, 32, JCRCP 2, 108, 109, etc., etc.
Merliss's counsel never actually grasped the limiting import oI the listing in NRS
40.254 oI the "certain types of property" to which a landlord could avail himselI oI the
"Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and exclusion of tenant from certain types of
property" where such section Iails to list a "commercial premises" amongst those "certain
types oI property" (in contrast to "commercial premises" being speciIically mentioned in
NRS 40.253(5)(a)...) to which the the landlord may "avail himselI oI the supplemental remedy
oI summary eviction" Iound in NRS 40.253.
NRS 40.254 "when the tenant oI a dwelling unit which is subject to the provisions oI
chapter 118A oI NRS, part oI a low-rent housing program operated by a public housing
authority, a mobile home or a recreational vehicle is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer, the
landlord is entitled to the summary procedures provided in NRS 40.253.
NRS 40.253(5)(a) applies to the Iollowing "types oI property": "...may apply ... Ior
eviction ...in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises...",
wherease, NRS 40.254 applies: "when the tenant oI a dwelling unit which is subject to the
provisions of chapter 118A of NRS, part oI a low-rent housing program operated by a public
housing authority, a mobile home or a recreational vehicle is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer..."
Plainly, a "commercial premises" is not among the "certain types oI property" to which the
"supplemental remedy oI summary eviction" set out in NRS 40.253 is available.
To discern the import oI NRS 40.254's "when the tenant oI a dwelling unit which is
subject to the provisions oI Chapter 118A oI NRS..." one necessarily must have a strong grasp
oI the deIinitions oI "dwelling unit", "premises" and the applicability provision ("subject to")
oI NRS 118A, then consider whether or not a "home law oIIice" and "law practice" and
"mattress business" that Coughlin also utilized as a "residence or sleeping place" would allow
Merliss to use summary eviction procedures against the portion oI the "premises" (NRS
118A.140) that Coughlin utilized as a "commercial premises" suIIicient to make a
jurisdictional bar voiding the summary eviction order and resulting criminal trespass
conviction (see 61901), and proposed disbarment (62337) the exclusion oI a "commercial
premises" Irom the "certain types oI property" to which a landlord proceeding on a "no-cause"
basis in a "holdover proceeding" is entitled ("NRS40.253UnlawIul detainer: Supplemental
remedy oI summary eviction and exclusion oI tenant Ior default in payment of rent")
NRS 118A.050 'Building, housing and health codes deIined.
NRS 118A.080 'Dwelling and 'dwelling unit deIined.
NRS 118A.140 'Premises deIined. NRS 118A.150
NRS 118A.170 'Tenant deIined.
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NRS 118A.180 Applicability.
Clearly, Merliss's composite aIIidavit (to whatever extent RPC 3.7 does not vitiate the
entirety oI Baker's Iraudulent 10/19/11 Declaration Pursuant to NRS 40.254(2)), even
allowing his testimony to "supplement" his aIIidavit (NRS 40.254
2
22 MAINTENANCE, REPAIRS, OR ALTERATIONS: Tenant acknowledges that
they premises are in good order and repair, unless otherwise indicated. Tenant will as his/her
own expense, maintain the premises in a clean sanitary manner including all equipment,
appliances, smoke detectors, plumbing, heating and air conditioning and will surrender the
same at termination in as good condition as received normal wear and tear excepted. Tenant
will not paint paper or otherwise redecorate or make alterations to the premises without the
prior written consent oI the Owner. All three prong outlets shall comply with all applicable
codes with respect to electrical grounding. Tenant will irrigate and maintain any surrounding
grounds, including laws and shrubbery, iI they are Ior the tenant's exclusive use. Tenant will
not permit any waste upon the premises or any nuisance or act which may disturb the quiet
enjoyment oI any tenant in the building. Owner will be responsible Ior the cost oI any
retroIitting required by governmental agencies.
23. DAMAGES TO PREMISES: II the premise are damaged by time or through any
other cause which renders the premises untenantable, either party will have the right to
terminated this Agreement as the date on which the damage occurs.
Written notice oI termination will be give to the other party within IiIteen (15) days aIter
occurrence oI such damage. Should such damage or destruction occur as the result oI
negligence oI Tenant, or his/her invitee, then only the Owner will have the right to terminate.
Should this right be exercised by her Owner or Tenant, the rent in the current month will be
prorated between the parties as oI the date the damage occurred. Any prepaid rent and unused
security deposit will be reIunded to Tenant. II this Agreement is not terminated, then Owner
will promptly repair the premises and there will be a proportionate reduction oI rent until the
premises are repaired and ready Ior Tenant's occupancy. The proportionate reduction will be
based on the extent which repairs interIere with Tenant's reasonable oI the premises.
24. POLICIES: Resident agrees to abide by any and all rules and policies including,
but not limited to, rules with respect to noise, odors, disposal oI reIuse, pets, parking and use
oI common areas. Further, Resident does not agree to abide by all amendments and additions
to these rules aIter due notice oI any such amendments or additions. Resident at the time oI
execution oI this Agreement acknowledges that he has notice oI all existing rules and
regulation pertaining to the Premises (Resident initials (note MU/ZC handwritten here).
25. INSPECTION: Resident agrees to grant management the right to enter the premise
as all reasonable times and Ior all reasonable purposes including showing to the perspective
residents, buyers, loan oIIicers or insurance agents or others with lawIul business therein and
Ior east one maintenance inspection each month. In accordance with NRS requirements,
Management agrees to give Resident twice the twenty (24) hour notiIication requirement Ior
entry.
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26. AMENITIES: Use oI washing machines or other equipment, in any, are Iurnished
by management Ior the pleasure and convenience oI Resident and are to be construed in a
manner as as a part oI the rent paid by the Resident. The swimming pool, recreational and
other service Iacilities, iI any, in the premises are Ior the use oI the Resident only, at the
discretion oI Management. Nothing
PAGE 2 OF 3
NOTE: Signed at the bottom oI the page by Merliss only, dated 2-14-10
ADDRESS 121 River Rock, Reno, NV 89503
herein shall be construed to require management, during the term oI the Agreement to keep
said swimming pool and other Iacilities in a condition Ior use by Resident, and the time oI
manner oI use, or the closing, temporarily or permanently oI said pool and Iacilities shall be at
the sole discretion oI management and in accordance with rules and regulations issued by
management. Any breach oI said rules and regulations shall constitute a breach hereto.
27. VEHICLES: All vehicles operated by resident must be registered with the
management. Only vehicles maintained and properly license may be parked in approved
areas. Unauthorized vehicles my be towed by management at owners epxense upon on a
week's notice. Resident may park no more than 3 vehicles on the premise at any one time.
There is one designated parking spot. Other cars can be parked where allowed.
28. LIABILITY: management shall not be liable Ior any damage or injury to Resident
or any other person or to any property occurring on the premises or any part thereoI, or in
common areas thereoI, unless such liability is based on the negligent acts or omission oI
Resident or his guests.
29. INVENTORY: A written inventory oI the premise and is contents will be attached
Ior your inspection. Please review it careIully and sign both your copy and the oIIices copy
within two weeks. You will be responsible Ior conditions oI the premises when vacating in
accordance with the attached. (Resident's initials: MU/ZC) acknowledge receipt oI inventory
by Resident.
30. TENANCY TERMINATION:. Upon termination oI the tenancy, the Resident shall
surrender and vacate the premises, including the removal oI an and all oI the Resident's
property. BeIore Departure, the Resident shall return keys and personal property listed on the
inventory to the owner in good clean and sanitary condition, normal wear accepted. Resident
shall allow Management to inspect the premises in the Resident's presence to veriIy the
condition oI premises and contents.
31. TAXES: In accordance with the Nevada Revised States, as a resident oI rental
property, you are entitled to know what portion oI your rent goes Ior real estate taxes. The
Iollowing is a breakdown Ior your inIormation:
TAX ALLOCATIONS $174.86 OTHER THAN TAXES $ TOTAL MONTHLY
RENT $
32. INSURANCE: It is agreed that TENANT may obtain RENTERS INSURANCE
AS LANDLORDS or his Agent's insurance supplements cover oI TENANT'S Property.
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33. CONTRACT: The above agreement is accepted and agreed to, jointly and
severally. The undersigned have read the above contract and understand and agree to all the
provisions thereoI and Iurther acknowledge that they have received a copy oI said contract.
34 NOTE: the above paragraph Headings are Ior reIerence only and do not add to or
diminish the intended meaning oI any paragraph.
35. ADDITIONAL TERMS & CONDITIONS
Resident Signatures dated 2/21/10 Melissa Ulloa and Zach Coughlin
Owner signature Matt Merliss 2-24-10
PAGE 3 OF 3 ADDRESS 121 River Rock, Reno, NV 89503 Inventory, 121 River Rock
Reno, NV 89503 Residents Melissa Ulloa and Zach Coughlin acknowledge that the Iollowing
items are apart oI the inventory at 121 River Rock, Reno~ NV 89503. The items will not be
removed and stay will stay the property upon vacating Stack able washer and dryer,
reIrigerator, gas range oven, water-heater, Iurnace. blinds (window coverings) and all other
items that are attached to
walls or Iloors or ceilings. Residents: Melissa Ulloa and Zach Coughlin acknowledge this
inventory" list by initialing page 3 item 29 Signed by Merliss 2.24.10" (emphasis added).
10/25/11 trial in 1708) and in the 9/27/11 5 Day Notice oI UD Ior Failure to Vacate, 40.254, it
is alleged that 'your rental agreement expired as oI February 28, 2011. NRS 40.251(1)(b)(1)
(II). However, that simply is not true. Beyond demonstrating a lack oI candor to the tribunal
and paucity oI Iairness to opposing counsel, it belies the Iact that Baker never provided
suIIicient notice oI termination oI the lease, as such, the 30 days required prior to any such
termination, by the lease, was not satisIied. Additionally, where Baker alleges that the 'rental
agreement expired as oI February 28, 2011 when, in Iact there is no such 'deIined
termination date in the lease.
G. HILL, CHARTERED, and that on the 27th day oI September, 2011, I personally handed at
the hearing in the above-reIerenced matter, a true and correct copy oI the Ioregoing Five Day
Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer Ior Failure to Vacate Rental Unit - NRS 40.251 (No-Cause
Termination) and Notice oI Summary Eviction -NRS 40.254 to: Zachary Coughlin: 121 River
Rock Street Reno, Nevada 89503.
prior to Baker having such admitted as 'PlaintiII's Exhibit D at the 10/25/11 'trial, which is
entirely too late to satisIy the subject matter jurisdiction prerequisites in NRS 40.254.
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#1 Ior the August 22nd, 2011 'NO-CAUSE TERMINATION NOTICE TO VACATE NRS
40.251(1) is a patent violation oI the requirement that such notices be clear and unequivocal.
'NRS40.251UnlawIul detainer: Possession oI property leased Ior indeIinite time aIter
notice to quit; older person or person with a disability entitled to extension oI period oI
possession upon request.
1.A tenant oI real property, a recreational vehicle or a mobile home Ior a term less than
liIe is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer when having leased:
(a)Real property, except as otherwise provided in this section, or a mobile home Ior an
indeIinite time, with monthly or other periodic rent reserved, the tenant continues in
possession thereoI, in person or by subtenant, without the landlord`s consent aIter the
expiration oI a notice oI:...
(2)Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, Ior all other periodic tenancies, at
least 30 days;...
(b)A dwelling unit subject to the provisions oI chapter 118A oI NRS, the tenant
continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, without the landlord`s consent aIter
expiration oI:
(1)The term oI the rental agreement or its termination and, except as otherwise
provided in subparagraph (2), the expiration oI a notice oI:...
(II)Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, at least 30 days Ior all other
periodic tenancies; or
NRS 40.251(1)(a) is inapplicable in that Coughlin did not lease 'Real property as
and his lease was not 'Ior an indeIinite time with monthly or other periodic rent reserved, the
tenant continues in possession thereoI, in person or by subtenant, without the landlord`s
consent aIter the expiration oI a notice
Further, iI Coughlin's tenancy or lease had 'expired, then the landlord did not provide
the proper notice under NRS 40.254(2), where such situation would require proceeding under
NRS 40.250, rather than the two conIlicting sections oI NRS 40.251 that Baker proceeded
under:
' NRS40.250UnlawIul detainer: Possession aIter expiration oI term.A tenant oI real
property or a mobile home Ior a term less than liIe is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer when the
tenant continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, oI the property or mobile home or
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any part thereoI, aIter the expiration oI the term Ior which it is let to the tenant. In all cases
where real property is leased Ior a speciIied term or period, or by express or implied contract,
whether written or parol, the tenancy terminates without notice at the expiration oI the
speciIied term or period.
S. Ct. 'Form #7 (with just a couple things changed by way oI placing 'Xs over 'or
terminated in a couple areas) reads:
No-Cause Termination Notice to Vacate NRS 40.251(1) TO:....Date oI Service: August
22nd, 2011
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that you must surrender and vacate the rental unit located at:
121 River Rock Street, Reno, Nevada 89503 You are entitled to a period oI:
ATTENTION! II you Iall to vacate the rental unit by September 23, 2011, you will be
guilty oI an unlawIul detainer (unlawIul possession), and I will start eviction proceedings
against you.
NOTE: II you are 60 years oI age or older. or iI you have a physical or mental
disability, and your tenancy is not week-to-week, you may make a written request to me to be
allowed to continue in possession oI the rental unit Ior an additional 30 days past the time
listed on this notice. You must provide me with prooI oI your age or disability with your
written request. II I reject your request, you have the right to petition the court to continue In
possession oI the rental unit Ior an additional 30 days. II the court denies your petition, you
will be allowed to continue in possession oI the rental unit Ior Iive (5) calendar days
Iollowing the date oI entry oI the order denying the petition.
ATTENTION! THIS NOTICE IS BEING GIVEN PURSUANT TO NEVADA
REVISED STATUTES. II you do not comply with this notice you will be In unlawIul
possession oI the rental unit. and you will be subject to the eviction procedures contained in
NRS 40.254 or NRS 40.290 et seq.
Landlord Merliss's 9/27/11 5 Day Notice oI UD Ior Failure to Vacate, Notice oI
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ATTENTION! II you do not vacate and leave the rental unit within FIVE JUDICIAL
DAYS Irom the date oI service oI this Notice, I will seek an order oI eviction Irom the Justice
Court. II you are evicted, you may legally be locked out oI the rental unit the same day.
ATTENTION! To contest this notice, you must Iile a Tenant's AIIidavit/Declaration
with the Justice Court oI Reno Township by noon oI the FIFTH JUDICIAL DAY Irom the
date oI service oI this notice There is a Iiling IeeoI $ 33.00 . II you are unable to pay the
Iiling Iee, you may Iile a written motion with the court requesting a Ieewaiver. II the court
grants your Iee waiver, your Tenant's AIIidavit/Declaration will be Iiled at no charge. You
must also deliver a Iile-stamped copy oI your Tenant's AIIidavit/Declaration to me. Upon the
Iiling and delivery oI your Tenant's AIIidavit/Declaration, you are entitled to a court hearing.
NOTE: II you are 60 years oI age or older, or iI you have a physical or mental
disability, and your tenancy is not week-to-week. you may make a written request to me to be
allowed to continue in possession oI the rental unit Ior an additional 30 days. You must
provide me with prooI oI your age or disability with your written request. II I reject your
request, you have the right to petition the court to continue in possession oI the rental unit Ior
an additional 30 days. II the court denies your petition, you will be allowed to continue in
possession oI the rental unit Ior Iive (5) calendar days Iollowing the date oI entry oI the order
denying the petition.
See NRS 40.251(4) and Coughlins 11/3/11 Iiling oI a Motion Ior Stay citing a
disability as a basis Ior such request.
Coughlin and Ulloa read as Iollows, in relevant part:
2. TERMS: Management does hereby rent ... Ior a period oI not less than 12 months
tenancy, commencing on the 1st day oI March, 2010 Ior a total amount oI $10,800.00 at a
monthly rate oI $900 ...
3. HOLDOVER: Under Nevada law this Rental Agreement and any changes properly
agreed to will remain in eIIect on a monthly basis aIter the initial term...
20. TERMINATION: This Agreement and the tenancy hereby granted may be
terminated by either party within 30 days oI the deIined termination date (reIer to Paragraph
2), or any time thereaIter by giving the other party not less than thirty (30) day prior notice in
9 Ior monetary liabilities)...
The problem Ior Baker and the landlord is that the 8/22/11 No-Cause Termination
Notice to Vacate made an incorrect assessment oI the 'Standard Rental Agreement, and,
without more, was inoperative as to noticing Coughlin that the landlord was, say, invoking
Paragraph '20. TERMINATION oI the 'Standard Rental Agreement between Coughlin and
Merliss. The thing is, when Hill and Baker submit these 'itemized and detailed 'Activity
Reports purporting to justiIy their moving Ior $18,000 in attorney's Iees at the trial court
level and Ior a whole 'nother $42,065 just Ior the appeal, they, under Brunzell, must be
required to provide the sort oI elegant, detailed, thoughtIull, tailored representation that such
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exorbinant Iees would demand. Rather, Baker and Hill prattle on about how 'this was
supposed to be a simple summary eviction case and, without speciIying any actual points oI
law or addressing any oI the evidence Coughlin put Iorward, make vague generalizations
about how 'unreasonable Coughlin was, and (insert language Irom 4/19/12 Motion Ior Atty
Fees).
Their client should not be leIt to argue that their misstatement oI the lease vis a vis its
term, duration, or any 'deIined termination date (clearly, there is not such date listed in
Paragraph 2 oI the lease, and perhaps, next time, neurologist landlord Merliss will pick his
leases more careIully, review them prior to signing them, and make sure he does, in Iact,
included a 'deIined termination date iI he so chooses, rather than, allegedly, incurring some
$70,000 in attorney's Iees alone, Ior a house that doesn't list Ior $90,000, these days, just to
get a summary eviction pushed through at breakneck speed. Especially where Merliss then
Iailed to rent out the house until February 2013 (it sat dormant and empty, with a 'Ior rent
sign on it between Coughlin's abbreviated opportunity to remove his belongings expiring on
December 23rd, 2011, until February 2013. Assuming Merliss could have continued getting
the same $900 monthly rent under the Coughlin lease during that period, that would mean he,
on top oI paying $70,000 to get the eviction done (instead oI accepting the settlement
Coughlin put Iorward where, arguably, Merliss's 'losses would have amounted to less than
$1,000, and obviated him oI any Iurther liability vis a vis the Green action Lawn Service
torts), Merliss also lost out on (Ior whatever reason) another $11,700 in rent due to his Iailure
to Iind another tenant, Ior the location that it was such a hurry to get Coughlin out oI. And
Baker characterizes that result as a 'complete and total victory suIIicient to qualiIy as a
'prevailing party under NRS 69.050 Ior the purposes oI an attorney's Iees award analysis.
Perhaps Baker and Hill were reIerring to the result the achieved Ior themselves, rather than
their client. Such is completely consistent with the assessment Iorty year member in good
standing, landlord tenant law expert Thomas J. Hall, Esq., provided to Coughlin oI his 2004
landlord tenant litigation wherein Hill was opposing counsel.`
PlaintiII's Exhibit D (16 pages) Irom the 10/25/11 'trial is a curious document indeed.
One, the Iax header on the Iirst page indicates that the RJC Iaxed to Hill's oIIice on 10/6/11 a
Iill in the blank landlord's 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit
Where Baker's Exhibit F lacks a suIIicient Declaration, lacking the NRS 53.045,
Buckwalter, requisite language, in that it states only: ' under p perjury, the RJC lacked
subject matter jurisdiction suIIicient to even hold the 'trial on 10/25/11. Beyond that, the
'summary eviction proceeding was held on 10/13/11, bringing to light the Iact that no
Landlord's AIIidavit (or Declaration), was Iiled prior to the 10/13/11 proceeding.
'NRS40.370VeriIication oI complaint and answer.The complaint and answer
must be veriIied.
Such is a jurisdictional prerequisite under NRS 40.253(5), and (6), making the Order oI
10/13/11 void Ior lack oI jurisdiction (NRCP 60(b)(4) applies under NRS 40.400, and this
Motion to Set Aside is brought timely where there is not a six month limitations period as to a
voidness basis. There is a price to pay Ior Merliss and Baker attempting to characterize the
lease in a clearly incorrect manner (ie, asserting that is has terminated on February 28th, 2011
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and that the term oI the lease was '12 months when, clearly, patently, that is not the case
upon a review oI the lease. That price is and was that the various Eviction Notices purported
served were insuIIicient Ior the purpose oI eIIecting a termination oI the lease. Which was
going to cost Merliss more time to get his precious summary eviction, adn which was going to
make the Iees Baker and Hill were charging Merliss to, up to that point, mostly just use Iorms
oI the Supreme Court's website, Ior which their is not guarantee (in addition to Baker Iailing
to (perhaps on purpose) get Merliss's 10/11/11 notarized 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit Iiled
in in the case, 1708, or even marked as an Exhibit. There simply is nothing to prove that
Baker or Merliss Iiled such an 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit in a timely manner here.
Baker's 10/19/11 Declaration is clearly Iraudulent in that respect, where it asserts that
Merliss's 10/11/11 notarized 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit was 'Iiled previously (see, also,
where Baker's indicates the same was 'submitted...well...which is it? There's no Iile stampe
on it Ior any time prior to it being marked as an Exhibit mid-way throgh the 10/25/11 'trial.
Basch v. Hooper, 507 N.Y.S.2d 620 N. Y.City.Civ., 1986 Termination notice in
nonprimary residence summary proceeding concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, so that
deIects in notice cannot be retroactively cured. Vidiaki, LLC v. Just BreakIast and Things!!!,
33 A.3d 848 t~233LANDLORD AND TENANT t~233IXRe-Entry and Recovery oI
Possession by Landlord t~233k 293Summary Proceedings t~233k:297Demand or Notice
t~233k297( I)k. Necessity oI demand, or notice to quit. Conn.App.,20 12 Page I A notice to
quit is a condition precedent to a summary process action and, iI deIective, deprives the court
oI subjectmatter jurisdiction over the action. po City oI Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores
oI Connecticut, Inc., 931 A.2d 837 Conn.,2007 A notice to quit is a condition precedent to a
summary process action and, iI Mill Pond Properties, LLC v. Moe's Tire & Auto Center,
LLC, 49 Conn. L. Rptr. &43West KeySummary|I|Conn.Super.,20IOCourt lacked
subjectmatter jurisdiction over landlord's summary process action because the landlord Iailed
to serve a valid "notice to quit" on the lessee. The lessee argued that the court lacked
jurisdiction because the "notice to quit" served by the plaintiII was premature, and thereIore
deIective, because it was not preceded by a pretermination notice as was required by the lease.
The landlord argued that his Iailure to give notice oI termination as the lease required could
serve as a deIense to a summary process action but did not remove the court's jurisdiction.
Because there was no preexisting deIault in the lease terms, the landlord's Iailure to comply
with the terms oI the lease deprived tile court oI jurisdiction. C.G.S.A. 4 7a-23. I
233k297(2)202177295700101202 I 772957001 Rosen v. Wade, 418 N.Y.S.2d 258 ??
233LANDLORD AND TENANT C233IXRe-Entry and Recovery oI Possession by
Landlord C233k 293Summary Proceedings C233k297Demand or Notice C233k297(3)k.
Service oI notice. N.Y.City.Civ.,1979 Page I Untimeliness oI quit notice is not a mere error
that can be cured by amendment to petition in summary proceeding; rather, it is a deIed which
deprives court oI subjectmatter jur'sdiction and authority to proceed altogether. Real Property
Law 232-a.
'NRS40.400Rules oI practice.'For the outrageous sums sought in attorney's
Iees, it is a little surprising that Casey D. Baker, Esq., admitted during his sworn testimony at
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Coughlin's criminal trespass trial on 6/18/12 in 26405, that he did not realize that NRCP, and
NRAP applied to the summary eviction in 1708 and appeal thereIrom, indicating, rather, that
he understood JCRCP to apply.
The notices Baker had served, allegedly, were deIicient (just because they are Iorms on
the Nevada Supreme Court's website does not make them satisIy the statutory jurisdictional
prerequisites...Baker and Hill should not use 'Iorms and then charge like they are a war
room Iull oI Manhattan lawyers doing some merger Ior a multinational...). And, what's really
Iunny, is that all those Iorms on the N. S. Ct's web-site are Irom 2006. Hello, Baker and Hill,
have there been any changes to the statutes since that time? Have the Iorms been updated?
What? You didn't check? Doesn't Dr. Merliss deserve to have you check that stuII out, what
with the $70K and all you guys say he paid you...or was it just 'incurred? What does NRS
69.050 require? Does NRS 69.050 even apply to an appeal oI a summary eviction
proceeding, or rather just to appeals oI civil actions? Clearly, a review oI the other sections oI
NRS 69 supports the view that 'costs are identiIied only as being incurred in the context oI a
'civil action (NJCRCP deIines 'landlord tenant matters as distinct Irom 'civil actions
(which would included plenary unlawIul detainer 'civil actions and neither the 10/13/11
'summary eviction proceeding or any 'trial (even under NJCRCP 108 and 109) Iall within
that purview). It's ironic, given all oI Baker and Hill's bluster in their Iilings in 06328 wherein
they allege Coughlin does not understand the diIIerence between a judgement and order, and
to which NRCP 52 and 59 may be invoked, as NRS 69.040 speaks only to 'judgments (and
both the 10/25/11 and 10/27/11 summary eviction 'Orders are, necessarily, not judgments,
with 'judgments universally being viewed as dispoing oI an entire 'case or 'action
(admittedly, the language deIining 'actions in NRS 118A does little to clariIy that, and
seemingly Judge SIerrazza, Baker, and Coughlin were all thrown Ior a loop by NJCRCP 109,
which speaks to 'trials in the context oI 'summary evictions (with the concepts oI trials
being viewed by all three as mutually exclusive Irom summary proceedings...however, a
review oI 'West's Analysis oI American Law and the index oI headnotes therein reveals that,
in Iact, there exists a head note within the 'summary proceedings section Ior possessory
actions that is titled 'trials, lending support Ior that which Judge SIerrazza did in setting a
trial Ior 10/25/11, even iI Judge SIerrazza's subsequent commentary on 10/25/11, aIter
admitting to Coughlin 'your're right. It is is a trial (whereupon Judge SIerrazza then
promptly attempted to coerce acquiescence Irom Coughlin to waiving the due process
procedural protections within NJCRCP 108 (in no case shall such occur less than 10 days
Irom....) and NJCRCP 109 (which, given the language in NJCRCP 2, and the section heading
prior to Rule 101 therein, appears to allow Ior 'trials within a summary eviction setting,
though the '20 days to respond to a 'summons and complaint normally attendant to a 'civil
action/unlawIul detainer action (and this is where the language oI NRS 7.085 becomes rather
problematic to the extent it speaks to 'civil action or proceeding, (NOTE: it does not say
"summary proceeding") especially when view along with NRS 118A How are 'small claims
actions appeal Iees limited to $15.00?
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Regardless, neither the 8/22/11 nor the 9/27/11 Notices (Exhibit's B and C at the
10/25/11 trial) contain that which they are required to under NRS 40.253(2)-(3), which is
ironic, considering that both oI those subsections became extremely key to this litigation (with
respect to the permissibility oI the corner cutting taken by the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice
(which led to Coughlin being subject to a lien and burglarized on 12/12/11 and made to wait
until 12/20/11 to even get his Hearing to contest the lient) in Iailing to do what every other
county in Nevada does (ie, post the 24 hour lock-out Orders, then wait 24 hours to eIIectuate
such lock-out) and the 10/4/11-10/5/11 unlawIul interruption oI essential services
(electricity), in Iact, is addressed by the the statute subsection 3 requires tenant's be advised oI
within such notices. DeIicient notice, jurisdictional prerequisites not met, lack oI subject
matter jurisdiction, Orders are void.
Baker's notices Iailed to 'advise the tenant under NRS40.253(3)(b)(2) that: '...iI the
court determines that the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer, the court may issue a
summary order Ior removal oI the tenant or an order providing Ior the nonadmittance oI the
tenant, directing the sheriII or constable oI the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours
aIter receipt oI the order.... Rather, Baker's notices merely indicated: ' II you are evicted,
you may legally be locked out oI the rental unit the same day Those are not even close to the
same thing.
Baker's notices Iailed to 'advise the tenant under NRS40.253(3)(b)(3) that:
'...pursuant to NRS 118A.390, a tenant may seek relieI iI a landlord unlawIully removes the
tenant Irom the premises or excludes the tenant by blocking or attempting to block the
tenant`s entry upon the premises or willIully interrupts or causes or permits the interruption oI
an essential service required by the rental agreement or chapter 118A oI NRS...
UnIortunately Ior landlord Merliss, Baker thought using Iorms would be good enough,
however, such 'Form #4 Iailed to satisIy NRS 40.253(2)-(3). But, at least 'Form #4 did
include some language that makes the lockout oI 11/1/11 even more illegal considering
Couglhin was entitled to rely upon its express indication that 'you have the right to petition
the court to continue in possession oI the rental unit Ior an additional 30 days. II the court
denies your petition, you will be allowed to continue in possession oI the rental unit Ior Iive
(5) calendar days Iollowing the date oI entry oI the order denying the petition. That's the
thing, though. By that notice's own language, Coughlin was entitled to 'continue in
possession ... 'Ior Iive (5) calendar days Iollowing the date oI entry Ior Iive (5) calendar
days Iollowing the date oI entry oI the order denying the petition. Judge SIerrazza still has
not denied Coughlin's Petition. Hill has diagnosed Coughlin with some 'hoarder condition
(arguably a disability), though. :
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Baker's 9/27/11 5 Day Notice oI UD Ior Failure to Vacate, Notice oI Summary
Eviction 40.254 provided that: 'PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to NRS 40.251, you
are in unlawIul detainer Ior Iailing to vacate and continuing in possession oI the rental unit
located at: 121 River Rock Street. Reno. Nevada 89503 aIter having been served the
Iollowing notice which has now expired:
Court. II you are evicted, you may legally be locked out oI the rental unit the same day.
date oI service oI this notice There is a Iiling IeeoI $ 33.00 . II you are unable to pay the
Iiling Iee, you may Iile a written motion with the court requesting a Ieewaiver. II the court
grants your Ieewaiver, your Tenant's AIIidavit/Declaration will be Iiled at no charge. You
Whomever put together those Iorms on the website probably didn't get paid $70,000
Ior six weeks oI part time work, at most, to put them together, though.

Defendant: yes Dr. Merliss did you Iind my Iormer co-tenant Ms. Melissa Lee Ella to seems
similarly entitled
Merliss: not at the time no
Defendant: to Ieel that way about her now
Merliss: she hasn't paid her rent I don't Iind that she's entitled but she hasn't paid her rent
Defendant: did you make an agreement with her in that regard with respect to her paying
rent?
Merliss: she said that she was going to pay the rent
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Plaintiff: did you ever write back to her that sounds good or I except that?
Merliss: yes
Defendant: you did?
Merliss: she was going to pay rent within the e-mails
Defendant: and you said okay I except that agreement with you?
Merliss: it wasn't an array an agreement she promised to pay me the rent
Defendant: and did you write her back assenting to that in some manner
Merliss: that it was okay that iI she paid me the rent yes I welcome the rent
Defendant: do you know whether or not so doing has some legal eIIect two Ior instance
except the late partial rent in Nevada
Plaintiff:: objection calls Ior legal conclusion
1udge: all sustained the
Merliss: Iight that I
1udge: Sir Sir Wade to answer your attorney posed an objection so wait until the core rules
on it beIore you answer and I am going to sustain the objection
Defendant: yes your honor is Darlene Sharpe or Dickson Realty in some way on the
mortgage deed alone Ior the two houses
Plaintiff:: objection relevance
1udge: all overruled the objection
Merliss: now
Plaintiff: okay what is the arrangement with Darlene Sharpe
Plaintiff:: objection
PlaintiII: I am objecting relevance the court has already ruled that we are not bringing in third
party sphere I don't know what relevancy this has to anything where not bringing in damage
claims either Your Honor
Defendant: earlier today is seen to spell and Mr. Baker is constantly doing this to me is
telling me what I said when it doesn't quite sound like something is set
1udge: I don't care what the question is whether or not it's relevant so you tell me how it's
relevant
Defendant: he's he then proceeded to state what your order was with regard to counterclaims
or Jordan there and earlier today it seems as though you said I didn't tell you he can bring
counter them send non-conIused
1udge: I said you have the right to Iile a counterclaim Sir but the Supreme Court has limited
normally convert the iI it goes to a Iull-blown trial you could do that and you're not precluded
Irom doing it aIter the Iact in this case it's just not germane to the issue oI whether or not the
unlawIul detainer should be granted
Defendant: so in this summary proceeding that we are having right now am I not able to
litigate counterclaims against third parties?
1udge: you are not able to litigate because you have the right to litigate them later under the
statute
Defendant: so I am not allowed to in this proceeding it's not permissive
1udge: nine in this proceeding today now and I am not able iI I'd given it timely cure beat
demand or request are those allowed in a summary proceeding
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1udge: okay Iirst oI all I ruled that sure request Ior a jury trial whether you're successIul in
your argument that today is a trial or as I indicated it is a hearing but either way the jury trial
demand was not timely Iiled all right it was not timely Iiled.
Defendant: and I suppose it's an appropriate to ask you what iIs iI I can go look that up in the
law library
1udge: you can look it up but I'm telling you it was not timely Iiled
Defendant: on not disputing it I'm just wondering iI I had Iiled a timely are those even
possible summary proceedings but I understand her time is limited
1udge: no I don't believe there possible summary proceedings no but iI this matter were to go
to trial iI the court Iinds I'm not going to argue with you anymore about the law you're asking
questions oI Dr. Merliss so go ahead and do it but I sustained the objection as to relevance as
to how Darlene Sharpe is involved in the property
Defendant: Dr. Merliss you receive any points Ior me wherein I detailed his level were health
or saIety or criminal all related the issues
Merliss: not any clear ones
Defendant: can you describe what you meant by that
Merliss: when you Iirst started to send me e-mails they were very unclear the language was
unclear I couldn't tell iI you were complaining or iI you wanted help there were very
ambiguous you later sent an e-mail about the toilet about urine that went on Ior three or Iour
e-mails that was completely bizarre I couldn't understand it and I even sent Antonio there he
couldn't Iind any with that e-mail you lost a lot oI credibility you were waxing elegance about
urine crystals and things like that I couldn't really Iollow you Irom there are on the nature oI
the e-mails deteriorated with your syntax and grammar and I couldn't really Iollow them aIter
that the e-mails seem to Iollow a certain pattern where the Iirst part oI the e-mail was
Plaintiff: I'm sorry
Merliss: I'm answering the question Sir
Defendant: yeah you're going past 1S
Merliss: the Iirst part oI the e-mail was complaining about
1udge:: all right also stained the injection is non responsive issue is the criminal complaints
and you said they were clear
Merliss: the e-mails were not clear Your Honor
okay and cannot provide Dr. Merliss can I give him something to reIer to while I reIerence
these e-mails
1udge: you can reIer to page and the e-mail speciIically that your are reIerring to is Exhibit 8
Defendant: yes your honor
1udge: and where is the one about the urine Sir
Defendant: yes with respect to the broken wax ring on the toilet were in the urine sludge was
pulling behind the toilet Ior months on end and I was extremely conscientious and not
jumping to the conclusion that it was a wax ring wonder iI maybe you Ior was spillover urine
I know it gets disgusting talking about this but I think to me that events a level oI concern Ior
not wasting Dr. Merliss is money he seemed to
1udge: will which but pages that on do you have an idea
1udge: to you have an idea Dr. what month that was
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Merliss:
Plaintiff: I see it on page 21 Your Honor this is the e-mail to which Dr. Merliss is reIerring to
as just too conIusing ... there is more than one e-mail I believe Your Honor
1udge: our a maybe you can look at them and identiIy
Plaintiff:
Defendant: Your Honor I believe I rejected some oI the I think to some Internet articles on
how to Iigure out what's going on with the toilet with a problem like this interest in the
interests oI brevity oI the attachments I rejected that out it was nothing I wrote it was some
yahoo.com article on Iiguring out iI you have a wax ring problem with your toilet
Plaintiff: Your Honor iI Mr. Coughlin's not going to present a complete document I have to
object to its admissibility
1udge:,
Plaintiff: iI Mr. Doc Coughlin is it that Mr. Coughlin is not gonna present a complete
document but just pick and choose the sentences he wants to present to the court I
1udge: well the thing is do you have the complete ones
Defendant: yes your honor but has Mr. Baker made the diligent inquiry
1udge: I just want to get the tenor oI what was said because the doctor testiIied that these
were to some extent or not coherence I guess
Defendant: and Your Honor iI you'll just note that approximately line 17 is one oI the Iirst
mentions oI this broken window in February
1udge: will serve you are not testiIied so I'm just reviewing the e-mail the question you asked
1udge: all right I've read them so go ahead with your next questions are
Defendant: Dr. Merliss can you look at the e-mail and tell me what's so conIusing about it to
it goes on Irom page 21 to 22 and Irom my reading it all seemed extremely conscientious the
think careIully thought out inconsiderate
1udge:. That is iI you want to look at it again
Merliss: I couldn't Iollow it it was rambling and I said
Defendant: will just go ahead and tell me what speciIically about it is rambling Dr. Merliss
1udge: well I guess I am having a little trouble about the relevance oI this right now
Defendant: to me it goes to the whole relationship
1udge: well it wasn't a criminal oIIense to have a leaking toilet so
Defendant: it constitutes this I'm a doctor don't bother me with your stupid toilet concerns
1udge: well I thought he is just addressed it immediately by saying he would send Antonio
over and
Defendant: did Antonio ever come over
Merliss: did he Iix it or yes Merliss yes
Plaintiff: did he Iix it?
Merliss: he came over and then he told me that there wasn't a problem
Plaintiff: how soon aIter did he come over
Merliss: a Iew days I don't know
Defendant: are you aware that he told me there was a problem and that he would be back in a
week and he never returned
Plaintiff:
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Merliss: I inquired speciIically about the toilet and he said that it wasn't a problem
Defendant: did he indicate to you that he told Melissa and myselI that he would be back in a
week or so to Iix it and that approximately a couple weeks went by and we never heard Irom
him?
Merliss: the only conversation I had with Antonio is I asked him how the toilet was what's
the problem the couldn't understand the e-mail he said that there wasn't a problem it's Iixed
there isn't a problem
Defendant: did Antonio speaks you in English?
Merliss: we speak English and Spanish
Plaintiff: you Iluent in Spanish
Merliss: I speak Spanish he speaks English as well
Plaintiff: how well would you say he speaks it
Defendant: he speaks it enough or not
Merliss: he speaks oI enough so that I can understand him
Defendant: when he's speaking just English?
Merliss: he speaks English or Spanish and I understand
Defendant: is he a licensed handyman
Merliss: I don't know
Defendant: did you make any eIIort to ascertain that beIore hiring him
Merliss: I watched his skill level which was stupendous
Plaintiff: were his prices really good to
Merliss: extremely skilled
Plaintiff: were his prices really love
1udge: I'm been entered throughout there's no objection but I don't get the relevance oI this
this issue Ior the two issues and the only issues have to do with retaliatory eviction and it has
to do with either habitability
Defendant: discrimination Iair housing
1udge: discrimination or the criminal reporting a crime
Defendant: sometimes it just sounds like white people are too high maintenance Ior Dr.
Merliss in some respects it seems like white people speciIically white man purchased too high
maintenance Ior Dr. Merliss to deal with
1udge: well I the question is whether you were too high maintenance that I'll
Plaintiff: it's interesting why you hired Nash pest-control and this other what was the other
name oI the what was this other entity that you apparently needed access to the interior oI the
house and Iix the exterior sprinkler system and you're trying to assert some breach claim or
something when you only gave like 20 hours notice the lease calls Ior 40th
Plaintiff: Your Honor Stern argument here somewhere
Defendant: this a subpoena Ior to handyman
Merliss: I don't know what you're talking about Mr. Coughlin
Defendant: Welty you or your attorney send out to handyman subpoena them
Merliss: we tried to inspect your house and you would not let the men
Defendant: who
Merliss: Nash and Fisher
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Defendant: Nash and Fisher
Merliss: you would not let them in
Defendant: it doesn't sound like Antonio anymore
Plaintiff: objection
1udge: the objection is sustained your test questions are
Defendant: okay I ask you to we get back to this year and e-mail I'm reading this this sounds
like a coach and description to a to a landlord oI a problem but the toilet can you speciIically
tell me what is so surreal or obtuse about this e-mail to you Dr. Merliss and Baker Your
Honor I am going to interpose an objection at this point Mr. Coughlin has identiIied what he
said were habitability issues again the court has now ruled on it twice that that his case is
conIined to those issues these bringing up new stuII on Coughlin Junction
1udge: well the toilet is part oI that but I don't believe it's habitability it's not deIined
plumbing is
Defendant: outlets plumbing
1udge: so iI you establish serve the it was leaking but the e-mail doesn't establish that is just
establish is you complained about it the smell oI urine
Plaintiff: the e-mail doesn't establish that there is urine sludge building up? How
1udge: well you yourselI said in the e-mail that you don't know what it is
Plaintiff: in the introductory there several e-mails the e-mail is saying look we've got this
pulling disgusting smell oI urine sludge behind the toilet
1udge: you said you may be been over the rim because you're tall you're not sure iI it's that or
iI it's a leak or iI it's the wax ring or iI it's the ring inside the toilet bowl where crystals oI
urine are being Iormed
Plaintiff: there is a bad smell and there's a pooling sludge behind it so and it's right next to the
shower it's hard to tell oI condensation
1udge: Sir the question is though did the eviction you because you complained about the
toilet and the evidence you presented me here is that he didn't give it to because oI that in Iact
see said Alston and Tony over next week and then he goes Iurther to the next e-mail he says
that will be out oI the country until the ends oI March iI there's a maintenance issue please get
to estimates choose the most reasonable and take it oII the next rental check I will be on the
valuable or I will I will be a valuable by e-mail thanks Matt
Defendant: how was the toilet situation eventually resolved Dr. Merliss
Merliss: Antonio said the toilet was Iine
Plaintiff: and that close the book on it
Merliss: Ior me it did
Plaintiff: yeah you had tenancy were saying there's a disgusting urine sludge smell pooling
behind the toilet and a close the book Ior it
Merliss: Well, Zach, you said that you might've caused the problem yourselI I can't help you
with that iI you caused that problem that's it
Defendant: Your Honor I'm been object to counsel Baker's constant unproIessional smirking
is just rude ticket less I've listen to the tape oI this this hearing and he smirks and does this
laugh saying like 45 times just ridiculous
Plaintiff: all try to control myselI Your Honor
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1udge: all right Sir go ahead
Plaintiff:'s youth oI the part were insane I don't want to send out thicker rope plumber who
charge you on like 150 bucks to come out stated you an insight into command-and-control
black-market low price maybe
1udge: Sir that is argumentative you are to ask questions not to argue about what he did or
didn't do
Plaintiff: my question is did you take the part oI these e-mails were he said you know I want
to be sure I'm not wasting your money to send somebody out here just airing your and that's
combining with condensation Irom the shower and making this pool and thing but I think it
might be a wax ring problem you took that Mike kind oI ambiguity there to just kind oI mean
oh ignore it?
Merliss: you are not asking you a question Mr. Coughlin you're making a statement by the
want me to do please
Plaintiff: how did you take that kind oI ambiguity you reIer to
Merliss: I spoke with Antonio sent them out he looked at it he said there wasn't a problem do
you have a question
Plaintiff: did we Iollow up with them
Merliss: you never mentioned it again was there another e-mail about that serve Coughlin?
1udge: Sir Buchanan argue either in the Merliss I'm sorry on
1udge: is inappropriate Ior you to be asking him questions and it's inappropriate Ior you to be
making statements so asking questions Mr. Coughlin
Defendant: yes or Dr. Merliss can you Iollow the chain oI e-mails with respect to the nine
issue urine issue and tell me that aIter the conIusing e-mails the ones that you describe is
conIusing there was a Iollow-up e-mail was there on page 22
Merliss: it's hard to understand your questions Mr. Coughlin
1udge: he read those two e-mails Sir is there 30 mouth? Mr. Coughlin? Coughlin
Plaintiff: there is an e-mail oI 215
1udge: okay on page
Plaintiff: to 16
1udge: on page 21 there is an e-mail dated to 15 RA then there is a response on to 16 at 7:57
AM to you that says all San Antonio over next week then on page 22 on 217 there is an e-mail
dated 2/16/11
Plaintiff: why on 3/14/11 Dr. Merliss to you suddenly send an e-mail talking about to
estimates is that in relation to the toilet and had Antonio not between 2/16/11 3/14/11 had he
not Iix the toilet and why did you send him over iI he said there was no issue
Plaintiff: objection compound question
1udge: okay Iirst oI all let's start I don't know that the 3/14/11 is related to that I just assume
that it it was your the one who put together this chain oI e-mails so I don't know iI there's any
e-mail between 2/16/11 and 3/14/11
Defendant: my recollection: is that Melissa Lee Ella had to call Dr. Merliss
1udge: Sir you're not testiIying the question is is there another e-mail between 2/16/11 and
3/14/11
Plaintiff: that's my question Ior Dr. Merliss
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1udge: RA well all right will all let him
Merliss: on which page please
Plaintiff: on page 22 with the 2/16/11 e-mail and the 3/14/11 e-mail
1udge: 2/16/11 e-mail is Irom the deIendant to you it's at the top oI page 22
Merliss: okay to 16 and 3/14/11
1udge: 3/14/11 purports to be Irom you to him
Merliss: well I don't see anything between 2/16/11 and 3/14/11 on this paper
Defendant: do you know why you would've written me on 3/14/11 out oI the blue to say get
two estimates enter deduction do you know whether it was related to the toilet been Iixed
Merliss: iI there is a maintenance issue oI any kind Mr. Coughlin because just to make it easy
Ior you any kind oI a maintenance issue that you have anything you need to get to estimates
save the receipts take that the take the most recent
Defendant: does it say save the receipts Sir? Does this case saved the receipts in your e-mail?
Merliss: no
Defendant: are you just kind oI adding that contemporaneous to your rereading oI the e-mails
Sir
Merliss: right at the beginning oI this lease we talked about how we would do things
objection
Defendant: objection hearsay
Defendant: to you see where it says save the receipts Sir? Did you just add that you're
reading?
1udge: objection hearsay? It's not hearsay so that objection is overruled but go ahead and it
answer the question
Merliss: G what me to read the e-mail to you?
Defendant: wow you just added that to the e-mail?
1udge: Sir I told you to not comment on the testimony
Defendant: yes or
1udge:: go ahead you can read it
Merliss: will be out oI the cut I will be out oI the country until the end oI March iI there is a
maintenance issue please get to estimates choose the most reasonable take it oII the next
rental check I will be a valuable by e-mail thanks
Defendant: and then does it say one more thing there Matt
Merliss: Matt
Defendant: below that though
Merliss: noxious weed ordinance. I did not write that
Defendant: oh I think that's part oI the next e-mail never mind withdrawn
Merliss: I didn't write that.
Defendant: I don't think he did Sir. Okay and then just skip ahead to kind oI the dnouement
oI this situation in August 11, 2011 iI I can just quickly get your
Judge: What page?
Defendant: page 25
1udge: are I won't give it to him
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Defendant: do you see approximately line 16 where it says wrote quote wrote you about the
Iallen insulation downstairs in the expose mold exposed mold both on the Iloorboard and
insulation you never responded please do, and quotations do you see that part?
Merliss: yes.
Defendant: did you is that correct had you not responded to some written notice oI mold and
insulation
Merliss: this came aIter I asked you to pay the rent. I was we were discussing the rent
payment and all oI the sudden none oI this came up beIore the
Plaintiff:: you had never been alerted oI the mold issue prior to that?
Merliss: no.
Defendant: ROK okay Willis is go back to page 19 Sir where there is talk oI I believe it's
actually age that well where there's talks oI bats be a TTS early are on earlier on yet page on
okay on page 19 so you're saying you'd never heard oI that beIore Irom that August e-mail to
hear back in May write about mind 10
Defendant: did you just ignore it when you got it ready in Thailand or what
Merliss: no
Defendant: know what
Merliss: I wasn't sure exactly what you wanted
Defendant: did you right back seeking clariIication
Merliss: I don't know iI I did or didn't
Defendant: you don't know? Whether you did or did not address a problem with potentially
toxic mold and in the home which somebody was paying you money Ior
Merliss: we send somebody over there and he wouldn't let the men.
Plaintiff: when was that was that close in time to this may 14th notice
Merliss: this was a Iew weeks ago we sent over Nash
Defendant: so was at a good 14 months later new line Merliss we sent over Nash and Mr.
Fisher to have a look
Defendant: is that within the 14 days to 14 days called Ior to Iix in this statue or did the
statutes not apply to you
Plaintiff: objection calls Ior legal conclusion
1udge: wait a second mummy rule on the objections please also sustain the objection go
ahead with your next question
Defendant: so does this establish your earlier testimony that the Iirst time this insulation issue
was ever brought up was right aIter you mentioned hey you owe me rent he said that about 5
min. ago and that was Irom this August 11 e-mail and then your testimony is seemingly
contradicted is meant by this may 14th issue may 14th e-mail wherein the mold issue is
clearly set Iorth in writing to you or is that not right? Did you just contradict yourselI?
1udge: will wait a second the question is conIusing me now
Plaintiff: okay I brought up the I went to the dnouement the untying oI the not the end oI the
play where in August when things started to get a little heated between us and I said what
what did you do August 2011 when I wrote you about the insulation August 11 and Dr.
Merliss said he you only brought that up when I asked about the back rent and I said all had
and I brought it up earlier?
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1udge: I recall that but the question is what is your question
Defendant: well you said that August was the Iirst time that that was brought up now we see
a may e-mail did you just Iorget about that earlier were you not remembering in were you
being untruthIul?
Merliss: when you read this e-mail Mr. Coughlin ICU describing something you are
describing no vapor barrier 8 x 6" mold inIested bats you have some deal that she wants but
you haven't really asked Ior anything you're saying we are only oIIering ways to address these
matters I don't really know what you're asking Ior and that's how a lot oI these e-mails are Mr.
Defendant: I don't know exactly what you want
Defendant: so is it just kind oI a just don't really respond or do anything see iI they just give
up?
Merliss: no it's not that Mr. Coughlin
Defendant: it's not that what is it then Sir?
Merliss: Mr. Coughlin you had every opportunity to have a maintenance man at a pest man in
your house
Plaintiff: Win Iorm team months aIter this e-mail Sir
Merliss: you reIuse to allow a person inside the house
Defendant: how much notice was given Ior that
Merliss: you didn't want them to see your house Mr. Coughlin
Plaintiff: what you mean you had every opportunity Mr. Coughlin between May in the
middle oI August I had every opportunity to live with toxic mold in the insulation is that what
you mean Sir
Merliss: Mr. Coughlin we don't even know iI you cause that molds yourselI we haven't been
able to see it
Defendant: did you get the pictures I sent you where the insulation that shoe seemingly hung
upside down because he the Iire Iire layer is supposed to be abutting the Iloorboard
1udge: Sir
Plaintiff: did you get the pictures where they Iell into the vapor barrier is less ground
1udge: Sir you keep saying toxic mold do you have some results Lab tests or anything that
show it was toxic mold
Defendant: oI have to check my records
1udge: alright I'll go ahead that
Plaintiff: so you get this may 14th e-mail and you read it and you say that I see he's quoting
me some Iigures he's saying ways to address this matter he's saying something about mold
and health issues and inIested and no vapor barrier and Iell Irom the ceiling I I just so I don't
really see any impetus to do or respond to this in any way is that kind oI your thought process
this is the kind oI your thought process there and then to do something
1udge: weight weight that the question
Plaintiff: objection argumentative mistakes prior testimony and assumes Iacts not in evidence
1udge: all overruled the objection go ahead Dr.
Merliss: Mr. Coughlin iI you had said to me I'd like somebody to look at this issue I would
send them out right away I would send them the next day to look at it
Plaintiff:: and you didn't take that e-mail as a request to have the issue addressed
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Merliss: aIter that urine e-mail I wasn't sure what to think about you Mr. Coughlin
Defendant: but sir that urine e-mail I believe came aIter the insulation e-mail
Merliss: these other e-mails
Defendant: so now it's kind oI not adding up what you're saying
Merliss: these other e-mails Mr. Coughlin
Plaintiff: what other e-mails are
Merliss: they are unclear
Defendant: what other e-mails this insulation the e-mail is Irom May 2010 so
Merliss: I testiIied I had problems understanding iI you're complaining whether you want
something or whether you're trying to get some money see you could do a project I can't it's
hard Ior me to understand those three things
Defendant: is that because you are busy with your medical practice and don't have a lot oI
time to review these real thoroughly in your medical practices really real important?
Plaintiff: objection argumentative
1udge: sustained
Defendant: I am trying to ascertain why these e-mails seem so conIounding to you Dr.
Merliss can you help me understand that it is it because you are busy?
1udge: Sir you asked a question then let him answer
Defendant: yes Your Honor
Merliss: I just explained it I can't tell whether you're asking Ior something complaining or iI
you are trying to get me to pay some money Ior something you want to do the work in make
money I can't tell what you want they have never been clear they are not submitted clearly
there is always a tone oI some sort oI bargaining I don't understand what you want Irom me
Defendant: and does that make you Ieel uncomIortable the bargaining aspect oI it
Merliss: it it makes me not understand what you want it's hard Ior me to help you iI I don't
understand the other thing is that Melissa the yellow sent me monthlies monthly letters that
everything was Iine back completely disagrees with what your complaints here
Defendant: do you know iI work was being done around the house who was doing it?
Melissa or me?
Merliss: I don't know I was told that you didn't even do the weeding
Defendant: by whom?
Merliss: I was told that I paid you $350 and then that you didn't do anything
Defendant: by who?
Merliss: I by Darlene.
Defendant: when
Merliss: a Iew months ago that is why I had to pay a Iew thousand dollars Ior extra weeding
Defendant: Ior the property I rent?
Merliss that's right
Defendant: you paid a Iew thousand dollars on top oI the $350 you agree to to have the
property I rent weeded
Merliss that's correct
Defendant: okay iI we go to June you agree to a $350 rent deduction iI I would take care oI
the weeds and you used three exclamation marks to To say alright
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Merliss: good
Defendant: so how long aIter you writing that e-mail where you agreed to that did it take Ior
Darlene to say he didn't do it and then Ior you to say I'm good to go pay somebody to grant to
two grand
Merliss: when the landscapers came I asked how the weeds looked over at your house said I
don't even think he did anything let's do the other house
1udge: I'm good at Europe right now because I've already ruled that we debate as I read the
statute is not habitability like
Defendant: it's a noxious weed or its complaining about a noxious weed or its
1udge: complained to who you are not talking about complaining now
Plaintiff: I believe I called the city oI Reno Reno direct about it
1udge: oI K
Defendant: and I know I told Dr. Merliss
1udge: okay I'm good with prepaid Iurther questioning along these lines at this time because
it's clear to me that you complained the landlord about noxious weeds I perjured testimony
that maybe you complained the city oI Reno
Plaintiff: I'm not asking about weeds not I'm going to credibility and Dr. Merliss continually
says one thing and then gets cornered somewhere and then has to switch oI the story and it
don't care about the weeds right now what I care about is
1udge: well I do because I have been here Ior the better part oI Iour or Iive hours listening to
this
Defendant: yes or
1udge: and is coming to answer
Plaintiff: is Your Honor it iI I can Iinish this last line oI inquiry with respect to the
inconsistencies and Dr. Merliss a statement then I will arrest
1udge: okay
Plaintiff: Plaintiff: Dr. Merle us is it Iair to say that you agree to our $350 rent deduction Ior
the weeds
Coughlin
Merliss: and oIIered that to
Defendant: you oIIered that oI the blue were
Merliss: I oIIered that in response to
Defendant: you oIIered it to me in response to my e-mail to you Zach correct
Merliss: yes
Defendant: okay and then house soon thereaIter did you in Darlene have this conversation
about I don't think he did anything?
Merliss: I don't remember
Defendant: would use it was a month later?
Merliss: I don't remember.
Defendant: okay how soon aIter you agreed to the rent deduction wherein you wrote hi Zach
the 350 seems okay please take it oII the rent thank you and then you put three exclamations
points how soon aIter that did the green action law crew, aIter an essentially attempt to do the
same weeding on the same property?
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Merliss: I don't remember
Defendant: okay well I can see in these e-mails where it's within Iour days so that would
imply that Darlene are your same Darlene said we should spend a couple grant sending green
action back over there because Iour days has passed since you agreed to a $350 deal with
Zach?
1udge: Sir you're making a statement.
What is the question
Defendant: Your Honor the question is how does that make sense?
1udge: you can argue that you got the e-mail Steve can argue that to me
Defendant: okay my question is you only let Iour days go by Irom when you paid one guy
$350 to do a job to where he said he didn't do a good enough I am going to spend two grand
hiring this other crew guys to do the same job? Does that make any sense?
objecting to me hiring somebody else to do the weeds I don't understand that rate
1udge:: well whether you understand it or not the question is was it Iour days?
Merliss: I don't know.
1udge: all right.
Defendant: so iI you sent this e-mail on Saturday, May 21, 2012 saying great sounds good
let's do it three $5350 and then on may 24 2012 three days later you get the e-mail Irom me
wherein I detail the conversion and larceny and property destruction to my property that's
three days so I guess you are saying in the span oI three days Darlene called to in complained
that I haven't done the weeding good enough and you say yes let's wrote $2000 that that?
Plaintiff:objection relevance Mr. Coughlin got his $350 credit what is the problem
Defendant: it's nonsensical it goes to his credibility.
1udge: okay well I've heard enough oI the so I'm going to sustain the objection
Plaintiff: I'll keep my word Your Honor that's all I have"
1udge: alright I am prepared to rule...Im sorry well certainly by October 10 when the
landlord's affidavit was filed but certainly today without question Iurther I have
considered the tenant's arguments with respect to it retaliation speciIically under
118A.510... with respect to the subsection "b", although defendant did present evidence
today of destruction of carpet and alleged that it was a crime under ARS 2.33
25.27 2.4 there is no evidence that said complaint cited a specific statute to the
landlord but rather a general complaint about the structure of this carpet and
therefore I find it that subsection of the statute was not satisIied as will him and I
further find that even if it was even if the landlord knew what you're trying to say
the landlord did not retaliate against you for that the landlord eviction was based on
nonpayment of rent not your complaining of your destruction of carpet...1udge: and
then with respect to the noxious weeds first of all I find that that is not a habitability
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issue (NOTE: this is clear error where NRS 118A.290 speciIically deIines habitability as
that which is covered by a city oI reno ordinance, where Coughlin put on on an exhibit oI
evidence as to the City oI Reno Municipal or Housing Code identiIying weeds "over 8
inches tall" as violative oI such, and where Coughlin put into evidence photographs oI
weeds that had clearly grown to no less than three Ieet tall) second oI all I Iind that under
the lease you were required to maintain the lawn and third this is under subsection "a",
you didn't make a complaint the governmental agency and there is no eviaence that you
aia with respect to the noxious weeas, as to the moldy insulation I do find that that
could be a habitability issue clearly could be. However, again under 118A.510
subsection to make it retaliatory it has to be have been presented either in action suit.
By you or defendant against you against by you and the judicial administrative
proceeding or arbitration in which the tenant raised the issue of compliance with the
requirements of habitability and since you didn't raise this issue until after the landlord
had in fact filed the complaint I find that that it did not violate the habitability statute
did not violate the retaliatory eviction statute for all those reasons I Iind that the
deIense oI retaliation does not meet the requirements oI chapter 40 speciIically one
second here speciIically 40.253 subsections 6 The Court aetermines that there is not a
legal aefense to the allegea unlawful aetainer ana therefore the court to this grant the
eviction with respect to the money in escrow the court finas that that money is to the
lanalora however I am not going to oraer that toaay since the aefenaant is maae
argument that the court aoes not have enough fact a proper rule with respect to escrow
as similar to Las Jegas fustice court rule 44 ana therefore since the tenant still has the
ability to appeal in this matter I will give him 10 days to file a proper appeal which is
the statutory time friend and if he does so that money will be used to satisfy his
appeal bond in this matter if he does not do so then at that time a proper motion can
be made by plaintiff's counsel on this matter the eviction will be eIIective October 31
at 5 PM.
Defendant: Your Honor is the IFP status bearing on the appeal or is that a whole new
IFP bond?
1udge: I denied your IFP on the appeal but I am not sure if I actually aia it in writing Sir
Defendant: but you granted to the instant case
1udge: I believe I don't recall
Plaintiff: but you denied it Ior the appeal?
1udge: well the thing is there is enough money aepositea that you aont neea an IFP Sir
Plaintiff: its all the money I have my name
1udge: while it may be but I am not releasing it to you but I am allowing you to use it
to satisfy the appeal bond in this case which would normally be three months rent are I
Defendant: not double?
1udge: okay I will grant your IFP for this appeal if you go forward but the appeal you
filed was not a proper appeal Sir
Defendant: okay at that point I get the rent escrow back?
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1udge: no you aont get rent that what happens is its gonna satisfy the appeal bona
penaing your appeal to the District Court
Defendant: so the the appeal bond toward the IFP doesn't apply to it
1udge: no. The oI appeal bond a separate the IFP's Ior the Iiling Iee that's all it's good Ior
Defendant: sometimes it covers depositions and
1udge: well it's not been a cover in this case are oI Artie told you
Defendant: and that's your ruling orders that
1udge: dying embers because it would be in District Court?
1udge: well you can argue District Court but it will be my ruling that you have to post
appeal bond post an appeal bond and I will since there's some question about the
money and the escrow I am going to order that it satisfied the appeal bond in this case
Defendant: on believe I filed an interlocutory appeal about the escrow
1udge: yeah I know you did but so far as I'm concerned that was not a valid appeal
Defendant: okay
1udge: but you can go Iorward with that appeal that's up to you are not going to advise
you
Defendant: do we adress the motion to stay here today Your Honor?
1udge: the motion to what question mark
Defendant: the motion to stay Your Honor
1udge: the motion to aismiss is aeniea writing get a stay from the District Court if you
want
Defendant: okay maybe I aont want to aaaress the motion the state toaay if thats all the
inquiry thats going to be too votea to it aevotea to it
Judge: I have read during the recess your brieIs and stuII but I'm denying a motion to stay
Richard Brisson stuII I'm denying a motion to stay so it's clear
Plaintiff: Your Honor I have two quick points with respect to an appeal bond Dr. Merliss
is entitled to an award oI Iees under NRS 40.254 sub three under NRS 40.254 sub three
1udge: what you can prepare proper memorandum oI costs and Iees
Plaintiff: yes or we will
Defendant: a prevailing party or in some egregious circumstances you get these?
Plaintiff: it's in the statute
1udge: it's in the statute under chapter 40 in fact they can get three times the rent too
Defendant: Ior when the nerve because somebody just
1udge: they could you need to read the statute
Plaintiff: my point in bringing that up Your Honor is that we will be asking Ior that those
Iees be considered part oI the appeal bond in addition to the money already with the court
I mean Mr. you seen the brieIs Dr. Merliss has incurred substantial amount oI Iees
1udge: well I understand but I don't even have your memorandum oI costs and Iees
Plaintiff: we will make the motion
1udge: you make the proper motion and I will decide it
Plaintiff: thank you Your Honor
1udge: it doesn't have to be decided today
Plaintiff: that's true Your Honor
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1udge: and in the meantime the money's not going anywhere nor do I believe this
deIendant is going to come up with more money
Plaintiff: Your Honor we would like to ask the court Ior permission to inspect the
property prior to October 31 we've attempted to inspect in the past but we are very
concerned about the property being damaged between now and then
1udge: I have alreaay tola you that I would allow in order to inspect the property
allowing order to inspect the property and what is your position on that as to a time when
it could be accommodated Sir newly cough and you said my position on the time to
accommodate that and let
1udge: yeah
Defendant: this emergency need to inspect it because it's good to be emptied in six days
my position is that it shocks the conscience
1udge: will okay I will grant the order 48 hours Irom today
Plaintiff: 48 hours Irom today we can and specs are
1udge: yes
Defendant: and I just like to preserve Ior the appeal all the egregious conduct by the
process server and all these others other matters
1udge: what you can preserve everything you want Sir what you can preserve
everything you want Sir
Plaintiff: shall I present prepare an order court
1udge: you can prepare the order
Plaintiff: I mean Ior the entire thing
1udge: you can prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law and a judgment iI you
wish
Defendant: can I Your Honor?
1udge: yes you get iI you want to do it and he can look at it but I would suggest that the
plaintiII prepared and submitted to you Ior comments
Defendant: well he is the one who got one years rent to litigate this case so
1udge: one years rent?
Bait Coughlin
Plaintiff: and understand either Surrey
Defendant: yeah 900x12 months
Plaintiff: all prepare the order and submit it Coughlin Ior his review
1udge: okay what you need to get it done you can both prepare orders and all picked the
one I want to sign
Plaintiff: you'll have by tomorrow answer
1udge: when will years be in Mr. Coughlin when will yours be in Mr. Coughlin
Defendant: well I will have to look at what records on the Your Honor records on that
Your Honor
1udge: well iI it's I'm going to give you today is Wednesday it will have to be done by
Thursday because I will be signing an order on Thursday no later than noon on
Thursday
Plaintiff: noon on Thursday yes or
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1udge: alright y'all have a good day
Plaintiff: thank you
Defendant: thank you sir."
10.2. Coughlin failea to present any eviaence that he "complained in good faith to the
landlord or a law enforcement agency of a violation of NRS Chapter 118A] or of a
specific statute that imposes a criminal penalty" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(b).
referenced termination and eviction notices , Coughlin had "instituted or defended against
a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which he] raised an issue of
dwelling units" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e). (NOTE: here Baker attempts to
mischaracterize the language oI the statute to get around the Iact that Couglin, by deIending
against the non-payment summary eviction proceeding Iollowing the 5 Day Non-Payment
Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer purportedly served on Couglhin on 8/22/11, in RJC Rev11-1708,
and therein arguing habitability issues, did, thereby, invoke the protections oI NRS
118A.510(1)(e), as, only thereaIter did Merliss 'bring...an action Ior possession in 1708.
While Baker attempts to argue that Couglin need have 'instituted or deIended against a
judicial...proceeding ' prior to being served with the referenced termination and eviction
notices the statute simply does not say that. Now, Baker can argue that his client did not
thereaIter 'bring and action for possession (and, given the unique nature oI Nevada's
approach, it is not entirely clear at which point one can be said to 'bring an action...is it upon
serving a 5 Day Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer? Did the landlord 'bring an action upon his
purportedly 'terminating Coughlin's 'month to month tenancy on 8/22/11? Hard to
imagine that qualiIies (particularly where such Notice oI 8/22/11 is deIicient in that is
incorrectly asserts that Coughlin's lease had 'expired, where, clearly, such is not the case
upon a close review oI Paragraphs 2, 3, and 20 oI the 2/24/10 'Standard Rental Agreement).
A close review oI the FOFCOLOSE, particularly Findings oI Fact 1-8 reveal
something curious....Baker's provided to Judge SIerrazza a proposed FOFCOLOSE that does
not actually make any indication as to the key inquiry with respect to the NRS 118A.510(e)
analysis vis a vis just when one can be said to 'bring an action Ior possession or have
'instituted or deIended against a judicial ... proceeding. It is likely that Nevada law will
view the landlord to be said to 'bring an action Ior possession either upon the service oI the
9/27/11 5 Day No Cause Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer, or, upon Couglin's Iiling his Tenant's
Answer in response thereto on 10/6/11, and the landlord thereaIter communicating some
intention to the Court to Iollow through with a hearing, and (or, perhaps, upon nothing more
than the Tenant Iiling a Tenant's AIIidavit...that is, the landlord need not do anything Iurther
thereaIter to be said to have 'brought (bring) and action Ior possession). However, Baker's
attempt to characterize the mere service oI some 30 Day Notice to Vacate as the 'bring(ing)
oI an 'action Ior possession is simply unsupportable, in light oI the Iact that there is no
legally operative eIIect to Baker's doing so absent his then serving a 5 Day Notice oI
UnlawIul Detainer, at which point, should tenant Coughlin have Iailed to Iile a Tenan'ts
Answer within 5 days thereoI, Merliss would be able to obtain a lockout Order Irom the court.
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The thing is, Couglin argued that his 'Litigation Demand Letters to Merliss between
May-September oI 2011 suIIice to meet the 'instituted or deIended against requirement (and
there are instances oI such letters Irom Coughlin to the landlord that predate even a Iinding
that the service oI the 30 Day Notice to Vacate oI 8/22/11). Indeed, how is Baker's service
upon Couglin oI a 30 Day Notice to Vacate 'bring(ing) an action Ior possession iI
Coughlin's 'litigation demand letters are not 'instituting or deIending against a judicial
proceeding where habitability an issue (and Coughlin's Litigation Demand Letters
speciIically invoke habitability issues and warn Merliss against any anticipated retaliatory
conduct by the landlord.
Further, the NRS 118A.510 inquiry is not limited to a comparison oI the mere temporal
relation between the landlord's 'bring(ing) or threatening to bring an action Ior possession
and the tenant's:
The 10/27/11 FOFCOL was changed by Judge SIerrazza's 11/7/11 Amended Order,
especially where the 10/27/11 FOFCOL reads:
'10.2. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he "complained in good faith
to the landlord or a law enforcement agency of a violation of NRS Chapter 118A]
or of a specific statute that imposes a criminal penalty" as required by NRS
118A.510(1)(b).
referenced termination and eviction notices , Coughlin had "instituted or defended
against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which he] raised
an issue of compliance with the requirements oI |NRS Chapter 118A| respecting the
habitability oI dwelling units" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e).
Landlord Merliss violated NRS 118A.510 in retaliating against Coughlin.
'NRS 118A.510 Retaliatory conduct by landlord against tenant prohibited; remedies;
exceptions.
1. . the landlord may not, in retaliation, terminate a tenancy , refuse to renew a
tenancy,... or bring or threaten to bring an action for possession iI:...
(b) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord...oI a violation oI this
chapter or oI a speciIic statute that imposes a criminal penalty...
(c) The tenant has organized or become a member oI a tenant`s union or similar
organization;
(e) The tenant has instituted or deIended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or
chapter respecting the habitability oI dwelling units;
(I) The tenant has Iailed or reIused to give written consent to a regulation adopted by the
landlord, aIter the tenant enters into the rental agreement, which requires the landlord to wait
until the appropriate time has elapsed beIore it is enIorceable against the tenant; or
(g) The tenant has complained in good Iaith to the landlord,... (or) an attorney ... oI a
violation oI NRS 118.010 to 118.120, inclusive, or the Fair Housing Act oI 1968, 42 U.S.C.
3601 et seq.,...
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2. II the landlord violates any provision oI subsection 1, the tenant is entitled to the
remedies provided in NRS 118A.390 and has a defense in any retaliatory action by the
landlord for possession.
3. A landlord who acts under the circumstances described in subsection 1 does not violate
that subsection if:
(b) The tenancy is terminated with cause;...
Coughlin also argued that Merliss's retatliating by terminating the lease immediately
aIter Coughlin sought to assert his rights under the lease as to the damage caused by Green
Action Lawn Service, was a violation oI NRS 118A.510(1)(I). The public policy behind this
is important, Ior, otherwise, landlord's would simply use eviction as a coercive bargaining
tactic to get tenant's to give up their bargained Ior rights...and, arguably, such is tantamount to
the criminal violation oI extortion, and thereIore, protected under NRS 118A.510, where
Coughlin's so asserting such rights is tantamount to a violation oI NRS 118A.510(1)(b)
(extortion), and, arguably where NRS 118A.510(1)(e) where Coughlin's reporting to the
landlord the violations oI the Reno Municipal Code's 'noxious weed ordinance is covered by
NRS 118A.290(1)(b),(e), and while Judge SIerrazza ruled that the weeds were not a
habitability issue, Coughlin did put on evidence that the Reno Municipal Code prohibits weed
growth oI over eight inches, (see pictures oI weeds well over thirty inches tall), and as such,
under NRS 118A.290(1)'s language, such 'violates provisions of housing or health codes
concerning the health, safety, sanitation or fitness for habitation of the dwelling unit.
It is interesting to note the diIIerences between NRS 118A.510(b) and (e). Whereas
(b) is broad, covering where the 'tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord...oI a
violation of this chapter or oI a speciIic statute that imposes a criminal penalty NRS
118A.510(e) is more narrow, applying only where the 'tenant has instituted or defended
against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the tenant raised an
issue oI compliance with the requirements oI this chapter respecting the habitability oI
dwelling units. A 'violation oI this chapter as reIerenced in NRS 118A.510(1)(b) could
include a number oI things beyond the more narrow requirement in NRS 118A.510(1)(e) that
habitability be the violation invoked where 'tenant raised an issue, and Iurther, the setting in
which the 'complain(ing) to the landlord reIerenced in (b) would seem to be more broad, as
well, compared to (e)'s requirements that 'tenant raised and issue oI habitability under
circumstances in which ''tenant has instituted or defended against a judicial or
administrative proceeding"...but the scope oI either oI those subsections is not really all that
clear or deIined...largely due to the use oI the phrase 'instituted or deIended against,
especially considering the approach taken under Nevada law with respect to summary
evictions (ie, where the tenant is actually the Iirst party to Iile anything with the court...which
arguably should be characterized as the tenant 'instituting an action such as 1492 or 1708.
zap
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RULE103.REQUIREMENT OF HEARING: No hearing is required when the landlord
Iiles an aIIidavit and application Ior an order oI summary eviction iI the tenant has not Iiled
an aIIidavit. Nothing in this rule is intended to prevent the justice Irom conducting a hearing
on the justice`s own motion. In any case in which the justice determines that a notice to the
tenant has not or may not have been served as required, although the court may not have been
inIormed oI this Iact until aIter the signing oI a summary eviction order, the court may stay all
proceedings until a hearing has been held.
RULE104.NOTICE OF HEARING: Prior to the holding oI a hearing Ior summary
eviction, the justice shall determine the method oI service oI notice oI the hearing on both
parties. The date oI service oI the notice shall be calculated to aIIord the parties suIIicient
opportunity to prepare their cases and be present at the hearing. A justice court may enact
rules requiring landlords to provide additional inIormation to tenants on the notice oI eviction,
and such rules shall not be subject to the provisions oI Rule 83.
RULE105.HEARINGS TO BE INFORMAL: "Hearings regarding applications Ior orders
oI summary eviction shall be inIormal. No formal pleading other than the affidavits and
application provided by these rules may be required, since it is the intent of such hearings
to determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit, notice or service of any
notice and to dispense fair and speedy justice."
Judge Flanagan appears to make the same 'mistake that Judge SIerrazza did in 1708.
That consists oI relying upon the twisted, Iraudulent mistatements oI the law that Baker and
Hill call lawyering, and Merliss's the same as to Iacts. Judge SIerrazza and Flangan could not
rely upon Baker and Merliss's declaration that the lease had 'expired or 'terminated given
the 'term in the agreement, the alleged, was Ior '12 months. (OI course, the 'term in the
lease was Ior 'not less than 12 months, and there was no 'deIined termination date to be
Iound in paragraph 2 oI the lease where paragraph 20 indicated such a deIined date would
aIIect the holdover/termination status oI the lease. Further, Judge SIerrazza may have relied
upon Baker's indicating that he elicited testimony Irom Merliss that spoke to all that contained
in Baker's 10/19/11 Declaration (which Baker purported to contain everything required by
NRS 40.254(2)). However, reliance upon Baker's purposeIully misleading approach there (in
violation oI RPC 3.3, 3.4, etc.) caused Judge SIerrazza to miss the part where Merliss Iailed to
Iile any landlord's aIIidavit/declaration (or even testiIy) to the requirement that he swear that
his claim Ior relieI was authorized by law, per NRS 40.254(2). As it turns out, Merliss's claim
was not authorized by law in that the lease was never terminated, as any attempt to notice
Coughlin on the termination oI the lease was deIicient, owing largely to a Iraudulent attempt
by Baker to avoid having the language oI the lease agreement that was so clearly negative to
his client's positions respective oI whether any retaliation occurred (especially with respect to
his client's liability Ior the actions oI Green Action Lawn Service and Darlene Sharpe), his
client's liability Ior the utility bill (given the standing orders and NV Energy's policies), the
set-oII required by NRS 118A.390 incident to the unlawIul interuption oI essential services,
etc.). Further Baker wished to avoid prolonging Iurther the summary eviction approach he
initially took in 1492 (Irom which Baker Iraudulently submitted a Memorandum oI Costs Ior
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in another case, 1708), but dropped, largely due to his mistakes and inexperience causing
delays and excessive Iees.
In his zeal to avoid having the lease agreement 'renew on its terms or continue
indeIinitely (the lease is ambiguous in that regard, and Baker's invoking NRS 40.251 rather
than NRS 40.250 (as Judge SIerrazza indicated was required or at issue) is telling. So, Baker
and Merliss lied to Judge SIerrazza about whether the lease was expired and as to the actual
term oI the lease. Judge SIerrazza prejudiced Coughlin by essentially bootstrapping the
notice Coughlin was provided in the nonpayment summary eviction in 1492 to the no cause
summary evictino in 1708. However, those are rather diIIerent theories oI law involved. As
such, there was no real notice to be bootstrapped, and the underlying rationale behind such
notice requirements (like those in NJCRCP 109, and 108) is to aIIord parties and their
attorneys an opportunity to build their cases Irom a legal and Iactual perspective (and maybe
to move their belongings out while also so preparing Ior a hearing). Given Judge SIerrazza's
reIusal to accord Coughlin the required twenty days to respond to a properly Iiled and served
Summons and Complaint under NJCRCP 109 (an per NRS 40.253(6)), Coughlin was unable
to suIIiciently prepare Ior the 10/25/11 'Trial. Additionally, there exists no authority Ior
Judge SIerrazza's position that he could convert a summary eviction proceeding to a 'Trial
(as he did in his 10/13/11 Order), and continue to retain the NRS 118A.355(5) escrow deposit
he required oI Coughlin, plus add on another new requirement that Coughlin deposit, on
November 1
st
, 2011, the rent Ior November, as a condition oI Coughlin being aIIorded the
procedural protections oI NJCRCP 109 and NRS 40.253(6). How about, Iirst, having Merliss
signed on the dotted line oI a Complaint, and get a Summons issued, then served on Coughlin,
the aIIord Coughlin an opportunity to Iile an Answer, rather than demanding Coughlin submit
to some sua sponte interrogation by Judge SIerrazza as to whether and how much rent he
owes Merliss, even in the Iace oI Baker insisting all that was up Ior the court's inspection was
possessio oI the premises. As Coughlin indicated on 10/25/11, reserving his objections to
Judge SIerrazza's essentially requiring Coughlin to pled non-payment, and placing the burden
on Coughlin to then show the he did actually Iail to so pay his rent... 'those are Iatual issues,
Your Honor. Indeed, that is very true considering the extent to which Merliss admitted to a
novation oI any laibility Coughlin had as to Coughlin's Iormer co-tenant, Melissa Ulloa,
taking Coughlin's rental contributions Ior May and June 2011 and surreptiously Iailing to
Iorward them to Merliss along with her part oI her own Ior May and all oI her share Ior June
2011.
)
MROA 800:16 (1:51pm JAVS): "Judge: the landlord's aIIidavit, so...PlaintiII: Yes,
which it was the last time. Judge: Huh? PlaintiII: Which it was the last time. I just want to be
sure that this court's form met the statutory requirements. So, when we look at NRS 40.254,
it authorizes an affidavit the landlord or the landlord`s agent, I signed the aIIidavits or the
--- Judge: But I'm not finding that affidavit that's what I'm trying to say. You Iiled that on
what date? PlaintiII: October 19th sir, at 3:41 PM. Judge: Okay, I have a letter Irom you.
PlaintiII: All I have is my Iile stamp copy. (MROA 800) Judge: I have the Notice oI appeal to
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district court which was Notice oI entry oI order dated October 18th. And I have this
declaration is that what you`re talking?
PlaintiII: Yes, declaration oI Casey Baker.... (MROA 801:1-4) (NOTE: the thing is, Baker
Iiled another Declaration on October 18th, 2011 (MROA 407-410) so its not clear that Judge
SIerrazza is not reIerring to that, but what is clear is that the 5 volume ROA transmitted to the
2JDC by the RJC on 12/21/11 only contains one instance oI a "Declaration oI Casey D.
Baker, Esq. Pursuant to NRS 40.254(2), and that appears as "Exhibit F" at the 10/25/11
"Trial". Regardless, even iI Baker did actually Iile such Declaration on that date (and, NRS
4.240 may provide some support such contention, though the "de novo review" oI the ROA
that the district court was required to undertake pursuant to Anvui makes the Iailure oI the
ROA to contain in the appropriate chronological placement any such 10/19/11 "Declaration oI
Casey D. Baker, Esq., Pursuant to NRS 40.254(2) such that the burden oI prooI necessary to
Iind that NRS 40.254(2) was complied with (including the NRS 40.280 analysis) is hardly
met (remember that the burden oI prooI is not the apparent "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard Judge SIerrazza seemingly applied against Coughlin to everything Coughlin
disputed, but rather the NRCP 56-lite standard the legislature reduced the will oI the people to
in NRS 40.253(6) (which necessarily considered the extent to which Nevada's law are the
most pro-landlord in the United States already (see WLS John Sasser's testimony as to AB226
3/1/11), and as such, a straight NRCP 56 standard would be inappropriate. In that regard, the
modiIied version thereoI Ioudn in NRS 40.253(6) accounts Ior the practical prevention oI any
meaningIul opportunity to conduct discovery in the summary eviction setting, and excised the
"genuine issue oI material Iact" prong Irom NRCP 56(c), and, rather, put it the Iollowing way:
at DeIendant: And just I quickly state Ior the record Your Honor, the authority Ior strictly
construing the proper Notice requirements I know you will |22.35| but just preserve it |22:40|
Judge: Well, I`m aware oI that but what you`re Iinding was not compliant with the, I mean,
what you`re arguing was not compliant with strict Rules. DeIendant: That |22.50| with
respect to iI a licensed process server || he also have to go and spend money to certiIicate oI
mailing to me it was, in a little bit. Judge: The |23.00| licensed process server because they
are required to meet certain standards |23:09| get license. DeIendant: No. Judge: Yes, the
presumption is licensed process server is less likely |23.14| DeIendant: I guess just Irom my
point oI view some oI the things I had experienced recently with. Judge: Well, sorry I`m
overruling your Objection because I do Iind that it meets the strict requirements oI the
statutory. DeIendant: I`ve just heard details oI process servers going to |23.30| Judge: Alright,
sir. But that`s not evidence in this hearing either. DeIendant: And |23.38| statements about
|23:41|. (MROA 801)
Baker's 10/19/11 Declaration Pursuant to NRS 40.254(2) should be thrown out or
otherwise ruled as inadmissible or inoperative. At that point, Merliss's "unlawIul detainer
aIIidavit" admitted at Trial on 10/25/11 is severely lacking and deIicient (and the
requirements oI NRS 40.253(5) and NRS 40.254(2) can be reconciled together to apply claim
preclusion to any concomitant or Iuture allegation that Coughlin owed any rent). Further,
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RPC 3.7 prevents Baker Irom attempting to have his Declaration Pursuant to NRS 40.254(2)
coyly claim "attorney client privilege" even under the guise oI being "submitted pursuant to
statute as the landlord's agent" (one oI the downside's oI having a law license, apparently, as
those pesky RPC's like 3.7 prevent the willy nilly approach NCS partakes in).
"Rule3.7.Lawyer as Witness.
(a)A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness unless:
(1)The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2)The testimony relates to the nature and value oI legal services rendered in the
case; or
(3)Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.
(b)A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer`s Iirm is
likely to be called as a witness unless precluded Irom doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9."
The Iraudulent attempt by Baker and Merliss to avoid making Merliss comply with
NRS 40.254(2)'s requirement, whilst also attempting to coyly leverage an invocation oI
"attorney-client privlege" all in an attempt to ameliorate the ills oI the deIicient notices and
services thereoI as to the 8/22/11 and 9/27/11 Notices and the aspects oI the lease (which was
absolutely not "expired" and which had not even been terminated, and as, such, still contained
terms that Merliss just plain did not like very much) hardly qualiIies as a scenario that "would
work substantial hardship on the client", nor one that "relates to an uncontested issue"
(actually, it relates to the very most material oI contested issues in such a proceeding, duh).
Its actually Iunny to consider Baker's Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq. Pursuant to
NRS 40.254(2) (one doesn't Iind the attorney's in Anvui and Venetian v. Two Roads
submitting such "landlord's aIIidavits" in there role as an attorney, buy suggesting that NRS
40.254(2)'s "the aIIidavit oI the landlord or the landlord's agent" somehow vitiates the import
oI RPC 3.7. Also, someone must have told Casey D. Baker, Esq. that there is something in
NRS 40 that insulates him Irom RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 given his all over the map statements
on the record on 10/25/11 and in his NRS 40.254(2) "Declaration" as to whether or not the
"landlord's aIIidavit" was "Iiled" "at the last hearing" on "10/13/11", because Baker alterately
"believes" Merliss's own "unlawIul detainer aIIidavit" was "Iiled", or "submitted", but then,
admits he just isn't "sure" iI it was or not (Judge SIerrazza makes statement indicating it
wasn't, and certainly NRS 4.240 would allow Ior any such docket entry or lack thereoI to
serve as prima Iacie evidence oI Iact that such was or was not Iiled, and, oh look, there is not
any such entry to be Iound (MROA 21).
Rose v Skiles (Tex Civ App) 245 SW 127; and HaeIell, 186 SW 1105 writ oI
resititution supersedeas stay possessory NRS 40.385 automatic non discretionary is such a
stay., See also Coomes 414 F. Supp. 975, and HaniI 369 F. Supp 502.; Sartin v. Barlow ex rei.
Smith, 16 So.2d 372. (Miss. 1944)
MROA 755, more on the insuIIiciency oI the service oI the notices under NRS 40.280
and NRS 40.253
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'DECLARATION OF CASEY D. BAKER. ESQ. PURSUANT TO NRS 40 reads:
'CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ
., being Iirst duly sworn, deposes and under penalty of perjury avers:
1. I am a resident oI the City oI Reno, County oI Washoe, State oI Nevada, and over 18 years
oI age. This declaration is based on my personal knowledge, except those matters stated on
inIormation and belieI, and as to those items I believe them to be true. This declaration is
made in my capacity as the landlord's agent, pursuant to NRS 40.254(2), and represents
my testimony if called on to present same in court.
2. I am an attorney duly licensed as such by the State oI Nevada to practice beIore all
courts oI this State and maintain my oIIice at 652 Forest Street, Reno, Nevada. I am also
licensed to practice beIore the United States District Court Ior the District oI Nevada.
3. My oIIice is counsel Ior the landlord, Matthew Merliss, in this matter.
4. Dr. Merliss submitted his landlord's aIIidavit in this matter at the time oI the hearing
on October 13, 2011.
5. AIter diligently searching Ior same on the Nevada Supreme Court website, I am
inIormed and believe that the Nevada Supreme Court has not promulgated a landlord's
aIIidavit Iorm Ior use in a 30-day no-cause eviction, such as this case.
6. Accordingly, with the exception oI attaching the summary eviction notices thereto,
Dr. Merliss' aIIidavit was on the Iorm provided by this court.
7. The purpose oI this declaration is to supplement Dr. Meriiss' aIIidavit in accordance
with the requirements oI NRS 40.254(2).
communications between my oIIice and Dr. Meriiss, I state the Iollowing on inIormation and
belieI:
8.1. The tenancy at issue commenced on March 1, 2010, and was Ior a term oI
12 months. A true and correct copy oI the rental agreement is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 1.
NRS 40.254(2)(a).
8.2. The rental agreement terminated by its terms on February 28, 2011.
paragraph 3 oI the rental agreement. NRS 40.254(2)(b).
inclusive, at the end oI the stated term oI the rental agreement, whereupon he became a
Dr. Merliss' aIIidavit, previously Iiled herein. In addition to the 5-day notice attached to Dr.
Merliss' aIIidavit, which was hand-delivered to Mr. Coughlin by me at the hearing on
September 27, 2011, an additional 5-day notice was served on Mr. Coughlin by Nevada Court
Services on that same date. A true and correct copy oI that notice, together with the certiIicate
oI service, has also been provided to the court. An additional copy is attached hereto as
EXHIBIT 2. NRS 40.254(2)(d).
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terminated pursuant to NRS 40.251(1). ThereIore, the claim Ior relieI oI possession oI the
9. I declare under penalty oI perjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct.
AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030 The undersigned does hereby aIIirm that the
19th oI October, 2011
/s/ CASEY D. BAKER, as the landlord's agent pursuant to NRS 40.254(2), and pursuant to
NRS 15.010 because the client is absent Irom the county in which the attorney resides.
As such, the requirements oI NRS 40.254(2) were never met (especially prior to the
start oI the 10/13/11 hearing, and the 10/25/11 "Trial"/continuation oI 10/13/11 hearing),
which requires:
"2. The aIIidavit oI the landlord or the landlord's agent submitted to the justice court or the
district court must contain:
(a) The date when the tenancy commencea, the term oI the tenancy, and, iI any, a copy oI the
rental agreement.
(b) The date when the tenancy or rental agreement allegealy terminatea.
(c) The date when the tenant became subject to the provisions of ARS 4.251 to 4.251,
inclusive, together with any supporting facts.
(d) The date when the written notice was given, a copy oI the notice and a statement that
notice was served in accordance with ARS 4.28.
(e) A statement that the claim for relief was authorized by law."
So, landlord Merliss's "unlawIul detainer aIIidavit" was Iirst Iiled or put into evidence
midway through the "Trial" on 10/25/11:
'Unlawful Detainer Affidavit: The undersigned petitioner. being Iirst duly sworn.
deposes and says:
1. That your aIIiant, in compliance with NRS 118A. is the landlord of certain dwellings or
2. That your aIIiant rented a c ertain dwelling or apartment to Melissa Ulloa and Zachary
Coughlin located at 121 River Rock. Reno. NV 89503 on March 1, 2010....- with periodic
any kind.
named premises.
County, ordering the above named tenant Irom the above mentioned premises, as provided in
NRS, Chapter 40. /s/ (what appears to be the signature oI Matthew Merliss)"
So,
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MROA 797: "Judge: BeIore we get into that though I`m trying to straighten up this
Iile. I`m going to put my orders on the leIt so I can Iind them. Okay. Service must be pursuant
to 40.250 and 40.280 sets the method oI service. Okay, so you`re on Exhibit C, Exhibit C is
the Iive-day Notice. PlaintiII: Go on. Judge: Yes. PlaintiII: There are two oI those documents.
I just want the court to be clear. On September 27th at our hearing I personally hand delivered
one oI those to Mr. Coughlin. I don`t know which one you have in your hand. Judge: Well,
this one --- PlaintiII: The |13:00| service will say. (MROA 797) Judge: --- is, I don`t know
who it`s signed by, to see you have to come up and look at it. It says |J. Dortmund 13.16|
PlaintiII: Okay, that`s, that`s |13:19| what happened, Your Honor, was on September 27th I
handed one oI these to Mr. Coughlin at the hearing. When I get back to the oIIice I thought
perhaps that`s not appropriate you better have it served as well. So, we had it served this well.
The court has the correct one. Judge: Alright. Well, this one shows service by J. Dortmund.
PlaintiII: Yes. Judge: And it indicates by posting a copy. PlaintiII: And mailing, sir. Judge:
Where is the US certiIicate postal service mailing? PlaintiII: Your Honor, I have the original
here. I`m going to see what these. Judge: I do have a copy oI them |14.40| envelope. PlaintiII:
That`s generally what we get back Irom them, sir. Judge: But the certiIicate oI mailing is a
little Iorm. PlaintiII: Well, Your Honor, these the aIIidavit declaration oI service which is
page 4 or 5. And this is US Supreme Court Iorm. This is what they Iilled out when they
posted in mail. Generally they will give us a photocopy oI the envelope as well. But I don`t
see that on this. Judge: So, the envelope`s here I have. PlaintiII: Okay. Judge: But not there is
the United States Postal Service certiIicate oI mailing. However, the statement signed by the
tenant and the witness acknowledging the tenant received the Notice... (MROA 798)...or B, a
certiIicate oI mailing issued by the United States Postal Service or C, the endorsement oI a
sheriII constable or other process server stating the time and manner oI service. So ---
PlaintiII: That`s what we have here, sir. Judge: And that`s what the deIendant was arguing
with ambiguous but I have ruled previously that iI it is a licensed process server, the
certiIicate oI mailing is not required iI they Iill out the aIIidavit as they have done in this case.
And, so, to the extent that that is your Objection I am going to hold that the Exhibit C meets
the statutory requirements. And Exhibit C is Iurther incorporated and Exhibit D does contain
the which is Exhibit 1 attached to Exhibit D has the envelope showing the postage and
mailing on August 22nd to Zachary DeIendant: so, and towards any doubt about it I do Iind it
the proper certiIicate has been Iurnished to the court. That means the requirements Ior the
Iive-day Notice and Iive-day Notice was given. It appears more than 30 days aIter the Exhibit
B the August 22nd which was the 30-day no cause. And then we have September 27th
actually I think I was told about the wrong document around here. September 27th was the
when I talk about the Iiveday Notice previously and the envelope I was actually reIerring to
the August 22nd 30-day Notice. The Iive-day Notice was served more than 30 days aIter the
30-day Notice so, that meets the statutory requirements. Then we have I`m going to mark as
Exhibit do we have Exhibit E where the okay, Exhibit E is going to be the lease
agreement...PlaintiII: I have such point out sir, the landlord`s aIIidavit Exhibit D is on the
Iorm provided by this court. The US Supreme Court has, as you know, we have these Iorms,
the eviction (MROA 799) Notice Iorms. However, they don`t have an aIIidavit Iorm Ior
|19.26|. So, we submitted the UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit Exhibit D signed by Dr. Merliss.
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However, going back and just looking at the stature there`s a make sure were covered NRS
40.254, I, as the landlord`s agent Iile a declaration on October 19th which addresses the items
in NRS 40.254 sub 2. I have just one point to have to the court --- Judge: No, I don`t have that
I don`t believe. Where is that? PlaintiII: That was Iiled on October 19th, sir. DeIendant:
|20.04| Objection as to not having the landlord making that declaration and hopeIully it serve
as |20:14|. Judge: Well, I`m not ruling whether or not that meets the requirements but the
aIIidavit can be Iiled at the hearing. The landlord`s aIIidavit so. PlaintiII: Yes, which it was
the last time. Judge: Huh? PlaintiII: Which it was the last time. I just want to be sure that his
court`s Iorm that the statutory requirements. So, when we look at NRS 40.254, it authorizes
an aIIidavit the landlord or the landlord`s agent, I signed the aIIidavits or the --- (MROA
800)....DeIendant: And just I quickly state Ior the record Your Honor, the authority Ior strictly
construing the proper Notice requirements I know you will |22.35| but just preserve it |22:40|
Judge: Well, I`m aware oI that but what you`re Iinding was not compliant with the, I mean,
what you`re arguing was not compliant with strict Rules. DeIendant: That |22.50| with
respect to iI a licensed process server || he also have to go and spend money to certiIicate oI
mailing to me it was, in a little bit. Judge: The |23.00| licensed process server because they
are required to meet certain standards |23:09| get license. DeIendant: No. Judge: Yes, the
presumption is licensed process server is less likely |23.14|...Judge: You have the opportunity
to subpoena the process server in this case. Okay, let`s just so your aIIidavit sir, I do need
someone to testiIy us to what`s contained there and about the lease etc. PlaintiII: Okay. Judge:
Since we are doing a hearing here, I do have Exhibit E and you are the counsel so I would
preIer to have your client do the actual testimony on the. PlaintiII: That`s Iine, sir. The
aIIidavit was submitted pursuant to statute as the landlord`s agent and. Judge: No, I know
but you are not going to be testiIying today, right? PlaintiII: I don`t think so unless we get to
that. Judge: Alright. So, the issue beIore me is what`s alleged in your aIIidavit at least that
portion which starts at the, I think it`s page 2, starting at paragraph 8, iI we can. PlaintiII:
Yeah. Judge: And you can remain there iI you wish, Doctor, iI you will please raise your right
hand. Do you swear under penalty oI perjury to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth? Doctor: I do. (MROA 802).
MROA 803: "Judge: ...why don`t you use the court`s copies so we can expedite this,
I`m just trying to make sure we have a record because I do not remember precisely what was
covered at the last hearing. I do not think that we had your affidavit wasn't even filed
|26.16| at the last hearing. DeIendant: That`s correct but the landlord`s aIIidavit was. Judge:
Yeah, I understand but the landlord's affidavit didn't have everything in it that you allege in
your affidavit. DeIendant: I understand, sir. Judge: Alright. DeIendant: Doctor Merliss, will
you please state your name as spell your last name Ior the record? Dr. Merliss: Matthew Joel
Merliss, M-E-R-L-I-S-S. PlaintiII: Thank you. And you are the owner oI 121 River Rock,
Reno, Nevada? Dr. Merliss: Yes. PlaintiII: Okay. |26.46| what`s been marked Ior
identiIication purposes as plaintiII`s Exhibit E. Do you recognize this, doctor? Dr. Merliss:
Yes. PlaintiII: Okay. What is it? Dr. Merliss: It`s the altered lease agreement. (NOTE: the
transcript somewhat routinely conIuses the "DeIendant" and the "PlaintiII", though that is
usually clear Irom context)...PlaintiII: Is this the lease agreement with Mr. Coughlin and Ms.
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Ulloa Ior 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada? Dr. Merliss: Yes. PlaintiII: |27.55| admit plaintiII`s
Exhibit E, Your Honor? Judge: Any Objections, sir? DeIendant: No, sir, Your Honor. Judge:
E is admitted. PlaintiII: Thank you, sir. I want you to take a look at Exhibit E, please. Can you
tell me, sir Irom looking Exhibit E when the tenancy commenced? Dr. Merliss: February
2010. PlaintiII: Okay. Dr. Merliss: February 20th. PlaintiII: I want you to take a look at
paragraph 2, Iourth line down. It says, excuse me....PlaintiII: Let me just rephrase my
question. Dr. Merliss, please look at paragraph 2 of the lease Exhibit E. (MROA
805)...Dr. Merliss: terms? Plaintiff: Yes. Do you see on the fourth line where the lease
states commencing on the first day of March 2010, do you see that? Dr. Merliss: Yes.
Plaintiff: Okay. Is that your understanding when the lease began? Dr. Merliss: Yes. PlaintiII:
And what was the term, how many months? (the JAVS recording reveals this testimony
transpired at 2:00:49 pm on 10/25/11, or 30:24 into the audio Iile name
102511Coughlin3.wmv) Dr. Merliss: 1hat's for 12 months. PlaintiII: Okay. (MROA 806:9-
19) So, iI the term (oI the) lease was Ior 12 months and it began on March 1, 2010 when it
would have ended? Dr. Merliss: (I guess).., March 1, 2011. PlaintiII: Well. Merliss: Er...uh
(NOTE: not present on rougher MROA transcript) PlaintiII: One year, right? Dr. Merliss:
Yes. DeIendant: Objection, |30.52| (Your Honor, leading the witness)... Dr. Merliss: Yes,
would be one year. Judge: The Objection is sustained but the answer is one year, so. PlaintiII:
Thank you. Dr. Merliss: Would be one year. PlaintiII: Alright, thank you. So one year would
be February 28, 2011, is that correct? Dr. Merliss: Yes. PlaintiII: Will you please go to the
next paragraph, paragraph 3, and titled hold over, do you see that?...Dr. Merliss: Yes.
PlaintiII: Will you read the Iirst Iull sentence in that paragraph? How about the. Dr. Merliss:
|31.20| agreement or any changes |properly agreed | to will remain in the Iact on a monthly
basis aIter the initial term. PlaintiII: Thank you. Your Honor, this point Dr. Merliss has
already authenticated the service of the eviction Aotices and I believe that covers
everything in my affidavit that was different from his. Judge: Alright. Then I will admit B,
C, D, E, and F. PlaintiII: Thank you, sir. (MROA 807).
Exhibit D Irom the 10/25/11 "Trial" in 1708 starts with the alleged 'UnlawIul Detainer
AIIidavit by landlord Merliss, which Iails to contain all required by NRS 40.254(2), and
which does not appear to be Iile stamped, and its not clear that it was Iiled in the RJC when
Baker's 10/19/11 Declaration indicates it was. It reads:
'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit
apartments within the jurisdictional conIines oI Reno Township, Washoe County, Nevada.
Coughlin located at 121 River Rock, Reno, NV 89503 on March 1, 2010 with periodic rental
payments reserved by the month or Ior a shorter period oI time, and a cleaning or rental
any kind.
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4. That more than thirty/seven days have elapsed since the service of the notices attached
named premises.
WHEREFORE. your aIIiant prays Ior an order oI this court, directed to the SheriII oI
Washoe County, ordering the abovenamed tenant Irom the above mentioned premises, as
provided in NRS, Chapter 40.
satisIactory evidence to be the person who appeared beIore me.
At MROA 1478 Hill's associate Baker attached an online police report that Hill
submitted (on 11/19/11) to the Reno Police Department that Iraudulently misrepresents that:
"Mr coughlin has sent me an email in which he claims that oIIicer carter, the rpd oIIicer who
arrested him on Sunday Nov 13, 2011(is taking bribes Irom me. The email is way too big to i
nclude i n this reporting Iorm. Please let me know how to get it to you. As i am sure oIIicer
carter will tell you, coughlin's allegations are Ialse."
" 1udge: You have the opportunity to subpoena the process server in this case. Okay, let`s just
so your aIIidavit sir, I ao neea someone to testify us to whats containea there ana about the
lease etc.
Plaintiff: Okay.
1udge: Since we are doing a hearing here, I do have Exhibit E and you are the counsel so I
would prefer to have your client do the actual testimony on the.
Plaintiff: That`s Iine, sir. 1he affidavit was submitted pursuant to statute as the landlord's
agent and.
1udge: No, I know but you are not going to be testifying today, right?
Plaintiff: I don`t think so unless we get to that.
1udge: Alright. So, the issue before me is what's alleged in your affidavit at least that
portion which starts at the, I think it's page 2, starting at paragraph 8, iI we can. ...
1udge: Wow, why don`t you use the court`s copies so we can expedite this, I`m just trying to
make sure we have a record because I do not remember precisely what was covered at the last
hearing. I do not think that we had your aIIidavit wasn`t even Iiled |26.16| at the last
hearing.
Defendant: That`s correct but the landlord`s aIIidavit was.
1udge: Yeah, I understand but the landlord`s aIIidavit didn`t have everything in it that you
allege in your aIIidavit....
Plaintiff: Thank you. And you are the owner oI 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada?
Dr. Merliss: Yes.
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Plaintiff: Okay. |26.46| what`s been marked Ior identiIication purposes as plaintiII`s Exhibit
E. Do you recognize this, doctor?... Dr. Merliss: It`s the altered lease agreement. ...
Plaintiff: Thank you, sir. I want you to take a look at Exhibit E, please. Can you tell me, sir
Irom looking Exhibit E when the tenancy commenced?
Dr. Merliss: February 2010.
Plaintiff: Okay.
Dr. Merliss: February 20th...
Plaintiff: Let me just rephrase my question. Dr. Merliss, please look at paragraph 2 oI the
lease Exhibit E.
Dr. Merliss: terms?
Plaintiff: Yes. Do you see on the Iourth line where the lease states commencing on the Iirst
day oI March 2010, do you see that?
Dr. Merliss: Yes.
Plaintiff: Okay. Is that your understanding when the lease began?
Dr. Merliss: Yes.
Plaintiff: And what was the term, how many months?
Dr. Merliss: Thats for 12 months. (MROA 806:10-13)
Plaintiff: Okay. So, iI the term in the lease was 12 months and it began on March 1, 2010
when it would have ended?
Dr. Merliss: Yes, March 1, 2011.
Plaintiff: Well. One year, right?
Dr. Merliss: Yes.
Defendant: Objection, |30.52|
Dr. Merliss: Yes, would be one year.
1udge: The Objection is sustained but the answer is one year, so.
Plaintiff: Thank you.
Dr. Merliss: Would be one year.
Plaintiff: Alright, thank you. So one year would be February 28, 2011, is that correct? Dr.
Merliss: Yes.
Plaintiff: Will you please go to the next paragraph, paragraph 3, and titled hold over, do you
see that?
Dr. Merliss: Yes.
Plaintiff: Will you read the Iirst Iull sentence in that paragraph? How about the.
Dr. Merliss: |31.20| agreement or any changes |properly agreed | to will remain in the Iact
on a monthly basis aIter the initial term.
Plaintiff: Thank you. Your Honor, this point Dr. Merliss has already authenticated the service
oI the eviction Notices and I believe that covers everything in my aIIidavit that was diIIerent
Irom his.
1udge: Alright. Then I will admit B, C, D, E, and F.
Plaintiff: Thank you, sir....." (MROA 807).
"Defendant: So, at this point I wouldn`t have anything Iurther. We could.
1udge: Alright, that`s being the case do you have any other witnesses?
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Defendant: Your Honor, I will have |37.32|
1udge: Well.
Defendant: I believe that the landlord has made its initial burden, to shiIt the burden to.
1udge: Alright." (MROA 810).
The problem Ior Merliss is that NRS 118A deIines "premises" diIIerently than it
deIines "dwelling place", and the import oI that becomes clear upon a close reading oI NRS
40.254: 'when the tenant oI a dwelling unit which is subject to the provisions of chapter
118A oI NRS'. Merliss can only argue that part oI Coughlin's lease and use oI the premises
was Ior a "dwelling unit", and he is deIenseless against the Iact that section 13 oI the lease
speciIically authorizes a commercial use oI the property in addition to the residential use
provided in the lease, and that Coughlin's Tenant's Answer oI 10/6/11, and the Iunctional
equivalents oI amendments thereto (including those oI 10/11/11, 10/13/11, 10/17/11, 10/17/11
(especially page six oI such Motion Ior Stay, which expressly sets out the commercial use oI
the premises and the jurisdictional predicate, bar, prerequisite (in giant bold, underlined style,
it was! MROA 376) presented where Merliss pursued a "no-cause" eviction under NRS
40.254 (Baker's 10/19/11 Declaration expressly cites to such statutory section, and Judge
SIerrazza's comments on the record on 11/7/11 make clear that "this was not an action Ior
non-payment oI rent)
NRS 118A.190(2): "Written notices to the tenant prescribed by this chapter shall be
served in the manner provided by NRS 40.280."
So, another jurisdictional prerequisite that is missing Irom both the 9/27/11 5 Day
UnlawIul Detainer Notice purportedly issued pursuant to NRS 40.253(1)
Another problem with using Iorms oII the internet, Ior lanldord Merliss, is that, when
the Iorms are dated at the bottom oI every page as Irom "2006", but the statutes, readily
available online, all hyperlinked up an everything, with the revisions thereto and dating
thereoI available at the bottom oI each section, there really is no excuse Ior Merliss's
attorney's seeking, by sworn declaration, some $18,000 in attorney's Iees Ior the summary
eviction proceeding in 1708 alone (ie, Baker's 10/27/11 Memorandum oI Costs was not Ior
the non-payment case in 1492 (though one could be Iorgiven Ior thinking it was given all the
entries in the "Activity Reports" therein that expressly reIerenced "non-payment" notices and
the "legal work" associate with the preparation thereoI (Baker utilized Iorms 1 and 4 Irom the
AOC site, and both Iorms having dating at the bottom thereoI indicating a vintage oI 2006,
but NRS 40.253 (http://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-040.html ) contains directly aIter the
text oI NRS 40.253 hyperlinks to the revisions thereto, dated by year: 2009, 1966; 2011,
235, 1489 ...so...let's see, iI "Froms #1 and #4" are dated 2006...then Baker and Hill might
want to check out those revision put in play by the legislature in 2009 and 2011...surely
Baker, whom repeatedly submitted Declaration attesting to his "six years" oI experience in
litigation, largely Iocusing in "business" and "commercial litigation" and "real estate", whom
indicated an hourly billing rate oI $250.00 would agree that its a bit hard to understand how
$18,000 in attorney's Iee could actually be incurrea just in the justice court, and then another
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$42,065 in Iees (under an assertion oI NRS 69.050 as supporting Iees Ior the appeal oI an
oraer, where Baker was Iorced to "join in the motion to vacate" the 11/9/11 award by the
justice court oI what must have been a very disappointing mere $1,500 (aIter Baker's 10/27/11
Memorandum oI Costs sought $18,000 in attorneys Iees).
MROA 796-97 speaks to the Iact that the 10/25/11 hearing was the Iirst point at which
Merliss's "unlawIul detainer aIIidavit" was even marked or admitted, muc less Iiled (ditto
Baker's 10/19/11 Declare Pursuant to NRS 40.254(2)).
Merliss's 9/27/11 5 Day UnlawIul Detainer Notice lacks the statutorily required
predicates identiIied in NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2)-(3) (especially important given the unlawIul
interruption oI essential services the ensued on 10/4/11-10/5/11, especially where, in light oI
the "standing order" Merliss had in place upon Ulloa taking the NV Energy electric bill out oI
her name, as NV Energy's Tsuda testiIied, to reverted to Merliss's name, and NV Energy
reIuses to let anyone without the requisite personal inIormation (Merliss's social security
number) pay such bill, and given the language in the then still very much active lease, such
was "not payable" by Coughlin, and thereIore, the lease required Merliss to pay it, to which
such unlawIul interruption was a violation oI NRS 118A.390...regardless oI the Iact that
Coughlin eventually sought damages Ior such, and a set oII thereto as to the NRS
118A.355(5) "rent escrow deposit" Judge SIerrazza, curiously, insisted upon (which, oI
course, Judge SIerrazza reIused to countenance), the Iact that the 9/27/11 Notice lacks such
statutorily required language barred the RJC Irom entering any summary eviction order. One,
such is not a deIect Coughlin can "waive". Two, an argument that there was such a waiver is
undone by the Iailure oI Merliss to comply with the service requirements Ior both the 8/22/11
and 9/27/11 Notices...it would be maniIestly unjust to hold Coughlin to have waived this or
that, or apply Lau to anything given the summary nature oI such proceedings to begin with
being extremely quick, made all the more untenable by the Iailure to "strictly adhere" the the
statutory requirements thereto (as required by Paul v. Armstrong, and Aikins).
ROA 320: "Defendant: I will do a slide show Your Honor iI that will be alright. And there is
a short video where the issues oI the property damage are essentially admitted by the Green
Action Lawn service.
Plaintiff: No, I`m going to Object to any video oI anything.it has no relevance to possession
oI property today and I have never seen it.
1udge: No, I`m understanding that but I believe it is integral to the deIense you have
|inaudible
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to credit Ior.
Plaintiff: You can go to the next picture in that order |inaudible 0:43:44|. |OFF MIC
CONVERSATION|
credit Ior 350.
Defendant: I believe he is reIerring to |inaudible 0:44:39| who you all paid to the landlord Ior
June Your Honor.
investigations as to whether or not their plans are based on fact or law. Can they just churn
do the same job. One wonders iI he is so well oII as a neurologist that he can aIIord to have
the same job done twice, or he doesn`t just accept my oIIer to have the window Iixed Ior
$100.
Plaintiff: Objection relevance. It`s a hissy Iit by him indeed.
1udge: Alright so I will give you one last chance to add anything else.
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor I believe the retaliation argument a prima facie case has
been made speciIically with regard to habitabllity issues, the habitabllity includes saIety.
The crumbling stair rises clearly presented a situation where that was an issue. habitabllity
1udge: Alright, sir. I am going to rule now because Iirst oI all I find under the NRS iI you
want to make a habitabllity claim you have to deposit the rent and iI it wasn`t clear in my
1udge: But now sir I am going to give you credit Ior your alleged habitabllity issues. The
rent that is due as oI today will be 4,500. I`m going to give you credit Ior the stairs oI 1250,
weeds oI 350 weeds oI 350 twice. The garbage disposal 125 and the window 150 which
comes out to 2225. In addition I`m going to give you 500 credit Ior the mold abatement,
which is 2725. So the 4500 minus 2225 is 2275. I will continue this till tomorrow at 9:00 AM
Ior you to deposit the 20. It won`t be tomorrow it will be Monday.
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third party.
1udge: Who said?
1udge: Well.
Defendant: Clearly.
amount oI 2275 I will continue this Ior Trial on the merits to determine whether or not there
really is a habitabllity issue..." (MROA 324).
It is completely inappropriate to allow the landlord to Iail to appear to the 10/13/11
summary eviction proceeding, deprive Coughlin oI his right to "test the truthIulness and
suIIiciency" oI some "landlord's aIIidavit" that had not even been Iiled at that point (as such,
the "trial" setting in the 10/13/11 Eviction Decision and Order "setting the matter Ior trial" Ior
10/25/11 is void, as is everything stemming thereIrom...Iurther, to prejudice Coughlin's
deIense in this matter by Iorcing him to deposit some ridiculously inIlated "rent escrow"
amount that was premised solely upon the landlord's attorney quasi-testiIying, not under oath,
especially where he alternately admits he doesn't really know how much rent he or the
landlord think might be owed (obviously, such does not meet the "preponderance oI the
evidence" standard that seems to apply generally to most issues in summary eviction
proceedings...Iurther, the 10/27/11 FOFCOL Iails to even speciIy whom has what burden oI
prooI, and just what that burden oI prooI is...rather, it conIuses the alleged "standard",
indicating it is a straight NRCP 56 analysis, when its really the modiIied version thereoI the
legislature set out in NRS 40.253(6), though it never makes clear what "burden oI prooI"
applies to any such "standard".
It is ridiculous to apply NRS 118A.355(5) where the landlord repeatedly insisted rent
was not being sought, and thereIore, rent was not alleged owed. Further, no such application
should issue where the landlord Iailed to Iile and aIIidavit complying with NRS 40.253(5)'s
requirements: "(1) The date the tenancy commenced. (2) The amount of perioaic rent
reservea. (3) The amounts of any cleaning, security or rent deposits paid in advance, in
excess of the first month`s rent, by the tenant. (4) The date the rental payments became
delinquent. (5) The length of time the tenant has remained in possession without paying
rent. (6) The amount of rent claimed due and delinquent. (7) A statement that the written
notice was served on the tenant in accordance with NRS 40.280. (8) A copy oI the written
notice served on the tenant. (9) A copy oI the signed written rental agreement, iI any."
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All this worry over getting the rent escrow right Ior a landlord whom decided not to
pursue a non-payment summary eviction Ior "tactical reasons", yet not a lick oI concern Ior
"the amount oI periodic rent reserved" or the "amounts oI any cleaning, security or rent
deposits paid in advance..." Judge's SIerrazza and Flanagan's approaches here likely will, iI
that have not already, get some tenant's killed. For real. It's shameIul.
Its just some patently lacking in due process as to be truly disturbing to think that
Judge SIerrazza thinks its somehow just to apply NRS 118A.355(5), Iail to require the
landlord, or even the "landlord's agent" (RPC 3.7 be damned, apparently, not to mention the
violations oI RPC 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4 where the landlord's attorney Baker's alternately admits he
is not realy sure how much rent they even think is owing, only to catch on to the routine and
immediately insist this or that many months is owing...), so, where such rent escrow deposit is
Ioisted upon a tenant, then surely NRS 118.360(3) and NRS40.2512 aIIord some relieI,
right? Including that whole bit about
NRS40.2512 UnlawIul detainer: Possession after default in payment of rent.A
tenant ... is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer when the tenant continues in possession...aIter
deIault in the payment oI any rent and aIter a notice in writing, requiring in the alternative
the payment of the rent or the surrender oI the detained premises, remains uncompliea with
for a perioa of 5 aays,..."
So, where was Coughlin's notice under NRS 40.2512? Any 8/22/11 5 Day UnlawIul
Detainer Notice Ior Non-Payment oI Rent allegedly served Coughlin in connection with the
prescursor non-payment summary eviction case in 1492 became invalid the minute the
landlord and his counsel made the decision to "withdraw" their non-payment claim in that
matter and proceed in 1708 with a no-cause summary eviction. As such, a new 5 Day
UnlawIul Detiner Notice Ior Non-Payment should have been required prior to burdening
Coughlin's deIense with a NRS 118A.355(5) rent escrow deposit or Iorcing Coughlin to spend
the lion's share oI court time "proving" whether or not his habilitability complaints were
"substantiated" or not or even related to habitability or whether this or that deserved a set-oII
as to the "rent escrow" deposit required, or whether this or that was admissible or relevant
with respect to such set-oIIs when the real material issues involved in this no-cause summary
eviction holdover proceeding concerned whether the landlord had a right to possession (ie,
whether the lease had "expired" or whether it was properly "terminated", what the term oI the
lease was, and whether the landlord even had any right to a no-cause termination under the
lease, especially where Coughlin was utlizing the rental, at least in part, as a "commercial
premises", as the lease expressly allowed Ior, and, perhaps most importantly oI all, whether
the landlord violated NRS 118A.510 where he did: "in retaliation, terminate a tenancy, reIuse
to renew a tenancy, increase rent or decrease essential items or services required by the rental
agreement or this chapter, or bring or threaten to bring an action Ior possession iI:
(b) The tenant has complained in good Iaith to the landlord or a law enIorcement agency
oI a violation of this chapter or oI a speciIic statute that imposes a criminal penalty;...
(e) The tenant has instituted or defended against a judicial ...proceeding ... in which the
tenant raised an issue oI compliance with the requirements oI this chapter respecting the
habitability oI dwelling units; (Obviously, the tenant did in 1492)...
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(I) The tenant has failea or refusea to give written consent to a regulation adopted by the
landlord, aIter the tenant enters into the rental agreement, ...(this is particularly clear in the
exchange between Couglin and Merliss in writing on 8/11/11 where Coughlin points out the
NRS 118A.360 rent deductions and damages under the lease he is entitled to and Merliss
promptly insists that Coughlin must, essentially "waive" Paragraph 23 under the lease, which
makes Merliss responsible Ior the acts oI the landscapers and the realtor/quasi-property
manager Sharpe; or
(g) The tenant has complained in good Iaith to the landlord, a government agency, an
attorney," Because iI the landlord did, tenant Coughlin has deIense to such retaliatory action
by the landlord Ior possession, and Iurther, and analysis oI the set-oIIs required her per any
NRS 118A.355(5) analysis that the justice court continues to insist upon, then, necessarily
requires an application oI NRS 118A.390, and Nevada law does not seem all that clear
whether such is addressable in the same summary proceeding, or the extent to which a
collateral bar applies iI such goes unaddressed, or whether a set-oII in light thereoI may issue.
(NRS 118A.510(2): "II the landlord violates any provision oI subsection 1, the tenant is
entitled to the remedies provided in NRS 118A.390 and has a deIense in any retaliatory action
by the landlord Ior possession").
"Re: status and rent? 8/11/11 Zach Coughlin To Matt Merliss From: ZC
(magundaaol.com) ... no one has compensated me for the damage done to my property by
the landscaping crew. 1he damage and labor required to repaie it was at least $1,... they
put my careIully installed proprty in the street and reIused to put it back. ... wrote you about
the fallen insulation in the downstairs and the exposed mold both in the floor board and
the insulation. You never responded. Please do."
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deductions."
To Matt Merliss
From: zachcoughlinhotmail.com (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent: Sun 8/14/11 10:56 AM
To: Matt Merliss (magundaaol.com)
approved..."
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eviction...."
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refuse...."
What becomes clear upon considering the requirements oI NRS 40.253(5) (all those
requirements to list the amount oI delinquent rent, etc.) and the GC Wallace decision oI
10/6/11 is that there is a price to pay Ior the aecision made by Merliss's counsel to "withdraw"
the non-payment summary eviction (RJC Rev2011-001492) they pursued immediately prior
to the no-cause summary eviction sought in the instant matter (and NRS 118A.510(I)
obviously presents another real impediment there...duh) as, one, whether or not Coughlin
owed any rent was, Ior all practical purposes, "actually litigated" in 1492, and Wallace makes
clear there is now a collateral bar to an assertion that Coughlin owed any rent (thus, Judge
SIerrazza's application oI NRS 118A.355(5) (even where Coughlin so expressly made clear
he was not asserting any "withholding' oI rent, and where Coughlin never once indicated that
he "owed" Merliss any rent whatsoever, and where Merliss's counsel actually went out oI his
way to make clear to Judge SIerrazza that Merliss was not seeking any rent...Iinally during the
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11/7/11 hearing Iollowing the 10/25/11 "Trial" Judge SIerrazza made even more clear that
"this was a no-cause summary eviction, it was not Ior the non-payment oI rent").
Beyond the claim preclusion eIIect Irom 1492 resulting Irom Wallace, is the Iact that
the "landlord's aIIidavit" serving as a jurisdictional prerequisite to even holding a hearing (see
NRS 40.253(6)) requires compliance with NRS 40.253(5), which requires: " (3) The amounts
oI any cleaning, security or rent deposits paid in advance, in excess oI the Iirst month`s rent,
by the tenant.(4) The date the rental payments became delinquent., (5) The length of time
the tenant has remained in possession without paying rent. (6) The amount of rent claimed
due and delinquent."
While NRS 40.254(2) speciIies: "2. The aIIidavit oI the landlord or the landlord`s
agent submitted to the justice court or the district court must contain: (a) The date when
the tenancy commenced, the term oI the tenancy, and, iI any, a copy oI the rental agreement.
(b) The date when the tenancy or rental agreement allegedly terminated. (c) The date
when the tenant became subject to the provisions oI NRS 40.251 to 40.2516, inclusive,
together with any supporting Iacts. (d) The date when the written notice was given, a copy
oI the notice and a statement that notice was served in accordance with NRS 40.280. (e) A
statement that the claim Ior relieI was authorized by law." NRS 40.254 leverages summary
eviction procedures where it provides "the landlord is entitled to the summary procedures
provided in NRS 40.253 ". That brings to light to diIIerences between what is required oI the
"aIIidavit oI the landlord" in NRS 40.254(2) and the "landlord's aIIidavit" in NRS 40.253(5)-
(6).
This Court should take this opportunity to make clear its position as to issues oI
collateral estoppel or claim preclusion in instances where a landlord pursues a holdover
proceeding (ie, a no-cause summary eviction in the parlance more common in Nevada) where
the landlord later seeks to make a claim Ior rent, or, where, as here, the landlord tests the non-
payment summary eviction waters and Iinds them not to his liking, and Ilips the script, hoping
to do some real broken Iield running in a summary holdover proceeding.
A collateral estoppel eIIect oI an eviction judgment does not prevent the tenant Irom
raising, in another action, an issue that could have been raised in the eviction action but was
not raised, or was raised in the eviction action but later withdrawn,64 an issue raised in the
eviction action on which the court declined to rule,65 or issues oI title.66 64. Steinberg v.
Silverman, 186 Minn. 640, 64243, 244 N.W. 105, 10506 (1932). 65. SeiIred v. Zabel, 369
N.W.2d 571, 574 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 66. Pushor v. Dale, 242 Minn. 564, 56869, 66
N.W.2d 11, 14 (1954). See inIra notes 12639 and accompanying text.
While the collateral estoppel eIIect oI eviction litigation is limited,256 tenants should
make a record in appropriate cases that the tenant is not litigating nor waiving a potential tort
claim.257 I Torts, 33 WM.MITCHELL L.REV. 427, 43839 (2006). 256. See supra notes
6466. 257. In Judge v. Rio Hot Properties, Inc., the court made no Iindings or conclusions on
tenant`s potential tort claims as they did not litigate them in the summary proceeding. Nos.
UD-1981202903, UD-1981005518, and UD- 1981104522 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 18, 1998)
(orders dismissing unlawIul detainer action).
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DeIendant-landlord`s notice oI termination oI tenancy is a pre-requisite to Iiling an
unlawIul detainer and thus a prelitigation communication. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232 Birkner v.
Lam
Judge SIerrazza's 11/9/11 Order in 1708 reads: 'ORDER AWARDING COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES This matter came on regularly Ior an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
NRS 40.254 and NRS 40.253( 6) on Octo ber 13,2011, and continued on Octo ber 25,2011,
beIore the Honora ble Peter J. SIerrazza, sitting without a jury. The plaintiII/landlord, Matt
Merliss ("Merliss"), having been the prevailing party, is entitled to recover his costs and
attorney's Iees pursuant to NRS 69.030. See also, Sandy Valley Assocs v. Sky Ranch Estates,
117 Nev. 948, 957, 35 P.2d 9 64 (2oo1Y ("Attorney Iees may also be a warded as damages in
those cases in which a party incurred the Iees in recovering real or personal propel:I}'
acquired through the wrongIul conduct oI the deIendant ... "). Merliss having timely Iiled and
served his Memorandum oI Costs and Disbursements; deIendant, Zachary /11 t Receded Irom
on other grounds by Horgan v. Felton, 123 Nev. 577, 170 P.3d 982 (2007) Barker "Coughlin
having Iailed to timely Iile and serve any motion to retax or opposition thereto with the court
in accordance with NRS 69.040(S); the Court being Iully inIormed in the premises and good
cause appearing thereIor; IT IS H EREB Y ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED , that
plaintiIIj .' \ landlord shall have judgment against and recover oI the deIendant ZAC ARY
BARKER " COUGH LIN costs in the amount oI $421.78 and attorney's Iees in the amount oI
$l,500.00, with such Iees and costs to earn interest at the legal rate Irom the date hereoI until
paid. ." DATED this 9th day oI November, 2011. /s/ Peter J. SIerrazza.
One really must be troubled by Baker's 11/9/11 "Correction oI Inadvertent Misstatment
oI Law Pursuant to NRPC 3.3" (MROA 1366-67) where Baker's takes the rather untenable
tact oI arguing that, sure, he cited to NRS 40.254(3) at the conclusion oI the 10/25/11 Trial in
announcing his intention to seek attorney's Iees, only to then be Ioreced to Iile such
"Correction"...yet only Iiled it after Coughlin announced, in open court, during the 11/7/11
Hearing, that Baker's citation to such statute was completely oII base, where such allows Ior
the narrowest oI applications to garner attorney's Iee awards in summary evictions provided
the tenant is violating the Controlled Substances Act in some way (likely requiring
manuIacture oI such). Such really begs the question oI why Baker waited until Coughlin
pointed out his citation to such obviously inapplicable basis Ior an attorney Iee award to Iile
such correction, particulary where Baker Iiled on 10/27/11 a Memorandum oI Costs seeking
some $18,000 in attorneys Iees. Baker's Iiling oI 11/7/11 reads:
"CORRECTION OF INADVERTENT MISSTATEMENT OF LAW PURSUANT TO
NRPC Pursuant to Nevada Rule oI ProIessional Conduct 3.3(a), CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ.,
attorney Ior landlord, MATT MERLISS, corrects an inadvertent misstatement oI the law
made by him, as Iollows: At or near the close oI the October 25, 2011 hearing in this matter,
the undersigned advised the court that Merliss was entitled to, and would be seeking,
attorney's Iees pursuant to NRS 40.254(3), and Iurther, that Merliss would ask the court to
include the amount oI any Iees awarded in any supersedeas bond required oI deIendant.
After reviewing the statute more closely following the hearing, it became clear that
counsel's statement of the law was not correct, in that the reIerenced statutory provision does
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not apply to these proceedings. Counsel's misstatement oI the law was not "knowing" under
NRPC 3.3(a), in that the undersigned believed that statutory provision applied at the time, but
simply misread it.
Further, it was not "material" as required by that rule, in that Merliss was not seeking
an award oI Iees at that time, but, rather, simply advising the court that he would be in the
Iuture. Moreover, Merliss did not cite or rely on that statute in his Memorandum oI Costs and
Disbursements, Iiled herein on October 27, 2011.
Finally, even though deIendant Coughlin Iailed to Iile any motion to retax or other
opposition to the memorandum oI costs, the court was apprised by him at the Aovember 7,
211 hearing that the referenced statutory provision did not apply. In response, the court
advised deIendant that he could "oppose" the memorandum oI costs. As such, the court is
already aware that it should not rely on NRS 40.254(3) in awarding any Iees to Merliss.
Nevertheless, the undersigned Iiles this correction in the interest oI Iull candor to the
tribunal. /s/ Casey D. Baker, Esq."
It is interesting to noted that Baker's "Correction" is Iile-stamped 11/9/11 at 12:23 pm,
and Judge SIerrazza's Order awarding attorney's Iees and costs, oI the same date bares a time-
stamping oI 3:12 pm. Seemingly, Judge SIerrazza used the interim between the two to do a
bit oI legal research on Baker's behalI and came up with a citation to NRS 69.030 and Sandy
Valley, (just classic, rule that the only thing at issue is "possession" then cite to Sandy Valley
as justiIying an award oI attorney's Iees as "damages", while no more than a sentence away
citing to NRS 69.030 as allowing Ior an award oI attorney's Iees as "costs" however, clearly
inapplicable, Ior placement in his 11/9/11 Order. (excising the term "judgment" Irom such
citation just as careIully as he careIully avoid using quotation marks around the phrase
"Nevada's courts" (where such citation actually only applies to "District courts") only to use
them later on in the same sentence when explicating the purported basis Ior what really was
just another abuse oI the contempt power and shiIting oI the disorder wrought by clerks and
bailiIIs doing as they please, regardless oI the law onto the public, rather than checking in
where necessary and where deserved (that 12/20/12 Administrative Order 2012-01 reads:
"WHEREAS, Nevada's courts are constitutionally authorized to issue all writs "proper and
necessary to the complete exercise oI their jurisdiction." Nev. Const. art. 6, 6(1)..."; just like
the the careIul attempts to, during the 10/25/11 "Trial" steer Coughlin away Irom the basis Ior
applying NRS 118A.510(b) where the tenant made such complaints "to the landlord"
regarding "violations oI" NRS 118A, but rather to suggest such subsection aIIords a basis
only Ior reporting a "speciIic criminal statute" to law enIorcement)
Contrast Baker's arguments that Coughlin Iailed to speciIically cite to NRS 40.385 as a
basis Ior a Motion Ior Stay (at least until such Iirst appears in the record in Coughlin's
11/23/11 Iiling)...so, apparently, its "okay" iI Baker's 10/27/11 Memorandum oI Costs did not
cite to an legal authority to support such a Iee award, never mind the Iact Baker was seeking
an outrageous $18,000 in attorney's Iees Ior a summary eviction proceeding (and, actually,
much oI the Iees he sought were Ior work done by non-attorney's as identiIied in his "Activity
Reports", and were Ior a aifferent case, ie, the non-payment summary eviction he abandoned
in 1492).
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It's rather odd to consider Judge SIerrazza's 11/9/11 Order (MROA 1369) awarding
Baker and his landlord client some $1,500 in attorney's Iees considering that Baker's
'10/27/11 Memorandum oI Costs contained absolutely no citation to support his Motion Ior
some $18,000 in attorney's Iees (most oI which were patently incurred in the non-payment
summary eviction case in 1492 that Baker dropped mid-way through). Baker's 10/27/11
"Memorandum oI Costs" contains nothing in the way oI citation to support such a request Ior
$18,000 oI attorney's Iees. Any attorney who claims to deserve such Iees cannot possibly
pretend to not know the "American Rule" as to attorney's Iees (ie, that absent some
contractual or statutory basis, parties commonly must bare their own attorney's Iees) (Baker's
Declaration in support oI his 10/27/11 seeking oI $18,000 attorney Iee award states "counsel
has practiced in this area Ior over 6 years; the Iees sought are reasonable in terms oI rates and
time charged under the circumstances oI this matter. The Iees Ior the undersigned were all
incurred at the standard hourly rate oI $225.00, except when the client was charged a Ilat Iee,
as noted. I am inIormed and believe that these rates are well within the normal range Ior
attorneys oI similar experience and qualiIication. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice
beIore all courts oI the State oI Nevada. The Iees incurred Ior Richard G. Hill, Esq. ("RGH:')
were incurred at his standard hourly rate oI $350.00; which upon inquiry and experience is
within the range charged by other similar qualiIied attorneys in the community. The result
obtained was highly Iavorable to my client. The charges identiIied as "SLH" were entered by
my secretary, Sherri L. Hill, and reIlect the identiIication oI costs only. The charges identiIied
as "GR" were entered by my secretary, Gabriela Reccelle, and reIlect the entry oI costs only."
MROA 1026 reveals Baker's misconduct in Iiling "VeriIication" at MROA 1021 claiming:
"that the items in the above memorandum contained are true and correct, to the best oI the
knowledge and belieI oI the undersigned; and that the said disbursements have been
necessarily incurred and paid in said action. As to the Iees, counsel represents to the Court
that the amount oI Iees requested has been actually, reasonably and necessarily incurred in
this case." Really? Where "this case" and "said action" was the "no-cause summary eviction
proceeding" in 1708, it really is not at all clear how Baker's Activity Reports can rightIully
include the Iollowing entries Irom the non-payment summary eviction in 1492: 8/16/11 "5
day nonpayment oI rent notice" $150.00...8/19/11 "Email to client. Prepare 5-day pay or
vacate notice....Flat Iee oI $150...8/19/11 "Emails to and Irom client. Some legal research on
construction and interpretation oI join liability under contract" $157.50 (NOTE: where "all
that is at issue is possession" in 1708, as Baker indicated in court, its not clear how such Iees
were "reasonably and necessarily incurred" in 1708, as whether Sharpe or Green Action had
any "joint liability" would apparently be an issue Ior another matter, right?)...9/1/11 "Nevada
Court Services--serve non-payment 5 day eviction notice $55.00"...9/6/11 "Complete
Landlord's Declaration Ior Summary Eviction Ior Non-Pament (Ilat Iee oI $150 per
agreement) $150.00"..."9/6/11 Prepare opposition to motion Ior sanctions 1.20 hrs $270.00"
(strange, there were no Iilings in 1708 until 10/6/11, so this 9/6/11 entry is necessarily Irom
reIerring to the sanctions motion oI that date in 1492)..."9/6/11 Receive and review new
motion Ior sanctions Irom Coughlin 0.30 hrs $67.50" ... "9/6/11 Legal research re: repairs and
motion Ior sanctions Irom Coughlin 0.50 $112.50"..."9/7/11 DraIt opposition and motion to
strike motion Ior sanctions. 1.50 $337.50"..."9/9/11 Revise and Iinalize opposition to motion
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Ior sanctions, motion to strike, counter-motion Ior sanctions, and declaration oI CDB in
support thereoI
Includes compiling exhibits and some legal research 2.00 hrs $450.00" (such "Opposition"
dealt with a Motion Ior Sanctions directed to misstatement as to the alleged amount oI rent
owed in a non-payment summary eviction in 1492, which has no relation to a no-cause
summary eviction in 1708 where rent was not claimed) ..."Receive and review Iax Irom court
(Coughlin's answer). Conduct some legal research. Multiple emails Irom and to Coughlin.
2.00 hrs $450.00" (such entry reIers to Coughlin's 9/19/11 Amended Tenant's Answer in
1492, the non-payment case)..."Prepare reply in support oI motion to strike/motion Ior
sanctions 2.00 hrs $450.00" (such entry reIers to the "Reply" Baker Iiled on 9/26/11 in the
non-payment case in 1492)..."Prepare reply in support oI motion to strike and Ior
sanctions. 2.50 $562.50" (ditto)..."edit Reply 1.10 hrs $247.50"..."9/23/11 Prepare Declaration
oI CBD in support oI Reply .60 hrs $135.00"..."9/26/11 Revise Reply .40 hrs
$90.00"..."8/25/11 Prepare Ior hearing 1.00 hrs $225.00"...9/26/11 Continue to prepare Ior
hearing 1.10 hrs $247.50"..."9/26/11 continue to prepare Ior hearing 2.00 hrs
$450.00"..."9/27/11 Iinal preparations Ior hearing 1.50 hrs $337.50" (all oI this is reIerring to
the 9/27/11 hearing in 1492)..."9/27/11 meet with client. to and Irom hearing 2.25 hrs
$506.25" ...10/4/11 review statute re: essential services .20 $45.00" (why Coughlin should
pay Ior research related to the unlawIul interruption oI his essential services is unclear)).
From Flanagan's 4/20/12 Order in Carpentier v. Aames, QLS, and RCS in CV08-
01709: 'Finally, this Court makes the Iollowing observations. The arguments raised by the
parties in their pleadings generally circumscribe the adjudicatory boundaries oI this Court.
See ..,Breliant v. PreIerred Equities Corp., 109 Nev. 842, 847, 858 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1993
(stating a district court generally may not consider matters outside oI the pleadings when
reviewing a motion to dismiss).
NCJC Rule 2.15 implicates the need to consider then ChieI Judge SIerrazza's work in
his 11/28/12 Order barring Coughlin Irom submitting Iilings by Iax (absent any notice or
opportunity to be heard on such Order entered in "ALL CASES; ALL DEPARTMENTS",
even as to "landlord tenant matters" and criminal case where such Order cited to JCRRT 10 as
providing authority Ior such a measure (against an "oIIicer oI the court" no less in attorney
Coughlin, arguably requiring a higher level oI due process prior to such a deprivation, Clark
v. Campbell, even where JCRRT 2 makes clear such Rule 10 does not apply to criminal and
or "landlord tenant matters") and his 12/20/12 "Administrative Order 2012-01" (which the
RJC has now given a makeover that Iurther usurps the executive branches charging Iunction
in attaching, retroactively, a criminal case number oI RCR2012-071437, but, hey, at least
Bruce Lindsay, Esquire was able to use such as an occasions to triple dip, incident to Judge
CliIton ("Dave" according to Lindsay, so much Ior appearances) perhaps running aIoul oI
Canon 2's dictates with respect to "Administrative Appointments" oI "appointed counsel"
(2006 L.A. Times article, Mahan, appointing receivers, Bob Bell Group apparently required
to make such appointments, not Judge CliIton directly, or Judge Pearson, whom oversees the
unauthorized practice oI law in his CCP court by Department oI Alternative Sentencing
oIIicers who lack any sort oI legal training or licensure (sort oI like WCDA Inspector
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Covington practicing law where ADA Helzer insulated DDA Zachary Norman Young, Esq.
and Amos Stege, Esq. Irom all those burdensome ethical quagmires presented by even talking
to Coughlin or reading any oI his correspondence, or Iiling, even, apparently). The Iact that
ChieI Judge Pearson countenanced then ChieI Judge SIerrazza's 12/20/12 Administrative
Order (which misstates this State's own Constitution in remixing Art. 6 Sec. 6 thereoI to read
"Nevada courts" where it really speaks to "District courts" (ie, courts oI "general jurisdiction"
versus the "courts oI limited jurisdiction" that both Judge SIerrazza's Reno Justice Court and
Reno Municipal Court Administrative Judge William Gardner's RMC are classiIied as
(Gardner's 1/16/13 "Administrative Order 2013-01" is a verbatim reproduction oI Judge
SIerrazza's 12/20/12 "Administrative Order" Iurther underscoring the extent to which having
the WCDA, 2JDC Family Court, RMC, and RJC all under one rooI has, at times, resulted in a
sort oI contest to see who can outdo who in terms oI most excessive overreaching past one's
jurisdictional limits, all in a sort oI group-think gang-up on the public at large, some might
say, to the point where a some judges apparently Ieels entitled to completely ignore the
legislature's work as to, say, tenant's rights. Tenant's, in the RJC, apparently, only have rights
iI the judges therein Ieel like recognizing them, and that can depend on an awIul lot oI
variables (rather easy to run aIoul oI the moods oI bailiIIs and court clerks alike, all,
apparently, emboldened by a laissez Iair approach by the RMC and RJC benches as to such
matters (see the RMC just plain not getting the 6/28/12 Iaxed Notice oI Appeal Irom
Coughlin appealing the criminal trespass conviction at issue in 62337 and 61901).
The extent to which Judge CliIton has carried out such laissez Iair approach to the do
nothing representation oI WCPD Biray Dogan and Jim Leslie (and Leslie's representation
beIore Judge SIerrazza in RCR2011-063341 went into Lawyer Kevorkian territory), and the
insulting and Iraudulent stylings oI Bruce Lindsay, Esq. (apparently WCDA DDA Young did
the ol' switcheroo as to the "global resolution" resolving all oI Coughlin's criminal matters
(including the convictions still arguably within the RJC's jurisdiction though on appeal given
the tolling motions Iiled therein), with such deal being in place just long enough to beneIit
DAS and the RJC during the 3/11/13 hearing in so many, many combined cases Ior which
Lindsay was quadruple billing (approx.) which obviated any need Ior the RJC and its BailiII's
to comply with NRS 22.030(2)'s aIIidavit requirement (echoes oI RMC Judge Nash Holmes
and Marshal Harley in FHE 4 and 5 (see 62337)), or Ior DAS OIIicers Wickman and Ramos
to explain their violation oI NRS 171.136 where ordering Coughlin to open the door to his
residence aIter 7 pm, and rather than announce they were arresting him prior to that and prior
to placing cuIIs on him, the only did so aIter, citing in the probable cause sheet to NRS
211A.215, a warrantless probation violation arrest statute (where such arrest stemmed Irom an
allegation that Coughlin Iailed to check in on the very day that RJC BailiIIs, in an obvious
overextension oI the largesse so questionably aIIorded them by the specious 12/20/12
Administrative Order, detained Coughlin just long enough at the security check in to allow
DAS to close its doors and prevent Coughlin Irom "checking in").
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NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2)-(3) presents statutorily required jurisdictional prerequisites which
must be apparent Irom the record, on its Iace, that are clearly lacking Irom Merliss's 9/27/11 5
Day Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer. see MROA 197 (which Coughlin does not believe he Iiled
with his 10/6/11 Tenant's Answer, as he had taken issue with the RJC's insistence that
Tenant's must attach a copy oI such 5 Day UnlawIul Detainer Notice to their Answer's, and
Iurther there is inconsistencies present when comparing the hold punching oI the two...
"PlaintiII's Exhibit B" at MROA 619-623 contains the 8/22/11 No-Cause Termination
Notice ot Vacate NRS 40.251(1) Iollowed by "PlaintiII's Exhibit C" 9/27/11 "Five-Day
Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer Ior Failure to Vacate Rental Unit- NRS 40.251 (No-Cause
Termination) and Notice oI Summary Eivction -NRS 40.254" (at MROA 624-626).
"PlaintiII's Exhibit C" Irom the 10/25/11 "Trial" simply Iails to contain that statutorily
required by NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2)-(3):
NRS40.253Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and
exclusion of tenant for default in payment of rent.
1....when the tenant oI any dwelling, apartment,... or commercial premises with
periodic rent reserved by the month... is in default in payment of the rent, the landlord...may
serve or have served a notice in writing, requiring in the alternative the payment oI the rent or
the surrender oI the premises:
3.A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must:...(b)Advise the tenant:...
(2)That iI the court determines that the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer, the
court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the
nonadmittance oI the tenant, airecting the sheriff... oI the county to remove the tenant within
24 hours after receipt of the order; and
(3)That, pursuant to NRS 118A.390, a tenant may seek relieI iI a landlord
unlawIully removes the tenant Irom the premises or excludes the tenant by blocking or
attempting to block the tenant`s entry upon the premises or willfully interrupts or causes or
permits the interruption of an essential service required by the rental agreement or chapter
118A oI NRS...
5.Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(a)The landlord or the landlord`s agent may apply by aIIidavit oI complaint Ior eviction
to the justice court oI the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or
commercial premises are located or to the district court oI the county in which the dwelling,
apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction over
the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriII or constable oI the
county to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order. The aIIidavit must state
or contain:
(1)The date the tenancy commenced.
(2)The amount oI periodic rent reserved.
(3)The amounts oI any cleaning, security or rent deposits paid in advance, in excess
oI the Iirst month`s rent, by the tenant.
(4)The date the rental payments became delinquent.
(5)The length oI time the tenant has remained in possession without paying rent.
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(6)The amount oI rent claimed due and delinquent.
(7)A statement that the written notice was served on the tenant in accordance
with NRS 40.280.
(8)A copy oI the written notice served on the tenant.
(9)A copy oI the signed written rental agreement, iI any.
(b)Except when the tenant has timely Iiled the aIIidavit described in subsection 3 and a
Iile-stamped copy oI it has been received by the landlord or the landlord`s agent, and except
when the landlord is prohibited pursuant to NRS 118A.480, the landlord or the landlord`s
agent may, in a peaceable manner, provide Ior the nonadmittance oI the tenant to the premises
by locking or otherwise.
6.Upon the Iiling by the tenant oI the aIIidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless oI
the inIormation contained in the aIIidavit, and the Iiling by the landlord oI the aIIidavit
permitted by subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall hold a hearing, aIter
service oI notice oI the hearing upon the parties, to determine the truthIulness and suIIiciency
oI any aIIidavit or notice provided Ior in this section. II the court determines that there is no
legal deIense as to the alleged unlawIul detainer and the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul
detainer, the court may issue a summary order Ior removal oI the tenant or an order providing
Ior the nonadmittance oI the tenant. II the court determines that there is a legal deIense as to
the alleged unlawIul detainer, the court shall reIuse to grant either party any relieI, and, except
as otherwise provided in this subsection, shall require that any Iurther proceedings be
conducted pursuant to NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive. The issuance oI a summary order Ior
removal oI the tenant does not preclude an action by the tenant Ior any damages or other relieI
to which the tenant may be entitled. II the alleged unlawIul detainer was based upon
subsection 5 oINRS 40.2514, the reIusal by the court to grant relieI does not preclude the
landlord thereaIter Irom pursuing an action Ior unlawIul detainer in accordance with NRS
40.251.
7.The tenant may, upon payment oI the appropriate Iees relating to the Iiling and
service oI a motion, Iile a motion with the court, on a Iorm provided by the clerk oI the court,
to dispute the amount oI the costs, iI any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS
118A.460 or118C.230 Ior the inventory, moving and storage oI personal property leIt on the
premises. The motion must be Iiled within 20 days aIter the summary order Ior removal oI the
tenant or the abandonment oI the premises by the tenant, or within 20 days aIter:
(a)The tenant has vacated or been removed Irom the premises; and
(b)A copy oI those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant,
whichever is later.
8.Upon the Iiling oI a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall schedule a
hearing on the motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days aIter the Iiling oI the motion.
The court shall aIIix the date oI the hearing to the motion and order a copy served upon the
landlord by the sheriII, constable or other process server. At the hearing, the court may:
(a)Determine the costs, iI any, claimed by the landlord pursuant toNRS
118A.460 or 118C.230 and any accumulating daily costs; and
(b)Order the release oI the tenant`s property upon the payment oI the charges determined
to be due or iI no charges are determined to be due.
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9.A landlord shall not reIuse to accept rent Irom a tenant that is submitted aIter the
landlord or the landlord`s agent has served or had served a notice pursuant to subsection 1 iI
the reIusal is based on the Iact that the tenant has not paid collection Iees, attorney`s Iees or
other costs other than rent, a reasonable charge Ior late payments oI rent or dishonored
checks, or a security. As used in this subsection, 'security has the meaning ascribed to it
in NRS 118A.240.
(Added to NRS by 1967, 195; A 1969, 263, 575; 1973, 1085; 1975, 1202; 1977, 418,
1346; 1979, 1398, 1879; 1985, 229; 1987, 1239; 1989, 1082, 1232; 1991, 113; 1995,
1851; 1997, 3511; 1999, 981;2009, 1966; 2011, 235, 1489)
exclusion of tenant from certain types of property.Except as otherwise provided by
speciIic statute, in addition to the remedy provided in NRS 40.251 and in NRS
40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when the tenant oI a dwelling unit which is subject to the
provisions oI chapter 118A oI NRS, part oI a low-rent housing program operated by a public
housing authority, a mobile home or a recreational vehicle is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer,
the landlord is entitled to the summary procedures provided in NRS 40.253 except that:
1.Written notice to surrender the premises must:
(a)Be given to the tenant in accordance with the provisions oI NRS 40.280;
(b)Advise the tenant oI the court that has jurisdiction over the matter; and
(c)Advise the tenant oI the tenant`s right to contest the notice by Iiling within 5 days an
aIIidavit with the court that has jurisdiction over the matter that the tenant is not guilty oI an
unlawIul detainer.
2.The aIIidavit oI the landlord or the landlord`s agent submitted to the justice court or
(e)A statement that the claim Ior relieI was authorized by law."
MROA 452: That 10/17/11 Order in 1708 (by Judge CliIton, Iilling in Ior an absent
Judge SIerrazza) manages to make very clear that the 10/25/11 date was a "trial date", in two
instances: "ORDER This matter has come beIore the Court upon DeIendant's Emergency
Motion to Stay, Set Aside, Vacate Eviction Hearing Order Iiled on today's date. An
Opposition by PlaintiII was also Iiled today. These pleadings Iollow a Summary Eviction
hearing held October 13, 2011; beIore Judge SIerrazza.
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The court's minutes indicate that DeIendant's eviction Irom the premises would only
occur on today's date iI he Iailed to post the rental amount oI $2,275.00 by October 17, 2011
with the court. A trial date was then set Ior October 25, 2011.
DeIendant has tendered $2,275.00 to the court on today's date. ThereIore, the instant
motion is now moot and the trial date oI October 25, 2011 stands. |s it thereIore HEREBY
ORDERED that DeIendant's Emergency Motion to Stay. Set Aside, Vacate Eviction Hearing
Order is DENIED. DATED this 17th day oI October, 2011. /s/ Justice oI the Peace David
CliIton".
It is unbelievably irresponsible Ior Judge CliIton to review Coughlin's 10/17/11 Motion
to Stay, which sets out the exigency associate with the RJC throwing all procedural
protections out the window while characterizing as plenary that which was proceeding at
summary speeding, and then characterize such as "moot" because the RJC was able to twist
Coughlin's arm into depositing his last $2,275. That sort oI reckless jurisprudence wound up
costing Coughlin a great deal so Iar, but now is the time where it needs to start costing
Merliss, Washoe County, the Reno Justice Court, Washoe County SheriII, and Reno Police
Department something, especially where the RJC's stock in trade is requiring others to be
responsible Ior their actions.
NRAP Rule 3(d)Serving the Notice of Appeal.
(1)In General.The appellant shall serve the notice oI appeal on all parties to the action
in the district court. Service on a party represented by counsel shall be made on counsel. II a
party is not represented by counsel, appellant shall serve the notice oI appeal on the party at
the party`s last known address. The appellant must note, on each copy, the date when the
notice oI appeal was Iiled. The notice oI appeal Iiled with the district court clerk shall contain
an acknowledgement oI service or prooI oI service that conIorms to the requirements oI Rule
25(d).
(
A motion to proceed in Iorma pauperis on appeal, supported by required documents, must be
made in the Iirst instance to the district court, and only iI that motion is denied is there
occasion to Iile an in Iorma pauperis motion with the appellate court. Boling-Bey v. U.S.
Parole Com'n, 559 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2009). In re Interest oI K.D.B., 233 Neb. 371, 445
N.W.2d 620 (1989).
http://www.ccwashoe.com/public/ckpublicqrydoct.cpdktrptIrames?
backtoP&caseidCV11-03051&begindate&enddate
NEFR Rule9.Electronic service.
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(a)Applicability.Electronic service oI documents is limited to those documents
permitted to be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or Iacsimile transmission. A
complaint, petition or other document that must be served with a summons, and a summons or
a subpoena cannot be served electronically.
(b)Service on registerea users.When a document is electronically Iiled, the court or
authorized electronic Iiling service provider must provide notice to all registered users on the
case that a document has been Iiled and is available on the electronic service system
document repository. The notice must be sent by e-mail to the addresses Iurnished by the
registered users under Rule 13(c). This notice shall be considered as valid and eIIective
service oI the document on the registered users and shall have the same legal eIIect as service
oI a paper document. A court is not required to make a document available until aIter the
clerk has reviewed and endorsed the document.
(c)Consent to electronic service.Other than service oI a summons or subpoena, users
who register with the electronic Iiling system are deemed to consent to receive service
electronically. A party may also agree to accept electronic service by Iiling and serving a
notice. The notice must include the electronic notiIication address(es) at which the party
agrees to accept service.
(d)Service on nonregisterea recipients.The party Iiling a document must serve
nonregistered recipients by traditional means such as mail, express mail, overnight delivery,
or Iacsimile transmission and provide prooI oI such service to the court.
(e)Service list.The parties must provide the clerk with a service list indicating the
parties to be served. The clerk shall maintain the service list, indicating which parties
are to be served electronically and which parties are to be served in the traditional
manner.
(I)Time of service, time to respona.Electronic service is complete at the time oI
transmission oI the notice required by subsection (b) oI this rule. For the purpose oI
computing time to respond to documents received via electronic service, any document served
on a day or at a time when the court is not open Ior business shall be deemed served at the
time oI the next opening oI the court Ior business.
Coughlin has and hereby again provides the 2JDC with a service list Ior CV11-03051 to
indicate that Richard G. HIll, Esq. has indicated, as has his client (correct me iI you Ieel
otherwise, please) that Hill and his oIIice are appearing on Merliss's behalI in CV11-03051.
Please add registered eIiler Hill and Casey D. Baker, Esq., to the service list therein, and at
least send him courtesy notiIication emails when there is a Iiling. Further, please provide
Coughlin a waiver oI the electronic Iiling Iees (which necessarily includes the yearly eFlex
subscription oI $300 (or at least some pro-rated or per case Iee Ior access and ability to eIile
in CV11-03051 considering that, at least implicitly, Coughlin's IFP Application thereon was
granted, at least to the $216.00 2JDC Iiling Iee, otherwise, that 12/8/11 $216.00 check Irom
Coughlin in the RJC docket oI 12/8/11 (see NRS 4.420, District Court docket entries are
prima Iacie evidence oI Iact) must have applied to CV11-03051 considering Judge Berry
entered an Order 12/8/11 as to Coughlin's 11/8/11 NRS 40.385 Motion Ior Stay (Court's don't
generally enters Order on Motions in cases where a Iiling Iee has not been paid where an in
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Iorma pauperis application has been denied in Iull...)...but that means that CV11-03628 never
met with a $216.00 2JDC Iiling Iee Irom Coughlin...its one or the other, but not both. Sort oI
like the situation Coughlin spelled out in his 12/22/11 Notice oI Posting Supersedeas Bond,
Where is my Stay and the 12/22/11 email to Hill, Baker, and RJC Judge SIerrazza vis a vis
the NRS 40.254 bar against utilizing NRS 40.253's summary eviction procedures against a
commercial tenant Ior a no cause eviction
NRS 118A.190
Additionally, the claim preclusion eIIects elucidated in CG Wallace likely apply to all the
various purported claims Ior rent, damages, etc. Merliss may wish to make, but didn't, in the
"Trial" that Rev11-001708 was converted to by the 10/13/11 Order.
Rule10.Payment of filing fees.
(a)Filing fees.The court clerk is not required to accept electronic documents that
require a Iee. II the clerk does accept electronic documents that require a Iee, the court may
permit the use oI credit cards, debit cards, electronic Iund transIers, or debit accounts Ior the
payment oI Iiling Iees associated with electronic Iiling. A court may also authorize other
methods oI payment consistent with any AOC guidelines that may be adopted.
(b)Waiver of fees. Anyone entitled to waiver oI nonelectronic Iiling Iees will not be
charged electronic Iiling Iees. The court or clerk shall establish an application and waiver
process consistent with the application and waiver process used with respect to nonelectronic
Iiling and Iiling Iees.
That's weird, the docket attached hereto lacks and entry Ior the 11/8/11 Motion Ior Stay by
Coughlin in CV11-03051, but it also lacks and entry striking such a Motion, and clearly,
Coughlin has a Iile stamped copy thereoI, and additionally, the 12/8/11 Order therein
certainly speaks to such a Iiling....
26. 3336 - Ord Deny
in Forma Pauperis
08-Nov-2011Extra Text: Transaction 2576889 - Approved By:
NOREVIEW : 11-08-2011:10:22:39
27. NEF - ProoI oI
Electronic Service
08-Nov-2011Extra Text: Transaction 2576924 - Approved By:
NOREVIEW : 11-08-2011:10:27:44
28. 2490 - Motion ... 01-Nov-2011Extra Text: AMENDED MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROCEED ON
APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
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29. 3860 - Request
Ior Submission
01-Nov-2011Extra Text: DOCUMENT TITLE: AMENDED
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA
PAUPERIS (NO PAPER ORDER) PARTY
SUBMITTING: ZACH COUGHLIN DATE
SUBMITTED: 11/01/11 SUBMITTED
30. 3860 - Request
Ior Submission
19-Oct-2011 Extra Text: DOCUMENT TITLE: MOTION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (DEFENDANT)
(PAPER ORDER PROVIDED) PARTY
SUBMITTING: ZACH COUGHLIN DATE
SUBMITTED: 10/19/2011 SUBMITTED BY: V.
ALLEN DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
31. 1075 - AIIidavit ... 19-Oct-2011 Extra Text: AFFIDAVIT OF POVERTY
(DEFENDANT) - NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM
RENO JUSTICE COURT
32. 2385 - Mtn
Proceed Forma
Pauperis
19-Oct-2011 Extra Text: NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM RENO
JUSTICE COURT
Summary
I. Introduction
Research ReIerences 1. DeIinitions 2. Power oI state to regulate practice oI law 3.
Nature oI attorney's oIIice 4. Duties oI oIIice 5. --Public versus private duties 6.
Necessity that litigant appear by counsel 7. Integrated bar 8. --Mandatory membership
dues and uses to which dues may constitutionally be put 9. Clients' security Iund 10.
Lawyer reIerence systems; the Legal Services Corporation 11. State occupation tax 12.
Municipal occupation tax
II. Judicial Supervision oI Legal ProIession
A. Admission to Practice
Research ReIerences
1. In General
13. Generally
14. Constitutionality oI admission requirements, generally 15. --Freedom oI speech and
association; privacy 16. Oath 17. Citizenship; residency 18. Bar examination; diploma
privilege 19. Procedural due process 20. Judicial review 21. Admission without
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examination 22. Admission Ior particular case 23. EIIect on right to practice oI change oI
residence to another state
2. Moral Character
24. Generally 25. Burden oI proving good moral character 26. What does or does not
constitute lack oI good character 27. Rehabilitation oI moral character; conditional
admission 28. Criminal record as bearing on moral character
B. Disciplinary Proceedings
Research ReIerences
1.
In General
29. Generally
30. Purpose oI proceeding
31. EIIect oI attempted resignation oI attorney
2.
Discipline as a Judicial Function
32. Generally
33. What courts have disciplinary power
34. Preliminary general investigation by bar
35. --Extent oI discipline as discretionary with court
36. Restitution
3.
EIIect oI Disbarment or Suspension
37. Generally 38. On practice in other states; reciprocal discipline 39. On practice in
Iederal courts
4.
Grounds Ior Discipline
a. In General
40. Basic considerations 41. Misconduct beIore admission to the bar 42. Misconduct
incident to admission to the bar 43. Loss oI moral character
b. Misconduct as an Attorney
(1). In General
44. Generally
(2). In Relation to Court or Judge
45. Generally
46. Frivolous or unIounded litigation
47. Communications with judge
48. Communications with jury
49. Suppression or Iabrication oI papers or evidence
50. DisrespectIul, abusive conduct
51. Criticism oI judicial acts
52. Contempt
53. Failure to cooperate with disciplinary body
(3). In Relation to Clients
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(a). In General
54. Failure to act honestly and in good Iaith
55. Representing conIlicting interests 56. --What constitutes conIlicting interests 57.
Business relations with client 58. Failure to communicate with client 59. Securing
agreements violative oI public policy 60. Fee collection practices 61. Excessive Iees; Iee
sharing
(b). Misappropriation, Conversion and Commingling
62. Generally 63. Misappropriation or conversion oI client's property 64. Commingling
oI Iunds 65. Mitigating Iactors considered
(c). Negligence; Inattention to Duty
66. Generally
67. Abandonment oI practice or cause
68. Aggravating Iactors
69. Mitigating Iactors
(4). Unethical Conduct
70. Generally 71. Acting as attorney and witness 72. DeIamation oI and other conduct
toward litigants or attorneys 73. Solicitation oI business 74. --Constitutional limitations on
regulation oI solicitation 75. Solicitation oI criminal representation 76. Ambulance
chasing
77. Advertising
78. Use oI assumed or trade name
c. Misconduct in OIIicial Capacity 79. Judicial oIIicer
80. Attorney Ior public entity
81. Other oIIices
d. NonproIessional Misconduct (1). In General
82. Generally
83. Alcohol or drug abuse
84. Sexual conduct
85. Political activities
(2). Conviction or Commission oI Crime
86. Generally
87. Homicide; assault
88. Narcotics oIIenses
89. OIIenses related to taxation
90. Violation oI securities regulations
91. Other crimes and oIIenses
92. EIIect oI appeal or probation
93. EIIect oI pardon
94. Conviction in another jurisdiction
95. Propriety oI proceeding prior to or pending criminal
prosecution 96. EIIect oI acquittal, dismissal, or nolle prosequi e. Misconduct oI Law
Partner
97. Generally
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5. DeIenses to Disciplinary Action
98. Mental or emotional illness
99. Entrapment
100. Other deIenses
6.
Procedure
101. Nature oI proceeding 102. Who may institute proceeding 103. Limitations and
laches 104. Right to jury 105. Due process requirements; notice and opportunity to be
heard 106. --Presumption oI innocence 107. Failure to answer 108. Discovery 109.
Right to subpoena witnesses 110. Evidence; admissibility 111. --SuIIiciency; standard oI
prooI 112. Protection against selI-incrimination 113. Judgment and award oI costs;
enIorcement 114. Review
7.
Reinstatement oI Disbarred Attorney
115. Generally; procedure 116. Considerations aIIecting right to reinstatement 117.
Burden oI showing present good character 118. Review
C. Judicial Prevention oI Unauthorized Practice oI Law
Research ReIerences
1. In General; What Constitutes Practice oI Law
a. In General
119. Generally
120. DraIting oI legal documents in general 121. Sale oI books or Iorms 122. Assistance
in divorce proceeding 123. DraIting instruments incident to realty transactions 124.
Services related to wills; estate planning 125. DraIting trust agreements 126. Examining
title and rendering opinion thereon 127. Matters beIore administrative bodies 128.
Preparing tax returns; negotiating with tax oIIicials 129. Adjusting claims 130. Activities
oI law clerks
b. Practice by Corporations
131. Generally 132. Handling oI probate matters 133. ProIessional service corporation
134. Legal assistance corporations
2. Procedure to Restrain Unauthorized Practice
135. Who may challenge inIringing activities 136. Methods oI restraint
III. Attorney-Client Relationship
A. Creation and Nature
Research ReIerences 137. Generally; retainer 138. Relationship as Iiduciary and
conIidential 139. Attorney's duties to client
140. --Documents in client's Iile
B. EIIect oI Relation on Transactions between Attorney and Client
Research ReIerences 141. Generally 142. Transactions concerning subject oI retainer
143. GiIts to attorney 144. Bequests Irom clients 145. Burden oI proving Iairness oI
transaction 146. --Testamentary giIts C. Authority oI Attorney
Research ReIerences
1. In General
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147. Power to bind client, generally 148. Giving and receiving notices 149. Collection
oI claims 150. Delegation oI authority 151. Employment oI associate counsel 152.
EIIect oI client's ratiIication oI, or estoppel to deny, attorney's acts; laches 2. Matters Imputed
to Client 153. Generally 154. ProIessional negligence or incompetency oI attorney 155.
Acts oI attorney in own interest or in Iraud oI client
3. Court Appearances
156. Express or implied authority necessary 157. Presumption oI authority 158.
Challenge oI authority, in general
159. Burden oI proving lack oI authority
4. Authority as to Matters Incidental to or AIIecting Litigation
160. Waiver oI original process 161. Giving and receiving notices; veriIication oI
pleadings 162. Authority to commence action; control oI procedural matters 163.
Stipulations 164. Statements or admissions by attorney during trial 165. Extrajudicial
statements or admissions by attorney 166. Incurring expenses
5. Release, Dismissal, or Compromise oI Cause oI Action; ConIession oI
Judgment 167. Release oI cause oI action 168. Dismissal oI action 169. Compromise or
settlement oI cause 170. --RatiIication or estoppel 171. ConIession oI judgment 6.
Authority aIter Judgment
172. Generally; issuance oI execution 173. Collection and satisIaction oI judgment 174.
Proceedings to vacate or modiIy judgment 175. Prosecuting appeal Irom adverse judgment
D. Termination oI Relationship
Research ReIerences
1. In General
176. Generally; right oI client to discharge attorney 177. --When attorney's power is
coupled with an interest 178. Attorney's right to notice oI discharge
179. Death oI client
180. Death oI attorney
2. Abandonment or Withdrawal oI Attorney
181. Generally 182. When justiIied 183. Notice to client
E. Substitution oI Attorneys
Research ReIerences 184. Generally
F. Right oI Client to Settle or Dismiss
Research ReIerences 185. Right to compromise or settle 186. Right to dismiss
IV. Privileges and Disabilities oI Attorney
A. In General
Research ReIerences 187. Privileges and exemptions
B. Representation oI ConIlicting Interests
Research ReIerences 188. General prohibition 189. Where conIlict oI interest arises Irom
Iormer employment oI attorney in
Iirm 190. Where adverse parties knowingly consent 191. Representation oI interest
adverse to that oI Iormer client 192. --Substantial relationship between current and Iormer
representation;
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presumption as to conIidential inIormation 193. Client's waiver oI right to object 194.
Matters involving public interest 195. Judicial control
C. Acquiring Adverse Interest in Subject Matter oI Litigation or Employment
Research ReIerences
1.
In General
196. Generally 197. Purchase by attorney at judicial or tax sale
2.
Remedies Available to Client
198. Generally 199. Good Iaith oI attorney no deIense 200. Laches
V. Liability oI Attorney Ior Malpractice
A. Liability to Client
Research ReIerences
1. In General
201. Generally 202. Representation oI adverse interest 203. Failure to exercise
reasonable degree oI care and skill 204. Basic legal knowledge; nonobservance oI local
statutes, rules, and decisions 205. EIIect oI advising client to commit crime or unlawIul act
206. Improper handling oI Iunds collected Ior client
207. Fraudulent acts or misrepresentation aIIecting client
208. EIIect oI errors oI judgment
209. Negligent or willIul acts oI partner or assistant
2. Particular Kinds oI Attorney Negligence
a. Negligence in Initiating and Conducting Litigation
210. Generally 211. Permitting statutory time limitation to run against client's claim
212. Appellate matters
b. Other Types oI Negligence
213. Handling criminal deIense matters
214. Settling or Iailing to settle client's case
215. Negligence incident to title search
216. Preparation oI legal instruments
217. Failure to record papers
218. Preparation and recordation oI security documents
219. Handling collections
3. Recovery by Suit
a. In General
220. Form oI remedy 221. Pleading 222. Burden oI prooI 223. --Causation; "case-
within-a-case" litigation 224. Questions oI law and Iact 225. Expert testimony 226.
Calculation oI damages
b. Statute oI Limitations
227. Generally 228. What statute applies 229. When statute oI limitations begins to run;
negligent acts and
omissions 230. When statute oI limitations is tolled 4. Recovery by Summary Proceeding
231. Generally 232. Limitations on available relieI
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233. Procedure
B. Liability to Third Persons
Research ReIerences 234. Generally 235. Duty to client's adversary 236. Acts
maliciously or otherwise improperly motivated 237. Money collected on judgment later
reversed 238. Negligence in draIting or execution oI will
VI. Compensation oI Attorneys
A. Right to Compensation
Research ReIerences 239. Generally 240. Necessity Ior attorney-client relationship 241.
--Private attorney general doctrine 242. Liability oI third party beneIited by services 243.
--Common Iund doctrine 244. --Subrogated insurer 245. Recovery by nonresident Ior
local services 246. Court-appointed attorney 247. --Statute providing Ior payment
B. Compensation Agreements
Research ReIerences
1. In General
248. Compensation agreements, generally 249. Retainer 250. Construction oI Iee
contract
251. Contract prior to inception oI relationship
252. Contract made during existence oI relationship
253. Contract made aIter completion oI services 254. Validity oI agreement to increase
compensation
255. Fee set by client or third party aIter completion oI services
256. Account stated
257. Fee-sharing agreements
2. Contingent Fee Contracts
258. Generally
259. Validity as dependent on Iairness to client
260. Validity in divorce or alimony proceedings
261. Services rendered aIter judgment or on appeal
C. Factors AIIecting Right to Compensation
Research ReIerences 262. Fidelity and proIessional competence 263. Representing
adverse interests 264. Abandonment oI cause 265. Discharge; prevention oI perIormance
by client 266. Compromise, settlement, or dismissal oI cause by client 267. Death,
incapacity, disqualiIication, or disbarment oI attorney 268. Contract against public policy
269. Contract void because oI illegality 270. --Compensation on quantum meruit basis
271. Statute oI limitations 272. --Withdrawal or discharge oI attorney
D. Measure oI Compensation
Research ReIerences
1. In General
noncontingent Iee contract contingent Iee contract
attorney's consent
division oI Iees
273. Under contract speciIying amount or percentage
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274. Under contract allowing client to set Iee 275. For services not speciIied in contract
276. Interest on unpaid Iees 277. Statutory limit on Iees 278. Court rule limiting
contingent Iees in negligence cases 279. When death oI attorney terminates services 280.
Where attorney is discharged without his or her Iault; under
281. Where attorney is discharged without his or her Iault; under
282. Where attorney terminates employment or is discharged Ior cause 283. Amount oI
contingent Iee payable where client settles without
284. Sharing oI Iees with other attorneys 285. Where several attorneys perIorm services
without agreement on
2. Factors Considered in Determining Reasonable Value oI Services
286. Generally 287. Novelty or diIIiculty oI issues 288. Time required; time limitations
289. Loss oI opportunity Ior other employment 290. Skill and standing oI counsel 291.
Value oI interests involved 292. Results secured 293. Ability oI client to pay 294.
Customary charges Ior similar services in same locality 295. Compensation oI public
oIIicials Ior similar services 296. Minimum Iee schedules oI bar association
297. Cost oI living; oIIice overhead
298. Services duplicating work done by others
299. Compensation contingent on success
E. Recovery by Action
Research ReIerences 300. Generally 301. Right to sue 302. --Adverse party or attorney
aIter compromise by client 303. Pleading 304. Burden oI prooI 305. --As to Iairness oI
contract 306. Expert testimony 307. --Weight
F. Division oI Fees on Dissolution oI Law Firm
Research ReIerences
308. Dissolution by death oI partner
309. Dissolution by agreement
VII. Attorneys' Liens
A. General or Retaining Lien
Research ReIerences 310. Generally; dependency on possession oI property 311. Property
subject to lien 312. --Money collected by attorney 313. Property not aIIected by lien
314. Loss oI lien 315. --Giving up possession oI property
316. EnIorcement oI lien
B. Special or Charging Lien
Research ReIerences
1. In General
a. Overview
317. Generally 318. Common-law or statutory basis oI lien 319. Agreement creating lien
320. Extent oI lien 321. Lien limited to services in particular suit 322. Notice oI lien;
when required 323. --SuIIiciency
b. Priority oI Lien
324. Generally
325. As to setoII by deIendant
c. Loss oI Lien
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326. Generally 327. Compromise or settlement by client
2.
To What Lien Attaches
328. Cause oI action 329. --Construction oI statute giving lien 330. Decree Ior alimony
or property settlement; child support 331. Property recovered in litigation 332. Money
3.
EnIorcement oI Lien
333. EnIorcement in original action
334. Equitable remedy
335. Independent legal action
336. Liability oI adverse party Ior destroying lien 337. Vacation oI dismissal 338.
ConIlict oI laws
Correlation Tables
Correlation Table
7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law SummarySummary
I. Introduction
Research ReIerences 1. DeIinitions 2. Power oI state to regulate practice oI law 3.
Nature oI attorney's oIIice 4. Duties oI oIIice 5. --Public versus private duties 6.
Necessity that litigant appear by counsel 7. Integrated bar 8. --Mandatory membership
dues and uses to which dues may constitutionally be put 9. Clients' security Iund 10.
Lawyer reIerence systems; the Legal Services Corporation 11. State occupation tax 12.
Municipal occupation tax
II. Judicial Supervision oI Legal ProIession
A. Admission to Practice
Research ReIerences
1. In General
13. Generally
14. Constitutionality oI admission requirements, generally 15. --Freedom oI speech and
association; privacy 16. Oath 17. Citizenship; residency 18. Bar examination; diploma
privilege 19. Procedural due process 20. Judicial review 21. Admission without
examination 22. Admission Ior particular case 23. EIIect on right to practice oI change oI
residence to another state
2. Moral Character
24. Generally 25. Burden oI proving good moral character 26. What does or does not
constitute lack oI good character 27. Rehabilitation oI moral character; conditional
admission 28. Criminal record as bearing on moral character
B. Disciplinary Proceedings
Research ReIerences
1.
In General
29. Generally
30. Purpose oI proceeding
31. EIIect oI attempted resignation oI attorney
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2.
Discipline as a Judicial Function
32. Generally
33. What courts have disciplinary power
34. Preliminary general investigation by bar
35. --Extent oI discipline as discretionary with court
36. Restitution
3.
EIIect oI Disbarment or Suspension
37. Generally 38. On practice in other states; reciprocal discipline 39. On practice in
Iederal courts
4.
Grounds Ior Discipline
a. In General
40. Basic considerations 41. Misconduct beIore admission to the bar 42. Misconduct
incident to admission to the bar 43. Loss oI moral character
b. Misconduct as an Attorney
(1). In General
44. Generally
(2). In Relation to Court or Judge
45. Generally
46. Frivolous or unIounded litigation
47. Communications with judge
48. Communications with jury
49. Suppression or Iabrication oI papers or evidence
50. DisrespectIul, abusive conduct
51. Criticism oI judicial acts
52. Contempt
53. Failure to cooperate with disciplinary body
(3). In Relation to Clients
(a). In General
54. Failure to act honestly and in good Iaith
55. Representing conIlicting interests 56. --What constitutes conIlicting interests 57.
Business relations with client 58. Failure to communicate with client 59. Securing
agreements violative oI public policy 60. Fee collection practices 61. Excessive Iees; Iee
sharing
(b). Misappropriation, Conversion and Commingling
62. Generally 63. Misappropriation or conversion oI client's property 64. Commingling
oI Iunds 65. Mitigating Iactors considered
(c). Negligence; Inattention to Duty
66. Generally
67. Abandonment oI practice or cause
68. Aggravating Iactors
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69. Mitigating Iactors
(4). Unethical Conduct
70. Generally 71. Acting as attorney and witness 72. DeIamation oI and other conduct
toward litigants or attorneys 73. Solicitation oI business 74. --Constitutional limitations on
regulation oI solicitation 75. Solicitation oI criminal representation 76. Ambulance
chasing
77. Advertising
78. Use oI assumed or trade name
c. Misconduct in OIIicial Capacity 79. Judicial oIIicer
80. Attorney Ior public entity
81. Other oIIices
d. NonproIessional Misconduct (1). In General
82. Generally
83. Alcohol or drug abuse
84. Sexual conduct
85. Political activities
(2). Conviction or Commission oI Crime
86. Generally
87. Homicide; assault
88. Narcotics oIIenses
89. OIIenses related to taxation
90. Violation oI securities regulations
91. Other crimes and oIIenses
92. EIIect oI appeal or probation
93. EIIect oI pardon
94. Conviction in another jurisdiction
95. Propriety oI proceeding prior to or pending criminal
prosecution 96. EIIect oI acquittal, dismissal, or nolle prosequi e. Misconduct oI Law
Partner
97. Generally
5. DeIenses to Disciplinary Action
98. Mental or emotional illness
99. Entrapment
100. Other deIenses
6.
Procedure
101. Nature oI proceeding 102. Who may institute proceeding 103. Limitations and
laches 104. Right to jury 105. Due process requirements; notice and opportunity to be
heard 106. --Presumption oI innocence 107. Failure to answer 108. Discovery 109.
Right to subpoena witnesses 110. Evidence; admissibility 111. --SuIIiciency; standard oI
prooI 112. Protection against selI-incrimination 113. Judgment and award oI costs;
enIorcement 114. Review
7.
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Reinstatement oI Disbarred Attorney
115. Generally; procedure 116. Considerations aIIecting right to reinstatement 117.
Burden oI showing present good character 118. Review
C. Judicial Prevention oI Unauthorized Practice oI Law
Research ReIerences
1. In General; What Constitutes Practice oI Law
a. In General
119. Generally
120. DraIting oI legal documents in general 121. Sale oI books or Iorms 122. Assistance
in divorce proceeding 123. DraIting instruments incident to realty transactions 124.
Services related to wills; estate planning 125. DraIting trust agreements 126. Examining
title and rendering opinion thereon 127. Matters beIore administrative bodies 128.
Preparing tax returns; negotiating with tax oIIicials 129. Adjusting claims 130. Activities
oI law clerks
b. Practice by Corporations
131. Generally 132. Handling oI probate matters 133. ProIessional service corporation
134. Legal assistance corporations
2. Procedure to Restrain Unauthorized Practice
135. Who may challenge inIringing activities 136. Methods oI restraint
III. Attorney-Client Relationship
A. Creation and Nature
Research ReIerences 137. Generally; retainer 138. Relationship as Iiduciary and
conIidential 139. Attorney's duties to client
140. --Documents in client's Iile
B. EIIect oI Relation on Transactions between Attorney and Client
Research ReIerences 141. Generally 142. Transactions concerning subject oI retainer
143. GiIts to attorney 144. Bequests Irom clients 145. Burden oI proving Iairness oI
transaction 146. --Testamentary giIts C. Authority oI Attorney
Research ReIerences
1. In General
147. Power to bind client, generally 148. Giving and receiving notices 149. Collection
oI claims 150. Delegation oI authority 151. Employment oI associate counsel 152.
EIIect oI client's ratiIication oI, or estoppel to deny, attorney's acts; laches 2. Matters Imputed
to Client 153. Generally 154. ProIessional negligence or incompetency oI attorney 155.
Acts oI attorney in own interest or in Iraud oI client
3. Court Appearances
156. Express or implied authority necessary 157. Presumption oI authority 158.
Challenge oI authority, in general
159. Burden oI proving lack oI authority
4. Authority as to Matters Incidental to or AIIecting Litigation
160. Waiver oI original process 161. Giving and receiving notices; veriIication oI
pleadings 162. Authority to commence action; control oI procedural matters 163.
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Stipulations 164. Statements or admissions by attorney during trial 165. Extrajudicial
statements or admissions by attorney 166. Incurring expenses
5. Release, Dismissal, or Compromise oI Cause oI Action; ConIession oI
Judgment 167. Release oI cause oI action 168. Dismissal oI action 169. Compromise or
settlement oI cause 170. --RatiIication or estoppel 171. ConIession oI judgment 6.
Authority aIter Judgment
172. Generally; issuance oI execution 173. Collection and satisIaction oI judgment 174.
Proceedings to vacate or modiIy judgment 175. Prosecuting appeal Irom adverse judgment
D. Termination oI Relationship
Research ReIerences
1. In General
176. Generally; right oI client to discharge attorney 177. --When attorney's power is
coupled with an interest 178. Attorney's right to notice oI discharge
179. Death oI client
180. Death oI attorney
2. Abandonment or Withdrawal oI Attorney
181. Generally 182. When justiIied 183. Notice to client
E. Substitution oI Attorneys
Research ReIerences 184. Generally
F. Right oI Client to Settle or Dismiss
Research ReIerences 185. Right to compromise or settle 186. Right to dismiss
IV. Privileges and Disabilities oI Attorney
A. In General
Research ReIerences 187. Privileges and exemptions
B. Representation oI ConIlicting Interests
Research ReIerences 188. General prohibition 189. Where conIlict oI interest arises Irom
Iormer employment oI attorney in
Iirm 190. Where adverse parties knowingly consent 191. Representation oI interest
adverse to that oI Iormer client 192. --Substantial relationship between current and Iormer
representation;
presumption as to conIidential inIormation 193. Client's waiver oI right to object 194.
Matters involving public interest 195. Judicial control
C. Acquiring Adverse Interest in Subject Matter oI Litigation or Employment
Research ReIerences
1.
In General
196. Generally 197. Purchase by attorney at judicial or tax sale
2.
Remedies Available to Client
198. Generally 199. Good Iaith oI attorney no deIense 200. Laches
V. Liability oI Attorney Ior Malpractice
A. Liability to Client
Research ReIerences
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1. In General
201. Generally 202. Representation oI adverse interest 203. Failure to exercise
reasonable degree oI care and skill 204. Basic legal knowledge; nonobservance oI local
statutes, rules, and decisions 205. EIIect oI advising client to commit crime or unlawIul act
206. Improper handling oI Iunds collected Ior client
207. Fraudulent acts or misrepresentation aIIecting client
208. EIIect oI errors oI judgment
209. Negligent or willIul acts oI partner or assistant
2. Particular Kinds oI Attorney Negligence
a. Negligence in Initiating and Conducting Litigation
210. Generally 211. Permitting statutory time limitation to run against client's claim
212. Appellate matters
b. Other Types oI Negligence
213. Handling criminal deIense matters
214. Settling or Iailing to settle client's case
215. Negligence incident to title search
216. Preparation oI legal instruments
217. Failure to record papers
218. Preparation and recordation oI security documents
219. Handling collections
3. Recovery by Suit
a. In General
220. Form oI remedy 221. Pleading 222. Burden oI prooI 223. --Causation; "case-
within-a-case" litigation 224. Questions oI law and Iact 225. Expert testimony 226.
Calculation oI damages
b. Statute oI Limitations
227. Generally 228. What statute applies 229. When statute oI limitations begins to run;
negligent acts and
omissions 230. When statute oI limitations is tolled 4. Recovery by Summary Proceeding
231. Generally 232. Limitations on available relieI
233. Procedure
B. Liability to Third Persons
Research ReIerences 234. Generally 235. Duty to client's adversary 236. Acts
maliciously or otherwise improperly motivated 237. Money collected on judgment later
reversed 238. Negligence in draIting or execution oI will
VI. Compensation oI Attorneys
A. Right to Compensation
Research ReIerences 239. Generally 240. Necessity Ior attorney-client relationship 241.
--Private attorney general doctrine 242. Liability oI third party beneIited by services 243.
--Common Iund doctrine 244. --Subrogated insurer 245. Recovery by nonresident Ior
local services 246. Court-appointed attorney 247. --Statute providing Ior payment
B. Compensation Agreements
Research ReIerences
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1. In General
248. Compensation agreements, generally 249. Retainer 250. Construction oI Iee
contract
251. Contract prior to inception oI relationship
252. Contract made during existence oI relationship
253. Contract made aIter completion oI services 254. Validity oI agreement to increase
compensation
255. Fee set by client or third party aIter completion oI services
256. Account stated
257. Fee-sharing agreements
2. Contingent Fee Contracts
258. Generally
259. Validity as dependent on Iairness to client
260. Validity in divorce or alimony proceedings
261. Services rendered aIter judgment or on appeal
C. Factors AIIecting Right to Compensation
Research ReIerences 262. Fidelity and proIessional competence 263. Representing
adverse interests 264. Abandonment oI cause 265. Discharge; prevention oI perIormance
by client 266. Compromise, settlement, or dismissal oI cause by client 267. Death,
incapacity, disqualiIication, or disbarment oI attorney 268. Contract against public policy
269. Contract void because oI illegality 270. --Compensation on quantum meruit basis
271. Statute oI limitations 272. --Withdrawal or discharge oI attorney
D. Measure oI Compensation
Research ReIerences
1. In General
noncontingent Iee contract contingent Iee contract
attorney's consent
division oI Iees
273. Under contract speciIying amount or percentage
274. Under contract allowing client to set Iee 275. For services not speciIied in contract
276. Interest on unpaid Iees 277. Statutory limit on Iees 278. Court rule limiting
contingent Iees in negligence cases 279. When death oI attorney terminates services 280.
Where attorney is discharged without his or her Iault; under
281. Where attorney is discharged without his or her Iault; under
282. Where attorney terminates employment or is discharged Ior cause 283. Amount oI
contingent Iee payable where client settles without
284. Sharing oI Iees with other attorneys 285. Where several attorneys perIorm services
without agreement on
2. Factors Considered in Determining Reasonable Value oI Services
286. Generally 287. Novelty or diIIiculty oI issues 288. Time required; time limitations
289. Loss oI opportunity Ior other employment 290. Skill and standing oI counsel 291.
Value oI interests involved 292. Results secured 293. Ability oI client to pay 294.
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Customary charges Ior similar services in same locality 295. Compensation oI public
oIIicials Ior similar services 296. Minimum Iee schedules oI bar association
297. Cost oI living; oIIice overhead
298. Services duplicating work done by others
299. Compensation contingent on success
E. Recovery by Action
Research ReIerences 300. Generally 301. Right to sue 302. --Adverse party or attorney
aIter compromise by client 303. Pleading 304. Burden oI prooI 305. --As to Iairness oI
contract 306. Expert testimony 307. --Weight
F. Division oI Fees on Dissolution oI Law Firm
Research ReIerences
308. Dissolution by death oI partner
309. Dissolution by agreement
VII. Attorneys' Liens
A. General or Retaining Lien
Research ReIerences 310. Generally; dependency on possession oI property 311. Property
subject to lien 312. --Money collected by attorney 313. Property not aIIected by lien
314. Loss oI lien 315. --Giving up possession oI property
316. EnIorcement oI lien
B. Special or Charging Lien
Research ReIerences
1. In General
a. Overview
317. Generally 318. Common-law or statutory basis oI lien 319. Agreement creating lien
320. Extent oI lien 321. Lien limited to services in particular suit 322. Notice oI lien;
when required 323. --SuIIiciency
b. Priority oI Lien
324. Generally
325. As to setoII by deIendant
c. Loss oI Lien
326. Generally 327. Compromise or settlement by client
2.
To What Lien Attaches
328. Cause oI action 329. --Construction oI statute giving lien 330. Decree Ior alimony
or property settlement; child support 331. Property recovered in litigation 332. Money
3.
EnIorcement oI Lien
333. EnIorcement in original action
334. Equitable remedy
335. Independent legal action
336. Liability oI adverse party Ior destroying lien 337. Vacation oI dismissal 338.
ConIlict oI laws
Correlation Tables
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Correlation Table
7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law Summary
Coughlin certainly does not Ieel that his appeal in 61383 is "moot", as an Order by the
Nevada Supreme Court undoing that ordered in CV11-03628 oI (especially where such a
reIusal to excercise its jurisdiction to entere the non-discretionary, automatic stay required
under NRS 40.385 pursuant to Coughlin's 12/30/12 Motion Ior Stay (see pages 12-13, and 18
therein, as its so much more than a Motion Ior TRO, though NRCP 62 does provide Ior an
automatic 10 day stay as to Orders such as that oI , which begs the question as to how it was
appropriate Ior Hill to insist on throwing away the personalty he had removed Irom the
Iormer home law oIIice (the 12/30/12 Motion in CV11-03628 was not directed solely to
enjoining the 12/21/11 Order in Rev11-001708, a closer reading than that done by Hill or
Baker will reveal the NRS 40.385 Motion Ior Stay therein), 3/30/12 (especially where such an
order exceeded the 2JDC's jurisdiction
Consider, speaking oI the idea that 61383 is "moot", the collateral consequences to
Coughlin oI the various Orders appeal Irom in CV11-03628 remaining in place (beyond the
Iact that Hill and or Merliss now has a "judgment" Ior $42,065 in attorney's Iees against
Coughlin Ior the appeal oI a summary eviction, with particularly emphasis on the salience oI
the conviction in 61901 and associated testimony by Hill vis a vis that criminal trespass
conviction and Coughlin's alleged lack oI competency, and or "conduct" or "candor" (whether
to the tribunal, Ior which there is an RPC, 3.3, that requires such, or, apparently to some non-
existenct RPC that the OBC's King believes require candor to opposing counsel (actually, its
RPC 3.4, requiring "Iairness", rather than "candor") in 62337:
The 12/14/12 Findings oI Fact; Conclusions oI Law now on appeal in 62337 (despite
the Iact that that the title oI that 12/14/12 FOFCOL Iails to categorize or identiIy such as a
"decision" suIIicient to invoked SCR 105(3)'s docketing oI such or implementation oI a
brieIing schedule or transmission oI any ROA (ironic given Hill and Echeverria's criticism
that the title oI Coughlins' Iile bare little relation to that addressed therein).That 12/14/12
FOFCOL includes the Iollowing:
"19. State Bar Counsel called attorney Richard Hill to testiIy at the hearing oI this matter:
Mr. Hill has been a member in good standing with the State Bar oI Nevada Ior 33 years. See
Transcript oI Proceedings oI Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 36, L 22 P 37 L 4. Mr. Hill
was retained by Dr. Merliss to assist Dr. Merliss in a landlord tenant dispute with his
tenant Coughlin. See Transcript oI Proceedings oI Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 37,
L14 -20. (HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 37:14 to 37:20) Q And how did you Iirst come into
contact with Mr. Coughlin? A Well, I was hired by a Dr. Matthew Merliss. My office was to
remove a tenant Irom a home at 121 River Rock in Reno. Dr. Merliss had going back and
Iorth with Mr. Coughlin Ior several months. Mr. Coughlin had not paid any rent Ior, at that
point I believe it was --)
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(NOTE: actually, it was Hill's associate Casey D. Baker, Esq. who worked the case, so why
it is that Hill was an appropriate witness to testiIy to all sorts oI matters in a case that he had
not appeared in (either 1708 or 03628 up until approximately August 2012 (where that appeal
was docketed in the 2JDC on 12/21/11, and by Hill's appearing in Baker's place upon Baker
absconding to Kentucky at a time, August 2011 when 99 oI the work in 1708 and 03628
had already been done by Baker, brieIing was over, the appeal was denied and oppositions to
post-judgment motions had been Iiled by Baker) is not clear:
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 38:20 to 38:23) "Q And did you end up representing Dr.
Merliss inan eviction action? A My office did. I assigned the case to my associate at
the time, Casey Baker.")
The FOFCOL continues on misrepresenting Hill's actual participation in 1708 and
03628: "Mr. Hill represented Dr. Merliss in Reno 1ustice Court and Washoe County
District Court and two appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court in the matters involving Dr.
Merliss and Coughlin. See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39, L 13
-24. Mr. Hill has also reviewed Iilings in oI a case in which Coughlin is involved with
Washoe Legal Services. See Transcript oI Proceedings Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P
39, L 25 P 40, L 3. (HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 39:13 to 40:3) Q "Could you describe to the
panel in a chronological manner some oI the events that you have personal knowledge oI that
exhibited this behavior that Iormed your opinion? MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. Relevancy.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. THE WITNESS (Hill): I've reaa (NOTE: Hill's
Declaration in support oI the Motion Ior Attorney's Fees that Baker made Iirst in his 2/24/12
Answering BrieI (violating DCR 13 where Baker made such a motion Ior Iees again on
4/19/12) attests only to reading everything Baker Iiled, but regardless, there is a diIIerence
between Hill as a witness asserting that he had personal knowledge oI whether or not
Coughlin displayed candor to the tribunal or anyone else, or Iairness to opposing counsel or
overall competency had Hill actually appeared in or worked the cases during the time Irames
oI the alleged events or misconduct to which he testiIies to (asserting Iirst hand knowledge
thereoI as to such events or conduct) and Hill merely perusing the Iile aIter the Iact) virtually
everything that Mr. Coughlin has Iiled, not only in the Department 7 eviction case, and beIore
that the Reno Justice Court's eviction case. He's now got -- had two appeals to the Nevada
Supreme Court in that case, and I've read virtually everything that he's done. I've also
Iollowed the Iilings that he's had in his dealings with Washoe Legal Services. And I've
Iollowed the Iilings that he had in the supreme court discipline matters."
20. In the eviction proceeding between Dr. Merliss and Coughlin, Mr. Hill's Iirm
obtained an eviction order allowing Coughlin one week to vacate the premises. (NOTE: here
the FOFCOL mischaracterizes what that 10/27/11 Order in 1708 actually said, where it reads:
""That the sheriII/constable oI Reno Township, or one oI their duly authorized agents be, and
hereby is, directed to remove each and every person Iound upon and within the rental uni t"
...the diIIerence is clear and order "allowing Couglin one week to vacate" sounds more like a
trespass warning than one that indicates the WCSO is "directed to remove each and every
person Iound upon and within the rental unit") Ultimately, Coughlin Iailed to comply with
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the eviction order and was convicted oI criminal trespass. See Transcript oI Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 41, L 18 -P 44, L 12.
21. On behalI oI his client Dr. Merliss, Mr. Hill sought and obtained an order in
Iavor oI Dr. Merliss and against Coughlin awarding Dr. Merliss attorney's Iees in the amount
oI $42,065.50. Washoe District Court Judge Patrick Flanagan entered the order on June 25,
2012. See Transcript oI Proceedings oI Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 47, L 3-7. -See
Hearing Exhibit 2, P 3, L 10-11. The motion seeking attorney's Iees was based on Coughlin's
conduct in the deIense oI the eviction matter, which conduct was characterized as Irivolous
and vexatious and presumably so Iound by Judge Flanagan. See Hearing Exhibit P 2, L 8-13;
P 3, L 4-11.
22. Based on Mr. Hill's experience and background, his review oI the pleadings in
the litigation between Dr. Merliss and Coughlin and his review oI the pleadings in Coughlin's
litigation with Washoe Legal Services, Mr. Hill is oI the opinion that Coughlin is not
competent to practice law. See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39,
L 1 -12.
23. Based on Mr. Hill's experience in litigating with Coughlin, Coughlin was not
truthIul with either counsel or the court. See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14,
2012, P 53, L 6 -16. Mr. Hill Ielt that Coughlin's Iilings were abusive, at one point calling Mr.
Hill's associate a lichen. Coughlin has accused Mr. Hill oI bribing the Reno Police
Department to have Coughlin arrested. Mr. Hill's staII is terrorized by Coughlin. See
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 54, L 4 -15."
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 40:11 to 41:4) Hill: "In the appeal -- we had recovered a $42,000
attorney's Iee award against Mr. Coughlin Ior handling just his appeal oI the eviction. He
would file these documents that would have a caption on it that would indicate that it
was a motion under Rule 59, for example. (NOTE: compare to 12/14/12 FOFCOL not
including characterizing in title identiIying such as a "decision" suIIicient to implicate SCR
105(3)) And you would get into it, and there would be no mention in the body oI Rule 59,
there would be no analysis oI Rule 59, but we would have to run down all oI the little issues
that he would raise on the oII chance that iI you don't respond to one, the district court judge
is going to Iind something that he thinks is important, and the client ends up having an
adverse result. $42,000 on a no-cause 30-day eviction, and that's just Ior the appeal oI it, is
absolutely astronomical. But that should tell you -- I have provided Mr. King with a copy of
1udge Flanagan's orders in which he sets forth the reasons for such an extraorainary
awara, being Mr. Coughlins behavior, ana the quality of the work that he was filing."
Hill demonstrates his own RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 violations where he Ialsely characterizes the
"reasons" Judge Flanagan provides Ior entering the attorney Iee award oI 6/25/12 in CV11-
03628 (FHE 2): "HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 40:25 to 41:4) I have provided Mr. King with
a copy of Judge Flanagan's orders in which he sets Iorth the reasons Ior such an extraordinary
award, being Mr. Coughlin's behavior, and the quality oI the work that he was Iiling."
Actually, as Hill and King (see King's inclusion oI such 8/28/12 Order in his 8/30/12
email to Coughlin) well know, Judge Flanagan's 8/21/12 and 8/28/12 Orders in 03628 clearly
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contradict Hill's assessment that Judge Flanagan's 6/25/12 Order in 03628 "sets for the the
reasons for asuch and extraordinary award, being Mr. Coughlin's behavior, and the
qualiity of the work that he was filing...". Rather, Judge Flanagan's 8/28/12 Order in 03628
makes clear:
"...Coughlin's Motions here attempts to re-litigate substantive issues this Court has already
decided, or frivolous claims this Court has previously ignored...Accordingly, Coughlin's
Motion to Alter or Amena Oraer, or Plea in Alternatia [sic{ Motion to Set Asiae Attorney Fee
Awara ana Motion for Oraer Shortening Time ana Notice of Appeal of Atly [sic{ Fee Awara
of 6/25/12 ana NRCP 60(b)(4) Motion to Set Asiae Attorneys Fees are DENIED."
Time to add some more Richard G. Hill, Esq. chestnuts to the lie pile, especially considering
Hill's testimony under oath at Coughlin's 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing and the Iollow sworn
testimony by Hill Irom the 6/18/12 Trial, viewed in conjunction with the statements Hill made
to the RPD OIIicer Chris Carter and Sargent Marcia Lopez just prior to and at the time oI the
11/13/11 custodial arrest oI Coughlin at his Iormer home law oIIice Ior trespassing:
THE COURT: When Mr. Hill is here to ask some questions that I think you've explored the
possibilities, and I don't know what else you can oIIer the Court in terms oI this case via
cross-examination. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir, Your Honor. I'll wrap this up quickly. BY
MR. COUGHLIN: Q Mr. Hill, at any time on that day, November 13th, did the owner oI the
premises warn the arrestee to leave the property? A I think the message was communicated. Q
Via what medium? A The Iact that you were handcuIIed and arrested. Didn't you get the
picture? Q Okay, prior to the handcuIIing and the arresting, did anybody say, "You need to
leave the premises?" A I didn't hear that. Q Nobody said that? A I did not hear that, sir. Q Did
you say it? A No. Q Did Dr. Merliss? A Not that I heard. Q Did the police? A No, not that I
heard. Q So, nobody that you heard oI warned the person arrested Ior trespassing? Page -110
(see transcript oI 6/18/12 criminal trespass trial in RMC 11 CR 26405.
Now, compare Hill's sworn testimony oI 6/18/12 in RMC 11 CR 26405 with his sworn
testimony at Coughlin's Iormal disciplinary hearing, and it becomes clear that Hill Iinally
Iigure out that an essential element oI a criminal trespass conviction under RMC 8.10.010 is a
Iailure to leave by one aIter being warned to do so...so, magically, at the 11/14/12 Iormal
disciplinary hearing in NG12-0204 (see 61901 and 62337) Hill managed to "remember" such
a warning...well, sort oI...not initially, then he couldn't keep straight whether the Police
identiIied themselves or not, whether three minutes intervened beIore some such "order" to
"come out, Zach", or whether there was just some vague "coaxing".
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 43:1 to 44:4)
Richard G. Hill, Esq.: "Two weeks aIter the eviction on a Sunday
Dr. Merliss comes to town and says, I want to see the
house. I meet him about 10:30, 11:00 o'clock on a Sunday
morning at the house. We go in. Back door is open.
There's Iood wrappers on the counter that've been there
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that weren't there the last time I was in. Windows are
open again, and it's a very exacerbating situation.
And he says, I want to check the basement. I
didn't know there was a basement in the house. There's
things piled in the stairwell to get down into the
basement, tool kits, and heavy stuII.
We get it out oI the way. We get down there.
And I can see when he pushes on the door, and he turns to
me, and he says, "It's barricaded," Irom the inside. It
wasn't locked, it was barricaded.
We know what's going on. So we call the
police. The police come over. They try to get Zach out
oI the basement, whoever was in there at that point. The
police bang on the door, "Come on out, Zach. Police. You
have to go." No response. They turned to us and say,
we're going to leave. Wait a minute. I'm the owner. You
have the authority to break the door down. "We don't do
that."
So Dr. Merliss goes down to the bottom oI the
stairs. Dr. Merliss kicks the door open, and the police
oIIicer sticks his head around the corner and pulls his
gun out, and here's Mr. Coughlin down there. Mr. Coughlin
voluntarily came upstairs with his dog and was placed
under arrest."
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
" Q Mr. Hill, did the Reno police identify
themselves as law enforcement prior to your client kicking
the door down on November 13th?
MR. KING: Objection. Relevance.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I believe they did, sir.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Is that what you testified on 1une 18th in
your sworn testimony in the criminal trespass trial?
A I believe it is.
Q Did you testiIy to that today?
A I believe I just did.
Q Just now, but not earlier when you were
providing an answer to Mr. King, and you went through what
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happened?
A Mr. Coughlin, let me make it easy Ior you. I
don't recall what I testiIied to on direct Irom Mr. King.
It is my clear recollection that before Dr. Merliss kicked
the door down in the basement, the police had identified
themselves loudly and clearly.
Q Can you describe that in as much detail as
possible?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: The relevance, Mr. Coughlin,
as to your competency or candor, which are the two issues
raised?
MR. COUGHLIN: It goes to whether or not there
was a criminal trespass, which I believe --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: You were convicted oI
criminal trespass, true?
MR. COUGHLIN: I was.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained.
MR. COUGHLIN: But a conviction under
Claiborne is not something you're entitled to just say,
all right, conviction, and be done with it.
Further, I'm not oIIering it to prove whether
or not there was conviction. I'm oIIering it to impeach
Mr. Hill's credibility, which is severely impeached by
this in that he lied, and his client lied to get an arrest
made.
MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, iI I can respond?
MR. COUGHLIN: That's been proven in my
Iilings.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. Coughlin.
Mr. King?
MR. KING: This is totally beyond the scope oI
the direct examination. II he wants to call him back or
make it his case, but iI the convictions oI the criminal
trespass and oI the theIt at Walmart, which will be coming
in, the appeals are exhausted. Those are Iinal decisions
as the supreme court has --
MR. COUGHLIN: Why did we have testimony on
it?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you are going
to cease interrupting.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir.
MR. KING: To the extent that Mr. Coughlin
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wants to refute the answers that Mr. Hill gave regarding
his demeanor or conduct, whatever. To the extent he wants
to attempt to suggest that the arrest wasn't valid or that
he wasn't convicted, I would say it should be excluded.
Otherwise, we'll be retrying those cases here today, and
that's not the purpose oI this hearing.
MR. COUGHLIN: Sir, I'm not trying to retry
it. I'm trying to impeach Mr. Hill's credibility.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: To that extent I'll allow
that question.
MR. COUGHLIN: Thank you, sir.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: But you better have some
evidence that -- iI you are going to ask questions, they
better be based on Iact.
MR. COUGHLIN: They are. They're based on
video.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a -- propose a
witness that will testiIy that the police did not identiIy
themselves?
MR. COUGHLIN: I have a video oI the
sergeant --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a witness?
MR. COUGHLIN: -- admitting to that.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a witness?
MR. COUGHLIN: So you're telling me it has to
come in the Iorm oI a witness as evidence?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: II you are intending to
impeach him on some Iacts, then I would require that you
make an oIIer oI prooI as to what witness will impeach
Mr. Hill.
MR. COUGHLIN: I would like to show Mr. Hill a
video oI Marsha Lopez, the sergeant with him that day,
admitting that Mr. Hill's account is wrong.
MR. KING: I'm going to object to any video or
display oI videos. And the reason I will object is,
number one, they are irrelevant. Number two, they're all
edits. And number three, he's trying to show that
something didn't occur by showing an excerpt oI a video.
It would be totally irrelevant and immaterial.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'll address the
admissibility oI the video when that appears.
Right now Mr. Coughlin has asked Mr. Hill
whether the police identiIied himselI. Mr. Hill said that
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they have. I think you've laid the groundwork. II you
have impeachment testimony that's admissible, when you
oIIer it --
MR. COUGHLIN: I'll ask a more clariIying
question.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed to another
subject.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q So when they identiIied themselves, how long
between identiIying themselves and kicking the door down?
A Three minutes. Two or three minutes.
Q Which one oI them identiIied themselI?
A I believe there was a lady sergeant, and there
was a male oIIicer. And I believe he's the one who banged
on the door with his nightstick and identiIied himselI as
being with the police. And I believe his words were, come
on out, Zach.
Q Was that it, come out Zach? Does that
identiIy it as being the police?
A He identiIied himselI as being with the Reno
Police Department.
Q In what words?
A I believe those were the words he used, sir.
Q What words?
A This is the police, please come out Zach.
Q Because previously all you said was, come on
out Zach.
A I believe you're mistaken, sir.
Q So you're saying that oIIicer Chris Carter,
Junior, three minutes beIore the door was kicked in by
your client, banged on the door with his nightstick, and
said, this is the police. Come on out, Zach?
A Mr. Coughlin, three minutes is probably a long
estimate. The process was we had cleared the stairwell --
Q Did he say, this is the police?
MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative.
THE WITNESS: I believe he did, sir.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Let me -- I'm
going to go ahead and overrule. Go ahead.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
A I believe he did, sir.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: You've asked that three times
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now.
THE WITNESS: At least.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Did Sergeant Lopez, the Iemale sergeant?
A She may have, but I don't recall.
Q Did you have a video camera with you?
A We had Dr. Merliss's phone.
Q Did you take 14 videos that you propounded to
the Reno city attorney that day?
THE WITNESS: We gave them what we had. The
number I don't recall.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Was there some reason -- you seem to have
video oI every moment oI that day, except Ior this
announcing themselves as law enIorcement. Is that what
you're testiIying to right now?
A Mr. Coughlin --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, the issue here
is whether or not you're competent to be an attorney and
should continue in the practice oI law. You're Iocusing
on a rather minor detail, and I would like you to Iocus on
the broader issues.
MR. COUGHLIN: It's not just competency, it's
candor.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: You've indicated you want to
impeach him. The issue is Mr. Hill has testiIied that the
police identiIied themselves. You say something
diIIerent. I've asked you Ior an oIIer oI prooI. You've
laid the Ioundation. Let's proceed.
MR. COUGHLIN: It also goes to --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed, Mr. Coughlin.
You would do yourselI some good iI you will Iocus on the
issues, iI you will."
So to compare in closer detail:
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 55:1 to 55:22)
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
"Q Mr. Hill, did the Reno police identiIy
themselves as law enIorcement prior to your client kicking
the door down on November 13th?
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THE WITNESS: I believe they did, sir.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Is that what you testiIied on June 18th in
your sworn testimony in the criminal trespass trial?
A I believe it is.
Q Did you testiIy to that today?
A I believe I just did.
Q Just now, but not earlier when you were
providing an answer to Mr. King, and you went through what
happened?
A Mr. Coughlin, let me make it easy Ior you. I
don't recall what I testiIied to on direct Irom Mr. King.
It is my clear recollection that before Dr. Merliss kicked
the door down in the basement, the police had identified
themselves loudly and clearly."
Now, considering Hill's testimony under oath at Coughlin's 11/14/12 Disciplinary
Hearing and the Iollow sworn testimony by Hill Irom the 6/18/12 Trial, viewed in conjunction
with the statements Hill made to the RPD OIIicer Chris Carter and Sargent Marcia Lopez just
prior to and at the time oI the 11/13/11 custodial arrest oI Coughlin at his Iormer home law
oIIice Ior trespassing:
BY MR. COUGHLIN: "Q Mr. Hill, at any time on that day, November 13th, did the owner
of the premises warn the arrestee to leave the property? A I think the message was
communicatea. Q Via what medium? A The fact that you were handcuffed and arrested.
Diant you get the picture? Q Okay, prior to the handcuIIing and the arresting, did anybody
say, "You need to leave the premises?" A I didn't hear that. Q Aobody said that? A I did
not hear that, sir. Q Did you say it? A Ao. Q Did Dr. Merliss? A Aot that I heard. Q Did the
police? A Ao, not that I heard. Q So, nobody that you heard oI warned the person arrested
Ior trespassing? Page -110 (see transcript oI 6/18/12 criminal trespass trial in RMC 11 CR
26405.
However, that is not quite how Hill put it at the 11/14/12 Iormal disciplinary hearing
now on appeal in 62337:
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 43:8 to 43:23) Hill: "And he says, I want to check the basement. I
didn't know there was a basement in the house. There's things piled in the stairwell to get
down into the basement, tool kits, and heavy stuII. We get it out oI the way. We get down
there. And I can see when he pushes on the door, and he turns to me, and he says, "It's
barricaded," Irom the inside. It wasn't locked, it was barricaded. We know what's going
on. So we call the police. The police come over. They try to get Zach out of the basement,
whoever was in there at that point. The police bang on the door, "Come on out, Zach.
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Police. You have to go." No response. They turned to us and say, we're going to leave.
Wait a minute. I'm the owner. You have the authority to break the door down. "We don't do
that.""
Also:
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
" Q So when they identiIied themselves, how long
between identiIying themselves and kicking the door down?
A Three minutes. Two or three minutes.
Q Which one oI them identiIied themselI?
A I believe there was a lady sergeant, and there
was a male oIIicer. And I believe he's the one who banged
on the door with his nightstick and identiIied himselI as
being with the police. And I believe his words were, come
on out, Zach.
Q Was that it, come out Zach? Does that
identify it as being the police?
A He identiIied himselI as being with the Reno
Police Department.
Q In what words?
A I believe those were the words he used, sir.
Q What words?
A This is the police, please come out Zach.
Q Because previously all you said was, come on
out Zach.
A I believe you're mistaken, sir.
Q So you're saying that oIIicer Chris Carter,
Junior, three minutes beIore the door was kicked in by
your client, banged on the door with his nightstick, and
said, this is the police. Come on out, Zach?
A Mr. Coughlin, three minutes is probably a long
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estimate. The process was we had cleared the stairwell --
THE WITNESS: I believe he did, sir.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Let me -- I'm
going to go ahead and overrule. Go ahead.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
A I believe he did, sir."
The most glaring error in the Panel's approach to the 11/14/12 Iormal disciplinary
hearing, the grievances, and the FOFCOL is that the Panel applied to instruction or
jurisdictional mandate in SCR 111(8) and the 6/7/12 Order in 60838 (which spoke only to the
"nature and degree oI punishment" Ior the one conviction at issue in 60838) to a whole range
oI mere allegations which have yet to be proven or even subject to the Iulcrum oI due process.
Simply put, the Panel skipped past the requirement to provide due process (notice and
opportunity to be heard) as to a rash oI mere allegations, and went directly to determining the
nature and degree oI punishment that should issue, doing so in what can only be seen a a
Iraudulent attempt to apply the Order in 60838 to allegations mere allegations in no way
connected to the conviction at issue and noticed in that 60838 SCR 111(6) Petition . Such
allegations oI contemptous conduct in NG12-0435 supported only by a since overridden (by
virtue oI the 6/19/09 Final Decree) 4/13/09 Order AIter Trial that spoke only to vexatiousness
vis a vis NRS 7.085 (which simply is not contemptuous conduct or anything related to
"candor").
The smoking guns to support such a Iinding that this was the Panel's approach:
MR. ECHEVERRIA: " I believe the issue that this
panel has to determine is what the degree, if any, of
punishment should be for the conduct that you have alleged
to have been involved with, in terms of candor to the
court, candor to counsel, candor to witnesses, competency
to practice law."
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Further, the OBC's King and Hill clearly attempt to mislead the NNDB Panel in
characterizing the 6/25/12 $42K atty Iee award in 03628 as a "sanction". Its Iunny, at one
turn King is
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Mr. Hill, is it somewhat incongruous Ior you to
assert to this panel that I completely lack competency,
and yet you ran up, counting the trial court $20,000 you
asked Ior, and the $42,000 you were ultimately awarded in
that appellate court?
MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative and
irrelevant.
MR. COUGHLIN: I think it goes to his
credibility.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sorry?
MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, I think it goes to
his credibility to the extent that he's saying, well,
Mr. Coughlin is so baseless and vexatious, yet I was able
to bill 60 grand Ior it.
To me it's like, well, at some point iI
somebody's arguments are so worthless and so unsupported,
shouldn't you be able to bring it home Ior less than 60
grand Ior a summary eviction?
MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, iI I could respond by
pointing out the Iact that the order Irom Judge Flanagan,
which has been admitted, suggests that that was -- that
those Iees were generated because oI Mr. Coughlin's
vexatious conduct. And that the Iees were reasonable and
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were awarded against Mr. Coughlin, not one cent oI which
has been paid.
So I think any suggestion to the contrary is
irrelevant, because 1udge Flanagan's order is to be
accepted by the panel. (NOTE: classic RPC 3.1 violation by King, ie, he indicates Flanagan's
Order merely suggests the Iees were the result oI a sanction, and its not until the next
sentence that King is alread then arguing that such a mere suggestion must be, essentially,
given the ol' SCR 111(5), "a conviction is conclusive prooI oI guilt"/SCR 111(8) "we are only
her today to determine the nature and extent oI your punishment Ior the suggestion, er,
uh...conviction/sanction we are assuming you were guilty oI in our skipping past the whole
trial on the merits part oI due process...ie, a suggestion oI guilt is good enough Ior the NNDB
Panel to treat it as a conviction/sanction that conclusively established guilt suIIicient to allow
the Panel to just skip straight to the sentencing phase....
MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, iI I can quickly
counter that. I don't know that's actually pled in your
complaint, Mr. King, or included amongst one oI the three
grievances. The extent to which -- am I here today
because this like Judge Gardner's sanctions coming up two
years later? Am I here today on Judge Flanagan's
sanction? Is he a grievant and accorded a case number
too?
MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, I was responding to
his question.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I believe you're here today
to measure all oI your conduct as a practicing lawyer. So
I'd like to move on. II you have Iurther questions oI
Mr. Hill, please ask them. I've now aIIorded you in
excess oI 20 minutes. I'll give you another Iive.
MR. COUGHLIN: So we're not here today based
on what's been noticed?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: We're not here today to
relitigate orders that have been filed (NOTE:no, rather the Panel was there to assume
something "suggested" by an Order provides conclusive prooI oI guilt/sanctionable conduct,
even where King and Hill know Iull well the 8/28/12 Order in CV11-03628 makes explicilty
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clear that the 6/25/12 Order was not a "sanction", King's nonsensical allusions to a conclusive
suggestion or whatever, notwithstanding) that you have appealed, and that you have lost.
MR. COUGHLIN: I'm not asking -- I'm asking
what is it limited to? Because it sounds like from what
you just said it's not limited.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't intend to impose any
limits on you in terms oI what you attempt to proIIer as
evidence. I will rule on what you proIIer as evidence.
MR. COUGHLIN: I'm saying what he's limited
to, your Honor.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: The issue here, sir, as I
understand the supreme court's order with respect to your
conviction oI theIt, and the issues here with respect to
the other grievances that have been filed against you are
to the extent as to what, if any, should be the punishment
that you should sustain as a result of your conduct.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yet this is entered into
evidence.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is what?
MR. COUGHLIN: This order has been entered
into evidence.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Exhibit 2 has.
MR. COUGHLIN: But it's not pled in any
complaint. 1udge Flanagan's not a grievant. I wasn't
noticed that that was the purpose of this hearing to some
extent today.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: You were noticed that the
issue oI your conviction oI trespass was an issue, that
your handling of that case was an issue, and it's relevant
as to that"
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To the extent Echeverria's indicating "that your handling oI that case was an issue"
reIers to Coughlin's handling oI either Rev11-1708 (the summary eviction Irom Iormer home
law oIIice that Hill's associate, not Hill (contrary to the FOFCOL's assessment that Hill
appeared in the trial court...which Hill attempts to imply when its convenient, only to back oII
such characterization when its not (like he gets caught in lying that Coughlin "didn't raise the
issue in the trial court" (vis a vis Coughlin's argument that NRS 40.254 Iorbid utilizing
summary procedures in NRS 40.253 against a commercial tenant in a no cause
eviction...something Coughlin clearly did raise in the trial court at page 6 oI his 10/17/11
Iiling therein), such a contention is clearly at odds with the text oI King's 8/23/12 Complaint
in the three grievances on appeal in 62337, as nothing therein notices Coughlin that his
"handling oI that case" (either the trial court in rev11-1708 or the appeal thereoI in CV11-
03628) would be at issue (including the 6/25/12 Order in cv11-03628 that became Iormal
hearing exhibit 2) or had otherwise been noticed per SCR 105(2) or 105(2)(c). Then
Echeverria continually allows King and HIll to testiIy as to matters peripheral to the trespass
conviction, purportedly to support some allegation oI misconduct vis a vis "candor" to either
the tribunal or opposing counsel, or some lack oI competency, or, perhaps, "Iairness to
opposing counsel" (which Echeverria seems to continually describe as "candor" to opposing
counsel) but when Coughlin seeks to ask question related thereto, Echeverria sua sponte
objects by asserting that Coughlin is not to "relitigate" his trespass conviction, and otherwise
precludes Couglhin Irom even impeaching HIll's testimony or showing bias, particularly as to
all the testiony related to the issues Hill testiIied to (candor to tribunal and opposing counsel,
whether Coughlin was abusive to opposing counsel or iI Hill's staII (hearsay) was "terrorized"
by Coughlin, whether Coughlin lacked competency, etc.
The Landlord's 4/26/13 Motion to Dismiss alleges: "IV. To the extent Coughlin
trying appeal decision, is to the district court's this court has no jurisdiction.
Court.
appeal Irom Reno Justice Court, this court has no appellate jurisdiction. "
5/28/13 Order: "The district court has Iinal appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising in
justice courts. Nev. Const. art. 6, 6; see also Waugh v. Casazza, 85 Nev. 520, 521, 458 P.2d
359, 360 (1969). Although NRAP 3A(b)(3) authorizes an appeal Irom an order reIusing to
grant an injunction, and NRAP 3A(b)(8) authorizes an appeal Irom a post-judgment order
awarding attorney Iees, see Winston Prods. Co., Inc. v. DeBoer, 122 Nev. 517, 525, 134 P.3d
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726, 731 (2006) (recognizing that an order awarding attorney Iees and costs is substantively
appealable as a special order aIter Iinal judgment), because the orders challenged in this case
arose Irom the district court's exercise oI appellate jurisdiction over an appeal Irom a justice
court decision, the district court's orders were ostensibly rendered Iinal and are not appealable
to this court."
One really does not hear the word "ostensibly" much Irom judges. Especially as to
matters related to whether they have jurisdiction or not to review something. Even less so
Irom Suprem Court Justices. Young, 208 P.2d 297, Nevada 1949 establishes that
regardless oI with a change oI circumstances prevents much practical eIIect Irom issuing upon
this court overturning the District Court's ruling that where vital collateral consequences (also
Russell v. Kalian, 414 A. 2d 462 and WolI-Lillie 4 F. Supp 1 establish that where the landlord
and the SheriII attempt to eIIect a lockout prior to the expiration oI the twenty Iour hours
required, by statute, under NRS 40.253 Irom when the SheriII posts the twenty Iour hour
lockout order, that it was the SheriII, Hill, and Merliss whom were trespassing on 11/13/11
when they all lied about whether they police had identiIied themselves as law enIorcement
prior to the landlord kicking the door down, and whether anyone at all had issued a "warning"
per RMC 8.10.010 or NRS 207.200 suIIicient to support a criminal trespass arrest, much less
the conviction upon which an SCR 111(4) Petition was Iiled against Coughlin in 61901 (and
how bar counsel Iailing to classiIy such "conviction" as an SCR 111(6) "serious oIIense" does
not preclude treating such as a basis Ior permanently disbarring Coughlin in 62337 is really
not at all clear) would be Iaced by one oI the parties the matter is not mute such is the case
here wherein 62337, 61901 and 60838 Coughlin has Iaced and continues to Iace just such
devastating collateral consequences vis-a-vis all the various orders being both appealed and
Ior which a writ oI certiorari is or will be sought beyond the $42,000 attorney oI the award
pursuant to NRS 69.050 (which by the way is a matter to which original jurisdiction is vested
in the District Court and as such pursuant to Klein, 6 Nev. 159, the Supreme Court has
appellate jurisdiction in all instances where original jurisdiction lies with the District Court
where only the District Court had original jurisdiction to rule on a 69.050 motion Ior attorneys
Iees Nevada Supreme Court necessarily has jurisdiction Ior Coughlin's appeal as to that six
2512 order Iurther and that similar line oI precedents the motion Ior stay pursuant to NRS
40.385 to Coughlin Iiled on December 30, 2011 with the District Court also involved a matter
where and the District Court had original jurisdiction where Coughlin a commercial tenant
was required by NRS 40.385 to move Ior a stay pursuant to NRA P8 which requires Coughlin
to Iirst move Ior a stay in the District Court to whatever extent this appeal may not be viewed
as a Iunctional equivalent oI a writ oI certiorari sellers makes clear that where judge Flanagan
exceeded his jurisdiction under 69.050 in light oI the Iact that all oI chapter 69 applies only to
judgments and the summary order appealed to the District Court necessarily is not a judgment
as such the award oI $42,000 oI attorney's Iees, which judge Flanagan made clear in his
August 21 and 28 2012 orders was not a sanction but rather an application, despite the
opposition Coughlin Iiled on 1/14/12 in advance (prospectively, in anticipation) oI the April
19, 2012 motion Ior attorneys Iees.
The Justice Court never considered whether NRS 69.050 allowed Ior an award oI
attorney's Iees. Rather, only NRS 69.030 was considered therein (decided wrongly, given
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NRS 69 only applies to "judgments" in plenary matters). The key distinction here is whether
Nevada Const. art. 6 sec. 6 applies to "cases arising in Justice Courts" or, rather over
"decisions in Justice Courts", because, clearly, the Justice Court here, the RJC, made no
"decision" as to whether attorney's Iees on appeal oI a summary eviction were available or in
order here. The same could be said with respect to whether an NRS 40.385 stay would be
granted, as Judge SIerrazza repeatedly indicated that he Ielt he had been divested oI
jurisdiction to rule on that (see his 12/1/11 and 12/8/11 Orders in 1708).
The Justice Court never ruled on whether Couglhin could get a stay under NRS 40.385,
or upon the posting oI a supersedeas bond pursuant thereto oI $250. As such, Iinallappellate
jurisdiction as to such where there was no "decision in" the justice court as to those issues,
does not lie with the District Court, but, rather, it was the Order in District Court denying
Coughlin's 12/30/11 Motion Ior Stay pursuant to NRS 40.385 that was the Iirst decision
thereon, and as such was a "decision in" or matter "arising in" the District Court and
Appealability and appellate review oI injunctions, see Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions 324
to 336 Issuance oI extraordinary writs by appellate courts, see Am. Jur. 2d, Certiorari 1 et
seq.; Am. Jur. 2d, Habeas Corpus and Postconviction Remedies 1 et seq.; Am. Jur. 2d,
Mandamus 1 et seq.; Am. Jur. 2d, Prohibition 1 et seq.; Am. Jur. 2d, Quo Warranto
1 et seq. Organization oI state courts, see Am. Jur. 2d, Courts 1 et seq. Trial, generally, see
Am. Jur. 2d, Trial 1 et seq. I. Jurisdiction oI Appellate Courts C. Appellate Jurisdiction oI
State Courts Topic Summary Correlation Table ReIerences 75. Generally West's Key
Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k17 to 25, 30 to 32 A.L.R.
Library Validity, construction, and application oI concurrent-sentence-doctrinestate cases,
56 A.L.R.5th 385 An appellate court has the responsibility to determine whether it has
jurisdiction to review a case.|FN1| The parties may not conIer jurisdiction on an appellate
court by waiver, acquiescence, or consent.|FN2| When a lower court does not have
jurisdiction over the case beIore it, an appellate court also lacks jurisdiction to review the
merits oI the claim.|FN3| CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: The issue oI appellate
jurisdiction is one oI law over which Supreme Court has unlimited review. State v. Scoville,
286 Kan. 800, 188 P.3d 959 (2008). Parties cannot conIer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court
oI Appeals directly or indirectly where it is otherwise lacking. Men & Women Against
Discrimination v. Family Protection Services Bd., 725 S.E.2d 756 (W. Va. 2011). |END OF
SUPPLEMENT| |FN1| Williamson v. Misemer, 316 Ark. 192, 871 S.W.2d 396 (1994); In re
Marriage oI Dureno, 854 P.2d 1352 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Ex parte Lewis, 663 S.W.2d 153
(Tex. App. Amarillo 1983). |FN2| Burchell v. Burchell, 684 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984);
Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dept., Inc., 302 Md. 281, 487 A.2d 288 (1985); In re Estate oI Lloyd,
676 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1984). |FN3| Armour v. L.H., 259 Neb. 138, 608 N.W.2d
599 (2000). AMJUR APPELLATE 75 C. Appellate Jurisdiction oI State Courts Topic
Summary Correlation Table ReIerences 76. Constitutional and statutory provisions West's
Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k17 to 25, 30 to 32 A.L.R.
Library Validity, construction, and application oI concurrent-sentence-doctrinestate cases,
56 A.L.R.5th 385 The jurisdiction oI an appellate court is oIten established by various
constitutional and statutory provisions, and may not be unlimited or absolute.|FN1| Appellate
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jurisdiction is derived Irom the constitutional or statutory provisions, and can be acquired and
exercised only in the manner prescribed.|FN2| The technical requirements in some statutes,
such as the time to bring a statutory appeal, are jurisdictional, and the matter oI acquiring
jurisdiction by an appellate court is a technical matter over which it has no discretion.|FN3|
However, some state rules oI appellate procedure are not jurisdictional.|FN4| Unless there are
constitutional limitations,|FN5| a legislature has the right to abridge or extend the right to
appeal.|FN6| In the absence oI express statutory language prohibiting judicial review, a
legislative intent to prohibit judicial review must be established by speciIic legislative history
or other reliable evidence oI intent.|FN7| CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: An
appellate court acquires no jurisdiction unless the appellant has satisIied the statutory
requirements Ior appellate jurisdiction. Wright v. Omaha Public School Dist., 280 Neb. 941,
791 N.W.2d 760 (2010). Acting in its appellate capacity, the superior court has limited
statutory jurisdiction, and all statutory requirements must be met beIore it properly invokes
this jurisdiction. Spice v. Pierce County, 149 Wash. App. 461, 204 P.3d 254 (Div. 2 2009).
|END OF SUPPLEMENT| |FN1| Ex parte Lewis, 663 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App. Amarillo
1983). |FN2| In re Nunez, 165 Conn. 435, 334 A.2d 898 (1973); Smith v. Sampson, 114 N.H.
638, 325 A.2d 796 (1974). |FN3| In re Covault Freeholder Petition, 218 Neb. 763, 359
N.W.2d 349, 22 Ed. Law Rep. 346 (1984). |FN4| Vincent v. State, Commercial Fisheries
Entry Com'n, 717 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1986). |FN5| People v. Pollenz, 67 N.Y.2d 264, 502
N.Y.S.2d 417, 493 N.E.2d 541 (1986). |FN6| Geraud v. Schrader, 531 P.2d 872 (Wyo. 1975).
|FN7| Texas Dept. oI Protective and Regulatory Services v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145
S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 2004). 2012 Thomson Reuters. 33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/RIA.
No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. All rights reserved. AMJUR APPELLATE 76
The decision whether to grant an interlocutory appeal Irom a district court order lies
within the district court's discretion. 28 U.S.C.A. 1292(b). Mills v. Everest Reinsurance Co.,
771
F. Supp. 2d 270 (S.D. N.Y. 2009).
Hill's 4/26/13 Motion to Dismiss and Stay BrieIing Schedule in 61383 reads:
"MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AND STAY BRIEFING Respondent, MATTHEW
MERLISS, by and through his counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, LTD., and RICHARD G. HILL,
ESQ., moves this court to dismiss this case and to stay the brieIing schedule in the interim.
The Iirst notice oI appeal that Mr. Coughlin Iiled was February 15, 2012. It was untimely, is
now moot, and must be dismissed. The second notice oI appeal, Iiled July 30, 2012, was not
timely and must be dismissed Ior lack oI jurisdiction. Appellant has not Iiled a bond, or other
security Ior costs, as required by NRAP 7, providing yet another reason why this case must be
dismissed. Finally, Mr. Coughlin mistakenly thinks he is appealing the district court's decision
denying his appeal Irom an eviction order in Reno Justice Court.
FACTS
The Iacts pertaining to this motion are:
This eviction case began in Reno Justice Court. NRS 4.370(g). See EXHIBIT 1,
tenant's answer, etc. Note: The "Appendix" that Coughlin has Iiled in this case is totally
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unuseable and the subject oI a motion to strike. All exhibits to authenticated by the aIIidavit
oI counsel, EXHIBIT 19 hereto.
On October 27, 2011, Reno Justice Court issued an eviction order. EXHIBIT 2.
On November 3, 2011, Coughlin Iiled a notice oI appeal to the Second Judicial District
Court. See EXHIBIT 3.
On December 30, 2011, Coughlin Iiled a motion in the district court seeking a
temporary restraining order against Merliss. See EXHIBIT 4. district court declined to issue
the preliminary injunction requested by Coughlin to restrain Merliss Irom removing
abandoned personal property Irom Coughlin's Iormer residence. See EXHIBIT 5. Notice oI
entry was Iiled that day, and electronically served on Coughlin on the same day, January 11,
2012. See EXHIBITS 17 and 18.
On February 15, 2012, Coughlin Iiled a notice oI appeal in the district court. It was Iive
days late. See EXHIBIT 6. Coughlin purports to be appealing " ... all the various orders
dismissing this case, including but not limited to those entered January 13, 2012." The only
orders entered as oI that date were: a) An order Iiled January 6, 2012, setting the appellate
brieIing schedule in the district court; b) the order reIusing to issue the temporary restraining
order I preliminary injunction Iiled by Coughlin, reIerred to in number 4, above; and c) an
order issued February 8, 2012 that Coughlin show cause why he should not be held in
contempt oI court, which was set Ior a hearing on March 23, 2012.
EXHIBIT 16 hereto is a true and correct copy oI the district court's docket Ior the case
below. There is no indication that Coughlin posted security Ior costs with his notice oI appeal
On March 30, 2012, the district court denied Coughlin's appeal Irom the eviction order
issued by Reno Justice Court. See EXHIBIT 7. Notice oI entry was Iiled and electronically
served on Coughlin that same day. See EXHIBITS 8 and 9.
On June 25, 2012, the district court granted Merliss' motion Ior Iees against Coughlin. See
EXHIBIT 10.
On the same day, June 25, 2012, notice oI entry oI that order was Iiled and served on
Coughlin. See EXHIBIT 11. That notice was electronically served on Coughlin on June 25,
2012. ThereIore, Coughlin's notice oI appeal was due no later than July 26, 2012,
On July 30, 2012, Coughlin Iiled a handwritten notice oI appeal in the district court as
to the Iees awarded to Merliss. See EXHIBIT 12. His Iiling was Iour days late.
On April 24, 2013, this court consolidated Coughlin's two pending appeals. At that
time, the clerk oI the court Iiled, and Merliss was served with, Coughlin's opening brieI. See
Iiling 13-11983 in this case in this court.
Document No. 2013-12021 in this case purports to be Coughlin's notice oI posting
bond on appeal, but there is no record oI any bond or security having been Iiled in the district
court or this court. See EXHIBIT 16, the district court's docket.
Coughlin's "opening brieI," document number 2013-12020, is almost exclusively
addressed to seeking review oI the district court's decision denying his appeal Irom Reno
Justice Court. It is apparent that he thinks he is appealing the ruling on the merits oI the
eviction.
ANALYSIS
I. The failure to mandates dismissal.
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NRAP 7 requires an appellant to post $500.00 security Ior costs on appeal. That has
not been done in this case, despite the attempt by Coughlin to make it appear that he has done
so. See Iiling 13-12021. It has long been the law in Nevada that the Iailure to post the required
security prevents this court's review oI the appeal and mandates dismissal. Shute v. Big
Meadow Inv. Co., 41 Nev. 361, 362, 170 Pac. 1049 (1918).
II. The on the of fees the district court was not timely taken.
The notice oI entry oI the award oI Iees in the district court was electronically
served on Coughlin, who was, at that time, an e-Iiler with that court. ReIerence is made to
EXHIBIT 9, the prooI oI service issued by the district court. That document shows the
electronic service oI the notice oI entry on Coughlin was completed on June 25, 2012.
EXHIBIT 10 is Coughlin's handwritten notice oI appeal. It bears a Iile stamp that it was not
Iiled in the district court until July 30, 2012.
NEFCR 9(t) states:
Electronic service is at the time of transmission of the
notice subsection of this rule. For the purpose oI
computing time to respond to documents received via electronic
service, any document served on a day or at a time when the court
is not open Ior business shall be deemed served at the time oI the
next opening oI the court Ior business.
(Emphasis added.)
ThereIore, service oI the notice oI entry on Coughlin was legally completed on
June 25, 2012, at which point, the time Ior him to appeal the award oI Iees began to run.
NRAP 4(a)(1) provides that a notice oI appeal must be Iiled" ... not later than 30 days aIter
the date that written notice oI entry oI the judgment or order appealed Irom is served."
(Emphasis added.) Coughlin Iiled his notice oI appeal aIter notice oI entry. The time limit in
NRAP 4(a) is mandatory and an appeal Iiled late must be dismissed. Magee v. Whitacre, 60
Nev. 202,204,96 P.2d 201, 202 (1939), abrogated on other grounds in Lee v. GNLV Corp.,
116 Nev. 424, 996 P.2d 416 (2000). Thus, the notice oI appeal Iiled July 30, 2012, was
deIective and Iailed to vet jurisdiction in this court.
III. The appeal of the denial of an injunction was untimely, is now moot, and
must be dismissed.
a) The appeal was untimely.
On February 15, 2012 (EXHIBIT 6), Coughlin initiated an interlocutory appeal oI the
order entered January 11, 2012 (EXHIBIT 5), in which the court denied Coughlin's request
Ior a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Coughlin's appeal oI that
order was not timely either. The notice oI appeal was due February 10, 2012, but was not Iiled
until February 15, 2013, Iive days late. Compare EXHIBITS 17 and 18 (notice oI entry Iiled
and served January 11, 2012) with EXHIBIT 6 (notice oI appeal Iiled February 15,2012).
As is Coughlin's invariable practice, aIter the district court declined to grant the requested
injunction, Coughlin Iiled a motion to alter or amend the court's order, relying on NRCP 52(b)
and NRCP 59. See EXHIBIT 14. Coughlin mistakenly believes that tactic enlarges his time to
appeal. Merliss submits that the motion to alter or amend was not timely, and did not invoke
the tolling provision oI NRAP 4(a)(4)(B) or (C), because NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 do not
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apply to an order denying an injunction. ThereIore, Coughlin's attempt to appeal the denial oI
his requested injunction was also late, and it must be dismissed Ior lack oI jurisdiction.
b) The appeal of the denial of injunctive relief is moot.
The appeal oI the denial oI an injunction is now moot because oI subsequent events.
ThereIore, the appeal in this court should be dismissed. Independence Party oI Richmond
County v. Graham, 413 F.3d 252, 256 (2nd Cir. 2005).
Mootness is a question oI justiciability. This court does not render advisory opinions.
There must be an actual live controversy throughout the case, including on any appeal.
Subsequent events may render a case moot. Personhood Nevada v. Bristol, 126 Nev.
(Adv.Opin. 56) 245 P.3d 572,574 (2010).
Coughlin had been evicted Irom a home he rented Irom Merliss. EXHIBIT 2. Several
weeks later, Coughlin was Iound living in the basement oI the property and was arrested. See
EXHIBIT 15, a motion Iiled in the district court, which sets Iorth a chronology oI events.
Coughlin appealed the decision oI the justice court to the district court. EXHIBIT 3. Coughlin
wanted the district court to prevent Merliss Irom removing his (Coughlin's) possessions Irom
the home in accordance with NRS 118A.460. EXHIBIT 4. The district court denied
Coughlin's motion. EXHIBIT 5. Merliss then disposed oI the "trove" that Coughlin had leIt in
the home.l In 1 This writer personally counted 13 automobile seats in the basement oI the
home.) See, declaration oI Richard G.Hill, Esq. Later, on March 30, 2012, the district court
denied Coughlin's appeal on the merits. EXHIBIT 7.
As oI today, Coughlin's appeal in this court, oI the district court's reIusal to enjoin
Merliss' disposition oI the property leIt in the home, is moot. First, Coughlin lost on the merits
oI his appeal in the district court. EXHIBIT 7. That appeal is now Iinal and binding.
ThereIore, Coughlin could never make the showing that he has a likelihood oI success on the
merits oI his claims as is required Ior the issuance oI any injunctive relieI. Clark County
School District v. Buchanan, 112 Nev. 1146, 1150, 924 Nev. 716 719 (1996), citing
Christensen v. Chromalloy Amer. Corp., 99 Nev. 34, 36, 656 P.2d 844,846 (1983).
Second, because he was not restrained by the district court, Merliss properly proceeded
to dispose oI the items oI personal property leIt at the home by Coughlin. Accord, NRS
118A.460. Thus, even iI this court were to determine that Coughlin could show the elements
necessary Ior the issuance oI injunctive relieI, and even iI this court somehow concluded that
the district court abused its discretion in the matter, this court's order would, nonetheless, be
an exercise in Iutility. II this court were to reverse the district court's decision, it would not
provide Coughlin with any relieI. The property Coughlin abandoned on Merliss' property is
gone and cannot be restored by an order oI this court. This court would be issuing nothing
more than an advisory opinion. Cj, Personhood.
IV. To the extent Coughlin trying appeal decision, is to the district court's this
court has no jurisdiction.
Court.
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appeal Irom Reno Justice Court, this court has no appellate jurisdiction.
RELIEF REQUESTED
Under the circumstances, the court should immediately stay the brieIing schedule. The
court should dismiss this entire consolidated appeal. Coughlin has not posted the mandatory
bond Ior costs on this appeal. The Iirst notice oI appeal was not timely, and the question
presented is now moot. The second notice oI appeal was not timely and must also be
dismissed. Contrary to the Iocus and contrary oI Coughlin's opening brieI, this court does not
have appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's decision on the merits oI Coughlin's
appeal to that court Irom Reno Justice Court.
The brieIing schedule in this case must be suspended until this motion and the motion
to strike Coughlin's appendix have been decided. Otherwise, Merliss will incur needless Iees
and costs.
WHEREFORE, respondent prays that this court stay the brieIing schedule; dismiss this
entire case; that appellant, Zachary Coughlin, be sanctioned; that respondent be awarded
attorney's Iees and costs pursuant to NRAP 38; and Ior such other, Iurther and additional
relieI as seems just to the Court in the premises.
DATED this oI 26th oI April, 2013. /s/ Richard G. Hill, Esq."
EXHIBIT INDEX
EXHIBIT NO. DESCRIPTION
1 Tenant's Answer/AIIidavit to 30 Day No Cause Eviction; Motion Ior Sanctions and
Attorney's Iees; Counterclaim Ior Damages
2 Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law and Order Ior Summary Eviction
3 Notice oI Appeal to District Court
4 Emergency Motion Ior Temporary Restraining Order or Injunction Preventing Merhss Irom
"Disposing" oI Tenants Property; or, in the Alternative, Motion Ior Stay
5 Order (1-11-12)
6 Notice oI Appeal (2-15-12)
7 Order (3-30-12)
8 Notice oI Entry oI Order (3-30-12)
9 ProoI oI Service
10 Order (6-25-12)
12 ProoI oI Service
13 Notice oI Appeal (7-30-12)
14 Motion under NRCP 52(b) to amend or make additional Iindings oI Iact; or, pled in the
alternative, Motion under NRCP 59 to alter or amend the Order Denying Motion to Prevent
Disposal oI Personal Property
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15 Second Motion Ior Order to Show Cause
16 District Court docket
18 ProoI oI Service
19 Declaration oI Richard G. Hill, Esq. 2
Hill's 5/20/13 Reply in 61383 reads:
" REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AND MOTION TO STAY BRIEFING
SCHEDULE
Respondent, MATTHEW MERLISS, by and through his counsel, RICHARD G.
HILL, LTD., and RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., replies to the opposition |sic| by appellant,
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, to appellant's motion to dismiss and to stay brieIing
schedule.
1. AIter Mr. Coughlin was granted a telephonic extension by the Clerk oI the Court within
which to Iile his response, it was, nonetheless, Iiled a day late. The opposition does not
conIorm to oI the Iormat requirements oI NRAP 27(d). It is single spaced and is 15 pages
long. This means it is almost twice as long as allowed by the rules.
The opposition is mostly unintelligible. The exhibits are totally unuseable, and how
they relate to, or support, the opposition is a mystery. The entire Iiling typiIies Coughlin's
inability to Iocus on discrete legal issues or Iollow the rules oI the Court. It is an unIair tactic
Ior Coughlin to try to Iorce his opponent (and court staII) to wade through 2 mountains oI
jumbled gibberish trying to glean any meaningIul contentions. The Court should not waste its
time with Coughlin's perpetually incoherent Iilings.
1.On April 24, 2013, respondent, Merliss, moved to strike the appendix Iiled by Coughlin
(Doc. #13-12021). Coughlin's "appendix" does not comply with any oI the Court's content or
Iormatting requirements in NRAP 30(c) or (d), and it was not served as required by NRAP
30(e). Coughlin has completely ignored that motion. The Court should accept that Iailure as
an admission that the motion to strike should be granted.
2.Appellant proved that Coughlin never posted the required $500.00 appeal cost bond as to
either oI his notices oI appeal. In his opposition, Coughlin claims to have paid the bond, but
cites to no evidence (ie. a receipt). By contrast, appellant's motion to dismiss included the
district court docket, which shows no such deposit by Coughlin as to either oI his notices oI
appeal. See, Exhibit 16 to the motion to dismiss. Coughlin's consolidated appeal must,
thereIore, be dismissed. Shute v. Big Meadow Inc. Co., 41 Nev. 361,362,170 Pac. 1049, 1050
(1918).
4. Notice of Appeal -Denial of Injunctive Relief.
Coughlin's Iirst notice oI appeal was not Iiled" ... no later than 30 days aIter the date that
written notice oI entry ... |was| served." CI .. , NRAP 4(a)(1). Coughlin's reIerence to a tolling
motion is unpersuasive, because neither NRCP 52 nor NRCP 59 apply to the court's decision
to deny Coughlin injunctive relieI. While that decision was an appealable order, the denial oI
injunctive relieI is not a judgment aIter trial to which either oI those rules apply.
Coughlin's appeal oI the denial oI the injunctive relieI is now unquestionably moot. This is so
because no order that this Court could possibly issue will provide Coughlin with any
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meaningIul relieI. Personhood Nevada v. Bristol, 126 Nev. (Adv. Opin. 56), 245 P .3d
572,574 (2010). While Coughlin's opposition recognizes that there are exceptions to the
mootness doctrine, he oIIered neither Iacts nor law to support any possible exception. shall
5. Notice of Appeal-Attorney's Fees.
Appellant proved that Couhglin's second notice oI appeal was due no later than July
26, 2012, 30 days aIter Coughlin was electronically served with notice oI entry oI the district
court's award oI attorney's Iees against him. By silence, Coughlin concedes that his July 30,
2012 notice oI appeal, Exhibit 13 to Motion to Dismiss, was untimely.
Coughlin's response is that he Iiled a notice oI appeal on July 24, 2012. A copy oI that paper
is attached as EXHIBIT 1 to this reply. The district court docket has that Iiling lodged as a
motion. See, Exhibit 16 to motion to dismiss at page 3 oI 14. That docket also shows no Iiling
Iees or security Ior costs Iiled with either the July 24, 2012 or July 30, 2012 notice oI appeal.
rd. Coughlin's request to proceed in Iorma pauperis was denied. See Iiling number 13-1198 in
this Court.
Coughlin relies on the July 24, 2012 paper as both a "tolling motion" and as a notice oI
appeal. He cannot have it both ways. He cannot simultaneously divest the district court oI
jurisdiction by appealing, yet also ask that court to grant him relieI. II Coughlin, a suspended
attorney, really believed that he had Iiled a notice oI appeal on July 24, 2012, then he must
explain why he re-Iiled his notice oI appeal on July 30, 2012. That Iiling belies his assertions
in opposition to the motion to dismiss. This is typical oI the procedural nonsense which has
been the hallmark oI Coughlin's behavior in this case. The Court need not reach the
conundrum Coughlin created, because as with his February 25, 2012 notice oI appeal, there is
no prooI that his July 24, 2012 Iiling (Exhibit 1) was ever served on Merliss' counsel. That
document was paper-Iiled and does not include a certiIicate oI service. CI., NRCP 5 and
NRAP 3(d)(1). Thus, Coughlin's July 24, 2012 Iiling is not a valid motion invoking either
NRCP 52 or NRCP 59, because oI his violation oI NRCP 5 (every pleading or paper Iiled in a
case" ... be served upon each oI the parties." Emphasis added.). He also violated DCR 13(1)
and (2). The eIIect oI his Iailure to make service means the tolling eIIect oI Rules 52 and 59
was never invoked. Rivera v. MIT Fossarina, 840 F.2d 152, 154 (1st Cir. 1988) (dealing with
FRCP 5(a), FRCP 52, and FRCP 59 |the timeliness oI a motion to alter or amend a judgment
is determined by the date oI service, not the date oI Iiling|.) As with his February 25, 2012
notice oI appeal as to the denial oI injunctive relieI, discussed above, his additional Iailure to
timely serve the notice oI appeal as to the award oI attorney's Iees is a Iatal Ilaw. NRAP 3(d).
The July 24, 2012 notice oI appeal was not served, and the July 30, 2012 notice was not
timely. That appeal must also be dismissed. In Re: Powell's Estate, 63 Nev. 19, 21, 158 P.2d
545 (1945).
CONCLUSIONS SOUGHT AND RELIEF
1. The present brieIing schedule must be stayed, or, at a bare minimum, reinstituted once the
Court resolves the motion to dismiss.
2. The unopposed motion to strike Coughlin's appendix (Doc. #13-12021) should be granted.
3. Coughlin has Iailed to post the required bond Ior costs as to either appeal. Dismissal is
required.
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4. The appeal regarding the denial oI injunctive relieI is moot and was not timely Iiled or
served. Dismissal is required.
5. Coughlin admits that the notice oI appeal regarding the award oI attorney's Iees by the
district court was not timely. His attempt to rely on a prior Iiling is unsound because that
paper is internally inconsistent and was not properly served.
6.Coughlin, a patently vexatious litigator, should be ordered to pay Merliss a multiple oI
Merliss' Iees incurred on this Irivolous appeal.
WHEREFORE, respondent prays that this Court strike Coughlin's purported appendix
(Doc. #13-12021), and dismiss this consolidated appeal; and Ior such other, Iurther and
additional relieI as seems just to the Court in the premises.
DATED this oI May, 2013 /s/ Richard G. Hill, Esq."
A three Justice panel oI the Nevada Supreme Court, in a 5/28/13 Order in
61383 ruled: "Order Dismissing Appeal:
This is an appeal Irom district court orders denying an emergency motion
Ior a temporary restraining order or injunction and awarding attorney Iees in a
landlord-tenant matter. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Patrick
Flanagan, Judge.
Appellant moved the district court Ior a temporary restraining order or
injunction in an appeal Irom a justice court order in a landlord tenant dispute.
Following the denial oI that motion, appellant appealed to this court.
Subsequently, the district court entered an order awarding attorney Iees to
respondent and appellant also appealed Irom that order.
The district court has Iinal appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising in
justice courts. Nev. Const. art. 6, 6; see also Waugh v. Casazza, 85 Nev. 520,
521, 458 P.2d 359, 360 (1969). Although NRAP 3A(b)(3) authorizes an appeal
Irom an order reIusing to grant an injunction, and NRAP 3A(b)(8) authorizes an
appeal Irom a post-judgment order awarding attorney Iees, see Winston Prods.
Co., Inc. v. DeBoer, 122 Nev. 517, 525, 134 P.3d 726, 731 (2006) (recognizing
that an order awarding attorney Iees and costs is substantively appealable as a
special order aIter Iinal judgment), because the orders challenged in this case
arose Irom the district court's exercise oI appellate jurisdiction over an appeal
Irom a justice court decision, the district court's orders were ostensibly rendered
Iinal and are not appealable to this court. For the same reasons, to the extent that
appellant seeks to appeal Irom any other order or determination arising Irom the
district court's appellate review oI the justice court matter, this court likewise
lacks jurisdiction to consider any such appeals. Accordingly, as we lack
jurisdiction over this appeal, we ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.In1 (In1:
Respondent's April 26, 2013, motion seeking to dismiss this appeal Ior lack oI
jurisdiction on other grounds and his April 26, 2013, motion to strike are denied
as moot. To the extent that respondent seeks attorney Iees based on the motion to
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dismiss this appeal, that request is denied. We Iurther deny as moot any other
requests Ior relieI pending in this matter.) /s/ Justices Gibbons, Douglas, and
Saitta.
52B C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant 1576: 'XII. Reentry and Recovery oI Possession by
Landlord C. Statutory Dispossession Proceedings; Summary Proceedings 7. Appellate
Review 1576. Standard of review West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant
233k291(18), 315(1), 315(3). Under some statutes, however, dispossession proceedings are
triable de novo on appea1. Ala.-Hyde v. Isbell, 254 Ala. 373,48 So. 2d 465 (1950). Mo.-
Conley v. Dee, 246 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952). Where there is a trial de novo, the
appellate court should consider the Iacts oI the case . Ariz.-Olds Bros. Lumber Co. v.
Rushing, 64 Ariz. 199,167 P.2d 394 (1946).| and render a proper judgment. Ariz.-Olds Bros.
Lumber Co. v. Rushing, 64 Ariz. 199, 167 P.2d 394 (1946). Mo.-Conley v. Dee, 246 S.W.2d
385 (Mo. C!. App. 1952). Whether the unlawIul detainer notice requirement is calculated in
accordance with the timing provisions oI the civil rules is a matter oI statutory interpretation
to be reviewed de novo. Wash.-Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash. 2d 365, 173 P.3d 228
(2007). An order granting a summary eviction under a lease providing for periodic rent
reserved by the month, or any shorter period, should be reviewed on appeal based upon
the standard of review for an order granting summary judgment, which is de novo
review, because such proceedings are analogous. Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123
Nev. 212, 163 P.3d 405 (2007).
|FNl | N.Y.-Metropolitan LiIe Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 43 Misc. 2d 639, 251 N.Y.S.2d 693
(App. Term 1964). |FN2| CaL-Whipple v. Haberle, 223 Cal. App. 2d 477, 36 Cal. Rptr. 9
(5th Dis!. 1963). Reviewing decision regarding issuance oI a protective order D.C.-Graham v.
Lanier Associates, 19 A.3d 361 (D.C. 2011). Plenary review oI suIIiciency oI notice to quit
Conn.-Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381,973 A.2d 1229 (2009). |FN3| Ala.-Hyde v.
Isbell, 254 Ala. 373,48 So. 2d 465 (1950). IlL-Woodson v. Benson, 330 IiI. App. 248, 70
N.E.2d 742 (1st Dis!. 1947). |FN4|IlI.-Mitchell v. Tyler, 332 III. App. 577, 76 N.E.2d 237
(1st Dis!. 1947). Mass.-Staples v. Collins, 321 Mass. 449, 73 N.E.2d 729 (1947). |FN5|
|FN6) |FN7| . |FN8| . |FN9| Nev.- |FN9| Nev.Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123
Nev. 212, 163 P.3d 405 (2007). CJS LANDLORD 1576
A review oI Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order and Bakers 2/24/12 Answering BrieI
reveal the extent to which Judge Flanagan, willing or not, was led down a clearly erroneous
path by Baker and his purposeIully misstatements oI the law, especially as to the 'Standard
of Review applicable to an appeal oI a 'summary eviction. Flanagan writes:
' Standard oI Review
On civil appeals Irom justice courts to district courts, a case "must not be tried anew.'
NJCRCP 72(c). Whether on appeal at the Nevada Supreme Court Irom a district court, or
appeal at a district court Irom a justice court, a lower court's Iindings "will not be disturbed on
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appeal unless they are clearly erroneous and are not based on substantial evidence." Gibellini
v Klindt, 110 Nev. 1201, 1204,885 P.2d 540, 542 (1994).
"|A|n order granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6) should be reviewed on
appeal based upon the standard Ior review oI an order granting summary judgment under
NRC 56 because these proceedings are analogous." Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123
Nev. 212 215, 163 P.3d 405, 407 (2007). Summary judgment is proper only iI no genuine
issue oI material Iact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oI law.
NEV. R. CIV P. 56(c); see Wood v. SaIeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029
(2005). The moving party bears the initial burden oI proving there is no genuine issue oI
material Iact. Main v. Stewart, 109 Nev. 721, 726-27, 857 P.2d 755, 758 (1993).
Once the moving party satisIies this burden, however, the burden shiIts to the
nonmoving party to show the existence oI a genuine issue oI material Iact. Id. at 727. While
the pleading and the record must be construed in the light most Iavorable to the nonmoving
party, the party must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
operative Iacts Wood, 121 Nev. at 729. To avoid having summary judgment entered against
it, the party must (page 5) by aIIidavit or otherwise, set Iorth speciIic Iacts demonstrating the
existence oI a genuine issue Ior trial. Id.
Legal Analysis
This Court has reviewed all oI the parties' pleadings and the exhibits attached thereto
This Court also has considered all oI the parties' relevant arguments. AIter this review and
consideration, this Court will not disturb Judge SIerrazza's October 27, 2011 Order granting
summary eviction. This Court Iinds that Order was based on substantial evidence and it was
no clearly erroneous. Thus, this Court concludes Merliss has met his initial buraen of
proving there is no genuine issue of material fact regaraing whether Coughlin was summarily
evictea properly. Consequently, the burden shiIts to Coughlin to show the existence oI a
genuine issue oI material Iact.
Although Coughlin raises several claims and makes numerous allegations in his BrieI
Coughlin fails to present additional facts related to his defenses raised in R1C that
undermine or legitimately call into question the substantial evidence upon which 1udge
Sferrazza relied when he granted summary eviction. This Court gives substantial
deference to the lower court's factual findings in this regard, particularly in light of the
numerous hearings hela before Juage Sferra::a ana Coughlins relatea opportunities to
present eviaence supporting his various aefenses. ThereIore, this Court finds no genuine
issue of material fact exists regarding whether Coughlin was summarily evicted
properly in the lower court. As a result, Coughlin's appeal is DENIED.
It is entirely unclear why Judge Flanagan's Order indicates:

'~Standard of Review On civil appeals Irom justice courts to district courts, a case "must
not be tried anew.' NJCRCP 72(c)... when a review oI JNCRCP 72(c) reveals no such
authority. Rather NJCRCP 72(c) reads: '(c)Content oI the Notice oI Appeal.The notice oI
appeal shall speciIy the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment, order
or part thereoI appealed Irom; and shall name the court to which the appeal is taken.
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Perhaps Judge Flanagan intended to cite to NJCRCP RULE
76A.POWERS OF DISTRICT COURT ON APPEAL. A case appealed
must not be tried anew. Upon an appeal heard upon the record or a statement
oI the case, the district court may review all orders aIIecting the judgment
appealed from and may set aside, or conIirm, or modiIy, any or all oI the
proceedings subsequent to and dependent upon such judgment, and may, iI
necessary or proper, order a new trial. However, it was not a 'judgment that
Coughlin appeal (particulary where Judge SIerrazza ruled that the 10/25/11 date
was not a 'Trial but, rather, a 'continuation oI a summary eviction proceeding
(he made numerous contradictory rulings in that regard, but the the 10/25/11
'Eviction Decision and Order has one title, and the 10/27/11 FOFCOL and
Order oI Summary Eviction certainly indicates NJCRCP 109 did not actually
come into play. Regardless, Baker, Coughlin, and Judge Flanagan all cite to
Anvui in the Order and their BrieIs...and Anvui makes extremely clear that
appeals oI summary eviction are reviewed 'de novo, which means 'tried
anew, so Judge Flanagan's invocation oI some rule holding that civil appeals
Irom justice courts to district courts, a case "must not be tried anew is clearly
erroneous.
507. ReIerences to record Appeal and Error k760 West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law
k1130(.5), (3) Federal Courts k712 Trial Strategy Considering Appeals, 61 Am. Jur. Trials 1,
66 In the Iederal courts, reIerences in brieIs to parts oI the record reproduced in an appendix
must generally be to the pages oI the appendix at which those parts oI the record appear.
|FN1| II the appendix is prepared aIter the brieIs are Iiled, reIerences in the brieIs to the
record must be made by one oI the methods allowed under the Federal Rules.|FN2| If the
case is to be heard on the original record and the record is not consecutively paginated, or
if the brief refers to an unreproduced part of the record, any reference must be to the page
of the original document.| FN3| (NOTE: the ROA oI 12/21/11 Iiled in the 2JDC by the RJC
was not paginated, and Coughlin did cite to the pages oI the original documents, whith their
Iiling dates mentioned therein as well), and given the ROA was apparently in some haphazard
type oI chronological order....) Only clear abbreviations may be used in the reIerences.|FN4|
A claim that is unsubstantiated by a citation to the record showing where the error was
preserved will not be allowed on appeal.|FN5| (Check Baker's 2/24/12 BrieI Ior a multitude
oI material such instances)... The Iailure to include proper citations to the record may result in
the imposition oI sanctions against the oIIending party,|FN6| or even, in rare cases,|FN7|
dismissal oI the appeal.|FN8| 1he court may also disregard asserted facts or arguments that
are not supported by record references.|FN9| Where there is a controversy over the
admissibility oI certain evidence oIIered in the trial court, reIerences must be made to the
pages oI the appendix or transcript at which the evidence was identiIied, oIIered, and received
or rejected.|FN10| References are important, because courts are not obligated to search the
record for error and will consider only a legal argument that is supported by references to
the factual record.|FN11| CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: The Supreme Court does
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not have the obligation to search the recora for substantiation of unsupportea factual matter
appearing in an appellants brief in oraer to aetermine whether a fuagment shoula be
reversea. Alexander v. GEICO Ins. Companies, 47 So. 3d 1225 (Ala. 2010). Wherever a
reIerence to a matter in the appellate record appears in an brieI in the Court oI Appeal, the
reIerence must be supported with a citation to the volume and page number oI the record
where the matter appears. Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 4th 967, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 802 (4th Dist. 2009), review denied, (Sept. 23, 2009). Appellate court could not
consider exhibit attached as appendix to appellate brieI; although document contained in
appendix to deIendant's brieI was discussed at hearing on deIendant's motion Ior new trial,
document was never admitted into evidence or Iiled with court, and was thereIore not
evidence in certiIied record. State v. Smith, 292 S.W.3d 595 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 2009). |END
OF SUPPLEMENT| |FN1| Fed. R. App. P. 28(e). A brieI is deIicient where it notes only the
beginning and ending page numbers oI testimony oI several witnesses. Rebuck v. Vogel, 713
F.2d 484, 37 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 334 (8th Cir. 1983). |FN2| Fed. R. App. P. 28(e), reIerring to
Fed. R. App. P. 30(c). As to alternative methods oI designating the contents oI the appendix,
see 486. |FN3| Fed. R. App. P. 28(e). |FN4| Fed. R. App. P. 28(e). |FN5| Smith v.
Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2006); Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-
Donohue & Associates, Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991). |FN6| L.S.F. Transp., Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 282 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2002); Allianz Ins. Co. v. Gagnon, 109 Nev. 990, 860 P.2d
720 (1993). |FN7| Karl v. Davis, 100 Md. App. 42, 639 A.2d 214 (1994); Symons Corp. v.
Insurance Co. oI North America, 94 N.C. App. 541, 380 S.E.2d 550 (1989). |FN8| Moore v.
F.D.I.C., 993 F.2d 106, 26 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 112 (5th Cir. 1993); Collier v. Avis Rent A Car
System, Inc., 248 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 188 Ill. Dec. 201, 618 N.E.2d 771 (1st Dist. 1993). |FN9|
LansIord v. Harris, 174 Ariz. 413, 850 P.2d 126 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1992); Matter oI Settlement
Ior Personal Injuries oI Konicki, 186 Wis. 2d 140, 519 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. 1994). |FN10|
Fed. R. App. P. 28(e). The Iailure to cite locations in the record where evidentiary errors
occurred at trial results in waiver. Flinn v. State, 563 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. 1990). |FN11| 511.
AMJUR APPELLATE 507
6. ----Costs and attorney Iees, review Upon reversal oI order granting summary
judgment, appellants would be allowed their costs on appeal, on proper Iiling oI a cost bill.
NRCP 56(c); N.R.S. 18.060. Coulter v. Eureka County School Dist., 1975, 535 P.2d 797, 91
Nev. 367. Costs 230 ReIusal to allow attorney Iees under rule making attorney Iees allowable
when it appears to satisIaction oI court that aIIidavits are presented in bad Iaith solely to delay
was discretionary. NRCP 56(g). Arley v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 1964, 388 P.2d 576, 80
Nev. 5. Costs 194.44
21. AIIidavits--In general
When a motion Ior summary judgment is made and properly supported, the non-moving party
may not rest upon general allegations and conclusions, but must, by aIIidavit or otherwise, set
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Iorth speciIic Iacts demonstrating the existence oI a genuine Iactual issue. Wood v. SaIeway,
Inc., 2005, 121 P.3d 1026, 121 Nev. 724. Judgment
185(5); Judgment
185.2(4)
AIIidavits setting Iorth plaintiII's 'belieIs as to deIendant's knowledge oI deIective condition
in real property were not suIIicient to deIeat properly supported motion Ior summary
judgment; aIIidavit must be made on personal knowledge and set Iorth Iacts that would be
admissible into evidence and that show aIIirmatively that aIIiant is competent to testiIy. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 56(e). Coblentz v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union WelIare
Fund, 1996, 925 P.2d 496, 112 Nev. 1161. Judgment
185.1(3)
Opponents oI summary judgment must, by aIIidavit or otherwise, set Iorth speciIic Iacts
demonstrating existence oI genuine issue Ior trial. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c). Posadas v.
City oI Reno, 1993, 851 P.2d 438, 109 Nev. 448. Judgment
185(2); Judgment 185.2(4)
It is not mandatory that all evidence accompanying motion Ior summary judgment be in
aIIidavit Iorm. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(e). Chambers by Cochran v. Sanderson, 1991, 822
P.2d 657, 107 Nev. 846. Judgment
185(1)
When motion Ior summary judgment is made and supported by evidence and aIIidavits, an
adverse party may not rest on mere allegations and denials oI its pleading, but must set Iorth
speciIic Iacts showing that there is genuine issue Ior trial. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(e).
Ferreira v. P.C.H. Inc., 1989, 774 P.2d 1041, 105 Nev. 305. Judgment
185.2(1); Judgment 185.2(4)
Court must accept as true all allegations in aIIidavits Iavorable to party against whom
summary judgment is entered and accord to that party all Iavorable intendments to which he
is entitled, but aIIidavits must raise genuine issue oI material Iact in order to Iorestall granting
oI summary judgment. NRCP 56(c). Polk v. MacMillan, 1971, 490 P.2d 218, 87 Nev. 526.
Judgment
185.2(5); Judgment
186
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22. ----Attachments, aIIidavits
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Rule providing that sworn or certiIied copies oI all papers reIerred to in aIIidavit on motion
Ior summary judgment shall be attached thereto or served therewith is mandatory, and
district court's reliance upon aIIidavit which does not comply with rule may constitute
reversible error. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(e). Havas v. Hughes Estate, 1982, 643 P.2d 1220,
98 Nev. 172. Appeal And Error
1073(1); Judgment
185.1(3)
23. ----Opposing aIIidavits
PlaintiII arrestee did not Iail to provide, in response to deIendant State's motion Ior summary
judgment, documentation setting Iorth speciIic Iacts oI genuine triable issue which would
preclude summary judgment Ior State on arrestee's claims oI malicious prosecution, Ialse
arrest, and Ialse imprisonment relating to his arrest Ior trespassing outside oI Supreme Court
building, though arrestee's documentation was not by aIIidavit, where arrestee had attached
police reports to his complaint, and he later submitted letter Irom Administrator oI State
Buildings and Grounds Division stating that Supreme Court building's grounds were
continuously open to the public. Jordan v. State ex rel. Dept. oI Motor Vehicles and Public
SaIety, 2005, 110 P.3d 30, 121 Nev. 44, rehearing denied. Judgment
185.2(9); Judgment
185.3(21)
A deIendant's aIIidavit opposing motion Ior summary judgment was not suIIicient to support
his denial oI liability Ior hotel bill where such aIIidavit, which stated that the bill 'went
beyond the agreed upon terms and was not supposed to cover anything but the room rent, did
not indicate that deIendant had any personal knowledge oI agreement or the bill or that he
would be competent to testiIy to it. NRCP 56(e). Saka v. Sahara-Nevada Corp., 1976, 558
P.2d 535, 92 Nev. 703. Judgment
185.3(8)
AIIidavit oIIered by plaintiII in opposition to motion Ior summary judgment in malicious
prosecution action, which stated that police oIIicer was extremely Iriendly to third party and
investigated certain incident Ior purpose oI exonerating gambling club Irom liability, was a
conclusion without Iactual support in the record and would not be admissible at trial and was
equally ineIIective Ior purpose oI deIeating the motion Ior summary judgment. NRCP 56(e).
Catrone v. 105 Casino Corp., 1966, 414 P.2d 106, 82 Nev. 166. Judgment
185.3(21)
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Where allegations made by plaintiII in his aIIidavit opposing deIendants' motion Ior summary
judgment in malicious prosecution action could not be the subject oI his testimony at trial
unless Ioundation as to competency could Iirst be established, which Ioundation was lacking
in the record, the aIIidavit was ineIIectual Ior purpose oI creating a genuine Iact issue as to
whether deIendants induced or procured police to criminally prosecute plaintiII, so that court
correctly granted deIendants' motion Ior summary judgment. NRCP 56(e). Catrone v. 105
Casino Corp., 1966, 414 P.2d 106, 82 Nev. 166. Judgment
185.3(21)
24. ----ConIlicts, aIIidavits
Genuine issue oI material Iact within intendment oI statute governing summary judgments
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may not be created by conIlicting sworn statements oI the party against whom summary
judgment was entered, and it is permissible Ior court deciding summary judgment motion to
preIer one statement over the other. NRCP 56. Bank oI Las Vegas v. Hoopes, 1968, 445 P.2d
937, 84 Nev. 585. Judgment
185(6); Judgment
186
ConIlicting statements oI bank's vice-president consisting oI an acknowledged satisIaction oI
debt and subsequent aIIidavit stating that debt was not paid, did not create a genuine issue oI
material Iact precluding summary judgment against bank in its action to recover amount
allegedly due upon installment note secured by chattel mortgage. NRCP 56. Bank oI Las
Vegas
v. Hoopes, 1968, 445 P.2d 937, 84 Nev. 585. Judgment
185.3(16)
That there was colorable conIlict in plaintiII's aIIidavits did not require trial court to
determine that there was issue oI material Iact as to date on which party discovered alleged
Iraud so as to bar summary judgment on limitation issue. NRCP 56. Aldabe v. Adams, 1965,
402 P.2d 34, 81 Nev. 280. Judgment
185.3(21)
25. ----SuIIiciency, aIIidavits
Gynecologist's aIIidavit in support oI his motion Ior summary judgment in medical
malpractice action, which stated that he perIormed according to standard oI practice, learning,
and skill ordinarily practiced by medical petitioners in community, was insuIIicient to
adequately address allegations in patient's complaint, especially where aIIidavit did not deny
he incised patient's bladder but instead stated conclusion that his perIormance conIormed to
applicable standard oI care. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(e). Clauson v. Lloyd, 1987, 743 P.2d
631, 103 Nev.
432. Judgment
185.1(4)
As debtor's aIIidavit in opposition to the summary judgment motion oI bank and bank oIIicers
Iailed to show that the debtor could produce the requisite quantum oI evidence to enable him
to reach the jury with his claims oI disparagement, intentional interIerence with prospective
economic advantage and contractual relation, and chilling Ioreclosure sale, summary
judgment was properly granted deIendants as to those claims, even though they turned on the
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bank oIIicers' state oI mind. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56. Collins v. Union Federal Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 1983, 662 P.2d 610, 99 Nev. 284. Judgment
185.3(5)
AIIidavit oI president oI deIendant corporation to which was attached an authenticated
invoice pertaining to a three-bedroom mobile home allegedly delivered to plaintiII purchasers
did not comply with Rule 56(e) concurring summary judgments and aIIidavit was otherwise
inadequate in that it was conclusory rather than Iactual and did not reIlect that president had
personal knowledge oI transaction with purchasers and was competent to testiIy regarding it.
NRCP 56(e). Gunlord Corp. v. Bozzano, 1979, 591 P.2d 1149, 95 Nev. 243. Judgment
185.3(18)
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In action in which Iormer employee sought to collect beneIits allegedly due him under
pension trust and retirement plan and in which employer was granted summary judgment,
employee's aIIidavit had not suIIiciently created a material dispute oI Iact in regard to whether
employer constructively terminated employee's employment and thereby prohibited
employee's compliance with requirement that employee be employed at qualiIication date in
order to be eligible Ior beneIits under plan. NRCP 56(e). Marcinko v. Harrah's Club, 1978,
575 P.2d 586, 94 Nev. 81. Judgment
185.3(13)
It is not suIIicient, in regard to summary judgment, that pleadings be supported by aIIidavits
alleging speciIic Iacts; such Iacts must be made on the aIIiant's personal knowledge and there
must be an aIIirmative showing oI his competency to testiIy to them. NRCP 56(e). Saka v.
Sahara-Nevada Corp., 1976, 558 P.2d 535, 92 Nev. 703. Judgment
185.1(2); Judgment
185.1(3)
AIIidavit oI insurance company's vice-president which did not show that he was custodian oI
any company records and competent to lay Ioundation oI introduction oI policy in issue or
any other document or that he was to testiIy to any oI the aIIidavit's other recitals and which
did not have attached thereto copy oI policy in issue was not suIIicient to support grant oI
summary judgment in action by owner-beneIiciary to recover under liIe policy. NRCP 56(e).
Daugherty v. Wabash LiIe Ins. Co., 1971, 482 P.2d 814, 87 Nev. 32. Judgment
185.3(12)
AIIidavits presented genuine issue oI Iact as to amounts owing precluding summary judgment
in an action brought to collect certain debts. NRCP 56(e). Brooks Rent-A-Car Co. v. Allied
Credit Bureau, Inc., 1967, 423 P.2d 883, 83 Nev. 119. Judgment
185.3(3)
In action by doctor against other doctors Ior libelous deIamation oI character arising out oI
alleged participation in publication oI his suspension by board oI trustees as member oI
medical staII oI hospital, aIIidavit in opposition to deIendants' motion Ior summary judgment
was insuIIicient to raise a genuine issue as to deIendants' participation and motion Ior
summary judgment was properly granted. Rules oI Civil Procedure, rule 56. Lockitch v.
Boyer, 1958, 321 P.2d 254, 74 Nev. 36. Judgment
185.3(21)
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26. ----Conclusory aIIidavits
PlaintiII's conclusory allegation's that he has proven his case as matter oI law and that
deIendant does not have evidence to win at trial are insuIIicient to warrant grant oI summary
judgment. Germaine Music v. Universal Songs oI Polygram, 2003, 275 F.Supp.2d 1288,
aIIirmed in part 130 Fed.Appx. 153, 2005 WL 1022110. Federal Civil Procedure
2546
Conclusory statements along with general allegations do not create issue oI Iact Ior summary
judgment purposes. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c). Yeager v. Harrah's Club, Inc., 1995, 897
P.2d 1093, 111 Nev. 830. Judgment
181(11)
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Alleged Iailure oI plaintiII to submit interrogatory answers
which were based on personal knowledge and which set Iorth
Iacts as would be admissible in evidence, and plaintiII's Iailure
to respond in additional time to reply to summary judgment
motion by way oI aIIidavit other than by requesting more time
to contact 'several important witnesses, was insuIIicient oIIer
to avoid entry oI summary judgment. NCRP 56(e). Hickman v.
Meadow Wood Reno, 1980, 617 P.2d 871, 96 Nev. 782.
Judgment
185.2(9)
AIIidavit oI employee oI deIendant corporation was deIicient Ior summary judgment
purposes as being conclusory and not Iounded upon personal knowledge, where employee, in
attempt to controvert statement that mobile home had been deIective in many respects, stated
that two unnamed persons had examined home and Iound deIects to be minor in character but
aIIidavits oI those two persons had not been obtained. NRCP 56(e). Gunlord Corp. v.
Bozzano, 1979, 591 P.2d 1149, 95 Nev. 243. Judgment
185.3(18)
PlaintiIIs, who in action Ior wrongIul death oI pedestrians oIIered nothing more than mere
allegations oI their complaint to support their position that deIendant county under a
preexisting agreement with state had a duty to maintain adequate lighting at intersection
where accident occurred and that county Iailed to do so, made showing that was insuIIicient
to withstand county's motion Ior summary judgment that was predicated on aIIidavit oI
county director oI public works which in essence negated any Iactual basis Ior liability on part
oI the county. NRCP 10(a), 56(e). Garvey v. Clark County, 1975, 532 P.2d 269, 91 Nev. 127.
Judgment 185.3(21)
Subcontractor's conclusory aIIidavit which was to eIIect that labor had been perIormed and
materials Iurnished Ior stipulated price pursuant to agreement with owner suing to challenge
correctness oI subcontractor's claim and which did not state essential terms oI the agreement
was insuIIicient to create issue oI material Iact as to whether subcontractor had overcharged
owner as Iound by special master whose report concerned quantum meruit, Ior summary
judgment purposes. NRCP 56(e). Bond v. Stardust, Inc., 1966, 410 P.2d 472, 82 Nev. 47.
Judgment
185.3(8)
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27. ----Bad Iaith aIIidavits
Where, in action Ior unjust enrichment, plaintiII Iailed to Iile either aIIidavits, pleadings or
other papers alleging bad Iaith on the part oI deIendant, trial court properly entered summary
judgment upholding Iinality oI payment oI check by plaintiII bank despite contention raised
on appeal that issue oI Iact existed relating to alleged bad Iaith oI deIendant payee. NRCP 56,
56(e); N.R.S. 104.3418. Exchange Bank v. Strout Realty, 1978, 575 P.2d 589, 94 Nev. 86.
Judgment
185.2(9)
In absence oI Iraud, malice or wantonness, where there were no Iindings that any oI aIIidavits
presented by city and power company were given in bad Iaith or solely Ior purpose oI delay in
taxpayers' suit to enjoin city and power company Irom placing power lines above ground in
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violation oI ordinance, and where neither damages nor attorney Iees as damages were
awarded, award oI attorney Iees to taxpayers' attorney was unauthorized. NRCP 56(g); N.R.S.
18.010, subd. 3(a). City oI Las Vegas v. Cragin Industries, Inc., 1970, 478 P.2d 585, 86 Nev.
933. Municipal Corporations
1000(7)
As to Paragraph 23 and 28 oI the lease issues vis a vis landscapers and Dickson's
quasi-property manager Sharpe per NRS 118A.510, 118A.390 issues:
Material issue oI Iact as to whether there was an agency relationship between tractor-trailer
owner and driver, who drove the pilot vehicle Ior tractor-trailer and allegedly caused accident,
precluded grant oI summary judgment to tractor-trailer owner on negligence claim brought by
passenger, who was injured when her car rolled over allegedly as result oI conduct oI driver
Ior the pilot vehicle Ior tractor-trailer. Zea v. Premier Transp. & Warehousing, Inc., 2008, 238
P.3d 868, 2008 WL 6124730, Unreported. Judgment
181(33)
In his 2/24/12 Answering BrieI, Baker writes: 'RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING
BRIEF
Respondent, MATT MERLISS ("MERLISS"), by and through his counsel, RICHARD
G. HILL, LTD. and CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ., submits his Answering BrieI.
I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES: The only issue in this appeal is whether the
Reno Justice Court erred in granting a summary eviction oI appellant, ZACHARY
COUGHLIN ("COUGHLIN") by its Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law, and Order Ior
Summary Eviction ("FFCL&O") dated December 27, 2012. See Record on Appeal ("ROA")
at Vol. II, pp. 75-80. EXHIBIT 1 hereto.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: Although Coughlin has muddied the record to a
spectacular degree with his abusive Iilings, at its core, this is a simple no-cause residential
summary eviction case. The pertinent Iacts are as Iollows:
The underlying Iacts oI the eviction are set Iorth in the FFCL&O. The statutory notices
and other documentary evidence the court relied on in making its Iindings oI Iact can be
Iound at ROA, Vol. V, pp. 85-89; 90-94; 95-109; 113-128. EXHIBITS 2, 3, 4 and 5 hereto.
The Standard Rental Agreement ("LEASE") Ior the home at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada
(the "PROPERTY") can be Iound at ROA, Vol. V, pp 129-132. EXHIBIT 6 hereto. Those
Iacts were established during two evidentiary hearings, in which Coughlin Iully participated.
The Iirst hearing was on October 13, 2011, and lasted 90 minutes. A continuation oI that
hearing occurred on October 25, 2011, and lasted several hours. l See FFCL&O at 1. The
purpose of those hearings was to "determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of the
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tenant's and the landlord's affidavits," to determine whether there is any "legal defense
as to the alleged unlawful detainer," and whether "the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul
detainer".2 NRS 40.253(6). FFCL&O at 4, Para. 3. Those hearings were Coughlin's
opportunity to substantiate, by competent evidence, any legal deIense he may have had to the
eviction.
The only deIenses raised by Coughlin below were based on what he claimed was
"retaliatory" conduct by Merliss, and "habitability" issues at the property. Both deIenses were
based on provisions oI NRS Chapter 118A.3 See FFCL&O at 3, Para. 9 et seq. See, also,
ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266; ROA, Vol. V, pp. 194-198. At the Iirst hearing, Coughlin alleged
his deIenses, but did not oIIer any evidence to support them. Judge SIerrazza could have
granted an eviction aIter that hearing, but chose instead to allow Coughlin another
opportunity to substantiate his allegations.4 NRS 40.253(6). Since Coughlin's deIenses
were based on alleged "habitability" issues, the court required him to deposit, pursuant to
NRS 40.355(5), the amount of rent Coughlin claimed he had withheld for those reasons
(AO1E: it is completely dishonest for Baker to assert that Couglin ever claimed he
withheld any rent "for those reasons" where such "reasons" would be an applciation of
ARS 118A.355(1)(d), as Coughlin made completely clear that he was not pursuing any
defense based thereon, but rather defenses involving ARS 118A.3, his rights to withhold
rent pursuant to the lease (see Paragraph 28), agreements with Merliss (see Merliss's
/2/11 email "get two estimates and deduct the cheaper one from the rent..." etc., and
Merliss's admissions as to excusing Coughlin from any liability for that which he assented
to hold Ulloa liable for (another thing that Merliss's testimony was less than truthfull about
on 1/25/11...check if ROA has email from Merliss where he admits to deal with Ulloa,
then compare to transcript's statement thereon by Merliss)., beIore he would be allowed to
substantiate them with evidence.5 ROA, Vol.l, p. 153. Coughlin ultimately failed to raise
any material factual dispute, and the court properly granted the eviction. The lockout was
perIormed on November 1, 2011. Coughlin Iiled his Iirst notice oI appeal on November 3,
2011.6 ROA Vol. III, pp. 229-233. On November 13,2011, Coughlin was Iound living in the
basement oI the property, and was arrested.7 ROA, Vol. III, pp. 18-33. Coughlin continues to
Iile additional papers in both courts, wherein he attempts to raise new arguments he never
raised below. (NOTE: where is the required cite to the record? What about all the Schuck
"not required to wade through?"...Is there really "wading" in conducting a "de novo review"
oI a summary eviction proceeding...really? By deIinition such a "summary proceedings"
ROA should not involved much oI any possibility oI "wading".).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "|A|n order granting summary eviction under NRS
40.253(6) should be reviewed on appeal based upon the standard Ior review oI an order
granting summary judgment under NRCP 56 because these proceedings are analogous.,,8
Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212, 215,163 P.3d 405 (2007). "To successfully
defend against a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must transcend the
pleadings and, by affidavit or other admissible evidence , introduce specific facts that show
a genuine issue of material fact . 9 Torrealba v. Kesmitis, 124 Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716 (2008).
'"A case appealed must not be tried a new."10 NJCRCP 76A. Further, "a |lower
court's| Iindings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous ana are not
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basea on substantial eviaence."11 Gibellini v. Klindt, 110 Nev. 1201, 1204, 885 P.2d 540
(1994) (emphasis added). "The notice oI appeal shall speciIy the party or parties taking the
appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or part thereoI appealed Irom ...,,12 NJCRCP
72(c). "Only those parts oI the judgment which are included in the notice oI appeal will be
considered by the appellate Court.,,13 Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Bibb, 76 Nev. 332, 335, 353
P.2d 458 (1960).
IV. ARGUMENT: Despite having Iiled more than 50 pages in two brieIs, Coughlin
Iails to articulate or coherently analyze what he claims to be errors by the justice court. 14
Please see Merliss' counter-motion to strike excess pages, Iiled herein on February 9, 2012. II
the court is going to consider anything beyond the Iirst Iive pages Iiled by Coughlin, Merliss
speciIically requests leave to Iile a supplemental brieI to meet those arguments. He does not
make so much as a single citation to the ROA, and his Iailure in this regard is sanctionable.15
See NRAP 28(a)(8) and (e). See also, Weddell v. Stewart, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 58,261 P.3d
1080, 1084 (Sept. 29,2011) (" ...it is imperative that the parties Iollow the applicable
procedural rules and that they comply in a timely Iashion with |the court's| directives."); and
Smith v. Emery, 109 Nev. 737, 743, 856 P.2d 1386 (1993). The Court and Merliss are
unIairly leIt to speculate as to the bases Ior his appeal. 16 CI., Schuck v. Signature Flight
Support oINevada, Inc., 126 Nev. (Adv.Op. 42),245 P.3d 542,544-545 (Nov. 4, 2010) (the
court is "not obligated to wade through and search the entire record Ior some speciIic Iacts
which might support the nonmoving party's claim.") CI., NJCRCP 74(b). The incoherency oI
Coughlin's brieIs makes that task nearly impossible. This diIIiculty is compounded by
Coughlin's reIusal to pay Ior a transcript oI the proceedings below. 17CI., NJCRCP 74(b). On
or about February 8, 2012, Coughlin attempted to supplement his opening brieI with a CD
that supposedly contained the audio recordings oI the hearings below. Not only was this an
improper attempt by Coughlin to circumvent the record on appeal, the CD delivered to the
undersigned's oIIice was so badly damaged, that it would not be opened, even by counsel's IT
proIessional. Because oI Coughlin's transgressions, Merliss has been deprived oI the ability to
accurately cite to the hearing below. As best Merliss can tell, Coughlin alleges the Iollowing
errors:
1. 1udge Sferrazza mistakenly called the October 25, 2012 hearing a "trial" and
required Coughlin to deposit the withheld rent with the court
Summary eviction hearings are conducted pursuant to NRS 40.253(6). "Formal"
eviction proceedings are conducted pursuant to NRS 40.290 through NRS 40.420. "Formal"
eviction proceedings contemplate the Iiling oI a complaint, an answer, conducting discovery,
and a Iormal "trial.,,18 Id. They can include claims Ior damages by both sides. "Formal"
evictions can either be initiated by the landlord in the Iirst instance, or, where a summary
eviction has been commenced, and the tenant establishes a legal deIense at the hearing, the
court must then order the parties to proceed under those statutes.19 See NRS 40.253(6).
When Judge SIerrazza continued the October 13, 2011 hearing, he misspoke and called
the second hearing a "trial." That same word, "trial," was entered into the court's order.20
ROA, Vol. I, p. 153. Coughlin has seized upon the word "trial" to argue that he should have
been aIIorded some Iurther procedural protections oI the "Iormal" eviction proceedings
(mainly, delay). This argument is nonsense.21 See, NJCRCP 104 ("Prior to the holding oI a
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hearing Ior summary eviction, the justice shall determine the method oI service oI notice oI
the hearing on both parties."). The only way the court could have ordered the parties to
proceed with a "Iormal" eviction is iI it Iound that Coughlin had raised a legal deIense to the
summary eviction.22 NRS 40.253(6). Here, it Iound the opposite.
In ruling Irom the bench, the court explained more than once that the purpose oI the
October 25, 2011 proceeding was to allow Coughlin another opportunity to substantiate the
deIenses he had alleged at the Iirst hearing, because he had not yet done so.23 Coughlin's
unexplained and unexcused reIusal to pay Ior a transcript makes it impossible to cite Judge
SIerrazza's statements with precision. The court's order reIlects this, in that it required
Coughlin to deposit the withheld rent iI he (Coughlin) wished to have another opportunity to
prove up his habitability deIenses. II he Iailed to post the rent, the eviction would be granted,
because he had not established a legal deIense as required by NRS 40.253(6). The court's
inadvertent use oI the word "trial" did not somehow take the case out oI the summary
proceedings, nor could it have, and any argument that it did exalts Iorm over substance and
ignores the clear purpose oI the order. 24 Accord, Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 427,
996 P.2d 416 (2000) (the important inquiry is on "what the order or judgment actually does,
not on what it is called.")(emphasis in original). Coughlin knew the October 25, 2011 hearing
was merely a continuation oI the Iirst hearing. He knew that there had not been any Iormal
complaint Iiled. There is not one in the record. He recognized, and argued repeatedly, that all
he had to do to deIeat the summary eviction was establish a material Iactual dispute Ior trial.
In Iact, he argues as much in the "statement oI Iacts and law" he purports to incorporate in his
Iirst notice oI appeal.25 ROA, Vol. III, pp. 230-233. Coughlin did not explain how he could
have possibly been prejudiced by the court's misstatement, so it is oI no consequence.
As to the rent deposit, NRS 118A.355 speciIically provides that "|a| tenant does not
have a deIense to an eviction under paragraph (d) oI subsection 1 unless the tenant has
deposited the withheld rent into an escrow account pursuant to this subsection." Coughlin was
attempting to set up a deIense based on "habitability".26 NRS 118A.355(l)(d). ROA, Vol. I,
pp. 238-266. He had withheld rent in the process, while purporting to invoke that statute.27
Id. Even though the eviction proceeding was Ior "no-cause," and not expressly based on
Coughlin's Iailure to pay rent, the court was correct to require him to deposit what he claimed
he had withheld, in order to proceed with his deIense. The statute is plain on its Iace, and
makes logical sense, as well. II Coughlin did not have the rent, and Iailed to prove his case,
the court has, in eIIect, improperly enjoined the landlord's use oI his property. In any event,
the October 13, 2011 order was not an appealable order under NJCRCP 72A. For that reason,
it is not properly at issue here. It is also moot, since the court eventually returned Coughlin's
deposit to him, as discussed Iurther, below.
2. Not finding any ambiguity in the lease regarding "weeds"
One "habitability" item alleged by Coughlin was that weeds were growing in the yard.
The court Iound that maintenance oI the surrounding grounds, including any weeds, were
Coughlin's responsibility under paragraph 22 oI the Lease. 28 See FFLC&O at Para.11-11.1.
That paragraph provides in part that "Tenant will irrigate and maintain any surrounding
grounds, including lawns and shrubbery, iI they are Ior the Tenant's exclusive use." 29
EXHIBIT 6 at 2, Para 22. It is undisputed that the yard at the property was Ior Coughlin's
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exclusive use. The Lease is unambiguous, and the court's Iinding was correct. Moreover,
"weeds" do not constitute a "habitability" issue under NRS 118A.290, in any event, and
Coughlin never presented any evidence that they did, or that he complied with the statutory
protocol Ior withholding, or had any right to withhold, any rent Ior that, or any other alleged
"habitability" issue.30 FFCL&O at Para.12-12.l.
3. Granting a no-cause summary eviction against a "commercial" tenant
Coughlin now argues that he was a "commercial" tenant, and thereIore not subject to
summary eviction. He Iirst raised this argument in his "opposition to motion Ior order to show
cause," which he Iiled on December 5, 2011, six weeks aIter the eviction was granted.31
ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 253-261. Merliss addressed it in his reply Iiled the Iollowing day. 32 See,
"Supplemental Justice Court Appeal Proceedings," at 2, Iiled herein on January 4, 2012.
Merliss' reply is identiIied as item number 4. For reasons unknown, copies oI those
documents were not made available to Merliss through the court's electronic Iiling system.
First, Coughlin has the law wrong. Summary evictions are available against a tenant oI any
property that is subject to NRS Chapter 118A, which Merliss' property unquestionably was.
33 NRS 40.254. Second, Coughlin aIIirmatively waived any argument that NRS Chapter
l18A does not apply by basing his entire deIense (retaliation/habitability) on what he alleged
were violations oI that chapter. 34 See FFCL&O beginning at ,9. See, also, ROA, Vol. I, pp.
238-266. Moreover, because the court adopted Coughlin's position and ruled on that basis, he
is judicially estopped Irom changing his theory now. 35 Marcuse v. Del Webb Communities,
123Nev. 278, 163 P.3d 462 (2007). Additionally, since Coughlin never timely raised the
argument below, it cannot Iorm the basis Ior any relieI on appeal.36 Schuck. The lower court
recognized as much at the December 20,2011 hearing on Coughlin's motion to contest
personal property lien. For that hearing, Merliss had subpoenaed Darlene Sharpe, the real
estate agent who had Iacilitated the rental oI the property to Coughlin, to testiIy in the event
the court was going to allow Coughlin to belatedly argue this issue. ROA, Vol. VI, p.183. At
that hearing, Judge SIerrazza appropriately recognized that Coughlin was improperly
attempting to relitigate the eviction based on previously unraised arguments, and did not let
the parties address or present any evidence on the matter. Ms. Sharpe was prepared to testiIy
that (1) Coughlin never mentioned that he was an attorney, or that he had either a "law
practice" or a "mattress business," (2) that Coughlin had represented himselI on his rental
application as a "selI-employed researcher," and (3) that Coughlin had surreptitiously altered
the lease to allow Ior "commercial" use oI the property. See, Reply in Support oI Motion Ior
Order to Show Cause, identiIied as item number 4 in the Supplemental Justice Court Appeal
Proceedings, Iiled herein on January 4, 2012. In any event, Coughlin has not cited to
anywhere in the ROA that would support this new argument, and neither this Court nor the
court below are or were obligated to siIt through the record in search oI some Iact which
might support his claim.37 Schuck. Finally, even iI Coughlin were running one or more
unlicensed businesses out oIt he property, he does not explain how that would take this matter
out oI NRS Chapter l18A.
4. Not holding a hearing on Coughlin's motion to contest personal property lien
within 10 days
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The FFCL&O was entered on October 27, 2011. Coughlin's Iirst notice oI appeal was
Iiled on November 3,2011. Coughlin Iiled his Iirst motion to contest persona| property lien on
November 16,2011.38 ROA, Vol. III, pp. 153-160. NRS 40.253(8) provides that a hearing on
that motion must be set within 10 days aIter the motion is Iiled. However, Coughlin reIused to
cooperate with court staII to set the hearing he requested, so it did not take place within 10
days.39 ROA, Vol. IV, pp.2, 22-23. Then, on November 23, 2011, Coughlin inexplicably
Iiled another notice oI appeal.40 ROA, Vol. III, p. 5. What is important Ior this court's
purposes is that neither notice oI appeal identiIies any perceived error regarding the court's
procedure in setting a hearing on that collateral matter. Nor is such an "issue" appealable
under NJCRCP 72A. As such, this "issue" is inappropriate Ior the court's consideration
here.41 Reno Newspapers, Inc.
5. Not granting Coughlin a stay
Coughlin was granted in Iorma pauperis ("IFP") status by the Reno Justice Court on
October 6, 2011.42 ROA, Vol. I, pp. 274-275. IFP status only applies to the trial level oI
litigation, not to appeals. 43 NRS 12:015. Casper v. Huber, 85 Nev. 474, 456 P.2d 436
(1969). Accordingly, iI he wished to stay the enIorcement oI the FFCL&O and stop the
lockout, he was required to post a supersedeas bond, and obtain an order granting a stay,
beIore the lockout occurred.
As to the bond requirement, since this case was not a "Iormal" eviction, NJCRCP
73A(a)(1)(4) do not apply. Instead, this case Ialls under the "catchall" provision at the end oI
subsection (a) oI that Rule, which provides in pertinent part "In cases not provided Ior in (1),
(2), (3) or (4) above, the giving oI an appeal bond, under the provisions oI Rule 73, shall stay
proceedings in the court below upon the judgment or order appealed Irom ... except where
the appellate court may otherwise direct upon such terms as it may in its discretion
impose.,,44 NJCRCP 73A(a). NJCRCP 73 provides that "The bond or equivalent security
shall be in the sum or value oI $250 unless the justice court Iixes a diIIerent amount."
(Emphasis added). NRS 40.385(1) provides that a stay may be obtained by posting a bond in
the amount oI $250.00 with the trial court.
Coughlin deposited $2,275 with the court pursuant to NRS 118A.355 and the court's
order oI October 13,2011. He orally moved the court Ior a stay oI the eviction at the end oI
the October 25, 2011 hearing, but did not cite any authority Ior his request. Accordingly, that
motion was denied.45 ROA, Vol. II, pp. 85,2. Thus, although the court ordered that
Coughlin's deposit would serve as his appeal bond, it denied a stay because Coughlin did not
provide the court with any basis to grant one, as was his legal responsibility. Then, at
Coughlin's speciIic request, the court held an emergency hearing on November 7, 2011, where
it amended the FFCL&O and returned all sums on deposit to Coughlin, as he was clamoring.
The court then set the supersedeas bond at $2,700.00, as it was entitled to do.46 ROA, Vol III,
pp. 218-219; Vol. II, pp. 4,27. Coughlin now argues that he should have been granted a stay
oI the eviction because he had Iunds on deposit with the court at the time oI the lockout. Even
iI he would have been entitled to that relieI, that position is inconsistent with his prior
demands that all oI his deposit be returned to him, and he is judicially estopped Irom arguing
it now.47Marcuse. II Coughlin wanted to apply those Iunds to a super-sedeas bond under
JCRCP 73A or NRS 40.385, he should have either made that request at the October 25, 2011
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hearing when the eviction was announced, or sometime between that hearing and the lockout
a week later. He never did so. In Iact, he did just the opposite. When Coughlin Iiled his
"motion Ior stay' 48 (ROA, Vol. II, p. 3.) on October 31,2011, in which he demanded his
deposit back 49 (ROA, Vol. II, pp. 4, 27), the lockout had not even occurred. That conIirms
that Coughlin had no intention oI posting a bond. or applying those Iunds in order to obtain a
stay. He cannot be heard to argue otherwise now. Then, aIter he received his deposit back, he
did not deposit any additional Iunds with the court until on or about December 8, 2011 when
he Iinally paid the Iiling Iee to perIect his appeal. ThereaIter, on December 14, 2011, he
posted $250.00 Ior his appeal bond, and $1.00 Ior his "supersedeas bond" (which sums he has
subsequently moved to have returned to him).50 ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 210-211.By then, his
request Ior a stay had been moot Ior approximately six weeks.
6. Sheriff's removal oftenant "within 24 hours of receipt of the Order."
Coughlin tries to imply some sort oI wrongdoing in relation to the lockout in this case
on page 1 oI his second opening brieI. But he does not inIorm the court to which "order" he is
reIerring that provided Ior a lockout "within 24 hours," or what, exactly, his argument is. 51
CI., Schuck. In this case, the court announced the eviction at the hearing on October 25,
2011.52 ROA, Vol. II, p. 85. That eviction was not eIIective until aIter 5:00 p.m. on October
31, 2011, six days later. This was conIirmed in the FFCL&O signed by the court on October
27, 2011. Coughlin was locked out on November 1, 2011. This "argument" is Irivolous,
unsupported, nonsensical and cannot Iorm the basis Ior any relieI here.
7. The trial Court's Application of NRS 118A.490
Coughlin complains that it was reversible error Ior the "trial court" to apply NRS 118A.490.
He does not cite to anywhere in the ROA to support his allegation that that statute was ever
applied by the court.53 CI., Schuck. In Iact, it never was. The justice court applied NRS
118A.355(5). This "argument" is oI no moment.
8. The Security Deposit.
Coughlin alleges that Merliss has not returned or accounted Ior the security deposit under the
Lease. He has not cited to anywhere in the ROA to substantiate that allegation. 54 CI.,
Schuck. He does not explain how the security deposit has anything to do with the underlying
no-cause eviction, or how the lower court erred in relation to it.55 CI., Gibellini. Coughlin
wants to discuss what he thinks is a claim Ior damages, but neither this Court nor the court
below have or had jurisdiction to even consider the matter. 56 NJCRCP 76A, Reno
Newspaper, Inc.; NRS
V. CONCLUSION: Despite two opportunities to do so, Coughlin Iailed to meet his
burden below to introduce, by aIIidavit or other admissible evidence, speciIic Iacts that show
a genuine issue oI material Iact. As such, the justice court properly granted the summary
eviction based on the evidence beIore it; namely, the Lease, the statutory notices served by
Merliss, and the testimony adduced at the hearings. Coughlin has not met his burden here to
show that any oI the court's Iindings were clearly erroneous and not based on substantial
evidence. The "arguments" he presents in his brieIs are nonsensical, and,. Ior the most part,
untimely, not properly preserved or beIore this court, and derived Irom unappealable activity
below. None oI Coughlin's arguments are supported by any citation to the record. As such, he
has not given this court any evidentiary or legal basis to overturn any ruling by the lower
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court. What Coughlin really wants to do is relitigate the case here, which is not permitted.
Coughlin is not entitled to any relieI, and his appeal must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, Merliss prays that Coughlin take nothing by way oI his appeal; that
same be dismissed in its entirety; and that the judgment oI the lower court, including its order
oI December 27, 2011, be aIIirmed; that Merliss be awarded his fees and costs of this appeal
in accordance with ARS 9.5; that Coughlin be held in contempt oI court as prayed Ior in
Merliss' motion Ior order to show cause, Iiled herein on January 20, 2012; and Ior such other,
Iurther and additional relieI as seems just to the court in the premises. /s/ Casey D. Baker
2/24/12
Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order denying Coughlin's appeal, amongst other things, in 03628
reads:
'ORDER
This case is an appeal Irom Reno Justice Court ("RJC") and involves the summary
eviction oI a tenant, PlaintiII ZACHARY COUGHLIN ("Coughlin"), under NRS Chapter 40.
Currently beIore this Court are three matters, all oI which have been Iully brieIed and
submitted Ior decision.
The Iirst matter beIore this Court is Coughlin's Motion under NRCP 52(b) and NRCP
59 to Alter or Amend the Order Denying Motion to Prevent Disposal oI Personal Property.
The second matter is DeIendant MATTHEW MERLISS's ("Merliss") Motion Ior Leave to
File Answering BrieI in Excess oI Five Pages. The third and Iinal matter is the parties'
Appellate BrieIs, including Coughlin's Opening BrieI and Merliss's Answering BrieI. This
Court will address each oI these matters in turn. Fn1 (In1: The parties are Iamiliar with the
Iacts and procedural history oI this case. Thus, this Court will recite neither the Iacts nor
procedural history unless doing so is necessary to this Court's determination.) (page 1)
NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59
The object oI Coughlin's Motion Iiled on January 30, 2012 appears to be this Court'
Order dated January 11, 2012. In that Order, this Court denied Coughlin's emergency request
Ior a temporary restraining order. Coughlin made the request aIter Judge SIerrazza oI RJ
entered an Order on December 21, 2011, in which he ordered: (1) Coughlin to pay $480.00 to
Merliss Ior storage oI his personal property between November 1,2011 and November
16,2011; and (2) Coughlin shall have access to the premises Irom 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
December 22, 2011 and December 23, 2011 to remove his personal property. Coughlin
claims this Court's January 11, 2012 Order "is clearly inaccurate to the extent it purports to
Iind that the undersigned made any agreement to waive his security deposit in exchange Ior
additional access to the property." (PI. Mot. at p. 12.) In addition, Coughlin aver counsel Ior
Merliss misled this Court by claiming Coughlin was permitted to remove persona property
aIter 5:00 p.m. Coughlin Iurther alleges counsel Ior Merliss "boarded up" the premises
"install|ed| a chain and padlock on the back gate," and later attempted to Iile suit Ior the
disposal costs oI removing the property, all oI which prevented Coughlin Irom removing the
items in the Iirst place. (Pl. Mot. at p. 14.) Consequently, Coughlin contends this Court's
Order should be amended or altered under NRCP 52 or 59 to include these allegations as
additional Iindings oI Iact.
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Conversely, in his Opposition Iiled on February 3, 2012 Merliss avers Coughlin Iails to
articulate which Iindings he wants amended under NRCP 52. Even iI Coughlin did articulate
such Iindings, however, Merliss contends relieI under NRCP 52(b) is nonetheless unavailable
to Coughlin because this Court's Order did not contain a Iinal judgment, as that rule requires.
Similarly, Merliss contends Coughlin is not entitled to relieI under NRCP 59(e) because "n
judgment has ever been entered by this court in this case, so there is no judgment Ior this
court t alter or amend." (DeI. Opp'n at p. 2.) In short, Merliss contends Coughlin's Motion
lacks an evidentiary basis, is "nonsense ... Iiled only to delay this matter and drive up Iees,"
and i "completely devoid oI any merit whatsoever," to the extent "it is even decipherable."
(page 2) (DeI NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 The object oI Coughlin's Motion Iiled on January
30, 2012 appears to be this Court' Order dated January 11, 2012. In that Order, this Court
denied Coughlin's emergency request Ior a temporary restraining order. Coughlin made the
request aIter Judge SIerrazza oI RJC entered an Order on December 21, 2011, in which he
ordered: (1) Coughlin to pay $480.00 t oI his 1, 2011 16, 2011; and (2) Coughlin shall have
access to the premises Irom 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. December 22, 2011 and December 23,
2011 to remove his personal property. Coughlin claims this Court's January 11, 2012 "is
clearly inaccurate to the extent it purports to Iind that the undersigned made any agreement to
waive his security deposit in exchange Ior additional access to the property. " (PI. Mot. at p.
12.) In addition, Coughlin aver counsel Ior Merliss misled this Court by claiming Coughlin
was permitted to remove personal property aIter 5:00 p.m. Coughlin Iurther alleges counsel
Ior Merliss "boarded up " the premises gate, " Iirst place. (PI. Mot. at p. 14.)
Consequently, Coughlin contends this Court's Order should be amended or altered
under NRCP 52 or 59 to include these allegations as additional Iindings oI Iact. such Iindings,
however, Merliss contends relieI under NRCP 52(b) is nonetheless unavailable to Coughlin
because this Court's Order did not contain a Iinal judgment, as that rule requires. Similarly,
Merliss contends Coughlin is not entitled to relieI under NRCP 59(e) because "no judgment
has ever been entered by this court in this case, so there is no judgment Ior this court to alter
or amend. " (DeI. Opp'n at p. 2.) In short, Merliss contends Coughlin's Motion lacks an
evidentiary basis, is "nonsense ... Iiled only to delay this matter and drive up Iees, " and is
"completely devoid oI any merit whatsoever, "to the extent "it is even decipherable ." (DeI
Opp'n at p. 1, 2.) In Iact, Merliss claims Coughlin should be subject to "vexatious litigation
tactics." (DeI. Opp'n at p. 1,2.)
AIter reviewing the parties' pleadings and the exhibits reviewing this Court's January
11,2012 Order, this Court has gleaned Irom Coughlin's Motion certain additional Iindings oI
Iact that Coughlin contends should be included - by amendment 0 alteration - in this Court's
Order. Ultimately, however, this Court's Order is unamendable or unalterable under the
Rules Coughlin cites because said Order does not contain a final appealable judgment,
or a disposition that resolves all of the parties' claims Simmons SelI-Storage Partners, LLC
v. (explaining jurisdiction to consider an appeal Irom the district court depends on whether
the district court has entered a Iinal judgment); Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996
P.2 416, 417 (2000) (deIining "Iinal judgment" as presented in the case, and leaves nothing
Ior the Iuture consideration oI the court, except Ior post-judgment issues such attorney's Iees
and costs."). relieI under NRCP 52 or 59 is unavailable to Coughlin. Although Simmons and
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GNL V involve appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court Irom th district court, this Court Iinds
the jurisdictional principles announced in those cases also apply t the district court when the
district court considers appeals Irom the justice courts, as well a when the district court
considers motions under NRCP 52 or 59, as we ThereIore, this Court concludes Coughlin's
Motion Under NRCP 52(b) to Amend or Additional Findings oI Fact; or, Pled in the
Alternative, Motion Under NRCP 59 to Alter a Amend the Order Denying Motion to Prevent
Disposal oI Personal Property is DENIED. Leave to File Answering BrieI in Excess oI Five
Pages In light oI the voluminous record in this case (which exceeds 2,000 pages), including
lengthy brieIs Iiled by Coughlin,2 this Court Iinds good cause exists to grant Merliss leave to
Iile 2 This Court acknowledges Merliss's complaint that Coughlin has violated the page limits
contained in Orders Iro this Court, as well as the local rules. However, pursuant to this Court's
longstanding policy oI considering cases on the merits, as opposed to dismissing them Ior
procedural reasons, this Court will overlook such violations in this particular case. AIter
reviewing the parties' pleadings and the exhibits attached thereto, and aIter reviewing this
Court's January 11, 11, 2012 Order, this Court has gleaned Irom Coughlin's MaIia certain
additional Iindings oI Iact that Coughlin contends should be included - by amendment 0
alteration - in this Court's Order. Ultimately, however, this Court's Order is unamendable or
unalterable under the Rules Coughlin cites because said Order does not contain a Iinal
appealable judgment, or a disposition that resolves all oI the parties' claims. See Simmons
SelI-Storage LLC v. Rib RooI, Inc., 247 P.3d 1107, 1108 (Nev. 2011) (explaining jurisdiction
to consider an appeal Irom the district court depends on whether th district court has entered a
Iinal judgment); Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2 416, 417 (2000) (deIining
"Iinal judgment" as presented in the case, and leaves nothing Ior the Iuture consideration oI
the court, except Ior post-judgment issues such as attorney's Iees and costs."). As a
consequence, this Court Iinds the relieI under NRCP 52 or 59 is unavailable to Coughlin.
Although Simmons and GNLV involve appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court district
court, this Court Iinds the jurisdictional principles announced in those cases also apply to the
district court when the district court considers appeals Irom the justice courts as well as when
the district court considers motions under NRCP 52 or 59, as we have in this case. ThereIore,
this Court concludes Coughlin's Motion Under NRCP 52(b) to Amend or Make Additional
Findings oI Fact; or, Pled in the Alternative, Motion Under NRCP 59 to Alter or Amend the
Order Denying Motion to Prevent Disposal oI Personal Property is DENIED.
Leave to File Answering BrieI in Excess oI Five Pages
In light oI the voluminous record in this case (which exceeds 2,000 pages), including
lengthy brieIs Iiled by Coughlin,2 this Court Iinds good cause exists to grant Merliss leave to
Iile (In2)(In2:This Court acknowledges Merliss's complaint that Coughlin has violated the
page limits contained in Orders Irom this Court, as well as the local rules. However, pursuant
to this Court's longstanding policy oI considering cases on the merits, as opposed to
dismissing them Ior procedural reasons, this Court will overlook such violations in this
particular case)... (page 4) an answering brieI in excess oI Iive pages. In addition, this Court
denies Merliss's motion t strike the excess material Iiled by Coughlin and also denies
Merliss's request Ior leave to Iile supplemental brieI to meet the arguments contained in that
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excess material. In3 (In 3 See note 2, supra. Merliss made this request in Iootnote 14 oI his
Answering BrieI discussed inIra)
Appellate BrieIs
As mentioned previously, this case involves the summary eviction oI Coughlin Irom
121 River Rock Street, Reno, NV 89501 ("the Property"). AIter two hearings in RJC in which
Coughlin alleged deIenses oI habitability, retaliation, and discrimination, Judge SIerrazza
adjudged Coughlin summarily evicted Irom the Property pursuant to NRS 40.253(6) by Order
dated October 27, 2011. SpeciIically, Judge SIerrazza Iound Merliss properly terminated
Coughlin's tenancy and thereaIter properly served Coughlin with a notice oI unlawIul
detainer. Judge SIerrazza Iurther Iound "Coughlin Iailed to present any evidence that Merliss
acted in an prohibited, discriminatory, or retaliatory Iashion as alleged by Coughlin, or
otherwise.' (SIerrazza, J., Order, Case No. REV2011-001708, Oct. 27, 2011.)
As a result, Coughlin was ordered to vacate the premises by October 31, 2011 at 5:00
p.m. Coughlin Iailed to do so. He also Iailed to remove his personal belongings. Consequently
Merliss sought a personal property lien Ior storage oI Coughlin's personal belongings in the
Property Irom the period oI November 1, 2011 to November 16, 2011. Coughlin Iiled a
motion to contest the lien. On December 21, 2011, Judge SIerrazza ordered Coughlin to pay
to Merliss $480.00 as "Iair and reasonable compensation" Ior Merliss's storage oI his personal
belongings. (SIerrazza, J., Order, Case No. REV2011-001708, Dec. 21, 2011.) Judge
SIerrazza also granted Coughlin access to the Property to remove his personal belongings by
December 23, 2011 5:00 p.m. Coughlin Iailed to do so. As a result, Merliss hired a contractor
to dispose oI Coughlin's personal belongings. Coughlin appealed.
Coughlin Iiled his Opening BrieI ("BrieI') on February 6, 2012. In4 (In 4 This pleading
replaced an Opening BrieI Coughlin previously Iiled two days earlier. Consequently, this
Court will treat this brieI as the operative pleading. In addition, on February 7, 2012 Coughlin
Iiled a Supplement to Appellant's Opening BrieI to which he attached an exhibit containing a
CD oI audio recordings) Merliss Iiled his Answering BrieI ("Response") on February 24,
2012. This Court took the matter under submission on February 27, 2012. This Order now
Iollows. As a preliminary matter, however this Court notes it is the issue oI summary eviction
and the Judge SIerrazza's October 27, 2011 Order that presently concerns this Court. Fn5 (In5
On appeal, Coughlin's BrieI spans Iorty-seven pages and contains several allegations and
claims. Many oI these claims touch upon collateral issues like, Ior example, alleged
relationships between Merliss's counsel and law enIorcement, alleged unconstitutional acts oI
city employees under Monell v. Dep't oI' Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 65 (1978), and Merliss' s
alleged disinterest in complaints Irom people like Coughlin and others associated wit
Coughlin. As such, this Court will not address these issues. In addition, because Coughlin
Iailed to timely Iile his notice oI appeal regarding the personal property lien, see NRS
40.253(8), and because Coughlin's notice oI appeal Iails to identiIy an error regarding the
court's procedure in setting a hearing on this issue, this Court will no consider this issue.)
Standard oI Review
On civil appeals Irom justice courts to district courts, a case "must not be tried anew.'
NJCRCP 72(c). Whether on appeal at the Nevada Supreme Court Irom a district court, or 0
appeal at a district court Irom a justice court, a lower court's Iindings "will not be disturbed on
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appeal unless they are clearly erroneous and are not based on substantial evidence." Gibellini
v Klindt, 110 Nev. 1201, 1204,885 P.2d 540, 542 (1994).
"|A|n order granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6) should be reviewed on
NRC 56 because these proceedings are analogous." Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123
Nev. 212 215, 163 P.3d 405, 407 (2007). Summary judgment is proper only iI no genuine
issue oI material Iact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oI law.
NEV. R. CIV P. 56(c); see Wood v. SaIeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029
(2005). The moving party bears the initial burden oI proving there is no genuine issue oI
material Iact. Main v. Stewart, 109 Nev. 721, 726-27, 857 P.2d 755, 758 (1993).
Once the moving party satisIies this burden, however, the burden shiIts to the
nonmoving party to show the existence oI a genuine issue oI material Iact. Id. at 727. While
the pleading and the record must be construed in the light most Iavorable to the nonmoving
party, the party must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
operative Iacts Wood, 121 Nev. at 729. To avoid having summary judgment entered against
it, the party must (page 5) by aIIidavit or otherwise, set Iorth speciIic Iacts demonstrating the
existence oI a genuine issue Ior trial. Id.
Legal Analysis
This Court has reviewed all oI the parties' pleadings and the exhibits attached thereto
This Court also has considered all oI the parties' relevant arguments. AIter this review and
consideration, this Court will not disturb Judge SIerrazza's October 27, 2011 Order granting
summary eviction. This Court Iinds that Order was based on substantial evidence and it was
no clearly erroneous. Thus, this Court concludes Merliss has met his initial burden oI proving
thee is no genuine issue oI material Iact regarding whether Coughlin was summarily evicted
properly. Consequently, the burden shiIts to Coughlin to show the existence oI a genuine
issue oI material Iact.
Although Coughlin raises several claims and makes numerous allegations in his BrieI
Coughlin Iails to present additional Iacts related to his deIenses raised in RJC that undermine
or legitimately call into question the substantial evidence upon which Judge SIerrazza relied
when he granted summary eviction. This Court gives substantial deIerence to the lower court's
Iactual Iindings in this regard, particularly in light oI the numerous hearings held beIore Judge
SIerrazza and Coughlin's related opportunities to present evidence supporting his various
deIenses. ThereIore, this Court Iinds no genuine issue oI material Iact exists regarding
whether Coughlin was summarily evicted properly in the lower court. As a result, Coughlin's
appeal is DENIED.
CONCLUSION Accordingly, in summary, this Court orders: 1) Coughlin's Motion
Under NRCP 52(b) to Amend or Make Additional Findings oI Fact; or, Pled in the
Alternative, Motion Under NRCP 59 to Alter or Amend the Order Denying Motion to Prevent
Disposal oI Personal Property is DENIED; 2) Merliss's request Ior leave to Iile Answering
BrieI in excess oI Iive pages is GRANTED; and (page 6) 3) Coughlin's appeal regarding
summary eviction Irom the Property is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. (page 7)
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The thing is: NRS40.400Rules oI practice.The provisions oI NRS, Nevada
Rules oI Civil Procedure and Nevada Rules oI Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions,
appeals and new trials, so Iar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions oI NRS 40.220
to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections.
As such, no 'local rule respecting 'page limits is applicable in an appeal to the
Justice Court oI a summary eviction. While Couglin has respect Ior Judge Flanagan's Order,
Coughlin's BrieI in excess thereoI somewhat sought permission to exceed such orders, and to
whatever extent it did not, it may be characterized as an 'open reIusal allowable under RPC
3.3
Iveson v. Second Judicial District Court oI the State oI Nevada, 66 Nev. 145, 152,206
P.2d 755 (1949); Abelleria v District Court, 17 Ca1.2.d 280, 295, 109 P.2d 942 (1941).
"Excess oI jurisdiction" Ior which certiorari will issue exists where the act is within the
judge's general power but is not authorized because the conditions Ior the exercise oI such
power (i.e., Ior example, lack oI notice) are wanting. Iveson at 151. Both Judge SIerrazza and
Judge Flanagan exceeded their jurisdiction in a number oI ways. Judge SIerrazza was no
longer able to rule that Coughlin's Motion Ior Jury trial was untimely upon his amending his
10/13/11 Order on 10/25/11 to recharacterize the setting oI the 10/25/11 date as a
'continuation oI the summary eviction proceeding rather than the 'trial ('the use oI the
term 'trial was unIortunate, Your Honor said Hill's associate Baker. Judge SIerrazza
Iurther exceeded his juridiction in ordering a 118A.355(5) rent escrow deposit where the RJC
has yet to promulgate and have approved a corollary to JCRLV 44.
It was reversible error to rule that Coughlin's demand Ior a jury trial was too late,
particularly where:
'PlaintiII: Your Honor, iI I may as well, there was something shoved through my mail slot
last night as well Irom Mr. Coughlin bearing a Iile stamp oI yesterday, Emergency Demand
Ior Jury trial and Amended Tenant's AIIidavit Answer Counter-Claim. Again, I haven`t had a
chance to look at this. I know it's not appropriate to have a jury trial here and the court has
already ruled that there's not been entertaining a third party claims, this is a summary eviction.
But, again, I haven`t had a chance to even look at this because it's |INDISCERNIBLE 3:45|
yesterday. Judge: All right. Well, you have 10 days to respond to that as well. So we'll put
those aside Ior the moment and now.
The Docket in 1708 shows that Coughlin made an appropriate jury trial demand in
1708 on 10/11/12 and deposited the required sums pursuant to NRCP 38 and JCRCP 38.
'NRS40.310Issue oI Iact to be tried by jury iI proper demand made.Whenever an issue
oI Iact is presented by the pleadings, it shall be tried by a jury, iI proper demand is made
pursuant to the Nevada Rules oI Civil Procedure or the Justice Court Rules oI Civil
Procedure
'NRS40.310Issue oI Iact to be tried by jury iI proper demand made.Whenever an issue
oI Iact is presented by the pleadings, it shall be tried by a jury, iI proper demand is made
pursuant to the Nevada Rules oI Civil Procedure or the Justice Court Rules oI Civil
Procedure
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MROA 491: "In connection with the summary eviction hearing, the landlord must Iile
a prooI oI service oI the notice. NRS 40.253(5)(a)(7). NRS 40.280(3) deIines prooI as: (a) A
statement, signed by the tenant and a witness, aclmowledging that the tenant received the
notice on a speciIied date; (b) A certiIicate oI mailing issued by the United States Post
Service; or (c) The endorsement oI a sheriII, constable or other process server stating the time
and maimer oI service. Where service is by a certiIicate oI mailing or by the sheriII or
constable, the cOUlis have not required cOHoboration by a witness as provided in NRS
40.280(1 )(a). Also, some courts require a showing oI due diligence beIore service can be
established based on posting and mailing. . Glazier v. Justice Court oI Smith Valley Tp.,
1995, 899 P.2d 110.FN1. Wood v. SaIeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029
(2005) (quoting NRCP 56(c))...." (MROA 491).
"Furthr, does 40.280 require landlord to Iile a certiIicate oI mailing in addition to when
a process server veriIies that the notice was taped to the door vis a vis NRS (MROA 553-554)
118a.190(2)? II so, this proceeding must be dismissd as the summary eviction nature is held
to strict adherence to procedural, notice, and service requirements.".
MROA 757:15-30: 'DeIendant: There -- Ior the record, there was no certiIicate oI mailing,
US Postal Service certiIicate oI mailing on Iile with respect to a notice. In the context of
summary eviction proceeaings, courts are airectea to aahere very strictly to the notice
requirements given the summary nature of it. That's one saIeguard that is insisted upon. A
right to a jury trial is granted by the United States Supreme Court Irom -- in summary -- in
eviction cases. Jury trial is an absolute right Ior all citizens in the United States. I said it's a
1970s case. I think it might be called Pearson. I believe I cite to it in my... (Page 33). Pernell
v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
Judge SIerrazza committed reversible error where, throughout the entirety oI the
10/13/11 date and the entire morning oI the 10/25/11 date, he put the initial burden on
Coughlin, Iorcing him to 'testiIy, reIusing to allow Coughlin to Iunction in his dual role as a
selI representing litigant, and to address issues prior to the landlord meeting the initial burden
upon him to prove his case as to an unlawIul detainer action, and limiting the issues and
presentation such that Coughlin was not permitted to bring counterclaims, or counter set-oIIs,
as entitled to under NRS 118A.490.
'Judge: ...the burden is on the landlord Iirst to establish a prima Iacie case Ior the unlawIul
detainer action. And so I`m going to have the landlord present its evidence with respect to the
lease and the no-cause eviction. Then the deIendant will have the opportunity because I think
the only issue then is whether or not this unlawIul detainer action no-cause eviction is a
retaliatory eviction and you will, the deIendant will need to meet the requirements Ior a
retaliatory eviction as set up in the statute. And I`m going to limit you to your presentation
with respect to those issues. I know you brought up a lot oI other things, one oI them being a
demand Ior a jury trial which the court Iinds is not timely and that request is denied. (Page
68).
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Coughlin's 10/11/12 Iiled and served demand Ior a jury trial was timely as to the 10/25/11
'trial, whether, depending upon NRS 40.400, on applies NJCRCP 38 or NRCP 38:
' NRCP 38(b)Demand.Any party may demand a trial by jury oI any issue triable oI right
by a jury by serving as required by Rule 5(b) upon the other parties a demand thereIor in
writing at any time aIter the commencement oI the action and not later than the time oI the
entry oI the order Iirst setting the case Ior trial. or:
NJCRCP 38(b): 'b)Demand.Any party may demand a trial by jury oI any issue triable oI
right by a jury by Iiling and serving upon the other parties a demand thereIor in writing at the
time that the party requests the matter be set Ior trial or beIore the entry oI the order Iirst
setting the case Ior trial, whichever comes Iirst.
The trial oI 10/25/11 was not set, and the entry oI the order oI the 10/13/11 Order so
setting the matter Ior trial Ior 10/25/11, until aIter Coughlin had already Iiled his 10/11/12
Demand For Jury trial.
Oddly, while Judge SIerrazza reIused to allow Coughlin to address or bring
counterclaims, he did allow Baker the beneIits oI a plenary trial where Baker was permitted to
undertake discovery pursuant to
'OCT 6 Motion to Proceed in Fonna Pauperis Iiled and submitted. GRANTED per Judge
SIerrazza.dss Tenant' s Answer/AIIidavit to 30 Day No Cause Eviction & UnlawIul Detainer;
Motion Ior Sanctions and Attorney's Fees; Counterclaim Ior Damages Iiled. Hearing set Ior
OCTOBER 13,2011 at 8:30 AM. Both parties notiIied by mail. LeIt message Ior tenant.
Spoke to Landlords attorney. Dss
OCT 11 Motion to Continue Iiled by Tenant SUBMITTED. ks OCT 12 Landlord's
Opposition to Tenant's Answer/AIIidavit to 30 Day No Cause Eviction; Motion Ior Sanctions
and Attorney's Fees; and Counterclaim Ior Damages Iiled. cv
OCT 13 PlaintiII, represented by CASEY BAKER, ESQ. DeIendant, ZACHARY
COUGHLIN appeared Ior a Summary Eviction hearing beIore Judge SFERRAZZA. Hearing
held. Tenant's Motion to Continue Denied. II tenant posts rent oI S2,275.00 by 9:00 am,
Monday October 17, 2011 a trial will be set Ior OCTOBER 25, 2011 AT 10:00 am. II tenant
does not post the monies, eviction GRANTED at 9:00 am. October 17, 2011. Jj; Emergency
Ex Parte Motion Iiled. cv
OCT 17 Opposition to Emergency Ex Parte Motion Iiled. cv
OCT 17 Emergency Motion To Stay, Set Aside, Vacate Eviction Hearing Order Iiled.bc
OCT 17 Emergency Ex Parte Motion Iiled. cv
$2,275.00 CASH posted by ZACHARY COUGHLIN, 121 River Rock St., Reno, NV. 89501
MROA 296:
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"1udge: What does that have to do with the rent though, sir? Because what we are here today
on is the Iailure to pay rent.
Defendant: Your Honor, the statute to me is complicated and conIusing but my
understanding oI it is that Mr. Merliss` or Dr. Merliss` Iailure to assert that he was owed rent
Ior a good, it seems like three months, takes this case out oI the purview oI the sections
requiring a depositing oI a rent escrow amount and his Iailure to cure the habitability issues
within 40 days.
1udge: Okay. Regardless oI that have you paid the rent or not, Iirst oI all?
Plaintiff: Your Honor, may.
1udge: I'm sorry?
Defendant: Your Honor, that`s a factual aetermination . I think that would need to be made
Plaintiff: Your Honor, may I please. We are not here on a non-payment oI rent. Your Honor,
I want to be very clear.
1udge: But you said a Iive-day Notice.
Plaintiff: We`re here on a no-cause termination to vacate. Mr. Coughlin was a month-
tomonth
tenant since March 2011. We served a 30-day no cause termination Notice to vacate.
1udge: I`ll have two Iiles.
Plaintiff: Yes, sir. That was Irom the previous the non-payment oI rent we had a hearing a
couple oI weeks ago. Those were dismissed. Gone, they`re gone.
1udge: So, which case number is still pending?
Plaintiff: This, Your Honor, this case is ends in 1708.
1udge: Right. So, 1492.
Plaintiff: Dismissed a couple oI weeks ago.
1udge: Fine. That was dismissed by the landlords..."
MROA 303:
"Plaintiff: Your Honor Rule 109 speaks to a 20 day period Notice prior to a hearing which I
believe is applicable in this case and has not been provided.
Defendant: I`m sorry I didn`t catch any oI that.
1udge: He said.
Plaintiff: Rule 109 Your Honor, setting oI Trial and actions."
MROA 304:
"Defendant: To that I Iiled a tenancy answer, a third party counterclaim bringing in third
parties.
1udge: Well Iirst oI all as to the third party complaint I`m going to rule as I indicated earlier
that there is a speciIic statutory procedure in this case which is applicable under Chapter 40 oI
the NRS. ThereIore you are governed by that statutory procedure which does not allow Ior
counterclaims to be heard. At the same time you can Iile a separate independent action as
indicated by counsel Ior the.
Defendant: NRS 40 you say Your Honor does not allow Ior third?
1udge: Chapter 40 in a summary proceeding such as this does not allow Ior counterclaims to
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be Iiled in the same action, iI they are Iiled as separate action. That`s under Rule 81 oI the
justice court Rules oI civil procedure."
MROA 305:
"1udge: I will allow you to testiIy as to what happened and why you believe the summary
eviction should not be applicable in this case. If you establish a case to my satisfaction then
I will set it over to Trial, right?
1udge: You`ve come in to argue a motion to dismiss based on Iailure to comply with Notice
and other issues which I denied at this point. So you can sit down and iI you want to test the
Iire as to why this should not be a summary eviction I will permit you to do so.
Defendant: Even were this to go Iorward as a summary eviction Your Honor I would just
like to state Ior the record I am moving Ior a continuance based upon the unduly prejudicial
nature oI the shutting oII the electricity in the middle oI the Iive days that you were here.
1udge: Well you were here quite some time ago and knew all about this, so that`s denied.
You Iirst came in here to court and back in this court dismissed the prior case in case number
1492 trying to Iind the date at which.
Defendant: I believe it was the 26th Your Honor oI September the hearing approximately.
Plaintiff: That was the 27th Your Honor, I remember because that was my birthday.
1udge: Alright in any event that`s been more than 20 days and I know on that date you were
Iully aware oI what was happening because the plaintiII tried to proceed at that time which I
denied. They attempted to proceed on this case as well. Alright? You probably do not
remember that, sir.
Defendant: I remember the hearing Your Honor and I just, I would think there is something
that when a tenant alleges a retaliatory eviction that the summary and extremely quick nature
oI this process is slowed somewhat.
12/31 TRANSCRIPT OF 10/13/11 SUMMARY EVICTION PROCEEDING AND 10/25/11
CONTINUATION
THEREOF OR TRIAL PURSUANT TO NJCRCP RULE 109
000305
1udge: Only iI the court Iinds that there is a meritorious deIense, which I haven`t done so, I
haven`t even been presented any evidence to persuade me that you have any meritorious
deIense whatsoever.
Defendant: Are you sure Your Honor?.
1udge: And I am giving you that opportunity to proceed. So do you want to proceed or not?
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor I have abundance oI evidence in support.
1udge: Come up here and take the stand, sir.
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor may I bring my laptop with me because it has pictures that I
intend to oIIer and a videotape as well?
1udge: Wait a second sir, no you may not what am asking you Ior is to establish a prima Iacie
case oI retaliatory eviction through your testimony and then iI I determine and establish the
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prima Iacie case then we`ll set it over Ior Trial.
1udge: So iI you want to come up here. Go ahead sir.
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor. I believe a prima Iacie case has been established with
respect to the claims oI retaliatory eviction. And been supported by the various Exhibits that
had been attached to both my original tenant`s answer and subsequent tenant`s answer. Just
most recent motion Ior continuance and speciIically.
1udge: I have that.
Defendant: SpeciIically Your Honor what`s convenient here is this has all pretty much been
detailed in emails to and Irom the landlord and myselI. Further I took videotapes oI an
incident where a good deal or property damage was done to my home law oIIice." MROA
306.
MROA 307:
"1udge: Done by whom?
Defendant: The landlords, agents and iI you reIerenced the lease I believe its subsection 28,
the lease speciIically provides that any damage done to the tenant or his property by the
landlord or the landlord`s agents is to be.would result in the landlord being held viable Ior
such damage. I can testiIy as to the damage done, I have a videotape showing the landscaping
crew doing the damage. The third party deIendants were involved in that to some extent. The
landlord admitted in writing that he authorized to third party deIendant Green Action Lawn
Services conduct in that regard. Aside Irom the property damage with respect to the
landscaping incident a prima Iacie case can be established.
1udge: So how was that retaliatory, what were they retaliating Ior?
Defendant: I believe he is evicting me Your Honor based in part on a number oI Iactors
that`s one because I complained about it. Two is .
1udge: Because you complained about the lawn service?
Defendant: The conduct oI Green Action Lawn Service, yes. They caused what I believe is
at least $1,000 damage. In addition the landlord Iailed to ensure a number oI habitability
issues that were brought to light in writing and he was given 14 days. The statute allows a
deduction Irom the landlord. The landlord agreed in writing to these deductions.
1udge: Well you have deducted three month`s rent.
Defendant: That`s a Iactual matter Your Honor that I believe is in dispute.
1udge: So you are saying you have paid the rent? Do you have the evidence oI payment oI
the rent today sir?"
MROA 308-309
"Defendant: Payment in the sense that rent deductions agreed to in writing and worked on
incident thereto amounts to a payment oI the rent in addition to.
1udge: Okay well do you have evidence oI that?
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor. The stairs Mr. Merliss, the stairs to the law oIIice were
crumbling, they were presenting a hazard and an aesthetically displeasing appearance. Mr.
Merliss agreed to a rent deduction and the stairs were repaired, he was submitted a statement
in that regard. He subsequently Iilled |inaudible 0:17:12| Notices that ignored that rent
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deduction. Ignored the rent deduction he agreed to in writing and the attached agreement.
1udge: Okay, sir I need to know precisely Iirst oI all how much is your rent per month?
Defendant: $900 a month.
1udge: How much was the bill Ior the stairs?
Defendant: $1,250.
1udge: Anything else, oIIsets that you are claiming today?
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor, the landlord agreed to a $350 oIIsets Ior taking care oI the
weeds at the house I oIIered to.
1udge: So how much was that 300?
Defendant: He agreed $350 Ior that season and he Iailed to respond to a request Ior the prior
season. So I believe I can argue $700...
Defendant: Well Your Honor he never responded to a previous seasons request in that regard
aIter 14 days Notice and I believe NRS 118A allows her rent deduction I believe the.
1udge: But habitability, what does the weeds a year ago have to do with habitability?
Defendant: The weeds were extreme Your Honor, they created a noxious weed ordinance
hazard, they.
1udge: Okay wait a second, whose responsibility is under the lease to maintain the
|CROSSTALK|?
Defendant: That person is the landlord Your Honor, in addition.
1udge: Do you have citation to the lease?
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor and I will sight to that but even absent that his subsequent
conduct ratiIies an interpretation that would deem the landlord responsible Ior. I believe the
noxious weed ordinance aIIect in Reno speciIies that it`s the property owner`s responsibility.
But the lease does speak to that Your Honor. My attachments, there is a good deal oI
photographic evidence attached as Exhibit where there is three to the motion Ior continuance
instead oI a two.
1udge: Brings up the issue oI the mold and the insulation.
Defendant: All these issues are in writing attached to the original September tenant`s answer
where in approximately 30 pages oI emails between myselI the tenant and the landlord
Merliss proved that he was provided 14 days written Notice oI various habitability issues
including mold growing on insulation that had Iallen Irom the ceiling and hit a dirt ground
that lacked vapor layer. There`s pictures I know the printouts there are not that clear, I do
have high quality colored photographs on my laptop. Just another small matter Your Honor,
there was a matter oI $125 deduction that was agreed to Ior the disposal. All these deductions
the landlord Merliss has subsequently seem to have Iorgotten.
1udge: Okay wait a second, we have weeds the total you were claiming is 700 and now you
say it is $125 Ior what?
Defendant: A broken kitchen garbage disposal.
1udge: Which you repaired?
1udge: You have receipts Ior all this?
Defendant: I have submitted statements to opposing counsel.
1udge: Alright so, iI I understand this correctly you owed $2,700 in rent.
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Defendant: Your Honor opposing counsel said rent is not an issue here.
1udge: No you are making it an issue. I mean you are the one who said that I`m supposed to
look at this because this is in retaliation Ior your complaints right?
Defendant: To the extent that an eviction is being sort, yes Your Honor. But the issue oI
whether or not I own it you may not believe this but it`s conceited at this point.
1udge: Conceited how?
Defendant: Or not even alleged by opposing counsel.
1udge: What they did is they dismissed the action Irom nonpayment oI rent. So they are not
evicting you based on nonpayment oI rent. That doesn`t mean and you were talking about a
counterclaim today which you wanted me to address Ior retaliatory eviction. And I`m trying
to Iind out what the retaliation was Ior. You are saying it has nothing to do with rent then
that`s Iine. What is the retaliation about? (MROA 310)
MROA 311:
"Defendant: Subject to NRS 118A.510 the retaliation applies because it occurred aIter
written
Notice by the tenant to the landlord oI both items. Both matters in statutes such as noxious
weed ordinates as well as complaining about habitability issues and.
1udge: retaliation is Ior complaining about noxious weeds?
Defendant: Noxious weeds, property damage done by the landscaping crew and Iailure to
cure habitability issues and the landlord`s parts aIter 14 days written Notice in pass.
1udge: Okay so you have noxious weeds, landscaper damages and what was the third?
Defendant: All these various, please Iix it landlord types oI written Notices.
1udge: That`s not habitability; habitability is speciIically deIined by statutes. So speciIically
what was the habitability issue, lack oI heat or?
Defendant: Your Honor I believe the insulation matter with its attended, mold problems it
comes within the essential services. I have seen some authority that seems to suggest
insulation is an essential service. There is saIety issues with regard to .
1udge: Insulation is an essential service.
Defendant: Or at least I believe so in some situations or at least it speaks to habitability,
insulation does. There is a window that`s remained broken with exposed shards oI glass held
in by the |inaudible 0:24:30| in the window, that presents a hazard. The stairs, the crumbling
stair rises my mailman has complained about that to the extent it looks bad, it`s not that saIe.
The wood deck to the Iront entry way seems rotted out."
MROA 312 (important because it establish that Coughlin plead and or argued that the
"Iirst eviction" in 1492 provided a basis under NRS 118.510 Ior arguing retaliation incident to
Coughlin deIended based upon habitabilty in that prior action, resulting in a retaliatory
possessory action in 1708:
"1udge: So what you are saying is because you complained about these Iour things the
landlord might have had to evict you?
1udge: It had nothing to do with the nonpayment oI rent?
Defendant: I believe it had to do with invoking the statutory right to deduct rent.
1udge: So. Okay so prior to your exercising your statutory right to deduct rent and you
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determined that the Iirst eviction was |inaudible 0:26:37| because I think you claim
retaliatory eviction based on the Iirst eviction did you not?
Defendant: Yes.
1udge: So your retaliatory eviction was based on these things and not your Iailure to pay
rent?
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor including that you complained oI the property damage by the
third party agency oI the landlord and his employees or agency."
MROA 312-313 (so much Ior the 10/13/11 hearing being held Ior the purpose oI
"establishling the truthIulness and suIIiciency oI the landlord and tenant's aIIidavits (the
landlord had yet to Iile an aIIidavit, and, at that point, Baker had not even Iiled his attempt to
satisIy that requirement via his privilege asserting 10/19/11 Declaration oI Casey D. Baker
(which goes to the Iraud issues respecting the Iact that Baker and Merliss lied about whether
the lease had expired or been terminated, which goes to the eIIectiveness oI the 8/22/11
notice) and Merliss did not even show up to the 10/13/11 hearing, so instead oI ruling that,
per se, the landlord did not meet the requirement upon such a "testing the truthIulness and
suIIiciency oI the landlord's aIIidavit", Judge SIerrazza simply placed that burden solely on
Coughlin, then allowed Baker to skip putting anything into evidence or putting on any
testimony, and rather, just proceed to "making argument"):
"Defendant: Your Honor I`m happy to cross-examine or I am happy to simply present an
argument.
1udge: Anything else sir.
Defendant: No sir Your Honor.
1udge: Okay you can step down. Okay with the landlord you can make any argument.
Plaintiff: Thank you Your Honor lets just start with the statutes Your Honor. II I understood
Mr. Coughlin`s testimony, his contention is that the no-cause eviction is in retaliation Ior his
complaints to the landlord about habitability. I think that`s what he testiIied to and he named
a couple oI things, weeds, landscaper damage, installation, windows. NRS 118A.290
provides what habitability is. Mr. Coughlin, he must show among other things Your Honor
that the property substantially lacks one oI these enumerated items. EIIective waterprooIing,
plumbing Iacilities, water supply, electrical lighting outlets et cetera.
Plaintiff: Your Honor just moving Iorward with the other items identiIied by Mr. Coughlin.
Insulation windows, garbage disposals.
1udge: Well the other question I heard about the weeds, he says he had them done Ior 350
and there was some agreement he would get a credit, you indicated that the landlord actually
had the weeds.
Plaintiff: Your Honor the.
1udge: Taken down.
Plaintiff: Yes. My understanding is the only rent deduction ever agreed to by the landlord
was $350; I believe it was Ior June it could have been Ior May, Ior Mr. Coughlin to deal with
the weeds. That was not disputed and in Iact Your Honor iI we go back to the last case, the
quantiIication oI the rent in our Iive day no pay Notice gives credit Ior that. The court gave
credit Ior it in its minute order. Dr Merliss also paid landscapers to. Dr Merliss also owns a
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property next door. The landscapers were doing the weeds next door; there were still weeds in
Mr. Coughlin`s property as I understand it he didn`t care oI the weeds. So landscapers also
pulled the weeds over there. That`s my understanding it has nothing to do with this
proceeding. Mr. Coughlin`s third party claims as he calls them have something to do with the
landscapers pulling the carpet out oI his Iront yard or something.
1udge: Well there were no third party |inaudible 0:33:36| Iiles, so there are not even an issue
here.
Plaintiff: I understand sir I`m trying to shed a little light on the weed situation. There was a
credit, that is the only credit Mr. Coughlin has not shown any other agreed upon credit and
what`s interesting here Your Honor is that on one hand Mr. Coughlin is arguing that the
landlord agreed to all these rent deductions and then on the other hand he is saying that
because I`m claiming rent deductions he is evicting me to retaliation. It doesn`t make any
sense Your Honor, which is it and he has not presented any presented any prooI either. Under
NRS 118A.510 your owner Mr. Coughlin has the burden to prove that the eviction was in
retaliation Ior one oI these enumerated things. He is hanging his hat on habitability, but the
lease puts the duty on Mr. Coughlin to maintain the property, every time he has got broken
blinds or a broken window that how did the inside pane get broken? We don`t know Mr.
Coughlin won`t let us inspect, he is claiming that`s a habitability issue.
1udge: Well I do have a question though; the court previously ruled that he needed to deposit
the rent which he disputed. But what`s your position in respect to the requirement to deposit
rent on the alleged habitability.
Plaintiff: Your Honor I think the court got it exactly right last time requiring Mr. Coughlin to
deposit the rent into an escrow account, that`s what the Rules and the statutes I believe
provide. In this case though Your Honor the only issue is possession based on a no a cause
termination oI the lease. Mr. Coughlin owes rent but we are not here to seek rent today. II
there is going to be claims Ior rent that`s a separate civil action it is not a summary
procedure.
Defendant: Objection Your Honor it`s unduly prejudicial Ior Mr. |David| to be able to
interject all these accusations and then run and cry wolI when it comes time to support them
as he has done in his pleadings as you say, opposing parties concedes this point when nothing
oI the sort was done. He says Mr. Coughlin outright lies in his pleadings he is making this"
(Judge SIerrazza continually allowed the lawyer, Baker, to testiIy, essentially, in light
oI the Iact that the client, landlord Merliss, didn't show up on 10/13/11. RPC 3.7 requires a
lawyer to withdraw iI a substantial likelihood exists that he will become a witness. Further,
Baker did not have Iirst hand knowledge upon which he could oIIer his testimony, rather, his
"testimony" consisted entirely oI hearsay.
MROA 317-318:
"Plaintiff: Yes sir Your Honor, iI I may at this time provide some Iurther support such as I
reIerenced my attention to earlier with regard to showing high quality photographs, eliciting
some oI these habitability issues with regard to certainly having, some oI these pictures oI
mold are kind oI disturbing. I don`t think anybody in this courtroom would want to live in
that situation; there is not just weed ordinance....
Plaintiff: Your Honor I wouldn`t want to live there with that mold stain where it was. I
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submitted Notice in writing not only 14 days passed but a good time oI time passed $500 was
spent in eradicating the mold issue. With respect to the habitability.
1udge: Who spent $500?
Defendant: I`m sorry Your Honor?
1udge: Who spent $500?
Defendant: I did Your Honor; I submitted a statement to Mr. Baker. Your Honor the broken
window comes within the purview oI Section 0.290 oI NRS 118A in addition to the noxious
weed ordinance that the City oI Reno has. Comes within language in Section 290 speaking to
a violation oI the housing code or complaint thereoI.
1udge: Well so how do you get around the lease, the lease requires you to maintain the law?
Defendant: That`s Mr. Baker`s interpretation oI the lease Your Honor, the lease does not say
weeds. It does not say weeds, it says lawn. There is no lawn its dirt. In that regard I have that
high quality, high density green woolen carpet to make the appearance oI a sort oI |inaudible
0:39:24| grass installation. A good deal oI money and time we spent so that I could have a
law oIIice that didn`t have a dirt lawn. Mr. Merliss a neurologist who has chosen to spent
upwards oI apparently Iive grand to litigate this rather than Iix a window and stand behind the
rent deductions. Who didn`t show up today, who didn`t stand up in court, when you yourselI
MROA 319-320:
"Your Honor told him to raise his right hand and stand to be sworn? He has clearly indicated a
lack oI respect Ior this process. He has indicated a habit oI kind oI shiIting tasks which he
seems to Iind minor and tedious on the people whose responsibility it isn`t to do those tasks.
He is essentially trying to mimic this pro-bono property manager. He says go get two
estimates Ior that little problem you alerted me to and then deducted them. I`m not at the
country right now I`m in Thailand or somewhere. Well that`s what landlords do, I`m an
attorney that`s going to take me an hour or two can I bail you $225 Ior that Dr. Merliss? No I
can`t I am just doing Ior Iree Ior you. You seem to employ time honored landlord tactic oI
ignoring tenants Ior any complaints and hoping to win by |inaudible 0:40:50| or just make
them Ieel like they are being tedious or you know high maintenance. When a clear review oI
the 30 somewhat pages show that I have been extremely conscientious throughout the year
and a halI that I rented Irom Dr. Merliss. To the extent that I have endured disgusting
conditions in this place in eIIorts to save Dr. Merliss money. Just to .
1udge: Alright so here is the deal I think I have heard enough. I am.
Defendant: Your Honor can I show the pictures oI.?
1udge: I have looked at them, I see the mold.
Defendant: You can`t see the mold in those reproductions.
1udge: Alright bring up any other pictures you`ve got, but what you said is you`ve corrected
that; you spent $500 to do that.
Defendant: Yes sir you honor, may I approach.
1udge: You may.
Defendant: Counsel was provided |inaudible 0:41:44| these pictures in addition to
photograph reproductions.
1udge: You are going to have to hand it to me because I can`t see it in the lighting.
Defendant: I will do a slide show Your Honor iI that will be alright. And there is a short
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video where the issues oI the property damage are essentially admitted by the Green Action
Lawn Service.
Plaintiff: No, I`m going to Object to any video oI anything.it has no relevance to
possession oI property today and I have never seen it.
1udge: No, I`m understanding that but I believe it is integral to the deIense you have
|inaudible
to credit Ior.
MROA 321:
"Plaintiff: You can go to the next picture in that order |inaudible 0:43:44|. |OFF MIC
CONVERSATION|
credit Ior 350.
Defendant: I believe he is reIerring to |inaudible 0:44:39| who you all paid to the landlord
Ior June Your Honor.
investigations as to whether or not their plans are based on Iact or law. Can they just churn
do the same job. One wonders iI he is so well oII as a neurologist that he can aIIord to have"
(MROA 322:) "1udge: Alright so I will give you one last chance to add anything else.
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor I believe the retaliation argument a prima Iacie case has been
made speciIically with regard to habitability issues, the habitability includes saIety. The
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crumbling stair rises clearly presented a situation where that was an issue. Habitability
1udge: Alright, sir. I am going to rule now because Iirst oI all I Iind under the NRS iI you
want to make a habitability claim you have to deposit the rent and iI it wasn`t clear in my
1udge: But now sir I am going to give you credit Ior your alleged habitability issues. The rent
that is due as oI today will be 4,500. I`m going to give you credit Ior the stairs oI 1250, weeds
oI 350 weeds oI 350 twice. The garbage disposal 125 and the window 150 which comes out
to 2225. In addition I`m going to give you 500 credit Ior the mold abatement, which is 2725.
So the 4500 minus 2225 is 2275. I will continue this till tomorrow at 9:00 AM Ior you to
deposit the 20. It won`t be tomorrow it will be Monday.
installation iI you wouldn`t mind." (such a counterclaim's nexus oI Iacts is so closely tied here
to the possessory action as to make it reversible error Ior Judge SIerrazza or Flanagan to
reIuse to permit Coughlin to bring such a claim or at the very least assert a set-oII (nevermind
the Iact that there was no testimony by Merliss as to how much rent was owed (much less a
veriIied aIIidavit swearing to such or that his claim is "authorized by law" as required by NRS
40.254...)
third party.
1udge: That is not habitability sir, that has nothing to do .
1udge: Who said?
1udge: Well.
Defendant: Clearly.
1udge: Yeah and |inaudible 0:48:58| that they are his agents I Iind they are in independent
amount oI 2275 I will continue this Ior Trial on the merits to determine whether or not there
really is a habitability issue. II the rent is not deposited then there will be no continuance the
eviction will be granted Iorthwith on Monday morning at 9:00 o`clock. And Iurthermore the
court is now making any Iinding other than that you have made an argument about
habitability and that you are entitled to Trial on that issue iI you deposit the rent. Alright but
you are not entitled to Trial iI you don`t deposit the rent. And I have given you credit based
on your allegation which is, which I do not Iind was substantiated today; I simply Iind that
you made that allegation, that this is what you were owed. And so iI you deposit the rent then
we will set this Ior Trial and it will be the Iollowing week aIter that on the same court day.
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The same day oI the week.
Defendant: Tuesdays and Thursday. So on the Tuesday it will be at 10:00 AM.
1udge: What day is that?
Defendant: Well you are looking at, okay he has had until 17th to post the 2275 and you are
saying have the hearing the Iollowing week that will be 25th October.
1udge: Okay 25th October what time?
Defendant: That would be at 10:00 o`clock.
1udge: Alright, so that`s the court`s order and I will see you back then have a good day.
|0:51:42|
31/"
It is intellectually dishonest and inaccurate Ior Baker to suggest something like how
much rent his client Ielt was due was "actually litigated" or "not disputed" in 1492 (especially
where Judge SIerrazza alleges the landlord dismissed that case (actually, it would seem only
judges are allowed to "dismiss" cases...) where Baker and Merliss turned tail and ran Irom
that case. Regardless, Baker Iailed to incorporate by reIernce or otherwise have admitted into
evidence (diIIicult to have any such itemized non-pay notice Irom 1492 authenticated when
landlord Merliss Iails to show up...when Coughlin allegedly Iailed to show up on 3/15/12 (or
was allegedly a couple minutes late) in Rev12-375, Coughlin's Iiling oI 3/8/12, apparently,
did not suIIice to speak Ior
him, though it was 40 pages and veriIied...
MROA 315: "Plaintiff: Yes. My understanding is the only rent deduction ever
agreed to by the landlord
was $350; I believe it was for 1une it could have been for May, for Mr. Coughlin to deal
with
the weeds. That was not disputed and in fact Your Honor if we go back to the last case,
the
quantification of the rent in our five day no pay Notice gives credit for that. The court
gave
credit for it in its minute order. Dr Merliss also paid landscapers to"
At MROA 302:7-12, Baker himselI admits that NRCP 56(c)'s Iirst prong ("genuine
issue oI material Iact") is not a part oI the NRS 40.253(6) analysis, but rather, its the second
JMOL prong that the Legislature chose to place alone in that statute:
"Defendant: Yes Your Honor I think that hits the nail right on the head. This is a summary
proceeding provided by statute NRS 40.254 and NRS 40.253(6). The only issue here today is
possession oI the property; the court`s inquiry is very focused and has only asked you
whether there is a legal defense to the alleged unlawIul detainer."
Its Iunny, where Coughlin's complaint that landlord Merliss was attempting to turn him
into a pro-bono handyman or property manager are echoed in Merliss Iailing to show up to
the 10/13/11 summary eviction proceeding. Being a landlord is a job...there is more to it than
cashing a rent check and paying oII the mortgage each month, yet Merliss did not even attend
the "evidentiary hearing" oI 10/13/11, nor, obviously, "participate" (see Baker's 2/24/12
Answering BrieI in 03628)
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: Although Coughlin has muddied the record to a
spectacular degree with his abusive Iilings, at its core, this is a simple no-cause residential
summary eviction case. The pertinent Iacts are as Iollows:
The underlying Iacts oI the eviction are set Iorth in the FFCL&O. The statutory notices
and other documentary evidence the court relied on in making its Iindings oI Iact can be
Iound at ROA, Vol. V, pp. 85-89; 90-94; 95-109; 113-128. EXHIBITS 2, 3, 4 and 5 hereto.
The Standard Rental Agreement ("LEASE") Ior the home at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada
(the "PROPERTY") can be Iound at ROA, Vol. V, pp 129-132. EXHIBIT 6 hereto. Those
Iacts were established during two evidentiary hearings, in which Coughlin Iully participated.
The Iirst hearing was on October 13, 2011, and lasted 90 minutes. A continuation oI that
hearing occurred on October 25, 2011, and lasted several hours. l See FFCL&O at 1. The
purpose of those hearings was to "determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of the
tenant's and the landlord's affidavits," to determine whether there is any "legal defense
as to the alleged unlawful detainer," and whether "the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul
detainer".2 NRS 40.253(6). FFCL&O at 4, Para. 3. Those hearings were Coughlin's
eviction.
The only deIenses raised by Coughlin below were based on what he claimed was
"retaliatory" conduct by Merliss, and "habitability" issues at the property. Both deIenses were
based on provisions oI NRS Chapter 118A.3 See FFCL&O at 3, Para. 9 et seq. See, also,
ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266; ROA, Vol. V, pp. 194-198. At the Iirst hearing, Coughlin alleged
his deIenses, but did not oIIer any evidence to support them. Judge SIerrazza could have
granted an eviction aIter that hearing, but chose instead to allow Coughlin another
opportunity to substantiate his allegations.4 NRS 40.253(6). Since Coughlin's deIenses
were based on alleged "habitability" issues, the court required him to deposit, pursuant to
NRS 40.355(5), the amount of rent Coughlin claimed he had withheld Ior those reasons,
beIore he would be allowed to substantiate them with evidence.5 ROA, Vol.l, p. 153.
Coughlin ultimately failed to raise any material factual dispute, and the court properly
granted the eviction. The lockout was perIormed on November 1, 2011. Coughlin Iiled his
Iirst notice oI appeal on November 3, 2011.6 ROA Vol. III, pp. 229-233. On November
13,2011, Coughlin was Iound living in the basement oI the property, and was arrested.7 ROA,
Vol. III, pp. 18-33. Coughlin continues to Iile additional papers in both courts, wherein he
attempts to raise new arguments he never raised below.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "|A|n order granting summary eviction under NRS
40.253(6) should be reviewed on appeal based upon the standard Ior review oI an order
granting summary judgment under NRCP 56 because these proceedings are analogous.,,8
Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212, 215,163 P.3d 405 (2007). "To successfully
defend against a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must transcend the
pleadings and, by affidavit or other admissible evidence, introduce specific facts that
show a genuine issue of material fact . 9 Torrealba v. Kesmitis, 124 Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716
(2008).
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(UnlawIul detainer proceedings are designed to aIIord the owner or landlord a speedy remedy
to recover possession
oI his or her land aIter expiration oI the term oI the tenancy or right oI possession oI the
tenant.|8|.. Its rather telling that Merliss and Baker continually alleged that Coughlin's
tenancy or lease had "expired" on March 1, 2011...yet, no eviction was sought until August
22nd 2011...yet they expect one to believe such was not sought in retaliation, even where the
events oI May 23, 2011, and the written correspondence between Coughlin and Merliss,
especially those between March 2011 and August 2011 (with a special emphasis on May 2011
and August 11th - 16th, 2011) demonstrate a clear retaliatory animus and connection) Prima
facie right to possession must be shown clearly
Aev.Farnow v. Department 1 of Eighth 1udicial Dist. Court in and for Clark County,
64 Nev. 109, 178
P.2d 371 (1947).
|FN4| Ill.Beach v. Boettcher, 323 Ill. App. 79, 55 N.E.2d 104 (1st Dist. 1944).
Prima facie defense
N.Y.Core Management Corp. v. Loeb, 118 N.Y.S.2d 657 (App. Term 1952).
C. Statutory Dispossession Proceedings; Summary Proceedings 5. Pleadings 1554. Answer,
counteraIIidavit, and subsequent pleadings , Landlord and Tenant 291(9), 305, 305.1, 307 A
deIendant in a summary proceeding Ior possession oI lease property generally is required to
Iile an answer or other appropriate pleading. A deIendant in a summary proceeding Ior
possession oI lease property generally is required to Iile an answer or other appropriate
pleading.|1| The answer or other pleading may either deny the allegations oI plaintiII's
pleading|2| or set up new matter constituting a deIense.|3| An answer or other pleading oI the
deIendant is suIIicient where it sets up in proper Iorm any deIense that, iI established, will
prevent a recovery oI judgment by the plaintiII.|4| |FN4| Ill.Beach v. Boettcher, 323 Ill.
App. 79, 55 N.E.2d 104 (1st Dist. 1944). Prima Iacie deIense N.Y.Core Management Corp.
v. Loeb, 118 N.Y.S.2d 657 (App. Term 1952). C. Statutory Dispossession Proceedings;
Summary Proceedings 6. Evidence, Trial, and Disposition b. Conduct oI Proceedings; Trial
1563. Dismissal or nonsuit; directed verdict , Landlord and Tenant 291(16), 309 A summary
dispossession proceeding may be dismissed, or a nonsuit may be granted, where the plaintiII
Iails to prove a condition precedent. A summary dispossession proceeding may be dismissed,
or a nonsuit may be granted, where the plaintiII Iails to prove a condition precedent.|1| The
action also may be dismissed where the plaintiII Iails to prove a material allegation made by
him or her and denied by the deIendant.|2| A dismissal or nonsuit may and should be reIused,
however, where the plaintiII has made out a prima Iacie case.|3| |FN1| N.C.Warren v.
Breedlove, 219 N.C. 383, 14 S.E.2d 43 (1941). . As to conditions precedent to summary
dispossession proceedings, generally, see 1541. . |FN2| N.C.Sycamore Mills v. Hervey
Veneer Co., 228 N.C. 115, 44 S.E.2d 531 (1947). . OhioParrish v. Stranahan, 86 Ohio App.
178, 41 Ohio Op. 27, 54 Ohio L. Abs. 586, 88 N.E.2d 263 (2d . Dist. Franklin County 1949). .
|FN3| Neb.Hoerger v. City State Bank, 151 Neb. 321, 37 N.W.2d 393 (1949). . N.Y.
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Sosniak v. Marcus, 191 Misc. 927, 82 N.Y.S.2d 619 (App. Term 1948). . Wash.Archer v.
Archer Blower & Pipe Co., 32 Wash. 2d 246, 201 P.2d 191 (1948). .
6. Landlord's Possessory Remedies b. Summary Possessory Actions (4) DeIenses, SetoII, and
Counterclaims (c) Landlord's Retaliatory Conduct AmJur LLT 873. Generall The landlord-
and-tenant statutes oI many states allow deIenses in unlawIul-detainer or summary-eviction
actions based on a statutory prohibition against unlawIul retaliation.|FN1| Such a statute
may provide that where a tenant makes the required threshold showingFN2] or prima
facie case of retaliatory conduct,|FN3| the trier oI Iact shall presume that retaliatory action
was taken|FN4| unless the landlord proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence| FN5|
or satisIies the statutory grounds Ior rebuttal oI the presumptions.|FN6| In another
jurisdiction, retaliatory conduct is not presumed, so the tenant retains the burden oI proving
the aIIirmative deIense oI retaliatory conduct regarding an eviction or lease nonrenewal.|FN7|
|FN1| Van Buren Apartments v. Adams, 145 Ariz. 325, 701 P.2d 583 (Ct. App. Div. 2 1984);
Drouet v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 4th 583, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003); Correa
v. Ward, 91 Conn. App. 142, 881 A.2d 393 (2005); Miller v. District oI Columbia Rental
Housing Com'n, 870 A.2d 556 (D.C. 2005); Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 835
N.E.2d 615 (2005) (holding that a claim Ior unlawIul retaliation did not lie); HoIIman v.
Davenport-MetcalI, 851 A.2d 1083 (R.I. 2004) (Iinding no unlawIul retaliation occurred);
Criss v. Salvation Army Residences, 173 W. Va. 634, 319 S.E.2d 403 (1984). |FN2| Borger
Management, Inc. v. Sindram, 886 A.2d 52 (D.C. 2005). |FN3| Correa v. Ward, 91 Conn.
App. 142, 881 A.2d 393 (2005). |FN4| Correa v. Ward, 91 Conn. App. 142, 881 A.2d 393
(2005); Borger Management, Inc. v. Sindram, 886 A.2d 52 (D.C. 2005); Zimbovsky v. Tokar,
2005 Mass. App. Div. 100, 2005 WL 2219683 (2005). As to the presumption oI retaliation
arising under the UniIorm Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, see 874. |FN5| Borger
Management, Inc. v. Sindram, 886 A.2d 52 (D.C. 2005). |FN6| Correa v. Ward, 91 Conn.
App. 142, 881 A.2d 393 (2005). The statutory presumption that a tenant's eviction was
retaliatory based on her report oI code violations to the Health Department did not apply
where the tenant was evicted Ior nonpayment oI rent. Zimbovsky v. Tokar, 2005 Mass. App.
Div. 100, 2005 WL 2219683 (2005). |FN7| Houle v. Quenneville, 173 Vt. 80, 787 A.2d 1258
(2001).
CJS Statutory Dispossession Proceedings; Summary Proceedings 3. DeIenses 1546.
Limitation on available deIenses generally , Landlord and Tenant 290(3), 290(4), 298(1) Only
claims bearing directly on the right oI immediate possession ordinarily are cognizable.|3| As
such, aIIirmative deIenses are permissible only insoIar as they would, iI successIul, preclude
removal oI the tenant Irom the premises.|4| Thus, the tenant in a summary proceeding may
interpose legal deIenses|5 |FN5| N.Y.Janks v. Central City RooIing Co., 271 A.D. 545, 67
N.Y.S.2d 355 (4th Dep't 1947). .| that show that his or her occupancy is rightIul.|6|
Additionally, equitable deIenses and counterclaims implicating the right to possession are also
available in a summary process proceeding.|7| |FN3| IdahoCarter v. Zollinger, 146 Idaho
842, 203 P.3d 1241 (2009). . N.D.VND, LLC v. Leevers Foods, Inc., 2003 ND 198, 672
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N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 2003). . |FN4| Cal.Vella v. Hudgins, 20 Cal. 3d 251, 142 Cal. Rptr. 414,
572 P.2d 28 (1977). . As to the scope oI remedy available in summary proceedings Ior
possession, generally, see 1531. . |FN5| N.Y.Janks v. Central City RooIing Co., 271 A.D.
545, 67 N.Y.S.2d 355 (4th Dep't 1947). . |FN6| N.Y.Zraick v. Reyes, 204 Misc. 174, 123
N.Y.S.2d 775 (Mun. Ct. 1953). . OhioDavis v. Boyajian, Inc., 11 Ohio Misc. 97, 40 Ohio
Op. 2d 344, 229 N.E.2d 116 (C.P. 1967). . Tex.Young Women's Christian Ass'n oI Austin
v. Hair, 165 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1942), . writ reIused w.o.m., (Nov. 25, 1942).
. |FN7| Conn.19 Perry Street, LLC v. Unionville Water Co., 294 Conn. 611, 987 A.2d 1009
(2010). . Retaliatory eviction. A landlord's retaliation against a tenant Ior the tenant's assertion
or exercise oI rights may be a deIense to eviction.| 15| However, where the landlord rebuts a
presumption oI retaliation by establishing a nonretaliatory motive Ior an eviction, there is no
bar to issuance oI a writ oI possession.|16| The retaliation deIense to an eviction is not limited
to situations where the landlord acts illegally since a retaliatory motive may taint an action to
evict tenants that would otherwise be lawIul.|17| |FN15| Cal.Fisher v. City oI Berkeley,
37 Cal. 3d 644, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682, 693 P.2d 261 (1984), judgment aII'd, 475 U.S. 260, 106 S.
Ct. 1045, 89 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1986). . IdahoWright v. Brady, 126 Idaho 671, 889 P.2d 105
(Ct. App. 1995). . Assertion by month-to-month tenants AlaskaVinson v. Hamilton, 854
P.2d 733 (Alaska 1993). Report oI housing code violation Wis.Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis.
2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297, 40 A.L.R.3d 740 (1970). . |FN16| Me.Perreault v. Parker, 490
A.2d 203 (Me. 1985). . Not applicable upon termination oI Iixed-term lease Mich.
Frenchtown Villa v. Meadors, 117 Mich. App. 683, 324 N.W.2d 133 (1982). |FN17| D.C.
Gomez v. Independence Management oI Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276 (D.C. 2009).
LECAL DEFEASE :
Thus, the tenant in a summary proceeding may interpose legal deIenses|5 |FN5| N.Y.Janks
v. Central City RooIing Co., 271 A.D. 545, 67 N.Y.S.2d 355 (4th Dep't 1947). .| that show
that his or her occupancy is rightIul.
C. Statutory Dispossession Proceedings; Summary Proceedings 3. DeIenses 1547. Payment
oI rent , Landlord and Tenant 290(3), 290(4), 298(1) Payment oI rent, or a lawIul excuse Ior
nonpayment, may be asserted as a deIense in a summary proceeding based on a Iailure to pay
rent. Equitable as well as legal deIenses asserting payment oI rent, or absolution Irom
payment in whole or in part, are available to the tenant in a dispossess action and must be
considered by the court.|1| In summary proceedings based on a nonpayment oI rent, a good
deIense may be raised by showing a payment, settlement, release, or discharge oI the liability
Ior rent,|2| so that there is no rent due,|3| or there is a lawIul and suIIicient excuse Ior its
nonpayment.| 4| However, under the particular statute providing Ior the summary process, a
Iailure on the part oI the landlord may be irrelevant in assessing the propriety oI possessory
relieI since a tenant is not entitled to withhold rent based on any other asserted breach oI
contract.|5| Tender oI rent when due ordinarily is the equivalent oI payment and constitutes a
good deIense.|6| However, a tender oI rent aIter the due date may not constitute a deIense|7|
unless strict perIormance oI the terms oI the lease has been waived.|8| A tender or oIIer to
pay does not constitute a deIense when made aIter the termination oI the tenancy|9| iI the
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proceeding is brought on the ground oI holding over rather than Ior nonpayment oI rent|10|
nor is the Iact that the rent claimed is not due a deIense to the proceedings based on a
termination oI the term oI the lease although that Iact may be relevant to the landlord's right to
terminate the lease.|11| |FN1| N.J.Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526, 40
A.L.R.3d 1356 (1970). As to right oI action based on nonpayment oI rent, see 1540. As to
rights and liability Ior rents, generally, see 1077 to 1235. . |FN2| N.Y.Galluccio v.
Moscatiello, 74 N.Y.S.2d 897 (App. Term 1947). . OhioHoover v. Israel, 34 Ohio Op. 253,
45 Ohio L. Abs. 490, 68 N.E.2d 90 (Mun. Ct. 1946). . Acceptance oI rent Ill.Gaskins v.
Ristich, 339 Ill. App. 493, 90 N.E.2d 232 (4th Dist. 1950). N.Y.Howard v. Major Aircoach
Systems, Inc., 118 N.Y.S.2d 607 (App. Term 1952). Dismissal upon payment oI rent and
costs N.J.Community Realty Management, Inc. Ior Wrightstown Arms Apartments v.
Harris, 155 N.J. 212, . 714 A.2d 282 (1998). . |FN3| N.Y.De Vita v. Pianisani, 127 Misc.
611, 217 N.Y.S. 438 (App. Term 1926). . |FN4| Neb.Farmer v. Pitts, 108 Neb. 9, 187 N.W.
95, 24 A.L.R. 719 (1922). . Excuse insuIIicient Wash.Young v. Riley, 59 Wash. 2d 50, 365
P.2d 769 (1961). Withholding oI rent Ior repairs La.Leggio v. Manion, 172 So. 2d 748 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1965). Unreasonable change in renewal lease N.J.447 Associates v.
Miranda, 115 N.J. 522, 559 A.2d 1362 (1989). . |FN5| D.C.Pinzon v. A & G Properties,
874 A.2d 347 (D.C. 2005). .|FN8| Ga.Arnold v. Selman, 83 Ga. App. 145, 62 S.E.2d 915
(1951). Failure to present check Ga.Yates v. Farmer, 102 Ga. App. 570, 117 S.E.2d 211
(1960). . |FN9| Ala.Allen v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 205 Ala. 363, 87 So. 562 (1921). .
N.Y.Finkelstein v. Fabyik, 107 N.Y.S. 67 (App. Term 1907). . |FN10| Ga.ShiIlett v.
Anchor Rome Mills, 78 Ga. App. 428, 50 S.E.2d 853 (1948). . N.C.Seligson v. Klyman,
227 N.C. 347, 42 S.E.2d 220 (1947). . Vt.CanIield v. Hall, 121 Vt. 479, 160 A.2d 768
(1960). . As to holding over as grounds Ior a summary dispossession proceeding, see 1537
to 1540. . |FN11| Conn.Webb v. Ambler, 125 Conn. 543, 7 A.2d 228 (1939). . CJS
LANDLORD 1547 XII. Reentry and Recovery oI Possession by Landlord C. Statutory
Dispossession Proceedings; Summary Proceedings 2. Right oI Action and Grounds a.
Grounds 1538. Holding over , Landlord and Tenant 290(2), 296(1), 389 The statutes
prescribing summary process Ior possession generally authorize such proceedings to oust
tenants holding over aIter the expiration or termination oI their terms. The statutes prescribing
summary process Ior possession generally authorize such proceedings to oust tenants holding
over aIter the expiration or termination oI their terms.|1| In the absence oI a contractual right
to terminate the tenancy beIore its natural expiration date,|2| a tenant may not be summarily
removed under such a statute until the expiration or termination oI the term within the
meaning oI the statute.|3| |FN1| U.S.Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hansen & Rowland
Corp., 166 F.2d 258 (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1948). N.Y.Remedco Corp. v. Bryn Mawr Hotel
Corp., 45 Misc. 2d 586, 257 N.Y.S.2d 525 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1965). Vt.CanIield v. Hall,
121 Vt. 479, 160 A.2d 768 (1960). Alternative remedies Commercial landlords possess three
separate, yet somewhat overlapping, remedies Ior removing a tenant who holds over aIter the
expiration oI a lease, including the historic common-law remedy oI ejectment, an unlawIul-
detainer action, and a tenant-removal action. Fla.Pro-Art Dental Lab, Inc. v. V-Strategic
Group, LLC, 986 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 2008). |FN2| N.Y.Baumeister v. Casieri, 32 Misc. 2d
654, 228 N.Y.S.2d 339 (App. Term 1961). |FN3| Conn.Feneck v. Nowakowski, 146 Conn.
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434, 151 A.2d 891 (1959). N.Y.Baumeister v. Casieri, 32 Misc. 2d 654, 228 N.Y.S.2d 339
(App. Term 1961). Vt.CanIield v. Hall, 121 Vt. 479, 160 A.2d 768 (1960). CJS
LANDLORD 1538
All the ambiguity in the lease agreement as to the lack oI a deIined termination date
arguably means that Merliss had not right to terminate the lease Ior no cause, ever, and
Iurther, that the lease never expired (term is listed in Paragraph 2 oI the lease as "no less than
12 months", which is Iar diIIerent than "12 months"):
Ambiguous provision requires nonsummary proceedings
Nev.Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212, 163 P.3d 405 (2007).
both legal and equitable deIenses available: Where the lessees do not raise issues oI
title through their aIIirmative deIenses in a Iorcible entry and unlawIul
detainer action brought by the lessor, and the issues they raise instead involve the question oI
whether there has been
an unlawIul detainer, both equitable and legal deIenses may be litigated to resolve such
issues.|13|FN13| N.M.Wal-Go Associates v. Leon, 95 N.M. 565, 624 P.2d 507 (1981).
C. Statutory Dispossession Proceedings; Summary Proceedings 3. DeIenses 1547. Payment

oI rent , Landlord and Tenant 290(3), 290(4), 298(1) Payment oI rent, or a lawIul excuse Ior
nonpayment, may be asserted as a deIense in a summary proceeding based on a Iailure to pay
rent. Equitable as well as legal deIenses asserting payment oI rent, or absolution Irom
payment in whole or in part, are available to the tenant in a dispossess action and must be
considered by the court.|1| I |FN1| N.J.Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526, 40
A.L.R.3d 1356 (1970).
II. Appealable Matters
A. In General; Finality
2. Factors Considered in Determining Finality
a. In General
Topic Summary Correlation Table ReIerences
84. Effect of post-trial motion
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k66, 76(3), 78(6)
Since an appeal will only lie Irom a Iinal decision, the Iiling oI a postjudgment motion
ordinarily suspends the appealability oI the judgment until a decision is made on the motion.
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|FN1| The Federal Rules oI Appellate Procedure provide that iI a party timely Iiles in the
district court any oI the Iollowing motions, as authorized the various provisions oI the Federal
Rules oI Civil Procedure, the time to Iile an appeal runs Ior all parties Irom the entry oI the
order disposing oI the last such remaining motion:|FN2|
(1) Motion Ior judgment under Rule 50(b);
(2) Motion to amend or make additional Iactual Iindings under Rule 52(b), whether or not
granting the motion would alter the judgment;
(3) Motion Ior attorney's Iees under Rule 54, iI the district court extends the time to appeal
under Rule 58;
(4) Motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59;
(5) Motion Ior a new trial under Rule 59; or
(6) Motion Ior relieI under Rule 60, iI the motion is Iiled no later than 10 days aIter the
judgment is entered.
II a party Iiles a notice oI appeal aIter the court announces or enters a judgment, but beIore
it disposes oI any oI the Ioregoing motions, the notice becomes eIIective to appeal a judgment
or order, in whole or in part, when the order disposing oI the last such remaining motion is
entered.|FN3|
Under similar state rules, when a post-trial motion is pending beIore an appeal is taken, the
judgment or decision to which the motion is addressed is interlocutory until the trial court
rules on the motion, and iI the nonmoving party appeals while the motion is pending, the ap
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peal is premature because the appeal was not taken Irom a Iinal judgment.|FN4| Thus,
Iinality does not attach to any judgment in a civil proceeding, so as to invoke the jurisdiction
oI the state supreme court over an appeal, while a timely Iiled motion Ior reargument is
pending in the lower court.|FN5| Likewise, a civil deIendant's motions Ior a new trial and Ior
judgment notwithstanding the verdict will render the judgment nonappealable until the trial
court enters an order disposing oI the motions, or the motions are deemed denied.|FN6|
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
A renewed motion Ior judgment as a matter oI law Iollowing verdict is not allowed unless
the movant sought relieI on similar grounds beIore the case was submitted to the jury. Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 171 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2008).
Pendency oI two motions in district court that sought permission to cash check that had
already been deposited in attorney's trust account and Ior which partial satisIaction oI
judgment had been Iiled did not aIIect Iinality oI other postjudgment orders Ior purposes oI
immediate appeal. Tweedle v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 527 F.3d 664 (8th Cir. 2008).
Case in which timely motion to alter or amend judgment has been Iiled lacks Iinality Ior
appeal because the motion tolls the time limitation Ior appeal in order to provide the trial
court with jurisdiction to resolve the motion. Tweedle v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 527 F.3d
664 (8th Cir. 2008).
END OF SUPPLEMENT]
|FN1| Century Laminating, Ltd. v. Montgomery, 595 F.2d 563, 27 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
264 (10th Cir. 1979).
|FN2| Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A).
|FN3| Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i).
|FN4| IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621 (Iowa 2000).
|FN5| Bowen v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., Inc., 879 A.2d 920 (Del. 2005).
|FN6| Thompson v. TLAT, Inc., 205 Or. App. 518, 134 P.3d 1099 (2006). 2012
Thomson Reuters. 33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt.
Works. All rights reserved. AMJUR APPELLATE 84
Tenants waived on appeal their argument that trial judge was required to Iind at least
clear and convincing prooI oI tenants' breach oI a lease agreement, where they did not raise
the issue in the trial court in eviction proceedings. Koon v. Fares, 379 S.C. 150, 666 S.E.2d
230 (2008).
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Tenant Iailed to preserve on appeal argument that judge's alleged ex parte
communications with landlord warranted recusal, where tenant Iailed to raise issue in the trial
court. Koon v. Fares, 379 S.C. 150, 666 S.E.2d 230 (2008).
The Justice Court never ruled on whether Couglhin could get a stay under NRS
40.385, or upon the posting oI a supersedeas bond pursuant thereto oI $250. As such, Iinall
appellate jurisdiction as to such where there was no "decision in" the justice court as to those
issues, does not lie with the District Court, but, rather, it was the Order in District Court
denying Coughlin's 12/30/11 Motion Ior Stay pursuant to NRS 40.385 that was the Iirst
decision thereon, and as such was a "decision in" or matter "arising in" the District Court and
B. Appealability or Reviewability oI Particular Types oI Decisions, Proceedings, or Issues
1. Preliminary Matters
b. Mode oI Trial
138. Stay of proceedings
West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k70(6), 870(2) West's Key Number Digest,
Federal Courts k572.1, 574, 576.1, 585.1
A.L.R. Library
Stay oI civil proceedings pending determination oI action in Iederal court in same state, 56
A.L.R.2d 335
Appealability oI order granting or reIusing stay or continuance under Iederal civil relieI
act because oI litigant's military service, 34 A.L.R.2d 1149
Stay oI civil proceedings pending determination oI action in another state or country, 19
A.L.R.2d 301
Since the general policy oI the law is to permit an appeal only Irom Iinal judgments or
decisions in the absence oI a statute or rule speciIically providing otherwise, an order or
decree staying, or reIusing to stay, a state civil action because another civil action is pending
in state court generally is not reviewable by appeal.|FN1| However, an appeal oI a stay may
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be allowed on the ground that the 'stay is, in eIIect, an injunction and thus immediately
appealable under a statutory provision authorizing review oI the entry oI an injunction.|FN2|
An order granting|FN3| or denying|FN4| a stay in Iederal civil cases likewise ordinarily is
not a Iinal, appealable order. On the other hand, an order granting a stay in Iederal court
pending resolution oI a state suit is Iinal and appealable when the res judicata eIIect oI the
judgment in state court would preclude Iurther litigation in Iederal court,|FN5| the
postponement oI which renders the Iederal plaintiII eIIectively out oI court,|FN6| and is
tantamount to a dismissal oI the underlying suit,|FN7| even where the language suggests the
order is subject
to revision|FN8| or progress reports.|FN9|
In addition, a nontentative, Iinal decision to stay Iederal litigation under the abstention
doctrine is immediately appealable, under the general Iederal appellate jurisdiction stat-ute,
|FN10| where the objective oI the stay is to require all or an essential part oI the Iederal suit to
be litigated in a state Iorum.|FN11| However, the Iederalism concerns posed by the abstention
problem are not implicated by a motion to stay in Iavor oI an action in another Iederal district.
|FN12|
A stay order is also appealable under 28 U.S.C.A. 1291 where
1.it eIIectively deprives the plaintiII oI his or her day in court, as where a prisoner's suit is
stayed until his or her release Irom incarceration.|FN13|
2.it limits the stay to which a receiver is entitled under Iederal law.|FN14|
3.a delay results in a denial oI justice, such as in a school desegregation case.|FN15|
4.a civil action alleging that a criminal prosecution would violate the plaintiIIs' constitutional
rights is stayed pending trial oI the criminal action.|FN16|
A district court's stay order in a suit challenging the enIorcement oI a provision oI a liquor
code prohibiting 'lewd, immoral, or improper entertainment in a Iacility holding a liquor
license, and implementing a regulation, did not Iinally resolve a disputed question or raise an
important issue distinct Irom the merits, but rather, it merely caused a delay, and, thus, was
not appealable.|FN17|
Cases:
Although district court's Iirst order granted Indian tribe partial summary judgment on IS-
DEAA claim Ior selI-determination contract Ior reservation health services, and directed tribe
and Department oI Health and Human Service (HHS) to draIt Iorm oI injunctive relieI, court's
second order in Iavor oI HHS's approach as to contract start date and payment oI contract
support costs did not expressly grant injunctive relieI, as would allow review oI second order,
since second order was merely step in litigation process stating that tribe was entitled to relieI,
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but did not enter judgment on merits speciIying that relieI. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v.
Leavitt, 564 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2009).
END OF SUPPLEMENT]
|FN1| Almon v. R. H. Macy & Co., 103 Ga. App. 372, 119 S.E.2d 140 (1961); Richard's
Buick, Inc. v. Sease, 116 Ga. App. 232, 156 S.E.2d 365 (1967), judgment aII'd, 223 Ga. 754,
158 S.E.2d 402 (1967); HighIield Water Co. v. Washington County Sanitary Dist., 295 Md.
410, 456 A.2d 371 (1983).
|FN2| Washington Suburban Sanitary Com'n v. C.I. Mitchell and Best Co., 303 Md. 544, 495
A.2d 30 (1985).
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|FN3| Boushel v. Toro Co., 985 F.2d 406 (8th Cir. 1993); Rolo v. General Development
Corp., 949 F.2d 695 (3d Cir. 1991). |FN4| Reise v. Board oI Regents oI University oI
Wisconsin System, 957 F.2d 293, 73 Ed. Law Rep. 348, 21 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 927 (7th Cir.
1992); U.S. v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 562 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1977); Anderson v. U.S., 520 F.2d
1027 (5th Cir. 1975). |FN5| Burns v. Watler, 931 F.2d 140 (1st Cir. 1991); Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Madonna, 914 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1990). |FN6| Rojas-Hernandez v. Puerto Rico Elec.
Power Authority, 925 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1991). |FN7| Boushel v. Toro Co., 985 F.2d 406 (8th
Cir. 1993); Cheyney State College Faculty v. HuIstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 10 Ed. Law Rep. 66
(3d Cir. 1983). |FN8| General Reinsurance Corp. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 853 F.2d 78 (2d Cir.
1988). |FN9| Burns v. Watler, 931 F.2d 140 (1st Cir. 1991). |FN10| 28 U.S.C.A. 1291,
discussed generally in 79. |FN11| Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1989). |FN12|
Harmon Kardon, Inc. v. Ashley Hi-Fi, 602 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1979). |FN13| McKnight v.
Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 999 (5th Cir. 1982). |FN14| Praxis Properties,
Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 947 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1991), as amended on denial oI reh'g,
(Nov. 13, 1991). |FN15| Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. oI Ed. oI Nashville and Davidson
County, Tenn., 436 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1970). |FN16| McSurely v. McClellan, 426 F.2d 664,
13 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1970). |FN17| Conchatta, Inc. v. Evanko, 83 Fed. Appx.
437 (3d Cir. 2003). 2012 Thomson Reuters. 33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No
Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. All rights reserved. AMJUR APPELLATE 138
1. Preliminary Matters
c. Jurisdiction and Process; Venue
142. Jurisdiction
West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k70(.5), 870(2) West's Key Number Digest,
Federal Courts k576.1, 585.1
A decision in the course oI a trial, overruling an objection to the court's jurisdiction, is usually
not directly appealable, any error in the decision thereon being reviewed only on appeal Irom
the Iinal judgment.|FN1| However, a trial court's declination to try a case on the ground that it
lacks jurisdiction is not merely an interlocutory decision, but a Iinal and thereIore appealable
decision.|FN2|
A state court judgment aIIirming the denial oI a deIendant's motion to dismiss a complaint Ior
want oI personal jurisdiction, challenging the constitutionality oI a long-arm statute, may
constitute a Iinal judgment Ior the purpose oI review in the United States Supreme Court.
|FN3| Similarly, a decision by a highest state court that the courts oI that state have
jurisdiction to adjudicate an action based upon sequestration oI the deIendant's property in the
state is a Iinal judgment reviewable by the Supreme Court pursuant to statute,|FN4| where, iI
an immediate appeal is not permitted, the appellants would have the choice oI suIIering the
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entry oI a deIault judgment or oI entering a general appearance and deIending on the mer-its.
|FN5|
A Iederal district court's order in a civil rights case declining to retain supplemental
jurisdiction over the plaintiII's state law claims is an unappealable interlocutory order, rather
than an immediately appealable Iinal order, where the order leaves intact the plaintiII's Iederal
law claims.|FN6|
|FN1| Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 293 S.E.2d 182 (1982).
|FN2| First American Nat. Bank oI Iuka v. Alcorn, Inc., 361 So. 2d 481, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1240 (Miss. 1978); Southern Spindle and Flyer Co., Inc. v. Milliken & Co., 53 N.C. App.
785, 281 S.E.2d 734 (1981); Speer v. Stover, 685 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. 1985). |FN3| Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 LED 2d 490 (1980). |FN4| 28 U.S.C.A.
1257. |FN5| ShaIIer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977).
|FN6| Montano v. City oI Chicago, 375 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2004). 2012 Thomson Reuters.
33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. All rights
reserved. AMJUR APPELLATE 142
5. Particular Types oI Judgments
161. Summary judgment
West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k78(1) West's Key Number Digest, Federal
Courts k576.1, 585.1, 595
An order granting a motion Ior summary judgment generally is appealable, since it is a
Iinal decision,|FN1| at least when the motion is granted on the whole case.|FN2| An order
granting partial summary judgment Irom which no immediate appeal lies is merged into the
Iinal judgment and reviewable on appeal Irom that Iinal judgment.|FN3| An order granting
partial summary judgment is not appealable, despite a voluntary dismissal oI the remaining
claims without prejudice, even though the dismissal order appears to be Iinal on its Iace,
where the parties have agreed to allow the plaintiII to reIile the dismissed claims at a later
point in time.|FN4| Similarly, summary judgment granted to Iewer than all oI the deIendants
in an action is not Iinal as to all parties and thereIore not immediately appealable, where the
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remaining deIendant or deIendants did not join in the motion Ior summary judgment and the
district court does not certiIy the order as appealable.|FN5|
Ordinarily, a court oI appeals has no jurisdiction to hear an immediate appeal Irom a
district court order denying summary judgment, because it is not a Iinal decision.|FN6| The
denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment generally is an interlocutory decision only, and
thereIore not directly appealable, since such a denial is not an adjudication on the merits
against the movant and he or she is not thereby Ioreclosed Irom the possibility oI prevailing in
the case when the Iacts are developed.|FN7| II the only order in the trial court is one
overruling a motion Ior summary judgment, that order generally is interlocutory and no
appeal will lie.|FN8| The trial court's denial oI summary judgment as to one claim establishes
that Iact issues still remain Ior resolution at trial, and this denial, in turn, renders the entire
order interlocutory, thereby precluding appellate review.|FN9|
Observation:
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When an appeal Irom denial oI summary judgment is raised in tandem with appeal oI an order
granting a cross-motion Ior summary judgment, a United States Court oI Appeals has
jurisdiction to review the propriety oI the denial oI summary judgment by a district court.
|FN10|
Practice Tip:
The provision oI the Federal Rules oI Civil Procedure allowing certiIication oI an appeal Irom
an order involving Iewer than all claims or parties|FN11| is the proper vehicle Ior a motion to
reconsider a denial oI summary judgment, because this type oI order is interlocutory in nature.
|FN12|
However, Ior purposes oI the collateral order doctrine and the requirement, under the
general Iederal appellate jurisdiction statute,|FN13| oI a Iinal decision Ior immediate
appealability Irom a Iederal district court to a Iederal court oI appeals, not every denial oI
summary judgment is nonappealable.|FN14| A Iederal appellate court has jurisdiction oI an
appeal Irom the denial oI a summary judgment motion on the grounds oI qualiIied immunity
where it involves a purely legal question,|FN15| and the district court's mere assertion that
disputed Iactual issues exist is not enough to preclude an immediate appeal oI an order
denying summary judgment on qualiIied immunity grounds.|FN16|
An order denying summary judgment ordinarily is immediately appealable where the
motion is made on the basis oI the qualiIied immunity oI a public oIIicer or employee.|FN17|
Likewise, denial oI a summary judgment motion based on absolute immunity is immediately
appealable since it is an issue oI law, separable Irom the merits oI the case, which once denied
cannot be eIIectively preserved Ior later review.|FN18| On the other hand, denial oI a police
oIIicer's motion Ior summary judgment on qualiIied immunity grounds in a civil rights action
Ior Ialse arrest and malicious prosecution is not immediately appealable where the district
court has ruled that a genuine issue oI material Iact existed as to whether it was reasonable Ior
the oIIicer to believe that probable cause existed Ior the arrest.|FN19| In a case in which an
individual, asserting that police oIIicers have used excessive Iorce by beating the individual,
brings a civil rights action against the oIIicers, and the oIIicers, who as government oIIicials
are entitled to assert a qualiIied immunity deIense to the action, move Ior summary judgment
as to the excessive Iorce question on the basis oI the argument that the record lacks suIIicient
evidence that the oIIicers beat the individual or were present when others did so, the portion
oI a Iederal district court's order denying the summary judgment motion as to the evidence
suIIiciency question, based on the district court's determination that the record raises a
genuine issue oI Iact concerning the oIIicers' involvement in the alleged beating, is not a Iinal
decision that is immediately appealable by the oIIicers as a collateral order.|FN20|
A district court's denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment based on qualiIied immunity,
in an arrestee's civil rights action, is an immediately appealable 'Iinal decision within the
meaning oI the statute providing Ior appeals Irom Iinal decisions oI district courts, even
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though the district court has Iound genuine issues oI material Iact that precluded summary
judgment, where the deIendant claims in his or her brieI to the court oI appeals that he or she
is entitled to qualiIied immunity even under the arrestee's version oI the Iacts.|FN21| Thus,
Ior example, a court oI appeals has jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal Irom a denial
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oI summary judgment based on qualiIied immunity, where the appellant concedes the
plaintiII-appellee's version oI the Iacts Ior purposes oI appeal and contends that he or she is
entitled to qualiIied immunity as a matter oI law on those Iacts.|FN22|
Summary judgment issues that are inextricably intertwined with the issue oI the propriety
oI the denial oI a preliminary injunction, over which a United States Court oI Appeals has
interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, can be addressed in an appeal Irom the denial oI
preliminary injunctive relieI.|FN23|
Caution:
The statute which grants the courts oI appeals jurisdiction oI appeals Irom certain
interlocutory orders, including those granting, continuing, modiIying, reIusing, or dissolving
injunctions, or reIusing to dissolve or modiIy injunctions, does not authorize an appeal Irom
orders denying motions Ior summary judgment because oI unresolved issues oI Iact.|FN24|
Whether public oIIicials have waived the deIense oI qualiIied immunity by Iailing to raise
it until they submitted a motion Ior summary judgment is an issue oI law over which a court
oI appeals has jurisdiction, under the collateral order doctrine, upon the oIIicials' appeal oI the
denial oI their motion Ior summary judgment.|FN25|
Cases:
DeIendant may not appeal order denying summary judgment on qualiIied immunity
grounds aIter Iull trial on merits; abrogating Goff v. Bise,173 F.3d 1068. Ortiz v. Jordan, 131
S. Ct. 884 (2011).
Court oI Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review district court's denial oI motion to vacate
denial oI deIendants' non-qualiIied-immunity-based summary judgment motion, in 1983
political discrimination action; deIendants' appeal was not Irom Iinal judgment. Guillemard-
Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 490 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2007).
Generally, the denial oI summary judgment is not a Iinal order subject to appeal; however,
it becomes so when accompanied by an order granting a cross-motion Ior summary judgment.
Lighthouse Institute Ior Evangelism, Inc. v. City oI Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2503 (U.S. 2008).
In 1983 action by Iormer county jail guards against other guards, alleging First
Amendment retaliation, deIendants could appeal Irom order conclusively denying motion Ior
summary judgment based on qualiIied immunity, whether or not the guards appealed Irom a
prior order denying a motion to dismiss the complaint and whether or not the motion Ior
summary judgment rested on new legal or Iactual arguments. Fairley v. Fermaint, 482 F.3d
897 (7th Cir. 2007).
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The court oI appeals may not review a district court's denial oI summary judgment on the
basis oI qualiIied immunity, insoIar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record
sets Iorth a genuine issue oI Iact Ior trial. Alston v. Read, 663 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2011).
Ordinarily a denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment is not a Iinal appealable order. 28
U.S.C.A. 1291. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010), petition Ior cert. Iiled
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(U.S. Aug. 17, 2010) and petition Ior cert. Iiled (U.S. Aug. 17, 2010). Ordinarily a denial oI a
motion Ior summary judgment is not a Iinal appealable order. 28
U.S.C.A. 1291. McComish v. Bennett, 605 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 2010). The law oI the case
doctrine does not apply to a denial oI summary judgment. Aycock Engineering, Inc. v.
AirIlite, Inc., 560 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
As a general rule, the denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment is neither reviewable nor
appealable, but that general rule does not apply where the reIusal to grant a summary
judgment motion has the eIIect oI determining that the appellant is not entitled to immunity
Irom suit, as the right oI immunity Irom suit is eIIectively lost iI a case is permitted to go to
trial. City oI Fayetteville v. Romine, 373 Ark. 318, 284 S.W.3d 10 (2008).
appealable, but that general rule does not apply where the reIusal to grant a summary
judgment motion has the eIIect oI determining that the appellant is not entitled to immunity
Irom suit, as the right oI immunity Irom suit is eIIectively lost iI a case is permitted to go to
trial.. City oI Fayetteville v. Romine, 373 Ark. 318, 284 S.W.3d 10 (2008).
The general rule that the denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment is neither reviewable
nor appealable does not apply where the reIusal to grant a summary-judgment motion has the
eIIect oI determining that the appellant is not entitled to immunity Irom suit, as the right oI
immunity Irom suit is eIIectively lost iI a case is permitted to go to trial. Arkansas River
Educational Services v. Modacure, 371 Ark. 466, 267 S.W.3d 595, 238 Ed. Law Rep. 918
(2007).
appealable. Arkansas River Educational Services v. Modacure, 371 Ark. 466, 267 S.W.3d
595, 238 Ed. Law Rep. 918 (2007).
A denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment is not subject to review on appeal, even aIter
a trial on the merits. Get Rid OI It Arkansas, Inc. v. Hughes, 368 Ark. 535, 247 S.W.3d 838
(2007).
The denial oI a summary judgment is not an appealable order and is not subject to review
on appeal, even aIter a trial on the merits. Flagstar Bank v. Gibbins, 367 Ark. 225, 238
S.W.3d 912 (2006).
In determining whether the parties' respective burdens were met on a deIendant's motion
Ior summary judgment in an employment discrimination action, reviewing court must view
the evidence in the light most Iavorable to plaintiII, as the nonmoving party, liberally
construing her evidence while strictly scrutinizing deIendant's. Scotch v. Art Institute oI
CaliIornia-Orange County, Inc., 173 Cal. App. 4th 986, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 338, 244 Ed. Law
Rep. 211 (4th Dist. 2009).
Statute requiring liberal construction oI pleadings is irrelevant in the Court oI Appeal's
review oI the granting oI a motion Ior summary judgment based on plaintiIIs' Iailure to meet
their burden to establish a triable issue oI material Iact. Gomez v. Lincare, Inc., 173 Cal. App.
4th 508, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 388 (4th Dist. 2009), as modiIied, (Apr. 28, 2009) and review
denied, (July 22, 2009).
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Trial court's order denying employer's motion Ior summary judgment and granting its
motion Ior summary adjudication only as to employee's claims Ior providing paystubs
containing misstatements and Ior Iailing to provide meal and rest periods was an appealable
order, even though it did not dispose oI three oI employee's causes oI action, where trial court
had certiIied subclasses on the paystub and meal time claims; the order terminated all claims
on behalI
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oI the paystub and meal time subclasses. Brinkley v. Public Storage, Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d
873 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2008), as modiIied, (Nov. 5, 2008) and review granted and opinion
superseded, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 674, 198 P.3d 1087 (Cal. 2009).
The denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment is ordinarily not an appealable Iinal
judgment; however, iI parties Iile cross motions Ior summary judgment and the court grants
one and denies the other, the appellate court has jurisdiction to consider both rulings on
appeal. HannaIord v. Mann, 134 Conn. App. 265, 38 A.3d 1239 (2012).
Denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment is not ordinarily appealable because it is not a
Iinal judgment, but where the case has not gone to trial, summary judgments are appealable
because the rationale that a decision based on more evidence should preclude a decision based
on less evidence is not applicable in that situation. Papapietro v. Farmington Police Dept., 129
Conn. App. 695, 22 A.3d 634 (2011).
Although the denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment ordinarily is not appealable
because it is not a Iinal judgment, the denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment on the basis
oI a claim oI res judicata is a Iinal judgment Ior purposes oI appeal because it invokes the
right not to go to trial on the merits. Sotavento Corp. v. Coastal Pallet Corp., 102 Conn. App.
828, 927 A.2d 351 (2007).
The grant oI a motion Ior summary judgment in a multi-party case will not, standing
alone, necessarily authorize the initiation oI a direct appeal thereIrom by any party to the
underlying case; rather, an appeal must be Iiled by one who has standing to pursue it. Davis v.
Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 285 Ga. 22, 673 S.E.2d 221 (2009).
An order denying a motion Ior summary judgment is not an appealable order itselI, nor is
it reviewable on appeal Irom a Iinal judgment. Grover v. Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 205 P.3d
1196 (2009).
Supreme Court does not review the denial oI summary judgment when there has been a
trial on the merits. Bybee v. Isaac, 145 Idaho 251, 178 P.3d 616 (2008).
Reviewing a summary judgment disposition, Supreme Court construes all evidence strictly
against the movant and liberally in Iavor oI the nonmoving party. Buenz v. Frontline Transp.
Co., 227 Ill. 2d 302, 317 Ill. Dec. 645, 882 N.E.2d 525 (2008).
A ruling denying a motion Ior summary judgment merges into the judgment aIter trial, and
the ruling is not reviewable on appeal. Robinson v. Tellabs, Inc., 391 Ill. App. 3d 60, 329 Ill.
Dec. 910, 907 N.E.2d 501 (1st Dist. 2009), appeal denied, 233 Ill. 2d 600, 335 Ill. Dec. 646,
919 N.E.2d 365 (2009).
In a review oI summary judgment, all Iacts established by the designated evidence, and all
reasonable inIerences Irom them, are to be construed in Iavor oI the nonmoving party. (Per
Boehm, J., with one judge concurring and one judge concurring in the result). Overton v.
Grillo, 896 N.E.2d 499 (Ind. 2008).
On appeal Irom a grant oI summary judgment, an appellate court must construe all Iacts
and reasonable inIerences in Iavor oI the non-moving party. Barnett v. Clark, 889 N.E.2d 281
(Ind. 2008).
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Appellate court will aIIirm summary judgment unless there is a genuine issue as to a
material Iact or the moving party is not entitled to a judgment as a matter oI law. Kopczynski
v. Barger, 887 N.E.2d 928 (Ind. 2008).
The denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment is no longer appealable once the matter
proceeds to a trial on the merits. Lindsay v. Cottingham & Butler Ins. Services, Inc., 763
N.W.2d
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568 (Iowa 2009).
On appeal Irom summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same rules as the trial
court. Potts v. Board oI County Com'rs oI Leavenworth County, 39 Kan. App. 2d 71, 176
P.3d 988 (2008).
Generally, a denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment is, Iirst, not appealable because oI
its interlocutory nature and, second, is not reviewable on appeal Irom a Iinal judgment where
the question is whether there exists a genuine issue oI material Iact; there is, however, an
exception to this rule that applies where: (1) the Iacts are not in dispute, (2) the only basis oI
the ruling is a matter oI law, (3) there is a denial oI the motion, and (4) there is an entry oI a
Iinal judgment with an appeal thereIrom. Hazard Coal Corp. v. Knight, 325 S.W.3d 290 (Ky.
2010).
In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court must determine whether the trial
court correctly Iound that there were no genuine issues as to any material Iact, and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter oI law. Jones v. Board oI Educ. oI Laurel
County, 2008 WL 4755327 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).
The denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment is not reviewable on appeal Irom a Iinal
judgment where the question is whether there exists a genuine issue oI material Iact; however
an exception to this rule is where: (1) the Iacts are not in dispute, (2) the only basis oI the
ruling is a matter oI law, (3) there is a denial oI the motion, and (4) there is an entry oI a Iinal
judgment with an appeal thereIrom. Gersh v. Bowman, 239 S.W.3d 567 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
A denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment, in whole or in part, is an interlocutory
judgment that is not appealable and cannot be certiIied as such; the same reasoning applies to
the denial oI exceptions. (Per McClendon, J., with one judge concurring and one judge
concurring in the result). Ascension School Employees Credit Union v. Provost Salter Harper
& AlIord, L.L.C., 960 So. 2d 939 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2007).
Because denials oI motions Ior summary judgment are interlocutory, generally they are
not immediately reviewable; when a denied motion Ior summary judgment addressed issues
oI privilege, immunity, or both Irom suit, however, the Supreme Judicial Court will review
such decisions based on judicially created exceptions to the Iinal-judgment rule. Morgan v.
Kooistra, 2008 ME 26, 941 A.2d 447 (Me. 2008).
Court oI Appeals only looks to the evidence submitted in opposition and support oI the
motion Ior summary judgment in reviewing the trial court's decision to grant the motion. La
Belle Epoque, LLC v. Old Europe Antidue Manor, LLC, 406 Md. 194, 958 A.2d 269 (2008).
On appeal Irom summary judgment, iI no material Iacts are placed in genuine dispute, the
appellate court must determine whether the trial court correctly entered summary judgment as
a matter oI law. Anderson v. Council oI Unit Owners oI Gables on Tuckerman Condominium,
404 Md. 560, 948 A.2d 11 (2008).
In considering a trial court's grant oI a motion Ior summary judgment, the appellate court
reviews the record in the light most Iavorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Council
oI Unit Owners oI Gables on Tuckerman Condominium, 404 Md. 560, 948 A.2d 11 (2008).
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Partial summary judgment is permissible, utilizing the same criteria Ior a grant or denial oI
a summary judgment and the same standard oI review on appeal. Waggoner v. Williamson, 8
So. 3d 147 (Miss. 2009).
The denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment is not subject to appellate review, even
when an appeal is taken Irom a Iinal judgment and not Irom the denial oI a motion Ior sum
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mary judgment. Brown v. Simmons, 335 S.W.3d 481 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 2010), transIer
denied, (Dec. 3, 2010) and reh'g and/or transIer denied, (Dec. 3, 2010).
On appeal Irom grant oI summary judgment to deIendant, Supreme Court views the Iacts
in the light most Iavorable to plaintiII. Livsey v. Mercury Ins. Group, 197 N.J. 522, 964 A.2d
312 (2009).
Facts as stated on appeal Irom summary judgment would be derived Irom evidence
submitted by the parties in support oI and in opposition to deIendant's summary judgment
motion, viewed in a light most Iavorable to plaintiII. Lebron v. Sanchez, 407 N.J. Super. 204,
970 A.2d 399, 244 Ed. Law Rep. 191 (App. Div. 2009).
For purposes oI an appeal Irom a trial court's entry oI summary judgment Ior the
prevailing party, the appealing party is not required to make assignments oI error, Ior the
reason that on appeal, review is necessarily limited to whether the trial court's conclusions as
to whether there is a genuine issue oI material Iact and whether the moving party is entitled to
judgment, both questions oI law, were correct. Schenkel & Shultz, Inc. v. Hermon F. Fox &
Associates, P.C., 362 N.C. 269, 658 S.E.2d 918 (2008).
Orders which deny summary judgment are ordinarily interlocutory and not appealable.
Harbin Yinhai Technology Development Co., Ltd. v. Greentree Financial Group, Inc., 677
S.E.2d 854 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
An order granting summary judgment is not appealable. Farmers Union Oil Co. oI
Garrison v. Smetana, 2009 ND 74, 764 N.W.2d 665 (N.D. 2009).
Denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment is generally not a Iinal appealable order. Sinnott
v. Aqua-Chem, Inc., 116 Ohio St. 3d 158, 2007-Ohio-5584, 876 N.E.2d 1217 (2007).
On appeal Irom an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court will review all
ambiguities, conclusions, and inIerences arising in and Irom the evidence in a light most
Iavorable to the non-moving party below. USAA Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clegg, 377
S.C. 643, 661 S.E.2d 791 (2008).
Appellate court reviews the grant oI a summary judgment motion under the same standard
as the trial court: summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any
material Iact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oI law. Austin v.
BeauIort County SheriII's OIIice, 377 S.C. 31, 659 S.E.2d 122 (2008).
On appeal Irom summary judgment, the appellate court is required to review the evidence
in the light most Iavorable to the nonmoving party and to draw all reasonable inIerences
Iavoring the nonmoving party. Martin v. NorIolk Southern Ry. Co., 271 S.W.3d 76 (Tenn.
2008).
Although the denial oI summary judgment is normally not appealable, the Supreme Court
may review such a denial when both parties moved Ior summary judgment and the trial court
granted one and denied the other. Texas Mun. Power Agency v. Public Utility Com'n oI
Texas, 253 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 2007).
There is no presumption oI Iinality Ior summary judgment orders, Ior purposes oI appeal.
Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chemical Co., 235 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. 2007).
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A person can appeal not only the denial oI summary judgment motion, but also the denial
oI a motion to dismiss, iI such a motion is based on an assertion oI immunity by an individual
who is an oIIicer or employee oI the state or a political subdivision oI the state. V.T.C.A.,
Civil Practice & Remedies Code 51.014(a), 101.106(e). University oI Texas Health
Science Center at Houston v. Crowder, 349 S.W.3d 640, 272 Ed. Law Rep. 1033 (Tex. App.
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Houston 14th Dist. 2011), reh'g overruled, (Aug. 10, 2011).
A non-movant needs no answer or response to a motion Ior summary judgment to contend
on appeal that the grounds expressly presented to the trial court by the movant's motion are
insuIIicient as a matter oI law to support summary judgment, because the trial court may not
grant a summary judgment by deIault Ior lack oI an answer or response. Gary E. Patterson &
Associates, P.C. v. Holub, 264 S.W.3d 180 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2008), review
denied, (Aug. 29, 2008).
Generally, a denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment is not a Iinal determination on the
merits and, thereIore, is not an appealable interlocutory order. Normandeau v. Hanson
Equipment, Inc., 2007 UT App 382, 174 P.3d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), cert. granted (Utah
Mar. 7, 2008).
Appellate court may exercise its discretion and rule on a denied motion Ior summary
judgment to serve the interest oI judicial economy where there are no genuine issues oI
material Iact. Walters v. A.A.A. WaterprooIing, Inc., 151 Wash. App. 316, 211 P.3d 454
(Div. 1 2009).
An expert's qualiIications and opinions are part and parcel oI a summary judgment, and
thereIore the Court oI Appeals does not deIer to the trial judge's rulings on evidence when
passing on the propriety oI a summary dismissal, but rather decides whether evidence is
suIIicient or should have been considered and to what extent. Hill v. Sacred Heart Medical
Center, 143 Wash. App. 438, 177 P.3d 1152 (Div. 3 2008).
Where an order granting summary judgment to a party completely disposes oI any issues
oI liability as to that party, the absence oI language prescribed by Rules oI Civil Procedure
indicating that "no just reason Ior delay" exists and "directi|ng| entry oI judgment" will not
render the order interlocutory and bar appeal provided that the appellate court can determine
Irom the order that the trial court's ruling approximates a Iinal order in its nature and eIIect.
Turner ex rel. Turner v. Turner, 223 W. Va. 106, 672 S.E.2d 242 (2008).
Supreme Court, when reviewing a ruling on a motion Ior summary judgment, determines
whether the complaint states an actionable claim. AccuWeb, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner, 2008
WI 24, 308 Wis. 2d 258, 746 N.W.2d 447 (2008).
Generally, the denial oI a motion Ior summary judgment is not an appealable Iinal order;
however, an exception to the general rule arises when a district court reIuses to dismiss a case
on the basis oI qualiIied immunity. State, Dept. oI Corrections v. Watts, 2008 WY 19, 177
P.3d 793 (Wyo. 2008).
END OF SUPPLEMENT]
|FN1| Ingalls v. Neidlinger, 70 Ariz. 40, 216 P.2d 387 (1950); Sligh v. Watson, 69 Ariz. 373,
214 P.2d 123 (1950) (overruled in part on other grounds by, Diamond v. Chiate, 81 Ariz. 86,
300 P.2d 583 (1956)); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99, 50 A.L.R.2d 246
(1954); Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955).
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|FN2| Bingham v. Kimbrell, 258 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1953); Ware v. Wright,
252 S.W.2d 1003 (Tex. Civ. App. Dallas 1952).
|FN3| Lind v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 254 F.3d 1281, 51 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 614
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(11th Cir. 2001). |FN4| Adonican v. City oI Los Angeles, 297 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2002).
|FN5| Hutchinson v. PIeil, 105 F.3d 566 (10th Cir. 1997). |FN6| Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451
F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2006). |FN7| Whitehead v. Baranco Color Labs, Inc., 353 So. 2d 793 (Ala.
1977); Madry v.
Sorel, 440 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1971); U.S. v. One Rockwell Intern. Commander 690
C/840, Serial Number 11627, 594 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.D. 1984), judgment rev'd on oth
er grounds, 754 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1985).
|FN8| Tobin v. Garcia, 159 Tex. 58, 316 S.W.2d 396 (1958).
|FN9| Acton v. City oI Columbia, Mo., 436 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2006).
|FN10| Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 16 A.D.D. 653 (3d Cir. 1996).
|FN11| Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), discussed in 113.
|FN12| Young v. Murphy, 161 F.R.D. 61 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
|FN13| 28 U.S.C.A. 1291, discussed generally in 79.
As to the collateral order doctrine, generally, see 105.
|FN14| Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 116 S. Ct. 834, 133 L. Ed. 2d 773, 34 Fed.
R. Serv. 3d 1 (1996). |FN15| Jemmott v. Coughlin, 85 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996). |FN16|
Rohman v. New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), 215 F.3d 208 (2d Cir.
2000). |FN17| Moore v. Gwinnett County, 967 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1992); McGovern v. City
oI Minneapolis, 475 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1991); City oI Houston v. Kilburn, 838 S.W.2d
344 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1992), writ denied with per curiam opinion, 849 S.W.2d
810 (Tex. 1993). As to the appealability oI orders denying claims oI Eleventh Amendment
immunity or
qualiIied immunity, see 80. |FN18| Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 1996). |FN19|
Marshall v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1996). |FN20| Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 115
S. Ct. 2151, 132 L. Ed. 2d 238, 32 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d 1 (1995).
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|FN21| Bultema v. Benzie County, 146 Fed. Appx. 28, 2005 FED App. 0715N (6th
Cir. 2005).
|FN22| Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 2005 FED App. 0209P (6th Cir. 2005).
|FN23| Lamar Advertising oI Penn, LLC v. Town oI Orchard Park, New York, 356
F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2004).
As to interlocutory appeals Irom orders denying, granting, or modiIying injunctions,
see 110, discussing 28 U.S.C.A. 1292(a)(1). |FN24| Switzerland Cheese Ass'n, Inc.
v. E. Horne's Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 87 S. Ct. 193, 17 L. Ed. 2d 23, 10 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d 1391 (1966) (reIerring to 28 U.S.C.A. 1292(a)).
|FN25| Eddy v. Virgin Islands Water and Power Auth., 256 F.3d 204, 50 Fed. R. Serv.
3d 1173 (3d Cir. 2001). 2012 Thomson Reuters. 33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/
RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. All rights reserved.
AMJUR APPELLATE 161
END OF DOCUMENT
5. Particular Types oI Judgments
165. Consent judgment
West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k78(1)
West's Key Number Digest, Federal Courts k576.1, 585.1
A 'consent judgment is not ordinarily reviewable,|FN1| because such a judgment is not
the judgment oI the court, but oI the parties, and is in the nature oI a contract.|FN2| However,
a consent judgment may be reviewable on appeal where the public interest is aIIected by the
judgment|FN3| or where there is a claim oI lack oI actual consent|FN4| or lack oI subject-
matter jurisdiction.|FN5| Furthermore, a district court's implementation oI a settlement
agreement via a consent judgment is a Iinal and appealable decision.|FN6|
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Although a party ordinarily may not appeal a consent judgment, iI the party gave consent
merely to Iacilitate an appeal Iollowing an adverse determination oI a critical issue, the party
will not lose his or her right to be heard on appeal.|FN7|
|FN1| Dong v. Board oI Trustees, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1572, 236 Cal. Rptr. 912, 39 Ed. Law
Rep. 209 (6th Dist. 1987); Greenblatt v. Kaplan's Restaurant, 171 Cal. App. 3d 991, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 746 (4th Dist. 1985); Urbanczyk v. Urbanczyk, 634 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. App. Tyler 1982).
|FN2| Massell v. Daley, 404 Ill. 479, 89 N.E.2d 361, 13 A.L.R.2d 1356 (1949); State
v. Huebner, 230 Ind. 461, 104 N.E.2d 385 (1952); Sauer v. Rhoades, 338 Mich. 679, 62
N.W.2d 634 (1954).
|FN3| Massell v. Daley, 404 Ill. 479, 89 N.E.2d 361, 13 A.L.R.2d 1356 (1949).
|FN4| U.S. v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1981); Reimer v. Davis, 224 Kan.
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225, 580 P.2d 81 (1978).
|FN5| U.S. v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1981). |FN6| Sims v. EGA
Products, Inc., 475 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2007). |FN7| Dong v. Board oI Trustees, 191
Cal. App. 3d 1572, 236 Cal. Rptr. 912, 39 Ed.
Law Rep. 209 (6th Dist. 1987); Gillum v. Republic Health Corp., 778 S.W.2d 558
(Tex. App. Dallas 1989). 2012 Thomson Reuters. 33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/
RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. All rights reserved. AMJUR APPELLATE 165
END OF DOCUMENT
7. Fees and Costs oI Action
175. Decisions passing exclusively on fees and costs
West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k78(7), 82(4), 87(10)
West's Key Number Digest, Federal Courts k576.1, 585.1, 597
Where the Iees and costs award in an action is related to the merits oI the underlying order
which gave rise to the Iees and costs award, it is appropriate to withhold independent review
oI that award until Iinal resolution oI the underlying substantive order.|FN1| However, this
general rule is subject to exceptions, such as where the power or right oI the court to assess
certain items oI cost is in dispute, or there is a claim that the trial court abused its discretion.
|FN2|
An order which deIinitively resolves claims Ior attorney's Iees and expenses payable out
oI a common Iund is severable Irom the decisions on the merits and suIIiciently Iinal to be
separately appealable.|FN3| Separate costs judgments likewise are regularly appealable as
Iinal judgments.|FN4|
Caution:
A separate order assessing costs is not a Iinal decision iI the exact amount has not been Iixed
by the court.|FN5| II a separate claim is brought Ior administrative enIorcement costs, the
judgment is also not Iinal until a Iinal determination is made on the separate claim.|FN6|
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An order directing payment oI witness Iees and bills Ior psychiatric examinations is
appealable under the collateral order doctrine.|FN7| Orders denying applications Ior costs,
expenses, and attorney's Iees also may be appealable under the collateral order doctrine.|FN8|
A deIendant's motion Ior costs is not a claim Ior relieI presented in an action, such as
required by the rule governing an appeal oI Iewer than all claims oI Iewer than all parties,
|FN9| and, standing alone, is not subject to appeal where the underlying action is still
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pending.|FN10|
Cases:
A trial court order taxing costs on appeal is appealable as an order aIter judgment, aIter a
previous judgment has been reversed on appeal but beIore a new judgment has been entered
on remand, since the relevant Iinal judgment is the judgment oI the Court oI Appeal. West's
Ann.Cal.C.C.P. 904.1(a)(2). Krikorian Premiere Theatres, LLC v. Westminster Central,
LLC (Two Cases), 193 Cal. App. 4th 1075, 2011 WL 1051743 (4th Dist. 2011), opinion
modiIied, 2011 WL 1344726 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2011).
An order awarding attorney Iees is distinct and separately appealable Irom the judgment
on the merits. City oI Colorado Springs v. Andersen Mahon Enterprises, LLP, 251 P.3d 536
(Colo. App. 2010), cert. denied, 2011 WL 532112 (Colo. 2011).
An appeal Irom an attorney Iee decision does not bring up Ior review a separate judgment
on the merits unless a timely notice oI appeal is Iiled Irom that judgment. Bushong v.
Wilsbach, 151 Wash. App. 373, 213 P.3d 42 (Div. 1 2009).
END OF SUPPLEMENT]
|FN1| Gross v. G.D. Searle & Co., 738 F.2d 600, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 510 (3d Cir.
1984); Ford v. Holden, 2 Haw. App. 549, 634 P.2d 1051 (1981). |FN2| Janicek v. Hinnen, 34
Colo. App. 68, 522 P.2d 113 (1974); Walton v. Walton's Guardianship, 120 Ind. App. 656, 95
N.E.2d 301 (1950); Kasper v. State, 206 Tenn. 434, 333 S.W.2d 934, 92 A.L.R.2d 1081
(1960).
|FN3| State, Dept. oI Citrus v. GriIIin, 332 So. 2d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1976);
Atwood v. Holmes, 229 Minn. 37, 38 N.W.2d 62, 11 A.L.R.2d 311 (1949).
|FN4| Massey v. David, 953 So. 2d 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2007). |FN5| Mekdeci
By and Through Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat. Laboratories, a Div. oI Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
711 F.2d 1510, 37 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 521 (11th Cir. 1983).
|FN6| Dunlop v. Ledet's Foodliner oI Larose, Inc., 509 F.2d 1387 (5th Cir. 1975). |FN7| U.S.
v. Rogalsky, 575 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1978). As to the collateral order doctrine, generally, see
105. |FN8| U. S. Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers oI America, 456 F.2d 483 (3d Cir.
1972). |FN9| Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), discussed in 113.
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|FN10| Norman v. Norman, 342 Ark. 493, 30 S.W.3d 83 (2000).
2012 Thomson Reuters. 33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S.
Govt. Works. All rights reserved. AMJUR APPELLATE 175 END OF DOCUMENT
7. Fees and Costs oI Action
176. Attorney's fees
West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k78(7), 82(4), 87(10)
Even though a collateral matter, such as attorney's Iees, is reserved in a judgment, the
judgment is Iinal and appealable as Iar as the merits oI the case are concerned.|FN1|
Attorney's Iees issues are subject to the ordinary principles oI Iinality.|FN2| Thus, the
denial oI a request Ior attorney's Iees is not a Iinal judgment iI the question oI damages still
remains.|FN3|
An award oI attorney's Iees which does not Iix the amount oI the award|FN4| or speciIy a
Iormula allowing the amount to be computed is not a Iinal decision.|FN5| A judgment is
Iinal, Ior purposes oI appeal, insoIar as it provides Ior indemniIication Ior settlement costs
and attorney's Iees incurred in the underlying antitrust litigation, where such sums have been
quantiIied, but are not Iinal to the extent that they relate to unquantiIied attorney's Iees
awarded to reimburse the indemnitees Ior costs incurred in deIending the corporate
indemnitor's declaratory judgment action regarding their right to indemniIication under the
indemnitor's bylaws.|FN6|
On the other hand, an order awarding Iees in an amount not yet determined can be
consolidated on appeal with a Iinal judgment on the merits.|FN7| In the appropriate
circumstances, such orders allowing Iees but Iailing to calculate the amount may constitute
Iinal, appealable judgments, such as where the determination has turned upon the nature oI
the plaintiII's cause oI action and the source oI the entitlement to attorney's Iees.|FN8|
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A decision awarding or denying attorney's Iees and expenses Irom a common Iund, as
opposed to Irom an adverse party, is severable Irom the decision on the merits and separately
appealable.|FN9| However, orders awarding interim attorney's Iees aIter a class action settle
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ment are not appealable as Iinal orders, even iI one oI three Iunds established by the
settlement Ior payment oI attorney's Iees has been exhausted by the interim Iee orders, where
the total Iee award has not been established by the district court because the value oI the
settlement and beneIits conIerred on class members remains unsettled, and distributions Irom
the other Iunds are neither Iinite nor Iinal.|FN10|
A postjudgment order awarding attorney's Iees and/or costs may be appealed as a special
order made aIter Iinal judgment.|FN11|
|FN1| Budinich v. Becton Dickinson and Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S. Ct. 1717, 100 L.
Ed. 2d 178, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1 (1988).
Reservation oI collateral matters is discussed in 83. |FN2| Apponi v. Sunshine
Biscuits, Inc., 809 F.2d 1210, 22 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 561, 7 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 565 (6th
Cir. 1987).
|FN3| Hain Pure Food Co., Inc. v. Sona Food Products Co., 618 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.
1980). |FN4| ConIer v. Custom Engineering Co., 952 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1991); Echols v.
Parker, 909 F.2d 795, 17 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 901 (5th Cir. 1990); Hay v. City oI Irving,
Tex., 893 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1990).
|FN5| Phelps v. Washburn University oI Topeka, 807 F.2d 153, 36 Ed. Law Rep. 566
(10th Cir. 1986). |FN6| American Society Ior Testing & Materials v. Corrpro
Companies, Inc., 478 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2007).
|FN7| Southern Travel Club, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 986 F.2d 125, 25 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d 335 (5th Cir. 1993); John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 135
(7th Cir. 1990).
|FN8| Rodriguez v. Handy, 802 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1986).
|FN9| Overseas Development Disc Corp. v. Sangamo Const. Co., Inc., 840 F.2d 1319
(7th Cir. 1988). |FN10| In re Diet Drugs
(Phentermine/FenIluramine/DexIenIlurammine) Products Li
ability Litigation, 401 F.3d 143, 61 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 79 (3d Cir. 2005). |FN11| Lee v.
GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 996 P.2d 416 (2000). As to appealability oI orders oI
special proceedings, see 116.
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Govt. Works. All rights reserved. AMJUR APPELLATE 176
13. Arbitration
195. Grant or denial of stay of judicial proceedings due to arbitration agreement
West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k76(1), 78(1)
A.L.R. Library
Appealability oI order staying, or reIusing to stay, proceeding in Iederal district court
pending arbitration procedure, 110 A.L.R. Fed. 148
An order staying trial and directing arbitration may be deemed appealable as one that
Iinally determines a special proceeding which is considered distinct and separate Irom the
arbitration proceedings that Iollow.|FN1| According to some authority, however, an order
granting a stay oI a pending judicial proceeding with direction Ior arbitration is interlocutory,
not Iinal, and so not appealable until Iinal judgment in the case, since such orders neither
determine the respective actions nor prevent judgments Irom eventually being entered.|FN2|
An order denying an application to stay arbitration is not appealable where the applicable
statute provides that appeals may be taken Irom orders denying applications to compel
arbitration and orders granting applications to stay arbitration, but does not grant the right to
appeal Irom an order denying an application to stay arbitration.|FN3|
Cases:
Stay oI discovery was warranted pending resolution oI deIendant's interlocutory appeal oI
order denying its motion to compel arbitration. Combined Energies v. CCI, Inc., 495 F. Supp.
2d 142 (D. Me. 2007).
END OF SUPPLEMENT]
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|FN1| Anthony v. Kualoa Ranch, Inc., 69 Haw. 112, 736 P.2d 55 (1987); Systems
Const., Inc. v. Worthington Forest, Ltd., 46 Ohio App. 2d 95, 75 Ohio Op. 2d 79, 345
N.E.2d 428 (10th Dist. Franklin County 1975); Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady
Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475 (Utah 1986).
As to the appealability oI orders terminating special proceedings, generally, see 116.
|FN2| Limbach Co. v. Gevyn Const. Corp., 544 F.2d 1104 (1st Cir. 1976); Bellaire
City Schools Bd. oI Ed. v. Paxton, 59 Ohio St. 2d 65, 13 Ohio Op. 3d 58, 391 N.E.2d
1021, 6 A.L.R.4th 645 (1979).
|FN3| Hodes v. Comprehensive Health Associates, P.A., 9 Kan. App. 2d 36, 670 P.2d
76 (1983).
Govt. Works. All rights reserved.
AMJUR APPELLATE 195
END OF DOCUMENT
14. Contempt
197. Generally
A.L.R. Library
Appealability oI contempt adjudication or conviction, 33 A.L.R.3d 448
Appealability oI acquittal Irom or dismissal oI charge oI contempt oI court, 24 A.L.R.3d
650
Appeals Irom judgments in contempt proceedings generally are permissible.|FN1| An
appeal may lie to review an order denying a charge oI contempt, iI the order aIIects a
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substantial right claimed by the appellant.|FN2| According to some authority, however, the
right oI appeal oI a contempt decision applies only to those adjudged in contempt, and does
not apply to those who have unsuccessIully sought to have another held to be contemptuous.
|FN3|
A judgment Ior contempt may be appealable under statutes expressly authorizing an
appeal Irom judgments in contempt proceedings.|FN4|
Caution:
An appeal Irom a contempt order which is jurisdictionally valid does not entail review oI a
prior order Ior the violation Ior which the contempt order was issued.|FN5|
Under Iederal law, criminal contempts are appealable, whether they arise as a part oI other
litigation or as independent proceedings.|FN6| Civil contempts not arising during the trial oI
related litigation likewise are appealable,|FN7| and civil contempts arising during the trial oI
related litigation are appealable iI adjudged against one who is not a party to the related
litigation.|FN8| Civil contempts arising during the trial oI related litigation are not
immediately ap
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pealable iI adjudged against a party litigant,|FN9| but such contempts are reviewable on
appeal Irom the Iinal judgment in the related litigation.|FN10|
In addition, while civil contempts are not ordinarily appealable iI adjudged against a party
litigant during the course oI related litigation, one who is a party may appeal Irom a civil
contempt order in connection with some other appealable order, such as a preliminary injunc-
tion.|FN11|
Cases:
District court's contempt order is itselI immediately appealable because it is a Iinal
judgment imposing penalties on the willIully disobedient witness in what is eIIectively a
separate proceeding. 28 U.S.C.A. 1291. In re Grand Jury, 680 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2012).
Criminal contempt sanctions are considered Iinal and appealable in pending actions by
parties and non-parties. East End Taxi Services, Inc. v. Virgin Islands Taxi Ass'n, Inc., 411
Fed. Appx. 495 (3d Cir. 2011).
Order holding a party in civil contempt is not a "Iinal decision," Ior purposes oI appeal. In
re Teknek, LLC, 512 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2007).
Denial oI motion Ior order to show cause why party should not be held in contempt is
Iinal, appealable order. Thomas v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass'n, 594 F.3d 814 (11th Cir.
2010).
Although plenary review oI civil contempt orders extends to some issues that are not truly
jurisdictional, its emphasis on Iundamental rights underscores the proposition that the grounds
Ior any appeal Irom a contempt order are more restricted than would be the case in an
ordinary plenary appeal Irom a civil judgment. In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 935 A.2d 1021
(2007).
On review oI a civil contempt order, iI the appellate court concludes that the underlying
court order was suIIiciently clear and unambiguous, the appellate court then determines
whether the trial court abused its discretion in issuing, or reIusing to issue, a judgment oI
contempt, which includes a review oI the trial court's determination oI whether the violation
was wilIul or excused by a good Iaith dispute or misunderstanding. In re Leah S., 284 Conn.
685, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007).
No appeal lies Irom a consent decree. Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 935 A.2d 731
(2007).
As general rule, no appeal lies Irom a consent order. Barnes v. Barnes, 181 Md. App. 390,
956 A.2d 770 (2008).
Criminal contempt is a crime and, thereIore, an order Iinding a party in criminal contempt
oI court and sanctioning the party is a Iinal order Irom which the contemnor may appeal as oI
right; however, an order Iinding a party in civil contempt oI court is not a Iinal order Ior
purposes oI appellate review. M.C.L.A. 7.202(6)(a, b), 7.203(A), 600.308(1, 2). In re
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Moroun, 295 Mich. App. 312, 814 N.W.2d 319 (2012), appeal denied, stay denied, 491 Mich.
855, 809 N.W.2d 148 (2012).
II incarceration occurs, the contemnor clearly knows that the judgment has been enIorced
and a stayed contempt order is Iinal and appealable. Carothers v. Carothers, 337 S.W.3d 21
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(Mo. 2011).
Appeal Irom contempt order that is jurisdictionally valid does not bring up Ior review the
prior order. North Tonawanda First ex rel. Kern v. City oI North Tonawanda, 94 A.D.3d
1537, 943 N.Y.S.2d 357 (4th Dep't 2012).
Contempt order is immediately appealable. Ross v. Ross, 715 S.E.2d 859 (N.C. Ct. App.
2011).
The Court oI Appeals lacks jurisdiction over a direct appeal Irom a contempt order, even iI
the contempt order is appealed along with a judgment that is appealable. Beeler v. Fuqua, 351
S.W.3d 428 (Tex. App. El Paso 2011), reh'g overruled, (Nov. 2, 2011).
END OF SUPPLEMENT]
|FN1| Harris v. U.S., 382 U.S. 162, 86 S. Ct. 352, 15 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1965); Cleveland
v. Cleveland, 57 Haw. 519, 559 P.2d 744 (1977); In re Calhoun, 47 Ohio St. 2d 15, 1 Ohio
Op. 3d 10, 350 N.E.2d 665 (1976).
|FN2| Piedmont Equipment Co., Inc. v. Weant, 30 N.C. App. 191, 226 S.E.2d 688 (1976).
As to the appealability oI orders aIIecting substantial rights, generally, see 115.
|FN3| Tyler v. Baltimore County, 256 Md. 64, 259 A.2d 307 (1969); Gonzales v. Gonzales,
533 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso 1976).
A Iederal district court's order denying a motion Ior contempt Iiled by a class oI indigent
minors diagnosed with severe emotional and mental disabilities, in which the court interpreted
a disputed provision oI a consent decree between state oIIicials and the minors, was not a
Iinal, appealable order. JeII D. v. Kempthorne, 365 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2004).
|FN4| Miller v. City oI Albuquerque, 88 N.M. 324, 540 P.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1975); Wellman
Engineering Co. v. Calderon Automation, Inc., 2 Ohio App. 2d 385, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 591, 209
N.E.2d 172 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1965).
|FN5| St. Regis Mohawk Development Corp. v. Cook, 181 A.D.2d 964, 581 N.Y.S.2d 877
(3d Dep't 1992).
|FN6| New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1317, 99 S. Ct. 6, 58 L. Ed. 2d 25
(1978); U.S. v. Miller, 588 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1978); Pabst Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers
Local Union No. 77, AFL-CIO, 555 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1977).
|FN7| U.S. Catholic ConIerence v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 108 S.
Ct. 2268, 101 L. Ed. 2d 69, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 463 (1988).
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|FN8| U.S. Catholic ConIerence v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 108 S.
Ct. 2268, 101 L. Ed. 2d 69, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 463 (1988); New York Times
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Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1317, 99 S. Ct. 6, 58 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1978). |FN9| U.S.
Catholic ConIerence v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 108 S. Ct.
2268, 101 L. Ed. 2d 69, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 463 (1988); Marshall v. Whit
taker Corp., Berwick Forge & Fabricating Co., 610 F.2d 1141 (3d Cir. 1979); Latrobe
Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers oI America, AFL-CIO, 545 F.2d 1336 (3d Cir. 1976).
|FN10| U.S. v. Spectro Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175 (3d Cir. 1976). |FN11| Latrobe
Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers oI America, AFL-CIO, 545 F.2d
1336 (3d Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Spectro Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175 (3d Cir. 1976). As to
the appealability oI orders granting, denying, or modiIying injunctions, see 110,
discussing 28 U.S.C.A. 1291(a)(1).
Govt. Works. All rights reserved. AMJUR APPELLATE 197 END OF DOCUMENT
15. Attorney Discipline
199. Generally
The appealability or reviewability oI a judgment or order oI a trial court disciplining an
attorney generally is determined according to the general provisions governing appeals in
civil cases.|FN1| Since charges must be Iiled and a hearing had beIore an attorney may be
disbarred, an order striking an attorney's name Irom the roll oI attorneys is appealable.|FN2|
However, according to some authority, there can be no appeal in a jurisdiction where the
disciplinary proceeding against an attorney at law is by way oI an original action in the
highest court oI the state, or where that court alone has the power to discipline attorneys at
law.|FN3|
When proIessional misconduct oI an attorney at law is treated as contempt oI court, the
rules determining appealability or reviewability in contempt-oI-court cases are applicable.
|FN4|
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|FN1| Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93, 176 S.W. 948 (1915); Houtchens v.
Mercer, 119 Tex. 431, 29 S.W.2d 1031, 69 A.L.R. 1103 (Comm'n App. 1930). As to attorney
disciplinary proceedings, generally, see Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law 30 et seq.
|FN2| Howard v. Wilbur, 166 F.2d 884 (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1948).
|FN3| State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Niklaus, 149 Neb. 859, 33 N.W.2d 145
(1948). |FN4| Haggard v. Superior Court, In and For Maricopa County, 26 Ariz. App. 162,
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547 P.2d 14 (Div. 1 1976); State v. Winthrop, 148 Wash. 526, 269 P. 793, 59 A.L.R.
1265 (1928).
As to the appealability oI contempt orders, generally, see 197. 2012 Thomson
Reuters. 33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. All
rights reserved.
AMJUR APPELLATE 199
END OF DOCUMENT
16. Criminal Proceedings
b. Particular Matters
205. Pleas and plea bargains
West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law k1023(3)
According to some authority, a trial court order denying a criminal deIendant's motion to
withdraw a plea oI guilty is reviewable on appeal.|FN1| According to other authority,
however, no appeal lies Irom an order denying a deIendant permission to withdraw his or her
guilty plea.|FN2| Unless a deIendant is sentenced, there is no Iinal judgment to support an
appeal oI a denial oI a motion to withdraw a plea.|FN3|
A Iederal district court order denying a criminal deIendant's motion to withdraw a criminal
plea oI guilty is a nonappealable interlocutory order where the deIendant has not yet been
sentenced at the time the appeal is Iiled.|FN4| A United States Court oI Appeals has no
jurisdiction, under the general Iederal appellate jurisdiction statute,|FN5| to review a district
court's order which denies a requested hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea but does
not rule on the merits oI the motion.|FN6| A court oI appeals also lacks jurisdiction over
interlocutory appeals involving plea bargain promises or grants oI immunity, or alleged
violations oI grants oI immunity Irom prosecution, since the guaranty aIIorded by immunity
can be adequately protected by appeal aIter conviction.|FN7|
A district court's pretrial order rejecting a proposed plea bargain agreement under a
provision oI the Federal Rules oI Criminal Procedure|FN8| is not a Iinal decision, nor does it
Iit within the collateral order doctrine; the deIendant must wait to appeal the issue until aIter
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conviction and sentencing.|FN9| Neither a deIendant nor the government may appeal a
preconviction order oI the district court denying a proposed plea bargain agreement.|FN10|
Where the deIendant and the government have a plea agreement with which the
government complains the deIendant has not Iully complied, denial oI the government's
motion Ior speciIic perIormance oI the plea agreement is Iinal and appealable.|FN11| Where
the portion
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oI the plea agreement which the government claims the deIendant has not complied with
concerns the disclosure oI assets and the consequent IorIeiture thereoI, under such
circumstances, the government can never institute an action Ior IorIeiture based upon the
crimes Ior which the deIendant was convicted due to his or her guilty plea under the plea
agreement, and the only avenue Ior its claim to the disputed assets is a motion Ior speciIic
perIormance oI the plea agreement.|FN12|
An order denying a colorable claim to dismiss an indictment Ior violation oI a prior plea
agreement is an appealable interlocutory order.|FN13|
Cases:
DeIendant did not IorIeit double jeopardy claim relating to withdrawn guilty plea and
sentencing credit, by Iailing to raise claim in his opening appellate brieI, where deIendant
presented claim in reply to State's assertion that deIendant would not be entitled to any credit
Ior the time he spent on probation towards his prison sentence under any circumstances; it
would have been unIair Ior to require deIendant, when writing his opening brieI, to anticipate
every argument that State might have raised. People v. WhitIield, 228 Ill. 2d 502, 321 Ill.
Dec. 233, 888 N.E.2d 1166 (2007), as modiIied on denial oI reh'g, (Apr. 23, 2008).
In general, a deIendant may not challenge a guilty plea through direct appeal; rather, the
path to challenging the plea and conviction runs by way oI a petition Ior post-conviction
relieI. St. Clair v. State, 901 N.E.2d 490 (Ind. 2009).
END OF SUPPLEMENT]
|FN1| Jurgenson v. State, 166 Neb. 111, 88 N.W.2d 129 (1958).
As to guilty pleas in criminal cases, generally, see Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law 645 et seq.
|FN2| People v. McDonough, 198 Cal. App. 2d 84, 17 Cal. Rptr. 643 (5th Dist. 1961);
Stevens v. State, 208 S.W.3d 893 (Mo. 2006). |FN3| Stevens v.
State, 208 S.W.3d 893 (Mo. 2006). |FN4| U.S. v. Gottlieb, 817
F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1987). |FN5| 28 U.S.C.A. 1291, discussed
generally in 79. |FN6| U.S. v. Mendoza, 554 F.2d 758 (5th
Cir. 1977). |FN7| U.S. v. Dederich, 825 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir.
1987).
|FN8| Fed. R. Crim P. 11.
|FN9| U.S. v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1985). As to the collateral order doctrine,
generally, see 105. |FN10| U.S. v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1985). |FN11| U.S. v.
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Alexander, 869 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1989). |FN12| U.S. v. Alexander, 869 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.
1989). |FN13| U.S. v. DiNapoli, 817 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1987). 2012 Thomson Reuters. 33-
34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. All rights reserved.
AMJUR APPELLATE 205
in 62337 the 12/14/12 FOFCOL is not appealable:
100. Findings of fact or conclusions of law Appeal and Error k123
As a general rule, no appeal lies Irom a court's Iindings oI Iact|FN1| and conclusions oI
law,|FN2| or mere 'rulings.|FN3| Rather, Iindings oI Iact and conclusions oI law must be
reduced to a judgment in compliance with applicable rules oI appellate procedure.|FN4|
Similarly, a reIusal by the trial court to make separate Iindings oI Iact and conclusions oI
law is not an appealable order.|FN5| Moreover, an appeal will not lie Irom an order denying a
motion Ior amended Iindings,|FN6| nor Irom an equivalent order denying a motion Ior
additional Iindings oI Iact and conclusions oI law.|FN7|
However, a judgment contained in a document entitled 'Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI
Law and Judgment may be regarded as a Iinal, appealable judgment, where the statutory
requirement that the judgment be set Iorth in a separate document is not jurisdictional.|FN8|
One does not appeal Irom a Iinding; one appeals Irom a judgment or Irom an order that the
Legislature has designated as appealable. In re S.B., 46 Cal. 4th 529, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 24, 207
P.3d 525 (2009).
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|FN1| Legg v. Los Angeles County, Dept. oI Charities, 175 Cal. App. 2d 637, 346
P.2d 472 (2d Dist. 1959); Corbett v. Derman Shoe Co., 338 Mass. 405, 155 N.E.2d
423, 80 A.L.R.2d 974 (1959); People ex rel. Cooke v. Cota, 5 A.D.2d 1000, 173
N.Y.S.2d 460 (2d Dep't 1958).
|FN2| In re Frickey's Estate, 280 A.D. 880, 114 N.Y.S.2d 270 (4th Dep't 1952); Jaster
v. Miller, 269 Wis. 223, 69 N.W.2d 265 (1955) (overruled in part on other grounds by,
Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969)).
|FN3| Schnare v. Evans, 301 Mass. 343, 17 N.E.2d 192 (1938); City oI St. Louis v.
Pope, 68 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. 1934); McVay v. Board oI Ed. oI City oI New York, 10
A.D.2d 705, 197 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1st Dep't 1960).
|FN4| Carter v. Aaacon Auto Transport, Inc., 286 Pa. Super. 547, 429 A.2d 658
(1981).
|FN5| Shore v. Chester, 40 Ohio App. 2d 412, 69 Ohio Op. 2d 368, 321 N.E.2d 614
(10th Dist. Franklin County 1974).
|FN6| Tompkins v. Sandeen, 243 Minn. 256, 67 N.W.2d 405, 49 A.L.R.2d 1162
(1954); Raymond v. McKenzie, 220 Minn. 234, 19 N.W.2d 423 (1945).
|FN7| Anderson v. Tuomi, 230 Minn. 490, 42 N.W.2d 204, 17 A.L.R.2d 744 (1950);
Raymond v. McKenzie, 220 Minn. 234, 19 N.W.2d 423 (1945).
|FN8| Gibson v. Benj. Franklin Federal Sav. and Loan, 294 Or. 702, 662 P.2d 703
(1983).
AMJUR APPELLATE 100
Subject-matter jurisdiction may be dependent on the service of a proper notice to
quit, which is a condition precedent to a summary process.Conn.City oI Bristol v. Ocean
State Job Lot Stores oI Connecticut, Inc., 284 Conn. 1, 931 A.2d 837 (2007).
As a prerequisite to a nonpayment summary proceeding, a demand Ior rent must Iairly
aIIord the tenant actual notice oI the amount due and the period Ior which the claim is made.
|FN1| A notice that seeks rent in excess oI the amount due is invalid and will not support an
unlawIul-detainer action,|FN2| |FN1| Schwartz v. Weiss-Newell, 87 Misc. 2d 558, 386
N.Y.S.2d 191 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1976). The lessor's claimed notice, in the Iorm oI a letter to
the lessee Irom the bank acting as rental agent Ior the lessor, did not strictly comply with the
statutory requirements concerning notice to pay rent or quit. Lamey v. Masciotra, 273 Cal.
App. 2d 709, 78 Cal. Rptr. 344 (2d Dist. 1969). |FN2| Levitz Furniture Co. v. Wingtip
Communications, Inc., 86 Cal. App. 4th 1035, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656 (1st Dist. 2001)
Bargain Mart, Inc. v. Lipkis, 212 Conn. 120 (1989) 561 A.2d 1365 Landlord and
Tenant SuIIiciency oI notice Notice to quit will not terminate lease iI notice itselI is invalid.
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4| The deIendants` argument erroneously equates an unequivocal notice oI intent to terminate
a lease with a termination oI the lease. As the Appellate Court correctly observed in
Bridgeport v. BarbourDaniel Electronics, Inc., 16 Conn.App. 574, 58284, 548 A.2d 744
(1988), however, a notice to quit will not terminate a lease iI **1372 the notice itselI is
invalid. Indeed, it is selI-evident that iI the notice is invalid, then the legal consequence oI
'termination arising Irom the service oI a valid notice does not result. In the present case, the
Malley heirs served Welch with notice oI deIault on January 27, 1983, and subsequent notices
to quit on February 15, 1983, and March 1, 1983, claiming that he had Iailed to pay rent and
taxes and had Iailed to maintain insurance as required by the lease. On March 14, 1983, the
heirs instituted a summary process action against Welch, seeking immediate possession.
Welch denied the allegations in the summary process action, and asserted several special
deIenses, including the deIense that the heirs had Iailed to serve upon him proper notice to
initiate the action. The parties eventually settled the dispute by a stipulated judgment. The
trial court in the summary process action never reached Welch`s special deIense that the
notices to quit were invalid. *135 A stipulated 'judgment is not a judicial determination oI
any litigated right.... The essence oI the judgment is that the parties to the litigation have
voluntarily entered into an agreement setting their dispute or disputes at rest and that, upon
this agreement, the court has entered judgment conIorming to the terms oI the agreement.
Bryan v. Reynolds, 143 Conn. 456, 460, 123 A.2d 192 (1956). Such a judgment represents 'a
settlement oI the controversy by the parties thereto |thus creating the presumption| that the
parties intended to settle all aspects oI the controversy, including all issues raised by the
papers comprising the record. Gagne v. Norton, 189 Conn. 29, 34, 453 A.2d 1162 (1983);
see also Guille v. Guille, 196 Conn. 260, 265, 492 A.2d 175 (1985). Because the trial court in
the summary process action did not determine whether the notices to quit were valid, we have
no basis Ior concluding that those notices terminated the Welch Lease. We are not persuaded
by the deIendants` assertion that the trial court`s conclusion means that a lease may be
considered 'terminated only iI the lessor wins in the summary process action. The trial
court`s conclusion did not make termination dependent on recovery oI possession. The trial
court`s analysis, consistent with our own, only recognizes that an invalid notice to quit does
not terminate the lease. Bridgeport v. BarbourDaniel Electronics, Inc., supra. Similarly, the
Appellate Court`s analysis relating to the 'revival oI a terminated lease in Housing Authority
v. Hird, supra, is irrelevant to the present case. In Hird, the landlord served the tenant with a
notice to quit claiming that the tenant had violated the lease by maintaining the premises in an
unsanitary condition and keeping pets. Id., 13 Conn.App. at 153, 535 A.2d 377. The tenant
prevailed in the subsequent summary process action. The Appellate Court held that a 'lease is
neither voided nor rescinded until the landlord perIorms |an unequivocal act notiIying the
tenant *136 oI termination| and, upon service oI a notice to quit possession, a tenancy at will
is converted to a tenancy at suIIerance. Mayron`s Bake Shops, Inc. v. Arrow Stores, Inc.,
|supra, 149 Conn. at 156, 176 A.2d 574|; ChapelHigh Corporation v. Cavallaro, |supra, 141
Conn. at 411, 106 A.2d 720|.... Id., 13 Conn.App. at 155, 535 A.2d 377. The Appellate Court
concluded, however, that because the tenant eventually prevailed at the summary process
action, that judgment 'revived the original lease agreement. Id. The deIendants argue that,
under Hird, there would be no reason Ior a judgment in Iavor oI the tenant in a summary
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process action to 'revive the lease iI the lease had not been terminated by the notice to quit.
We have no reason, however, to review this proposition in the present case. In the summary
process action by the Malley heirs against Welch, the validity oI the notices to quit was in
dispute, and the trial court made no Iindings or conclusions on that issue. There was no
dispute about the validity oI any notices to quit in Hird, or in our cases upon which the
Appellate Court relied. Housing Authority v. Hird, supra, 13 Conn.App. at 153, 535 A.2d
377; **1373 Mayron`s Bake Shops, Inc. v. Arrow Stores, Inc., supra, 149 Conn. at 153, 156,
176 A.2d 574; ChapelHigh Corporation v. Cavallaro, supra. Thus, the logical predicate to
the Hird court`s 'revival analysisthe existence oI a valid notice to quit or, where the
validity oI the notice is in dispute, a Iinding oI validitywas absent in the Malley heirs-
Welch summary process action.
883. Liability oI landlord Ior wrongIul eviction West's Key Number Digest West's
Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant k292, 318 A.L.R. Library Tenant's recovery oI
damages Ior emotional distress under UniIorm Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 6
A.L.R.4th 528 Right oI landlord legally entitled to possession to dispossess tenant without
legal process, 6 A.L.R.3d 177 Recovery by tenant oI damages Ior physical injury or mental
anguish occasioned by wrongIul eviction, 17 A.L.R.2d 936 Forms Am. Jur. Pleading and
Practice Forms, Complaint, petition, or declarationEviction Irom apartment leased under
oral agreementFor damages, Landlord and Tenant 298 Statutes commonly provide Ior an
award oI damages Ior wrongIul eviction by a landlord.|FN1| Observation: A statute may
allow actual damages when an illegal eviction occurs.|FN2| In this context, "actual damages"
may include lost proIits, lost goods, expenses incurred in renovating the premises, and the
beneIits oI lost services.|FN3| However, the Iormer tenant has the burden oI establishing his
or her actual damages.|FN4| In some jurisdictions, an evicted tenant may bring an action in
tort Ior personal injury, mental anguish, and damage to personal property caused by the
eviction.|FN5| However, wrongIul eviction is a breach oI contract that gives rise to a claim
Ior mental anguish only when accompanied by extremely outrageous conduct.|FN6|
Regardless oI the validity oI a landlord's retaking possession without process,|FN7| a tenant
may generally recover Ior damages to personal property.|FN8| Damages might include
the value oI lost, destroyed, or damaged equipment.|FN9| the value oI spoiled perishable
goods.|FN10| compensatory as well as exemplary damages Ior the landlord's conversion
oI personal property and Iailure to return property upon demand or to Iile a Ioreclosure action
oI his or her asserted lien.|FN11| Furthermore, a tenant in lawIul possession who is
improperly ejected and has suIIered lost proIits is entitled to the proIits' recovery.|FN12|
Observation: Under some Iorcible-detainer statutes, restitution oI the premises is a permissive
remedy.|FN13| Thus, a tenant's claim Ior damages, without an additional claim Ior restitution
oI the premises, does not invalidate the tenant's claim under the Iorcible-detainer statutes.
|FN14| CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: Lost proIits, lost goods, such as Iood, and the
beneIits oI lost services, such as advertising, are examples oI losses that may constitute
"actual damages" Ior illegal eviction. 14 M.R.S.A. 6014(2)(A). Degenhardt v. Ewe Ltd.
Partnership, 2011 ME 23, 13 A.3d 790 (Me. 2011). |END OF SUPPLEMENT| |FN1|
Freeman v. Alamo Management Co., 221 Conn. 674, 607 A.2d 370 (1992); Bielek v. Drs.
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Bielek, Birely and Salerno, P. A., 366 So. 2d 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1978); SwiIt
Loan & Finance Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 195 Ga. App. 556, 394 S.E.2d 356 (1990); Kaiama v.
Aguilar, 67 Haw. 549, 696 P.2d 839 (1985); Geiger v. Wallace, 233 Kan. 656, 664 P.2d 846
(1983); Deroshia v. Union Terminal Piers, 151 Mich. App. 715, 391 N.W.2d 458 (1986);
Rocke v. 1041 Bushwick Ave. Assoc., Inc., 169 A.D.2d 525, 564 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1st Dep't
1991). Both a landlord and its counsel were liable Ior wrongIul eviction on an invalid warrant,
153, 723 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 2001). As to a landlord's liability Ior wrongIul use oI
eviction by selI-help, generally, see 837. |FN2| Reardon v. Lovely Development, Inc., 2004
ME 74, 852 A.2d 66 (Me. 2004). |FN3| Reardon v. Lovely Development, Inc., 2004 ME 74,
852 A.2d 66 (Me. 2004). |FN4| Reardon v. Lovely Development, Inc., 2004 ME 74, 852 A.2d
66 (Me. 2004). |FN5| In re Berberian, 34 B.R. 580 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1983) (damages Ior
emotional distress); Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20, 6
A.L.R.3d 161 (1961) (deprivation oI personal property); Kerlin v. Lane Co., 165 Ga. App.
622, 302 S.E.2d 369 (1983); Flickinger v. Mark IV Apartments, Ass'n, 315 N.W.2d 794
(Iowa 1982) (conversion oI personal property); Knight v. M.H. SiegIried Real Estate, Inc.,
647 S.W.2d 811 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1982) (conversion oI personal property). |FN6| Country
Escrow Service v. Janes, 121 Ariz. 511, 591 P.2d 999 (Ct. App. Div. 2 1979). A tenant
evicted by the landlord may not recover damages Ior humiliation or mental suIIering endured
by the tenant's children as a result oI the eviction. Drinkard v. Anderton, 280 S.W. 1076 (Tex.
Civ. App. Waco 1926), writ dismissed w.o.j., (Mar. 31, 1926). |FN7| As to dispossession
without legal process, generally, see 829. |FN8| Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20, 6 A.L.R.3d 161 (1961); Pelavin v. Misner, 241 Mich. 209, 217 N.W.
36, 60 A.L.R. 276 (1928), aII'd, 243 Mich. 516, 220 N.W. 665 (1928); Nichols v. Eustis, 146
A.D. 475, 131 N.Y.S. 265 (2d Dep't 1911); Price v. Osborne, 24 Tenn. App. 525, 147 S.W.2d
412 (1940). A holdover tenant's damages are limited to those damages suIIered as a direct
result oI the landlord's use oI the improper procedure. Deroshia v. Union Terminal Piers, 151
Mich. App. 715, 391 N.W.2d 458 (1986). |FN9| Deroshia v. Union Terminal Piers, 151 Mich.
App. 715, 391 N.W.2d 458 (1986). |FN10| Deroshia v. Union Terminal Piers, 151 Mich.
App. 715, 391 N.W.2d 458 (1986). |FN11| Clark v. Morris, 710 P.2d 1130 (Colo. Ct. App.
1985). |FN12| Deroshia v. Union Terminal Piers, 151 Mich. App. 715, 391 N.W.2d 458
(1986). |FN13| Aris Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management, Inc., 2005 UT
App 326, 121 P.3d 24 (Utah Ct. App. 2005), cert. granted, 125 P.3d 102 (Utah 2005) and
decision aII'd, 2006 UT 38, 2006 WL 2035949 (Utah 2006). |FN14| Aris Vision Institute, Inc.
v. Wasatch Property Management, Inc., 2005 UT App 326, 121 P.3d 24 (Utah Ct. App. 2005),
cert. granted, 125 P.3d 102 (Utah 2005) and decision aII'd, 2006 UT 38, 2006 WL 2035949
(Utah 2006).
In prisoner's civil rights suit alleging unreasonable use oI Iorce by guards, prisoner's
disciplinary records should not have been admitted into evidence since key disputed issue was
who initiated physical altercations underlying suit, and evidence was oIIered to show
prisoner's aggressive character and thus that it was more likely that he was aggressor. Hynes v
Coughlin (1996, CA2 NY) 79 F3d 285.
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Judge SIerrazza's Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law, and Order Ior Summary
Eviction oI 10/27/11, reads:
"FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION
This matter having come on regularly Ior an evidentiary hearing pursuant to NRS
40.254 and NRS 40.253(6) on October 13, 2011, and continued on October 25, 2011, beIore
the Honorable Peter J. SIerrazza, sitting without a jury; the plaintiII/landlord, Matt Merlis;
("Merliss"), having been present, and represented by counsel, Richard G. Hill, Chartered and
Casey D. Baker, Esq., and deIendant/tenant, Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq. ("Coughlin"),
having been present and having proceeded in proper person; the parties having oIIered
evidence, called witnesses and having oIIered argument; the matter having been submitted to
the Court Ior a decision; the Court being Iully inIormed in the premises and good cause
appearing thereIor; the Court herewith enters its Iindings oI Iact, conclusions oI law and order
Ior summary eviction:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Merliss is the owner oI the real property located at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada (the
"Property").
2. The tenancy at issue commenced on March 1, 2010, and was for a term of 12 months.
3. The rental agreement terminated by its terms on February 28, 211. ThereaIter, Coughlin
became a month to month tenant pursuant to NRS 118A.470 and paragraph 3 oI the parties'
rental agreement.
4. Coughlin became subject to the provisions of NRS 40.251 to 40.2516, inclusive, at the
end of the stated term of the rental agreement, whereupon he became a monthto-month
tenant, as noted above.
month tenancy pursuant to ARS 4.251, by serving the statutory No-Cause Termination
Notice to Vacate NRS 40.251(1) upon him, which notice was admitted into evidence at
the hearing. The court speciIically Iinds that service of that notice was proper pursuant to,
and Ior all purposes contemplated under, NRS 40.280.
6. Coughlin Iailed to vacate the Property within 30 calendar days oI being served with the
2011, at the latest.
7. On September 27,2011, Merliss properly served Coughlin with a Five-Day Notice oI
UnlawIul Detainer For Failure to Vacate Rental Unit -NRS 40.251 (No-Cause Termination)
and Notice oI Summary Eviction -NRS 40.254, which notice was admitted into evidence at
the hearing. The court speciIically Iinds that service of that notice was proper pursuant to,
and Ior all purposes contemplated under, NRS 40.280. (NOTE: the Exhibit admitted at the
hearing Iails to include the envelope Irom NCS, where such was included Ior the 8/22/11
Notice by NCS).
8. Merliss' claim for relief of possession of the premises was authorized by law.
9. Coughlin alleged, as a legal defense to the summary eviction, retaliatory conduct by
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based, in part, on what he identiIied as "habitability" issues, and his alleged complaints
regarding same. Coughlin Iurther alleged that Merliss acted in a discriminatory manner
toward him based on Coughlin's race, national origin, and sex.
10. The court Iinds that Coughlin failed to present any evidence that Merliss acted in any
prohibited, discriminatory, or retaliatory fashion as alleged by Coughlin, or otherwise.
10.1. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he "complained in good Iaith oI a
10.2. Coughlin failea to present any eviaence that he "complained in good faith to
the landlord or a law enforcement agency of a violation of NRS Chapter 118A] or of a
specific statute that imposes a criminal penalty" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(b).
referenced termination and eviction notices , Coughlin had "instituted or defended against
dwelling units" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e). (NOTE: here Baker attempts to
mischaracterize the language oI the statute to get around the Iact that Couglin, by deIending
against the non-payment summary eviction proceeding Iollowing the 5 Day Non-Payment
Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer purportedly served on Couglhin on 8/22/11, in RJC Rev11-1708,
and therein arguing habitability issues, did, thereby, invoke the protections oI NRS
118A.510(1)(e), as, only thereaIter did Merliss 'bring...an action Ior possession in 1708.
While Baker attempts to argue that Couglin need have 'instituted or deIended against a
judicial...proceeding ' prior to being served with the referenced termination and eviction
notices the statute simply does not say that. Now, Baker can argue that his client did not
thereaIter 'bring and action for possession (and, given the unique nature oI Nevada's
approach, it is not entirely clear at which point one can be said to 'bring an action...is it upon
serving a 5 Day Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer? Did the landlord 'bring an action upon his
purportedly 'terminating Coughlin's 'month to month tenancy on 8/22/11? Hard to
imagine that qualiIies (particularly where such Notice oI 8/22/11 is deIicient in that is
incorrectly asserts that Coughlin's lease had 'expired, where, clearly, such is not the case
upon a close review oI Paragraphs 2, 3, and 20 oI the 2/24/10 'Standard Rental Agreement).
A close review oI the FOFCOLOSE, particularly Findings oI Fact 1-8 reveal
something curious....Baker's provided to Judge SIerrazza a proposed FOFCOLOSE that does
not actually make any indication as to the key inquiry with respect to the NRS 118A.510(e)
analysis vis a vis just when one can be said to 'bring an action Ior possession or have
'instituted or deIended against a judicial ... proceeding. It is likely that Nevada law will
view the landlord to be said to 'bring an action Ior possession either upon the service oI the
9/27/11 5 Day No Cause Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer, or, upon Couglin's Iiling his Tenant's
Answer in response thereto on 10/6/11, and the landlord thereaIter communicating some
intention to the Court to Iollow through with a hearing, and (or, perhaps, upon nothing more
than the Tenant Iiling a Tenant's AIIidavit...that is, the landlord need not do anything Iurther
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thereaIter to be said to have 'brought (bring) and action Ior possession). However, Baker's
attempt to characterize the mere service oI some 30 Day Notice to Vacate as the 'bring(ing)
oI an 'action Ior possession is simply unsupportable, in light oI the Iact that there is no
legally operative eIIect to Baker's doing so absent his then serving a 5 Day Notice oI
UnlawIul Detainer, at which point, should tenant Coughlin have Iailed to Iile a Tenan'ts
Answer within 5 days thereoI, Merliss would be able to obtain a lockout Order Irom the court.
The thing is, Couglin argued that his 'Litigation Demand Letters to Merliss between
May-September oI 2011 suIIice to meet the 'instituted or deIended against requirement (and
there are instances oI such letters Irom Coughlin to the landlord that predate even a Iinding
that the service oI the 30 Day Notice to Vacate oI 8/22/11). Indeed, how is Baker's service
upon Couglin oI a 30 Day Notice to Vacate 'bring(ing) an action Ior possession iI
Coughlin's 'litigation demand letters are not 'instituting or deIending against a judicial
proceeding where habitability an issue (and Coughlin's Litigation Demand Letters
speciIically invoke habitability issues and warn Merliss against any anticipated retaliatory
conduct by the landlord.
Further, the NRS 118A.510 inquiry is not limited to a comparison oI the mere temporal
relation between the landlord's 'bring(ing) or threatening to bring an action Ior possession
and the tenant's:
The 10/27/11 FOFCOL was changed by Judge SIerrazza's 11/7/11 Amended Order,
especially where the 10/27/11 FOFCOL reads:
'10.2. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he "complained in good faith
to the landlord or a law enforcement agency of a violation of NRS Chapter 118A]
or of a specific statute that imposes a criminal penalty" as required by NRS
118A.510(1)(b).
referenced termination and eviction notices , Coughlin had "instituted or defended
against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which he] raised
an issue of compliance with the requirements oI |NRS Chapter 118A| respecting the
habitability oI dwelling units" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e).
exceptions.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, the landlord may not, in retaliation,
terminate a tenancy , refuse to renew a tenancy ,... or bring or threaten to bring an action
for possession iI:...
organization;
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3601 et seq.,...
that subsection if:
It is interesting to note the diIIerences between NRS 118A.510(b) and (e). Whereas
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'NRS 118A.290 Habitability of dwelling unit.
dwelling unit or if it substantially lacks:
(a) EIIective waterprooIing and weather protection oI the rooI and exterior walls,
including windows and doors.
(b) Plumbing Iacilities which conIormed to applicable law when installed and which are
maintained in good working order.
(c) A water supply approved under applicable law, which is:.
(3) Connected to a sewage disposal system approved under applicable law and
maintained in good working order to the extent that the system can be controlled by the
landlord...
(e) Electrical lighting, outlets, wiring and electrical equipment which conIormed to
applicable law when installed and are maintained in good working order....
(g) Building, grounds, appurtenances and all other areas under the landlord's control at
the time of the commencement of the tenancy in every part clean, sanitary and reasonably
free from all accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents, insects and vermin.
(h) Floors, walls, ceilings, stairways and railings maintained in good repair.
(i) Ventilating, air-conditioning and other Iacilities and appliances, including elevators,
maintained in good repair iI supplied or required to be supplied by the landlord.
2. The landlord and tenant may agree that the tenant is to perform specified repairs,
maintenance tasks and minor remodeling...
Baker's 8/22/11 'No-Cause Termination Notice to Vacate (utilizing a pre-printed N. S. Ct.
'Form #7 (with just a couple things changed by way oI placing 'Xs over 'or terminated in
a couple areas) reads:
22nd, 2011
against you.
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possession oI the rental unit. and you will be subject to the eviction procedures contained in
Baker attempts to argue (by way oI the language he included in the 10/27/11
FOFCOLOSE) that Merliss's patent, obvious retaliatory conduct was not violative oI NRS
118A.510 because 'Coughlin Iailed to present any evidence that prior to being served with
the referenced termination and eviction notices , Coughlin had "instituted or defended
against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which he] raised an issue
of ... habitability. However, the statute does not require Coughlin to show that he
"instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding 'prior to being
'NRS 118A.510 Retaliatory conduct by landlord against
tenant prohibited; remedies; exceptions. 1. ... the landlord
may not, in retaliation, terminate a tenancy, refuse to
renew a tenancy, increase rent or decrease essential
services required by the rental agreement or this
chapter, or bring or threaten to bring an action for
possession iI:...(e) The tenant has instituted or deIended
against a judicial or administrative proceeding or
arbitration in which the tenant raised an issue of
compliance with the requirements of this chapter
respecting the habitability oI dwelling units;
(Judge SIerrazza indicated Baker may prepare (Judge SIerrazza reIerred to such as a
'judgment...which makes problematic the Iact that Coughlin was not provided the 5 days to
review Baker's 'proposed judgment under JCRRT 17...see, also, NJCRCP 52) (Merliss's
conduct is so obviously retaliatory upon reviewing Exhibit 6 to Couglin's 10/11/11 Motion Ior
Continuance, and Couglin's Exhibit 6 oI 10/25/11, the emails between Merliss and Coughlin)
especially given the extreme temporal connection between the very protected complaints by
Coughlin under NRS 118A.510 and the 8/22/11 Notices, especially where Arizona, Texas,
and Minnesota have statutes listing time Irames oI 6 months as indicative oI retaliation where
such interval between the protected complaint and act purported to be done in retaliation is
that or less)
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Further, iI only by way oI analogy (given JCRRT per Rule 2 do not apply to 'landlord
tenant matters) JCRRT Rule17.Preparation oI Iindings, conclusions, and judgment.In
a civil case, where a judge directs an attorney to prepare Iindings oI Iact, conclusions oI law,
and judgment, the attorney shall serve a copy oI the proposed document upon counsel Ior all
parties who have appeared, or upon the party iI a party has appeared in proper person at the
trial and are aIIected by the judgment. Five days after service counsel shall submit the same
to the court for signature together with proof of such service.
Where the proceedzing/Trial ended on 10/25/11, it was simply inequitable to require
Couglin to receive an email with the proposed FOFCOL Irom Baker at noon on 10/27/11,
where Judge SIerrazza signed such FOFCOl by 4:39 pm that day. Indeed, even Judge
SIerrazza, turns out, could have used more time to review the proposed FOFCOL given the
Iact that an 11/7/11 hearing was necessitated to vacate the portion oI his ruling that awarded
the $2,275 to the landlord, where Judge SIerrazza agreed with Couglin at that hearing upon
Couglin criticizing Baker Ior Iailing to IaithIully reproduce Judge SIerrazza's order as
rendered (such absolutely did not indicate that the $2,275 rent escrow was 'the property oI the
landlord, but rather, indicated that ... Baker and Hill continue to attach Judge SIerrazza's
10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE as though it was not amended substantially by Judge SIerrazza's
Order amending that FOFCOLOSE on 11/7/11 (rendered Irom the bench). Clearly, Judge
SIerrazza substantially distanced his Iinal ruling on a variety oI matters Irom the 10/27/11
FOFCOL in his Amended Order as rendered on 11/7/11 in 1708.
'NRS 118A.510 Retaliatory conduct by landlord against
tenant prohibited; remedies; exceptions. 1. ... the landlord
may not, in retaliation, terminate a tenancy, refuse to
renew a tenancy, increase rent or decrease essential
services required by the rental agreement or this
chapter, or bring or threaten to bring an action for
possession iI:...(e) The tenant has instituted or deIended
against a judicial or administrative proceeding or
arbitration in which the tenant raised an issue of
compliance with the requirements of this chapter
respecting the habitability oI dwelling units;
10.4 Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he had "complained in good Iaith to
the landlord, a government agency, an attorney, a Iair housing agency or any other
appropriate body oI a violation oI NRS 118.010 to 118.120, inclusive, or the Fair Housing
Act oI 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., or ha|d| otherwise exercised rights which are
guaranteed or protected under those laws" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(g).
11. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that the Property was at any time not habitable,
as that term is deIined in NRS 118A.290, or otherwise, with respect to any oI the alleged
not limited to, the Iront and back steps, any broken window, any alleged mold, 2.any Ialling
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insulation, the garbage disposal, and any weeds on the Property. (NOTE: it is pretty clear
Irom the transcript oI the 11/7/11 hearing in 1708 that Judge SIerrazza amended this 10/27/11
Order as to this "conclusion" as well, especially with respect to the insulation, and Iurther, this
10/27/11 Order is clearly at odds with the Order as rendered on 10/25/11 by Judge SIerrazza,
something Judge SIerrazza admitted at the 11/7/11 Hearing, thereaIter resulting in Judge
SIerrazza rendering an oral amendment to such 10/27/11 Order suIIicient to bring such into
accord with his order as rendered on 10/25/11. Judge SIerrazza should be entitled, somewhat,
to rely on Baker to IaithIully render the order as announced, not remix it to suit Baker's
objectives. RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 require as much.)
that the maintenance oI the surrounding grounds, including weed control, was the sole
responsibility oI Coughlin under paragraph 22 oI the parties' rental agreement. (NOTE: Here
Baker artIully and Iraudulently sidesteps the issues relative to the lease's use oI the term
"lawn" and the Iact that there was no "lawn" but rather a dirt/quasi-decomposed granite
"yard", wherein weeds continually grew several times a year, which Coughlin addressed, with
Merliss's assent and accord to a novation oI any requirement one might read into the lease that
Coughlin was responsible Ior such "taking care oI the weeds" via the agreement oI May 17th,
2011, entered into the record as an exhibit to Coughlin's 10/12/11 Motion Ior Continuance,
and at the 10/25/11 hearing/"Trial" as Exhibit 8, a collection oI the emails between Merliss
and Coughlin. It is the very ambiguity attendant to the leases use oI the term "lawn", which
Judge SIerrazza attempted to avoid by mixing in the term "yard at the 11/7/11 hearing, that
echoes the Iinding in Anvui as to "construction oI a contractual term" being a "question oI
law" which "we review de novo"...careIul to not that "the parties intentions regarding a
contractual provision present a question oI Iact". Certainly, the email Irom Merliss to Couglin
oI 5/17/11 wherein Merliss agreed to a rent deduction or oII-set oI $350 Ior Couglin "taking
care oI the weeds" Ior that season, presents just such a scenario where a "genuine issue oI
material Iact" is apparent Irom such maniIestation oI the "parties intentions". Anvui. Furhter,
Anvui contains one very interesting sentence: "We Iurther conclude that summary eviction
was not appropriate in this case because there is a legal deIense based upon unresolved issues
oI material Iact. Dragon must attempt to pursue restitution oI the premises, iI at all, under
NRS 40.290 to 40.420." It is that pothole that resulted in Baker (in submitting the proposed
Order that Judge SIerrazza originally pretty much rubber stamped, until he substantially
amended it at the 11/7/11 hearing (to his credit)) continually inserting his ridiculous Iantasia
that the some 6 hours oI presentation on the record scattered over two court dates consisted
entirely oI repeated instances where "Coughlin Iailed to present any evidence" oI this or
that...as Couglin presenting pretty much "any evidence" oI anything would veer dangerously
close to presenting a "genuine issue oI material Iact" resulting in a Iinding that "there is a
legal deIense based upon unresolved issues oI material Iact". The key issue here seems to be
to what extent issues oI Iact play a role in determining whether there is "no legal deIense"
pursuant to NRS 40.253(6) and in considering oI the language therein directing that such
summary proceedings are to "test the truthIullness and suIIiciency oI the aIIidavits". The
legislature Iailed to impose on NRS 40.253(6) some "genuine issue oI material Iact" prong Ior
a reason. It simply is unIair to impose a standard oI even that intensity in a context such as a
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summary eviction, where little to no discovery is possible. This is true, especially, here,
where Merliss Iailed to even Iile any "unlawIul detainer aIIidavit" or "landlord's aIIidavit"
(much less one that satisIies NRS 40.254(2), not to mention the Iraud attendant to Baker and
Merliss's chicanery vis a vis the deIiciciency in their 8/22/11 Notice oI Termination being
premised upon an incorrect (at best) assertion therein that the lease had "expired" "by its
terms" on February 28, 2011, when, in actuality, the actual language in that lease asserts that
the term shall be Ior "no less than 12 months" Irom March 1, 2010, and where paragraph 2
therein Iails to contain any such "deIined termination date" as reIerenced in paragraph 20
thereoI...clearly indicating that the lease in question had not "expired" and the Iailure oI the
8/22/11 Notice oI Termination to be unequivocal or, even, accurate, renders it ineIIective Ior
the purpose oI terminating the lease, and thereIore makes "not truthIul" any claim by Baker or
Merliss that their "claim is authorized by law" as required by NRS 40.254(2), to say nothing
oI the extent to which the various attempts to cobble together any such aIIidavit required
therein could not possibly be viewed as meeting the "suIIiciency" standard required in NRS
40.253(6), to say nothing oI the lack oI due process attendant to Merliss Iailing to meet the
jurisdictional prerequisite to Iile such "unlawIul detainer aIIidavit" before the hearing/"Trial.
Carriage Court Inn v Rains, 524 NYS 2d 647 "notice oI termination must be deIinite and
unequivocal" an alleged basis with suIIicient speciIicity and particularity so as to provide
tenant an opportunity to known what it is they must deIend against. Anvui is quite
clear...there is not "genuine issue oI material Iact" prong to the NRS 40.253(6) analysis,
which is to be subjected to a "de novo review" on appeal: "Standard oI review As a matter oI
Iirst impression, we conclude that an order granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6)
should be reviewed on appeal based upon the standard Ior review oI an order granting
summary judgment under NRCP 56 because these proceedings are analogous. This court
reviews orders granting summary judgment de novo...Accordingly, our review oI the district
court's order granting summary eviction is de novo. Anvui raised a legal deIense as to the
unlawIul detainer NRS 40.253(6) states that aIter a hearing "to determine the truthIulness and
suIIiciency oI |the aIIidavits and notices Iiled, summary eviction will be granted| |i|I the court
determines that there is no legal deIense . . . and the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer."
On appeal, Anvui contends that the district court erred in granting summary eviction because
it raised a legal deIense to its alleged unlawIul detainer and that Dragon is required to Iollow
the procedures set Iorth in NRS 40.290 to 40.420. We agree and conclude that the district
court erroneously Iound in Dragon's Iavor Iollowing the hearing on Dragon's aIIidavit oI
complaint Ior summary eviction. "Construction oI a contractual term is a question oI law,"2
which we review de novo.3 In interpreting a contract, "`the court shall eIIectuate the intent oI
the parties, which may be determined in light oI the surrounding circumstances iI not clear
Irom the contract itselI.'"4 A contract is ambiguous when it is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation.5 Any ambiguity, moreover, should be construed against the
draIter.6 The parties' intentions regarding a contractual provision present a question oI
Iact.7 .... This ambiguity creates a genuine issue oI material Iact as to the parties' intent, which
is a legal deIense to a request Ior summary eviction. CONCLUSION We conclude that we
review a district court order granting summary eviction based on the standard Ior review oI an
order granting summary judgment. We Iurther conclude that summary eviction was not
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appropriate in this case because there is a legal deIense based upon unresolved issues oI
material Iact. Dragon must attempt to pursue restitution oI the premises, iI at all, under NRS
40.290 to 40.420." So dishonest is Baker's approach in his proposed FOFCOLOSE and in his
2/24/12 BrieI as to quote to Anvui, then ignore the Iact that Anvui merely indicates the
"standard oI review" applicable to appeals oI summary judgment is the same as that Ior
appeals oI summary evictions (ie, "de novo review), thereby attempting to mislead the Court
into believe that the elements oI NRCP 56(c) and NRS 40.253(6) are identical (they are not,
there is no "genuine issue oI material Iact" prong to NRS 40.253(6), whereas there is in
NRCP 56(c)). But, Baker doesn't stop there, as aIter citing to Anvui, he continues on to
ignore the "de novo review" requirement (careIul to add the "genuine issue oI material Iact"
prong Irom NRCP 56(c) while ignoring the "de novo review" "standard oI review" applicable
thereto (which Anvui speciIically expresses), which, given that "these proceedings are
analogous" (Anvui says oI summary eviction and summary judgments) in thereaIter arguing
that, pursuant to NJCRCP 72 or 76, such "matters must not be tried anew" (the exact language
oI Baker's brieI Judge Flanagan adopted in his 3/30/12 Order denying Coughlin's appeal. The
best part is where the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE applies a "preponderance oI the evidence"
standard where asserting, irrelevantly, that there was "no genuine issue oI material Iact").
12. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he complied, or that Merliss Iailed to
comply, with any requirement set Iorth in NRS 118A.355 and NRS 118A.360, which statutes
address the withholding of rent Ior alleged "habitability" issues. (NOTE: actually NRS
118A.360 does not address "withholding of rent", but rather "Iixing and deducting" the costs
associated with that which the tenant complains oI and requests attention to with respect to
that which is covered by such statute, which is not limited to "habitability" issues, but also
covers "failure to comply with the rental agreement", which relates to the "reduction oI rent"
Coughlin was entitled to pursuant to Paragraph 23 "Damage to Premises" oI the lease, and it
was clear error where the justice court continually reIused to allow Coughlin to put on any
evidence or make argument directed thereto, especially in relation to the NRS 118A.355(5)
"rent escrow" analysis, the 10/13/11 "Eviction Decision and Order" requiring Coughlin to
deposit $2,275 in escrow with the justice court to avoid the entering oI a summary eviction
and have the right to a "trial" on 10/25/11 (NOTE: the justice court committed Iurther clear
error where such order setting trial went beyond any arguable limitation provided by NRS
118A.355(5) (which merely indicates the tenant will not be able to assert a "deIense to an
eviction under paragraph (d) of subsection (1) unless the tenant has deposited the withheld
rent into an escrow account pursuant to this subsection") in purporting to refuse to
Coughlin his right to assert a NRS 118A.510(a)-(g) retaliation defense, reIusing to
countenance Coughlin's NRS 118A.390(1),(5)(a)-(b) claims Ior relieI (arguably, Coughlin's
10/6/11 Iiling (not to mention the NRS 118A.390 by Coughlin on 11/2/11 and 11/17/11) is the
Iunctional equivalent oI a any oI the three distinct avenues oI seeking relieI set out in those
three subsections, ie, a "civil action" seeking "actual damages" under NRS 118.A.390(1), or,
alternatively, a "veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI" pursuant to subsection (5)(a), or,
lastly, should the justice court view such Iiling (which did assert claims against Merliss and
other necessary parties (Dickson's Sharpe, the landscapers, etc...and the IFP and subsection
(7) operate to obviate any argument that any alleged Iailure to pay a Iiling Iee prevents such
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an interpretation, and Iurther, the WCSO did serve process or attempt to, upon the individuals
Coughlin listed in the caption thereoI...meaning a deIault judgment may have been
appropriate in Coughlin's Iavor)
items or services; procedure Ior expedited relieI.
Indeed, NRS 118A.390(1) provides: "...II the landlord unlawfully removes the tenant
from the premises or excludes the tenant by blocking or attempting to block the tenant's
entry upon the premises,(which is a good description oI what Merliss and his attorney's
characterize as a "lockout" on 11/1/11...which Mayes and Russell v. Kalian demonstrate was
actually a criminal trespass by those involved, which Merliss and Hill continued on 11/13/11,
with an assist by the Reno Police Department) willfully interrupts or causes or permits the
interruption of any essential item or service required by the rental agreement or this
chapter or otherwise recovers possession of the dwelling unit in violation of NRS
118A.480, the tenant may recover immediate possession pursuant to subsection 4, proceed
under NRS 118A.380 or terminate the rental agreement and, in addition to any other remedy,
recover the tenant`s actual damages, receive an amount not greater than $2,500 to be Iixed by
the court, or both.
items or services; procedure Ior expedited relieI.
1. II the landlord unlawIully removes the tenant Irom the premises or excludes the tenant
by blocking or attempting to block the tenant`s entry upon the premises, willIully interrupts or
causes or permits the interruption oI any essential item or service required by the rental
agreement or this chapter or otherwise recovers possession oI the dwelling unit in violation oI
NRS 118A.480, the tenant may recover immediate possession pursuant to subsection 4,
proceed under NRS 118A.380 or terminate the rental agreement and, in addition to any other
remedy, recover the tenant`s actual damages, receive an amount not greater than $2,500 to be
Iixed by the court, or both.
153, 723 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 2001).
Coughlin's 10/24/12 Iiling in 61901: "But, actually, the United States Supreme Court,
in Soldal v. Cook County, might beg to diIIer with Judge Carter's analysis...Russell v.
Kalian, 414 A.2d 462 R.I.,1980 Where execution, which was issued on May 23, speciIied
that it was valid Ior 20 days, landlord and constable acted unlawIully in evicting tenant on the
execution on June 13, and landlord and constable had thereby subjected themselves to
liability for trespass."
Beyond the Iact that the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE had not been "served" on Coughlin
(noting NRS 40.400 makes the "constructive service" analysis under NRCP 6(e) relevant
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where Merliss's attorneys readily admit, and the record on its Iace demonstrates that the
earliest either the justice court or Merliss's attorneys mailed either the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE
or any Notice oI Entry thereoI was the very day such was allegedly posted on the door to
Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice, 11/1/11, at which time (in violation oI the requirement
under NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2) that "the sheriII" is not "to remove the tenant" until no earlier than
the passing oI "24 hours" Irom the tenants receipt of the oraer". Further, the 10/27/11
FOFCOLOSE lacks a jurisdictional predicate or prerequisite where it Iails to include the
Iollowing language, especially where the 9/27/11 5 Day
NRS 40.253(3)(b): "...(2)That iI the court determines that the tenant is guilty oI an
unlawIul detainer, the court may issue a summary order Ior removal oI the tenant or an order
providing Ior the nonadmittance oI the tenant, directing the sheriII or constable oI the county
to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order; and
attempting to block the tenant`s entry upon the premises or willIully interrupts or causes or
permits the interruption oI an essential service required by the rental agreement or chapter
118A oI NRS.
Disposition oI appeal generally, review Summary judgment should be aIIirmed only iI, upon
reviewing the evidence in the light most Iavorable to nonmoving party, appellate court Iinds
that no genuine issues oI Iact were created by the pleadings and prooI below. Siragusa v.
Brown, 1998, 971 P.2d 801, 114 Nev. 1384, rehearing denied. Appeal And Error 863; Appeal
And Error 934(1)
12.1. As such, the court Iinds that Coughlin was not entitled to withhold any rent based
on any alleged "habitability" issue, or otherwise, and that all sums heretofore deposited by
Coughlin pursuant to the Court's order dated October 13, 211, rightfully belong to
Merliss as and for past due rent.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter oI this case. Venue
is appropriate in this court.
2. The ultimate issue before the court at the referenced hearing was the right of the
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3. The purpose of the hearing was to "determine the truthfulness and sufficiency
of the tenant's and the landlord's affidavits," to determine whether there is any "legal
defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer," and whether "the tenant is guilty oI an
unlawIul detainer". NRS 40.253(6).
4. Merliss met his burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish
that Coughlin was guilty oI unlawIul detainer oI the property as oI September 27, 2011, at the
latest.
5. "|A|n order granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6) should be reviewed on
NRCP 56 because these proceedings are analogous." Anvui, LLC v. C.L. Dragon, LLC) 123
Nev. 212, 215, 163 P.3d 405 (2007).
6. "To successfully defend against a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving
party must transcend the pleadings and, by affidavit or other admissible evidence,
introduce specific facts that show a genuine issue of material fact." Torrealba v.
Kesmilis, 124 Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716 (2008).
7. Coughlin Iailed to show that any genuine issue of material fact remains for trial.
As such, Coughlin failed to meet his burden of proof to establish any legal defense to the
summary eviction. Anvui. Torrealba.
8. As no issues of fact had yet been presented to the court to warrant a trial, Coughlin
was not entitled to have the summary eviction hearing heard by a jury. NJCRCP 38. NJCRCP
39. NRS 40.310. Any demand by Coughlin Ior a jury was untimely, in any event. NJCRCP
38.
9. Pursuant to NRS 40.253(6), Merliss is entitled to immediate possession oI the
property.
Landlord, MATT MERLISS, having applied by Affidavit for an Order seeking
summary eviction oI the above-named Tenant and it appearing from the record on file
herein that the statutory requirements have been met and that the Tenant, aIter notice,
unlawIully detains and withholds the rental unit, and the Court being Iully advised and
Iinding good cause, thereIore,
That the sheriff/constable of Reno Township, or one of their duly authorized
agents be, and hereby is, directed to remove each and every person found upon the
rental unit at 121 River Rock, Reno, Washoe County, Nevada, by no earlier than
October 31, 2011 at 5 pm. Landlord is hereby awarded the right oI possession oI the
premises.
FOLLOWS:
The sums currently on deposit with the Court, in the amount of $2,275.00, are the
property oI the landlord, Matt Merliss, but shall not be immediately released to him.
Instead, those sums shall serve as Coughlin's security for costs on appeal, pursuant to
A1CRCP 73, in the event Coughlin timely and properly appeals this order. In the event
Coughlin fails to timely and properly appeal this order, those sums shall be immediately
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released to Merliss or his counsel of record. These sums shall not, in any event, operate
to stay enforcement of this order and the surrender of the right of Coughlin to possess
the Property. Nothing in this order shall prevent this court or an appellate court from
releasing the deposited funds to Merliss or his counsel prior to or after any appeal is
perfected, or from increasing the amount of any security to be posted by Coughlin for
any reason, or both, either upon its own motion or upon motion by Merliss.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
In 03628, Baker's 1/20/12 Iiling:
'SECOND MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
PlaintiII, MATTHEW MERLISS, through counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, LTD., and
CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ., moves the court pursuant to NRS 22.010(3) Ior an order requiring
appellant, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN ("COUGHLIN"), to appear and show cause
why he should not be held in contempt oI this court Ior unlawIully resisting Merliss' eIIorts to
comply with this court's order oI January 11, 2012. This is plaintiIIs second motion Ior order
to show cause, and is in addition to the motion plaintiII Iiled in the Reno Justice Court on
November 21, 2011. This motion is based on the points and authorities below and all papers
and pleadings on Iile herein.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
ADJUDICATED FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Merliss is the owner oI the real property located at 121 River Rock Street, Reno,
Nevada (the "PROPERTY").
2. On or about March 1, 2010, MerIiss rented the Property to Coughlin and his then-
girlIriend.
3. On August 22, 2011, Merliss properly and lawIully terminated Coughlin's month-
to-month tenancy pursuant to NRS 40.251, by serving the statutory No-Cause Termination
Notice to Vacate NRS 40.251(1) upon him.
4. On September 27,2011, MerIiss properly served Coughlin with a Five-Day Notice
oI UnlawIul Detainer For Failure to Vacate Rental Unit -NRS 40.251 (No-Cause
Termination) and Notice oI Summary Eviction -NRS 40.254.
5. On October 27,2011, aIter all due and proper notice and opportunity to be heard had
been given to Coughlin, this court entered its Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law and Order
FACTS SHOWING CONTEMPT OF COURT
6. EXHIBIT 1 was served on Coughlin on November 1, 2011 by the Washoe County
SheriIIs Department in its customary manner, by posting same on the Iront door oI the
property in the manner customary Ior evictions in Washoe County. The locks to the premises
were changed at that time, thereby ejecting and dispossessing Coughlin oI possession oI the
Property.
7. ThereaIter, Mr. Coughlin unlawIully, and without any right to do so, reentered upon,
and took possession oI, the Property.
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8. SpeciIically, on November 13, 2011, Mr. Coughlin was Iound to be living in the
basement oI the Property. Coughlin was arrested and charged with trespassing at that time. A
motion Ior order to show cause relating to Coughlin's unlawIul reentry on the Property is
currently pending in the Reno Justice Court. That reentry is not the subject oI this motion, but
is reIerenced here to give the court some background oI the events leading up to this motion.
9. On December 21, 2011, aIter a hearing on Coughlin's motion to contest Merliss'
personal property lien, Judge SIerrazza oI the Reno Justice Court entered another order. A
true and correct copy oI that court's order resolving motion to contest personal property lien is
attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2.
10. Also on December 21, 2011, this case was sent up to this court on appeal Irom the
Reno Justice Court.
11. Pursuant to EXHIBIT 2, Coughlin was provided access to the Property on
Thursday, December 22, 2011. That day, Coughlin sent an email to the undersigned and
Judge SIerrazza, in which he essentially announced that he was entitled to a stay, and to return
to and continue in possession oI the Property. Judge SIerrazza quickly responded by email,
and reminded Mr. Coughlin that the stay had been denied. Coughlin removed very little oI his
property that day, and clearly intended to simply re-take possession oI the house, until Judge
SIerrazza disabused him oI that notion.
12. On Friday, December 23, 2011, Coughlin had a crew oI helpers, and made
progress. Nonetheless, Coughlin Iailed to remove all oI his belongings Irom the Property.
Coughlin Iailed to remove his things despite having been given additional time to do so aIter
the time set by the Reno Justice Court in its order oI December 1, 2011 (EXHIBIT 2) had
expired.
13. On December 30, 2011, Coughlin moved this Court Ior a temporary restraining
order to prevent Merliss Irom disposing oI the items he (Coughlin) had abandoned on the
Property. Coughlin's motion was Iully brieIed, and the Court entered its order denying the
motion on January 11, 2012. A true and correct copy oI this Court's January 11,2012 order is
14. On Thursday, January 12, 2012, in accordance with EXHIBIT 2 and EXHIBIT 3, a
licensed contractor hired by Merliss began cleaning up the Property and disposing oI the
abandoned items still remaining there.
15. Early that aIternoon, while the contractor was hauling the Iirst oI several loads oI
abandoned property to the transIer station (dump) Ior disposal, Coughlin stopped the
contractor in traIIic and attempted to prevent him Irom carrying out his task.
16. SpeciIically, Coughlin stood in Iront oI the contractor's vehicle in an eIIort to
prevent him Irom proceeding to the transIer station. Coughlin threatened to sue the contractor.
Coughlin climbed up on the contractor's vehicle. Coughlin then called the police and Ialsely
told them that the contractor had stolen his possessions, and that the contractor had tried to
run him over. Coughlin's acts were speciIically calculated to prevent the contractor Irom
disposing oI the abandoned property, and to
Irustrate and interIere with Merliss' compliance with this Court's January 11,
2012 order.
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17. When Mr. Hill oI the undersigned's oIIice was notiIied oI the Ioregoing, he went to
the transIer station and presented EXHIBIT 2 and EXHIBIT 3 to the police. The contractor
was then allowed to proceed.
18. However, beIore the contractor could return to the River Rock Property, Coughlin
was there. He had his video camera and was walking up and down the street screaming and
yelling at the police, the contractor, and Mr. Hill, once Mr. Hill arrived. At the instruction oI
the police, Mr. Hill then obtained a temporary protective order ("TPO") against Coughlin
Irom the Reno Justice Court. Coughlin ended up being arrested and taken to jail that day as a
result oI his antics at the transIer station and the Property.
19. On the morning oI Friday, January 13,2012, Coughlin sent an email to the oIIice oI
the undersigned. Attached to that email was a "Supplemental Reply" prepared and signed by
Coughlin. A true and correct copy oIthe email and attached "supplemental reply" are attached
20. The court is asked to note that on page 1 oI his "supplemental reply," Coughlin
identiIies himselI as "Pro per appellant," which, together with his accompanying email, seems
to indicate that he intended to Iile the "supplemental reply" in this case. However, the caption
oI the document, as well as most oI its content, indicates that he perhaps intended to Iile it in
the Carpentier v. Aames Funding case (Case No. CV08-01709). On inIormation and belieI,
the document ended up being actually Iiled in the
Carpentier case.
21. OI particular note to this Court, however, is the Iirst six pages oI Coughlin's
"supplemental reply," wherein Coughlin describes, in some detail, the events oI January 12,
2012.
22. On January 17, 2012, Coughlin Iiled two documents in this case. Each document
was entitled "Opposition to Motion Ior Attorney's Fees." There is not, and has never been, any
motion Ior attorney's Iees Iiled in this case in this court. Coughlin's opposition is a Iugitive
document, it violates Rule 11 and Nevada RPC 3.1 (meritorious contention), and should be
stricken by the court. It is only worth mentioning here because it contains the same 6-page
rant about the events oI January 12, 2012 as does his earlier"supplemental reply."
23. ReIerence is made to the declaration oI Phillip Stewart, attached hereto as
EXHIBIT 5.
24. ReIerence is made to the Declaration oI Richard G. Hill, Esq., attached hereto as
EXHIBIT 6.
LAW
1. ReIerence is made to NRS 22.010: "The Iollowing acts or omissions shall be
deemed contempts: ... 3. Disobedience or resistance to any lawIul writ, order, rule or process
issued by the court or judge at chambers." (Emphasis added.)
2. ReIerence is made to NRS 22.030(2), which provides: "2. II a contempt is not
committed in the immediate view and presence oI the court or judge at chambers, an aIIidavit
must be presented to the court or judge oI the Iacts constituting the contempt, or a statement
oI the Iacts by the masters or arbitrators."
Analysis: On December 21,2011, Judge SIerrazza oI the Reno Justice Court entered an order
that, among other things, allowed Merliss to dispose oI anything leIt at the Property aIter 5:00
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p.m. on Friday, December 23, 2011. See EXHIBIT 2. On January 11, 2012, this Court denied
Coughlin's motion Ior a temporary restraining order, and, in so doing, aIIirmed Judge
SIerrazza's previous order. See EXHIBIT 3. When Merliss attempted to comply with the
courts' orders, Coughlin attempted to prevent him Irom doing so. Coughlin even attempted to
Iraudulently enlist the police to aid him in his eIIorts to thwart this Court's and the Reno
Justice Court's directives. Coughlin's actions constitute contempt oI court under NRS
22.010(3). The aIIidavits contemplated by NRS 22.030(2) are attached
hereto as EXHIBIT 5 and EXHIBIT 6. The Iorm oI the order Merliss asks the court to enter is
WHEREFORE, Merliss prays Ior an order oI this court requiring deIendant,
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, to appear and show cause why he should not be held in
contempt oI this court under NRS 22.010(3) Ior his resistance to this court's lawIully entered
order; and Ior such other, Iurther and additional relieI as seems just to the court in the
premises. DATED this 20th day oI January, 2012. /s/ Casey D. Baker, Esq.
EXHIBIT INDEX
DESCRIPTION PAGES
1. Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law and Order Granting Summary Eviction dated
10/27/11
2. Order resolving motion to contest personal property lien dated 12/21/11
3. Order dated denying motion Ior temporary restraining order
4. Email and "supplemental reply" dated 1/13/12 27
5. Declaration oI Phil Stewart 3
6. Declaration oI Richard G. Hill
7. Proposed order
Exhibit 5 to that 1/20/12 Second Motion Ior Order to Show Cause reads:
'DECLARATION OF PHILLIP STEWART PHILLIP STEWART, being Iirst duly sworn,
deposes and under penalty oI perjury avers:
1. I am a resident oIthe City oI Reno, County oIWashoe, State oI Nevada, and over 18
years oI age. This declaration is based on my personal knowledge, except those matters stated
on inIormation and belieI, and as to those items I believe them to be true. This declaration is
made in support oI respondent's Motion/or Order to Show Cause, and represents my
testimony iI called on to present same in court.
2. I am the owner oI Nevada Building Industries, and a licensed contractor in the State
oI Nevada. My contractor's license number is 15023.
3. Nevada Building Industries was hired by the law oIIice oI Richard G. Hill, Ltd. to
clean out the property leIt behind at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada aIter the mostrecent
tenant was evicted.
4. On Thursday, January 12, 2012, we began work.
5. Early that aIternoon, as I was taking the Iirst load oI debris to the Waste
Management transIer station, I was Ilagged down by Zach Coughlin. At Iirst I thought it was
a citizen trying to alert me that debris was Ialling out oI the truck, so I stopped. The driver
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approached me. I immediately recognized Mr. Coughlin Irom a previous encounter with him
at the River Rock property, and Irom having seen him in court.
6. Mr. Coughlin was very conIrontational. He accused me oI stealing his things. He
climbed on my vehicle. He threatened to sue me iI I disposed oI my load at the transIer
station. He tried to prevent me Irom doing so by, among other things, standing in the street in
Iront oI my truck.
7. Mr. Coughlin threatened to call the police. I told him that iI he didn't call them, I
would. I then called Mr. Hill. Mr. Hill told me to have Mr. Coughlin call him (Mr. Hill) to
discuss terms to release the load in my truck to Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Coughlin said he did not
have a cell phone. I then proceeded to the transIer station but not without being harassed
along the way by Mr. Coughlin.
8. When I arrived at the transIer station, Mr. Coughlin jumped in Iront oI my truck to
stop me Irom entering the transIer station building. He produced a cell phone and was talking
to somebody, who I later learned was a Iemale Sergeant with the Reno Police Department.
Coughlin was Ialsely screaming that I was running over him. He physically prevented me
Irom proceeding. The police arrived and I called Mr. Hill to come to the transIer station. Mr.
Hill arrived at the transIer station a short time later. AIter Mr. Hill showed some paperwork to
the police oIIicer, I was allowed to proceed with dumping my load at the transIer station.
9. When I Iinished at the transIer station, I returned to the River Rock property. Mr.
Coughlin was already there. Mr. Coughlin was walking up and down the street with his video
camera, yelling and screaming at me, my crew, and, later, the police and Mr. Hill, when they
arrived. The police told Mr. Hill to go to the Reno Justice Court and get a TPO, which he did.
10. Mr. Coughlin continued videotaping and harassing me, my crew, and the police.
Finally, aIter he reIused to comply with their requests, Mr. Coughlin was arrested and taken
into custody.
11. I declare under penalty oI perjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct. DATED
this (no date was entered therein) day oI January, 2012 /s/ Phillip Stewart, (Nevada Building
Industries).
Exhibit 6 in 03628 to Baker's 1/20/12 Second Motion Ior Order to Show Cause reads: '
DECLARATION OF RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ. RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., being Iirst duly
sworn, deposes and under penalty oI perjury avers:
years oIage. This declaration is based on my personal knowledge, except those matters stated
made in support oI respondent's MotionIor Order to Show Cause, and represents my
licensed to practice beIore the United States District Court Ior the District oI Nevada, the
Ninth Circuit Court oIAppeals and the United States Supreme Court.
3. My oIIice represents the respondent, Dr. Matthew Merliss, in this matter.
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4. In accordance with the Reno Justice Court's order oI December 21, 2011, on
Thursday, December 22, 2011, Mr. Coughlin was given Iull run oI the River Rock property,
starting at 9:00 a.m. At about noon that day, he sent an email to the eIIect that because he had
appealed the justice court's order, he Ielt himselI entitled to resume living in the property and
would not leave. Later that day, Judge SIerrazza sent out an email that Coughlin's stay had
been denied. When we arrived at 5:00 p.m. to lock the property up, it was apparent that Mr.
Coughlin had done virtually nothing to remove any possessions. This is relevant to the order
to show cause, because it shows that Coughlin was more interested in conIrontation that in
actually getting his possessions out oI the house.
5. On Friday, December 23, 2011, we unlocked the house at 9:00 a.m. As ordered. We
overlooked the chain on the back gate. There was nobody at the house when we were there.
At approximately noon, my staII inIormed me that an enraged Mr. Coughlin had called the
oIIice screaming that he could not get in the back yard. When I Iinished the meeting I was in,
I immediately went over and unlocked the back gate. Coughlin had a small crew. He charged
at me and made physical contact. He was enraged. We leIt. When we returned at 5:00 p.m.,
Mr. Coughlin was screaming and yelling obscenities. He drove oII in a small U -Haul. His
crew remained. We walked the property with them. The inside.ground Iloor was mostly
cleared oI all but a big TV. The basement had been cleared somewhat, butthere was still a lot
oI"junk. " We could not access the attic. We went outside. I told Coughlin's crew they could
remove anything and everything outside, iI they would only try to rehang the gate that Mr.
Coughlin had taken oII the hinges beIore we could get over to unlock it. I told them I would
lock the gates in the morning over to the River Rock property. When I returned the next day,
Coughlin's crew had not taken much oI what had been outside the night beIore. I secured the
backyard, and nothing was moved until the events detailed herein.
6. On Thursday, January 12,2012, I met with Phil Stewart oI Nevada Building
Industries at the River Rock property to make arrangements with him to remove and dispose
oI the abandoned property leIt there by Mr. Coughlin. I then returned to my oIIice.
7. Approximately Iour to Iive hours aIter returning to my oIIice, I received a telephone
call Irom Mr. Stewart. Mr. Stewart inIormed me that Mr. Coughlin had Ilagged him down
near the Waste Management transIer station, where Mr. Stewart was attempting to dump his
Iirst load oI debris removed Irom the house that morning.
8. Mr. Stewart told me that Coughlin was accusing him (Mr. Stewart) oI stealing his
things, threatening to sue Mr. Stewart, and generally trying to prevent Mr. Stewart Irom
disposing oI those items by, among other things, standing in the street in Iront oI Mr.
Stewart's truck. I told Mr. Stewart to have Mr. Coughlin call me, because I wanted to try to
negotiate terms to release the contents oI the truck to Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Stewart told me Mr.
Coughlin said he did not have a cell phone.
9. Shortly thereaIter, I received another call Irom Mr. Stewart. He was at the transIer
station. Mr. Coughlin had stopped him Irom entering. Mr. Coughlin had called the police, and
told them that Mr. Stewart had stolen his (Coughlin's) possessions, and that they were in the
truck.
10. I immediately drove to the transIer station. When I got there, Mr. Coughlin was
present, and being cordoned away by two Reno Police Department oIIicers. AIter I presented
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the police oIIicers with the Reno Justice Court's December 21,2011 order, and this court's
January 11, 2012 order, Mr. Stewart was allowed to proceed. I then returned to my oIIice.
11. Approximately 15 minutes later, I received another call Irom Mr. Stewart, who
inIormed me that Mr. Coughlin was at the River Rock property. I immediately drove over to
the River Rock property.
12. When I got there, Mr. Coughlin was walking up and down the street and in the
street with his video camera, yelling and screaming at me, the police, and Mr. Stewart.
13. On the advice oI the police oIIicer on the scene, I then went to the Reno Justice
Court and obtained a temporary protective order against Mr. Coughlin to prevent him Irom
returning to the River Rock property or Iurther harassing Mr. Stewart and his crew. I Iilled out
the TPO paperwork and returnedto River Rock. Mr. Coughlin was already in custody. He was
in the back oI a squad car. When he saw me, he began swearing and yelling. He was
screaming at the police and would not cooperate with them. I received a call to return to the
Reno Justice Court to retrieve the TPO, which I subsequently gave to
an RPD oIIicer, who said he would serve Mr. Coughlin at the jail.
14. I have personally reviewed exhibits 1-4 to the instant motion, and each exhibit is a
true and correct copy oI what it purports to be.
15. Mr. Coughlin's behavior was calculated to disrupt the removal oI debris Irom
thehome. I counted no less than 13 automobile seats in the basement, including what I am told
is the Iront bench-seat Irom a Chevrolet Blazer. Mr. Coughlin leIt signiIicant quantities oI
trash and garbage at the property.
DATED this 19th day oI January, 2012. /s/ Richard G. Hill, Esq.
Whether RPD OIIicer Carter or Sargent Lopez did any 'announcing pursuant to the 'knock
and announce requirement in connection with the criminal trespass arrest became a disputed
issue, with Coughlin contending that neither Merliss nor Hill (and they admit they did not an-
nounce themselves in any way, but rather, called the police upon Iinding the door to the
crawlspace/quasi basement under the house locked Irom the inside; which is odd, considering
later, in the very videos oI the arrest that they Iilmed Hill and Merliss are caught lying in there
assertion to the RPD that they 'warned Coughlin to leave prior to the custodial arrest being
made suIIicient to meet the requirements Ior a criminal trespass violation under RMC
8.10.010.
King's 8/23/12 Complaint puts it this way (largely copied and pasted Irom the Iilings oI
Hill's associate Baker, much like Susich's 5/31/12 60975 SCR 117 Petition against Coughlin):
'10. Respondent was arrested on November 13, 2011 by Reno Police Department and
charged with trespassing, a misdemeanor, Ior which he was later convicted.
11. The circumstances leading to the above-mentioned arrest are as Iollows: at an
hearing Justice oI the Peace Peter SIerrazza ordered that Respondent vacate the home he
was renting effective Aovember 1, 211. AIter the locks were changed and the notice was
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posted on the Iront door the owner, Dr. Merliss, discovered that someone had broken into
the home and was barricaded in the basement. The Reno Police tried to coax whoever was
in the basement to open the door. Dr. Merliss was forcea to kick open the aoor where the
Reno Police founa Responaent. Respondent had broken into the home and living in the
basement. Respondent was arrested Ior criminal trespass and was subsequently convicted oI
that charge.
12. Respondent, representing himselI as co-counsel, Iiled a 36-page motion to dismiss
on March 5, 2012. The motion was denied by Judge William Gardner and was determined to
be without merit. The motion, on its Iace, demonstrates that Respondent lacks competence to
practice law.
13. Once Respondent was evicted, an order was obtained to remove his belongings
from the home. Respondent interfered with the contractor who was hired to remove
Respondent's personal belongings. The police were called and aIter talking with Respondent
they recommended that he Iind something else to do. Respondent reIused to their advice and
was subsequently arrested by the Reno police.
Compare that account in King's 8/23/12 Complaint in NG12-0204 to NNDB Chiarman
Susich's in his 5/31/12 SCR 117(2) Petition in 60975:
'14. On November 13, 2011, Respondent was arrested by Reno Police Department and
charged with Trespassing, a misdemeanor. Respondent recorded his arrest and has posted the
arrest video on You-Tube. The internet address oI the video is:
http:www.youtube.com/watch?vssEOFWHFNEY
15. Respondent's trespass arrest arose aIter an eviction hearing beIore Justice oI the Peace
Peter SIerrazza. Respondent was evicted Irom his residence per order oI the court eIIective
November 1, 2011. AIter being evicted, Respondent was later Iound living in the basement oI
the residence. The locks on the residence had been broken. 1he Reno Police tried to
convince Respondent to leave the premises; but he would not voluntarily leave. 1he owner
kicked a door open and Respondent was arrested thereafter.
Respondent Iiled a 36-page "Notice oI Appearance as Co-Counsel and Motion to
Dismiss" the trespass charge on March 5, 2012, in the Second Judicial District Court, bearing
Case No. 11 CR 26405. A copy oI the "motion" is attached as Exhibit 3 and incorporated by
this reIerence. The document is incoherent, conIused and rambling.
Compare those two accounts to Hill's Declaration and Baker's Iilings oI 11/21/11 in the
eviction case in their Motion Ior Order to Show Cause, and in the appeal in 03628 oI the
eviction in 1708, in their 1/20/12 Iiling...along with Hill and Baker's sworn testimony at the
criminal trespass trial on 6/18/12 in 26405, then Hill's testimony at the Iormal disciplinary
hearing oI 11/14/12, along with Hill and RPD OIIicer Carter's written statements in the police
report Ior the 11/13/11 criminal trespass arrest, and the statements made by RPD Carter and
Sargent Lopez, along with Coughlin, Hill, and landlord Merliss in the videos Hill and Merliss
themselves Iilmed beIore, during, and aIter the criminal trespass arrest. Then, compare the
statements Couglin videotaped Sargent Lopez admitting to on 1/13/12, along with Sargent
Lopez's testimony oI 3/19/13 in 065630. Coughlin's 11/19/12 Iiling in 61383 is particularly
insightIul in that regard, as is his 10/24/12 Iiling in 61901, and the 10/31/12 Iiling in the
disciplinary matter NG12-0204 that the SBN has curiously Iailed to include in either version
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oI the ROA is Iiled, despite Coughlin having a Iile stamped copy and FHE14 demonstrating
such. (and as to King and Hill's allegation oI Couglin simply Iiling his own Iilings multiple
times but merely changing the title, King's Complaint and Susich's SCR 117 Petition are
merely reheated versions oI the Iilings by Hill's associate, Baker, and the FOFCOL is yet
another carbon copy thereoI, with a generous helping oI quotations Irom a Iew scattered,
dubious orders.
Also, the duplicity oI all involved here except Couglin is on display with respect to the
characterizations oI the locks at the Iormer home law oIIice.
Also, it is instructive to look at Hill, King, Baker, RCA Hazlett-Stevens, RPD Carter,
Sargent Lopez, and Susich's characterization oI the lockout order (all three attempt to make it
read as much more oI a trespass warning than what it was, which was an eviction order that
merely reads as Iollows, in relevant part:
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 41:17 to 44:16) 'BY MR. KING: Q Did you end up getting an
eviction order removing Mr. Coughlin Irom Dr. Merliss's home? A We did. Q Subsequent
to the eviction order, was Mr. Coughlin removed Irom the home? A I'm sorry. There was an
order issued in court that gave Mr. Coughlin a week to vacate. I believe it was November 1
that my wiIe, my associate -- and my associate, went to the home with the sheriII and
conducted a lockout. The Iront door locks were changed. The back door locks were changed.
MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Objection what? MR.
COUGHLIN: Hearsay. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Hearsay? Overruled. THE WITNESS: And
the whole thing was videotaped. The next day I went to the home to videotape the place to
preserve what was there to prevent any arguments later, because by that point in time we
knew what we were dealing with. I get there, and the Iront door is locked, but almost all the
windows are closed but unlocked, and the back door is unlocked. And I, oI course, go
through, lock everything, make sure the place is secure, videotaped it. And I went back and
read my wiIe and my associate the riot act, and they both said no, the doors were locked.
Okay. I go back the next day, same thing. Back door's unlocked, windows are unlocked. This
continues Ior the next two weeks. Mr. Coughlin is sending out e-mails to us but will not,
apparently, read the e-mails we're sending to him saying we have to get your stuII out oI here.
No response. Two weeks aIter the eviction on a Sunday Dr. Merliss comes to town and says, I
want to see the house. I meet him about 10:30, 11:00 o'clock on a Sunday morning at the
house. We go in. Back door is open. There's Iood wrappers on the counter that've been there
that weren't there the last time I was in. Windows are open again, and it's a very exacerbating
situation. And he says, I want to check the basement. I didn't know there was a basement in
the house. There's things piled in the stairwell to get down into the basement, tool kits, and
heavy stuII. We get it out oI the way. We get down there. And I can see when he pushes on
the door, and he turns to me, and he says, "It's barricaded," Irom the inside. It wasn't locked, it
was barricaded. We know what's going on. So we call the police. The police come over. They
try to get Zach out oI the basement, whoever was in there at that point. The police bang on the
door, "Come on out, Zach. Police. You have to go." No response. They turned to us and say,
we're going to leave. Wait a minute. I'm the owner. You have the authority to break the door
down. "We don't do that." So Dr. Merliss goes down to the bottom oI the stairs. Dr. Merliss
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kicks the door open, and the police oIIicer sticks his head around the corner and pulls his gun
out, and here's Mr. Coughlin down there. Mr. Coughlin voluntarily came upstairs with his dog
and was placed under arrest. AIter he leIt, we went downstairs. Mr. Coughlin had a dwelling
set up. He had water. He had Iood. He had a hot plate, a microwave, had his computer set up
down there. He had the dog. There was dog Iood, dog poop. He had a bed and his computer
system set up down there. He was arrested and was subsequently convicted oI criminal
trespass. MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. Relevancy. II he's testiIying about trespass, that's one
thing. But he's testiIying about a lot oI stuII beyond trespass. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Overruled.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 55:1 to 56:20) CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. COUGHLIN:
'Q Mr. Hill, did the Reno police identiIy themselves as law enIorcement prior to your client
kicking the door down on November 13th? MR. KING: Objection. Relevance. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. THE WITNESS: I believe they did, sir. BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Is that what you testiIied on June 18th in your sworn testimony in the criminal trespass
trial? A I believe it is. Q Did you testiIy to that today? A I believe I just did. Q Just now,
but not earlier when you were providing an answer to Mr. King, and you went through what
happened? A Mr. Coughlin, let me make it easy Ior you. I don't recall what I testiIied to on
direct Irom Mr. King. It is my clear recollection that beIore Dr. Merliss kicked the door down
in the basement, the police had identiIied themselves loudly and clearly. Q Can you describe
that in as much detail as possible? MR. KING: Objection. Relevance. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The relevance, Mr. Coughlin, as to your competency or candor, which are the two issues
raised? MR. COUGHLIN: It goes to whether or not there was a criminal trespass, which I
believe -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: You were convicted oI criminal trespass, true? MR.
COUGHLIN: I was. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. MR. COUGHLIN: But a conviction
under Claiborne is not something you're entitled to just say, all right, conviction, and be done
with it. Further, I'm not oIIering it to prove whether or not there was conviction. I'm oIIering
it to impeach Mr. Hill's credibility, which is severely impeached by this in that he lied, and his
client lied to get an arrest made. MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, iI I can respond? MR.
COUGHLIN: That's been proven in my Iilings.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 57:16 to 62:4) 'MR. COUGHLIN: Sir, I'm not trying to retry it.
I'm trying to impeach Mr. Hill's credibility. MR. ECHEVERRIA: To that extent I'll allow
that question. MR. COUGHLIN: Thank you, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: But you better have
some evidence that -- iI you are going to ask questions, they better be based on Iact. MR.
COUGHLIN: They are. They're based on video. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a --
propose a witness that will testiIy that the police did not identiIy themselves? MR.
COUGHLIN: I have a video oI the sergeant -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a witness?
MR. COUGHLIN: -- admitting to that. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a witness? MR.
COUGHLIN: So you're telling me it has to come in the Iorm oI a witness as evidence? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: II you are intending to impeach him on some Iacts, then I would require that
you make an oIIer oI prooI as to what witness will impeach Mr. Hill. MR. COUGHLIN: I
would like to show Mr. Hill a video oI Marsha Lopez, the sergeant with him that day,
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admitting that Mr. Hill's account is wrong. MR. KING: I'm going to object to any video or
display oI videos. And the reason I will object is, number one, they are irrelevant. Number
two, they're all edits. And number three, he's trying to show that something didn't occur by
showing an excerpt oI a video. It would be totally irrelevant and immaterial. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I'll address the admissibility oI the video when that appears. Right now Mr.
Coughlin has asked Mr. Hill whether the police identiIied himselI. Mr. Hill said that they
have. I think you've laid the groundwork. II you have impeachment testimony that's
admissible, when you oIIer it -- MR. COUGHLIN: I'll ask a more clariIying question. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed to another subject. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q So when they
identiIied themselves, how long between identiIying themselves and kicking the door down?
A Three minutes. Two or three minutes. Q Which one oI them identiIied themselI? A I
believe there was a lady sergeant, and there was a male oIIicer. And I believe he's the one
who banged on the door with his nightstick and identiIied himselI as being with the police.
And I believe his words were, come on out, Zach. Q Was that it, come out Zach? Does that
identiIy it as being the police? A He identiIied himselI as being with the Reno Police
Department. Q In what words? A I believe those were the words he used, sir. Q What
words? A This is the police, please come out Zach. Q Because previously all you said was,
come on out Zach. A I believe you're mistaken, sir. Q So you're saying that oIIicer Chris
Carter, Junior, three minutes beIore the door was kicked in by your client, banged on the door
with his nightstick, and said, this is the police. Come on out, Zach? A Mr. Coughlin, three
minutes is probably a long estimate. The process was we had cleared the stairwell -- Q Did
he say, this is the police? MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative. THE WITNESS: I believe
he did, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Let me -- I'm going to go ahead and overrule.
Go ahead. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Did he say, this is the police? A I believe he did, sir.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: You've asked that three times now. THE WITNESS: At least. BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q Did Sergeant Lopez, the Iemale sergeant? A She may have, but I don't
recall. Q Did you have a video camera with you? A We had Dr. Merliss's phone. Q Did
you take 14 videos that you propounded to the Reno city attorney that day? MR. KING:
Objection. Relevance. THE WITNESS: We gave them what we had. The number I don't
recall. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Was there some reason -- you seem to have video oI every
moment oI that day, except Ior this announcing themselves as law enIorcement. Is that what
you're testiIying to right now? A Mr. Coughlin -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, the
issue here is whether or not you're competent to be an attorney and should continue in the
practice oI law. You're Iocusing on a rather minor detail, and I would like you to Iocus on the
broader issues. MR. COUGHLIN: It's not just competency, it's candor. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
You've indicated you want to impeach him. The issue is Mr. Hill has testiIied that the police
identiIied themselves. You say something diIIerent. I've asked you Ior an oIIer oI prooI.
You've laid the Ioundation. Let's proceed. MR. COUGHLIN: It also goes to -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed, Mr. Coughlin. You would do yourselI some good iI you
will Iocus on the issues, iI you will.
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From the transcript oI the criminal trespass trial on 6/18/12, Hill's testimony:
'January 13th, 2012 RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez and OIIicer Travis Warren and OIIicer Avila
respond to a call Ior help regarding a domestic disturbance Irom Zach Coughlin relating to the
attacks by his housemates, Christopher "Erin" Allaback and Laura Foreshee Ior which
Coughlin ultimately received two Orders oI Protection in FV12-00187 and FV12-00188.
Sargent Lopez subjected Coughlin to a custodial arrest Ior criminal trespass in Reno
Municipal Court case 11 CR 26405, on November 13th, 2011 (which resulted in Coughlin
being convicted Ior criminal trespass Iollowing the June 18th, 2012 Trial wherein Richard
Hill testiIied as Iollows:
BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q By whom and when was either I, or anyone else, legally deemed to
be the tenant, warned to leave the premises? THE COURT: And then to the extent you can
answer that, Mr. Baker, answer it. II you can't, don't.
THE WITNESS: I can answer it, sir.
THE COURT: Okay, thank you.
THE WITNESS: The Iirst two notices were served on you on August 22nd, 2011. One oI
those was a 5-day notice that warned you that iI you did not pay your rent within Iive days
you would be evicted. MR. COUGHLIN: Objection, Your Honor, relevancy. When one has a
legal right to be somewhere THE
COURT: You asked the question. He's giving the answer. II you are going answer (sic) open
ended questions on cross-examination, you're stuck with the answer.
You can answer that question, Mr. Baker. Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
The second oI those notices was a 30-day no cause that gave you 30 days. And what that
notice did was that it told you that your tenancy, your month-to-month tenancy, was being
terminated as oI that time.
Page -87So,
you had through sometime in the middle to the end oI
September to vacate under that notice.
The way it works is aIter the 30 days has run, then we serve you, and we served you with
another 5-day Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer. That was your third warning.
Then we had our hearings on October 13'h and October 2'h. At the end oIthat hearing, at
approximately 5:00 on October 25th, Judge SIerrazza told you, and told me and everyone else
in the Court, that the eviction had been granted, and that you had through October 31 at 5:00
p.m. That was your Iourth warning.
AIter that, well -that was your Iourth warning. BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q So, when you're saying "warning," are you saying upon the original warning in August that
Iailing to leave at that time would have justiIied a criminal trespass prosecution at that time?
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Judge, it calls Ior a legal conclusion. Objection. THE COURT:
Sustained. This witness cannot answer that question. That does call Ior a legal conclusion.
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THE WITNESS: You were also warned on October 27'h when I emailed you the proposed
Order. BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q And when you say "warned," warned to do what and by when?
Page -88A
Your question was were you ever warned that you were going to be evicted, so I think that's
why.
Q Ao, it wasn't. It was, "were you ever warned to leave the premises?" I keep referring to a
criminal trespass statute, and you keep referring to civil eviction statutes.
THE COURT: Listen, I don't want to have an engagement between the witness and the
DeIendant. I want you to answer questions. I can Iigure this stuII out up here. I wasn't -I've
been doing this Ior Iive years.
You've asked some important questions, Mr. Coughlin. I don't know iI you're going to really
help yourselI anymore by asking any more questions Irom this witness. I think Mr. Baker has
testiIied to the best oI his ability about what he knows, and I think that's all he can testiIY to.
MR. COUGHLIN: Alright, thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You made some headway, and it's probably a good time to stop unless you
have some other direct, relevant questions related to his direct examination. (at page 88 oI the
CertiIied Transcript oI the June 18th, 2012 Trial in 11 CR 26405).
...
...BY MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Q And what did happen when you got there on the 13th
aIter you inspected the property? A At that point in time, the client said, "Well, I want to
check the basement." I said, "Basement?"
And the basement entrance was outside the locked back door on the porch. And we went
around out the back door to go down the staircase, and there were tool boxes oI -like small
suitcases, boxes, stacked in the stairwell that we had to pick up and move to get out oI the
way so we could get down the stairs to go to see what was in the basement.
We Iinally got all that stuII out oI the way, having to walk through all oI the stuII that was on
the porch.
Anyway, the client gets down to the bottom oIthe stairs. I was 3 or 4 Ieet behind him, and he
pushed on the door, and I could see that the door was moving, but it was barricaded. And he
turned to me and said, "It's barricaded Irom the inside." I said, "Okay, that's it. Let's go
upstairs."
We went upstairs. We called the police. They arrived about 10 minutes later. Told them what
the problem was. They went down. It was a lady sergeant. I believe her name was Lopez, and
an oIIicer. I don't recall his rank. I believe it was Carter.
They went down, and banged on the door with their nightsticks. We were pretty sure who was
inside. Didn't know Ior sure. And I said, "Come on out, Zach." Nothing. "Come on out,
Zach." Nothing.
And that went on Ior 2 or 3 minutes. And they specifically identified themselves as the
police. They said, "Well, that's it, we're going to leave." And both Dr. Merliss and I said,
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"What do you mean? This guy is in here. Somebody is in here criminally trespassing. We
need to know who it is and get him out oI here." And they said, "Well, we're not going to
break down the door."
So, Dr. Merliss went down the stairs, and he's the one that kicked the door open. Broke the
door in the process. He then came up. One oI the police oIIicers went down with his gun
drawn, Ilashlight turned down, and the Iirst thing I heard was, "Show me your hands! Show
me your hands! Come towards me."
Page -93
Page -94
And I don't recall at that time whether Mr. Coughlin identiIied
himselI or not. We then proceeded upstairs, and Mr. Coughlin then came upstairs on his own.
BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Mr. Hill, at any time on that day, November 13th, did the owner oI
the premises warn the arrestee to leave the property?
A
I think the message was communicated.
Q
Via what medium?
A
The Iact that you were handcuIIed and arrested. Didn't
you get the picture?
Q Okay, prior to the handcuIIing and the arresting, did anybody say, "You need to leave the
premises?" A I didn't hear that. Q Nobody said that? A I did not hear that, sir. Q Did you say
it? A No. Q Did Dr. Merliss? A Not that I heard. Q Did the police? A No, not that I heard. Q
So, nobody that you heard oI warned the person
arrested Ior trespassing?
Page -1 10
THE COURT: I think it's been asked and answered. I've heard
the question Iive times, and we're going nowhere by answering this. I think you asked the
question that's relevant. Mr. Hill answered it. Now, move on to your next relevant question iI
you have any.
MR. COUGHLIN: Alright, Your Honor. And this might not be relevant, but the other part oI
the statute is someone Iailed to leave aIter being warned to do so.
We have testimony that there was no warning.
THE COURT: You can ask a question right now. This is all subject to argument later on. It's
subject to other testimony, but Mr. Hill has answered the questions that you seem to have
answered (sic) that are relevant to his direct testimony. BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Did the accused ever Iail to leave the property aIter being warned to do so? A You were
there. THE COURT: To the extent you can answer that would be yes or no, Mr. Hill. Answer
the question so we don't drag this out.
THE WITNESS: I don't know that I can answer it yes or no.
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THE COURT: II you can't answer it, that's Iine.
MR. COUGHLIN: And then just quickly, and I'll wrap this up, Your Honor. BY MR.
COUGHLIN:
Q Did the accused ever say anything to the police to the eIIect that, "Why would you arrest
me instead oI telling me to leave?"
Page -1 11A
No.
Q
Warn me to leave?
A
No.
Q Do the videos that you propounded to the City Attorney showed just that?
A I don't remember.
Q Have you reviewed the videos you propounded to the City Attorney?
A Not really.
Q Okay, did the police report that you Iiled indicate whether or not you warned the accused to
leave?
A I'd have to see it.
Q Okay, did the police ever ask you whether or not you had indicated to the accused that you
would be charging him the Iull rental value oI the property during this period oI time?
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Judge, I'm going to object.
THE COURT: It's irrelevant, sustained.
MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, I believe it THE
COURT: We're not -that doesn't help the Court with the issues at all. I'm just telling you right
now that's irrelevant in my opinion. MR. COUGHLIN: II the eviction is withdrawn? THE
COURT: Objection is sustained. You can ask your next
question. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. I think this is my last question, Your Honor.
Page -1 12BY
MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Mr. Hill, you say the police -you're testiIying under oath that you're sure the police
speciIically identiIied themselves as police prior to the door being kicked down?
A I am. Q And can you tell me speciIically how MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Judge, I'm
going to object as to relevance. It's not relevant.
THE COURT: It's irrelevant to me, Mr. Coughlin, what the police identiIied -he's testiIied
they've identiIied themselves. They were oIIicers on the premises. What relevance is it at this
point to explore any line oI questioning related to that Iact?
MR. COUGHLIN: Well, iIit's someone with authority to warn someone to leave, that's one
thing. II it's a crazy person outside on the street, saying, "Come on out."
THE COURT: Ask Mr. Hill a couple oI questions related to the police, what they were
dressed like, what they asked when they showed up.
You can ask that.
MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm sorry, I couldn't understand what THE
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COURT:
Go ahead and ask some questions related
to that.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Can you tell me exactly what the police said when they identiIied themselves as police
prior to the door being kicked down?
Page -1 13-
A We told them that we were pretty sure you were there, so my best recollection is that they
shouted, "Come on out, Zach. Come on out, Zach." Words to that eIIect.
I recall hearing that, as well as, "Come on out, this is the
police." basement.
Q A
When did you hear, "Come on out, this is the police." When they were down banging on the
door oI the
Q A
Prior to the door being kicked down? Yes.
Q A
You're sure? Positive.
Q A
Were you videotaping during this period oItime? I wasn't.
Q A Q
You were not videotaping? Nope. At any time on this date in question?
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Judge, that misstates the question. He said, "Were you taping at
this time?"
He answered that question. He said, "No." THE COURT: Ask another question, Mr.
Coughlin. I'm not sure how relevant this is, to tell you the truth.
Again, I think I've made myselI very clear. You are getting Iar aIield. It's not necessarily
helpIul to the Court, and you're making an ultimate conclusion regarding the trespass
violation.
Page -114
MR. COUGHLIN: Here's my offer of proof, Your Honor, is that if Mr. Hill was taping,
and he has a tape of everything except a period where anybody warns the accused to
leave, or a period where the police actually identity themselves as police, prior to the
door being kicked down, then that would tend to indicate that those things didn't
happen.
THE COURT: Okay, I'll note Ior the record.
'ow deposit...not giving the 20 days to respond to a Complaint called Ior by JCRCP
109....basically giving HIll and Merliss all the beneIits oI the quick and easy summary
eviction proceeding (Coughlin was precluded Irom making counterclaims or bringing in third
party deIendants like Dickson Realty or NV Energy or Green Action Lawn Service, etc), and
Coughlin none oI the procedural protections oI a plenary unlawIul detainer, while also
attempting to aIIor HIll and Merliss the beneIits oI a plenary unlawIul detainer (awarding
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back rent, attorney's Iees, landlord was able to bring a summary eviction proceeding against a
commercial tenant based only on a No Cause Notice, verboten under NRS 40.253...). Further,
and this is shown on the videos Hill and Merliss Iilmed, the RPD at no time gave Coughlin a
warning to leave where Coughlin could have heeded it and leIt, or otherwise been issue a
citation in lieu oI a custodial arrest. The RPD wanted to make the big rich landlord and
attorney happy here, and neither the RPD (which was mad at Coughlin Ior Iiling a police
misconduct complaint incident to the wrongIul August 20th, 2011 arrest oI Coughlin that ain't
lookin' good Ior the State now that Coughlin got WCPD Jim Leslie booted Irom the case in
RCR2011-063341) nor Hill or Merliss were going to be satisIied with just issuing Coughlin a
"warning" to leave the premises, as they Iigure Coughlin would just heed any such
warning....The RPD and Merliss/HIll were all jacked up on revenge powder and wanted
Coughlin arrested. Dr. Merliss is practically Irothing at the mouth (demanding "more eye
contact!" Irom Coughlin in the video "Zach's arrest 0010" just beIore Dr. Merliss commits a
crime in lying to the RPD in response to Coughlin's querying those there as to who warned
him against trespassing and when, whereupon Dr. Merliss lies in order to get Coughlin
arrested, and Hill co-signs it:
Richard G. Hill, Esq. (opposing counsel in the civil eviction case Irom which this criminal
trespass trial stems) testiIied, under oath, that the Reno Police Department identiIied
themselves as law enIorcement and issued a lawIul order to leave prior to the RPD entering
the door that Hill's client Merliss kicked down after such identiIication and issuance oI a
lawIul order or warning to leave the premises was issued by the RPD. '
'1.1 January 13th, 2012 RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez and OIIicer Travis Warren and OIIicer
Avila respond to a call Ior help regarding a domestic disturbance Irom Zach Coughlin relating
to the attacks by his housemates, Christopher "Erin" Allaback and Laura Foreshee Ior which
Coughlin ultimately received two Orders oI Protection in FV12-00187 and FV12-00188.
Sargent Lopez subjected Coughlin to a custodial arrest Ior criminal trespass in Reno
The admission by Sargent Lopez was captured on a high 8mm video camera that
Coughlin bought Irom a thriIt store Ior Iive dollars aIter his then housemate ruined his digital
smart phone video recorder by throwing hot coIIee on it an Coughlin. Coughlin then
transIerred the tape Irom that high 8mm to a digital version by Iilming a television with a
digital video camera later obtained, while it was playing that high 8mm tape. The Iile was
name "0201 cropped Carter Lopez 26405.wmv, and the Iollowing represents and accurate
transcription thereoI, in relevant part:
Coughlin: Sargent Lopez are you going to arrest Nevada
court services Ior trespass?
Lopez: I'm not going to arrest them Ior trespass.
Coughlin: but you arrested me Ior trespass.
Lopez: because you were squatting in the property.
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Coughlin: why do you say that you have any evidence oI
that? (5 seconds oI silence is Sargent Lopez's response) did
you announce that you were Reno PD prior to kicking the
door in?
Lopez: I didn't kick the door in.
Coughlin: did you announce that you are Reno PD prior to
anybody kicking the door in?
Lopez: I didn't have to,
Coughlin: so nobody announced that they were Reno PD?
Lopez: because the guy who kicked it in had to kick in his
own door because you were squatting in his place.
Coughlin: so you are admitting that you guys didn't
announce that you were Reno PD.
Lopez: you are wearing my patience thin, Sir, okay. I am
trying to come here to help you, and I bring a specialized
oIIicer (motioning to RPD OIIicer Travis Warren, whom has
been described as some sort oI RPD OIIicer with some
specialty in "mental health" related areas).
Coughlin: that's interesting, you admit that you and OIIicer
Carter never announced that you are Reno PD, and that you
never asked me to leave, did you, prior to the door being
kicked in?
OIIicer Travis Warren: She didn't have to do anything like
that.
Coughlin: you didn't have to! That's great, but that means
you didn't either.
Warren: hold on Zach. You asked us to come here because
you needed help now you are being conIrontational.
Coughlin: no I'm not, no not. Anybody who asked you a
question is conIrontational, I guess, huh?
Warren: Zach, let's try to stay on topic.
Coughlin: On topic? I'm not on the topic you want me to be
on.
Warren: Zach the topic that I'm interested in...
Coughlin: Is the one that covers your ass!
Warren: No, it's not.
Coughlin: Yes, it is."
...
Coughlin: So, Sargent Lopez you have admitted that you did
not ask me to leave and you did not announce that you are
Reno PD either you or your partner either oI those things
when you arrested me Ior trespass. Are you been arrest
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Nevada Court Services Ior the trespass that there is video
evidence oI on YouTube right now? Are you can a do that,
Sargent? Sargent, are you?
Warren: Zach, that's not the topic were on.
Coughlin: Are you going to do that, Sargent? Sargent, are
you?
Lopez: are you going to Iill out your statement?
Coughlin: sure. Are you going to do that?
Lopez: I am not going to arrest Nevada Court Services.
Coughlin: Why, are they your buddies?
Lopez: because they did their job.
Coughlin: wait a did their job by going behind my back
Ience and banging on my windows Ior 45 minutes three
times a time a day? Interesting...
Lopez: Zach, we need you to Iill out the paper.
Coughlin: Interesting how it works down there at the Reno
PD. You know, there is a lots oI documentary Iilmmakers
out there these days, Sargent Lopez? Do you have anything
you would like to say?
Lopez: Zach, you need to Iinish your statement.
Warren: Zach, you call us here to help you, and now your
are...
Coughlin: well apparently not because you arrest me Ior
trespass when you either didn't tell me to leave Ior
announced that you were the PD (police Department) and
then you have video evidence oI Nevada Court Services
doing trespassing harassing banging on windows Ior 40 min.
at a clip three times a day, behind a back gate is obviously
trespassing, and you are seeing you are not going to do
anything...
Lopez: have you had your day in court on that yet?
Coughlin:That is coming up.
...
Warren: Zach, we really need to stay on topic, okay?
Coughlin: What is the topic? Nevada Court Services? The
buddies oI Sargent Lopez?
Warren: No...
...
Coughlin: are you guys going to do anything on this call
because the last time you didn't run anybody's priors and iI
you had it would have been interesting what you would have
Iound, what did you say? Is that proper procedure children
somebody's priors?
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Lopez: The priors Ior who?
Coughlin: because you guys didn't do that... Well who
would I be talking about?
Lopez:(smirking) YourselI, maybe? The priors Ior yourselI?
Coughlin: Oh, is that a...do you think you are Iunny?
Lopez: I think it is Iunny, yeah. I think everything is Iunny,
actually. I am amused by a lot oI stuII.
Coughlin: Really? Do you think it's Iunny when your
partner says that Richard Hill pays him a lot oI money to
arrest whom he says to?
Lopez: I am pretty sure he didn't...
Coughlin: and you were there? And you didn't Iollow up
with the questions oI whether Richard Hill had given me a
bill Ior rent that month and yet you still arrested me Ior
trespass?
Lopez: 5 min. Zach.
Coughlin: I think that's Iunny, that you think it's Iunny.
Lopez: 4 min. Zach
...
Lopez:, did the management give you an eviction notice?
Coughlin: what are you getting involved in civil matters
now? You are going above and beyond, Sargent Lopez,
getting involved in civil matters...
Lopez: Zach did they give you an eviction notice or not?
Coughlin: wow you are working oI the storm over there
aren't you
Lopez: Yes or no:
Warren: you could say no comment, Zach.
Coughlin: thank you, counselor. I appreciate your advice.
Now, what criminal matter were you investigating here?
Lopez: I am asking you a question.
Coughlin: About a what? A civil matter?
Lopez: Zach, did you get an eviction notice Irom these guys
(Sargent Lopez is reIerring to Western Nevada Management
posting a John Doe 30 day eviction notice, allegedly, on the
door oI the 1422 E. 9th St. #2 town home that WNM (which,
like NCS, commits the unauthorized practice oI landlord
tenant law) had agreed to some deal with Coughlin's
housemates (or maybe they were his sublessors? Coughlin
rented a room Irom them oII oI Craigslist, but to some extent
they were held out to be employees or partners oI WNM,
and WNM did testiIy at a February 23rd, 2012 hearing aIter
Coughlin Iiled an interruption oI essential services
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complaint against WNM, Gayle Kern, Esq., LTD, and Park
Terrace Townhomes that Iormer WNM manager, Robyn
Batalado received approval Irom the Park Terrace Town
Homes Homeowners Associattion to allow Coughlin's
sublessors to live their in exchange Ior some handyman
work (and perhaps in light oI the lessened insurance costs
associated with not having the unit vacant incident to some
scenario where the PTTHOA bought the unit at a Ioreclosure
sale).
Warren: We will take that as a yes or no, or a maybe, who
knows? All right, Zach? You are not going to be able to
bait us into saying things?
Coughlin: Well, I've been listening to you here whether
you've been baited or not, you have said a whole lot today.
...
Coughlin:... What iI Richard Hill sent me a Bill Ior rent Ior the month oI November,
should you Iollow phone that beIore you make it trespass arrest? And what did you say
to that? You say no we are not going to that Richard Hill pays us a lot oI money, and
we are going to arrest whom he says to arrest, did you hear that Sargent Lopez?
Warren: Zach, let's stay on topic.
Coughlin: this could be your star turn... This could be your
star turn.
Lopez: you need some help, brother.
Coughlin: really?
Lopez: Yeah, you do.
...(Sargent Lopez and OIIicers Warren and Avila then leave
shortly thereaIter, and Coughlin has the Iollowing exchange
with his housemate's/abusers teenage daughter):
Coughlin: look someday, you are trying to support yourselI
and someone steals your license plate, and slashes your
tires, and locks you out aIter you have given them the last
money you had...
Teenage Girl's Friend: well, someday we won't be an assh*le
like you
Coughlin:What is an "assh*le" about that?
Teenage Girl: you are I*cking r*tarded, you are being
r*tarded, you're making my dad not like you, you steal his
knives. His steak knives, like seriously?
Coughlin: You mean the one oI he held while chasing me up
the stairs with saying he was gonna kill me?
Teenage Girl: He didn't I*ckin' chase you up the stairs and
tell you he was gonna kill you. Why would he say that, he's
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not like that. And iI he say's it, it doesn't mean he means it.
You make him say that, you I*ckin' pr*ck."
Additionally, the custodial trespass arrest oI Coughlin on 11/13/11 invokes the Iruit oI
the poisonous tree doctrine as well, as the RPD trespassed onto Coughlin's property, in
violation oI the Fourth Amendment (whether or not the landlord kick down the door to the
crawlspace/quasi-basement under the house, and Hill testiIied that the OIIicer entered the
quasi-basement, but regardless, the property was completely Ienced and the oIIicers entered
the quasi-basement by a route through the house, where such was trespassing in light oI NRS
40.385 and NRS 40.360(3) and the Iact that any eviction order in RJC Rev2011-001708 was
void in light oI the lack oI presence oI a variety oI jurisdictional prerequisites (no 'landlord's
aIIidavit Iiled, no 'twenty days to Iile an answer aIter being served a summons and
complaint a la NJCRCP Rule 109, anything purported to satisIy the requirements oI NRS
40.254 being deIicient, particularly in light oI the veriIication requirement in NRS 40.XX,
and the patent inconsistency between Baker's arguments and assertions and landlord Merliss's
testimony with respect to what the lease indicated with respect to the term oI the tenancy and
the patent incongruities reveal by an inspection oI paragraphs 2, 3, and 20 therein in
comparision to the 8/22/11 and 9/27/11 Notices posted on Coughlin's door admitted at the
10/25/11 hearing as exhibits.
C. Standing
State v. Dennis, 182 Ohio App. 3d 674, 2009-Ohio-2173 Police responded to the report oI a
trespasser at an apartment complex. Believing apartment had been abandoned, oIIicer entered
and Iound the deIendant in a recliner and a crack pipe in a potato chip bag. (1) DeIendant had
standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation. While trespassing Ior purposes oI criminal
law does not strictly Iollow civil law, he retained an expectation oI privacy in the premises
even though he had received eviction notices. Though he had been gone Ior a while, he was
present when the oIIicers entered and the state Iailed to prove the eviction process had been
completed. (2) Good Iaith does not save the search. Good Iaith mainly applies in warrant
cases. Court does not reach whether it should be extended here. The oIIicers could not have
reasonably believed the apartment was vacant based on the inIormation they had.
'Similarly, on search and seizure issues involving law enIorcement access to a premises, the
power to consent or object depends on who has privacy rights. In Vincennes v. Emmons,
#42S02-0504-CV-131, 817 N.E. 2
nd
155 (Ind. 2006), the court stated that a city's ordinance
authorizing warrantless inspections oI rental units unless tenants object did not violate the
constitutional rights oI landlords, as landlords had no reasonable expectation oI privacy in
units rented to either residential or commercial tenants. In instances where the landlords are
themselves the tenants, the ordinance would be interpreted as also requiring their consent or a
warrant.
In Harvey v. Plains Township, #04-1148, 421 F. 3rd 185 (3d Cir. 2005), the court held that
a police oIIicer who ordered a landlord to open a door to an apartment so that a woman's ex-
boyIriend could retrieve his possessions was not entitled to qualiIied immunity on a woman's
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claim that he violated her Fourth Amendment rights by becoming actively involved in an ex
parte private repossession.
In this case, aIter a woman's relationship with her boyIriend deteriorated, she obtained an
order oI protection granting her exclusive right oI possession oI their apartment. Pursuant to
that order, the boyIriend was required to immediately retrieve all oI his belongings. The trial
court denied a request that he be allowed to return to pick up Iurnishings and other items that
would be diIIicult to remove during his Iirst trip.
The man's attorney sent a letter to the woman inIorming her that he would go to the apartment
at a particular time to retrieve his remaining belongings. A copy oI the letter was sent to the
woman's landlord and to the local police department. A police oIIicer was sent to the apart-
ment at the time designated in the letter in order to 'keep the peace at the repossession, and
the landlord was also present at that time. The woman, who claimed never to have received
the letter, was not there.
The oIIicer allegedly directed the landlord to unlock the door so that the man could re-
trieve his property. AIter this was done, and when the woman returned, she Iound the apart-
ment in 'disarray, and claimed that many items were missing, including some not included
in the ex-boyIriend's list oI his property.
On appeal, the federal appeals court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the
officer, holding that a police officer actively involved in an ex parte private repossession
of property may be engaged in state action in violation of the Fourth Amendment. It
agreed, however, that the landlord, who opened the door at the direction oI the oIIicer, was
not engaged in state action, and upheld the result as to the remaining deIendants.
The appeals court rejected the oIIicer's argument that his conduct was not state action and
that he was 'merely present at a private repossession. There was evidence, including the
testimony oI the landlord, that the oIIicer directed the opening oI the door, and that she never
would have opened it without the oIIicer's instructions. II this was true, the oIIicer played a
'principal role in the entry and seizure oI the property, and a reasonable jury could conclude
that he used his public authority to help the ex-boyIriend gain entry and take the property
Irom the apartment. The record supported a Iinding that he was not a 'mere spectator.
Additionally, the law was 'unquestionably clear at the date oI the incident, September 1999,
that the Fourth Amendment prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures oI a person's home
by the police without a warrant. The court also Iound that iI the oIIicer concluded that the wo-
man had consented to the repossession merely on the basis oI a copy oI the letter, to which the
woman did not respond (and which she claimed she never got) that was not reasonable. 'A
reasonable oIIicer at least would have reIused to assist with opening the door until he was sat-
isIied that consent was given.
Irom AELE article attached as Exhibit 1 to Coughlin's 6/5/12 Motion to Dismiss/Suppress
in 26405: '
When oIIicers respond to a complaint about the presence oI a trespasser, they should inquire
as to the reason the person is there. The answer to that question may provide probable
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grounds Ior an arrest. Many laws concerning trespass, however, require that, prior to an arrest,
a person is asked to leave and is given an opportunity to comply. Make sure oIIicers are Ia-
miliar with state statutes and/or local ordinances bearing on this question.
It is very telling that RCA Hazlett-Stevens, despite sending Coughlin notice oI the sub-
poena on WCSO Machen (which shoudl have then been Iiled within 2 days in the ROA, yet
was not) Iailed to put into evidence the 11/7/11 AIIidavit oI Service by WCSO Machen in re-
v11-1708, the eviction matter connected to the tresppas case in 26405. Further, Hill did not,
and did not testiIy that he at any point provided the RPD with an prooI oI service oI the evic-
tion order upon Coughlin, neither by way oI a mailed Notice oI Entry to Coughlin Irom Hill's
OIIicer, or anything Irom the RJC, much less the WCSO 11/7/11 AIIidavit oI Service. That is
telling, adn goes to whether the RPD had a reasonable basis Ior believing the reports oI tres-
passing and or probable cause to make the arrest, and to enter the building in any event. Fur-
ther, the Iact that so much oI Coughlin's property remained at his Iormer home law oIIice cer-
tainly weighs against the 'abandonment analysis that arose in Dennis. Coughlin cited to
Higgins v Penobscot at the 6/18/12 Trial in 26405. State v. Dennis, 182 Ohio App. 3D 674 is
perhaps the most applicable case:
'' 17} Dennis`s Iirst assignment oI error states:
18} 'The trial court erred in determining that appellant was a trespasser and lacked
standing to suppress the entry into his apartment and subsequent search oI the premises.
19} Dennis claims that the trial court erred in determining that he was a trespasser and in
concluding that he lacked standing to challenge the entry into the apartment. He argues that
he could not be considered a trespasser at his apartment until a court entered an order
of restitution of the PREMISES TO THE LANDLORD IN A CIVIL ACTION, PURSUANT TO R.C. CHAPTER
1923. DENNIS FURTHER ASSERTS THAT the circumstances oI this case are distinguishable Irom
State v. Little, Montgomery App. No. 19976,
2004-Ohio-1814, and State v. Fleming, Clark App. No. 2003 CA 71, 2004-Ohio-5278, upon
which
the trial court relied to support its conclusion that Dennis was a trespasser and lacked standing
to
object to the oIIicers` entry into the apartment.
20} In reviewing the trial court`s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, this court must
accept the Iindings oI Iact made by the trial court iI they are supported by competent, credible
evidence. See also State v. Morgan (Jan. 18, 2002), Montgomery App. No. 18985, 2002 WL
63196.
However, 'the reviewing court must independently determine, as a matter oI law, whether the
Iacts
meet the appropriate legal standard. Id.
///The individual must have a subjective expectation oI privacy in the placed searche, and that
expectation must be objectively reasonable and justiIiable. Rakas at 143; State v. Buzzard,
112 Ohio
St.3d 451, 2007-Ohio-373, 14.
22} It is well established that a tenant has an expectation of privacy in his or her ren-
ted
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apartment. ~Because the right to exclude others is one of the main rights attaching to
property,
TENANTS IN LAWFUL POSSESSION OF A HOME OR APARTMENT GENERALLY HAVE A LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY BY VIRTUE OF HAVING A PROPERTY INTEREST IN A SPECIFIC PIECE OF REAL ESTATE. HIGGINS
V.
Penobscot Cty.. Sheriff`s Dept. (1une 2, 2005), D.Maine No. 04-157-B-W. See also Copley
v.
Voorhies (Aug. 27, 2007), S.D.Ohio No. 2:06-cv-847, 2007 WL 2462651, citing Rakas,
439 U.S. at
143, 99 S.CT. 421, 58 L.ED.2D 387, FN.12 (~AN INDIVIDUAL HAS A 'LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY`
AND, THEREFORE, STANDING TO CHALLENGE LAW ENFORCEMENT`S WARRANTLESS SEARCH ON PROPERTY
THAT THE INDIVIDUAL LAWFULLY POSSESSES).
23] IN EVALUATING WHETHER DENNIS HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE
APARTMENT,
THE TRIAL COURT RELIED UPON LITTLE AND FLEMING, IN WHICH WE HELD THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAD
NO LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE PREMISES, BECAUSE THEY WERE TRESPASSERS AT THE
TIME OF THE OFFICERS` ENTRY. ...
25} Although the deIendants in Little and Fleming were not Iormer or current tenants oI
an apartment, such as Dennis, both cases instruct that once an individual becomes a trespass-
er, the
individual loses any legitimate expectation oI privacy that he once had in the premises.
However, as
neither a social guest nor a hotel guest has the statutory protections against eviction that a ten-
ant has,
Little and Fleming are not controlling Ior determining whether Dennis had become a trespass-
er.
26} WE THEREFORE TURN TO WHETHER DENNIS RETAINED A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN
APARTMENT F WHEN THE OFFICERS ENTERED WITHOUT A WARRANT ON AUGUST 17, 2007. DENNIS CLAIMS
THAT THE evidence was insufficient to establish that he was a trespasser - and, con-
sequently, that he no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy - because he was
still in ~lawful possession of the apartment since there was no evidence that the proper
legal procedures for eviction had been completed under R.C. Chapter 1923.
27} ~C]oncepts of state property law are relevant, but not necessarily dispositive, for
deciding the question whether there was a legitimate privacy interest for F]ourth
A]mendment PURPOSES. UNITED STATES V. SLEDGE (C.A.9, 1981), 650 F.2D 1075, 1082.
28] ~I]T IS UNNECESSARY AND ILL-ADVISED TO IMPORT INTO THE LAW SURROUNDING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES SUBTLE
DISTINCTIONS, DEVELOPED AND REFINED BY THE COMMON LAW IN EVOLVING THE BODY OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY LAW WHICH, MORE THAN ALMOST ANY OTHER BRANCH OF LAW, HAS BEEN SHAPED BY
DISTINCTIONS WHOSE VALIDITY IS LARGELY HISTORICAL.
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9
1ONES V. UNITED STATES (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 266, 80 S.CT. 725, 4 L.ED.2D 697, OVERRULED
ON OTHER
GROUNDS BY UNITED STATES V. SALVUCCI (1980), 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.CT. 2547, 65 L.ED.2D 619.
SEE ALSO
GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH (2006), 547 U.S. 103, 110, 126 S.CT. 1515, 164 L.ED.2D 208 (STATING
THAT
'FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS ARE NOT LIMITED BY THE LAW OF PROPERTY).
29] AT THE SAME TIME, ~A]LTHOUGH PROPERTY LAW] CONCEPTS ARE NOT NECESSARILY
DETERMINATIVE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS, THEY ARE NONETHELESS HELPFUL IN ASSESSING
WHICH
EXPECTATIONS SOCIETY IS PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE AS LEGITIMATE. IN PARTICULAR, A TENANT`S
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS APARTMENT CEASES TO BE 'OB1ECTIVELY 1USTIFIABLE` WHEN HIS
OCCUPANCY CEASES TO BE
LAWFUL, AS DETERMINED BY THE TERMS OF HIS LEASE AND THE PROVISIONS OF HIS STATE`S LANDLORD-
TENANT LAW.
(CITATIONS OMITTED.) UNITED STATES V. ROSS (C.A.6, 2002), 43 FED.APPX. 751, 757.
30] UNDER OHIO LAW, A LANDLORD MUST FOLLOW A THREE-STEP PROCESS TO EVICT A TENANT.
~FIRST,
the landlord must serve the tenant with a notice to terminate the tenancy. R.C. 5321.17.
Second, a
TIMELY NOTICE TO VACATE THE PREMISES MUST BE SERJED ON THE TENANT. R.C. 1923.04. THIRD, THE
LANDLORD must file a complaint in forcible entry and detainer. R.C. 1923.05. Steiner v.
Minkowski (1991), 72
OHIO APP.3D 754, 761.
31] IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT DENNIS HAD BEEN A TENANT OF 1719 RADIO ROAD, APARTMENT F,
AND
HE WAS FOUND AT THE APARTMENT ON AUGUST 17, 2007. THE RECORD ESTABLISHED, HOWEVER, THAT
DENNIS
HAD RECEIVED TWO EVICT ION NOTICES, ONE OF WHICH (THE THREE-DAY NOTICE) HAD BEEN SEEN BY
KINSTLE IN
the apartment. Dennis acknowledged that he had received both a 30-day eviction notice
and a threeday eviction notice, and he stated to the officers that he had been ~evicted.
According to Dennis`s landlord, the apartment had not been cleaned and the locks had
not been changed simply because the LANDLORD WAS ON VACATION. THE ~UNOFFICIAL
CARETAKER HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CALL THE POLICE IF DENNIS RETURNED.
10
32} IN OUR VIEW, DENNIS MET HIS BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THAT HE HAD LAWFUL POSSESSION OF
THE APARTMENT. WHILE THE EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT DENNIS WAS A TENANT OF APARTMENT F AND THAT
HE
HAD BEEN ORDERED TO LEAVE THE APARTMENT BY THE LANDLORD, 'HE DIDN`T SAY ANYTHING ABOUT WHEN
HE WAS
SUPPOSED TO LEAVE. DENNIS`S STATEMENT THAT HE HAD BEEN 'EVICT ED IS SIMPLY HIS VERNACULAR
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acknowledgment that he had been served with eviction notices. There was no evidence beIore
the
court demonstrating that his tenancy had expired. The Iact that Dennis had a tenancy interest
in the
APARTMENT WAS SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE HAD LAWFUL POSSESSION OF THE APARTMENT AND,
THUS, A
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY.
33} ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT DENNIS HAD BEEN SERVED WITH EVICT ION NOTICES, THIS
evidence was insuIIicient to rebut the evidence that Dennis had lawIul possession oI the apart-
ment
and retained a reasonable expectation oI privacy in the premises. Ohio landlord-tenant law
does not
allow Ior 'selI-help by a landlord. As stated above, a landlord is required to successIully
bring a
Iorcible entry and detainer action against Dennis in order to eIIectuate an eviction. Without a
judgment oI restitution in the landlord`s Iavor, Dennis could continue to lawIully possess the
PREMISES. SEE STATE EX REL. JENKINS V. HAMILTON CTY. COURT, AREA NO. EIGHT (1961), 114 OHIO
APP.
231, 233 (FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER ACTION DETERMINES THE RIGHT TO IMMEDIATE POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY); R.C. 1923.09, 1923.11, 1923.13, AND 1923.14.
34} THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT A TENANT HAS THE RIGHT IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES TO REMAIN IN AN
APARTMENT AND TO ENJOY A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY THAT SOCIETY IS PREPARED TO
RECOGNIZE
ONCE HE HAS BEEN SERVED WITH THE REQUIRED NOTICES AND PAPERS. RATHER, ALTHOUGH THERE IS A
PAUCITY OF
OHIO LAW ON THIS SUBJECT, IT IS TO HOLD THAT IT IS CERTAINLY NOT THE PREROGATIVE OF A LANDLORD,
UNILATERALLY,
BY THE SIMPLE DELIVERY OF CIVIL NOTICES AVAILABLE AT ANY CONVENIENCE STORE OR OVER THE INTERNET,
TO
REMOVE A TENANT`S REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY. A TENANT, HAVING RECEIVED SUCH PAPERS,
MAY
11
THINK THAT HE CAN PAY BACK RENT (IF THAT IS THE REASON FOR THE NOTICES) AND STAY, MAY REALIZE
THAT HIS
LAWFUL PRESENCE IN THE APARTMENT WILL SOON BE TERMINATED, OR MAY DECIDE JUST TO LEAVE ON HIS
OWN, BUT
HE DOES NOT REASONABLY EXPECT THAT HE HAS IMMEDIATELY BEEN TRANSFORMED INTO A TRESPASSER AND
THAT THE
LANDLORD OR THE POLICE OR ANYONE ELSE CAN ENTER HIS APARTMENT. ACCORDINGLY, IN ORDER TO REFUTE
EVIDENCE THAT DENNIS WAS A LAWFUL TENANT, THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO PRESENT SOME EVIDENCE THAT
DENNIS WAS LEGALLY A TRESPASSER. NO SUCH EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED.
35} WHILE DENNIS`S PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE NOT DETERMINATIVE OF HIS FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS,
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WE CONCLUDE THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT HE HAD BEEN LAWFULLY EJECTED FROM THE
APARTMENT,
DENNIS COULD NOT PROPERLY BE CONSIDERED A TRESPASSER IN HIS APARTMENT SOLELY DUE TO HIS RECEIPT
OF
EVICTION NOTICES. SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, SCHNEIDER V. STATE (SEPT. 3, 2003), ARK.APP. NO. CACR 02-
771,
2003 WL 22052832 (holding that under state law, the deIendant-tenant retained an expecta-
tion oI
PRIVACY IN THE RESIDENCE, EVEN THOUGH LEASE HAD EXPIRED, WHEN LANDLORD HAD NOT EVICT ED THE
TENANT BY
the statutorily required legal process subsequent to the expiration oI the lease).
36} Moreover, the Iacts that Dennis had some possessions in the apartment and he was
Iound sitting there indicate that Dennis also subjectively retained an interest in the apartment.
37} The state asserts that Dennis nevertheless had no legitimate expectation oI privacy in
this apartment, because he abandoned the property prior to August 17, 2007. As we stated in
State
v. Russell, Montgomery App. No. 21458, 2007-Ohio-137:
38} 'It has long been settled that |a| deIendant has no standing under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution to object to a search and seizure oI property that
he has
voluntarily abandoned.` State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044, para-
graph
two oI the syllabus. As the Ohio Supreme Court has reiterated:
39} ' Abandonment is primarily a question oI intent, and intent may be inIerred Irom
12
words spoken, acts done, and other objective Iacts. United States v. Cowan (C.A.2, 1968),
396 F.2d
83, 87. All relevant circumstances existing at the time oI the alleged abandonment should be
considered. United States v. Manning (C.A.5, 1971), 440 F.2d 1105, 1111. The issue is not
abandonment in the strict property-right sense, but whether the person prejudiced by the
search had
voluntarily discarded, leIt behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property in
question so
that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation oI privacy with regard to it at the time
oI the
search. United States v. Edwards, supra, 441 F.2d at 753; Katz v. United States (1967), 389
U.S.
347, 83 S.Ct. 507.` Id. at 297, quoting United States v. Colbert (C.A.5, 1973), 474 F.2d 174,
176.
Russell, 2007-Ohio-137, at 21-22.
40} Stated simply, once a tenant has surrendered or abandoned his or her apartment, the
tenant no longer has a reasonable expectation oI privacy in the premises. See Russell. II the
tenant
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subsequently returned, his status would be that oI a trespasser.
41} The government bears the burden oI establishing, by a preponderance oI the evidence,
that the deIendant abandoned the property at issue. State v. Dubose, 164 Ohio App.3d 698,
2005-
Ohio-6602, 43.
42} At the suppression hearing, the state presented the landlord`s statements, through
OIIicer Kinstle, that Dennis had cleaned out the apartment and had not been seen at the apart-
ment Ior
a week. Kinstle had also testiIied that the apartment was 'typical oI what you`d expect in a
vacant
apartment. No moving boxes were present and a Iew random pieces oI Iurniture remained.
The
landlord assumed that all remaining property had been abandoned.
43} We do not Iind that the Iacts support the conclusion that Dennis abandoned the
apartment. SigniIicantly, Dennis was Iound inside the apartment sitting in a La-Z-Boy chair.
This
Iact alone suggests that Dennis did not intend to abandon the apartment and the property with-
in it.
13
Even accepting that Dennis had not been seen at Apartment F Ior a week, a brieI absence
Irom a
residence does not constitute abandonment, particularly when the resident returns. Moreover,
the
Iact that Dennis had moved most oI his possessions to another apartment did not establish that
he no
longer had an expectation oI privacy in the apartment, particularly when he continued to have
a
lawIul possessory interest in the property.
44} The trial court erred in concluding that Dennis was a trespasser in his apartment when
the oIIicers entered on August 17, 2007. Accordingly, Dennis was entitled to contest the oI-
Iicers`
entrance into and search oI the apartment under the Fourth Amendment.
45} Dennis`s Iirst assignment oI error is sustained.
III
46} Dennis`s second assignment oI error states:
47} 'The opening oI appellant`s door and entrance into his apartment violated his Fourth
Amendment constitutional rights.
48} In his second assignment oI error, Dennis claims that the oIIicers` entry into his
apartment violated his Fourth Amendment rights, because the oIIicers lacked a justiIiable
basis Ior
entering the apartment without a warrant. The state responds that the oIIicers` entry into the
apartment was based on an objectively reasonable belieI that the apartment was vacant and,
thus, the
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evidence seized did not need to be suppressed.
49} The trial court`s decision dealt mainly with standing and with the oIIicers` actions
once they entered the apartment, but the question oI the lawIulness oI the entry was clearly
beIore the
court by way oI the original motion, the evidence, and the arguments. For example, the de-
Iense
counsel stated that 'even iI the court Iinds they had reason to enter the apartment and the
prosecutor
argued that 'these oIIicers acted reasonably in entering that apartment to pursue the trespass
14
complaint.
Woods v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1115 Ind.App.,1998 Evidence that health club member remained
on club premises aIter being inIormed by manager, based on erroneous computer records, that
her membership had expired, and aIter being asked to leave, was insuIIicient to support con-
viction Ior criminal trespass, where member had Iair and reasonable belieI that she was en-
titled to be present on club property and in Iact had undisputed bona Iide contractual interest
in being present on club property, evidenced by her membership contract. West's A.I.C. 35-
43-2-2(a)(2).
The 12/14/12 FOFCOL in NG12-0204 includes the Iollowing:
'19. State Bar Counsel called attorney Richard Hill to testiIy at the hearing oI this matter:
Mr. Hill has been a member in good standing with the State Bar oI Nevada Ior 33 years. See
Transcript oI Proceedings oI Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 36, L 22 P 37 L 4. Mr. Hill
was retained by Dr. Merliss to assist Dr. Merliss in a landlord tenant dispute with his tenant
Coughlin. See Transcript oI Proceedings oI Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 37, L14 -20.
Mr. Hill represented Dr. Merliss in Reno Justice Court and Washoe County District Court and
two appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court in the matters involving Dr. Merliss and Coughlin.
See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14,2012,P 39, L 13 -24. Mr. Hill has also
reviewed Iilings in oI a case in which Coughlin is involved with Washoe Legal Services. See
Transcript oI Proceedings Wednesday, November 14,2012, P 39, L 25 P 40, L 3.
20. In the eviction proceeding between Dr. Meriiss and Coughlin, Mr. Hill's Iirm
obtained an eviction order allowing Coughlin one week to vacate the premises. Ultimately,
Coughlin Iailed to comply with the eviction order and was convicted oI criminal trespass. See
Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 41, L 18 -P 44, L 12.
21. On behalI oI his client Dr. Merliss, Mr. Hill sought and obtained an order in
Iavor oI Dr. Merliss and against Coughlin awarding Dr. Merliss attorney's Iees in the amount
oI $42,065.50. Washoe District Court Judge Patrick Flanagan entered the order on June 25,
2012. See Transcript oI Proceedings oI Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 47, L 3-7. -See
Hearing Exhibit 2, P 3, L 10-11. The motion seeking attorney's Iees was based on Coughlin's
conduct in the deIense oI the eviction matter, which conduct was characterized as Irivolous
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and vexatious and presumably so Iound by Judge Flanagan. See Hearing Exhibit P 2, L 8-13;
P 3, L 4-11.
22. Based on Mr. Hill's experience and background, his review oI the pleadings in
the litigation between Dr. Merliss and Coughlin and his review oI the pleadings in Coughlin's
litigation with Washoe Legal Services, Mr. Hill is oI the opinion that Coughlin is not
competent to practice law. See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39,
L 1 -12.
23. Based on Mr. Hill's experience in litigating with Coughlin, Coughlin was not truthIul
with either counsel or the court. See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P
53, L 6 -16. Mr. Hill Ielt that Coughlin's Iilings were abusive, at one point calling Mr. Hill's
associate a lichen. Coughlin has accused Mr. Hill oI bribing the Reno Police Department to
have Coughlin arrested. Mr. Hill's staII is terrorized by Coughlin. See Wednesday, November
14, 2012, P 54, L 4 -15...
Meritorious Claims and Contentions
(U) RPC 3.1 in pertinent part states "A lawyer shall not bring or deIend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in .law and Iact Ior doing so that is
not Irivolous, which includes a good Iaith argument Ior an extension, modiIication or reversal
oI existing law."
(V) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin continuously and
repetitively Iiles irrelevant pleadings. pleadings unrelated to the issue at hand and
continuously and repetitively injects irrelevant matters into proceedings.
(W) Judge Nash Holmes Iound, Ior example, that Coughlin repeatedly injected
allegations oI bribery, perjury and police retaliation in a simple traIIic case involving the
Iailure to stop at a stop sign. Supra 7 She also Iound that Coughlin repeatedly injected
attorney Richard Hill into questions and statements when Mr. Hill was in no way involved in
the traIIic citation trial. Supra 7 She also Iound that pleadings Iiled subsequent to
Coughlin's incarceration were lengthy (more than 200 pages) contained scant discussion oI, or
relevance to, the matter and contained irrelevant discussion oI Iacts unrelated to the
proceedings at hand. Supra. 10
(X) The record establishes that in the Merliss eviction action, Coughlin's conduct was
so vexatious and Irivolous as to result in substantial sanction oI attorney's Iees. Supra 21
See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 2, L 8 -13; P3, L 4 -11.
(Y) The Pleading Docket in this matter establishes also that Coughlin's Iilings, even
in his own deIense oI the disciplinary matter, inject lengthy, irrelevant Iacts and legal issues
into this proceeding.
Candor to the Tribunal
(Z) RPC 3.3(a)(1) states "A lawyer shall not knowingly: (m)ake a Ialse statement oI
Iact or law to a tribunal or Iail to correct a Ialse statement .oI material Iact or law previously
made to the tribunal by the lawyer."
(AA) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin violated RPC
3.3(a)(l) when he lied to Judge Nash Holmes as to whether or not he was surreptitiously and
without permission to record the proceeding. Supra 7 OI note, Coughlin did not deny that
he had lied to Judge Nash Holmes. Instead, his cross examination oI Judge Nash Holmes
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Iocused on how she had learned oI the true Iacts. See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 139, L
(BB) Attorney Richard Hill testiIied that based on his experience in litigating with
Coughlin, Coughlin was not truthIul with either counsel or the Court. Supra Paragraph 23.
...Respect Ior the Rights oI Third Persons
(RR) RPC 4.4(a) states '"In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person... "
(uh...like Hill's allegations oI Iinding a "crack pipe and a bag oI weed" or a "vial oI
something" and "a large quantity oI pills"?).
(SS) The record establishes clearly and convincingly that in the Merliss eviction action,
Coughlin conducted himselI in a manner that was abusive, vexatious and Ior purposes oI
delay. The matter was a simple eviction action that apparently lasted through several
proceedings at the Municipal Court level, an appeal to the District Court and two appeals to
the Nevada Supreme Court and which also resulted in Coughlin's conviction Ior criminal
trespass. Supra 19 and 20 Coughlin's conduct in the proceedings was so egregious that
Judge Flanagan ordered Coughlin to pay Dr. Merliss $42,065.50, an amount that is still
unpaid. Supra 21
(TT) The record also establishes that Coughlin habitually prolongs proceedings
unnecessarily; Iiles lengthy, irrelevant, nonsensical pleadings requiring court, staII and
counsel to spend unnecessary eIIort in evaluating and/or responding to the pleadings. Supra
4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 21, 23, 25, 27, 39 and 40
Disciplinary matter
(UU) RPC 8.1(b) provides, in pertinent part, " ... a lawyer ... in connection with a
disciplinary shall not: (b) ... knowingly Iail to respond to a lawIul demand Ior inIormation
Irom an
(VV) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin knowingly Iailed
to respond to the State Bar's request Ior inIormation in the disciplinary proceeding and Iailed
to timely Iile a required veriIied responsive answer or pleading to the Complaint.
(WW) First, Coughlin asked Ior an extension oI time to respond to the letter oI
February 14, 2012...
Misconduct
(DDD) RPC 8.4 provides (in pertinent parts):
It is proIessional misconduct Ior a lawyer to :
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules oI ProIessional Conduct...
(b) Commit a criminal act that reIlects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or Iitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, Iraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration oI justice.
(EEE) The Pleadings, Hearing Exhibits and Transcript oI these proceedings
overwhelmingly,
clearly and convincingly establish a repeated, unrelenting and obstinate pattern oI misconduct
by Respondent Coughlin evincing numerous and repeated violations oI several provisions oI
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RPC 8.4 in violation oI RPC 8.4(a). (So, would that not be something not noticed or plead in
the Complaint, and thereIore, only appropriate in some Iuture disciplinary hearing, iI any?
Otherwise, is that not transmogriIying what is required to be a plenary hearing into one oI a
summary nature?).
(FFF) Coughlin was convicted oI petit larceny on November 30, 201 1, a violation oI
RPC 8.4(b). Such violation is suIIicient alone to trigger application oI SCR 111 . The Nevada
Supreme Court reIerred the matter to the appropriate disciplinary panel Ior a determination oI
the extent oI punishment that should Iollow Irom the conviction. Supra 5
(GGG) The record also establishes that Coughlin was convicted oI criminal trespass in
the prolonged eviction proceedings involving Dr. Merliss, a violation oI RPC 8.4(b). Supra
20 ..
Misconduct
(b) Commit a criminal act that reIlects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or Iitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, Iraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration oI justice.
overwhelmingly,
clearly and convincingly establish a repeated, unrelenting and obstinate pattern oI misconduct
by Respondent Coughlin evincing numerous and repeated violations oI several provisions oI
RPC 8.4 in violation oI RPC 8.4(a). (So, would that not be something not noticed or plead in
the Complaint, and thereIore, only appropriate in some Iuture disciplinary hearing, iI any?
Otherwise, is that not transmogriIying what is required to be a plenary hearing into one oI a
summary nature?).
(FFF) Coughlin was convicted oI petit larceny on November 30, 201 1, a violation oI
RPC 8.4(b). Such violation is suIIicient alone to trigger application oI SCR 111 . The Nevada
Supreme Court reIerred the matter to the appropriate disciplinary panel Ior a determination oI
the extent oI punishment that should Iollow Irom the conviction. Supra 5
(GGG) The record also establishes that Coughlin was convicted oI criminal trespass in
the prolonged eviction proceedings involving Dr. Merliss, a violation oI RPC 8.4(b). Supra
20
(HHH) The Complaint in this matter alleges that Coughlin has been arrested and is
awaiting trial on a larceny charge involving a cell phone and on a charge oI abusing 911
emergency procedures. However, no evidence was presented on these charges but as a matter
oI deIault the allegations may be deemed admitted and would constitute additional violations
oI RPC 8.4(b).
(JJJ) The record, as described at length above, establishes several violations oI RPC
8.4(c).
See (AA), (BB), (CC), (AAA), (BBB) and (CCC).....
('Candor to the Tribunal
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(Z) RPC 3.3(a)(1) states "A lawyer shall not knowingly: (m)ake a Ialse
statement oI Iact or law to a tribunal or Iail to correct a Ialse statement .oI material Iact
or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer."...
(BB) Attorney Richard Hill testiIied that based on his experience in litigating
with Coughlin, Coughlin was not truthIul with either counsel or the Court. Supra
Paragraph 23. ('23. Based on Mr. Hill's experience in litigating with Coughlin,
Coughlin was not truthIul with either counsel or the court. See Transcript oI Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 53, L 6 -16. ('HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 53:5 to
53:16) BY MR. KING: Q Let me restate the question. The question is: As an
attorney, having a responsibility to be truthIul and to have candor with opposing
counsel, was Mr. Coughlin truthIul, and did he use candor with you? A No. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King, wrap it up, please. You're limited to 15 minutes. BY MR.
KING: Q SpeciIically relating to Mr. Coughlin's candor to the court, did he show
candor to the courts? A No.) Mr. Hill Ielt that Coughlin's Iilings were abusive, at
one point calling Mr. Hill's associate a lichen. Coughlin has accused Mr. Hill oI
bribing the Reno Police Department to have Coughlin arrested. Mr. Hill's staII is
terrorized by Coughlin. See Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 54, L 4 -15...)
('HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 54:3 to 54:15) BY MR. KING: Q With regard to a
person perhaps -- to the extent that Mr. Coughlin may have exhibited these bad
behaviors, was he otherwise kind in his dealings with you and Dr. Merliss? Could you
explain, just brieIly, to the panel his actual demeanor with regard to his dealings with
you and your client? A His e-mails, his Iilings were abusive, to say the least. Calling
my -- he called my associate a lichen. I'll admit we all had to retreat to the dictionary
on that one. Name calling. He's accused me oI bribing the Reno Police Department to
have him arrested. My staII is absolutely terrorized by this man.))...
(KKK) The entire record in this matter is replete with instances demonstrating
that Coughlin's conduct is prejudicial to the administration oI justice. Coughlin has
been repeatedly sanctioned monetarily and by way oI incarceration Ior his conduct,
has repeatedly Iiled lengthy, irrelevant and nonsensical pleadings requiring staIIs,
courts and counsel to expend needless and unnecessary time in responding to such
pleadings, has repeatedly disrupted proceedings and Iailed to Iollow instructions and
admonitions oI the courts. The record establishes that the pattern oI conduct continues
despite the severe sanctions administered and continues up to and during the
disciplinary process and hearing oI this matter.
SBN King's FHE6, a letter misaddressed to Couglin (it lacks the '#2 unit number Ior
the rented town home Coughlin was then utilizing as a home oIIice (aIter having rented a
room oII Craigslist with his last $200 Irom two individuals Irom whom Coughlin, on 1/23/12,
in FV12-00187, and 188 received temporary protection orders against Irom 2JDC Master
Edmondson) reads:
'February 14, 2012
Zach Coughlin. Esq.
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1422 E. 9th Street Reno, NV
89512
RE: Grievance File #NG12-0204 Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Dear Mr. Coughlin:
The OIIice oI Bar Counsel has received the enclosed correspondence Irom Richard G.
Hill, Esq., which alleges proIessional misconduct on your part. As such, a grievance Iile has
been opened. Please respond in writing to this grievance within ten (10) days Irom the date oI
this letter and kindly direct your response to the State Bar's Reno oIIice. Your response should
address each allegation contained within Mr. Hill's grievance and, whenever possible. all
applicable documentation in support oI your response should be included.
II you intend to supplement your response, please indicate an expected date oI receipt
Ior the same in your response. II you have any questions. please do not hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely, Patrick O. King Assistant Bar Counsel POK/lp Enclosure
Coughlin has obtained what might be the letter King reIerence (but Iailed to include
therewith) in his FHE6, which might read (and, its important to note, such letter is neither
signed nor sworn, nor made under penalty oI perjury, such as one would have to so assert
were they to make a Complaint with the Commission on Judicial Discipline and the same
David Sarnwoski that RMC Judge Holmes listed as a reIerence in here 2007 application Ior
the then open Reno Justice Court Justice oI the Peace position...Iurther, Hill's 'grievance
was, also, apparently, only emailea to the SBN (although the SBN does hold such manner oI
transmission out to the public as an acceptable means oI so submitting such a grievance or
complaint...however, the Commission on Judicial Discipline demands that all Complaints be
submitted through the mail, curiously...it hardly seems equitable or without a violation oI the
equal protection clause Ior judges to be shielded by negligent, spurious complaints such as
that purportedly made by Hill were attorneys receive no such protections. The strength oI the
judiciary and legal system in general absolutely depends on the strength oI a single attorney.
Were it is the case that a solo attorney can be snuIIed out with minimal eIIort by a Iew judges
or a corrupt bar counsel, or some other concerted duplicity, the legal system will inevitably
Iail at Iar too high an error rate):
'January 14, 2012
VIA EMAIL ONLY patrickknvbar.org
Patrick King, Esq.
Assistant Bar Counsel
State Bar oI Nevada
9456 Double R. Blvd.
Reno, Nevada 89521
Re: Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 9473
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Mr. King:
You and I have previously discussed Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Coughlin, due to his
mental instability, lack oI integrity, and complete incompetence, constitutes a danger to the
public iI he is allowed to continue to practice law. This letter is written to discharge my and
my associate's reporting obligations under RPC 8.3. Please consider the Iollowing:
1. Rissone v. Gessin, CVIO-01341. Although not among Mr. Coughlin's most
signiIicant ethical violations, it presents a good microcosm oI his derelictions. Mr. Gessin was
a client oI our oIIice. He deIrauded the plaintiII, as is his modus operandi in dealing with
women. Approximately one year aIter judgment was entered and the case concluded, Mr.
Coughlin interjected himselI in the case on behalI oI Gessin, trying to collect on a sanction
award against opposing counsel. It turns out that because he had Iiled bankruptcy, Gessin no
longer owns this claim. II you look at the Iile, you will see that Coughlin appeared and then
Iiled a bizarre "partial withdrawal" document on December 8, 2011.
Subsequent to that time, Coughlin has been ghostwriting documents that purport
to be Irom Gessin, individually, and e-Iiling them Ior Gessin. He is using the "/s/" Ior Gessin's
signature. These are clearly not docunlents that are signed or prepared by Mr. Gessin, and the
Iact that somebody (Coughlin) e-Iiles them conIirms he is ghostwriting without the required
disclosure. In addition, it appears that Coughlin has Iacilitated the oI what nlay be a
Iraudulent bankruptcy on behalI oI Gessin. Coughlin's lack is demonstrated in the Gessin case
by the Iact that he does not eIIect on the ownership oI Gessin's potential claims Irom Gessin
having Iiled a bankruptcy, (Le., the claims now belong to the bankruptcy trustee, not Gessin.)
As with all oI the matters reIerenced below, I strongly suggest that you contact the
Second Judicial District Court and get e-Iiling access to the cases mentioned so you can look
at the documents yourselI. Glade Hall, Esq., is opposing counsel in that case and may be oI
help to you.
2. I am inIormed and believe that Mr. Coughlin was recently convicted oI a theIt crime in
Reno Municipal Court. I am Iurther inIormed that the matter arises out oI shopliIting at
Walmart. That case is presently on appeal to the district court in case number CR11-2064. Mr.
Coughlin is representing himselI.
'3. Mr. Coughlin is presently Iacing criminal charges regarding the theIt oI an iPod. That is
pending in Reno Justice Court as case number RCR2011-063341. I have reviewed the Iile.
Mr. Coughlin got into some sort oI argument with his public deIender. As a result, he was
reIerred out Ior a competency evaluation.
4. We represent Dr. Matthew Merliss, a physician Irom Chico, CaliIornia. Dr. Merliss owns
the property at 121 River Rock Street, Reno, Nevada. Beginning in March 2010, the property
was leased to Mr. Coughlin and his then-girlIriend. The lease expired in February 2011. The
girlIriend leIt the community in approximately May 2011. Dr. Merliss contacted us in
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approximately August 2011 to assist in evicting Mr. Coughlin. Coughlin had not paid rent or
utilities since May. He contended that there were habitability issues with the property that
justiIied his withholding rent. All oI his claims were decided adversely to his position at the
eviction hearing. Justice oI the Peace Peter SIerazza ordered Coughlin evicted Irom the
premises eIIective November 1, 2011. On that date, the Washoe County SheriIIs Department
perIormed their normal eviction procedure: locks were changed and the eviction notice was
posted on the Iront door. We videotaped the home and its contents at that time. Upon
inspection over the next Iew days, it became apparent that "somebody" was breaking into the
home on a regular basis.
On Sunday, November 13, 20 11, Dr. Merliss came to town, and I met him at the home
on River Rock Street. As we walked through the home, it was obvious that someone had been
in there since I had last been in several days beIore. Dr. Merliss discovered that the basement
door was barricaded (not locked) Irom the inside. The Reno Police Department was
summoned. They tried to coax whoever was in the basement out, without success. AIter Dr.
Merliss had to kick the door down, it "was discovered that Mr. Coughlin had broken in and
was in the basement. He was arrested and is presently Iacing criminal trespass charges in
Reno Municipal Court. See case no. 11 CR 26405 21. He is also Iacing a contempt motion in
Iront oI Judge SIerazza in the eviction case. Judge SIerazza has stayed that matter pending the
resolution oI the criminal trial. That was scheduled Ior January 10, 2012, but was continued at
the request oI Mr. Coughlin's new attorney.
5. The eviction order is now on appeal to the Second Judicial District Court. See case CVl1-
o3628, pending in Department 7. As part oI the eviction process, a lien was asserted against
the personal property that Coughlin leIt behind at the home. On November 16, 2011,
Coughlin Iiled a motion to contest the landlord's lien in the Reno Justice Court. The court
tried to promptly set a hearing, but Coughlin reIused to cooperate in setting the matter, and
the court took it oII calendar. Coughlin then reinitiated that process and a hearing was held in
December, at which time the court heard evidence oI Coughlin's lack oI cooperation in setting
the November hearing. You may also want to contact Reno Justice Court staII, and in
particular, chieI clerk Karen Stancil, about Mr. Coughlin's abusive treatment oI her and her
staII. AIter the hearing, the court issued an Order granting Coughlin a two-day time window
to remove his personal property. The Iirst day was Thursday, December 22, 20 11. AIter
Coughlin was allowed into the home that Iirst day, he sent out an e-mail to the eIIect that
because he had appealed Judge SIerazza's order, he was entitled to a stay oI proceedings and
was to resume in the home. As a result, he did very little to remove any oI his personal
property that day. On Friday, December 23, 2011, aIter he learned, again, that his stay had
been denied, Coughlin assembled a small crew and they were able to remove a substantial
amount oI his personal property. (You need to understand that Mr. Coughlin is a hoarder. We
have the photos and videos iI you would like to see them.) However, Mr. Coughlin did not get
all oI his property out. For example, I counted 13 car seats that he had somehow managed to
get down into the basement.
Having Iailed to remove all oI his belongings, Mr. Coughlin then moved beIore Judge
Flanagan Ior a temporary restraining order to prevent the disposal oI his abandoned property
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in accordance with Judge SIerazza's order. Attached is Mr. Coughlin's motion, my oIIice's
opposition, and Mr. Coughlin's reply. These documents demonstrate Mr. Coughlin's complete
and utter incompetence as an attorney. On January 11, 2012, Judge Flanagan denied Mr.
Coughlin's request Ior a temporary restraining order. On January 12, 2011, the contractor
hired to clean the house commenced work. Mr. Coughlin Ilagged the contractor down in
traIIic when he (the contractor) was on his way to the dump with the abandoned property
Irom the home. Coughlin called the police, who arrived at the transIer station. Coughlin was
Ialsely asserting that the contractor had tried to run hin1 over. He also told the police that the
contractor had stolen his possessions. AIter I presented the court orders to the police, the
contractor was allowed to proceed. At their instruction, I have now had a TPO issued against
Coughlin by Reno Justice Court.
However, beIore the contractor could get back to the River Rock house, Coughlin was
there. He had his video camera and was walking up and down the street screaming and yelling
at police, at the contractor, and at me, when I arrived. Mr. Coughlin ended up bemg arrested
and taken to jail. The police inIormed me that because oI the number and types oI contacts
they have had with him, he is no longer eligible Ior citations in the event oI inIractions.
Enclosed you will Iind a copy oI a supplemental document Iiled by Mr. Coughlin on
January 13, 2012, and sent to my staII and I by email Irom Coughlin that morning. Please
note that the attorney designation on the Iirst page indicates that it is being Iiled by Coughlin
as appellant. You will note that the caption is Irom a diIIerent case. It is unclear in which case
Mr. Coughlin intended to Iile this document, although, because oI the case number and the
caption, it appears to have ultimately been routed to the Carpentier case (CVOB-01709) and
not the eviction appeal case (CV11-0362B). I am told that counsel in the captioned case may
also be in the process oI Iiling a bar complaint against Coughlin.
6. When the house was secured aIter Coughlin's arrest, we Iound a crack pipe and a bag oI
what appeared to be marijuana. The contractor also reported Iinding a box oI pills and a vial
oI some sort. We understand Coughlin has unsuccessIully tried the Lawyers Concerned Ior
Lawyers program, and that he has a history oI substance problems.
7. Mr. Coughlin has Iiled two lawsuits against his Iormer employer, Washoe Legal Services.
He has sued all oI the board oI directors and the management oI the company. Both cases
have now been dismissed. Both cases demonstrate his lack oI competence. I suggest you
contact Joseph Garin, Esq., in Las Vegas, as he was counsel Ior the deIendants in that case.
You may want to contact Paul E1cano, Esq., the director oI Washoe Legal Services.
8. Mr. Coughlin has a habit oI initiating cases and asking to proceed in Iorma pauperis. He
has done so in cases against me, my oIIice, my client, and Washoe Legal Services. You will
Iind them iI you run a search Ior Coughlin Z on the Second Judicial District Court website.
The courts that have reviewed the documents have generally denied his requests. What is oI
note is that his representations in the applications to proceed in Iorma pauperis are
inconsistent \vith and contrary to the representations that he has Inade to Judge Flanagan in
the context oI seeking a teinporary restraining order. On the one hand, he tells the court he is
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broke and has no property, and on the other hand, he is telling the court that he has a great
deal oI valuable property at the home that needs to be protected. This demonstrates a gross
lack oI candor with the tribunals with which he deals.
9. Coughlin has also tried to Iile a case against me, Iny associate, my client, and others,
including the Reno Justice Court. It is also to be Iound on the website. Judge Steinheimer has
ruled that he did not comply with NRCP 8.
10. Coughlin's behavior was unusual to start, and has become more and more bizarre during
the we have been dealing with him. He serves papers he does not Iile, and Iiles does not serve.
He consistently signs certiIicates oI service that he has mailed to us, but we have never
received Irom him by mai1. He has posted videos oI the eviction service attempts and parts oI
the trial on YouTube, including some recordings he secretly made in court with his cellphone.
11. Another example oI his incompetence is that he does not understand what orders are, and
are not, appealable. He does not understand that Iiling a notice oI appeal divests the lower
court oI jurisdiction. I am conIident that once you look into this matter, you will agree that
Mr. Coughlin should not be practicing law. He is a danger to the community. Sincerely, /S/
Richard G. Hill
RGH:kn
Enclosures:
-Coughlin Amended Emergency Motion Ior Restraining Order
-Merliss Opposition to Motion Ior TRO
-Coughlin Reply to Opposition to Motion Ior TRO
-Suppleinental Reply to Opposition dated 1/13/12
In 1708, Baker's 11/21/11 Opposition to Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien; Joinder in
Motion to Set Aside or Vacate Attorney Fee Award, reads:
'OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO CONTEST PERSONAL PROPERTY; JOINDER IN
MOTION TO SET ASIDE OR VACATE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD
PlaintiII/landlord, MATT MERLISS, through counsel, RICHARD G. HILL,
CHARTERED and CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ., opposes deIendant's motion to contest
personal property lien. DeIendant has been given every opportunity to retrieve his belongings,
but is simply reIusing to pay the statutorily permitted storage Iees. PlaintiII joins in
deIendant's motion to set aside or vacate attorney Iees award entered on November 9, 2011,
and asks the court to vacate the entire award.
This opposition and joinder are based on the points and authorities below and all
papers and pleadings on Iile herein.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES FACTS
1. Merliss is the owner oI the real property located at 121 River Rock Street,
Reno, Nevada (the "PROPERTY").
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2. On or about March 1, 2010, Merliss rented the Property to Coughlin and his
then-girlIriend.
5.On August 22, 2011, Merliss properly and lawIully terminated Coughlin's month-to-month
tenancy pursuant to NRS 40.251, by serving the statutory No-Cause Termination Notice to
Vacate NRS 40.25i(1) upon him.
6.On September 27, 2011, Merliss properly served Coughlin with a Five-Day Notice oI
UnlawIul Detainer For Failure to Vacate Rental Unit - NRS 40.251 (No-Cause Termination)
and Notice oI Summary Eviction - NRS 40.254.
7.On October 27, 2011, aIter all due and proper notice and opportunity to be heard had been
given to Coughlin, this court entered its Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law and Order
8.EXHIBIT 1 was served on Coughlin on November 1, 2011 by the Washoe County SheriIIs
Department, by posting same on the Iront door oI the property in the manner customary Ior
evictions in Washoe County. The locks to the premises were changI;d at that time, thereby
ejecting a,nd dispossessing Coughlin oI possession oI the Property. Mr. Coughlin was not
present, but the notice was posted and the locks were changed.
7. ThereaIter, Mr. Coughlin unlawIully, and without any right to do so,
reentered upon, and took possession oI, oI the Property.
8. SpeciIically, on November 13, 2011, Mr. Coughlin was Iound to be living in the basement
oI the Property. Coughlin was arrested and charged with trespassing at that time.
ReIerence is made to plaintiIIs Motion Ior Order to Show Cause, Iiled herewith and
incorporated herein by this reIerence, Ior Iurther particulars regarding the discovery and arrest
oI Mr. Coughlin on that date.
9. Beginning on November 2,2011, plaintiIIs counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., began
sending emails to Coughlin on an almost daily basis, asking Coughlin to contact Mr. Hill's
oIIice to make arrangements to retrieve Coughlin's belongings Irom the property. See
Declaration oI Richard G. Hill, Esq., attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2. Copies oI the reIerenced
emails are authenticated in.and attached to.Mr. Hill's declaration.
10. Mr. Coughlin would not respond directly to Mr. Hill's emails, claiming that he did not
receive them. Coughlin Iirst claimed that he was having "technical diIIiculties" and that
"some emails appear blank or black". Now, Coughlin claims that he did not receive those
emails because he had added Mr. Hill's email address to his "blocked senders list". Coughlin
eventually responded directly to Mr. Hill's em ails, but still has not proposed any plan Ior
paying the storage Iees he owes and retrieving his belongings.
11. On November 10, 2011, the undersigned sent three emails to Mr. Coughlin, one oI which
included a letter regarding Mr. Coughlin's debt to Dr. Merliss. See Declaration oI Casey D.
Baker, Esq., attached hereto as EXHIBIT 3. Copies oI the reIerenced emails are authenticated
in, and attached to, Mr. Baker's declaration.
12. Mr. Coughlin claims that the undersigned's letter dated November 10, 2011 somehow
authorized him to remain living at the property aIter the eviction. He is simply wrong. See
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EXHIBIT 1 to Mr. Baker's declaration. Nowhere in that letter is there any authorization Ior
Mr. Coughlin to trespass and squat at Dr. Merliss' property.
13. Coughlin did not attempt telephone contact with Mr. Hill's oIIice until approximately
11:00 p.m. on Saturday, November 12, 2011, at which time he leIt two voice messages.
14. ThereaIter, Coughlin placed several telephone calls to Mr. Hill's oIIice, during which he
harassed Mr. Hill and his staII. On November 15, 2011, Coughlin showed up at Mr. Hill's
oIIice unannounced, and barged in and created a scene, interrupting a deposition in the
process.
LAW
provide property the end collect beIore property nghtIully
1. ReIerence is made to NRS 118A.460(1)(a), which provides in pertinent part
as Iollows:
1. The landlord may dispose oI personal property abandoned on the premises by a Iormer
tenant or leIt on the premises aIter eviction oI the tenant without incurring civil or criminal
liability in the Iollowing manner:
(a) The landlord shall reasonably Ior the saIe storage oI the Ior 30 days aIter abandonment or
eviction or the oI the rental period and may charge and the reasonable and actual costs oI
inventory, moving and storage
releasing !he t the tenant or his or her authonzed representatIve claImmg the property within
that period. The landlord is liable to the tenant only Ior the landlord's negligent or wrongIul
acts in storing the property.
NRS n8AA60(1)(a) (emphasis added). See also the oIIicial Nevada Supreme Court Form #15,
entitled Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien and For Return oI Personal Property,
attached hereto as EXHIBIT 5, at paragraph 4 ("I understand that the landlord may charge and
collect the reasonable and actual costs oI inventory, moving and storage oI my personal
property beIore releasing it to me ... ")
ANALYSIS
The second and Iinal day oI the summary eviction hearing in this matter was Tuesday,
October 25, 2011. At the conclusion oI that hearing, the court announced its Iindings oI Iact,
and speciIically granted the eviction, all on the record. Coughlin was present in court, and
knew, at that moment, that he had until October 31, 2011 to vacate the
property, or he would be locked out. In Iact, Coughlin even asked the court Ior an
opportunity to prepare and submit his own version oI the court's Iindings, but, predictably,
Iailed to do so. Then, on October 27, 2011, the court entered its written order, a copy oI which
is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 1. That order was served on Coughlin by the Washoe County
SheriIIs Department on Tuesday, November 1, 2011, a Iull week aIter the hearing in which
Coughlin was Iirst given notice, on the record, that an eviction had been granted. The order
was posted to the Iront door in the customary manner oI evictions perIormed in
Washoe County, and the locks on the Iront and back doors were changed at that time. 4 !
Even though he had a week to do so, Coughlin did not remove his personal belongings Irom
the property prior to the lockout. In Iact, he did not even remove himselI Irom the property.
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Unbeknownst to Merliss or his counsel, Coughlin continued to live in the basement oI the
property until he was discovered squatting there on November 13, 2011 -
nearly two weeks aIter he was legally locked out. Coughlin had barricaded himselI, his dog,
and some oI his presumably more cherished possessions in the basement. When Coughlin
reIused to emerge Irom the basement aIter being ordered to do so by the police, Merliss was
Iorced to kick down the door to gain access to his own property. Coughlin was arrested and
charged with trespassing. Due to Coughlin's criminal activities, the security
oI the house was compromised. As a result, Merliss was Iorced to incur costs in the amount oI
$1,060.00 to secure the property in order to protect it and Coughlin's belongings. A true and
correct copy oI the bill Irom the contractor is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2.
Now, unbelievably, Coughlin asks the court to exercise its equitable powers to
reduce or eliminate Merliss' statutory right to recover the reasonable costs oI storing
Coughlin's property. Under no circumstances should Coughlin be granted any relieI at this
juncture, equitable or otherwise.
Coughlin continued to illegally live in the basement, without permission, aIter he was evicted.
He had a bed set up, Iood, water, computers, televisions, and even a pet (which was
deIecating on the Iloor). The walls were (and are) lined with bags and boxes oI
A. Merliss is Entitled to Charge and Collect a Reasonable Fee Ior Storage oI Coughlin's
Property BeIore Releasing it.
NRS 118A.460(1)(a) controls. Coughlin was evicted and the locks were changed. Coughlin
had known Ior an entire week that he would be getting locked out, but he leIt the main level
oI the house essentially Iull and untouched, as though he never intended to leave (in Iact, he
never did leave). Photographs showing a "lived in" and Iully Iurnished residence, which was
obviously not in the process oI being vacated, will be provided at the November 21, 2011
hearing. 5
what can only be described as "junk". Every nook and cranny oI the space was, and is, taken
up with some thing or another. In addition to the main living area and the basement,
Coughlin has managed to literally stuIIthe attic Iull oI even more junk. Photographs oI the
basement and attic will be provided at the November 21, 2011 hearing. Mr. Coughlin's
personal property did, and does, Iully occupy the entire house.
Under NRS 118A.460, Merliss is obligated to store Coughlin's belongings Ior 30 days beIore
he can lawIully dispose oI them. Under normal circumstances, it might be cost eIIective to
inventory and move a household Iull oI goods to a storage unit Ior those 30 days. But here, it
is simply not economical. Coughlin has Iilled the house with so much trash and other
worthless debris, that to inventory, pack, and move it, together with Coughlin's belongings
that may have some value, would not only require a herculean eIIort, it would be a colossal
waste oI resources. By leaving the Coughlin's property in the house and charging him the Iair
rental value Ior storage ($900.00 per month), Merliss is actually mitigate the costs Coughlin is
statutorily required to bear. Coughlin should be thanking Merliss, not stalking and harassing
his attorneys.
Mr. Hill and the undersigned, have made numerous eIIorts to coax Mr. Coughlin into
arranging to retrieve his belongings. See EXHIBIT 3 and EXHIBIT 4, hereto. Instead oI
responding to those eIIorts in a civilized, reasonable, or even rational manner, Coughlin has
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instead chosen to resort to his usual game-play, pretending to have never received counsel's
communications. Except this time, Mr. Coughlin has elevated his antics to include threatening
and stalking behavior toward Mr. Hill and his staII. Why Mr. Coughlin Ieels it is necessary to
video-record the license plates oI Mr. Hill's staII members is beyond the grasp oI this writer.
Perhaps Mr. Coughlin will be able to explain this tactic at the hearing. In any event, it is
painIully obvious that the reason Mr. Coughlin never responded to Mr. Hill's inquiries
regarding the removal oI his personal belongings beIore
November 13, 2011, is because Coughlin was illegally living in the property the whole time.
Only now, aIter the property has been secured, and Mr. Coughlin released Irom jail without 6
his wallet, cell phone, or computer, does he even approach what can be considered a sincere
request to remove his things Irom the house. UnIortunately Ior Mr. Coughlin, he has Iully
committed himselI to his gamesmanship. He cannot seem to bring himselI to deal with the
reality oI the situation: that he must pay those costs Merliss was Iorced to incur as a direct
result oI his prior bad decisions, beIore he can retrieve his belongings. NRS 118A-460.
Instead, Coughlin continues to pretend that he is not receiving Mr. Hill's emails, even though
he obviously has, and he has now Iiled yet another unsupported motion Ior sanctions against
Hill and Baker. Despite all oI this, Mr. Hill has repeatedly oIIered to retrieve Mr. Coughlin's
wallet and his "client Iiles" Ior him without any requirement Ior payment in advance. For
some reason, Coughlin would rather argue with Mr. Hill than take him up on that oIIer.
Coughlin's abuse oI this court's processes must be stopped. He continues to Iile baseless and
Irivolous motions and other papers, even though he has appealed this case to the district court.
He continues his pattern oI sending late-night email rants to counsel, which serve only to
drive up Iees Ior Merliss and Iurther destroy whatever shred oI credibility Coughlin may still
possess. He has harassed, cursed at, and abused Mr. Hill's staII, and, on one occasion, barged
into Hill's oIIice unannounced, creating a scene and interrupting a deposition. Enough is
enough. It is time Ior Mr. Coughlin to Iace Iacts and move on. This court must not tolerate
any Iurther ravings Irom Mr. Coughlin, and should order hill), once and Ior all, to comply
with the law.
B. The Attorney's Fee Award Should be Vacated.
Although there is no case-law on the matter in Nevada, Coughlin may be right
about one thing. Based on the language oI the statute, NRS 69.030 may not authorize
attorney's Iees and costs to a prevailing party in a summary eviction action. Merliss does not
concede the point, but simply does not wish to deal with the matter on appeal. Merliss has
oIIered to stipulate with Coughlin to vacate the award, but, despite having sought the same
relieI Irom the court by Iiling this motion, Coughlin has Iailed to respond to that oIIer.
Merliss joins in Coughlin's request to vacate the award oI Iees and costs entered herein on
November 9, 2011 . CONCLUSION Merliss is entitled to charge and collect a reasonable
storage Iee Irom Coughlin beIore releasing his property to him. NRS 118A.460. Counsel Ior
Merliss have gone out oI their way to make the process easy on Coughlin, and to let him
know what he needs to do to get his belongings, despite Coughlin's constant harassment oI
counsel and their staII. Coughlin reIuses to cooperate, and only wants to Iight. His
gamesmanship and criminal behavior should prevent this court Irom awarding him any
equitable or other relieI whatsoever. II Coughlin want his things, he needs to pay as required
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under the statute. WHEREFORE, plaintiII prays that the Coughlin take nothing by way oI his
motion to contest personal property lien; that same be denied in its entirety; and that Coughlin
be required to pay storage Iees under NRS 118A.460 in the amount oI $30.00 per day Irom
November 1, 2011, plus $1,060.00 Ior costs incurred to secure the property, beIore he be
allowed to retrieve his belongings; that, in the event Coughlin pays as required, that he be
ordered to remove and properly dispose oI all oI his belongings at the property; that the
court's order awarding attorney's Iees and costs entered herein on November 9, 2011 be
vacated; and Ior such other, Iurther and additional relieI as seems just to the court in the
premises. AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030 The undersigned does hereby \ aIIirm
that the preceding document does not contain the social security number oI any person.
DATED this 21st day oI November, 2011. /s/ Casey D. Baker, Esq. '
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Him and him and her and opposition Hill him and him as part a motion to conclude contempt
citation work title in that that the. Shall I, do that at the order resolving motion to contest
personal property lien is ported to him and him and him and him the something
memorializing a situation where the parties agreed to allow the court enter an order based
upon the evidence presented Ior going back he also the settlement put in more than a
settlement in a motion to conclude contempt citation also like there was a template page and
we denied concluded is based upon those motions show cause is just laughable motion show
cause alter an order requiring copy oI the hearing adulation being held in contact recursion his
contractor whatever the hell got his order by Judge Flanagan required Coughlin oI pay Ior
thousand dollars to secure property work already had a baseline $80 per moving and
inventorying and storage at where had already admitted the storage cost was bein with
Richard Hill this trigger a she continue unabated and his recent September 11, 2012 request
Ior submission oI ex parte motion to conclude contents is citation contents oI the contempt
citation in that the ex parte motion to concludes contempt citation that a Iiled on same day
would be cause Ior submission thereoI and why it needs to be an ex parte motion is unclear oI
Iact that Richards lies in misconduct is Iinally catching up with him perhaps hopeIully it's not
to conclude contempt citation Richard g $1000 it was taken did that thousand dollar poster
contractor bill board up the property and storage thing to anyway on the and him and routing
Hill and November 21, 2011 declaration oh neglect to punish is that the letter went on to
testiIy to its validity oI Coughlin to or and Coughlin permeates my beloved is during a
January 2012 11 Iiling call to attend her a copy secured I might: that Sargent Lopez admit that
neither she nor oIIicer Carter and out the daily me with law enIorcement or proceeding under
color oI law during these moments wearing Hill reports that agency to coax Coughlin out a
basement and is November 3 November 21 declaration was held in Cyrillic letter on they
needed and that allegation oI the especially in June 18, 2000 PASS trial at which he'll shut up
looking and walkie he transcript oI the trespass to the judge Garner in a a but back to the and
his declaration oI November 21 at seven on pace to a .4 L Writes the Court, Sunday summary
eviction order to try seven 2011 this summary eviction order on November 1, 2001 wash at
church departments are that order notice at the notice was posted on the door the home by the
Los Angeles Department oI matter customary was County privations blocking or changed on
its it's a Iailure to demonstrate handed to the tribunal Ior held to suggested posting that
eviction order on the door when no one was Thomas tantamount to serving that order not
tantamount serving our not in the legal sense engaged in getting nasty P5 be to an RCP 60 not
then oIIicer Carter the Reno Police Department would deem "what is involved in the service
oI civil order eviction criminal law is notorious Ior having much more lax use oI what
deIendants are entitled to a search service requirements indeed the deadline Iile a notice oI
appeal in criminal while runs Irom the rendition oI an order nine notice oI entry oI order is
that an salon rendition oI order under NRS 189.030 is essentially is when somebody's in court
the just stated that order out loud even iI the order was made in absentia on proton exchange
later and in this case eviction order Ior held to purported Coughlin served dated October 25
when it was rendered Irom the bench is nonsense is not criminal trial Iurther will ultimately
wind up in that order the Iind that includes a lot oI sign October 27 is so Iar departed Irom
Irom anything judge SIerrazza said the conclusion oI the trial on October 25 this is nonsense
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to suggest Coughlin was certain that order Irom those with respect what contain October 25
rather the SheriII's Department Hill umbrellas are stuck with the Iact that nobody bothered to
mail Coughlin the order until November 1 as the prooI oI service on the notice oI entry oI
order to show Iiled on October on November 1 shows were in his oIIice assistant and her
prooI oI mailing or certiIicate oI service and David only on November 1 she plays that order
in the mail and the notice oI entry oI order back to the police work in the November 13
trespass arrest and the the him attention to him that his words and health declaration oI
November 21 on pace to same .4 indicates that there was cashier certainly order on by and
that the notice was quote posted on the door, Washoe shows up in their customer and Washoe
County privations. However in his witness statement oI November 30, 2011 incident to the
custodial arrest called Ior trespass Bill O'Malley notice oI the papers were posted by the
Washoe County SheriII's Department on November 1, 2011 unclear why the police report
contains mentioned that Dr. merciless notice people or somebody was in the house and weeks
preceding the rest in the week preceding the arrest with those declaration Iailed to mention
that Dr. Marlys was there knowing that Hill was there in the center shows going to opposing
counsel's oIIice personal Iixing computers and in Iact there is evidence to show that while
Coughlin's hard drives were held possession new video drivers loaded on them on December
6 at a time which only Hill as to her possession oI those hard drives was tense just so made
copies the hard drives pages so completely unIathomably improper to describe them in a
criminal complaint Iilled signed on November 13 he notes that I am on November 13 the
deIendant at that at the 121 River Rock St. the deIendant was Iound probably have to be
convicted on November 1, 2011 and that's not as a set oI Iacts that support the trespass charge
trespass requires one to remain in place with a how lawIul right to be aIter being warned to
leave a even iI that eviction notice was properly served and even iI that order was not illegal
nullity or stellar board rescinded or otherwise and even iI Hill's indications to Coughlin that
he was charging in the Iair rental value oI the property don't entitle Coughlin to the 40s and
access the property and even iI NRS 40.760 were somebody's making a storage Iranian a
storage unit provides that eviction to the proper remedy at one Ieel someone is using a storage
Iacility is a resident Iurther Coughlin getting charge Ior storage use oI its impermissible
suggest that he had no right to be there is a him and him and him oIIicer Carter's arrest report
and declaration oI probable cause Irom November 13 Carter writes that own the deIendant
was Iound inside the house aIter being served an eviction notice to be convicted on November
1, 2011. Is not eIIicient oIIicer Carter has any idea what it means Ior something be served
incident the celebration case thereIore he lacks the knowledge even know what area oI
probable cause make cited a citation my Iuzzy again custodial arrest this is nonsense Iurther
Coughlin was completely cheated out oI due process and 61 night counsel where Reno me
deIender Steve S reIused to subpoena oIIicer Carter uses and detective Lopez reIused. Dr.
Marlys reIused pretty much do anything Keith Loomis is a joke oI an attorney is the best
prosecutor the Reno Municipal Court has an key behaviors and Pauline court wanted deIender
in card amounts no that didn't likelihood that the deIendant would chart return he did not
qualiIy Ior citation Carter's Ior elementary declaration goes a lot Iurther than that in Iact what
killed testiIied Ior trial on June 18 and what Carter writes the supplementary declaration is
completely contradicted I did the damn hit videos health oI himselI even despite the Iact that
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upon inIormation believed till throughout her Iailed to the video detective Carter and Lopez
Iailing to identiIy themselves as proceeding under color oI law are in any way associated with
law enIorcement or identiIying themselves any way at all besides just being random voices
asking Coughlin account mom prior to Dr. Miller's ignore them so Hill wide committed
perjury under oath when he suggested that the Reno Police Department identiIy themselves
prior to and during down and that Coughlin reviews amount upon any such voices saying they
were acting under color oI law are with the police department or whatever simply not the case
Coughlin swears under penalty oI perjury that he is determined.going through his mind that
the voices: to him indicated that they were with law enIorcement that he would probably have
to go to the door and come out but that was not the case the doors kicked down part anybody
indicating who the hell they were what the voices were whether there was Nevada court
services seeking to break lost more or whether they were with a realtor with Dr. Marlys or
whether there were some old Iriends oI Coughlin's or what
the very court approach by the Reno PD and it's telling indicated that they needed to work on
risky ground and probably in the wrong and not did not have her putting in and attack they
were taking probably violation oI sold-out he could County US record case 1992 wherein 42
USC section 1983 cause cause oI action Ior deprivation once property rights other civil rights
was set Iorth by is a spring core incident to a landlord matter where landlord without utilizing
the proper eviction proceedings at the police come to mobile home lot and active they I guess
civil standby or something to keep the peace while landlord drive somebody's mobile home
awIul lot absent getting that actual diction to do it mobile home resident the police arrest rent
landlord Ior trespass the police reIusing indicated they were just there to keep these and
having canceled out he could County were in the place and the gang were where held liable
Ior Iailing to respond to the deIense indication that his towel along with content that can not
destroy while the landlord had a drag that are in a oIIicer Carter's narrative he writes that
Richard is global attorney is representing homeowner Matthew Marlys Rose publishing
papers on his tenant Coughlin at 121 River rock last month and is served at the home by
leaving them on the door. The eviction paper said that Zachary was to vacate the property on
November 1, 2011. Carter Iailed to mention when they were served or how they researched it
stake sales workprint that there were served and in doing so basically looks like somebody
who's on Richard Hill's Pero whether or not that's actually the case and certainly Carter was
Carter and Sargent Tarter the Reno PD were not have a copy repeated the indication oIIicer
Carter made in response to Coughlin's query as to whether you to Richard Hill Ior oII plan
oIIicer Carter stated that yes he was on Richard Hill's Pero because Richard Hill pays him a
lot oI money so even where Richard Hill said that there arrested to Richard Hill's oI the arrest
Carter may have been sarcastic or joking but it was hardly a situation to the joking i.e. where
you're going to Attorney Ior Sgt. Carter Goes on to Lien Is Pleased Ior When He Writes That
Sargent Lopez and I'm Not Done the Basement Door and Announced Loudly Reno Police and
Called out Ior Zachary to Open the Door We Are Met with No Response That He Decided He
Would Kick the Door Open and Did StuII That Is Simply Not True That Is a Blatant out Right
Lie and It It It That Did Take Place He Can Be Sure That Hill Would Have Video Editing
with Propounded City Attorney Instead Hill Had a Video oI Everything That Happened That
Day Seem the besides That Moment Where Allegedly the Reno Police Not on the Basement
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Door and out While the Reno Plays There Just Simply Didn't Happen at Carter's Maricopa
That I Answered the Door with the Basement and Found Zachary Staying at the Rear oI the
Room Holding a Small BBQ Ted Incident Come out and Eventually Gets up That Came
Upstairs and Seamless regarding His Legal Standing in House Asking Me Hypothetically
Speaking That Question Tina and Told Me I Was Making a False Rest oI the Fact That I'm on
Richard Hill's Pero and He Was Consuming. I Try to Explain Zachary That He Was Served
Eviction Papers He Asked Me What I Can Do about It the Hypothetically Didn't Get Them
Even Told Me That He Had Worked a Deal with Matthew to Continue Paying Rent and That
the Legal Eviction Was No Longer Valid. Then OIIicer Carter Seemingly ReIerring to the
Fact That Hill Had Sent a Car Finally Hill And/or His Associate Had Indicated to Coughlin
That They Were Charging Him $900 the Same Price Prepare a Value Which Would Tend to
Suggest That They Visited and Withdrawn and That Coughlin Was Free to Do Far More
Property Than Just North StuII There Is Descended the Same Price or Ior Use and Access
Was Was Being Charged Carter Doesn't Write the Letter and That Narrative oI November 13
Does 11 Again Attorneys Linda Second That Judge Signed an Order Forcing Him to Leave
the Property and All He Did Was State Civil Case Possibly I'm Unsure II Any oI the Cases He
Was Rambling on about Even Exist and Tell Me That I Was Making a Bad Arrest While
RadcliIIe OIIicer Carter's Unaware That This Case Is a Good Message to Tenuous Grasp oI
Concepts and Serve. Serve Withdrawing oI It oI Innovation and or Even Morality and Point
oI Law Judges Lack oI Jurisdiction or Claim Arising under Etc. Perhaps He Shouldn't Be so
Quick to Place an Attorney and As. Carter Concludes by Stating That Due to Zachary
Marbling Is Anything Wrong That EIIectively Ceased Us Standing There Is Reasonable
Possibly Zachary Will Return House ThereIore Do Not QualiIy Ior a Misdemeanor Citation.
Today Is the Hill Propounded to the Reno City Attorney Clearly Show That That's Not the
Case in the Videos Coughlin Can Be Heard Asking Carter Wise to Cite Coughlin Issue a
Citation Ask Emily and Coughlin Indicates Vehemently They Would Say Legislating and
Give Wouldn't Be Further Problem There Seems to Be Clear Indication OIIicer Carter at
Vested Interest and AIIecting a Custodial Arrest oI Coughlin Had Contacted Someone
Indicates That Any Statement Carter Said the AIIected Richard Hill Paying Him Money and
May Fact Be True Given How Eager to Arrest Coughlin Carter Was the State Which He Lied
in a Police Report and the Fact That There Is Reno Municipal Court by Way oI Its Public
Vendors Sought to Obstruct Justice and Prevent Coughlin Irom Having a Due Process Here Is
Particularly Troubling Why Was That Dr. Marlys Who There at the Time Had Have Richard
Complete Statement on His BehalI and Signed a Criminal Complaint Is Not Clear Again
Limits ReIused It Subpoena Any oI These Witnesses and Complaint Has Been Filed with the
State Bar Density Limits and Him and He Is Frankly Disgusting Attorney's
II Richard Hill this trigger a she continue unabated and his recent September 11, 2012 request
Ior submission oI ex parte motion to conclude contents is citation contents oI the contempt
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citation in that the ex parte motion to concludes contempt citation that a Iiled on same day
would be cause Ior submission thereoI and why it needs to be an ex parte motion is unclear oI
the Iact that Richards lies in misconduct is Iinally catching up with him perhaps hopeIully it's
not to conclude contempt citation Richard you can say you want at their request Ior
submission oI your motion Ior order to show cause but all that thing asked Ior was Ior a
hearing or an order actually Ior an order requiring Coughlin oI year-end a hearing show cause
why shouldn't the back contempt it's not you know you're skipping past the hearing part oI a
larger Richard Waring on your Moore's a motion Ior show cause oI November 21, 2011 on
page 3 that reads were Iormer Ior an order oI this court requiring deIendant Zachary Barker
Coughlin appear show cause why should not become contempt this court under NRS 22.010
subsection 3 purchases since the scores lawIully enter order and under NRS 20.2 overs illegal
reentry onto the subject property aIter eviction Ior an order that oIten been grossly caustic
register the property aIter the break and by Coughlin as a condition oI his papers is contempt
court and hurt so what is that mean oI is being purged so now instead oI asking the have
Coughlin pay you some money in exchange Ior not I guess be Iine contempt court as would
being purged oI it means now build may be because he started gone an order giving him the
money Ior the break-in that he alleges occurred on top oI the storage Iees the $480 was
ordered aIter the court system or 21st 2012 order on top oI the and order granting held
memorandum oI costs which included thousand dollars he wants Ior securing the property
even though on December 14 Hill's eIIorts in securing the property didn't prevent it Irom
being robbed oI approximately $8000 a pop personalty outlines the cost is clear the property
rent into some activity. Coughlin undertook in the Iirst 14 days oI November and that the
thousand dollars there and aIter that his contractor Phil Stewart claims to have billed pelican
that invoice mentioned Iixing a leak in the basement which certainly that included under NRS
118 80460 in the lowest cost a security worker aIter any alleging trespass by Coughlin
honored on November 13 despite spending apparently ever granted secure the property didn't
prevent property being robbed on December 14 at 12 or 14 the shall administer interestingly
upon review oI the police report entered into that criminal trespass matter oI some interesting
stuII is revealed particularly when one views the video that Hill took oI the arrest oI Coughlin
which curiously do not include the most pivotal moment oI the arrest or that their action
between Coughlin and the Reno Police Department I would be when oIIicer Lopez Sgt.
Michael Lopez and oIIicer Chris Carter Junior were gathered with murder listen Hill Hill with
his video camera and tact which matched him everything else a day at the door to the
Klondike basement height thing that never had a lock on it at Coughlin Iormer law oIIice in
his aIIidavit in his order to show cause illness and statements about that on page 3 oI that
exhibited hills oI Exhibit 2 to Hill's motion Ior order show cause the declaration Richard Hill
Hill alleges on page.
They are point heading eight on the please read the agreement does that is very likely
someone was printed in the basement the please try to cut the person come out but without
success. Nine. When the police declined or ignored number listed seven leaIlets inciting
discover the deIendant Zachary Coughlin was thought oIIering him obviously much as an will
place an arrest but please Ior trespassing going a Hill but declares under penalty perjury when
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the police arrived agreed with those that is very likely Samoans work in the basement the
police take oI the person come out but without said that important because Hill to it who
never misses an opportunity to slander Coughlin or distort the Iacts on their it is on page 2.8
does not indicated the police announced who they were or indicated that they were the Reno
Police Department that the vital Iact right there and it goes to deal men criminal trespass
charge that Coughlin Iaced upon individual custodial arrest on November 13 on till later
testiIied at trial in the attached transcript that the police did and aIter they were is curious
because in this declaration on the more contemporaneous with the activities and. The June 18
trial on that Reno Municipal Court matter 11 CR 2645 Hill doesn't mention anything about
please announcing that they were there under color oI law the place he just mentioned that
they try to coax Coughlin out on day being not anyone apparently is identiIy themselves to
Coughlin at that point Coughlin's. Then in that closet basement in not known when the hell
was calling Ior him or whether they were proceeding under some claim oI rider color oI law
are or what or whether they were just another Nevada court services style noon squad
attempting to break into Coughlin's property where he arguably had a lawIul right to be and
thereIore could not be deemed to be trespassing the Sedgewick oIten I lawIul right to be there
hinges on several key issues legal notions oI service being chieI among them as ineIIective
the justice court had Iailed to or or that Coughlin had yet to receive the money the justice
court Iorced him to deposit Irom the justice court that he was Iorced to deposit percentile rent
escrow deposit is that was not permissible under Nevada law on which judge SIerrazza later
rule was converting the court that probably taken the party suggests court converted J legal in
the justice in a note that apparently the Reno Municipal Court have a problem Iaxing Hill
police reports and that things oI that sort and naturally clear upon reviewing Hill second
motion Ior order to show cause which he Iiled in CV 11 03628 upon review oI the Iax headers
is Iilled with passionate clear that the Reno Municipal Court has no problem Iaxing Hill
documentation related Coughlin conviction Ior trespass led Reno Municipal Court steadIastly
reIused back Coughlin I bank and apparently reIuses to accept a big problem by Iaxing clearly
knows oI appeal in this just trespass case on that Coughlin Iaxed just hours beIore being
arrested again by the Reno PD error by the Washoe SheriII's oIIice incident to the June 28,
2012 wrongIul arrest which arguably involve some errors on the civil division oI the Reno
justice court part entered into a Iairly complex landlord-tenant matter between Coughlin and
Northwind apartments wherein Northlands or Coughlin is a Iive eviction notice on that listed
the wrong Iorum and that listed Sparks justice court while the property was in Reno Coughlin
did Iile a or submitted Ior Iiling a tenant aIIidavit to Sparks justice court and he
communicated the Reno justice court as to the possibility oI conIusion and that Ms. stamp on
the court should should be aware that oI the problems associated with the notice NRS 40 0253
requires the notice to list the court oI the tenant Iiled aIIidavit in Coughlin was justiIied in
relying on that an Coughlin should not be subjected a situation restaurant around a diIIerent
course Amel Iiling Iees did because Nevada court services which is committing not rise press
law committed either error some sort or worse Iurther the declaration oI personal service by
Nevada court services license process server Robert Ray WR a Y Ior the June 14, 2012 Iive a
notice oI unlawIul detainer Ior some apparent breach oI contract that they Ielt speciIy with a.
With very that declaration service was Iraudulent and likely I am perjury and that tested
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personal service where Coughlin hearing now that that Ray did nothing more than post or post
the notice on the door by wedging in your crack in the door and that the rental upon which he
did that had no windows and the door was closed raid and Northwind apartment manager
Duane Jacob did attempt to break into the rental though and it might be the case that there the
video oI that wherein the other thread made under cause I are purport color oI law in Nevada
court services are made including calling the Iire department all sorts oI other nonsense and
him and him and him and him and him which is that in hills motion Ior order show cause in
the declaration Richard Hill iI*that .5 .4 rather on page 2 Hill goes on to say Ior. On October
27, 2011 the course on the summary eviction order in on November 1, 2011 the Washoe
County SheriII's Department served that order. The notice was posted on the door oI the home
the Washoe County SheriII's Department in that customer in the wash County privations. Lots
oI the door Iront backward your changing and we retain all cases home. Five. AIter the date
again and that is the question the thinking is, approximately November 4, 2011 I became
concerned about, contents. I entered and was able Irom this somebody had been getting it I
somebody I thought I had secured the means oI entry being used by whoever it was that was
getting and however only the later visits, was clear that the Iacility surreptitiously access. Six.
On November 13 Dr. Rose came to Reno because he wanted to inspect, countries is evading
taxes. This is likely that Hill and Marlys were the ones committing trespass on November 14
and that hinges upon Hill statement that Coughlin was served on that day a license attorney
and he can be expected to be aware the NRS 4400 makes a Iootball at RCP to landlord-tenant
matters including summary eviction and the and RCP Iive subsection B subsection 2 and
FRCP six subsection he made clear that where personal service is not aIIected one must post
and mail such a summary eviction order allow three days Ior mailing to the extent that the
posting admittedly by have lost County SheriII's oIIice including the civil division supervisor
listed Salina and February e-mail to Coughlin whom admitted that the aIIidavit oI November
7 by (SheriII's oIIice deputy John action is a Iraudulent or at least incorrect to the extent that it
says that personal service by that Coughlin was personally served the lockout order where no
such thing took place rather social mix-and-match and told her e-mail posted order on the
door and nobody was home to change locks. Docket oI service issue upon a review oI the way
to go back to Hill's assertions oI noticing somebody and how that diIIers Irom within the
police report curiously the police report and it mentions that Dr. Merle is notice that
somebody within the house that appears to be a cover-up by Hill perhaps because Hill realizes
that you know there might be something wrong Richard with going into opposing counsel's
Iormer home law oIIice particularly where the issue oI whether or not service was correct so it
appears that Hill was attempting to cover that Iact that by alleging that his client was the one
who is going into the home however or rather the right rather. That's incorrect bill does admit
to going in the house and aIIidavit it in the police report that oIIicer Carter seems to mention
that it was Marlys who was there the week prior to the arrest noticing this somebody was
going and him so it is likely that iI it is odd and it might be in the state by Carter but clearly
on in the police report incidents that November 13 arrest and Hill's written statement he
knows that we represent property owner we evicted Coughlin the papers were posted by
Washoe County SheriII's Department on November 1 we have observed evidence that he was
coming going today we Iound him buried in the basement called Reno PD on that interesting
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that Hill mentioned that he is the papers were posted rather than served bill does not use the
legal term served and that Kelly and his witness statement however that does not prevent error
Reno Police Department oIIicer Chris Carter Irom getting loose with the deIinition oI legal
service and Iurther in videos the hell take oI the arrest on November 13 which again curiously
do not contain any video oI the moments where the police are going to the door where the
thing Coughlin is barricaded then and allegedly according to oIIicer Carter and depending
upon when you ask Hill according to Hill given that in his declaration oI November and him
and him and him earn his declaration and him and him and him and him and him and him and
him and him and him and him and him and him and him him him him him him him him and
his declaration is due January 2012 a scant six weeks or so or or a over two months aIter the
arrest on November 13 Ior trespass Hill rather strike that that that the diIIerent duration by
Hill and his second motion Ior order to show cause oI the more contemporaneous separation
by Hill is Iound him and him and him and him and his November 21, 2011 declaration which
obviously was extremely contemporaneous with the November 13, 2011 arrest and is way
more reliable than Richard Hill's coach dubbed crept oI testimony at June 18, 2012 trespass
trial oI Coughlin and the Reno media court in that November 21 declaration on page 2 a Bill
right that .8 8.08. When the police arrived agreed with is that it was very likely with them is
barricaded in the basement lease had a person come out but without excess there is no
mention that the police announced that they were the police that Coughlin at that time prior to
a wireless allegedly kicking the door at on page 2 a .990. Nine. When the police declined to
break down the door list Dr. relisted so the police Liechtenstein discovered the deIendant
Zachary Coughlin was thought. 10. Coughlin cannot peaceIully went upstairs was placed
under arrest but please Ior trespassing at particularly curious and that there's nothing in this
declaration by by Hill that suggested the police ever on and out oI the with police at any time
Coughlin was in the basement and I goes to the elements oI the trespass criminal trespass
charge which included Iailing to leave the premises where one does not have a lawIul right to
be aIter being given a warning to do so Iive, the authority to do that there's nothing in this
declaration by Hill is extremely contemporaneous with the arrest and indicate that anyone oI
color oI law identiIy themselves as having color oI law or that it even anyone with a with oI a
right to tell Coughlin to leave the property told Coughlin only property prior to Coughlin
deIlation arrest Ior the
FACTS
1.When Coughlin was in the quasi-"basement" (it isn't a room Iit Ior habitation or use under
the Housing Code (only one exit, ceiling are about 5 Ieet high in most places, Iloor was dirt
when Coughlin Iirst rented it, but he Iixed it up very nicely over time and it certainly looked
like someone could have been living in there well prior to the eviction, but Judge Gardner
ruled all that stuII about "using it as a residence" was irrelevant, except Ior the Iact he
mentioned it in his Order and Hazlett let it creep into his closing arguments....) there was not
any voices calling to him (certainly the videos Iilmed by Hill and Merliss, propounded to the
City and the court appointed deIenders who reIused to subpoena Merliss despite Hill's and the
RPD's obvious motive and bias...show that neither Hill nor Merliss, as conIirmed by Hill's
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Trial testiony, made any verbal incantations to Coughlin, but rather, retreated upstairs to wait
Ior the RPD...) prior to what was ultimately revealed to be the RPD arriving. As shown with
a lot more indicia oI reliability than Hill's lie Iilled June 18th, 2012 sworn testimony at trial,
in his November 21st, 2011 Declaration, Hill Iails to assert that the RPD "identiIied
themselves as law enIorcement" and issued a lawIul order to emerge Irom the basement
(which is not necessarily lawIul, even iI they identiIy themselves as law enIorcement, iI they
were not given the authority to issue it by someone having such authority, and its not clearl
that either Merliss or Hill did...). Regardless, the RPD deIinitely DID NOT "identiIy
themselves as law enIorcement" prior to Merliss kicking the door down. Rather, it is telling
that in HIll's November 21st, 2011 Declaration he merely mentions the RPD attempting to
(see this dissected in glorious detail in the attached Bar grievance) "coax Coughlin to emerge
Irom the basement". And the RPD did just that. Only, they didn't identiIy themselves as law
enIorcement at any time prior to the door being kicked down. So, iI you are Coughlin, and
you have a real strong claim oI right deIense to any allegation oI trespass, then just hearing
some random voices "coaxing" him to talk to them like they are therapists or some other crap
like that is not tantamount to a "lawIul order to emerge Irom the basement" or warning to
leave the premises else be cited or arrested Ior criminal trespass. (Hill told Coughlin he was
billing him the same $900 a month as when Coughlin was there under a lease allowing Ior
"Iull use an occupancy"; any eviction order was void Ior lack oI jurisdiction, Coughlin was
entitled to a stay Coughlin had yet to receive back Irom the RJC the "rent escrow" $2,275 that
Judge SIerrazza, on October 27t, 2011, announced would be held onto by the RJC as
Coughlin's "bond on appeal" (meaning the supersedeas bond, as appeal bond's are set
statutorily at $250 in such matters and supersedeas bond's are the ones teh RJC typically
makes in an amount worth "three month's rent" (ie, the RJC can't keep the money Ior the stay,
and call it that, and deny the stay...its like calling it a summary eviction hearing, but ruling on
more than possession, then ruling Coughlin established a genuine issue oI material Iact and
noticing the October 27th, 2011 date as a "Trial" in writing (Baker says on the record in that
case "the use oI the term "Trial" was unIortunate, Your Honor....", then ordering an
impermissible rent escrow deposit...not giving the 20 days to respond to a Complaint called
Ior by JCRCP 109....basically giving HIll and Merliss all the beneIits oI the quick and easy
summary eviction proceeding (Coughlin was precluded Irom making counterclaims or
bringing in third party deIendants like Dickson Realty or NV Energy or Green Action Lawn
Service, etc), and Coughlin none oI the procedural protections oI a plenary unlawIul detainer,
while also attempting to aIIor HIll and Merliss the beneIits oI a plenary unlawIul detainer
(awarding back rent, attorney's Iees, landlord was able to bring a summary eviction
proceeding against a commercial tenant based only on a No Cause Notice, verboten under
NRS 40.253...). Further, and this is shown on the videos Hill and Merliss Iilmed, the RPD at
no time gave Coughlin a warning to leave where Coughlin could have heeded it and leIt, or
otherwise been issue a citation in lieu oI a custodial arrest. The RPD wanted to make the big
rich landlord and attorney happy here, and neither the RPD (which was mad at Coughlin Ior
Iiling a police misconduct complaint incident to the wrongIul August 20th, 2011 arrest oI
Coughlin that ain't lookin' good Ior the State now that Coughlin got WCPD Jim Leslie booted
Irom the case in RCR2011-063341) nor Hill or Merliss were going to be satisIied with just
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issuing Coughlin a "warning" to leave the premises, as they Iigure Coughlin would just heed
any such warning....The RPD and Merliss/HIll were all jacked up on revenge powder and
wanted Coughlin arrested. Dr. Merliss is practically Irothing at the mouth (demanding "more
eye contact!" Irom Coughlin in the video "Zach's arrest 0010" just beIore Dr. Merliss commits
a crime in lying to the RPD in response to Coughlin's querying those there as to who warned
him against trespassing and when, whereupon Dr. Merliss lies in order to get Coughlin
arrested, and Hill co-signs it:
Richard G. Hill, Esq. (opposing counsel in the civil eviction case Irom which this criminal
trespass trial stems) testiIied, under oath, that the Reno Police Department identiIied
themselves as law enIorcement and issued a lawIul order to leave prior to the RPD entering
the door that Hill's client Merliss kicked down after such identiIication and issuance oI a
lawIul order or warning to leave the premises was issued by the RPD. Additionally, beyond
the impermissible extent to which RMC D2 Judicial Assistant Lisa Wagner Iailed to Iile
Coughlin's June 28th, 2012 Notice oI Appeal (Iax Iiling allowable under RMC Rules, any
Order by Judge Gardner to the contrary spoke to pre-trial Motions only), the Washoe County
Detention Center impermissibly reIused to timely Iile Coughin's additional Notice oI Appeal
in a timely Iashion while Coughlin was wrongIully incarcerated incident to a wrongIul arrest
by the RPD, buttressed upon an impermissible bail increase (supported in Judge Gardner's
rationale by a "public health and saIety" rationale not providing a basis Ior bail under Nevada
Law), at an unnoticed impromptu bail hearing on July 5th, 2012 wherein the RMC and court
appointed deIender Keith Loomis, Esq. coerced Irom Coughlin an impermissible invasion oI
Coughlin's medical records under extremely coercive circumstances made worse by the Iraud
committed upon the court by RPD Sargent Dye and OIIicer Weaver (the arrest in that matter
12 CR 12420 was pretextual and Iraudulent, and compounded by Sargent Oliver Miller and
OIIicer Weaver subsequent misconduct incident to another Soldal v. Cook County violation
on their part involving Coughlin and Superior Mini Storage in an RJC eviction matter
stemming Irom police misconduct by Miller and Weaver on or about September 22nd, 2012.
There was an Order For Competency Evaluation by Judge CliIton in RCR2012-065630
entered February 27th, 2012, and the Order in CR12--0376 adjudging Coughlin competent
and remanding jurisdiction back to the lower court was not entered until May 9th, 2012, yet
Loomis and Hazlett-Stevens persisted in seeking to ramrod the criminal trespass case in RMC
11 CR 26405 through...and both were well aware oI the February 27th, 2012 Order Ior
Competency Evaluation and the import oI NRS 178.405, requiring the suspension oI all
proceedings during the pendency oI such an Order, made applicabel via NRS 5.010 and the
various rationale set Iorth in the attached materials. Further, the RMC Iailed to Iile the timely
Notice oI Appeal I submitted Ior Iiling on June 28th, 2012, and which was served by
delivering to the City Attorney's OIIice on June 27th, 2012 (timely within 10 days under NRS
189.010) resulting in the dismissal oI the appeal. The Iraud oI the WCSO, RPD, City
Attorney and others prevented Coughlin Irom having an appropriate chance to Iile as
complete and thorough a Motion Ior New Trial as he intended, including a wrongIul arrest on
June 28th, 2012, the WCDC denying Coughlin even a phone call Ior no reason Ior 20 hours,
until aIter the RMC had closed on Friday, June 29th, 2012, and then another wrongIul arrest
on July 3rd, 2012 by the RPD, with an impermissibly bail increase by the same Judge William
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Gardner whom should have recused himselI Irom the June 18th, 2012 Trial in 11 CR 26405 in
the RMC, violating oI most provision Iound in the NRS related to bail.
Transcript oI video taken by Hill and Merliss propounded to City Attorney: Zach's
arrest 010.mp4
RPD OIIicer Carter (Carter): Come on, get on up here, this is stupid. Come on,
okay, well bring your dog with you. (Carter and Sargent Lopez walk Irom the
stairway to the "basement", up the stairs through the back door oI the house,
through the kitchen, past Hill, whom is Iilming with his handheld video camera,
Iollowed by Coughlin holding his Pekingnese dog (Ieatured in the December 2012
Nevada Lawyer Animal Law issue) where a sitting landlord Merliss is on the couch
in the living room, whereupon Coughlin is directed to sit in the chair next to the
couch and the police begin questioning Coughlin as Hill joins them in the living
room.
Carter: Why are we going through all this headache? Huh? This is where you say
something!
Coughlin: What do you want to know?
Coughlin: I don't agree to be Iilmed, Rich.
Richard HIll (Hill): Nobody asked you.
Coughlin: I'll have to talk to my lawyer
Sargent Lopez: Do you have some place or body to take the dog?
Coughlin: Yeah.
Lopez: somebody we can call Ior the dog?
Coughlin: Why?
Lopez: Because, you are gonna probably go to go to jail.
Coughlin: Why? For what?
Lopez: Trespassing.
Coughlin: Where?
Carter: Here.
Lopez: Here, you have been evicted.
Coughlin: hhhhhmmnI.
Carter: hhhhmmmnI.
Hill: You also have breaking and entereing...
Carter:No...we have trespassing, that's all we have.
Coughlin: Well, iI you Ieel I am trespassing, couldn't you just tell me to leave?
Carter: We tried....we actually Ieel that your are playing games...
Lopez: You were told not to come back....um, uh RETURN!, uh, um..and that's
, that's ....when, um, you were told to leave and not to come back
Hill: I told you.
Coughlin: Who told me to leave?
Hill: Me.
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Coughlin: When?
Merliss: We told you to leave, Zach! I deserve some eye contact, Zach!
Carter: You sittin' over there splittin' hairs? (to Coughlin).
Hill: We changed the locks!
Merliss: You sorry about all oI this?
Coughlin: I am sorry that you are upset, Dr. Merliss.
Merliss: You are sorry, Zach? You know how much you have cost me, Ior
nothing? $20,000! You are going to be arrested!
Hill: You're gonna be arrested!
Coughlin: Excuse me, I'm sorry, I don't believe that they have established that I was
warned or served...
Carter: I don't believe that we need to establish that...we are not in court anymore!
M'kay?
Coughlin: Well, you have to have probable cause to arrest me...
Carter: I do have probable cause to arrest you, and iI you don't like it my name will
be on your arresting sheet..
Coughlin: I understand, sir.
Carter: Okay, why don't you stand up and put your hands behind your back.
Lopez: What can we do with the dog (reIering to Coughlin's dog, Jackson
Pawluck).
Merliss: I have two dogs, Zach.
Coughlin: What are you talking about taking him back to Chico?
Merliss: Yeah.
Coughlin:I would rather just my Iamily get the dogs.
Merliss: Okay, then call your Iamily Irom jail! This isn't your dog's Iault, Zach!
You did this! Your dog is not responsible Ior this!
Carter: (whispering in the background to Richard Hill while Merliss hold
Coughlin's Pekingnese dog in his hands, standing two Ieet Irom Coughlin's Iace)
breaking and entering is (unintelligible)
Hill: No, breaking and entering would be better because its a Ielony...
Carter: Look, Rich, come on...he's trespassing...
Hill: Alright, let's start with that...
Carter: That's all we have...
Hill: Well, you can't blame a guy Ior trying...I don't do any criminal work...
Sargent Lopez gets caught trying to play along with the lie that Merliss and Hill try to
get over, and all oI this is reiterated by Carter's statement that "we actually Ieel that you are
playing games"...which suggests that Merliss, Hill, and the RPD are playing a game oI their
own...And Carter's other statement to Coughlin ("you're sittin' over there splittin' hairs"
certainly betrays the Iact that Carter knows Coughlin has a point here, ie, that the RPD is
making a very, very suspect arrest Ior trespassing where neither the RPD, nor Hill, nor
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Merliss told Coughlin to leave or warned him against a trespass charge at any time on that
day, and that they only other "warnings" Hill or Merliss could possibly argue here relate to
civil eviction notices that were not served appropriately, and that do no warn one against a
criminal trespass charge (and Hazlett's reinterpretation oI the October 27th, 2011 Order
attempts to mislead the court in his tortuous eIIort to make the language therein say
something it simply does not) one where they want to arrest an attorney who has either
angered them by complaining oI police misconduct recently (Coughlin Iiled a complaint with
the RPD on September 7th, 2011, and more shortly thereaIter) or by contesting a summarey
eviction oI a commercial tenant where the non-payment oI rent was not plead (Ior good
reason, Merliss's case was really bad on retaliation, habitability issues, and all the set-oIIs or
Iix and deducts that had acrued, not to mention the property damage caused by his negligence
in agreeing to a weed maintenance arrangment with Coughlin (that Coughlin chose to address
through articial grass coverings oI the dirt lawn) while also, apparently, agreeing to a deal
with Green Action Lawn Care (which came to the law oIIice and tore up the articiIical grass
installation Coughlin had spent at least 3 days and hundreds oI dollars meticulously installing,
and threw it in the street, then reIused to put it back, all oI which Merliss is responsible Ior
under paragraph 23 oI the Standard Rental Agreement, which, by the way, allows Ior
Coughlin's commercial use oI the premises, and given the Hill Iailed to plead the non-
payment oI rent (because there was advantages to proceeding that way, or so Hill thought) the
whole summary eviction order that Merliss had just apparently paid Hill $20,000 to procure
was likely void in light oI the Iact that the RJC mixed too many plenary unlawIul detainer
hallmarks in Iavor oI the landlrod into what it later remixed as a "summary eviction
proceeding" suIIicient to make void Ior lack oI jurisdiction the October 25th, and October
27th, 2011 Orders, and Iurther, the October 13th, 2011 Order was void under NRS 40.253(6)
to the extnet is purported to rule on more than possession (ie, it ordered a rent escrow deposit
oI the last $2,275 Coughlin had to his name, then held on to that, and proceeded to expect
Coughlin to hire a team oI movers and rent a u-Haul and pay Ior a new place, or at least
storage, all within days oI the conclusion oI an exhausting six weeks oI preparation Ior what
was essentiall y an unlawIul detainer Trial-lite, rather than a mere summary eviction
proceeding. Additionally, Coughlin's Iiling oI a notice oI appeal on October 18th, 2011
divested the RJC oI jurisdiction, even Iurther making suspect the October 27th, 2011 Order
Hill and Merliss so cling to. Add to that the Iact that the "receipt" oI the Order beyond the
"within 24 hours" allowable under the statute, by the WCSO, in relation to the November 1,
2011 4:30 pm lockout (Baker testiIied to October 28th, 2011, though some clariIication may
be in order there (not that a relevancy objection wouldn't have been sustained by Judge
Gardner anywhere that Coughlin sought to inquire into aspects oI civil landlord tenant law
bearing on service, notice, constructive service, and void Ior lack oI jurisdiction or claim oI
right issues (however, City Attorney Hazlett got the green light on anything he wanted or
needed to poach Irom civil eviction law during the criminal trespass trial, and even where
Coughlin's objection to Hazlett's tacky "you were living there" type questions was sustained,
that didn't prevent Judge Gardner Irom relying on the "you were living there" accusations in
his order, nor did it stop Hazlett Irom going there on closing argument, all misconduct
requiring a new trial (and timeliness oI the motions arguments are undone by the RPD and
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WCSO two Irauduluent arrests oI Coughlin shortly aIter the June 18th, 2012 trial in RMC 11
CR 26405, compounded by a bail increase by Judge Gardner that is just not supportable.
Further evidence oI the Iraud the RPD, Merliss and Hill were successIul in perpetrating
this wrongIul arrest is Hill's statement: "we changed the locks!" in response to Coughlin
querying him as to who warned him against a trespass charge and when? To the extent the
RPD, Merliss and Hill then (in sworn testimony, Carter's Supplemental Declaration, and
other materials, including Hill's November 21st, 2011 Declaration and Baker's Opposition to
Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien that Declaration is an exhibit to) Iraudulently assert
that they identiIied themselves as law enIorcement and issued a lawIul order or warning to
leave prior to the door being kicked down, they should Iace criminal prosecution. Its either
them or, some might say, somebody else here should be Iacing some misconduct
allegations...And please be sure to remember that Reno City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens had all
these videos and still put on all that perjured testimony....And, a review oI Coughlin's Motion
to Dismiss and the Criminal Complaint signed by Hill reveal that the inIormation in the
Complaint does not support a probable cause analysis to satisIy Hazlett's RPC 3.8 duty, and
should have been dismissed. There is no mention oI an "warning" legally suIIicient to
support a criminal trespass prosecution. That Complaints rads "That said deIendant on or
about Nov. 13, 2011 in the City oI Reno, State oI Nevada at 121 River Rock st. the deI. Iound
on the properly aIter being evicted, all oI which is a violation oI 8.1 oI the Reno Municipal
Code. I thereIore request that said DeIendant be dealt with according to law. I hereby declare
upon inIormation and belieI under penalty oI perjury pursuant to NRS 171.102, that the
Ioregoing is true and correct to the best oI my knowledge". And it is signed by Richard Hill,
Esq., oppossing counsel in a summary eviction matter that was then on appeal in CV11-
03628. Why didn't RPD Carter or Lopez sign it, especially iI what Carter asserts in his
unsworn Supplemental Declaration is true? Regardless, Carter nevers avers that he issued
Coughlin a warning to leave, and the City Attorney's certainly did not want Carter or Lopez
showing up to be cross-examined, Ior they would have been completely exposed. Upon
inIormation and belieI, the licensed attorney had served on Carter and Lopez an attorney's
subpoena, that was or should have been served upon them by Coughlin having it delivered to
the Iront desk oI the RPD downtown headquarters. Coughlin moved Ior a continuance upon
their Iailure to show, and one should have been granted. Regardless, the Iact that RPD Carter
had Richard Hill sign the Complaint says it all... Carter and Lopez know they did not issue
Coughlin as lawIul order to leave, or provide Coughlin any such chance to heed such a
warning, nor did they identiIy themselves as law enIorcement prior to Merliss kicking the
door down ("we think you are playing games" "you're splitting hairs over there" and the Iact
that these RPD knew they weren't on solid enough ground to be kicking anything down says it
all). Further, Carter's probable cause sheet lies where it indicates "DeIendant was Iound
inside the house aIter being serve". Coughlin was "under" the house in an enclosure that
never had a lock and that is not technically even a "basement" given the 5 Ioot ceiling and the
Iact that it has one exit door, and had a dirt Iloor beIore Coughlin laid a vapor barrier and
carpet down there (there was a bed there, a nice Tempurpedic one Ior over a year, the whole
things was decked out, and HIll admits as much, there was 14 luxury sedan 14 way power car
seats, Coughlin is a tinkerer patent attorney and its nobody's business what he collects, and he
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is no more a "hoarder" than Richard Hill with his Iourteen Porsches). Further, upon
inIormation and belieI, prosecutorial misconduct was committed by the City Iailing to turn
over exculpatory dispatch logs, audio tapes oI dispatch calls and 911/rpd calls by Hill and
between teh oIIicers and dispatch/emergency services, particularly to the extent they shed
light on Hill and Merliss' lies regardin their having warned Coughlin to leave that day.
Let's compare Hill's assertions in the video above, with his written witness
statement in the police report, and Hill's November 21st, 2012 Declaraton (attached to
Baker's equally suspect Opposition to Coughlin's Personal Property Lien of that date in
R1C Rev2011-001708, and with Hill's 1anuary 14th, 2012 grievance letter against
Coughlin to the SBN:
-1/14/12 greivance against Coughlin in Letter to Patrick King, Esq. 1anuary 14, 2012
Page 3: "Someone had been in there since I had last been in several days before. Dr.
Merliss discovered that the baselnent door was barricaded (not locked) fronl the inside.
The Reno Police Department was summoned. They tried to coax whoever was in the
basement out, without success. After Dr. Merliss had to kick the door down, it "vas
discovered that Mr. Coughlin had broken in and was in the basement. He was arrested
and is presently facing criminal trespass charges in Reno Municipal Court. See case no.
11 CR 26405 21."
Transcript oI video: Zach's arrest 011.mp4:
Carter: (continuing his conversation with Hill) Rich, when and where was he
served the paperwork?
Hill: Um...on November 1st, I believe...
Coughlin: Where was I served?
Hill: They put it on the Iront door because you ran away (odd, given Baker
testiIied Hill was not there on November 1st with the WCSO Deputies conducting
the lockout, and Coughlin was at the Washoe County Law Library)
Carter: The paper was leIt on the 1st?
Coughlin: Sir, OIIicer, I don't believe you've established that I was served...
Carter: That doesn't matter.
Coughlin: Or that I receivea any Lockout Order.
Hill: (chortle, chortle) Note taken.
Carter: So, October 1st, you believe?
Hill: No, November 1st.
Coughlin: By who?
Hill: Washoe County SheriII...
Coughlin: Was it in person?
Lopez; It doesn't need to be in person, actually...
Hill: You knew you were evicted! You were in Court!. You heard what the Judge
said!
Carter: They just tape this stuII to the Iront door...
Hill: And you took it down oII the Iront door!
Carter: Allegealy...
Coughlin: I am not corroberating anything you are accusing me oI.
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Hill: That's Iine,
Carter you don't need to....When was he supposed to be out?
Hill: by the 1st...(at this point Dr. Merliss takes the video camera Irom Rich and
starts doing some weird zoom in close up camera work oI Coughli's wrists and
hands in handcuIIs, with an inescapable homeoerotic bondage type physician
control Ireak air to it all)
Carter: (to Hill) come on, we'll do that in the car....
Carter: Hey, Rich, do you have his social security number?
Hill: Yeah, out in my car. (Coughlin then makes a phone call by having Sargent
Lopez hold a phone up to his head, trying to arrange Ior someone to care Ior his
dog)
Merliss: You need to call her, Zach, about the dog!
Coughlin: You aren't an OIIicer, are you Dr. Merliss?
Merliss: I am not going to take care oI your dog?
Coughlin: (to Carter) its kind oI disrespectIul Ior him to be jumping in where an
oIIicer...
Carter: Well it's disrespectIul Ior you to be here. You are not the victim, here!
Hill: Ha!
But, actually, the United States Supreme Court, in Soldal v. Cook County, might beg
to diIIer with Judge Carter's analysis...Russell v. Kalian, 414 A.2d 462 R.I.,1980 Where
execution, which was issued on May 23, specified that it was valid for 20 days, landlord
and constable acted unlawfully in evicting tenant on the execution on 1une 13, and
landlord and constable had thereby subjected themselves to liability for trespass.State v.
Fanger, 665 A.2d 36 Vt.,1995 There was suIIicient evidence to prove that deIendant, an
apartment manager, entered tenant's residence knowing he was not licensed or privileged to
do so to sustain trespass conviction, although deIendant stated he entered tenant's residence to
make sure heat was on, given tenant's testimony that deIendant's only acts with respect to the
heat was to disconnect the heat, deIendant made clear he was there to evict tenant, and
deIendant pushed open door while tenant was attempting to keep it shut, knocking over her
child in the process.
And it is in OIIicer Carter's Supplemental Declaraton where his lying really shines
through, especially aIter viewing the videos Iilmed by Merliss and Hill, which Iorm a nice
counterpoint to the remixed chronology oI events and statements (with a tough oI just Ilat out
imagining things by Carter) Iound in that writing oI Carters, which reads in relevant part:
"Matthew has been to the house several times over the past week and has observed evidence
oI someone coming and going. Today he was at the house and Iound the basement door to be
locked Irom inside. Matthew contacted Richard who responded and called the police. Sgt
Lopez and I knocked on the basement door and announced loudly "Reno Police" and called
out Ior Zachary to open the door. We were met with no response. Matthew decided he would
kick the door open, and did so. I entered the doorway oI the basement and Iound Zachary
standing at the rear oI the room holding a small dog. He was hesitant to come out and
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tried to explain to Zachary that he was served eviction papers and he asked me what I could
do about it iI he hypothetically didn't get them. He then told me that he had worked a deal
with Matthew to continue paying rent and that the legal eviction was no longer valid. I again
tried to explain to Zachary that a judge had signed an order Iorcing him to leave the property
and all he did was cite civil case law to me (I'm unsure iI any oI the cases he was rambling on
about even exist) and tell me that I was making a bad arrest. Due to Zachary not believing he
has done anything wrong that the Iact he believes he still has standing there is reasonable
grounds to believe Zachary will return to the house. ThereIore he did not qualiIy Ior a
misdemeanor citation. Richard completed a statement on Matthews' behalI and signed a
criminal complaint."
State v. Lovins, 2009 WL 4723392, City Attorney Hazlett managed to Iind just about
the only one case in American jurisprudence that Iound an evicted tenant guilty oI trespass,
but that case is inapplicable to this one, becuase in the instant case, no express indication
exists in the record that tenant was "told not to return to the property", which was a
requirement in Lovins, and where the City's citation and Judge Gardner's reliance thereupon is
predicated upon more than mere service or "constructive service" (and while Judge Gardner's
Order speciIically Iound Coughlin had "constructive service" oI the eviction order, and,
apparently, thereIore, suIIicient warning to support a criminal trespass charged (despite Judge
Gardner ruling irrelevant Coughlin's evidence, testimony, and legal argument directed to just
what rules apply in order to Iigure out iI one has been "constructively served" an eviction
order in Nevada in light oI AB226, the testimony beIore the Committee on the Judiciary on
March 31st, 2011, etc., etc. and the dicates oI NRS 40.400, NRCP 6(e), and NRCP 5(b)(2) vis
a vis NRS 40.253(5). Tenn.Crim.App.,2009 SuIIicient evidence supported deIendant's
conviction Ior criminal trespass. The evidence showed that deIendant worked and lived on the
homeowner's Iarm property. The homeowner's termination oI deIendant and subsequent
eviction notice ordering him oII the property indicated that the homeowner's did not want the
deIendant on their property. DeIendant indicated he knew that he was not welcome on the
property. Thus, when the deIendant repeatedly drove onto the homeowner's property yelling
at them, he had already been expressly told not to return to the property. State v. Lovins,
2009 WL 4723392.
But any timeliness arguments are further undone by the newly discovered
evidence aspect, and here is one part of it. RPD Officer Travis Warren was there in
1anuary 2012 at a RPD response to Coughlin's 911 call regarding domestic violence
against him by his then housemates on E. 9th St.. Warren was there to witness Coughlin
video record Lopez and goad her into admitting that the RPD neither identified
themselves as law enforcement or issued Coughlin a lawful warning or order to leave.
And Sargent Lopez has some integrity, so it is and was difficult for her to play along
with Hill and Merliss' fraudulent non-sense. But, add on to the the fact that Coughlin
only just discovered this weekend that RPD Warren and another officer, and two social
worker types met secretly with Coughlin's father, local family practionern at Coughlin's
medical practice's office at some point in the last six months or so. This likely violates
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Palmer v. Pioneer, and further underscores the impermissible conflicts that exist here,
made worse by the violations of NRS 178.405 where convenient for various parties
involved here. Further, Dr. Coughlin is Reno City Attorney 1ohn Kadlic's longtime
personal physician and Dr. Coughlin (known as "the 1udge Whisperer" in some circles
for being involved in interventions with numerous local judges over the last 25 years(in
addition to his work with the Impaired Physicians Committee and other diversion
programs) has in the past demonstrated a complete and utter incapability to grasp the
concept of boundaries when it comes to his son, Zach Coughlin, calling up Deans of law
schools (Coughlin was deposed by the State Bar of California regarding an ill advised
call by Dr. Coughlin to then Dean of UNLV"s Boyd School of Law, Richard Morgan, in
2007), State Bars, etc., etc., and offering his various contradictory diagnosis, all of which
tend to border on Munchausen by Proxy at times (a slight exaggeration, perhaps),
though he is a wonderful father otherwise, and a very good man, however, he is, like all
doctors, deeply jealous of any lawyer and wishing he could be one, as is, apparently, Dr.
Merliss (who tried to take over 1udge Sferrazza's court room with an impromptu cross
examination of Coughlin while Merliss was on the witness stand). And, needless to say,
they are both complete and utter control freaks of the highest order. Dr. Coughlin
married the daughter of the neurosurgeon in Morelli v. Morelli (Dr. Coughlin's sister in
law is a lawyer who sued her physician father, and that published opinion is oft cited for
some third party beneficiary point of law incident to marital settlement agreements in
Nevada). So, adding up the behind the scenes sabotage of Coughlin's life, his ability to
defend in this matter (or even get to trial with the video exhibits or proof of subpoenaing
the various material witness (Merliss, Sargent Lopez, Officer Carter, the latter two
being under supboena by the City of Reno and therefore, Coughlin arguably deserved a
continuance in response to his request given their failure to appear, to the extent
Coughlin's attempts at subpoenaing them did not technically comply with applicable
rules (which Coughlin si not even sure of given the arrest, bail, withhold medications,
violat Soldal v. Cook Co., get no love from the 1ustice Court, rinse and repeat Washoe
County and the City of Reno, WCSO, RPD, RMC, R1C, City Attorney's Office, SBN,
Richard Hill, and WCDA Office have had Coughlin on in the last 14 months or so....
Regardless, justice dictates at least a hearing on this Motion for New Trial, and or
to Vacate 1udgement, or Arrest 1udgment, etc... RPD Officer Carter, Sargent Lopez,
Officer Warren and a few others (Officer Weaver, Sargent Dye, Sargent Miller) need to
answer some question, under oath...and Richard Hill and Casey Baker have a lot of
'splainin' to do...and add to that Dr. Merliss. Otherwise...Some of the "peculiarities"
attendant to this and other trials involving Coughlin in the RMC shall, perhaps, get a bit
more retrospection...
Bagwell v. 1amison, 25 S.C.L. 249, S.C.App.L.,1840 In trespass against a bailiff,
for levying under a distress warrant alleged to be void, defendant justified by plaintiff's
admissions that rent was due. Acknowledgments by the landlord, deceased, of partial
satisfaction, were admitted in reply. State v. Riddell, 21 P.3d 128 Or.App.,2001 In
prosecution for criminal trespass in the second degree, defendant should have been
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allowed to attack underlying exclusion order that precluded him from appearing in
courthouse square, which defendant contended was invalid on ground that it prohibited
his constitutionally protected activity of expressive ~freeze modeling in a public area.
Hayes v. State, 79 S.E. 761 Ga.App.,1913 A tenant who in good faith claims possession of
land under a bona fide claimant of title and right of possession cannot be convicted of
trespass. O'Banion v. Com., 519 S.E.2d 817 Va.App.,1999 The statutory offense of
criminal trespass requires a willful trespass; thus, one who enters or stays upon
another's land under a bona fide claim of right cannot be convicted of trespass.O'Banion
v. Com., 519 S.E.2d 817 Va.App.,1999 A ~bona fide claim of right, which may serve as
a defense to a trespass charge, is a sincere, although perhaps mistaken, good faith belief
that one has some legal right to be on the property; the claim need not be one of title or
ownership, but it must rise to the level of authorization.
The proposed amendment was not the type of an amendment which should have
been allowed under Section 157 of the 1ustice Court Act. A summary proceeding is a
statutory remedy and the petition must be strictly construed. The service of a proper
notice against a tenant holding over, is a jurisdictional fact, which must be properly
`805 pleaded and proved. If the notice is defective or insufficient, the proceeding falls.
The notice cannot be amended upon the trial and no facts can be included as a
jurisdictional ground for the proceeding, which are not included in the original notice.
Under the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law Section 8585 of the Unconsolidated
Laws as amended by the Laws of 1951 and the regulations of the Temporary State
Housing Rent Commission thereunder, the facts constituting the nuisance are additional
requirements of a notice to a tenant holding over. The facts upon which the landlord
bases his claim of nuisance, are jurisdictional and a summary proceeding cannot be
successfully maintained without full compliance with the statute. A jurisdictional defect
cannot be cured by amendment. Ferber v. Apfel, 113 App.Div. 720, 99 N.Y.S. 215. If the
judgment in this case rested upon a verdict of a jury, I would consider the reception of
the evidence of loud and profane language by the tenants and the submission of that
issue to a jury under the present circumstances, reversible error. However, the Trial
Court, in his decision finds, that the tenants maintained a clothesline approximately five
feet from the ground across the rear of the premises in such a position that it was
hazardous and dangerous to the landlords and to the members of his family who were
obliged to pass this clothesline in walking from the garage to the rear entrance of the
portion of the premises occupied by the landlords. He also finds, that the tenants
persisted in maintaining the clothesline in this location contrary to the wishes of the
landlords. In his decision, the Trial Court calls attention to the... N.Y.Co.Ct. 1952
Blozevich v. Tasber 116 N.Y.S.2d 801
Tenant's failure to raise notice issue in his initial dismissal motion or to plead it
with specificity in his answer did not relieve landlord of its trial burden to establish
compliance with statutory requirements for notice to cure in summary eviction
proceeding.N.Y.Sup.App.Term,2006. W 54-7 LLC v. Schick 14 Misc.3d 49, 829 N.Y.S.2d
399, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 26499
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Is was reversible error to rule as irrelevant Coughlin's materials on a "claim of
right" defense: License from the owner to access the premises, within meaning of
statutory affirmative defense against prosecution for criminal trespass, is satisfied by
showing license from any owner or other person authorized to license access to the
premises. West's Neb.Rev.St. 28-522. State v. McCave, 282 Neb. 500, 805 N.W.2d 290
(2011). Further, see NRS 40.760 and 108.475.
At the time of Coughlin's arrest, he was a licensed attorney. It would not be
reasonable to expect one to litigate, basically, a plenary unlawful detainer Trial (remixed
and recharacterized as a summarey eviction proceeding over half way through) then
expect them to move out practially overnight, and expect a USPS change of address to
adequately allay any concerns about that attorney's mail being forward in time to avoid
any damage to his client's cases. It is unreasonable to suggest that the RPD can then
tackle some attorney stepping foot on the property to get his mail. And where 1udge
Garner ruled all the nonsense about pajamas (don't look like pajamas in the videos to
me, Chris, or Rich) and slippers and "you were living there (in a civil pleading HIll
admits that the stuff in the basement was probably there well before the eviction, then
HIll goes on to ponder about Coughlin preferring to "spider hole" himself in the
basement, even prior to the eviction...Hill has continually demeaned Coughlin
throughout these matters and caused his client to needlessly incur fees).
Further, 1udge Gardner's Order of Conviction was so thin, he almost
immediately started to reach for guidance given by the legistlature or city counsel of
something regarding posting at intervals of this or that...there was zero testimony or
evidence about the posting of no trespassing signs...and zero testimony or citation to the
effect that post an eviction notice is tantamount to posting a no trespassing sign. They
are legally distinct.
VIOLATIONS OF NRS 178.405 AND NRS 5.010 BY RENO CITY ATTORNEY AND
WASHOE COUNTY PROSECUTORS AND RMC AND WCPD COURT APPOINTED
DEFENDERS
September 8th, 2011 Order for Competency Evaluation by 1udge Schroeder in
RCR2011-063341
September 9th, 2011: Coughlin arrested at Wal-Mart in RMC 11 CR 22176 Ior petty larceny
October 10th, 2011: Coughlin arraigned in RMC 11 CR 22176 Ior petty larceny charge
October 26th, 2011 (or a short time after depending upon entry of order) 1udge
Sferrazza declares Coughlin competent in RCR2011-063341
February 27th, 2012: file stamped at 1:31pm in RCR2012-065630 1udge Clifton signs an
Order for Competency evaluation of Coughlin
-February 27th, 2012: despite being present at the "clandestine status conIerence" (Dogan's
client Coughlin was noticed, in writing, that it had been reset to March 29th, 2012) DDA
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Young Iiled an Opposition to Motion to Continue Trial Date and Motion to Appoint Co-
Counsel on 2/27/12 at 2:55 pm in a companion case that he was also prosecuting, RCR2011-
063341 in violation oI NRS 178.405. In her March 13th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin,
Judge Nash Holmes admits to communications in this regard between her and the Washoe
County Public DeIender's OIIice.
-February 27th, 2012: At 3:00 pm, despite the communications she admits to with the
WCPD, Judge Nash Holmes holds a trial where Coughlin is Iorced to appear as an indigent
criminal deIendant proceeding with selI representation in 11 TR 26800, which is suspened
upon Judge Nash Holmes Iinding Coughlin in "summary criminal contempt" seconds aIter he
testiIies that RPD Sargetn Tarter lied in connection with a retaliatory traIIic citations incident
to Tarter telling Coughlin to leave the law oIIice oI Richard G. Hill, Esq. on November 15th,
2012 aIter Coughlin was released Irom 3 days in jail incident to a criminal trespass custodial
arrest upon Hill lying to oIIicers and signing a criminal complaint in 11 CR 26405 Ior
criminal trespass on November 13th, 2012. Tarter ordered Coughlin to leave aIter Hill
reIused to give Coughlin his state issued drivers license or identiIication, his hard
drives/client's Iiles, his keys, or his wallet.
-Judge Nash Holmes proceeds to Iile numerous Orders
-March 5th, 2012: in RMC 11 CR 26405, the criminal trespass case Irom Coughlin's Iormer
home law oIIice the CertiIied Copy oI Docket done by the Judicial Assistant, D2's Lisa
Wagner, who couldn't quite seem to Iind or remember the Iact that Coughlin Iaxed in a Notice
oI Appeal on June 28th, 2012, and her Iailure to docket that led to the dismissal oI Coughlin's
appeal in CR12-1262, despite Coughlin having electronic conIirmation oI receipt oI that Iax
delivering his Notice oI Appeal to the RMC and to City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens (whom
coyly tries to assert he didn't get it or the paper copy Coughlin personally delivered to the
oIIices oI the City Attorney within the 10 days set Iorth in NRS 189.010) Trial date set Ior
April 10, 2012 by Court.
-05 March 2012: Notice OI Appearace As Co-Counsel And Motion To Dismiss Iiled
deIendant. 20 March 2012: Order #1 denying deIendant's motion Iiled 13,February 2012
signed Judge William Gardner. RMC 11 CR 26405
-21 March 2012: Order #2 denying deIendant's motion Iiled 5, March 2012 signed by Judge
William Gardner. RMC 11 CR 26405
-21 March 2012: Motion To Strike DeIendant's Motion To Dismiss Complaint Iiled by
Deputy City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens. RMC 11 CR 26405
-10 April 2012: DeIendant appeared Ior trial with counsel Keith Loomis, Judge William
Gardner presiding. Present on behalI oI the City was Christopher Hazlett-Stevens. Several
pre-trial motions were heard. An Order Suspending Proceedings was signed. All proceedings
suspended until the question oI competence is determined. Case Status Hearing scheduled Ior
8, May 2012. RMC 11 CR 26405. See attached emails demonstrating the knowledge oI and
complicity between the Washoe County Public DeIenders, the court appointed Reno
Municipal Court deIenders, the City oI Reno Prosecutors, Washoe County District Attorney's
OIIice, RMC, RJC, and both court's Iiling oIIice's staII and administrators respecting the
existence oI these Orders Ior Competency Evaluation and the brazen violation oI NRS
178.405 and NRs 5.010 by these individuals. Further, on April 19th, 2012, DDA Young again
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violated NRS 178.405 where he moved to have Coughlin remanded to custody (whereupon
Coughlin could again have his medication suddenly withheld Irom him, all while RMC Judge
Nash Holmes seeks to leverage jail staII to get Coughlin to sign some waiver oI his medical
records privacy rights and where WCPD Biray Dogan announces conIidential HIPAA
protected medical inIormation relating to his client Coughlin into the public record, in Iront oI
40 members oI the public gathered in D10, a transgression which WCPD Jeremy Bosler later
reIused to seek to ameliorate or strike Irom the record in any manner whatsoever).
-May 7th, 2012 in RCR2011-063341 WCPD Goodnight and DDA Young violate NRS
178.405 by attempting TO HOLD A TRIAL in that matter during the pendency oI an Order
Ior Competency directored towards Goodnight's client, Coughlin. Goodnight manages to jam
Coughlin into an ill-advised Mental Health Court sign-up in MH12-0032, which ends badly
when the MHC's Reno Biondo commits Iraud in asserting that Coughlin was removed Irom
the MHC Ior "Iailing to Iollowing MHC policies" similar to the arguments put Iorth by
Sharon Dollarhide, despite the MHC, and perhaps Goodnight too, having given Coughlin a
list oI medications it prohibits, and a contract Ior entry into the MCH, aIter having inIormed
Coughlin he was accepted into the MCH upon entering the contract. The MCH subsequently
threatened Coughlin with incarceration Ior taking a medication is only aIter the Iact objected
to, then, upon having the bargained Ior consieration, oIIer and acceptance pointed out to it,
the MCH lied and disparaged Coughlin to the RJC and others, causing Coughlin reputational
damage, and Coughlin's case was remanded to the RJC at a later date. During this period oI
time, D10 Judge Elliot Iorced Coughlin back into custody at the WCDC, where Coughlin has
been denied his medication every single one oI his 10 trips to jail this year, with no titration
down oI dosing whatsoever, even where Coughlin was willing and able to arrange Ior
delivery oI the medication at his own expense, etc.
-08 May 2012: Case Status hearing held beIore Judge William Gardner. Present on behalI oI
the City was Deputy City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Ior the deIense Keith Loomis
and deIendant Zachary Coughlin. DeIendant was Iound to be competent. DeIendant's motion
to remove Keith Loomis as counsel granted. Trial date set by the court Ior June 18,2012.
RMC 11 CR 26405. Strangely, despite Coughlin still being subject to an as yet to be
ruled upon Order For Competency evaluation and despite Coughlin having just the
previous day been accepted into Mental Health Court and the R1C case RCR2011-
063341 transferred there, RMC 1udge William Gardner jammed Coughlin both into
proceeding without the Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel and into some trial setting,
even though NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 forbids it, and even though 1udge Gardner
admitted to being aware of 1udge Nash Holmes, his fellow RMC 1udge, seeking to have
Coughlin's law license taken away based upon a SCR 117 Disability Petition (1udge
Nash Holmes, in her March 14th, 2012 letter/grievance to the State Bar of Nevada,
wherein she purports to speak for 1udge William Gardner and managed to pass on to
the SBN the April 2009 Order For Sanctions by 1udge William Gardner's sister Family
Court 1udge Linda Gardner, that 1udge William Gardner passed to 1udge Nash Holmes
after receiving from his sister sometime in the first quarter of 2012). Incidentally,
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Coughlin was previously a domestic violence attorney at Washoe Legal Services until
Family Court 1udge Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin $1,000
personally for the arguments he made in representing a domestic violence victim in a
divorce trial were cited by WLS Executive Director Paul Elcano as the "sole reason" for
Coughlin being fired. Coughlin filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in respone to that
Order with the Nevada Supreme Court in 54844. Coughlin filed a Notice of Appeal of
the dismissal for insufficient service of process of his wrongful termination case against
Washoe Legal Services on February 27th, 2012, and that matter is currently on appeal
with the Nevada Supreme Court in 60302. Oh, and Reno City Attorney 1ohn Kadlic is a
patient of Zach Coughlin's father, Dr. Timothy Coughlin, and the City of Reno and or
the RPD have sought to pressure Coughlin's parents into having him "committed",
despite the fact that the numerous (about 8-10 ish) wrongful arrests Coughlin has been
subjected to this year (most of which violate Soldal v. Cook County and have been
captured on video tape, amazingly) all kind oI give Mr. Kadlic a bit motivation to quiet and
or discredit Coughlin (and and arrest on June 28th, 2012 by the WCSO and various instances
this year where Iraudulent AIIidavits oI Service by the WCSO have been involved in arrests
oI Coughlin give the WCDA OIIice its own motivations).
Given that this trial setting and denial oI Coughlin's Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
occurred during the pendency oI an Order Ior Competency Evaluation oI Coughlin that the
RMC, Judge William Gardner, court appointed deIender Keith Loomis, Esq. and City
Attorney's Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Esq. were well aware oI, the Iollowing are void: O5
June 2012: Notice OI Appearance As Counsel ; Motion To Dismiss; Motion To Suppress;
Motion For A Continuance OI Trial And TransIer To Mental Health Court Iiled by deIendant.
18 June 2012: DeIendant appeared Ior trial pro-per, Judge William Gardner presiding. Present
on behalI oI the City was Christopher Hazlett-Stevens. Several pre-trial motions were heard.
Motion to Continue Iiled by deIendant denied. Motion to Dismiss Iiled by deIendant denied.
Motion to Suppress denied. Motion to Recuse denied. Motion to TransIer to Mental Health
Court denied. Case tried on its merits and the DeIendant was Iound guilty oI the charge oI
Trespass, a violation oI R.M.C 08.10.010. .."'Y25'2012 The DeIendant was sentenced as
Iollows: Trespass, a violation oI R.M.C 08.10.0 10. : Time Served (3 days at usual $100 a
day, and a $310.00 Iine Ior a total oI $610 raked in by the RMC on a Iirst oIIense trespass
charge where typically the Iine is $305. Also, Richard G. Hill, Esq. lied under oath at that
June 18th, 2012 criminal trespass Trial where he testiIied that the RPD identiIied themselves
as law enIorcement and issued a lawIul order or warning Ior Coughlin to leave the premises
prior to the landlord kicking down a door to a quasi "basement" under the Iormer law oIIice.
The videos oI the arrest Iilmed by Hill demonstrate that Coughlin was never given an
opportunity to heed any warning to leave given that day prior to a custodial arrest being
eIIectuated, contrary to the Supplemental Declaration by RPD OIIicer Chris Carter, Jr. RPD
Sargent Marcia Lopez subsequently admitted that the RPD neither identiIied themselves as
law enIorcement nor issued a lawIul order to emerge Irom the basement prior to landlord
Merliss kicking down the basement door on November 13th, 2012. WCSO Civil Supervisor
Liz Stuchell has admitted in an email to Coughlin that Deputy Machen's November 7th, 2011
AIIidavit oI Service swearing to have "personally served" the RJC REV2011-001708
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Summary Eviction Order on November 1st, 2011 was "incorrect" in that to Machen
"personally served" means "posting it to the door when no one is home. However, given NRS
40.400 makes applicable NRCP 5(b)(2) and 6(e) to summary evictions (even those that are
noticed by the RJC, in writing, as a "Trial" and even where, at the October 13th, 2011
"summary eviction proceeding" the RJC ruled that Coughlin "had met his burden oI
establishing there is a genuine issue oI material Iact concerning his retaliatory eviction
deIense" and the matter was then "set Ior trial on October 25th, 2011 provided Coughlin
deposits $2,275 into the court's rent escrow account", all oI which violates JCRCP Rule 109
and NRS 40.253(6)) the lockout Deputy Machen oversaw on November 1st, 2011 was based
upon a void Eviction Order and Decision oI October 25th, 2011 and an October 27th, 2011
Findings oI Fact...that Hill's associate Baker testiIied as to having apparently provided receipt
thereoI to the WCSO on October 28th, 2011, and which RJC ChieI Civil Clerk Karen Stancil
indicates were transmitted to the WCSO via Iax according to the usual custom and practice oI
the RJC...meaning, the WCSO Iailed to eIIectuate a lockout "within 24 hours" oI "receipt" oI
either oI those Orders...meaning Hill and Merliss were trespassing on November 13th, 2011,
not Coughlin, and they brought the RPD along Ior the ride, whereupon the RPD eIIected a
wrongIul arrest (based upon lies by neurologist Merliss and his attorney Hill to the eIIect that
they warned Coughlin to leave that day prior to the RPD showing up, which is clearly show to
be Ialse by the videos Iilmed by Hill and Merliss themselves and Hill's subsequent testimony
at the June 18th, 2012 criminal trespass trial in 11 CR 26405).
May 9th, 2012: Order finding Coughlin competent in CR12-0376, by 1udge Elliot of
Department 10 resolving the February 27th, 2012 Order for Competency Evaluation
signed by R1C 1udge Clifton and file stamped at 1:31 pm on that date.
September 5th, 2012: Order for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin by 1udge Sferrazza
in RCR2011-063341
October 2, 2012: WCPD Leslie and Dogan and DDA Young violate NRS 178.405 by
swapping the October 15th, 2012 Trial continuation/Competency Hearing Date in RCR2011-
063341 with RCR2012-065630, and setting/stipulating to a new hearing on October 22nd,
2012, and resetting the Trial date to November 19th, 2012, but not beIore attempting to cram
RCR2012-067980 onto the calendar with RCR2012-063341 Ior October 22nd, 2012 (and
Leslie and Dogan lied to Coughlin about whether "mandatory status conIerence" was held on
August 6th, 2012 in RCR2012-065630, and RCR2012-067980, the latter at which Leslie set a
Trial date oI September 18th, 2012 despite his legal assistant Linda Gray admitting to
Coughlin that Coughlin was provided no notice whatsoever oI the August 6th, 2012 hearing
date in those cases. Also, Dogan and Leslie again violated NRS 178.405 on October 2nd,
2012 where tehy reset Ior October 30th, 2012 a Motion Hearing on DDA Young's
impermissible Motion to Amend the Complaint in RCR2012-065630 (six months aIter the
arrest, no speciIic Iacts pled in either to support either charge, really). Further, Dogan Iailed
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to alert Coughlin in any way to the Iact that, in his July 31st, 2012 Motion to Amend Criminal
Complaint, DDA Young attempted to, in violation oI RPC 3.8, amend the "misue oI
emergency services" charge (where Coughlin is accused oI using 911 to report police
misconduct) to a charge that would provide the District Attorney more leverage against
Coughlin, a retaliatory prosecution, Ior a crime that would damage Coughlin's law license
given the import oI SCR 111(6), despite DDA Young lacking probable cause to so amend his
charge. Dogan and Young previously conspired to retaliate against Coughlin incident to their
"clandestine status conIerence" oI February 27th, 2012, which just so happened to be the date
that Coughlin Iiled a Notice oI Appeal in his case against Washoe Legal Services 60302 and
the date that Judge William Gardner transIerred jurisdiction Irom RMC D1 Judge Dilworth to
RMC D3 Judge Nash Holmes in 12 CR 000696, a case where Coughlin was subject to a
custodial arrest Ior jaywalkign on January 12th, 2012 incident to Coughli's peaceIully Iilming
Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s contractor's crew Irom a public sidewalk, disposing oI property leIt at
Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice due to Hill locking a gate thereto during the time Coughlin
was aIIorded to remove such property and where Hill had boarded up on oI the entrances to
the property as well, in addition to remove the only ladder to the upstairs attic/storage space at
the property. On February 27th, 2012 in 11 TR 26800 Judge Nash Holmes told Coughlin she
would have him thrown in jail iI he mentioned Richard G. Hill's name one more time. On
January 31st, 2012, at an extension hearing on the TPO Richard Hill received against
CoughlinI or Coughlin's alleged jaywalking on January 12th, 2012, RJC Judge Schroeder
roared at Coughlin "do you want to go to jail!" when Coughlin broached the subject oI Hill's
abuse oI process. Judge Schroeder is listed in the RJC docket as presiding over the February
27th, 2012 "clandestine status conIerence" that ultimately resulted in Judge CliIton signing
the Order Ior Competency Evaluation. It is unclear iI any actual hearing beIore a judge even
took place that day, however.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
NEW TRIAL OR MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT: NRS 176.515 ARREST OF
JUDGMENT NRS 176.525 Arrest oI judgment: NRS 176.565 Clerical mistakes. Clerical
mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the record
arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after
such notice, if any, as the court orders. The RMC Iailed to Iile Coughlin June 28th, 2012
Notice oI Appeal, and that resulted in the appeal cr12-1262 being dismissed. NRS 178.589
Use oI Iacsimile machine. The Reno Municipal Court has sought to apply rules to Coughlin it
does not apply to others, even where NRS 178.608 and NRS 178.610 Iorbid it Irom doing so.
Further, Coughlin's rights to Iile the best Motion Ior New Trial that he could and to ensure
that the RMC did in Iact Iile his June 28th, 2012 Notice oI Appeal were prejudiced by an
impermissibly bail increase by Judge Gardner, unnoticed (Coughlin did not have an attorney
oI record at the time and was not appropriately noticed as to the July 5th, 2012 impromptu
bail hearing at which the RPD committed Iraud, and Iurther, the "saIety oI other persons and
oI the community" argument does not accord the RPD the right to violate Soldal v. Cook
County. NRS 178.498 Amount. II the deIendant is admitted to bail, the bail must be set at an
amount which in the judgment oI the magistrate will reasonably ensure the appearance oI the
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deIendant and the saIety oI other persons and oI the community, ...having regard to: 1. The
nature and circumstances oI the oIIense charged; 2. The Iinancial ability oI the deIendant to
give bail; 3. The character oI the deIendant; and 4. The Iactors listed in NRS 178.4853. NRS
178.499 Increase in amount. 1. At any time aIter a district or Justice Court has ordered bail to
be set at a speciIic amount, and beIore acquittal or conviction, the court may upon its own
motion or upon motion oI the district attorney and aIter notice to the deIendant`s attorney oI
record or, iI none, to the deIendant, increase the amount oI bail Ior good cause shown. 2. II
the deIendant has been released on bail beIore the time when the motion to increase bail is
granted, the deIendant shall either return to custody or give the additional amount oI bail A
2012 published and publicly disseminated Reno Municipal Court Bail Schedule indicates
criminal trespass under teh RMC 8.10.010 Trespassing carries a Iine oI $ 305. Coughlin's
Iirst oIIense criminal trespass charge incident to a civil eviction was Iined $610 by Judge
William Gardner, twice the normal amount, considering the three days oI incarceration
Coughlin served (typically credited at $100 a day) and the $310 "Iine" that Judge Gardner
kept Irom Coughlin's cash bail Ior the RMC. Another indication oI the impropriety oI Iailing
to recuse himselI.
Further, Loomis and Puentes deprived me oI my right to supboena witnesses to deIend
myselI in RMC 11 CR 26405, a criminal trespass matter resulting in a criminal trespass
conviction on June 18th, 2012, which I reported to Bar Counsel in compliance with SCR 111.
SBN Bar Counsel King has the audio Irom two oI the pre-trial hearings and I am attaching the
audio oI the trial or linking to it herein. It demonstrates the Iact that Dr. Merliss was a
percipient, material eye witness (in Iact Dr. Merliss lied to the RPD in eIIectuating this
wrongIul arrest, and Sargent Marcia Lopez has admitted to me, contrary to RPD OIIicer Chris
Carter's police report and Richard Hill's June 18th, 2012 sworn testimony and Casey Baker,
Esq's (whom was not even there on November 13th, 2011) NRCP Rule 11 violating (given he
possessed the video's taken by Dr. Merliss and his supervisory attorney, Richard G. Hill, Esq,
which were propounded to the Reno City Attorney's OIIice and which both Loomis and
Puentes had, which Iurther demonstrate their culpability. There is a suggestion that these
"contract" court appointed deIenders put their own proIit motive above their client's rights to
subpoena witnesses and gather evidence to deIende their cases (similar to the reIusals by
WCPD Jim Leslie, Loomis reIused to procure and provide the audio oI two extremely
relevant court proceedings in the RJC, necessary to the deIense oI RMC case, which led to 18
days wrongIul incarceration oI me Irom July 3, 2012 to July 21st, 2012 in RMC 12 CR
12420. The two RJC matters are the Milan Krebs TPO hearing in RJC RCP2012-000287
(particularly necessary to the deIense oI that matter, in addition to the matter Leslie represent
me on incident to a wrongIul June 28th, 2012 arrest by the WCSO in RCR2012-067980,
incident to a Iraudulently procurred Summary Eviction Order (stemming Irom the Iraudulent
Declaration oI Personal Service by license process server Robert Wray Ior Nevada Court
Services, which was committing the unauthorized practice oI law (deeming themselves an
"eviction consulting and process service company" in RJC rev2012-001048, where Wray lied
about "personally serving" me a June 14th, 2012 5 day unlawIul detainer notice (he tried to
break and enter my rental #29, which had not windows and which had a locked Iront door at
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the time that he and Northwind Apartments Manager Duane Jakob attempted to break and
enter and committ another trespass (as they had done previously, when they Iailed to get the
City oI Reno Code EnIorcement to do their bidding in seeking to subvert the summary
eviction process, and where the RPD, though making threats to arrest me Ior criminal trespass
violative oI Soldal v. Cook County, was taking too long to "help" Northwind out. WCPD
Leslie Iailed to inIorm me or notiIy me in any way as to the Iact that the WCDA Iiled, on
August 23rd, 2012, a document listing Jakob as a witness it intends to call in its prosecution
oI me in RCR2012-067980. Further, WCPD Biray Dogan Iailed to inIorm me in any way oI
the Iact that, on July 31st, 2012, DDA Young Iiled a Motion to Amend Criminal Complaint
wherein he, lacking a RPC 3.8 probable cause basis to do so, seeks to amend his charge in
RCR2012-065630 to a charge that would invoke, upon a conviction, the reporting
requirements oI SCR 111(6), rather than maintain the diIIicult task oI prosecuting one Ior
"misue oI 911" where 911 was allegedly utilized to report police misconduct, whereupon 911
operators purportedly eIused to document such a complaint or report in any way.
Additionally, Henry Sotelo, similar to Loomis, reIused to procure and provide to his client,
Coughlin (once Loomis received his second Order granting his withdrawal as court appointed
counsel Ior Coughlin, once in RMC 11 CR 26405 (now a SCR 111(4) petition, Iiled by Bar
Counsel against Coughlin on October 15th, 2012) and again in RMC 12 CR 12420 (Loomis
also reIused to send a request Ior discovery or subpoena duces tecum to the City oI Reno or
RPD Ior the various police reports Sargent Dye and OIIicer Weaver reIerence during an
impermissible, unnotice, impromptu bail hearing (wherein Jill Drake, Esq. committed
proIessional misconduct) on July 5th, 2012 (at which RMC Judge Gardner again Iailed to
recuse himselI despite the pending grievances Iiled on his behalI by Judge Nash Holmes,
NG12-0434 and NG12-0435, the latter oI which resulted Irom Judge W. Gardner's sister
passing to him, her brother, her April 2009 Order AIter trial sanction Coughlin, to RMC
Judge Nash Holmes, whom Iiled it on March 14th, 2012 with Bar Counsel, along with her
admission to to communications with the WCPD's OIIice, which the WCPD'S OIIice,
including Bosler, Dogan, and Leslie, have reIused to comment on to Coughlin in any way,
aside Irom Leslie's dubious assertion that he is completely unaware oI such.
Regardless, given the import oI NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010, the June 18th, 2012
Trial in RMC 11 CR 26405 should have never taken place, should have never been set on
May 8th, 2012 (particularly where the 2/27/12 Order Ior Competency Evaluation in
RCR2012-065630, to which Loomis admits to have been aware oI, was not ruled upon by
D10 ("Tiburon" prinout sua sponte gathered by Judge Gardner aside, where Loomis didn't
manage to get one, though he did argue that an unoIIicial online "docket" was somehow
capable oI providing judicial notice oI an Order Finding Coughlin competent on May 8th,
2012, which is clearly violative oI NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010). Additionally, it is
preposterous to Iind that Coughlin was able to make the decision to proceed without Loomis
or other court appointed, Sixth Amendment satisIying representation, on May 8th, 2012,
given the Order by D10 in CR12-0376 Iinding Coughlin competent did not get signed and
entered until May 9th, 2012. This is reminiscent oI DDA Young Iiling an Opposition to
Coughlin's Motion to Appear as Co-Counsel in RCR2011-063341 aIter the entry oI the
2/27/12 Order Ior Competency Evaluation by Judge CliIton in RCR2012-065630 (though the
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docket lists Judge Schroeder as presiding over that "clandestine" status conIerence, so deemed
in light oI Coughlin being notice in writing that it had been vacated to March 29th, 2012, in
light oI the scheduling conIlict presented by the RMC 11 TR 26800 traIIic citation trial set Ior
1:00 pm on 2/27/12 beIore Judge Nash Holmes, which she held anyways, despite the dictates
oI NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 and the communicatiosn Judge Nash Holmes admits to in the
March 14th, 2012 grievance she Iiled on behalI oI all RMC Judges (including pro tempore
ones) on March 14th, 2012, and Ior which Judge William Gardner admits to being aware oI,
as does City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens, whom makes ridiculously mincing arguments
respecting the diIIerence in being "competent" to practice law versus being "competent" to
stand trial, even where he was aware oI RCR2012-065630 and CR12-0376. Further, upon
inIormation and belieI, Hazlett-Stevens demonstrates a lack oI candor to tribunals where he
argues he was not "served" documents that he recieved via email and or Iax where the RMC
Rules allow Ior such transmissions to constitute service upon "governmental attorneys". I
reserve my right to supplement this grievance Iurther at a later date. Additionally, Mr. Sotelo
violated NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 on September 30th, 2012 where he Iiled a Motion to
Withdraw as Coughlin's Counsel oI Record in 12 CR 12420 during a period in which a
September 5th, 2012 (though it might be Iile stamped September 7th, 2012) Order Ior
Competency Evaluation oI Coughlin in RCR2011-063341 was entered (and which the RMC,
City Attorney Sooudi, and RMC deIender Sotelo recognized as requiring a stay oI a Motion
Hearing in 12 CR 12420 on September 18th, 2012...). Sotelo compounds his misconduct by
making spurious and vague allegations against his then client Coughlin in that Motion
alluding to some "repugnant" course he alleges Coughlin wishes to maintain, though,
predictably, Sotelo Iails to provide any support Ior his egregiously prejudicial statement,
damaging oI his client's interests and deIense, all while violating NRS 178.405 and NRS
5.010.
Further, given the correspondences admitted to between Puentes and Loomis with the
Washoe County Public DeIender's OIIice, and in light oI the Iact that both Loomis and
Puentes are employed by the RMC, the various Orders Ior Competency Evaluation Iiled since
the Iirst one oI September 8th, 2011 regarding Coughlin, in RCR2011-063341, vitiate the
import oI all subsequently void Orders predicated upon any part oI any proceeding not stayed
during the pendency oI such an Order Ior Competency Evaluation. That means, the
conviction in RMC 11 CR 22176 underpinning the SCR 111(6) petition in 60838 resulting in
Coughlin's current temporary suspension oI his law license, is necessarily void, particularly
where the arraignment took place at a time (October 10th, 2011) when Coughlin's competency
was put into question, particularly where RMC deIender Lew Taitel, appointed at Coughlin's
court ordered deIense counsel beginning on November 19th, 2011, was aware oI the pending
Order Ior Competency Evaluation in RJC RCR2011-063341 at the time oI the November
30th, 2011 Trial in RMC 11 CR 22176. resulting in Coughlin's conviction Ior petty larceny.
Included in such misconduct is Pamela Robert, Esq., City oI Reno prosecutor as well, in
addition to her coworker Allison Ormaas, particularly where she appeared and oIIered
argument both at the 2/27/12 Trial in 11 TR 26800 in the RMC, but as well as the February
12th, 2012 continuation oI that Trial. In that regard, all oI Judge Nash Holmes purported
Orders, including those Iinding Coughlin "by clear and convincing evidence" to be guilty oI
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"summary criminal contempt" and other violations oI the Rules oI ProIessional Conduct
incident to the traIIic citation trial in 11 TR 26800 on 2/27/12 that Judge Nash Holmes,
despite the mandates oI NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010, transmogriIied into a disciplinary
proceeding against a pro se attorney indigent criminal deIendant denied his Sixth Amendment
Right To Counsel in a proceeding wherein jail time was ultimately ordered, are also void, to
the extent they are not already void given the divesting oI her jurisdiction incident to
Coughlin Iiling, on March 7th, 2012, a Notice oI Appeal oI that summary contempt order as
rendered (especially where the March 28th,2 2012 written Order by Judge Nash Holmes was
mailed to an address Ior Coughlin that the RMC knew was no longer good).
The Summary Eviction Order incident to a "Trial" (that's what the notice says it is, and
that is what Judge SIerrazza characterized it as on both October 13th, and October 25th, 2011,
contrary to Baker's assertions, in addition to Baker's misrepresenting the Iact that Judge
SFerrazza also ruled that Coughlin met the "summary judgment" standard required oI him
already at the October 13th, 2011 "proceeding", and thereby, with the Iiling oI a Notice oI
Appeal by Coughlin on Octobe 18th, 2011, the RJC was divested oI jurisdiction to hold a
"Trial" on October 25th, 2011, to the extent it lacked jurisdiction to begin with in Iailing to
comply with JCRCP 109 respecting the number oI days to respond to a "Complaint" incident
to an unlawIul detainer "Trial" and the notice requirements incident thereto, much less the
unlawIul Iorced rent escrow depositing, or the denial oI a stay, even where the RJC held onto
the $2,275 "rent escrow" deposit" under the auspices oI holding is as Coughlin's 'bond on
appeal" (necessarily meaning the "superseadeas bond, given the appeal bond is statutorily set
as $250 and only a supersedeas can be adjudicate in such a manner to be "three times the
monthly rent"...never mind the Iact that, given Coughlin's monthly rent was under $1,000,
NRS 118A.385 dictates such a "supersedeas bond" be $250, unless the Court Iind's Coughlin
a commercial tenant, but in that case, given the non-payment oI rent was not pled, a summary
eviction is verboten under NRS 40.253 anyways, so...NRCP 60(b)(4) void Ior lack oI
jurisdiction, and thereIore, to the extent the criminal trespass conviction does not Ialter on any
oI these numerous other grounds...it shall there as well.
2. Coughlin submitted Ior Iiling with the RMC, both in person in June 27th, 2012 and
by Iax on June 28th, 2012 a Notice oI Appeal, timely under NRS 189.010, which Coughlin
also timely served on the City oI Reno via personally delivering it to their oIIice and emailing
and Iaxing to the City Attorney as well, all timely. Coughlin in person attempt to Iile on June
27th, 2012 was rejected, though he beat the "on a timer" locking oI the door to the court house
prior to 5:00 pm attested to by the WCSO. Coughlin Iax Iiled the Notice Appeal to Judge
Gardner's Iax number as held out to the public by the RMC and on the www.nvbar.org
website (and has electronic conIirmation oI a successIul transmission thereoI) on June 28th,
2012 (Coughlin was prevented Irom Iiling in person on June 28th, 2012 a Notice oI Appeal
due to a wrongIul arrest in RCR2012-067980 by the WCSO based upon a Iraudulent aIIidavit
oI service by Nevada Court Services (which is partners with RMC deIender Lew Taitel, Esq.)
licensed process server Robert Wray, and a deIective 5 day unlawIul detainer notice, violative
oI NRS 40.253 (which required such a notice to list the court to Iile a Tenant's AIIidavit) in
that it listed the wrong court to Iile a Tenant's AIIidavit in the 6/14/12 Notice by citing Sparks
Justice Court (to which Coughlin submitted such a Tenant's AIIidavit, along with several
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"heads up" calls to the RJC and a 6/26/12 email to the WCSO and RJC alerting them to the
jurisdictional deIiciencies and concomitant voidness oI any RJC lockout order stemming Irom
such a deIective notice. (see Exhibit 1), Hill also testiIied that Merliss had not been at the
121 River Rock property in the week preceding the arrest, despite OIIicer Carter's report
indicating Hill or Merliss told him otherwise. Coughlin was prevented Irom presenting his
case at the June 18th 2012 trial in light oI Iraud by the Mental Health Court (which went back
on a written contract with Coughlin), an wrongIul imprisonment by Judge Elliot incident to an
April 19th, 2012 hearing in CR12-0376 (incident to Iraud by Lake's Crossing's psychologists
Sally Farmer, Ph.D. and Bill Davis, Ph.D. in an April 18th, 2012 letter Iiled with D10 in that
matter, in addition to the Iraud committed by the MHC's Reno Biondo in lying about the
reasoning Ior Coughlin's being removed Irom the MHC in MH12-0032. Regardless,
Coughlin was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel by City Attorney Christopher
Hazlett-Stevens, and RMC contract court appointed deIenders Lew Taitel (whom violated
RMC rules in Iailing to speciIy the rationale Ior his withdrawal, in addition to Iailing to own
up to his proIessional misconduct in taking on Coughlin's representation at a time when
conIlict existed in light oI Coughlin Iiling suit against Taitle's business partners, Nevada
Court Services, in CV11-03051 on October 19th, 2011), Roberto Puentes and Keith Loomis,
with Loomis and the RMC D2 violating NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 in Iailing to abide by
statutory dictates respecting the staying oI proceeding during the pendency oI an Order Ior
Competency Evaluation (the RMC and D2, in addition to Loomis were well aware oI the
clandestine status conIerence between WCPD Biray Dogan and DDA Zach Young,
communicated to and or joined in on by RMC Judge Nash Holmes, as admitted to in her
March 14th, 2012 grievance to the State Bar oI Nevada, Iiled on behalI oI D2's Judge William
Gardner and his sister Judge Linda Gardner (whom's April 2009 Order Ior Sanctions now
Iorms the basis Ior an SCR 105 Complaint against Coughlin in NG12-0435, which was Iiled
by Judge Nash Holmes on behalI oI Judge William Gardner and his sister, Washoe District
Family Court Judge Linda Gardner along with the NG12-0434 grievance RMC Judge Nash
Holmes Iiled on behalI oI all RMC Judges against Coughlin on March 14th, 2012.
3. Further Washoe County SheriII's OIIice Iiled Ialse aIIidavit, by Deputy Machem, alleging
Coughlin was "personally served" eviction Sorder, however WCSO IA Supervisor Liz
Stuchell has admitted in writing (see her email to Coughlin in Exhibit 1) that "personally
served", to the WCSO civil division, means just taping a notice to a door when no one is
home, and Stuchell conIirmed in writing that WCSO Deputy Machem indicated to her that no
one was home at 121 River Rock when, on November 1, 2011, he perIormed a lockout on
Coughlin's law oIIice and alleges he posted the Order Ior Summary Eviction on Coughlin's
door.
Nevada Revised Statutes Section 176.515 - Procedure in Criminal Cases New trial
NRS 178.394 No person to be compelled to be witness against himselI or
herselI in criminal action, or to be unnecessarily restrained. By the RMC in Judge Nash
Holmes and possibly through Judge Gardner reIusing to provide Coughlin appropriate court
appointed counsel, and then reIusing to allow Coughlin to selI represent without making
everything he says as a deIense attorney or on his own behalI subject to being declared
testimonial, and necessarily sworn under oath, Coughlin ws deprived his rights under the FiIth
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Amendment and the above statute. Regardless, it is unreasonable to expect Coughlin to Ieel
anything other than terriIied to make arguments on his own behalI (particularly those
exposign this police misconduct) where the two previous RMC trial he was Iorced to appear
pro se in resulted in summary contempt convictions and incarcerations (which he had to
report the USPTO and SBN).
The City Iailed to put on any evidence that anybody (not the Reno Justice Court, not
the WCSO, not opposing counsel Hill or Baker, etc) actually mailed Coughlin a copy oI the
Order oI Summary Eviction prior to the illegal lockout oI November 1, 2011, thereIore
making any such lockout a legal nullity, and void, and a trespass, actually, done under color
oI state law 42 USC Sec 1983, see Lynn v Desiderio....however, NRCP is made applicable to
landlord tenant matters in Nevada, and thereIore, substituted or constructive service is
required (ie, 3 days Ior mailing where personal service is not done). ThereIore, Richard Hill
and Merliss were the trespassers, in addition to the Reno Police Department OIIicer Chris
Carter and Sargent Marcia Lopez, whom admitted to Coughlin that RPD OIIicer Chris Carter
and Richard Hill and Dr. Merliss lied when they allege that she and OIIicer Carter identiIied
themselves as law enIorcement and issued Coughlin a lawIul order or warning to leave prior
to Merliss kicking the "basement" door down on November 13th, 2011, and where Hill and
OIIicer Carter allege Coughlin was given any chance to leave in response to any such warning
or that Coughlin indicated he was reIusing to take the RPD upon on any such chance to heed
any such warning. This is clearly proven by the videos Hill and Merliss took, propounded to
City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens, indicative oI proIessional misconduct on his part in oIIering
perjured testimony at trial that he knew to be Ialse, and Iurther Iailing to propound
exculpatory dispatch and 911/RPD recordings revealing the extent to which Hill and Merliss
are shown lying in the videos propounded wherein they lie in asserting that they warned
Coughlin oI a criminal trespass charge prior to Coughlin's arrest on November 13th, 2011.
Further, where both RJC Civil Division Supervisor Karen Stancil and Casey Baker (in his
June 18th, 2012 sworn testimony at Trial) indicate that pursuant to Baker's admitted October
28th, 2011 transaction with the WCSO and Stancil's admission as to the "usual pattern and
practice" oI the RJC vis a vis the transmission and, thereIore, receipt oI the Eviction Decision
and Order oI October 25th, 2011 and the Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law and Order oI
Summary Eviction oI October 27th, 2011 in REV2011-001708 (City's Exhibits 1 through 3)
by the wCSO occurred too soon here, and thereIore these "Lockout Orders" were stale,
invalid, void, and ineIIective Ior all purposes. A claim oI right deIense is particularly
prevailing in this regard, and the admission by Hill at Trial that he communicated to Coughlin
that he was charging the same "Iair market value Ior Iull use and occupancy", some $900 per
month, to Coughlin that was regularly charged under the Standard Rental Agreement makes
clear reversible error occurred where a relevancy objection was sustained directed to such a
claim oI right deIense. Further, Hazlett-Steven's and Baker demonstrated a lack oI candor to
the tribunal where they assert the October 27th, 2011 Order indicated "shall" or some other
language suIIicient to support their contentions where it did not.
Judge William Gardner oI the Reno Municipal Court reIused to recuse himselI despite
having worked Ior the Reno City Attorney's OIIice just 2 years prior to this case, and despite
his own sister, Second Judicial District Court Family Judge Hon. Linda Gardner being
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involved in a State Bar grievance against Coughlin based upon her Order Ior Sanctions
against Coughlin three years prior in a divorce trial. Coughlin Iiled a Petition Ior Writ oI
Mandamus challenging Judge Linda Gardner's Order Ior Sanctions. Coughlin was Iired Irom
his job at Washoe Legal Services, according to WLS Executive Director Paul Elcano, strictly
because oI Judge Linda Gardner's sanctions against Coughlin.
http://caseinIo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID22746
Please see attached the May 2009 letter Irom WLS inIorming Coughlin oI his Iiring in
light oI Judge Linda Gardners April 2009 Order Ior sanctisn in the Joshi divorce case.
Hazlett misleads the court in citing to State v. Nichols 106 Nevada 651, 790 9P. 2D
550 (1990) was purely dicta and should not oI been relied upon by this court in reaching its
decision to issue a conviction here that case, McNichols, dealt with the lawIulness oI a search
by the state and involve a criminal conviction Ior possession oI a controlled substance it
simply did not involve trespass incident to a civil eviction oI a tenant by landlord any
discussion oI addiction and McNichols related to a Ioreclosure was dicta no actual trespassers
statute (in Iact, there is nothing in the opinion to distinguish between whether a civil trespass
or criminal trespass is distinguished in that dicta) was cited to and use oI the term trespass
was as a term oI art there was no distinction whether it was a civil trespass or criminal
trespass and McNichols and no real discussion by the court as to whether the service
requirements are met ,
Further grounds Ior new trial are revealed in the extent to which Judge Gardner is
bullying Coughlin throughout the trial to avoid key areas oI inquiry, to shorten, limit, and
narrow every aspect oI everything, and in going back on his pre lunch attestations about
limiting the scope oI cross, aIter "giving you an hour to think about it", Judge Gardner
commences the post lunch resumption oI th Trial with an entirely new stance on the matter,
wherein he is clearly attempting to prevent Coughlin Irom putting testimonial evidence on the
record with the threat oI yet another summary contempt incarceration or worse (and clearly,
given Judge Nash Holmes hit piece in 11 TR 26800 and the work put in by Judge Howard, the
RMC Judges are willing to put on a real show just in case their message hasn't been heard
loud enough.
This is a Iormal Complaint against all three oI the RMC public deIenders I had
represent me on that matter, Taitel, Puentes, and Loomis. Please place a copy oI this in their
employment/personnel/independent contractor Iiles and indicate whether the court appointed
counsel the RMC contracts with must pay out oI pocket (or out oI their $7k a month Irom the
RMC Ior subpoena Iees, as none oI my court appointed counsel so Iar have complied with a
single request on my part to procure and provide to me audio recordings oI hearings (please
produce to me the audio Irom the entire morning oI July 5th, 2012 (I was called up several
times) Ior 12 CR 12420, actually, please produce the audio Ior any and all court dates I have
ever had at the RMC, including the one on November 14th, 2011 where I was brought to
court while in custody, but not brought in Ior the Trial in 11 CR 22176, through no Iault oI
my own, but Ior which Judge Howard later relied upon in denying my Motion to Continue the
November 30th, 2011 Trial date in that matter, which was denied, the same day Department 2
granted the City's request to continue the criminal trespass matter in 11 CR 26405 because
Richard G. Hill, Esq., was going to be on vacation Ior six weeks (Taitel never told me about
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the Motion to Continue, then violated RMC Rules by Iailing to speciIiy, in a written motion,
the reason Ior his withdrawal...though it was likely because when Taitel took on my case and
got my social security number in my Iile on or around November 19th, 2011...I had Iiled an
IFP and proposed Complaint against Taitel's business partners, Nevada Court Services, on
October 19th, 2011 in CV11-03051....though Taitel's replacement, Puentes, admitted he has
similar conIlicts. Regardless, all oI these court appointed deIenders have continually reIused
to subpoena ANY witnesses on my behalI, including PERCIPIENT EYE WITNESSES TO
MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE. Such as whether the RPD identiIied themselves as law
enIorcement and or issued a lawIul order or warning to leave the property prior to the landlord
kicking the door down to the "basement" and the RPD arresting me, and whether, subsequent
to the door being kicked down, whether the RPD or landlord issued a warning to leave and or
sought to issue a citation in lieu oI a custodial arrest, which they did not, though OIIicer
Carter lied about it in his police report (though the video Hill Iilmed oI the incident betrays
that), and Hill and Merliss lied about it on the video, though Hill didn't lie in his November
21st, 2011 Declaration in the eviction matter, but Hill went on to lie on the stand on June
18th, 2012 at the Trial in 11CR26405. 1833 Associates v. Frying Carpets Co., Inc., 594
N.Y.S.2d 121 N.Y.City.Civ.,1992 Summary proceeding is intended as speedy means oI
recovering possession oI real property because either rent has not been paid or tenant is
holding over aIter expiration or termination oI lease term and is not an alternative to plenary
action Ior money nor is it a substitute Ior proper application Ior provisional remedy or
declaratory judgment, not available in civil court. Guidetti v. Moroze, 423 N.Y.S.2d 140
N.Y.Co.,1979 Although action seeking recovery oI possession oI leased property Ior
nonpayment oI rent and to collect said rent was properly inserted as summary action, the
owner's sale converted the summary proceeding Ior collection oI unpaid rent into a plenary
action Ior same. RPAPL 701 et seq. Velazquez v. Thompson, 451 F.2d 202 C.A.2.N.Y.,1971
Primary purpose oI summary eviction proceedings is to enable landlords to regain possession
quickly and inexpensively and thereby avoid plenary action Ior ejectment and its incident
delays which prompted landlords to short circuit judicial process by resort to selI-help
continuance and my Iiles?
12/09/11
To: puenteslawaol.com
Zach Coughlin
From:
Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent:
Fri 12/09/11 1:11 AM
To:
puenteslawaol.com
Dear Mr. Puentes,
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I would like Ior you to subpoena both OIIicers present at the arrest oI November 13, 2011 to
testiIy at the trial. I would like Ior you to subpoena (by subpoena duces tecum, I suppose) all
recordings, dispatch reports, written documentation, reports in any way connected to, or other
materials, whether admissible or not, in any way connected to the arrest oI November 13,
2011 or the charges against which I am deIending in conjunction with your representation. I
wish Ior you to email me these materials to the extent possible, and where that is not possible,
please mail them to me at my address oI record at www.nvbar.org, and Iound below at the end
oI this letter. Email is better Ior me than Iax, as it is Iree whereas I have to pay Ior Iaxes by
the page, whether local or not. I preIer email too over having to take time out oI what is an
extremely busy and trying schedule oI mine currently.
RPD OIIicer Carter made a statement at the scene oI the arrest that Mr. Richard Hill paid him
a lot oI money and thereIore he does what Mr. Hill says to do and arrest who Mr. Hill says to
arrest. This has been reported to several RPD OIIicers, including Sargent Tarter, who
responded by retaliating against me with several traIIic citations and made incorrect assertions
about whether one would be turning into oncoming one way traIIic to get to Mr. Hills 652
Forest St. address Irom the intersection oI Forest and St. Laurence in justiIying his retalitatory
citation (Ior which he apparently called in another oIIicer to write out, curiously). I DO NOT
WANT YOU TO DISCUSS MY CASE WITH ANYONE OUTSIDE OF MY PRESENCE,
INCLUDING VERBAL AND OR WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS. THIS INCLUDES
ANY COMMUNICATIONS, VERBAL OR WRITTEN WITH THE RENO MUNICIPAL
COURT AND ANYONE IN ANY WAY CONNECTED WITH THE RENO POLICE
DEPARTMENT OR RENO CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, AS WELL AS LEW TAITEL.
Please email or Iax me a complete copy oI my Iile, including all pleadings, correspondences,
and any other documentation or media at all connected with my case. Please Iurther disclose
any conIlicts oI interest you might have in representing me. I did not agree to a continuance,
and I believe it is my right as a client to control the means and objectives oI the litigation and
or deIense, and that, to me, does not include waiving my right to contest any motion Ior a
continuance or making things nice and easy Ior Richard G. Hill, Esq. Further, I would like to
know who agreed to thecontinuance and why it is Mr. Taitel is no longer attorney oI record
(nothing against you, please believe that).
Further, iIMr. Taitel isno longer attorney oI record in this matter, please explain why, in
detail, in writing. IIhe haswithdrawn, and iI you did so based on some conIlict oI interest, how
is it that that conIlict oI interest did not preclude him Irom apparently agreeing to a
continuance or Iailing to Iile an opposition or alerting me to the situation at all? Please note
my new address and contact inIormation below. Additionally, please indicate, in writing, the
extent to which you have an established procedure to check Ior conIlicts prior to taking on
cases and prior to obtaining conIidential client Iiles and inIormation. Please indicate in
writing any deviation Irom such a procedure or Iailing oI your oIIice's practices to prevent
such prejudice to my case in your taking on my representation. Please copy me on any and all
correspondences and or documentation or discovery in any way related to this matter.
Sincerely,
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/S/ ZACH COUGHLIN, SIGNED ELECTRONICALLY
Zach Coughlin
817 N. Virginia St. #2
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
continuance and my Iiles?
12/09/11
Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
Fri 12/09/11 3:53 AM
To:
puenteslawaol.com
1 attachment
12 8 11 Iax to Puentes.pdI (63.6 KB)
Mr. Puentes, please Iind attached my signed written request Ior you to Iile certain motions. I
want to review the Iinal draIts prior to your Iiling them and have tried hard to do most oI the
work Ior you. Further, you might Iind the Iollowing documentary that someone posted on
youtube.com helpIul in understanding this case:
http://www.youtube.com/user/25teddyjames?Ieaturewatch
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
Tel: please only communicate in writing
Fax: 949 667 7402
Dear Mr. Puentes,
I would also like Ior you to subpoena Dr. Matt Merliss, the owner oI the property who was
present at the scene oI arrest. Further, I would like Ior you to depose both RPD OIIicers
(Carter and the Iemale OIIicer). I would like a copy oI the probable cause sheet and all
witness statements and OIIicer's Supplemental Declarations as soon as possible, please, in
addition to all the other materials I set Iorth in my previous written correspondence to you.
I would like a Motion in Limine to be Iiled to exclude anything discovered upon the RPD
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illegal search oI the property, including any videos by Richard Hill or anyone else that the
Reno City Attorney seeks to have admitted. I want a Motion to Dismiss Iiled seeking to
dismiss this case based upon a number oI arguments, including the Iact that any underlying
Summary Eviction Order was void Ior lack oI jurisdiction (please see my recent Iiling,
attached, in Reno Justice Court case rev2011-001708, in that this was noticed as a No Cause
Eviction against a commercial lessee. As such, any Summary Eviction Order is void Ior lack
oI jurisdiction given the express prohibition in both NRS 40.253 and the Nevada Supreme
Court's explanation in the toLandlord Tenant Handbookt? Iound on the Supreme Court's
website and elsewhere where it is made explicitly clear that landlord's may not use Summary
Eviction Proceedings to evict commercial lessees or tenants where non payment oI rent is not
alleged or where the Notice oI Eviction or UnlawIul detainer is a No Cause notice, as was the
case in Rev2011-001708. As such, no trespassing could have occurred.
Beyond that, I am requesting you Iile a Motion to Dismiss based upon the Iact that any
lockout occurring on November 1, 2011 necessarily occurred too early and prior to any lawIul
notice or service oI any Summary Eviction Order only signed on October 27th, 2011,
especially where no personal service oI such an ordered was alleged or shown. I detailed this
in the email pasted below.
Further, a Motion to Dismiss I request you Iile due to Casey Baker's November 11, 2011 letter
to me wherein he sends me a bill Ior the Iull rental value oI the property where the
commercial lease was located Ior the entire month oI November 2011, a period aIter the
alleged illegal lockout. As such, no trespass could have occurred because such a bill Ior rent is
tantamount to rescinding any void eviction order or otherwise indicative oI an invitation,
entrapment, or assent to the addressee oI such a letter or bill being able to go onto the
property, allegedly. In his letter mailed to Coughlin oI November 10, 2011, Casey Baker, Esq
wrote toIn addition to the sums identiIied by Dr. Merliss in his aIIidavit, your debt now also
includes Iees Ior storage oI your personal possessions leIt at the property, which accrue daily
at the Iair rental value oI the property. Your debt Iurther includes actual costs Ior inventorying
and moving your possessions Irom the property. See NRS 118A.460. Those sums will be
provided to you once they have been Iixed. Enclosed you will also Iind a notice oI entry oI
the court's order awarding costs and attorney's Iees against you. The court's award oI cost in
the amount oI $421.75, and attorney's Iees in the amount oI $1,500.00, has now been reduced
to judgment. You are responsible Ior those sums. Further, as you know, in his Memorandum
oI Costs and Disbursements Iiled on October 27,2011, Dr. Merliss actually sought $607.24 in
costs and $17,938.75 in attorney's Iees against you. We believe you are responsible Ior those
amounts, plus any and all Iees and costs that have accrued, and continue to accrue, since
Letter to Zachary Coughlin Re: VeriIication oI Debt November 10, 2011 Page 20I2 that date,
in the matters currently pending beIore the courts as an item oI damages. Dr. Merliss win seek
recovery oI those sums, and an Iuture Iees and costs incurred, through the appropriate
channels...t?
As such, Baker and Hill sent Coughlin a bill Ior the Iull rent oI the property. $900 a month
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was the rent Ior the property under the commercial lease. Baker and Hill wrote telling
Coughlin they were continuing to charge him that even aIter the alleged illegal lockout oI
November 1, 2011. Further, Baker and Hill Ilagrantly wrote to Coughlin in the same letter
that the impermissible $1,500 in attorney's Iees ordered by Judge SIerrazza was not enough
Ior them, and that they Iully intended to continue to pursue recovery oI the nearly $20,000 in
attorney's Iees they sought in their Memorandum oI Fees and Costs oI October 27th, 2011,
despite the res judicata eIIect oI Judge SIerrazza's November 9, 2011 Order granting them
$1,500 in attorney's Iees, and despite the Iact that NRS 69.030 only allows Ior prevailing
party attorney's Iees in tocivil actionst?, while JCRCP 3 speciIically provides that there
are three types oI matters in Nevada's Justice Court, and expressly separates tolandlord
tenant matterst? Irom tocivil actionst?, and, as such, the prevailing party attorney's
provisions oI NRS 69.030 do not apply and there exists no other basis Ior an attorney's Iees
award under any oI the arguments Baker or Hill put Iorth. There conduct is tantamount to
extortion while leveraging their law licenses and degrees.
Further, I would like Ior you to seek a continuance oI the trial in this matter as this case is
going to require extensive discovery, settlement negotiations, and other complex legal work
and there is not enough time Ior that as the schedule is currently set. I am attaching a
collection oI written materials the landlord/property owner at 121 River Rock St 89501
(where the trespass arrest occurred sent me), including some letters that inIorm me they were
charging me the Iull rent oI the property Ior the entire month oI November 2011 (the illegal
lockout allegedly occurred on November 1, 2011, though there has been no prooI oI service
or "receipt" pursuant to NRS 40, and given that the lockout was apparently signed by Judge
SIerrazza on October 27th, 2011, that day does not count Ior service oI the Order, the Reno
Justice Court is closed on Fridays, non judicial weekend days don't count Ior the 3 days Ior
service under NRCP 4-6, etc. As such, the earliest service by mail could have been aIIected
Ior the Order Ior Summary Eviction would have been November 2, 2011. It is alleged the
lockout occurred prior to that time, and Iurther, no emails were received Irom Richard Hill's
email address, rhillrichardhillaw.com at any point between August 17th, 2011 and
November 18th, 2011, period. Whether any emails Irom Hillts rhillrichardhillaw.com
address were "bounced back" to him or whether that address was added to my "blocked
sender" list is a matter Ior Mr. Hill to sludge his way through, but I can attest under penalty oI
perjury that I did not receive any emails Irom that rhillrichardhillaw.com email address
between that time period. I can Iurther attest that I made calls and written correspondences to
both Hill's rhillrichardhillaw.com email and his associate Casey Baker, Esq.'s email,
electroencephalographic addresses that went unresponded to with regard to my numerous
requests to be allowed access to remove my property, commercial and otherwise.
These included, but were not limited to, the Iollowing:
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From: zachcoughlinhotmail.com
Sent: Wed 11/09/11 12:43 PM
To: Casey Baker (cdbakerrichardhillaw.com)
Don't ignore my calls about my possessions. You potentially conducted an illegal lockout oI a
law oIIice an inspection outside my presence. The lease requires my presence. It also makes
your guy responsible Ior the electric bill, read it careIully. Show your prooI oI any "receipt"
oI any lockout order 24 hours prior to your actions. My possessions better be saIe and
aIIorded all legal protections and I want updates one whatI is being done with them and an
opportunity to clean or otherwise put the premises in the condition I intended to leave it in
prior to the illegal lockout. I want my possessions that are in the house and all privacy rights
respected. There is a motion Ior stay in district court right now.
Re: VeriIication oI Your Debt? 11/10/11
To Casey Baker
(Sent: Thu 11/10/11 12:24 PM
To: Casey Baker (cdbakerrichardhillaw.com)
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You guys are way over the days Ior providing veriIication under the FDCPA. Can you say
treble damages? I habe not received a single email such as those you reIer to Irom richard hill.
I dont consent to service oI anything via email Irom your shop. I know you want everything to
be at warp speed, but you have to serve me through the mail or some non electronic means.
Make sure rich isnt getting "unnsuccessIul email transmission" messages....i can certainly
prove i have not received any such emails Irom Dick. I want my stuII its important client
materials etc. You guys have not returned my messages about that, its wrong to try to charge
me rent when you are ducking me.
From: zachcoughlinhotmail.com Sent: Fri 11/11/11 12:49 AM To: Casey Baker
(cdbakerrichardhillaw.com); rhillrichardhillaw.com (rhillrichardhillaw.com) Hi Guys, I
have been having some technical diIIiculties, some emails appear blank or black, kind oI like
your client described in response to some oI my emails. Hey, ever heard oI a litigation hold
notice? That is what this is ,please retain and Iailure messages you recieve in your own email
which might prove that an email you sent me just didn't quite make it. You know just
producing a copy oI some email you sent me (even though i have repeatedly told you i dont
consent to service electronically in any Iorm and am not a registered eIiler like you two legal
eagles) is not going to be good enough when i break out the old litigation hold notice and
anything elese that might tend to show any emails you sent could
not have made it to me....why such a rush, Boys? You are doing your patented and typical
bang up milking job on thos headstrong rich client oI yours...smell the Ilowers a little. For
instance, you don't want to do an illegal lockout and illegal inspection, particularly where the
lease calls Ior my presence at any inspection and then iI you did not make sure the "receipt"
requirement was met Ior any lockout order then went ahead and violated someone's
constitutional rights to boot. Plus you are way late on the FDCPA stuII, and the prevailing
party atty Iee statute is Ior cicil actons, which jcrcp 3 separates justice court matters into 3
types, and the civil actions mentioned in seller's prevailing party Iee statute is mentioned as
diIIerent Irom landord tenant cases and small claims cases..So where is your good Iaith basis
Ior moving Ior atty Iees, much less Ior $20k worth oI them. Why did you cite the controlled
substances manuIacture statute to support your atty Iee motion? I pulled every eviction y'all
ever done... RJC has been like swinging the bat in the on deck circle with 5 donuts on the bat
Ior me, gentlemen. For you, its been the polar opposite. But we gettin' called up to the show!
You never know when you are on tape or Iilm guys. And my bat speed is lookin' tremendous.
I have tried again and again to get some response Irom you guys about accesing my important
Iiles and keeping my very valuable possesions saIe but have yet to here back Ieom you, in the
event you have done a lockout. Mr. Baker said he did some Iilmmaking or something when he
broke in to any attorneys oIIice, it was hard to hear through all the cooing. Anyways, I aren't
that smart, but dontcha have to like store my possessions aIter movin' them somewhere saIe,
the make a reasonably diligent attempt to rent the place out to mitigate and damages or lost
rent, plus provide me my deposit within like 10 days or something? I know mighty Casey
likes to give me lil research projects, but I am busy Ileshing out some motion work right now,
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so maybe you get on that and let me know when and where I can get my things and valuable
client Iiles, hopeIully you two points oI light haven't done nuthhin' to 'em. Now, I dont want
to come between you and Casey...I know he is probably getting a little tired oI you keeping
most oI the proIit while he gets dirty doing the gutters, but you guys have a nice lil batman
robin thing going and it would be a shame to see it end, so let's just try and make this work."
From the alleged date oI the illegal lockout oI November 1, 2011 until Casey Baker's
November 10, 2011 written bill to me Ior Iull rent Ior the month oI November 2011 (ie, aIter
the alleged illegal lockout and thereIore extinguishing the eviction and creating a new lease or
rescinding the eviction order and, perhaps making extortionate threats to apply an unlawIul
rent distraint in contravention oI NRS 40.460, and NRS 40. 520, etc.) I received two written
correspondences oI any sort Irom anyone connected with the landlord Matt Merliss (a
neurosurgeon graduate oI Beverly Hills HS) and the law oIIice oI Richard G. Hill, Esq.
(including Hill and Baker, etc.). These two written correspondences Irom Casey Baker are
attached and pasted below:
subject: VeriIication oI Your Debtt?
11/10/11
Casey Baker
To zachcoughlinhotmail.com
From: Casey Baker (cdbakerrichardhillaw.com)
Sent: Thu 11/10/11 11:13 AM
1 attachment
LT Coughlin (veriI oI debt)(11-10-11).pdI (146.0 KB)
Mr. Coughlin:
Attached please Iind my letter to you dated November 10, 2011.
Sincerely,
Casey D. Baker, Esq.
Richard G. Hill, Chartered
652 Forest Street
Reno, Nevada 89509
Phone: (775) 348-0888
Fax: (775) 348-0858
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Email: cdbakerrichardhillaw.com
CONFIDENTIAL: ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT; ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
This e-mail may contain legally privileged or conIidential inIormation. II you are not the
intended recipient, please do not read, copy, use, or disclose this communication to anyone
other than the intended recipient. II you have received this message in error, please notiIy the
sender and delete the email message Irom your system. Thank you.
Circular 230 Notice.
To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inIorm you that any U.S.
Iederal tax advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) is not
intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, Ior the purpose oI (i) avoiding penalties
under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another
party any transaction or matter addressed herein.
RE: request Ior 30 days additional to stay in possession disabilityt?
11/04/11
Casey Baker
To zachcoughlinhotmail.com
From: Casey Baker (cdbakerrichardhillaw.com)
Sent: Fri 11/04/11 12:36 PM
Mr. Coughlin:
We have never been served with any paper entitled toMotion to Continue in Possession.t?
II you have prooI to the contrary, please provide it.
With respect to your request Ior toanother 30 dayst?, please identiIy the legal and Iactual
basis Ior your request, including any speciIic statute you are purporting to invoke.
Casey Baker
Below Ior your convenience is a copy oI the email I recently sent you as my, Zach Coughlin's,
counsel oI record, Mr. Puentes:
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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Subject: continuance and my Iiles
Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2011 01:11:35 -0800
Dear Mr. Puentes,
I would like Ior you to subpoena both OIIicers present at the arrest oI November 13, 2011 to
testiIy at the trial. I would like Ior you to subpoena (by subpoena duces tecum, I suppose) all
recordings, dispatch reports, written documentation, reports in any way connected to, or other
materials, whether admissible or not, in any way connected to the arrest oI November 13,
2011 or the charges against which I am deIending in conjunction with your representation. I
wish Ior you to email me these materials to the extent possible, and where that is not possible,
please mail them to me at my address oI record at www.nvbar.org, and Iound below at the end
oI this letter. Email is better Ior me than Iax, as it is Iree whereas I have to pay Ior Iaxes by
the page, whether local or not. I preIer email too over having to take time out oI what is an
extremely busy and trying schedule oI mine currently.
RPD OIIicer Carter made a statement at the scene oI the arrest that Mr. Richard Hill paid him
a lot oI money and thereIore he does what Mr. Hill says to do and arrest who Mr. Hill says to
arrest. This has been reported to several RPD OIIicers, including Sargent Tarter, who
responded by retaliating against me with several traIIic citations and made incorrect assertions
about whether one would be turning into oncoming one way traIIic to get to Mr. Hills 652
Forest St. address Irom the intersection oI Forest and St. Laurence in justiIying his retalitatory
citation (Ior which he apparently called in another oIIicer to write out, curiously). I DO NOT
WANT YOU TO DISCUSS MY CASE WITH ANYONE OUTSIDE OF MY PRESENCE,
INCLUDING VERBAL AND OR WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS. THIS INCLUDES
ANY COMMUNICATIONS, VERBAL OR WRITTEN WITH THE RENO MUNICIPAL
COURT AND ANYONE IN ANY WAY CONNECTED WITH THE RENO POLICE
DEPARTMENT OR RENO CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, AS WELL AS LEW TAITEL.
Please email or Iax me a complete copy oI my Iile, including all pleadings, correspondences,
and any other documentation or media at all connected with my case. Please Iurther disclose
any conIlicts oI interest you might have in representing me. I did not agree to a continuance,
and I believe it is my right as a client to control the means and objectives oI the litigation and
or deIense, and that, to me, does not include waiving my right to contest any motion Ior a
continuance or making things nice and easy Ior Richard G. Hill, Esq. Further, I would like to
know who agreed to the continuance and why it is Mr. Taitel is no longer attorney oI record
(nothing against you, please believe that).
Further, iI Mr. Taitel is no longer attorney oI record in this matter, please explain why, in
detail, in writing. II he has withdrawn, and iI you did so based on some conIlict oI interest,
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how is it that that conIlict oI interest did not preclude him Irom apparently agreeing to a
continuance or Iailing to Iile an opposition or alerting me to the situation at all? Please note
my new address and contact inIormation below. Additionally, please indicate, in writing, the
extent to which you have an established procedure to check Ior conIlicts prior to taking on
cases and prior to obtaining conIidential client Iiles and inIormation. Please indicate in
writing any deviation Irom such a procedure or Iailing oI your oIIice's practices to prevent
such prejudice to my case in your taking on my representation. Please copy me on any and all
correspondences and or documentation or discovery in any way related to this matter.
Sincerely,
/S/ ZACH COUGHLIN, SIGNED ELECTRONICALLY
Zach Coughlin
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Iaxed signed letter attached?
12/14/11
Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
Wed 12/14/11 12:35 AM
To:
puenteslawaol.com
2 attachments
12 14 11 Iaxed letter to Puentes 11 CR 26405 2I.pdI (55.0 KB) , Coughlin IFP and Financial
Inquiry Application RMC 11222011 11 CR 26405 2I.pdI (381.9 KB)
Mr. Puentes,
Please Iind my Iaxed signed letter attached. Also, iI I am supposed to Iile an updated
Financial Status Application, please Iind that attached.
December 13th, 2011
Dear Mr. Puentes,
Hello, I received a package Irom you in the mail today. It did not contain a letter Irom you or
any
indication oI whether you will subpoena Dr. Merliss to attend the January Trial date, which is
Iast
approaching, whether you will depose him or Richard Hill, etc. Please respond in writing
regard the
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various written requests and questions I posed to you in my recent written correspondences,
including,
but not limited to, whether you will comply with my requests to Iile a Motion in Limine,
Motion to
Dismiss, Depose Dr. Merliss and Richard Hill, Iile a Motion to Set Aside the Continuance, Ior
which I
was never appropriately provided a chance to contest, or served the Original Motion Ior
Continuance.
I want to be copied, in writing, on every single thing related in any way to this case. RMC
Rules
require the attorney, such as you and Lew Taitel to Iile a Notice oI Appearance and to Iile a
Motion to
Withdraw. Please provide a copy oI the docket in this case. I do not see where Mr. Taitel ever
Iiled a
Motion to Withdraw or where an Order Granting such a withdrawal was granted. It is my
understanding, though, that an Order Granting a Motion to Dismiss was likely entered. I want
Ior you
to Iile a Motion To Set Aside that Order iI it was based on Richard Hill citing some lame
reason, like he
was going to be Porsche shopping in Florida or otherwise on vacation Ior some extended
stretch or that
Richard Hill was the only person able to testiIy about whatever it is Richard Hill may want to
testiIy
about. Dr. Merliss can take time out oI raking in millions oI dollars being a Beverly Hills HS
graduate
neurosurgeon. I want him subpoenaed and deposed Ior the upcoming trial. I want a subpoena
duces
tecum served on Richard Hill Ior any evidence related to this case, including any videos.
Further, I
want you to make an inquiry and take appropriate action to discern whether I was
appropriately served
any Notice Setting Hearing documents in this case, ascertaining exactly who (including which
Marshal)
may have served me anything, the manner and place in which is was served, whose signature
is there,
etc., whether the signature bears a date that is PRIOR in time to the toPrint Datet? on the
Notice Setting
Hearing, etc.
Further, I want you to subpoena or obtain a copy oI (and provide one to me) oI the video oI
the
November 14th, 2011 toarraignmentt?, the entire video, start to Iinish (not just my
appearance), I will pay
any charge iI I have to, but I believe an IFP was granted that would cover such a charge in
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this matter.
I do not believe it would be accurate Ior the Reno Municipal Court to state or write, with
respect to my
and the November 14, 2011 arraignment, that toDEFENDANT APPEARED, WAS
EXPLAINED
HIS/HER RIGHTS BY THE JUDGE AND INDICATED THAT HE/SHE UNDERSTOOD
THEM
COMPLETELY...t? II the RMC has made that assertion in writing I want you to Iile
something in
writing contesting that assertion. I do not believe I have been told that there is any possibility
that I will
be required to pay you or the RMC any Iees in connection with your representation. II that is
not the
case, please explain in writing.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
Iax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlinhotmail.com
Nevada Bar No: 9473
client controls means and objectives oI litigation under Rules oI ProIessional Conduct?
12/14/11
Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
Wed 12/14/11 12:52 AM
To:
puenteslawaol.com
Dear Mr. Puentes,
Please let me know when we can discuss my case, the trial is very soon. I received a mailing
Irom you, but it did not have a signed letter Irom you stating what was in the package. Please
email me or Iax me any document production in the Iuture and redact my personally
identiIiable inIormation Irom all documentions coming in or out oI your oIIice.
In the mailing I received Irom you was:
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1. WCSO Mugshot ProIile booking no: 1119876, one page
2. Criminal Complaint 11-22185, one page, signed by Richard Hill, not Iilestamped
3. ARrest Report and Declaration oI Probable Cause rpd 1101921 C r650225 , Declarant RPD
OIIicer Carter, no Magistrate signature (please Iind out why), one page
4. RPD, 3 pages 11-22185 Adminstrative InIormation, etc. (please subpoena and depose both
RPD OIIicer's Lopez and Carter, asking them whether they verbally identiIied themselves
prior to, according to Hill, kicking the door down, and Iurther questions them concerning the
accuracy oI Hill's written statement and whether OIIicer Carter said to the accused that
Richard Hill pays him, OIIicer Carter, a lot oI money and thereIore Carter arrests who Hills
says to arrest and does what Hill says to do. Further, please depose both oIIicers, asking
whether the accused requested they take any action or ask Hill any questions and whether the
OIIicers did so. Please subpoena the RPD Ior any recordings, calls, documentation relating to
this matter, or RPD Sargent Tarter's alleged retaliation against me and the traIIic citations he
called in another RPD oIIicer to write against me on or around November 15th, 2011. Please
Iile a counterclaim alleged 42 USC 1983 violations againt the City oI Reno and the RPD, in
addition to other appropriate counterclaims. Please depose Hill to veriIy his written account
that he actually walked into the Basement, that Merliss himselI kicked the door down,
whether the RPD OIIicers verbally identiIied themselves prior to the door being kicked down,
whether the accused hesitated at all upon the RPD identiIying themselves, etc....
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
Iax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
CORRECTION FW: client controls means and objectives oI litigation under Rules oI
ProIessional Conduct?
12/14/11
Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
Wed 12/14/11 1:19 AM
To:
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puenteslawaol.com
Dear Mr. Puentes,
Please amend the list below to include the Iollowing:
5. RPD Statement by Richard Hill 11-22185
Further, please note I mistakenly noted in paragraph 4 below, that Hill was attributed as
making a written stament about entering the basement. Please, instead, ask the same questions
oI OIIicer Carter, as to whether he "entered the doorway oI the basement and Iound..." and
what exactly he means by "He was hesitant to come out and eventually did so". IE, what
exactly does "eventually" mean? Like, one second, ten minutes? What? Whether OIIicer
Carter ever actually stepped Ioot in the basement, or whether by writing that he "entered the
doorway" OIIicer Carter is actually stating that he peeked his head in or otherwise peered in.
Please inquire as to whether the RPD reIused to kick the door down or whether someone else
did, etc. PLEASE ASK OFFICER CARTER WHETHER HIS WRITTEN STATMENT IS
ENTIRELY ACCURATE WHERE IT ATTRIBUTES A QUOTE TO THE ACCUSED
THAT CARTER IS OR WAS "ON RICHARD HILL'S PAYROLL..." and Iurther what
exactly was allegedly said about "working a deal". Please ask Carter and Lopez whether the
accused asked why they didn't just issue a citation and whether one would be arrested Ior
getting their mail aIter an eviction and why exactly an incarceration was necessary compared
to a citation. Please Iurther inquire as to whether these OIIicers reIused to make any arrests or
investigation requested by the accused and whether Carter indicated that he would never
arrest anyone based on anything said by the person he is arresting at the time such
accusations, or counter accusations, are made. Please Iurther send Merliss and Hill subpoena
duces tecum/interrogatories/request Ior production/ and request Ior admission seeking
speciIic, written indication and evidence supporting all contentions in any oI the materials
upon which this arrest or this case is based, including, but not limited to Hill's written
statement that "We have observed evidence that he was coming and going."
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Subject: client controls means and objectives oI litigation under Rules oI ProIessional
Conduct
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 00:52:25 -0800
Dear Mr. Puentes,
Please let me know when we can discuss my case, the trial is very soon. I received a mailing
Irom you, but it did not have a signed letter Irom you stating what was in the package. Please
email me or Iax me any document production in the Iuture and redact my personally
identiIiable inIormation Irom all documentions coming in or out oI your oIIice.
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In the mailing I received Irom you was:
1. WCSO Mugshot ProIile booking no: 1119876, one page
2. Criminal Complaint 11-22185, one page, signed by Richard Hill, not Iilestamped
3. ARrest Report and Declaration oI Probable Cause rpd 1101921 C r650225 , Declarant RPD
OIIicer Carter, no Magistrate signature (please Iind out why), one page
4. RPD, 3 pages 11-22185 Adminstrative InIormation, etc. (please subpoena and depose both
RPD OIIicer's Lopez and Carter, asking them whether they verbally identiIied themselves
prior to, according to Hill, kicking the door down, and Iurther questions them concerning the
accuracy oI Hill's written statement and whether OIIicer Carter said to the accused that
Richard Hill pays him, OIIicer Carter, a lot oI money and thereIore Carter arrests who Hills
says to arrest and does what Hill says to do. Further, please depose both oIIicers, asking
whether the accused requested they take any action or ask Hill any questions and whether the
OIIicers did so. Please subpoena the RPD Ior any recordings, calls, documentation relating to
this matter, or RPD Sargent Tarter's alleged retaliation against me and the traIIic citations he
called in another RPD oIIicer to write against me on or around November 15th, 2011. Please
Iile a counterclaim alleged 42 USC 1983 violations againt the City oI Reno and the RPD, in
addition to other appropriate counterclaims. Please depose Hill to veriIy his written account
that he actually walked into the Basement, that Merliss himselI kicked the door down,
whether the RPD OIIicers verbally identiIied themselves prior to the door being kicked down,
whether the accused hesitated at all upon the RPD identiIying themselves, etc....
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
Iax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
THIS COULD WIN THE CASE IN 11 CR 26405 2I?
12/14/11
Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
Wed 12/14/11 5:02 AM
To:
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puenteslawaol.com
5 attachments
11 1 2011 AIIidavit oI Service, Notice oI Entry oI Order, and Order Ior Summary Eviction
Rev2011-001708.pdI (7.8 MB) , AIIidavit oI Service SheriII's Machen 4 30 pm 11 1 2011.pdI
(555.1 KB) , 12 14 11 Iax to Puentes ISSUES THAT CAN WIN THE CASE.pdI (144.2 KB) ,
11 21 11 Declaration oI Richard Hill attach to his M Ior OSC (11-21-11) Compare to Police
Reports and deposition oI RPD's Carter and Lopez and Merliss.pdI (791.4 KB) , 11 21 2011
REV2011-00178 RICHARD HILL'S M Ior OSC (11-21-11).pdI (711.7 KB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
Tel: please only communicate in writing
Fax: 949 667 7402
Licensed in Nevada, NV Bar No: 9473
December 14th, 2011
Dear Mr. Puentes,
Mr. Puentes,
Please Iind attached the AIIidavit oI Service, Iiled November 7th, 2011 in the eviction case in
RJC (REV2011-0017808) Irom which the trespass case you are Attorney oI Record Ior (RMC
11 CR 26405 2I) stems. TURNS OUT, THE AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE FILED BY THE
WASHOE COUNTY SHERIFF'S AUTHORIZED AGENT, JOHN MACHEN ADMITS, IN
WRITING, THAT THE EVICTION ORDER AND LOCKOUT WERE SERVED AND
CONDUCTED PRIOR TO THE TIME AND DATE CALLED FOR BY THE EVICTION
ORDER (WHICH WAS NOT EVEN PUT INTO THE MAIL WITH A PROOF OF
SERVICE UNTIL NOVEMBER 1, 2011...AND NRCP 4-6 APPLY TO STATUTORY
UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTIONS, THEREFORE, THE RJC IS CLOSED FRIDAYS
AND OTHER NON JUDICIAL DAYS DO NOT COUNT, NOR DOES THE DAY THE
ORDER IS SIGNED COUNT). PLEASE ALSO FIND ATTACHED RICHARD HILL,
ESQ'S DECLARATION ATTACHED TO A MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE HE FILED IN
REV2011-001708, WHICH I BELIEVE MAY PROVIDE FERTILE GROUND FOR
IMPEACHING THE WRITTEN STATEMENTS AND FUTURE TESTIMONY OF RPD
OFFICER'S CARTER, LOPEZ, LANDLORD MERLISS, HILL HIMSELF, ETC. PLEASE
DO NOT DISCUSS THIS VERBALLY OR IN WRITING WITH ANYONE OTHER THAN
MYSELF ABSENT MY EXPRESS WRITTEN CONSENT PRIOR TO DOING SO.
I preIer to discuss this with you prior to your taking any action in relation to this illegal
lockout or insuIIicient service oI process or early lockout or however it is described. The
SheriII's server, Machen, might try to argue that he served the Eviction Order at 4:30 pm, then
waited around until aIter 5 pm (as required by the Eviction Order) to perIorm the actual
lockout. I think it would be best to get Machen admitting, by tricking him into admitting, iI
necessary, that he perIormed the lockout within minutes oI serving the Eviction Order.
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Further, the law in our State does not seem exceptionally clear with regard to the service and
process requirements and timelines, and manner oI calculating time with respect to the
"receipt" oI Lockout Orders. The AIIidavit oI Service by Machen states that he "personally
served the described documents upon" my, Zach Coughlin...However, I can attest by
AIIidavit that I was not "personally served" to the extent that "personally served" means or
implies that I was there, that Machen saw me or identiIied me, or any oI the other indicators
oI something, such as a Complaint, being "personally served" such as I understand the phrase
to me. NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii). Further, as Baker and Hill have so oIten pointed out, I cannot,
according to them, receive any attorney's Iee award Ior appearing as pro se attorney, as such,
NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii), should apply to me only as a party, and not as a party's attorney, and,
thereIore, according to NRCP 5, Service: "(2) Service under this rule is made by: (A)
Delivering a copy to the attorney or the party by: (i) handing it to the attorney or to the party;
(ii) leaving it at the attorneyts or partyts oIIice with a clerk or other person in charge,
or iI there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place in the oIIice; or (iii) iI the
oIIice is closed or the person to be served has no oIIice, leaving it at the personts dwelling
house or usual place oI abode with some person oI suitable age and discretion residing
there..." So, either it was my oIIice, in which case a No Cause Eviction Notice makes
impermissible a Summary Eviction Proceeding under NRS 40.253, and thereIore, the Order
oI Summary Eviction is void Ior lack oI jurisdiction, or, the AIIidavit oI Service was on my
home, and was not "handed" to me, or "personally served" (despite the AIIidavit attesting to
having "personally served" me), nor was the Order oI Summary Eviction served in
accordance with NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(iii), which requires: "iI the oIIice is closed or the person to
be served has no oIIice, leaving it at the personts dwelling house or usual place oI abode
with some person oI suitable age and discretion residing there.."
Further, I believe posting an Order on one's residence door, particularly in the context oI
serving a No Cause Notice oI Eviction or UnlawIul Detainer, is only valid iI the document
being served is also placed in the mail and 3 non judicial days are accorded Ior service to be
complete. See NRCP 6(e). I do not believe they can prove that at all, not even close. NRCP
applies to Summary Eviction Actions, according to the Iollowing:
"NRS 40.380 Provisions governing appeals. Either party may, within 10 days, appeal Irom the
judgment rendered. But an appeal by the deIendant shall not stay the execution oI the
judgment, unless, within the 10 days, the deIendant shall execute and Iile with the court or
justice the deIendantts undertaking to the plaintiII, with two or more sureties, in an
amount to be Iixed by the court or justice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount oI
the judgment and costs, to the eIIect that, iI the judgment appealed Irom be aIIirmed or the
appeal be dismissed, the appellant will pay the judgment and the cost oI appeal, the value oI
the use and occupation oI the property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiII during the
pendency oI the appeal. Upon taking the appeal and Iiling the undertaking, all Iurther
proceedings in the case shall be stayed.t?
Actually, a lot oI people seemed conIused regarding the to24 hourst? lockout thing. The
Eviction Proceedings oI anything related to to24 hourst? is in NRS 40.253(5), which only
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Eviction Notice: to5. Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(a) The landlord or the landlordts agent may apply by aIIidavit oI complaint Ior eviction
or contain...t?
So, absent some statutory provision allowing the Order oI Summary Eviction to result in a
lockout by the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice prior to the 3 days Ior mailing where personal
service oI the Order oI Summary Eviction was not eIIectuated, despite what WCSO employee
may have incorrectly (or Ialsely) asserted in the WCSO's John Machem's AIIidavit oI Service
Irom, Iile stamped November 7, 2011 (especially where it is timestamped 4:30 pm, November
1, 2011, especially where the Order oI Summary Eviction explicitly reads that no such
lockout shall occur prior to 5:00 pm on November 1, 2011). See, NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii),
NRCP 6(e).
Interestingly, Richard Hill knows his case is toast under NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii), NRCP 6(e),
in addition to NRCP 11. That is why in Richard Hill's November 21, 2011 Motion Ior Order
To Show Cause, on page 2, Hills resorts to literally grasping at straws, imagining that what
the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice customarily does is somehow automatically codiIied into
mandatory precedent black letter law. To wit, Richard Hill wrote in his Motion For Order To
Show Cause that: toFACTS SHOWING CONTEMPT OF COURT 6. EXHIBIT 1 was
served on Coughlin on November " 2011 by the Washoe County SheriIIs Department, by
dispossessing Coughlin oI possession oI the Property.t? Further, therein Richard Hill admits
NRS 40.385 Stay oI execution upon appeal; duty oI tenant who retains possession oI premises
to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal Irom an order entered pursuant to NRS 40.253:
Iiling with the trial court a bond in the amount oI $250 to cover the expected costs on appeal.
In an action concerning a lease oI commercial property or any other property Ior which the
monthly rent exceeds $1,000, the court may, upon its own motion or that oI a party, and upon
a showing oI good cause, order an additional bond to be posted to cover the expected costs on
appeal. A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction oI the appellate court and
irrevocably appoints the clerk oI that court as the suretyts agent upon whom papers
aIIecting the suretyts liability upon the bond may be served. Liability oI a surety may be
action.
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2. A tenant who retains possession oI the premises that are the subject oI the appeal during
the pendency oI the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided in the
underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes due. II the tenant Iails
to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new proceedings Ior a summary eviction by serving
the tenant with a new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253.
NRS 40.390 Appellate court not to dismiss or quash proceedings Ior want oI Iorm. In all
cases oI appeal under NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, the appellate court shall not dismiss
or quash the proceedings Ior want oI Iorm, provided the proceedings have been conducted
substantially according to the provisions oI NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive; and
amendments to the complaint, answer or summons, in matters oI Iorm only, may be allowed
by the court at any time beIore Iinal judgment upon such terms as may be just; and all matters
oI excuse, justiIication or avoidance oI the allegations in the complaint may be given in
evidence under the answer.
NRS 40.400 Rules oI practice. The provisions oI NRS, Nevada Rules oI Civil Procedure and
Nevada Rules oI Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials, so Iar as
they are not inconsistent with the provisions oI NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the
proceedings mentioned in those sections.t?
So, considering that NRS 40.400 requires that NRCP apply to Summary Eviction Proceedings
under NRS 40.253, then service, process, and time calculations oI such must comport with the
dictates oI NRCP 5-6: "RULE 5. SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER
PAPERS
(a) Service: When Required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, every order
required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the original complaint unless
the court otherwise orders because oI numerous deIendants, every paper relating to discovery
required to be served upon a party unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion
other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand,
oIIer oI judgment, designation oI record on appeal, and similar paper shall be served upon
each oI the parties. No service need be made on parties in deIault Ior Iailure to appear except
that pleadings asserting new or additional claims Ior relieI against them shall be served upon
them in the manner provided Ior service oI summons in Rule 4.
(b) Same: How Made.
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party
represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless the court orders
that service be made upon the party.
(2) Service under this rule is made by:
(A) Delivering a copy to the attorney or the party by:
(i) handing it to the attorney or to the party;
(ii) leaving it at the attorneyts or partyts oIIice with a clerk or other person in charge,
or iI there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place in the oIIice; or
(iii) iI the oIIice is closed or the person to be served has no oIIice, leaving it at the
personts dwelling house or usual place oI abode with some person oI suitable age and
discretion residing there.
(B) Mailing a copy to the attorney or the party at his or her last known address. Service by
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mail is complete on mailing; provided, however, a motion, answer or other document
constituting the initial appearance oI a party must also, iI served by mail, be Iiled within the
time allowed Ior service; and provided Iurther, that aIter such initial appearance, service by
mail be made only by mailing Irom a point within the State oI Nevada.
(C) II the attorney or the party has no known address, leaving a copy with the clerk oI the
court.
(D) Delivering a copy by electronic means iI the attorney or the party served has consented to
service by electronic means. Service by electronic means is complete on transmission
provided, however, a motion, answer or other document constituting the initial appearance oI
a party must also, iI served by electronic means, be Iiled within the time allowed Ior service.
The served attorneyts or partyts consent to service by electronic means shall be
expressly stated and Iiled in writing with the clerk oI the court and served on the other parties
to the action. The written consent shall identiIy:
(i) the persons upon whom service must be made;
(ii) the appropriate address or location Ior such service, such as the electronic-mail address or
Iacsimile number;
(iii) the Iormat to be used Ior attachments; and
(iv) any other limits on the scope or duration oI the consent.
An attorneyts or partyts consent shall remain eIIective until expressly revoked or until
the representation oI a party changes through entry, withdrawal, or substitution oI counsel. An
attorney or party who has consented to service by electronic means shall, within 10 days aIter
any change oI electronic-mail address or Iacsimile number, serve and Iile notice oI the new
electronic-mail address or Iacsimile number.
(3) Service by electronic means under Rule 5(b)(2)(D) is not eIIective iI the party making
service learns that the attempted service did not reach the person to be served.
(4) ProoI oI service may be made by certiIicate oI an attorney or oI the attorneyts
employee, or by written admission, or by aIIidavit, or other prooI satisIactory to the court.
Failure to make prooI oI service shall not aIIect the validity oI service...
RULE 6. toTIME
(a) Computation. In computing any period oI time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by
the local rules oI any district court, by order oI court, or by any applicable statute, the day oI
the act, event, or deIault Irom which the designated period oI time begins to run shall not be
included. The last day oI the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a nonjudicial day, in which event the period runs until the end oI the next day
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a nonjudicial day, or, when the act to be done is the
Iiling oI a paper in court, a day on which weather or other conditions have made the oIIice oI
the clerk oI the district court inaccessible, in which event the period runs until the end oI the
next day which is not one oI the aIorementioned days. When the period oI time prescribed or
allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and nonjudicial days shall be
excluded in the computation except Ior those proceedings Iiled under Titles 12 or 13 oI the
Nevada Revised Statutes...
(e) Additional Time AIter Service by Mail or Electronic Means. Whenever a party has the
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period aIter
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the service oI a notice or other paper, other than process, upon the party and the notice or
paper is served upon the party by mail or by electronic means, 3 days shall be added to the
prescribed period.
Subdivision (a) is revised to extend the exclusion oI intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and
nonjudicial days to the computation oI time periods less than 11 days consistent with the 1985
amendments to the Iederal rule. Additionally, the t`tìnaccessibility oI the courttt
provision Iound in subdivision (a) oI the Iederal rule is added to Rule 6(a). Subdivision (a) is
Iurther amended, by adding language reIerring to t`t`proceedings Iiled under Titles 12 or
13 oI the Nevada Revised Statutes,tt to avoid any changes to current procedures in
probate, guardianship and trust proceedings....
Subdivision (e) is amended to provide an additional 3 days to act in response to a paper that
is served by electronic means under new paragraph (2)(D) added to Rule 5(b)."
tenant Ior deIault in payment oI rent.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 10, in addition to the remedy provided in NRS
40.2512 and 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when the tenant oI any
dwelling, apartment, mobile home, recreational vehicle or commercial premises with periodic
rent reserved by the month or any shorter period is in deIault in payment oI the rent, the
landlord or the landlordts agent, unless otherwise agreed in writing, may serve or have
served a notice in writing, requiring in the alternative the payment oI the rent or the surrender
oI the premises...
4. II the tenant Iiles such an aIIidavit at or beIore the time stated in the notice, the landlord or
the landlordts agent, aIter receipt oI a Iile-stamped copy oI the aIIidavit which was Iiled,
shall not provide Ior the nonadmittance oI the tenant to the premises by locking or otherwise.
5. Upon noncompliance with the notice:
county to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order..
6. Upon the Iiling by the tenant oI the aIIidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless oI the
inIormation contained in the aIIidavit, and the Iiling by the landlord oI the aIIidavit permitted
by subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall hold a hearing, aIter service oI
notice oI the hearing upon the parties, to determine the truthIulness and suIIiciency oI any
aIIidavit or notice provided Ior in this section. II the court determines that there is no legal
deIense as to the alleged unlawIul detainer and the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer, the
court may issue a summary order Ior removal oI the tenant or an order providing Ior the
nonadmittance oI the tenant. II the court determines that there is a legal deIense as to the
alleged unlawIul detainer, the court shall reIuse to grant either party any relieI, and, except as
otherwise provided in this subsection, shall require that any Iurther proceedings be conducted
pursuant to NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive. The issuance oI a summary order Ior removal oI
the tenant does not preclude an action by the tenant Ior any damages or other relieI to which
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the tenant may be entitled....
7. The tenant may, upon payment oI the appropriate Iees relating to the Iiling and service oI a
motion, Iile a motion with the court, on a Iorm provided by the clerk oI the court, to dispute
the amount oI the costs, iI any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118.207 or 118A.460
Ior the inventory, moving and storage oI personal property leIt on the premises. The motion
must be Iiled within 20 days aIter the summary order Ior removal oI the tenant or the
abandonment oI the premises by the tenant, or within 20 days aIter:
(a) The tenant has vacated or been removed Irom the premises; and
(b) A copy oI those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant,
S whichever is later.
8. Upon the Iiling oI a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall schedule a hearing on
the motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days aIter the Iiling oI the motion. The court
shall aIIix the date oI the hearing to the motion and order a copy served upon the landlord by
the sheriII, constable or other process server. At the hearing, the court may:
(a) Determine the costs, iI any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118.207 or
118A.460 and any accumulating daily costs; and
(b) Order the release oI the tenantts property upon the payment oI the charges determined
to be due or iI no charges are determined to be due.t?
Landlord Merliss Iiled only a No Cause Notice oI Eviction in REV2011-001708 on
Commercial Tenant Zach Coughlin, Esq.'s law oIIice. As such, a Summary Eviction
Proceeding is impermissible given the requirement oI NRS 40.253 that the Notice alleged
non-payment oI rent to allow the landlord to proceed under the Summary Eviction Proceeding
section, NRS 40.253. Further, Judge SIerrazza was precluded Irom ruling on anything other
than possession oI the premises pursuant to NRS 40.253(6), Anvui, and Glazier. Further, the
tenancy did not terminate under the Lease Agreement, it ws renewed.
tenant Irom certain types oI property. Except as otherwise provided by speciIic statute, in
addition to the remedy provided in NRS 40.251 and in NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when
the tenant oI a dwelling unit which is subject to the provisions oI chapter 118A oI NRS, part
oI a low-rent housing program operated by a public housing authority, a mobile home or a
recreational vehicle is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer, the landlord is entitled to the summary
procedures provided in NRS 40.253 except that:
1. Written notice to surrender the premises must:...(e) A statement that the claim Ior relieI
was authorized by law.
As such, the too early lockout brings into play the Iollowing:
toNRS 118A.390 UnlawIul removal or exclusion oI tenant or willIul interruption oI
essential services; procedure Ior expedited relieI.
1. II the landlord unlawIully removes the tenant Irom the premises or excludes the tenant by
blocking or attempting to block the tenantts entry upon the premises or willIully interrupts
or causes or permits the interruption oI any essential service required by the rental agreement
or this chapter, the tenant may recover immediate possession pursuant to subsection 4,
proceed under NRS 118A.380 or terminate the rental agreement and, in addition to any other
remedy, recover the tenantts actual damages, receive an amount not greater than $1,000 to
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be Iixed by the court, or both.
consider:
(c) The degree oI harm to the tenant caused by the landlordts conduct.
3. II the rental agreement is terminated pursuant to subsection 1, the landlord shall return all
prepaid rent and security recoverable under this chapter.
4. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 5, the tenant may recover immediate possession
oI the premises Irom the landlord by Iiling a veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI Ior the
unlawIul removal or exclusion oI the tenant Irom the premises or the willIul interruption oI
essential services.
5. A veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI:
(a) Must be Iiled with the court within 5 judicial days aIter the date oI the unlawIul act by the
landlord, and the veriIied complaint must be dismissed iI it is not timely Iiled. II the veriIied
complaint Ior expedited relieI is dismissed pursuant to this paragraph, the tenant retains the
right to pursue all other available remedies against the landlord.
(b) May not be Iiled with the court iI an action Ior summary eviction or unlawIul detainer is
already pending between the landlord and tenant, but the tenant may seek similar relieI beIore
the judge presiding over the pending action.
6. The court shall conduct a hearing on the veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI within 3
judicial days aIter the Iiling oI the veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI. BeIore or at the
scheduled hearing, the tenant must provide prooI that the landlord has been properly served
with a copy oI the veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI. Upon the hearing, iI it is determined
that the landlord has violated any oI the provisions oI subsection 1, the court may:
(a) Order the landlord to restore to the tenant the premises or essential services, or both;
(c) Enjoin the landlord Irom violating the provisions oI subsection 1 and, iI the circumstances
so warrant, hold the landlord in contempt oI court.
prevail, except that the court may reduce them or waive them, as justice may require.t?
toNRS 118A.090 toExcludet? deIined. toExcludet? means to evict or to prohibit
entry by locking doors or by otherwise blocking or attempting to block entry, or to make a
dwelling unit uninhabitable by interrupting or causing the interruption oI electric, gas, water
or other essential services.t?
ALL PAPERS AND PLEADINGS AND CORRESPONDENCS PREVIOUSLY
SUBMITTED TO THE RENO JUSTICE COURT AND OR ITS EMPLOYEES IS HEREBY
INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO THIS FILING.
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NRS 118A.190: to Notice: DeIinition; service.
1. A person has notice oI a Iact iI:
(a) The person has actual knowledge oI it;
(b) The person has received a notice or notiIication oI it; or
(c) From all the Iacts and circumstances the person reasonably should know that it exists.
2. Written notices to the tenant prescribed by this chapter shall be served in the manner
provided by NRS 40.280.
3. Written notices to the landlord prescribed by this chapter may be delivered or mailed to the
place oI business oI the landlord designated in the rental agreement or to any place held out
by the landlord as the place Ior the receipt oI rental payments Irom the tenant and are eIIective
Irom the date oI delivery or mailing.t?
toNRS 40.280 Service oI notices to quit; prooI required beIore issuance oI order to remove.
1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.253, the notices required by NRS 40.251 to
40.260, inclusive,
may be served:
(a) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally, in the presence oI a witness;
(b) II the tenant is absent Irom the tenantts place oI residence or Irom the tenantts
usual place oI business, by leaving a copy with a person oI suitable age and discretion at
either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the tenantts place oI residence or place oI
business; or
(c) II the place oI residence or business cannot be ascertained, or a person oI suitable age or
discretion cannot be Iound there, by posting a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased
property, delivering a copy to a person there residing, iI the person can be Iound, and mailing
a copy to the tenant at the place where the leased property is situated.t?
I did not receive any oI the emails allegedly sent to my Irom Richard Hill's email address,
rhillrichardhillaw.com between August 18th, 2011 to November 17th, 2011, and certainly
none Irom rhillrichardhillaw.com during the period between the illegal lockout at 4:30 pm
November 1, 2011 and the trespass arrest oI November 13th, 2011 which allegedly spoke to
my being provided access to the property Ior the purpose oI my removing my belongings,
despite my numerous calls and written requests, which outlined the exigencies inherent to my
being precluded access to my client Iiles incident to an unlawIul and improperly notice and
too early occurring lockout by the WCSO. I and my business have been damaged greatly by
these acts. Further, I had repeatedly sent both Baker and Hill notice, in writing, that I did not
consent to service or notice oI anything via electronic means. Further NRS 118A.190 does not
speak to tonotice oIt? a legal Iinding, but rather to tonotice oI a Iactt?. As such, I was
not appropriately served notice oI the Order oI Summary Eviction, and an illegal lockout
occurred, as such no criminal trespass charge can stand.
toNRS 118A.260 Disclosure oI names and addresses oI managers and owners; emergency
telephone number; service oI process.
1. The landlord, or any person authorized to enter into a rental agreement on his or her behalI,
shall disclose to the tenant in writing at or beIore the commencement oI the tenancy:
(a) The name and address oI:
(1) The persons authorized to manage the premises;
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(2) A person within this State authorized to act Ior and on behalI oI the landlord Ior the
purpose oI service oI process and receiving notices and demands; and
(3) The principal or corporate owner.
(b) A telephone number at which a responsible person who resides in the county or within 60
miles oI where the premises are located may be called in case oI emergency.
2. The inIormation required to be Iurnished by this section must be kept current, and this
section is enIorceable against any successor landlord or manager oI the premises.
3. A party who enters into a rental agreement on behalI oI the landlord and Iails to comply
with this section is an agent oI the landlord Ior purposes oI:
(a) Service oI process and receiving notices and demands; and
(b) PerIorming the obligations oI the landlord under law and under the rental agreement.
4. In any action against a landlord which involves his or her rental property, service oI process
upon the manager oI the property or a person described in paragraph (a) oI subsection 1 shall
be deemed to be service upon the landlord. The obligations oI the landlord devolve upon the
persons authorized to enter into a rental agreement on his or her behalI.
5. This section does not limit or remove the liability oI an undisclosed landlord.t?
NRS 40.310 Issue oI Iact to be tried by jury iI proper demand made. Whenever an issue oI
Iact is presented by the pleadings, it shall be tried by a jury, iI proper demand is made
pursuant to the Nevada Rules oI Civil Procedure or the Justice Court Rules oI Civil Procedure
Actually, a lot oI people seemed conIused regarding the to24 hourst? lockout thing. The
Eviction Proceedings oI anything related to to24 hourst? is in NRS 40.253(5), which only
Eviction Notice: to5. Upon noncompliance with the notice:
or contain...t?
So, absent some statutory provision allowing the Order oI Summary Eviction to result in a
lockout by the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice prior to the 3 days Ior mailing where personal
service oI the Order oI Summary Eviction was not eIIectuated, despite what WCSO employee
may have incorrectly (or Ialsely) asserted in the WCSO's John Machem's AIIidavit oI Service
Irom, Iile stamped November 7, 2011 (especially where it is timestamped 4:30 pm, November
1, 2011, especially where the Order oI Summary Eviction explicitly reads that no such
lockout shall occur prior to 5:00 pm on November 1, 2011). See, NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii),
NRCP 6(e).
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Interestingly, Richard Hill knows his case is toast under NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii), NRCP 6(e),
in addition to NRCP 11. That is why in Richard Hill's November 21, 2011 Motion Ior Order
To Show Cause, on page 2, Hills resorts to literally grasping at straws, imagining that what
the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice customarily does is somehow automatically codiIied into
mandatory precedent black letter law. To wit, Richard Hill wrote in his Motion For Order To
Show Cause that: toFACTS SHOWING CONTEMPT OF COURT 6. EXHIBIT 1 was
served on Coughlin on November " 2011 by the Washoe County SheriIIs Department, by
dispossessing Coughlin oI possession oI the Property.t? Further, therein Richard Hill admits
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
Iax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
FW: THIS COULD WIN THE CASE IN 11 CR 26405 2I?
12/14/11
Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
Wed 12/14/11 5:39 AM
To:
puenteslawaol.com
5 attachments
11 1 2011 AIIidavit oI Service, Notice oI Entry oI Order, and Order Ior Summary Eviction
Rev2011-001708.pdI (7.8 MB) , AIIidavit oI Service SheriII's Machen 4 30 pm 11 1 2011.pdI
(555.1 KB) , 12 14 11 Iax to Puentes ISSUES THAT CAN WIN THE CASE.pdI (144.2 KB) ,
11 21 11 Declaration oI Richard Hill attach to his M Ior OSC (11-21-11) Compare to Police
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Reports and deposition oI RPD's Carter and Lopez and Merliss.pdI (791.4 KB) , 11 21 2011
REV2011-00178 RICHARD HILL'S M Ior OSC (11-21-11).pdI (711.7 KB)
Hi Mr. Puentes,
What is inconsistent in the discovery you provided me and Hill's Motion to Show Cause? I am
interested to see what you come up with and who you would want to ask what questions. I
went to the University oI Washington too, Ior awhile at least, year round Irom 9/95 to 12/96.
Hill's Declaration in his 11 21, 2011 Motion to Show Cause indicates that:
"DECLARATION OF RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ. RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., being Iirst
duly sworn, deposes and under penalty oI perjury avers:
1. I am a resident oI the City oI Reno, County oI Washoe, State oI Nevada, and over 18
years oI age. This declaration is based on my personal knowledge, except those matters stated
made in support oI plaintiIIs Motion Ior Contempt Citation, and represents my testimony iI
called on to present same in court.
licensed to practice beIore the United States District Court Ior the District oI Nevada, the
Ninth Circuit Court oI Appeals and the United States Supreme Court.
3. My oIIice represents the plaintiII, Dr. Matthew Merliss, in this matter.
4. On October 27, 2011, this court signed a summary eviction order, and on November
1, 2011, the Washoe County SheriII's Department served that order. The notice was posted on
the door oI the home by the Washoe County SheriII's Department in the manner customary in
Washoe County Ior evictions. The locks on the Iront door and back door were changed, and
we retained all keys to the home.
5. AIter that date, I began to notice that it looked like somebody had been getting into
the home. On approximately November 4, 2011, I became concerned about the home and its
contents. I entered it and was able to conIirm that "somebody" had been getting in. I thought I
had secured the means oI entry being used by whoever it was that was getting in. However,
on later visits to the home, it was clear that the home was still being surreptitiously accessed.
6. On November 13, 2011, Dr. Merliss came to Reno because he wanted to inspect the
home. Upon entry, it was clear that somebody had again accessed the home.
7. We tried to enter the basement and Iound the door was barricaded, not locked, Irom
the inside. We were concerned that whoever had been accessing the home was inside, so we
called the police.
8. When the police arrived, they agreed with us that it was very likely that somebody
was barricaded in the basement. The police tried to coax the personto come out, but without
success.
9. When the police declined to break down the door, Dr. Merliss did so. The police
looked inside and discovered the deIendant, Zachary Coughlin, and his dog.
10. Coughlin came out peaceIully, went upstairs and was placed under arrest
by the police Ior trespassing.
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11. AIter Coughlin was taken to jail, Dr. Merliss and I tried to videotape the contents
oIthe basement where Coughlin had been hiding. It was too dark to eIIectively videotape, but
we were able to ascertain that Coughlin and his dog have been living. in the basement oI the
home Ior quite some time, likely even beIore the lockout. I observed that Coughlin had a bed
set up. He had several computer monitors. He had a store oI both Iood and water. He had
electric space heaters.
12. Since the eviction order was served, my associate, Mr. Baker, and I had sent
numerous emails to Coughlin, in which we both repeatedly made it clear to him that he was
not to be at the home without our prior permission. No such permission was given. Mr.
Coughlin had no reason to possibly think he was permitted on the property. We had tried to
coax him to cooperate on getting his possessions out, without success, or even a response.
13. As a result oI Mr. Coughlin's break-ins, Dr. Merliss has incurred a bill oI $1,060
with a licensed contractor to secure the premises. That does not include the cost oI the door
that was broken in order to get Coughlin out. That does not include the numerous hours oI me
and my staII to deal with Mr. Coughlin's repeated break-ins at the home.
14. I am no expert, but I believe Mr. Coughlin is what is called a "hoarder." He has
many car seats throughout the house. He has many dead televisions. He has a box oI car
window servo motors. The attic, which can only be accessed through a very narrow opening,
is Iull oI items, including dead electronic devices.
15. We have Iound drugs at the home. We Iound a bag oI what looks like marijuana
on the kitchen counter. I Iound a crack pipe. The contractor Iound what he said was a large
quantity oI pills.
16. Mr. Coughlin has been harassing and stalking me, and possibly, my staII. On
November 15, 2011, he burst intomy oIIice and created a scene. Then, he was parading up
and down the sidewalk across the street with a video camera screaming obscenities at me and
my staII.
17. I declare under penalty oI perjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct...Dated this
21
st
day oI November, 2011 /s/ Richard G. Hill, Esq."
The 11/13/11 Criminal Complaint against Coughlin Ior criminal trespass in RMC 11
CR 26405 reads: 'I Richard G. Hill, on behalI oI Matthew Merliss, hereby complain and say
that Zachary B. Coughlin has committed the crime oI trespass to wit: That said deIendant on
or about November 13, 2011, in the City oI Reno, State oI Nevada, at 121 River Rock St., the
DeI Iound on the property aIter being evicted. All oI which is in violation oI 8.10.010 oI the
Reno Municipal Code. I thereIore request that said DeIendant be deale with according to law.
I hereby declare upon inIormation and belieI under penalty oI perjury pursuant to NRS
171.102, that the Ioregoing is true and correct to the best oI my knowledge. /s/ Richard G.
Hill, Esq., Complainant 11/13/11.
RPD OIIicer Chris Carter, Jr.'s 11/13/11 'Arrest Report and Declaration oI Probable
Cause reads: 'On the above date, time and location the deIendant was Iound inside the house
aIter being served an eviction noticed and being evicted on 11/1/11. The TP state he believes
the deIendant has beein and out oI the house since being evicted. Due to the likelihood that
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the deI. Would return he did not qualiIy Ior a citation. (reviewing supervisor RPD Sargent
Marcia Lopez) (no warrant indicated).
Hill's 'Written Statement oI 11/13/11 is included in the Police Report and reads: 'We
represent the property owner. WE evicted Coughlin. The papers were posted by WCSO on
11/1/11. We have observed evidence that he was coming and going. Today we Iound him
barricaded in the basement. Called RPD. /s/ Richard G. Hill, Esq.
But RPD OIIicer Carter wrote in his Supplemental Declaration to his 11/13/11Police
Report: "On November 13, 2011 at approximately 1200 hours I responded to 121 River Rock
St, Reno, on a report oI an unwanted subject in the home. I arrived on scene with Sgt Lopez
and we met with the RIP. Richard Hill, who told us the Iollowing:Richard is a local attorney
who is representing the home owner, Matthew Merliss. Matthew Iiled eviction papers on his
tenant, Zachary Coughlin, at 121 River Rock St last month and they were served at the home
by leaving them on the door. The eviction papers stated that Zachary was to vacate the
property on November 1, 2011 .
Matthew has been to the house several times over the past week and has observed
evidence oI someone coming and going. Today he was at the house and Iound the basement
door to be locked Irom inside.Matthew contacted Richard who responded and called the
police.
Sgt Lopez and I knocked on the basement door and announced loudly "Reno Police"
and called out Ior Zachary to open the door. We were met with no response. Matthew decided
he would kick the door open, and did so. I entered the doorway oI the basement and Iound
Zachary standing at the rear oI the room holding a small dog. He was hesitant to come out and
tried to explain to Zachary that he was seNed eviction papers and he asked me what I could
do about it iI he hypothetically didn't get them . He then told me that he had worked a deal
with Matthew to continue paying rent and that the legal eviction was no longer valid. I again
tried to explain to Zachary that a judge had signed an order Iorcing him to leave the property
and all he did was cite civil case law to me (l'm unsure iI any oI the cases he was rambling on
about even exist) and tell me that I was making a bad arrest. Due to Zachary not believing he
has done anything wrong that the Iact he believes he still has standing there is reasonable
grounds to believe Zachary will return to the house. ThereIore he did not qualiIy Ior a
misdemeanor citation.
Richard completed a statement on Matthews' behalI and signed a criminal complaint.
Zachary was transported and booked into the Washoe County Jail without incident Ior
Trespassing."
Further, Richard Hill's own Written Statment oI 11 13, 2011, provided to the RPD
writes that "We evicted Coughlin. The papers were posted by WCSO on 11/1/11 We have
observed evidence that he was coming and going...."
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Why didn't Merliss make a Written Statement. Was Merliss really in Reno during the
time Irame to observe what Hill asserts Merliss observed in Hill's Declaration oI 11 21, 2011?
What other holes do you see?
Hills 11 21, 2011 Declaration states that:
"6. On November 13, 2011, Dr. Merliss came to Reno because he wanted to inspect the
home. Upon entry, it was clear that somebody had again accessed the home.
7. We tried to enter the basement and Iound the door was barricaded, not locked, Irom
the inside. We were concerned that whoever had been accessing the home was
inside, so we called the police.
8. When the police arrived, they agreed with us that it was very likely that somebody
was barricaded in the basement. The police tried to coax the person to come out, but without
success.
9. When the police declined to break down the door, Dr. Merliss did so. The police
looked inside and discovered the deIendant, Zachary Coughlin, and his dog.
10. Coughlin came out peaceIully, went upstairs and was placed under arres by the
police Ior trespassing."
However, RPD OIIicer Carter's Narrative, on page 3 oI 3 Irom his November 14th,
2011 Report writes that: "Matthew has been to the house several times over the past week and
has observed evidence oI someone coming and going. Today he was at the house and Iound
the basement door to be locked Irom inside.
Matthew contacted Richard who responded and called the police. Sgt Lopez and I
knocked on the basement door and announced loudly "Reno Police" and called out Ior
Zachary to open the door. We were met with no response. Matthew decided he would kick the
door open, and did so.
I entered the doorway oI the basement and Iound Zachary standing at the rear oI the
room holding a small dog. He was hesitant to come out and eventually did so."
Hill's Declaration contains nothing about this "reluctance" RPD OIIicer Carter
mentions. Further, Hill's Declaration makes no mention oI Merliss's noticing anything at the
property or any trips by Merliss to the property, in marked contrast to RPD OIIicer's Carter
writing that "Matthew has been to the house several times over the past week and has
observed evidence oI someone coming and going." Additionally, Merliss picked up my dog
and held it in his hands close to his body and demanded that I let him have it, and the RPD
OIIicers did nothing about it, Iurther, Merliss was taunting me during the arrest demanding I
give him "some more eye contact", accusing me oI costing him $20,000 Ior the inIormed
consent wrong site legal surgery that was Hill's billing oI $20K in a Summary Eviction
Proceeding where JCRCP 3 and NRS 69.030 preclude an award oI Iees, etc. Notice Hill's
Declaration only writes that "the police tried to coax the person out" but clearly does not
corroborate RPD's Carter's assertion that the RPD announced itselI as police prior to the door
being kicked down. Hills Written Statement that the eviction papers were "served" by the
WCSO "leaving them on the door" is a violation oI NRCP 11 and leaves him and his client
liable Ior the wrongIul arrest and deIamation that occurred incident to RPD's actions.
Zach Coughlin, Esq. 817 N. Virginia St. #2
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The closing arguments and ruling or opinion in the criminal trespass case in 26405 (the
one Richard G. Hill testiIied in in the criminal case itselI then again at Coughlin's Iormal
disciplinary hearing" Iollows:
'BY MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: This case, I'll tell you, has been, Irankly by the testimony
presented today, proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The charge oI Trespass was proven by
at least two diIIerent avenues in this case. Mr. Coughlin was warned not to trespass, not to
go on 121 River Rock, which is in the City o I Reno, and he was warned at least Iive times
by these people in all kinds oI diIIerent manner. He was warned originally when he was
sent a 5-day and a 30- day notice. They didn't want him on the property. They wanted him
to quit. They wanted him to leave the property. They sent those notices. Page - 126- He was
noticed again on an additional 5-day notice sometime later beIore the 0/25 proceeding
where they sent another notice asking him to leave the property. Most importantly in this
case, Your Honor, is the 1 0/25 hearing where Judge SIerrazza - where Judge SIerrazza
announced in open Court where Mr. Coughlin was present, that the eviction is granted. And
I draw Your Honor's attention to City's 1 . III could Iind that, I would - THE COURT: Do
you need a copy oI it? I have it right here in evidence. MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: No, it's
in evidence, Your Honor. And I'll draw your attention to the part that says, "Decision." And
it also says, "Matthew Merliss present, Casey Baker - represented by Casey Baker," and
then it also indicates Zachary Coughlin present. And then I'll draw your attention to the
decision where it says "eviction granted eIIective October 3 1 st, 20 1 1, at 5 :00 p.m."
That's what Judge SIerrazza announced in open Court with Mr. Coughlin, according to Mr.
Baker, listening, actively listening to the Judge. He wasn't writing anything down, but he
was actively listening to the Judge when he announced that decision in open Court. And
you have the Order granting eviction right there. Now, there was another issue whether or
not the proceedings were stayed pending some sort oI appeal, but that Motion to Stay was
also denied in the October 25th, 20 1 1 , hearing. And you'll see in City's 1, it Page -1 27-
actually says, "Tenant's verbal motion to stay, denied." The case was over at that point.
Then, Mr. Baker draIted up the Findings oI Facts, Conclusions oI Law, and Order oI
Summary Eviction. That was provided to you as City's 2. That was also emailed to Mr.
Coughlin. There's another notice that they don't want him here. They want him oII the
property. They warned him to be oII the property as oI October 3 1 st at 5 :00 p.m. This
Order oI Eviction speciIies that Mr. Coughlin, excuse me, the tenant oI the property or
anyone thereon, is to be out oI the property no earlier than October 3 1 st, 20 1 1 , at 5:00
p.m., just as announced in open Court on 1 0125. So, Mr. Baker emailed that document to
Mr. Coughlin as a courtesy, I imagine. And then what happens next? On November 1, 20 1
1, 1 2 days beIore the trespass in this case, Mr. Hill executes a Notice oI Entry oI Order and
sends that to Mr. Coughlin's last known address, as he would normally do in his course oI
business, i s send a Notice oI Entry oI Order. And what does he attach to that? The
Findings oI Facts, Conclusions oI Law, and Order oI Summary Eviction. What does Mr.
Coughlin do in response to that? 1 2 days, 1 3 days aIter Mr. Coughlin was evicted Irom
that property, pursuant to Judge SIerrazza's Order oI Eviction, he's Iound on the property by
Mr. Hill. In Iact, Mr. Hill testiIies he sees him walk up the stairs Irom the basement, walk
in the living room into - or in the kitchen into the living room. He's at the house aIter he's
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been evicted Irom the property. That is a criminal trespass, Your Honor. Page -1 28- He's
been warned many times that they do not want him there, and yet, he's there on the property
aIter being Iormally evicted, aIter going through all oI the Court proceedings, and that
doesn't keep him out. He goes back aIter all oI this. There's another issue here too, Your
Honor. The City argues that anyone that goes on the property and "lives in the property"
was Iound in his pajamas, his night - a shirt, slippers, his dog downstairs, is living at that
property with the intent oI vexing or annoying the owners oI that property. Because that is
vexing and annoying aIter they go through all the legal proper procedures, pursue this case
in Court, Iinally aIter days oI test - or aIter a Iull day oI testimony and argument. And then
on 1 0/25, Iinally getting an Order oI Eviction, he goes back to the house. That is indicia oI
vexing or annoying the owners oI that property aIter this huge legal battle. That's not even
enough. Then you have Mr. Baker testiIy that well, he was at the Court proceeding, or
excuse me, he was at the eviction, the lockout he called it, on November 1 st, 201 1 , where
he saw the SheriII, the Washoe County SheriII, tape onto the Iront door, City's 2, Findings
oI Facts, Conclusions oI Law, Order oI Eviction. They tape it onto the Iront door. But that's
not all that happens. There's a locksmith there as well. The locksmith goes about to change
or rekey the locks, both the Iront door and the back door, so that no one can enter that
property. In Iact, his testimony was that aIter a question, "Could the person with the key
previously have entered that aIter he rekeyed?" "No." That's the idea. You lock them out.
Page -129- And so he recalls that he was given the new set oI keys. There was no way in
that property other than some kind oI Iorced entry, or illegal entry at that point, Irankly.
That's enough oI a warning right there. We don't want you. We're locking you out. The
Court says we can lock you out. We're locking you out. How many warnings does Mr.
Coughlin need? That was a huge warning. He has to enter some other way. His key
wouldn't work anymore, so in order to get in that property, he had to enter that property
having been locked out. That shows an intent to vex or annoy the owners, as well, oI the
warning, not to trespass, not to be on that property, and being on that property. Now, there
isn't a lot oI case law as you might imagine in Nevada, Your Honor, with regard to
reentering property aIter being evicted, and whether that's a criminal trespass. There is that
one case I did announce, and that was State v. Nichols, 1 06 Nev. 6 5 1 , where the Court
did say, "Reentry aIter eviction is a trespass." It's a trespass. They can't be any clearer than
that. It's a trespass. That's what the Court said. And we agree. It's a trespass. There is case
law in other jurisdictions, most oI it unpublished, Your Honor, because as you might
imagine, these are pretty benign matters that go through the criminal justice process. But
there was one case out in Nashville, Tennessee, the Court oI Criminal Appeals. This was a
published decision, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. Lexus 1 002, where the Court did Iind that aIter
being served a Notice oI Eviction aIter remaining on the property aIter being evicted, the
person was Page -130- subject to criminal trespass penalties. The jury had suIIicient
evidence to actually Iind that person criminally trespassed. So, this isn't anything new. This
is actually what's happening out in the country, and this is just one case that I could Iind
that was a published opinion on just this. Here, I'll just provide it to you. THE COURT:
And just Ior the record, is there a cite or a name on that Tennessee case? MR. HAZLETI-
STEVENS: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Just because we've run into this. MR .
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HAZLETI-STEVENS: Certainly, it's Tennessee v. Lovins (inaudible), L-O-V-I-N-S, and
I'll say it slowly, it's 2009, Tenn., T-E-N-N, period, Crim, period, App., A-P-P, period,
Lexus, 1002. THE COURT: Okay, thank you. BY MR. HAZLETI-STEVENS: And, Judge,
I think based on all oI the evidence presented with Mr. Hill having authority provided to
him by Mr. Merliss to evict, to have Mr. Coughlin leave that property, and going through
all the proper channels to have him leave that property - they didn't use selI-help in this
case. They went through the summary eviction proceeding as they were supposed to do.
And yet, aIter they've noticed him, they've warned him, they've asked him not to be on the
property by many diIIerent avenues, he still is on the property. And I think they were leIt to
no other remedy than to call the police and have him arrested Ior criminal trespass, and
that's pursuant to 8 1 0.01 0, trespassing statute oI the Reno Municipal Code. Thank you,
Judge. Page - 1 3 1 - THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hazlett-Stevens. Mr. Coughlin, closing
argument? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir, Your Honor. BY MR. COUGHLIN: I actually came
across that Lovins case, too. I don't know that it quite says what Mr. Hazlett-Stevens
purports it to say, but it's impressive that he Iound that nonetheless. I Io und a number oI
cases that do speak to just this situation. I'll quickly cite to them. Not all oI them, I believe,
are entirely positive Irom my point oI view, but I believe the vast majority oI them are
given the public policy behind. I'm trying to avoid situations where you're evicting
someone, and that's tough enough, but then when you go and you pile on criminal
prosecution on top oI it, and maybe like in this case, you pile on a Iorced rent escrow
deposit that's contrary to Nevada law, and the Court Iailing to give back that money, while
at the same time, apparently requiring the commercial tenant who was evicted in a
summary proceeding Ior non- payment oI rent was not alleged, contrary to Nevada law
again. I know I'm running on with this sentence, but there's just a lot o I stuII that went on
here that adds up to a pretty tough set oI circumstances that the Legislature actually enacted
laws to prevent, but unIortunately, maybe it's due to my poor legal work, maybe it's due to
Judge SIerrrazza's court having limited jurisdiction having to deal with too broad oI a
subject matter. God knows it would be diIIicult to do all the work that he does do. Page
-132- But Steele v. State, Steele with an "E" on the end, 1 32 - and Your Honor, I can give
this to the Court so to avoid anyone - iI you need to write it down. But Ior the record, Steele
v. State, 1 32, N.E. 739 at 740. State v. Peers, 4 1 7 A.2d 1 085. Reed v. Comm, 366 S.E.
2d 275. There is an Am. Jur. Section, 75 Am. Jur. 2d trespass, section 87, that's Iairly
relevant. The case Lynn v. Desiderio, 1 59. Fed. App. 382. Dawson v. State, 52 Indiana
478. Myers v. State, 1 30 N.E. 1 16. Charles S. Downy v. S&D Liquor, 880 N.E. 2d 322.
And just quickly, Houston, 647 N.E. 2d 16. State v. Johnson, Higgins v. Penoscot, In The
Matter oI Maricopa, 942 P.2d 477, and Iinally Ken v. Wood, 275 S.2d. 60. Those cases
largely speak to what the public policy rationale underlining my position that wherever
possible a criminal eviction statute should not be applied incident to a civil eviction, the
criminal trespass incident to a civil eviction. Now, obviously, there's got to be some
reasonable place to draw the line. Some (inaudible) will not leave. They just keep
(inaudible) the Court's authority. I guess a contempt order could be issued, a Motion to
Show Cause. There's a number oIthings, and maybe somewhere way down the line, sure a
criminal trespass arrest, or a citation. I would hope not what happened here, three days in
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jail, a custodial arrest, and all that's attendant to that. Mr. Hazlett-Stevens, in his closing
argument, cited to a lot oI emails that I don't believe were introduced into the record. At
least not Page -133- today. I could be wrong. They might have been somewhere in there,
but it was kind oI curious because he mentioned a number oIthese warnings occurred in
these emails, yet, they are not introduced as exhibits herein. Perhaps that's due to the Iact
that the opposing attorneys were warned that email would not be a valid means oI serving
notice oI anything. And that was done because the speeding nature oI these summary
eviction proceedings is Iast enough as is. Mr. Hill's law Iirm seemed to continually attempt
to speed it up even more by serving things through email. The Legislature in NRS 40.253
has explicitly provided that Ior commercial tenants it is against the law to use a summary
eviction proceeding to evict them unless the non-payment oI rent is alleged. I take that to
mean the Legislature saying look, it's hard. We're a pro-business state. It's hard enough to
succeed in business. We don't want people being summarily evicted unless they're just not
paying their rent. II they're paying their rent, and they have - and the landlord just wants
them out Ior some other reason, well, they're going to have to do it a little bit slower. Now,
there was testimony today that the rent was being - was not being paid. However, that's not
what was served. That's not what was ItIed. That's not what was litigated. Mr. Hill and his
client chose to litigate it a certain way Ior legitimate reasons. They chose not to allege the
non-payment oI rent. They could say it's because I'm making up stuII. They could say it's
because I'm Page -1 34- - what was the term he used? I Iorget, but Mr. Baker used a term,
and I queried him on it. They could say all that, and they've said that about just about
everything I've ever uttered. You know, I'm kind oI a Yosemite Sam cartoon villain as Iar
as they put it. Everything I do or say is just ridiculous, I'm crazy, I'm a charlatan, Iraud, and
all this. Well, that's their position, but to me, it dilutes itselI. They don't ever mix in a little
bit oI ''well you got a point there" once in a while. There was a lot oI evidence put on in this
summary eviction. They spent $60 grand litigating this so to say it was totally baseless and
I put on no evidence, yet their Iees oI $60 grand were legitimate and appropriate and they
should be compensated Ior them is to me, trying to have it both ways. II my case was so
baseless and groundless and vexatious, I would think they could have brought it home Ior
something less than $60 grand. In Nevada, under - and I know this isn't speaking to the real
reason we're here, the criminal trespass, but in Nevada there's a case called Aitkens in the
landlord/tenant context which provides that the procedural notice requirements, and it's A-
I-T-K-E-N-S, the procedural notice requirements within the context oI eviction
proceedings, particularly within summary eviction proceedings, must be strictly adhered to.
The policy rationale underlying, that is that given the privacy oI one's home ,or business,
and in my case, both the home oIIice, is so important that the law really needs to strictly
adhere to them. Similar to Page - 1 35- what the Nevada Supreme Court has reinterpreted
the Foreclosure Mediation Statute to be whereas the Legislature might have said you need
substantial compliance with it, and the Nevada Supreme Court said, "No, we're going to say
you need strict compliance with it." Well, that's somewhat oI an analogy in what goes on in
these eviction matters. I believe there is a couple quasi 60(b) basis Ior challenging the
validity oI any - to the extent this Court views the Eviction Order as a warning, which I
think is kind oI the big inquiry here. Maybe not, but to me, it seems like it's possibly what
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the case could come down to. To the extent the Court does consider a valid Eviction Order
appropriately served, a warning suIIicient to satisIY the criminal trespass statute, I believe
there is a couple 60(b) like basis to challenge that Order. One is brought up by Mr. Loomis,
who so astutely pointed out that under the McManley case there was a Notice oI Appeal
Iiled in the interim between the initial October 1 3th hearing, and then the October 25th
trial. MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Judge, this is getting into testimony - or evidence that's
not in testimony, testimony that's not in evidence rather. It's not there about any appeal
taken. THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: Well, I believe Mr. Loomis - THE
COURT: Your argument is limited to the Iacts that were produced today at trial. MR.
COUGHLIN: Just today, not what Mr. Loomis - Page -136- THE COURT: That's correct,
today's trial. So to that extent, the objection - and I try to give parties a great deal oI leeway
in closing argument, but when you start getting Iar aIield oI what was argued, presented via
Iacts oI the trial, that's not proper argument. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay, and I thought it was
part oI the record at this point. And iIit's not too late, I'd object to the notice by email that
was introduced. THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Beyond that 60(b)
basis, I believe there is an additional basis in that - there is a couple. I think under the
ANVUI, A-N-V-U-I-E - A-N-V-U-I, which is kind oI the main Nevada case on summary
evictions oI commercial tenants. That was a restaurant in Vegas doing a lot oI business, like
$500K a month or something, and they got evicted, and it went to the Nevada Supreme
Court, and a lot oI litigation was done over that. And the holding, the take home holding
Irom that was that it's basically a summary judgment standard in the summary eviction
proceedings. The tenant merely needs to present a material issue oI law or Iact to beat a
summary judgment motion. II they do that, the Court may do nothing Iurther, and it has to
go on to a (inaudible) unlawIul detainer approach. Served, 20 days to respond, discovery,
all that. So, my position would be that there's a 60(b) basis Ior viewing this - any summary
eviction order, as void in that I was a licensed attorney, at that time, at least, and I held that
out as my law oIIice. I Iiled a tenant's aIIidavit that I was a commercial tenant. I pled that.
Mr. Hill testiIied today that he wasn't aware oI that, and he didn't consider it a particular
Page - 1 3 7- consideration, Ior his neurosurgeon client who had spent $60 grand on this.
That's where I'm at the analogy oI the wrong side legal surgery, because I think it could
wind up potentially being Iairly important to his client iI it's proven that a wrongIul eviction
occurred. II it's proven that yes, I did present a (inaudible) issue oI material Iact, that this
was a commercial tenancy, and to the extent judicial notice could be taken that it was
merely a No-Cause Eviction Notice that was pursued and that non-payment oI rent was not
alleged, then this could be problematic, and Mr. Hill might wish he had considered that
point whether this was a commercial tenancy, and I ' m not subject to summary eviction
proceedings in 40.253, and (inaudible) pay my rent as alleged as being in Iact very
important. Just some ancillary Iactual considerations. The main summary eviction statute in
Nevada is NRS 40.253. It's about this long. It's 8 to 9 subsections, and that's just kind oI the
procedural mechanisms oI that. It's mixed in there with the construction deIect and Chapter
40 and some other stuII. THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin, how does this all relate to the case?
We're getting really Iar aIield on these eviction issues when we're here on a trespassing
case. So let's try to keep our Iocus limited to this criminal case, and the trespassing issues
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raised in this hearing. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, Your Honor. I guess the reason I'm
going into this one, my position is I'm not guilty. But iI you are reading some guilt into this,
I think there are some mitigating Iactors that the Court might consider. Page - 1 38- II that's
appropriate, I could go into those brieIly. THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to - I just want
you to limit your argument to testimony that was presented here this morning on the
trespassing statute. That's what Mr. Hazlett-Stevens did, and that's what I'm asking you to
do. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. THE COURT: It doesn't mean you have to be up here Ior an
hour talking, and necessarily more isn't necessarily better. But iI you Iocus in on the legal
issues and identiIy them during your closing
argument and why they support your position that you're not guilty, that would be helpIul.
BY MR. COUGHLIN: Okay, the charge is RMC 8 1 0.040. I believe that the speciIic
language - THE COURT: Section 8 1 0.010. MR. COUGHLIN: Oh, it's 010, okay. THE
COURT: Just Ior the record. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay, I believe that the exact language is
Iailure to leave the premises aIter being warned to do so. It doesn't say Iailure to leave the
premises aIter kind oI having an Eviction Notice served, according to the procedures oIthe
Washoe County SheriII, maybe, but maybe not according to the NRCP that's ruled
expressly applicable to civil evictions under NRS 40.258. It doesn't say that. It says,
"Failure to leave the premises aIter being warned to do so." So, what do we have when we
have somebody evicted, and they need to go get their mail Ior a couple days? Are we going
Page - 1 39- to go arrest them when they go into their mailbox and get that social security
check? Are we going to charge them with criminal trespass there? Or are we going to say,
"Hey you need to leave," and iI they don't leave, then maybe consider that because that's
what the precedent would be here today is anybody who is evicted who's Iound on the
property and is unIortunate enough to have Richard Hill roll up and call the police and do
what took place here, is going to not only be Iacing an eviction, wherein they might have
also been subject to an impermissible rent/escrow deposit, in that the Reno Justice Court is
not allowed to do that, unless they pass a rule like Las Vegas Justice Court Rule 44. In
order to do so, they have to publish it and get it approved by the Nevada Supreme Court.
The Nevada Supreme Court let Las Vegas implement such a rent/escrow requirement i n
their Justice Court Rules because it's Las Vegas. It's crazy. I went to law school there. They
have to make some crazy rules to deal with the transiency oI that community. I love Las
Vegas. Don't get me wrong. But I can understand why the Court would say, "Alright,
normally, we're not going to allow these Iorced rent escrow deposits to tenants in a
summary eviction setting." But because it's Las Vegas, and otherwise it would be too hard
to be a landlord, we're going to let you implement Rule 44. Now, Justice Court Rule 84
says beIore a Justice Court can implement such a rule like that, they have to get it approved
by the Nevada Supreme Court. THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin, we're getting way out again.
MR. COUGHLIN: Alright. Page -140- THE COURT: I mean, (inaudible) State v.
McNichols, the Nevada Supreme Court case in 1990 clearly indicated that someone who
has been evicted Irom the property and subsequently reenters the property is guilty oI
trespass. MR. COUGHLIN: Is that a casino case though? THE COURT: A resident where
someone lost their home in Ioreclosure, went back on the property, eviction was served,
and then there was ultimately an arrest made on the property Ior the crime oI narcotics.
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MR. COUGHLIN: For a crime oI narcotics? THE COURT: Although the Supreme Court
has said subsequent . reentry is a trespass. MR. COUGHLIN: AIter the eviction? THE
COURT: AIter being evicted. MR. COUGHLIN: The eviction was -- THE COURT: AIter
being evicted and having the owners change the locks. MR. COUGHLIN: AIter the
eviction was served you said. THE COURT: Then why don't you Iocus in - no, I didn't say
that. I said aIter an eviction. Why don't you Iocus in on the relevant issues so we're not here
Ior the next three hours talking about things that are irrelevant. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay,
but I did, Your Honor, hear you say the word "served." THE COURT: I said subsequent
reentry was a trespass aIter an eviction process. Three and Iour days notices oI an unlawIul
detainer were Page -141- served as present order oI summary eviction. So, iI you think that
there's a deIense there, that's what you should Iocus in on. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. I do
think there is, and especially under the A itken case that I mentioned earlier requiring that
strict adherence. There was not appropriate service here. And, in Iact, Mr. Hill in his
pleadings struggles to point to some rule somewhere that says, "Yeah, that's appropriate.
That satisIies the standard having the SheriII post it on the door." In Iact, iI one really looks
into the Anvui restaurant summary eviction case, there is a strong argument that Hill, et aI.,
were not allowed to eIIectuate this lock out Ior at least Iive days. Furthermore, and the
Court was holding $2,275.00 oI my money. Given that under 1 1 8(a).380, a supercedes
bond is only $250.00. There is a very strong argument that this - THE COURT: What does
that have to do with this case? You are going nowhere with helping the Court when you get
oII on these tangents about the speciIics oI the Justice Court. You do make some headway
when you talk about the service oI the eviction proceedings, so iI you want to Iocus on that
and limit i t to that, that would be Iine. But you are just getting way out there, and it's also, I
think, outside the course and scope oI the evidence presented today at the trial. MR.
COUGHLIN: So, is it not something this Court considers whether or not something is void
under 60(b)4? THE COURT: I'm not going to give any legal advice during closing
argument, Mr. Coughlin. You know as a lawyer that's inappropriate. Page -142- I'm just
saying that you are getting Iar aIield on your arguments based on the evidence. MR.
COUGHLIN: Well, I Ie el I'm trying to make relevant arguments that point out that -- THE
COURT: I'm telling you they're not that relevant, at least to this Judge. MR. COUGHLIN:
Well, but I didn't get to say much about the supercedes bond, and the Iact that the Court
took 1 0 times what it was, and didn't give me a stay. MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: And,
Judge, I'm going to object to that because that's not testimony that's presented here at trial
today. THE COURT: That's not even the testimony. I didn't even hear anything about a
supercedes bond until just about two seconds ago. MR. COUGHLIN: It's in my motions on
Iile in the record. MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: I'm going to object. Those are not evidence,
Judge. THE COURT: Let's move Iorward with the argument, Mr. . Coughlin. Mr. Hazlett-
Stevens' objection is sustained. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. I believe it is NRS 40.280, but it
is somewhere in NRS 40 that speciIically incorporates NRCP or applies NRCP to service
requirements, just in general, to these landlord/tenant matters to the extent the subject
matter has been spoken to already in the landlord/tenant statute. So, when you want to
know how you serve somebody, it's not set Iorth in the landlord/tenant statute, which it's
not, you go to NRCP, Page - 1 43- Nevada Rules oI Civil Procedure. And iI you can't serve
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somebody in person, personally served, and I ask that you take judicial notice that
personally served means handing something to someone in person. Because the Washoe
County SheriII doesn't view it that way. They think posting something on the door, and
they've told me this. MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Judge, I'm going to object. Him telling -
it's hearsay that wasn't even provided in testimony. THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin, I don't
know iI you're hearing what I'm saying here. You are getting so Iar aIield that it's
undermining and eroding your argument. MR. COUGHLIN: Well, I heard you say that I
should Iocus on -- THE COURT: I'm not tell you what to say. You need to stay Iocused
and comment only on evidence that was related this morning. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay.
THE COURT: And when you rehash it Ior the IiIth and sixth time, it loses it's value and
punch. I mean, aIter awhile you make your argument, there's nothing else to be said. I
mean, a good lawyer knows when to sit down aIter making an argument instead oI droning
on and droning on, I mean, Iorever. At some point, the argument is made and the
inIormation is digested, and then it becomes to be noise. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. THE
COURT: You've made some valid points. I've heard them. But I don't need to hear them ten
times. I heard a lot oI stuII this morning over and over and over. Page -144- MR.
COUGHLIN : Yes, Your Honor, and I'll just conclude with stating that there was no
warning to leave the premises. There was no Iailure to heed a warning to leave the
premises. Perhaps it's a matter oI Mr. Hill just jumped the gun and called the police a little
too soon, and he would have been better oII saying, "You need to leave," and then getting
that reIusal to leave, and then call the police. But as it occurred, there simply was no
warning to leave the premises. An Eviction Order, even iI appropriately served, and I don't
believe it was here, prior to the lockout, is not a warning under all those cases, or at least a
majority oI those cases that I cited to you, suIIicient to sustain a criminal trespass
prosecution. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you, and I appreciate you
zooming in on that because I think that's a good issue. Mr. Hazlett-Stevens, would you like
to Iinish up? BY MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: That's right, Your Honor. That's the crux oI
the issue in this case. Mr. Coughlin restates or limits RMC 8.10.010 just a little bit, and
improperly. There' s many ways to get a trespass under the law, Your Honor. Mr. Coughlin
said you had to be warned and remain on the property in order to get a trespass, but that's
not the only way to have a criminal trespass under statute. There are three ways under
Subsection A. Page -145- II you go on the property with the intent to vex or annoy
someone, you've committed a criminal trespass. That's it, right there. There's another part oI
the statute that says iI you go or remain on the property aIter being warned not to trespass,
you are guilty oI a trespass. So, it is the case that sometimes, and we see these all the time
in casino cases, where the casino security is saying, "You leave the property." And they
say,
"No, I'm not leaving the property," or they do some other gesture that indicates they're
reIusing to leave the property. That's a criminal trespass. But iI you go onto the property
aIter being warned not to go on the property, that's also a trespass. He was warned so many
times by them personally, by Mr. Hill and Mr. Baker, through notices, through Judge
SIerrazza that he was evicted Irom the property, and then through a Notice oI Entry oI
Order. I don't know how many other ways they could have possibly done this. Are they
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required to warn him when they actually go on the property 1 3 days later, and he's still
living on the property? I don't think so. I think they're well within their rights to call the
police, and say, "Hey, we got this guy evicted, and he's still on our property." That's a valid
arrest. Now, we're not here to talk about the public policy, Your Honor, about whether it's
advisable, whether it's a good idea to arrest someone who's been evicted Irom the property.
That's not why we're here. We're not here to have you decide whether that's good public
policy or not. Page -146- We're here to have you decide whether there was a criminal
trespass under RMC. You might not think so, or you might think so, but that's why we're
here. We're not here to set public policy precedent about trespassing people who have been
evicted Ior various reasons, or Ioreclosed upon, or anything like that. We're not here to do
that. With regard to all oI the issues Mr. Coughlin brought up in regard to commercial
residence, commercial property, notices, whether or not they can take summary eviction
proceedings against a commercial tenant, this is not the proper Iorum to decide that issue.
That, Mr. Coughlin, had an opportunity to address in Iront oI Judge SIerrazza, in his appeal
in Iront oI Judge Flanagan, which you actually did hear in evidence today. That matter is
appealed, and Judge Flanagan already denied the appeal. That issue should have been
litigated in the proper jurisdiction. The issue here is simple. He was evicted Irom his
property as announced in open Court by Judge SIerrazza. He was provided a copy oI the
Notice. Regardless, it was announced by Judge SIerrazza, "You are evicted as oI October
31st at 5:00 p.m." That's enough right there. Right there. II he was on that property aIter
October 3 1 st, 2011 , aIter 5 :00 p.m., he is criminally trespassing on that property either
by an intent to vex or annoy the other litigants in that party, or by being warned not to come
on that property, and going on that property pursuant to statute. I think the City has proven
its case based on those two theories, and I'll submit it beyond that. Thank you. Page - 147-
THE COURT: Thank you very much. Alright -- MR. COUGlllJN: Your Honor, could I?
THE COURT (RMC Judge William Gardner, the brother oI 2JDC Judge Linda Gardner,
co-grievants against Coughlin in NG12-0435, see also Coughlin's Petition Ior Writ oI
Mandamus against 2JDC Judge L. Gardner in 53833 and 54844, noting Judge W. Garnder's
Iailure to divulge the Iamilial relation until Coughlin brought it up, even where Judge W.
Gardner subsequently admitted to having been passed by his sister, Judge L. Garnder, her
4/13/09 Order AIter Trial (FHE 3), which he then passed around to all the Iellow RMC
Judges, with Judge Nash Holmes including such in her 3/14/12 "box oI materials" that she
had deliever to the SBN, stamped received "3/14/12", but Ior which Pat King and Laura
Peters made a concious, willIul decision to attempt to mislead in this process by then
aIIixing a date received stamping on the 4/13/09 Order oI "3/15/09", manipulating on
several occasions with interlineations the "5" in the "15" oI "3/15/12", then attempting to
cover up the multiple improprieties and conIlicts oI interest that arisen incident thereto
subsequently): No, we're done. That's it. You know how it works. The prosecutor goes Iirst,
you go second, they Iinish up. They have the burden oI prooI. That's it. No more argument.
That's very clear. Alright, let me just make a couple comments here. Both parties have
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identiIied - there's numerous issues here. The big issue is the warning. Under our statute,
both 207.200, and RMC 810.0lD, the party - it doesn't even talk about the vex or annoy, the
party who goes or remains, either one, Mr. Hazlett-Stevens pointed that out, into any
building aIter being warned by the owner or the occupant, and the owners and occupants
can be agents with ostensible, actual or implied authority, and certainly Mr. Hill and Mr.
Baker had that authority. That's clearly established by the evidence. I I you go back onto
that property aIter having been warned, you are guilty oI a trespass, and I guess the
question is what is a warning? And unlike many areas in the law, it's not deIined under the
trespassing ordinance, or the trespassing statute. It's a notice requirement. And the real
issue in this case - there's a number oI issues, but I do - there's no question, Mr. Coughlin,
that you were on property that belonged to another at 1 2 1 River Rock on November 1 3th,
and that's in the City oI Reno, and there's no question about that. The question is, what type
oI warning did you have? You had so many types oI warnings, it's hard to Iigure out which
one is the best. Page - 148- First oI all, the Iirst warning - and by the way, when we talk
about warning here, when you look at the statute under state law or the Municipal Code,
both the Legislature and the City Council have given some guidance that indicate Ior some
occupants they've got suIIicient warning iI the property is posted in a conspicuous manner
in intervals oI not less than 700 Ieet. So, something as broad as that is suIIicient warning
under our trespass statute. And the statute goes on to say it's prima Iacia evidence oI a
trespass iI the property is posted or Ienced on a property. That's prima Iacia. So, the
question is did you have notice? Did you have some sort oI warning not to be on that
property, and here's what the Court has determined. You received some kind oI mild notice,
and a warning when you were given a 5-day notice and a 30-day notice. Probably in and oI
itselI, probably not enough to support a trespassing Iinding. But at two separate hearings in
October oI 20 1 1 , on the 1 3th and the 25th, where you were present in Court, there can be
no question that the issue is whether or not the owner oI that property wanted you on that
property more, or should you be on that property. Then, right in open Court, Judge
SIerrazza evicted you Irom the property. He Iollowed that up with a written Eviction
Decision and Order clearly indicating that you were evicted, and that the stay was denied.
So, I don't know what - that would be what I call super notice, or super warning, coming
Irom the Judge himselI. Page -149- It's oIten the situation we never get that kind oI
warning. So not only did you get a warning, you got an Order Ir om the Judge that you
were evicted Irom the property. That was then posted on the Iront door oI a property that
you had been in and returned to on November pt, 2012 (sic) the day it was posted. There
was a copy leIt on a coIIee table later at some point in time aIter Mr. Hill had entered the
property and realized that there had been someone in the property. You were emailed.
Whether or not you received that email, I don't know, but there was at least another attempt
to email you at an address to which you had responded, and to an address, an email address,
to which you had responded that you would not accept emails on your - as notice. Finally,
you were mailed a Notice oI Entry o I Judgment to 1 2 1 River Rock. I'm sure - I would
guess you didn't get that, but the parties here did everything possible to provide you notice,
to provide you warning, and you had actual notice, you had constructive notice, that you
shouldn't be on that property. The State oI Nevada and the Supreme Court decision which
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Mr. Hazlett-Stevens quoted this morning and I have in Iront oI me, State v. McNichols, \ 06
Nev. 6 5 1 , clearly, clearly, says that aIter someone has been evicted, a subsequent reentry
in the property is a trespass. A trespass reentry is what the Supreme Court called it, did not
create an objective oI that expectation oI privacy. So, that's just the Iirst section. That's been
proved beyond any doubt. There's no question that portion oI the statute has been proved.
Page -1 50- And I would also submit that Mr. Hazlett-Stevens is correct. And aIter going
back on that property numerous occasions, setting up a residence with your pet in the
basement, constitutes a separate basis independent Irom the notice requirement that you
went on to that property with the intent to vex or annoy the owner. So, under any theory set
Io rth by the City, I Iind you guilty oI the charge oI Trespassing. We can proceed to
sentencing. Mr. Hazlett-Stevens?
Its instructive to compare the summary eviction order as rendered in that summary
eviction proceeding (see 61383) Irom which the above criminal trespass conviction stemmed,
in the Reno Justice Court such NRS 40.253 proceeding was, involving Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s
law Iirm, with his then associate Casey D. Baker, Esq. appearing Ior the landlord Merliss Ior
the 121 River Rock Iormer home law oIIice at which Coughlin was arrested Ior criminal
trespass:
1udge: me I the deIendant has the rights to make an argument you have a right to the
argument stance tell you what I'm going to do until I hear the arguments
Plaintiff: well I think customarily it's the deIendant gets to go plaintiII gets no less
1udge: one actually is you are burdened so sure burdened so it's his burden on the
retaliatory part oI it but it sure burdened on the eviction itselI
Plaintiff: okay thank you Your Honor with respect to plaintiII's burden the plaintiIIs
plaintiII has introduced evidence that the lease terminated by its terms at the end oI
February 2011 thereaIter Mr. Coughlin was a month-to-month tenant pursuant to NRS
40.251 or Coughlin was properly served with a no cause termination notice to vacate on
August 22 as exhibit B exhibit C is the Iive day notice oI unlawIul detainer based on Mr.
Coughlin's Iailure to vacate the premises aIter his tenancy was terminated the aIIidavits
and testimony presented here today and Iorm conIorms with the statute conIormed with
the Iorm promulgated by the Nevada Supreme Court and with the Iorm provided by this
court plaintiII has met its burden to show that Mr. Coughlin was a month to month tenant
in August 2011 when the termination notice was properly served the eviction notice was
properly served Mr. Coughlin now bears the burden Your Honor it shiIts to him to present
and substantiate a legal deIense now the legal standard Ior summary judgment in Nevada
which is what were doing dealing with here is that Mr. Coughlin must again transcend his
allegations oI his pleadings and show by admissible evidence that there is a disputed issue
oI Iact that he has a legal deIense as a matter oI law he has not done that Your Honor he
has identiIied only a couple oI things and despite great latitude by the courts to to present
evidence and establishes legal deIense he has Iailed to do so NRS 118A.510 that is the
retaliatory eviction statutes now Mr. Coughlin chose to Iocus on subsection 1B a
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complaint that he complained in good Iaith to the landlord or law enIorcement agency Ior
a violation oI this chapter or oI a speciIic statute that imposes a criminal penalty we talked
about this at length today Mr. Coughlin identiIied one e-mail which he admitted on a
cross examination does not identiIy a speciIic statute that imposes a criminal penalty and I
think we need to be extremely clear. With this statute the statute requires the tenant has
complaint in good Iaith to the landlord oI a speciIic statute that imposes a criminal
liability he did not do that he did not identiIy a statute he alleged something about some
landscapers damaged the carpet he's read on the lawn that does not satisIy the statute
Your Honor moving down the statute to sub EEE the tenant has instituted or deIended
against judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the tenant raised an
issue oI compliance with the requirements oI this chapter respecting habitability oI
dwelling its. That cannot be. He notices the Iirst no cause termination notice to vacate
exhibit B was served on August 22, 2011 Mr. Coughlin did not institute or deIendant any
proceeding on any habitability issues until aIter those notices were provided Dr. Merliss
can't retaliate Ior something that is going to happen in the Iuture that has not happened yet
Mr. Coughlin cannot proceed under that statute to the extent Mr. Coughlin is complaining
about this small business Iirst oI all the may e-mail in Exhibit 8 does not qualiIy in or
satisIied the statutes regarding notice to a landlord about a habitability issues and Dr.
Merliss drove this point home when he testiIied that he didn't understand what Mr.
Coughlin was asking Ior I mean iI you look through these e-mails what Mr. Coughlin
does is he identiIies something he claims is some sort oI problem and then he tries to
bargain some money oII oI the rent Ior he has not produced to mean he does not say in
then they e-mail this is my notice to you under NRS 118 A .355 I am going to withhold
this rent unless you Iix this he just says we've got this issue he is later come Ior the court
and he has told it that he Iixed it to the tune oI $500 well he is not produced in receipt is
not produced a bit or invoice Irom contractor he hasn't produced anything Iurthermore
Your Honor under NRS 118 A355 so to the tenant may not proceed under this section iI
the landlord's inability to adequately remedy the Iailure or use his best eIIorts to remedy
the Iailure within 14 days is due to the tenant's reIusal to allow lawIul access to dwelling
unit as required by the rental agreement or this chapter Dr. Merliss testiIied that he tried
to send Zach Nash out there he tried to send Randy Fisher the handyman out there they
weren't allowed in nine Your Honor iI the court is I have this gentleman ready to testiIy
sooner to that eIIect nevertheless Mr. Coughlin he cannot proceed under the statute he has
no deIense iI he doesn't let them in to Iix. What is more Your Honor Mr. Coughlin wants
to Iocus on this 48 hour notice under the lease iI Mr. Coughlin is the one making a
complaint the complaints about these alleged it dishes came all being one oI them which
we have no prooI oI that there is more than the house but let's just say Ior arguments sake
he makes the complaint then he is waived the right to hide behind the notice provision oI
the lease or at the very least should be a stop Irom asserting it it's his request that's what
were running into and that's what we see here on exhibits a through I Your Honor here.
He here he is Mr. Coughlin makes a complaint about mold and insulation and here is Dr.
Merliss immediately saying hey I'll get somebody out there will get this Iixed note
lookup statutory notice NRS inspection landlord tenant. Mr. Coughlin should be a stop
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Irom the Irom hiding behind the notice provision in the lease with respect to Randy Fisher
Your Honor I was not able to put him on the stand today but Mr. Coughlin was provided
with substantial notice more than 48 hours Ior Mr. Fisher to go inspect the window issue
there was an electrical lied that's Mr. Coughlin identiIied. Mr. Coughlin cannot proceed
under the retaliatory under the habit to excuse me under the habitability statutes iI he
doesn't allow lawIul access to the property in any event Your Honor nothing that Mr.
Coughlin as not even made an attempt much less a showing to to have any oI the issues
that he identiIied as habitability type issues the Windows the stairs the weeds the mold he
is not made any attempt to have those Iit under the habitability statute
1udge: well I tend to agree that under subsection see or EM sorry oI 118A.510 one he he
has to have instituted or deIended against a judicial or administrative proceeding based on
habitability which that is diIIerent than complaining about habitability which he can
interests through a separate lawsuit
Plaintiff: yes
1udge: so I simply. Simply complaining about habitability issues does not satisIy the
retaliatory conduct provision
Plaintiff: that is exactly right Your Honor and in any event Mr. Coughlin has not shown
as is his burden to do that any oI his complaints were in good Iaith under that statute or
that Dr. Merliss acted in a retaliatory Iashion Dr. Merliss said I didn't evict you because
oI these things you didn't pay your rent we tried to help you you would let us that's not
retaliation Your Honor he's Mr. Coughlin is attempting to make logical leaps between
him threatening to sue Ior retaliation and Dr. Merle is hiring our oIIice that that is you
know per se retaliatory well what are you supposed to do when you're tenant threatens to
sue you you gotta get a lawyer it's just simply not relevant in the logical leave is not their
Sir. Your Honor the only issue beIore the court today his possession oI the property in the
court notice this and we've gone over this Mr. Coughlin has gone on and on and on about
potential claims
Coughlin Your Honor it's been 5 min.
1udge: they have 5 min. are up so go ahead Mr. Coughlin
Coughlin thank you Your Honor just sit at the outset that I know I've been critical oI Mr.
Plaintiff: at some point throughout this but I do think Dr. Merle us is gotten his money's
worth is gotten some pretty solid litigating in most respects Your Honor I Ieel pretty
strongly about this case but I could see where possibly some other people would see other
people Ieels diIIerent ways I think it has a lot to do with maybe what you want this date in
the CD to be iI you wanted to be a one where the people who aren't that powerIul don't
have much money but who demands that the law be Iollowed or iI you want to be a
scarcity like that I guess you would rule one way but iI you're going to ruled the other
way it seems to me that you would have to make some torturous twists and turning her to
Iind that Dr. Merliss all the sudden doesn't get his rent on August 11 he wakes up inspect
the country August 11, 2011 notices his mortgage check hasn't been coming in every day
on August 11, 2000 $.11 an e-mail saying hey what's up with this I want my money I
don't want to hear about your complaints I want my money you're not gonna give me your
money will guess what I'm sending to people down there right now one today and one
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tomorrow oh you want your notice guess what single Iurther communications to my
attorney CIA like that kick you out on your ass in a big you and that's how it comes across
to me and that's exactly what the legislature intended to prevent with 118 A.510. It has
been educational to me an interesting certainly to try to present some oI these arguments
justice court ruled Las Vegas 44 certainly have good reIer to your vast breadth oI your
experience and its approach in your courtroom there are considering your longest tenured
mayor Reno's history
1udge: surgeon-escrow any points with so
Defendant: on about try to score points Your Honor am trying to validate to myselI that
someone is bringing to bear to his decision on this ability to see the whole Iield. What I'm
worried about is what this does to we want to be Las Vegas do we want to be rule 44 Las
Vegas where is such a transient community people are handing out prostitution pamphlets
got all this super Las Vegas type stuII going on and so they had a knack rule 44 to allow
them to do certain things to deal with the craziness Reno's not Las Vegas Reno is months
the most well read cities in the country I went to law school Las Vegas unIamiliar with
Las Vegas I'm Irom Reno unIamiliar with Reno investing in tenants rights and I have a
background legal services I work Ior Washoe legal services they have a landlord tenant
section there I didn't work and I worked as a domestic violence attorney Ior a while but
investing in tenants rights is an investment in the community and that something that this
community needs at this but thank you Your Honor
1udge: alright I am prepared to rule and I do Iirst oI all I do want to say I acknowledge
the defendant's argument with respect to rule 44 And 1ustice Court in Las Vegas
and I have been unable to find a similar rule with respect to Reno justice court so
my decision with respect to the escrow money will be separate from this but I do find
number one that the landlord met its burden of proof with respect to unlawIul detainer
that the exhibits and the testimony submitted to the court speciIically exhibit B the tenant
was notiIied oI the no cause termination in a timely manner and with proper service
exhibit C the tenant was notiIied Iive day notice oI unlawIul detainer and compliance with
the statute and with proper service and thereIore the deIendant was an unlawIul detainer
eIIective as oI the date oI the beginning oI these proceedings which was on artists. Im
sorry well certainly by October 10 when the landlord's affidavit was filed but certainly
today without question Iurther I have considered the tenant's arguments with respect to it
retaliation speciIically under 118A.510 with respect to subsection "a" although the
tenant has complained about violations of building housing or health code I do not
find there is any evidence that he made said complaint to a government agency
charged with responsibility for enforcement of that code.
Second, with respect to the subsection "b", although defendant did present evidence
today of destruction of carpet and alleged that it was a crime under ARS 2.33
25.27 2.4 there is no evidence that said complaint cited a specific statute to the
landlord but rather a general complaint about the structure of this carpet and
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therefore I find it that subsection of the statute was not satisIied as will him and I
further find that even if it was even if the landlord knew what you're trying to say
the landlord did not retaliate against you for that the landlord eviction was based on
nonpayment of rent not your complaining of your destruction of carpet and I also at
the prior court proceeding I made findings with respect to the damages and those
damages in total were $2725 and that was the outside number and so I found that you
owed at least $2275 even giving you the benefit of all the doubts and today there was
evidence presented that the stairs were only $75 I gave you $125 for the stairs credit
there was an e-mail presented today that indicated that it's all you are asking for was
$75.
Defendant: may I preserve my objection Ior settlement oIIers being admitted
1udge: will you can reserve your objection preservative I am making my Iindings are not
oI
1udge: and then with respect to the noxious weeds first of all I find that that is not a
habitability issue second oI all I Iind that under the lease you were required to maintain
the lawn and third this is under subsection "a", you didn't make a complaint the
governmental agency and there is no eviaence that you aia with respect to the noxious
weeas, as to the moldy insulation I do find that that could be a habitability issue
clearly could be. However, again under 118A.510 subsection to make it retaliatory it
has to be have been presented either in action suit. By you or defendant against you
against by you and the judicial administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the
tenant raised the issue of compliance with the requirements of habitability and since
you didn't raise this issue until after the landlord had in fact filed the complaint I find
that that it did not violate the habitability statute did not violate the retaliatory
eviction statute for all those reasons I Iind that the deIense oI retaliation does not meet
the requirements oI chapter 40 speciIically one second here speciIically 40.253
subsections 6 The Court aetermines that there is not a legal aefense to the allegea
unlawful aetainer ana therefore the court to this grant the eviction with respect to the
money in escrow the court finas that that money is to the lanalora however I am not
going to oraer that toaay since the aefenaant is maae argument that the court aoes not
have enough fact a proper rule with respect to escrow as similar to Las Jegas fustice
court rule 44 ana therefore since the tenant still has the ability to appeal in this matter I
will give him 10 days to file a proper appeal which is the statutory time friend and if
he does so that money will be used to satisfy his appeal bond in this matter if he does
not do so then at that time a proper motion can be made by plaintiff's counsel on this
matter the eviction will be eIIective October 31 at 5 PM.
Defendant: Your Honor is the IFP status bearing on the appeal or is that a whole new
IFP bond?
1udge: I denied your IFP on the appeal but I am not sure if I actually aia it in writing Sir
Defendant: but you granted to the instant case
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1udge: I believe I don't recall
Plaintiff: but you denied it Ior the appeal?
1udge: well the thing is there is enough money aepositea that you aont neea an IFP Sir
Plaintiff: its all the money I have my name
1udge: while it may be but I am not releasing it to you but I am allowing you to use it
to satisfy the appeal bond in this case which would normally be three months rent are I
Defendant: not double?
1udge: okay I will grant your IFP for this appeal if you go forward but the appeal you
filed was not a proper appeal Sir
Defendant: okay at that point I get the rent escrow back?
1udge: no you aont get rent that what happens is its gonna satisfy the appeal bona
penaing your appeal to the District Court
Defendant: so the the appeal bond toward the IFP doesn't apply to it
1udge: no. The oI appeal bond a separate the IFP's Ior the Iiling Iee that's all it's good Ior
Defendant: sometimes it covers depositions and
1udge: well it's not been a cover in this case are oI Artie told you
Defendant: and that's your ruling orders that
1udge: dying embers because it would be in District Court?
1udge: well you can argue District Court but it will be my ruling that you have to post
appeal bond post an appeal bond and I will since there's some question about the
money and the escrow I am going to order that it satisfied the appeal bond in this case
Defendant: okay
1udge: but you can go Iorward with that appeal that's up to you are not going to advise
you
Defendant: do we adress the motion to stay here today Your Honor?
1udge: the motion to what question mark
Defendant: the motion to stay Your Honor
1udge: the motion to aismiss is aeniea writing get a stay from the District Court if you
want
Defendant: okay maybe I aont want to aaaress the motion the state toaay if thats all the
inquiry thats going to be too votea to it aevotea to it
Judge: I have read during the recess your brieIs and stuII but I'm denying a motion to stay
Richard Brisson stuII I'm denying a motion to stay so it's clear
Plaintiff: Your Honor I have two quick points with respect to an appeal bond Dr. Merliss
is entitled to an award oI Iees under NRS 40.254 sub three under NRS 40.254 sub three
1udge: what you can prepare proper memorandum oI costs and Iees
Plaintiff: yes or we will
Defendant: a prevailing party or in some egregious circumstances you get these?
Plaintiff: it's in the statute
1udge: it's in the statute under chapter 40 in fact they can get three times the rent too
Defendant: Ior when the nerve because somebody just
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1udge: they could you need to read the statute
Plaintiff: my point in bringing that up Your Honor is that we will be asking Ior that those
Iees be considered part oI the appeal bond in addition to the money already with the court
I mean Mr. you seen the brieIs Dr. Merliss has incurred substantial amount oI Iees
1udge: well I understand but I don't even have your memorandum oI costs and Iees
Plaintiff: we will make the motion
1udge: you make the proper motion and I will decide it
Plaintiff: thank you Your Honor
1udge: it doesn't have to be decided today
Plaintiff: that's true Your Honor
1udge: and in the meantime the money's not going anywhere nor do I believe this
deIendant is going to come up with more money
Plaintiff: Your Honor we would like to ask the court Ior permission to inspect the
property prior to October 31 we've attempted to inspect in the past but we are very
concerned about the property being damaged between now and then
1udge: I have alreaay tola you that I would allow in order to inspect the property
allowing order to inspect the property and what is your position on that as to a time when
it could be accommodated Sir newly cough and you said my position on the time to
accommodate that and let
1udge: yeah
Defendant: this emergency need to inspect it because it's good to be emptied in six days
my position is that it shocks the conscience
1udge: will okay I will grant the order 48 hours Irom today
Plaintiff: 48 hours Irom today we can and specs are
1udge: yes
Defendant: and I just like to preserve Ior the appeal all the egregious conduct by the
wish
Defendant: can I Your Honor?
1udge: yes you get iI you want to do it and he can look at it but I would suggest that the
plaintiII prepared and submitted to you Ior comments
Defendant: well he is the one who got one years rent to litigate this case so
1udge: one years rent?
Bait Coughlin
Plaintiff: and understand either Surrey
Defendant: yeah 900x12 months
Plaintiff: all prepare the order and submit it Coughlin Ior his review
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1udge: okay what you need to get it done you can both prepare orders and all picked the
one I want to sign
Plaintiff: you'll have by tomorrow answer
1udge: when will years be in Mr. Coughlin when will yours be in Mr. Coughlin
Defendant: well I will have to look at what records on the Your Honor records on that
Your Honor
1udge: well iI it's I'm going to give you today is Wednesday it will have to be done by
Thursday because I will be signing an order on Thursday no later than noon on
Thursday
Plaintiff: noon on Thursday yes or
1udge: alright y'all have a good day
Plaintiff: thank you
Defendant: thank you sir."

Its quite clear that the summary eviction order as rendered Irom the bench by justice court
Judge SIerrazza on 10/27/11 departs markedly Irom the prosed Order that Hill's associate
Baker was able to get Judge SIerrazza to sign, but regardless, Judge SIerrazza's
orders/rulings Irom rendered Irom the bench at the conclusion oI the 11/7/11 hearing in
the justice court amended such 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE, as well.
Judge SIerrazza continually mixed summary and plenary law and concepts where there
is a real premium per Aikins, Davidsohn, and Paul (not to mention NJCRCP 108, and
109) not to in summary eviction proceedings (MROA 898):
"Defendant: and I just like to preserve Ior the appeal all the egregious conduct by the
wish"
So, where a "judgment" is involved, Merliss Iailed to meet the jurisdictional
prerequisite oI having a "veriIied" complaint on Iile, and his attorney Baker's 10/19/11
Declaration is insuIIicient to satisIy such a requirement.
NRS40.370VeriIication oI complaint and answer.The complaint and answer must
be veriIied.
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MROA 1623-24 is the RJC's Judge SIerrazza's Order vacating his 11/9/11 NRS 69.030
Attorney Fee award in light oI Baker's admission that nothing about NRS 69 applies to
summary eviction proceedings or the appeals thereoI. Such would then provide a judicial
estoppel collateral bar to Baker's subsequent 1/3/12, 2/24/12, 4/3/12, and 4/19/12 Motions
Ior Attorney's Fees and Costs (beyond the extend to which a DCR 13 provides that "a
motion once made" may not be made again), all premised upon NRS 69.050 or the
equally inapplicable NRS 18.005.
MROA 424-426 is Coughlin's 10/19/11 Notice oI Interlocutory Appeal and the
accompanying Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis submitted along therewith. Such
IFP Motion "perIected" the appeal, and the justice court's statements on the record at the
conclusion oI the 10/25/11 "trial"/continuation oI the 10/13/11 summary eviction
proceeding make clear that no Order denying such was entered, and that such IFP Motion
was granted (though Judge SIerrazza maintained that such Order would not grant a waiver
oI the bond Ior costs on appeal
Filing such an IFP Motion satisIies any requirement Ior perIecting an appeal oI paying
a Iiling Iee.
An unlawIul-detainer statute violates the Due Process Clause|FN4| oI the Federal
Constitution to the extent that it permits service oI an unlawIul-detainer action by merely
leaving or posting a summons at a tenant's residence.|FN5| Furthermore, a court lacks
personal jurisdiction iI a deIective summons is issued by the landlord on the tenant in an
unlawIul-detainer action| FN6| or iI the landlord Iailed to perIect service oI the summons and
complaint.|FN7|
|FN4| U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, 1. |FN5| Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 102 S.
Ct. 1874, 72 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1982); Thornton v. Butler, 728 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
|FN6| Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite, Inc., 2001 UT App 347, 37 P.3d 1202 (Utah
Ct. App. 2001). Compliance with statutory service requirements is jurisdictional. Canterwood
Place L.P. v. Thande, 106 Wash. App. 844, 25 P.3d 495 (Div. 1 2001). |FN7| Don Ash
Properties v. Dunno, 2003-Ohio-5893, 2003 WL 22480323 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist.
Franklin County 2003) (involving a Iorcible-entry-and-detainer action.)
MROA 628-629 demonstrates that there is nothing in the record to comply with NRS
40.280(3)(b)'s requirement that "certificate of mailing issued by the United States Postal
Service". Further, 1udge Sferrazza committed reversible error and exceeded his
jurisdiction where he purported to excise from the requirements of NRS 40.280 the
requirement for such a "certificate of mailing issued by the United States Postal
Service" under some interpretation of NRS 40.280(3)(c)'s: "(c)The endorsement oI a
sheriII, constable or other process server stating the time and manner of service."" The
phrase "manner oI service" in NRS 40.280(3)(c) necessarily requires a close review oI NRS
40.280(1), which provides Ior the manner in which the 8/22/11 and 9/27/11 "notices to quit"
"may be served"
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MROA 491:18-20 Couglins preserved his NRS 40.280 argument in this 10/24/11
Emergency Demand Ior Jurty Trial and Amended Tenant's Answer/Counterclaim: "Where
service is by a certiIicate oI mailing or by the sheriII or constable, the cOUlis have not
required cOHoboration by a witness as provided in NRS 40.280(1 )(a). Also, some courts
require a showing of due diligence before service can be established based on posting and
mailing. . Glazier v. Justice Court oI Smith Valley Tp., 1995, 899 P.2d 110.FN1. Wood v.
SaIeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) (quoting NRCP 56(c))."
As to Baker's purported 10/19/11 Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq. Pursuant to
NRS 40.254, there is mention oI it in the docket at page 9 oI 275 in the RJC's Volume 1 Iiled
in the 2JDC on 12/21/11, however, such purported Iilings is missing Irom both Volume 1 and
2 (ie, its not juxtaposed to its chronological neighbor Iilings...the only appearance oI such
Iiling (Coughlin's MROA is consistent with this as well) by Baker is as an Exhibit at the
10/25/11 "Trial", which means there is no record oI any sort oI "landlord's aIIidavit" (whether
one considers Baker's Declaration oI Casey D. Baker Pursuant to NRS 40.254 or Merliss's
"unlawIul detainer aIIidavit") actually being Iile stamped in or admitted into evidence until
both were so admitted as exhibits at the 10/25/11 "Trial" (the docket entry Ior "10/19/11" lists
such Baker Declaration, yet the Volumes 1 and 2 oI the RJC's 12/21/11 ROA Iiled with the
2JDC simply do not contain any such entry, and its not until one review the "Volume 5"
(which is really merely marked "Exhibit" Ior the 10/25/11 hearing that one comes across such
attempts to satisIy the requirements oI NRS 40.254(2). NRS 40.253(5)(6) and just basic
Iairness and notions oI due process require that Coughlin be provided such "complaint" prior
to the Trial/continuation of the 10/13/11 summary eviction proceeaing. It is hardly Iair to
expect Coughlin to show up on 10/25/11 prepared to litigate complicated holdover
proceedings issues, especially where Merliss and Baker perpetuated a Iraud with respect to
whether there claim was "authorized by law" vis a vis the issue relative to the lease, the
"stated lease term", whether there was a "deIined termination date", etc., etc.
NRS40.280Service oI notices to quit; prooI required beIore issuance oI order to remove.
1.the notices required by NRS 40.251 to 40.260, inclusive, may be served:...(MROA 627
NCS's Durden checked box 3 oI "Form #4", eliminating subsections (a)-(b) Irom this
calculus) (c)II the place oI residence or business cannot be ascertained, or a person oI
suitable age or discretion cannot be Iound there, by posting a copy in a conspicuous place on
the leased property, delivering a copy to a person there residing, iI the person can be Iound,
and mailing a copy to the tenant at the place where the leased property is situated...
3.Before an order to remove a tenant is issued pursuant to subsection 5 oI NRS
40.253, a landlord shall Iile with the court a prooI oI service oI any notice required by that
section... this prooI must consist oI:
(a)A statement, signed by the tenant and a witness, acknowledging that the tenant
received the notice on a speciIied date;
(b)A certificate of mailing issued by the United States Postal Service; or
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(c)The endorsement oI a sheriII, constable or other process server stating the time and
manner of service."
As Ior the 9/27/11 MROA 627's option 3 is checked, which reads: "Because the place
oI residence or business could not be ascertained, or a person of suitable age or discretion
could not be found there, by posting a copy in a conspicuous place on the property,
delivering a copy to a person' there residing, iI the person could be Iound, and mailing a copy
to the tenant(s) at the place where the property is situated. (Attach United Stales Postal
Service Certificate of Mailing)." (Durden elected not to check box 1 therein, which would
have indicated he was swearing to have perIormed service by "delivering a copy to the tenant
personally in the presence oI a witness. (Server, Tenant, & Witness Must all Sign).
There is very little good reason Ior Judge SIerrazza's apparent lessening oI the NRS
40.280 standard oI prooI oI service where "licensed process servers" are involved, given
companies such as Nevada Court Services necessarily have a vested, Iinancial interest in
delivering to their clients, like landlord Merliss and his attorney's Baker and Hill, the sort oI
"personal service" that would speed up these already overly quick summary evictions in light
oI the removal oI the "3 days Ior mailing" necessitated by NRCP 6(e)'s dictates (see NRS
40.400).
Judge SIerrazza's 9/27/11 Order in 1492 reads: "Motions to Strike granted. Case
dismissed without prejudice on landlords motion."
Further MROA 620 contains the notice required alerting a tenant oI their rights under
NRS 40.251(4), and given Coughlin's multiple motions Ior stay (including those oI 10/13/11,
10/17/11, 10/25/11 (according to the court), 10/26/11, 10/31/11, and 11/1/11, and oI 11/3/11
(which speciIically invoked NRS 70.010 and a disability providing "prooI" thereoI by virtue
oI the Iact that a licensed attorney was making such assertions, and alluding to ADA "privacy
issues"), all prior to the lockout (though there is no requirement that such motions must occur
prior to such, and indeed, by analogy, NRS 40.380 expressly makes clear that a tenant has up
to "within 10 days" after such unlawIul detainer ruling to so move Ior a stay).
NRS 40.251(2). ...the tenant may request to be allowed to continue in possession Ior an
additional 30 days ... by submitting a written request for an extended period and
providing proof of the tenant`s age or disability. ... (4).II a landlord rejects a request to
allow a tenant to continue in possession Ior an additional 30 days pursuant to subsection 2, the
tenant may petition the court for an order to continue in possession for the additional 30
days. If the tenant submits proof to the court that the tenant is entitled to request such
an extension, the court may grant the petition and enter an order allowing the tenant to
continue in possession Ior the additional 30 days. II the court denies the petition, the tenant
must be allowed to continue in possession Ior 5 calendar days Iollowing the date oI entry oI
the order denying the petition.
MROA 224 (Coughlin's 10/11/11 Motion Ior Continuanc) cites to Nev JCRCP 110,
which reads: "RULE110.MOTION TO STAY ENFORCEMENT OF A SUMMARY
EVICTION ORDER: A tenant may Iile a motion to stay a summary eviction order pursuant
to NRS 70.010 at any time aIter a notice Ior eviction is served upon the tenant. II such a
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motion is Iiled beIore the court issues the relevant summary eviction order, the court shall
consider the motion and reIlect in the summary order, the time and date to which, iI the
motion is granted, the order is stayed."
Such language note only rebuts Merliss's contention that Motion to Stay not made
beIore the execution oI the 24 hour lockout order are moot (clearly, they are not), but brings
up NRS 40.251(4), Judge SIerrazza's verbally rendering a denial oI Coughlin even bringing
up the idea oI a Motion to Stay at the conclusion oI the 10/25/11 trial, the Iact that the RJC
did not even mail the 10/26/11 Order by Judge SIerrazza denying Coughlin's 10/26/11 Motion
to Set Aside, or Stay Eviction Order until RJC Stancil's CertiIicate oI Mailing indicates on
10/31/11, and the 5 days Irom "the date oI entry oI the order denying the petition" (under
NRS 40.251(4), especially consdiering NRCP 6(e) provides that such periods oI time "less
than 10 days" involves counting only judicial days (the RJC was not open on Fridays back
then, such as October 28th, 2011, and the Iollowing Monday,
Nev JCRCP 110 is arguably unconstitutional or otherwise void Ior vagueness where it
mixes the summary concept oI a summary eviction order and the plenary concept oI a
"judgment":
"NRS 70.010 Execution may issue at any time within 6 years; stay of execution of
judgment.
1. Execution Ior the enIorcement oI a judgment oI a justice court may be issued by a
justice or the clerk oI the court, under the direction and supervision oI a justice, on the
application oI the party entitled thereto, at any time within 6 years Irom the entry oI judgment.
2. The court, or any justice thereoI, may stay the execution oI any judgment, including
any judgment in a case oI Iorcible or unlawIul detainer, Ior a period not exceeding 10 days.
"
"
MROA 111:9-21 (also at MROA 177:20-25): "All the materials and arguments
contained in Coughlin's original Tenant's Answer and Motion Ior Sanctions and Motion Ior
ClariIication are hereby incorporated by reference. Coughlin obtained the directed estimates
Ior the repair oI the crumbling stairs/steps/risers at the home/oIIice's entryway steps.
Following Merliss's instructing yielded a cost oI $1,250 Ior the repair oI the stairs. A $350
rent deduction Ior one seasons oI noxious weed ordinance was agreed to in writing by
Merliss, another was agreed to implicitly Ior a total yard work rent deduction oI $750. This is
all detailed in painstakingly clear emails to and Irom the landlord and tenant attached to the
original Tenant's Answer. Similarly, the disposal repair came to $125. Coughlin's law
practice, and liIe in general, has been adversely impacted a great deal by Merliss's misdeeds
as a landlord. Somehow, however, globe trottin' CaliIornian Merliss thinks Coughlin has
exhibited an 'attitude oI entitlement in this situation. NRS 118A.510"
MROA 170: "Tenant Iurther moves Ior sanctions against landlord, Matt Merliss
('Merliss) and his attorney Casey Baker, Esq. ('Baker), pursuant to NRS 7.085, Ior the
attorneys' Iees tenant has needlessly incurred due to Merliss and Baker's reckless uses oI this
court's processes, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT BAD FAITH ATTEMPTS
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TO INSPECT WITH RECORDING EQUIPMENT PLAINTIFF'S HOME LAW OFFICE
HOURS AFTER HAVING THE POWER SHUT OFF AT PLAINTIFF'S HOME LAW
OFFICE WHERE LANDLORD HAD, APPARENTLY, A DELINQUENT UTILITY BILL
ASSIGNED TO THE PROPERTY TENANT RENTS, AND WHERE NO NOTICE WAS
PROVIDED TO TENANT OF THE IMPENDING INTERRUPTION OF ESSENTIAL
SERVICES, CAUSIAC A11ORAEY 1EAAA1 COUCHLIA'S LAW PRAC1ICE
DAMAGES."
MROA 376 (Coughlin's 10/17/11 Motion Ior Stay): "In most cases, the landlord can
choose whether to Iile a summary or Iormal eviction action. However, there are circumstances
under which summary eviction cannot be used. For instance, summary eviction is not
available Ior: 2) Eviction oI commercial tenants Ior other than nonpayment oI rent (See NRS
40.254) Using location Ior a "commercial" law practice, you Iiled a no cause, ie, "Ior other
than nonpayment oI rent, not based in law or Iact, Rule 11, plus this escrow thing gets put
asunder. NRS 40.254 UnlawIul detainer: Supplemental remedy oI summary eviction and
exclusion oI tenant Irom certain types oI property. Lease allows Ior use Ior commercial
purposes. Void, void, void! NJCRCP 59, 60..."
MROA 529 (10/25/11 Motion Ior Summary Judgment/Pre-Trial Statement by
Coughlin): "The Green Action crew admitted to Coughlin (and Coughlin was prevented
from submitting video and audio recordings into the record by 1udge Sferrazza, despite
the salient importance to Coughlin's counterclaims any statements they made would have
as to whether Dr. Merliss is responsible Ior or ratiIied the property damage to Coughlin
careIul wool green law carpet installation, which was laid, cut, and notched around the house
and exterior Ience in a very exacting manner, only to be converted by the Green Action crew
and leIt in the street and sidewalk near the house, creating a theIt hazard and exigent situation
in which the undersigned's law practice suIIered economic damages and Coughlin was
required to take immediate action to mitigate the damages. If the Reno 1ustice Court wants
to implement something similar to 1ustice Court Rule 44 of Las Jegas, it must first have
the rule approved by the Supreme Court of Nevada. See, Nevada 1CRCP RULE 83."
MROA 1225 (transcript oI 11/7/11 Hearing on Coughlin's Motion to Stay):
"DeIendant: I Your Honor I went into the main case on this and we case a bistro case down in
Las Vegas. I believe as I said I have to ask the justice court Iirst day perhaps it later on this
court Iirst day. A stay would be appropriate under rule eight in that the object of my
appeal a leasehold interest would be defeated if it were not to be granted I would suffer
irreparable harm and so would my law practice and perhaps my clients some oI whom are
trying to avoid trustee sales in the context oI a Ioreclosure on their mortgages. "
MROA 197: The Reno Justice Court has a policy oI requiring tenant's to Iile a copy oI
the 5 day notice with their Tenant's Answer, which not only is an unlawIul end around oI the
protections against landlord excesses presented by NRS 7.085 and NRCP 11, but in no way
should operate as an admission oI anything by the tenant, and certainly not oI service or in
any way speak to NRS 40.280 issues. Regardless, there is no USPS CertiIicate oI Mailing
there either.
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NRS 40.254 makes real clear that NRS 40.280 must be satisIied (Davidsohn and
Aikins establish doing so is a jurisdictional prerequisite) and it is maniIest Irom the Iact oI the
record that no USPS CertiIicate oI Mailing was ever Iiled (or, even, apparently utilized, and
as Ior the 9/27/11 Notice, there is nothing in the record to even suggest such was actually
mailed to Coughlin, as Baker apparently believed that his courthouse sanctuary violating
purported attempt to hand any such 9/27/11 5 Day Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer to Coughlin
during the hearing in the precursor non-payment summary eviction in 1492 (any such
purported attempt at service Iails in light oI the immunity accord litigants and their attorneys
to service oI process while attending court)
II service occurs by leaving the summons with a person oI suitable age or by aIIixing a
copy oI the summons to the premises, a statute may require that a copy oI the summons and
complaint also be mailed to the tenant. McLellan v. Pearson, 546 So. 2d 817 (La. Ct. App. 5th
Cir. 1989); Marrero v. Escoto, 145 Misc. 2d 974, 554 N.Y.S.2d 375 (App. Term 1990).
Hill's associate Baker's 12/1/11 Iiling in 1708 reads: "OPPOSITION TO, AND
RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO OPPOSE ON THE MERITS, ALL PAPERS FILED OR
SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANT ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER 23, 2011
PlaintiII, MATT MERLISS, through counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, CHARTERED and
CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ., opposes all papers Iiled or submitted to the court by deIendant,
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, on or about November 23, 2011. ThIS oppositio;n is
primarily based on the apparent Iugitive nature oI the papers that were actually delivered to
Merliss' counsel, and the impossibility oI any merit-based opposition by Merliss at this time
due to those papers' illegibility, as discussed below. However, Merliss also reserves his right
to oppose any oI the reIerenced papers on the merits in the event the court elects to so
consider them. .
The papers at issue, which, on inIormation and belieI may have been Iiled or submitted to the
court by Mr. Coughlin on or about November 23, 2011, include:
1) Order Ior Hearing; 2) Motion to Set Bond and Stay Eviction; 3) Designation oI
Record and Statement oI Points on Appeal and Notice oI Intent to File BrieI; 4)
AIIidavit/Declaration in Support oI Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien and Ior Return
oI Personal Property Iiled; 5) CertiIicate oI No Transcript; 6) Notice oI Appeal; 7) Statement
oI Proceedings (2); 8) Notice oI Posting and Acceptance oI Supersedeas/Cost Bond on
Appeal; and 9) Tenant's AIIidavit/Declaration (Other than Nonpayment oI Rent -Private
Housing) (delivered by Coughlin, but no corresponding document reIerenced on the court's
docket.) PlaintiII Iurther reserves his right to oppose any other document Iiled or submitted by
Coughlin which may not have been served on plaintiII. This opposition/reservation is based
on the points and authorities below and all papers and pleadings on Iile herein.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES PlaintiII believes the court to be Iamiliar with the
substantive and procedural Iacts oI this case, and will not needlessly repeat them here. The
pertinent Iacts Ior purposes oI this opposition are as Iollows:
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1. On the morning oI Friday, November 25, 2011 (Family Day, the day aIter
Thanksgiying) Richard G. Hill, Esq., counsel Ior Merliss, arrived at his oIIice to Iind a
Iootball-sized wad oI crumpled papers that had been stuIIed through the Iront-door mail slot
by Mr. Coughlin.
1.1 True and correct copies oI photographs taken oI Mr. Coughlin's documents
are attached hereto as EXHIBIT 1.
2. Because Mr. Hill's oIIice was closed on that day, which is a court holiday, the
original papers were not untangled and reviewed until Monday, November 28, 2011, when the
undersigried, Casey D. Baker, Esq., returned to the oIIice.
3. What the undersigned discovered is what appears to be nine separate, incomplete
documents, all oI which appear to be landlord/tenant forms published by the Nevada Supreme
Court, which have been partially, but incomprehensibly , Iilled out and
signed by Mr. Coughlin.
4. The documents were crumpled into a large ball. See EXHIBIT 1. They are all
missing their Iinal page (presumably, a certiIicate oI service). None oI the documents were
stapled. None oI the documents were paper clipped or attached in any way. None oI the
documents were in order. Some oI the documents were duplicates. One oI the documents was
literally one-halI oI a torn page. It took the undersigned and a member oI his staII
approximately 20 minutes to un-crumple and sort through the pile oI papers just to organize
and identiIy what Mr. Coughlin had delivered. Even then, because there were duplicates,
counsel is not sure that all of the pages have been appropriately placed with the correct
document. The stack oI papers then had to be leIt under heavy books Ior two days to Ilatten
them out, just so they could be reviewed and placed into a Iile.
5. Importantly, each oI the documents appears to be an original. That is, each
document contains original ''handwriting'' in blue ink. Further, none oI the documents are Iile-
stamped, and none oI them contain a certiIicate oI service. As such, the undersigned has no
idea whether or not the documents served on his oIIice were ever Iiled with the court. Upon a
review oI the court's docket, it appears that the same or similarly captioned documents were
Iiled by Mr. Coughlin on November 23, 2011, but without reviewing the court's actual Iile,
there is no way to know Ior certain whether those documents are the same as what was served
on counsel.
5.1. True and correct copies oI the documents Mr. Coughlin stuIIed through
counsel's mail slot are attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2. Given the manner oI "service", the
condition oI the documents, and the history oI this case, it is highly likely that these
doc.uments are not the same as the documents Mr. Coughlin actually Iiled with the court,
even though the Iorms appear to bear the same or similar names. Thus, Merliss speciIically
reserves his right to a reasonable and real opportunity to oppose all papers that were actually
Iiled by Mr. Coughlin on or about the time the documents in EXHIBIT 2 were served.
6. Even more importantly, virtually all of the "handwriting" on all of the
documents is completely illegible. Merliss cannot be expected to intelligently respond to
unintelligible scribbles. Ironically, one oI the only legible entries by Mr. Coughlin: is his
admission on page 5 oI 6 oI his (apparently unIiled) Tenant's AIIidavit/Declaration that his
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request for a stay is moot. Why, then, aoes Mr. Coughlin feel it is necessary to continue to
move this court for that relief (CI., NRS 7.085. CI., NJCRCP 11.
7. ReIerence is made to the Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq., attached hereto as
EXHIBIT 4, Ior authentication or all exhibits.
LAW AND ANALYSIS Proper service under NJCRCP 5(b) requires that a copy oI
any Iiled document be delivered to counsel Ior the opposing party. That is to ensure that the
opposing party receives exactly what has been Iiled with the court, so he has a real and
meaningIul opportunity to respond to it. As a practicing attorney, Mr. Coughlin must be
presumed to be aware oI this most basic procedural requirement. Nevertheless, here,
Coughlin's "service" consisted oI shoving a wadded-up pile oI original, incomplete, unsorted,
unstapled, unclipped, illegible, hand-scribbled documents through counsel's door in the
middle oI the night on a holiday. Not only are the documents illegible and completely
unintelligible, Merliss has no way to know whether those documents are the same as what
was filed with the court two days earlier, since they all appear to be originals. CI., NJCRCP
s(b). As such, Merliss cannot reasonably be expected to respond to whatever information
Mr. Coughlin has actually presented to the court in the papers he actually filed. It is
important Ior the court to note that it is Mr. Coughlin's obligation to properly serve Merliss,
pursuant to the rules oI civil procedure, with an actual copy oI whatever he Iiled.
It is not Merliss' responsibility to chase down the true contents of whatever
illegible, original, fugitive documents Coughlin may deliver to counsel's office under
cover of darkness.
At the emergency hearing on November 7, 2011, this court admonished Mr. Coughlin,
an attorney, about his frivolous filings. In Iact, at that hearing, the court specifically
instructed the undersigned not to oppose any motion for new trial Coughlin might Iile,
citing the massive amounts oI attorney's Iees Mr. Coughlin's Irivolity has already caused Dr.
Merliss to incur in this case.1 (Inl oI course, the time Ior Coughlin to Iile such a motion has
long since passed, and any request Ior that relieI is now time-barred as a matter oI law.
NJCRCP 59(b). Coughlin's antics continue to cause Merliss to needlessly incur attorney's
Iees.)
(NOTE: at review oI the transcript Irom that 11/7/11 hearing reveals the extent to
which Baker violates RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 in the above assertion, at MROA 1237-38:
Defendant: thank you Your Honor. Can I just preserve one more thing Your Honor
1udge:I'm done done the hearing is over, Sir. But I will tell you this. And I will tell you this
that iI anything else is Iiled with this Court I'm good order that it will not be accepted by the
clerk, all right?. The only appropriate place to Iile anything now is the District Court, all
right?
Defendant: with respect to a rule 59 motion to correct clerical mistakes in the order
1udge: Sir iI it's a timely Iiled motion with this court. You said you perIect your appeal,
once you perIect your appeal, I no longer have jurisdiction over this case, with the exception
oI what she said the stay.
Defendant: it's my understanding that litigants can still Iile rule 59 or 60's. Rule 59's are
tolling motions with respect to appeals.
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1udge: alright I will allow you to Iollow rule 59, but I am but as this chart counsel Ior the
deIense not to answer it at this point, the Iees, I don't know iI you have read the
memorandum oI costs and Iees, which Evan Iiled anything against her
Defendant: well that speaks to making meth...
1udge: well iI you don't do something that's going to be granted, all right
Defendant: what that attorneys Iees provision speaks to where controlled substances are
being manuIactured
1udge: alright well you need to oppose that
Defendant: yes sir.")
By Iiling opposition, Merliss is speciIically reminding the court oI that prior
admonishment, and reserving his right to proper service, actual notice, and a real opportunity
to respond, on the merits, to anything Iiled herein by Mr. Coughlin. this In the event the court
deems it necessary to address the merits oI any oI the papers recently Iiled by Mr. Coughlin,
other than to strike them or simply deny Coughlin any relieI, Merliss asks Ior notiIication,
clean copies oI whatever was actually Iiled, and a real opportunity to oppose same. (NOTE:
this is a completely Iraudulent statement by Baker, as, actually, SIerrazza indicated the RJC
was divested oI jursidiction and said nothing about Coughlin making any "Irivolous" Iilings).
Merliss Iurther reminds the court that Mr. Coughlin had, but elected to squander an
opportunity to have a hearing on his November 16, 2011 Motion to Contest Personal Property
Lien. That hearing was to have taken place on November 22, 2011. But instead oI pressing
Iorward with his motion in good Iaith, Coughlin chose to evade the court's and counsel's
efforts to contact him to confirm that hearing. (another Iraudulent statement by Baker
where Coughlin wrote both the RJC and Merliss on 11/21/11, copying both with an email that
included Hill's email to Coughlin inIorming him to contact the RJC as to the 11/22/11
hearing, which is exactly what Coughlin did...Hill and Baker just didn't Ieel like showing up
on 11/22/11:
"
There has been no citation by the RJC or Hill or Baker to support this contention that
'Coughlin Iailed to cooperated with the RJC in setting the hearing (actually, that is not true,
Coughlin did cooperate, but the RJC seemingly gives Hill and Baker better treatment than it
does tenant's like Coughlin, as leaving a voice mail Ior Coughlin is all the notice the RJC ever
provided Coughlin Ior most hearings, and Coughlin responded to ChieI Clerk Stancil's written
notice oI the hearing, and in no way reIused to have the matter so set. Upon recieving
indication Irom Hill that the hearing was set Ior 11/22/11, Coughlin promptly notiIied the
RJC that he was aware oI the setting, and even indicated he was looking Iorward to getting his
wallet, state issued identiIication (driver's license), and client's Iiles at the hearing should Hill
and or Baker live up to Hill's alleged oIIer to bring them to the hearing set Ior 11/22/11.
'RE: getting my property
From: Richard Hill (rhillrichardhillaw.com) You moved this message to its current
location.
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Sent: Mon 11/21/11 2:07 PM
Cc: cdbakerrichardhillaw.com
the court is trying to get ahold oI you to hear your motion on the landlord's lien tomorrow.
iI you don't contact them, you won't get a hearing & your stuII will just stay where it is
until late december, because our schedule is blocked until then.
please contact the court
325-6501 rgh
'Our conversation
location.
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 2:21 PM
Mr. Coughlin - this conIirms our conversation oI a Iew moments ago.
You need to call Reno justice's court & conIirm that the hearing on your
motion is on Ior tomorrow.
Once you have done that, & the hearing is on calendar, call me back, & we
will have a substantive conversation
I want you to set your hearing, because you are not going to get everything
you want, and want you to have had a hearing.
As a lawyer, you know the rules.
Please proceed responsibly.
Also, please do not be putting words in my mouth when we speak.
I choose my words with you as careIully as I can
Rgh
'River rock
location.
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 2:51 PM
Mr coughlin -this conIirms a voicemail leIt Ior you
I now have your drivers license & what I think are your client Iiles.
Don't know, didn't look that closely - your privacy & all.
Will release them to you at the hearing tomorrow.
Please confirm that the hearing is on calendar
Rgh
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'RE: Our conversation
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 3:13 PM Civil
To: rhillrichardhillaw.com; cdbakerrichardhillaw.com; kstancilwashoecounty.us
Dear R1C, Ms. Stancil:

Please note that my temporary address Ior now is:
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
c/o Silver Dollar Motel
817 N. Virginia St., Unit # 2
Reno, NV 89501

I do have a Iax number, but I would preIer iI you didn't use it because it is somewhat tied
to the computers that Richard Hill is applying what I believe to be an unlawIul rent
distraint to.

I don't really have a reliable temporary phone number. Richard Hill refuses to give me
back my state issued identification, wallet, cell phone, keys, etc. (I also need my client
files very badly, for their sake and mine).

Dear Mr. Hill,
Usually courts send some notice in writing about hearings, not have the opposing
attorney claim there is one in an email, nor allow the opposing attorney to condition his
return of someone's state issued identification and or exigent client materials and law
practice equipment upon the other attoreny assenting to a waiver of the notice and
service requirements applicable to the matter....What rules apply to procedural notice
requirements in these cases? Aothing in 1CRR1 according to 1CRR1 Rule 2, not much
found in ARS 4 or 118a. 1CRCP R 83 forbids the "house rules" that you seek to take
advantage of, where they are neither published nor approved by the AJ S. Ct.....plus you
have Iorbidden me to get my mail Irom the property (and you have even attempted to get
me arrested and threatened to do so Ior my standing in public places not really doing much
oI anything) and the USPS probably has not processed my change oI address yet. I need to
get my property, not help you circumvent the procedural protection oI notice and service oI
hearings. I know, you are so used to some people bending over backwards to help you get
things done quickly that you get all crabby and tuckered out when you actually have to role
up your sleeves and do work. But, just relax, get yourselI a juicebox and a Lunchable or
something, and take it one thing at a time....like Iind a basis Ior notice Ior these hearings,
etc....make sure that it doesn't stem Irom some unpublished, unapproved by the N. S. Ct.
"house rule" oI the RJC, and lets go Irom there. In the meantime, get some inIormed
consent Irom your client, because that SchiII case puts your client in danger oI losing his
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house over a retaliatory reIusal to stand behind a couple hundred bucks oI rent deductions
he agreed to or to Iail to Iollow the notice oI inspection provisions he agree to in writing in
the Lease Agreement.
Again, I have a standing caveat in this case that I will not respond to or reIute every
baseless allegation or attempt at recounting Iacts that you make in writing or otherwise, it
would just be too burdensome. So all your "this email memorializes, whatever, whatever,"
you can save.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Licensed in Nevada
Coughlin even Iollowed up on that written indication to the RJC that he was aware that
the hearing on his 11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property lien was on calendar and
set Ior 9:30 am on 11/22/11 and that Hill and Baker were noticed on it, with another
written correspondence shortly theraIter, noting the importance oI Hill living up to his
promise to provide Coughlin his client's Iiles and driver's license at the 11/22/11 hearing:
'supersedeas bond
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 8:46 PM
To: kstancilwashoecounty.us
Ms. Stancil,
I may be unable to post the supersedeas bond in time if I am not provided my wallet,
state issued, identifcation, etc. by mr. Hill. Further law oI the case applies to Judge
SIerrazza's earlier determinatino oI the amount, and under JCRCP 73 and nrs 40.380 its not
clear what the bond should be, iI any, as well as whether the execution should have been
stayed during the period Judge SIerrazza continued to hold the $2,275. I seek clariIication
Irom you and the RJC.
Thank You,").
Further, Mr. Coughlin was made aware, prior to November 22, 2011, that counsel
for Merliss would not be available for any hearing in this matter from Thanksgiving
until late December. See EXHIBIT 3 hereto, which are true and correct copies oI emails
between Mr. Hill and Mr.
Coughlin, and the undersigned and Mr. Coughlin. (NOTE: must be nice to be able to get the
RJC to legislate away NRS 40.253(8)'s requirement that such hearing be held "within 10
days" oI Coughlin 11/16/11 Iiling).
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In any event, Coughlin's Motion To Contest Personal Property Lien, and Merliss'
Motion Ior Order to Show Cause, Iiled on November 21, 2011, have not been fully briefed.
(NOTE: really? there was the Opposition to Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien oI
11/21/11...) Merliss will ask the court to consider the matter oI Coughlin's contempt oI court
pursuant to NRS 22.020, as outlined in his motion Ior order to show cause, at any hearing set
in this matter. In Iairness to Mr. Coughlin, he should have the opportunity to oppose that
motion in writing beIore any hearing on it, presuming he can bring himself to do so within
the bounds of the rules of civil procedure.
CONCLUSION: Merliss is unable to intelligently oppose any of Coughlin's recent
papers, because they are almost entirely illegible. (NOTE: Merliss admits the consist oI
Nevada Supreme Court approved Iorms...that are typea, consisting mostly of checkboxes for
interlineations). Merliss does not know whether the apparently original, but incomplete and
incomprehensible, documents recently served on his counsel are, in Iact, the same documents
Coughlin Iiled with the court. Coughlin was previously admonished about his frivolous
filings, (there is no indication Irom the record or even the JAVS transcripts oI any hearings
that this assertion is true) and Merliss counsel was instructea not to oppose the only motion
Coughlin was given permission to file. (see transcript oI 11/7/11 hearing in 1708 between
MROA 1221-1238:
11/7/11 HEARING TRANSCRIPT IN R1C Rev11-1708 on MOTION TO SET ASIDE,
ALTER OR AMEND 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE, AND MOTION TO STAY:
(10:06 AM)
Bailiff: please rise
1udge: Please be seated. I just want to make sure that the recording is on. It appears that it is.
This is a matter oI Matthew Merliss versus Zachary Coughlin. And this hearing is for
limited purpose, fairly limited purpose which is set out in my e-mail to the parties it is not
to discuss the full case. I have already denied the motion for stay which once made
cannot be made again to the court (NOTE: MROA 1222; such invocation oI JCRRT 10 is
oII base where JCRRT 2 makes clear that such rules do not relate to "landlord tenant
matters"...then ChieI Judge SIerrazza similarly utilized JCRRT 10 in his 11/28/12 Order in
"ALL CASES" and "ALL DEPARTMENTS" wherein he purported to bar Coughlin Irom
Iiling anything by Iacsimile despite other attorneys, and perhaps other pro se litigants,
selectively, having such right) you can address that to the District Court, Sir. But, what I
am willing to consider this morning is what I indicated previously is the deposit of $2275
With the Court. And, since Mr. Coughlin this was your motion I will allow you to argue Iirst
and then we will hear Irom Mr. Baker his response
Defendant: yes sir Your Honor. Good morning. System upon clariIication at the outset you
said I had already submitted a motion to say? Are you reIerring to the one that was somewhat
oI the interlocutory motion to stay aIter the October 13 hearing?
1udge: no I'm talking about the one that was made immediately Iollowing the ruling on the
eviction that you made in court orally.
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Defendant: all I didn't believe that that was a motion to stay I thought we just discussed the
possibility oI. I have certainly come prepared today to set Iorth why a motion to stay should
issue summarizing that. II I may approach Your Honor I have the motion to stay Irom the
Anvui case.
1udge: Sir I said that I have previously ruled on the motion to stay and that I denied it.
Defendant: it was less than summary Your Honor okay.
1udge: what do you mean it was less than summary.
Defendant: I mean I said less than a sentence on it. We are talking about my home and my
oIIice in my liIe and my clients interests and you are saying that halI a sentence amounts to a
chance to put on motion.
1udge: no I'm saying a motion Iiled on October 31 had been denied previously. You Iiled a
motion with this court on October 31. And, prior to that you had Iiled a motion to stay.
Defendant: Your Honor I am conIused the hearing took place on October 25
1udge: yeah and that was the second motion I'm talking about right now the Iirst motion. 1
seconds or Sir. You Iiled an emergency motion to stay on October 17. Do you recall that one
DeIendant: yes Your Honor that's the one I reIerred to his interlocutory Ior lack oI a better
word because we still had the October 25 hearing to go.
1udge: and then on October 25, it said tenants verbal motion to stay denied. That is the one
you're saying was this summary motion?
Defendant: I'm saying I didn't recognize that as my submitting a motion Tuesday I broach the
topic oI submitting a motion to stay and you said it was denied. Right aIter I said the words
motion to stay
1udge: no I said I'd considered your prior motion that you had Iiled with the court which was
Iiled on the day oI the hearing or shortly beIore
Defendant: October 17? The original hearing was October 13. Your Honor iI I could just
deserve my objection Ior the record Ior the notice Ior the hearing today I don't believe it was
appropriate I could be wrong
1udge: what is your objection Sir
Defendant: there needs to be notice Ior hearings.
1udge: Sir I will cancel the series you can go Ior the District Court iI that's what you want to
do. This is an emergency Hearing. You made a motion, an emergency request.
Defendant: okay is that all that's to be addressed?
1udge: I'll give you 5 min. to argue whatever you want. This was this is an emergency
appeal I am not even sure what court it is filed in on the cover of it it says Reno justice
court it says in the second judicial District Court and t hen it's handwritten motion to stay
eviction. (MROA 1224)
Defendant: yes or
1udge: and I noted on this or beIore that you had a motion to set aside or to stay eviction in
the Reno justice court Iiled October 31 and then one Iiled on November 1. So what is it that
you want the court to hear Sir
Defendant: well Your Honor there is a number oI things, one.
1udge: well, here's what I'm going to do I will give you 10 min. total time and then I will give
him 10 min. and I will rule and we will be done, and, whatever you wish to argue to the
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District Court you can do so. I am not clear iI you have even Iiled an appeal yet? Have you
Iiled a notice oI appeal?
Defendant: yes. Thursday, a Iull on notice oI appeal, I had Iiled an interlocutory earlier. I
was worried that that wouldn't cover the whole proceeding so I filed one 1hursday. a notice
of appeal.
1udge: so does this court even have jurisdiction over this matter?
Defendant: yes I believe particularly with respect to this matter, I have to ask this court for
a stay, and I would like to take you up on your oIIer to have 10 min. to enunciate
1udge: all right will him go ahead and when it's done it's done.
Defendant: I Your Honor I went into the main case on this and we case a bistro case down in
Las Vegas. I believe as I said I have to ask the justice court Iirst day perhaps it later on this
court Iirst day. A stay would be appropriate under Rule 8 (MROA 1225, such invocation oI
NRAP 8 belies a NRS 40.385 reIerence, it would seem, in light oI the statutory amendments
thereto made eIIect just six weeks prior, on 10/1/11, which reads:
"NRS40.385Stay oI execution upon appeal; duty oI tenant who retains possession oI
premises to pay rent during stay.Upon an appeal Irom an order entered pursuant to NRS
40.253:
1.Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of execution may be obtainea
by filing with the trial court a bona in the amount of $25 to cover the expected costs on
appeal. A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction oI the appellate court ... A tenant
oI commercial property may obtain a stay oI execution only upon the issuance oI a stay
pursuant to Rule 8 of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure and the posting of a
supersedeas bond in the amount oI 100 percent oI the unpaid rent claim oI the landlord.
2.A tenant who retains possession oI the premises that are the subject oI the appeal
during the pendency oI the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided in the
underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes due. If the tenant fails
to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new proceedings for a summary eviction by
serving the tenant with a new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253."
Fitchett may speak to which version oI NRS 40.385 shoudl apply, but the version in
eIIect prior to 10/1/11 reads:
"NRS 40.385 Stay oI execution upon appeal; duty oI tenant who retains possession oI
premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal Irom an order entered pursuant to NRS
40.253:
1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay oI execution may be obtained
by Iiling with the trial court a bond in the amount oI $250 to cover the expected costs
on appeal. In an action concerning a lease oI commercial property or any other
property for which the monthly rent exceeds $1,, the court may, upon its own
motion or that oI a party, and upon a showing oI good cause, order an additional bond
to be posted to cover the expected costs on appeal. ... the bona may be releasea, on
motion in the appellate court without inaepenaent action....2. (such subsection is the
same in both versions oI NRS 40.385)."
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MROA 1236:22-23: Judge SIerrazza made clear that "1here is no rent due in this
case, this was not an action or nonpayment of rent". As such, no subsequent assertion that
the jurisdictional bar under Davidsohn and NRS 40.254 against utilizing the summary
procedures in NRS 40.253 by way oI 40.253 was somehow overcome by amending the
"complaint" or "unlawIul detainer" aIIidavit or any other pleading suIIicient to make such
proceeding one Ior non-payment, will be unavailing.
) in that the object oI my appeal a leasehold interest would be deIeated iI it were not to be
granted I would suffer irreparable harm and so would my law practice and perhaps my
clients some of whom are trying to avoid trustee sales in the context of a foreclosure on
their mortgages. (MROA 1225:5-6) Further a stay during the pendency oI the appeal would
cause no irreparable harm to Dr. Merliss a Beverly Hills high school graduate neurosurgeon
who is living in Chico right now. (NOTE: especially in light oI the opporunity to summarily
evict Coughlin shoudl he Iail to continue paying rent during such appeals pendency via NRS
40.385(2)). Additionally, I am likely to prevail on the merits of this appeal and I will
quickly go into why that is. Summary judgment is like a slamdunk in basketball it's a shot
that's not oIten missed I use that analogy because usually a party only wins or deIeats
summary judgment when it's such a slam dunk that either there case is valid or the case is
invalid. I believe summary judgment is the same standard applied to summary evictions is the
summary judgment standard. Show there's no issue of material fact. Anvui goes into that a
bit and it goes into some oI the contractual ambiguities in that case with respect to some tax
issues in the lease in the instant case there is some ambiguities therein. I know Your
Honor is been fairly clear in saying that you didn't believe the lease in this case, which
states that Dr. Merliss will be liable for any damages caused by his agents and I don't
know whether it says employees are not certainly have the lease here, but I believe that
presents an issue of material fact or ambiguity in the contract.
1udge: Sir this was an eviction Ior no cause eviction which was Ior staying past the 30 days
notice. You had no lease any longer. So, you are a tenant at will subject to a 30 day notice.
Defendant: I believe that there is some ambiguity in that regard to with the lease it doesn't
say I had no lease it says it re-ups on the same terms and continues. Perhaps that issue wasn't
the best one to lead with because it doesn't relate to the retaliatory basis, (NOTE: actually,
it does given Merliss essentially demanded that Coughlin assent to an amendment to the lease
as to such vicarious liability that Section 23 oI the lease holds Merliss to Ior Green Action and
Dickson Realty's Darlene Sharpe's torts oI May 23rd, 2011, as provided protection against in
NRS 118A.510(d)) the legal aefense that Im seeking to make a Prima facie a case with I
believe I did make a Prima Iacie case with respect to the legal deIense I am obligated to
show under .510 and that I did make a complaint to the landlord about habitability issues
as enunciated section .290 with, the bathroom the toilet sludge situation that's the
plumbing issue that is one of the subsections of .290. Dr. Merliss was provided I showed
by admissible evidence e-mails Dr. Merliss was given there was certainly an issue of
material fact in that regard. Dr. Merliss was contradictory on the stand with respect to
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whether or not Antonio did this or that. I have additional evidence in that regard. But to
move on from the toilet then we going to the mold issue where I complained to Dr.
Merliss on May 14 of the mold issue, that fits within the purview of section .290 and that
it's right there in the statute I believe it's insulation, complaining to the landlord for a
violation of subsection B of .510 in that regard I believe that showed an issue of material
fact. I don't know why, and hearing listen to ruling Your Honor, and you did say clearly that
could be an issue, yet you Iound that I didn't beat the summary judgment motion,. I have to
assume it is because you Ielt Dr. Merliss his testimony was compelling where he said it wasn't
clear you are asking me to Iix this mold issue. Well, Dr. Merliss his testimony right there
proves my case when things are clear they are not a slam dunk they are not summary
judgment, what you need to go to a plenary trial. Dr. Merliss sat there on the witness stand
again and again.
1udge: Sir just to get this clear I Iound that you did not approve what you said which was
toxic mold, there was no evidence whatsoever presented that there was toxic mold in the
premises, there was some evidence that there may have been some old, which you yourselI
had corrected, it no longer existed, and that is what I Iound. Not that. There was no issue oI
the mold any longer.
Defendant: I do not believe that was established.
1udge: will you don't believe it but I do mind the trier Iact all right?
Defendant: iI things are so clear, but iI we were talking about a summary judgment motion
there, a slam dunk, is a clear that he didn't retaliate against me Ior asserting or complaining
about this habitability issue that is right in the statute lack oI insulation, the problem with
insulation.
1udge: I am not going to go through each oI my rulings, but I'm telling you that I did. That
is what the appeal is about.
Defendant: and that is what the stay is about, the Iourth prong oI the stay rule, is that I am
likely to prevail on appeal to prevail on the merits oI my appeal. I will go on Iurther with
respect to why, we went into the matter oI whether was that on the 25th was that a hearing
was that a trial? It was noticed as a trial or elite was set as a trial on the paper on the notice it
said it was a trial. II it was deemed a trial there wasn't 20 days notice as called Ior in a plenary
unlawIul detainer action thereIore under Aikin the strict adherence to the procedural rules
renders that void. II we are talking about judicial economy, and Dr. Merliss his expenses
incurred I would think he would be better oII just going to a plenary hearing.
1udge: I did say that it was mistakenly designated as a trial, and that is something which you
have the right to appeal in the District Court can overturn that determination.
Defendant: yes or Your Honor just quickly to get through the other reasons why I am likely
to prevail on the merits oI the appeal the Iourth prong oI a motion to stay would be that as to
summary judgment I said I think that I called Reno direct about the weed ordinance. There is
an ordinance in the Reno municipal code that speaks to noxious weeds. It says something like
iI they are over 8 inches I presented admissible evidence showing that these weeds were over
8 inches. II I say that I think I called Reno direct my understanding is that the court has to
take what I assert is the truth
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1udge: Sir on that issue I took what you asserted which was not even assertion oI a Iact it was
a supposition on your part speculation on your part in what I did have was that clearly states
that it was your responsibility to maintain the yard (10:23 am)
Defendant: the lawn. And there is a dirt Iloor so thats another ambiguity in the contract
1udge: well that would include a my mind cutting the weeds are right? In your mind it
doesn't, but we disagree so that is my Iinding
Defendant: is it a slam dunk that it's my responsibility to do the weeds?
1udge: to me it's a slam dunk it's it's tenants responsibility and you are trying to blame the
landlord
Coughlin tenants responsibility to do what?
1udge: to maintain the lawn. The yard
Defendant: lawn or yard it's ambiguous
1udge: I don't know that it's ambiguous you said that it's a dirt yard so to me that means
maintaining as a dirt yard not having noxious weeds but that was ambiguous as to whether it
was dirt or lawn. but it is not ambiguous to me Sir that you had to maintain the yard.
(NOTE: here Judge SIerrazza grows uncomIortable with the Iact that the
lease uses the term lawn and instead he attempts to shiIt to the use oI his own
term yard in light oI the Iact that lawn connotes grass in the problematic Iact
that there was no grass on that quote unquote lawn making diIIicult to
maintain his argument that there's no ambiguity inherent in the lease
speaking to the tenants responsibility to maintain the lawn, where there was
no grass anywhere at the rental).
1udge: I have been told that your time is up
Defendant: iI I could just make one last point Your Honor
1udge:all right but I would like you to address one thing
Defendant: I don't believe it's been 10 min.
judges started at 10 aIter I will give you one more minute but I would like you to address the
one issue that I asked you to be here Ior which was the $2275.
Defendant: I okay I will adjust that but iI I could speak to one last issue Your Honor
1udge: Okay
Defendant: I very big case in this regard that speaks to a lot oI these summary judgment
standards in these cases is Gomez v. Independence Management oI Delaware, 967 A.2d 1276.
and that speaks to summary judgment standards in the context oI retaliation and motive and
intent Ior retaliation and questions oI Iact and law and I will just quickly mention that quote at
Iootnote 19 we have said in another context that the claim oI retaliatory motive is a question
oI Iact Ior the jury or the judge in a non jury trial like other types oI claims which motive or
intent is an issue it is not well-suited to disposition on a motion Ior summary judgment. The
same has been said with respect to contractual terms as well. In quotations. So that case iI you
do get a chance Gomez be independent management oI Delaware it really hits a lot oI the
touchstones that this case had son. Now Your Honor to address the rent escrow privation, I
agree Your Honor when the statue has 355 and it. What you're not allowed to do a rent
escrow. The statute says iI you're gonna litigate,. It's conIusing I think but, the bench book
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that judges as I understand it courts in the state get. i took a look at that I Iound on the Internet
right in the bench book it says must establish a local rule iI the court is going to order a rent
escrow deposit within a summary eviction context. So the bench book says that 40.253
subsections six is very clear and that no Iurther order shall issue. Mr. Baker has been very
curious throughout this whole proceeding Iirst he wants asked Ior rent and then he says "no, i
am not going to ask Ior. For rent all that suIIer issues all that suIIer issues possession all that
is up Ior issue is possession because I don't want to want to get into a rule 11 issue or anything
else like that and then the court says sua sponte that were gonna talk about rent or rent escrow
and Mr. Baker knew he was walking a Iine line because he knows there's contrary authority in
that regard that says it's not Iair said
1udge: no sir I'm not talking about Mr. Baker what I said and what the statue choirs requires
is that there has to be a deposit iI you are going to contest habitability that is what I reIerred to
and I think I sent an e-mail to that eIIect but it is true that it also requires the court to establish
an escrow account
Defendant: and that is where I as I have always maintained that that habitability section is Ior
something more contemporaneous been coming at a tenant three months later and saying hey
I need this or that is my understanding that is when somebody wants to do I I don't even
understand that Irankly
1udge: well it's when somebody wants to not have to pay rent, which is due Ior Iive months
like
Defendant: that is not clear Your Honor that is an issue oI material Iact. There is two ways to
do these rent deductions isn't there iI they don't cure within 14 days you can have it Iixed and
deduct it. I do I do not think there is any rent escrow depositing in that regard. One is 355 and
one is 360. But clearly the bench book says no rent escrow in summary eviction unless you
have rule 44 like in Las Vegas we don't.
1udge: all right,
Plaintiff: Firstly this is not be appropriate place to be re-arguing the merits oI the case which
is what Mr. Coughlin is doing and I think the courts well aware oI that with respect to this
Gomez case out oI Delaware. Never one that is not Nevada law. Number two Mr. Coughlin
an attorney, has now had, this is his third attempt to be heard by this court to argue the law on
this case law on the Iax. At some point this has to stop Mr. Coughlin has had had more than
enough opportunities just to get right to the point Your Honor regarding the deposit With the
Court, Mr. Coughlin basically makes or has two arguments number one that there is no rule
44 and that like Las Vegas status oI the court was somehow not entitled to make Mr.
Coughlin to deposit rent and number two that this rent escrow situation was somehow out side
the NRS 40.25376. I will take the rule 44 business Iirst. Your courts are charged with
enIorcing the laws oI the state oI Nevada.
They have in their in inherent authority to control the proceedings in the litigants in
Iront oI them. They also have the inherent the earth the authority that is granted to them by
the rules the statutes. Looking at justice court ruled one Your Honor Nevada just core rules
one court rule one. Whenever it is made to appear to the court that a particular situation does
not Iall within any oI these rules or that the literal application oI a rule would work hardship
or injustice in a particular situation, the court shall make such order as the interest oI justice
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require. This statute in quotations the statute NRS 41st Disney 118 A.355 subsection 5 says
you have to the deposit the rent with the court in an escrow account iI you want to do certain
oIIense a deIense based on habitability. We don't have a rule here in Reno justice court but
under rule 1. The Court is Iree to make the order that it needs to make in order to enIorce the
statue it has to do that and that is what the court did in the court was absolutely correct in
doing. II Mr. Coughlin's arguments were correct that's because we don't have a corollary to
rule 44 Irom Las Vegas that then the court cannot make a tenant deposit the rent with the
court then under the statute no tenant in this court could ever allegedly Ience or try to to assert
a deIense based on habitability because the court's hands are tied they cannot enIorce the
statute and the statute is clear a tenant does not have a deIense based on habitability iI he
doesn't deposit the rent with the court the court had to make the order that it made it is
directed to by statute it has the power to do it both inherently in under justice court rules civil
procedure rule one it was absolutely within the court's power to make that order and the order
was correct with respect. With respect to Mr. Coughlin's argument that such an order was
outside the summary eviction proceedings, that is just wrong as a matter oI law Your Honor
under NRS 40.253 subsections the ultimate issue beIore the court is possession oI the
property that is correct. However, the course inquiry under the statute is Iocused on whether
or not there is a legal deIense in order to Iind whether or not there is a legal deIense the court
much the court must make Iindings as to Iindings oI Iact and conclusions oI law based on
whatever legal deIense the tenant chooses to put Iorward.
Here, Mr. Coughlin chose to base his legal deIense on retaliation in habitability that we
just discussed. He tried to prove them but he couldn't. He couldn't even prove a material Iact
as to those that remain Ior trial thus, summary eviction was appropriate. Now with respect to
the money, the sums that are on deposit with the court. It was Mr. Coughlin that identiIied
those allegedly habitability issues Ior the court. The court said what are the issues to Coughlin
said was stairs the Windows the garbage disposal etc. etc. and he is the one that told the court
what the value oI the rent that he withheld was. The court took him at his word. That
inIormation came Irom Mr. Coughlin. On one hand he argues I am entitled to withhold rents
but on the other hand he says under the same statute I don't want to put it under the court I just
want to hold onto it. That can't be. Your Honor in determining whether Mr. Coughlin based
on the data provided by him had substantiated a legal deIense under the summary eviction
statute the court Iound as it had to that he was not entitled to withhold that rents that is a
necessary Iinding in conclusion to reach the determination that the court did. Logically, that
rent belongs to Dr. Merliss, and Irankly it is our position that it should be released to him,
now, under no basis Mr. Coughlin has not shown any basis or any circumstances that would
justiIy releasing those Iunds to Mr. Coughlin. Again, he claimed to with whole in the court
Iound that he was not entitled to, that money can I go back to Mr. Coughlin.
At the very least that money must continue to be held by this court or iI this case is
ever appealed it should be transIerred up to the District Court to be held pending a
determination oI that appeal. The court's order was speciIically inside or within its powers
under NRS 40.253 the summary eviction statute the court had to make this Iindings in order
to address the legal deIenses chosen and put Iorward by Mr. Coughlin as to a stay Your Honor
I guess my Iirst comment would be that any stay oI these proceedings is moves, the lockout is
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mute the lockout has already happened. I am not sure what Mr. Coughlin wants to stay other
than these motions he keeps Iiling I just don't really understand why we are talking about a
stay at this point.
1udge: where is his stuII right now?
Plaintiff: it is in the house. We have contacted Mr. Coughlin to contact us with the time
where he wants to go get it I believe Mr. Hill made that I was out oI the oIIice last week I
believe Mr. Hill did contact Mr. Coughlin to arrange that but this stuII is in the house and the
locks oI been changed its locked up.
I have not heard any authority any legal authority or any Iacts that would justiIy any
stay in the stay at this point is moot what he is really asking the court to do is to overturn its
order Ior eviction and that is just not appropriate he has the opportunity to appeal he is
entitled to do that he hasn't yet as Iar as the deposit with the court that needs to stay with the
court or the district court under no circumstances should it go back to Mr. Coughlin that's all I
have Your Honor.
Defendant: it iI I may make one point Your Honor
1udge: I will let you make one point and that's it
Defendant: okay just quickly your order as interpreted by Mr. Baker departs Irom what you
said on the stand you did not say the monies reIerred to Dr. Merliss you were quite clear in
that regard it seem like you said plaintiII can make a motion at that point Mr. Baker took the
liberty oI putting into the order that they are deIinitely ordered to go to Dr. Merliss. There is
no basis Ior that into not be Iair to this court and IaithIully
1udge: alright sir you don't need to argue that because I agree with you on that issue. I am
Iirst oI all I am going to ruled that there is no bases Ior stay in this case and the reason being
as I indicated earlier, this was an action Ior unlawIul detainer Iollowing a 30 day no cause
termination oI lease and there was nothing oIIered to the court to show that that was not a
valid no cause eviction, however there was an argument made with respect to retaliatory
eviction, and the court to consider that and Iound that it was without merit, and there were no
material issues oI Iact. You may disagree with that but that's what the purpose oI the appeal to
the district court is. Now with respect to the rent deposit I agree with counsel Ior the landlord
that under 118A.360 and that is subpart two oI paragraph 5 which you reIerred is subpart one
but subpart to Sissy tenant does not have a deIense subpart two says a tenant does not have it
deIense to it eviction under paragraph 2 oI subsection 1 unless the tenant has deposited the
withheld some into an escrow account pursuant to this subsection. The problem is. And you
are correct about this that the justice court did not established by local rule although I believe
the judges did have a meeting to that eIIect but it is not and are rules a mechanism by which
tenants may deposit rents withheld under subsection D oI subsection 1 escrow accounts. We
did establish the escrow account, however it is not in our rules, our local rules, so I agree with
deIendant on that. So what I am going to do, I am going to modiIy my previous order to the
extent that I said that that money would automatically be converted to a, and I will Iind the
language here (10:40 AM)... And I will point out, Sir, Mr. Coughlin that I also gave you an
opportunity and I gave you a speciIic time to do it to submit your own proposed order which
you did not do, there was one proposed order beIore the court.
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Defendant: and Your Honor I was given the audio CD that contain pretty much everything
but the last hour oI trial, so I like to IaithIully Iollow what the core rules rather than remix it
to suit my own needs as Mr. Baker's seems to so I was prevented Irom doing so by the Iiling
oIIices mistaken that regard
1udge: I don't know iI it's the Iiling oIIices mistake or iI it just doesn't exist.
Defendant: Your Honor I can clariIy that originally they gave me a CD that had Iour tracks
on it was missing the IiIth on Thursday I came back and they gave me a CD with Iive tracks
the IiIth one was the one containing your order
1udge: well I did speciIically enter an order saying that you were to be evicted no later than 5
PM October 31 I changed it to say that no earlier. I did review this but the last paragraph
provides the sums currently on deposit with the court in the amount oI $2275 are the property
oI the landlord but shall not immediately be released to him. I am going to modiIy that that
the $2275. And I will explain this. There is no rent due in this case, this was not an action
Ior nonpayment oI rent so I do think it was inappropriate Ior the court to order that that money
go to the landlord. The court had no jurisdiction over that. And so I am going to order that it
be surrendered to Mr. Coughlin. With respect to the appeal, I am going to order that's iI the
stay is granted by the District Court that the bond amount shall be three times the rents which
is $2700. The District Court could amend that iI they wish but that is what we always charge
in this court. Three months rent. So, iI the District Court wishes to modiIy that that's Iine but
you'll get your money back and you can proceed with the appeal however you wish. I did
grant you an inIormal pauperis which I believe applies to the Iiling Iees Ior the appeal. All
right?
Plaintiff: may I just request clariIication Your Honor. So iI I understand correctly, the court
is modiIy the order to reIlect that the $2,275 currently on the deposit is going to Mr.
Coughlin, that it's going to be released. However, iI Mr. Coughlin ever appeals this case and
wants to stay, he needs to post a supersedeas bond in an amount oI three months worth oI rent
1udge: $2700.
Plaintiff: $2700, that would be a supersedeas bond, understood.
Defendant: can I just enter my objection Your Honor you've already. It's arty law oI the
case you have ordered that any supersedeas bond would be $2275.
1udge: no you said I had no jurisdiction to do that which I agreed with, that was conversion
oI that money Ior that purpose, the district court can overrule me on that server Sir but that
bond is the amount that is typically required by this court and I am allowing you to appeal in
Iorma pauperis mangy may argue that you are not required to Iile a supersedeas bond Ior that
purpose, but I no longer have jurisdiction over that issue, all right? So, you get your money
back, and it is my understanding that iI I sign an order you can wait downstairs and they will
release it to you. All right?
Defendant: yes or
1udge: so you all have a good day
Baker thank you Your Honor
Defendant: thank you Your Honor. Can I just preserve one more thing Your Honor
1udge:I'm done done the hearing is over, Sir. But I will tell you this. And I will tell you this
that iI anything else is Iiled with this Court I'm good order that it will not be accepted by the
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clerk, all right?. The only appropriate place to Iile anything now is the District Court, all
right?
Defendant: with respect to a rule 59 motion to correct clerical mistakes in the order
1udge: Sir iI it's a timely Iiled motion with this court. You said you perIect your appeal,
once you perIect your appeal, I no longer have jurisdiction over this case, with the exception
oI what she said the stay.
Defendant: it's my understanding that litigants can still Iile rule 59 or 60's. Rule 59's are
tolling motions with respect to appeals.
1udge: alright I will allow you to Iollow rule 59, but I am but as this chart counsel Ior the
deIense not to answer it at this point, the Iees, I don't know iI you have read the memorandum
oI costs and Iees, which Evan Iiled anything against her
Defendant: well that speaks to making mad
1udge: well iI you don't do something that's going to be granted, all right
Defendant: what that attorneys Iees provision speaks to where controlled substances are
being manuIactured
1udge: alright well you need to oppose that
Defendant: yes sir.)."
ThereIore, Merliss reserves his right to proper service, actual notice, and a
reasonable opportunity to oppose, on the merits, (NOTE: interesting that Merliss's 4/19/12
Motion Ior Attorney Fees, premised upon NRS 69.050, and his 4/3/12 Memorandum oI Costs
(premised upon NRS 18.005(17) et seq) not only seek Iees and costs Ior subject matter
occurring after the tenancy ended (when the only issue on appeal was that oI Coughlin's right
to possession per NRS 40.253(6)) still managed to seek some $x in Iees Ior craIting this
"Opposition" which he admits Iailed to "oppose, on the merits" Coughlin's Iilings...must be
nice to cry "holidays" and "reserve his right to" later "oppose, on the merits" that which is
entirely legible in the attachments to such 12/1/11 Iiling by Baker...iI Coughlin's 11/23/11
Iilings are legible where Baker attached them to his 12/1/11 Opposition, then how does
Baker's illegibility cries carry any weight? "under cover oI darkeness", and "on a holiday"?
As iI either oI those circumstances have anythign to do with the rules relative to service,
much less the Iact that there is absolutely no requirement that Coughlin serve a "Iile stamped"
copy oI any such Iilings) any paper actually Iiled by Coughlin in this matter, in the event the
court elects to consider any such paper.
WHEREFORE, Merliss prays that Coughlin take nothing by way oI any motion or
other paper Iiled by him on or about November 23, 2011, or attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2;
that same be stricken or denied in their entirety; or that, in the event the court elects to
consider the merits oI any such motion or other paper, that Merliss be provided proper
service, a clean copy oI the actual document under consideration, and a real opportunity to
respond to same; that any hearing in this matter be postponed until the week oI December 19,
2011, at the earliest; and Ior such other, Iurther, and additional relieI as seems just to the court
in the premises.
DATED this 1st oI December, 2011 /s/ Casey D. Baker, Esq.
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EXHIBIT INDEX: Ex. 1 Copies oI photographs taken oI Mr. Coughlin's 3 pages; Exh. 2
Copies oI the documents Mr. Coughlin stuIIed through counsel's mail slot 51 pages; Exh. 3
Copies oI emails between Mr. Hill and Mr. Coughlin, and Mr. Baker and Mr. Coughlin 18
pages; Exh. 4 Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq. 2 pages"
The nature oI how summary evictions in Nevada begin in the courts and the purported
requirement that a Tenant Iile an Answer within 5 days brings up some questions with respect
to whether a demurrer or motion to quash can be Iiled, and the extent to which Iiling an
answer waives such or iI these diIIerent approaches can co-exist:
The only responsive pleadings that may be Iiled are an answer, a demurrer, or a motion to
quash service oI the summons. CCP 418.10, 1170.
A motion to quash (CCP 1167.4) must be heard within three to seven days and any
summary judgment motion (CCP 1170.7) within Iive days oI notice.
JUDICIAL TIP: A common delay tactic by tenants is to set motions Iar in advance,
especially demurrers (which are not subject to the shorter times). Keep in mind that all
motions may be decided on the written pleadings alone. There is no right to a personal
appearance or oral argument on motions.
By choosing the summary unlawIul detainer proceeding, a landlord is held to strict
compliance with the applicable statutory requirements Ior such a proceeding. Berry v Society
oI Saint Pius X, supra, 69 CA4th at 363.
2. |31.8| Summons and DeIendant`s Time To Respond
When the complaint is Iiled, a summons must be issued (see CCP 1166(e)) in the Iorm
speciIied by CCP 412.20, except that the deIendant has Iive, rather than 30, days to respond
to the complaint aIter service oI the summons. CCP 1167, 1167.3. II substituted service is
used, the deIendant has 15 days aIter the other copies are mailed within which to respond. See
CCP 415.20(a). The summons must be served and returned in the same manner as a
summons in a civil action. CCP 1167.
The Iact that a deIendant in an unlawIul detainer action has Iive, not 30, days to Iile a
response does not violate the due process or equal pro-tection clauses oI the Iederal or state
constitutions. Deal v Municipal Court (1984) 157 CA3d 991, 994, 998, 204 CR 79. However,
service oI a Iive-day summons on a complaint that Iails to state a cause oI action Ior unlawIul
detainer is deIective, does not give the court jurisdiction over the deIendant, and is subject to
a motion to quash. See Greene v Municipal Court (1975) 51 CA3d 446, 451452, 124 CR
139; 31.43. 3. |31.9| Service oI Summons by Posting The summons in an unlawIul detainer
action may be served by posting only aIter the court has been satisIied that the deIendant
cannot be served by any other method using reasonable diligence. CCP 415.45. When
service is made by posting, two aIIidavits oI service must be Iiled with the court: one Irom the
person who posted the summons on the property, showing when and where it was posted; and
another showing when and where copies oI the summons and complaint were mailed to the
deIendant. CCP 417.10(e). II the deIendant Iiles a demurrer, which is overruled, or a motion
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to quash, which is denied, the deIendant generally has Iive days aIter the court`s ruling within
which to Iile an answer to the complaint. See CCP 1167.3.
For residential tenancies, the 3-day notice to pay rent or quit must accurately state the
amount that is due and various other payment inIormation. See CCP 1161(2); 31.16. A
notice that overstates the amount oI rent due is ineIIective and will not support an unlawIul
detainer action. See Levitz Furniture Co. v Wingtip Communications, Inc. (2001) 86 CA4th
1035, 1038, 1040, 103 CR2d 656; Bevill v Zoura (1994) 27 CA4th 694, 696698, 32 CR2d
635. One purpose oI this provision is to discourage landlords Irom claiming an overdue rental
Iigure that is so exaggerated that a tenant would never choose to pay. Levitz Furniture Co. v
Wingtip Communications, Inc., supra, 86 CA4th at 1040. Even a minor overstatement oI the
rent due may be suIIicient to render the notice deIective. See NouraIchan v Miner (1985) 169
CA3d 746, 763, 215 CR 450 ($5.96 error when more than $1000 rent was due rendered the
notice deIective).
Baker's Iaxed only (yet, curiously, Iile stamped by the RJC...leading to the question oI
why Coughlin's 12/26/11 Iax submitted Notice oI Appeal was not Iiled stamped by the RJC,
much less actually transmitted in accordance with the 'CertiIicate oI Clerk on page 3 oI the
1/4/12 Supplemental in 03628) letter to Judge SIerrazza oI 10/20/11 essentially admits that
the RJC was divested oI jurisdiction upon Coughlin's Iiling a Notice oI Appeal, on 10/18/11,
oI the 10/13/11 'Eviction Decision and Order requiring him to pay some $2,275 in 'rent
escrow in order Ior 'the matter to be 'set Ior trial on October 25th, 2011. That letter reads
(MROA 483-84):
'Re, EMERGENCY REQUEST FOR HEARING Merliss v. Coughlin (case No.
REV2011-001708)
Dear Judge SIerrazza: ReIerence is made to my letter to Judge CliIton, dated October
18, 2011, a copy oI which is enclosed Ior your reIerence. The purpose oI this letter is to
request an emergency hearing on two speciIic issues that need to be brought beIore the
court. In advance oI the hearing currently scheduled Ior October 25, 2011. Those issues
are:
(1) Whether Mr. Coughlin's notice oI appeal, Iiled on October 18, 2011, divests this
court of jurisdiction to proceea with the October 25, 2011 hearing . We believe that it
does not, and that the hearing should go forward; and
(2) Merliss's motion Ior order requiring inspection oI real property, Iiled herein, on
October 18, 2011. Merliss is entitled to inspect the property. But, in Iairness. Mr.
Coughlin needs to have an opportunity to be heard on the matter.
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In the event the parties are not able to be heard on the matter, and Merliss is unable to
inspect the property beIore next Tuesday's heming, we will likely have no choice but to
seek to adjourn that hearing at some point to go inspect the property in order to meet any
prooI that Mr. Coughlin might present For that reason, I believe that an emergency'
hearing either this aIternoon (October 20, 2011), or Iirst thing the morning oI October 21,
2011, would be the best use oI the court's time, and would avoid any unnecessary Iurther
continuances oI this matter. II I or my staII can do anything to speed up the process,
please do not hesitate to call on us.
Sincerely, Casey O. Baker, Esq. Encl. Letter to Judge CliIton dated October 18, 2011
cc: Zach Coughlin (by email (wlth enclosures):z.chcougbllnhotmail.com)
Witters v Hicks, 790 NE 2d 5 (5th Dist. '03) disagrees with Merliss's view as
Coughlin's 10/19/11 Notice oI Appeal (and Tijernia v Plentl, 984 F. 2d 148 (11th Cir. '92)
establishes that Coughlin's submitting a Motion to Proceed IFP in connection with his
10/19/11 Notice oI Appeal did all the "perIecting" necessary to require the RJC to comply
with, in light oI NRS 40.400, NRAP, and NRAP 10, 11, etc.) "restrains the trial court
Irom enterein any order which would change or modiIy" the 10/13/11 and 10/17/11
Orders on appeal or "which would have the eIIect oI interIering with the review oI those
orders".
Also, as to Dist Ct. Judge Flanagan's 6/25/12 Order indicating that Coughlin's 1/30/12
Motion to Alter/Amend etc. was not a "Iinal appealable order" to which such NRCP 52,
or 59 Motion could relate: Although they do not share all the characteristics oI typical
appeals, action beIore the Court oI Appeals Ior relieI Irom interlocutory order that has
granted, denied, modiIied, or dissolved a temporary injunction, and action to vacate or
modiIy the Court oI Appeals's order in ruling on such action Ior relieI, are, in Iact,
appeals. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 65.07, 65.09. Courier-Journal, Inc. v. Lawson, 307
S.W.3d 617, 38 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1655 (Ky. 2010). Such also goes to Hill's
contention in his 4/26/13 Motion to Dismiss/Strike Appendix that such 1/30/12 Iilign by
Couglin (which identiIied itselI as a "notice oI interlocutory appeal" anyways) is not a
tolling motion.
Judge SIerrazza's Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law, and Order Ior Summary
Eviction oI 10/27/11, reads: "FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
This matter having come on regularly for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to NRS
40.254 and NRS 40.253(6) on October 13, 2011, and continued on October 25, 2011,
beIore the Honorable Peter J. SIerrazza, sitting without a jury; the plaintiII/landlord, Matt
Merliss; ("Merliss"), having been present, and represented by counsel, Richard G. Hill,
Chartered and Casey D. Baker, Esq., and deIendant/tenant, Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq.
("Coughlin"), having been present and having proceeded in proper person; the parties having
oIIered evidence, called witnesses and having oIIered argument; the matter having been
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submitted to the Court Ior a decision; the Court being Iully inIormed in the premises and good
cause appearing thereIor; the Court herewith enters its Iindings oI Iact, conclusions oI law and
order Ior summary eviction:
FINDINGS OF FACT: The Court Iinds the Iollowing Iacts:
1. Merliss is the owner of the real property located at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada (the
"Property").
3. The rental agreement terminatea by its terms on February 28, 211. ThereaIter, Coughlin
became a month to month tenant pursuant to NRS 118A.470 and paragraph 3 of the parties'
rental agreement.
4. Coughlin became subject to the provisions oI NRS 40.251 to 40.2516, inclusive, at the
Notice to Vacate NRS 40.251(1) upon him, which notice was admitted into evidence at the
hearing. The court specifically finds that service of that notice was proper pursuant to, and
Ior all purposes contemplated under, NRS 40.280.
6. Coughlin Iailed to vacate the Property within 30 calendar days of being served with the
7. On September 27, 2011, Merliss properly served Coughlin with a Five-Day Notice of
Unlawful Detainer For Failure to Vacate Rental Unit -NRS 40.251 (No-Cause
Termination) and Notice of Summary Eviction -NRS 40.254, which notice was admitted
into evidence at the hearing. The court specifically finds that service of that notice was
proper pursuant to, and for all purposes contemplated under, ARS 4.28.
10.2. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he "complainea in gooa faith to the
lanalora or a law enforcement agency of a violation of [ARS Chapter 118Aj or of a
specific statute that imposes a criminal penalty" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(b)
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referenced termination and eviction notices, Coughlin had "instituted or deIended against a
the lanalora, a government agency, an attorney, a Iair housing agency or any other
not limited to, the Iront and back steps, any broken window, any alleged mold, any Ialling
11.1. With respect to any weeas on the Property, the court further specifically finas
that the maintenance of the surrounaing grounas, incluaing weea control, was the sole
responsibility oI Coughlin unaer paragraph 22 of the parties rental agreement.
12.1. As such, the court finds that Coughlin was not entitled to withhold any rent
based on any alleged "habitability" issue, or otherwise, and that all sums heretofore
deposited by Coughlin pursuant to the Court's order dated October 13, 211, rightfully
belong to Merliss as and for past due rent.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this case.
Venue is appropriate in this court.
NRCP 56 because these proceedings are analogous." Anvui, LLC v. C.L. Dragon, LLC, 123
Nev. 212, 215, 163 P.3d 405 (2007).
6. "To successIully deIend against a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party
must transcena the pleaaings ana, by affiaavit or other aamissible eviaence, introauce
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specific facts that show a genuine issue of material fact." Torrealba v. Kesmilis, 124 Nev. 95,
178 P.3d 716 (2008).
7. Coughlin failed to show that any genuine issue of material fact remains for trial.
As such, Coughlin failea to meet his buraen of proof to establish any legal aefense to the
summary eviction. Anvui. 1orrealba.
8. As no issues of fact had yet been presented to the court to warrant a trial,
Coughlin was not entitled to have the summary eviction hearing heard by ajury. NJCRCP 38.
NJCRCP 39. NRS 40.310. Any demand by Coughlin Ior a jury was untimely, in any event.
NJCRCP 38.
property.
summary eviction of the above-named 1enant and it appearing from the record on file
That the sheriff/constable of Reno Township, or one of their auly authori:ea agents be,
ana hereby is, directed to remove each and every person found upon the rental unit at 121
River Rock, Reno, Washoe County, Nevaaa, by no earlier than October 31, 2011 at 5 pm.
FOLLOWS:
The sums currently on deposit with the Court, in the amount of $2,275., are the
property of the landlord, Matt Merliss, but shall not be immediately released to him. Instead,
those sums shall serve as Coughlin's security for costs on appeal , pursuant to NJCRCP 73 , in
his counsel of record. These sums shall not, in any event, operate to stay enforcement of
this order and the surrender of the right of Coughlin to possess the Property. Nothing in
this order shall prevent this court or an appellate court Irom releasing the deposited Iunds to
Merliss or his counsel prior to or aIter any appeal is perIected, or Irom increasing the amount
oI any security to be posted by Coughlin Ior any reason, or both, either upon its own motion
or upon motion by Merliss.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
Judge SIerrazza's 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE committed reversible error in that it Iailed to
ruled that ARS 4.28 was not satisfied (strict compliance required under Davidsohn v.
Doyle, Paul v. Armstrong, Aikins, jurisdictional prerequisites that set out in the statutory
remedy under NRS 40 et seq). a USPS Certificate of Mailing is required, regardless oI the
activities oI a process served, and Nevada Court Services cheaped out on the 8/22/11 Notice
and merely photcopied their own prepaid postage envelope (a USPS Cert oI Mailing is a
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diIIerent animal, and adds another $1.20 to the cost oI NCS doing business Ior a reason,
Iurther Baker's courthouse sanctuary rule violating attempted personal service in court on
9/27/11 also is violates the immunity Irom such service oI process aIIorded litigants and their
attorneys. Not even an envelope Ior the 9/27/11 notice and
Also, Couglin Iiled on 11/3/11 a Motion to Continue in Possession as a disabled tenant,
and NRS 40.251(4) is quite clear in accorded Coughlin 5 additional days to continue in
possession upon the notice oI entry oI an Order denying such request...even the 8/22/11 and
or 9/27/11 Notices notiIy the tenant oI such, as required by law, so clearly, Coughlin was not
trespassing during the time in question over and above the Iact that Russell v Kalian makes
clear that the WCSO and Hill's associate Baker either eIIected a lockout with a stale order, or
they Iailed to accord the Iull 24 hours required pursuant to NRS 40.253 (every other county
posts, waits 24 hours, then does the lockout, and Lippis makes clear statutes like these must
apply statewide, so, despite Hill and Baker's allusions to the "usual and customary practices oI
the WCSO", the Legislature had something else in mind, and it didn't consist oI saving the
WCSO a trip and otherwise making there job easier at every turn at the expense oI the
counties tenants and the massive human cost attendant to the ridiculous manner in which the
WCSO has carried out 24 hour summary eviction lockout orders. Its disgraceIul. The 2JDC
denied Couglin's 10/26/11 IFP applicatio submitted with a proposed qui tam action in CV11-
03126.
153, 723 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 2001): "PlaintiIIs, lessees and occupants oI an apartment
owned by deIendant UVI Holdings, Inc. and located at 406 West 56th Street, commenced this
action to recover damages Ior their eviction on July 9, 1996, which was previously Iound to
have been wrongIul because executed on an invalid warrant. The action is prosecuted against
the corporate owner, together with the managing agent Ior the premises, Arthur Haruvi, who
is also the president oI UVI Holdings (collectively, the landlord); against their attorneys, the
Iirm oI Mujica & Goodman and Jacob Goodman, individually (collectively, the law Iirm);
and against Iormer New York City Marshal Rita Herzog, who carried out the
eviction...Whether plaintiIIs' eviction on an invalid warrant was deliberate or inadvertent,
there is no question that neither the landlord nor its attorneys can evade responsibility Ior the
wrongIul eviction. Generally, a landlord "is not responsible Ior the manner in which an oIIicer
executes a valid process duly issued * * * the oIIicer only becomes his agent where the
process is irregular, unauthorized, or void" (Ide v Finn, 196 App Div 304, 314-315; see also,
Campbell v Maslin,91 A.D.2d 559, 560, aIId59 N.Y.2d 722Ior reasons stated below). ...It is
oI no moment that, in the proceedings conducted beIore Civil Court, the landlord's interests
were represented by a party which is an adversary in the present litigation. The rule oI
collateral estoppel incorporates sound public policy considerations, including the need to
"conserve the resources oI courts and litigants" (Gilberg v Barbieri,53 N.Y.2d 285, 291). That
a particular outcome resulted Irom some misconduct on the part oI counsel does not warrant
disturbing a ruling to revisit an issue decided against a party that was "accorded a Iull and Iair
opportunity to contest the issue" (Allied Chem. v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,72 N.Y.2d
271, 276, cert denied 488 U.S. 1005). Under such circumstances, the clients "are relegated to
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relieI against their Iormer attorney Ior any damages which his conduct may have caused
them" (Hallock v State oI New York, supra, at 230). Because the law Iirm cannot delegate its
responsibility to supervise the litigation, liability to its client may be imposed as a matter oI
law (id.; Da Silva v Suozzi, English, Cianciulli & Peirez,233 A.D.2d 172, 177).
As between the law Iirm and the Marshal, the Iirm, as the entity in control oI the litigation,
had superior knowledge oI its course (see, Bevona v Judson Realty,213 A.D.2d 349, 350).
Thus, the Iirm bore the responsibility to keep the Marshal inIormed concerning the status oI a
warrant that appeared valid on its Iace (see, Chelsea Marina v Scoralick,94 A.D.2d 189, 193
|Iailure to advise SheriII oI temporary restraining order|),
and any misapprehension necessarily implicates a lapse by counsel (supra, at 195).
Furthermore, the Marshal, as an oIIicer oI the court, is entitled to rely on the presumption oI
regularity (see, CPLR 4520), which has long been accorded to the conduct oI the aIIairs oI her
oIIice (see, Burkhard v Smith, 19 Misc. 31 |1896|), and deIendant law Iirm has Iailed to make
a prima Iacie showing to overcome the presumption by demonstrating that she knowingly or
negligently executed an invalid warrant (cI., De Zego v Donald F. Bruhn, M.D., P. C.,67
N.Y.2d 875, 877). Nor do plaintiIIs suggest that the outcome should be otherwise. They state
that counsel, in the person oI Jacob Goodman, "admitted his oIIice instructed the Marshal to
execute a warrant that he himselI had agreed to vacate, and that led to a `major screw-up.' The
law Iirm deIendants are thereIore responsible as a matter oI law Ior the illegal eviction...o the
extent that plaintiIIs did not intend to abandon their remaining causes oI action, they are
largely without merit. The claims Ior property damage, conversion, and negligence, which are
asserted against all deIendants, do not constitute cognizable causes oI action but merely state
demands Ior damages to be considered as elements oI the statutory cause oI action upon
which summary relieI is sought (see, Maracina v Shirrmeister, supra, at 673). In an action Ior
wrongIul eviction, courts have permitted recovery oI damages Ior loss oI property (e.g., H &
P Research v Liza Realty Corp.,943 F.Supp. 328 |customer list|) and even negligent inIliction
oI emotional distress (Bianchi v Hood, supra |aggravation oI ankle injury|) in addition to
traditional damages, measured by the loss oI the value oI the leasehold (Randall-Smith, Inc. v
43rd St. Estates Corp.,17 N.Y.2d 99)....
A direct cause oI action by a nonclient against a law Iirm is not generally cognizable, except
where injury is "sustained by a third party as a consequence oI the attorney's wrongIul or
improper exercise oI authority, or where the attorney has committed Iraud or collusion or a
malicious or tortious act" (Singer v Whitman & Ransom,83 A.D.2d 862, 863). The
procurement oI an eviction upon an invalid warrant is certainly an "improper
exercise oI authority," and may be indicative oI collusion between the landlord and its
attorneys. ThereIore, under the circumstances, a direct action against the law Iirm is available
to plaintiIIs. However, as a "wrongdoer" within the meaning oI RPAPL 853, the law Iirm is
statutorily liable, and the claim asserted in plaintiIIs' ninth cause oI action is thereIore
redundant."
"Tenant's recovery oI damages Ior emotional distress under UniIorm Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act, 6 A.L.R.4th 528 Right oI landlord legally entitled to possession to
dispossess tenant without legal process, 6 A.L.R.3d 177 Recovery by tenant oI damages Ior
physical injury or mental anguish occasioned by wrongIul eviction, 17 A.L.R.2d 936"
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Coughlin was never "notiIied oI the no cause termination" where the 8/22/11 "No-
Cause Termination Notice to Vacate" Iails to satisIy the lease agreement as to it purporting to
be notice in writing that the landlord is exercising some option to terminate the lease. Rather,
(and Ior fraudulent reasons based in an desire to shore up an argument that Merliss
woudl nto be stuck with the terms of the lease in question which he particularly did not
like (like the part expressly permitting Coughlin's use of such for commercial or
residential purposes or both, or the part making Merliss liable for the wrongs of his
agents (like the landscapers), or the part in sections 2, 3, and 20 of the lease which make
clear that Merliss's testimony and or "unlawful detainer affidavit" and his counsel
10/19/11 Declaration are Iraudulently inaccurate in there contention that the lease "expired"
12 months aIter it commenced...rather, the lease was Ior "not less than 12 months", making
the 8/22/11 Notice's indication that the lease had "expired" months beIore inaccurate, and
thereIore vitiating any purported attempt to characterize such as some written notice suIIicient
to satisIy Merliss's obligation to notice Coughlin in writing oI a maniIest, clear, unequivocal
intent to terminate the lease (and its not even clear merliss had such a right to do so, as the
perpetuity nature oI a lease with a "deIined termination date" oI "not less than 12 months"
Irom the day the lease began, may vitiate any argument that Merliss had any right to so elect
to terminate such lease...its ambiguous, and Anvui and SaIeway, and the delaware csae
Gomez v. Independence Management make clear such matters oI ambiguity, retaliation,
contractual intent, are not well suited to summary judgment, particularly where animus,
motive, and intent are so integral to the analysis.
At MROA 1603-04 (again, the RJC Iailed to Iile stamp such, but it was submitted on
11/23/11 along with the multiple other Iilings oI that date, and given the illegal lockout oI
11/1/11, and arguably the waiver oI the eviction order obtained maniIested by Merliss's
attorney Ilying too close to the sun and sending Coughlin a bill Ior November rent oI the same
$900 charged Ior Iull use and occupancy (now the may argue such was mitigatory to avoid the
expense oI moving and inventorying such personatly, but NRS 118A.460 is clear in that such
charges must be incurred, not projected): "3. on 27th day oI September, 2011 I received a
door posting no certiIicate oI mailing a" "30-day No-Cause Termination Notice ot Vacate-
NRS 40.251(1)(b)...4. I have a written retal agreement which allows me to stay until renews
automatically, AFAIK...7. Even though the terms oI my original tenancy (Coughlin then
circled the word "expired" Iound therein on "Form #16" Irom the AOC Iorms and
interlineated "Don't Ieel lease agreement indicates 'expiration'") the landlord has renewed my
tenancy by either accepting Iren Ior a new rental period and/or enterein a new rental
agreement."...11. I received a ...am a tenant who...has a physical or mental disability...ADA
Privacy rights asserted, opposing counsel made 'hoarder' blasts.. the Notice Iailed to notiIy me
oI my right to request to be allowed to coninue in possession....NRS 40.251(3)"
MROA 1604-05 spells out the NRS 118A.510 retaliation argument basis: '(checked
box) B. having complained to the landlord oI a violation oI the Nevada Landlord Tenant Act
lots oI them 118A.510, 118A.290, etc....D. having complaint to the landlord oI a violation oI a
statute imposing a criminal penalty, ie...Green Action/Darlene Sharpe conversion etc....G.
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having instituted or deIended against a judicial ..proceeding..in which I raided an issue oI
compliance with the legal requirements respecting the habitability oI dwelling units. Yep. H.
having complained in good Iaith oI a violation oI the Federal Fair Housing Act or Nevada
laws Iorbidding discrimination in housing to (Iollowing boxes checked) 1. the landlord...4. an
attorney...I. having excercised rights ...Iorbidding discrimination in housing. 13. Other
(explain): Lease agreement allows Ior commercial use oI premises rent under $1,00, ie, no
summary eviction allows NRS 40.254"
Further, while the justice court indicated at the conclusion oI the 10/25/11 date that
"...Im sorry well certainly by October 10 when the landlord's affidavit was filed ...", but
there is no file stamp of that date on such "unlawful detainer affidavit" such was not
marked at anytime prior to its being offered into evidence during the "Trial"/summary
continuation of 10/25/11, and a jurisdicitonal prereq to even holding a NRS 40.253(6)
hearing, under sub 5 is the Iiling oI such aIIidavit, and its cannot be done by Merliss's
attorney Baker in light oI RPC 3.7.
Further, where such court date was to satisIy the mandate oI NRS 40.253(6) to "test the
truthIulness and suIIiciency oI the aIIidavits" and determine whether there is "no legal
deIense" to the summary eviciton, Merliss's proceeding undr NRS 40.254(2) requires that
such "unlawIul detainer aIIidavit" consist oI:
" 2.The aIIidavit oI the landlord or the landlord`s agent submitted to the justice court or the
district court must contain:
(e)A statement that the claim Ior relieI was authorized by law.:
It is patently clear Irom the Iace oI the lease in question and the content and dating oI
the 10/25/11 "unlawIul detainer aIIidavit" and counsel baker's 10/19/11 Declaration that a
maniIest lack oI due process, and a multitude oI irregularities accompany any Iinding that
Merliss was successIul in proving Coughlin had "no legal deIense" or otherwise
demonstrating the "truthIulness and suIIiciency" oI Merliss's "unlawIul detainer aIIidavit",
thus rendering Merliss's claims Iailure under the Celotex standard.
At the 10/13/11 summary eviction proceed in in 1708, Merliss Iailed to appear, and his
counsel Baker never had the purported "unlawIul detainer aIIidavit" marked, much less
oIIered or admitted into evidence at that time:
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"Plaintiff: Thank you, sir. Your Honor, what we`re here on today is a 30-day no-cause
eviction that is all we`re on today. Under |INDISCERNIBLE 137| 40.253, Your Honor, I
have copies oI the landlord`s aIIidavit here. II I may approach?
1udge: Yeah, bring it up.
Plaintiff: Yes.
1udge: But you don`t have a witness?
Plaintiff: No, sir. Your Honor, the Notices have been previously provided to the court. I also
have additional copies here iI the court needs them. The 30-day no-cause Notice was served
on August 22. The Iive-day Iailure to vacate Notice was served on September 27. Mr.
Coughlin has Iailed to vacate the property and that`s why we`re here, sir.
Defendant: Alright, sir.
Defendant: Yes, sir, Your Honor. I have Iiled a tenancy aIIidavit in this matter, as well as a
motion Ior continuance. I'm citing exigent circumstances such as the essential service like
electricity being turned oII in the midst oI the Iive-day period in addition to a.
1udge: Well, I`ll allow you to testiIy as to your answers oI your . raise your right hand. Do
you swear under penalty oI perjury to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?
Defendant: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
1udge: Right. You can be seated and tell me what your deIense is..."
The record on appeal simply does not reveal any "Iiling" oI Merliss 'unlawIul detainer
aIIidavit' on 10/13/11, and Baker's 10/19/11 Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq. Pursuant to
NRS 40.254(2) (which is missing Irom the RJC's ROA until it appears as , in comparing para
3 to 8.4 belies the Iact that such was not actually Iiled or even marked Ior admission until
10/25/11:
PlaintiII's Exhibit F at the 10/25/11 'trial, the 10/19/11 Iile stamped : 'DECLARATION OF
CASEY D. BAKER. ESQ. PURSUANT TO NRS 40.254(2) (MROA 629-642) reads:
'CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ., being Iirst duly sworn, deposes and under p perjury
avers:
oI age. This declaration is based on my personal knowledge, except those matters stated
on information and belief, and as to those items I believe them to be true. This
declaration is made in my capacity as the lanaloras agent, pursuant to NRS 40.254(2),
and represents my testimony iI called on to present same in court.
4. Dr. Merliss submitted his landlord's affidavit in this matter at the time of the
hearing on October 13, 2011.
6. Accordingly, with the exception of attaching the summary eviction notices
thereto, Dr. Merliss' affidavit was on the form provided by this court.
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7. The purpose of this declaration is to supplement Dr. Meriiss' affidavit in
accordance with the requirements of NRS 40.254(2).
communications between my oIIice and Dr. Meriiss, I state the Iollowing on information
and belief:
1. NRS 40.254(2)(a).
8.3. The tenant became subfect to the provisions oI NRS 40.251 to 40.2516,
inclusive, at the end of the stated term of the rental agreement , whereupon he became a
EXHIBIT 2. NRS 40.254(2)(d).
9. I declare under penalty of perjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct.
Again, with the Iorms. Exhibit D Irom the 10/25/11 trial starts with the alleged
'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit by landlord Merliss, which Iails to contain all required by NRS
40.254(2), and which does not appear to be Iile stamped, and its not clear that it was Iiled in
the RJC when Baker's 10/19/11 Declaration indicates it was. It reads:
~Unlawful Detainer Affidavit
Coughlin located at 121 Rjyer Rock. Reno. NV 89503 on March 1, 2010....- with periodic
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any kind.
named premises.
NRS, Chapter 40.
INFORMATION
iI the signor is known to the notary public. 1he seal and signature cannot be affixed to a
document without the correct notarial wording. As an additional option an affiant can
produce an affidavit on the same document as as the notarial certificate wording to
eliminate the use of additional documentation.
to have even been Iiled prior to the 10/13/11 hearing, in violation oI NRS 40.253(5)-(6)) to
contain:
(a)The date when the tenancy commenced, the term of the tenancy, and, iI any, a copy
of the rental agreement.
(c)The date when the tenant became subject to the provisions of NRS 40.251 to
40.2516, inclusive, together with any supporting facts.
(d)The date when the written notice was given, a copy of the notice and a statement
that notice was served in accordance with NRS 40.280.
(e)A statement that the claim for relief was authorized by law.
So, basically, Merliss's 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit lacked all required under
NRS 40.253(2). Baker appears to have Iraudulently attempted to ameliorate his earlier
reliance on Iorms in his 10/19/11 Declaration, but to the extent that purports to be based upon
information and belief, it does not qualiIy (to hear Panel Chair Echeverria tell it) as
'veriIied (particularly where its not even Merliss signing the Declaration, but his out oI state
attorney, also out oI County as Baker's Declaration indicates) under NRS40.370
Verification of complaint and answer.The complaint and answer must be verified.
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Additionally, and this is Iurther evidence oI the Iraud oI Merliss and Baker, even during his
'testimony during the 10/25/11 'trial Merliss and Baker continued to attempt to hoodwink
the court, particularly in attempting to assert that Merliss himselI, rather than Baker, had,
upon the admission thereoI oI his 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit on 10/25/11 and some rather
Iraudulent questioning by Baker, thereaIter submitted and or testiIied to all that which is
required under NRS 40.254(2). However, aside Irom Ialsely testiIying about iI the lease had
'expired or terminated, and Ialsely stating a date oI expiration or termination oI the lease as
Iound within the lease, and being twelve months aIter February 20
th
, 2012 Merliss Iailed to, at
any point, testiIy or sign an AIIidavit stating that his claim Ior relieI was 'authorized by law.
And Judge SIerrazza made clear that Baker would not be allowed to make such veriIied
statement Ior him. And Baker successIully avoided eliciting such a statement Irom his client
(why he didn't isn't clear, because, clearly, it wasn't to prevent his client Irom lying, as Merliss
already did upon his testiIying that the lease expired by its terms on February 20
th
, 2011, even
reIerencing some alleged date oI expiration within Paragraph 2 oI the lease, where, clearly
there is none). While such a statement Irom Merliss that his 'claim Ior relieI was authorized
by law would have been a lie (Ior his claim to have been 'authorized by law pursuant to the
statutory section under which he proceeded, NRS 40.254 (which provides Ior summary
evictions under a no cause basis (ie, where the lease has expired pursuant to its terms or where
a landlord has successIully terminated a lease where such was still in eIIect under either a
contractual holdover provision or suych holdover provision Iound NRS 118A.470) Merliss
would have had to be able to truthIully say that either the lease had expired by its terms (on its
Iace, the lease had not expired, as there was no 'deIined termination date listed in the lease,
but there was a provision expressly providing that the lease would last Ior 'not less than 12
months and that terminate the lease, then serve such notice in accord with NRS 40.280, then
Iile Ior a
So, Coughlin used 'the Iorm provided by the RJC Ior a couple oI his various Notices oI
Appeal, some limiting the attorney's Iee exposure per the Iorm, to $15.00. But, Coughlin has
a $42,065 Attorney's Fee...Order? Judgment? Basis Ior disbarment?
So, shouldn't Merliss's using the RJC's Iorm, where it Iailed to contain the required
inIormation pursuant to NRS 40.254, be held against him? 'Accordingly, with the exception
of attaching the summary eviction notices thereto, Dr. Merliss' affidavit was on the form
provided by this court.
Also, Baker did not file in any ~Unlawful Detainer Affidavit signed by the
landlord Merliss at, during, or before the 10/13/11 summary eviction proceeding. It was
not until mid-way through the 10/25/11 ~Trial that Baker had such ~Unlawful Detainer
Affidavit admitted into evidence as an exhibit. Therefore, 1udge Sferrazza lacked the
subject matter jurisdiction to even hold the 10/13/11 summary eviction proceeding given
the statutory jurisdicitonal prerequisite posed by NRS 40.254(2). Further, Baker's
mincing (~without waiving attorney client privilege...upon information and belief...
attempts to file such statutorily required affidavit on behalf of his then out of state, out
of county client, landlord Merliss, is ineffective, as any ~Trial setting of 10/13/11 was
defective for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the entirety of what occurred on the
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record on 10/25/11 is necessarily inappropriate (beyond just 1udge Sferrazza riding
Coughlin about having his exhibits marked beforehand only to take thirty minutes of
court time helping Baker get his marked and organized...during which time is is made
abundandtly clear, on the record, that no such ~Unlawful Detainer Affidavit sufficient
to satisfy NRS 40.254(2) was filed prior to either hearing, or ever, really, given one is not
permitted (ask Chair Echeverria in refernce to Coughlin suggesting David Grundy,
Esq., could verify a response for his clients under SCR 105(2)'s ~verified answer or
response requirement).
NRS 40.253(6) makes clear that the filing of such a "landlord's affidavit" prior to
the holding of any such hearing is a jurisdicitonal predicate/prerequisite, etc.: "6.
Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless of the
information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the affidavit
permitted by subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall hold a hearing..."
The assertion that the lessor has not provided proper notice oI termination as required
by statute. Wasatch Property Management v. Degrate, 35 Cal. 4th 1111, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262,
112 P.3d 647 (2005), as modiIied, (July 27, 2005).
The methods prescribed by statute Ior obtaining and exercising jurisdiction ordinarily
must be strictly pursued. |8| In a landlord tenant dispossess proceeding, while the Iailure oI
the landlord to allege or prove the tenant's deIault, is suIIicient ground to warrant dismissal
Ior lack oI jurisdiction.|9| Subject-matter jurisdiction may be dependent on the service oI a
proper notice to quit, which is a condition precedent to a summary process.|10| |FN9| N.J.
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526, 40 A.L.R.3d 1356 (1970). |FN10| Conn.City
oI Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores oI Connecticut, Inc., 284 Conn. 1, 931 A.2d . 837
(2007). . |FN11| N.Y.Brause v. 2968 Third Ave., Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 691, 251 N.Y.S.2d 974
(App. Term 1964). . |FN12| N.Y.Schor v. Domery, 34 Misc. 2d 865, 232 N.Y.S.2d 205 (J.
Ct. 1962). . |FN13| N.Y.Liza Realty Corp. v. M. Machlus Leather Goods, 43 Misc. 2d 57,
250 N.Y.S.2d 379 (App. . Term 1964). Failure to give proper notice as deIense Tex.Fitch v.
Wilkins Properties, 635 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1982). A landlord is not entitled
to maintain an action Ior restitution oI the premises without Iirst having given proper notice
complying with the terms oI the applicable statute.|4| Notice is not eIIective when given aIter
the action has been commenced.|5| |FN4| UtahAmerican Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 Utah
2d 432, 464 P.2d 592 (1970). Failure to give proper notice as deIense Tex.Fitch v. Wilkins
Properties, 635 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1982). . |FN5| UtahVan Zyverden v.
Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964).
Under most statutes, the notice or demand required as a prerequisite to the institution
oI a summary proceeding Ior possession oI leased premises must be in writing.|7| While the
notice or demand must comply with statutory requirements as to its contents,|8| |FN7| Iowa
Laughlin v. Hall, 236 Iowa 990, 20 N.W.2d 415 (1945). . Mo.Kaimann v. Kaimann
Bros., 182 S.W.2d 458 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944). . N.Y.Ferraro v. TriIiro, 60 N.Y.S.2d 679
(Mun. Ct. 1946). . UtahAmerican Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 432, 464 P.2d 592
(1970). . |FN8| Ill.Goldblatt v. Perlman, 338 Ill. App. 654, 88 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist.
1949). . IowaWright v. Zachgo, 222 Iowa 1368, 271 N.W. 512 (1937). . Failure to comply
with statute UtahAmerican Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 432, 464 P.2d 592 (1970). .
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N.J.5000 Park Associates v. Collado, 253 N.J. Super. 653, 602 A.2d 803 (Law Div. 1991).
(1946).
EIIect oI deIects or irregularities in service. The court presiding over a summary
proceeding Ior possession oI leased property does not acquire jurisdiction over the parties
where the process or service thereoI does not comply with the statutory requirements
applicable to the particular case. N.Y.Marluted Realty Corp. v. Decker, 46 Misc. 2d 736,
260 N.Y.S.2d 988 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. . 1965). . S.C.Ladshaw v. Hoskins, 204 S.C. 346, 29
S.E.2d 480 (1944). . W.Va.Rogers v. Jones, 129 W. Va. 264, 39 S.E.2d 919 (1946).
InsuIIicient allegations Conn.Macha v. Eastern Conn. Training School Ior Firemen,
Inc., 1 Conn. Cir. Ct. 469, 24 Conn. Supp. . 151, 187 A.2d 638 (App. Div. 1962). . N.Y.
Lonya Realty Corp. v. Montes, 113 N.Y.S.2d 299 (App. Term 1952). . |FN10| N.J.Weller
v. Kelly, 136 N.J.L. 281, 55 A.2d 55 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1947). . N.Y.Stier v. President Hotel,
Inc., 28 A.D.2d 795, 281 N.Y.S.2d 140 (3d Dep't 1967). . InsuIIicient allegations Conn.
Macha v. Eastern Conn. Training School Ior Firemen, Inc., 1 Conn. Cir. Ct. 469, 24 Conn.
Supp. . 151, 187 A.2d 638 (App. Div. 1962). . N.Y.Lonya Realty Corp. v. Montes, 113
N.Y.S.2d 299 (App. Term 1952). . |FN10| N.J.Weller v. Kelly, 136 N.J.L. 281, 55 A.2d 55
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1947). . N.Y.Stier v. President Hotel, Inc., 28 A.D.2d 795, 281 N.Y.S.2d 140
(3d Dep't 1967). .
1573. Stay pending appeal , Landlord and Tenant 290.5, 291(18), 299, 315(1) The
enIorcement oI a judgment in summary proceedings may be included in the automatic stay
provisions oI a statute, where the property is still in the possession oI the tenant. The
enIorcement oI a judgment in summary proceedings may be included in the automatic stay
provisions oI a statute, where the property is still in the possession oI the tenant.|1| However,
an appeal ordinarily does not stay or suspend the execution oI the judgment|2| unless there is
compliance with statutory conditions, such as Iurnishing a bond.|3| A statute may properly
require a tenant to post an adequate bond beIore an appeal will be granted to cover the
judgment appealed Irom in an unlawIul entry and detainer action, as well as rent that will
accrue during the pendency oI the appeal.|4| A Iailure to Iile a bond will warrant the dismissal
oI a motion to stay the proceedings|5| but does not divest the tenant oI the right to appeal.|6|
Under a particular statute, the Iiling oI an aIIidavit oI substantial hardship may automatically
stay the execution oI a judgment Ior possession, as a matter oI law, pending an appeal oI the
unlawIul detainer action.|7| |FN1| N.Y.Oleck v. Pearlman, 49 Misc. 2d 202, 267 N.Y.S.2d
76 (Sup 1966). . |FN2| Pa.White v. Long, 289 Pa. 525, 137 A. 673 (1927). . Tenn.Bell v.
Smith, 185 Tenn. 11, 202 S.W.2d 654 (1947). . |FN3| N.Y.Pisano v. Nassau County, 41
Misc. 2d 844, 246 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup 1963), order aII'd, 21 . A.D.2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 22
(2d Dep't 1964). . Purpose oI bond requirement Conn.Young v. Young, 249 Conn. 482, 733
A.2d 835 (1999). Requirement oI adequate security permissible U.S.Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56, 92 S. Ct. 862, 31 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1972). Process Ior challenging appeal bond Mass.
Erickson v. Somers, 446 Mass. 1015, 846 N.E.2d 1125 (2006). |FN4| W.Va.State ex rel.
Reece v. Gies, 156 W. Va. 729, 198 S.E.2d 211 (1973). Bond covering damages, costs, and
rent required Ariz.Tovar v. Superior Court oI Arizona In and For Maricopa County, 132
Ariz. 549, 647 P.2d 1147 (1982). Supersedeas bond proper Mont.Rasmussen v. Lee, 276
Mont. 84, 916 P.2d 98 (1996). |FN5| Ark.Harris v. Boyd G. Montgomery Testamentary
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Trust, 370 Ark. 518, 262 S.W.3d 145 (2007). |FN6| Tex.Marshall v. Housing Authority oI
City oI San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. 2006). |FN7| Ala.Ex parte Forbus, 510 So. 2d
242 (Ala. 1987). AIIidavit suIIicient Tex.Walker v. Blue Water Garden Apartments, 776
S.W.2d 578 (Tex. 1989). CJS LANDLORD 1573.
A question directed to the jurisdiction oI the trial court over the subject matter may be
raised Ior the Iirst time on appeal.|4| Where the lack oI jurisdiction oI a superior court trying
the case de novo appears on the Iace oI the record, the deIendant's exception to the judgment
Ior the plaintiII challenges the correctness oI the judgment.|5| |FN4| Ill.William Knapp &
Co. v. Johns, 335 Ill. App. 226, 81 N.E.2d 264 (1st Dist. 1948). . |FN5| N.C.Howell v.
Branson, 226 N.C. 264, 37 S.E.2d 687 (1946).
Plenary review oI suIIiciency oI notice to quit Conn.Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292
Conn. 381, 973 A.2d 1229 (2009).
Judge Flanagan appears to make the same 'mistake that Judge SIerrazza did in 1708.
That consists oI relying upon the twisted, Iraudulent mistatements oI the law that Baker and
Hill call lawyering, then overreacting to the human displays oI emotions by the opposing
attorney/litigant, and engaging in what some might say appears to be a transparent display oI
'inadvertent errors oI law borne oI a retaliatory animus. At the end oI the day, however,
these judges are busy and have heavy case loads. They are somewhat entitled to rely upon the
representations as to law and Iacts made to them by the attorneys appearing beIore them.
However, Judge SIerrazza could nto rely upon Baker and Merliss's declaration that the lease
had 'expired or 'terminated given the 'term in the agreement was Ior '12 months. (OI
course, the 'term in the lease was Ior 'no less than 12 months, and there was no 'deIined
termination date to be Iound in paragraph 2 oI the lease where paragraph 20 indicated such a
deIined date would aIIect the holdover/termination status oI the lease. Further, Judge
SIerrazza may have relied upon Baker's indicating that he elicited testimony Irom Merliss that
spoke to all that contained in Baker's 10/19/11 Declaration (which Baker purported to contain
everything required by NRS 40.254(2)). However, reliance upon Baker's purposeIully
misleading approach there (in violation oI RPC 3.3, 3.4, etc.) caused Judge SIerrazza to miss
the part where Merliss Iailed to Iile any landlord's aIIidavit/declaration (or even testiIy) to the
requirement that he swear that his claim Ior relieI was authorized by law, per NRS 40.254(2).
As it turns out, Merliss's claim was not authorized by law in that the lease was never
terminated, as any attempt to notice Coughlin on the termination oI the lease was deIicient,
owing largely to a Iraudulent attempt by Baker to avoid having the language oI the lease
agreement that was so clearly negative to his client's positions respective oI whether any
retaliation occurred (especially with respect to his client's liability Ior the actions oI Green
Action Lawn Service and Darlene Sharpe), his client's liability Ior the utility bill (given the
standing orders and NV Energy's policies), the set-oII required by NRS 118A.390 incident to
the unlawIul interuption oI essential services, etc.). Further Baker wished to avoid prolonging
Iurther the summary eviction approach he initially took in 1492 (Irom which Baker
Iraudulently submitted a Memorandum oI Costs Ior in another case, 1708), but dropped,
largely due to his mistakes and inexperience causing delays and excessive Iees.
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In his zeal to avoid havign the lease agreement 'renew on its terms or continue
indeIinitely (the lease is ambiguous in that regard, and Baker's invoking NRS 40.251 rather
than NRS 40.250 (as Judge SIerrazza indicated was required or at issue) is telling. So, Baker
and Merliss lied to Judge SIerrazza about whether the lease was expired and as to the actual
term oI the lease. Judge SIerrazza prejudiced Coughlin by essentially bootstrapping the
notice Coughlin was provided in the nonpayment summary eviction in 1492 to the no cause
summary evictino in 1708. However, those are rather diIIerent theories oI law involved. As
such, there was no real notice to be bootstrapped, and the underlying rationale behind such
notice requirements (like those in NJCRCP 109, and 108) is to aIIord parties and their
attorneys an opportunity to build their cases Irom a legal and Iactual perspective (and maybe
to move their belongings out while also so preparing Ior a hearing). Given Judge SIerrazza's
reIusal to accord Coughlin the required twenty days to respond to a properly Iiled and served
Summons and Complaint under NJCRCP 109 (an per NRS 40.253(6)), Coughlin was unable
to suIIiciently prepare Ior the 10/25/11 'Trial. Additionally, there exists no authority Ior
Judge SIerrazza's position that he could convert a summary eviction proceeding to a 'Trial
(as he did in his 10/13/11 Order), and continue to retain the NRS 118A.355(5) escrow deposit
he required oI Coughlin, plus add on another new requirement that Coughlin deposit, on
November 1
st
, 2011, the rent Ior November, as a condition oI Coughlin being aIIorded the
procedural protections oI NJCRCP 109 and NRS 40.253(6). How about, Iirst, having Merliss
signed on the dotted line oI a Complaint, and get a Summons issued, then served on Coughlin,
the aIIord Coughlin an opportunity to Iile an Answer, rather than demanding Coughlin submit
to some sua sponte interrogation by Judge SIerrazza as to whether and how much rent he
owes Merliss, even in the Iace oI Baker insisting all that was up Ior the court's inspection was
possessio oI the premises. As Coughlin indicated on 10/25/11, reserving his objections to
Judge SIerrazza's essentially requiring Coughlin to pled non-payment, and placing the burden
on Coughlin to then show the he did actually Iail to so pay his rent... 'those are Iatual issues,
Your Honor. Indeed, that is very true considering the extent to which Merliss admitted to a
novation oI any laibility Coughlin had as to Coughlin's Iormer co-tenant, Melissa Ulloa,
taking Coughlin's rental contributions Ior May and June 2011 and surreptiously Iailing to
Iorward them to Merliss along with her part oI her own Ior May and all oI her share Ior June
2011.
Merliss, the landlord, under Celotex, had the inital burden as the moving party, and
Iailing to even oIIer such "unlawIul detiner aIIidavit" or have it Iiled or served on the
opposing party, is a jurisdictional deIect. Merliss should have had a deIault entered against
him, or his "case" dismissed, on 10/13/11, rather than the court shiItin the burden over to
Coughlin as a punishment Ior his actually showing up to litigate, and having Iiled his
pleadings well in advance.
The justice court's 10/27/11 summary eviction order continues on: Second, with
respect to the subsection "b", although defendant did present evidence today of
destruction of carpet and alleged that it was a crime under ARS 2.33 25.27
2.4 there is no evidence that said complaint cited a specific statute to the landlord
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but rather a general complaint about the structure of this carpet and therefore I find
it that subsection of the statute was not satisIied...."
Exhibit 8 oIIered by Coughlin at the 10/25/11 date, and well in advance as an
attachment to the 9/7/11 Tenant's Asnwer in the original "non-pay" case, and the 10/11/11
Motion Ior Continuance int he no cause case provide clear, written unequivocal prooI that
Coughlin cite speciIically to destruction Io property and larceny statutes in complaintin
about the landscapers actions to Merliss. Further, Coughlin's Iailure to waiver the liability
Merliss agreed to in the lease agreement as to the acts oI such agents was on oI the basis
Ior the retaliation, and such is protected under NSR 118A.510
as will him and I further find that even if it was even if the landlord knew what
you're trying to say the landlord did not retaliate against you for that the landlord
eviction was based on nonpayment of rent not your complaining of your destruction
of carpet and I also at the prior court proceeding I made findings with respect to the
damages and those damages in total were $2725 and that was the outside number and
so I found that you owed at least $2275 even giving you the benefit of all the doubts
and today there was evidence presented that the stairs were only $75 I gave you $125
for the stairs credit there was an e-mail presented today that indicated that it's all you
are asking for was $75."
It is reversible error for 1udge Sferrazza to still be characterizign the matter as
"based on non-payment" where it was specifically pled as a no-cause, and one
perso's "based on nonpayment" is another person's "retaliated against the tenant
for asserting his NRS 118A.360 fix and deduct rights, or his rights to refuse material
alterations to the lease forged upon him by the landlord (such as Merliss's patent
insistence on retaliating against Coughlin where he indicated an intent to assert his
rights to damages from Merliss for the landscapers actons, as well as Coughlin's
rights to 48 hours notice prior to any inspection, etc. etc), or otherwise complaining
to the landlord, ie under NRS 118A.510(b), of the variosu violations possible within
NRS 118A (whether.290, .390, .510, etc., etc).
To allow Baker to interject such prejudicial settlement offers at the conclusion of
the trial is very clearly error.
"1udge: and then with respect to the noxious weeds first of all I find that that is not a
habitability issue "
Actually, Couglin had admitted an exhibit demonstrating that a provision Io the reno
municipal housing code speaks to weed growing taller than 8 inches, and thereIore, under
NRS 118A.290, such is per se habitability, and certainly strong enough, especially when
combined with the photographs admitted, to beat the waterdowned summary judgment
standard the legislature speciIically tailore to the unique setting known as summary
eviction land.
While the justice court Iound "second oI all I Iind that under the lease you were
required to maintain the lawn" coughlin provided emails Irom the landlord hwereby the
landlord eliminates any such amibiguity and agrees to be respoinsbile Ior such weed
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maintenance, or at least bargains with Coughlin Ior a resolution oI such ambiguity to the
tune oI $350 Ior one season's weed maintenance, on 5/17/11, with the 5/23/11 damage by
the landscapers resultin in Coughlin (as detailed in his exhibits oI correspondence
between landlord and tenant) immediately asserting his rights under the lease where
Merliss is to be liable Ior such damages oI his agents...
Judge SIerrazza took a curiosu tact oI reIusign to acknowledge the arguments Coughlin
made as to NRS 118A.510(b) as to complainign directly to the landlord oI a violation oI
NRS 118A..rather, the justice court seems to have excised such portion oI that statute out
in Iavor oI the latter halI thereoI, to which it indicated Coughlin's complaints weren't
"speciIic" enough in citing chapter and verse oI some particularly criminal violation in its
statutory Iorm (there was no indication as to whether tenant's are expected to perIectly
blue book 14 day Iix and deduct letters as well...).
The 10/27/11 Order errors (and beyond error in exceeding its jurisdiction) where it
reads: "as to the moldy insulation I do find that that could be a habitability issue
clearly could be. However, again under 118A.510 subsection to make it retaliatory it
has to be have been presented either in action suit by you or defendant against you
against by you and the judicial administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the
tenant raised the issue of compliance with the requirements of habitability and since
you didn't raise this issue until after the landlord had in fact filed the complaint I find
that that it did not violate the habitability statute did not violate the retaliatory
eviction statute.
Such an interpretation of NRS 118A.510
10/27/11 order: '1udge: I denied your IFP on the appeal but I am not sure if I actually
aia it in writing Sir
...1udge: okay I will grant your IFP for this appeal if you go forward but the appeal
you filed was not a proper appeal Sir...

Its quite clear that the summary eviction order as rendered Irom the bench by justice court
Judge SIerrazza on 10/27/11 departs markedly Irom the prosed Order that Hill's associate
Baker was able to get Judge SIerrazza to sign, but regardless, Judge SIerrazza's
orders/rulings Irom rendered Irom the bench at the conclusion oI the 11/7/11 hearing in
the justice court amended such 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE, as well.
Judge SIerrazza's Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law, and Order Ior Summary Eviction oI
10/27/11, reads: "FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER FOR
SUMMARY EVICTION
This matter having come on regularly for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to NRS
40.254 and NRS 40.253(6) on October 13, 2011, and continued on October 25, 2011 (well,
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actually the justice court admitted it "made a mistake" in setting the matter as a
"Trial" for 10/25/11 and noticing it as such in writing)... The Court Iinds the Iollowing
Iacts:
1. Merliss is the owner of the real property located at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada (the
"Property")." (actually, no: and the title questions take jurisdiction out oI concurrent land and
render it appropriate in the district court only: "
Merliss, contrary to the caption listed by Baker and in the UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit oI
Merliss and Baker's Iilign, including his 10/19/11 Declaration, is not the owner oI the
rental in question, but rather, the "Matthew J. Merliss Living Trust" is so listed on the
Washoe County Recorders website, presneting subject matter, personal jurisdiciton and
authority oI the courts deIiciencies nulliIying the orders in 1708."
The 10/27/11 order is clearly erroneous where it held: "2. The tenancy at issue
commenced on March 1, 2010, and was for a term of 12 months.
3. The rental agreement terminatea by its terms on February 28, 211. ThereaIter, Coughlin
became a month to month tenant pursuant to NRS 118A.470 and paragraph 3 of the parties'
rental agreement.
hearing. The court specifically finds that service of that notice was proper pursuant to, and
6. Coughlin Iailed to vacate the Property within 30 calendar days of being served with the
Termination) and Notice of Summary Eviction -NRS 40.254, which notice was admitted
proper pursuant to, and for all purposes contemplated under, ARS 4.28.
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10.2. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he "complainea in gooa faith to the
lanalora or a law enforcement agency of a violation of [ARS Chapter 118Aj or of a
specific statute that imposes a criminal penalty" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(b)
referenced termination and eviction notices, Coughlin had "instituted or deIended against a
the lanalora, a government agency, an attorney, a Iair housing agency or any other
not limited to, the Iront and back steps, any broken window, any alleged mold, any Ialling
11.1. With respect to any weeas on the Property, the court further specifically finas
that the maintenance of the surrounaing grounas, incluaing weea control, was the sole
responsibility oI Coughlin unaer paragraph 22 of the parties rental agreement.
12.1. As such, the court finds that Coughlin was not entitled to withhold any rent
based on any alleged "habitability" issue, or otherwise, and that all sums heretofore
deposited by Coughlin pursuant to the Court's order dated October 13, 211, rightfully
belong to Merliss as and for past due rent.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this case.
Venue is appropriate in this court.
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NRCP 56 because these proceedings are analogous." Anvui, LLC v. C.L. Dragon, LLC, 123
Nev. 212, 215, 163 P.3d 405 (2007).
must transcena the pleaaings ana, by affiaavit or other aamissible eviaence, introauce
specific facts that show a genuine issue of material fact." Torrealba v. Kesmilis, 124 Nev. 95,
178 P.3d 716 (2008).
7. Coughlin failed to show that any genuine issue of material fact remains for trial.
As such, Coughlin failea to meet his buraen of proof to establish any legal aefense to the
summary eviction. Anvui. 1orrealba.
8. As no issues of fact had yet been presented to the court to warrant a trial,
Coughlin was not entitled to have the summary eviction hearing heard by ajury. NJCRCP 38.
NJCRCP 38.
property.
summary eviction of the above-named 1enant and it appearing from the record on file
That the sheriff/constable of Reno Township, or one of their auly authori:ea agents be,
ana hereby is, directed to remove each and every person found upon the rental unit at 121
River Rock, Reno, Washoe County, Nevaaa, by no earlier than October 31, 2011 at 5 pm.
FOLLOWS:
The sums currently on deposit with the Court, in the amount of $2,275., are the
property of the landlord, Matt Merliss, but shall not be immediately released to him. Instead,
those sums shall serve as Coughlin's security for costs on appeal , pursuant to NJCRCP 73 , in
his counsel of record. These sums shall not, in any event, operate to stay enforcement of
this order and the surrender of the right of Coughlin to possess the Property. Nothing in
this order shall prevent this court or an appellate court Irom releasing the deposited Iunds to
Merliss or his counsel prior to or aIter any appeal is perIected, or Irom increasing the amount
oI any security to be posted by Coughlin Ior any reason, or both, either upon its own motion
or upon motion by Merliss.
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IT IS SO ORDERED."
The thing is, Coughlin clearly argued and pled retaliation under NRS 118A.510(b),
both in complaining oI violation oI NRS 118A (which includes complaining oI retaliation
under NRS 118A.510, habitability under NRS 118A.290, unlawIul interruption oI essential
services, NRS 118A.390, etc., etc.). Additionally, Coughlin, an attorney, clearl complained to
himselI, in satisIaction oI NRS 118A.510 oI discrimination. Further, Coughlin's Iailure to
assent to Merliss demand that he waive the 48 hours bargained Ior notice requiremetn Ior any
inspection or entry by the landlord is protected under NSR 118A.510. Likewise, Coughlin's
deIending in the precursor non-payment summary evictio in 1492 satisIied the requirements
oI NRS 118A.510 where Merliss both threatened to, and did bring an action Ior possession in
retaliation Ior Coughlin's
exceptions.
1. ...the landlord may not, in retaliation , terminate a tenancy, reIuse to renew a tenancy, ...
decrease essential items or services required by the rental agreement or this chapter, or bring
or threaten to bring an action Ior possession iI:
(a) The tenant has complained in good Iaith oI a violation oI a building, housing or health
code applicable to the premises and aIIecting health or saIety to a governmental agency
charged with the responsibility Ior the enIorcement oI that code;
(b) The tenant has complained in good Iaith to the landlord or a law enIorcement agency oI
a violation oI this chapter or oI a speciIic statute that imposes a criminal penalty;
organization;
(e) The tenant has instituted or deIended against a judicial proceeding ... in which the
tenant raised an issue oI ... habitability oI dwelling units;"
(I) The tenant has failed or refused to give written consent to a regulation adopted by the
landlord, after the tenant enters into the rental agreement, ...
attorney, ...(oI discrimination)...
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NRS 118A.510 contrasts where: "The landlord may not, in retaliation, terminate a
tenancy, reIuse to renew a tenancy,... decrease essential items or services ... or bring or
threaten to bring an action Ior possession iI: ... (e) The tenant has instituted or deIended
against a judicial proceeding ... in which the tenant raised an issue oI ... habitability oI
dwelling units;"
Judge SIerrazza Iound causcasian and male where not protected class, nor was a national
origian oI th United States.
NRS 118A.290 Habitability oI dwelling unit.
habitable condition. A dwelling unit is not habitable iI it violates provisions oI housing or
health codes concerning the health, saIety, sanitation or Iitness Ior habitation oI the dwelling
unit or iI it substantially lacks:
(a) EIIective waterprooIing and weather protection oI the rooI and exterior walls, including
windows and doors.
(c) A water supply approved under applicable law, which is:
(1) Under the control oI the tenant or landlord and is capable oI producing hot and cold
running water;
(2) Furnished to appropriate Iixtures; and
landlord.
(d) Adequate heating Iacilities which conIormed to applicable law when installed and are
applicable law when installed and are maintained in good working order.
(I) An adequate number oI appropriate receptacles Ior garbage and rubbish in clean
condition and good repair at the commencement oI the tenancy. The landlord shall arrange Ior
the removal oI garbage and rubbish Irom the premises unless the parties by written agreement
provide otherwise.
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"1udge: The only one Irom what you`re saying looks applicable to me is E, the tenant has
instituted or deIended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which
the tenant raised an issue oI compliances with requirements oI this chapter respecting the
habitability. That`s the only thing that I recall in all these proceedings we`ve had so Iar that
may come or |45.27|. This statute that within the context oI this statute. Unless you have
something I`m missing. Because G, is a complaint to the landlord but it has to do with Iair
housing which I`ve never heard that you mentioned any other discrimination.
Defendant: I haven`t |45.56| Your Honor.
1udge: What is your what is the discrimination that you are alleging?
Defendant: Race, sex and national origin |46.07| to classes.
1udge: What is your race, sir?
Defendant: Caucasian, parts Irish, German.
1udge: It's not a protected class.
Defendant: Yes, it is.
1udge: Well, you will need to cite the law Ior me because.
Defendant: Oh, that. That would be in this context I`m more Iamiliar with the |46.35|
context but and this context is a Iair housing statute or statute. And those statutes according ||
1udge: Sir, I but the thing is the complaint. Do you have a copy oI the complaint to the
landlord or government agency an attorney or the Iair housing agency or other appropriate oI
a violation oI NRS 118.010 to 118.120?
Defendant: Yes, the |47.02|
1udge: Okay, well, what is the complaint, sir?
Defendant: They complaint is that |47.10| with me because me and || he seems to be ||
anybody who is non-white male account beIore any Iault and the next is the Iacts surrounding
this case.
1udge: Anyone who is non-white male?
Defendant: Yeah. |47.25| is Iine with them. Antonio the handyman is Iine with him. The
landscaping crew all Hispanic is Iine with him. Darlene |17.35 Sharpe|, a woman realtor who
seemly directed two two diIIerent groups oI people to be the same job who get paid Ior
twice.
1udge: Okay. What is the.
Defendant: He is |47.43| with her but he want to be out.
1udge: What is the email, what is the email and where is the rate when complained Iirst oI
all?
Defendant: It`s in Exhibit 8.
1udge: Exhibit 8?
Defendant: 8.
1udge: Okay, we have Exhibit 8. And just so I understand that.
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Defendant: Quickly Your Honor, |48.06| Objection the previous sections of .51 I don't
believe those are not satisfied with someone complaints the landlord, I do that makes it
applicable. I don't think it called for a.
1udge: Subsection (a)?
Defendant: I don`t know about that but it seems like you`re saying, all in one oI those sub,
subsections in that statute is putting the fact by complaining to the landlord and I would say
|48.34|
1udge: And I`m conIused about what you`re saying now. I just said that subsection (a) does
not apply iI you do not make a complaint to a governmental agency. And that is my ruling.
Defendant: I thought it was iI you made a complaint involving co-section other
governmental agency.
1udge: No.
Defendant: 1o the landlord, to an agency.
1udge: No, it says, that`s not what the statute says. It says, through a governmental agency.
Defendant: I got it here now, Your Honor, I`m sorry. I was under an impression |49.20|.
1udge: Sir, you can appeal my ruling but I am ruling that the complaint has to be to a
governmental agency, not to the landlord.
Defendant: I see right, that`s clear. My mistake. But subsection (b) is where the language
have to the landlord begins to. "
Couglhin goes on to argue and provide evidence in support oI both aspects oI NRS
118A.510(b), as to the violations oI NRS 118A that Coughlin complained to landlord Merliss
about and as to violations oI speciIic criminal statutes that Coughlin complained to Merliss
about with respect to the 5/23/11 actions oI the landscapers whose actions Merliss is
responsible Ior, damages wise, under the lease.
"Defendant: Well, and I have those issues Your Honor but I`m not I haven`t addressed the
good Iaith violation oI building, housing or health care. This sounds very similar.
1udge: Which one is that?
Defendant: That`s
118A.510 sub 1A.
1udge: And I already ruled it. You have to make the complaint to the government agency.
Defendant: I am not sure whether or not I did. I seem to recall making a call.
1udge: No, okay. Well, you seem to recall you don`t have any evidence oI that today. And
iI you seem to recall how would the landlord even know to evict you because oI that, iI you
don`t even know iI you made a complaint, sir?
Defendant: Well, I did write the landlord with respect to the weeds.
1udge: I understand but you didn`t come you didn`t write the landlord |1.11.50| complain
to this governmental agency about the weeds, did you?
Defendant: I think he could have inIerred that that was a possibility Irom my writing.
1udge: Okay. I`m not going to do that. So, go on to the next item.
Defendant: I don't - just to state an Objection, I don't think that the statute says I have
that.
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1udge: You are arguing with me, you are a witness.
Defendant: None oI the court |1.12.12|
1udge: Yeah, just where are the line you are a witness, sir.
Defendant: Yeah.
1udge: I`ve given a lot oI latitude. You are a witness testiIying as to the Iacts not arguing the
law. So, I tell me what else you have then today, on the retaliatory oI eviction?
Defendant: I believe we`ve gone over the complaints to the landlord oI a criminal statute. As
Iar as I know there has been no citations issue. So, section D does not apply. The tenant
has instituted or defended against it. In sub E a judicial or administrative proceeding. I
did prior his filing for eviction say all file retaliatory eviction law said against you, I
think that could be tantamount to instituted a judicial or administrative proceeding, it`s
allegation demand - at what point does the proceeding began I guess is the question of
fact and I, in this regard, prima facie established 1.13.23] I`m supposed to have all
issues in fact resolved. I believe in my favor to the extent there kind of a 50-50, I think
it`s fair and ] summary adjustment make a prima facie case which - it`s my
understanding this is the same ] judgment as ] here. And that`s fairly low standard.
It`s not proved beyond reasonable doubt too sir.
1udge: I`m not asking you for that, I am asking for a articulable defense that you can tell
me precisely what it is in that`s subsection (I), well, I`m sorry, subsection (e). The tenant has
instituted or deIended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which
the tenant raised an issue oI compliance with requirements oI this chapter in respect to
habitability.
Defendant: Yes, sir. In Exhibit 8 on page 28, I point out to Dr. Merliss that he`ll be sued Ior
retaliatory eviction. To me that tantamount to instituting a proceeding whereupon he promptly
evicted me or sought to with the help oI.
1udge: I thought he already was evicting you...
Defendant: No, it`s not that point. He was still trying to convince me. The property damage
wasn`t 'germane to the issues and that he would 'check up on the insurance about it Ior
which he never got back to me. And kind oI just, you know, soIt pedaling my complaints out
oI the door, I guess, or trying to ignore them away. But at that point I Ieel that I was
instituting a proceeding by making a litigation demand and his subsequent conduct in hiring
an attorney and seeking to evict me is just per se classic retaliatory eviction.
1udge: Alright. Anything else, sir?
Defendant: It`s not elegant at all. It`s the employee goes to the boss and complains oI sexual
harassment inspired the next day. That`s essentially what we had going on here. And to
analogize.
1udge: We are not to analogize, sir, you`re not arguing you`re testiIying.
Defendant: Yes, Your Honor. With respect to other bases I deal which habitability issues and
I believe when a tenant invokes the right to do a rent deduction that is protected. I suppose
that.
1udge: The statute is quite clear, sir that when we do that it has to be deposited and re arguing
about this but you can appeal that.
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Defendant: Your Honor, just to clarify and I know you want me to argue but there is -
there is this section in the statute that it says fix it yourself and there`s no depositing
going on there.
1udge: That`s a separate section. If - but you don`t get to deduct five months of rent for
- we went through this within the last hearing the maximum amount you claim was
$2,000 something, $2,700.
Defendant: There was about 1,000 missing. My Iormer co-tenant had paid him
approximately $900, I was missing $250 working with the |1:16:53| in the back stairs was not
addressed.
1udge: I included the stairs, sir.
Defendant: That`s the Iront stairs, Your Honor, the back stairs I had issues about.
1udge: No I you can`t make this up each week I see you. I Iinalized at the last hearing I
said, is there anything else and you indicated, no.
Defendant: And I Iiled a motion to correct the judgment |1.17.12| or clariIy a rule 59 motion
the Iollowing Monday. There is a strong indication || was going to go on here with Dr.
Merliss. I`ve got emails wherein Iormer co tenant, we are all inmates, she took the rent money
Irom me as was the practice instead oI Iorwarding both our shares on to Dr. Merliss she
Iorwarded it on against my share and she made arrangements to pay him later, wherein he
ratiIied that or agreed to that and apparently will collect that money. This kind |1.17.56|
collection practice argument.
1udge: And sir, we`re not here about the nonpayment oI rent. That was dropped.
Defendant: I alleged habitability based on and I think that`s where I`m getting conIused,
Your Honor.
1udge: Habitability is sent out in the statures crystal clear. And.
Defendant: Installation, molding installation that`s habitability.
1udge: That was one.
Defendant: Windows, broken windows.
1udge: Yes.
Defendant: Not only a window thing. It`s a saIety thing there`s |1.18.33| glass.
1udge: I understand that those were alleged. But the question is, were they repaired, number
one. And number two, you were evicted because oI those things.
Defendant: Yes and I think that on the tenure all the you`re entitled type comments and the
proximity and time we`re talking about literally like a week aIter Dr. Merliss what I kind
oI conIuse this is.
1udge: Are we here to what, sir?
Defendant: Well, it`s like he Iinally came back Irom being out oI the country Ior three
months Notice he haven`t been paid rent. And I don`t know iI also knows he had a bunch oI
emails built up over a year asking him to Iix habitability issues that he never did. And then he
paused his whatever takes up his time and imagine he`s busy medical practice he pause that
and turn to me and wanted all his rent. And he didn`t want to Iix any oI the issues and he
wanted it right then and he was going to evict me iI he didn`t have like then right away. And
that`s retaliatory eviction. |1.19.40| the sections oI the statutes 118A that allowed me to do
rent deductions when he.
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1udge: Sir, where is the 14-day Notice? And.
Defendant: Exhibit 8, is at the |1.19.52| over.
1udge: Exhibit 8 what, what page?
Defendant: There`s probably 10 and since this throughout this 15 pages.
1udge: I want to know one.
Defendant: Okay.
1udge: Starting with one.
Defendant: The mold, the installation issue. Starting on page 19 which would be page 2
|1.20.15|.
1udge: Well, we`re here your saying something about replacing the baths Ior $320.
Defendant: Yes, sir. And the pictures I`ve submitted and showed on my laptop at the last
hearing and I emailed them to both you and Counsel Baker today. I caught the pictures.
1udge: Well, did you Iix that or not?
Defendant: Yes. AIter literally I would estimate months oI no response Irom Dr. Merliss."
FW: 121 River Rock?
12/17/11
To: ballarddreno.gov, howardkreno.gov, robertspreno.gov,
renomunirecordsreno.gov, hazlett-stevenscreno.gov, puenteslawaol.com
Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
Sat 12/17/11 12:15 AM
To:
ballarddreno.gov; howardkreno.gov; robertspreno.gov; renomunirecordsreno.gov;
hazlett-stevenscreno.gov; puenteslawaol.com
Unbelievable. The idea that exculpating evidence is being withheld under some "lien" is
transmitted into the universe, next thing I know, my law oIIice is broken in to and the Richard
B. Hill gang is stil asserting a lien on property that was stolen, in my opinion,as a result oI
their own negligence, leaving a window air conditioner unit in a window, without even
putting a window jam between the top oI the sill and lower pain, Iacing a sidewalk a block
Irom the Lakemill Lodge and across Irom City Center Apartments, great. Great. And I still
have not been Iaxed or appropriately served the Order and Contempt OrderI was told would
be Iaxed to me.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
Iax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
To: cdbakerrichardhillaw.com; knielsenrichardhillaw.com;
sgallagherrichardhillaw.com
Subject: RE: 121 River Rock
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 15:43:38 -0800
Dear Mr. Baker,
I drove by the property recently and saw you had added boarding up the Iront door on very,
very recently. UnIortunately, your client and your Iirm, despite billing up some $1,060 Ior
"securing" the property on top oI charging $900 Ior storage Ior what could Iit inside a 10x20
Ioot storage shed, never once providing an inventory, and contributing to a wrongIul arrest
and deIamation causing me and my clients great damage, Iailed to take even basic steps to
secure the property, despite my making numerous written requests that you do so, including,
but not limited to, taking the damn window unit air conditioner out oI the window Iacing the
sidewalk on the side oI the house very close to the damn Lakemill Lodge, or even putting a
strong stick in between the bottom sliding window pain and the top oI the sill to prevent
someone Irom simply pushing in the window unit air conditioner and pushing the window up
to gain access. Further, a blanket that was on the orange circular couch is clearly in the Ilower
bed in Iront oI the house. Additionally, there are reports that someone with your oIIice gave
someone a mattress Irom the inventory oI Coughlin Memory Foam (a Nevada licensed
business located at the property) and an expensive mattress platIorm has clearly been
damaged and placed in the Ilower bed as well, in addition to one oI the wooden porch shades
being removed Irom the Iront porch. You and your client are, oI course, liable Ior all oI this.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
Iax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
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From: cdbakerrichardhillaw.com
CC: rhillrichardhillaw.com
Subject: 121 River Rock
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 13:50:02 -0800
Mr. Coughlin:
The River Rock property has been broken into. We believe the break-in occurred sometime
on Monday, December 12, 2011. There appear to be items missing, including the TV in the
living room, perhaps a computer monitor, and perhaps some stereo equipment. I cantt tell
what else. The contents oI the residence appear to have been riIled through.
I am providing you with this inIormation as a courtesy. This email does NOT constitute
permission Ior you to go to the River Rock property.
Casey D. Baker, Esq.
Richard G. Hill, Chartered
652 Forest Street
Reno, Nevada 89509
Phone: (775) 348-0888
Fax: (775) 348-0858
Email: cdbakerrichardhillaw.com
CONFIDENTIAL: ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT; ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
This e-mail may contain legally privileged or conIidential inIormation. II you are not the
intended recipient, please do not read, copy, use, or disclose this communication to anyone
other than the intended recipient. II you have received this message in error, please notiIy the
sender and delete the email message Irom your system. Thank you.
Circular 230 Notice.
To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inIorm you that any U.S.
Iederal tax advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) is not
intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, Ior the purpose oI (i) avoiding penalties
under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another
party any transaction or matter addressed herein.
need to communicate with you regarding my requests?
12/26/11
Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
Mon 12/26/11 3:52 PM
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To:
puenteslawaol.com
Dear Mr. Puentes,
I called you just now and leIt a message. I have received nothing Irom you in regard to my
written requests Ior action on your part and Ior inIormation in connection with the matter Ior
which you are attorney oI record RMC 11 CR 22185 2I.
Please respond in writing.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
Iax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
scope oI representation?
12/30/11
Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
Fri 12/30/11 10:36 PM
To:
puenteslawaol.com
Dear Mr. Puentes,
Please move Ior a continuance immediately in this matter, set Ior trial on January 10th, 2011.
You assured me in person at our meeting at your oIIice that you would be able to get one, and
I deIinitely want and need one, and RMCR indicates there are certain deadlines Ior moving
Ior one, which I have already asked you to do in writing.
I am upset that you slammed down the telephone ended our telephone conversation abruptly
when we spoke yesterday, immediately aIter I asked you to provide something in writing
outlining the scope oI your representation oI me. I wish Ior you to prepare and Iile (aIter
receiving express prior written authorization Irom me upon review oI your draIts) the Motion
to Supress and Motions in Limine I previously request that you Iile, in addition to subpoening
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Dr. Merliss, Richard Hill, both RPD OIIicers at the scene oI the trespassing arrest, and a
subpoena duces tecume to the Law OIIice oI Richard Hill, the RPD, and Dr. Merliss
demanding any and all documentation and or media at all connected with this matter in any
way. Further you indicated that you had not even attempted to view the discovery produced
by the Reno City Attorney, nor did you have any interest in seeing anything I might have to
show you. That was enormously upsetting to me, as any sentient human being might
reasonably be expected to anticipate. Please note my new address. Please Iile a conIlict
motion seeking to make the Reno City Atty recuse itselI in light oI the conIlicts oI interest
incident to the various arrests and torts against me committed by the RPD and Reno City
Attorney.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
new address Ior me?
12/31/11
Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
Sat 12/31/11 1:32 AM
To:
puenteslawaol.com
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
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Nevada Bar No: 9473
Pendency oI Criminal Prosecution as Ground Ior Continuance or Postponement oI Civil
Action Involving Facts or Transactions upon which Prosecution Is PredicatedState
CasesPendency oI Criminal Prosecution as Ground Ior Continuance or Postponement oI
Civil?
12/31/11
Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
Sat 12/31/11 8:14 PM
To:
puenteslawaol.com
2 attachments
jail time counsel sixth amendment possibility misdemeanor.pdI (3.1 MB) , IiIth amendment
right civil proceeding parallel.pdI (2.6 MB)
Pendency oI Criminal Prosecution as Ground Ior Continuance or Postponement oI Civil
Action Involving Facts or Transactions upon which Prosecution Is PredicatedtState
Cases...37 A.L.R.6th 511 (Originally published in 2008)
;please Iind that ALR attached, perhaps it speaks to the res gestae and or stay during the
pendency oI the civil appeal we discussed vis a vis the criminal trespass charge
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
more motivation Ior you?
12/31/11
From:
zachcoughlinhotmail.com You moved this message to its current location.
Saved:
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Sat 12/31/11 8:28 PM
To:
puenteslawaol.com
6 attachments
public deIender liability.pdI (2.2 MB) , Public DeIender's Immunity Irom Liability Ior
Malpractice.pdI (4.0 MB) , conIlicts with PUBLIC DEFENDER EMPLOYEES.pdI (2.0
MB) , Construction and eIIect oI statutes providing Ior oIIice oI public deIender.pdI (5.7 MB)
, LegalmalpracticeindeIenseoIcriminalprosecution|1|.pdI (6.7 MB) ,
tolling60bmotionsattorneymalpractice|1|.pdI (2.8 MB)
Continue writing
,
Delete
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Is Roberto Puentes on Youtube.com? also more motivation Ior you in this case?
12/31/11
Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
Sat 12/31/11 9:19 PM
To:
puenteslawaol.com
10 attachments
Legal malpractice in deIense oI criminal prosecution.pdI (6.7 MB) , Public DeIender's
Immunity Irom Liability Ior Malpractice.pdI (4.0 MB) , process server Iraud harass
trespass.pdI (3.1 MB) , ICircumstances giving rise to prejudicial conIlict oI interests
between criminal deIendant.pdI (2.7 MB) , public deIender liability.pdI (2.2 MB) , conIlicts
with PUBLIC DEFENDER EMPLOYEES.pdI (2.0 MB) , Civil liability oI attorney Ior abuse
oI process process server trespass Iraud.pdI (1925.1 KB) , process server abuse harass
trespass.pdI (1816.6 KB) , Trespass state prosecution Ior unauthorized entry or occupation,
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Ior public demonstration purposes, oI business, industrial, or utility premises.pdI (339.6 KB) ,
SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY AT A HEARING OR TRIAL IN A CRIMINAL CASE.pdI
(281.9 KB)
Hi Mr. Puentes,
I know you have repeatedly told me you could care less to watch any youtube.com videos,
regardless oI whether they prove my innocence or whatever, however, I think you might need
to watch some oI these:
http://www.youtube.com/results?
searchquerynevadacourtservices&oqnevadacourtservices&aqI&aqi&aql&gssm
e&gsupl18l3308l0l3556l19l15l0l9l0l1l311l1375l0.1.4.1l6l0
It seems Nevada Court Services, which shares an oIIice and a receptionist with the Iormer
appointed public deIender Ior this case representing me, Lew Taitel, Esq, who departed Irom
RMC Rules by Iailing to Iile a Motion to Withdraw when he sought to and Iailed to disclose
the conIlict oI interest that he Iailed to prevent his taking on my case and reviewing ultra
personal inIormation, that is directly connected to the subject matter oI the litigation Irom
which the conIlict arises as well as the deIense oI the suit you and he have both appeared as
attorney oI record in, this trespass case. I don't think you are on any oI the videos, but there
are so many ultra zealous documentary Iilmmakers these days that I cannot be sure.
Anyways, Lew Taitel, as I have indicated to you in writing, is listed as "associated with"
Nevada Court Services, on their website, with his picture. They share and oIIice and a
receptionist, and perhaps others staII, in the oIIice across Irom the Iormer Chocolate Bar.
PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY OF ALL, AND SOMETHING I WANT YOU TO
LITIGATE AGGREsSIVELY (CLIENT CONTROLS MEANS AND OBJECTIVES OF A
LITIGATION, WHETHER APPOINTED ATTORNEY LIKES IT OR NOT) IS THAT
NEVADA COURT SERVICES, INCLUDE ITS PROCESS SERVER JOEL DURDEN, CAN
BE SEEN TRESPASSING ONTO MY PROPERTY AND OTHERWISE ASSAULTING,
HARASSING, AND VEXING ME, BEHIND MY BACK GATE, NO LESS IN THE
VIDEOS FOUND AT THE LINK ABOVE.
PLEASE DISCLOSE ANY CONFLICTS OR PREVIOUS WORKING RELATIONSHIPS
YOU HAVE WITH ANY OF THE RENO CITY ATTORNEY, RPD, RENO MUNICIPAL
COURT STAFF, RICHARD HILL, OR ANY OTHER INDIVIDUALS WITH WHOM YOU
HAVE HAD PRIOR DEALINGS AND THEREFOR MAY PRESENT A SITUATION
WHERE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST ARISES.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Zach Coughlin has shared a Iolder with you.?
1/05/12
Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
Thu 1/05/12 8:22 AM
To:
puenteslawaol.com
Dear Mr. Puentes, Please let me know, in writing, the status oI the Motion For Continuance
you indicated you would both Iile and which you Ielt sure would be obtained, either through
written stipulation with opposing counsel oI by Order oI the RMC
Zach has 14 Iiles to share with you on SkyDrive. To view them, click the links below.
zach's arrest 001.avi
Download all
Share your Iiles with
video oI trespass arrest?
1/05/12
Zach Coughlin
From:
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Sent:
Thu 1/05/12 8:43 AM
To:
puenteslawaol.com
1 attachment
zach's arrest 009.Ilv (10.4 MB)
https://skydrive.live.com/redir.aspx?cid43084638I32I5I28&resid43084638F32F5F28!
1050&parid43084638F32F5F28!117&authkey!ACPUJSqi94trtcY
Dear Mr. Puentes,
Please provide an indication, in writing, as to the status oI the continuance oI the upcoming
trespass trial, which you indicated would be obtained.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
another video oI the arrest which lacks anyone telling Coughlin to leave or seeking to issue a
citation in lieu oI custodial arrest?
1/05/12
Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
Thu 1/05/12 3:26 PM
To:
puenteslawaol.com
1 attachment
zach's arrest 011.Ilv (16.2 MB)
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
ARRESTED FOR JAYWALKING BY RENO PD?
1/13/12
To: peteeastmangmail.com, tcoughlinmdhotmail.com, marybarkbarkyahoo.com,
carcoughstergmail.com, melissa.l.ulloagmail.com, tjhlaweschelon.com,
geoIgileshotmail.com, teddyjames25gmail.com, jgoodnightwashoecounty.us,
puenteslawaol.com
Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
Fri 1/13/12 7:49 AM
To:
peteeastmangmail.com; tcoughlinmdhotmail.com; marybarkbarkyahoo.com;
carcoughstergmail.com; melissa.l.ulloagmail.com; tjhlaweschelon.com;
geoIgileshotmail.com; teddyjames25gmail.com; jgoodnightwashoecounty.us;
puenteslawaol.com
1 attachment
SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY TO OPPOSITION CV08-01709 1 13 12.pdI (162.9 KB)
Nevada Courts Services CEO JeII Chandler drove by the scene while I was in the patrol car. I
am suing Nevada Court Services incident to their trespassing into my backyard and banging
on windows and ringing doorbells in teams Ior 40 minutes at a clip three times a day on
Richard HIlls behalI. Mr. Puentes, as my court appointed deIender in the trespass action
against me (arrested at Richard Hill's behest by an RPD OIIicer would said Hill pays him
money) you recently inIormed me you have ties to Nevada Court Services and Lew Taitel, the
court appointed deIender whom mysteriously was able to withdraw Irom my representation
prior to your involvement despite not Iiling a motion in compliance with Reno Municipal
Court Rules, nor any Order granting such a withdrawal being Iiled. Can you clariIy your, in
your words "extremely close relationship with Lew Taitel" and your "business relationship"
with Nevada Court Services?
Sincerely
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
request Ior memorandum oI services provided?
2/03/12
Zach Coughlin
From:
Sent:
Fri 2/03/12 12:40 AM
To:
puenteslawaol.com
Dear Mr. Puentes,
Could you please provide me with a Memorandum detailing what work you did on my case
and provide me with a complete copy oI my Iile, including any work product that you created.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
NOTICE OF APPEAL MOTION TO SET ASIDE WITHDRAWAL?
2/15/12
To: puenteslawaol.com, drakejreno.gov
Zach Coughlin
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From:
Sent:
Wed 2/15/12 3:21 AM
To:
puenteslawaol.com; drakejreno.gov
1 attachment
2 13 12 nOTICE OF APPEAL PUENTES DEAL WITH ATTACHED EXHIBIT 1.pdI (415.9
KB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
On February 27th, 2012, while awaiting trial beIore Judge Nash Holmes in 11 TR 26800, and
in a private meeting with Reno City Attorney Allison Ormaas in one oI the private
conIerence/meeting rooms outside the interior doors to the court room, RMC Marshal Harley
entered the room and purported to personally serve Coughlin a document in the appeal oI the
eviction Irom Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice, in CV11-03628, apparently at the direction
oI Richard G. Hill, Esq., on behalI oI his client Merliss (the landlord, whom all three oI the
appointed deIenders provided by the RMC to Coughlin reIused to subpoena, apparently
because it would cut into their $7K Iee Irom the RMC and because oI an apparent desire to
torpedo Coughlin's deIense, despite Merliss being a material witness. Further, it is believed
OFIicer Carter and Sargent Lopez were subpoened by the City, and perhaps by Coughlin,
though a continuance was denied upon their Ialing to appear). Washoe County SheriII's
Deputy John Machen Iiled a Ialse AIIidavit oI Service on November 7th, 2011, in RJC
Rev2011-001708 alleging to have "personally served" Coughlin at the time the WCSO's
Deputy Machen eIIectuated the lockout on November 1st, 2011 at 4:30 pm (by which time the
ORders oI October 25th and October 27th, 2011 made exhibits in this Trial by the City had
become stale, invalid, perhaps void, etc. given, as admitted to, apparently, by both the RJC's
ChieI Civil Clerk/Supervisor Karen Stancil (to be clear, I mean this only to the extent that Ms.
Stancil has represented to the undersigned the "usual custom and practice" oI the RJC is to Iax
over Orders such as those mentioned above to the WCSO the day they are Iile stamped, or at
the latest by the next day...plus Baker testiIied, apprently to receipt oI the ORder by the
WCSO on October 28th, 2011...all making the WCSO's "receipt" oI the Orders outside the
statutorily dictate that the lockout occur "within 24 hours" thereoI under NRS 40.253.
Regardless, back to RMC Marshal Harley (whom RMC Judge Nash Holmes, in her March 12,
2012 rendition oI some Order Iinding Coughlin guilty oI every RPD in the book, incident to a
traIIic citation matter that Judge Nash Holmes had transmogriIied into a hearing beIore the
NNDB, apparently (see In Re Kunstler), Judge Nash Holmes alleged that Marshal Harley,
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apparently, Iollowed Coughlin into the bathroom during the restroom break just prior to Judge
Nash Holmes incarcerating Coughlin, whereupon Harley apparently played peeping tom on
Coughlin the bathroom stall and averred to Judge Nash Homes that Coughlin "disassembled
his smart phone" (Martin Crowley is laughing somewhere)...the thing is, "summary contempt"
(even "misdemeanor summary criminal contempt", ie, some law Judge Nash Holmes appears
to have legislated on the spot, and which does not require her to comply with the dictates oI
NRS 189.010-060, as she reIuses to transmit the record and order the production o the
transcript (and its illegal Ior the RMC to Iorce criminal indigents to pay Pam Longoni, and
only Pam Longoni, ANYTHING, up Iront, in some application oI a civil statute related
thereto. Regardless, Judge Nash Holmes "summary criminal contempt" Orders relies upon
allegations oI conduct allegedly committed OUTSIDE the presence oI the Court, so
whichever Marshal went playing peeping' Tom on Coughlin in a restroom stall needs to sign
their name on an AIIidavit and stand behind it like a grown up rather than right some insipid
letter to the State Bar oI Nevada criticizing Coughlin's Iashion sense, then proceeding to lie
and lie and lie about Coughlin whilst also demonstrating a disturbing extent to which the City
oI Reno Marshals behave as a coordinated crew oI intimidators and coerces towards the
citizens oI Reno attempting to access justice, and to which these Marshals themselves obstruct
justice on a regular basis. Right in line with that behavior was that demonstrated by RMC
Marshal Harley in barging into a plea bargaining session between City Attorney Ormaas and
Coughlin and undertaking the legally questionable task (but certainly an intimidating,
coercive, and inappropriate action by Harley) oI "personally serving" Coughlin and Order to
Show Cause in CV11-03628 (despite Coughlin already having been served it via his
electronic Iiler status, something Richard Hill and Casey Baker, E Sq knew Iull well) .
Harley personally served Coughlin some document, then WCSO Machen Iiled an AIIidavit
oI Service on 3 8 12 saying he himselI personally served Coughlin. The RMC puts people in
jail Ior less than that every single day. Then Harley got real uncomIortable with Coughlin
asking him questions related to the propriety oI what Harley just did. Then Harley starts
whispering in City Attorney Ormaas's ear during the trial in 11 TR 26800, held aIter that on
the same day, despite the RMC, apparently, in light oI Judge Nash Holmes March 14, 2012
letter/grievance against Coughlin to the SBN indications therein, being aware that an Order
For Competency Evaluation oI Coughlin was entered at 1:31pm on 2/27/12 in RCR2012-
065630, as Judge Nash Holmes admits to communications with the WCPD regarding
Coughlin. The RMC Marshals, especially Marshal Menzel like to bark menacingly at
deIendants that they have to sign some acceptance oI service or waiver oI service oI various
documents in some apparent eIIort to cost cut postage expenses oI the RMC in aIIording
others due process. But worse than that is Marshal Harley taking it upon himselI to
personally serve Coughlin documents on behalI oI Richard G. Hill, Esq. especially where
RPD Sargent Tarter came to testiIy that day about the 3 traIIic citations he issued Ior Hill
against Coughlin, and Tarter put his feet up on Juage Nash Holmes bench (ie, where the
Juage might set her gavel) while the RMC staII served Sargent Tarter bottled water.
Avoiding an appearance oI impartiality or impropriety is a cannon or something, some might
say. This is true especially incident to a trial appearance related to 3 retaliatory traIIic
citations issued by the RPD aIter they told Coughlin to leave the sidewalk near Hill's law
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OIIice, and where Judge Nash Holmes told Coughlin she would "put you in jail iI you say
Richard Hill's name one more time"... See some oI the materials in Exhibit 1 that show
Also, there may be some clerk Iailure or misconduct where Michelle Purdy and or Lori
Matheus appear to have reIused a Iilign by Coughlin on October 19th, 2011 which arguably
could have Iunctioned as a Motion Ior STay in CV11-03051 - ZACH COUGHLIN VS.
MATT MERLISS ET AL (D1) Filing Date: Wednesday, October 19th, 2011 . And City
Attorney allison Ormaas and Dan Wong both told Coughlin the were not going to investigate,
Iollow up on, notate, or in any way document the Iact that Coughlin repeated to them the
exact words that RPD OIIicer Chris Carter said to Coughlin on November 13th, 2011 when
the Iollowing exchange occurred between Coughlin and RPD OIIicer Carter aIter Carter
subjected Coughlin to a custodial criminal trespass arrest where Hill and Sargent Lopez both
admit that nobody issued Coughlin a warning to leave the premises that day and that the RPD
did not identiIiy themselves as law enIorcement or issue a lawIul order to leave to Coughlin
prior to landlord Merliss kicking in a "basement" door:
Coughlin: (speaking to RPD OIIicer Carter) Are you on Richard G.
Hill's payroll, too?
RPD OIIicer Chris Carter, Jr: "Yes, I am. Richard Hill pays me a lot
oI money so I arrest who he says to arrest and I do what he says to
do".
OIIicer Carter said it. I reported it. Period. Now the SBN's Patrick King has Iailed to
subpoena Marshal Harley or City Attorney Ormaas (maybe he is aIraid they will start
whispering in each other's ears again during some hearing the SBN wants to violate
Coughlin's due process rights in holding on November 14th, 2012), and instead Pat King has
listed his old Iriend and coworker Irom the Attorney Generals OIIice to come testiIy at the
hearing and also listed Marshal Coppa (instead oI Harley?) to testiIy as the hearing?
Hhmmmmmn......Its just wrong Ior a smirking and chortling RMC Marshal Harley to be
perpetuating the Iraud oI WCSO Machen and the Rambo charlatan litigation tactics, attempts
at intimidation, and creation oI the appearance oI impropriety that Richard HIll and Casey
Baker cultivate so well in everything they do. Besides, why does Hill need to have the
wCSO and RMC serving Coughlin notices oI Orders to Show cause when the Iollowing is
documented: 02-08-2012 Court ProoI oI Electronic Service Filed by or in behalI oI: Court
ProoI oI Electronic Service 02-08-2012 Court Ord to Show Cause Filed by or in behalI oI:
Court Ord to Show Cause...02-10-2012 Court ProoI oI Electronic Service Filed by or in
behalI oI: Court ProoI oI Electronic Service 02-10-2012 DeIendant Notice oI Entry oI Ord
Filed by or in behalI oI: RICHARD HILL, ESQ. Notice oI Entry oI Ord - Continuation (iI
not Ior some impermissible purpose?).
5/23/13 Order Dismissing Appeal in 63041 (appeal oI 4/3/13 Order by Judge Sattler
Striking Coughlin's 4/2/13 Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus, now even more suspect in light oI
6/11/13 ChieI Judge Hardy's transIerring all oI Coughlin's cases to Department 8, Judge
Stiglich, and Sattler's Iailure to divulge and or recuse himselI Irom CV11-01955 where he sits
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on the Board oI Directors oI Washoe Legal Services and Coughlin is suing WLS Ior wrongIul
termination therein), reads: "Order Dismissing Appeal This is a proper person appeal Irom an
order striking an emergency petition Ior a writ oI mandamus. Second Judicial District Court,
Washoe County; Elliott A. Sattler, II, Judge. Because no statute or court rule permits an
appeal Irom an order striking a petition, we lack jurisdiction. Castillo v. State, 106 Nev. 349,
352, 792 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1990). Accordingly, we ORDER this appeal DISMISSED."
Judge Sattler's 4/3/13 Order striking Coughlin's 4/2/13 Emergency Petition Ior Writ oI
Mandamus seeking to enjoin the RJC Irom holding a trial in violation oI NRS 178.405 reads:
"ORDER Case No. CR13-0552 Dept. No. 10 The Court is in receipt oI an "EmerKency
Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamaus (sic) and IPF MOTION and Declaration oI Poverty"
(hereinaIter, ''the document")(emphasis and varying Iont in the original) Iile stamped April 2,
2013. The document in question Iails to state a rational claim upon which the Court can rule.
Further, the document does not direct the Court to the Iactual and/or legal grounds upon
which the document should be considered. Indeed, the Court is unclear what is being sought
by way oI the Iiling oI the document. The document Iails to Iollow numerous applicable
District Court Rules (hereinaIter, "D.C.R.") and local rules (hereinaIter, "WDCR"). See
generally, D.C.R. 12, D.C.R. 13, WDCR 10, and WDCRI2. But see, WDCR 18 (the Court
does not believe that WDCR 18 authorizes the complete abandonment oI all oI the other rules
in criminal matters). D.C.R. 5 states in Iull: These rules shall be liberally construed to secure
the proper and eIIicient administration oI the business and aIIairs oI the court and to promote
and Iacilitate the administration oI justice by the court. These rules cover the practice and
procedure in all actions in the district courts oI all districts where no local rule covering the
same subject has been approved by the supreme court. Local rules which are approved Ior a
particular judicial district shall be applied in each instance whether they are the same as or
inconsistent with these rules. It is the Court's conclusion that the document is in violation oI
D.C.R. 5. The Court also Iinds that the petitioner has Iailed to qualiIy to represent himselI
pursuant to S.C.R. 253. See also, Faretta v. CaliIornia, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975),
Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48 (2008) and Wayne v. State, 100 Nev. 582 (1984). The canvass
required pursuant to S.C.R 253(1) is mandatory in every case where a deIendant appears in
district court and chooses selI representation. For all oI the Ioregoing reasons it is hereby
ORDERED that the document is stricken and the Court shall take no Iurther action on the
document.. Dated this 3rd day oI April 2013. /s/ Judge Sattler".
A pesky area is where the judge was once a prosecutor, and cases, which were in some stage
oI prosecution while he or she was in that capacity, begin to surIace in court aIter the judge's
elevation to the bench. These circumstances occur Irequently, and have led to a variety oI
decisions on the issuesome holding that recusal is mandatory, others concluding not. It
appears in this area that a showing must be made that the judge was an actual participant in
the investigation or Iormation oI the prosecution case beIore recusal is mandated. Based upon
the cases cited, it is probably not suIIicient iI the judge was only involved in procedural or
tangential matters as a prosecutor, and it is not suIIicient to merely allege that the judge was a
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member oI the prosecutor's oIIice at the time oI the Iormation oI charges. The same rationale
would appear to apply to other government legal agencies.|40| It is clear that it is the
individual involvement oI the judge that is examined, not the involvement oI the oIIice. The
oIIices oI county prosecutors, United States attorneys and state attorney generals are not
considered the same as private law Iirms, where mere association with the oIIice can be
considered a disqualiIying consideration iI anyone Irom the private Iirm was involved with
the instant litigation.|41| |FN40| Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting Attorney as
DisqualiIying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550. |FN41| See,
13A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (2d ed.) 3544, and cases cited therein.
1. All oI the allegations herein also relate to "irregularities" in the proceedings and
prosecutorial misconduct" justIying the relieI requested herein. Coughlin's ability to get this
excuplatory video wherein Sargent Lopez admits RPD OIIicer Carter and Richard Hill, Esq.
and Casey Baker, Esq. lied, under oath (in Hill's case) at the June 18th, 2012 Trial and in
violation oI NRCP Rule 11 (in Baker's case in his November 21st, 2011 Opposition to
Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien) was severaly compromised, to an
excusable neglect extent, and to a good cause standard, by the various Iraudulent, retaliatory
arrests and incarcerations (which have seen attendant deprivations oI Coughlin's medication
or medications, some oI which may be, by some, considered "pyschotropic" by the WCDC),
and the Iraudulent attempts by RPD OIIicer Warren and others to alienate Coughlin Irom his
Iamily and any other type oI a support system, all in the name oI covering up wrongIul arrests
by the WCPD, and or WCSO and or wrongIul "summary contempt" Iindings, including those
in 11 TR 26800, RCR 2012-065630 ( ARgent SiIre's order to arrest Couglin on January 14th,
2012 Ior "misue oI emergency communciations", in addition to WCSO Deputy Machen's
Iraudulent arrest oI Coughlin on June 28th, 2012, including the Iraudulent "Sixth Amendment
representation by WCPD Jim Leslie and Biray Dogan (in RCR 2012-065630 and RCR2012-
067980) in those matters)) (iI Marshal Harley is going to Iollow Coughlin into the restroom,
then peer through a restroom stall and, as alleged by Judge Nash Holmes in her 3/12/12 Order
Iollowing a hearing that Coughlin was not appropriately noticed on by the RMC, despite it
being aware oI Coughlin's then current address at the time it mailed a 2/28/12 Order in 11 TR
26800 to Coughlin...and Judge Nash Holmes is going to enter and Order Iinding Coughlin to
be guilty oI "summary criminal contempt" (which isn't even an actual charge under NRS),
then Marshal Harley and or Judge Nash Holmes need to sign aIIidavits to the extent those
Ordes explicitly reIerence alleged conduct in a bathroom stall, ie, not, allegedly "committed in
the court's presence" under any section oI NRS 22)), then Marshal Harley needs to sign an
aIIidavit, which he has not done. And RMC Marshal Coppa should perhaps Iocus less on
critiquing Coughlin's alleged wearing oI "pajama bottoms" to the RMC Iiling oIIice coutner
while checking a traIIic citation, and more on whether he violated the Fourth Amendment and
other laws incident to his conduct on February 27th, 2012 in pulling into a back room in the
sally bay at the WCDC WCSP Deputy Cheung and seeking to, upon inIormation and belieI,
commit some misconduct (and the RMC Marshals coming back to the WCDC on June 28th,
2012 and retrieving Coughlin's smart phone, phone, and micro sd card is not a "search
incident to arrest", and a warrant needs to be produced to show how the RMC and or the
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Marshal did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Further, the RMC needs to answer Ior why it
has Ilouted Nevada law in Iailing to transmit the appropriate materials in response to
Coughlin's Iiling, on March 7th, 2012, oI a NOtice oI Appeal (see NRS 189.010-.050) in 11
TR 26800). Further, iI any "recording device" was "dissassembled" during a bathroom break,
then how could Coughlin's answers to Judge Nash Holmes sua sponte interrogation, incident
to improper suggestions made to her by the Reno Marshals and or City Attorney Allison
Ormass, possibly be appropriate? Further, in CR12-0376 Coughlin's rights were raped by the
court system, and WCPD Biray Dogan and Jeremy Bosler, and Judge Elliot's incarcerating
Coughlin on April 19th, 2012 until April 26th, 2012 (incident to a Iraudulent Iiled letter by
Lake's Crossing oI April 18t, 2012, signed by Dr. Bill Davis, and Dr.Farmer, though Davis
disclaims and connection to that letter, amazingly) provides a Iurther excusable neglect basis,
as does the Iraudulent conduct oI the RJC and or the WCSO (including Deputy Machen) oI
June 28th, 2012 in the custodial arrest (with impermissible denial oI a phone call, Ior now
reason at all, thanks to the misconduct oI Deputy Van der Wall and "Nurse Katherine", and
Deputy Beatson, in denying Coughlin a phoen call Ior 20 hours, Ior no reason whatsoever
(despite WCDC policy and or the law requiring one within 3 hours), in addition to the Iraud
oI Nevada Court Services (partners with RMC court appointed deIender Lew Taitel, whom
represented Couglin in this very matter, 11 CR 26405, despite an obvious conIlict).
Ior exhibit 1 materials please Iind a courtesy copy
Also, the Iraud by Ltn. Kevin Brown, Sargent Oliver Miller, OIIicer Alan Weaver, and
Sargent Dye oI the RPD in connection with the incarceration oI Coughlin Irom July 3rd, 2012
to July 21st, 2012 contributed to preventing Coughlin Irom (as did the Iraud by the WCDC in
reIusing to timely Iile Coughlin's court Iilings so submitted, including one's in this case and in
the sister case appeal in cv11-03628 wherein during his incarceration Coughlin was prevented
Irom opposing or otherwise addressing an outrageous $40,050 attorney's Iees award to
Richard G. Hill, Esq. incident to the appeal oI the wrongIul summary eviction in RJC
Rev2011-001708 by Richard. G. HIll, ESq., and Iurther curious is RMC Judge Gardner's
11/30/11 transIerring oI the ridiculous wrongIul arrest Ior "jaywalking" oI Coughlin on
January 12th, 2012 incident to Coguhlin's peaceIully Iilming Hill's crew loading up personalty
Irom Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice to take to the town dump, wherein HIll lied to RPD
OIIicer Alan Hollingsworth, i na criminal violation by Hill, eventually leading to a wrongIul
custodial arrest oI Coughlin Ior jaywalking in RMC 12 CR 00696 (the case "Administrative
Judge" William Gardner oI the RMC just so happened to transIer to Judge Nash Holmes (to
go along with all the work she was puttin' in Ior thr RMC on 11 TR 26800, the triple traIIic
citation incdient to Coughlin seeking the return oI his client's Iiles and state issued
indentiIication Irom Richard G. Hill, ESq. on NOvember 125th, 2011, Iollowing Coughlin's
relesae Irom 3 days incarceration incident to the Iraudulent and wrongIul custodial arrest oI
Coughlin on NOvember 13th, 2011 in 11 CR 26405 by RPD OIIicer Carter and Sargent
Lopez.. Everytime, Coughlin has been wrongIully arrested (which is everytime Coughlin has
been arrested) the WCDC has impermissibly withheld Coughlin's medications Irom him while
the WCDA's OIIice and REno City attorney and or the RMC and RJC have sought to violate
NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 in plowing ahead with Trials and settings during the pendency
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oI an Order Ior Competency Evaluation (including the one's detailed in Coughlin's previous
Iiling in this regard). Add to that the Iraud oI Northwinds in RJC reve2012-001048, the Iraud
oI GAyle Kern and WNM's Sue King in the Coughlin v. Park Terrace Town Homes HOA in
the RJC and that oI JeII Nichols in Couglhin v NIchols (another landlrod tenant matter in the
RJC) and its excusable neglect any extent to which Coughlin did not previously produce this
exculpatory video, particularly where it was wrongIully withheld Irom his under an unlawIul
rent distraint or other impermissilbe action by a landlord, and how that is excusable neglect is
obvious, no matter what RMC Judge Howard's lack oI appreciation oI what being a tenant
subjected to Iraud by a landlord may have revealed in 11 CR 22176 or the misconduct oI Pam
Roberts, Esq., City attorney in that matter (and all the Iallout oI the decisions and action by
those two therein).
1.1 January 13th, 2012 RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez and OIIicer Travis Warren and
OIIicer Avila respond to a call Ior help regarding a domestic disturbance Irom Zach Coughlin
relating to the attacks by his housemates, Christopher "Erin" Allaback and Laura Foreshee Ior
which Coughlin ultimately received two Orders oI Protection in FV12-00187 and FV12-
00188. Sargent Lopez subjected Coughlin to a custodial arrest Ior criminal trespass in Reno
The admission by Sargent Lopez was captured on a high 8mm video camera that
Coughlin bought Irom a thriIt store Ior Iive dollars aIter his then housemate ruined his digital
smart phone video recorder by throwing hot coIIee on it an Coughlin. Coughlin then
transIerred the tape Irom that high 8mm to a digital version by Iilming a television with a
digital video camera later obtained, while it was playing that high 8mm tape. The Iile was
name "0201 cropped Carter Lopez 26405.wmv, and the Iollowing represents and accurate
transcription thereoI, in relevant part:
Coughlin: Sargent Lopez are you going to arrest Nevada
court services Ior trespass?
Lopez: I'm not going to arrest them Ior trespass.
Coughlin: but you arrested me Ior trespass.
Lopez: because you were squatting in the property.
Coughlin: why do you say that you have any evidence oI
that? (5 seconds oI silence is Sargent Lopez's response) did
you announce that you were Reno PD prior to kicking the
door in?
Lopez: I didn't kick the door in.
Coughlin: did you announce that you are Reno PD prior to
anybody kicking the door in?
Lopez: I didn't have to,
Coughlin: so nobody announced that they were Reno PD?
Lopez: because the guy who kicked it in had to kick in his
own door because you were squatting in his place.
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Coughlin: so you are admitting that you guys didn't
announce that you were Reno PD.
Lopez: you are wearing my patience thin, Sir, okay. I am
trying to come here to help you, and I bring a specialized
oIIicer (motioning to RPD OIIicer Travis Warren, whom has
been described as some sort oI RPD OIIicer with some
specialty in "mental health" related areas).
Coughlin: that's interesting, you admit that you and OIIicer
Carter never announced that you are Reno PD, and that you
never asked me to leave, did you, prior to the door being
kicked in?
OIIicer Travis Warren: She didn't have to do anything like
that.
Coughlin: you didn't have to! That's great, but that means
you didn't either.
Warren: hold on Zach. You asked us to come here because
you needed help now you are being conIrontational.
Coughlin: no I'm not, no not. Anybody who asked you a
question is conIrontational, I guess, huh?
Warren: Zach, let's try to stay on topic.
Coughlin: On topic? I'm not on the topic you want me to be
on.
Warren: Zach the topic that I'm interested in...
Coughlin: Is the one that covers your ass!
Warren: No, it's not.
Coughlin: Yes, it is."
...
Coughlin: So, Sargent Lopez you have admitted that you did
not ask me to leave and you did not announce that you are
Reno PD either you or your partner either oI those things
when you arrested me Ior trespass. Are you been arrest
Nevada Court Services Ior the trespass that there is video
evidence oI on YouTube right now? Are you can a do that,
Sargent? Sargent, are you?
Warren: Zach, that's not the topic were on.
Coughlin: Are you going to do that, Sargent? Sargent, are
you?
Lopez: are you going to Iill out your statement?
Coughlin: sure. Are you going to do that?
Lopez: I am not going to arrest Nevada Court Services.
Coughlin: Why, are they your buddies?
Lopez: because they did their job.
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Coughlin: wait a did their job by going behind my back
Ience and banging on my windows Ior 45 minutes three
times a time a day? Interesting...
Lopez: Zach, we need you to Iill out the paper.
Coughlin: Interesting how it works down there at the Reno
PD. You know, there is a lots oI documentary Iilmmakers
out there these days, Sargent Lopez? Do you have anything
you would like to say?
Lopez: Zach, you need to Iinish your statement.
Warren: Zach, you call us here to help you, and now your
are...
Coughlin: well apparently not because you arrest me Ior
trespass when you either didn't tell me to leave Ior
announced that you were the PD (police Department) and
then you have video evidence oI Nevada Court Services
doing trespassing harassing banging on windows Ior 40 min.
at a clip three times a day, behind a back gate is obviously
trespassing, and you are seeing you are not going to do
anything...
Lopez: have you had your day in court on that yet?
Coughlin:That is coming up.
...
Warren: Zach, we really need to stay on topic, okay?
Coughlin: What is the topic? Nevada Court Services? The
buddies oI Sargent Lopez?
Warren: No...
...
Coughlin: are you guys going to do anything on this call
because the last time you didn't run anybody's priors and iI
you had it would have been interesting what you would have
Iound, what did you say? Is that proper procedure children
somebody's priors?
Lopez: The priors Ior who?
Coughlin: because you guys didn't do that... Well who
would I be talking about?
Lopez:(smirking) YourselI, maybe? The priors Ior yourselI?
Coughlin: Oh, is that a...do you think you are Iunny?
Lopez: I think it is Iunny, yeah. I think everything is Iunny,
actually. I am amused by a lot oI stuII.
Coughlin: Really? Do you think it's Iunny when your
partner says that Richard Hill pays him a lot oI money to
arrest whom he says to?
Lopez: I am pretty sure he didn't...
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Coughlin: and you were there? And you didn't Iollow up
with the questions oI whether Richard Hill had given me a
bill Ior rent that month and yet you still arrested me Ior
trespass?
Lopez: 5 min. Zach.
Coughlin: I think that's Iunny, that you think it's Iunny.
Lopez: 4 min. Zach
...
Lopez:, did the management give you an eviction notice?
Coughlin: what are you getting involved in civil matters
now? You are going above and beyond, Sargent Lopez,
getting involved in civil matters...
Lopez: Zach did they give you an eviction notice or not?
Coughlin: wow you are working oI the storm over there
aren't you
Lopez: Yes or no:
Warren: you could say no comment, Zach.
Coughlin: thank you, counselor. I appreciate your advice.
Now, what criminal matter were you investigating here?
Lopez: I am asking you a question.
Coughlin: About a what? A civil matter?
Lopez: Zach, did you get an eviction notice Irom these guys
(Sargent Lopez is reIerring to Western Nevada Management
posting a John Doe 30 day eviction notice, allegedly, on the
door oI the 1422 E. 9th St. #2 town home that WNM (which,
like NCS, commits the unauthorized practice oI landlord
tenant law) had agreed to some deal with Coughlin's
housemates (or maybe they were his sublessors? Coughlin
rented a room Irom them oII oI Craigslist, but to some extent
they were held out to be employees or partners oI WNM,
and WNM did testiIy at a February 23rd, 2012 hearing aIter
Coughlin Iiled an interruption oI essential services
complaint against WNM, Gayle Kern, Esq., LTD, and Park
Terrace Townhomes that Iormer WNM manager, Robyn
Batalado received approval Irom the Park Terrace Town
Homes Homeowners Associattion to allow Coughlin's
sublessors to live their in exchange Ior some handyman
work (and perhaps in light oI the lessened insurance costs
associated with not having the unit vacant incident to some
scenario where the PTTHOA bought the unit at a Ioreclosure
sale).
Warren: We will take that as a yes or no, or a maybe, who
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knows? All right, Zach? You are not going to be able to
bait us into saying things?
Coughlin: Well, I've been listening to you here whether
you've been baited or not, you have said a whole lot today.
...
Coughlin:... What iI Richard Hill sent me a Bill Ior rent Ior the month oI November,
should you Iollow phone that beIore you make it trespass arrest? And what did you say
to that? You say no we are not going to that Richard Hill pays us a lot oI money, and
we are going to arrest whom he says to arrest, did you hear that Sargent Lopez?
Warren: Zach, let's stay on topic.
Coughlin: this could be your star turn... This could be your
star turn.
Lopez: you need some help, brother.
Coughlin: really?
Lopez: Yeah, you do.
...(Sargent Lopez and OIIicers Warren and Avila then leave
shortly thereaIter, and Coughlin has the Iollowing exchange
with his housemate's/abusers teenage daughter):
Coughlin: look someday, you are trying to support yourselI
and someone steals your license plate, and slashes your
tires, and locks you out aIter you have given them the last
money you had...
Teenage Girl's Friend: well, someday we won't be an assh*le
like you
Coughlin:What is an "assh*le" about that?
Teenage Girl: you are I*cking r*tarded, you are being
r*tarded, you're making my dad not like you, you steal his
knives. His steak knives, like seriously?
Coughlin: You mean the one oI he held while chasing me up
the stairs with saying he was gonna kill me?
Teenage Girl: He didn't I*ckin' chase you up the stairs and
tell you he was gonna kill you. Why would he say that, he's
not like that. And iI he say's it, it doesn't mean he means it.
You make him say that, you I*ckin' pr*ck."
January 12th, 2012 custodial arrest (in RMC 12 CR 00696, which was transIIered by RMC
Judge William Gardner on 2/27/12, to RMC Judge Nash Holmes in D3, Irom D1, the same
day Judge Nash Holmes violated NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 in proceeding with a traIIic
citation trial despite the communications Irom the Washoe County public deIender's OIIicer
and or Biray Dogan in connection with the clandestine status conIerence (that Dogan told his
client Coughlin, via a written notice oI February 24th, 2012 had been reset, but which Dogan
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and WCDA DDA Zach Young, Esq. held anyway, and procurred an Order Ior Competency
Evaluation oI Coughlin RCR2012-065630 Iilestamped at 1:31pm, whereupon RMC Judge
Nash Holmes stil held the 11 TR 26800 traIIic citation trial, at which she Iound Coughlin in
"summary criminal contempt", and despite her march 14th, 2012 grievance to the SBN
alleging such concern Ior Coughlin's client's she denied any stay whatsoever to Coughlin to
arrange Ior alternatives to avoid such prejudice to Coughlin's client's cases (some might say,
because the RMC really wanted to, despite the pretextual "summary criminal contempt" basis
asserted at the time, conduct a search incident to arrest oI Coughlin, an attorney appearing Ior
himselI, selI representation...whereup the RMC Ielt entitled to search Coughlin's smartphone,
micro sd card, Ilip phone, and other property as a "search incident to arrest" except the RMC
and its Marshall Scott Coppa did not do so at the time Coughlin was booked on February
27th, 2012, and the RMC and its Marshals only retrieving those materials, later, aIter the
period to conduct a search INCIDENT to arrest had deIinitely passed, upon the RMC and its
Marshals retrieving those materials (with some subterIuge attempts by the WCSO, WCDC,
and, perhpas, WCDA) on February 28th, 2012, was impermissilble, to say nothing oI the Iact
that the smart phone and data on the micro sd ard were wiped Irom those items or otherwise
destroyed prior to there being returned to Coguhlin some 37 days later (at which time WCSO
Deputy Beatson threatened Coughlin with yet another Iraudulent arrest, citing some made up
non-sense involving Iront desk Deputy "Maddy"). WCSO Beaston later contributed to
Coughlin being denied a phone call Ior no reason whatsoever, Ior over 20 hours, incident to
the Iraudulent and wrongIul arrest oI Coughlin on June 28th, 2012 in RCR2012-067980.
(Irom which her ORder oI 2/28/12 and the various Orders she entered thereinaIter, incuding
those steming Irom the 3/12/12 hearing which Coughlin was unaware oI and did not attend,
all oI which Iorm the predominant basis Ior the State Bar oI Nevada's current SCR 105
Complaint against Coughlin in NG12-0204 (the Richard G. Hill, Esq, grievance letter to Pat
King oI 1/14/12) and NG12-0434 (RMC Judge Nash Holmes March 14th, 2012 grievance
against Coughlin on behalI oI all RMC Judges, even where RMC Judge Gardner attempts to
assert he was unaware oI it incident to a hearings on 4/10/12 and 5/8/12 in RMC 11
CR26045) and NG12-0435 (the grievance that Judge Nash Holmes Iiled Ior RMC Judge
William Gardner and his sister Family Court Judge Linda Gardner (by submitting the April
2009 Order sanctioing Coughlin which Coughlin attacked via a Petition Ior Writ oI
Mandamaus in 54844, the Joshi divorce case that Washoe Legal Services cited as the sole
basis Ior Iiring Coughlin in May 2009 in WLS Executive Director Paul Elcano's May 14th,
2012 termination letter to Coguhlin)Ior "pedestrian Iailing to use sidewalk where available"
(aka, jaywalking) in Iront oI Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice at 121 River Rock St., Reno,
NV 89501.
(in the video Coughlin begins Iiliming Irom the parking lot
in Iron oI his Iormer home law oIIice and walks towards the
property, where Hill's contractor Phil Stewart is already
there (Ior some reason Hill kept making a deal about how
Coughlin was "already at the property" when Stewart
returned their Irom the transIer center, but that is not true,
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Coughlin actually took almost 30 minutes to get to the River
Rock Property aIter the talks at the transIer center, as
Coughlin had to go retrieve his hi 8mm video camera Irom
his E. 9th St. address on that date.
Coughlin: What would the contractor's board say about you
submitting Iraudulent bills? (said to Hill's contractor, Phil
Stewart, owner and operator oI Nevada Building Industries
(NBI), whose bill Ior $1,060 Ior "securing" the property was
submitted as an attachment in Hill's Memorandum oI Costs
ana in Hill's Opposition to Coughlin's Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien under a personalty lien theory citing
to NRS 118A.460, which allows Ior reasonable costs Ior
"moving, storage, and inventorying" a tenant's personal
property). Would they be okay with that? Neck carpet right
there that's Dr. Merliss's property iI you throw it away, you
are throwing away the carpet, so you are on notice and you
should tell Richard Hill, iI he tries to sue me Ior the carpet,
and you throw it away, I will sue you Ior Iraud.
...
(Coughlin is seen in the video walking a Iew Ieet oII the
sidewalk in light oI the Iact that Hill's contractor's crew have
taken up the whole oI the sidewalk (Stewart's white
dumptruck is parked so as to extend Irom the drive way out
onto the street so as to completely block the sidewalk, and
beyond that, the sidewalk is dotted with various items
Stewart's crew is in the process oI moving Irom the Iormer
home law oIIice) on the southern Iacing side oI the property
in Iurtherance oI their eIIorts to load up the rest oI
Coughlin's personalty and take it to the dump (as there was
apparently an incredibly urgent need to do something with
the property, despite the Iact that, to this day, over one year
later, it still remains un-rented).
Coughlin: gentlemen, you are under notice this is my
property and I want it. I believe I might have some legal
recourse against you Ior destroying my property. I could be
wrong. You are certainly welcome to listen to your boss.
You know what is interesting is that I have prooI right here
that you used my own plywood to board up the property and
then you try to charge a thousand dollars Ior it and Ior Iixing
a leak that's my plywood Phil or whatever your name is, guy
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with a contractor's license. (Coughlin is saying this while in
the parking lot oI the studio apartments that abuts the
backyard Ience to his Iormer home law oIIice (ie, not on the
sidewalk even. One oI Stewart's laborers walk up to
Coughlin within about 8 Ieet oI him and snaps a Ilash
photo):
John Doe: What's up?. (snaps another photo oI Coughlin in
the parking lots oI the Mill Place studio apartments)
Coughlin: Hi, how are you doing? What's your name?
John Doe: John Doe.
Coughlin: John Doe, really?
Doe: Don't get mouthy, buddy.
Coughlin: What's that?
Doe: I said don't get crowley, buddy.
Coughlin: What's "crowley"?
Doe: "Crowley" means like "Crowley Lake".
Coughlin: I don't know what you mean. Anyways Phil what
do you have to say about the Iact that you Iraudulently
submitted a Bill Ior thousand dollars Ior boarding up the
property to Iix a leak yet you used my plywood to do it,
Phil?
John Doe: Hey, can you stay away Irom him (motioning to
Phil Stewart)?
Coughlin: I am on a public spot right here (actually,
Coughlin is still standing in the Mill Place studio apartment's
parking lot at this time). I am not bothering him you guys
just expect people to watch you use their own property to
board up a place?
Phil Stewart: do you have a receipt Ior that?
Coughlin: yeah I do. It was submitted into evidence guy.
You guys submitted it into evidence as a bill. (Coughlin
then walks out oI the Mill Place parking lot and around
Stewart's white dump truck (which was completely blocking
the sidewalk) and out a Iew Ieet into the road on Court St
west oI River Rock, where the camera's view reveals
Stewart's crew has set a couch and some other personalty on
the sidewalk, where Stewart and John Dow walk onto
towards the Iront oI the property on River Rock St. to talk
with Richard G. Hill, Esq.) are you going to ask Richard
about that? I even ask Richard about the Iact they used my
own property to board up the property and charged with
thousand dollars Ior it this gotta be an easier way to make
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money was and ain't that easy to be an attorney as you can
see, Phil.
Stewart: you obviously need to start taking your medication.
Coughlin:(Coughlin has retreated back to the Mill Place
parking lot at this point) what did you say? Are you making
some sort oI accusation or insult about taking medication? Is
that what you are doing? You know it is Iunny because a lot
oI this property could've been used to Ieed Iamilies in need.
Phil are you going to throw away the carpet and then try to
bill beIore it is that what you are going to do some pretty
sure that that would be Iraud Phil. Sir, I am putting you on
notice that carpet belongs to Dr. Merliss (a couple members
oI Stewart's crew are now seen picking up the rolled up
bundles oI carpet that Coughlin, whom has now walked
around to the Iront oI the property to River Rock St. walking
just oII the sidewalk (though a large tan/brown Silverado
style pickup truck parked on the North Side oI Court Street,
that Coughlin recalls seeing a large manilla Iolder in with
the notation, in hand writing, "Sargent Bradshaw" is an
obstacle Coughlin must walk around, especially where
Stewart himselI is utilizing the sidewalk, and given John
Doe's very recent request that Coughlin "stay away" Irom
Stewart, it would seem cautious oI Coughlin not to attempt
to walk on the same small patch oI sidewalk oII Court Street
as Stewart and his laborers.) Hey, Phil? Phil? The carpet,
there was also some more oI it right around there...
HopeIully you haven't thrown it away already... HopeIully,
you do not try to bill me Ior it Phil....
(Coughlin is now standing on the sidewalk on the western
side oI River Rock, parallel with the northern boundardy line
oI the property, when John Doe appears Irom around the
corner oII oI Court Street and snaps another Ilash bulb
photograph at Coughlin).
Coughlin: Sir, this is a public street. This is a public street
you do not on the sidewalks are have you ever heard oI a
documentary? You know there's a lot oI guys making
documentaries these days about the bad things people do.
(up rolls RPD OIIicer Hollingsworth on his motorcycle, and
RPD dispatch chatter can be heard describing a "suspect in a
larceny". OIIicer Hollingsworth has been called to the scene
by Richard G. Hill, Esq. and Phil Stewart. Hill shows up
seconds aIter Hollingsworth. Now, neither Hill nor Stewart
were charged with "misuse oI emergency services like
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Coughlin was in RCR2012-065630. So in this video Stewart
talks with oIIicer Hollingsworth Ior a Iew moments until
Richard Hill arrives...)
Coughlin: hey Rich how are you doing?
Hill: Great, Zach, thank you buddy.
Coughlin: would you preIer oI psychology Mr. Hill?
Hill: I would, Zach.
Coughlin: Mr. Hill, how are you doing? Hey that is a cool
"skulls" shirt, Mr. Hill (Hill is wearing a black Ed Hardy
style bowling shirt with Ilaming red skulls on it.. Hill begins
doing his Reno PD thing with OIIicer Hollingsworth,
Coughlin stands back about 12 Ieet Irom their communique).
Hill: (to OIIicer Hollingsworth) can we get him out oI here?
(and therein, besides calling 911/RPD dispatch in the Iirst
place where no legitimate reason existed to, Hill proceeds to
leverage law enIorcement acting with color oI law to prevent
opposing counsel Irom collectin evidence Ior a wrongIul
eviction damages analysis).
Hollingsworth: Iirst oI all oI gotta Iigure out iI I have legal
authority to do so.
Hill: Re: court order evicting him Irom the property,
subsequently we had him arrested Ior trespass is lost his
appeal (which was totally not true when Hill made that Ialse
statement to a police oIIicer seeking to have Coughlin
arrested, on January 12th, 2012, given that the appeal would
not be decided Ior months), he's lost.... Now we have been
talking to our workers
Hollingsworth: Have you tried to get a protection order?
Hill: no but we do have an order Irom the court disposition
oI the premises (unintelligible...)
Coughlin: what about the sidewalk bridge you on the
sidewalk?
Hill: is been over to the transIer station Sargent Bradshaw I
just leIt Irom there is Sargent Bradshaw who is been on
(unintelligible)... These over here just generally being a pain
in the ass
Coughlin: Ireedom oI the press, Rich. (Hill starts making
some big gesticulating motions to OIIicer Hollingsworth like
a child whom is not being given the toy he wanted Ior
Christmas or Veruca Salt throwing a Iit in Charley's
Chocolate Factory). They have important things to do rich
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they are busy. (Helen Stewart continued talking the
Hollingsworth by this time OIIicer Del Vecchio is showed
up, it looks like OIIicer McQuattie is there (actually, that
might be then trainee OIIicer Leedy, OIIicer Look is there
now too)
RPD OIIicer Travis Look: hey how are you doing (note,
RPD OIIicer Travis Look, in early May 2012, reIused to
investigate or take a report, and claimed that no police report
existed regarding, the theIt oI Coughlin's red Gary Fisher
mountain bike on October 4th, 2012 at the time that NV
Energy came and, unnoticed, shut oII the power to
Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice on the last day to Iile a
Tenan'ts Answer in the eviction Richard G. HIll and Casey
Baker, ESq. were opposing counsel on, and Casey Baker,
Esq. showed up within hours oI the power being shut oII
with a videographer seeking to "inspect" the Iormer home
law oIIice. Coughlin Iound his stolen red mountain bike in
May 2012 and a smirking and smug RPD OIIicer Look
responded to a call to dispatch by Coughlin with a reIusal to
investigate the matter).
Coughlin: Hi, Sir, good to see you again. I didn't catch your
name last time I recognize you Irom the the day..
Look: with oIIicer look
Coughlin nice to see you again I think I saw you the other
day when came out on a call with OIIicer Gannon, Ior a
domestic disturbance a run East-Sage
look: I honestly don't remember
Coughlin: Yeah, I think you guys are up in my bedroom...
Look: Right on Scottsdale
Coughlin: Satan E. 9th St., Park Terrace Town homes...
Freedom oI the press, Rich.
Look what you guys have going on today?
Hill: contempt oI court Mr. Coughlin!
Coughlin: well, that carpet belongs to your client, Mr. Hill iI
you try to throw it away and then build me Ior it.
Hollingsworth: (comes over to talk to Coughlin) can you
turn that oII, Sir, Ior a second stuII over here on over on the
sidewalk (Coughlin was already on the sidewalk, but
Hollingworth leads them Iurther North along the River Rock
side walk's western side). Okay so what's the deal today why
are we here?
Coughlin: I don't know, sir.
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Hollingsworth did used to live here?
Coughlin: I preIer to just keep my privacy as a private
citizen. But I mean you no disrespect Sir.
Hollingsworth no problem, I can respect that here's the deal
you understand here in the sidewalk no problem you on it
student run tape no problem but you can't interIere with
them doing their job and they're probably enough apply Ior
temporary station order against you in which he/she can be
within 100 yards oI there or them. (Hill gets into his
$100,000 Porsche Carrera where he goes oII the Reno
Justice Court and gets a TPO signed by Judge Schroeder
within 40 minutes oI the application being stamped in.
Behind Hill's Porsche is OIIicer Look's patrol car and the
patrol car being utilized by OIIicer Leedy and his training,
tenured OIIicer, OIIicer Del Vecchio. These vehicles are in
addition to the motorcycle ridden by OIIicer Hollingsworth.
Richard Hill's wiIe/legal assistant Sheri Hill is parked in the
lot on the east side oI River Rock in her maroon Lexus SUV.
Contractor Stewart is seen jaywalking across River Rock to
the lot where Sheri Hill is parked, but he is not arrested.).
All they are trying to do is get their business or taking care
oI
Coughlin: I'm trying to take care oI my business, too.
Hollingsworth: okay is there something we can help you
with?
Coughlin: I don't believe so, sir. I called the police recently
I told them somebody threatened my liIe the the day that in
six see Iit to arrest anybody so apparently Richard Hill is a
national treasure.
Hollingsworth: Okay, well, I don't know who that is, all I
know is I'm here today and you are here with the camera
and you're not breaking any laws that I can see but they're
gonna try to get it to where you are violating a temporary
protection order
Coughlin I understand it threatening abuse oI process and
malicious prosecution
Hollingsworth: so it would be helpIul iI maybe you could
Iind something else to do this aIternoon because I have been
listening on the radio and we've had two or three calls Ior
service Ior you already today and would like to be evidence
oI do some other work today, no one I mean
Coughlin okay well I hear what you're saying
Hollingsworth is basically a second help you with
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Coughlin: iI you wouldn't mind telling me your last name
Hollingsworth: Hollingsworth
Coughlin thank you, Sir, Goodbye OIIicer Look, good to see
you again, Sir.(Coughlin then proceeds to walk back towards
the mill place parking lot Western Lane along court street he
does not walk in the street but rather uses the sidewalk
which is now cleared oI Stewart's laborers and any oI the
personalty they are seeking to take to the dump however the
white dump truck belong to Stewart is still blocking the
sidewalk. Coughlin Fox all the way back to the area in the
Mill's Place parking lot immediately to the west oI the
Ienced, gated backyard to his Iormer home law oIIice, and
can view OIIicer Hollingsworth pull away on his motorcycle
heading north on River Rock. Footage oI contractor
Stewart's white dump truck reveals how extremely
implausible Stewart sworn testimony was at the February
23, 2012 Order to Show Cause hearing (which Hill had
Coughlin personally served Notice oI by WCSO Deputy
Machen (by way oI RMC Marshal Harley) incident to
Coughlin arriving and waiting at the RMC Ior the traIIic
citation Trial in 11 TR 26800 stemming Irom the three
traIIic citations RPD Sargent John Tarter had issued to
Coughlin incident to the November 15 incident at Hill's law
oIIice where Coughlin ventured upon being released Irom
three days incarceration Iollowing the November 13, 2011
criminal trespass rests at Coughlin's Iormer law oIIice
Coughlin went to Hill's oIIice to retrieve his keys state
issued drivers license and or identiIication his wallet and his
client's Iiles, which Hill reIused to release. It took until
November 22nd, 2011 beIore Hill turned over Coughlin's
wallet and driver's license to Coughlin. It took until
December 22nd, 2011 beIore Hill turned over Coughlin's
client's Iiles, causing Coughlin to incur great expense in
arranging Ior alternatives. Coughlin starts to make his way
back towards the Iront oI the property and decides to walk
along the edge oI the parked Tan Brown pickup truck
instead oI venture near it be laborers working Ior Stewart
who are now utilizing the sidewalk on the north side oI court
street once again. Coughlin notices the large manila
envelope and the dashboard oI the track with a large.
Written note indicating Sargent Bradshaw on the outside oI
oI the Iolder. Coughlin then crosses the street in a straight
continuation Irom the northern sidewalk on Court St. to the
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parking lot on the east side oI River Rock, just as any
pedestrian would (except Contractor Stewart actually just
walked out in the middle oI the road when he crossed River
Rock earlier, rather than in a straight continuation oI the
sidewalks. Coughlin notices Contractor Stewart milling
about on the west sidewalk oI River Rock just north oI his
Iormer law oIIice. This group includes Stewart, Del
Vecchio, Leedy, and Look, whom are now joined by Sargent
SiIre. OIIicer Hollingsworth has leIt to do some real police
work by this time. Sheri Hill is still watching on Irom her
maroon Lexus SUV in the parking lot).
Coughlin: (talking vaguely in the direction oI Contractor
Stewart who is approximately 30 Ieet away) you might when
I try to make sure you don't throw away that carpet over
there because I will dispute it iI you guys try to bill me Ior it.
(Coughlin then positions himselI to get a shot oI the interior
oI the Iormer home law oIIice where a he sees a very
sentimental item to him that he Iorgot to grab at the last
second during the mad rush to move his property out to
whatever extent possible by the 5 PM deadline December 23
this item is a 5" x 16" caricature oI his Iormer domestic
partner oI the preceding Iour and a halI years Irom a
relationship that ended in late May 2011 and himselI done
during the early stages oI their relationship. This was
amongst Coughlin's most treasured possessions and was
only leIt atop a crown molding during the move with the
idea that it would be the last thing Coughlin would grab, and
thereIore he would be able to place it in a saIe place on his
U-Hauls dash board or somewhere else where it would be
saIe. However, the chaos incident to Richard Hill's showing
up in demanding everyone be oII the property by exactly 5
PM under the threat oI arrest caused Coughlin to overlooked
grabbing this treasured sentimental item. This caricature is
visible in the video)
Coughlin: that is that sentimental picture that I told them
about oI Melissa and I. the caricature... And I believe the
dolphin windchime mobile, one oI the last things my
grandmother gave me beIore she died is in there...oh, and
look at that there is $150 appliance. (to Contractor Stewart).
Sir I season sentimental heirloom keepsakes in their that I
guess you are just going to throw it away you don't care, the
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last thing my grandmother gave me beIore she died very
sentimental thing (at this point Contractor Stewart turns to
the camera an makes a revolting gesture). Sir when you put
a padlock on the back Ience? (Hill's placing a padlock on the
back Ience only just about the time that it was Coughlin's
right to remove his property resulted in Coughlin's progress
in moving all his personalty being severely impeded.).
...
(At this point in the video Coughlin returns to the parking lot
oI Mill's Place, private property, behind the Ienced back
yard oI his Iormer home law oIIice. Like a couple oI goons
approaching, OIIicer's Leedy and OIIicer Look venture into
that private property, the Mill's Place parking lot:
OIIicer Leedy: Mr. Coughlin could talk to Ior second?
Coughlin: I mean neither conIirming that that's my name,
Sir, but you are the law under asking to speak to somebody
so.
(at this point OIIicer Look approaches Coughlin very rapidly
and immediately grabs Coughlin's wrist, Couglin holding his
video camera, which is, obviously, still Iilming, as OIIicer
Leedy and OIIicer Look immediately jump straight to
applying excessive Iorce to Coughlin's wrists. OIIicer Look
jumps at Coughlin Irom Coughlin's leIt side and OIIicer
Leedy sneeks around behind Coughlin and grabs Coughlin's
camera out oI his right hand and turns it oII)
OIIicer Look: video camera down, put your camera down.
Coughlin:Whoa! Whoa! Why are you touching me!
(OIIicer Look is captured on video breaking back Coughlin's
leIt wrist and wrenching Coughlin's leIt arm behind his
back, prior to any sort oI attempt to peaceably approach
Coughlin, a license attorney, whatsoever, but then
accidentally turns it back on a second later, a Iact to which
he is unaware. OIIicer Leedy places both oI his hands on
Coughlin's right side and right arm and wrist in a display oI
excessive use oI Iorce.)
OIIicer Leedy: We don't want your camera....
Coughlin why are you touching me this is not their
properties, Sir? (the camera goes black Ior a moment)
Coughlin: Owww!. You are breaking my wrist!! Oww!
Owww!! Help!!! Help!!! My wrist hurts, somebody call 911.
Owww!! Owww!!! Somebody help!!! Somebody help!!!
Sir, there is no need to break my wrist like that, Sir.
Oww!!!. Oww!!!Why are you handcuIIing me, Sir?
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OIIicer Leedy: You are being placed under arrest.
Coughlin: For what? For what?
Sargent Paul SiIre: They'll explain everything to you in a
little bit (but, actually, Coughlin would not be told what he
was charged with Ior over an hour and a halI, and in the
intervening period while he was handcuIIed and placed in
the OIIicer Leedy's patrol car, with tenured training OIIicer
Del Vecchio (whom had handcuIIed Coughlin, and placed
him in the back oI his patrol car on night in July 2011
incident to Del Vecchio drawing his weapon, or appearing
to, on both Coughlin (whom was walking his bike at the
time) and another bicyclist in Iront oI Coughlin's Iormer
home law oIIice at approximately 10 pm at night, all
because OIIicer Del Vecchio Ielt the light on Coughlin's
bike was "not up to code").
Sargent SiIre: I am going to shut your camera oII so the
battery will not run down.(OIIicer Del Vecchio can be seen
in the video at this point walking around in his acid wash
jeans).
Coughlin: I don't wan't it shut oII, Sir. You are obstructing
justice iI you shut it oII! (Sargent Paul SiIre then shuts oII
the video camera whereupon OIIicer's Look and trainee
OIIicer Leedy continuing applying the wrongIul use oI
excessive Iorce to Coughlin's arms and wrists as they pin
him Iace down to the concrete with a smug, nauseating
CaliIornian transplant name Sargent Paul SiIre (whom
incident to another wrongIul detention oI Coughlin on
March 29th, 2012 told Coughlin he doesn't like Nevada or
Reno, but the job he has pays him so much, and he has so
little chance oI Iinding such an arrangement in any local
more to his liking, that he essentially has a pair oI "golden
handcuIIs" tying him to Northern Nevada, which he detests,
beIore going on to tell Coughlin about how he lead his little
league team in both home runs and strike outs, then
proceeding to ramble on unconvincingly about how he was
"trying to get you the help you need", in a tone that was
more suggestive oI a veiled threat to Coughlin, the import oI
which was clear, ie, that Coughlin better not complain
anymore about the RPD's police misconduct, such as
Coughlin did in his written complaints to the RPD on
September 7th, 2011 and January 8th, 2012 wherein
Coughlin complained oI the police misconduct by RPD
OIIicers Nick Duralde and Ron Rosa during the wrongIul
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arrest oI Coughlin on August 20th, 2011in RCR2011-
063341 (written complaint submitted to the RPD on
September 7th, 2011 and supplemental on January 8th,
2012, at which time a written complaint against Nevada
Court Services, RPD OIIicer Chris Carter, Jr., and Sargent
Marcia Lopez incident to their police misconduct during the
November 13th, 2011 wrongIul arrest oI Coughlin in RMC
11 CR 26405. Sargent SiIre would again order Coughlin
arrested less than 48 hours later in RCR2012-065630 Ior
"misue oI emergency communications services". In between
these two arrests RPD OIIicer Duralde would get a chance to
retaliate against Coughlin incident to pulling Coughlin over
in his car in the early morning hours oI January 13th, 2012,
aIter Coughlin bailed himselI out oI jail and use a
combination oI a cab ride and walking to get to his car in 20
degree whether on a very windy night. Coughlin instantly
recognized SiIreon January 14th, 2012 Irom seeing him on
January 12th, 2012 as on both days Iact that SiIre was
wearing a short sleeves uniIorm shirt emphasizing his tribal
armband tatoos, and body builder biceps.
...
See attached in Exhibit 1 the videos Irom all oI these varius
wrongIul arrests by local law enIorcemtn oI Coughlin
While it may be expendient Ior some in local law
enIorcement to discredit Coughlin or have him "committed",
it does not make it legal, and it does not vitiate the import oI
law enIorcement misconduct in all oI the wrongIul arrests oI
Coughlin since August 19th, 2011.
Coughlin was just inIormed by his mother that this same OIIicer Travis Warren, along
with another RPD OIIicer and "two social worker types" met with Coughlin's mother, Very
Special Arts oI Nevada (VSAN) Program Director Mary Barker, and Coughlin's Iather, Dr.
Timothy D. Coughlin, MD, oI Reno Family Physicians at Dr. Coughlin's medical oIIice in an
purported attempt to have Coughlin "committed" sometime in approximately February 2012.
Such a meeting is conveniently and suspiciously close in time to the video transcribed above
wherein Sargent Lopez essentially admits that she and OIIicer Carter lacked probable cause
Ior a criminal trespass arrest oI Coughlin (and, upon inIormation and belieI, the RPD was
served a subpoena by Coughlin requiring Carter and Lopez's presence at Trial, though neither
managed to show up, despite the City Attorney's having previously subpoenaed at least one oI
them Ior that purpose as well...It seems to City Attorney's OIIice got wind oI how terribly
Iraudulent OIIicer Carter's probable cause sheet was (and Carter did tell Coughlin, in the
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"Zach's arrest 010.mp4" video that Carter would put his name on the "arrest sheet iI you have
any problem with that" in response to Coughlin mentioning to OIIicer Carter that the police
did need to have probable cause to make such an arrest. Further troubling is the Iact that RPD
Sargent SiIre had Coughlin arrested just over 24 hours aIter Sargent Lopez put her Ioot in her
mouth her, bringing 5 other RPD OIIicers with him on January 14h, 2012 to respond to a 911
call by Coughlin reporting the disappearance oI his Pekingese dog, Jackson Pawluck, and the
menacing statements connected thereto by the house mates against whom Coughlin would
eventually be awarded two diIIerent TPO's.
Just about 12 hours prior to Sargent Lopez and OIIicer Warren and OIIicer Avila
arriving at Coughlin's E. 9th St. rental in response to a call by Coughlin reporting a domestic
dispute (two oI Coughlin's tires had been slashed and his license plate had turned up missing),
just aIter Coughlin spent his last $160 bailing himselI out oI jail incident to the January 12th,
2012 "jaywalking" arrest ordered by RPD Sargent Paul SiIre, Coughlin was pulled over while
driving home his vehicle aIter making his way to it Irom the Washoe County Detention
Center (which had seen Iit to release Coughlin exactly a couple minutes aIter the last RTC bus
had leIt Ior the night (on a night where the temperature was a balmy 25 degrees, with a
considerable wind chill on top oI that) by the same RPD OIIicer Nick Duralde (whose wiIe is
an emergency communications dispatcher, Jessica Duralde, which complicates matters
considering that the petty larceny oI an iPhone case, RCR2011-063341 stemming Irom
Duralde's wrongIul August 20th, 2011 arrest oI Coughlin has involved an inquiry wherein
Duralde's basis Ior alleging he was justiIied in conducting a Terry Stop "weapons check pat
down" and or a search incident to arrest was largely premised upon some purported
"inIormation he received Irom dispatch" oI a "disturbance or possible Iight", despite the Iact
that none oI the discovery, 911 logs, dispatch reports, etc. propounded to Coughlin mention a
"possible Iight", but they do mention a "disturbance" and "possible larceny oI a cell phone"
and the "RP (reporting party) screaming at the accused". DDA Young may need to answer
Ior just where this whole notion oI Duralde being dispatched mention oI a "possible Iight"
comes Irom exactly, other than the prosecutors wish list oI things he wishes there was
documentation oI to support his hopes oI proving Coughlin's Fourth Amendment rights were
not violated by an OIIicer eager to show up the lawyer in Iront oI some teen-agers and early
twenty-somethings. To be Iair, those youths did a Iair amount oI lying that night in their
Iraudulent attempts to cover up the conduct oI Cory Goble, which may be tantamount to
having abandoned (and iI Goble did not abandon it, then anyone whom claimed it in response
to the "man holding a six-pack" oIIering it up and threatening to "throw it in the river iI
someone doesn't claim it right away", arguably "saved" the iPhone Irom being destroyed in
connection with Goble's alleged negligence or abandonment oI it, and thereby, the iPhone was
no longer Goble's, iI it was, indeed, his to begin with (which is unclear given Goble's
contradictory statements in that regard where he alleges that he himselI bought it three years
previously, according to Duralde in his Supplemental Declaration incident to his arrest report,
in comparison to Goble's testimony on the August 29th, 2012 Trial date in RCR2011-063341,
wherein Goble alleges his brother bought it Ior him three years previously, not that WCPD
Jim Leslie would undertake any investigation or issue a subpoena to clariIy such a thing, mind
you) his three year old iPhone 3G (Goble's Iriend testiIied that Goble set it down on the
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concrete ground at around 11:00 pm or so on a Saturday evening in the downtown Reno skate
plaza in Iront oI City Hall (and Goble's statements in his Witness Statement, that he was
"skateboarding 15 Ieet away Irom the phone" conIlicting sharply with both Goble's statements
on the audio tape oI his 911 calls (wherein he admits to having been at his Jeep at the relevant
time, which was, apparently, according to Goble's Iriend Nathaniel Zarate's testimony, parked
on the west side oI the skate plaza, on Virginia Street, whereas some still unidentiIied "man
holding a six-pack" whom Zarate alleges picked up the phone oII the ground and held it aloIt
(and Zarate's Iriend Nicole Watson admitted on a video Iilmed by Coughlin upon his being
released Irom 7 days in WCDC, where this liIelong resident oI Reno, an attorney, whose
entire immediate Iamily lives here, who had no criminal record previous convictions aside
Irom a January 2003 "dry" reckless driving conviction, was denied an OR release by a
retaliatory WCDC staII Ior 7 days, and where Coughlin's bail was impermissibly inIlated by
Duralde's Iraudulent overcharging as Ielony grand larceny Ior the purported theIt oI an item
that was three years old and on worth "between $250 and $300" when it was bought new three
years previously. The RMC impermissibly violated NRS 5.011 when Judge Gardner held
Coughlin's arraignment in 11 CR 22716 on October 10th, 2012 during the pendency oI the
Order Ior Competency Evaluation oI Coughlin in RCR2011-063341. So, OIIicer Duralde
and Iive other RPD OIIicers just happened to be hanging around Coughlin's car when he
Iinally made his way to it upon his release Irom jail in the early morning hours oI January
13th, 2012. Coughlin had previously Iiled a written complaint against RPD OIIicer Duralde
and OIIicer Ron Rosa on September 7th, 2011 and January 8th, 2012, making such a large
show oI Iorce incident to that pull over (Ior a license plate that just so happened to all the
sudden turn up missing", and the main suspects would be the RPD, or Coughlin's then house
mates, or, Iinally, some stranger). A video oI the wrongIul arrest was taken by Coughlin, and
here is the transcript (oI the video Coughlin took oI the August 20th, 2011 petty larceny arrest
in RCR2011-063341):
RETALIATORY ARREST: "Let him do his job or we will call the Nevada Bar and tell
them how you cooperated with our investigation. How's that runnin' for ya?" and
"Now, your're under arrest ofr larceny. Now we can search you incident to arrest.
How's that?"
On the video/audio recording oI the arrest ( VID20110820232801) the Iile name oI
which represent an accurate time stamping oI the time at which the video Iile began recording
on 8/20/11 at 11:28:01 pm incident to the petty larceny charge Coughlin is currently Iacing in
RCR2011-063341)
(3 second mark)
Coughlin: I am scared oI you young kids...you have nothing to lose, oI
course I'm scared oI you...please don't hurt me...you have clearly scared
me"
(at approximately the 22 second mark RPD OIIicer Duralde arrives on the
scene)
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Austin Lichty: We saw it light up in his pocket. He won't give it back.
Robert Dawson: He won't give us the phone he stole.
(27 second mark)
Zarate: I saw the whole thing.
(28 second mark)
Duralde: Do you have the phone?...Is it in your pocket?"
Coughlin: What?
Colton Templeton: The iPhone!
Lichty: Don't play dumb, just give it to us!
Duralde: The iPhone.
(41 second)
Coughlin: Don't I have a right not to answer an OIIicer when he inquires as
to what is in my pockets? Unless this is a Terry Stop, but I don't think this
is a reasonable cause to do a pat down...
Duralde: It is a reasonable cause to do one.
Coughlin: Perhaps, you might be right.
(54 second mark)
Templeton: And iI he calls it and it lights up in his pocket, will that prove
it?
Duralde: Set your bike down on the ground, and move over there Ior a pat
down.
(1:00 minute mark)
Coughlin: This dog likes to run away, OIIicer, can I tie it to something?
Duralde: Tie it to your bike.
Coughlin: Okay.
Austin Lichty: Corey, We can call it. Let's call it.
(1:02 mark).
Duralde: Dude, I am going to be real with you right now, the kid will
probably be Iine iI you give him the phone back, if not, we are going to
get it out of your pocket and you are going to go to jail.
(From the 1:08 mark to the 1:28 mark Coughlin ties his dog to his bike and
moves several Ieet south towards the Siena in response to D's direction.)
Templeton: You want to go to jail over a iPhone that's not yours?
Lichty: You have a touch screen phone
Goble: Seriously, I don't get it, you just said iPhones are played out...
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(1:28 mark)
Duralde: Face that way, other hand on the back oI your head...this hand on
the back oI your head, there you go...
(1:32 mark)
Coughlin: Can, I say one thing OIIicer? I'm a lawyer.
(1:36 mark)
Duralde (startled): Okay! (strange slipping/click sound emitted on video oI
arrest at this point)
Coughlin: You just touched my junk! OIIicer, I don't appreciate you
touching my penis. I am a lawyer, and you haven't even asked me a
question yet and you are handcuIIing me. I don't see how this is a Terry
Stop. I wish you would tell me why you are proceeding like this.
(2:00 minute mark)
Alaksa: You are a suspect in a larceny oI a phone. You have been
identiIied by a victim as a suspect in a larceny oI a phone. We are
conducting an investigational stop. We checked you Ior weapons to make
sure that you do not have any weapons,.
Zach: Those young men assaulted me, I do not see them being handcuIIed.
(2:35 mark)
Duralde: Dude, you are the one who is accused oI the Irickin' crime.
Coughlin: I am accusing them oI assaulting me.
Duralde: Okay, and I am saying that is unIounded how are you injured.
Coughlin: Uh, assault isn't injury, its apprehension oI imminent bodily
harm.
Duralde: Okay, so what did they do?
Coughlin: They grabbed me, they pushed me, they reached into my pocket,
and they pulled my dog Irom me,
Duralde: II they touched you its not assault.
Coughlin: ...As a gang oI skaters, twenty oI them backed me up into
oncoming traIIic.
(3:05 mark)
Duralde: Citizen's arrest. They wouldn't have been coming aIter you iI you
hadn't stolen the kids phone.
Coughlin: OIIicer, let me tone this down a little bit, okay. I have respect
Ior you.
Duralde: What is your name?
Coughlin: Zachary Coughlin, Nevada Bar number 9473.
Duralde: I don't care what your bar number is, what is that? How does that
bare on this?
Coughlin: Well, maybe it bares towards...okay, you seem to not respect or
be willing to hear anything an attorney says, yet a group oI skaters you
believe wholeheartedly.
Duralde: Do you have the phone?
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Coughlin: I'm not an...well, let me think about that....Do I have the phone?
Do I have a right not to answer your question?
(3:41 mark)
Duralde: 1ust don't talk anymore.
Coughlin: Okay.
(3:45)
Coughlin: Do you have a right to search my pockets right now?
Duralde: What is your last name, how do you spell it?
(3:55 mark)
Coughlin: Am I under arrest?
Duralde: Dude, you are detained Ior a crime we have every right to identiIy
you.
Coughlin: So, I think its under the Hiibel case where the guy reIused to
give the police oIIicer his name?
Rosa: Its called 171.123, Terry Stop. You can provide your name or be
arrested Ior obstruction.
Coughlin: You know what I'm talking about.
RPD OIIicer Rosa: Yeah, I know what your are talking about.
Coughlin: Search incident to arrest.
RPD OIIicer Rosa: That's not what your being...you are being detained,
dude.
Duralde: You are not under arrest.
Coughlin: Okay.
(4:15 mark)
RPD OIIicer Rosa: Provide your name or go to jail for obstruction, and
we will call the Nevada Bar and let them know how you cooperated
with our investigation, how is that runnin' for ya? We are tired, and we
are busy tonight, we have got better things to do tonight than be out here
and debate the law with you. Give the man your name and let him do his
job. Is there anything wrong with that?
Coughlin: Well, can I ask you a question?
RPD OIIicer Rosa: No! You can't, just provide your name and
inIormation or go to jail. Those are your options, we are done discussing
the law.
(4:40 mark)
Coughlin: Am I under arrest?
RPD OIIicer Rosa: How many times do I have to tell you, your are being
detained.
(4:42 mark, dispatch radio traIIic can be heard in the background Irom the
OIIicer's radio saying "3994", the State Iailed to produce any dispatch
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recordings despite being served with a subpoena and despite the Iact that
such radio traIIic is recorded under RPD policies).
RPD OIIicer Alaksa: A decision has not been made
(4:46 mark, oII in the distance)
Skater voice, likely Templeton's: It will either light up or vibrate.
Coughlin: Okay, Can I just ask a question?
RPD OIIicer Rosa: What is your question.
Coughlin: I have total respect Ior you, believe me, I do.
(4:51 mark oII in distance)
Goble: He might have switched it over and or flipped it over.
(4:52 mark)
RPD OIIicer Rosa: Well then give the man your name, show him a little
respect.
(4:54 mark)
Goble: He might have flipped it over to the right if it isn't in there then.
Licthy: Yeah, that is what he did.
(4:58 mark)
Coughlin: Can you ask these kids to back oII so we can tone down this
situation..
RPD OIIicer Alaksa: You guys can you leave us along! Back oII! I said I
would help you out. Okay, allow me to do my job, okay?
(5:02 mark, radio dispatch traIIic remains audible)
(5:07 mark)
Duralde: Now, you are under arrest Ior larceny. Now, we can search you
incident to arrest. How's that?
Coughlin: Well, I mean, I wish you had asked me some questions prior to
arresting me, I mean, it might look better Ior you.
Duralde: Stand up!
(5:39 mark)
RPD OIIicer Alaksa: Who do you live with, Sir.
Coughlin: At this point OIIicer, though I respect you, iI you guys want to
play so hardcore with me, you know...
RPD OIIicer Alaksa: I want to try to help you with your dog and your bike,
who can take care oI your dog?
Coughlin: I live alone.
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(5:52 mark, RPD OIIicer Duralde removes Coughlin's HTC G2 smartphone
Irom Coughlin's right side short's pocket, looks at the screen light up aIter
touching it, and presses the red recording button to stop the video
recording).
The RPD and or Reno City Attorney's OIIice misconduct justiIies a tolling oI any
deadline to Iile a Motion Ior New Trial, or Arrest Judgment, or any other deadline given the
many instances oI such wrongIul conduct, including the Iollowing January 14th, 2012 arrest
oI Coughlin in RJC RCR2012-065630 Ior "misuse oI emergency services" (and add to that
the repeated Iraud by the pre-trial services staII at the WCDC in lying and committing
misconduct incident to their retaliatory dealings with Coughlin). Here is a transcript, in
relevant part, oI at least some oI the video and or audio recordings oI the momenets prior to
the arrest in RCR2012-065630 (and ECOMM and DDA Young and the RPD/State's
misconduct in reIusing to turn over excuplatory recordings and materials in that matter Iurther
provides a good cause, tolling, excusable neglect basis Ior granting the relieI requested
herein).
TRANSCRIPT OF RECORDING OF RPD INTERACTIONS, IN PART, OF
COUGHLIN INCIDENT TO CUSTODIAL ARREST FOR MISUSE OF
EMERGENCY SERVICES INCIDETN TO CUSTODIAL ARREST OF COUGHLIN
ON 1ANUARY 14TH, 2012 IN RCR2012-065630:
RPD OFFICER SCHAUR: how are you doing over here?
Coughlin: not so good.
Schaur: What's wrong.
Coughlin: My dog is gone.
Schaur: What kind oI dog do you have?
Coughlin: Pekingese.
Schaur: Peningese? I didn't see a Pekingese when we were comin' in here...do you have a
tracker on it or somethin' on it, one oI those little scanners?
Coughlin: Like a microchip? You have six cops here? Why? I recognize this guy over here
(reIerencing RPD Sargent Paul SiIre, whom admits to having ordered Coughlin be subjected
to a custodial arrest Ior "jaywalking" which obstructed justice incident to Coughlin collecting
evidence Ior a wrongIul eviction lawsuit against landlord Merliss and his counsel, Richard G.
Hill, Esq. and Casey Baker, Esq. stemming Irom RJC Rev2011-001708.) You arrested me Ior
jaywalking the other day.
RPD Sargent Paul SiIre: No, I didn't arrest you Ior jaywalking but I was on the scene.
Coughlin: what was your name?
Sargent SiIre: Here's the deal...what do you need today?
Coughlin: My dog is gone, threatening statements and smirks were made by the two women
or girls in here and the man...
...
SiIre: are these your roommates?
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Coughlin: she wasn't (reIerring to the teenage daughter oI one oI Coughlin's domestic
abusers) she moved in aIterwards, it's my understanding she is supposed to be living with her
mother. Can I go in there and hera what they are saying (motioning to the RPD interviewing
Laura Foreshee and Stephanie Allaback)?
SiIre: No, you have to stay here, we have to Iigure out iI you even have a domestic
relationship.
Coughlin: So, you didn't arrest me the other day?
SiIre: No, I was on the scene, though.
Coughlin: So, who did arrest me?
SiIre: its on the paperwork.
Coughlin: Who did arrest me? OIIicer Leedy (RPD OIIicer WESLEY LEEDY), the trainee,
or OIIicer Del Vecchio (RPD OIIicer AlIred Del Vecchio), the observer?
SiIre: OIIicer Leedy, the trainee,.
Coughlin: So Leedy was the trainee but he was making the arrest?
SiIre, Yeah, but he was still sworn personnel. How long have you been livin' here, man?
Coughlin: why wouldnt' you tell me what the arrest was Ior?
SiIre: Yeah, they told you.
Coughlin: What was it?
SiIre: Pedestrian in a roadway.
Coughlin: is that normally necessitate a custodial arrest?
SiIre: It can be.
Coughlin: Why did it need to be a custodial arrest, Sir?
SiIre: That one, because I said it was?
Coughlin: Why did you make that choice?
SiIre: Because we had several incidents involving you yesterday, or, uh, Thursday.
Coughlin: And just because they involvea me, it necessitated a custodial arrest?
SiIre: Yeah, you didn't qualiIy Ior a citation?
Coughlin: Why was that?
Sargent SiIre: I just told you, we had several incidents involving you...
Coughlin: But, what iI I was the victim in each incident?
RPD Sargent SiIre: then you shouldn't keep putting yourselI in that situation.
Coughlin: Oh, okay. (Coughlin previously worked as a domestic violence attorney/advocate at
Washoe Legal Services and is well Iamilar with the "blaming the victim" methoaology
employed here by RPD Sargent SiIre)/
Sargent SiIre: That is why you got served with the TPO (temporary protection Order Iiled by
Richard G. HIll, Esq., incident to his abuse oI process and successIul attempts to obstruct
justice in
The cases wherein Coughlin was a victim oI opposing party and or law enIorcement
misconduct justiIying the relieI sought herein, include, but are not limited to
REV 2012-001082 Northwind Apts. Vs Zach Coughlin
REV 2012-001083 Northwind Apts. Vs Zach Coughlin
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REV 2012-075658 Zach Coughlin vs JeII Nichols
RJC 2012-076746 Zach Coughlin vs Northwind Apts.
REV 2012-00374 Park Terrace Townhomes vs Zach Coughlin
REV 2012-074408 Zach Coughlin vs Park Terrace Townhomes
REV 2012-001048 Northwind Apts vs Zach Coughlin
RJC RCP2012-000287 Milan Krebs (Northwinds maintenance man) v. Zach Coughlin
(another TPO the RPD Iraudulently induced a landlord to procure against Coughlin, thanks to
RPD OIIicer Alan Weaver, Sargent Oliver Miller, and Ltn. Kevin Brown).
REV 2011-001492 Matt Merliss vs Zach Coughlin
REV 2011-001708 Matthew Merliss vs Zachary Coughlin
RJC RCP2012-000018 Richard G. Hill, Esq. v. Zach Coughlin (temporary protection order
application that Hill claims the RPD told him to Iile, shortly aIter Hill lied to RPD OIIicer
Hollingsworth on January 12th, 2012 by asserting that Coughlin has "lost his appeal" oI a
summary eviction matter in CV11-03628, that would not even be decided Ior months...Hill
reIences a reoccurring Iigure throughout all these wrongIul arrest, RPD Sargent Kimberly
Bradshaw (whom ordered the July 3, 2012 wrongIul arrest oI Coughlin in RMC 12 CR
12420, and perhpas, despite Sargent SiIre taking credit Ior it, the January 12th, 2012
"jaywalking" arrest oI Coughlin in RMC 12 CR 00696, and may have played some role in the
arrests in 11 TR 26800, RCR2012-067980, and the wrongIul, Soldal v. Cook County
violations by RPD Sargent Oliver Miller and OIIicer Alan Weaver on or around september
22nd, 2012 incident to the Superior Mini STorage matter. The RPD, especialy via Sargent
Miller, Sargent SiIre, Sargent Dye, OIIicer Weaver, Sargent Marcia Lopez, and others have
demonstrated a menacing and smug attitude toward co-opting "concern Ior your 'mental
health issues'" via some pretextual guise meant really to cover up their own police misconduct
and pursue violations oI Soldal v. Cook County (oIten with City oI Reno Code EnIorcement
showing up later, as they did in the Superior Storage and Northwinds Matters) to collect a
little sugar Ior their bowl, in suspiciously close connection in time to the "eIIorts" by the RPD
to make these landlords happy (which typically has resulted in their being able to, or
eIIectively being able to, to subvert the lawIul civil eviction process put into law by the
legislature, which RJC Judge Pearson willIully Iailed to Iollow anyways in RJC rev2012-
001048 in allowing, in violation oI NRCP 11 (made applicaable via NRS 40.400) those guilty
oI the unauthorized practice oI law, JeII Chandler and Nevada Court Servies, to cross the bar
and make arguments at a legal hearing, and to prepare and Iile legal work on behalI oI a
corporate client that does busines in ten states as a monolithic apartment complex behemoth,
Northwinds Apartments Associates, LLC (www.acg-ampi.com) where NCS lied about
"personally serving" the 6/14/12 5 day ud notice (process server r. wray IalsiIied his
Declaration oI Service aIter attempting to break and enter Coughlin's rental $29 on that date),
where Chandler and NCS listed the wrong court Ior the tenant to Iile and Answer (they listed
Sparks Justice Court rather than the RJC, in violation oI NRs 40.253...though Judge Pearson
made Coughlin pick up the tab Ior their criminal law violations and "malpractice". Judge
Pearson spent the Iirst 12 years oI his career as a prosecutor in the Washoe County District
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Attorney's OIIice, and seems to have done some good work in creating the Mandatory Status
ConIerences therein, though WCPD Dogan and DDA Young pretty much treat those like a
joke (as does WCPD Jim Leslie, Iailing to notice his client on them...which isn't as bad as
Dogan, who on 2/27/12 actually lied to his client Coughlin and told him the court date on
2/27/12 was cancelled, only to reatliate against Coughlin's 2/21/12 Iiling in rcr2012-065630
by moving Ior and getting a 2/27/12 ORder Ior Competency Evaluation against Coughlin on
that date, Iile stamped at 1:31 pm, which proves that DDA Youngs Iiling an Opposition to
Coughlin's Motion to Appear as Co-counsel at 2:55 pm, on that same date, in RR2011-
063341, violated NRS 178.405. Further, Young made an even worse transgression against
that statutory dictate where he attempted to hold a TRIAL in RCR2011-063341 on May 7th,
2012 where the Order Iinding Coughlin competent (and thus resolving the February 27th,
2012 Order Ior Competenecy Evaluation in 650630) was not signed and Iile stamped until
May 9th, 2012...this is made worse by the WDC's D10 Judge Elliot coercing out oI Coughlin
a waiver oI his HIPAA rights in CR12-0376 (especially where Dogan later compounded that
by entering, seemingly willIully, private medical inIormation into the open, public record, in
open court, on April 26th, 2012...aIter the WCDC had denied Coughlin his, arguably
"psychotropic" medication during that completely unnecessary 8 day incarceration...only to be
release and have WCPD Goodnight and DDA Young attempt to ramrod through a may 9th,
2012 trial date in rcr2011-063341 oI Coughlin, despite Goodnight admitting minutes beIore
the trial that he had not even viewed or listened to extremelely material exculpatory media
gathered by Coughin during the investigation into deIending against those charges).
RJC 2012-078432 Zachary Barker Coughlin vs Superior Mini Storage (in this matter, on
approximately September 22nd, 2012, besides RPD OIIicer Weaver calling up Coughlin's
mother an attempt to coerce her into assisting him and the RPD In violating Soldal v. Cook
County, the RPD and OIIicer Weaver and Sargent Oliver Miller also attempted to induce
Superior's Matt Grant to Iile another Iraudulent "distrubing the peace" charge against
Coughlin shortly aIter Weaver swaggeringly, and in a smug manner, threatened to
Iraudulently arrest Coughlin again Ior another "Iailure to secure a load" citation and conduct
another impermissible "search incident to arrest" or "inventorying" oI Coughlin's vehicle.
RPD Sargent Dye and OIIicer Weaver had also violated criminal laws in attempting to
dissuade Couglin Irom testiIying at to their misconduct in RMC 12 CR 12420 on September
5th, 2012 (SArgent Dye tracked Coughlin down while he was deliverying materials incident
to his part time job, shortly aIter midnight on September 5th, 2012 to attempt to intimidate
Coughlin in a Scolari's desolate parking lot, and OIIicer Weaver made menacing
gesticulations to Coughlin in court while they waited Ior the 12 CR 12420 case to be called,
wherein Reno City Attorney committed proIessional misconduct in violating RPC 3.8 in
amending the criminal complaint in that matter to charge Coughlin with trespassing, and
RMC "deIenders" Keith Loomis, Esq. and Henry Sotelo both violated NRS 178.405 and NRS
5.010 at various times by Iailing to abide by the stay required therein and in obtaining orders
allowing their withdrawal (oI course, the kept their monthly, princely $7K "side gig" payment
Irom the RMC, which Ior all purposes seems to be made in exchange Ior their selling their
criminal indigent client's down the river and or subjecting them to impromptu cross
examination demanding answers to which they are not entitled, especially in Loomis's case,
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and otherwise withholding Irom criminal indigent deIendant's the Iew inviolable rights they
have, including, the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, the right to subpoena or call
witnesses, and the decision on whether or not to testiIy.
Storage. Loomis also committed Iraud in assisting in having Coughlin incarcerated
wrongIully Ior nearly 20 days in July 2012, including his Iailure to Iorward to the RMC the
prooI oI insurance Coughlin provided Loomis (which had already been provided to charlatan
police oIIicer's Weaver and Dye anyways), and in coercing wrongIully Irom Coughlin some
purported consent to view Coughlin's HIPAA protected medical records (something WCDC
social worker Jan Guidetti also sought to do on behalI oI RMC Judge Nash Holmes)
Coughlin also took a video oI the January 12th, 2012 "jaywalking" arrest in RMC 12
CR 00696, and Coughlin also took a video oI at least part oI the January 14th, 2012 arrest Ior
"misuse oI emergency services" (a gross misdemeanor) in RCR2012-065630. Both arrests
were ordered by Sargent SiIre, as admitted by SiIre himselI in the video Coughlin took oI at
least part oI the January 14t, 2012 arrest. And, curiously, the RPD, ECOMM, and DDA
YOung, despite having been loaded up with visible cameras and audio recorders (amongst the
various 6 oIIicers dispatched in response to Coughlin's 911 call oI that night) have so Iar
Iailed to propound (despite WCPD Dogan purporting to have made such requests and or
served the appropriate subpoenas...though everything with Dogan has been rather "murky",
with his supervisor Jim Leslie hovering around the case exacting a similar toll upon
Coughlin's deIense as that Leslie has done to two other cases wherein he purports to be
"deIending" Coughlin (in RCR2011-063341, the iPhone petty larceny case, which Coughlin
Iinally managed to get Leslie booted Irom on October 22nd, 2012, leaving Coughlin little
time to prepare Ior the November 19th, 2012 resumption oI that Trial, particularly where
Leslie has still Iailed to comply with an Order in that matter requiring him to digitally
transmit various materials Irom Coughlin's Iile to Coughlin; and in RCR2012-067980, the
"Ialse statement to a public oIIicer" retaliatory prosecution that DDA Young is bringing
against Coughlin incident to a wrongIul arrest by ol' WCSO Deputy Machen on June 28th,
2012, stemming Irom a Summary Eviction Order that Judge Schroeder oI the RJC managed to
sign despite numerous written correspondences to the RJC and the Sparks Justice Court
providing a "heads up" that the 5 day unlawIul detainer served by ol' Northwind Apartments
Associates, LLC (a corporation, and thereIore, not entitled to appear without an attorney
under NRCP 11, nor entitled to utilize an entity committing the unauthorized practice oI law,
though they did, in hiring "eviction consulting and process services" Iirm Nevada Court
Services, in RJC REV2012-001048, whose licensed process service Robert Wray (or maybe
it is Ryan Wray?) Iiled a Iraudulent declaration oI service alleging he personally served
Coughin on June 14th, 2012 a 5 day unlawIul detainer notice incident to Wray and
Northwind's Manager Duane Jakob attempting to break into Coughlin's rental #29 at
Northwind's Apartments on that date, a rental with no windows whose door was closed and
locked, though Wray alleges to have "personally served" the notice (and thereby cut short by
3 days the amount oI time the tenant had to Iile a Tenant's AIIidavit...though Coughlin did
submit just that to the court listed as having jurisdiction on the Nevada Court Services
prepared June 14th, 2012 5 day notice (which "mistakenly" listed Sparks Justice Court" as the
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Iorum to Iile such a Tenant's Answer or AIIidavit), Sparks Justice Court, on June 26th, 2012
(and the SJC Iaxed as much over to the RJC on June 28th, 2012). Deputy Machen arrested
Coughlin on June 28th, 2012, alleging it did
OIIicer Warren To be Iair, OIIicer Travis Warren did a rather proIessional and
admirable job recently in coordinating, with RPD OIIicer Wilson, a "civil standby" oI sorts at
Northwind Apartments, on or about October 10th, 2012 when Coughlin went there to retrieve
what remained oI his personalty aIter he was unable to remove it all Irom his three diIIerent
rentals at Northwinds on during the 16 hours allotted on August 13th-14th, 2012. A
Northwind's apartment maintenance man was able to assist his employer in subverting the
civil eviction process along with some inspiration and coaxing by Reno Police Department
oIIicer Alan Weaver and Sargent Dye by obtaining a temporary order protection against
Coughlin on July 5, 2012 in RJC RCP2012-000287 (Milan Krebs v. Zach Coughlin). OIIicer
Weaver and Sargent Dye had arrested Coughlin on July 3, 2012 (in RMC 12CR12420, which
has now seen granted two diIIerent Motion to Withdraw by Coughlin's court appointed
Counsel in that matter: Keith Loomis, Esq. (and Loomis scored a similar Order allowing him
to depart Irom his purported Sixth Amendment IulIillment aIter continuing to do little while
unIailingly collecting his "side gig" $7K a month as a contracted court appointed counsel Ior
the RMC, gotta pay Ior that new white BMW somehow, right, Keith) and Henry Sotelo, Esq.
(also pulling in a princely "side gig" as one oI the RMC's many, many McGeorge School oI
Law alumni Iormer prosecutors turned court appointed prosecutor's helpers, er, indigent
criminal deIendant herders, er, deIense counsel, to go along with the various McGeorge
School oI Law alumni sitting judges at the RMC (some, oI whom, like RMC Judge Kenneth
Howard, have been close personal Iriends with Loomis since their days playing on the law
school basketball team back at McGeorge; Judge Howard, McGeorge 1981, another judge at
the RMC, McGeorge, 1985, Judge Nash Holmes, McGeorge 1977, court appointed deIender
Iormer prosecutor Keith Loomis, McGeorge 1982; court appointed deIender Iormer
prosecutor Henry Sotelo, McGeorge 1987; Loomis has been busy puttin' in work Ior the
RMC oI late with respect to Coughlin, managing to torpedo Coughlin's deIense in the
criminal trespass matter beIore Judge William Gardner in 11 CR 26405 by Ilat out reIusing to
subpoena either Sargent Lopez or OIIicer Carter, or landlord Merliss, despite all three being
the only other eye witnesses to the events to the November 13th, 2011 arrest scene (besides
the seemingly conveniently edited videos Hill and Merliss Iilmed, which Hill seemingly never
bothered to view as they expressly contradict his sworn testimony at the June 18th, 2012 Trial
in that matter) incident to pulling him over Ior a minor traIIic violation and alleged in plastic
tub had Iallen oII his vehicle wherein they charged him with Iailure to secure load and Iailure
to maintain prooI oI insurance, despite the Iact that Coughlin provided prooI oI his vehicles
and should current insurance in the Iorm oI a PDF high-resolution image oI his insurance card
on his 5 inch smart phone screen to which oIIicer Weaver declared that the prooI needed to be
on actual paper at which point oIIicer Weaver arrested Coughlin Ior disturbing the peace
incident to some alleged statement by Coughlin that morning at Northwind apartments
wherein Milan Krebs asserts Coughlin said something all along the lines oI "don't mess with
my locks again or else you'll be sorry" (which Coughlin did not even say, though Coughlin
did arrive at his rental at Northwind's on that July 3rd, 2012 morning to Iind "someone" had
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placed some sort oI glue in the key slot oI the lock on his rental's door), though Krebs's
statements in his application Ior an order oI protection compared to those he makes in his
witness statement incident to the July 3 arrest oI Coughlin contains some glaring
inconsistencies particularly with respect to the protection order going into some alleged
propensity oI Coughlin to carry around large butcher knives where is the witness statement in
connection with the July 3 disturbing the peace arrest Iails to mention such a minor detail.
Krebs also makes an allegation that Coughlin burglarized his truck despite the Iact that
Coughlin has a video oI the incident Krebs reIers to wearing Krebs admits under oI at the
extension hearing on his application Ior a temporary protection order that he was not present
during incident wherein his coworker Luke idea and his manager Dwayne Jakob indicated
him that they caught Coughlin attempting to burglarized his truck. Coughlin also has a video
oI the incident wherein Krebs alleges Coughlin was Iollowing him Ior 5 minutes and
screaming out threats and inciting in the violence. Also may be critical oI Coughlin's
propensity to Iilm things one might ask himselI where Coughlin would be had he not all these
exculpatory videos proving the perjury oI various individuals including OIIicer Weaver,
Northwind's Apartment's Associates, LLC (part oI the monolithic ACG-AMPI, Inc., doing
business in ten states operating enormous apartment complexes that are known Ior cheating
it's tenants out oI their damage deposits by asserting especially spurious rationale in support
Ior Iailing to so return such deposits) Manager Duane Jakob (who lied under oath at the July
31st, 2012 Hearing related to various Motions Coughlin Iiled in connection with a wrongIul
arrest oI June 28th, 2012, wherein the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice's Deputy Machen (the
same deputy whose Iraudulent aIIidavit oI service Iiled November 7, 2011 asserted that it
personally served Coughlin the lockout order on November 1, 2011 incident the eviction Irom
Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice despite the Iact. Mansions supervisor Washoe County
SheriII's oIIice civil division supervisor Liz digital admits and had February 2012 e-mail to
Coughlin that matching merely posted. Summary eviction order on the door to Coughlin's
Iormer law oIIice when no one was home and proceeded to then eIIectuate a lockout, and
thereby Iailed to comply with the dictates oI NRS 40.400 (which incorporate the Nevada
Rules oI Civil Procedure into landlord tenant summary eviction proceedings and unlawIul
detainer actions under NRS 40. Arrested Coughlin (and, yes, that arrest was captured on video
tape as well, and is providing another basis Ior DDA Zach Young to Iurther hone his
retaliatory prosecution chops) an idea
There may be an inIerence that the RJC and perhaps the 2JDC have attempted to cover
up or purposeIully ignore the Iact that Coughlin Iiled a Notice oI Appeal both on 12/26/12
and 2/2/12 in 1708 as to the 12/20/11 Order Resolving his 11/16/11 Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien in 1708 where the various iterations oI the Docket Irom the RJC
demonstrates that the two entries Ior February appear to have been removed, where the most
recent Iax oI 12/20/12 by the RJC's Cheryl lacked those two February 2012 entries, though
Coughlin's repeated trips to the RJC and requesting and retaining various iterations oI that
Docket reveal that at one point there were the Iollowing entries noting Coughlin's Iiling oI a
Notice oI Appeal on 2/2/12 (and a tolling motion prior thereto would have made that timely to
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whatever extent Coughlins 12/26/11 Notice appealing that 12/20/11 Order is not accorded
legal signiIicance.
Further, as to the allegations oI Coughlin's own alleged violations oI RPC 3.1
(Meritorious Claims), Rule 3.2 (Expediging), Rule 2.3. (Cando to Tirbunal), and especially
Rule 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Partny and Counsel) HIll and Baker's Iilings and letters to
Coughlin in relation to Coughlin's 11/16/11 Iiling oI a Motion to Contest Personal Property
lien, through their 11/21/11 Opposition thereto and the 12/19/11 Opposition to Coughlin's
Second Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien reveal an extremnely troubling and
Iraudulent (coercive to boot...even Judge SIerrazza at one point had to point out to Baker that
"its the law" in rebuIIing Baker's contention that he and Hill should be allowed to place all
sorts oI ridiculous restrictiosn on Coughlin's right to retrieve his property (insisting upon a
showing by Coughlin oI various things, like renting a uhaul, a crew, etc.,etc. to avoid
Coughlin's "cherry picking" only those items he wanted to Irom the property and leaving the
rest to be disposed oI and litigated in whatever manner permissible under the law...NRS
118.460 was not to their liking, so Hill and Baker coercively and Iraudulently attempted to
legistlate on their client's behalI).
Further, that same older style RJC docket, on page 5 oI 6, in the two diIIerent entries
Ior 12/27/11 (one by Cheryl E.) indicate a distrubingly lax approach taken by both the Clerk
and by Senior Judge Dannan that resulting in a 3/30/12 Order by Judge Flanagan that Iailed to
address Coughlin's appealing the 12/20/11 Order Resolving Coughlin's 11/16/11 Motion to
Contest Personal Property Lient...combined with a very suspect practice by Judge SIerrazza
oI calling clerk's as the court's own witness as to whether Couglin allowed the RJC to
schedule in a timely manner the hearing required by NRS 40.253(8).
Such an anticipated SBN v Coughlin SCR 105 Complaint, according to King, will be based
largely upon Coughlin allegedly wearing "pajama bottoms" to the Reno Municipal Court
Iiling counter one day while inquiring about a parking ticket or some other non-sensensical
high school jibberish, will contain more oI the same reckless and lacking in Ioundation
mentions oI "breaking into" the Iormer law oIIice and "broken locks" despite the Iact that no
Iactual support exists Ior such an allegation, there were no "broken locks" ever mentioned by
anyone (and iI Hill is willing to make up Iinding a "bag oI weed and crack pipe" along with
describing what Hill's own videos show to be vitamins as a "large quantity oI pills", then you
know Richard G. Hill, Esq. would have been all over any "broken locks" at the Iormer home
law oIIice, yet, there simply were none, not that that would stop Pat King or J. Thomas
Susich Irom cobbling together such an allegation in the SCR 117 Petition in 60975) along
with something about Coughlin being subject to a custodial arrest Ior "jaywalking" by the
Reno Police Department while Coughlin was Iilming Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s contractor's
crew loading up a dump truck with items oI personal property then located in Coughlin's
Iormer home law oIIice (the arrest occurred shortly aIter Coughlin discovered that Hill's
contractor, Phil Stewart, had used Coughlin's own distinctive plywood to "secure" or "board
up the property" in December 2011, Ior which the landlord was ultimately awarded costs,
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$1,060 oI which were based upon Stewart's invoice Ior "securing the property", which
included the cost oI plywood, and "Iixing a leak in the basement" despite NRS 118A.460
only allowing costs Ior "moving, storing, and inventorying" a tenant's personal property),
which Coughlin was unable to remove during the scant 13 hours he was aIIorded to do so by
the Reno Justice Court's Order Iollowing a Hearing on Coughlin's November 16th, 2011
Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien (the Hearing was not set or conducted with the "10
days" required by NRS 40.253(7)-(8) because Richard G. Hill, Esq. needed to go on a six-
week vacation shortly aIter Coughlin's November 16th, 2011 Iiling (in a matter now on
appeal in SCR 60331 and 61838, wherein, somehow, a commercial tenant, Coughlin (whom
was both running a law practice and Coughlin Memory Foam, a Ioam mattress business Irom
his home, which was previously utilized Ior commercial purposes by a drug and alcohol
rehabilitation counseling business and is zone Ior mixed use purposes) was summarily
evicted based upon a No Cause Eviction Notice only (ie, the non-payment oI rent was neither
noticed, pled, nor argued by the landlord) despite the clear dictate against the use oI summary
eviction proceedings against commercial tenants not based upon the non-payment oI rent
(Bench Book stuII) set Iorth in NRS 40.253. The December 21st, 2011 Order "Resolving"
Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien actually required Coughlin to pay the
exact same amount oI rent Ior 17 days (November 1 to November 17th, 2011), $480 (ie, pro-
rated Irom the $900 per month rental agreement) as Coughlin would have under a "Iair rental
value", Ior the "Iull use and occupancy oI the premises" despite the Iact that Hill somehow
signed a Criminal Complaint Ior Trespass Against Coughlin, on November 13th, 2011
despite any Summary Eviction Order not being served in accordance with NRS 40.400 (and
thereIore NRCP 5 and 6(e) vis a vis the "within 24 hours" oI "receipt" oI the lockout order,
and, thereIore, any such lockout that had occured being rendered a nullity or pursuant to a
void Order) and where the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice Civil Process Service Supervisor
Liz Stuchell has admitted in writing that the AIIidavit oI Service Iiled November 7th, 2011
by Deputy Machen, attesting to having "personally served" the Summary Eviction Order on
November 1st, 2011, was, in Iact, purportedly merely posted to the door oI Coughlin's Iormer
law oIIice while Coughlin was not home, at which point a Soldal v. Cook County violating
illegal lockout occurred. In a February 7th, 2012 written correspondence to Coughlin,
Stuchell wrote: "Mr. Coughlin, Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day
was personally served by Deputy Machen by posting a copy oI the Order to the residence.
The residence was unoccupied at the time. Liz Stuchell, Supervisor WCSO Civil Section".
The text oI NRS 40.253 speaks to service oI Lockout Orders: 'The court may
thereupon issue an order directing the sheriII or constable oI the county to remove the tenant
within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order
Granting Summary Eviction was signed by October 27th, 2011 (though not mailed to
Coughlin until aIter the November 1, 2011 lockout had allegedly already occured). That
language is only Iound in situations inapplicable to the one incident that in the summary
eviction Irom Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and NRS 40.253(5)
(a) are the only sections oI NRS 40 where this 'within 24 hours language occurs, and those
situations only apply where, in: 40.253(3)(b)(2): ' 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1
or 2 must: ...(b) Advise the tenant: .. (2) That iI the court determines that the tenant is guilty
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oI an unlawIul detainer, the court may issue a summary order Ior removal oI the tenant or an
order providing Ior the nonadmittance oI the tenant, directing the sheriII or constable oI the
county to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order and, 40.253(5)(a): '5.
Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the landlord`s agent may apply by
aIIidavit oI complaint Ior eviction to the justice court oI the township in which the dwelling,
apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located or to the district court oI the
county in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located,
whichever has jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing
the sheriII or constable oI the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the
order. The way these summary eviction proceedings are being carried out in Reno Justice
Court presently shocks the conscience and violates Nevada law. There is not basis Ior
eIIectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in this case. The requirements
attendant to serving Summary Eviction Orders and conducting lockouts are Iound in NRS
40.253 in two sections containing the 'within 24 hours oI receipt language are inapplicable,
as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where the Tenant did Iile an
AIIidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not oIten seen. To require Nevada's tenants
to get up and get out 'within 24 hours oI 'receipt oI the order (what does that even mean?
The use oI terms like 'rendition, 'rendered, 'notice oI entry, 'pronounced, is absent
here, and this 'receipt oI the order language is something rarely Iound elsewhere in Nevada
law-see attached DMV statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must
Iile a Complaint within 90 days oI 'receipt oI a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which
Iollows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing receipt oI such a letter, when actual receipt
is not shown, by applying a 'constructive notice standard that relies upon the days Ior
mailing extension oI time Ior items served in the mailing, etc.). In Abraham v. Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the record did not reIlect when the
plaintiII received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on November 24, 2006. The
court calculated that the 90-day period commenced on November 30, 2006, based on three
days Ior mailing aIter excluding Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim under
either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiII must exhaust administrative remedies and sue within
90 days oI receipt oI a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(I)(1). See Baldwin County
Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)
(granting plaintiII an additional three days Ior mailing pursuant to Rule 6).... Further, as
seen in the Anvui case, there is some argument respecting not eIIecting a lockout Ior at least
5 days where a lease has not expired by its terms, as Coughlin's arguably had not.
However, in his January 20th, 2012 Second Motion Ior Order to Show Cause, Richard
G. Hill, Esq. did not get all bogged down in legal research and stuII, instead he just pointed
out: "FACTS SHOWING CONTEMPT OF COURT 6. EXHIBIT 1 (the Summary Eviction
Lockout Order) was served on Coughlin on November 1, 2011 by the Washoe County
Sheriffs Department in its customary manner, by posting same on the front door of the
property in the manner customary for evictions in Washoe County. The locks to the
premises were changed at that time, thereby ejecting and dispossessing Coughlin oI
possession oI the Property." Hill went on to lie again in that January 20th, 2012 Motion
when he equated his oIIer to let Coughlin get some oI the personalty Coughlin was unable to
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remove, due largely to Hill Iailing to remove the chain link padlock Irom the backyard gate
that Hill had only just installed in time Ior the 13 hours Coughlin had to remove his property
in exchange Ior Coughlin waiving his rights to the $700 damage deposit Coughlin provided
upon moving in, where Hill spins it: "12. On Friday, December 23, 2011, Coughlin had a
crew oI helpers, and made progress. Nonetheless, Coughlin Iailed to remove all oI his
belongings Irom the Property. Coughlin Iailed to remove his things despite having been given
additional time to do so aIter the time set by the Reno Justice Court in its order oI
December 21, 2011 (EXHIBIT 2) had expired." Apparently, to Hill, at least one has " Iailed
to remove all oI his belongings Irom the Property. Coughlin Iailed to remove his things
despite having been given additional time to do so" where Hill threatens to have one arrested
Ior criminal trespass or larceny (oI their own stuII, arguably) iI one is on the property one
minute past 5 p.m., unless one waives any right to their damage deposit (which neither Hill
nor the Landlord eve did return, nor did they comply with the requirement that they provide
an itemized statement indicating an application thereoI justiIying such a Iailure to return such
deposit within 30 days....and Hill does not want to get into whether his conduct is violative oI
the FDCPA or whether he is licensed a as debt collector). In that Motion, Hill continued on:
"13. On December 30, 2011, Coughlin moved this Court Ior a temporary restraining order to
prevent Merliss Irom disposing oI the items he (Coughlin) had abandoned on the Property.
Coughlin's motion was Iully brieIed, and the Court entered its order denying the motion on
January 11, 2012. A true and correct copy oI this Court's January 11,2012 order is attached
hereto as EXHIBIT 3. 14. On Thursday, January 12, 2012, in accordance with EXHIBIT 2
and EXHIBIT 3, a licensed contractor hired by Merliss began cleaning up the Property and
disposing oI the abandoned items still remaining there. 15. Early that aIternoon, while the
contractor was hauling the Iirst oI several loads oI abandoned property to the transIer station
(dump) Ior disposal, Coughlin stopped the contractor in traIIic and attempted to prevent him
Irom carrying out his task. 16. SpeciIically, Coughlin stood in Iront oI the contractor's vehicle
in an eIIort to prevent him Irom proceeding to the transIer station. Coughlin threatened to sue
the contractor. Coughlin climbed up on the contractor's vehicle. Coughlin then called the
police and Ialsely told them that the contractor had stolen his possessions, and that the
contractor had tried to run him over. Coughlin's acts were speciIically calculated to prevent
the contractor Irom disposing oI the abandoned property, and to Irustrate and interIere with
Merliss' compliance with this Court's January 11, 2012 order. 17. When Mr. Hill oI the
undersigned's oIIice was notiIied oI the Ioregoing, he went to the transIer station and
presented EXHIBIT 2 and EXHIBIT 3 to the police. The contractor was then allowed to
proceed. 18. However, beIore the contractor could return to the River Rock Property,
Coughlin was there. He had his video camera and was walking up and down the street
screaming and yelling at the police, the contractor, and Mr. Hill, once Mr. Hill arrived. At the
instruction oI the police, Mr. Hill then obtained a temporary protective order ("TPO") again~t
Coughlin Irom the Reno Justice Court. Coughlin ended up being arrested and taken to jail
that day as a result oI his antics at the transIer station and the Property."
The thing is, and Coughlin would sure like to get the 911 tapes (or, more likely, with
Hill, any recordings that may exist oI Hill calling somebody in particular he may have had in
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mind with the RPD) oI calls by Coughlin (and iI Wal-Mart can call 911 over a candy bar, or a
skater board over an iPhone he seems to have set down on the concrete ground in downtown
Reno, then skaterboarded oII some 100 yards away Ior suIIiciently long period oI time to
seem to have been pretty much the only person not to have heard somebody who picked it up
threaten to throw it is in the river iI it went unclaimed can call 911 (and make up a bunch oI
lies on the spot Ior the purpose oI manipulating the police into assuages the skateboarders
own negligence vis a vis the iPhone) is it unreasonable Ior Coughlin to call 911 upon
happening, totally by chance, to cross paths with Hill's contractor while driving, catching site
oI a huge dump truck Iull oI Coughlin's personal property headed towards the town dump?
Hill admits the Order denying Coughlin's Motion Ior a TPO (and hey, Iamily heirlooms are
pretty Iungible, right? Who needs a TPO Ior that? And its not like the landlord could just
accept rent in the meantime, or that the property still remains unrented to this day, some 11
months aIter the lockout, and apparently, some $60,000 worth oI attorney's Iees paid to Hill
Ior a two bedroom home that appraises at around $90,000 currently, iI that. And Hill's
Iantastic legal work ("wrong site surgery" and all) was surely worth the risk oI a wrongIul
eviction lawsuit (and check out those potential damages under Winchell v. SchiII, 124 Nev.
938, 193 P.3d 946 (2008), not that the loss oI a patent attorney's career could amount to all
that much). Regardless, its not all that colorable Ior Hill to allege Coughlin was violating
some Order entered on January 11th, 2012 by Coughlin's conduct oI January 12th, 2012
when NRCP 6(e) provides that 3 days Ior mailing is to be accorded to account Ior the service
oI Iilings, even Iilings electronically served on registered eIilers like Coughlin. Its similar to
Hill wanting a criminal trespass arrest where NRCP 6(e)'s three days Ior mailing where no
personal service was accomplished (by way oI NRS 40.400) and Hill's et al did not even
comply with the constructive service requirements oI mailing the summary eviction lockout
order prior to Hill's breaking into Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice on November 1st, 2011,
with the help oI the WCSO, in violation oI Soldal v. Cook County where Coughlin was not
accorded the "24 hours" cushion aIter Coughlin's "receipt" oI the lockout order mentioned in
this Court's own packets on the service oI Lockout Orders, which Hill himselI attached as a
subsequent exhibit recently...It gets Iunnier. The civil division oI the Justice Court and the
SheriII's OIIice think that whole "within 24 hours" language in NRS 40.253 means "within
24 hours" oI the SheriII's "receipt" oI the Order Irom the Justice Court...While other's think it
is "within 24 hours" oI the tenant's receipt oI the Order Irom the SheriII...and this Court's
oIIicial Iorms and instructions seem to imply that "at least 24 hours" Irom "receipt" oI the
lockout Order must be accorded to a tenant. Who knows? But, it is not clear, as Hill
suggests, that the "usual custom and practice oI the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice" is black
letter law upon which Bar grievances, custodial criminal trespass arrests, multiple Motion Ior
Order To Show Cause, tens oI thousands oI dollars in attorney's Iees sanctions against a pro
se appellant, etc. are warranted. Somehow the District Court Iound a way to sanction
Coughlin with $40,050 worth oI attorney's Iee in that appeal oI the summary eviction without
holding a single hearing, well, other than the Hearing on Hills Order to Show Cause, which
was denied when Coughlin destroyed Hill's contractor Phil Stewart on cross-examination.
(Really, Phil? Really? You could Iell "a depression" in your 2 ton loaded to capacity dump
truck upon Coughlin allegedly "climbing up on it", though you indicated you had already
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"alighted Irom the vehicle", but, wait, you could see Coughlin's head above the tailgate walls
in your rear view mirror (which doesn't seem to be there on any the many videos oI the
events oI that day. And even iI such a mirror where present on Stewart's truck, that doesn't
really explain how all the personalty stacked up so high in the truck bed (replete with
specialized add-on high stack retaining walls) wouldn't obscure any purported view oI
Coughlin's head high above the area above the specialize hydraulic dump truck's tailgate,
conIirming Stewart's mere suspicion that Coughlin climbed on his truck. Coughlin swears
under oath he did not climb on Stewart's truck. Hill needed a little "Iact" to spice up his
Motion to Show Cause just enough, and "Coughlin climbed up on the truck" was "just the
ticket", and Stewart did not mind going along Ior the ride, so long as... And none oI the many
videos Irom that day actually show any oI the Yosemite Sam cartoon villian type behavior
Hill attributes to Coughlin in his wonderIully imaginative Motion Ior Order to Show Cause
and or Application Ior Order oI Protection concerning the events involved in the jaywalking
custodial arrest Hill had Coughlin subjected to on January 12th, 2012.
Much like Hill's contractor, Phil Stewart, Ilat out lying in an aIIidavit when he swore
Coughlin "climbed up on" his truck, Hill similarly lied in an aIIidavit about Coughlin,
apparently while "engraged" making "physical contact" with Hill. On Page 2 oI Hill's
AIIidavit attach to his Motion Ior Order to Show Cause, January 20th, 2012, Hills attests: "5.
On Friday, December 23, 2011, we unlocked the house at 9:00 a.m. as ordered. We
At approximately noon, my staII inIormed me that an enraged Mr. Coughlin had called the
I immediately went over and unlocked the back gate. Coughlin had a small crew. He charged
at me and made physical contact. He was enraged. We leIt. When we returned at 5:00 p.m.,
Mr. Coughlin was screaming and yelling obscenities. He drove oII in a small U -Haul. His
crew remained. We walked the property with them. The inside .ground Iloor was mostly
cleared oI all but a big TV. The basement had been cleared somewhat, but there was still a lot
oI "junk. " We could not access the attic. We went outside. I told Coughlin's crew they could
remove anything and everything outside, iI they would only try to rehang the gate that Mr.
Coughlin had taken oII the hinges beIore we could get over to unlock it. I told them I would
lock the gates in the morning.
That is really interesting. Compare the above to the Iollowing excerpt Irom page 3 oI
Hills January 3rd, 2012 Opposition in CV11-03628, the appeal oI the summary eviction
Order: "12. While at the property to remove the padlock, Coughlin, on more than one
occasion, screamed proIanities at Merliss' counsel, and, at one point, charged Mr. Hill and
attempted to physically intimidate him. At least the audio oI this incident was captured on
tape. 13. Nevertheless, at 5:00 p.m. on Friday, December 23,2011, counsel granted
Coughlin and his agents additional, unfettered, and unlimited access to the outside of
the property to remove any remaining items." Whereas in his January 20th, 2012 sworn
Declaration Hill goes so Iar as to indicate Coughlin "made physical contact" (which is a
damn lie anyways), in Hill's then associate Casey Baker, Esq.'s NRCP 11 signed January
3rd, 2012 Opposition, HIll's associate Baker will only go so Iar as to say that Coughlin, "at
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one point, charged Mr. Hill and attempted to physically intimidate him." Baker was standing
directly next to Hill during the interacation wherin Hill swore, under penalty oI perjury, that
Couglhin "made physical contact" with Hill). Sounds like Casey Baker, Esq. was not quite
willing to "spice up" the story line as Hill himselI was. Casey probably did not have enough
reason to sign on to the lies about Coughlin "climbing on" the contractor's truck. In Hill's
Application Ior a Protection Order against Coughlin Hill slips up and claims that Coughlin
was "climbing on the contractor's truck, picking through the contents" back at Couglin's
Iormer home law aIter the interaction at the "transIer station" (town dump), whereas Hill's
contractor indicated in his AIIidavit that the alleged "climbing" on his truck occurred at the
"transIer station". However, both Hill and his contractor, Phil Stewart indicate that the Reno
Police Department "requested" that Hill Iiled a Protection Order Application against
Coughlin. II that is true, its improper. The RPD can provide individuals inIormation about
seeking one, but when the RPD goes a step Iurther and starts urging individuals to Iile
protection order applications, or, as has recently been the case with RPD OIIicer Alan
Weaver and Sargent Oliver Miller, whom, upon inIormation and belieI, urged Northwind's
apartment maintenance man Milan Krebs to sign a Iraudulent criminal complaint against
Coughlin Ior "disturbing the peace" on July 3rd, 2011, and again urged Superior Mini
Storage's Matt Grant to sign a similar baseless "disturbing the peace" criminal Complaint
against Coughlin on approximately September 21st, 2012 then there is more than a little
indication that the RPD is out oI control and attempting to incite members oI the public to
sign Iraudulent criminal complaints based upon a retaliatory animus by the RPD towards
Coughlin. OIIicer Weaver and Sargent Dye showed up to an unnoticed July 5th, 2012 bail
hearing Ior Coughlin, presided over by Judge Linda Gardner's brother RMC Judge William
Gardner (whom received Coughlin's timely Notice oI Appeal oI the criminal trespass
conviction, under NRS 189.010, yet Iailed to Iorward it on to the District Court, which
somewhat recently dismissed Coughlin's appeal in that matter, wherein Sargent Dye and
OIIicer Weaver testiIied under oath, with City Attorney Jill Drake singing backup, the the
eIIectd that, despite bail only being valid based upon one reason in Nevada (to secure the
deIendant's attendance at trial) the "public health and saIety" dictated increasing the cash
required to bail out Couglin TENFOLD, Irom a bondable $1,415 to a CASH ONLY $3,000.
Consequently, upon Judge Gardner so impermissibly raising Coughlin's bail, alleging a
"public health and saIety" rationale Ior so doing, Couglin was Iorced to spend 18 days in jail,
wherein the opportunity to timely contest the $40,050 attorney Iees award to Richard Hill
incident to the summary eviction appeal ran, all while Coughlin was denied any opportunity
to access justice or Iile documents Irom jail, and where Coughlin sustained signIicant
damages, Iinancial and otherwise, and where the jail reIused to transport Coughlin to a
hearing on a landlord tenant matter wherein he was a named party. The extent to which local
law enIorcement is willing to play "kick the can" with an attorney, particularly where Bar
Counsel Pat King is so willing to join the chorus, is troubling, and indicates the judiciary
need issue a clarion call out to announce the extent to which such misconduct can not, and
will not, be tolerated. Such a retaliatory animus towards Coughlin by the RPD is likely due
to his September 7th, 2011 Complaint with respect to a wrongIul, retaliatory, and Iraudulent
arrest by RPD OIIicer Nicholas Duralde, which was accompanied by extortionate threats by
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RPD OIIicer Ron Rosa that iI Coughlin didn't cooperate they would "call the Nevada Bar and
let them know how you cooperated with our investigation. How's that runnin' Ior ya?"
While Duralde testiIied that he did not hear or recall Rosa's coercive threats to Coughlin just
prior to the arrest, the Iact that Duralde echoed those threats by saying "Now, I can arrest you
Ior larceny. Now, I can do a search incident to arrest. How's that?" tends to undermine
Duralde's contention that "he doesn't recall" hearing anything like what OIIicer Rosa was
capture on tape saying to Coughlin just prior to the arrest. Upon making a Fourth
Amendment violating arrest completely lacking in probable cause, and smugly "joking" to
Coughlin about the "beneIits" associated with charging Coughlin with a "Ielony", (at the time
oI the August 20th, 2011 arrest, the Ielony larceny amount limit was $250 and above)
compared to a misdemeanor (under some halI baked "grand larceny" oI an allegedly lost or
mislaid or abandoned three year old iPhone 3G that the alleged victim testiIied was only then
worth "about $80-100" on eBay or Craigslist), ie, search incident to custodial arrest possible
where probable cause lacking to arrest, or even reasonable suspicion missing to do a pat
down, where alleged crime occured outside oIIicer's presence, aIter 7 p.m., and no citizens
arrest immediately eIIectuated, particularly where Coughlin himselI made a 911 call prior to
OIIicer's arriving and where video Irom minutes prior to oIIicer arriving reveal Coughlin
suggesting the 8-12 hostile late teens to early twenties skater boarders relax, stay peaceIul,
reIrain Irom assaulting and battering Couglin, and wait Ior the police arrive so a lawIul,
peaceIul resolution could be attained (with Coughlin even cautioning the youths about a then
recent tragic death occurring not Iar Irom that location).
Further Hill just Ilat out lies in his January 3rd, 2012 Opposition to Amended Motion
Ior Emergency Restraining Order. Well, he did tell the truth when he wrote, on page 3: "11.
On Friday, December 23,2011, counsel Ior Merliss neglected to remove the padlock to the
back gate oI the property." That is true, he did do that, and it did prevent Coughlin Irom
removing all his property during the scant 13 hours Coughlin had to move it. But, when Hill
swears, on page 3, that: "Coughlin's access to the house itselI was never hindered.:" he is just
"sippin' drank" or something, as, obviously Iailing to remove a lock on a gate gonna tend to
have that eIIect, now...and when Hill swears: " 13. Nevertheless, at 5:00 p.m. on Friday,
December 23,2011, counsel granted Coughlin and his agents additional, unIettered, and
unlimited access to the outside oI the property to remove any remaining items. The only
condition placed on that access was that Coughlin's helpers agreed to replace the gate on its
hinges as best they could. Coughlin and his agents Iailed to remove the remainder oI
Coughin's property Irom the yard that night, and Iailed to put the gate back on the hinges."
Coughlin was never made aware oI any such "oIIer" by Hill, and, even iI he had been, hey,
it's the "outside oI the property", Rich, people generally put their valuables insiae, you know?
Then the Hill prevarication and obIuscation express kicks into overdrive, when, in his
January 3rd, 2012 Opposition to Amended Emergency Motion Ior Temporary Restraining
Order" (which is a bastardization oI the original title to Coughlin's 12/30/11 Iiling, which
actually included within the caption thereoI "or, in the alternative, Motion Ior Stay") he
continues on (MROA 2109-2110; with the portion oI the landlord's Answering BrieI oI
2/24/12 included thereaIter Ior a comparison oI the lack oI a response Iorm Merliss to
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Coughlin's citations to NRS 40.385 and moving Ior a stay in the trial court on 11/23/11 and
XXXXXXXXXXXXX; Iurther, it is importnant to note that Merliss moved Ior attorney's
Iees in multiple Iilings (including that oI 1/3/12) prior to again moving Ior recompense Ior
the exact same Iees in connection with the exact same work in his 4/19/13 Motion Ior
Attorney's Fees, despite the Iact that the 12/21/11 (in the trial court), 1/11/12 , 3/27/12, and
3/30/12 Orders all Iailed to award attorney's Iees (see MROA 2108:10-18, 2185-86, 89, ): "C.
Coughlin is Not Entitled to A Stay Coughlin claims to have deposited $250 with the
justice's court pursuant to NRS 40.385, although he has not provided any prooI in support oI
his claim. Attached hereto as EXHIBIT 10 is a true and correct copy oI the justice's court's
docket as oI December 19, 2011. That docket shows that Coughlin paid a Iiling Iee Ior his
appeal on December 12, 2011, in the amount oI $216.00." (Coughlin's Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis and Declaration in Support thereoI oI 10/19/11 in CV11-03051 suIIices to
"perIect" Coughlin's appeal to whatever extent Judge SIerrazza's 10/6/11 Order granting
Coughlin IFP statuts or his 10/25/11 Order rendered waiving the Iiling Iees Ior his appeal did
not) Well, actually, Judge SIerrazza waived the Justice Court's $24.00 Iiling Iee, and the
$216.00 represents the District Court's Iiling Iee, and its not really clear whether that date is
when the check was cashed by the District Court, or whether the Justice Court held on to the
check Ior quite awhile beIore shipping it along with the ROA to the District Court, etc., etc.
Hill continues: "It is entirely unclear Irom the Iollowing entries oI that docket whether or
when Coughlin ever paid an additional $250.00 under NRS 40.385." That might, technically
be true, Rich, to the extent that you wrote it on January 3rd, 2012, and are sneakily indicating
that you are looking at an old docket Irom the Justice Court Irom December 19th, 2012, even
though Coughlin made a big deal to you and the Justice Court, in writing, that he was
depositing the $250.00 supersedeas bond mentioned in NRS 40.385, on December 22nd,
2011, a Iact which Hill himselI mentions in his own Iilings...So, kind oI a lack oI candor to
the tribunal there to make all this argument based upon some old docket and the extent to
which it Iails to reveal or "make clear" matters to which Hill had ready written notice oI via
his own e-Flex account and service oI Iilings upon him connected thereto, in addition to
Coughlin's Iaxes, emails, and there might have even been a service oI a Notice oI Posting
Supersedeas Bond (need to check on that more), etc. in connection with the depositing on
December 22nd 2012, the $250 required Ior a stay during appeal oI a summary eviction in
NRS 40.385. And, actually, Hill slipped up a bit there, in light oI the Iollowing: And,
actually, Hill, in his January 20th, 2012 Iiling, admitted that Coughlin sent him that
December 22nd, 2011 email notiIying him oI the posting oI the $250 supersedeas bond
seeking a stay, when he admits, on page 3: "11. Pursuant to EXHIBIT 2, Coughlin was
provided access to the Property on Thursday, December 22, 2011. That day, Coughlin sent
an email to the undersigned and 1udge Sferrazza, in which he essentially announced
that he was entitled to a stay, and to return to and continue in possession of the
Property. 1udge Sferrazza quickly responded by email, and reminded Mr. Coughlin
that the stay had been denied." Found in Exhibit 1 is the December 22nd email to Hill's
OIIice that alerts them to the posting oI $250 , speciIied as a "supersedeas bond", with a
citation to NRS 40.385:
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Hill's January 3rd, 2012 Opposition continues, on page 8: "Even iI Coughlin
eventually paid some amount toward an appeal bond, it was not in time to stay the eviction
during this appeal. To do that, a proper motion must be made and granted, and the bond
posted, prior to the lockout. The lockout here occurred on November 1, 2011. By the time
Coughlin managed to Iind that statute and pay any money to the court, he had been locked
out oI the property Ior six weeks. As such, any request Ior a stay was, and is, moot. At this
point, Coughlin does not have any rights in either the real or personal". Oddly, Anvui saw a
stay granted aIter a lockout was conducted, and Hill (RPC 3.1 "meritorious contention"
issues) cites to no legal authority Ior his contention that "to stay the eviction during this
appeal...a proper motion must be made and granted, and the bond posed, prior to the
lockout." Citation? None.
Despite Hill's strange approach oI not actually indicating that his oIIice did not get an
December 22nd, 2011 email notiIying them oI the posting oI $250 Ior a supersedeas bond
seeking a stay under NRS 118A.385 (but rather, Hill Iocuses on what one cannot glean Irom
looking at a dated docket...), Hill's OIIice was made aware oI such matters, in writing, in the
Iollowing December 22nd email to Hill's OIIiee: "...Further, this is all moot at this point as I
have Iiled a Supersedeas Bond of $250, and according to NRS 40.385, I automatically get
a stay of eviction and am entitled to return to the property and continue in possession.
The statute sets the Supersedeas Bond (which yields a stay) at $250 if rent is under
$1000, unless the Court wishes to rule that I am a commercial tenant. However, if the
court does rule that I am a commercial tenant, the No Cause Eviction Notice in this
case, under NRS 40.253 makes a Summary Eviction Proceeding impermissible, as
Summary Eviction Proceedings are not allowed against commercial tenants where only
a No Cause Eviction Notice is filed. Its one or the other, but Mr. Hill and Baker cannot
have it both ways. Further, the Courts Order of December 21, 2011 is just that, and
Order, its not an agreement, its not a settlement, etc, etc. and the audio record clearly
reflects that. NRS 40.385 Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who retains
possession of premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal from an order entered
pursuant to NRS 40.253: 1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of
execution may be obtained by filing with the trial court a bond in the amount of $250 to
cover the expected costs on appeal. In an action concerning a lease of commercial
property or any other property Ior which the monthly rent exceeds $1,000, the court may,
upon its own motion or that oI a party, and upon a showing oI good cause, order an additional
bond to be posted to cover the expected costs on appeal. A surety upon the bond submits to
the jurisdiction oI the appellate court and irrevocably appoints the clerk oI that court as the
surety's agent upon whom papers aIIecting the surety's liability upon the bond may be served.
Liability oI a surety may be enIorced, or the bond may be released, on motion in the appellate
court without independent action. 2. A tenant who retains possession oI the premises that are
the subject oI the appeal during the pendency oI the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in
the amount provided in the underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it
becomes due. II the tenant Iails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new proceedings
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Ior a summary eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253.
Sincerely, Zach Coughlin, Esq.".
Oh, and Hill and Stewart admit to this in a video. Richard Hill's contractor, Ior some
strange reason, removed a ladder Coughlin owns Irom the property, preventing Coughlin's
access to the attic upon his being allowed that scant 13 hours to remove his property (and the
attic had been renovated to allow Ior storage oI a considerable amount oI property. II
Coughlin was Hill he would have called the RPD to report the "larceny" oI his ladder by Hill,
in a RICO thing with his contractor. But Hill escaped prosecution that time, over they whole
ladder deal. It never was made clear why the contractor removed the ladder Irom the
property, other than, perhaps, like the applying oI a lock to the backyard gate, make it even
more unlikely that Coughlin would be able to remove all he needed to, especially given the
limited Iunds Ior moving vehicles and hired help, in the scant 13 hours allowed under the
December 21st, 2012 Order.
The Iact that the criminal trespass custodial arrest occurred at a time when Coughlin still had
not received back the $2,275 "rent escrow" the Reno Justice Court Iorced Coughlin to deposit
with the RJC in that very summary eviction proceeding/"Trial" (all while Coughlin was, at
least according to Hill, supposed to hire movers and rent a U-Haul and otherwise have
suIIicient Iunds to conduct a large scale move oI a home law oIIice aIter having just gone
Irom zero to expert on landlord tenant law litigating a "Trial" Ior a law oIIice tenant in a
matters oI days...). Coughlin made such a deposit or $2,275 "rent escrow" with the RJC on
October 17th, 2011 (aIter the October 13th, 2011 summary eviction hearing in Rev2011-
001708 wherein the RJC Judge ruled that Coughlin "had established a material issue oI Iact"
as to retaliation and habitability (and perhaps discrimination, that is not clear) and set a
"Trial" (but only iI Coughlin deposited $2,275 in a "rent escrow" account with the RJC by
October 17th, 2011) Ior October 25th, 2011 (despite a "Trial" under JCRCP 109 requiring 20
days to respond to a Complaint, under NRS 40.251, ie, a plenary unlawIul detainer action
with all the attendant due process trimmings). Further, the Summary Eviction Order
stemming Irom the October 25th, 2011 "Trial" (it was noticed as a "Trial" in writing by the
Court, reIerred to as a Trial by the Court) and the accompanying criminal trespass conviction
stemming thereIrom are likely void do to the Iact that Coughlin Iiled, on October 18th, 2011
a Notice oI Appeal (on a Iorm that, by the way, indicated McLaughlin's exposure Ior any
attorney's Iee award would be limited to $15.00, much less the $40,050 ultimately entered
against Coughlin in an attorney's Iee sanction in CV11-03628 by Judge Patrick Flanagan.
That Notice oI Appeal Iorm was provided to Coughlin by a Clerk oI the RJC in response to a
speciIic request by Coughlin Ior the Iorm to appeal the Order stemming Irom his October
13th, 2011 summary eviction proceeding, and the Iorms on the RJC web site at the time,
under a heading oI "Notice oI Appeal" linked to that same Iorm, and did not in any way
speciIy such Iorm to only apply to appeals oI small claims actions). Coughlin's Iiling oI a
Notice oI Appeal oI that October 13th, 2011 Order Iollowing the summary eviction
proceeding, under Mack v. Mack-Manley, divested any jurisdiction oI the RJC to hold such
a "Trial" on October 25th, 2011, and any such "Trial" was void Ior lack oI jurisdiction
anyway, NRCP 60(b)(4) in light oI the dictates oI NRS 40.253(6) ("shall make no Iurther
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Order" upon the Justice Court Iinding tenant had established a genuine issue oI material Iact,
which Judge SIerrazza indicated Coughlin had in his Order Iollowing the October 13th, 2011
summary eviction proceeding, and again, on the record, during the October 25th, 2011 Trial,
Judge SIerrazza again stated that he set the matter Ior "Trial" upon his making a "Iinding that
Coughlin established a genuine issue oI material Iact", which, under Anvui, and NRS
40.253(6), prevented Judge SIerrazza Irom making any Iurther order, and the lack oI a
corollary to Las Vegas Justice Court Rule 44 in the RJC, along with the dictates against
unwritten/not approved by the Nevada Supreme Court and counter to express statutory
mandates in NRS 118A and NRS 40 "house rules" set Iorth in JCRCP 83 should have
prevented Iorcing Coughlin to make any "rent escrow" deposit oI $2,275 right in the middle
(actually aIter it should have ended) oI a summary eviction proceeding.
JCRCP RULE83.RULES BY JUSTICE COURTS
Each justice or justice court in a township with more than one justice,
by action oI a majority oI the justices thereoI, may Irom time to time
make and amend the rules governing its practices not inconsistent
with these rules. Copies oI rules and amendments so made by any
justice court shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the
Supreme Court, but shall not become effective until after
approval by the Supreme Court and publication. In all cases not
provided for by these rules the justice courts may regulate their
practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.
Further, any "Trial" in that summary eviction matter, and thereIore
any criminal trespass arrest based upon any Iailure to properly adhere
to some improperly served Lockout Order stemming thereIrom, is
also void in light oI the noncompliance with JCRCP 109: SETTING
OF TRIAL IN ACTIONS
"(a)In no case shall a trial on the merits be set less than 20
calendar days aIter service oI summons and complaint."
To continue the temporary suspension oI Coughlin's constitutionally
protected (under the Fourteenth Amendment, a law license is a "property right")
law license based upon conjecture, hearsay, Pat King's "innocent" mistakes
about "Iacts" and various orders so terribly subject to being Iound void under
NRCP 60(b)(4), etc. and a criminal trespass conviction similarly suspect,
particularly where Coughlin's Iilings
Further, Judge SIerrazza admitted that the RJC did not have a rule Ior
Iorcing Coughlin to make such a "rent escrow" deposit at the time such was
ordered on October 13th, 2011 in the summary eviction proceeding. And even
iI the RJC did have such a rule speaking to "deposits" with the RJC, JCRRT
Rule 2 makes clear that such a rule does not apply to "landlord tenant matters":
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JCRRT Rule 2. Application oI Rules. Except as otherwise provided
by statue, these rules apply to all civil proceedings Iiled in Reno
Township except small claims and landlord tenant matters.
Oh, and Hill still managed to get Coughlin subject to the November 13th, 2011
custodial arrest (ie custodial have someone with color oI law make you strip naked and
spread your buttocks search incident to arrest, and even apparently allow a complete copying
and, some times "erasing" oI one's smart phone, separate micro sd data card, or laptop
pursuant to such a "search incident to arrest"...like what occurred on February 27th, 2012
incident to the traIIic citation trial beIore RMC Judge Nash Holmes (whom told Coughlin she
would have him arrested iI he said Richard G. Hill's name one more time) in 11 TR 26800 2I
stemming Irom the three traIIic citations RPD Sargent John Tarter called in a diIIerent RPD
OIIicer to issue Coughlin incident to Coughlin being told to leave Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s law
oIIice where Coughlin had gone (upon being released Irom jail on November 15th, 2011) to
retrieve his keys, wallet, state issued identiIication and client's Iiles Irom Hill, whom reIused
to provide such items to Coughlin, upon Coughlin being bailed oI jail aIter spending three
days there in connection with the criminal trespass arrest connected to the criminal
Complaint signed by Richard G. Hill, Esq. At that February 27th, 2012 traffic citation Trial
in RMC 11 TR 26800 (and not even some juicy reckless driving thing, just a plain old
"Iailure to come to a complete stop at a stop sign/CaliIornia Roll/Boulevard Stop traIIic
ticket"), Coughlin was sentenced to Iive days jail, denied a stay (despite being a practicing
attorney with actual clients depending upon him) by RMC Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes
seconds aIter Coughlin testiIied that RPD Sargent Tarter "lied" during his testimony
concerning what Coughlin's purported to be a retaliatory issuance oI multiple traIIic citations
incident to Coughlin repeating to Tarter what may have been a sarcastic repose to Coughlin
by RPD OIIicer Chris Carter during the criminal trespass arrest Irom Coughlin's Iormer home
law oIIice just days prior, when Coughlin queried Carter iI he, too, was on Hill's payroll.
.Coughlin did report to City Attorney Allison Ormaas during a brieI plea bargaining session
immediately beIore the Trial that RPD OIIicer Carter made a statement (perhaps said
sarcastically while arresting an attorney Ior criminal trespass where the RPD reIused to issue
a citation or identiIy themselves as law enIorcement prior storming in Coughlin's Iormer law
oIIice's "basement", where a stay is mandated under NRS 118A.380, where one's rent is less
than $1,000 and damages awarded are nil, Ior no more than a $250 deposit, at a time when
Coughlin had yet to be returned the $2,275 impermissible "rent escrow" deposit Iorced upon
him in a summary eviction) that "Richard Hill pays me a lot oI money so I arrest who he says
to arrest and do what he says to do" upon Coughlin asking Carter iI he, too, was on Richard
G. Hill's payroll. It appears that at some point, perhaps while they were whispering in each
other's ears (as Coughlin noted on the record during the Trial in 11 TR 26800) during the
Trial that Marshal and City Attorney Ormaas were aIraid Coughlin may have some evidence
oI Ormaas's admitting to Coughlin that she was in no way going to Iollowing up on an
statements by an RPD OIIicer that may tend to present and admission oI accepting some
improper beneIit in exchange Ior committing oIIicial misconduct under color oI law, or
otherwise document such inIormation. The RMC's Marshal Harley seemed to be upset about
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the possibility that Coughlin may have some evidence oI Harley purporting to personally
serve Coughlin the Order to Show Cause in CV11-03628 (and Machen's AIIidavit oI Service
Iiled March 8th, 2012 indicates Machen "personally served" Coughlin, which not the case, as
apparently Machen did not want to wait around Ior a Iew minutes Ior Coughlin's bargaining
session with City Attorney Ormaas to end, which means Machen was cutting a corner, which
is something courts and local law enIorcement punish ordinary citizens Ior every day in
Washoe County. When Marshal Harley began to realize Coughlin's questions to him were
revealing some questionable issue (so, you don't know whoat WCSO Deputy handed you this
Order to Show Cause? You have no idea? You didn't recognize him at all? Did he
"personally serve" me it, or did you, Marshal Harley? Why is this even being personally
served? And why while I am attending court on a totally unrelated matter? Is that proper? Is
that somewhat hostile and done in an attempt to embarass Coughlin at the courthouse? Is that
appropriate? Is there even a rule requiring such an "Order to Show Cause" be personally
served"? Have not Iound one yet...Especially where Coughlin was a registerd eIiler at the
time, and thereIore, likely had already been deemed served. Where the subsequent AIIidavit
oI Service theIore indicated it was actually the same WCSO Deputy Machen having
"personally served" such Notice on Coughlin, along with some impromptu questioning oI
Harley as to whether such service was being done bas To the extent City oI Reno Marshal
Harley barged in to that bargaining session purporting to personally serve Coughlin Notice oI
a Hearing and or Order to Show Cause in connection with Hill's Motion Ior Order to Show
Cause in the appeal oI the summary eviction matter (which resulted in a quadruple jeopardy
cocktail courtesy oI Hill, based largely upon the same acts which resulted in Coughlin being
arrested Ior "jaywalking", and Hill getting a TPO, and Bar Counsel Pat King making a
Iederal case oI Hill's January 13th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin submitted to the SBN,
wherein Hill leads oII with an allegation that Coughlin was "ghostwriting Ior" someone Ior
whom Coughlin was listed as attorney of recora. Huh? Then Hill went to "comply with his
RPC 8.3 obligation" by reporting the conviction underpinning the current temporary
suspension (something Coughlin himselI reported in compliance with SCR 111 prior to any
knowledge oI Hill's having done so, not that Bar Counsel bothered to mention that in its SCR
111 Petition, something this Court made note oI a lack thereoI in its June 7th, 2012 Order).
Incidentally, RPD Sargent Monica Lopez admitted during a videotaped interview that
neither she nor her Iellow oIIice, Carter, identiIied themselves as law enIorcement while
calling to Coughlin at the basement door prior to the landlord opening it, nor requested or
warned Coughlin to leave the property prior to arresting him Irom criminal trespass Irom
Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice on November 13th, 2011...despite Hill testiIying under
oath that they did so identiIy themselves prior to the landlord opening the "basement" door
and that the RPD OIIicer did issue a warning to leave to Coughlin or otherwise provide
Coughlin a chance to heed such a warning prior to eIIecting a custodial arrest. What makes
that even more troubling is the Iact that Hill provided the City oI Reno prosecutors video oI
pretty much all events other than the "knock and identiIy themselves" as law enIorcement
Hill purports the RPD did (even where RPD Sargent Lopez indicates neither she nor OIIicer
Carter did so identiIy themselves prior to the basement door being opened by the landlord).
Amongst the videos that Hill Iilmed on November 13th, 2011 that Hill did manage to provide
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to City oI Reno prosecutors was a video oI Coughlin asking OIIicer Carter and Sargent
Tarter, prior to the point oI arrest, why, iI they Ielt he was trespassing, they wouldn't simply
issue a citation in lieu oI making a custodial arrest. Hill's own video establishes that Hill's
testimony during the criminal trespass matter is extremely problematic respecting whether
the RPD identiIied themselves prior to the landlord opening the door and whether the RPD
issued Coughlina warning to leave and opportunity to heed it prior to eIIecting a custodial
criminal trespass arrest. Hill had Coughlin arrested Ior criminal trespass, even where
Coughlin had to pay Ior "storage" the same amount, $480 as the Lease Agreement required
Ior "Iull rental value Ior Iull use and occupancy oI the premises" Ior 17 days oI "storage" oI
Coughlin's personal property, and even where NRS 108.475 and NRS 40.760 indicate a
summary eviction is required where one is "using a storage Iacility as a residence" (iI that
was the case, which has not been established), not a criminal trespass arrest, particularly
where RPD OIIicer Chris Carter, in violating Soldal v. Cook County, expounded to Coughlin
upon his learned views on "service" oI eviction orders like some modern day Friedenthal.
Then there is the Iact that Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice was robbed oI approximately
$8,000 worth oI personalty on December 12th, 2011 (during the six week wait Ior a Hearing
on Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien, again, because, according to Hill,
the RJC was going to postpone setting any such hearing until Hill's six week vacation was
over, despite the statutory dictate that such a hearing be set within 10 days oI Coughlin's
November 16th, 2011 Iiling oI a Motion to Contest Personal Proeprty Lien). The December
21st, 2011 Order on Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien required Coughlin
to rush into his Iormer home law oIIice, and take in the specter oI it having been torn asunder
and robber, with a chortling Richard G. Hill, Esq. standing on Iilming the occasion, and
quickly throw together an "inventory oI anything lost, stolen or damaged", then hop over to
Kinko's or some wi-Ii and email the RJC with such an inventory, copying Hill in the process.
Even though the statutes in Nevada are amongst the harshest towards tenants compared to the
other 49 states, the RJC, Washoe County SheriII's OIIice, Reno Police Department, and
landlords like Dr. Matthew Joel Merliss, MD (a Chico, Ca. based neurosurgeon whom
graduated Irom Beverly Hills HS) and their attorney (or, their unauthorized practice oI law
committing "eviction consulting and process service" company, like Nevada Court Services)
really go the extra mile in making Nevada a very dangerous, and perhaps, lethal, place to be a
tenant. Oh, and the Judge Iinding Coughlin guilty oI the Reno Municipal Code's version oI
criminal trespass, RMC Judge William Garnder, Iound support Ior the "when on property
with an intent to vex and annoy" the owner oI a property version oI criminal trespass where
the Judge and prosecution also maintained that Coughlin was "secretly" going on the
property (apparently Coughlin was haunting the subconscious oI the property owner where
the prosecution did not have support Ior the "Iailed to leave aIter being warned to do so"
version oI criminal trespass in RMC 8.10.010 is also the brother oI the Family Court Judge
Linda Gardner whose April 2009 Order Ior Sanctions oI Coughlin incident to Coughlin's
service Ior legal aid organizations Washoe Legal Services as a domestic violence attorney
was cited as the "sole reason" Ior Washoe Legal Service Iiring Coughlin, and which Iormed
the basis Ior Coughlin's Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus challenging said Order Ior Sanctions
in 54844 and whom admitted, on the record, in the case Ilowing Irom Coughlin's criminal
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trespass arrest, in RMC 11 CR 26405, that he "passed along" to his Iellow RMC Judge Nash
Holmes "his own sister's" over three years old Order Ior Sanctions ($1,000 attorney's Iee
award personally payable by Coughlin under NRS 7.085 despite Coughlin's citing to an ALR
article demonstrating the position he maintained to be the majority viewpoint in Amercian
jurisprudence, ie, no setting oII "duty" such as alimony Ior unsecured third party credit card
debt where other spouse is sole signatory. A Iar Ilung doctrine oI the necessaries threat by
various unsecured debt holders, where none oI the debts are likely large enough to engender
much litigation, hardly makes vexatious a Iailure to agree to John Springgate's proposed
marital settlement agreement
. RMC Judge William Gardner reIused to recuse himselI Irom Coughlin's criminal trespass
trial despite acknowleding that he was aware that his passing on his sister's 2009 Order Ior
Sanctions to Judge Nash Holmes had resulted in a grievance being Iiled with the SBN, based
upon his sister's Order Ior Sanctions, upon Judge Nash Holmes Iorwarding said Order onto
the SBN. Bar Counsel King issued that "grievance" based upon Judge Linda Gardner's 2009
Order Ior Sanctions its own case number, yet has continued to reIuse to speciIy how that case
came to be, who Iiled the grievance based upon that Order, or in any other way indicated that
such grievance came to be other than an immaculate conception oI sorts.
CONCLUSION
Please expunge this SCR 111(4) petition and the SCR 105 Complaint currently
stemming Irom this wrongIul eviction and or grant this Motion Ior New Trial or Vacate the
Judgement oI Conviction and or reinstate Coughlin's appeal and apprise D10 in CR12-1262 oI
Coughlin's timely Iiling a notice oI appeal on June 28th, 2012 and timely serving the City
Attorney. DeIendant/Appelant Coughlin hereby respectIully requests all Orders, Convictions,
Judgments, Contempt Findings, etc, be amended, set aside, etc.
(But Iirst some law...) "II the trial court lacks jurisdiction, the appellate court has jurisdiction
only to vacate the judgment oI the trial court and dismiss the cause.|FN5| Indeed, where a
trial court enters judgment without jurisdiction, the judgment is void and the appellate court
acquires jurisdiction only to determine the invalidity oI the judgment and to dismiss the
appeal.|FN6| However, the view has been expressed that where a party alleges that the trial
court lacks jurisdiction to consider a cause oI action, it is the duty oI the appellate court to
examine the case and determine whether the allegation is meritorious, and iI the appellate
court Iinds that the trial court did lack jurisdiction, the appellate court may be required to
vacate the trial court's judgment with regard to the cause oI action but is not required to
dismiss the appeal Ior lack oI jurisdiction beIore the appellate court. FN7. |FN5| Allen v.
Day, 213 S.W.3d 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, (Dec. 27, 2006); Kerr v. Harris
County, 177 S.W.3d 290 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2005). |FN6| Richardson v. Jallen
Investment Group, Inc., 140 S.W.3d 112 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2004). |FN7| Brown v. Duncan,
361 Ill. App. 3d 125, 296 Ill. Dec. 663, 836 N.E.2d 78, 202 Ed. Law Rep. 735 (1st Dist.
2005)." 5 AMJUR Appellate Review 2d 807. Lack oI appellate jurisdiction.
Ala.,2009. Williamson v. Fourth Ave. Supermarket, Inc. 12 So.3d 1200:'"|1| 'On
questions oI subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court is not limited by the parties' arguments or
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by the legal conclusions oI the trial and intermediate appellate courts regarding the existence
oI jurisdiction. Rather, we are obligated to dismiss an appeal iI, Ior any reason, jurisdiction
does not exist. See Ex parte Smith, 438 So.2d 766, 768 (Ala.1983) (Lack oI subject-matter
jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties and it is the duty oI an appellate court to
consider lack oI subject-matter jurisdiction ex mero motu. ` (citing City oI Huntsville v.
Miller, 271 Ala. 687, 688, 127 So.2d 606, 608 (1958))). Ex parte Alabama Dep't oI Human
Res., 999 So.2d 891, 894-95 (Ala.2008).
Since when is seeking to enjoin the RJC Irom exceeding its jurisdiction to hold a
criminal trial where NRS 178.405's mandatory stay upon a Iellow RJC department (where
written notice thereoI was provided) requires staying "all proceedings" in all departments oI
the RJC "until the question oI competence is determined" so very conIusing suIIicient to
justiIy striking Coughlin's 4/2/13 Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus ("The document in question
Iails to state a rational claim upon which the Court can rule. Further, the document does not
direct the Court to the Iactual and/or legal grounds upon which the document should be
considered. Indeed, the Court is unclear what is being sought by way oI the Iiling oI the
document.")? Page 1 oI Coughlin's 4/2/13 Emergency Petition Ior Writ seems to plainly state
" a rational claim upon which the Court can rule" and "directs the Court the the Iactual an
legal grounds upon which the document should be considered" where it reads: "moves this
Court Ior a Writ requiring the RJC to stay all proceedings in the RJC prosecuting Coughlin
and abide by Judge Pearson's 2/5/13 Order For Competency Evaluation in RCR2011-063341
and vacate whatever Order "Sua Sponte" "Amending" such order, which was only made in
violation oI NRS 178.405,upon DDA Young and Judge CliIton encouraging Judge Pearson
to violate NRS 178.405, which in itselI is a violation, and Judge Pearson reIused to/Iailed to
rebut the inIerence made by the questions Coughlin asked him directed to whether he decision
to suddenly reconsider his Order Ior Competency Evaluation an hour beIore was the result oI
any prompting Irom DDA Young or Judge CliIton and whether he and Judge CliIton
discussed Coughlin in any way during the recess Judge CliIton ordered upon being presented,
in a copy oI the 2/5/13 Order Ior Competency Evaluation entered by Judge Pearson an hour
beIore the continuation oI the trial in rcr12-065630 beIore Judge CliIton..."
Coughlin's 4/2/13 Emergency Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus is hardly unclear in its
desire to have the criminal trial Judge CliIton sought to Iorge Iorward with despite the
mandatory stay required by NRS 178.405 upon Judge Pearson's entering an Order For
Competency Evaluation on 2/5/13 just prior to the continuation oI the trial beIore Judge
CliIton minutes later.
some related judicial excesses vis a vis NRS 178.405 in Nevada:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?vXZFUBwgZGzE
We have considered some issues related to competency hearings where an "important
legal issue needs clariIication." Sims v. Dist. Ct., 125 Nev. 126, 129, 206 P.3d 980, 982
(2009). See Fergusen, 124 Nev. at 805, 192 P.3d at 719; Calvin v. State, 122 Nev. 1178, 147
P.3d 1097 (2006); Morales v. State, 116 Nev. 19, 22, 922 P.2d 252, 254 (2000); NRS
178.405;
"NRS 178.405 Suspension oI trial or pronouncement oI judgment when doubt arises as
to competence oI deIendant... 1. Any time...iI doubt arises as to the competence oI the
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deIendant, the court shall suspend the proceedings, the trial or the pronouncing of the
judgment, as the case may be, until the question of competence is determined.
2. II the proceedings, the trial or the pronouncing oI the judgment are suspended, the
court must notify any other departments of the court of the suspension in writing. Upon
receiving such notice, the other departments oI the court shall suspend any other proceedings
relating to the deIendant until the defendant is determined to be competent."
Judge Sattler's 4/3/13 Order striking Coughlin's 4/2/13 Emergency Petition Ior Writ oI
Mandamus seeking to enjoin the RJC Irom holding a trial in violation oI NRS 178.405 reads:
"ORDER Case No. CR13-0552 Dept. No. 10 The Court is in receipt oI an "Emergency
Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus and IPF MOTION and Declaration oI Poverty" (hereinaIter,
''the document")(emphasis and varying Iont in the original) Iile stamped April 2, 2013. The
document in question fails to state a rational claim upon which the Court can rule.
Further, the document does not direct the Court to the factual and/or legal grounds upon
which the document should be considered. Indeed, the Court is unclear what is being
sought by way of the filing of the document. The document Iails to Iollow numerous
applicable District Court Rules (hereinaIter, "D.C.R.") and local rules (hereinaIter, "WDCR").
See generally, D.C.R. 12, D.C.R. 13, WDCR 10, and WDCR 12. But see, WDCR 18 (the
Court does not believe that WDCR 18 authorizes the complete abandonment of all of the
other rules in criminal matters). D.C.R. 5 states in Iull: These rules shall be liberally
construed to secure the proper and eIIicient administration oI the business and aIIairs oI the
court and to promote and Iacilitate the administration oI justice by the court. These rules
cover the practice and procedure in all actions in the district courts oI all districts where no
local rule covering the same subject has been approved by the supreme court. Local rules
which are approved for a particular judicial district shall be applied in each instance
whether they are the same as or inconsistent with these rules. It is the Court's conclusion
that the document is in violation oI D.C.R. 5. The Court also Iinds that the petitioner has
Iailed to qualiIy to represent himselI pursuant to S.C.R. 253. See also, Faretta v. CaliIornia,
422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975), Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48 (2008) and Wayne v. State,
100 Nev. 582 (1984). The canvass required pursuant to S.C.R 253(1) is mandatory in every
case where a deIendant appears in district court and chooses selI representation. For all oI the
Ioregoing reasons it is hereby ORDERED that the document is stricken and the Court shall
take no Iurther action on the document.. Dated this 3rd day oI April 2013. /s/ Judge Sattler".
ChieI Justice Pickering's Order oI 5/14/13 reads: "ORDER REDESIGNATING
APPEAL This is an appeal Irom a district court order entered on April 3, 2013. This appeal
was inadvertently docketed in this court as a Iast track appeal subject to the provisions oI
NRAP 3C. Because appellant is representing himselI in this appeal, this appeal should have
been docketed as a proper person appeal. The parties shall disregard the brieIing notices
issued by this court on April 18, 2013. HereaIter, this appeal shall proceed as a proper person
appeal. It is so ORDERED."
1. Coughlin moved Ior an received an Order Ior Competency Evaluation Irom ChieI Judge
Pearson in RCR11-063341 on 2/5/13 at 8:30 am. AIter that hearing on an Order to Show
Cause
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Coughlin was arrested on May 23rd, 2013 by the same RJC and its BailiIIs that he is
appealing the Order oI 4/13/13 Order Striking his Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus (the 2JDC's
Iormer WCDA's OIIice Iormer coworker oI now Judge CliIton struck Coughlin's 4/2/13
Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus seeking to require RJC Judges CliIton and his Iormer
coworker at the WCDA's OIIice, now RJC ChieI Judge Pearson, Irom Iurther violating NRS
178.405's mandatory stay incident (in all departments) to Judge Pearson's entering (and
Coughlin providing written notice thereoI to Judge CliIton on 2/5/13) an Order Ior
Competency Evaluation oI Coughlin in RCR2011-063341 on 2/5/13. So, minutes aIter
Coughlin Iiled a request Ior some documents and permission to review Iiles with the RJC
(necessary to Coughlin's work in 61383, 62337, 61901, etc), the RJC's BailiII Reyes attacked
Coughlin, resulting in his arrest the very day a Panel oI this Court entered is 5/23/13 Order
Dismissing Appeal in this matter. Coughlin was incarcerated between 5/23/13 and 6/6/13 and
herein submits this as soon as was reasonably possible given all the other matters which
Coughlin was denied any ability to make Iilings with regard to by the Washoe County Jail
during his incarceration, and those matters which required more immediate attention in the
intervening days since he bailed out on 6/6/13. This is an important case. There is way too
much striking oI deIendants/litigants Iilings in the RJC/RMC/2JDC (see D7 Judge Flanagan's
recent 5/29/13 Order Striking Coughlin's Emergency Amended Notice oI Appeal in CV11-
03628...now on appeal in 61383 (see collateral consequnces in appeal oI disbarment
recommendation in 62337), as well as Judge Nash Holmes striking Coughlin's Notices oI
Appeal oI her summary contempt Order in RMC 11 TR 26800 (ditto the consequences thereoI
a major part oI the 12/14/12 FOFCOL in 62337), and consider Judge Elliott's striking a
multitude oI Coughlin's Iilings in CR12-2025 (see 62821) on his last day in oIIice, not to
mention to legion oI instances where judges in Washoe County have viewed responding to
Motions to DisqualiIy in accord with NRS 1.230, 1.235 as an optional or discretionary aspect
oI being a judge....Now consider 2JDC ChieI Judge Hardy's very recent 6/11/13 Order in a
vast number oI cases wherein Coughlin is a party transIerring those matters to one
department, D8, Judge Stiglich.
Further, the circumstances oI CR13-0552 and Judge Sattler's sitting on Washoe Legal
Services Board (Judge Elliott's Iailure to disclose sitting on CAAW's Board) and the Iact that
WLS and CAAW are co-deIendants against Coughlin in CV11-01955 all add up to not adding
up. Add to all this the numerous instances oI judges in Washoe County reIusing to allow
Coughlin to selI represent or appear as co-counsel (much less issue his own subpoenas, or, to
even have the court issue him blanks) in the various criminal prosecutions he has been abused
by since August 2011, even during times when Coughlin's law license in Nevada was not
suspended, and where he Iiled the appropriate Notice oI Appearance, Substitution oI Counsel,
etc. (somehow these judges simultaneously declared Coughlin unIit to represent himselI, yet
Iit to stand try, or otherwise denied Coughlin's Motion Ior Order Ior Competency Evaluation
oI transIer to Mental Health Court (never mind the Iact that Coughlin was summarily
removed Irom Mental Health Court with zero notice or opportunity to be heard as to a
dubious contention that such was appropriate on the basis oI Coughlin asking the MHC
whether it was seeking to summarily remove him Ior his taking a medication which the
program materials/contract indicated Coughlin would be permitted to take (nevermind the Iact
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that the 6/25/12 atty Iee award the SBN is Iraudulently seeking to hold out as a sanction
justiIying an application oI some SCR 111(5) "conclusive prooI" oI various RPC violations
stems Irom a 4/19/12 post-judgment Motion Ior Sanctions in CV11-03628 (see 61383) that
Coughlin was prevented Irom Iurther opposing as a result oI an extremely dubious summary
incarceration oI 8 days by Judge Elliott Ior asking a HIPAA question, only to be deprived oI
his medications by the Washoe County Jail, then release to the WCPD and WCDA's OIIice
continuing their hitting streak as to violating the mandatory stay under NRS 178.405 on
5/7/12 where they attempted to hold a trial in RCR2011-063341 (despite the remand Irom
CR12-0376 not occuring until 5/23/12) on 5/7/12, the very day the Opposition to such 4/19/12
Motion Ior Atty Fee Sanction was do in 03628...Nevermind the Iact that in the interim the
RJC made Coughlin move mountains just to retrieve some oI his belongings Irom an landlord
who Iraudulently and illegally locked him out in Coughlin v Nichols....Rev12-075658.
Oh, then there is the wrongIul summary eviction oI 3/15/12 in Rev12-374, Northwinds
v Coughlin were the jurisdictional prereq oI the landlord actually Iiling an unlawIul detainer
aIIidavit beIore a hearing being held, much less beIore getting a summary eviction order by
deIault (despite Coughlin's Iiling a Tenant's Answer on 3/8/12 and RPC 3.5A making it a no
no Ior Gayle Kern, Esq. to smugly smile at Coughlin as she walked out with her lockout order
where Coughlin was allegedly a minute or two late to the 3/15/12 8:30 am hearing...resulting
in the WCSO racing over to Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice at 1422 E. 9th St. #2 89512 to
continue their assault on the requirement that all laws in Nevada apply evenly to all counties
(like NRS 40.253's 24 hour post and wait requirement as to lockout orders, requiring the
WCSO to post such a lockout order and wait 24 hours beIore breaking in to a tenant's rental
and subjecting said tenant to the vagaries oI the way in which the RJC handles NRS
118A.460 scenarios. which became key in the disbarment case vis a vis NVB Judge
Beesley's testimony oI 11/14/12 (nevermind that the SBN careIully avoided disclosing his
testimony in the DowSoe, waiting until one day beIore the 11/14/12 hearing, without oIIering
any excuse Ior such a Iailure to timely comply with SCR 105(2)(c) (especially where the SBN
had been well aware oI all oI the circumstances to which Judge Beesley testiIied Ior six
months and completely Iailed to notice-plead such in its 8/23/12 Complaint whatsoever...),
wherein Judge Beesley testiIied as to Coughlins' "competency" or "Iitness" in light oI
Coughlins' presentation in the NVB in 10-05104 Cadle Co. v. Keller at 2:30 pm, just minutes
aIter Coughlin was accorded only a Iew minutes by the WCSO to grab what he may incident
to their illegal lockout oI him Irom his Iormer home law oIIice on 3/15/12 based upon a 24
hour lockout order that had issued only hours beIore, in violation oI NRS 40.253(5)-(6) and
RPC 3.5A.
Beyond the ordinary vicissitudes in the practice oI law (and, being an indigent 'non-attorney
(according the WCDA DDA Watts 11/13/12 Iaxed objection to Coughlin's SCR 110
subpoenas, which he was expressly inIormed he was authorized to issue on his own, which he
did, then had served appropriately by a non-paty on 2JDC Judges and personnel, and Asst.
Bar Counsel King regularly taunted Coughlin regarding 'not being an attorney...except RMC
Judge W. Gardner, RJC Judge CliIton, SIerrazza, etc. all reIused to allow Coughlin to appear
on his own behalI, or as co-counsel, even while Coughlin was license in Nevada, and where
he Iiled Substitutions oI Counsel, Notices oI Appearances and Authorizationl
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2. In oI oI his Iinal orders beIore retiring, Judge Steven Elliott ented and Order on 1/9/13
granting Coughlin's IFP request and ordering that the transcript Ior this matter (perhaps
including all oI the trial court proceedings in RJC RCR2011-063341, the appeal thereoI in
CR12-1262, and now this 62821). The RJC Iailed to comply with Judge Elliott's Order, and,
as Iar as is known, continues to.
The Panel's 5/23/13 Order Dismissing Appeal in 63041 (appeal oI 4/3/13 Order by
Judge Sattler Striking Coughlin's 4/2/13 Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus, now even more
suspect in light oI 6/11/13 ChieI Judge Hardy's transIerring all oI Coughlin's cases to
Department 8, Judge Stiglich, and Sattler's Iailure to divulge and or recuse himselI Irom
CV11-01955 where he sits on the Board oI Directors oI Washoe Legal Services and Coughlin
is suing WLS Ior wrongIul termination therein), reads: "Order Dismissing Appeal This is a
proper person appeal Irom an order striking an emergency petition Ior a writ oI mandamus.
Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Elliott A. Sattler, II, Judge. Because no
statute or court rule permits an appeal Irom an order striking a petition, we lack jurisdiction.
Castillo v. State, 106 Nev. 349, 352, 792 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1990). Accordingly, we ORDER
this appeal DISMISSED."
b. Particular Grounds Ior Dismissal 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review Summary 807.
Lack of appellate jurisdiction West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest,
Appeal and Error k782, 792 West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law k1131(4) West's Key
Number Digest, Federal Courts k725 Forms Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Appeal
and Error 757 (NoticeMotion to dismiss appealLack oI service oI proposed case) Am.
Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Appeal and Error 760 (AIIidavitIn support oI motion to
dismiss appealLack oI service) Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Appeal and Error
764 (MotionTo dismiss appeal Improper party appellant) Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice
Forms, Appeal and Error 765 (MotionTo dismiss appeal Improper party appellant
Lack oI service) Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Appeal and Error 766 (MotionTo
dismiss appeal Judgment appealed Irom not Iinal) Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms,
Appeal and Error 777 (OrderDismissing appeal Failure to serve proposed case) An
appellate court has a duty to consider its jurisdiction over an appeal and dismiss the appeal iI
jurisdiction is lacking.|FN1| An appellate court must dismiss an appeal even where the point
is raised by neither party, being instead raised on the court's own initiative or motion.| FN2| A
court's jurisdiction is never presumed, and iI the record does not aIIirmatively demonstrate the
appellate court's jurisdiction, the appeal must be dismissed.|FN3| An appeal Iailing to satisIy
the jurisdictional minimum amount in controversy must also be dismissed.| FN4| II the trial
court lacks jurisdiction, the appellate court has jurisdiction only to vacate the judgment oI the
trial court and dismiss the cause.|FN5| Indeed, where a trial court enters judgment without
jurisdiction, the judgment is void and the appellate court acquires jurisdiction only to
determine the invalidity oI the judgment and to dismiss the appeal.|FN6| However, the view
has been expressed that where a party alleges that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider
a cause oI action, it is the duty oI the appellate court to examine the case and determine
whether the allegation is meritorious, and iI the appellate court Iinds that the trial court did
lack jurisdiction, the appellate court may be required to vacate the trial court's judgment with
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regard to the cause oI action but is not required to dismiss the appeal Ior lack oI jurisdiction
beIore the appellate court.|FN7| The question whether an order or judgment is Iinal Ior appeal
purposes is a jurisdictional question, and an appellate court, on a determination that the order
or judgment is not Iinal, has a duty to dismiss the appeal,|FN8| and iI the appellee has not
moved Ior a dismissal, then the court should dismiss the appeal on its own motion.|FN9| The
Iailure to comply with the rule requiring certiIication oI Iinal judgment in appealing Irom a
summary judgment that does not dispose oI all the parties and claims deprives the appellate
court oI jurisdiction, and the appeal will be dismissed.|FN10| An appellate court lacks
jurisdiction over a deIendant whom the plaintiIIs dismissed Irom litigation beIore trial,
requiring dismissal oI the appeal pertaining to such deIendant.|FN11| The United States
Supreme Court may also dismiss an appeal Ior lack oI jurisdiction where the appellants lack
authority to pursue the appeal as individuals and are no longer parties to the action.|FN12|
Observation: Where an intermediate appeal is dismissed because a Iinal judgment has been
entered, the issues in the intermediate appeal may be considered on the appeal Irom the Iinal
judgment.| FN13| CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: When it is determined that an
order appealed Irom is not a Iinal judgment, it is the duty oI the appellate court to dismiss the
appeal ex mero motu. Ex parte Green, 58 So. 3d 135 (Ala. 2010). Since a void judgment will
not support an appeal, it Iollows that the appeal is due to be dismissed. Pierce v. American
General Finance, Inc., 991 So. 2d 212 (Ala. 2008). A dismissal on the merits cannot be
aIIirmed on appeal iI the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter oI the
action; instead, the judgment oI dismissal must be vacated. Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin,
Richter & Hampton, 173 Cal. App. 4th 675, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 220 (2d Dist. 2009). Although
inventor brought his action against attorney and law Iirm in state court, he was entitled to
challenge state court's subject matter jurisdiction over action on appeal, claiming that the
matter was within the exclusive jurisdiction oI Iederal courts; inventor's case was dismissed
on the merits, and thus, iI he was correct that his claims should have been dismissed Ior lack
oI jurisdiction, he was prejudiced by the dismissal on the merits due to the res judicata eIIect
such a dismissal had, and the appellate court would have to vacate that dismissal. Lockwood
v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 173 Cal. App. 4th 675, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 220 (2d
Dist. 2009). The appellate court has a duty to dismiss, even on its own initiative, any appeal
that it lacks jurisdiction to hear. Lewis v. Slack, 110 Conn. App. 641, 955 A.2d 620 (2008),
certiIication denied, 289 Conn. 953, 961 A.2d 417 (2008). II an appellate court does not have
jurisdiction, it has a duty to dismiss an appeal. Williams v. Lawton, 288 Kan. 768, 207 P.3d
1027 (2009). An appellate court has a duty to question jurisdiction on its own initiative. State
v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 190 P.3d 207 (2008). II the record shows there is no jurisdiction Ior
the appeal, the appeal must be dismissed, and to make this determination, appellate courts
must examine the governing statutes because the right to appeal is statutory; neither the
United States nor Kansas Constitutions grant such a right. State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824,
190 P.3d 207 (2008). The right to appeal is purely statutory, and an appellate court has a duty
to question jurisdiction on its own initiative. State v. Scoville, 286 Kan. 800, 188 P.3d 959
(2008). II the record reveals that jurisdiction does not exist, an appeal must be dismissed.
State v. Scoville, 286 Kan. 800, 188 P.3d 959 (2008). Whether an appeal is subject to
dismissal because the decision appealed Irom is advisory in nature may be raised by the Court
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on its own motion. Farrell v. City oI Auburn, 2010 ME 88, 3 A.3d 385 (Me. 2010). Motion by
health care providers to seal documents shielded by protective order in the event that Court oI
Appeals determined review oI order was warranted would be dismissed as moot on patient's
appeal Irom judgment Ior providers in negligence action, where Court oI Appeals determined
that it lacked jurisdiction to review protective order. Yorke v. Novant Health, Inc., 666 S.E.2d
127 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). The Supreme Court generally dismisses an appeal as oI right only
when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the appeal, the appeal is barred by
statute, or the appeal has been rendered moot. Rosen v. Celebrezze, 117 Ohio St. 3d 241,
2008-Ohio-853, 883 N.E.2d 420 (2008). Landowner could not cure jurisdictional deIect in his
negligence claims against Texas Parks and WildliIe Department (TPWD) and TPWD
employees, and thus claims would be dismissed on appeal, rather than remanded to allow
landowner to amend, given Iinding that landowner's allegations, arising Irom damage to
premises leased to TPWD Ior boat storage, did not relate to the active use or operation oI a
motor vehicle or motor-driven equipment, as would support a Iinding oI waiver oI sovereign
immunity, but to the condition oI state property. Texas Parks and WildliIe Dept. v. E.E.
Lowrey Realty, Ltd., 235 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. 2007). An appellate court lacks jurisdiction over
an appeal that is not taken Irom a Iinal order or judgment; in such circumstances, the appellate
court must reIuse to decide those cases not properly beIore it. DFI Properties LLC v. GR 2
Enterprises LLC, 2010 UT 61, 242 P.3d 781 (Utah 2010). |END OF SUPPLEMENT| |FN1|
Smook v. Minnehaha County, 457 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1885, 167
L. Ed. 2d 386 (U.S. 2007); Holmes v. Johnson, 2007 WL 867025 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007); Kim
v. Mansoori, 214 Ariz. 457, 153 P.3d 1086 (Ct. App. Div. 2 2007); In re Conservatorship oI
Ben C., 40 Cal. 4th 529, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 150 P.3d 738 (2007), petition Ior cert. Iiled
(U.S. May 3, 2007); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 281 Conn. 262, 914 A.2d 1025 (2007); St.
Elizabeth's Hosp. v. Workers' Compensation Com'n, 371 Ill. App. 3d 882, 309 Ill. Dec. 400,
864 N.E.2d 266 (5th Dist. 2007); Flores Rentals, L.L.C. v. Flores, 153 P.3d 523 (Kan. 2007),
as modiIied, (May 11, 2007); State ex rel. Stude v. Jackson, 213 S.W.3d 208 (Mo. Ct. App.
E.D. 2007); Texas Dept. oI Public SaIety v. Styron, 2007 WL 178178 (Tex. App. Houston 1st
Dist. 2007); In re Adoption oI JRH, 2006 WY 89, 138 P.3d 683 (Wyo. 2006). Generally, as to
jurisdiction oI appellate courts, see 1 to 76. |FN2| Holmes v. Johnson, 2007 WL 867025
(Ala. Civ. App. 2007); In re Conservatorship oI Ben C., 40 Cal. 4th 529, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856,
150 P.3d 738 (2007), petition Ior cert. Iiled (U.S. May 3, 2007); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 281
Conn. 262, 914 A.2d 1025 (2007); Leslie v. Estate oI Tavares, 109 Haw. 8, 122 P.3d 803
(2005), reconsideration granted in part, 109 Haw. 423, 127 P.3d 83 (2005); In re Marriage oI
Mardjetko, 369 Ill. App. 3d 934, 308 Ill. Dec. 289, 861 N.E.2d 354 (2d Dist. 2007); Moser v.
Moser, 838 N.E.2d 532 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), transIer denied, 855 N.E.2d 1008 (Ind. 2006);
Gates v. Goodyear, 155 P.3d 1196 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007); Anne Arundel County v. Cambridge
Commons L.P., 167 Md. App. 219, 892 A.2d 593 (2005), cert. denied, 393 Md. 242, 900
A.2d 749 (2006); State ex rel. Stude v. Jackson, 213 S.W.3d 208 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2007);
Manning v. Manning, 2006 ND 67, 711 N.W.2d
149 (N.D. 2006). |FN3| Zuniga v. Navarro & Associates, P.C., 158 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. App.
Corpus Christi 2005), reh'g overruled, (Apr. 7, 2005) and review denied, (Oct. 14, 2005).
|FN4| Rick v. Sprague, 706 N.W.2d 717 (Iowa 2005). |FN5| Allen v. Day, 213 S.W.3d 244
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(Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, (Dec. 27, 2006); Kerr v. Harris County, 177 S.W.3d
290 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2005). |FN6| Richardson v. Jallen Investment Group, Inc.,
140 S.W.3d 112 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2004). |FN7| Brown v. Duncan, 361 Ill. App. 3d 125,
296 Ill. Dec. 663, 836 N.E.2d 78, 202 Ed. Law Rep. 735 (1st Dist. 2005). |FN8| Blankenship
v. Blankenship, 2007 WL 548799 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007); Vivid Video, Inc. v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc., 147 Cal. App. 4th 434, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 232 (2d Dist. 2007);
Gorelick v. Montanaro, 94 Conn. App. 14, 891 A.2d 41 (2006); Common Cause oI Kentucky
v. Com., 143 S.W.3d 634 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); Bell v. American Intern. Group, 950 So. 2d
164 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2007); In re Marriage oI Rhoads, 209 S.W.3d 24 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D.
2006); Hallie Management Co. v. Perry, 272 Neb. 81, 718 N.W.2d 531 (2006); Burns v.
Morgan, 165 Ohio App. 3d 694, 2006-Ohio-1213, 847 N.E.2d 1288 (4th Dist. Highland
County 2006); Southwest Const. Receivables, Ltd. v. Regions Bank, 162 S.W.3d 859 (Tex.
App. Texarkana 2005), review denied, (2 pets.)(June 9, 2006) (except Ior statutory
exceptions, iI the judgment Irom which the party has appealed does not dispose oI all pending
parties and claims, then the judgment is deemed to be interlocutory and the court oI appeals
should either abate the appeal or dismiss it Ior want oI jurisdiction). |FN9| G.C. v. J.G., 2007
WL 80462 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 167 Ohio App. 3d 704, 2006-Ohio-
3676, 856 N.E.2d 1023 (4th Dist. Washington County 2006). |FN10| Lee v. Martindale, 363
Ark. 249, 213 S.W.3d 1 (2005). |FN11| Conway v. Dravenstott, 2006-Ohio-4840, 2006 WL
2664241 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. CrawIord County 2006). |FN12| Karcher v. May, 484 U.S.
72, 108 S. Ct. 388, 98 L. Ed. 2d 327, 42 Ed. Law Rep. 1062 (1987). |FN13| Legendre v.
Siqing Bao, 29 A.D.3d 645, 816 N.Y.S.2d 495 (2d Dep't 2006); Lewin v. County oI SuIIolk,
18 A.D.3d 621, 795 N.Y.S.2d 659 (2d Dep't 2005). 2012 Thomson Reuters. 33-34B
2012 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. All rights reserved.
AMJUR APPELLATE 807
Please incorporate
318. Appeal by rightTrial court's power to strike notice oI appeal West's Key
Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Appeal and Error k357(1) West's Key Number
Digest, Federal Courts k660.40 A district court has no power to strike a notice oI appeal.
|FN1| The notice oI appeal operates to transIer jurisdiction oI the case to the court oI appeals,
and thereaIter the district court lacks jurisdiction to act except in aid oI the appeal.|FN2|
However, where an appeal has not been docketed in the court oI appeals, the district court
may dismiss the appeal upon the Iiling oI a stipulation Ior dismissal signed by all parties, or
upon motion and notice by the appellant.|FN3| Only Iailure to timely serve and Iile the notice
oI appeal is jurisdictionally Iatal to an appeal's validity, while lesser omissions may be subject
to sanctions.|FN4| The court oI appeals is charged with the duty to dismiss an appeal
whenever it becomes apparent that the court oI appeals lacks jurisdiction; the Iact that a
motions panel denied the government's motion to dismiss an appeal does not Iree the court oI
appeals Irom the independent duty to decide whether it has jurisdiction, and the doctrine oI
'law oI the case is inapplicable to the question oI jurisdiction to consider an appeal.|FN5|
|FN1| Liles v. South Carolina Dept. oI Corrections, 414 F.2d 612 (4th Cir. 1969); Hogg v.
U.S., 411 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1969); Arundar v. DeKalb County School Dist., 522 F. Supp. 677
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(N.D. Ga. 1981). |FN3| 817. |FN4| Western States Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. Lexington
Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 429 (S.D. 1990). |FN5| U.S. v. Houser, 804 F.2d 565, 21 Fed. R. Evid.
Serv. 1376 (9th Cir. 1986).
CONCLUSION
Please grant this Motion Ior Extension oI time to Iile Request Ior Rough DraIt
Transcripts.
Dated this 6/17/13
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zachary Barker Coughlin
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:
The undersigned hereby certiIies that a true and correct copy oI the Ioregoing was
placed in a sealed envelope and sent by U.S. Regular mail and certiIied mail, postage Iully
prepaid thereon, and was electronically served through the Nevada Supreme Court's eIlex
system on:
WCDA Terrence McCarthy, Esq.
Dated June 17th, 2013
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Appellant
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DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN:
I, Zachary Barker Coughlin, swear under penalty oI perjury, NRS 53.045 that the Iollowing
is true and correct to the best oI my knowledge:
VIOLATIONS OF NRS 178.405 AND NRS 5.010 BY RENO CITY ATTORNEY AND
WASHOE COUNTY PROSECUTORS AND RMC AND WCPD COURT APPOINTED
DEFENDERS
September 8th, 2011 Order Ior Competency Evaluation by Judge Schroeder in RCR2011-
063341
September 9th, 2011: Coughlin arrested at Wal-Mart in RMC 11 CR 22176 Ior petty
larceny October 10th, 2011: Coughlin arraigned in RMC 11 CR 22176 Ior petty larceny
charge
October 26th, 2011 (or a short time aIter depending upon entry oI order) Judge SIerrazza
declares Coughlin competent in RCR2011-063341
February 27th, 2012: Iile stamped at 1:31pm in RCR2012-065630 Judge CliIton signs an
Order Ior Competency evaluation oI Coughlin
-February 27th, 2012: despite being present at the "clandestine status conIerence" (Dogan's
client Coughlin was noticed, in writing, that it had been reset to March 29th, 2012) DDA
Young Iiled an Opposition to Motion to Continue Trial Date and Motion to Appoint Co-
Counsel on 2/27/12 at 2:55 pm in a companion case that he was also prosecuting,
RCR2011-063341 in violation oI NRS 178.405. In her March 13th, 2012 grievance against
Coughlin, Judge Nash Holmes admits to communications in this regard between her and the
Washoe County Public DeIender's OIIice. -February 27th, 2012: At 3:00 pm, despite the
communications she admits to with the WCPD, Judge Nash Holmes holds a trial where
Coughlin is Iorced to appear as an indigent criminal deIendant proceeding with selI
representation in 11 TR 26800, which is suspened upon Judge Nash Holmes Iinding
Coughlin in "summary criminal contempt" seconds aIter he testiIies that RPD Sargetn
Tarter lied in connection with a retaliatory traIIic citations incident to Tarter telling
Coughlin to leave the law oIIice oI Richard G. Hill, Esq. on November 15th, 2012 aIter
Coughlin was released Irom 3 days in jail incident to a criminal trespass custodial arrest
upon Hill lying to oIIicers and signing a criminal complaint in 11 CR 26405 Ior criminal
trespass on November 13th, 2012. Tarter ordered Coughlin to leave aIter Hill reIused to
give Coughlin his state issued drivers license or identiIication, his hard drives/client's Iiles,
his keys, or his wallet. -Judge Nash Holmes proceeds to Iile numerous Orders -March 5th,
2012: in RMC 11 CR 26405, the criminal trespass case Irom Coughlin's Iormer home law
oIIice the CertiIied Copy oI Docket done by the Judicial Assistant, D2's Lisa Wagner, who
couldn't quite seem to Iind or remember the Iact that Coughlin Iaxed in a Notice oI Appeal
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on June 28th, 2012, and her Iailure to docket that led to the dismissal oI Coughlin's appeal
in CR12-1262, despite Coughlin having electronic conIirmation oI receipt oI that Iax
delivering his Notice oI Appeal to the RMC and to City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens (whom
coyly tries to assert he didn't get it or the paper copy Coughlin personally delivered to the
oIIices oI the City Attorney within the 10 days set Iorth in NRS 189.010) Trial date set Ior
April 10, 2012 by Court. -05 March 2012: Notice OI Appearace As Co-Counsel And
Motion To Dismiss Iiled deIendant. 20 March 2012: Order #1 denying deIendant's motion
Iiled 13,February 2012 signed Judge William Gardner. RMC 11 CR 26405 -21 March 2012:
Order #2 denying deIendant's motion Iiled 5, March 2012 signed by Judge William
Gardner. RMC 11 CR 26405 -21 March 2012: Motion To Strike DeIendant's Motion To
Dismiss Complaint Iiled by Deputy City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens. RMC 11
CR 26405 -10 April 2012: DeIendant appeared Ior trial with counsel Keith Loomis, Judge
William Gardner
1/5
presiding. Present on behalI oI the City was Christopher Hazlett-Stevens. Several pre-trial
motions were heard. An Order Suspending Proceedings was signed. All proceedings
suspended until the question oI competence is determined. Case Status Hearing scheduled
Ior 8, May 2012. RMC 11 CR 26405. See attached emails demonstrating the knowledge oI
and complicity between the Washoe County Public DeIenders, the court appointed Reno
Municipal Court deIenders, the City oI Reno Prosecutors, Washoe County District
Attorney's OIIice, RMC, RJC, and both court's Iiling oIIice's staII and administrators
respecting the existence oI these Orders Ior Competency Evaluation and the brazen
violation oI NRS 178.405 and NRs 5.010 by these individuals. Further, on April 19th, 2012,
DDA Young again violated NRS 178.405 where he moved to have Coughlin remanded to
custody (whereupon Coughlin could again have his medication suddenly withheld Irom
him, all while RMC Judge Nash Holmes seeks to leverage jail staII to get Coughlin to sign
some waiver oI his medical records privacy rights and where WCPD Biray Dogan
announces conIidential HIPAA protected medical inIormation relating to his client
Coughlin into the public record, in Iront oI 40 members oI the public gathered in D10, a
transgression which WCPD Jeremy Bosler later reIused to seek to ameliorate or strike Irom
the record in any manner whatsoever).
-May 7th, 2012 in RCR2011-063341 WCPD Goodnight and DDA Young violate NRS
178.405 by attempting TO HOLD A TRIAL in that matter during the pendency oI an Order
Ior Competency directored towards Goodnight's client, Coughlin. Goodnight manages to
jam Coughlin into an ill-advised Mental Health Court sign-up in MH12-0032, which ends
badly when the MHC's Reno Biondo commits Iraud in asserting that Coughlin was removed
Irom the MHC Ior "Iailing to Iollowing MHC policies" similar to the arguments put Iorth
by Sharon Dollarhide, despite the MHC, and perhaps Goodnight too, having given Coughlin
a list oI medications it prohibits, and a contract Ior entry into the MCH, aIter having
inIormed Coughlin he was accepted into the MCH upon entering the contract. The MCH
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subsequently threatened Coughlin with incarceration Ior taking a medication is only aIter
the Iact objected to, then, upon having the bargained Ior consieration, oIIer and acceptance
pointed out to it, the MCH lied and disparaged Coughlin to the RJC and others, causing
Coughlin reputational damage, and Coughlin's case was remanded to the RJC at a later date.
During this period oI time, D10 Judge Elliot Iorced Coughlin back into custody at the
WCDC, where Coughlin has been denied his medication every single one oI his 10 trips to
jail this year, with no titration down oI dosing whatsoever, even where Coughlin was
willing and able to arrange Ior delivery oI the medication at his own expense, etc.
-08 May 2012: Case Status hearing held beIore Judge William Gardner. Present on behalI
oI the City was Deputy City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Ior the deIense Keith
Loomis and deIendant Zachary Coughlin. DeIendant was Iound to be competent.
DeIendant's motion to remove Keith Loomis as counsel granted. Trial date set by the court
Ior June 18,2012. RMC 11 CR 26405. Strangely, despite Coughlin still being subject to an
as yet to be ruled upon Order For Competency evaluation and despite Coughlin having just
the previous day been accepted into Mental Health Court and the RJC case RCR2011-
063341 transIerred there, RMC Judge William Gardner jammed Coughlin both into
proceeding without the Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel and into some trial setting,
even though NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 Iorbids it, and even though Judge Gardner
admitted to being aware oI Judge Nash Holmes, his Iellow RMC Judge, seeking to have
Coughlin's law license taken away based upon a SCR 117 Disability Petition (Judge Nash
Holmes, in her March 14th, 2012 letter/grievance to the State Bar oI Nevada, wherein she
purports to speak Ior Judge William Gardner and managed to pass on to the SBN the April
2009 Order For Sanctions by Judge William Gardner's sister Family Court Judge Linda
Gardner, that Judge William Gardner passed to Judge Nash Holmes aIter receiving Irom his
sister sometime in
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the Iirst quarter oI 2012). Incidentally, Coughlin was previously a domestic violence
attorney at Washoe Legal Services until Family Court Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009
Order sanctioning Coughlin $1,000 personally Ior the arguments he made in representing a
domestic violence victim in a divorce trial were cited by WLS Executive Director Paul
Elcano as the "sole reason" Ior Coughlin being Iired. Coughlin Iiled a Petition Ior Writ oI
Mandamus in respone to that Order with the Nevada Supreme Court in 54844. Coughlin
Iiled a Notice oI Appeal oI the dismissal Ior insuIIicient service oI process oI his wrongIul
termination case against Washoe Legal Services on February 27th, 2012, and that matter is
currently on appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court in 60302. Oh, and Reno City Attorney
John Kadlic is a patient oI Zach Coughlin's Iather, Dr. Timothy Coughlin, and the City oI
Reno and or the RPD have sought to pressure Coughlin's parents into having him
"committed", despite the Iact that the numerous (about 8-10 ish) wrongIul arrests Coughlin
has been subjected to this year (most oI which violate Soldal v. Cook County and have been
captured on video tape, amazingly) all kind oI give Mr. Kadlic a bit motivation to quiet and
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or discredit Coughlin (and and arrest on June 28th, 2012 by the WCSO and various
instances this year where Iraudulent AIIidavits oI Service by the WCSO have been involved
in arrests oI Coughlin give the WCDA OIIice its own motivations).
Given that this trial setting and denial oI Coughlin's Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
occurred during the pendency oI an Order Ior Competency Evaluation oI Coughlin that the
RMC, Judge William Gardner, court appointed deIender Keith Loomis, Esq. and City
Attorney's Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Esq. were well aware oI, the Iollowing are void: O5
June 2012: Notice OI Appearance As Counsel ; Motion To Dismiss; Motion To Suppress;
Motion For A Continuance OI Trial And TransIer To Mental Health Court Iiled by
deIendant. 18 June 2012: DeIendant appeared Ior trial pro-per, Judge William Gardner
presiding. Present on behalI oI the City was Christopher Hazlett-Stevens. Several pre-trial
motions were heard. Motion to Continue Iiled by deIendant denied. Motion to Dismiss Iiled
by deIendant denied. Motion to Suppress denied. Motion to Recuse denied. Motion to
TransIer to Mental Health Court denied. Case tried on its merits and the DeIendant was
Iound guilty oI the charge oI Trespass, a violation oI R.M.C 08.10.010. .."'Y25'2012 The
DeIendant was sentenced as Iollows: Trespass, a violation oI R.M.C 08.10.0 10. : Time
Served (3 days at usual $100 a day, and a $310.00 Iine Ior a total oI $610 raked in by the
RMC on a Iirst oIIense trespass charge where typically the Iine is $305. Also, Richard G.
Hill, Esq. lied under oath at that June 18th, 2012 criminal trespass Trial where he testiIied
that the RPD identiIied themselves as law enIorcement and issued a lawIul order or warning
Ior Coughlin to leave the premises prior to the landlord kicking down a door to a quasi
"basement" under the Iormer law oIIice. The videos oI the arrest Iilmed by Hill demonstrate
that Coughlin was never given an opportunity to heed any warning to leave given that day
prior to a custodial arrest being eIIectuated, contrary to the Supplemental Declaration by
RPD OIIicer Chris Carter, Jr. RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez subsequently admitted that the
RPD neither identiIied themselves as law enIorcement nor issued a lawIul order to emerge
Irom the basement prior to landlord Merliss kicking down the basement door on November
13th, 2012. WCSO Civil Supervisor Liz Stuchell has admitted in an email to Coughlin that
Deputy Machen's November 7th, 2011 AIIidavit oI Service swearing to have "personally
served" the RJC REV2011-001708 Summary Eviction Order on November 1st, 2011 was
"incorrect" in that to Machen "personally served" means "posting it to the door when no one
is home. However, given NRS 40.400 makes applicable NRCP 5(b)(2) and 6(e) to summary
evictions (even those that are noticed by the RJC, in writing, as a "Trial" and even where, at
the October 13th, 2011 "summary eviction proceeding" the RJC ruled that Coughlin "had
met his burden oI establishing there is a genuine issue oI material Iact concerning his
retaliatory eviction deIense" and the matter was then "set Ior trial on October 25th, 2011
provided Coughlin deposits $2,275 into the court's rent escrow account", all oI which
violates JCRCP Rule 109 and NRS
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40.253(6)) the lockout Deputy Machen oversaw on November 1st, 2011 was based upon a
void Eviction Order and Decision oI October 25th, 2011 and an October 27th, 2011
Findings oI Fact...that Hill's associate Baker testiIied as to having apparently provided
receipt thereoI to the WCSO on October 28th, 2011, and which RJC ChieI Civil Clerk
Karen Stancil indicates were transmitted to the WCSO via Iax according to the usual
custom and practice oI the RJC...meaning, the WCSO Iailed to eIIectuate a lockout "within
24 hours" oI "receipt" oI either oI those Orders...meaning Hill and Merliss were trespassing
on November 13th, 2011, not Coughlin, and they brought the RPD along Ior the ride,
whereupon the RPD eIIected a wrongIul arrest (based upon lies by neurologist Merliss and
his attorney Hill to the eIIect that they warned Coughlin to leave that day prior to the RPD
showing up, which is clearly show to be Ialse by the videos Iilmed by Hill and Merliss
themselves and Hill's subsequent testimony at the June 18th, 2012 criminal trespass trial in
11 CR 26405).
May 9th, 2012: Order Iinding Coughlin competent in CR12-0376, by Judge Elliot oI
Department 10 resolving the February 27th, 2012 Order Ior Competency Evaluation signed
by RJC Judge CliIton and Iile stamped at 1:31 pm on that date.
September 5th, 2012: Order Ior Competency Evaluation oI Coughlin by Judge SIerrazza in
RCR2011-063341
October 2, 2012: WCPD Leslie and Dogan and DDA Young violate NRS 178.405 by
swapping the October 15th, 2012 Trial continuation/Competency Hearing Date in
RCR2011-063341 with RCR2012065630, and setting/stipulating to a new hearing on
October 22nd, 2012, and resetting the Trial date to November 19th, 2012, but not beIore
attempting to cram RCR2012-067980 onto the calendar with RCR2012-063341 Ior October
22nd, 2012 (and Leslie and Dogan lied to Coughlin about whether "mandatory status
conIerence" was held on August 6th, 2012 in RCR2012-065630, and RCR2012067980, the
latter at which Leslie set a Trial date oI September 18th, 2012 despite his legal assistant
Linda Gray admitting to Coughlin that Coughlin was provided no notice whatsoever oI the
August 6th, 2012 hearing date in those cases. Also, Dogan and Leslie again violated NRS
178.405 on October 2nd, 2012 where tehy reset Ior October 30th, 2012 a Motion Hearing
on DDA Young's impermissible Motion to Amend the Complaint in RCR2012-065630 (six
months aIter the arrest, no speciIic Iacts pled in either to support either charge, really).
Further, Dogan Iailed to alert Coughlin in any way to the Iact that, in his July 31st, 2012
Motion to Amend Criminal Complaint, DDA Young attempted to, in violation oI RPC 3.8,
amend the "misue oI emergency services" charge (where Coughlin is accused oI using 911
to report police misconduct) to a charge that would provide the District Attorney more
leverage against Coughlin, a retaliatory prosecution, Ior a crime that would damage
Coughlin's law license given the import oI SCR 111(6), despite DDA Young lacking
probable cause to so amend his charge. Dogan and Young previously conspired to retaliate
against Coughlin incident to their "clandestine status conIerence" oI February 27th, 2012,
which just so happened to be the date that Coughlin Iiled a Notice oI Appeal in his case
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against Washoe Legal Services 60302 and the date that Judge William Gardner transIerred
jurisdiction Irom RMC D1 Judge Dilworth to RMC D3 Judge Nash Holmes in 12 CR
000696, a case where Coughlin was subject to a custodial arrest Ior jaywalkign on January
12th, 2012 incident to Coughli's peaceIully Iilming Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s contractor's crew
Irom a public sidewalk, disposing oI property leIt at Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice due
to Hill locking a gate thereto during the time Coughlin was aIIorded to remove such
property and where Hill had boarded up on oI the entrances to the property as well, in
addition to remove the only ladder to the
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upstairs attic/storage space at the property. On February 27th, 2012 in 11 TR 26800 Judge
Nash Holmes told Coughlin she would have him thrown in jail iI he mentioned Richard G.
Hill's name one more time. On January 31st, 2012, at an extension hearing on the TPO
Richard Hill received against CoughlinI or Coughlin's alleged jaywalking on January 12th,
2012, RJC Judge Schroeder roared at Coughlin "do you want to go to jail!" when Coughlin
broached the subject oI Hill's abuse oI process. Judge Schroeder is listed in the RJC docket
as presiding over the February 27th, 2012 "clandestine status conIerence" that ultimately
resulted in Judge CliIton signing the Order Ior Competency Evaluation. It is unclear iI any
actual hearing beIore a judge even took place that day, however.
5/5
an update to the list oI violations oI the stay required by NRS 178.405 concerns an Order
Ior Comptency Evaluation entered by RJC Judge Scott Pearson on 2/5/13 in RCR2011-
063341, only to have DDA Young continue his hot streak oI setting every mandatory stay
under NRS 178.405 that he comes across aIlame, with Bruce Lindsay, Esq. (whom Judge
CliIton arranged to have 'represent Coughlin at a 2/13/13 quasi-summary 'criminal
contempt hearing Ior allegedly being late in the presence oI the court. Not there, but in the
presence oI the court, somehow...
t that 2/5/13 Hearing I got an Order Ior Competency Evaluation Irom Pearson, then went
and provided that to Judge CliIton at the resumption oI the 065630 trial immediately
thereaIter, which, under NRS 178.405, required CliIton to suspend the trial in 11-065630.
OI course, he did not. He has demonstrated a willingness to Iail to apply the law as written
in certain instances, invariably to the beneIit oI the State, oIten with the encouragement oI
DDA Young (though, to be Iair, at the 2/13/13 Trial, DDA Young did point out to Judge
CliIton the 'shall language in NRS 178.405, to which Judge CliIton made, admittedly, an
inventive, argument that some Iailure to make speciIic Iindings oI Iact or something along
those lines in Judge Pearsons just minted Order For Competency Evaluation in 11-063341
oI 2/13/13 made inapplicable the mandatory stay under NRS 178.405. Even iI one were to
overlook in possible impropriety oI Judge CliIton suspending that Trial, starting at 9 am in
12-065630 long enough Ior DDA Young to go to the RJC counter and make and ex parte
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request Ior an emergency reconsideration hearing beIore Judge Pearson, including the
evident partiality revelaed by Iailing to apply procedural rules to the State in the same rigid
and overly Iormulaic manner to which the RJC has applied them to Coughlin (including the
10 days Coughlin should have to respond to such a Motion Ior Reconsideration oI the Order
Ior Competency Evaluation oI 2/13/13 in 11-063341), there still exists the Iact that Judge
CliIton Iailed to Iollow NRS 178.405 and immediately Stay all proceedings in all
departments, but rather, allowed DDA Young a recess to go and make his ex parte
communications to the RJC BailiII counter seeking an Emergency Hearing beIore Judge
Pearson to reconsider his 2/13/13 Order Ior Competency Evaluation. DDA Young's making
such Motion violated the mandatory automatic stay required by NRS 178.405 leaving the
RJC to rely upon some dubious assertion that Jduge Pearson just happened to continue
mulling his decision to enter the Order For Competency Evaluation he entered in 11-063441
at approximately 8:45 am, sua sponte, without any prompting or extra judicial
communications with Judge CliIton, DDA Young, or anyone else...something Judge
Pearson reIused to reIute the allegation oI upon Coughlin putting it beIore him during the
brieI Emergency Reconsideration Hearing Judge CliIton leIt the bench long enough in 12-
065630 on 2/5/13 to allow Judge Pearson to take it an vacate or otherwise amend his Order
Ior Competency Evaluation, at which point Judge Pearson did render a ruling that he would
enter an Order having the State pay Ior a 'mental health evaluation Ior the indigent
Coughlin, that, to this date, still has not been entered and Coughlin has been unable to have
such done due to the Iailure to issue a check to him made out to his psychiatrist, Dr. Suat
Yasar, MD (the State, DDA Young, and Richard G. Hill, Esq., have all been able to get
Emergency Ex Parte Motions granted against Coughlin, whereas, DDA Young's Iailure to
oppose Coughlin's 2/21/12 Motion to Dismiss in 12-065630 (which, arguably under Polk v.
State and DCR 13(3) may required such Motion to Dismiss be granted) resulted in Judge
CliIton, almost reIlexively by instinct, sua sponte, making an argument on the State's behalI
that DDA Young had implicilty opposed such Motion to Dismiss, thereby revealing Iurther
the evident partiality against Coughlin by the RJC judiciary pervading all oI the various
prosecutions and evictions/landlord tenant matters therein).
NRS 4.230 Docket: Entries; Iorm. NRS 4.240 Entries in docket prima Iacie evidence oI
Iacts. NRS 4.250 Docket must be kept by justice oI the peace. NRS 4.280 Jurisdiction oI
justice oI the peace with whom docket is deposited. NRS 4.350 Deputy clerk: Appointment;
compensation; powers and duties. NRS 4.353 Deputy marshal: Appointment; duties;
qualiIications; compensation. NRS 4.370 Jurisdiction. NRS 4.371 EIIect oI transIer oI
original jurisdiction Irom district court to justice court. The Iollowing brings up some
questions as to the RJC morphing the 12/20/12 'Administrative Order 2012-01, In the
Administrative Matter oI Zachary Coughlin (to which, on 2/25/13, ChieI Judge Pearson
issued an Order to Show Cause to Coughlin, baring the same caption (ie, lacking a case
number oI an opposing party), setting an OSC Hearing Ior 3/5/13, which was continued
until 3/11/13 (with Coughlin preserving Ior the record that he wished to remain his own
counsel thereaIter and his objections to any attempts to insert the 'Administrative Order
into any other case (Judge Pearson indicated it was retroactively being placed into
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RCR2011-063341, despite the Iact that there was not ostensible connection between the two
or the subject matter involved (indeed, the 2/25/13 OSC Iails to cite any actual names in
connection with any oI the vague allegations (in violation oI NRS 22.030(2)). Upon
Coughlin pointing out the issues with such an approach, a new case was created,
RCR2013071437, with the 'Complaint therein consisting oI the 12/20/12 'Administrative
Order 201201 baring the same 12/20/12 Iile stamp date, with the new case number aIIixed
thereto, with no new Iile stamping to go along with the new case number (ie, a document
was altered by the RJC aIter it was Iile stamped). This presents several issue with respect to
NRS 4.230. 'NRS 4.230(c) The date oI the summons, and the time oI its return; and iI an
order to arrest the deIendant be made, or a writ oI attachment be issued, a statement oI the
Iact. Coughlin was summarily arrested (aIter 7 pm in his own home, no less) by a DAS
oIIicer on 2/1/13 aIter 7 pm in violation oI NRS 171.136 and where the Arrest Report and
Probable Cause sheet listed such as a warrantless arrest and cited to a warrantless probation
violation arrest statute therein (hours aIter sending an email to the WCDA's OIIice). DAS
OIIicer Ramos indicated to Coughlin at the time oI the arrest that he was arresting Coughlin
summarily Ior two speciIic alleged parole violations, indicating they consisted oI two
alleged Iailures to check in with DAS, one on 1/2/13 and one on 1/23/13. At the 3/12/13
OSC Hearing, Judge Pearson sought to characterize that 2/1/13 DAS arrest oI Coughlin as
stemming Irom the alleged issuance oI a warrant Ior Coughlin's arrest pursuant to an alleged
Iailure by Coughlin to obtain a 'mental health evaluation within 30 days oI the Order oI
11/21/12 by Judge SIerrazza in RCR11-063341. However, the Docket in that matter, and
the correspondence and communications between Coughlin, DAS, and RJC ChieI BailiII
Sexton, and BailiII Heibert clearly reveal that not only was the issuance oI a warrant on
1/9/13 Ior Coughlin's arrest in that regard unsupportable in the Iirst place, but such warrant
was Further, Judge Pearson's revisionist history as to the basis Ior the summary probation
violation arrest indicated by DAS OIIicer Ramos on 2/2/12 (to which he completely lacked
probable cause considering the correspondence between DAS OIIicer Brown et al and
Coughlin as to both the 1/2/13 and 1/23/12 checkins, particularly where RJC BailiII
Augustin Medina willIully prevented Coughlin Irom accessing the DAS oIIice prior to its
3:00 pm closing time (and DAS is not 'an area under the exclusive control oI the RJC to
whatever extent Judge SIerrazza's 12/20/12 'Administrative Order 2012-01 is even a legal
order (and Coughlin should not be subject to the threat oI incarceration oI 25 days Ior every
alleged de minimis inIraction thereoI (and the RJC and Judge Pearson, in his 2/25/12 OSC
and statements on the record on 3/5/13 and 3/11/13 have made contradictory assessments Io
the extent to which DAS is under the umbrella or a part oI the RJC suIIicient to make, say, a
phone call or email to a DAS OIIicer a violation oI such 'Administrative Order 2012-01.
The Iact that Coughlin had provided documentation and medical evidence that he is
diagnosed with and being treated Ior ADD/ADHD and Major Depressive Disorder makes
all the more untenable the extent to which DAS and the RJC have narrowed the acceptable
time Irames and methods oI communicating or submitting materials to both the RJC and the
SBN (exposing Coughlin to an arraignment on 4/17/13 incident to the Ielony and gross
misdemeanor protection orders violation charges that the WCDA's oIIice dropped on
3/7/12. And the City oI Reno's indication that the WCDA's OIIice dropped such
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prosecutions only based on a lack oI jurisdiction makes no sense where the RJC prosecuted
Coughlin Ior a misdemeanor arrest by the RPD that was similarly alleged to have occurred
within Reno City limits (as was the case in 11-063341 and 12-065630, and probably, 12-
067980). So, where the Arrest Report and Probable Cause Report by DAS OIIicers Ior the
2/1/13 summary arrest Ior alleged probation violations clearly Iails to indicate any warrant
having been issued. Rather, that 2/1/13 (and RJC BailiII Sexton and Heibert and the docket
in 11-063341 reveal no such warrant was issued suIIicient to make that 2/1/13 arrest), but
rather, speciIially mentions two alleged Iailures to check in with DAS (Iailing to allege any
sort oI 'no call no show typically required Ior such a summary arrest, Judge Pearson and
the RJC's attempts to retroactively recharacterize whether such arrest was based upon a
warrant is troubling, especially where the warrant was allegedly issued incident to an
allegation that Coughlin Iailed to 'provide prooI oI obtaining a mental health evaluation
within 30 days oI the 11/21/12 Order in 11-063341. This is particularly true considering
the communciations and correspondences between Coughlin and DAS in that regard,
Coughlin's submitting an IFP as to the expense oI any such evaluation that was not satisIied
by virtue oI the evaluation connected to the docket entry oI '10/22/12 Hearing Result
(Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter ) DeIendiJnt has been Iound competent. DeIendant has
indicated that he would like to represent himselI. DeIendant Faretlo Canvassed. DeIendant's
motion to represent hirnseloI is GRANTED. The Court also appointes Public DeIender Jim
Leslie as standby coulISel. Motion by DeIendant to have trameript prepared at public
expense. Motion DENIED. Trial conIirmed setIor with Lake's Crossing's Durante's report
or prooI thereoI provided to DAS, in addition to communications regarding the arrangement
with NNAHMS. Indeed, the docket in 11-063341 expressly rebuts the indication by Judge
Pearson as to whether the 2/1/13 arrest was based upon a warrant: '1/11/13 Warrant
Recalled Per Order oI Steve Tuttle and Judge Pearson, warrant is recalled DAS to inIorm
DeIendant oI evaluation and need to get it completed. DO NOT ISSUE WARRANT
WITHOUT OK FROM PEARSON. Further, The 2/1/13 'Inmate Booking InIormation
Form indicates the DAS arrest time as 7:02 pm (ie, in violation oI NRS 171.136 where the
probation stemmed Irom a simple misdemeanor conviction (Ior which Coughlin has already
now served 13 days, to go along with the completely overreaching 180 day suspended
sentence in 11-063341 and another 180 day suspended sentence incident to the 4/2/13
conviction in 12-065630 Ior an SCR 111(6) "serious oIIense) (wherein Judge CliIton in
another display oI transparent overreaching made that sentence run consecutive to the one
in 11-063341, giving Coughlin Iour years oI probation Ior two misdemeanors that don't add
up to ten days in jail given the Iine schedule Ior a petty larceny charge and a 'resisting a
public oIIicer charge . The 2/4/12 10:22 pm Inmate Release InIormation Form
(Coughlin was not actually released until 1:30 am on 2/5/12, yet still made it to the 8:30 am
hearing that morning in 11-063341 (incident to his being in court anyways Ior the 2/5/13
continuation Io the trial in 12065630... For the RJC to suggest is has not made such patently
overreaching convictions and sentences Ior any other reason that to assist Washoe County
and the WCDA's OIIice/RJC, and WCSO's OIIice in dealing with Coughlin (even where
Coughlin has been chucking the deuce up Ior months/waiving the white Ilag oI surrender),
is just preposterous, and really, its very insincere and ignorant, somehow, at the same time,
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Ior Judge SIerrazza and CliIton (not to mention ready attack dog with Clydesdale style
ethics conIlicts blinders on DDA Zachary Norman Young, Esq., courtesy oI ADA Helzer)
to continue stacking as many SCR 111(6) convictions on Coughlin records, all whilst
ignoring the patent consequential eIIects oI their extremely suspect rulings in Rev2011-
001708 (including Judge CliIton's oI 10/17/11, and Judge Schroeders oI 3/15/12 in rev12-
374, and in Rev12-1048 oI 6/28/12 and 7/5/12, and Judge Pearson's in the same Rev12-
1048 oI 7/31/12 and in Rev12-078432 oI 10/2/12 (and the RJC's Iailure to accord Coughlin
a hearing as required upon his Iiling a Tenant's AIIidaivt incident to the summary eviction
he only learned oI at the 10/2/12 hearing upon cross-examing Ken Grant oI Superior
Storage. Holland & Hart's Rick Elmore may have some 'splainin to do on that one, and
might exchange notes with Gayle Kern, Esq., as to the violations oI RPC 3.5A, Irom
Rev12-374 on 3/15/12. So, the RJC and Washoe County beneIitted in its avowed goal to
have Coughlin disbarred by putting him in jail Ior Iive days right beIore the 2/13/13
deadline Ior Coughlin to Iile his Appeal BrieI in 62337. ' Judge Pearson on 2/5/13 at,
according to the docket entry and OSC hearing (Iurther Coughlin has absolutely no
recollection oI the 2/4/13 video hearing beIore Judge SIerrazza being an 'arraignment and
certainly no warrant being mentioned is recalled by Coughlin at 8:30 am
in 11-063341 (which was improperly noticed to Coughlin on his Jail Inmate Release
InIormation paperwork as being set Ior February 5th, 2013, which, incidentally, the 2/25/13
OSC in AO12-01 includes as one oI the dates wherein Coughlin is alleged to have violated
the AO12-01 ('On February 5, 2013 Coughlin contacted two employees who are not
bailiIIs at a number other than that provided to him as the bailiII s station. At Page 2. It is
possible that someone inquired with the RJC on that 2/5/13 date as to whether any such
hearing in 11-063341 was still on calendar and that an RJC employee, whom may have
been a BailiII, indicated that such 2/5/13 Hearing in 11-063341 was, in Iact, not still on
calendar, but, rather, had been incorrectly listed on Coughlin' WC Jail Inmate Release
InIormation paperwork where such Hearing was actually set Ior, and did, in Iact take place
on, 2/5/13 at 8:30 am. Whether now it is the case that the RJC Judges intended the 2/5/13
Hearing to be a Gagnon I style hearing and such Hearing indentiIied in Coughlin's WC Jail
Inmate Release InIormation paperwork to be a 'Gagnon II type oI Hearing is possible. It
may be possible that an RJC employee, whom may have been a BailiII, but, whom may also
not have been a BailiII incorrectly indicated to someone whom may have inquired with the
RJC with regard to whether such 2/7/13 Hearing in 11-063341 was still on calendar that
such Hearing was not still on calendar oI set to take place, but had, in Iact, been vacated.)
The 2/25/13 OSC in AO12-01 reads: Docket in 11-063341 reads: '1/11/13 Warrant
Recalled Per Order oI Steve Tultle and Judge Pearson, warralJt is recalled DAS to inIorm
DeIendant oI evaluation and Ireed /0 get iI completed. DO NOT ISSUE WARRANT
WrrIIOUT OK FROM PEARSON. 1/17/13 CANCELE D Warrant Arraignment (10:00
AM) (Judicial OIIicer: Schroeder, Jack) Vacated Mental Health Evaluation and comply
with recommendations . Case is on Appeal. .2/4/13 Warrant Arraignment (10:00 AM)
(Judicial OIIicer: SIernlZZa, Peter) FTC-DAS Violation. .BAIL:$5oo CASH Parties
Present: DeIendant Coughlin, Zachary Barker .2/4/13 'Bail Sct (Judicial OIIicer:
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SIerrazza, Peter) Bail Set at $500.00 CASH ONLY. DeIendant .Remanded to the Custody
oI the Washoe County SheriII. .'2/5/13 Order to Show Cause (8:30 AM) (Judicial OIIicer:
Pearson, Scott) FTC-DAS VIOlATION .Parties present: DeIendant Coughlin, Zachary
Barker . DAS OIIicer Brown has been particularly dishonest with Coughlin with respect to
her comunications with Coughlin vis a vis getting a mental health evaluation done, the Iee
waiver application process, whether a warrant would issue, the extent to which Coughlin
had already provided 'prooI oI obtaining such evaluation 'within 30 days', etc., etc.
Regardless, the Arrest Report and PC Sheet oI the 2/1/13 DAS summary probation violation
arrest clearly indicates no warrant was involved, that it took place aIter 7 pm (DAS OIIicers
ordered Coughlin out oI his residence) and was premised upon a total lack oI probable
cause to make such a summary arrest. So, despite Judge Pearson's attempts to undo the
violation oI NRS 171.136 by DAS OIIicer in arresting Cougglin in his home aIter 7 pm
without a warrant on 2/1/13, the PC Sheet and docket in RCR11-063341 tells the real story.
Some might say: do the Reno Justice Court judges ever Iollow the law? That AR and PC
Sheet identiIies the charge as the Iollowing:
'NRS 211A.125 Arrest oI probationer. 1. The chieI or an assistant may arrest a
probationer without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the
probationer has committed an act that constitutes a violation of a condition of his or
her suspended sentence or residential conIinement. 2. Any other peace oIIicer may
arrest a probationer upon receipt oI a written order by a chieI or an assistant stating that
there is probable cause to believe that a probationer has committed an act that
constitutes a violation oI a condition oI his or her suspended sentence or residential
conIinement. 3. AIter making an arrest, the chieI, assistant or other peace oIIicer shall
immediately notiIy the sentencing court oI the arrest oI the probationer and shall submit
a written report setting Iorth the act that constituted a violation oI a condition oI the
suspended sentence or residential conIinement oI the probationer. 4. A chief, an
assistant or another peace officer may immediately release from custody without any
further proceedings any probationer arrested without a warrant pursuant to this
section if the chief, assistant or other peace officer determines that there is not
probable cause to believe that the person violated the condition of his or her
suspended sentence or residential conIinement.
With 'transporting OIIicer Ramos with him, DAS OIIicer Wickman made the
warrantless arrest oI 2/1/13, indicating: 'on 2/1/13 at apprxoimately 18:45 hours, we made
contact with the above subject who is on probation with this department. Subject failed to
check in into this department as required on 1/3/13 and 1/23/13. Subject was taken
into custody for failing to check in which is a violation of his probation. Subject was
taken into custody, cuIIed, double locked, and checked Ior tightness. Subject was then
transported to Washoe Jail.. OIIicer Wickman's declaration only indicates 'we made
contact Iailing to mention the 'contact consisted oI banging on Coughlin's resdience door
(this Washoe County/City oI Reno Gang Bang has reduced National Merit Finalist/Iormer
Reno High All-Time leading Scorer in Basketball (2 time all state, whatever
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whatever/passed the NV bar exam aIter second year oI law schoo. Tenth in his law school
class, USPTO patent attorney, etc.) Coughlin to living in a IiIth wheel trailer he rents Ior
$75 a month and eating at Iood pantries. Isn't Nevada great? No wonder it leads or is near
the bottom, or top? OI all the misery categories and indexes (unemployment, suicides,
disease, Ioreclosures, bankruptcies. Maybe iI Nevada's Judge cease co-signing all the
misconduct oI law enIorcement and prosecutors, and instead invested in its residents a bit
more (and the Iew skilled, educated young proIessional/students who don't bolt the state at
the Iirst chance they get) Nevada could progress a bit, no? Instead, its become a mecca Ior
law enIorcement oIIicers transplanted Irom CaliIornia taking out their Irustrations on locals,
while being comparitively well beneIited and compensated Ior the privilege oI doing so..
However, the time oI arrest as listed on teh Sure does help to have Judge Elliot strike Irom
the record on his last day on the bench all oI Coughlin's Iiling in CR12-2025 (the appeal oI
11-063341) including Coughlin's typed 1/18/13 Motion to Stay Probation (citing some
ridiculous Iont size allegation applicable to perhaps 1 sentence at most oI a 10 page Iiling,
made all the more dubious given the subject matter exposed therein relative to the per se
disqualiIication basis Judge Elliott ignored due to his Board Presidency Ior the same
CAAW Coughlin was suing beIore him in CV11-01955, and act oI judicial misconduct
suIIicient to have all rulings or ordres by Judge Elliott in any case involving Coughlin
overtturned (and Elliot handled all oI Coughlin's criminal appeals and disposed oI all oI
them on ultra suspect grounds (and went to StanIord with Elcano and Echeverria). Further,
the RJC still reIused to process the Notice oI Appeal Coughlin Iiled in various matters,
includign on 3/19/13 in 11-063341 as to the 3/11/134 Order. 11-063341 '2/5/13 Order to
Show Cause Hearing Held (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scot!) DeIendant has submit/ed an
SB89 request. GRANTED. Court is to pay Ior evaluation. Evaluator may C()T/tact the
DeIendant at (949) 667-7402 or bye-mail at zachcoughlinholmail.com. DeIendant is to
continue checking in with DAS between 9:00 am and 2:00pm on Wednesdays. DeIendant is
to have no contact with RJC staII . by phone, leller or e-mail. DeIendant may Iile pleadings,
but is to check in with security Iirst at the entrance oI the Mills B. Lance OIIice Building.
and a IUC Baj/iIwI illb e notiIied Bail is to remain inIull Iorce and eIIect.In a Trial set in
RCR 2012-065630. Deputy District Allorney Zoch Young requested to go back on the
record beIore Judge Pearson to be heard regarding the previous SB89 GRANTED in RCR
2011-063341. DeIendant who is appearing without caunse/, objected Judge CliIton
GRANTS Slates request . Hearing proceeded beIore Judge Scolt Pearson. State is
represented by Zach Young, Esq., DeIendant is not represented by Counsel. AIter Iurther
review oI the Iile, the Court has reconsidered DeIendanJs SB89 Iiled February 5, 2013, at
8:54 am and has DENIED it. The Court is still ordering the DeIendant get evaluated Ior
competency at the Courts expelue. DeIendant requested that his medicatioll be paid Ior. The
Court indicaled it will comider il at a laler time. The order ta show cause hearing has been
conIirmed setIor February 25.2013, aI8:30A.M. DeIondant is ordered to maU an apt. Ior
evaluation by February 12, 20/3 and is to show DASproo I o I lhal apt. '3/5/13 Order to
Show Cause (2:00 PM) (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott) Parties Present: DeIendant
Coughlin. Zachary Barker\ '3/5/13 Hearing Result (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott ) Upon
the order oI Judge Scott Pearson. Bruce Lindsay oI tire Bob Bell Group, is hereby appointed
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to represent the DeIendant in this matter and the Administrative Order. First, Coughlin
clearly retained, on the the record, his right to continue selI representing, only assenting to
Lindsay appearing in '11-063341 in a co-counsel arrangement, which Judge Pearson
indicated 'was up to you and Mr. Lindsay. Coughlin never assented to Lindsay appearing
in 'the Administrative Matter or some new case created thereaIter to Iit such into
13071437. Lindsay's role seemed to consist chieIly oI collecting checks Ior three
diIIerent case number he was allegedly appointed on Ior every one 'hearing he showed up
to (usually late, with no conIerring oI any sort with his 'client beIorehand) and just,
generall, playing the Washington Generals role to a 't'. So, 'this matter and 'the
Administrative Order are diIIerent cases, whereas up until Coughlin pointing out the
illegality thereoI, Judge Pearson was attempting to retroactively stick the 'Administrative
Order into 'this matter (11-063341). Perhaps the RPD, Washoe County, and the RJC
should stop handing out arrest and prosecutions like candy iI it lacks the resources to aIIord
the due process, record keeping, and organizational structure necessary to support the
massive inIrastructure such overcharging/ adn baseless arresting requires. '12/0612012
12110/2012 1211912012 0111012013 01/11/2013 0111712013 0210412013 0210412013
0210512013 0210512013 RENO CRIMINAL CASE SUMMARY CASE No. RCRlOll-
063341 requested by James Leslie, Deputy Public DeIender J Appeal Filed Notice OI
Appeal; Designation OI Record; Request Ior Transcript Cash Bail Converted and ReIunded
Bail converted to Iines and Iees in the amoulJt oI$175.00. Balance reIunded in the amount
oI $290.oocheck #040474 Ql Order Filed l Proceedings CertiIied to the Second Judicial
District Court Letter Sent B.l Proceedings CertiIied to the Second Judicial District Court
Supplemental tlI Warrant Issued First Bench Warrant issued bail set at $500.00 Cosh Only
Warrant Recalled Per Order oI Steve Tultle and Judge Pearson, warralJt is recalled DAS to
inIorm DeIendant oI evaluation and Ireed /0 get iI comple/ed. DO NOT ISSUE
WARRANT WrrIIOUT OK FROM PEARSON. CANCELE D Warrant Arraignment
(10:00 AM) (Judicial OIIicer: Schroeder, Jack) Vacated Mental Health Evaluation and
comply with recommendations . Case is on Appeal. Qj Warrant Arraignment (10:00 AM)
(Judicial OIIicer: SIernlZZa, Peter) I7C-DAS Violation. BAIL:$5oo CASH Parties Present:
DeIendant Coughlin, Zachary Barker 9J Bail Sct (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter) Bail Set
at $500.00 CASHO NLY. DeIendant Remanded to the CU!itadyo I the Washoe County
SheriII. j Order to Show Cause (8:30 AM) (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott) FTC-DAS
VIOlATION Parties "resent: DeIendant Coughlin, lcJchary Barker B.l Order to Show Cause
Hearing Held (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scot!) DeIendant has submit/ed an SB89 request.
GRANTED. Court is to pay Ior evaluation. Evaluator may C()T/tact the DeIendant at (949)
667-7402 or bye-mail at zachcoughlinholmail.com. DeIendant is to continue checking in
with DAS between 9:00 am and 2:00pm on Wednesdays. DeIendant is to have no contact
with RJC staII . by phone, leller or e-mail. DeIendant may Iile pleadings, but is to check in
with security Iirst at the entrance oI the Mills B. Lance OIIice Building. and a IUC Baj/iIwI
illb e notiIied Bail is to remain inIull Iorce and eIIect.In a Trial set in RCR 2012-065630.
Deputy District Allorney Zoch Young requested to go back on the record beIore Judge
Pearson to be heard regarding the previous SB89 GRANTED in RCR 2011-063341.
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DeIendant who is appearing without caunse/, objected Judge CliIton GRANTS Slates
request . Hearing proceeded beIore Judge Scolt Pearson. State is represented by Zach
Young, Esq., DeIendant is not represented by Counsel. AIter Iurther review oI the Iile, the
Court has reconsidered DeIendanJs SB89 Iiled February 5, 2013, at 8:54 am and has
DENIED it. The Court is still ordering the DeIendant get evaluated Ior competency at the
Courts expelue. DeIendant requested that his medicatioll be paid Ior. The Court indicaled it
will comider il at a laler time. The order ta show cause hearing has been conIirmed setIor
February 25.2013, aI8:30A.M. DeIondant is ordered to maU an apt. Ior evaluation by
February 12, 20/3 and is to show DASproo I o I lhal apt. Cash Bail Posted in the amount
oI$500. oo B.l Ord rr to Show Cause (2:00 PM) (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott) Parties
Present: DeIendant Coughlin. Zachary Barhr Hearing Result (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson,
Scott ) Upon the order oI Judge Scott Pearson. Bruce Lindsay oI tire Bob Bell Group, is
hereby appointed to represent the DeIendant in this malleI' and lhe Adminislrative Ordel'. )
Order to Show Cause (8:30 AM) (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott) 0212512013 Continued
to 03/11/2013 Arraignment Reset/Continuance Coughlin. Zachary Barker Order to Show
Cause Hearing Hel4 (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, SCOI!) DeIendan/ is nimtated into DAS
supel'Vision Ior up to THlKTY-SIX (36) months. DeIendant is onkred to obtain Evaluation
at Court's Expense. DeIondant is not to use or possess any countrolled substance unless
presCl'ibed by Medical Doctor. DeIondallJ is to give his atlor1l(1Y, Bruce Lindsay, /lame
oI DeIotukmts psychiatrist. who shall provide Evaluation. DeIendant is to be nim/aled into
the CCP Program to begin March 21, 2013 at 1:30 P.M. Court Compliance Program To
begin 312112013 ) Motion Filed Motion to Vacate any Order Issuing Irom March 1 I.
2013 Hearing in RCR201 1063341 Iiled. Q) Request Ior Submission Filed B.l MOlion
Filed Motion to Remove Bruce Lindsay, Esq. as Co-Counsel Iiled. tlI Motion Filed Motion/
or Check/or Dr. Yasar Pursuant to Order Rendend on 2/13/13 and Submission 0/ Proposed
Order Ior Mental health Evaluation SJ Motion Filed Notice oI Appeal Court Com lianee '
Further, Judge CliIton indicated on the record to Couglhin on 2/12/13 that a Bench Warrant
Ior Failure To Appear issued Ior Coughlin's arrest on that date at 9:36 am, however, the
docket in that matter indicates that such warrant issued at 1:00 pm on 2/12/13. Couglhin
was allegedly late to court that morning Ior a 9:00 trial, allegedly calling the Court at
approximately 9:35 am (where the continuation Io the trial was set to start at 9:00 am) to
report that he had slept through two diIIerent alarm clocks aIter being up most oI the night
preparing Ior the trial, having diIIiculty adjusting his daily routine due to the arrests oI
2/1/13 (conIined and taken oII his medication until his release on 2/4/12 at 1:30 am
Docket in 12-065630 '3/19/13 Misdemeanor Judgment Filed (Judicial OIIicer; CliIton,
David ) on February 13, 2013, AMEMDED by Judge CliIton to read Misdemeanor
commitment Order
'NRS 4.240 Entries in docket prima Iacie evidence oI Iacts. The several particulars oI NRS
4.230 speciIied must be entered under the title oI the action to which they relate, and (unless
otherwise in this chapter provided) at the time when they occur. Such entries in a justice`s
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docket, or a transcript thereoI, certiIied by the justice, or the justice`s successor in oIIice,
are prima Iacie evidence oI the Iacts so stated. Docket in 12-065630 indicates: '01/17/2012
Public DeIender Appointed 1/23/12 Case Filed 1/23/12 Formal Charges USE OF THE 911
EMERGENCY SYSTEM WHEN NO ACTUAL OR PERCEIVED EMERGENCY
EXISTS, a violation oI NRS 207.145 '2/14/12 CANCELED Arraignment (10:00 AM)
(Judicial OIIiter: Pearson, Scott) Vacated Arraignment (10:00 AM) (Judicial OIIicer:
Pearson, Scott) Dogan was appointed to deIend Couglin on 1/17/12, and the WCPD's
OIIice sent Coughlin a letter notiIying him oI Dogan's appearance as attorney oI record on
on January 26th, 2012, and Dogan's supervisor, Chris Fortier emailed Coughlin on 2/6/12 to
discuss Dogan's representation, and Dogan an Coughlin met and discussed the case on
2/8/12, at which time, to Coughlin's understanding, Dogan agreed to appear on Coughlin's
behalI at the 2/14/12 arraingment and enter a not guilty plea. Given the charge was a gross
misdemeanor, under Nevada law, Coughlin was entitled to 'representation at all stages oI
the proceedings, including the arraignment. Dogan Iailed to appear, though he was
required to. The RJC 's Judicial Secretary Lori Townsend voluntarily sent the SBN OBCs
King the 2/21/12 Iiling by Coughlin represented by the Iollowing docket entry: '2/21/12
Notice Notice oI Appearance. Entry oI Plea oI Not Guilty, Waiver oI Right to Arraignment;
Motion to Dismiss Iiled. (DDA Young Iailed to ever oppose this Motion to Dismiss, to
which, on 3/19/13 Judge CliIton rejected Coughlin's DCR 13(3), Polk v. State argument that
such Iailure to oppose should be taken as an admission, makign a sua sponte argument that
DDA Young 'implicilty opposed Coughlin's Motion. Further problematic is the
unexplained transIerring oI 12-065630 Irom D1, Judge Lynch, to D5, Judge CliIton, on
2/27/12. '2/27/12 Mandatory Status ConIerence (1 :30 PM) (judicial OIIicer: Schroeder,
Jack) The docket does not indicate that MSC oI 2/27/12 was 'CANCELLED (as it does
Ior the 3/29/12 date), yet the RJC has continued to maintain that no audio transcript is
available Ior that hearing due to the Iact that it was not held. The docket entry immediately
thereaIter, Ior the same 2/27/12 date, indicates '2/27/12 Order Ior Competency Evaluation
Filed. '2/28/12 Case TransIerred to Another Court to D.C. 2127120/2 PSYCH 5/23/12
Remand Irom Second Judicial District Court Filed The docket indicates Coughlin, then a
an attorney license in Nevada, Iiled a ''2/21/12 Notice Notice oI Appearance. Despite that,
Judge CliIton steadIastly reIused to allow Coughlin to Iile documents thereaIter or issue his
own subpoenas, subjecting Coughlin to the threat oI contempt charges and worse. '8/21/12
Hearing Result (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peler ) DeIendant Iailed to appear, DeIense
requested that this cose be continued and set with his misdemeanor Reno Justice Court Case
set Ior August 29, 2012 01 8:30A.M. State opposes as this is Mr. Caughlin's second time
Ioiling to appear. DeIense's motion is GRANTED. MSC is setIor August 29,2012 at
9:00A.M. Coughlin dispute the allegation that he Iailed to appear on either 2/14/12 or
8/29/12, rather, the WCPD Iailed to appear despite agreeing to at the 2/14/12 arraignment,
and the WCPD admits to Iailing to notiIy Coughlin in writing Ior the 8/6/12 hearing, and
the docket Iails to contain any entry on 8/6/12 to indicate that some Motion Hearing was to
be held on that date, or that such was continued. Rather, the Iirst appearance in the RJC's
docket oI any indication that there was some 8/6/12 hearing in 12-065630 is indicated in the
docket entry Ior 8/21/12. '8/27/12 Motion Hearing (8:30 AM) (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza,
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Peter) Parties Presenl: PlaintiII The State oI Nevada Deputy Dislrict At/orney Yaung, Zach
DeIendant Coughlin, Zachary Barker Public DeIender l.eslie, James Briand ' '8/27/12
Amended Criminal Complaint Filed (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter ) Stricken '8/27/12
Hearing Result (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter) The State moved to strike Second
Amended Criminal Complaint. '8/27/12 Motion Granted (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza,
Peter) to Strike Second Amended Criminal Complaint. '8/27/12 Hearing Result The Slate
read oIIered plea negotiations into the record at which time the DeIendant accepted the
oIIered plea. the State Iiled Amended Criminal Complaints. Hearing proceeded at
conclusion oI the hearing, the Court will not accept DeIendant's plea. The State moved to
Strike Amended Criminal Complaint. GRANTED. Mandatory Status ConIerence remains
set August 29, 2012, at 9:00A.M. It was overly prejudicial to Coughlin's deIense Ior Judge
CliIton to, unexplainedly, be given some: '11/5/12 Correspondence Recieved via mail Irom
Reno City Attorney's OIIice Re: Written Objection Pursuant to Reno Justice Court Rule 45
(RJCR 45) Regarding E-mailed Subpeonas to City oI Reno Emergency Communication
Center Irom Zach Coughlin Concerning RCR2011-063341. Further, in RJC RCR11-
063341, the docket entry Ior 7/16/12 only serves to prove Coughlin's contention that during
that Trial date Judge SIerrazza indicated that the 8/29/12 court date would not be a trial
date, but rather: 'Hearing Result (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter ) DeIense movesIor
continuance; Public DeIonder Jeremy Bosler indicated that a new Deputy Public DeIender
shall be appointed to take over the case. State Agrees. Trial shall be set on August 29, 2012.
All Motions shall be decided at that date. The subsequent need to have an appearance oI
the docket entry Ior 8/9/12 does little more than prove that Coughlin's newly introduced
WCPD Leslie (a ChieI Deputy Public DeIender who never handles misdemeanor cases,
save Ior taking over all three oI Coughlins Ior the express purpose oI sabotaging them to
beneIit the Washoe County Iisc), whom replaced WCPD DPD Goodnight minutes beIore
the 7/16/09 Trial date, lobbied behind the scenes to Judge SIerrazza to enter such a Notice/
Order to deIeat Coughlin's argument that the 8/29/12 date was not a 'Trial date, but rather
set Ior disposing oI 'pre-trial motions, and to then set a Trial date should one be necessary.
Leslie, as his is wont, oI course, attempted to jam both the hearing oI pre-trial motions and
an MSC in 12-065630, and a hearing in 12-067980 all into that 8/29/12 date (which
occurred a couple days aIter Leslie successIully oI the only inviolable right oI criminal
deIendant that Leslie had yet to rape, ie, Coughlin's right to decide whether to accept the
State's plea bargain or to go to trial). While that docket indicates '8/9/12 Notice The
Honorable Peler J. SIerrazza will hear Motion to Suppress at the time set Ior Trial that
entry was, oI course, interpreted to mean the trial was set Ior 8/29/12. OI course, that 8/9/12
docket entry does not actually indicate that the trial date was set Ior 8/29/12. This materially
prejudiced Coughlin's deIense, as did Leslie's lying to his client Coughlin regarding his
arranging Ior the 'witnesses to be held to their subpoenas (Templeton and
Dawson...Dawson later admitted to Coughlin Leslie told him not to show up Ior the 8/29/12
date, and Leslie, only inIormed Coughlin that he released all witnesses Irom their subpoenas
well into the State's presentation oI its case during the Hearing on the Motion to Suppress
(going beyond a Iailure to communicate with his client, Leslie actually purposeIully mislead
his client, Iailed to review the exculpatory video/audio oI the arrest/assault and battery oI
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Coughlin just prior to the arrest/and subsequent investigatory videos Irom one week aIter
the arrest wherein the material witness Leslie and the WCPD reIused to even attempt to
serve a subpoena on via NRS 174.345 (not to mention she is a McQueen High School
student, so, she's not that diIIicult to track down), Nicole Watson, whom Coughlin caught
on tape, knowing she was being recorded, admit to hearing an unidentiIied man whom she
witnessed pick up a phone oII the ground int he middle oI the skate plaza (in constrast to
Goble's assertions that he careIully set such phone in a hat on a ledge on the perimeter
thereoI next to a group oI his Iriends) and threat to throw the phone 'in the river iI
someone did not claim it immediately...which is not the case upon a review oI the audio
transcript and the docket entry Irom 7/16/12. Rather, that docket entry Ior 7/15/12 indicated
'Trial shall be set on August 29, 2012. All Motions shall be decided at that date. Setting a
trial on a date is Iar diIIerent than setting a trial Ior a date. Further, indicating 'all motions
shall be decided at that date Iails to characterize 'that date as a trial date, rather, is Iurther
underscores the extent to which 'that date was set Ior nothing more than hearing, and
deciding 'all motions and to then, 'iI necessary set a trial date. The entry in 11-063341
Ior 8/29/12 reads: 'Hearing Result The Stale read oIIered plea negotiations into the record
at which time the DeIendant accepted the oIIered plea. Tire State Iiled Amended Criminal
Complaints. Hearing proceeded. At conclusion oI the hearing. The Court will not accept
DeIendant's plea. The State moved to Strike Amended Criminal Complaint. GRANTED.
Trial remains set August 29, 2012. at 9:00 A.M. The docket entry in 11-063341 Ior the
Suppressio Hearing demonstrates the clearly reversible error attendant to Judge SIerrazza
ruling there was probable cause to make the arrest (despite it clearly being violative oI NRS
171.136, especially where Goble testiIied that he told the OIIicer the phones value
was less than the amount required to charge Coughlin with 'Ielony grand larceny and the
arrest occurred 'between 7 pm and 7 am). Without anything connected to the 'pat down
search, which the docket indicates 'DeIendant's motion to Suppress GRANTED to the
extent oI the 'pat down search, there is insuIIicient evidence or support to Iind suIIicient
probable cause to arrest existed. The State Iailed to argue any 'inevitable discovery or that
Duralde would have 'heard the 'silent 'vibrating incoming call alert (where there was
testimony and evidence that the alert was nothign more than the phone's screen lighting up,
and no 'vibrating sound...and where the video/audio Io the arrest, taken with a high
deIinition audio/video smartphone less than 10 inches away, reveals absolutely none oI the
'vibrating that RPD OIIicer Duralde indicated he could 'hear in connectin with his pat
down search (and at that point, it was a second quasi-pat down search (read, really a Fourth
Amendment violating search and seizure, rather than a 'pat down search where, at that
point, Duralde indicated he had already discerned that Coughlin possessed no weapons and
posed no threat'). The docket entry Ior 8/29/12 reads:Hearing Result (Judicial OIIicer:
SIerrazza, Peter) DeIendant addressed motion to appoint co-counSel. DeIenrdant's Counsel
addressed motion to appoint co-counsel. The State opposes motion to appoint co-counsel.
Motion DENIED. II DeIendant so chooses the Court will conduct a Faretta Canvas.
DeIendant moved Ior selI representation. The Court canvassed the DeIendant regarding the
Faretta inquiry. The State objects to DeIendant's motion to represent himselI on the grounds
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that it is untimely and that this is Ior the purpose oI delay and not in good Iaith. DeIendant's
counsel addressed motion Ior selI representation. Motion DENIED. The State's motion to
Strike all Documents that were Iiled solely by the DeIendant is hereby GRANTED. The
DeIendant previously Iiled Motion to Suppress. Motion Hearing proceeded. The State
opposes DeIendant's Motion to Suppress. DeIendant's Motion to Suppress GRANTED to
the extent oI the "pat down search". Trial proceeded. Witnesses held to subpoenas. Its no
wonder that Coughlin Ielt Iorced to conIirm the sole selI representation that he was
unlawIully prevented Irom undertaking since his Iiling, as prima Iacie evidence oI is
demonstrated oI by the Iollowing docket entries in 11-063341: '2/15/12 Authorization to
Represent Filed by Couglin while he was an attorney licensed to practice in Nevada.
Another couple Coughlin Iilings on '2/15/12 Motion Filed Motion to Allow Late Filing
Pre-Trial Notice and 'Motion Filed Pre-Trial Motion. Additionally, Coughlin's right to
represent himselI where he was an attorney licensed in Nevada was denied, revealing
clearly reversible error where Coughlin Iiled, as the docket indicates on '2/17/12 Notice oI
Appearance Filed and Supplement to Motion to Accept Pre Trial Motions Where
Untimely. The stressIul lead up to the 2/29/12 trial date in 11-063341 is a SCR 102.5
mitigating Iactor as to any misconduct alleged in connection with the 2/27/12 or 3/12/12
trial dates in 11 TR 26800. Further, there is no indication in the 11-063341 docket that the
required 'notice in writing to all other departments was issued by D5 in response to the
2/27/12 Order Ior Competency Evaluation. Regardless, given jurisdiction was only
remanded back the the RJC on 5/18/12 by Judge Elliott, the docket entry oI '5/3/12
Response Reply to State's Opposition to Motion to Supress represents a Iugitive document
Iiled in violation oI the stay under NRS 178.405, as was the 2/27/12, 2:55 pm Iile stamped
'Opposition to Motion to Continue Filed Trial date and Motion to Appoint Co-Counsel by
DDA Young... As such, it was reversible error to reIuse Coughlin his right to appear on his
own behalI, especiall under DCR 13(3) and Polk where, one would think, at some point,
DDA Young would be held to having his Iugitive documents and Iailures to oppose held
against the State in anywhere near the same overly rigid and Iormulaic application oI
procedural rules that Judge CliIton and SIerrazza so consistently applied to Coughlin.
Further, the 5/7/12 transIer to Mental Health Court itselI violated the NRS 178.405 stay, as
did the State and DPD Goodnight's attempts to hold the '5/7/12 Misdemeanor Trial, as was
the setting oI that trial itselI (the RJC constantly moves cases Iorward during such
mandatory stays, though the public deIenders most deIinitely do not build a deIense case
during such time). '5/7/12 Mcnlal Health Court (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter) DeIense
requested /0 be trans/erred /0 Melltal Health Court. StaU did 1101 oppose m IonS! m lhe
DeIendalll entered a plea to the charges. The Court Iinds that the DeIendant does 1101
inIocl have to enter a plea. State requested (hat iI/he Court decides to transIer this case 10
Mental lIea/lh Court. prior to that happelling. witness Iees be paid ill the amount oI$75.oo.
DeIellSe opposed stating De/erukm! has no means oIpaying witness/ees. 11 is ordered
IhlJIIJre DeIondant is topay S75.OO witness/ees by May 7. 20/1 Upon/urther order a/ the
COlVt. this cose is traTISIorred to the jurisdiction o/District Court Mental Health Court
without a plea. Further, Judge Breen's shameIul summary removal oI Coughlin Irom
Mental Health Court was truly appalling. There was absolutely no notice or opportunity to
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be heard as to the Iraudulent basis Ior the MHC removign Coughlin where the program
materials, oIIer, acceptance, and contract entered into with Coughlin was thereaIter,
apparently, unilaterally altered by an AA Iocused Judge Breen, whom lacks a medical
degree or license to practice medicine, yet, along with Rene Biondo (and the complicity oI
silent WCPD JenniIer Rains) reIused to allow Coughlin to take a medication Ior
ADD/ADHD/Treatment Resistant Depression that the MHC's Sharon Dollarhide admitted
was not excluded by the contract or program materials/rules/guidelines provided to
Coughlin. Following that 5/24/12 hearing, Coughlin was accosted by several WCSO
Deputies in the hallway oI the 2JDC courthouse demanding to search Coughlin Ior any
recording devices and interrogating him as to whether he recorded any oI the 'hearing
beIore Judge Breen. It was reversible error to reIuse to reject to plea bargain Coughlin
voluntarily and Ireely accepted (and expressly indicated to the Court that he had so done) on
'8/27/12 Hearing Result The Stale read oIIered plea negotiatioTIS into lhe record at which
lime the DeIondant accepted tire oIIered plea. Tire S,ate Iiled Amended Crimino/
Complo/nls. Hearing proceeded AI conclusion oI the heoring. lhe CalVI will not accept De/
elldant's plea. The State moved to Strike Amended Criminal Complaint. GRANTED. Trial
remains sel August 29. 2012. al 9:00 A.AI. in 11-063341. Further, the suggestion by Judge
CliIton that Coughlin was seeking (or, rather, had successIully attained) an Order Ior
Competency Evaluation Irom Judge Pearson (which Coughlin handed to Judge CliIton in
court, on the record, on 2/5/13 in 12-065630, requiring a stay oI proceedings in 'all
departments, which Judge CliIton, as is his wont, violated Nevada law in willIully ignoring
in his patent display oI partiality towards the same WCDA's OIIice in which he was a
prosecutor Ior the 25 years preceding his investiture ceremon in January oI 2011. Further,
Judge CliIton's evident partiality and the extent to which he has yet to embrace his role as a
judge, but rather constantly reverts to the more Iamiliar, to him, role oI a prosecutor, was
evident when, during the 3/19/12 Trial date in 12-065630 he announced to Coughlin, on the
record: 'I know what I am doing, I have been doing this Ior twenty-Iive years...which is
curious given Judge CliIton worked in civil litigation Ior Iive years prior to his twenty-Iive
years as a prosecutor with the WCDA's OIIice (where he worked alongside 2JDC Judge L.
Gardner in the domestic violence unit Ior some time, a reunion oI sorts Irom their tenure
together at Reno High School (class oI '77 and '78, respectively, with the Judge in
Coughlin's criminal trespass prosecution in RMC 26405, W. Garnder, L. Gardner's brother,
class oI '75). Regardless, prosecutorial and police misconduct was revealed incident to the
Iailure to propound the ECOMM recordings between the RPD and ECOMM. That docket
entry Ior 12/19/11 reads: 'Request Filed Request/or Discovery, which represents the Iiling
by WCPD Goodnight which demanded all recordings (logs or audio Iiles) by Ecomm/RPD,
etc....and despite that the ECOMM recordings between the RPD and ECOMM, which
totally vitiated the Iraudulent recounting oI 'what the oIIicer's were told by dispatch (the
oIIicer's were out oI there cars and on scene, unable to read the logs on their in car screens,
and nothing on their radios indicated anything about 'a possible Iight or 'someone just
socked a minor, thereIore, no exigent saIety basis Ior the pat down search, etc., etc. (911
dispatchers, one oI which on duty that night was RPD OIIicer Duralde's wiIe, dispatcher
Jessica Duralde...a connection that Judge CliIton threatened to jail Coughlin should he
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mention it again, aIter striking such mention Irom the record on 3/19/13 and 4/2/13 (where
Judge CliIton gave similar indications in response to Coughlin unearthing the marital
relationship between Judge CliIton and Deputy AG Rhonda CliIton, see 62821, where the
AG's oIIice is representing the WCDA's OIIice...and consider that Judge Sattler is a
member oI the Board oI Directors oI Washoe Legal Services (replacing CAAW Executive
Board member Judge Elliott in CV11-01955, where Coughlin was suing both WLS and
CAAW...oh, and WLS's Executive Director Paul Elcano's daughter, Tyler Elcano, Esq., was
recently hired as a prosecutor Ior the Washoe County District Attorney's
OIIice. WLS and the WCDA's OIIice have partnered (with Coughlin's Iormer RMC public
deIender, Lew Taitel, Esq....see CV11-03216 and RMC 11 CR 26405, and RJC Rev12-
1048, and RCR12-067980, and Rev11-1708 Ior a ConIlict-Palooza...ADA Hezler will have
none oI this (or NNDB/DDA Kandaras's 12/13/12 emails to Coughlin's then WCPD CPD
Leslie declaring Coughlin's 'competency an issue (implicating NRS 178.405...which oI
course, the WCDA's OIIice and RJC as a whole ignored completely, especially at the
improperly noticed ('your're here! said Judge CliIton, echoing RMC Jugde Dilworth's
statements in response to similar due process/lack oI notice/service arguments made by
Coughlin at the 12/3/12 Trial in 12 CR 12420 (which is entirely connected to CV11-03126,
RJC Rev12-1048, RCR12-067980, and, thereIore, CV11-03126, and thereIore, CV11-
01955, and thereIore RCR12-065630, and thereIore NG12-0204, 0434, 0435, etc., etc., and
on and one. Sure the Nevada Constituting requires some to swear to protection 'the
Constitution and the government oI Nevada but its a bit much to stretch that and JCRCP 1
to an exception that swallows all dur process protections and procedural rules, not to
mention individual liberties and rights altogether. But, it sure helps come re-election time).
Quite clear that Coughlin was seeking the 2JDC to required the RJC judges to Iollow the
law vis a vis NRS 178.405, where they Iailed to on 2/5/13 in rcr11-063341, and rcr12-
065630, leading to a conviction Ior a SCR 111(6) 'serious oIIense in 12-065630 on 4/2/13.
Emails between Coughlin and DAS OIIicer Brown incident to probation in RCR11-
063341 (rebutting the assertion in the 2/1/13 Arrest Report and Probable Cause Sheet by
DAS OIIicers Wickman and or Ramos that the aIter 7 pm warrantless arrest oI Coughlin
was based an alleged violation oI NRS 211A.125 (a statute providing Ior the arrest oI
probationers without a warrant provided there is suIIicient probable cause to believe a
violation oI one's probation has occurred) upon the Iollowing: "ON 2/1/13 at approximately
1845 hours, we made contact with the above subject who is on probation with the
department. Subject failea to check into this Department as requirea on 1/2/13 ana
1/23/13 . Subject was taken into custody Ior failing to check in which is a violation of his
probation. Subject was taken into custody, cuIIed, double locked, and checked Ior
tightness. Subject was then transported to Washoe Jail."
Clearly, the Iollowing email Irom DAS OIIicer Brown vitiates any suggestion that
DAS had probable cause to believ eCoughlin Iailed to check in on 1/23/12 (and aIter that, is
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a multitude oI written evidence demonstrating that Coughlin contacted DAS well beIore and
aIter 1/2/13 to arrange Ior an alternate check in given the extraordinary circumstances oI his
NRCP 52, 59 Iiling deadlines as to the 12/14/12 FOFCOL recommending permanent
disbarment in 62337 running on 1/3/13...beyond that, NRS 176A requires DAS to notiIy the
court oI any alleged violation "within 24 hours" oI such taking place, so why a warrantless
arrest on 2/1/13 Ior alleged conduct consisting oI alleged Iailures to check in (and
regardless, certainly no oI the "no call no show" variety) on 1/2/13 and 1/23/13? How can it
be that there was allegedly suIIicient probable cause to make the warrantless 2/1/13 arrest oI
Coughlin (an impose a cash only bail oI $500 resulting in 5 days in jail Ior Coughlin) yet
DAS did not "report within 24 hours" to the RJC such alleged violations oI 1/2/13 and
1/23/13? Indeed, during the 2/1/13 warrantless probation violation arrest aIter 7 pm in
violation oI NRS 171.136, DAS OIIicer Ramos went out oI his way to insist he didn't not
care to hear about or see any written evidence disproving the allegations that Couglhin
Iailed to check in on 1/2/13 and 1/23/13 (Coughlin attempted to show OIIicer Ramos the
1/24/13 email Irom DAS OIIicer Brown admitting to the Iact that the RJC BailiII's overly
broad interpretation oI an already suspect "Administrative Order" (DAS, as part oI the
executive branch, cannot be "under the exclusive control" oI the RJC suIIicient to require an
RJC BailiII escort Coughlin every Wednesday Ior his probation check in, though the
5/23/13 arrest oI Coughlin and ridiculous overstacking oI redundant and outsized charges
by an RJC BailiII Reyes whose wiIe Iiled a TPO Application against him on 5/2/12
indicating his suIIers Irom "severe depression" and is "oII his medications" and exhibits
controlling and abusive behavior resulted in a bail oI $16,500 Ior Coughlin and
incarceration between 5/23/13 and 6/6/13, with deadlines missed and prejudice suIIered in
62337, 61383, 63041, 60302, and more..accordingly, Coughlin was placed in a Catch-22 on
1/23/13 where he waited Ior RJC BailiII Medina to escort him to DAS, Medina taking just
long enough Ior DAS to close its doors, though DAS OIIicer Brown's email to Coughlin oI
1/24/13 certainly precludes any view that probable cause existed to view such
circumstances as tantamount a Iailure to check in violation oI Coughlin's probation on
1/23/13. DAS OIIicer Brown's written admission to Coughlin oI 1/24/13 Iollows (and
includes her narrowing the time Irame Ior Coughlin's Iuture check ins in a reverse oI the
common accommodations provided to those with disabilities (whether Coughlins is
disabled due to a diagnosis oI ADHD/ADD or MDD or the SCR 117 Petition in 60975...Its
inappropriate Ior DAS OIIicer to be playing lawyer (like they do in CCP court, sitting
opposite WCPD Rains) and judge (as Brown is here where she is altering the terms oI
Coughlin's probation in a manner that Iails to provide Equal Protection under the law, and is
clearly retaliatory to boot):
"RE: ATTN CJ oI Department oI Alternative SEntencingRE: New voicemail Irom:
7753299517? From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Wed 1/02/13 4:13
PM To: Brown, Celeste (CBrownwashoecounty.us) Dear oIIicer brown, car trouble be
there tomorrow"
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"RE: I appreciate your eIIorts? From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent:
Thu 1/03/13 12:20 PM To: Brown, Celeste (cbrownwashoecounty.us) Dear OIIicer
Brown, Would it possibly be okay iI I checked in with DAS tomorrow, Friday? An Order
was entered recommending Ior me to be disbarred permanently as an attorney and I need to
consult with an attorney within a very limited time Irame to challenge it. Sincerely, Zach
Coughlin"
"RE: I appreciate your eIIorts? From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent:
Fri 1/04/13 12:24 PM To: Brown, Celeste (cbrownwashoecounty.us) Dear OIIicer
Brown, I got very sick late last night with a stomach virus and apologize Ior not coming in
today. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin"
"Subject: about today? From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent:
Mon 1/07/13 2:57 PM To: Brown, Celeste (cbrownwashoecounty.us) Dear OIIicer
Brown, I am pretty sure I called or wrote last Friday saying I would check in today. I did
come to Court (I had a hearing in the RJC) but I Iorgot my $5 whistle tube and am very low
on money right now, plus I had not slept all night because I am working on an appeal brieI to
an Order that seeks to disbar me permanently Irom the practice oI law...and the RJC BailiIIs
have some Orders to limit my access to any areas within the RJC's dominion and control...so
it seemed like I had a halIway good argument that they were telling me to leave, but II I
pushed it I probably could have gone and checked in at the DAS counter. HopeIully you can
give me a little slack here (I will check in Wednesday and get the application Ior the Iee
waiver Ior any competency evaluation you want me to take. I only have a Iew more days to
Iinish my appeal brieI as to the attached Order, and its just a ton oI work (I am doing it all
myselI because I cannot aIIord an attorney). Sincerely, Zach Coughlin Zach has a Iile to share
with you on SkyDrive. To view it, click the link below. 12 14 12 stamped 0204 Order by
Chair Echeverria Findings oI Fact Conclusion oI Law seeking to disbar Coughlin.pdI "
"Subject: competency or mental health evaluation evaluation? From: Zach Coughlin
(zachcoughlinhotmail.com) You moved this message to its current location. Sent:
Wed 1/16/13 11:10 AM To: cbrownwashoecounty.us
(cbrownwashoecounty.us) Dear OIIicer Brown, When we last spoke I inIormed you that I
had not slept in at least 30 hours having been working very long hours on a brieI addressing
and order seeking to permanently disbar my license to practice law. You indicated you could
care less about such a thing an mentioned how you were tired oI my coming in during your
oIIices working hours, indicating you were upset that I came in to close to closing time. While
it was my understanding previously that we had done whatever intake was required you
recently mentioned that you would like to do an additional intake meeting oI some sort.
Additionaly, I have previously written you and your oIIice respecting any requirement that I
have a competency evaluation done within 30 days oI the 11/20/12 Order. My understanding
was that Judge SIerrazza's declaring me competent on 10/22/12 complied with that Order in
that it was within 30 days oI 11/20/12. I am attaching the report by Lake's Crossing Tom
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Durante upon which Judge SIerrazza's Order evaluating me as mentally competent to stand
trial was based. Addtionaly, we had discussed that there was some uncertainty as to whether
that 10/22/12 Order Iinding me competent as suIIicinet or whether I would need to have a
Iourth competency evaluation done within the last 15 months, and Judge SIerrazza's ruling on
11/20/12 that waived all Iees associated with my participation in DAS's program, which I
understood to included any costs associated thereto, including any competency or mental
health evaluation that may be required to be done within 30 days oI the 11/20/12 conviction
order, should the 10/22/12 Order Iinding me competent not be satisIactory. You directed me
so ask Ior and Iill out some materials at my next checkin, However, when I appeared and
requested such materials Irom Sabrina, and reIerenced you directions that I pick up the Iee
waiver application Ior any competency or mental health evaluation that may be required,
Sabrina knew not oI what I was speaking nor was she aware oI or did she have any such Iee
waiver application. Now, in complying with your request that I check in today I called prior to
10 am and sought Iurther clariIication and you indicated to me that there is no Iee waiver
application or process Ior any competency evaluation and that you had reported to Robbin
Baker something causing my case to potentially "go to warrant" despite my justiIiable
reliance upon your previous directions and indications to me that you could and were
extending any such requirement to have a competency or mental health evaluation done
within 30 days oI the 11/20/12 conviction until issues related to Iiguring out the Iee waiver
application process and whether or not the 10/22/12 Order Declaring me competent based
upon a report by a Lake's Crossing mental health proIessional was satisIactory. I appreciate
your assistance in notating my Iile suIIiciently to insure this does not go to warrant as I
believe I have relied justiIiably upon your previous express assertions that it would not,
especially considering that you have now changed your position respecting the Iee waiver
application process. I am attaching a Iee waiver application and the Lake's Crossing
evaluation and a docket Irom RCR2011-063341 wherein the 10/22/12 Order delcaring me
competent was rendered and links to the JAVS audio transcript oI both that hearing and the
conclusion oI the trial and decision oI conviction on 11/20/12 wherein the waiver oI all Iees
associated with the my participation in the DAS program were addressed. 10/22/12 in 063341
declaring competent: http://www.youtube.com/watch?vajOqx4xFCK4 11/20/12 in 063341:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?vnOgSKVkvqFU Sincerely, Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471
E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402 ZachCoughlinhotmail.com Zach has
2 Iiles to share with you on SkyDrive. To view them, click the links below. 1 15 12 updated
063341 iIp coughlin to DAS Ior Iee waiver Ior any competency evaluation required 0204
printed.pdI 10 1 12 Lake's Crossing Competency Evaluation Report by Durante Ruled
Competent by Judge SIerrazza on 10 22 12 which is within 30 days oI 11 20 12 Order to get
evaluation done within 30 days 063341.pdI Download all"
"RE: Update?
From: Brown, Celeste (CBrownwashoecounty.us) This sender is in your saIe list.
Sent: Thu 1/24/13 3:10 PM
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To: 'Zach Coughlin' (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Per the video, you showed up at 2:56 p.m From here on out Zach, you need to
check in between 9:45 and 2:00 p.m. Let`s see if we can fix the problem ok?
Sgt. CJ Brown WC Dept. OI Alternative Sentencing 1 South Sierra St. Reno, Nv 89501
desk 775)327-8384 Iax 775)327-8383
From: Zach Coughlin |mailto:zachcoughlinhotmail.com| Sent: Thursday,
January 24, 2013 2:42 PM
To: Brown, Celeste Subject: Update
Dear OIIicer Brown,
I appreciate your recent note. Thank you. It meant a lot. I came in yesterday well
more than 5 minutes prior to 3 pm, but was detained too long at the security
station Ior BailiII Medina to escort me to the DAS OIIice (then ChieI Judge
SIerrazza's Administrative Order 12-01 oI December 20th, 2012 requires as
much). I saw Judge Linda Gardner's bailiII, Deputy Kirkham milling about with
Iour or Iive other deputies near the courthouse exit perIorming a pbc test on a
man, and requested permission to wait my turn and take one as well. I
memorialized this in a note that I gave to BailiII Medina Ior which he agreed to
provide to DAS. Deputy Kirkham made some sneering commentary about
alcoholism and dependency issues in general (I cannot recall speciIically whether
or not she then "high-Iived" one oI her Iellow deputies) as they relate to me, and
perhaps the Irish race and my ancestry in general, then reIused to allow me to
take a pbc test and document it on the note I leIt with BailiII Medina Ior DAS.
Deputy Kirkham decided against assisting in a pbc test. Deputy Kirkham, the
SBN arranged, was present Ior my 11/14/12 Iormal disciplinary hearing at the
State Bar oI Nevada, despite the involvement oI 2JDC Family Court Judge Linda
Gardner (the SBN has been purposeIully vague and obstructionist as to whether
ng12-0435 is a grievance with a grievant oI Linda Gardner given some oI the
ethical problems associated with Judges writing letters whether oI
recommendation or condemnation (or Orders AIter Trial) and submitting them
voluntarily (or having their brother RMC Judge William Gardner do so by way oI
taking the 4/13/09 Order AIter Trial by his sister and passing it to RMC Judge
Nash Holmes, then having her include that in the 3/14/09 grievance she herselI
Iiled on behalI oI RMC Judge William Gardner and all other RMC
Judges....especially where RMC Judge W. Gardner reIused to recuse himselI
Irom the criminal trespass prosecution oI Coughlin Irom his Iormer home law
oIIice incident to the summary eviction Irom it presided over by RJC Judge
SIerrazza (where a $2,275 rent escrow deposit was ordered by the RJC in
violation oI Nevada law and still not returned to Coughlin by the time oI the
trespassing arrest or during any period in which Coughlin was expected to hire
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movers and rent a uhaul and arrange Ior an alternate location to place such
personalty). Further RMC Judge Garder Iailed to disclose that his sister is 2JDC
Family Court Judge Linda Gardner during the audio record oI the 2/2/12 hearing
in 11 CR 26405 wherein Coughlin prompted Judge Gardner to disclose any such
matters that would tend to create an appearance oI impropriety or a basis Ior a
conIlict or bias, whether or not such did, in Iact exist, and whether the judge
himselI thought such did in Iact exist.
As to the permissibility oI such voluntary extra-judicial contacts with
adjudicatory panels (including that by RJC Judicial Secretary Lori Townsend on
4/11/12 to the SBN wherein she volunteered Iilings by Coughlin in 063341 and
065630 and the dockets in those respective cases):
In re Frank, 753 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 2000) (retired appellate judge publicly
reprimanded Ior actions while on bench, including making Ialse or misleading
statements under oath concerning his involvement in divorce litigation oI his
daughter; not recusing himselI Irom appeals based on his Iriendship with attorney
in those appeals; improperly interIering with Bar grievance proceeding oI that
attorney; threatening to have son-in-law arrested or committed to psychiatric
Iacility during divorce proceedings involving his other daughter).
In re Inquiry Concerning Ward, 654 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1995) (judge received public
reprimand Ior writing character reIerence letter Ior criminal deIendant
recommending probation; letter was not response to oIIicial request by
deIendant's probation oIIicer).
In re Fogan, 646 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1994) (judge sanctioned Ior writing character
reIerence letter on oIIicial court stationery Ior personal Iriend Iacing sentencing
in Iederal court; Iriend's Iederal probation oIIicer had not requested letter).
http://www.Ilcourts.org/genpublic/courted/bin/judicialethicsbenchguide.pdI
6. What Contact with Investigative or Adjudicatory Bodies Is Permitted?
The case law and committee opinions advise that a judge may not initiate contact
with an investigatory or adjudicatory body determining rights, duties, privileges,
or immunities oI a person requesting that the judge contact the body on his or her
behalI. Opinion 75-6 (improper to write character letter Ior attorney who is
principal in disbarment proceeding); Opinion 75-18 (improper to write letter to
bar grievance committee or supreme court in disciplinary proceeding or to Iederal
judge in criminal sentencing without oIIicial request); Opinion 82-15 (improper
to write letter voluntarily to Board oI Bar Examiners); Opinion 89-15
(impermissible to appear beIore judicial nominating commission to introduce
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candidate or express opinion about who is best qualiIied to serve as judge...See
Judge SIerrazza's letter in 2007 on this and Judge Linda Gardner's submitting
numerous letters oI recommendation Irom local judges:
http://www.washoecounty.us/largeIiles/agendas/071007/35.pdI page 101-104);
4. May Judge Write Letters oI Recommendation or Serve as Character Witness?
Canon 2B governs letters oI recommendation and states in pertinent part: 'A
judge shall not lend the prestige oI judicial oIIice to advance the private interests
oI the judge or others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to inIluence the judge. Generally,
Florida Supreme Court opinions allow, and Committee opinions advise, that it is
ethically acceptable Ior judges to write letters oI recommendation to educational
institutions on behalI oI persons about whom they have actual knowledge based
on personal observation. See In re Code oI Judicial Conduct, 643 So.2d 1037
(Fla. 1994) (citing Committee opinions 75-18, 75-22, 77-17, 79-3, 88-19, 92-2,
92-30, and 93-1, all identiIied as proper interpretations oI the canon). Similarly,
the opinions cited above indicate that a judge may write a letter oI
recommendation Ior a person applying Ior employment iI the judge has actual
knowledge and communicates Iactual inIormation regarding character,
knowledge, skills, and ability relevant to the job in question or relevant to
proIessional competence generally.
5. What Contact with Investigative or Adjudicatory Bodies Is Permitted?
The case law and Committee opinions advise that a judge may not initiate contact
with an investigatory or adjudicatory body determining rights, duties, privileges,
or immunities oI a person requesting that the judge contact the body in his or her
behalI. See In re Inquiry Concerning Ward, 654 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1995) (judge
wrote letter oI character reIerence on oIIicial court stationery on behalI oI Iriend
awaiting sentencing in Iederal court, a violation oI Canon 2B, Ior which judge
received public reprimand). See Opinion 75-6 (improper to write character letter
Ior attorney who is principal in disbarment proceeding); Opinion 75-18 (improper
to write letter to bar grievance committee or Supreme Court in disciplinary
proceeding or to Iederal judge in criminal sentencing without oIIicial request);
Opinion 82-15 (improper to write letter voluntarily to Board oI Bar Examiners);
Opinion 88-11 (improper to communicate with Florida Bar members on behalI oI
Florida Bar presidential candidate); Opinion 89-4 (improper to ask Board oI Bar
Examiners to expedite application Ior law clerk); Opinion 89-15 (impermissible
to appear beIore judicial nominating commission to introduce candidate or
express opinion about who is best qualiIied to serve as judge).
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Recent case law, in two notable decisions, does, however, suggest that some
communications initiated by a judge with an investigative or adjudicatory body
may be permissible. In In re Frank, 753 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 2000), the court was
Iaced with a judge who contacted Bar grievance attorneys to express Irustration
with their handling oI a matter. Notably, the judge did not ask Ior or demand
special treatment based on his position. The court noted at 1240-41:
Knowledge that one is a judicial oIIicer or respectIul conduct in response to such
knowledge does not automatically translate into a determination that a judicial
position has been abused. Judge Frank did not IorIeit the right to make proper
inquiry concerning the pending matters simply because he held judicial oIIice. A
judicial oIIicer should not be sanctioned simply because those with whom he or
she has interaction are aware oI the oIIicial position. The use oI a judicial
position or power oI the position in an...
May 7, 2004 OPINION: JE04-004 http://judicial.state.nv.us/je040043new.htm
THE PROPRIETY OF VARIOUS EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONDUCT. Issue 1.
May a judge write a letter oI recommendation on behalI oI a candidate Ior
admission to law school? 2. May a judge write a letter oI support on behalI oI a
doctor in a medical licensing hearing? ... DATE ISSUED: May 7, 2004
OPINION: JE04-004 THE PROPRIETY OF VARIOUS EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONDUCT. Issue 1. May a judge write a letter oI recommendation on behalI oI a
candidate Ior admission to law school? 2. May a judge write a letter oI support on
behalI oI a doctor in a medical licensing hearing? Finally, the judge has asked the
Committee whether judicial stationery may be used Ior the letters oI support
approved above. This Committee has previously rendered an opinion that the use
oI judicial stationery while not expressly prohibited, is disIavored when used as a
letter oI congratulation to successIul candidates Ior election to judicial or non-
judicial oIIice. See JE03-002. Judicial ethics committees around the country are
divided on whether judges may use oIIicial stationery to write letters oI
recommendation. See generally, Recommendations by Judges, supra, p. 6. This
Committee believes that as long as the letters oI recommendation are written
upon personal knowledge and otherwise comply with the cautions set out above
to prevent the prestige oI judicial oIIice being used Ior the private gain oI others,
that the use oI judicial stationery is allowable. ReIerences Canon 2B; Canon 4;
Canon 4B; Florida Advisory Opinion 75-6; Missouri Advisory Opinion 137
(1988); Recommendations by Judges, Cynthia Gray, American Judicature
Society, 1966 at p.10; Canon 5; Sections 5B(2) and 5C(1); Canon 5A(1); Canon
5A(1)(b); Canon 4C(1); Canon 4G; Canon 4C(4)(a); Canon 4C(4)(a)(ii); and
JE03-002. This opinion is issued by the Standing Committee
on Judicial Ethics and Election Practices. It is advisory only. It is not binding
upon the courts, the State Bar oI Nevada, the Nevada Commission on Judicial
Discipline, any person or tribunal charged with regulatory responsibilities, any
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member oI the Nevada judiciary, or any person or entity which requested the
opinion. Phillip W. Bartlett Committee
Chairman"
FindACase INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE NO. 93-145 ROBERT J
0204 judges letters oI recommendation.pdI
CJE Opinion No 0204 Massachusetts advisory opinion on Judges writing letters
oI recommendation Ior disbarment proceedings 0204.pdI
1 23 13 0204 01168 WLS decision in 3 10 02 Tax appeal to State Board oI
Equalization email Iorm Anita Moore.pdI
0204 in re ward regarding judges writing voluntarily character reIerence letters
0204 op-82248.pdI
in re Iogan judge letter oI recommendation 0204.pdI
5 7 04 judicial discipline commission opinion nv on judges writing letters.pdI
Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline 0204 nv judges writing letters oI
recommendation.pdI
Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline appearance oI impropriety contacts
0204 eviction.pdI
Iogan type case 0204.pdI
NO. 06-B-2222 in Re John Whitaker Judge writing reIerence letter on letterhead
prestige to advance interest oI another disciplinary matter 0204.pdI
Download all
One thing that I am particular.y unhappy about is what I perceive to be the
sexism displayed by the RJC BailiIIs as it relates to their curious insistence upon
only attempting to violate courthouse sanctuary doctrine within the relatively
cramped conIines oI the DAS check in room. Perhaps they do so in some attempt
to set up an argument that court house sanctuary doctrine has not been violated
where they attempt to eIIect service oI the spurious abuse oI process Iound in the
State Bar oI Nevada and Washoe County Public DeIender's recent Applications
Ior Orders oI Protection and RJC ChieI Judge Pearson's subsequent granting
thereoI.
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However, to me it seems more in line with the regrettably typical approach by so
many males whom cannot bring themselves to respect the jurisdiction oI a
woman such as yourselI who has ascended to a position oI power and inIluence,
and at such a young age to boot. I Ieel that, at least as long as a DAS participant
is in the check in room Ior DAS, that the RJC BailiIIs should respect the sanctity
oI the process and not impinge upon the Iine and important work being done
therein in their attempts to legitimize the spurious abuse oI process by DDAs
Kandaras, D. Watts-Vial (more troubling is the relation the 2JDC Family Court
Judge Walker's Administrative Assistant Laura Watts-Vial given the 54844
Mandamus action's reception by the Family Court Judges in general, which, to
say the least, has not been as equinimitable, according to John Springgate, Esq.,
(whom back in 2009 suggested I Iocuse more on "repairing your relationship with
the Family Court Judges" as though they were a collective vindictive whole
whom blanche biliously at any advocacy counter to their preIerence) as I might
have hoped it would be...), WCPD Jim Leslie, Esq., and the SBN's Patrick O.
King, Esq.
While my resources and time are scarce currently given the pendency oI the
BrieIing Schedule in the Appeal oI the FOFCOL seeking to permanently disbar
me...I will come in today to submit Ior another pbc iI you tell me to, or tomorrow
iI you do not get this message today, and I have mental health evaluation
scheduled and will get the results to you post haste.
Sincerely,
Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667
7402"
Now, considering that under NRS 4.240 docket entries in Justice Courts are prima
Iacie evidence oI Iact, it is interesting to consider the various entries in the cases wherein
Coughlin is or was being prosecuted, along with the statements on the record by Judges
Pearson and CliIton, along with a review oI the written correspondence between Coughlin
and DAS OIIicer Celeste Brown, in addition to considering the role oI conIlict court
appointed (allegedly) attorney Bruce Lindsay, Esq. (especially considering the various
statements oI DDA Young and RJC ChieI Criminal Division Clerk Robbin Baker relayed to
Coughlin through Lindsay's secretary/paralegal Diana Sims.
The docket in RCR11-063341 indicates on page 1: "Warrants Bench Warrant Failure
to Comply. Coughlin, Zachary Barker (Judicial OIIicer: SIcrrazza, Peter) 01/11/2013 11:33
AM Recalled 01/10/2013 10:27 AM Issued 01/09/2013 2:49 PM Pending Clerk. Review
Finc: $0 $500.00 Bonds Cash Bail Without Notice $500.00 2/5/2013 Posted Counts: 1, 2".
ThereaIter, Bruce Lindsay, Esq. is listed as "Lead Attorney" with no indication that
Coughlin is acting as co-counsel, despite Coughlin's express reservations on 3/5/13 and
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3/11/13 in the combo-hearings that he insisted upon staying on as co-counsel with Iinal say
on all decisions related to his representation in any way. There is no entry anywhere in the
docket Ior either a Notice oI Appearance by Lindsay or a Motion to Withdraw or Order
granting such relative to Lindsay's designation in the docket as attorney oI record, Ior which
Lindsay receives compensation Irom the Bob Bell, Esq. Group as necessitate by the WCPD,
through the WCDA's OIIice, receiving a Workplace Harassment EPO against Coughlin
Irom RJC Judge Pearson on 12/18/12 in RCP 12-599.
page 8 oI the docket reveals:
"11/20/12 Disposition (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter) 1. PETIT LARCENY Found
Guilty 2. POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY Found Guilty
11/20/12 Sentence (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter) 1. PETIT LARCENY SUSPENDED
Sentenced to ConIinement Agency: Washoe County Jail term: 180 Days CTS: 7 Days
Comment: not to exceed ONE (1) to TWO (2) years.
11/20/12 Amended Sentence (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peler) 1. PETIT LARCENY
IMPOSED Condition - Adult: I. Department oI Alternative Sentencing. Supervision Ior 1-2
years. All supervision Iees are WAIVED. 11/20/2012, Active 11/20/2014 2. Abstain Irom
Drugs and Alcohol, 11/20/2012, Closed 11/20/2012 3. No Further Violations, 11/20/2012,
Closed 11/20/2012 4. ProoI oI Evaluation and to Follow Evaluatiob Recommendations, To
obtain a Mental Health Evaluation and provide prooI to the Court. 11.20.2012, Active
12/20/2012 5. Other, DeIendant is to take all prescribed medications. 11/20/2012, Closed
11/20/2012"
While Coughlin was never served it by the RJC (indeed there exists no prooI oI
service thereoI in the ROA in the appeal in CR12-2025, perhaps owing to a rendition
standard), the 11/21/11 "Misdemeanor Judgment" by Judge SIerrazza reads: "The
DeIendant on November 20, 2012, plead not guilty, was tried by the Court and was Iound
guilty oI CT. 1. PETIT LARCENY, a violation oI WCC 53.160 and 125.050 and CT. II.
POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY, a violation oI NRS 205.275, Count II conviction
merges with Count I Ior purpose oI sentencing. No Cause appearing why judgment should
not be pronounced, It is ordered and adjudged by the Court that the DeIendant is sentenced
on Count I to serve ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) days in the County Detention
Facility, with credit Ior EIGHT (8) days time served, SUSPENDED Ior an indeIinite period
oI time not to exceed TWO (2) years on the Iollowing conditions: 1) DeIendant is to obtain
at his own expense a Mental Health Evaluation and provide prooI to the Court by December
20, 2012; 2) DeIendant is to take all prescribed prescription medications; 3) DeIendant is
not to consume or possess unauthorized drug and/or alcohol; 4) To violate no laws; 5)
DeIendant is released on Probation to the Department oI Alternative Sentencing Ior
remainder oI sentence; DeIendant ordered to comply with all DAS requirements. It is
Iurther ordered that the DeIendant be detained and brought Iorthwith beIore the Court by
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any duly sworn peace oIIicer oI the State oI Nevada iI the DeIendant violates or Iails to
IulIill any condition oI sentence ordered herein 'or iI the DeIendant violates or Iails to IulIill
any condition oI alternative sentencing in which the DeIendant is allowed to participate by
any agency oI the state or local government. Dated this November 21,2012."
From the quasi-transcript the RJC's Cathy Wood prepared oI the conclusion oI the
11/20/12 Trial in 063341, it is clear Judge SIerrazza still Iailed to grasp the import oI
Coughlin's Motion Ior Mistrial served on the WCDA's OIIice on 10/18/12, but not Iiled
(due to Iaxing error) in the RJC until 11/9/12, which clearly set out that Staab and Shepp
provide mandatory authority preventing a court Irom convicting one Ior both larceny and
receiving stolen property where the allegation is that one received Irom himselI the very
property he himselI stole, ie, "a thieI cannot receive the Iruits oI his own theIt": "Coughlin:
And let's start Irom learning very basic things, I think anyone could have read the 230 page
motion Ior mistrial memorandum oI law that Mr. Young has had since October 18th, I
believe, well over 30 days prior to today. Well, iI today's the 20th. But I see a lot oI growth
was there relevant to the issues here, Staab v State, all this case law I cited herein, urn, is
extremely applicable to things like the amended charge. And I don't want to misstate it now
by citing the wrong case, but I will just say there is cases, and I set them out, and there is, I
believe, mandatory authority in Nevada that iI (page 109) the prosecutor does not plead
Irom another -THE COURT: Sir, it does say Irom another. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm sorry, sir,
I meant speciIy. I believe in my --it needs to speciIy Irom who, or provide Iacts in support
thereoI. THE COURT: In looking at the complaint, it says the property oI Cory Goble in
Count One and Count Two ..." (NOTE: its clear that DDA Young Iailed to grasp the above
argument and authority Couglin made via motion and during the trial by the Iollowing at
page 116: State (DDA Young): "MR. YOUNG: Very brieI, Your Honor. Again, there is no
need Ior the State to prove that the larceny was, in Mr. Coughlin's words, Irom the person oI
116 another, that's a total diIIerent crime, that's a Ielony."
Coughlin: "Urn, but I think it's clear that one in Nevada it's mandatory authority, iI
you Iound that I got the phone, or took the phone, or anything oI that sort, iI you don't Iind
that I had Ielonious intent at that time, at that time, this mandatory authority in Nevada says
that that is not larceny, or, urn, receiving, or possession oI stolen property. And it's a kind oI
quirky thing about Nevada law that legal commentators have noted, but it's deIinitely
exciting, and I don't believe it's worth costing the Court, you know, a bunch more resources,
or the appellate court, or anything oI that regard, particularly when there's mandatory
authority in Nevada law that easily disposes oI this, where I believe the Iacts are very, very
clear that, urn, the accused did not --did not show up and get anything, urn, upon someone
just oIIering a phone up. There's no testimony today that someone oIIered a phone up, and
the accused ran up and got it. (page 113) In Iact, there's tons oI inconsistent testimony, and I
really savaged the skateboard use in this brieI, I typed out the 12 pages oI hours oI
transcripts. THE COURT: Are you reIerring to Staab v State, or are you reIerring to
something else? MR. COUGHLIN: That's a big one. I believe State v Clifford is the one
that deals with, urn, conversely as oI the time oI the taking, the taker --it deals with a --well,
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that's an Arkansas one, but there's Nevada law, State v Clifford: "II such intent does not
exist at the time oI Iinding, but instead the Iinder intends to restore the property to the
owner, a subsequent concealment or Iraudulent appropriation does not constitute larceny." It
might sound like larceny, people might not be proud oI their actions, other people might be
upset, but that's mandatory law in Nevada."
Its interesting to note DDA Young's assessment oI the extent to which the "Iacts" he
attempted to establish support the elements oI the crimes he charged: State: "And I would
submit the standard oI prooI beyond a reasonable doubt has been suIIiciently met with
respect to what this case, a Iairly simple case, is. Taking a cellphone and trying to leave and
all the subsequent actions showing why he's trying to hold on to that, including Ilipping it
over, denying that he has it, and everything else that you've heard over the couple days oI
testimony that we've had." (page 117). All oI the witness testimony purporting to have eye
witnessed Coughlin "Ilipping the phone over" was thoroughly contradicted and or made by
one whom necessarily could not have and did not so witness any such "Ilipping over" oI a
phone suIIicient to conceal the lcd screen oI such lighting up in an incoming call
notiIication supposedly visible through Coughlin's right Iront short's pocket. The witness
testimony (particularly that oI Zarate and Lichty, when considered in relation the the call
records to and Irom the phone during the time in question (which the WCPD tried to
conceal Irom Couglhin and was thoroughly successIully in obstructing Coughlin in his
attempts to identiIy the callers and the locations at the time oI such calls oI such purported
eye witnesses oI such "Ilipping over" or "lighting up" oI the phone Ior the purpose oI
contradicting their claims oI being eye witnesses to such events. The purported "taking",
per that in evidence, at best, consists oI alleged eye witness testimony by Zarate (and
Coughlin was denied the right to have admitted a video oI Zarate admitting that he did not
personally eye witness Coughlin "taking" the phone, but only inIerred that "the man with
the six pack oI beer" gave it to Coughlin through circumstantial deduction) that Coughlin
was Ireely given the phone (which contradicts the statements attributed to Zarate in RPD
OIIicer Duralde's Arrest Report, which indicates Zarate told him Coughlin "grabbed" the
phone oII a ledge, which itselI contradicts Zarate's own written Witness Statement, which
speaks to his belieI that a man gave Coughlin the phone. The bigger pothole Ior the State's
case relates to the "property oI another" element oI petty larceny, which Young decidely
steered clear oI addressing during his closing argument and within the case itselI. Young's
closing and the evidence he put on was also decidedly void oI any support Ior the "intent to
permanently deprive" element, and, in Iact, testimony relative to Coughlin allegedly asking
Goble why he would even want a 3G smart phone when 4G was the newer benchmark (and
Goble's own statement on the 911 recording and videos Coughlin Iilmed oI the moments
prior to the RPD arriving to Couglin: "you just admitted you stole my phone!"...and
Coughlin's statements to Goble that one would be lacking in perspective were they to "set a
phone down, then skateboard a mile away, and get mad iI someone picks it up", both oI
which hardly support any assertion that Coughlin was "denying that he has it" or an
inIerence that Coughlin maniIested some "intent to permanently deprive" one oI their
property. Further, the only testimony oIIered to support Young's contention that Couglhin
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ws "denying that he has it" consisted oI Goble testiIying that he queried Coughlin as to
whether he had "my phone", a possessive clause that necessitates one having knowledge oI
which phones, out oI all the phones in the world, belong, in a legal ownership sense, to one,
Goble, whom was a stranger to Goble prior to these events, and where Goble and other
witnesses admitted the item in question, allegedly a Iungible iPhone 3G with nothing in the
way oI identiIying marks oI ownership displayed thereon (and Goble's testimony oI a screen
lock implying one would be unable to even search such phone Ior clues as to "ownership"
or title).
As to Judge SIerrazza's rendition oI judgment, it clearly reveals the negligent
approach he took to this case, at best, and his apparent (at best) complete lack oI
understanding oI the legal precedent that Coughlin set out in explicit, intricate detail in his
Iilings and trial presentation. Further, the blase, nonchalant approach Judge SIerrazza takes
to convicting Coughlin oI the second charge, the "receiving stolen property charge" can
only undermine any Iaith one has in his ruling as to the larceny charge. Clearly, a Iinder oI
Iact whom hands out SCR 111(6) serious oIIense convictions as easily as candy (and with
zero analysis as to the elements oI a receiving stolen property charge, or any apparent
understanding as to the Iact that one must "receive" such "stolen" property "Irom another"
whom one "knows came to possess that property" by "stealing" it...ie, there was zero
testimony to support a view that "the man holding a six pack" whom Zarate lied with regard
to in testiIying, under oath, that he "personally eye witnessed" to anyone, but especially to
one whose livelihood would suIIer enormous collateral consequences upon such a
conviction, such as an attorney (which the receiving stolen property charge is, as it contains
an element in its deIinition involving theIt) :
"THE COURT: I am prepared to rule at this time, and although I don't believe I'm
required to explain my decision, I am going to indicate that I have reviewed State v
Clifford, and also the other case cited by Mr. Coughlin, Staab v State, and Irom that
State v CliIIord, it does indicate that the mere fact of a person's converting to his
own use goods found by him does not, as a matter of law, make him guilty of theft.
Conversely, if at the time of the taking the taker knows or has means of
discovering the owner, it is his legal and moral duty to hold and restore the goods
to him, and if under such circumstances he absolutely appropriates them to his
own use, excluding the dominion of the owner, it is larceny. And that's State v
Clifford, 14 Nevada 72, 1879 case. And then Staab v State provides that: "It is the Iact
oI possession," and that's 90 Nevada 347, 1974, "it is the Iact oI possession that
provides the inIerence oI guilt. The inIerence which is Iounded on maniIest reason that
when goods have been taken Irom one person and are quickly thereaIter Iound in the
possession oI another, there is a strong probability that they were taken by the latter."
And based upon the law oI the statute, the case law in CliIIord and Staab, which were
cited by the deIendant, the Court Iinds beyond a reasonable doubt that the deIendant in
this case is guilty oI petty larceny, and in Count Two, the Court Iinds 118 I beyond a
reasonable doubt that the deIendant is guilty oI possession oI stolen property. And with
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respect to sentencing, we'll hear Irom the State at this time, and then we'll hear Irom the
deIendant. MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, with respect to sentencing I believe the case
law is clear that essentially Counts One and Two merge, so I'm only going to be
asking for effectively one sentence...
THE COURT: All right. Sir, I'm going to impose sentence. I'm not punishing you for
going through a trial, but I do agree with the district attorney in this case that this is
not a run of the mill petty larceny case, I am going to sentence you to the 180 days,
which will be suspended, and you will get credit Ior the time you served, which you
indicated was seven and a halI days, I'll give you credit Ior eight days on this case. (page
123) I will suspend it on condition that you are supervised by DAS, and I will waive --
instruct DAS to waive any cost for the supervision, normally defendants are required
to pay the cost of their supervision. MR. COUGHLIN: What is DAS? THE COURT:
Department oI Alternative Sentencing. MR. COUGHLIN: Thank you. THE COURT:
You'll need to check in no later than tomorrow with them. You'll need to sign an order
to attend up Iront beIore you leave. I will not impose any fine, but there will be a
condition you abstain from use of alcohol and illegal drugs, and that you take
medications as prescribed. And that you get a mental health evaluation within 3
days from today, and follow the recommendations, that will need to be presented to
the Court no later than 3 days from today. And if you do all that, you will not go to
jail, and you will your sentence is suspended for a minimum of one to two years.
And I do not want to see you back in court again, but I don't believe your problems
with the law are being caused by Mr. Young, he doesn't go out in the streets and
find you and accuse you of offenses, that is the police, and it is (page 124)
independent of Mr. Young, it is independent from me , it is independent of the
landlords you've had problems with, or the other attorneys, prosecuting attorneys,
and the judges, you've had a variety of judges consider your cases. I think you've
had an opportunity to present your case, and I do find that this is a reasonable
sentence in light of everything that's happened. And you do have the right to appeal
iI you disagree."
It is noteworthy that nothing in the judgment and sentence as rendered by
Judge SIerrazza orders Coughlin to pay Ior the cost oI the "Mental Health Evaluation".
The alleged Iailure oI Coughlin to comply with such condition in a timely manner
became central to the 1/10/13 issuance oI a warrant by Judge SIerrazza, noted in the
docket, which was quickly quashed by ChieI Judge Pearson on 1/11/13/ As such, the
notation in the docket Ior 2/4/13 oI a "Warrant Arraignment" Ior a FTC (Failure to
Comply) DAS Probation Violation certainly runs counter to the Arrest Report and
Probable Cause sheet by DAS OIIicers Wickman and Ramos oI 2/1/13 in not only
crossing out the box Ior entering a "Warrant # & Date" but Iurther listing a warrantless
probation violation statute, NRS 211A.125 in the box Ior "NRS/ORD #". Further, that
ARDOPC lists the "Arrest Date" as "2/1/13" with a "Time" oI "1902", which is an
admission that the arrest violated NRS 171.136 in making a warrantless arrest oI
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Coughlin in his home (especially where the two oIIicers reIused to indicate to Coughlin
that he was going to be placed under arrest, as required by law prior to doing so, and
where the indicated to Coughlin through a closed, locked home door, that they were
"ordering" him to exit his home, and that he would be in violation oI the law should he
Iail to do so. This is particularly true where the judgment and sentence as rendered
contain nothing to support a view that a condition oI Coughlin's probation involved
submitting to "random search and seizure", and the any assertion that "being supervised
by DAS" includes such, especially per the listed options in NRS 178, or that the DAS
"Contract" requires such a waiver oI one's rights (especially not where Coughlin
interlineated on such contract that he was not waiving any such rights and not agreeing
to comply with anything more than the express conditions oI his sentence and or
probation as rendered in court by Judge SIerrazza (and any subsequent amendments
thereto, or diIIerences between the sentence as rendered in open court and as reduced to
writing in the "Misdemeanor Judgment" oI 11/21/12 (which, again, was never served on
Coughlin and where even the Record on Appeal in the appeal oI this matter in CR12-
2025 lacks any ProoI oI Service or Notice oI Entry whatsoever to support an assertion
that Coughlin ever received such 11/21/11 Misdemeanor Judgment" suIIicient to place
him on notice oI any such terms or otherwise lend any credence to a view that such are
not void).
the terms oI Couglin's probation in 063341 (which is the only probation Couglin is
currently subject to given Judge CliIton made Coughlin's sentence in 065630 run
consecutive to Coughlin's sentence in 063341, meaning, Coughlin's probation incident
to the conviction in 065630 (now on appeal in CR13-0614) has yet to even begin) do
not include being 'Subject To Random Search and Seizure by a Peace OIIicer anymore
than the do not require 'Publice DeIender Reimbursement. Upon complying with
Judge SIerrazza's 11/20/12 'Order to Attend in 063341, which reads: 'YOU ARE
ORDERED to attend and complete the Iollowing: (NOTE: there are box that are not
check Ior the Iollowing: Dui School, Victim Impact Panel, Domestic Violence Program,
Anger Counseling Program, SelI Help Meetings, To appaer Ior Courts Counesling
Compliance Program (CCP), Public DeIender Reimbursement, Evaluation, Parenting
Class, Restitution) (NOTE: there is a 'check in the boxes Ior the Iollowing): Due by;
1-2 years; Alternative Sentencing Division...Report Ior Probation by 11/21/2012. Hours
Mon.-Thurs. 9:00 AM 3:00 P.M.; Due by; 12/20/2012; Other: To obtain a Mental
Health Evaluation and provide prooI to the Court. YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR
PROVIDING THE COURT WITH YOUR CURRENT ADDRESS WITHIN 10 DAYS
OF ANY CHANGE. YOU ARE FURTHER ORDERED to enroll within 10 days and
appear alcohol Iree. Upon successIul completion, you are responsible Ior producing a
completion certiIicate to the Court on or beIore the due date. Failure to comply with any
requirement oI your counseling program(s) may result in the issuance oI a bench
warrant Ior your arrest (A $25.00 late Iee will be assessed eo each programs(s) not
complete on the due date). DATE this 20th day oI November, 2012 /s/s PETER J.
SFERRAZZA, Justice oI the Peace, Department #2. The sentence imposed upon
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Couglin by Judge SIerrazza in 063341 not only waived all oI the Iees associated with
DAS, it did not impose any Iine on Couglin either, and gave him credit Ior all the time
he served in connection with the charge levied (which is diIIicult to actually discern
given the 15 custodial arrests and the various intricacies oI which bail applied to what
charge, and the 52 days oI incarceration Couglin has been subject to since the 8/20/11
arrest in 063341, incident to which he was given 8 days credit Ior his incarceration
between 8/20/11 8/26/11 whereupon he was released on his own recognizance upon
the charge being lessened Irom 'ooh thats a Ielony grand larceny (as said RPD OIIicer
Duralde to Couglin shortly aIter eIIecting a custodial arrest at 11 pm in violation oI
NRS 171.136) alleging Coughlin larcenized a '$80 used iPhone, but still charging
Couglin with Ielony grand larceny in retaliatoin Ior Coughlin inquiring about the Hiibel
case, Terry Stops, reasonable suspicion and probable cause, etc., and taking issue with
the Iact that Duralde (by all indications, accidentally) touched Coughlin's penis during
one oI the many 'Terry Stop weapons check pat downs that he conducted that night.).
Anyways, Judge SIerrazza did not order, as a condition oI Coughlin's probation, that he
be 'subject ot random search and seizure by a peace oIIicer.
The disturbin link between Coughlin's email oI 1:30 AM to the WCDA's OIIice on
2/1/13 and the warrantless, retaliatory DAS arrest some seventeen hour later is clear when
considering not only the content oI that email and surrounding circumstances, but the terms
oI Coughlin's suspended sentence and NRS 176A.310
NRS 176A.310 Conditions; duties oI surety; probationer to report to and pay surety. 1.
1he court shall set the conditions of a program of probation ... The conditions may
include, but are not limited to, any one or more of the following: (a) Submission to
periodic tests to determine whether the probationer is using any controlled substance or
alcohol. (b) Participation in a program Ior the treatment oI the abuse oI a controlled
substance or alcohol or a program Ior the treatment oI any other impairment. (c)
Participation in a program oI proIessional counseling, including, but not limited to,
counseling Ior the Iamily oI the probationer. (d) Restrictions or a prohibition on contact
or communication with witnesses or victims oI the crime committed by the probationer.
(e) A requirement to obtain and keep employment. (I) Submission to a Program oI
Intensive Supervision. (g) Restrictions on travel by the probationer outside the
jurisdiction oI the court. (h) Payment oI restitution. (i) Payment oI Iines and court costs.
(j) Supervised community service. (k) Participation in educational courses. 2. A surety
shall: (a) Provide the Iacilities or equipment necessary to: (1) PerIorm tests to determine
whether the probationer is using any controlled substance or alcohol, iI the court
requires such tests as a condition oI probation; (2) Carry out a Program oI Intensive
Supervision, iI the court requires such a Program as a condition oI probation; and (3)
Enable the probationer to report regularly to the surety. (b) Notify the court within 24
hours after the surety has knowledge of a violation of or a failure to fulfill a
condition of the program of probation. 3. A probationer participating in a program oI
probation secured by a surety bond shall: (a) Report regularly to the surety; and (b) Pay
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the Iee charged by the surety Ior the execution oI the bond. In the Minutes by Clerk
1anet Taylor from the 10/3/08 Case Management ConIerence held beIore Senior Judge Scott Jordan
Iiled 10/10/08 the following is indicated:
'
: Present in Court were PlaintiII Ashwin Joshi, represented by counsel John
Springgate, Esq.; and DeIendant Bharti Joshi, represented by counsel Zachary
Coughlin, Esq.
This matter was scheduled as a Case Management Conference, and the parties
have agreed to put the Iollowing issues beIore the Court:
Mr. Springgate inIormed the Court that the parties have two children that are no
longer minors; thereIore custody will not be at issue. Plaintiff has a family debt of
approximately $5,000.00 incurred in bringing the family over from Tanzania. He
agrees to keep that debt. The parties have consumer debt of approximately
$20,000.00 that the parties shall be divided equally.
Plaintiff also has a $48,000.00 medical bill. Although it is a community debt, he
will continue to pay and accept liability Ior it. Mr. Springgate has explained to
PlaintiII that should he be sued for that medical debt he could file bankruptcy.
Although Plaintiff is not pondering bankruptcy at this point, should it become
necessary, it will be a great deal of family debt Plaintiff will no longer be
responsible for. For that reason they agree to the Court keeping jurisdiction on
alimony for five years at $1.00 per year to protect Defendant should a
bankruptcy be filed.
There are two signiIicant items oI personal property in dispute, a television and a
computer. PlaintiII requests his personal papers located at the residence in order to
apply Ior citizenship.
In regard to the automobiles, PlaintiII shall keep the Trailblazer and maintain, and
DeIendant shall keep the Caravan and maintain payments on that vehicle. All other
vehicles belong to the children.
DeIendant has a claim about her 'woman`s wealth brought into the marriage, and
giIts. PlaintiII testiIies that he does not have it, and does not know where it is. He
believes it may be with his sister in Tanzania. Since he doesn`t have it, he cannot
agree to give it to her. He does, however agree that it belongs to DeIendant and is not
community property. PlaintiII agrees to notiIy his Iamily that it should be delivered
to DeIendant and will attempt to expedite that delivery.
Mr. Coughlin states that Defendant has considered the offer and is not at a
point to agree to it. Defendant is troubled by the lack of effort on Plaintiff`s part
to obtain the woman`s wealth. Defendant strongly fees some alimony award is in
order.
PlaintiII veriIied that he works at a catering company and has no other
employment.
The Court indicates that its` goal is to attempt to settle this matter. In regard to the
marital wealth, both parties agree it should be awarded to DeIendant. It is important
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PlaintiII cooperate in returning those items to DeIendant. The Court has no other
power to order their return other than awarding them to Defendant.
The medical debt is being treated as a community debt, and Plaintiff agrees to
pay in full. The Court wants to make sure the parties understand that should PlaintiII
be sued Ior non-payment oI the medical debt the doctors have the right to pursue
DeIendant Ior payment. Her recourse would be to sue Plaintiff.
The Court states that in regard to alimony, under Nevada rules alimony is
awarded when there is an imbalance between earnings of the parties. Based upon
the information, both parties earn the same amount so there is no basis for
alimony. Since Plaintiff is taking more than the debt, this should offset any
claim for alimony.
In regard to the issue oI personal property, each party is to keep what they
currently have in their possession. PlaintiII does not want the television but requests
the Iinancial inIormation Irom the hard drive oI the computer.
The Court states it has no power to order custody or visitation but encourages the
parties to have a meaningIul relationship Ior the beneIit oI the children.
The parties agreed to recess and attempt a settlement.
The Court was inIormed that the parties could not settle, thereIore it did not
reconvene.
Coughlin wrote WLS's Elcano in an email (and possibly a Iax) transmitted successIully on
4/19/09:
"PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent: Sun 4/19/09 7:52 PM To: Paul Elcano (pelcanowashoelegalservices.org); THIS
MESSAGE IS INTENDED FOR PAUL ELCANO ONLY, PLEASE DO NOT READ
UNLESS YOU ARE THE INTENDED RECIPIENT. April 15th, 2009
Dear Paul, I wish to make another Iormal complaint alleging a hostile work environment
that includes harassment, sexual harassment, workplace bullying, discrimination and other
prohibited conduct directed towards due to my race, gender, religion, national origin, political
aIIiliation, sexual orientation, and age.
Ì have been harassed, sexually harassed, and discriminated against by employees oI
Washoe Legal Services on many occasions. This is ongoing. I have inIormed you and others
at our workplace oI this harassment many times. Some, but not all, oI the prohibited behavior
directed towards me includes inappropriate sexually charged comments, racially charged
comments, gender discrimination, screaming, the use oI disparaging and Ioul language,
bullying, and intimidation. Much oI this conduct has Iocused on my gender, sexual
orientation, national origin, political aIIiliation or viewpoint, race and other immutable
characteristics. This conduct has continued to occur and is presently ongoing. Marc Ashley,
Karen Sabo, and John Sasser were deIinitely made aware oI this by me in one oI our sit down
meetings and I inIormed them oI my wish to Iile a Iormal complaint at that time, though I do
not believe my request was Iollowed up on. I recently Iiled a Iormal complaint approximately
two months ago but have yet to hear back Irom anyone with Washoe Legal Services
regarding that complaint.
I am in no way going to detail every single inappropriate or prohibited act by a Washoe
Legal Services employee directed at me in this communication. It is my Iirm desire that we
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all just get along, serve our clients well, and make eIIicient use oI the grants bestowed upon
us, and I would hate to see anyone lose their job without a real opportunity to address these
issues. This inappropriate conduct has included a variety oI activities, not all oI which I will
be able to Iully detail in this complaint but will be able to provide details at an appropriate
time.
I would like a copy oI this and my other complaints placed in my employment Iile. I
request that the Iormal complaint and grievance process begin soon. Sincerely, Zach
Coughlin, Esq."
Kathy Breckenridge, Esq. (Board President Ior WLS in 2009 at the time oI Coughlin's
termination) along with DDA Mary Kandaras, Esq. (involved in the conIiscation on 2/28/12 oI
Coughlin's smart phone, cell phone, and micro sd data card well aIter it any period in which a "search
incident to arrest" could permissibly be done, and aIter such items were booked into Coughlin's
personal secured property at the Washoe County jail, and the return oI such items, albeit with all the
data wiped, a Iull 7 days aIter the 3/30/12 Order by Judge Nash Holmes in 26800 requiring that
WCDA DDA Kandaras and the WCSO release them to Coughlin), sit on the NNDB and should not
have been on the Screening Panel, nor should have Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s admitted best Iriend David
Hamilton, Esq.
"Subject: WLS
From: Kathy Breckenridge (kathykbreckenridgelaw.com)
Sent: Fri 4/24/09 9:27 AM
1 attachment Coughlin ltr Apr23, 09.pdI (4.4 KB)... VIA E-MAIL AT
zachcoughlinhotmail.com AND US MAIL
Dear Mr. Coughlin: Several events relating to your employment with Washoe Legal
Services have transpired in the last week that must and will be addressed in an orderly and
timely manner. One of these events is the order issued by 1udge Gardner sanctioning your
conduct. Your employment was suspended with pay to give Washoe Legal Services the
opportunity to investigate and take appropriate action to address concerns resulting from
these events. We have ordered the tape oI the hearing beIore 1udge Gardner and will be
reviewing it as part oI our investigation. As I inIormed you during our conversation on April
22, we are conducting an investigation and you will have the opportunity to present the Iacts
Irom your perspective.
On April 20, 2009, after your employment suspension , you presented us with a letter
where you notified us that you had previously filed complaints with Washoe Legal
Services. We will extend the scope of our investigation to cover your complaints. Again,
you will have the opportunity to explain the basis oI your complaints. We will contact you
within the next week to schedule your interview.
In your April 20 letter, you requested a copy oI your personnel Iile. I have asked Paul to
make a copy oI your Iile. Please email my Assistant at tarakbreckenridgelaw.com to let her
know the address Ior us to send the Iile to you. II you would preIer to pick up a copy oI your
personnel Iile Irom my oIIice, let my Assistant know when to expect you.
Very truly yours, Kathleen T. Breckenridge, Esq. President oI The Board"
'employment complaint oI Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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Sent: Mon 4/20/09 4:30 PM
To: kathykbreckenridgelaw.com
2 attachments
Letter to Board President Breckenridge.doc (39.0 KB) , Complaint Ior Washoe Legal Services
Board.doc (26.0 KB)
NB: attachments contain the same as that which is pasted below:
Kathleen T. Breckenridge, Esq.
Board President, Washoe Legal Services
Kathleen T. Breckenridge Ltd.
462 Court Street
Reno, NV 89501
April 20th, 2009
Dear Kathleen,
Normally I would not write to you at this juncture in the process, however, you apparently are
already aware oI some situation now existing between Washoe Legal Services and myselI. I do not
know whether you are aware that I had already Iiled complaints and or grievances with Washoe Legal
Services and am awaiting a response. This communication is intended to make sure that you are
aware oI this.
I am concerned Ior my clients and wish to have access to my oIIice and Iiles so that I may
comply with the Rules oI ProIessional Responsibility. Further, one case, the Bharti Joshi matter
contains a ruling that orders me to personally pay attorney`s Iees to the opposing party.
Reconsideration oI this Order aIter Trial must be sought immediately and I would like some
indication Irom Washoe Legal Services as to whether I am 'allowed to seek such reconsideration. I
intend to seek to have this order reconsidered and would like some direction as to whether you, the
Board, or Washoe Legal Services intends to continue to, in some way, prevent me Irom having a
chance to have my personal liability in that case reconsidered in addition to preserving the clients
avenues Ior reconsideration.
Paul Elcano, Executive Director oI Washoe Legal Services, has directed me to have no
involvement in any oI my cases, and to reIrain Irom entering the building at 299 S. Arlington Avenue
regardless oI any duty I may have under the Rules oI ProIessional Responsibility or otherwise. He
indicates this is the Board`s directive as well. He Iurther indicates that he and the Board have decided
that I will not be allowed to retrieve anything Irom my oIIice until Iurther notice, including my
personal belongings. I would like some indication, in writing, that that is the case, as I Ieel I have a
responsibility to my clients to protect their interests to the Iullest extent possible and that it is
impossible to do so while obeying these directives.
I still have yet to be told what it is I am being accused oI, or by whom, and I have not been
interviewed or questioned in that regard prior to implementation oI the Board`s apparent decision to
suspend me. Further, the employment complaints and grievances (and there is more than one) that I
Iiled prior to any such suspension have yet to be responded to in any way that I am aware oI.
Whether any retaliation Ior my complaints is occurring is certainly up Ior debate.
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I request that I am given proper written notice oI what is alleged against me and by whom,
that I be in all appropriate ways included in this process, and that I am allowed to retrieve my
personal belongings and take the appropriate steps to assure the protection oI my clients` interests.
With regard to being ordered to personally pay attorney`s Iees in the Joshi divorce matter, I
Ieel I have quite a strong argument Ior overturning that Order. Basically, the award oI attorney`s Iees
relates to my reIusal to accept a settlement oIIer whereby my client would agree to taking $1.00 oI
alimony Ior Iive years in exchange Ior the opposing party agreeing to be responsible Ior about
$30,000 oI consumer debt. This consumer debt was largely incurred on the opposing party`s credit
cards, to which my client was not a co-signer or authorized user and was never allowed to examine
any sort oI itemized statement oI the charges incurred (despite my written requests to opposing
counsel and indication that allowing her to do so would Iurther settlement negotiations). While these
credit card debts were presumptively community property and my client could have her share oI the
community property (Ior which there was none, they are paycheck to paycheck people who don`t own
a house) used to satisIy the community credit card debt, she Iaced no personal liability. This was a 21
year marriage with a $12,000 yearly income disparity Iavoring the opposing party. My client had
been the primary caregiver to their now 20 year old children.
I argued against accepting such a settlement (though I certainly inIormed my client that the
decision to go to trial was largely hers). I anticipated the trial would result in an alimony award to my
client oI roughly $500 per month, potentially Ior over 10 years. Should my client have been ordered
to pay halI the community credit card debt (Ior which her personal property probably could not be
used to satisIy as she was not a cosigner on the account), any subsequent Iailure on her part to do so
could arguably not be used as a proper basis to set oII any alimony award received.
It seems I was ordered to personally pay attorney`s Iees Ior Iailing to accept the settlement and
pursuing an argument that the court did not Ieel was warranted by existing law. However, as detailed
below, there does appear to be a good deal oI existing law supporting the position we took in
rejecting the settlement oIIer. I in no way told my client to disobey any order oI the court. Like
many domestic violence cases, the settlement oIIered exerted a good deal oI inappropriate 'power and
control (a la the Duluth model) over my client and her rights and I objected to that and am proud Ior
having done so in the Iace oI much arm twisting.
The court in each oI the Iollowing cases determined that an oIIset against an arrearage oI
alimony Ior payments to various third parties on behalI oI a Iormer spouse, including tuition and sums
spent in satisIaction oI a bank loan or credit card charges, would not be permitted.
The court in Morel v Morel (1982, La App 5th Cir) 425 So 2d 1289, cert den (La) 430 So 2d
99, reIused to allow as an oIIset against delinquent alimony pendente lite and child support several
noncomplying expenditures by the husband, including the payment oI the children's tuition, a
community debt, when the amount expended could be recovered by him at the time oI the settlement
oI the marital community, and the payment was not made pursuant to the spouses' agreement. A
request by the wiIe that the husband make such payments during a later time period was Iound
irrelevant to the instant indirect payments.
Where the wiIe testiIied that she used the credit card to "balance out" household expenses Ior
herselI and the children while the couple was separated, the court in Youngberg v Youngberg (1986,
La App 4th Cir) 499 So 2d 329, would not permit an oIIset against post-divorce permanent alimony
and child support arrearages Ior one-halI oI the credit card charges. The husband had been ordered to
pay alimony pendente lite and child support during the period in which the charges were made, but
was current in his payments at that time, and asserted that the wiIe made the charges without the his
permission. The wiIe maintained that the credit card charges were Ior expenses Ior which the husband
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was responsible. The court concluded that neither spouse intended such a credit when the husband
paid the credit card account balance, denying the oIIset apparently based on the lack oI evidence oI an
agreement between the parties.
In Gottsegen v Gottsegen (1987, La App 4th Cir) 508 So 2d 162, the court disallowed credit
against past-due permanent alimony Ior pre-award payments made on veterinarian and cable
television bills when those items could not be considered necessary Ior the wiIe's support, pursuant to
La.R.S. 9:310, which provided Ior the retroactive eIIect oI such awards subject to credit Ior any
support provided.
Credit card charges Ior the purchase oI luggage and an airline ticket by the wiIe immediately
prior to separation, which apparently Iell to the husband to pay, were not oIIset against arrears in
alimony pendente lite by the court in Rauch v Rauch (1988, La App 5th Cir) 535 So 2d 1317, when
the husband's claim was not "liquidated" within the meaning oI LSA-C.C. art. 1893, the statutory
setoII provision.
Although aIIirming the lower court's postponement oI a decision respecting the husband's
right to credit until the divorce trial because this aspect oI the decision was not appealed, the court in
KeII v KeII (1983, 3d Dept) 95 App Div 2d 888, 464 NYS2d 29, remarked that a judgment requiring
the husband to pay the Iull amount oI the claimed arrears in temporary maintenance and child support
would have been appropriate, notwithstanding a claimed setoII Ior amounts paid by him Ior attorney's
Iees owed by the wiIe. The court noted that the husband neither moved Ior relieI oI the support order,
nor proIIered any reason Ior his neglect, and his unilateral reduction oI support was improper.
The court in Gluck v Gluck (1987, 2d Dept) 134 App Div 2d 237, 520 NYS2d 581, concluded
that a husband's payment oI the spouses' credit card bills, apparently prior to divorce, could not be
oIIset against arrears in (temporary) maintenance and child support owed to his wiIe.
In Bruner v Bruner (1978, La App 2d Cir) 356 So 2d 1101, cert gr (La) 358 So 2d 641, it was
held that the trial court erred in allowing a husband credit or an oIIset against a claimed arrearage oI
alimony pendente lite Ior payments made by him to third parties on his wiIe's behalI where the
evidence did not show that the payments were made at the request oI, or with the consent oI, his wiIe.
A husband was not entitled to credit against arrears in pendente lite maintenance and child
support Ior voluntary payments he made to third parties Ior his wiIe's and children's beneIit,
according to the court in Krantz v Krantz (1991, 2d Dept) 175 App Div 2d 865, 573 NYS2d 738, on
the ground that several oI the payments also satisIied the husband's contractual obligations.
Remanding the case Ior a new trial to determine whether the wiIe consented to certain
payments to third parties in lieu oI alimony and child support arrearages due under a separation
agreement, the court in Lopez v Lopez (1980, App) 125 Ariz 309, 609 P2d 579, observed that support
payments, whether Ior the wiIe's or child's support, are to be disbursed by the supported spouse as she
sees Iit, and the supporting spouse ordinarily is not entitled to credits against past-due support Ior
monies that he paid to third parties on his own accord and without her consent, unless equitable
exceptions so demand and such an allowance would not do an injustice to the supported spouse. The
husband had requested credit Ior payments made by him through his insurance company, to doctors
and dentists on behalI oI his wiIe and children, and one-halI oI the payment made on a lot purchased
by him in both parties' name.
And, in Kerpen v Kerpen (1991, 2d Dept) 172 App Div 2d 496, 567 NYS2d 849, the court
reIused to credit a husband with voluntary payments made on behalI oI his wiIe Ior "club and other
items" toward the sum oI money owed by him Ior maintenance and child support under a pendente
lite order.
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I Ieel strongly that existing law did indeed warrant the position we took at trial. The court also
took some issue with my repeated objections to opposing counsel entering exhibits into evidence
without providing a copy to me at the time they were being introduced (indicating that the documents
were produced at an earlier stage oI the litigation). However, the court`s own Pre-Trial Order
indicated that should more than ten exhibits be used at trial, the introducing party is to provide
opposing counsel with copies that are bound, tabbed, and indexed. I believe more than ten exhibits
were introduced into evidence.
There are a number oI pressing matters relating to my clients and cases that must be dealt with
at once. Further, it is impossible Ior me to identiIy all such matters while being denied access to my
Iiles and oIIice. For instance, Lidia Davenport, your Iormer client, has a deadline oI today, I believe,
Ior which to submit a subpoena duces tecum to the various lenders that Mr. Davenport was able to
convince to give him approximately $2,000,000 in loans (despite his current contention that he is a
Ilat broke ski instructor , even considering the NINJA loan economic climate oI the time), otherwise
she will be barred Irom introducing any evidence related to that request at trial. We seek to obtain
copies oI the loan applications Iilled out by Mr. Davenport Ior purposes oI establishing his income,
which is relevant to both the alimony and property distribution issues. Further, a deadline is Iast
approaching to seek reconsideration oI Judge Hardy`s Interim Order aIter Settlement ConIerence
whereby Mrs. Davenports monthly spousal support award was reduced to $500.00 and no speciIic
perIormance, even on a temporary basis, oI the AIIidavit oI Support obligation was ordered. My
research indicates that Mr. Davenport has a contractual obligation that Mrs. Davenport can seek
speciIic perIormance oI in state court, pursuant to the language oI 8 U.S.C.A. 1183a(e)(1) and the
Younis, Cheshire, Stump, and Davis cases. This is true regardless oI whether Mrs. Davenport is
seeking to be employed, and perhaps even where she is employed, and even where such parties have
divorced. Am I allowed to Iile such a motion Ior reconsideration, according to Washoe Legal
Services?
Further, I would like to Iile some sort oI Summary Judgment Motion in this Davenport case
seeking to Iind out whether Judge Hardy will rule on the AIIidavit oI Support obligation as to liability
and damages prior to trial in hopes oI avoiding the possibility oI having another award personally
requiring me to pay attorneys Iees.
I request that a copy oI all the employment complaints I have provided Washoe Legal
Services be included in my employment Iile. Also, I request that I be provided a copy oI my
employment Iile, to be mailed to my home address, or that arrangements are made which will allow
me to make such a copy.
I regret that I Ieel the need to send a communication such as this to you and certainly
appreciate and respect the altruistic contributions you make to our community in serving as the Board
President Ior Washoe Legal Services.
Sincerely, Zach Coughlin, Esq.
To: pelcanowashoelegalservices.org;
Subject: PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2009 19:52:41 -0700
Paul Elcano, Executive Director
Washoe Legal Services
299 S. Arlington Ave.
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Reno, NV 89501
April 15th, 2009
Dear Paul,
I wish to make another Iormal complaint alleging a hostile work environment that
includes harassment, sexual harassment, workplace bullying, discrimination and other
prohibited conduct directed towards due to my race, gender, religion, national origin,
political aIIiliation, sexual orientation, and age... (the remained oI that email was therein
included)
Clearly, Coughlin's written complaint oI 4/19/09, successIully transmitted to Elcano via digital
transmission on 4/19/09, was beIore any "employment suspension" Breckenridge indicates occurred
on 4/20/09 above. Neither Board President Breckenridge, nor anyone else with WLS ever indicated
to Coughlin what the "several events" were mentioned in Breckenridge's letter oI 4/24/09, above.
However, that letter does not indicate that any events other than the Order by Judge Gardner involved
any consternation directed at any conduct by Couglin.
In a 4/22/09 email Elcano sent three days aIter the successIul transmission oI Coughlin's
4/19/12 written complaint oI employment discrimination, and hostile work environment issue at
Washoe Legal Services, Elcano wrote:
'Subject: (No Subject)
From: Paul Elcano (pelcanowashoelegalservices.org)
Sent:Wed 4/22/09 8:58 AM
To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com Cc:kathykbreckenridgelaw.com;
toddtorvinensbcglobal.net
Dear Zach, For some reason your e-mail did not come through on my computer so I just
received it yesterday Irom a board member. This matter was referred to the Board
independently, not by me, and as a result they are handling it. Because oI this situation I
am not to be communicating directly with you. The purpose oI this communication is to
clariIy my status and address a misunderstanding about your personal belongings. You are
Iree to pick up any personal aIIects you want. We only request that you do so outside oI
business hours and with me and a board member present. Arrangements to do so, and all
Iurther communication about this matter should be made to our Board President Kathy
Breckenridge at Kathykbreckenridgelaw.com with a copy to Todd Torvinen at
toddtorvinensbcglobal.net. II they instruct you diIIerently then you should Iollow their
instructions.
Sincerely, Paul Elcano"
"From: Zach Coughlin |mailto:zachcoughlinhotmail.com| Sent: Friday, April
24, 2009 11:02 PM To: Paul Elcano; Marc Ashley Subject: The email you were
sent last Sunday
Dear Paul, Here is the email you were sent last Sunday. My account shows
that it was received by you. Please place a copy oI this in my employment Iile.
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Sincerely, Zach Coughlin (a copy oI Coughlin's email to Elcano Irom
4/18/09 detailing his employment law based complaints was included thereaIter,
Ior which no unsuccessIul transmission messages were received (Coughlin's
4/19/09 email to Elcano was thereaIter included)"
"RE: The email you were sent last Sunday
From: Paul Elcano (pelcanowashoelegalservices.org) Sent: Mon 4/27/09 9:36
AM To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com
Zach,
This e-mail states it is intended Ior my eyes only. UnIortunately, it
requests a copy oI the e-mail be placed in your personnel Iile. By placing it in the
personnel Iile it has become available to the Board who is handling this matter.
-Paul ...(a copy oI Coughlin's email to Elcano oI 4/24/09 at 11:02 PM was
included below this email Irom Elcano)"
"Subject: WLS From: Paul Elcano (pelcanowashoelegalservices.org) Sent: Fri 5/01/09 8:52 AM
To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com Cc: Kathy Breckenridge (kathykbreckenridgelaw.com) 1
attachment ltrCoughlin2ndDraIt.doc (30.5 KB) Letter attached.
Dear Zach, I have been authorized by the Board to handle this matter.
1. Your current suspension was a result of the order entered by 1udge Gardner in the 1oshi
matter;
2. Suspension means that you are no longer to participate as a lawyer in any case assigned to you
by WLS until Iurther notice. You may appear on your own behalf to litigate the order of
sanctions entered by 1udge Gardner. II any lawyer contacts you about a WLS case you must reIer
them to Caryn Sternlicht or Marc Ashley;
3. According to the Court`s order, you were sanctioned Ior arguing incessantly, being
unprepared, making sarcastic and derogatory remarks to the Court, and for rude and
disrespectful conduct. You were personally Iined $934 as a result oI this conduct;
4. I could not evaluate your conduct at trial until I received the tape oI the hearing; this tape was
promptly ordered, and was finally received on Thursday, April 23rd. I have not yet reviewed this
tape in its entirety.
5. You have requested a copy of your personnel file. This has been made available to you;
6. We have delivered a copy oI the tape oI the Joshi matter to you;
7. You requested a Iormal response to your complaint concerning Rhonda. This was investigated by
me within 48 hours oI your complaint. There is no question that your oIIice behavior (which included
yelling, and calling her a hall monitor, etc.) upset her, and as a direct result she made a comment to
you. She was counseled as to the type oI language she used, and speciIically told that even though she
was upset this language ('bite me) was not appropriate Ior the workplace. I did not realize you
wanted a Iormal response to this incident. Please consider this your Iormal response. I am unaware oI
any speciIic written complaints other than the one you made to me about Rhonda. Please provide me
with copies oI all other written complaints sent by you to me prior to the entry oI Judge Gardner`s
order. Please make sure they are dated. I will review them and indicate to you what the disposition oI
those matters may be.
8. Counseling Ior diIIiculties in oIIice interaction had already been scheduled when I received Judge
Gardner`s order. You did not appear Ior the mandatory meeting at which I announced this counseling;
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9. We have received a copy oI a 50 page motion Ior reconsideration you Iiled in the Joshi matter. I
will review this in its entirety. II there is any other written material you want me to review in
determining whether or not your employment should continue with WLS you must provide it to me
by 5:00 pm Monday, May 4th. I will be happy to pick up any such material at a reasonable time and
place iI you are not comIortable emailing it to me.
Based on the Iorgoing I will be taking the Iollowing action:
1. I will review the tape in the Joshi matter, your IiIty page motion Ior reconsideration and any
other written material you provide to me. II your conduct was as represented by Judge Gardner you
will be terminated. This termination will be based exclusively on the manner in which you conducted
this hearing, and will not be related to any ultimate outcome regarding the sanctions order. WLS can
not maintain an employment relationship with a lawyer who argues incessantly, appears unprepared
and makes sarcastic and derogatory remarks to the court, and otherwise conducts his or her case in a
rude and disrespectIul manner. This determination will be made by me by 10:00 am Wednesday
morning, May 6, 2009.
2. II the hearing tape does not justiIy Judge Gardner`s order WLS will require you to
participate in the previously reIerred to employee counseling pursuant to the directives oI our
industrial psychologist. This counseling is currently going on with other employees at WLS. The
counselor will determine the extent to which you will participate and maintain a case load. You will
maintain your employment status, and will receive pay and beneIits throughout this course oI
counseling.
3. II you wish to discuss any resolution oI this matter between now and Wednesday morning
at 10 am I will be available to meet with you at any convenient time and place, including this
weekend. You may bring any person you would like to a resolution discussion. I will come alone
unless you request otherwise. This has been sent to you by email. Please advise me as to the address
to which a hard copy oI this transmittal should be delivered. Sincerely, Paul Elcano"
Strangely, despite Elcano indicating that WLS complied with Coughlin's request Ior a copy oI
his personnel Iile, what was produced by WLS contained neither Coughlin's January 2009 written
employment law complaint to Elcano Iollowing former Beesley Peck partner and then WLS ChieI
Child Advocacy Attorney Karen Sabo, Esq.'s paralegal Rhonda Harrison yelling "bite me" at
Coughlin when Coughlin, blanching at her interrogation as to why he might be using the upstairs
restroom at WLS, asked her iI she was "the hall monitor", nor any letters Irom or to WLS regarding
Coughlin and Michelle Carnine/Joni Kaiser oI CAAW, or Iormer client Paula Haubl vis a vis the
Cecilia Gonzalez/Tahoe Women's Services issues
There was one TPO hearing beIore either Master Edmondson or Master Cooke where one oI
Coughlin's rare male clients was either denied an extension oI a TPO or aIIorded extremely limited
visitation rights to his children even where he was beaten with a metal toaster being swung Irom its
electric cord and or an alarm clock wielded in the same manner. This was a hispanic gentleman, and
the term "Iather's being treated like special needs Iourth graders" may have been included in a Iiling
challengin the iniquity oI such limited visitation rights given the presumptions created upon a Iinding
oI domestic violence being committed by the opposing party.
As usual, the advocates Irom CAAW, whom run and staII the TPO OIIice Ior the Second
Judicial District Court and exclude males Irom the oIIice, to Judge Weller's dismay (though Judge
Linda Gardner, in her 2007 application to be a RJC Justice oI the Peace and in interview lists Judge
Weller as a reIerence and a mentor, though hopeIully he did not assist her in her approach to the Joshi
DV08-01168 matter, particularly aIter the 2JDC, Springgate, and WLS, and Judge Gardner did what
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they did to keep Coughlin out oI the loop as to developments in that case once he was removed as
attorney oI record therein (a review oI the CertiIicates oI Services Ior all Iilings in that matter post
April 2009 reveals some disturbing things, particularly with respect to the allegedly vexatious,
sanctionable conduct by Coughlin incident to the Siragusa alimony/bankrupcty/marital property
settlement issues underpinning Coughlin's basis Ior following his clients express wishes with respect
to whether to accept or reject the settlement proposal
WLS has been completely obstructive in Iailing to provide Coughlin access to his work
computer, MS Outlook archive oI emails, notes, calendar, notes, and other attorney work product and
correspondence particularly necessary to deIending himselI, and which was denied Coughlin during
that crucial 10 day period in which to Iile a Motion Ior Reconsideration oI Judge Linda Gardner's
4/13/09 Order AIter Trial in DV08-01168, and thereaIter ).(Most, not all, oI the TPO OIIice personnel
Irom CAAW hassled Coughlin reIused to let Coughlin use the victim's center to Iill out his TPO
application on 1/23/12 in FV12-000188 and FV12-00187 (which were ultimately granted and which
involved Coughlin's abusers admittedly interIerring with his access to his mail at the 1422 E. 9th St.
#2 address to which Bar Counsel admits mailing a 2/14/12 letter to Coughlin (admitted at the
11/14/12 Iormal disciplinary hearing despite Bar Counsel King violating the rule oI completeness and
other evidentiary saIeguards in only including a portion oI what was mailed, particularly where what
was admitted itselI does not include any identiIication or speciIication as to what else was attached to
it).
"Subject: WLS
From: Paul Elcano (pelcanowashoelegalservices.org)
Sent: Wed 5/06/09 9:38 AM
Dear Zach,
You are correct about the letter being delivered on April 20th, I misread my timeline. My
decision is limited to the hearing conduct. You have proIIered nothing that indicates that the way
you acted in court is in any way related to any outside event. Your 50 page motion Ior reconsideration
beIore Judge Gardner has not linked your conduct in any way to an outside event. You have reIused
to give me a time and date to meet once again, and I will issue my determination tomorrow morning
at 9:00 am.
Access to your computer materials, will be made at a convenient time and place with our
oIIice manager, executive director or designee and our computer specialist present. This is a business
computer, and without Iurther research I will not give you access to it privately. You have been given
a tape oI the two Joshi hearings. To date, you have not agreed to meet at any time and place to discuss
these hearings; and you have not specifically requested any identified items, documents etc. that
were related to your conduct in this hearing. Your series oI questions about the Board is irrelevant.
The Board delegated this matter to me to handle as a personnel matter. -Paul "
5/7/09 Termination Letter to Coughlin from WLS's Elcano:
"Dear Mr. Coughlin,
I have reviewed the following: 1. The 1oshi hearing CD, 2. Your fifty page
Motion for Reconsideration before 1udge Gardner, 3. Your seventeen page letter
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to me, 4. Each and every one of your emails and attachments to date, including
your e-mail of May 7, 2009 sent at 1:45 am., 5. The 1oshi file.
In an attempt to resolve this matter I have tried to schedule a meeting with you. I have
leIt you voicemails asking you to call me, and I have indicated that I would meet you
at any convenient time and place to discuss resolution. For whatever reason, you have
not scheduled such a session. In addition, I have attempted through independent means
to schedule meetings with you. This involved discussion with persons I believe to be
your mentors prior to and during your employment here. It is my understanding that
they also have been unable to schedule a meeting with you.
I have reviewed the hearings in detail and have concluded that your conduct in
these two hearings warrants termination. The judge`s Iindings that you argued
incessantly, made rude and sarcastic remarks, and reIused to heed the Court`s
admonitions were well Iounded. Your conduct obstructed the hearing process. You
refused to or were unable to follow the simplest instructions from the 1udge.
Washoe Legal Services cannot employ an attorney who repeatedly conducts
himself with such lack of civility and professionalism in court.
Your performance in the second hearing was virtually a repeat of the first, even
though the hearings were five days apart. I have therefore concluded that 'heat of
the battle was not a significant factor in your inappropriate conduct. 1udge
Gardner was not rude or antagonistic. She repeatedly explained how she wanted
you to handle matters and you reIused to conIorm your conduct to her wishes. The
hearing CD speaks for itself: so I will not analyze it any further in the body of
this letter.
Your employment termination is effective as of Monday, May 11, 2009 at 5:00 pm.
Your final paycheck will be available Monday, May 11, 2009 at 5:00 pm. It will be
made by direct deposit unless you request otherwise. Your medical benefits will
terminate in conformity with this letter, and applicable law. You may schedule a
time with me outside oI business hours to pick up your personal eIIects. Computer
contents will be handled as discussed in my previous email. II you wish to resign
Irom your employment to avoid an involuntary termination on your employment
records, you must meet with me prior to Monday, May 11, 2009 at 5:00 pm to discuss
this issue.
Sincerely, Paul Elcano Executive Director" (emphasis added).
However, in his sworn testimony at the 11/14/12 Iormal disciplinary hearing,
Elcano took the coaching Assistant Bar Counsel King gave him to heart, and changed
his tune, indicating the Iiring and basis Ior Judge L. Gardner's 4/13/09 Order AIter
Trial in DV08-01168 was in light oI Coughlin's lack oI 'competency
'HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 93:21 to 94:8) Q (King) And in your capacity working
Ior Washoe County Legal Services, did you come to work with Mr. Coughlin? A
(Elcano) Yes. Q In your work with Mr. Coughlin, did you Iorm an opinion as to his
competency to practice law in Nevada as a lawyer? A Yes. Q I'll Iirst ask what that
opinion is, then work backward as to why you Ieel that way. What is your opinion
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currently oI Mr. Coughlin's ability to practice law? A Currently I don't believe he's
competent to practice law based on the inIormation I have.
'HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 106:25 to 112:12) Q II you recall the question, it was,
why did you Iind that -- or did you Iind that order important? A Under this order Mr.
Coughlin was sanctioned Ior attorney's Iees in, I Iorget the amount, $900-some as I
recall. $934. MS. PEARL: Can you speak up, please? I can barely hear you. THE
WITNESS: $934 he was sanctioned in attorney's Iees. And as a result oI the sanction,
I reviewed the transcript. BY MR. KING: Q This hearing, you testiIied that this
hearing and the resulting order were one oI the Iactors that you used to determine that
Mr. Coughlin is not competent to practice; is that correct? A Yes. That's the Iirst, the
Iirst really major one. Q The court speciIically -- MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. That
wasn't pled in relevancy. And Mr. Elcano has not been qualiIied as an expert to
provide the opinion as to someone's competency to practice law. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Overruled. BY MR. KING: Q Could you -- Ior the record could you read Irom Page
13 oI the Order, which is the one that contains her signature, the paragraph that begins
at Line No. 5 and goes to Line 13? A Yes. "The most troubling aspect oI this case
was Mr. Coughlin's rude, sarcastic, and disrespectIul presentation at trial. Mr.
Coughlin's inability to understand the balance sheet, his Iailure to conduct discovery,
and his lack oI knowledge with regard to the rules oI evidence and trial procedure. All
oI this was compounded with a continuously antagonistic presentation oI the case that
resulted in a shiIt Irom a Iairly simple divorce case to a contentious divorce trial
lasting an excessive amount oI time." Q In the next sentence the court also Iinds that
the "arguments in support thereoI to be unIounded in Iact, unwarranted by existing
law, unreasonable, and vexatious throughout this entire proceeding." Is that a correct
statement oI that order? A For the most part, yes. Q Is there anything that needs to
be clariIied? A No, I don't think so. I'm just saying that my review oI the transcript
conIirmed that. Q When you listened to the -- were you a supervisor -- at this time
were you a supervisor oI Mr. Coughlin? A Yes. Q Did you determine -- did you
have an opinion at that time, having listened to the hearing itselI, did you determine
that the position oI the judge was correct? A Yes. Q What was another Iactor that
Iormed your opinion that Mr. Coughlin is not currently competent to practice law? A
Several things have happened since. There have been two issues that I'm personally
aware oI dealing with dishonesty. MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. THE WITNESS:
The quality -- MR. COUGHLIN: Foundation. Hearsay. Relevancy. THE WITNESS:
The quality oI the work -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. THE WITNESS: -- that
has comes across my desk has been disjointed, Iilled with irrelevant material, and has
not met reasonable competency standards. He's had a tortious residential pattern, and I
don't believe he's made any type oI regular oIIice, so it would be diIIicult Ior clients to
contact him based on what I have seen and know. And I don't believe he has a mental
status that's capable oI exhibiting judgment to counsel people in what they should and
shouldn't do with their legal situations. BY MR. KING: Q In your capacity as a
supervisor and somebody who said they like Mr. Coughlin, did you attempt to advise
Mr. Coughlin to seek mental health or assistance with his circumstances? A No, I
don't believe I've ever advised Mr. Coughlin to do that. Because oI the Joshi matter he
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was terminated, and I didn't have any Iurther contact with him. Q Did you have
contact with his Iamily? A I've had, subsequent to his termination, I believe
somewhere in the neighborhood oI two or three telephone calls with his Iather, maybe
Iour, trying to Iind a way to get him some help. Q To your knowledge, has Mr.
Coughlin ever heeded the recommendation that he get help? A I have no knowledge
one way or another. Q There are some times when a person has an issue or mental
inIirmity or whatever is going on iI they are nice. How would you describe, in terms
oI Mr. Coughlin, his demeanor in his current state? A As we sit here today? Q II
you know what his -- A I haven't seen Zach since -- I haven't seen him Ior a long
time. Today is the Iirst time I've seen him. Q Back when you were supervising him,
and he wasn't acting appropriately, how would you describe his demeanor? A Well,
we had him Ior this given period oI time. And initially I worked on virtually -- when
we hired him, I knew that Zach had had some issues in the past. I did not know he had
any mental issues. Or even iI he did, I don't know that to this day. And so I mentored
him and watched him very closely Ior a period oI time, and his work seemed to
improve. We had some complaints Irom the two women's shelters, CAAW and Tahoe
Women's Services, over the course oI, I couldn't be exact, I would have to check, but
maybe the Iirst year. I'm very protective oI my employees. I met with the people Irom
those two shelters. I thought they were biased in part. And I reviewed some oI Mr.
Coughlin's clients, and I didn't really think there was a critical issue. And aIter about a
year, 18 months, he started to deteriorate, in my opinion, started to have diIIiculties,
serious diIIiculties, relating with other employees. And then about this time the order
came down Irom Judge Gardner. And aIter I reviewed the transcript, I didn't believe
we could maintain him as an employee. And one oI the things that was relevant there
is that this hearing took place in two sections; I want to say they were a week or ten
days apart. And the conduct and the criticisms oI the conduct by the judge in the Iirst
hearing, Mr. Coughlin came back and behaved exactly the same way in the second
hearing, he had not heeded anything the judge had told him. And Mr. Coughlin is not
stupid. So I took that in large part to be a competency issue. MR. KING: I very much
appreciate your testimony and candor. I'll pass the witness. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Thank you, Mr. King.
'HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 116:22 to 124:6) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q When you
were telling me, giving me some mentoring, that when you walk into that courtroom,
that courtroom is yours. It's not the judge's, it's not opposing counsel's, it's yours. Does
that sound like something you said to me? MR. KING: Objection. Relevance. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Was there an objection? I didn't hear it. MR. KING: Yes.
Objection. Relevance. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'll overrule it. Go ahead. THE
WITNESS: Yes. Out oI context. But that's a statement I would make, yes. BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q How is that reconciled with your criticism oI my work in the Joshi
case? A I don't understand the question. But your work in the Joshi case was that it
was incompetent. It had nothing to do with whether or not you took over the
courtroom. There were no -- it was a divorce case. There was no statement or
itemization oI the community property. There was no statement or itemization oI the
community debts. You were completely at a loss as to issues oI relevance. You made
objections like you did today that went over and over and over again without legal
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basis, and incorporated strange rules. The judge kindly tried to give you direction,
which you totally eschewed. You did this Ior three or Iour hours the Iirst time, came
back a week or ten days later and did it again. It had nothing to do with whether or not
you took control oI the courtroom. Q Have you reviewed the mandamus position I
Iiled in response to that sanction? A I don't know. I don't recall. Q You Iire an
attorney based on, in your words, solely in light oI her order, yet you don't recall
whether or not you reviewed a petition Ior writ oI mandamus that attorney Iiled? MR.
KING: Objection. Argumentative, and mischaracterizes the testimony. MR.
COUGHLIN: That attorney that is suing your organization right now. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: You've compounded the question. The question is: Do you recall
reviewing the writ oI mandamus? His answer is no, he doesn't recall having reviewed
it. Go on to your next question. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q To clariIy, your answer is
you don't recall? A I don't recall reviewing the mandamus. I recall reviewing your
motion Ior reconsideration oI 60-some pages or 58 pages, but not mandamus. Q So
even -- did that reconsideration motion evince any more competency or skill in that
Iamily law setting than you Ielt was shown at the trial? A No. Q Are you aware oI
whether or not the majority viewpoint oI the law was argued by me vis-a-vis the setoII
or impermissibility thereoI oI a domestic duty with a third party debt, such as was
presented by Mr. Springgate's illusory settlement oIIer oI waiving alimony in
exchange Ior his client agreeing to be responsible Ior a multitude oI third-party debts
on which he was the sole signature? A I don't understand the question. Q And yet
you -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Wait a minute. He indicated he didn't understand the
question. Quite Irankly, I didn't either. I Ielt it was compound. Do you want to ask
simple questions? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q What's your
understanding with respect to the position taken by me in that trial vis-a-vis the
majority viewpoint oI law on setting oII or oIIsetting domestic duties like alimony or
child support with third-party debts in a property settlement or debt settlement
context? A I'm still not sure I understand the question. But there were no children, as
I recall, so child custody had no issue in it. And in terms oI the oIIset, I don't know
what law you proIIered. Q Well, a duty like alimony. A domestic duty. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: To me that's an incomplete question. What's the complete question?
MR. COUGHLIN: I guess I'm trying to ascertain Mr. Elcano's awareness oI the
position. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q What's your understanding oI the permissibility oI
setting oII a debt with a duty, a domestic duty? MR. KING: Objection. Irrelevant.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. MR. COUGHLIN: Did you say relevancy? May I
respond to it, your Honor? Just to the extent Mr. Elcano is here today purporting to
critique my work in that regard, I think it is relevant to ascertain whether or not he has
any sort oI conception oI permissibility oI setting oII a domestic duty, like alimony,
with some debt. My point. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Are you Iinished? MR.
COUGHLIN: Yeah. And I didn't end it very well, but I didn't want to give away what
I Ieel the answer is or the majority viewpoint oI American law. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The objection is sustained. Mr. Coughlin, it's now 11:41. You have Iive more minutes.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. Really? The relevancy objection is sustained. He gets to
testiIy as to how clueless I am. And this when I ask to see iI he has any sort oI
knowledge in this area, it's not relevant? MR. ECHEVERRIA: He's testiIied on a
number oI issues as to your competency, your demeanor in the courtroom, your
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conduct toward witnesses, toward judges, your ability to Iollow the judge's directions.
MR. COUGHLIN: They are all relevant when he was talking about them. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Those issues are, sir. Whether or not he knows the intricacies oI
some Iine point oI law to me is irrelevant. Now, iI you have some questions to address
to Mr. Elcano, please do so, and let's not argue. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q Mr. Elcano, Ior you to have any sort oI legitimate inIormed bases
Ior the opinion you proIIered here today with respect to my competency incident to
my work in that Joshi case, wouldn't you need to know whether or not a domestic duty
is accorded greater signiIicance and protection in the law than is a third-party debt -- A
No. Q -- therein? It's not permissible to do essentially what Judge Gardner tried to
Iorce on my client, which is accept a settlement, whereby a setoII is made whereby my
client waived her alimony in exchange Ior Mr. Springgate's client saying he set it oII
by the debts, by taking them on, even though they could never get at her anyway
because he was the sole signatory. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Is there a question there, Mr.
Coughlin? THE WITNESS: I don't understand. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Or is that a
statement? MR. COUGHLIN: It is a statement. I think -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Then
ask a -- MR. COUGHLIN: He's talking about things he doesn't know about. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Then ask a question. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Was it appropriate
Ior Judge Gardner to tell my client, Ms. Joshi, not to listen to her attorney in a close-
range inIormal settlement conIerence? A I don't recall that issue. I have no opinion
on it. Q You don't recall that issue? A No. Q Do you know whether or not Judge
Gardner in sitting inIormally with myselI and Ms. Joshi in the settlement conIerence
impromptu Iive minutes beIore the trial told me to shut up? A No, I have no
knowledge oI that. Q Do you know whether she told my client not to listen to her
attorney? A I have no knowledge oI that settlement conIerence. Q Do you know
whether or not all these materials were cited in Iilings? A I don't understand that
question. I don't know what materials you're talking about. Q Were those issues
brought up in Iilings that you have purported to this panel to have read and reviewed?
A No, I read the order. Q But you didn't just read the order; right? MR. KING:
Objection. Argumentative. MR. ECHEVERRIA: That is argumentative. You can ask
it in a way that is not argumentative. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Didn't you testiIy
earlier that you read the motion Ior reconsideration? MR. ECHEVERRIA: We're not
interested in what he previously testiIied to. That's on the record. Ask a direct
question. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Did you read anything besides the order? A
Back at the time oI your termination I did go through the Iile. I don't remember
currently what I read. I read your motion Ior reconsideration when it was Iiled.
'HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 125:19 to 126:22) Q Did you have a communication
with me incident to some oI these complaints or a complaint, I don't know iI it was the
Tahoe one or CAAW one or iI it was Rhonda or something, in about January-February
2009, wherein you said, you know what? I asked Master Edmondson about you, and I
asked Judge Gardner -- might have been it was Judge Gardner by that point -- and they
both gave you thumbs up, or something similar to that? A No. I don't think you're
characterizing what I said correctly. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Your time has expired, Mr.
Coughlin. Do you want to ask one more question? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. I would
like him to clariIy as to where I'm amiss there. What it is that he might have said. MR.
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ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, iI you can, Mr. Elcano. THE WITNESS: Periodically I
ask judges how our employees are doing, and especially iI there's a complaint. And
somewhere early on or to the middle oI Mr. Coughlin's employment I asked one or
two judges iI he was doing okay, and they said he was doing okay. So as a result, I did
not pursue the complaint oI the two shelter organizations. So I stood by my employee
at that time MR. ECHEVERRIA: Anything Iurther, Mr. King? MR. COUGHLIN:
Was one oI those judges, Judge Gardner? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, your
time has expired.
So, basically, Elcano gets tripped up every other sentence, Irom his indicating he
never suggested mental health counseling to Coughlin (where his 5/4/09 letter ot
Coughlin indicates it would be a condition oI his return to WLS) to indicating Judge
Gardner's 4/13/09 Order is the only thing he reviewed, only to admit he reviewed
Coughlin's Motion Ior Reconsideration (too bad that Elcano, allegedly, Iailed to read
anything Irom Coughlin's 53833 or 54844 Appeal/Mandamus cases incident thereto,
which speciIically mentions matters that Elcano testiIied to having 'no awareness oI
(like Judge Gardner telling Coughlin to shut up in Iront oI his client, Ms. Joshi, during
the inIormal Settlement ConIerence, in addition to her telling Ms. Joshi: 'don't listen
to your attorney).
What is exceedingly clear Irom reading Elcano's 5/7/09 Termination Letter to
Coughlin then reviewing his 11/14/12 sworn testimony is the extent to which Elcano is
willing to lie to help out Bar Counsel King. Elcano obviously recharacterizes his
rationale Ior Iiring Coughlin Irom the 'conduct issues he harps on in his 5/7/09
Termination Letter to the 'competency issues he repeats again and again at Trial.
King already had all the 'conduct Orders he needed Irom the RMC, so, he attempts to
get Elcano to provide some RPC 1.1 testimony and to characterize the 4/13/09 Order
as relating to Coughlin's 'competency when, really, at best, that Order speaks to RPC
3.1 issues (in a NRS 7.085 invokes NRCP Rule 11 which is kind oI like RPC 3.1, a la
the Mirch approach). But the problem is, competency (not a 60975 SCR 117
competency analysis, though Elcano, King and the panel consistnetly conIused the
two, seeking to essentially turn the 11/14/12 hearing into one addressing NNDB
Susich's Hill/Baker copy and pasted ready made SCR 117 Petition) and conduct or
contemptuous conduct are two very diIIerent species. Indeed, one involves a willIul
Iailure to due that which one coula ao (ie, not behave in a contemptuous conduct type
oI Iashion), whereas the other, seemingly involves the inability to perIorm up to a
required level oI skill or 'competency.
There is no aspect to RPC 1.1 that involves any oI the 'conduct, 'rudeness, etc.,
etc., that Elcano Iocuses on exclusively in his 5/7/09 Termination Letter to Coughlin,
which purports to base his decision to Coughlin solely on the hearing and order to
which Elcano's 11/14/12 sworn testimony Iocused in purpoting to provide testimony
as to Coughlin's 'competency (though King, whether purposeIully or not, never
really made clear in what sense he was utilizing the word 'competency or
'competenct (ie, unclear whether in a RPC 1.1 or SCR 117 sense, and, it would seem,
they are diIIerent):
'Rule1.1.Competence.A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary Ior the representation.
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Further, Elcano is Iorced to admit he lacks any understanding whatsoever oI the
particular domestic relations/bankruptcy points oI law at issue in the Joshi trial (Iunny
how the OBC's King Ieels Elcano was an 'expert witness, never mind the obvious
bias attendnat to Elcano being sued Ior wrongIul termination by Coughlin, in a matter
presided over by Judge Elliott in CV11-01955, where Judge Elliott Iailed to disclose
his Board Presidency oI CAAW's Executive Board to Coughlin where CAAW was
one oI Elcano and WLS's co-deIendants (that matter is now beIore Judge Elliott's
successor, Iormer WCDA's OIIicer prosecutor now 2JDC Judge Elliott Sattler, whom
recently ruled stricken Irom the record a Petition Ior Mandamus that Coughlin Iiled in
CR13-0552 seeking relieI Irom RJC Judges (and Iormer career long WCDA's OIIice
prosecutors) Pearson and CliIton's violation oI the mandatory stay under NRS 178.405
(especially attendant to the 3/19/13 trial beIore Judge CliIton in RCR12-065630, given
Judge Pearson having ruled previously Elcano's shaky, contradictory, biased view oI
these matters is evident especially when comparing his 5/7/09 Termination Letter to
Coughlin from WLS's, where it reads: "I have reviewed the following: 1. The
1oshi hearing CD, 2. Your fifty page Motion for Reconsideration before 1udge
Gardner, 3. Your seventeen page letter to me, 4. Each and every one of your
emails and attachments to date, including your e-mail of May 7, 2009 sent at 1:45
am., 5. The 1oshi file...
I have reviewed the hearings in detail and have concluded that your conduct in
these two hearings warrants termination. The judge`s Iindings that you arguea
incessantly, maae ruae ana sarcastic remarks, ana refusea to heea the Courts
aamonitions were well Iounded . Your conduct obstructed the hearing process . You
refused to or were unable to follow the simplest instructions from the 1udge.
Washoe Legal Services cannot employ an attorney who repeatedly conducts
himself with such lack of civility and professionalism in court.
Your performance in the second hearing was virtually a repeat of the first, even
though the hearings were five days apart. I have therefore concluded that 'heat of
the battle was not a significant factor in your inappropriate conduct. 1udge
Gardner was not rude or antagonistic. She repeatedly explained how she wanted
you to handle matters and you refusea to conform your conauct to her wishes . The
hearing CD speaks for itself: so I will not analyze it any further in the body of
this letter... Computer contents will be handled as discussed in my previous
email. Sincerely, /s/ Paul Elcano Executive Director" (emphasis added).
There simply is nothing in Elcano's above assessment and accusations in his 5/7/09
Termination Letter that is consistent with Elcano's 11/14/12 sworn testimony where
that testimony consistently spoke to Elcano's take on Coughlin's 'competence or
'competency, which, under RPC 1.1 (the only pleading or notice Coughlin had as to
anythign related to 'competency or 'competence in this matter, whether in the
8/23/12 Complaint, etc., relates to RPC 1.1, not SCR 117, and indeed, the Panel lacks
jurisdiction to attempt to rule on 60975, and Coughlin was not provided notice or an
opporutnity to be heard as to 60975 or SCR 117 issues. RPC 1.1 involves whether one
: ''Rule1.1.Competence.A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary Ior the representation. Where RPC 1.1 indicates a
'lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client it clearly contemplates
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speciIic instances oI Iailign to do so as to speciIic clients, not some vague overall lack
oI the ability to do so in general such as King continually attempted to assert and elicit
testimony related thereto. Elcano likely had no idea whether the 11/14/12 hearing was
over issues raised in 60975/SCR 117 context, or in some NG12-0204, 0434, 0435
RPC 1.1 context. As such, his testimony is worthless to King Ior yet another reason.
Elcano's testimony is actually rather useIul Ior Coughlin's deIense, on a multitude oI
levels.
Speaking oI where one's 'conduct obstructed the hearing process, Elcano (whom
claimed in his testimony to be 'very protective oI ' his employees) and WLS were too
busy reIusing Coughlin access to any oI the materials necessary to deIend himselI
against Judge L. Gardner's 4/13/09 Order AIter Trial and claiming to have
schedule/oIIered Coughlin opportunities to meet with WLS during the scant time Ior
Coughlin to Iile a Motion Ior Reconsideration/NRCP 52/59 Motions to challenge that
Order.
'RE: Washoe Legal Services meeting From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent:
Mon 4/27/09 9:22 AM To: jproctormbareno.com Dear Mr. Proctor, ... I have been forbid
access to these client files, my personal notes, my office and calendaring system, etc. I have
no remote access to WLS's computer system. ... I have a Motion For Reconsideration due
today in the Bharti 1oshi matter and I have been prevented by WLS from accessing my files,
emails, notes, records, and office for the purposes of defending either Ms. 1oshi's objectives or
my own with regard to the attorney's fees ordered. Please make these materials available
immediately. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin, Esq. '
WLS Elcano wrote Coughlin a letter on 1une 25, 2009 which read:
"Dear Mr. Coughlin:
Regarding your correspondence oI June 9th and June 11th, Please note the
Iollowing:
1. Your unused accrued vacation was paid in your Iinal check.
2. Washoe Legal Services employees are enrolled in the Washoe County
Group Health Plan. The plan is administered by Washoe County Human Resources
Department. Premiums are pro-rated to the last day oI employment. Your Cobra
Coverage documents were mailed to you by the plan administrator on May 11th, 2009
as required by law. Handling oI beneIits pursuant to termination is within the purview
the plan administrator. Please review the documents which were mailed to you and
direct any questions to the contacts listed in the letter. A copy oI the letter is attached
Ior your reIerence.
3. Your personnel Iile was delivered to you.
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4. Upon review, we Iound some loose documents that inadvertently were not
delivered to you. An inventory is attached as Exhibit A. You may pick up these
documents at the reception desk at Todd Torvinen's oIIice between the hours oI 9am-
12pm or 1pm to 5pm on or aIter June 26, 2009.
Sincerely,
Paul Elcano, Executive Director
EXHIBIT A: LISTING OF LOOSE DOCUMENTS FROM ZACH COUGHLIN'S
OFFICE...Draft of letter dated 10/15/08 from Paul Elcano to Ms. Kaiser at
CAAW. (3 pages)" (emphasis added).
1udge Linda Gardner's 2/25/09 Pre-Trial Order in DV08-01168 actually provides supports
Ior the very objection made by Coughlin that Judge Gardner took most umbrage to:
"PRE-TRIAL ORDER: This matter is set Ior trial on March 12, 2009 at 1 :30 p.m.
Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, iI a party intends to oIIer
more than ten trial exhibits, the proposed exhibits must be bound, tabbed and
indexed. PlaintiII's exhibits will be marked in alphabetical sequence and DeIendant's
exhibits will be marked in numerical sequence. Each party shall submit two copies
of the proposed exhibits to the Court and one copy to the opposing counsel.
Counsel shall contact Martha Casique-Andrews at 775-325-6779 to schedule a time
with the Clerk to organize and mark exhibits. For trials set Ior one Iull day or more,
counsel shall meet with the Court Clerk no later than 3 :00 p.m. on the Friday prior to
trial to mark the trial exhibits. For trials which are scheduled Ior less than one Iull
day, exhibits shall be marked immediately prior to the convening Ior trial, and counsel
shall arrive at least 15 minutes beIore the scheduled time oI trial. Prior to meeting
with (ile Court Clerk, counsel shall meet and discuss the admissibility oI proposed
exhibits. At the time oI marking the exhibits with the Clerk, the Clerk shall be told
which Exhibits may be admitted without objection. At the opening oI trial, counsel
shall inIorm the Court which exhibits are being admitted without objection. Each
party must Iile with the Court a trial statement, Iinancial declaration and UCCJA
declaration. Courtesy copies of the trial statement shall be hand-delivered to
opposing counsel and 1udge Gardner's chambers by no later than 5:00 p.m. five
(5) days prior to trial. Failure to timely deliver these documents may result in
sanctions against the oIIending party as set Iorth in NRCP 37. II the Iinancial
circumstances oI a party have changed substantially since the Iiling oI the most recent
Iinancial declaration, that party is to Iile an updated Iinancial declaration at the same
time as Iiling the trial statement."
To wit, Springgate oIIered more than ten exhibits at Trial, upon Coughlin objecting, Judge
Gardner actually wound up punishing Coughlin Ior relying upon her own Pre-Trial Order oI 2/25/09
in 01168. Additionally, it was Coughlin who Iile his Trial Statment timely on March 5th, 2009 (and
paralegal Deborah Pringle certainly deserves a good share oI the credit Ior such systematic and timely
Iilings), compared to Springgate Iiling his Pre-Trial Statement just the day beIore the Trial on
3/11/12.
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Further, the Final Order Judge Gardner entered in the Joshi 01168 matter overrides her Order
AIter Trial oI 4/13/09, and that Final Order contains none oI the language that the SBN quoted Irom
that 4/13/09 Order in it's 8/23/12 Complaint. Judge Gardner was Iorced to make a concession to the
various arguements Coughlin raised against her Order oI 4/13/09, and that resulted in the much more
temperate language in her Final Order in 01168.
This concession and the diIIiculty Judge Gardner Iaced in resolving the conIlict inherent in
her 4/13/09 Order is underscored by WLS Attorney Marc Ashley's commentary in the Iollowing
email to Couighlin Irom 6/4/09:
"RE: WDCR 9 Proposed Final Decree, RE: discoveryFrom: Marc Ashley
(mashleywashoelegalservices.org) Sent: Thu 6/04/09 3:19 PM To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com;
Deborah Pringle (dpringlewashoelegalservices.org); Caryn Sternlicht
(csternlichtwashoelegalservices.org)
Zach, Sorry Ior the delay in getting back to you on this. I`ve been out oI the oIIice and this is
my Iirst day back. When summarizing the evidence in her order, the judge did mention that Mr.
1oshi suggested that maintenance be kept open for 5 years as protection against his default on
the debts he was ordered to pay. However, when she got to that portion of her oraer concerning
maintenance, she specifically aeniea maintenance after reviewing relevant factors such as the
parties relative ages, earning capacities ana state of their health. Springgate recalls discussing the
award of $1 per year maintenance for 5 years so it could be revised to account for any default
on his client`s part and also has said that he thought the provision was going to be part oI the order.
However, he Ieels that the clause cannot be included in light of the judge`s plain statement that
maintenance is denied (I would assume also because it doesn`t beneIit his client), so the Iinal decree
was submitted as originally proposed. We have Iiled a motion to amend it on the basis oI mistake or
inadvertence. Marc Ashley StaII Attorney Washoe Legal Services" (emphasis added).
Do you see how funny this is. Springgate is giving up things that go against his client's
interest's in the name oI giving Couglin's Iormer client things that both Springgate and Judge Gardner
allege she does not deserve...and Coughlin is being vexatious. Chimera...illusory...Tahoe Women's
Services and CAAW think Coughlin isn't pushing the battered women hard enough to go Ior the
TPOs (even where, in Iormer client Paula Haubl's case, she admitted to Elcano that she Iound Ms.
Cecelia Gonzales Irom TWS (or the more gender neutral name that subsequently adopted, Crisis,
though they still put on perIormances oI The Jagina Monologues with grant Iunds) to be pressuring
her too much to seek an extension oI the TPO she had against her domestic partner. In Iact, Haubl
inIormed Elcano that she actually appreciate the more client objectives Iocused approach taken by
Coughlin. As Ior Michelle Carnine, Iormer client, and or CAAWS/Joanie Kaiser/Sternlicht's issues
with Coughlin, they certainly did not seem to prevent Carnine Irom achieving the goals she expressed
at the outset in both her TPO and divorce with custody matters, and Carnine ultimately indicated to
Elcano that she approved oI the work Coughlin did on her behalI.
II Karen Sabo was upset by Coughlin's mass email soliciting support Ior his trip to
Edingburgh to participate in the Run Ior Prostate Health 10k too soon aIter a similar, yet somewhat
diIIerent email Irom Sabo, then she would probably not be too into the "though provoking and
unearthing" run oI perIormances oI The Penis Diatribes one local legal aid entity is purportedly
planning to undertake via a generous contribution Irom the Nevada Law Foundation.
Further, Washoe Legal Services has been obstructionist is Iailing to aIIord Couglin access to
essential materials necessary to his deIense against not only the 4/13/09 Order within the context oI
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01168 and 54844, but now in this Iormal disciplinary hearing setting, including the Iailure to provide
Coughlin the materials he mentions in the Iollowing email (and the Iailure to provide Coughlin even
constructive notice oI the calling oI Elcano as a witness, much less an expert witness, until the day
beIore the 11/14/12 hearing, much less the 8/23/12 Complaints Iailure to attach as an Exhibit the
4/13/09 Order in 01168 or the SBN Iailure to otherwise prove it ever provided it to Coughlin or
suIIiciently pled it such that it would appropriately be at issue is Iurther grounds Ior striking oI
vacating those portions oI the 12/14/12 FOFCOL and Rcommendations that rest upon such materials:
"From: Zach Coughlin |mailto:zachcoughlinhotmail.com| Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2009
10:46 AM To: Marc Ashley; Deborah Pringle; Caryn Sternlicht Subject: FW: WDCR 9 Proposed
Final Decree, RE: discovery requests
Dear Washoe Legal Services, Please see my concerns in the emails below. The proposed
Decree submitted by Mr. Springgate presents real problems for Ms. 1oshi. Specifically the debt
distribution is in no way referred to as being characterized as in lieu of alimony or given any
similar treatment. There is a wealth of authority, some oI which I have provided and some of
which is contained in my emails to Mr. Springgate during the pre-trial phase of the 1oshi
litigation that spells out why this is disadvantageous to Ms. Joshi. Bankruptcy law specifically
532a(15) coula potentially see Mr. Joshi, upon the requisite showing, be aischargea of the aebt
aistributea in the aecree ana not forcea to pay alimony. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin, Esq."
1udge Linda Gardner's Order After Trial (SBN Exhibit 3 at the 11/14/12 formal
disciplinary hearing) in DV08-01168, of 4/13/09 reads:
"A Complaint Ior Divorce was Iiled by ASHWIN JOSHI (hereinaIter Mr. Joshi), by and
through his attorney, JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ., on July 8, 2008. An Answer and Counterclaim
was Iiled by BHARTI JOSHI (hereinaIter 'Ms. Joshi'), by and through her attorney oI record,
ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN, ESQ., on July 18, 2008. Argument was heard on March 12, 2009 and
March 17, 2009. Mr. Joshi was present and represented by John P. Springgate, Esq.; and Ms. Joshi,
was present and represented by Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq., oI Washoe Legal Services.
All testimony and arguments having been heard, all pleadings on Iile having been read, all
exhibits, tapes, and notes having been reviewed, the Court Iinds and Orders as FINDINGS OF FACT
1,2008, 18,2008, """FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The parties were married May 11, 1987, in Bombay,
India. 2. The parties have two children, both oI whom are now adults. Although Mr. Yoshi has no
obligation to support said children any longer pursuant to NRS 125.510(9)(b), Ms. Yoshi requests the
Iinancial assistance oI Mr. Yoshi so as to provide Ior the children's continuing education. (Answer,
pg. 2, lines 16-18). The Court notes that on August 1, 2008, Mr. Joshi Iiled a 'Motion For Return OI
Personal Property' requesting that Ms. Joshi return his passport, green card and social security card.
On August 7, 2008, Ms. Joshi, by and through her attorney oI record, Mr. Coughlin, Iiled an
Opposition to the return oI Mr. Joshi's passport citing case law involving minor children and their
support. Ms. Yoshi Iiled said opposition while acknowledging the parties' children were both over
eighteen years oI age at the time. On August 18, 2008, Judge Schumacher ordered Ms. Joshi to
immediately return Mr. Joshi's passport within Iive days. 3. There is community property to be
divided. In Mr. Joshi's Complaint Iiled July 8, 2008, he indicated there was community property and
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debts which should be divided by the Court. Ms. Joshi Iiled an Answer and Counterclaim on July 18,
2008, indicating the parties' community property should be equitably divided, including Ms. Joshi's
"women's wealth", the vehicles in each party's possession, the vehicles in their children's possession,
and " the money the |Ms. Yoshi| earned while working Ior Legendary Luxury Camping SaIari in
Houston Texas which was automatically deposited in |Mr. Yoshi's| account every month Ior two and
one-halI years, |and| which |Mr. Yoshi| told |Ms. Yoshi| he would give to her." (Answer, pg. 2, lines
21-26). The Court notes the Iollowing inIormation has been provided and has been taken into
consideration on this issue: a. "Women's Wealth" Property - The parties agreed that the parties'
community interest in the "woman's wealth" jewelry (location unknown) belongs to Ms. Joshi's
Exhibit"Joshi's d. Joshi. Mr. Joshi stated that he would contact his relatives, who may have some oI
the property, and will request its immediate return to Ms. Joshi. b. Mr. Ioshi's Vehicle - Mr. Joshi
introduced evidence that the balance on his 2005 Chevrolet Blazer is $15,009.75 as oI March 6, 2009.
(Trial Exhibit " A"); and Kelley Blue Book value Ior the Blazer is $10,910 (Exhibit "B"). ThereIore, a
deIicit in the amount oI approximately $4,100.00 exists on the vehicle. At the conclusion oI trial, Mr.
Joshi requested that he be awarded the Chevrolet Blazer. Ms. Joshi presented no evidence on this
issue. To the Court's knowledge, Ms. Joshi conducted no discovery on this issue. c. Ms. Ioshi's
Vehicle - There was no evidence introduced regarding the value oI Ms. Joshi's car. Son's Vehicle -
Mr. Joshi testiIied that his adult son is presently driving the Jeep Grand Cherokee and is making the
payments Ior the car directly to the lender, Clear Star Financial. Both parties testiIied that Ms. Joshi
and the parties' son are named on the title. No evidence was presented regarding the balance owed on
the Jeep Grand Cherokee. Ms. Joshi presented no evidence on this issue. To the Court's knowledge,
Ms. Joshi conducted no discovery on this issue. e. Daughter's Vehicle - Mr. Joshi testiIied that the
parties' adult daughter drives and makes payments on the Honda Accord and that title is held in the
name oI both Mr. Joshi and the parties' daughter. Ms. Joshi testiIied that she made a payment oI
$6,000.00 on her credit card Ior said automobile and the present balance on the credit card was
approximately $5,000.00. However, Ms. Joshi presented no evidence to corroborate this contention.
Ms. Joshi did not speciIy a date on which said debt was incurred, she did not provide evidence oI any
payments made on said credit card, and she did not present evidence oI any credit card with a balance
in the amount oI $5,000.00 remaining thereon. Ms. Joshi presented no Iurther evidence on this issue.
e. London Bank Account - Mr. Joshi testiIied that that he did not know iI Ms. Joshi's earnings Irom
Tanzania were placed in a London bank account. Mr. Joshi testiIied he did not control Ms. Joshi's
money at that time. Ms. Joshi presented no evidence that her earnings were placed in a London bank
account. To the Court's knowledge, Ms. Joshi conducted no discovery on this issue. I. Community
Bank Accounts - Ms. Joshi testiIied that she requested access to the bank accounts Irom Mr. Joshi,
but that he would not let her see the bank statements. Further, Ms. Joshi testiIied that she did have her
own credit and she did have access to Mr. Joshi's credit card statements. There was no Iurther
evidence presented as to the community bank accounts. 4. There is community debt to be divided.
The Court notes the Iollowing inIormation has been provided and has been taken into consideration
on this issue: a. General Credit Card Debt - Mr. Joshi testiIied that he owes approximately $15,650 in
credit card debt (Trial Exhibit "E"), and argued the charges were incurred Ior community expenses,
holidays, Iamily expenses and household expenses. Ms. Joshi presented no evidence regarding
community credit card debt. b. Best Buy Credit Card Debt - Mr. Joshi stated that the parties
purchased a computer and T.V. at Best Buy Ior approximately $1,314.00. Mr. Joshi testiIied Ms.
Joshi has both oI these items. Mr. Joshi requested he be awarded the computer presently in Ms.
Joshi's possession and that she retain the T.V. Ms. Joshi presented no evidence on this issue. c.
Medical Debt - Mr. Joshi testiIied he owes $6,735.00 to St. Mary's Hospital Ior surgery in May 2008
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(Trial Exhibit "F") and $500.00 to REMSA (Trial Exhibit "G"). At trial, Mr. Joshi oIIered to pay
these community debts. Ms. Joshi presented no evidence that her earnings were placed in a London
bank There was no Iurther evidence presented as to the community bank accounts. The Court notes
the Iollowing inIormation has been provided and has been taken Mr. d. "Ms. Joshi presented no
evidence on this issue. To the Court's knowledge, Ms. Joshi conducted no discovery on this issue. d.
Family Debt - there are two debts owing to Iamily members or on behalI oI Iamily members that were
presented at trial. Mr. Joshi introduced evidence at trial regarding a $5,000.00 debt to Rod and Meena
Fowler (Trial Exhibit "H") in the Iorm oI a letter Irom Rod and Meena Fowler. The letter states that
the parties owe money in the amount oI $6,000.00, which was "long overdue" by approximately six
(6) years, Ior money loaned to Mr. Joshi's mother when she was ill. The letter reIerences a "copy oI
your letter agreeing to pay us back", but did not attach a copy oI said letter. At trial, Mr. Joshi
testiIied that he did not have a copy oI the reIerenced letter. Ms. Joshi testiIied that this debt was
"made up." Mr. Joshi testiIied regarding a debt oI approximately $5,000 owing to a Iamily member
by the name oI Ashik Nanaby (sp?), Ior buying plane tickets Ior the Joshi Iamily to come to the
Unites States in 2001. Ms. Joshi testiIied that she could not obtain any inIormation regarding this debt
as the other party "wanted to stay out oI the divorce." At trial, Mr. Joshi oIIered to pay these
community debts. e. General Community Debt - Mr. Joshi testiIied that he pays approximately $600
per month Ior community debts, excluding his car and insurance. Ms. Joshi presented no evidence
regarding general community debt. Mr. Joshi oIIered to pay the community debt in his name that he
had been paying and take an unequal division oI community debt. 5. Ms. Joshi requests spousal
support. SpeciIically, Ms. Joshi requested spousal support "until her death or remarriage, whichever
occurs Iirst." (Answer, p. 3, lines 5-6). The Court notes the Iollowing inIormation has been provided
and has been taken into consideration on this issue: Mr. Joshi is 51 years oI age and Ms. Joshi is 46
years oI age. The parties moved to the United States Irom Tanzania in 2001. $4,157. C"); Ms. Joshi is
a college graduate and has worked continuously since the parties moved to the United States. Ms.
Joshi is presently employed by Raley's as a pharmaceutical technician and earned approximately
$29,500.00 in 2008. Ms. Joshi has testiIied she has raised the parties' children and thereby has
Ioregone educational opportunities and has put her dreams aside. Mr. Joshi testiIied he is a high
school graduate. Mr. Joshi is employed as a catering manager. In 20m3, Mr. Joshi earned
approximately $41,500.00 while working Ior two companies - American Bar and Restaurant and
Sierra Sport Service. At trial, Mr. Joshi introduced his W-2 Irom American Bar and Restaurant
reIlecting earnings oI $4,157. (Trial Exhibit "C" ); and his W-2 Irom Sierra Sport Service in the
amount oI $37,504.18 (Trial Exhibit "D"). Mr. Joshi testiIied that business is slow and he is presently
working Ior only one company - American Bar and Restaurant. Mr. Joshi testiIied he has only two
weeks oI work scheduled Ior March, 2009; and he Iiled Ior unemployment beneIits in March, 2009.
Mr. Joshi requested the Court consider his net income aIter deducting taxes, Iactor in the present $600
per month he is presently paying Ior community debt, and set oII any alimony responsibility by his
assumption oI an unequal distribution oI community debt. Further, to protect Ms. Joshi in the event
Mr. Joshi Iiled Ior bankruptcy, Mr. Joshi suggested that the court maintain jurisdiction over the issue
oI spousal support Ior Iive years. 5. Ms. Joshi requests reasonable attorney's Iees be paid to Washoe
Legal Services Ior the services oI Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Joshi requests reasonable attorney's Iees be paid
to his attorney, Mr. Springgate. The Court notes the Iollowing inIormation has been provided and has
been taken into consideration on this issue: On July 18, 2008, Mr. Coughlin Iiled a Statement oI
Legal Aid Representation which states DeIendant is receiving "Iree legal assistance" Irom Washoe
Legal Services pursuant to NRS 12.015.
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client ""CONCLUSIONS OF LAW On October 3, 2008, Judge Jordan presided over the parties' Case
Management ConIerence. At that hearing, the parties were unable to reach a settlement. Further, on
March 12, 2009, Judge Gardner conducted a Settlement ConIerence Ior approximately one and one-
halI hours, prior to starting the trial at approximately 3:00 pm. The parties did not agree on settlement
and trial was commenced. In his closing argument at trial, Mr. Coughlin, on behalI oI Ms. Joshi,
stated that he did not understand and could not agree with equalizing debt when one party ended up
with a nicer car. He stated that he had" crunched the numbers" and could not see it the other way. Mr.
Coughlin cited an ALR article regarding community debt and stated his client " does not have much
Ior the creditors to take." He requested that his client assume one-halI the community debt and that
the Court Iind PlaintiII's two $5,000 debts to Iamily members and Iriends as Mr. Joshi's separate
debts. Mr. Coughlin stated his client is being asked to "Ioot the bill" Ior PlaintiII's debts and
reIerenced that Ms. Joshi is a caring and committed mother. Mr. Joshi testiIied that he had paid Mr.
Springgate $4,000.00 since July, 2008, Ior attorney's Iees and costs. Mr. Joshi requested that Mr.
Coughlin personally pay his attorney's Iees Ior 4.15 hours oI trial at the rate oI $225 per hour pursuant
to NRS 7.085. Mr. Springgate testiIied Mr. Coughlin had not conducted any discovery, had produced
no evidence regarding Ms. Joshi's community debts other than her Financial Declaration on Iile, had
presented no evidence regarding alimony, and had acted in a vexatious and unreasonable manner in
representing Ms. Joshi in this divorce proceeding. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Ongoing Support Ior
the Adult Children's Education- Pursuant to NRS 125.510(9)(b), except where a contract providing
otherwise has been executed pursuant to NRS 123.080, the obligation Ior care, education,
maintenance and support oI any minor child created by any order entered pursuant to this section
ceases: (a) Upon the death oI the person to whom the order was directed; or (b) When iI Pursuant
Putterman v. Putterman, a. "Women's Wealth" - The parties have agreed that the parties' Joshi's Mr.
10,910.00but Joshi's the child reaches 18 years oI age iI he is no longer enrolled in high school,
otherwise, when he reaches 19 years oI age. There has been no evidence presented by Ms. Joshi
justiIying a request Ior continuing support oI the parties' adult children. As there has been no legal
basis presented to make such a Iinding, the Court denies Ms. Joshi's request that Mr. Joshi Iinancially
provide Ior the adult children's education. 2. Community Property/Debt - Pursuant to NRS 125.150(1)
(b) and v. 113 Nev. 606, 939 P.2d 1047 (1997), in granting a divorce, the Court shall ensure an equal
disposition oI the community estate, absent compelling reasons justiIying an unequal distribution.
The Court must make written Iindings as to why such a division is appropriate. a. "Women's Wealth"
- The parties have agreed that the parties' community interests in the "women's wealth" belongs
entirely to Ms. Joshi according to their customary belieIs, and thereby should be declared her sole and
separate property. As such, Mr. Joshi is ordered to contact any and all relatives who may have this
property and immediately return said property to Ms. Joshi as soon as possible. b. Mr. Ioshi's Vehicle
- The 2005 Chevrolet Blazer shall be considered Mr. Joshi's sole and separate property. Mr. Joshi
shall be responsible Ior the debt remaining thereon. As the car is worth $10,910. 00 but there is
$15,009.75 due and owing on said car, the Court will consider Mr. Joshi's assumption oI this asset as
an undertaking oI community debt oI approximately $4,100.00. c. Ms. Ioshi's Vehicle - Ms. Joshi's
car shall be considered her sole and separate property. Ms. Joshi shall be responsible Ior any debt
remaining thereon. As there was no evidence presented as to its value (either positive or negative), the
Court is unable to determine a value Ior this community asset. d. Son's Vehicle - As the only evidence
presented on this issue was the Iact that the parties' adult son drives this vehicle and makes the
payments thereon, this asset will not be divided among the community. h. 1. Television - J. k. e.
Daughter's Vehicle - The only evidence presented on this issue was the Iact that the parties' adult
daughter drives this car and makes payments thereon. Ms. Joshi presented no evidence oI a balance
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owing on the car or its Iair market value. Thereby, this car will not be divided as a community asset.
I. London Bank Account - there was no evidence presented to the Court veriIying said bank account
exists. As such, there is no Iactual basis to support an order dividing it as a community asset. g.
Community Bank Accounts - there was no evidence presented as to the existence oI community bank
accounts. As such, there is no Iactual basis to support an order dividing it as a community asset. h.
Computer - Mr. Joshi is awarded the computer purchased at Best Buy. Ms. Joshi shall deliver said
computer to Mr. Springgate's oIIice on or beIore Friday, April 17, 2009, at 5:00pm. 1. Television Ms.
Joshi is awarded the television purchased at Best Buy. It is the Court's understanding this television is
currently in Ms. Joshi's possession. J. General Credit Card Debt - The evidence presented indicates a
general debt oI approximately $15, 650.00 which has been expended Ior community purposes. Mr.
Joshi agreed to be responsible Ior this debt at trial. As such, Mr. Joshi shall be solely and separately
responsible Ior this debt. Best Buy Credit Card Debt - The evidence presented indicates there is a debt
oI approximately $1,314.00 outstanding Ior the purchase oI the television and computer. Mr. Joshi
agreed to be responsible Ior this debt at trial. As such, Mr. Joshi shall be solely and separately
responsible Ior this debt. 1. Mr. 3. Support- divorce." 196954 37,39 1. Medical Debt - As Mr. Joshi
has oIIered to pay these debts, he shall be solely and separately responsible Ior the payment oI
$6,735.00 to St.Mary's Hospital; and $500.00 to Remsa. m. Family Debt - There was no documentary
evidence presented as to the debt owing to Ashik Nanaby (sp?) Ior buying plane tickets Ior the Joshi
Iamily. Further, as the only evidence provided regarding the $5,000.00 debt to Rod and Meena
Fowler indicates said debt was incurred Ior the beneIit oI Mr. Joshi's mother. As Mr. Joshi has agreed
to take on both oI these debts, they shall henceIorth be his sole and separate responsibility. n. General
Community Debt - There was no evidence other than testimonial evidence to establish community
debts. As Mr. Joshi has oIIered to pay any remaining community debt in his name that is hereaIter
outstanding, said debt shall be the sole and separate responsibility oI Mr. Joshi. The Court notes Mr.
Joshi has likely incurred an unequal distribution oI the community debt in this case. The Court Iinds
his testimonial acquiescence at trial to take on this debt is a compelling reason to make an unequal
distribution oI the community debt. 3. Spousal Support - The statutory mandate Ior alimony is that it
be "just and equitable." NRS 125.150(1)(a). Alimony is an equitable award to serve the post-decree
needs and rights oI the Iormer spouse. WolII v. WolII, 112 Nev. 1355, 929 P.2d 916 (1996).
Although post-decree incomes need not be equalized, in marriages oI some duration, alimony may be
used to narrow large gaps between the post-divorce earning capacities oI the parties and to allow the
recipient spouse to live" as nearly as possible to the station in liIe enjoyed beIore the divorce. "
Shydler v. Shydler, 114 Nev. 192, 196 954 P.2d 37, 39 (1998). The individual circumstances oI each
case will determine the appropriate amount and length oI any alimony award. Id. 8), 8) 2,458 2008, 8)
(8)(8)(8)(Fees- 1998).) 18.010(the... 7.085, Pursuant to NRS 125.150(B), there are eleven (11) Iactors
the court shall consider in awarding alimony. Ms. Joshi presented no evidence in support oI her
request Ior alimony other than her own testimonial evidence that she raised the parties' children, had
Ioregone educational opportunities, and put her dreams on hold while married. Ms. Joshi testiIied that
she is healthy and has always worked. There was no reIerence to any oI the eleven Iactors in NRS
125.150(B) in Ms. Joshi's presentation and argument in support oI an award oI spousal support. The
Court Iinds that the parties presently earn approximately the same amount, Ms. Joshi earns $2,45B
per month and Mr. Joshi earned approximately $3,125 per month in 200B, but testiIied he is working
substantially less in 2009 and has Iiled Ior unemployment beneIits the beginning oI March 2009. (See
NRS 125.150(B)(a)). The parties have been married 21 years and Ms. Joshi has always been
employed during that time. (See NRS 125.150(B)(d)).
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Ms. Joshi obtained a college degree prior to marriage and Mr. Joshi has a high school degree. (See
NRS 125.150(B)(h)). Both parties are healthy and able to work. (See NRS 125.150(B)(k)). Based
upon the evidence presented and the applicable law, this Court does not believe Ms. Joshi is entitled
to an award oI alimony. 4. Attorney's Fees - This Court enjoys discretion to award attorney's Iees in a
divorce action. (See NRS 125.150(3); Love v. Love, 114 Nev. 572, 959 P.2d 523 (199B).) Also,
pursuant to NRS 1B.010(2)(b), the court has authority to order attorney's Iees "when the court Iinds
that the ... deIense oI the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to
harass the prevailing party." Finally, pursuant to NRS 7.0B5, iI a court Iinds that an attorney has: (a)
Iiled, maintained or deIended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State and such action or
deIense is not well-grounded in Iact or is not warranted by existing law or by an argument Ior
changing the existing law that is made in good Iaith; or (b) unreasonably and vexatiously extended a
civil action or proceeding Mr. Joshi stating""1 could discovery Coughlin beIore any court in this
State, the court shall require the attorney personally to pay the additional costs, expenses and
attorney's Iees reasonably incurred because oI such conduct. At trial, Mr. Springgate stated that Mr.
Coughlin had conducted no discovery in this case. In addition, Mr. Coughlin Iailed to present one
documentary piece oI evidence at trial on behalI oI Ms. Joshi's claims. Mr. Coughlin argued
incessantly with the Court throughout trial and made sarcastic, derogatory remarks to the Court, Mr.
Springgate, and Mr. Joshi throughout trial. The Court notes that there were well over 40 objections
during Iour (4) hours oI trial. Mr. Springgate's objections were well-Iounded and continuously
sustained except in one instance. Mr. Coughlin was overruled on every objection except one and
argued with the Court over most rulings. Mr. Coughlin was admonished approximately 15 times by
the Court to quit arguing, to ask speciIic questions, to discontinue asking questions calling Ior a legal
conclusion, and to reIrain Irom making degrading remarks to both Mr. Ioshi and Mr. Springgate. The
Court notes that at one point, aIter an exhibit had been admitted, Mr. Coughlin could not Iind the
copy provided by Mr. Springgate in discovery. Mr. Coughlin demanded a copy be provided at trial,
stating " am I supposed to be riIling through my papers? My understanding is that you are supposed
to provide a copy." When asked iI he had the copy oI the document, Mr. Coughlin stated, 1 do not
know. I :ould spend my time and mental energy looking around Ior Mr. Springgate's document like I
am his assistant, or we could ask Mr. Springgate to provide a copy at the time he is seeking admission
like I believe the rule states." Mr. Coughlin cited no rule and then proceeded to interrupt the
proceedings twice approximately Iive (5) minutes and twelve (12) minutes post ruling to re-argue the
point. Mr. Springgate replied to the arguments by reIerencing when exactly the copy had been
provided to Mr. Coughlin during :liscovery and where the copy could be located. The Court had to
admonish Mr. Coughlin to quit arguing the point and reiterate that the exhibit had been admitted. Mr.
Coughlin Iiled an Answer and Counterclaim on Ms. Joshi's behalI that included allegations
unsupported by law; and Iiled an Opposition to the request Ior return oI Mr. Joshi's passport without
any Iactual or legal basis. Further, at trial, Mr. Coughlin presented almost no evidence to support Ms.
Joshi's requests and claims. The most troubling aspect oI this case was Mr. Coughlin's rude, sarcastic
and disrespectIul presentation at trial; Mr. Coughlin's inability to understand a balance sheet; his
Iailure to conduct discovery; and his lack oI knowledge with regard to the rules oI evidence and trial
procedure. All oI this was compounded with a continuously antagonistic presentation oI the case that
resulted in a shiIt Irom a Iairly simple divorce case to a contentious divorce trial lasting an excessive
amount oI time. For all these reasons, the Court Iinds that Mr. Coughlin's presentation oI the case and
arguments in support thereoI to be unIounded in Iact, unwarranted by existing law, unreasonable, and
vexatious throughout this entire proceeding. Based upon the Ioregoing, Mr. Springgate's request that
Mr. Coughlin personally pay Mr. Joshi 4.15 hours at the rate oI $225 per hour Ior the cost oI the trial
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is GRANTED. Mr. Coughlin shall submit a check to Mr. Joshi in the amount oI $934 within 30 days
oI this Order. 5. Preparation oI the Decree Mr. Springgate shall prepare the decree oI divorce
consistent with this memorandum decision. Mr. Springgate shall tender his proposed decree to Mr.
Coughlin, pursuant to WDCR 9, within 20 days Irom the date oI this order. GOOD CAUSE
APPEARING, IT IS SO ORDERED. ~2009. ~~ ..;/ /7 ~~~ DISTRICT JUDGE evidence presentation
oI the case that resulted in a shiIt Irom a Iairly simple divorce :ase and arguments in support thereoI
to be unIounded in Iact, unwarranted by existing law, Llnreasonable, Mr. Coughlin shall submit a
check to Mr. Joshi in the amount oI within days oI this Order. Preparation - :oughlin, pursuant to
WDCR within days Irom the date oI this order. GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS SO
ORDERED."
1udge Linda Gardner's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce
(FOFCOLDOD) in DV08-01168 of 6/19/09 held:
"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce
The above-entitled matter came on Ior trial beIore this Court on March 11, 2009 and March
12,2009. ASHWIN JOSHI, PlaintiII, was present and represented by his counsel, JOHN P.
SPRINGGATE, ESQ. BHARTI JOSHI, DeIendant, was present and represented by her counsel,
ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ. The Court issued its Order AIter Trial which was Iiled on April 13, 2009.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. PlaintiII is a resident oI the State oI Nevada, and Ior a period oI more than six (6) weeks
beIore commencement oI this action has resided and been physically present and domiciled in the
State oI Nevada.
2. DeIendant is a resident oI the State oI Nevada, and Ior a period oI more than six (6) weeks
beIore commencement oI this action has resided and been physically present and domiciled in the
State oI Nevada.
3. PlaintiII and DeIendant were married on May 11, 1987 in Bombay, India, and ever since
that date have been, and now are, Husband and WiIe.
4. There are two children oI this marriage, both oI whom are now adults.
5. DeIendant is not pregnant at this time.
6. PlaintiII and DeIendant have become, and continue to be, incompatible in marriage, and no
reconciliation is possible.
7. The current address oI PlaintiII is 1644 Fieldcrest Drive, Sparks, NV 89434.
8. The current address oI DeIendant is 260 Booth Street, Apt. Q, Reno, NV 89509.
9. The Court adopts, as Findings oI Fact, each and every Conclusion oI Law below, which by
this reIerence are expressly incorporated herein.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. JURISDICTION. This Court has jurisdiction oI PlaintiII and DeIendant, and oI the subject
matter herein.
2. GROUNDS. PlaintiII is entitled to a Decree oI Divorce Irom DeIendant on the grounds oI
incompatibility.
3. CHILD SUPPORT/ADULT CHILDREN'S EDUCATION. Mr Joshi will not be held
responsible Ior the continuing education oI the adult children oI this marriage.
4. COMMUNITY PROPERTY/DEBT.
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A) Women's Wealth: The "women's wealth" at issue herein is the sole and separate
property oI the DeIendant. PlaintiII is to contact any and all relatives who may have this property and
immediately ask them to return said property to the DeIendant as soon as possible.
B) Mr. Joshi's Vehicle: The 2005 Chevrolet Blazer shall be considered as PlaintiII's
sole and separate property and PlaintiIIshall be responsible Ior the debt remaining thereon. Since the
car is worth about $10,910.00 and there is $15,009.75 due and owing on the vehicle, Mr. Joshi's
assumption oI this asset is to be considered as an undertaking oI community debt oI approximately
$4,100.00.
C) Ms. Joshi's car shall be considered as her sole and separate property and she shall
be responsible Ior any debt remaining thereon. Since no evidence was presented to the Court as to the
value oI the auto, either positive or negative, there is no value Ior this community asset.
D) Son's Vehicle: This vehicle is not considered as an asset and will not be divided
among the community.
E) Daughter's Vehicle: This vehicle is not considered as an asset and will not be
divided among the community.
F) London Bank Account: There is no Iactual basis to support that this account exists
and thereIore it is not being considered a community asset.
G) Community Bank Accounts: There is no Iactual basis to support that community
bank accounts exist and thereIore the same is not being considered a community asset.
H) Computer: The computer which was purchased at Best Buy is awarded to Mr Joshi.
I) Television: Ms. Joshi is awarded the television which was purchased at Best Buy.
Said television is currently in Ms. Joshi's possession and shall be deemed her sole and separate
property.
J) General Credit Card Debt: There is general debt oI approximately $15,650.00 which
has been expended Ior community purposes. Mr. Joshi has agreed to be responsible Ior this debt and
the same shall be considered as his sole and separate responsibility.
K) Best Buy Credit Card Debt: There is an approximately balance oI $1,314.00
outstanding Ior the purchase oIthe television and computer. Mr. Joshi has agreed to be responsible Ior
this debt and the same shall be considered as his sole and separate responsibility. Daughter'S E) K)
Ms. Joshi's Vehicle: Ms. Joshi's car shall be considered as her sole and separate property and she shall
be responsible Ior any debt remaining thereon. Since no evidence was presented to the Court as to the
value oI the auto, either positive or
L) Medical Debt: There is a debt due to St. Mary's Hospital Ior $6,735.00 and a debt to
REMSA Ior $500.00. Mr. Joshi has agreed to be responsible Ior these debts and the same shall be
considered as his sole and separate responsibility.
M) Family Debt: There is a debt due to Ashik Nanaby and a $5,000.00 debt due to Rod
and Meena Fowler. Mr. Joshi has agreed to be responsible Ior these debts and the same shall be
considered as his sole and separate responsibility.
N) General Community Debt: There was no evidence to establish community debt.
Mr. Joshi agreed to take the remaining community debt in his name that is outstanding and the debt
shall be his sole and separate responsibility. It should be noted that Mr. Joshi has likely incurred an
unequal distribution oI the community debt oI the parties and the Court Iinds his testimony to be a
compelling reason Ior making an unequal distribution oIthe community debt.
5. Spousal Support: The Court has Iound that Mr. Joshi is 51 and Ms. Joshi is 46; the parties
earn roughly equivalent amounts; the parties have been married 21 years but Ms. Joshi has always
been employed during that time; Ms. Joshi has a college degree; both parties are able to work; and
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aIter consideration oI the net income, deduction oI taxes, and the amount paid in community debt by
Mr. Joshi, an award oI alimony in the amount oI one dollar ($1.00) shall be awarded to Ms. Joshi
pursuant to NRS 125.150, WolIIv. WolII 112 Nev. 1355,929 P.2d 196, and Shydler v. Shydler, 194
Nev. 192, 196,954 P.2d 37, 39 (1988).
1UDGEMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, AD1UDGED, AND DECREED
1. PlaintiII, ASHWIN JOSHI be, and he is, Iinally and absolutely divorced Irom DeIendant,
BHARTI JOSHI, and that the bonds oI matrimony heretoIore existing between PlaintiII ASHWIN
JOSHI, and DeIendant, BHARTI JOSHI, be, and they hereby are, dissolved, and the parties hereto are
restored to the status oI single and unmarried persons.
2. There DeIendant's name shall be restored to that oI BHARTI R. DAVE.
3. The matter, as set Iorthin the preceding Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law, and Decree
oI Divorce, is hereby ratiIied, adopted, and approved, and the parties are Ordered to comply with the
terms oI such. GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS SO ORDERED."
WLS's Paul Elcano's testimony at 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing in NG12-0435 (21DC
Family Court 1udge L. Gardner complaint against Coughlin consisting of her 4/13/09 Order
After Trial in DV08-01168):
'MR. COUGHLIN: Is there somewhere a plug I would be permitted to use?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I have no idea. Is there a plug Ior Mr. Coughlin's computer?
(Discussion oII the record.)
MR. ECHEVERRIA: The time, according to the clock on the State Bar wall is now 11:05. Mr. King,
pursuant to the panel's previous order, you have 15 minutes to present Mr. Elcano.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. KING:
Q Mr. Elcano, could you state your name and Page 89
spell it Ior the record, please.
A Paul Elcano. E-L-C-A-N-O.
Q And how are you employed?
MR. COUGHLIN: I'm sorry. II I can just quickly interject. I don't mean to take up time. The second
oI three witnesses is one who was only noticed about Iour, Iive days ago, so I will object to that. I'm
standing on ceremony with SCR 1052(c).
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. Proceed.
BY MR. KING:
Q Could you tell the panel how you are employed? A I'm currently the executive director oI Washoe
Legal Services, a 501(c)3, that provides legal services to indigents.
Q Thank you Ior that service. Did you have
contact with Mr. Coughlin as an employee oI Washoe Legal Services?
A Yes. We employed Mr. Coughlin Irom August MR. COUGHLIN: II I can just --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me.
MR. COUGHLIN: Is there any conIlict that I should be aware oI?
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MR. ECHEVERRIA: Any what?
MR. COUGHLIN: ConIlict.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Among the panel members? Page 90
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Not that I know oI.
MR. COUGHLIN: With Mr. Elcano? A
long-standing personal relationship?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Are you looking to me? I've known Mr. Elcano since we were young children. I
probably haven't seen you in two or three years. And then brieIly socially, I don't even remember
where. So iI that's a conIlict you're reIerring to, Mr. Coughlin MR. COUGHLIN: Did you go to
StanIord
together?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. Not that I know.
MR. COUGHLIN: You both went to StanIord? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I went to StanIord. I don't know
where Mr. Elcano went.
MR. COUGHLIN: StanIord?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
MR. KING: It's part oI Mr. Coughlin MR. ECHEVERRIA: Are you raising an objection that I
should recuse myselI? II so articulate your point.
MR. COUGHLIN: Sir, it's my understanding that I might have some duty to ask iI there's a conIlict or
some basis.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm taking it as an
implication that you are asserting that I have a conIlict.
Page 91
Make your case.
MR. COUGHLIN: I don't know that I'm doing that, sir.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Make your case.
MR. COUGHLIN: I don't have enough inIormation to do that. That's why I'm asking. I believe the
judicial canons at least suggest that maybe upon some prompting or without prompting oIten kind oI
like with the Gardners when I had to prompt, you're Judge Gardner's brother?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I couldn't understand that.
MR. COUGHLIN: Well, the criminal trespass case, it was --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm Iocusing --
MR. COUGHLIN: -- Judge Gardner's brother who was the judge on that.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you're raising an issue that I perhaps should recuse myselI.
MR. COUGHLIN: I don't know that, sir. I don't know enough about the situation. I didn't know you
were Iriends as small children. I didn't know you guys went back that Iar.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Are you asserting that the grounds that someone knew someone at a young age
is grounds enough to require recusal?
Page 92
MR. COUGHLIN: I don't know.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Are you asserting that? MR. COUGHLIN: I doubt that's enough.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Okay. Are you asserting that the Iact that two people went to college at the
same place and didn't even know they were there together is grounds Ior a mandatory recusal?
MR. COUGHLIN: I just asked Ior inIormation.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Are you making that
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assertion?
MR. COUGHLIN: I just asked Ior inIormation.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I gave you the inIormation.
I don't know when Mr. Elcano went there. I attended StanIord Irom 1966 to 1967.
Mr. Elcano, when were you there, iI you were? THE WITNESS: '66 to '69.
MR. COUGHLIN: So the same year?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Pardon me?
MR. COUGHLIN: '66.
MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, I hope this isn't counting against my time.
MR. COUGHLIN: You were unaware oI this? You were childhood Iriends, and you're unaware oI
this? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Yes. That's true. That's how limited our relationship is.
Page 93
Now, are you asserting, sir, that the Iact that Mr. Elcano and I attended the same school at the same
time and didn't know that to this day, are you asserting that is grounds Ior mandatory recusal? Yes or
no? MR. COUGHLIN: So you didn't know that to this day?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I did not know that, sir.
Are you asserting that as grounds; yes or no? MR. COUGHLIN: I don't think I have enough
inIormation.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Proceed.
MR. VELLIS: Just Ior the record, Mr. King should have 15 minutes Irom I guess 10 minutes aIter.
That shouldn't eat into his time Ior the examination.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I agree. It's now 11:10.
BY MR. KING:
Q I believe I asked you iI the Washoe Legal
Services had employed Mr. Coughlin?
A According to our records, he was employed about August 29th, 2007, to May 11, 2009.
Q And in your capacity working Ior Washoe County Legal Services, did you come to work with Mr.
Coughlin? A Yes.
Q In your work with Mr. Coughlin, did you Iorm an opinion as to his competency to practice law in
Nevada Page 94
as a lawyer?
A Yes.
Q I'll Iirst ask what that opinion is, then work backward as to why you Ieel that way. What is your
opinion currently oI Mr. Coughlin's ability to practice law?
A Currently I don't believe he's competent to practice law based on the inIormation I have.
Q Just by way oI background, did you at one point?
MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. Relevancy.
BY MR. KING:
Q At some point in time --
MR. COUGHLIN: Calls Ior an expert --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: He hasn't Iinished the question yet, Mr. Coughlin.
BY MR. KING:
Q At some point in time did you consider
Mr. Coughlin as a Iriend or did you like Mr. Coughlin? A Yes. Actually, in a way I've always liked
Mr. Coughlin. I don't have a dislike Ior him.
Q Backing up to what activities did you
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personally see or witness that Iormed the basis oI your opinion that he is not competent to practice? A
The Iirst one was the order entered in the Page 95
Joshi case by Judge Gardner wherein he was sanctioned Ior various things which are listed in the
order. As a result oI that, I reviewed the tape oI the hearing.
Q So you actually listened to the hearing
itselI?
A Yes. I went through the hearing transcript.
MR. KENT: Can I ask a question on that? MR. KING: Handing you what has been marked as Exhibit
3 Ior identiIication purposes.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. King?
MR. KENT: I just want to ask a clariIying question. II that was during the time that he was
employed?
THE WITNESS: Yes, he was still employed Ior us at that time.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: What were those dates oI employment again?
THE WITNESS: August 29th, 2007, to May 11th, 2009.
MR. COUGHLIN: Can I just ask, am I in danger oI communication with represented parties? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Are you what, sir?
MR. COUGHLIN: Am I in danger oI making communications with a represented party to the extent
Mr. Elcano is, I'm assuming, I believe him and his Page 96
organization right now, and his lawyer Joseph Gearing's not here?
MR. KING: No.
MR. COUGHLIN: I want to be sure.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't know what kind oI an objection that is, but let's take the issues one at a
time.
Mr. King you're proIIering.
MR. KING: I was asking the witness iI he recognized this particular document.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Have you marked it?
MR. KING: Yes. It's been marked as Exhibit
3. It has not been proIIered yet.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Okay.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. KING:
Q Which judge signed that order?
A Judge Linda Gardner, who is a Iamily court judge in Washoe County, Nevada.
Q What is the date that she signed the order? MR. COUGHLIN: You say it's been marked, Pat, you
haven't entered it yet?
MR. KING: That's correct.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: He hasn't oIIered it yet.
MR. COUGHLIN: Just a --
Page 97
BY MR. KING:
Q The date next to her signature?
A April 10th, 2009.
MR. KING: I'm going to move that this order, a certiIied copy oI which has been produced, be
admitted as Exhibit No. 3.
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MR. COUGHLIN: I'll object, sir. It just looks substantially diIIerent than what I have seen oI this
order. Further, the received on it is not certiIied, and that goes to a material issue here to the extent
that this is purportedly a ghost grievance. We don't know how this materialized at the State Bar. We
don't know iI it involves some brother and sister judicial well, we actually kind oI do know that
Judge Linda Gardner passed it to her brother, the administrator oI muni court who presided over the
trespass conviction. And he admits passing to Judge Nash Holmes --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: What's the objection?
MR. COUGHLIN: -- the day beIore March 15th on this Iiled her grievance with the State Bar.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: What is the objection? MR. COUGHLIN: I want to know exactly where and
how Mr. King got this order. Why the 5 on this March 15th looks so odd and diIIerent than the
previous versions where it looks like somebody drew the 5 in a little Page 98
darker, Pat.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: So your objection is what, sir?
MR. COUGHLIN: He's talking about it being certiIied, and all this and that. I would like some more
inIormation about that. How is it certiIied? MR. KING: I asked the witness I was going to ask the
witness the witness identiIied this as a document he recognized that was signed by the judge. The
witness testiIied that he heard the hearing.
BY MR. KING:
Q Why did this matter to you --
MR. COUGHLIN: No, he said it's certiIied.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Wait. Please. The exhibit has been oIIered. Your objection is? I'm still not
clear.
MR. COUGHLIN: He's saying when you oIIer, it's my understanding when you oIIer, and I'm not
that great at this.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: What's the objection?
MR. COUGHLIN: It's not certiIied, as Iar as I know. II you are going to be oIIering a judicial
document, it needs to be a certiIied copy.
MR. KING: It does not.
MR. COUGHLIN: Did he get it Irom --
Page 99
MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's one way oI having it admitted is to be certiIied. There's other ways to lay
a Ioundation. Do you have an objection?
MR. COUGHLIN: Well, he said it was certiIied.
So my objection is, let's see the prooI. Did you get it Irom Joey or Gina Hastings or did you get it
Irom the clerk oI court oI the muni court?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. I'm not going to entertain questions between and among the
lawyers. II you have a question, direct it to the panel or the witness. The objection is this lacks
Ioundation? MR. COUGHLIN: No. That this certiIication hadn't been proved or even spoken to
besides MR. ECHEVERRIA: Is it your position MR. COUGHLIN: -- certiIied.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: -- position that only legal documents can be admitted that are certiIied? MR.
COUGHLIN: Well, I didn't make a position on that. My position is he said it was certiIied. So I'm
contesting that.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Is this certiIied?
MR. KING: Let me get the clerk to bring the certiIication copies, unless she gave them to you
already, which I understood she did. Did she bring you copies? MR. ECHEVERRIA: This particular
one is not Page 100
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certiIied. Do you have one that's certiIied? MR. KING: I have already introduced the copies do not
show that it's certiIied.
MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, iI I can quickly interject Ior the record, I mean that not disrespectIul.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Are we on the record? Are you getting this, Ms. Reporter?
THE COURT REPORTER: Yes.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead.
MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, I'll lay I
understood, and since this has been Iiled with the courts that we have certiIied copies. Since the copy
I gave you is not certiIied, I'm going to lay a Ioundation a diIIerent way and withdraw the
representation that the copy I gave is a certiIied copy.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah. And that's just another basis Ior all the 13th time on the clock. I'm going
to say Iormally yes, I think a recusal is appropriate. And I think, Pat, you need to consider whether
that's Iraud, to be saying it's certiIied, backtracking once you get caught on it. But I'm just going to
put that out Ior the record.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Let's deal with this. Are you now making a motion that I should recuse myselI?
MR. COUGHLIN: Do you think you should? MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. Are you making that motion?
Position.
Enough.
Page 101
MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah, I think so. Probably.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Well, then articulate your I'd like to hear it.
MR. COUGHLIN: I think it's been set Iorth MR. ECHEVERRIA: Set Iorth what?
MR. COUGHLIN: You've admitted to being childhood Iriends. There's a rather odd suggestion that
you didn't know you both went to StanIord in 1966 despite being childhood Iriends, and being in
northern Nevada practicing law or members oI the legal community. And I would like to know any
other relevant nexus between the two oI you.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: So your basis Ior moving that I should recuse myselI is that I knew Mr. Elcano
as a childhood Iriend, and we were at the same school together? MR. COUGHLIN: And the Iact that
Mr. King has worn every diIIerent hat he's wanted to wear here. The Iact he just said something was
certiIied, then he backtracks and you asked me Ior my basis.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I'm asking you to Iocus on your motion Ior recusal. Is it your
position that legally any judicial oIIicer must recuse themselves iI he happens to have --
Page 102
MR. COUGHLIN: I'm not going to get narrowed down into iI you were childhood Iriends. I'm telling
you my basis, and that is that there is too much Iunny business going on here.
MR. COUGHLIN: I'd like to set Iorth
speciIically.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I've asked you to three times, and you won't do it.
MR. COUGHLIN: You want to narrow it down just iI you were childhood Iriends, and I want to go
with the totality oI the circumstances.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Articulate your case, sir.
I've asked you to.
THE WITNESS: SCR 105's been thrown out the window. You've ruled on motions beIore I've even
had a chance to oppose them or Iile a reply to an opposition.
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You claim that NRCP is applicable here. Yet under NRCP when I Iile a motion to biIurcate, and he
Iiled an opposition, and I get three days Ior mailing under 6-C, and he purports to Iile it on the 24th,
and you rule on it when? On the 30th? Don't I get Iive days, plus three Ior mailing to Iile my
opposition to preserve Ior appeal? MR. ECHEVERRIA: So should we disregard the motions you Iiled
without giving the State Bar the Page 103
opportunity to respond timely? I had two motions shoved under my door last night. Should those be
disregarded under your legal reasoning? Because you did not oIIer the State Bar the opportunity to
respond.
MR. COUGHLIN: Well, that --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Yes or no, Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: It's not a yes or no.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Yes, it is.
MR. COUGHLIN: That would entail Iiguring out whether or not 30 days prior to the hearing MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Let's Iocus on the issues back. You've made a motion now to require me to recuse
myselI.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: You made it on the basis that, one, Mr. Elcano and I knew each other as
childhood Iriends. And two, that we attended the same school together, apparently. And you say it's
suspicious that I did not know that. Anything else?
MR. COUGHLIN: Every --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Anything else?
MR. COUGHLIN: Every aspect oI SCR 1052(c) has been violated by your orders. And the way this
thing has been run, you have thrown out every last procedural due process substantive protection
accorded me Ior my property Page 104
right under the 14th Amendment. You have insulted me by the way you have run this panel.
MR. KING: Mr. Chairman --
MR. COUGHLIN: And I Iind out you're childhood Iriends with a guy I'm suing.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm childhood Iriends with justice --
MR. COUGHLIN: And you went to StanIord together in '66, and you didn't know that. And let me
guess. Are you on the Basque board too Ior UNR? And Paul tells us he's Basque every Iive minutes
you talk to him.
MR. KING: Mr. Chairman. My experience with Mr. Coughlin is iI this is allowed to continue, he will
be thrilled, and it will go on Ior eight hours. My witness has a limited time.
MR. COUGHLIN: And your oIIice is a stone's throw Irom the State Bar.
MR. KING: I need to move Iorward, because the witness has limited time, with your permission.
MR. COUGHLIN: I like you personally. I think you're a charming guy. I do, your Honor. Just like
Mr. Elcano. But the clock chimed 13 times. And iI I don't put into the record what is it going to say
on appeal? They are trying to merge me here. Let's be honest. So iI it's a merging that's going on here,
I'm Page 105
going to preserve everything Ior the record.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm going to overrule your motion Ior recusal. The supreme court has already
ruled that the Iact that a judge knows a witness or a lawyer is not, in and oI itselI, grounds Ior recusal.
That's been decided and litigated in this state. So the motion Ior recusal is overruled.
Mr. King, proceed to lay the Ioundation Ior Exhibit 3.
BY MR. KING:
Q Exhibit 3. Thank you. You just testiIied
that this is the order that emanated Irom the hearing you heard?
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A Yes.
Q And why were you concerned about this
particular order?
MR. COUGHLIN: I'm sorry. I don't want to take up more time. II I can incorporate by reIerence all
my procedural whining and moaning Ior why I think the recusal is appropriate.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Is this a motion you Iiled within the last 30 days?
MR. COUGHLIN: It's hard, because Mr. King lies to me so much about how things MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Which motion --
Page 106
MR. COUGHLIN: -- whether they're Iiled or not, whether they will accept, who controls who, who
the clerk oI court has independence Irom. I don't know what's being done by anybody, what I need to
do Ior a subpoena, whether I have to pay witness Iees, or whether the certiIied mailing oI August 23rd
is going to be used MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. Coughlin.
MR. COUGHLIN: There is no return oI service here.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. I'm going to interrupt you. You're oII base. We're Iocusing on
Exhibit 3.
Proceed, Mr. King.
MR. COUGHLIN: Can I incorporate by
reIerence --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't know what you are trying to incorporate --
MR. COUGHLIN: All my Iilings. The arguments.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. I'm not going to allow you to incorporate all your Iilings.
Mr. King, please proceed.
MR. KING: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate your patience.
BY MR. KING:
Q II you recall the question, it was, why did Page 107
you Iind that or did you Iind that order important? A Under this order Mr. Coughlin was sanctioned
Ior attorney's Iees in, I Iorget the amount, $900-some as I recall. $934.
MS. PEARL: Can you speak up, please? I can barely hear you.
THE WITNESS: $934 he was sanctioned in attorney's Iees. And as a result oI the sanction, I reviewed
the transcript.
BY MR. KING:
Q This hearing, you testiIied that this hearing and the resulting order were one oI the Iactors that you
used to determine that Mr. Coughlin is not competent to practice; is that correct?
A Yes. That's the Iirst, the Iirst really major one.
Q The court speciIically --
MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. That wasn't pled in relevancy. And Mr. Elcano has not been qualiIied
as an expert to provide the opinion as to someone's competency to practice law.
BY MR. KING:
Q Could you Ior the record could you read Irom Page 13 oI the Order, which is the one that
contains Page 108
her signature, the paragraph that begins at Line No. 5 and goes to Line 13?
A Yes. "The most troubling aspect oI this case was Mr. Coughlin's rude, sarcastic, and disrespectIul
presentation at trial. Mr. Coughlin's inability to understand the balance sheet, his Iailure to conduct
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discovery, and his lack oI knowledge with regard to the rules oI evidence and trial procedure. All oI
this was compounded with a continuously antagonistic presentation oI the case that resulted in a shiIt
Irom a Iairly simple divorce case to a contentious divorce trial lasting an excessive amount oI time."
Q In the next sentence the court also Iinds that the "arguments in support thereoI to be unIounded in
Iact, unwarranted by existing law, unreasonable, and vexatious throughout this entire proceeding."
Is that a correct statement oI that order?
A For the most part, yes.
Q Is there anything that needs to be clariIied? A No, I don't think so. I'm just saying that my review oI
the transcript conIirmed that.
Q When you listened to the were you a
supervisor at this time were you a supervisor oI Mr. Coughlin?
A Yes.
Page 109
Q Did you determine did you have an opinion at that time, having listened to the hearing itselI, did
you determine that the position oI the judge was correct? A Yes.
Q What was another Iactor that Iormed your opinion that Mr. Coughlin is not currently competent to
practice law?
A Several things have happened since. There have been two issues that I'm personally aware oI
dealing with dishonesty.
MR. COUGHLIN: Objection.
THE WITNESS: The quality --
MR. COUGHLIN: Foundation. Hearsay.
Relevancy.
THE WITNESS: The quality oI the work MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: -- that has comes across my desk has been disjointed, Iilled with irrelevant material,
and has not met reasonable competency standards. He's had a tortious residential pattern, and I don't
believe he's made any type oI regular oIIice, so it would be diIIicult Ior clients to contact him based
on what I have seen and know. And I don't believe he has a mental status that's capable oI exhibiting
judgment to counsel people in what they should and shouldn't do with their legal situations.
Page 110
BY MR. KING:
Q In your capacity as a supervisor and somebody who said they like Mr. Coughlin, did you attempt to
advise Mr. Coughlin to seek mental health or assistance with his circumstances?
A No, I don't believe I've ever advised Mr. Coughlin to do that. Because oI the Joshi matter he was
terminated, and I didn't have any Iurther contact with him.
Q Did you have contact with his Iamily?
A I've had, subsequent to his termination, I believe somewhere in the neighborhood oI two or three
telephone calls with his Iather, maybe Iour, trying to Iind a way to get him some help.
Q To your knowledge, has Mr. Coughlin ever heeded the recommendation that he get help? A I have
no knowledge one way or another.
Q There are some times when a person has an issue or mental inIirmity or whatever is going on iI
they are nice. How would you describe, in terms oI Mr. Coughlin, his demeanor in his current state?
A As we sit here today?
Q II you know what his --
A I haven't seen Zach since I haven't seen him Ior a long time. Today is the Iirst time I've seen Page
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him.
Q Back when you were supervising him, and he wasn't acting appropriately, how would you describe
his demeanor?
A Well, we had him Ior this given period oI time. And initially I worked on virtually when we hired
him, I knew that Zach had had some issues in the past. I did not know he had any mental issues. Or
even iI he did, I don't know that to this day. And so I mentored him and watched him very closely Ior
a period oI time, and his work seemed to improve.
We had some complaints Irom the two women's shelters, CAAW and Tahoe Women's Services, over
the course oI, I couldn't be exact, I would have to check, but maybe the Iirst year. I'm very protective
oI my employees. I met with the people Irom those two shelters. I thought they were biased in part.
And I reviewed some oI Mr. Coughlin's clients, and I didn't really think there was a critical issue.
And aIter about a year, 18 months, he started to deteriorate, in my opinion, started to have diIIiculties,
serious diIIiculties, relating with other employees. And then about this time the order came down
Irom Judge Gardner. And aIter I reviewed the transcript, I didn't believe we could maintain him as an
employee.
Page 112
And one oI the things that was relevant there is that this hearing took place in two sections; I want to
say they were a week or ten days apart. And the conduct and the criticisms oI the conduct by the
judge in the Iirst hearing, Mr. Coughlin came back and behaved exactly the same way in the second
hearing, he had not heeded anything the judge had told him.
And Mr. Coughlin is not stupid. So I took that in large part to be a competency issue.
MR. KING: I very much appreciate your
testimony and candor. I'll pass the witness.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Thank you, Mr. King.
Mr. Coughlin, it's now 11:31. You have 15 minutes.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. Thank you.
MR. KING: I apologize. I meant to have this admitted. Did I lay a proper Ioundation? I would move
Ior Exhibit 3 to be admitted.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Any objection now, sir? MR. COUGHLIN: I didn't hear the Ioundation.
I'm sorry.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: The Ioundation was Mr. Elcano attended the hearing, reviewed this order, and
determined it to be --
This is a true and correct copy oI the order that you looked at Iollowing the hearing? Page 113
THE WITNESS: Yes. The one that was
transmitted to us by the judge.
MR. COUGHLIN: Transmitted just by the judge? THE WITNESS: We have a copy oI it in our Iile.
MR. COUGHLIN: Transmitted to you?
THE WITNESS: Washoe Legal Services. I
checked it with my order. It appears to be the same order.
MR. COUGHLIN: But you're not saying how it was transmitted to the State Bar?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm interested in how it was transmitted. I'm interested in iI this is a true and
correct copy oI the order issued by Judge Gardner in the Joshi case --
MR. COUGHLIN: You mentioned he attended trial. He didn't attend the trial.
MR. KING: He said he --
MR. COUGHLIN: You said he attended the trial.
But he didn't attend the trial.
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MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Elcano testiIied he attended the hearing.
THE WITNESS: No, I reviewed the tape oI the hearing. I wasn't at the hearing. But in the Iamily
court they are on tape.
Page 114
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm Iocused on whether or not this is a true and correct copy oI the order issued
by Judge Gardner. And have you determined this to be the true and correct copy?
THE WITNESS: Yes. It's the order I relied on.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: It will be admitted.
(Exhibit 3 admitted.)
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, Mr. Coughlin.
MR. COUGHLIN: One thing, your Honor, with respect to the received stamp on it. That's something
that was on the order.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Pardon me?
MR. COUGHLIN: See the received?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Right.
MR. COUGHLIN: That's State Bar.
MR. COUGHLIN: Put that there.
MR. COUGHLIN: So it's not really a copy oI the order. It has something that was not on the order.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Okay. Overruled. Is that your objection?
MR. COUGHLIN: It has a Iunny 5 on it. It's one day aIter Judge Gardner submitted hers. It seems
kind Page 115
oI Iunny, like ghost reading is going on, because we don't know who submitted this.
Who submitted it, Pat?
MR. VELLIS: Mr. Elcano, do you have another copy oI the order that you received Irom the court
aIter the hearing that you compared this one to? I think you said you did?
THE WITNESS: I compared it to it. Mine has two blank spots in it though, two short areas, but
otherwise they seem to be verbatim and end on the same pages.
MR. VELLIS: Is there a stamp Irom the State Bar on the one that you got Irom the court? MR.
COUGHLIN: You didn't get this Irom Joey or Gina Hastings --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I'm not going to permit questions among the attorneys. That's
improper.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: So iI you have a question, you need to address it to the panel.
MR. COUGHLIN: It's improper to say it's certiIied when it's not.
THE WITNESS: The copy I reviewed is Iiled electronically by Howard Conyers, the clerk oI the
court.
MR. VELLIS: And there's no stamp Irom the Page 116
State Bar on the one that you reviewed? THE WITNESS: No.
MR. VELLIS: That's the one you received Irom the court?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. VELLIS: And that one is the same as the one that's been admitted, Exhibit 3?
THE WITNESS: Save and except two blank spots that are the Iault oI the copier.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, it's admitted.
Proceed.
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MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. Thank you.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Mr. Elcano, did you tell me when I was working at Washoe I'll say Washoe Ior short and I'll
say I like Mr. Elcano a great deal. I respect him a lot. I do.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm not interested in your side issues. II you have a question oI Mr. Elcano,
please ask him.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q When you were telling me, giving me some mentoring, that when you walk into that courtroom,
that courtroom is yours. It's not the judge's, it's not Page 117
opposing counsel's, it's yours. Does that sound like something you said to me?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Was there an objection? I didn't hear it.
MR. KING: Yes. Objection. Relevance.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'll overrule it. Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: Yes. Out oI context. But
that's a statement I would make, yes.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q How is that reconciled with your criticism oI my work in the Joshi case?
A I don't understand the question. But your work in the Joshi case was that it was incompetent. It had
nothing to do with whether or not you took over the courtroom. There were no it was a divorce
case. There was no statement or itemization oI the community property.
There was no statement or itemization oI the community debts. You were completely at a loss as to
issues oI relevance. You made objections like you did today that went over and over and over again
without legal basis, and incorporated strange rules.
The judge kindly tried to give you direction, which you totally eschewed. You did this Ior three or
Iour hours the Iirst time, came back a week or ten days Page 118
later and did it again. It had nothing to do with whether or not you took control oI the courtroom.
Q Have you reviewed the mandamus position I Iiled in response to that sanction?
A I don't know. I don't recall.
Q You Iire an attorney based on, in your words, solely in light oI her order, yet you don't recall
whether or not you reviewed a petition Ior writ oI mandamus that attorney Iiled?
MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative, and mischaracterizes the testimony.
MR. COUGHLIN: That attorney that is suing your organization right now.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: You've compounded the
question. The question is: Do you recall reviewing the writ oI mandamus? His answer is no, he
doesn't recall having reviewed it. Go on to your next question.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q To clariIy, your answer is you don't recall? A I don't recall reviewing the mandamus. I recall
reviewing your motion Ior reconsideration oI 60-some pages or 58 pages, but not mandamus.
Q So even did that reconsideration motion evince any more competency or skill in that Iamily law
setting than you Ielt was shown at the trial? Page 119
A No.
Q Are you aware oI whether or not the majority viewpoint oI the law was argued by me vis-a-vis the
setoII or impermissibility thereoI oI a domestic duty with a third party debt, such as was presented by
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Mr. Springgate's illusory settlement oIIer oI waiving alimony in exchange Ior his client agreeing to be
responsible Ior a multitude oI third-party debts on which he was the sole signature?
A I don't understand the question.
Q And yet you --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Wait a minute. He indicated he didn't understand the question. Quite Irankly, I
didn't either. I Ielt it was compound. Do you want to ask simple questions?
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q What's your understanding with respect to the position taken by me in that trial vis-a-vis the
majority viewpoint oI law on setting oII or oIIsetting domestic duties like alimony or child support
with third-party debts in a property settlement or debt settlement context? A I'm still not sure I
understand the question.
But there were no children, as I recall, so child custody had no issue in it. And in terms oI the oIIset, I
don't Page 120
know what law you proIIered.
Q Well, a duty like alimony. A domestic duty.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: To me that's an incomplete question. What's the complete question? MR.
COUGHLIN: I guess I'm trying to ascertain Mr. Elcano's awareness oI the position.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q What's your understanding oI the
permissibility oI setting oII a debt with a duty, a domestic duty?
MR. KING: Objection. Irrelevant.
MR. COUGHLIN: Did you say relevancy? May I respond to it, your Honor? Just to the extent Mr.
Elcano is here today purporting to critique my work in that regard, I think it is relevant to ascertain
whether or not he has any sort oI conception oI permissibility oI setting oII a domestic duty, like
alimony, with some debt. My point.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Are you Iinished?
MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah. And I didn't end it very well, but I didn't want to give away what I Ieel the
answer is or the majority viewpoint oI American law.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: The objection is sustained.
Mr. Coughlin, it's now 11:41. You have Iive Page 121
more minutes.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. Really? The relevancy objection is sustained. He gets to testiIy as to how
clueless I am. And this when I ask to see iI he has any sort oI knowledge in this area, it's not relevant?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: He's testiIied on a number oI issues as to your competency, your demeanor in
the courtroom, your conduct toward witnesses, toward judges, your ability to Iollow the judge's
directions.
MR. COUGHLIN: They are all relevant when he was talking about them.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Those issues are, sir.
Whether or not he knows the intricacies oI some Iine point oI law to me is irrelevant. Now, iI you
have some questions to address to Mr. Elcano, please do so, and let's not argue.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Mr. Elcano, Ior you to have any sort oI
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legitimate inIormed bases Ior the opinion you proIIered here today with respect to my competency
incident to my work in that Joshi case, wouldn't you need to know whether or not a domestic duty is
accorded greater signiIicance and protection in the law than is a third-party debt A No.
Page 122
Q therein? It's not permissible to do
essentially what Judge Gardner tried to Iorce on my client, which is accept a settlement, whereby a
setoII is made whereby my client waived her alimony in exchange Ior Mr. Springgate's client saying
he set it oII by the debts, by taking them on, even though they could never get at her anyway because
he was the sole signatory.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Is there a question there, Mr. Coughlin?
THE WITNESS: I don't understand.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Or is that a statement? MR. COUGHLIN: It is a statement. I think MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Then ask a --
MR. COUGHLIN: He's talking about things he doesn't know about.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Then ask a question.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Was it appropriate Ior Judge Gardner to tell my client, Ms. Joshi, not to listen to her attorney in a
close-range inIormal settlement conIerence? A I don't recall that issue. I have no opinion on it.
Q You don't recall that issue?
A No.
Q Do you know whether or not Judge Gardner in Page 123
sitting inIormally with myselI and Ms. Joshi in the settlement conIerence impromptu Iive minutes
beIore the trial told me to shut up?
A No, I have no knowledge oI that.
Q Do you know whether she told my client not to listen to her attorney?
A I have no knowledge oI that settlement conIerence.
Q Do you know whether or not all these materials were cited in Iilings?
A I don't understand that question. I don't know what materials you're talking about.
Q Were those issues brought up in Iilings that you have purported to this panel to have read and
reviewed?
A No, I read the order.
Q But you didn't just read the order; right?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: That is argumentative. You can ask it in a way that is not argumentative.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Didn't you testiIy earlier that you read the motion Ior reconsideration?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: We're not interested in what he previously testiIied to. That's on the record. Ask
a Page 124
direct question.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Did you read anything besides the order?
A Back at the time oI your termination I did go through the Iile. I don't remember currently what I
read.
I read your motion Ior reconsideration when it was Iiled.
Q Did you hire Lindy Wisher beIore her Bar results came in?
A We hired Lindy Wisher long beIore she went to law school.
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Q Right. But as an attorney, beIore her Bar
results came back, did you extend an oIIer oI employment to her?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
MR. COUGHLIN: It goes to witness bias.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Goes to what?
MR. COUGHLIN: Goes to bias. Mr. Elcano hired --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: It's now 11:46. I'm going to aIIord you two more minutes.
BY MR. COUGHLIN:
Q Did you say that Matt Pinkolini couldn't deal with working with Karen Sternly?
Page 125
A I don't think I said that in those words.
Q Did you say anything remotely like that?
A I don't recall. I can testiIy that Matt Pinkolini leIt our employ, and he did not enjoy working with
Karen Sternly. Exactly why he leIt, I can't tell you.
Q Would that be a similar basis Ior Larry
Belasco leaving the domestic violence unit?
A That I'm not sure oI. But Larry Belasco wanted a transIer to work in the child advocacy unit.
When an opening came up, I moved him.
Q Did he ever communicate to you a displeasure in working with Miss Sternly?
A He may have.
Q Did he?
A I don't recall exactly, but he may have. I know I've had diIIiculties in working with her, so it
wouldn't surprise me iI Larry Belasco had some.
Q Did you have a communication with me incident to some oI these complaints or a complaint, I
don't know iI it was the Tahoe one or CAAW one or iI it was Rhonda or something, in about January-
February 2009, wherein you said, you know what? I asked Master Edmondson about you, and I asked
Judge Gardner might have been it was Judge Gardner by that point and they both gave you
thumbs up, Page 126
or something similar to that?
A No. I don't think you're characterizing what I said correctly.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Your time has expired, Mr. Coughlin. Do you want to ask one more question?
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. I would like him to clariIy as to where I'm amiss there. What it is that he
might have said.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, iI you can,
Mr. Elcano.
THE WITNESS: Periodically I ask judges how our employees are doing, and especially iI there's a
complaint. And somewhere early on or to the middle oI Mr. Coughlin's employment I asked one or
two judges iI he was doing okay, and they said he was doing okay. So as a result, I did not pursue the
complaint oI the two shelter organizations. So I stood by my employee at that time MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Anything Iurther, Mr. King? MR. COUGHLIN: Was one oI those judges, Judge
Gardner?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, your time has expired.
MR. KING: I don't know iI the panel has any questions, but I don't.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Any questions Irom the panel Page 127
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members?
May Mr. Elcano be excused?
MR. KING: Thank you Ior your time today.
o12/28/09 John Springgate Re: Proposed Order Ior Return oI Appeal Bond? 12/28/09 John
Springgate Re: Donation? 12/15/09 John Springgate Re: Letter? 12/09/09 John Springgate Letter?
8/18/09 John Springgate Re: Stipulation Ior Extension oI Time? 8/18/09 John Springgate Re:
Stipulation Ior Extension oI Time? 6/17/09 John Springgate Re: Docketing Statement Attached?
5/28/09 John (No Subject)? 5/26/09 John Springgate Re: WDCR 9 Proposed Final Decree, RE:
discovery requests? 5/26/09 John Springgate Re: Joshi Supreme Court Appeal? 5/18/09 John
Springgate Re: returning your call?
In a letter to Coughlin Irom John Springgate, Esq, oI 5/28/09, Springgate wrote:
'May 28, 2009 VIA EMAIL Zachary Coughlin, Esq. 945 West 12th Street Reno, NV 89503
Mr. Coughlin:
This is in response to your emails. I doubt velY much that I will continue to be corresponding
with you via email. I should also advise you that I am continuing to IUn the clock on this matter, so
that you have Iair warning that iI you continue on this, I will seek additional Iees and sanctions.
To be clear, I will not clariIY what I said to you previously. It seems Iairly straight Iorward.
Secondly, I will not respond to your requests Ior additional data.
Third, I will not notiIY the COUli or take other steps that you request I do. II you think the
rules have not been complied with, kindly Iile an objection to the proposed Decree. I suggest that you
Iind reasons that you believe it does not conIorm with the Iinal order. You have been doing a pretty
good job with your objections so Iar, so I see no reason that an additional one should not be Iiled.
Next, with regards to your most recent email regarding copies oI correspondence or
communications, please note that I copied you on the correspondence with Mr. Meador because he is
appointed by the Supreme COUli. Further, there has been no correspondence with Judge Gardner,
other than documents as reIlected in the cOUli Iile. I understand communication about ex palie
matters. You should pay attention to your communications in that regard. Nothing Iurther will be
provided to you.
And, to the extent that you continue to complain to other pmiies about my proposed actions,
be prepared to back those up with documentation or Iilings, because you are crossing the line into
personal communications which, as I recall, is what got you in trouble in the Iirst place.
Lastly, with regards to Mr. Meador's communication, I believe he was indicating that he could serve
as settlement counsel in this matter, but was seeking our opinion as to whether or not we Ielt a recusal
was in order. You will note Irom my copy oI the correspondence to you that I did not believe that to
be the case. You seem to indicate in your emails that there is some belieI that I may not be
Iorwardingthe entirety oI the communication to you. That is insulting.
Just wanted to let you know where we stood. Very truly yours,
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JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ. /S/
DV08-01532 MICHELLE CARNINE VS. BRADLEY CARNINE (D2)
13-MAR-2009 Heard-Settled COUNSEL COUGHLIN TO PREPARE DECREE
08-APR-2009 ** Notes ...CD BURNED HEARING DATE 03-13-2009 REQUESTED BY
ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN CALLED FOR PICK UP 04-08-2009/JA
27-APR-2009 ***Minutes Entry: 3/13/09 SETTLEMENT CONF - Transaction 733073 - Approved
By: NOREVIEW : 04-27-2009:12:40:26
FV09-00886 JOSE URIBE VS. KARINA CAMACHO VALDEZ (DM)
TC - TPO - CHILDREN
13-MAR-2009 Extended Protection Ord Entry: EXTENDED FOR ONE YEAR (NOTE:
Iollowing EPO Hearing held on 3/12/09)...EXPIRES AT 11:59 PM ON 3-13-10
13-MAR-2009 Hrg Exhibits Maintnd in File Entry: APPLICANT'S EXHIBIT A...OFFERED,
MARKED AND ADMITTED
20-MAR-2009 12:12 PM Heard ...Entry: APPL WITH COUNSEL; ADVP PRO PER JAVS/HRG
RM A/GD
20-MAR-2009 12:12 PM Ord AIter Hearing...Entry: MODIFIED EPO RE VISITATION
EXCHANGES
03-APR-2009 10:22 AM Ex-Parte Mtn...Coughlin, Esq., Zachary Entry: TO AMEND
EXTENDED PROTECTION ORDER AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
03-APR-2009 Request Ior SubmissionCoughlin, Esq., Zachary Entry: DOCUMENT TITLE: EX
PARTE MOTION TO AMEND EXTENDED PROTECTION ORDER AGAINST DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE PARTY SUBMITTING: ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ DATE SUBMITTED:
04/03/09 SUBMITTED BY: JN DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
10-APR-2009 04.51 PM ** Notes ...Entry.CD BURAED HEARIAC DA1E 3-2-
29 REQUES1ED KA1HLEEA BRECKEARIDCE
(AO1E: BRECKEARIDCE WAS WLS'S BOARD PRESIDEA1 A1 1HIS 1IME,
AAD BO1H SHE AAD ELCAAO COAJEAIEA1Y FAILED 1O DISCLOSE
1HA1 1HE JERY SAME 1HEMES PRESEA1 IA COUCHLIA'S ADJOCACY
FOR MALE DOMES1IC JIOLEAC JIC1IM 1OSE URIBE OA 3/12/9 AA
3/3/9 (EERILY SIMILAR 1O 1HE 3/12/9 AAD 3/17/9 DA1ES OF 1HE
1OSHI DIJORCE 1RIAL IA DJ8-118 1HA1 RESUL1IAC IA 1HE 4/13/9
(AO1E, EA1ERED AFTER WLS PRESIDENT BRECKENRIDGE HAD
ALREADY PICKED UP THE CD SHE CURIOUSLY REQUESTED OF
COUGHLIN'S WORK IN THE 3/12/09 URIBE EPO HEARING)...SEE HER
4/24/12 LE11ER 1O COUCHLIA AAD ELCAAO'S S1A1EMEA1'S IA HIS
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4/2/9, 5/1/9, AAD 5/7/9 LE11ERS 1O COUCHLIA AAAOUACIAC 1HE
BASIS FOR 1HE MELODRAMA1CI IMMEDIA1E SUSPEASIOA BARRIAC
COUCHLIA FROM WLS PROPER1Y, 1HE SCOPE OF 1HE
"IAJES1ICA1IOA", AAD 1HE BASIS FOR COUCHLIA'S 1ERMIAA1IOA, IA
COMPARISIOA 1O 1HE OJERLY COAJEAIEA1 REJISIOAIS1 HIS1ORY
1ES1IFIED 1O UADER OA1H BY ELCAAO A1 COUCHLIA'S 11/14/12
FORMAL DISCIPLIAARY HEARIAC)CALLED FOR PICK
Certainly, it is not lacking in irony that Elcano testiIied as to Coughlin's competency at the
11/14/12 Iormal disciplinary hearing when a review oI the State oI Nevada Board oI Equalization tax
appeal matter that Elcano asked Coughlin to address suddenly on approximately Thursday,March 5
th
,
2009 and to which Coughlin returned to Elcano (without whining about something not 'being part oI
my job description...especially considering Sternlicht reIused to help out in nearly any way with
covering Coughlin's cases upon Elcano's negligent decision to attempt to quickly Iire Coughlin with
hel oI the impermissible attempt to use the prestige oI Judge Gardner's judicial oIIice, in violation oI
Nevada Code oI Judicial Conduct Canon 2, to Iurther WLS's Elcano, CAAW's, and, some might say,
Judge L. Gardner and Springgate's own personal interest by Iiring Coughlin with what ultimately they
would attempt to assert as a locktight/impenetrable justiIication Ior doing so, an Order AIter Trial by
a sitting District Court Judge (almost as strong as a Letter oI Recommendation Ior Judicial OIIice on
Judicial Stationary). Beyond Elcano merely glomming on in a reckless, phony, shallow Iashion to
Judge L. Gardner's 4/13/09 Order AIter Trial (not even a Iinal Order, as is calls Ior Springgate to
Prepare a FOFCOL and Decree oI Divorce, which, ultimately subsumed on 6/19/09 and language
relied upon by the SBN in its 8/23/12 Complaint against Coughlin in NG12-0435 or the Panel Chair
Echeverria's solo 12/14/12 Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law (which is not even an appealable
Order, Decision, or Recommendation given the untrained jurist Chair Echeverria's Iailure to so title
the document thusly, and as a result, in 62337, Clerk Lindeman's 12/24/12 Issued Notice oI BrieIing
Schedule/Bar Discipline. Due date: 30 days. II no opening brieI is Iiled, the matter will be submitted
Ior decision on the record without brieIing or oral argument.
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/courtrules/
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/courtrules/RPC.html
12-24-2012 Filed Record oI Bar Proceedings, Pleadings and Transcript oI Hearings. Vols. 1
through 3.
12-24-2012 Issued Notice oI BrieIing Schedule/Bar Discipline. Due date: 30 days. II no opening
brieI is Iiled, the matter will be submitted Ior decision on the record without brieIing or oral
argument.
04-10-2009/JA 21-MAY-2009 12:19 PM Substitution oI Counsel Ashley, Esq., Marc
Entry: MARC ASHLEY ESQ SUBSTITUTING OBO APPLICANT IN PLACE OF ZACHARY
COUGHLIN, ESQ
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Minutes from the 3/12/09 Trial date in DV08-01168: 'HEARING -SETTLEMENT
CONFERENCE/TRIAL
THE COURT HELD A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE OFF RECORD. NO AGREEMENT WAS
REACHED AND THE MATTER CONVENED ON THE RECORD FOR TRIAL.
PlantiII Ashwin Joshi was present with counsel, Zachary Coughlin, Esq., and was sworn to testiIy.
DeIendant Bharti Joshi was present with counsel, John Springgate, Esq., and was sworn to testiIy.
Mr. Springgate waived opening statement and called Mr. Joshi to testiIy. Mr. 1oshi testified on direct-
examination: Is renting his residence Ior approximately the last 9 months when he had to leave the marital
residence as per a Protection Order. He took some belongings but the bulk oI the belongings are at the marital
residence. Beside the cars, the TV and computer are at issue. He wants the computer. His inIormation (Iiles) was
wiped oII the computer. TestiIied regarding DeIendant`s exhibits A (Clearstar statement) and B (Kelley Blue Book
value print out). Mr. Springgate offerea the exhibits into eviaence. They were aamittea with no obfection by Mr.
Coughlin. Mr. Joshi testiIied he used to work Ior two employers, has worked six hours in the past 2 weeks and has
Iiled Ior unemployment. He hasn`t received unemployment yet but expects to receive $320 per week. He has
projected 30 hrs. oI work next week, 30 hrs. during three days Iollowing that, and no other projected work Ior the
Iollowing 2 months. He testiIied regarding accounts, balances, and his expenses, reIerring to DeIendant`s exhibit E.
Mr. Coughlin objection to a question regarding purchase oI the computer as a community expense arguing it is
leading. The obfection was overrulea ana the question rulea founaational. Mr. Joshi testiIied regarding the Discover
account. Mr. Coughlin objection to a question regarding whether it was community expense arguing it calls Ior a
legal opinion. The obfection was sustainea. Mr. Joshi testiIied Iurther regarding Discover, WaMu, Wells Fargo,
other debts, and that the St. Mary`s account is Irom an operation he had in May. He didn`t have insurance, didn`t
have insurance through his employer because he Iorgot and missed the enrollment period, and thought he was on his
wiIe`s insurance. St. Mary`s discounted the bill. Mr. Joshi testiIied regarding DeIendant`s exhibit F, the St. Mary`s
bill. Mr. Coughlin stated he was not provided a copy, he may have or not been provided one (on Mr. Springgate`s
comment that it was provided to him prior), and had no objection to its admittance. Exhibit F was aamittea.
Mr. Coughlin movea to not aamit the Remsa (markea as exhibit G) bill as an exhibit stating he wasnt proviaea
a copy. Mr. Springgate proviaea a prior one, it was markea as Plaintiffs exhibit G ana Mr. Springgate statea it was
proviaea, in his supplementea proauction of aocuments, to Mr. Coughlin on February 17th. Mr. Coughlin statea he
aiant know if he receivea it. The Court overrulea Mr. Coughlins obfection as him having alreaay receivea a copy.
Mr. Coughlin arguea further. The Court continuea to hear testimony.
Mr. Joshi testiIied regarding exhibit G. Exhibit G was aamittea. Mr. Joshi testiIied regarding the anesthesiology
bill. Exhibit E was offerea ana aamittea with no obfection. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi testiIied Iurther
regarding medical bills and money owed to Iriends who Iacilitated the parties` move to the US and to his sister and
brother in law. Exhibit H was markea. Mr. Joshi testiIied to exhibit H, transIers Irom his sister and brother in law;
the debt in the amount oI 3.600 (approximately $5,000). Regaraing the letter referencea in the exhibit, Mr. Joshi
statea it was no his computer. Mr. Coughlin statea he aoesnt know if he obfects to the exhibit. Exhibit H was
aamittea. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi stated inIormation on money owed to his Iriends was on his computer,
Mrs. Joshi cancelled his email, and he doesn`t know iI he can retrieve it Irom the company.
Mr. Coughlin obfectea on hearsay. The Court founa that the exhibit was alreaay aamittea. The obfection was
overrulea. Mr. Coughlin arguea further that Mr. Springgate is to bring a copy for him. The Court reviewea the
applicable rule ana founa that copies have been proviaea ana the statute has been compliea with. Mr. Coughlin
arguea further. Testimony continued. Mr. Coughlin obfectea to the testimony on hearsay. Mr. Springgate rephrasea
the question ana continuea his airect-examination. Mr. Joshi testiIied Iurther regarding money owed to Iriends. Mr.
Coughlin obfectea that a question callea for a legal conclusion. Upon arguments presentea, the Court overrulea the
obfection. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi testiIied regarding the vehicles.
Mr. Coughlin obfectea regaraing the earlier aiscussion as to proauction of aocuments. The Court founa that
Mr. Springgate compliea with the rule.
Mr. Joshi continuea his testimony regaraing the vehicles. Mr. Coughlin obfectea on hearsay. The obfection was
overrulea. Mr. Coughlin arguea further. Mr. Springgate continued the questioning. Mr. Coughlin obfectea. The
obfection was overrulea. Testimony continued regarding the vehicles, Mrs. Joshi`s 'woman`s wealth, and
regarding the parties debt. Mr. Coughlin obfectea that Mr. Springgates questioning is aiscussing settlement
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aiscussions. Upon arguments presentea, the obfection was overrulea. Testimony continued and concluded on direct
examination.
Mr. 1oshi testified on cross-examination by Mr. Coughlin: Mr. Joshi testiIied regarding his tip earnings. Mr.
Springgate obfectea that a question regaraing his tips in that Mr. Joshi is incompetent to speak as to the IRS ana
requestea the question be rephrasea. Mr. Coughlin rephrasea the question. Testimony continued. An obfection by
Mr. Springgate was sustainea. Testimony continued regarding his unemployment and probability oI employment in
the next week. Regaraing his line of questioning, Mr. Coughlin agreea that he woula stipulate to Mr. Joshis
earnings as shown on his W2, ana has questions to Mr. Joshis testimony that he is earning less. Testimony
continued. Mr. Joshi testiIied Iurther regarding his employment. Mr. Springgate obfectea to a question as
argumentative. The Court founa the question was askea ana answerea. Mr. Coughlin arguea further. After
aiscussion, the Court allowea the question. Mr. Springgate obfectea that the question 'Are you lying?` is
argumentative, improper, ana prefuaicial. After aiscussion, the Court airectea proceeaing beyona the question. Mr.
Joshi testiIied Iurther regarding his unemployment Iiling and medical billings Irom Reno Physicians. The Court
notea Mr. Joshi testifiea that bill has been paia off ana no longer an issue as community aebt. On inquiry by the
Court as to his questioning of the bill, Mr. Coughlin statea his question goes to impeachment. Mr. Joshi continued
testimony regarding his medical bills. Two obfections by Springgate as argumentative were sustainea. Mr. Joshie
arguea further. The Court sustainea the obfections. Testimony continued. There was a further obfection as
argumentative ana further aiscussion. AIter discussion, testimony continued regarding the charges incurred. There
was an obfection on relevance regaraing loans to family. After aiscussion, questioning continuea. Mr. Joshi testiIied
regarding charges incurred. An obfection by Mr. Springgate that a question calls for a legal conclusion was
sustainea. Questioning continued. An obfection by Mr. Springgate as argumentative was sustainea. Questioning
continued. Mr. Joshi testiIied regarding accounts and whose name they are in, and regarding debts. An obfection by
Springgate regaraing certain expenaitures ana whether they are community in that the question calls for a legal
conclusion was sustainea ana the Court airectea questions be askea that aont call for a legal conclusion.
Testimony continued. Mr. Springgate obfectea. The Court heara arguments. The obfection was sustainea.
Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi testiIied regarding a trip with his sister, regarding account balance transIers, his
medical operation, his legal representation charges, and the IRS income tax Iiling. Mr. Springgate obfectea on
relevancy to a question regaraing the IRS refuna usea for legal charges. The obfection was sustainea. The Court
recessed and the matter was continued to March 17, 2009 at 8:15 am. (end oI Minutes Irom 3/12/09 Trial date in
DV08-01168).
Minutes Irom second day oI Trial in DV08-01168, 3/17/09: 'HEARING-CONTINUED
TRIAL
PlaintiII Ashwin Joshi was present with counsel, Zachary Coughlin, Esq., and was sworn to
testiIy.
DeIendant Bharti Joshi was present with counsel, John Springgate, Esq., and was sworn to testiIy.
This matter continued Irom March 12
th
. PlaintiII Ashwin 1oshi, took the stand and continued
his testimony on cross-examination. Mr. Joshi testiIied: He paid attorney`s Iees with a credit card
(US Bank) that he then paid with a tax reIund and testiIied Iurther regarding the debts. An obfection
by Mr. Springgate as a mischaracteri:ation of Mr. Joshis prior testimony was sustainea. Testimony
continued regarding debts. Mr. Springgate obfectea on relevance to a question regaraing community
property. Mr. Coughlin arguea that Mr. Joshi is making a concertea effort to aetermine what is
community property. The obfection was sustainea. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi stated the
vehicles were all purchased during the marriage and testiIied Iurther regarding the vehicles. An
obfection by Mr. Springgate that a question regaraing the cars, listea in the financial aeclaration, is
compouna ana misrepresentative of the testimony was sustainea. Mr. Joshi arguea further. The
Court informea Mr. Joshi the obfection was sustainea ana requestea he proceea with questioning.
Mr. Joshi statea he is going to respona though sustainea. The Court hela a bench conference with
the attorneys.
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The matter reconvened. Mr. Joshi continued his testimony on cross examination: He didn`t collect
unemployment last year and testiIied Iurther regarding his employment and debts; testiIied regarding
Iamily visits, travels, and costs covered by him and Ms. Joshi. Tow obfections by Mr. Springgate on
hearsay was sustainea. An obfection by Mr. Springgate on relevance was overrulea. Testimony
continued. Mr. Joshi testiIied that Ms. Joshi`s employment check was not deposited to any bank
account in London; Ms. Joshi`s earnings while in Tanzania were used by the household, she had
control oI them, and were not deposited into an account; testiIied Iurther regarding the Honda. Mr.
Coughlin obfectea to testimony that the aaughter is paying for the car. The obfection was sustainea.
A question by Mr. Coughlin was obfectea to by Mr. Springgate as argumentative. The obfection was
sustainea. The Court notea that the Honaa was purchasea with cash from Ms. Joshi aavancea from a
creait cara. Mr. Joshi testiIied Iurther: He and his daughter took the cash to the seller, purchased the
car, and the car was titled in his and the daughter`s name; the daughter made payments to him by
transIer Irom her account to Mr. Joshi`s account, Mr. Joshi took the payment and deposited into Ms.
Joshi`s account to pay the credit card; when he was out oI the house, the daughter started paying Ms.
Joshi directly. Mr. Springgate testifiea as argumentative to a question as to whether he has proof ana
arguea that Mr. Coughlin coula obtain proof on aiscovery. Mr. Coughlin arguea that Mr. Springgate
aoesnt know what aocuments he has on aiscovery. The obfection was sustainea. There was further
aiscussion.
Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi testiIied Iurther regarding accounts. Obfections as argumentative
by Mr. Springgate were sustainea. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi stated he hasn`t made an eIIort to
ask his Iamily about Ms. Joshi`s woman`s wealth, Ms. Joshi is on talking terms with them and can ask
them; stated Ms. Joshi leIt her woman`s wealth with his mother, his mother has passed, and then leIt
it with his sister, but he really doesn`t know. After aiscussion regaraing testimony, questioning
continuea. Mr. Joshi stated he doesn`t know about a speciIic custom but the bride retains her wealth
that she brings with her, she keeps it, and she decides whether to keep it anywhere else. Mr.
Springgate obfectea that Mr. Coughlin is arguing with the witness. The obfection was sustainea.
There were a further obfection ana aiscussion regaraing the questioning regaraing womans wealth.
The Court aaaressea the issue of obfections. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi testiIied Iurther that his
understanding is that Ms. Joshi leIt her woman`s wealth with his sister. Mr. Springgate obfectea to
question whether he attemptea to retrieve it from his sister as argumentative. The obfection was
sustainea. The Court cautionea counsel about broaa arguments, about the manner of questioning,
ana about being argumentative with the witness. Mr. Joshi stated he told Ms. Joshi she could call his
sister and to not involve him; testiIied regarding loans Irom Iriends and Iamily; testiIied as to what he
(vs. Ms. Joshi or them both) paid Ior during the marriage. There were no Iurther questions on cross-
examination.
Mr. 1oshi testiIied on re-direct examination: During his surgery, he was oII work, applied Ior
unemployment but didn`t receive any. An obfection by Mr. Coughlin as argumentative was overrulea.
Mr. Joshi stated there are trips oI Ms. Joshi`s also placed on the cards-a vacation to India Ior two
weeks. An obfection by Mr. Coughlin to a question by Mr. Springgate in that it calls for a legal
opinion was sustainea. Mr. Joshi testiIied regarding his legal Iees and payments. An obfection by Mr.
Coughlin as leaaing was overrulea. Mr. Joshi testiIied Iurther regarding his legal costs. On re-cross,
Mr. Joshi testiIied that he has paid his attorney $4000-by the end oI February, he paid his attorney
$4,000, paid $600 a couple oI days ago, stated he has it in writing, and agreed he has paid a total oI
$4600; he didn`t receive unemployment because he was hospitalized; he didn`t receive any money
Irom the government. There were no other questions and the witness was excused.
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Mr. Springgate rested Plaintiff`s case.
Mr. Coughlin called Ms. 1oshi to testify. Ms. 1oshi testiIied on direct examination: She didn`t
ask Ior access to bank statements; asked Ior credit card statements but didn`t get them; she could have
access to Wells Fargo because the statements were lying around the house but not to credit card
statements; she asked the companies Ior statements. Two obfections by Mr. Springgate to hearsay
were sustainea. Testimony continued. Ms. Joshi stated she went to US Bank and was told she
couldn`t have access with Mr. Joshi present. An obfection by Mr. Springgate to leaaing was
sustainea. Testimony continued. Ms. Joshi stated she was never made aware oI any oI the $5000
loans; she incurred expenses related to immigration; regarding the letter, exhibit H, stated she thinks
they are trying to make up a debt; she never took any money Irom them. An obfection by Mr.
Springgate was sustainea. Ms. Joshi continued her testimony regarding the daughter`s car, there`s
$5000 still owed; testiIied regarding the Jeep-there`s a loan with Clearstar, she and her son; testiIied
Iurther regarding the cars; her children help her pay the rent, phone, pays expenses with her paycheck;
asked Ior spousal support-got some initially but is not anymore. Obfections by Mr. Springgate to
questions regaraing whether she consiaers Mr. Joshi shoula be half responsible for her living costs
were sustainea. Ms. Joshi testiIied that stated she thinks Mr. Joshi made up the other $5000 debt
owed to Mr. Joshi`s Iriend; she asked the Iriend about it and the Iriend stated he wanted to stay out oI
the divorce and didn`t want to discuss it; she didn`t inquire to the Fowler`s regarding the other debts;
she sent an email to Mr. Joshi`s sister regarding her woman`s wealth and received no response; Mr.
Joshi also sent his sister an email aIter hers. There was aiscussion regaraing Mr. Joshis email, Mr.
Coughlin statea hes not sure if he has a copy ana requestea to ask questions about it. The request
was aeniea. Ms. Joshi testiIied regarding a saIety deposit box listed in Mr. Joshi`s deposit box. There
was argument regaraing Mr. Coughlins questioning. The Court airectea Mr. Coughlin to ask
questions on airect without impeaching his own witness or arguing with her. Ms. Joshi continued her
testimony regarding the saIety box. Obfections by Mr. Springgate as argumentative were sustainea.
Mr. Springgate obfectea on relevance to a question regaraing whether Mr. Joshi threaten her. Mr.
Coughlin arguea in response that it goes towara aetermination of Mr. Josh running up aebts. Mr.
Springgate statea his obfection is basea on Roarigue: v. Roarigue:, 116 Nev 993. Mr. Coughlin was
aamonishea for interrupting. Mr. Coughlin arguea that the question was not maae to aetermine fault
for purposes of alimony but for purposes of the valiaity of the aebt. The obfection was sustainea.
Testimony continued. Ms. Joshi stated she got a TPO on Mr. Joshi. Mr. Springgate obfectea on the
same basis as the prior obfection. The Court aamonishea Mr. Coughlin to be respectful ana took
fuaicial notice. Mr. Coughlin arguea further. Mr. Springgate obfectea to a question regaraing
whether accepting alimony maae her responsible for aebts in that it callea for a legal conclusion. The
obfection was sustainea.
Testimony continued. Ms. Joshi testiIied Iurther regarding the debts; regarding the car loans,
stated each should take the loan Ior his/her car; testiIied regarding her caretaking oI the children. Mr.
Springgates obfection on lack of founaation was sustainea. Ms. Joshi stated she has basically always
worked; gave up some oI her dreams Ior the Iamily and believes Mr. Joshi did not take the same
responsibility to the marriage. An obfection by Mr. Springgate to a question whether Mr. Joshi
exertea control over the marriage was overrulea. Mr. Coughlin had no Iurther questions.
Ms. 1oshi testified on cross-examination: Ms. Joshi stated the parties didn`t have joint accounts;
testiIied regarding the car debt-her daughter makes the payments directly to the credit card account
around $200. Obfections by Mr. Coughlin to a question whether Mr. Joshi shoula sign the title over
to the aaughter on the basis that it calls for speculation, on relevance, ana argumentative were
overrulea. Ms. Joshi stated she is concerned about Mr. Joshi owning the car and the debt Ior it oI
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about $5000; the son is paying Ior his car and it`s in his name. Mr. Coughlin obfectea on relevance to
whether the parties chilaren live with her was overrulea. Ms. Joshi stated she has a saIety deposit
box, her woman`s wealth is not in it; her woman`s wealth Irom Mr. Joshi was leIt with his Iamily; her
woman`s wealth Irom her side is with her. An obfection on relevance to whether she has attorneys
fees was overrulea. Ms. Joshi continued testimony: In Tanzania Mr. Joshi owned a restaurant and she
helped him in the business; testiIied regarding her employment in the US; she has a degree in
commerce Irom Bombay; she has individual accounts in her name.
Ms. 1oshi testified on re-direct examination. Ms. Joshi testiIied that there was domestic
violence during the marriage. Mr. Springgate obfectea on relevance. Mr. Coughlin arguea that it
goes towara her ability to have any reasonable opportunity to obfect to any incurrea aebts. Mr.
Springgate arguea that whether or not she incurrea aebts (for representation) are relevant to
community aebt ana aomestic violence is not relevant. Upon arguments presentea, the obfection was
sustainea. There were no other questions and the witness was excused.
There were no other witnesses or testimony. The Court recessed. Upon reconvening, the Court
heard closing arguments Irom the attorneys.
Mr. Springgate moved the Court Ior attorney`s Iees, imposed on Mr. Coughlin directly, under
NRS 7.085. Mr. Coughlin argued in response and in opposition. The Court took the matter
under submission and will issue an Order. (end of Minutes Irom 3/17/09 Trial date in DV08-
01168).
What seems clear is that DAS wants it both ways. DAS wants to make a warrantless
arrest oI Coughlin on 2/1/13, based upon
Coughlin's email to the WCDA's OIIice which engendered the DAS retaliation
a scant 18 hours later reads:
"Subject: Covington's threats vis a vis State Bar oI Nevada 62337? From: Zach Coughlin
(zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Fri 2/01/13 1:01 PM To:
jhelzerda.washoecounty.us (jhelzerda.washoecounty.us);
triandada.washoecounty.us (triandada.washoecounty.us); MBaysda.washoecounty.us
(mbaysda.washoecounty.us); sjstewartda.washoecounty.us
(sjstewartda.washoecounty.us); tgallida.washoecounty.us (tgallida.washoecounty.us);
plipparellida.washoecounty.us (plipparellida.washoecounty.us);
plipparda.washoecounty.us (plipparda.washoecounty.us); zyoungda.washoecounty.us
(zyoungda.washoecounty.us); phalsteadda.washoecounty.us
(phalsteadda.washoecounty.us); (redacted address) lcastillonvcourts.nv.gov
(lcastillonvcourts.nv.gov); tlindemannvcourts.nv.gov (tlindemannvcourts.nv.gov)
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Dear ADA Helzer, In her 12/13/12 email to WCPD Leslie, DDA Kandaras admits that
there is an incapacity issue with Coughlin, yet the WCDA's OIIicer persists with the 1/22/13
Trial in 065630. Instead oI moving Ior a competency evaluation, Leslie and Kandaras (and
Watts-Vial, the DDA, not the Judicial Assistant lawyer Ior Judge Walker) abuse process,
dodge and obstruct Coughlin's subpoenas on 2JDC Judges and Adminstrators, and the RJC
Custodian oI Records, Washoe County SheriII's OIIice, etc., etc. This is awIully similar to
the besMIRCHING oI the legal proIession's dignity here in Northern Nevada awhile back in
In Re Mirch...some SBN WCDA's OIIice synergy there too. The thing about WCPD
Leslie's protection order that is the most striking lie, is that the linked clip is not a "video" at
all. It is audio only. Further, nothing in the audio could possibly be said to amount to a "vow
to continue harassing his Iormer public deIender". Jim Leslie is a liar and a Iraud. And one
oI the best prosecutor's the WCDA's OIIice has. Also, Paula Cambpell oI the State Bar oI
Nevada completely disputes Bar Counsel Pat King's attributions to her in his own TPO
Application, which, as usual, contains King's brand oI lying every other word out oI his
moutn. A FOFCOL is not an Order. King, you demand Coughlin call ahead prior to coming
to the SBN to Iile anything, then, when he does, you characterize it as requiring you call the
police? Ever heard oI a post hearing motion? Why doesn't King and Clerk oI Court Peters
try to lie a little less about the representations they make to Respondent's vis a vis SCR
105(4), SCR 110, and SCR 119(3), and all the ex parte communications with the Panel that
King admits to intending to make during a 10/15/12 conversation with Coughlin in NG12-
0204?
And coached up that Panel was...ruling on voluminous motions on 10/3/12 beIore the
Order appointing Panel Chair Echeverria could have even arrived in the mail given NNDB
NVDETR Chairman Susich's Order appointing the Panel is signed and dated 10/30/12. Oh,
that's right, no time Ior "a regular motion cycle" to quash all oI Coughlin's subpoenas. And
look, its a prosecutor's world here in Northern Nevada. And there will always be the
prosecutor's at the SBN there to catch them iI they Iall, like with In Re Beckett (Bare
couldnt' bring himselI to characterize a crime with the exacting wording in its elements as
that Iound in SCR 111(6) as a serious oIIense? No matter, even upon the Supreme Court
doing it Ior him, Beckett got the ol' SCR 111(10) pass, aIter an arduous week oI rehab
"cured" him...). And no biggie with Willardson having an aIIair with the Judge while
appearing in case beIore him...http://www.lvrj.com/news/lawyer-who-had-relationship-
with-judge-won-t-Iace-discipline-Irom-bar-189160421.html?reI421 What am I being
disbarred again Ior? Oh, that's right, Iormer WCDA DDA domestic violence attorney now
Judge Linda Gardner sanctioned me under NRS 7.085 Ior asking Ior alimony Ior the
domestic violence victim I was representing as a legal aid attorney...Iinding it vexatious
(though not requiring, under any canon, her to report anything related to Coughlin's
advocacy there to the SBN...) despite her 6/19/09 FOFCOL and Decree oI Divorce
ultimately including a $1.00 per year jurisdictional reservation alimony award...and
18.010(2)(b) address only Irivolous and vextious claims or deIense, not "Iailing to conduct
discovery" or "sarcastic" presentation. So either Judge Gardner violated a Canon by Iailing
to report Coughlin to the Bar Ior some alleged violation oI an RPC, or Bar Counsel King is
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violating RPC 3.8, 4.1, 3.3, and 3.4 by taking Judge L. Garnder's 4/13/09 Order AIter Trial
that he got Irom RMC Judge Nash Holmes aIter Judge L. Gardner passed it to her brother,
RMC Judge W. Gardner, whom passed it to all the other RMC Judges. RMC Judge Nash
Holmes also admits to the WCPD potentially violating the attorney-client privilege in
communicating with her, Ior god knows what reason, in her 3/14/12 grievance against
Coughlin to the SBN, where she alleges Coughlin is "decompensating", though, Judge W.
Gardner admitted on the record on 4/10/12 that Judge Nash Holmes violated Nevada law by
Iailing to notiIy the other departments oI the RMC in wirting oI her suspension oI the trial
oI 2/27/12 in 11 TR 26800 upon her Iinding Coughlin's competency in question and
"reIerring this matter to the State Bar", but not beIore she established the majority
viewpoint in the law by Iailing to grant even a brieI stay to an attorney representing clients
prior to summarily incarcerating him Ior summary contempt (she characterized it as
criminal, but cited to civil statutes, though, conveniently avoided NRS 22.030(2), which
would required ol' shiIty Marshal Harley to put it in an AIIidavit, which he deIinitely does
not want to do. And NNDB/WCDA DDA Kandaras had to sign oII on Judge Nash Holmes
3/30/09 Order resleasing Coughlin property to him (which oddly, contrary to the booking
intake Iorm listing Coughlin's personal property as including a stand alone micro sd card,
only mentioned two phones and a shaver...though the smartphone had the micro sd card
inserted into it...though all the date was wiped Iorm everything....hhmmmmn.
And Coughlin did not lie to Judge Nash Holmes during the 2/27/12 Trial, period. She
was reduced to alleging he lied about having recording devices (because neither she nor
anyone else invovled wants to address the warrantless conIiscation oI Coughlin's property
not incident to a search incident to arrest where the WCSO released Coughlin's property to
the City oI Reno Marshals a day aIter he was booked and where Coughlin's property was
already booked into his own personal property at the jail, its not a Diaz search incident to
arrest, its just a Fourth Amendment violation at that point... But the thing is, the audio
transcript oI the 2/27/12 Trial clearly shows that Coughlin made an "open reIusal" to
indicate whether or not he had any "recording devices", telling Judge Nash Holmes "what is
in my pockets is private, and that's a Fourth Amendment issue..."whereupon she changed
her question, asking Coughlin is he was presently recording the proceedings. Coughlin
responded truthIully that he was not. Feeling the reasonableness oI her sua sponte
interrogation evaporating, Judge Nash Holmes moved on....and showed up at Coughlin's
11/14/12 Iormal disciplinary hearing with an awIully slippery version oI the events that day,
easily disproven by a simple review oI the audio transcript, not that Panel Chair Echeverria
was going to let that happen. One restroom break. No interrogation about recording or
"recording devices" until AFTER that one restroom break. Judge Nash Holmes tried to
cobble together a Iinding oI reasonable suspicion by alleging she queried Coughlin about
recording and recording devices, whereupon he quickly "got all squirmy and begged to use
the restroom". Yeah, no. Didn't quite happen. Nice try, though. Oh, well, Judge Nash
Holmes will just allude to some unsworn unattributed hearsay to stand in place Ior the Iailed
proIIer oI Iacts supporting reasonable suspicion... Its odd that Washoe Legal Services Iired
Coughlin, asserting it was solely due to Iormer WCDA's OIIice domestic violence attorney
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now 2JDC Judge Linda Gardner's 4/13/09 Order AIter Trial in DV08-01168 when
considering the docket in FV09-00886 shows then WLS Board President Breckenridge
picked up the cd oI the hearing wherein Coughlin represented a male domestic violence
victim, and in doing so so upset Roxanne oI the CAAW run TPO Advocates oIIice. Then
there is CAAW complaining about Coughlin incident to the Carnine case. So...is CAAW an
independent contractor? Is 2JDC Judge Gardner "a party" Ior an RPC 4.2 analysis? Would
that make the WCDA's OIIice an inappropriate choice Ior an entity to prosecute Coughlin
here? That Joshi 01168 Trial started on 3/12/09...The Uribe TPO was on 3/12/09. Carnine
was on 3/13/09, and the Joshi 01168 Trial concluded on 3/17/09, with another Hearing in
Uribe on 3/20/09...and the Board oI Equalization appeal WLS's (WCDA's OIIice ECR
partner, another conIlict) dropped oII on Coughlin a week beIore the 3/10/09 Iiling dealinde
came due and was Iiled by Coughlin on 3/10/09. And while Coughlin's competence to
practice law has been put in question by DDA Kandaras' Iellow NNDB members...the
Davenport case The SBN and DDA Kandaras's Iellow NNDB members are attempting to
disbar me. A big part oI that is the $42,060 attorneys Iee award by my and Patridcia
Halstead's Iormer coworker, now 2JDC Judge Flanagan, incident to the Motion Ior
Attorney's Fees Iiled by Richard G. Hill, Esq. on the same day 2JDC Judge Elliott
incarcerated me Ior asking a question about my HIPAA rights incident to DDA Young (and
Ms. Halstead bares some responsibility there as she was listed as attorney oI record as well)
violating the stay in NRS 178.405 by making one oI his myriad demands upon local judges
to take me into custody Ior mentioning some constitutional right or other (it really is marked
how DDA Young orders Judges around, very impressive the command oI the judiciary your
oIIice has, some might say). Besides that, on May 7th, 2012, the day an Opposition was due
to Hill's attorney's Iee motion, DDA Young attempted to hold a Trial against me in
RCR2011-063341 (the iPhone case), and WCPD Joe Goodnight admitted minutes beIore
the trial started that he had not viewed the excuplatory video wherein I obtained a
conIession Irom material witness Nicole Watson that the man who picked up the iphone oII
the ground in the middle oI the downtown skate place in Iront oI City Hall, threatened to
throw it in the river iI someone did not claim it immediately.
The WCPD couldn't even be bothered to mail out a certiIied mail subpoena Ior a
misdemeanor trial to attempt to served that McQueen High School student, Nicole Watson.
Also, during the 8 days I spent in jail starting on 4/19/12, I was deprived my regular
psychoactive medication. Yet, your oIIice persists in a prosecution in 065630 based upon an
allegation that I lied in asserting that an oIIicer was shining a Ilash light in my Iace, when
really, the oIIicer asserts, he was merely shining the Ilashlight at my shoulder.... My Boyd
School oI Law 2000 classmate Chris Hicks saw me at the cross walk between the Mills
Lane Justice Center and the District Courthouse and ambled down the sidewalk in an eIIort
to avoid cross paths with me, just last week, jaywalking in the process. I was arrested, a
custodial arrest, Ior such jaywalking on 1/12/12 in 12 RMC 00696. At some point, is
playing kick the can with the struggling civil rights attorney with mental health issues
incident to a 18 month slide Iollowing a divorce beneath the WCDA's OIIice? I believe it is
impermissible to have Investigator Covington essentially practicing law without a license
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where DDA Young has been walled oII Irom any oI my attempts to communicate with him
regarding CR12-2025. This has made it impossible to discuss settings, and other matter.
Additionally, I think (combined with what I Ieel is misconduct by DDA Watts-Vial and
DDA Kandaras incident to the Iailure oI 2JDC Judges and Administrators and RJC
Custodian oI Records to respond to my subpoenas and subpoena Duces Tecums Ior the
11/14/12 Iormal disciplinary hearing, and Kandaras egging WCPD Jim Leslie on to Iile a
baseless abuse oI process TPO in RJC RCP2012-000599 (DDA Kandaras is on the NNDB,
and reIused to deny that she was on the Screening Panel Ior my case). Now, just two days
ago Inspector Covington made veiled threats relative to phone conversations I had with the
State Bar oI Nevada, and I believe it is impermissible to have NNDB member Kandaras, a
party, also prosecuting me with your oIIice, particularly wherer DDA Young is not excused
Irom his RPC obligations, despite the attempts to wall him oII Irom any oI my
communications. The Iailure to propound the Brady material that Iinally was provided on
aIter I received an email notice oI its availability on 12/5/12 is particularly troubling
considering how close in time that is to the 12/11/12 trial in RCR2012-065630, and the
extent to which Sargent SiIre's commentary, some might say, indicate some level oI
complicity between the RJC And the RPD incident to the 6 or so wrongIul evictions and
arrests I have been subjected to this year. I am just trying to stabilize and get back on my
Iee. I have lived here all my liIe and have strong ties to the community and would gladly
welcome and opportunity to dispose oI all three oI these criminal matters in exchange Ior a
waiver oI any civil causes oI action I might have in connection with these three
prosecutions and the arrests underpinning them and the wrongIul evictions and anything
related to the RJC. I only want to do something like that iI it is legally permissible to, but I
have seen some authority (ie a Am Trials articler "Representing Lawyers in Disciplinary
Matters" that suggests doing so is permissible iI the District Attorney's OIIice signs oII on
it...). I appreciate the opportunity to address some oI my concerns here.
RespectIully Submitted, Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402 ZachCoughlinhotmail.com
has 104 Iiles to share with you on SkyDrive. To view them, click the links below.
11 13 12 wcda wcso watts vial supboena correspondence 441pm.pdI
11 14 12 0204 Galli WCDA and NNDB Kandaras's Mtn to Quash Subpoenas on WCSO Machen D
0376 2064.pdI
11 14 12 0204 RJC Schroeder 374 Orderny Denying Coughlin.pdI
11 14 12 063341 Kandaras Emergency ex parte 0204 quash Coughlin Motion to Quash Subpoenas
11 14 12 vol 3 0204 bates 1 TO 574.pdI
11 14 12 WCDA DDA Kandaras 0204 Motion to Quash Subpoenas.pdI
11 14 12 wcso kirkham judge linda gardner 0204 54844 0435 2025 01168.pdI
11 15 12 063341 Submission oI Materials Related to Subpoenas etc 0204 1708 cover page stamped
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FV09-00886 - JOSE URIBE VS. KARINA CAMACHO VALDEZ (DM) WLS President Brecken
burned picked up 4 10 09.pdI
3 10 09 01168 wls 54844 0204 Coughlin tax appeal Ior Elcano days beIore L. Gardner Trial 4 13 0
Washoe Lgl-Final.pdI
3 12 09 0204 Uribe EPO Hearing Exhibit photographs oI abuse DV09-00886 0204 CAAW Advoca
Breckenridge Orders hearing cd picked up 4 10 09 01168 01955.pdI
3 13 12 158 pm 26800 Nash rmc SUA SPONTE ORDER DENYING RELIEF SOUGHT IN IMPR
3 13 12 216 pm with ex1 iIp 26800 ORDER STRIKING FUGITIVE document nash rmc.pdI
3 13 12 1238pm 11 TR 26800 SUA SPONTE ORDER DENYING RELlEF SOUGHT IN IMPROP
WCSO RMC RJC NASH KING CLARK SBN.pdI
3 13 12 email Irom wcso debi campbell dcampbellwashoecounty.us 26800 0204.pdI
3 14 12 grievance by Judge Nash Holmes RMC 26800 0434.pdI
3 15 12 000374 Lockout Order PTTHOA wcso 0204 with Iax headers schroeder.pdI
3 20 12 Elliot 0204 CAAW Crisis 01955 Order Awarding Fees 03.20.12.pdI
3 21 12 per judges Orders Marshal Deighton rmc 11 tr 26800.pdI
3 22 12 0204 email Irom RMC Administrator Cassandra Jackson to SBN and RMC Judges and Jud

https://skydrive.live.com/redir.aspx?
cid43084638I32I5I28&pagedownloadaszip&resid43084638F32F5F28217076&authke
y21AJJo4iuGM6L4coQ&BpubSDX.SkyDrive&BsrcSkyMail "
At the 3/5/13 and 3/11/13 Hearings on some Order to Show Cause oI indeterminate
case number, combined with a vague allusion to a DAS probation violation hearing in
RCR11-063341 (which Judge Pearson purported to related to a warrant issuing, upon which
the 2/1/13 arrest was allegedly premised (conveniently taking care oI the NRS 171.136
problem) in relation to some alleged Iailure on Coughlin's part to comply with a non-
existent condition oI his probation that he obtain a Mental Health Evaluation, "at his own
expense" (while severely indigent and battling deadlines related to the 12/14/12 FOFCOL
seeking to disbar him permanently now on appeal in 62337) "within 30 days" oI the
11/20/12 misdemeanor judgment's rendition in RCR11-063341.
At the 3/5/13 OSC Hearing (Ior which the docket in Judge CliIton's RCR12-065630
indicates was "vacated") Judge Pearson indicated that the "Administrative Order 2012-01,
In the Matter oI Zachary Coughlin" alleged violations detailed in a 2/25/13 Order to Show
Cause that lacked an opposing party or actual case number in the caption (stemming Irom
then ChieI Judge SIerrazza's 12/20/12 "Administrative Order 2012-01") was to be placed
into RCR2011-063341 (the same matter in which the alleged probation violation resulting
in the 2/1/13 arrest by DAS resides in). BeIore continuing the 3/5/13 hearing to 3/11/13 so
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that Coughlin could have co-counsel in Bruce Lindsay, Esq. appear along with him
(Coughlin taking care to make clear on both 3/5/13 and 3/11/13 that he was not
relinquishing Iinal decision making authority on all matters related to any representation oI
himselI, and that he would and always will remain, at the very least, co-counsel on all his
cases) Judge Pearson made clear that it was up to Coughlin whether or not he wished to
remain co-counsel on his cases. At that 3/5/13 combination hearing Judge Pearson indicate
the DAS alleged probation violation related to an allegation that Coughlin Iailed to get some
mental health evaluation done at his own expense allegedly required by the terms oI his
probation in RCR11-063341 (which Judge Perason indicated on 2/5/13 he had taken over
Irom Judge SIerrazza, not indicating whether or not such was in response to Coughlin's
11/29/12 Motion to DisqualiIy Judge SIerrazza pursuant to either NRS 1.235 (to which no
response was made) or Canon 3(d). Prior to concluding the 2/5/13 hearing on the OSC In
RCR11-063341 Judge Pearson indicated to Coughlin that DAS was "part oI " the RJC,
which implied Coughlin's emailing or calling DAS would be violative oI the
"Administrative Order 2012-01" which, counter to Judge Pearson's indications oI 3/5/13,
would not be "placed into" RCR11-063341, but rather, was given its own new 2013 case
number RCR2013-071437, despite the Iact that the Iile stamping on the 12/20/12 Order did
not change the date thereon, meaning, the RJC interlineated a 2012 case number on 3/11/13
aIter the hearing wherein Coughlin and Lindsay appeared as co-counsel, Ior an Order to
Show Casue Hearing that Coughlin was noticed as combining both the DAS alleged
probation violation and the 2/25/13 Order to Show Cause's allegation oI Coughlin violating
the Adminstrative Order that Judge Pearson, during the 3/5/13 OSC Hearing that was
continued to 3/11/13, indicated would be "placed in" RCR11-063341. Subsequent to the
3/11/13 hearing (beIore, during, and aIter which Lindsay indicated to Coughlin that nothing
more than a "two week continuance" would issue as to any oI the matters or cases being
addressed therein, in addition to Lindsay's representations regarding the "global resolution"
that had been agreed to by the WCDA's OIIice and the RJC Judges).
Coughlin, thereaIter was in no way alerted to the Iact that a new criminal case against
him was opened, RCR2013-071437, which purported to represent the "Administrative
Order 2012-01 In the Matter oI Zachary Coughlin" that Judge Pearson indicated at the
3/5/13 OSC hearing was "placed into" RCR11-063341. Lindsay's oIIice was theraIter listed
as sole attorney oI record and Lindsay was compensated Ior such "representation" by the
Bob Bell Group. Coughlin attempted to Iile Motions/Notice challenging an Order or
Findign that an "consent order" had been agreed to suIIicient to obviate the need Ior the
RJC or WCDA's OIIice or DAS to prove a violation oI either the terms oI Coughlin's
probation in RCR11-063341 or any violation oI the "Administrative Order 2012-01 In re
Coughlin". Coughlin, Iearing he had been duped, Iiled a Notice oI Appeal on 3/20/13 in the
RJC to the 2JDC as to any continuation oI the "Administrative Order" within a new
criminal case number or any Iinding whatsoever that he had violated his probation (a
subsequent CCP hearing in RCR2011-063341 (and Lindsay, despite his promises to on
3/11/13 to Coughlin, should the RJC view the result oI the 3/11/13 OSC Hearing to be
Coughlin being required to appear monthly Ior CCP court, that Lindsay would go to every
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CCP Heearing with him (Lindsay is required to regardless where the RJC lists him as
attorney oI record, and his Iailure to appear Ior Coughlin, even as co-counsel on 5/30/13 is
something Rule 2.15 speaks to, in addition to Lindsay's indicating to Coughlin on 3/16/13,
incident to a dispute regarding whether Lindsay was attorney or co-counsel oI record in
RCR12-065630 (Ior his assistant's listing such case number and addressing Lindsay's Iaxed
letter requesting a continuation Irom Judge CliIton in 065630, combined with a docket entry
therein Ior 3/5/13 listing an "Order to Show Cause" hearing vacated that day, certainly
supports to view that Lindsay had appeared and been recognized by the RJC as at least co-
counsel oI record therein, much more than just Ior the 2/13/13 Contempt Hearing, whether
such being a result oI Lindsay's being retained or agreeing to appear or being "appointed" is
besides the point. Somehow, Judge CliIton Iound it equitable to insist that Coughlin had
chosen selI representation at the 11/27/12 hearing wherein WCPD Dogan was granted a
withdrawal, suIIicient to reIuse to "appoint" Lindsay to the matter beyond allowing Lindsay
to (contrary to his assistant's assertion that Lindsay's appearance was a "Ireebie") make a
quick proIit by showing up on 2/13/13 (whereupon Coughlin was brought into court in
shackles and surprised to see Lindsay seated at the deIense table, and during which hearing
Coughlin in no way assented to Lindsay's appearing as sole counsel, much less just Ior the
contempt hearing). Where Judge CliIton reIused to provide representation to Coughlin at
public expense Ior the continuation oI the trial in 065630, he did so allow Lindsay to make
some more money in RCR12-067980, where Lindsay was appointed on 12/22/12, though
Coughlin was not apprised oI this Iact until Lindsay showed up late Ior the 1/7/13 status
conIerence therein and proceeded to "agree" to one oI many, many continuances to come
(which Judge CliIton so Ireely granted to Lindsay and Young, where he denied all but one
such request Irom Coughlin (the 2/5/13 continuance he acquisced to given Coughlin's
walking home 4 miles Irom jail the previous night at 1:30 am aIter serving 5 days in jail on
the bogus 2/1/13 retaliatory DAS arrest, incident to which Coughlin was abruptly Iorced oII
his medications by the Washoe County Jail)(earlier that day Coughlin Iiled and received a
Iile stamped copy and had served on Judge CliIton's chambers the copy required by NRS
1.235 a Motion to DisqualiIy Judge CliIton and the RJC and the WCDA's OIIice which is
not noted in the docket. II Judge CliIton wished to strike such Iiling, that's one thing, but
Ior such to simply be given the evaporation treatement is entirely inappropriate. Any
striking oI such Iiling (dubious in light oI NRS 1.235) should be noticed to Coughlin and
represented in the docket and record. (subsequnet to WCPD Leslie being granted an Order
allowing his withdrawal in response to his ex parte 12/14/12 unIiled motion to Judge
CliIton, which Coughlin had never been allowed knowledge oI and despite Coughlin's
12/3/12 Iilings therein seeking to conIlict out Leslie going unresponded to, never mind the
lack oI notice or opportunity to be heard accorded Coughlin as to Leslie's in court motion
on 12/18/12). Coughlin's introduction to the "Bruce Lindsay, Esq" approach began on
1/7/13 wherein Lindsay gave the Iirst oI what would become a repetitive loop consisting oI
a rather tepid arrangement oI cliches he spews about how "there's two types oI clients, those
who recognize that they are guilty and wrong and those that don't" and how he's "been
doing this 39 years", with a healthy dose oI blatant admission thats he knows nothing at all
about one's case and has absolutely no intention oI doing anything to change that.
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Also, as to the 2/5/13 OSC hearing in RCR11-063341, and subsequent emergency
hearing to set aside or reconsider the Order Ior Competency Evaluation Coughlin obtained
just an hour prior (DDA Young's approach during the trial in RCR12-065630 Iollowing the
OSC Hearing at 8:30 am in 063341 may best be described comparing the docket entries in
those matters...but one thing is clear, given the possibility oI jail time and Gagnon, the Sixth
Amendment entitled Coughlin to representation at both the 8:30 am OSC Hearing and
Hearing on Young's Ex Parte verbal motion to reconsider the Order Ior Competency
Evaluation in RCR11-063341. Such present a Iurther basis Ior voiding the 4/2/13
conviction in RCR12-065630, and undermining the dismissal oI Coughlin's appeal oI the
4/3/13 Order Striking Coughlin's Emergency Mandamus Petition in CR13-0553 (see
63041).
Perhaps the biggest issue is the extent to which, during the 2/5/13 impromptu Hearing
on DDA Young's ex part motion Ior reconsdieration oI the 2/5/13 Order Ior Competency
Evaluation in 063341, Judge Pearson reIused to address whether Judge CliIton had
inIluenced him or discussed Coughlin or any oI Coughlin's cases in any way with Judge
Pearson in chambers or otherwise Iollowing DDA Young's request "to go back on the
record beIore Judge Pearson to be heard regarding teh SB90 Granted" in 063341
(amazingly, DDA Young /Judge CliIton argued such Order in 063341 was granted ex
parte...but its Young whom Iailed to appear at the 2/5/13 Order to Show Cause in 063341
(Coughlin was not noticed on such or given any written discovery prior thereto, and was
denied counsel pursuant to Gagnon), or rather, DAS regularly appears in the WCDA's
OIIice's stead, committing the unauthorized practice oI law, subjecting probationer's to DAS
OIIicer's Iascimile oI legal work, unburdened by the Rules oI ProIessional Responsibility or
licensure oversight or legal training requirements. To that end, its none oI Young concern
what occurred in 063341, or at least, he is a disinterested third party and must accept the
application oI NRS 178.405 even to probation proceedings, as such are explicitly listed in
the statute. Coughlin has on numerous occasions attempted to obtain a copy oI both the
2/5/13 Order to Show Cause hearing and subsequent Hearing on Young's Reconsideration
Motion (which Judge Pearson actually tried to pass oII as a situation where he was just
thinking about the case aIter concluding the 2/5/14 OSC Hearing in 063341 and sua sponte
decided to "grant
In that 2/5/13 Order to Show Cause (8:30 AM) (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott)
FTC-DAS VIOI.ATION Parties Present: DeIendant Coughlin, Zachary Barker (DAS
OIIicers were present, but the docket Iails to note that, actually Iailing to list any party Ior the
side opposing Coughlin's)... (curiously, the docket in 063341 then provides support Ior the
indication Judge Pearson clearly expressed during the 3/5/13 hearing, ie, that the
"Administrative Order" would be "placed into" 063341, as the docket entries speak to the
subject matter involved in that Administrative Order where it reads: "Defendant is to have
no contact with R1C staff, by phone, letter or e-mail. Defenaant may file pleaaings, but is
to check in with security first at the entrance of the Mills B. Lane Office Building, and a
R1C Bailiff will be notified. Bail is to remain in Iull Iorce and eIIect. In a Trial set in RCR
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2011-065630, Deputy District Attorney Zach Young requested to go back on the record
before 1udge Pearson to be heard regarding the previous SB89 GRANTED in RCR
2011-063341. Defendant who is appearing without counsel, objected. 1udge Clifton
GRANTS States request. Hearing proceeded before 1udge Scott Pearson. State is
represented by Zach Young, Esq., DeIendant is not represented by Counsel. After further
review of the file, the Court has reconsidered Defendants SB89 filea February 5, 2013, at
8.54 am ana has DENIED it.
Arguably, the Administrative Order 2012-01 was amended by then newly minted
ChieI Judge Pearson where the docket entries express rulings as to Coughlin's ability to "Iile
pleadings" that contain none oI the onerous and dubious requirements oI the 12/20/12
Administrative Order as it related to Coughlin "checking in with security" and "waiting Ior
an RJC BailiII" where the docket in 063341 reads: ""Defendant is to have no contact with
R1C staff, by phone, letter or e-mail. Defenaant may file pleaaings, but is to check in
with security first at the entrance of the Mills B. Lane Office Building, and a R1C
Bailiff will be notified".
As amended above, Coughlin is still prohibited Irom having "contact" with RJC staII
"by phone, letter, or email", but, Coughlin, "DeIendant may Iile pleadings" (meaning,
Coughlin, himselI can walk right into the RJC Iiling oIIices and submit documents Ior Iiling,
and receive a Iile stamp Ior his "original and two copies" etc., etc.) with the only restriction
being that Coughlin "is to check in with security Iirst as the entrance" oI the MBL Justice
Center, whereupon "a RJC BailiII will be notiIied". The Admin Order as amended merely
requires Couglin to "check in with security Iirst at the entrance"...it does not require
Coughlin to wait Ior anyone, and it doesn't even require Coughlin to inIorm security where
he is going, whether it be the RMC, WCDA's OIIice, RJC, Family Court or the selI-help
center. Simply put, the Admin Order was a creation oI Judge SIerrazza at precisely the time
where he should have been doing the opposite. It is not something that needs to burden or
potentially besmirch ChieI Judge Pearson's term as ChieI Judge. Clearly, Judge Pearson (in
an intelligent, thoughtIul, and measured action) excised the "BailiII escort" requirement, and
removed the strictures in place that were severely prejudicing Coughlin in his attempts to
access justice, chieI oI which being that he was Iorced, Ior months, during key phases oI
several criminal prosecutions and appeals oI the convictions therein, to interact solely with
RJC BailiII who lack any training as "court clerks" and do not particularly care to learn
anything about such important work or actually do any oI it, even where such BailiIIs were
required to by the Administrative Order.
The docket entries amending the Admin Order leave a bit unclear, such as how
Coughlin may go about requesting to view a Iile in the RJC, or obtain copies oI documents.
The 5/31/13 Complaint in RCR13-072675 speaks not to what it is that BailiII Reyes alleges
Coughlin was doing at the time when Reyes issued his "command" and Coughlin, allegedly
"interIered with" a publice oIIicer" in "carrying out a legal duty oI his oIIice" where
Coughlin allegedly "refused to comply with Bailiff Reyes' command to move to an area
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where the defendant had been previously ordered by the court to remain and did then
physically resist Bailiff Reyes while he attempted to escort the defendant to said
designated area".
The 5/31/13 Complaint therein in RCR13-072675 is premised upon an allegation that
Coughlin disobeyed RJC BailiII Reyes by committing yet another SCR 111(6) "serious
oIIense" (possibly) under NRS 199.280 in "resisting a public oIIicer" where Coughlin
allegedly "did willIully and unlawIully "resist a BailiII" (note the Iailure to use the statute's
terminology, indicating a BailiII might not be a "public oIIicer" under such statute) "in
discharging a legal duty oI his oIIice", at "1 S. Sierra Street" (note the Complaint Iails to
indicate such events took place in the RJC or in some location therein where Coughlin could
be said to have been "present in the exclusive premises of the Reno 1ustice Court" or to
have "entered the premises oI the Reno Justice Court" prior to . "refused to comply with
Bailiff Reyes' command to move to an area where the defendant had been previously
ordered by the court to remain and did then physically resist Bailiff Reyes while he
attempted to escort the defendant to said designated area"
The Arrest Report and Declaration oI Probable Cause, wherein RJC BailiII Reyes
idenitiIies himselI as "a police oIIicer" and "declares under penalty oI perjury" that "At
approximately 1620 hrs, I ordered Zachary Coughlin to voluntarily move to the RJC Iront
entrance lobby, to await documents he requested, aIter he reIused several requests to do so.
I placed Coughlin in a control hold to escort him to the desired location. While passing
through the "magnetometer unit", Coughlin upturned it onto the Iloor in a willful manner,
since he was resisting. When advised he was under arrest, Coughlin told me "no, you're not,
I'm leaving!".
Even iI one where to Iail to recognize the amendments to the Admin Order made by
ChieI Judge Pearson, any application oI the 12/20/12 version oI the Admin Order to the
alleged Iacts would not support RJC BailiII Reyes and the WCDA's OIIices allegations (why
the WCDA's OIIice is constantly reIerred to as the "State" when the Reno City Attorney's
OIIice is reIerred to as the "City", in unclear). Reyes alleges Coughlin had "requested"
"documents". Importantly, Reyes makes no mention oI Coughlin seeking to "Iile" any
"documents". Part 1(b) oI the 12/20/12 version oI the Admin Order cover instances where
"Coughlin sishes to make a request oI the Reno Justice Court Ior copies, transcripts..."
While Coughlin had made such a request Ior documents to the RJC, in writing, via BailiII
Heibert, previously that day, there was nothing Ior Coughlin to wait Ior, as BailiII Heibert
had provided Couglin with a copy oI such request, with a "stamp" indicating such was
"received", iI not "Iiled stamped". BailiII Heibert indicated to Coughlin upon returning to
him a copy oI his written request that none oI the materials requested copied, nor any oI the
Iiles Coughlin requested to access, would be made available to him that day, 5/23/13. While
the RJC BailiIIs (not to mention the RMC Marshals incident to the verbatim copy oI the
12/20/12 Admin Order RMC Administrative Judge W. Gardner entered on 1/16/13) have
approached ever appearance by Coughlin in the MBL Justice Center as though Coughlin
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were a prisoner in custody Irom the moment he enters the building, to the moment they allow
him to leave, there is no support Ior such an approach under any version oI the Admin Order.
The only "waiting" mentioned in any version thereoI is in Part 1(a), and that only requires
Couglhin to "wait Ior a bailiII" to "respond to his location" iI "Coughlin wishes to Iile a
document with" the RJC...
Even Section 1(b) oI the original version oI the Admin Order Iails to present a
justiIication Ior BailiII Reyes's "command" to Coughlin: "b. If ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN wishes to make a request of the Reno 1ustice Court for copies, transcripts,
access to a court file or to ask a question he shall do so in writing and either mail the
request to the Reno 1ustice Court or deliver the written request to a bailiff of the Reno
1ustice Court by first contacting the bailiff through court security as detailed above.
The bailiff will then file the document for Mr. Coughlin and provide him a file stamped
copy in return ..." BailiII Reyes's statements does not mention Coughlin "waiting" Ior a "Iile
stamped copy" oI any "written request " "Ior copies" oI some "documents he (Coughlin)
requested". Rather, Reyes's statement indicates he "ordered" Couglin to move "to the
desired location", apparently the "RJC Iront entrance lobby" to do something not mentioned
in any way in the 12/20/12 Admin Order. Such version oI the Admin Order in no way
requires Coughlin to wait around anywhere, much less near the security check in, Ior copies
oI documents Coughlin may have requested, which invariably take days and days Ior the
RJC to produce to Coughlin (RJC policy indicates a 72 hour wait time Ior document requests
is standard). Further, the area in which Coughlin was seated when he was attacked by BailiII
Reyes is in no way within the "exclusive premises" oI the RJC, and iI Coughlin wants to sit
on a bench in a shared walkway in Iront oI the MLB Justice Center's coIIee/pastry shop, its
none oI BailiII Reyes's business, and certainly does not present a rationale Ior
"ordering"/attacking "Zachary" to "move" to Reyes's "desired location" (which, by the way,
iI the Iront entrance lobby really was "the RJC Iront entrance lobby" and thereIore included
amongst the RJC's "exclusive premises", then Coughlin would be in violation oI the Admin
Order were he to venture there without an RJC escort, no?), whereupon some alleged
"reIusal" oI "several requests to do so" was reacted to by Reyes placing "Zachary" "in a
control hold" to "escort him to the desired location". Indeed, such circumstances hardly
justiIy BailiII Reyes then apparently attempting to manuIacture some incident wherein he
himselI purposeIully knocks over the magnetometer, only to blame such on occurrence on
Coughlin (odd, given the many cameras rolling) and proceeding to stack as many redundant
and excessive charges as possible onto an Arrest Report built upon the Ilimsiest and most
unproIessional oI Ioundations.
Most decidedly, no version oI the Admin Order requires Coughlin to "await documents
he requested" at the 'RJC front entrance lobby". Further, it is interesting that in that shared
building, with a shared lobby/entrance, RJC BailiII Reyes, in a display oI "power and
control" reminsicent oI the Duluth Model, characterizes the MBL Justice Center's "Iront
entrance lobby" (which is not reIerence anywhere in any version oI the Admin Order, such
merely mentions the "main security entrance") as "the RJC Iront entrance lobby". Such a
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display oI dominance has been Iurther evinced in BailiII Reyes, English, and Medina
invading the DAS check in vestibule while Coughlin was checking in with DAS to attempt
to eIIect service on Coughlin oI various orders by the RJC. On one occasion BailiII Medina
entered the DAS vestibule while Coughlin was therein and demanded to Sabrina: "don't
check him in".)
MBL Justice Center Olympik Security Iront entrance guard Matt Greene indicated to
Coughlin on 6/10/13 that his supervisor, James Thomas, the same one whom has arranged
Ior pictures oI Coughlin to be posted in Iull public view on the machines used to scan court
goers property, and Iully viewable to the public (think the "bounced check" circle oI photos
as your local convenience store), has uniIormly issued an edict to his employees Iorbidden
them to speak to Coughlin about the events they were eye witnesses to during the arrest and
alleged resisting and or creation oI a public nuisance causing $250.00 by Coughlin on
5/23/13. Such is tantamount to dissuading a witness or seeking to. Greene reIused to answer
any questions, such as "what caused the "magnetometer unit" to Iall over?" and "Did you
witness Coughlin resisting RJC BailiII in any way on 5/23/13?".
Contrast the above docket entries in 063341 with the originally maniIestation oI the
Administrative Order: "1. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not enter the premises
of the Reno Justice Court at One South Sierra Street except as Iollows:
a. If ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN wishes to file a document with the Reno
1ustice Court or attend a hearing in the Reno 1ustice Court he must notify the security
personnel at the main security entrance located at the east entrance of One South Sierra
Street and wait for a bailiff of the Reno justice Court to respond to his location .
b. If ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN wishes to make a request of the Reno
1ustice Court for copies, transcripts, access to a court file or to ask a question he shall do
so in writing and either mail the request to the Reno 1ustice Court or deliver the written
request to a bailiff of the Reno 1ustice Court by first contacting the bailiff through court
security as detailed above. The bailiff will then file the document for Mr. Coughlin and
provide him a file stamped copy in return ...
2. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not be present in the exclusive
premises of the Reno 1ustice Court ...without the escort of a bailiff of this Court ana
without first following the proceaures outlinea above...."
Such docket entries, again, under NRS 4.240, are prima Iacie evidence oI Iact, and
certainly seem to indicate that BailiII Reyes apparent view oI the continued validity oI the
Iollowing portions oI then ChieI Judge SIerrazza's 12/20/12 Administrative Order 2012-01 is
not in line with the maniIestation oI such Administrative Order upon ChieI Judge Pearson
term beginning, during which Judge Pearson, using the creativity and Iorward thinking
approach he is known Ior (balanced with a human touch) amended such Administrative
Order suIIicient to make it hardly recognizable. It is high time the RJC BailiII's and DAS
OIIicers get the memo. Had they prior to 5/23/13, RCR2013-072675 could have been
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avoided, as could have a good deal oI collateral consequences to both Coughlin's and the
RJC's interests, and that oI the Bench and Bar in Washoe County as well.
1. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not enter the premises of the Reno
Justice Court at One South Sierra Street except as Iollows:
Street and wait for a bailiff of the Reno justice Court to respond to his location.
provide him a file stamped copy in return...
2. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not be present in the exclusive
premises of the Reno 1ustice Court ...without the escort oI a bailiII oI this Court and
without Iirst Iollowing the procedures outlined above....
Docket entries in RCR11-063341 Ior:
2/5/13 Order to Show Cause (8:30 AM) (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott) FTC-DAS
VIOI.ATION Parties Present: DeIendant Coughlin, Zachary Barker
"2/5/13 Order to Show Cause Hearing Held (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott) DeIendant
has submitted an SB89 request. GRANTED. Court is to pay Ior evaluation. Evaluator may
contact the DeIendant at (949) 667-7402 or by e-mail at zachcoughlinhotmail.com.
DeIendant is to continue checking in with DAS between 9:00 am and 2:00 pm on
Wednesdays. Defendant is to have no contact with R1C staff, by phone, letter or e-mail.
Defendant may file pleadings, but is to check in with security first at the entrance of the
Mills B. Lane Office Building, and a R1C Bailiff will be notified Bail is to remain in Iull
Iorce and eIIect. In a Trial set in RCR 2011-065630, Deputy District Attorney Zach
Young requested to go back on the record before 1udge Pearson to be heard regarding
the previous SB89 GRANTED in RCR 2011-063341. Defendant who is appearing
without counsel, objected. 1udge Clifton GRANTS States request. Hearing proceeded
before 1udge Scott Pearson. State is represented by Zach Young, Esq., DeIendant is not
represented by Counsel. After further review of the file, the Court has reconsidered
Defendants SB89 filea February 5, 2013, at 8.54 am ana has DENIED it. The Court is still
ordering the DeIendant get evaluated (page 9) Ior competency at the Court's expense.
DeIendant requested that his medication be paid Ior. The Court indicated it will consider it at
a later time. The order to show cause hearing has been conIirmed set Ior February 25, 2013,
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at 8:30A.M. DeIendant is ordered to make an apt. Ior evaluation by February 12, 2013 and is
to show DAS prooI oI that apt."
3/5/13 Order to Show Cause (2:00 PM) (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott) Parties Present:
DeIendant Coughlin, Zachary Barker
3/5/13 Hearing Result (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott) Upon the order oI Judge Scott
Pearson, Bruce Lindsay a/the Bob Bell Group, is hereby appointed to represent the
DeIendant in this mailer and the Administrative Order.
3/11/13 Order to Show Cause (8:30 AM) (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott) 02/25/2013
Continued to 03/11/2013 Arraignment Reset/Continuance Coughlin, Zachary Barker
3/11/13 Order to Show Cause Hearing Held (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott ) DeIendant is
reinstated into DAS supervision/or up to THIRTYSIX (36) months. DeIendant is ordered to
obtain Evaluation at Court's expense. DeIendant is not to use or possess any controlled
substance unless prescribed by Medical Doctor. DeIendant is to give his attorney, Bruce
Lindsay, name oI DeIendant's psychiatrist, who shall provide Evaluation. DeIendant is to be
reinstated into the CCP Program to begin March 21, 2013 at 1:30 P.M.
3/11/13 Motion Filed Motion to Vacate any Order Issuing Irom March 11, 2013 Hearing in
RCR20J 1-063341 Iiled.
3/11/13 Request Ior Submission Filed
3/11/13 Motion Filed Motion to Remove Bruce Lindsay, Esq. as Co-Counsel Iiled
3/19/13 Motion Filed Notice oI Appeal"
However, the Docket in RCR2012-065630 causes conIusions as to the description oI
such events in the docket in RCR11-063341, etc.:
3/5/13 CANCELED Order to Show Cause (2:00 PM) (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott)
Vacated
2/5/13 Hearing Result (Judicial OIIicer: CliIton, David) DeIendant submitted a 5889 request.
State has opposed this request. Court has DENIED. the SB89 request at this time. DeIendant
has requested a continuance due to recent incarceration and lack oI medication. State
opposed Court has GRANTED DeIendants request Ior continuance
2/5/13 Notice Notice oI Order For Competency Evaluation requiring suspension oI all
proceedings in all. departments oI the Reno Justice Court. Filed in open court on 2/5/2013 at
9:17 am.
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The docket in RCR13-071437 indicates:
12/20/12 Criminal Complaint Filed Administrative Order 2012-01
12/20/12 Summons Issued. No Summons issued - Administrative Order Issued and Served
2/25/13 Order Show Cause Filed
2/28/13 Motion Filed Order to Show Cause (2:00 PM) (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott)
Parties Present: DeIendant Coughlin. Zachary Barker
3/5/13 Hearing Result (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott ) Upon the order oI Judge Scott
Pearson. Bruce Lindsay oI the Bob Bell Group. is hereby appointed to represent the
DeIendant in this matter and the Administrative Order.
3/11/13 Order to Show Cause (8:30 AM) (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott) Parties Present:
ConIlict Attorney DeIendant Lindsay. Robert Bruce Coughlin. Zachary Barker
3/11/13 Order to Show Cause Hearing Held (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott )
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER TO REMAIN IN EFFECT
3/20/13 Notice Notice oI Appeal Iiled (Not Addressed)
Further, the Docket in RCR2012-071437 (which indicates on page 1 a "date assigned"
oI "3/6/13" and an "OIIense" oI "Deg M" "Contempt oI Court, misdemeanor" complicates
matters Iurther, especially where "Bruce Lindsay" is listed alone as "Lead Attorney", not to
mention to lack oI any attorney listed Ior the "State oI Nevada", which, while listed as
"PlaintiII", may Ieel that the judicial branch has usurped its executive charging Iunction
therein.
The docket in 071437 is missing several oI Coughlin's Iilings as to the Administrative
Order prior to such being given the 071437 case number (playing "hide the case number"
should not enable the RJC to prevent Coughlin Irom challenging the Administrative Order,
particular now where the collateral consequences have mounted signIicantly with the 5/23/13
through 6/6/13 arrest and incarceration (another $200 cash to meet the $1,000 bail) in
RCR2012-072675). The 5/31/13 Complaint therein in RCR13-072675 is premised upon an
allegation that Coughlin disobeyed RJC BailiII Reyes by committing yet another SCR
111(6) "serious oIIense" (possibly) under NRS 199.280 in "resisting a public oIIicer" where
Coughlin allegedly "did willIully and unlawIully "resist a BailiII" (note the Iailure to use the
statute's terminology, indicating a BailiII might not be a "public oIIicer" under such statute)
"in discharging a legal duty oI his oIIice", at "1 S. Sierra Street" (note the Complaint Iails to
indicate such events took place in the RJC or in some location therein where Coughlin could
be said to have been "present in the exclusive premises of the Reno 1ustice Court" or to
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have "entered the premises oI the Reno Justice Court" prior to . "refused to comply with
Bailiff Reyes' command to move to an area where the defendant had been previously
ordered by the court to remain and did then physically resist Bailiff Reyes while he
attempted to escort the defendant to said designated area"
So, the "Administrative Order 2012-01" that became, suddenly, on 3/11/13, RCR2013-
071437 (and begat RCR2013-072675) is reIerred to in the 5/31/13 Complaint in RCR13-
072675 as providing the basis upon which RJC BailiII Reyes issued a "command" in
reIerence to something in the Administrative Order 2012-01 (which was no more at that
point, as on 3/11/13 it was transmuted into a "Criminal Complaint" in RCR13-071437)
which had purportedly something therein supporting a view that there was a "designated
area" "where the defendant had been previously ordered by the court to remain". OI
course, an RJC BailiII, Reyes, is employed by the Reno Justice Court, and subject to the
view that BailiII Reyes was limited to charging or reporting Coughlin Ior alleged contempt.
Nev. Const. Art. 6, 6(1) reads: "District Courts: Jurisdiction; ... 1.The District
Courts in the several Judicial Districts oI this State have original jurisdiction in all cases
excluded by law Irom the original jurisdiction oI justices` courts. They also have Iinal
appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in Justices Courts and such other inIerior tribunals as
may be established by law. The District Courts and the Judges thereoI have power to issue
writs oI Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction, Quo-Warranto, Certiorari, and all other writs
proper and necessary to the complete exercise of their jurisdiction..."
The RJC ChieI Judge SIerrazza takes some liberties in his 12/20/12 "Administrative
Order 2012-01" (now a "Criminal Complaint" in RCR13-071437. Judge SIerrazza remixed
the Constitution oI the State oI Nevada by replacing in Nev. Const. Art. 6, 6(1) the limiter
"The District Courts and the 1udges thereof " with "Aevada courts" and excising the bit
about "and the Judges thereof". while retaining, ironically, the language clariIying that such
"power to issue" to that which is "proper and necessary to the complete exercise oI their
jurisdiction."
A writ oI certiorari serves to remedy jurisdictional excesses committed by an inIerior
tribunal, board, or oIIicer, exercising judicial Iunctions. NRS 34.020(2). " This court has
oIten stated that the inquiry upon a petition Ior a writ oI certiorari is limited to whether the
inIerior tribunal acted in excess oI its jurisdiction.1 See Iveson v. District Court, 66 Nev.
145, 206 P.2d 755 (1949); State ex rel. Hinckley v. Court, 53 Nev. 343, 1 P.2d 105 (1931);
Phillips v. Welch, 12 Nev. 158 (1877)." A writ oI certiorari can only be granted iI petitioner
demonstrates that the court exceeded its jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. Goicoechea v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 96 Nev. 287,607 P.2d 1140
(1980); See Also NRS 34.020 (2)/
A review oI that Administrative Order/"Criminal Compliant" allegedly docketed on
12/20/12 in RCR2013-071437 reveals the Iollowing: "WHEREAS, "disobedience or
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resistance to any lawIul writ, order, rule or process issued by the court or judge at chambers"
constitutes contempt oI court in the State oI Nevada; and WHEREAS, Aevada's courts are
constitutionally authorized to issue all writs "proper and necessary to the complete exercise
oI their jurisdiction." Nev. Const. Art. 6, 6(1); and WHEREAS, to protect the peaceIul and
eIIective operation oI this Court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not enter the premises of the Reno Justice
Court at One South Sierra Street except as Iollows:
Street and wait for a bailiff of the Reno justice Court to respond to his location.
provide him a file stamped copy in return...
2. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not be present in the exclusive premises
of the Reno 1ustice Court ...without the escort oI a bailiII oI this Court and without Iirst Iol-
lowing the procedures outlined above....
5. Any violation of this Order may be considered contempt of court and punished
pursuant to NRS Chapter 22 by a Iine oI up to $500 and/or incarceration Ior up to 25 days
in the Washoe County Detention Facility.
6. This Order is effective upon personal service upon Mr. Coughlin."
OI course, the RJC had a party purport to serve that 12/20/12 Administrative Order
where BailiII English purports to have attempted or eIIected service thereoI on 12/20/12 with-
in the courthouse at the Reno Justice Court. OI course, personal service must be conducted
by a non-party, thereIore the RJC lacks personal jurisdiction in RCR2013-071437 (beyond the
courthouse sanctuary rule/immunity Irom service oI process accorded litigants and attorneys
while in the courthouse) Further, all oI the ProoI oI Service/Return oI Service in 599, 607,
3913, 3914, RCR13-071437, etc. all Iail under the requirements oI NRCP 4(c),(d),(g):"
Clearly, Coughlin in no way Iailed to comply with any such condition oI his
probation. Further, DAS OIIicer Brown's written communications to Coughlin oI 1/2/13
are troubling considering her abrupt about Iace one week later on a day 1/9/13 when the
Docket in RCR11-063341 indicates a warrant was issued pending "Clerk's Review" (one
would subsequently issue on 1/10/13 by Judge SIerrazza (whom apparently hadn't gotten
enough shots at Coughlin yet), though Judge Pearson (whom masterminded the RJC's MSC
program that has met with such success, in contrast to the ECR deal run by WLS/WCDA
partnership, with NCS"s Taitel aboard) quickly put the kabosh on that warrant on 1/11/13,
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as the docket indicates no such Iurther warrant is to issue unless ChieI Judge Pearson
approves oI it.
DAS OIIicer Brown actually tried to completely change her story, much less her
stance, to Coughlin on 1/9/13 when Coughlin Iollowed upon on her instructions in her email
to him oI 1/2/13 vis a vis obtaining a Iee waiver to pay Ior such Mental Health Evaluation
and obtaining an "indigent application Ior instructions at that point" (Brown wrote to
Coughlin on 1/2/13 in response to Coughlin's timely 12/20/12 (within 30 days oI the
11/21/12 judgment) request Ior "an extension oI time to comply with the Order
oI ...11/21...to the extent that I have not already done so..." etc. ,etc.
The 1/2/13 email to Couglin Irom DAS Brown reads: "RE: ATTN CJ oI Department
oI Alternative SEntencingRE: New voicemail Irom: 7753299517? From: Brown, Celeste
(CBrownwashoecounty.us) This sender is in your saIe list. Sent: Wed 1/02/13 8:21 AM
To: 'Zach Coughlin' (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Zach, When you come to check in
today pick up an indigent application and ask Ior instructions at that point. OIIicer CJ Brown
WC Dept. OI Alternative Sentencing 1 South Sierra St. Reno, Nv 89501 desk 775)327-8384
Iax 775)327-8383
From: Zach Coughlin |mailto:zachcoughlinhotmail.com| Sent: Thursday, December
20, 2012 2:12 PM To: Brown, Celeste Subject: RE: ATTN CJ oI Department oI
Alternative SEntencingRE: New voicemail Irom: 7753299517 Dear OIIicer Brown, I
am indigent and cannot aIIord a competency evaluation at the present time. I am
writing to request an extension oI time to comply with the Order oI 11/20 or 11/21/12
in rcr2011-063341 to the extent I have not already done so. I am unsure whether an
evaluation is even required given that I had 3 done this year and I was adjudged
competent pursuant to an evaluation by Lakes Crossing by Judge SIerrazza's own
10/22/12 Order, which is, technically, within 30 days oI the 11/20 or 11/21
Order...Judge SIerrazza also waived all Iees associated with my DAS activities, and I
believe that extends to any evaluation required. Can you direct me as to where I should
have the evaluation done, iI one is still needed? Additionally, since the 11/20/12 Trial, i
had a trial on a traIIic citation (Iailure to secure a load on one's vehicle) on December
3rd, and another trial in rcr2012-065630 on December 11th, 2012, with a hearing in that
matter on November 27th, 2012, and many things to do related to the Iormal
disciplinary hearing with the State Bar oI Nevada on November 14th, 2012, so getting
any evaluation required done within 30 days, while having nearly no money to my
name, has been extremely diIIicult. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV
89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402"
"RE: my reliance upon your indications regarding any necessary extension and Iee
waiver application? From: Brown, Celeste (CBrownwashoecounty.us) This sender
is in your saIe list. Sent: Wed 1/16/13 1:27 PM To: 'Zach Coughlin'
(zachcoughlinhotmail.com) I`ll talk to you when you come in Sgt. CJ Brown WC
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Dept. OI Alternative Sentencing 1 South Sierra St. Reno, Nv 89501 desk 775)327-8384
Iax 775)327-8383 From: Zach Coughlin |mailto:zachcoughlinhotmail.com| Sent:
Wednesday, January 16, 2013 11:28 AM To: Brown, Celeste Subject: my reliance upon
your indications regarding any necessary extension and Iee waiver application Dear
OIIicer Brown, Will you please provide me an indication in writing oI what you or
anyone with DAS have communicated to anyone with the RJC about my participation
in DAS and any alleged Iailure to comply with any requirements, including inIormation
related to my email to Irom within the last 30 minutes detailing my reliance upon your
express indications concerning an extension oI time to have any competency or mental
health evaluation done, should the one the Lakes Crossing Report and 10/22/12 Order
declaring me Competent by Judge SIerrazaa not be deemed to satisIy the requirement to
have a competency or mental health evaluation done within 30 days oI 11/20/12
(which, Irom my reading, meant 30 days in either direction). Would you Iurther please
email or Iax me the materials that you reIerenced in our previous discussion and
directed me to pick up Irom Sabrina, but that Sabrina was unaware oI when I requested
them? Sincerely, Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and
Fax: 949 667 7402"
The WCDA OIIice should be disqualiIied Iorm prosecuting Coughlin, particularly
where DDA Kandaras' above email admits to Ieeling Coughlin's competency is brought into
question, the events involving two Iormer WCDA Criminal Division prosecutor's turned
RJC Judges on 2/13/13 in (an Order Ior Competency Evaluation signed and entered by
Judge Pearson at an 8:30 am hearing in 11-063341 was provided, in writing, to Judge
CliIton in 12-065630, with 'shall language, and DDA Young's willingness to go along
with Judge CliIton in reIusing to Iollow NRS 178.405's mandatory stay is arguably
impermissible. To have RJC BailliII's then Order Coughlin to remain at the RJC, then go
into a hearing brought on an Emergency Basis upon DDA Young making an Ex Parte
Request Ior Judge CliIton to resconsider his Order Ior Competency Evaluation all has a
rather 'Iox in the hen house quality to it when it comes to the WCDA's OIIice, and now
RJC Judges whom had previously spent the majority oI their career's in the WCDA's
OIIice-Criminal Division, having things a certain way an awIul lot oI the time.). That's the
hearing Couglin really wanted continued because, as speciIically mentioned by Judge
Pearson at a 2/5/13 8:30 am hearing on some unserved, unnoticed Order Show Cause
(Coughlin was bailed out at 1:45 am (aIter the last bus had leIt 911 Parr Blvd, requiring I
walk 3.5 miles to my 1471 E. 9th St. location, at which I rent a IiIth wheel trailer Ior $75 a
month, a rent I can barely make each month) and Coughlin was only around to attend that
11-063341 unnoticed (or improperly noticed Gagnon 1 hearing considering his WC Inmate
Release inIormation indicated such hearing would be on 2/7/13, and now Coughlin Iaced
Show Cause Hearing on 3/5/13 (which is, curiously, noted in the docket Ior RCR12-
065630, and explains the Iact that Bruce Lindsay's paralegal Diana Sim's Iaxed a letter
Lindsay dictated seeking a continuance oI such 3/5/13 OSC Hearing Irom Judge CliIton,
citing a scheduling conIlict, with Sims Iaxing the the RJC such letter to Judge CliIton with a
designation thereon that it reIered to "RCR12-065630" which completely undermines
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Lindsay's subsequent assertion that his Iailure to appear on 3/19/13 at the continuation oI
the trial in that matter was not problematic, as he Ielt he was not attorney oI record on
"Dave's case" (Judge David CliIton) and that his earlier indications to Coughlin just beIore
and during the 3/11/13 OSC Hearing (the case number assigned to that combination hearing
has changed numerous times, with inconsistent indications as to which allegations and
subject matter were to be and were addressed in which case number) that a "global
resolution that will allow you to practice law and not have any SCR 111(6) convictions on
your record as to any oI the case wherein you have ever been a deIendant in the RJC" was,
not true aIter all) over some allegation that Coughlin called the RJC, allegedly in violation
oI Judge SIerrazza's 12/20/12 Administrative Order 12-01 (no case number indicated in the
caption thereinm and arguably, the service oI process oI that Administrative Order was
insuIIicient, and such Order extinguished upon the calendaring year changing to 2013, and
the seating oI a new ChieI Judge to replace then ChieI Judge SIerrazza), to see iI that
Hearing in 11-063341 indicated as set Ior 2/5/13 was, in Iact, still on calendar, or whether
the Hearing held at 8:30 am on 2/5/13 replaced such Hearing) 12-065630...that DAS
hearing in 063341 was incorrectly noticed on my Jail Release papers Ior 2/5/13 or
something...At that 2/3/13 Hearing I got an Order Ior Competency Evaluation Irom
Pearson, then went and provided that to Judge CliIton at the resumption oI the 065630 trial
immediately thereaIter, which, under NRS 178.405, required CliIton to suspend the trial in
11-065630. OI course, he did not. He has demonstrated a willingness to Iail to apply the law
as written in certain instances, invariably to the beneIit oI the State, oIten with the
encouragement oI DDA Young (though, to be Iair, at the 2/13/13 Trial, DDA Young did
point out to Judge CliIton the 'shall language in NRS 178.405, to which Judge CliIton
made, admittedly, an inventive, argument that some Iailure to make speciIic Iindings oI Iact
or something along those lines in Judge Pearsons just minted Order For Competency
Evaluation in 11-063341 oI 2/13/13 made inapplicable the mandatory stay under NRS
178.405. Even iI one were to overlook in possible impropriety oI Judge CliIton suspending
that Trial, starting at 9 am in 12-065630 long enough Ior DDA Young to go to the RJC
counter and make and ex parte request Ior an emergency reconsideration hearing beIore
Judge Pearson, including the evident partiality revelaed by Iailing to apply procedural rules
to the State in the same rigid and overly Iormulaic manner to which the RJC has applied
them to Coughlin (including the 10 days Coughlin should have to respond to such a Motion
Ior Reconsideration oI the Order Ior Competency Evaluation oI 2/13/13 in 11-063341),
there still exists the Iact that Judge CliIton Iailed to Iollow NRS 178.405 and immediately
Stay all proceedings in all departments, but rather, allowed DDA Young a recess to go and
make his ex parte communications to the RJC BailiII counter seeking an Emergency
Hearing beIore Judge Pearson to reconsider his 2/13/13 Order Ior Competency Evaluation.
DDA Young's making such Motion violated the mandatory automatic stay required by NRS
178.405 leaving the RJC to rely upon some dubious assertion that Jduge Pearson just
happened to continue mulling his decision to enter the Order For Competency Evaluation he
entered in 11-063441 at approximately 8:45 am, sua sponte, without any prompting or extra
judicial communications with Judge CliIton, DDA Young, or anyone else...something Judge
Pearson reIused to reIute the allegation oI upon Coughlin putting it beIore him during the
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brieI Emergency Reconsideration Hearing Judge CliIton leIt the bench long enough in 12-
065630 on 2/13/13 to allow Judge Pearson to take it an vacate or otherwise amend his Order
Ior Competency Evaluation, at which point Judge Pearson did render a rulign that he would
enter an Order having the State pay Ior a 'mental health evaluation Ior the indigent
Coughlin, that, to this date, still has not been entered and Coughlin has been unable to have
such done due to the Iailure to issue a check to him made out to his pyschiatrist, Dr. Suat
Yasar, MD (the State, DDA Young, and Richard G. Hill, Esq., have all been able to get
Emergency Ex Parte Motions granted against Coughlin, whereas, DDA Young's Iailure to
oppose Coughlin's 2/21/12 Motion to Dismiss in 12-065630 (which, arguably under Polk v.
State and DCR 13(3) may required such Motion to Dismiss be granted) resulted in Judge
CliIton, almost reIlexively by instinct, sua sponte, making an argument on the State's behalI
that DDA Young had implicilty opposed such Motion to Dismiss, thereby revealing Iurther
the evident partiality against Coughlin by the RJC judiciary pervading all oI the various
prosecutions and evictions/landlord tenant matters therein). The motion pending beIore this
Court asks that the district court judge who heard the case be disqualiIied. A motion.to
disqualiIy a judge must set Iorth Iacts and reasons suIIicient to cause a reasonable person to
question the judge's impartiality, and the challenged judge may contradict the motion's
allegation. The motion must be reIerred to another judge Ior adjudication. Towbin Dodge,
LLC v. Dist. Ct. 121 Nev. 251,260, 112 P.3d 1063 (2005). Coughlin Iiled and had a copy
served on Judge CliIton's chambers prior to the commencement oI trial on 12/12/12 in 12-
065630 (in accordance with the express language oI NRS 1.235(2)(b), to which Judge
CliIton made a non-sequitur argument related to the 'time set Ior start oI trial where such
statutory dictate actually requires making a Motion to DisqualiIy such as Couglin's oI
12/11/12 in 12-065630 'not later than the commencement oI trial or hearing oI the case
where 'the Iacts upon which disqualiIication oI the judge is sought are not known to the
party beIore the party is notiIied oI the assignment oI the judge or beoIre any pretrial
hearing is held. Coughlin was not notiIied oI the transIer oI 12-065630 to Judge CliIton,
Irom Judge Lynch until a time to close in proximity to the commencement oI trial on
12/11/13 in 12-065630 and still has not been told why the matter was apparently
transIerred, curiously, on 2/27/12 (same day as trial beIore Judge Nash Holmes in 11 TR
26800 resulting in 5 day summary contempt incarceration and a 3/14/12 written grievance
to the SBN wherein Judge Nash Holmes indicates she had 'heard he (Coughlin) may be
living in his car somewhere, which is rather troubling (especially consdiering RJC Judge
Schroeder would issue a deIault summary eviction lockout Order the Iollowing day in 12-
374 to Gayle Kern, Esq., where Kern herselI violated RPC 3.5A, especially considerin the
lengthy Tenant's Answer and Pre-Hearing BrieI Coughlin Iiled on 3/8/12 in 12-374 and the
jurisdictional bar in NRS 40.253(6) requiring that Kern Iile a Landlord's AIIidavit PRIOR
to the holding oI any such summary eviction hearing (Coughlin allegedly appeared a couple
minutes lat to that 3/15/12 hearing, where NV Energey and Kern, and her unauthorized
practitioner oI law non attorney associate/property manager Western Nevada Management's
Sue King allegedly conspired to deprive Coughlin oI electricity to his then home law oIIice
at 1422 E. 9th ST. #2 Ior over one week), making Judge Schroeder's 3/15/12 Lockout Order
voide Ior lack oI jurisdiction (see NRS 40.400 and NRC 60(b)(4), though, extra-judicial sua
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sponte 'investigation, apparently, by RJC Judge Schroeder resulted in a rather curious
Order on 11/14/12 disposing oI any need Ior Kern to addresss such serious allegations oI
proIessional misconduct. This is especially true iI one consider Marshal Menzel used to be a
RJC BailiII and RJC BailiII Reyes had interrogated Coughlin as to whether he was
recording the summary eviction trial (it is not clear that SCR Rules related to members oI
the media apply to pro se attorney litigants in Justice Court, regardless, even had Coughlin
been aware oI them at the time) in 11-1708 beIore Judge SIerrazza and Judge Nash Holmes
testimony on 11/14/12 at Coughlin's SBN Iormal disciplinary hearing that she had 'heard
you like to record things. Put together, the inIrence is that RJC BailiII Reyes and Marshal
Menzel (Coughlin Iiled a TPO Against Reyes in February 2012 and Menzel sent a report to
the SBN detailing issues he takes with Coughlin in April 2012) do a lot oI gossiping while
at work. Menzel has Iollowed Couglin into the RJC Criminal Division Iiling and castigated
Coughlin Ior not having a 'job. Reyes has issued invective to Coughlin regarding
Coughlin 'taking mental medication. RJC BailiII Reyes admits to telling Coughlin, with
WCPD Leslie and Goodnight seated beside a seated Coughlin that Reyes would 'put my
boot up your ass, though Reyes, shortly aIter mistating Coughlin's citation to Shepp (Reyes
accused Coughlin oI lying to Judge SIerrazza about the import oI Shepp, then proceeded to
provide his butchered interpreation oI the exclusionary rule to the Fourth Amendment,
during a conversation with Coughlin the day aIter Judge SIerrazza convicted Coughlin oI
BOTH petty larceny and receiving stolen property where Coughlin was alleged to have
recieved the very property he allegedly stole, FROM HIMSELF). Reyes went on to chide
Coughlin Ior allegedly stealing some lost, mislaid, or abandoned property Irom a 24 year
old skateboard whom allegedly had set his iPhone down on the concrete at 11:15pm at night
in the downtown Reno skate plaze then venture to the opposite side oI the plaze, Iar enough
away to Iail to hear a still unidentiIied man (as conIirmed by a video taped admission that
Judge SIerrazza ruled irrelevant and hearsay, oI Nicole Watson) hold the iPhone aloIt, oIIer
it up, then proceed to threaten to 'throw it in the river iI someone did not claim it
immediately). Reyes characterized the 24 year old skateboard to Coughlin as 'just a kid.
Reyes excused his own threat to Coughlin to 'put my boot up your ass oI October 9th,
2011 as a 'subterIuge that was permissible given Reyes status as a member oI law
enIorcement. Further, upon Judge CliIton having Coughlin taken into custody on 2/13/13
in 12-065630, ChieI BailiII Sexton reminded Coughlin that he still 'have hanging over your
head Iive diIIerent extremely de minimis alleged violations oI Judge SIerrazza's 12/20/12
Administrative Order 12-01, which threat apparently was put into play by the 2/25/13 Order
To Show Cause AO 12-01, Iile stamped 3:45pm, upon Coughlin Iiling a Notice oI Appeal
to the 2/13/13 Order by Judge CliIton in 12-065630 sentencing Coughlin, summarily, and
denying any stay thereto despite good cause show, especially relating to 62337 and the jail
depriving Coughlin oI his medications during two oI the three questionable incarcerations
the RJC had subjected Coughlin to between 2/1/13 and 2/12/13, and Coughlin's established
suIIering Irom clinical Major Depressive Disorder , Treatment Resistant Depression, and
ADD/ADHD. The causal connection between Coughlin's early mornign email oI 2/1/13 to
WCDA Inspector Covington (the only person ADA Helzer is allowing Coughlin to
communicate with in reIerence to CR12-2025 and RJC 11-0633341) and the NRS 171.136
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violating summary arrest Ior an alleged probation violation disproven by DAS OIIicer
Ramos' own Coworker, DAS OIIicer Brown's 1/24/13 email to Coughlin, where such arrest
is notated at occuring AFTER 7 pm (7:02 pm) on the PC Sheet and Inmate Booking papers
Irom 2/1/13, is obvious, and troubling. A similar casual connection seems apparent
between a 2/6/13 email to WCDA DDA-Civil Division Watts-Vial objecting to his 11/13/12
Iaxed objections ot Coughlin's SCR 110 subpoenas on Washoe County and 2JDC personnel
and the 2/8/13 point a gun at Coughlin's head Irom Iive Ieet away Ior no good reason by
RPD Waddle arrest and charge oI a gross misdemeanor violation oI the SBN TPO over
some alleged violation on 1/3/13 and a Ielony charge Ior some alleged violation oI the SBN
EPO in 12-607 over some alleged conduct on 1/23/13 or thereabouts (the purported service
oI the TPO in 12-599 by BailiII Reyes on 12/19/12 involved Reyes Iollowing Coughlin into
the tiny DAS check in closet and shoving his Iorearm into Coughlin's midsection in
insisting Coughlin was being detained suIIiciently long enough to serve Coughlin the TPO
Order in 12-599...similarly shoving oI a Iorearm into Coughlin's midsection occurred during
an attempted service oI an EPO in either both 12-599 and 12-6087 by WCSO Deputy
Courteney, on 1/4/13. Such apparent misconduct Iurther vitiates the viability oI such
attempts at service, especially where Deputy Courteney utilized Iorce in attempting to
prevent Coughlin Irom walking on his drive way towards his IiIth wheel. Next in the
apparent retaliatory causal connection parade is Coughlin's inquiring with WCDA DDA
Watts-Vial on 2/25/13 about those SCR 110 Supboenas again, at approximately 2pm, just
beIore Iormer WCDA OIIice-Criminal Division prosecutor turne RJC Judge Pearson
entered his 2/25/13 Show Cause Order setting Ior hearing such matter on 3/5/13, based
upon some unsworn, unattributed, allegations that Coughlin had made various 'contacts
with non-RJC BailiII personnel, though the complete lack oI speciIicity, the violation oI the
requirement Ior such out oI the presence oI the court alleged conduct constituting contempt
under NRS 22.030(3), and the general lack oI notice as to the charges against him (what did
such contacts entail? Who exactly would the witnesses oI such contacts be? How can
Coughlin subpoena them without suIIiciently detailed notice thereoI? Why is Couglhin not
aIIorded at least the 10 judicial days seemingly required to prepare Ior any such Show
Cause Hearing. Is not the purported service oI such Show Cause Order incident to
Coughlin checkign in with DAS insuIIicient service oI process Ior the same reasons other
such service attempts in 12-607, 12-599, RJC AO 12-01, etc., should Iail? Do not the
TPO's and EPO's in 12-607 and 12-599 exceed the jurisdiction to make such orders where
they impinge upon Coughlin's Iirst Amendment Rights and rights as a litigatin in his Iormal
disciplinary hearing and the appeal thereoI, and where such orders are in now way
reasonably or narrowly tailore to achieve the purported saIety goals to which they address?
'NRS 1.235 Procedure Ior disqualiIying judges other than Supreme Court justices. 1. Any
party to an action or proceeding pending in any court other than the Supreme Court, who
seeks to disqualiIy a judge Ior actual or implied bias or prejudice must Iile an aIIidavit
speciIying the Iacts upon which the disqualiIication is sought. The aIIidavit oI a party
represented by an attorney must be accompanied by a certiIicate oI the attorney oI record
that the aIIidavit is Iiled in good Iaith and not interposed Ior delay. Except as otherwise
provided in subsections 2 and 3, the aIIidavit must be Iiled: (a) Not less than 20 days beIore
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the date set Ior trial or hearing oI the case; or (b) Not less than 3 days beIore the date set Ior
the hearing oI any pretrial matter. 2. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection and
subsection 3, iI a case is not assigned to a judge beIore the time required under subsection 1
Ior Iiling the aIIidavit, the aIIidavit must be Iiled: (a) Within 10 days aIter the party or the
party`s attorney is notiIied that the case has been assigned to a judge; (b) BeIore the hearing
oI any pretrial matter; or (c) BeIore the jury is empaneled, evidence taken or any ruling
made in the trial or hearing, whichever occurs Iirst. II the Iacts upon which
disqualiIication oI the judge is sought are not known to the party beIore the party is notiIied
oI the assignment oI the judge or beIore any pretrial hearing is held, the aIIidavit may be
Iiled not later than the commencement oI the trial or hearing oI the case. 3. II a case is
reassigned to a new judge and the time Ior Iiling the aIIidavit under subsection 1 and
paragraph (a) oI subsection 2 has expired, the parties have 10 days aIter notice oI the new
assignment within which to Iile the aIIidavit, and the trial or hearing oI the case must be
rescheduled Ior a date aIter the expiration oI the 10-day period unless the parties stipulate to
an earlier date. 4. At the time the aIIidavit is Iiled, a copy must be served upon the judge
sought to be disqualiIied. Service must be made by delivering the copy to the judge
personally or by leaving it at the judge`s chambers with some person oI suitable age and
discretion employed therein. 5. The judge against whom an aIIidavit alleging bias or
prejudice is Iiled shall proceed no Iurther with the matter and shall: (a) Immediately transIer
the case to another department oI the court, iI there is more than one department oI the court
in the district, or request the judge oI another district court to preside at the trial or hearing
oI the matter; or (b) File a written answer with the clerk oI the court within 5 judicial days
aIter the aIIidavit is Iiled, admitting or denying any or all oI the allegations contained in the
aIIidavit and setting Iorth any additional Iacts which bear on the question oI the judge`s
disqualiIication. The question oI the judge`s disqualiIication must thereupon be heard and
determined by another judge agreed upon by the parties or, iI they are unable to agree, by a
judge appointed: (1) By the presiding judge oI the judicial district in judicial districts
having more than one judge, or iI the presiding judge oI the judicial district is sought to be
disqualiIied, by the judge having the greatest number oI years oI service. (2) By the
Supreme Court in judicial districts having only one judge. A multitude oI such Iacts were
not known to Coughlin, and necessarily could not be known as indicated in NRS 1.235(2)
(b), as Coughlin detailed in his 12/11/12 Motion to DisqualiIy and in a 1/7/13 Motion to
DisqualiIy Judge CliIton as well in 12-067980. Somehow, Judge CliIton then allowed
DDA a recess to go to the counter and request and Emergency Hearing beIore Judge
Pearson to have that Order Ior Competency Evaluation entered an hour beIore in 063341
vacated. DDA Young was successIul in getting a hearing and having that Order vacated.
Judge Pearson was, some might say, evasive during that hearing when questioned as to
whether he had extra-judicial discussions with CliIton (whom had just exited the Bench in
Courtroom D where the continuation oI the Trial in 12-065630 was being held on 2/13/13
despite Coughlin's 1/22/13 Motion Ior Order Ior Competency Evaluation, and despite Judge
CliIton justiIying his Iailure to Iollow the requirement in NRS 1.235 that he respond, in
aIIidavit, to Coughlin's Motion Ior DisqualiIication oI 12/11/12 based upon an indication
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that Coughlin's use oI a Declaration only Iailed to meet the call Ior an 'aIIidavit in that
statute, despite the import oI NRS 53.045 and the Court's holding in Buckwalter which
conclusively establish as mandatory authority that a Declaration will absolutely suIIice in
such circumstances, particularly where Coughlin had already been accorded in Iorma
pauperis status by Judge CliIton and could not aIIord a notary, and the SelI Help Center at 1
S. Sierra St. only provides Iree notary service in Iamily law cases) long enough Ior Judge
Pearson to hold the Emergency Hearing to Vacate his just entered Order Ior Competency
Evaluation in 11-063341, which he claimed to have been reviewing, unprompted, Iollowing
his entry oI that Order, in his chambers, unprompted...). It has also become even Iurther
apparent that the RJC BailiII are or may be engaging in a coordinated eIIort (Iurther
suggested by the apparent dictate in Judge SIerrazza's Administrative Order 12-01 that
Coughlin : 'inser language where on 2/21/13 Couglin appeared at the RJC to take the PBC
test and check in with DAS as required by his probation in 11-063341 (in part based upon a
conviction Ior 'possessing or receiving stolen property that is clearly violative oI Nevada
law: ('(A) Count 3 charged Shepp with having received property stolen by him during the
commission oI the burglary charged in Count 2. Since a thieI cannot receive Irom himselI
the Iruits oI his larceny, the jury must be instructed that it could convict oI either burglary or
receiving, | 484 P.2d 565 | but not oI both. People v. Taylor, 4 Cal.App.2d 214, 40 P.2d 870
(Cal. 1935); People v. Morales, 263 Cal.App.2d 211, 69 Cal.Rptr. 553 (1968); Milanovich
v. United States, 365 U.S. 551, 81 S.Ct. 728, 5 L.Ed.2d 773 (1961); Thomas v. United
States, 418 F.2d 567 (5 Cir.1969); Baker v. United States, 357 F.2d 11 (5 Cir.1966). Such
an instruction was requested but the court declined to give it. This was error, and later
acknowledged by the court to be such when it set aside the receiving conviction and ordered
a new trial on that charge. The appellate issue is whether that manner oI handling the error
eIIectively cured it. The error was not cured by the setting aside oI the receiving conviction
since there is no way oI knowing whether a properly instructed jury would have Iound the
deIendant guilty oI burglary, Count 2, or receiving, Count 3. Milanovich v. United States,
supra. Both convictions should have been set aside and a new trial ordered. SHEPP v.
STATE 484 P.2d 563 (1971)) Add to that the eIIorts oI the WCPD's Leslie in working with
SBN King in a Memorandum Iound in the Iile Leslie provided to Lindsay, Esq., upon the
WCPD and APD being conIlicted out oI representing Coughlin (and Leslie clearly violates
his duty oI conIidentiality to Coughlin under RPC 1.16 in the Iollowing and beyond):
'Memorandum To: Zach Coughlin Iile, RCR12-067980, PD number 144825 From: Jim
Leslie ChieI Deputy Public DeIender Re: Threat Date: 12/13/12 On the above date, I
received a return call Irom Patrick King and David Clark at the State Bar. They were
responding to my email to King yesterday regarding possible threat by Coughlin as
contained in an email Coughlin had sent to me, other attorneys in this oIIice, and several
other recipients. Copy oI that email is attached hereto as Exhibit "1" and copy oI the
website that the end oI the Iirst paragraph oI the email leads to is attached hereto as Exhibit
"2". King and Clark both agreed that the email Irom Coughlin, in context and with the
reIerence to the website with the video clip and other materials Irom "Cape Fear",
constitutes a threat oI violence against me and other attorneys in our oIIice. They disclosed
that they had had their own problems with Coughlin, including having to have armed
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security at his State Bar hearing and that they each had considered obtaining restraining
orders against him and probably will do so upon completion oI the Bar proceeding. They
both stated that "heightened alert" is appropriate in light oI the email he sent and generally
when dealing with Mr. Coughlin. They told me that iI I reIer the email in question to law
enIorcement they would not consider it a breach oI attorney client conIidentiality under
Rule 1.6(c) and also because Mr. Coughlin includes so many recipients in the email that he
has waived conIidentiality. J indicated I was intended to ask to be relieved oI the remaining
case our oIIice has with Coughlin, and they agreed I could and should do so. I am moving
Iorward with asking to be relieved Irom Coughlin's case in RCR12-067980 and am also
considering possible reIerral oI the email to law enIorcement. END Even iI one accepts
Leslie's waiver oI conIidentiality argument where he writes : They told me that iI I reIer
the email in question to law enIorcement they would not consider it a breach oI attorney
client conIidentiality under Rule 1.6(c) and also because Mr. Coughlin includes so many
recipients in the email that he has waived conIidentiality, that still does not excuse the
extent to which Leslie then reIers to matters outside such email in violating his duty oI
conIidentiality. Further, again, Leslie, like the SBN's King, and like RMC Judge Nash
Holmes, relies heavily upon unsworn, oIten unattributed hearsay. The only reason I went
into court is because I am selI representing on 063341. Bruce Lindsay is not my attorney oI
record on that case, nor have I ever consented to his becoming my attorney oI record therein
at this point, though would consider it iI the State were to provide Ior Lindsay to be paid to
do so. I am asking in writing iI Bruce Lindsay, Esq. was appointed as my counsel oI record
in 2012-065630 Ior the 2/13/13 Contempt Hearing, at which I received 5 days in jail Ior
being late, wherein Judge CliIton alleged I had already had the beneIit oI a warning, yet I
maintain that Robbin Baker told me the start time oI the trial in that matter on 12/11/11 had
been moved Irom 9 am to 1:30 pm. Judge CliIton maintained that he did not change the
start time, then insisted Robbin Baker did not tell me that, then reIused to indicate just how
he could possibly know what Robbin Baker had told me. Subsequently it was learned that
Robbin Baker was not even at work that day, and that no one had called her that day to
inquire as to whether I was correct in my assertion as to her having communicated the start
time oI the trial as having changed. I believe it is situations like that that resulted in the
current Administrative Order 12-01 (which may not even still be binding considering it was
Irom 2012 and by Iormer ChieI Judge SIerrazza) wherein I seemingly am prevented Irom
communicating with any court personnel besides the BailiII's, based upon some unnoticed
Iinding that I had caused distruptions in the Iiling oIIice, an accusation to which I was never
provided an opportunity to be heard on. Previously, Judge SIerrazza reIused to allow me to
appear on my own behalI, despite my having been a licensed attorney in Nevada at the time
in 11-063341, and despite my having Iiled a Notice oI Appearance therein, and an
Authorization to represent. Then Judge SIerrazza, at trial on 8/27/12 and 8/29/12 reIused to
allow me to selI represent still. Then he reIused to accept the plea agreement that would
have disposed oI all three matters to which I am a deIendant in the RJC (11-063341, which
is now on appeal in CR12-2025, with the Appeal BrieI, per the attached BrieIing Schedule,
on March 9th, 2013, and where Judge Elliott entered an Order granting my IFP on 1/9/13
providing Ior the preparation oI the transcript at public expense; 11-065630, which
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stemmed Iorm a 1/14/12 "misuse oI emergency communications" gross misdemeanor arrest,
that had the trial start on 12/11/12, where the WCPD was releived on 11/27/12 (the day pre-
trial motions were due, I maintain I was Iorced to proceed pro se due to Biray Dogan's
complete lack oI representation, including Iailing to appear where required at the 2/14/12
arraignment on a gross misdemeanor (indigent deIendnans entitled to representation on
gross misdo and Ielonies "at all stages"...); and the matter wherein Bruce is counsel oI
record, 12-067980, where Bruce has stipulated to several continuances...and now today
apparently DDA Young tried to pull something where he Iailed to stip to the continuance in
11-063341, reIuses to take my calls or respond to any written communications. Further
WCDA Legal Assistant Tina Galli inIormed me today that I am not to call their oIIice on
11-063341 and that "Diana
Irom Bruce Lindsay's OIIice is handling it". That is not true. I am selI representing in 11-
063341 at this point. Further, I never expressly consented to Lindsay appearing in 11-
065630 at the 2/13/13 Contempt Hearing, wherein I was brought in upon being summarily
taken into custody the day beIore, and without consulting with Lindsay at all or ever
consenting to his appearing on my behalI, Lindsay was seated at the deIendants desk.
Lindsay then proceeded to disparage my ability to represent clients currently on the record,
stating "Your Honor, can you imagine him trying to represent clients in his current state?"
as though I was so incompetent that doing so would surely produce poor results. Judge
CliIton quickly pointed out my competency to be an attorney was not the relevant inquiry.
Lindsay reIused to seek to examined Robbin Baker or call her as a witness in line with my
argument that I had not actually ever been given a "warning" against my being late to court
"happening again" (as Judge CliIton indicated I had). Further, Lindsay ask me, in open
court, in Iront oI Judge CliIton, "so what happened, why were you late". duty oI
conIidentiality. A member oI Washoe County law enIorcement stated to me at some point
while in custody on 2/12/13 that he expected I would be released the Iollowing day with
credit Ior time served. Instead, I received 5 days incarceration. Another member oI washoe
county law enIorcement subsequently expressed to me that he was surprised by such an
long sentence. I have been told that Lindsay's appeared on 2/13/13 in 12-065630 "Iree oI
charge" despite my indigent status and the Iact that the State is required to provide me an
attorney at any hearing, even a civil contempt hearing, wherein there is even a possibility oI
any jail time, much less 5 days oI jail time...Lindsay still has not Iiled an SB89 Iorm or
Proposed Order (though he seemed to orally make such motion on 2/13/13) requiring that I
be evaluated Ior competency or Iitness to stand trial, despite his repeatedly indicating he
believes my competency is seriously in question. I believe he is obligated to Iile such a
Propose Order and or Motion Ior an Order Ior Competency Evaluation Immediately,
pursuant to NRS 178.405. Further, even at the Contempt Hearing on 2/13/13, in 12-
067980, the State was required to provide me counsel, and given the conIlict present with
the WCPD and APD, private counsel was required. Additionally, I believe it is extremely
bad Iaith Ior the State and RJC to reIused to provide me private counsel Ior the 12/11/12
Trial in 12-065630, only to then allow WCPD Leslie to abuse process with his 12/18/12
TPO Application, therein bringing about the current arrangement with court appointed
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private counsel. Please indicate in writing whether Lindsay was paid to appear on my
behalI on 2/13/13 in 12-065630 at the Contempt Hearing. The DAS arrest on 2/1/13 was
aIter 7pm in violation oI NRS 171.136. Further, the attached emails below support a
Iinding that there did not exist probable cause to make such an arrest. Additionally, please
Iind below the Plea Deal that I voluntarily accepted, on the record in 11-063341, 12-
065630, and 12-067980 that should dispose oI all three oI these matters. Further, please
indicate in writing whether Mr. Lindsay has been assigned to represent me in the matter
stemming Irom the 2/8/13 arrest Ior a gross misdemeanor TPO violation alleged to have
occurred on 1/3/13, and a Ielony EPO violation alleged to have occurred on or about
1/23/13. Please provide any documentation your oIIice has received with respect to that
case and an written indication oI whether your oIIice will be appearing at the arraignment
on 3/6/13. I would preIer that all three matters be resolved (and hopeIully the appeal oI 11-
063341 in CR12-2025 beIore Judge Elliott can be included in such a global resolution) in
accordance with the terms I agreed to on the record on 8/27/13 in 11-063341 (a hearing
which arguably was combined with the other two matters). 'Matters? From: Dogan,
Biray (BDoganwashoecounty.us) This sender is in your saIe list. Sent: Wed 6/27/12
9:04 AM To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com Cc: Goodnight, Joseph W
(JGoodnightwashoecounty.us) Zach, On June 13th, I sent to you via email (see below) an
oIIer negotiated w/ the State. I have not heard back Irom you regarding the oIIer. The DA is
requesting an answer to whether you are going to accept / reject the resolution by July 10.
You are currently scheduled Ior trial in Joe Goodnight's case on July 16, and an MSC on the
same day Ior my case. Please let us know beIore July 10 whether you want to go Iorward
with trial or otherwise. In the case you have w/ me. Plead Guilty to an amended count oI
Disturbing the Peace. Serve 90 days jail (concurrent to the case you have w/ Goodnight)
"suspended," on condition you continue to see your psychologist or psychiatrist, provide
monthly reports oI this to the Justice Court, maintain any Rx regimen prescribed by your
doctor, and obey all laws. In the case you have Joe Goodnight. Plead Guilty to an amended
count oI Disturbing the Peace. Serve 90 days jail (concurrent to the case you have w/ me)
"suspended," on the same conditions stated above.
There terms oI my probation under RCR2011-063341 require me to check in with
"DAS"...The security personnel whom I checked in with (Judge SIerrazza entered and
Administrative Order requiring me to be escorted by a RJC BailiII anytime I go to areas
under the control oI the RJC, due to, basically, Irom what I understanding, past
"disruptions"...so I check in with the Iront door security staII whenever I go to 1 S. Sierra St
Ior anything related to DAS (Department oI Alternative Sentencing) or the RJC, and then
wait Ior an RJC BailiII to appear to escort me to, say, the DAS check in area in the RJC
Iiling oIIice. The day oI one oI the allege EPO violation 1/23/13 was also the day my
Appellant's BrieI was due in the N. S. Ct. case involving the State Bar oI Nevada's attempt
to have me disbarred irrevocably. I was able to obtain a telephonic 5 day extension,
ultimately, making my brieI due on 1/30/13 (ultimately the Record on Appeal in that matter
was struck Irom the record due to some things like the State Bar putting more than 250
pages per bound volume, printing on both sides oI the paper, Iailing to bates stamp certain
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things, etc., so my BrieI is now due Iurther out, but at the time, I did not know whether or
not the Court would grant my Motion to Extend the Deadline to Iile my BrieI, etc...so,
basically, is was a stressIul situation.. Also, the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board issues
its Findings on 12/14/12 recommending to the Court that I be Iorever disbarred. I
attempted to Iile a post-Findings Motion Ior New Trial or to Alter or Amend the
Findings...under NRCP 52 and or 59, and maybe DCR13(7), that was due 10 judicial days
Irom that 12/14/12 mailing oI the Findings...which would have been 1/3/13...I don't wish to
violate the EPO or Iile a BrieI that disparages anyone. Rather, I hope to be able to pull
together the enormous amount oI material involved in deIending against the SBN's
Complaint, which alleged I violated some 12 Rules oI ProIessional Conduct and untold
number oI times, in a proIessional and Iair manner, with a Iocus on mitigating Iactors
involved in what has occurred in my liIe since August 2011, should an outright agreement
related to some SCR 117 Disability arrangement not be available with the SBN. I have
recently complete an intake with Northern Nevada Adult Mental Health Services and start
counseling and hopeIully that will result in an arrangement where, even iI I cannot aIIord
them myselI, I will be able to get my Wellbutrin antidepressant and avoid some oI the
things that may, in part happen when I run out oI it and can't aIIord a reIill. I have sent the
WCDA's OIIice some ill advised emails and or writings in the last month or so (and
probably beyond that), and believe that was at least in part a result oI not being able to
aIIord my medication. However, the TPO/EPOs may be void given the purported service oI
the TPO and Notice oI the EPO Hearing appears to violate Courthouse sanctuary doctrine,
on top oI the dictate against serving attorney's process while they access the courts.
Additionally, neither WC nor SBN put up the bond statutorily required Ior a workplace
TPO, and exhibits on their Iace demonstrate that the link in the email Coughlin alleged to
have sent on or about 12/12/12 was to a hark.com audio clip only not a movie. NRCP
56(g), bad Iaith aIIidavits, untenable, particulary where WCPD Jim Leslies admits to Iailing
to provide coughlin 911 audio Iiles on two dics propounded by the WCDA on 8/13 and
8/17/12. Further, audio clip speaks to learning, reading, and philosophy, which would not
seem to support a Iinding oI the sort oI conduct required to support such an Order.
Additionally, Iree speach and access to SBN Iiling oIIice procedures, including those under
SCR 105(4), including those expressed by the SBN and its Clerk oI Court and Iax Iiling
(some authority equates email with Iax as well) may present claim oI right deIense to any
alleged EPO violation. As Such, the diIIiculties associated with being arrested on 2/8/13
and charged with a Ielony and gross misdemeanor incident to alleged EPO and TPO
violations occuring on day oI deadlines to Iile NRCP 52 and or 59 motions as to 12/14/12
NNDB Panel Findings and Motion Ior Extension Io Time Ior Appeal BrieI in 62337, have
made it inordinately diIIicult to prepare Ior 2/25/13 Show Cause Hearing. Additionally, it
may have been improper to apply rigid and Iormulaic In Re Erickson application oI
procedural rules to pro se deIendant in various RJC matters, where DDA Young has
obtained several Emergency Ex Parte Orders and or Motions Settings (11/27/12 no Iaxing
in 065630...the approach
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to the Order For Competency Evaluation in 063341 as it relates to the Stay required on
2/12/13 in 065630 ('shall...NRS 178.405). May be impermissible Ior RJC BailiIIs and or
Judge CliIton to required Coughlin, essentially to waive any notice or service requirement
Ior improptu reconsideration Hearing presided over by ChieI Judge Pearson setting aside
the Order For Competency Eval made just an hour previous, and such may have been the
result oI extrajudicial communications which may not be a permissible basis Ior such action
(adjudicatory boundaries limited to what parties appropriately put Iorth to the Court...Ex
parte communications by DDA Young at RJC Counter and or anythign communicated to
Judge Pearson on 2/12/13 may not be appropriate basis Ior setting aside Order Ior
Competency Evaluation). Lastly, DAS OIIicer Celeste Brown email to Coughlin oI 1/24/13
indicates the 'video showed Coughlin presented to the security Check in arguably a timely
manner on 1/23/13 suIIicient to rebut a Iinding oI a violation, or at least demonstrate a good
Iaith attempt to comply. Further, arrest report/booking sheet Ior 2/1/13 arrest by DAS
indicates time oI arrest 7:02 pm, which may violate NRS 171.136 dicate against
misdemeanor arrest between 7pm and 7am without a warrant. Coughlin ordered to exit his
residence aIter 7pm by DAS OIIicer. Further, as to WCPD Jim Leslies's TPO application it
is telling he mistates the 12/12/12 email as continaing a link to a violent video clip when in
Iact the link is to nothing more than an audio clip that relates to learning, reading, and
philosophy (the verbatim transcript oI the entirety oI the audio only clip linked to in the
12/12/12 email is as Iollows: 'I ain't no white trash piece oI shit. I'm better than you all. I
can out learn you. I can out read you. I can outthink you, and I can out philosophize you.
And I'm going to outlast you. You think a couple oI whacks to my good old boy gut's gonna
get me down? It's going to take a hell oI a lot more than that, Counselor, to prove you're
better than me! (Max looks around in an attempt to Iind where Sam is hiding) The link to
this in the 12/12/12 email does not contain a single violent statement or image. II the link
had been to a clip oI Max Cady's 'Your going to learn about loss... speach, Iine, that may
amount to an implied threat. But it wasn't. It was to a short audio clip oI Cady making the
above statement. Leslie is adding his own remembrances oI 'Cape Fear where he alleges
that such quotations occurs aIter Cady has beaten two men. Actually, iI one went and view
that whole scene Irom the movie, it shows Cady being attacked by about six men that his
public deIender, played by Nick Nolte, had hired to go and attack and beat Cady with
'baseball bats and bicycle chains. Cady Iought them oII, then delivered a speach to a trash
dumpster that he Iigured his Iormer 'counselor Nolte was hiding behind when he heard a
rustling emanate Irom behind it Iollowing his successIully warding oII the attack by the six
hired thugs. Leslie demonstrates a complete lack oI candor to the tribunal in his application
(as does WCDA DDA Watts-Vial, whose 11/13/12 last minuted Iaxed objections to
Coughlin's SCR 110 Subpoenas upon 2JDC Judges Flanagan and Elliot, Clerk oI Court
Hastings and the 2JDC Custodian oI Records, where Watts-Vial admits to extended
discussions with the very Bar Counsel whom conIirmed to Coughlin that he, as a
respondent suspended attorney appearing pro se in his Iormal disciplinary matter, may, in
Iact, issue his own subpoenas (and, given NNDB Susich's 7/27/12 email to Coughlin,
Coughlin was entitled to rely upon such express indications by Bar Counsel King, provided
as a message conIirming such King was relaying to Coughlin upon conIirming such with
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his supervisor, ChieI Bar Counsel David Clark. Instead, leslie chooses to Iocus on a
tertiary aspect oI some description oI the Iilm incident to a link to buy the Iilm
As to Marshals Harley and Coppa and BailiIIs Reyes, English serving process: JCRRT Rule
8. Duties oI bailiII, sheriII. During the time the court remains in session, the bailiII, iI there
is one, or the sheriII or his deputy in attendance pursuant to law iI there is no bailiII,
shall: ...(I) PerIorm such other duties as are required by the justice oI the peace. RJC
BailiII's Medina and Reyes, Heibert. and Ramsey in sua sponte amending the 12/20/12
Administrative Order and thereby reIusing to accept Irom Coughlin documents he presents
Ior Iiling more than once a day (even, say, on a day where the deadline uner NRS 189.010
or NRS 175.515 runs, even where no prior notice oI such amendedment by BailiII to a
Judges order was provided Coughlin) are likely in violation NRS 4.353(c) PerIorm other
such duties as may be required oI the deputy marshal by the justice oI the peace oI the
court... where the 12/20/12 Administrative Order reads: ' a. II ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN wishes to Iile a document with the Reno Justice Court or attend a hearing in
the Reno Justice Court he must notiIy the security personnel at the main security entrance
located at the east entrance oI One South Sierra Street and wait Ior a bailiII oI the Reno
justice Court to respond to his location. b. II ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN wishes to
make a request oI the Reno Justice Court Ior copies, transcripts, access to a court Iile or to
ask a question he shall do so in writing and either mail the request to the Reno Justice Court
or deliver the written request to a bailiII oI the Reno Justice Court by Iirst contacting the
bailiII through court security as detailed above. The bailiII will then Iile the document Ior
Mr. Coughlin and provide him a Iile stamped copy in return. There is nothing in that order
allowing BailiII's Medina and Reyes to reIuse to accept documents Couglin presents Ior
Iiling at say, 4 pm, because Couglin presented something earlier in the day at, say, 9 am.
Regardless, the entirety oI Judge SIerrazza's 12/20/12 Administrative Order 2012-01 is oI
an disturbingly dubious nature. 'NRS 4.353 Deputy marshal: Appointment; duties;
qualiIications; compensation.... 3. Each deputy marshal shall:...(c) PerIorm other such
duties as may be required oI the deputy marshal by the justice oI the peace oI the court...
7. The provisions oI this section do not authorize the deputy marshal to serve any civil or
criminal process, except such orders oI the court which are specially directed by the court or
the presiding justice oI the peace thereoI to the deputy marshal Ior service. Judge
SIerrazza's Order oI 11/28/12 in "Case No.: ALL CASES Dept. No.: ALL
DEPARTMENTS" reads: "ORDER Pursuant to Justice Court Rules oI Civil Procedure Rule
84(b)(1) as ChieI Justice oI the Reno Justice Court I am responsible Ior the administration
oI court rules and regulations. Pursuant to Rule 84(b)(5), the ChieI Judge oversees all
administrative and clerical work and Iunctions oI the court. Pursuant to Rule 5(e) oI the
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Justice Court Rules oI Civil Procedure, a court may by local rule permit papers to be Iiled,
signed or veriIied by electronic means that are consistent with technical standards, iI any,
that the Judicial ConIerence oI the United States establishes. Currently, Reno Justice Court
has not adopted a rule permitting papers to be Iiled electronically. Justice Court Rules oI
Reno Township Rule 10(I) provides that the clerk must not accept Ior Iiling any pleading or
documents which do not comply with this rule, but Ior good cause shown, the Court may
permit the Iiling oI noncomplying pleadings and documents. HenceIorth, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the DeIendant, Zachary Coughlin, shall not be permitted to Iile any Iurther
documents in any and all departments oI Reno Justice Court by electronic means including,
but not limited to, Iax or email. In the event he violates this Order, he will be in contempt oI
court and subject to twenty-Iive (25) days imprisonment Ior each violation." Further, as to
Judge SIerrazza Iinding authority Ior makign his 11/28/12 Order in NJCRCP, Rules 1 and 2
therein may quite clear that (similar to JCRRT Rule 2) NJCRCP Rule 5(e) does not apply to
criminal case in the RJC, and does not apply to 'summary evictions. NJCRCP RULE 1.
SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF RULES: 'These rules govern the procedure in the
justice courts in all suits oI a civil nature, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81. NJCRCP
RULE 2. THREE FORMS OF ACTION: 'There shall be three Iorms oI action in justice
courts to be known as 'civil actions, 'small claims actions and 'summary eviction
actions. Rules 3 through 87 govern civil actions. Rules governing small claims actions
begin with Rule 88 and end with Rule 100. Rules governing summary evictions commence
with Rule 101. JCRRT Rule 10. Form oI pleadings.... '(I) The clerk must not accept Ior
Iiling any pleading or documents that do not comply with this rule, but Ior good cause
shown, the court may permit the Iiling oI noncomplying pleadings and documents.
Paragraph (1), except as to the size oI paper, and paragraph (3) oI this rule do not apply to
printed Iorms Iurnished by the clerk, district attorney, or public deIender. Despite it patent
inapplicability to 'landlord tenant matters as indicated in JCRRT Rule 2, Judge SIerrazza
continually applied, in the summary eviction case in 1708 the Iollowing rule to Coughlin's
various Motions to Alter, Amend, Stay, etc.: JCRRT Rule 11. Motions: Procedure Ior
making motions; aIIidavits; renewal, rehearing oI motions....(g) No motion once heard and
disposed oI shall be renewed in the same cause, nor shall the same matters therein embraced
be reheard, unless by leave oI the court. So, Judge SIerrazza manages to base his 11/28/12
Order entirely upon rules that are inapplicable to ALL oI the case Couglin has ever had in
the RJC. Coughlin has never once been a party to a 'civil action in the RJC. Regardless,
clearly, the RJC accepts Iilings by Iacsimile Irom some parties and their attorneys, whereas
it does not Irom others...This was the case throughout September 2011 until Couglin caught
on to the Iact that, despite RJC Clerk Christine Erickson and others indicating that Iiling by
Iax was not permitted, Richard G. Hill's associate, Casey D. Baker, was able to Iile some
things by Iax, including his 10/19/11 Request Ior an Order Shortening Time, etc., etc. Upon
discovering this, Coughlin conIronted Erickson about her previous apparently incorrect
assertions to him vis a vis Iax Iiling and Erickson said 'no comment. Similarly, in the
criminal division, ChieI Criminal Filing OIIicer Clerk Robbin Baker continually maintained
to Coughlin that Iiling by Iax was not permitted, until she changed her tune in mid-February
2012, whereupon Coughlin's Iilings in criminal cases in the RJC were accepted Ior Iiling,
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with Baker indicating 'a Iax is an original under the approach taken by the RJC.
JCRRT Rule 10.(a) All pleadings and papers presented Ior Iiling must be Ilat, unIolded,
Iirmly bound together at the top, on white paper oI standard quality, not less than 16-lb.
weight and 8 1/2 by 11 inches in size. All papers shall be typewritten or prepared by some
other process that will produce clear and permanent copies equally legible to printing. The
print size shall not be more than 12 points. Carbon or photocopies may not be Iiled. Only
one side oI the paper may be used..... There is, or should be, a pretty big diIIerence
between being a politician (or, Ior that matter, a member oI the executive branch) and being
a member oI the judicial branch. Whereas those in the executive branch are permitted to
utilize inIluence, bargaining, and leverage to Iurther their objecties, those in the judicial
branch must dispense justice based on law and Iact alone in a neutral manner devoid oI bias
or agenda. Judge SIerrazza continually abuses his contempt power...well, actually, he more
threatens to abuse it (which is still arguably abusing it) versus actually Iollowing through
and abusing in the way Judge Holmes did on on 2/27/12 in summarily incarcerating then
practicing attorney with client's Couglin Ior Iive days while denying any stay whatsoever
(which is what Judge Howard did on 11/30/11, although, ordering a mere 3 days
incarceration). The Justice Court Rules oI Reno Township do not apply to 'criminal case
or to 'landlord tenant matters, yet in his 11/28/12 Order in 'ALL CASES and in 'ALL
DEPARTMENTS then ChieI Judge SIerrazza ordered just that. Couglin has and hereby
again communicates on 'open reIusal pursuant to RPC 3.4(c) as to the illegality oI Judge
SIerrazza's 11/28/12 Order (the enIorcement oI which by criminal division clerks Robbin
Baker and Cathy Wood has materially prejudiced Coughlin's deIense in various criminal
prosecutions, including 11-063341 and 12-065630). RPC Rule 3.4. Fairness to Opposing
Party and Counsel. A lawyer shall not: ... (c) Knowingly disobey an obligation under the
rules oI a tribunal except Ior an open reIusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exists JCRRT 'Rule 2. Application oI rules. Except as otherwise provided by statute, these
rules apply to all civil proceedings Iiled in Reno Township except small claims and landlord
tenant matters. Further, it is completely untrue or erroneous Ior the RJC Docket in RCR13-
071437 to purport that a 'criminal complaint was Iiled therein on 12/20/12 in the Iorm oI
the Administrative Order oI 12/20/12, and Iurther, at the OSC Hearing on 3/5/13, Couglin
did not consent to Bruce Linsday doing anything more than appearing as co-counsel,
subject to Coughlin having Iinal say in RCR11-063341 as to the allegation oI Couglin
having violated his probation incident to the warrantless aIter 7pm NRS 171.136 violating
arrest by the Department oI Alternative Sentencing on 2/1/13...it seems Lindsay wins
because he gets another check Irom the Bob Bell group, and the RJC wins because it gets
to claim Couglin was given his day in court as to the 2/25/13 Order To Show Cause that
alleged Coughlin had violated the 12/20/12 Administrative Order some Iive times...its really
appalling, Iirst to enter that Administrative Order, as lacking in jurisdiction or anything in
the way oI actual precedent to support what it purports to order, but to then seek to leverage
every alleged 'violation no matter how de minimis, all without complying with NRS
22.030(2) aIIiedavit requirement as to the alleged 'distrubances Coughlin caused in the
RJC Iiling oIIice (there's cameras everywhere, so...iI there is something so dramatic, it
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should be produced...). So, it is really inappropriate Ior Bruce Lindsay to be getting multiple
checks Irom the Bob Bell Group incident to the WCPD and APD being conIlicted out oI
representing Couglin by virtue oI Leslie's TPO/EPO where the same subject matter/ 'case/
'Administrative Order is being rebranded with a diIIerent case number three and Iour
times, particularly where Lindsay showed up twenty minutes late on 3/11/13 (something
Judge CliIton gave Coughlin Iive days in jail Ior on 2/13/12 incident to Coughlin being less
than an hour late to court on 2/12/12, which was the result oI the disorienting eIIect oI
attempting to prepare and Iile the ROA and BrieI in 62337 whilst being wrongIully arrest
on 2/1/13 by DAS, incarcerated until 1 am on 2/5/13 (requiring $500 bail that still has not
been returned by the RJC), then arreste again on 2/8/13 by the RPD and overcharged by
Detective Yturbide (citing to the wrong statute, NRS 200.591, rather than NRS 33.350,
resulting in Couglin being subject to a $5,000 bail), Couglin bailing out at 2 am on 2/9/13,
with the combined eIIect oI those arrest and the concomitant Iorced immediate no titration
cessation oI two psychoactive medications (Wellbutrin and Adderall...unless one want to
comply with the Washoe County Jail's insistence on dosing Wellbutrin at bedtime...where
such medication is known Ior causing sleeplessness and as such would necessarily disturb
one's circadian rhythmns...) and somehow, whereas Lindsay gets a pass Ior being 20
minutes late (not to mention completely unprepared and clueless as to the merits, Iact, and
law, at issue in the various cases he was triple dipping on (getting paid Ior two or three
diIIerent cases by attending one 'combo hearing)..and somehow Judge CliIton issues a
warrant Ior Coughlin's arrest (he alleges he did so at 9:36 am, but the docket indicates it was
at noon) where Couglin arrived just beIore 10:00 am Ior the continuation oI the trial in
065630 that was set to start at 9 am (and which should have never taken place at all given
the plea deal accepted on 8/27/12, Judge CliIton's Iailure to abide by NRS 1.230, .235 upon
Couglin Iiling and having served on his chambers a Motion to DisqualiIy (CliIton ignored
NRS 53.045 and Buckwalter in insisting that the Iact that Coughlin had not presented a
notarized 'aIIidavit the judge was not then compelled to Iollow the procedures (5 days to
Iile a responsive aIIidavit/declaration, etc., etc.) upon Couglin Iiling 'prior to the start oI
trial (it matters not the argument that, ignoring the Iact that RJC Clerk Robbin Baker told
Couglin the trial's start time was moved to 1:30 pm on 12/11/12, regardless, Couglin Iiled
the Motion to DisqualiIy oI 12/11/12 prior to 'the start oI trial (and Tom Viloria's case was
taken up the morning in the RJC anyways, which is why Baker told Couglin the start time
was moved. Regardless reIusing to allow Couglhin to query Baker or subpoena here with
respect to that, such an incident being Couglin's one 'warning not to be late, and Judge
CliIton's dubious insistence that he knew Baker did not tell Couglin that even where Baker
was absent Irom work on 12/11/12 and Cathy Wood later told Coughlin that day that no one
Irom the RJC had called Baker Ior any reason (that and Baker's verge oI tears Ilip Ilopping
to Coughlin on 11/27/12 respecting the Iact that she originally said that she clearly
remembered the Iiligns Coughlin personally gave her Ior Iiling on 11/15/12 both having
discs attached to them...only to minutes later tearIully exclaim 'I'm not talking to you
Zach! upon Couglin conIronting her about the curious about Iace Baker demonstrated aIter
a quick talking to by Cathy Wood and some stern looks (some might say, all oI which
resulted in the 12/20/12 Administrative Order...along with, perhaps, Coughlin's asking
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BailiII Reyes iI, perhaps, there was a bit oI an appearance oI bias incident to Reyes serving
Couglin the TPO Washoe County obtained on behalI oI Reyes's Iellow Washoe County
employee Leslie, on 12/19/12.... NRS 33.350 Penalty Ior intentional violation oI order. A
person who intentionally violates a temporary or extended order Ior protection against
harassment in the workplace is guilty oI a misdemeanor, unless a more severe penalty is
prescribed by law Ior the act that constitutes the violation oI the order. The docket in
071437 claims something that just did not happen...Couglin never asked to have Lindsay
appear on his behalI in the Administrative Order 'matter...and at that 3/5/13 OSC Hearing,
Judge Pearson indicated that 'the Order to Show Cause on the Administrative Matter is
being put into the probation violation case in 11-063341..., which makes no sense given
the subject matter involved in the two have no connection whatsoever, and what really
appears to be the case is that the RJC is unable to control, some might say, the DAS
OIIicers, like Ramos, Irom, ever so suspiciously, summarily arresting Coughlin, every time
Couglin sends an email to the WCDA's OIIice like that oI the very early morning hours oI
2/1/13, resulting in his arrest by DAS less than 24 hours later. But the RJC is clever, as such
it recently in 11-063341 (actually, the docket therein indicates Judge SIerrazza vacated his
judgment as rendered almost immediately aIter making it where the 'obey all laws
requirement was 'closed etc. Iurther, both Judges CliIton in 065630 (the probation Ior
which doesn't even start Ior at least one, iI not two years given the consecutive nature oI the
sentence) and Judge Pearson eliminated the 'no alcohol term oI Couglin's sentence in
063341, and as there never was any 'be subject to search and seizure (and Coughlin
indicated to DAS at the outset that such was his position and that he was not waiving any oI
his rights in that regard...), so DAS perhaps should cease descending upon Coughlin's
home and oIIice and banging on every wall thereoI Ior twenty minutes at a time, angrily
shouting invective in menacing tones, then unplugging the electricity to Coughlin's home
and oIIice, apparently, when Iinally deciding to leave, as was apparently the case on 4/30/13
according to those living near Coughlin. Judge SIerrazza's Administrative Order 2012-01,
oI 12/20/12 (lacking any case number), reads: "ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 2012-01 .
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has been the subject oI disciplinary
hearings beIore the State Bar oI Nevada Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board wherein the
Board Iound Mr. Coughlin "committed mUltiple violations oI the Rules oI ProIessional
conduct" and that Mr. Coughlin "engaged in bad Iaith obstruction oI the disciplinary
process"; and WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has been a party in cases
beIore the Reno Municipal Court including cases beIore the Honorable Dorothy Nash
Holmes and the Honorable Kenneth Howard wherein Mr. Coughlin was held in contempt oI
court Ior Iailing to Iollow the Court's orders and directives; and WHEREAS, ZACHARY
BARKER COUGHLIN has been a party in both civil and criminal matters beIore this Court
including cases beIore the Honorable Peter SIerrazza, the Honorable Scott Pearson, and the
Honorable David CliIton wherein Mr. Coughlin has been admonished Ior Iailing to Iollow
the Court's orders and directive; and WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is
currently the subject oI a Temporary Order Ior Protection against Harassment in the
Workplace requested by the Washoe County Public DeIender's OIIice, his counsel in
several cases beIore this Court; and WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is
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currently the subject oI a Temporary Order Ior Protection Against Harassment in the
Workplace requested by the State Bar oI Nevada based upon Mr. Coughlin's harassing and
disruptive behavior with employees and oIIicers oI the State Bar; and WHEREAS,
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is currently a party in cases beIore this court; and
WHEREAS, citizens, whether or not indigent, have a constitutional right to access to the
courts with the protection oI due process oI law; and WHEREAS, Irivolous or vexatious
claims and deIenses overburden limited judicial resources, hinder the timely resolution oI
meritorious claims and increase the costs oI engaging in business and providing
proIessional services to the public; and WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN
has repeatedly caused a disturbance in the Iiling oIIice oI the Reno Justice Court, disrupted
the orderly business oI the Court and overburdened the limited judicial resources oI this
Court thereby hindering the timely resolution oI meritorious claims and increasing the costs
oI engaging in business and providing proIessional services to the public; and WHEREAS,
"a breach oI the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance in the presence oI the
court, or in its immediate vicinity, tending to interrupt the due course oI the trial or other
judicial proceeding" constitutes contempt oI court in the State oI Nevada; and WHEREAS,
"disobedience or resistance to any lawIul writ, order, rule or process issued by the court or
judge at chambers" constitutes contempt oI court in the State oI Nevada; and WHEREAS,
Nevada's courts are constitutionally authorized to issue all
writs "proper and necessary to the complete exercise oI their jurisdiction." Nev. Const. art.
6, 6(1); and WHEREAS, to protect the peaceIul and eIIective operation oI this Court, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not enter the
premises oI the Reno Justice Court at One South Sierra Street except as Iollows: a. II
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN wishes to Iile a document with the Reno Justice Court
or attend a hearing in the Reno Justice Court he must notiIy the security personnel at the
main security entrance located at the east entrance oI One South Sierra Street and wait Ior a
bailiII oI the Reno justice Court to respond to his location. b. II ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN wishes to make a request oI the Reno Justice Court Ior copies, transcripts,
access to a court Iile or to ask a question he shall do so in writing and either mail the request
to the Reno Justice Court or deliver the written request to a bailiII oI the Reno Justice Court
by Iirst contacting the bailiII through court security as detailed above. The bailiII will then
Iile the document Ior Mr. Coughlin and provide him a Iile stamped copy in return. c. II
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN wishes to attend a Court hearing in the Reno Justice
Court he shall be escorted by a bailiII oI this Court. 2. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN
shall not be present in the exclusive premises oI the Reno Justice Court including the
criminal, civil, citation, or administrative Iacilities located on the Iirst Iloor oI the North
Tower oI One South Sierra Street and the entire area located on the second Iloor oI the
North Tower oI One South Sierra Street without the escort oI a bailiII oI this Court and
without Iirst Iollowing the procedures outlined above. 3. ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN is not allowed to contact any member oI this Court other than a uniIormed
bailiII. 4. II ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is a party to a case he may address the
Court during the Court proceedings. 5. Any violation oI this Order may be considered
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contempt oI court and punished pursuant to NRS Chapter 22 by a Iine oI up to $500 and/or
incarceration Ior up to 25 days in the Washoe County Detention Facility. 6. This Order is
eIIective upon personal service upon Mr. Coughlin." OI course, the RJC had a party purport
to serve that 12/20/12 Administrative Order where BailiII English purports to have
attempted or eIIected service thereoI on 12/20/12 within the courthouse at the Reno Justice
Court. Further, all oI the ProoI oI Service/Return oI Service in 599, 607, 3913, 3914, etc. all
Iail under the requirements oI NRCP 4(c),(d),(g): (c) By Whom Served. Process shall be
served by the sheriII oI the county where the deIendant is Iound, or by a deputy, or by any
person who is not a party and who is over 18 years oI age, except that a subpoena may be
served as provided in Rule 45; where the service oI process is made outside oI the United
States, aIter an order oI publication, it may be served either by any person who is not a party
and who is over 18 years oI age or by any resident oI the country, territory, colony or
province, who is not a party and who is over 18 years oI age. (d) Summons: Personal
Service. The summons and complaint shall be served together. The plaintiII shall Iurnish
the person making service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made by
delivering a copy oI the summons attached to a copy oI the complaint as Iollows:... (6)
Service Upon Individuals. In all other cases to the deIendant personally, or by leaving
copies thereoI at the deIendant`s dwelling house or usual place oI abode with some person
oI suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or by delivering a copy oI the summons
and complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service oI
process. ... (g) Return. The person serving the process shall make prooI oI service thereoI to
the court promptly and in any event within the time during which the person served must
respond to the process. ProoI oI service shall be as Iollows:...(4) The written admission oI
the deIendant....In case oI service otherwise than by publication, the certiIicate or aIIidavit
shall state the date, place and manner oI service. Failure to make prooI oI service shall not
aIIect the validity oI the service. See 60302 and Garins' 11/15/12 Motion to Dismiss
therein: '4. DeIendants Actual Notice Does Not Constitute Service Any assertion by
PlaintiII that DeIendant has actual notice oI this lawsuit, and knowledge oI this case excuses
service oI the summons and complaint, misses the point. The Nevada Supreme Court has
long acknowledged that notice oI a litigation is not a substitute Ior proper service oI
process. C.H.A Venture v. G.C. Wallace Consulting Engineers, Inc., 794 P.2d 707, 709
(Nev. 1990). In eIIect, DeIendant's notice oI this litigation does not excuse PlaintiII's non-
service on DeIendant. Note that the 'ProoI oI Service Ior the 1/12/12 NRS 200.591
'Stalking/Harassment TPO Richard G. Hill, Esq., obtained Irom the RJC is signed by RJC
BailiII Plamondon. NRS 4.230 Docket: Entries; Iorm. 1. Every justice must keep a
docket, in which the justice must enter: (a) The title oI every action or proceeding.
(b) The object oI the action or proceeding; and iI a sum oI money be claimed, the amount
thereoI. (c) The date oI the summons, and the time oI its return; and iI an order to arrest
the deIendant be made, or a writ oI attachment be issued, a statement oI the Iact. (d) The
time when the parties, or either oI them, appear, or their nonappearance, iI deIault be made;
a minute oI the pleadings and motions; iI in writing, reIerring to them; iI not in writing, a
concise statement oI the material parts oI the pleading. The RJC's BailiII Reyes and ChieI
Civil Clerk Christine Erickson have reIused to provide Coughlin a docket in Rev11-1492
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and Rev11-1708, citing to JCRRT rule requiring 'typewritten pleadings, despite the
inapplicability oI JCRRT to 'landlord tenant matters as indicate in JCRRT Rule 3. Further,
Coughlin has had Reyes reIuse to take requests Couglin has submitted Ior Iiling Ior dockets
and copies oI the JAVS audio oI the 1/4/13 hearing in RCP12-607, and whether 'deIault be
made therein is key...particularly given that NRS 33.270 requires more than a deIault, it
requires to applicant prove (probably by the same 'clear and convicing evidence standard
CaliIornia uses, that set Iorth therein...not simply enter a deIault upon some alleged 'Iailure
to appear by Coughlin, especially where teh 12/26/12 ProoI oI Service by RJC BailiII
English is deIicient and violative oI courthouse sanctuary and attorney litigant
privilege/immunity Irom service oI process in the courthouse (the same deIicieny which
beIalls Baker's attempts to personally serve Couglhin on 9/27/11 the 5 Day UnlawIul
Detainer Notice in 1708. (e) Every adjournment, stating on whose application and to
what time. (I) The demand Ior a trial by jury, when the same is made, and by whom
made, the order Ior the jury, and the time appointed Ior the return oI the jury and Ior the
trial.... (this is somewhat is dispute in 1708, though the title oI Coughlin's 10/11/11 Iiling
therein does contain the words 'Demand Ior Jury Trial...which is problematic considering
that Judge SIerrazza denied Couglin a jury trial, despite Couglin timely makign such a
demand under NRCP 38 (see NRS 40.400), which was prior to the 10/13/11 'Eviction
Decision and Order 'setting the matter over Ior Trial on 10/25/11 should Couglin deposit
some $2,275 in rent escrow pursuant to NRS 118A.355(5), even though Couglin always
maintained he was entitled to an application oI NRS 118A.360's Iix and deduct dictates, in
additon to the set oIIs inuring to Coughlin under NRS 118A.390, 118A.510, NRS
118A.290, and NRS 118A.355(2). (i) The judgment oI the court, speciIying the costs
included, and the time when rendered. (j) The issuing oI the execution, when issued and
to whom; the renewals thereoI, iI any, and when made, and a statement oI any money paid
to the justice, when and by whom. (k) The receipt oI a notice oI appeal, iI any be given,
and oI the appeal bond, iI any be Iiled. (this is a bit oI an issue in RCR11-063341 and
RCR13-071437 as to the Iilings and order oI and around 3/11/13).
Personal service oI summons--Authority or capacity to serve
Service oI summons attempted to be made by plaintiII's attorney held void (Rev. Laws,
5022, 5474). Nevada Cornell Silver Mines v. Hankins, 1929, 279 P. 27, 51 Nev. 420.
XXI. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL.
See also CONSTITUTIONAL LA W ;;::~4646.
90S. Nature and scope oI remedy oI new trial in general.
906. Constitutional and statutory provisions as to new trial.
907. Right oI prosecution to new trial.
908. Right oI accused to new trial.
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909. In general.
910. --CodeIendants.
911.
Discretion oI court as to new trial.
912.
Successive applications Ior new trial.
912.S. Necessity oI objections or exceptions at
trial in general.
913. Grounds Ior new trial in general. (1). In general. (2). DisqualiIication or prejudice oI
judge or oIIicers at trial. (3). Absence oI witness.
(4). Imposition oI improper sentence. (S). Want oI capacity to commit crime. (6). Former
conviction Ior same oIIense.
914. Errors and irregularities in preliminary proceedings.
91S. DeIects in indictment or inIormation as ground Ior new trial.
916. Want oI preparation.
917. ReIusal oI continuance. (1). In general. (2). Absence oI witness.
918. Errors and irregularities in conduct oI trial.
(1). In general.
(2). Irregularities aIIecting witnesses. (3). Summoning, impaneling, and oath
oI jury ..
(4). ProoI oI corpus delicti. (5). Remarks by judge.
(6). Failure to appoint counsel Ior accused.
(7). Trial without plea.
(8). Temporary absence oI judge.
(9). Absence oI deIendant or counsel.
(10). Objections and exceptions at trial.
919. Misconduct oI counsel Ior prosecution. (1). In general.
(2). In examination oI witnesses.
(3). In argument in general.
(4). Comments on deIendant's Iailure to testiIy.
(5). Objections and exceptions.
920.
Incompetency or neglect oI counsel Ior deIense.
921.
Rulings on evidence.
922.
Instructions and Iailure or reIusal to instruct
. .(1). In general.
(2). Failure to give proper instructions.
(3). Giving erroneous instructions.
(4). Construction or eIIect oI instruction.
(S). Harmless error.
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(6). Instructions aIter sbmission oI case.
923. Competency oI jurors and challenges.
(1). In general:
(2). Previous opinion, prejudice, or declaration.
(3). Alienage'.
(4). Relationship. (
5). Age oI juror.
(6). ,Physical disability.
(7). Member oI previous jury. (8). Member oI grand jury; (9). Necessity oI objections at trial.
924.) Miscondllct oI or aIIecting jurors. 92S. --In general. (1). In general. (2). Misconduct oI
prosecuting witness. (4). Taking notes oI evidence. (S). Improper inIluence inducing
agreement to verdict.
925.5. --Considering matters not in evidence. (1). In general. (2). Visiting or viewing place oI
crime. (3). Statements by jurors during deliberation. (4). Access to ot reading newspapers. (S).
Access to or reading law books.
926. --Use oI intoxicating liquors.
927. --Separation. (1). In general. (2). Separation aIter submission oI case. (3). Separation
aIter agreement or rendition oI inIormal verdict. (4). Separation by consent oI court or
counsel. (S). Presumptions and burden oI prooI as to eIIect oI separation.
928. --Communications by or with jurors.
929. --Misconduct oI oIIicer
930. --Misconduct oI bystanders;
931. Necessity oI objection at trial.
932. --EIIect as to result.
933. Irregularities or deIects in verdict as ground Ior new trial.
934. Verdict contrary to law.
935. Verdict contrary to evidence. (.S). In general. (1). Weight and suIIiciency oI evidence in
general. ' (2). Failure oI prooI. (3). Objections and exceptions. 936. Surprise, accident,
inadvertence, or mistake. (1). In general. (2). Mistake oI counsel. (3). Absence oI witness or
counsel. (4). Surprise as to testimony oI witness. (5). Time Ior raising question. (6). EIIect oI
Iailure to ask continuance or postponement.
937. Newly discovered evidence. 938. In general. (1). In general. (2). What constitutes newly
discovered evidence in general. (3). Facts within knowledge oI deIendant. (4). Further or
other testimony oI Iormer witness. (5). Witness rendered competent since trial. (6). Showing
mistake at trial.
939. --Diligence. (1). In general. (2). In procuring absent witnesses. (3). Failure to ascertain
knowledge oI witness. (4). Failure to ask continuance.
940. --Materiality.
941. Cumulative evidence. (1). In general. (2). What is cumulative evidence.
942. --Impeachment oI witness. (1). In general. (2). Contradictory statements by witness.
943. --ConIlicting or contradicted evidence .
944. Credibility.
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945. SuIIiciency and probable eIIect. (.5). In general. (1). Probable eIIect oI new evidence, in
general.. (2). Particular evidence or cases.
946. Waiver oI right to new trial. 947. New trial on court's own motion. 948. Application Ior
new trial. ' 948.1. In general. 949. --.Form and requisites in general. (1). In general. (2).
VeriIication. (3). Amended and supplemental motions.
950. Jurisdiction.
951. Time Ior making. (1). In general. (2). BeIore judgment or sentence. (3). In vacation. (4).
At term oI conviction. (5). At subsequent term. (6). Amended motion.
952. Parties.
953. Notice.
954. Statement oI grounds. (1). In general. (2). Competency oI jurors. (3). Misconduct oI or
aIIecting jurors. (4). Rulings on evidence. (5). Instructions. (6). Verdict contrary to law or
evidence. (7). Scope oI assignment.
955. --Bill oI exceptions or statement oI case. (.5). In general. (1). Necessity Ior bill oI
exceptions. (2). SuIIiciency. (3). BrieI oI evidence.
956. AIIidavits and other prooIs in general. (1). In general. (2). Necessity Ior aIIidavits in
general. (3). Counter aIIidavits. (4). SuIIiciency oI prooIs in general. (5). Absence oI witness.
(6). Absence oI judge. (7). Incompetency or neglect oI counsel Ior deIense. (8).
DisqualiIication oI jurors in general. (9). Presumptions and burden oI prooI as to
disqualiIication oI jurors. (10). SuIIiciency oI prooIs as to disqualiIication oI jurors. (11).
Misconduct oI or aIIecting jurors in gen(!ral. (12). Presumptions and burden oI prooI as to
misconduct oI or aIIecting jurors. (13). SuIIiciency oI prooIs as to misconduct aIar aIIecting
jurors.
957. Statements, aIIidavits, and testimony oI jurors. (1). In general. (2). Denying or
explaining assent to verdict. (3). Misconduct oI jurors, in general. .;(4). Separation oI jury.
(5). Consideration by jury oI matters not in evidence. (6). Misconduct oI others aIIecting
jurors.
958. AIIidavits and evidence as to newly discovered evidence. (1). In general. (2). AIIidavit
by deIendant or his counsel. (3). AIIidavit as to diligence. (4). AIIidavit oI proposed witness.
(5). Counter aIIidavits. (6). SuIIiciency oI prooIs in general.
959. --Hearing and rehearing in general.
960. Presence oI accused at hearing.
961. Determination.
962. Grant oI new trial ineIIectual or not beneIicial.
964. Order granting or reIusing new trial.
965. Proceedings at new trial.
XXII. ARREST OF JUDGMENT.
966. Nature and scope oI remedy by arr
'video evidence.... the court, on its own, may order a new trial Ior any reason that would
justiIy granting one on a party`s motion.
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Sent: Fri 10/28/11 3:09 AM
To: psIerrazzawashoecounty.us; cdbakerrichardhillaw.com
Dear Judge SIerrazza and Counselor Baker,
The video materials that I sought to introduced at trial, but was denied an opportunity to are
stored at the Iollowing link:
https://skydrive.live.com/?
scdocuments&cid43084638I32I5I28#cid43084638F32F5F28&id43084638F32F5F28!
452
The Reno Justice Court Iiling oIIice indicated they had diIIiculties processing materials such
as these, so I am linking them in this email to preserve them Ior my appeal. Judge SIerrazza, I
do wish to preserve Ior appeal the many issues I pointed out, including Counselor Bakers
very, very unIortunate decision to introduce an exact dollar Iigure Irom a settlement
negotiation (the stairs). To Iurther muddy the waters, the dollar Iigure was not even related to
what was ultimately done to the stairs. The high quality photos at the link reveal a much
diIIerent approach than the make shiIt repatching oI the concrete/mortar patching that had
already Iailed. It would seem Counselor Baker's approach was unduly prejudicial and,
unIortunately, probably resulted in a waste oI everyone's time as a new trial will likely be
required in light oI the extreme prejudice to my case caused by Counselor Baker's abominable
decision to introduce conIidential settlement negotiations and exact Iigures into evidence
during, essentially, the closing minutes oI the "Trial". Contempt such as that, committed in
the court's presence, needs no 21 day saIe harbor a la Rule 11, and certainly NRS 22 may
come into play. In that regard:
JCRCP RULE 59. NEW TRIALS; AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENTS...
'FP/ FINANCIAL INQUIRY APPLICATION From: Zach Coughlin
(zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Wed 12/14/11 12:22 AM To: ballarddreno.gov;
renomunirecordsreno.gov 2 attachments Coughlin IFP and Financial Inquiry Application
RMC 11222011 11 CR 26405 2I.pdI (381.9 KB) , Coughlin IFP and Financial Inquiry
Application RMC 1122211 11 CR 2217 2I.pdf (372. KB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
Iax: 949 667 7402 ZachCoughlinhotmail.com
Aevada Bar Ao: 9473
Ms. Ballard, Please note, the gentleman I worked with at the Iiling oIIice counter today
inIormed me there were no appeal Iees, bonds, or other charges that I could pay (including
transcription costs) as "all charges are being taken Irom" my bail in the respective matters.
Please email me the audio Irom the November 20th,2011 Trial in 11 cr 22176 2I and prooI oI
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service oI any Contempt Order or Guilty Verdict/Order in that matter. Please Iile this as well
as a Opposition to Any Motion to Continue Trial in 11 cr 26405, dept 2, and a Motion to Set
Aside or Vacate any Order Granting Continuance in response to such an Order Granting
Continuance. Please email, Iax, or mail me a copy oI the Notice oI Appearances by both
Taitel and Puentes and the Motion and Order Granting Withdrawal oI Taitel, iI it exists. I
would like a copy oI the docket in both 11 CR 26405 2I and 11 CR 22176, despite your
inIorming me today that I would need to subpoena the docket to have any chance oI seeing it
and that I would not be provided access to documents in the public record, including Orders
in both oI these cases. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin
King and the Panel's attempts to assert some Iraud on Coughlin's part or Iailure to
identiIy himselI as a lawyer in the unnamed IFP's mentioned in the 8/23/12 Complaint are
tantamount to Iraud themselves (with a last ditch eIIort to pull in language Irom the 12/15/11
Order allgedly by RMC Judge Gardner recharacterizing the accusation as 'Iailure to identiIy
any income Irom the practice oI law, which, is not true (Coughlin did, including it under the
umbrella oI his being a selI employed 'jack oI all trades). Clearly the 'page 1 oI 3 oI
Coughlin's 3/7/12 IFP reveals Coughlin identiIied himselI therein as an attorney, yet King
excised it Irom his Exhibit. Then, the above email clearly reIutes any allegation that
Coughlin Iailed to identiIy himselI as an attorney in either the IFP in 26405 or 22176, with a
special note oI the misstatement oI the date such was submitted in the 12/15/11 Order in
22176 (FHE 10), where such is noted as being submitted on November 14
th
, 2011, where,
actually, the correct date is 12/14/11, as evinced by the Iile stamping thereon and the Iilign by
email listed above which the RMC's Ballard (she oI the quasi-certiIications on the various
exhibits) expressly permitted Coughlin to utilize in submitting Iilings.
During RJC Clerk Jonas's testimony on 12/20/11 she indicates that on 11/22/11
Coughlin appeared in the Iiling oIIice an indicated 'he wasn't ready to set the matter Ior
hearing (reIerring to setting a hearing on Coughlin's 11/16/11 Motinon to Contest Personal
Property Lien. Coughlin, having just returned Irom the second Iloor check in area oI the RJC,
where he presented prior to the time set Ior hearing to RJC ChieI BailiIIr Sexton on
November 22
nd
2011 (being inIormed by ChieI Sexton that Richard G. Hill, Esq., nor Casey
D. Baker, Esq., were there, and that the hearing had been 'cancelled because neither Hill nor
Baker showed up. One can be quite sure that had it been the oththin a summary eviction
proceeding...its just that it must be conducted, pursuant to NRS 40.253(6), in a manner
consistent with the plenary unlawIul detainer procedural dictates Iound in NRS 40.290 to
Further, there is nothing in any statute or court rule about Coughlin needed to
'cooperate with the court in setting the hearing. Indeed, Packet 11, containing the
intructions Ior Form #22 Irom the standardized Iorms the Nevada Supreme Court holds out to
the public (though, there is likely a disclaimer, and obviously, one should not ask Ior $18,000
in attorney's Iees Ior a summary eviction when using so many Iorms) states:
NRS 40.253(8) required the RJC to hold a hearing within 10 days oI Coughlin's
11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien. The RJC holds hearings all the time
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where litigants Iail to appear, issuing deIaults in the majority oI instances (see the 3/15/12
hearing in 374 where Coughlin was notiIied oI such hearing by voice mail):
NRS 40.253(8): '8.Upon the Iiling oI a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court
shall schedule a hearing on the motion. The hearing must be held within 1 days
after the filing of the motion. The court shall affix the date of the hearing to the
motion and order a copy served upon the landlord by the sheriff, constable or other
process server. At the hearing, the court may:
(a)Determine the costs, iI any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460
or 118C.230 and any accumulating daily costs; and
(b)Order the release oI the tenant`s property upon the payment oI the charges
determined to be due or iI no charges are determined to be due.
'WHAT HAPPENS NEXT? The Justice Court clerk should accept your Motion upon
payment oI applicable Iees, iI any. The clerk will either give your hearing date immediately or
will notiIy you later oI the hearing date. Ask the clerk how long this will take or what you
should do to Iind out the hearing date as quickly as possible. Under NRS 40.253(8), the
hearing Apartment 7 oI 7 Tenant Instructions Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien and
Ior Return oI Personal Property, AIIidavit/Declaration In Support oI Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien and Ior Return oI Personal Property, and Order Ior Hearing ReIers to
Form #20, #21 & #22 2006 Nevada Supreme Court Revised: April 14, 2006 date must be
within ten (10) judicial days1 oI the day you Iiled the Motion. The court will tell you how to
notiIy your landlord oI the hearing date. At the hearing, the court will decide what happens to
your property. While you are at the hearing and in Iront oI the judge, ask the landlord Ior a
time to pick up the property. DO NOT MISS THE HEARING! II you Iail to attend your
hearing, you will probably lose any chance oI getting your property back. At the hearing,
explain to the judge why the landlord`s Iees are excessive or why the landlord should not be
allowed to withhold your property. The judge will decide what, iI anything, you must pay
beIore receiving your property back. pages 5 to 7 oI Packet 11, instructions to Form 22 Irom
Nevada Supreme Court site Ior landlord tenant Iorms.
'Nev. JCRCP RULE 104. NOTICE OF HEARING
Prior to the holding oI a hearing Ior summary eviction, the justice
shall determine the method oI service oI notice oI the hearing on both
parties. The date oI service oI the notice shall be calculated to aIIord the
parties suIIicient opportunity to prepare their cases and be present at the
hearing. A justice court may enact rules requiring landlords to provide
additional inIormation to tenants on the notice oI eviction, and such rules
shall not be subject to the provisions oI Rule 83.
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There has been no citation by the RJC or Hill or Baker to support this contention that
'Coughlin Iailed to cooperated with the RJC in setting the hearing (actually, that is not true,
Coughlin did cooperate, but the RJC seemingly gives Hill and Baker better treatment than it
does tenant's like Coughlin, as leaving a voice mail Ior Coughlin is all the notice the RJC ever
provided Coughlin Ior most hearings, and Coughlin responded to ChieI Clerk Stancil's written
notice oI the hearing, and in no way reIused to have the matter so set. Upon recieving
indication Irom Hill that the hearing was set Ior 11/22/11, Coughlin promptly notiIied the
RJC that he was aware oI the setting, and even indicated he was looking Iorward to getting his
wallet, state issued identiIication (driver's license), and client's Iiles at the hearing should Hill
and or Baker live up to Hill's alleged oIIer to bring them to the hearing set Ior 11/22/11.
location.
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 2:07 PM
iI you don't contact them, you won't get a hearing & your stuII will just stay where it is until
late december, because our schedule is blocked until then.
325-6501
rgh
'Our conversation
location.
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 2:21 PM
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Rgh
'River rock
location.
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 2:51 PM
Rgh
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 3:13 PM Civil
Dear R1C, Ms. Stancil:
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
I do have a Iax number, but I would preIer iI you didn't use it because it is somewhat tied to
the computers that Richard Hill is applying what I believe to be an unlawIul rent distraint to.
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I don't really have a reliable temporary phone number. Richard Hill refuses to give me back
my state issued identification, wallet, cell phone, keys, etc. (I also need my client files
very badly, for their sake and mine).
Dear Mr. Hill,
Usually courts send some notice in writing about hearings, not have the opposing attorney
claim there is one in an email, nor allow the opposing attorney to condition his return of
someone's state issued identification and or exigent client materials and law practice
equipment upon the other attoreny assenting to a waiver of the notice and service
requirements applicable to the matter....What rules apply to procedural notice requirements
in these cases? Aothing in 1CRR1 according to 1CRR1 Rule 2, not much found in ARS
4 or 118a. 1CRCP R 83 forbids the "house rules" that you seek to take advantage of,
where they are neither published nor approved by the AJ S. Ct.....plus you have Iorbidden
me to get my mail Irom the property (and you have even attempted to get me arrested and
threatened to do so Ior my standing in public places not really doing much oI anything) and
the USPS probably has not processed my change oI address yet. I need to get my property,
not help you circumvent the procedural protection oI notice and service oI hearings. I know,
you are so used to some people bending over backwards to help you get things done quickly
that you get all crabby and tuckered out when you actually have to role up your sleeves and
do work. But, just relax, get yourselI a juicebox and a Lunchable or something, and take it
one thing at a time....like Iind a basis Ior notice Ior these hearings, etc....make sure that it
doesn't stem Irom some unpublished, unapproved by the N. S. Ct. "house rule" oI the RJC,
and lets go Irom there. In the meantime, get some inIormed consent Irom your client, because
that SchiII case puts your client in danger oI losing his house over a retaliatory reIusal to
stand behind a couple hundred bucks oI rent deductions he agreed to or to Iail to Iollow the
notice oI inspection provisions he agree to in writing in the Lease Agreement.
Again, I have a standing caveat in this case that I will not respond to or reIute every baseless
allegation or attempt at recounting Iacts that you make in writing or otherwise, it would just
be too burdensome. So all your "this email memorializes, whatever, whatever," you can save.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Licensed in Nevada
Coughlin even Iollowed up on that written indication to the RJC that he was aware that
the hearing on his 11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property lien was on calendar and set
Ior 9:30 am on 11/22/11 and that Hill and Baker were noticed on it, with another written
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correspondence shortly theraIter, noting the importance oI Hill living up to his promise to
provide Coughlin his client's Iiles and driver's license at the 11/22/11 hearing:
'supersedeas bond
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 8:46 PM
Ms. Stancil,
Thank You,"
'From: zachcoughlinhotmail.com
To: rhillrichardhillaw.com; cdbakerrichardhillaw.com
Subject: my temporary contact inIormation
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 03:54:46 -0800
My temporary address is Silver Dollar Motor Lodge at 817 N. Virginia St., Reno NV 89501.
Please Iorward any mail that belongs to me to that address. I have a change oI address with
the USPS that is being processed, but some mail may have made it to 121 River Rock in the
meantime. Richard G. Hill, Esq. is withholding my cell phone, my registered contact number
oI 775 338 8118, but I have a temporary cell oI 775 229 6737. this email is the best way to
reach me currently. Please let me know by email asap when I can get me property Irom 121
River Rock and any amounts I must pay to get at least my:
1. wallet with state issued id
2. phone
3. materials necessary to my legal practice
4. any other property.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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'getting my property
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 1:02 PM
To: rhillrichardhillaw.com; cdbakerrichardhillaw.com
Dear Mr. Hill and Mr. Baker,
I am writing to check in with you and see iI you will allow me to get anything Irom the 121
River Rock property today. I cannot stress enough how much you are damaging my
business, and my client's affairs minute by minute. Your "suggestions" that I address
the back porch first show a completely callous disregard for my clients rights. Further,
I believe you are committing a crime by withholding my wallet and state issued
identification. Let's just resolve this. I believe the wallet is in the basement, perhaps on the
hanging table by the mattress. The phone is likely nearby that. There are a couple oI phones.
Further, I need all three scanner/printer type devices, both laptops, various power cords, the
desktop, all my monitors (both upstairs and in the basement), I also need to get my Iamilies
mementoes and heirlooms and anything connected to my law practice, right away. It is not
that I am abandoning anything else, its that I have exigent client needs that must be
addressed. You try running your liIe without your ID card and bank card, it is not easy. I
checked the phone number I gave you, and received no messages Irom either oI you, nor did I
receive any emails. I Ieel it would be more prudent Ior me to go to the property and avoid
you or your agents handling any oI my Iragile property or conIidential client Iiles. II you
want someone to supervise, that is Iine, but I dont' have a photographic memory and cannot
just write to you with exact inIormation related to everythign I need to get on an exigent basis
and include exact location inIormation. I don't see my stuII as "junk" as you have
characterized it, however, I believe NRS 40.460 addresses how you may protect your clients
interests, and it speaks to what you may do aIter 30 days have passes, not all the busybody,
nosy, hall monitor "conditions" and "hoops" you would love to make me jump through
pursuant to your Iantastical interpretation oI the statute, assuming you ever even read it,
which, considering Mr. Baker's asking the court Ior some $20K in attorneys Iees in a
summary eviction proceeding where no allegations oI controlled substances manuIacture
where ever made, despite Baker's citing to NRS 40.253(3), and where NRS 69.030 only
allows Ior prevailing party Iees in "civil actions", which, under JCRCP 3 are distinct Irom
eviction matters., is not that likely.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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location.
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 2:07 PM
iI you don't contact them, you won't get a hearing & your stuII will just stay where it is until
late december, because our schedule is blocked until then.
325-6501
rgh
'Our conversation
location.
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 2:21 PM
Rgh
'River rock
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location.
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 2:51 PM
Rgh
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 3:13 PM
Dear RJC, Ms. Stancil:
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
I do have a Iax number, but I would preIer iI you didn't use it because it is somewhat tied to
the computers that Richard Hill is applying what I believe to be an unlawIul rent distraint to.
I don't really have a reliable temporary phone number. Richard Hill reIuses to give me back
my state issued identiIication, wallet, cell phone, keys, etc. (I also need my client Iiles very
badly, Ior their sake and mine).
Dear Mr. Hill,
Usually courts send some notice in writing about hearings, not have the opposing attorney
claim there is one in an email, nor allow the opposing attorney to condition his return oI
someone's state issued identiIication and or exigent client materials and law practice
equipment upon the other attoreny assenting to a waiver oI the notice and service
requirements applicable to the matter....What rules apply to procedural notice requirements in
these cases? Nothing in JCRRT according to JCRRT Rule 2, not much Iound in NRS 40 or
118a. JCRCP R 83 Iorbids the "house rules" that you seek to take advantage oI, where they
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are neither published nor approved by the NV S. Ct.....plus you have Iorbidden me to get my
mail Irom the property (and you have even attempted to get me arrested and threatened to do
so Ior my standing in public places not really doing much oI anything) and the USPS
probably has not processed my change oI address yet. I need to get my property, not help you
circumvent the procedural protection oI notice and service oI hearings. I know, you are so
used to some people bending over backwards to help you get things done quickly that you get
all crabby and tuckered out when you actually have to role up your sleeves and do work. But,
just relax, get yourselI a juicebox and a Lunchable or something, and take it one thing at a
time....like Iind a basis Ior notice Ior these hearings, etc....make sure that it doesn't stem Irom
some unpublished, unapproved by the N. S. Ct. "house rule" oI the RJC, and lets go Irom
there. In the meantime, get some inIormed consent Irom your client, because that SchiII case
puts your client in danger oI losing his house over a retaliatory reIusal to stand behind a
couple hundred bucks oI rent deductions he agreed to or to Iail to Iollow the notice oI
inspection provisions he agree to in writing in the Lease Agreement.
Again, I have a standing caveat in this case that I will not respond to or reIute every baseless
allegation or attempt at recounting Iacts that you make in writing or otherwise, it would just
be too burdensome. So all your "this email memorializes, whatever, whatever," you can save.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
'RE: River rock
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 3:15 PM
To: rhillrichardhillaw.com
Rich, you are aware that "Iiles" can include things on hard drives, right?
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
'RE: River rock
location.
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 3:27 PM
and the hearing status...............??
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location.
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 3:30 PM
To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com; cdbakerrichardhillaw.com; kstancilwashoecounty.us
ms stancil - if mr coughlin does not want the hearing prayed for in his motion, that is his
decision.
we are available.
please let us know the court's decision on whether or not to proceed tomorrow at 9:30
we would like to proceed, so that there is at least a record.
regards
rgh
348-0888
'RE: Merliss v. Coughlin
location.
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 4:24 PM
To: 'Casey Baker' (cdbakerrichardhillaw.com); zachcoughlinhotmail.com
mr coughlin - what is wrong with you?
you ask for a hearing and then refuse to agree to have it?
does that sound like a responsible attorney to you?
if we are wrong - let's go see the judge, he'll know what to do to us.
if you are right, this ouught to be a cakewalk for you
told you - wallet at hearing
no hearing, lien stays in place
your call.
rgh
'River rock
location.
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 4:28 PM
Cc: 'Casey Baker' (cdbakerrichardhillaw.com)
Mr coughlin - the court advises the hearing is oII - because oI your lack oI
cooperation.
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See you in december, I'm busy
Rgh
''supersedeas bond
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 8:46 PM
Ms. Stancil,
Thank You,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
'RE: temporary address change and instruction to pursue a continuance
From: Goodnight, Joseph W (JGoodnightwashoecounty.us) You moved this message to its
current location.
Sent: Tue 11/22/11 1:39 PM
Mr. Coughlin,
The pre-trial hearing is next Monday, November 28, 2011 at 8:30 a.m. Please arrive at 8:15
a.m. I'm sorry, but I don't see good cause Ior a continuance and can't request one without
such. You were notiIied oI the hearing in court on October 26 by tear-out and again on
November 11 by email. Your circumstances do not warrant a continuance as you've provided
no reason why you cannot attend court.
Regarding your document request; again, I believe I have provided you with everything in
your Iile that you are entitled to.
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Sincerely,
Joe Goodnight
**********************************************************
Joseph W. Goodnight
Deputy Public DeIender
(775) 337-4839
jgoodnightwashoecounty.us
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain conIidential
inIormation intended Ior the speciIied individual (s) only. II you are not the intended recipient
or an agent responsible Ior delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notiIied that
you have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the
taking oI any action based on the contents oI this inIormation is strictly prohibited.
From: Zach Coughlin |mailto:zachcoughlinhotmail.com|
Sent: Monday, November 21, 2011 3:44 PM
To: Goodnight, Joseph W
Subject: temporary address change and instruction to pursue a continuance
Dear Mr. Goodnight.
I have been evicted and perhaps subject to an illegal lockout and unlawIul rent distraint by
Richard G. Hill, Esq., who is withholding my state issued indentiIication, wallet, and all
materials necessary to my law practice. I am instructing you to pursue a continuance oI the
upcoming hearing, I cannot even access when that hearing is. Please contact DDA Young in
writing to request one, and Iailing his assent Iile a Motion Ior Continuance with the court.
Dear RJC, Ms. Stancil:
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
Richard G. Hill, Esq. is withholding my phone as well. Email is the best way to get ahold oI
me.
Further contributing to the need Ior a continuance is your Iailure to provide the materials I
requested oI you in writing and in a FOIA request.
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Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Further, beyond the Iact that the $2,275 10/17/11 rent escrow deposit by Coughlin that
Coughlin did not receive back Irom the RJC until 11/16/11 more than covered the $250
statutorily set appeal bond, ditto the NRS 40.385 supersedeas bond, and the $216.00 District
Court Iiling Iee (the RJC waived its $24 Iiling Iee), Coughlin was reIused on several
occasions by the RJC (including Clerk Christine Erickson and Cheryl) in his attempts to
deposit the $250 required by NRS 40.385:
'42 usc 1983 violation again by Sexton? Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
11/23/11 To: kstancilwashoecounty.us, stuttlewashoecounty.us From: Zach Coughlin
(zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Wed 11/23/11 11:19 PM To:
kstancilwashoecounty.us; stuttlewashoecounty.us This time overly aggressive
comments Iocusing on my "butt", said in a hostile, domineering way. Interesting that the
comments revolved around my "butt". I will settle this matter Ior $25,000, but that oIIer is
only available Ior the next 14 days. Further, I was reIused in my attempts to pay in any and all
Iees, bonds, costs, etc. required oI me in this case and again reIused in my attempts to Iile
papers, in direct contravention oI the numerous Nevada Supreme Court decisions I have cited
to you previously. I would think that a negligent hiring, training, and supervision cause oI
action would be strengthened by the various previous written complaints I have sent you.
Please provide a copy oI this complaint to Mr. Sexton's supervisor and I request that a copy oI
it be placed in Mr. Sexton's personnel Iile. Zach Coughlin, Esq. 121 River Rock St. Reno, NV
89501 775 338 8118 Licensed in Nevada
'denied Iiling? Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) 11/23/11 To:
kstancilwashoecounty.us, stuttlewashoecounty.us From: Zach Coughlin
(zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Wed 11/23/11 3:30 PM To:
kstancilwashoecounty.us; stuttlewashoecounty.us Dear Mr. Tuttle and Ms. Stancil,
I walked into the Iiling oIIice yesterday at 4:56 pm, oIIicial PST time, and approached the
counter to Iile a number oI documents and pay a Iee. Initially the clerk took my documents,
but several minutes later Mr. Sexton came over and grunted out his legal opinion about the
Whitman and Sullivan cases vis a vis Nevada black letter law on Iiling oIIice clerk's duties
and told me to leave. The clerk reIused to even mark my documents as received or otherwise
validate my attempts to access justice.
'supersedeas bond? Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) 11/21/11 To:
kstancilwashoecounty.us From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent:
Mon 11/21/11 8:46 PM To:kstancilwashoecounty.us Ms. Stancil, I may be unable to
post the supersedeas bond in time iI I am not provided my wallet, state issued, identiIcation,
etc. by mr. Hill. Further law oI the case applies to Judge SIerrazza's earlier determinatino oI
the amount, and under JCRCP 73 and nrs 40.380 its not clear what the bond should be, iI any,
as well as whether the execution should have been stayed during the period Judge SIerrazza
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continued to hold the $2,275. I seek clariIication Irom you and the RJC. Thank You, Zach
Coughlin, Esq. 121 River Rock St. Reno, NV 89501 775 338 8118 Licensed in Nevada
Judge Sattler's 1/3/13 Order in CR13-0552 reads: 'ORDER The Court is in receipt oI
an "Emereency Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamaus (sic) and IPFMOTION and Declaration oI
Poverty" (hereinaIter, "the document")(emphasis and varying Iont in theoriginal) Iile stamped
April 2, 2013. The document in question Iails to state a rational claim upon which the Court
can rule. Further, the document does not direct the Court to the Iactual and/or legal grounds
upon which the document should be considered. Indeed, the Court is unclear what is ber way
around, a deIault would have been granted against Coughlin. Next, Coughlin went to the
RJC Iiling oIIice, and indicated to Ms. Jonas that he believed a deIault should be entered
against Baker's client, landlord Merliss, and that he intended to move Ior such, whereupon
Clerk Jonas indicated that she would like to set the matter Ior hearing, whereupon Coughlin
indicated ChieI Civil Clerk Stancil had already done so, and that it was set Ior 9:30 am on
November 22
nd
, 2011, and that neither Hill not Baker showed up, and thereIore, Coughlin
should be issued a deIault Order. Coughlin indicated to Jonas that, beyond that, the RJC has
never needed Coughlin, nor any tenant's 'permission to set any hearing, and, in Iact,
individuals like Christine Erickson oIten seem to attempt to set hearings prior to even the 5
days to Iile a tenant's answer expiring (on top oI requiring tenants to Iile the notices that the
landlord's must themselves Iile as jurisdicitonal prerequisites to a hearing even being held, in
the all too common approach at the RJC where the duties and obligations oI the landlord and
or the court are shiIted to the tenant).
Further, Baker alternately declares that Coughlin cites to rules that 'do not apply to
summary eviction proceedings (even ones that clearly do, like JCRCP 109, which the RJC
violated in holding a 'Trial (which, a 'Trial does seem to be allowed wieing sought by way
oI the Iiling oI the document.). So, once again, Baker seeks to take advantage oI a rule that
he has previously indicated is inapplicable (Baker said this about several rules Coughlin cited
to on 10/13/11 (one that was very much applicable, NJCRCP 109, and which was violated in
that, upon Judge SIerrazza 'setting the matter over Ior trial Ior 10/25/11, a jurisdictional
prerequisite to any suc JNCRCP 109 Trial being held was that Couglhin be aIIorded 20 days
to Iile an Answer aIter being served a Summons and Complaint. Baker had not even Iiled the
'landlord's aIIidavit required by NRS 40.254, 40.253(5),(6), until an hour into the Trial on
10/25/11, and such was deIicient still, and arguably remains deIicient, but attempts to bolster
the 'suIIiciency oI that 'landlord's aIIidavit did not even occur until aIter the lunch break
on 10/25/11. So, instead oI the 20 days Coughlin is statutorily guaranteed under NRS
40.253(6) and NJCRCP 109 (and, in any event, never 'less than 10 days under NJCRCP
108...which neither Judge SIerrazza nor Baker brought up at any point...which goes to the
suggestion that any alleged Iailure by Coughlin to cite to the exact statutory section speaking
ot stays during appeals oI summary eviction (NRS 40.385) is somehow dispositive oI the
legitimarcy oI so denying the various Motions Ior Stay made by Coughlin in that 'inIormal
proceeding, and how uncolorable it is, when considering the Iailure to ever cite to NJCRCP
108, much less comply with it).
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The document Iails to Iollow numerous applicable District Court Rules (hereinaIter,
"D.C.R.") and local rules (hereinaIter, "WDCR"). See generally, D.C.R. 12, D.C.R. 13,
WDCR 10, and WDCR12. But see, WDCR 18 (the Court does not believe that WDCR 18
authorizes the complete abandonment oI all oI the other rules in criminal matters). D.C.R. 5
states in Iull: These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the proper and eIIicient
administration oI the business and aIIairs oI the court and to promote and Iacilitate the
administration oI justice by the court.
These rules cover the practice and procedure in all actions in the distric
t courts oI all districts where no local rule covering the same subject has been approved by the
supreme court. Local rules which are approved Ior a particular judicial district shall be applied
in each instance whether they are the same as or inconsistent with these rules. It is the Court's
conclusion that the docwnent is in violation oID.C.R . 5.
The Court also Iinds that the petitioner has Iailed to qualiIy to represent himselI
pursuant to S.C.R. 253. See also, Faretta v. CaliIornia, 422 U.S. 806,95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975),
Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48 (2008) and Wayne v. State, 100 Nev. 582 (1984). The canvass
required pursuant to S.C.R 253(1) is mandatory in every case where a deIendant appears in
district court and chooses selI representation. For all oI the Ioregoing reasons it is hereby
ORDE RED that the docwnent is stricken and the Court shall take no Iurther action on the
docwnent. DATED this jay oI April, 2013. /s/ Elliott Sattler
Baker's 12/19/11 Iiling reads: 'REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE
PlaintiII, MATT MERLISS, through counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, CHARTERED and
CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ .. ; rep}i.e....ii .sPpo.. oI his motion Ior order to show cause Iiled
herein. Coughlin has Iailed to oppose the motion in any real way, and does not dispute that he
is in contempt oI court. This reply is based on the points and authorities below and all papers
ru!d pleadings on Iile herein.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES:
Coughlin was evicted and locked out oI the subject property on November 1, 2011. On
November 13, 2011, he was discovered living in the basement and was arrested Ior
trespassing. ReIerence is made to the declaration oI Richard G. Hill, Esq. attached to the
instant motion at Exhibit 2 Ior Iurther Iactual particulars. Coughlin has not denied these Iacts.
Coughlin is in contempt oI court under both NRS 22.020 and NRS 22.010(3).
A. Coughlin's Arguments Regarding a "Commercial" Lease are Untimely, Have Been
Waived by Him, and are InIirm as a Matter oI Both Law and Fact, and he Should be
Judicially Estopped From Raising Them.
It appears that Ceughlin may have eppesed this metien in his "motion to' vacate", Iiled
herein on December 5, 2011. In that paper, he takes the new position the lockoutt was
impermissible because he had a "commercial lease". Fer the court's reIerence, a true and
corroct cepy oI the Iully executed lease, which was entered into evidence at the eviction
hearing as Exhibit A, is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 1.
First, it is clear that Ceughlin has net read NRS 40.254, the statute upen which his
evictien was based. Instead, he is seeking to' apply, as law, the general statement in the
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landlerd/tenant handbeek that summary evictions are net available Ier the evictien oI
cemmercial tenants Ier ether than thEl ;nenpayment eI rent. That ' is an
evergeneralizatien .. . .,., . '\; eI the law, and, in any event,' de.. net. apply here.
NRS 40. 254 speciIically prevides that summary evictiens are available "when the
tenant oI a dwelling unit | | is subject to the provisions oI chapter uSA oI NRS .. " ..em
phasis added). Coughlin tries to' Iecus en calling the lease" cemmercial"instead eI
"residential", but that tactic is misguided. That argument is meaningless in light eI the plain
language eI the centrelling statute. The preper Iecus is en whether er net the lease was subject
to' NRS Chapter u8A. SO' leng as it was, summary evictien was allewed. Net until aIter the
evictien was cemplete, did Coqghlinmakethis argument. Further, Ceughlin has net made any
shewing that Chapter u8A did net apply. In Iact, threugheut the evictien preceedings, he
speciIically argued that it did apply, and the ceurt ruled en that basis. Ceughlin's twO'
pesitiens are tetally inconsistent, and he is judicially estepped Irem changing his deIense new.
S,ee, tlrcuse O.Del Webb Cemmunities, 123 Nev. 278, 163 P .3d 462 (2007), which prevides
as Iellews:
'Judicial esteppel applies when the Iellewing Iive criteria are met: party ajudicial
accepted totally (5) oI ignorance, ..Gapv.l....qUity ... (1) the same has taken two positions; (2)
the positions were taken in or quasi-judicial administrative proceeding; (3) the party was
successIul in asserting the Iirst position (i.e. the tribunal adopted the position or it as true); (4)
the two positions are inconsisterit; and the Iirst position was not taken as a result Iraud, or
mistake. Marcuse at 287.
As set Iorth above, Coughlin has clearly met all criteria oIthe judicial estoppel test, and
he must not be allowed to change his deIense now. Coughlin's argument Iails Ior several
additional reasons:
First, Coughlin's argument is untimely. Coughlin had two months, two hearings, and
countless motions in which raise this argument beIore his rights in the property were
terminated by the court and he was legally locked out. He never did so. '... .. Coughlin cannot
be allowed to re-argue the merits oI the case now, nearly two months aIter he was properly
locked out oI the property.
Second, Coughlin aIIirmatively waived any such argument. During the eviction
proceedings, Coughlin chose to Iocus on his trumped-up and Iabricated "retaliation" and
"habitability" claims under NRS 118A.510, 118A.290, 118A.355, and 118A.360. He now
wants to change his story and allege that his lease was a "commercial" lease. As noted above,
Coughlin has not Iigured out that the appropriate inquiry is not on the term "commercial", but
9n oI NRS Chapter u8A. As such, Coughlin's ... .. ' '"argument is misguided, and would not
entitle him to any relieI even iI he had raised it timely. Nevertheless, by choosing his deIenses
based on NRS Chapter 118A, Coughlin aIIirmatiyely took the position that the lease was
subject to that chapter, and waived any argument that it was not. Coughlin cannot be allowed
to change his argument now. Marcuse. He chose his position and is bound by it.
Even iI Coughlin had not aIIirmatively chosen a contrary position at the hearing on the
merits, and had simply Iailed to raise a particular deIense, he would not be permitted to raise
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that new deIense now, or on appeal. See Schuck v. Signature Flight Support oI Nevada, Inc.,
126 Nev. (Adv.Op. 42), 245 p.3d 542 (Nov. 4, 2010). The Court in Schuck stated as
Iollows:
summaryj udgment, general jurisdiction will appeal' through wliich '/'
Coughlin/tha6paIagraph recall..that
' The problem with these arguments is that Schuck did not make them when he opposed the
summary judgment motion in the district court. While this court gives a de novo review to a
district court's decision to grant summary judgment, a de novo standard oI review does not
trump the rule that '|a| point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of
that court, is deemed to have been waived and not be considered on appeal' a district court is
not obligated to wade and search the entire record Ior some speciIic Iacts might support the
nonmoving party's claim. Schuck at 544-545 (internal citations omitted).
Even if Coughlin's current fabricated argument that the lease was "commercial"
could somehow be considered jurisdictional,' Coughlin affirmatively waived that
argument by choosing his defenses based on NRS Chapter 118A. He never raised the
issue, and the court was not obligated to Iind it and raise it Ior him. Schuck. Further, even iI
Coughlin were running one or more unlicensed businesses out oI that property, he still has not
shown how that removes the matter Irom NRS 118A. In Iact, Coughlin continues to Iile
motions based on provisions oI NRS Chapter 118A, including the motion that gave rise to the
December 20, 2011 hearing, and in which he argues that the lease was "commercial." As a
Iactual matter, any assertion that the lease was anything but a residential lease is simply not
true. Paragraph 2 oI the lease provides that the premises was rented to Coughlin and his
girlIriend Ior "residential purposes only". The paragraph that Coughlin is relying on is
paragraph 11 oI the lease. In the executed lease, that paragraph provides in part that the
property "shall be used Ior a residence and Ior other purposes." See EXHIBIT 1. In the event
the court is inclined to hear argument on the matter, Merliss will present evidence at the
December 22, 2011 hearing that paragraph 11 in the original lease document provided to
Coughlin stated "shall be used Ior a residence and Ior no other purpose". Merliss will Iurther
present evidence that Coughlin surreptitiously altered that language beIore he signed and
returned the lease. The court will recakk that Dr. Merliss testiIied at the October 25, 2011
hearing about other provisions oI the lease that Coughlin had also changed without inIorming
Merliss that he had done so. Merliss will also present evidence, through the testimony oI
Darlene Sharpe, the real estate agent who leased the property to Coughlin Ior Merliss, that
Coughlin never mentioned that he was a lawyer or that he intended to operate a law practice
or any other business out oI the property. He also never mentioned any sort oI mattress
business, which he now claims to have been operating out oI the property. In Iact, the court
will see that on his rental application, Coughlin listed his employment history as"selI
employed researcher 1995 to present". The lease was never intended to be, and was not,
anything other than a residential lease. To the extent the lease now contains an ambiguity as
between paragraphs 2 and 11, that ambiguity should be construed against Coughlin not only
because he created it, but because oI the underhanded way in which he tried to sneak that and
other changes past Merliss. Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, 123 Nev. 212, 163 P.3d 405 (2007).
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In any event, the altered language oI paragraph 11 oI the lease ("Ior other purposes") is so
broad and so vague that nothing in it could possibly take the lease out oI Chapter 118A,
especially where, as here, the property was obviously intended, and used, as a dwelling unit as
reIerred to by NRS 40.254, and as deIined by NRS 118A.080. Coughlin is grasping at straws
and, quite literally, continuing to make it up as he goes along.
With respect to Mr. Coughlin's alleged mattress business, that business license has
been expired since October 2006, more than three years beIore Coughlin ever rented the River
Rock property Irom Merliss. Attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2 is a true and correct copy oI a
printout Irom the City oI Reno business licensing department webpage, which , shows the
expired status oI Coughlin's business license Ior his mattress business. The court will also
note that the address listed Ior that deIunct and unlicensed business is not the address oI the
Merliss' property (121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada). Coughlin's claims about this lease being
anything other than a residence are more oI his pure Iabrication. Coughlin has already
demonstrated a history oI raising an argument in a motion, only to withdraw it at the hearing
when conIronted with a witness who will present the truth. Thus, in the interest oI mitigating
the a,lready staggering amount oI Iees and costs that Coughlin has caused Merliss to incur on
what should have been a simple eviction, Merliss has not subpoenaed the City oI Reno, but
reserves his right to do so in the event the court elects to entertain, any argument or evidence
put Iorth by Coughlin in support oI this Iallacy. In1 (In1 The court is asked to recall that at the
October 25, 2011 eviction hearing, a representative Irom NV Energy had only just begun
testiIying when Mr. CoughHn withdrew his argument about some retaliatory interruption oI
his electrical service, rendering that testimony unnecessary. The witness was then dismissed
aIter having wasted ap. entire morning on this matter. The NV Energy attorney, who had
Ilown up Irom Lastyegas Ior the hearing, had wasted a trip. It is this type oI perpetual
nonsense by Coughlin, an attorney, that has Iorced MerHss to incur tens oI thousands oI
dollars in Iees and costs in this matter.)
CONCLUSION: Coughlin is in contempt oI this court. He does not deny it. Instead,
he wants to raise untimely, untrue, inIirm, and unsupported arguments about some non-
existent, unlicensed businesses he may have been illegally operating out oI the property.
Coughlin has not oIIered any real opposition to the motion, and the court should issue the
order to show cause Iorthwith. ReIerence is made to the declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq.,
attached hereto as EXHIBIT 3, Ior authentication oI all exhibits. A Iorm oI the proposed order
is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 4.
WHEREFORE; Merilss pays For an order oI this court requiring deIendant,
contempt oI court under NRS 22.010(3) Ior his resistance to this court's lawIully entered
order, and under NRS 22.020 Ior his illegal reentry onto the subject property aIter eviction;
Ior an order that Coughlin pay Merliss Ior the costs incurred to secure the property aIter the
break-in by Coughlin as a condition oI his being purged oI his contempt oI court; and Ior such
other, Iurther and additional relieI as seems just to the Court in the premises. '
preceding' document does not contain the social security number oI any person. DATED this
19
th
day oI December, 2011. /s/ Casey D. Baker, Esq.
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'Baker writes, in his 12/19/11 Iiling: 'OPPOSITION TO COUGHLIN'S SECOND MOTION
TO CONTEST PERSONAL
PROPERTY LIEN AND FOR RETURN OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
PlaintiII/Landlord,Iy1A.Tl( ME;RLISS, through counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, '. '
CHARTERED and CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ., opposes the motion to contest personal
property lien Iiled herein by deIendant, ZACHARY COUGHLIN, on December 5, 2011. The
motion is,untimely, and an impermissible second attempt to have the court hear a motion he
once abandoned, and which has become stale. This opposition is based on the points and
authorities below and all papers and pleadings on Iile herein.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; FACTS; Mr. Coughlin was evicted Irom the property on
November 1, 2011. He Iiled his Iirst motion to contest personal property lien on November
16, 2011. Merliss opposed that motion on November 21, 2011. That opposition is
incorporated herein by this reIerence. At that time, the court was attempted to set a hearing on
Mr. Coughlin's motion Ior November 22,2011, but Mr. Coughlin reIused to cooperate or
communicate with the court'to get that hearing on calendar, despite repeated requests by
Merliss' counsel that he do so. See Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 4 to Merliss' November 21, 2011
opposition.
Due solely to Mr. Coughlin's game-play, the hearing that the court was attempting to
schedule Ior November 22, 2011 was never placed on the court's calendar, and never
happened. OI course, Mr. Coughlin now, predictably, claims that he showed up to court on
November 22 prepared to go Iorward. Whether or not he showed up to court, Mr. Coughlin
knew that the hearing had not been placed on the calendar, and why. By now, Mr. Coughlin's
complete and utter lack oI veracity in the conduct oI these proceedings should not even need
mentioning.
Mr. Coughlin then Iiled a second motion to contest personal property lien on Decembet
5, 2011. ThereaIter, the court set a hearing on that motion Ior Tuesday, December 20, 2011.
This paper is Iiled in opposition to that motion.
LAW AND ANALYSIS Coughlin's motion is brought pursuant to NRS 118A.460.
Subsection (2) oI that statute provides:
2. Any dispute relating to the amount oI the costs claimed by the landlord pursuant to
paragraph (a) oI subsection 1 may be resolved using the procedure proVIded in subsection 7
oI NRS 40.253 NRS 1..8A.460(2) , -"I NRS 40.253(7)-(8) provides as Iollows:
7. The tenant may, upon payment oI the appropriate Iees relating to the Iiling and
service oI a motion, Iile a motion with the court, on a Iorm provided by the clerk oI the court,
to dispute the amount oI the costs, iI any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118.207 or
n8A.460 Ior the inventory, moving and storage oI: personal property leIt on the premises. The
motion must be Iiled within 20 days aIter the summary order Ior removal oI the tenant or the
abandonment oI the premises by the tenant, or within 20 days aIter:
(a) The tenant has vacated or been removed Irom the premises; and
(b) A copy oI those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant,
whichever is later.
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8. Upon the Iiling oI a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall schedule a heating on
the motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days aIter the Iiling oI the motion. The court
shall aIIix the date oI the hearing to the motion and order a copy served upon the landlord by
the sheriII, constable or other process server. At the hearing, the court may: ... (a) Determine
the costs, iI any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118.207 or 118A.460 and any
accumulating daily " costs; and (b) Order the release oI the tenant's property upon the
payment oI the charges determined to be due or iI no charges are determined to be due. NRS
40.253(7)-(8) (emphasis added).
Here, Coughlin Iiled his Iirst motion pursuant to NRS 118A.460 on November 16,
2011. That motion was timely. However, when the court attempted to set the hearing,
Coughlin reIused to cooperate or communicate with the court to get the hearing on calendar,
despite repeated requests Irom M.erliss' counsel that he do so. As a sole and direct result oI
Mr. Coughlin's reIusal to cooperate with the court to set his own hearing, that hearing never
happened. The 10 days in which to hold the hearing under NRS 40.253(8) have now expired.
Mr. Coughlin's motion is stale, and the relieI he seeks is now timer barred. ..ecause he
abandoned that motion, it was, eIIectively, denied. He has not shown any good reason why he
should be given leave to re-Iile that motion. See, e.g. Masonry & Tile Contractors Ass'n oIS.
Nev. v. Jolley, Urga & Wirth, Ltd., 113 Nev. 737, 741, 941 P.2d 486 (1997) ("A district court
may reconsider a previously decided issue iI substantially diIIerent evidence is subsequently
introduced or the decision is clearly erroneous.") Accord, DCR 13(7).
Nevertheless, Mr. Coughlin Iiled his second motion pursuant to NRS 118A.460 on
December 5, 2011. Even though th.. co..rt has already set a hearing on the motion, the, "
motion should be denied. Mr. Cdughli was evicted Irom the property on November 1, 2011.
He was Iirst told on that Dr. Merliss was claiming an lien on his property at the Iair rental
value oI the property on November 10, 2011. See Exhibit 1 to Exhibit 4 oI Merliss' November
21,2011 opposition. Coughlin knew that Iigure to be a daily prorated amount oI $900.00 per
month (or $30.00 per day), because that was the rent set in the underlying lease he signed. He
also conIirmed his knowledge oI that Iigure in his email oI November 12, 2011, which he
attached to his November 16, 2011 motion. In that email, Coughlin says "... they were billing
the Iull $900 rental value oI the property to the undersigned, even aIter any eviction they
sought to enIorce ... " The additional charges oI $1060.00 Ior securing the property aIter Mr.
Coughlin was Iound to be squatting there were not incurred until aIter Coughlin was arrested
and removed Irom the property on November 13, 2011. ThereIore, under NRS 40.253(7),
Coughlin's motion was due to be Iiled by no November 30, 2011, twenty days aIter he was
inIormed oI the charges. Coughlin's motion is untimely, and must, be denied.
WHEREFORE, plaintiII prays that deIendant take nothing byway oI his motion and
that same be denied in its entirety; and Ior such other, Iurther and additional relieI as seems
just to the Court in the premises. DATED this 19
th
Day oI December, 2011.
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
PlaintiII, MATTMERLISS, through counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, CHARTERED and
CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ .. ; rep}i.eii .sPpo oI his motion Ior order to show cause
Iiled herein. Coughlin has Iailed to oppose the motion in any real way, and does not dispute
that he is in contempt oI court. This reply is based on the points and authorities below and all
papers ru!d pleadings on Iile herein.
Coughlin was evicted and locked out oI the subject property on November 1, 2011. On
November 13, 2011, he was discovered living in the basement and was arrested Ior
trespassing. ReIerence is made to the declaration oI Richard G. Hill, Esq. attached to the
instant motion at Exhibit 2 Ior Iurther Iactual particulars. Coughlin has not denied these Iacts.
Coughlin is in contempt oI court under both NRS 22.020 and NRS 22.010(3).
A. Coughlin's Argumnts Regarding a "Commrcial" Lease are
.
Untimely, Have Been Wived by Him, and are InIirm as a Matter oI Both Law and Fact, and
he Should be Judicially Estopped From Raising Them.
It appears that Ceughlin may have eppesed this metien in his "metien to'
vacate", ijiled herein en December 5, 2011. In that paper, he takes the new pesitien the leckeut
was impermissible because he had a "cemmercial lease". Fer the ceurt's reIerence, a true nd
cerrect cepy eI the Iully executed lease, which was entered intO' evidence at the evictien
hearing as Exhibit A, is attached heretO' as EXHIBIT 1.
First, it is clear that Ceughlin has net read NRS 40.254, the statute upen which his evictien
was based. Instead, he is seeking to' apply, as law, the general statement in the landlerd/tenant
handbeek that summary evictions are net available Ier the evictien oI cemmercial tenants Ier
ether than thEl ;nenpayment eI rent. That ' is an evergeneralizatien oI the law, and, in any
event,' de net. apply here.
NRS 40. 254 speciIically prevides that summary evictiens are available "when the tenant oI a
dwelling unit | | is subject to the provisions oI chapter uSA oI NRS " em phasis
added). Coughlin tries to' Iecus en calling the lease" cemmercial"instead eI "residential", but
that tactic is misguided. That argument is meaningless in light eI the plain language eI the
centrelling statute. The preper Iecus is en whether er net the lease was subject to' NRS
Chapter u8A. SO' leng as it was, summary evictien was allewed. Net until aIter the evictien
was cemplete, did Coqghlinmakethis argument. Further, Ceughlin
has net made any shewing that Chapter u8A did net apply. In Iact, threugheut the evictien
preceedings, he speciIically argued that it did apply, and the ceurt ruled en that basis.
Ceughlin's twO' pesitiens are tetally inconsistent, and he is judicially estepped Irem
changing his deIense new. S,ee, tlrcuse O.Del Webb Cemmunities, 123 Nev. 278, 163 P .3d
462 (2007), which prevides as Iellews:
Judicial esteppel applies when the Iellewing Iive criteria are met:
3 party ajudicial accepted totally (5) oI ignorance,
(1) the same has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in or quasi-judicial
administrative proceeding; (3) the party was successIul in asserting the Iirst position (i.e. the
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tribunal adopted the position or it as true); (4) the two positions are inconsisterit; and the Iirst
position was not taken as a result Iraud, or mistake. Marcuse at 287. As set Iorth above,
Coughlin has clearly met all criteria oIthe judicial estoppel test, and he must not be allowed to
change his deIense now. Coughlin's arg1JJIlerIails ' Io &everal additional reasons:
First, Coughlin's argument is untimely. Coughlin had two months, two hearings, and
countless motions in which raise this argument beIore his rights in the property.ere
terminated by the court and he was legally locked out. He never did so. '. Coughlin
cannot be allowed to re-argue the merits oI the case now, nearly two months aIter he was
properly locked out oI the property. Second, Coughlin aIIirmatively waived any such
argument. During the eviction proceedings, Coughlin chose to Iocus . on his trumped-up and
Iabricated "retaliation" and "habitability" claims under NRS 118A.510, 118A.290, 118A.355,
and 118A.360. He now wants to change his story and allege that his lease was a "commercial"
lease. As noted above, Coughlin has not Iigured out that the appropriate inquiry is not on the
term "commercial", but 9n oI NRS Chapter u8A. As such, Coughlin's ... .. ' '" argument is
misguided, and would not entitle him to any relieI even iI he had raised it timely.
Nevertheless, by choosing his deIenses based on NRS Chapter n8A, Coughlin aIIirmatiyely
took the position that the lease was subject to that chapter, and waived any i).'. argument that
it was not. Coughlin cannot be allowed to change his argument now. Marcuse. He chose his
position and is bound by it. Even iI Coughlin had not aIIirmatively chosen a contrary position
at the hearing on the merits, and had simply Iailed to raise a particular deIense, h would not
be permitted to raise that new deIense now, or on appeal. See Schuck v. Signature Flight
Support oI Nevada, Inc., 126 Nev. (Adv.Op. 42), 245 p.3d 542 (Nov. 4, 2010). The Court in
Schuck stated as Iollows: ,-summaryj udgment, general jurisdiction will appeal' through
wliich '/' Coughlin/tha6paIagraph recallthat
The problem with these a,rguments is that Schuck did not make them when he 9P'pod
slim 5iry judgment in the district court. While this court gIves a de novo review to a district
court's decision to grant a de novo standard oI review does not trump the rule that '|a| point
not urged in the trial court, unless it goes to the oI that court, is deemed to have been waived
and not be considered on . ... a district ;! court is not obligated to wade and search the entire
record Ior some speciIic Iacts might support the nonmoving party's claim. Schuck at 544-545
(internal citations omitted). Even iI Coughlin's current Iabricated argument that the lease was"
commercial" could somehow be considered jurisdictional,' Coughlin aIIirmatively waived that
argument by choosing his deIenses based on NRS Chapter 118A. He never raised the issue,
and the court was not obligated to Iind it and raise it Ior him. Schuck. Further, even iI
Coughlin were running one or more unlicepsd l:~,ps,inessesout oI that property, he still has
not shown how that removes the matteIro Nis,6hkpter u8A. In Iact, Coughlin continues to
Iile motions based on provisions oI NRS Chapter uSA, including the motion that gave rise to
the December 20, 2011 hearing, and in which he argues that the leas was "commercial."
As a Iactual matter, any assertion that the lease was anything but a residential lease is simply
not true. Paragraph 2 oI the lease provides that the premises was rented to Coughlin and his
girlIriend Ior "residential purposes only". Th paragraph that Coughlin is relying on is
paragraph 11 oI the lease. ,In the executed lease, that paragraph provides in part that the
property "shall be used Ior a residence and Ior other purposes." See EXHIBIT 1. In the event
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the court is inclined to hear argument on the matter, Merliss will present evidence at the
December 22, 2011 .. hearing that paragraph 11 in the original lease . . . . ", .,' 'I)document
provided to stated "shall be used Ior a residence and Ior no other purpose". Merliss will
Iurther present evidence that Coughlin surreptitiouslyaltered that language beIore he signed
and returned the lease. The court will Dr. Merliss testiIied at the October 25,2011 hearing
about other provisio.ns oI the lease that Coughlin had also changed without inIorming Merliss
that he had done so. Merliss will also present evidence, through the testimony oI Darlene
Sharpe, the real estate agent ho leased the property to Coughlin Ior Merliss, that Coughlin
never mentioned that he was.a lawyer or that he intended to operate a law practice or any
other business out oI the property. He also never mentioned any sort oI mattress business,
which he now claims to have been operating out oI the property. In Iact, the court will see that
on his rental application, Coughlin liste4.his ,ePlPl()'ymel1t history as"selI employed
researcher 1995 to present". The lease was never intended to be, and was not, anything other
than a residential lease. To the extent the lease now contains an ambiguity as between
paragrapps 2 and 11, that ambiguity should be construed against Coughlin not only because
he created it, but because oI the underhanded way in which he tried to sneak that and other
changes past Merliss. Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, 123 Nev. 212, 163 P.3d 405 (2007). In any
event, the altered language oI paragraph 11 oI the lease ("Ior other purposes") is so broad and
so vague that nothing in it could possibly take the lease out oI Chapter nSA, especially where,
as here, the property was obviously intended, and used, as a dwelling unit as reIerred to by
NRS 40.254, and as deIined by NRS uSA.oSo. Coughlin is grasping at straws and, quite
literally, continuing to make it up as he goes along.
With respect to .r. c,pug1in; eged mattress business, that business license
has been expired since October 2006, more than three years beIore Coughlin ever rented the
River Rock property Irom Merliss. Attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2 is a true and correct copy
oI a}printout Irom the City oI Reno business licensing department webpage, which
,
shows the expired status oI Coughlin's business license Ior his mattress business. The court
will also note that the address listed Ior that deIunct and unlicensed business is not the address
oI the Merliss' property (121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada). Coughlin's claims about this lease
being anything other than a residenallease ar:e more oI his pure Iabrication. Coughlin has
already demonstrated a history oI raising an argument in a motion, only to withdraw it at the
hearing when conIronted with a witness who will present the truth. Thus,
III CONCLUSION
in the interest oI mitigating the a,lready sgering amount oI Iees and costs that Coughlin
has caused Merliss to incur on what should have been a simple eviction, Merliss has not
subpoenaed the City oI Reno, but reserves his right to do so in the event the court elects to
entertain, any argument or evidence put Iorth by Coughlin in support oI this Iallacy. 1
Coughlin is in contempt oI this court. He does not deny it. Instead, he wants to raise untimely,
untrue, inIirm, and unsupported arguments about some non-existent, unlicensed businesses he
may have been illegally operating out oI the property. Coughlin has not oIIered any real
opposition to the motion, and the court should issue the order to show cause Iorthwith.
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ReIerence is made to the declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq., attached hereto as EXHIBIT 3,
Ior authentication oI all exhibits. A Iorm oI the proposed
order is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 4..
.#,... .WHEREFORE; Merilss pays lor an order oI this court requiring deIendant,
contempt oI court under NRS 22.0lO(3) Ior his resistance to this court's lawIully entered
order, arib) under NRS 22.020 Ior his illegal reentry onto the subject property aIter eviction;
Ior an order that Coughlin pay Merliss Ior the costs incurred to secure the property aIter the
break-in by Coughlin as a condition oI his being purged oI his contempt oI court; and Ior such
other, Iurther and additional relieI as seems just to the Court in the premises .
1 The court is asked to recall that at the October 25, 2011 eviction hearing, a representative
Irom NV Energy had only just begun testiIying when Mr. CoughHn withdrew his argument
about some retaliatory interruption oI his electrical service, rendering that testimony
unnecessary. The witness was then dismissed aIter having wasted ap. entire morning on this
matter. The NV Energy attorney, who had Ilown up Irom Lastyegas Ior the hearing, had
wasted a trip. It is this type oI perpetual nonsense
by Coughlin, an attorney, that has Iorced MerHss to incur tens oI thousands oI dollars in
Iees and costs in this matter.
preceding'
The very arguments Baker himselI makes in his 12/19/11 Opposition and Motion make
clear the inapplicability to Coughlin's commercial lease (home law oIIice ambiguity mixed
use commercial residential Anvui, just not Iit Ior summary adjudication) oI NRS 118A. NRS
118C did not exist during the Iormation oI this agreement and throughout most oI the events
involved, becomign eIIective just 13 days beIore the summary eviction proceeding.
However, Coughlin certainly, as a commercial tenant, should nto have been Iorced to pay
some residential tenant's NRS 118A.355(5) rent escrow amount.
plicitly authorizes such tenants to raise all legal and equitable deIenses to actions
brought by a landlord Ior possession oI a dwelling. See Section 83.60(1), Florida Statutes.
Similar deIenses are available to tenants under The Florida Mobile Home Act, Sections
723.001, et seq., Florida Statutes (1985). See speciIically section 723.063(1). II, however, the
tenant raises any deIense other than payment, he is required to pay into the registry oI the
court the accrued rent, as alleged in the complaint or as determined by the court, and all rent
accruing during the pendency oI the proceeding, when due. Section 83.60(2). See also section
723.063(2).
The Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, by its terms, however, speciIically applies
to the rental oI dwelling units, see Section 83.41, Florida Statutes and not to nonresidential
tenancies, governed by part I oI Chapter 83. Herrell.
Also, Merliss should have to sign some oI the Declaration's Baker and Hill are always
attaching to there Iilings...like the 12/19/11 Reply in Support oI Motion Ior OSC.
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Another problem with the SBN's 2/13/13 ROA is the unexplained Iailure to Iile stamp
in Coughlin's Post-Hearing BrieI oI 11/16/12. Certainly, Coughlin had not received the
Chair's 11/16/12 Order oI that date, even, assuming, such Order prevented Coughlin Irom
Iiling documents in the matter (which, clearly it did not, given the Iile stamping made by the
SBN on Coughlin's Iiling oI 11/30/12). It appears Pat King simply did not want to be
obligated to file any Opposition to Coughlin's Post-Hearing Brief. However, Chair
Echeverria specifically rulea that Coughlin woula be allowea to submit fust such a Post-
Hearing Brief, and SCR 105 allows for such.
Its not clear why Judge SIerrazza's 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE should get so much
deIerence Irom Judge Flanagan when Judge SIerraza's 11/8/11 Order granting the landlord
$1,500 in attorney's Iees reveal the extent to which Judge SIerrazza, apparently, was still
unaware that NRS 69.030 does not apply to 'landlord tenant matters, considering NJCRCP 3
deIines 'civil actions as distinct Irom 'landlord tenant matters.
Baker's insipid 10/27/11 Memorandum oI Fees and Costs Iails to cite to any law in
support oI his motion Ior a ridiculous $18,000 in attorney's Iees Ior the summary eviction
obtained. Further, the vast majority oI entries in his 'Activity Report expressly relate to the
non-payment summary eviction that Baker dropped in Rev2011-001492. Additionally,
beyond Baker citing to the patently inapplicable NRS 40.253(3) (which involves the
UniIormed Controlled Substances Act) as his basis Ior moving Ior attorney's Iees during the
10/25/11 'continuation oI the summary eviction proceeding Irom 10/13/11 (once Judge
SIerrazza Iigure out his 'setting the matter over Ior trial would entail complying with
NJCRCP 109 (20 days Ior Coughlin to answer upon being served a Summons and
Complaint...or no less than 10 calendar days (should have just waited a couple more days,
darn it, the the whole void Ior lack oI subject matter jurisdiction in light oI Iailing to abide by
the statutorily set jurisdictional prerequisites pothole would not have been an issue).
Additionally, Ior all oI Baker's puIIery about how he obtained such a 'superior result Ior his
client, the matter oI Baker Iailing to take the easy way out and poitn out the deIiciencies in
Coughlin's 11/3/11 Notice oI Appeal (it Iails to identiIy what judgment or order is being
appealed, and not conIorming Notice oI Appeal or amendment thereto was Iiled by Coughlin
within the jurisdictional ten days to do so (whether Irom rendition or Irom the Notice oI Entry
oI 11/1/11 or Irom RJC Stancil's mailing oI the 10/27/11 Order on 10/31/11). OI course,
Baker and Hill would not have been able to milk their willIull neurologist client Ior another
couple oI months had they pointed out that simple and obvious jurisdictional deIense.
The ROA Irom the RJC reveals that Ior some unexplained reason the RJC Iailed to Iile
stamp Coughlin's Motion Ior Summary Judgment, Pre-Trial Statement (though it may have
Iile stamped a copy Ior Coughlin, more investigation is needed) Iiled by Coughlin prior to the
10/25/11 Trial. It is completely unIair Ior the RJC to have done so, particularly where Baker
still had not Iiled the landlord's aIIidavit by the start time oI that 10/25/11 trial. Coughlin was
prejudiced in not being noticed on the speciIic Iacts supporting the landlord's position as
statutorily required prior to the start oI any such hearing by NRS 40.254.
Baker's Iaxed only (yet, curiously, Iile stamped by the RJC...leading to the question oI why
Coughlin's 12/26/11 Iax submitted Notice oI Appeal was not Iiled stamped by the RJC, much
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less actually transmitted in accordance with the 'CertiIicate oI Clerk on page 3 oI the 1/4/12
Supplemental in 03628) letter to Judge SIerrazza oI 10/20/11 essentially admits that the RJC
was divested oI jurisdiction upon Coughlin's Iiling a Notice oI Appeal, on 10/18/11, oI the
10/13/11 'Eviction Decision and Order requiring him to pay some $2,275 in 'rent escrow
in order Ior 'the matter to be 'set Ior trial on October 25
th
, 2011. That letter reads:
'Re, EMERGENCY REQUEST FOR HEARING Merliss v. Coughlin (case No. REV2011-
001708) Dear Judge SIerrazza: ReIerence is made to my letter to Judge CliIton, dated October
18, 2011, a copy oI which is enclosed Ior your reIerence. The purpose oI this letter is to
request an emergency hearing on two speciIic issues that need to be brought beIore the court.
In advance oI the hearing currently scheduled Ior October 25, 2011. Those issues are: (1)
Whether Mr. Coughlin's notice of appeal, filed on October 18, 211, divests this court of
jurisdiction to proceed with the October 25, 211 hearing. We believe that it does not, and
that the hearing should go forward; and (2) Merliss's motion Ior order requiring inspection
oI real property, Iiled herein, on October 18, 2011. Merliss is entitled to inspect the property.
But, in Iairness. Mr. Coughlin needs to have an opportunity to be heard on the matter. In the
event the parties are not able to be heard on the matter, and Merliss is unable to Inspect the
property beIore next Tuesday's heming, we will likely heve no choice but to seek to adjourn
that hearing at some poipt to go inspecttbe property in order to meet any prooI that Mr.
Coughlin might present For thet reason, I believe that an emergency' hearing either this
aIternoon (October 20, 2011), or Iirst thing the morning oI October 21, 2011, would be the
best use oI the court's time, and would avoid any unnecessary Iurther continuances oI this
matter. II! or mystaII can do anything to speed up the proce.ss, please do not hesitate to call
00 us. Sincerely, Casey O. Baker, Esq. Enel. Letter to Judge CliIton dated October 18, 2011
cc: Zach Coughlin (by email (wlth enclosures):z.chcougbllnhotmail.com)
Such was an impermissible ex parte communication considering Coughlin had
repeatedly put Baker and Hill on notice that he would not accept service oI anything
electronically in this matter.
''From: Don Christensen ChristensenDreno.gov~ Sent: Thursday, November 01, 2012
11:00 AM To: Patrick King Cc: Patrick, William Gardner; Dorothy Nash Holmes; Ken
Howard; Jay Dilworth Subject: Coughlin subpoenas Attachments: Coughlin subpoenas.pdI
As we discussed yesterday, I represent the Reno Municipal Court, its judges and
employees with respect to a purported service oI two subpoenas regarding a State Bar hearing
regarding Zach Coughlin scheduled Ior Nov. 14, 2012. A copy oI each subpoena is attached.
Each subpoena was leIt at a window at the Municipal Ct's clerk's oIIice on Oct. 30. No
personal service was made on any oI the individuals identiIied in either SUbpoena. As you are
aware, personal service oI a subpoena i.. required Ior eIIective service under Consolidated
Generator-Nev., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 114 Nev. 1304, 971 P .2d 1251 (1998).
ThereIore it is my view that eIIective service oI the subpoena was not made on any oI the
individuals identiIied in either subpoena and that none oI them are required to appear at the
hearing. None oI these individuals will be appearing at the State Bar hearing pursuant to
either subpoena.
The individuals identiIied in one or both oI the subpoenas are as Iollows: Judge
Gardner, Judge Nash Holmes, Judge Howard, Ct. Marshal Harley, Ct. Marshal Coppa, ChieI
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Marshal Roper, Cassandra Jackson (Muni Ct. Administrator), and Lisa Wagner (Judge
Gardner's Admin. Asst.). The judges oI the Municipal Court are aware that they have been
requested by you to attend the State Bar hearIng iI they have inIormation they would like to
present at the hearing regarding Mr. Coughlin's suitability to practice law in Nevada. It is my
understanding that you would ask any oI them that are interested in so testiIying to call you at
328-1384 as soon as possible. Thank you Ior your assistance. II you have any questions
regarding this matter, please give me a call.
Don Christensen Deputy City Attorney City oI Reno Tel. (775) 334-2068 Please note
that my e-mail address has changed christensendreno.gov
Judge SIerrazza's 11/9/11 Order in 1708 reads: 'ORDER AWARDING COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES This matter came on regularly Ior an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
NRS 40.254 and NRS 40.253(6) on October 13, 2011, and continued on October 25, 2011,
beIore the Honorable Peter J. SIerrazza, sitting without a jury. The plaintiII/landlord, Matt
Merliss ("Merliss"), having been the prevailing party, is entitled to recover his costs and
attorney's Iees pursuant to NRS 69.030. See also, Sandy Valley Assocs v. Sky Ranch Estates,
117 Nev. 948, 957,35 P.2d 9 64 (2001) ("Attorney Iees may also be awarded as damages in
those cases in which a party incurred the Iees in recovering real or personal property' acquired
through the wrongIul conduct oI the deIendant ... "). Merliss having timely Iiled and served
his Memorandum oI Costs and Disbursements; deIendant, Zachary (ceded Irom on other
grounds by Horgan v. Felton, 123 Nev. 577,170 P.3d 982 (2007). Barker "Coughlin having
Iailed to timely Iile and serve any motion to retax or opposition thereto with the court in
accordance with NRS 69.040(S); the Court being Iully inIormed in the premises and good
cause appearing thereIor; IT IS H EREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED A ND DECREED, that
plaintiII.' \ landlord shall have judgment against and recover oI the deIendant ZACHARY
BARKER " COUGH LIN costs in the amount oI $421.78 and attorney's Iees in the amount OI
$l,500 with such Iees and costs to earn interest at the legal rate Irom the date hereoI until paid.
." DATED this 9th day oI November, 2011.
It's rather odd to consider Judge SIerrazza's 11/9/11 Order awarding Baker and his
landlord client some $1,500 in attorney's Iees consdiering that Baker's '10/27/11
Memorandum oI Costs contained absolutely no citation to support his Motion Ior some
$18,000 in attorney's Iees (most oI which were patently incurred int he non-payment summary
eviction case in 1492 that Baker dropped mid-way through.
Such improvisational Ilourishes by Judge SIerrazza, though, are void according
Jugde Flanagan's 4/20/12 Order in Carpentier v. Aames, QLS, and RCS in CV08-01709
(the case Irom which Hill apparently sent the SBN one oI Coughlin's pleadings, it upset him
so, detaling how Hill was able to get Coughlin arrested Ior jaywalking suIIicient to prevent
Coughlin Irom collecting anymore evidence oI the Iraud oI Hill's contractor or the damages
incident to the wrongIul eviction and Hill's insistence on both obstructing Coughlin during
the scant 16 hours he was allowed to move his home and law oIIice (with very little money
to his name, two days beIore Christmas Day), while also insisting on throwing away much
property Coughlin clearly had not 'abandoned and expreslly indicated to Hill his desire to
retrieve. Instead, Hill and Baker lied to Judge Flanagan in asserting that he oIIered to allow
Coughlin additional time to retrieve property, and or that there ever was any agreement
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wherby Coughlin would waive his $700 deposit in exchange Ior such additional time (this
was a similar to their earlier prevarications about Hill's alleged oIIer to provide Coughlin
his client's Iiles between November 18th-21
st
, 2011...Hill never did turn over the client's
Iiles until six weeks later, possibly leading to a multitude oI claims by Coughlin's clients
with respect to the damage done by Hill's improperly asserting a lien against their property,
their Iiles).: 'Finally, this Court makes the Iollowing observations. The arguments raised by
the parties in their pleadings generally circumscribe the adjudicatory boundaries oI this
Court. See ..,Breliant v. PreIerred Equities Corp., 109 Nev. 842, 847, 858 P.2d 1258, 1261
(1993 (stating a district court generally may not consider matters outside oI the pleadings
when reviewing a motion to dismiss)/
Indeed, iI the rubric is, as Baker suggests, that Coughlin's Iailure to speciIically cite
to NRS 40.385, by number, until (veriIy Iirst appearance, 12/5/11 might be it, though a
November 2011 motion on a court Iorm may count) somehow must result in Coughlin's
Motion Ior Stay being denied, then how could Baker be awarded attorney's Iees where he
Iailed to cite to anything (once you consider his 11/10/11 Notice oI Mistatement oI the
Law wherein, upon Coughlin, at the 11/7/11 hearing, pointing out the malIeasance
attendant to Baker citing to a clearly inapplicable attorney's Iees statute in his verbal motion
at the conclusion oI 10/25/11 (does not the Iailure to include such an award in the rendition
oI the Order at said's dates conclusion amount to a denial Io such motion?), NRS
40.254(3)). Baker's assertion, in his 11/10/11 Notice oI Misstatement that he independently
'Iollowing the hearing looked more closely at the attorney's Iee statute he cited to does
little to explain why it took Coughlin pointing out its patent inaplicability in court on
11/7/11 (at which time, contrary to Judge SIerrazza's indication in his 11/9/11 Iee award oI
$1,500, Coughlin did verbally oppose the motion, obviously, and vitiated the application oI
the little law Baker did cite to insupport thereoI...whereupon Judge SIerrazza, apparently,
took it upon himselI to apply a generalized Justice Court 'prevailing party (apparently the
analysis involved in determing who qualiIies as a 'prevaling party is rather simple in a
summary eviction, ie, iI the landlord get his eviction, she is necessarily the prevailing party?
Even iI it costs's $60K to get it?) attorney's Iees statute applicable only to 'civil actions (ie,
not summary eviction proceedings), and marry it to a misleading at best citation to a case
involving title to real property being clouded by the misconauct of another as fustying an
awara of attorneys fees in a civil action to a 'prevailing party`. It takes a whole lotta
stretching to get that to apply to a 'summary eviction possessory action (somehow, even
though 'all that's at issue here, Your Honor, is possession oI the property, said Baker, on
10/25/11, Coughlin was still Iorced to deposit an obviously inIlated rent escrow some under
an extremely tortous application oI NRS 118A.355(5), where Judge SIerrazza also managed
to excise any oI the set-oII Coughlin should have received pursuant to NRS 118A.390,
some additional amounts under NRS 118A.360 (does .360 only apply to habitability under
118A.290? And, iI so, does the 'noxious weeds issue Iall within the purview thereoI?), and
the negotiated written agreements between Coughlin and Merliss (Iigure out speciIics using
the handwritten notes on the math involved). Damages recoverable by a tenant against a
landlord may be setoII against any unpaid lease consideration Sant v. Baril, 173 Mont. 14,
566 P.2d 48 (1977).
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Under some landlord and tenant acts, however, the deIense oI the unIit condition oI
the premises is available only to a tenant who is not in deIault in rental payments.|FN7| II
the statute provides Ior IorIeiture oI the lease upon nonpayment oI rent and demand Ior it, a
tenant who does not pay rent on the grounds that the landlord Iailed to make repairs on the
leased premises is precluded Irom equitable relieI against the IorIeiture oI the lease.|FN8|
The deIense oI implied warranty oI habitability applies only to residential leases and is not
applicable to unlawIul-detainer actions involving commercial tenancies.|FN9| |FN7|
Martins Ferry Jaycee Housing, Inc. v. Pawlaczyk, 4 Ohio App. 3d 302, 448 N.E.2d 512 (7th
Dist. Belmont County 1982). |FN8| Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3d 552, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 620 (4th Dist. 1980); Elizondo v. Perez, 42 Ill. App. 3d 313, 1 Ill. Dec. 112, 356
N.E.2d 112 (1st Dist. 1976); Schuminsky v. Field, 1980 OK 22, 606 P.2d 1133 (Okla.
1980). |FN9| Muro v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 229 Cal. Rptr. 383 (2d Dist.
1986); Fish Construction Co. v. Moselle Coach Works, Inc., 148 Cal. App. 3d 654, 196 Cal.
Rptr. 174 (2d Dist. 1983); Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3d 552, 166 Cal. Rptr. 620 (4th
Dist. 1980) (noting the adequacy oI the lessees' alternative remedies to recover damages Ior
the lessors' alleged breach). AmJur LLT 869. Landlord's breach oI implied warranty oI
habitability.
So, there is just not much accurate or truthIull in Judge SIerrazza's 11/9/11 Order
awarding attorney's Iees to the landlord:
-'This matter came on regularly for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to NRS 40.254 and
NRS 40.253(6) on October 13, 2011, and continued on October 25, 2011, beIore the
Honorable Peter J. SIerrazza, sitting without a jury. '
Its true, there was no jury (despite a timely jury demand (Rule 38, either NRCP or
NJCRCP) being made on 10/11/11 where the NJCRCP 109 'Trial was not set until
10/13/11, and arguably, the setting was not Iinalized until 10/17/11 when Coughlin posted
the rent escrow. Its a bit oI revisionist history though (problematic, even under any sua
sponte (well, with some prompting Irom Baker that violated RPC 3.3) amending oI his
10/13/11 Order within 10 days oI entering it, where the substance oI the Order itselI
aIIected the notice aspect oI the due process Coughlin is entitled to with respect to several
oI the key distinctions between 'trials and 'continued 'evidentiary hearing under NRS
40.253(6). Actually, the Iollowing excerpt Irom the 10/25/11 transcript is insightIul:
'DeIendant: And we're in a trial, so. Judge: No, we're not yet, sir. Do you have my order
Irom the last court date |18:14|? ...this is an order October 13th. 'Tenant's motion to
continue denied. II the deIendant posts rent, a trial will be set Ior October 25th at 10 a.m.
So it is a trial. PlaintiII: Yeah. (page 36) Judge: ... you're telling me that you disagree
that we can go forward with the trial today? What you want to do is get a 20-day
complaint and go to trial in that manner? DeIendant: Well, are we talking about 20 days
Irom some past notice or some Iuture service |19:52|. Judge: ... I'm just clariIying, are you
arguing today that we should not be going Iorward with the trial?...DeIendant: ... a plenary
trial ... Judge: Well, the problem with that position, sir, you are going to have to post
the additional rent as of November 1st. DeIendant: Your Honor,-- 40.253(6) if the court
showing no further order once converting this to a full-scale plenary trial. Juage. I
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havent convertea it to anything, sir. Defenaant. But it seems as though youre saying if that
occurs, once it converts to a plenary that you woula have to post rent. Judge: No, I'm
saying as a condition of doing that, I'm not going to let you live there without -- or use
the office without paying rent. DeIendant: That's Las Vegas Rule 44... Judge: I don't care
about Las Vegas Rule 44. (page 37) DeIendant: We don't have a corollary to that Reno,
Your Honor. Judge: And we do have a statute and we do have our own rule, sir. ..
DeIendant: ... Reno Justice Court Rule 2 says they don't apply to landlord-tenant actions.
So we're leIt with. Judge: We do have rules that allow us to accept deposit, sir... '
Judge SIerrazza's indication that Coughlin would have needed to deposit November
2011's rent into the court's escrow account as well (apparently, under the same ultimatum as
previously premised upon NRS 118A.355(5) with respect to the initial $2,275 required
deposit) runs counter, in a clearly reversible manner, to NRS 40.253(6), and, by analogy, to
the spirit oINRS 40.385(2). Further, it is oI paramount improtance in this matter to discern
iI the 2011 revision to NRS 40.385(1) is applicable. However, given Judge SIerrazza
granted the summary no cause eviction (unless Coughlin pleading retaliation somehow
turns such a matter into a non-payment Ior cause eviction), and given that NRS 40.254
makes clear it may not be utilized against a commercial tenant unless non-payment oI rent
is pled, it arguably doesn't matter which version oI NRS 40.385 is applicable, to the extent
the law oI the case would hold Coughlin a commercial tenant. Further, under the 2011
revision thereto, '100 percent oI the unpaid rent claim oI the landlord would be $0.00
given the no cause basis Merliss pursued (Baker wanted to beneIits oI so proceeding, and he
must take the good with the bad, as there are some drawbacks).
Its seems, perhaps, one oI the overriding questions oI law stemming Irom this
summary eviction is whether a tenant's pleading retaliation under NRS 118A.510 to a no
cause eviction may expose such tenant to being Iorced to deposit 'any rent becoming due
pursuant to NRS 118A.355(5). Restatement Second, Property: Landlord and Tenant 14.8,
14.9(1)
Its not all that clear what rules oI procedure apply to appeals Irom justice court to
district court: 'NEVADA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE I. APPLICABILITY
OF RULES RULE 1. SCOPE, CONSTRUCTION OF RULES (a) Scope oI Rules. These
Rules govern procedure in the Supreme Court oI Nevada.
2011 Statutes of Nevada, Page 1492 (Chapter 271, AB 398)
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action. A tenant of commercial property may obtain a stay of execution only upon the
landlord.
NRAP RULE8.STAY OR INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL OR RESOLUTION OF
ORIGINAL WRIT PROCEEDINGS
(a)Motion Ior Stay.
(1)Initial Motion in the District Court.A party must ordinarily move Iirst in the
district court Ior the Iollowing relieI:
(A)a stay oI the judgment or order oI, or proceedings in, a district court pending
appeal or resolution oI a petition to the Supreme Court Ior an extraordinary writ;
(B)approval oI a supersedeas bond; or
(C)an order suspending, modiIying, restoring or granting an injunction while an
appeal or original writ petition is pending.

(2)Motion in the Supreme Court; Conditions on RelieI.A motion for the relief
mentioned in Rule 8(a)(1) may be made to the Supreme Court or to one of its justices.
(A)The motion shall:
(i)show that moving Iirst in the district court would be impracticable; or
(ii)state that, a motion having been made, the district court denied the motion or
Iailed to aIIord the relieI requested and state any reasons given by the district court Ior its
action.
(B)The motion shall also include:
(i)the reasons Ior granting the relieI requested and the Iacts relied on;
(ii)originals or copies oI aIIidavits or other sworn statements supporting Iacts
subject to dispute; and
(iii)relevant parts oI the record.
(C)The moving party must give reasonable notice oI the motion to all parties.
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(D)A motion under this Rule shall be Iiled with the clerk and normally will be
considered by a panel oI the court. But in an exceptional case in which time constraints
make that procedure impracticable, the motion may be considered by a single justice.
(E)The court may condition relieI on a party`s Iiling a bond or other appropriate
security in the district court...
(c)Stays in Civil Cases Not Involving Child Custody.In deciding whether to issue a
stay or injunction, the Supreme Court will generally consider the Iollowing Iactors: (1)
whether the object oI the appeal or writ petition will be deIeated iI the stay or injunction is
denied; (2) whether appellant/petitioner will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the
stay or injunction is denied; (3) whether respondent/real party in interest will suIIer
irreparable or serious injury iI the stay or injunction is granted; and (4) whether appellant/
petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits in the appeal or writ petition.

Further, at the 10/25/11 date: 'DeIendant: I just want to clariIy how does that
reconcile with 40.253(6)? ... It says once the court finds a material issue has been
alleged, a prima facie showing, the court shall make no Iurther order and this shall be
converted to a plenary trial.... and there's two cases that interpret that, too, Anvui, the
Nevada cases, Nevada Supreme Court, Anvui and the Glacier. That's 163 P.3d 413...
PlaintiII:..the exact language Irom NRS 40.253(6) says, "II the court determines that there
is a legal defense ... the court shall refuse to grant either party any relief, and, ... any
Iurther proceedings be...(plenary)...statutes contemplated veriIied complaint and answer
discovery trial, et cetera,... However, beIore that ...it says, "...t shall hold a hearing, ... to
determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided Ior in that
section." ...The court found specifically that he had alleged it and if Mr. Coughlin wants
to call that a prima facie case, whatever. The court found that he alleged it, but had
not substantiated it... Judge: All right... I agree that I have not made the requisite finding
that requires a trial at this time. (pages 37-39).
Its not clear that all Merliss had to do was meet some initial burden oI prooI to show
that his 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit ( lease had expired or terminated, and that the
notices were suIIiciently and correctly served (which h
NRS 118A.355 Failure oI landlord to maintain dwelling unit in habitable condition.. '(
3). II the rental agreement is terminated, the landlord shall return all prepaid rent and security
recoverable by the tenant under this chapter. Coughlin did not get his 'security deposit
under this section in 1708, despite Baker asserting the agreement was terminated.
Another big problem stemming Irom Baker's dishonest characterization that the lease
had 'expired in his 8/22/11 and 9/27/11 Notices is provided by NRS 40.360(3) (and that 5
day notice does nto satisIy NRS 40.280 given there is no envelope or certiIied mailing slip, to
suggest that the process server mailed such notice, in aaaition to posting it...and Baker
himselI admitted the insuIIicency oI his attempts at service thereoI on Coughlin, on the
record, in open court, on 9/27/11, likely alluding to courthouse sanctuary rule and or the
immunity oI attorney's and litigants Irom service oI such while attending court, especially an
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action immediately connected thereto. And that Iailure, brings to light additional Iaults with
the various halI-stepping attempts to comply with the requirement in NRS 40.254(2) that the
landlord Iile an aIIidavit containing certain speciIic inIormation (and it must be in writing, not
some quasi-patch work oI testimony by Merliss, the 10/19/11 Declaration oI Casey Baker,
Esq. (with all its murky assertions oI attorney-client privilege, and some 10/11/11 'UnlawIul
Detainer AIIidavit that was, contrary to the text oI such Iiling by Baker on 10/12/11, not, in
Iact, attached thereto, and not oIIered, marked, or admitted into evidence at the 10/13/11
hearing, at which, Judge SIerrazza noted, Baker lacked a witness. Judge SIerrazza quickly
improvised an instead shiIted the burden on to Coughlin, immediately insisting that Coughlin
be sworn and start testiIying.
Personal service oI summons--Authority or capacity to serve
Service oI summons attempted to be made by plaintiII's attorney held void (Rev. Laws,
5022, 5474). Nevada Cornell Silver Mines v. Hankins, 1929, 279 P. 27, 51 Nev. 420.
37. Mandamus
Extraordinary relieI is available to challenge an order denying motion to quash service oI
process.
Rules App.Proc., Rule 21(b). Cariaga v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court oI State, 1988, 762
P.2d 886, 104 Nev. 544
NRS40.360(3):Judgment; damages; execution and enIorcement... '( 3).Execution and
enIorcement.When the proceeding is Ior an unlawIul detainer aIter deIault in the payment
oI the rent, and the lease or agreement under which the rent is payable has not by its terms
expired, execution upon the fuagment shall not be issued until the expiration oI 5 days aIter
the entry of the fuagment, within which time the tenant, or any subtenant, or any mortgagee oI
the term, or other party interested in its continuance, may pay into court Ior the landlord the
amount oI the judgment and costs, and thereupon the judgment shall be satisIied and the
tenant be restored to the tenant`s estate; but, iI payment, as herein provided, be not made
within the 5 days, the judgment may be enIorced Ior its Iull amount and Ior the possession oI
the premises. In all other cases the judgment may be enIorced immediately.
NRS 118A.355 Failure oI landlord to maintain dwelling unit in habitable condition.
1. ... iI a landlord Iails to maintain a dwelling unit in a habitable condition ...or to make a
reasonable eIIort to do so within the prescribed time, the tenant may:...
(d) Withhold any rent that becomes due without incurring late Iees, charges Ior notice or
any other charge or Iee authorized by this chapter or the rental agreement until the landlord
has remedied, or has attempted in good Iaith to remedy, the Iailure...
5. Justice courts shall establish by local rule a mechanism by which tenants may deposit rent
withheld under paragraph (d) oI subsection 1 into an escrow account maintained or approved
by the court. A tenant does not have a defense to an eviction under paragraph (d) of
subsection 1 unless the tenant has deposited the withheld rent into an escrow account
pursuant to this subsection.
It was reversible error to require Coughlin to deposit any amoutn under
NRS118A.355(5) incident to a no cause sumamry eviction notice, as, necessarily, there is not
'any rent that becomes due where the landlord Iail to plead non-payment oI rent.
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Further discrepancies between the SBN's 12/14/12 ROA and the 2/13/13 ROA appear,
beginning at R386. The SBN has cleverly utilized an Alphabetical Index oI Documents only
in both ROA's to disguise this. Not like and Index by page number or date (like a
Docket...like the 'Pleadings Docket reIerred to so many times in the FOFCOL (R1356:25,
R1357:22, R1358:8, R1361:17,19, R1362:11 ) would be oI use....but there simply is not one
in either ROA, and the SBN consistently reIused to provide Coughlin one or access to the Iile
in this matter.
In the ROA oI 2/13/13 (ROA2) beginning at R386, ROA1 begins to depart again Irom
ROA1.
Where ROA2 indicates at pages: '353-714 one will Iind 'Motion Ior New trial,
Notice oI Hill and Baker's MalIeasance oI 11/30/12... ROA1 diIIered, indicating that at
pages '353-540 in Volume II one Iinds a Iiling Iile stamped 11/30/12 title 'Motion Ior New
trial oI Formal Disciplinary Hearing and Notice oI Hill and Baker's MalIeasance...in both
instances at R375 is the Index to Exhibit Ior that Motion, indicating that Exhibit 1 consists oI
a 'Declaration oI Zach Coughlin and a 637 page collection oI relevant materials (and its
interesting that that collection is repoduced in both the SBN's ROAs in such an illegible
manner when it contains so many materials demonstrating the patent misconduct oI Richard
G. Hill, Esq., and his associate Casey D. Baker, Esq., in the eviction oI Coughlin Irom his
Iormer home law oIIice at 121 River Rock, and in the appeal thereIrom, particularly given
Hill's inclusion on the NNDB, the Milsner v. Carstarphen connection between King and Hill,
and King's decision to completely disenIect the record oI any written grievance by
Hill...which disadvantages the SBN in its attempts to prove that Coughlin violated RPC 8.1 or
otherwise Iailed to appropriately respond to any 3/14/12 letter Irom Pat King depicted in
Formal Hearing Exhibit (FHE) 6, at R1779, where there is nothing in the record to
authenticate or veriIy the contents oI the purported 'enclosed correspondence Irom Richard
G. Hill, Esq., which alleges misconduct on (Coughlin's) part or whether any responses Irom
Coughlin managed to 'address each allegation contained in Mr. Hill's grievance.
Interestingly, also, the SBN/Clerk oI Court Peters chose not to insert a USPS CertiIied Mail
Receipt atop King's letter in FHE6. Regardless, through no Iault oI Coughlin's own, he did
not even receive any mailing Irom King until 3/9/12, due to the domestic violence/Gayle
Kern, Esq., Sue King, Western Nevada Management/Buck Hyde, Terri Passot, USPS
obstructionism resulting in delays in Coughlin's mail even being delivered to him, iI at all.
R444 and R445 present an interesting revelation. One, a continuation oI the practice in
ROA1 is seen, where, only with respect to Coughlin's Iiling, the SBN encourages any
reviewer oI the ROA to either quit reviewing it or get a headache where the pages are
presented upside down, then right side up, then awhile later, upside down again, then right
side up, requiring the reviewer to constantly be reorienting the hard copy volume oI the record
being surmised. That is not how Exhibit 1 to Coughlin's 11/30/12 Iiling was presented to the
SBN. Such is Iurther justiIication Ior striking ROA2 Irom the record. Such a Ilip Ilopping oI
orientation is seen between R444-445. Additionally, R445 present an email Irom Coughlin to
the same Reno Carson Messenger Service whose purported unsigned, unsworn, quasi-
AIIidavit oI attempted service somehow Iound its way into both ROAs at R32...and R32
really provides support Ior Coughlin's sworn contention that it was Iraudulent Ior King and
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the SBN to put Iorward the AIIidavit oI Mailing oI the 8/23/12 Complaint (R28, and again
within FHE1 at R1732):
Note, Ior all citations hereIorth beginning thusly 'HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages please
obtain the citation to the SBN's ROA2 by adding 1,373 to the pages number listed (hereIorth
cited as RX with x being the page number, and where CRX will be the Iormat Ior citing to
Coughlin's ROA, and CAX the Iormat Ior citing to Coughlin's Appendix with x, again,
representing the page number...also, all emphasis herein is added by Coughlin unless
otherwise indicated).
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 33:12 to 36:4) (note, adding 1,373 to Page 33 yields a cite oI
R1,396...iI time permits Coughlin will make all such conversions at a later date) 'MR.
COUGHLIN: fraudulent return oI service. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. Coughlin.
MR. KING: So I would ask that this be admitted as Exhibit No. 1. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
Coughlin, any objection? MR. COUGHLIN: I would object based on the Iact that Mr. King's
violating NRCP 11. And he knows the returns oI service are fraudulent. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That he knows what? MR. COUGHLIN: He knows the returns -- that he's
submitting that is fraudulent. MR. ECHEVERRIA: How so? MR. COUGHLIN: Because
one, the notice oI the hearing, he's attached a certiIied mailing that says it was mailed out on
the 12th. Well, iI you do a tracking conIirm on the USPS Website, it says the Iirst time it was
scanned into their service was the 16th. Further, it says I didn't get it until the 27th. Further, it
says I couldn't have gotten it -- the soonest I could have gotten it was the 22nd, through no
Iault oI my own. Now, that might have been due to, one, it didn't get into the system until the
16th, and I can testiIy to that in some respect. But even beyond that, it didn't get into my
mailbox or become available to me, according to the USPS tracking conIirm Website,
because it gets that speciIic, until the 22nd. Now, we're speaking about the notice oI the
hearing, which is also, according to SCR 1052(c), supposed to include the DowSoE. And that
is again supposed to be sent by the panel. And that service by the panel, which is supposed to
be in accordance with SCR 109, is supposed to be such that the hearing, I would be served
notice oI the hearing in the DowSoE no less than 30 days prior to the hearing. Instead, Mr.
King, which he's wont to do every chance he gets, every chance Mr. King gets, he wants to
play the director. And he's taking on the panel's role, he's controlling the clerk oI court here,
he's, I believe, controlling my clients and oIIering them attorneys -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm
interested in an objection to Exhibit 1 being admitted, and your objection is improper service?
MR. COUGHLIN: That it's Iraud. Mr. King's committing Iraud by presenting that to the
court. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Because oI improper service? MR. COUGHLIN: Because oI --
the State Bar has represented to me, one, that the 823 purported certiIied mailing would not be
presented as a return oI service. And that's what he's doing here, he's presenting that as a
return oI service to get around the Iact that when I appeared here on September 25th Mr.
King pulled my jacket Ior a hearing, Ior the hearing I'm supposed to get -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Let's Iocus on -- MR. COUGHLIN: I am. But this is very important. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: No, you're not, sir. I'm interested in what your objection is to the admission
oI Exhibit 1. You say it's Iraud. That's a broad conclusion. Is it Iraud because oI improper
service? MR. COUGHLIN: It's Iraud because he's seeking to avoid what happened on the
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25th. He's going against what the State Bar told me. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I have no idea
what happened on the 25th. I'm interested in your explanation oI Iraud. I've asked you three
times. I've been unable to obtain a meaningIul answer. I'm going to overrule your objection.
Mr. King. (Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence.)
Its pretty dishonest oI King and the Panel to attempt to get Coughlin to testiIy as to a
'result that they know what not actually the 'result oI such (Particularly where Judge Elliott
utlizes the word 'Ruling
Further, where Chair Echeverria indicates: HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 35:24 to 35:25):
'MR. ECHEVERRIA: I have no iaea what happenea on th e 25th . Im interestea in your
explanation of fraua. Chair Echeverria should have a pretty good idea oI what happened on
9/25/12 (meaning he didn't read R44-52 much, or understand how it relates to the issue oI
whether the SBN ever served Coughlin the Complaint in this matter given the SBN's previous
express representations that the 8/23/12 AIIidavit oI Mailing (R28 and R1732)giving his
10/31/12 Order (R163:18-21) which disposed oI a mutlitude oI motions literally hours aIter
Chairman Susich appointed him Panel Chair) denied Coughlin's Motion Ior Order to Show
Cause/Motion to Dismiss (which Chair Echverria indicates was 'prepared October 2
nd
, 2012,
and Iiled October 16
th
, 2012 (R163:20-21)...which totally contradicts ROA2, which in the
Alphabetical Index immediately preceeding the ROA lists such submission by Coughlin
(Iound at R44-106) as 'not Iiled (apparently King, beyond disobeying this Court's 6/7/12
Order in 60838 (where he 'consolidated his ridiculous SCR 105 Complaint with that which
the jurisdiction aIIorded by that Order accorded) also disobeys the Chair's ruling as to whether
or not Coughlin's submission at R44 should be Iiled in and Iile stamped...another huge issue is
the SBN's Iailure to Iile in, or even, apparently, in any way notiIy the Panel and Chair oI
Coughlin's 11/9/12 submission, which in its title identiIies itselI as a 'Formal Response and
is veriIied and Iurther denies any wrongdoing as to all the allegations even more than
Coughlin's 4/16/12 written correspondence to the SBN and King did.
King either gets caught lying, or admitting to impermissible ex parte communications
with the Panel Chair in the Iollowing:
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 47:9 to 47:24): HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 47:8 to 47:24) 'Q R.
KING: Mr. Chairman, we have provided you with certified copies of each of these orders.
I would move that Exhibit No. 1 be admitted pursuant to the NRS statute 52 -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Exhibit 1 has been admitted. MR. KING: I'm sorry. I meant Exhibit 2. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Any objection, Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, is it truly a
certified copy has been -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: 1hat's what he's represented. MR.
COUGHLIN: Is that true? MR. KING: I have certified copies of all the orders that are
going to be admitted.
So, King attempts to make up Ior the Iact that he lacks a certiIied copy oI FHE2
(R1754 hardly suIIices, and whatever extent King was provided some purported certiIied
copy oI such Irom Hill presents chain oI custody issues that King at least ought be required to
disclose...getting a bootleg 'certiIied copy oI some Order Irom a guy oII the street in a trench
coat name 'Gator is not quite the same as King asserting to the Panel that the certiIied copy
he is providing at the time oI seeking admission oI such and having it marked is one that
either he, or an SBN agent, themselves received directly Irom someone with the 2JDC with
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the requisite authority to so provide and endorse any such 'certiIied copy. So, especially
with FHE3 (laughably, the 'certiIied copy King that King alternately indicated he has, or
proviaea, (or Chair Echeverria with another assist to King, allowing Ior an oopsie moment
where the Chair is the one mischaracterizing King's proIIer where the Chair indicates 'that's
what he's represented in reIerence to Coughlin's 'is it truly a certfiea copy` (though,
arguably under RPC 3.3, and 3.4 King has or had a duty to correct such a
mischaracterization...regardless..iI King did 'have certiIied copies oI all the orders that are
goign to be admitted then why didn't he just produce such certiIied copy Ior FHE2, FHE3
(and all the quasi- 'certiIied copies by the RMC) at the time oI seeking its admission? Did
King mean he had 'provided the Panel with such 'certiIied copies at some earlier time?
Certainly nothing in the ROA supports such a statement (none oI King's Iiling attach either
FHE's 2,3, 10, 12, 13, etc.
Further, FHE 12 and 13 were not admitted into evidence, yet the FOFCOL relies upon
them (R1376), which is rather important, especially with respect to FHE 13 and the alleged
'criminal trespass conviction and alleged disposition oI the appeal where neither FHE12 or
13 was admitted (price to pay Ior Mr. King 'ruling his own Exhibits admitted aIter trying to
badger Coughlin into providing some 'legal opinion as to the documents contained therein
(and King's questions were unclear anyways...convicted oI what? Contempt? Civil or
criminal? AIIirmed or denied what? A ruling, decision, order, judgment, verdict? They are
diIIerent, and it matters.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 194:12 to 198:4) BY MR. KING: Q Mr. Coughlin, aIter a trial
on the -- I think you just alluded to a charge that had something to do with the Indian tribal
police or something, I'm not sure. But were you charged with theIt out oI a Walmart store? A
I believe so. Q Was there a trial on that, a court trial? A Yes, sir. Q At the end oI that
court trial did the judge render a verdict Iinding you guilty? A Yes, sir. Q Was that
appealed, was the decision oI the court appealed by you? A Yes. Q Was the conviction
upheld on appeal? A Well, when he rendered his order -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
Coughlin, the question calls Ior a yes or no answer. Was the conviction -- BY MR. KING: Q
I'll give you an opportunity to explain. But iI you would just start with that answer. Was it
upheld on appeal? A I don't know quite how to answer that, iI a yes or no. I would have to
read the order more thoroughly. Q Not to be condescending, but you're Iighting Ior your law
license. Do you know whether or not you Iilled an appeal and whether or not it was upheld on
appeal? A II something is dismissed, is that the same as being not upheld? I know it cited to
a civil statue on the preparation oI transcripts, which doesn't apply to a criminal deIendant.
Even though on the bench 14 years, some people would say that's kind oI -- I don't know how
appropriate that is. And he told me that when they brought me back Irom the cell. He said,
you have to pay Ior the transcript up Iront at your own expense. When actually Nevada law
does not say that. It says the court has to order the transcript prepared within ten days,
regardless oI whether you pay or not. Regardless. So who is stealing? MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Maybe the question can be phrased diIIerently. You did take an appeal Irom the conviction?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: What was the result oI the appeal? THE
WITNESS: Judge Elliott said I didn't cite to the transcript. MR. ECHEVERRIA: What was
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the result -- THE WITNESS: So I want to say he denied the appeal, because I didn't cite to
the transcript that the muni court violated Nevada law in not preparing -- when they hold out
Pam Longoni, house transcriptionist, and they tell you she is the only one you can use, and
you have to pay her a substantial down payment up Iront, and we're not going to prepare the
transcript until you do that. And I think they also say they are not going to transmit it in Iull
until you pay in Iull. But they don't start it until you put down like 250 or something. It
depends on how long it is. Which is all violative oI Nevada law -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: It
would help, Mr. Coughlin, iI you could Iocus on the questions. THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: What was the result oI the appeal? THE WITNESS: Technically, I
don't know how. I Iiled a brieI. It did not turn out good Ior me. I don't know whether they said
it was denied or upheld. But basically the order was short, and it said, you didn't cite to the
transcript. So I think he essentially said I'm not going to consider your 40-page 50-page brieI,
whatever that I typed out -- well, maybe that was a subsequent supreme court thing -- MR.
KING: Mr. Chairman, I was hoping to expedite by getting the testimony Irom Mr. Coughlin.
I have the orders. I will just mark them and admit them. (Exhibit 12 marked.) THE
WITNESS: Basically Judge Elliott said you have to cite to the record -- (Exhibit 13 marked.)
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King is handing something to the reporter. Please don't talk while
he's doing that. MR. KING: So you should each have two documents in Iront oI you. One is
entitled Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal. The other order is the Order
AIIirming Ruling oI the Reno Municipal Court. MR. VELLIS: What numbers are those?
MR. KING: 12 and 13.
Indeed at ROA1348:7-14, it is reversible error to, apparently (see criticism oI ROA's
bates stamping obscurring original page numbers oI documents, even improtant one's like the
FOFCOL betwwen R1348-1698) utilize language Irom King's Complaint (rather than some
ruling, order, judgment, etc.) as prooI oI the Iollowing: '3. On September 9, 2011,
Coughlin shopliIted a candy bar and cough drops Irom a Wal-Mart store with an approximate
value oI Iourteen dollars ($14.00). On November 30, 2011, Municipal Court Judge Kenneth
R. Howard Iound Coughlin guilty oI the oIIense oI Petit Larceny, a violation oI RMC
8.10.040. Coughlin appealed the judgment oI conviction. On March 15, 2012, the Honorable
District Court Judge Steven P. Elliott aIIirmed the judgment oI conviction on appeal. See
Hearing Exhibit 1 at 0002, para 5, lines 11-15; (State Bar oI Nevada vs. Zachary B. Coughlin,
Esq., Case No: NG12-0204, NG12-0435, NG12-0434, Complaint at P2 (Iiled August 23,
2012)
Further, the SBN's ROA's utilize a bates stamping method that cuts oI a signiIicant
portion oI the Iooter oI all documents, and thereby prevents the reviewer Irom seeing the
original pagination on such documents or Iilings (Ior instance one does not know upon
reviewin R166-167 what the original page numbers were Ior such 'Iilings), justiIying
striking the ROA (as does the obscuring oI the Iooter in Iilings, cutting oII a signIicant
portion oI, say, the title Io the document listed therein along with the page number, Ior
instance at R44). Indeed, when the FOFCOL cites to 'See Hearing Exhibit 1 at 0002 one
has no idea what page is being cited, as the bates stamping oI the ROA completely covers up
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(Ior no good reason, with a halI inch swath oI white running along the bottom margin oI all
pages, accomplishing nothing more than adding a bates stamp in the lower right corner) the
bates stamping King had applied to his FHE1 itselI. So, what is 'See Hearing Exhibit 1 at
0002? Is it the selections oI RPC's that King put together at the Start oI FHE1 (and R1699 is
no help at all, having, apparently, been purposeIully obscured (its only the Index to the
documents collected in FHE1, so, no biggie) especially when considering how very clear the
same page was in ROA1 (such 'Index oI Documents at what would be page 335 oI Volume
3 in that ROA (the SBN Iailed to bates stamp volume three, but did add handwritten page
numbers Ior every page aIter the Iinal page oI the Transcript (which is paginated
itselI...though the SBN excised some 60 pages oI its Index...which is kind a similar to the
SBN only providing an Alphabetical Index oI Documents in either ROA, both an attempt to
obIuscate how baseless, non-meritorious, and Iraudulent this whole proceeding and the
Complaint and grievances underyling it have been and are.).
Additionally, R1376 appears to incorrectly assert that Coughlin's FHE14 was not
admitted into evidence to any degree.
The 2JDC has now admitted that the RJC Iailed to actuall transmit the actual
documents themselves listed in the 'Appeal Receipt on page 2 oI the 1/4/12 Supplmental in
CV11-03628, despite the 'CertiIicate oI Clerk Irom both the RJC and the 2JDC indicating
that such haa been receivea on 1/4/12. Obviously, this is hugely important and calls into
question Judge Flanagan's Orders in 03628, including those oI 1/11/12, 2/8/12, 3/30/12,
6/25/12, 8/28/12 (which King will really need to explain his emailing to Coughlin on 8/30/12
then proceeding to oIIer FHE2 as evidence oI Coughlin being sanctioned when Judge
Flanagan explicitly rules in his Order oI 8/28/12 that he had not sanctioned Coughlin in his
3/30/12 Order or otherwise premised the award oI attorney's Iees on anything other then DCR
13(3). Both King and Hill clearly attempted to mislead the tribunal in that regard (Hill was
served the 8/28/12 Order, so what's his excuse? He can't go with his trusty 'I wasn't at the
trial). The Iollowing is a true and correct copy oI the email contained below (Coughlin
declares under penalty oI perjury that whenever he produces the text oI or quotes to any such
correspondence, order, notice, etc., anywhere herein, it is a true and correct representation oI
what is and was included therein, either in part, or in whole).:
'Subject: RE: DeIicient ROA's and Supplementals, list oI parties to put on service list under
NEFR 9
Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2013 12:22:10 -0700 From: Julie.Wisewashoecourts.us
To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com CC: Joey.Hastingswashoecourts.us
Dear Mr. Coughlin:
The documents listed on the Appeal Receipt oI the Supplemental to Justice Court
Appeal Proceedings Iiled on January 4, 2012 have now been received by the Second Judicial
District Court. The documents were Iiled into case CV11-03628 on Monday, April 1, 2013.
Thank you, Julie
Obviously, it is troubling the extent to which Iootnote 5 on page 5 oI Judge Flanagan's
3/30/12 Order appears to seek to excuplate the RJC and its Clerks, etc. Ior the Iailure to set
and hold within 10 days oI Couglhin's 11/16/11 Motion To Contest Personal Property lien
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purusant to NRS 40.253(8), when viewed in conjunction with the admission by 2JDC Asst.
Clerk oI Court Wise that the RJC did not, in Iact, transmit the documents listed in the 'Appeal
Receipt oI the 1/4/12 Supplmental in CV11-03628, particularly where one such document
was a Notice oI Appeal oI that 12/21/11 Order Resolving Motion to Contest Personal
Property Lien. More problematic still is the Iact that, even had the documents listed in said
'Appeal Receipt actually been transmitted, such would have Iailed to included the 12/22/11
Iilings by Coughlin...the very one's Hill testiIied at the Iormal disciplinary hearing.
While 'WDCR Rule 19. Appeals Irom municipal and justice courts. ...4. In civil
appeals Irom the justice court, appellant shall Iile within 30 days aIter the Iiling oI a notice oI
appeal a written brieI containing a statement oI the errors committed in the justice court with
accompanying authorities which shall not exceed 5 pages. Within 20 days aIter the Iiling and
service oI appellant`s brieI, respondent shall Iile a written answering brieI which shall not
exceed 5 pages is cited in Judge Flanagan's 1/6/12 Order Ior BrieIing Schedule, such Order
is void given there is a speciIic statutory rememdy and rules attendant to appeals thereoI in
appeals oI summary evictions, makign NRAP 30, and 32 applicable (30 page page limit)
under NRS 40.400. Further, the de novo review required oI such summary eviction order
under Anvui makes inappropriate any such '5 pages limitation.
Exhibit 5 to Baker's 1/20/12 Second Motion Ior Order to Show Cause consists oI an
undated 'DECLARATION OF PHILLIP STEWART PHILLIP STEWART wherein Stewart
alleges: 'being Iirst duly sworn, deposes and under penalty oI peIjury avers:
clean out the property leIt behind at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada aIter the most-recent
tenant was evicted.
4. On Thursday, 1anuary 12, 212, we began work.
Management transIer station, I was flagged down by Zach Coughlin. At first I thought it
was a citizen trying to alert me that debris was falling out of the truck, so I stopped. The
driver approached me. I immediately recognized Mr. Coughlin from a previous
encounter with him at the River Rock property, and from having seen him in court.
station. He tried to prevent me Irom doing so by, among other things, standing in the street
in front of my truck.
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have a cell phone. I then proceeded to the transfer station, but not without being harassed
8. When I arrived at the transfer station, Mr. Coughlin jumped in Iront oI my truck
to stop me Irom entering the transIer station building. He produced a cell phone and was
talking to somebody, who I later learned was a Iemale Sergeant with the Reno Police
Department. Coughlin was Ialsely screaming that I was running over him. He physically
prevented me Irom proceeding. The police arrived and I called Mr. Hill to come to the
transIer station. Mr. Hill arrived at the transIer station a short time later. AIter Mr. Hill
showed some paperwork to the police oIIicer, I was allowed to proceed with dumping my
load at the transIer station.
Coughlin was already there. Mr. Coughlin was walking up and down the street with his
video camera, yelling and screaming at me, my crew, and, later, the police and Mr. Hill,
when they arrived. The police tola Mr. Hill to go to the Reno Justice Court ana get a TPO,
which he did.
Finally, after he refused to comply with their requests, Mr. Coughlin was arrested and taken
into custody.
preceding document does not contain the social security number oIany person. . DATED this
day oI January, 2012
Stewart is also the individual whom submitted a bill, which Baker attached as an
Exhibit to his Memorandum oI costs seekign to be reimbursed $1,060 Ior 'securing the
property and 'Iixing a leak in the basement Ior work done allegedly done on 11/17/11
(which brings up the question oI how Coughlin could have been ordered to pay some $480 Ior
'16 days oI storage at the Iull Iair rental value oI the property Ior Iull use and occcupancy
between November 1 to November 16
th
, 2011 (the date Coughlin Iiled his Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien). It is entirely unjust Ior Judge Flanagan to reIuse to consider those
matter related to Coughlin's claims vis a vis the 12/21/11 Order Resolving Coughlin's
11/16/11 Motion to Contest Lien where res judicata incident to Judge SIerrazza's 12/21/11
Order makes clear that no NRS 118A.460 'reasonable storage, moving, and inventorying
expenses would be awarded beyond the $480 in rent, especially where Hill and Baker sought
an award under such statute in 1708, not 03628, Ior that same $1,060 bill by contractor
Stewart at the 12/20/11 Hearing in 1708.
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Attached as Exhibit 6 to Baker's 1/20/12 Second Motion Ior Order to Show Cause in
03628 is the:
'DECLARATION OF RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ. RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., being Iirst
duly sworn, deposes and under penalty oIperjury avers:
1. I am a resident oIthe City oI Reno, County oIWashoe, State oI Nevada, and over 18 years
oIage. This declaration is based on my personal knowledge, except those matters stated on
2. I am an attorney duly licensed as such by the State oI Nevada to practice beIore all courts
oIthis State and maintain my oIIice at 652 Forest Street, Reno, Nevada. I am also licensed to
practice beIore the United States District Court Ior the District oI Nevada, the Ninth Circuit
Court oIAppeals and the United States Supreme Court.
4. In accordance with the Reno Justice Court's order oI December 21, 2011, on Thursday,
December 22, 2011, Mr. Coughlin was given Iull run oI the River Rock property, starting at
9:00 a.m. At about noon that day, he sent an email to the eIIect that because he had appealed
the justice court's order, he Ielt himselI entitled to resume living in the property and would not
leave. Later that day, Judge SIerrazza sent out an email that Coughlin's stay had been denied.
When we arrived at 5:00 p.m. to lock the property up, it was apparentthat Mr. Coughlin had
done virtually nothing to remove any possessions. This is relevant to the order to show cause,
because it shows that Coughlin was more interested in conIrontation that in actually getting
his possessions out oI the house.
5. On Friday, December 23, 2011, we unlocked the house at 9:00 a.m. as ordered. We
At approximately noon, my staII inIormed me that an enragedMr. Coughlin had called the
I immediately went over and unlocked the back gate.
Coughlin had a small crew. He charged at me and made physical contact. He was enraged.
We leIt.
When we returned at 5:00 p.m., Mr. Coughlin was screaming and yelling obscenities. He
drove oII in a small U -Haul. His crew remained. We walked the property with them. The
inside.ground Iloor was mostly cleared oI all but a big TV. The basement had been cleared
somewhat, butthere was still a lot oI "junk. " We could not access the attic.
We went outside. I told Coughlin's crew they could remove anything and everything outside,
iI they would only try to rehang the gate that Mr. Coughlin had taken oII the hinges beIore we
could get over to unlock it. I told them I would lock the gates in the morning. over to the
River Rock property.When I returned the next day, Coughlin's crew had not taken much oI
what
had been outside the night beIore. I secured the backyard, and nothing was moved until the
events detailed herein.
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6. On Thursday, January 12,2012, I met with Phil Stewart oI Nevada Building Industries at
the River Rock property to make arrangements with him to remove and dispose oI the
abandoned property leIt there by Mr. Coughlin. I then returned to my oIIice.
7. Approximately Iour to Iive hours aIter returning to my oIIice, I received a telephone call
Irom Mr. Stewart. Mr. Stewart inIormed me that Mr. Coughlin had Ilagged him down near the
Waste Management transIer station, where Mr. Stewart was attempting to dump his Iirst load
oI debris removed Irom the house that morning.
8. Mr. Stewart told me that Coughlin was accusing him (Mr. Stewart) oI stealing his things,
threatening to sue Mr. Stewart, and generally trying to prevent Mr. Stewart Irom disposing oI
those items by, among other things, standing in the street in Iront oI Mr. Stewart's truck. I told
Mr. Stewart to have Mr. Coughlin call me, because I wanted to try to negotiate terms to
release the contents oI the truck to Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Stewart told me Mr. Coughlin said he
did not have a cell phone.
9. Shortly thereaIter, I received another call Irom Mr. Stewart. He was at the transIer station.
Mr. Coughlin had stopped him Irom entering. Mr. Coughlin had called the police, and told
them that Mr. Stewart had stolen his (Coughlin's) possessions, and that they were in the truck.
10. I immediately drove to the transIer station. When I got there, Mr. Coughlin was present,
and being cordoned away by two Reno Police Department oIIicers. AIter I presented the
police oIIicers with the Reno Justice Court's December 21,2011 order, and this court's January
11, 2012 order, Mr. Stewart was allowed to proceed. I then returned to my oIIice.
11. Approximately 15 minutes later, I received another call Irom Mr. Stewart, who inIormed
me that Mr. Coughlin was at the River Rock property. I immediately drove
12.When I got there, Mr. Coughlin was walking up and down the street and in the street with
his video camera, yelling and screaming at me, the police, and Mr. Stewart.
13. On the advice oI the police oIIicer on the scene, I then went to the Reno Justice Court and
obtained a temporary protective order against Mr. Coughlin to prevent him Irom returning to
the River Rock property or Iurther harassing Mr. Stewart and his crew. I Iilled outthe TPO
paperwork and returnedto River Rock. Mr. Coughlin was already in custody. He was in the
back oI a squad car. When he saw me, he began swearing and yelling. He was screaming at
the police and would not cooperate with them. I received a call to return to the Reno Justice
Court to retrieve the TPO, which I subsequently gave to an RPD oIIicer, who said he would
serve Mr. Coughlin at the jail.
14. I have personally reviewed exhibits 1-4 to the instant motion, and each exhibit is a true
and correct copy oIwhat it purports to be.
15. Mr. Coughlin's behavior was calculated to disrupt the removal oI debris Irom thehome. I
counted no less than 13 automobile seats in the basement, including what I am told is the Iront
bench-seat Irom a Chevrolet Blazer. Mr. Coughlin leIt signiIicant quantities oItrash and
garbage at the property.
AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby aIIirm that the preceding document does not contain the social
security number oI any person.
DATED this 19th day oI January, 2012
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The Minutes Irom the 3/23/12 Hearing on Baker's 1/20/12 Second Motion Ior Order
To Show Cause provide:
'ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Zachary Coughlin, Esq. was present in Court, acting in proper person.
Casey Baker, Esq. and Richard Hill, Esq. were present in Court on behalI oI the DeIendant,
who was not present.
11:00 a.m. Court convened.
The Court presented a brieI procedural history oI the case at bar including the proceedings at
the lower court level.
Counsel Coughlin addressed the Court and moved Ior a continuance.
COURT ORDERED: Motion to Continue: DENIED.
Counsel Baker requested the Court take judicial notice oI: the Order Resolving Motion to
Contest Personal Property Lien Iiled in Justice Court on December 21, 2011, this Court`s
Order, dated January 11, 2012 which was e-Iiled and e-served on the PlaintiII, that the
PlaintiII is a registered e-Iiler, and take judicial notice oI the Notice oI Entry oI Order also
Iiled on January 11, 2012, including the certiIicate oI service.
Counsel Baker called Phil Stewart, who was sworn, direct examination conducted. Counsel
Coughlin moved Ior this Court to appoint counsel to represent him, arguing that he is
indigent.
COURT ORDERED: Motion Ior the Appointment oI Counsel: DENIED.
Cross-examination conducted.
The Court took judicial notice oI all pleadings in this case.
11:40 a.m. Short recess.
11:50 a.m. Court reconvened.
Phil Stewart resumed the stand, heretoIore sworn, and cross- examination continued.
Counsel Coughlin invoked the rule oI exclusion, as it relates to Counsel Richard Hill. Motion:
DENIED. Cross-examination continued.
The Court advised counsel that the Courthouse closes at noon on Friday, thereIore this matter
will be continued. The Court, counsel, and the witness discussed various dates.
COURT ORDERED: Matter continued Ior Order to Show Cause to Monday, March 26, 2012
at 10:00 a.m.
12:08 p.m. Court stood in recess.
The Minutes Irom the Continuation Io the 3/23/12 OSC Hearing on 3/26/12 read:
'ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Zachary Coughlin, Esq. was present in Court, acting in proper person.
Casey Baker, Esq. and Richard Hill, Esq. were present in Court on behalI oI the DeIendant,
who was not present.
10:05 a.m. Court convened.
The Court addressed the parties and requested they clariIy their positions regarding the
Motion Requesting an Order to Show Cause and address
the December 21, 2011 Order issued Judge Peter J. SIerrazza
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this Court`s Order dated January, 11, 2012 and
InterIerence with the Order relating to the removal oI the PlaintiII`s property.
Counsel Baker responded.
The Court reviewed Supreme Court Order, Case No. 55668, Ristenpart v. the Second Judicial
District Court, in which this Court was ordered to vacate the contempt order, and the Hicks v.
Feiock, and City Council oI Reno v. Reno Newspapers decisions.
Counsel Baker advised the Court that it is his opinion that the contempt matter is a civil
matter but the Court has the authority to order a Iine and/or jail time.
The Court reviewed the Order issued on January 11, 2012 in which it denied the PlaintiII`s
Motion Ior a Temporary Restraining Order or an Injunction preventing the property owner
Irom deposing oI the tenant`s property or in the alternative a Motion Ior Stay.
COURT FINDS that PlaintiII Zachary Coughlin has not violated its Order dated January 11,
2012.
COURT FINDS the parties may have a legitimate dispute relative to PlaintiII`s actions
relating to the removal oI the PlaintiII`s property but that this dispute is in Iront oI Judge
SIerrazza.
COURT ORDERED: DeIendant Motion Ior an Order to Show Cause holding Zachary
Coughlin in Contempt: DENIED.
10:32 a.m. Court stood in recess.
In his 2/24/12 Answering BrieI, Baker writes: 'RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING
BRIEF Respondent, MATT MERLISS ("MERLISS"), by and through his counsel,
RICHARD G. HILL, LTD. and CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ., submits his Answering BrieI. I.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES: The only issue in this appeal is whether the Reno Justice
Court erred in granting a summary eviction oI appellant, ZACHARY COUGHLIN
("COUGHLIN") by its Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law, and Order Ior Summary
Eviction ("FFCL&O") dated December 27,201.2. See Record on Appeal ("ROA") at Vol. II,
pp. 75-80. EXHIBIT 1 hereto. II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: Although Coughlin has
muddied the record to a spectacular degree with his abusive Iilings, at its core, this is a simple
no-cause residential summary eviction case. The pertinent Iacts are as Iollows: The
underlying Iacts oI the eviction are set Iorth in the FFCL&O. The statutory notices and other
documentary evidence the court relied on in making its Iindings oI Iact can be Iound at ROA,
Vol. V, pp. 85-89; 90-94; 95-109; 113-128. EXHIBITS 2,3,4 and 5 hereto. The Standard
Rental Agreement ("LEASE") Ior the home at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada (the
"PROPERTY") can be Iound at ROA, Vol. V, pp 129-132. EXHIBIT 6 hereto. Those Iacts
were established during two evidentiary hearings, in which Coughlin Iully participated. The
Iirst hearing was on October 13, 2011, and lasted 90 minutes. A continuation oIthat hearing
occurred on October 25, 2011, and lasted several hours. l The purpose oIthose hearings was to
"determine the truthIulness and suIIiciency oIthe tenant's and the landlord's aIIidavits," to
determine whether there is any "legal deIense as to the alleged unlawIul detainer," and
whether "the tenant is guilty oIan unlawIul detainer".2 Those hearings were Coughlin's
eviction.
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The only deIenses raised by Coughlin below were based on what he claimed was "retaliatory"
conduct by Merliss, and "habitability" issues at the property. Both deIenses were based on
provisions oINRS Chapter lISA.3 At the Iirst hearing, Coughlin alleged his deIenses, but did
not oIIer any evidence to support them. Judge SIerrazza could have granted an eviction aIter
that hearing, but .chose instead to allow Coughlin another opportunity to substantiate his
allegations.4 Since Coughlin's deIenses were based on alleged "habitability" issues, the court
required him to deposit, pursuant to NRS 40.355(5), the amount oIrent Coughlin claimed he
had withheld Ior those reasons, beIore he would be allowed to substantiate them with
evidence.s Coughlin ultimately Iailed to raise any material Iactual dispute, and the court
properly granted the eviction. The lockout was perIormed on November I, 2011. Coughlin
Iiled his Iirst notice oIappeal on November 3, 2011.6 On November 13,2011, Coughlin was
Iound living in the basement oI the property, and was arrested.7 Coughlin continues to Iile
additional papers in both courts, wherein he attempts to raise new arguments he never raised
below.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "|A|n order granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6)
should be reviewed on appeal based upon the standard Ior review oI an order granting
summary judgment under NRCP 56 because these proceedings are analogous.,,8 "To
successIully deIend against a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must
transcend the pleadings and, by aIIidavit or other admissible evidence, introduce speciIic Iacts
that show a genuine issue oImaterial Iact.'"A case appealed must not be tried anew."IO
Further, "a |lower court's| Iindings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly
erroneous and are not based on substantial evidence."J 1 "The notice oIappeal shall speciIy
the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or part thereoI
appealed Irom ...,,12 "Only those parts oIthe judgment which are included in the notice
oIappeal will be considered by the appellate COurt.,,!3
IV. ARGUMENT: Despite having Iiled more than 50 pages in two brieIs, Coughlin Iails to
articulate or coherently analyze what he claims to be errors by the justice court. 14 He does
not make so much as a single citation to the ROA, and his Iailure in this regard is
sanctionable.15 The Court and Merliss are unIairly leIt to speculate as to the bases Ior his
appeal. 16 The incoherency oI Coughlin's brieIs makes that task nearly impossible. This
diIIiculty is compounded by Coughlin's reIusal to pay Ior a transcript oIthe proceedings
below. 17 On or about February 8, 2012, Coughlin attempted to supplement his opening brieI
with a CD that supposedly contained the audio recordings oIthe hearings below. Not only was
this an improper attempt by Coughlin to circumvent the record on appeal, the CD delivered to
the undersigned's oIIice was so badly damaged, that it would not be opened, even by counsel's
IT proIessional. Because oICoughlin's transgressions, Merliss has been deprived oIthe ability
to accurately cite to the hearing below. As best Merliss can tell, Coughlin alleges the
Iollowing errors:
1. Judge SIerrazza mistakenly called the October 25, 2012 hearing a "trial" and required
Coughlin to deposit the withheld rent with the court
Summary eviction hearings are conducted pursuant to NRS 40.253(6). "Formal" eviction
proceedings are conducted pursuant to NRS 40.290 through NRS 40.420. "Formal" eviction
proceedings contemplate the Iiling oI a complaint, an answer, conducting discovery, and a
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Iormal "trial.,,18 They can include claims Ior damages by both sides. "Formal" evictions can
either be initiated by the landlord in the Iirst instance, or, where a summary eviction has been
commenced, and the tenant establishes a legal deIense at the hearing, the court must then
order the parties to proceed under those statutes.19
When Judge SIerrazza continued the October 13,2011 hearing, he misspoke and called the
second hearing a "trial." That same word, "trial," was entered into the court's order.20
Coughlin has seized J.lpon the word "trial" to argue that he should have been aIIorded some
Iurther procedural protections oI the "Iormal" eviction proceedings (mainly, delay). This
argument is nonsense.21 The only way the court could have ordered the parties to proceed
with a "Iormal" eviction is int Iound that Coughlin had raised a legal deIense to the summary
eviction.22 Here, it Iound the opposite.
In ruling Irom the bench, the court explained more than once that the purpose oIthe October
25, 2011 proceeding was to allow Coughlin another opportunity to substantiate the deIenses
he had alleged at the Iirst hearing, because he had not yet done SO.23 The court's order
reIlects this, in that it required Coughlin to deposit the withheld rent iIhe (Coughlin) wished to
have another opportunity to prove up his habitability deIenses. II he Iailed to post the rent, the
eviction would be granted, because he had not established a legal deIense as required by NRS
40.253(6). The court's inadvertent use oIthe word "trial" did not somehow take the case out
oI the summary proceedings, nor could it have, and any argument that it did exalts Iorm over
substance and ignores the clear purpose oIthe order.24 Coughlin knew the October 25,2011
hearing was merely a continuation oIthe Iirst hearing. He knew that there had not been any
Iormal complaint Iiled. There is not one in the record. He recognized, and argued repeatedly,
that all he had to do to deIeat the summary eviction was establish a material Iactual dispute
Ior trial. In Iact, he argues as much in the "statement oIIacts and law" he purports to
incorporate in his Iirst notice oI appea1.25 Coughlin did not explain how he could have
possibly been prejudiced by the court's misstatement, so it is oI no consequence.
As to the rent deposit, NRS 118A.355 speciIically provides that "|a| tenant does not have a
deIense to an eviction under paragraph (d) oIsubsection 1 unless the tenant has deposited the
withheld rentinto an escrow account pursuant to this subsection." Coughlin was attempting to
set up a deIense based on "habitability".26 He had withheld rent in the process, while
purporting to invoke that statute.27 Even though the eviction proceeding was Ior "no-cause,"
and not expressly based on Coughlin's Iailure to pay rent, the court was correct to require him
to deposit what he claimed he had withheld, in order to proceed with his deIense. The statute
is plain on its Iace, and makes logical sense, as well. II Coughlin did not have the rent, and
Iailed to prove his case, the court has, in eIIect, improperly enjoined the landlord's use oI his
property. In any event, the October 13,2011 order was not an appealable order under NJCRCP
72A. For that reason, it is not properly at issue here. Itis also moot, since the court eventually
returned Coughlin's deposit to him, as discussed Iurther, below.
2. Not Iinding any ambiguity in the lease regarding "weeds"
One "habitability" item alleged by Coughlin was that weeds were growing in the yard. The
court Iound that maintenance oI the surrounding grounds, including any weeds, were
Coughlin's responsibility under paragraph 22 oI the Lease.28 That paragraph provides in part
that "Tenant will irrigate and maintain any surrounding grounds, including lawns and
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shrubbery, iI they are Ior the Tenant's exclusive use."29 Itis undisputed that the yard at the
property was Ior Coughlin's exclusive use. The Lease is unambiguous, and the court's Iinding
was correct. Moreover, "weeds" do not constitute a "habitability" issue under NRS 118A.290,
in any event, and Coughlin never presented any evidence that they did, or that he complied
with the statutory protocol Ior withholding, or had any right to withhold, any rent Ior that, or
any other alleged "habitability" issue.3o
3. Granting a no-cause summary eviction against a "commercial" tenant
Coughlin now argues that he was a "commercial" tenant, and thereIore not subject to
summary eviction. He Iirst raised this argument in his "opposition to motion Ior order to show
cause," which he Iiled on December 5, 2011, six weeks aIter the eviction was granted?1
Merliss addressed it in his reply Iiled the Iollowing day.32 First, Coughlin has the law wrong.
Summary evictions are available against a tenant oI any property that is subject to NRS
Chapter 11SA, which Merliss' property unquestionably was.33 Second, Coughlin
aIIirmatively waived any argument that NRS Chapter lI8A does not apply by basing his entire
deIense (retaliation/habitability) on what he alleged were violations oI that chapter.34
Moreover, because the court adopted Coughlin's position and ruled on that basis, he is
judicially estopped Irom changing his theory now.35 Additionally, since Coughlin never
timely raised the argument below, it cannot Iorm the basis Ior any relieI on appeal.36 In any
event, Coughlin has not cited to anywhere in the ROA that would support this new argument,
and neither this Court nor the court below are or were obligated to siIt through the record in
search oIsome Iact 7hich might support his claim.37 Finally, even iI Coughlin were running
one or more unlicensed businesses out oIt he property, he does not explain how that would
take this matter out oINRS Chapter l18A.
4. Not holding a hearing on Coughlin's motion to contest personal property lien within 10
The FFCL&O was entered on October 27, 2011. Coughlin's Iirst notice oIappeal was Iiled on
November 3,2011. Coughlin Iiled his Iirst motion to contest persona| property lien on
November 16,2011.38 NRS 40.253(8) provides that a hearing on that motion must be set
within 10 days aIter the motion is Iiled. However, Coughlin reIused to cooperate with court
staII to set the hearing he requested, so it did not take place within 10 days.39 Then, on
November 23, 2011, Coughlin inexplicably Iiled another notice oIappea1.4o What is
important Ior this court's purposes is that neither notice oIappeal identiIies any perceived error
regarding the court's procedure in setting a hearing on that collateral matter. Nor is such an
"issue" appealable under NJCRCP 72A. As such, this "issue" is inappropriate Ior the court's
consideration here.41
5. Not granting Coughlin a stay
Coughlin was granted in Iorma pauperis ("IFP") status by the Reno Justice Court on October
6, 2011.42 IFPstatus only applies to the trial level oI litigation, not to appeals. 43
Accordingly, iI he wished to stay the enIorcement oI the FFCL&O and stop the lockout, he
was required to post a supersedeas bond, and obtain an order granting a stay, beIore the
lockout occurred.
As to the bond requirement, since this case was not a "Iormal" eviction, NJCRCP 73A(a)(1)
(4) do not apply. Instead, this case Ialls underthe "catchall" provision at the end oI subsection
(a) oI that Rule, which provides in pertinent part "In cases not provided Iorin (1), (2), (3) or
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(4) above, the giving oIan appeal bond, under the provisions oI Rule 73, shall stay
proceedings in the court below upon the judgment or order appealed Irom ... except where
the appellate court may otherwise direct upon such terms as it may in its discretion
impose.,,44 NJCRCP 73 provides that "The bond or equivalent security shall be in the sum or
value oI $250 unless the justice court Iixes a diIIerent amount." (Emphasis added). NRS
40.385(1) provides that a stay may be obtained by posting a bond in the amount oI $250.00
with the trial court.
Coughlin deposited $2,275 with the court pursuant to NRS 1 18A.355 and the court's order
oIOctober 13,2011. He orally moved the court Ior a stay oIthe eviction at the end oIthe
October 25, 2011 hearing, but did not cite any authority Ior his request. Accordingly, that
motion was denied.45 Thus, although the court ordered that Coughlin's deposit would serve as
his appeal bond, it denied a stay because Coughlin did not provide the court with any basis to
grant one, as was his legal responsibility. Then, at Coughlin's speciIic request, the court held
an emergency hearing on November 7,2011, where it amended the FFCL&O and returned all
sums on deposit to Coughlin, as he was clamoring. The court then set the supersedeas bond at
$2,700.00, as it was entitled to do.46 Coughlin now argues that he should have been granted a
stay oIthe eviction because he had Iunds on deposit with the court at the time oI the lockout.
Even iI he would have been entitled to that relieI, that position is inconsistent with his prior
demands that all oI his deposit be returned to him, and he is judicially estopped Irom arguing
it now.47 IICoughlin wanted to apply those Iunds to a super-sedeas bond under
JCRCP 73A or NRS 40.385, he should have either made that request at the October 25, 2011
hearing when the eviction was announced, or sometime between that hearing and the lockout
a week later. He never did so. In Iact, he did just the opposite. When Coughlin Iiled his
"motion Ior stay'~48 on October 31,2011, in which he demanded his deposit back49, the
lockout had not even occurred. That conIirms that Coughlin had no intention oIposting a
bond. or applying those Iunds in order to obtain a stay. He cannot be heard to argue otherwise
now. Then, aIter he received his deposit back, he did not deposit any additional Iunds with the
court until on or about December 8, 2011 when he Iinally paid the Iiling feeto perIect his
appeal. ThereaIter, on December 14,2011, he posted $250.00 Ior his appeal bond, and $1.00
Ior his "supersedeas bond" (which sums he has subsequently moved to have returned to
him).50 By then, his request Ior a stay had been moot Ior approximately six weeks.
6. SheriII's removal oItenant "within 24 hours oIreceipt oIthe Order."
Coughlin tries to imply some sort oI wrongdoing in relation to the lockout in this case on page
1 oIhis second opening brieI. But he does not inIorm the court to which "order" he is reIerring
that provided Ior a lockout "within 24 hours," or what, exactly, his argument is. 51 In this
case, the court announced the eviction at the hearing on October 25, 2011.52 That eviction
was not eIIective until aIter
5 :00 p.m. on October 31, 2011, six days later. This was conIirmed in the FFCL&O signed by
the court on October 27,2011. Coughlin was locked out on November 1,2011. This
"argument" is Irivolous, unsupporte , nonsenslca ,an cannot 10rm t e aSls lOr any re Ie ere.
7. The trial Court's Application oINRS 118A.490
Coughlin complains that it was reversible error Ior the "trial court" to apply NRS 118A.490.
He does not cite to anywhere in the ROA to support his allegation that that statute was ever
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applied by the court.53 In Iact, it never was. The justice court applied NRS 118A.355(5). This
"argument" is oI no moment.
8. The Security Deposit.
Coughlin alleges that Merliss has not returned or accounted Ior the security deposit under the
Lease. He has not cited to anywhere in the ROA to substantiate that allegation. 54 He does
not explain how the security deposit has anything to do with the underlying no-cause eviction,
or how the lower court erred in relation to it.55 Coughlin wants to discuss what he thinks is a
claim Ior damages, but neither this Court nor the court below have or had jurisdiction to even
consider the matter. 56
V. CONCLUSION: Despite two opportunities to do so, Coughlin Iailed to meet his burden
below to introduce, by aIIidavit or other admissible evidence, speciIic Iacts that show a
genuine issue oI material Iact. As such, the justice court properly granted the summary
eviction based on the evidence beIore it; namely, the Lease, the statutory notices served by
Merliss, and the testimony adduced at the hearings. Coughlin has not met his burden here to
show that any oIthe court's Iindings were clearly erroneous and not based on substantial
evidence. The "arguments" he presents in his brieIs are nonsensical, and,. Ior the most part,
untimely, not properly preserved or beIore this court, and derived Irom unappealable activity
below. None oI Coughlin's arguments are supported by any citation to the record. As such, he
has not given this court any evidentiary or legal basis to overturn any ruling by the lower
court. What Coughlin really wants to do is relitigate the case here, which is not permitted.
Coughlin is not entitled to any relieI, and his appeal must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, Merliss prays that Coughlin take nothing by way oI his appeal; that same be
dismissed in its entirety; and that the judgment oI the lower court, including its order oI
December 27, 2011, be aIIirmed; that Merliss be awarded his fees and costs of this appeal
in accordance with ARS 9.5; that Coughlin be held in contempt of court as prayed for
in Merliss' motion for order to show cause, Iiled herein on 1anuary 20, 2012; and Ior such
other, Iurther and additional relieIas seems just to the court in the premises. /s/ Casey D.
Baker 2/24/12
ENDNOTES
See FFCL&O at 1
NRS 40.253(6). FFCL&O at 4, ,3.
See FFCL&O at 3,,9 et seq. See, also, ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266; ROA, Vol. V, pp. 194-198.
NRS 40.253(6).
ROA, Vol.l, p. 153.
. ROA Vol. III, pp. 229-233. 7 ROA, Vol. III, pp. 18-33.
Anvui, LLC v G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212,215,163 P.3d 405 (2007).
Torrealba v. Kesmitis, 124 Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716 (2008).
NJCRCP 76A.
Gibellini v. Klindt, 110 Nev. 1201, 1204,885 P.2d 540 (1994) (emphasis added).
NJCRCP 72( c).
Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Bibb, 76 Nev. 332, 335, 353 P.2d 458 (1960).
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14.Please see Merliss' counter-motion to strike excess pages, Iiled herein on February 9,2012.
II the court is going to consider anything beyond the Iirst Iive pages Iiled by Coughlin,
Merliss speciIically requests leave to Iile a supplemental brieIto meet those arguments.
15. See NRAP 28(a)(8) and (e). See also, Weddell v. Stewart, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 58,261 P.3d
1080, 1084 (Sept. 29,2011) (" ...it is imperative that the parties Iollow the applicable
procedural rules and that they comply in a timely Iashion with |the court's| directives."); and
Smith v. Emery, 109 Nev. 737, 743, 856 P.2d 1386 (1993).
CI., Schuck v. Signature Flight Support oINevada, Inc., 126 Nev. (Adv.Op. 42),245 P.3d
542,544-545 (Nov. 4, 2010) (the court is "not obligated to wade through and search the entire
record Ior some speciIic Iacts which might support the nonmoving party's claim.") CI.,
NJCRCP 74(b).
18.Id
19 See NRS 40.253(6).
ROA, Vol. I, p. 153.
21.
See, NJCRCP 104 ("Prior to the holding oI a hearing Ior summary eviction, the justice shall
determine the method oI service oInotice oI the hearing on both parties.")
22.
NRS 40.253(6).
23.
Coughlin's unexplained and unexcused reIusal to pay Ior a transcript makes it impossible to
cite Judge SIerrazza's statements with precision.
24.
Accord, Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424,427,996 P.2d 416 (2000) (the important inquiry is
on "what the order or judgment actually does, not on what it is called.")(emphasis in
original).
25.
ROA, Vol. III, pp. 230-233.
26.
NRS 118A.355(l)(d). ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266.
27. Id.
28.
See FFLC&O at ~'11-11.1.
29.
EXHIBIT 6 at 2, ,22.
30. FFCL&O at '~12-12.l.
31.
ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 253-261.
32.
See, "Supplemental Justice Court Appeal Proceedings," at 2, Iiled herein on January 4, 2012.
Merliss' reply is identiIied as item number 4. For reasons unknown, copies oIthose documents
were not made available to Merliss through the court's electronic Iiling system.
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33.
NRS 40.254.
34.
See FFCL&O beginning at ,9. See, also, ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266.
35.
Marcuse v. Del Webb Communities, 123Nev. 278, 163 P.3d 462 (2007).
36.
Schuck. The lower court recognized as much at the December 20,2011 hearing on Coughlin's
motion to contest personal property lien. For that hearing, Merliss had subpoenaed Darlene
Sharpe, the real estate agent who had Iacilitated the rental oIthe property to Coughlin, to
testiIy in the event the court was going to allow Coughlin to belatedly argue this issue. ROA,
Vol. VI, p.183. At that hearing, Judge SIerrazza appropriately recognized that Coughlin was
improperly attempting to relitigate the eviction based on previously unraised arguments, and
did not let the parties address or present any evidence on the matter. Ms. Sharpe was prepared
to testiIy that (1) Coughlin never mentioned that he was an attorney, or that he had either a
"law practice" or a "mattress business,"
(2) that Coughlin had represented himselI on his rental application as a "selI-employed
researcher," and (3) that Coughlin had surreptitiously altered the lease to allow Ior
"commercial" use oI the property. See, Reply in Support oI Motion Ior Order to Show Cause,
identiIied as item number 4 in the Supplemental Justice Court Appeal Proceedings, Iiled
herein on January 4, 2012.
37. Schuck.
38.
ROA, Vol. III, pp. 153-160.
39.
ROA, Vol. IV, pp.2, 22-23.
40.
ROA, Vol. III, p. 5.
41. Reno Newspapers, Inc.
42. ROA, Vol. I, pp. 274-275.
43 NRS 12:015. Casper v. Huber, 85 Nev. 474,456 P.2d 436 (1969).
44 NJCRCP 73A(a).
45 ROA, Vol. II, pp. 85,2.
46. ROA, Vol III, pp. 218-219; Vol. II, pp. 4,27.
46. ROA, Vol III, pp. 218-219; Vol. II, pp. 4,27.
47. Marcuse.
48. ROA, Vol. II, p. 3.
49. ROA, Vol. II, pp. 4, 27
50. ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 210-211.
51. CI., Schuck.
52. ROA, Vol. II, p. 85.
53. CI., Schuck
54. CI., Schuck.
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55. CI., Gibellini.
56. NJCRCP 76A, Reno Newspaper, Inc.; NRS 40.253(6).
Exhibit 5 to Baker's 1/20/12 Second Motion Ior Order to Show Cause consists oI an undated
'DECLARATION OF PHILLIP STEWART PHILLIP STEWART wherein Stewart alleges:
'being Iirst duly sworn, deposes and under penalty oI peIjury avers:
clean out the property leIt behind at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada aIter the most-recent
tenant was evicted.
4. On Thursday, January 12, 2012, we began work.
Management transIer station, I was Ilagged down by Zach Coughlin. At Iirst I thought it was
a citizen trying to alert me that debris was Ialling out oI the truck, so I stopped. The driver
approached me. I immediately recognized Mr. Coughlin Irom a previous encounter with him
at the River Rock property, and Irom having seen him in court.
station. He tried to prevent me Irom doing so by, among other things, standing in the street in
Iront oI my truck.
have a cell phone. I then proceeded to the transIer station, but not without being harassed
8. When I arrived at the transIer station, Mr. Coughlin jumped in Iront oI my truck to
stop me Irom entering the transIer station building. He produced a cell phone and was talking
to somebody, who I later learned was a Iemale Sergeant with the Reno Police Department.
Coughlin was Ialsely screaming that I was running over him. He physically prevented me
Irom proceeding. The police arrived and I called Mr. Hill to come to the transIer station. Mr.
Hill arrived at the transIer station a short time later. AIter Mr. Hill showed some paperwork to
the police oIIicer, I was allowed to proceed with dumping my load at the transIer station.
Coughlin was already there. Mr. Coughlin was walking up and down the street with his video
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camera, yelling and screaming at me, my crew, and, later, the police and Mr. Hill, when they
arrived. The police told Mr. Hill to go to the Reno Justice Court and get a TPO, which he did.
Finally, aIter he reIused to comply with their requests, Mr. Coughlin was arrested and taken
into custody.
preceding document does not contain the social security number oIany person. . DATED this
day oI January, 2012
Attached as Exhibit 6 to Baker's 1/20/12 Second Motion Ior Order to Show Cause in 03628 is
the:
'DECLARATION OF RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ. RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., being Iirst
duly sworn, deposes and under penalty oIperjury avers:
1. I am a resident oIthe City oI Reno, County oIWashoe, State oI Nevada, and over 18 years
oIage. This declaration is based on my personal knowledge, except those matters stated on
2. I am an attorney duly licensed as such by the State oI Nevada to practice beIore all courts
oIthis State and maintain my oIIice at 652 Forest Street, Reno, Nevada. I am also licensed to
practice beIore the United States District Court Ior the District oI Nevada, the Ninth Circuit
Court oIAppeals and the United States Supreme Court.
4. In accordance with the Reno Justice Court's order oI December 21, 2011, on Thursday,
December 22, 2011, Mr. Coughlin was given Iull run oI the River Rock property, starting at
9:00 a.m. At about noon that day, he sent an email to the eIIect that because he had appealed
the justice court's order, he Ielt himselI entitled to resume living in the property and would not
leave. Later that day, Judge SIerrazza sent out an email that Coughlin's stay had been denied.
When we arrived at 5:00 p.m. to lock the property up, it was apparentthat Mr. Coughlin had
done virtually nothing to remove any possessions. This is relevant to the order to show cause,
because it shows that Coughlin was more interested in conIrontation that in actually getting
his possessions out oI the house.
5. On Friday, December 23, 2011, we unlocked the house at 9:00 a.m. as ordered. We
At approximately noon, my staII inIormed me that an enragedMr. Coughlin had called the
I immediately went over and unlocked the back gate.
Coughlin had a small crew. He charged at me and made physical contact. He was enraged.
We leIt.
When we returned at 5:00 p.m., Mr. Coughlin was screaming and yelling obscenities. He
drove oII in a small U -Haul. His crew remained. We walked the property with them. The
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inside.ground Iloor was mostly cleared oI all but a big TV. The basement had been cleared
somewhat, butthere was still a lot oI "junk. " We could not access the attic.
We went outside. I told Coughlin's crew they could remove anything and everything outside,
iI they would only try to rehang the gate that Mr. Coughlin had taken oII the hinges beIore we
could get over to unlock it. I told them I would lock the gates in the morning. over to the
River Rock property.When I returned the next day, Coughlin's crew had not taken much oI
what
had been outside the night beIore. I secured the backyard, and nothing was moved until the
events detailed herein.
6. On Thursday, January 12,2012, I met with Phil Stewart oI Nevada Building Industries at
the River Rock property to make arrangements with him to remove and dispose oI the
abandoned property leIt there by Mr. Coughlin. I then returned to my oIIice.
7. Approximately Iour to Iive hours aIter returning to my oIIice, I received a telephone call
Irom Mr. Stewart. Mr. Stewart inIormed me that Mr. Coughlin had Ilagged him down near the
Waste Management transIer station, where Mr. Stewart was attempting to dump his Iirst load
oI debris removed Irom the house that morning.
8. Mr. Stewart told me that Coughlin was accusing him (Mr. Stewart) oI stealing his things,
threatening to sue Mr. Stewart, and generally trying to prevent Mr. Stewart Irom disposing oI
those items by, among other things, standing in the street in Iront oI Mr. Stewart's truck. I told
Mr. Stewart to have Mr. Coughlin call me, because I wanted to try to negotiate terms to
release the contents oI the truck to Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Stewart told me Mr. Coughlin said he
did not have a cell phone.
9. Shortly thereaIter, I received another call Irom Mr. Stewart. He was at the transIer station.
Mr. Coughlin had stopped him Irom entering. Mr. Coughlin had called the police, and told
them that Mr. Stewart had stolen his (Coughlin's) possessions, and that they were in the truck.
10. I immediately drove to the transIer station. When I got there, Mr. Coughlin was present,
and being cordoned away by two Reno Police Department oIIicers. AIter I presented the
police oIIicers with the Reno Justice Court's December 21,2011 order, and this court's January
11, 2012 order, Mr. Stewart was allowed to proceed. I then returned to my oIIice.
11. Approximately 15 minutes later, I received another call Irom Mr. Stewart, who inIormed
me that Mr. Coughlin was at the River Rock property. I immediately drove
12.When I got there, Mr. Coughlin was walking up and down the street and in the street with
his video camera, yelling and screaming at me, the police, and Mr. Stewart.
13. On the advice oI the police oIIicer on the scene, I then went to the Reno Justice Court and
obtained a temporary protective order against Mr. Coughlin to prevent him Irom returning to
the River Rock property or Iurther harassing Mr. Stewart and his crew. I Iilled outthe TPO
paperwork and returnedto River Rock. Mr. Coughlin was already in custody. He was in the
back oI a squad car. When he saw me, he began swearing and yelling. He was screaming at
the police and would not cooperate with them. I received a call to return to the Reno Justice
Court to retrieve the TPO, which I subsequently gave to an RPD oIIicer, who said he would
serve Mr. Coughlin at the jail.
14. I have personally reviewed exhibits 1-4 to the instant motion, and each exhibit is a true
and correct copy oIwhat it purports to be.
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15. Mr. Coughlin's behavior was calculated to disrupt the removal oI debris Irom thehome. I
counted no less than 13 automobile seats in the basement, including what I am told is the Iront
bench-seat Irom a Chevrolet Blazer. Mr. Coughlin leIt signiIicant quantities oItrash and
garbage at the property.
AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby aIIirm that the preceding document does not contain the social
security number oI any person.
DATED this 19th day oI January, 2012
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 54:10 to 54:11) 'A His e-mails, his Iilings were abusive, to
say the least. Calling my -- he called my associate a lichen.
The Transcript should read, instead oI 'lichen 'lycan, ie, a werewolI type. And the
Iilings in 1708 and 03628 make clear it is Hill who was reIerred to as a lycan. Additionally,
Hill at time reIerred to Coughlin as 'wacky Zacky on cracky, made light oI the dissolution oI
Coughlin's Iour and halI year domestic partnership (where such occurred in such close
conjuntion to the wrongIul summary eviction Hill's oIIice committed), gave Couglin a bag oI
trash saying 'here's your client's Iiles, reIerred to Coughlin as a 'hoarder, etc., etc.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 42:25 to 43:3) Two weeks aIter the eviction on a Sunday Dr.
Merliss comes to town and says, I want to see the house. The contrast to the police report oI
11/13/12 by RPD Carter wherein it is alleged that is was Merliss whom had 'noticed
someone had been coming and going Irom the house reveals the extent to which Hill and
Merliss lied in an attempt to avoid Hill's being required to withdraw Irom 03628 where his
likely becoming a witness so dictated under RPC 3.7.
Regardless, its simply ridiculous Ior the SBN to present an ROA that displays pages
printed at two pages per sheet to be as illegible as they appear within either version oI the
ROA here, especially where any such pages were printed on Coughlins' laser printer (a printer
whose lowest possible printing resolution is 300 dpi). It might be halIway believable iI the
problematic pages were conIined to those instances where, in one oI Coughlin's exhibits, he
attached a printout oI a portion oI the ROA Irom the RJC, transmitted to the 2JDC on
12/21/11 (with Supplementals oI 1/4/12 and 1/11/12) given that the RJC chose to scan in
documents Ior that ROA at a completely unacceptable 75 dpi...but those materials included in
the Exhibit 1 thereto are not comprised solely oI materials drawn Irom such low resolution
RJC ROA in 1708, but, rather, include materials printed directly Irom digital Iormat such as
dockets oI EIlex) to Coughlin's laser printer, as as such, there is no reason why they should be
so completely illegible at say R384-385, particularly iI the SBN's Clerk oI Court was
complying with NRAP 10, 11.
beyond that the RJC's ROA consists oI Iour volumes, and an additional volume purporting to
consist oI the 10/25/11 Hearing Exhibits (also, the RJC reIused to provide Coughlin a copy oI
the ROA it transmitted incident to the appeal in CR12-2025, which was especially prejudicial
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in that Coughlin was not an electronic Iiler with the 2JDC at that time (12/8/12) while WCDA
DDA Young was, meaning Young was aIIorded immediate digital access to that 806 page pdI
Iiled on 12/8/12 in CR12-2025, whereas Coughlin had to lobby Ior over a month (soon the
RJC would purport to serve Coughlin with an Adminstrative Order 2012-01 which was not
based upon a properly made motion, alleged matters Ior which there was no aIIidavit
suIIicient to meet the requirements oI NRS 22.030(2), and aIIorded Coughlin no notice or
opportunity to be prior to a Iundamental right oI his being deprived (ie, that to access the
courts in any meaningIul way...similar to a 12/5/12 Order by then RJC ChieI Judge SIerrazza
which purported to apply to 'ALL CASES IN 'ALL DEPARTMENTS, and set Iorth a
dictate preventing Coughlin Irom utilizing the Iax Iiling procedures enjoyed by other
litigants). Soon the RMC would Iollow suit with its own 1/16/13 'Administrative Order
2013-01 which was a verbatim reproduction oI the RJC's previous version thereoI. Then,
subsequently, Coughlin would be greated by the courty security, Reno Marshals, and,
especially, RJC BailiIIs with vague, unattributed (RJC ChieI BailiII Michael Sexton
repeatedly reIused to provide any attribution to Coughlin upon request aIter Sexton would cite
to something a 'clerk told him suIIicient to result in a Iiling or request oI Coughlin's not
being Iiled, not even being marked as received, and not processed in any way) rejections oI
Coughlin's Iilings and requests Ior documents Irom or access to the various criminal
prosecutions and eviction matters in the RJC wherein Coughlin is a party. Further, despite
Judge CliIton ruling on 11/27/12 in RCR12-065630 that Coughlin was absolutely entitled, as
an indigent criminal deIendant deprived oI his Sixth Amendment rights incident to the gag
order WCPD Jim Leslie placed on the WCPD DPD Dogan (whom Iailed to appear at the
2/14/12 arraingment Ior a gross misdemeanor at a time where Dogan's was clearly ensconced
at that point as Coughlin's attorney oI record) to the audio JAVS transcripts oI all his hearings
in the matter, and the RJC holding out to Coughlin and the public that all such audio transcript
requests will be IulIilled within 72 hours, Coughlin's submitting such requests on 3/26/13 in
various matters, including RCR12-065630 (Ior which the continuation oI the trial therein is
and was set Ior 4/2/13 beIore Judge CliIton), no such audio transcripts were provided to
Coughlin prior to the 4/2/13 continuation oI trial. Additionally, Coughlin's preparation oI his
Appellate BrieI in 62337 and the various associated motion work therein (and creation oI his
own ROA, Appendix, critique oI the SBN's, etc.) was materially prejudiced by Judge CliIton's
insistence in moving Iorward such matter (even despite the Order Ior Competency Evaluation
by ChieI Judge Pearson on 2/2/13 in RCR11-063341), even where Judge CliIton had
repeatedly rubber stamped continuances oI RCR12-067980, where the same Bruce Lindsay,
Esq. (whom threatened to kill Coughlin and takes an approach that consists oI Iailing to
communicate with his client at all, showing up late to hearings with no pre hearing contact
with his client, proIessing to have 'globally resolved all these matters with DDA Young,
only to later excise RCR12-065630 Irom such 'global resolution, and Iails to garner any
inIormed consent Irom his client to 'consent orders' signing his client up Ior three years oI
probation incident to an 3/11/13 hearing on the 2/25/13 Order to Show Cause in (well, that
OSC has been shoehorned into Iour diIIerent cases numbers...so it depends whom one
asks...and now a new criminal case number has been assigned to it....but it appeared that the 3
years oI probation a la the 'CCP program, in addition to the two years oI DAS probation
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already in place incident to the same case in RCR11-063341 was utlimately assigned to rcr11-
063341) where his representation and his client's understanding was that nothing more than a
'two week continuance as to all three oI the matters being addressed as another one oI the
RJC's 'combination hearings (wherein three or so oI the scattershot WCDA prosecutions oI
Coughlin would be jammed together, oIten the same day as a trial in one oI them...), only Ior
Lindsay to, aIter the hearing, announce to his client upon consternation as to the apparent
three years oI probation signed up Ior incident to an OSC related to de miminis unattributed
allegations oI violating a Iugitive 'Administrative Order in the Iirst place....only then would
Lindsay go with his 'your liIe sucks, your liIe is and was going nowhere...you need to learn to
say thank you...I did you a big Iavor blah, blah, blah...).
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 252:2 to 252:24) 'Mr. King has coyly prevented me Irom accessing
this Iile since March. Yes, he gave me some audio, and I appreciate that. I don't appreciate the
extent to which he's preventing me Irom getting it into the record here today. Particularly
where it's something really disgusting going on. Where the judge is saying something that's
just not true. It's just not true. Penalty oI perjury, it is completely Ialse Ior her to say that she
asked me iI I was recording or had a recording device at any time prior to the one bathroom
break. That's just not true. There was a bathroom break. And immediately aIter I got back
Irom that bathroom break she starts interrogating me sua sponte about recording. I should say
-- I would like to play it Ior you to know exactly what was said, exactly what my response
was -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, we have already addressed that issue. So now
we're on -- I have been trying to determine Irom you whether you believe you have Iiled a
veriIied answer or response to the complaint at any time. And you indicated you'll have to
research that issue, and I'll afford you that opportunity.
Page 329-350 oI the SBN's 2/13/13 ROA revealing some extremely troubling
practices. What appears to have been one 7 page Iile printed uncollated, two copies thereoI,
reveals scanner/copier manipulation by the SBN. Why its it the USPS Track & ConIirm
pages are so Iaint as to be useless? As such, the R329-330 are the same page printed
twice,though the SBN/Clerk oI Court have arranged to have those USPS Track & ConIirm
pages that would require vacating the 11/14/12 Iormal hearing date scanned and copied in
such a manner as to make them completely unreadable, and, at the same time, completely
violate oI NRAP 10,11 and the requirement that the output be equal 'to that oI a laser printer
(which means at least 300 dpi, and the SBN has scanned a collection oI pages interspersed
throughout it's ROA at an exceedingly low 75 dpi, and beyond that, manipulated other
settings with scanner/pdI soItward to make selected pages oI Coughlin's Iilings unreadable.
And it just so happens that they are the pages that best prove that the SBN more than
substantially violated ever aspect oI Scr 105(2)(3), even more so than it did in In Re Boles.
This really is pathetic, what the SBN is doing. Just, really bottom dweller behavior. R329-
R330 is the same page 1 oI the 7 page collection Couglin inserted in Iront oI Exhibit 1 oI his
11/13/12 Emergency Iiling. Those pages are the USPS Track & ConIirm proving that the
SBN's 10/9/12 mailing oI the its Notice oI Intent to Take DeIault was returned to the SBN,
marked as delivered to the SBN's 89521 address on Double R. Blvd, in Reno, Nevada on
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11/8/12. This Track & ConIrim Iurther demonstrates that notice was leIt in Coughlin's 89505
PO Box 3961 Iormer SCR 79 mailing address on 10/10/12, despite the Iact that Coughlin
personally hand delivered his OIIicial USPS Change oI Address card to the downtown Reno
Postal Station on October 5
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Reno, NV 89512 address.
Nonetheless, in an abundance oI caution, Coughlin continued to regularly return to that
PO Box 3961 to check Ior mail. Coughlin regularly check with the downtown Postal Station,
bringing the speciIic certiIied mailing slips leIt Ior him, to pick up his mail. As detailed in
Coughlin's Iilings and Declarations, upon presenting to downtown Reno Postal Station
counter clerk 'Tim he was not provided the certiIied mailing Ior him to correspond with the
slip leIt Ior the 10/9/12 Notice oI Intent to Take DeIault, which had a CertiIied Mailing
Number oI 70102780000354295458. . Coughlin returned again days later to the downtown
Postal Station and against presented the certiIied mailing slip and asked counter attendant
'Tim to check agains. At that time 'Tim returned with the 8.5 x 11 10/9/12 NOITTD
certiIied mailing with insuIIicient postage, and reIused to release it to Coughlin given it had
only $1.25 oI the SBN's red Pitney Bowes printed postage thereon, where some over $5.45
worth oI postage was required to mail such via certiIied mailing. The SBN placed
insuIIicient postage on an important mailing, one that SBN Clerk oI Court had insisted to
Couglin on 9/11/12 would be mailed to him prior to any deIault being taken against him.
Next, at R331-332 is the double printed (apparently a result oI Couglin's inadvertently
attaching an uncollated collection oI the same 7 page collection USPS Track & ConIirm
printouts and the SBN's 10/12/12 DowSoE, where, at R339-340 is, again, a double printing oI
the 'CertiIicate oI Service Ior that mailing (taken Irom the 11/7/12 bates stamped 3,200
production by the SBN, which, interstingly, lists in said CertiIicate oI Service only that the
'Notice oI Formal Hearing was included therein, while the USPS Postal Service CertiIied
Mail Receipt that the SBN placed atop thereoI at a later point (as at has done with a multitude
oI selected Iilings (leading one to wonder just who it placing such CertiIied Mail Receipt into
the ROA? King? 'Clerk oI Court Peters? II the Clerk oI Court, is it appropriate Ior her to
be going back into the ROA and selectively placing CertiIied Mail Receipts into only a Iew
select Iilings, superimposed upon their CertiIicates oI Service, while not doing so Ior others?
Hardly presenting the appearance oI an impartial, neutral keeper oI the record, where Peters is
held out to Respondent's as the SBN's Clerk oI Court. King even reIerred to Peters as the
Clerk oI Court during the awkward exchange on 9/25/12 when Coughlin appeared Ior the
Iormal hearing stemmign Irom the 6/7/12 Order in 60838 that Peters and the SBN had
indicated to him was 'on calendar and noticed him on in writing, at which time, as quoted in
Coughlin's (curiously included in the ROA, yet lacking a Iile stamp) Motion Ior Order to
Show Cause. The Iact that R331-332 and R341-342 are so Iaint as to be completely illegible,
while the intervening SBN pages are extremely clear and legible (when considering the
circumstances oI the 7 page Iile being printed twice, uncollated, and inadvertently included in
uncollated duplicate beIore the 3,083 bates stamped Exhibit 1 to Coughlin's 11/13/12
Emergency Iiling makes extremely clear that the SBN has manipulated the record to excise
the inconvenient Iact that those two extremely important Iilings (Irom a SCR 105(2)(c) and
due process perspective) were not provided to Couglhin (either, as with the NOITTD, at all,
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or with the 10/12/12 DoWSoe with a CertiIied Mail Receipt number oI
70102780000354295472, which corresponds with the USPS Track & ConIirm included,
inadvertently (when the SBN is cheating so much, things get somewhat sloppy, and
Coughlin's 7 page Iile there contained the USPS Track & ConIirm Ior the 5472 mailing twice,
at page 2 thereoI and page 7) twice, belonging to the 10/12/12 SBN Notice oI Hearing (per
the SBN's CertiIicate oI Mailing on R339-340), showing such was only Iirst scanned in
('process through USPS Sort Facility) on 10/16/12, despite the SBN's CertiIicate oI Service
indicating such was placed in the mail on 10/12/12...nonetheless, as Coughlin testiIied to on
11/14/12, a CertiIied Mail slip was only placed in Coughlin's mailbox (the USPS Track &
ConIrim indicates 'Notice LeIt Ior such) on 10/22/12...meaning, through no Iault oI
Coughlin's own, the earliest he could have picked up the SBN's '10/12/12 DowSoe was
10/22/12, which is a Iull one third less time than the '30 days prior to the 11/14/12 Iormal
hearing by which the SBN must provide such DoWSoE to Coughlin under SCR 105(2)(c).
How would you Ieel iI someone tried to come up to you and steal, say, your house Irom you
pocket by holding some sham hearing upon cheating you out oI the number oI days you were
supposed to be accorded under the law to prepare Ior such? And its not like the SBN's
DowSoE was at all suIIicient to comply with SCR 105(2) and SCR 105(2)(c)'s requirements,
or Laub, SchaeIIer,, or Mirch.
Pages 1723-1724 oI the 2/13/13 ROA are particularly disturbing. Therein, as King's
FHE1, is what King held out in violation oI NRCP 11 and RPC 3.3, 3.4, and 3.8 as a true and
correct copy oI the Complaint oI 8/23/12. However, those two pages are substantially
diIIerent than the Iirst two pages oI Exhibit 3 oI that 8/23/12 Complaint in that they are
legibile, whereas the versions attached to the Complaint were not in some places, places
which were oI material relevance and important to this disciplinary matter and the purported
allegations noticed to Coughlin in the Complaint (especially given that the RMC admits that
the 3/12/12 Order it mailed to Coughlin's 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2 address was returned to sender
(and this was through no Iault oI Coughlin's own given the OIIicial USPS Change oI Address
Coughlin Iiled on 12/27/11 and 3/14/12 and the attendant USPS errors in withholding
Coughlin's mail Irom him or returning it to sender incident to, upon information and belief,
the misconduct oI the Gayle Kern, Esq., and her unlicensed practitioner oI law 'associate,
Western Nevada Management's property manager Sue King, and those Iormer housemates
against whom Coughlin obtained protection orders on 1/23/12 in FV12-00188,187. It is
particularly troubling and prejudicial that the WCDA's OIIice beIore 25 year veteran criminal
prosecutor turned RJC Judge in January 2011, Judge David CliIton (husband oI Nevada ChieI
Deputy Attorney General Rhonda CliIton, thereIore, as CliIton represents the State oI Nevada
in cases where Coughlin is an opposing party (60630, active case in 62821), Judge CliIton has
a bright line rule requiring he disqualiIy himselI Irom the trial in the matter that King details
in his Complaint at R2:24-3:6, a 'misuse oI 911 emergency communications incident to
various alleged 911 calls made by Coughlin complaining oI being a victim oI domestic
violence at the $200 a month room Ior rent he used as a home law oIIice between 12/27/11
and the wrongIul eviction and trespassing by the WCSO that Judge Beesley overlooked oI
3/15/12 (which Judge Nash Holmes mentions, apparently, in her 3/14/12 grievance against
Coughlin to the SBN, aIter, apparently, 'hearing some things around the courthouse, perhaps
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Irom RMC Marshal James Menzel, a Iormer RJC BailiII, incident to the 3/15/12 summary
eviction matter that was calendared at that time wherein Gayle Kern, Esq., was attempting to
summarily evict Coughlin Irom that 1422 E. 9
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St. #2 address beIore RJC Judge Shroeder,
whom allowed Kern to violate RPC 3.5A in taking a deIault lockout order upon Coughlin,
allegedly, appearing a couple minutes late to that 3/15/12 hearing, especially where Kern
smirked at Coughlin as she was walking out oI Judge Schroeder's courtroom, where she then
went to Iile the landlord's UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit, only problem was, her Iailure to Iile
that prior to the hearing, as it is a jurisdictional prerequisite under NRS 40.254, 40.253(5)-(6)
rendered Judge Schroeder Order void Ior lack oI subject matter jurisdiction, and Coughlin's
Iiling a detailed Tenant's Ansnwer and Pre-Hearing BrieI on 3/8/12 clearly put Kern on notice
that Coughlin was contesting the matter, and regardless oI any allegedly being a minute or
two late by Coughlin on 3/15/12, the matter should have been decided upon taking into
account the arguments and evidence in Coughlin's 3/8/12 Pre-Hearing BrieI and Tenant's
Answer, especially where no Landlord's AIIidavit was Iiled by that point.
Further, the Exhibit 3 to King's SCR 105 Complaint oI 8/23/12 is not a 'certiIied copy
oI any such Order, as it must be to accord any oI the sort oI 'conclusive prooI oI Coughlin's
guilt thereto, and Iurther, the Panel and King fraudulently reIerred to Exhibit 5 as 'the Order
attached to the Complaint where there was no such certiIication on the version thereoI at
R19, which diIIers, again, markedly Irom the other version Iound at R1773
All pages oI Exhibit 3 to the 8/23/12 Complaint (R17-23) were illegible, and there was
no certiIication thereto, and Iurther, it is not a complete document as the ProoI oI Service
page originally aIIixed by the RMC is not present, and where, as here, whether and when
Coughlin received such Order is oI material relevance, such should be stricken and can in no
way be said to have placed Coughlin on any notice as to anything connected to the purported
Order contained in Exhibit 3.
Further, and the SBN has done this throughout (along with Clerk oI Court Peters) the
USPS 'CertiIied Mail Receipt placed onto the CertiIicate oI Service at R1746 was not
present on the actual version oI that page served on Coughlin, and thereIore, such page has
now been 'altered inappropriately and should be stricken, as should all such instances oI the
SBN retroactively placing such receipts onto its various ProoIs oI Service, CertiIicates oI
Mailing, etc.
Further, at R1779 King commits more Iraud where he never, nor did anyone else with
the SBN, email to Coughlin any alleged grievance by Richard G. Hill, Esq., as alleged in that
Exhibit 6 and in King's Complaint at R1:24-2:6.
5 -Order attached to Complaint 3 12 12 Judge Holmes attached to Complaint Order
26800 Ied clear and convincing burden Ior RPC standard by SBN page 412
6 -Letter dated February 14, 2012 to Mr. Coughlin from Mr. King 2 14 12 partial letter
Irom SBN King excised Hill's 1 14 12 ng12-0204 grievance, so no notice oI it, not pled page
419
7 -Two-page letter dated March 9, 2011 from Mr. Coughlin to State Bar Coughlin's 3 9
12 Iax to SBN regarding delayed receipt oI 2 14 12 letter Irom King re Hill's grievance page
421
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8 -Two page letter dated March 14, 2012 from 1udge Holmes to SBN Northern Office 3
14 12 complaint against Coughlin to SBN North page 424
It is just hysterical to consier the Panel's 'conclusion oI law respecting the task
reIerred to hit by this Court's and the Chair's and SBN proIessing, ad nauseum, how IaithIul
they were to the constraints and jurisdiction provided by this Court's 6/7/12 Order and SCR
111(8) when considering:
'The Extent of the Discipline to be imposed pursuant to SCR 111 As a Result of
Conviction of the "Serious" Crime of Petit Larceny.
(LLL) The matter of the referral from the Supreme Court was considered in
conjunction with the allegations in the Complaint filed by the State Bar. While the
conviction at issue in the Supreme Court Order of 1une 7, 2012 may not alone warrant
the discipline recommended in this Panel's recommendations, taken as a whole ana in
confunction with the numerous and repeated other violations oI the Rules oI ProIessional
Conduct, warrant, in this Panels view, the aiscipline recommenaea herein. '
King' Complaint is Iurther Iraudulent where it reads:
'1. Multiple grievances were received by the OIIice oI Bar Counsel between the period oI
January 14 and March 15, 2012, concerning Respondent. Due to the serious allegations oI
misconduct, grievance Iiles were opened and an investigation was initiated by Assistant Bar
Counsel Patrick King. 2. Respondent was advised oI the grievances via U.S. mail, e-mail
and by a brieI meeting with Mr. King at the State Bar OIIice in Reno. Respondent did not
cooperate with the investigation and rather than respond to the grievances as requested,
Respondent sent non-responsive and disparaging e-mails.
3. Respondent has not made a request to be placed on disability status, nor has he
acknowledged that he may have mental inIirmity, illness, or addiction.
4. The investigation oI the grievances against Respondent shows a serious pattern oI
misconduct.
II by the 'investigation oI the grievances against Respondent shows a serious pattern oI
misconduct King means that his 'investigation revealed that Hill is as attrociously
immoral and unproIessional an attorney as attorney's Thomas J. Hall, Richard Cornell, GeoI
Giles, Michael Lehners, James Andre Boles, Sarah Carrasco, and others have indicated Hill
to be, then Iine. II (and the ambiguity renders such Complaint to have Iailed to suIIiciently
notice Coughlin as to an allegation oI a 'pattern oI misconduct on Coughlin's part, and
thereIore any such Iinding oI 'the numerous and repeated other violations oI the RPC
indicated by the FOFCOL is reversible error given the lack oI notice and due process
deIiciencies attendant thereto.
'HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 240:23 to 244:5) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Let's return to the
video that you claim to have taken that you now intend to proIIer. Is it a video oI your arrest
that ultimately led to your conviction Ior criminal trespass? MR. COUGHLIN: Not the one
oI the admission by Sergeant Lopez. MR. ECHEVERRIA: What is it that you intend to
play oI Sergeant Lopez? MR. COUGHLIN: A video where I'm asking her some stuII about
police misconduct. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Police misconduct. That's not an issue here. MR.
COUGHLIN: Incident to the Richard Hill deal. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'll rule it as
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irrelevant. Proceed. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. Can I play a video where, incident to the
Walmart conviction, it shows that I did give my driver's license to the oIIicer, the tribal
oIIicer, and that given that his testimony at trial was that the only reason he was allowed to
eIIectuate an arrest was my lack oI giving him my driver's license. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
That is not an issue Ior this panel to determine. The supreme court speciIically directed that
the only issues with respect to that conviction was the nature and extent oI punishment.
We're not going to relitigate your conviction Ior theIt. MR. COUGHLIN: So the -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Next, Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: Can I enter my objection? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Pardon? MR. COUGHLIN: Can I enter my objection or basis Ior my
objection? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Basis Ior your objection to your own? MR. COUGHLIN:
Wanting to put that in an oIIer oI prooI, I guess. Something like that. Have you read the
Claiborne case? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Yes. MR. COUGHLIN: Does that have any
applicability here? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm governed by the case that the supreme
court decided with respect to Zachary Barker Coughlin in which they tell us that the
only issue that this panel is to determine is what the nature and extent of the
punishment is flowing from your conviction for theft. We're not to address the
underlying issues involving that conviction. MR. COUGHLIN: How are you
addressing so many issues completely divorced from that Walmart theft case? How
did you do that today? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I'm dealing with one
issue at a time. You have proIIered a videotape that the supreme court tells us is not
relevant. Proceed with your next witness. MR. COUGHLIN: I'd like to oIIer into evidence
my ex parte emergency motion and the DVD attachment to it. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Which
one? You attempted to Iax several to me, one oI which was labeled emergency ex parte
motion that apparently was 32 pages oI which I only received three. MR. COUGHLIN:
You only received three? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Correct. MR. COUGHLIN: Did the State
Bar get it? MR. ECHEVERRIA: You attempted to Iax it to my oIIice on Iour diIIerent
occasions. MR. COUGHLIN: And all Iour times did you guys reject it somehow or
otherwise keep it Irom going through? MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. It was sent to my oIIice
aIter business hours. There was no one manning the Iax machine, so no one could have
interrupted the transmission. MR. COUGHLIN: And it just didn't go through? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: None oI your Iaxes went through. The Iirst one was one oI 362 pages that
you attempted to Iax on November 8th at 4:50 in the aIternoon. We received two oI them.
Apparently the second page oI that one was entitled, Well Would You. MR. COUGHLIN:
All right. Well, I gave the State Bar copies oI it, and you said they Iorwarded it on to you.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sir, what speciIically is the ex parte motion that you now wish to
oIIer as evidence?
Further, beyond the Iailure to Iollow Claiborne and SCR 114, the Panel committed
reversible error in reIusing to allow Coughlin to put on the various proIIers oI misconduct
oI others (including local law enIorcement and members oI the judiciary, and opposing
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counsel) where such is relevant to the SCR 102.5 analysis, as the speciIically enumerated
subsections thereoI, as expressly indicated in the rule, are no exhaustive:
'Proposal Ior Ascent NBI and Dr. Yasar?
Sent: Fri 3/29/13 9:52 PM
To: Megan Sredy (meganascentreno.com)
10 attachments
4 28 12 0204 Couglin's RX History with physician prescriber names listed and pharmacists
signature.pdI (1046.6 KB) , 5 14 12 and 7 31 12 0204 RX history attacment to email to
nvbar.org Irom Zach Coughlin rx history since February 2008.pdI (292.7 KB) , 6 18 12
60975 with Index SCR 117 Petition by NNDB Susich 0204.pdI (13.2 MB) , 11 14 12 0204
Transcript oI Hearing with Index 170008ch-Full.pdI (697.8 KB) , 12 14 12 Panel's
FOFCOL and 8 23 12 SBN Complaint untouched.pdI (228.3 KB) , 12 14 12 stamped 0204
Order by Chair Echeverria Findings oI Fact Conclusion oI Law seeking to disbar Coughlin
bz.pdI (1602.3 KB) , 6 7 12 Order in 60838 0204 sole purpose 12-17976.pdI (199.8 KB) , 6
11 12 de minimis 37 cIr 11.25(3)(a) not a serious oIIense support and 11.25(3)(c) lacking
due process 60838 0204.pdI (129.1 KB) , 6 18 12 12-18962 60838 in re coughlin scr 111
Iiled stamped.pdI (2.2 MB) , 8 13 12 Iilestamped probably in 61426 though no case number
on it 102(4)(d) petition and scr 111(7) ocrd and tagged jbig2 lossy.pdI (724.6 KB)
Thanks Ms. Sredy,
I appreciate it. I want you and Dr. Yasar to Ieel comIortable, and to get paid some
decent money Ior the service provided. Luckily (one oI the Iew silver linings oI a lot oI
really miserable involvement with local law enIorcement and courts) is that Reno Justice
Court Judge Scott Pearson has agreed to use some oI the money Irom his CCP program to
pay Ior a "mental health evaluation" (whatever that is...I will attempt to narrow that down
through some research within NRS)...but I told Judge Pearson, and it appears he is "okay"
with it iI I seek something Irom Dr. Yasar that would serve a dual purpose. The second
purpose would be some sort oI "expert or treating physician"
testimony/aIIidavit/declaration/report suIIicient to satisIy, or at least address a mitigation
analysis under Nevada Supreme Court Rule 102.5...which relates to when attorneys get in
trouble, and they oIIer their excuses Ior their conduct, and try to get the Court to agree that
there were mitigating Iactors involved, and thereIore, the punishment should be less in
consideration oI such Iactors.
In some past email to your oIIice, I believe I have attached some ALR articles on just such
subject matter. Here's the thing. I realize it is on me to take up as little oI Dr. Yasar's and
your oIIices resources and time, while also getting your oIIice as much compensation, as
possible.
What I propose is that I put together a brieI oIIering Ior Dr. Yasar to review. I have
been extremely up Iront with him during all my visits about my various arrests and
proIessional licensure issues since I called your oIIice on or about August 2nd, 2011 and
cancelled my schedule appointment, and abruptly went oII both Adderall and Wellbutrin
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(please see my attache RX records and letter to the State Bar oI Nevada detailing the
connection between my doing so and the ensuing arrests oI August 20th, 2011 (alleged
petty larceny oI an iPhone upon a scenario where is is alleged I retrieved an iPhone Irom a
man who had picked it up oII the ground, in the skate plaza in Iront oI city hall, oIIered it
up to those in the surrounding area, then threatened to throw the phone in the river iI
someone did not claim it, whereupon, it is alleged I did, then was several minutes later
accosted by others whom claimed it was there phone, police were called, I lawyered up,
etc., etc.), I served 7 days in jail Ior that and was released on August 26th, 2011, Iinding a
summary eviction notice on my door upon returning home, Ior a dispute that began on
August 11th, 2011.
Then, I was arrested, again, Ior petty larceny oI "a candy bar and some cough drops"
(and the cough drops were Duract Cough Melts, each containing 30 mg oI
Dextromethorphan, which is a potent dissociative at the levels I am alleged to have
consumed while shopping Ior and paying Ior some $83 oI other groceries. I was evicted,
wrongIully (see 61901, 60331, 61383, and 62337) Irom my Iormer home law oIIice on
November 1st, 2011 (especially considering I Iiled Ior a temporary stay oI such eviction
incident to what may be a disability, either MDD, or ADHD, and there was an allegation oI
my being a "hoarder", plus the abrupt cessation oI medications), and then arrested Ior
criminal trespass at my Iormer home law oIIice on November 13th, 2011.
I was "removed" Irom mental health court on about May 24th, 2011, aIter having been
transIerred into it (in lieu oI the prosecution stemming Irom the August 20th, 2011 arrest)
on May 7th, 2011 (a date at which the WCDA attempted to hold a trial despite the
pendency oI an Order Ior Competency Evaluation in violation oI NRS 178.405). I was
provided materials and indications that I would be permitted to take Adderall while in the
MHC. Judge Breen, MD, however, abruptly removed me Irom Mental Health Court upon
my inquiring as to the permissibility oI the MHC telling me one thing to get me to sign up
Ior it, then changing their story later...
It seams that Dr. Yasar (oI course, its up to him, and he has a duty to be honest) may be
able to provide support Ior the presence oI mitigating Iactors pursuant to Nevada SCR
102.5(2)(c), and especially 102.5(2)(i)(1)-(4), and SCR 102.5(2)(k). 102.5(2)(i)(1)-(4), and
SCR 102.5(2)(k).
SCR
SCR 102.5(2) .Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or Iactors that may justify
a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. The following list of examples is
illustrative and is not exclusive :
2.Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a
reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. The following list of examples is
illustrative and is not exclusive:...
(c)personal or emotional problems;...
(e)full and free disclosure to disciplinary authority or cooperative attitude toward
proceeding;...
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(h)physical disability;
(i)mental disability or chemical dependency including alcoholism or drug abuse
when:
(1)there is medical evidence that the respondent is affected by chemical
dependency or a mental disability;
(2)the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct;
(3)the respondent`s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental
disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful
rehabilitation; and
(4)the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that misconduct is
unlikely;...
(k)interim rehabilitation;".
I have had an excruciating time since August oI 2011, trying to get back on and remain
on my Ieet. There has been a great deal oI what some might say is misconduct committed
by individuals other than me which has contributed to a number oI arrests and evictions that
I have endured. Some might say, those making the arrests, processing the evictions, and the
prosecutions, all have a concerted, combined, vested interest in both discrediting me and
derailing me. I believe such circumstances provide mitigating Iactors as well, and must be
considered in any SCR 102.5(2) analysis, whether or not some theory that one's alleged
misconduct was a consequence or the necessary Iallout oI the misconduct oI others or
wrongs committed against them (like being wrongIully evicted, having one's domestic
partner abscond with rental shares (though the landlord, perhaps, and his attorneys bare
more culpability where some novation may be read into the agreement between the landlord
and Coughlin's Iormer domestic partner vis a vis the rental obligations Ior May and June oI
2011), prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, etc. Further, such matters arguably Iit within
one or more oI the express elements oI such an analysis, including SCR 102.5(b),(c),(g),
and (l), though, regardless, SCR 102.5(2) makes clear that the "Iollowing list oI examples is
illustrative and is not exclusive":
SCR 102.5(2). Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that
may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. The following list of
examples is illustrative and is not exclusive:
(a) absence oI a prior disciplinary record;
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) personal or emotional problems;
(d) timely good Iaith eIIort to make restitution or to rectiIy consequences oI misconduct;
(e) Iull and Iree disclosure to disciplinary authority or cooperative attitude toward
proceeding;
(I) inexperience in the practice oI law;
(g) character or reputation;
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(h) physical disability;
(i) mental disability or chemical dependency including alcoholism or drug abuse when:
(1) there is medical evidence that the respondent is affected by chemical dependency or a
mental disability;
(2) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct;
(3) the respondent`s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of
successful rehabilitation; and
(4) the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely;
(j) delay in disciplinary proceedings;
(k) interim rehabilitation;
(l) imposition oI other penalties or sanctions;
(m) remorse;
(n) remoteness oI prior oIIenses.
Attached is the 8/23/12 Complaint against me in State Bar oI Nevada v. Zach
Coughlin, and some oI my Iilings which may be characterized as a response or otherwise
relevant to this analysis, and the 12/14/12 Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law by the
Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board's Hearing Panel, which is now on appeal beIore the
Nevada Supreme Court in case number 62337, which is publicly viewable here:
I am extremely indigent at the current time. I know I owe your oIIice $85, but it is my
understanding that the amounts Judge Pearson will authorize a check Ior would include that
which is necessary Ior me to receive Iurther services Irom your oIIice, and thus should
include the $85 balance. Beyond that, I believe it is somewhat Ilexible how much Judge
Pearson will authorize, and it may be a larger amount iI it can be broken up into payments.
However, I have proceeded through the orientation with NNAMHS (they all love Dr. Yasar
there and remember him Iondly), and am currently being maintained on my Adderall and
Wellbutrin by Dr. Stepanova, and am signed up Ior counseling to start 5/6/13 with Bill
Jackson, Ph.D.
I would like to (assumign Dr. Yasar can Ieel comIortable with this, and Ieel that he is able
to make and oIIer an inIormed proIessional opinion, either as an expert witness or treating
physician (and his Iunctioning previously as my treating physician might prevent him Irom
oIIering an expert opinion, I am not sure yet). I am not sure what one charges Ior such, but I
would like to see Dr. Yasar and your oIIice be well compensated, especially by the Reno
Justice Court. I would totally be in Iavor oI Dr. Yasar being paid a substantial sum.
Here is what I propose. Judge Pearson apparently was not aware that NNAHMS has
now (and they indicated they didn't cover Adderall when I called them in August oI 2011
prior to my arrests) decided to treat me and cover my Adderall prescriptions and my
Wellbutrin. Judge Pearson had previously to becoming aware oI that put me into his CCP
program Ior at least 2 years, agreeing to pay Ior one $105.00 oIIice visit every 4 months,
and the costs oI my medications per month, which were amounting to approximately
$150.00 per month. As such, over, say, a two year period, that would amount to $840 Ior
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two years oI oIIice visits and $3,600 in medications over two years Ior a two year total oI
$4,400. I am not saying he approved such a payment to Dr. Yasar Ior extensive assistance
in establishing a strong SCR102.5 presentation on my behalI (including, possibly, testiIying
at a Iuture hearing beIore the NNDB or Nevada Supreme Court), but the inIlux oI coverage
Ior my medications and oIIice visits Irom NNAHMS changes the circumstances. I made
Judge Pearson aware oI this, and he seems to be amendable to altering the approach
previously set out (where the cost oI medications was taking up a much larger percentage oI
the available CCP Iunds).
I think it is possible that Judge Pearson will authorize something in the neighborhood
oI that original $4,400 commitment he had made in a slightly modiIied way, wherein Dr.
Yasar would be well compensated in exchange Ior that set out above. I am an extremely
motivated patient/person representing myselI in a disciplinary/proIessional licensure setting
(which is what one has to be unless they have thousands oI dollars to hire David Grundy,
Esq., and expert witnesses, etc., etc.). My work is getting better and less disorganized, and
much oI the initial presentation on my part was hampered by, essentially, the due process
corner cutting oI the SBN.
Also, and SCR 117 Petition was Iiled seeking to declare me disabled in May oI 2011,
which has laid largely dormant while the SBN and NNDB have been trying to rush through
a slapdash Iaux due process dog and pony show seeking to disbar me Ior extremely dubious
reasons. That is attached as well.
I look Iorward to working with your oIIice more on this iI it is amenable to doing so.
Sincerely,
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Its rather noticeable that Chair Echeverria's FOFCOL completely leaves out the Major
Depressive Disorder testimony by Coughlin and the patent causal connection between the
misconduct oI others (Baker and Hill's 'Rambo litigation tactics in conducting a wrongIul
summary eviction, which started Iour days beIore the Iirst arrest oI 8/20/11 on 8/16/11 in
Coughlin's initial communications with Hill, and that oI Coughlin's Iormer domestic
partner, Melissa Ulloa, though Ulloa's apparent misconduct must be balanced against the
Iact that she did call up the landlord Merliss, and own up to having taken Coughlin's rental
contributions (Ior May 2011, and Coughlin submits, also Ior June 2011) and Iailed to
Iorward some $350 Io the total $900 rent owed Ior May, and all oI the $900 owed Ior June
2011 (meaning that Ulloa took $900 worth oI Coughlin's rental contributions over a two
month period and Iailed to Iorward them on to Merliss, as was their practice Ior over Iour
years, in addition to Iailing to Iorward on some $350 oI what she owed Ior May 2011 and
the entire $450 that she owed Ior June 2011 to the landlord... The landlord, Merliss,
admitted under oath at the 10/25/11 'trial in 1708 that he had entered into an agreement
with Ulloa whereby he agreed to allow her to pay him back over time, which amounts to a
novation or waiver to any joint liability Coughlin may have unIortunately assumed by
entering into a co-tenancy lease with Ulloa (which also brings up the NRCP 11 violations
by Baker in his 8/22/11 5 Day Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer-Nonpayment oI Rent notice,
which Iailed to not only deduct Irom the rental sums it alleged were delinquent those
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amounts disposed oI by the agreement between Merliss and Ulloa, but also Iailed to deduct
the amounts Merliss had agreed to allow Coughlin to deduct Irom his rental obligation, in
writing (at least one, and arguably two $350 credits Ior 'taking care oI the weeds (in May
2011 and the previous season, and other deductions, causing Couglhin to experience a
heightened sense oI exigency with respect to the impending summary eviction and alleged
delinquent rental amounts he would need to come up with). Further, Baker's excessively
overstating the alleged delinquent rental amounts operated to vititate completely the 5 Day
Non Pay eviction Notice (which arguably Iailed to terminate the then still active lease
agreement, especially where Baker and Merliss lied to Judge SIerrazza that the lease had
'expried on February 20
th
, 2011, where they also testiIied the the term oI the lease, under
the 'deIined termination date listed in Paragraph 2 oI the lease called Ior such tenancy to
expire '12 months aIter the start oI the lease, listed therein as February 20
th
, 2010, where
both Baker and Merliss testiIied that the lease then expired on or around February 20
th
,
2011, which, clearly, is not the case given the lease indicates the lease's term was 'Ior a
period oI no less than 12 months and where, in Iact, there is no 'deIined termination date
indicated in Paragraph 2 oI that lease, contrary to the sworn testimony oI both Baker and
Merliss (and Baker's 10/19/11 Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, in asserting 'attorney client
privilege not being waiver, makes clear the Iraudulent intent oI both Baker and Merliss
given the actual language in the lease, the patent ambiguity revealed by Baker's checking
two diIIerent boxes on the Eviction Notices (with either box relating to when and iI the
tenancy had 'expired or terminated, and thus, completely material to any holdover
proceeding).
The bates stamping method utilized by the SBN (or, doubtlessly, the outside contractor
the SBN utilizes as it is rather clear the SBN is rather devoid oI any sort oI technological
expertise as Iar as the Northern OBC and Clerk oI Court Peters is concerned) renders the
ROA worthless and subject to being stricken. This is so because every single page is
rendered to be approximately 15 smaller (as was the case with all pages in the 11/7/12
3,200 page SCR 105(2)(c) deIicient production by the SBN)than it existed in its original
Iorm to make room Ior the bates stamping method utilized by the SBN. This is a
completely unnecessary practice (Adobe Acrobat Pro can place bates stamping anywhere
one wants, and superimpose such on the prexisting elements or characters in a page). For
instance, in the First Designation oI Hearing Panel by the SBN oI 8/23, the page number 1
at the bottom oI the Iirst page therein starts at the 0.4 margin measured Irom the bottom oI
the 8.5 x 11 page. However, at R24, that page number is completely cut oII, to make
room Ior some method oI bates stamping that does not superimpose such bates stamping
over existing characters on a page in a manner that enables one to continue seeing such
original existing characters. This is true not just Ior the bates stamping applied itselI, but
Ior an entire horizontal swatch oI the page that has been 'whited out to make room Ior
such 0.6 swaths oI bates stamping.
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It is rather curious timing that the day aIter Couglin Iiled his 8/22/12 NRCP 60(b)(4)
Motion in 1708 seeking to have set aside the eviction Hill's associate Baker procurred Irom
Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice, the SBN chose to Iile its 8/23/12 Complaint, though the
SBN managed to disenIect such Complaint oI NNDB Member Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s name
thereIrom (and the SBN was too embarrassed by whatever Hill sent them as a grievance,
whether signed, sworn, only emailed, or not) to even put such into evidence, thereIore
preventing the SBN Irom alleging that anything contained in such purported Hill grievance
provided Coughlin notice oI any particular allegation against which Coughlin is said to have
Iailed to responde to (including the allegation that Coughlin Iailed to Iile a 'VeriIied Answer
oI Response (which Chair Echeverria provided unsolicited legal advice to Coughlin that was
wrong respecting whether such veriIication can be made 'upon information and
belief...something particularly necessary when responding to such a vague, cursory,
unsupported complaint by King, particularly where Exhibit 3 was so illegible therein, all
pages oI it(R17-23)).
' NRS 15.010 VeriIication oI pleadings.
1. In all cases oI the veriIication oI a pleading, the aIIidavit oI the party shall state that the
same is true oI the party`s own knowledge, except as to the matters which are therein stated
on the party`s inIormation and belieI, and as to those matters that the party believes it to be
true. And where a pleading is veriIied, it shall be by the aIIidavit oI the party, unless the party
is absent Irom the county where the attorneys reside, or Irom some cause unable to veriIy it,
or the Iacts are within the knowledge oI the party`s attorney or other person veriIying the
same.
2. When the pleading is veriIied by the attorney, or any other person except the party, the
attorney or other person shall set Iorth in the aIIidavit the reasons why it is not made by the
party.
3. When a corporation is a party, the veriIication may be made by any oIIicer thereoI; or
when the State, or any oIIicer thereoI in its behalI, is a party, the veriIication may be made by
any person acquainted with the Iacts; except that in actions prosecuted by the Attorney
General, in behalI oI the State, the pleadings need not, in any case, be veriIied.
4. In all cases where, by the Ioregoing provisions, the veriIication may be made by the
attorney, such veriIication may be by the attorney made on inIormation and belieI iI the Iacts
are not within the attorney`s knowledge.
5. The aIIidavit may be in substantially the Iollowing Iorm and need not be subscribed
beIore a notary public:
Under penalties oI perjury, the undersigned declares that he or she is
the ................................ (plaintiII, deIendant) named in the Ioregoing ................................
(complaint, answer) and knows the contents thereoI; that the pleading is true oI his or her own
knowledge, except as to those matters stated on inIormation and belieI, and that as to such
matters he or she believes it to be true.
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SBN Clerk oI Court Laura Peter's CertiIicate oI Service by mail oI 2/13/13 at R1372
contains nothing even close to the 'certiIication by the 'clerk oI the 'court required in
NRAP 10, 11. There is nothing else in the ROA that does so either.
The trasnscript (at R1375) describes Exhibit 5 thusly: '5 - Order attached to
complaint. That description was based upon the characterization therreoI made by the Chair
and King. Such is an inaccurate description given the completely diIIerent versions oI such
purported Order Iound at R17-23, R 1722-1727, and R1173-1778, with only the last version,
at R1778, containing the RMC's CertiIicate oI Service).
All oI the 'certiIication allegedly provided by RMC 'clerk Donna Ballard are not
dated in any way, and are thereIore completely ineIIective and not at all capable oI providing
a 'certiIied copy suIIicient to satisIy any provision oI SCR 111 or other applicable, relevant
rules oI evidence herein.
It is particularly interesting to consider the 'veriIication requirement in SCR 105(2)
and in NRS 40.253(5)-(6) and the lack oI subject matter jurisidiction voiding all RJC's orders
in that Hill summary eviction oI Coughlin in 1708 (and, necessarily, Judge Flanagan's
attorney feeOrder (FHE2), the criminal trespass conviction premised thereupon (FHEX), and
the eviction iteselI where the landlrod Iailed to comply with NRS 40.253 prior to the 10/13/11
Hearing, and where the only thing in the record in 1708 to attempt to do so is Baker's
10/19/11 'Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq., especially where (given the Iraud Baker and
Merliss were perpetuating respecting the Iact that the lease agreement in question, in the
context oI a holdover proceeding inquiry where retaliation was alleged as the cause oI any
purported terminating oI the lease) at the 'trial on 10/25/11 Baker and Merliss still Iailed to
Iile in a landlord's 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit suIIicient to contain all that required by
NRS 40.254 (Ior good reason...Merliss did not want to lie on the record or in an AIIidavit
about whether the lease had a 'deIined termination date or when the lease 'terminated or
'expired and why, especially given the patent retaliation attendant to Merliss having Hill
contact Coughlin on 8/16/11, serving two diIIerent evictio Notices on 8/22/11, consdiering the
written communications between Merliss and Coughlin, and circumstances attendant thereto,
especially those immediately prior to the alleged attempted 'terminating oI the lease (which
was not expired at all, and the Iact that Baker had to check two diIIerent boxes on the notices
reveals just the sort oI Anvui ambiguity making such matters not appropriate Ior summary
judgment).
Chair Echeverria takes aIter Judge Holmes between T257-272 where he alternately
admits he does not know whether Coughlin wrote on or 'altered Exhibit 14 (R1800) or 15
(R1861...making R1860 reveal the extent to which the SBN Iailed to Iorward the discs
attached thereto on in the ROA, whereas in the 12/24/12 version oI the ROA the SBN Iiled,
indication by way oI a photocopy oI the discs themselves was included in that ROA (at the
12/24/12 ROA's R541-542 with R540 baring an Index by Coughlin that indicates 2 discs were
attached thereto) (he also provides prooI that both exhibits had dics attached to them, which
brings up the question as to why the ROA only has he discs attached to one oI those Iilings,
especially where King objected to the presence oI discs on both FHE14 and FHE 15 (more
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reasons to strike the ROA, R1800 cuts oII the marking oI the Exhibit, leaving one to wonder
what Exhibit is Iound there. Further, Panel Chair attempted to oIIer his own exhibit with
FHE16, though he Iailed to provide Coughlin at the time oI doing so, or even Ior a long time
thereaIter, as the SBN/Panel only Iinally provided Coughlin a copy oI FHE16 upon mailign
the 2/13/13 ROA, as they had Iailed to send Coughlin what was 'Volume 3 in the 12/14/12
ROA (which was a 574 page volume consisting oI 332 pages oI the Transcript oI the FH, with
the index at the conclusion thereto excised, and the 16 FHE's...). FHE16 oI the 2/13/13 ROA
should be stricken given it is not a complete copy oI what it purports to be given it does not
contain the discs originally attached to that Iiling (admitting to do so a R1098 oI the 12/14/12
ROA, which this Court had a duty to keep a copy oI as Iar as Coughlin is concerned,
especially under Waters and especially now that A LITIGATION HOLD NOTICE has been
placed on both the SBN, Panel, Board, and anyone else who arguably should be retaining any
materials in any way related to the epidmeic levels oI Iraud being carrier out by the Panel
here, the NNDB, the OBC, and Clerk oI Court Peters). (in a similarly ridiculous attempt to
assert some impropriety on Coughlin's part, like that done by Judge Nash Holmes in her
3/13/12 Order Striking Fugitive Document that King was too embarassed by to admit in its
entirety into the record, but which is mistakenly included the CertiIicate oI Mailing thereto
along with the partial purported Iiling by Coughlin admitted as FHE9 (R1784-1786) where
R1786 is the RMC's CertiIicate oI Service that King mistakenly Iorgot to excise Irom FHE9,
though King did manage to Iraudulently excise 'page 1 oI 3 oI the 3/7/12 Iiling by Coughlin
(the page that would have come right beIore the 'AIIidavit Iound at R1784), a page which
clearly indicates Coughlin is an attorney (to whatever ridiculous extent the RMC and King are
alleging they were not already aware that Coughlin was an attorney, including where
Coughlin's plea Ior a stay oI the 5 day incarceration order on 2/27/12 included (as King's own
stupid pleadings have recounted, duh) the prejudice to Coughlin's client upon Judge Nash
Holmes going against the overwhelming majority viewpoint in american jurisprudence
essentially requring a Judge reIrain Irom summarily incarcerating an attorney Ior contempt
('R1782-83, especailly R1783, which makes all the more Iraudulent what King presented on
the very next page oI the ROA, where he clearly violated PRC 3.3, 3.4, and 3.8 in removing
the Iirst page oI the 3/7/12 Iiling by Coughlin in 26800, along with the 3/13/12 Order Striking
Fugitive Document by Judge Holmes' (the Order to which the CertiIicate oI Service Iound on
page 1786 goes to) that attached said Iiling oI 3/7/12 by Coughlin (which Iurther conceals the
extent to which the RMC attempted to prevent Coughlin Irom accessing the recording oI that
2/27/12 'trial in 26800, as Coughlin also Iiled a 'Records Request on the Iorm the RMC
hold out Ior such purposes, directed towards obtaining the audio transcript oI all hearings in
that matter, including that oI 2/27/12, which the RMC reIused to respond to...which is why
Coughlin had to stealthily have his momma go obtain to the audio transcript Irom the RMC,
in addition to the 'versions which King and the SBN Iinally provided Coughlin in late June
2012, which King, curiously, alleges to be 'not certiIied and apparently lacking in
Ioundation and probably not all that truthIull, apparently (iI that's so, then why isn't someone
investigating the RMC Ior providing 'altered audio transcripts to the SBN?).
Couglin wsa provided the ROA that the SBN sent this Court by Deputy Clerk Castillo,
who was about to throw it out, into the trash, upon receiving, essentially in Coughlin's
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presence, the 2/7/13 Order oI this Court...Instead, Coughlin lobbied to be provided it, and has
retained it, and scanned it and is now submitting it Ior Iiling, to be made publicly available on
this Court's site, as should be the scanned second ROA Io 2/13/13, so the public can compare
the two and see how Iraudulent the OBC and Clerk oI Court have been throughout this aIIair,
and perhaps the Panel, especially where King and Peters admitted to Coughlin that Chair
Echeverria had the only copy oI the ROA Ior quite some time Iollowing the 11/14/12
Hearing...Echeverria, the 'boyhood chum oI witness Paul Elcano, whom went to StanIord
with Elcano and Judge Elliott, whom King purported to have also planned to call as a witness
and who denied, in extremely suspect grounds, Coughlin's appeals oI the crminal trespass
conviction (FHEX) and the petty larceny conviction cited in 60838(FHE1,X, and denial oI its
appeal X).
(note, the Iollowing citation Iormat is applied Ior all citation to the Transcript oI the FH Irom
11/14/12..iI time permits Couglhin will go back and transpose all such citations to provide the
ROA citation, which is easy enough to Iigure out, as, Ior instance, the oIllowing page 257 oI
the FH Transcript can be Iound in the ROA by add 1343 to the page number, given that is the
ROA page at which such transcript begins): 'HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 257:6 to 272:12)
MR. ECHEVERRIA: The rule is very speciIic that says the attorney against whom a
grievance is made and a complaint is Iiled, the attorney, that attorney, must Iile a veriIied
response. MR. COUGHLIN: II I hire David Grundy to represent me, then I still have to sign
something that attaches to David Grundy the answer he Iiles Ior me saying I veriIy yes that
the Iactual assertions in here are true? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Yes. MR. KING: Objection.
Hypothetical. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. I'll do that right now. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. I'm
asking iI you Iiled that. And you've indicated, one, you're not sure what veriIied means. And
two, that you need to research it. So what is your next piece oI evidence you intend to oIIer,
sir? MR. COUGHLIN: I intend to take these materials that I have already Iiled and say I
declare under penalty oI perjury, NRS 53.045, that the assertions herein are true and correct to
the best oI my knowledge, except Ior those materials based on inIormation and belieI. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: And a veriIication cannot be made on inIormation and belieI. So is
everything in there true and correct? MR. COUGHLIN: II I had hired David Grundy, I don't
think that would be the standard. Because David Grundy could stand in my stead and sign it
under NRCP 11. MR. KING: No, he couldn't. MR. ECHEVERRIA: What is the next piece
you have to oIIer, Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: You know what though? This stuII is
true, you know. Some oI it's opinion, you know. But do you think you Iile this much stuII iI
you are lying? You know. Do I strike you as somebody who would lie a lot or do I strike you
as somebody that doesn't have much oI a Iilter and maybe tells the truth too much? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: What's your next piece oI evidence? MR. COUGHLIN: You're not letting
me admit this either? MR. ECHEVERRIA: You still haven't identiIied, because I have seen
at least three documents entitled an ex parte motion, and you haven't identiIied which one it is
yet. MR. COUGHLIN: Ex parte motion. Okay. MR. KING: I would object on two grounds.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Let's identiIy what it is he's oIIering. I still don't know. MR.
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COUGHLIN: I would like to oIIer this one that has a Iile stamp oI October 31st, 2012,
prehearing motion to dismiss summary judgment, memorandum oI law. I'll interlineate
veriIied response. MR. KING: Don't change it now, Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: I'll get
a -- MR. KING: It's already stamp Iiled. I don't want you to alter a Iile copy. MR.
COUGHLIN: -- a new Iile stamp on it. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You have just added some
writing to that document that was lodged with the State Bar on October 31? MR.
COUGHLIN: Yeah. MR. ECHEVERRIA: It's the one dated September 12th? MR.
COUGHLIN: No. I really don't see you nitpicking Pat King like this. And Pat King violated
every aspect oI SCR 1052(c). Every aspect. And I don't see you nitpicking him a bit. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: It will serve you better iI you did not exhibit such anger and contempt Ior
the panel. I'm trying to identiIy, sir, because I have seen at least two Iilings that are the
handwritten iteration oI the caption that the original caption is in a State court proceeding
wherein you're a deIendant where you have handwritten in ex parte motion. I've seen two oI
those. I'm interested in having you identiIy which one you are now oIIering, because the two
are slightly diIIerent. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm oIIering the one I'm oIIering today. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: We don't know which one that is. MR. COUGHLIN: It's the one that I'm
oIIering today. MR. ECHEVERRIA: So identiIy it Ior us, please. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: You haven't shown it to us. MR. COUGHLIN: One second, please,
sir. MR. KING: I realize Mr. Coughlin has not identiIied the document to the satisIaction oI
the chair yet. But I would object on the grounds that there appears to be a disk attached to the
back that should deIinitely not come in, because there is no Ioundation Ior it whatsoever. And
ex parte motions are not necessary in these proceedings, because we're right here at the State
Bar trying to Iind out what his responses are. And Ior him to suggest he's Iiling ex parte
documents to the chair oI the panel to avoid the State Bar is inappropriate. And lastly, I think
it's a great concern that Mr. Coughlin is adding. Instead oI creating a new document or asking
Ior leave to Iile a new document is apparently interlineating or adding to the document that's
already been proIIered and stamped. So I don't know what it was originally. Now I know he's
added to it, but it's not the same document anymore. MR. COUGHLIN: It a new document
I'm Iiling right now. That's new. It's diIIerent and new. It might be substantially similar to one
previously Iiled, but it's new. MR. KING: For those reasons I would object. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, would you ask the court reporter to please mark it and make
it part oI the record. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. I apologize. MR. KING: Can I ask the disk
be removed? MR. ECHEVERRIA: It hasn't been admitted yet. Doesn't matter. He's oIIering
it. I want it to be part oI the record. MR. COUGHLIN: I want the disk too. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: The next issue is whether it will be admitted. (Exhibit 14 marked.) MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, let me understand this. You've added some handwriting to
this Irom something you had previously Iiled? MR. COUGHLIN: I attempted to use
something. I believe that's a copy oI what was previously Iiled. And I attempted to notate that.
I'm not attempting to mislead anybody. I think I wrote something about it being new. I
scratched out the Iile stamp, and then I changed the title oI the document, and I redated it and
signed it and put a veriIication, what I believe should suIIice as a veriIication. And I would be
happy to Iurther veriIy it iI this court would be so kind as to give me an education oI what it
might like to see in that regard. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I have had an opportunity to review
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this document in an earlier Iorm. It seems to address the underlying issues as to whether or
not the conviction on the various orders by the court -- I think this one addresses Judge
Holmes' order. To me this is a document that was used to -- originally entitled Notice OI
Errata And Revised Supplemental Motion For New trial, Or Alternatively Supplemental
Motion To Vacate judgment Or Conviction Or In The Alternative Motion For Arrest OI
judgment that appears to have been Iiled in the underlying case. It appears that Mr. Coughlin
is now attempting to reIile that document which addresses issues oI the underlying case in this
current State Bar proceeding, and thereIore, unless panel members disagree, I would rule this
document as irrelevant to the proceedings as it constitutes an attempt to obtain a new trial or
vacation oI an earlier judgment. MR. COUGHLIN: No, it -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's
my ruling, sir. MR. COUGHLIN: All right. MR. ECHEVERRIA: But it is part oI the record.
MR. COUGHLIN: I thought you just ruled you weren't accepting it. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
It's part oI the record. It's just not admitted into evidence. But you can argue to the supreme
court that I committed error. It's now 3:36 or so, and I want to aIIord both sides the
opportunity to present a Iinal argument. MR. COUGHLIN: So -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do
you have any additional evidence? MR. COUGHLIN: So the amount oI time today went
Irom 9:00 o'clock to 2:30 Ior Mr. King, and you gave me an hour? MR. ECHEVERRIA: No.
I'm giving you 15 minutes -- the ruling was it was 30 minutes per witness, 15 minutes per
each side. I'm giving you the opportunity to present your next evidence. MR. COUGHLIN:
Okay. I would like to present -- give me one second, please. I would like to move into
evidence a declaration. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Let's have the reporter mark it. (Exhibit 15
marked.) MR. ECHEVERRIA: I believe -- did you just handwrite some inIormation on this?
MR. COUGHLIN: That's attorney-client privilege. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You did it in the
presence oI the panel. I saw you writing on some document, Mr. Coughlin. Was this -- MR.
COUGHLIN: I don't think that's been proven. MR. ECHEVERRIA: -- was this the
document that you were writing on? MR. COUGHLIN: I've been writing on lot oI stuII
today. MR. ECHEVERRIA: When did you Iile this document? MR. COUGHLIN: I'm just
giving that to you right now. I don't see a Iile stamp. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You haven't Iiled
it yet? MR. COUGHLIN: I don't see a Iile stamp on it. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm asking, did
you Iile this with the State Bar? This is a pleading. MR. COUGHLIN: That's a declaration.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: It's a pleading in a case entitled State Bar oI Nevada, Petitioner, versus
Zach Coughlin, reIerence in cases NG12-0204, NG-0435, and NG-0434. The caption oI the
document I have seen. I believe it was stuck under my door at my oIIice last night. MR.
COUGHLIN: That's a diIIerent one. MR. ECHEVERRIA: A diIIerent one? MR.
COUGHLIN: Yeah. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Did you serve this one on anybody? MR.
COUGHLIN: That's a whole new thing. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. You've completely
written on this. I'm just trying to understand what you are attempting to oIIer here. MR.
COUGHLIN: II you change one blade oI grass, it's a diIIerent Iield, a diIIerent ball game.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: So this is a document that you want now entitled Declaration. And
what is that word? VeriIied response? And this is what you are oIIering as your veriIied
response to the State Bar's complaint? MR. COUGHLIN: It's what I'm oIIering into evidence
right now. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King, any comment? MR. KING: I haven't seen that.
I'm sorry. First oI all, I will object to it, and I would strongly -- I believe it's extremely
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inappropriate Ior Mr. Coughlin to have written on this document, and then to have suggested
he doesn't acknowledge your question, but he just wrote on this particular
document. MR. COUGHLIN: I don't know that that's what I said. I've written on a lot oI
things today. Well, maybe not that many things. MR. KING: The document purports to be
similar to other irrelevant pleadings that have been Iiled in the past, essentially incoherent. OI
great concern to me is that attached to the document again purport to be disks that Mr.
Coughlin has created or handwritten on. And in addition, Ior him to have essentially altered a
document in an attempt to proIIer it as some sort oI motion or evidence today I think is
objectionable and should be reIused. MR. COUGHLIN: Altered? MR. KING: I don't know
what it says, actually. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Would you ask the court reporter to mark this
document as the next. (Exhibit 16 marked.) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Because oI the unusual
circumstances presented by this, unless panel members disagree, I'm going to admit both
Exhibits 15 and 16, because I think the manner -- and Exhibit 16 I will identiIy, Iirst oI all, as
a document that I received a phone call at about 7:00 o'clock last night, that was a document
shoved under my door at my oIIice. It bears a Iile stamp with the State Bar oI November 13th,
2012. MR. COUGHLIN: There's no Iile stamp on that. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sorry? MR.
COUGHLIN: I'm asking -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm showing you Exhibit 16. It has a Iile
stamped copy that was shoved under my door. MR. COUGHLIN: Did I give you the wrong
one? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Exhibit 16 will speak Ior itselI. I'm going to admit Exhibits 15
and 16, because I think they bear relevancy on the issue oI competency, candor with the
tribunal. 15 and 16 are admitted, Mr. Coughlin. Next? (Exhibits 15 and 16 admitted into
evidence.) MR. COUGHLIN: I would like -- MR. VELLIS: Are those admitted with the
transcript or tape on the back? Because I think Mr. King had objected to the tapes. MR.
KING: I don't have the capability, nor do I want to make copies oI the disks so I will have to
ask how that gets accomplished. To the extent it's going to be made part oI the record that
goes to the supreme court, Laura will make copies. Do you want her to make copies oI those
documents now? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm admitting these Ior the limited purpose, not Ior
the truth oI what's in here -- MR. KING: I totally understand. MR. ECHEVERRIA: -- or
admitting the disk as evidence itselI. But I'm admitting the two documents, because I believe
it goes to the credibility oI this witness in terms oI what he told us he was altering today. MR.
COUGHLIN: Altering? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sorry, Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN:
Altering? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Yes, altering. MR. COUGHLIN: What are you purporting
that I told you? MR. ECHEVERRIA: The record will speak Ior itselI -- MR. COUGHLIN: --
get out oI the room. MR. ECHEVERRIA: -- this panel writes its decision, I will explain my
reasoning Ior it. But I'm trying to do it now. You Iiled with the State Bar yesterday a pleading
that is, in my opinion, virtually identical to the one you say today was not Iiled, that you
handwrote on, and then changed it Irom the pleading that you originally Iiled it as, to a
veriIied -- attempted to change it to a veriIied response. I believe the Iact that you did that --
I'm not admitting them Ior the truth oI anything in there. I'm admitting it because I think it
bears on the issue as to the competency and the ability to represent people in a tribunal. MR.
COUGHLIN: Why can't I admit -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm not arguing with you, Mr.
Coughlin, I'm explaining my decision. We're not going to argue. Do you have any other
evidence to present? MR. COUGHLIN: I would like to preserve Ior the record that I am
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seeking to have it admitted Ior the truth, presented it Ior the truth oI the matter. I imagine
most courts can either believe it not believe it. But to say we're not going to admit it. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I'm admitting it Ior the -- MR. COUGHLIN: No. You said you are
admitting it Ior a more limited purpose. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Yes. MR. COUGHLIN: And
I'm saying I would like to admit it Ior the truth oI the matter asserted. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm going to overrule that objection. MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, Laura Peters has asked me to
ascertain how many copies oI those three documents the panel really needs. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I believe Irom my perspective whatever is in the oIIicial transcript. MR.
KING: Do I need to make Iive copies oI those documents Ior each panel member or can I just
make a couple? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Whatever panel member wants a copy oI them. MR.
KENT: I don't. MR. COUGHLIN: For the record, you don't want a copy you said? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. Coughlin. MR. KENT: The original is with the court
reporter. MR. KING: The original will be with the court reporter. MR. KENT: I don't need
another copy Irom that. MR. COUGHLIN: Did you ever get a copy? MR. KENT: No. MR.
COUGHLIN: OI the CDs? MR. KENT: No. MR. COUGHLIN: So you are admitting you're
not going to review it? MR. KENT: No. I don't need another copy. The copy is being marked
with the court reporter. MR. COUGHLIN: How are you going to view it? MR. KENT: I will
go look at that. MR. COUGHLIN: The CD. But Mr. King earlier today said he has been
giving the panel -- I see you all have a copy oI everything I Iiled, yet he's not giving you a
copy oI the CD or DVDs. MR. KING: That is not correct, Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN:
That seems Iraudulent. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Stop it. Stop it. I admitted those two documents
Ior a very limited purpose, Mr. Coughlin, because you denied having changed or altered them.
MR. COUGHLIN: That's not correct. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The record speaks Ior itselI.
MR. COUGHLIN: I took no position. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You asserted an attorney-client
privilege despite the Iact that you did it in the presence oI people -- MR. COUGHLIN: I'm
allowed to Iile things how I -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you're trying my patience.
It's 10 to 4:00. Do you have any other evidence to present?
'HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 30:1 to 32:20) MR. ECHEVERRIA: We took that testimony
under consideration oI your objection. Let's hear your objection, Mr. Coughlin. MR.
COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. Well, I believe Judge Beesley was identiIied in a supplement to Mr.
King's, I'll call it a DowSoE, and I hope the panel will know what I mean, designation oI
witness's summary oI evidence. I've shortened it in my Iilings. Which, incidently, SCR
1052(c) is one oI the Iew procedural rules in the supreme court rules designed to aIIord
attorneys or suspended attorneys, such as myselI, some due process. That rule requires that
the DowSoE be served in the same manner in which the complaint is served upon the
respondent by the panel with at least 30 days notice, or at least 30 days prior to the hearing.
This panel wasn't even empaneled until, I believe the order was October 30th. Mr. King
purports to have sent the DowSoE himselI rather than in some separation in accord with the
rule, but he sent it himselI. On October 12th he Iiled material suggesting that he sent a
certiIied mail October 12th, and in that way it's completely violative oI the rules. Completely.
And Steve Harris, who the judge testiIied to, who was -- he admitted to misappropriating
800K. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Harris is not the subject matter oI this hearing. You are.
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MR. COUGHLIN: He got David Grundy. And he got his DowSoE sent by the panel. And he
got his Iull 30 days. And I sent that Iorward -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm not concerned with
Mr. Harris. Did you get notice that Judge Beesley would be testiIying? MR. COUGHLIN:
Maybe -- I would like to check my records, but like a couple days beIore this hearing. A
couple days. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Was that a supplemental designation? MR. COUGHLIN:
Yeah. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Is that permitted? MR. COUGHLIN: I think it is permitted,
perhaps iI something comes up out oI the blue that's really bearing, but Mr. King's known
about this Ior quite some time. And, in Iact, I've Iiled a complaint with, I believe I included
this in my complaint with State Bar president Lardon -- I hope I'm saying that correctly --
under SCR, I want to say 104(3) in that I believe upon information and belief that Mr. King
contacted one oI my clients or maybe one oI my clients contacted him in early May -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I'm Iocusing on your objection to the testimony oI Judge Beesley. Do you
claim any prejudice because oI that? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: What is
that prejudice? MR. COUGHLIN: Lack oI notice. MR. ECHEVERRIA: How does the lack
oI notice lead to prejudice? You seem to be very Iamiliar with cases that appeared -- in which
you appeared in Iront oI Judge Beesley. MR. COUGHLIN: I wasn't. I wasn't as sharp on that
Cado stuII, because I didn't think I needed to be this morning, and I could have been a lot
sharper on that. I really could have. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm going to overrule the objection.
I think the notice was sent. Mr. Coughlin was aware that Judge Beesley would be testiIying,
and unless the panel has any objection to Judge Beesley, would accept that testimony. Next
witness, Mr. King.
While the 12/24/12 ROA places the 10/9/12 AIIidavit oI Laura Peters at pages 38-39,
the 2/13/13 version oI the ROA places the same at pages 33-34, which is especially odd
considering that the Iile stamp on that AIIidavit oI Laura Peters on at ROA 38 is earlier in
time than the Iile stamp on the Notice oI Formal Hearing and DoWSoE on page 33. This is
even more odd given that the original placement in the ROA oI 12/14 put such 10/9/12
AIIidavit oI Laura Peters in a position after a later dated document (the Notice oI Formal
Hearing, that is, oI 10/12/12 was place after the 10/9/12 AIIidavit oI Laura Peters, which, was
actually placed in the OBC's 11/7/12 production oI documents in lieu oI SCR 105(2)(c)'s
jurisdictional requirements being met. In that 11/7/12 production (which Coughlin sought to
introduce as evidence at the Iormal hearing, but was not even allowed to have marked), that
10/9/12 AIIidavit oI Laura Peters was placed after the 10/24/12 Opposition to Respondent's
Motion to BiIurcate Hearing/Motion to Dismiss, and after the 10/30/12 Order Appointing
Formal Hearing Panel and 10/31/12 Order, indicating that, regardless oI when it was Iiled
stamped or notarized, it was not placed in the 'Iormal pleadings Iile until, at the earliest,
10/31/12. This is extremely prejudicial (especially where the SBN/Panel are now asserting a
deIault basis/admission oI misconduct theory) when view in combination with the SBN's
reIusal to allow Coughlin to take advantage oI the right to inspect, 'up to 3 days prior to the
hearing (which, arguably meant up to and through November 9
th
, 2012), all that to which he
was entitled to inspect under SCR 105(2)(c) (the waiver oI service oI and Subpoenas on
Elcano and Beesley would have been helpIul to see, Beesley's supposed letter to the OBC and
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dating thereoI, etc., and all the suspect redactions or 'privileged and withheld ommissions
Irom what was actually produced to Coughlin on 11/7/12 (which only included materials up
to 10/31/12, as such was 'sent to the printers the morning oI 11/1/12, as admitted to verbally
by Peters and in writing by King).
The second ROA persists with inserting at bates 32 some quasi-AIIidavit oI Attempted
service that is neither signed (and was not, given the lack oI any Index to Exhibits or cover
page Ior any exhibit) attached to that 10/9/12 Notice oI Intent to Take DeIault Iound
immediately preceding it in the ROA (Coughlin, oI course, only Iirst received any version oI
that 10/9/12 NOITTD upon Iinding it bates stamped among some 3,200 other pages oI
documents in the production oI 11/7/12). As such, page 32 oI the ROA should be stricken.
There is not even a name assigned to the various 'statements (unsworn, oI course) made
therein Ior the various dates detailed. Especially with regard to the lack oI notice to Coughlin
that such would be put Iorward as evidence (that Iound on page 32 oI the ROA makes another
appearance within FHE 1 at page 1736...and now it becomes clear why the Index on page
1699 to FHE 1 has been photocopied in a manner to completely obscure what it details...that
was done to obIuscate the reality that the SBN held out to the Panel page 1736 as being
included in that which was originally mailed to Coughlin (with insuIIicient postage placed
thereon resulting in the USPS reIusing to release it to Coughlin, which Coughlin promptly
notiIied the SBN oI and placed the SBN on a Litigation Hold Notice with respect to the
contents and envelope oI that mailing, which was returned to sender with a handwritten
notation detailing the insuIIiciency oI postage placed thereon, made by USPS Downtown
Postal Station longtime employee 'Tim (tall, IiIties, glasses). Coughlin is Iiling herewith a
version oI what the SBN did Iile with this Court on 12/24/12 (though, in an apparent attempt
to coerce payment up Iront Ior the Transcript and certiIied copy oI the Formal Hearing
Exhibits (including Exhibit 16, that Coughlin was not provided the day oI the hearing, and
where none oI the Exhbits were marked as provided to Coughlin), and has aIIixed bates
stamping thereto, such that the 574 page Volume 3 oI 12/14/12 is bates stamped to continue
where page 1098 oI Volume 2 leIt oII. As such, the Index to the FH1 Index oI Documents
that is too blurry to read on the second ROA's page 1699 is much more readable at what
would have been bates stamp page 2001 in the Iirst ROA Iiled. And therein is revealed an
attempt by the SBN to hold out that quasi-AIIidavit oI Service Iound at page 32 oI the second
ROA, included again, as an Exhibit to the 10/9/12 Notice oI Intent to Take DeIault. However,
as detailed above, it is not at all clear that such Reno/Carson Messenger Service receipt was
actually included therewith, (though, a review oI pages 2001 Irom the Iirst ROA and page
1736 oI the second ROA would give one that impression, despite the unlikelihood oI that,
given the RCMS receipt is dated 10/6/12, adn does nto appear to have been Iaxed to the SBN,
and would, thereIore, unlikely have made its way to the SBN in time to be aIIixed to the
10/9/12 purported mailing oI the 10/9/12 NOITTD.And, it is important to recall, as admitted
to on page 1098 oI the Iirst ROA oI 12/24/12, that SBN Clerk oI Court Laura Peters only
mailed the Iirst 2 oI 3 volumes oI that ROA to Coughlin (and that ROA and the second ROA
Iailed to comply with the requirement in NRAP that the Clerk oI Court certiIy the contents oI
such ROA, and, regardless, the SBN's negligent, at best, preparation oI the ROA here is
risable. And, really, in the 2/13/13 ROA, what would purportedly be Exhibit 1, starting at
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page 1699, is not marked in any way to indicate that it is Exhibit 1, and as such, should be
stricken in its entirely. It appears Irom reviewing the Iirst ROA Iiled (since stricken by the
2/7/13 Order) that the SBN excised an essentially blank (though ink wasting dark red or black
page) that had aIIixed to it an 'Exhibit 1 sticker Irom the ROA Iiled on 2/13/13. You can be
entirely certain that the Panel and SBN applied every single ticky tack little reason Ior striking
something or ruling as inadmissible something Coughlin sought to introduce into evidence,
and such an approach should be applied to the SBN's Exhibit 1 beginning on page 1699 in the
2/13/13 ROA, through 1750 (or iI not stricken, at perhaps ruled as inadmissible, particularly
given the apparent Sierra Glass violation incident to pages 1727 and 1736 as detailed above).
Page 133 oI the second ROA contains an Index to Exhibits page attached to Coughlin's
10/16/12 Iile stamped Motion to Review, etc., etc., indicating '1,000 pages and a cd oI the
various relevant videos is attached thereto as Exhibit 1. Instead, what Iollows between pages
134 (with this Court Iile stamping Ior the 10/5/12 similar Iiling in 60838 Iound at page 150)
and 152 is a hard copy oI a Iiling Irom another case (the 10/5/12 Iiling in 60838) that
Coughlin was providing to the SBN. Coughlin and the SBN are involved in numerous
litigations as opposing parties. This is what Indexes to Exhibits and cover pages thereto are
Ior. As Ior the second ROAS page 134 through page 152 should be stricken as unrelated to
this matter (other than to the extent that Coughlin expressly incorporated by reIerence and
adopted therein to this matter all oI his Iilings that are pbulicly available on this Court's
website, held out to the public, including those where the SBN, grievants, or Iormal hearing
witnesses are parties (60331 and 61383 Ieature Hill, 60302 and 60317 Ieature Elcano and
WLS, which King purported to have Hill testiIy about, despite King's 10/12/12 DowSoE
limiting Hill's testimony to: 'Attorney Richard Hill, Esq., is expected to testimony with regard
to Respondent's conduct in connection with Case No. CV11-03628. ROA 33-34. (That is
important, as the majority oI Hill's testimony related to the matters involving Washoe Legal
Services in 60302 or 60317, or the trial court summary eviction proceeding in 1708 (the one
he alternately claimed to be an expert and so well versed on, only to disclaim knowledge oI
much oI anything about the trial court case in RJC Rev2011-001708 when getting caught in a
patent lie and or an outright violation oI RPC 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, and 8.1, and perhaps, 8.2) , 53833
and 54844 Ieature Judge Linda Gardner, 61901, 60838, 61426, and others involved both
Coughlin and the SBN and or NNDB), and the City oI Reno in 60630.
King's 10/12/12 DoWSoE at ROA 33-34 is a particularly troubled document, and
should require the majority oI the testimony put on by King and the majority oI the Iindings
oI Iact and conclusions oI law set out in the 12/14/12 FOFCOl be stricken as violative oI SCR
105(2), and SCR 105(2)(c), Mirch, SchaeIer, and Laub, in particular. Where King's
DowSoW, ROA 33, limits Hill's testimony to 'Attorney Richard Hill, Esq., is expected to
testimony with regard to Respondent's conduct in connection with Case No. CJ11-328,
King and the Panel should be estopped Irom putting on testimony directed to and relying
upon such invovling allegations oI 'Iiling but not serving and or 'serving but not Iiling
where Baker, Hill, and Coughlin were all three registered electronic Iilers at all relevant times
involved in that appeal oI 1708 in CV11-03628. To whatever extent Hill was purporting to
testiIy as to some aspect oI 1708, the DowSoE should prevent him Irom doing so, as should
Hill ultimately being Iorced to admit he knew very little about that trial court summary
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eviction proceeding in 1708 (Hill lied and or violated RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 where he testiIied
at both Coughlin 6/18/12 criminal trespass trial in 26405 and at the 11/14/12 Iormal
disciplinary hearing that Couglhin 'didn't raise the issue in the trial court regarding the
impermissibilty oI utilizing a summary eviction proceeding against a commercial tenant such
as Coughlin at his Iormer home law oIIice (an the hybrid nature thereoI only results in the sort
oI ambiguity that Anvui provides mandatory authority to support the position that such a
matter is not suitable Ior a summary judgment determination like those made in NRS
40.253).
And Iurther, Hill's arguments as to Couglin's allegedly 'not raising the issue in the
trial court are even more inapplicable considering the appeal oI a summary eviction is
review on a de novo basis (which means the trial court records is not slavishly adhered to, but
rather, the matter is 'tried anew and clearly, in Coughlin's 2/4/12 Appellant's Opening BrieI
at page 2:14-26, such was done: 'However, NRS 40.253(7) and (8) do require the RJC to set a
hearing within 10 days and to have the sheriII serve notice oI it on the landlrod, which was
not done. Further, the RJC Ieigns needing Coughlin's permission to set such a hearing
(Coughlin showed up on November 22nd, but nobody else did), however, the RJC didn't need
Coughlin's permission to set the November 7, 2011 hearing where it hurriedly gave Coughlin
back the $2300 it converted Irom him in skirting NRS 40.253(6), particularly where the RJC
had Iailed to comply with NRS 40.385 by reIusing Coughlin a stay, even though his rent
was under $1000, and $250 was all that was required, and Coughlin was a commercial
tenant with his home law office in a Lease Agreement that expressly approved any use of
the premises Coughlin desired, including a commercial use and NRS 40.253 expressly
forbids using a summary eviction proceeding against su h a commercial tenant unless the
non payment oI rent is alleged by serving Notice oI Eviction Ior Non-Payment oI Rent notice.
Only a No Cause eviction notice was served and...
Further, in Coughlin's Appellant's Opening BrieI oI 2/6/12 at page 10:6-28, it reads: '-
1. Whether or not Appellant is a commercial tenant, and thus the summary eviction
procedures in NRS 40.253 are unavailable to evict Appellant where the only type oI Eviction
Notice served in this case was a No Cause Eviction Notice (ie, the nonpayment oI rent was
neither plead nor alleged).
Testimony and documentary evidence is contained both in the Record on Appeal and the
audio transcript oI the various hearings in this matter more than suIIicient to present a genuine
issue oI material Iact as to whether Appellant was a commercial tenant. Actually, nothing in
Judge SIerrazza's various Orders, including the 10/27/11 Findings oI Fact, ConIlusions oI
Law, and Order Ior Summary Eviction speaks to what type oI tenancy the Court viewed the
Appellant to have. Further, Respondent did not contest this issue in the trial Court, despite
Appellant entering testimony and documentary evidence into the record in support oI
categorizing this tenancy one oI a commercial variety, as such, under Polk that issue should
be deemed conceded by Respondent. Further, the Lease Agreement expressly allows Ior such
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a commercial use oI the premises, in both Section 11 (see below) and elsewhere, and any
ambiguity is construed against the Respondent, landlord/draIter oI the agreement:
'11. OCCUPANCY: Occupancy oI the premises is limited to 2 adults ? Children, and shall be
used Ior a residence and Ior other purposes....
'13. UTILITIES: resident agrees to pay Ior the Iollowing utilities: Gas x Electricity x Oil,
Light x, Heat x, Energy x, Other, resident's responsibility Ior these begins at the
commencement oI this agreement. See attached transIer oI account Addendum (note: there is
no such TransIer oI...
'HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 80:8 to 82:23) Q Do you think it's possible that I just Ielt
that I had a basis for defending against a summary eviction as a commercial tenant where
you pled no cause, and the law has an express dictate against summarily evicting
commercial tenants unless you pled nonpayment of rent? Do you think maybe I just thought
that was a legitimate position I took? A No, sir. You maae that up after the fact. Q Have
you noticed that in the tenth (sic, it should read Tenant's) aIIidavit I pled that it was my law
office? A You did not have a business license, sir. You were not lawfully operating a
business there. Q Well, regardless oI whether or not that's true, that's different than what
you just said. You said this is a criminal trespass trial. You said, "You made that up after
the fact." But then I pointed out to you that, no, Rich it's pled right there. It's pled right
there. So is that truthIul? MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative. THE WITNESS: Is there a
question in there? BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Yeah. You throw out, "You made it up aIter the
Iact." And then I say, no, Rich, it's October 19th, it's pled there, it's pled in the tenth
affidavit, it's dealt with extensively at trial. A lot of questions and testimony at the trial
which was later remixed into a -- so is that demonstrating candor on your part to assert
that I made it up after the fact when there's all this documentation that says, no, Rich,
it's right there, it's commercial tenancy? A Mr. Coughlin, as you know, I aia not attena
that trial, nor have I reaa the transcript. I will note though that Juage Sferra::a rulea that
you aia not prove anything that you attemptea to try to prove. Q So you just said -- A That
speaks very loualy to your competence ana what you put in the recora in that court. And it
was aIIirmed on appeal. Q Can you tell me, when you say you didn't plead that, you
didn't bring it up. But then a minute later you say, I didn't go to the trial, and I didn't
read this and that. How can you say you didn't bring that up, you made it up after the
fact, and reconcile that with the statement that you didn't go to the trial? MR. KING:
Objection. Argumentative. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. I'll allow you one more question.
MR. COUGHLIN: That's all. (there should be a question mark, as in 'That's All?) MR.
ECHEVERRIA: It's now, according to the clock on the wall here, it's now 10:45. BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q What do you mean when you say, "You made that up after the fact"? A
Mr. Baker, in papers that he filed, pointed out to the court that you had not raised that
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issue in the justice's court, and you did not challenge that statement by Mr. Baker in the
papers that he filed with the court in your responding papers. Q What statement by Mr.
Baker? A That you had not timely raised the commercial tenant business in the justice's
court. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Okay. Mr. Hill, you've been here an hour. I believe we have
limited the testimony oI witnesses to halI an hour. I think we have aIIorded Mr. Coughlin the
opportunity to ask as many questions he believes are relevant as possible.
Regardless oI the Iact that Coughlin most certainly did raise the issue (or the Iact that
Judge Nash Holmes curiously time incarceration oI Coughlin Ior Iive days during the time in
which Coughlin's deadline to Iile a Reply to Baker's Respondent's BrieI Iell, preventing
Coughlin Irom so Iiling such a Reply BrieI...but no matter, Coughlin not only raised the issue,
he did so in the trial court, and regardless, its a jurisdictional voidness scenario, which may
be raised at any time under NRCP 60(b)(4), with the only limitation being 'within a
reasonable time, which certainly extends longer than the 'within 180 days Iound in NRCP
60(b)(1)-(3).
And even had Coughlin not 'raised the issue in the trial court, as Hill Ialsely alleges,
such may not be held against Coughlin (similar to hear, where any Lau based allegation or
striking oI Coughlin's Iiling over page limit or Iont requirements were work a complete
injustice where King has cheated at every turn, cutting a substantial number oI the days oI
notice and to prepare, and review SCR 105(2)(c) materials, and any speciIicity or suIIiciency
oI the Complaint that Coughlin is entitled to, essentially making it one more summary
proceeding Coughlin has been subjet to this year (summary evictions, summary
transmogriIied traIIic citation trial cum disciplinary hearing, summary disciplinary hearing on
11/14/12, etc., etc.)
The transcript oI the 10/13/11 summary eviction proceeding, however, reveals:
'DeIendant: SpeciIically Your Honor what`s convenient here is this has all pretty much been
detailed in emails to and Irom the landlord and myselI. Further I took videotapes oI an
incident where a good deal or property damage was done to my home law office. (page
12)....DeIendant: That`s Mr. Baker`s interpretation oI the lease Your Honor, the lease does
not say weeds. It does not say weeds, it says lawn. There is no lawn its dirt. In that regard I
have that high quality, high density green woolen carpet to make the appearance oI a sort oI
|inaudible 0:39:24| grass installation. A good deal oI money and time we spent so that I could
have a law office that didn`t have a dirt lawn. (page 23).....Judge: Yeah, well, this thing
is a -- this is an order October 13th. Tenant's motion to continue denied. II the deIendant posts
rent, a trial will be set Ior October 25th at 10 a.m. So it is a trial. PlaintiII: Yeah. 36 Judge:
However, just to clariIy this, sir, you're telling me that you disagree that we can go Iorward
with the trial today. What you want to do is get a 20-day complaint and go to trial in that
manner. DeIendant: Well, are we talking about |INDISCERNIBLE 19:52| 20 days or we
have... Judge: No, I don't -- I'm not talking about anything. I'm just clariIying, are you arguing
today that we should not be going Iorward with the trial? Because that's what I want to
address Iirst. DeIendant: I think that's -- that is set Iorth in my motion I Iiled today, Your
Honor. Judge: Well, the motion you Iiled today is not timely, so the issue is your position
right now is it your desire to receive 20-days' notice and go that way? DeIendant: You know, I
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think that would be most every tenant's position. They'd like a plenary trial with like all this--
Judge: Well, the problem with that position, sir, you are going to have to post the additional
rent as oI November 1st. DeIendant: Your Honor, 2 -- 40.253(6) iI the court showing no
Iurther order once converting this to a Iull-scale plenary trial. Judge: I haven`t converted it to
anything, sir. DeIendant: But it seems as though you're saying iI that occurs, once it converts
to a plenary that you would have to post rent. Judge: No, I'm saying as a condition oI doing
that, I'm not going to let you live there without -- or use the office without paying rent.
DeIendant: That's Las Vegas Rule 44, where you. Judge: I don't care about Las Vegas Rule
44. 37 DeIendant: We don't have a corollary to that Reno, Your Honor. Judge: And we do
have a statute and we do have our own rule, sir. I don't know why you're citing Las Vegas
rules. DeIendant: Because there's no rule. The Reno Justice Court Rules Rule 2 says they
don't apply to landlord-tenant actions. So we're leIt with. Judge: We do have rules that
allow us to accept deposit, sir. (page 37)...DeIendant: Your Honor, similar to most oI the
witnesses that are called, Mr. Fisher was sent with less than 20 hours notice. It was e-mail
notice the lease calls Ior 48 hours written notice. So I don`t know why his time has been taken
up. I don`t know what he could possibly testiIy to. The lease says 48 hours notice it's a law
office. It is not a college kids dorm room where you can just barge in at any moment.
(Page 66)....DeIendant: The crew oI men, the crew oI Hispanic men that Dr. Merliss in
conjunction with the Iemale realtor Darlene Sharpe sent to my law oIIice to work on weeds
Ior which Dr. Merliss already agreed to pay me the job. So, that sort oI the double group
eIIort |51.05| currently it was causes no expense in that regard subsequently. (Page
92)....Judge: And you wrote back within one day that no one other than me is to enter the
house. DeIendant: Absent prior notice. Yes, absolutely. Judge: No, I understand. But it was
not a conciliatory tone at all. DeIendant: Well. Judge: You`re blaming him Ior being.
DeIendant: The tone oI our previous correspondences would suggest that Dr. Merliss would
probably assume that he could just have somebody walk in my law oIIice.... (Page 113).
'PlaintiII: Thank you, Your Honor. NRS 40.254, I believe, is the operative statute here.
Pursuant to the court`s policies in that statute the landlord has Iiled his aIIidavit in this matter.
I don`t know how many additional copies I have here but that is in the court`s Iiles. I believe
actually Your Honor I have submitted at the last hearing which was presented as. (Page
68)....PlaintiII: I have such point out sir, the landlord`s aIIidavit exhibit D is on the Iorm
provided by this court. The US Supreme Court has, as you know, we have these Iorms, the
eviction notice Iorms. However, they don`t have an aIIidavit Iorm Ior |19.26|. So, we
submitted the unlawIul detainer aIIidavit exhibit D signed by Dr. Merliss. However, going
back and just looking at the stature there`s a make sure were covered NRS 40.254, I, as the
landlord`s agent Iile a declaration on October 19th which addresses the items in NRS 40.254
sub 2. I have just one point to have to the court ---...(Page 75)....PlaintiII: Which it was the
last time. I just want to be sure that his court`s Iorm that the statutory requirements. So, when
we look at NRS 40.254, it authorizes an aIIidavit the landlord or the landlord`s agent, I signed
the aIIidavits or the --- (Page 76).
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'DeIendant: Yes Your Honor I think that hits the nail right on the head. This is a summary
proceeding provided by statute NRS 40.254 and NRS 40.253(6). The only issue here today is
possession oI the property; the court`s inquiry is very Iocused and has only asked you whether
7 there is a legal deIense to the alleged unlawIul detainer. II Mr. Coughlin has claims against
third parties or my client he can make them in a separate civil suit. What are these third
parties going to add to the discussion oI possession oI the property today? None. There has
been no complaint Iiled, there has been no point alleged. (Page 8).
King's 10/12/12 DowSoE reads:
'A. Documentary Evidence 1. Any and all documentation contained in the
State Bar oI Nevada's tile regarding grievance Iiles NG12-0204, NG12-0435 and
NG12-0434, except Ior screening materials and Bar Counsel work product. Pursuant
to SCR 105 (2)(c) Respondent may inspect the State Bar tile up to three (3) days
prior to the hearing.
B. Witnesses and Brief Statement of Facts
1. Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes will appear by phone to testiIy with regard to
Respondent's conduct in connection with Case No. 11-TR-26800 12 in Reno
Municipal Court.
2. Judge Kenneth R. Howard is expected to testiIy about Respondent's conduct in
connection with Case No. 11 CR 21176 21.
3. Dr. Matt Merliss is expected to testify about the situation leading up to
Respondent's arrest for trespassing. (ROA 33)
DESIGNATION OF SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
4. Attorney Richard Hill, Esq., is expected to testimony with regard to
Respondent's conduct in connection with Case Ao. CJ11-328.
5. Scott Coppa, Marshall Ior the Reno Municipal Court is expected to testiIy about
Respondent's disruptive behavior on March 22,201 2.
6. Attorney Daniel Wong is expected to testiIy about Respondent's conduct in Reno
Justice Court.
7. Steve Tuttle, Reno Justice Court employee, is expected to testiIy about
Respondent's conduct when visiting the court complex.
8. Karen Stanck, Reno Justice Court employee, is expected to testiIy about
Respondent's conduct when visiting the court complex. 9. Robbin Baker, Reno
Justice Court employee, is expected to testiIy about Respondent's conduct when
visiting the court complex. 10. Dr. Richard T. Bissett is expected to testiIy about the
examination he perIormed on Respondent in preparation Ior a competency hearing in
Case No. 12-0376.
11. Dr. Mary R. Vieth is expected to testiIy about the examination she perIormed on
Respondent in preparation Ior a competency hearing in Case No. 12-0376.
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12. A member oI the staII oI the State Bar oI Nevada Ethics Department is expected
to testiIy as Custodian oI Records regarding documentation contained in the records
oI the State Bar oI Nevada and Respondent's discipline and licensure history.
13. Zachary B. Coughlin is expected to testiIy regarding the Iacts and circumstances
in all three disciplinary matters. The State Bar oI Nevada reserves the right to
supplement this disclosure. DATED this .. day oI October, 2012.
Any and all testimony or documentary evidence put on by the SBN or relied on by
the Panel that related to 'competency in an SCR 117 sense should be stricken and the
various rulings against Coughlin's repeated relevancy objections present clearly reversible
error. King's Case Summary Ior Record on Appeal oI 2/13/13 (not bates stamped) seeks to
now recharacterize the hearing and FOFCOL, purporting that: 'The Nature of the Rules
Violations. 1he Panel heard witness testimony that supported Respondents' various
individual acts of misconduct. The Panel made findings that the Respondent continues
to engage in a pattern of conduct that is consistent and includes , without limitation, the
disruption of court proceedings, the refusal to heed the directions and admonitions of
the court, the injection of irrelevant material and matters, the filing of lengthy,
irrelevant and nonsensical pleadings, the willingness to lie to court and counsel and the
inability to understand and follow the rules of evidence and procedure . What King is
really saying there is 'gosh, we didn't actually get into speciIic instances oI misconduct at
all (other than, perhaps, one completely baseless allegation by Hill, as to something related
to 1708 where the DowSoE limits Hill's testimony to 03628 (Hill's testimony related to
Coughlin's completely supportable moving Ior the mandatory stay evince in Venetian v.
Two Roads incident to NRS 40.385 and the mysteriously missing Irom an Supplementals
transmitted to the 2JDC by the RJC Iilings by Coughlin oI 12/22/11 in 1708.
The 12/22/11 Iilings by Couglhin and depositing, again, oI the statutorily set $250 Ior
a stay oI eviction, which is apparently a mandatory stay, in RJC 1708 (and, really, the
associated attempts to so Iile such by Couglhin in the 2JDC, which were denied initially by
Clerks there inIorming Coughlin he must so move in the RJC, and also where Couglin's IFP
in CV11-03051 was not ruled on until 11/8/11 (and Coughlin was not constructively served
such ruling until aIter he was arrested Ior criminal trespass on 11/13/11, as Coughlin is not
listed on the electronic prooIs oI service thereto in CV11-03051 until being so added to the
NEFR 9 service list later on in that matter. This analysis and the underlying basis Ior
completely destroying Hill's testimony and any credibility Hill ever had also involves a
consideration oI the 12/20/11 Hearing on Coughlin's 11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal
Property Lien in RJC 1708, the Iailure oI the RJC to hold a hearing within 10 days as
required by NRS 40.253(8), Hill's 11/21/11 written correspondence to Coughlin and the
extent to which it implies an improper ability to inIluence a tribunal, the 12/21/11 Order
Resolving Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien, NRS 40.385, Venetian v.
Two Roads and the transcript available on this Court's web site oI the hearing therein
related to NRS 40.385 issues, and the 10/13/11 Order in the RJC requiring Coughlin deposit
some $2,275 in rent escrow to preserve any right to litigate habitability issues in a 'trial
set and noticed in writing as a trial Ior 10/25/11 (subsequently, aIter Coughlin's 10/18/11
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Notice oI Appeal oI that 10/13/11 Order divested the RJC oI jurisdiction, as touched on by
Hill's associate Baker's 10/18/11 Iax to RJC Judge SIerrazza (mysteriously missing Irom the
ROA the RJC sent to the 2JDC), Judge SIerrazza's Iailure to provide Ior the return oI such
$2,275 worth oI 'rent escrow deposit upon announcing his ruling at the conclusion oI the
10/25/11 summary proceeding/'trial (at which point Judge SIerrazza indicated the rent
escrow deposit would not be released, but rather serve to satisIy Coughlin's 'bond on
appeal (cost bonds on appeal are statutorily set at $250, as are supersedeas bond's where
the tenant's rent is less than $1,000, or where not a commercial tenancy, though as detailed
in Coughlin's 12/22/11 correspondence to Hill, Baker, and Judge SIerrazza and the 12/22/11
Iilign by Coughlin in 1708, and interpreation that Coughlin's was a commercial tenancy
would thereby invoke the jurisdictional bar to pursuing a summary eviction oI the sort
utlimately awarded where the landlord pursued only a No-Cause basis Ior eviction and so
noticed Coughlin thereoI, where summarily evicting a commercial tenant in Nevada
requires that the landlord plead non-payment oI rent, and Hill and Baker chose not to do so.
They chose to continue billing their client just like they were conducting a Iull on plenary
unlawIul detainer 'trial, only they were willing to do little more than Iill in some
standardized evictions Iorms Irom this Court's website, attach a bunch oI irrelevant and
voluminous NV Energy receipts, subpoena handymen to testiIy where their attempts to
enter Coughlin's law oIIice were outside the 48 hours notice required by the lease
agreement, and cite to an attorney's feeprovision in Chapter 40 that related only to where a
tenant was engaged in the manuIacture oI controlled substances (resulting in Baker being
Iorced to Iile a document with the court correcting his mistatement oI the law and joining in
Coughlin's Motion to Vacate the attorney's feeaward Judge SIerrazza entered on 11/8/11,
wherre Baker had sought some $18,000 in attorney's Iees Ior a summary eviction
proceeding.
Pretty much every word Panel Chair Echeverria wrote or uttered in this matter
evinced a disturbingly high level oI evident partiality, consider:
'HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 54:18 to 54:22) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I'm going
to aIIord you extra time also Ior cross-examination. Part of it, the length of the direct, was
due to lengthy objections, and I have to take that into consideration. So please proceed,
and I will give you additional time. Even iI what is stated immediately above is true, such
would not necessarily be Coughlin's Iault. It could be King's Iault Ior asking questions so
worthy oI objections. Further, a review oI the objections that not only King, but also,
repeatedly, the Panel made to the various questions Coughlin asked in his various direct
examinations and or where seeking to introduced documentary evidence, reveals that, by
Iar, a Iar greater percentage oI Coughlin's time was so eaten up, and that the Panel made
absolutely no accommodation thereto.
'HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 1424:10 to 1425:15) Q Mr. Hill, I appreciate your time today.
Thanks Ior your patience. Was Mr. Coughlin, in his dealings with you as an attorney, was
he truthIul or did he show candor in his dealings with you as a lawyer? MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm sorry, your Honor. II I can interject. It's been well over 15 minutes. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That's true. Do you want to wrap it up, Mr. King? MR. KING: Yes. BY
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MR. KING: Q With that said, did he show candor to you? A In our dealings with Mr.
Coughlin, you could not trust him at all. No agreement ever made with Mr. Coughlin
was honored by him. For example, when 1udge Sferrazza ordered that Mr. Coughlin
could have two days -- he was originally given a week to move his stuff out before the
eviction order was served. Thereafter there was a hearing. The judge gave Mr.
Coughlin two days to go in and remove his possessions. Mr. Coughlin -- we went over
there, opened the doors about 8:00 o'clock. He wasn't there. About 11: o'clock we get
an e-mail from Mr. Coughlin saying I have appealed 1udge Sferrazza's ruling. That
means his ruling is stayed. That means I can go back into the house. I'm staying in the
house, and there's nothing you can do about it. MR. COUGHLIN: Objection, hearsay.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. THE WITNESS: Sometime later that day we got an
order Irom Judge SIerrazza saying that the request Ior a stay had been denied. Mr. Coughlin
had burned basically a whole day doing nothing trying to get his stuII out. That was typical.
He repeatedly has signed certificates of mailing that he mailed thus and so to us. We
have never, ever gotten anything by mail from Mr. Coughlin. In the justice's court he
would serve things that he didn't file. He would file things that he didn't serve. We
would have to call the clerk on an every other day basis to stay on top of what was
going on. Finally, when we got in the district court, we were able to use the e-flex
system, and we were able to keep track of what was going on. BY MR. KING: Q Let
me restate the question. The question is: As an attorney, having a responsibility to be
truthIul and to have candor with opposing counsel, was Mr. Coughlin truthIul, and did he
use candor with you? A No. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King, wrap it up, please. You're
limited to 15 minutes. BY MR. KING: Q SpeciIically relating to Mr. Coughlin's candor to
the court, did he show candor to the courts? A No. Q In his demeanor -- MR.
COUGHLIN: Objection. Lack oI Ioundation. MR. KING: My last question. MR.
COUGHLIN: Pretty damming statement to have no Ioundation. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Please don't interrupt. We haven't heard the question yet to which you've objected. MR.
COUGHLIN: The last one, whether I showed candor to the court, and he said no. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: You object to that one? Its overrulea. Go ahead. BY MR. KING: Q
With regard to a person perhaps -- to the extent that Mr. Coughlin may have exhibited these
bad behaviors, was he otherwise kind in his dealings with you and Dr. Merliss? Could you
explain, just brieIly, to the panel his actual demeanor with regard to his dealings with you
and your client? A His e-mails, his Iilings were abusive, to say the least. Calling my -- he
called my associate a lichen. I'll admit we all had to retreat to the dictionary on that one.
Name calling. He's accused me oI bribing the Reno Police Department to have him arrested.
My staII is absolutely terrorized by this man.
Additionally, Hill's testimony and King's presentation oI FHE 2 (R1751-53), Judge
Flanagan's 6/25/12 Order wherein Hill's associate Baker's 4/19/12 post-judgment motion
Ior attorney's feesanctions, citing to as a basis Ior such ARS 9.5 and ARS 7.85
(1751:22-23) was completely Iraudulent and violative oI RPC 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.8 where
both Hill and King were served with and well aware oI Judge Flanagan's 8/28/12 Order in
03628, which speciIically Iound that no sanctions were issued against Coughlin in the
6/25/12 Order in 03628.
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NRAP 38, and 39 apply under NRS 40.400 to 03628. As such, Baker's citation to
NRS 7.085 in the appeal Irom and entirely diIIerent 'civil action or proceeding (even iI a
summary eviction and any NJCRPC 109 'trial is included within the purview oI NRS
7.085, the Iact that 03628 has a diIIerent case number than 1708 makes clear (beyond the
inapplicability oI NRS 69.050 to appeals oI 'orders versus the 'judgments reIerenced in
all sections oI NRS 69 speaking to 'costs, including NRS 69.020, 69.030,
69.040...ThereIore, the reIerence in NRS 69.050 to 'costs and 'prevailing party and
'judgment must necessarily apply those terms as they are utilized in the same chapter oI
NRS within which NRS 69.050, and both 'costs and 'prevailing party are utilized with
NRS 69 only in circumstances involving a 'judgment(see NRS 69.020 identiIying any
such recovering as incident to an 'action and any 'any judgment recovered therein..
'NRS 69.020 prevailing party entitled to costs. The prevailing party in justice courts is
entitled to costs oI the action, and also oI any proceedings taken in aid oI an execution
issued upon any judgment recoverea therein.`
NRS 69.030 prevailing party allowed attorney`s feeto be taxed as costs in justice court.
The prevailing party in any civil action at law in the justice courts oI this State shall
receive, in addition to the costs oI court as now allowed by law, a reasonable attorney fee.
The attorney feeshall be Iixed by the justice and taxed as costs against the losing party.
NRS 69.040 costs must be included in judgment; cost bill; motion to retax costs.
1. The justice must tax and include in the judgment the costs allowed by law to the
prevailing party.
2. The party in whose Iavor judgment is rendered and who claims costs must deliver to
the justice, and serve a copy upon the adverse party, within 2 days aIter the verdict or notice
oI the decision oI the justice, or such Iurther time as may be granted, a memorandum oI the
items oI the costs and necessary disbursements in the action, which memorandum must be
veriIied by the oath oI the party or the party`s attorney or agent or by the clerk oI the party`s
attorney, stating that to the best oI his or her knowledge and belieI the items are correct and
that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action. The party in whose
Iavor judgment is rendered shall be entitled to recover the witness Iees, although at the
time the party may not have actually paid them.
3. Issuance or service oI subpoena shall not be necessary to entitle the prevailing party
to tax as costs witness Iees and mileage, providing that such witnesses be sworn and testiIy
in the cause.
4. It shall not be necessary to embody in the memorandum the Iees oI the justice, but the
justice shall add the same according to the Iees oI the justice Iixed by statute.
5. Within 2 days aIter service oI a copy oI the memorandum, the adverse party may
move the court, upon 2 days` notice to retax and settle the costs, a copy oI which notice oI
motion shall be Iiled and served upon the prevailing party claiming costs, and thereupon
the justice shall settle the costs.
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6. II the judgment is entered by deIault it shall not be necessary to make service oI a
copy oI the cost bill.
NRAP 38, and 39 read:
'RULE38.FRIVOLOUS CIVIL APPEALSDAMAGES AND costS
(a)Frivolous Appeals; costs.II the Supreme Court determines that an appeal is
Irivolous, it may impose monetary sanctions.

(b)Frivolous Appeals; Attorney Fees as costs.When an appeal has Irivolously been
taken or been processed in a Irivolous manner; when circumstances indicate that an appeal
has been taken or processed solely Ior purposes oI delay, when an appeal has been
occasioned through respondent`s imposition on the court below; or whenever the appellate
processes oI the court have otherwise been misused, the court may, on its own motion,
require the oIIending party to pay, as costs on appeal, such attorney Iees as it deems
appropriate to discourage like conduct in the Iuture.
RULE39.costS
(a)Against Whom Assessed.The Iollowing rules apply in civil appeals unless the law
provides or the court orders otherwise:
(1)iI an appeal is dismissed, costs are taxed against the appellant, unless the parties
agree otherwise;
(2)iI a judgment is aIIirmed, costs are taxed against the appellant;
(3)iI a judgment is reversed, costs are taxed against the respondent;
(4)iI a judgment is aIIirmed in part, reversed in part, modiIied, or vacated, costs are
taxed only as the court orders.
(b)Reserved.
(c)costs oI BrieIs, Appendices, Counsel`s Transportation; Limitation.
(1)costs oI Copies.The cost oI producing necessary copies oI brieIs or appendices
shall be taxable in the Supreme Court at rates not higher than those generally charged Ior
such work in the area where the district court is located.
(2)costs oI Counsel`s Transportation.The actual costs oI round trip transportation Ior
one attorney, actually attending arguments beIore the Supreme Court, between the place
where the district court is located and the place where the appeal is argued shall be taxable.
For the purpose oI this Rule, 'actual costs Ior private automobile travel shall be deemed to
be 15 cents per mile, but where commercial air transportation is available at a cost less than
private automobile travel, only the cost oI the air transportation shall be taxable.

(3)Bill oI costs.A party who wants such costs taxed shallwithin 14 days aIter
entry oI judgmentIile an itemized and veriIied bill oI costs with the clerk, with prooI oI
service.

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(4)Objections.Objections to a bill oI costs shall be Iiled within 5 days aIter service
oI the bill oI costs, unless the court extends the time.

(5)Limit on costs.The maximum amount oI costs taxable under this section shall be
$500.

(d)Clerk to Insert costs in Remittitur.The clerk shall prepare and certiIy an itemized
statement oI costs taxed in the Supreme Court Ior insertion in the remittitur, but issuance oI
the remittitur must not be delayed Ior taxing costs. II the remittitur issues beIore costs are
Iinally determined, the district court clerk mustupon the Supreme Court clerk`s request
add the statement oI costs, or any amendment oI it, to the remittitur.

(e)costs on Appeal Taxable in the District Courts.The Iollowing costs on appeal are
taxable in the district court Ior the beneIit oI the party entitled to costs under this Rule:

(1)the preparation and transmission oI the record;

(2)the reporter`s transcript, iI needed to determine the appeal;

(3)preparation oI the appendix;

(4)premiums paid Ior a supersedeas bond or other bond to preserve rights pending
appeal; and
(5)the feeIor Iiling the notice oI appeal.
'NRS7.085Payment of additional costs, expenses and attorney`s fees by attorney
who files, maintains or defends certain civil actions or extends civil actions in certain
circumstances.
1.II a court Iinds that an attorney has:
(a)Filed, maintained or deIended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State
and such action or deIense is not well-grounded in Iact or is not warranted by existing law
or by an argument Ior changing the existing law that is made in good Iaith; or
(b)Unreasonably and vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding beIore any
court in this State, the court shall require the attorney personally to pay the additional costs,
expenses and attorney`s Iees reasonably incurred because oI such conduct.
2.The court shall liberally construe the provisions oI this section in Iavor oI awarding
costs, expenses and attorney`s Iees in all appropriate situations. It is the intent oI the
Legislature that the court award costs, expenses and attorney`s Iees pursuant to this section
and impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Aevada Rules of Civil Procedure in all
appropriate situations to punish Ior and deter Irivolous or vexatious claims and defenses
because such claims and deIenses overburden limited judicial resources, hinder the timely
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resolution oI meritorious claims and increase the costs oI engaging in business and
providing proIessional services to the public.
NRS 7.085 applies to 'claims and deIenses, not appeals, Iurther, the use oI the term
'proceeding therein, in the context oI the phrase 'civil action or proceeding does not
properly received the same application as the term 'proceeding and 'action is given in
NRS 118A.
Regardless, to whatever extent the attorney Iee award oI 6/25/12 is not void, NRS
118A.355(1)(d) absolves Coughlin oI any duty to pay it until certain conditions are met:
'(d) Withhold any rent that becomes due without incurring late Iees, charges Ior notice or
any other charge or fee authorized by this chapter or the rental agreement until the
landlord has remedied, or has attempted in good faith to remedy, the failure.
Wherever the landlord and Baker must rely upon a section oI 'this chapter (NRS
118A to make applicable NRS 7.085 (
Baker violated RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 in his attempts to patenly mischaracterize the
lease as 'expired in the 8/22/11 and 9/27/11 notices (and then as 'terminated in his
10/19/11 Declaration in 1708) that he had admitted as Exhibits at the 10/25/11 'Trial in
1708, and in his invocation oI NRS 118A.470. It was the very language in the 'NRS
118A.470 Holding over by tenant. II a tenant remains in possession without the landlord`s
consent after expiration of the term of the rental agreement or its termination, the
landlord may bring an action Ior possession and Ior rent and the landlord may also recover
his or her actual damages. II the landlord consents to the tenant`s continued occupancy, the
tenancy is Irom week to week in the case oI a tenant who pays weekly rent, and in all other
cases the tenancy is Irom month to month. Such occupancy is otherwise on the same terms
ana conaitions as were containea in the rental agreement unless specifically agreea
otherwise.
2. 1ERMS: Management aoes hereby rent ... for a period of not less than 12 months
tenancy, commencing on the 1
st
day oI March, 2010 Ior a total amount oI $10,800.00 at a
monthly rate of $9 ...
3. HOLDOVER: Under Nevada law this Rental Agreement and any changes
properly agreed to will remain in effect on a monthly basis after the initial term ...
10. SUBLEASING: ... Resident further may use the premises for any commercial
enterprise...
13. UTILITIES: Resident agrees to pay for the following utilities: Gas x
Electricity x Oil___, Light x, Heat x, Energy x, Other_____, Resident's responsibility for
these begins at the commencement of this agreement. See attached transfer of account
Addendum (note: there is/was no such TransIer oI Account Addendum attached to the Lease
Agreement). Utilities not payable by the Resident will be paid by the Management ...
20. TERMINATION: 1his Agreement and the tenancy hereby granted may be
terminated by either party within 3 days of the defined termination date (refer to
Paragraph 2), or any time thereaIter by giving the other party not less than thirty (30) day
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prior notice in writing or as otherwise allowed by the laws of the State of Nevada (ReIer
to Paragraph 1 and 9 Ior monetary liabilities)..
That 'Standard Rental Agreement continues:
~22. MAINTENANCE, REPAIRS, OR ALTERATIONS: ... Tenant will irrigate
and maintain any surrounding grounds, including laws and shrubbery, if they are for
the tenant's exclusive use....
23. DAMAGES TO PREMISES: II the premise are damaged by time or through
any other cause which renders the premises untenantable, ... the rent in the current
month will be prorated...If this Agreement is not terminated, then Owner will promptly
repair the premises and there will be a proportionate reduction of rent until the
premises are repaired ... The proportionate reauction will be basea on the extent which
repairs interfere with Tenants reasonable of the premises....
28. LIABILITY: management shall not be liable Ior any damage or injury to Resident
common areas thereoI, unless such liability is based on the negligent acts or omission of
Resident or his guests....
32. INSURANCE: It is agreed that TENANT may obtain REA1ERS IASURAACE
AS LAADLORDS or his Agent's insurance supplements cover of 1EAAA1'S Property.
severally. The undersigned have reaa the above contract ana unaerstana ana agree to all
the provisions thereof and further acknowledge that they have received a copy of said
contract.
34. NOTE: the above paragraph Heading are for reference only and do not add to
or diminish the intended meaning of any paragraph...
Any interpretation that Paragraph 22 oI the lease applied to 'taking care oI the weeds
is clearly vitiated by the express waiver thereto by Merliss in his written assent to an
agreement with Coughlin Ior $350 in May 2011 Ior Coughlin's 'taking care oI the weeds.
Obviously Baker and Merliss woula want the tenancy and lease to thave 'terminated
by its terms, especially given the liability his client Iaces under it pursuant to paragraphs 23
(Judge SIerrazza committed reversible error where he Iailed to allow Ior a set-oII to Coughlin
as to any NRS 118A.355(5) rent escrow required where, incident to the Green
Action/Dickson's Darlene Sharpe incident on May 24
th
, 2011, and the unlawIul interruption oI
essential services between October 4
th
-5
th
(laughably NV Energy's Denise Tsuda engaged in,
while sworn, the Hill and Baker approach oI saying what she wishes was true in a manner that
indicates she has some actual basis Ior believing it so where she testiIied that the electricial
service was disconnected Ior 'less than 24 hours, only to be Iorced to admit (even though, in
more reversible error, Judge SIerrazza reIused to allow Coughlin to cross-examine NV
Energy's Tsuda) that she had no basis Ior knowing whether or not more than '24 hours
passed while the service was interrupted) and 28 (' management shall not be liable Ior any
damage or injury to Resident or any other person or to any property occurring on the premises
or any part thereoI, or in common areas thereoI, unless such liability is based on the
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negligent acts or omission of management, his agent, or employee,"; which Couglin pointed
out to Merliss in an email just days prior to Merliss hiring attorney's Baker and Hill, in a
patent display oI retaliation under NRS 118A.510 (Iailure to assent to a rule
change/modiIication oI the lease, and reporting oI a violation oI a government code (RMC
noxious weed ordinance, and criminal law violations by Green Action Lawn Service/Darlene
Sharpe).
Also, there's the problem oI the lease not having any 'deIined termination date in
paragraph 2 where paragraph 20 reIerences any such 'deIined termination date and makes
any termination contingent upon the landlord having given Coughlin notice that he was
terminating the lease...instead, Baker Ilew too close to the sun, and attempted to avoid the
messy situation oI paragraph 3 oI the lease remaining 'in eIIect on a monthly basis aIter the
initial term. Likewise, Baker attempted to make an end run around the Iact that the lease
clearly, explicitly, unambiguously allows Ior a commercial use in paragraph 10: 'Resident
further may use the premises for any commercial enterprise..." Baker displayed a true lack
oI candor in that regard where he Iiled a pleading completely Iailing to address the language
in paragraph 10 oI the lease, and where he excised the ambiguous language in paragraph 1
with respect to just what 'only reIerred to (ie, 'only a residential use, or 'only those
certain premises deIined thereaIter. Merliss Iailed to introduce any evidence other than his
testimony with respect to what the lease he admits he provided (unsigned) to Coughlin
actually said (best evidence rule, hearsay). Regardless, even were it true that Coughlin
submitted to Merliss a signed version oI the lease that contained a Iew minor revisions
thereto, tantamount to a counteroIIer at best, Merliss should still be considered the 'draIter
oI the lease (or contract), and as such, any ambiguity thereto shall be held against him.
Regardless, any ambiguity (and there is a Iair amount in the Iew instances where Coughlin's
arguments and interpretations are not explicitly, patently, and clearly supported by the express
terms oI the lease), under Anvui, only serves to prove that this matter was not suitable Ior
summary adjudication (ambiguity in contractual lease terms held to take matter out oI range
oI those appropriately disposed oI in summary eviction proceeding), and that is only added to
what Coughlin's inspired cite to Gomez holds.). Additionally, Baker wanted so badly to avoid
the language in paragraph 13 oI the lease ('Utilities not payable by the Resident will be paid
by the Management..) making Merliss responsible Ior all utilities aIter Ulloa terminated her
service and Merliss's 'standing order went into eIIect.
It is not clear what relevant testimony Baker was seeking to obtain Irom NV Energy,
other than to assist Coughlin in proving that the 'standing order which reverted the
electricity servies to Dr. Merliss's name (where NV Energy admits Coughlin would not have
been permitted to make a payment on the account under that 'standing order absent having
personally identiIiable inIormation Ior Dr. Merliss suIIicient to identiIy the account and prove
the requisite authority to so make a payment was possessed), considering the lease provides
that 'all utilities
The 10/24/11 Subpoena Duces Tecum Baker had served on NV Energy speciIied in
'EXHIBIT "1": '
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to bring with you at the above stated time and
place the Iollowing documents |NOTE: by the term "documents", plaintiIIs mean all written,
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recorded, or graphic matters, however produced or reproduced, oI every kind and description,
without limitation or reservation, pertaining in any way to the subject matter oI this action.
The term "documents" shall include, but is not limited to, any books, pamphlets, periodicals,
memoranda (including those oI telephone and oral conversations), contracts, correspondence,
agreements, applications, Iinancial records, security instruments, disbursements, checks, bank
statements, time records, accounting or Iinancial records, notes, diaries, logs, telegrams or
cables prepared, draIted, received, or sent, tapes, transcripts, recordings, minutes oI meetings,
directives, work papers, charts, drawings, prints, Ilow sheets, photographs (including the
negatives Ior the entire roll Irom which the photographs were printed), Iilm, computer
printouts, medical and hospital records and reports, x-ray photographs, advertisements,
catalogs, or any handwritten recorded, transcribed, punched, taped, Iilmed, or graphic matter,
however produced or reproduced, in your possession, custody. or Control or to which you
have or have had access, without limitation or reservation. This includes any documents kept
in any electronic or similar media.|:
1. Your entire file regarding 121 River Rock Street, Reno, Aevada, from February
21 to present. You will be expected to testiIy Iully about the Iollowing topics:
1) Any change in the identity of the person or persons responsible for the service
during the reIerenced time period, including why and when those changes were made; 2) Any
interruption in service during the reIerenced time period, including, but not limited to, on or
about October 4, 211. You will be expected to testiIy about the cause and precise duration
of any interruption in service, when and why the service was restored, and your normal
policies and procedures under the circumstances, including whether and how advance notice
is provided to the occupant oI the service address. 3) Any "standing order" or other
agreement or directive shifting the responsibility for the service back to Matthew Merliss; 4)
Any application by Zachary Coughlin or Melissa Ulloa; 5) All payments made by Zachary
Coughlin or Melissa Ulloa during the reIerenced time period; and 6) All payments made by
Matthew Merliss during the reIerenced time period.
Further, res judicata, law oI the case, and the 'no motion once made may be made
again local rule prevents Baker Irom seeking Iees in his 4/19/12 post-judgment sanctions
motion where he already did so in his 2/24/12 Respondent's Appeal BrieI. Baker's so
seeking Iees twice is particularly ironic given the language in his own 2/24/12 BrieI in
03628 arguing that Coughlin was prevented Irom seeking a stay incident to some shameIul
beyond summary denial oI the 'motion Coughlin made upon merely mentioning the word
'stay at the conclusion oI the 10/25/11 hearing (and, actually, JCRLV 11, 40, and 44 (in
addition to the inapplicability oI JCRRT 11, 12, in light oI Rule 2, 3 make clear that Baker
and Judge SIerrazza's viewpoint (as set Iorth in the Note Orders oI 11/2/11, 11/17/11,
12/17/11, and 12/22/11 some oI which were not transmitted by the RJC in any ROA or
Supplemental thereto) is clearly inapplicable in a summary eviction setting...Iurther Judge
SIerrazza clearly ruled otherwise in allowing argument as to the stay during the 11/7/11
hearing in 1708). Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order clearly indicates it is addressing and
disposing oI the 'third and final matter beIore him, 'the parties' Appellate Briefs,
including Coughlin's Opening Brief and Merliss's Answering Brief . Baker clearly
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already made his motion Ior attorney's Iees under NRS 69.050 in his 2/24/12 Asnwering
BrieI: 'WHEREFORE, Merliss prays that Coughlin take nothing by way oI his appeal; that
same be dismissed in its entirety; and that the judgment oI the lower court, including its
order oI December 27, 2011, be aIIirmed; that Merliss be awarded his fees and costs of
this appeal in accordance with ARS 9.5; that Coughlin be held in contempt of court
as prayed for in Merliss' motion for order to show cause, Iiled herein on 1anuary 20,
2012; and Ior such other, Iurther and additional relieIas seems just to the court in the
premises.
Additionally, as Judge Flanagan's own order in Carptentier v. Aames makes clear, his
'adjudicatory boundaries are limited to what is put beIore him by the parties (something
RJC Judge CliIton repeatedly Iailed to do in RCR2012-065630 with his incessant sua
sponte argument on behalI oI his Iormer employer oI 25 years, the Criminal Division Io the
WCDA's OIIice...and Judge CliIton's comments during the trial therein on 3/19/12 that 'I
know what I am doing, I have been doing this Ior 25 years are troubling considering
'doing this and the Iact that Judge CliIton's investiture ceremony took place in January oI
2011 and his previous legal experience consisted oI Iive years with a civil litigation Iirm
and the '25 years as a prosecutor with the WCDA's OIIice's Criminal Division, clearly
indicate that Judge CliIton, by Ireudian slip, has yet to Iully embrace the diIIerences
between being a judge and being a prosecutor...additionally, Judge CliIton's commentary to
Coughlin during extremely troubling and suspect 2/13/13 'contempt hearing (Coughlin
was not provided any notice whatsoever, much less in writing, oI the nature oI the
contempt, or that a 'criminal contempt charge was being levied against him, apparently
(Judge CliIton seemed to choose to characterize the 2/13/13 'Misdemeanor Commitment
Citation as a 'conviction Ior 'criminal contempt against Coughlin only upon Coughlin
querrying him, on 3/19/13, at the trial's continuation, as to whether Coughlin should report
such to the USPTO or State Bar oI Nevada incident to the reporting requirements oI SCR
111(2) ('within 30 days oI conviction oI a crime), Judge CliIton being unable to cite to
(and, certainly, the 2/13/13 'Misdemeanor Committment Citation Coughlin was only
provided upon Judge CliIton making a 'nunc pro tunc interlineation thereon (and the
deadline to Iile an appeal to such has not begun to run given no notice oI entry oI order has
been served on Coughlin's apparent attorney or record in that context, Bruce Lindsay, Esq.,
whose mysterious appearance at the 2/13/13 Hearing is particularly troubling in addition to
Lindsay's comments to Coughlin on 3/15/13 outside the Mills Lane Justice Center that
Judge CliItons harbors a personal dislike and bias against Coughlin, and thereIore, the
'global resolution Lindsay had assured Coughlin was in place, disposing oI all criminal
prosecutions, probation violation allegations, and adminstrative orders/allegations oI so
violating, which Lindsay and his oIIice indicated they had received agreement to Irom DDA
Young, was no longer in place, making Lindsay's assurances to Coughlin prior to and aIter
the 3/11/13 Hearing (and Lindsay's OIIice is reIusing to turn over the 3/5/13 three page Iax
to Judge CliIton seeking a continuance in '067980 as to the OSC set Ior that date, which
the RJC has alternately characterized as being address in no less than three diIIerent 'case
numbers or 'matters (the 'Administrative Order oI 12/20/11 and OSC oI 2/25/12 both
lack a true 'case number, much less an opposing party, and neither issued upon a properly
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made motion), and Lindsay's OIIice indicated to Coughlin that Robbin Baker and other
personnel oI the RJC indicated to Lindsay's legal assistant Diana Sims that the 3/5/13 OSC
Hearing would be addressed in 067980, and only upon (and Judge Pearson indicated at the
brieI OSC Hearing on 3/5/13 that Coughlin Iully retained his right to be his own 'attorney
or record and selI-representing in whatever matter or case number the OSC oI 2/25/13 was
ultimately placed in (with Couglhin expressly reserving his rights and indicating a non-
waiver as to any oI the insuIIiciencies, or inIirmaties oI anythign associated with such
'Administrative Order. Lindsay's role so Iar seems to be that oI a lubricating agent,
enabling the RJC to overcome such inIirmities in its 2/28/12 Order in 'ALL CASE/ALL
DEPARTMENTS and the 2/25/13 OSC).
Additionally, as Judge Flanagan's own order in Carptentier v. Aames makes clear,
his 'adjudicatory boundaries are limited to what is put beIore him by the parties:
From Flanagan's 4/20/12 Order in Carpentier v. Aames, QLS, and RCS in CV08-
01709: 'Finally, this Court makes the Iollowing observations. The arguments raised by the
parties in their pleadings generally circumscribe the adjudicatory boundaries oI this
Court. See ..,Breliant v. PreIerred Equities Corp., 109 Nev. 842, 847, 858 P.2d 1258, 1261
(1993 (stating a district court generally may not consider matters outside oI the pleadings
when reviewing a motion to dismiss). As such, this Court takes no position on whether the
Iinancial institutions in this case Iollowed the law when they were lining up the documents
to Ioreclose on the Property. Nonetheless, the manner and timing in which these
institutions-particularl Aames, Deutsche,and Quality-recorded the assignment, Iied the
Substitution oI Trustee, and Iiled the Notice oI DeIault, is suspicious and troubling to this
Court. Regardless, Baker's 4/19/12 Motion Ior Attorney's Fees is deIicient where it cites to
NRS 7.085 (beyond the Iact that he Iailed to Iollow the speciIically incorporated dicates oI
NRCP 11 therein, including his Iailure to ever serve Couglin with a Iiling ready 21 day saIe
harbor motion) where 03628 was an 'appeal and NRAP applies pursuant to NRS
40.400...as such NRAP 38 applies, and Baker's Iailure to cite to it should be held against
him every bit as much as Baker wishes to, laughably, insist that Coughlin's Iailure to utter
'NRS 40.385 beIore Judge SIerrazza summarily intereced 'Its denied! immediately aIter
the word 'stay coming out oI Coughlin's mouth at the conclusion oI the 10/25/11 'trial
(as Baker argued in his 2/24/12 Answering BrieI).
NRS 118A.010 Short title. This chapter may be cited as the Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act.
The Iact that NRS 118C was not in existence prior to 11/1/11 is extremely relevant
here. Whether or not 118C is even applicable to 1708 or 03628, and the 2011 revisions to
NRS 40.385 makes clear that no 'sanctions motion is justiIiable here (and there was no
sanctions awarded, clearly, in the 6/25/12 Order in 03628) given the ambiguity and
unsettled nature oI the law involved at the time oI the events being litigated.
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NRS 118A.020 Definitions. As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise
requires, the terms deIined in NRS 118A.030 to 118A.170, inclusive, have the meanings
ascribed to them in those sections.
NRS 118A.030 'Abandoned property deIined. 'Abandoned property means property
which is leIt unattended on the premises aIter the termination oI the tenancy, unless the
owner of the property has expressed an intent to return for the property.
Clearly Hill and Baker's arguments in their 1/3/13 Opposition in 03628 reveal a RPC
3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 violation where they alleged Coughlin 'abanonded his property.
NRS 118A.040 ~action defined. ~action includes counterclaim, crossclaim, third-
party claim or any other proceeding in which rights are determined.
' NRS 118A.050 'Building, housing and health codes deIined. 'Building, housing and
health codes include any law, ordinance or governmental regulation concerning:
1. Health, saIety, sanitation or Iitness Ior habitation; or
2. The construction, maintenance, operation, occupancy, use or appearance,
of any premises or dwelling unit. see NRS 118A.290 and 118A.510 and Coughlin's
arguments per the Green action Lawn Service incident.
NRS 118A.080 ~Dwelling and ~dwelling unit defined. ~Dwelling or ~dwelling
unit means a structure or the part of a structure that is occupied as, or designed or
intended for occupancy as, a residence or sleeping place by one person who maintains a
household or by two or more persons who maintain a common household.
NRS 118A.090 'Exclude deIined. 'Exclude means to evict or to prohibit entry by
locking doors or by otherwise blocking or attempting to block entry, or to make a dwelling
unit uninhabitable by interrupting or causing the interruption of electric, gas, water
or other essential services
NRS 118A.140 "Premises" defined. ~Premises means a dwelling unit and the
structure of which it is a part, facilities, Iurniture, utilities and appurtenances therein ana
grounas, areas ana facilities hela out for the use of tenants.
NRS 118A.150 'Rent deIined. ~Rent means all periodic payments to be made to
the landlord Ior occupancy oI a dwelling unit, including, without limitation, all reasonable
and actual late Iees set Iorth in the rental agreement.
NRS 118A.170 ~Tenant defined. 'Tenant means a person entitled under a rental
agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion oI others.
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At the time oI these matters (1708 and 03628) NRS 118A was regularly applied in
the legal world to commercial tenancies.
The use oI the term 'premises in the lease agreement and in NRS 118A.180 is key,
as is the Iat that NRS 118A.180(2) does not speciIically include 'commercial tenancies
amongst those to which 'this chapter does not apply.
NRS 118A.180 Applicability.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, this chapter applies to, regulates
and determines rights, obligations and remedies under a rental agreement, wherever
made, for a dwelling unit or premises located within this State.
2. This chapter aoes not apply to:
(a) A rental agreement subject to the provisions oI chapter 118B oI NRS;
(b) Low-rent housing programs operated by public housing authorities and established
pursuant to the United States Housing Act oI 1937, 42 U.S.C. 1437 et seq.;
(c) Residence in an institution, public or private, incident to detention or the provision oI
medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious or similar service;
(d) Occupancy under a contract oI sale oI a dwelling unit or the property oI which it is a
part, iI the occupant is the purchaser or his or her successor in interest;
(e) Occupancy by a member oI a Iraternal or social organization in the portion oI a
structure operated Ior the beneIit oI the organization;
(I) Occupancy in a hotel or motel Ior less than 30 consecutive days unless the occupant
clearly maniIests an intent to remain Ior a longer continuous period;
(g) Occupancy by an employee oI a landlord whose right to occupancy is solely
conditional upon employment in or about the premises;
(h) Occupancy by an owner oI a condominium unit or by a holder oI a proprietary lease
in a cooperative apartment; or
(i) Occupancy under a rental agreement covering premises used by the occupant primarily
Ior agricultural purposes.
'NRS 118A.350 Failure of landlord to comply with rental agreement.
1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, iI the landlord Iails to comply with the
rental agreement, the tenant shall deliver a written notice to the landlord speciIying the acts
and omissions constituting the breach and stating that the rental agreement will terminate as
provided in this section. II the breach is remediable and the landlord adequately remedies
the breach or uses his or her best eIIorts to remedy the breach within 14 days aIter receipt oI
the notice, the rental agreement does not terminate by reason oI the breach. II the landlord
Iails to remedy the breach or make a reasonable eIIort to do so within the prescribed time,
the tenant may:
(a) Terminate the rental agreement immediately.
(b) Recover actual damages.
(c) Apply to the court Ior such relieI as the court deems proper under the circumstances.
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2. The tenant may not terminate the rental agreement Ior a condition caused by the
tenant`s own deliberate or negligent act or omission or that oI a member oI his or her
household or other person on the premises with his or her consent.
3. II the rental agreement is terminated, the landlord shall return all prepaid rent and
security recoverable by the tenant under this chapter.
Coughlin gave notice as to the Green action Lawn Service issues in writing to
Merliss, who curtly dismissed such, despite Coughlin citing to the speciIic sections oI the
lease which made Merliss so liabile, to which Merliss promptly retaliated against Coughlin
with a possessory against in patent violation oI NRS 118A.510.
In an action by or against the tenant, a complaint brought within one year
beIore the alleged act oI retaliation is presumed to be retaliatory conduct oI the landlord.
UniI. Residential Landlord and Tenant Act 5.101(b). The extreme proximity between the
time Coughlin asserted his right to a setoII (via the Iix and deduct mechanism oI NRS
118A.360, and Merliss's hiring HIll and Baker and (see the emails, 5 days between the time
when Merliss emailed Coughlin on 8/11/11 and the 8/16/11 email announcing the hiring oI
Merliss's attorneys). clearly displays a retaliatory animus.
1udge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order denying Coughlin's appeal, amongst other
things, in 03628 reads:
'ORDER
This case is an appeal Irom Reno Justice Court ("RJC") and
involves the summary eviction oI a tenant, PlaintiII ZACHARY
COUGHLIN ("Coughlin"), under NRS Chapter 40. Currently beIore this
Court are three matters, all oI which have been Iully brieIed and
submitted Ior decision.
The Iirst matter beIore this Court is Coughlin's Motion under
NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 to Alter or Amend the Order Denying
Motion to Prevent Disposal oI Personal Property. The second matter is
DeIendant MATTHEW MERLISS's ("Merliss") Motion Ior Leave to
File Answering BrieI in Excess oI Five Pages. The third and final
matter is the parties' Appellate Briefs, including Coughlin's
Opening Brief and Merliss's Answering Brief . This Court will address
each oI these matters in turn. Fn1 (In1: The parties are Iamiliar with the
Iacts and procedural history oI this case. Thus, this Court will recite
neither the Iacts nor procedural history unless doing so is necessary to
this Court's determination.) (page 1)
NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59
The object oI Coughlin's Motion Iiled on January 30, 2012
appears to be this Court' Order dated January 11, 2012. In that Order,
this Court denied Coughlin's emergency request Ior a temporary
restraining order. Coughlin made the request aIter Judge SIerrazza oI RJ
entered an Order on December 21, 2011, in which he ordered: (1)
Coughlin to pay $480.00 to Merliss Ior storage oI his personal property
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between November 1,2011 and November 16,2011; and (2) Coughlin
shall have access to the premises Irom 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. December
22, 2011 and December 23, 2011 to remove his personal property.
Coughlin claims this Court's January 11, 2012 Order "is clearly
inaccurate to the extent it purports to Iind that the undersigned made any
agreement to waive his security deposit in exchange Ior additional
access to the property." (PI. Mot. at p. 12.) In addition, Coughlin aver
counsel Ior Merliss misled this Court by claiming Coughlin was
permitted to remove persona property aIter 5:00 p.m. Coughlin Iurther
alleges counsel Ior Merliss "boarded up" the premises "install|ed| a
chain and padlock on the back gate," and later attempted to Iile suit Ior
the disposal costs oI removing the property, all oI which prevented
Coughlin Irom removing the items in the Iirst place. (Pl. Mot. at p. 14.)
Consequently, Coughlin contends this Court's Order should be amended
or altered under NRCP 52 or 59 to include these allegations as additional
Iindings oI Iact.
Conversely, in his Opposition Iiled on February 3, 2012 Merliss
avers Coughlin Iails to articulate which Iindings he wants amended
under NRCP 52. Even iI Coughlin did articulate such Iindings, however,
Merliss contends relieI under NRCP 52(b) is nonetheless unavailable to
Coughlin because this Court's Order did not contain a Iinal judgment, as
that rule requires. Similarly, Merliss contends Coughlin is not entitled to
relieI under NRCP 59(e) because "n judgment has ever been entered by
this court in this case, so there is no judgment Ior this court t alter or
amend." (DeI. Opp'n at p. 2.) In short, Merliss contends Coughlin's
Motion lacks an evidentiary basis, is "nonsense ... Iiled only to delay this
matter and drive up Iees," and i "completely devoid oI any merit
whatsoever," to the extent "it is even decipherable." (page 2) (DeI NRCP
52(b) and NRCP 59 The object oI Coughlin's Motion Iiled on January
30, 2012 appears to be this Court' Order dated January 11, 2012. In that
Order, this Court denied Coughlin's emergency request Ior a temporary
restraining order. Coughlin made the request aIter Judge SIerrazza oI
RJC entered an Order on December 21, 2011, in which he ordered: (1)
Coughlin to pay $480.00 t oI his 1, 2011 16, 2011; and (2) Coughlin
shall have access to the premises Irom 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. December
22, 2011 and December 23, 2011 to remove his personal property.
Coughlin claims this Court's January 11, 2012 "is clearly inaccurate to
the extent it purports to Iind that the undersigned made any agreement to
waive his security deposit in exchange Ior additional access to the
property. " (PI. Mot. at p. 12.) In addition, Coughlin aver counsel Ior
Merliss misled this Court by claiming Coughlin was permitted to remove
personal property aIter 5:00 p.m. Coughlin Iurther alleges counsel Ior
Merliss "boarded up " the premises gate, " Iirst place. (PI. Mot. at p. 14.)
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Consequently, Coughlin contends this Court's Order should be
amended or altered under NRCP 52 or 59 to include these allegations as
additional Iindings oI Iact. such Iindings, however, Merliss contends
relieI under NRCP 52(b) is nonetheless unavailable to Coughlin because
this Court's Order did not contain a Iinal judgment, as that rule requires.
Similarly, Merliss contends Coughlin is not entitled to relieI under
NRCP 59(e) because "no judgment has ever been entered by this court
in this case, so there is no judgment Ior this court to alter or amend. "
(DeI. Opp'n at p. 2.) In short, Merliss contends Coughlin's Motion lacks
an evidentiary basis, is "nonsense ... Iiled only to delay this matter and
drive up Iees, " and is "completely devoid oI any merit whatsoever, "to
the extent "it is even decipherable ." (DeI Opp'n at p. 1, 2.) In Iact,
Merliss claims Coughlin should be subject to "vexatious litigation
tactics." (DeI. Opp'n at p. 1,2.)
AIter reviewing the parties' pleadings and the exhibits reviewing
this Court's January 11,2012 Order, this Court has gleaned Irom
Coughlin's Motion certain additional Iindings oI Iact that Coughlin
contends should be included - by amendment 0 alteration - in this
Court's Order. Ultimately, however, this Court's Order is unamendable
or unalterable under the Rules Coughlin cites because said Order does
not contain a Iinal appealable judgment, or a disposition that resolves
all oI the parties' Simmons SelI-Storage Partners, LLC v. (explaining
jurisdiction to consider an appeal Irom the district court depends on
whether the district court has entered a Iinal judgment); Lee v. GNLV
Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2 416, 417 (2000) (deIining "Iinal
judgment" as presented in the case, and leaves nothing Ior the Iuture
consideration oI the court, except Ior post-judgment issues such
attorney's Iees and costs."). relieI under NRCP 52 or 59 is unavailable to
Coughlin. Although Simmons and GNL V involve appeals to the
Nevada Supreme Court Irom th district court, this Court Iinds the
jurisdictional principles announced in those cases also apply t the district
court when the district court considers appeals Irom the justice courts, as
well a when the district court considers motions under NRCP 52 or 59,
as we ThereIore, this Court concludes Coughlin's Motion Under NRCP
52(b) to Amend or Additional Findings oI Fact; or, Pled in the
Alternative, Motion Under NRCP 59 to Alter a Amend the Order
Denying Motion to Prevent Disposal oI Personal Property is DENIED.
Leave to File Answering BrieI in Excess oI Five Pages In light oI the
voluminous record in this case (which exceeds 2,000 pages), including
lengthy brieIs Iiled by Coughlin,2 this Court Iinds good cause exists to
grant Merliss leave to Iile 2 This Court acknowledges Merliss's
complaint that Coughlin has violated the page limits contained in
Orders fro this Court, as well as the local rules. However, pursuant to
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this Court's longstanding policy oI considering cases on the merits, as
opposed to dismissing them Ior procedural reasons, this Court will
overlook such violations in this particular case. AIter reviewing the
parties' pleadings and the exhibits attached thereto, and aIter reviewing
this Court's January 11, 11, 2012 Order, this Court has gleaned Irom
Coughlin's MaIia certain additional Iindings oI Iact that Coughlin
contends should be included - by amendment 0 alteration - in this
Court's Order. Ultimately, however, this Court's Order is unamendable
or unalterable under the Rules Coughlin cites because said Order does
not contain a Iinal appealable judgment, or a disposition that resolves
all oI the parties' claims. See Simmons SelI-Storage LLC v. Rib RooI,
Inc., 247 P.3d 1107, 1108 (Nev. 2011) (explaining jurisdiction to
consider an appeal Irom the district court depends on whether th district
court has entered a Iinal judgment); Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424,
426, 996 P.2 416, 417 (2000) (deIining "Iinal judgment" as presented in
the case, and leaves nothing Ior the Iuture consideration oI the court,
except Ior post-judgment issues such as attorney's Iees and costs."). As
a consequence, this Court Iinds the relieI under NRCP 52 or 59 is
unavailable to Coughlin.
Although Simmons and GNL V involve appeals to the Nevada
Supreme Court district court, this Court Iinds the jurisdictional
principles announced in those cases also apply to the district court when
the district court considers appeals Irom the justice courts as well a when
the district court considers motions under NRCP 52 or 59, as we have in
this case. ThereIore, this Court concludes Coughlin's Motion Under
NRCP 52(b) to Amend or Make Additional Findings oI Fact; or, Pled in
the Alternative, Motion Under NRCP 59 to Alter a Amend the Order
Denying Motion to Prevent Disposal oI Personal Property is DENIED.
Leave to File Answering Brief in Excess of Five Pages
In light oI the voluminous record in this case (which exceeds
2,000 pages), including lengthy brieIs Iiled by Coughlin,2 this Court
Iinds good cause exists to grant Merliss leave to Iile (In2)(In2:This
Court acknowledges Merliss's complaint that Coughlin has violated the
page limits contained in Orders Irom this Court, as well as the local
rules. However, pursuant to this Court's longstanding policy oI
considering cases on the merits, as opposed to dismissing them Ior
procedural reasons, this Court will overlook such violations in this
particular case)... (page 4) an answering brieI in excess oI Iive pages. In
addition, this Court denies Merliss's motion t strike the excess material
Iiled by Coughlin and also denies Merliss's request Ior leave to Iile
supplemental brieI to meet the arguments contained in that excess
material. In3 (In 3 See note 2, supra. Merliss made this request in
Iootnote 14 oI his Answering BrieI discussed inIra)
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Appellate Briefs
As mentioned previously, this case involves the summary eviction
oI Coughlin Irom 121 River Rock Street, Reno, NV 89501 ("the
Property"). AIter two hearings in RJC in which Coughlin alleged
deIenses oI habitability, retaliation, and discrimination, Judge SIerrazza
adjudged Coughlin summarily evicted Irom the Property pursuant to
NRS 40.253(6) by Order dated October 27, 2011. SpeciIically, Judge
SIerrazza Iound Merliss properly terminated Coughlin's tenancy and
thereaIter properly served Coughlin with a notice oI unlawIul detainer.
Judge SIerrazza Iurther Iound "Coughlin Iailed to present any evidence
that Merliss acted in an prohibited, discriminatory, or retaliatory Iashion
as alleged by Coughlin, or otherwise.' (SIerrazza, J., Order, Case No.
REV2011-001708, Oct. 27, 2011.)
As a result, Coughlin was ordered to vacate the premises by
October 31, 2011 at 5:00 p.m. Coughlin Iailed to do so. He also Iailed to
remove his personal belongings. Consequently Merliss sought a personal
property lien Ior storage oI Coughlin's personal belongings in th
Property Irom the period oI November 1, 2011 to November 16, 2011.
Coughlin Iiled a motion to contest the lien. On December 21, 2011,
Judge SIerrazza ordered Coughlin to pay to Merliss $480.00 as "Iair and
reasonable compensation" Ior Merliss's storage oI his personal
belongings. (SIerrazza, J., Order, Case No. REV2011-001708, Dec. 21,
2011.) Judge SIerrazza also granted Coughlin access to the Property to
remove his personal belongings by December 23, 2011 5:00 p.m.
Coughlin Iailed to do so. As a result, Merliss hired a contractor to
dispose oI Coughlin's personal belongings. Coughlin appealed.
Coughlin Iiled his Opening BrieI ("BrieI') on February 6, 2012.
In4 (In 4 This pleading replaced an Opening BrieI Coughlin previously
Iiled two days earlier. Consequently, this Court will treat this brieI as the
operative pleading. In addition, on February 7, 2012 Coughlin Iiled a
Supplement to Appellant's Opening BrieI to which he attached an
exhibit containing a CD oI audio recordings) Merliss Iiled his
Answering BrieI ("Response") on February 24, 2012. This Court took
the matter under submission on February 27, 2012. This Order now
Iollows. As a preliminary matter, however this Court notes it is the issue
oI summary eviction and the Judge SIerrazza's October 27, 2011 Order
that presently concerns this Court. Fn5 (In5 On appeal, Coughlin's BrieI
spans Iorty-seven pages and contains several allegations and claims.
Many oI these claims touch upon collateral issues like, Ior example,
alleged relationships between Merliss's counsel and la enIorcement,
alleged unconstitutional acts oI city employees under Monell v. Dep't
oI'soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 65 (1978), and Merliss' s alleged disinterest in
complaints Irom people like Coughlin and others associated wit
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Coughlin. As such, this Court will not address these issues. In addition,
because Coughlin Iailed to timely Iile his notice oI appeal regarding the
personal property lien, see NRS 40.253(8), and because Coughlin's
notice oI appeal Iails to identiIy an error regarding the court's procedure
in setting a hearing on this issue, this Court will no consider this issue.)
Standard of Review
On civil appeals Irom justice courts to district courts, a case "must
not be tried anew.' NJCRCP 72(c). Whether on appeal at the Nevada
Supreme Court Irom a district court, or 0 appeal at a district court Irom a
justice court, a lower court's Iindings "will not be disturbed on appeal
unless they are clearly erroneous and are not based on substantial
evidence." Gibellini v Klindt, 110 Nev. 1201, 1204,885 P.2d 540, 542
(1994).
"|A|n order granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6)
should be reviewed on appeal based upon the standard Ior review oI an
order granting summary judgment under NRC 56 because these
proceedings are analogous." Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123
Nev. 212 215, 163 P.3d 405, 407 (2007). Summary judgment is proper
only iI no genuine issue oI material Iact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter oI law. NEV. R. CIV P. 56(c); see
Wood v. SaIeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005).
The moving party bears the initial burden oI proving there is no genuine
issue oI material Iact. Main v. Stewart, 109 Nev. 721, 726-27, 857 P.2d
755, 758 (1993).
Once the moving party satisIies this burden, however, the burden
shiIts to the nonmoving party to show the existence oI a genuine issue oI
material Iact. Id. at 727. While the pleading and the record must be
construed in the light most Iavorable to the nonmoving party, the party
must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the operative Iacts Wood, 121 Nev. at 729. To avoid having summary
judgment entered against it, the party must (page 5) by aIIidavit or
otherwise, set Iorth speciIic Iacts demonstrating the existence oI a
genuine issue Ior trial. Id.
Legal Analysis
This Court has reviewed all oI the parties' pleadings and the
exhibits attached thereto This Court also has considered all oI the parties'
relevant arguments. AIter this review and consideration, this Court will
not disturb Judge SIerrazza's October 27, 2011 Order granting summary
eviction. This Court Iinds that Order was based on substantial evidence
and it was no clearly erroneous. Thus, this Court concludes Merliss has
met his initial burden oI proving thee is no genuine issue oI material Iact
regarding whether Coughlin was summarily evicted properly
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Consequently, the burden shiIts to Coughlin to show the existence oI a
genuine issue oI material Iact.
Although Coughlin raises several claims and makes numerous
allegations in his BrieI Coughlin fails to present additional facts
related to his defenses raised in R1C that undermine or legitimately
call into question the substantial evidence upon which 1udge
Sferrazza relied when he granted summary eviction. This Court gives
substantial deference to the lower court's factual findings in this
regard, particularly in light oI the numerous hearings held beIore Judge
SIerrazza and Coughlin's related opportunities to present evidence
supporting his various deIenses. ThereIore, this Court Iinds no genuine
issue oI material Iact exists regarding whether Coughlin was summarily
evicted properly in the lower court. As a result, Coughlin's appeal is
DENIED.
CONCLUSION Accordingly, in summary, this Court orders: 1)
Coughlin's Motion Under NRCP 52(b) to Amend or Make Additional
Findings oI Fact; or, Pled in the Alternative, Motion Under NRCP 59 to
Alter or Amend the Order Denying Motion to Prevent Disposal oI
Personal Property is DENIED; 2) Merliss's request Ior leave to Iile
Answering BrieI in excess oI Iive pages is GRANTED; and (page 6) 3)
Coughlin's appeal regarding summary eviction Irom the Property is
DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. (page 7)
The thing is: NRS40.400Rules oI practice.The provisions oI NRS,
Nevada Rules oI Civil Procedure and Nevada Rules oI Appellate Procedure
relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials, so Iar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions oI NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, apply to
the proceedings mentioned in those sections.
As such, no 'local rule respecting 'page limits is applicable in an
appeal to the Justice Court oI a summary eviction. While Couglin has respect
Ior Judge Flanagan's Order, Coughlin's BrieI in excess thereoI somewhat sought
permission to exceed such orders, and to whatever extent it did not, it may be
characterized as an 'open reIusal allowable under RPC 3.3
Iveson v. Second Judicial District Court oI the State oI Nevada, 66 Nev.
145, 152,206 P.2d 755 (1949); Abelleria v District Court, 17 Ca1.2.d 280, 295,
109 P.2d 942 (1941). "Excess of jurisdiction" Ior which certiorari will issue
exists where the act is within the judge's general power but is not authori:ea
because the conaitions for the exercise of such power (i.e., Ior example, lack oI
notice) are wanting. Iveson at 151. Both Judge SIerrazza and Judge Flanagan
exceeded their jurisdiction in a number oI ways. Judge SIerrazza was no
longer able to rule that Coughlin's Motion for 1ury trial was untimely upon
his amending his 10/13/11 Order on 10/25/11 to recharacterize the setting of
the 10/25/11 date as a ~continuation of the summary eviction proceeding
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rather than the 'trial ('the use oI the term 'trial was unIortunate, Your
Honor said Hill's associate Baker. Judge SIerrazza Iurther exceeded his
juridiction in ordering a 118A.355(5) rent escrow deposit where the RJC has yet
to promulgate and have approved a corollary to JCRLV 44.
It was reversible error to rule that Coughlin's demand Ior a jury trial was
too late, particularly where:
'PlaintiII: Your Honor, iI I may as well, there was something shoved through
my mail slot last night as well Irom Mr. Coughlin bearing a Iile stamp oI
yesterday, Emergency Demand for 1ury trial and Amended Tenant's AIIidavit
Answer Counter-Claim. Again, I haven`t had a chance to look at this. I know
it's not appropriate to have a jury trial here and the court has already ruled that
there's not been entertaining a third party claims, this is a summary eviction.
But, again, I haven`t had a chance to even look at this because it's
|INDISCERNIBLE 3:45| yesterday. Judge: All right. Well, you have 10 days to
respond to that as well. So we'll put those aside Ior the moment and now.
The Docket in 1708 shows that Coughlin made an appropriate jury trial
demand in 1708 on 10/11/12 and deposited the required sums pursuant to NRCP
38 and JCRCP 38.
'NRS40.310Issue oI Iact to be tried by jury iI proper demand made.
Whenever an issue oI Iact is presented by the pleadings, it shall be tried by a
jury, iI proper demand is made pursuant to the Nevada Rules oI Civil Procedure
or the Justice Court Rules oI Civil Procedure
'NRS40.310Issue oI Iact to be tried by jury if proper demand made.
Whenever an issue oI Iact is presented by the pleadings, it shall be tried by a
jury, iI proper demand is made pursuant to the Nevada Rules oI Civil Procedure
or the Justice Court Rules oI Civil Procedure
'DeIendant: There -- Ior the record, there was no certiIicate in my name, US
Postal Service certiIicate mailing on Iile with respect to a notice. In the context
oI summary eviction proceedings, courts are directed to adhere very strictly to
the notes requirements given the summary nature oI it. That's one saIeguard that
is insisted upon. A right to a jury trial is granted by the United States
Supreme Court from -- in summary -- in eviction cases. 1ury trial is an
absolute right Ior all citizens in the United States. I said it's a 1970s case. I
think it might be called Pearson. I believe I cite to it in my case. (Page 33).
Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
Judge SIerrazza committed reversible error where, throughout the
entirety oI the 10/13/11 date and the entire morning oI the 10/25/11 date, he put
the initial burden on Coughlin, Iorcing him to 'testiIy, reIusing to allow
Coughlin to Iunction in his dual role as a selI representing litigant, and to
address issues prior to the landlord meeting the initial burden upon him to prove
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his case as to an unlawIul detainer action, and limiting the issues and
presentation such that Coughlin was not permitted to bring counterclaims, or
counter set-oIIs, as entitled to under NRS 118A.490.
Further, in the Merliss Coughlin leaseparagraph '23. DAMAGES TO
PREMISES: II the premise are damaged by time or through any other cause
which renders the premises untenantable, ... the rent in the current month
will be prorated...If this Agreement is not terminated, then Owner will
promptly repair the premises and there will be a proportionate reduction
of rent until the premises are repaired ... The proportionate reauction will
be basea on the extent which repairs interfere with Tenants reasonable of the
premises....
28. LIABILITY: management shall not be liable Ior any damage or injury to Resident or any
other person or to any property occurring on the premises or any part thereoI, or in common
areas thereoI, unless such liability is based on the negligent acts or omission of
Resident or his guests...
Other authority holds that a court has discretion to allow all relevant
counterclaims iI no undue delay will result, notwithstanding a "no
counterclaim" clause in a residential standard Iorm lease. Haskell v. Surita, 109
Misc. 2d 409, 439 N.Y.S.2d 990 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1981). But, again, there is
not a 'no counterclaim provision in the instant rental agreement, rather, it
explicilty, at paragraph 28, indicates that Coughlin will not hold Merliss
harmless. Indeed, some courts will allow counterclaims even where the lease
actually does contain such a 'no counterclaim provision, under circumstances
similar to these (where the equities weighed heavily in Iavor oI so allow such
counterclaims to expedite the entire controversy, avoid multiplicity oI other
suits, speed oI the overall process, and eliminate delay and expense.
Lease conditions precluding tenants Irom interposing counterclaims in
summary proceedings are enIorceable|FN1| unless the counterclaim is so
inextricably intertwined with the landlord's claim that joint resolution oI claims
will:|FN2| expedite disposition oI an entire controversy avoid multiplicity oI
other lawsuits between parties to accomplish the same result do speedy justice
Ior all eliminate greater delay and expense. |FN1| Ring v. Arts Intern., Inc., 7
Misc. 3d 869, 792 N.Y.S.2d 296 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 2004). |FN2| Ring v. Arts
Intern., Inc., 7 Misc. 3d 869, 792 N.Y.S.2d 296 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 2004).
|FN3| Haskell v. Surita, 109 Misc. 2d 409, 439 N.Y.S.2d 990 (N.Y. City Civ.
Ct. 1981).
878. CounterclaimsPermitted or compulsory counterclaims
233k290(5), 298(2) Under some authority, simple issues|FN1| or tenant
counterclaims|FN2| that are related to the main claim may be litigated in a
summary-eviction proceeding. Other jurisdictions permit counterclaims,|FN3|
such as those under the state's enactment oI the UniIorm Residential Landlord
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and Tenant Act.|FN4| Tenant claims that arise Irom the tenancy may even be
compulsory counterclaims in unlawIul detainer|FN5| or dispossessory|FN6|
actions. Observation: Citing the policy behind the adoption oI the warranty oI
habitability, some authority rejects the position that damages Ior the
uninhabitable conditions existing beIore the tenant's withholding must be
recovered in a separate action.|FN7| |FN1| Ivy Hill Park Apartments v. GNB
Parking Corp., 237 N.J. Super. 1, 566 A.2d 820 (App. Div. 1989). |FN2| Ying
Lung Corp. v. Medrano, 123 Misc. 2d 1074, 475 N.Y.S.2d 772 (N.Y. City Civ.
Ct. 1984). |FN3| Favors v. Arnold, 181 Ga. App. 286, 351 S.E.2d 641 (1986) (a
dispossessory action may cover all related claims between the landlord and the
tenant); Miller v. Ritchie, 45 Ohio St. 3d 222, 543 N.E.2d 1265 (1989); Criss v.
Salvation Army Residences, 173 W. Va. 634, 319 S.E.2d 403 (1984). |FN4|
Mead, Samuel & Co., Inc. v. Dyar, 127 Ariz. 565, 622 P.2d 512 (Ct. App. Div.
1 1980) (counterclaims not arising under the Arizona Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act are not permitted in a Iorcible-detainer action); Edwards v. Fenn,
308 Or. 129, 775 P.2d 1375 (1989). |FN5| Golden Host Westchase, Inc. v. First
Service Corp., 29 Ark. App. 107, 778 S.W.2d 633 (1989). As to judgment in
summary-possessory actions as res judicata with respect to compulsory
counterclaims, see 884. |FN6| Trust Co. Bank oI Northwest Georgia v. Shaw,
182 Ga. App. 165, 355 S.E.2d 99 (1987). |FN7| Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006
(Utah 1991). As to deIenses based on the warranty oI habitability, generally, see
869. One Nevada decision was issued just 7 days beIore the 10/13/11
summary eviction proceeding here. CG Wallace.
'Judge: ...the burden is on the landlord Iirst to establish a prima Iacie case Ior
the unlawIul detainer action. And so I`m going to have the landlord present its
evidence with respect to the lease and the no-cause eviction. Then the deIendant
will have the opportunity because I think the only issue then is whether or
not this unlawful detainer action no-cause eviction is a retaliatory eviction
and you will, the defendant will need to meet the requirements for a
retaliatory eviction as set up in the statute. And I'm going to limit you to
your presentation with respect to those issues. I know you brought up a lot oI
other things, one of them being a demand Ior a jury trial which the court
finas is not timely and that request is denied. (Page 68).
Coughlin's 10/11/12 Iiled and served demand Ior a jury trial was timely as to
the 10/25/11 'trial, whether, depending upon NRS 40.400, on applies
NJCRCP 38 or NRCP 38:
' NRCP 38(b)Demand.Any party may demand a trial by jury oI any issue
triable oI right by a jury by serving as required by Rule 5(b) upon the other
parties a demand thereIor in writing at any time aIter the commencement oI the
action and not later than the time oI the entry oI the order Iirst setting the case
Ior trial. or:
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NJCRCP 38(b): 'b)Demand.Any party may demand a trial by jury oI any
issue triable oI right by a jury by Iiling and serving upon the other parties a
demand thereIor in writing at the time that the party requests the matter be set
Ior trial or before the entry of the order first setting the case for trial,
whichever comes first.
The trial oI 10/25/11 was not set, and the entry oI the order oI the
10/13/11 Order so setting the matter Ior trial Ior 10/25/11, until aIter Coughlin
had already Iiled his 10/11/12 Demand For Jury trial.
Oddly, while Judge SIerrazza reIused to allow Coughlin to address or bring counterclaims, he
did allow Baker the beneIits oI a plenary trial where Baker was permitted to undertake discovery pursuant to
'OCT 6 Motion to Proceed in Fonna Pauperis Iiled and submitted. GRANTED per Judge SIerrazza.dss Tenant
s Answer/AIIidavit to 30 Day No Cause Eviction & UnlawIul Detainer; Motion Ior Sanctions and Attorney's
Fees; Counterclaim Ior Damages Iiled. Hearing set Ior OCTOBER 13,2011 at 8:30 AM. Both parties notiIied
by mail. LeIt message Ior tenant. Spoke to Landlords attorney. Dss
OCT 11 Motion to Continue Iiled by Tenant SUBMITTED. ks OCT 12 Landlord's Opposition to Tenant's
Answer/AIIidavit to 30 Day No Cause Eviction; Motion Ior Sanctions and Attorney's Fees; and Counterclaim
Ior Damages Iiled. cv
OCT 13 PlaintiII, represented by CASEY BAKER, ESQ. DeIendant, ZACHARY COUGHLIN appeared Ior a
Summary Eviction hearing beIore Judge SFERRAZZA. Hearing held. Tenant's Motion to Continue Denied. II
tenant posts rent oIS2,275.oo by 9:00 am, Monday October 17, 2011 a trial will be set Ior OCTOBER 25,
2011 AT 10:00 am. II tenant does not post the monies, eviction GRANTED at 9:00 am. October 17,2011. Jj
Emergency Ex Parte Motion Iiled. cv
OCT 17 Opposition to Emergency Ex Parte Motion Iiled. cv OCT 17 Emergency Motion To Stay, Set Aside,
Vacate Eviction Hearing Order Iiled. be OCT 17 Emergency Ex Parte Motion Iiled. cv $2,275.00 CASH
posted by ZACHARY COUGHLIN, 121 River Rock St., Reno, NV. 89501
OCT 17 OCT 18 OCT 18 OCT 18 OCT 18 OCT 19 OCT 19 OCT 19 OCT 19 OCT 20 OCT 20 OCT 24 OCT
25
OCT 17 Opposition to Emergency Motion To Stay Set Aside; v!te Eviction Hearing Order Iiled. Bc
OCT 17 Order Ior emergency Motion To Stay Set Aside; Vacate Eviction Hearing DENIED. Bc
OCT 17 Letter returned to court "Notice oI Hearing" to Green action Lawn Service.
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OCT 18 Motion Ior Order Requiring Inspection oI Real Property Pursuant to NJCRCP 34 Iiled. Ex Parte
Motion Ior Order Shortening Time Iiled. Request Ior Submission oI Ex Parte Motion Ior Order Shortening
Time Iiled. Order Shortening time SUBMITTED. cv
OCT 18 Errata To Opposition To Emergency Motion To Stay, Set Aside, Vacate Eviction Hearing
OCT 18 Received -Notice oI Appeal to District Court. bc Order Iiled. bc
OCT 18 Request For Audio Copy oI Proceedings along with a Motion InIorma Pauperis Granted. Subpoena
Duces Tecwn Re Hearing issued to RANDY FISHER. Subpoena Duces Tecum Re Hearing issued to ZACH
NASH. Jj Subpoena Duces Tecwn Re Hearing issued to NV Energy.be CertiIicate arService Iiled. Declaration
oI Casey 0 Baker, Esq. Pursuant to NRS 40.254 Iiled. Notice oI Entry oI Order Iiled. be Notice oI Appeal to
District Court Iiled. dss Faxed Emergency Request Ior ConIerence Call Iiled. Order Shortening Time Iiled,
requiring Inspection oI Real Property on Monday the 24th OI October 20 II at 10:00 A.M. bc Emergency
Request Ior Hearing submitted. Bc VOLUMEJI Emergency Request Ior Hearing-issues will all be taken care
oI at the October 25, 2011 Hearing. be Subpoena Duces Tecum Re Hearing (NV Energy) Iiled with an
AIIidavit oI Service to Joanne McMaster, Legal Assistant ON October 20, 2011. jJ Emergency Demand Ior
Jury trial and Amended Tenant's AIIidavit/Answer/Counterclaim Iiled. PlaintiII, MATTHEW MERLISS
appeared and represented by CASEY BAKER, ESQ. PlaintiIIs 1st Witness: Denise Tsuda, NV Energy
-represented by Brandon BarkhuII, Esq. PlaintiII's 2nd Witness: Matthew Merliss DeIendant's lSI Witness:
Zachary Coughlin DeIendant's 2nd Witness: Matthew Merliss Plaintitrs Exhibits: A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H,l marked -
A -I admitted DeIendant's Exhibits: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 marked -1-9 admitted DeIendant, ZACHARY
COUGHLIN appeared Ior a Summary Eviction hearing beIore Judge SFERRAZZA. Hearing held. Landlord
has met his burden oI prooI EVICTION GRANTED eIIective October 31, 2011 at 5:00 pm. Landlord may in
48 hows Irom today, inspect the property. Order to be submitted to the court by noon on Thursday.
Rule44.Rent deposits relating to claims of uninhabitability
under NRS 118A.355.
(a)In an eviction action, iI the tenant proceeds under NRS 118A.355 and
raises a claim oI uninhabitability relating to his dwelling unit, the tenant may
not raise as a defense that the tenant is entitled to withhold rent under NRS
118A.355 unless the tenant deposits the withheld rent into an escrow
account maintained by the Las Vegas 1ustice Court in accordance with this
rule. The deposit(s) may be paid by cash, money order, debit card, MasterCard,
or Visa. Deposits may not be paid by personal check.
(b)At the time that the tenant Iiles an answer to the eviction action, the
tenant must indicate in the answer that he has withheld rent pursuant to NRS
118A.355, and he must deposit the current accrued withheld rent with the Las
Vegas Justice Court.
(c)II the tenant Iails to make the deposit required by this rule, the tenant
does not have a deIense under NRS 118A.355...
(e)When the eviction action proceeds to a hearing, the court may order:
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(1)The withheld rent to be returned to the tenant;
(2)The withheld rent to be forwarded to the landlord; or
(3)Any aistribution of the withhela rent that is fust ana equitable
under the circumstances... /
(h)This rule does not apply to rent that is withheld under NRS
118A.380 for a landlord`s failure to supply essential services .
It was reversible error Ior Judge SIerrazza to Iail to oII-set several sums
Ior which Coughlin asserted he was entitle to such under the 'Iix and deduct
section oI NRS 118A.360. Coughlin simply never invoked, nor proceeded
under NRS 118A.355(5), but, rather, Judge SIerrazza Iunneled him that way,
then reIused to Iollow the plain application oI summary judgments standards in
reIusing Coughlin set-oIIs under 118A.360, and .380 (see Coughlin's
Declaration as to the damages pursuant to the unnoticed, impermissible shut oII
oI electricity on October 4
th
, 2011...and the lease speaks to 'not payable, and
NV Energy testiIied that Merliss had a 'standing order wherein the utilities
reverted back to Merliss's name upon Iormer co-tenant calling and having her
name removed Irom the account, which Merliss waived any right to object to
upon Iailing to do so Ior months, and regardless, under the lease, Merliss
became responsible Ior all the utilities upon the 'standing order reverting such
to his name and making it so that Coughlin was not able to pay the bill directly
to NV Energy. Merliss certainly enjoyed the control attendnat to having the
electricity shut oII abruptly the day Coughlin's Tenant's Answer/AIIidavit was
due and during the time Baker showed up to conduct an 'inspection.
879. SetoII West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest,
Landlord and Tenant k290(5), 298(2) Unless the lease|FN1| or statute|FN2|
provides otherwise, setoII Ior excess previously paid rent may be interposed as
an aIIirmative deIense in a summary proceeding.|FN3| In addition, in a
possessory action based on the nonpayment oI rent, evidence oI expenditures
made by the lessee Ior improvements or repairs is admissible iI the expenditures
were to be credited toward rent.|FN4| The same would be true Ior services
perIormed by the tenant.|FN5| |FN1| Hardwick, Cook & Co. v. 3379 Peachtree,
Ltd., 184 Ga. App. 822, 363 S.E.2d 31 (1987). |FN2| FaIard v. Lincoln
Pharmacy oI MilIord, Inc., 439 Mass. 512, 789 N.E.2d 147 (2003) (holding that
under a statute governing summary process action, a commercial tenant could
not bring a counterclaim against landlord Ior a setoII). |FN3| Minelian v.
Manzella, 215 Cal. App. 3d 457, 263 Cal. Rptr. 597 (2d Dist. 1989). |FN4|
Campos v. Aguila, 464 A.2d 132 (D.C. 1983); Roberson v. Weaver, 145 Ga.
626, 89 S.E. 769 (1916); Rodriguez v. Owaynat, 137 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 92 Ill.
Dec. 627, 485 N.E.2d 438 (1st Dist. 1985); Snow v. West Sixty-FiIth St. Garage
Co., 166 N.Y.S. 414 (Mun. Ct. 1917). |FN5| Quel v. Hansen, 126 Ill. App. 3d
1086, 82 Ill. Dec. 164, 468 N.E.2d 426 (1st Dist. 1984).
The ROA in 03628 demonstrates that Coughlin's 11/1/11 Iiling, at 3:24
pm That 11/1/11 'Emergency Appeal and Motion to Stay Eviction Coughlin
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initially attempted to submit in the Justice Court Appeal oI the RJC summary
eviction in CV11-03051 (Iiled 10/19/11, thereby making void the entirety oI
CV11-03628) to the 2JDC, but Michelle Purdy reIused to accept it (and the RJC
was still holding on to Coughlin's last $2,275, save the $158.00 in his bank
account reIlected in the Declaration provided in support oI his Amended Motion
to Proceed IFP in 03051 oI 11/1/11. Iiled by Coughlin personally delivering
such to the RJC, as Christine Erickson was still inIorming Coughlin at that time
that Iax Iiling was not permitted in the RJC, which is odd, given Baker's Iaxes
to the RJC oI 10/18/11 and 10/19/11 were Iile stamped in. Regardless, while
Hill lied to the police on 11/13/11 (captured by a video Hill himselI Iilmed and
propounded to the Reno City Attorney's OIIice Ior the criminal trespass
prosecution against Coughlin) in asserting the SheriII 'posted the 24 hour lock-
out order to your door because you ran away... (actually, Hill's associate Baker
then testiIied that Hill was not even there the day oI the Lock-out, and that
neither was Coughlin, and Baker Iailed to co-sign Hill's baseless assertion that
Coughlin 'ran away, similarly to Baker Iailing to co-sign Hill's other baseless
assertions that Coughlin was 'climbing on the contractor's truck on 1/12/12
(something Judge Flanagan Iound did not occur in denying Baker's Second
Motion Ior Order to Show Cause (which Ieatures a Declaration oI Hill's Irom
1/21/12 wherein Hill's lies in alleging Coughlin made physical contact with Hill
during some conIrontation oI 12/23/11, consisting oI Hill and Baker milling
around harassing Coughlin and those helping him move during the scant time he
was aIIorded to do so by Judge SIerrazza's 12/21/11 Order in 1708.
Clerk's error upon which Couglin should not be prejudiced is evidenced
in the Iollowing regarding these very matters:
~Emergency Appeal attached. IFP motion for Appeal attached.
Sent: Fri 10/28/11 10:54 PM
To: eIlexwashoecourts.us; courtadminwashoecourts.us
2 attachments
marked as received by M. Purdy Mtn and AIIid proceed on appeal IFP Merliss v
Coughlin eviction.pdI (64.9 KB) , Emergency Appeal marked as received M.
Purdee WDC Iiling oIIice attempt to submit with IFP.pdI (142.1 KB)
Dear WDC
On Thursday I attempted to submit an Emergency Appeal oI the Order
that seeks to evict me Irom my HOME and MY LAW OFFICE. It took me
about an hour to scan all this and get this emailed here, aIter having taken my
time, about one hour, to drive down there and try to Iile something. $225 x 2,
please accept this bill Ior $450 or provide support Ior your contentions that the
WDC and Iiling oIIice personnel are not subject to the dictates oI WDCR
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12(10), NRCP 5(e), Whitman, Sullivan, et al...or waive my eIlex subscription as
courtesy stemming Irom the various time consuming incidents I have detailed
here and in previous correspondences. Just think how nice it will be not to see
me in the Iiling oIIice!....To me, this is important, I do not seek to annoy Iiling
oIIice staII and respect the work they do and the general dedication they
display. I asked the WDC Iiling oIIice to retain the hard copy oI the Emergency
Appeal that I sought to submit (I am not clear whether it could be Iile stamped
at that point, I imagine the IFP would need to be approved....). Judge
Steinheimer has been known to answer an IFP with a denial and directions to
submit more detailed Iinancial status inIormation. I don't have much time given
the nature oI summary evictions. That is why I took the time to go to the Iiling
oIIice and avoid any such situation or delays. The Iiling oIIice agreed to mark
as received the document on the back oI the Iront page. I scanned that and am
emailing that combined with the actual document to you within. I Ieel there is a
chance Judge Steinheimer may Iind the IFP I previously submitted will not be
detailed enough. As such, I also attempted to submit the more detailed
IFP/AIIidavit in Support oI IFP on Thursday. The Iiling oIIice signed and dated
that document but reIused to retain the hard copy as well....I am attaching that to
this email also.
Additionally, Rules oI Practice Ior the Second Judicial District Court oI
the State oI Nevada, Rule 12(10) provides:
10. Drop box Iiling.
(a) Papers eligible Ior Iiling. All papers and pleadings, including motions,
oppositions and replies may be Iiled in the drop box located outside the Court
Clerk`s OIIice, with the exception oI Iilings which require the payment oI Iiling
Iees. Filings which require the payment oI Iiling Iees must be made directly
with the Court Clerk`s OIIice.
(b) Procedure. Papers may be Iiled in the drop box during all hours the
courthouse is open. Papers must be date and time stamped prior to being placed
in the drop box. Drop box Iilings shall be deemed Iiled as oI the date and time
noted on the paper or pleading. II a drop box Iiling has not been date and time
stamped, the paper or pleading shall be deemed Iiled at the time it is date and
time stamped by the Court Clerk.
I would like my eIiling subscription charges waived in light oI the
Court's Iailure to comply with WDCR 12(10). Please let me know in writing
the decision on that request.
Further, NRCP 5(e) holds that:
"(e) Filing With the Court DeIined. The Iiling oI pleadings and other papers
with the court as required by these rules shall be made by Iiling them with the
clerk oI the court, except that the judge may permit the papers to be Iiled with
the judge, in which event the judge shall note thereon the Iiling date and
Iorthwith transmit them to the oIIice oI the clerk. A court may by local rule
permit papers to be Iiled, signed or veriIied by electronic means that are
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consistent with technical standards, iI any, that the Judicial ConIerence oI the
United States establishes. A paper signed by electronic means in compliance
with the local rule constitutes a written paper presented Ior the purpose oI
applying these rules. The clerk shall not reIuse to accept Ior Iiling any paper
presented Ior that purpose solely because it is not presented in proper Iorm as
required by these rules or any local rules or practices."
~Emergency Appeal/Motion to Stay Eviction attached. IFP motion for
Appeal attached.
Sent: Wed 11/02/11 2:27 AM
To: judge.steinheimerwashoecourts.us; judge.berrywashoecourts.us;
cdbakerrichardhillaw.com
2 attachments
marked as received by M. Purdy Mtn and AIIid proceed on appeal IFP Merliss v
Coughlin eviction.pdI (69.8 KB) , Emergency Appeal and Motion to Stay
Eviction or Lockout marked as received M. Purdee WDC Iiling oIIice attempt
to submit with IFP.pdI (148.7 KB)
Dear Judge Steinheimer and Judge Berry,
I am sorry to have to resort to seeking to submit Iilings to the Court in
this manner, but, given the exigencies oI trying to represent my clients in the
most zealous manner possible (some oI my clients have very pressing matters,
such as seeking to have Trustee Sales postponed) while being conIronted with
the summary nature oI an eviction proceeding/"trial" that has included an
impermissible Iorced depositing oI $2,275 into the Reno Justice Court's rent
escrow account, in addition to impermissible departures Irom the strict notice
requirements attendant to any summary possessory action, I Ieel I must contact
the Court in this manner. This is even more true in light oI the lack oI response I
have received Irom Mr. Conyers and the news that he has resigned very, very
recently.
On Thursday I attempted to submit an Emergency Appeal oI the Order that
seeks to evict me Irom my law oIIice, which I also utilize as a residence.To me,
this is important, I do not seek to annoy Iiling oIIice staII and respect the work
they do and the general dedication they display. I asked the WDC Iiling oIIice
to retain the hard copy oI the Emergency Appeal that I sought to submit (I am
not clear whether it could be Iile stamped at that point, I imagine the IFP would
need to be approved....
Further NRS 12.015 seems to require one to submit a proposed Iiling
with an IFP Petition). I wish to submit this Amended In Forma Pauperis
Petition, containing more detailed Iinancial status inIormation. I don't have
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much time given the nature oI summary evictions. My landlord's attorney,
Casey Baker, Esq. and Richard G. Hill, Esq. seek to have a constable lock me
out oI my home law oIIice prior to a written Eviction Order even being
appropriately served upon me in writing. They seek to achieve something
similar with respect to a videotaped inspection oI my law oIIice without
providing appropriate written notice, nor detailing the reason Ior such an
inspection nor the reasonableness Ior seeking one, all without appropriate
written notice oI an intent to inspect, nor written notice oI an Order allowing Ior
such an inspection. That is why I took the time to go to the Iiling oIIice and
avoid any such situation or delays. The Iiling oIIice agreed to mark as received
the document on the back oI the Iront page. I scanned that and am emailing that
combined with the actual document to you within. I Ieel there is a chance Judge
Steinheimer may Iind the IFP I previously submitted will not be detailed
enough. As such, I also attempted to submit the more detailed IFP/AIIidavit in
Support oI IFP on Thursday. The Iiling oIIice signed and dated that document
but reIused to retain the hard copy as well....I am attaching that to this email
also. I could be wrong with regard to my contentions that the Iiling oIIice is not
supposed to reject Iilings oI this sort. II that is the case, I apologize Ior
requesting your attention in this matter.
With regard to the WDC Iiling oIIice staII reIusing to Iile papers
submitted Ior Iiling, please consider:
Sullivan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court In and For County oI Clark, 904 P.2d
1039, 111 Nev. 1367 (Nev., 1995): 'This proper person petition Ior a writ oI
mandamus seeks an order Irom this court directing the Eighth Judicial District
Court to Iile petitioner's application to proceed in Iorma pauperis and his civil
complaint. 1 On July 25, 1995, we ordered the state to Iile an answer to this
petition. The state's answer was Iiled on August 11, 1995. 2 Documentation
submitted by petitioner to this court establishes that petitioner submitted to the
clerk oI the district court Ior Iiling an application to proceed in Iorma pauperis
and a civil complaint on May 15, 1995. Although the application Ior leave to
proceed in Iorma pauperis was in proper Iorm and was sworn to under penalty
oI perjury, the clerk oI the district court did not Iile that application. 3
The Iailure to Iile the application was in violation oI the clear statutory
mandate that such an application be Iiled. NRS 12.015(1) provides that "|a|ny
person ... may Iile an aIIidavit |seeking leave to proceed without payment oI
Iees|." Further, we have repeatedly instructed the clerk oI the Eighth Judicial
District Court that such documents must be Iiled. See Bowman v. District Court,
102 Nev. 474, 728 P.2d 433 (1986) (clerk has a ministerial duty to accept and
Iile documents iI those documents are in proper Iorm; clerk must not exercise
any judicial discretion); Barnes v. District Court, 103 Nev. 679, 748 P.2d 483
(1987) (prisoner's right oI access to court cannot be denied on basis oI
indigency); Huebner v. State, 107 Nev. 328, 810 P.2d 1209 (1991) (clerk must
create an accurate record oI all pleadings submitted Ior Iiling, whether or not the
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documents are actually Iiled); Whitman v. Whitman, 108 Nev. 949, 840 P.2d
1232 (1992) (clerk has no authority to return documents submitted Ior Iiling;
instead, clerk must stamp documents that cannot be immediately Iiled
"received," and must maintain such documents in the record oI the case);
Donoho v. District Court, 108 Nev. 1027, 842 P.2d 731 (1992) (the clerk oI the
district court has a duty to Iile documents and to keep an accurate record oI the
proceedings beIore the court); Grey v. Grey, 111 Nev. 388, 892 P.2d 595 (1995)
(clerk oI district court admonished Ior Iailure to keep accurate record oI
documents submitted Ior Iiling). Petitioner alleges that the district court has
reIused to Iile his application and has returned it with directions to provide more
inIormation regarding employment.
Indeed, petitioner has attached to his petition Ior a writ in this court his
original application as it was returned to him. Attached to the top oI the
document is a "post-it" note with the handwritten notation: "application denied
incomplete inIo-employment currently." 4 The state inIorms us that the note
was written by "the chieI judge." In addition, petitioner alleges, and the
allegation is apparently true, that along with his "denied" application Ior leave
to proceed in Iorma pauperis, his civil complaint was returned to him unIiled.
Finally, petitioner alleges, and has attached documentation to support the
allegation, that judges' law clerks oIten return to prisoners unIiled motions along
with letters purporting to rule on the legal suIIiciency oI those motions. The
state argues in its answer to this petition that "petitioner's application ... was
denied on the basis that the address oI the Petitioner which was later given to
the Court by Petitioner ... did not appear to be a jail and that such inIormation
was contrary to the inIormation shown in the application which stated that the
Petitioner was in prison.
The 'out oI jail' address suggested an ability oI the Petitioner to be
employed." This vague reIerence to an "out oI jail" address is not explained in
the documents beIore this court. Nevertheless, the state's assertion that
petitioner's application was denied is incorrect. The handwritten notation on
petitioner's unIiled application clearly does not constitute a proper judicial
disposition oI that application. Further, the action oI the clerk oI the district
court in returning petitioner's application and civil complaint to him unIiled is in
direct violation oI this court's instructions to the clerk oI the district court in
Whitman v. Whitman, 108 Nev. 949, 840 P.2d 1232 (1992). This court has
several times conIirmed the absolute obligation oI the district courts to Iile
documents submitted to them and to preserve the right oI citizens to access to
the courts, whether indigent or not. Barnes v. District Court, 103 Nev. 679, 748
P.2d 483 (1987); Huebner v. State, 107 Nev. 328, 810 P.2d 1209 (1991).
Indeed, in Donoho v. District Court, 108 Nev. 1027, 842 P.2d 731 (1992), a
case directly analogous to this case, we held that the clerk oI the district court
violated the rights oI an indigent party when she neglected to Iile a motion Ior
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leave to proceed in Iorma pauperis and a motion Ior relieI Irom a deIault
judgment.
SpeciIically, we stated: "|T|he clerk |oI the district court| had an absolute
duty to Iile the motion Ior leave to proceed in Iorma pauperis and to clearly
stamp the date oI receipt oI the other documents on the documents. Further, the
clerk had a duty to keep an accurate record oI the case pending beIore the
district court." Id. at 1029, 842 P.2d at 733 (citation omitted; emphasis added).
Thus, petitioner's application Ior leave to proceed in Iorma pauperis must be
Iiled. II, on subsequent review oI the application, the district court determines
that petitioner has not shown he is indigent, the district court may order
petitioner to provide Iurther inIormation or may deny the application in an
appropriately Iiled written order. II, on the other hand, the district court grants
the application, the district court must then proceed to require the Iiling oI
petitioner's other documents and to consider them in due course. Donoho, 108
Nev. at 1030, 842 P.2d at 733..
This argument is contrary to the statutes governing summary evictions. NRS
40.390 speciIically says that summary eviction proceedings and appeals shall not
be quashed Ior lack oI Iorm, provided that the proceedings have been conducted
substantially according to provisions oI the summary eviction statute. Tenants
contesting their evictions pro se, as Coughlin did, cannot be expected to always
know the correct legal terminology or the speciIic statute they must cite. NRS
40.390 protects those tenants Irom Ialling prey to procedural traps that will prevent
their case Irom being heard on its merits. Under NRS 40.390, so long as a tenant
substantively complies with the summary eviction procedures, his right to appeal
his case will not be abridged. Here, where Coughlin made it clear Irom his Iirst
Iiling that he wanted to contest the eviction on its merits and the Justice Court
heard the case on its merits, Coughlin has substantially complied with the
summary eviction proceedings as required by NRS 40.390 and his appeal should
not have been dismissed Ior lack oI Iorm at the Justice Court or District
Court.1...NRS 40.390 requires the courts to look to the substantive content oI
pleadings Iiled under the summary eviction statute rather than their Iorm when
determining whether an appeal is proper. Here, looking at the substantive content
oI Coughlin's Iiling, both in the RJC and 2JDC clearly reveal a basis Ior granting
his appeal. However, beyond that, the RJC Iailed to transmit numerous items that
should have been included in the ROA, which is incredibly deIective beyond that
even. Additionally, a disc oI high deIinition photos and videos attached as an
Exhibit by Coughlin was not transmitted ot the 2JDC, and Judge SIerrazza also
authorized Coughlin to submit more evidence still by email, which Coughlin did,
which was not transmitted to the 2JDC either.
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Additionally, there is an earlier Iiled appeal oI the summary eviction matter,
1708, appeal in 03628. Whereas the Iiling date oI 03628 is December 21
st
, 2011,
Coughlin Iiled the Iollowing previous to that, making all oI 03628 void Ior lack oI
jurisdiction: Case Description: CV11-03051 - ZACH COUGHLIN VS. MATT
MERLISS ET AL (D1) - Filing Date: 19-Oct-2011 Case Type: CA - 1USTICE
COURT CIVIL APPEAL (see docket Irom 2JDC's www.ccwashoe.com; which
also contains the Iollowing entry: '25. 2385 - Mtn Proceed Forma Pauperis 19-
Oct-2011 Extra Text: NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM RENO JUSTICE COURT).
A similar NRS 118A.390 quashing Ior lack oI Iorm is evident Irom Judge Berry's
Order (much less Clerk Michelle Purdy reIusing to let Coughlin Iile his Motion Ior
a Stay oI both 10/19/11 and 10/26/11. Judge Berry's 11/8/11 Order reads:
'ORDER This case arises from a summary eviction trial
held in the 1ustices Court of Reno Township on October 25, 2011.
Pursuant to the decision oI the Justice oI the Peace, DeIendant Zachary
Coughlin was evicted on October 31, 2011. Mr. Coughlin Iiled an
Emergency Motion Ior Stay Summary Eviction Order and Motion Ior
New trial/Motion Ior RelieI Irom judgment on November 8, 2011. In
his Motion, Coughlin requests a stay oI the Justice oI the Peace's
decision, among a myriad oI other things.
In support oI his Motion, Coughlin cites N.R.C.P. 59, N.R.C.P.
60, N.R.C.P. 62, J.C.R.C.P. 109, J.C.R.C.P. 110, N.R.S. 12.015, N.R.S.
40.253, J.C.R.C.P. 83, and N.R.S. 118A et. seq. (among others), but then
Iails to make a coherent argument as to how any oI these statutory
sections may provide Coughlin with the relieI he is requesting.
Accordingly, and good cause appearing, Coughlin's Emergency Motion
Ior Stay Summary Eviction Order and Motion Ior New trial/Motion Ior
RelieI Irom judgment is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED
Judge Steinheimmer's ruled, also on 11/8/11, in her:
'ORDER DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS
Having read ZACH COUGHLIN's Motion to Proceed in Forma
Pauperis" and his "AIIidavit oI Poverty," this Court Iinds that pursuant
to NRS 12.015, Mr. Coughlin's affidavit is insuIIicient to grant Iorma
pauperis status at this time. (Iootnote 1: "1 NRS 12.015(1) Any person
who desires to prosecute or deIend a civil action may file an affidavit
with the court setting Iorth with particular Iacts concerning his income,
property and other resources which establish that he is unable to
prosecute or deIend the action because he is unable to pay the costs oI
so doing.") By affidavit, Mr. Coughlin Iailed to establish that he has
insuIIicient means with which to pay the costs associated with the
prosecution oI this action. Additionally, the District Court does not have
jurisdiction to waive the appeal bond required by the Justice Court to
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appeal that court's decision. Based upon the Ioregoing and good cause
appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Zach Coughlin's Motion to
Proceed in Forma Pauperis is denied.
Judge Steinheimmer's above Order seems to relate to the rather common
practice in Washoe County court's (despite this the decision in Buckwalter
regarding the permissibility oI Declarations in lieu oI AIIidavits under NRS
53.045) to continue to demand indigent litigants to pay a notary $5 Ior each and
every IFP Iiled (or risk having RMC Judge Nash Holmes report one to the SBN Ior
making an 'errant, altered, and inappropriate document where one, say, changes
the caption on a notarized IFP (yet changes nothing with respect to the speciIics oI
one's Iinancial condition therein). Judge Steinheimmer denied Coughlins' IFP
where he sworn to making less than $200 per month Irom his solo law practice,
owning only a 1996 Honda accord worth less than $1,000, having only $158.00 in
his bank account, and owning not stocks, bonds, or real property, and indicating he
had no other sources oI income, and monthly expenses oI approximately $2,000.
Hill's associate Baker's 4/19/12 Motion for Attorney's Fees in 03628, reads:
'MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES Respondent, MATT MERLISS, by and through
his counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, LTD., and CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ. moves the court,
pursuant to NRS 69.050 and NRS 7.085, Ior an award oI attorney's Iees. This motion is based
on the above-reIerenced statutes, the record on appeal ("ROA"), the points and authorities
below, and all papers and pleadings on Iile herein. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES FACTS
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. This is an appeal Irom a summary eviction entered in the Reno Justice Court
("RJC"). ReIerence is made to the Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law, and Order Ior
Summary Eviction entered by the RJC on October 27, 2012 Ior the Iacts oI the underlying
eviction. ROA, Vol. II, pp. 75-80.
2. Coughlin Iiled his Iirst notice oI appeal in the eviction case on November 3, 2011,
two days aIter he was properly and lawIully locked out oI the property. ROA, Vol. III, pp.
229-233. Coughlin inexplicably Iiled an additional notice oI appeal on November 23, 2011.
ROA, Vol. III, P.5.
3. Since Iiling his Iirst notice oI appeal, Coughlin has deliberately engaged in a pattern
oI abusive, vexatious, and most importantly, expensive behavior in both this appeal and in the
case below. Coughlin continued to Iile motions and other documents, and engage in other
inappropriate and time-consuming behavior in the RJC, both beIore and aIter the Iirst ROA
was Iinally sent up to this court, some seven weeks aIter the Iirst notice oI appeal was Iiled.
1he court is asked to take judicial notice, pursuant to ARS 47.13, that the R1C sent up a
supplement to the ROA on 1anuary 4, 212, which consisted of 21 additional items. It is
beyond any doubt that Coughlin's behavior has been speciIically calculated to cause Merliss
to needlessly incur additional attorney's Iees and costs. By way oI example and not
necessarily limitation:
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3.1. On November 13, 2011, almost three weeks aIter the eviction was granted
in open court, and two weeks aIter he was properly and legally locked out oI the property,
Coughlin was Iound to be living in the basement oI the home. Coughlin's trespass led to his
arrest. That necessitated additional motion practice and other activity by Merliss' counsel.
Even now, Coughlin reIuses, or is unable, to grasp that what he was doing was unacceptable,
both criminally and in the context oI this litigation. See NRS 22.020. Prior to being caught
illegally squatting on the property, Coughlin had increased his personal attacks on Merliss, his
counsel, and others, most oI whom were only tangentially involved in the eviction matter.
See, e.g., the "Complaint" Coughlin attempted to Iile against all oI those individuals in case
no. CV11-03126.
3.2. For weeks aIter he Iirst Iiled his notice oI appeal, Coughlin continued to Iile
additional motions and other papers in the Reno Justice Court, even while (page 2) avoiding
that court's eIIorts to set a hearing on those motions. See ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 22-23. During
that time, Coughlin supplemented his motion practice with dozens oI lengthy and abusive
emails to both the justice's court and counsel-the purpose oI which was simply to keep the
Iight going. All oI Coughlin's behavior during that time required substantial additional work
by Merliss' counsel, Iar beyond anything in a "normal" eviction.
3.3. AIter a lengthy hearing, Coughlin was granted additional time to remove
his belongings Irom the property in late December 2011.In1 OI course, the removal process
itselI was not without substantial Iurther bickering and unnecessary diIIiculty, all oI which
was brought on by Coughlin's insistence on creating conIrontation where none should have
existed.
3.4. For example, Coughlin chose to spend the Iirst oI his two allotted days
sending combative emails to both Judge SIerrazza and Merliss' counsel, instead oI diligently
trying to remove his belongings. At one point, Coughlin even announced that he was entitled
to a stay oI the proceedings, and that would allow him to return to, and retake possession oI,
the property. Judge SIerrazza notiIied Coughlin that a stay had been denied. See EXHIBIT 1,
which is a true and correct copy oI the reIerenced emails oI December 22, 2011. Because
Coughlin chose to waste halI oI his allotted time trying to pick a Iight over that which was
already moot, he Iailed to remove all oI his belongings Irom the property. In2 This, oI course,
led him to Iile a motion Ior a temporary restraining order ("TRO") in this
In 1 Coughlin had one week Irom the time the court ruled, on October 25, 2011, that he would
be evicted, until he was locked out on November 1,2011. Then, he was coming and going on
the property Ior another two weeks. Yet, during this time, he Iailed to remove any oI this
possessions. In that regard, the court should know that Mr. Coughlin is a hoarder.
Fn.2 Even though Coughlin removed at least one Iull U-Haul box truck oI his belongings
Irom the property, he still leIt mountains oI"junk" behind. For example, there were no less
than 13 automobile seats in the basement. The backyard was Iull, up to the top oI the six Ioot
Ience, with discarded televisions, car body parts, tires, and broken Iurniture. (page 3)
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court, which is discussed Iurther, below. When Coughlin's TRO motion was denied, that, in
turn, led him to physically attempt to interfere with Merliss' efforts to dispose of the
property Coughlin had chosen to abandon. Predictably, the end result was substantial
additional fees incurred by Merliss, which was, of course, Coughlin's goal all along.
3.5. In addition to his continued activity in the RJC, Coughlin has Iiled
hundreds oI pages oI abusive, and often nonsensical, materials with this court, in which he
has repeatedly sought relief to which he was not even arguably entitled. In many oI his
Iilings, Coughlin failed to even identify, much less analyze, the controlling law on the
subject. Nevertheless, Merliss was forced to respond to those filing, lest the court take
Merliss' silence as an admission under DCR 13(3) that Coughlin's requests were
meritorious.
3.6. For example, Coughlin's December 30, 2011 motion Ior a temporary
restraining order was 2 pages long, excluding exhibits. Coughlin, a lawyer, failed to identify
or discuss the controlling law, ARCP 5(b) and ARS 33.1, in any way. In addition to
being procedurally deIicient, that motion was substantively without any merit whatsoever,
and this court so Iound. See this court's Order dated January 11, 2012. Nevertheless, Merliss
was forced to incur attorney's fees to respond to that frivolous motion, and, as a safe-
harbor, delay his efforts to clean out and re-let the property, causing him further
damage.
3.7. On January 12, 2012, aIter his motion Ior a TRO was denied, Coughlin
chose to resort to the self-help tactic of physically interfering with Merliss' efforts to
clean out the property. See Merliss' motion Ior order to show cause Iiled herein on January
20, 2012 Ior Iurther particulars. Those antics ultimately led to Coughlin's arrest, and
additional motions and hearings, continuing his tactic oI causing Merliss more and more Iees.
3.8. On January 14, 2012 in this case, Coughlin Iiled a document titled
"Opposition to Motion for Attorney's Fees," even though no such motion had been filed.
(page 4)
3.9. On January 30, 2012, Coughlin Iiled a motion to alter or amend this court's
January 11th, 2012 order under NRCP 52(b) or 59. Once again, Coughlin's motion was
without any merit whatsoever, but nevertheless required a full response. Coughlin
completely ignored the Iundamental, threshold requirement that no judgment had been
entered in this case, and, thereIore, no relieI was available to him under the rules he purported
to invoke. Each and every one of Coughlin's numerous and lengthy motions have been so
devoid of any factual or legal basis so as to be sanctionable in and among themselves. ARS
7.85. ARCP 11(b).
3.10. On February 2, 2012, Coughlin Iiled a notice to set a hearing in this case
in Department 10. He cited irrelevant and inapplicable statutes in support of his notice.
Merliss incurred fees in moving the court to strike Coughlin's fugitive and nonsensical
notice.
4. The overriding problem Merliss has consistently Iaced when responding to
Coughlin's multiple and lengthy Iilings has been that Coughlin, an attorney, was able to at
least identify just enough law so that his motion or other papers could not be left
unopposed. Coughlin never presented any true legal analysis to the court, but his invocation
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of arguably relevant statutes, or, at least, possible legal theories (e.g. 1RO), forced Merliss
to respond to each of his frivolous filings. Merliss could not risk the court accepting some
random citation in Coughlin's papers and entering an adverse ruling because Merliss had
not opposed it. See DCR 13(3). OIten, as was the case with the series oI documents Coughlin
Iiled Irom April 5 through April 9, 2012, Coughlin simply regurgitated and reIiled the same
document over and over, but with a diIIerent title and (sometimes) a diIIerent prayer Ior relieI.
1hat string of filings, in particular, did not contain any relevant citation to any controlling
authority, or any cogent analyses, to support any relief Coughlin claimed he was
requesting. CI., NRCP 7(b). Because Coughlin knew enough to at least ask for some
recognizable form of relief in the caption and prayer for relief, Merliss could not simply
ignore Coughlin's papers. And to make matters worse, because (page 5) Coughlin's
motions were so devoid of any coherent analysis, Merliss' counsel was often forced to brief
the entire document for the court, rather than focusing his opposition on any particular
element or other aspect of the law. All oI this resulted in an extraordinary amount of fees
needlessly heaped upon Merliss to try to conclude what should have been a simple "no-
cause" summary eviction.
5. Coughlin is an attorney duly licensed as such by the State oI Nevada. His state bar
number is 9473.
6. Since Coughlin filed his first notice of appeal on Aovember 3, 212, Merliss has
incurred $42,065.50 in attorney's Iees. As explained by Mr. Hill in his declaration (EXHIBIT
4, hereto), those Iees do not include a substantial amount oI editing and other activities
perIormed by him in this case. Under NRS 69.050, this court is authorized to award Merliss,
as the prevailing party on appeal, his Iees Ior "all services rendered" in his behalI. An award
oI Iees is also available, and appropriate, under NRS 7.085, Ior Coughlin's Irivolous and
unnecessary deIense and extension oI this matter. It is hard to imagine a more appropriate
case than this in which to award the maximum amount justiIied by the substantial evidence
beIore the court.
LAW
1. ReIerence is made to NRS 69.050 ("In the event oI an appeal, the district court is
authorized to award to the prevailing party all costs oI court as now allowed by law incurred
by such party, and also a reasonable attorney fee to be Iixed and allowed by the district court
Ior all services rendered in behalI oI the prevailing party").
2. ReIerence is made to NRCP 54(d)(2)(A) ("A claim Ior attorney Iees must be made
by motion.")
3. ReIerence is made to NRS 7.085, which provides in Iull as Iollows:
1. II a court Iinds that an attorney has:
(a) Filed, maintained or deIended a civil action or proceeding in any court
in this State and such action or deIense is not well-grounded in Iact or is not
warranted by existing law or by an argument Ior changing the existing law
that is made in good Iaith; or (page 6)
(b) Unreasonably and vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding
beIore any court in this State, the court shall require the attorney personally
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to pay the additional costs, expenses and attorney's Iees reasonably incurred
because oI such conduct.
2. The court shall liberally construe the provisions oI this section in Iavor
oI awarding costs, expenses and attorney's Iees in all appropriate situations.
It is the Intent oI the Legislature that the court award costs, expenses and
attorney's Iees pursuant to this section and impose sanctions pursuant to Rule
11 oI the Nevada Rules oI Civil Procedure in all appropriate situations to
punish Ior and deter Irivolous or vexatious claims and deIenses because such
claims and deIenses overburden limited Judicial resources, hinder the timely
resolution oI meritorious claims and increase the costs oI engaging in
business and providing proIessional services to the public.
NRS 7.085 (emphasis added).
ANALYSIS
I. MERLISS IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF FEES UNDERNRS 69.050 AND NRS
7.085
"Attorney's Iees are not recoverable absent a statute, rule or contractual provision to the
contrary." Bobby Berosini, Ltd. v. PETA, 114 Nev. 1348, 1356, 971 P.2d383 (1998) Here, the
authority Ior an award oI Iees is provided by two statutes.
NRS 69.050 provides that the prevailing party on an appeal Irom justice' s court is to be
awarded "a reasonable attorney fee... Ior all services rendered" on his behalI in connection
with this case. Merliss is entitled to his Iees because he is the prevailing party in this appeal.
See this court's order dated March 30, 2012. Since the notice oIentry oIthe court's order was
served by Merliss on March 30, 2011, this motion is timely. NRCP 54(d)(2)(A). The prooI
required by NRCP 54(d)(2)(B) is set Iorth below and in the Declaration oI Casey D. Baker,
attached hereto as EXHIBIT 3. ReIerence is also made to the Declaration oIRichard G. Hill,
An award oIIset against Coughlin, an attorney representing himselI, is also appropriate
under NRS 7.085. That statute is remedial, and requires a liberal (page 7) construction oI its
own provisions. That law requires the court to award Iees upon a Iinding that Coughlin either:
(a) Filed, maintained or defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this
State and such action or deIense is not well-grounded in Iact or is not warranted
by existing law or by an argument Ior changing the existing law that is made in
good Iaith; or
(b) Unreasonably and vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding beIore
any court in this State,
NRS 7.085(1)(a)(b) (emphasis added).
Here, the court need look no Iurther than its own Iile and the 2,000 page ROA
to conclude that Coughlin has behaved unreasonably, vexatiously, and that none oI his
"arguments" have been well-grounded in either Iact or law. In Iact, his rants and
ravings have been nothing more than him exacting revenge on Merliss and all those
associated with him. As such, a fee award is mandatory. As to the amount oI Iees, NRS
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7.085 provides that the court shall require the attorney personally to pay the additional
costs, expenses and attorney's Iees reasonably incurred because oI such conduct.
NRS 7.085(1) (emphasis added).
As proven above and below, the Irivolity and vexatiousness oI Coughlin's maintenance
and extension oI this matter has been so beyond reason, and so outrageous, and the nexus oI
his behavior to the Iees incurred by Merliss so direct and indisputable, that nothing less than a
Iull award oI those Iees should even be considered by the court. To not impose the Iull
measure oI the harm Coughlin has caused would reward and encourage his vexatiousness in
this and other cases. There needs to be a day oI reckoning Ior Coughlin's antics. (page 8)
II. COUGHLIN HAS INFUCTED $42,065.50 IN ATTORNEY'S FEES UPON MERLISS
SINCE THE FILING OF HIS FIRST NOTICE OF APPEAL.
At every stage oI this proceeding, both in and out oI court, Coughlin has deliberately
engaged in a pattern oI outrageous and abusive behavior speciIically calculated to cause
Merliss to needlessly incur attorney's Iees and costs. In its Order dated March 30, 2012, at 2,
this court recognized that the record in this case "exceeds 2,000 pages." As the court is surely
aware by now, that observation is but oI the tip oI the iceberg that is Coughlin's abusive,
Irivolous, and vexatious style oI litigation in this matter. The time Ior Coughlin to Iace the
consequences oI his actions is now. This court can no longer ignore the Iact that Coughlin, a
licensed attorney and current member oI the bar, had one, and only one agenda in this case -to
drive up Iees Ior Merliss. In this regard, and only int his regard, he has been wildly successIul.
The stated intent oI NRS 7.085(2), and the implied intent oI NRS 69.050, is to "punish Ior and
deter" precisely this type oI behavior.
This was a summary eviction case. Summary proceedings are inIormal. They are
designed and intended by the Legislature to "dispense Iair and speedy justice." NJCRCP 105.
For that reason, the parties are not entitled to conduct discovery. No Iormal hearings are
required. Ao money is at directly at stake. 1he only thing at issue in a summary proceeding
is possession of the property. ARS 4.253(). G.C. Wallace, Inc., v. Dist. Court, 127 Nev.
Adv. Op. 64, 262 P.3d 1135 (October 6, 2011). Here, the residence was subject to a month-
to-month tenancy that could be, and was, properly terminated for no-cause by the use oI a
court-approved Iorm. Summary eviction proceedings are designed to be simple, so that
landlords and tenants can conduct them without the need Ior counsel. The Nevada Supreme
Court has promulgated dozens oI Iorms, and made those Iorms available online, so that the
entire proceeding, Irom beginning to end, can take place without substantial draIting that
would require an attorney. Summary eviction proceedings should never require hundreds of
bill able hours by an attorney to complete. Yet, here, due solely to Coughlin's unbelievable
propensity Ior conIrontation, his irrational reIusal to deal (page 9) with the reality oI the
situation he created, and his single-minded Iocus on causing as much damage to as many
people as he possibly can, the hours and Iees in this case have been driven out oI all
reasonable control.
Substantively, all Coughlin had to do to stop the eviction below was to show, by
admissible evidence, that a single, material Iactual dispute existed for trial. Anvui, LLC v.
C.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212, 215, 163 P.3d 405 (2007). He could not even do that,
despite Iiling hundreds oI pages oI brieIs with the court, and despite the court allowing him
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two hearings, which lasted in excess oI 10 hours, in which to present his claims. Judge
SIerrazza did not deny Coughlin the entry oIeven a single piece oI evidence. But still, despite
all oI his ravings, Coughlin could not meet this very low burden oI prooI. 1hat was because,
without exception, each and every word Coughlin uttered in pursuit of his frivolous
defenses was completely and absolutely without merit. That was just the beginning, but it
illustrates perIectly the Ioundation upon which Coughlin built his appeal in this court.
Once he Iinally managed to perIect his appeal and Iile his brieI(s) in this court,
Coughlin could not point to a single, speciIic, articulable error by the RJC. He improperly
Iiled two appellate brieIs, in excess oI 50 pages, plus a CD, but still could not even identiIy,
much less meet, or even approach, his evidentiary burden oI showing that the lower court's
decision was clearly erroneous and not based on substantial evidence. See Gibellini v. Klindt,
110 Nev. 1201, 1204, 885 P.2d 540 (1994). Coughlin could not coherently identify the
Iactual bases for his appeal because there were none, just like there were no factual bases
for the ridiculous and unsupported defenses of habitability/retaliation/discrimination he
attempted to set up in the R1C. Coughlin's deIenses below, his appeal, and every motion
and other paper Coughlin has Iiled have been perIectly Irivolous. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 677 (ih ed. 1999) ("Irivolous, adj. lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not
serious; not reasonably purposeIul.") CI., NRS7.085(1)(a). His eIIorts to extend this matter in
spite oI that Irivolity (page 10) have been perIectly vexatious. See id. at 1559 ("vexatious, adj.
(OI conduct) without reasonable or probable cause or excuse; harassing; annoying.")
The preposterous, unIounded, unsupported, and largely unarticulated legal
"arguments" Coughlin attempted to make in the hundreds upon hundreds oI pages he has Iiled
in this court are more than enough to justiIy a Iull award oI Iees to Merliss under NRS 7.085.
But that is to say nothing oI the sarcastic, abusive, derogatory vitriol and personal attacks
Coughlin has repeatedly heaped on Merliss, his counsel, this court, the RJC, court staII, his
public deIenders, various prosecutors, Nevada Court Services employees, NV Energy, and
any number oI other witnesses, lawyers, judges, and private individuals who were unIortunate
enough to have crossed his path in the past eight months. For some unknown and unexplained
reason, Coughlin has chosen litigation in general, and this case in particular, as his Iorum Ior
lashing out at anyone and everyone he perceives as even remotely connected to, or
responsible Ior, the downward spiral in which he Iinds his liIe. Merliss is precisely within the
class oIperson, and has suIIered precisely the type oIharm, that both NRS 69.050 and NRS
7.085 were designed to prevent and remedy.
In considering this matter, it must not escape the court's attention that Coughlin
literally took every single opportunity that presented itselI to him to delay, Irustrate, and
abuse this court's and the RJC's processes, andall participants inthis matter. Several times,
Coughlin's antics have ended in his arrest or citation by the Reno Police Department. For
example, on November 15, 2011, aIter he burst into the undersigned's oIIice, disrupting a
deposition, andwas thereaIter parading up and downthe streetIilming and yelling obscenities,
Coughlin was cited shortly aIter leaving counsel's oIIice. See Declaration oI Richard G. Hill,
Exhibit 2 to the motion Ior order to show cause Iiled in the RJC on November 21, 2011.
ROA, Vol. III, pp.18-33. And on January 12, 2012, when he was arrested Ior jaywalking
while attempting to prevent Merliss' contractor Irom disposing oIthe things Coughlin had
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abandoned at the property. That day, shortly before his arrest, (page 11) Coughlin had been
climbing on the contractors truck, falsely accusing the contractor of stealing his things,
and feigning injury to prevent the contractor from entering the Waste Management
transfer station. See Merliss' second motion Ior order to show cause, Iiled herein on January
20, 2012. See also, Coughlin's motion to alter or amend, Iiled on January 30, 2012, at 4:7, in
which he states "Richard Hill keeps doing his Reno PD thing, I keep getting arrested ... ".
Coughlin has repeatedly and falsely accused Mr. Hill of bribing the Reno Police to arrest
him. Coughlin, oI course, has never explained the relevance of this ridiculous accusation
to these proceedings. But his intent is obviously only to deIame Mr. Hill and deIlect
attention Irom his, Coughlin's, habitual criminal behavior.
In addition to the physical conIrontations and harassment Coughlin has doled out, he
has sent hundreds oI emails to the undersigned and Mr. Hill during the course oI these
proceedings. Much like his court Iilings, those emails oIten contained page aIter page oI
nonsensical string cites oI irrelevant legal authority, laced with abuse and name-calling. Any
original thought contained in those em ails usually consisted oI some derogatory insult or
other personal tirade against Merliss or his counsel, in one Iorm or another. Coughlin's
communications, some oI which have been made exhibits in this proceeding, were more oIten
than not conIused, conIusing, and bizarre. His reIusal to deal with reality, his insistence on
creating conIrontation at every turn, his Ilagrant abuses oI this court's processes, and,
ultimately, his criminal behavior, have cost Merliss an astounding amount oI Iees, all oI
which Coughlin should pay pursuant to the mandate oI NRS 7.085.
But there is more. According to his internet postings, Coughlin Iancies himselI as "a
landlord's worst mother eIIin (sic) nightmare." Coughlin states that he sometimes deIends
tenants Ior Iree "just Ior shetz (sic) and gegs (sic)." See EXHIBIT 2 attached hereto, which is
a true and correct copy oI a printout Irom Coughlin's YouTube page, which he operates and
maintains under the username "25teddyjames." These two statements alone strip away any
veneer oI legitimacy Ior any oI Coughlin's "legal (page 12) arguments" in this case. Perhaps
even more disturbing, Coughlin is obviously and blatantly proud oI the Iact that his antics
have cost Merliss, and others, such a staggering amount oI Iees. See Coughlin's Supplement
to MotiontoVacate Hearing on Orderto Show Cause, at 6:15-16, where he states"...AND
RICH AND CASEY CAN ENJOY THE MONEY THE (sic) JUST EARNED. AND BY
GAWD, THEY DID EARN IT, DIDN'T THEY?" (emphasis in original). This all proves that
Coughlin's behavior was intentional.
To call Coughlin's litigation "tactics" unproIessional would be an understatement oI
historic proportions. But unIortunately Ior Merliss, all oI Coughlin's nonsense has had to be
read, absorbed, analyzed, and dealt with by Merliss' counsel, whether or not a Iormal response
was ever Iiled with the court. Due to the consistent and pervasive incoherency oIeach and
every one oI Coughlin's Iilings, all oI that activity has taken a spectacularly disproportionate
amount oI counsel's time. That, oIcourse, has ended up costing Merliss an obscene amount oI
money, which is exactly the result Coughlin not only intended, but proclaimed Irom the
beginning as his goal.
Coughlin has gone to great lengths to make the court, Merliss, and anyone else who
would listen, aware that he, Coughlin, claims to be without Iinancial resources. See
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Coughlin's motion to proceed in Iorma pauperis on appeal, Iiled herein on February 16, 2012.
He repeatedly rails against what he perceives as disparate treatment oI him, and those he
believes to be wealthy, privileged, or even employed, including Merliss, his counsel, and
members oIthe judiciary and local police Iorce. See, e.g, Coughlin's motion to alter or amend
order denying his motion to proceed in Iorma pauperis, Iiled herein on April 5, 2012. But
even iIthat were the case, that Coughlin has less Iinancial resources than others, that does not
give him the right to Ioist the costs oI his gamesmanship onthose who have been unIortunate
enough to become involved in litigation with him.
A suit at law is not a children's game, but a serious eIIort on the part oI adult human
beings to administer justice. Tremps v. Ascot Oils, Inc., 561 F.2d 41, 44 (7th Cir. 1977)
(emphasis added). (page 13)
That is a concept that Coughlin, a current member oI the bar, does not yet grasp, but
needs to learn. NRS 69.050 and NRS 7.085 are designed and speciIically intended to teach
that lesson to litigants such as Coughlin, to deter Iuture similar acts. Here, either as a result
oIhis complete indiIIerence, or by speciIic design, Coughlin's antics have cost Merliss a very
large amount oI very real money. Merliss does not have the luxury oI representing himselI
without incurring actual Iees, as Coughlin does. Instead, Merliss was Iorced to pay real
lawyers to practice real law in the Iace oI Coughlin's childish, Irivolous, and reckless abuses
oI the court system. The Iees inIlicted upon Merliss to litigate, and eventually prevail, in this
matter, should be borne by Coughlin, the sole, direct, and proximate cause oI that harm. NRS
7.085. NRS 69.050.
CONCLUSION
Coughlin is a grown man, and an attorney. It is time Ior him to Iace the consequences
oIhis actions. This court can no longer tolerate or ignore the Iinancial harm Coughlin has
purposeIully and recklessly inIlicted on Merliss in this case. Merliss has incurred a staggering
amount oI Iees in this matter due exclusively to Coughlin's unproIessional, Irivolous, and
abusive litigation "tactics," including his oIten criminal behavior. Merliss is entitled to recoup
those Iees now. NRS 69.050. NRS 7.085. Coughlin is entitled to and prays Ior an award
oIIees in the amount oI $42,065.50 pursuant to the reIerenced statutes.
WHEREFORE, Merliss prays Ior an order oI this court, pursuant to NRS
69.050 and NRS 7.085, awarding Merliss his attorney's Iees in this matter in the amount oI
$42,065.50, plus any sums reasonably incurred in responding to any additional papers that
may be Iiled in this case by Coughlin; and Ior such other, Iurther, and additional relieI as
seems just to the court in the premises. /s/ Casey D. Baker, Esq.
1udge SIerrazza's coercive attempts to get Coughlin to waive his NJCRCP 109
arguments as to the impropriety oI holding the trial on 10/25/11 violate NRS 40.253 where
Judge SIerrazza indicated that he would require, as a condition oI Coughlin deIending against
a trail held in compliance with the requirement oI 20 days to respond (plenary rules) Irom the
service oI a Summons and Complaint (and the tenor oI the courtroom and proceedings at that
point certainly suggested Judge SIerrazza would permit the landlord to bootstrap some
insuIIicient 'aIIidavit Irom the early 1492 case, or Irom 1708, suIIicient to qualiIy as such a
'Summons and Complaint, meanign such 'plenary trial would likely have been held within
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another couple days or so, rather than the Court requiring the landlord to Iile, and have served
a Summons and Complaint, allow 20 days Ior Coughlin to Iile and answer, then comply with
NJCRCP 109 (which indicates may invoke NRS 40.253...though its not clear that the regular
JCRCP Ior 'civil actions such as a plenary unlawIul detainer trial would not apply and that
JCRCP 109 is only Ior 'trials within a summary eviction proceeding contest (20 days is
required, either way).
NRS 40.253(6): ~If the court determines that there is a legal defense as to the
alleged unlawful detainer, the court shall refuse to grant either party any relief, and,
except as otherwise provided in this subsection, shall require that any further
proceedings be conducted pursuant to NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive. As such, 1udge
Sferrazza, on 10/25/11, admitted ~so, it is a trial, but then countered ~the only
problem with that, Sir, is you are going to have to deposit the additional rent on
November 1
st
, 2011...and therein 1udge Sferrazza presents yet another onerous
remixing of the law against tenants, and Coughlin in particular, by attempting to
enlarge the scope of his NRS 118A.355(5) application, rather than follows the dictates
and procedure required upon his finding that Coughlin had made a sufficient showing
to necessitate a ~trial (whether a plenary ~unlawful detainer trial, or a 1CRCP 109
~Trial within a summary eviction setting, NRS 40.290 is invoked:
NRS40.290 Parties defendant; persons bound by judgment.
NRS40.300 Contents of complaint; issuance and service of summons; temporary
writ of restitution; notice, hearing and bond.
NRS40.310 Issue of fact to be tried by jury if proper demand made.
NRS40.320 Proof required of plaintiff and defendant on trial.
NRS40.330 Amendment of complaint to conform to proof; continuance.
NRS40.340 Adjournments.
NRS40.350 Trial not to be adjourned when complainant admits evidence in
affidavit would be given.
NRS40.360 1udgment; damages; execution and enforcement.
NRS40.370 Verification of complaint and answer.
NRS40.380 Provisions governing appeals.
NRS40.385 Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who retains possession
of premises to pay rent during stay.
NRS40.390 Appellate court not to dismiss or quash proceedings for want of
form.
NRS40.400 Rules of practice.
NRS40.420 Form of writ of restitution; execution.
NRS40.425 Notice of execution on writ of restitution.
Indeed, Coughlin's 10/19/11 filing quotes the ~Landlord Tenant Handbook in
elucidating this:
~The benefits of summary eviction are:
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the formal eviction process.
1. You cannot get a money judgment as part oI your action (but you can sue in a
separate action);
heard by posting a bond with the court that may be cheaper than that required in the formal
eviction process.
RULE108.SHORTENING TIME TO ANSWER PURSUANT TO NRS 40.300(2)
In an eviction action, time to appear and defend may not be shortened to less than 10
calendar days after service of summons and complaint.
Added; effective 1anuary 1, 2007.]
RULE109.SETTING OF TRIAL IN ACTIONS
PURSUANT TO NRS 40.290
(a)In no case shall a trial on the merits be set less than 20 calendar days after
service of summons and complaint.
(b)If the court issues an order to show cause why a temporary writ of restitution
shall not be issued, it may notice on such order the date and time set for trial in addition
to the date and time set for the temporary writ show cause hearing. However, if service
of the summons and complaint occurs less than 11 days prior to the date for a hearing
for a temporary writ or less than 20 calendar days prior to a trial date, the court shall
continue the relevant hearing date upon request by the tenant.
(c)The trial on the merits shall not be set and noticed using an order to show cause.
NJCRCP 76B provides that: 'Appeal Irom formal eviction: Within 10 days of service of
entry of order . ARS 4.38; Rule 73A(4). Fees: Payable upon Iiling notice oI appeal. Rule
74B(a)(1). Bond Ior costs: Filed with notice oI appeal. Rule 73. Bond, supersedeas: At or
aIter time oI Iiling notice oI appeal. Stay is effective when bond filed. Rule 73A.
Baker's own Answering Brief admits that 1708 was not a ~formal eviction, and
therefore, N1CRP 73A(a)(4) does not apply.
Exhibit 1 is the 12/22/11 email:
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From: SIerrazza, Pete |psIerrazzawashoecounty.usJ
Sent: Thursday, December 22, 2011 2:33 PM
To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com; cdbakerrichardhillaw.com
Cc: Stancil, Karen
Subject: RE: inventory continued
Dear Mr Coughlin:
The stay was denied. You will need to ask the District Court Ior a stay.
Pete SIerrazza
Sent: Thursday, December 22,201112:09 PM
To: SIerrazza, Pete; cdbakerrichardhillaw.com
Subject: inventory continued
Dear Judge SIerrazza and Mr. Baker,
Additionally some rare book are missing, Iamily photographs/keepsakes/heirlooms/media, I
believe the .~
.... hammer weighted action casio 88 key PX 330 is the model number, I believe, I will have
to check ....... Further, this is all moot at this point as I have Iiled a Supersedeas Bond oI $250,
and according to NRS 40.385, I automatically get a stay oI eviction and am entitled to return
to the property and continue in possession. The Statute sets the Supersedeas Bond (which
yields a stay) at $250 if rent is under $1000, unless the Court wishes to rule that I am a
commercial tenant. However, if the court does rule that I am a commercial tenant, the
No Cause Eviction Notice in this case, under NRS 40.253 makes a Summary Eviction
Proceeding impermissible, as Summary Eviction Proceedings are not allowed against
commercial tenants where only a No cause Eviction Notice is Iiled. Its one or the other, but
Mr. Hill and Baker cannot have it both ways. Further, the Courts Order oI December 21, 2011
is just that, and Order, its not an agreement, its not a settlement, etc, etc. and the audio record
clearly reIlects that.
NRS 40.385 Stay oI execution upon appeal; duty oI tenant who retains possession oI premises
to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal Irom an order entered pursuant to NRS 40.253:
1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay oI execution may be obtained
by Iiling with the trial court a bond in the amount oI $250 to cover the expected costs
on appeal. In an action concerning a lease oI commercial property or any other
property Ior which the monthly rent exceeds $1,000, the court may, upon its own
motion or that oI a party, and upon a showing oI good cause, order an additional bond to
be posted to cover the expected costs on appeal. A surety upon the bond submits to the
jurisdiction oI the appellate court and irrevocably appoints the clerk oI that court as the
surety's agent upon whom papers aIIecting the surety's liability upon the bond may be
served. Liability oI a surety may be enIorced, or the bond may be released, on motion in
the appellate court without independent action.
2. A tenant who retains possession oI the premises that are the subject oI the appeal
during the pendency oI the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided
in the underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes due. II the
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tenant Iails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new proceedings Ior a summary
eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253.
Sincerely, Zach Coughlin, Esq.
http://www.clarkcountycourts.us/CivilSHC/landlord-tenant-evictions/order-summary-
eviction.html
'Appeals Irom Orders Ior Summary Eviction
All tenants Iiling an appeal must post a bond oI at least $250. II you wish to stop the eviction
pending your appeal and are a tenant of a residential property whose monthly rent is
$1000 or less, this $250 is all you are required to pay.
II you are a tenant oI residential property whose monthly rent exceeds $1000 or a tenant oI a
commercial property you must post bond oI $250 but the court can, on its own or on the
motion oI the landlord, increase the bond. See NRS 40.385(1)
Page 3 oI the 'Landlord Tenant Handbook distributed on the this Court's website reads:
http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/viewdocumentsandIorms/Iunc-startdown/5158/
'Choosing Whether to File A Summary or ~Formal Eviction action
In most cases, the landlord can choose whether to Iile a summary or formal eviction
action. However, there are circumstances under which summary eviction cannot be used.
For instance, summary eviction is not available Ior:
2) Eviction of commercial tenants for other than nonpayment of rent
(See NRS 40.254)
3) Eviction oI a tenant oI a mobile home park Irom the park
(See NRS 40.253(10) and NRS Chapter 118B)
The benefits of summary eviction are:
the Iormal eviction process.
separate action);
heard by posting a bond with the court that may be cheaper than that required in the
Iormal eviction process.
' NRS40.253UnlawIul detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and
exclusion oI tenant for default in payment of rent.
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1.Except as otherwise provided in subsection 10, in addition to the remedy provided in
NRS 40.2512 and 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when the tenant oI any dwelling, apartment,
mobile home, recreational vehicle or commercial premises with periodic rent reserved by the
month or any shorter period is in deIault in payment oI the rent, the landlord or the landlord`s
agent, unless otherwise agreed in writing, may serve or have served a notice in writing,
requiring in the alternative the payment oI the rent or the surrender oI the premises:
~NRS40.254Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and
exclusion of tenant from certain types of property. Except as otherwise provided by
speciIic statute, in addition to the remedy provided in NRS 40.251 and in NRS 40.290 to
40.420, inclusive, when the tenant of a dwelling unit which is subject to the provisions of
chapter 118A of NRS, part of a low-rent housing program operated by a public housing
authority, a mobile home or a recreational vehicle is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer, the
landlord is entitled to the summary eviction...
What is easy to miss, is the Iact that, under Nevada law, proceeding against a
commercial tenant Ior other than non-payment oI rent (ie, breach, no cause, etc..) is not
available via a summary eviction proceeding. Hill and Baker simply did not understand that
and or were not aware oI it. It is easy to me, as one really must notice doing so is verboten by
realizing that a 'commercial tenancy is not amongst those listed in NRS 40.254 as
permissible to utilize the 'supplemental remedy oI summary eviction against where other
than the non-payment oI rent Iorms the basis Ior seeking to evict the tenant.
Baker simply did not care that Coughlin kept pleading that his was a commercial
tenancy, or that Coughlin, as early as his 10/17/11 Emergency Motion, set Iorth the law in
Nevada that a No Cause Summary Eviction is not allowable against a commercial tenant.
For all his exorbinant attorney's Iees, Baker simply did not realize how important, and how
jurisdictional that would be. Upon so realizing, Hill and Baker quickly decided to argue that
Coughlin's was not a commercial tenancy. Well, iI that is the case, then NRS 40.385
provides a mandatory stay oI the eviction upon Coughlin, whose rent was under the $1,000
jurisdictional limit, posting the statutorily set supersedeas bond oI $250, which he did, on
multiple occasions (initially, by virtue oI so movign Ior a stay, and Judge SIerrazza ruling that
the 'rent escrow deposit would satisIy Coughlin's 'bond on appeal (which could not have
meant just the 'appeal bond, as those are statutorily set at $250, and meant only to cover
potential court 'costs, and attorney's Iees are not considered 'costs in that context.
Additionally, the Iact that the tenant is required to continue paying rent during the pendency
oI the appeal, and may be subject to another summary eviction should they Iail to, makes
unavailing any argument Judge SIerrazza, the RJC, Hill or Baker may make that 'three times
the monthly rent, on top oI the continuing obligation to timely pay rent as it accrues, is
somehow a reasonable 'supersedeas bond, particularly when considering just what it is such
bonds are designed Ior, and the rationale underyling such.
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Partial Exhibit 2, Baker's Declaration:
'4. Attached hereto as EXHIBIT "I" is a true and correct (redacted) copy oIa billing "activity
report" generated by my oIIice showing work perIormed since November 3,2012 as part oImy
oIIice's representation oIDr. Merliss in connection with this matter. I have only redacted those
portions oI the billings which might reveal privileged inIormation (Le., attorney-client andlor
attorney work product) or charges which do not pertain to the instant matter. All charges
arising Irom the entries on the attached report were actually, reasonably and necessarily
incurred on behalIoImy client in this case. The data presented is, essentially, the billings sent
to the clients in a slightly modiIied Iormat.
a) The charges Ior my time prior to March 1, 2012 were all assessed at the rate oI $225.00 per
hour, which was my standard hourly rate at that time. The charges Ior my time beginning on
and aIter March 1, 2012 were all assessed at the rate oI $250.00 per hour, which is my
standard rate now. Upon investigation and experience, these rates are well within the range
oIIees charged by other attorneys in the community.
5. The total Iees incurred by Merliss in connection with this matter since November 3, 2012
are $42,065.50.
6. In accordance with the Iactors enunciated by the Nevada Supreme Court in Brunzellv.
Golden Gate Nat. Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d31 (1969) and as setIorth in NRPC 1.5, I
show the Court:
a) I have been practicing law in Nevada Ior over 6 years. My practice
emphasizes collections, real estate, real estate litigation, construction, construction deIect,
business, business litigation and general commercial law.
My current standard hourly rate is $250.00 per hour. Upon inquiry, I understand that rate to
be well within the range oI Iees charged by other attorneys with comparable qualiIications in
the community Ior similar services. The Iees charged were actually, reasonably and
necessarily incurred.
b) Most oI the work that was actually perIormed in connection with this
matter is itemized on EXHIBIT "1." ReIerence is made to the Declaration oI Richard G. Hill,
Esq., Iiled herewith, Ior a discussion oI work that was perIormed by him, but not billed to the
client. The entries on EXHIBIT "1II identiIied as "CB" were entered by me. The entries
identiIied as "RGH" were entered by Mr. Hill. The charges identiIied as "SLH" were entered
by my secretary, Sherri L. Hill. The entries on EXHIBIT "1" were made as the charges were
incurred. The billings show a total oI176.78 hours spent on this matter, each and every
instance oI which was necessary and reasonable under the circumstances.
In that regard, it is important Ior the court to understand that this case required
substantially more work than a "normal" eviction case would have or should have required.
All oI this work was necessitated solely due to the unpredictable, erratic, and abusive
behavior by the tenant, Mr. Coughlin, as described in the instant motion. As discussed by Mr.
Hill in his declaration, I, too, have not charge Dr. Merliss Ior a signiIicant amount oI time I
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have spent dealing with this matter, including time spent in consultation with Mr. Hill, and in
dealing with the property. The end result obtained Ior the client was a complete victory, both
in the underlying eviction and in this appeal. As a result, Dr. Merliss is now able to re-Iet his
property on River Rock
c) Mr. Hill has been practicing law in Nevada Ior over 33 years. His
practice, like mine, emphasizes collections, real estate, real estate litigation, construction,
construction deIect, business, business litigation and general commercial law. Mr. Hill has
spoken at real estate seminars in the legal community. He is Irequently consulted by other
attorneys in the legal community on collections, real estate, procedure, business, construction
and related issues. He maintains an extensive library on collections, construction, real estate
and real estate litigation issues, in addition to an extensive library on litigation and trial
issues....
Exhibit 1 to Baker's Declaration in Exhibit 3: Activity Reports
11/3/2011 ROH emails wi cdb; reviewing today's ravings by ZC 0.30 $11)~.00
111412011 ROB review 46 pages oI drivel Iaxed Irom RJC -look Ior disbility motion -none
Iound 0,40 $140.00
11/6/2011 CB Prepare Ior hearing re: deposit and inspection. 2.00 $450.00
11/7/11 ROB email to client multiple drivebys over the weekend 0.25 $87.50
11/712011 ROB to & Irom house -video #3 0040 $140.00
111712011 CB Attend hearing. 8:00 -10:00. Email to client. 2.00 $450;,,00
11/7/2011 ROB phone wi PI & setting up tomorrow; emails to & Irom client 0.33 $115.50
11/7/2011 CB Receive and review stack oI new motions. 0.50 $112.50
11/8/2011 ROB to & Irom & through the house; email to client 0040 $140.00
1118/2011 CB Receive and review tenant's opposition to memo oI costs. Telephone with
court (x2) 0.50 $112.50:
111812011 CB Telephone with client. 0.20 $45.00
111812011 CB Instructions to staII. Edit request Ior submission. 0.10 $22.51
1118/2011 CB To and Irom court to Iile request Ior submission. nlc. 0.30 $0.00
1119/2011 CB Receive and review a pile oInewly Iiled motions both RJC and DC-0.50
$112.50
1119/2011 CB Prepare correction oI misstatement oI law. nlc. 0.30 $0.00
1119/2011 CB Telephone Irom court. Prepare order. 0.30 $67.50
11/9/2011 CB To and Irom courthouse to deliver order and Iile correction. nlc. 0040 $0.00
1119/2011 CB Email Irom Coughlin. 0.10 $22.50
111912011 CB Telephone and emails with client. 0.20 $45.00
11/10/2011 CB DraIt and edit letter to Coughlin. 0.30 $61.50
11/10/2011 CB Emails Irom and to Coughlin. 0.20 $,45 :.t),)"
11/14/2011 ROB meet w/ client -to & Irom house; zach gets arrested 2.00 $700.00'
11114/2011 CB Telephone and texts with Merliss. 0.30 $67.50
11115/2011 ROB 11114 -phone w/ MM while at the gym . 0.25 $8750
11/1512011 ROB phone wi WCSD -memo to client -nlc 0.00 $0.00.
(Page 1)
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11115/2011 RGH meet wi contractor at river rock -secure the place; photos oI the basement
0.80 $280.00
11116/2011 RGH --phone w/ client 0.25 $87.50
11117/2011 RGH meet w/CDB lengthy email Irom and to ZC 0.66 $23L,~0 i~!l'
11117/2011 CB Meet with RGH 0.50 $112:~9
1111712011 CB Telephone (x2) with Reno Justice Court. Email to client. 0040 $90.00
11117/2011 CB Begin draIting motion Ior order to show cause. 0.20 $45.00
11/18/2011 CB Finalize motion Ior order to show cause. 0.60 $135.00
11118/2011 CB Prepare opposition to motion to release property. 1.00 $225.00
11118/2011 CB Continue preparing opposition to motion to contest personal property lien.
1.50 $337.50
11/19/2011 RGH 11/18 edit declaration -contempt 0040 $ 140.0Q
11119/2011 RGH 11118 -emails w/ ZC 0.25 $87.50
11120/2011 CB Prepare oppositions to motions to return property, waive transcript costs.
Multiple emails Irom Coughlin. 1.50 $337.50
1112112011 CB Finish preparing oppositions to various motions. 2.30 $517.50
11121/2011 RGH phone w/ insurance company 0.25 $87.50
1112112011 RGH to & Irom house -photos Ior hearing; interview 0.50 $175.00 witness
11/2112011 RGH haggling -phone & emails w/ zach 0.33 $ 115;9
11/2112011 RGH to & Irom house X2... nlc 0.00 $O.tJ~
1112112011 CB Prepare Ior hearing. To and Irom River Rock property to retrieve wallet and
client Iiles with RGH.2.00 $450.00
1112112011 CB Continue to prepare Ior hearing. Multiple emails Irom and to Coughlin.1.50
$337.50 Telephone with court.
11122/2011 CB Emails Irom Coughlin. 0.10 $22.50
11122/2011 CB To and Irom courthouse to review Iiles re: motion in Additional online Iile
review. 1.50 $337.50 appeal.
11122/2011 CB Telephone with client. 0.20 $45.00
1112512011 RGH huge emails w/ Zc.... numerous phone calls, he calls up pretending to be
somebody else ...last 4 days 1.50 $525.00
11128/2011 CB Multiple emails Irom Coughlin over Thanksgiving 0.50 $112.50 weekend.
11128/2011 CB Telephone to court re: redact 33#. Prepare notice oI 0.30 $0.00 redaction.
nlc.
11129/2011 CB Email Irom Coughlin. Review lease agreement. 0.20 $45.00 Email to client.
11130/2011 CB Email Irom Coughlin with attached motion. Email to 0.30 $67.:50 Coughlin.
11/30/2011 CB Telephone with insurance adjuster. Emails to and 0.40 $90.00 Irom client.
11130/2011 CB Telephone with court re: updated docket. 0.10 $22.50
11130/2011 CB Prepare opposition to group oI motions delivered on Thanksgiving.2.50
$562.5(}:
12/1/2011 CB Edit and Iinalize opposition to bundle oI motions, and declaration oI CDB in
support thereoI, and all exhibits 1.70 $382.5(}'.
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12/212011 CB Review statute. Letter to Coughlin. 0.50 $112.50
12/2/2011 CB Telephone Irom Phil Stewart. Email to Merliss. 0.40 $90.00,
1212/2011 CB To and Irom property to meet with insurance guy. No Show. 0.50 $112.50
12/2/2011 CB Revise letter to Zach. 0.20 $4$.00
12/512011 CB Multiple emails over the weekend Irom Coughlin and court. Order Irom court.
Email to client. 0.30 $67~~9
12/512011 CB To and Irom walkthrough with Farmers Insurance. Receive and review more
motions Irom Coughlin. Email to client. 1.00 $225.0Q
12/6/2011 CB Telephone Irom court. Fax Irom court. Email to client. Review lease and other
documents in preparation Ior hearing . .0,80 $180.00
12/7/2011 CB Assist in preparation oIexhibits and things to be produced to city attorney.0.70
$157.50 ,
12/8/2011 CB Email Irom Coughlin. 0.10 $22.5d
12/9/2011 CB Email and Iax Irom Coughlin. Prepare Ior hearing. Email to Coughlin. 1.50
$337.50
12/9/2011 CB Emails to and Irom client. - 0.40 $~}(XOO
12/13/2011 CB Multiple emails Irom and to client. 0.20 $45:i)9'
12/1312011 CB Telephone to Darlene Sharpe. 0.40 $9IQO, i.~" :'1:"/
12113/2011 CB Telephone with Phil Stewart (x2). 0.10 $12.5)
12/13/2011 CB To and Irom River Rock property to walk house. 0.60 $135.00
12/13/2011 CB Emails to and Irom client. 0.30 $67.50
12/13/2011 CB Telephone to Phil Stewart. Instructions to secure property.0.10 $22.50'
12/13/2011 CB Review CD to go to DA. Instructions Ior staII. 0,70 $157.50
12113/2011 CB Telephone with Farmer's Insurance (x2). 0.30 $67.50;
12/13/2011 CB Telephone with RPD. 0.30 $67.50
12/13/2011 CB Email Irom Coughlin with another emergency motion. 0.20 $45.00
12113/2011 CB Email to client. 0.20 $45.00
12114/2011 CB Meet with Phil Stewart. 0.20 $45.00
12/14/2011 CB Prepare letter to RPD re: recent break-in. Try to Iile online, To and Irom
police station.1.00 $225.00'
12/1412011 CB Email to Coughlin. Email to client. 0.10 $22.50~
12/1412011 CB Emails Irom and to Darlene Sharpe. 0.20 $45.00
12/1412011 CB Online research re: Coughlin's business license. Telephone with business
license oIIice. I 0.60 $135~00
12/14/2011 CB Email Irom Coughlin. 0.10 $".J2.S0I
12/15/2011 CB Multiple emails and huge Iax Irom Coughlin. 0.40 $90.00"
1211512011 CB Meet with Darlene Sharpe. 1.00 $225.00
12/1512011 CB Email Irom and to client. 0.10 $22.50'
12/15/2011 CB Emails with client. 0.10 $22.50
12/15/2011 CB Telephone with insurance adjuster. 0.10 $22.50
12/15/2011 CB To and Irom meeting with insurance adjuster. 1.00 $225.00'
12/15/2011 CB Multiple emails Irom and to Darlene Sharp. 0.60 $135.00'
12116/2011 CB Emails Irom Sharpe. 0.20 $45.00
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12/16/2011 CB Email to insurance adjuster. 0.10 $22.50
12/16/2011 CB Prepare opposition to second motion to contest personal property lien 1.10
$247.50.
12116/2011 CB Telephone (x2) with Phil Stewart. Email to client 0.10 $22.50
12/1812011 CB Prepare reply in support oI motion Ior order to show cause.1.00 $225.00
12/19/2011 CB Emails and Iaxes Irom Coughlin. Emails to and Irom client.0.30 $67.50
12119/2011 CB Edit and Imalize opposition to motion to contest personal property lien.1.10
$247.50
12/19/2011 CB Edit and Imalize reply in support oI motion Ior order to show cause 1.70
$382.50.
12119/2011 CB Finalize reply in support oImotion Ior order to show Prepare declaration oI
CDB. Prepare order to show cause. 0.60 $135.00
12/19/2011 CB Prepare Ior hearing, including preparation oI examinations oI RGH, Phil
Stewart, Darlene Sharpe. Includes some legal research. 4.00 $900.00
12/1912011 CB Prepare argument and examination oI Coughlin. 1.00 $225.00
12/20/2011 CB Final preparations Ior hearing. 1.50 $337.50
12/20/2011 CB Attend hearing on personal property lien. 9:30 -4:00. 6.50 $1,462.50
12/20/2011 CB Telephone with client. 0.10 $22.50
12/2112011 CB Receive and review order Irom court. Instructions to 0.10 $22,~,11. staII. -
12/22/2011 CB To and Irom property to video and open Ior Coughlin. Telephone with
contractor. 1.00 $225.00',
12/22/2011 CB Emails Irom Coughlin. Further research re: jurisdiction issues. Emails to
client. 1.00 $225.00;
12/23/2011 CB Email Irom Coughlin. Review supreme court Iorms and instructions re: stay.
0.30 $67.50'
12/23/2011 CB To and Irom property to open it up Ior Coughlin. 0.30 $67.50:
12/23/2011 SLH Drive by house on way back Irom post oIIice, about 0.00 $0.00 10:45 am.
Tum oII Mill, and see a couple oI people are walking across River Rock toward house,
carrying boxes. Zach walks out into street to greet them, then starts to head back toward the
house when he notices me. He stops in the middle oI the street and begins taping me with the
video camera. I try driving around him, but he moves so he is still blocking me. He gets out
his cellphone and starts photographing or taping me. I creep a bit closer (about 2' away), but
still he doesn't move. So I backed up, turned around, and headed back to the oIIice. There was
an empty V-Haul truck parked on Pine. |N/C|
12/23/2011 CB To and Irom the property Ior Imal walk through. 0.60 $135.00
12/27/2011 CB Multiple emails and Iaxes Irom Coughlin. 0.50 $112.50::
12/27/2011 CB More emails Irom Coughlin. 0.20 $45.00
12/28/2011 CB More emails and motions etc. Irom Coughlin. 0.50 $112.50: .. -......
12/29/2011 CB Emails Irom Judge SIerrazza. 0.10 $22.50
12/29/2011 CB Email to Coughlin. 0.10 $22.50
12/30/2011 CB Emails and another emergency motion Irom Coughlin. 0.50 $112.50
12/30/2011 CB Opposition to emergency motion Ior TRO. 3.60 $810.00
113/2012 CB Multiple emails Irom Coughlin over the holiday weekend.0.30 $67.50
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113/2012 CB Edit, revise, and Iinalize opposition to emergency motion Ior TRO. 2.50
$562.50 '
113/2012 CB Legal research in preparation Ior draIting motion to dismiss appeal. 0.50
$112:50
11612012 CB Appeal -Receive and review reply Irom Coughlin. Instructions to staII. 0.60
$135.0~ -
111112012 CB Receive and review order re: TRO. Meet with RGH Emails to and Irom
client. 0.50 $112.50
111112012 CB Instructions to staII. Receive and review new Iilings 0.20 $45.00 by Coughlin
in Iirst (premature) appeal, and lawsuit, and new TPO case against Coughlin . .
1112/2012 RGH to & Irom house -meet with contractor -major Iilming 0.66 $231.00
1112/2012 RGH to & Irom transIer station -zach acting up & hassling contractor 0.25 $8l50
111212012 RGH 3-5:30 morning -dealing with zach -transIer station with the cops; at the
house with zach & cops; RIC apply Ior and get TPO (2 trips); back to the house- deal with the
cops; video the house in morning and late aIternoon charge 2 hours 2.00 $700.QO
1113/2012 CB Email Irom Coughlin -supplemental reply to motion denied two days ago . . .
0.20 $45.QQ
1113/2012 CB To and Irom house Ior walkthrough. n/c. 0.40 $0.00:
111312012 CB Telephone Irom contractor. 0.10 $22.50,
1117/2012 CB Appeal -Prepare motion Ior order to show cause. 1.30 $292.50
111712012 CB Appeal -receive and review opposition to motion Ior attorney's Iees (??).0.20
$45.00
1117/2012 CB Appeal -edit and revise motion Ior order to show 0.30 $67.50 cause.
111812012 CB Appeal -revise motion Ior order to show cause. 0.20 $45.00:
111812012 CB Appeal-Prepare declarations oI RGH and Stewart in support oI motion Ior
OSC. Prepare proposed order.1.20 $270.00 .
1119/2012 CB Finalized motion Ior order to show cause and related declarations. 1.60
$360.00'
1120/2012 CB Meet with Phil Stewart re: motion Ior OSC. 0.20 $45.00'
1127/2012 CB Email Irom Coughlin. 0.10 $22.50'
1130/2012 CB Email to Coughlin. Email to client. 0.10 $22.50
1/30/2012 CB Email to Coughlin. 0.10 $22.50 .
113112012 CB Telephone Irom Darlene Sharpe. Email to client. 0.20 $45.00
113112012 CB Emails Irom Sharpe. Email Irom client. 0.10 $22.50
1/3112012 CB Receive and review new motion Irom Coughlin. Legal research and analyze
appropriate response to motion. ;;l1.50 $337,50
2/1/2012 CB Appeal -prepare opposition to motion to amend. 1.70 $382.5
212/2012 CB Appeal -edit opposition to motion to amend. 0.30 $67.50
2/212012 CB Receive and review notice to set. Review rules and statutes cited in notice
-none apply.0.20 $45.00
2/3/2012 CB Edit opposition to motion to amend. 0.10 $22.50
2/3/2012 CB Prepare opposition and motion to strike notice to set hearing. 0.50 $112.50
2/6/2012 CB Appeal-receive and review Coughlin's opening brieI. 0.30 $67.50
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21712012 CB Appeal -Receive and review second opening brieI. Begin draIting answering
brieI. 1.50 $337.50
21712012 CB Appeal -receive and review motion Ior extension oI time. Begin draIting
opposition and motion to strike. 1.00 $225.00
21712012 CB Email to client. 0.20
2/8/2012 CB Appeal -prepare opposition to motion Ior extension. 2.00 $450.00
2/8/2012 CB Telephone Irom court to set OSC hearing. Email to 0.20 $45.00 client.
2/912012 CB Appeal revise opposition to motion Ior extension. 0.50 $112.50
2110/2012 CB 20 page email Irom Coughlin. Email to client. 0.40 $90.0Q.
2116/2012 CB Appeal -Prepare answering brieI. LIO $247.50
211712012 CB Appeal-email Irom Coughlin. 0.10 $22.50
2/1712012 CB Appeal-legal research and continue to prepare answering brieI 3.00 $675.00.
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2/2112012 CB Continue to prepare answering brieI. 3.00 $675.0q
2/22/2012 CB Appeal -Continue to prepare Answering BrieI. Includes substantial review and
citation to enormous record on appeal, distillation and analysis oI Coughlin's barely-
articulated arguments, and additional legal research. 6.00 $1,350.00
2/22/2012 CB Appeal Receive and review supreme court deIiciency notice. Review relevant
NRAP 0.10 $22.59.
2/23/2012 CB Appeal-Continue to prepare answering brieI. Major editing to reduce to 5 page
limit.4.80 $1,080.00
2/23/2012 CB Appeal -additional editing oI Answering BrieI. 1.50 $337.50
2/23/2012 CB Prepare motion Ior leave to exceed page limit. 0.50 $Il2.50j
2/24/2012 CB Appeal -Finalize answering brieI. 4.10 $922.5Oi
2/2412012 CB Appeal -Finalize motion to exceed page limit. DraIt 0.30 $67.501 declaration
oI CDB.
2/24/2012 CB Appeal -Iinalize answering brieI. 0.50 $112.50
2127/2012 CB Appeal-draIt errata to answering brieI. nlc. 0.10 $0.00
2/27/2012 CB Email Irom Coughlin. 0.10 $22.50
2/27/2012 CB Receive and review deIiciency statement Irom court. 0.10 $22.50 Email to
client.
3/5/2012 CB Letter Irom Farmers. Emails to and Irom client. 0.10 $25.00
3/8/2012 CB Receive and review 47 page motion Irom Coughlin. 0.50 $125,00
3/8/2012 CB Receive and review second motion Irom Coughlin. 0.10 $25.0Q:;
3/8/2012 CB Receive and review order denying Coughlin's motion 0.10 $25.0t| to proceed
IFP on appeal.
3/2112012 CB asc -meet with Stewart. View video online. 1.50 $375.0();. Prepare Ior
hearing. "
3/22/2012 CB OSC -prepare Ior hearing, including testimony, 4.00 $1,OOO.OQ exhibits,
argument, and legal research.
3/23/2012 CB OSC Imal preparations Ior OSC hearing. 1.00 $250.00
3/2312012 CB Additional preparation Ior OSC hearing. 1.50 $375.00
3/23/2012 CB To and Irom courthouse Ior OSC hearing. 10:30 2.00 $500;00 12:30. ' Ol/t
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3/26/2012 CB Prepare Ior resumption oI OSC hearing. 1.00 $250'~9
3/26/2012 CB To and Irom court Ior continuation oI OSC hearing. 1.00 $250.00
3/27/2012 CB Email to Merliss. 0.10 $25.00
3/2712012 CB Telephone Irom client. 0.20 $50.0Q
4/212012 CB Prepare motion Ior Iees. 3.30 $825.0()
4/2/2012 CB Review memo oIcosts. 0.20 $50.0Q
4/31/2012 CB Legal research re: recoverable costs. Edit memo oI Continue to prepare
motion Ior Iees.2.00 $500.00 costs.
4/512012 CB Receive and review motion to alter or amend denial oI IFP. Review relevant
pleadings. Email to client 0.40 $100.00.
4/9/2012 CB Receive and review new Iilings (x3) Irom Coughlin. 0.50 $125.00
4/9/2012 CB Prepare reply to opposition to memo oI costs. 2.00 $500.00
4/10/2012 CB Prepare response to opposition to memo oI costs. 3.50 $875.00
4/11/2012 CB Edit and Imalize reply to opposition to memo oI 0.50 $125.0q: costs.
4111/2012 CB Edit and revise reply to opposition to memo oI costs. 0.50 $125.00
4/1212012 CB Edit, revise, and Imalize reply in support oI memo oI 3.00 $750.00 costs. ~.
4/1212012 CB Prepare opposition to motion to alter or amend denial 2.00 $500',9P oIIFP.
Wi'
4/13/2012 CB Prepare opposition to motion to alter or amend order 1.00 $250.00' denying
appeal.
4/16/2012 CB Finish opposition to to motion to alter or amend order 3.30 $825.00, aIIrrming
summary eviction order.
4/1712012 CB Continue to prepare motion Ior Iees. 3.20 $800.00'
4/1812012 CB Major edit and revision oImotion Ior Iees, including 4.00 $1,000.00; extensive
review oIIile and ROA
4/18/2012 CB Finalize opposition to motion to alter or amend order 0.30 $75.00 aIItrming
eviction.
4/1812012 CB Final edit and revision oI motion Ior Iees, including 1.80 $450.00 review and
citation to the ROA.
4/1812012 CB Prepare declartion oIRGH. 0.50 $125.00 4/19/2012 CB Finalize motion Ior
Iees. 1.00 $250.00,'
4/19/2012 CB Prepare declaration oICDB in support oI motion Ior Iees 0.80 $200.00
Exhibit 4: Declaration of Richard G. Hill, Esq. :
'6. In this case, Mr. Baker and I realized very quickly that Mr. Coughlin's behavior was
unpredictable and erratic, and that this was not going to be a "normal" summary eviction case.
From the very Iirst contact with him, it was clear that Coughlin intended to cause our client to
incur needless Iees and costs dealing with his Iabrications and lack oI ethics. Since Coughlin
had no clients, it was clear he intended to make this matter the Iocus oI his daily activities. It
was also clear that he suIIered Irom proIound emotional and mental problems that maniIested
themselves in aggressive and calculated reckless behavior.
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7. As a result, I spent more time than I normally would have on this case, both in consulting
with Mr. Baker, and in editing his work; and in dealing with and monitoring Mr. Coughlin.
8. In Iact, in this case, I reviewed, at least once, nearly every paper Mr. Baker prepared
before it was filed. That is not the normal protocol in our oIIice, but was due solely to Mr.
Coughlin's behavior in this litigation, and the Iact that his behavior was unreasonably driving
the Iees in this case at an alarming rate, as described in the instant motion.
9. Out of compassion Ior Dr. Merliss, I did not charge him Ior the bulk oI the vast amount oI
my time spent in consultation with Mr. Baker, and in editing his work product. Nor did I
charge Ior most oI the time I spent dealing with Mr. Coughlin, the property in question, or my
countless interactions with the police and prosecutors as a result oI Coughlin's antics,
including stalking me and my staff. In addition, I felt an enormous amount of professional
embarrassment, that a member oI the Nevada Bar could so readily and recklessly abuse the
processes oI our courts solely Ior the satisIaction oI inIlicting harm on others. The fees
requested are far below the amount of time, energy and focus provided by me and my staff
on this matter.
10. I declare under penalty oI perjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct
Coughlin did attempt to bring counterclaim's or other such set-oIIs incident to the
matter in 1708, having the WCSO service and Iile AIIidavits oI Service (make sure they Iiled
them, actually) on NV Energy, Dickson Realty, Realtor Darlene Sharpe, Richard G. Hill,
Esq., Green action Lawn Service and its owner Nery Macal Cruz, etc. Judge SIerrazza
appears to have exceeded his jurisdiction in reIusing to allow Coughlin to bring such claims
even where such were necessary parties or Couglhin's claims were not appropriately severed
Irom the matter.
655. Generally West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and
Tenant k223(1), 223(2) The principles which control a deIendant's right to assert a demand by
way oI counterclaim, recoupment, or setoII determine the right oI a tenant to assert a
particular demand by way oI counterclaim, recoupment, or setoII in an action brought against
him or her Ior rent; a tenant is entitled to set oII a debt owing to him or her by the landlord
against the landlord's claim Ior rent.|FN1| In some jurisdictions, a tenant may, in an action Ior
rent, recoup damages arising Irom a breach by the landlord oI his or her agreements contained
in the lease.|FN2| The tenant can elect to assert a claim Ior damages caused by the landlord's
breach oI covenant, either by interposing a counterclaim Ior, or demand Ior recoupment oI,
such damages in the landlord's action Ior the rent, or by bringing a separate action against the
landlord Ior the damages.|FN3| A provision in a lease prohibiting counterclaims in a
summary proceeding Ior nonpayment oI rent is valid, and a counterclaim interposed in
violation oI such a provision will be dismissed without prejudice to the tenants' right to bring
an independent action based on such a counterclaim, but this principle does not apply to a
counterclaim based upon breach oI the warranty oI habitability.|FN4| However, lease clauses
prohibiting a tenant Irom initiating a counterclaim when the landlord Iiled an action Ior the
nonpayment oI rent have been held unenIorceable where the clause conIlicts with a rule oI
civil procedure stating that compulsory counterclaims must be pled iI they arise out oI the
same transaction or occurrence|FN5| or on the basis oI equity where the counterclaims are
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intertwined with the landlord's claim.|FN6| |FN1| RREEF Mid-America Fund III v.
Distronics Corp., 652 F. Supp. 1490, 22 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1655 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (security
deposit); La Casa Nino, Inc. v. Plaza Esteban, 762 P.2d 669 (Colo. 1988) (entry premium);
Cubbon v. Locker, 5 Ohio App. 3d 200, 450 N.E.2d 697 (6th Dist. Lucas County 1982)
(abrogated on other grounds by, Dennis v. Morgan, 89 Ohio St. 3d 417, 2000-Ohio-211, 732
N.E.2d 391 (2000)) (damage deposit); Marlow v. Medlin, 558 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App.
Waco 1977). In an action Ior possession based upon nonpayment oI the rent or in an action
Ior rent when the tenant is in possession, the tenant may |counterclaim| Ior any amount he
may recover under the rental agreement or the UniIorm Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.
UniI. Residential Landlord and Tenant Act 4.105(a). In a proceeding to collect rent arrears
Irom the estate oI a loIt tenant, the estate was entitled to an oIIset Ior the value oI the tenant's
improvements which were sold. Moskowitz v. Jorden, 27 A.D.3d 305, 812 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1st
Dep't 2006), leave to appeal dismissed (N.Y. July 5, 2006). A landlord under a nursing home
lease, by reletting the premises, mitigated its damages and the original lessee was thereIore
entitled to a setoII thereIor, even though the landlord and subsequent lessee were owned by
same individual, with the alleged eIIect that no rental payments Irom the subsequent lessee
were actually realized. Boonville Convalescent Center, Inc. v. CloverleaI Healthcare Services,
Inc., 834 N.E.2d 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), transIer denied, (Mar. 16, 2006). |FN2| Reed v.
U.S. Postal Service, 660 F. Supp. 178 (D. Mass. 1987) (applying Massachusetts law); Paul v.
Camden Motor Co., 221 Ark. 702, 255 S.W.2d 418 (1953); Seidenberg v. Burka, 106 A.2d
499 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1954); Overstreet v. Rhodes, 93 Ga. App. 422, 91 S.E.2d 863
(1956), judgment rev'd on other grounds, 212 Ga. 521, 93 S.E.2d 715 (1956); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Maple Road Realty Co., 123 Ind. App. 355, 109 N.E.2d 440 (1952) (holding
that a tenant had not sustained the burden oI prooI oI the landlord's Iailure to repair); Perry
Properties v. Servico Protective Covers, Inc., 59 A.D.2d 1014, 399 N.Y.S.2d 744 (4th Dep't
1977); John Meckes & Sons Co. v. American Meat Co., 96 Ohio App. 17, 54 Ohio Op. 153,
117 N.E.2d 191 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1954). In a landlord's summary proceeding Ior
nonpayment oI rent, a tenant's counterclaim based on breach oI warranty oI habitability would
be permitted, though not in excess oI the amount sued Ior by the landlord, since a statute
established such a warranty in every lease and any provision waiving said beneIit was void as
against public policy. Cosmopolitan Associates v. Ortega, 90 Misc. 2d 437, 395 N.Y.S.2d 358
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1977). |FN3| Missionary Sisters oI the Sacred Heart v. Meer, 131 A.D.2d
393, 517 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1st Dep't 1987). The compulsory counterclaim rule did not apply to
an action Iiled in an associate circuit court, and thus, a tenant could make a claim Ior damages
Ior the breach oI lease in a separate action brought aIter judgment was entered Ior the landlord
in an action Ior rent. Becker Glove Intern., Inc. v. Jack Dubinsky & Sons, 41 S.W.3d 885
(Mo. 2001). |FN4| Cosmopolitan Associates v. Ortega, 90 Misc. 2d 437, 395 N.Y.S.2d 358
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1977). |FN5| Musca Properties, L.L.C. v. DeLallo Fine Italian Foods,
Inc., 2004-Ohio-1193, 2005 WL 628515 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 2005).
|FN6| 610 W. 142nd St. Owners Corp. v. Braxton, 137 Misc. 2d 567, 521 N.Y.S.2d 370
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1987), order aII'd as modiIied on other grounds, 140 Misc. 2d 826, 535
N.Y.S.2d 870 (App. Term 1988).
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te court Irom releasing the deposited Iunds to Merliss or his counsel prior to or aIter any
appeal is perIected, or from increasing the amount of any security to be posted by
Coughlin for any reason, or both, either upon its own motion or upon motion by Merliss. \
IT IS SO ORDERED."
The Standard Rental Agreement entered into between landlord Merliss and co-
tenants Coughlin and Ulloa on or about February 20
th
, 2010, read as Iollows:
"STANDARD RENTAL AGREEMENT
Meadowood West
This AGREEMENT entered into on the 20
th
day oI February, 2010 between hereinaIter
reIerred to Management, and Melissa Ulloa and Zach Coughlin, hereinaIter reIerred to as
Tenant, which parties hereby agree to as Iollows:
1. SUMMARY oI initial rents charges and deposits
RECEIVED AND PAYABLE PRIOR TO OCCUPANY:
Total rent Ior the period oI March 1, 2010 to February 28, 2011: $900.00
Last months rent: blank
Cleaning Iee: $200.00
Security Deposit: (see Section 6) $500.00
Key and Re-key Deposit: blank
Other: blank
Total: $1,600
2. TERMS: Management does hereby rent to Tenants and Tenant hereby rents Irom
management Ior residential purposes only those certain premises described at: 121 River
Rock St., Reno, NV 89503, located at: 121 River Rock St., Reno, NV 89503 for a period of
not less than 12 months tenancy, commencing on the 1
st
day oI March, 2010 Ior a total
amount oI $10,800.00 at a monthly rate oI $900 payable in advance on the 1st day oI each
and every month. Payments will be accepted at 11791 Ridge Rim Road, Chico, CA 95928,
during normal business hours unless otherwise agree to. Make all checks payable to Matthew
Merliss (Merliss initialed here) and PLEASE MAIL.
agreed to will remain in eIIect on a monthly basis aIter the initial term. A 30 day written
notice to vacate must be issued by the resident prior to vacating anytime during or aIter the
initial term oI this agreement. II improper notice or no notice to vacate is given by resident,
resident is liable Ior prorated rent until lawIul termination and Management may deduct this
Irom the Security Deposit on hand, or collect any money due by other lawIul means.
4. CLEANING: Upon vacating Tenant, at Tenant's expense, shall have the carpet
cleaned. Tenant will vacate home in the same condition or better than when initially
occupied. This includes, but is not limited to, the interior, the exterior, all coverings , walls,
ceilings, windows, baseboards, window coverings, appliances, Iixtures, driveways, parking
areas, etc.
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5. SECURITY DEPOSIT: THE SECURITY DEPOSIT HELD BY THE OWNER,
WILL SECURE THE PERFORMANCE ON TENANT'S OBLIGATIONS. OWNER
SHALL APPLY ALL PORTIONS OF SAID DEPOSIT ON ACCOUNT OF TENANT'S
OBLIGATIONS. ANY BALANCE REMAINING UPON TERMINATION WILL BE
RETURNED TO TENANT.
6. KEY & RE-KEY DEPOSIT: n/a The above state Key and re-key Deposit
shall be reIunded in accordance with law iI all keys consisting oI door key(s), mail
box key(s), laundry room key(s), pools and tennis court key(s), other key(s)
are returned the day premises are vacated.
7. COLLECTION: II resident owes more money than has been held in his account
the Management aIter issuing a proper itemized statement noting amount owed may pursue
as his option any legal means oI collection.
8. RENT PAYMENTS: Rent payments are legally the responsibility oI the resident
without notice or demand and may be acted upon anytime aIter the due date stated above.
Payments oI rent beIore the due date will be gladly accepted with a discount (iI agreed to
by the Management and initiated by same ).
9. PENALITIES: Rent payments made aIter the 5
th
day oI the month will be subject to
a penalty oI $5.00 plus $3.00 per day. resident shall pay at a daily rate oI $n/a Ior each
partial payment oI rent. resident shall pay $50.00 Ior any dishonored bank check made to
management. Acceptance oI a check in no way grants the resident credit should there by
insuIIicient Iunds in the account.
10. SUBLEASING: resident may not assign, sublet, or transIer his interest, no any
part thereoI without prior written consent oI management, which will not be unreasonably
withheld. resident further may use the premises for any commercial enterprise, but not
for any purpose which unlawful.
11. OCCUPANCY: Occupancy oI the premises is limited to 2 adults 2 Children, and
shall be used Ior a resid ence and for other purposes . resident does not agree to pay $
per day Ior each guest remaining on the premises Ior more than days.
12. MULTIPLE OCCUPANCY: It is expressly understood that this agreement is
between the owner and each signatory jointly. Each signatory will be responsible Ior timely
payment oI rent and perIormance oI all other provisions oI this Agreement.
PAGE 1 oI 3
signed by Merliss 2-14-10, not signed or initialed by either Ulloa or Coughlin
13. UTILITIES: resident agrees to pay Ior the Iollowing utilities: Gas x Electricity x
Oil, Light x, Heat x, Energy x, Other, resident's responsibility Ior these begins at
the commencement oI this agreement. See attached transIer oI account Addendum (note:
there is/was no such TransIer oI Account Addendum attached to the Lease Agreement).
Utilities not payable by the resident will be paid by the Management.
14 PETS: resident agrees that an animal, bird, pet or oI any kind may be kept in, on or
about the premises by the resident or his Guests without prior separate agreement signed by
Management.
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15. WATERBEDS, ETC.: resident shall not keep in or about said premises
waterbeds, boats, camper, trailers, mobile homes or on-operative vehicles without separate
written agreement signed by Management.
16. ALTERATIONS: resident shall make no alterations or do any painting to the
property without Managements approval and all alterations shall remain.
17. BREACH OF CONTRACT: Failure oI resident to pay rent or other charges
promptly when due or to comply with any other terms or conditions hereto or to comply with
any applicable provisions oI the law oI the State oI Nevada, shall at the option oI the
Management empower them to terminate this tenancy upon giving proper notice as set Iorth
in the residential Landlord and Tenant act contained in the Nevada Revised Statues.
18. WAIVER OF TERMS: Any Iailure by Management aIter any deIault shall not be
construed to waive any right oI management AIIect any notice or legal action theretoIore
given or commend.
19 WAIVER OF RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS: Nothing containea in this
agreement shall be construea as waiving any of the resid ents or managements right or
obligations unaer the laws of the State of Nevaaa.
20 TERMINATION: This Agreement and the tenancy hereby granted may be
terminated by either party within 30 days oI the deIined termination date (reIer to Paragraph
2), or any time thereaIter by giving the other party not less than thirty (30)day prior notice in
9 Ior monetary liabilities).
21 OWNER: The principal or corporate owner(s) oI the lease premises is (are):
Matthew Merliss. (note: Merliss initialed here)
22 MAINTENANCE, REPAIRS, OR ALTERATIONS: Tenant acknowledges that
they premises are in good order and repair, unless otherwise indicated. Tenant will as his/her
own expense, maintain the premises in a clean sanitary manner including all equipment,
appliances, smoke detectors, plumbing, heating and air conditioning and will surrender the
same at termination in as good condition as received normal wear and tear excepted. Tenant
will not paint paper or otherwise redecorate or make alterations to the premises without the
prior written consent oI the Owner. All three prong outlets shall comply with all applicable
codes with respect to electrical grounding. Tenant will irrigate and maintain any
surrounding grounds, including laws and shrubbery, if they are for the tenant's
exclusive use. Tenant will not permit any waste upon the premises or any nuisance or act
which may disturb the quiet enjoyment oI any tenant in the building. Owner will be
responsible for the cost of any retrofitting required by governmental agencies.
any other cause which renders the premises untenantable, either party will have the
right to terminated this Agreement as the date on which the damage occurs. Written notice oI
termination will be give to the other party within IiIteen (15) days aIter occurrence oI such
damage. Should such damage or destruction occur as the result oI negligence oI Tenant, or
his/her invitee, then only the Owner will have the right to terminate. Should this right be
exercised by her Owner or Tenant, the rent in the current month will be prorated
between the parties as of the date the damage occurred. Any prepaid rent and unused
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security deposit will be reIunded to Tenant. If this Agreement is not terminated, then
Owner will promptly repair the premises and there will be a proportionate reduction of
rent until the premises are repaired and ready for Tenant's occupancy. The
proportionate reduction will be based on the extent which repairs interIere with Tenant's
reasonable oI the premises.
24. POLICIES: resident agrees to abide by any and all rules and policies including,
but not limited to, rules with respect to noise, odors, disposal oI reIuse, pets, parking and use
oI common areas. Further, resident does not agree to abide by all amendments and additions
to these rules aIter due notice oI any such amendments or additions. resident at the time oI
execution oI this Agreement acknowledges that he has notice oI all existing rules and
regulation pertaining to the Premises (resident initials (note MU/ZC handwritten here).
25. INSPECTION: resident agrees to grant management the right to enter the premise
Management agrees to give resident twice the twenty (24) hour notiIication requirement
Ior entry.
26. AMENITIES: Use oI washing machines or other equipment, in any, are Iurnished
by management Ior the pleasure and convenience oI resident and are to be construed in a
manner as as a part oI the rent paid by the resident. The swimming pool, recreational and
other service Iacilities, iI any, in the premises are Ior the use oI the resident only, at the
discretion oI Management. Nothing
PAGE 2 OF 3
NOTE: Signed at the bottom oI the page by Merliss only, dated 2-14-10
ADDRESS 121 River Rock, Reno, NV 89503
herein shall be construed to require management, during the term oI the Agreement to keep
said swimming pool and other Iacilities in a condition Ior use by resident, and the time oI
manner oI use, or the closing, temporarily or permanently oI said pool and Iacilities shall be at
the sole discretion oI management and in accordance with rules and regulations issued by
management. Any breach oI said rules and regulations shall constitute a breach hereto.
27. VEHICLES: All vehicles operated by resident must be registered with the
management. Only vehicles maintained and properly license may be parked in approved
areas. Unauthorized vehicles my be towed by management at owners epxense upon on a
week's notice. resident may park no more than 3 vehicles on the premise at any one time.
There is one designated parking spot. Other cars can be parked where allowed.
28. LIABILITY: management shall not be liable Ior any damage or injury to resident
management, his agent, or employee, but resident will not agree to hold management
resident or his guests.
29. INVENTORY: A written inventory oI the premise and is contents will be
attached Ior your inspection. Please review it careIully and sign both your copy and the
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oIIices copy within two weeks. You will be responsible Ior conditions oI the premises when
vacating in accordance with the attached. (resident's initials: MU/ZC) acknowledge receipt
oI inventory by resident.
30. TENANCY TERMINATION:. Upon termination oI the tenancy, the resident
shall surrender and vacate the premises, including the removal oI an and all oI the resident's
property. BeIore Departure, the resident shall return keys and personal property listed on the
inventory to the owner in good clean and sanitary condition, normal wear accepted. resident
shall allow Management to inspect the premises in the resident's presence to veriIy the
condition oI premises and contents.
31. TAXES: In accordance with the Nevada Revised States, as a resident oI rental
property, you are entitled to know what portion oI your rent goes Ior real estate taxes. The
Iollowing is a breakdown Ior your inIormation:
TAX ALLOCATIONS $174.86 OTHER THAN TAXES $ TOTAL MONTHLY
RENT $
32. INSURANCE: It is agreed that TENANT may obtain RENTERS INSURANCE
AS LANDLORDS or his Agent's insurance supplements cover of TENANT'S Property.
severally. The undersigned have read the above contract and understand and agree to all the
provisions thereoI and Iurther acknowledge that they have received a copy oI said contract.
34 NOTE: the above paragraph Headings are Ior reIerence only and do not add to or
diminish the intended meaning oI any paragraph.
35. ADDITIONAL TERMS & CONDITIONS
resident Signatures dated 2/21/10 Melissa Ulloa and Zach Coughlin
Owner signature Matt Merliss 2-24-10
PAGE 3 OF 3 ADDRESS 121 River Rock, Reno, NV 89503 Inventory, 121 River Rock
Reno, NV 89503 residents Melissa Ulloa and Zach Coughlin acknowledge that the Iollowing
items are apart oI the inventory at 121 River Rock, Reno~ NV 89503. The items will not be
removed and stay will stay the property upon vacating Stack able washer and dryer,
reIrigerator, gas range oven, water-heater, Iurnace. blinds (window coverings) and all other
items that are attached to
walls or Iloors or ceilings. residents: Melissa Ulloa and Zach Coughlin acknowledge this
inventory" list by initialing page 3 item 29 Signed by Merliss 2.24.10" (emphasis added).
Did Notices oI 8/22/11 become stale? From 1492? Baker violated courthouse
sanctuary rule and attorney litigant immunity rules as to service oI process where purportedly
serving Couglhin the notices (including the 5 Day UnlawIul Detainer Notices) in the
courtroom, during the 9/27/11 Hearing (either in 1492 or 1708, and iI in 1492, then perhaps
inoperative in 1708 or withdraw?). For the $18K Baker sought in attorney's Iees at the trial
court level Ior a summary eviction proceeaing, certainly, Baker ought be required to provide
representation as to some oI the Iiner details such as: wcll 3/27/13 notes..
What was the downside Ior the landlord in aborting the non-payment eviction
originally pursued in 1492 Iollowing the hearing oI (was the only other hearing on 9/27/11?).
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While Baker was so keen (and dishonest) to get the Iollowing language into an Order,
ironically, his doing so undermines his arguments Ior Iees: '10. The court finds that
Coughlin failed to present any evidence
As to pleading a commercial tenancy and arguing that the use oI a summary eviction
proceeding where the non-payment oI rent was not a basis Ior pursuing such summary action,
the 10/13/11 Emergency Ex Parte Motion by Coughlin (that Baker responded to, so, clearly it
was not Ex Parte) reads, at page 6:5-20:
'It seemed as though, in Court today, Tenant/Coughlin/Counterclaimaint/Crossclaimant was
either barred Irom asserting the counter and cross claims and adding oI third parties or real
parties in interest, or interpleading. However, the authority directly above, in West, seems to
clearly contemplate doing so, even in an 'unlawIul detainer action, and thus the claim that
the 'summary nature oI the proceeding somehow prevents Coughlin Irom asserting him
rights to make counterclaims, crossclaims, interplead third parties or real parties in interest,
seems to be counter to existing authority. Admittedly, this is all pretty darn conIusing. At
least the warp speed Summary Eviction process does not involve something extremely
primal and integral, like the roof over one's head or the office one uses to make a living
and thereIore does not require the plenary status accorded to such important matters as a
business dispute over, say, some widgets. Oh, wait, the Summary Eviction process does
involve the rooI over one's head ana the office they use to make a living .
Page 28 thereoI goes on to cite to: ' residential and commercial Landlord-Tenant
Practice In Massachusetts, App. 2, at |section| 37 (Catherine F. Downing ed., 2001 & Supps.
2004, 2006); see also PaIumi v. Halgas, No. 06-SP-0844 (Hous. Ct. Dep't Order Mar. 24,
2006) (allowing tenant to bring counterclaim in Iault eviction, even though practice not
recognized by statute).
Additionally, Couglin incorporated by reIerence into 1708 his Iilings in the associated
previous matter 1492, where in the 9/6/11 Tenant's Answer in Opposition to Summary
Eviction Motion Ior Sanctions, it reads:
'Landlord has violated NRS 118A.290 in his Iailure to repair, well aIter 14 days oI written
notice, items such as a broken Iront bedroom window (complete with jagged exposed
edges oI glass), Iallen insulation that has appeared to resulted in the creation oI potentially
toxis mold when it came in contact with the ground below, which lacked a vapor shield, a
toilet with a deIective was ring, the Iront stairs to Tenant's home/oIIice came to a state oI
disrepair, replete with crumbling risers that presented a saIety hazard and liability issues.
Landlord agreed to a signiIicant rent deduction in exchange Ior arranging to have the work
done and paying Ior the work itselI, yet now Landlord seems to have Iorgotten these
written correspondences, etc. Landlord agreed to a variety oI rent deductions, including
those related to the crumbling concrete steps at the entry door to the house. At least
$1,000 is to be deducted Irom any rent owed and counsel Iiled pleading which completely
ignored the Iact that Landlord agreed to such a deduction. Similar deductions oI at least
$... are due Ior disposal repair and other matters. Basic inquiry would have revealed to
Landlord's counsel and Landlord himselI that Landlord clearly agreed in writing to a $350
deduction Ior seasonal weeding/yardwork, and another $350 is owed in rent deductions Ior
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the prior seasons weeding/yardwork as well (all requisite notice was provided in writing)
57 Am. Jur. ProoI oI Facts 3d 127, commercial Tenant's Remedies Where Landlord Fails
to Keep Premises in Condition Fit or Suitable Ior commercial Use. Page 4:10-20.
Further, Baker's overstating, by Iar, an alleged rent owed vitiates the viability oI the
'eviction notices that he purports served to 'terminate the lease, which Baker, in other
Iilings and in the proposed Order oI 10/27/11, alternately describes as having terminated upon
the exipiration oI 12 months Irom the start date, which is not what the lease provides.
Vidiaki, 33 A. 3d 848 (Iirst notice terminated lease, so no subject matter jurisdiction); Bogatz,
687 NYS 2d 558. 379 SE 2d 649 (notice was ineIIective to serve as a predicate to terminating
commercial lease where it demanded substantially more than rent actually owed). Lack oI
candor to tribunal and Iairness to opposing counsel. See, also, 81 So 3d 780 or 789 or 784.
ARE-100, 550 SE 2d 21, 267 P. 1109, Pinzon 874 A. 2d 247 (non-pay, set-oII, commercial,
term expired), 603 NYS 2d 990; allegation oI lack oI a business license Ior law oIIice or
expired one Ior mattress business not dispositive oI whether a commercial tenancy, Gram
751 NYS 2d 667; 921 NYS 2d 781, 334 NYS 2d 930,
Aikin like Davidsohn (108 Nev 145, 825 P.2d 1227, 185 p 1067, 553 NYS 2d 983, Island
Property, LLC, 2002 NYS Slip Op 40540(0).
Further, Coughlin served a Iiling ready sanctions motion on Hill and Baker on
11/21/11 (even Iurther reIuting Baker's allegation in his 12/19/11 Iiling that Coughlin only
raised or pled his commercial tenancy as barring the use oI a no cause summary eviction,
where, at pages 2 and 3: 'Dear Mr. Hill, I only conIirmed the receipt oI three emails Irom
your email as listed on the www.nvbar.org website: rhillrichardhillaw.com, two Irom
November 17, 2011(one Irom 6:51 am which purpors to "paste below" some email you allege
you sent me "day beIore", on November 16, 2011- and one Irom 2:15 pm and one Irom
August 16, 2011). Your email oI November 19, 2011 is incorrect to the extent is purports that
I have in any way 'admitted to receiving any emails Irom our rhillrichardhilllaw.com
email account at anytime between August 17, 2011 through November 17, 2011. To be clear,
I did not receive any email Irom rhillrichardhillaw.com on November 16, 2011, that is to
say, such an email is simply not in my inbox, never was in my inbox etc. I hope you
understand, I am not saying I know whether you such an email on that date or not. For all I
know, you very well may have. What I am indicating, here, in writing, is that my
zachcoughlinhotmail.com account did not receive any emails Irom your email address
between August 17, 2011 and November 17, 2011. I think you will Iind any emails you sent
to zachcoughlinhotmail.com during that period Io time were returned to you as
undeliverable. Perhaps, an analogy would be helpIul. Sometimes, you send a letter through
the United States Postal Service to an address, and you get the letter back with a yellow
sticker that says "returned to sender" or "undeliverable" or "no longer at this address"...email
is similar. II your rhillrichardhillaw.com was added to a "blocked sender" list within, say, a
MSN Hotmail account, then any emails you sent to that account Irom the address that was
added to the blocked list, would simply not make it through to the MSN Hotmail account that
had added your rhillrichardhillaw.com email address to the list oI blocked senders....Maybe
Mr. Baker can help you grasp this, but I think it inappropriate to waste judicial resources and
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your client's money and peace oI mind arguing about it and litigating the point. There are
other avenues oI argument that would make more sense Ior you to pursue. You may want to
ask me or OIIicer Carter iI he sounded all that serious when he commented to me, that you,
Richard Hill pay him a lot oI money to arrest who you say to and to do what you say to.
Maybe RPD OIIicer Carter would say that he was being sarcastic, you would just have to ask
him. Now, it wouldn't be very smart Ior him to deny that he said these things, given that there
are various scenarios under which it may have been committed to tape, and 'tape don't lie.
However, Iocusing on establishing whether or not what RPD OIIicer Carter said was, in Iact,
said seriously or not and the context in which it was communicated would likely be a much
more prudent approach Ior you to take rather than trotting out the ol' 'hey, I Iound a crack
pipe and a bag oI weed smear meme, particularly where the implication actually only makes
your oIIices Memorandum oI Fees and Costs seem all the more ridiculous. I can see it now:
'really? You are alleging the opposing party/attorney had crack pipes and bags oI weed laying
around his oIIice, AND IT STILL TOOK YOU GUYS $20K WORTH OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES TO GET AN IMMINENTLY VACATABLE, VOIDABLE, AMENDABLE, AND
APPEALABLE SUMMARY EVICTION ORDER? Do you really want to have to oIIer
mincing attempts to explain how those those circumstances may be able to co-exist.
Regardless, absent some wonderIully improbable convergence oI unlikely events, like an
intruder breaking into my home oIIice and actual leaving their crack pipe and bag oI weed,
and depending upon where you or your henchmen say this 'crack pipe and bag oI weed was
Iound at the home law oIIice (let me guess, you are going to say it was on the exquisite wood
inlay coIIee table in the Ioyer, right, next to the 62 inch DLP HDTV,? Or perhaps right next
to the dual 32 inch lcd computer monitor displays at the attorney's desk? Because we all know
nothing says 'crack pipe and a bag oI weed like high end electronics and Iine Iurniture.
Now, lest you wish to question my IFP statuts, rest assured, you wouldn't believe what one
can get Irom the 'Iree stuII section on Craigslist, knowing how to use a soldering iron and
multimeter, to repair the electronics our disposal culture determines not worth the trouble to
Iix, and regularly popping in to Goodwill stores during the 'spring cleaning seasons when
rich people like you make room Ior their next vintage Porsche. And quit acting like all my
stuII is 'junk, Rich. I know you with your vintage Porsche Ietish have your eyes on my
collection oI vintage leather power seats in the basement, including the black and silver 1991
BMW 735iL seats, hands oII, they are mine. Quit all your nonsense about calling my property
junk. Further, who are you demand a blueprint oI the means and manner anyone intends to
use to remove their property Irom your client's rental? Where in NRS 40.460 does it allow
you to turn into some overgrown hall monitor, insisting upon the younger tenant attorney
showing you prooI oI a U-Haul, or a written declaration oI the manpower he intends to use to
remove his property. Further, you allege you hired a 'contractor (note to Rich, typically,
'contractors don't talk trash to the opposing attorney, as your's did, calling Coughlin an 'ex-
attorney when Coughlin saw them traipsing through his home law oIIice). You need to
provide me with access to the property so I can remove my property. There is nothing in the
law that allows you to attempt to brew up some more attorney's Iees and 'rental charges at
the property at Iull market value, ie, the same rate Ior which rent was being charged $900,
rather than complying with NRS 40.460 and NRS 40.520. I implore you to realize this case
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will be beIore the Nevada Supreme Court someday, not on your backyard H.O.R.S.E hoop.
And the way you are playing, coach gon' have ta put cha on the bench early in the second
quarter with 3 Iouls, then you gonna pick up another right aIter halItime, and Baker is going
to have to sub in Ior you.
Baker's complicity in Iorcing Coughlin to deposit 118A.355(5) escrow amounted to a
withdraw oI his 'no cause notice or any termination notice, to whatever extent there was any
such eIIective notice..
Paul, 1 Nev 70, 76.
An appealable issue or instance oI clear error on Judge SIerrazza and Flanagan's part
occurred where, despite the landlord pleading only a No Cause basis (lapse oI time, alleged
termination oI the lease) basis Ior evicting Coughlin, SIerrazza, incident to Coughlin alleging
amongst various deIenses, the deIense oI retaliation, required Coughlin to deposit escrow
(with an insuIIicient set-oII under NRS 118A.360 that did not account Ior the unopposed
allegation oI $500 set-oII/Iix and deduct incident to the moldy insulation issue, or the
unlawIul interruption oI essential services on October 4th-5
th
(Ior over 24 hours), 2011 and
associated damages connected thereto (set oII required under NRS 118A.390). What was the
point oI the rent escrow? What iI Judge SIerrazza ruled that Couglin had met his burden?
Would Coughlin then be allowed to stay, but Iorced to turn over the 'rent escrow sum to the
landlord?
6. Tenant's Obligation to Pay Rent a. In General (8) SetoII, Counterclaim, and
Recoupment 657. Disturbance oI tenant's possession West's Key Number Digest West's Key
Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant k223(5) Forms CounterclaimLandlord interIered with
tenant's use oI leased premises operated in connection with landlord's hotel, Am. Jur. Pleading
and Practice Forms, Landlord and Tenant 103 II the lessor disturbs the possession oI the
tenant by an unlawIul interIerence with such possession, the lessee may, when sued Ior the
rent, set up as a counterclaim the damages arising Irom such disturbance.|FN1| |FN1|
Heywood v. Ogden Motor Car Co., 71 Utah 417, 266 P. 1040, 62 A.L.R. 1232 (1928). As to
disturbance oI possession as deIense to action Ior rent, generally, see 597 to 605.
Fairness dictates that a court either view Baker's pleading as being that oI a no cause
basis only (to which, Coughlin should not be Iorced to comply with NRS 118A.355(5), which
arguably is only aplicable to non-pay cases, or...Coughlin should have been aIIorded the
protections oI NRS 40.360, particularly where the lease had not 'by its terms expired.
Such was detailed at page 14-15 oI Coughlin's Appelant's Openign BrieI oI 2/6/12 in
03628: 'Additionally, Appellant respectIully submits that the October 27th, 2011 Order is not
in compliance with Nevada Law inasmuch as it calls Ior execution oI the eviction within 24
hours oI service oI it. NRS 40.360 states that "When the proceeding iI Ior an unlawIul
detainer aIter the deIault in the payment oI rent, and the lease agreement under which the rent
is payable has not by its terms expired, execution upon the judgment shall not be issued until
the expiration oI 5 days aIter entry oI the judmgent...." 'NRS 40.360 (3). Execution and
enIorcement. When the proceeding is Ior an unlawIul detainer aIter deIault in the payment oI
the rent, and the lease or agreement under which the rent is payable has not by its terms
expired, execution upon the judgment shall not be issued until the expiration oI 5 days aIter
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the entry oI the judgment, within which time the tenant, or any subtenant, or any mortgagee
oI the term, or other party interested in its continuance, may pay into court Ior the landlord the
amount oI the judgment and costs, and thereupon the judgment shall be satisIied and the
tenant be restored to the tenant`s estate; but, iI payment, as herein provided, be not made
within the 5 days, the judgment may be enIorced Ior its Iull amount and Ior the possession oI
the premises. In all other cases the judgment may be enIorced immediately. So, to the extent
the RJC chose to read into Respondent's case what was not plead or argued (the RJC seemed
to want to create a non-payment oI rent Order where such a claim was not plead, in which
case, turnabout is Iair play, and the October 27th, 2011 Order is void Ior lack oI jurisdiction in
that is goes against the dictates oI NRS 40.360 (3) regarding execution and enIorcement.
Further, NRCP 62(d), NRS 40.385, and NRAP 7 provide that execution oI an Order shall be
stayed pending appeal as long as a bond or equivalent security in the sum oI $250 to cover
costs oI appeal is Iled with the district court. The RJC held on to $2,275 oI Appellants money,
more than enough to cover the $250 appeal bond and any reasonable supersedeas bond (and
NRS 40.385 strongly asserts that a supersedeas bond oI only $250 was all required oI
Appellant where his rent was less than $1,000, as here). Appellant may obtain a stay pending
appeal by complying with the provisions oI NRS 40.385. This statute (at the relevant time in
question) provided that iI an appeal is taken Irom an order oI summary eviction entered
pursuant to NRS 40.253, "a stay oI execution may be obtained by Iiling with the trial court a
bond in the amount oI $250 to cover the expected costs on appeal." NRS 40.385(1). The
statute Iurther provides that iI the subject lease is Ior commercial property and the monthly
rent exceeds $1,000, the district court "may, upon its own motion or that oI a party, and upon
a showing oI good cause, order an additional bond to be posted to cover the expected costs on
appeal." Id. Judge SIerrazza's November 7, 2011 Order, purporting to release to Appellant
what had earlier been classiIied as satisIying both the appeal bond and supersedeas bond, in
addition to resetting the.
Speaking oI 'turnabout being Iair play...Coughlin was impermissibly prevented by
Judge SIerrazza Irom putting on his case to show that the lease had not terminated...and where
Coughlin is subject to a statutory provision only applicable to nonpayment oI rent evictions
(even where Merliss did not so pled), then Merliss should be subject to the 'Tenant's right to
cure any rental deIiciency Iound in NRS 40.360(3), particularly where the testimony oI
Merliss, his aIIidavit, and the Delcaration oI his counsel, Baker, all plainly show the lease had
note expired by its term as they indicated. That being the case, NRS 40.360(3) was still
availing to Coughlin, or should have been:
NRS40.360judgment; damages; execution and enforcement.
'3.Execution and enIorcement.When the proceeding is for an unlawful detainer
after default in the payment of the rent, and the lease or agreement under which the rent is
payable has not by its terms expired, execution upon the judgment shall not be issued until
the expiration of 5 days after the entry of the judgment, within which time the tenant, or
any subtenant, or any mortgagee oI the term, or other party interested in its continuance, may
pay into court Ior the landlord the amount oI the judgment and costs, and thereupon the
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judgment shall be satisIied and the tenant be restored to the tenant`s estate; but, iI payment,
as herein provided, be not made within the 5 days, the judgment may be enIorced Ior its Iull
amount and Ior the possession oI the premises. In all other cases the judgment may be
enforced immediately.
880. Tenant's right to cure West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest,
Landlord and Tenant k290(3), 298(1) A.L.R. Library Lease provisions allowing termination
or IorIeiture Ior violation oI law, 92 A.L.R.3d 967 Forms Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice
Forms, Petition or applicationTo recover possession oI leasehold aIter payment or tender oI
rent in arrears, Landlord and Tenant 180 UnlawIul-detainer statutes generally entitle the
tenant to a certain number oI days aIter notice oI deIault in which to comply with the
requirements oI the lease.|FN1| II the lessor Iails to allow the lessee to cure the deIault within
the time period provided in the lease, the lessor is precluded Irom suing Ior possession on the
basis oI the deIault.|FN2| The tenant has a reasonable time in which to cure a deIault iI notice
is not given and the lease speciIically requires notice.|FN3| When a summary action has been
brought Ior the nonpayment oI rent, statutes commonly provide Ior a stay oI execution and the
reinstatement oI the tenant upon the tenant's curing the deIault beIore the execution oI the writ
oI restitution.|FN4| A court has discretion, however, to deny equitable relieI to a tenant who
violated the lease and did not attempt to cure the breach during a cure period even iI the
violation is cured shortly beIore the trial date.|FN5| Furthermore, a tenant who tries to cure
only one oI a number oI deIaults mentioned in a deIault notice does not comply with the
notice's requirement that "such deIaults" be resolved within a stated period, and may be
lawIully evicted.|FN6| II the lease entitles the landlord to prompt and immediate eviction
upon nonpayment oI rent,|FN7| a court may not permit a tenant who is delinquent under a
conventional residential lease to repay back rent in installments.|FN8| To redeem, the tenant
must tender the rent due with interest and costs.|FN9| |FN1| In re Windmill Farms, Inc., 841
F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1988); Greenhill v. Allen, 181 Ga. App. 532, 352 S.E.2d 845 (1987);
Bank oI Belleville v. Stidimire, 119 Ill. App. 3d 73, 74 Ill. Dec. 673, 456 N.E.2d 175 (5th
Dist. 1983); Allen v. First Nat. Bank oI Commerce, 440 So. 2d 172 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
1983), writ denied, 444 So. 2d 1219 (La. 1984); Finley v. Park 10 Associates, 83 A.D.2d 537,
441 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1st Dep't 1981); Goodman Inv., Inc. v. Swanston Equipment Co., 299
N.W.2d 786 (N.D. 1980); Dang v. Cox Corp., 655 P.2d 658 (Utah 1982); Housing Authority
oI City oI Everett v. Terry, 114 Wash. 2d 558, 789 P.2d 745 (1990). As to a notice to quit or
demand Ior possession, see 845. |FN2| Norwalk Mall Venture v. Mijo, Inc., 11 Conn. App.
360, 527 A.2d 1202 (1987); Tage II Corp. v. Ducas (U.S.) Realty Corp., 17 Mass. App. Ct.
664, 461 N.E.2d 1222 (1984). |FN3| Valley Properties, Inc. v. Strahan, 565 So. 2d 571 (Ala.
1990). |FN4| In re Telephonics, Inc., 85 B.R. 312 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Johnson v.
Edgewood Management Corp., 512 A.2d 287 (D.C. 1986); Omni Quip oI Jacksonville, II,
Inc. v. Milo Inc., 542 So. 2d 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1989); Zazanis v. Gold Coast
Mall, Inc., 63 Md. App. 364, 492 A.2d 953 (1985); Paul McCusker and Associates, Inc. v.
Omodt, 359 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); French v. Ester, 749 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. Ct.
App. E.D. 1988); University Court v. Mahasin, 166 N.J. Super. 551, 400 A.2d 133 (App. Div.
1979); Post v. 120 East End Ave. Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 19, 475 N.Y.S.2d 821, 464 N.E.2d 125
(1984); Eddy v. Parazoo, 77 Or. App. 120, 711 P.2d 205 (1985); Allred v. Smith, 674 P.2d 99
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(Utah 1983). In an action brought to recover the possession oI demised premises upon a
IorIeiture Ior the nonpayment oI rent, all proceedings must cease iI the tenant pays or tenders
the rent due and the costs oI the action beIore judgment is rendered unless the lease provides
otherwise. Charlotte OIIice Tower Associates v. Carolina SNS Corp., 89 N.C. App. 697, 366
S.E.2d 905 (1988). |FN5| Grubb v. Wm. Calomiris Inv. Corp., 588 A.2d 1144 (D.C. 1991).
|FN6| Walters v. National Properties, LLC, 2005 WI 87, 282 Wis. 2d 176, 699 N.W.2d 71
(2005). |FN7| 857. |FN8| Goodwin v. Rodriguez, 520 Pa. 296, 554 A.2d 6 (1989). |FN9|
Pritch v. Henry, 543 A.2d 808 (D.C. 1988).
10/25/11 trial in 1708) and in the 9/27/11 5 Day Notice of UD for Failure to Vacate,
40.254, it is alleged that 'your rental agreement expired as of February 28, 2011. NRS
40.251(1)(b)(1)(II). However, that simply is not true. Beyond demonstrating a lack oI
candor to the tribunal and paucity oI Iairness to opposing counsel, it belies the Iact that Baker
never provided suIIicient notice oI termination oI the lease, as such, the 30 days required prior
to any such termination, by the lease, was not satisIied. Additionally, where Baker alleges
that the 'rental agreement expired as oI February 28, 2011 when, in Iact there is no such
'deIined termination date in the lease.
NRS 118A.020 DeIinitions. As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise
requires, the terms deIined in NRS 118A.030 to 118A.170, inclusive, have the meanings
ascribed to them in those sections.
The deIinition oI the term 'action in NRS 118A.040 may be such that 'the context
otherwise requires (pursuant to NRS 118A.020) assigning a diIIerent meaning, perhaps
given Nevada JCRCP 2: 'RULE2.THREE FORMS OF actionS
There shall be three Iorms oI action in justice courts to be known as 'civil actions,
'small claims actions and 'summary eviction actions. Rules 3 through 87 govern civil
actions. Rules governing small claims actions begin with Rule 88 and end with Rule 100.
Rules governing summary evictions commence with Rule 101.
What is not clear is how
NJCRCP contain a section heading just beIore Rule 101 that reads: 'XIII.
SUMMARY EVICTION PROCEEDINGS. This is consistent with the designation in
NJCRCP Rule 2 which states: 'Rules governing summary evictions commence with Rule
101. One, perhaps, may assume that all rules aIter Rule 101 (ie, to the last rule, Rule 100)
apply to 'summary eviction proceedings, and in that vein, Judge SIerrazza's 'setting the
matter over Ior 'trial would have been pursuant to JCRCP 109 (which Baker alleged was
inapplicable to a summary eviction proceeding)
RULE101.NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Aotices required for summary eviction under NRS 40.253 and NRS 40.254 must be
specific when alleging any ground Ior the existence oI an unlawIul detainer.
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|As amended; eIIective June 28, 1988.|
|
NJCRCP 'RULE105.HEARINGS TO BE INFORMAL
Hearings regarding applications Ior orders oI summary eviction shall be inIormal. No
formal pleading other than the affidavits and application provided by these rules may be
requirea, since it is the intent of such hearings to determine the truthfulness ana
sufficiency of any affiaavit, notice or service of any notice and to dispense Iair and speedy
justice.
So, the one "formal pleading" required of Merliss's attorney Baker, whom wanted
$18,000 in attorney's feefor just the trial court summary eviction proceeding, was not
filed. Merliss's 10/11/11 ~Unlawful Detainer Affidavit was never filed, was never
served, etc. It was entered into evidence as Exhibit D at the 10/25/11 'trial, but that was Iar
to late. Indeed, even should such 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit oI Merliss be considered a
'summons and complaint under NJCRCP Rule 108, Coughlin would have had 20 calendar
days aIter service oI such beIore a 'trial could be set. Given that the section heading prior
to Rule 101 (and, in Nevada, statutes or rule sets typically denote that section headings do not
alter, in any way, the meaning oI content oI the statutes or rules themselves, but...) is 'XIII.
SUMMARY EVICTION PROCEEDINGS, one might assume that Rule 108 and Rule 109
apply might inIer that Rule 108 and Rule 109 apply to even summary eviction proceedings or
'summary eviction actions under JCRCP 2. NRS 40.253(6) makes clear that such Iiling oI
a suIIicient 'landlord's aIIidavit is a subject matter jurisdictional prerequisite to the setting
and holding oI either the 10/13/11 summary eviction proceeding or the 10/25/11 trial:
'Judge: Why don`t you go ahead then? PlaintiII: Thank you, sir. Your Honor, what we`re here
on today is a 30-day no-cause eviction that is all we`re on today. Under |INDISCERNIBLE
137| 40.253, Your Honor, I have copies oI the landlord`s aIIidavit here. II I may approach?
Judge: Yeah, bring it up. PlaintiII: Yes. Judge: But you don`t have a witness? PlaintiII: No,
sir. Your Honor, the notices have been previously provided to the court. I also have additional
copies here iI the court needs them. The 30-day no-cause notice was served on August 22.
The Iive-day Iailure to vacate notice was served on September 27. Mr. Coughlin (Page 1).
Its actually pretty Iunny to consider Baker's 10/11/11 'Landlord's Opposition
now...both because it indicates, at 2:18-20 that it is attached Dr. Merliss's 'UnlawIul Detainer
AIIidavit, then Iails to ('court. Id. Dr. Merliss's affidavit, as required by ARS 4.253, and
on the form provided by the court, is filed herewith. Alas, there is no such 'Dr. Merliss
'aIIidavit attached to the 10/12/11 'Landlord's Opposition. Also because it cites to NJRCP
sections outside oI those rules Iollowing Rule 101 (ie, those JNCRCP indicate, in Rule 2, are
inapplicable, which makes Judge Flangan's citation later on to NJCRCP 72(c) puzzling), in
addition to citing to JCRRT (within which Rule 2 makes clear such rule set is inapplicable to
'landlord tenant matters). So, Merliss was paying Ior Baker to learn the law, as clearly
clueless about eviction matters as Baker was, as evinced by his work in this 10/12/11
Landlord's Opposition. How Brunzel would justiIy $18,000 in Iees Ior the summary eviction
proceeding, then $42,065 Ior the appeal Ior such apprentice work, is hard to Iigure.. Baker is
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clearly unaware that NRS 118A.490 allows Ior counterclaims. Baker does manage to point
out that Coughlin Iailed to Iile an actual aIIidavit or declaration attendant to any 'Tenant's
AIIidavit/Answer and thereIore, everything Judges SIerrazza or Flanagan ruled is void Ior
lack oI meeting the jurisdictional prerequisite set out in NRS 40.253(6), as Baker elucidates.
Good job, Casey. Also, Baker points out that there are certain things that were disposed oI
(probably even 'actually litigated) in the precursor non-payment summary eviction case
sister matter to 1708 in RJC Rev2011-001492. So, perhaps, (Coughlin will say 'perhaps
here to avoid doing what Baker and Hill regularly do, which, with plenty oI supposition,
declare that which they wish were true to be so, even where the Iacts and law run towards the
opposite conclusion) some oI that 'pled by Baker, then abruptly dismissed should be held
against the landlord. And the Iunny thing is, CG Wallace had not been issued at mandatory
precedent in Nevada at that point, at the 9/27/11 hearing wherein (or soon thereaIterwards) the
landlord dropped his 'complaint in 1492. However, to the extent that some issues Irom 1492
may be held as decided against Baker on account oI his start then stop approach (didn't seem
to look both ways much on that), then Brunzel certainly would not auger towards much oI a
attorney's Iee award to Baker.
Baker's 10/12/11 'LANDLORD'S OPPOSITION TO TENANT'S
ANSWER/AFFIDAVIT TO 30 DAY NO CAUSE MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES, ironically, reads:
Mr. Coughlin's "aIIidavit" is defective for several reasons, which include, but are not
limited to, the Iollowing:
1. The "aIIidavit" is not sworn or acknowledged as required by NRS 53.010. Neither is
it properly in the Iorm oI a veriIied pleading. See NRS 15.010. Neither does otherwise meet
the Iorm required oI an unsworn declaration to be used in place oI aIIidavit. See NRS 53.045.
Mr. Coughlin's answer/aIIidavit is a Iugitive document, deIective as a matter oI law, and
cannot serve to satisIy his burdens under the summary proceedings set Iorth in NRS 40.254(1)
and NRS 40.253(6). Mr. Coughlin's "aIIidavit" Iurther deIective because it contains extensive
and substantial argument, which prohibited by 1CRR1 11(E).
2. The only issue beIore the court at the hearing oI this matter is possession oI the
property. In that regard, the court's sole Iocus at the hearing is "to determine truthfulness and
sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided for in this section", in order to determine
whether there is a legal deIense as to the alleged unlawIul detainer. NRS 40.254(1). NRS
40.253(6). Since Mr. Coughlin has not provided any affidavit, there is nothing from him
for the court to consider, and he has not shown any evidentiary basis to support a legal
deIense to the no-cause eviction. Further, to the extent Mr. Coughlin seeks any aIIirmative
relieI in his "aIIidavit", any such request is not properly beIore the court. Id. Dr. Merliss's
affidavit, as required by ARS 4.253, and on the form provided by the court, is filed
herewith.
3. With the exception oI the caption, some oI the introductory material, and perhaps
some oI the "Iacts" set Iorth in Mr. Coughlin's "aIIidavit", it is essentially the same document
that Mr. Coughlin Iiled in previously dismissed case number REV2011-001492. As such, the
arguments presented by Mr. ,Coughlin here, which pertain loosely to papers Iiled in that
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previous case, are simply nonsensical and irrelevant. The only possible meaning that could be
given to Mr. Coughlin's document is that he is attempting to renew those arguments
already heard and disposed of by the court in the prior case. Mr. Coughlin has neither
sought, nor obtained, leave oI the court to rehear that matter. As such, arguments must not be
considered. See 1CRRT 11(G).
4. Mr. Coughlin is an attorney representing himselI. As such, he is not entitled to
recover attorney's Iees as a matter oI law, because he has not incurred any. Sellers Fourth
Judicial Dist. Ct., 119 Nev. 256, 71 P.3d495 (2003). This matter was briefed by the parties
in the previous case, and the court so ruled.
5. To the extent Mr. Coughlin denominates his paper a "counterclaim", procedure
is incorrect. No complaint has been filed. Thus, there can be no answer, and that answer
cannot contain a counterclaim. N1CRCP 7. II Mr. Coughlin wants to Iile a lawsuit against
the parties he purports to add to this summary eviction proceeding, he is Iree to so; but, he
must comply with the rules oI civil procedure. See, e.g. A1CRCP 3.... /s/ Casey D. Baker,
Esq.
Judge SIerrazza in his 'Eviction Decision and Order oI 10/13/11 Iailed to rule on
Coughlins' 10/6/11 Motion Ior Sanctions (where Coughlin, unlike Baker oI Hill, actually did
comply with the 21 day saIe harbor requirements oI NRCP Rule 11.
Ironically, considering Baker's 10/11/11 explication oI what, under NRS 40.253(6) the
purpose oI a hearing is Ior ('to test the truth and suIIiciency oI the landlord's and tenant's
aIIidavits) and the 10/6/11 NOTICE OF HEARING which reads in relevant part: 'you may
appear on that date to show cause why the Court should or should not grant an eviction. II you
appear you must be prepared to provide testimonial and documentary evidence to the Court
which supports your position. If you fail to appear, the Court may grant an eviction by
default or may dismiss the case.
'PlaintiII: My oIIice represents Dr. Merliss. Judge: Oh, okay. You were listed in the wrong
location. Alright, please be seated. Is the plaintiII ready to proceed then? PlaintiII: Yes, Your
Honor. Judge: Why don`t you go ahead then? PlaintiII: Thank you, sir. Your Honor, what
we`re here on today is a 30-day no-cause eviction that is all we`re on today. Under
|INDISCERNIBLE 137| 40.253, Your Honor, I have copies oI the landlord`s aIIidavit here. II
I may approach? Judge: Yeah, bring it up. PlaintiII: Yes. Judge: But you don`t have a
witness? PlaintiII: No, sir. Your Honor, the notices have been previously provided to the
court. I also have additional copies here iI the court needs them. The 30-day no-cause notice
was served on August 22. The Iive-day Iailure to vacate notice was served on September 27.
Mr. Coughlin has Iailed to vacate the property and that`s why we`re here, sir. (Page 1).
Problem is, don't have a witness, don't have anyone to authenticate or lay Ioundation
Ior the alleged AIIidavit, which is not Iound in the ROA at any point prior to it being admitted
into evidence on 10/25/11. Dr. Merliss chose not to show up Ior the 10/13/11 summary
eviction proceeding. Coughlin should have been granted a deIault. Baker is not an
appropriate witness Ior the purposes Ior such a hearing Under NRS 40.253(6)
NJCRCP 'RULE108.SHORTENING TIME TO ANSWER PURSUANT TO NRS
40.300(2)
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In an eviction action, time to appear and defend may not be shortened to less than 10
calendar days after service of summons and complaint .
'Judge: Are you saying you haven`t had 10-days notice of this hearing, sir? Defendant:
Yes, Your Honor. 1udge: Yes, you`re saying that or yes, you have had 10 days?
Defendant: I am saying that no, I have not had 10-days notice, Your Honor. Particularly
with regard to the 1ustice Court Rules of Reno Township cite Nevada 1ustice Court
Rules procedure...Given that the envelope in which the notice of the hearing sent from
the 1ustice Court, not from plaintiff`s attorney as 1ustice Court Rule 22 (i) requires was
postmarked 7th, Friday. Today being 13th is less than 10 days. (Page 1 at 10/13/11
proceeding).
NJCRCP 'RULE109.SETTING OF trial IN actionS
PURSUANT TO NRS 40.290 (a)In no case shall a trial on the merits be set less than 20
calendar days after service of summons and complaint.
'DeIendant: ...I know I spent too much time on that, Your Honor, but when you say trial, it's
-- well, the most important thing, Your Honor, to get across Irom my point oI view, is that
issue oI Iact, it's a pause-- Judge: No, I didn`t imply that there was. I Iound that you made a
prima Iacie case-- DeIendant: That's what I'm -- that's what I meant to-- Judge: With respect
to habitability and so I set it Ior a trial today on that issue. But the separate issue is whether
you have any deIense, which you haven`t given me, to the no cause eviction, which--
DeIendant: And I do and I can speak to that brieIly, Your Honor, just-- Judge: They're two
separate things. Well, you're not under oath, sir, so you're arguing now and I didn`t -- I let you
have some latitude, but the question is do you have any Iacts to present to the court today?
DeIendant: Yes, Your Honor, but just one last introductory matter-- Judge: Okay. DeIendant:
Is that 4.253() says once the court has Iound there's a prima Iacie showing, the court must
pause and convert this to a Iull-scale unlawIul detainer action with a complaint and the 20-
days Notice incident to Rule 109 oI the summary eviction proceedings, so -- and we don't
have that here. PlaintiII: Your Honor, may I? DeIendant: And there's two cases, Anvui and
Glacier-- Judge: All right.
T: 'Judge: Well actually I have no proof so far that the lease is over or anything else. I
don`t even have a copy oI the lease. DeIendant: Your Honor the statute provides that I am to
provide that today and I have copies here. PlaintiII: Your Honor Rule 109 speaks to a 20 day
period notice prior to a hearing which I believe is applicable in this case and has not been
provided. DeIendant: I`m sorry I didn`t catch any oI that. Judge: He said. PlaintiII: Rule 109
Your Honor, setting oI trial and actions. Your Honor NRS 118A.510 speaks Ior retaliatory
conduct by the landlord against the tenant. It goes into the extent to which notice is required
and up to date to put on a deIense and to litigate those claims as aIIorded to |inaudible
0:05:50| turning oII their power in the middle oI the Iive day notice period is unduly
burdensome and it I believe is in violation oI the Iederal statutes and state statutes respecting
the appropriate notice one must give to tenants prior to shoving them out. DeIendant: Your
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Honor I have a copy oI the lease here would you like to see it? Judge: Yes please. DeIendant:
I attach that to my . Judge: The section you are starting to sort oI apply |inaudible 0:06:24|
you are not going under summary eviction. This is a summary eviction.
'DeIendant: Your Honor, iI I could just ask Ior a clariIication. When a matter has third party
deIendants brought in and counterclaims made, does that application oI the Justice Court
Rules seems to apply under Rules 88 |INDISCERNIBLE 13:31| is landlord-tenant law.
Judge: Sir, you`re the one who argue that you can join courter-claims in this action without
citing any authority Ior that position. DeIendant: I did cite such authority, Your Honor. Judge:
What is that? DeIendant: There`s I believe is Justice Court Rules. It`s in my motion Ior
continuance. I could Iind it iI you like, Your Honor. Judge: II you can Iind, go ahead.
DeIendant: Okay. Judge: Sir, have you Iound it? DeIendant: I believe it`s Justice Court Rule
12, Your Honor. Judge: Local rules or? DeIendant: No. In the Justice Court Rules. Judge:
Alright, I'm going to take a brieI recess and get the rules. I`ll be right back. DeIendant: Thank
you, Your Honor. Judge: So Mr. Coughlin you indicated that it was Rule 12 oI the justice
court rules? DeIendant: Yes Your Honor I believe it`s actually Rule 13 or 14; I`m looking at it
now. Judge: II you want to go ahead sir. What is a. DeIendant: Yes sir Your Honor. Judge:
Rule 13? DeIendant: Rule 13 Your Honor, Rule 13 oI the justice court rules and civil
procedure Your Honor in the state oI Nevada speaks to counterclaims and cross-claims. It
allows me to state either a compulsory or permissive counterclaim to the extent that the claims
made 'arise out oI the transaction or occurrences and subject matter oI the claim. The
opposing parties claim here which is dealing with an eviction. They do arise out oI the same
in that while Counsel Baker states rent is not an issue here; the retaliatory eviction deIense
that I say does bring into play all those issues. With that come in all the |Iailure to cure| in the
subsequent rent deductions that are allowed under the statute |inaudible 0:02:16| tenant and
myselI. DeIendant: May I be heard Your Honor? Judge: Yes and can you address Rule 81 too.
DeIendant: I don`t have a copy oI Rule 81 in Iront oI me Your Honor. Judge: Well Rule 81
says these rules do not govern procedure and practice in any special statutory proceeding in so
Iar as they are in inconsistent or in conIlict with the procedure in practice provided by the
applicable statute. DeIendant: Yes Your Honor I think that hits the nail right on the head. This
is a summary proceeding provided by statute NRS 40.254 and NRS 40.253(6). The only issue
here today is possession oI the property; the court`s inquiry is very Iocused and has only
asked you whether there is a legal deIense to the alleged unlawIul detainer. II Mr. Coughlin
has claims against third parties or my client he can make them in a separate civil suit. What
are these third parties going to add to the discussion oI possession oI the property today?
None. There has been no complaint Iiled, there has been no point alleged. Judge: Well I don`t
know what the third party complaints are but the issue oI retaliatory eviction may or may not.
PlaintiII: Your Honor under NRS 118A.510 the burden is on Mr. Coughlin to show
retaliation, he has not done that. He has not oIIered any prooI that there is any sort oI
retaliation here. The parties, the whole purpose oI the 30 day notice and the statute and then
the lease is Ireedom oI contract Your Honor. Once Mr. Coughlin is a month to month tenant
the landlord is Iree to terminate the lease with 30 days notice Mr. Coughlin is Iree to move
out with 30 days notice. II we Ilip it around and Mr. Coughlin had given 30 days notice and
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we had come down here tried to stop him Irom moving this doesn`t make any sense Your
Honor. There has been no prooI put Iorward that there is any retaliation here. Judge: Well
actually I have no prooI so Iar that the lease is over or anything else. I don`t even have a copy
oI the lease. DeIendant: Your Honor the statute provides that I am to provide that today and I
have copies here...
873. Generally; 233k290(3), 290(4), 298(1)l Retaliatory eviction oI tenant Ior
reporting landlord's violation oI law, 23 A.L.R.5th 140; Tenant's Rights and Remedies
Against Retaliatory Eviction by Landlord, 45 Am. Jur. ProoI oI Facts 3d 375; Am. Jur.
Pleading and Practice Forms, AnswerDeIenseNotice to terminate ineIIective
Landlord's intimidation oI tenant Ior reporting violation oI sanitation ordinance, Landlord and
Tenant 144 The landlord-and-tenant statutes oI many states allow deIenses in unlawIul-
detainer or summary-eviction actions based on a statutory prohibition against unlawIul
retaliation.|FN1| Such a statute may provide that where a tenant makes the required threshold
showing|FN2| or prima Iacie case oI retaliatory conduct,|FN3| the trier oI Iact shall presume
that retaliatory action was taken |FN4| unless the landlord proves otherwise by clear and
convincing evidence|FN5| or satisIies the statutory grounds Ior rebuttal oI the presumptions.
|FN6| |FN1| Van Buren Apartments v. Adams, 145 Ariz. 325, 701 P.2d 583 (Ct. App. Div. 2
1984); Drouet v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 4th 583, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 73 P.3d 1185 (2003);
Correa v. Ward, 91 Conn. App. 142, 881 A.2d 393 (2005); Miller v. District oI Columbia
Rental Housing Com'n, 870 A.2d 556 (D.C. 2005); Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass. App. Ct.
744, 835 N.E.2d 615 (2005) (holding that a claim Ior unlawIul retaliation did not lie);
HoIIman v. Davenport-MetcalI, 851 A.2d 1083 (R.I. 2004) (Iinding no unlawIul retaliation
occurred); Criss v. Salvation Army Residences, 173 W. Va. 634, 319 S.E.2d 403 (1984).
|FN2| Borger Management, Inc. v. Sindram, 886 A.2d 52 (D.C. 2005). |FN3| Correa v. Ward,
91 Conn. App. 142, 881 A.2d 393 (2005). |FN4| Correa v. Ward, 91 Conn. App. 142, 881
A.2d 393 (2005); Borger Management, Inc. v. Sindram, 886 A.2d 52 (D.C. 2005); Zimbovsky
v. Tokar, 2005 Mass. App. Div. 100, 2005 WL 2219683 (2005). As to the presumption oI
retaliation arising under the UniIorm Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, see 874. |FN5|
Borger Management, Inc. v. Sindram, 886 A.2d 52 (D.C. 2005). |FN6| Correa v. Ward, 91
Conn. App. 142, 881 A.2d 393 (2005). The statutory presumption that a tenant's eviction was
retaliatory based on her report oI code violations to the Health Department did not apply
where the tenant was evicted Ior nonpayment oI rent. Zimbovsky v. Tokar, 2005 Mass. App.
Div. 100, 2005 WL 2219683 (2005).
'PlaintiII: Your Honor Rule 109 speaks to a 20 day period notice prior to a hearing which I
believe is applicable in this case and has not been provided. DeIendant: I`m sorry I didn`t
catch any oI that. Judge: He said. PlaintiII: Rule 109 Your Honor, setting oI trial and actions.
Your Honor NRS 118A.510 speaks Ior retaliatory conduct by the landlord against the tenant.
It goes into the extent to which notice is required and up to date to put on a deIense and to
litigate those claims as aIIorded to |inaudible 0:05:50| turning oII their power in the middle oI
the Iive day notice period is unduly burdensome and it I believe is in violation oI the Iederal
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statutes and state statutes respecting the appropriate notice one must give to tenants prior to
shoving them out. DeIendant: Your Honor I have a copy oI the lease here would you like to
see it? Judge: Yes please. DeIendant: I attach that to my . Judge: The section you are
starting to sort oI apply |inaudible 0:06:24| you are not going under summary eviction. This is
a summary eviction. DeIendant: I thought you said at the outset that this was a no cause not a
summary eviction Your Honor or Mr. Baker said that? Judge: No cause is summary. Non-
payment is summary as well. DeIendant: No cause is summary as well; you know it gives 30
days versus the Iive days that the non-payment gets. Judge: You are talking about two
separate notices. They gave you 30 day notice, that you need a 30 day notice oI termination oI
lease and that`s the no cause. Then when you don`t move out then it`s an unlawIul detainer
which is the Iive day notice. DeIendant: That you are saying is summary in nature Your
Honor? Judge: Yes. DeIendant: To that I Iiled a tenancy answer, a third party counterclaim
bringing in third parties. Judge: Well Iirst oI all as to the third party complaint I`m going to
rule as I indicated earlier that there is a speciIic statutory procedure in this case which is
applicable under Chapter 40 oI the NRS. ThereIore you are governed by that statutory
procedure which does not allow Ior counterclaims to be heard. At the same time you can Iile a
separate independent action as indicated by counsel Ior the. DeIendant: NRS 40 you say
Your Honor does not allow Ior third? Judge: Chapter 40 in a summary proceeding such as this
does not allow Ior counterclaims to be Iiled in the same action, iI they are Iiled as separate
action. That`s under Rule 81 oI the justice court rules oI civil procedure. DeIendant: You
said, okay in addition to Rule 83. Your Honor I don`t believe any oI those rules allow a
landlord attorney oI power oII in the middle oI the |inaudible 0:08:52|. Judge: I`m not saying
they do. DeIendant: I`m just putting Iorth that. Judge: I will allow you to testiIy as to what
happened and why you believe the summary eviction should not be applicable in this case. II
you establish a case to my satisIaction then I will set it over to trial, right? But at this point
you haven`t done that.
T11ish: 'Judge: Well Iirst oI all as to the third party complaint I`m going to rule as I indicated
earlier that there is a speciIic statutory procedure in this case which is applicable under
Chapter 40 oI the NRS. ThereIore you are governed by that statutory procedure which does
not allow Ior counterclaims to be heard. At the same time you can Iile a separate independent
action as indicated by counsel Ior the. ... Judge: Chapter 40 in a summary proceeding such
as this does not allow Ior counterclaims to be Iiled in the same action, iI they are Iiled as
separate action. That`s under Rule 81 oI the justice court rules oI civil procedure.
Coughlin's 10/6/11 'TENANT'S ANSWER/AFFIDAVIT TO 30 DAY NO CAUSE
EVICTION, MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES, COUNTERCLAIM
FOR DAMAGES deIinitely states counterclaims. It was reversible error Ior Judge SIerrazza
to reIuse to hear such claims, particularly where he 'set the matter Ior trial. Even a trial
under NJCRCP 109 (and even under Rule 108, and even assuming Baker's 10/19/11
Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq., met the requirements oI NRS 40.254(2) (and it clearly
does not) less than '10 calendar days had elapsed under even the most onerous interpretation
oI NJCRCP 109's dictate that 'no less than 10 calendar days Irom service oI the summons and
complaint passing beIore the setting oI such trial to whatever dubious extent the 10/19/11
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Declaration oI Casey Baker, Esq., is operative as a 'summons and complaint Ior such
purposes. Even were a court to so Iind such 10/19/11 Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq.,
operative, such Declaration is deIicient under a NRS 40.254(2) analysis as the prooI oI
service oI the notice attached thereto as Exhibit 2, Ior the September 27, 2011 'FIVE-DAY
NOTICE OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER FOR FAILURE TO VACATE RENTAL UNIT
NRS 40.251 AND NOTIC EOF SUMMARY EVICTION NRS 40.254 is wholly deIicient
in that it is purported to have been served by the landlord's attorney himselI, Baker, in the
courtroom at the September 27
th
, 2011 hearing in the related matter RJC Rev2011-001492, the
non-payment oI rent summary eviction case that Baker alleges he and Merliss decided to
'dismiss in their assessment that doing so provided the 'path oI least resistance. Such
attempted service oI any notice is violative oI the courthouse sanctuary rule and the immunity
Irom service aIIorded to litigants and there attorney's while attending court, particularly Ior
matters involving the exact same nexus oI Iacts, circumstances, and claims, save the
distinction between a no cause and non-pay summary eviction.
G. HILL, CHARTERED, and that on the 27
th
day of September, 2011, I personally
handed at the hearing in the above-referenced matter , a true and correct copy oI the
Ioregoing Five Day Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer Ior Failure to Vacate Rental Unit - NRS
40.251 (No-Cause Termination) and Notice oI Summary Eviction -NRS 40.254 to: Zachary
Coughlin: 121 River Rock Street Reno, Nevada 89503.
prior to Baker having such admitted as 'PlaintiII's Exhibit D at the 10/25/11 'trial, which is
entirely too late to satisIy the subject matter jurisdiction prerequisites in NRS 40.254.
#1 Ior the August 22
nd
, 2011 'NO-CAUSE TERMINATION NOTICE TO VACATE NRS
40.251(1) is a patent violation oI
'NRS40.300Contents oI complaint; issuance and service of summons; temporary writ
oI restitution; notice, hearing and bond.
1.The plaintiII in his or her complaint, which shall be in writing, must set forth the
facts on which the plaintiff seeks to recover, and describe the premises with reasonable
certainty and may set forth therein any circumstances of fraud, force or violence which
may have accompanied the alleged forcible entry, or forcible or unlawful aetainer, and
claim damages therefor, or compensation for the occupation of the premises or both. In
case the unlawful aetainer chargea be after aefault in the payment of rent, the complaint must
state the amount of such rent.
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2.The summons shall be issued and served as in other cases, but the court, judge or
justice oI the peace may shorten the time within which the defendant shall be required to
appear and defend the action, in which case the officer or person serving the summons shall
change the prescribed Iorm thereoI to conIorm to the time oI service as ordered; but where
publication is necessary the court shall direct publication Ior a period oI not less than 1
week...
Clearly, the landlord's attorney is not an appropriate person to serve the summons and
complaint 'as in other cases wherein NRCP 4 requires that a 'non-interested person do so.
It was Iurther reversible error Ior Judge SIerrazza to demand that Coughlin testiIy as to
speciIics as to any alleged rent owed, whereas Merliss was never so interrogated by the Court.

Reversible error as 118A.490 does allow Ior counterclaims, and iI, in a non cause (ie,
Merliss never pled the nonpayment oI rent, Coughlin did not cede the issue, and only spoke oI
it in hypotheticals (and not every amount mentioned was a Iix and decut set-oII under NRS
118A.360, rather, Merliss and Coughlin (as Merliss testiIied) engaged in bargaining, resulting
in agreements, that go beyond Iix and deducts (the stairs, disposal, etc.) summary
eviction/trial such as in 1708, Coughlin can be Iorced to deposit rent escrow under NRS
118A.355(5), then....
4. Warranty oI Habitability b. Landlord's Obligations Concerning Condition, Repair,
and Improvement (2) Agreement by Landlord to Repair (a) In General 463. Notice oI need
oI repairs West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant
k152(6) A.L.R. Library Breach oI lessor's agreement as ground oI liability Ior personal injury
to tenant or one in privity with latter, 78 A.L.R.2d 1238 Forms Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d,
Lessee to notiIy lessor oI deIects requiring repair 161:585 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Notice
to lessorNeed Ior repairsEstimated cost 161:1219 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Notice to
lessor to make repairsLessee to terminate on Iailure to comply 161:1223 Am. Jur. Legal
Forms 2d, Notice to lessor to make repairsLessee to make repairs on Iailure to comply
Expense to be deducted Irom rent 161:1224 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Notice to lessor to
make repairsCommon areas retained by lessorLessee to terminate on Iailure to comply
161:1225 Generally, unless it appears that the landlord knows oI the need to repair the leased
premises,|FN1| the tenant must notiIy the landlord oI such need in order to place the landlord
in deIault Ior Iailure to repair.|FN2| Except as otherwise provided, iI there is a material
noncompliance by the landlord with the rental agreement or with the provisions oI the
UniIorm Residential Landlord and Tenant Act requiring the landlord to maintain the premises
materially aIIecting health and saIety, the tenant may deliver a written notice to the landlord
speciIying the acts and omissions constituting the breach and that the agreement will
terminate on a date not less than 30 days aIter receipt oI the notice iI the breach is not
remedied in 14 days The agreement will terminate as provided in the notice unless the breach
is remedial by repairs, the payment oI damages, or otherwise and the landlord adequately
remedies the breach beIore the time speciIied in the notice. II substantially the same act or
omission which constituted a prior noncompliance oI which notice was given recurs within
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six months, the tenant may terminate the agreement upon at least 14 days' written notice
speciIying the breach and the date oI termination oI the agreement.|FN3| No notice oI a need
Ior repairs is necessary where the landlord has a duty to inspect the premises.|FN4| The lease
may, by its terms, impose a duty upon the landlord to repair only aIter he or she receives
notice oI the necessity oI repairs. Under such a provision, there is ordinarily no breach oI the
covenant to repair until the required notice has been given.|FN5| Where a landlord has been
placed on notice oI a tenant's claim, the tenant's occupancy oI deIective rental premises over a
lengthy period oI time doe not constitute a waiver oI the landlord's statutory duty to maintain
the premises or a waiver oI the tenant's right to recover Ior damages resulting Irom the
landlord's breach oI this duty.|FN6| CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Editor's Notes: The
statement "A landlord is not entitled to notice oI the necessity oI repairs with regard to
portions oI the building over which the landlord retains control, and can be held liable Ior
breach oI covenant Ior Iailing to make repairs to such areas without having received notice."
and the supporting authority in Iootnote 6 --Stemple v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 430 F.2d 178
(10th Cir. 1970) (applying Colorado law) --has been deleted. Cases: City's personal service on
landlord oI notice to repair residential building substantially complied with statutory
requirement that notice be posted in a conspicuous place on the property. City oI Santa
Monica v. Gonzalez, 43 Cal. 4th 905, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 483, 182 P.3d 1027 (2008). Landlord
could not rely on city's Iailure, in issuing notice to repair building in violation oI local
building standards, to give notice to each aIIected residential unit and to give notice that
landlord was prohibited Irom retaliating against tenants as basis Ior invalidating orders
placing building in receivership aIter landlord Iailed to comply with notice; notice to units and
retaliation notice were Ior protection oI tenants, not landlord. City oI Santa Monica v.
Gonzalez, 43 Cal. 4th 905, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 483, 182 P.3d 1027 (2008). Liability imposed
upon a landlord Ior Iailure to repair the leased premises arises only in instances where there is
a duty to repair and notice has been given oI the deIect. Gainey v. Smacky's Investments, Inc.,
287 Ga. App. 529, 652 S.E.2d 167 (2007). |END OF SUPPLEMENT| |FN1| All v. Smith's
Management Corp., 109 Idaho 479, 708 P.2d 884 (1985); Harrison v. Roberts, 800 S.W.2d 40
(Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1990). |FN2| ProIIer v. Randall, 755 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D.
1988); Montelongo v. Goodall, 788 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App. Austin 1990). Generally, a repair
clause in a lease imposes liability only upon notice and opportunity to make repairs. Newell v.
Weston, 150 Or. App. 562, 946 P.2d 691 (1997). |FN3| UniI. Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act 4.101(a). |FN4| Harrison v. Roberts, 800 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1990).
|FN5| Montelongo v. Goodall, 788 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App. Austin 1990); Enerco, Inc. v. SOS
StaIIing Services, Inc., 2002 UT 78, 52 P.3d 1272, 48 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1098 (Utah
2002). |FN6| Miller v. Ritchie, 45 Ohio St. 3d 222, 543 N.E.2d 1265 (1989). As to the
landlord's statutory duty to repair, generally, see 456.
II 1708 was a no cause summary eviction, yet Coughlin was still Iorced to deposit rent
escrow under a statute, NRS 118A.355, that only applies were the 'tenant is in deIault as to
the payment oI rent, then, turnabout it Iair play, and Coughlin should have been able to bring
counterclaims, particularly where all those Coughlin sought to bring were completely
connected to the retaliation prohibited under NRS 118A.510:
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'In a summary unlawIul-detainer action,|FN1| counterclaims and cross-complaints are
generally inadmissible.|FN2| As with deIenses,|FN3| only counterclaims that relate to the
right oI possession are usually permitted.|FN4| Observation: The purpose oI the no-
counterclaim provision in the eviction statutes is to get a speedy determination oI possession
without bringing in any extraneous matters.|FN5| Under the rule limiting counterclaims in
unlawIul-detainer or summary-possession actions, a tenant may not claim an earlier,
unrelated debt owed by the landlord as a setoII Ior past-due rent.|FN6| bring a
counterclaim based on the landlord's alleged Iailure to repair.|FN7| Iile a counterclaim Ior
damages to the tenant's property.|FN8| |FN1| 840. |FN2| Barela v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.
3d 244, 178 Cal. Rptr. 618, 636 P.2d 582 (1981); MedIord v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App.
3d 236, 189 Cal. Rptr. 227 (2d Dist. 1983); Gibson v. Johnson, 492 A.2d 574 (D.C. 1985);
V.F.W. Post No. 7222 v. Summersville Saddle Club, 788 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D.
1990); Koelzer v. Pizzirani, 718 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1986) (statutory claim Ior
damages and attorney's Iees Ior bad-Iaith retention oI security deposit may not be interposed);
Housing Authority oI City oI Everett v. Terry, 114 Wash. 2d 558, 789 P.2d 745 (1990). As to
judgment as not barring a subsequent suit on legal and equitable claims, such as questions oI
title and aIIirmative deIenses, see 884. |FN3| As to deIenses in an unlawIul-detainer action,
generally, see 865. |FN4| Ossen v. Wanat, 217 Conn. 313, 585 A.2d 685 (1991)
(constitutional issues raised by the deIendanttenant are outside the scope oI a summary
process action); Mathis v. Barrett, 544 A.2d 287 (D.C. 1988) (a tenant may not raise the
counterclaim oI malicious prosecution in the landlord's summary possession action);
Bismarck Hotel Co. v. Sutherland, 92 Ill. App. 3d 167, 47 Ill. Dec. 512, 415 N.E.2d 517 (1st
Dist. 1980); White Earth Housing Authority v. Schwabe, 375 N.W.2d 568 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); Henze v. Shell Oil Co., 758 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1988). |FN5| VND, LLC v.
Leevers Foods, Inc., 2003 ND 198, 672 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 2003). |FN6| Nork v. PaciIic
Coast Medical Enterprises, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 410, 140 Cal. Rptr. 734 (4th Dist. 1977).
|FN7| Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3d 552, 166 Cal. Rptr. 620 (4th Dist. 1980);
Schuminsky v. Field, 1980 OK 22, 606 P.2d 1133 (Okla. 1980). As to the deIense oI the
landlord's breach oI an implied warranty oI habitability, see 869. |FN8| Pinzon v. A & G
Properties, 874 A.2d 347 (D.C. 2005).
a warranty oI Iitness or suitability Ior purpose is implied, by statute or common law, in
leases oI real property Ior commercial use, which means that at the inception oI the lease there
are no latent deIects in the Iacilities that are vital to the use oI the premises Ior their intended
purpose and that these essential Iacilities will remain in a suitable condition. A landlord may
be held liable Ior damages Ior breach oI this warranty. Pylate v. Inabnet, 458 So. 2d 1378 (La.
Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984); Parts Industries Corp. v. A.V.A. Services, Inc., 104 S.W.3d 671 (Tex.
App. Corpus Christi 2003). As to the implied covenant by a landlord in a commercial lease
situation that the premises will be suitable Ior their intended commercial purpose, generally,
see 64. 64. Commercial leases; implied covenant oI continuous operation West's Key
Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant k44(1) to 45, 47 Pursuant to
the doctrine oI necessary implication, there is an implied covenant by the landlord in a
commercial lease situation that the premises will be suitable Ior their intended commercial
purpose.|FN1| This means that at the inception oI the lease, there is an implied warranty that
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there are no latent deIects in the Iacilities that are vital to the use oI the premises Ior their
intended commercial purpose and that the essential Iacilities will remain in a suitable
condition.|FN2| In addition, with regard to a commercial lease, it has been held that a
component oI the implied good Iaith and Iair dealing covenant going to the essence oI the
agreement, is the duty on the part oI a landlord to promote the continued use and occupancy
oI the premises by the existing tenant.|FN3| In turn, in cases involving commercial leases
which, in addition to a certain minimum or Iixed-base rental, obligate the business lessee to
pay a signiIicant part oI the rental in the Iorm oI a percentage oI the lessee's gross receipts,
which can only be collected iI the business is operating on the premises, a covenant oI
continuous use and operation on the part oI the lessee will be implied.|FN4| The inadequacy
oI the base rent implies a covenant oI continuous operation.|FN5| However, absent evidence
that the minimum or base rental is insigniIicant, courts generally will not imply a covenant to
continue diligent operation oI the business, the rationale being that where the base rent is
substantial, the lack oI a substantial percentage rental will not deIeat the purpose oI the lease.
|FN6| In this connection, it has been held that the base rent is inadequate, thereby implying a
covenant oI continuous operation, where it is not equal to the Iair rental value oI the premises,
|FN7| or where it is substantially below the market value at the time the lease was signed.
|FN8| |FN1| Davidow v. Inwood North ProIessional GroupPhase I, 747 S.W.2d 373, 76
A.L.R.4th 919 (Tex. 1988). |FN2| Davidow v. Inwood North ProIessional GroupPhase I,
747 S.W.2d 373, 76 A.L.R.4th 919 (Tex. 1988). |FN3| Ocean Services Corp. v. Ventura Port
Dist., 15 Cal. App. 4th 1762, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 750 (2d Dist. 1993), as modiIied on denial oI
reh'g, (June 23, 1993). |FN4| EMRO Marketing Co. v. Plemmons, 855 F.2d 528 (8th Cir.
1988); Evans v. Grand Union Co., 759 F. Supp. 818 (M.D. Ga. 1990); First American Bank &
Trust Co. v. SaIeway Stores, Inc., 151 Ariz. 584, 729 P.2d 938 (Ct. App. Div. 2 1986). |FN5|
Casa D'Angelo, Inc. v. A & R Realty Co., 553 N.E.2d 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1990).
|FN6| Bobenal Investment, Inc. v. Giant Super Markets, Inc., 79 Mich. App. 31, 260 N.W.2d
915 (1977). |FN7| First American Bank & Trust Co. v. SaIeway Stores, Inc., 151 Ariz. 584,
729 P.2d 938 (Ct. App. Div. 2 1986). |FN8| Worcester-Tatnuck Square CVS, Inc. v. Kaplan,
33 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 601 N.E.2d 485 (1992).
' NRS 118A.490 actions based upon nonpayment of rent: Counterclaim by tenant; deposit
oI rent with court; judgment Ior eviction.
It is instructive to note that atop Coughlin's 9/7/11 Tenant's Answer/AIIidavit in the
precursor case to 1708, 1492, Coughlin is listed as an attorney, with his law oIIice address
listed as the address oI the property at which the summary eviction was directed. This is
evidence that Baker and landlord Merliss were Iurther noticed that Coughlin's was a
commercial tenancy, and NRS 40.254 (which speaks to evictions based on something other
than non-payment) does not allow Ior the use oI the summary procedures in NRS 40.253
against a commercial tenancy

NRS 118A.040 'action deIined. 'action includes counterclaim, crossclaim, third-party
claim or any other proceeding in which rights are determined.
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'NRS40.251UnlawIul detainer: Possession oI property leased Ior indefinite time aIter
1.A tenant oI real property, a recreational vehicle or a mobile home Ior a term less than
liIe is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer when having leased:
(a)Real property, except as otherwise provided in this section, or a mobile home for an
indefinite time, with monthly or other periodic rent reserved, the tenant continues in
possession thereoI, in person or by subtenant, without the landlord`s consent after the
expiration of a notice oI:...
(2)Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, for all other periodic tenancies,
at least 30 days;...
(b)A dwelling unit subject to the provisions of chapter 118A of NRS , the tenant
continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, without the landlord's consent after
expiration of:
(1)The term of the rental agreement or its termination and, except as otherwise
NRS 40.251(1)(a) is inapplicable in that Coughlin did not lease 'Real property" as
and his lease was not 'for an indefinite time" with monthly or other periodic rent reserved,
the tenant continues in possession thereoI, in person or by subtenant, without the landlord`s
consent after the expiration of a notice"
rental agreement expired as of February 28, 2011. However, the 'Standard Lease
Further, iI Coughlin's tenancy or lease had 'expired, then the landlord did not provide
the proper notice under NRS 40.254(2), where such situation would require proceeding under
NRS 40.250, rather than the two conIlicting sections oI NRS 40.251 that Baker proceeded
under:
' NRS40.250Unlawful detainer: Possession after expiration of term .A tenant oI real
property or a mobile home Ior a term less than liIe is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer when the
tenant continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, oI the property or mobile home or
any part thereoI, after the expiration of the term for which it is let to the tenant. In all cases
where real property is leased for a specified term or period, or by express or implied
contract, whether written or parol, the tenancy terminates without notice at the expiration of
the specified term or period.
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S. Ct. 'Form #7 (with just a couple things changed by way oI placing 'Xs over 'or
terminated in a couple areas) reads:
22
nd
, 2011
against you.
possessuon oI the rental unit. and you will be subject to the eviction procedures contained in
Landlord Merliss's 9/27/11 5 Day Notice of UD for Failure to Vacate, Notice of
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Court. If you are evicted, you may legally be locked out of the rental unit the same day.
date oI service oI this notice There is a Iiling feeoI $ 33.00 . II you are unable to pay the
Iiling Iee, you may Iile a written motion with the court requesting a feewaiver. II the court
grants your feewaiver, your Tenant's AIIidavit/Declaration will be Iiled at no charge. You
st
agreed to will remain in effect on a monthly basis after the initial term...
20. TERMINATION: 1his Agreement and the tenancy hereby granted may be
to Paragraph 1 and 9 Ior monetary liabilities)...
The problem Ior Baker and the landlord is that the 8/22/11 No-Cause Termination
Notice to Vacate made an incorrect assessment oI the 'Standard Rental Agreement, and,
without more, was inoperative as to noticing Coughlin that the landlord was, say, invoking
Paragraph '20. TERMINATION oI the 'Standard Rental Agreement between Coughlin and
Merliss. The thing is, when Hill and Baker submit these 'itemized and detailed 'Activity
Reports purporting to justiIy their moving Ior $18,000 in attorney's Iees at the trial court
level and Ior a whole 'nother $42,065 fust for the appeal, they, under Brunzell, must be
required to provide the sort oI elegant, detailed, thoughtIull, tailored representation that such
exorbinant Iees would demand. Rather, Baker and Hill prattle on about how 'this was
supposed to be a simple summary eviction case and, without speciIying any actual points oI
law or addressing any oI the evidence Coughlin put Iorward, make vague generalizations
about how 'unreasonable Coughlin was, and (insert language Irom 4/19/12 Motion Ior Atty
Fees).
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Their client should not be leIt to argue that their misstatement oI the lease vis a vis its
term, duration, or any 'deIined termination date (clearly, there is not such date listed in
Paragraph 2 oI the lease, and perhaps, next time, neurologist landlord Merliss will pick his
leases more careIully, review them prior to signing them, and make sure he does, in Iact,
included a 'deIined termination date iI he so chooses, rather than, allegedly, incurring some
$70,000 in attorney's Iees alone, Ior a house that doesn't list Ior $90,000, these days, just to
get a summary eviction pushed through at breakneck speed. Especially where Merliss then
Iailed to rent out the house until February 2013 (it sat dormant and empty, with a 'Ior rent
sign on it between Coughlin's abbreviated opportunity to remove his belongings expiring on
December 23
rd
, 2011, until February 2013. Assuming Merliss could have continued getting
the same $900 monthly rent under the Coughlin lease during that period, that would mean he,
on top oI paying $70,000 to get the eviction done (instead oI accepting the settlement
Coughlin put Iorward where, arguably, Merliss's 'losses would have amounted to less than
$1,000, and obviated him oI any Iurther liability vis a vis the Green action Lawn Service
torts), Merliss also lost out on (Ior whatever reason) another $11,700 in rent due to his Iailure
to Iind another tenant, Ior the location that it was such a hurry to get Coughlin out oI. And
Baker characterizes that result as a 'complete and total victory suIIicient to qualiIy as a
'prevailing party under NRS 69.050 Ior the purposes oI an attorney's Iees award analysis.
Perhaps Baker and Hill were reIerring to the result the achieved Ior themselves, rather than
their client. Such is completely consistent with the assessment Iorty year member in good
standing, landlord tenant law expert Thomas J. Hall, Esq., provided to Coughlin oI his 2004
landlord tenant litigation wherein Hill was opposing counsel.`
PlaintiII's Exhibit D (16 pages) Irom the 10/25/11 'trial is a curious document
indeed. One, the Iax header on the Iirst page indicates that the RJC Iaxed to Hill's oIIice on
10/6/11 a Iill in the blank landlord's 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit
Where Baker's Exhibit F lacks a suIIicient Declaration, lacking the NRS 53.045,
Buckwalter, requisite language, in that it states only: ' under p perjury", the R1C lacked
subject matter jurisdiction suIIicient to even hold the 'trial on 10/25/11. Beyond that, the
'summary eviction proceeding was held on 10/13/11, bringing to light the Iact that no
Landlord's AIIidavit (or Declaration), was Iiled prior to the 10/13/11 proceeding.
'NRS40.370VeriIication oI complaint and answer.The complaint and answer
must be veriIied.
Such is a jurisdictional prerequisite under NRS 40.253(5), and (6), making the Order oI
10/13/11 void Ior lack oI jurisdiction (NRCP 60(b)(4) applies under NRS 40.400, and this
Motion to Set Aside is brought timely where there is not a six month limitations period as to a
voidness basis. There is a price to pay Ior Merliss and Baker attempting to characterize the
lease in a clearly incorrect manner (ie, asserting that is has terminated on February 28
th
, 2011
and that the term oI the lease was '12 months when, clearly, patently, that is not the case
upon a review oI the lease. That price is and was that the various Eviction Notices purported
served were insuIIicient Ior the purpose oI eIIecting a termination oI the lease. Which was
going to cost Merliss more time to get his precious summary eviction, adn which was going
to make the Iees Baker and Hill were charging Merliss to, up to that point, mostly just use
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Iorms oI the Supreme Court's website, Ior which their is not guarantee (in addition to Baker
Iailing to (perhaps on purpose) get Merliss's 10/11/11 notarized 'UnlawIul Detainer
AIIidavit Iiled in in the case, 1708, or even marked as an Exhibit. There simply is nothing to
prove that Baker or Merliss Iiled such an 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit in a timely manner
here. Baker's 10/19/11 Declaration is clearly Iraudulent in that respect, where it asserts that
Merliss's 10/11/11 notarized 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit was 'Iiled previously (see, also,
where Baker's indicates the same was 'submitted...well...which is it? There's no Iile stampe
on it Ior any time prior to it being marked as an Exhibit mid-way throgh the 10/25/11 'trial.
Basch v. Hooper, 507 N.Y.S.2d 620 N. Y.City.Civ., 1986 Termination notice in nonprimary
residence summary proceeding concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, so that deIects in notice
cannot be retroactively cured. Vidiaki, LLC v. Just BreakIast and Things!!!, 33 A.3d 848
t~233LANDLORD AND TENANT t~233IXRe-Entry and Recovery oI Possession by
Landlord t~233k 293Summary Proceedings t~233k:297Demand or Notice
t~233k297( I)k. Necessity oI demand, or notice to quit. Conn.App.,20 12 Page I A notice to
quit is a condition precedent to a summary process action and, iI deIective, deprives the court
oI subjectmatter jurisdiction over the action. po City oI Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores
oI Connecticut, Inc., 931 A.2d 837 Conn.,2007 A notice to quit is a condition precedent to a
summary process action and, iI Mill Pond Properties, LLC v. Moe's Tire & Auto Center,
LLC, 49 Conn. L. Rptr. &43West KeySummary|I|Conn.Super.,20IOCourt lacked
subjectmatter jurisdiction over landlord's summary process action because the landlord Iailed
to serve a valid "notice to quit" on the lessee. The lessee argued that the court lacked
jurisdiction because the "notice to quit" served by the plaintiII was premature, and thereIore
deIective, because it was not preceded by a pretermination notice as was required by the lease.
The landlord argued that his Iailure to give notice oI termination as the lease required could
serve as a deIense to a summary process action but did not remove the court's jurisdiction.
Because there was no preexisting deIault in the lease terms, the landlord's Iailure to comply
with the terms oI the lease deprived tile court oI jurisdiction. C.G.S.A. 4 7a-23. I
233k297(2)202177295700101202 I 772957001 Rosen v. Wade, 418 N.Y.S.2d 258 ??
233LANDLORD AND TENANT C233IXRe-Entry and Recovery oI Possession by
Landlord C233k 293Summary Proceedings C233k297Demand or Notice C233k297(3)k.
Service oI notice. N.Y.City.Civ.,1979 Page I Untimeliness oI quit notice is not a mere error
that can be cured by amendment to petition in summary proceeding; rather, it is a deIed which
deprives court oI subjectmatter jur'sdiction and authority to proceed altogether. Real Property
Law 232-a.
'NRS40.400Rules oI practice.The provisions oI NRS, Nevada Rules oI Civil
Procedure and Nevada Rules oI Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new
trials, so Iar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions oI NRS 40.220 to 40.420,
inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections.
For the outrageous sums sought in attorney's Iees, it is a little surprising that Casey D.
Baker, Esq., admitted during his sworn testimony at Coughlin's criminal trespass trial on
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6/18/12 in 26405, that he did not realize that NRCP, and NRAP applied to the summary
eviction in 1708 and appeal thereIrom, indicating, rather, that he understood JCRCP to apply.
exclusion of tenant from certain types of property. ...when the tenant of a dwelling unit
which is subject to the provisions of chapter 118A of NRS, part of a low-rent housing
program operated by a public housing authority, a mobile home or a recreational
vehicle (notice a commercial tenancy is not listed herein, whereas it is in NRS 40.253's
non-payment basis allowing for summary eviction) is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer, the
landlord is entitled to the summary procedures provided in ARS 4.253 except that:...
The notices Baker had served, allegedly, were deIicient (just because they are Iorms on
the Nevada Supreme Court's website does not make them satisIy the statutory jurisdictional
prerequisites...Baker and Hill should not use 'Iorms and then charge like they are a war
room Iull oI Manhattan lawyers doing some merger Ior a multinational...). And, what's really
Iunny, is that all those Iorms on the N. S. Ct's web-site are Irom 2006. Hello, Baker and Hill,
have there been any changes to the statutes since that time? Have the Iorms been updated?
What? You didn't check? Doesn't Dr. Merliss deserve to have you check that stuII out, what
with the $70K and all you guys say he paid you...or was it just 'incurred? What does NRS
69.050 require? Does NRS 69.050 even apply to an appeal oI a summary eviction
proceeding, or rather just to appeals oI civil actions? Clearly, a review oI the other sections oI
NRS 69 supports the view that 'costs are identiIied only as being incurred in the context oI a
'civil action (NJCRCP deIines 'landlord tenant matters as distinct Irom 'civil actions
(which would included plenary unlawIul detainer 'civil actions and neither the 10/13/11
'summary eviction proceeding or any 'trial (even under NJCRCP 108 and 109) Iall within
that purview). It's ironic, given all oI Baker and Hill's bluster in their Iilings in 06328 wherein
they allege Coughlin does not understand the diIIerence between a judgement and order, and
to which NRCP 52 and 59 may be invoked, as NRS 69.040 speaks only to 'judgments (and
both the 10/25/11 and 10/27/11 summary eviction 'Orders are, necessarily, not judgments,
with 'judgments universally being viewed as dispoing oI an entire 'case or 'action
(admittedly, the language deIining 'actions in NRS 118A does little to clariIy that, and
seemingly Judge SIerrazza, Baker, and Coughlin were all thrown Ior a loop by NJCRCP 109,
which speaks to 'trials in the context oI 'summary evictions (with the concepts oI trials
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being viewed by all three as mutually exclusive Irom summary proceedings...however, a
review oI 'West's Analysis oI American Law and the index oI headnotes therein reveals that,
in Iact, there exists a head note within the 'summary proceedings section Ior possessory
actions that is titled 'trials, lending support Ior that which Judge SIerrazza did in setting a
trial Ior 10/25/11, even iI Judge SIerrazza's subsequent commentary on 10/25/11, aIter
admitting to Coughlin 'your're right. It is is a trial (whereupon Judge SIerrazza then
promptly attempted to coerce acquiescence Irom Coughlin to waiving the due process
procedural protections within NJCRCP 108 (in no case shall such occur less than 10 days
Irom....) and NJCRCP 109 by indicating that he would require Couglin deposit, on 11/1/11,
additional money (the monthly rent, $900) into the court's rent escrow account to preserve his
right to go to trial. This is violative oI NRS 40.385(2), at least in spirit.
' NRS40.385Stay oI execution upon appeal; duty oI tenant who retains possession oI
40.253:... '2.A tenant who retains possession oI the premises that are the subject oI the
appeal during the pendency oI the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided
in the underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes due. If the
tenant fails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new proceedings for a summary
eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253.
As to NJCRCP 109, given the language in NJCRCP 2, and the section heading prior to
Rule 101 therein, appears to allow Ior 'trials within a summary eviction setting, though the
'20 days to respond to a 'summons and complaint normally attendant to a 'civil
action/unlawIul detainer action (and this is where the language oI NRS 7.085 becomes
rather problematic to the extent it speaks to 'civil action or proceeding, especially when
view along with NRS 118A How are 'small claims actions appeal Iees limited to $15.00?
NRS 69.020 prevailing party entitled to costs. The prevailing party in justice courts is
entitled to costs oI the action, and also oI any proceedings taken in aia of an execution issued
upon any judgment recovered therein.
NRS 69.030 prevailing party allowed attorney`s feeto be taxed as costs in justice court.
The prevailing party in any civil action at law in the justice courts oI this State shall receive,
in addition to the costs oI court as now allowed by law, a reasonable attorney Iee. The
attorney fee shall be Iixed by the justice and taxed as costs against the losing party.
|Part 1911 CPA 872; A 1921, 89; 1925, 331; 1937, 30; 1931 NCL 9361|
NRS 69.040 costs must be included in judgment; cost bill; motion to retax costs.
1. The justice must tax and include in the judgment the costs allowed by law to the
prevailing party.
2. The party in whose Iavor judgment is rendered and who claims costs must deliver to
the justice, and serve a copy upon the adverse party, within 2 days aIter the verdict or notice
oI the decision oI the justice, or such Iurther time as may be granted, a memorandum oI the
items oI the costs and necessary disbursements in the action, which memorandum must be
veriIied by the oath oI the party or the party`s attorney or agent or by the clerk oI the party`s
attorney, stating that to the best oI his or her knowledge and belieI the items are correct and
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that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action. The party in whose Iavor
judgment is rendered shall be entitled to recover the witness Iees, although at the time the
party may not have actually paid them.
3. Issuance or service oI subpoena shall not be necessary to entitle the prevailing party to
tax as costs witness Iees and mileage, providing that such witnesses be sworn and testiIy in
the cause.
4. It shall not be necessary to embody in the memorandum the Iees oI the justice, but the
justice shall add the same according to the Iees oI the justice Iixed by statute.
5. Within 2 days aIter service oI a copy oI the memorandum, the adverse party may move
the court, upon 2 days` notice to retax and settle the costs, a copy oI which notice oI motion
shall be Iiled and served upon the prevailing party claiming costs, and thereupon the justice
shall settle the costs.
6. II the judgment is entered by deIault it shall not be necessary to make service oI a copy
oI the cost bill.
|1911 CPA 836; A 1913, 364; 1925, 15; NCL 9325|
NRS 69.050 Award oI costs to prevailing party by district court on appeal Irom justice
court. In the event oI an appeal, the district court is authorized to award to the prevailing
party all costs oI court as now allowed by law incurred by such party, and also a reasonable
attorney feeto be Iixed and allowed by the district court Ior all services rendered in behalI oI
the prevailing party.
Regardless, neither the 8/22/11 nor the 9/27/11 Notices (Exhibit's B and C at the
10/25/11 trial) contain that which they are required to under NRS 40.253(2)-(3), which is
ironic, considering that both oI those subsections became extremely key to this litigation (with
respect to the permissibility oI the corner cutting taken by the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice
(which led to Coughlin being subject to a lien and burglarized on 12/12/11 and made to wait
until 12/20/11 to even get his Hearing to contest the lient) in Iailing to do what every other
county in Nevada does (ie, post the 24 hour lock-out Orders, then wait 24 hours to eIIectuate
such lock-out) and the 10/4/11-10/5/11 unlawIul interruption oI essential services
(electricity), in Iact, is addressed by the the statute subsection 3 requires tenant's be advised oI
within such notices. DeIicient notice, jurisdictional prerequisites not met, lack oI subject
matter jurisdiction, Orders are void.
NRS40.253UnlawIul detainer: Supplemental remedy oI summary eviction and exclusion
oI tenant for default in payment of rent...
3.A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must:...
(2)That iI the court determines that the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer, the
court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order providing for
the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the county to
remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order; and
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attempting to block the tenant`s entry upon the premises or willIully interrupts or causes or
permits the interruption oI an essential service required by the rental agreement or chapter
118A oI NRS...
Baker's notices Iailed to 'advise the tenant under NRS40.253(3)(b)(2) that: '...iI the
court determines that the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer, the court may issue a
summary order for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance
of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within
24 hours after receipt of the order.... Rather, Baker's notices merely indicated: ' If you are
evicted, you may legally be locked out of the rental unit the same day Those are not
even close to the same thing.
Baker's notices Iailed to 'advise the tenant under NRS40.253(3)(b)(3) that:
'...pursuant to NRS 118A.390, a tenant may seek relieI iI a landlord unlawIully removes the
tenant Irom the premises or excludes the tenant by blocking or attempting to block the
tenant`s entry upon the premises or willIully interrupts or causes or permits the interruption oI
an essential service required by the rental agreement or chapter 118A oI NRS...
UnIortunately Ior landlord Merliss, Baker thought using Iorms would be good enough,
however, such 'Form #4 Iailed to satisIy NRS 40.253(2)-(3). But, at least 'Form #4 did
include some language that makes the lockout oI 11/1/11 even more illegal considering
Couglhin was entitled to rely upon its express indication that 'you have the right to petition
the court to continue in possession of the rental unit for an additional 30 days. If the
court denies your petition, you will be allowed to continue in possession of the rental unit
for five (5) calendar days following the date of entry of the order denying the petition.
That's the thing, though. By that notice's own language, Coughlin was entitled to 'continue in
possession ... 'Ior Iive (5) calendar days Iollowing the date oI entry for five (5) calendar
days following the date of entry of the order denying the petition . Judge SIerrazza still
has not denied Coughlin's Petition. Hill has aiagnosea Coughlin with some 'hoarder
condition (arguably a disability), though. :
Baker's 9/27/11 5 Day Notice of UD for Failure to Vacate, Notice of Summary
Eviction 40.254 provided that: 'PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to NRS 40.251, you
are in unlawIul detainer Ior Iailing to vacate and continuing in possession oI the rental unit
located at: 121 River Rock Street. Reno. Nevada 89503 aIter having been served the
Iollowing notice which has now expired:
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Court. If you are evicted, you may legally be locked out of the rental unit the same day.
date oI service oI this notice There is a Iiling feeoI $ 33.00 . II you are unable to pay the
Iiling Iee, you may Iile a written motion with the court requesting a feewaiver. II the court
grants your feewaiver, your Tenant's AIIidavit/Declaration will be Iiled at no charge. You
Whomever put together those Iorms on the website probably didn't get paid $70,000
Ior six weeks oI part time work, at most, to put them together, though.
'NRS40.370VeriIication oI complaint and answer.The complaint and answer must be
veriIied.
The RJC lacked subject matter jurisdiction in that the Landlord's AIIidavit was not
veriIied, or even Iiled, at the 10/13/11 Hearing,
Further, despite the indication in Anvui that, on appeal, summary evictions should be
reviewed based upon the 'summary judgment standard as 'they are analogous, that does
not mean that Coughlin was required to meet the summary judgment standard. Rather, the
exact language in NRS 40.253(6) speaks to when 'no legal deIense is present...which is
diIIerent than, as Judge Flanagan ruled, Coughlin Iailed to show there was a 'genuine issue oI
material Iact. Issues oI Iact and whether there is 'no legal deIense are Iundamentally
diIIerent things.
In Sellers v. Fourth Judicial Di.strict Court, 119 Nev. 256, 71 P.3d 495 (2003), Justice
Court awarded attorney's Iees to a prevailing selI..represcnted party, pursuant tl NRS 69.030.
Id., 119 Nev. at 257, 71 P.3d at 496. Because no , atttorney's Iees were incurred, the losing
party (Sellers) appealed and district court aIIirmedd the justice court decision. ld. Sellers then
Iiled a writ with the Nevada Supreme Court. ld. This Court granted a writ oI certiorari, voided
the award oI attorney's Iees, and directed the district court to remand the void order back to
Justice Court Ior moditietltion. ld., 119 Nev. a 260, 71 P.3d at 498. This Court Iound that the
district court exceeded its jurisdiction in allowing an award oI attorney's Iees to the
selt..represcnted prevailing party in justic' court. ld . By not complying with the statutory
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prerequisite Ii:Jr an (lw(lrd oI attorney's Iees, the justice court and district court lacked
jurisdiction to let stand an award 0 attorney's lees. Id., 119 Nev. a|258, 71 P.3d at 497. When
statutes create a proceeding or remedy, the Iailure to Iollow those statutes divests a court oI
subject matter jurisdiction. Ex. ReI. WolIv. Justice oI thc Peace , 47 Nev. 359, 364, 223 P.
821, 822 (1924). In Nevada, unlawIul detainer actions (lr statutory creations. NRS 40.2515-
40,425. In a summary eviction, and aU othcr unlawIul detainer (lctions, the Nevada Supreme
Court has held that the mode oI acquiring jurisdiction "should be strictly pursued. . .. Where a
statute prescribes the mode oI acquiring jurisdiction, that mode must be complied with or the
proceedings are a nullity.' Paul v. Armstrong, 1 Nev. 70 (1865); see also C.H.A Vt:nture v.
G.e. Wallace Cons. Eng., 106 Nev. 381, 794 r.2d 708 (1990) (reh'g denied) (where this Court
adheres to th' same rule in all cases). The unl(lwthl detainer proceeding was unknown at
eommon la and "purely a statutory proceeding (md remedy .... " Gibby's v. Aylett, 96 Nev.
678, 680- 681,615 P.2d 949, 951(1980). "As such, the statute must bc strictly construed and is
presumably exclusivc (lnd eomplete as to thc procedure to be Iollowed pursuant to it." Td.
Here, Judge Bixler exceeded the court's jurisdiction by Iuiling to Iollow the statutorily
prescribed procedure and dismiss the eviction where W alker House did not have a righ to
judgment as a mutter oI law and hmes raised a lcgal deIense by showing that, genuine issue
oI material Iact existed. 2. Summary Eviction proceedings under NRS 40.253(6) arc reviewed
as iI the were (I summary judgment motion.This Court has held that review oI a summary
eviction order is similar to th granting oI summary judgment under FeRr 56, I.e. the review is
"de novo to determin whether the evidenee properly beIore the district court 'demonstratelsl
that no genuine issue as to any material Iact |remains| and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgm.en as a matter oIlaw.'" Anvui v. G.L. Dragon, 123 Nev. 205, 213,163 P.3d 405,407
(2007 (quote removed). NRS 40.253(6) states that aIter a hearing "to determine the
truthIulness and suI'Iiekncy oI |the atlidavits and notices tiled, summary eviction will be
granted| |iJi the court dctcrmines that there is no legal deIense ... and the tenant is guilty oI m
unlawIul detainer." However, iI the landlord Iails to establish that she is cntitled t judgment
as a matter oI law or the tenant in a proceeding under NRS 40.253(6) does show a legal
deIense to the alleged unlawIul detainer, the action under NRS 40.253 must be dismissed and
proceedings must be conducted pursuant to the more Ionnal evictio proccdures in NRS 40.290
to 40.420. Any Iurther inquiry exceeds the court's jurisdiction. 3. 'Inc I,andlord bears thc
initial burden oI production in a summary judgme n motion, and present evidence that wou.ld
entitle her to a judgmcnt oI as a llmttcr oI law in the absence on contrary evidenced. The party
moving Ior summary judgment has the burden oI pro duet ion to show th absence oI a
genuine issue oI m aterial Iact. CU:CLC v. Unlv. & Cmty. College Sys., 123 Nev. 598, 172
P.3d 131 (2007) (citing Wood v. Saieway, 121 Nev. 724, 732, 121 P.3d 1026, 1031 (2005.
In a summary eviction proceeding, the landlord is the moving party because she is the party
seeking the cviction. Thus, the landlord has the burden 0 production in a summary eviction
ease. II the moving party in a summary judgment case would have the burden 0 persuasioIl at
a trial, she must meet her burden oI production by presenting evidence tha would entitle her
to a judgmcnt as a matter oI law in the absence oI contrary evidence. Cuzze, 123 Nev. at 602,
172 P.3d at 134 (citing Cclotrcx Corp. v Catrectt, 477 US 317, 106 St. Ct. 2548 (1986. In
breach oI contract cases, the party alleging the breach has the burden oI prooI. Williston on
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Contracts 63.14; see also Mullins v. TcstAmerica. Inc., 564FJd 386, 411 (5th CiI. Tcx.
2009); Midwcst Oilsecds, Inc. v. Ljmagrai Genetics Corp., 387 F.3d 705, 720 (8th Cir. Iowa
20(4); Sa/eeo Ins. Co. oI America v. City oI White House. Tcnn., 191 FJd 675.682 (6'11 Cir.
1999); Technica.1 A..sistancc Int'l v.United Slates, 150 .F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fcd. Cir. 1998);
and,F irestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pearson. 769 F.2d 1471. 1482 (lOth CiI. Utah 1(85). As
the burden oI persuasiol1 L part oI the burden oIprool.. Rivera v. Philip Morris, 209 P.3d
271,275 (2009), the party alleging lhe brcach oI a contract has thc burden oI pcrsuasion. In an
eviction Il)r cause, the landlord alleges a brcach oI the lcase. Thus, th landlord would have the
burden oI persuasion at a trial. As thc landlord has the burdcn oI persuasion, shc must satisIy
her burden oI production in a summary eviction action b presenting evidence 111at would
entitle her to a judgment as a matter oI law in the absence oI contrary evidence. Gcneral
allegations and conclusions are not enough to meet the burden 01 production in a summary
judgment. Pegasus v. Reno Newspapcr.., Inc., 118 Nev. 706, 713, 57 P3d 82, 87 (2002).
SpcciI1cally. summary judgmcnt rcquires 1111t supporting am opposing anjdavits sh(I\l set
I)rth such Iacts as would be admissible in evidence, an shall show aIilrmativc1y that the
aIIiant is competent to testily to the matters therein. Gunlord Corp. v. B07211110, 95 Nev.
243, 245, 591 P2d 1149, 1151 ( l 978). Moreover, sworn or certiIied copies oI all papcrs or
parts rcIt.'rred to in an aIIidavit must be attached |0 the summary judgment motion. Gunlord,
243 Ncv. at 245. When the mandate oIlhL' rule is not met the court will regard the papers as
legally insuIIicient. Gunlord, 243 Nev. at 245 (citing Saki v. Sahara-Nevada Corp., 92 Nev.
703, 558 P.2d 535 (1976) and Catrone v. 105 Casino Corp., 82 Nev. 1 66,414 P.2d 106
(1966)). 'Ihus. a landlord Hlin, Ior a summary eviction is required to have personal
knowledge oI the non-payment an explain why she is compctent to testiIy to thc lack oI
paymcnt. Additionally, where til landlord's knowledge oI the lack oI payment derives Irom
her business records, (\s i almost always will, she must also provide some kind oI regularly
kept business reeor showing a lack oI payment II the landlord does not provide this
inIormation, she hai 111ikd to meet her burden oI production and the summary eviction
should be dismissed. 4. 1he Court below exceeded its jurisdiction by tailing to disnriss the
sUlIlmar eviction where W(llker House did meet its initial burden oI pro duet ion. H.ere,
Walker House Iailed to meet its burden oI production and thus the eviction should have been
dismissed at the Justicc Court level. Walker H.ouse's manager did no have personal
knowledge oI .Twpes' alleged nonpaymcnt because she was not th manager oI the property
during the months she claimed that J ames had Iailed to pay hi. rent. |Exhibit 4, 6, and 7.| Nor
did she provide Justice Court with business records indicating that .Tames did not pay his
rent, because the judge in Justice Court had h continue the hearing to allow her to go back and
examine Walker .House's records to se iI she could account Ior James' payments. |Exhibit 6.|
Walker I-louse tailed to meet its burden oI production at the Iirst eviction hearing where the
manager did not hav' personal knowledge oI the alleged nOll-payment and did not provide
bnsiness records t( substantiate her claims. As Walker House Iailed to meet its burden
oIproduction it was not entitled to . summary evictioIl and the Justice Court should have
dismissed the case outright at th Iirst hearing. Where the Justice Court Iailed to dismiss the
case as required by NRS 40.253 and the District Court upheld the Justice Court's decision,
both courts exceeded their jurisdiction by Iailing to Iollow the summary eviction procedures
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under NRS 40.253. 5. 111e Court below exceeded its jurisdiction by Ihiling to dismiss the eas
where James provided a legal thet by sho"ring a genuine issue oI material thct existed. Under
NRS 40.253, a tellllnt may deIeat a landlord's claim Ior summary evictiol by presenting a
lcgal deIense. Demonstrating a genuine issue oI material Iact constitutes a legal deIense and
the tenant's claims are reviewed as iI the tenant were contesting ( summary eviction motion.
Anvui, 123 Nev. at 213. When reviewing a motion 1'0 summary judgment, the evidence, and
any reasonable inIerences drawn Irom it, must be viewed in the light most Iavorable to the
nonmoving party. Lipps v. Southern Nevada Paving, 116 Nev. 497, 498, 998 P.2d 1183, 1184
(2000) (citing Butler V. Bogdanovich, IOl Nev. 449, 451, 705 P.2d 662, 663 (1985. 'J'he
non-moving party may not rest upon general allegatiolls and conclusions, but lllllst, by
aIIidavit or otherwise, set Iorth speciH ' Iacts demollstrating the existence oI a genuine Iactual
issue. Pegasus v. Ren Newspapers, Inc., 1 18 Nev. 706, 713, 57 P.3d 82, 87 (2002). "The non-
moving party's documentation must be admissiblc evidence," as he " is not entitled to build a
case on th gossamer threads oI whimsy, speculation and conjecture.'" Pegasus, 118 Nev. at
713-7 14 (quoting Posadas v. C ity oI Reno, 109 Nev. 448, 452 (Nev. 1993) (quoting Collins
v. Union Fed. Savings and Loan, 99 Nev. 284, 302, 662 P. 2d 610,621 (1983. However, all
oI the non-moving party's statements must bc accepted a s true, all reasonabl interenees that
can be drawn Irom the evidence must be admitted, and the court may no decide issues oI
credibility based upon the evidence submitted in the motion or tht: opposition. Pegasus, 1 18
Nev. at 714 (quoting Great Am. I ns. Co. v. General Builders, Inc., 1 13 Nev. 346, 351 (Nev.
1997. A party can demonstrate that a Iactual dispute L' genuine when tho evidence is such til
at a rational trier oI Iact could return a ver dict J() the nonmoving party. Wood v. SaIeway,
121 Nev. 724, 732, 121 1'.3d 1026, 1031 (2005). |'he non-moving party is not required to
show that a Iin ding in their iavor is the mos likely or most plausible outcome, only that the
rational trier oI Iact could decide in tllei Iavor. Here, both the J ust ice Court and the District
Court exceeded their jurisdiction by Iailing to dismiss the summary eviction proceedi ng
against James where he htl established that a genuine issue oI material Ihct existed. In his
initial Motion to Stay 0 Vacate, .James specitieally alleged that he was current on his rent.
|Exhibit 4.| When James appeared in courl on July 7, 20 1 1, he prcsented money order
receipts and a carbo copy oI a check to support his claim that he had paid the rent Ior the
disputed months. |Exhibit 5.J Moreover, Walker Housc's representative admitted that the
prcviou ' manager had leIt the oIIices in disarray and thaI Walker House was unable to
account Ior some rental payments. Viewing the Iacts in light most Iavorable to James, there is
nc doubt that a rational trier oI Illct could Iind that James paid his rent and the previou,'
management misplaced or improperly accounted Ior the checks. Thus, James established the
existence oI a genuine issue oI material Ihct. Because James raised these issues .it his aItidavit
in Justice Court, NRS 40.253(3) required the Court to dismiss the summary cviction.4 11lUS,
the lack oI jurisdiction supports the issuance oI a writ oI certiorari reversing Judge Bixler's
order dismissing James' appeal or ordering the District Court t\ show c,tUse why such order
should not be dismissed.
NRS40.380Provisions governing appeals.Either party may, within 10 days, appeal
Irom the judgment rendered. But an appeal by the deIendant shall not stay the execution oI
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the judgment, unless, within the 10 days, the deIendant shall execute and Iile with the court or
justice the deIendant`s undertaking to the plaintiII, with two or more sureties, in an amount to
be Iixed by the court or justice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount of the
judgment and costs, to the eIIect that, iI the judgment appealed Irom be aIIirmed or the
appeal be dismissed, the appellant will pay the judgment and the cost oI appeal, the value oI
the use and occupation oI the property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiII during the
pendency oI the appeal. Upon taking the appeal and Iiling the undertaking, all Iurther
proceedings in the case shall be stayed.
Where Judge SIerrazza's 11/2/11 Post-It Note Order (check date) purports to deny
Coughlin's 'Motion to Stay by indicating Coughlin Iailed to post the supersedeas bond
'within 10 days, apparently invoking the language in NRS 40.380. However, that statute
applies to 'judgments, which issue Irom plenary 'actions, not 'summary eviction
proceedings
judgments and orders are terms that are very diIIerent in terms oI meaning. In court, a
judgment is a decision with Iinality in which a court has issued to end, close, or clear a
lawsuit or prosecution. It is the last segment oI an ordinary court case. judgments thus create
resolutions Ior controversies and determine what each party or side is obligated to do (pay
charges, be imprisoned, or be cleared Irom all charges). These obligations are part oI the
content stated within the judgment. Other statements within the judgment are the telling oI
the winning party and injunctive relieI among others. Unlike court orders, judgments usually
Iollow a Iormat. AIter all Iact presentations, evidence gatherings, thorough interrogations and
Iault Iinding mechanisms have all been exhausted, the court is then bound to seal it all with a
Iinal verdict. judgments Iormally end the court`s hold oI the case. It is the result oI an
adjudication (balancing evidences). On the other hand, the court judge is the one who
proclaims a court order. This actually tells the legal connection between the involved parties
to a court case. It may also dictate what measures each or all sides must do with regard to the
case. A common example oI such is a temporary restraining order or TRO. Ideally, it is just
the judge who is going to sign the written order but in some areas, a notarization oI the order
is also mandatory. Unlike judgments, the judge may just verbally state his orders in the court,
which will be transcribed later in by the stenographer in some occasions. Summary:
1.judgments end the court case whereas an order does not. 2.The content oI a court
judgment usually Iollows a standard Iormat that involves the conditions to be carried out and
many others while a court order can have a simple small content as short as a mere date
depending on the type oI case. 3.Because oI the nature oI the document, judgments are
almost always put into writing while orders can be verbally proclaimed by the judge in some
cases. http://www.diIIerencebetween.net/miscellaneous/diIIerence-between-judgment-and-
order/#ixzz2OupiNhP8
Did the revisions to NRS 40.385 become eIIective on 10/1/11? II so, do such apply to
Coughlin's Motion Ior Stay since 10/13/11? How does that relate to CV11-03051?
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NRS40.385Stay oI execution upon appeal; duty oI tenant who retains possession oI
40.253:
1.Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of execution may be
obtained by filing with the trial court a bond in the amount oI $250 to cover the expected
costs on appeal. A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction oI the appellate court and
irrevocably appoints the clerk oI that court as the surety`s agent upon whom papers aIIecting
the surety`s liability upon the bond may be served. Liability oI a surety may be enIorced, or
the bond may be released, on motion in the appellate court without independent action. A
tenant of commercial property may obtain a stay of execution only upon the issuance of
a stay pursuant to Rule 8 of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure and the posting of
a supersedeas bond in the amount of 100 percent of the unpaid rent claim of the
landlord.
2.A tenant who retains possession oI the premises that are the subject oI the appeal
during the pendency oI the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided in the
(Added to NRS by 1997, 3510; A 2011, 1492)
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2011 Statutes of Nevada, Page 1485
Assembly Bill No. 398Assemblyman Ohrenschall

Joint Sponsor: Senator Parks

CHAPTER 271

|Approved: June 4, 2011|

AN ACT relating to commercial tenancies; prohibiting a landlord`s interIerence with a
tenant`s use oI commercial premises under certain circumstances; establishing a
procedure Ior a tenant to recover possession oI commercial premises Iollowing a
lockout; setting Iorth the circumstances under which a tenant can be presumed to have
abandoned commercial premises; repealing and reenacting provisions relating to the
disposal oI personal property abandoned by a tenant on commercial premises; and
providing other matters properly relating thereto.
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Legislative Counsel`s Digest:
Section 14 oI this bill prohibits a landlord Irom interIering in certain manners with a
tenant`s use oI commercial premises.
Section 15 oI this bill establishes a process Ior a tenant to recover possession oI
commercial premises Irom which a landlord has locked the tenant out.
Section 15.5 oI this bill provides that the justice court has jurisdiction over any civil
action or proceeding concerning the exclusion oI a tenant Irom commercial premises or the
summary eviction oI a tenant Irom commercial premises in which no party is seeking
damages.Section 15.5 also provides that certain provisions oI existing law governing actions
Ior the recovery oI a debt secured by a mortgage or other lien and the doctrines oI res judicata
and collateral estoppel do not apply to: (1) a claim by a landlord Ior contractual damages
which is brought subsequent to an action by the landlord Ior the summary eviction oI a tenant
Irom commercial premises; or (2) an action by a landlord Ior the summary eviction oI a
tenant Irom commercial premises which is brought subsequent to a claim by the landlord Ior
contractual damages.
Sections 16 and 27 oI this bill repeal and reenact provisions authorizing a landlord to
dispose oI abandoned personal property leIt on commercial premises by a tenant under
certain circumstances.
Section 26.3 oI this bill revises provisions governing the granting oI a stay oI execution
to a tenant oI commercial property who appeals an order oI eviction by providing that the
tenant may obtain a stay oI execution only upon the issuance oI a stay pursuant to Rule 8 oI
the Nevada Rules oI Appellate Procedure and the posting oI a supersedeas bond in the amount
oI 100 percent oI the unpaid rent claim oI the landlord.
EXPLANATION Matter in bolded italics is new; matter between brackets omitted
material] is material to be omitted.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, REPRESENTED IN
SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
Section 1. Title 10 of NRS is hereby amended by adding thereto a new chapter to consist
oI the provisions set Iorth as sections 2 to 24, inclusive, oI this act.
Sec. 2. As used in sections 2 to 24, inclusive, of this act, unless the context otherwise
requires, the words and terms defined in sections 3 to 12, inclusive, of this act, have the
meanings ascribed to them in those sections.
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Sec. 3. 'Abandoned personal property" means any personal property which is left
unattended on commercial premises after the termination of the tenancy and which is not
removed by the tenant or a person who has an ownership interest in the personal property
within 14 days after the date on which the landlord mailed, by certified mail, return receipt
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requested, notice of the landlord's intention to dispose of the personal property, as required
by paragraph (a) of subsection 1 of section 1 of this act.
Sec. 4. 'action" includes a counterclaim, crossclaim, third-party claim or any other
proceeding in which rights are determined.
Sec. 4.5. 'commercial premises" means any real property other than premises as
defined in ARS 118A.14.
ARS 118A.8 "Dwelling" and "dwelling unit" defined. "Dwelling" or "dwelling unit"
means a structure or the part of a structure that is occupied as, or designed or intended for
occupancy as, a residence or sleeping place by one person who maintains a household or
by two or more persons who maintain a common household.
ARS 118A.14 "Premises" defined. "Premises" means a dwelling unit and the
structure of which it is a part, facilities, furniture, utilities and appurtenances therein and
grounds, areas and facilities held out for the use of tenants.
Sec. 5. 'Court" means the district court, justice court or other court of competent
jurisdiction situated in the county or township wherein the commercial premises are
located.
Sec. 6. 'Landlord" means a person who provides commercial premises for use by
another person pursuant to a rental agreement.
Sec. 7. 'Owner" means one or more persons, jointly or severally, in whom is vested:
1. All or part of the legal title to a commercial premises, except a trustee under a deed
of trust who is not in possession of the commercial premises; or
2. All or part of the beneficial ownership, and a right to present use and enjoyment of
the commercial premises.
Sec. 8. 'Person" includes a government, a governmental agency and a political
subdivision of a government.
Sec. 9. 'Rent" means all periodic payments to be made to the landlord for occupancy of
commercial premises, including, without limitation, all reasonable and actual late fees set
forth in the rental agreement.
Sec. 10. 'Rental agreement" means an agreement to lease or sublease commercial
premises for a term less than life which provides for the periodic payment of rent.
Sec. 11. (Deleted by amendment.)
Sec. 12. '1enant" means a person who has the right to possess commercial premises
pursuant to a rental agreement.
Sec. 13. 1he provisions of sections 2 to 24, inclusive, of this act apply only to the
relationship between landlords and tenants of commercial premises.
Sec. 14. 1. A landlord or a landlord's agent may not interrupt or cause the interruption
of utility service paid for directly to the utility company by a tenant unless the interruption
results from construction, bona fide repairs or an emergency.
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2. A landlord may not remove:
(a) A door, window or attic hatchway cover;
(b) A lock, latch, hinge, hinge pin, doorknob or other mechanism connected to a door,
window or attic hatchway cover; or
(c) Furniture, fixtures or appliances furnished by the landlord,
from commercial premises unless the landlord removes the item for a bona fide repair or
replacement. If a landlord removes any of the items listed in this subsection for a bona fide
repair or replacement, the repair or replacement must be promptly performed.
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3. A landlord may not intentionally prevent a tenant from entering the commercial
premises except by judicial process unless the exclusion results from:
(a) Construction, bona fide repairs or an emergency;
(b) Removing the contents of commercial premises abandoned by a tenant; or
(c) Changing the door locks of a tenant who is delinquent in paying at least part of the
rent.
4. If a landlord or a landlord's agent changes the door lock of commercial premises
leased to a tenant who is delinquent in paying rent, the landlord or agent must, for a period
of not less than 5 business days, place a written notice on the front door of the commercial
premises stating the name and the address or telephone number of the person or company
from which the new key may be obtained. 1he new key is required to be provided only
during the regular business hours of the tenant and only if the tenant pays the delinquent
rent.
5. If a landlord or a landlord's agent violates this section, the tenant may:
(a) Recover possession of the commercial premises; and
(b) Recover from the landlord an amount equal to the sum of the tenant's actual
damages, one month's rent or $5, whichever is greater, reasonable attorney's fees and
court costs, less any delinquent rents or other sums for which the tenant is liable to the
landlord.
. A rental agreement supersedes this section to the extent of any conflict.
Sec. 15. 1. If a landlord locks a tenant out of commercial premises that are subject to a
rental agreement in violation of section 14 of this act, the tenant may recover possession of
the commercial premises as provided by this section.
2. A tenant must file with the justice court of the township in which the commercial
premises are located a verified complaint for reentry, specifying the facts of the alleged
unlawful lockout by the landlord or the landlord's agent. 1he tenant must also state orally
under oath to the court the facts of the alleged unlawful lockout.
3. If a tenant has complied with subsection 2 and if the court reasonably believes an
unlawful lockout may have occurred, the court:
(a) Shall issue an order requiring the tenant to post a bond in an amount equal to 1
month of rent; and
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(b) Upon the posting of the bond, may issue, ex parte, a temporary writ of restitution
that entitles the tenant to immediate and temporary possession of the commercial premises,
pending a final hearing on the tenant's verified complaint for reentry.
4. A temporary writ of restitution must be served on the landlord or the landlord's agent
in the same manner as a writ of restitution in a forcible detainer action. A sheriff or
constable may use reasonable force in executing a temporary writ of restitution under this
subsection.
5. 1he court shall hold a hearing on a tenant's verified complaint for reentry. A
temporary writ of restitution must notify the landlord of the pendency of the matter and the
date of the hearing. 1he hearing must be held not earlier than the first judicial day and not
later than the fifth judicial day after the date on which the court issues the temporary writ
of restitution.
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. A party may appeal from the court's judgment at the hearing on the verified
complaint for reentry in the same manner as a party may appeal a judgment in an action
for forcible detainer.
7. If a writ of restitution is issued, the writ supersedes a temporary writ of restitution.
8. If the landlord or the person on whom a writ of restitution is served fails to
immediately comply with the writ or later disobeys the writ, the failure is grounds for
contempt of court against the landlord or the person on whom the writ was served, under
chapter 22 of ARS.
9. 1his section does not affect a tenant's right to pursue a separate cause of action
under section 14 of this act.
1. If a tenant in bad faith files a sworn complaint for reentry resulting in a writ of
restitution being served on the landlord or landlord's agent, the landlord may in a separate
cause of action recover from the tenant an amount equal to actual damages, one month's
rent or $5, whichever is greater, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of court, less any
sums for which the landlord is liable to the tenant.
11. 1his section does not affect the rights of a landlord or tenant in a forcible detainer,
unlawful detainer or forcible entry and detainer action.
Sec. 15.5. 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, the justice court has
jurisdiction over any civil action or proceeding concerning the exclusion of a tenant from
commercial premises or the summary eviction of a tenant from commercial premises in
which no party is seeking damages.
2. If a landlord combines an action for summary eviction of a tenant from commercial
premises with a claim to recover contractual damages, jurisdiction over the claims rests
with the court which has jurisdiction over the amount in controversy.
3. 1he provisions of ARS 4.43 and the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel do not apply to:
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(a) A claim by a landlord for contractual damages which is brought subsequent to an
action by the landlord for the summary eviction of a tenant from commercial premises; or
(b) An action by a landlord for the summary eviction of a tenant from commercial
premises which is brought subsequent to a claim by the landlord for contractual damages.
Sec. 16. 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, a landlord who leases or
subleases any commercial premises under a rental agreement that has been terminated for
any reason may, in accordance with the following provisions, dispose of any abandoned
personal property, regardless of its character, left on the commercial premises without
incurring any civil or criminal liability:
(a) 1he landlord may dispose of the abandoned personal property and recover his or her
reasonable costs out of the abandoned personal property or the value thereof if the
landlord has notified the tenant in writing of the landlord's intention to dispose of the
abandoned personal property and 14 days have elapsed since the notice was mailed to the
tenant. 1he notice must be mailed, by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the tenant
at the tenant's present address, and if that address is unknown, then at the tenant's last
known address.
(b) 1he landlord may charge and collect the reasonable and actual costs of inventory,
moving and safe storage, if necessary, before releasing the abandoned personal property to
the tenant or his or her authorized representative rightfully claiming the abandoned
personal property within the appropriate period set forth in paragraph (a).
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the abandoned personal property to the tenant or his or her authorized representative
rightfully claiming the abandoned personal property within the appropriate period set forth
in paragraph (a).
(c) Jehicles must be disposed of in the manner provided in chapter 487 of ARS for
abandoned vehicles.
2. A tenant of commercial premises is presumed to have abandoned the premises if:
(a) Coods, equipment or other property, in an amount substantial enough to indicate a
probable intent to abandon the commercial premises, is being or has been removed from
the commercial premises; and
(b) 1he removal is not within the normal course of business of the tenant.
3. If a written agreement between a landlord and a person who has an ownership
interest in any abandoned personal property of the tenant contains provisions which relate
to the removal and disposal of abandoned personal property, the provisions of the
agreement determine the rights and obligations of the landlord and the person with respect
to the removal and disposal of the abandoned personal property.
4. Any dispute relating to the amount of the costs claimed by the landlord pursuant to
paragraph (b) of subsection 1 may be resolved using the procedure provided in subsection 7
of ARS 4.253.
Secs. 17-24. (Deleted by amendment.)
Sec. 25. NRS 118.171 is hereby amended to read as Iollows:
118.171 As used in NRS 118.171 to 118.207,] 118.25, inclusive, unless the context
otherwise requires:
1. 'Abandoned personal property means any personal property which is leIt unattended
on any commercial premises aIter the termination oI the tenancy and which is not removed
by the tenant or a person who has a perIected lien on, or perIected security interest in, the
personal property within 14 days aIter the later oI the date on which the landlord:
(a) Mailed, by certiIied mail, return receipt requested, notice oI the landlord`s intention to
dispose oI the personal property, as required by subparagraph (1) oI paragraph (a) oI
subsection 1 oI NRS 118.207; or
(b) Provided notice to a person who has a perIected lien on, or a perIected security interest
in, the personal property that the personal property has been leIt on the premises, as required
by subparagraph (2) oI paragraph (a) oI subsection 1 oI NRS 118.207.
2.] 'Real property includes an apartment, a dwelling, a mobile home that is owned by a
landlord and located on property owned by the landlord and commercial premises.
3.] 2. 'Rental agreement means an agreement to lease or sublease real property Ior a
term less than liIe which provides Ior the periodic payment oI rent.
4.] 3. 'Tenant means a person who has the right to possess real property pursuant to a
rental agreement.
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the motion and order a copy served upon the landlord by the sheriII, constable or other
(a) Determine the costs, iI any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118.207
or] 118A.460 or section 1 of this actand any accumulating daily costs; and
(b) Order the release oI the tenant`s property upon the payment oI the charges determined
to be due or iI no charges are determined to be due.
9. A landlord shall not reIuse to accept rent Irom a tenant that is submitted aIter the
landlord or the landlord`s agent has served or had served a notice pursuant to subsection 1 iI
the reIusal is based on the Iact that the tenant has not paid collection Iees, attorney`s Iees or
other costs other than rent, a reasonable charge Ior late payments oI rent or dishonored
checks, or a security. As used in this subsection, 'security has the meaning ascribed to it in
NRS 118A.240.
10. This section does not apply to the tenant oI a mobile home lot in a mobile home park
or to the tenant oI a recreational vehicle lot in an area oI a mobile home park in this State
other than an area designated as a recreational vehicle lot pursuant to the provisions oI
subsection 6 oI NRS 40.215.
Sec. 26.3. NRS 40.385 is hereby amended to read as Iollows:
action. A tenant of commercial property may obtain a stay of execution only upon the
landlord.
Sec. 26.5. NRS 40.430 is hereby amended to read as Iollows:
40.430 1. Except in cases where a person proceeds under subsection 2 oI NRS 40.495 or
subsection 1 oI NRS 40.512,and except as otherwise provided in section 15.5 of this
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act, there may be but one action Ior the recovery oI any debt, or Ior the enIorcement oI any
right secured by a mortgage or other lien upon real estate. That action must be in accordance
with the provisions oI NRS 40.430 to 40.459, inclusive. In that action, the judgment must be
rendered Ior the amount Iound due the plaintiII, and the court, by its decree or judgment,
may direct a sale oI the encumbered property, or such part thereoI as is necessary, and apply
the proceeds oI the sale as provided in NRS 40.462.
NRS 40.253(5):Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(a)The landlord or the landlord`s agent may apply by affidavit of complaint for
eviction to the justice court oI the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or
or contain:
(3)The amounts oI any cleaning, security or rent deposits paid in advance, in excess
oI the Iirst month`s rent, by the tenant.
(5)The length oI time the tenant has remained in possession without paying rent.
(7)A statement that the written notice was served on the tenant in accordance with
NRS 40.280.
(b)Except when the tenant has timely Iiled the aIIidavit described in subsection 3 and a
Iile-stamped copy oI it has been received by the landlord or the landlord`s agent, and except
when the landlord is prohibited pursuant to NRS 118A.480, the landlord or the landlord`s
agent may, in a peaceable manner, provide Ior the nonadmittance oI the tenant to the premises
by locking or otherwise.
6.Upon the Iiling by the tenant oI the aIIidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless oI
the inIormation contained in the aIIidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the affidavit
permitted by subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall hold a hearing,
aIter service oI notice oI the hearing upon the parties, to determine the truthIulness and
suIIiciency oI any aIIidavit or notice provided Ior in this section. II the court determines that
there is no legal deIense as to the alleged unlawIul detainer and the tenant is guilty oI an
unlawIul detainer, the court may issue a summary order Ior removal oI the tenant or an order
providing Ior the nonadmittance oI the tenant. II the court determines that there is a legal
deIense as to the alleged unlawIul detainer, the court shall reIuse to grant either party any
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relieI, and, except as otherwise provided in this subsection, shall require that any Iurther
proceedings be conducted pursuant to NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive. The issuance oI a
summary order Ior removal oI the tenant does not preclude an action by the tenant Ior any
damages or other relieI to which the tenant may be entitled. II the alleged unlawIul detainer
was based upon subsection 5 oI NRS 40.2514, the reIusal by the court to grant relieI does not
preclude the landlord thereaIter Irom pursuing an action Ior unlawIul detainer in accordance
with NRS 40.251.

'NRS40.254UnlawIul detainer: Supplemental remedy oI summary eviction and exclusion
oI tenant Irom certain types oI property...
3.II the tenant is Iound guilty oI unlawIul detainer as a result of the tenant`s violation
oI any oI the provisions oI NRS 453.011 to 453.552, inclusive, except NRS 453.336, the
landlord is entitled to be awarded any reasonable attorney`s fees incurred by the landlord
or the landlord`s agent as a result oI a hearing, iI any, held pursuant to subsection 6 oI NRS
40.253 wherein the tenant contested the eviction.
Despite the Iact that Baker had to admit he had not actually read any part oI NRS 453
(UniIorm Controlled Substances Act), despite moving Ior some $18,000 in attorney's fee in
the trial court incident to the one paragraph long attorney's feeprovision in NRS 40.254
(which is an exceedingly short statute in its own right), Hill was or is, apparently, still holding
out some hope oI not only damaging Coughlin's reputation by lying about him or purposeIully
attempting to mislead (vitamins are characterized in Hill's 11/20/11 Declaration as 'a large
quantity oI pills, but see the video Hill and Merliss Iilmed and provided to the Reno City
Attorney, especially 'Zach's Arrest 014 where such is revealed to be vitamins), but also,
perhaps, still having a shot at getting that $18,000 in attorney's Iees. However, once again,
Hill was too lazy to read the exception to that statute, which, even iI Hill's inIerence implicit
to his declaring 'a crack pipe and bag oI weed was Iound in Coughlin's Iormer law oIIice
(which Coughlin, under penalty oI perjury swears he had no 'crack pipe nor any 'bag oI
weed in his oIIice at any time (the timing, content, lack oI reporting to the police where he
calls the police about anything and everything else, and other circumstances attendant to such
allegations in Hill's Declaration make such extremely suspect) were true. But, oI course, Hill
presents a 'so when did you stop beating your wiIe scenario...can't exactly say Ior sure one
knows Hill is lying, but, perhaps could reasonably assume he is lying.
NRS 453.336 UnlawIul possession not Ior purpose oI sale: Prohibition; penalties.
Again, with the Iorms. Exhibit D Irom the 10/25/11 trial starts with the alleged
'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit by landlord Merliss, which Iails to contain all required by NRS
40.254(2), and which does not appear to be Iile stamped, and its not clear that it was Iiled in
the RJC when Baker's 10/19/11 Declaration indicates it was. It reads:
~Unlawful Detainer Affidavit
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Coughlin located at 121 Rjyer Rock. Reno. NV 89503 on March 1, 2010....- with periodic
any kind.
named premises.
NRS, Chapter 40.
INFORMATION
iI the signor is known to the notary public. 1he seal and signature cannot be affixed to a
document without the correct notarial wording. As an additional option an affiant can
produce an affidavit on the same document as as the notarial certificate wording to
eliminate the use of additional documentation.
to have even been Iiled prior to the 10/13/11 hearing, in violation oI NRS 40.253(5)-(6)) to
contain:
(a)The date when the tenancy commenced, the term of the tenancy, and, iI any, a copy
of the rental agreement.
(c)The date when the tenant became subject to the provisions of NRS 40.251 to
40.2516, inclusive, together with any supporting facts.
(d)The date when the written notice was given, a copy of the notice and a statement
that notice was served in accordance with NRS 40.280.
(e)A statement that the claim for relief was authorized by law.
So, basically, Merliss's 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit lacked all required under
NRS 40.253(2). Baker appears to have Iraudulently attempted to ameliorate his earlier
reliance on Iorms in his 10/19/11 Declaration, but to the extent that purports to be based upon
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information and belief, it does not qualiIy (to hear Panel Chair Echeverria tell it) as
'veriIied (particularly where its not even Merliss signing the Declaration, but his out oI state
attorney, also out oI County as Baker's Declaration indicates) under NRS40.370
Verification of complaint and answer.The complaint and answer must be verified.
Additionally, and this is Iurther evidence oI the Iraud oI Merliss and Baker, even during his
'testimony during the 10/25/11 'trial Merliss and Baker continued to attempt to hoodwink
the court, particularly in attempting to assert that Merliss himselI, rather than Baker, had,
upon the admission thereoI oI his 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit on 10/25/11 and some rather
Iraudulent questioning by Baker, thereaIter submitted and or testiIied to all that which is
required under NRS 40.254(2). However, aside Irom Ialsely testiIying about iI the lease had
'expired or terminated, and Ialsely stating a date oI expiration or termination oI the lease as
Iound within the lease, and being twelve months aIter February 20
th
, 2012 Merliss Iailed to, at
any point, testiIy or sign an AIIidavit stating that his claim Ior relieI was 'authorized by law.
And Judge SIerrazza made clear that Baker would not be allowed to make such veriIied
statement Ior him. And Baker successIully avoided eliciting such a statement Irom his client
(why he didn't isn't clear, because, clearly, it wasn't to prevent his client Irom lying, as Merliss
already did upon his testiIying that the lease expired by its terms on February 20
th
, 2011, even
reIerencing some alleged date oI expiration within Paragraph 2 oI the lease, where, clearly
there is none). While such a statement Irom Merliss that his 'claim Ior relieI was authorized
by law would have been a lie (Ior his claim to have been 'authorized by law pursuant to the
statutory section under which he proceeded, NRS 40.254 (which provides Ior summary
evictions under a no cause basis (ie, where the lease has expired pursuant to its terms or where
a landlord has successIully terminated a lease where such was still in eIIect under either a
contractual holdover provision or suych holdover provision Iound NRS 118A.470) Merliss
would have had to be able to truthIully say that either the lease had expired by its terms (on its
Iace, the lease had not expired, as there was no 'deIined termination date listed in the lease,
but there was a provision expressly providing that the lease would last Ior 'no less than 12
months and that terminate the lease, then serve such notice in accord with NRS 40.280, then
Iile Ior a
'HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 256:24 to 258:13) MR. COUGHLIN: I would like to submit
these materials I prepared into evidence. II it's a case oI you Ieel I haven't veriIied them, and I
think some oI that might be due to the diIIiculty inherent to selI-representation where -- it's
like Mr. King isn't Iiling things under penalty oI perjury. And I gather that the client needs to
sign a veriIication -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: The rule is very speciIic that says the attorney
against whom a grievance is made and a complaint is filed, the attorney, that attorney,
must file a verified response. MR. COUGHLIN: If I hire David Grundy to represent
me, then I still have to sign something that attaches to David Grundy the answer he files
for me saying I verify yes that the factual assertions in here are true? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Yes. MR. KING: Objection. Hypothetical. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay.
I'll do that right now. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. I'm asking if you filed that. And you've
indicated, one, you're not sure what verified means. And two, that you need to research
it. So what is your next piece of evidence you intend to offer, sir? MR. COUGHLIN: I
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intend to take these materials that I have already filed and say I declare under penalty
of perjury, NRS 53.045, that the assertions herein are true and correct to the best oI my
knowledge, except for those materials basea on information ana belief. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
And a verification cannot be maae on information ana belief. So is everything in there true
and correct? MR. COUGHLIN: If I had hired David Grundy, I don't think that would be
the standard. Because David Grundy could stand in my stead and sign it under ARCP 11.
MR. KING: Ao, he couldn't. MR. ECHEVERRIA: What is the next piece you have to oIIer,
Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: You know what though? 1his stuff is true, you know.
With King's Complaint beign so hopeIulessly unsupported by speciIics and vague, how
else is Coughlin supposed to Iile a veriIied response? Coughlin's Iilings essentially operate as
a request Ior a bill oI particulars, to which King provided nothing constructive. Further, its
Iunny to hear Chair Echeverria take Coughlin to task Ior submitting an Emergency Ex Parte
Motion (and really, nothing was submitted Ex Parte, Coughlin was using 'Ex Parte in the
bastardized sense which it is oIten used, as a stand in Ior 'Emergency, the SBN was timely
provided a copy thereoI, regardless) and asking it be considered where the SBN had not had a
chance to absorb it and respond...which is Iunny considering that is just what the SBN did in
its 11/2/12 Motion to Quash Coughlin's subpoenas, which didn't stop Echeverria Irom
granting them right about the time, under NRCP 6(e), that Coughlin would have even had
constructive notice oI them.
'HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 102:13 to 103:11) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Articulate your
case, sir. I've asked you to. THE WITNESS: SCR 105's been thrown out the window. You've
ruled on motions beIore I've even had a chance to oppose them or Iile a reply to an
opposition. You claim that NRCP is applicable here. Yet under NRCP when I Iile a motion to
biIurcate, and he Iiled an opposition, and I get three days Ior mailing under 6-C, and he
purports to Iile it on the 24th, and you rule on it when? On the 30th? Don't I get Iive days,
plus three Ior mailing to Iile my opposition to preserve Ior appeal? MR. ECHEVERRIA: So
should we disregard the motions you filed without giving the State Bar the opportunity
to respond timely? I had two motions shoved under my door last night. Should those be
disregarded under your legal reasoning? Because you did not offer the State Bar the
opportunity to respond. MR. COUGHLIN: Well, that -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Yes or no,
Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: It's not a yes or no. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Yes, it is. MR.
COUGHLIN: That would entail Iiguring out whether or not 30 days prior to the hearing --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Let's Iocus on the issues

As to whether the appeal oI the conviction underpinning 60838 has even appropriately
occured yet: 'McCrary v. McCrary, 764 P.2d 522, 1988 OK 122 (Okla. Nov 01, 1988) (NO.
62,814) judgment is deemed rendered only when its *527 terms are announced to the parties
by the judge, and a judgment in absentia is not 'rendered until notice oI its entry is mailed
to the parties. McCullough v. SaIeway Stores, Inc., Okl., 626 P.2d 1332 (1981); Rules oI
Appellate Procedure, 12 O.S.1981, Ch. 15, App. 2, Rule 1.11(b). See: Peralta v. Heights
Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988). We also note that
aIter the trial court's ruling the intervenors attempted to obtain extraordinary relieI Irom this
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Court to prohibit the court Irom proceeding Iurther, and we denied relieI. There undersigned
believes, under penalty oI perjury, that Pam Roberts was not even in the courtroom when
Judge HOward brought the undersigned back in chains to correct that which he has been
"remiss" in not doing earlier (ie, making rulings related to the Stay oI the Contempt
punishment, and the deadline to Iile a notice oI appeal, or even inIorming the underisgned oI
his right to Iile an appeal and the requirments). Judge Howard did say some stuII about how
he "is sure you know this" or that about the procedural technicalities that Judge Howard
encounters everyday in his job, yet the undersigned really does not know such things. 10 days
to Iile a notice oI appeal? didn't know that. NRCP 6(a) and (e) don't apply to such matters? Its
straight days? Rendition, not notice oI entry? Didn't know none oI that. Thats what the Sixth
Amendment is Ior.
So, Coughlin used 'the Iorm provided by the RJC Ior a couple oI his various Notices
oI Appeal, some limiting the attorney's feeexposure per the Iorm, to $15.00. But, Coughlin
has a $42,065 Attorney's Fee...Order? judgment? Basis Ior disbarment?
So, shouldn't Merliss's using the RJC's Iorm, where it Iailed to contain the required
inIormation pursuant to NRS 40.254, be held against him? 'Accordingly, with the exception
of attaching the summary eviction notices thereto, Dr. Merliss' affidavit was on the form
provided by this court.
Also, Baker did not file in any ~Unlawful Detainer Affidavit signed by the
landlord Merliss at, during, or before the 10/13/11 summary eviction proceeding. It was
not until mid-way through the 10/25/11 ~trial that Baker had such ~Unlawful Detainer
Affidavit admitted into evidence as an exhibit. Therefore, 1udge Sferrazza lacked the
subject matter jurisdiction to even hold the 10/13/11 summary eviction proceeding given
the statutory jurisdicitonal prerequisite posed by NRS 40.254(2). Further, Baker's
mincing (~without waiving attorney client privilege...upon information and belief...
attempts to file such statutorily required affidavit on behalf of his then out of state, out
of county client, landlord Merliss, is ineffective, as any ~trial setting of 10/13/11 was
defective for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the entirety of what occurred on the
record on 10/25/11 is necessarily inappropriate (beyond just 1udge Sferrazza riding
Coughlin about having his exhibits marked beforehand only to take thirty minutes of
court time helping Baker get his marked and organized...during which time is is made
abundandtly clear, on the record, that no such ~Unlawful Detainer Affidavit sufficient
to satisfy NRS 40.254(2) was filed prior to either hearing, or ever, really, given one is not
permitted (ask Chair Echeverria in refernce to Coughlin suggesting David Grundy,
Esq., could verify a response for his clients under SCR 105(2)'s ~verified answer or
response requirement)
exclusion of tenant from certain types of property. ...when the tenant of a dwelling unit
which is subject to the provisions of chapter 118A of NRS, part of a low-rent housing
program operated by a public housing authority, a mobile home or a recreational
vehicle (notice a commercial tenancy is not listed herein, whereas it is in NRS 40.253's
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non-payment basis allowing for summary eviction) is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer, the
landlord is entitled to the summary procedures provided in ARS 4.253 except that:...
A review oI the lease (well, a legible copy oI the lease, versus the unreadable one in
the ROA and as attached by Baker) reveals how exceedingly Iraudulent (and recklessly so)
Baker's 11/19/11 Declaration is, particularly with respect to the term oI the lease, any alleged
date oI termination, and whether such claim was authorized by law. Further, it is dishonest
where Baker has the lease, and yet in both notices he checks boxes 2 and 5, which are
mutually exclusive. Its one or the other, but Baker and Merliss cannot claim both a basis.
10/25/11 trial in 1708) and in the 9/27/11 5 Day Notice of UD for Failure to Vacate,
40.254, it is alleged that 'your rental agreement expired as of February 28, 2011. NRS
40.251(1)(b)(1)(II). However, that simply is not true. Beyond demonstrating a lack oI
candor to the tribunal and paucity oI Iairness to opposing counsel, it belies the Iact that Baker
never provided suIIicient notice oI termination oI the lease, as such, the 30 days required prior
to any such termination, by the lease, was not satisIied. Additionally, where Baker alleges
that the 'rental agreement expired as oI February 28, 2011 when, in Iact there is no such
'deIined termination date in the lease. A review oI the Iollowing makes exceedingly clear
that Baker was attempting to cover up the Iact that his Notices were deIicient in that they
misstated the 'term oI the rental agreement or its termination date (because, given paragraph
2 in the 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit (which states 'your aIIiant rented a certain dwelling or
apartment...locking Baker into NRS 40.251(1)(b)(1), even more than the Iact that Baker was,
by 10/19/11 (especially given how much Coughlin harped on the no summary eviction oI a
commercial tenant prohibition in Nevada law in his 10/17/11 Emergency Motion) especially
keen to avoid any Iinding that Coughlin's was a commercial tenancy (especially given
Merliss had driven up to Reno Ior a 9/27/11 Hearing the was aborted due to Baker's erring
with regard to premature, making the hearing premature, and as such, Ieeling pressure to
produce Ior Merliss, Baker was desperate not to have to start over again with suIIicient
notices oI termination that did not missstate, so obviously, the 'deIined termination date oI
the lease or its term, etc., etc. Baker likely did not even read the lease initially, and as such
was unaware that it does not simply say it a lease starting on 3/1/10 Ior twelve months. Its
more elegant than that. And that is particularly true where the anti-retaliation statute places
such emphasis on when and how and why a landlord either Iailed to renew a tenancy, or
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terminated one. In that light, Baker was keen (enough to lie about it under oath) assert that
the lease was already terminated by the time the 8/22/11 notice was served (especially where
he was looking at things on 10/10/11 or so, where Baker had already upset Merliss with the
9/27/11 debacle (and possible hearing on or about 10/6/11) and was hesistant to admitting
another procedural and or draIting error had cost the ancious Merliss another trip and at least
another couple weeks oI the pest Couglin in his rental.
exceptions.
terminate a tenancy, refuse to renew a tenancy , increase rent or decrease essential items
or services required by the rental agreement or this chapter, or bring or threaten to bring an
action Ior possession iI:
charged with the responsibility Ior the enIorcement oI that code;
(b) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord or a law enIorcement
agency of a violation of this chapter or of a specific statute that imposes a criminal
penalty;...
(e) The tenant has instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative
proceeding or arbitration in which the tenant raised an issue of compliance with the
requirements of this chapter respecting the habitability of dwelling units;
attorney, a Iair housing agency or any other appropriate body oI a violation oI NRS 118.010
to 118.120, inclusive, or the Fair Housing Act oI 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., or has
otherwise exercised rights which are guaranteed or protected under those laws.
2. II the landlord violates any provision oI subsection 1, the tenant is entitled to the remedies
provided in NRS 118A.390 and has a deIense in any retaliatory action by the landlord Ior
possession.
Arguably, upon some oI the emails even between Irom Couglin to Merliss, and then to
Hill and Baker Irom Coughlin, which could easily be characterized as Litigation Demand
Letters (and thereIore invoking the protections oI NRS 118A.510(e)), Couglin had already
'instituted or deIended against a judicial or administrative proceeding...and, similarly , with
the May 20th-24
th
, 2011 Green action Law Service debacles and complaints to Merliss
invoking NRS 118A.510(b) ('(b) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord
or a law enIorcement agency of a violation of this chapter or of a specific statute that
imposes a criminal penalty :) .
So, it becomes rather improtant, what is meant by 'terminate a tenancy, refuse to
renew a tenancy , Especially 'reIuse to renew a tenancy
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'NRS40.251UnlawIul detainer: Possession oI property leased Ior indeIinite time aIter
1.A tenant oI real property, a recreational vehicle or a mobile home Ior a term less
than liIe is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer when having leased:
(a)Real property, except as otherwise provided in this section, or a mobile home for an
indefinite time, with monthly or other periodic rent reserved, the tenant continues in
possession thereoI, in person or by subtenant, without the landlord`s consent after the
expiration of a notice oI:...
(2)Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, for all other periodic tenancies,
at least 30 days;...
(b)A dwelling unit subject to the provisions of chapter 118A of NRS , the tenant
continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, without the landlord's consent after
expiration of:
(1)The term of the rental agreement or its termination and, except as otherwise
rental agreement expired as of February 28, 2011. However, the 'Standard Lease
Baker's Declaration misstates the materials aspects oI the lease and the notices he used
and had served, allegedly:
'8.1. The tenancy at issue commenced on March 1, 2010, and was for a term of 12
months. A true and correct copy oI the rental agreement is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 1.
NRS 40.254(2)(a).
8.2. The rental agreement terminatea by its terms on February 28, 2011 .
ThereaIter, Mr. Coughlin became a month to month tenant pursuant to NRS 118A.470 ana
inclusive, at the end of the stated term of the rental agreement, whereupon he became a
Dr. Merliss' aIIidavit, previously Iiled herein. In addition to the 5-day notice attached to Dr.
EXHIBIT 2. NRS 40.254(2)(d).
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Its very telling that in paragraph 8.5 Baker avoid speciIying just which sub-section oI
40.251(1) such claim was authorized.
Further, there was not ~Landlord's Affidavit or ~Unlawful Detainer Affidavit
filed by Merliss, or even by Baker on Merliss's behalf, prior to, during, or at the
10/13/11 summary eviction proceeding. Nor was any such Landlord's Affidavit filed
prior to the 10/25/11 trial, and Baker's 10/19/11 Declaration of Casey D. Baker (which
fraudulently asserts that such a Landlord's Affidavit, or Merliss' ~Unlawful Detainer
Affidavit had been ~previously filed when it had not) might satisfy as an affidavit by a
~landlord's agent under NRS 40.253(5), but that only applies in those situations where
the Tenant fails to file a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit by the end of the 5 day period in
which they must do so. Coughlin did file such a timely Tenant's Answer or Affidavit.
As such, NRS 40.253(6) makes clear that there is a statutory subject matter
jurisdictional prerequisite to the holding of any such summary eviction hearing (such as
on 10/13/11, much less the ~trial on 10/25/11, noticed in writing as a ~trial in the
10/13/11 Order folling the 10/13/11 Hearing, constantly referred to as a ~trial by 1udge
Sferrazza (~the use of the term ~trial was unfortunate, Your Honor said Baker on
10/25/11) even throughout the first hour and a half of the 10/25/11 court date...until
Coughlin made clear that, given it was a ~trial, 1udge Sferrazza lacked the subject
matter jurisdiciton to order such a rent escrow deposit such as he did, the R1C was
divested of jurisdiction upon Coughlin's filing a notice of appeal on 10/18/11, Couglhin
had nto been provided 20 days to answer a Complaint as would be required for a ~trial
under 1CRCP 109, etc., etc....at which point Baker prompted 1udge Sferrazza to
recharacterize his 10/13/11 ruling as one where the 10/25/11 ~trial was really just a
~continuation of the summary eviction proceeding, etc., etc.. The point is due process.
Coughlin should not be forced to litigate a matter of this import where the landlord had
failed to file his Complaint or Landlord's Affidavit prior to either hearing, and only had
such entered into evidence (and thus, there was never a file staped ~landlord's affidavit
in that matter) mid-way through the ~trial on 10/25/11. Coughlin had a right to have
~notice of just what NRS 40.254(2) requires in a ~landlord's affidavit and Baker and
Merliss purposefully avoid providing such because they knew that they screwed up, but
they didn't want any more delays in getting there summary eviction.
Regardless NRS 40.253(6) (applicable through NRS 40.254) clearly provides a
subject matter jurisdictional prerequisite to any hearing even starting, until the
landlord's affidavit it filed, and such may not be filed by the ~landlord's agent, where a
tenant has filed a Tenant's Affidavit or Answer. The rationale behind requiring the
lanlord to file his own ~lanldords' affidavit in NRS 40.253(6) is obvious...if it means
enough to a tenant to contest the eviction, then the landlord, and not some property
manager like Nevada Court Services or Western Nevada Management, ought have to
file a verified ~Unlawful Detainer Affidavit like they mean it, and stand behind it,
under penalty of perjury, period. Even upon finally showing up to testify on 10/25/11
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(the landlord, Merliss, failed to appear on 10/13/11, arguably entitling Coughlin to just
the sort of default that Gayle Kern, Esq., enjoyed on 3/15/11 in R1C Rev12-374) Merliss
still avoided stating, under penalty of perjury, all that is required by NRS 40.254(2),
instead, during his testimony, Baker attempted to have Merliss testify only to those
matters that were different or not present between Merliss's 10/11/11 notarized, but
unfiled ~Unlawful Detainer Affidavit) and Baker's Declaration of 10/19/11...of course,
Merliss failed to testify or sign an affidavit that his ~claim was authorized by law, and
clearly, under NRS 40.253(6), it is not allowable for the ~landlord's agent (Baker) to
file an affidaivt (like Baker's Declaration of 10/19/11) purporting to meet the
requirement of NRS 40.254, where NRS 40.253(6) reads: ~6.Upon the filing by the
tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless of the information contained
in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the affidavit permitted by subsection 5,
the justice court or the district court shall hold a hearing, after service of notice of the
hearing upon the parties, to determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit
or notice provided for in this section. This is in marked contrast to the other
subsections of NRS 40.253, where the phrase ~landlord or the landlord's agent is used
repeatedly (always in situations where an initial step is taken (posting of a notice) or
where a default is to be taken upon the tenant's failure to file a Tenant's Answer or
Tenant's Affidavit. To wit, NRS 40.253(5) allows a ~landlord's agent to file such an
affidavit, where NRS 40.253(6) insists that the landlord himself must do so, as NRS
40.253(5) reads: ~5.Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(a)The landlord or the lanaloras agent may apply by aIIidavit of complaint for
eviction to the justice court.
Also, this means, that upon Coughlin Iiling his Tenant's AIIidavit/Answer and Pre-
Hearing BrieI in RJC Rev12-374, Gayle Kern, Esq., the 'landlord's agent Ior PTTHOA was
not longer able to Iile the aIIidavit required by NRS 40.253(6), and as such, the eviction order
is void). Also, as to the eviction oI 6/28/12 (and the prejudicial impact on Coughlin's ability
to deIend himselI in his Iormal disciplinary hearing given the cumulative impact oI the 18
month long ordeal the RJC subjected Coughlin to incident to the numerous unlawIul evictions
it sanctioned against him, brazenly reIusing to Iollow the law again and again where the RJC
Judges (Pearson and Schroeder in RJC Rev12-1048, Schroeder in Rev12-374, SIerrazza and
CliIton in Rev11-1708, Albright in Rev12-Nichols case, Lynch in Rev12-1183, Pearson in
Rev12-1182, etc., etc. all relevant under a SCR 102.5(2) mitigation analysis.
To wit, at the 10/13/11 summary eviction proceeding 1708, Baker never did get Iiled,
or even marked as an Exhibit any 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit Irom the landlord
(something he tried to make up Ior by Iilign his 10/19/11 Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, only
NRS 40.253(6) requires the landlord himselI to Iile such a document, and he still has not, to
this day...Even had Merliss's testimony on 10/25/11 stated all such required elements, that is
not the same thing as Iiling something in writing, prior to either court date...the notice
beIorehand is an essential aspect oI due process, particularly in a proceeding oI a summary
nature, as Aikin, Davidsohn, and Volpert make exceedingly clear. The transcript Io the
10/13/11 summary eviction proceeding starts oII:
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'Morning, please be seated. Morning. Judge: First matter I have is Matthew Merliss
versus Zachary Coughlin. And I do have |Casey Beare|, Esq. representing the deIendant.
Is it Casey Beare, Esq.? PlaintiII: Casey Baker, Your Honor. Judge: Oh, Baker. PlaintiII:
My oIIice represents Dr. Merliss. Judge: Oh, okay. You were listed in the wrong
location. Alright, please be seated. Is the plaintiII ready to proceed then? PlaintiII: Yes,
Your Honor. Judge: Why don`t you go ahead then? PlaintiII: Thank you, sir. Your
Honor, what we`re here on today is a 30-day no-cause eviction that is all we`re on
today. Under |INDISCERNIBLE 137| 40.253, Your Honor, I have copies of the
landlord's affidavit here. II I may approach? Judge: Yeah, bring it up. PlaintiII: Yes.
1udge: But you don`t have a witness? Plaintiff: No, sir. Your Honor, the notices have
been previously provided to the court. I also have additional copies here iI the court
needs them. The 30-day no-cause notice was served on August 22. The Iive-day Iailure
to vacate notice was served on September 27. Mr. Coughlin has Iailed to vacate the
property and that`s why we`re here, sir. DeIendant: Alright, sir. (page 1) DeIendant:
Yes, sir, Your Honor. I have filed a tenancy affidavit in this matter, as well as a motion
Ior continuance. I'm citing exigent circumstances such as the essential service like
electricity being turned oII in the midst oI the Iive-day period in addition to a. 1udge:
Well, I`ll allow you to testify as to your answers of your . raise your right hand.
Do you swear under penalty of perjury to tell the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth? Defendant: Yes, sir, Your Honor. 1udge: Right. You can be
seated and tell me what your defense is. DeIendant: Yes, Your Honor. As a preliminary
matter, Your Honor, iI I may address the motion Ior continuance.
So, where the landlord not only Iails to appear, but also Iails to comply with NRS
40.253(6)'s mandate that he, and not the 'landlord's agent must Iile his aIIidavit, and only
'upon that occurring 'the justice court...shall hold a hearing to determine the truthfulness
and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided for in this section. How it is Coughlin
can be penalized Ior showing up Ior the hearing, essentially Iorcing him to be subjected to
Judge SIerrazza's litany oI sua sponte interrogations and legal arguments oIIered on behalI oI
the landlord, whom was already represented by his own attorney, Baker, is rather unclear.
So, next, aIter excusing the statutory requirement that the landlord himselI Iile an
aIIidavit, Judge SIerrazza proceeds to interrogate Coughlin as to whether he owes any rent,
even where Baker made clear at the start Io the hearing that 'Your Honor, what we`re here
on today is a 30-day no-cause eviction that is all we`re on today....the 30-day no-cause
notice was served on August 22. UnIazed, Judge SIerrazza persists:
'DeIendant: Yes, Your Honor. As a preliminary matter, Your Honor, iI I may
address the motion Ior continuance. Judge: You may. Go ahead. DeIendant: In the
midst oI the Iive-day period, aIter the unlawIul detainer notice was served it`s my
understanding I have Iive judicial days to Iile a tenant`s answer. However auring
that time the power, the electricity, that is to the property was shut off absent any
notice to myself and created undue difficulty in preparing to defending in this
matter and in adding the requisite third party deIendants such as the realtor/property
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manager. |INDISCERNIBLE 4:31| Realty, the landscaping company and at this
point, I believe NB Energy might be a necessary party. 1udge: What does that have
to do with the rent though, sir? Because what we are here today on is the failure
to pay rent. DeIendant: Your Honor, the statute to me is complicated and conIusing
but my understanding oI it is that Mr. Merliss` or Dr. Merliss` failure to assert that
he was owea rent`... 1udge: Okay. Regardless of that have you paid the rent or
not, first of all?
Baker, apparently to dumbstruck to accept that Judge SIerrazza was sua sponte, turning
the 'no cause hearing into a 'non-pay hearing, proceeded to attempt to correct Judge
SIerrazza's apparent mistaken, in instead oI Iollowing the statute and making the landlord
meet his intial burden oI proving that the tenancy was appropriately terminated, that he had
Iiled a 'landlord's aIIidavit that included all that is required by NRS 40.254(2):
'...(a)The date when the tenancy commenced, the term oI the tenancy, and, iI any, a copy oI
(c)The date when the tenant became subject to the provisions oI NRS 40.251 to 40.2516 ,
inclusive, together with any supporting facts.
'NRS40.251UnlawIul detainer...
1.A tenant oI real property,... is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer when having leased:
(a)Real property,...Ior an inaefinite time, with monthly... rent reserved, the tenant
continues in possession...without the landlord`s consent aIter the expiration oI a notice oI:...
(2)...at least 30 days; or
(b)A dwelling unit subject to the provisions oI chapter 118A oI NRS, the tenant
continues in possession...without the landlord`s consent aIter expiration oI:
(1)The term of the rental agreement or its termination and...the expiration oI a
notice oI:... (II)... at least 30 days Ior all other periodic tenancies; or
Baker and Merliss were very keen to manuIacture a reality where the lease was
already terminated before all the things occurred that make patently obvious that Merliss
retaliated against Couglin, in violation oI NRS 118A.510. However, to get there, they had to
lie, a lot. They had to lie about whether the lease contained a 'deIined termination date
under Paragraph 2 oI the lease, had to lie that the lease had a deIinite term oI '12 months
when in Iact, its stated term was 'no less than 12 months, had to lie in their notices (which,
conveniently they never had to Iile under oath, even though NRS 40.254 requires such be
attached to the landlord's aIIidavit. NRS 40.251(a) is inapplicable, especially where Judge
SIerrazza and Flanagan necessarily had to rule Coughlin's was a residiential tenancy,
apparently (the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE does nto speciIically Iind that, and at one point in the
10/25/11 transcript, Judge SIerrazza threatens Coughlin: 'Judge: No, I'm saying as a condition
oI doing that, I'm not going to let you live there without -- or use the oIIice without paying
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rent.Judge: No, I'm saying as a condition oI doing that, I'm not going to let you live there
without -- or use the office without paying rent. (page 37, 10/25/11).
'NRS 118A.510(1): '... the landlord may not, in retaliation, terminate a tenancy, refuse to
renew a tenancy, increase rent or decrease essential items or services required by the rental
agreement or this chapter, (Merliss did by having the electricity, an essential service, shut
oII on 10/4/11, and the Iact that such occurred after the intial eviction notices Iails to take it
out oI the purview oI this section) 'or bring or threaten to bring an action for possession
iI:...
(b) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord ...oI a violation oI this
chapter or of a specific statute that imposes a criminal penalty...
(e) The tenant has instituted or defended against a judicial... proceeding or arbitration in
which the tenant raised an issue of compliance with the requirements of this chapter
respecting... habitability ...
landlord,... (this section relates to where Coughlin 'reIused to give written consent to
Merliss's coercive attemtps to avoid owning up to his liability under the lease with respect to
the damages done by his landscapers, Green action Lawn Service)
'(g) The tenant has complained in good Iaith to the landlord,... an attorney, ... oI a violation
oI NRS 118.010 to 118.120 (NOTE: CHAPTER 118 - DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING)
', inclusive, or the Fair Housing Act oI 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.,... (Coughlin clearly
complained to Merliss about discrimination against Coughlin
remeaies proviaea in NRS 118A.390` (and Coughlin is entitled to proceed under NRS
118A.380 or NRS 118A.360 in that respect, providing even Iurther an oIIset to any amounts
Judge SIerrazza ruled that Coughlin must deposit in a NRS 118A.355(5) rent escrow account,
even though the RJC has Iailed to enact a corollary to JCRLV 44, where such Rule 44
speciIically invokes NRS 118A.355(5), providing support Ior the view that without enacting a
court rule pursuant to JCRCP Rule 83, there existed no authority Ior the RJC to so order
Coughlin to depsoit such a rent escrow amount) 'and has a defense in any retaliatory
action by the lanalora for possession .
The patent retaliation under NRS 118A.510(1)(b),(e),(I),(g) is made rather obvious,
especially given the proximate chronological causual connection apparent, upon a review oI
the Iollowing exchange:
'From: rhillrichardhillaw.com
To: magundaaol.com; zachcoughlinhotmail.com
Subject: RE: Lease property damage liability provision
Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2011 16:34:40 -0700
mr coughlin - please direct all Iurther communictaions on the river rock property to my oIIice.
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rgh
652 Iorest street
reno 89509
...
From: Matt Merliss |mailto:magundaaol.com|
Sent: Tuesday, August 16, 2011 4:18 PM
Cc: rhillrichardhillaw.com
Subject: Re: Lease property damage liability provision
zach,
send all Iurther communication to my attorney, richard hill. his email is
rhillrichardhillaw.com.
-----Original Message-----
From: zachcoughlin zachcoughlinhotmail.com~
To: Matt Merliss magundaaol.com~
Sent: Tue, Aug 16, 2011 3:49 pm
Subject: Lease property damage liability provision
Subsections 23 and 28 oI the lease, in addition to established case law and the
relecvant sections oI nac and nrs speak pretty clearly to your liability vis a vis the
landscaping crews purposeIul property destruction. Further, the conditio. OI the
entry way and the broken window similarly are ypur responsibility and trigger a
reduction in rent.
'NRS 118A.510(1): '... the landlord may not, in retaliation, terminate a tenancy, refuse to
renew a tenancy, increase rent or decrease essential items or services required by the rental
agreement or this chapter, or bring or threaten to bring an action for possession iI:...
(b) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord ...oI a violation oI this
chapter or of a specific statute that imposes a criminal penalty...
(e) The tenant has instituted or defended against a judicial... proceeding or arbitration in
which the tenant raised an issue of compliance with the requirements of this chapter
respecting... habitability ...
landlord,...
(g) The tenant has complained in good Iaith to the landlord,... an attorney, ... oI a violation
oI NRS 118.010 to 118.120 (NOTE: CHAPTER 118 - DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING)
', inclusive, or the Fair Housing Act oI 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.,...
remeaies proviaea in NRS 118A.390 and has a defense in any retaliatory action by the
lanalora for possession.
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From the transcript oI the 10/25/11 date in 1708:
'DeIendant: But I did complain to the landlord in writing and I Ieel like he reacted given
retaliatory circumstances || suggest it was retaliatory. Judge: The only one Irom what you`re
saying looks applicable to me is E, the tenant has instituted or deIended against a judicial or
administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the tenant raised an issue oI compliances
with requirements oI this chapter respecting the habitability. That`s the only thing that I recall
in all these proceedings we`ve had so Iar that may come or |45.27|. This statute that within
the context oI this statute. Unless you have something I`m missing. Because G, is a complaint
to the landlord but it has to do with Iair housing which I`ve never heard that you mentioned
any other discrimination. DeIendant: I haven`t |45.56| Your Honor. Judge: What is your
what is the discrimination that you are alleging? DeIendant: Race, sex and national origin
|46.07| to classes. Judge: What is your race, sir? 89 DeIendant: Caucasian, parts Irish,
German. Judge: It`s not a protected class. DeIendant: Yes, it is. Judge: Well, you will need to
cite the law Ior me because. DeIendant: Oh, that. That would be in this context I`m more
Iamiliar with the |46.35| context but and this context is a Iair housing statute or statute. And
those statutes according || Judge: Sir, I but the thing is the complaint. Do you have a copy
oI the complaint to the landlord or government agency an attorney or the Iair housing agency
or other appropriate oI a violation oI NRS 118.010 to 118.120? DeIendant: Yes, the |47.02|
Judge: Okay, well, what is the complaint, sir? DeIendant: They complaint is that |47.10| with
me because me and || he seems to be || anybody who is non-white male account beIore any
Iault and the next is the Iacts surrounding this case. Judge: Anyone who is non-white male?
DeIendant: Yeah. |47.25| is Iine with them. Antonio the handyman is Iine with him. The
landscaping crew all Hispanic is Iine with him. Darlene |17.35 Sharpe|, a woman realtor who
seemly directed two two diIIerent groups oI people to be the same job who get paid Ior
twice. Judge: Okay. What is the. DeIendant: He is |47.43| with her but he want to be out.
Judge: What is the email, what is the email and where is the rate when complained Iirst oI all?
90 DeIendant: It`s in exhibit 8. Judge: Exhibit 8? DeIendant: 8. Judge: Okay, we have exhibit
8. And just so I understand that. DeIendant: Quickly Your Honor, |48.06| objection the
previous sections oI .510 I don`t believe those are not satisIied with someone complaints the
landlord, I do that makes it applicable. I don`t think it called Ior a. Judge: Subsection (a)?
DeIendant: I don`t know about that but it seems like you`re saying, all in one oI those sub,
subsections in that statute is putting the Iact by complaining to the landlord and I would say
|48.34| Judge: And I`m conIused about what you`re saying now. I just said that subsection (a)
does not apply iI you do not make a complaint to a governmental agency. And that is my
ruling. DeIendant: I thought it was iI you made a complaint involving co-section other
governmental agency. Judge: No. DeIendant: To the landlord, to an agency. Judge: No, it
says, that`s not what the statute says. It says, through a governmental agency. DeIendant: I got
it here now, Your Honor, I`m sorry. I was under an impression |49.20|. Judge: Sir, you can
appeal my ruling but I am ruling that the complaint has to be to a governmental agency, not to
the landlord. DeIendant: I see right, that`s clear. My mistake. But subsection (b) is where the
language have to the landlord begins to. 91 Judge: That`s true but then that`s Ior criminal.
DeIendant: |49.45| a complaint with respect to a criminal and I`ve got a number oI criminal
statutes here wherein a conduct oI the landscaping crew is tantamount to mayhem,
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conversion, larceny, destruction oI property and while I. Judge: Okay. Sir, sir, hang on a
second. Here, iI you are claiming a violation oI subsection (b), then tell me precisely what it is
and what documents you have that support that. DeIendant: Yes, sir. NRS 205.220 is grand
larceny, that`s the taking carrying away property oI another. Judge: Then who allegedly
took and carried away the property? DeIendant: The crew oI men, the crew oI Hispanic men
that Dr. Merliss in conjunction with the Iemale realtor Darlene Sharpe sent to my law oIIice
to work on weeds Ior which Dr. Merliss already agreed to pay me the job. So, that sort oI the
double group eIIort |51.05| currently it was causes no expense in that regard subsequently.
Judge: No, he said he hired somebody to remove the weeds at your property and did you Iile a
criminal complaint, sir? DeIendant: At this point, I`m ruling my options, Your Honor. Judge:
Alright, well, the individuals, did you see them take your property? DeIendant: Oh, you`re
right, yes sir, I videotaped it and I ask this court iI I could submit that video evidence |51.35|
and I believe he said I couldn`t. Judge: And at the last hearing you could not but the question
was, so you have a videotape oI an individual stealing your property? DeIendant: Stealing, uh,
perhaps under a technical term, they took something they took a lot oI time and eIIort which
was to get green, high density, high quality wool carpet, cut and notched to Iit around all 92
the Ience |52.16| in the house and make it so it wasn`t a dirt line and it`s not everybody`s
case. Judge: So then how can I understand that so that they take this carpet and take it away?
DeIendant: To |52.30| the weed, so they could do their weeding. Judge: But aIter they did that
did they permanently deprive you oI that carpet? DeIendant: They leIt it in the street and
reIused to put it back. Judge: And so they did not permanently deprive you the property?
DeIendant: Well, my eIIorts to mitigate lightly pervaded a situation were yes the trash men
were taking, somebody else were taking it, and it would be damaged. Judge: Alright. But I did
not believe that meets the requirements oI NRS 205 with respect to larceny so, unless there
was an attempt to permanently deprive you oI the property which by your own testimony they
leIt it there. DeIendant: They were intending to make it better I don`t think, Your Honor. But
there are other sections oI crimes against property under NRS 205 that I Ieel would be
applicable. 206.040, entering property with intention oI damage or destroy property. 205.270,
penalty Ior taking property Irom another under circumstances not amounting to robbery,
limitation on granting oI probation or suspension oI sentence. Judge: Sir, you can`t just read
oII the statute, you need to tell me precisely what it was that happened and then the evidence
that you complain oI it. DeIendant: Yes, sir. Judge: And then Iurther the evidence that this
subjection was caused by that complaint. 93 DeIendant: Yes, sir. Judge: And then there has to
be a linkage. DeIendant: I believe it`s quite clear on viewing the emails and the chronology
and the timing |54.08|. The emails in to and Irom Dr. Merliss in exhibit 8 speaks to that with
respect to the taking. Judge: Okay, well let`s go there to exhibit 8 and tell me precisely what
page you`re talking about or. PlaintiII: Yes, sir. Have copies please that the attached or
something that I can reIer to? Judge: Yeah, I have these. PlaintiII: I have no idea what those
are. Judge: Oh, here, come. DeIendant: And that`s telling because I would be here |54.40|
reasonably diligent investigation prior to. Judge: Sir. DeIendant: . would required you do
know what this is. Judge: He doesn`t -- DeIendant: I believe he does, Your Honor. You can`t
just throw mud on the wall and see what sticks. You need to know, you`re Iiling some days ||
law. |Unclear|: I don`t. Judge: What he is presenting so Iar was crystal clear, sir. PlaintiII:
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He didn`t present a whole lot, Your Honor. 94 Judge: He presented all he needs to present to
establish an unlawIul detainer.
'DECLARATION OF CASEY D. BAKER. ESQ. PURSUANT TO NRS 40 reads:
'CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ., being Iirst duly sworn, deposes and under p perjury
avers:
oI age. This declaration is based on my personal knowledge, except those matters stated
on information and belief, and as to those items I believe them to be true. This
declaration is made in my capacity as the lanaloras agent, pursuant to NRS 40.254(2),
and represents my testimony iI called on to present same in court.
4. Dr. Merliss submitted his landlord's affidavit in this matter at the time of the
hearing on October 13, 2011.
6. Accordingly, with the exception of attaching the summary eviction notices
thereto, Dr. Merliss' affidavit was on the form provided by this court.
7. The purpose of this declaration is to supplement Dr. Meriiss' affidavit in
accordance with the requirements of NRS 40.254(2).
communications between my oIIice and Dr. Meriiss, I state the Iollowing on information
and belief:
1. NRS 40.254(2)(a).
8.3. The tenant became subfect to the provisions oI NRS 40.251 to 40.2516,
inclusive, at the end of the stated term of the rental agreement , whereupon he became a
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EXHIBIT 2. NRS 40.254(2)(d).
9. I declare under penalty of perjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct.
Its rather curious that in DCA Roberts 'Declaration attached in Exhibit 1 oI her Reply
to Opposition it makes sure to avoid being made under penalty oI perjury: '2. That this
unsworn declaration in lieu oI an aIIidavit or other sworn declaration is
made purs uant to NRS 53 045.
Well, shoot, had the 'tenancy been properly terminated or had the 'rental agreement
terminated In this regard it is plaintiIIs' contention that deIendant's answer was deIective Ior
the reason that the denials contained therein, which were based upon deIendant's lack oI
inIormation and belieI, related to matters which were presumptively within deIendant's
personal knowledge.
|4| Although Code oI Civil Procedure section 437 In. 1 authorizes denials based upon lack oI
inIormation or belieI "II the deIendant has no inIormation or belieI upon the subject suIIicient
to enable him to answer an allegation oI the complaint," it is established in this state that
denials in this Iorm are limited to situations where the deIendant is not able to deny or admit
positively. |5a| Accordingly, iI the matter is within the deIendant's actual knowledge or by its
nature is presumed to be within his knowledge, or iI the deIendant has the means oI
ascertaining whether or not it is true, a denial on inIormation and belieI or Ior lack oI either
will be deemed sham and evasive and may be stricken out or disregarded. (Mulcahy v.
Buckley, 100 Cal. 484, 486-489 |35 P. 144|; Bartlett Estate Co. v. Fraser, 11 Cal.App. 373,
375 |105 P. 130|; |242 Cal. App. 2d 792| Zenos v. Britten-Cook Land etc. Co., 75 Cal.App.
299, 304 |242 P. 914|; Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 424-425 |292 P. 624, 71 A.L.R.
871|; Dietlin v. General American LiIe Ins. Co., 4 Cal. 2d 336, 349 |49 P.2d 590|; Zany v.
Rawhide Gold Min. Co., 15 Cal.App. 373, 375-376 |114 P. 1026|; Taylor v. Newton, 117
Cal. App. 2d 752, 760 |257 P.2d 68|; Oliver v. Swiss Club Tell, 222 Cal. App. 2d 528, 538-
539 |35 Cal.Rptr. 324|.) |6| Consistent with this rule, thereIore, "iI the answer Iails otherwise
to put in issue the material allegations oI the complaint, judgment may be rendered and
entered on the pleadings." (Le Breton v. Stanley Contracting Co., 15 Cal.App. 429, 434 |114
P. 1028|; Zany v. Rawhide Gold Min. Co., supra, p. 376; Doll v. Good, 38 Cal. 287, 289-
290.)
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Further, it was reversible error Ior Judge SIerrazza to allow the landlord (and Baker is
complicit in this) to Iorce Coughlin to deposit sums into a rent escrow account, where Judge
SIerrazza also precluded Coughlin Irom bringing counterclaims. Either the Court ruled that
Coughlin, essentially, pled the non-payment oI rent Ior Merliss or not...but iI it did (and it did
require a rent escrow deposit in the contest oI a no cause holdover proceeding, so...), then
what's good Ior the goose is good Ior the gander, and it was reversible error Ior Judge
SIerrazza to reIuse to allow Coughlin to bring counterclaims, including those amounts owing
under the lease incident to the provision making Merliss responsible Ior the torts oI his
'agentsetc., including Green action Lawn Service and Darlene Sharpe, the realtor, quasi-
property manager Ior the out-oI-state landlord whom may or may not have complied with the
statute requiring he provide the tenant notice oI such property manager in writing.
Further, it is not simply a matter oI Baker and the landlord deciding to drop the
Nonpay eviction in 1492 upon it becoming apparent that Coughlin had plenty oI legal and
Iactual support Ior his set-oII and or 'Iix and deduct arguments, in addition to the
agreements Merliss Ireely and voluntarily entered into with Coughlin, not to mention
Merliss's liability under lease subsections 23 and 28 respecting the conduct oI Darlene Sharpe
and Green action Lawn Service. So, Iine, Baker and Merliss decide to drop 1492...that only
applies to their claims, not Coughlin's counterclaims, as such they have deIaulted thereon.
Page 4 oI Coughlin's 9/7/11 Tenant's Answer in the precursor to 1708, 1492, provides
Iurther prooI that Coughlin pled a commercial tenancy:
'Landlord has violated NRS 118A.290 in his Iailure to repair, well aIter 14 days oI written
notice, items such as a broken Iront bedroom window (complete with jagged exposed edges
oI glass), Iallen insulation that has appeared to resulted in the creation oI potentially toxis
mold when it came in contact with the ground below, which lacked a vapor shield, a toilet
with a deIective was ring, the Iront stairs to Tenant's home/oIIice came to a state oI disrepair,
replete with crumbling risers that presented a saIety hazard and liability issues. (page 4
thereoI).
'NRS 118A.490 actions based upon nonpayment oI rent: Counterclaim by tenant; deposit oI
rent with court; judgment Ior eviction.
1. In an action Ior possession based upon nonpayment oI rent or in an action Ior rent
where the tenant is in possession, the tenant may defend and counterclaim for any amount
which the tenant may recover under the rental agreement, this chapter, or other applicable
law. II it appears that there is money which may be due to the landlord by the tenant aIter the
day oI the hearing or iI a judgment is delayed Ior any reason, the court shall require a tenant
who remains in possession oI the premises to deposit with the court a just and reasonable
amount to satisIy the obligation, but not more than 1 day's rent for each day until the new
hearing date. The court shall order the tenant to pay the landlord any rent which is not in
dispute and shall determine the amount due to each party. Upon the application oI either
party, the court, aIter notice and opportunity Ior a hearing, may Ior good cause release to
either party all or any portion oI the rent paid into court by the tenant. The court shall award
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the prevailing party the amount owed and shall give judgment Ior any other amount which
is due.
2. In any action Ior rent where the tenant is not in possession, the tenant may
counterclaim as provided in subsection 1 but is not required to pay any rent into court.
3. When the court renders a decision on the landlord`s claim Ior possession, it shall
distribute any rent paid into court under subsection 1 upon a determination oI the amount due
to each party.
4. II a tenant Iails to deposit with the court within 24 hours aIter the original hearing the
entire amount required pursuant to subsection 1, the tenant relinquishes the right to a hearing
and the court shall at that time grant a judgment Ior eviction without Iurther hearing.
Additionally, with respect to the Iirst case landlord Merliss brought against Couglin,
the summary eviction based permised upon a 5 day Non-Payment oI Rent Notice served
8/22/11, where Coughlin Iiled his Tenant's Answer/AIIidavit on September 6
th
, 2011
Judge SIerrazza's 10/27/11 Order in 1708 reads: FINDINGS OF FACT
"Property").
3. The rental agreement terminated by its terms on February 28, 2011. ThereaIter,
Coughlin became a month to month tenant pursuant to NRS 118A.470 and paragraph 3
of the parties' rental agreement.
hearing. The court specifically finds that service of that notice was proper pursuant to,
and for all purposes contemplated under, NRS 40.280.
7. On September 27,2011, Merliss properly served Coughlin with a Five-Day Notice oI
UnlawIul Detainer For Failure to Vacate Rental Unit -NRS 40.251 (No-Cause Termination)
and Notice oI Summary Eviction -NRS 40.254, which notice was admitted into evidence at
the hearing. The court speciIically Iinds that service oI that notice was proper pursuant to, and
Importantly, in reIerence to paragraph '20. Termination oI that lease, there is no
'deIined termination date to be Iound where the lease provides that one must 'reIer to
Paragraph 2, apparently, to determine any such 'deIined termination date. No speciIic
'deIined termination date is to be Iound, however, in Paragraph 2, besides the indication
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that the lease shall be in eIIect 'for a period of not less than 12 months tenancy,
commencing on the 1
st
day oI March, 2010
reIerenced termination and eviction notices, Coughlin had "instituted or defended against
compliance with the requirements of NRS Chapter 118A] respecting the habitability
of dwelling units" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e).
Further, at page 6:20-25, thereoI, Coughlin points out the Iact that the RJC is in
violation oI JCRCP 102 where it tells tenants it will not Iile there Tenant's Answer's unless
the tenant attaches the eviction notice, where such is not a prerequisite under Rule 102, and
JCRCP Rule 83 has not been complied with by the RJC suIIicient to make such a requirement
permissible:
'RULE 102. FILING OF SUMMARY EVICTION CASES
A summary eviction case shall be deemed filed with a justice court upon the timely
filing of an affidavit by a tenant and the payment of the required filing feeby the tenant
or upon the Iiling oI an aIIidavit by the landlord with an application Ior an order oI summary
eviction, together with the payment oI the required Iiling feeby the landlord.
OI course, Kern, in 374 had not Iiled such an AIIidavit prior to the 3/15/12 hearing nor
prior to the signing and entering oI the Order (which was, essentially a deIault, and where
Coughlin had appeared in the action, and clearly indicated an intent not to deIault, by way oI
his 3/8/12 Iiling therein, Kern's conduct was violative oI RPC 3.5A). Additionally, in 1048,
NCS's unauthorized practitioner oI law status makes Iugitive or void any such aIIidavit or
application it Iiled.
st
agreed to will remain in effect on a monthly basis after the initial term ...
10. SUBLEASING: ... resident further may use the premises for any commercial
enterprise...
11. OCCUPANCY: Occupancy oI the premises is limited to 2 adults 2 Children, and
shall be used Ior a resid ence and for other purposes. resident does not agree to pay $
per day Ior each guest remaining on the premises Ior more than days....
13. UTILITIES: resident agrees to pay Ior the Iollowing utilities: Gas x Electricity x
Oil, Light x, Heat x, Energy x, Other, resident's responsibility Ior these begins at
the commencement oI this agreement. See attached transIer oI account Addendum (note:
there is/was no such TransIer oI Account Addendum attached to the Lease Agreement).
Utilities not payable by the resident will be paid by the Management ...
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19 WAIVER OF RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS: Nothing containea in this
agreement shall be construea as waiving any of the resid ents or managements right or
obligations unaer the laws of the State of Nevaaa.
20 TERMINATION: 1his Agreement and the tenancy hereby granted may be
to Paragraph 1 and 9 Ior monetary liabilities)...
Doesn't 118A.510 provide Ior making a complaint to an attorney? What about
Coughlin to himselI? What about the eIIect oI 1492 and any counterclaims Coughlin made
therein, especially as to the legitimacy oI 1708's: '"instituted or defended against a judicial
or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which he] raised an issue of compliance
with the requirements of NRS Chapter 118A] respecting the habitability of dwelling
units""instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or
arbitration in which he] raised an issue of compliance with the requirements of NRS
Chapter 118A] respecting the habitability of dwelling units"
Further, it was plainly reversible error Ior Judge SIerrazza and Flanagan to rule there
was 'no genuine issue oI material Iact as to ARS 118A.51(g), particularly where Coughlin
was then a licensed attorney in the State of Nevada and was clearly complaining to himself
about the very discriminatory and retaliatory conduct NRS 118A.510 protects against:
exceptions.
terminate a tenancy, refuse to renew a tenancy, increase rent or decrease essential
services required by the rental agreement or this chapter, or bring or threaten to bring
an action for possession iI:
charged with the responsibility Ior the enIorcement oI that code;...
(Couglin testiIied that he believed he had so complained about the noxious weed
ordinance violation to Reno Direct.)
'(b) The tenant has complained in good Iaith to the landlord or a law enIorcement agency
oI a violation oI this chapter or oI a speciIic statute that imposes a criminal penalty;
organization;
(d) A citation has been issued resulting Irom a complaint described in paragraph (a);
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(g) The tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord, a government agency, an
attorney, a fair housing agency or any other appropriate body of a violation of NRS
118.010 to 118.120, inclusive, or the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.,
or has otherwise exercised rights which are guaranteed or protected under those laws.
'DeIendant: Yes. Yes, sir, Your Honor. Rather than having myselI have another bite at the
apple and I'm responding in this situation that I've been required to, and in doing that, it's
aIIorded me an opportunity to 31 learn quite a bit about these proceedings. Maybe the best
place to start would be to bring up Las Vegas Justice Court Rule 44. Judge: Well, I don't think
that'd be a good spot to start at all because it doesn`t apply. DeIendant: II you'll just humor me
Ior a second, Your Honor, I'll tell you why I think that's important. Las Vegas Justice Court
Rule 44 speaks to a situation-- PlaintiII: Your Honor, can I put my objection on the record to
any discussion oI Las Vegas Justice Court Rules, please? Thank you. Judge: Well, your
objection is noted, but I will allow him to state whatever it is you're going to say. DeIendant:
Vegas |INDISCERNIBLE 9:29| enact 44 Ior a reason. Reno doesn`t have 44. II it wanted to,
it would have to enact it and you get the Supreme Court to sign oII on it. 44 Las Vegas 2 in
the context oI a summary eviction proceeding require a deposit rent escrow. II the statute
alone in NRS 118A and NRS 40.253 in combination with the Nevada Justice Court Rules oI
Civil Procedure, iI just those three things alone allowed Ior making litigants oI summary
eviction proceeding deposit monies into the rent escrow, Las Vegas would have had no need
to enact Rule 44. We don`t have Rule 44 in Reno. Reno is very diIIerent Irom Las Vegas. As
such, I believe that the rent escrow amount should be returned to me. It's my understanding
that in a summary eviction proceeding, the standard Ior summary judgment is to be applied. I
apologize, Your Honor, Ior -- when last you saw me on October 17th, I listened to the hearing
and it seemed like I wasn`t getting to what you wanted me to get to, which was the most
important thing, to establish material issue oI Iacts, to make a prima Iacie case that I have a
legal deIense to the -- Judge: Well, I accept that you did and that's why we're having the trial
today. 32 DeIendant: And that's -- I'm glad you bring that up. You said trial, Your Honor.
You didn`t say summary eviction, you didn`t say summary execution. You said trial,
plenary-- Judge: trial on a retaliatory nature oI the eviction. I assumed you made a prima
Iacie case on that as there's no trial on the issue. It is summary as to whether or not you were
given notice served, which the court Iinds you were, with a notice to terminate your lease.
DeIendant: II I can just quickly interject Ior the record, Your Honor-- Judge: Unless you had
-- unless you have a lease to show that you're not there at will at this point. DeIendant: There
-- Ior the record, there was no certiIicate in my name, US Postal Service certiIicate mailing on
Iile with respect to a notice. In the context oI summary eviction proceedings, courts are
directed to adhere very strictly to the notes requirements given the summary nature oI it.
That's one saIeguard that is insisted upon. A right to a jury trial is granted by the United
States Supreme Court Irom -- in summary -- in eviction cases. Jury trial is an absolute right
Ior all citizens in the United States. I said it's a 1970s case. I think it might be called Pearson.
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I believe I cite to it in my case. I don't know that a certiIicate oI mailing is required whereas
Mr. Baker did. He had apparently a process server, post something on the door and contest to
that. I think that might be a |INDISCERNIBLE 12:40| Supreme Court to clariIy the statute at
some point. I know I spent too much time on that, Your Honor, but when you say trial, it's --
well, the most important thing, Your Honor, to get across Irom my point oI view, is that
issue oI Iact, it's a pause-- Judge: No, I didn`t imply that there was. I Iound that you made a
prima Iacie case-- DeIendant: That's what I'm -- that's what I meant to-- 33 Judge: With
respect to habitability and so I set it Ior a trial today on that issue. But the separate issue is
whether you have any deIense, which you haven`t given me, to the no cause eviction, which--
DeIendant: And I do and I can speak to that brieIly, Your Honor, just-- Judge: They're two
separate things. Well, you're not under oath, sir, so you're arguing now and I didn`t -- I let you
have some latitude, but the question is do you have any Iacts to present to the court today?
DeIendant: Yes, Your Honor, but just one last introductory matter-- Judge: Okay. DeIendant:
Is that 40.253(6) says once the court has Iound there's a prima Iacie showing, the court must
pause and convert this to a Iull-scale unlawIul detainer action with a complaint and the 20-
days notice incident to Rule 109 oI the summary eviction proceedings, so -- and we don't have
that here. PlaintiII: Your Honor, may I? DeIendant: And there's two cases, Anvui and
Glacier-- Judge: All right. DeIendant: That speaks to that one, Investment court. PlaintiII:
May I respond, Your Honor? Judge: Yes. PlaintiII: Thank you. What the court speciIically
Iound at the last hearing was that Mr. Coughlin had alleged a retaliatory habitability issue that
he had alleged, but that he had not substantiated it. Your Honor used those exact words. So
the point oI today's hearing is, as I understand it, a continuation oI the-- Judge: To establish
whether or not he has a prima Iacie case. 34 PlaintiII: Exactly, to substantiate it. The court's
inquiry today is under 40.253(6) whether he has a legal deIense, the suIIiciency oI his
aIIidavit and his prooI, not under Torrealba, the summary judgment standard. Mr. Coughlin
must transcend his allegations and show by admissible evidence that there is a material issue
oI Iact. That he has a deIense. That he has Iacts to support that deIense. He's not done that.
He's resting on his allegations. Now, the court gave him credit Ior those allegations and
basically said, okay, look. II you want to substantiate this, you got to put the rent in the
escrow as required by the habitability statute. That's why we're here today. The court did not
dismiss it. The court withheld ruling on whether or not a legal deIense had been substantiated.
Well, in Iact, it ruled that it had not, but it gave Mr. Coughlin another attempt, and that's why
we're at. Judge: Okay. So just so I'm clear now and I believe you have reIreshed my memory,
what the inquiry today is to whether or not there is a material issue oI Iact and iI I Iind there
is, Sir, then we will go Iorward Irom there. DeIendant: Your Honor, I'll just enter an objection
Ior the record. Counsel Baker is telling you what your order was-- Judge: No. DeIendant: You
tell us what your order is and you said it was a trial that we were having-- Judge: Well, I said
that, but I stand corrected because I do remember and I do have the order, so we will Iind the
order. PlaintiII: Your Honor, the use oI the word "trial" was unIortunate, but it was very clear
on the record what the point oI today's hearing was. DeIendant: The trial was -- trial was in
the notice as well. The notice says trial. |INDISCERNIBLE 16:56| other bases Ior
|INDISCERNIBLE 17:02| are Iurther speciIied in this summary judgment motion beIore you
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because they were the previous Iiles. Those are the |INDISCERNIBLE 17:09| complaining
about criminal law violations such as converging 35 |INDISCERNIBLE 17:13| lawn carpet.
They include Reno Municipal Code-- Judge: Sir, I mean at some point, you can't add stuII and
keep adding in and adding in. I mean at some point, you have to put in writing what your
speciIic -- and you have to give the landlord notice oI that ahead oI time on the habitability.
DeIendant: And that's where the plenary trial is nice in that regard, Your Honor. I did attach
an aIIidavit to this summary judgment motion. It seems to me plaintiII's counsel-- Judge: Sir,
I am working at this-- DeIendant: -- |INDISCERNIBLE 17:50| summary nature when, in Iact,
that's what they wanted. It cuts both ways. PlaintiII: For the record, Your Honor, we are
requesting a summary eviction order based on a no cause eviction. DeIendant: And we're in a
trial, so. Judge: No, we're not yet, sir. Do you have my order Irom the last court
|INDISCERNIBLE 18:14|? Clerk: There was one October 15th, so I'm sure it's
|INDISCERNIBLE 18:22| PlaintiII: I might be able to Iind it, Your Honor. But. Judge:
Well, it's got to be in this Iile, so -- and what happened is there's been so many papers Iiled
since then. Clerk: Yeah, |INDISCERNIBLE 18:35| like a Iourth Iile |INDISCERNIBLE
18:42| Judge: Yeah, well, this thing is a -- this is an order October 13th. Tenant's motion to
continue denied. II the deIendant posts rent, a trial will be set Ior October 25th at 10 a.m. So
it is a trial. PlaintiII: Yeah. 36 Judge: However, just to clariIy this, sir, you're telling me that
you disagree that we can go Iorward with the trial today. What you want to do is get a 20-day
complaint and go to trial in that manner. DeIendant: Well, are we talking about
|INDISCERNIBLE 19:52| 20 days or we have... Judge: No, I don't -- I'm not talking about
anything. I'm just clariIying, are you arguing today that we should not be going Iorward with
the trial? Because that's what I want to address Iirst. DeIendant: I think that's -- that is set
Iorth in my motion I Iiled today, Your Honor. Judge: Well, the motion you Iiled today is not
timely, so the issue is your position right now is it your desire to receive 20-days' notice and
go that way? DeIendant: You know, I think that would be most every tenant's position. They'd
like a plenary trial with like all this-- Judge: Well, the problem with that position, sir, you are
going to have to post the additional rent as oI November 1st. DeIendant: Your Honor, 2 --
40.253(6) iI the court showing no Iurther order once converting this to a Iull-scale plenary
trial. Judge: I haven`t converted it to anything, sir. DeIendant: But it seems as though you're
saying iI that occurs, once it converts to a plenary that you would have to post rent. Judge:
No, I'm saying as a condition oI doing that, I'm not going to let you live there without -- or
use the oIIice without paying rent. DeIendant: That's Las Vegas Rule 44, where you. Judge:
I don't care about Las Vegas Rule 44. 37 DeIendant: We don't have a corollary to that Reno,
Your Honor. Judge: And we do have a statute and we do have our own rule, sir. I don't know
why you're citing Las Vegas rules. DeIendant: Because there's no rule. The Reno Justice
Court Rules Rule 2 says they don't apply to landlord-tenant actions. So we're leIt with.
Judge: We do have rules that allow us to accept deposit, sir. DeIendant: From 118A. NRS
118A. Judge: Okay. So, I'm not going to argue with it. II you want, you will need to deposit
the rent Ior the month oI November-- DeIendant: Your Honor, I just-- Judge: On time.
DeIendant: I just want to clariIy how does that reconcile with 40.253(6)? II we could just read
the exact language oI that, I can read this to you, Your Honor. It says once the court Iinds a
material issue has been alleged, a prima Iacie showing, the court shall make no Iurther order
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and this shall be converted to a plenary trial. PlaintiII: That's not |INDISCERNIBLE 22:27|
DeIendant: Exactly. Clerk: |INDISCERNIBLE 22:29| DeIendant: And that -- and there's two
cases that interpret that, too, Anvui, the Nevada cases, Nevada Supreme Court, Anvui and the
Glacier. That's 163 P.3d 413. Judge: Sir, I agree with you as to the issue oI habitability, but
not as to the no cause eviction.
1udge Sferrazza's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Summary
Eviction of 10/27/11, reads:
"FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER FOR SUMMARY
EVICTION
This matter having come on regularly for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to ARS
4.254 and ARS 4.253() on October 13, 2011, and continued on October 25, 2011 ,
beIore the Honorable Peter J. SIerrazza, sitting without a jury; the plaintiII/landlord, Matt
Merliss; ("Merliss"), having been present, and represented by counsel, Richard G. Hill,
Chartered and Casey D. Baker, Esq., and deIendant/tenant, Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq.
("Coughlin"), having been present and having proceeded in proper person; the parties
having offerea eviaence, callea witnesses ana having offerea argument; the matter having
been submitted to the Court Ior a decision; the Court being Iully inIormed in the premises
and good cause appearing thereIor; the Court herewith enters its Iindings oI Iact, conclusions
oI law and order for summary eviction:
FINDINGS OF FACT
"Property").
3. The rental agreement terminated by its terms on February 28, 2011. ThereaIter,
Coughlin became a month to month tenant pursuant to NRS 118A.470 and paragraph 3
of the parties' rental agreement.
hearing. The court specifically finds that service of that notice was proper pursuant to,
and for all purposes contemplated under, NRS 40.280.
Termination) and Notice oI Summary Eviction -NRS 40.254, which notice was admitted
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proper pursuant to, and for all purposes contemplated under, NRS 40.280.
8. Merliss' claim Ior relieI oI possession oI the premises was authorized by law.
9. Coughlin alleged, as a legal defense to the summary eviction, retaliatory conduct by
Merliss under various subsections of NRS 118A.510. Coughlin's alleged defense was
further based, in part, on what he identified as "habitability" issues, and his alleged
complaints regarding same. Coughlin Iurther alleged that Merliss acted in a
discriminatory manner toward him based on Coughlin's race, national origin, and sex.
10. The court finds that Coughlin failed to present any evidence that Merliss acted in any
prohibited, discriminatory, or retaliatory fashion as alleged by Coughlin, or otherwise.
10.1. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he "complained in good Iaith oI a
violation oI a building, housing or health code applicable to the premises and aIIecting
health or saIety to a governmental agency charged with the responsibility Ior the
enIorcement oI that code" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(a).
10.2. Coughlin Iailed to present any evidence that he "complained in good Iaith to the
landlord or a law enIorcement agency oI a violation oI |NRS Chapter 118A| or oI a speciIic
statute that imposes a criminal penalty" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(b)
reIerenced termination and eviction notices, Coughlin had "instituted or defended against
compliance with the requirements of NRS Chapter 118A] respecting the habitability
of dwelling units" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e).
the landlord, a government agency, an attorney, a Iair housing agency or any other
11. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that the Property was at any time not
habitable, as that term is deIined in NRS 118A.290, or otherwise, with respect to any oI the
alleged deIiciencies identiIied by him. Those alleged, but unproven, deficiencies
included, but were not limited to, the front and back steps, any broken window, any
alleged mold, any falling insulation, the garbage disposal, and any weeds on the
Property.
that the maintenance oI the surrounding grounds, including weed control, was the sole
responsibility oI Coughlin under paragraph 22 oI the parties' rental agreement.
12. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he complied, or that Merliss failed to
comply, with any requirement set forth in NRS 118A.355 and NRS 118A.360, which
statutes address the withholding of rent for alleged "habitability" issues.
12.1. As such, the court Iinds that Coughlin was not entitled to withhold any rent
based on any alleged "habitability" issue, or otherwise, and that all sums heretoIore
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deposited by Coughlin pursuant to the Court's order dated October 13, 2011, rightIully
belong to Merliss as and Ior past due rent.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this case. Venue
is appropriate in this court.
2. The ultimate issue before the court at the reIerenced hearing was the right oI the
landlord, Merliss, to immediate possession of the Property. NRS 40.254. NRS 40.253(6).
defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer," and whether "the tenant is guilty of an
unlawful detainer". NRS 40.253(6).
5. "|A|n order granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6) should be reviewed
on appeal based upon the standard Ior review oI an order granting summary judgment
under NRCP 56 because these proceedings are analogous." Anvui, LLC v. C.L. Dragon,
LLC, 123 Nev. 212, 215, 163 P.3d 405 (2007).
must transcend the pleadings and, by aIIidavit or other admissible evidence, introduce
speciIic Iacts that show a genuine issue oI material Iact." Torrealba v. Kesmilis, 124 Nev.
95, 178 P.3d 716 (2008).
7. Coughlin Iailed to show that any genuine issue oI material Iact remains Ior trial. As
such, Coughlin Iailed to meet his burden oI prooI to establish any legal deIense to the
summary eviction. Anvui. Torrealba.
8. As no issues oI Iact had yet been presented to the court to warrant a trial, Coughlin
was not entitled to have the summary eviction hearing heard by ajury. NJCRCP 38.
NJCRCP 38. 9. Pursuant to NRS 40.253(6), Merliss is entitled to immediate possession oI
the property.
Landlord, MATT MERLISS, having applied by Affidavit Ior an Order seeking
summary eviction oI the above-named Tenant and it appearing Irom the record on Iile
That the sheriII/constable oI Reno Township, or one oI their duly authorized agents
be, and hereby is, directed to remove each and every person Iound upon the rental unit at
121 River Rock, Reno, Washoe County, Nevada, by no earlier than October 31, 2011 at 5
pm. Landlord is hereby awarded the right oI possession oI the premises.
FOLLOWS:
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property of the landlord, Matt Merliss, but shall not be immediately released to him.
N1CRCP 73, in the event Coughlin timely and properly appeals this order. In the event
Coughlin Iails to timely and properly appeal this order, those sums shall be immediately
released to Merliss or his counsel oI record. These sums shall not, in any event, operate to
stay enforcement of this order and the surrender of the right of Coughlin to possess the
Property. Nothing in this order shall prevent this court or an appellate court Irom
releasing the deposited Iunds to Merliss or his counsel prior to or aIter any appeal is
perIected, or from increasing the amount of any security to be posted by Coughlin for
any reason, or both, either upon its own motion or upon motion by Merliss.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
II it were true, as SIerrazza's 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE reads: '11.1. With respect to any
weeds on the Property, the court further specifically finds that the maintenance of the
surrounding grounds, including weed control, was the sole responsibility of Coughlin
under paragraph 22 of the parties' rental agreement, then why did Judge SIerrazza
apply a NRS 118A.360 set-oII oI at least one $350 sum Ior 'taking care oI the weeds?
Further, had not the landlord waived any such interpretation oI the lease by assenting, in
writing, to such an arrangement? And, Iurther, how credible was Dr. Merliss's testimony
that, just days aIter agreeing to such set-oII with Coughlin Ior 'taking care oI the weeds,
upon a discussion with realtor Darlene Sharpe, Merliss decided that Coughlin had not 'done
anything, and instead, arranged to have Green action Lawn Service 'take care oI the
weeds Ior 'a couple thousand dollars.
OI course, Hill's associate Baker, submitted a lengthy FOFCOLOSE to Judge SIerrazza that
was completely divorced Irom reality, including the Iollowing whoppers:
'This matter having come on regularly for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to NRS
40.254 and NRS 40.253(6) on October 13, 2011, and continued on October 25, 2011...
Actually, the 10/13/11 Order Iollowing the 'summary eviction proceeding oI the
same date made clear that the 10/25/11 date was set Ior 'trial upon Judge SIerrazza Iinding
that Coughlin had established his prima Iacie case, suIIicient to invoked NRS 40.253(6)'s
dictate that:
'6.Upon the Iiling by the tenant oI the aIIidavit permitted in subsection 3,
regardless oI the inIormation contained in the aIIidavit, and the filing by the
landlord of the affidavit permitted by subsection 5, the justice court or the
district court shall hold a hearing... to determine the truthfulness and
sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided Ior in this section... If the
court determines that there is a legal defense as to the alleged unlawful
detainer, the court shall refuse to grant either party any relief , and, except
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as otherwise provided in this subsection, shall require that any further
proceedings be conducted pursuant to NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive.
One, Baker did not Iile the required Landlord's AIIidavit oI any sort prior to the
holding oI the hearing and entering oI the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE. That 10/13/11 'Eviction
Decision and Order reads: 'DECISION: Tenant's Motion to Continue Denied. If tenant
posts rent of $2,275. by 9:00 am, Monday October 17,2011 a trial will be set for
OCTOBER 25, 2011 AT 10:00 am. II tenant does not post the monies, eviction GRANTED
at 9:00 am. October 17, 2011.
Baker's proposed FOFCOLOSE continued: '2. The tenancy at issue commenced on
March 1, 2010, and was for a term of 12 months. While that may be what Baker and Hill
wish the lease said, it actually reads: 'Paragraph 2, besides the indication that the lease shall
be in eIIect 'for a period of not less than 12 months tenancy, commencing on the 1
st
day oI
March, 2010. Further, that lease also provided: '3. HOLDOVER: Under Nevada law this
Rental Agreement and any changes properly agreed to will remain in effect on a monthly
basis after the initial term... and '20 TERMINATION: 1his Agreement and the tenancy
hereby granted may be terminated by either party within 3 days of the defined termination
date (refer to Paragraph 2), or any time thereaIter by giving the other party not less than
thirty (30) day prior notice in writing or as otherwise allowed by the laws of the State of
Nevada.
The 'laws oI the State oI Nevada do not permit a landlord to terminate a lease in
retaliation Ior a tenant asserting a Iix and deduct habitability issues, complaining oI
habitability issues or retaliation, seeking to enIorce the Iollowing two provisions upon
landlord Merliss (aIter having assented to an agreement with Coughlin memorialized in
written communications between the two wherein Merliss agrees that 'taking care oI the
weeds is his responsibility under the lease, and agrees to a $350 rent deduction Ior the month
oI June, 2011, in exchange Ior Coughlin doing so).
However, landlord Merliss either Iorgot about this agreement with Couglhin (unlikely)
or was jammed into IulIilling another very similar agreement by his quasi-property
manager/realtor, Darlene Sharpe oI Dickson Realty, where Green action Lawn Service
arrived at Couglin's Iormer home law oIIice just days later and tore up and placed on the
street and sidewalks the artiIical grass installation Coughlin had installed (with signiIicant
expense and eIIort) just days beIore, in some misguided eIIort to perIorm 'weeding services
under some purported agreement with Merliss, then reIusing to return Coughlin's artiIical
grass installation as they Iound it. The installation obviated the need Ior any such weeding.
Judge SIerrazza, despite the acknowledgement that 'taking care oI the weeds was the
landlord's responsibility under the lease, reIused to even allow Coughlin to have marked or
admitted videos oI these events and the damage done to Coughlin's law practice, ruling that
there was not even ~a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Merliss was
responsible Ior such damage under the lease, and thereaIter retaliated against Coughlin Ior
asserting his rights therein, by seeking to terminate the lease, in violation oI NRS 118A.510,
118A.290, 118A.360, 118A.380 (including the reporting oI the criminal law violations
incident to the property damage caused by the Green action Lawn Service landscapers.
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and Improvement (2) Agreement by Landlord to Repair (b) Rights and Remedies oI Tenant
Ior Breach oI Agreement to Repair; Damages (ii) Measure and Elements oI Damages 469.
Injuries to property or business; loss oI proIits West's Key Number Digest West's Key
Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant k154(4) A.L.R. Library Rights and remedies oI tenant
upon landlord's breach oI covenant to repair, 28 A.L.R.2d 446 The lessee may be entitled to
recover compensation Ior injury to his or her property that is situated on the demised premises
or Ior injury to his or her business that results Irom a breach oI the covenant to repair.|FN1|
While the measure oI damages to a tenant's goods as a result oI a landlord's improper repairs
is ordinarily the diIIerence between the market value oI the goods beIore and aIter injury,
|FN2| the market value will not always be the appropriate measure oI compensation, and
damages are not to be determined alone on either wholesale or retail market value, but on all
the Iacts and circumstances oI the case.|FN3| Where the landlord's breach oI a covenant to
repair causes injury to or interruption oI the tenant's business, the tenant may recover Ior the
loss oI anticipated proIits provided there is some standard or Iixed method by which they may
be estimated and determined with a Iair degree oI accuracy, and provided the loss oI such
proIits can be deemed to have been within the contemplation oI the parties at the time the
lease was made,|FN4| In addition, in order to be recoverable, such loss oI proIits may not be
too contingent and remote or too speculat-ive.|FN5| |FN1| Devlin v. The Phoenix, Inc., 471
So. 2d 93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1985). A landlord was responsible Ior damage to
merchandise incurred by her tenant due to a leaky rooI where the landlord had contracted to
"keep in repair and maintain the exterior parts oI the building, including, . rooIs" and where
she voluntarily undertook perIormance oI that duty by hiring an independent contractor to
replace the leaky rooI. Damron v. C. R. Anthony Co., 586 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App.
Amarillo 1979). |FN2| Youngset, Inc. v. Five City Plaza, Inc., 156 Conn. 22, 237 A.2d 366
(1968); Wolverine Upholstery Co. v. Ammerman, 1 Mich. App. 235, 135 N.W.2d 572 (1965).
|FN3| Youngset, Inc. v. Five City Plaza, Inc., 156 Conn. 22, 237 A.2d 366 (1968). |FN4|
Mills v. Ruppert, 167 Cal. App. 2d 58, 333 P.2d 818 (3d Dist. 1959); Hargis v. Sample, 306
S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1957). Where a warehouse lease speciIically repudiated liability Ior damage
Ior water coming through the rooI, the measure oI liability Ior the landlord's Iailure to repair
the rooI did not include a loss oI business or loss oI customers or a diminution in anticipated
proIits. Zion Industries, Inc. v. Loy, 46 Ill. App. 3d 902, 5 Ill. Dec. 282, 361 N.E.2d 605 (2d
Dist. 1977). |FN5| Stern's Gallery oI GiIts, Inc. v. Corporate Property Investors, Inc., 176 Ga.
App. 586, 337 S.E.2d 29 (1985). A commercial tenant that sued a landlord Ior damage
allegedly caused by a leaky rooI, and which thereaIter terminated the lease early and went out
oI business, liquidating its inventory at substantially reduced prices, could not recover
damages Ior lost proIits resulting Irom that sale; there was no indication that the plaintiII
could not have relocated its business aIter terminating the lease agreement, the plaintiII's lost
proIits Iormula erroneously assumed that it would have received Iull retail price, and the
plaintiII Iailed to demonstrate what Iair market value oI its inventory was. Carpet Cent., Inc.
v. Johnson, 222 Ga. App. 26, 473 S.E.2d 569 (1996).
(8) SetoII, Counterclaim, and Recoupment 658. Breach oI lessor's covenant to repair
or improve West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant
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k223(6) A.L.R. Library Rights and remedies oI tenant upon landlord's breach oI covenant to
repair, 28 A.L.R.2d 446 Forms CounterclaimDamages resulting Irom landlord's Iailure to
repair, Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Landlord and Tenant 102 In actions against a
tenant to recover the rental oI the demised premises, the tenant may assert a breach oI the
landlord's covenant to repair in reduction or extinguishment oI the latter's claim to rent; the
manner oI asserting the breach, whether by setoII, recoupment, or counterclaim, depends
upon the local practice.|FN1| Thus, the tenant is permitted to oIIset, in an action against him
or her Ior rent, the damages which he or she has suIIered Irom the landlord's breach oI
agreement to repair.|FN2| The Iact that the tenant has made a payment oI rent does not
indicate an acquiescence by the tenant in an attempted perIormance by the landlord as a
satisIaction oI the latter's covenant to repair, and, accordingly, does not preclude the tenant
Irom subsequently asserting, in an action against him or her Ior the rent, an oIIset oI damages
resulting to the tenant Irom the nonperIormance oI the covenant.|FN3| While the act oI a
tenant in accepting or retaining possession oI the demised premises Iollowing a breach by the
landlord oI the latter's covenant to repair may render it impossible Ior the tenant to insist that
such breach oI covenant relieved him or her oI liability Ior rent, it does not preclude the tenant
Irom demanding that the rent be reduced or mitigated by the amount oI the damages which he
or she has suIIered on account oI the breach oI the covenant to repair.|FN4| Only nominal
damages are allowable Ior breach oI covenant to repair in the absence oI prooI oI actual
damages.|FN5| |FN1| LeaIdale v. Mesa Wholesale Sales Terminal, 79 Ariz. 112, 284 P.2d
649 (1955) (counterclaim); Leejon Realty Co. v. Davis, 99 Misc. 2d 681, 416 N.Y.S.2d 948
(App. Term 1977), judgment aII'd, 67 A.D.2d 1113, 413 N.Y.S.2d 798 (2d Dep't 1979)
(setoII). As to breach oI lessor's covenant to repair or improve as deIense to action Ior rent,
see 627 to 632. |FN2| Hinds v. Poo-Yie's, Inc., 520 So. 2d 1016 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1987); Missionary Sisters oI the Sacred Heart v. Meer, 131 A.D.2d 393, 517 N.Y.S.2d 504
(1st Dep't 1987); Peterson v. Front Page, Inc., 462 N.W.2d 157 (N.D. 1990). |FN3| Ng v.
Warren, 79 Cal. App. 2d 54, 179 P.2d 41 (1st Dist. 1947) (holding that the Iact that the lessee
has paid the rent Ior the greater part oI the term will not deprive him oI the right to
counterclaim his damages Ior the entire term). |FN4| LeaIdale v. Mesa Wholesale Sales
Terminal, 79 Ariz. 112, 284 P.2d 649 (1955). |FN5| Seidenberg v. Burka, 106 A.2d 499
(Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1954).
Couglin did not plead or proceed under NRS 118A.355. However, Judge SIerrazza
applied NRS 118A.355(5) in requiring Couglin to deposit $2,275 into the RJC's 'rent escrow
account
'NRS 118A.355 Failure of landlord to maintain dwelling unit in habitable condition.
1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, iI a landlord Iails to maintain a dwelling
unit in a habitable condition as required by this chapter, the tenant shall deliver a written
notice to the landlord speciIying each Iailure by the landlord to maintain the dwelling unit in a
habitable condition and requesting that the landlord remedy the Iailures...If the landlord fails
to remedy a material failure to maintain the dwelling unit in a habitable condition or to
make a reasonable effort to do so within the prescribed time, the tenant may:..
(b) Recover actual damages...
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(d) Withhold any rent that becomes due without incurring late Iees, charges Ior notice or
any other charge or feeauthorized by this chapter or the rental agreement until the landlord has
remedied, or has attempted in good Iaith to remedy, the Iailure...
5. 1ustice courts shall establish by local rule a mechanism by which tenants may deposit
rent withheld under paragraph (d) of subsection 1 into an escrow account maintained or
approved by the court. A tenant does not have a defense to an eviction under paragraph
(d) of subsection 1 unless the tenant has deposited the withheld rent into an escrow
account pursuant to this subsection.
Coughlin plead, and put on evidence and testimony in support oI, the deIense to the No
Cause Eviction presented where the landlord violated NRS 118A.510 in retaliating against
Coughlin. It inappropriate Ior Judge SIerrazza to rule that Coughlin had, essentially, pled
non-payment of rent for the landlord . This was Iound, apparently, under some sort oI sua
sponte legal argument/theory Judge SIerrazza made in the Iace oI Baker himselI protesting
that 'all we are here Ior today is possession oI the property and that 'we are proceeding on a
no cause basis only that Coughlin had opened the door to that issue by alleging the landlord
retaliated against you Ior, amongst other things, asserting that you had properly invoked your
NRS 118A.360 'Iix and deduct upon the landlord's Iailure to cure those habitability issues
you noticed to him in writing. Judge SIerrazza then Iurther compounded his novel, ultra pro-
landlord approach (in a summary setting no less) by then applying NRS 118A.355(5)'s.
and Improvement (2) Agreement by Landlord to Repair (b) Rights and Remedies oI Tenant
Ior Breach oI Agreement to Repair; Damages (i) In General 465. Making repairs at
landlord's expense West's Key Number Digest West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and
Tenant k150(5), 152(10) A.L.R. Library Tenant's right, where landlord Iails to make repairs,
to have them made and set oII cost against rent, 40 A.L.R.3d 1369 Rights and remedies oI
tenant upon landlord's breach oI covenant to repair, 28 A.L.R.2d 446 Forms Am. Jur. Legal
Forms 2d, Lessor to reimburse lessee Ior making necessary repairs 161:582 Am. Jur. Legal
Forms 2d, Lessor to reimburse lessee Ior making necessary repairsRight oI lessee to repair
and deduct cost Irom rent 161:583 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Notice to lessee to make
repairsBills to be Iorwarded to lessor Ior payment 161:1222 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d,
Notice to lessor to make repairsLessee to make repairs on Iailure to complyExpense to
be deducted Irom rent 161:1224 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Complaint, petition,
or declarationLandlord's breach oI covenant to repair plumbingTo recover Ior
construction oI improvements and repairs made by tenant, Landlord and Tenant 225 Am.
Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Complaint, petition, or declarationTo recover Ior
construction oI improvements and repairs made by tenant, Landlord and Tenant 226 Upon
the breach by a landlord oI the covenant to repair, the tenant may make the repairs and
recover the reasonable cost oI such repairs Irom the landlord or charge it against the rent,
|FN1| so long as the tenant has Iirst given the landlord suIIicient notice oI the needed repairs
and the landlord has reIused to make the repairs within a reasonable time.|FN2| Under certain
circumstances, such as where the cost oI repairs is trivial in comparison with the damages
naturally resulting Irom the continued existence oI the deIect, the tenant may have the duty to
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make repairs,|FN3| pursuant to the rule that the tenant must make reasonable eIIorts to reduce
or minimize his or her damages when subjected to injury Ior breach oI a covenant to make
repairs.|FN4| II the landlord Iails to comply with the rental agreement or the provisions oI the
UniIorm Act requiring the landlord to maintain the premises, and the reasonable cost oI
compliance is less than $100, or an amount equal to one-halI the periodic rent, whichever is
greater, the tenant may cause the work to be done in workmanlike manner and, aIter
submitting an itemized statement to the landlord, deduct Irom his or her rent the actual and
reasonable cost or the Iair and reasonable value oI the work, not exceeding the amount
speciIied above.|FN5| |FN1| Gaetan v. Weber, 729 A.2d 895 (D.C. 1999); Walters v. Greer,
726 So. 2d 1094 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1999); Missionary Sisters oI the Sacred Heart v. Meer,
131 A.D.2d 393, 517 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1st Dep't 1987). |FN2| In re Sunbelt Vacation Travel,
Inc., 94 B.R. 715 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1988); Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897
(1979). Evidence was suIIicient to support a Iinding that a landlord was given reasonable
opportunity to correct a plumbing problem beIore the ex-tenant paid to have it Iixed by a third
party and thus that he was required to reimburse the ex-tenant Ior the repair cost; there was
evidence that sewage had backed up into the home Ior six days, that several phone calls to the
landlord had yielded no response, that children lived in the house, and that the sewage back-
up had been a recurrent problem. Johnson v. Brown, 2003-Ohio-1257, 2003 WL 1193795
(Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. Clark County 2003). As to the notice requirement, generally, see
463. |FN3| Leonards v. U-Jin Enterprises, Inc., 811 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1991);
Cato Ladies Modes oI North Carolina, Inc. v. Pope, 21 N.C. App. 133, 203 S.E.2d 405
(1974). |FN4| 470. |FN5| UniI. Residential Landlord and Tenant Act 4.103(a).
This Court's 'Landlord Tenant Handbook, at page 19, provides:
~What May A Tenant Do If Their Rental Is Uninhabitable?
Step 1: Deliver Written Notice. Give written notice specifying the problem to the
landlord or the person within this State authorized to act for and on behalf of the
landlord for the purpose of receiving notices. Notice is not required iI the landlord
receives written notice oI the problem Irom a code enIorcement agency. Click here Ior
inIormation on how to contact a code enIorcement agency in your area.
Step 2: Wait 14 days. The landlord must use his best eIIorts to comply within 14
days aIter being notiIied, or more promptly iI conditions require in case oI emergency. II the
landlord has complied, proceed to Step 3.
Step 3: Select a remedy. II, the landlord has failed to fix, or use his best efforts to
fix, the problem, the tenant may take any of the following actions:
(a) Withhold rent (if the tenant is being evicted for non-payment of rent, the
tenant must continue to pay the rent to the court's escrow account to be able
to raise habitability as a defense in any eviction action).
(b) Repair and deduct the costs oI the repair Irom the rent aIter submitting to
the landlord an itemized statement (Note: the cost oI the repair cannot exceed
one month`s rent and the tenant must have notiIied the landlord oI the tenant`s
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intention to correct the condition at the landlord`s expense at the time the tenant
sent the notice in Step 1
(c) Terminate the rental agreement; and/or
(d) Sue the landlord Ior damages and/or Ior an order to repair the problem(s).
However, as Baker readily admitted, and as the pleadings on Iile clearly show,
Coughlin was not being eviced for non-payment of rent. It is simply untenable to allow
Baker and Hill to indulge in the beneIits ('the path oI least resistance they called proceeding
under No Cause basis) oI only pleading No Cause, while then holding against Coughlin the
detriments and duties Iound in NRS 118A.355. To be Iair to Judge SIerrazza (whom is a
good man, whom may have grown overly antagonistic towards Coughlin, in large part, due to
the malIeasance oI Baker and Hill in their approach, which consistently violates PRC 3.1, 3.3,
3.4, 3.7, etc.) Judge SIerrazza appeared to apply a sort oI hybrid approach, combining both
NRS 118A.355(5) and 118A.360. This is evinced by the ruling on 10/13/11 wherein Judge
SIerrazza set oII most oI the rental amounts that Coughlin was Iorced to assert where satisIied
by way oI a NRS 118A.360 'Iix and deduct (insert speciIic dollar Iigures and issues here),
and then requiring Coughlin to deposit into the court's rent escrow account, consistent with
NRS 118A.355(d)'s requirement (and that brings up a void Ior lack or jurisdiction issue as to
whether JCRRT's dictate that such rule do not apply to 'landlord tenant matters, and a lack
oI some other 'local rule as required by NRS 118A.355(5) (' 1ustice courts shall establish
by local rule a mechanism by which tenants may deposit rent withheld under paragraph
(d) of subsection 1 into an escrow account maintained or approved by the court).
However, as to those amounts Coughlin was Iorced to make a rent escrow deposit
(some $2,275) Baker violated his duty oI candor to the court with respect to a signiIicant
amount thereoI (Iailing to admit to the court that his client had assented to the set oII oI at
least one $350 charge Ior 'taking care oI the weeds, etc., though iI that was amongst such
amounts set oII by Judge SIerrazza, such was likely not actionable), including the amounts
that Merliss had assented to a waiver oI any claim against Coughlin as to pursuant to his
agreement with Coughlin's Iormer Co-tenant Ulloa, where Ulloa had Iailed to mail to Merliss
$350 oI her share oI May 2011's rent, and taken Irom Coughlin $450 cash Ior June 2011's rent
and Iailed to mail that to Merliss either, in addition to Iailing to mail her share oI the June
2011 rent (another $450). As such, an additional $1,250 was included in the calculation oI
the 'rent escrow deposit that Baker lack a basis in law or Iact suIIicient to support his Iailure
to demonstrate candor to the tribunal as to, in participating in the Iorcing oI a deposit oI said
sums by Coughlin under NRS 118A.355(5).
As to those issues Coughlin sent the landlord 14 day 'Iix and deduct letters pursuant
to NRS 118A.355, see, Coughlin's email to the landlord regarding the toilet, the back door
lock, the moldy insulation, the Iront oIIice window, and, should the negotiated agreement
between Merliss and Coughlin respecting the entry way stairs and garbage disposal not be
recognized (Merliss wrote to Coughlin that he would be out oI the country Ior some time, and
instructed Coughlin to get 'two estimates, pick the cheaper one, and take it oII your rent),
then as to those per se habitability issues as well)repair your habitability complaints under
NRS 118A.360, it was NRS 118A.360 that actually covers the Iix and deduct Couglin
proceeded with instead oI any NRS 118A.355 approach, which would have subjected
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Coughlin to an extended wait to get the moldy insulation, crumbling stairs, disposal, back
door key lock, etc., etc., taken care oI and to being Iorced to deposit some 'rent escrow
amount with the RJC. Instead, Coughlin proceed under NRS 118A.360, and NRS 118A.380,
neither oI which require any 'rent escrow deposit in those Iew situations where Merliss and
Coughlin did not enter into an agreement outside any such statutory Iix and deduct
subsections (the repair oI the stairs, arguably, was an agreement setting oII rent, as was the
disposal, door lock, toilet, moldy insulation, broken Iront oIIice window, perhaps the light
Iixture, etc.).
Additionally, pursuant to the unnoticed, unlawIul summary shut oII oI electricity the
very day oI Baker's sudden inspection (10/4/11, interIering greatly, during such circumscribed
a summary time period, with Coughlin's preparation oI the Tenant's Answer/AIIidavit),
Iurther basis Ior set oII as to any NRA 118A.355(5) 'rent escrow amounts Coughlin was
required to deposit (to preserve habitability as a deIense (and note, that section does not say
'to preserve retaliation as a deIense where such retaliation the tenant alleges was based upon
and a complaint oI uninhabitability, and the tenant's asserting his rights to a NRS 118A.360
'Iix and deduct set-oII oI rent based upon the landlord's Iailure to timely cure within 14 days
the habitability issues tenant complained oI by way oI written notice)
'NRS 118A.360 Failure of landlord to comply with rental agreement or maintain
dwelling unit in habitable condition where cost oI compliance less than speciIied amount.
1. II the landlord Iails to comply with the rental agreement or his or her obligation to
maintain the dwelling unit in a habitable condition as required by this chapter, and the
reasonable cost oI compliance or repair is less than $100 or an amount equal to one month`s
periodic rent, whichever amount is greater, the tenant may recover damages Ior the breach or
notiIy the landlord oI the tenant`s intention to correct the condition at the landlord`s expense.
II the landlord Iails to use his or her best eIIorts to comply within 14 days aIter being notiIied
by the tenant in writing or more promptly iI conditions require in case oI emergency, the
tenant may cause the work to be done in a workmanlike manner and aIter submitting to the
landlord an itemized statement, the tenant may deduct Irom his or her rent the actual and
reasonable cost or the Iair or reasonable value oI the work, not exceeding the amount
speciIied in this subsection.
2. The landlord may speciIy in the rental agreement or otherwise that work done under
this section and NRS 118A.380 must be perIormed by a named person or Iirm or class oI
persons or Iirms qualiIied to do the work and the tenant must comply with the speciIications.
II the person qualiIied to do the work is unavailable or unable to perIorm the repairs the tenant
shall use another qualiIied person who perIorms repairs.
3. A tenant may not repair at the landlord`s expense iI the condition was caused by the
deliberate or negligent act or omission oI the tenant, a member oI the tenant`s household or
other person on the premises with his or her consent.
4. The landlord`s liability under this section is limited to $100 or an amount equal to one
month`s periodic rent, whichever amount is greater, within any 12-month period.
5. A tenant may not proceed under this section unless the tenant has given notice to the
landlord that the dwelling is not in a habitable condition as required by this chapter.
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Another 'Iix and deduct section:
'NRS 118A.380 Failure of landlord to supply essential items or services.
1. II the landlord is required by the rental agreement or this chapter to supply heat, air-
conditioning, running water, hot water, electricity, gas, a Iunctioning door lock or another
essential item or service and the landlord willIully or negligently Iails to do so, causing the
premises to become unIit Ior habitation, the tenant shall give written notice to the landlord
speciIying the breach. II the landlord does not adequately remedy the breach, or use his or her
best eIIorts to remedy the breach within 48 hours, except a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday,
aIter it is received by the landlord, the tenant may, in addition to any other remedy:
(a) Procure reasonable amounts oI such essential items or services during the landlord`s
noncompliance and deduct their actual and reasonable cost from the rent;
exceptions.
terminate a tenancy , refuse to renew a tenancy ,... or bring or threaten to bring an action
for possession iI:...
organization;
3601 et seq.,...
that subsection if:
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It is interesting to note the diIIerences between NRS 118A.510(b) and (e). Whereeas
'NRS 118A.290 Habitability of dwelling unit.
dwelling unit or if it substantially lacks:
(a) EIIective waterprooIing and weather protection oI the rooI and exterior walls,
including windows and doors.
(c) A water supply approved under applicable law, which is:.
landlord...
applicable law when installed and are maintained in good working order....
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(g) Building, grounds, appurtenances and all other areas under the landlord's control at
the time of the commencement of the tenancy in every part clean, sanitary and reasonably
free from all accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents, insects and vermin.
2. The landlord and tenant may agree that the tenant is to perform specified repairs,
maintenance tasks and minor remodeling...

Just what exactly is meant by the phrase Iound in the Iollowing two subsection oI NRS
40.253 in necessary to determine whether Judge SIerrazza's two diIIerent eviction orders were
stale or void at the time the lockout was conducted, and, necessarily, the extent to which
Couglin's 11/2/11 Motion or VeriIied Complaint Ior RelieI Irom Illegal Lockout and NRS
118A.390(5)(b) are dispositive and iI such was properly ignored by the Justice Court.
Such necessarily depends upon the application oI 'already pending to those Iacts...and
the various theories as to whether 'within 24 hours means 'up to as quickly as within 24
hours oI the eviction decision (ie, the tenant gets at least 24 hours Irom when the 24 hour
lock-out order is posted on their door) and, just whose 'receipt (the tenant's? The SheriII's?)
oI the 'order starts the running oI the '24 hours (Ior, iI it is the SheriII's receipt oI such an
Order Irom which some '24 hours begins running, and the Eviction Order becomes stale
upon the expiration oI '24 hours thereoI, then Baker's testimony at Coughlin's 6/18/12
criminal trespass trial, combined with Couglin's Declarations (iI everyone else here gets to
testiIy as to unsworn hearsay, why can't Couglin as to what Locksmith Sean Cheathum (oI All
American Lock & SaIe) told him about the lockout oI 11/1/11 (that it occurred outside oI the
expiration oI '24 hours Irom even the alleged 'receipt oI the lock-out Order as purported by
the Reno Carson Messenger statement (which Baker attached to his Memo oI costs and which
indicated such Eviction Order was delivered at 4:30 pm on 10/31/11 to the WCSO, which is
odd, considering the WCSO receipt Ior the lock-out feeindicates such was paid on 11/1/11 at
8:41 am, and the WCSO Iailed to respond to Coughlin's 11/2/11 Subpoena Duces Tecum, as
did the RJC to Coughlin's 10/30/12 Subpoena Duces Tecum, both in this matter oI indicating
such was delivered to the WCSO on , and what RJC Clerks Stancil and Cooper indicated it is
the 'usual custom and practice oI the RJC to Iax such eviction Orders over to the WCSO the
day the are entered, or the next day at the latest (the RJC simply producing the Iax logs would
shine some light on this issue, but it has reIused). OI course, the SCR 110 issues become
quite pertinent therein as well. R1457-69. Then there is the egregious amount oI redacting
Irom all those billing statements Ior costs and attorney's Iees that Hill and Baker attached to
the alleged.y 'detailed and thorough summary oI Iees invoices (per Judge Flanagan in his
6/25/12 Order, FHE 2. R1353. Further, that same 6/25/12 Order, at R1353, indicates that a
DCR 13(3) application was that basis Ior so awarding such Iees where Judge Flanagan admits
that he only considered 'Merliss's moving papers in making his decision, given the Iact that
Coughlin's 1/14/12 Opposition to Motion Ior Attorney's Fees was viewed as made too soon to
oppose the post-judgment motion Ior attorney's feesanction oI 4/19/12, and Coughlin's
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6/15/12 Supplemental to Opposition to Motion Ior Attorney's Fees was made too late,
considering the ten judicial days to Oppose such 4/19/12 Motion Ior Attorney's Fees Sanction
Iell the same day the WCPD, WCDA's OIIice, and RJC persisted in violating NRS 178.405
once again in holding the trial in RCR11-063341, the prosecution oI Coughlin mentioned Ior
prejudicial purposes only in King's Complaint. R2:18-23. (made, after, Coughlin's law
license was suspended, and, pursuant to this Court according Coughlin an entirely diIIerent
treatment in 60302 due to such Iact, no RPC violation may issue or be supported based on
anything Coughlin Iiled was his license was temporarily suspended, as, the counter oI the
WCDA's OIIice being able to claim Coughlin was not able to 'issue subpoenas given his
being 'suspended, similarly, Coughlin may not be adjudged to have violated RPC's Ior Iiling
made on his own behalI while so suspended (particularly those outside oI RPC 8.4).
'HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 84:14 to 87:5) I'm asking Mr. Coughlin to give us at
least a halI-hour notice iI you intend to call Mr. Hill in your case. MR.
COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. Chairman, sir, may I ask, with respect to the subpoena
duces tecum, can I ask Mr. Hill to present documentation as to when his oIIice met
with the sheriII? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Did you subpoena Mr. Hill? MR.
COUGHLIN: That's diIIicult to answer given -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: It shouldn't
be. It's either a yes or no. MR. COUGHLIN: I have to know what rules apply. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Pardon me? MR. COUGHLIN: I would have to know what rules
apply in this setting. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The issue is, did you subpoena Mr. Hill
to testiIy here today in your case? MR. COUGHLIN: According to the law oI
what? MR. ECHEVERRIA: The State oI Nevada. MR. COUGHLIN: NRCP? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Yes. MR. COUGHLIN: Is applicable here? MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Yes. MR. COUGHLIN: Really? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Did you subpoena Mr.
Hill? MR. COUGHLIN: Because it doesn't seem like it is applicable here. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, that's a very simple question. Did you cause a
subpoena to be issued Ior Mr. Hill's attendance in your case in chieI? MR.
COUGHLIN: Bar counsel told me I don't have to pay subpoena Iees. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, will you answer my question? MR. COUGHLIN:
I'm trying to, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. It's either a yes or a no. MR.
COUGHLIN: Depends whether or not witness Iees are required. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: No, it doesn't. That's another issue. The issue is: Did you cause a
subpoena to be issued to Mr. Hill and serve him with a subpoena; did you do that?
MR. COUGHLIN: I have to be careIul about what I say, sir. And I don't say this
out oI disrespect. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I think you should be careIul, because it
requires a truthIul answer. The answer is either yes, I did subpoena him, or no, I
didn't. MR. COUGHLIN: You're not going to Iorce me into saying what's
dismissed when they have made representations that I'm allowed to issue
subpoenas, or that I don't have to pay witness Iees, and you want to jam me into
saying yes, yes, I did this under the rules oI this, and not taking into accord what
they have been saying to me. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, did you cause a
subpoena to be issued -- MR. COUGHLIN: I would have to know what they are
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telling me is -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm going to take that as a no. Mr. Hill, you're
excused. MR. COUGHLIN: I don't know that I would say that. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I just did.
Just what exactly is meant by the phrase Iound in the Iollowing two subsection oI NRS
40.253 in necessary to determine whether Judge SIerrazza's two diIIerent eviction orders were
stale or void at the time the lockout was conducted, and, necessarily, the extent to which
Couglin's 11/2/11 Motion or VeriIied Complaint Ior RelieI Irom Illegal Lockout and NRS
118A.390(5)(b) are dispositive and iI such was properly ignored by the Justice Court:
NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2) ('(2)That iI the court determines that the tenant is guilty oI an
unlawIul detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an
order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of
the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt of the order) and,
NRS 40.253(5)(a): '5.Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(a)The landlord or the landlord`s agent may apply by affidavit of complaint for
eviction to the justice court oI the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or
the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of
the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order. The affidavit
must state or contain:
(3)The a mounts of any cleaning, security or rent deposits paid in advance, in
excess oI the Iirst month`s rent, by the tenant.
(5)The length of time the tenant has remained in possession without paying
rent.
(6)The amount of rent claimed due and delinquent.
(7)A statement that the written notice was served on the tenant in accordance with
NRS 40.280.
(8)A copy of the written notice served on the tenant.
Coughlin's 2/12/12 Iiling in the criminal trespass case, 26405, spells out the above, as
does his 6/5/12 Iiling therein, both provided to the OBC/NNDB/Panel and inappropriately
excluded Irom the ROA oI 2/13/13.
'NRS 118A.390 Unlawful removal or exclusion of tenant or willIul interruption oI
essential items or services; procedure Ior expedited relieI.
1. If the landlord unlawfully removes the tenant from the premises or excludes the
tenant by blocking or attempting to block the tenant`s entry upon the premises, willIully
interrupts or causes or permits the interruption oI any essential item or service required by the
rental agreement or this chapter or otherwise recovers possession oI the dwelling unit in
violation oI NRS 118A.480, the tenant may recover immediate possession pursuant to
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subsection 4, proceed under NRS 118A.380 or terminate the rental agreement and, in addition
to any other remedy, recover the tenant`s actual damages, receive an amount not greater than
$2,500 to be Iixed by the court, or both.
consider:
(c) The degree of harm to the tenant caused by the landlord`s conduct...
5. A veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI:...
(b) May not be filed with the court if an action for summary eviction or unlawful
detainer is already pending between the landlord and tenant, but the tenant may seek
similar relief before the judge presiding over the pending action .
6. The court shall conduct a hearing on the veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI not later
than 3 judicial days aIter the Iiling oI the veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI. BeIore or at
the scheduled hearing, the tenant must provide prooI that the landlord has been properly
served with a copy oI the veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI. Upon the hearing, iI it is
determined that the landlord has violated any oI the provisions oI subsection 1, the court may:
(a) Order the landlord to restore to the tenant the premises or essential items or services, or
both;
(c) Enjoin the landlord Irom violating the provisions oI subsection 1 and, iI the
circumstances so warrant, hold the landlord in contempt oI court.
prevail, except that the court may reduce them or waive them, as justice may require.
'NRS 118A.520 When lien or security interest in tenant`s household goods may be
enIorced; distraint for rent abolished; damages.
1. Any lien or security interest in the tenant`s household goods created in Iavor oI the
landlord to ensure the payment oI rent is unenIorceable unless created by attachment or
garnishment.
2. Distraint Ior rent is abolished.
3. A landlord who retains the household goods or other personal property oI a tenant in
violation oI this section is liable to the tenant Ior damages as provided in NRS 118A.390.
Further, under whatever theory Judge SIerrazza allowed the landlord to proceed under
the No Cause Eviction Notice (and, again, there was not a Landlord's AIIidavit Iiled as
required by NRS 40.253(5), likely due to the Iact that Baker and Hill sought to avoid having
declared 'actually litigated or res judicata the issue oI whether Coughlin owed the landlord
any rent (they expressly stated in letters to Coughlin their intent to seek such at a later time,
explaining that proceeding under a 'No Cause basis only in 1708, was simply 'easier Ior
the time being. That's the thing though. The operated on the leIt knee when they were
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supposed to do the operation on the right knee. That is, served a 5 Day No Cause Eviction
Notice, even iI they didn't Iile a Landlord's AIIidavit 'pleading as much, there other Iilings
and representations and arguments to the court expressly stated they were proceeding under a
No Cause basis only, and they acknowledged that 'we activated the 30-day no cause right to
terminate the lease...But, we are here only to talk about possession oI the property, Your
Honor (10/25/11 hearing noticed as a 'trial in 10/13/11 'Eviction Decision and Order, an
Order which Coughlin Iiled a Notice oI Appeal to on 10/18/11, divesting the RJC oI
jurisdiction to hold such 10/25/11 'trial even more than NRS 40.253(6) and the Iailure to
require service oI a written Complaint and allow '20 days Ior Coughlin to Iile a response
(which would have permitted counterclaims, and where Coughlin would have been entitled to
conduct discovery) under NJCRCP and the plenary unlawIul detainer statute).
Coughlin provided the SBN and Panel both the audio transcript he purchased Irom the
RJC (which the RJC indicates is a 'certiIied copy) and an unoIIicial partial transcript oI both
the 10/11/11 and 10/25/11 court dates. On 10/25/11, the Iollowing occurred on the record:
'DeIendant: In the midst oI the Iive-day period, aIter the unlawIul detainer notice was
served it`s my understanding I have Iive judicial days to Iile a tenant`s answer. However
during that time the power, the electricity, that is to the property was shut oII absent any
notice to myselI and created undue diIIiculty in preparing to deIending in this matter and
in adding the requisite third party deIendants such as the realtor/property manager.
|INDISCERNIBLE 4:31| Realty, the landscaping company and at this point, I believe NV
Energy might be a necessary party.
Judge: What does that have to do with the rent though, sir? Because what we are here
today on is the failure to pay rent.
DeIendant: Your Honor, the statute to me is complicated and conIusing but my
understanding oI it is that Mr. Merliss` or Dr. Merliss` failure to assert that he was
owed rent...takes this case out oI the purview oI the sections requiring a depositing oI a
rent escrow amount and his Iailure to cure the habitability issues within 14 days.
Judge: Okay. Regardless oI that have you paid the rent or not, Iirst oI all? (page 2)
PlaintiII (Hill's associate Baker): Your Honor, may.
Judge: I'm sorry?
DeIendant: Your Honor, that`s a Iactual determination. I think that would need to be made
PlaintiII: Your Honor, may I please. We are not here on a non-payment of rent. Your
Honor, I want to be very clear.
Judge: But you said a Iive-day notice.
PlaintiII: We`re here on a no-cause termination to vacate. Mr. Coughlin was a month-
to-month tenant since March 2011. We served a 30-day no cause termination notice to
vacate.
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1udge Sferrazza's 11/7/11 ~Eviction Decision and Order in 1708 (which, would
seem to operate to withdraw the entirety oI the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE) reads: 'DECISION:
1. Rent deposit to be reIunded to plaintiII in tbe amount oI$2275.00. 2. Stay denied. 3.
Supercedeas bond iI stay granted by District Court is 3 times monthly rent or $2700.00.
Much oI the $42,050 worth oI 'attorney's Iees awarded to the landlord in 1708 were incurred
in having set aside Baker's managing to sneak past Judge SIerrazza the Iollowing, and into the
10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE:
'IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS
FOLLOWS:
property of the landlord, Matt Merliss, but shall not be immediately released to him.
A1CRCP 73, in the event Coughlin timely and properly appeals this order. In the event
Coughlin Iails to timely and properly appeal this order, those sums shall be immediately
released to Merliss or his counsel oI record. These sums shall not, in any event, operate to
stay enforcement of this order and the surrender of the right of Coughlin to possess the
Property. Nothing in this order shall prevent this court or an appellate court Irom releasing
the deposited Iunds to Merliss or his counsel prior to or aIter any appeal is perIected, or from
increasing the amount of any security to be posted by Coughlin for any reason, or both,
either upon its own motion or upon motion by Merliss.
That 'Standard Rental Agreement continues:
~22 MAINTENANCE, REPAIRS, OR ALTERATIONS: ... Tenant will irrigate
and maintain any surrounding grounds, including laws and shrubbery, if they are for
the tenant's exclusive use....
any other cause which renders the premises untenantable, ... the rent in the current
month will be prorated...If this Agreement is not terminated, then Owner will promptly
repair the premises and there will be a proportionate reduction of rent until the
premises are repaired ... The proportionate reduction will be based on the extent which
repairs interIere with Tenant's reasonable oI the premises....
25. INSPECTION: resident agrees to grant management the right to enter the premise
Management agrees to give resident twice the twenty (24) hour notification requirement
for entry...
28. LIABILITY: management shall not be liable Ior any damage or injury to resident
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management, his agent, or employee, but resident will not agree to hold management
resident or his guests...
For some unimaginable reason, Judge SIerrazza granted the landlord Hill's associate
Baker represented in 1708 a right to inspect the property during the period oI time Coughlin
was to be allotted (provided no stay, withdrawing oI the eviction, or Iailure to appropriately
and timely eIIectuate the the 24 hour lock-out Order suIIicient to prevent it Irom being stale
or void, were to occur. Why on earth such an inspection would be necessary, when the
landlord would have all the time to inspect the property he could desire just a couple days
later, and where such an inspection would necessarily be distruptive to the tenant's eIIorts to
move an entire home and law oIIice during the weekend Iollowing six grueling weeks oI
litigating a summary eviction proceeding/trial that was, essentially, a pastiche oI all most
pro-landlord aspects oI both types oI evictions, is completely unclear.
Also, in the criminal trespass RMC case, a 'judgment oI Conviction and Court
Order was entered on 11/14/11, making the Iiling oI the same title on 6/18/12 void. One
can be sure, as they have demonstrated time and again, that the RMC would apply such an
overly rigid and Iormulaic approach to procedure to a pro se indigent criminal deIendant, and
its only Iair to hold the RMC accountable where, such as here, its negligence has resulted in
the entering oI multiple 'judgment oI Conviction and Court Order(s) in the same case.
Given that the JCCO oI 11/14/11 Iails to speciIy that Coughlin was convicted oI an crime in
particular, Coughlin was adjudged acquitted oI the charge oI criminal trespass, and, as such,
the second JCCO oI 6/18/12 was a violation oI the prohibition against double jeopardy, res
judicata, law oI the case, etc. Further, the Iact that the RMC appointed Lew Taitel, Esq., to
represent Coughlin in that criminal trespass case, where Richard G. Hill, Esq., signed the
Complaint oI 11/13/11, where Coughlin was, at that time suing Taitel's business partners (the
unauthorized practioners oI law, Nevada Court Services, whose misconduct in another
summary eviction oI Coughlin, on 6/28/12 in RJC Rev2012-001048 also resulted in another
custodial arrest oI Coughlin in RCR12-067980, Ior 'Resisting a Public OIIicer where
Coughlin allegedly Iailed to open the door to his rental, where the WCSO reIused to identiIy
itselI or indicate whether they were members oI law enIorcement prior to the landlord having
the door to the rental cut open, with Nevada Court Service's Chandler running in to take
photographs oI Coughlin's rental, which he then provided to the WCDA's OIIice and or the
WCPD's OIIice, and where Chandler then appeared in court on behalI oI his out oI state
corporate client, in violation oI NRCP 11, and Iiled legal pleadings NCS had prepared
without a law license in 1048) in CV11-03126, and where Judge W. Gardner had previously
reIused to identiIy to Coughlin the 'Iour or Iive possible 'court appointed deIendse
counsel that Coughlin may be assigned upon Coughlin querying him as to the names oI
such counsel, mentioning such inIormation was necessary to assess conIlicts or the risk oI, to
which Judge W. Gardner outright reIused to provide such inIormation to Coughlin at the
10/11/11 arraignment in 22176 (leading to a delay in Coughlin's knowing whether or not he
would be provided appointed Sixth Amendment satisIying deIense counsel in that matter,
which resulted in Coughlin's current temporary suspension, and, where Coughlin, in Iact,
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was ultimately denied court appointed counsel in Judge Howard's 10/26/11 Order (which
Iailed to rule that jail time was not a possibility), they delay in becoming aware that such
counsel would not be appointed prejudiced Coughlin's deIense, particulary given the scant
time that leIt Coughlin to make other arrangements when considering the intervening
wrongIul summary eviction, wrongIul eIIectuation oI a 24 hour lock-out Order by the
WCSO, wrongIul custodial criminal trespass arrest (and three day incarceration) and
holidays. Basically, citizens oI Reno and Washoe County get knocked around pretty hard by
those working in local law enIorcement, and its kind oI a 'iI you don't like, tough attitude
taken...Consider, Ior example, iI one were to treat their assets that way? One would likely
not have much wealth ultimately. Where Reno, and Washoe County's assets are its citizens,
primarily, its no wonder that both are experiencing such decline (amongst the leaders in
Ioreclosures, suicides, bankruptcies, Iailing educational standards, disease, etc., etc.).
Further, the charging document in that criminal trespass prosecution is insuIIicient to
support any conviction. It reads: 'I, Richard G. Hill, on behalI oI Matthew Merliss, hereby
complain and say that Zachary B. Coughlin has committed the crime of trespass to wit:
That said deIendant on or about Nov. 13, 2011 in the City oI Reno, State oI Nevada, at 121
River Rock St., the Def. Was found on the property after being evicted on 11-1-11. All
of which is in violation of 8.10.010 of the Reno Municipal Code. I thereIore request that
said DeIendant be dealt with according to law. I hereby declare upon information and
belief under penalty oI perjury pursuant to NRS 171.102, that the Ioregoing is true and
correct to the best oI my knowledge. /s/ Richard G. Hill, Esq., 11/13/11, Complianant.
Consider the text oI the RMC Code section merely cited to in the 11/13/11 Criminal
Complaint (that is, it Iails to lists each element or speciIy which subsection the prosecution is
proceeding under:
'RMC Sec. 8.10.010. - Trespassing.
(a) Every person who goes upon the land or into any building of
another with intent to vex or annoy the owner or occupant thereof,
or to commit any unlawful act, or wilfully goes or remains upon any
land or in any building after having been warned by the owner or
occupant thereof not to trespass, is guilty oI a misdemeanor...
The Reno City Attorney argued at trial on 6/18/12 that the alleged posting oI Judge
SIerrazza's 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE and eIIectuation oI a lock-out on 11/1/11, immediately
aIter such posting (and thereIore violative oI NRS 40.253(5) in that less than 24 hours
elapsed between the posting oI such Order and the lock-out being carried out) amounted to a
'warning suIIicient to support a trespass conviction. There was no evidence or testimony
put on relative to any warning inherent to any posted signs (or any allegations that there were
any such 'no trespassing signs, or to any arguments relative to Iencing oI the property).
The distinction between a warning 'not to trespass under RMC 8.10.010 and
Coughlin's allegedly (at least according to Judge SIerrazza's 3/30/12 characterization oI
Judge SIerrazza's various eviction Orders, keeping in mind the RJC's Iailure to transmit
numerous key documents to the 2JDC in the 1/4/12 Supplemental it Iiled in CV11-03628
which would, necessarily weigh heavily oI the issue oI whether any purported 'order to
'vacate was operative) being 'ordered to vacate the property per Judge Flanagan's
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3/30/12 combination Order in 03628. However, neither oI eviction order's Judge SIerrazza
signed and entered have any language, in any way, that amount to Coughlin having been
'ordered to vacate the property. Rather, the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE reads: 'IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: That the
sheriII/constable oI Reno Township, or one oI their duly authorized agents be, and hereby is,
directed to remove each and every person found upon the rental unit at 121 River
Rock, Reno, Washoe County, Nevada, by no earlier than October 31, 2011 at 5 pm.
There is a legally distinct diIIerence between one being 'ordered to vacate the
property (and, to be clear, Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order mistates Judge SIerrazza's Order
where is makes such a restatement oI it) and the language in the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE in
1708, where the SheriII 'is, directed to remove each and every person found upon the
rental unit... and going ~upon the land or into any building of another with intent to
vex or annoy the owner or occupant thereof, or to commit any unlawful act, or wilfully
(going) or (remaining) upon any land or in any building after having been warned by
the owner or occupant thereof not to". A SheriII being ordered to 'remove each and every
person at a rental, allegedly posting a copy oI the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE on the door
thereoI, and conducting a lock-out while the Iormer home law oIIice at a time when
Coughlin was not there is in no way tantamount to the 'owner having 'warned Couglhin
not to 'trespass, which the Reno Municipal Code has deIined as occurring when a person
'goes upon the land or into any building of another with intent to vex or annoy the
owner or occupant thereof, or to commit any unlawful act, or wilfully goes or remains
upon any land or in any building after having been warned by the owner or occupant
thereof not to".
In his Order, Judge Flanagan, in a scant eight pages, ruled on three vastly diIIerent
motions-(the 3/30/12 Order reads, at page 1 lines 20-28: 'Currently beIore this Court are
three matters, all oI which have been Iully brieIed and submitted Ior decision. The Iirst
matter beIore this Court is Coughlin's Motion under NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 to Alter or
Amend the Order Denying Motion to Prevent Disposal oI Personal Property. The second
matter is DeIendant MATTHEW MERLISS's ("Merliss") Motion Ior Leave to File
Answering BrieI in Excess oI Five Pages. The third and Iinal matter is the parties' Appellate
BrieIs, including Coughlin's Opening BrieI and Merliss's Answering BrieI. This Court will
address each oI these matters in turn), at page 4, ln 14) and the actual language in Judge
SIerrazza's two diIIerent eviction Orders is important.
Actually, it is Hill and his associate Baker's lack oI candor to the tribunal in 03628 that
led Judge Flanagan to get things to wrong in his 3/30/12 Order, especially where, at page 4,
line 9-20, it reads:
' SpeciIically, Judge SIerrazza Iound Merliss properly terminated Coughlin's tenancy and
thereaIter properly served Coughlin with a notice oI unlawIul detainer. 1udge Sferrazza
further found "Coughlin failed to present any evidence that Merliss acted in an
prohibited, discriminatory, or retaliatory fashion as alleged by Coughlin, or otherwise.'
(SIerrazza, J., Order, Case No. REV2011-001708, Oct. 27, 2011.) As a result, Coughlin was
ordered to vacate the premises by October 31, 211 at 5: p.m. Coughlin Iailed to do so. He
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also Iailed to remove his personal belongings. Consequently Merliss sought a personal
property lien for storage of Coughlin's personal belongings in the Property from the
period of Aovember 1, 211 to Aovember 1, 211. Coughlin filea a motion to contest the
lien. On December 21, 2011, Judge SIerrazza ordered Coughlin to pay to Merlis $480.00 as
"Iair and reasonable compensation" Ior Merliss's storage oI his personal belongings.
(SIerrazza, J., Order, Case No. REV2011-001708, Dec. 21, 2011.) Judge SIerrazza also
granted Coughlin access to the Property to remove his personal belongings by December 23,
2011 5 :00 p.m. Coughlin Iailed to do so. As a result, Merliss hired a contractor to dispose
Coughlin's personal belongings.
Actually, Baker and Hill sought much more than Judge SIerrazza recounts above with
respect to the personal property lien. They argued Ior and Iiled papers directed to their
allegation that the landlord should received the 'Iull rental value (the same $900 per month
previously charged Ior 'Iull use and occupancy up to the December 23
rd
, 2011 date at which
Coughlin's access to the property to remove his belongings would cease pursuant to Judge
SIerrazza's 12/21/11 Order. Some might say that Judge Flanagan goes out oI his way to
downplay the RJC's Iailure to provide the hearing required within 10 days oI Coughlin Iiling
his Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien (the Iirst on 11/16/11, and again on 12/5/12;
and in both instances, no hearing was held within the 10 days required under NRS
40.253(8)). While Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order notes at page 5 line 18 'Coughlin filea a
motion to contest the lien it is noticeably silent as to all the troubling peripheral matters and
dates connected thereto. Well, it was silent, until attempting to shiIt blame to Coughlin (and
away Irom either the 2JDC or the RJC, or Hill and Baker) Ior his Order's Iailure to address
Coughlin's including in his appeal the 12/21/11 Order Resolving Motion to Contest Personal
Property Lien in the Iootnote on page 5, lines 25-28, oI that 3/30/12 Order in 03628, which
reads:
'5 ... because Coughlin failed to timely file his notice of appeal regarding the
personal property lien, see NRS 40.253(8), and because Coughlin's notice of
appeal fails to identify an error regarding the court's procedure in setting a
hearing on this issue, this Court will not consider this issue.
NRS 40.253(8): 'Upon the Iiling oI a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court
shall schedule a hearing on the motion . The hearing must be held within 10
days after the filing of the motion. The court shall aIIix the date oI the hearing to
the motion and order a copy served upon the landlord by the sheriff, constable
or other process server. At the hearing, the court may:
(a)Determine the costs, iI any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS
determined to be due or iI no charges are determined to be due..
It is not at all clear why Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order in 063628 cites to NRS
40.253(8) at page 5, line 25-28, given nothing in that subsection oI the summary eviction
procedure statute relates in any way to determining whether 'Coughlin Iailed to timely Iile
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his notice oI appeal regarding the personal property lien. What seems clear is that the
1/4/12 Supplemental to Justice Court Proceedings transmitted to the 2JDC by the RJC and
Iiled in 03628 does not conIorm to the 'CertiIicate OI Clerk Iound at page 3 oI the 3 page
pdI that was held out on the 2JDC eFlex system since that 1/4/12 Iiling date as that Iiling,
where, clearly, the 3 page Iiling does not contain all the documents listed on page 2 in the
'Appeal Receipt that the 'CertiIicate oI Clerk on page 3 oI that Supplemental indicates
are therein included. It appears as though this very omission oI those Iilings Irom the 1/4/12
Supplemental resulted in Judge Flanagan's Iootnote on page 5 oI his 3/30/12 Order, wherein
he bases his Iailure to include
Coughlin's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis in 1708 was granted 10/6/11
and would apply to any such 'service oI process Iees involved above, to whatever
extent NRS 40.253(8)'s dictate that 'the court shall...order a copy served upon the
landlord by the sheriII, constable or other process server. Given the primacy oI one's
residence or business, and the summary nature oI these types proceedings, it would
seem more likely (especially given the absence oI any express dictate that the tenant
have the Order Ior Hearing served in such a special manner) that the Legislature
intended Ior the court to order the service thereoI by the sheriII, especially where, as
here, the Order Ior the 12/20/11 hearing is silent in that regard, and where Hill's emails
to Coughlin and the RJC oI 11/21/11 would seem to operate as a waiver to any such
service requirement.
Considering the 1/4/12 Supplemental to Justice Court Proceedings transmitted by the
RJC to the 2JDC and Iiled in 03628 is a mere 3 pages, with none oI the documents listed on
page 2 thereoI in the 'Appeal Receipt (which reveals the robo-signing being done by the
2JDC upon considering the 'CertiIication oI Clerk therein), Judge Flanagan's above
analysis is particularly curious, and suspect. Just what Notice oI Appeal is he reIerring to?
One he has viewed? Where his Iootnote 5 indicates that 'Coughlin Iailed to timely Iile his
notice oI appeal an indication is clearly made that there was a Notice oI Appeal Iiled by
Coughlin in connection with Judge SIerrazza's 12/21/11 Order Resolving Motion to Contest
Personal Property Line. A review oI the ROA Irom the RJC and all Supplementals Iile in
03268 reveals that the Coughlin submitted Ior Iiling by an approved method oI delivery, on
12/26/12 just such a Notice oI Appeal to the 12/21/11 Order Resolving Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien, and that within that Notice oI Appeal, there is more than
suIIiciently managed to 'identify an error regarding the court's procedure in setting a
hearing on this issue, this Court will not consider this issue. Some might say, the above
reveals in impermissible chop block by one judge in protection oI a lower court's Iailure to
hold a hearing (something the RJC was concerned enough about to sua sponte, put on
Clerks Stancil and Jonas as 'witnesses at the 12/21/11 Hearing, and to have each Iiled
unsworn Declarations regarding such matters, and place them into the Iile in 1708 (though,
not actually serve them on Coughlin...very similar to what King and Clerk oI Court Peters
have done in this matter with pages 32 and 216, etc, etc.). Regardless, even had Couglhin
Iailed to 'identiIy an error regarding the court's proedure in setting a hearing on this issue
such is not a requirement to get an appellate judge to rule on it. There are a multitude oI
aspects Coughlin took issue with in connection to the 12/11/11 Order, not just some 'error
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regarding the court's procedure in setting a hearing on this issue... Things like the
suIIiciency oI the evidence oI the allegation that Coughlin Iailed to seek an opportunity to
retrieve his property. Whether an unlawIul rent distraint was being applied. Whether the
$30 a day Ior rent was reasonable. Whether any such amount shoudl be oIIset by the
thousands oI dollars burglarized Irom the property due to Hill and Baker's negligence...etc.,
etc.
The language in Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order above demonstrates clearly the extent
to which Judge Flanagan either was unaware that an appeal oI a summary eviction is
reviewed de novo (and the pleadings and other orders on Iile would vitiate such a theory) or
simply does not wish to actually conduct a 'de novo review. Judge Flanagan managed to
hold two hearings Ior Hill and Baker's insipied, lie Iilled (NRCP 56(g) bad Iaith aIIidavit
violating) Second Motion Ior Order To Show Cause (which was part oI a quadruple jeopardy
attack launched by Hill when it became clear neither he nor his associate were anywhere
close to be capable oI competing with Coughlin using just law and Iacts and analysis).
Further, while Coughlin attempted to set a hearing consistent with Anvui's dictate that a
review oI a summary eviction be done de novo, Hill violated RPC 3.1 in disputing that, and
Department 7 reIused to hold such a hearing. Additionally, the Iootnote onI page 4, lines 27-
29 oI Judge Flanagan's Order is rather troubling, as is indicates that 'Coguhlin Iiled a
Supplement to Appellant's Opening BrieI, to which he attached an exhibit containing a cd of
audio recordings That may, generally, be true, but the Iact that those 'audio recordings
were all oI the JAVS audio transcripts that Coughlin was Iorced to pay $35 Ior each Irom the
RJC (the 10/13/11, 10/25/11, 11/7/11, and 12/20/11 summary eviction
proceedings/'trial/hearings) indicates pretty clearly that Judge Flanagan did not even listen
to one Iile on the disc attached as an Exhibit to Coughlin's Appellant's BrieI. ThereIore,
Judge Flanagan's rationale in Iailing to
Chair Echeverria attempted to provide legal advice, wrongIully, to Coughlin at the
disciplinary hearing regarding whether one can 'veriIy the 'Answer or VeriIies Response
required by SCR 105, 'upon information and belief, similar to the Declaration by Hill
above. Further, it is inappropriate Ior the SBN to be able to bring a Complaint that is not
veriIied and which is not based on veriIied or sworn written grievances. Hill's purportedly
did not even sign his grievance, and emailed it only. Judge Nash Holmes made numerous
statement sin her 3/14/12 grievance that her own Iellow RMC Judges have disclaimed as not
true, particularly, Judge W. Gardner, on the record on 4/10/12 in 26405 and Judge Dilworth,
again, on the record on 12/3/12 in RMC 12 CR 12420.
Judge Holmes' 3/14/12 greivance against Coughlin hand delivered to the SBN along
with a 'box oI materials reads:
'...This letter constitutes a Iormal complaint oI attorney misconduct and/or
disability against Zachary Barker Coughlin. The accompanying box of
materials demonstrates some oI the problems with the practice oI this attorney
being experienced by myself and the other three judges in Reno Municipal
Court. My two most recent Orders in what should be a simple traffic
citation case are selI-explanatory and are included, together with copies oI
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massive documents Mr. Coughlin has faxfiled to our court in this case. Audio
recordings oI two oI my hearings in this matter are also included . He Iailed to
appear Ior the second one this past Monday.
I have another traffic case pending trial with him that was re-assigned to
me based on our Department 1 judge being out for surgery. We have
multiple addresses for Mr. Coughlin and can't seem to locate him between
cases very easily. We are setting that case for trial and attempting to serve
him at the most recent address we have (1422 E. 9th St. #2 Reno NY 89512),
although I heard today he may be living in his vehicle somewhere. We do
have an address for his mother, however, as she recently posted part oI a Iine
Ior hi m .
Judge Ken Howard, Department 4, had a case on Mr. Coughlin late last year
that is now on appeal to the Second Judicial District Court. Judge Bill Gardner,
Department 2, also has a matter currently pending in his court with Mr.
Coughlin as the deIendant. I have enclosed some copies of documents from
those matters, in chronological order, simply because they appear to
demonstrate that he is quickly decompensating in his mental status . Our staff
also made you some audio tapes oI Coughlin in the matters in Departments 2
and 4 so you can hear Ior yourselI how this attorney acts in court. You can see
his behavior in my traIIic citation case does not appear to be an isolated
incident.
It is my understanding that Reno 1ustice Court also has a matter pending on
this attorney. My 1udicial Assistant was contacted by the Washoe Public
Defender in February when I had Mr. Coughlin jailed for Contempt of
Court and they stated that they represent him in a Cross Misdemeanor
matter in R1C. I have no other information on that.
You will have the full cooperation of myself, the other judges, and the staff
of Reno Municipal Court in your pursuit of this matter. Mr. Coughlin has
positioned himselI as a vexatious litigant in our court, antagonizing the staII
and even our pro temp judges on the most simple traIIic and misdemeanor
matters. I do think this is a case oI some urgency, and I apologize for taking
two days to get this package to you; our IT person was ill and could not make
the copies oI the audios oI Mr. Coughlin's hearings until today, and I Ielt it was
important that the audios be included in the materials to be considered by the
State Bar. On February 27, 2012, Mr. Coughlin told me he was actively
practicing law and had appointments with clients . I do not know iI that was
true, but iI so, he could be causing serious harm to the practice oI law in
Northern Nevada and could be jeopardizing someone's Ireedom or property
interests. "
For all oI King and the Panel's wasting oI Coughlin's time to put on his case, making
specious arguments about the certiIication oI the 'audio recordings (whether those Coughlin
was Iorced to have his mother buy aIter Judge Holmes' struck Irom the record Coughlin's
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3/7/12 IFP (and the SBN's FHE 9 (1784-86) is amongst the most Iraudulent pieces oI work
by any attorney in the State oI Nevada in quite some time, which, obviously, is especially
troubling considering it was done by an Assistant Bar Counsel in conspiracy with one or
more judges oI a municipal court. The big deal is that 'page 1 oI 3 oI that Iax Iiled
document (Coughlin's
The Complaint, at R3, really does not provide anywhere near enough speciIics
regardign Iacts or legal basis or theories in support thereoI suIIicient to support the Panel's
FOFCOL's in that regard, where the Complaitns reads:
'17. Respondent Iiled AIIidavits oI Poverty in Support oI his Motion to Proceed
InIorma Pauperis, wherein he Iails to disclose that he is a licensed attorney and instead under
Employment and SelI-Employment he identiIies himselI as a "Jack oI All Trades".
18. Despite a claim oI poverty in the above mentioned aIIidavits, Respondent told the Court
that his incarceration Ior contempt would adversely aIIect his clients. '
However, at the Hearing oI 11/14/12, King evinced a complete lack oI candor to the
tribunal and Iairness to opposing party where he oIIered as an Exhibit a partial document as
best, that was a combination oI two diIIerent Iilings. The page 1 oI 3 that King omitted
thereIrom not only evinces the extent to which Coughlin attempted to obtain a copy oI the
audio transcript oI the 2/27/12 Hearing in which Judge Holmes Iound him in direct contempt
and summarily sentenced him to 5 days incarceration, but also, as indicated in the third page
oI R1784-86. The CertiIicate oI Service on r1784 reveals that FH9 at 1786 is an impartial
version oI an Order by Judge Nash Holmes and a Motion to Proceed on Appeal IFP and
Request Ior Audio by Coughlin that Judge Holmes attached to her Order String the same.
Hill's 1/4/12 Declaration in 03628 reads: '4. On Sunday, November 13, 2011, Dr.
Merliss and I Iound Mr. Coughlin 3 living in the basement oI the home on River Rock. He
had barricaded himselI in the 4 basement and had clearly been living there Ior quite some
time.
"DCR Rule13.Motions: Procedure Ior making motions; aIIidavits; renewal,
rehearing oI motions... '3.Within 10 days aIter the service oI the motion, the opposing
party shall serve and Iile his written opposition thereto, together with a memorandum oI
points and authorities and supporting aIIidavits, iI any, stating Iacts showing why the motion
should be denied. Failure of the opposing party to serve and file his written opposition
may be construed as an admission that the motion is meritorious and a consent to
granting the same."
1udge Linda Gardner's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce
(FOFCOLDOD) in DV08-01168 of 6/1 9/09 held:
Judge Flanagan's 3/27/12 Order Denying Respondent Merliss's Motion for Order to Show
Cause to Hold Appellant Couglin in Contempt of his Order of 1anuary 11th, 2012 in the
summary eviction appeal invovling Hill, reads:
"ORDER Procedural History On January 20, 2012, Respondent, Matt Merliss
|hereaIter Merliss|, Iiled his Second MotionIor Order to Show Cause, and the matter was
submitted Ior decision on February 8, 2012. An Order to Show Cause was entered February
8,2012, setting the hearing date Ior same on March 23,2012, to commence at 11:00 a.m.
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On March 13, Appellant, Zachary Barker Coughlin |hereaIter Coughlin|, Iiled his
Supplement to Motion to Vacate or Stay Hearing on Order to Show Cause. The matter was
heard on March 23, 2012, and due to time constraints, the hearing was continued and
completed on March 26, 2012.
This Court, having heard evidence, argument and apprised oI the pleadings herein
Orders that Respondent Merliss's Motion for Order to Show Cause to hold Appellant
Coughlin in contempt of this Court's Order of 1anuary 11, 2012, is DENIED."
"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce
The above-entitled matter came on Ior trial beIore this Court on March 11, 2009 and
March 12,2009. ASHWIN JOSHI, PlaintiII, was present and represented by his counsel,
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ. BHARTI JOSHI, DeIendant, was present and represented by
her counsel, ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ. The Court issued its Order AIter trial which was
Iiled on April 13, 2009.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. PlaintiII is a resident oI the State oI Nevada, and Ior a period oI more than six (6)
weeks beIore commencement oI this action has resided and been physically present and
domiciled in the State oI Nevada.
2. DeIendant is a resident oI the State oI Nevada, and Ior a period oI more than six (6)
weeks beIore commencement oI this action has resided and been physically present and
domiciled in the State oI Nevada.
3. PlaintiII and DeIendant were married on May 11, 1987 in Bombay, India, and ever
since that date have been, and now are, Husband and WiIe.
4. There are two children oI this marriage, both oI whom are now adults.
5. DeIendant is not pregnant at this time.
6. PlaintiII and DeIendant have become, and continue to be, incompatible in marriage,
and no reconciliation is possible.
7. The current address oI PlaintiII is 1644 Fieldcrest Drive, Sparks, NV 89434.
8. The current address oI DeIendant is 260 Booth Street, Apt. Q, Reno, NV 89509.
9. The Court adopts, as Findings oI Fact, each and every Conclusion oI Law below,
which by this reIerence are expressly incorporated herein.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. JURISDICTION. This Court has jurisdiction oI PlaintiII and DeIendant, and oI the
subject matter herein.
2. GROUNDS. PlaintiII is entitled to a Decree oI Divorce Irom DeIendant on the
grounds oI incompatibility.
3. CHILD SUPPORT/ADULT CHILDREN'S EDUCATION. Mr Joshi will not be
held responsible Ior the continuing education oI the adult children oI this marriage.
4. COMMUNITY PROPERTY/DEBT.
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A) Women's Wealth: The "women's wealth" at issue herein is the sole and
separate property oI the DeIendant. PlaintiII is to contact any and all relatives who may have
this property and immediately ask them to return said property to the DeIendant as soon as
possible.
B) Mr. Joshi's Vehicle: The 2005 Chevrolet Blazer shall be considered as
PlaintiII's sole and separate property and PlaintiIIshall be responsible Ior the debt remaining
thereon. Since the car is worth about $10,910.00 and there is $15,009.75 due and owing on
the vehicle, Mr. Joshi's assumption oI this asset is to be considered as an undertaking oI
community debt oI approximately $4,100.00.
C) Ms. Joshi's car shall be considered as her sole and separate property and she
shall be responsible Ior any debt remaining thereon. Since no evidence was presented to the
Court as to the value oI the auto, either positive or negative, there is no value Ior this
community asset.
D) Son's Vehicle: This vehicle is not considered as an asset and will not be
E) Daughter's Vehicle: This vehicle is not considered as an asset and will not be
F) London Bank Account: There is no Iactual basis to support that this account
exists and thereIore it is not being considered a community asset.
G) Community Bank Accounts: There is no Iactual basis to support that
community bank accounts exist and thereIore the same is not being considered a community
asset.
H) Computer: The computer which was purchased at Best Buy is awarded to Mr
Joshi.
I) Television: Ms. Joshi is awarded the television which was purchased at Best
Buy. Said television is currently in Ms. Joshi's possession and shall be deemed her sole and
separate property.
J) General Credit Card Debt: There is general debt oI approximately $15,650.00
which has been expended Ior community purposes. Mr. Joshi has agreed to be responsible Ior
this debt and the same shall be considered as his sole and separate responsibility.
K) Best Buy Credit Card Debt: There is an approximately balance oI $1,314.00
outstanding Ior the purchase oIthe television and computer. Mr. Joshi has agreed to be
responsible Ior this debt and the same shall be considered as his sole and separate
responsibility. Daughter'S E) K) Ms. Joshi's Vehicle: Ms. Joshi's car shall be considered as
her sole and separate property and she shall be responsible Ior any debt remaining thereon.
Since no evidence was presented to the Court as to the value oI the auto, either positive or
L) Medical Debt: There is a debt due to St. Mary's Hospital Ior $6,735.00 and a
debt to REMSA Ior $500.00. Mr. Joshi has agreed to be responsible Ior these debts and the
same shall be considered as his sole and separate responsibility.
M) Family Debt: There is a debt due to Ashik Nanaby and a $5,000.00 debt due
to Rod and Meena Fowler. Mr. Joshi has agreed to be responsible Ior these debts and the
same shall be considered as his sole and separate responsibility.
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N) General Community Debt: There was no evidence to establish community
debt. Mr. Joshi agreed to take the remaining community debt in his name that is outstanding
and the debt shall be his sole and separate responsibility. It should be noted that Mr. Joshi has
likely incurred an unequal distribution oI the community debt oI the parties and the Court
Iinds his testimony to be a compelling reason Ior making an unequal distribution oIthe
community debt.
5. Spousal Support: The Court has Iound that Mr. Joshi is 51 and Ms. Joshi is 46; the
parties earn roughly equivalent amounts; the parties have been married 21 years but Ms. Joshi
has always been employed during that time; Ms. Joshi has a college degree; both parties are
able to work; and aIter consideration oI the net income, deduction oI taxes, and the amount
paid in community debt by Mr. Joshi, an award oI alimony in the amount oI one dollar
($1.00) shall be awarded to Ms. Joshi pursuant to NRS 125.150, WolIIv. WolII 112 Nev.
1355,929 P.2d 196, and Shydler v. Shydler, 194 Nev. 192, 196,954 P.2d 37, 39 (1988).
1UDGEMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, AD1UDGED, AND DECREED
1. PlaintiII, ASHWIN JOSHI be, and he is, Iinally and absolutely divorced Irom
DeIendant, BHARTI JOSHI, and that the bonds oI matrimony heretoIore existing between
PlaintiII ASHWIN JOSHI, and DeIendant, BHARTI JOSHI, be, and they hereby are,
dissolved, and the parties hereto are restored to the status oI single and unmarried persons.
2. There DeIendant's name shall be restored to that oI BHARTI R. DAVE.
3. The matter, as set Iorthin the preceding Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law, and Decree
oI Divorce, is hereby ratiIied, adopted, and approved, and the parties are Ordered to comply
with the terms oI such. GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS SO ORDERED."
1udge Elliott's 3/15/12 ORDER AFFIRMING RULING OF THE RENO
MUNICIPAL COURT reads: "Presently beIore the Court Is an Appeal Irom a rul ing oI the
Reno Municipal Court, Ilied by Appellant ZACHARY BAKER COUGHLIN (hereaIter
"Appellant") on December 23, 2011. Following, on February 7, 2012, Appellant Iiled his
Opening BrieI on Appeal. ThereaIter, on February 23, 2012, Respondent CITY OF RENO
(hereinaIter "Respondent") Iiled its Answering BrieI. The matter is now beIore the Court Ior
Its conSideration. This matter comes beIore the Court on a criminal appeal Irom the Reno
Municipal Court. On November 30,2011, Appellant was convicted oI Petit Larceny, a
violation oI RMC 8.10.040. ThereaIter, on December 13, 2011, Appellant Iiled a Notice oI
Appeal with the Court. Although Appellant's arguments on appeal are unclear, Appellant
raises a wide variety oI issues, including, inter aI/a: that he was denied his Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel, that the Municipal Court erred in Iailing to grant him a continuance, that the
prosecution engaged in misconduct, that he .. .. as reIused an opportunity to testiIy on his
own behalI, that certain evidence should have been suppressed pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment oI the United States Constitution, that his conviction is not supported by
suIIicient evidence, and that "|I|urther Improprieties and due process deIiciencies" occurred.
UnIortunately, Appellant neither supports his arguments with relevant authority nor citations
to relevant portions oI the record. Most Importantly, Appellant has Iailed to provide this Court
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with a copy oI the transcript oI relevant proceedings In the Reno Municipal Court. The
Nevada Supreme Court has held that an "|a|ppellant has the ultimate responsibility to provide
this court with 'portions oI the record essential to determination oI issues raised in appellant's
appeal:" Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37 n. 4, 83 P.3d 818 (2004) (citingNRAP 30(b)(3).
Further, NRAP 28(e) provides that "|e|very assertion in brieIs regarding matters In the record
shall be supported by a reIerence to the page oI the transcript or appendix where the matter
relied on is to be Iound." While Appellant did provide this Court with a Compact Disc
containing a recording oI the MuniCipal Court proceedings, Appellant did not cite to the
portions oI the Compact Disc that he Ielt supported his arguments, and It Is not the
responsibility oI this Court to guess which portions oI the Compact Disc might support
Appellant's arguments. In short, Appellant did not satiSIy his responsibility to supply and cite
to relevant portions oI the record merely by producing a Compact Disc recording oI the entire
Municipal Court proceeding. In light oI Appellant's Iailure to provide this Court with an
adequate appellate reCOrd, and Appellant's correspondent Iailure to cite to such a record, tnls
Court is unable to conduct a meaningIul review oI Appellant's appeal. Thus, Appellant has
Iailed to meet
1udge Nash Holmes's 2/28/12 Order Finding Defendant In Contempt and
Imposing Sanctions in 11 TR 26800 reads:
"A trial was held in Reno Municipal Court on February 27, 2012 on a traIIic citation
issued to the deIendant, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN. He was initially charged with
three oIIenses alleged to have occurred on November 15,2011 in the City oI Reno. At the
onset oI the trial it was detennined that Failure to Provide Evidence oI Security or Insurance
(a violation oI RMC 6.06.555(a) and Failure to Provide Vehicle Registration (a violation oI
RMC 6.06.560(a) were both dismissed at arraignment aIter the deIendant established that he
had complied with both code sections but simply had not carried the documentation with him
in the vehicle on that day. During trial, the oIIicer also testiIied that he could have cited the
deIendant with Iailure to carry his Nevada Driver's License in his possession but gave him a
break by not citing him Ior that. as well. The remaining charge, a Right oI Way Stop Sign
violation at an intersection, known as a "Boulevard Stop" (rolling through a Stop Sign and not
stopping completely), a violation oI RMC 6.06.170(a), was the subject oI the trial.
The City oI Reno was represented by Deputy City Attorney Alison Ormaas. deIendant,
a licensed attorney, represented himselI. Reno Police Sergeant John Tarter was the sole
witness. The court had the deIendant sworn at the beginning oI the trial, stating that the court
has Iound that most selI-represented deIendants tend to testiIy a great deal as they cross-
examine opposing witnesses, so the deIendant would be under oath Irom the start, too. No
exhibits were marked or admitted.
The matter was called at approximately 3:00 p.m. and concluded without a verdict
about 4:30 p.m. aIter the court held the deIendant in criminal contempt oI court Ior his
behavior ana activities committed in the airect presence of this court during the trial .
The court Iinds that deIendant's contemptuous conduct consisted oI his rude, sarcastic,
inappropriate, insubordinate, disrespectIul, antagonistic, deceitIul, disruptive, argumentative
and childish behavior during trial, all oI which appeared to be done to vex and annoy the
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court, the witness, and the opposing party, and to disrupt the trial process. The court Iinds
that the Iollowing occurred, and constitute contempt: 1) deIendant's mime-like, clownish
antics oI making Iaces at the court; sagging down into his seat and hanging his head; looking
behind himselI and inside his coat as iI searching Ior a better way to ask a question; rolling his
eyes; and mimicking others words; 2) deIendant's incessant arguing with the court, talking
over the court, and interrupting the court; 3) deIendant's repeatedly restating matters aIter
being told by the court to "move on" or "ask the next question;" 4) deIendant's repeatedly
injecting allegations oI bribery, perjury, and police retaliation into the matter aIter the court
instructed him not to, and directed him to limit himselI to issues pertaining to the Iacts oI the
"Boulevard Stop;" 5) deIendant' s repeatedly trying to insert "Richard Hill" into his questions
and statements when such person was not relevant to the proceedings and the deIendant had
been ordered to stop discussing that; 6) deIendant's disregarding the rules oI evidence and
court procedure by continually posing improper questions aIter being directed by the court to
properly phrase his questions; 7) deIendant's continually accusing the court oI denying him
the right or ability to ask questions and telling the court to "give me a list oI questions you
want me to ask;" 8) deIendant's suggesting that the court "tell me what would make you
happy;" 9) deIendant's lying to the court in response to direct questions posed by the court
with regard to his recording the proceedings; and 10) deIendant's Iailing and reIusing to
properly examine the witness, despite numerous admonitions by the court to stop repeating
questions, misstating answers, injecting irrelevant material, arguing with the witness and
mischaracterizing the testimony.
The court Iinds that the deIendant's actions were intentional and done in utter
disregard and contempt Ior the court, and in the presence oI the court, Ior purposes oI
disrupting and delaying the proceedings and dishonoring the rule oI law and this court, and
constitute the misdemeanor oI criminal contempt, a violation oI NRS 22.010. Good cause
appearing thereIore, the Iollowing sanctions are imposed:
IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to NRS 22.100, that the deIendant be incarcerated at the
Washoe County Regional Detention Facility Ior the term oI Iive (5) days, Irom the time he
was taken into custody on this court's order on February 27, 2012, and that sentence shall not
be reduced Ior any reason. In the alternative, the deIendant may pay a Iine oI $500 to the
Reno Municipal Court.
Dated this 28th day oI February, 2012.
/s/ The Hon. Dorothy Nash Holmes, Reno Municipal Court Judge."
1UDGE NASH HOLMES 3/12/12 ORDER IN RMC 11 TR 26800 "CLEAR AND
CONVINCING" RPC VIOLATIONS
RMC Judge Nash Holmes, in her 3/12/12 Order in RMC 11 TR 26800 wrote: "March
12,2012 was the time set Ior the resumption oI the traIIic citation trial oI DeIendant
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN who, as member No. 9473 oI the Nevada Bar, is an
attorney representing himselI, the deIendant. The trial was continued on February 27, 2012,
when, aIter approximately an hour and a halI, the deIendant was held in criminal contempt
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by the court Ior his antics and misconduct during that trial. His behavior is noted in detail in
the court's Order entered on February 27, 2010.
Today, Mr. Coughlin Iailed to appear to complete this trial. He has not contacted this .
court to explain or excuse his absence. Deputy City Attorney Alison Ormaas appeared and
was prepared to proceed. She inIormed the court that she had no contact with Mr. Coughlin
other than receiving voluminous Iaxed documents Irom him at the Reno City Attorney's
OIIice. The deIendant's Iailure to appear was noted on the record.
The court makes the Iollowing Iindings on the record: AIter he served his Iive-day
Contempt oI Court sanction imposed by this court on February 27, 2012, Mr. Coughlin Iax-
Iiled (In. 1 RMC Rules and Procedures 5 pennits Iax Iiling oI motions.) to this court a 224-
page document entitled "Notice oI Appeal oI Summary Contempt Order; Motion to Return
Personal Property ConIiscated by Reno Municipal Court and Its Marshals; Motion Ior New
trial and to Alter or Amend Summary Contempt Order." The document purported to appeal
this court's Order holding him in direct criminal contempt. It contained a portion oI one
sentence on page 4 seeking a continuance oI today's hearing, but no Iurther discussion oI that
topic. It also mentioned being a "tolling" motion in an apparent aIterthought. It did not
address most oI the other topics listed in the caption. Instead, the document contained
rambling reIerences to his personal liIe and this court's; his Iather's Iootball career in college;
dozens oI pages oI string citations taken oII the internet; documents Irom a prisoner online
site; an article about a "police state;" an article about Discovery; a website printout showing a
police oIIicer's salary; and copy oI court documents Irom a District oI Columbia case.
It was a disjointed regurgitation oI case law citations Irom a legal research online site
with little reIerence to, or argument about, the Iacts oI his instant "Boulevard Stop" traIIic
case. The document was an incoherent and pathetic demonstration oI what might once have
been legal and academic prowess that appears to now be greatly damaged. Mr. Coughlin Iax-
Iiled another document in which he apparently took a Motion to Proceed InIorma Pauperis
|sic| in another case and typed over it "Request Ior Audio Recording oI February 27th 2012
trial and Ior Appt |sic| and to Waive Filing feeand Transcript feeIor Appeal Counsel."He had
that Iiled in the instant case on March 7,2012, even though it was dated November 22, 2011.
Whereas Mr. Coughlin's eIIorts to conduct his own deIense in his traIIic citation trial
on February 27, 2012 disrupted Department 3 oI this court and caused distress to this court
and its staII and marshals, as well as the prosecutor and the witness, and resulted in Mr.
Coughlin being held in contempt oI court, his Iaxing and Iiling oI these documents greatly
disrupted the operation oI the entire Reno Municipal Court system, including the clerk's oIIice
and the other departments, and necessitated that action be taken by the Court Administrator
and Administrative Judge.
Apparently beginning on March 9, 2012 at 12:38 p.m., Mr. Coughlin again undertook
another massive Iax-Iiling to Reno Municipal Court. This time it was a document that was
Iile-stamped by the clerk on March 12,2012 at 8:12 a.m. This second 218-page document
purported to be yet another motion in this case entitled "Motion to Return Cell Phones;
Motion to Set Aside Summary Contempt Order; and Notice oI Appeal oI Summary Contempt
Order." With scant discussion oI, or relevance to, the above-captioned matter, said document
mostly argues against Judge Howard in a Department 4 case and again contains more than
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200 pages oI string legal citations; lyrics to rocks songs; Mr. Coughlin's personal Iamily
history; discussion oI an eviction case and another contempt case; disjointed legal citations,
and other nonsensical matters that have no apparent relevance to his traIIic citation case.
Both documents were massive and took up a great deal oI time because the court had
to review them to look Ior some connection to the case. This court has the inherent authority
to maintain respect, order and decorum in the court, and to reIuse to allow the court to be used
as a vehicle Ior the deranged rantings oI a litigant.
The conduct oI Mr. Coughlin has been inappropriate, bizarre, dishonest, irrational and
disruptive, to say the least. He has not practiced law in this case in a manner that demonstrates
his competence, proIessionalism, preparation, consideration Ior the court, the witness, or his
opposing counsel. He has been disrespectIul to the court. He has Iailed to appear or explain
his absence to the court. Inasmuch as the court has at least Iour diIIerent addresses Ior him, it
is unable to ascertain his exact whereabouts. He shows signs oI mental instability, iI not
serious mental illness.
Based upon the total circumstances oI this case, the in-court perIormance oI the
deIendant, as observed by this court, the written documents Iaxed to the court Ior Iiling by
this deIendant, the statements and behavior oI this deIendant and his overall conduct herein,
this court Iinds, by clear and convincing evidence, that Zachary Barker Coughlin, an attorney
licensed to practice law in the State oI Nevada, has committed numerous acts oI attorney
misconduct, including, but not limited to, violating the Iollowing Rules oI ProIessional
Conduct: 8.4(c)-engaging in dishonesty, Iraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
8.4 (d)-engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration oI justice;
3.3 (a)-lack oI candor to the court by knowingly making Ialse statements to a tribunal;
3.1-deIending in a proceeding by asserting or controverting an issue without a basis in
Iact and with matters that are known to be Irivolous;
3.2-Iailure to make reasonable eIIorts to expedite litigation, and, in Iact, taking extreme
measures to delay litigation;
3.4( e)-being unIair to opposing counsel by continually alluding to matters the lawyer
does not reasonably believe are relevant or supported by admissible evidence;
1.3-Iailing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness; and
1.1-lack oI competence in his practice and appearances beIore this court.
In addition, Zachary Barker Coughlin, likely also violated Nevada Supreme Court Rule
229, section 2(b), as amended by ADKT 449 on August 1, 2011, by surreptitiously recording
the traIIic citation trial oI February 27,2012 without the advance permission oI this court and
then lying to this court when questioned about it and denying that he had done so. Whether or
not there are medical reasons to explain Mr. Coughlin's actions is not Ior this court to decide.
He has become nothing less than a vexatious litigant to Reno Municipal Court due to his
unorthodox, disruptive, bizarre and irrational methods and practices that go beyond the pale
oI anything that is civil, ethical, proIessional or competent. Good cause appearing thereIore,
the court orders as Iollows:
IT IS ORDERED that this matter is continued, and all proceedings relating thereto are
tolled, until Iurther order oI this court, while the matter oI attorney Zachary Barker Coughlin
is reIerred to the State Bar oI Nevada; IT IS ORDERED that no Iurther action shall be taken
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by the Reno City Attorney's OIIice, or the clerks or staII oI Reno Municipal Court, in the
above-entitled case, pending Iurther order oI this court; IT IS ORDERED that Zachary
Barker Coughlin is barred and Iorbidden Irom Iaxing, emailing, delivering, having delivered,
serving, presenting Ior Iiling, personally or otherwise, any motion or document to Reno
Municipal Court, in the above-entitled case, pending Iurther order oI this court. Dated this
12th day oI March, 2012."
The earlier stamped oI the two very similar Orders, Judge Nash Holmes SUA
SPONTE ORDER DENYING RELIEF IN IMPROPER DOCUMENT Iiled on 3/13/12 in 11
TR 26800 reads:
~SUA SPONTE ORDERDENYING RELIEF SOUGHT IN IMPROPER
DOCUMENT
On March 9, 2012, at 12:38 p.m., deIendant Zachary Barker Coughlin, an attorney and
selI-represented litigant in the instant traIIic citation case, began Iax-Iiling a 218-page
document to the Reno Municipal Court purporting to seek various and sundry types oI relieI
Irom this court on a "Boulevard Stop" traIIic citation matter. He labeled his document
"Motion to Return Cell Phones; Motion to Set Aside Summary Contempt Order; and Notice
oI Appeal oI Summary Contempt Order." Said document was Iiled by the Clerk oI the Court,
on Monday March 12,2012, aIter causing much disruption to the court's operations.
The court herein issues this Order sua sponte to prevent the plaintiII, Reno City
Attorney,Irom devoting any additional time.or resources to this document, and to relieve the
plaintiII Irom any burden oI attempting to respond to said document. Likewise, the court staII
is relieved oI any obligation to Iurther deal with this aberrant document.
The court Iinds that the deIendant has Iailed to Iollow proper legal procedure in
preparing and Iiling his motions and purported Notice oI Appeal. The court also Iinds that Mr.
Coughlin has blatantly abused the court's Iax-Iiling process oIIered Ior the convenience oI
parties appearing in this court. As with his previous, mostly incoherent document, this
document Iiled by Mr. Coughlin appears to be a recitation oI Iamily grievances, lyrics to rock
(page 1) songs, disjointed legal ramblings, citations and argument in another case with
another judge in a diIIerent department oI Reno Municipal Court, and, is, thus, even more
irrelevant to the instant case than the 224-page document previously Iiled by Mr. Coughlin.
IT IS ORDERED that any and all relieI sought by the deIendant Zachary Barker
Coughlin in the above-described document is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Zachary Barker Coughlin shall reIrain Irom, and is
hereby barred and prohibited Irom Iaxing an y documents to Reno Municipal Court.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that iI Zachary Barker Coughlin wishes to Iile documents in
Reno Municipal Court on any matter assigned to Department 3, he must present signed
originals only, in appropriate legal Iorm and Iormat, limited to no more than 15 pages in
length, and beIore they are Iiled, the clerk oI the court shall present them to this court Ior
review in chambers, and this court will make a pre-Iiling determination iI they can be Iiled by
the clerk.
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IT IS SO ORDERED Dated this 13th day oI March, 2012. /s/ The Hon. Dorothy Nash
Holmes, Reno Municipal Judge"
1udge Nash Holmes SUA SPONTE ORDER DENYING RELIEF IN IMPROPER
DOCUMENT filed on 3/13/12 in 11 TR 26800 reads:
"On March 7. 2012, at 1:58 p.m., deIendant Zachary Barker Coughlin, an attorney and
selI represented litigant in the instant traIIic citation case, began Iax-Iiling a 224-page
document to the Reno Municipal Court purporting to seek various and sundry types oI relieI
Irom this court on a "Boulevard Stop" traIIic citation matter. He labeled his document, Notice
oI Appeal oI Summary Contempt Order; Motion to Return Personal Property ConIiscated by
Reno Municipal Court and Its Marshals; Motion Ior New trial and to Alter or Amend
Summary Contempt Order." Said document was Iiled by the Clerk oI the Court aIter much
disruption to the court's operations.
The court herein issues this Order sua sponte to prevent the plaintiII, Reno City
Attorney Irom devoting any additional time or resource to this document, and to relieve the
plaintiII Irom any burden oI attempting to respond to said document. Likewise. the court staII
is relieved oI any obligation to Iurther deal with this aberrant document.
The court Iinds that the deIendant has Iailed to Iollow proper legal procedure in
preparing and Iiling a Notice oI Appeal, or Motion with appropriate citation to the record, the
Iacts and the applicable law. and argument thereoI. and has blatantly abused the Court's Iax
Iiling process oIIered Ior the convenience oI parties appearing in this court. Furthermore, the
document Iiled by Mr. Coughlin appears to contain a eries oI disjointed legal rambling
plucked Irom online resources that are neither relevant nor applicable to the matters in this
case.
IT IS ORDERED that any and all relieI sought by the deIendant Zachary Barker
Coughlin in the above-described document is denied; at such time as Mr. Coughlin Iiles a
correct and proper motion or notice, his legal document will be considered by the court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Zachary Barker Coughlin shall reIrain Irom, and I
hereby barred and prohibited Irom Iaxing any documents to Reno Municipal Court. IT IS
ALSO ORDERED that iI Zachary Barker Coughlin wishes to Iile documents in Reno
Municipal Court on any matter assigned to Department 3. he must present signed originals
only in appropriate legal Iorm and Iormat limited to no more than 15 pages in length, and
beIore they are Iiled the clerk oI the court shall present them to this court Ior review in
chambers. and this court will make a pre-Iiling determination iI they can be Iiled by the clerk.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated this 13th day oI March, 2012. The Hon. Dorothy Nash Holmes, Reno
Municipal Judge"
Judge Nash Holmes' 3/13/12 Order Striking Fugitive Document Filed on March 7,
2012 reads:
'ORDER STRIKING FUGITIVE DOCUMENT FILED ON MARCH 7, 2012
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On March 7, 2012 at 2:16 p.m., the Clerk oI the Reno Municipal Court Iiled a
document Iaxed to the court by selI-represented litigant Zach Coughlin in the above-
captioned case. Zach Coughlin is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State oI Nevada
under Bar No. 9473. In his Iaxed document, he had apparently typed the words "REQUEST
FOR AUDIO RECORDING OF FEBRUARY 27TH, 2012 trial AND FOR APPT AND
TO WAIVE FILING feeAND TRANSCRIPT feeFOR APPEAL COUNSEL" over a
document he had previously prepared entitled Motion to Proceed Informa Pauperis. The
date that appears on the document, Iaxed to the court Ior Iiling at 1:53 p.m. on March 7,
2012, is November 22, 2011. The document contains the hand-written signature oI Zach
Coughlin and has a 2-page affidavit attached. Mr. Coughlin had apparently typed into that
document the case number and department oI his instant traIIic citation case in this
department, although the content oI the motion and aIIidavit appears to be one he used
previously in a case in another department (Page 1) in Reno Municipal Court last year. A
copy oI said Iaxed and Iiled document is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 to this Order.
This court Iinds that said document is an errant. altered. and inappropriate document
that shoud not have been Iiled by the clerk oI this court. This court Iurther Iinds that Zach
Coughlin submitted said document to this court by Iax Ior Iiling. in knowing disregard oI the
rules oI procedure known to all attorneys who practice law in this court. and that. in doing so
he was taking advantage oI the Iact that it is standard court procedure Ior the clerk oI the
court to automatically Iile all documents that are Iaxed to the court Ior Iiling. ThereIore. the
above-described document is a Iugitive document.
IT IS ORDERED that the Iugitive document Iiled as "Request Ior Audio Recording.
etc' hall be stricken Irom the record in this case and shall be disregarded by the parties and
staII in this court. Dated this 13th day oI March, 2012. /s/ the Hon. Dorothy Nash
Holmes(Page 2)
It is very odd that King, Judge Holmes, and the RMC treat the various Motions to
Proceed InIorma Pauperis (page 1 oI 3) Iiled therein by Coughlin as separate and distinct
(according a diIIerent Iiling stamp Ior each oI the three consecutively numbered pages in
some instances) Irom the 'AIIidavit oI Poverty In support oI Motion to Proceed InIorma
Pauperis Iollowing immediately thereaIter (numbered as pages 2 and 3, evincing a clear
connection between the Motion to Proceed InIorma Pauperis on page 1, especially
considering the lack oI a caption or case number on the AIIidavit on pages 2 and 3. It is
clear why King, in perhaps a violation oI Sierra Glass chose to present FHE9 (R1784) as he
did, with not only the 'REQUEST FOR AUDIO RECORDING OF FEBRUARY 27TH,
2012 trial, MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND FOR APPT COUNSEL
AND TO WAIVE FILING feeAND TRANSCRIPT feeFOR APPEAL Iound on page one
oI that three page Iax Iiling by Coughlin (and, unless something changed, Coughlin's Voxox
account always sent such Iaxes to the RMC with a cover page, in strict technical compliance
with RMC Rule 5, which requires attorneys so Iiling to list their bar number thereon)
removed. King would have be unable to tack on this baseless allegation (apparently an
essential part oI the kitchen sink approach he took herein) without excising page 1 oI 3 oI
that 3/7/12 2:16 pm Iiling by Coughlin that Judge Nash Holmes had attached as an Exhibit
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(that the reason that r1786 is a CertiIicate oI Service from the RMC, which, no less,
speciIically identiIies Coughlin as an attorney therein) to her 3/13/12 Order Striking
Fugitive Document Filed on March 7, 2012, which reads, in relevant part:
'ORDER STRIKING FUGITIVE DOCUMENT FILED ON MARCH
7, 2012
On March 7, 2012 at 2:16 p.m., the Clerk oI the Reno Municipal
Court Iiled a document Iaxed to the court by selI-represented litigant
Zach Coughlin in the above-captioned case. Zach Coughlin is an
attorney licensed to practice law in the State oI Nevada under Bar No.
9473. In his Iaxed document, he had apparently typed the words
"REQUEST FOR AUDIO RECORDING OF FEBRUARY 27TH,
2012 trial AND FOR APPT AND TO WAIVE FILING feeAND
TRANSCRIPT feeFOR APPEAL COUNSEL " over a document he
had previously prepared entitled Motion to Proceed Informa
Pauperis. The date that appears on the document, Iaxed to the court
Ior Iiling at 1:53 p.m. on March 7, 2012, is November 22, 2011. The
document contains the hand-written signature oI Zach Coughlin and
has a 2-page affidavit attached. Mr. Coughlin had apparently typed
into that document the case number and department oI his instant
traIIic citation case in this department, although the content oI the
motion and aIIidavit appears to be one he used previously in a case in
another department (Page 1) in Reno Municipal Court last year. A
copy of said faxed and filed document is attached hereto as Exhibit
1 to this Order.
This court finds that said document is an errant. altered. and
inappropriate document that should not have been filed by the clerk
of this court. This court Iurther Iinds that Zach Coughlin submitted
said document to this court by fax for filing in knowing disregard
of the rules of procedure known to all attorneys who practice law
in this court, and that, in doing so, he was taking advantage of the
fact that it is standard court procedure for the clerk of the court to
automatically file all documents that are faxed to the court for filing.
ThereIore, the above-described document is a fugitive documen t.
IT IS ORDERED that the Iugitive document Iiled as "Request
Ior Audio Recording. etc' shall be stricken from the record in this case
and shall be disregarded by the parties and staff in this court. Dated
this 13th day oI March, 2012. /s/ the Hon. Dorothy Nash Holmes (Page
2)
Coughlin really has no idea what Judge Holmes Iound inappropriate where her Order
reads: 'This court finds that said document is an errant. altered. and inappropriate
document that should not have been filed by the clerk of this court. This court Iurther
Iinds that Zach Coughlin submitted said document to this court by fax for filing in
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knowing disregard of the rules of procedure known to all attorneys who practice law in
this court, and that, in doing so, he was taking advantage of the fact that it is standard
court procedure for the clerk of the court to automatically file all documents that are faxed
to the court for filing. ThereIore, the above-described document is a fugitive document.
How could Coughlin be said to have ' submitted said document to this court by fax
for filing in knowing disregard of the rules of procedure known to all attorneys who
practice law in this court, if (and they do and did) the RMC Rules allow for just such a
method of submitting a filing (ie, by fax)? That being the case, how could Coughlin ~in
doing so, be ~taking advantage of the fact that it is standard court procedure for the clerk
of the court to automatically file all documents that are faxed to the court for filing in any
way that was objectionable, much less inappropriate or suIIicient to suIIiciently noteworthy
to justiIy striking such document, and describing such, in an Order, as 'a fugitive
document.? While King and, perhaps, a multitude oI other judges (Steinheimmer, Hardy,
SIerrazza, Schroeder) did not Iind such matters to be at all noteworthy (its not as iI some
substantive aspect oI the AIIidavit and speciIics oI Coughlin Iinancial status as detailed
therein was 'altered, rather, Judge Holmes' allegation is that Coughlin interlineated
something about requesting an audio recording oI the trial and the preparation oI the
transcript at public expense into the title oI the document beneath the caption (in an
inordinately, over-the-top-obvious Iashion evincing absolutely no intent to deceive, and
certainly nothing suIIicient to enter an order so characterizing the document as 'an errant.
altered. and inappropriate document. Some might say that so Iinding evinces just the sort
oI patent retaliatory animus that Judicial Canon 1.2(a) was designed to address. Regardless,
King did not 'notice-plead anything oI the sort as evidence alleged to support a misconduct
Iinding (rather, King and the Panel shiIted gears late in this proceeding, and, though not at all
noticed or present in the complaint or DoWSoE, began to perseverate on some new 'failed to
identify any income from the practice of law (R1362:28-1363:3) (Coughlin was a 'jack oI
all trades and one oI those trades was the practice oI law and the $800 per month he listed as
his income Irom his 'selI employment as a 'jack oI all trades was absolutely truthIul when
including the practice oI law under that description oI this employment as a 'jack oI all
trades (its hard to get too bourgie about it being a proIession when its run by people like
Patrick O. King, Esq., Vellis, Echeverria, Kent, Pearl, Michael K. Johnson, Esq., Hill, Baker,
the RMC Marshals, the RJC BailiIIs, the RPD (and all the CaliIornia transplants it hires,
which local judges routinely turn a blind eye to their misconduct to the detriment oI long-
time locals and natives...then proceed to adorn their campaign literature and commercials
almost exclusively with the endorsements oI a myriad oI 'law enIorcement signs oI
approval). Then you have 'Lawyers Concerned Ior Lawyers...yeah, right. Its run by a
politician, and his best Iriend is a lobbyist. They are both lawyers, apparently, but... Then
there is Thomas J. Hall. Trashes Hill, yet 'too out oI the loop to put anything in the record.
Then there are judges like Wal Raven and McGee. While Iormer President oI the State Bar
oI Nevada and decade long member oI the SBN's Board oI Director's, now NVB Judge
Beesley doesn't mind weighing in, not all 'worried about violating the canons'/lending the
prestige...etc., etc. McGee and VanWalraven (whom has trashed Hill's work in landlord
tenant matters as well) are tough to get ahold oI or ready with vague oIIers to 'stand up Ior
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you that never quite amount to anything tangible) (not sure exactly what the prosecutors in
LCL did to get there (okay, well there was one who blew over a 1.0 in court...but a 30 day
suspension seems pretty light compared to what Coughlin had endured here...the other
one...no disciplinary record on his page...DL never missed a paycheck, either.) and the some
oI the various judges encountered throughout the events at issue here), and their income at
that point thereIrom within such AIIidavits (which the Complaint completely Iails to identiIy
with any case numbers, dates, or cases numbers, or courts, even (R4:18-24)) Candor to the
Tribunal......less than candid with the Court in two separate applications to proceed in
forma pauperis, when he failed to disclose his true occupation as an attorne y and instead
indicated he was selI-employed as a "1ack of all Trades" and Iailed to identiIy any income
Irom the practice oI law after having represented to the court that his incarceration would
adversely affect his clients. Supra 31 & 32 ', based upon the Iollowing 'Iindings oI Iact:
'31. On March 7,2012 Coughlin caused to be Iiled an "AIIidavit oI Poverty in Support oI
Motion to Proceed InIorma Pauperis." See Hearing Exhibit 9. In his AIIidavit, Coughlin
represented that he was selI-employed as a "Jack oI all Trades." See Hearing Exhibit 9. The
AIIidavit does not identiIy Mr. Coughlin as a lawyer or identity any income Irom the practice
oI law. See Hearing Exhibit 9.
32. The record also indicates that Coughlin had also filed a motion on November 14, 2011
to proceed In Forma Pauperis in case number 11CR 22176 pending in the Reno Municipal
Court beIore Judge Kenneth R. Howard. See Hearing Exhibit 10. Judge Howard's Order
denying Coughlin's motion speciIically noted that Coughlin's "aIIidavit oI poverty" did not
identiIy any income Irom the practice oI law yet Coughlin had implied to the court when
sentenced to incarceration Ior contempt that his incarceration would adversely aIIect his
clients. See Hearing Exhibit 10, P 2, L 19 -23.' (R1356:9-20).
It is important to clariIy that the Motion mentioned immediately above was actually
Iiled in the RMC on 12/14/11, after, the 11/30/11 trial in 22176, at which, oI course,
extended discussion about Coughlin's being an attorney (needing a stay oI the three day
incarceration Ior his client's sake, etc.) were captured on the record, Ior which is was
reversible error to reIuse to admit and or allow Coughlin to utilize in an way at the FH.
For whatever reason (perhaps he thought it untoward the extent to which Judge
Holmes so readily strikes Iilings Irom the record, sua sponte, and relieves the RCA and RMC
staII oI any 'obligations, or maybe it was the Iact that so striking Coughlin's Request Ior
Audio Recording oI the 2/27/12 trial date in 26800 necessarily prejudiced Coughlin's ability
to deIend against the allegations Ilowing thereIrom, both in the sense oI the 2/28/12 Order
incarcerating summarily Coughlin Ior 5 days, upon citing to civil contempts statutes oI a
plenary nature (NRS 22.010), whilst utilizing the language oI the summary contempt statute
(NRS 22.030's
As to the patent deprivation oI due process in 60838, Couglhin was denied the
Complaint in 22176 and 'Arrest Report and Declaration oI Probable Cause Ior over one
month Irom the date oI arrest, despite his being constitutionally entitled to such, even
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without a subpoena, upon being booked in incident to arrest. It is obvious why the RMC,
RCA, and RSIC (all three) reIused to give Coughlin such items Ior over 30 days, especially
when considering teh Iact that the Arrest Report and Declaration oI Probable Cause is not
date or time stamped (page 9 oI the ROA in 2064, despite such being a requirement, nor is it
dated in any way). RSIC personnel, including Sargent Avansino, RMC Iiling oIIice clerks
and supervisor Donna Ballard (she oI the quasi-certiIication on the various documents King
sought to admit at the FH, including on documents Irom courts other than the one she works
Ior, and where none her 'certiIications are dated), RCA Hazlett-Steven's and RCA
personnel all reIused to release the PC Sheet (and the Complaint in the ROA in 2064l, at
page 8, is not so much Iile stamped as it had 'ENT'D Sep 14 2011 on it, and it lacks the
RMC case number '11 CR 22176 anywhere thereon, but rather bares the case number Ior
the RSIC 'Tribal Police, whom, oI course, are not permitted to make misdemeanor arrests
such as the petty larceny arrest in 22176 under NRS 171.1255, which Coughlin has made the
RCA well aware. OI Course, at page 2 oI the ROA in 2064 the 'CertiIied Copy oI Docket
reveals that on 'September 14, 2011: Criminal Complaint Iiled charging DeIendant with
Petit Larceny. Iollowd immediately by 'September 14, 2011:Arrest Report and Declaration
oI Probable Cause. Coughlin was absolutely told by RCA Iiling oIIice supervisor Donna
Ballard that the RMD did not, and would not, have such PC sheet until after the 10/10/11
arraignment (which was held in violation oI NRS 178.405 given the Order Ior Competency
Evaluation oI 9/8/11's pendency in RJC RCR2011-063341 and NRS 5.071.
~records request for incident report urgent please
Sent: Tue 10/04/11 3:10 PM
To: renomunirecordsreno.gov
1 attachment
records request to reno city attorneys oIIice oct 4.pdI (66.5 KB)
RenoMuniRecordsreno.gov
Dear Reno City Attorney Records Department.
My name is Zach Coughlin. I wish to obtain any and all records available incident to an
arrest at the E. 2nd St. Walmart by the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police on or about
Saturday October 10th, 2011 at between approximately 9pm and 10:30pm. I want any and
all records, video, audio, paper documentation or otherwise that I have a right to. I am
representing myselI. I have sought these records Irom the Reno Municipal Court's Records
OIIice and they kept telling me they didn't have them yet and that I should return sometime
soon. Finally, they admitted the do not keep these records and they must be obtained Irom
your oIIice. The RSIC Police reIused to give me a copy oI these records. This delay has
unduly prejudiced my case and I request that you provide these records to me at once, with
no delay, please. I believe this case should be dismissed.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin signed electronically and signed in attached PDF. I can come pick the
records up with identiIication iI that is required or I hereby give you permission to email
them to me or mail them to the address below:
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Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
~records request
Sent: Tue 10/04/11 4:41 PM
To: renomunirecordsreno.gov
2 attachments
RMC subpoena.pdI (67.8 KB) , RECORDREQUESTZach Coughlin to RMC.pdI (20.2
KB)
October 4, 2011
Dear Reno Municipal Court Records Division,
My name is Zach Coughlin. I have now been inIormed by both the Reno Municipal Court
and the Reno City Attorney's oIIicer, and the Reno Sparks Indian Colony none oI these
entities can provide my requested records. You have them, I believe I have a constitutional
right to them. II you Ieel diIIerently, please explain in writing why that is the case.
I wish to obtain any and all records available incident to IC110627 at the E. 2nd St. Walmart
by the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police on or about Saturday October 10th, 2011 at
between approximately 9pm and 10:30pm. I want any and all records, video, audio, paper
documentation or otherwise that I have a right to. I am representing myselI. I have sought
these records Irom the Reno Municipal Court's Records OIIice and they kept telling me they
didn't have them yet and that I should return sometime soon. Finally, they admitted they do
not keep these records and they must be obtained Irom your the Reno City Attorney's OIIice.
At the RMC records window I spoke with a supervisor named Karen. She denied my request
Ior these records today. This delay has unduly prejudiced my case and I request that you
provide these records to me at once, with no delay, please. The RS Indian Colony Police
reIused to give me a copy oI these records today when I spoke with Sargent Avansino, who
was polite and helpIul otherwise. I believe this case should be dismissed.
Signed electronically and signed in a signed attached PDF. I can come pick the records up
with identiIication iI that is required or I hereby give you permission to email them to me or
mail them to the address below:
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
ubpoena and request Ior arrest records?
Sent: Tue 10/04/11 4:26 PM
To: lcooleyrsic.org; voldenburgrsic.org; rariwitersic.org; policersic.org
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2 attachments
gov.uscourts.nvd.52455.8.0 hernandez against reno sparks indian police.PDF (224.4 KB) ,
gov.uscourts.mied.209033.1.0 Sweeney Class action Walmart.PDF (415.2 KB)
October 4, 2011
Dear Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police Department and Counsel,
My name is Zach Coughlin. I have now been inIormed by both the Reno Municipal Court
and the Reno City Attorney's oIIicer that neither entity can provide my requested records.
You have them, I believe I have a constitutional right to them. II you Ieel diIIerently, please
explain in writing why that is the case. Please review:
Construction and eIIect, in Ialse imprisonment action, oI statute providing Ior detention oI
sus-
pected shopliIters, 47 A.L.R. 3d 998
Liability oI municipality or other governmental unit Ior Iailure to provide police protection,
46
A.L.R. 3d 1084
Personal liability oI policeman, sheriIIs, or similar peace oIIicer or his bond, Ior injury
suIIered as
a result oI Iailure to enIorce law or arrest lawbreaker, 41 A.L.R. 3d 700
Admissibility oI deIendant's rules or instructions Ior dealing with shopliIters, in action Ior
Ialse
imprisonment or malicious prosecution, 31 A.L.R. 3D 705
Genuine issue oI material Iact, as to whether homeowner voluntarily consented to
warrantless search oI his residence, or whether he had been coerced into giving his consent
by oIIicers' alleged reIusal to honor his requests to speak with attorney, and by their alleged
threats that, unless he consented, he would be Iorced to wait outside while oIIicers obtained
warrant and then "t|ore| his house apart and arrest|ed| his girlIriend," precluded entry oI
summary judgment Ior government in civil Ior- Ieiture action in which only evidence
supporting government's position was evidence that homeowner sought to suppress.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act oI 1970,
511(a)(7), 21 U.S.C.A. 881(a)(7). U.S. v. One Piece oI Real Property Located at 5800
SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099;Manning v Commonwealth (1959, Ky) 328
SW2d 421.
Please consider this a subpoena requesting all records having anything to do with this
incident.
I wish to obtain any and all records available incident to IC110627 at the E. 2nd St. Walmart
by the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police on or about Saturday October 10th, 2011 at
between approximately 9pm and 10:30pm. I want any and all records, video, audio, paper
documentation or otherwise that I have a right to. I am representing myselI. I have sought
these records Irom the Reno Municipal Court's Records OIIice and they kept telling me they
didn't have them yet and that I should return sometime soon. Finally, they admitted the do
not keep these records and they must be obtained Irom your oIIice. This delay has unduly
prejudiced my case and I request that you provide these records to me at once, with no delay,
please. The RS Indian Colony Police reIused to give me a copy oI these records today when I
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spoke with Sargent Avansino, who was polite and helpIul otherwise. I believe this case
should be dismissed.
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Civil Results
Party Name Court Case NOS Date Filed Date Closed
1 Reno Sparks Indian Tribal Council (dIt) nvdce 3:2007-cv-00023 440
02/27/2007 07/17/2007
Appellate Results
Party Name Court Case NOS Date Filed Date Closed
2 Reno Sparks Indian Tribal Council (pty) 09cae 07-16422 3440 08/10/2007
12/27/2007
~request for arrest records
Sent: Tue 10/04/11 3:22 PM
To: lcooleyrsic.org; voldenburgrsic.org; rariwitersic.org; policersic.org
1 attachment
records request to rsic police.pdI (65.8 KB)
lcooleyrsic.org, voldenburgrsic.org, rariwitersic.org, policersic.org,
TO: Larry Cooley, ChieI oI Police
October 4, 2011
Dear Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police Records Department and Administrators, including
ChieI Cooley, Attorney Oldenburg, and Tribal Administrator Ariwhite,
My name is Zach Coughlin. I wish to obtain any and all records available incident to an
arrest at the E. 2nd St. Walmart by the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police on or about
Saturday October 10th, 2011 at between approximately 9pm and 10:30pm. I want any and all
records, video, audio, paper documentation or otherwise that I have a right to. I am
representing myselI. I have sought these records Irom the Reno Municipal Court's Records
OIIice and they kept telling me they didn't have them yet and that I should return sometime
soon. Finally, they admitted the do not keep these records and they must be obtained Irom
your oIIice. This delay has unduly prejudiced my case and I request that you provide these
records to me at once, with no delay, please. The RS Indian Colony Police reIused to give
me a copy oI these records today when I spoke with Sargent Avansino, who was polite and
helpIul otherwise. I believe this case should be dismissed.
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Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
While Wal-Mart's Thomas Frontino signed the pre-printed Ior 'Walmart #2106
'Criminal Complaint (Petit Larceny) Iill in the blank 'Iorm, declaring under NRS 53.045
'penalty oI perjury that Coughlin 'did take or carry away Walmart property valued at less
than $250.00 with the intent to deprive Walmart said property. Said property consisted oI
cough drops, chocolate bar. OI course, as detailed in 60838 (and Coughlin incorporated by
reIerence and speciIically adopted all oI his Iilings ever made beIore the Nevada Supreme
Court in any case into his deIense in this matter and into the pleadings on Iile therein),
Frontino was caught lying during the trial where he testiIied, with such certainty and smug
conIidence, that he personally eye-witnessed Coughlin 'select and consume the speciIic
'chocolate bar mentioned Irom 'the candy isle, upon it being revealed the the UPC Ior that
item allegedly consumed (which is not necessarily tantamount to 'taking or carrying away)
belongs to an ice cream bar, which would, necessarily, be Iound in the Irozen Iood isle, not
the 'candy isle. Frontino was similarly caught lying during the trial with respect to his
testimony that the UPC oI the Duract Cough Melts, he contended, did not appear on the
receipt Ior the $83.82 worth oI groceries he admits Coughlin selected and paid Ior while,
allegedly, consuming enough DXM to kill someone, and eating the 'candy bar he swore he
witnessed Coughlin 'select Irom the candy isle where the 'more expensive chocolate bars
are located.
The reason the RCA and RSIC needed to stall Coughlin's obtaining the 9/14/11
Criminal Complaint (allegedly Iiled without a RMC case number in the RMC 11 CR 22176
Iile) and Arrest Report and Declaration oI Probable Cause Ior so long was that the RSIC,
RCA, and Walmart had yet to Iigure out how they were going to handle the prohibition
against tribal police making misdemeanor arrests under NRS 171.1255, whilst also helping
the RSIC's business partner, Walmart, successIully avoid any potential civil liability Ior
wrongIul arrests incident to a 'citizen's arrest being made by a Walmart employee. It was
just that sticky wicket which lead RCA Roberts to elicit and put on the testimony oI
Walmart's Frontino and the RSIC's CrawIord that she did. And RCA Robert's Iile stamped
11/18/11 Notice oI Availability oI Discovery, given the constructive service time allotted Ior
the method oI serivce employed, and the trial date oI 11/14/11, accorded Coughlin just three
weeks to prepare Ior trial, with an intervening wrongIul eviction, and a wrongIul custodial
arrest Ior criminal trespass where the opposing counsel in the wrongIul summary eviction
signed the criminal trespass complaint Ior the RPD...and still, even despite RCA Roberts
agreeing, in writing, to a continuance, none was Iorthcoming Irom the RMC in the Walmart
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candy bar case, yet one was granted to RCA Hazlett on the very same day in the criminal
trespass case, in light oI the 'vacation planned by that very same attorney signing the
criminal trespass arrest Criminal Complaint and acting as opposing counsel in the wrongIul
summary eviction connected thereto, Irom the Iormer home law oIIice at which the 11/13/11
criminal trespass arrest took place...Richard G. Hill, Esq....whom has Iiled numerous exhibits
in various courts that bare Iax headers indicating that the RCA is Iaxing Hill Iilings in
criminal prosecutions oI Coughlin. And, Hill sits on the City oI Reno's Citizen's Advisory
Board. And, as Judge Nash Holmes' indicated to Coughlin during trial on 2/27/12 'iI you
say the name Richard G. Hill, one more time, you are going out oI here in handcuIIs!
he RMC reIused to allow me a copy oI the Complaint and PC Sheet until after the 10/10/11
arraignment where such was Iiled therein on 9/14/11 (based on an arrest by Tribal Police that
RCA Roberts knows is violative oI NRS 171.1255's dictate against such, particularly where
she put on testimony Irom multiple witnesses indicating that no "citizen's arrest" was made,
but rather, that the decision to arrest Coughlin was made by RSIC OIIicer CrawIord only
aIter Coughlin allegedly Iailed to provide his driver's license, which the attach pictures, the
video Walmart provided the RCA showing CrawIord copying Couglhin's drivers license
number thereIrom, dispatch logs and recordings, and the Inmate Detention Intake Property
Booking Iorm Irom 9/9/11 Ior Coughlin Irom the jail all show was just not true.
Also, RCA Hazlett's 3/21/11 Motion to Strike in RMC 11 CR 26405 and 8/14/12 Request to
Submit in CR12-1262 would seem to be rather suspect considering Drake's 2/2/12 Motion,
and the multitude oI CertiIicates oI Service to and Irom the RCA, RMC, court appointed
DeIenders, and Coughlin wherein email is listed as the method oI service (making RCA
Robert's 12/19/11 Opposition/Motion rather suspect, in addition to calling into doubt to
legitimacy oI the sua sponte Order entered by Judge Howard on 12/15/11 in RMC 11 CR
22176 (particularly where both oI his "judgments" where made in absentia with respect to
RCA Roberts having leIt the courtroom Ior the night prior to Coughlin being brought beIore
Judge Howard, again, some might say, to receive misleading inIormation with respect to the
appealability oI the civil summary contempt Order Punishing Summary Contempt Committed
in the Immediate View and Presence oI the Court, which, some might say, is rather close to a
NRS 1.230(4) issue considering the Motion to DisqualiIy made therein, where such "Orders"
are Iinal appealable orders.
Considering all the CertiIicates oI Service on Iile in the prosecutions oI Coughlin in the
RMC that identiIy the means oI service to consist oI email, the Iollowing is rather suspect. In
22176, FHE10 (despite note being notice-pled, in any way in the complaint, no less) RMC
Judge Howard's 12/15/11 Order indicates, sua sponte:
'A. FAILURE TO PROPERLY SERVE CITY ATTORNEY
Written motions are to be served upon each oI the parties. NRS 178.582. Service upon
the attorney or upon a party must be made in the manner provided in civil actions. NRS
178.584. Appellant has chosen to serve the City Attorney with these various pleadings via
electronic mail. There is no provision in the Aevada Revised Statutes or the Rules of
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Court which denotes electronic mail as an appropriate means of service of process. This
alone is a basis for non-consideration/denial of Appellant's various requests. R1787:20-
1787:8. Interestingly, the RMC's CertiIicate oI Service on that 12/15/11 Order diIIers
markedly Irom all that preceded it in that case in that is indicates such was done by use oI the
USPS.
The thing is, though, the ProoI oI Service on Coughlin's 12/13/11 Motion Ior New
trial, Notice oI Appeal, etc., actually indicates:
'PROOF OF SERVICE I, Zach Coughlin, declare: On December 12, 2011, I, Mr. Zach
Coughlin served the Ioregoing Notice oI Appeal, Motion to Vacate and or Set Aside, JCRCP
59, JCRCP 60, Motion Ior Reconsideration; Motion Ior Recusal by emailing and faxing and
or placing in the mail a true copy thereof to: Pamela C Roberts Company: Reno City
Attorney's Office - Criminal Divison Address: P.O. Box 1900 Reno , NV 89505 Phone
Number: 775-334-2050 Fax number: 775-334-2420 Email: robertspreno.gov DATED
THIS12th day oI December, 2011 BY:
So, how is it appropriate Ior RMC Judge Howard to indicate: 'Appellant has chosen to
serve the City Attorney with these various pleadings via electronic mail and then
summarily dispose of a Motion for New trial, etc.? 1udge Howard's Order simply Iocuses
on what is wants, ignores what's less expedient, and calls it a day. Its kind oI a 'City Attorney
said/Citizen said equals Municipalitie's Judge summarily believes City Attorney, game
over....again and again down at the RMC type situation. City bidness is Iamily bidness.
Family bidness is City bidness. And on and on. They go together like bread and meat.
RDCA Robert's 12/15/11 Notice oI Non-Service reads: 'NOTICE OF DENIAL OF
SERVICE 17 PlaintiII City oI Reno by and through John J. Kadlic, Reno City Attorney, and
Pamela G. 18 Roberts, Deputy City Attorney, Iiles this Notice oI Denial oI Service. PlaintiII
City oI Reno (hereinaIter the "City") is inIonned and believes that on or about December 13,
2011 DeIendant Zachary Coughlin (hereinaIter "Coughlin ") sent an email to and Iormer
Reno Municipal Court Administrator Matt Fisk at See Declaration oI Pamela G. Roberts.
Coughlin subsequently Iorward that email to DeputyCity AttorneyPamela G.
Roberts(hereinaIter .. DCA Roberts .. ).1d. Contained within the email Coughlin sent to and
Ionner Reno Municipal Court Administrator Matt Fisk at and Iorwarded to DCA Roberts is
the allegation: PROOF OF SERVICE: I emailed a copy oI this to Pam Roberts Ior the
PlaintiII City -1 oI Reno on this date, a true and correct copy and Iurther email her a copy oI
all the 12 11 11 MOtion |sic| Ior New trial, etc. yesterday to: Pamela G Roberts Company:
Reno City Attorney's OIIice -Criminal Divison |sic| Address: P.O. Box 1900 Reno, NV
89505 Phone Number: 775-334-2050 Fax number: 775-334-2420 Email: Id. Thus it
appears that Coughlin is making the allegation that the City has been served with some type
oI motion Ior a new trial. There is no provision in the Nevada Revised Statutes, Reno
Municipal Code or R.M.C.R. which provides Ior service oI motions or other pleadings via
email. See Nevada Revised Statutes, Reno Municipal Code and the R.M.C.R. Indeed,
Coughlin has been inIormed by DCA Roberts that the City will not accept service oI any
motions or other pleadings via email. See Declaration oI Pamela G. Roberts. The City has
not been properly served by Coughlin with motions or other pleading or Iilings in this case
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since Coughlin's conviction Ior Petit Larceny on November 30, 2011.DECLARATION OF
PAMELA G. ROBERTS DeIendant Zachary Coughlin was Iound Guilty oI Petit Larceny by
the Honorable Judge Kenneth Howard aIter a trial on Wednesday, November 30, 2011. On
Monday, December 5, 2011, I opened an email Irom DeIendant Coughlin and replied to him
stating that I would not respond to any correspondence Irom him via email and that he
needed to Iile any motions or notices in accordance with the applicable rules oI the Court.
That despite my admonition to DeIendant Coughlin, he has sent at least three more emails,
some oI which could be construed as an attempt to serve me with a motion. The
aIorementioned emails contain links and attachments that the City and I will not open as on
or about December 13, 2011 (hereinaIter "Coughlin") sent an email to and Iormer Reno
Municipal Court Administrator Matt Fisk at Coughlin subsequently Iorward that email to me.
and Iormer Reno and Iorwarded to me is the emailed a copy oI this to Pam Roberts Ior the
PlaintiII City oI Reno on this date, a true and correct copy and Iurther email her a copy oI all
the 12 11 11 MOtion |sic| Ior New Company: Reno City Attorney's OIIice -Criminal
Divison |sic| NV 89505 -3 2 I. I am a Deputy City Attorney Ior the City oI Reno, Nevada. 3
2. 4 5 3. 4. 5. we have concerns about computer viruses. 6. PlaintiII City oI Reno is inIormed
and believes that DeIendant Zachary Coughlin I Address: P.O. Box 1900 Reno, Fax
number: 775-334-2420 7. Contained within the email Coughlin sent to Municipal Court
Administrator Matt Fisk at allegation: III III PROOF OF SERVICE 8. The City has not
been served by DeIendant Coughlin with Iilings in this case by mail or personal service since
Coughlin's conviction Ior Petit Larceny on November 30, 2011. Pursuant to NRS 53.045, I
declare under penalty oI petjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct. Executed on December
14, 2011.
RDCA Robert's 12/21/11 Opposition to Motion Ior New trial in 22176 reads:
'OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRlAL DeIendant. The City oI Reno, by and
through John Kadlic, Reno City Attorney and Pamela Roberts, Deputy City Attorney,
opposes what appears to be DeIendant Zachery Barker Coughlin's Motion Ior New trial.
This Opposition is made pursuant to Reno Municipal Court Rule 4 and based on the
Iollowing Points and Authorities. POINTS AND AUTHORlTIES FACTS On December IS,
2011 at approximately 3:4 6 PM, the City received a two page Iax (hereinaIter "First Fax")
Irom DeIendant Zachary Barker Coughlin (hereinaIter "DeIendant"). See Declaration oI
Pamela Roberts. It appears to be a copy oI an email DeIendant sent to Deputy City Attorney
Chris Hazlett-Stevens, Deputy City Attorney Pamela Roberts and City Attorney John Kadlic
on Monday, December 12 , 20 11 at 9:52 PM. Id. At the top oI the First Fax is the heading
"Here is service oI the Motion Ior a New trial, Set Aside, Va | sic|." Id. at Exhibit A-I and
A-On December 15, 2011 at approximately 4:01 PM, the City received a three page Iax
(hereinaIter "Second Fax") Irom DeIendant. Id. This Second Fax has a one page "FAX
COVER SHEET" which indicates "RE: City oI reno |sic| v Coughlin RMC 11 CR 22176 21
Motion Ior New Id. at Exhibit 8-1, 8-2 and 8-3. The second and third pages oI the Second
Fax are virtually identical to the First Fax received at approximately 3:46 PM. Id. On
December 19,2011 at approximately 5:21 PM, the City received a 92 -page Iax Irom
DeIendant. Id. The Iirst page thereoI has a court and cause oI this case and is entitled "Notice
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oI Denial oI Service; Opposition City oI Reno's Notice oI Denial oI Service; Request Ior
ClariIication Regarding Deadline Ior Filing Motion For New trial, Other Tolling Motions,
etc.; APPLICATION FOR DEFERRAL OR WAIVER OF COURT FEES AND cost"
(hereinaIter "Notice-Opposition-Request-Application"). Id. The City presumes this has been
Iiled with the Court. Contained therein is a "DECLARATION OF ZACH COUGHLIN"
which contains two reIerences to a "Motion Ior a New trial" and a "Motion Ior New trial."
See Notice-OppositionRequest-Application at "DECLARATION OF ZACH
COUGHLIN" ..3 and ..15. At ..3, DeIendant writes "I ... have Iaxed |Ms. Roberts| the
December 13th Motion Ior a New trial, etc. to Ms. Roberts at her Iax number." Id. The City
did not receive such a Iax or Motion Ior a New trial. See Declaration oI Pamela Roberts.
At ..15, DeIendant writes "He did indicate that 'they' said the Motion Ior New trial that I had
recently Iiled was timely, .. ." See Notice-Opposition-Request-Application at
"DECLARATION OF ZACH COUGHLIN" at ..1 5. The City has not received proper
service oI any Iiled Motion Ior New trial. See Declaration oI Pamela Roberts. II.
ARGUMENT A. The City Was Not Served With Any Motion Ior New trial via the First
Fax. The First Fax is merely a copy oI an alleged email. See Declaration oI Pamela Roberts
and Exhibits A-I and A-2 thereto. There is no Motion Ior New trial attached thereto. Id.
There is no aIIidavit or aIIidavits and no points and authorities as is required by R.M.C.R. 4.
Id. B. The City Was Not Served With Any Motion Ior New trial via the Second Fax. The
Second Fax has a Fax Cover Sheet and then is merely a copy oI an alleged email. Id There is
no Motion Ior New trial attached thereto. Id. There is no aIIidavit or aIIidavits and no points
and authorities as is required by R.M.C.R. 4. Id. c. The City Has Not Been Properly Served -
Indeed Has Not Received -Any Motion For New trial. DeIendant alleges in his Notice-
Opposition-Request-Application that he Iiled with the Court and served via fax a Motion
for New trial upon Deputy City Attorney Roberts and the City. The City is unaware iI
DeIendant has in Iact Iiled a Motion Ior New trial with the Court. The City denies it was
served via fax and denies that it was served at all with any Motion for New trial filed on
or about December 13 or 15, 2011. III. CONCLUSION Any Motion Ior New trial Iiled by
DeIendant on or about December 13 or IS, 2011 should be denied Ior Iailure to serve the
City. Robert's continues on in her Declaration to swear: '4. On December 19, 2011 at
approximately 5:21 PM, the City received a 92-page Iax Irom DeIendant. The Iirst page
thereoI has a court and cause oI this case and is entitled "Notice oI Denial oI Service;
Opposition City oI Reno's Notice oI Denial oI Service; Request Ior ClariIication Regarding
Deadline Ior Filing Motion For New trial, Other Tolling Motions, etc.; APPLICATION
FOR DEFERRAL OR WAIVER OF COURT FEES AND cost' (hereinaIter "Notice-
Opposition7 Request-Application"). The City presumes this has been Iiled with the Court.
Contained therein is a "DECLARATION OF ZACH COUGHLIN" which contains two
reIerences to a "Motion Ior a New trial" and a "Motion Ior New trial." See Notice-
Opposition-Request-Application at "DECLARATION OF ZACH COUGHLIN" 113 and
1115. 5. At 113, DeIendant writes "I .. . have Iaxed |Ms. Roberts| the December 13th Motion
Ior a New trial, etc. to Ms. Roberts at her Iax number." The City did not receive such a fax
or Motion for a New trial. 6. At 1115, DeIendant writes "He did indicate that 'they' said the
Motion Ior New trial that I had recently Iiled was timely, .. . " See Notice-Opposition-
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Request. 7 Application at "DECLARATION OF ZACH COUGHLIN" at 1115. The City
has not received proper service of any filea Motion for New trial. 7. Pursuant to NRS
53.045, I declare under penalty oI perjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct. Executed on
December 20, 2011
That is not what Coughlin's Voxox Iax conIirmation reports indicate, however. Also,
there RCA Roberts is being misleading and coy again when she writes that the 'City has not
received proper service oI any filea Motion Ior New trial. There, Roberts, like Hazlett, is
misleadingly making assertions about not having been served with something where the City
Attorney's position is that the RMC is not allowed to tell it what constitutes eIIective service.
But, the RMC holds out to the public those Rules oI Court, and the City should be held to
them, and even iI they are not, the City has at least implicitly consented to Iax and email
service by virtue oI the multitude oI instances where it itselI eIIects service by such means,
and where it has accepted service by such means, and RCA Roberts Iellow RCA's have done
that on her behalI, as has Drake on behalI oI Hazlett, whom has a duty, upon taking over in
26405 sometime in late February, 2012, to Iamiliarize himselI with what has gone on in the
case, including reviewing the CertiIicates oI Service therein.
Consider the games RCA Hazlett playes in his 3/21/12 Motion to Strike DeIendant's
Motion to Dismiss Complaint (where he trots out the old DDA Young 'aah, come on, Judge,
can I get a 'Iugitive document ruling? I shouldn't have to work and stuII): 'MOTION TO
STRIKE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT COMES NOW
PlaintiIIClTY OF RENO, by and through JOHN J. KADLIC, Reno City Attorney, and
Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Deputy City Attorney, and Iiles its Motion to Strike as Iollows.
This Motion is made and based upon the pleading and documents on Iile herein, and the
Points and Authorities which are attached hereto and by this reIerence made a part hereoI.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES From all appearances, DeIendant Iiled Oil or about March 5,
2012 a Notice oI Appearance oI Co-Counsel and Motion to Dismiss. The City requests the
instant motion be stricken. The motion Iiled by DeIendant contains a caption Ior the Second
Judicial District Court yet was apparently Iiled in the Reno Municipal Court.l Said motion
was Iiled on March 5, 2012 in the Reno Municipal Court. Yet, the City was never served
with this Motion. NRS 178.584 states that motions must be served on the attorney in
accordance with the manner provided in civil actions. NRS 178.584(2). Rule 5 oI the
Nevada Rules oI Civil Procedure govern Iiling and service oI pleadings and other papers in
civil actions. NRCP 5 states that every written motion must be served upon the attorney Ior
the party and speciIies several alternative methods oI service. The City Iirst learned oI this
motion on March 20, 2012 by way oI a courtesy copy provided by the Court. See Declaration
oI Christopher Hazlett-Stevens attached hereto as Exhibit" I." The certiIicate oI services
included in the motion claims that the motion was served upon the Reno City Attorney's
OIIice by Iaxing, emailing, dropping oII at their oIIice and placing a true and correct copy oI
the document in the US mail addressed to 1ill Drake, Esq. at the Reno City Attorney's
OIIice-Criminal Division. However, the City never received service of this document as
claimed in the certificate of service. See Exhibit "I." While NCRP Rule 5 does allow for
electronic service of certain documents, this service is only permitted if the party served
consents to service by electronic means.2 The City has never, either expressly or
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impliedly, consentea to electronic service of aocuments in this case. Accordingly, iI
deIendant did send a copy oI the motion to the City Attorney's OIIice in an electronic
Iashion, this would not constitute proper service absent an express agreement as speciIied in
NRCP Rule 5., It should be noted that deIendant Iiled this motion on his own behalI and
without his counsel. 'In relevant part, NRCP5(b)(2)(D) states that service may be made
by: Delivering a copy by electronic means if the attorney or the party served has
consented to service by electronic means. Service by electronic means is complete on
transmission provided, however, a motion, answer or other document constituting the initial
appearance oI a party must also, iI served by electronic means, be Iiled within the time
allowed Ior service. The served attorney's or party's consent to service by electronic
means shall be expressly stated and filed in writing with the clerk of the court and
served on the other parties to the action. |Emphasis added) In conclusion, the motion Iiled
by deIendant is a Iugitive document and should be stricken by this Court. Accordingly, the
City respectIully requests that this Honorable Court grant the City's Motion to Strike.
Well, RCA Drake's consent to electronic service Irom Puentes when he was
representing Coughlin extends to RCA Hazlett upon Coughlin taking over Ior Puentes. Also,
where RCA Hazlett writes: 'The certiIicate oI services included in the motion claims that the
motion was served upon the Reno City Attorney's OIIice by Iaxing, emailing, dropping oII
at their oIIice and placing a true and correct copy oI the document in the US mail addressed
to 1ill Drake, Esq. at the Reno City Attorney's OIIice-Criminal Division. However, the
City never received service of this document as claimed in the certificate of service.
Even absent a USPS Track & ConIrim and certiIied mailing receipt (one really must
not assume anything beneath the Reno City Attorney's OIIice, and Ol' Johnnie Double Dip),
where Hazlett swears: 'However, the City never received service of this document as
claimed in the certificate of service he really ought be made to answer Ior the Iollowing:
Coughlin email both oI his Iilings in 26405 to RCA Drake (the attorney oI record on
that case at the time) on 2/15/12 (Notice oI Appeal, etc. as to Order Granting Puentes
Withdrawal) and 3/3/12 (Motion to Dismiss, etc.). Drake Iailed to object in any way, and
had previously accepted emailed service Irom the RMC and Puentes, and utilized such
herselI as well.
'The City first learned of this motion on March 20, 2012 by way of a courtesy copy
provided by the Court. (must be nice) 'See Declaration oI Christopher Hazlett-Stevens
attached hereto as Exhibit" I." The certiIicate oI services included in the motion claims that
the motion was served upon the Reno City Attorney's OIIice by Iaxing, emailing, dropping
oII at their oIIice and placing a true and correct copy oI the document in the US mail
addressed to 1ill Drake, Esq. at the Reno City Attorney's OIIice-Criminal Division.
However, the City never received service of this document as claimed in the certificate
of service. See Exhibit "I." While NCRP Rule 5 does allow for electronic service of
certain documents, this service is only permitted if the party served consents to service
by electronic means.2 The City has never, either expressly or impliedly, consentea to
electronic service of aocuments in this case. Accordingly, iI deIendant did send a copy oI the
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motion to the City Attorney's OIIice in an electronic Iashion, this would not constitute proper
service absent an express agreement as speciIied in NRCP Rule 5., It should be noted that
deIendant Iiled this motion on his own behalI and without his counsel. 'In relevant part,
NRCP5(b)(2)(D) states that service may be made by: Delivering a copy by electronic
means if the attorney or the party served has consented to service by electronic means.
Service by electronic means is complete on transmission provided, however, a motion,
answer or other document constituting the initial appearance oI a party must also, iI served
by electronic means, be Iiled within the time allowed Ior service. The served attorney's or
party's consent to service by electronic means shall be expressly stated and filed in
writing with the clerk of the court and served on the other parties to the action.
|Emphasis added) In conclusion, the motion Iiled by deIendant is a fugitive document and
should be stricken by this Court. Accordingly, the City respectIully requests that this
Honorable Court grant the City's Motion to Strike.
RCA Roberts Declaration oI 12/15/11 in 22176, at page 3, swears: 'On Monday,
December 5, 2011, I opened an email Irom DeIendant Coughlin and replied to him stating
that I would not respond to any correspondence Irom him via email and that he needed to
file any motions or notices in accordance with the applicable rules of the Court.
I am apparently barred Irom contacting the RMC Iiling oIIice about these matters
incident to the Administrative Order 2013-01 "entered" by RMC Administrative Judge W.
Gardner in a "case" that lacks an opposing party oI case number (I have yet to Iind any SCR
99 type oI rule allowing such "Administrative Orders" be summarily "entered" and served on
criminal deIendants upon entering the courthouse Ior various diIIerent reasons...But, I Ieel
the Record on Appeal in CR11-2064 is deIicient in several material respects the undermine
the rationale in the 3/15/12 Order AIIirming the Ruling oI the RMC.
Also, since Richard G. Hill, Esq., is a thread running throughout all these matters, I am
writing to inquire as to whether the 2JDC ever did received the actual documents that the
CertiIicate oI Clerk on the 1/4/12 Supplemental to Justice Court Proceedings in CV11-03628
indicates (by the signature/stamp oI both RJC Court Administrator Steve Tuttle and 2JDC
Clerk oI Court Hastings, which indicates "I certiIy that the enclosed documents are true and
correct copies oI the original documents on Iile with the Reno Justice Court") were in Iact
transmitted to the appellate court, but, upon a review oI Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order
disposing oI Coughlin's appeal, and the Iootnote on page 5 therein with respect to the Iailure
to include the 12/21/11 Order Resolving Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property
Lien within those matters addressed in that appeal (curious given the Iact that the 1/4/12
Supplemental (its only 3 pages in the Iorm that is and has been available on eFlex) in CV11-
03628 lists a document therein, and should include therein the 12/26/11 Iiled Notice oI
Appeal (two diIIerent Iaxed Iilings by Coughlin to the RJC on 12/26/11 appear to have been
either conIused as one, or treated in an inconsistent manner, with Coughlin's Iirst Iax being
Iiled stamped, but his second Iax, the one that was a Notice oI Appeal oI the 12/21/11 Order
Resolving, etc. not being given a Iile stamping by the RJC, unbeknownst to Coughlin at the
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time) by Coughlin oI that very 12/21/11 Order Resolving Coughlin's Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien. The Iact that one oI the main rationale Ior the current 12/14/12
FOFCOL seeking to disbar Coughlin irrevocably relates substantially to such matters, in
addition to the NRS 40.385 supersedeas bond matters (and Coughlin's 12/22/11 Notice oI
Posting Supersedeas Bond in RJC Rev2011-001708, curiously, appears to be absent Irom the
ROA in CV11-03628, not being Iound in the 1/4/12 Supplemental, nor the 1/12/12
Supplemental in CV11-03628)
I am writing Ior a Iew reasons. One, I do not have an active eIlex account. I have Iiled
numerous motions with the Filing OIIice in the past months by hand, and was under the
understanding that those would be electronicallys served on any attorney oI record in those
matters who is also a registered EIlex user, such as in:
cv11-03628: Richard G. Hill and Casey D. Baker
cr12-2025 (I think WCDA DDA Young is a registered eIlex user)
cr13-0011 (I assumed Reno City Attorney Ormaas would be handling the appeal there?
Pursuant to NEFR 9 please list the Iollowing parties or attorneys on the respective electronic
notice service lists
cr13-0011 Reno City Attorney Allison Ormaas and Dan Wong
CR12-2025 WCDA DDA Zachary Young
Ior cr12-1262 please list Reno City Attorney Chris Hazlett-Stevens.
CV11-03628 Richard G. Hill and Casey Baker (the 7/24/12 Notice oI Appeal I Iiled therein
does not seem to have been electronically served through eIlex on those two, perhaps
because I Iiled it in hard copy Iorm? Further, the docket in that matter identiIies the $250
Iiling feepaid on 9/6/12 as attached to the Notice oI Appeal Iiled on 7/31/12 (I understood it
to more apply Iirst to the 7/24/12 Notice oI Appeal, but either way, it was meant to apply to
the appeal oI the $42K attorney feeaward in 61383, not the earlier Notice oI Appeal that
became 60331).
in CR12-1262, RCA Hazlett's 7/31/12 Motion to Dismiss was not served on me via eIlex,
and I was not emailed an electronic notice oI the Iiling, nor was I able to access Iiles in that
case via EIlex until at the earlierst 8/24/12.
The Motion to Dismiss was granted upon Hazlett Iiling a Request to Submit on 8/14/12,
which would have been too early considering the three days Ior mailing under:
CoMPUtiNG AND EXtENDiNG tiME
NRAP 26: Non-judicial days are now excluded when the deadline is less than 11 days, rather
than seven days (NRAP 26(a)(2)). The rule does not apply when 'the period is stated as a
speciIic date. The new rule now conIorms with the Nevada Rules oI Civil Procedure Ior
computing time.
A Iive-day telephonic extension oI time Ior perIorming any act other than Iiling a notice oI
appeal is now available Ior 'good cause through the Supreme Court clerk`s oIIice (NRAP
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26(b)(1)(B)). Unlike the Ninth Circuit`s similar rule, a request Ior a telephonic extension in
the Nevada Supreme Court does not preclude subsequent stipulations or motions Ior
extension to the court.
Additional time oI three days aIter service applies to any Iorm oI service 'unless the paper is
delivered on the date oI service stated in the prooI oI service (NRAP 26(c)). The three-day
allowance does not apply to speciIic due dates set Iorth by court order or acts required to be
taken within a speciIic time period set Iorth in an order. For purposes oI this rule, 'a paper
that is served electronically is not treated as delivered on the date oI service stated in the
prooI oI service. Adding upon the language oI NRAP 26(c), the Nevada Electronic Filing
Rules (NEFR) explain that the time to respond to a document received electronically is
counted Irom the judicial day aIter receiving the document (NEFR 9(I)). So, documents
served on non-judicial days are not treated as served until the next judicial day. The Supreme
Court`s website also clariIies that the three-day allowance Ior service does not apply Ior
registered users oI the court`s electronic Iiling system.1 1 eIile.nvsupremecourt.us/Iaqs.jsp
I am Iacing disbarment currently due in part to that criminal trespass conviction being upheld
in CR12-1262. My 8/15/12 Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss includes prooI showing that
I timely Iiled on 6/28/12 a Notice oI Appeal with the RMC and timely served such on the
Reno City Attorney.
RE: cannot access cr12-1262 on eIlex despite Iiling notice oI appearance
To see messages related to this one, group messages by conversation.
Smith, Annie (Annie.Smithwashoecourts.us)Add to contacts8/20/12
To: Zach Coughlin, eIlex, Court Tech, WebFiling, eFlexSupport
Zach;
You should be able to view your documents now.
Sent: Sunday, August 19, 2012 7:20 PM
To: eIlex; Court Tech; WebFiling; eFlexSupport
Subject: cannot access cr12-1262 on eIlex despite Iiling notice oI appearance

Dear Court Tech and EIlex,

I am writing to respectIully request that I be granted eIlex access to cr12-1262 at your
earliest convenience. I Iiled a Notice oI Appearance on August 15th, 2012 and would like to
access some oI the3 materials on Iile in preparing the Opening BrieI Ior that appeal.
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http://www.ccwashoe.com/public/ckpublicqrydoct.cpdktrptIrames?
backtoP&caseidCR12-1262&begindate&enddate
Also, the "Ruling" in CR11-2064 was AIIirmed, with the Order pointing out a Iailure to cite
to pages in the record supporting the arguments in the BrieI. Permission to Iile by email was
granted to Coughlin therein by RMC Filing OIIicer Supervisor Ballard (see attached
exampled oI Supervisor Ballard Iile stamping a subpoena that was submitted via email only.
Such permission to Iile be email was withdraw at the earliest, on 12/19/11 (constructive
notice to Coughlin thereoI). However, the Record on Appeal in CR11-2064 Iails to contain
the clear, one page per page emailed Iilings, rather, in some instances, completely illegible 4
page per page versions were submitted (despite express indications to the RMC Iiling oIIice
that the email version ought be included in the ROA).
"Fwd: Attached Image
Donna Ballard (BallardDreno.gov)Add to contacts11/29/11
From: Donna Ballard (BallardDreno.gov) You moved this message to its current location.
Sent: Tue 11/29/11 4:47 PM
Outlook Active View
1 attachment (44.0 KB)
0661001.pdI
Download
Download as zip

Thank you. I am taking it up to the Department now.
Donna
From: "MUNI CT 1st Floor Clerks" canonreno.gov~
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To: "DONNA" ballarddreno.gov~
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 17:42:28 -0800
Subject: Attached Image
Donna Ballard
Senior Court Specialist
Reno Municipal Court
1 South Sierra Street
Reno, Nevada 89501
(775)334-3101
Sincerely,

Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlinhotmail.com"
Also:
"
RE: Attached Image / Subpoena
To see messages related to this one, group messages by conversation.
Donna Ballard (BallardDreno.gov)Add to contacts11/29/11
To: Zach Coughlin
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From: Donna Ballard (BallardDreno.gov) You moved this message to its current location.
Sent: Tue 11/29/11 3:53 PM
To: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
I am so sorry, I must have misunderstood.
These must be served and the aIIidavit portion completed beIore they can be Iile stamped in.
Thank you,
Donna
From: Zach Coughlin zachcoughlinhotmail.com~
To: ballarddreno.gov~
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 15:48:31 -0800
Subject: RE: Attached Image / Subpoena
Dear Ms. Ballard,
Thank you sending these and agreeing to stamp and emal them back to me today, very, very
much appreciate.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
email is the best way to contact me, having phone issues today.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
Licensed in Nevada and USPTO"
I believe the CD disc included in the ROA transmitted in cr11-2064 Iailed to image the pdIs
on that disc and include them in what was available on eIlex, and ask that that be done now.
Additionally, the 1/4/12 Supplemental in CV11-03628 is deIiicient in that it does not contain
the documents listed in the "Appeal Receipt" on page 2 oI that 3 page pdI. Included amongst
the documents listed therein is an entry representing my 12/26/11 submitted Ior Iiling Notice
oI Appeal oI the 12/21/11 Order Resolving Coughlin's 11/16/12 Motion to Contest Personal
Property Lien, which Judge Flanagan's Order in CV11-032628, at the Iootnote on page 5
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speciIically indicates is not being considered in the 3/30/12 Order denying my appeal due to
my alleged Iailure to appeal that 12/21/11 Order. I believe the 1/4/12 Supplemental's Iailure
to include such materials ought be corrected. The Supplemental oI 1/12/12 contains the
actual documents listed in the "Appeal Receipt".\
AS TO the materials which I contend should have been included in the Record on Appeal
transmitted Irom the RMC in light oI RMC Supervisor Ballard indicating Coughlin was
permitted to Iile by email:
Sent: Tue 11/29/11 3:48 PM
To: ballarddreno.gov
4 attachments
RMC subpoena Ellis Walmart Manager and loss prevention manager.pdI (42.7 KB) , RMC
subpoena Janice store clerk walmart arrest receipt cashier 2nd St. 89501 Walmart.pdI (44.3
KB) , RMC subpoena Store Manager Brian Bain 2nd st Walmart Reno and LP supervisor
2nd St. 89501 Walmart.pdI (43.3 KB) , RMC subpoena Iill in the blank Ior name stylein city
oI reno v coughlin 11 cr 22176 2I.pdI (43.7 KB)
Dear Ms. Ballard,
much appreciate.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
Licensed in Nevada and USPTO

Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 15:22:14 -0800
From: BallardDreno.gov
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Subject: Fwd: Attached Image / Subpoena

Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 16:14:15 -0800

Donna Ballard
Reno, Nevada 89501
(775)334-3101
Sent: Tue 11/29/11 4:29 PM
To: ballarddreno.gov
1 attachment
RMC various walmart subpoenasreno v coughlin 11 cr 22176 2I.pdI (56.9 KB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402

Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 15:53:46 -0800
I am so sorry, I must have misunderstood.
These must be served and the aIIidavit portion completed beIore they can be Iile stamped in.
Thank you,
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Donna
From: Zach Coughlin zachcoughlinhotmail.com~
To: ballarddreno.gov~
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 15:48:31 -0800
Dear Ms. Ballard,
much appreciate.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 15:22:14 -0800
Subject: Fwd: Attached Image / Subpoena

Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 16:14:15 -0800

Donna Ballard
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Reno, Nevada 89501
(775)334-3101
Donna Ballard
Reno, Nevada 89501
(775)334-3101"
A review oI the Record on Appeal as transmitted to the 2JDC and placed in pdI Iormat on
the e-Flex system reveals a 352 page pdI
cid43084638I32I5I28&resid43084638F32F5F28211031&paridroot
Here is service oI the Motion Ior a New trial, Set Aside, Va
Sent: Mon 12/12/11 9:52 PM
To: hazlett-stevenscreno.gov; robertspreno.gov; kadlicjreno.gov
Is it about time Ior you to get that CD/DVD that Walmar'ts AP guy Faustino handed the two
Reno Sparks Indian Colony oIIicers when they were leading the suspect away in cuIIs...not
the video you gave me oI sling blade badgering the lawyer I got those two videos you gave
me which just the badgering in the interrogation room. I am talking about the cd/dvd that
Walmart's guy gave them as they were walking out....Doesn't it seem like you really need to
get that now, to stay on the right side oI NiIong? You remember NiIong, don't you.
Walmart ap guy sit there on the stand, under penalty oI perjury and testiIy that no video was
collected in any way related to me or this case aside Irom the 2 interrogation room videos
you provided (with a highly suspect 14mb "codec" program required to view the
videos....can you indicate why that is necessary to watch a simple old .avi Iile?).
why did you suborn the perjury oI both the walmart guy and the oIIicers regarding no other
video existing? I can't Iigure that one out. Ms. Roberts, don't you practice in RMC quite a
bit? Maybe I am conIused, but doesn't the RMC rules permit serving a government attorney
such as yourselI via email? What do you have against email? It is economical Ior those oI
use who don't have such public largesse to work with. Here is service oI the Motion Ior a
New trial, Set Aside, Vacate, etc., etc:
https://skydrive.live.com/redir.aspx?cid43084638I32I5I28&resid43084638F32F5F28!
1031&paridroot
Its only something like 1,000 pages.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
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tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
That ROA shows there is no ProoI oI Service upon Coughlin Ior the 11/30/11 Order Ior
Summary Punishment oI Contempt Committed in the Immediate View and Presence oI the
Court and, likewise, no ProoI oI Service Ior the Appeal Bond Order oI 12/22/11.
Additionally, the 11/15/11 Notice Setting Hearing in RMC 11 CR 22176 intended to provide
Coughlin notice oI the 11/30/11 trial date has a ProoI oI Service indicating it was sent only
to Coughlin's then deIunct 121 River Rock St. address, the site oI the Iormer home law oIIice
he was evicted Irom. The RMC and Judge Howard were alerted to Coughlin's then new 817
N. Virginia St. address no less than IiIteen times between Coughlin's wrriten notice thereoI
on 11/2/11 and 12/15/12, the date listed on the ProoI oI Service Ior that Notice Setting
Hearing. There is, at page 24 oI 352 oI the ROA Iiled in CR11-2065, a CertiIicate oI Service
dated 11/22/11 indicating the 11/15/11 Notice Setting Hearing notiIying Coughlin oI the
11/30/11 trial date was sent to Coughlin's then current 817 North Virginia Street address, but
such provided less than the required 10 judicial days notice. In Iact, given the intervening
two court holidays (Thanksgiving and Family Day) Coughlin was aIIorded only two days
notice thereoI.
While Judge Elliott's 3/15/12 Order AIIirming the Decision oI the Reno Municipal Court
(lacking an indication oI whether the 11/30/11 Order Imposing Summary Punishment Ior
Contempt was considered therein.
"Temporary address change and instruction to pursue a continuance
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 4:06 PM
To: howardkreno.gov; robertspreno.gov

Dear Judge Howard Deputy City Attorney Roberts,

I have been evicted and perhaps subject to an illegal lockout and unlawIul rent distraint by an
attorney representing my Beverly Hills High School graduate CaliIornia Neurosurgeon
landlord, who has spent approx $30,000 in attorneys Iees pursuing a summary eviction, and
whose attorney is withholding my state issued indentiIication, wallet, and all materials
necessary to my law practice all in an unlawIul rent distraint prohibited by NRS 40.460 and
40.520. I am pursuing a continuance oI the upcoming hearing/trial, I cannot even access
when that hearing is. I have inIormed opposing counsel Roberts oI some oI the issues which
will require extensive discovery, a jury trial, and more time to aIIord myselI a legitimate
opportunity to deIend this case. I have not been served any Order responding to my request
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Ior appointment oI counsel, as I believe it is required even iI the State does not "intend" to
seek jail time, where any incarceration is a possibility, the Sixth Amendment guarantees it.

Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501

The opposing counsel in the summary eviction matter is withholding my phone as well and
reIusing to allow me to access any mail that may remain at the property Irom those times
when the USPS was processing my oIIicial Change oI Address. Email is the best way to get
in contact with me during this transition period.

For instance, I am unware whether my Motion Ior Appointment oI Counsel was granted or
not. I called Judge Howard's assistant and requested that she email me the docket in this case
and any pleadings or orders Iiled, including any order that may have stemmed Iorm any oI
my previous motions, as I am not sure how those were ruled on. I believe my internet based
Iax service will allow me to receive those materials at my number 949 667 7402, though I
would preIer email, but I know many governmental entities preIer to Iax such items. I am
requesting a jury trial, a substantial continuance, and the appointment oI counsel. I object to
the RMC's practice oI reIusing to tell litigants who the 4 "house" appointed deIenders are
upon questioning. Further, it has become clear that some oI these "Iormer prosecutors" who
are now the gang oI Iour "house" deIenders, do not even announce to accused arraignees that
they are, in Iact, the deIender or an attorney or that they may be representing the arraignees.
I am hereby Iiling a motion in limine regarding any materials or inIormation gleaned Irom
the unlawIul search by the RSIC OIIicer, who clearly announced that they would base their
probable cause to arrest and conduct a search incident to arrest upon any Iailure to consent to
a search by the accused. Further, the alleged conduct did not occur in the OIIicer's presence,
and I believe there exists authority preventing a minor misdemeanor arrest and transport
under those circumstances. Additionally, more time is needed to conduct discovery in this
matter, especially in light oI allegations that Walmart had previously threatened individuals,
including, perhaps, the accused, with retaliatory action, including illicit abuse oI process, Ior
the purported attempts by someone to have the Walmart Return Policy enIorced, and to hold
accountable all Walmart employees and managers, some oI whom have over a decade
experience in their positions, who curiously "Iorget" they Return Policy Walmart holds out to
the public when it is convenient to do so, the same Return Policy that Walmart used to drive
out oI business so many competitors. Further, this case is likely to get extremely
complicated given the apparent conIlict oI interest stemming Irom the Iact that the Walmart
in question is on land owned by the RSIC, which may own or employ the RSIC police, and
which is rented or owned in part by Walmart.

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I know Opposing Counsel Roberts may appreciate a continuance as well and the opportunity
it would aIIord her to IulIill her NRCP 11 duty and other prosecutorial duties to conduct a
reasonably diligent inquiry into these matters.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin"
Further notice oI the address change was made by no less than 8 emails to
RenoMuniRecordsreno.gov between 11/21/11 and 12/15/12 notiIying the RMC oI such.
"
At page 109 oI the ROA Irom the RMC in CR11-2064 is the Iile stamped 12/13/11 Iiling by
Coughlin oI his Notice oI Appeal, Motion to Vacate and or Set Aside, JCRCP 59, JCRCP 60,
Motion Ior Reconsideration; Motion Ior Recusal; Motion For Publication OI Transcript at
Public Expense, Petition Ior In Forma Pauperis Status and the version Iiled by the RMC is
suIIicient up until page 120 where the version transmitted by the departs Irom that which was
agreed upon and in light oI the express representaiton made to Coughlin by the RMC Iiling
oIIice that the version he emailed to the RMC would be the version included in the ROA.
The version oI that 12/13/11 Iiling by Coughlin that was email is 901 pages long. Pages 12-
901 oI the pdI available at the Skydrive link and also provided via attachments in the emails
to RenoMuniRecordsreno.gov (in line with the express permission granted Coughlin to so
submit Ior Iiling via that method by RMC Filing OIIicer Supervisor Donna Ballard) should
replace or be added alongside pages 120 to 133 oI the original ROA transmitted by the RMC
(which was 352 pages).
Further, at page 135 oI that original 352 page FOA is the disc Coughlin attached as Exhibit 1
to that 12/13/11 Iiling, and someone (likely a court or Iiling oIIice employee) has added the
handwritten notation "unable to image cd; located in Exhibit Room". It is Coughlin's
contention that the pdI's contained on that cd should be imaged and uploaded to eIlex and
made part oI the portions oI the ROA accesible via eFlex. While media such as audio and
movies do not seem to be uploaded and made accessible on eIlex under the current rules,
pdIs on such discs arguably should, and such is arguably required by the applicable rules,
though some insight in that regard is very welcome and appreciated.
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At pages 136 and 137 oI the ROA two Record Requests by Coughlin which bare Iile
stamped dates that diIIer markedly Irom the dates indicated thereon by Coughlin and the
dates such documents were submitted Ior Iiling via email to the RMC.
Judge Howard's 12/15/11 Order in 22176 misdates the Iile stamping on Coughlin's Motion to
Proceed IFP, indicating such was Iiled on 11/14/11, which, iI was the case, might support
(might) the subsequent argument by the State Bar oI Nevada that Coughlin somehow
committed Iraud by "Iailing" to point out that he was a licensed attorney at that time.
However, the correct date oI such submission by Coughlin oI that Motion to Proceed IFP is
actually 12/14/11, and by that time Judge Howard and the RMC had been made well aware
that Coughlin was then a licensed attorney, including the extent to which Coughlin pleaded
Ior a stay oI the 3 day summary contempt incarceration that Judge Howard rendered at 8:30
pm on 11/30/11, where Coughlin indicated a Iailure to so grant even a brieI stay would
prejudice Coughlin's client's aIIairs to an extent which the law would require be avoided
where as easily done as there. Judge Howard, like Judge Nash Holmes would later, instead
bucked the majority viewpoint on that issue in american jurisprudence and plowed out in an
apparent willing and knowing attempt to punish Coughlin Iurther by causing damage to his
client's aIIairs, essentially using Coughlin's clients as pawns.
Voxox noreplyvoxox.com~ Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 3:49 PM
To: renoattorneygmail.com
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successIully sent to 4a7773d6-e3a4-4e47-9478-346a5917d80bgeneral693298
( 17753342420).
Your Fax was delivered 11:49:24 PM on 2011-12-15.
|Quoted text hidden|
Voxox noreplyvoxox.com~ Thu, Dec 15, 2011 at 4:03 PM
Hi zachcoughlin,
( 17753342420).
Your Fax was delivered 12:03:54 AM on 2011-12-16.
Voxox noreplyvoxox.com~ Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 12:03 AM
Hi zachcoughlin,
- 1046/1409 -
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( 17753342420).
Hi zachcoughlin,
( 17753342420).
Hi zachcoughlin,
( 17753342420).
Hi zachcoughlin,
( 17753342420).
Hi zachcoughlin,
( 17753342420).
- 1047/1409 -
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Hi zachcoughlin,
( 17753342420).
Further, the RCA's oIIice clearly held itselI out as accepting service oI Iilings by email,
and the ROA in both CR11-2064 and CR12-1262 makes this abundantly clear in the
multitude oI instances where CertiIicate oI Services indicates a Iiling was served on the RCA
by the RMC by email.
Further, there are no Supplementals transmitted to the 2JDC (such as those in CV11-03628
Iiled on 1/4/12 and 1/12/12) despite the RMC providing the State Bar oI Nevada Iile stamped
copies oI a 2/24/12 Iiling RMC 11 CR 22176 by Coughlin. Coughlin's Iiling in the ROA in
22176, in addition to his 1/9/12 Iiling in 11 TR 26800 make very clear that the RMC and
Judge Nash Holmes were well aware that mailing her 2/28/12 Order Finding DeIendant in
Contempt and Imposing Sanctions to the address oI Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice at
121 River Rock St (Irom which Coughlin had provided a multitude oI written
correspondences and Iilings to the RMC indicating such was no longer a good address Ior
him Ior mailing or otherwise, and that, in Iact, he had been evicted Irom there) would not
likely result in such reaching Coughlin. Further, the RMC Iailed to remail that Order to
Coughlin upon receiving it as "returned to sender", despite, by that time, in Department 3 (in
addition to the 1/9/12 Iiling in 11 TR 26800 in Department 3 that expressly put D3 on notice
oI Coughlin's then 1422 E. 9th St. #2, 89512 address) a number oI Iiling by Coughlin had
been received (including Coughlin's 3/7/12 Iilings, Iaxes oI 3/9/12, etc., etc.). Judge Nash
Holmes testimony at Coughlin's Iormal disciplinary hearing at the State Bar oI Nevada on
11/14/12 is not supported by the ProoI oI Service on that 2/28/12 Order Finding DeIendant in
Contempt and Imposing Sanctions where such ProoI oI Service Iails to support Judge Nash
Holmes' sworn testimony that she "had him (Coughlin) served at the jail" either that 2/28/12
Order or any written notice oI the 3/12/12 continuation oI that trial in 11 TR 26800.
At page 62 oI the 901 page 12/13/11 pdI Coughlin submitted to the RMC Ior Iiling in
accordance with the RMC's express representations that doing so was a permissible method
oI submitting Iilings and that such Iiling would, in Iact, be Iiled in an included in the ROA is
the receipt Ior the $83.82 worth oI groceries Coughlin paid Ior at Wal-Mart on 9/9/11 at
9:14:48 pm, shortly beIore the custodial arrest Ior a misdemeanor petty larceny charge by the
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Reno Sparks Indian Colony OIIicers in violation oI NRS 171.1255, which Iorbids tribal
police Irom making misdemeanor arrests. And Iurther, even though the prosecutorial and
police misconduct incident to the Iraudulent assertion put on by RCA Roberts in the
testimony oI RSIC OIIicer Kameron CrawIord that Coughlin Iailed to provide his driver's
license, and thereIore, some alleged lack oI inIormation necessary to issue a citation rather
than make a custodial arrest justiIied making such an arrest (an excuse oIIered by the RCA
and RSIC upon the Iact that there entire probable cause analysis rested upon the idea that
Iailing to consent to a search oI one's person provided all the probable cause the RSIC
OIIicers needed to make a custodial arrest and conduct a search incident thereto, was
revealed). Regardless, even though Wal-Mart's own video and photo evidence propounded
to the RCA demonstrates conclusively that Coughlin did provide his Nevada driver's license
to OIIicer CrawIord (as does the PC Sheet and dispatch recordings), Ior the sake oI
argument, had Coughlin so Iailed to provide such identiIication or other inIormation
necessary to issue a citation, such Iailure would still be a mere misdemeanor, and NRS
171.1255 woudl still bar the RSIC OIIicers Irom making that arrest, and the exclusionary
rule must be applied to the halI packet oI Duract Cough Melts RSIC OIIicer CrawIord
alleged to have recovered Irom Coughlin's pocket. Leaving the RMC And RCA with very
little to support Judge Howard's Iinding that Coughlin's guilt was established "beyond a
reasonable doubt", especially where practically every material Iact testiIied to by any oI the
RCA's witnesses was contradicted by their own subsequent testimony. This included the
sworn testimony by Wal-Mart's Frontino and the RSIC's CrawIord that the $83.83 receipt Ior
the items Coughlin paid Ior shortly beIore being arrested did not include any entry with the
same UPC as that Iound on the Duract Cough Melt package Coughlin was accused oI having
"stolen" incident to an allegation that Coughlin "selected and consumed" such Duract Cough
Melts while shopping.. However, the UPC Ior that exact product, the 12 lozenge package oI
Duract Cough Melts does, in Iact, appear on both the receipt Wal-Mart made Ior the items
Coughlin is alleged to have consumed while shopping without paying Ior and the $83.82
receipt that was withheld Irom Coughlin via an impermissible rent distraint applied by
opposing counsel Richard G. Hill, Esq., and Casey D. Baker, Esq., in the eviction action
Irom Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice.
Further, Coughlin's appeal oI the criminal trespass conviction in RMC 11 CR 26405 was
dismissed incident to RCA Hazlett's too early Iiled 8/14/12 Request Ior Submission (the
7/31/12 Motion to Dismiss was not served electronically, thereIore 3 days Ior mailing is
accorded to the 10 days to respond thereto, making Coughlin's 8/15/12 Opposition to Motion
to Dismiss timely). Regardless, Coughlin's Opposition oI 8/15/12 went unresponded to, as
the RCA Iailed to Iiled a Reply, and under Polk v State, such may be treated as an admission.
Further, the
WILLIAM L. GARDNER
Company:
Address:
1 S. Sierra Street
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P.O. Box 1900
Reno , NV 89505
Phone Number:
775-334-2297
Fax number:
775-334-3859
Coughlin's 8/15/12 Opposition to the 7/31/12 Motion to Dismiss provided prooI oI Coughlin
submitting Ior Iiling via Iax to Department 2 his Notice oI Appeal, which, curiously, is not
included in the Record on Appeal in CR12-1262.
It was not untila note was published in The Writ's July/August 2012 issue that the RMC's
"Procedure Change" was announced:
"Reno Municipal Court Procedure Change
Pursuant to Reno Municipal Court Rule 5B, all motions /
pleadings submitted via Iacsimile shall be directed to the Reno
Municipal Court Clerk`s OIIice Iacsimile at 775-334-3824. II
you have any questions regarding this procedure, please contact
Cassandra Jackson, Court Administrator at 775-334-2295."
Outbound Iax report
Inbox
x
Voxox noreplyvoxox.com~
6/27/12
to me
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successIully sent to 14021bda-178b-448I-aIcc-1aI150604a18general693298
( 17753344226).
xoxo,
The Voxox Team
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This message was intended Ior renoattorneygmail.com. Want to control which emails you
receive Irom Voxox? GetVoxox: http://download.voxox.com and adjust your NotiIications in
the Settings/PreIerences window. Voxox by TelCentris, Inc. is located at 10180 Telesis Ct.,
San Diego, CA 92109.
6/27/12
to me
Hi zachcoughlin,
( 17753344226).
6/28/12
to me
Hi zachcoughlin,
( 17753344226).
6/28/12
to me
Hi zachcoughlin,
( 17753344226).
6/28/12
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to me
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successIully sent to 3ad3I15b-3a33-4863-a6cd-7934ec8I8b32general693298
( 17753343859).
RCA Hazlett Iailed to oppose in any way the arguments made by Coughlin and evidence
provided in support thereoI that Coughlin submitted Ior Iiling, in an appropriate manner, a
Notice oI Appeal on 6/28/12 in RMC 11 CR 26405, and also timely served such under NRS
189.010 upon the Reno City Attorney's OIIice. As such, the Iailure to oppose such should be
taken as an admission by the RCA.
Thank You,
This is a cute little game the RCA plays. It 'denies it was served via fax and denies
that it was served at all with any Motion for New trial filed on or about December 13 or
15, 2011. RCA Roberts (like Hazlett) doesn't say she did not get such a fax...just that
she was not served via fax...relying upon the confusion attendant to the RMC Rule 5
held out to the public entitling defendants to believe fax service upon a ~government
attorney such as RCA Roberts is permissible (which it is, under the RMC Rules of
Court).
Regardless of the fact that Coughlin did, in fact serve RCA Roberts that 12/13/11
file stamped filing in 22176 via fax (as in faxing one page per page, the entirety of said
filing), Coughlin also served her by fax by faxing RCA Roberts a Skydrive link at
which she could download an electronic copy of the entirety of said filing. ~We have
concerns about computer viruses Roberts and RCA's chorus. Well, your IT guy does
get paid real money, right? Couldn't someone give you a cd with a virus on it as an
attachment?
Judge Holmes' 3/14/12 greivance against Coughlin hand delivered to the SBN along
with a 'box oI materials reads:
'Re: Zachary Barker Coughlin, Nevada Bar No. 9473
Dear Mr. Clark:
This letter constitutes a Iormal complaint oI attorney misconduct and/or disability
against Zachary Barker Coughlin. The accompanying box oI materials demonstrates some oI
the problems with the practice oI this attorney being experienced by myselI and the other
three judges in Reno Municipal Court. My two most recent Orders in what should be a simple
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traIIic citation case are selI-explanatory and are included, together with copies oI massive
documents Me. Coughlin has IaxIiled to our court in this case. Audio recordings oI two oI
my hearings in this matter are also included. He Iailed to appear Ior the second one this past
Monday.
I have another traIIic case pending trial with him that was re-assigned to me based on
our Department I judge being out Ior surgery. We have multiple addresses Ior Mr. Coughlin
and can't seem to locate him between cases very easily. We are setting that case Ior trial and
attempting to serve him at the most recent address we have (1422 E. 9th St. #2 Reno NY
89512), although I heard today he may be living in his vehicle somewhere. We do have an
address Ior his mother, however, as she recently posted part oI a Iine Ior him.
Judge Ken Howard, Department 4, had a case on Mr. Coughlin late last year that is
now on appeal to the Second Judicial District Court. Judge Bill Gardner, Department 2, also
has a matter currently pending in his court with Mr. Coughlin as the deIendant. I have
enclosed some copies oI documents Irom those matters, in chronological order, simply
because they appear to demonstrate that he is quickly decompensating in his mental status.
Our staII also made you some audio tapes oI Coughlin in the matters in Departments 2 and 4
so you can hear Ior yourselI how this attorney acts in court. You can see his behavior in my
traIIic citation case does not appear to be an isolated incident.
It is my understanding that Reno Justice Court also has a matter pending on this
attorney. My Judicial Assistant was contacted by the Washoe Public DeIender in February
when I had Mr. Coughlin jailed Ior Contempt oI Court and they stated that they represent him
in a Gross Misdemeanor matter in RJC. I have no other inIormation on that.
You will have the Iull cooperation oI myselI, the other judges, and the staII oI Reno
Municipal Court in your pursuit oI this matter. Mr. Coughlin has positioned himselI as a
vexatious litigant in our court, antagonizing the staII and even our pro temp judges on the
most simple traIIic and misdemeanor matters. I do think this is a case oI some urgency, and I
apologize Ior taking two days to get this package to you; our IT person was ill and could not
make the copies oI the audios oI Mr. Coughlin's hearings until today, and I Ielt it was
important that the audios be included in the materials to be considered by the State Bar. On
February 27, 2012, Mr. Coughlin told me he was actively practicing law and had
appointments with clients. | do not know iI that was true, but iI so, he could be causing
serious harm to the practice oI law in Northern Nevada and could be jeopardizing someone's
Ireedom or property interests. "
Another example oI how the SBN has beneIited Irom Iiling two version oI the ROA
and getting to go to school on Coughlin's since stricken Iirst brieI and the other Iilings oI
Coughlin that have been submitted but not Iiled or since stricken is that, now that the SBN
was 'caught trying to slip in FHE 1 (within the version oI the Complaint included therein,
Coughlin has previously detailed the patent misconduct where King, without making any
mention oI doing so to the Panel or Opposing Counsel (in a blatant violation oI Sierra Glass
justiIying a mistrial, inserted a legible version oI what was attached as Exhibit 3 to his
8/23/12 Complaint) a clearer, legible version oI the 3/12/12 Order in 26800 (in the Iirst 574
page ROA (which was not bates stamped and which did have Sunshine Litigation's Formal
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Hearing Exhibit cover pages), at what would have been page 1,461, had it been bates
stamped; now, at page 1727 oI the second ROA (Iiled 2/13/13) the bates stamping oI '01901
that was placed just under the bates stamping utilized just Ior that which was admitted as
FHE (which was 00023 Ior that page, with 01901 Iound just below it) is not to be Iound. This
is illustrative oI the unacceptable manner oI bates stamping utilized by the SBN, wherein,
essentially, and entire horizontal strip oI the bottom oI any page that gets bates stamped is
'white out save Ior the new bate stamp place therein. This oIten includes the page numbers
and counts and titles oI documents or Iilings traditionally Iound in the Iooters thereoI. It is
completely possible to place bates stamping on documents without do that (witness
Coughlin's bates stamping). Further, none oI the 'certiIications by RMC Filing OIIicer
Supervisor Donna Ballard are dated. However in the 2/13/13 ROA, Irom 1723 to 1727, the
issues Coughlin previously detailed (the mixing and matching oI the most legible pages then
available to King, whether certiIied or not, to 'Irankenstein together a more legible copy oI
Ex. 3 to his 8/23/12 Complaint) is obscured in the representation thereoI Iound in the second
ROA, with the bates stamping Irom the 11/7/12 production Additionally, it is Iar Irom clear
that Ballard is qualiIied to perIorm such certiIications (as evinced Irom the lack oI dating
thereon, her willingness to 'certiIy documents Irom diIIerent courts and her admitting to
Couglhin on numberous occassions that the 'Iiles stay up in the Departments (especially
Coughlin's) the majority oI the time, that the Iiling oIIice is not able to provide Coughlin a
docket Irom those various cases, etc. There simply is not a 'Iiling oIIice per se at the Reno
Municipal Court, and there certainly is no separation between what is held out as the 'Iiling
oIIice oI 'Clerk's OIIice and the various departments therein. Further, it is very clear
(especially upon a review oI the various AIIidavits submitted to the SBN by the RMC
Marshals and Iiling oIIice employees) that the employees and clerks in the Iiling oIIice are
ordered around by and intimidated oI both the judges and Marshals. Hardly an atmosphere
oI transparency and accountability. Perhaps, such a setting explains the accounting issues the
RMC had in recent years.
The record is simply incomplete to a prejudicial extent where Coughlin is prevented
Irom herein Iiling as Exhibits available to the public both versions oI the ROA (12/14/12 and
2/13/13) so the progression evinced therein is discernible and therein it is revealed the
methoaology employed by Pat King and Laura Peters in their approach. Much like attorneys
Richard G. Hill, Casey D. Baker, Pamela Roberts, Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Zach Young,
Jospeph Garin, Brian Gonsalves, Jim Leslie, and Biray Dogan's approach, that oI King and
Peters involves trying to get away with as much as they can, until they get caught, then
cloacking themselves in either some purported immunity, or claiming 'oopsie, won't happen
again (or in Hill's case, immediately aIter attempting to qualiIy himselI as an expert and
thoroughly versed in every Iiling and aspect oI both the trial court proceeding and appeal oI
that eviction ('you didn't plead a commercial tenancy in the trial court), upon being caught
in his lies, Hill dips, Ilips, and changes his script ('well, I wasn't there in the trial court...I
don't have the audio oI the hearing (wrong, Hill, you were provided both a hard copy and both
Hill and his associate were email a link to a Skydrive that to this day still has Ireely available
the audio oI all oI the hearings in 1708).
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At page 40 oI the second ROA is Coughlin's Motion to Dismiss, with page 43
revealing that the 9/9/12 letter to Susich and King (which was both Iaxed and emailed to both
individuals) was attached as Exhibit 1 to that Iiling in all modes in which such Iiling was
submitted Ior Iiling to the SBN (by personal delivery, attached to an email with the Motion to
Dismiss therein), and by Iax. As such, that nine page letter should be interpolated into the
ROA should that ROA not be stricken, or iI stricken, should be included in the third version
thereoI. Additionally, particularly where Panel Chair Echeverria's 10/31/12 Orde rules on it
and speciIically identiIies it as Iiled on October 16
th
, 2012, the Motion Ior Order to Show
Cause starting on page 44 oI the ROA should be aIIixed with a Iile stamping representing the
date oI Iiling accorded to it by the Panel Chair (and certainly, Coughlin was entitled to rely
upon the Panel Chair's representations that such 10/16/12 Motion Ior Order To Show Cause
had been Iiled in and ruled on, and given that such Iiling was only submitted to the Panel and
SBN/Clerk oI Court via email and Iax, Iurther support is provided Ior Coughlin's contention
that Iax Iiling was held out as an acceptable practice, and any such attempts to Iile a document
in such a manner made by Coughlin should be included in the ROA, whether the SBN aIIixed
such with a Iile stamping or not. ProoI in support oI the contention Coughlin herein makes,
that such Iiling oI a Motion Ior Order to Show Cause (accord a Iiling data oI 10/16/12 in the
Panel's 10/31/12 Order) was submitted via only email and Iax is Iound at page 105 and 106,
wherein an electronic signature only is revealed (as opposed to those instances where
Coughlin also served something on the SBN by personally delivering it to the SBN, wherein
Coughlin consistently aIIixed a manual, handwritten signature thereto).
Further, the ROA reveals a curious practice throughout wherein the SBN sometimes
includes a USPS certiIied mailing slip with tracking number (which was not depicted on the
original version oI such Iilings but later added thereto), and other times does not. For all the
instances where the SBN did not so aIIix USPS certiIied mailing and return receipt requested
prooI, slips, or USPS Track & ConIrim printouts, such should then be taken as an admission
by the SBN oI the insuIIiciency oI the service described in the CertiIicate oI Mailing or some
other problem related thereto. For those instances, especially that Iound on page 216 oI the
ROA, where the SBN places an outdated, and misleading USPS Track & ConIirm into the
record, sanctions should issue, and a mistrial declared as well.
Perhaps the most salient discrepancy between the Iirst ROA Iiled by the SBN on
12/24/12 and the second on 2/13/13 is the way the SBN just slipped page 216 oI the ROA in
there, but at least did not attempt to characterize such page (which is a bordering on
Iraudulent attempt by the SBN to disguise the controversy over the SBN's Iailing to own up to
its error in placing insuIIicient postage on the one mailing oI the 10/9/12 Notice oI Intent to
Take DeIault (which the SBN's Clerk oI Court held out as being amongst the documents it is
required to serve upon the Respondent prior to any deIault being taken, with Peters holding
herselI out as authorized to make such pronouncement and application). The thing is that
such USPS Track & ConIirm Ior the 10/9/12 NOITTD is placed not on such 10/9/12 Iiling,
but rather, immediately aIter Coughlin's 11/8/12 Supplemental DoWSoe, and immediately
before Coughlin's Well Would You Look At That, Notice oI Non-Service oI Notice oI Intent
to Take DeIault. So, Obviously, the SBN and or Clerk oI Court Peters were motivated to
counter the assertions Coughlin made in that 11/8/12 Notice oI Non-Service oI 10/9/12
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NOITTD...however, not motivated enough to actually place a current USPS Track and
ConIirm Ior that mailing (via checking the online inIormation Ior the tracking number
assigned thereto...well, actually, the SBN placed what may be a then current USPS Track &
ConIirm there, its just that the SBN covered up the portion oI such that would reveal the item
was returned to the SBN (in light oI the SBN placing insuIIicient postage therein, as Coughlin
personally eye-witnessed long-time USPS Downtown Station counter clerk Tim notate in his
own handwriting upon Coughlin presenting to claim such certiIied mailing, only to have the
USPS reIuse to release it to Coughlin in light oI the insuIIicient postage placed thereon. How
completely dishonest is it Ior the SBN to not only insert such page 216 into the 12/24/12 ROA
(despite it not being attached to any Iiling (and the Alphabetical Index oI Documents Ior that
12/24/12 ROA does not include any entry within which ROA page 216 would be
included...however, the subsequent 2/13/13 ROA, hysterically, actually attempts to shoehorn
the SBN's misleading USPS Track & ConIrim at ROA page 216 into one of Coughlins own
filings, as noted in that Alphabetical Index characterizing Coughlin's 11/8/12 Supplemental as
extending Irom ROA page 205-216) , but to then take the arguments in Coughlin's late
January 2013 Iilings (many oI which were not Iiled in 62337 due to the ROA being stricken
by the 2/7/13 Order (however, the SBN certainly beneIited Irom an advance preview oI the
arguments Coughlin was craIting in his various motions and Opening BrieI...though its
awIully unclear how shoving its own dubious inclusion on Page 216 into one oI Coughlin's
own Iilings in the 2/13/13 Alphabetical Index does much to change the Iact that SBN is
obviously attempting to cover up the mistrial required incident to its own Iailure to own up to
the insuIIiciency oI postage it placed on such a material Iiling (the NOITTD), and the
concomitant Iailure to stipulate to a continuance or otherwise own up to its mistake)...
Further, the SBN Iails to explain why in the Iirst ROA oI 12/24/12 there is some
(the 2/13/13 ROA has between pages 353-714 the Motion Ior New trial or Formal
Disciplinary Hearing Iiling oI 11/30/12, whereas the 12/24/12 version oI that Iiling extends
only Irom bates stamped pages 353-540 Ior the Iile stamped 11/30/12 entry in that
Alphabetical Index notated as Motion Ior New trial oI Formal Disciplinary Hearing and
Notice oI Hill and Baker's MalIeasance... a diIIerence oI some 174 pages missing in the Iirst
ROA's version oI that Iiling...).
Also, while the 2/13/13 version oI the ROA indicates that Irom pages 797-1347 is
Coughlin's Motion Ior Mistrial (Notice that 10/9/12 AIIidavit oI Laura Peters is Whopper
Chocked, etc. (again, Ior some totally unexplained reason the SBN merely indicates such
Iiling was 'Not Filed in the entry Ior such in the Alphabetical Index, despite such Iiling
being properly submitted Ior Iiling on 12/3/12). So, so, the 2/13/13 ROA's version oI that
Iiling totals 550 pages, while the 12/24/12 version extends Irom 613-1068, thereIore totalling
only 455 pages...the SBN Iails to explain at all where Irom or why there is now an additionaly
95 pages associated with such Iiling. Beyond all oI that, the multitude oI Coughlin's Iiling
have been rendered illegible due to the SBN's Iraudulent Iiddling with the scanner and copier
settings. NRAP 11 requires the output oI such to be equal to that oI a laser printer, which
requires at least 300 dpi, and clearly, the SBN has gone beyond just scanning Coughlin's
Iilings in at the lowest setting possible (75dpi), but rather has taken to adjusting the
resolution, sharpness, contrast, shrinking and also settings available to those whom wish to
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obscure the record to achieve an impermissible advantage. Beyond this, King has sought to
obviate the due process problems (lack oI notice, insuIIiciency oI service oI process, and oI
the process itselI...see 60302) associated with his attaching to his 8/23/12 Complaint Orders
wherein portions thereoI are entirely illegible.
Also missing Irom both versions oI the ROA Iiled by the OBC is Couglhin's 11/9/12
'AFFIDAVIT OF ZACH COUGHLIN AND SUPPLMENTAL TO DESIGNATION
OFWITNESS AND SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE; MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF PANEL
CHAIR ECHEVERRIA; and EMERGENCY EX PARTE MOTION TO DISMISS THE
11/14/12 HEARING OR OTHERWISE RECOGNIZE THE LACK OF JURISDICTION TO
HOLD IT GIVEN THE NUMEROUS VIOLATIONS OF SCR 105 BY THE PANEL AND
THE SBN (6 pages with Exhibit 1 attached as disc).
Further, the second version oI the ROA continues on with the extremely suspect
practice oI eliminating the Index Irom the Iormal hearing transcript that should Iollow page
1698. Additionally, page 1699 is an entirely illegible 'Index oI Documents page to the
suspect collection oI documents King collected and had admitted into evidence in his Exhibit
1. King violated Sierra Glass where he Iailed to indicate to the Panel that the excerpts oI the
various RPC's he presented in the Iirst pages therein are not complete, though the inclusion oI
RPC 1.2 Scope and Allocation oI Authority Betwen Attorney and Client does nicely evince
the slapdash manner in which King carries out his prosecutions given such rule was never
reIerenced anywhere in the matter (including within the 8/23/12 Complaint or any Orders
even tangentially reIernced therein) other than in Coughlin's various correspondence sto the
SBN complaining about his various public deIenders and RMC provided deIense counsel
reIusing to advocated on his behalI in any useIul way.
Further, Ior some reason, the Alphabetical Index oI Documents included in both
versions oI the ROA by the SBN (which, again, contains items that are not bates stamped (the
extremely suspect and misleading Case Summary and Record on Appeal, and said
Alphabetical Index...and its telling there is not such 'Pleadings Docket even though the
FOFCOL continuously cites to one, especially given the SBN's Iailure to Iile a timely
opposition to Coughlin's 9/17/12 Motion to Dismiss (and in the ROA the 9 page Iax Coughlin
sent to the SBN and NNDB on 9/12/12 is missing, despite being attached to that Motion as
Exhibit 1). Further, it seems particularly dubious Ior the SBN (which Iailed to actually certiIy
the ROA as required by NRAP 10) to include only an Alphabetical Index. How useIul is
that? The lack oI any chronological index or 'Pleadings Docket is an attempt by the OBC to
obscure various procedural deIiciencies that resulted in this proceeding being one that would
not meet the bar set out by SCR 114(c), etc. Beyond the Iailure oI the SBN to timely Oppose
Coughlin's 9/17/12 Motion to Dismiss, (the Alphabetical Index notates the OBC's Opposition
thereto as Iiled on 10/21/12, despite the actual Iile stamp thereon indicating 10/24/12, which
is even more curious given King's signature therein is dated 10/25/12), a chronological index
or pleadings dockets would reveal the overly quick rulings by Chair Echeverria and the
completely laissez Iaire approach taken by 'Chairman Susich, whom clearly does not take
his obligation seriously at all (see his 7/27/12 letter to Coughlin, the Iact that this whole
proceeding must be vacated given the entirely prejudicial nature oI the Panel Chair making a
void Ior lack oI jurisdiction ruling (such is only properly beIore the NNDB Board Chair, not
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the Panel Chair, under SCR 110, presumably so one person could consistently rule on such
important matters and, hopeIully, have some Iund oI knowledge or training to bring to bare
thereon, rather than the slapdash co-signing oI the OBC's contradictory non-sense evince in
the Panel Chair's rulings herein (11/7/12 Order agrees with Bar Counsel in quashing
Coughlin's subpoenas on judges, Bar Counsel, and the SBN Clerk oI Court, and others, only
to then allow King to ask questions oI those judges about their mental processes (the exact
basis Ior King's Motion to Quash), and allow king to testiIy at the hearing (apparently SCR
106 immunity extends to characterizing an 'action in the broades sense imaginable...which
leads to the question oI how deIending one's selI at all in these proceedings is not such an
'action, where the 11/7/12 Panel Chair Order considers subpoening bar counsel an 'action,
suIIicient to invoke SCR 106 immunity...but that really does not explain why the Clerk oI
Court could not be subpoened, especially where she knowingly signed a waiver oI service
thereoI). Additionally, a chronological pleadings docket would demonstrate the lack oI 'time
Ior a regular motion cycle, attendant to the Motions to Quash brought by King on 11/2/12
(and given the OBC's continual reIusing to copy Couglin on such Iilings by Iax and or email,
combined with the curious exclusion oI any USPS certiIicate oI certiIied mailing or tracking
number suIIicient to conduct a USPS Track & ConIirm-the OBC omits those where it Iailed
to place such a mailing in the outgoing mail box prior to the last pickup oI that day, typically
on a Friday, meaning that the 11/2/12 Motions to Quash did not even get picked up by the
USPS Ior mailing until Monday, and where only delivered to Coughlin on November 6
th
,
2012, the day prior to the Panel Chair ruling to quash such subpoenas (despite not having
jurisdiction to do so under SCR 110(4). To claim that any Iailure on Coughlin's part, pursuant
to Lau to preserve some objection thereto or arguments Ior appeal is untenable, especially
where Coughlin was shortly to be subject to the sudden, injection oI NVB Judge Beesley and
WLS's Elcano as 'surprise, non-impeachment witnesses that King had known about Ior over
six months, and where nothing new existed to justiIy such a late disclosure thereoI by King,
and where King oIIered no argument, even, to claim such a justiIication or excuse under SCR
105(2)(c)'s 'W itnesses or evidence, other than for impeachment , which became known to
bar counsel thereafter, and which bar counsel intends to use at the hearing, shall be
promptly disclosed to the attorney. For good cause shown, the chair may allow additional
time, not to exceed 90 days, to conduct the hearing. Coughlin put together a Iiling (again
Coughlin's VeriIied Response Irom 11/9/12, an 88 page Iiling with voluminous attached
Exhibits is completely missing Irom the ROA, indicating it was not provided to the Panel, and
the OBC/SBN has oIIered no justiIication Ior Iailing to so included such Iiling), showing just
such good cause Ior just such 'additional time to conduct the hearing (its not Coughlin's Iault
King leaves everything until the eleventh hour in a cheater's attempt to jam through his
ambush scenarios)in his 11/13/12 Emergency Ex Part Motion Showing Good Cause Ior such
(and the ROA is missing another one oI Coughlin's Iiling oI 11/13/12, Ior no good reason).
Additionally, the SBN essentially admits a basis Ior declaring a mistrail in this matter
where King stupidly not only moved Ior a TPO and EPO in RJC Rev2012-00607 based upon
a damn email allegedly sent airectea to Coughlins public aefenaers patent misconauct, but
then compound that error (which resulted in the Reno Police Department coming out to
Coughlin's home and, without so much as announcing there presence, walking up on
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Coughlin with loaded guns drawn and pointing them at Coughlin's head Irom Iour Ieet away,
arresting Couglin on 2/8/12 and charging him with a gross misdemeanor violation (wherein
an allegation oI Coughlin having a courier deliver to the SBN a 1/3/13 tolling motion on the
ninth or tenth judicial day Irom the 12/14/12 FOFCOL allegedly being constructively served
upon Coughlin), as well as a Ielony EPO violation (wherein an allegation oI Couglhin Iax
Iiling an amended or supplemental Iiling in connection with his alleged 1/13/13 Iiling was
made, despite the SBN having admitted Coughlin was permitted to Iax Iile and having never
revoked such, and where the SBN Iailed to post the jurisdictional bond required Ior such a
workplace protection oraer from harassment, and where a litigant whose Fourteenth
Amendment property right necessarily has a right to communicate with opposing counsel by
such means, including under the First Amendment. Obviously, iI the SBN's King is so aIraid
oI Coughlin, he ought disqualiIy or recuse himselI Irom the appeal herein and let an actual
proIessional continue in his stead. Certainly Couglin could Iollow King's approach and seek
to have King charged with sexual assault Irom walking up to Couglhin while he was using a
urinal during the 11/14/ Iormal hearing, and with both men stationed at adjoining urinals, their
penises in their hands where engaged in the act oI urinating, King exlcaimed to Couglin
'pretty good grub, huh, Zach?. Whether King was reIerring to the urine, his or Coughlin's
penis, or the tepid sandwich and deli tray arrangement he arranged to be provided as a lunch
to the Respondent, Panel, and 'our good security is not entirely clear, though the
inappropriate nature oI any one such subjects Ior such commentary, all things considered, is
(in a godawIul display oI grandstanding and poor judgment, King arranged to have one oI the
grievant's (Judge Linda Gardner's in NG12-0435) own courtroom bailiII 'work the 11/14/12
Iormal disciplinary hearing as 'security. Another subsequent contact between that BailiII,
WCSO Deputy Kirkham and Couglin occurred on 1/24/13 as detaile din the attached written
correspondence oI that date between Coughlin and DAS OIIicer Brown.
SCR 105(2)(c)'s jurisdictional requirements that the Respondent be provided 'at least
30 days prior to the hearing a 'summary prepared by bar counsel oI the evidence against the
attorney, and the names oI the witnesses bar counsel intends to call Ior other than
impeachment, together with a brieI statement oI the Iacts to which each will testiIy:
'2.Commencement of formal proceedings.Formal disciplinary proceedings are
commenced by bar counsel Iiling a written complaint in the name oI the state bar. The
complaint shall be sufficiently clear and specific to inform the attorney of the charges
against him or her and the underlying conduct supporting the charges . A copy oI the
complaint shall be served on the attorney and it shall direct that a veriIied response or answer
be served on bar counsel within 20 days oI service; the original shall be Iiled with bar
counsel`s oIIice. The time to respond may be extended once by the chair Ior not more than 20
days Ior good cause or upon stipulation oI the parties. In the event the attorney Iails to plead,
the charges shall be deemed admitted; provided, however, that an attorney who Iails to
respond within the time provided may thereaIter obtain permission oI the appropriate
disciplinary board chair to do so, iI Iailure to Iile is attributable to mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect...
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(c)Time to conduct hearing; notice of hearing; discovery of evidence against
attorney.The hearing panel shall conduct a hearing within 45 days of assignment and
give the attorney at least 30 days` written notice oI its time and place. The notice shall be
served in the same manner as the complaint, and shall inIorm the attorney that he or she is
entitled to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence.
The notice shall be accompanied by a summary prepared by bar counsel oI the evidence
against the attorney, and the names oI the witnesses bar counsel intends to call Ior other than
impeachment, together with a brieI statement oI the Iacts to which each will testiIy, all oI
which may be inspected up to 3 days prior to the hearing. W itnesses or evidence, other than
for impeachment, which became known to bar counsel thereafter, and which bar
counsel intends to use at the hearing, shall be promptly disclosed to the attorney. For
good cause shown, the chair may allow additional time, not to exceed 90 days, to conduct the
hearing.
The Hearing Panel and NNDB, whilst claiming to be so darn hamstrung by this Court's
dictate that such Iormal hearing was 'Ior the sole purpose oI determining the nature and
extent oI the punishment oI A-Z (with that last part enlarging the subject matter jurisdiction
the panel and eliminating the burden on bar counsel to oppose Coughlin's well laid out subject
matter jursidiction arguments (in addition to Coughlni beating the Lau bar that beIalled
Mirch where it became rather obvious early on that Mirch was the blueprint upon while
King was building his 'ambush, to borrow the Respondent's characterization oI King's
approach in Boles) did not manage to take such a rigid procedural approach when it came to
holding the hearing 'within 45 days oI assignment. Rather, King and the Panel Iound it
preIerable to kill Coughlin's law practice and sources oI income Ior over 5 months by the time
the 11/14/12 Iormal hearing was held, disparage him publicly with a 'conIidential SCR 117
Petition, and violate SCR 121's conIidentiality requirements in communicating conIidential
inIormation to one oI Coughlin's client's, Peter Eastman (whom, incidentally, managed to rob
and batter Coughlin, contributed to a wrongIul eviction, and breaking and entering, damaging
Coughlin's law practice, resulting in theIt, and contributing to Coughlin's diIIiculties in Iiling
another (he Iiled a preemptive Opposition to attorney's Iees in CV11-03628 on 1/14/12)
Opposition or Supplemental to Opposition to Hill's associate's 4/19/12 post-judgment Motion
Ior Attorney's Fees Sanctions) where the RJC in Coughlin v. Nichols (and Nichols repeatedly
committed perjury, in a Ilagrant Iashion on the stand therein) continued on with its
sledgehammer eviction tribunal approach with Coughlin).
The assignment to the Hearing Panel, which the Panel Chair consistently reIerred to in
citing to this Court's Order oI 6/7/12 (though Echeverria continually sought to apply some
SCR 111(5) 'conclusive prooI/ 'sole purpose oI determining the nature and extent oI the
punishment/anti-Claiborne/anti-SCR 114 approach to all oI the allegations in the complaint,
whilst also dubiously confusing the 11/30/11 OPSC Ior 'criminal contempt (same can be
said Ior the 2/28/12 Order as such cites to civil contempts statutes only in 26800, on top oI
such 2/28/12 OFDCIS not being attached to the 8/23 Complaint (and thereby insuIIicinetly
noticed under Laub and SchaeIIer and Mirch), while walking a think line between allowing
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Judge Nash to transmogrify a 'simple traIIic citation trial into some 'summary Iormal
disciplinary hearing suIIicient to somehow provide Ior a SCR 111(5) 'conclusive prooI oI
Coughlin's alleged violations oI the scattershot, carpet-bombed RPC Palooza applied by Judge
Nash Holmes therein (wherein she contradicts her Order as rendered on 3/12/12 in 26800
(reversible error to reIuse to allow Coughlin to enter such into evidence) wherein her 'ruling
assigns burdens oI prooI utilizing a 'probably standard and a 'there certainly seems to be a
question oI or 'issue whether he violated that one too quasi-standards as to the burden oI
prooI founa satisIied therein.
King's own dubiously placed 'Case Summary for Record on Appeal (the second
version, dated but not Iile stamped 2/12/13) itselI implicitly admits the extent to which the
SBN and Panel completely Iailed to Iind any specific instances oI misconduct or violations oI
any speciIic RPC on Coughlin's part:
'1. Summary of Nature of the Case. Zachary B. Coughlin ("Respondent") was
temporarily suspended Irom the practice oI law in the State oI Nevada on June 7, 2012,
pursuant to an SCR 111 petition Iiled by the OIIice oI Bar Counsel. The Formal Disciplinary
Hearing in that matter was consolidated with three separate grievances concerning his
sanctioned conduct before Reno Municipal, 1ustice and District Court 1udges.
Number oI Grievances included in Case. Three (3) Grievances.
2. The Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC). Alleged in Complaint. The State Bar alleged
violation oI RPC 1.1 (Competence), RPC 1.3 (Diligence), RPC 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and
Contentions), RPC 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal), RPC 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party
and Counsel), RPC 3. 5 (Impatiality and Decorum oI the Tribunal), RPC 4.1 (TruthIulness in
Statements to Others), RPC 4.4 (Respect Ior the Rights oI Third Persons), RPC 5A (Relations
with Opposing Counsel), RPC 8.1 (Disciplinary Matters), RPC 8.2 (Judicial and Legal
OIIicials) and RPC 8.4 (Misconduct).
The Nature of the Rules Violations. 1he Panel heard witness testimony that
supported Respondents' various individual acts of misconduct. The Panel made findings
that the Respondent continues to engage in a pattern of conduct that is consistent and
includes, without limitation, the disruption of court proceedings, the refusal to heed the
directions and admonitions of the court, the injection of irrelevant material and matters,
the filing of lengthy, irrelevant and nonsensical pleadings, the willingness to lie to court
and counsel and the inability to understand and follow the rules of evidence and
procedure.
Summary of the Recommended Discipline. The Panel recommends as Iollows:
Respondent be irrevocably disbarred by the Supreme Court; Respondent's temporary
suspension be continued pending Iinal resolution oI this matter; Within three (3) days oI the
eIIective date oI disbarment, to demonstrate to Bar Counsel that he has placed all his Nevada
clients with other counsel; and Respondent pay the costs associated with these proceedings
pursuant to SCR 120. DATED this 12th day oI February, 2013. by /s/ Patrick O. King,
Assistant Bar Counsel.
One, it is pathologically dishonest Ior King to asser that: ' 1he Panel heard witness
testimony that supported Respondents' various individual acts of misconduct". That is
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simply not true. Rather, the OBC put on and the Panel assisted in a slapdash mishmash oI and
SCR 117 style 'competency inquiry (Coughlin was not noticed that the 11/14/12 hearing
would be a de Iacto hearing on the 60975 Petition, and the Panel wasted most oI the scant
time Coughlin was permitted to put on his case in chieI (and Coughlin was reIused the right to
cross-examined a key witness...himselI...and Coughlin's direct examination oI himselI was
hijacked by Echeverria (with his insipid and dishonest repeated assertions that this Court's
6/7/12 Order, which, reads, in relevant part:
'Pursuant to SCR 111 temporary suspension and reIerral to the appropriate
disciplinary board are mandatory when an attorney has been convicted oI a
"serious" crime, which includes theIt. SCR 111(6)-(8). Accordingly, pursuant to
SCR 111(8), we refer this matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for thej
institution of a formal hearing before a hearing panel in which the sole issue to
be determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed. Furthermore,
pursuant to SCR 111(7), we hereby temporarily suspend attorney Zachary B.
Coughlin Irom the practice oI law in Nevada, pending Iinal disposition oI the
disciplinary proceedings.
Both the 6/7/12 Order and the applicable rule (SCR 111(8)) make explicitly clear that
this Court's Order 'reIer(ed) this matter (ie, not the kitchen sink style SCR 105
Complaint King crafted to appease a few select members of the judicary, most all of
whom were in their first 18 months on the bench when any issues with Coughlin arose).
Further, it it the Board in whom the 'institution oI a Iormal hearing beIore a hearing panel
is vested with, not Bar Counsel. II Bar Counsel wished to Iile a SCR 105, or 102 Complaint
or Petition against Coughlin it was Iree to do so, but not as some sort oI combo
'consolidated package wherein King was permitted to take advantage oI Coughlin's
indigency incident to a dispute, though, regardless de minimis 'theIt conviction resulting in a
temporary suspension, which, along with the Board and Panel dragging its Ieet (with help
Irom the SBN, which is what happened to some who passed the 2001 July Nevada bar
examination and where still around Ior a ninth Supplemental report to or oI the Board oI Bar
Examiners (the point being, many oI those in, associated with, or connected to the SBN seem
to view rules as things that don't apply much to them or what they are doing, and rather, apply
them selectively to applicants and other attorney's much like a desert Iield mouse might ration
out water or morsels, or whatever, to its crony mice Iriends). Indeed, Echeverria never did get
around to applying the whole 'the sole issue to be determined part oI SCR 111(8) and this
Court's 6/7/12 Order, which Echeverria continually claimed to be so hamstrung by and having
such high Iidelity to...to the the scattershot, carpet bombed allegations made by King in an
unsworn, unveriIied SCR 105 Complaint brought upon some supposed written grievance Irom
Hill (purportedly in an unsigned, unsworn email to King Irom Hill shortly beIore the case
they worked on together, Milsner v. Carstarphen, saw a written opinion thereon released.
Further, the OBC, NNDB, and Panel Iailed to comply with yet another rule where no hearing
was held within 45 days oI 'assignment: '(c)Time to conduct hearing; notice oI hearing;
discovery oI evidence against attorney.The hearing panel shall conduct a hearing within 45
days oI assignment and give the attorney at least 30 days` written notice oI its time and
place.
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This Court's 6/7/12 Order in 60838, upon which the OBC's King and Panel Chair
Echeverria proIessed such undying conIormity to, actually reads, in relevant part:
'ORDER OF TEMPORARY SUSPENSION REFERRAL
TO DISCIPLINARY BOARD
Bar counsel Ior the State Bar oI Nevada has filed a
petition pursuant SCR 111 seeking an order Irom this court
temporarily suspending attorney Zachary B. Coughlin, Bar
Number 9473, Irom the practice oI law and referring him for
disciplinary proceedings. The petition alleges that on
September 9, 2011, Coughlin shopliIted a candy bar and cough
drops Irom a Wal-Mart store. It is supported by documentation
indicating that on November 30, 2011, in the l\lunicip(il Court
oI the City oI Reno, Coughlin was Iound guilty, Iollowing a
bench trial, oI one count oI petit larceny/theIt in violation oI
Reno Municipal Code 8.10.040. He was ordered to pay $400 in
Iines and Iees. Coughlin appealed his conviction to the Second
Judicial District Court, and on March 15, 2012, the judgment
was aIIirmed. Fn1 (In1: The petition does not indicate whether
Coughlin inIormed bar counsel oI the conviction as required by
SCR 111(2).)
Pursuant to SCR 111, temporary suspension and reIerral
to the appropriate disciplinary board are mandatory when an
attorney has been convicted oI a "serious" crime, which
includes theIt. SCR 111(6)-(8). Accordingly, pursuant to SCR
111(8), we reIer this matter to the appropriate disciplinary
board Ior the institution oI a Iormal hearing beIore a hearing
panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the
extent oI the discipline to be imposed. Furthermore, pursuant to
SCR 111(7), we hereby temporarily suspend attorney Zachary
B. Coughlin Irom the practice oI law in Nevada, pending Iinal
disposition oI the disciplinary proceedings. It is so ORDERED.
In2 (In2: This order constitutes our Iinal disposition oI this
matter. Should there be any Iurther proceedings regarding
Coughlin, they shall be docketed as a new matter.The petition
does not indicate whether Coughlin inIormed bar counsel oI the
conviction as required by SCR 111(2).
What the above Order does not say is 'King's Petition complied with SCR 111(4) and
SCR 104(d), and SCR 111(7)It is instructive to really read and take a good hard look at Bar
Counsel 5/10/12 Iiled SCR 111 Petition in 60838, which reads:
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'PETITION OF BAR COUNSEL FOR
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE
OF LAW PURSUANT TO SCR 111
In accordance with the requirements set Iorth in
Supreme Court Rule ("SCR") 111(4), the State Bar oI Nevada,
by and through its Bar Counsel, David A. Clark, hereby notiIies
the Supreme Court oI the conviction oI attorney ZACHARY B.
COUGHLIN Nevada Bar No. 9473, aIter a trial and an appeal
on a charge oI larceny (theIt.) STATEMENT OF FACTS Mr.
Coughlin is a member oI the State Bar oI Nevada. His Bar
Number is 9473. Mr. Coughlin was admitted to the Bar on
March 25, 2005. His date oI birth is September 27, 1976, and
he is 36 years old. Mr. Coughlin was recently convicted oI a
crime involving theIt. On November 30, 2011, Mr. Coughlin
was Iound guilty, aIter a trial, oI the oIIense oI Petit Larceny, a
violation oI RMC 8.10.040, in Municipal Court Ior the City oI
Reno. See Exhibit 1. On September 9, 2011, Mr. Coughlin had
shopliIted a candy bar and cough drops Irom a Wal-Mart store
with a value oI approximately Iourteen dollars ($14.00). Mr.
Coughlin appealed the judgment oI conviction. The judgment
oI conviction was aIIirmed on appeal. See Exhibit 2. As
evidenced by the documentation submitted herein, Respondent
has been convicted oI a crime which triggered the reporting
requirements oI Bar Counsel under SCR 111(4). In addition,
111(7) and)(8), state that upon receipt oI a petition
demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted oI a serious
crime, the Court shall enter an order suspending the attorney,
pending the Iinal disposition oI a disciplinary proceeding, in
which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent oI the
discipline to be imposed.
As evidenced by the documentation submitted herein,
Mr. Coughlin has been convicted oI a misdemeanor crime
under the Nevada Revised Statutes. However, that conviction
was Ior "theft." The Iollowing language, as set Iorth in SCR
111(6), dictates that Respondent's crime constitutes a serious
crime:
DeIinition oI "serious crime." The term "serious crime"
means (1) a Ielony and (2) any crime less than a Ielony a
necessary element oI which is, as determined by the statutory or
common-law deIinition oI the crime, improper conduct as an
attorney, interIerence with the administration oI justice, Ialse
swearing, misrepresentation, Iraud, willIul Iailure to Iile an
income tax return, deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation,
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theft, or an attempt or a conspiracy or solicitation oI another to
commit a "serious crime." |Emphasis added.|
CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, Bar Counsel
respectfully brings this matter to the Court's attention and
requests that the Court enter an Order temporarily
suspending Respondent Irom the practice oI law and referring
this matter to the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board for
further disciplinary proceedings, in accordance with SCR
111(7) and (8).
Thats the thing, though. Where Bar Counsel essentially made his bid to consolidate
the reIerral by this Court in 60838 with a bunch oI other suspect grievances (all roads oI
which, lead back to NNDB member Richard G. Hill, Esq., in one way or another)
'commenced by Bar Counsel by way oI an SCR 105 Complaint (rather Iollow this Court's
6/7/12 Order and SCR 111(8) where both 'refer the matter to the appropriate disciplinary
board for the institution of a formal hearing before a hearing panel in which the sole issue
to be determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed"), this Court's 6/7/12
Order and its wholesale Iidelity to SCR 111(8) provided Ior something less than that sought
by King's overreaching. As such, that 6/7/12 Order makes res judicata (or is it collateral
estoppel) the determination presented thereby as to whether King was allowed to
'consolidate that required by the 6/7/12 Order in 60838 and the kitchen sink he dumped into
Iive pages oI piIIle, codswallop, and gibberish comprising his 8/23/12 Complaint. Where
King's 5/10/12 Petition 'requests that the Court enter an Order temporarily suspending
Respondent Irom the practice oI law and referring this matter to the Northern Nevada
Disciplinary Board for further disciplinary proceedings, in accordance with SCR 111(7)
and (8), this Court's 6/7/12 Order, explicitly, said 'no: 'Bar counsel Ior the State Bar oI
Nevada has filed a petition pursuant SCR 111 seeking an order from this court
temporarily suspending ...Coughlin...and referring him for disciplinary proceedings ...SCR
111(6)-(8). Accordingly, pursuant to SCR 111(8), we reIer this matter to the appropriate
disciplinary board Ior the institution of a formal hearing beIore a hearing panel in which the
sole issue to be determined shall be the extent oI the discipline to be imposed. Furthermore,
pursuant to SCR 111(7), we hereby temporarily suspend attorney Zachary B. Coughlin Irom
the practice oI law in Nevada, pending final disposition of the disciplinary proceedings .
So, King's 5/10/12 Petition in 60838 sought an interpretation oI SCR 111(7) and (8) that
would allow King to turn SCR 111(7)'s 'disciplinary proceeding (singular) into
'disciplinary proceedings (plural) While, I guess, Chair Echeverria deserves a little credit
(not really) Ior trying to stretch the 'sole issue to be determined shall be the extent oI the
discipline to be imposed across a SCR 111(5) 'conclusive prooI canvas drawn over all the
diIIerent machinations Iorming King's 8/23/12 Complaint, the little matter of this Court's
6/7/12 Order in 60838 limiting such reIerral to 'this matter" (and, any good bar counsel will
tell you, in trying to justiIy a Complaint as thin and ready as King's here, that 'Nevada is a
notice-pleading state, and under no sane interpretation oI such doctrine could 'this matter
in 60838, upon a review oI the 5/10/12 Petition therein (and, heck, even adding the 6/7/12
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Order's expanse thereto) be interpretea to include all the various unsworn, unsupported,
devoid oI any actual speciIics, charlatan claptrap oIIered by King in his 8/23/12 Complaint.
ROA 1-24). Oh, also, there is the mandatory authority presented by SCR 111(8). Speaking
oI, the last sentence in this Court's 6/7/12 Order in 60838, perhaps, may allow Ior an
interpretation that Coughlin's temporary suspension shall last 'pending Iinal disposition oI the
disciplinary proceedings. (plural). However, such use oI the plural in this Court's Order is
arguably a scrivenor's error, and iI not, it goes against the mandatory authority presented by
SCR 111(7) itselI (which this Court holds out to Coughlin and those like him as the Rules oI
Court upon which he is entitled to rely and noticed thereon) where such subsection oI SCR
111, in Iact, does not utilize the plural, but rather, is conIined to the singular 'proceeding.
Even iI this Court, (which, oI course, may have 'the inherent authority to depart Irom its
own rules, where justice so requires) did intend Ior such temporary suspension to continue
'pending Iinal disposition oI the disciplinary proceedings, meaning, throughout the
biIurcated, separate, distinct, not consolidated 'Iormal hearing that SCR 111(8) requires
(wherein 'the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent oI the discipline to be imposed
in connection with the reIerral oI 'the matter to the NNDB), that does not allow Ior the
consolidating that bar counsel and the Panel have tried to cook up here, period. And, given
the excessive length oI the 'temporary suspension Ilowing Irom 60838 (there has been no
SCR 102 Petition suIIicient to justiIying what has now become a nine and a halI month
suspension Ior the 'petty larceny (really, even iI what Coughlin still disputes was actually
true, consuming such while shopping and paying Ior $83.82 worth oI other items hardly
qualiIies as 'carrying away...destruction oI property, perhaps, but not 'carrying away, and
Iurther, larceny or any sort oI theIt crime has always been a 'speciIic intent crime, and
nothing in the 11/30/11 JCCO attached to the Complaint (which is, again, not a certified
copy, the purported 'certiIication is not dated, and its made by a Deputy Clerk oI Court
Donna Ballard whom obviously does not understand that the language on the 'certiIication
she is applying to documents like the copies oI documents the RMC receives Irom the 2JDC,
necessarily are not be 'the original in the records oI the Reno Municipal Court...and that the
Clerk oI Court is the custodian oI the original record and that I am authorized to make the
certiIication (ROA 11), especially where the CertiIicate oI Mailing thereto (ROA 14) does
not indicate that the 2JDC sent a copy thereoI (much less the original) to the RMC. It is
telling that this Court's 6/7/12 Order in 60838 (page 1, line 20) using language that departs
Irom that in one oI this Court's typical SCR 111(6) temporary suspension orders where it
indicates that the Petition 'is supported by documentation indicating that on November 30,
2011, in the Municipal Court oI the City oI Reno, Coughlin was Iound guilty, Iollowing a
bench trial, oI one count oI petit larceny/theft in violation oI Reno Municipal Code
8.10.040. Therein, this Court appears to admit that the 'certified copy attached to both the
5/10/12 Petition in 60838 and again to the Complaint in 'this matter (ROA 9; and as to
notice-pleading issues, the civil summary contempt convictions misleadlingly characterized as
'criminal contempt conviction in both the Complaint and FOFCOL (iI they are criminal
convictions, then where is the SCR 111 Petition Ior each? And any such 'criminal contempt
conviction, as detailed in either contempt orders that the Panel dishonestly attempts to pass
oII a 'criminal convictions, hardly support a SCR 111(6) Petition, regardless) is not a
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'certified copy at all (and certainly not suIIicient to satisIy the requirement Ior such in
SCR 111(4) and SCR 104(d), and SCR 111(7) (the SCR section on Misconduct contains a
multitude oI instances where a 'certiIied copy is required, Ior good reason, and where the
RMC Iailed to even attach or create a CertiIicate oI Mailing or ProoI oI Service Ior either oI
the 'convictions attached to the Complaint (ROA 10 (some unnamed initialing and
handwritten 'reIused in the blank Ior the signature oI a deIendant Iollowing 'I understand
and promise to obey this order. DeIendant hardly suIIices as a prooI oI service or certiIicate
oI mailing (and even should one make the argument that, in criminal matters, the rendition
standard does not require such, is certainly does where such 'judgment oI Conviction and
Court Order (ROA 8-10) has been 'modiIied outside the presence oI the opposing counsel
(ROA 8, community service requirement excised upon Judge Howard aamitting that he was
mistaken in his original belieI that Coughlin caused the continuance oI the 11/14/12 original
trial date (where such mistaken Iormed the basis, in large part, Ior Judge Howard making his
contempt Iinding ten minutes into the trial on 11/30/11, arguably requiring a mistrial, or
something more substantial than crossing out some community service requirement), made in
absentia, and thereIore then requires a Notice oI Entry (which would require a CertiIicate oI
Mailing) and 17 (while ROA 10 at least has some vauge initialing and notation oI 'reIused,
apparently by some RMC employee, next to a 'promise to obey, apparently oIIered in
satisIaction oI an actual CertiIicate oI Mailing, ROA 17 and the 11/30/11 OPSC Iails to
contain even that, indicating that such order was not rendered, and thereaIter, was never even
mailed to Coughlin or provided to him in any way (as Iurther revealed upon a review oI the
ROA in 22176 in the appeal in CR11-2064, which Coughlin attached in Exhibits to his
various Iilings, and which was included in the discs attached to Exhibits 14 and 15 at the
Hearing, but which the SBN has Iailed to transmit in the ROA.)
SCR 111(7).Suspension on certiIication.Upon the Iiling with the supreme court
oI a petition with a certiIied copy oI prooI oI the conviction, demonstrating that an
attorney has been convicted oI a serious crime, the court shall enter an order
suspending the attorney, regardless oI the pendency oI an appeal, pending Iinal
disposition oI a disciplinary proceeding, which shall be commenced by the
appropriate disciplinary board upon referral by the supreme court. For good
cause, the court may set aside its order suspending the attorney Irom the practice oI
law.
8.ReIerral to disciplinary board.Upon receipt oI a petition Iiled under
subsection 4 oI this rule, demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted oI a
serious crime, the supreme court shall, in addition to suspending the attorney in
accordance with the provisions oI subsection 7 oI this rule, refer the matter to the
appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hearing beIore a
hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent oI the
discipline to be imposed. The panel may, Ior good cause, postpone the proceeding
until all appeals Irom the conviction have been concluded.
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So, King and the Panel actually are having a whole lot oI trouble complying with SCR
111(8) (which this Court's 6/7/12 Order Bar cites to twice and speciIically incorporates by
reIerence, and acknowledges the mandatory authority supplied thereby where that 6/7/12
Order in 60838 reads, at page 2 thereoI, lines 1 to 10: '... reIerral to the appropriate
disciplinary board are mandatory when an attorney has been convicted oI a "serious" crime,
which includes theIt. SCR 111(6)-(8). Accordingly , pursuant to SCR 111(8), we reIer this
matter to the appropriate disciplinary board Ior the institution oI a Iormal hearing beIore a
hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent oI the discipline to
be imposed. While King's 5/10/12 Petition echoes this Court's use oI the root 'accord (in
'Accordingly, pursuant to SCR 111(8)..., above), where it reads 'requests that the Court
enter an Order temporarily suspending Respondent Irom the practice oI law and reIerring this
matter to the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board Ior Iurther disciplinary proceedings, in
accordance with SCR 111(7) and (8), King actually had no intention Io proceeding 'in
accordance with SCR 111(8), or anything in SCR 105(2), or 105(2)(c), or, even, in SCR
104(d) (well, really, SCR 104(a)-(e)), SCR 105(1)(a), SCR 105(4), SCR SCR 110, 111(4),
SCR 119(1), or SCR 121. Heck, it would be easier to just point out the rare instances where
King did, in Iact, comply with an SCR.
Bar Counsel apparently attempted to obtain an Order allowing him to 'consolidate the
reIerral in 60838 required by SCR 111(8) (which present issues making the FOFCOL void Ior
lack oI jurisdiction) with the kitchen sink King sought to throw into his thinly supported SCR
105 Complaint oI 8/23/12 (ROA 1to 24). And, King made his pitch Ior such consolidation (as
usual, without citing to a shred oI authority to support his 'motion) only in the Conclusion
section oI a one and a halI page 'Petition, ironic given the FOFCOL's reliance upon Judge
Nash Holmes and Hill's claims or criticisms that Coughlin's Iilings, at times, reveal a lack oI a
connection between the title oI his Iilings and that contained therein, or a lack oI explication,
consistency, connection, or basis Ior citing to some particular rule given the content oI such
Iiling. Here, King is apparently requesting, in a misleading manor (aIter Iailing to Iollow
SCR 111(4) where he Iailed to obtain a 'certiIied copy oI the conviction (and the RMC's
Ballard, again, is not an appropriate person to 'certiIy some document Irom the 2JDC, and
regardless, the 3/15/12 Order AIIirming the Ruling oI the RMC (interesting choice oI words
there, 'Ruling, huh...kind oI obscures the whole matter oI Coughlin appealing both the
JCCO and OPSC, both, purportedly oI 11/30/11 in 22176...and a 'ruling does not exactly
connote the Iinality called Ior in SCR 111(1): 'Conviction deIined.For purposes oI this
rule, in addition to a final judgment of conviction, a 'conviction shall include a plea oI
guilty or nolo contendere, a plea under North Carolina v. AlIord, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), or a
guilty verdict Iollowing either a bench or a jury trial, regardless oI whether a sentence is
suspended or deIerred or whether a final judgment of conviction has been entered, and
regardless oI any pending appeals. A 'ruling is hardly a 'Iinal judgment oI conviction oI a
crime. There is a reason Judge Elliott chose the words he did. Additionally, where King's
5/10/12 Petition indicates that 'On November 30, 2011, Mr. Coughlin was Iound guilty, aIter
a trial, oI the oIIense oI Petit Larceny, a violation oI RMC 8.10.040, in Municipal Court Ior
the City oI Reno. See Exhibit 1, thereaIter, a review oI Exhibit 1 reveals no such 'certiIied
copy oI a 'Iinal judgment oI conviction as required by SCR 111(1) and (4).
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Additionaly, by its very title the 11/30/11 'judgment of Conviction and Court
Order in RMC 11 CR 22176 (ROA 8-10) is not clearly a 'final judgment. Rather, the
terms ~judgment, ~conviction, and ~order all imply Iairly contradictory meanings or
natures, and the ambiguity attendant thereto is echoed by the use oI the term ~ruling in
Judge Elliott's 3/15/12 'Order AIIirming the Ruling oI the Reno Municipal Court. ROA 11-
13. Upon crossing out the community service requirement, combined with Iailing to alter the
title oI the 11/30/11 'judgment oI Covniction and Court Order the situation became even
more muddled, suIIicient to make clear now that no conviction may be gleaned Irom that
document, as there is Iar too much ambiguity theirein, especially considering the res judicata
eIIect attendnat to the 3/15/12 Order in CR11-2064 characterizing that document as a 'ruling
and Couglin's appeal as an 'appeal oI a ruling. Additionally, King's 5/10/12 Petition in
60838 violates RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4, and 8.1 where it misstates several diIIerent Iactual and
legal points: One, the Couglhin was not 'convicted oI a crime involving theIt. King
presented no authority whatsoever that a conviction oI 'petit larceny under RMC 8.10.040
involves theIt. King may as well characterize some civil penalty Ior copyright inIringement
as 'involving theIt. Or Iailure to pay a parking ticket as 'theIt. King must at least cite to
some authority Ior his blanket assertion that 'petit larceny is a 'serious oIIense simply
because he asserts it involves 'theIt. And Iurther, King must provide support Ior the
contention that a 'theIt crime (which always involved 'speciIic intent) is necessarily
involved in any conviction oI 'petit larceny under the RMC 8.10.040, and more speciIically,
within the 11/30/11 JCCO (ROA 8-11).
RMC Sec. 8.10.040. - Petit larceny. It is unlawIul Ior any person to take or carry away the
property oI another with the intent to deprive the owner oI his property therein, in any value
less than $650.00 and Ior his conviction thereIore, he shall be Iined in an amount not more
than $1,000.00 and/or be incarcerated not more than six months. In addition to any other
penalty, the court shall order the person to pay restitution. (Code 1966, 11.12.003; Ord. No.
2762, 1, 8-13-79; Ord. No. 3866, 1, 9-25-89; Ord. No. 4815, 1, 10-28-97; Ord. No.
5058, 1, 11-12-99; Ord. No. 6237, 1, 6-27-12) State law reIerence Petit larceny, NRS
205.240.
King misstates the text oI SCR 111(7) and (8) in his 60838 Petition:
SCR 111: '7.Suspension on certiIication.Upon the Iiling
with the supreme court oI a petition with a certiIied copy oI
prooI oI the conviction, demonstrating that an attorney has
been convicted oI a serious crime, the court shall enter an
order suspending the attorney, regardless oI the pendency oI
an appeal, pending Iinal disposition oI a disciplinary
proceeding, which shall be commenced by the appropriate
disciplinary board upon reIerral by the supreme court. For
good cause, the court may set aside its order suspending the
attorney Irom the practice oI law.
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8.ReIerral to disciplinary board.Upon receipt oI a
petition Iiled under subsection 4 oI this rule, demonstrating
that an attorney has been convicted oI a serious crime, the
supreme court shall, in addition to suspending the attorney in
accordance with the provisions oI subsection 7 oI this rule,
reIer the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board Ior the
institution oI a Iormal hearing beIore a hearing panel in which
the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent oI the
discipline to be imposed. The panel may, Ior good cause,
postpone the proceeding until all appeals Irom the conviction
have been concluded.
One, the 60838 Petition is hardly 'in accordance with the requirements set Iorth in
SCR 111(4), where Bar counsel Iailed to obtain a 'certiIied copy oI prooI oI the
conviction. Rather, in the Complaint herein and in the 60838 Petition, bar counsel
obtained a copy that is not suIIiciently 'certiIied (it lacks a date, it lacks a prooI oI service,
the judges signature is a rubber stamp, the initials and handwritten 'reIused Iail to identiIy
the individual making such indication, and regardless, the placement thereoI reveals, at best,
a reIusal by the deIendant to sign some agreement to 'obey some 'Order. An 'Order is
not a 'conviction. Further, the Petition in 60838 Iails to accurately state what the charge
was and what the appeal related to. The charge was 'petity larceny, not 'larceny (theIt).
Its not quite true, either, Ior Bar counsel to write that Coughlin ' appealed the judgment of
conviction when, actually, Coughlin appealed whatever it is the 11/30/1 1CCO is, and
any ruling, order, finding, judgment, or otherwise purporting to hold Coughlin in any
type of contempt. Further, rather than just state the Iacts and procedural history
accurately, bar counsel wrote: ' judgment oI conviction was aIIirmed on appeal.
Actually, the 3/15/12 'Order AIIirming the Ruling oI the RMC does not aIIirm the
'judgment oI conviction, but rather, 'aIIirms the ruling oI the RMC. There is a
diIIerence. Additionally, the Petition is misleading and mistates SCR 111(4) where it reads
'as evidenced by the documentation submitted herein, Respondent has been convicted
of a crime which triggered the reporting requirements of Bar Counsel under SCR
111(4). Actually, the reporting requirements oI SCR 111(4) are not 'triggered until Bar
Counsel obtains a 'certiIied copy oI prooI oI conviction, whereupon, bar counsel 'shall Iile
a petition. Bar counsel Iailed to obtain such a certiIied copy oI prooI oI conviction.
Rather, he obtained some quasi-pretend certiIication by an RMC Iiling oIIice employee, that
purports to provide prooI oI some vague hybrid oI a 'judgment 'conviction, and 'order
that, the 3/15/12 Order bar counsel included therewith characterizes as a 'ruling.
Further, n addition, the 60838 Petition purposeIully misstates SCR 11 where it reads:
'111(7) and)(8), state that upon receipt of a petition demonstrating that an attorney
has been convicted of a serious crime, the Court shall enter an order suspending the
attorney.... Actually, SCR 111(7) speciIies that 'Upon the filing with the supreme court
of a petition with a certified copy of proof of the conviction, demonstrating that an
attorney has been convicted oI a serious crime.... What becomes very clear upon a review
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oI the work oI the RMC and Asst. Bar Counsel King is that they are inordinately lazy,
overpaid, entitled, and arrogant, and more than a little dishonest. Rather than actually Iigure
out what goes into a 'certiIied copy and whether that which RMC 'Clerk oI Court (its not
clear that Ballard has actually had an ounce oI training or certiIication suIIicient to make
such claim to be a 'Deputy Clerk oI Court) Ballard aIIixes on these documents qualiIies as
such, King simply rephrases some oI the language in SCR 111(7) and SCR 111(4) and
hopes this Court will not notice, and calls it a day and plays some grab ass around the halls
oI the SBN with his Great Dane, which he brings with him to work daily, even on days
where a Iormal disciplinary hearing is being held (and at Coughlin's, King saw Iit to wear
cargo pants, a blazer, and a drab tie). The 60838 Petition continues on to reveal King's
complete lack oI training or expertise in these matters (and that's on David Clark) However,
that conviction was Ior "theft." Actually, 'theIt is not a crime Iound in the NRS or Reno
Municipal Code. A closer reading oI SCR 111(6) than King was willing to undertake
reveals 'theIt to be, in some cases 'a necessary element oI various 'serious crimes, but
not a crime in and oI itselI. King's competes his 5/10/12 60838 Petition with one Iinal
purposeIul misstatement oI one oI the very, very Iew law that he must understand in his role
as bar counsel, SCR 111(7),(8) in characterizing the reIerral to the NNDB as Ior the plural
'disciplinary proceedings, rather than the singular 'disciplinary proceeding Iound therein:
' Bar Counsel respectfully brings this matter to the Court's attention and requests that
the Court enter an Order temporarily suspending Respondent Irom the practice oI law and
referring this matter to the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board for further
disciplinary proceedings, in accordance with SCR 111(7) and (8).

SCR 111(4), which reads:
~SCR 111(4).Bar counsel`s responsibility.Upon being
advised that an attorney subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction
oI the supreme court has been convicted oI a crime, other than a
misdemeanor traIIic violation not involving the use oI alcohol
or a controlled substance, bar counsel shall obtain a certified
copy of proof of the conviction and shall file a petition with
the supreme court, attaching the certified copy...
Further, where the 5/10/12 Petition in 60838 reads: 'CONCLUSION WHEREFORE,
Bar Counsel respectfully brings this matter to the Court's attention and requests that
the Court enter an Order temporarily suspending Respondent Irom the practice oI law and
referring this matter to the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board for further
disciplinary proceedings, in accordance with SCR 111(7) and (8) King thereby put in his
bid, in however a misleading manner (given the purported 'accordance with SCR 111(7) and
(8), which, in no way support the sort oI 'consolidation ('an accepted practice King
claimed in In Re Boles, when called out on his unnoticed kitchen sink pleading/ambush style)
King attempted here (and which the Panel, despite all its grandstanding about IaithIully
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Iollowing this Court's 6/7/12 Order in ruling everything Coughlin sought to introduce into
evidence or argumentation he sought to make as 'irrelevant considering the allegedly strict
dictate in this Court's 6/7/12 Order to conIine the entirety of the hearing (well, really, just the
part where Coughlin was talking, as King and all the other witnesses were permitted and or
encouraged to go oII on whatever tangents they Iancied) and Coughlin's response or deIense
to any oI the various vague and unspeciIied and or unsupported by any actual speciIics,
allegations to that which complies with the jurisdiction allegedly accorded the Panel where
this Court 6/7/12 Order in 60838 reads: ~Accordingly, pursuant to SCR 111(8) , we refer
this matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hearing
before a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent of the
discipline to be imposed.
So, in their ridiculously dishonest approach here, the SBN and the Panel twisted this
Court's Order and SCR 111(8) suIIicient to attempt to apply some SCR 111(5) 'conclusive
prooI application to all oI the Complaint's allegations (which were, to begin with scattershot,
carpet bombed, inspeciIic/unsupported by Iacts/inconsistent with the DowSoE's indication
allegations in a scant 5 page Complaint (which clearly had not been prooI read given the
numerous typos, and misnumbering oI rules and paragraphs, not unlike the FOFCOL, which
conIuses a traIIic citation Ior a custodial arrest, conIused 'Judge Gardner with 'Judge
Howard, and on, and on) with the risable interpreation oI SCR 111(8) and this Court's 6/7/12
Order (which it seems King and Echeverria kept Irom all other Panel member's eyes with
great eIIort, though Vellis, Pearl, Kent, and Johnson really come out oI this looking, at best,
incompetent, lazy, and immoral, and at worst....well. However, it is noticeable that only
Echverria's signature is on the FOFCOL, though Mr. Johnson may have been too engrossed in
his smart phone, as he was throughout the hearing, to have responded to any entreaty to sign
the thing. Kent, well, he was probably a little gun shy aIter the humiliating (Ior him) moment
where he was caught admitting that he had not reviewed any oI the Exhibits to Coughlin's
Iilings, and didn't care to, and was openly co-signing Pat King's lies that the SBN had copied
all oI Coughlin's Iilings and Exhibits to each oI the Panel members rather than provide
Coughlin any contact inIormation or addresses Ior each (especially where King had admitted
that he didn't know how to copy a cd/dvd disc (though, the 'copies oI the audio transcripts
the RMC provided King, the SBN was, apparently, somehow, able to make copies oI Ior the
Screening Panel (as King indicated he had recieved approval Irom Clark to provide Couglhin
with 'leItover copies oI such Irom the 'Screening Panel)...so, really...King can't decide
which prevarications he wants to stick with, and continues to expound contradictory ones, so
you can't really blame Mr. Kent Ior getting all mussed up incident to it all. And, with Vellis's
approach, it's really hard to imagine how Jones Vargas went under so quick, what with being
so top heavy with the leadership and industry oI Vellis-types. One shouldn't be too hard on
Echeverria, he was only showing out Ior his 'boyhood chum Elcano, with whom he went to
StanIord University along with Judge Elliott, Iollowing Elcano, Beesley, and Echeverria
attending Reno High together in 1962, and Elcano, Beesley, and Nash Holmes attending
McGeorge together in 1977. So, how Iair would it be, really, Ior the warning in the 2/7/13
Order (should the warning therein be carried out, indicating that any Iiling by Coughlin which
Iails to technically comply with the NRAP may be stricken) to be carried out against
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Coughlin where Bar Counsel has gleeIully broken every last rule applicable to these
proceedings, and even appallingly trumpeted how his callow approach is consequence Iree
given his view oI the application oI SCR 106 (though, such does not protect King Irom
criminal prosecution, as 'an action is not a prosecution, under Nevada law. Additionally,
the Order by Judge Holmes attached as Exhibit 3 to the Complaint herein (ROA 23) itselI
lacks any sort oI CertiIicate oI Mailing upon Coughlin, and Judge Holmes' sworn testimony
purporting to have Couglhin served such Order 'up in jail when he was being held Ior
contempt is contradicted by the CertiIicate oI Service (ROA 1772) aIIixed thereto, which
does not support Holmes' testimony: 'HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 137:8 to 137:14) THE
WITNESS: Mr. Echeverria, that was also provided to Mr. Coughlin. At the time that order
was entered, I had him served up in jail when he was being held Ior contempt -- MR.
COUGHLIN: No, you didn't. THE WITNESS: -- mailed to his house as well. MR.
COUGHLIN: No, she didn't. (ROA 1503:8-15). Further, that CertiIicate oI Mailing aIIixed
to the 2/28/12 Order (ROA 1772:9-12) indicates that Order was mailed only to the address oI
the Iormer home law oIIice Irom which Hill had Coughlin summarily evicted, as Coughlin
indicated to Holmes during the trial on 2/27/12, and where Coughlin's then current 1422 E.
9
th
St. #2 address was prominently displayed on the 1/9/12 Iiling with the RMC in the same
case (that Holmes reIerenced during that same trial date as providing prooI that Couglhin did,
in Iact, have the requisite registration and insurance required to dismiss those charges), and on
the 2/23/12 Iiling in RMC 22176 beIore Judge Howard that Judge Holmes admits to having
reviewed during one oI the 'judges meetings convened to discuss what approach the RMC
would take towards Coughlin (and Iurther evidenced by Judge Nash Holmes pointing out
(ROA 1782) in her 3/14/12 greivance against Coughlin to the OBC, that she had 'Iour
diIIerent addresses Ior Coughlin, and that she realized his 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2 address was, at
that time, his most current address (outside oI her cheap shot, unattributed 'sleeping in his
car non-sense, that she would know was not true as oI 3/14/12 given her conversations with
RJC Judge Schroeder revealing to her that Coughlin was set Ior a summary eviction
proceeding the Iollowing morning, 3/15/12 (with Gayle Kern, Esq., on the opposing side, just
hours beIore the 3/15/12 hearing beIore Judge Holmes' McGeorge 1977 classmate NVB
Judge Beesley, wherein Judge Beesley admitted he reIuses to view the misconduct oI law
enIorcement as a possible cause Ior one's clothing/appearance at a hearing being substandard
(1392:20-25; 1393:2-15), but rather, chooses to assign whatever pretextual Iaux LCL entreaty
will make him look best whilst also, conveniently, Iurther the agenda (ROA 1379:7-13;
1382:1-5; 1387:8-1389:10; 1383:9-16: reversible error to sustain overrule key Ioundation
objection where King oIIers only a lame hearsay exception)
oI he and the 'other judges and 'other people that he admits to conspiring with.
And, really, how disturbing is it that Pat King did not even manage to get the
~certified copy required to be attached to his Petition in 60838. SCR 104(d). II King
can't even get that done, how hard is it to believe that he cuts practically every other due
process corner possible? Should such a cheap cheater really be 'Assistant Bar Counsel Ior
the State Bar oI Nevada? Its not like all that much is expected oI Mr. King, really. Consider
the duties oI State bar counsel as set Iorth in SCR 104 (its not that long a read, really):
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' Rule104.State bar counsel.
1.State bar counsel shall:
(a)I nvestigate all matters involving possible attorney misconduct or incapacity
called to bar counsel`s attention, whether by grievance or otherwise.
(b)Subject to Rule 105(1), dispose of all matters involving alleged misconduct
by dismissal of the allegation(s) or by the filing of a written complaint.
(c)Prosecute all proceedings under these rules beIore all Iorums in the name oI
the State Bar oI Nevada.
(d)File with the supreme court petitions with certified copies of proof of
conviction demonstrating that attorneys have been convicted of serious crimes, as
defined in Rule 111.
(e)Maintain permanent records of all matters investigated under these rules...
Apparently, King has aelegatea some oI his SCR 104(a) duty to investigate the
'matters involving possible attorney misconduct reported by Coughlin regarding Baker,
Hill, Kerns, and Leslie's misconduct to 'Clerk oI Court/Paralegal/Investigator Laura Peters.
However, Investigator Peters was so resistant to actually doing any investigation (or, even, to
be provided with enough inIormation and prooI suIIicient to obtain a conviction) oI Hill and
others that she actually aaaea Coughlins email aaaress to her 'blockea senaers list` ana
threatenea to get a 'protection oraer` if Coughlin continuea to proviae her with such
materials. How noble. It would be very interesting to know fust what, exactly
'investigation King undertook in relation to the accusations against Coughlin. Certainly,
nothing in the record indicates anything therein was 'discovered by King upon undertaking
an 'investigation beyond that which RMC Judge Holmes mailed to him in the 'box oI
materials provided on 3/14/12 and again, apparently upon an initial Screening Panel not
giving King the answer he was looking Ior (King's statements in his emails to Coughlin and
during discussion, and NNDB Chair Susich's SCR 117 Petition in 60975 reveal the extent to
which multiple Screening Panels, apparently, were necessary beIore the SBN got the
greenlight it needed to pursue the hit piece its masters ordered (with a little help Irom an
'Associated Press write Ied this Court's 6/7/12 Order in 60838, a piece run thereon in
papers and on broadcast news programs in several states and multiple cities, in a double
jeopardy/res judiciata violating approach, King obtained additional materials Irom the RMC
(some insipid AIIidavits oI 4/11/12 by various RMC employees/City oI Reno Marshals
which do little more than reveal the inappropriate overbearing inIluence the RMC Judges
and Marshals exercise over the Iiling oIIice therein, and the Iiling oIIice's complicity thereto.
Coughlin has yet to receive even a letter acknowledging the grievances or complaints he
made to King and the OBC regarding Gayle Kern, Esq.'s conduct in RJC Rev12-374,
especially relative to the events oI 3/15/12 (impermissible deIault summary eviction against
a commercial tenant where only the landlord only plea a No Cause basis Ior eviction,
violation oI RPC 3.5A given Coughlin's detailed in lengthy 3/8/12 Motion on Iile therein,
Iailure oI Kern to Iile the landlord's aIIidavit required by NRS 40.253(5) prior to a hearing oI
the sort 'held on 3/15/12 going Iorward, her contributing to the unauthorized practice oI
law by Western Nevada Property manager Sue King, the curious things 'the court had
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discovered, apparently on an entirely ex parte basis, as mentioned in the various Orders by
RJC Judge Schroeder in 374 (especially that oI 11/8/12), or WCPD Leslie's numerous
violations oI the Rules oI ProIessional Conduct while 'representing Coughlin.
One, Coughlin absolutely did notiIy bar counsel, unprompted oI his conviction, and
arguably in a timely Iashion under SCR 111(2) via a written correspondence with Bar
Counsel David Clark on 1/23/13, and a telephone call to Asst. Bar Counsel Glenn Machado oI
the same date. While SCR 111(2) requires reporting oI such a conviction within 30 days
(both by Coughlin and the RMC Clerk oI Court...and the RMC Clerk oI Court never did
manage to report the conviction, and was seemingly unaware oI that rule), such 30 days, in
Coughlin's case, arguably may not have even began to run yet given the in absentia nature oI
the amendments and supplements to his order as rendered at 8:30 pm on 11/30/11 (iI
deIendants Iax Iilings received aIter 4:30 pm are not accorded a Iile stamp until the Iollowing
day, it Iollows that the RMC should be prevented Irom Iile stamping its Orders (such as the
JCCO or OPSC, both stamped 11/30/12, though Coughlin is completely sure he was not
provided the OPSC prior to being taken to his cell, and not at any time until the ROA was
Iiled in the appeal, despite his making numerous calls and writings requesting the same and
despite RMC Judicial Assistant Veronica Lopez initially gruIIly reIusing to provide such,
then indicating, Ialsely, that she would Iax the same to Coughlin, upon Coughlin calling her
on the phone the Monday Iollowing his three day summary contempt incarceration.
Coughlin's Opposition to RCA Robert's Motion to Dismiss the appeal in CR11-2065 lays out
the authority in support oI such a position, including the Iact that a Notice oI Entry oI Order
would be required to begin the running oI any such NRS 189.010 deadlines, and such NOE
was never served as to either the JCCO or OPSC oI 11/30/12 (which, arguably, even Iailing to
recognize the arguments just set out, should not be accorded a Iile stamp until, at the earliest,
12/1/11). Further, the 30 day reporting requirement was added to SCR 111 after Coughlin
was admitted to practice, and that, combined with Coughlin's misplaced reliance upon 'moral
character or 'moral turpitude and looking in the Rules oI ProIessional Conduct (not all that
illogical consdiering RPC 8.4's language) rather than in the Supreme Court Rules (Coughlin
was not practicing beIore the Nevada Supreme Court at that time, and, even though SCR 99
accords this Court jurisdiction over all attorney's in Nevada, Couglin is likely not alone in not
being all that Iamiliar with Waters at that time and, rather, viewing the SBN as the entity to
which he would need answer, though, admittedly, SCR 79 is something every attorney in
Nevada is likely Iamiliar with, and as such provides support Ior the view that even iI one is
not practicing beIore this Court, there are some SCR's to which they must comply...though the
ready Iamiliarity with SCR is largely owing to it involving yearly reporting, and or keeping
one's current mailing address on Iile, both exigent, regular concerns. Coughlin had never
been convicted oI any SCR 111 oIIense prior the that in 60838, not even a SCR 111(4)
oIIense. Additionally, Coughlin did have extended discussion with his public deIender, Joe
Goodnight at that time, indicating to Mr. Goodnight that he approved oI any such required
reporting oI the conviction in 60838 (wherein Coughlin was required to represent himselI by
the RMC), even providign Mr. Goodnight a large collection oI legal research devoted to
determining just what the reporting obligation was...however, the misplaced reliance on the
search phrases 'moral character and 'moral turpitude delayed Coughlin's discovering SCR
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111(6), as did the Iact that the Nevada Court Rules, as displayed on on the Legislatures web
site, just are not very user Iriendly where they completely lack any sort oI index, and the
reader is greeted with an extended preamble and history oI revisions to work through, beIore
meeting with the entirety oI say, the Supreme Court Rules, all 248 oI them. Coughlin does
not have a Civil Practice Manual, and, perhaps, such an item does have Indexes to each set oI
Rules (which would be enormously useIul, and which Couglin has since pretty much created
on his own, Ior just the reasons set Iorth above).
Given there were two intervening wrongIul arrests oI Coughlin and some three days
combined incarceration, and an illegal lockout by Silver Dollar Motor Lodge on 12/27/11 (or
illegal unconsented to allowing themselves into Coughlin's monthly rental, then lying about
whether Coughlin signed any waiver oI any such right aginst; Iorcing Coughlin to rent a room
oII Craigslist and move on 12/27/11), and several incidents oI domestic violence being
directed at Coughlin by the housemates Irom whom he rented such room, resulting in
Coughlin being awarded two against those house mates (whom interIered with his mail
between January 2012-April 2012, as indicated in King's FHE 7 (ROA 1780-81). Those
wrongIul arrests Ieatured prominently in King's 8/23/12 Complaint (ROA 2:14 to 3:24),
despite absolutely no evidence or testimony being put on with respect to at the 11/14/12
Iormal hearing: 1/12/12 custodial arrest Ior jaywalking (apparently that detailed, without any
citation, at ROA 3:19-24) and Iorty eight hours later
Between the arrest oI 1/12/12 and 1/14/12 Coughlin video record (with their Iull
knowledge oI) an interview with RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez at around noon on 1/13/12
wherein Sargent Lopez admitted a number oI things about the 11/13/11 custodial arrest oI
Coughlin Irom criminal trespass that no only reveal such arrest to have been wrongIul, but
which also demonstrate that Richard G. Hill, Esq., lied at both the 6/18/12 criminal trespass
trial in 26405 (and King's Iailing to plead such as a SCR 111(6) 'serious oIIense (or his
choice not to, to be Iair to Mr. King, as he backed oII an initial suggestion that he may), but
rather as a mere SCR 111(4) may provide a res judicata bar to the Panel's asserting such
conviction to be ith an intervening traIIic stop by the same OIIicer Nick Duralde whose
wrongIul arrest oI 8/20/11 (purposeIully overcharging Coughlin with 'Ielony grand larceny
incident to, as admitted by hostile witnesses during interviews wherein they knew they were
being record, that an unidentiIied man picked up a phone oI the ground at the skating plaza in
Iront oI Reno's City Hall, near the Truckee River, at around 11:20 pm, a Saturday Night, on
8/20/11, the proceeded to loudly oIIer the phone up to the inhabitants oI the skate plaza, then
proceeded to indicate that he would 'throw it in the river iI someone did not claim it
immediately-hostile witness Nicole Watson was captured admitting this shortly beIore the
State's material witness Nate Zarate is captured on video attempting to dissuade Watson Irom
Iurther revealing the extent to which Zarate and the alleged owner oI the iPhone involved,
Cory Goble's lies, combined with those oI RPD OIIicer Nick Duralde, resulted in the
wrongIul arrest oI Coughlin), at testimony during the trial that RJC Judge SIerrazza insisted
he would accord no continuance Ior despite the 11/19/12 trial date being inordinately close in
time to Coughlin's 11/14/12 Iormal disciplinary hearing. There are double jeopardy and res
judicata issues attendant to 60838, 61901, 60975, and 62337, all exacerbated by King's
approach.
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Apparently Judge SIerrazza, whom also presided over the summary eviction Irom
Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice in which the 5 day No Cause Summary Eviction Notice
Coughlin Iound posted on his door upon being released Irom jail on 8/26/11 Iollowing the
wrongIul arrest oI 8/20/11 by Duralde, in RJC Rev2011-001708) did not Ieel a continuance
was in order, despite the public deIender and deputy district attorney's being able to stipulate
to such routinely, in the RJC, and, in the case oI RCR2012-067980 (wherein the wrongIul
arrest oI Coughlin on 6/28/12 connects with the wrongIul eviction oI Coughlin in RJC
Rev2012-001048, making it such that court appointed conIlict attorney Bruce Lindsay, Esq.,
and DDA Zach Young, Esq., have repeatedly Iound it preIerable to continue to stipulate to
continuances again, and again, oI anything related to that matter, an instead, swap in court
dates accorded thereto with trial dates in RCR2012-065630, which is pled in King's
Complaint at ROA 2:19 to 3:5 (even though RJC Judicial Secretary Lori Townsend's 4/11/12
voluntarily sending Bar Counsel King Coughlin's Iiling in that matter (065630) (the Panel
reIused to allow Coughlin to even have an exhibit including such evidence marked) oI
2/21/12, criticizing his public deIender Biray Dogan Ior not only Iailing to show up to a gross
misdemeanor arraignment where, upon being so charged (especially where Coughlin received
a letter on or about February 4
th
, 2012 Irom the WCPD indicating Dogan was his attorney, and
an email Irom Dogan's supervisor on 2/6/12 indicating as much, and, upon a chance meeting
with Dogan at Sparks Justice Court, having conIerred with Dogan about the case Ior
approximately 90 minutes (including obtaining an agreement Irom Dogan that he woudl
attend the 2/14/12 arraignment on Coughlin's behalI and enter a not guilty plea).(ROA 2:19-
23) was the Iirst oI IiIteen retaliatory arrests against Coughlin by local law enIorcement since
that 8/20/11 arrest (with approximately ten wrongIul no cause evictions by the RJC
interspersed throughout, including one in RJC Rev2012-001048 on 6/28/12 simulatenous to
the WCSO conducting another one oI its patented '24 hour lock-outs in a manner that Iails
to post such lock-out order then wait, at least 24 hours beIore eIIectuating the breaking and
entering into such property and IorceIully removing anyone therein, oIten at gunpoint. (no
other county in Nevada 'interprets NRS 40.253 to permit the SheriII or Constable to race
over to a tenant's rental immediately aIter a summary eviction hearing and utilize the services
oI a locksmith to break in, then accord a landlord a lien under NRS 118.460 oI the sort that
landlord's and scurrilous attorneys like Casey D. Baker, Esq., Richard G. Hill, Esq., Gayle
Kern, Esq., and non-attorney's committing the unauthorized practice oI law with the blessing
oI the RJ, like Nevada Court Services JeII Chandler, to abuse and utlize a a coercive means oI
robbing tenants oI their security deposits, right to privacy, and eIIectively, their right to
litigate a summary eviction (iI one must move any such property they can not risk subjecting
to a robbery oI the sort that beIell Coughlin on 12/12/11 or the withholding oI client's Iiles or
exculpatory evidence necessary to Coughlin's deIense in 22176 on 11/30/12 (all done in
connection with the unlawIul rent distraint in violation oI NRS 118A.520 by Baker and Hill
under the guise oI some NRS 118A.460 application), in the interim between the 11/30/12
trial date in 22176 and Coughlin's writing and calling the SBN to report that conviction
(Coughlin also, in an abundance oI caution and candor, report the civil summary contempt,
NRS 22.030 incarceration to bar counsel as well, in addition to the USPTO, as he also did
with the 2/27/12 summary contempt pastiche Iive day incarceration in 26800 (where the
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2/28/12 OFDCIS cites to a civil contempt statute, the Bar, Panel, and Judge Nash Holmes
shoudl be estopped Irom trying to characterize such as a 'misdemeanor or 'criminal
contempt.
Pat King and the Panel have one's possessing a license to practice law in the State oI
Nevada conIused with a summer job at the mall working at Hot Dog on a Stick. Like,
literally, that easy to lose, capable oI being taken away in an instant with little to no due
process or underlying rationale, much less prooI in support oI any accusations, no matter how
repugnant the individual making them (Hill), or how completely overreaching they are in
nature (0434, 0435).
This Court's 6/12/12 Order in 60838 should absolutely be included in the ROA here, as
should King's 5/10/12 SCR 111 Petition in 60838. Both reveal much, including King's Iailure
to obtain 'a certiIied copy (and thereIore, Iailing to show 'conclusive prooI oI Coughlin's
guilt (really, King thinks he has a two Ioot putt Ior par and he gets so distracted by his Arnold
Palmer that he Iorgets to even try to tap it in, as required by SCR 111(4)...resulting in,
apparently, this Court amending the typical language Iound orders temporarily suspending an
attorney's license upon bar counsel Iiling a 'certiIied copy oI a conviction oI a SCR 111(6)
crime in a manner that altered the language typically contained therein citing such a
~certified copy being included with a Petition filed by bar counsel, to, rather, indicate
that:
SCR Rule111.Attorneys convicted of crimes.
1.'Conviction deIined.For purposes oI this rule, in addition to a final judgment of
conviction, a 'conviction shall include a plea oI guilty or nolo contendere, a plea under
North Carolina v. AlIord, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), or a guilty verdict Iollowing either a bench or a
jury trial, regardless oI whether a sentence is suspended or deIerred or whether a final
judgment of conviction has been entered, and regardless oI any pending appeals.
2.Duty to inIorm bar counsel.Upon being convicted oI a crime by a court oI
competent jurisdiction, other than a misdemeanor traIIic violation not involving the use oI
alcohol or a controlled substance, an attorney subject to these rules shall inIorm bar counsel
within 30 days.
3.Court clerks to transmit prooI oI conviction.The clerk oI any court in this state in
which an attorney is convicted oI a crime, other than a misdemeanor traIIic violation not
involving the use oI alcohol or a controlled substance, shall transmit a certified copy oI prooI
oI the conviction to the supreme court and bar counsel within 10 days after its entry.
4.Bar counsel`s responsibility.Upon being advised that an attorney subject to the
disciplinary jurisdiction oI the supreme court has been convicted oI a crime... bar counsel
shall obtain a certified copy of proof of the conviction and shall file a petition with the
supreme court, attaching the certified copy...
5.Certified document conclusive.A certified copy oI prooI oI a conviction is
conclusive evidence oI the commission oI the crime stated in it in any disciplinary proceeding
instituted against an attorney based on the conviction...
7.Suspension on certiIication.Upon the filing with the supreme court of a petition
with a certified copy of proof of the conviction, demonstrating that an attorney has been
convicted oI a serious crime, the court shall enter an order suspending the attorney, regardless
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oI the pendency oI an appeal, pending Iinal disposition oI a disciplinary proceeding, which
shall be commenced by the appropriate disciplinary board upon reIerral by the supreme
court. For good cause, the court may set aside its order suspending the attorney Irom the
practice oI law.
8.ReIerral to disciplinary board.Upon receipt of a petition filed under subsection 4
of this rule, aemonstrating that an attorney has been convicted oI a serious crime, the
supreme court shall, in addition to suspending the attorney in accordance with the provisions
oI subsection 7 oI this rule, refer the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the
institution of a formal hearing before a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be
determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed. The panel may, Ior good
cause, postpone the proceeding until all appeals Irom the conviction have been concluded.
One, there has been no 'entry oI any 'conviction (a 'Iinal judgment oI conviction
or otherwise) in RMC 11 CR 22176, as required by SCR 111(3). Rendition is not entry.
Also, SCR 111(7) allows Ior a 'disciplinary proceeding (singular), not 'disciplinary
proceedings (plural) consisting oI a consoliaation oI the 'matter ('we reIer this matter...)
reIerenced in this Court's 6/7/12 Order in 06838 with some SCR 105 collection oI three
greivances ('commencea` by the way by Bar Counsel, not by the Board (contrary to SCR
111(7), which King's 5/10/12 Petition purports to be moving 'in accordance with (at page 2
thereoI, line 16), which, at least according to King and Holmes, and Judge W. Gardner are
wildly unrelated ('II you say the name Richard G. Hill, Esq., one more time I am going to put
you in jail Ior contempt said Judge Holmes to Coughlin on the record on 2/27/12 in 26800,
and her 3/12/12 Order cites to Coughlin attempting to interject Hill's name where it was not
relevant as a basis Ior the 'clear and convicing Iinding (cite).. Coughlin would agree that
NG12-0435 (the grievance consisting oI the Order AIter trial sanctioning Coughlin attached
Further, Coughlin was not on notice that he would need to litigate whether King had
presented 'conclusive evidence oI 'the commission oI the crime involved in 60838 at the
11/14/12 Iormal hearing, as such, The Order oI 6/7/12 by this Court (or three members oI it,
one oI whom recused himselI Irom the matter involving Coughlin and WLS in 60302, which
is even more relevant now that Elcano was one oI Iour witnesses called by the Bar, and where
a second witness (Hill) purportedly oIIered 'expert testimony related to that WLS matter in
60302 and where in the related case in 60317, in the trial court matter appealed therein, 2JDC
Judge Elliott committed a per se violation oI a Canon oI the Code oI Judicial Conduct in
Iailing to disclose his Board Presidency Ior one oI WLS's co-deIendant's therein, CAAW, in
Coughlin's wrongIul termination suit (there are some curious matters related to the 'random
assignment oI that case, Iiled 6/30/11, as well, given the emails Irom 2JDC Cindy Fladager
requesting that Coughlin reIile
This Court's 6/7/12 Order in 60838, which incorporates verbatim SCR 111(8)'s dictate)
permitted him to unilaterally rule irrelevant all subject matter, as to any oI the allegations in
the complaint (or at least that which Coughlin sought to put on, as King was permitted to ask
Hill about 'setting up a residence in the basement, allegedly Iinding 'Iood wrappers; non-
sense about 'slippers and 'pajamas when the very video's Hill and landlord Merliss Iilmed
oI the events just prior to the arrest (except, natch, the alleged announcing by the RPD that
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they were law enIorcement and issuing oI a lawIul order to leave the premises that was not
obeyed by Coughlin....see Hill's ridiculously inconsistent and implausible testimony regarding
such matters in comparing his Declarations (oI 11/21/11 in 1708, and oI 1/20/12 in 03628),
his sworn testimony at the criminal trespass trial on 6/18/12 26405 (Ior which an oIIicial
transcript exists and the admission oI and reIerence to during the Iormal hearing was denied,
in a display oI clearly reversible error, where the Chair somehow sustained a relevancy
objection despite allowing Hill to expound on the exact same matters, the 8/23/12 Complaint
injecting such 'irrelevant material in a RPC 3.4 violation oI King's own), and where both
SCR 114(c) and Claiborne and the res judicata or party opponent admission in 61901
regarding any such criminal trespass conviction being a mere SCR 111(4) (ie, not a SCR
111(6) 'serious oIIense, thereIore, not an appropriate subject matter Ior a SCR 105
disciplinary complaint or Iormal hearing) the elements oI a criminal trespass charge, the
reversible error oI both reIusing to allow Coughlin to play the video oI RPD Sargent Marcia
Lopez's admission during a 'domestic disturbance response call by the RPD to the location
where Coughlin was arrested the Iollowing day upon 6 RPD oIIicer's (including the same
Sargent SiIre whom had ordered Coughlin arrested on 1/12/12 at Hill's behest, outside the
same Iormer home law oIIice where Hill had Coughlin both wrongIully evicted and
wrongIully arrested Ior trespass, in addition to where the events Hill lied about allegedly took
place incident to Hill abusing process and obtaining a TPO against Coughlin Irom the same
RJC Judge Schroeder whom allowed Gayle Kern, Esq., to violate RPC 3.5A at the 3/15/12
summary eviction hearing in 374) showing up in a menacing overkill oI a response to another
alleged 'domestic disturbance call purportedly involving the menacing commentary and
gestures made by Coughlin's then housemates at 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2 (against whom he would
obtain two diIIerent TPO's on 1/23/12 in FV12-00187, 188).
King did not make the argument that he should be permitted to put on evidence beyond
what any SCR 111(5) 'certiIied copy oI prooI oI conviction is conclusive evidence oI the
commission oI the crime relevance was to be had. Under Lau, King is estopped Irom
attempting to assert such (including nearly all the testimony by Hill) somehow supported any
RPC 8.4 allegation (the Complaint Iails to even speciIy a subsection oI that rule, in violation
oI SCR 105(2)), or other alleged RPC violation (X.Y,Z).
Further, as to the various FOFCOL Iindings or conclusions being supported by Hill's
testimony or anything else, one must consider the RJC Clerk's Iailure to transmit in either the
ROA or Supplementals on Iile with the District Court in the appeal, all oI the most important
Iilings related thereto. Really, it's rather curious what is missing, especially given Judge
Flanagan's curious Iootnot on page 5 oI his 3/30/12 Order (and considering some oI the other
Orders that came out on 3/30/12 related to Coughlin by Judge Nash Holmes, and Judge
Elliott), especially upon a review oI some oI the, uh, peculiarities attendant to the 12/20/11
Hearing on Coughlin's 11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien (or the subsequent
12/5/11 second Motion Ior such by Coughlin), the 12/21/11 Order Resolving such, the
complete omission oI Coughlin's 12/22/12 Notice oI Posting Supersedeas Bond Where is My
Stay (and the concomitant depositing by Couglin oI $250 with the RJC, and Couglin's
12/21/11 Notice that Any Order Following Hearing oI 12/20/12 Was Just That, and Order,
and That No Settlement or Agreement Was Entered Into By Coughlin.
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SCR 111(8): '8.ReIerral to disciplinary board.Upon receipt oI a petition Iiled
under subsection 4 oI this rule, demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted oI a serious
crime, the supreme court shall, in addition to suspending the attorney in accordance with the
provisions oI subsection 7 oI this rule, refer the matter to the appropriate disciplinary
board for the institution of a formal hearing before a hearing panel in which the sole
issue to be determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed. The panel may,
for gooa cause, postpone the proceeaing until all appeals from the conviction have been
concluaea.
The appeal oI the 'conviction beIore Judge Nash Holmes in 26800 never got oII the
ground as Judge Holmes repeatedly struck Irom the record Coughlin's various Notices oI
Appeal, and Iurther, Iailed to Order the transcript oI the 2/27/12 and 3/12/12 proceedings,
despite such orders being 'Iinal appealable orders.
The FOFCOL was heavily reliant upon Richard Hill, Esq.'s 'expert testimony, despite
the Iact that King had been Iorced to disenIect his entire 8/23/12 Complaint oI any mention oI
Hill due to the Iact that the repugnance that is Hill pervades every single aspect oI anything in
the Complaint itselI or even tangentially related thereto, including every single arrest oI
Coughlin this year: However, despite the inevitable too late Ior Lau argument that Bar
Counsel will now make that 'Nevada is a notice-pleading state, the SBN's Designation oI
Witnesses and Summary oI Evidence, Iile stamped 10/12/12, though the USPS Track &
ConIirm inIormation that Coughlin attached to his Iilings, but which have all been curiously
obscurred via Iraudulent Iiddling with the dpi, resolution, contrast, and other settings on the
SBN's copiers and scanners (really, guess King picked up some tricks Irom Garin, Fuller, and
Gonslaves in 60302, and 60317, and whatever RJC employee scanned in the ROA at a
ridiculously low 75 dpi. Could that RJC employee have been saturnine Clerk Christine
Erickson, maybe? She oI the 'no you cannot Iile by Iax repeated assertions to Coughlin
between August 28
th
, 2011 until Coughlin became aware through sheer persistence and will
that such was an accepted practice in the RJC and that the RJC's position the was 'a Iascimile
is an original. Upon being conIronted with such knowledge that Iax Iiling in the RJC was an
accepted practice, Clerk Erickson grew completely reticent and Iurtive, reIusing to oIIer an
explanation Ior her apparent willIul mistatement oI court procedures to a litigant and attorney
oI record.
Indeed, curiously, the Iax Iiled 12/26/11 Notice oI Appeal Coughlin submitted Ior
Iiling to the RJC, appealing the 12/21/11 Order Resolving Motion to Contest Personal
Property Lien (and, it was reversible error Ior the panel to reIuse to admit and allow Coughlin
to put on evidence and testimony related to the Iailure oI the RJC and 2JDC to include such
matters in the appeal in CV11-03628, as noted in the Iootnote on page 5 oI Judge Flanagan's
3/30/12 Order denying Coughlin's appeal (wherein Judge Flanagan haphazardly crams several
rulings on disparate motions into one 8 page opinion completely devoid oI any evidence that
he was Iamiliar with the speciIics oI the case to any material degree, and where he disposes oI
Coughlin's impermissibly based upon some alleged 'want oI Iorm or lack oI suIIiciently
citing to the ROA or transcript (the RJC Iailed to order the transcript prepared despite holding
on to more than enough oI Coughlin's money ('conversion) than would have been required
to do so). Perhaps, Judge Flanagan's apparent complete and lack oI understanding as to the
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actual issues involved in that appeal in CV11-03628 could be excused by the headache one is
sure to get upon reviewing the 'ROA in that matter, given the completely deIicient execution
thereoI. That ROA is not bates stamped, it is not presented in chronological order, but rather
was simply photocopied in the Iorm in which it existed in the court's Iile (ie, more recent
Iilings placed atop older Iilings, in reverse chronological order (which, made things even
more ridiculously inscrutable when the RJC provided Coughlin his copy thereoI in a Iurther
indiscernible arrangment wherein such order was simply printed last page Iirst, and thereIore,
Coughlin's copy contained the older Iilings Iirst (which is the correct order Ior an ROA),
howver, each individual Iiling was printed backwaras, with the last page thereoI printed Iirst,
etc, etc.).
Regardless, the Iour volume ROA Ms. Erickson certiIied to the District Court and
noticed the parties on in a letter oI 12/22/11 was scanned in at the lowest possible scanner
setting oI 75 dpi, and with contrast settings applied making several oI Coughlin's exhibits
entirely unreadable). This, on top oI the Iact that such ROA is missing, curiously, all the
most damaging Iilings by either party to the positions taken by the landlord and the mistakes
and other dubious actions taken by the Justice Court. Among the Iilings missing Irom the
ROA and any Supplementals transmitted to the District Court by the RJC was Coughlin's
12/21/11 Notice that the Order Following Hearing oI 12/20/11 Was Just That, An Order, and
That No Consent Agreement Had Been Entered Into By Coughlin Whatsoever; Coughlin's Iax
submitted 12/26/11 Notice oI Appeal oI the 12/21/11 Order Resolving Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien; and the 10/18/11 Iax Irom Baker to RJC Judge SIerrazza (broaching
the divesting oI the RJC's jurisdiction upon Coughlin's Iiling on 10/18/11 a Notice oI Appeal,
voiding any orders stemmign Irom the 10/25/11 'trial/hearing; a 10/19/11 Iax Iiled letter
Irom Baker to RJC Judge CliIton seeking an Emergency Ex Parte Order authorizing the
inspection oI Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice (actually, its just that that letter's dubious
content is completely obscurred by a creatively place, overly large Post-It Note with a court
employee's notation thereon), etc., etc.
That 12/21/11 Notice Iiling by Coughlin Iurther memorialized the express statements
on the record during that six hour 12/20/11 Hearing on Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal
Property Lien beIore RJC Judge SIerrazza, wherein Coughlin continually and repeatedly
make explicilty clear that he was not waiving his appeal rights in any way or otherwise
agreeing to any sort oI Consent Agreement or Order Resolving his 11/16/11, and 12/5/11
Motions to Contest Personal Property Lien (and in neither case did the RJC obey NRS
40.253(8)'s requirement that a hearing be held within 10 days oI such a Iiling, and Baker and
Hill demonstrated an extremely duplicitous and coercive practice in attempting to exact Irom
Coughlin some 'settlement by the day prior to such hearing being held, as set out in their
12/2/11 ransom letter to Coughlin.
Further, Hill himselI at least implied an improper ability to inIluence a tribunal in his
11/22/11 letter to Coughlin wherein he claims to be able to prevent Coughlin Irom getting a
timely hearing in the RJC on such a matter, rather, indicating that unless Coughlin agree to
Hill's coercive terms, Coughlin will have to wait another some six weeks until Hill is back
Irom the same vacation that resulted in RMC Judge W. Gardner granting a continuance to the
City oI Reno (inhis 11/30/11 Order) in Coughlin's criminal trespass prosecution (wherein the
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Complaint was signed by Hill), even where any such continuance was denied Coughlin in the
Wal-Mart petty larceny oI 'a candy bar and some cough drops prosecution on the very same
aay (11/30/11) even where Coughlin sworn, uner penalty oI perjury, that Hill was applying an
unlawIul rent distraint, violative oI NRS 118A.520 to exculpatory video, audio, and other
materials (like the $83.82 receipt proving the UPC oI the Duract Cough Melts was in Iact
included on both that and the 'dummy $14.00 receipt prepared by Wal-Mart supplied to
detail the UPC's and retail value oI the allegedly stolen items).
This also included the 10/18/11 Iax Iiled letter to Judge SIerrazza by Hill's associate
(the since absconded to Kentucky Casey D. Baker, Esq.) regarding whether the RJC had been
'divested oI jurisdiction upon Coughlin Iiling a notice oI appeal on 10/18/11 directed to the
void Ior lack oI jurisdiction 10/13/11 Order Iollowing the summary eviction proceeding oI
that date (which took place despite the jurisdictional prerequisite under NRS 40.253(5)
requiring the landlord Iirst Iile a Landlord's AIIidavit prior to any such hearing being held not
having been Iiled beIorehand, and where Baker violated the rule oI courthouse sanctuary in
purporting to personally served Coughlin, in open court, on September 27
th
, 2011, a 5 Day No
Cause UnlawIul Detainer Notice himselI).
FOFCOL, ROA 1353-1354: '19. State Bar Counsel called attorney Richard Hill
to testiIy at the hearing oI this matter: Mr. Hill has been a member in good standing
with the State Bar oI Nevada Ior 33 years. See Transcript oI Proceedings oI
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 36, L 22 P 37 L 4. Mr. Hill was retained by Dr.
Merliss to assist Dr. Merliss in a landlord tenant dispute with his tenant Coughlin.
See Transcript oI Proceedings oI Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 37, L14 -20.
Mr. Hill represented Dr. Merliss in Reno Justice Court and Washoe County District
Court and two appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court in the matters involving Dr.
Merliss and Coughlin. See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14,2012,P
39, L 13 -24. Mr. Hill has also reviewed Iilings in oI a case in which Coughlin is
involved with Washoe Legal Services. See Transcript oI Proceedings Wednesday,
November 14,2012, P 39, L 25 P 40, L 3. (ROA 1353).
20. In the eviction proceeding between Dr. Meriiss and Coughlin, Mr. Hill's
Iirm obtained an eviction order allowing Coughlin one week to vacate the premises.
Ultimately, Coughlin Iailed to comply with the eviction order and was convicted oI
criminal trespass. See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 41,
L 18 -P 44, L 12.
21. On behalI oI his client Dr. Merliss, Mr. Hill sought and obtained an order
in Iavor oI Dr. Merliss and against Coughlin awarding Dr. Merliss attorney's Iees in
the amount oI $42,065.50. Washoe District Court Judge Patrick Flanagan entered the
order on June 25, 2012. See Transcript oI Proceedings oI Wednesday, November 14,
2012, P 47, L 3-7. -See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 3, L 10-11. The motion seeking
attorney's Iees was based on Coughlin's conduct in the deIense oI the eviction
matter, which conduct was characterized as Irivolous and vexatious and presumably
so Iound by Judge Flanagan. See Hearing Exhibit P 2, L 8-13; P 3, L 4-11.
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22. Based on Mr. Hill's experience and background, his review oI the
pleadings in the litigation between Dr. Merliss and Coughlin and his review oI the
pleadings in Coughlin's litigation with Washoe Legal Services, Mr. Hill is oI the
opinion that Coughlin is not competent to practice law. See Transcript oI Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39, L 1 -12.
23. Based on Mr. Hill's experience in litigating with Coughlin, Coughlin was not
truthIul with either counsel or the court. See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday,
November 14, 2012,P 53, L 6 -16. Mr. Hill Ielt that Coughlin's Iilings were abusive,
at one point calling Mr. Hill's associate a lichen. Coughlin has accused Mr. Hill oI
bribing the Reno Police Department to have Coughlin arrested. Mr. Hill's staII is
terrorized by Coughlin. See Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 54, L 4 -15.
though not, apparently suIIicient to requiring Hill abide by Sierra Glass or withdraw as
counsel where his being a witness was likely...making more curious the inconsistencies in the
police report oI the 11/13/12 arrest wherein RPD OIIicer Carter recounts that it was landlord
Merliss whom had 'noticed somebody was gaining entry to the Iormer home law oIIice in
the weeks prior to the arrest...whereas, subsequent testimony by Hill at the 6/18/12 criminal
trespass case (where Coughlin was denied his constitutional right to cross-examine his
accuser, the RPD OIIicer Carter making the arrest, as Hill admits that neither he nor Merliss
did, in Iact, he (and Merliss on the videos they Iilmed oI the incident) admit that the Iailed to
identiIy themselves in any way to whomever they Ielt was in the crawlspace/quasi-basement
under the house (and any presence therein could hardly be said to be suIIicient to support a
'breaking into the residence, especially where Coughlin was reIused the right to show the
videos oI realtor Darlene Sharpe showing Coughlin such crawlspace prior to his moving in
and describing it as such.
Further, while the FOFCOL mistakenly notes: 'Mr. Hill represented Dr. Merliss in
Reno 1ustice Court and Washoe County District Court and two appeals to the Nevada
Supreme Court in the matters involving Dr. Merliss and Coughlin. See Transcript oI Hearing
Wednesday, November 14,2012,P 39, L 13 -24... Hill, actually did not represent landlord
Merliss at the Justice Court level in the summary eviction oI a commercial tenant based on
notice and pleading oI only a No Cause Summary Eviction Irom Coughlin's Iormer home law
oIIice . See ROA, generally, 1404-1453; 1353:19-1354:21.
That summary eviction by Hill's oIIice in 1708 was Iurther void upon the RJC, as
essentially admitted to in a 10/18/12 letter to Judge SIerrazza on Iile in that matter, though,
curiously, not included in the ROA the RJC transmitted to the District Court (also curiously
not transmitted to the District Court by the RJC, in either the ROA or any Supplementals
thereto are exactly the Iilings that would tend to implicate reversible error and or misconduct
on the RJC's part, including Coughlin's 12/22/12 Notice oI Posting Supersedeas Bond Where
is My Stay Iiling (and curious the ROA was transmitted on 12/22/12...though the signature
lines have that date crossed out and 12/21/12 put therein, in what some may deem an apparent
attempt to absolve the RJC oI the import oI Coughlin posting such Supersedeas Bond (again,
as the RJC Iorcing an impermissible 'rent escrow deposit upon Coughlin (there is not local
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rule in the RJC applicable to 'landlord tenant matters, and the same is true as to any
incorrect assertion by Judge SIerrazza that 'a motion once made cannot be properly made
again as it relates to Motion to Set Aside a Summary Eviction, etc. (as a Post-It Note Order
oI 11/2/12 in the RJC Iiled that Coughlin was never served seems to assert) where the RJC
has Iailed to enact any such local rules under NJCRCP 83 (suIIicient to be corollaries to what
has been done in the Justice Court oI Law Vegas Township with JCRLV 44 requiring a
mandatory stay under NRS 40.385 (hardly a meritless contention by Coughlin, despite Hill's
continued baseless allegations, upon a review oI the trial court transcripts in Venetian v. Two
Roads). Further JCRRT 2 makes even more clear that any such JCRRT (such as JCRRT
11(g) purporting to prohibit any such motions Iiled by Couglin in 1708 is inapplicable, under
JCRRT 2, to such a 'landlord tenant matter.
JCRRT Rule2.Application oI rules.Except as otherwise provided by statute,
these rules apply to all civil proceedings filed in Reno Township except small claims and
landlord tenant matters.
JCRRT Rule11.Motions: Procedure Ior making motions; aIIidavits; renewal,
rehearing oI motions... '(g)No motion once heard and disposed of shall be renewed in the
same cause, nor shall the same matters therein embraced be reheard, unless by leave of
the court.
Further, Judge SIerrazza's assertion the the court 'heard some Motion Ior Stay by
Coughlin and 'disposed oI such is not colorable, and troubling, where a review oI the
transcript Irom the Iinal minutes oI the 10/25/12 summary eviction 'trial in 1708 reveals
that no sooner than Coughlin announced an intention to make or Iile such a Motion Ior Stay
did Judge SIerrazza announce 'its denied, reIusing to even allow Coughlin to recite any Iacts
or argument support oI the various elements thereoI. While the RJC continued to hold on to
Coughlin's $2,275 (arguably requiring the preparation oI the Transcript, a stay under NRS
40.385, and covering the statutorily set appeal bond ($250), and then some...all allegedly
leading to Coughlin being arrested Ior criminal trespass and subject to a still pending Motion
to Show Cause beIore Judge SIerrazza (and the RJC has reIused to return Coughlin that $250
Supersedeas Bond subsequently posted upon the RJC Iinally returning Coughlin's $2,275,
claiming it has been divested oI jurisdiction to do so (Iunny, the RJC was not divested oI
jurisdiction to hold the 10/25/12 'trial, or the 12/20/12 Hearing on Coughlin's 11/16/12
Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien (which the RJC Iailed to actually hold within the 10
days required by NRS 40.253(8)).
Much like the argument Coughlin made respecting the lack oI a corollary to JCRLV 44
in the RJC, there exists no rule in the JCRRT, applicable to summary evictions, supporting
Judge SIerrazza's contention that, upon summarily denying any 'Motion Ior Stay that
Coughlin may have started to make (ruling beIore the word 'stay had Iully leIt Coughlin's
mouth at the close oI the 10/25/11 'trial), any subsequent Motion Ior Stay Iiled by Coughlin
was improper under an application oI JCRRT's 'a motion once made cannot be properly made
again...however, JCRRT makes clear those rules do not apply to 'landlord tenant matters,
and JCRCP 83 makes clear that iI the RJC wishes to have a rule similar to JCRRT 11(g):
Motions: Procedure Ior making motions; aIIidavits; renewal, rehearing oI motions...(g)No
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motion once heard and disposed of shall be renewed in the same cause, nor shall the
same matters therein embraced be reheard, unless by leave of the court
then it most do so through Iollowing the process set out in 1CRCP 83, at which point, it could
then have a corollary to 1CRLV 40: 'Motions to stay in eviction cases.
(a)A tenant in an eviction case may only file 1 motion to stay or 1 motion to vacate
per case, on a Iorm approved by the court.
(b)Upon the Iiling oI a motion to stay under subsection (a), any pending eviction order
shall be stayed until Iurther order oI the court.... (i)As used in this section, 'eviction action
means: (1)A summary eviction action pursuant to NRS 40.253 or NRS 40.254; or.
N1CRCP RULE83.RULES BY 1USTICE COURTS: ~Each justice or justice
court in a township with more than one justice, by action oI a majority oI the justices thereoI,
may from time to time make and amend the rules governing its practice not inconsistent
with these rules. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any justice court shall
upon their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court, but shall not become
effective until after approval by the Supreme Court and publication. In all cases not
provided for by these rules the justice courts may regulate their practice in any manner
not inconsistent with these rules.
Further, NRS40.390Appellate court not to dismiss or quash proceedings for
want of form.In all cases oI appeal under NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, the appellate
court shall not dismiss or quash the proceedings Ior want oI Iorm, provided the proceedings
have been conducted substantially according to the provisions oI NRS 40.220 to 40.420,
inclusive; and amendments to the complaint, answer or summons, in matters of form
only, may be allowed by the court at any time before final judgment upon such terms as
may be just; and all matters of excuse, fustification or avoiaance of the allegations in the
complaint may be given in evidence under the answer.
As to the RJC being divested oI jursidiction upon Coughlin Iiling a Notice oI Appeal
on 10/18/11, consider:
NJCRCP RULE72A.STANDING TO APPEAL; APPEALABLE
DETERMINATIONS
'(a)Aggrieved Party May Appeal.Any appealable judgment or order in a civil action
or proceeding may be appealed Irom and reviewed as prescribed by these rules, and not
otherwise. Any party aggrieved may appeal, with or without Iirst moving Ior a new trial, and
the district court may consider errors oI law and the suIIiciency oI the evidence, and may
remand Ior a new trial whether or not a motion Ior new trial has been made.
(b)Appealable Determinations.An appeal may be taken:
(1)From a Iinal judgment in an action or proceeding commenced in the court in
which the judgment is rendered.
(2)From an order granting or reIusing a new trial, or dissolving or reIusing to
dissolve an attachment, or changing or reIusing to change the place oI trial, and Irom any
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special order made aIter Iinal judgment except an order granting a motion to set aside a
deIault judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1).
(3)From an interlocutory judgment, order or decree made or entered in actions to
redeem personal property Irom a mortgage thereoI or lien thereon, determining such right to
redeem and directing an accounting, and Irom an interlocutory judgment in actions Ior
partition which determines the rights and interests oI the respective parties and directs
partition, sale or division to be made.
Further, Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order denying Coughlin's appeal is extremely
suspect given Anvui requires such appeals to be heard de novo, where Judge Flanagan's Order
cites to and rests upon Judge SIerrazza's 10/27/11 Order. In law, an appeal is a process Ior
requesting a Iormal change to an oIIicial decision. Very broadly speaking there are appeals on
the record and de novo appeals. In de novo appeals, a new decision maker re-hears the case
without any reIerence to the prior decision maker. In appeals on the record, the decision oI the
prior decision maker is challenged by arguing that he or she misapplied the law, came to an
incorrect Iactual Iinding, acted in excess oI his jurisdiction, abused his powers, was biased,
considered evidence which he should not have considered or Iailed to consider evidence that
he should have considered.. As such, and alleged Iailure on Coughlin's part to 'cited to the
Record on Appeal or Transcript is entirely oII base, and completely insuIIicient a basis to
summarily deny Coughlin's appeal, especially in an Order that purports to dispose oI
numerous motions at the same time, and only devots around halI a page to explaining the
decision denying the appeal. What's more appaling is that Judge Flanagan then saw Iit to
approve a post-judgment motion Ior attorney's feesanction oI an astronomically ridiculous
$42,060, even where the 21 day saIe harbor procedural dictates oI NRCP 11 had not been met
(and, really, given that is was an appeal beIore Judge SIerrazza, Hill's associates 4/19/12
Motion Ior Attorney's Fees Sanction is entirely unsupported where it Iails to cite to NRAP 38
whatsoever, but rather speciIically identiIies NRS 7.085 as the basis supporting such a motion
(and remember, Baker moved Ior some $18,000 in attorney's Iees in the trial court,
mistakenlyciting to a statute allowing such only where the manuIacture oI a controlled
substance by the tenant was involved...Baker being Iorced to 'join in Coughlin's Motion to
Vacate such Attorney's feeaward, ultimately, which Judge SIerrazza granted. However, part
oI that $42,060 attorney's Iees award Ior Iees incurred on appeal was clearly (via the, per
Flanagan's 6/25/12 Order, 'detailed and speciIic invoices, provided by the landlord's
attorneys) related to litigating matters only made necessary by Hill's associates own reckless
and rather implausibl mistakenly moving Ior $18,000 worth oI an attorney's feeaward in a
summary eviction proceeding where doing so is clearly a meritless (oh, the irony) claim given
NRS 69.030 makes clear such a feeaward is only available to a prevailing party in an
'action, given that JCRCP 3 makes explicilty clear that 'landlord tenant matters are
entirely distinct and separate Irom 'actions.
Additionally, Judge Flanagan's reliance in denying Coughlin's appeal (beyond the
Anvui dictate that he conduct a de novo review (arguably including a hearing on the merits
itselI) upon the assertion that Coughlin's alleged Iailure to cite to the 'Record on Appeal
(That Iour volume 'Justice Court Proceedings Iiled is clearly violative oI NRAP 10 and 11
(the pages are not bates stamped at all, much less consecutively number, there are over 250
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pages per volume in several instances, the papers and Iilings therein are not in chronological
order, Post-It handwritten notes by Judges and court personnel cover up material aspects oI
important Iilings or corrspondence (including that wherein Baker touches on the extent to
which Coughlin's Iiling a Notice oI Appeal on 10/18/11 to the 10/13/11 Eviction Decision and
Order (and where that Order 'set the matter Ior trial Ior 10/25/11, then, at that 'trial, upon
some prompting by Baker, Judge SIerrazza altered or amended his Order, in order to
recharacterize the matter therein as a 'continuation oI the summary eviction proceeding)
makes inapplicable Judge SIerrazza's rationale Ior denying Coughlin his constitutionally
guaranteed right to a jury trial, even in a summary eviction, under Pernell, as Coughlin's
demand Ior such and the $2,275 deposited with the RJC more than satisIies the procedural
prerequisites Ior a jury trial)
This argument is contrary to the statutes governing summary evictions. NRS 40.390
speciIically says that summary eviction proceedings and appeals shall not be quashed Ior lack
oI Iorm, provided that the proceedings have been conducted substantially according to
provisions oI the summary eviction statute. Tenants contesting their evictions pro se, as James
did, cannot be expected to always know the correct legal terminology or the speciIic statute
they must cite. NRS 40.390 protects those tenants Irom Ialling prey to procedural traps that
will prevent their case Irom being heard on its merits. Under NRS 40.390, so long as a tenant
substantively complies with the summary eviction procedures, his right to appeal his case will
not be abridged. Here, where James made it clear Irom his Iirst Iiling that he wanted to contest
the eviction on its merits and the Justice Court heard the case on its merits, James has
substantially complied with the summary 3
eviction proceedings as required by NRS 40.390 and his appeal should not have been
dismissed Ior lack oI Iorm at the Justice Court or District Court.1
'Another 1urisdiction. The phrase 'another jurisdiction Iound in SCR 114 does not
necessarily mean one in another state. Bar Counsel Iailed to raise such argument, and under
Lau, may not due so now on appeal, and Iurthermore, may not expose Coughlin to double
jeopardy by later seeking to Iile some SCR 114 Petition where, instead, it sought to shoehorn
such subject matter into this Court's 6/7/12 restatement oI SCR 111(8)'s
Rule114. Reciprocal discipline. :
' 2.Duties of bar counsel .Upon being inIormed that an attorney subject to these
rules has been disciplined in another jurisdiction, bar counsel shall obtain a certiIied copy oI
the disciplinary order, or other document so demonstrating. In the event that bar counsel
receives information, Irom a source other than the attorney, indicating that an attorney subject
to these rules may have been disciplined in another jurisdiction, bar counsel shall
investigate the matter. II the investigation reveals that an attorney subject to these rules was
in Iact disciplined in another jurisdiction, bar counsel shall obtain a certiIied copy oI the
disciplinary order, or other document so demonstrating and file a petition Ior reciprocal
discipline as described in subsection 3 oI this rule.
3.Procedure. Bar counsel shall file a petition with the supreme court, and shall
serve a copy oI the petition on the attorney at the address on Iile with the state bar under Rule
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79 and provide prooI oI service to the supreme court. The petition must contain a brieI
statement oI the Iacts known to bar counsel, any Nevada Rules oI ProIessional Conduct
counterparts to the rules violated, and an attachment oI the certiIied copy oI the other
furisaictions aisciplinary oraer, or other document so demonstrating. The attorney shall have
15 days Irom the date oI service to Iile a response, iI any, with the supreme court, including
any claim that the identical discipline is not warranted, predicated on the grounds set Iorth in
subsection 4 oI this rule.
4.Identical discipline to be imposed; exceptions.AIter the time Ior the attorney to
respond has expired, the supreme court shall impose the identical discipline unless the
attorney demonstrates, or the supreme court Iinds, that on the Iace oI the record upon which
the discipline is predicated it clearly appears:
(a)That the procedure in the other jurisdiction was so lacking in notice or opportunity to
be heard as to constitute a deprivation oI due process; or
(b)That there was such an inIirmity oI prooI establishing the misconduct as to give rise
to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept the decision oI
the other jurisdiction as Iairly reached; or
(c)That the misconduct established warrants substantially diIIerent discipline in this
state; or
(d)That the misconduct established does not constitute misconduct under any Nevada
Rule oI ProIessional Conduct.
II the court determines that any oI the preceding Iactors exist, it shall enter an appropriate
order.
King Iailed to meet his SCR 114 duty. Further, he Iailed to Iile any such Petition as
requirea by SCR 114(3) 'with the supreme court. Rather, Bar Counsel sought to take a SCR
111(6) 'conviction (one oI dubious legitimacy at best, Ior an allegation oI an extremely de
minimis '
crime that could not possibly be characterized as a 'serious oIIense where misappropriating
$750,000 oI a clients money did not even received a theIt based charge and prosecution Irom
the Washoe County District Attorney's OIIice in Harris's case, much less, as Gary Silverman,
Esq., tsk, tsk'ed, a SCR 102.5 Petition Ior Temporary Suspension by Bar Counsel...guess the
David Grundy, Esq., card is accepted at the SBN, along with the Coe Swobe co-opt) and
shoehorn in through the backdoor some NRS 22.030 civil 'summary contempt 11/30/11
Order Imposing Summary Punishment Ior Contempt Committed in the Immediate View and
Presence oI the Court by RMC Judge Howard that itselI was violive oI NRS 1.230(4) (' 4.
A judge or court shall not punish for contempt any person who proceeds under the
provisions of this chapter for a change of judge in a case.) in holding Coughlin in
contempt Ior moving Ior Judge Howard's disqualiIication (regardless oI what dubious pretext
such OSPC claims Iormed the basis Ior that 3 days summary incarceration where judicial
misconduct is likely present in Judge Howard denying any stay at all to then license attorney
Coughlin upon Coughlin's imploring Ior such a stay to arrange Ior any prejudice to his client's
aIIairs to be avoided). And, Iurther, the RMC Iailed to even serve or even provide Coughlin
that 11/30/11 OPSC (despite agreeing to the Iollowing Monday, RMC Judicial Assistant
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Veronica Lopez never did Iax or mail such OPSC and the ROA in the appeal oI both the
JCCO and OPSC does not include any ProoI oI Service oI such (especially required where the
Iinal three or so minutes oI what limited 'rendition oI any such order (and 'rendition is a
criminal law standard under NRS 189.010, and, as such, the deadline to Iile an appeal as to
any civil summary contempt Order runs Irom Notice oI Entry oI such Order, and even where
that not the case, the Iact that such was made (along with, arguably, the JCCO) in absentia
RCA Roberts (See Coughlin's Opposition to RCA Roberts Motion to Dismiss in the appeal
thereoI in CR11-2064) makes necessary, even Ior any criminal conviction, a Notice oI Entry
being served upon both parties beIore the deadline to Iile a Notice oI Appeal or any post-
judgment motions would even start to run, and as such, arguably, there is not even a
'conviction underpinning 60838 or RMC 11 CR 22176 yet, as no Notice oI Entry oI either
has been served on either party.
On 11/30/11 Coughlin arbuably 'Iiled or moved Ior a disqualiIication oI Judge
Howard during the hearing oI pre-trial motions, and thereIore, such was in line with NRS
1.235's dictate that: ' the affiaavit may be filea not later than the commencement of the trial
or hearing of the case`. As such, Judge Howard's Iinding Coughlin in contempt just ten
minutes into that pre-trial hearing on 11/30/11 (and subsequently summarily denying
Coughlin his right to counsel where the possibility oI some 25 days incarceration and other
attendant peripheral consequences aIIecting a substantial property right (Coughlin's law
license) were necessarily implicated, arguing strongly Ior the appointment oI oI counsel to the
then indigent Coughlin, whose
Further, upon D10's Judge Elliott retiring and Iormer WCDA's OIIice Criminal
Division ChieI Prosecutor Elliott Sattler being appointed in his place, Judge Sattler arguably
ought disqualiIy himselI, and Coughlin so moves Ior the same, given then prosecutor Sattler's
presence at the 12/11/12 trial in RJC RCR2012-065630 (the case reIerenced in the 8/23/12
Complaint ROA 2:24-3:6) and the 12/12/13 email underlying the TPO the SBN Iound
appropriate Ior inclusion in the ROA.
Further the
NRS1.230Grounds for disqualifying judges other than Supreme Court
justices.
1.A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when the judge entertains
actual bias or prejudice Ior or against one oI the parties to the action.
2.A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when implied bias exists in
any oI the Iollowing respects:
(a)When the judge is a party to or interested in the action or proceeding.
(b)When the judge is related to either party by consanguinity or aIIinity within the third
degree.

(d)When the judge is related to an attorney or counselor Ior either oI the parties by
consanguinity or aIIinity within the third degree. This paragraph does not apply to the
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presentation oI ex parte or uncontested matters, except in Iixing Iees Ior an attorney so related
to the judge.
3.A judge, upon the judge`s own motion, may disqualiIy himselI or herselI Irom acting
in any matter upon the ground oI actual or implied bias.
4.A judge or court shall not punish for contempt any person who proceeds under
the provisions of this chapter for a change of judge in a case.
5.This section does not apply to the arrangement oI the calendar or the regulation oI the
order oI business.
NRS1.235Procedure for disqualifying judges other than Supreme Court justices.
1.Any party to an action or proceeding pending in any court other than the Supreme
Court, who seeks to disqualiIy a judge Ior actual or implied bias or prejudice must Iile an
aIIidavit speciIying the Iacts upon which the disqualiIication is sought. The aIIidavit oI a
party represented by an attorney must be accompanied by a certificate of the attorney of
record that the affidavit is filed in good faith and not interposed for delay. Except as
otherwise provided in subsections 2 and 3, the aIIidavit must be Iiled:
(a)Not less than 20 days before the date set for trial or hearing of the case; or
(b)Not less than 3 days beIore the date set Ior the hearing oI any pretrial matter.
2.Except as otherwise provided in this subsection and subsection 3, iI a case is not
assigned to a judge beIore the time required under subsection 1 Ior Iiling the aIIidavit, the
aIIidavit must be Iiled:
(a)Within 10 days after the party or the party`s attorney is notified that the case has
been assigned to a judge;
(b)BeIore the hearing oI any pretrial matter; or
(c)BeIore the jury is empaneled, evidence taken or any ruling made in the trial or
hearing,
whichever occurs Iirst. If the facts upon which disqualification of the judge is sought
are not known to the party before the party is notified of the assignment of the judge or
before any pretrial hearing is held, the affiaavit may be filea not later than the
commencement of the trial or hearing of the case .
3.II a case is reassigned to a new judge and the time Ior Iiling the aIIidavit under
subsection 1 and paragraph (a) oI subsection 2 has expired, the parties have 10 days aIter
notice oI the new assignment within which to Iile the aIIidavit, and the trial or hearing oI the
case must be rescheduled Ior a date aIter the expiration oI the 10-day period unless the parties
stipulate to an earlier date.
4.At the time the aIIidavit is Iiled, a copy must be served upon the judge sought to
be disqualified. Service must be made by delivering the copy to the judge personally or
by leaving it at the judge`s chambers with some person of suitable age and discretion
employed therein.
5.The judge against whom an aIIidavit alleging bias or prejudice is Iiled shall proceed
no Iurther with the matter and shall:
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(a)Immediately transIer the case to another department oI the court, iI there is more than
one department oI the court in the district, or request the judge oI another district court to
preside at the trial or hearing oI the matter; or
(b)File a written answer with the clerk oI the court within 5 judicial days aIter the
aIIidavit is Iiled, admitting or denying any or all oI the allegations contained in the aIIidavit
and setting Iorth any additional Iacts which bear on the question oI the judge`s
disqualiIication. The question oI the judge`s disqualiIication must thereupon be heard and
determined by another judge agreed upon by the parties or, iI they are unable to agree, by a
judge appointed:
(1)By the presiding judge oI the judicial district in judicial districts having more
than one judge, or iI the presiding judge oI the judicial district is sought to be disqualiIied, by
the judge having the greatest number oI years oI service.
(2)By the Supreme Court in judicial districts having only one judge.
NRS1.250Subsequent application for order refused or granted conditionally;
contempt and vacation of order.
'1.II an application Ior an order made to a judge oI a court in which the action or
proceeding is pending be reIused, in whole or in part, or be granted conditionally, no
subsequent application for the same order shall be made to any other judge except of a
higher court.
2.Nothing in this section shall be so construed as to apply to motions refused for
any informality in the papers or proceedings necessary to obtain an order.
3.A violation of this section may be punishea as a contempt; and an order made contrary
thereto may be revoked by the judge who made it, or vacated by a judge oI the court in which
the action or proceeding is pending.
The United States legal system generally recognizes two types oI appeals: a trial "de novo" or
an appeal on the record.
A trial de novo is usually available Ior review oI inIormal proceedings conducted by some
minor judicial tribunals in proceedings that do not provide all the procedural attributes oI a
Iormal judicial trial. II unchallenged, these decisions have the power to settle more minor
legal disputes once and Ior all. II a party is dissatisIied with the Iinding oI such a tribunal, one
generally has the power to request a trial "de novo" by a court oI record. In such a
proceeding, all issues and evidence may be developed newly, as though never heard beIore,
and one is not restricted to the evidence heard in the lower proceeding. Sometimes, however,
the decision oI the lower proceeding is itselI admissible as evidence, thus helping to curb
Irivolous appeals.
In some cases, an application Ior "trial de novo" eIIectively erases the prior trial as iI it had
never taken place. The Supreme Court oI Virginia has stated that '"This Court has repeatedly
held that the eIIect oI an appeal to circuit court is to "annul the judgment oI the inIerior
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tribunal as completely as iI there had been no previous trial."'|13| The only exception to this
is that iI a deIendant appeals a conviction Ior a crime having multiple levels oI oIIenses,
where they are convicted on a lesser oIIense, the appeal is oI the lesser oIIense; the conviction
represents an acquittal oI the more serious oIIenses. "|A| trial on the same charges in the
circuit court does not violate double jeopardy principles, . . . subject only to the limitation that
conviction in |the| district court Ior an oIIense lesser included in the one charged constitutes
an acquittal oI the greater oIIense, permitting trial de novo in the circuit court only Ior the
lesser-included oIIense."|14|/ ` Rule 4(b)(1)(A)
` "Gaskill v. Commonwealth", 206 Va. 486, 490, 144 S.E.2d 293, 296 (1965)
` "Kenyon v. Commonwealth", 37 Va. App. 668, 673, 561 S.E.2d 17, 1920. |
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The biggest 'Smoking Gun here however is the diIIerence in the
CertiIicates oI Services on the multitude oI RMC Iilings, including that on RMC
Judge Howard's own 12/16/11 Order in 22176 wherein the RMC and City oI Reno
admit that service via electronic means, including email was accepted, and where,
speciIicaly in RMC Rule 5, service via electronic mail on governmental attornyes
as a Rule OI Court, which, unexplainedly, RMC Howard seemed to be unaware oI
in Iashioning his 12/15/12 Order dismissing Coughlin's Motion Ior New trial
where he sua sponte Iound that Coughlin served Roberts by email only, which is
not the case anyways, as Coughlin served Roberts by more than one means.
the 1/18/12 CertiIicate oI Service to the 1/18/12 Notice Setting Hearing
proves that RMC Rules did at the time (and they mysteriously and silently
changed shortly aIter Coughlin began complaining about the Iact that, regardless
oI the Iact that his various Motions Ior New trial in 22176 were not only served
by email (despite RCA Roberts misleading indications and the Sua Sponte
12/16/12 Order oI Judge Howard) allow Ior service via "electronic mail" as is
indicated by RMC Judicial Assistant Lisa Wagner.
UnIavorable Report. The Court has an inherent power and authority to
reinstate a suspended attorney in spit eoI unIavorable report upon application Ior
reinstatment by board oI state Bar. Resner v. State Bar oI CaliIornia 63 Cal. Rptr.
740, 433 P.2d 748. The court may consider the character and reputation oI the
panel members in considering its report and recommendations. Petition oI
Emmons, 47 N.W. 2D 620.
The Additional Case InIormation section og the 6/18/12 Order in 26506 has
removed the bit about 'the deIense attorney shall provide the Order resolving
the Order Ior Competency Evaluation in CR12-0376 (RMC Judge Gardner's
looking up stuII on Tiburon, notwithstanding, and reIerence Flanagan's citation to
the 'adjudicatory boundaries oI a Court a limited to what is in the parties
pleadings citation Irom his Order in Carpentier oI 4/19/12 to address the
propriety oI RMC Judge W. Garnder going out oI his way again and again to
deprive Coughlin oI due process and otherwise violate the mandatory stay in NRS
178.405/5.073.
And Bar Counsel King is always right there with a terrible little bit oI
harmonization to that agenda. Why is it the 6/18/12 RMC conviction Ior trespass
and the associated 'Additional Case InIromation is never introduced into the
record or attached as an exhibit by King? Too many holes...too many NRS
178.405 stay violations....to much implied bias, appearance oI impropriety, etc.,
etc...
Where is the prooI that Coughlin was noticed appropriately oI the new trial
date in 22176...see the Notice Setting Hearing oI 11/15/11...not prooI oI service
and the release documents Irom the jail lack any indication Io the 11/30/11 trial
date...and just because Coughlin showed up to it doesn't make service suIIicient,
see 60302...and the CertiIicate oI Service on that 11/15/12 Notice Setting Hearing
may indicate it was sent to 121 River Rock after Coughlin had provided a new
address to the RMC (check that).
Check to see when that additional case note thing on page 4 oI the 6/18/12
26405 conviction prohibiting Iaxing by both sides was placed...see iI its on the
5/8/12 trial setting, regardless, even iI it is...is a void Order made during the
pendency oI the competency stay, therIore, the RMC's failure to file in
Coughlin's fax submitted 6/28/12 Notice of Appeal in 26506 is untenable, as
there existed at that time no valid order preventing Coughlin from so fax file
where RMC Rule 5 allowed such manner of filing, and the RCA has not
argument befcause Coughlin also hand delivered timely under NRS 189.010
the Notice of Appeal to Hazlett-Stevens office.
Also, check for when the 3/31/ 12 Opposition to Coughlin's Motion to
Dismiss by Hazlett was ever sent to Coughlin as the CertiIicate oI Service lists
Loomis (see iI Loomis emails or Iaxes ever inIormed Coughlin
thereoI...regardless, Coughlin's appearing while a licensed attorney, co-counsel oI
not, is not something Judge Gardner could prevent, and Hazlett's Iailure to copy
Coughlin on his Iilings is proIessional misconduct in vilation oI RPC 3.3, 3.4, and
pheraps 3.5A, and Hazlett's positions respecting no recieving service oI basically
anythign throughout 26405 is violative oI 3.1.
'When Swobe was 55, his Iamily Iorced an intervention. AIter about a
dozen years oI sobriety, he discovered Lawyers Concerned Ior Lawyers, a group
Iounded in 1985 by attorney and recovering alcoholic Ben Graham. Graham Iound
support Ior his new group Irom Michael Cherry, another lawyer recovering Irom
alcoholism. Cherry is now a Nevada Supreme Court justice. "Mainly the (State)
Bar supported us with money," Cherry recalled. "They supported us Irom the
beginning and we patterned this aIter what was going on (with a similar program)
in Oregon." The State Bar supports Lawyers Concerned Ior Lawyers Iinancially,
but does not receive any conIidential inIormation on those being counseled,
Swobe said. "We are an independent organization, because we are eIIective being
independent oI the Bar," Swobe said. Cam Ferenbach talked about Lawyers
Concerned Ior Lawyers shortly aIter he was named State Bar oI Nevada president
over the summer. He emphasized the need to keep the support system going and in
the public eye. "It's a place lawyers can go to get help without worrying about
disciplinary action. Everything is kept conIidential," Ferenbach said. "We want to
see this program continue." The idea oI the State Bar learning oI attorneys'
problems terriIies lawyers with addictions. So, Swobe is quick to distance his
group Irom the State Bar, which administers discipline. "Lawyers are paranoid
about the (State) Bar Iinding out," he said. "We had a phone line that went to the
(State) Bar and attorneys hung up when they heard, 'State Bar.' So now we have a
diIIerent number." Swobe gained the support oI Nevada's lawyers, judges and
Supreme Court in 1994 as he worked to ensure that they were educated about
substance abuse and other addictions in the legal proIession. A Iew years ago, The
Nevada Supreme Court adopted a rule allowing Lawyers Concerned Ior Lawyers
to keep all client inIormation conIidential.
http://www.lvbusinesspress.com/articles/2010/12/29/news/iq40738363.txt
Justice Cherry, acting alone, on 11/20/12 entered an Order conIusing the
payment on 9/6/12 oI a Iiling feeIor 61383 (the $42,060 attorney feeaward by
Judge Flanagan to Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s landlord client in the summary eviction
Irom Coughlin's law oIIice (which invovled three separate Iiling deadlines
somehow related thereto being aIIected by three separate wrongIul incarcerations
oI Coughlin and the jail's obstructionist tactics in preventing Coughlin Irom being
able to access justice while therein). The docket in CV11-03628 notes that the
9/6/12 Iiling feeis Ior the Notice oI Appeal Iiled on 7/31/12 (ie, 61383, the $42K
attorney feecase, not 60331, as Justice Cherry's 11/20/12 Order in 60331 mistakes
it Ior. Justice Cherry also recently, acting along, disposed oI Coughlin's appeal in
60317, which is a rather trouble case considering that it is the appeal Irom CV11-
01955, Coughlin's wrongIul termination suit against Washoe Legal Services and
CAAW, which Judge Elliott served as President oI CAAW's Executive Board,
Iailed to disclose that to plaintiII Coughlin, and Iailed to recuse himselI (even
where a judicial canon Iorbids lending the prestige oI judicial oIIice in situations
where an appearance oI bias or impropriety might be inIerred), and Iurther was
randomly assigned, on December 24rd, the Iirst oI Iive criminal appeals involving
Coughlin, each oI which Judge Elliott has managed to hanale in way that accorded
Coughlin about as little appellate review oI some extremely troubled municipal
court convictions as could possibly occur. In the appeal Io the criminal trespass
conviction in CR12-1262, the Reno Municipal Court has taken to reIusing to Iile
the 6/28/12 timely Notice oI Appeal Coughlin Iaxed in. The RMC relives upon
some mention Judge W. Gardner made on the record on 5/8/12 during the
pendency oI the 2/27/12 Order Ior Competency Evaluation oI Coughlin and in
violation oI the stay required by NRS 178.405 by way oI NRS 5.073 and Judge W.
Gardner's own commentary and rulings at the time. As such, any order made at
that time limiting the parties (as notated in the 'Additional Case InIormation
section oI the 5/8/12 Notice Setting trial Ior 6/18/12 (apparently the stay under
NRS 178.405 does not preclude jamming Coughlin out oI court appointed counsel
(so long, Mr. Loomis, hardly knew ya, other than that bit where you reIused to
assert a claim oI right deIense to the trespass charge where Richard G. Hill, Esq.,
admitted to charging the same $900 Ior that month oI November when the
criminal trespass occurred as was charged every month over the preceding 18
months Ior the 'Iull use and occupancy oI the premises (and where Hill's
Associate Casey D. Baker, Esq., threatened to seek even Iurther unlawIul rent
distraint lien proceeds by claiming the moving, storage, and inventorying would
be added thereto (so, apparently, the $900 was a justiIiabily high 'storage charge
given the idea that moving so much 'junk would cost a bit...but Baker was still
planning on chargeing Ior moving it? Oh, and Loomis reIused to even
countenance the idea that a potential deIense exists where any lockout order was
void or stale at the time oI eIIectuating the lockout)...But, anyways, the RMC has
no excuse Ior Iailing to Iile in Coughlin's Notice oI Appeal on 6/28/12. The Iax
conIirmation shows the RMC received it. The 5/8/12 'additional case notes
applies only to 'Pre-trial Motions anyways, not a Notice oI Appeal, and
regardless, that 5/8/12 order (it it can even be called that) is void given it was
made during the pendency oI a competency evaluation (and Loomis never did
comply with the order requiring him to actually get that Order resolving the Order
Ior Competency Evaluation Iiled, as required by an entry in those same
'Additional Case InIormation notes in both the
Justice Cherry's 11/20/12 Order in 60331 reads: 'O R D E R This matter
was docketed on February 29, 2012. Appellant did not pay the Iiling feeat that
time, and subsequently sought leave in the district court to proceed in Iorma
pauperis on appeal. The district court denied the motion, and appellant Iiled a
motion in this court, which is opposed by respondent. This court notes that the
motion Iiled in this court does not comport with the requirements oI NRAP 24,
and the motion is denied. Nonetheless, on September 6, 2012, appellant paid the
Iiling Iee. This appeal may thereIore proceed. It is so ORDERED. It is not clear,
Iorm a review oI the docket in that matter, what 'motion Justice Cherry is
reIering to, as apparently that motion was not Iiled, despite Justice Cherry
indicating there was such a 'motion Iiled in this court... Coughlin asks that the
motion be Iiled and viewable by the public and that the appeals in 60417 and
61383 be reinstated.
Justice Cherry, whom is a co-Iounder oI Lawyers Concerned Ior Lawyers
with the same Coe Swobe whom NVB Judge Beesley inappropriately name
checked (along with LCL) during Coughlin's 11/14/12 Iormal disciplinary hearing
(lending the prestige oI LCL under inappropriate pretense, at Iirst indicating no
jacket on 3/15/12, then remembering there was a jacket...not that Chair Echeverria
managed to get that correct in his 12/14/12 Order, or that such a thing is all that
relevant anyways given that Gayle Kern's conduct on the very 'jacket or not
jacket NVB hearing held minutes aIter the wrongIul eviction oI Coughlin Irom
his law oIIice at 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2 on 3/15/12 (where Coughlin just barely
managed to grab his hard drives and client Iiles, a t-shirt, tie, and jacket, pants,
dog, etc. aIter being accosted at gunpoint by WCSO OIIicers breaking into his
Iormer home law oIIice to eIIect a summary eviction lockout order in RJC
Rev2012-000374 even where Kern had not Iiled in the Landlord's AIIidavit until
after the hearing, and where the Iax header on the lockout order to the WCSO
(which supports the position that, even where a private attorney like Kern or Hill
is on the case, the RJC aoes Iax such Orders to the WCSO Ior processing the
lockouts....a position which is Iurther supported by Hill's associate Baker's
testimony during the trespass prosecution on 6/18/12 in the attached transcript
thereIrom (the 11/1/11 lockout in RJC Rev2011-001708 was based upon a void
and stale eviction order, and the RJC and WCSO/WCDA Iailed to appropriately
respond to Coughlin's subpoenas Ior the Iax headers and records oI when the
WCSO 'received (see NRS 40.253's requirement that such orders, at that time, be
eIIectuated 'within 24 hours oI receipt). Regardless. Coughlin s not a licensed
attoreny at this point, so NRAP 24 is not appropriately applied with rigid
particularity to such a pro se appellant. Additionally, the irony is just too rich to
pass up wher 60317 (and 60302) present a Ieast attendant to those matters being
dismissed, in large part, based upon an allegation that the copies oI the
Complaints served upon those parties where 'illegible where the SBN' King was
reduced to reimagining just how legible his own 8/23/12 Complaint's Exhibit 3
was (the 3/12/12 Order by Judge Nash Holmes in 26800) where, suddenly, (and
King demonstrated a lack oI candor to the tribunal and Iairness to the opposing
party in doing so) that Exhibit 3 'Order oI RMC Judge Nash Holmes was no
longer the blurred akimbo aIIair it was in its original incarnation, but rather was a
neat, pressed, clear, rehabbed version (this betrayed by the bates stamping on only
some oI the pages in King's Exhibit 1 (on bates stampe page 00023 there are two
sets oI bates stamping therein, with the 01901 over which is superimposed the
00023 belonging to the bates stamping Irom the box oI 3,200 pages oI documents
King had delivered to Coughlin two judicial days beIore the 11/13/12 Iormal
hearing instead oI actually Iollowing the law and SCR 105(2)(c) and allowing
Coughlin access as set out in SCR 105(2)(c)...some might say that would have
been one oI the things King and the Panel worked out during one oI the ex parte
communiques King admitted to planning to have with it during a 10/15/12
conversation with Coughlin where King relayed to Coughlin the
ruling/policy/custom applicable to that disciplinary matter wherein Coughlin, as a
temporarily suspended Respondent attorney, had the right to issue his own
supboenas and need not venture down to an SBN Northern OIIice that clearly did
not like having him there anyways to get a the Clerk oI Court to issue such a
subpoena Ior him (although King's Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Quash
Coughlins' Subpoenas (because, darn it, there just wasn't time Ior a Iull motion
cycle, and all, given King arranging thangs a certain way (something he was able
to do where SCR 105 was violated in that it was not the Panel sending out a
Notice oI Hearing, but rather King, as the Panel allegealy was not even created or
identiIied until NNDB Chairman Sucich's 10/30/12 Order (makign the 10/31/12
Order by newly christened Panel Chair Echeverria disposing oI an enormous
amount oI motion work evince an extraordinarily Iast approach to justice,
indeed...so Iast, in Iact, that it seems Chair Echeverria missed the part about how
its the Disciplinary Board Chair, not the Panel Chair under SCR 109 whom is to
hear and rule on Motion to Quash Subpoenas, making the 11/7/12 Order by Panel
Chair Echverria doing so void, and thereIore, requiring a mistrial oI the 11/14/12
Iormal disciplinary hearing....a newer set Ior that Hearing Exhibit 1, and an d at
the 11/14/12 Iormal disciplinary hearing, which was a little red covered collection
oI 'documents King sought to introduce quickly wholesale at the start oI the
hearing... Or, shortly aIter King jammed through testimony by Iederal judge
Beesley under the auspices that there just wasn't time to hear Coughlin's objection
thereto (especially where Beesley's testimony was only noticed to Coughlin,
constructively, under NRCP 6(e) (applicable via SCR 119) the aay before the
11/14/12 hearing (same deal with WLS's Elcano's testimony), because, character
assasination thorough unattributed unsworn hearsay utilizing compound multiple
lending oI the prestige oI multiple judicial oIIices is a pretty easy bell to unring, ya
know? But...at least Coughlin was allowed to call any oI the SBN's own
witnesses back Ior direct examination in his own case, right? Yeah...no. So, as to
the legibility oI the Compliant issues WLS's counsel Garin utilized to such great
eIIecdt (and Coughlin has in his possession a leItover oI the service packets
printed on the same exact printer, same day, everything with the 9 pages per page
selections, and they are a thousand times more legible than what Garin, Gonsalves,
and Fuller attached as their doctored-up-Iiddle-with-the-scanner-dpi-settings
exhibits in CV11-001896 and CV11-01955 that purport to represent the
attachments to the Complaints Coughlin had served on the deIendants and there
legibility thereoI... (a trick they must have taken time to show Bar Counsel king
and Clerk oI Court Peters considering the inIluence clearly attributable upon a
review oI some oI the 12/25/12 Record on Appeal in 62337.
The 3/15/12 hearing NVB Judge Beesley testiIied to (regarding an
adversary proceeding in 10-05104 where monolithic debt buyer Cadle Company is
still smarting Irom the whoopin' Coughlin handed them with both his cell phones
tied behind his back, er, locked away in some Reno Municipal Court drawer, iI
you believe what WCSO Deputy Hodge says about the City oI Reno Marshals
retrieving those items (without a warrant, not during some search incident to
arrest, Reno City Attorney Christensen Iailing to turn over the pc sheet,
declaration oI probable cause, or narrative thereto...)that were booked into
Coughlin's personal property at the jail on 2/27/12 upon Judge Nash Holmes
denying Coughlin a stay oI her summary contempt pastiche order) occurred just
minutes aIter another summary eviction Irom another Iormer home law oIIice oI
Coughlin's violates one oI the twelve Rules oI ProIessional Conduct that Bar
Counsel King alleged Coughlin himselI violated in, in King's scattershot
moonshine codswallop 8/23/12 Complaint (which remixed the directives oI this
Court in its 6/7/12 Order in 60838 by making the inquiry which that Order and
SCR 111(8) required be the 'sole purpose oI such a hearing into little more than a
throwaway thought amongst the legion oI little hit pieces King and the gang put
together in their procession oI accusations utterly devoid oI speciIics, entirely
reliant upon unsworn and mostly unattributed hearsay, laid out in a proceeding
violative oI every last nook and cranny oI SCR 105(2)(c)'s due process
boutique...something the SBN is rather known Ior when David Grundy, Esq., is
not on the case. Oh, and lots oI 'expert witnesses whom are parties to or
representatives thereoI to the very matters to which King purports they be
provided expert testimony on. And these experts mention things like 'he Iiles
things he doesn't serve and he serves things he doesn't Iile even where both side
were at all relevant times electronic Iilers...But the WCDA's oIIice's lines in that
play (including NNDB member DDA Mary Kandaras's hand-ons role therein)
somehow do not auger towards conIlicting out that oIIice in the three diIIerent
prosecutions oI Coughlin it is currently besMIRCHing his reputation with?
On its Iace, NVB Judge Beesley's testimony Iailing to identiIy the whole
RMC Judge Nash Holmes' conIiscating Keller's attorney's cell phone and thereIore
prejudicing his client meme in his testimony at Coughlin's Iormal disciplinary
hearing on 11/14/12 is devoid oI credibility. To top that oII is the underlying
conIlict and bias attendant to Coughlin then suing WLS's Karen Sabo (a Iormer
law partner oI oI Beesley's at Beesley Peck), along with WLS's Elcano and RMC
Judge Nash Holmes being 1977 McGeorge School oI Law classmates oI Judge
Beesley....not to mention to incongruity between the above quoted approach oI
LCL and its relatioship to the SBN (and Beesley's 10 year run on the SBN Board
oI Governors and Presidency oI the SBN (like Coughlin's Iormer coworker at
Hale Lane, Judge Flanagan, he oI the $42,060 attorney fee award against Coughlin
(only in light oI DCR 13(3) Irom any reasonable reading oI that 6/25/12 Order in
CV11-03628...especially given the import oI Judge Flanagan's 3/27/12 Order
denying Hill's Secona Motion Ior Order To Show Cause).
Justice Cherry's (w11/26/12 Order Dismssing Appeal in 60317 reads: On
February 28, 2012, this matter was docketed without the requisite Iiling Iee. That
same day, this Court issued a notice directing appellant to pay the Iiling feewithin
10 days. The notice Iurther advised that Iailure to pay the feewithin 10 days would
result in the dismissal oI this matter. To date, appellant has not paid the Iiling Iee.
Respondents have Iiled motions seeking the dismissal oI this appeal. Although
appellant Iiled an opposition, he has not demonstrated good cause Ior Iailing to
pay the Iiling Iee. Accordingly, cause appearing, the motions are granted and this
appeal is dismissed. It is so ORDERED.
So, it's all spelled out pretty clearly when viewing the time line. There's
RMC Judge
11/26/201
2
Order/Dispositional - Order
Dismissing Appeal
Filed Order Dismissing Appeal. Respondents have Iile
dismissal oI this appeal. The motions are granted and "
dismissed."
Goodnights' 5/3/12 063341 Request to Submit is a bit late in the game...
(notwithstanding the stay he and DDA Young violated in everyway
otherwisee.....the stay only works to make it so the WCPD doesn't have to pursue
building a clien'ts case or deIense, but the RJC and RMC, etc. Plunge right ahead
in sheduling trial dates, etc., etc. , but just try and get a subpoena issued during a
stay, or get you public deIender to do anythign on your case....the emails and
records in the RJC Iiles indicate that ChieI Criminal Division Clerks Baker and
Wood lack much oI a conception oI what the stay is about or entails, though even
iI they did, it seems the would violate it in an attempt to please the WCPD, and
WCDA, ana perhaps, uh....others. Oh, wait...is that impugning the court? Why
doesn't RJC Judge CliIton view his Judicial Assistnat's 4/11/12 voluntary
submission to an adjudicatory body (the SBN OBC) as an extension Io the court?
And CliIton accuses Coughlin oI trying to have it both ways, or making a 'cake
and eat it too reIerence.
http://www.nnbw.com/ArticleRead.aspx?storyID18844 The media
attention related to a Nevada Supreme Court Opinion released one week beIore
Coughlin's summary eviction proceeding (the CG Wallace case See G.C. Wallace,
Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 262 P.3d 1135 (Nev. 2011) : 'Accordingly, NRS
40.253 must be construed as exempting summary eviction proceedings Irom the
doctrine oI claim preclusion in some instances.3(In 3We note this caveat because
preclusive eIIect would most likely attach to claims that are actually litigated
during the summary eviction proceeding. See Sewell v. Clean Cut 621 N.W.2d
222, 225 (Mich. 2001) (although a summary eviction judgment does not bar other
claims and remedies, it is conclusive on claims that are actually litigated)
http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/images/advanceopinions/127nevadvopno64.pdI
The more one looks at it, Chair Echeverria is like the typical StanIord
Legacy Admit, and the Iact that he only made it one year at StanIord speaks
volumes, as does his insistence that Coughlin being a National Merit Finalist
means nothing...In 1995, Reno High School had the most National Merit Finalists
oI any high school int he State oI Nevada with 7. A Iormer girlIriend oI
Coughlin's name Sarah Perry was one oI the other 6 NMF. She went to MIT, and
then became a lawyer, graduating Irom the University oI San Diego's law school.
One RHS student who was 'only selected as a National Merit Semi-Finalist went
on to be receive a Iull ride scholarship to Cal-Tech. There were Iour National
Merit Finalists in UNR's entering class in 1995-96. Coughlin spent his Iirst year
and a halI oI college at the University oI Washington aIter being rejected by Yale
(whose coach visited Coughlin's home during a basketball recruiting visit in 1995),
StanIord, Harvard, yada, yada. The students Irom RHS who got into StanIord in
1995 were not National Merit Finalist, and were not two-time All State in
basketball or there school's all-time leading scorer. There parents did go to
StanIord, however, like Chair Echverria's, whom swallows wholesale Hill and the
SBN's circular contentions that Coughlins' conduct in CV11-03628 was vexatious
(and the SBN's DowSoE limits the inquiry as Iar as Hill and his grievance go to
the appeal in 03628, not the trial court matter in 1708, and given both sides were
registered eIilers throughout the entirety oI that appeal, Hill's unsupported
allegations (seemingly all premised upon unsworn hearsay by unnamed
'employees ('my staII is terrori:ea by him`) as to Coughlin 'Iiling things he
doesn't serve and serving things he doesn't Iile is, on it's Iace, vexatious...is
eIiling...there is no dispute....Coughlin has been an advocate Ior court's and
opposing parties embracing technology more (the SBN's King reIuses to become
an eIiler with the Nevada Supreme Court and during a 3/26/12 in person meeting
with Coughlin indicated that he believe emails were sent Irom websites, rather
Irom another's email account. Further, RMC Judge Howard takes a particularly
luddite approach to electronic Iiling, and given the RMC's demonstrated attempts
to, uh, control all sorts oI aspects oI the cases beIore it, not much explanation is
needed Ior that. See Judge Howard's 12/16/11 Order in 22176:
Additionally, that same Notice Setting Hearing oI 1/18/12 demonstrates the extent
to which the RMC reIuses to apply the rules to the RCA and or the RMC's own
court appointed in house deIenders, where Lew Taitel was granted a curiously
silent Withdrawal where he Iailed to comply with RMC Rule 5(e), which requires
Motion Ior Order to Withdrawal to state, in writing, by motion, the basis Ior so
moving. RMC Judge Gardner's reIusal to provide Coughlin at the 10/10/11
arraignment the names oI possible RMC court appointed deIenders Ior Coughlin's
express desire to do a conIlict check, resulted in a terrible conIlict and deprivation
oI Coughlin's conIidentiality where, at the time Taitel appeared in 26405 on
Coughlin's behalI, incident to a criminal trespass arrest oI Coughlin at the 121
River Rock St. address, Coughlin was suing Taitel and his business partners at
Nevada Court services in CV11-03126 incident to the wrongIul eviction in 1708.
Page 2 oI that 1/18/12 Notice Setting Hearing, under "Additional Court
InIormation" shortly aIter announcing the appointment oI Roberto Puentes, Esq. as
counsel, reads: 11/30/11 LEGAL DEFENDER RELIEVED: LEWIS TAITEL- -
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE LEGAL DEFENDER BE RELIEVED
FROM HIS/HER ASSIGNMENT TO THIS CASE". No Iurther explanation is
given and Taitel never Iiled anything in write seeking a withdrawl, and Puentes
own subsequent letter to Coughlin indicates reIusal to Iollow up on the prejudice
to Coughlin thereto or the impropriety thereoI.
RJC ChieI Criminal Clerk Robbin Baker wrote Coughlin's then WCPD
Goodnight on 2/28/12 (at which time Goodnight was aware oI the pendency oI the
2/27/12 Order Ior Competency Evaluation in 065630 and the import oI NRS
178.405 requireing the stay extend to any matter in any departments oI the RJC,
Coughlin is personally sure oI each oI those assertions) asking "Do you want this
case re-set as a Pre-trial or a trial?". Goodnight wort back on 2/27/12: "Please
leave it as a trial.".
DDA manages to, in a 2/28/12 email to Baker, Goodnight, and Coughlins
WCPD in 065630, Dogan, admit he is aware oI the stay under NRS 178.405 as to
all cases, and that "the subsequent date will depend on the results oI the
evaluation..." Though, at that time, a handwritten note on those email in the RJC
Iile indicates a "Go trial" was set Ior 5/7/09, and Goodnight Iailed to, despite
Coughlin's express desire, have the trial reset upon the Order Ior Competency
Evaluation remaining pending at the time oI the 5/7/09 trial in 063342, and where
Coughlin had been incarcerated wrongIully between 4/19/09 and 4/26/09 incident
to both the lies by Lake's Crossing Bill Davis and Sally Farmer, and the judicial
misconduct oI Judge Elliott on April 19th, 2012 in CR12-0376, and teh washoe
county jail depriving Coughlin oI his medications throughout his stay.
There may be an inIerence that the RJC and perhaps the 2JDC have
attempted to cover up or purposeIully ignore the Iact that Coughlin Iiled a Notice
oI Appeal both on 12/26/12 and 2/2/12 in 1708 as to the 12/20/11 Order Resolving
his 11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien in 1708 where the various
iterations oI the Docket Irom the RJC demonstrates that the two entries Ior
February appear to have been removed, where the most recent Iax oI 12/20/12 by
the RJC's Cheryl lacked those two February 2012 entries, though Coughlin's
repeated trips to the RJC and requesting and retaining various iterations oI that
Docket reveal that at one point there were the Iollowing entries noting Coughlin's
Iiling oI a Notice oI Appeal on 2/2/12 (and a tolling motion prior thereto would
have made that timely to whatever extent Coughlins 12/26/11 Notice appealing
that 12/20/11 Order is not accorded legal signiIicance.
Further, as to the allegations oI Coughlin's own alleged violations oI RPC
3.1 (Meritorious Claims), Rule 3.2 (Expediging), Rule 2.3. (Cando to Tirbunal),
and especially Rule 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Partny and Counsel) HIll and
Baker's Iilings and letters to Coughlin in relation to Coughlin's 11/16/11 Iiling oI a
Motion to Contest Personal Property lien, through their 11/21/11 Opposition
thereto and the 12/19/11 Opposition to Coughlin's Second Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien reveal an extremnely troubling and Iraudulent (coercive to
boot...even Judge SIerrazza at one point had to point out to Baker that "its the law"
in rebuIIing Baker's contention that he and Hill should be allowed to place all sorts
oI ridiculous restrictiosn on Coughlin's right to retrieve his property (insisting
upon a showing by Coughlin oI various things, like renting a uhaul, a crew,
etc.,etc. to avoid Coughlin's "cherry picking" only those items he wanted to Irom
the property and leaving the rest to be disposed oI and litigated in whatever
manner permissible under the law...NRS 118.460 was not to their liking, so Hill
and Baker coercively and Iraudulently attempted to legistlate on their client's
behalI).
Further, that same older style RJC docket, on page 5 oI 6, in the two
diIIerent entries Ior 12/27/11 (one by Cheryl E.) indicate a distrubingly lax
approach taken by both the Clerk and by Senior Judge Dannan that resulting in a
3/30/12 Order by Judge Flanagan that Iailed to address Coughlin's appealing the
12/20/11 Order Resolving Coughlin's 11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal
Property Lient...combined with a very suspect practice by Judge SIerrazza oI
calling clerk's as the court's own witness as to whether Couglin allowea the RJC to
schedule in a timely manner the hearing required by NRS 40.253(8).
Review the rationale provided by RMC Judge Howard in his 12/15/11
Order in 22176 Ior (admitted into evidence over Coughlin's objections at the
11/14/12 Hearing as Exhibit 10) actually presents a very good exampled oI the
double standard the RMC applies and Iurther demonstrates the extent to which
Judge Howard went out oI his way to deprive Coughlin oI due process given how
overly invested Howard was in damaging Coughlin's interests, thereby revealing
his impermissible bias even more than his violation NRS 1.235 in Iinding
Coughlin in contempt Ior moving to disqualiIy Judge Howard based upon his
evident partiality shortly into the 11/30/11 trial in 22176. The various CertiIicates
oI Service in that matter and the trespass prosecution in 26405 reveal an attempt
by the RMC to hid the Iact that electronical mail service was, in Iact, and accepted
manner oI service upon "governmental attorneys" such as RCA Roberts, and such
was, in Iact, utilized by the RMC. This Iact
Very curious what RCA Hazlet says about electronic service being
permissible under the RMC Ruless sometimes in his 3/21/12 Opposition to
Coughlin's Motion to Dismiss and the Iact that he never served that on Coughlin,
nor did Loomis...where Coughlin appeared in the matter while a licensed attorney,
especially where court rules seem to suggest that Coughlin's doing so does not
require an Order oI the court permitting it, which Iurhter undermines the tact
takeby by RMC judge Gardner in his Order #1 and Order #1 Irom 3/30/12 in
26405 and his bench commentary on the record on 4/10/09 in announcing that he
would not allow Coughlin to appear while Loomis was on the case. RCA Hazlett
has violated RPC 3.4 in Iailing to serve Coughlin his 3/21/12 Opposition, which is
vintage Hazlett-Stevens, whom is devoid oI any ethical content and whom assured
Coughlin when he called on or about September 14th, 2011 that the RCA did not
have anything Irom the RSIC (assuring Coughlin he had personally veriIied this
with suIIicient investigation to reasonably conclude he was being truthIul) under
after the 10/10/11 arriagnment, which is clearly disproven by the Iax headers Irom
the RSIC to the RCA in the very discovery utlimately propound one day aIter the
arraignment (the headers indicate the RCA was Iaxed materials (not Iully
propounded by the way, likely in violation oI Brady) Irom the RSIC on 9/13/11.
Further, the Notice Setting Hearing on 5/8/12 in 26406 expressly
commands the "deIense attorney" to Iile with the RMC the Order showing
Coughlin was adjuged competent to stand trial prior to the 6/18/12 trial
date...which Loomis never did, and its certainly not a pro se non attorney litigants
responsibility to do that Ior the RMC upon the RMC and Loomis coercively
requiring Couglhin to proceed with selI representation upon the 5/8/12 Order
granting Loomis's Withdrawal (without Loomis having expended one red cent
subpoening anybody Ior Coughlin or otherwise conducting any investigation,
reIusing to provide Coughlin anything in writing detailing his theory oI the case or
proposed deIense, expressly reIusing to make the argument Coughlin had provide
he and Puentes detailed explication thereoI with respect to the service and noticed
issues (see Coughlin's Iaxes to Puentes, transIerred to Loomis upon Puentes
withdrawing and the conversation on the record on Ithe 4/10/12 trial date between
Coughlin and Loomis at the start thereoI where Loomis Ilat out reIuses to make
any claim oI right deIense argument to the criminal trespass charge even where
there exists majority viewpoitn authority in support thereoI...with Loomis'
claiming the argument was not colorable because "there is no way in hell those
guys wanted you back on the property" (Iirst 90 seconds oI audio transcript
(certiIied) that Coughlin himselI bought Irom the RMC (the SBN provided some
"Screening Panel" leItovers months later....(which Chair Ecvheverria would nto
allow into evidence Ior any purpose...even where he allowed hearsay testimony
Irom a witness whose testimony was not noticed until the day beIore the hearing
on 11/13/12, NVB Judge Beesley, which consisted oI damning hearsay alluding to
other judges purported badmouthing oI Coughlin (so coumpound double hearsay
violative oI the multiple Canons and sections oI the Judicial Code oI Conduct
regarding the impropriety oI lending the prestige oI judicial oIIice Ior purposes
such as that King oIIered such testimony Ior (ie, to be a good little attack dog and
dispose oI Coughlin's 14th Amendment rights as expeditiously as possible, while
disenIecting the record, with the Chair's help, wherever possible.
As to Hazlett's 3/21/12 Opposition in 26405, it cites to NRCP 5, so....the
same civil Rules oI Procedure that RMC Judge Howard Iound so inapplicable to
Coughlin's case in 22176 where Coughlin cited to NRS 12.015 as one oI a number
oI basis Ior granting his Motion Ior court appointed Counsel and or Preparation oI
the Transcript at Public Expense.
Connection between Eastman's replacement attorney Freitage and Freitag's
nonsensical letter to Coughlin claiming to have troubling tracking down contact
inIo...with Eastman's partner in the deIrauding Io Coughlin and attach and IorceIul
wronIul eviction in the 074328 4/17/12 illegal lockout case against Nichols...and
Nichol's claim that his "buddy Davey Allison, ESq" told him the City oI Reno is
"out to get" Coughlin...and the Iact that Allison and Puentes share an oIIice and
that Iormer Sparks City Attorney Frietage (who hasn't exactly set Eastman's case
on Iire with his adovcacy and whom is Iorever barred Irom holding judicial oIIice)
also mentions communicating with Dan Wong, eSq. whom menacingly yelled at
Coughlin on 1/19/12 at the arraginment Ior 26800 and expressly indicated to
Coughlin that he would neither charte nor Iollow up on Coughlin's reporting to
him the exact statement RPD Carter, Jr, made about Richard G. Hill, Esq "paying"
him a lot oI money and Carter's arresting whom Hill says to arrest and doing what
Hill says to do, the Panel Chair Echeverria and RMC Judge Homles grew so angry
at Coughlin Ior repeating.
It is striking that, on the certiIied audio transcript oI the 4/10/12 trial date
in 26406, that RMC court appoiunted deIender Loomis choose the order oI issues
to address in the Iollowing order: 1. whether there is a basis Ior recusal as to
Judge W. Gardner. 2). (check this to be sure and the occurs within the Iirst 15
minutes oI the audio Iile, and mostly around the 12-14 minute mark) whether there
is a competency issue and the extent to which Gardner is aware oI Judge Nash
Holme's 3/14/12 grievance to the SBN against Coughlin, which Loomis avers to
Gardner contains indication by Holmes that she is bringing it on behalI oI and with
the Iull support oI the entire RMC and its Judges, and 3) Mr. Loomis' contention
that Coughlin has asked him to withdraw as Counsel. AIter Gardner makes and
attempt to disclose the extra-judicial meeting between he, Loomis, and City
Attorney Hazlett-Stevens near the start oI the record (mentioning that RMC Court
Administrator Cassandra Jackson had, just the previous day, brought it to
Garnder's attention that there was a youtube.com video Ieaturing Coughlin
oIIering extended commentary on the RMC, its staII, their salaries, but 'not really
much oI anything to do with this trespass case (as Gardner admitted to watching
the video Jackson presented to him; Gardner also admitted to being aware that
Judge Nash Holmes presented materials related to Coughlin to the SBN; and was
vague as to whether or nto he was aware oI any other RMC Judge or employee
also presenting such materials...(in a discussion with Coughlin, RMC Marshal
Roper avvered that he was not aware oI anything being sent directly Irom the
Marshals to the SBN, but rather materials perhaps being sent to the SBN Irom
those the Marshals provided to either RMC Judges or the Reno City Attorney's
OIIice.
Then, Gardner and Loomis go about an extended dance where they purport
to be provided Coughlin an opportunity to make as record as to his rationale or the
basis Ior Gardner recusing himselI, or the ineIIective assistnace oI Loomis or
issues realted to whether Loomis was himselI seeking to withdraw absent any
request by Coughlin (where Loomis alleges that Couglhin had asked him to
withdraw, a matter oI dispute between Loomis and Coughlin detailed in emails
between the two), only to then have Loomis or Gardner cut Coughlin oII an
prevent Coughlin Irom entering any speciIics into the record as the the basis Ior
the above mentioned areas oI concern or requests, with Loomis beign particularly
obstructive and prosecutorial in that regard (and Loomis was the Lyon County
District Attorney at one point, so...)
...At the start oI that 4/10/12 trial date is a very telling exchange between Loomis
and Coughlin wherein a bullying, gruII, condescending and mean spirited Loomis
snears oII Coughlin's questioing as to whether he brought with him (Ior the
purpose oI oIIering prooI Ior a claim oI right deIense to the trespass charge) a
letter Iorm Hill and Baker wherein a bill Ior the Iull rental value Ior the 'Iair rental
value previously assigned under the lease Ior 'Iull use and occupancy oI the
premises, including a provision in the Standard Lease Agreement explicilty
permitting the use oI the premises Ior a commercial purpose. Loomis dismisses
such an approach as 'Irivolous, noting to Coughlin 'yes they wanted money Irom
you, but there was no way in hell they wanted you back in there, to which
Coughlin replies 'so they wanted to double dip? By charging the same amount as
previously charged Ior 'Iull use and occupancy? (or something substantially
similar, might not be verbatim). Never mind the Iact that the remedy available to
the landlord even had the circumstances oI 11/13/11 been as he and Hill described
them (and that's a big 'iI) would be Iound in NRS 40.760 and Nrs 108.475, not in
RMC 8.10.010 or NRS 207.200, the trespass statutes, though, the void/stale nature
oI the various relevant eviction Orders in 1708 would makes those statutes and
Soldal v. Cook Co. Applicable to the conduct oI Hill and Merliss and likely the
RPD (though WCPD Jim Leslie was quick to inIorm Coughlin that pointing out
any police misconduct would surely result in retaliation by the Justice Court
Judges...that's Jim Leslie saying that, not Coughlin, to be clear). To this, Loomis
quickly turns on the bluster, rather then engage any any extended theoretical
discussion oI the legitimacy oI his claim that such a claim oI right deIense would
be 'Irivolous, despite the explicit provision RPC 3.1 allowing criminal deIense
counsel the most leeway Ior zealous advocacy under the law given that one's
personal Ireedom might be at stake, particularly where that is suIIiciently a
possibility to result in court appointed counsel being assigned to an indigent such
as Coughlin. Actually, that is required iI jail time is a mere possibility under
Aigersinger, Iound right in Judge Howard's Court's oI Limited Jurisidiction 2008
Bench Book (which, with all due respect, is woeIully thin compared to what, say,
CaliIornia, Texas, and Florida have to oIIer as to Bench Books...sure, CaliIornia
has 30 times the population, but why couldn't Nevada 'borrow some oI those
Bench Books? Or remix them? Certainly, Judges Howard, Nash Holmes, and
Elliott would be well served to review the sections in the CaliIornia Bench Guide
relative to the advisibility oI almost always granting a stay oI at least some length
prior to incarcerating an actively practicing, license attorney, such as Coughlin
was during all three oI those incarcerations summarily ordered by those judges (in
22176, on 11/30/11: Howard, 3 days; in 26800 on 2/27/12: Nash Holmes 5 days;
in 0376: Elliott: 8 days) particularly where, as in all oI those cases, Coughlin
pleaded with the Court Ior a stay Ior the speciIic purposes oI arranging Ior his
client's aIIairs to be prejudiced as little as possible. It certainly appearaed that all
three oI those judges were, some might say, using Coughlins' client's as pawns in a
game whereby the prejudice the Iace and damages they incurred could somehow
provide those judges to Iorward an agenda they sought to realize against Coughlin,
largely related to Coughlin suing WLS and Elcano and being a vocal opponent oI
the prosecutorial largesse and misconduct/lack oI adovacy by court appointe
counsel, that has plagued Washoe County to such an extent that in 2008 the
WCPD withdrew Irom the ECR program (surrounded by a rash oI media coverage
oI such indigent deIense deprivation criticism), whereby soon, Elcano and WLS
soon moved in to replaced the WCPD in an alliance with the WCDA's OIIice as
the new ECR contractor (with WLS contracting with or hiring Lewis Tatitle,
Loomis was curiously quick to inIorm Coughlin oI)..
The 5/8/12 Hearing in 26405 begins with a similar interaction between
Loomis and Coughlin where a bellicose Loomis is clearly peeved accusing
Coughlin oI reIusing to do Loomis's job Ior him (ie, investigate whether the
2/27/12 Order Ior Competency Evaluation that may or may not be the reason Ior
Gardner's suspending the trial on 4/10/12 (aIter he, the RMC, RCA Hazlett, and
Loomis got some things accomplished , some might say, Ior any agenda item other
than the deIense oI Coughlin
One lasting image oI RCA Hazlett-Stevens, Esq., will be what his, 6:30
secs into the certiIied audio transcript Irom 5/8/12 nobly seeking to push the
envelope as to just how big oI a question oI a deIendant's competency may exist
Ior it to still be permissible Ior a wiry, hard chargin', unctuous McGeorge bred
prosecutor like Hazlett-Stevens to still saIely persist in his prosecuting. (RCA
Hazlett was sure to 'put on the record that he Ieels quite strongly that 'there is a
diIIerence between competency to stand trial and competency to rpPersist in
puttin' in work Ior the City oI Reno in makin' it saIe 'gainst the scourage oI
charlatan squatter summarily evicted commercial tenant's whom had yet to
received back Irom the RJC the $2,275 in rent escrow that the RJC had
impermissibly ordered in its wanton pastiche oI all the most landlord Iriendly
aspects oI both summary possessory and plenary unlawIul detainer approaches to
eviction have to oIIer, EVEN WHERE NRS 40.253 EXPRESSLY FORBIDS
UTLIZING SUMMARY EVICTION PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
COMMERICAL TENANTS WHERE, AS THERE, THE LANDLORD'S
AFFIDAVIT PLED ONLY A NO CAUSE BASIS FOR SEEKING THE
EVICTION, AND ONLY A NO CAUSE 5 DAY UNLAWFUL DETAINER
NOTICE WAS OPERATIVE.'
At the 4:52 mark on 5/8/12 Couglin seeks to pin the RMC and Gardner
down as to what exactly was the basis Ior suspending the Trail on 4/10/12 (ie,
whether it was Garnder's
Add to Hazlett-Steven's gutter dwellign approach to competency ethics
I would like there to be a distinction on the record between somone's competency
to practice law and
Loomis: Its not your choice!..'Listen to what i tell ya!
Coughlin: well...what is my choice?
Loomis: to listen to what I tell ya!
Coughlin: Doesnt' the client have the right to with respect to the means..?
L: the outcome. What is the objective oI the litigation.
C: and you have control Io the tactics?
L: That's right.
C: So what are you going to say her
l I tell him you decline to disclose
c i dind'i said isn't that up the th
l you declined to disclose
c so you recollection is that the judge continued the last trial because there was a
pending evalluation in d. Ct
l absolutely
c and not that that was required by law but that (Loomis lets out a terrible sigh at
this point...) he Ielt that was appropriate just in light oI that, not in light oI
anything judge nash holmes did or told him
l that's right
BailiII: Please rise Ior the Hon. William Garnder, court is now in seesion.
Gardner: Good morning gentleman. We last appeared in this case on April 10,
2012 the day oI trial on this trespassing and leIt oII where I suspended the
proceedings when an issue arose as to Mr. Coughlin's competency, I beliee where
a hearing had been set Ior 4/19/12 with Judge Elliot. ' I receiveainIormation this
mornign simply that Mr. Coughlin had been Iound competent...
Next Garnder asks Loomis and and RCA Hazlett whether they have heard
oI or know anything regarding whether the competency issue had been resolved
and both Loomis and Hazlette indicated the didn't have 'any Iirm inIormation as
to that with Hazeltt indicating he had 'heard some things by word oI mouth..
Neither Hazlett nor Loomis exactly set the courts on Iire with ther RPC 3.2
prowess ther in Iailign to actually look up anything (even a www.ccwashoe.com
docket note...something...Judge Garnder notes that 'i was hoping somebody would
have something on this today...to which Loomis indicates he would be willing to
look it up in the publice record, but Gardner's stops him and indicates he thinks he
'has enough inIormation her based upon this Tiburon record to set this matter Ior
trial...
~I RECIEVED THIS MORNING VERSUS ~I DIDN'T CONTACT
ANYBODY I SIMPLY PULLED UP A TIBURON
FORM....CONTRADICTORY CHARACTERIZATION BY RMC 1UDGE
GARNDER AS TO HIS EXTRA-1UDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO EXTEND
THE AD1UDICATORY BOUNDARIES AVAILABLE TO HIM
' all i have i didn't contact anybody, I simply pulled up a Tiburon Iorm that is a
Washoe County jail thing available to the courts and all it says is 'competent
remand to Justice Court O.R. per Elliott was perIormed, deIendent to be release
per Judge Elliott, that's all it says, I am going to assume that Judge Elliott made a
Iinding somewhere on the record Iinding Mr. Coughlin competent, so I am going
to set the matter Ior trial at this time absent a Iinding on the record that that would
Ior some reason be inappropriate, Mr. Coughlin did you have something to add Ior
the record?
Coughlin: I believe it would not be okay because homes write sbn on your behalI
and aslo base on your sister's order that pased through you also now being a
grievance with the stat ebar but mostly in lgiht oI judge nash homles greivance
bring ing int o question competency and in Iact at the last hearing I thin that was
the ultimate Iactual circumstances resulting in your suspending this matter
pursuant to her reIering it to the bsn...to which Gardner is quick to indicqte that he
'thinks what suspend it was my making a Iinding that competnecy became an
issue.
Coughlin: so there is other matters in the RMC that are suspended right
now
At 6:48 mark Garnder: 'Those? I cant' speak Ior Judge Nash Holmes but
once I made a Iinding oI competency being an issue I notiIid in writing the other
departments oI the RMC...Once I conIirm with the District Court that there was a
competency Iinding, I don't intend to have any personal communications with
anyone there other than to conIirm
Coughlin: Yes sir your honor. So, I assume that Judge Nash Holmes similarly
notiIied you in writing as to suspending the proceedings beIore her as well?
Gardner: what is goign on with the SBN is unrelated with respect to hwat is going
on with the RMC
Coughliin
G: just nash holmes woul dhave had to make a Iinding on the record that your
competency came into question
Coughlin so you haven't made a Iinding on the record today indicating that you are
Iinding me competent?
Gardner: I haven't I have made or Iound a document on the Tiburon indicating that
you were Iound competent or that a District Court judge on this very issue
Coughlin: well, usually the adjudicatory boundaries are limited what have been
put Iorth to the court by counsel, notiIication
Garner, I am not following you Mr. Coughlin. Here is my ruling today. Its my
understadnign that a District Court Judge on this very issues probably has Iound
you competent based upon what Tiburon prinout indicates... I am going to set this
matter Ior trial.
RCA Hazlett: Ready to proceed, Judge!
The clerk asks eveyrbody some schedulign questions....
G. I want to set it RIGHT NOW... I want to get this matter concluded!
Coughlin: (at the 12 minutes mark) can i interject?,.
(Coughlin then mentions being denied counsel in matter before 1udge
Howard, ultimate 3 day incarcerat therin, then being evicted just before
that ...then arrested in this trespass case, then two days before howard trial
for trespass, then deneid continuance of 11/30/11 trial before 1udge Howard
~where I was arrested for shopliffting...I AM A LAWYER
G: Mr. Coughlin we are trying to get a trial date set her, this is not relevant
C: I think it is relevant, here's how... at no time has ever been an mention
made of Mental Health Court nor has that option ever been
pursued...something Mr. Loomis has never broached with me... howerad 3
day contmpet, arresest for
Then Loomis indicates he explored the MHC option with the City Attorney
and they weren't interested. Coughlin notes that the RCA's permission is not
required to transIer the case to MCH.
Its colder than a hooker's heart up in that Reno Muni Court, some might
say...
Then loomis interjects and Gardner notes that we leIt oI on 4/10/12 upon
the compenency suspension with the issue oI having Loomis removed or Coughlin
appearing as co-counsel...Garnder notes 'I am goign to gell you right now I am
not going to approve a co-counsel arrangement, as it will nto work to your
interests...I think that ultimately will work to your detriment and will work to
delay these proceedings as well, but beIore setting a trial date, last time you asked
to proced as your own attorney.
C: i don't believe that's corredt, I believe i asked asbout th co-counsel arrangement,
in order ot make the analysis oI whether to proced as my own attorney, given you
are reIusing to permit a co-counsel arrangment
G: we are not in a vaccum we are not goign to arrnage the schedule around any
inconvenience you may Iace upon having Mr. Loomis being removed as counsel
and whether you have a need ot obtain subsituted counsel, I just want an answer
RIGHT NOW TODAY! You brought this up last time on 4/10/12
C: I believ eI brough up the co-counsel arrangment then?
G: what is your take Looims on proceding, has the thing borken down liek with
Puentes.
Coughlin asks the preosepct os obeing able to have Loomis reovmed a week Irom
then iI he decides not to have it done on the present day....Garnder indicate sthe
trial would go Iorward regardless (without clearly indicating that Coughlin would
have the right to proceed without being handcuIIed with Loomis and getting into
the whle Layton, delay, too late in the game, your stuck with Jim Leslie approach
that occurred in the RJC in 063341, etc.
RCA Hazlett mes a 'cake and eat it to allegation against Coughlin there,
citing Loomis' suggesitn Coughlin's argument would be baseless (htat's not too
prejudicial now is it, Ior Hazlett to say that, and check iI Loomis every really said
that on the record or just in a sidebar with Coughlin that Hazlett may have
overhead or been told in private by Loomis (with oor without the judge presnet)....
Then Coughlin notes that the MCH option shoudl be explored beIore the removal
oI Loomis or coercive Iorcing oI Coughlin to proceed pro se...Gardner insists upon
disposing oI the issue oI whether to keep Loomis on or not beIore addressing a
transIer to MHC...Loomis is relieved, indicating Coughlin can dirve all the way
across town the Iollowing day to pick up the Iile (including the 3/21/12 Opposition
to Coughlin's Motion to Dismiss by City Attorney Hazlett that Loomis Iailed to
copy Coughlin on where Hazletter mailed it to Loomis only.
The Gardner attempts to make it more diIIicult Ior indigent pro se Couglin
to access justice, ruling that 'all pre-trial motions must be Iiled in person 2 aays
prior to the 6/18/12 trial aate ` There, Judge Gardner's evident partiality goes into
Iull blow metastasy given the Iact that RMC Rule 5 expressly , at that time
permitted Iilign by Iax and service theroI upon 'government attorneys' by either
fax or email, especially where Nevada law un NRS 172? provides pre-trial
motions are due only 15 days prior to trial...so its clear Garnder is attempting to
speed things up to advantage Hazlett, whom does nothing but criminal work in the
RMC , and disavantage Couglhin, whom had zero criminal law experience prior to
Judge Howard Iorcing Coughlin to deIend himselI and his law license being
subject to SCR 111(6) attack incident to the lies oI a shady walmart loss
prevention associate Thomas Frontino, whose name was subseuqently associated
with libelous allegations posted on news websites in the comments sections on
6/10/11 upon an Associate Press story being released in conjuction with this
Court's 6/7/12 Order Temporarily Suspednign Coughlin's law license, whwer a
'thomasIrontino attirbuted comments on a new websiee comments sections
makes competely Iasle allegations that Coughlin was then sanctioned Ior Iorging
(or somethign like that) a subpoena in the 11/30/11 walmart trial beIore Judge
Gardner, which was based upon an arrest that violates state law under NRS
171.1255, thereby exposoing RCA Roberts to allegation oI violatingin RPC 3.8,
4.3, 4.1, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 1.2, and 1.3, etc., etc., though one should not hold one's
breath waiting Ior the RMC Judges to suspend any oI RCA Roberts prosecutions
upon reIerring such matters oI Roberts misconduct and or her 'signs oI mental
instability, iI not serious mental health issues.. (much less any unattributed
unsworn hearsay regarding RCA Roberts living in her car and eating cat Iood) to
the SBN Ior a hit piece , some might say, on the order oI magnitude attempted
upon Coughlin there.
There seems to be a bit oI a problem with respect to whether Judge Gardner
was divested oI jursidiction upon becoming aware oI the pending Order Ior
Competency Evaluation in the 2JDC, stemmign Iorm the 2/27/12 Order Ior
Competency Evaluation in the RJC, on 2/27/12 at the very time that Judge Nash
Holmes could nto be located Ior the trial oI Coughlin in 26800 concernign the
three retaliatory traIIic citations issued by the RPD outside oI Hill's oIIice almost
immediately aIter Coughlin reported the apparent admission to accepting money
Irom Richard G. Hill, Esq., by RPD OIIicer Chris Carter, Jr., where, OIIicer
Carter, did in Iact (and he may have been jesting, who knows) say to Coughlin
shortly aIter placing Couglhin in handcuIIs upon eIIecting a custodial arrest oI
Coughlin on 11/13/12 at Coughlin Iormer home law oIIice.
(note: Gardner admits on the record that Judge Nash Holmes Iailed to notiIy, in
writing, all other departments oI the RMC oI her suspending 11 TR 26800 upon
her making a Iinding on page 4 oI her 3/12/12 Order (though dollars to donuts that
Iinding would not be characterized as being made 'by clear and convincing
evidence where even less strong a Iinding oI Coughlin's competency being an
issue would, under NRS 178.405/5.073, made the entire 3/12/12 Order void Ior
lack oI jurisdicition and even, perhaps, expose Judge Nash Holmes to judicial
discipline, or at last a lil' more continuing legal education training on competency
issues to go along with all that 'expertise she claims to possess with respect to
mental health care incident to her tenure with the Nevada Department oI
Corrections. It appears that Judge Nash Holmes (in a reoccuring multi-tasking
theme also seen in the work oI both W and L. Gardner and Judge SIerrazza)
sought to at once suspend 26800 and reIer the matter to the SBN to have Coughlin
summarily disbarred, and, perhaps, waterboarded or something (and Coughlin did
go to Torture Memo U., ie, Boyd School oI Law, Iormer home oI Bush White
House attorney Bybee). Shout out to ProI Lynne Henderson. ProIessor Douglas
Grant. ProIessor Halstuck.
At the 28 minute mark oI the Hearing oI 5/10/12 in 26405 Couglin points
out to Judge W. Garnder that he is aware that W. Garnder does not lack insight
into the very bankruptcy law issues connected to marital property settlements and
alimony issues that were the alleged underpinnings to his sisters 4/13/09 (laches,
much) Order AIter trial assessing Coughlin personally with attorney's Iees (not
sure how given 18.010(b) would require Springgate's client to be a 'prevailing
party which is not clear where, one, the ultimate 6/19/09 FOFCOL and Decree
oI Divorce in that matter recognized the viability oI Coughlin's citing to an ALR
article on the issue during the trial in 01168 (contrary to the Judge's Iindings in
the 4/13/09 Order) that established Coughlin's position vis a vis the
bankruptcy/alimony issues was the majority viewpoint throughout American
jurisprudence...also Coughlin ran the trial positiosn by WLS Board Member
Iamily law speciliast/cpa Todd Torvinen, Esq., whom signed oII on the positions
respecting the alimony/property settlement issue that Couglhlin ultimately took...
(really, more understanding oI why WLS then Board President and now NNDB
member Kathleen Breckenridge is notated as having picked up the cd oI the the
3/12/09 TPO Hearing wherein Coughlin upset the advocate 'Roxanne in the
CAAW run 2JDC TPO Advocate's OIIice (whom Judge Weller has be maligned
by as well Ior pointing out the inequity oI CAAW reIusing to allow male TPO
applicants inside the OIIice in certain instances...where Couglin advocated Ior Jose
Urbie where Mr. Uribe had strong photographic evidence, still onn Iile oI the
bruising and bitemarks he sustained including being hit by an alarm clock swung
Irom its electrical cord on mutliple occasions....to which Master Edmonson saw Iit
to required Uribe to take a drug test, to which Coughlin objected to (as
drug/alcohol use or dependecy is a de Iacto shorthand in the Iamily courts Ior a
lack oI Iitness as a parent, and in other sectors oI liIe, whether or not on actually
underperIorms or not, and even where normal sober people exists who are
completely devoid oI talent or work ethic and just continue to show up on time day
in day out to punch a clock and provide their tepid, perIunctory contributions to
great aplomb as though showing up on time was somehow the single most
important Iactor in any bottom line How would you Ieel iI you were a diabetic
and the vast majority oI your liIe people told you having regular blood glucose
level was the most valuable trait one could possibly exhibit? People with ADHD/
ADD and or MDD and or substance abuse issues have their own strengths and
weaknesses, but any such conditions should not provide bar counsel a shorthand,
quickdraw, easy ticket out oI according such individuals the due process any old
talentless normal hack is entitled to, right Biray?
The StuhhI decision is really Iatal to Judge Nash Holme's claims that
Couglin's condut was 'disruptive where the lion share oI the conduct cited (to
whatever extent any speciIics suIIicinet to satisIy Houston v. 8JDC can be said to
be Iound in any oI Judge Nash Holme's various Orders in 26800. Also, as to the
competency issue, the unattirubted hearsay Judge Nash Holmes Ielt appropriate to
include in her 3/14/12 letter to the SBN (wherein she pledges the 'Iull support oI
myselI and all the other RMC Judges and support staII (check iI verbatim)
wherein she alleges she 'heard he (Coughlin) may be living in his car somewhere
(suggesting a conversation between Judge Nash Holmes and RJC Judge Schroeder
as to the then looming 3/15/12 summary eviciton proceeding in RJC REV2012-
000375 that Gayle Kern, Esq. Violated RPC 3.5A in considering Coughlin's
detailed, lengthy Iiling oI 2/27/12 (well, the RJC didn't Iile stampe it in until
3/8/12, but....) wherein Coughlin clearly demonstrated that a deIault should not be
expected or taken absent Iurther attempts to contact Couglin as opposing counsel,
much less smugly smirk at him while crossing paths outside the courtrroms doors
on the cold morning oI 3/15/12 just aIter Kern had obtained a deIault Lockout
Order (yet where Kern had still not Iiled in the Landlord's AIIidavit, which, by the
way, may be Iraudulent to the extent that it seeks to recharacterize the basis Ior
and Notice provided respecting the 3/15/12 hearing considerin the Glazier v.
Justice Court diIIiculties Couglin detailed Iacing Kern in his 3/8/12 Iiling and the
about Iace in pleading apparent in that 3/15/12 landlord's AIIidavit that Kern never
served on Coughlin (neither did Hill or Baker in 1708 timely serve prior to the
hearing any Landlord's AIidavit) that may seek to allege the non-payment oI rent
all the sudden...
Its interest that Judge Gardner originall characterisize his apparent attempts
to do some independnet research on whether the quesiton oI Coughlins'
competency had been determined by characterizign his gather materials in an
attempt to extend ther permissible adjuciatory boundaries (reIerence Judge
Flanagan's citations Irom his 4/19/12 Order in Carpentier v. Aames (which
Coughlin took over aIter Loomis' Iirm obtained a Withdrawl once the money ran
out, with Coughlin being paid a grand total oI $1,500 Ior his work on that matter
versus something in the $7,000 range by Loomis' partners. (by indicating 'just this
morning I recievea`.. which he later then attempts to recharacterize as something
nobody 'gave him` but that he 'gathered on (his) my own. That's along the lines
oI Justice Springer' dissent in Lane v. Allstate vis a vis it taking three to have an
interception.
As Ior the Docket in 60975, would it be possible to have it emailed or Iaxed to
me? Barring that, how may I obtain a docket Irom that case? I recall asking the
SBN/OBC/Clerk oI Court Peters/NNDB/Panel (hereinaIter at all times everywhere
"SBNOBCCOCPNNDBP" or "Leviathan" Ior a docket in NG12-0204, NG12-
0434, NG12-0435 (at all times hereinaIter "0204") and not being provided one but
rather met with ridiculous threats oI abuse oI process as early as 10/31/12 by the
SBNOBCCOCPNNDBP, or , again " the Leviathan".
http://www.youtube.com/watch?vigQEVFuMPUU
I would like to access the ROA Irom 12/24/12 in 62337. This issue has come up
recently in a case I am on in the 2JDC in CR12-2025. I am not an eIiler in the
2JDC and the RJC Iailed to send me the ROA Ior RJC2011-063341's appeal in
CR12-2025...but the WCDA's OIIice DDA Young is an eIiler in the 2JDC, so he
received the ROA via eIiling, thereIore creating an impermissible advantage, some
might say.
Now, I am the eIiler in 62337, yet the ROA is not available to me, despite being
listed as a party and or attorney oI record or counsel, and I am subject to the
deadlines involved, and the SBN's OBC/Clerk oI Court completely Iailed to
transmit the entirety oI Volume 3 oI that ROA to me.
AS to the Order Dismissing Appeal in 60317 on 11/26/12: 194. 3060 - Ord
Granting Mtn ... 13-Jan-2012 Extra Text: TO DISMISS COMPLAINT (AS TO
DEFENDANT COMMITTEE TO AID ABUSED WOMEN) -...17-Jan-2012
Extra Text: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER - ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO DISMISS FOR INSUFFICIENT SERVICE OF PROCESS - KATHY
BRECKENRIDGE...17-Jan-2012 Extra Text: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER -
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR INSUFFICIENT SERVICE
OF PROCESS - PAUL ELCANO 4085 - Summons Filed 02-Feb-2012Extra Text:
COMPLAINT SERVED ON TODD TORVINEN AND PAUL ELCANO ON
10/27/11 - (so, the whole appeal in 60317 may be rendered rather moot
considering all the 1/13/12 Orders Granting the Various Motions to Dismiss were
made without consideration Io the Iact that at least Torvinen, arguably and OIIicer
or Director suIIicient to eIIect service upon WLS as a corporation, as appropriately
served on 10/27/11 (and thereIore timely served within the 120 days limtiations
period) as shown in the 2/2/12 Iiling oI the Summons served by Fitzhenry. Then,
there is this: Notice oI Appeal Supreme Court 15-Feb-2012Extra Text:
APPELLANT, ZACHARY COUGHLIN. So, on 2/15/12 Coughlin Iiles a Notice
oI Appeal in his wrongIul termination lawsuit against CAAW and WLS/Elcano,
RMC Judge Nash Holmes and NVB Judge Beesley's classmate Irom McGeorge
School oI Law back in 1977. And with that, Coughlin proceeding to a "simple
traIIice" citation trial beIore Judge Holmes on 2/27/12 which resule in the 5 day
summary incarceration and the conIiscation oI Coughlin's cell phone and
smartphone as detailed in Coughlin's 3/30/12 Iiling beIore Judge Beelsey in NVG
10-05104, Cadle Co. v. Keller..
This became an issue in CV11-03628 (now on appeal in 60331 and 61383) with
respect to a 1/4/12 Supplemental to Appeal Irom Justice Court Proceedings where
the RJC's Appeal Receipt as provided in pdI merely listed some documents, but
did not actually included them, which, oI course, became hugely important and
resulted in a Iootnote in Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order denying Coughlin's
appeal oI that summary eviction Irom his Iormer home law oIIice. Page 5 oI that
3/30/12 Order contains a Iootnote that explains: "...un addition, because Coughlin
failed to timely file his notice of appeal regarding the personal property lien,
see NRS 40.253(8), and because Coughlin's notice oI appeal fails to identify an
error regarding the court's procedure in setting a hearing on this issue, this
Court will no consider this issue." However, a review oI the materials that were at
least inaexea in the 1/4/12 Supplemental to Justice Court Appeal Iiled in CV11-
03628 clearly reveals that Coughlin did timely submit Ior Iiling on 12/26/12 a
Notice oI Appeal to Judge SIerrazza's Order Resolving DeIendant's Motion to
Contest Personal Property Lien and that Coughlin's Opening BrieI does, in Iact,
"identiIy an error regarding the court's procedure in setting a hearing" (never mind
the Iact that even without any such error in setting such a hearing...the Order
stemming thereIrom is still appealable on any number oI grounds.
I do not believe it is appropriate Ior the RJC or any court to suggest that a party
should have all the documents that are being transmitted on appeal as an
ROA...For instance, with the 12/24/12 ROA by the SBN/Clerk oI Court Peters in
62337...how would I know that page 216 had been slipped in there?
The SBN Iailed to include a 60 page Index in the Volume 3 that it never provided
me incident to the 12/24/12 Iiling. Further, many cd/dvd attachments to my Iilings
in that matter, I am told, by Clerk Castillo, are not in the ROA. I believe the ROA
is deIicient in this matter, perhaps Iraudulently so.
All oI the SBN's histrionics and melodrama related to the Extended Order oI
Protection obtained Irom an RJC that is entirely to conIlicted here to be making
rulings limiting the means by which I am able to communicate with an opposing
party and or Iile documents or seek extensions or stipulations where time is oI the
essence...and not just with an opposing party, but with a "Clerk oI Court" as the
SBN's Laura Peters hold herselI out to be, as does the SBN and OBC hold her out.
In an eIIort to avoid an ex parte communications accusations (though Bar Counsel
King readily admits to having those all the time with the Panel...and to controlling
the Clerk oI Court Peters (coercing her into the 10/9/12 AIIidavit oI Laura Peters,
which, according to the bates stamps oI the "Iile" provided by the SBN on 11/8/12
was only placed into the "Iile" on 10/31/12, as the Iilings in the interim between
those dates have a bates stamping indicating that 10/9/12 AIIidavit oI Laura Peters
(which lacks a caption and is not attached to any Iiling by the SBN or Panel).
II the SBN and or Clerk oI Court Peters is going to be eliminating a 60 page index
Irom the OIIicial Transcript, or dropping in page 216 on Volume 1 (which is
hugely inappropriate considering the Iact that page 216 oI Volume 1 is a USPS
Track & ConIirm printout the SBN printed just aIter Coughlin alerted it to the Iact
that the downtwon Reno postal station at Iirst Iailed to Iind, then reIused to
provide Coughlin with the SBN's 10/9/12 mailing to Couglhin given the
insuIIiciency oI the postage attached thereto, and the circumstances related to the
SBN placing insuIIicient postage on that 10/9/12 Notice oI Intent to Take DeIault
and receiving it back Irom the USPS with a "insuIIicient postage"/return to send
handwritten note that Coughlin personally saw USPS downtown station counter
clerk "Tim" aIIix to that large manilla package (which brings up the Iact that the
Reno Carson Messenger Service unsworn quasi-AIIidavit oI Attempted service
was not a part oI that 10/9/12 NOITD, either, meaning that page 32 oI Volume 1
(the Reno Carson Messenger Service Receipt) oI the 12/24/12 ROA is another
instance oI the SBN/OBC/Clerk oI Court Peters/NNDB/Panel (my point is...there
is no point oI distinction between any oI those entities...they all bleed together
completely, with the main characteristic they share being that Bar Counsel Pat
King is permitted to Iraudulent and coerce them around into doing his bidding as
an attack dog Ior the rich and powerIul....Peters signs the CertiIicates oI Service
Ior all involved....Chair Echeverria's OIIice is in the SBN's back parking
lot...Peter's grants Coughlin permission to Iile by Iax on 9/11/12 at 4:48 pm (and a
review oI all emails and Iax conIirmations involved, and, uh...some other things
makes clear that Peters 10/9/12 AIIidavit oI Laura Peters is an
extremely troublea document, as is Bar Counsel's holding out the 8/23/12
Complaint and AIIidavit oI Service therein by Peters as something other than a
Iraudulent assertion oI service violative oI RPC 3.3, 3.4, and many oI the
provisions in the Model Code oI Conduct Ior Judicial Employees in the State oI
Nevada:
http://www.courtethics.org/Nevada20Model20Code20oI20Conduct.pdI
In that Model Code the appearance oI impropriety is reIerenced at length. On that
note, I reIerence the "Dispositional Order' entered by Clerk Lindeman that Richard
G. Hill, Esq. conveniently reIerenced in his testimony at the Iormal disciplinary
11/07/201
2
Order/Dispositional - Order
Dismissing Appeal
Filed Order Dismissing Appeal. To date, appellant has n
feeor otherwise responded to this court's notice. Accord
appearing, this appeal is dimissed.
Further, why is Coughlin's Motion Ior Order to Show Cause on page 44 oI Vol 1
not Iile stamped, even where the Panel Chair ruled on it in his 10/31/12 Order? Is
it permissible to issue a BrieIing Schedule on 12/24/12 where Motion Ior New
trial, NRCP 52, NRCP 59 tolling motions are pending?
IN RE: DISCIPLINE OF ZACHARY COUGHLIN 62337
Jan 25 2013 02:12 p.m.
Filed Order Granting Telephonic Extension. Opening BrieI due: January 30, 2013.
Jan 25 2013 03:51 a.m.
Filed Supplemental Motion Ior Extension and Exceed Page Limitations.
Dec 24 2012 08:32 a.m.
Issued Notice oI BrieIing Schedule/Bar Discipline. Due date: 30 days. II no opening brieI is Iiled, th
decision on the record without brieIing or oral argument.
I am not able to download those Iiles Ior some reason...are they truly Iiled?
https://eIile.nvsupremecourt.us/notiIy/12513020462337SUPPLEMENTAL
MOTIONFOREXTENSION.pdI?
page action GetNotiIierDocument&cmsDocId176338&caseNumber62337
I am trying to Iollow the rules as closely as possible against an opponent that
smugly and openly basks in an assertion that SCR 106 makes clear there are no
rules applicable to them...

10 2 12 to 1 25 13 written communications to nvcourts.nv.gov 0204 62337 063342 065630 maybe

As to what the public can see right now, versus what has been purported to have
been Iiled in this, a matter oI the public record:
Case InIormation: 62337
Short Caption:
IN RE: DISCIPLINE OF ZACHARY
COUGHLIN
ClassiIication: Bar
Lower Court Case(s): NONE Case Status: Bri
DisqualiIications: Panel Assigned: En
Replacement:
To SP/Judge: SP Status:
Oral Argument: Oral Argument Location:
Submission Date: How Submitted:
- Party InIormation
Role Party Name Represented By
Appellant Zachary B. Coughlin In Proper Person
Respondent State Bar oI Nevada Patrick O. King (State Bar oI Nevada/Re
- Due Items
Due Date Status Due Item
01/30/2013 Open Opening BrieI/Notice Issued
Docket Entries
Date Type/Subtype Description
12/24/2012 Filing fee- Filing feeWaived Filing feeWaived: bar matter.
12/24/2012
Record on Appeal Documents -
Record oI Bar Proceedings
Filed Record oI Bar Proceedings, Pleadings and
Transcript oI Hearings. Vols. 1 through 3.
12/24/2012
Notice/Outgoing - Notice oI
BrieIing Schedule/Bar Discipline
Issued Notice oI BrieIing Schedule/Bar Discipline
Due date: 30 days. II no opening brieI is Iiled, the
matter will be submitted Ior decision on the record
without brieIing or oral argument.
01/25/2013
Order/Clerk's - Order Granting
Extension Per Telephonic Request
Filed Order Granting Telephonic Extension. Open
BrieI due: January 30, 2013.
01/25/2013 Motion - Motion
Filed Supplemental Motion Ior Extension and Exc
Page Limitations.
For me, there is conIusion as I have received two diIIerent notices oI Iilings
related to my Motions Ior Extension oI Time to File BrieIs, where my original
submission was not Iiled, but then was Iiled, on top oI the Supplemental thereto
being "Iiled"...but now only the Supplemental is listed as Iiled....I belieI the
Record on Appeal Volumes 1 to 3 are supposed to be accessible to my as a party.
I Iind it distasteIul that the SBN chooses not to be eIilers (well, David Clark is...)
and rather wastes everyone's time and money by transmitting and ROA that
violates many rules (Volume 2 is WAY thicker than 2 inches permitted under
NRAP...especially considering the Iact that the SBN likes its duplex printing (kind
oI untoward where the SBN's OBC commands the Clerk oI Court to take a rigidly
Iormulaic approach to Respondent's appearing pro se, even where that means
making a liar oI Clerk oI Court Peters with respect to the permission to Iax Iile,
King's uh-oh moment on 10/9/12 when he received a written communication Irom
Coughlin pointing out that DCR 13(3) should be applied to King's Iailure to
oppose Coughlin's motion to Dismiss just as it was in Judge Flanagan's 6/25/12
Order granting Richard G. Hill, Esq. an astonishingly inappropriate $42,060 in
attorney's Iees Ior just the appeal oI a summary eviction proceeding in CV11-
03628 (and clearly, that 6/26/12 Order relies upon a Iinding that Coughlin Iailed to
Oppose the 4/19/12 Motion Ior Attorney's Fees Iiled by Hill's associate Baker,
rather than any express Iinding oI vexatious conduct on Coughlin's part (reducing
Bar Counsel King, Hill, and Chair Echeverria to quoting a mere procedural
recitation oI the arguments put Iorward by the parties in Judge Flanagan's 6/25/12
Order (the Hearing Exhibit King put on as his best evidence oI Coughlin's alleged
misconduct...ie, the star oI the show, the cleanup hitter...all oI which only shows
how thoroughly baseless and inappropriate this entire proceeding has been given
the utter paucity oI speciIics provided respecting just what was so vexatious or
unreasonable about Coughlin's positions, especially considering that the CG
Wallace case only came out seven aays prior to the 10/13/11 summary eviction
proceeding Irom which that CV11-03628 appeal stems and all the associate media
coverage detailing the murky state oI aIIairs respecting summary eviction law as
applied to commercial tenancies in Nevada.
The manner oI binding those Volumes 1 to 3 (again, Volume 3 was not provided
to Coughlin by the SBN or Clerk oI Court Peters, and despite Coughlin making an
appropriate SCR 119 request upon Bar Counsel Ior the Transcript, and even
oIIering to pay Ior it up Iront, immediately aIter the 11/14/12 Iormal hearing, Bar
Counsel King only responded to Coughlin's request on 12/18/12, insisting that
Coughlin must pay some is in no way conducive to enjoying that duplex
printing...Iurther, the extremely Iaint reproduction oI Coughlin's various Iilings
borders on Iraud (as they in no way, just like in 60302, are representative oI what
Coughlin actually submitted Ior Iiling) and THIS IS A LITIGATION HOLD
NOTICE TO THE SBN AND CLERK OF COURT PETERS TO MAINTAIN
THE ORIGINALS AS THE SAME NONSENSE EMPLOYED IN 60302 IS
BEING DONE HERE BY THE SBN (WHICH HAS QUITE A PICK AND ROLL
COMBO GOING WITH WASHOE LEGAL SERVICES AND PAUL ELCANO
OF LATE).
Further, this is a request Ior the SBN to indicate whom is and is not a "party" or a
"represented party" with suIIicient clarity as Bar Counsel King has purposeIully
Iailed to identiIy whom is or is not a party or grievant in the collective oI
greivances numbers that 62337 stems Irom..Is Hill a party? Does Coughlin have a
duty to avoid ex parte communications to Hill as they relate to 62337 where such
matters intersect with 60331 or 61383? Is Hill's Iormer associate Casey D. Baker,
Esq a greivant? Did Hill speciIy in some grievance he may or may not have Iiled
with the SBN, which he may or may not have signed, which may or may not have
been sworn, which may or may not be deemed to have provided notice to
Coughlin oI matters which may or may not have been testiIied to or alleged by
Hill and the SBN and which made there way into the FOFCOL oI 12/14/12, even
though the SBN's DowSoE oI 10/12/12 is very limited with respect to what Hill
would be testiIying to or the evidence he may provide. Should not the SBN be
stuck with the extent to which Hill's participation in the proceedings became so
ungainly and based upon such apparent misconduct oI his own (duty to withdraw
where lawyer likely to be a witness...curious apparent misstatements to RPD in
OIIicer Carter's police report (including the Narrative and Supplemental
Declaration and Hill's own Witness Statement) wherein Hill appears to be walking
the narrow beam associated with the desire to remain on as counsel oI record
where the neurosurgeon was payin' those record setting Iees despite a settlement
oIIer having been provided in writing to Hill and Baker that would have resolved
the matter Ior, arguably, around $1,500 (not a bad trade...$60,000 attorney feebill
to evict a tenant Irom a house not worth $80,000 while running the risk that the
wrong site surgery the physician's lawyer's perIormed (to borrow a medical
analogy Hill's client is sure to grasp) may expose Hill's client to the rather large
liability associated with ruining a patent attorney's career by wrongIully evicting a
commercial tenant under only a No Cause 5 Day UnlawIul Detainer Eviction
Notice where NRS 40.253 is quite clear that such a summary proceeding is
unavailable under such pleading. Hill, Baker, and their client, landlord Merliss
Ilew too close to the sun, wanting to have so many, many things, so many, many
ways...and down that primrose path RJC Judge SIerrazza Iailed to prevent them
Irom going, and any attempt to ameliorate the vast deprivation oI due process
attendant to Judge SIerrazza purporting to give Coughlin a couple extra days to get
his personalty out oI his Iormer home law oIIice now appears to be backIiring on
the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice, the RJC, the RMC, Hill, Baker, and Merliss,
the Reno Police Department, and the SBN, etc., etc. where NRS 40.253 clearly
requires that such summary eviction lockout orders (there are two, incidentally,
involved here, one oI 10/25/11 and one oI 10/27/11, and Baker's testimony at the
6/18/12 trial in the criminal trespass prosecution that RMC Judge W. Gardner
(whom SBN Bar Counsel King, as oI 10/15/12, was still claiming not to have been
aware is the brother oI 2JDC Family Court Judge Linda Gardner, see 53833, 54
Given the name checking oI Lawyers Concerned Ior Lawyers Chester Coe Swobe,
Esq. by NVB Judge Beesley (out oI concern, and all...just Iailed to mention his
going to law school in 1977 with WLS's Elcano and RMC Judge Nash Holmes at
McGeorge, or being a Iormer law partner to WLS's Karen Sabo, see 60302, 60317
and Coughlin's 3/30/12 Iilings in NVB 10-05104 beIore Judge Beesley detailing
the prejudice to Coughlin's clinet wrought by RMC Judge Nash Holmes
conIiscating, without a warrant or court order (thanks to the cooperation oI the
WCSO and WCDA OIIicer (not to mention DDA Watts-Vial being related to
2JDC Judicial Assistant and licensed attorney Laura Watts-Vial, Esq., and DDA
Watts-Vial eleventh hour objections to Coughlin's 10/30/12 subpoenas and
subpoena duces tecums upon various 2JDC Judges and Administrators, and DDA
Watts-Vials 11/13/12 441pm Iax to Coughlin indicating that he had provided Bar
Counsel King with "certiIied copies oI all the Orders"...combined with King's
initial Iraudulent contention that he had a certiIied copy oI Judge L. Gardner's
4/13/09 Order AIter trial (subsumed by her 6/19/09 FOFCOL and Decree oI
Divorce anyway, not to mention it being NRCP 60(b)(4) void where NRS
18.020(b) requires Springgate's client be a "prevailing party" (which he was not,
especially wher the 6/19/09 Decree ultimately had to recognize the legitimacy oI
Coughlin's argument by awarding alimony anyways....but by that time Couglhin
was Iired Irom WLS...so...but its curious how it took soooooo long Ior the Minutes
to get done in that Uribe v. Valdez Extended Protection Order (EPO) Hearing
beIore Judge L. Gardner's admitted best Iriend Master Sue Edmondson that had
the CAAW TPO OIIice Advocate Irothing with anger towards Coughlin Irom the
same day as the trial in DV08-01168 (3/12/08 in FV09-00886). Yeah, the 2JDC's
TPO OIIice, run by CAAW....the one that got so angry at Family Court Judge
Weller Ior criticizing its practice oI excluding male TPO applicants Irom its walls.
Especially curious given CAAW is a party in CV11-01955 (and thereIore in
60317), and Justice Cherry is a co-Iounder oI Lawyers Concerned Ior Lawyers
(with Coe Swobe and Ben Graham...and its Graham's presentation to the courts on
criminal procedure that really drove home to Coughlin that the Iailure oI
Coughlin's WCPD Dogan to appear at the arraignment on 2/14/12 in RJC
RCR2012-065630, as detailed in the 2/21/12 Iiling by Coughlin pled as a basis Ior
disbarring Coughlin by the SBN in its 8/23/12 Complaint (voluntarily provided to
the SBN by the RJC's Judicial Secretary Lori Townsend, in violation
Case InIormation: 60331
Short Caption: COUGHLIN VS. MERLISS ClassiIication: C
Related Case(s):
6
6
3
Lower Court Case(s): Washoe Co. - Second Judicial District -
CV1103628
Case Status: B
DisqualiIications: Panel Assigned: P
Replacement:
To SP/Judge: SP Status:
Oral Argument: Oral Argument Location:
Submission Date: How Submitted:
- Party InIormation
Role Party Name Represented By
Appellant Zachary Coughlin Zachary B. Coughlin
Respondent Matthew Merliss Richard G. Hill (Richard G. Hill, Chartered
Docket Entries
Date Type/Subtype Description
02/29/2012 Filing fee- Filing feedue Filing feedue.
02/29/2012
Notice oI Appeal Documents -
Notice oI Appeal
Filed Notice oI Appeal. Appeal docketed in the
Supreme Court this day.
02/29/2012
Notice/Outgoing - Notice to Pay
Supreme Court Filing Fee
Issued Notice to Pay Supreme Court Filing Fee. N
action will be taken on this matter until Iiling feeis
paid. Due Date: 10 days.
02/29/2012
Notice/Outgoing - Notice to File
Case Appeal Statement/Civil
Issued Notice to File Case Appeal Statement/Civil
Due date: 10 days.
03/09/2012
Order/Incoming - District Court
Order
Filed District court order. Copy oI Order Denying
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Iiled in distr
court on 3/8/2012 and Case Appeal Statement or, P
in the alternative, Motion Ior Extension oI Time to
Correct DeIiciencies in Appeal Papers.
04/09/2012 Motion - Motion
Filed Amended Case Appeal Statement and Reque
Ior Extension oI Time to Pay Filing feeand Bring
Filings into Compliance with Various Rules.
04/13/2012
Notice oI Appeal Documents -
Case Appeal Statement
Filed Case Appeal Statement.
08/27/2012 Motion - Motion Filed Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis.
08/27/2012 BrieI - Opening BrieI Received Appellant's Opening BrieI (via E-Flex).
08/29/2012 Motion - Response to Motion
Filed Response to Appellant's Motion to Continue
Forma Pauperis or Ior Extension oI Time to Pay Fi
Fee.
08/30/2012 Notice/Incoming - Notice Filed NRAP 26.1 Dislcosure.
09/06/2012 Fm,kiling fee- Filing feePaid E-Payment $250.00 Irom Zachary B. Coughlin
11/09/2012 Notice/Incoming - Notice
Received document entitled "Submission oI appen
and notice oI RJC's Iailure to Iile Notice oI Appeal
12/20/11 order on 12/26/11."
11/20/2012 Order/Procedural - Order
Filed Order. This court notes that the motion Iiled
this court does not comport with the requirements
NRAP 24, and the motion is denied. On September
2012, appellant paid the Iiling Iee. This appeal may
thereIore proceed.
|7| In support oI their contention that the matters contained in their complaint were
within deIendant's personal knowledge and should thereIore have been positively
admitted or denied by deIendant, plaintiIIs rely on the case oI Raphael Weill &
Co. v. Crittenden, 139 Cal. 488 |73 P. 238|. In that case the complaint alleged that
the plaintiII had sold and delivered to the deIendant, at the latter's special instance
and request, merchandise oI the value oI $429.98. The deIendant Iiled an answer
denying the allegations oI the plaintiII's complaint on the basis oI lack oI
inIormation and belieI. Subsequently the plaintiII moved Ior judgment on the
pleadings on the ground that the matters alleged in its complaint were presumably
within the deIendant's knowledge. The trial court granted the plaintiII's motion
and entered judgment on the pleadings and the Supreme Court aIIirmed this
judgment. Although the holding oI this case appears to be controlling in the
instant case, deIendant seeks to distinguish it and to avoid its application here on
the bases that (1) it was decided over 60 years ago in the days oI more stringent
pleading, and (2) it involved only a single transaction whereas the instant case
involves multiple transactions. Neither oI these arguments is persuasive. While
admittedly the Raphael Weill case is not a recent decision, the principle oI law
stated therein that denials cannot be made on inIormation and belieI as to matters
presumptively within the deIendant's knowledge has been stated and applied in a
number oI more recent decisions. (See e.g., Zenos v. Britten- Cook Land etc. Co.,
supra, 75 Cal.App. 299, 304; Goldwater v. Oltman, supra, 210 Cal. 408, 424-425;
Dietlin v. General American LiIe Ins. Co., supra, 4 Cal. 2d 336, 349; Bence v.
Teddy's Taxi, 112 Cal.App. 636, 643 |297 P. 128|; Taylor v. Newton, supra, 117
Cal. App. 2d 752, 760.) In |242 Cal. App. 2d 793| any event, Raphael Weill, being
a decision oI the Supreme Court, is binding on this court and must be Iollowed by
us. (Stoneman v. Fritz, 34 Cal. App. 2d 26, 31 |92 P.2d 1035|; Auto Equity Sales,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455 |20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937|;
Estate oI Maguire, 14 Cal. App. 2d 388, 390 |58 P.2d 209|.) As to deIendant's
attempt to distinguish Raphael Weill Irom the instant case on the basis that the
Iormer involved a single transaction while the latter involves multiple
transactions, we Iind nothing in the Raphael Weill case indicating that the $429.98
allegedly due to the plaintiII Irom the deIendant resulted Irom a single sale oI
merchandise rather than Irom multiple sales. |5b| In any event, even iI Raphael
Weill did involve a single transaction, we discern no reason Ior distinguishing it
Irom this case on such a Iactual basis. The rationale oI the Raphael Weill case is
that the deIendant was presumed to have knowledge oI whether or not the plaintiII
sold and delivered to the deIendant at his special instance and request merchandise
valued at $429.98. This rationale applies equally to single and multiple
transactions between parties.
In Zany the plaintiII sued the deIendant Ior $1,972.88, the balance due Ior
boarding the employees oI the deIendant, Ior Iurnishing the deIendant with
materials and teams and Ior perIorming certain services Ior the deIendant at its
special instance and request. All oI the denials in the deIendant's answer were
either on inIormation and belieI or Ior want oI inIormation and belieI. In holding
that the Iacts stated in the complaint were presumptively within the knowledge oI
the deIendant, the reviewing court stated as Iollows: "|T|he implication that the
deIendant has no positive knowledge whether it entered into a certain contract
with plaintiII to board its employees and to Iurnish said deIendant with a team at a
certain price, etc., and that plaintiII perIormed his part oI the agreement, and that a
certain amount oI money became due thereunder to plaintiII and that no part oI it
has been paid, is not to be tolerated Ior a moment. The assumption that deIendant
had no positive knowledge as to all these matters is opposed to common
observation and experience. ... II, when he is served with the complaint, he is
actually ignorant oI any material Iact which he ought to know, it is his duty to
become inIormed beIore he Iiles his answer. |Citation.|" (P. 376.) Similarly in
Bartlett it was held that denials as to nonpayment upon information and belief
are within the rule laid down in Mulcahy that " 'A deIendant is not at liberty to
|242 Cal. App. 2d 794| answer an allegation in this Iorm, when he may be
presumed to know or when he is aware beIore answering that he has the means oI
ascertaining whether or not such allegation is true.' " (P. 375.)
|1b| Adverting to the instant case in the light oI the Ioregoing principles we
conclude that deIendant's answer should have positively admitted or denied the
allegations oI plaintiIIs' complaint. The Iacts as to whether goods were sold and
delivered by plaintiIIs to deIendant and whether deIendant made any payments to
plaintiIIs Ior such goods are matters presumptively within deIendant's knowledge.
II, when deIendant was served with the complaint, he was actually ignorant oI the
items oI the account or oI the payments, iI any, made Ior such items, it was his
duty to become inIormed beIore he Iiled his answer since these were material Iacts
which he should have known. |8a| Since the complaint was Iramed in the Iorm oI
common counts, deIendant was entitled to demand a bill oI particulars under
section 454, requiring plaintiIIs to Iurnish deIendant with the details regarding the
items charged against him. (See Pike v. Zadig, 171 Cal. 273, 276-277 |152 P.
923|; Salinas Valley Lumber Co. v. Magne-Silica Co., 159 Cal. 182, 186 |112 P.
1089|; Farwell v. Murray, 104 Cal. 464, 466 |38 P. 199|; and see Lewin v. Merck
& Co., Inc., 209 Cal. App. 2d 131, 133 |25 Cal.Rptr. 619|.) As stated in Meredith
v. Marks, 212 Cal. App. 2d 265, 269 |27 Cal.Rptr. 737|: |9| "The rationale oI the
requirement oI our code system oI pleading that a bill oI particulars be Iurnished
upon demand in connection with litigation concerning accounts is that such a bill
oI particulars ampliIies the pleadings to which it relates in the nature oI a more
speciIic allegation oI the Iacts claimed to exist." |10| It has also been said that the
purpose oI a bill oI particulars is to apprise the deIendant oI the details oI the
plaintiII's claim in order that the deIendant may intelligently present his deIenses.
(Butler Bros. v. Connolly, 204 Cal. App. 2d 22, 24 |22 Cal.Rptr. 175|; Gilmore v.
Hill, 152 Cal. App. 2d 881, 882-883 |313 P.2d 898|.)
|11, 12| While it is true that a demand Ior a bill oI particulars does not extend the
time to answer (SvistunoII v. SvistunoII, 108 Cal. App. 2d 638, 641 |239 P.2d
650|; Steineck v. Coleman, 72 Cal.App. 244, 248 |236 P. 962|), and while it is not
the equivalent oI a demurrer (Butler v. Robinson, 76 Cal.App. 223, 225 |244 P.
162|), such demand resembles a demurrer Ior uncertainty "in that each has a
pleading purpose, i.e., each represents an attempt by the deIendant to |242 Cal.
App. 2d 795| ascertain how to Irame his answering pleading" (2 Witkin, Cal.
Procedure (1954) Pleading, 242, p. 1218). In the instant case deIendant
apparently misconceived his remedy since the record discloses that upon the Iiling
oI the demurrer to his answer, and pending the hearing thereoI, he sought to obtain
inIormation as to the items oI the accounts charged against him by requesting
answers to certain written interrogatories Iiled and served upon plaintiIIs. In. 2
|13| While modern discovery devices may serve the same purpose as a bill oI
particulars, it should be noted that the primary purpose oI discovery is the
production oI evidence Ior use at the trial while that oI a bill oI particulars is to
ampliIy the complaint "in order to make it easier Ior the deIendant to prepare his
pleading." (2 Witkin, supra, p. 1219; see 6 Wigmore, Evidence, 1848, p. 388.)
|8b| It is apparent that in the case at bench deIendant had access to a legal
procedure by way oI demand Ior a bill oI particulars which aIIorded him a means
oI obtaining positive knowledge oI the Iacts charged in the complaint. In reaching
this conclusion we are not unmindIul that it might be necessary Ior a deIendant to
procure an extension oI time pursuant to section 1054 within which to plead to the
complaint pending the delivery oI the bill oI particulars, and that such an extension
might not be granted by the court in the exercise oI its discretion. However, in
light oI the liberal attitude oI modern courts in granting extensions oI time to plead
upon a showing oI good cause, we doubt that a court would, within the limitations
oI its power, reIuse to grant an extension oI time to plead to a complaint upon
being apprised that a demand Ior a bill oI particulars had been made. |14|
Assuming arguendo that such an extension is reIused or that Ior some reason the
bill is not delivered within the time the court is empowered to extend the time to
plead, this circumstance, together with the other circumstances indicating actual
ignorance oI the Iacts which the deIendant ought to know, should be pleaded in
the answer in explanation oI the deIendant's inability to deny the allegations oI the
complaint positively in order to obviate the eIIect oI the rule here under
discussion. (See Zany v. Rawhide Gold Min. Co., supra, p. 376; Brown v. Scott,
25 Cal. 189, 196; 2 Witkin, supra, 523, pp. 1515, 1516.)
DeIendant argues that iI his answer be deemed insuIIicient |242 Cal. App. 2d 796|
the trial court should not have entered judgment without Iirst giving him an
opportunity to amend his answer. |15| In CaliIornia it appears that there are two
basic situations in which the trial court must grant leave to amend beIore granting
a motion Ior judgment on the pleadings. The Iirst is that described and discussed
in MacIsaac v. Pozzo, supra, 26 Cal. 2d 809, 815-816, as Iollows: "|W|hen the
Iacts stated indicate that the party probably has a good cause oI action or deIense,
but that it has been pleaded imperIectly or deIectively, and the deIects have not
been called to his attention by demurrer or by a notice oI motion Ior judgment on
the pleadings, the court should not grant the motion without Iirst giving the party
an opportunity to elect whether he will stand on his pleadings or amend them. The
granting oI the motion without leave to amend would in many cases be an absolute
denial oI justice, and is directly opposed to the policy oI the law that cases should
be tried and decided on the merits." (See also Cruise v. City & County oI San
Francisco, 101 Cal. App. 2d 558, 561-562 |225 P.2d 988|; cI. Hardy v. Admiral
Oil Co., 56 Cal. 2d 836, 841-842 |16 Cal.Rptr. 894, 366 P.2d 310|.)
The other situation in which leave to amend should be allowed beIore granting
judgment on the pleadings is that situation where the deIective pleading has
previously been upheld against a general demurrer. This situation was discussed in
Shabrick v. Moore, 195 Cal. App. 2d 56, 60 |15 Cal.Rptr. 310|, as Iollows: "The
need Ior allowing an opportunity to amend is particularly apparent where, as in the
instant case, the complaint has already been upheld against a general demurrer. As
said by Witkin: '... It would seem even more true that, aIter a complaint or answer
has been held suIIicient by a law and motion judge, iI the trial judge decides
otherwise on a motion Ior judgment on the pleadings, an opportunity to amend
should be allowed. ...' (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) Proceedings Without trial,
74, p. 1711.)"
Judge SIerrazz'a Note Order (which, even aIter the 4/1/13 Supplemental
(the second attempt thereoI by th eRJC) still is not in the materials transmitted to
the District Court) mistakenly applies the 'within 10 days to move Ior a stay in
NRS 40.380 to a summary eviction (ie, where there is no 'judgment such as
mentioned in NRS 40.380). Theoretically, Coughlin could still Iile Ior a stay
under NRS 40.385, and that may be why Merliss did not rent the property out until
shortly aIter the 11/9/12 Order by Clerk Lindeman dismissed the appeal in 61383
(a Order which was premised upon the mistaken view that the 9/6//12 payment oI
the $250 Iilign (contrary to what the 2JDC docket and receipt indicates) was,
counterintuitively, applied to the one oI the two appeals thereIrom in which
Coughlin had Iiled a Motion to Proceed IFP with the Supreme Court...rather, that
$250 was to pay the Iilign Iee Ior the notice oI appeal Iiled on 7/31/12, Ior 61383,
no 60331.
Additionally, the RJC printed out and placed in the Iile in 1708 the
12/22/11 emails between Baker, Judge SIerrazza and Coughlin, though such is
missing, again, Irom what was sent to the 2JDC by the RJC.
Judge SIerrazza prejudiced Coughlin by only starting the Trial at the
appropriate place (ie, making the landlord meet the initial burden to show he was
entitled to utilize a summary procedure Ior a no cause eviction) halIway throught
the trial. Then, Judge SIerrazza Iurther committed reversible error by limiting
Coughlin to what subjects he could address in his deIense in chieI, limiting
Coughlin to only addressing the retaliation issues, preventign Coughlin Irom
putting on evidence that the lease had not 'expired (and any notice oI termination
was deIicient were it misstated the term oI the lease and reality oI whether or not
the lease had 'expired). Judge SIerrazza Iurther announced beIore even makign
Merliss put on evidence what he would required Coughlin to prove (indicating,
like Judge CliIton did in on 2/13/12 in RCR2012-065630, that he had already
made op his mind beIore Coughlin even got to put on his case). Additionally,
Merliss's testimony was patently Ialse in conjunction with the lease in evidence.
Merliss testiIied that the term oI the lease was 'Ior 12 months when the lease
explicitly contradicts that in that it indicates, in paragraph 2, that the term is Ior
'no less than 12 months. There is a diIIerence and Baker and Merliss knew that
and went out oI there way to mislead the Court. Baker lied to the Court in
asserting that Merliss's 'UnlawIul Detainer AIIidavit had been Iiled previous to
the 10/25/11 hearing when it plainly had not.
I. CREATION AND EXISTENCE OF THE RELATION, e:::~1-19.
II. LEASES AND AGREEMENTS IN GENERAL, e:::~20--49.
(A) REQUISITES AND VALIDITY, e:::~20-35.
(B) CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION, e:::~37-49.
V. TENANCIES FROM YEAR TO YEAR AND MONTH TO MONTH,
e:::~113-116.
VII. PREMISES, AND ENJOYMENT AND USE THEREOF, e:::~121-180.
VII. PREMISES; AND ENJOYMENT AND USE THEREOF-Cont'd
(B) POSSESSION, ENJOYMENT, AND USE, e:::~126-144. .
(D) REPAIRS, INSURANCE, AND IMPROVEMENTS, e:::~150-161.
(E) INJURIES FROM DANGEROUS OR DEFECTIVE CONDITION,'
e:::~162-170.
(F) EVICTION, e:::~171-1S0.
VIII. RENT AND ADVANCES, e:::~181-274.
(A) RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES, e:::~181-216.
IX. RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY OF POSSESSION BYLANDLORD,
e:::~275-31S.
I. CREATION AND EXISTENCE OF THE RELATION.
11. --Occupancy incident to employment.
II. LEASES AND AGREEMENTS IN GENERAL.
(A) REQUISITES AND VALIDITY.
25.3. Delivery and acceptance.
27. Validity of assent in general.
28. Fraud.
(1). In general.
(2). Concealment.
29. Legality oI object.
(1). In general.
30. Limitation oI term.
33. ModiIication.
35. Right to contest validity.
V. TENANCIES FROM YEAR TO YEAR AND MONTH TO
MONTH.
113. Nature and incidents oI tenancy.
114. Creation oI tenancy Irom year to year.
(1). In general.
(2). Void or defective leases or contracts.
(3). Tenant holding over after expiration of term for a year or years.
115. Creation oI tenancy Irom month to month.
(3). Tenant holding over aIter expiration oI term.
116. Termination.
(.5). In general.
(1). Tenancy Irom year to year in general.
(2). Notice to terminate tenancy Irom year to year.
(3). Waiver oI notice.
(4). Tenancy Irom month to month in general.
(5). Notice to terminate tenancy from month to month.
(6). Waiver of defects in notice.
(7). Waiver by landlord oI termination by notice.
VII. PREMISES, AND EN1OYMENT AND USE THEREOF.
(B) POSSESSION, EN1OYMENT, AND USE.
134. Use oI premises.
(.5). In general.
(1). Mode oI use in general.
(2). Restrictions in lease as to mode oI use.
(3). Purpose Ior which premises may be used.
(5). InterIerence with use by landlordor others.
(6). Actions by landlord.
140. Injuries to premises.
140.1 . -- In general.
141. -- By landlord.
142. --. By third persons.
(1). In general.
(4). Obstruction oI way.
(5). Liability of landlord.
(6). Actions in general.
(7). Damages.
(8). Right oI tenant to abate nuisance.
144. Duty of tenant to surrender on termination of lease.
(D) REPAIRS, INSURANCE, AND IMPROVEMENTS.
150. Right and duty to make repairs in general.
(1). In general.
(5). Right of tenant to repair at landlord's cost.
151. Statutory provisions.
152. Covenants and agreements as to repairs and alterations.
(1). In general.
(2). Consideration Ior agreement.
(3). Construction and operation oI covenants in general.
(4). Nature oI repairs included in covenant or agreement.
(6). Right oI landlord to notice that repairs are necessary.
(7). Agreement by landlord to pay for repairs.
(9). Waiver oI claims under or stipulations in covenant or agreement.
(10). Right of tenant to repair and recover cost.
( 11). Alterations by tenant.
153. Mode oI making repairs.
154. Remedies for failure to make repairs and alterations.
(.5). In general.
(1). Nature and Iorm oI remedy.
(2). Right of action and defenses.
(3). Pleading and evidence.
(4). Damages.
(5). Trial.
160. Condition oI premises at termination oI tenancy.
(1). In general.
(2). Covenants and agreements as to condition oI premises on termination
oI tenancy.
161. Personal property on premises at termination of tenancy.
(1). In general.
(2). Care oI property leIt on premises by outgoing tenant.
(3). Actions to recover property or value.
(E) IN1URIES FROM DANGEROUS OR DEFECTIVE CONDITION.
162. Nature and extent oI landlord's duty.
(2). Injuries due to Iailure to repair.
166. Injuries to property oI tenant on premises.
(.5). In general.
(1). Nature and extent oI the duties oI landlord and tenant respectively.
(3). Injuries due to Iailure to repair.
(6). Injuries due to negligent acts oI landlord.
(7). Injuries due to negligence oI third persons in general.
(5). Injuries due to openings, deIects, or obstructions in walks or streets.
(
(F) EVICTION.
171. Nature oI eviction.
180. Actions Ior damages by tenant.
(.5). In general.
(1). Right oI action and deIenses.
(2). Time when right oI action accrues.
(3). Parties, pleading and evidence.
(4). Damages.
(S). Amount oI recovery.
(6). Trial.
VIII. RENT AND ADVANCES.
(A) RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES.
184. Deposits and other security by tenant.
(2). Deposits.
196. Holding over after expiration of term.
200.9. Tenant holding over.
200.18. -- Business or commercial use.
200.26. -- Fair rental value.
200.28. -- Deduction of expenses, maintenance and repairs.
211. Abatement.
212. Payment.
213. -- In general.
(1). In general.
(2). Payment by making repairs.
IX. RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY OF POSSESSION BY
LANDLORD.
275. Right to retake possession in general.
278.4. -- Persons and premises subject to regulations.
(.5). In general.
(1). Business or commercial space.
(3). Occupancy for dwelling purposes .
278.9. -- Violation oI tenancy.
(2). Illegal or unauthorized use or occupancy.
278.10. -- Notice to terminate tenancy or surrender possession.
(1). In general.
(2). Service of notice.
(3). Sufficiency of notice.
278.12. -- Certificate of eviction.
(1). In general.
(2). Necessity.
(3). Operation and eIIect.
278.13. -- Pleading.
278.14. -- Evidence.
(.5). In general.
(1). Presumption and burden of proof.
(2). Admissibility.
(3). Weight and sufficiency.
(3.1). -- In general.
(4). -- Good Iaith oI landlord.
(5). -- Violation oI tenancy.
278.15. -- Questions of law and fact.
279. Actions for recovery of possession.
279. 1 . -- In general.
280. -- Nature and Iorm.
280.5. -- Right to maintain action.
281. -- Grounds.
282. -- Conditions precedent in general.
283. -- Demand or notice to quit.
284. -- Defenses.
(1). In general.
(2). Set-off and counterclaim.
284.5. -- Injunction against or stay of proceedings.
285. -- Jurisdiction and proceedings
(1). In general.
(2). Time to sue.
(3). Pleading.
(4). Evidence.
(S). Trial.
(6). 1udgment and enforcement thereof.
(7). Review.
(8). Redemption.
(9). Costs.
286. Damages ..
287. Actions for unlawful detainer.
287. 1. -- In general.
289. -- Statutory provisions.
290. -- Right of action and defenses.
(.5). In general.
(1). Existence oI relation oI landlord and tenant.
(2). Grounds oI action.
(3). Defenses and grounds of opposition in general.
(4). Invalidity of lease:
290.5. -- Injunction agaipst or stay of proceedings.
291 . -- Jurisaiction ana proceeaings.
(.5). In general.
(1). Necessity and sufficiency of demand or notice in general.
(2). Service oI notice.
(3). Waiver of objection as to sufficiency of notice.
(6). Necessary and proper parties.
(6.5). Jurisaiction.
(7). Time to sue and limitations.
(7.5). Process.
(8). Complaint.
(9). Answer.
(10). Issues, proof, and variance.
(11). Presumptions and burden oI prooI.
(12). Admissibility oI evidence.
(13). Weight and sufficiency of evidence.
( 14). Damages and amount oI recovery.
(15). Bonds.
(16). Trial.
(17). Judgment and enIorcement thereoI.
(18). Review.
292. -- WrongIul dispossession.
287. Actions for unlawful detainer.... 233k291(18) Review 233k293.
Summary proceedings. 233K302 jurisdiction in summary proceedings,
233K311. -- Warrant to dispossess, and execution thereof.
293.1. -- In general.
295. -- Statutory provisions.
296. -- Grounds and right to maintain proceedings.
(1). In general.
297. -- Demand or notice.
(.5). In general.
(1). Necessity of demand, or notice to quit.
(2). Sufficiency of notice or demand. 293k297(2)
(3). Service oI notice.
(4). Waiver by landlord oI notice given.
298. -- Defenses and grounds of opposition.
(1). In general.
299. -- Injunction against or stay of proceedings.
302. -- 1urisdiction.
303. -- Petition or complaint.
(1). In general.
(4). Verification.
303.1 . -- Affidavit.
304. -- Summons.
( 1). In general.
(2). Service and prooI thereoI.
305. -- Answer.
305.1. -- Counter affidavit.
306. -- Issues, proof, and variance.
307. -- Amendments and motions, and objections relating to pleadings.
308. -- Evidence.
(.5). In general.
( 1). Presumptions and burden of proof.
(2). Admissibility.,
(3). Weight and sufficiency.
309. -- Trial.
310. -- 1udgment or final order.
(1). In general.
(2). Sufficiency of record.
311. -- Warrant to dispossess, and execution thereof.
312. -- Property of tenant on premises after dispossession.
313. -- Operation and effect of warrant and dispossession.
314. -- Redemption.
315. -- Appeal.
(1). In general.
(2). Transfer of cause.
(3). Trial of cause anew.
(4). Liabilities on bonds.
316. -- Review on certiorari.
317. -- Restitution.
318. -- WrongIul dispossession.
(1). In general.
(2). Pleading.
(3). Damages.
Am Jur
816 'b. Summary Possessory Actions
b. Summary Possessory Actions
(1) In General
(a) Generally
843. Application to holdover tenant
West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant k290(.5) to 290(2), 296 to
296(2)
A.L.R. Library
What constitutes tenant's holding over oI leased premises, 13 A.L.R.5th 169
Trial Strategy
Forcible Entry and Detainer: Requisite Right, Title or Possession oI PlaintiII,
21 Am. Jur. ProoI oI Facts 2d 567 1
Forms
Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Reentry and repossession on deIaultGenerally
161:918
Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Complaint, petition, or declarationTo
recover possession oI premisesAIter expiration oI term, Landlord and Tenant
134
Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Findings oI Iact and conclusions oI law
In summary proceeding to remove tenantHolding over aIter notice to quit,
Landlord and Tenant
160
Definitions:
A tenant becomes a "holdover tenant" by Iailing to properly exercise an option to
extend the lease and occupying the premises past the term oI the lease so that the
landlord is entitled to possession oI the premises.|FN1| "Holding over possession
Irom the landlord" means a holding over aIter the tenancy has ended; until then,
the possession belongs to the tenant who is not holding over and is not guilty oI
unlawIul detainer.|FN2|
When a tenant improperly holds over aIter the termination oI the lease, the
landlord or an incoming tenant entitled to possession oI the leased property may
pursue the judicial remedies available under the controlling local law Ior the
recovery oI the possession oI the leased property.|FN3| UnlawIul detainer applies
to a tenant who holds over against a landlord aIter there has been a termination oI
the tenancy and an unsuccessIul demand Ior possession.|FN4| The action may
relate to either residential or commercial property.|FN5|
An unlawIul-detainer action may only be used when the tenant is unlawIully
holding over.|FN6| Since an action in an unlawIul detainer involves a IorIeiture oI
the tenant's right to possession, the landlord must plead and prove that the tenant
remains in unlawIul possession oI the premises.|FN7| II the tenant surrenders the
premises to the landlord beIore the Iiling oI the complaint, the landlord's remedy is
an action Ior damages and rent.|FN8|
Cases:
Commercial landlords possess three separate, yet somewhat overlapping,
remedies Ior removing a tenant who holds over aIter the expiration oI a lease: the
historic common-law remedy oI ejectment, an unlawIul-detainer action, and a
tenant-removal action. Pro-Art Dental Lab, Inc. v. V-Strategic Group, LLC, 986
So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 2008).
Summary procedure set Iorth by statute applies during an unlawIul-detainer or
tenant-removal action, but does not apply during an ejectment action. Pro-Art
Dental Lab, Inc. v. V-Strategic Group, LLC, 986 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 2008).
END OF SUPPLEMENT]
|FN1| The Elena Carcieri Trust-1988 v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. oI Rhode
Island, 871 A.2d 944 (R.I. 2005).
|FN2| Morrison v. Smith, 757 S.W.2d 678 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
|FN3| Restatement Second, Property: Landlord and Tenant 14.1.
|FN4| Thornton v. Butler, 728 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Ala. 1990); Roosen v. SchaIIer,
127 Ariz. 346, 621 P.2d 33 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1980); Balassy v. Superior Court, 181
Cal. App. 3d 1148, 226 Cal. Rptr. 817 (2d Dist. 1986); Mac-Du Properties v.
LaBresh, 392 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
As to termination oI a tenancy, generally, see 192. As to the landlord's
notice to quit or demand Ior possession, see 845. |FN5| Ramirez v. Baran,
1986 OK 76, 730 P.2d 515 (Okla. 1986). |FN6| Thornton v. Butler, 728 F.
Supp. 679 (M.D. Ala. 1990). As to re-entry upon a tenant's abandonment oI
the premises, see 833. |FN7| Briggs v. Electronic Memories & Magnetics
Corp., 53 Cal. App. 3d 900, 126
Cal. Rptr. 34 (2d Dist. 1975); Rubin v. Josephson, 478 A.2d 665 (Me.
1984); Mac-Du Properties v. LaBresh, 392 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986); Village Bridge Apartments v. Mammucari, 239 N.J. Super. 235, 570
A.2d 1301 (App. Div. 1990).
In a summary process action, the party seeking possession has the burden oI
prooI. Pine Grove Village, Inc. v. Cardullo, 2001 Mass. App. Div. 234,
2001 WL 1563688 (2001).
|FN8| Briggs v. Electronic Memories & Magnetics Corp., 53 Cal. App. 3d
900, 126
Cal. Rptr. 34 (2d Dist. 1975). 2012 Thomson Reuters. 33-34B 2012
Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. All rights reserved.
(1) In General
(b) Notice to Quit and Demand Ior Possession
845. Generally
West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant k291(.5), 291(1), 297(.5)
A.L.R. Library
Tenants' procedural rights prior to eviction or termination oI beneIits under sec.
8 oI Housing Act oI 1937 (42 U.S.C.A. sec. 1437I), 81 A.L.R. Fed. 844.
Forms
Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Demand Ior rentForIeiture to be declared iI rent
not paid 161:1210.
Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Notice to lesseeNotice and demand Ior delivery oI
possession 161:1245 to 161:1248
Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Notice to lessee to surrender premisesInstitution
oI summary proceedings on Iailure to surrender 161:1265
Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Notice3 days'To pay rent or
surrender possession, Landlord and Tenant 133.2
Under the common law, a landlord may not IorIeit the lease due to the tenant's
Iailure to comply with the lease provisions without Iirst making a demand upon
the tenant Ior perIorm
ance.|FN1| Thus, a notice to leave or quit|FN2| or notice oI IorIeiture and
demand Ior compliance with the lease terms|FN3| is necessary in a Iorcible-entry-
and-detainer action. Stated another way, a valid notice to quit or oI termination is a
condition precedent to a summary holdover proceeding,|FN4| a summary process
eviction action,|FN5| or a suit Ior possession.|FN6|
Accordingly, a landlord is not entitled to recover possession oI premises in a
Iorcible entry and detainer suit iI there is no prooI that the landlord delivered the
eviction notice to the deIendant and no exception excusing notice applies.|FN7|
Proper notice to quit has also been described as a jurisdictional necessity.
|FN8| Except in circumstances where cure is impossible, iI a landlord Iails to
serve the requisite notice to cure, a lease remains in eIIect and the tenancy cannot
be terminated.|FN9|
A notice to cease is a warning notice|FN10| and must provide some period to
permit a tenant to "cure" the breach alleged in the notice to cease.|FN11|
|FN1| 246.
|FN2| I.P. Homeowners, Inc. v. Morrow, 12 Neb. App. 119, 668 N.W.2d 515
(2003).
|FN3| Langdon v. United Restaurants, Inc., 105 S.W.3d 882 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D.
2003).
|FN4| Second & E. 82 Realty LLC v. 82nd Street Gily Corp., 192 Misc. 2d 55,
745 N.Y.S.2d 371 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 2002).
A landlord's Iailure to serve a notice to cure is Iatal to a holdover summary
proceeding. 2215-75 Cruger Apartments, Inc. v. Stovel, 196 Misc. 2d 346, 769
N.Y.S.2d 347 (App. Term 2003).
|FN5| Rock Rimmon Grange #142, Inc. v. The Bible Speaks Ministries, Inc., 92
Conn. App. 410, 885 A.2d 768 (2005); 11 Everett Street Realty Trust v. Hynes,
2002 Mass. App. Div. 10, 2002 WL 63797 (2002).
|FN6| Russell v. Dept. oI Housing and Urban Development, 836 A.2d 576 (D.C.
2003).
|FN7| Reeves v. Rodgers, 204 Or. App. 281, 129 P.3d 721 (2006).
|FN8| HUD/Willow Street Apartments v. Gonzalez, 68 Conn. App. 638, 792 A.2d
165 (2002); Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Morgan, 155 Ohio App. 3d 189,
2003-Ohio-5671, 800 N.E.2d 64 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 2003), appeal
allowed, 101 Ohio St. 3d 1487, 2004-Ohio-1293, 805 N.E.2d 538 (2004) and
judgment rev'd on other grounds, 104 Ohio St. 3d 445, 2004-Ohio-6554, 820
N.E.2d 315 (2004).
A landlord's Iailure to give notice within the statutory period Ior the remedy oI the
breach oI the lease deprives the court oI jurisdiction to hear the summary
action to recover possession oI the leased property. Liberty Manor v.
Rinnels, 487 N.W.2d 324 (Iowa 1992).
|FN9| 2215-75 Cruger Apartments, Inc. v. Stovel, 196 Misc. 2d 346, 769
N.Y.S.2d
347 (App. Term 2003). |FN10| Walters v. National Properties, LLC, 2005
WI 87, 282 Wis. 2d 176, 699 N.W.2d 71 (2005).
|FN11| Brunswick Street Associates v. Gerard, 357 N.J. Super. 598, 816
A.2d 213 (Law Div. 2002).
As to a tenant's right to cure, generally, see 880. 2012 Thomson
Reuters. 33-34B 2012 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt.
Works. All rights reserved.
AMJUR
LANDLORD 845
(1) In General
846. When given
West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant k291(.5) to 291(2), 297(.5) to
297(3)
Under unlawIul-detainer statutes, there is typically a requirement that notice to
quit be given a minimum number oI days beIore the landlord terminates the rental
agreement and commences an action Ior possession.|FN1| A statute may require a
30-day notice oI lease termination which is separate and distinct Irom a 3-day
notice to quit.|FN2|
II the tenancy is month-to-month and notice oI eviction|FN3| or notice to
quit|FN4| is given in the middle oI the month the tenant has until the end oI the
Iollowing month to vacate the premises|FN5| or cure the deIault,|FN6| and not
merely 30 days Irom the date oI the notice.|FN7| However, a landlordhousing
authority is not required to give the statutory notice beIore beginning an eviction
action iI the tenant is conducting illegal activities on the premises.|FN8|
Observation:
Where a statute provides Ior the issuance oI a notice to pay or quit "at any time
within one year aIter the rent becomes due," a landlord who waits over a year to
sue Ior unpaid rent cannot collect that rent in an unlawIul-detainer action but is
limited to a standard breach oI contract action.|FN9|
|FN1| Anthes v. Thompson, 28 Ark. App. 304, 773 S.W.2d 846, 55 Ed.
Law Rep. 326 (1989); Walters v. Meyers, 226 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 15, 277
Cal. Rptr. 316 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1990); Magliocco v. Olson, 762 P.2d
681 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); City oI Bridgeport v. Barbour-Daniel
Electronics, Inc., 16 Conn. App. 574, 548 A.2d 744 (1988); Pritch v.
Henry, 543 A.2d 808 (D.C. 1988); Clark v. Hiett, 495 So. 2d 773 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1986); May v. Poole, 174 Ga. App. 224, 329 S.E.2d 561
(1985); Chicago Housing Authority v. Taylor, 207 Ill. App. 3d 821, 152 Ill.
Dec. 730, 566 N.E.2d 417 (1st Dist. 1990); Garrison v. Fetters, 383 N.W.2d
550 (Iowa 1986); Slavin v. Rent Control Bd. oI Brookline, 26 Mass. App.
Ct. 985, 529 N.E.2d 893 (1988); Watson v. Arcadian Foods, Inc., 233 Neb.
622, 447 N.W.2d 477 (1989); Billips v. Hawkins, 298 S.C. 435, 381 S.E.2d
210 (Ct. App. 1989) (overruled on other grounds by, Kiriakides v. United
Artists Communications, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 440 S.E.2d 364 (1994));
Carstensen v. Hansen, 107 Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944); Housing
Authority oI City oI Everett v. Terry, 114 Wash. 2d 558, 789 P.2d 745
(1990).
As to the tenant's right to cure, see 880.
|FN2| I.P. Homeowners, Inc. v. Morrow, 12 Neb. App. 119, 668 N.W.2d
515 (2003).
|FN4| Grimes v. Newsome, 780 A.2d 1119 (D.C. 2001).
|FN6| Grimes v. Newsome, 780 A.2d 1119 (D.C. 2001).
|FN7| Grimes v. Newsome, 780 A.2d 1119 (D.C. 2001); Morrison v.
Smith, 757 S.W.2d 678 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
|FN8| Federal Land Bank oI Spokane v. Schelske, 87 Or. App. 346, 742
P.2d 659 (1987).
As to illegal activity as a ground Ior a summary-possessory or eviction
action, generally, see 858.
|FN9| Levitz Furniture Co. v. Wingtip Communications, Inc., 86 Cal. App.
4th 1035, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656 (1st Dist. 2001) (noting that a breach oI
contract action results only in a money judgment without restitution oI the
demised property).
(1) In General
848. Requisites; sufficiency
West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant k291(1), 297(2)
Forms
Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Notice to pay rent or quit 121:8
Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Notice to lesseeTo perIorm covenant or condition
or to quit premises 161:1238
As a prerequisite to a nonpayment summary proceeding, a demand Ior rent
must Iairly aIIord the tenant actual notice oI the amount due and the period Ior
which the claim is made.|FN1| A notice that seeks rent in excess oI the amount
due is invalid and will not support an unlawIul-detainer action,|FN2| nor will a
notice that the deIendant does not receive and that describes property occupied by
a person other than the deIendant.|FN3| Furthermore, a Iorcible-entry-and-
detainer action is not properly begun when the notice to vacate premises does not
contain the speciIic language contained in the governing statute but merely
contains a partial paraphrase oI the statutory language.|FN4| However, in a case
involving a commercial lease, a landlord's notice letter that does not expressly
state the speciIic date on which the rent had to be received to cure the tenant's
deIault does not relieve the tenant oI its obligation under the lease agreement to
cure its deIault within "Iive days aIter notice" to avoid termination oI the lease.
|FN5|
An unlawIul-detainer statute may require that a notice to quit served on a
commercial or a
residential tenant be in both English and Spanish.|FN6|
|FN1| Schwartz v. Weiss-Newell, 87 Misc. 2d 558, 386 N.Y.S.2d 191
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1976).
The lessor's claimed notice, in the Iorm oI a letter to the lessee Irom the
bank acting as rental agent Ior the lessor, did not strictly comply with the
statutory requirements concerning notice to pay rent or quit. Lamey v.
Masciotra, 273 Cal. App. 2d 709, 78 Cal. Rptr. 344 (2d Dist. 1969).
|FN2| Levitz Furniture Co. v. Wingtip Communications, Inc., 86 Cal. App.
4th 1035, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656 (1st Dist. 2001).
|FN3| Vogel v. Bacus, 133 Conn. 95, 48 A.2d 237, 169 A.L.R. 910 (1946).
|FN4| Mularcik v. Adams, 2004-Ohio-1383, 2004 WL 549489 (Ohio Ct.
App. 7th Dist. JeIIerson County 2004) (holding that such a notice does not
conIorm to statutory requirements.)
|FN5| Southpark Mall Ltd. Partnership v. CLT Food Management, Inc.,
142 N.C. App. 675, 544 S.E.2d 14 (2001) (noting that iI the tenant was
conIused, it could have consulted the lease.)
|FN6| Ontell v. Capitol Hill E.W. Ltd. Partnership, 527 A.2d 1292 (D.C.
1987).
Landlord's Possessory Remedies
(1) In General
(d) Landlord's Right to Damages
855. Attorney's fees
West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant k291(14), 310(1)
A.L.R. Library
Construction and eIIect oI lease provision relating to attorneys' Iees, 77 A.L.R.2d
735
Forms
Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Attorney's Iees as additional rent 161:204
Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Appointment by lessee oI attorney Ior enIorcement
DeIault in rent 161:1008
Definition:
A "prevailing party" is one in whose Iavor the decision or verdict is rendered and
the judgment entered.|FN1|
A party who prevails on a summary-eviction claim is not entitled to an award
oI attorney's Iees where there is neither contractual nor statutory authority Ior an
award.|FN2| A prevailing party may be awarded attorney's Iees pursuant to a lease
provision.|FN3| However, it has been held that a trial court's statutory authority to
award attorney's Iees incurred by a lessor in a
successIul Iorcible-detainer action could not be expanded by the lease where
the statute did not authorize attorney's Iee awards.|FN4|
In a number oI jurisdictions, statutes provide that the prevailing party is
entitled to attorney's Iees in evictions or summary-possessory actions.|FN5| An
award oI attorney's Iees is also appropriate where there has been a willIul breach
oI contract and where a lessor is Iorced to take legal action against its lessee to
recover possession when the lessee improperly holds the lease over aIter
termination.|FN6|
Both the landlord and the tenant are "prevailing parties," Ior the purposes oI a
statute that provides Ior an award oI attorney's Iees to the prevailing party, where
the trial court Iinds Ior the tenant on the landlord's ejectment claim and Ior the
landlord on the tenant's retaliation claim.|FN7| Similarly, a trial court may award
Iees to both parties where the landlord received a judgment Ior possession but the
tenant prevailed in part by obtaining a reduction in the amount oI a utility bill due
the landlord.|FN8| However, courts have denied attorney's Iees
where the landlord cancels the lease and brings an action under the unlawIul-
detainer statutes, notwithstanding that the lease provided Ior the recovery oI Iees.
|FN9|
where the parties entered into a settlement agreement with the trial court's assist-
ance.|FN10|
in an appeal which successIully challenged the writ oI restitution oI the premises
where the unlawIul-detainer statute only provided Ior attorney's Iees iI the
landlord removed the tenant without a court order and not Ior a wrongIully issued
writ.|FN11|
The Iirst appropriate opportunity Ior a tenant to allege a right to attorney's Iees
in a Iorcible-entry-and-detainer action is when the tenant makes his or her Iirst
court appearance pursuant to a statutory summons.|FN12| Thus, neither a
landlord's voluntary dismissal oI the action beIore the tenant's Iirst court
appearance nor the tenant's Iailure to orally notiIy the landlord beIore the court
appearance that he or she would seek attorney's Iees precludes an award oI
attorney's Iees.|FN13| On the other hand, Iees have been denied where the
landlord does not reIer to attorney's Iees in the complaint but Iirst demands Iees
only when judgment is about to be entered.|FN14|
Observation:
A court may abuse its discretion by awarding only a percentage oI attorney's Iees
incurred by a landlord in litigating a Iorcible-entry-and-detainer action against its
tenants where the Iacts supported signiIicantly greater Iees than awarded.|FN15|
Cases:
Statute authorizing an award oI attorney Iees in actions to cancel oil and gas
leases provides a trial court with the discretion to award attorney Iees, but does not
mandate an award. Dexter v. Brake, 38 Kan. App. 2d 1005, 174 P.3d 924 (2008).
END OF SUPPLEMENT]
|FN1| Keal v. Day, 164 Ohio App. 3d 21, 2005-Ohio-5551, 840 N.E.2d 1139 (1st
Dist. Hamilton County 2005).
|FN2| Hamilton v. William Calomiris Inv. Corp., Inc., 461 A.2d 466 (D.C. 1983);
Satellite Gateway Communications, Inc. v. Musi Dining Car Co., Inc., 110 N.J.
280, 540 A.2d 1267 (1988); H-T Enterprises v. Antelope Creek Bison Ranch,
2005 ND 71, 694 N.W.2d 691 (N.D. 2005); City oI Gahanna v. Eastgate
Properties, Inc., 36 Ohio St. 3d 65, 521 N.E.2d 814 (1988).
|FN3| TuIco, Inc. v. PaciIic Environmental Corp., 113 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2005);
North Associates v. Bell, 184 Cal. App. 3d 860, 229 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1st Dist.
1986); Integra Financial, Inc. v. Grynberg Petroleum Co., 74 P.3d 347 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2002) (recognizing the rule); Hardwick, Cook & Co. v. 3379 Peachtree, Ltd.,
184 Ga. App. 822, 363 S.E.2d 31 (1987); Shipka v. Inserra, 211 Ill. App. 3d 735,
156 Ill. Dec. 128, 570 N.E.2d 604 (1st Dist. 1991); Borne v. Wilander, 509 So. 2d
572 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987); Bay Park One Co. v. Crosby, 109 Misc. 2d 47,
442 N.Y.S.2d 837 (App. Term 1981); Keal v. Day, 164 Ohio App. 3d 21, 2005-
Ohio-5551, 840 N.E.2d 1139 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 2005); Desmarais v. The
Stayers, Inc., 182 Or. App. 338, 51 P.3d 1 (2002); M H 2 Co. v. Hwang, 104
Wash. App. 680, 16 P.3d 1272 (Div. 3 2001).
|FN4| Camelback Plaza Development, L.C. v. Hard Rock CaIe Intern. (Phoenix),
Inc., 200 Ariz. 206, 25 P.3d 8 (Ct. App. Div. 1 2001).
|FN5| Stokus v. Marsh, 217 Cal. App. 3d 647, 266 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1st Dist. 1990);
Integra Financial, Inc. v. Grynberg Petroleum Co., 74 P.3d 347 (Colo. Ct. App.
2002); Matusko v. Gourlay, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 966, 560 N.E.2d 724 (1990);
T.W.I.W., Inc. v. Rhudy, 96 N.M. 354, 630 P.2d 753 (1981); Haberman v.
Wassberg, 131 A.D.2d 331, 516 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1st Dep't 1987); IwenoIu v.
Consolidated Management, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 3d 33, 550 N.E.2d 505 (8th Dist.
Cuyahoga County 1988); OakleaI Mobile Home Park v. Mancilla, 189 Or. App.
458, 75 P.3d 908 (2003), review denied, 336 Or. 376, 84 P.3d 1080 (2004);
Phillips v. Hardwick, 29 Wash. App. 382, 628 P.2d 506 (Div. 1 1981).
|FN6| Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc., 210 W. Va. 200, 557 S.E.2d 254
(2001).
|FN7| Barlow Trail Mobile Home Park v. Dunham, 189 Or. App. 513, 76 P.3d
1146 (2003).
|FN8| Chang v. Louis & Alexander, Inc., 645 A.2d 1110 (D.C. 1994) (the lease
entitled the prevailing party to recovery oI any and all reasonable expenses in the
event oI any breach or threatened breach.)
|FN9| Lincoln Financial Corp. v. Ferrier, 567 P.2d 1102 (Utah 1977). |FN10|
Boxer Max Corp. v. Cane A. Sucre, Inc., 905 So. 2d 916 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d
Dist. 2005) (court had awarded $1,800 in damages). |FN11| Housing Authority oI
City oI Pasco and Franklin County v. Pleasant, 126 Wash. App. 382, 109 P.3d 422
(Div. 3 2005). |FN12| OakleaI Mobile Home Park v. Mancilla, 189 Or. App. 458,
75 P.3d 908 (2003), review denied, 336 Or. 376, 84 P.3d 1080 (2004). |FN13|
OakleaI Mobile Home Park v. Mancilla, 189 Or. App. 458, 75 P.3d 908 (2003),
review denied, 336 Or. 376, 84 P.3d 1080 (2004). |FN14| Shipley v. Major, 44
A.2d 540 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1945) (the lease provides Ior the tenant's payment
oI attorney's Iees in the event oI the tenant's deIault). |FN15| Dawson v.
Temanson, 107 P.3d 892 (Alaska 2005).
45 Am. Jur. ProoI oI Facts 3d 375 (Originally published in 1998)
6. Landlord's Possessory Remedies
(4) DeIenses, SetoII, and Counterclaims
(a) In General
865. Generally
West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant k290(3) to 290(5), 298(1),
298(2)
A.L.R. Library
What constitutes improvements, alterations, or additions within provisions oI
lease permitting or prohibiting tenant's removal thereoI at termination oI lease, 30
A.L.R.3d 998.
Holding over under lease, or renewal or extension thereoI, as extending time
Ior exercise oI option to purchase contained therein, 15 A.L.R.3d 470.
Tenants' procedural rights prior to eviction or termination oI beneIits under sec.
8 oI Housing Act oI 1937 (42 U.S.C.A. sec. 1437I), 81 A.L.R. Fed. 844
Because an unlawIul-detainer action is a summary proceeding designed to
allow the lessor to obtain speedy possession oI the real property when wrongIully
held out oI possession,|FN1| the law generally permits only those deIenses that
relate directly to the right oI possession.|FN2| While aIIirmative deIenses
generally may not be considered,|FN3| due process requires that a deIendant
Iacing eviction be permitted to raise aIIirmative deIenses which, iI proved, would
keep the deIendant in possession oI the premises.|FN4| Furthermore, aIter making
the unlawIul-detainer action an ordinary suit Ior damages by giving up possession
aIter the unlawIul-detainer action has commenced, a tenant may raise aIIirmative
deIenses.|FN5| Similarly, the tenant may also raise aIIirmative deIenses iI the
right to possession ceases to be at issue at any time between the commencement oI
the action and the tri
al.|FN6|
A lease provision prohibiting the tenant Irom asserting a deIense to a summary
proceeding is unconscionable and unenIorceable.|FN7| An unlawIul-detainer
statute may expressly entitle both residential and nonresidential tenants to raise all
legal and equitable deIenses to actions brought by a landlord Ior possession oI a
dwelling.|FN8|
|FN1| 840.
|FN2| S.P. Growers Assn. v. Rodriguez, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 131 Cal. Rptr. 761, 552
P.2d 721 (1976); Tinaco Plaza, LLC v. Freebob's, Inc., 74 Conn. App. 760, 814
A.2d 403 (2003); Hareas v. Kyriakopoulos, 101 Ill. App. 3d 393, 56 Ill. Dec. 908,
428 N.E.2d 500 (1st Dist. 1981); Williams v. Reynolds, 448 So. 2d 845 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1984); Lanzo v. F & D Motor Works, 396 N.W.2d 631 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986); Mosher
v. Levering Investments, Inc., 806 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. 1991); Spruce Park
Apartments v. Beckett, 230 N.J. Super. 311, 553 A.2d 395 (Law Div. 1988).
As to judgment as not barring a subsequent suit on questions oI title and
aIIirmative deIenses, see 884.
|FN3| Barela v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 244, 178 Cal. Rptr. 618, 636 P.2d 582
(1981).
The statute that establishes summary-possessory proceedings does not provide Ior
claims oI the tenant other than the prepayment oI rent. McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d
535 (Alaska 1976).
The landlord's breach oI a covenant to Iurnish heat under a commercial lease is not
available as a deIense in a summary proceeding action grounded on the
nonpayment oI rent. S. H. V. C., Inc. v. Roy, 37 Conn. Supp. 579, 428 A.2d 806
(Super. Ct. Appellate Sess. 1981).
A deIense based on the enIorceability oI a renewal clause in a lease is not relevant
to the landlord's summary process action. Tinaco Plaza, LLC v. Freebob's, Inc., 74
Conn. App. 760, 814 A.2d 403 (2003).
As to counterclaims and setoIIs oI the tenant, see 876 to 879.
|FN4| Asuncion v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 141, 166 Cal. Rptr. 306 (4th
Dist. 1980).
|FN5| Fish Construction Co. v. Moselle Coach Works, Inc., 148 Cal. App. 3d 654,
196 Cal. Rptr. 174 (2d Dist. 1983).
|FN6| Munden v. Hazelrigg, 105 Wash. 2d 39, 711 P.2d 295 (1985).
|FN7| Ultrashmere House, Ltd. v. 38 Town Associates, 123 Misc. 2d 102,
473 N.Y.S.2d 120 (Sup 1984).
|FN8| Danpar Associates v. Falkha, 37 Conn. Supp. 820, 438 A.2d 1209
(Super. Ct. Appellate Sess. 1981); First Nat. Bank oI Evergreen Park v.
Chrysler Realty Corp., 168 Ill. App. 3d 784, 119 Ill. Dec. 439, 522 N.E.2d
1298 (1st Dist. 1988); Cobert Const. Corp. v. Bassett, 109 Misc. 2d 119,
442 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Term 1981).
(a) In General
866. Effect of raising defenses
298(2)
Tenants, in actions Ior possession Ior nonpayment oI rent, are obligated to pay
rent as a condition to remaining in possession, irrespective oI their deIenses and
counterclaims.|FN1| The court may also direct a residential tenant to pay into the
court registry any rent which has concededly not been paid.|FN2| Other authority
holds that a tenant who raises a deIense other than payment oI rent may be
required to pay into the registry oI the court the accrued rent.|FN3|
|FN1| First Hanover v. Vazquez, 848 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d
Dist. 2003). As to the requirement oI continued payment oI rent on appeal,
see 888. |FN2| Herrell v. SeyIarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 491
So. 2d 1173 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1986). |FN3| Herrell v. SeyIarth, Shaw, Fairweather &
Geraldson, 491 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1986).
(b) Particular deIenses
867. Defenses allowed; generally
298(2)
A.L.R. Library
Estoppel oI lessee, because oI occupancy oI, or other activities in connection
with, premises, to assert invalidity oI lease because oI irregularities in description
or deIects in execution, 84 A.L.R.2d 920
In an unlawIul-detainer action, the deIenses that the court may properly
consider include:
The tenant's relinquishment oI the premises beIore the complaint is Iiled|FN1|
The landlord's substantial breach oI an agreement by subleasing a portion oI the
premises|FN2|
A dispute between the landlord and tenant since the inception oI the tenancy as to
the amount oI space conveyed by the lease and the amount oI rent to be paid|FN3|
The violation oI the tenant's Fourth Amendment rights by the landlord or police
who have entered the premises without the consent oI the tenant|FN4|
The lack oI a landlordtenant relationship|FN5|
The landlord's lack oI just cause Ior seeking the eviction|FN6|
A racially motivated termination oI the lease and action Ior possession|FN7|
DeIenses under the UniIorm Residential Landlord and Tenant Act|FN8|
The assertion that the lessor has not provided proper notice oI termination as
required by statute|FN9|
Where there is a breach oI the covenant oI quiet enjoyment, the deIense oI
constructive eviction.|FN10|
|FN1| Minelian v. Manzella, 215 Cal. App. 3d 457, 263 Cal. Rptr. 597 (2d Dist.
1989). |FN2| Malt v. R. J. Mueller Enterprises, Inc., 396 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1981). |FN3| Malt v. R. J. Mueller Enterprises, Inc., 396 So. 2d
1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1981). |FN4| State v. Main, 159 Ariz. 96, 764
P.2d 1155 (Ct. App. Div. 2 1988). |FN5| Bread oI LiIe Baptist Church v. Price,
194 Ga. App. 693, 392 S.E.2d 15 (1990). As to the requirement that an unlawIul-
detainer action concern a landlordtenant relationship, see 861. |FN6| E. S.
Bills, Inc. v. Tzucanow, 38 Cal. 3d 824, 215 Cal. Rptr. 278, 700 P.2d 1280 (1985).
|FN7| Banke v. Community Realty Corp., 497 F. Supp. 409 (D. Md. 1980);
Mascaro v. Hudson, 496 So. 2d 428 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1986). |FN8| McCall v.
Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976). |FN9| Wasatch Property Management v.
Degrate, 35 Cal. 4th 1111, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 112 P.3d 647 (2005), as modiIied,
(July 27, 2005). As to notice, generally, see 845. |FN10| Wesson v. Leone
Enterprises, Inc., 437 Mass. 708, 774 N.E.2d 611 (2002) (action to recover rent).
869. Landlord's breach of implied warranty of habitability
West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant k290(3), 290(4), 298(1)
Trial Strategy
Tenant's Rights and Remedies Against Retaliatory Eviction by Landlord, 45
Am. Jur. ProoI oI Facts 3d 375
Forms
Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, AnswerDeIenseViolation by
landlord oI housing codeObligation to pay rent suspended, Landlord and Tenant
150
Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Instruction to juryTenant's right to
suspend payment oI rent on landlord's breach oI warranty oI habitability, Landlord
and Tenant 151
In an unlawIul-detainer action, a residential tenant may assert the aIIirmative
deIense oI the landlord's breach oI the implied warranty oI habitability|FN1|
regardless oI whether the deIective condition was known to the tenant at the time
oI the occupancy oI the premises|FN2| or whether the lease contains a "no
counterclaim" clause.|FN3| The aIIirmative deIense oI breach oI the implied
warranty oI habitability directly addresses the question oI whether rent is due,
which is the primary issue in an unlawIul-detainer action.|FN4| The landlord's
breach oI the warranty oI habitability may serve as a partial or complete setoII to
the
landlord's claim Ior the rent owed Ior the period when the dwelling was
uninhabitable and the landlord had notice oI its condition.|FN5| Thus, in an
unlawIul-detainer action, instructions on the warranty oI habitability were proper
in connection with the issue oI damages where the premises were maintained in
violation oI health and saIety codes beIore and during the period oI unlawIul
detainer.|FN6|
Under some landlord and tenant acts, however, the deIense oI the unIit
condition oI the premises is available only to a tenant who is not in deIault in
rental payments.|FN7| II the statute provides Ior IorIeiture oI the lease upon
nonpayment oI rent and demand Ior it, a tenant who does not pay rent on the
grounds that the landlord Iailed to make repairs on the leased premises is
precluded Irom equitable relieI against the IorIeiture oI the lease.|FN8|
The deIense oI implied warranty oI habitability applies only to residential
leases and is not applicable to unlawIul-detainer actions involving commercial
tenancies.|FN9|
|FN1| Pole Realty Co. v. Sorrells, 84 Ill. 2d 178, 49 Ill. Dec. 283, 417 N.E.2d
1297 (1981); Hutchins v. Peabody, 151 N.H. 82, 849 A.2d 136 (2004); P.H. Inv. v.
Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018 (Utah 1991).
|FN2| Knight v. Hallsthammar, 29 Cal. 3d 46, 171 Cal. Rptr. 707, 623 P.2d 268
(1981); Lau v. Bautista, 61 Haw. 144, 598 P.2d 161 (1979).
|FN3| Randall Co. v. Alan Lobel Photography, Inc., 120 Misc. 2d 112, 465
N.Y.S.2d 489 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1983).
|FN4| Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 517 P.2d 1168
(1974); Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973); Foisy v. Wyman,
83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
As to the purpose oI an unlawIul-detainer action, see 840.
|FN5| Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831
(1973).
|FN6| Four Seas Inv. Corp. v. International Hotel Tenants' Assn., 81 Cal. App. 3d
604, 146 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1st Dist. 1978) (judge had directed verdict Ior the
landlord on the liability issue).
|FN7| Martins Ferry Jaycee Housing, Inc. v. Pawlaczyk, 4 Ohio App. 3d 302, 448
N.E.2d 512 (7th Dist. Belmont County 1982).
|FN8| Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3d 552, 166 Cal. Rptr. 620 (4th Dist.
1980); Elizondo v. Perez, 42 Ill. App. 3d 313, 1 Ill. Dec. 112, 356 N.E.2d 112 (1st
Dist. 1976); Schuminsky v. Field, 1980 OK 22, 606 P.2d 1133 (Okla. 1980).
|FN9| Muro v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 229 Cal. Rptr. 383 (2d
Dist.
1986); Fish Construction Co. v. Moselle Coach Works, Inc., 148 Cal. App.
3d 654, 196 Cal. Rptr. 174 (2d Dist. 1983); Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal.
App. 3d 552, 166 Cal. Rptr. 620 (4th Dist. 1980) (noting the adequacy oI
the lessees' alternative remedies to recover damages Ior the lessors' alleged
breach). AMJUR LANDLORD 869
(c) Landlord's Retaliatory Conduct
873. Generally; 233k290(3), 290(4), 298(1)l Retaliatory eviction oI tenant Ior
reporting landlord's violation oI law, 23 A.L.R.5th 140; Tenant's Rights and
Remedies Against Retaliatory Eviction by Landlord, 45 Am. Jur. ProoI oI Facts 3d
375; Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, AnswerDeIenseNotice to
terminate ineIIectiveLandlord's intimidation oI tenant Ior reporting violation oI
sanitation ordinance, Landlord and Tenant 144
The landlord-and-tenant statutes oI many states allow deIenses in unlawIul-
detainer or summary-eviction actions based on a statutory prohibition against
unlawIul retaliation.|FN1| Such a statute may provide that where a tenant makes
the required threshold showing|FN2| or prima Iacie case oI retaliatory conduct,
|FN3| the trier oI Iact shall presume that retaliatory action was taken |FN4| unless
the landlord proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence|FN5| or satisIies
the statutory grounds Ior rebuttal oI the presumptions.|FN6| In another
jurisdiction, retaliatory conduct is not presumed, so the tenant retains the burden oI
proving the aIIirmative deIense oI retaliatory conduct regarding an eviction or
lease nonrenewal.|FN7|
Observation:
In the absence oI extenuating circumstances, any agreement that purports to waive
the tenant's right to raise the deIense oI retaliatory eviction is void as against
public policy.|FN8|
A retaliatory-eviction statute may allow a landlord to do the acts listed in the
statute Ior a lawIul cause.|FN9| Courts have held that
a Iinding oI retaliatory eviction will not normally lie Ior an eviction oI a residential
tenant based on nonpayment oI rent.|FN10|
in order to provide the tenant with a deIense, the landlord's conduct must be
undertaken in retaliation Ior actions by the tenant and be intended to deter the
assertion oI tenant rights.|FN11|
retaliatory eviction is a deIense to a Iorcible-detainer action only iI there was a
landlordtenant relationship between the parties.|FN12|
Caution:
Some authority, however, holds that retaliatory eviction may not be raised as an
aIIirmative deIense in an unlawIul-detainer action.|FN13|
|FN1| Van Buren Apartments v. Adams, 145 Ariz. 325, 701 P.2d 583 (Ct. App.
Div. 2 1984); Drouet v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 4th 583, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 73
P.3d 1185 (2003); Correa v. Ward, 91 Conn. App. 142, 881 A.2d 393 (2005);
Miller v. District oI Columbia Rental Housing Com'n, 870 A.2d 556 (D.C. 2005);
Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 835 N.E.2d 615 (2005) (holding that a
claim Ior unlawIul retaliation did not lie); HoIIman v. Davenport-MetcalI, 851
A.2d 1083 (R.I. 2004) (Iinding no unlawIul retaliation occurred); Criss v.
Salvation Army Residences, 173 W. Va. 634, 319 S.E.2d 403 (1984).
|FN2| Borger Management, Inc. v. Sindram, 886 A.2d 52 (D.C. 2005).
|FN3| Correa v. Ward, 91 Conn. App. 142, 881 A.2d 393 (2005).
|FN4| Correa v. Ward, 91 Conn. App. 142, 881 A.2d 393 (2005); Borger
Management, Inc. v. Sindram, 886 A.2d 52 (D.C. 2005); Zimbovsky v. Tokar,
2005 Mass. App. Div. 100, 2005 WL 2219683 (2005).
As to the presumption oI retaliation arising under the UniIorm Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act, see 874.
|FN5| Borger Management, Inc. v. Sindram, 886 A.2d 52 (D.C. 2005).
|FN6| Correa v. Ward, 91 Conn. App. 142, 881 A.2d 393 (2005). The
statutory presumption that a tenant's eviction was retaliatory based on her
report oI
code violations to the Health Department did not apply where the tenant
was evicted Ior nonpayment oI rent. Zimbovsky v. Tokar, 2005 Mass. App.
Div. 100, 2005 WL 2219683 (2005).
|FN7| Houle v. Quenneville, 173 Vt. 80, 787 A.2d 1258 (2001). |FN8|
Restatement Second, Property: Landlord and Tenant 14.9(2). |FN9|
Drouet v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 4th 583, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 73 P.3d
1185
(2003). |FN10| Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 835 N.E.2d 615
(2005). |FN11| McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976). |FN12|
CaliIornia Livestock Production Credit Assn. v. SutIin, 165 Cal. App. 3d
136,
211 Cal. Rptr. 152 (3d Dist. 1985).
As to the requirement that an unlawIul-detainer action involve a landlord
tenant relationship, see 861. |FN13| Leve v. Delph, 710 S.W.2d 389 (Mo.
Ct. App. E.D. 1986).
874. Under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant k290(3), 290(4), 298(1)
The UniIorm Residential Landlord and Tenant Act prohibits the landlord Irom
retaliating by bringing or threatening to bring an action Ior possession aIter:|FN1|
(1) the tenant has complained to a governmental agency charged with
responsibility Ior enIorcement oI a building or housing code concerning a
violation applicable to the premises and materially aIIecting health and saIety;
(2) the tenant has complained to the landlord concerning the landlord's duty to
maintain the premises; or
(3) the tenant has organized or become a member oI a tenant's union or similar
organization.
II the landlord threatens to bring an action Ior possession in retaliation Ior the
assertion oI tenants' rights, the tenant is entitled to the remedies Ior unlawIul
ouster by a landlord and has a deIense in any retaliatory action against the tenant
Ior possession.|FN2|
In an action by or against the tenant, a complaint brought within one year
beIore the alleged act oI retaliation is presumed to be retaliatory conduct oI the
landlord.|FN3| The presumption does not arise iI the tenant made the complaint
aIter notice oI a proposed rent increase or diminution oI services.|FN4|
|FN1| UniI. Residential Landlord and Tenant Act 5.101(a). |FN2| UniI.
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act 5.101(b). |FN3| UniI. Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act 5.101(b). |FN4| UniI. Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act 5.101(b).
875. Under the Restatement; 233k290(3), 290(4), 298(1)
Under the Restatement Second, Property: Landlord and Tenant, .510retaliatory
action by the landlord is a deIense available to the tenant in an eviction proceeding
and can also be grounds Ior enjoining the proceeding.|FN1| A landlord takes
retaliatory action against a tenant with respect to residential property whenever the
landlord attempts to terminate a tenancy that is terminable by an appropriate notice
or reIuses to renew a tenancy oI a speciIied term when the term ends and:|FN2|
there is a protective housing statute embodying a public purpose to insure proper
conditions oI housing, especially multi-unit housing designed Ior rental to tenants
oI low or moderate income the landlord is in the business oI renting residential
property the tenant is not materially in deIault in the perIormance oI the tenant's
obligations under the lease at the time the landlord acts the landlord is primarily
motivated in so acting because the tenant, either alone or through the tenant's
participation in a lawIul organization oI tenants, has complained concerning a
violation by the landlord oI a protective housing statute the tenant made the
complaint in good Iaith and with reasonable cause |FN1| Restatement Second,
Property: Landlord and Tenant 14.9(1). |FN2| Restatement Second, Property:
Landlord and Tenant 14.8.. AMJUR LANDLORD 875
b. Summary Possessory Actions (4) DeIenses, SetoII, and Counterclaims (d)
Counterclaims; SetoII; Right to Cure 876. Counterclaims West's Key Number
Digest West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant k290(5), 298(2)
In a summary unlawIul-detainer action,|FN1| counterclaims and cross-
complaints are generally inadmissible.|FN2| As with deIenses,|FN3| only
counterclaims that relate to the right oI possession are usually permitted.|FN4|
Observation: The purpose oI the no-counterclaim provision in the eviction statutes
is to get a speedy determination oI possession without bringing in any extraneous
matters.|FN5| Under the rule limiting counterclaims in unlawIul-detainer or
summary-possession actions, a tenant may not claim an earlier, unrelated
debt owed by the landlord as a setoII Ior past-due rent.|FN6| bring a
counterclaim based on the landlord's alleged Iailure to repair.|FN7| Iile a
counterclaim Ior damages to the tenant's property.|FN8| bring claims against
the landlord based on a denial oI the tenant's right oI Iirst reIusal to purchase the
property.|FN9| |FN1| 840. |FN2| Barela v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 244, 178
Cal. Rptr. 618, 636 P.2d 582 (1981); MedIord v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 3d
236, 189 Cal. Rptr. 227 (2d Dist. 1983); Gibson v. Johnson, 492 A.2d 574 (D.C.
1985); V.F.W. Post No. 7222 v. Summersville Saddle Club, 788 S.W.2d 796 (Mo.
Ct. App. S.D. 1990); Koelzer v. Pizzirani, 718 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. App. Fort Worth
1986) (statutory claim Ior damages and attorney's Iees Ior bad-Iaith retention oI
security deposit may not be interposed); Housing Authority oI City oI Everett v.
Terry, 114 Wash. 2d 558, 789 P.2d 745 (1990). As to judgment as not barring a
subsequent suit on legal and equitable claims, such as questions oI title and
aIIirmative deIenses, see 884. |FN3| As to deIenses in an unlawIul-detainer
action, generally, see 865. |FN4| Ossen v. Wanat, 217 Conn. 313, 585 A.2d 685
(1991) (constitutional issues raised by the deIendanttenant are outside the scope
oI a summary process action); Mathis v. Barrett, 544 A.2d 287 (D.C. 1988) (a
tenant may not raise the counterclaim oI malicious prosecution in the landlord's
summary possession action); Bismarck Hotel Co. v. Sutherland, 92 Ill. App. 3d
167, 47 Ill. Dec. 512, 415 N.E.2d 517 (1st Dist. 1980); White Earth Housing
Authority v. Schwabe, 375 N.W.2d 568 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Henze v. Shell Oil
Co., 758 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1988). |FN5| VND, LLC v. Leevers
Foods, Inc., 2003 ND 198, 672 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 2003). |FN6| Nork v. PaciIic
Coast Medical Enterprises, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 410, 140 Cal. Rptr. 734 (4th Dist.
1977). |FN7| Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3d 552, 166 Cal. Rptr. 620 (4th
Dist. 1980); Schuminsky v. Field, 1980 OK 22, 606 P.2d 1133 (Okla. 1980). As to
the deIense oI the landlord's breach oI an implied warranty oI habitability, see
869. |FN8| Pinzon v. A & G Properties, 874 A.2d 347 (D.C. 2005). |FN9|
Anderson v. Heinze, 2002 ND 60, 643 N.W.2d 24 (N.D. 2002) (holding that these
could only be pursued in a separate action.)
878. CounterclaimsPermitted or compulsory counterclaims 233k290(5),
298(2) Under some authority, simple issues|FN1| or tenant counterclaims|FN2|
that are related to the main claim may be litigated in a summary-eviction
proceeding. Other jurisdictions permit counterclaims,|FN3| such as those under
the state's enactment oI the UniIorm Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.|FN4|
Tenant claims that arise Irom the tenancy may even be compulsory counterclaims
in unlawIul detainer|FN5| or dispossessory|FN6| actions. Observation: Citing the
policy behind the adoption oI the warranty oI habitability, some authority rejects
the position that damages Ior the uninhabitable conditions existing beIore the
tenant's withholding must be recovered in a separate action.|FN7| |FN1| Ivy Hill
Park Apartments v. GNB Parking Corp., 237 N.J. Super. 1, 566 A.2d 820 (App.
Div. 1989). |FN2| Ying Lung Corp. v. Medrano, 123 Misc. 2d 1074, 475
N.Y.S.2d 772 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1984). |FN3| Favors v. Arnold, 181 Ga. App.
286, 351 S.E.2d 641 (1986) (a dispossessory action may cover all related claims
between the landlord and the tenant); Miller v. Ritchie, 45 Ohio St. 3d 222, 543
N.E.2d 1265 (1989); Criss v. Salvation Army Residences, 173 W. Va. 634, 319
S.E.2d 403 (1984). |FN4| Mead, Samuel & Co., Inc. v. Dyar, 127 Ariz. 565, 622
P.2d 512 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1980) (counterclaims not arising under the Arizona
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act are not permitted in a Iorcible-detainer
action); Edwards v. Fenn, 308 Or. 129, 775 P.2d 1375 (1989). |FN5| Golden Host
Westchase, Inc. v. First Service Corp., 29 Ark. App. 107, 778 S.W.2d 633 (1989).
As to judgment in summary-possessory actions as res judicata with respect to
compulsory counterclaims, see 884. |FN6| Trust Co. Bank oI Northwest Georgia
v. Shaw, 182 Ga. App. 165, 355 S.E.2d 99 (1987). |FN7| Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d
1006 (Utah 1991). As to deIenses based on the warranty oI habitability, generally,
see 869. One Nevada decision was issued just 7 days beIore the 10/13/11
summary eviction proceeding here. CG Wallace.
XXI. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL.
See also CONSTITUTIONAL LA W ;;::~4646.
90S. Nature and scope oI remedy oI new trial in general.
906. Constitutional and statutory provisions as to new trial.
907. Right oI prosecution to new trial.
908. Right oI accused to new trial.
909. In general.
910. --CodeIendants.
911.
Discretion oI court as to new trial.
912.
Successive applications Ior new trial.
912.S. Necessity oI objections or exceptions at
trial in general.
913. Grounds Ior new trial in general. (1). In general. (2). DisqualiIication or
prejudice oI
judge or oIIicers at trial. (3). Absence oI witness.
(4). Imposition oI improper sentence. (S). Want oI capacity to commit crime. (6).
Former conviction Ior same oIIense.
914. Errors and irregularities in preliminary proceedings.
91S. DeIects in indictment or inIormation as ground Ior new trial.
916. Want oI preparation.
917. ReIusal oI continuance. (1). In general. (2). Absence oI witness.
918. Errors and irregularities in conduct oI trial.
(1). In general.
(2). Irregularities aIIecting witnesses. (3). Summoning, impaneling, and oath
oI jury ..
(4). ProoI oI corpus delicti. (5). Remarks by judge.
(6). Failure to appoint counsel Ior accused.
(7). Trial without plea.
(8). Temporary absence oI judge.
(9). Absence oI deIendant or counsel.
919. Misconduct oI counsel Ior prosecution. (1). In general.
(2). In examination oI witnesses.
(3). In argument in general.
(4). Comments on deIendant's Iailure to testiIy.
(5). Objections and exceptions.
920.
Incompetency or neglect oI counsel Ior deIense.
921.
Rulings on evidence.
922.
Instructions and Iailure or reIusal to instruct
. .(1). In general.
(2). Failure to give proper instructions.
(3). Giving erroneous instructions.
(4). Construction or eIIect oI instruction.
(S). Harmless error.
(6). Instructions aIter sbmission oI case.
923. Competency oI jurors and challenges.
(1). In general:
(2). Previous opinion, prejudice, or declaration.
(3). Alienage'.
(4). Relationship. (
5). Age oI juror.
(6). ,Physical disability.
(7). Member oI previous jury. (8). Member oI grand jury; (9). Necessity oI
objections at trial.
924.) Miscondllct oI or aIIecting jurors. 92S. --In general. (1). In general. (2).
Misconduct oI prosecuting witness. (4). Taking notes oI evidence. (S). Improper
inIluence inducing agreement to verdict.
925.5. --Considering matters not in evidence. (1). In general. (2). Visiting or
viewing place oI crime. (3). Statements by jurors during deliberation. (4). Access
to ot reading newspapers. (S). Access to or reading law books.
926. --Use oI intoxicating liquors.
927. --Separation. (1). In general. (2). Separation aIter submission oI case. (3).
Separation aIter agreement or rendition oI inIormal verdict. (4). Separation by
consent oI court or counsel. (S). Presumptions and burden oI prooI as to eIIect oI
separation.
928. --Communications by or with jurors.
929. --Misconduct oI oIIicer
930. --Misconduct oI bystanders;
931. Necessity oI objection at trial.
932. --EIIect as to result.
933. Irregularities or deIects in verdict as ground Ior new trial.
934. Verdict contrary to law.
935. Verdict contrary to evidence. (.S). In general. (1). Weight and suIIiciency oI
evidence in general. ' (2). Failure oI prooI. (3). Objections and exceptions. 936.
Surprise, accident, inadvertence, or mistake. (1). In general. (2). Mistake oI
counsel. (3). Absence oI witness or counsel. (4). Surprise as to testimony oI
witness. (5). Time Ior raising question. (6). EIIect oI Iailure to ask continuance or
postponement.
937. Newly discovered evidence. 938. In general. (1). In general. (2). What
constitutes newly discovered evidence in general. (3). Facts within knowledge oI
deIendant. (4). Further or other testimony oI Iormer witness. (5). Witness rendered
competent since trial. (6). Showing mistake at trial.
939. --Diligence. (1). In general. (2). In procuring absent witnesses. (3). Failure to
ascertain knowledge oI witness. (4). Failure to ask continuance.
940. --Materiality.
941. Cumulative evidence. (1). In general. (2). What is cumulative evidence.
942. --Impeachment oI witness. (1). In general. (2). Contradictory statements by
witness.
943. --ConIlicting or contradicted evidence .
944. Credibility.
945. SuIIiciency and probable eIIect. (.5). In general. (1). Probable eIIect oI new
evidence, in general.. (2). Particular evidence or cases.
946. Waiver oI right to new trial. 947. New trial on court's own motion. 948.
Application Ior new trial. ' 948.1. In general. 949. --.Form and requisites in
general. (1). In general. (2). VeriIication. (3). Amended and supplemental motions.
950. Jurisdiction.
951. Time Ior making. (1). In general. (2). BeIore judgment or sentence. (3). In
vacation. (4). At term oI conviction. (5). At subsequent term. (6). Amended
motion.
952. Parties.
953. Notice.
954. Statement oI grounds. (1). In general. (2). Competency oI jurors. (3).
Misconduct oI or aIIecting jurors. (4). Rulings on evidence. (5). Instructions. (6).
Verdict contrary to law or evidence. (7). Scope oI assignment.
955. --Bill oI exceptions or statement oI case. (.5). In general. (1). Necessity Ior
bill oI exceptions. (2). SuIIiciency. (3). BrieI oI evidence.
956. AIIidavits and other prooIs in general. (1). In general. (2). Necessity Ior
aIIidavits in general. (3). Counter aIIidavits. (4). SuIIiciency oI prooIs in general.
(5). Absence oI witness. (6). Absence oI judge. (7). Incompetency or neglect oI
counsel Ior deIense. (8). DisqualiIication oI jurors in general. (9). Presumptions
and burden oI prooI as to disqualiIication oI jurors. (10). SuIIiciency oI prooIs as
to disqualiIication oI jurors. (11). Misconduct oI or aIIecting jurors in gen(!ral.
(12). Presumptions and burden oI prooI as to misconduct oI or aIIecting jurors.
(13). SuIIiciency oI prooIs as to misconduct aIar aIIecting jurors.
957. Statements, aIIidavits, and testimony oI jurors. (1). In general. (2). Denying
or explaining assent to verdict. (3). Misconduct oI jurors, in general. .;(4).
Separation oI jury. (5). Consideration by jury oI matters not in evidence. (6).
Misconduct oI others aIIecting jurors.
958. AIIidavits and evidence as to newly discovered evidence. (1). In general. (2).
AIIidavit by deIendant or his counsel. (3). AIIidavit as to diligence. (4). AIIidavit
oI proposed witness. (5). Counter aIIidavits. (6). SuIIiciency oI prooIs in general.
959. --Hearing and rehearing in general.
960. Presence oI accused at hearing.
961. Determination.
962. Grant oI new trial ineIIectual or not beneIicial.
964. Order granting or reIusing new trial.
965. Proceedings at new trial.
XXII. ARREST OF JUDGMENT.
966. Nature and scope oI remedy by arrest oI judgment.
967. Grounds Ior arrest oI judgment.
The FOFCOL reads:
'4. Coughlin's conduct during the trial oI the petit larceny case on November
30, 2011, in which Coughlin appeared in propria persona, was so disruptive that
Judge Howard Iound Coughlin in direct contempt oI court and sentenced him to
jail that same day to be released on December 3, 2011 at 8:00 PM. 1udge
Howard specifically found Coughlin's conduct to be disorderly and was
either contemptuous or behavior insolent toward the judge in that Coughlin
reIused:
"... to obey directives oI the Judge, continuing lines oI inquiry aIter
being advised by the Court to reIrain Irom doing so; demeaning the
Court with statements such as "WOW" in response to court rulings;
laughing during testimony and Iurther questioning the court and its
authority."
See Hearing Exhibit 11 ORDER FOR SUMMARY PUNISHMENT OF
CONTEMPT COMMITTED IN THE IMMEDIATE VIEW AND PRESENCE
OF THE COURT, November 30, 2011.
However, that is not quite what Judge Howard's 11/30/11 OPSCIIVPC
says. Actually, that Order seems to be a bit oI a mixed up rehashing oI the
various subsections oI NRS 22.010, and seems to contradict itselI, to wit:
'NRS22.010Acts or omissions constituting contempts.The Iollowing acts
or omissions shall be deemed contempts:
1.Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while
the judge is holding court, or engaged in judicial duties at chambers, or toward
masters or arbitrators while sitting on a reIerence or arbitration, or other judicial
proceeding.
2.A breach oI the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance in the
presence oI the court, or in its immediate vicinity, tending to interrupt the due
course oI the trial or other judicial proceeding.
3.Disobedience or resistance to any lawIul writ, order, rule or process
issued by the court or judge at chambers...
The FOFCOL attempts to make up Ior the vagueness and uncertainty
inherent to Judge Howard's 'check the blanks 'Iorm Order (one blank reIers to
'demeaning the court, yet it is not checked, where, too ambiguously, other
sections oI the order word 'demeaning... (along with the awesome power oI
being a muni court judge comes the burden oI craIting suIIiciently particular
orders), where it identiIies certainty in such Order where there is none. That
Order simply does not meet the Houston standard Ior speciIicity and particularity
where it Iails to identiIy speciIically whether Coughlin's 'behavior was
'Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior. Misleadingly, the FOFCOL
does purport such Order to have 'speciIically Iound Coughlin's conduct to be
disorderly (the FOFCOL reads at R1349:14-25: '1udge Howard specifically
found Coughlin's conduct to be disorderly and was either contemptuous or
behavior insolent toward the judge in that Coughlin reIused:
The FOFCOL and Chair Echeverria's commentary throughout the 11/14/12
Iormal hearing reveal the Iraudulent extent to which the Panel and OBC
attempted to characterize Judge Howard's Order in FHE11 or Judge Holmes'
2/28/12 Order in FHE4 as 'criminal contempt suIIicient to allow the Panel and
OBC to skip the whole due process step oI actually proving Coughlin committed
any such 'crime, much less and alleged violation oI the Rules oI ProIessional
Conduct stemming thereIrom. In seeking to misleadingly characterize either
Order as 'criminal contempt the Panel and OBC attempt to leverage SCR
111(5)'s language (SCR 111(5): 'CertiIied document conclusive.A certiIied
copy oI prooI oI a conviction is conclusive evidence of the commission of the
crime stated in it in any disciplinary proceeding instituted against an attorney
based on the conviction.)
Also, another jurisdictional prerequisite is not present Ior the SBN to bring
the SCR 105 Complaint it brought, especially where the SBN and Panel now
seek to apply SCR 111(5) to that which the OBC never Iiled a Petition as
required by SCR 104 (its as iI the OBC and NNDB are seeking to excise the
discretionary role the Nevada Supreme Court has with respect to the reIerral oI
SCR 111 Petitions (even where one was Iiled, under only SCR 111(4) in 61901,
and none were Iiled with respect to FHE 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, all oI which, to one degree
or another, the OBC and Panel have sought to shoehorn into the jurisdiction
aIIorded the Panel by SCR 111(8) (as expressly restated in this Court's 6/7/12
Order) and thereIore seek to Iraudulently co-opt some halI ass SCR 111(5)
approach.
'SCR Rule104.State bar counsel.
1.State bar counsel shall:
(a)Investigate all matters involving possible attorney misconduct or
incapacity called to bar counsel`s attention, whether by grievance or otherwise.
(b)Subject to Rule 15(1), dispose oI all matters involving alleged
misconduct by dismissal oI the allegation(s) or by the Iiling oI a written
complaint...
(d)File with the supreme court petitions with certified copies of proof of
conviction demonstrating that attorneys have been convicted of serious
crimes, as defined in Rule 111...
2.Bar counsel may meet with an attorney against whom a grievance has
been received to informally resolve a matter that does not involve the
commission oI a serious crime, as deIined in these rules...
'SCR 111(4).Bar counsel`s responsibility.Upon being advised that an
attorney... has been convicted of a crime, .., bar counsel shall obtain a certiIied
copy oI prooI oI the conviction and shall file a petition with the supreme court,
attaching the certiIied copy. Upon being advised that an attorney subject to the
disciplinary jurisdiction oI the supreme court has been convicted oI a
misdemeanor involving the use of alcohol or a controlled substance and the
oIIense is not the attorney`s Iirst such oIIense, bar counsel shall investigate and
present the matter to the appropriate panel oI the disciplinary board prior to the
Iiling oI the petition. The petition shall be accompaniea by the panels
recommenaation regaraing the appropriate aisciplinary action, if any, to be
imposea unaer these or any other rules of the supreme court that pertain to the
conauct of attorneys.
Bar Counsel Iailed to attach such 'panel's recommendation to the Petition
in 60838, which involved the alleged theIt (or consumption oI an enormous
amount oI a 'controlled substance, ie Dextromethorphan (DXM) (a potent
psychoactive disassociative in high enough doesages, like those Coughlin is
accused oI consuming on 9/9/11 (approximately 720 mg oI DXM, or two
packages oI the 12 'cough melt per package Duract Cough Melts, each melt
containing 30 mg oI Iast release DXM). DXM is absolutely a 'controlled
substance, and Wal-Mart itselI limits the number oI packages customers are able
to purchase at one time. Bar Counsel's Iailure to comply with SCR 104(1)(d) and
SCR 111(4) deprives it and the Panel oI the subject matter jurisdiction necessary
to address to majority oI matters ruled on in the FOFCOL and pled in the
Complaint in this matter.
For Mandamus Petitions as to 22176, 26800, 065630, 0376, and Ior 3/23/12
hearing beIore Flanagan in 03628
see Hicks on
BehalI oI Feiock v. Feiock, U.S.Cal.1988, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 485 U.S. 624, 99
L.Ed.2d
721, on remand 263 Cal.Rptr. 437, 215 Cal.App.3d 141, review denied.
33 ALR 3rd 448, Appealability oI Contempt Adjudication or Conviction
Bail, penalty Ior violating court order, see NRS 178.484.
Court powers, enIorcement oI order, see NRS 1.210.
Courts-martial, authority, see NRS 193.110.
Criminal contempt, generally, see NRS 193.300.
Grand juries, secrecy oI proceedings, see NRS 172.245.
Habeas corpus, contempt during release on bail, see NRS 34.540.
Jurors, Iailure to attend and serve, see NRS 6.040.
Juvenile courts, disobedience oI court orders, see NRS 62E.040.
Legislative process, interIerence, see NRS 218A.925.
Misconduct oI deIendant, see NRS 175.387.
Municipal courts, punishment Ior contempt, see NRS 266.570.
Parental rights, termination proceeding, Iailure to appear or bring minor, see NRS
128.130.
Subpoenas, Iailure to obey, see NRS 174.385.
see Hicks on BehalI oI Feiock v. Feiock, U.S.Cal.1988, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 485 U.S.
624, 99 L.Ed.2d
721, on remand 263 Cal.Rptr. 437, 215 Cal.App.3d 141, review denied.
'A writ oI prohibition may issue to arrest district court proceedings when such
proceedings exceed the district court's jurisdiction, NRS 34.320, and "there is not
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course oI law." NRS 34.330.
Because writ relieI is an extraordinary remedy, "the decision to entertain a writ
petition lies within our discretion." Haleyv. Dist. Ct., 128 Nev. . , 273 P.3d
855, 858 (2012). In an appropriate case, "a writ oI prohibition |may| issue to
prevent discovery required by court order entered in excess oI the court's
jurisdiction. " Wardleigh v. District Court, III Nev. 345, 351, 891 P.2d 1180,
1184 (1995). Prohibition is also available to arrest a district judge's exercise oI
contempt powers when NRS 22.030(3) applies and dictates that the contempt
proceeding be conducted beIore a diIIerent district judge. McCormick v. District
Court, 67 Nev. 318, 332, 218 P.2d 939, 945 (1950); see Pengilly v. Rancho Santa
Fe Homeowners, 116 Nev. 646, 649, 5 P.3d 569, 571 (2000). NRS 22.030(3)
provides that, "iI a contempt is not committed in the immediate view and
presence oI the court, the judge oI the court in whose contempt the person is
alleged to be shall not preside at the trial oI the contempt over the objection oI the
person." By its terms, this statute applies to the contempt proceeding in this case.
The contempt charged did not occur "in the immediate view and presence oI the
court|;|" it consisted oI disobedience oI an inspection order that American Legion
later reported to the court. The contemnor, Marshall, timely and speciIically
objected to the judge whose order he reportedly violated deciding the contempt
charge. Under McCormick, 67 Nev. at 332, 218 P.2d at 945, the district judge
thus exceeded her jurisdiction in presiding over the contempt proceeding.
DeIending the contempt order, American Legion argues that NRS 22.030(3) does
not, and constitutionally cannot under the separationoI- powers doctrine, apply to
civil contempt proceedings. The identical arguments were made and rejected in
McCormick, which also involved "a civil or perhaps quasi-criminal contempt, "
67 Nev. at 326, 218 P.2d at 942. At issue in McCormick was the predecessor to
NRS 22.030(3), which provided "that in all cases oI contempt arising without the
immediate view 2 and presence oI the court, the judge oI such court in whose
contempt the deIendant is alleged to be shall not preside at such trial over the
objection oI the deIendant." 4 NCL 8943 (1929). An earlier case, PaciIic Live
Stock Co. v. Ellison Ranching Co., 46 Nev. 351, 213 P. 700 (1923), had
invalidated a statute requiring jury trials in contempt proceedings under
separation-oI-powers doctrine because the statute eIIectively removed the court
as the arbiter oI contempt, substituting it with a jury. Distinguishing the PaciIic
Live Stock decision, McCormick holds that NRS 22.030(3)'s predecessor did not
unconstitutionally invade the prerogative oI the judicial branch, since "the
identical court whose decree is claimed to have been violated hears and
determines the contempt charge|,| . . . |t|here is no transIer to a diIIerent
tribunal|, and o|nly the judge oI that court becomes disqualiIied when the proper
objection is made." McCormick, 67 Nev. at 330, 218 P.2d at 944. Continuing,
McCormick notes that, "DisqualiIication oI judges, under the regulatory power oI
the legislature, is by no means new to our statutes." Id. On this basis, this court
issued a writ oI prohibition barring the district judge, violation oI whose order
gave rise to the indirect contempt charge, Irom presiding over the contempt
proceeding. Id. at 332, 218 P.2d at 945.
Coughlin moved to disqualiIy Judge Howard in FHE11, Judge Holmes in
FHE11, and, more recently, Judge CliIton incident to teh 2/13/13 Contempt
Order in RJC 12-065630. None oI them obeyed NRS 22.030(2).
Title 2. Civil Practice (Chapters 10-22) Chapter 22. Contempts (ReIs & Annos)
22.010. Acts or omissions constituting contempts
The Iollowing acts or omissions shall be deemed contempts:
1.
Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while the judge
is holding court, or engaged in judicial duties at chambers, or toward masters or
arbitrators while sitting on a reIerence or arbitration, or other judicial proceeding.
2.
A breach oI the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance in the presence
oI the court, or in its immediate vicinity, tending to interrupt the due course oI the
trial or other judicial proceeding.
3.
Disobedience or resistance to any lawIul writ, order, rule or process issued by the
court or judge at chambers.
4.
Disobedience oI a subpoena duly served, or reIusing to be sworn or answer as a
witness.
5.
Rescuing any person or property in the custody oI an oIIicer by virtue oI an order
or process oI such court or judge at chambers.
6.
Disobedience oI the order or direction oI the court made pending the trial oI an
action, in speaking to or in the presence oI a juror concerning an action in which
the juror has been impaneled to determine, or in any manner approaching or
interIering with such juror with the intent to inIluence the verdict.
7.
Abusing the process or proceedings oI the court or Ialsely pretending to act under
the authority oI an order or process oI the court.
CREDIT(S)
Amended by Laws 1983, p. 843.
Formerly Civil Practice Act oI 1911, 452; RL (1912), 5394; NCL (1929),
8941.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
2009 Legislation
Technical corrections were made to conIorm with Legislative Counsel Bureau
revisions (2009).
CROSS REFERENCES
Bail, penalty Ior violating court order, see NRS 178.484.
Court powers, enIorcement oI order, see NRS 1.210.
Courts-martial, authority, see NRS 193.110.
Criminal contempt, generally, see NRS 193.300.
Grand juries, secrecy oI proceedings, see NRS 172.245.
Habeas corpus, contempt during release on bail, see NRS 34.540.
Jurors, Iailure to attend and serve, see NRS 6.040.
Juvenile courts, disobedience oI court orders, see NRS 62E.040.
Legislative process, interIerence, see NRS 218A.925.
Misconduct oI deIendant, see NRS 175.387.
Municipal courts, punishment Ior contempt, see NRS 266.570.
Parental rights, termination proceeding, Iailure to appear or bring minor, see NRS
128.130.
Subpoenas, Iailure to obey, see NRS 174.385.
Witnesses, reIusal to be sworn or to answer, see NRS 50.195.
LAW REVIEW COMMENTARIES
Perjury in Our Family Courts. Aurora M. Marshall & Robert P. Dickerson. 8
Nev. Law. 23 (May 1999).
Review oI Selected Nevada Legislation (1983 Session). 1983
Pac.L.J.Rev.Nev.Legis. 46.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Contempt 1 to 26.
Witnesses
21.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 93k1 to 93k26; 410k21.
C.J.S.
Contempt 1, 5 to 6, 8, 10 to 14, 16 to 22, 24 to 27, 29 to 31, 35.
C.J.S.
Witnesses 27.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR Library
33 ALR 3rd 448, Appealability oI Contempt Adjudication or Conviction.
65 ALR 1518, Power oI Legislative Body or Committee to Compel Attendance
oI Nonmember as Witness.
Treatises and Practice Aids
Grand Jury Law and Practice 11:19, Contempt oI Court--Criminal Contempt:
Background and Development.
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
Contempt, Iederal crimes and oIIenses, see 18 U.S.C.A. 401 et seq.
Contempt, trial and disposition, Iederal criminal procedure, see 18 U.S.C.A.
3691 et seq.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Child support,
Payment oI support,
Child support, presumption oI ability to pay, civil or criminal contempt, see
Hicks on BehalI oI Feiock v. Feiock, U.S.Cal.1988, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 485 U.S.
624, 99 L.Ed.2d 721, on remand 263 Cal.Rptr. 437, 215 Cal.App.3d 141, review
denied.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
In general 1
Ability to obey, disobeying orders 6
Attorneys generally 11
Clarity oI orders, disobeying orders 4
Court oIIicers 10
DeIenses generally 12
Disobeying orders 3-6
Disobeying orders -In general 3
Disobeying orders -Ability to obey 6
Disobeying orders -Clarity oI orders 4
Disobeying orders -LawIulness oI orders 5
LawIulness oI orders, disobeying orders 5
Misconduct in presence oI court 9
Rescuing property in custody oI the law 8
Review 13
Right to counsel 14
WilIul behavior 2
Witnesses 7
1. In general
Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction over an appeal Irom a contempt order
issued against party or non-party when no rule or statute provides Ior such an
appeal; proper mode oI review is by original writ petition; overruling Poirier v.
Board oI Dental Examiners, 81 Nev. 384, 404 P.2d 1; abrogating Guerin v.
Guerin, 114 Nev. 127, 953 P.2d 716, Awad v. Wright, 106 Nev. 407, 794 P.2d
713. Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners Ass'n, 2000, 5 P.3d 569, 116
Nev. 646. Contempt 66(1)
Contempt proceeding against civil deIendant Ior 11 violations oI court orders
was, on balance, criminal in nature, though it also contained civil elements oI
intending to protect plaintiII's rights and to compel obedience to earlier order
prohibiting disposal oI property, where the punishment was a set term oI eleven
months imprisonment and thus punitive rather than coercive; thereIore, deIendant
was entitled, under FiIth Amendment, to reIuse to testiIy at contempt proceeding
in order to avoid contempt charges. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. Warner v. Second
Judicial Dist. Court In and For County oI Washoe, 1995, 906 P.2d 707, 111 Nev.
1379 . Contempt 3; Witnesses 297(13.1)
Contempt proceedings, while usually called civil or criminal, are, strictly
speaking, neither; they may best be characterized as sui generis, and may partake
oI the characteristics oI both.
Warner v. Second Judicial Dist. Court In and For County oI Washoe, 1995, 906
P.2d 707, 111 Nev. 1379. Contempt 2; Contempt 40
Proceedings in the nature oI 'criminal contempt are those directed to
preservation oI the dignity and authority oI the court, while 'civil contempt
proceedings are those prosecuted to enIorce the rights oI private parties and to
compel obedience to orders or decrees Ior the beneIit oI opposing parties; a
Iurther distinction is that imprisonment Ior 'criminal contempt is inIlicted as a
punishment Ior that which has been done, whereas imprisonment Ior 'civil
contempt is usually coercive. Warner v. Second Judicial Dist. Court In and For
County oI Washoe, 1995, 906 P.2d 707, 111 Nev. 1379. Contempt 3; Contempt 4
Criminal contempt oI court concerns violation oI penal statute, and must be
strictly construed in Iavor oI those accused. City Council oI City oI Reno v. Reno
Newspapers, Inc., 1989, 784 P.2d 974, 105 Nev. 886. Contempt
Order on which judgment oI civil contempt is grounded must be clear and
unambiguous. Southwest Gas Corp. v. Flintkote Co.--U. S. Lime Div., 1983, 659
P.2d 861, 99 Nev. 127. Contempt 20
When contempt citation is issued apparently in order to ensure compliance with
court order, process is coercive in nature rather than punitive and is proper.
N.R.S. 22.110. Hildahl v. Hildahl, 1979, 601 P.2d 58, 95 Nev. 657. Contempt 20
3
2 2
InterIerence with oIIicer oI court in perIormance oI oIIicial duties constitutes
'contempt oI court. State v. District Court oI Sixth Judicial Dist. oI Nevada, in
and Ior Humboldt County, 1930, 286 P. 418, 52 Nev. 270. Contempt
DeIendant, an attorney oI the Supreme Court, in a petition Ior rehearing oI a
cause in which the Supreme Court had held a statute limiting the hours oI labor
constitutional, stated that in his opinion the decisions Iavoring the power oI the
state to limit the hours oI labor on the ground oI the police power oI the state
were all wrong, were written by men who have never perIormed manual labor,
and by politicians and Ior politics, and that they did not know what they wrote
about. Held, that such statement constituted a contempt oI the Supreme Court,
which was not purged by deIendant's disavowal oI any intent to commit a
contempt and by his apology. In re Chartz, 1906, 85 P. 352, 29 Nev. 110, 124
Am.St.Rep. 915. Contempt
The statute concerning contempts is a penal statute, and must be strictly
construed in Iavor oI those accused oI violating its prohibitions. Maxwell v.
Rives, 1876, 11 Nev. 213. Contempt 31
2. WilIul behavior
Experienced trial judge's ignorance oI proper contempt procedures, without more,
may constitute 'bad Iaith necessary to Iinding oI willIul misconduct. N.R.S.
22.010, 199.340. Goldman
v. Nevada Com'n on Judicial Discipline, 1992, 830 P.2d 107, 108 Nev. 251.
Judges 11(2)
3. Disobeying orders--In general
A party cannot be Iound guilty oI contempt Ior Iailing to pay child support and
sentenced to jail conditional upon his payment oI arrearages unless the trial court
Iirst determines that the individual (1) has the ability to make the payment and (2)
willIully reIuses to pay. Rodriguez
v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County oI Clark, 2004, 102 P.3d 41, 120
Nev. 798, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 2905, 545 U.S. 1116, 162 L.Ed.2d 298.
Child Support 444; Child Support 445; Child Support 497
Viewing members oI Commission on Judicial Discipline as conscientious and
reasonable persons who were donating their energies with worthwhile social ends
in view, Supreme Court would not immediately treat Commission members'
deIiance, apparently counseled by Attorney General and associates, oI Supreme
Court's order Ior in camera inspection oI commission records as actionable
contempt on part oI any member. Whitehead v. Nevada Com'n On Judicial
Discipline, 1994, 906 P.2d 230, 110 Nev. 128, decision clariIied on denial oI
rehearing 873 P.2d 946, 110 Nev. 380. Contempt 28(2)
Court order which did not spell out the details oI compliance in clear, speciIic,
and unambiguous terms could not Iorm basis Ior subsequent contempt order.
State Indus. Ins. System v.
Sleeper, 1984, 679 P.2d 1273, 100 Nev. 267. Contempt 20
Divorce decree which set out schedule oI husband's support obligations and
which incorporated and approved settlement agreement's provision Ior
conveyance oI Iamily home to wiIe was 'order issued by court within statute
including in acts or omissions constituting con-tempts disobedience or resistance
to any lawIul order issued by court; thus husband's unilateral modiIication oI his
perIormance under that order violated the decree and he was properly held in
contempt. N.R.S. 22.010, subd. 3, 125.140, subd. 2, 125.150, subd. 5, 125.180,
subd.
1. Hildahl v. Hildahl, 1979, 601 P.2d 58, 95 Nev. 657. Divorce 1103; Divorce
1104
Trial court has right to punish Ior disobedience to its lawIul mandate. N.R.S.
199.340, subd. 4. Poirier v. Board oI Dental Examiners, 1965, 404 P.2d 1, 81
Nev. 384. Contempt 20
Where receiver was ordered to make monthly payments to plaintiII Ior plaintiII's
support, attachment oI such payments by third party pursuant to alleged
agreement between such third party, his attorney, and the receiver, whereupon
receiver reIused to make payments to plaintiII and, aIter judgment against
plaintiII, paid third party under writ oI execution, would constitute 'contempt oI
court by third party, his attorney, and the receiver. Comp.Laws, 8941.
Gottwals v. Manske, 1940, 99 P.2d 645, 60 Nev. 76, rehearing denied 100 P.2d
580, 60 Nev. 76. Receivers 74
4. ----Clarity oI orders, disobeying orders
Order on which judgment oI contempt is based must be clear and unambiguous,
and must spell out details oI compliance in clear, speciIic and unambiguous
terms, so that person will readily know exactly what duties are imposed on him.
Cunningham v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court oI State oI Nev., In and For Clark
County, 1986, 729 P.2d 1328, 102 Nev. 551. Contempt 20
Judge's phone conversation with police commander's secretary, directing police
commander to appear at courthouse, was not clear and unambiguous order such
as would support judgment oI contempt, where secretary testiIied that judge did
not properly identiIy himselI, did not otherwise identiIy purpose oI call, and did
not leave number at which commander could return call. Cunningham v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court oI State oI Nev., In and For Clark County, 1986, 729 P.2d
1328, 102 Nev. 551. Contempt 20
Generally, an order Ior civil contempt must be grounded on one's disobedience oI
an order that spells out the details oI compliance in clear, speciIic and
unambiguous terms so that such person will readily know what duties or
obligations are imposed on him. Southwest Gas Corp.
v. Flintkote Co.--U. S. Lime Div., 1983, 659 P.2d 861, 99 Nev. 127. Contempt 20
Natural gas supplier and its executive vice-president could not be held in civil
contempt oI order
remanding rate reIund proceeding to Public Service Commission with direction
to issue an appropriate order directing supplier to make reIunds in accordance
with procedures set Iorth in Commission opinion where the order did not
speciIically direct the supplier or vice-president to do anything and no part oI the
order was directed to them, even though customers had prayed Ior relieI against
supplier. Southwest Gas Corp. v. Flintkote Co.--U. S. Lime Div., 1983, 659 P.2d
861, 99 Nev. 127. Contempt 20
5. ----LawIulness oI orders, disobeying orders
Violation oI Supreme Court orders issued in excess oI jurisdiction could not
produce valid judgment oI contempt. Del Papa v. SteIIen, 1996, 915 P.2d 245,
112 Nev. 369. Contempt 21 'Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction doctrine
relates to authority oI courts to issue ancillary orders while considering other
questions (including determination oI their own jurisdiction) and to punish as
criminal contempt violations oI such orders even though it may later be judicially
determined that court lacked jurisdiction over proceedings in which ancillary
orders were issued. Whitehead v. Nevada Com'n On Judicial Discipline, 1994,
906 P.2d 230, 110 Nev. 128, decision clariIied on denial oI rehearing 873 P.2d
946, 110 Nev. 380. Contempt 21; Courts 27; Courts 39
One may not be held in contempt oI a void order. State Indus. Ins. System v.
Sleeper, 1984, 679 P.2d 1273, 100 Nev. 267. Contempt 21
Trial court was without power to order county comptroller to pay Iees Ior
appointed deIense counsel in excess oI that allowed by statute and, hence,
comptroller could not be held in contempt oI order. N.R.S. 7.260, St.1965, c. 279.
Daines v. MarkoII, 1976, 555 P.2d 490, 92 Nev.
582. Attorney And Client 132; Contempt 21
Court was without jurisdiction to cite deIendant in a replevin action Ior contempt
Ior Iailure to deliver an automobile, where court although having suIIicient data
Ior entry oI a judgment requiring in the alternative, delivery oI the automobile, or
its value in case delivery could not be had, instead entered judgment requiring
deIendant to deliver the automobile to plaintiII with no alternative. N.R.S.
17.120. Application oI Havas, 1962, 371 P.2d 30, 78 Nev. 237. Contempt 21
ReIusal oI Iather to produce children to enable county court to make such
disposition oI children during pendency oI divorce action as would be most
advantageous to each child was contempt where Iather, an Ohio resident, was
personally served in Nevada with summons in divorce action. N.R.S. 125.060.
Application oI Byington, 1961, 366 P.2d 518, 77 Nev. 456. Contempt 20
IndeIiniteness and uncertainty in a judgment or decree may constitute a good
deIense in contempt proceedings. State ex rel. Smith v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court,
Humboldt County, 1946, 167 P.2d 648, 63 Nev. 249. Contempt 21
An order by reIerees staying proceedings, being beyond the power oI the reIerees
to make aIter their report was Iiled, the court could not punish Ior contempt Ior
violation thereoI. Cline
v. Langan, 1909, 101 P. 553, 31 Nev. 239. Contempt 22
In an action relating to a leasehold, and rents, an order by reIerees staying
proceedings, pending a motion Ior new trial, iI regularly made, would not be
valid against a second action by deIendant Ior rents accruing aIter the
commencement oI the Iirst action, and the court could not punish deIendant Ior
contempt Ior bringing such action. Cline v. Langan, 1909, 101
P. 553, 31 Nev. 239. Contempt 22
It is not a contempt oI court to Iail to comply with an order which was void Ior
want oI jurisdiction. Ex parte Gardner, 1895, 39 P. 570, 22 Nev. 280. Contempt
21
The only design oI the law requiring an aIIidavit to be made oI certain Iacts,
beIore the court shall make an order to have a party in jail produced in court, to
testiIy at the instance oI the adverse party, was to prevent improper and
unnecessary interIerence with the custody oI prisoners. II the order Ior the
prisoner's attendance in court was improvidently granted, it is no concern oI the
prisoner; being beIore the court he is bound to answer any question that he would
have been required to answer iI the process Ior bringing him there had been
strictly pursued. Maxwell v. Rives, 1876, 11 Nev. 213. Witnesses 18
6. ----Ability to obey, disobeying orders
A party's inability to comply with a judicial order constitutes a deIense to a
charge oI civil contempt. F.T.C. v. AIIordable Media, 1999, 179 F.3d 1228.
Contempt 24
Where contemners have voluntarily or contumaciously brought on themselves
disability to obey order or decree, deIense that contemners would be unable to
obey order without Iault on their part is not available. McCormick v. Sixth
Judicial Dist. Court in and Ior Humboldt County, 1950, 218 P.2d 939, 67 Nev.
318. Contempt 24
The general rule that aIIidavit in proceeding against divorced husband Ior
contempt in Iailing to pay moneys as directed by divorce decree to wiIe Ior minor
child's support need not show respondent's ability to pay applies in case oI
divorced husband Iailing to appear in response to order to show cause why he
should not be punished Ior such contempt beIore Supreme Court's decision
overruling or modiIying its opinion in previous case that aIIidavit must show
such ability. Steeves v. Second Judicial District Court in and Ior Washoe County,
1939, 94 P.2d 1093, 59 Nev. 405. Child Support 475
An aIIidavit Ior order to show cause why divorced husband should not be
punished Ior contempt in Iailing to pay wiIe sums speciIied in divorce decree Ior
minor child's support need not show his ability to pay, as his inability to do so is
matter oI deIense. Steeves v. Second Judicial District Court in and Ior Washoe
County, 1939, 94 P.2d 1093, 59 Nev. 405. Child Support 480
Order Iinding Iormer husband in civil contempt Ior Iailing to pay entirety oI his
$4,000 per month support obligation to Iormer wiIe during certain period and
ordering him to pay Iormer wiIe $5,000 in attorney Iees was not supported by
Iindings indicating whether or on what basis court determined that Iormer
husband had ability to pay entirety oI obligation during speciIied period, or that
he willIully Iailed to do so, thus warranting reversal oI contempt order. Bland v.
Bland, 2008, 238 P.3d 796, 2008 WL 6099075, Unreported. Divorce 1119(5);
Divorce 1316(2)
7. Witnesses
Bribing a person, who is known to be a material witness, to remain away Irom
court, is a contempt oI court, whether such person has been subpoenaed or not,
and though punishable by indictment, under Rev.St. 5399, 18 U.S.C.A. 241,
is also punishable under Rev.St. 725, 28
U.S.C.A. 385, as a contempt committed by misbehavior 'so near the court 'as
to obstruct the administration oI justice. In re Brule, 1895, 71 F. 943. Contempt
12
Where State made good-Iaith attempt to comply with trial judge's order requiring
production oI inIormant, but was unable to comply because inIormant had
jumped bail, it was abuse oI discretion to dismiss charges. State v. Stiglitz, 1978,
576 P.2d 746, 94 Nev. 158. Criminal Law 627.10(9)
Disobedience oI subpoena duly served is deemed contempt and a court
proceeding on aIIidavit, citing unwilling witness to show cause why he should
not be punished Ior contempt, is proper method oI enIorcement. N.R.S. 22.010,
subd. 4. Nevada Commission on Equal Rights oI Citizens v. Smith, 1964, 396
P.2d 677, 80 Nev. 469. Witnesses 21
Commission on Equal Rights oI Citizens may lawIully proceed to enIorce
subpoenas issued by it by a court proceeding on aIIidavit citing unwilling witness
to show cause why he should not be punished Ior contempt. N.R.S. 22.010, subd.
4, 233.010-233.080, 233.010, subd. 1. Nevada Commission on Equal Rights oI
Citizens v. Smith, 1964, 396 P.2d 677, 80 Nev. 469. Civil Rights 1709
8. Rescuing property in custody oI the law
Replacing boards in spillway oI ditch, previously removed by water
commissioner, would not constitute contempt, iI water commissioner was not
acting in accordance with order determin18
6
ing water rights. Comp.Laws 1929, 7890 et seq. State v. Sixth Judicial Dist.
Court in and Ior Humboldt County, 1931, 1 P.2d 105, 53 Nev. 343. Contempt 18
AIter Iiling oI order oI determination oI water rights with clerk oI court by state
engineer, water oI river system was in custodia legis (Water Law, 38, as
amended by St. 1915, pp. 381, 382, 8, and 36 1/2, as added by St. 1927, c.
192). State v. District Court oI Sixth Judicial Dist. oI Nevada, in and Ior
Humboldt County, 1930, 286 P. 418, 52 Nev. 270. Contempt
9. Misconduct in presence oI court
Though a grand jury is an adjunct oI the court, it is not such part thereoI as, under
Comp. Laws, 3556, authorizing summary punishment Ior a contempt in the
immediate presence oI the court, permits the judge to summarily punish oIIenders
Ior any act beIore the grand jury, without proceeding on aIIidavit and citing the
oIIender to show cause why he should not be punished. Ex parte Hedden, 1907,
90 P. 737, 29 Nev. 352, 13 Am.Ann.Cas. 1173. Contempt
10. Court oIIicers
Deputy county clerk's action in accepting and Iiling a deIendant's motion to
dismiss action aIter deIault had been entered against that deIendant on previous
day did not constitute 'contemptuous act on part oI court clerk. Bowman v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, In and For Clark County, 1986, 728 P.2d 433, 102
Nev. 474. Contempt 10
Clerk oI court has ministerial duty to accept and Iile documents, she has no
authority to pass upon validity oI instruments presented Ior Iiling. Bowman v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, In and For Clark County, 1986, 728 P.2d 433, 102
Nev. 474. Clerks OI Courts 67
It is duty oI clerk oI court to accept Ior Iiling any paper presented to her which is
in acceptable Iorm under court rules and is accompanied by requisite Iee unless
she has speciIic instructions Irom court to contrary. Bowman v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, In and For Clark County, 1986, 728 P.2d 433, 102 Nev. 474. Clerks
OI Courts 67
11. Attorneys generally
Deputy district attorney's mere inability to advise district court as to whether state
would be ready to try case on previously set trial date, as a result oI clerk's Iailure
to send Iile oI case assigned to major violators' section oI district attorney's oIIice
to court, did not warrant Iinding oI contempt, where team deputy was not
disorderly, contemptuous or insolent, no breach oI peace, boisterous conduct or
violent disturbance took place, team deputy did not disobey or resist any lawIul
writ, order, common rule or process, or abuse process or proceeding oI court, and
there was no showing that anyone connected with oIIice deliberately or
recklessly disregarded
their duties with respect to court. N.R.S. 22.010, 199.340. OIIice oI Clark County
Dist. Atty. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court In and For Clark County, 1985, 710
P.2d 1384, 101 Nev.
843. Contempt 10
Absence or tardiness oI an attorney Irom courtroom or other place where he has
duty to appear, beIore judge or other oIIicer oI court at designated time, to
participate in hearing, trial or other proceeding in which he is counsel Ior a party
may constitute contempt unless Iailure to appear is due to attorney's inability or
incapacity without Iault to be present or punctual. Kellar v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 1970, 470 P.2d 434, 86 Nev. 445. Contempt 10
Failure to appear at scheduled arraignments oI client oI which timely notice had
been given justiIied contempt judgment. N.R.S. 22.010, subd. 3, 22.090, 22.100.
Kellar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 1970, 470 P.2d 434, 86 Nev. 445. Contempt
10
Citation oI contempt Ior Iailure to appear at arraignments Ior client is quasi-
criminal in nature and requires citing court to prove contempt beyond reasonable
doubt. N.R.S. 199.340, subd. 4. Kellar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 1970, 470
P.2d 434, 86 Nev. 445. Contempt 60(3)
Evidence supported Iinding that timely notice oI order setting arraignments oI
client had been given. Kellar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 1970, 470 P.2d 434,
86 Nev. 445. Contempt 60(3)
12. DeIenses generally
Fact that attorney was in justice's court at time set Ior district court arraignments
oI client was not suIIicient excuse Ior Iailure to appear Ior arraignments. Kellar v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 1970, 470 P.2d 434, 86 Nev. 445. Contempt 28(1)
13. Review
Supreme Court had jurisdiction over direct appeal Irom district court's contempt
order, where proceeding arose in part Irom contempt order issued as a Iinal
judgment under statute governing distribution oI water rights by State Engineer.
In re Determination oI Relative Rights oI Claimants and Appropriators oI Waters
oI Humboldt River Stream System and Tributaries, 2002, 59 P.3d 1226, 118 Nev.
901. Contempt 66(2)
Whether a person is guilty oI contempt is generally within the particular
knowledge oI the district court, and the district court's order should not lightly be
overturned. Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners Ass'n, 2000, 5 P.3d 569,
116 Nev. 646. Contempt 66(7)
Contempt charged against receiver and others Ior violating court order requiring
monthly payments
by receiver to plaintiII by reason oI conspiracy whereby such others brought
action against plaintiII and attached monthly payments which receiver thereupon
reIused to pay to plaintiII and, aIter judgment against plaintiII, paid to others
under writ oI execution, was a 'civil contempt and not a 'criminal contempt,
hence Supreme Court had jurisdiction upon plaintiII's appeal Irom dismissal oI
the contempt proceedings. Comp.Laws, 8941. Gottwals
v. Manske, 1940, 99 P.2d 645, 60 Nev. 76, rehearing denied 100 P.2d 580, 60
Nev. 76. Contempt 4; Contempt 66(1)
Error in ordering that divorced husband, adjudged guilty oI contempt Ior
violating order to show cause why he should not be punished Ior contempt in
Iailing to pay moneys to wiIe as directed by divorce decree Ior minor child's
support, be conIined in county jail Ior 30 days, instead oI 25 days authorized by
statute, does not require reversal or annulment oI order, which will be modiIied
by reducing term oI conIinement to 25 days. Comp.Laws, 8950. Steeves v.
Second Judicial District Court in and Ior Washoe County, 1939, 94 P.2d 1093, 59
Nev. 405. Child Support 559
14. Right to counsel
The need Ior appointed counsel in a civil contempt proceeding Ior nonpayment oI
child support turns on an initial determination oI indigency, Ior unless a party is
truly indigent, the State need not provide representation; iI an indigent party Iaces
the threat oI possible incarceration Ior the nonpayment oI child support, the court
should then seek to balance the private liberty interest at stake, the government's
interest, and the risk oI an erroneous Iinding, taking into account the complexity
oI the legal and Iactual issues and the party's ability to eIIectively communicate
on his own behalI. Rodriguez v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County oI
Clark, 2004, 102 P.3d 41, 120 Nev. 798, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 2905, 545
U.S. 1116, 162 L.Ed.2d 298. Child Support 491
In determining whether an indigent party in a contempt proceeding based on
nonpayment oI child support has a due process right to appointment oI counsel,
aIter balancing each oI the due process elements against the other, they as a
whole are measured against the presumption that a right to appointed counsel
arises only when the indigent party may lose his personal Ireedom. Rodriguez v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County oI Clark, 2004, 102 P.3d 41, 120 Nev.
798, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 2905, 545 U.S. 1116, 162 L.Ed.2d 298.
Constitutional Law 4494
N. R. S. 22.010, NV ST 22.010
Current through the 2009 75th Regular Session and the 2010 26th Special
Session oI the Nevada Legislature and technical corrections received Irom the
Legislative Counsel Bureau (2010).
Title 2. Civil Practice (Chapters 10-22) Chapter 22. Contempts (ReIs & Annos)
22.030. Summary punishment oI contempt committed in immediate view and
presence oI court; aIIidavit or statement to be Iiled when contempt committed
outside immediate view and presence oI court; disqualiIication oI judge
1. II a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence oI the court or
judge at chambers, the contempt may be punished summarily. II the court or
judge summarily punishes a person Ior a contempt pursuant to this subsection,
the court or judge shall enter an order that:
(a)
Recites the Iacts constituting the contempt in the immediate view and presence oI
the court or judge;
(b)
Finds the person guilty oI the contempt; and
(c)
Prescribes the punishment Ior the contempt.
2.
II a contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence oI the court
or judge at chambers, an aIIidavit must be presented to the court or judge oI the
Iacts constituting the contempt, or a statement oI the Iacts by the masters or
arbitrators.
3.
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, iI a contempt is not committed
in the immediate view and presence oI the court, the judge oI the court in whose
contempt the person is alleged to be shall not preside at the trial oI the contempt
over the objection oI the person. The provisions oI this subsection do not apply
in:
(a)
Any case where a Iinal judgment or decree oI the court is drawn in question and
such judgment or decree was entered in such court by a predecessor judge thereoI
10 years or more preceding the bringing oI contempt proceedings Ior the
violation oI the judgment or decree.
(b)
Any proceeding described in subsection 1 oI NRS 3.223, whether or not a Iamily
court has been established in the judicial district.
CREDIT(S)
39 to 56.
Amended by Laws 1999, p. 2021.
Formerly Civil Practice Act oI 1911, 454; Laws 1913, p. 117; Laws 1951, p.
448.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 1999, c. 434, in subsec. 1, Iollowing 'summarily rewrote the remainder oI
the subsection, which previously read, ', Ior which an order shall be made,
reciting the Iacts as occurring in such immediate view and presence, adjudging
that the person proceeded against is thereby guilty oI a contempt and that he be
punished as therein prescribed; and in subsec. 3, in the introductory paragraph,
in the Iirst sentence, inserted 'Except as otherwise provided in this subsection,
and inserted 'oI the contempt, designated par. (a), and added par. (b).
LAW REVIEW COMMENTARIES
Order in the Court. Mary Anne Decaria. 14 Nev. Law. 44 (Sept. 2006).
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Contempt 51 to 54.
Judges
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 93k51 to 93k54; 227k39 to 227k56.
C.J.S.
Contempt 62, 70 to 71.
C.J.S.
Judges 62, 98 to 160.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR Library
154 ALR 1227, Necessity and SuIIiciency oI Making and Recording Subsidiary
or Detailed Findings Supporting Adjudication oI Direct Contempt.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
AIIidavits 3
Judges 4
Order oI court 5, 6
Order oI court -In general 5
Order oI court -SuIIiciency 6
Presence oI court 2
SuIIiciency, order oI court 6
Validity 1
1. Validity
6
Statute providing that in all cases oI contempt arising without immediate view
and presence oI court, judge oI court in whose contempt deIendant is alleged to
be, shall not preside at such trial over objection oI deIendant, is constitutional.
N.C.L.1929, 8943. McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court in and Ior
Humboldt County, 1950, 218 P.2d 939, 67 Nev. 318. Contempt 31
2. Presence oI court
Though a grand jury is an adjunct oI the court, it is not such part thereoI as, under
Comp. Laws, 3556, authorizing summary punishment Ior a contempt in the
immediate presence oI the court, permits the judge to summarily punish oIIenders
Ior any act beIore the grand jury, without proceeding on aIIidavit and citing the
oIIender to show cause why he should not be punished. Ex parte Hedden, 1907,
90 P. 737, 29 Nev. 352, 13 Am.Ann.Cas. 1173. Contempt
3. AIIidavits
Order to show cause complaining oI alleged contemptuous conduct oI wiIe and
her attorney in recording property settlement agreement with county recorder's
oIIice aIter district court had ordered all records in the matter to be sealed should
have been accompanied by aIIidavit, as complained oI conduct was not
committed in immediate view and presence oI court or judge in chambers. N.R.S.
22.030, subd. 2. Awad v. Wright, 1990, 794 P.2d 713, 106 Nev. 407. Contempt
54(1)
Where suit was begun in 1907 to establish water rights oI various appropriators
on river system, and decree was entered in 1919, changes in ownership were
understandable, and contempt petition Ior violation oI decree containing
inIormation and belieI veriIication oI allegations setting Iorth history oI suit and
rights granted to each oI parties thereto, was suIIicient. N.C.L.1929, 8943.
McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court in and Ior Humboldt County, 1950, 218
P.2d 939, 67 Nev. 318. Contempt 54(4)
An aIIidavit Ior order to show cause why divorced husband should not be
punished Ior contempt in Iailing to pay wiIe sums speciIied in divorce decree Ior
minor child's support need not show his ability to pay, as his inability to do so is
matter oI deIense. Steeves v. Second Judicial District Court in and Ior Washoe
The general rule that aIIidavit in proceeding against divorced husband Ior
contempt in Iailing to pay moneys as directed by divorce decree to wiIe Ior minor
child's support need not show respondent's ability to pay applies in case oI
divorced husband Iailing to appear in response to order to show cause why he
should not be punished Ior such contempt beIore Supreme Court's
decision overruling or modiIying its opinion in previous case that aIIidavit must
show such ability. Steeves v. Second Judicial District Court in and Ior Washoe
An aIIidavit that deIendants had continued to enlarge a ditch across plaintiII's
ranch in violation oI an injunction held suIIicient to conIer jurisdiction on the
court to proceed against them Ior contempt, under Rev. Laws 1912, 5396, as
amended by St. 1913, c. 94, requiring that the aIIidavit present the Iacts
constituting the contempt, though tested by an original proceeding in prohibition
rather than on certiorari, in which there is no chance to amend the aIIidavit; lack
oI jurisdiction being the only ground on which either writ will issue. State v.
Second Judicial Dist. Court, 1922, 211 P. 105, 46 Nev. 410. Injunction 230(2)
To give jurisdiction oI a proceeding Ior contempt, a substantial and general
statement in the aIIidavit is suIIicient. Strait v. Williams, 1884, 4 P. 1083, 18
Nev. 430. Contempt 54(4)
4. Judges
In case oI contempt arising outside view oI court, judge should have recused
herselI in response to peremptory challenge. N.R.S. 22.030, subd. 3. Awad v.
Wright, 1990, 794 P.2d 713, 106 Nev. 407. Judges 51(4)
Counsel's Iailure to appear Ior scheduled hearing beIore the Supreme Court,
conduct occurring within immediate view and presence oI the court, was a
'direct rather than a indirect, contempt; hence, the Supreme Court was not
disqualiIied Irom presiding over the contempt proceedings. N.R.S. 22.030, subd.
3. Gipson v. State, 1986, 714 P.2d 1007, 102 Nev. 61. Contempt 52
Where contempt petition was suIIicient under circumstances and record to give
district court jurisdiction, and question oI inability to comply with court order by
reason oI interest oI United States was a matter oI deIense, writ oI prohibition
would issue prohibiting judge who issued order Irom presiding at trial oI
contempt proceedings. N.C.L.1929, 8943. McCormick
v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court in and Ior Humboldt County, 1950, 218 P.2d 939, 67
Nev. 318. Prohibition 5(3)
Where judge voluntarily disqualiIied himselI and called another judge upon
request oI parties without requiring payment oI Iee, change held not 'change oI
judge so as to preclude right to have diIIerent judge hear order to show cause
upon Iiling aIIidavit oI prejudice and paying Iee. Comp.Laws, 8943; 8407, as
amended by St.1931, c. 153, 1; 8407.02, as added by St.1931, c. 153, 3.
State ex rel. Warren v. Sixth Judicial District Court in and Ior Humboldt County,
1936, 61 P.2d 6, 57 Nev. 214. Judges 51(1)
Where plaintiII, his attorney, and Ioreman took possession oI personalty,
adjudged to belong
to deIendants in Ioreclosure action, upon alleged abandonment by receiver
appointed to take possession pending appeal, attorney and Ioreman held not
'parties entitled to disqualiIy judge who had tried action and, upon instance oI
receiver, issued order to show cause why personalty should not be surrendered to
receiver. Comp.Laws, 8943; 8407, as amended by St.1931, c. 153, 1;
8407.02, as added by St.1931, c. 153, 3. State ex rel. Warren v. Sixth Judicial
District Court in and Ior Humboldt County, 1936, 61 P.2d 6, 57 Nev. 214. Judges
51(1)
PlaintiII who did not object to calling oI diIIerent judge upon deIendants' request,
and who stipulated that action be assigned to new judge Ior all Iurther
proceedings, waived right to change oI judge to hear order to show cause issued
while appeal Irom decree was pending. Comp.Laws, 8943; 8407, as amended
by St.1931, c. 153, 1; 8407.02, as added by St.1931, c. 153, 3. State ex rel.
Warren v. Sixth Judicial District Court in and Ior Humboldt County, 1936, 61
P.2d 6, 57 Nev. 214. Judges 54
5. Order oI court--In general
For purposes oI statute governing summary contempt proceedings Ior direct
contempt committed in judge's presence, which requires court to 'enter an order,
while a trial court's oral contempt order is immediately enIorceable, a written
order including the statute's required elements must be promptly entered.
Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County oI Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d
1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 52
6. ----SuIIiciency
Appropriate remedy Ior attorney who had been Iound in direct contempt oI court
in divorce proceeding in which he represented wiIe, where contempt order had
been Iound to be insuIIicient by Supreme Court, in that it did not contain a
suIIicient statement concerning what conduct was held to be contemptuous, was
to permit trial court to enter amended order, given that Supreme Court's opinion
addressed issue oI Iirst impression and announced standard Ior contents oI
written contempt order. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County oI
Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 66(8)
A written summary contempt order, issued pursuant to statute governing
summary contempt proceedings Ior direct contempt committed in judge's
presence, must set Iorth speciIic Iacts concerning the conduct Iound to be
contemptuous. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County oI Clark,
2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 52
Written summary contempt order Iinding attorney Ior wiIe in divorce proceeding
in direct contempt oI court Iailed to indicate what particular comments by
attorney were held to be contemptuous, and, thus, order was insuIIicient, under
statute governing summary contempt proceedings Ior direct contempt committed
in judge's presence. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County oI
Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 52
N. R. S. 22.030, NV ST 22.030
'*552 DISCUSSION
NRS 22.030(1) governs summary punishment Ior direct contempt:
II a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence oI the court or
judge at chambers, the contempt may be punished summarily. II the court or
judge summarily punishes a person Ior a contempt pursuant to this subsection,
the court or judge shall enter an order that:
(a) Recites the Iacts constituting the contempt in the immediate view and
presence oI the court or judge;
(b)
Finds the person guilty oI the contempt; and
(c)
Prescribes the punishment Ior the contempt.
**1274 Two phrases Irom this statute are at issue in this petition, and so we must
determine how to apply the requirements that 'the court or judge shall enter an
order, which '|r|ecites the Iacts constituting the contempt.
Requirement oI a written order
The district court makes a plain language argument that 'summary means
'without delay or Iormality; quickly executed, and thus no written order is
required so long as the contemnor is aware oI the Iacts constituting the contempt.
The district court argues that an oral order is suIIicient, relying on language in
this court's recent opinion in State, Division oI Child & Family Services v.
District Court.FN1 In that case, we considered when a district court's oral order
must be written, signed and Iiled beIore becoming eIIective and noted that
'nothing in this opinion precludes a court Irom summarily punishing a party who
commits contempt in the court's immediate presence, pursuant to NRS 22.030.
FN2 In contrast, Houston implicitly contends that a written order must be
entered.
FN1. 120 Nev. 445, 92 P.3d 1239 (2004).
FN2. Id. at 454, 92 P.3d at 1245.
Resolution oI this issue hinges on the meaning oI the phrase 'the court or judge
shall enter an order. We have previously stated that '|t|his court gives eIIect to
the legislature's intent by looking Iirst to the plain language oI the statute. But iI
the statutory language is ambiguous or Iails to address the issue, this court
construes the statute according to that which reason and public policy would
indicate the legislature intended.` FN3 Here, the phrase 'enter an order could
mean entry oI a written order, or it could *553 mean entry oI the court clerk's
minutes oI the district court's oral decision. Thus, the phrase is ambiguous.
FN3. Clark County v. Sun State Properties, 119 Nev. 329, 334, 72 P.3d 954, 957
(2003) (Iootnote omitted) (quoting State, Dep't Mtr. Vehicles v. Vezeris, 102
Nev. 232, 236, 720 P.2d 1208, 1211 (1986)).
|1| The Iirst sentence oI NRS 22.030(1) states that a contempt committed in the
court's presence may be punished summarily, and the second sentence provides
that iI a court summarily punishes a contempt, then it must enter an order that
memorializes the grounds Ior contempt, the contemnor's guilt, and the
punishment imposed. Under NRCP 58(c), only written judgments are
'enteredsigned by the judge and Iiled with the clerk. While a contempt order
is not a 'judgment as deIined in NRCP 54(a), since no appeal may be taken
Irom a contempt order, NRCP 58(c)'s language is still instructive and implies that
an 'entered order must be in writing. The statute's structure and language thus
indicate that the court's verbal order is enIorceable to punish the contempt and
restore order, but that a written Iollow-up order must nevertheless be entered.
This interpretation comports with common sense and the purpose oI summary
direct contempt. When Iaced with disruptive, contemptuous conduct during court
proceedings, a judge must have the power to restore order immediately by issuing
a verbal contempt order. It would be absurd to read the statute to require that,
beIore the judge could enIorce order in the courtroom, the judge must brieIly
recess the proceedings to prepare a written order. But a written order nevertheless
serves valuable purposes: it Iacilitates our review, and it helps to ensure that the
district court's contempt power is used with care and circumspection. We
thereIore conclude that while the district court's verbal contempt order is
immediately enIorceable, a written order including the statute's required elements
must promptly be entered.
Degree oI speciIicity required in Iact recitation
NRS 22.030(1)(a) requires that the written order must '|r|ecite| | the Iacts
constituting the contempt. The statute does not state how speciIic the Iactual
recitation must be. The phrase could mean that a detailed description oI the
accused contemnor's conduct must be set Iorth, or it could be interpreted to
permit a general summary oI the contemptuous conduct. We must determine
which meaning best reIlects the Legislature's intent.
**1275 Relying on cases Irom other jurisdictions, Houston argues that the instant
contempt order does not meet the required standard oI detail. In particular,
Houston cites a Missouri case, which holds that a contempt order must include
suIIicient speciIic Iacts so that a reviewing court can determine Irom the Iace oI
the order whether a contempt has been committed and that bare conclusions are
insuIIicient.*554 FN4 The district court asserts that iI the Iacts constituting
contempt appear in the record and are known to the contemnor, then NRS
22.030(1)(a) is satisIied. But the district court cites no authority in support oI its
position.
FN4. State ex rel. Tannenbaum v. Clark, 838 S.W.2d 26 (Mo.Ct.App.1992).
Petitioner also cites Gallagher v. Municipal Court oI City oI Los Angeles, 31
Cal.2d 784, 192 P.2d 905 (1948) and People v. GriIIith, 247 Ill.App.3d 21, 189
Ill.Dec. 821, 620 N.E.2d 1138 (1993), but Illinois permits review oI the complete
record, rather than requiring the written order to stand alone. See People v. Bell,
276 Ill.App.3d 939, 213 Ill.Dec. 351, 658 N.E.2d 1372 (1995).
Contrary to the district court's assertion, a majority oI jurisdictions require that
the basis Ior contempt be set Iorth in detail in the written order.FN5 Also, the
governing Iederal rule, which has language similar to NRS 22.030, has been
interpreted to require speciIic Iacts set Iorth in the written certiIicate oI
contempt.FN6 These jurisdictions reason that appellate review is simpliIied by
requiring the written order to be speciIic, FN7 that a clear written order avoids
compelling the appellate court to inIer Irom a transcript the contempt's basis,FN8
and that requiring a speciIic written order Iurthers the goal oI ensuring that the
contempt power is used appropriately.FN9 Some oI these cases have held that
statutes or rules similar to NRS
22.030 require speciIic Iacts, not conclusory characterizations, in the written
order in situations similar to that presented in this case.FN10
FN5. See In re D.W., 123 Cal.App.4th 491, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 274 (2004); In re
Marriage oI McGinnis, 778 P.2d 281 (Colo.Ct.App.1989); Matter oI Butler, 609
A.2d 1080 (Del.1992); Williams v. U.S., 576 A.2d 1339 (D.C.1990); Guardado
v. Guardado, 813 So.2d 236 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2002); State v. Hicks, 71 Haw.
564, 798 P.2d 906 (1990); Matter oI Williams, 120 Idaho 473, 817 P.2d 139
(1991); Matter oI Steelman, 648 N.E.2d 366 (Ind.Ct.App.1995); Hudson v.
Jenkins, 288 N.W.2d 566 (Iowa 1980); State
v.
Williams, 28 Kan.App.2d 97, 11 P.3d 1187 (2000); State v. Pelletier, 786 A.2d
609 (Me.2001); Hermina v. Baltimore LiIe, 128 Md.App. 568, 739 A.2d 893
(Ct.Spec.App.1999); Com. v. Segal, 401 Mass. 95, 514 N.E.2d 1082 (1987);
Hentz v. State, 496 So.2d 668 (Miss.1986); Tannenbaum, 838 S.W.2d 26
(Missouri appellate case); State ex rel. Smith v. District Court, 210 Mont. 344,
677 P.2d 589 (1984); State
v.
Harker, 8 Neb.App. 663, 600 N.W.2d 488 (1999); Town oI Nottingham v. Cedar
Waters, Inc., 118 N.H. 282, 385 A.2d 851 (1978); State v. Quintana, 270
N.J.Super. 676, 637 A.2d 969 (Ct.App.Div.1994); O'Connell v. Taddeo, 174
Misc.2d 110, 662 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Sup.Ct.1997); State v. Treon, 188 N.E.2d 308
(Ohio Ct.App.1963), cited in In re Contemnor Caron, 110 Ohio Misc.2d 58, 744
N.E.2d 787 (C.P.2000); State v. Parks, 89 Or.App. 647, 750 P.2d 526 (1988);
State v. Barlow, 771 P.2d 662 (Utah Ct.App.1989); Badley v. City oI Sheridan,
440 P.2d 516 (Wyo.1968).
FN6. See, e.g., United States v. Schrimsher, 493 F.2d 842 (5th Cir.1974).
FN7. Smith, 677 P.2d at 590.
FN8. Pelletier, 786 A.2d at 613.
FN9. Guardado, 813 So.2d at 237.
FN10. See, e.g., Schrimsher, 493 F.2d 842 (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a));
Guardado, 813 So.2d 236 (citing Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.830 (1999)); Williams, 28
Kan.App.2d 97, 11 P.3d 1187 (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. 201203 (2004)).
|2||3| *555 Although a minority oI jurisdictions holds that a contempt Iinding
will be upheld so long as the record contains suIIicient inIormation
demonstrating the contempt,FN11 we are convinced that the majority view
concerning the required degree oI speciIicity adheres to the Legislature's intent.
This case illustrates precisely why a detailed written order would be helpIul. The
order entered here does not indicate what particular **1276 comments by
petitioner
were held to be contemptuous, and it is not clear Irom the transcript which
comments or actions the district judge intended to sanction. Also, the transcript
does not include any nonverbal conduct that may have impacted the district
court's contempt Iinding, such as body language, tone oI voice, or volume. Thus,
a written summary contempt order must set Iorth speciIic Iacts concerning the
conduct Iound to be contemptuous. The written order entered here does not meet
this standard.
FN11. See Smith v. Smith, 365 So.2d 88 (Ala.Civ.App.1978); Weiss v. Superior
Court oI Pima County, 106 Ariz. 577, 480 P.2d 3 (1971); Widmer v. State, 243
Ark. 952, 422 S.W.2d 881 (1968); In re Dodson, 214 Conn. 344, 572 A.2d 328
(1990); In re Orenstein, 265 Ga.App. 230, 593 S.E.2d 690 (2004); Bell, 276
Ill.App.3d 939, 213 Ill.Dec. 351, 658 N.E.2d 1372 (Illinois appellate decision);
Garrett v. Andrews, 767 So.2d 941 (La.Ct.App.2000); In re Henry, 369 Mich.
347, 119 N.W.2d 671 (1963); State v. Bevilacqua, 316 S.C. 122, 447 S.E.2d 213
(Ct.App.1994); State v. Hobble, 126 Wash.2d 283, 892 P.2d 85 (1995); Moore v.
Kitsap County Superior Court, 25 Wash.App. 565, 610 P.2d 927 (1980).
Appropriate remedy
|4| Here, the district court entered a written order, but it did not contain a
suIIicient statement concerning what conduct was held to be contemptuous.
Houston asserts that the order is thereIore void. The district court asks that it be
permitted to enter an amended order. We conclude that since this opinion
addresses an issue oI Iirst impression, the district court here should have the
opportunity to enter an amended order that satisIies the standard announced
today.
CONCLUSION
NRS 22.030(1) provides that the district court's oral order is enIorceable, but that
a written order must be entered. The written order must contain a speciIic
description oI the conduct held to be contemptuous.
Accordingly, we grant the petition in part. We direct the court clerk to issue a
writ oI mandamus directing the district court to enter an amended contempt
order, describing petitioner's conduct that was Iound to be contemptuous.
Nev.,2006. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County oI Clark 122
Nev. 544, 135 P.3d 1269
'Writ relieI
|1||2||3| A writ oI mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may issue iI the
petitioner has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. FN3 We have
absolute discretion whether to consider a mandamus petition. FN4 The writ
generally serves 'to compel the perIormance oI an act that the law requires as a
duty resulting Irom an oIIice, trust or station, or to control an arbitrary or
capricious exercise oI discretion. FN5 Even iI eIIective alternative remedies
exist, we may entertain a petition Ior mandamus under urgent circumstances or
'when an important issue oI law needs clariIication and sound judicial economy
and administration Iavor the granting oI the petition. FN6 A writ oI prohibition
is the counterpart oI a writ oI mandamus and is available to arrest 'the
proceedings oI any tribunal ... when such proceedings are without or in excess oI
the jurisdiction oI such tribunal. FN7
FN3. NRS 34.170; see also NRS 34.330 (writ oI prohibition).
FN4. State oI Nevada v. Dist. Ct. (Ducharm), 118 Nev. 609, 614, 55 P.3d 420,
423 (2002).
FN5. Id.
FN6. Id.
FN7. NRS 34.320.
|4||5| We do not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal Irom an order holding a
party or a nonparty in contempt because no rule or statute provides Ior such an
appeal.FN8 The proper way to challenge *450 a contempt order is through a writ
petition.FN9 Consequently, this petition appropriately challenges the district
court's contempt order.
FN8. Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners, 116 Nev. 646, 649, 5 P.3d 569,
571 (2000).
FN9. Id.Nev.,2004. Division oI Child and Family Services, Dept. oI Human
Resources, State oI Nevada v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County oI Clark
120 Nev. 445, 92 P.3d 1239
'Mr. Mitchell has now moved to disqualiIy the justices oI this court Irom
presiding at the scheduled hearing on March 13. His objection, made pursuant to
NRS 22.030(3), is premised upon his contention that his Iailure to appear
constituted an indirect contempt only, rather than one committed in our
presence.FN1
FN1. NRS 22.030(3) provides in pertinent part:
In all cases oI contempt arising without the immediate view and presence oI the
court, the judge oI such court in whose contempt the deIendant is alleged to be
shall not preside at such trial over the objection oI the deIendant....
We reject that contention. Where an attorney Iails to appear Ior a scheduled
hearing, his oIIensive conductto wit, his absenceoccurs within the
immediate view and presence oI the court and thus cannot be characterized as
indirect contempt. See Arthur v. Superior Court oI Los Angeles County, 62
Cal.2d 404, 42 Cal.Rptr. 441, 398 P.2d 777 (1965); Chula v. Superior Court, 57
Cal.2d 199, 18 Cal.Rptr. 507, 368 P.2d 107 (1962); *63Lyons v. Superior Court,
43 Cal.2d 755, 278 P.2d 681 (1955); Vaughn v. Municipal Court oI Los Angeles
Judicial Dist., 252 Cal.App.2d 348, 60 Cal.Rptr. 575 (1967), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 856, 89 S.Ct. 125, 21
L.Ed.2d 126 (1968); Murphy v. State, 46 Md.App. 138, 416 A.2d 748 (1980).
See also In re Contempt oI Potter, 207 Neb. 769, 301 N.W.2d 560 (1981); State
v. Dias, 76 N.J.Super. 337, 184 A.2d 535 (App.Div.1962). As the Supreme Court
oI CaliIornia noted in Lyons, supra:
It is clear that the |hearing| and the attorney's participation in it are in the court's
immediate view and presence and, obviously, petitioner's obstruction oI the
|hearing| by absenting himselI Irom the court is just as directly within the view
and presence and knowledge oI the court as would be any other conduct by him
during, and directly aIIecting, the |hearing|. II, in truth, the absence with its
ensuing interruption oI the court proceedings is occasioned by some cause not
reasonably within the attorney's control, the duty oI explanation is but part and
parcel oI his duty to be present, and the burden oI producing the exculpatory Iacts
to the court properly Ialls upon the attorney.
278 P.2d at 683.
Accordingly, statutory provisions relating to indirect contempt have no
application in a case oI this nature. Arthur, 398 P.2d at 780. The rights oI the
attorney are Iully protected by an order to show cause apprising him oI the charge
against him, Iollowed by an opportunity to be heard. Chula, 368 P.2d at 112
(Gibson, C.J., concurring); In re Contempt oI Potter, 301 N.W.2d at 563. And, in
such a case, 'no question oI the disqualiIication oI the judge aIIronted by the
direct contempt can arise. The necessities oI the case require that the aIIronted
judge preside. Vaughn, supra, 60 Cal.Rptr. at 586 (quoting Turkington v.
Municipal Court, 85 Cal.App.2d 631, 193 P.2d 795, 799 (1948)). Contrary to Mr.
Mitchell's suggestion, nothing in our opinion in Kellar v. District Court, 86 Nev.
445, 470 P.2d 434 (1970), is inconsistent with these views. Indeed, we cited
Arthur, Chula and Lyons, supra, with approval in that opinion.
For these reasons, we deny Mr. Mitchell's request that we disqualiIy ourselves in
this matter.
Nev.,1986. Gipson v. State 102 Nev. 61, 714 P.2d 1007

SCR 'Rule120.Costs; bar counsel conIlict or disqualiIication.
1.An attorney subjected to discipline or seeking reinstatement under these
rules may be assessed the costs, in Iull or in part, oI the proceeding, including,
but not limited to, reporter`s Iees, investigation Iees, bar counsel and staII`s
salaries, witness expenses, service costs, publication costs, and any other Iees or
costs deemed reasonable by the panel and allocable to the proceeding.
2.II, Ior any reason, bar counsel is disqualiIied or has a conIlict oI interest,
the board oI governors shall appoint an attorney, ad hoc, to act in the place oI bar
counsel
King, simply by virtue oI Iilign Ior a and receiving a TPO and an EPO Irom
the RJC, should be disqualiIied, as should, arguably, the SBN and the OBC, Irom
62337.
'Marshall (Edward) v. Dist. Ct. (China Post No. 1),
Docket No. 56973 Marshall ISSUE: Does NRS 22.030(3) apply to civil, as
well as criminal, contempt proceedings? Regardless, FHE4 and 11 both cited
to a civil contempt statute, NRS 22.010, Iound with the the 'Civil Practice titled
Title 2 oI NRS.
By shirking its SCR Rule 104(1)(b) jurisdictional limits (ie, this Court's
Rules do not allow bar counsel to do what it has done here, skip the SCR 104(1)
(d) step, ignore its responsibilities under SCR 111(4) (not to mention attempt to
dispose oI an important step in the process wherein this Court excercises
discretion, particularly with respect to whether that which is addressed in any
such 'Petition by the OBC actually involves a 'convcition or a 'crime, and, iI
so, whether such is a SCR 111(6) 'serious oIIense. This becomes important
given the extent to which is is not at all uncommon Ior members oI law
enIorcement to charge individuals with, say, that which the arrest pled in the
SBN's Complaint at R2:22-R3:3 (which initial 'misuse oI 911 emergency
services charge was subsequently pled aown to a charge oI violating NRS
199.340 ('resisting a public oIIicer) which, at least under the Beckett case that
the WCDA's OIIice took and used against Coughlin incident to a good Iaith
research eIIort on Coughlin's part to provide insight into possible plea bargain
alternatives (such as the one Judge SIerrazza reIused to accept Coughlin's plea as
to on August 27
th
, 2012, that would have disposed oI three criminal prosecutions
oI Coughlin (including the 'petty theIt charge which stemmed Irom the Iirst oI
fifteen aifferent arrests or incarcerations of Coughlin since that August 20
th
,
2011 arrest. R2:19-22). It simply creates too high an opportunity Ior abuse oI
process Ior such a minor misdemeanor charge as 'resisting a public oIIicer to be
rubber stamped as a 'serious oIIense under SCR 111(6), particularly where, say,
the WCDA's oIIice attempts to characterize a 911 dispatcher as a 'public oIIicer
suIIicient to support such a prosecution (which is brazenly pretextual and
disturbingly conIlict ridden given Coughlin's suing the WCDA's ECR partner,
Washoe Legal Services and its director Paul Elcano, particularly where, now, the
WCDA's OIIice has hired Elcano's daughter, Tyler Elcano, Esq., as an attorney).
Further, it is Iar Irom clear that NRS 199.280 is a 'serious oIIense or that
it invokes SCR 111(6) by way oI a suggestion that 'a necessary element oI such
charge 'as determined by its statutory or common-law deIinition would
involved 'interIerence with the administration oI justice, where this court
(though not, apparently, a 'published opinion suIIicient to provide mandatory
precedent, especially in such a Iact dependent situation) held, in Beckett that
'NRS 199.280 deIines Beckett's crime as the willIul obstruction oI a public
oIIicer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legl duty oI his or her oIIice,
and his involves interIerence with the administration oI justice. That 'his in
the preceding sentence is pretty key, in determining whether any conviction that
might issue Irom that pled in the Complaint at R2:22-R3:2 (and, where such
pleading has necessarily inIluenced the Panel's decision here, would it not be
'double jeopardy to later Iorce Coughlin to deIend against such again, or any
SCR 111 Petition that would Iollow any such conviction?). The speciIic Iacts
involved in Beckett are so completely diIIerent than those involved in that
1/14/12 arrest oI Coughlin pled at R2:22-R3:3. Whereas Beckett was the
prosecuting District Attorney engaged carrying out the duties oI his employment
incident to the charge oI 'resisting a public oIIicer (ie, Beckett was accused oI
reIusing to give the comptroller receipts).
In 'In Re Beckett (57280) the 12/6/10 Petition indicates: 'The Complaint
charged that on April 23, 2010, Respondent willIully and unlawIully obstructed
Kim Zimmerman, Nye County Deputy Treasurer, by reIusing to make available
and Iurnish any and all bank account numbers, bank statements, accounts
receivable, accounts payables and all internal bookkeeping inIormation regarding
the Nye. County District Attorney's Bad Check program, thereby interIering with
Zimmerman and CPA Dan McArthur Irom conducting an audit oI that program.
The players and Iacts involved in that Complaint contain a Iar more obvious
connection to the 'administration oI justice than arises Irom either oI the
charging documents involved in the arrest pled in the OBC's Compliant at R2:22-
R3:3 (ie, the original 'misuse oI emergency services gross misdemeanor charge,
or the amended 'resisting a public oIIicer charge).
The 1/23/12 Complaint in RJC RCR12-065630 read: ZACH YOUNG oI
the County oI Washoe, State oI Nevada, veriIies and declares upon inIormation
and belieI and under penalty oI perjury, that ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN
the deIendant has committed the crime oI: USE OF THE 911 EMERGENCY
SYSTEM WHEN NO ACTUAL OR PERCEIVED EMERGENCY EXISTS, a
violation oI NRS 207.245, a gross misdemeanor, (G360) in the manner
Iollowing, to wit:
That the said deIendant on or between the 13
th
day oI January, 2012, and
the 14
th
day oI January, 2012, at Reno Township, within the County oI Washoe,
State oI Nevada, did willIully or knowingly, while in the County oI Washoe,
make one or more emergency telephone calls to the 911 emergency system when
no actual or perceived emergency existed. DATED this 23
rd
day oI January,
2012 /s/ Zachary Norman Young, Esq.
The Amended Complaint in 12-065630 thereaIter reads: 'ZACH YOUNG
oI the County oI Washoe, State oI Nevada, veriIies and declares upon inIormation
and belieI and under penalty oI perjury, that ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN,
the deIendant above-named, has committed the crime oI: RESISTING,
DELAYING, OR OBSTRUCTING A PUBLIC OFFICER, a violation oI NRS
199.280(3), a misdemeanor in the manner Iollowing, to wit: That the said
deIendant on or between the 12th day oI January, 2012 and the 14th oI January,
2012, at Reno Township, within the County oI Washoe, State oI Nevada, did
willIully and unlawIully resist, delay, or obstruct public oIIicers, namely, RENO
POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS JASON SCHAUR, SCOTT HEGLAR,
TIMOTHY BROADWAY, , AND/OR OTHER RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT
OFFICERS AND/OR RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT SERGEANTS PAUL
SIFRE AND/OR CARLOS MADRID AND/OR CITY OF RENO EMERGENCY
DISPATCH SUPERVISOR KARIANN BEECHLER AND/OR OTHER RENO
EMERGENCY DISPATCHERS, in discharging or attempting to discharge a legal
duty oI their oIIice, in that the said deIendant made one or more telephone calls to
the 911 emergency system when no actual or perceived emergency existed and/or
continued to call the 911 emergency system when no actual or perceived
emergency existed after having been warned or otherwise advised not to so call,
to wit: during the calls, the said deIendant, among other things, falsely reported
that officers on scene were shining a flashlight in his face, asked for law
enforcement assistance when law enforcement officials were already on scene,
used profane and otherwise inappropriate language when speaking with 911
emergency dispatchers, requested to lodge various complaints against public
officers, was argumentative with and failed to cooperate with questions asked
by 911 emergency dispatchers, and/or hung up on 911 emergency dispatchers,
in Reno, Washoe County, Nevada. DATED this 6
th
day oI November, 2012 /s/
Zachary Norman Young, Esq.,
Other than the useIul leveraging oI SCR 111(6) and the alleged import oI
Beckett in 57280, it is not at all clear why the State decided to change the initial
NRS 197.190 charge listed by the WCSO on the Arrest Report and Declaration oI
Probable Cause to a charge falling unaer NRS Chapter 199. Certainly the police
department and what has repeatedly been characterized by the RPD and State as a
corollary thereto, ECOMM (emergency communications dispatch) Iall more
squarely in the executive branch, and thereIore, a NRS 197.190 charge would
seem Iar more Iitting than the NRS 199.280 charge, which Ialls within a chapter oI
NRS, 199, that is titled: ' Chapter 199 Crimes Against Public Justice.
Regardless, it would seem rather clear that none oI the alleged 'public
oIIicers identiIied in the State's Complaint or case belong to the Judicial Branch,
and thereIore, none implication that any 'interIering with one engaged in 'the
administration oI justice suIIicient to support a SCR 111(6) Petition approach
may be Iound, under the circumstances pled in the OBC's Compliant at R2:22-
R3:3, or in any subsequently amended Complaint (and the OBC Iailed to procure
any such 11/6/12 Amended Complaint in 12-065630, and under Lau may not now
so assert such an argument.
CHAPTER 197 - CRIMES BY AND AGAINST THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF
THIS STATE
NRS 197.190 Obstructing public oIIicer.
'NRS 197.190 Obstructing public oIIicer. Every person who, aIter due notice,
shall reIuse or neglect to make or Iurnish any statement, report or inIormation
lawIully required oI the person by any public oIIicer, or who, in such statement,
report or inIormation shall make any willIully untrue, misleading or exaggerated
statement, or who shall willIully hinder, delay or obstruct any public oIIicer in the
discharge oI oIIicial powers or duties, shall, where no other provision oI law
applies, be guilty oI a misdemeanor.
Further, its not at all clear how King's various misstatements (and the oI the
Panel, to boot) are not violative oI NRS 197.130 False report by public oIIicer.
Every public oIIicer who shall knowingly make any Ialse or misleading statement
in any oIIicial report or statement, under circumstances not otherwise prohibited
by law, shall be guilty oI a gross misdemeanor. This is especially true with
respect to King's characterization oI FHE2 as a 'sanction upon reviewing King's
8/30/12 email to Coughlin and the 8/28/12 Order by Judge Flanagan attached
thereto, or, with respect to the characterizations oI the FHE4, and 11 as
'misdemeanors or 'criminal contempt convictions.
NRS193.050 Conduct constituting crime; prohibited or unlawIul acts;
common law.
'NRS193.230LawIul resistance to commission oI public oIIense: Who
may make.LawIul resistance to the commission oI a public oIIense may be
made:
1.By the party about to be injured.
2.By other parties.
'NRS193.240Resistance by party about to be injured.Resistance
suIIicient to prevent the oIIense may be made by the party about to be injured:
1.To prevent an oIIense against his or her person, Iamily or some member oI
his or her Iamily.
2.To prevent an illegal attempt, by Iorce, to take or injure property in his or
her lawIul possession.
Certainly, the circumstances attendant to the 1/12/12 custodial arrest oI
Coughlin Ior 'jaywalking admittedly order by the same Sargent SiIre whom
ordered Coughlin arrested just Iorty-eight hours later Ior 'misuse oI 911
emergency services presents a situation where Coughlin right may assert the
deIenses presented by the above two statutes.
Certainly it would be reversible error Ior Judge CliIton to reIuse to allow
Coughlin to put on testimony by Sargent Zach Thew as to the claim oI right
deIense that may be availing where Thew admits to having told Coughlin he may
call him iI in need, and where Coughlin asserts Thew even indicated that Coughlin
may call 'dispatch or 911 iI Coughlin was unable to Iind the particular number
Thew gave him upon Thew and Coughlin (whom coicidentally went to grade
school together in Gardnerville, Nevada over twenty years ago and reconnected
the night Coughlin's then housemates locked him out oI the house all night
(12/31/11) by changing all oI the locks upon a dispute regarding Coughlin's
reIusal/inability to pay them more rent than they had agreed upon, where such was
demanded only aIter Coughlin going to great eIIort to move his personalty there
during the Iallout Irom the very wrongIul eviction itselI that Judge CliIton
contributed incident to his 10/17/11 Order Denying Coughlin the stay under NRS
40.385 that the RJC is mandated to grant upon, where, as there, Coughlin deposite
the statutorily set $250 required thereunder (especially where Coughlin actually
deposited nearly ten times that amount incident to a Iorced 'rent escrow deposit
ordered by Judge SIerrazza on 10/13/11 that was violative oI Nevada law in that
NRS 40.253(6) Iorbids and such 'Iurther order aIter where, as there, Judge
SIerrazza ruled that Coughlin had established a legal deIense to the summary
eviction proceeding (which was held without the jurisdictional prerequisite oI a
landlord's aIIidavit being Iiled, ever, in violation oI NRS 40.253(5)-(6)) and
'setting the matter over Ior trial despite NJCRCP 109 not being Iollowed, as
required by Nevada law, much less Rule 108.
So, Coughlin arbuably had a deIense under:
' NRS193.260Persons acting by command oI oIIicers oI justice.Whenever
the oIIicers oI justice are authorized to act in the prevention oI public oIIenses,
other persons, who by their command act in their aid, are justiIied in so doing...
with respect to Sargent Thew's 'commands or 'instructions to Coughlin incident
to numerous interactions between the two subsequent to their initial telephone
conversation oI 12/31/11, especially where Coughlin was granted protection
orders against those very roommates on 1/23/13.
Further, Coughlin was certainly prejudiced by the State being permitted to
amend its Complaint so Iar out Irom the arrest (nearly an entire year, on 11/6/11,
and where the Motion to so Amend was not made until the expiration oI over six
months Irom the date oI arrest, and where the original Complaint Iailed to alleged
anything as ocurring on January 12
th
, 2012, particularly where the subsequent trial
Iocused primarily on January 12
th
, 2012 alleged events, as did the Amended
Complaint oI 11/6/12.
'NRS193.017'Knowingly deIined.'Knowingly imports a knowledge
that the Iacts exist which constitute the act or omission oI a crime, and does not
require knowledge oI its unlawIulness. Knowledge oI any particular Iact may be
inIerred Irom the knowledge oI such other Iacts as should put an ordinarily
prudent person upon inquiry.
'NRS193.019'OIIicer and 'public oIIicer deIined.'OIIicer and
'public oIIicer include all oIIicers, members and employees oI:
1.The State oI Nevada;
2.Any political subdivision oI this State;
3.Any other special district, public corporation or quasi-public corporation
oI this State; and
4.Any agency, board or commission established by this State or any oI its
political subdivisions,
and all persons exercising or assuming to exercise any oI the powers or
Iunctions oI a public oIIicer.
NRS 193.019, where oIIered to support an interpreation oI NRS 199.280 as
to whom is included within the purview oI the term 'public oIIicer is
unconsitutionally overbroad, particularly where 'all persons...assuming to
excercise any oI the powers or Iunctions oI a public oIIicer could mean just about
anyone, whether they have any color oI authority to do so or not, Ior all they need
do is 'assume. Further, how much does anyone want to bet that a 'solo
practitioner attorney is not a 'public oIIicer but that just about anyone drawing a
paycheck Irom the City oI Reno is?
'Because the state may choose to retry Walker, we are compelled to address his
argument concerning the Iailure oI the trial court to grant him an instruction on the
lesser oIIense oI resisting a public oIIicer, a violation oI NRS 199.280.1 This court
has consistently held that it is error to reIuse to give an instruction on a lesser
oIIense iI there is any evidence, however slight, to support that instruction.
Roberts v. State, 102 Nev. , 717 P.2d 1115 (1986). A prison guard is an
employee oI the State oI Nevada and thereIore a public oIIicer as deIined by NRS
193.019. See NRS 193.010. In the instant case the testimony oI some oI the other
prison inmates could have led a reasonable jury to conclude that Walker merely
resisted Jacobs without committing an assault and battery and that Jacobs'
overreaction resulted in the wrestling match. It was thereIore error Ior the trial
court to reIuse the instruction on the oIIense oI resisting a public oIIicer
Arguably the plea bargain Couglin accepted involved just such a 'lesser
misdemeanor, 'disturbing the peace, and would have been Iar more Iitting here
than an SCR 111(6) 'serious oIIense charge attendant to the amending oI the
criminal complaint to charge a violation oI NRS 199.280.
OI note, the RJC recently dropped the third prosecution oI Coughlin in
RCR12-068980 (Irom a 6/28/12 arrest where the probable cause sheet charged
Coughlin with 'obstructing a public oIIicer under NRS 197, though the
prosecution eventually amended such to, again, 'resisting a public oIIicer NRS
199.280, incident to yet another wrongIul eviction oI Coughlin based upon a void
lock-out Order issued by RJC Judge Schroeder under, again, extremely suspect
circumstances (note, the RPD arrested Coughlin again just days later on 7/3/12 in
12 RMC 12420, charging him with a completely Iraudulent 'disturbing the
peace charge resulting Coughlin's spending 18 days in jail upon an
impermissible bail increase by the grievant in NG12-0435's brother Judge W.
Gardner, talk about abuse oI process.) (there is now a Iourth murky prosecution
stemming Irom a 'charge not brought by the executive branch, but rather Irom
the 'Administrative Order 2012-01 signed by then ChieI Judge SIerrazza on
12/20/12...which the RJC has now put a 2013 case number on, yet Iailed to Iile
stamp with the date such case number was thereaIter placed (speaking oI
altering) on that 12/20/12 'Administrative Order 2012-01...IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, which
purports to place restrictions on Coughlin the criminal deIendant, not Coughlin
the then temporarily suspended attorney. Further, Hill's allegation that Coughlin
was declared a 'vexatious litigator by some August 2012 Order by Judge
Flanagan is certainly not borne out by any reporting on the Administrative OIIice
oI the Court's site, where such is required. Additionally, the ultra questionable
'Administrative Order 2012-01 by the RJC oI 12/20/12 and the copy-cat
verbatim 'Administrative Order 2013-01 subsequently served on Coughlin in
violation oI courthouse sanctuary rule and litigant/attorney immunity Irom
service oI process in the courthouse by the Reno Municipal Court did not result
in any such reporting to the OAC oI any 'vexatious litigant designation assigned
to Coughlin. It would seem the mandatory reporting has a dual Iunction...not
only to help identiIy 'vexatious litigators, but also to hold accountable those
court that seek to abuse any such power to designate or otherwise utilize such Ior
impermissible leverage or intimidation. The very same argument could be made
with respect to the mandatory reporting requirement in SCR 111(3) that the Reno
Municipal Court Iailed to adhere to (RMC Clerk Ballard and 'Court
Administrator Cassandra Jackson were not even aware oI such until Coughlin
apprised them oI their duties thereto). Could such reporting requirement be in
place not only to insure attorney misconduct is identiIied, but also to keep track
oI any court's that would seek to abuse the power to so adjudge attorneys and the
all to possible leveraging oI such that could necessarily arise? For a court like
the RMC, which makes is almost impossible to get a 'docket (unless one is
willing to endure all sorts oI intimidation by a muscled up staII oI Marshals,
repeated milquetoast excuses Ior rejecting this or that request Ior such, apparent
retaliatory reIusals to grant even oe continuance, abuse oI the court's contempt
power, denial oI one's right to counsel in violation oI Aigersinger, unreasonable
delays, etc., etc, as Coughlin was so subject to in the RMC).
The point is, without requiring the OBC and Panel to actually adhere to the
Iew due process protection availing to attorney under this Court's rules, the
various prosecutors in City Attorney's and County District Attorney's OIIices
may to easily engage in an 'approach in conjunction with those in 'law
enIorcement that necessarily compromises the position oI an attorney in society.
Simply put, attorney are put in a position where it is just Iar to easy Ior a beat
copy to charge them with 'resisting or 'obstructing, whereupon, say, a civil
rights attorney may suddenly be subject to an impermissible application oI
dubious SCR 111(6) 'leverage incident to the charging 'discretion oI
prosecutors whom also, oIten, have civil law conIlicts they seek to ignore or
'dispell connected to that same attorney an civil law matters. Perhaps there
should be a per se reIerral to another jurisdiction Ior such prosecution.
Regardless, where, as here, liIelong prosecutor Judge CliIton reIused to even
countenance Coughlin's various Motion to DisqualiIy both he and the WCDA's
OIIice...its troubling.
Rather than risk having his purported jurisdiction (read, 'power grab)
curtailed by any order oI this Court Ilowing Irom the various SCR 111 Petitions
that bar counsel is required to Iiled under SCR 111(4) that may Iail to 'reIer this
matter to the appropriate disciplinary ('SCR 111(4).Bar counsel`s
responsibility.Upon being advised that an attorney ... has been convicted oI a
crime,...bar counsel shall obtain a certiIied copy oI prooI oI the conviction and
shall Iile a petition with the supreme court, attaching the certiIied copy).
More support Ior the view that none oI the 'contempt conviction put
Iorward by the OBC or Panel as deserving an SCR 111(5) approach, or anything
consistent with the oIt cited view oI this Court's 6/7/12 Order and or SCR 111(8)
put Iorward by Chair Echeverria is Iound in the Iollowing:
'SCR Rule101.Grounds Ior discipline.Conviction oI a crime or acts or
omissions by an attorney, including contempt oI a hearing panel, individually or
in concert with another person, which violate the rules of the supreme court or
the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct are misconduct and constitute
grounds Ior discipline.
SCR Rule 101 necessarily distinguishes between 'conviction oI a crime
and any 'acts or omissions by an attorney, including contempt (the word 'or is
huge there). So, iI the law in Nevada wanted Ior something distinguished Irom
'conviction oI a crime (such as that characterized in the second halI oI SCR
Rule 101: 'acts or omissions by an attorney, including contempt oI a hearing
panel, ... which violate the rules of the supreme court or the Nevada Rules of
Professional Conduct) to be included within the purview oI SCR 111(5), and
SCR 111, in general, then this Court, and, in some more limited instances, the
Legislature, could have and would have so expressed such an intention, but
neither did. As such the corner cutting oI the OBC and Panel must not be
countenanced. ('Inherent Rulemaking Power oI the Supreme Court and
Legislative Recognition ThereoI...One oI the inherent powers oI the supreme
court, existing independently oI statute, is the right to control its order oI business
and to prescribe rules, not inconsistent with law, Ior its own government and the
government oI its oIIicers....Notwithstanding this inherent power oI the supreme
court, the rulemaking power has been, and now is, expressly conIerred or
recognized by statutory enactment.'
'SCR Rule111.Attorneys convicted oI crimes.
1.'Conviction deIined.For purposes oI this rule, in addition to a Iinal
judgment oI conviction, a 'conviction shall include a plea oI guilty or nolo
contendere, a plea under North Carolina v. AlIord, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), or a
guilty verdict Iollowing either a bench or a jury trial, regardless oI whether a
sentence is suspended or deIerred or whether a Iinal judgment oI conviction has
been entered, and regardless oI any pending appeals.)
The problem Ior the OBC is that 'civil contempt Orders (such as in FHE4
and FHE11 both oI which cite to NRS 22.010, which is a chapter oI NRS Iound
within the 'Civil Practice section) simply are not 'convictions suIIicient to
invoked SCR 111(5) Ior the purposes oI Iurther Chair Echeverria's clearly
Iraudulent goal, ie, depriving Coughlin oI his day in court and the due process
trimmings (notice, opportunity to be heard, which was especially denied by
Echeverria's continually sustaining every relevancy objection King made, where
Echeverria constantly purported this Court's 6/7/12 Order in 60838 and or SCR
111(8) to support such a Iraudulent thievery oI Coughlin's protected Fourteenth
Amendment property right...and all to make his 'boyhood chum happy. And
which 'boyhood chum indicated to Coughlin (whom's competency he openly
questioned, though, apparently, in an irrelevant SCR 117 context, rather than in
RPC 1.1 sense) during working hours at WLS, while engaged in his supervisory
capacity that he believes '(blank) people 's brains are structurally and
physiologically inIerior to (redacted) people's brain.. Some might say, he can
thank his 'Iriends and Iormer classmates Holmes, Beesley, Echeverria, partners
in the ECR program, and King Ior that coming to light. Then there is WLS's
Caryn Sternlicht complaining to Elcano about his Iailure to hire the '(redacted)
Iemale Harvard summa cum laude graduate whom applied Ior an attorney's
position with WLS, whom Elcano described as 'entitled.
NRS 22.010 'civil contempt Orders are simply not 'crimes or
'convictions suIIicient to invoked 'the easy day at work/no due process Ior you
stupid attorney not part oI our old boys'n'girls club approach that King,
Echeverria, Vellis, and Kent were so eager to get over with. To wit: such statute
is Iound within: 'TITLE 2CIVIL PRACTICE.
That citation to 'NRS 22.010 Iound in both oI those contempts orders
certainly does not Iall within the Title or Chapter oI NRS wherein 'crimes and
'convictions thereoI are addressed: 'TITLE 15-CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS ... Chapter 199 Crimes Against Public 1ustice...NRS
199.340 Criminal contempt....
Further, support Ior the Iact that 'civil contempt is not a 'crime nor
suIIicient to create a 'conviction:
'NRS193.300Punishment Ior contempt.A criminal act which at the same
time constitutes contempt oI court, and has been punished as such, may also be
punished as a crime, but in such case the punishment Ior contempt may be
considered in mitigation
NRS 199.340 Criminal contempt. Every person who shall commit a contempt oI
court oI any one oI the Iollowing kinds shall be guilty oI a misdemeanor: 1.
Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior committed during the sitting oI
the court, in its immediate view and presence, and directly tending to interrupt its
proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority; 2. Behavior oI like
character in the presence oI a reIeree, while actually engaged in a trial or hearing
pursuant to an order oI court, or in the presence oI a jury while actually sitting in
the trial oI a cause or upon an inquest or other proceeding authorized by law; 3.
Breach oI the peace, noise or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the
proceedings oI a court, jury or reIeree; 4. WillIul disobedience to the lawIul
process or mandate oI a court; 5. Resistance, willIully oIIered, to its lawIul
process or mandate; 6. Contumacious and unlawIul reIusal to be sworn as a
witness or, aIter being sworn, to answer any legal and proper interrogatory; 7.
Publication of a false or grossly inaccurate report of its proceedings; or 8.
Assuming to be an attorney or officer of a court or acting as such without
authority.
And its Iunny to read through NRS 199.340, as it contains language
contained in Judge Howards 11/30/11 contempt Order, but its hardly Iair Ior the
Panel or OBC to now attempt to characerized FHE11 as a 'criminal contempt
conviction when nothing in that FHE11 so characterizes it, and in Iact, rather,
such Order speciIically cites to the statute detailing 'civil contempt
And, really, its Echeverria's oIIice staII (one oI which lied to Coughlin in
allegeging that she was 'an attorney only to have to subsequently admit that she
lied, in violation oI NRS 199.340(8)) and King and the Panel themsleves whom
have committed criminal contempt (especially with regard to NRS 199.340(8)
and that patent misstatements and 'grossly inaccurate reports oI oI the
'proceedings in pretty much all the matters to which the OBC attached orders
thereIrom at the 11/14/12 Hearing. NRS 199.340 Criminal contempt. Every
person who shall commit a contempt oI court oI any one oI the Iollowing kinds
shall be guilty oI a misdemeanor: 1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent
behavior committed during the sitting oI the court, in its immediate view and
presence, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect
due to its authority; 2. Behavior oI like character in the presence oI a reIeree,
while actually engaged in a trial or hearing pursuant to an order oI court, or in the
presence oI a jury while actually sitting in the trial oI a cause or upon an inquest
or other proceeding authorized by law; 3. Breach oI the peace, noise or other
disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings oI a court, jury or
reIeree; 4. WillIul disobedience to the lawIul process or mandate oI a court; 5.
Resistance, willIully oIIered, to its lawIul process or mandate; 6. Contumacious
and unlawIul reIusal to be sworn as a witness or, aIter being sworn, to answer
any legal and proper interrogatory; 7. Publication of a false or grossly
inaccurate report of its proceedings; or 8. Assuming to be an attorney or
officer of a court or acting as such without authority.
'NRS199.340Criminal contempt.Every person who shall commit a
contempt oI court oI any one oI the Iollowing kinds shall be guilty oI a
misdemeanor:
1.Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior committed during the
sitting oI the court, in its immediate view and presence, and directly tending to
interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority;
2.Behavior oI like character in the presence oI a reIeree, while actually
engaged in a trial or hearing pursuant to an order oI court, or in the presence oI a
jury while actually sitting in the trial oI a cause or upon an inquest or other
proceeding authorized by law;
3.Breach oI the peace, noise or other disturbance directly tending to
interrupt the proceedings oI a court, jury or reIeree;
4.WillIul disobedience to the lawIul process or mandate oI a court;
5.Resistance, willIully oIIered, to its lawIul process or mandate;
6.Contumacious and unlawIul reIusal to be sworn as a witness or, aIter
being sworn, to answer any legal and proper interrogatory;
7.Publication oI a Ialse or grossly inaccurate report oI its proceedings; or
8.Assuming to be an attorney or oIIicer oI a court or acting as such without
authority.'
Further, as well detailed in Coughlin's 1/30/12 Opposition to City Attorney
Robert's Motion to Dismiss the appeal oI (well, Coughlin appealed both the petty
larceny conviction in FHE10 and that indicated in FHE11, which there is no
CertiIicate oI Service thereto, nor was Coughlin served such at any point on
11/30/11, nor was any Notice oI Entry oI such Order ever Iiled or served, as
such, such Order is not even in eIIect yet, nor has the deadline to Iile a notice oI
appeal even begun to run thereto, especially where such was made in absentia oI
at least RCA Roberts, and perhaps, also, Coughlin.
Judge Nash Holmes (and Judge CliIton, incidentally, incident to his recent
2/13/13 'Misdemeanor Committment Order in RJC RCR12-065630 (which
Coughlin was never provided a copy oI until Judge CliIton gave him, on 3/19/13
his 'nunc pro tunc interlineated amendement thereto (ambiguously, Judge CliIton
seemed to indicate in response to Coughlin's SCR 111(2) reporting requirements
question seeking clariIication as to whether it was a 'criminal contempt Coughlin
as sentenced to Iive days on summary (well, summarily taken into custody upon
Judge CliIton's assertions that a 'warrant issued at 9:36 am today, even that the
docket, which is prima Iacie taken to be Iact under Nevada law, incidates no
warrant issued until 1:00 pm that day, regardless, iI it wasn't summary contempt
(and how could it be, Ior iI the WCDA's and DAS arresting and rearresting
Coughlin on 2/1/13 and 2/8/13 and each time the jail ripping Coughlin oII his
ADHD/MDD medication and makign him take Wellbutrin at bedtime (thereby
totalling distrubing Coughlin's circadian rhythmns suIIicient to cause Coughlin to
sleep through two alarm clocks prior to the 9 am continuation oI trial on 2/12/13 in
rjc rcr12-065630) given Coughlin's abscence or alleged tardiness would,
necessarily, involved conduct outsiae the courts presence...And its laughable to
suggest by Judge CliIton arranging Ior his buddy Bruce Lindsay ('Dave hates
you Lindsay would later indicate to Coughlin in attempting to explain his Iailures
associate with his Iraudulent assertions to Coughlin beIore and aIter the 3/11/13
OSC hearing (where Lindsay promised Coughlin he had all matters related to any
oI the criminal prosecutions oI Coughli by the RJC or appeals thereIrom resolved
in an agreement entered into with DDA Young which would result in Coughlin
not having any SCR 111(6) 'serious oIIense conviction on his record incident to
any RJC prosecution) in whichever case number it is the RJC is now seeking to
shoehorn that matter into (RCR11-063341? 'Administrative Order 2012-01?
RCR2013-071437? 12-067980? 12-065630? The 2/25/13 OSC and subsequent
3/11/13 OSC Hearing has been characterized as ascribed to all oI those diIIerent
case numbers by the RJC as various points....) The 3/19/13 'nunc pro tunc
interlineantion (made in absnentia oI purported 'attorney or record Lindsay, and
thereIore not invoking the running oI any SCR 111(2) deadline until a Notice oI
Entry thereto i served may have been Judge CliIton attempting to do Coughlin a
'solid (CliIton crossed out the word 'Misdemeanor Irom the title oI the 'Order,
'Misdemeanor Commitment Order, however CliIton's response to Coughlins'
questioning seemed to imply, at least, that CliIton was characterizing such as a
'criminal conviction', so...Coughlin has timely mailed the OBC more notice than
that arguably required by SCR 111(2), but hereby so announces this again here in
an abundance oI caution. Further, any 'conviction issuing Irom the continuation
oI that trial on 4/2/13 would seem to be void given the RJC was divested oI
jurisdiction upon Coughlin's Iiling a notice oI Appeal as to that 2/13/13 order or
'contempt conviction. Regardless, Couhlin was not provided any suIIicient
notice or opportunity to be heard, much less eIIective assistance oI counsel thereto
to support any Iinding oI a valid 'conviction).
SCR Rule 111. Attorneys convicted oI crimes. ..(1). 'Conviction deIined. For
purposes oI this rule, in addition to a final judgment of conviction, a
'conviction shall include a plea oI guilty or nolo contendere, a plea under North
Carolina v. AlIord, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), or a guilty verdict Iollowing either a
bench or a jury trial, regardless oI whether a sentence is suspended or deIerred or
whether a Iinal judgment oI conviction has been entered, and regardless oI any
pending appeals.
The very title oI FHE11 belies the Iact that it is not a 'judgment suIIicient
to invoked SCR 111 (that Order is titled 'Order Imposing Punishment Ior
Summary Contempt Committed in the Immediate View and Presence oI the
Court. An 'oraer` is not a 'fuagment` nor is it a 'veraict`. Those ambiguities
speak volumes to Judge Elliott's decision to title FHE12 'Order AIIirming Ruling
oI Reno Muni Court.
Further support Ior the Iact that an NRS 22.010 and or 22.030 Order is not a
'conviction oI a 'crime is revealed by: 'NRS 22.120 Indictment Ior
contemptuous conduct. Persons proceeded against according to the provisions oI
this chapter shall also be liable to indictment Ior the same misconduct, iI it be an
indictable oIIense, but the court beIore which a conviction is had on an
indictment, in passing sentence, shall take into consideration the punishment
beIore inIlicted.
The OBC does not
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 61:13 to 62:4) 'Mr. Coughlin -- MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin, the issue here is whether or not you're competent to be an attorney
and should continue in the practice oI law. You're Iocusing on a rather minor
detail, and I would like you to Iocus on the broader issues. MR. COUGHLIN:
It's not just competency, it's candor. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You've indicated you
want to impeach him. The issue is Mr. Hill has testiIied that the police identiIied
themselves. You say something diIIerent. I've asked you Ior an oIIer oI prooI.
You've laid the Ioundation. Let's proceed. MR. COUGHLIN: It also goes to --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed, Mr. Coughlin. You would do yourselI
some good iI you will Iocus on the issues, iI you will.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 62:14 to 62:21) MR. ECHEVERRIA: -- this panel has
been asked to look at. The issue as to whether or not you were properly in that
residence building, the issue as to whether you were trespassing has all been
litigated. That's not the Iunction oI this panel. This panel is to determine, by
supreme court order, what, iI any, punishment you should be subject to. I'd like
you to Iocus on that issue.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 63:25 to 64:21) MR. COUGHLIN: The important
thing is the law in Nevada says within 24 hours oI the sheriII receiving that
eviction order they've got to do the lockout. MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's all been
litigated, hasn't it? Didn't you raise these issues below? MR. COUGHLIN: In
which context? MR. ECHEVERRIA: In the trespass conviction. MR.
COUGHLIN: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Okay. Let's Iocus on the issues here,
which, as I understand it, are to Iocus on what, iI any, punishment you should be
subject to with respect to -- MR. COUGHLIN: What's all this living in the
basement stuII have to do with that? Jesus. This is Richard Hill in a nutshell.
Prejudicial nonsense. Hearsay. Character assassination. And then you try to rebut
it, and this is not the issue, it's not relevant. Nothing he says is relevant. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I didn't say that. It is relevant. Your conviction is relevant.
You're trying to relitigate -- MR. COUGHLIN: He's talking about slippers
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 71:10 to 71:15) MR. ECHEVERRIA: I believe the
issue that this panel has to determine is what the degree, iI any, oI punishment
should be Ior the conduct that you have alleged to have been involved with, in
terms oI candor to the court, candor to counsel, candor to witnesses, competency
to practice law.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 72:4 to 75:7) Q Mr. Hill, is it somewhat incongruus
Ior you to assert to this panel that I completely lack competency, and yet you ran
up, counting the trial court $20,000 you asked Ior, and the $42,000 you were
ultimately awarded in that appellate court? MR. KING: Objection.
Argumentative and irrelevant. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. MR.
COUGHLIN: I think it goes to his credibility. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sorry?
MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, I think it goes to his credibility to the extent that
he's saying, well, Mr. Coughlin is so baseless and vexatious, yet I was able to bill
60 grand Ior it. To me it's like, well, at some point if somebody's arguments
are so worthless and so unsupported, shouldn't you be able to bring it home
for less than 60 grand for a summary eviction? MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, iI
I could respond by pointing out the Iact that the order Irom Judge Flanagan,
which has been admitted, suggests that that was -- that those fees were
generated because of Mr. Coughlin's vexatious conduct. (NOTE: Not according
to Flanagan's 8/28/12 Order in CV11-03628, which Pat King emailed to
Coughlin on 8/30/12...so who is violating RPC 3.3, Pat? RPC 3.8? Pat?) And
that the Iees were reasonable and were awarded against Mr. Coughlin, not one
cent oI which has been paid. So I think any suggestion to the contrary is
irrelevant, because 1udge Flanagan's order is to be accepted by the panel. MR.
COUGHLIN: Your Honor, iI I can quickly counter that. I don't know that's
actually pled in your complaint, Mr. King, or included amongst one of the
three grievances. The extent to which -- am I here today because this like Judge
Gardner's sanctions coming up two years later? Am I here today on Judge
Flanagan's... '... Is he a grievant and accorded a case number too? .... MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I believe you're here today to measure all of your conduct
as a practicing lawyer. ... MR. COUCHLIA: So we're not here today based on
what's been noticed? MR. ECHEVERRIA: We're not here today to relitigate
orders that have been filed that you have appealed, and that you have lost. MR.
COUGHLIN: ...I'm asking what is it limited to? Because it sounds like Irom
what you just said it's not limited...MR. ECHEVERRIA: 1he issue here, sir, as
I understand the supreme court's order with respect to your conviction of theft,
and the issues here with respect to the other grievances that have been filed
against you are to the extent as to what, if any, should be the punishment that
you should sustain as a result of your conduct. MR. COUGHLIN: Yet this is
entered into evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is what? MR. COUGHLIN:
This order has been entered into evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Exhibit 2 has.
MR. COUGHLIN: But it's not pled in any complaint. 1udge Flanagan's not a
grievant. I wasn't noticed that that was the purpose of this hearing... MR.
ECHEVERRIA: You were noticed that the issue of your conviction of trespass
was an issue, that your hanaling of that case was an issue, and it's relevant as to
that. Now, iI you have some more questions oI Mr. Hill, please ask them, and
let's move on.:
So, when Chair Echeverria purports that Couglin was 'noticed that the
issue oI your conviction oI trespass was an issue that might be true, given the
trespass conviction was pled in the 8/23/12 Complaint, however, nothing about
either the trail court level summary eviction proceeding in 1708 or the appeal
thereIrom in 03628 was pled in the Complaint, and thereIore Coughlin was not
noticed in any way that Judge Flanagan's Order (FHE 2...Iunny, its the leadoII
hitter in King's presentation aIter his 'Formal Hearing Packet (which King
admits to providing the panel ex parte prior to the hearing) would be at issue in
the Iormal disciplinary hearing or the main basis Ior seeking to disbar Coughlin.
So, when Echeverria indicates 'your handling oI that case was an issue he must
be reIerring to Coughlin's 'handling oI the trespass case, as there simply is
nothing in the 8/23/12 Complaint that in any way notices Coughlin that either
1708 or 03628 (the eviction matter involving Hill and the appeal) would be an
issue, or that such was noticed). To whatever extent Echeverria intended to
indicate that Coughlin's 'handling oI that was was an issue to invoke the Hill
eviction or appeal (1708 and 03628) there simply is no support Ior that, other
than the DowSoe Coughlin was only Iirst provided on 10/22/12 (through no Iault
oI Coughlin and in violation oI SCR 105(2)(c)'s dictate that Coughlin be
providing 'at least 30 days, not 20 days, as was the case here. While King's
untimely DowSoE mention that 'Attorney Richard G. Hill, Esq., is expected to
testiIying with regard to Respondent's conduct in connection with Case No:
CV11-03628 King oIIered no support or argument whatsoever that such is
tantamount to amending his Complaint or otherwise cure the deIiciency with
respect to King Iailing to pled anythign in the complaint related to Hill or the
eviction and appeal thereIrom to which Hill's OIIice was attached (in 1708 and
03628). One can go through King's 8/23/12 Complaint with a Iine tooth comb
and there is simply nothing therein to notice Coughlin that anything remotely
related to the eviction in 1708 and appeal thereoI in 03628 would be at issue in
this Iormal disciplinary matter. Again, King is hamstrung by his embarassment
at the complete and utter lack oI proIessionalism in Hill's greivance, so much so
that King reIused to even put it into evidence, reIused to attach it to his
Complaint or any pleading, Ior that matter, etc., etc. Any with good reason, as,
purportedly, Hill's greivance contains so many patent RPC violations itselI that it
was too hideous to see the light oI day in King's mind.
Chair Echeverria either reveals his complete and utter lack oI understanding
oI due process and SCR 105(2) and 105(2)(c), or his undying allegiance and bias
towards his 'boyhood chum Elcano, in indicating: 'HEARING - Vol. I, (Page
73:18 to 73:19) MR. ECHEVERRIA: I believe you're here today to measure all
oI your conduct as a practicing lawyer.
Further, Echeverria brazenly, Ilagrantly announces his intention that this
Iormal disciplinary panel absolutely abdicate it's responsibilities, and instead,
apply some completely Iraudulent and misguided application oI SCR 111(5) to
even civil attorney's Iees award (in 01168, FHE 3), or some void Order in FHE5
made aIter Judge Holmes was divested oI jurisdiction by both her Iailure to meet
the NRCP 59 timeline to make a sua sponte amendment to her 2/28/12 Order, but
also by Coughlin's Iiling on 3/7/12 a Notice oI Appeal oI her Iinal appealable
contempt order in FHE4) . So, Echeverria attempts to characterize FHE3 as some
sort oI 'conviction that 'conclusively establishes Coughlin's 'guilt with
respect to....what? All FHE3 can be said to 'Iind (and any Iinding therein is
completely set aside by Judge Gardner's subsequent FOFCOLDO Divorce oI
6/19/09, wherein she validates Coughlins' positions taken, begrudingly, by
awarding alimony, something WLS, Judge Gardner, and opposing counsel
Springgate therein attempted to Iraudulently hide Irom Coughlin):
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 74:11 to 74:16) MR. ECHEVERRIA: The issue here,
sir, as I understand the supreme court's order with respect to your conviction oI
theIt, and the issues here with respect to the other grievances that have been
filed against you are to the extent as to what, iI any, should be the punishment
that you should sustain as a result oI your conduct. So, Echeverria admits that he,
as Iar as the Panel is concerned, came into the 11/14/12 hearing viewing Coughlin
as having already been convictea oI everything the OBC pled in its Complaint or
accused Coughlin oI, when nothing could be Iurther Irom the case.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 178:6 to 181:7) 'MR. KING: ... You said you did
receive it. He doesn't recall how. And my Iollow-up question was: Did you
respond to the allegations by Judge Holmes that are contained in that letter, and by
the accompanying documents? ... THE WITNESS: One, this letter is not to me. I
would like to read it. Again, that's where the notice part oI due process is key, you
know. If I was noticed on the idea that I didn't respond to this -- and I'll enter
my objection. I would like to see where in the complaint it says Mr. Coughlin
failed to respond or cooperate with Bar counsel. It might. I'd just like to be sure.
Where does it say where -- was I noticed the import oI today was going to include,
the relevant inquiry today that I have been put on notice Ior, was going to include
the idea that I didn't appropriately respond to this? So iI I go to the complaint, I'm
just wondering where in the complaint might I be put on notice that I would be
expected to know when I got this today, and respond intelligently in that regard.
(Exhibit 9 marked.) MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, may I move on? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: You may. THE WITNESS: May I answer as best as I can
remember then? MR. ECHEVERRIA: II you will answer the question, it would
be helpIul. But these rambling discourses are not helpIul. THE WITNESS:
They're not winning any points on notice and due process? MR. ECHEVERRIA:
This is a preliminary investigation. Bar rules require attorneys to cooperate with
the preliminary investigation. As I understand, Mr. King is trying to establish
whether or not you did so. That's an issue that I believe is relevant to the
determination oI the degree oI punishment, iI any, that should Ilow to you as a
result oI your conduct. So, Mr. King, move on, please. MR. KING: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, can I just quickly attempt to more thoroughly
address that issue? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I think you've been aIIorded adequate
opportunity to do so. How you choose to respond is up to you. Mr. King, next
question, please. MR. KING: Thank you. THE WITNESS: That's the whole
notice thing. You're asking me to answer a question based upon a two-page letter
where I haven't been noticed on the idea that I will be asked to. And then iI I don't
-- iI I'm working through it, you're cutting me oII, not letting me put it in the
record. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King, you cited in one oI your pleadings a
request that all issues pending beIore you be heard at one hearing. There was a
letter you sent to the state Bar that you quote in one oI your pleadings. THE
WITNESS: I requested that? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Yes, sir. THE WITNESS:
You haven't read my pleadings. My whole point was biIurcating, how ridiculous it
is to glom all these together. I'm so glad you just said that on the record. BY MR.
KING: Q Could you please take a look at this document that's been marked as
Exhibit No. 9, and tell me iI you recognize that? A You actually just said that.
My whole point was -- Q Mr. Coughlin, there is a question pending -- A --
separate hearing. The sole purpose oI the 60838 suspension, on a candy bar. That
was my whole point.
While at r2:3-6, King's Complaint reads: '2. Respondent was advised oI the
grievances via U.S. mail, e-mail and by a brief meeting with Mr. King at the
State Bar Office in Reno. Respondent did not cooperate with the investigation and
rather than respond to the grievances as requested, Respondent sent non-
responsive and disparaging e-mails is it simply Ialse Ior King to indicate he or the
SBN emailed Coughlin anything to 'advise him oI the Hill greivance or the
Gardner grievance. Further, King apprised Coughlin oI nothing during said 'brieI
meeting with Mr. King at the State Bar OIIice in Reno with respect to anything
other than the Judge Nash Holmes grievance. It is telling that King chose not to
have anything admitted into evidence that purports to be a letter Irom the OBC
seeking a response Irom Coughlin as to any grievance other than the Hill
grievance (whichever case number that is...King Iails to identiIy any oI the alleged
three grievances by number, or even, really, much in the way as to whom the
greivant is, much less what was actually alleged in such greivances, beyond
having admitted a letter Irom Judge Nash Holmes to the SBN (ie, not to Coughlin,
and there was no evidence or testimony put on by the SBN as to when or how
Coughlin would have received any such materials suIIicient to be said to have
'advised Coughlin oI the grievances and Coughlins' testimony contrary to the
vague allusions in the Complaint at R2:3-6 went unrebutted by the SBN.
Why would the OBC have Iailed to, or chosen not to seek admission oI
some letter to Coughlin Irom the OBC requesting a response Irom Coughlin as to
the purported letter Irom Judge Holmes to the OBC admitted as Exhibit FHE8?
Could it be that any such letter Iailed to include a date by which the OBC sought a
response? Could any such letter involved matters related to whom the actual
grievant is or was in NG12-0435 (apparently the grievance involving the stale,
laches ridden (R60:4-9, 21-26 ha) FHE3 (Iunny, why number 3 in the batting
order, something so stale?).
Could it be related to where King's March 16
th
, 2012 letter to Coughlin,
which may or may not have had attached to it it this or that (King certainly didn't
get anything into evidence to support any Iinding as to what Coughlin was even
provided by the OBC with respect to any thing relating to the purported Iailure oI
Coughlin to 'cooperate with the OBCs investigation or some alleged Iailure to
'respond appropriately.
The thing is, King failed to put together any combination of a written
correspondence to Coughlin from the OBC requesting a response from
Coughlin COMBINED with something that would provide Coughlin anything
in the way of notice (preferably in writing) of just what allegation he need
respond to. For example, while FHE6 represents a minor victory Ior the OBC
(King managed to put on evidence to support the idea that the OBC sent Coughlin
a letter requesting a response Irom Coughlin), the Iailure oI King to even attempt
to get into evidence anything in the way oI just what the OBC provided to
Coughlin to in any way identiIy to Coughlin was allegation he need respond to.
While FHE6 does mention some 'enclosed correspondence Irom Richard G. Hill,
Esq. King completely Iailed to even attempt to put anything into evidence
establishing just what allegation Coughlin supposedly Iailed to respond to. Then,
as to, apparently the only other 'grievances that Coughlin could have allegedly
'Iailed to respond to or otherwise cooperate with the OBC with respect to some
'investigation thereoI King is only able to oIIer FHE8...the only problem is is
that FHE8 consists oI a 2 page letter Irom Judge Holmes to the OBC...not to
Coughlin. Further, the OBC was unable to put on any testimony or eviaence
(aside Irom King attempting to 'testiIy while being the OBC's lawyer as to what
Coughlin was allegedly provided by the SBN to provide anything in the way oI
speciIics as to the allegations suIIicient to support any sort oI Iinding that
Coughlin Iailed to respond thereto) to support any allegation that Coughlin was
provided FHE8 by the OBC, much less anything to identiIy when Coughlin may
have been provided such. Coughlin's general denials as to all the allegation in the
Complaint serve to rebut
Let's say King sent Coughlin some letter dated 3/16/12 that read:
'Dear Mr. Coughlin:
The OIIice oI Bar Counsel has received several grievances concerning your
conduct as a lawyer. The grievances include supporting evidence in the Iorm oI:
audio oI your conduct in court proceedings and copies oI pleadings and documents
prepared and Iiled by you in Justice and District Court. Together these grievances
raise serious questions regarding your competency and ability to practice law.
These concerns are serious and the OIIice oI Bar Counsel is considering the
necessity oI seeking a Petition to Determine Competency pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 117.
I am enclosing with this letter copies oI a grievance letter, Irom the
Municipal Court and a copy oI an Order Irom District Court. Please respond to
allegations pertaining to your conduct I will make available Ior your review and
inspection the supporting documents and audio recordings.
I have leIt phone messages and sent you an e-mail asking you to call me.
As oI the draIting oI this Ietter you have not called me I would like to meet with
you so that we can discuss this important matter and see II there IS a way that we
can help you. Again , please call me at your earliest opportunity.
Here's what happened. Here is why King was Iorced to omit any such
3/16/12 letter to Coughlin Irom the OBC, even where he absolutely needed to put
it into evidence to having any legitimate hope oI providing his allegation that
Coughlin vilated RPC 8.1 ''2. Respondent was advised oI the grievances via U.S.
mail, e-mail and by a brieI meeting with Mr. King at the State Bar OIIice in Reno.
Respondent did not cooperate with the investigation and rather than respond to the
grievances as requested, Respondent sent non-responsive and disparaging e-mails
R2:3-6. '...27. In light oI the Iorgoing Respondent violated...RPC 8.1
(Disciplinary Matters)...R5:9-14.
Further, its not all that clear just what RPC the above portion oI King's
Complaint could be said to speak to...iI other than RPC 8.1...which isn't that
natural a Iit considering the language therein:
'NRPC Rule8.1.Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters.An applicant Ior
admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or
in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
(a)Knowingly make a Ialse statement oI material Iact; or
(b)Fail to disclose a Iact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by
the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful
demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except
that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Rule 1..
Certainly, the the extent In re SchaeIer holds that the RPC's apply to an
attorney, (though SchaeIIer was not temporarily suspended as Coughlin
was...which brings up WCDA DDA Watts-Vial's reIsual to comply with
Coughlin's SCR 110 subpoenas by asserting Couglhin, due to his then 'temporary
suspendion (in Nevada, but not beIore the USPTO...which does not appear to
have removed Coughlin Irom the list oI practitioners identiIied as 'patent
attorneys or in any way suspended his license as a 'patent attorney (much like
the ALR where attorneys suspended in the only state wherein they are admitted to
practice, in some Iederal courts, have still been permitted to practice, Ior instance,
in Bankrupcty courts....so there are lots oI issues related to Coughlin's temporary
suspension oI his Nevada law license being alternately used against him where
convenient (as in the WCDA asserting Coughlin's subpoenas could not have been
'properly issued under NRCP 45 or Judge CliIton constantly calling Coughlin an
attorney all while expressly threatening Coughlin with contempt should he issue
his own subpoenas in 12-065630) but not used in his Iavor (do RPCs apply to a
suspended attorney?). Where Judge Holmes puports Couglhin to have violated
RPC's as to the 'Client-Lawyer Relationship (ie, RPC 1.1, RPC 1.3 see FHE5) in
his representation in 26800 of himself.) As such, selI-representing Respondent
Coughlin's RPC 1.6 duty to himselI arguably shields him Irom any allegations that
he, as either the attorney or his own client, violated RPC 8.1. Regardless,
Coughlin did absolutely cooperate a great deal with bar counsel, the OBC just did
not get the 'Iall on your sword whether your guilty or not response Irom Coughlin
it so eagerly anticipated. King's idea oI 'Iair hear is Stephen R. Harris, Esq., gets
no temporary suspension Ior misappropriating $755,000 Irom clients, then using it
on prostitutes and designer goods (Coughlin has empathy Ior those with addiction
issues, though less than he has Ior those with addiction issues who went and
worked as a telemarketer Ior $11 an hour during periods where such issues
prevented them Irom Iunctioning up to the requisite level...and whom did not take
client's money or trust and apply it to said addiction, though, but Ior the grace oI
god, 'go I. Coe Swobe can show up to Harris' deal or write a letter. Coughlin
was absolutely ambushed by Beesley name dropping Swobe, whose Thursday
night extremely inIormal LCL meeting Coughlin has gone to oII and on since
March oI 2003. Further, King's allusion to Swobe being a Coughlin supporter
when Coughlin 'was Iirst seeking admission is completely out oI line, violative
oI SCR 105.5, etc., etc. (although, in Iairness to King, Coughlins' Supplemental
DowSoE and some o
ther Iilings may have essentially waived some aspects oI whatever it was King
was reIerring to...) and three months an actual suspension whilst Coughlin can go
away Ior 'Iour years and the come back and try and meet the burden oI prooI he
traded the SBN (where the SBN has it in SCR 105 matters, Coughlin would get it
under SCR 117). To King, that would be 'thrilling. That's not the kind oI
judgment a Respondent should put much trust in, and clearly, Coughlin did not.
'Nevada RPC Rule1.6.ConIidentiality oI InIormation. (a)A lawyer shall not
reveal inIormation relating to representation oI a client unless the client gives
inIormed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, or the disclosure is permitted by paragraphs (b) and (c).... (b)A
lawyer may reveal inIormation relating to the representation oI a client to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:... (6)To comply with other law
or a court order.
Here's what the FOFCOL had to say about RPC 8.1 and any violations
thereoI by Coughlin:
'Disciplinary Matters
(UU) RPC 8.1(b) provides, in pertinent part, " ... a lawyer ... in connection
with a disciplinary shall not: (b) ... knowingly Iail to respond to a lawIul demand
Ior inIormation Irom an admissions or disciplinary authority...
(VV) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin
knowingly Iailed to respond to the State Bar's request Ior inIormation in the
disciplinary proceeding and Iailed to timely Iile a required veriIied responsive
answer or pleading to the Complaint.
(WW) First, Coughlin asked Ior an extension oI time to respond to the letter
oI February 14, 2012 regarding the Richard Hill Complaint then Iailed to respond
at all. Supra 29.
'29. State Bar Counsel called Coughlin to testiIy at the hearing oI the matter.
Coughlin was questioned with regard to a letter dated February 14, 2012 Irom
Assistant Bar Counsel King to Coughlin in which Bar Counsel Iorwarded to
Coughlin correspondence received Irom Richard G. Hill. See Transcript oI
Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 163, L 13 -P 164, L 23. See Hearing
Exhibit 6.
(
Coughlin's response, dated March 9, 2012, asked Ior additional time in
which to respond. See Hearing Exhibit 7. No evidence was presented that
Coughlin substantively responded to Bar Counsel's letter oI February 14, 2012
prior to the Iiling oI the Complaint in this matter. Coughlin Iailed to directly
respond to Bar Counsel's questions inquiring iI Coughlin ever subsequently
responded to Bar Counsel's letter oI February 14, 2012. See Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 169, L 13 -P 172, L 16.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 169:13 to 172:16) 'Q My question is: Did you send a
subsequent letter or explanation to the State Bar? In other words, you're asking Ior
additional time. Did you ever send -- A What you do is evil, Pat. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. THE WITNESS: What you do is evil. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I have cautioned you about interrupting on
numerous occasions. But apparently a pattern oI behavior has been the subject oI
at least three court orders that we have seen so Iar. And I would ask you to, in your
best interests, to attempt to resist yourselI, allow the question to be completed, and
then make whatever objection you wish. The question directly to you, and iI it's
not direct enough, let me ask it. Did you ever speciIically respond to the letter oI
February 14th, 2012, Exhibit 6? THE WITNESS: I responded to it. SpeciIically.
I'm not sure exactly what that means. I believe I cooperated with Bar counsel. I
don't have a thousand pages oI stuII. (NOTE: the transcript contains an error there
in that Couglin actually said: 'I know provided the Bar thousands oI pages oI stuII
and...videos, audios transcripts, etc.. This is conIirmed by King's own admission
in the transcript and only Iurther underscores the extent to which Echeverria
conducted the hearing like a total Iraudster working overtime to get over his
agenda). Videos. Audio. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The question is: On February
14th you were sent substantial, apparently, correspondence Irom Richard Hill
alleging proIessional misconduct. You were asked to make a speciIic response
within ten days. It appears that you did not do so, unless you have some evidence
to the contrary -- THE WITNESS: I didn't get this letter. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
I'm sorry. I continue to talk while you're trying to interrupt. My question is: Did
you ever respond speciIically, prior to the institution oI the complaint, to Mr. Hill's
comments and reporting to the State Bar? Did you ever address those issues raised
by Mr. Hill prior to the Iiling oI the complaint? THE WITNESS: Maybe it would
help iI I had the Mr. Hill attachment. I believe I did. MR. ECHEVERRIA: When
did you do that? THE WITNESS: There's a multitude oI instances where I wrote
or responded or communicated with Mr. King. (Exhibit 8 marked.) MR.
ECHEVERRIA: When was the Iirst time? THE WITNESS: Well, probably this
time in asking Ior more time, because I didn't get this letter very soon aIter it was
sent. I rented a room oII Craigslist. And there was some ill will that built up, the
people I rented it Irom. And I didn't get this letter -- basically I think I got it this
day, and I threw this together. I was obviously very upset to see that the State Bar
had wanted to hear Irom me, and given me ten days. I think, obviously, it had
already passed by this point. So right when I got that letter -- and I think iI I had
been noticed on this, I would have given you the envelope that shows that there
was some -- like the post oIIice wouldn't let me -- I Iorget exactly what happened.
But I think I gave Pat this stuII -- MR. KING: With the chair's permission, I'll
move on. THE WITNESS: -- legitimate reasons why I didn't get this that evince a
lack oI culpability on my part. But that's consistent with what Pat does. He puts on
stuII he knows is baseless. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. King. Mr.
Coughlin, I don't believe you answered the question. It was a direct question.
When did you Iirst respond substantively to Mr. Hill's complaints? I have not
heard an answer. The response -- THE WITNESS: Yeah. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Excuse me. Your response is argumentative. Mr. King, go ahead with your next
question. MR. KING: Thank you. THE WITNESS: I can answer it. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, there's not a question pending. THE WITNESS:
But it sounded like you said I didn't answer the last question. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That was my observation. (NOTE: Echeverria's citing to that
particular portion oI the transcript, and ending such citation where he did,
especially considering what occurred immediately thereaIter only Iurther
underscores the ridiculous patent partiality that Echeverria revealed in his
shameIul display, to which Vellis consistently provided a pathetic recapitulation
to, with some chorus eIIect by Kent. Some might say, it is very, very diIIicult to
have any respect whatsoever Ior either oI those three, whether as 'men or as
'attorneys, and certainly as 'Iinders oI Iact.
King deIinately 'testiIied that Coughlin provided him 'thousands oI
pages in response to the grievances...whether King Ielt such was merely
'disparaging or 'non-responsive is a subjective matter, but, clearly, the
FOFCOL is wrong where it purports to Iind that Coughlin provided 'nothing or
'Iailed to respond at all.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 303:10 to 304:15) 'MR. KING: Correct. My
pleadings, Ior instance, as you can see by the Bates stamp numbers are thousands
of pages of nonsensical e-mails and disparaging e-mails. I didn't think that that
would add to this day or help the supreme court. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I think the
conIusion, at least I have, is whether or not the pleadings themselves, whatever
file, whatever Mr. Coughlin has filed, a motion for whatever reason, are those
part of the record that go up on appeal? In civil litigation, with which I'm only
Iamiliar, that does become part oI the record iI so designated. MR. KIAC: If the
orders go up, pleadings that are not admitted do not go up. MR. COUGHLIN:
Your Honor, iI I can just interject -- MR. KING: In other words, everything Mr.
Coughlin sent, oftentimes with these multiple captions where he's sending them
to many people, he might caption as a pleading, it doesn't make it a pleading. It
has to be something that was sent to us, filed in, and that would be a pleading.
And iI there was such a thing as Iile stamped with the supreme court, it will go up.
MR. VELLIS: That is my question. It doesn't have to be necessarily be brought up
here, but iI it was submitted and Iile stamped as being submitted, then it's part oI
the record that goes up, whether it was mentioned here or not? MR. KING:
Correct. That would be my understanding. Only iI it was properly filed, timely
filed, stamped in by the court.
Just how ridiculously Iraudulent oI a display by King and the OBC is set
out above? Its pretty much an ancient, guarded secret what it takes to get a
document accepted Ior Iiling, Iile stamped, and Iiled by the OBC suIIicient Ior it
to be a 'pleading or included in the items that 'go up on appeal. Clearly, King
Iraudulently controls ('the Director Coughlin dubbed King in a Iiling) the ROA
that the SBN sends to this Court (Coughlin obtained the 12/24/12 ROA Irom this
Court, the version the SBN sent to this Court (Couglhin was given it directly by a
Clerk upon the 2/7/12 Order striking such about to result in that three volume
ROA being thrown in the trash...its a good thing Coughlin retained it. The third
volume contains Exhibits which are reproductions oI the documents therein
shrunken approximately to 75 oI their original size...which makes completely
illegible Coughlin's FHE 15, and just generally makes a review oI the ROA and
FHE something that would give the reader a headache.
So, apparently there is some hidden wrinkly to the rules applicable to the
Iiling oI documents in the 'Court that is the OBC's SBN. While SCR 119(3)
provides that: 'Rule119.Additional rules oI procedure.... 3.Other rules oI
procedure.Except as otherwise provided in these rules, the Nevada Rules oI
Civil Procedure and the Nevada Rules oI Appellate Procedure apply in
disciplinary cases. (which would mean, apparently, that NRCP applies in the
'trial court level wherein the Iormal hearing takes place at the SBNs oIIice
beIore the NNDB Panel, and that NRAP applies on appeal?
Also SCR 105(2)(e) provides that: '(e)Rules oI evidence; support oI
panel`s decision.The rules applicable to the admission oI evidence in the district
courts oI Nevada govern admission oI evidence beIore a hearing panel.
Evidentiary rulings shall be made by the chair oI the panel, iI one has been
designated, or by the chair oI the appropriate disciplinary board prior to such a
designation. The Iindings oI the panel must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence.
' SCR 105(3).Review by supreme court. (a)Time and manner oI
appeal.A decision oI a hearing panel shall be served on the attorney, and service
shall be deemed Notice oI Entry oI Decision Ior appeal purposes....1o the extent
not inconsistent with these rules, an appeal from a decision of a hearing panel
shall be treated as would an appeal from a civil judgment of a district court and
is governed by the Aevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The title oI the 12/14/12 document alleged served on Respondent Coughlin
in no way identiIies it as a 'decision, but rather as a 'Findings oI Fact;
Conclusions oI Law.
In the above excerpt King plainly admits to Iraudulently editing the ROA
along with Clerk oI Court Peters to exclude various submission by Coughlin that
should have been Iile stamped and included in the ROA (such as the 88 page
'VeriIied Response by Coughlin submitting Ior Iiling, timely, pursuant to the
deadline set out in Chair Echeverria's Order, on 11/9/12. It is beyond Iraudulent
Ior King and the OBC/Peters to simply, what? Throw away such submission by
Coughlin? Further, there is simply no explanation Ior why the 10/31/12 Iiling by
Coughlin (which Coughlin actually was able to get the SBN to divulge a Iile
stamped copy thereoI (and the SBN went back on its express pronouncements that
all oI Coughlin's submission would be Iile stamped, and that he would be mailed a
Iile stamped copy oI the cover page thereoI, and that the entirety oI any such
submission Ior Iiling would be submitted to each panel member (along with
reproductions oI all oI the exhibits attached thereto...and clearly King and the
OBC were able to reproduce 'discs Ior the multiple copies need Ior the Panel oI
the audio transcripts received Irom the RMC (as reIerenced in both King's 3/16/12
letter to Coughlin, which actually is in the record, perhaps not 'authenticated
suIIicient to meet King's purposes, but...
Frankly, its amazing King can keep a straight Iace when he says:
'HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 304:13 to 304:15) MR. KING: Correct. That would be
my understanding. Only iI it was properly Iiled, timely Iiled, stamped in by the
court. By 'stamped in by the court King means 'II I, OBC King, tell 'Clerk oI
Court Peters that she may aIIix a Iile stamp the whatever submission by Coughlin
is at issue (even those he submitted beyond the Iax Iiling method that I, King, am
well aware that Peters expressly indicated to Couglhin on 9/11/12 that he was
permitted to do, and which Rose Cota and other OBC employees in other cases
have permitted (ie Iax Iiling) in the past). To that hurdle to getting somethign
included the in the ROA, King, oI course, adds the qualiIier 'timely Iiled.
ThereIore, King has chosen to instruct Peters to exclude Irom the ROA Coughlin's
11/9/12 'VeriIied Response under Kings view that such was not 'timely Iiled
(never mind the Iact that Coughlin's 11/13/12 Iiling was Iile stamped...let's guess..
King's silent justiIication Ior that would be (oh, we know Pat, you 'don't tell the
Clerk oI Court what to do, and you certainly didn't tell her not to Iile stampe in
Coughlin's 9/17/12 Motion to Dismiss, right, Pat? R53:3-15.
King conIuses matters in the above excerpt oI the T, but where he says '
My pleaaings, Ior instance, as you can see by the Bates stamp numbers are
thousands of pages of nonsensical e-mails and disparaging e-mails he is
clearly recapitulating that which he pled in the Complaint (' Respondent did not
cooperate with the investigation and rather than respond to the grievances as
requested, Respondent sent non-responsive and disparaging e-mails R2:3-6),
though he misuses the term 'pleadings... King was reIerring to (the only bates
stamped item by King or the OBC that gets into the 'thousands oI pages) his
11/7/12 production oI 3,200 pages (many oI which were useless and redundant
copies oI the same Iilings by Coughlin, where such repetition added nothing other
than to make Coughlin's task oI absorbing and culling anything useIul Irom such
voluminous production the the scant 2 judicials days beIore the hearing time in
which it was provided, unduly burdensom and prejudicial. And really, even that
statement by King is oII. That 3,200 page SCR 105(2)(c) substitute by King
actually contained very Iew oI Coughlin's emails to the SBN. It is rather apparent
that King Iailed to even read the majority oI correspondences Coughlin sent him..
Ditto, 'Clerk oI Court/Investigator Peters...much less review the many, many
attachments thereto (similar to Hill claiming he was never provided the audio
transcripts oI all hearing in 1708...where clearly, he was not only provided a hard
copy disc, he was email such items in digital Iormat as well, as was his associate).
So, the FOFCOL is clearly wrong, bordering on Iraudulently so where it
Iinds : (VV) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin
knowingly Iailed to respond to the State Bar's request Ior inIormation in the
disciplinary proceeding and Iailed to timely Iile a required veriIied responsive
answer or pleading to the Complaint. (WW) First, Coughlin asked Ior an
extension oI time to respond to the letter oI February 14, 2012 regarding the
Richard Hill Complaint then failed to respond at all. It is such a patent lie by
Echeverria and the Panel to rule that Coughlin 'Iailed to respond at all. King
himselI admits, at least, that Coughlin 'responded with 'disparaging emails.
Also, even had Coughlin ' Iailed to timely Iile a required veriIied
responsive answer or pleading to the Complaint such is not, and never has been
the basis Ior Iinding a RPC 8.1 violation. Were that the case, every Respondent
against whom a deIault is taken would be guilty thereoI, and a review oI the
jurisprudence in this area clearly reveals such is not the case. Further, King
oIIered nothing in the way oI support Ior any wish he had that the Panel 'amend
the pleading to conIorm to the prooI (such as a citation to some authority to
support such an argument, stare decisis, etc.), and even where King managed to
announce even the idea thereoI, the Chair clearly admonished him that he was
doing so at an inappropriate time in the proceeding, and as such, King Iailed to
preserved such argument Ior the record where he never Iiled any document so
arguing such a 'amend the pleading to conIorm to the prooI argument, nor did he
revisit such during the argument portion oI the hearing. Additionally, the tack-on
King made at the very, very end oI the hearing must not be considered as part oI
King's 'argument portion oI the hearing as clearly the Chair indicated King had
used up all his time, and would be provided no rebuttal, and King Iailed to argue
Ior Coughlin to be assessed costs or have his reinstatement conditioned upon
paying Hill's client, the landlord, any Iee award by Judge Flanagan. R 1700.
Coughlin caught on to the whole 'pass FHE3 Irom 2JDC Judge Linda
Gardner to her brother RMC Judge William Gardner, whom admits to passing it to
his Iellow RMC Judges, including Judge Nash Holmes, whom admits to including
it in the 'box oI materials reIerenced in FHE8 (note, there was no evidence put
on, Ior good reason, by the OBC as to having supplied Coughlin with that 'box oI
materials, or what such box may have included (might get into a sticky area
where the audio transcripts reIerenced by Judge Holmes in FHE8 would
necessarily come into evidence or have to be 'authenticated or a 'Ioundation
laid by the OBC (reversible error Ior Echeverria to rule Coughlin could not
provide Ioundation thereIore, and Iurther, Coughlin's mother did so provide
suIIicient Ioundation, at least as much as Elcano did with respect to FHE3, and
Elcano did not testiIy as to having received a 'certiIied copy oI FHE3, other than
some lame/dishonest (and Elcano lied a lot during his testimony, though he was
surprisingly truthIul as to some things like the whole 'that court room is YOURS
matters.) assertion by Elcano that the eIlex stamping or something by Conyers
suIIices, which clearly it does not, and Elcano's whole bit about something being
'the Iault oI the copier is entirely unexplained, and speculative).
As to the 4/16/13 arraignment in the RMC beIore the same Judge Howard
whose conviction Iormed the basis Ior 60838: 'The Nevada Constitution
guarantees the people oI Nevada the right to bail in non-capital oIIenses and
prohibits the district court Irom imposing excessive bail. See Nev. Const. art. 1,
6 and 7; see also NRS 178.484(1) ('|A| person arrested Ior an oIIense other than
murder oI the Iirst degree must be admitted to bail. (emphasis added)); St. Pierre
v. SheriII, 90 Nev. 282, 286, 524 P.2d 1278, 1280 (1974) ('|O|ur Constitution
does not encompass inclusion oI a non-capital oIIense as non-bailable.). 'This
traditional right to Ireedom beIore conviction permits the unhampered preparation
oI a deIense, and serves to prevent the inIliction oI punishment prior to
conviction. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). In deciding a reasonable amount
Ior bail the district court may consider 'the nature oI the oIIense charged, the
penalty which may be inIlicted, the probability oI the appearance oI the accused,
his pecuniary condition, his character and reputation, and the circumstances
surrounding the case relative to the likelihood oI conviction. Ex parte Jagles and
Varnes, 44 Nev. 370, 195 P. 808 (1921); see also NRS 178.498; NRS 178.4853.
However, 'Bail must not be. . . more than the accused can reasonably be expected
under the circumstances to give, Ior iI so it is substantially a denial oI bail. Ex
parte Malley, 50 Nev. 248, 253, 256 P. 512, 514 (1927). Our review oI the record
reveals that the district court violated the Nevada Constitution in two ways. It
denied the petitioner bail Ior IiIteen days and then imposed a bail amount which
greatly exceeded the amount the petitioner could reasonably be expected to pay.
As the real party in interest notes in its answering brieI, the district court imposed
a bail amount that was IiIty times greater than the Clark County standard bail
schedule Ior category B Ielonies. In light oI the district court`s Iailure to consider
all oI the relevant Iactors, see NRS 178.498, its stated reason Ior remanding
petitioner to custody, petitioner`s indigent status, and the amount oI bail, we can
only conclude that the district court was attempting to punish petitioner Ior his
attitude without utilizing the procedures provided Ior in Nevada law. See NRS
22.030(1) (explaining when a person may be punished summarily Ior contempt);
NRS 22.010 (deIining contempt). For these reasons, we conclude that the district
court maniIestly abused its discretion by remanding petitioner to custodywithout
bail Ior IiIteen days and imposing excessive bail. See State v.Dist. Ct.
(Armstrong), 127 Nev. , 267 P.3d 777, 779-80 (2011) (discussing when a writ oI
mandamus will issue).
Do search Ior 'Iault oI the copier and Coughlin's mother's testimony.
King's attempt to 'testiIy during the hearing to address the problems he
had with respect to getting somethign into evidence to support his contentions as
to what Coughlin was provided that he Iailed to 'respond to or 'cooperate as to
with respect to the 'investigation thereoI (largely owing to all the problems the
OBC would have iI they put 'Clerk oI Court Laura Peters on as a witness, which
is why Coughlin subpoenaed her) which is inappropriate, like King Iiling himselI
Ior a 'workplace harrassment protection order Ior himselI (and, apparently, the
entire SBN) where Nevada law requires King's employer to do that Ior him, and
Ior a bond to be put up, a jurisdictional prerequisite that King Iailed to seek a
waiver oI in any way.
As to the alleged 'investigations by the OBC that Coughlin apparently
Iailed to 'cooperate with...there is not a whole lot oI sleuthing going on by the
OBC in this matter, basically a baton pass Irom a muni court judge and an
opposing counsel accusing Coughlin oI stalking (seriously, iI one reads the
'enclosed correspondence Irom Hill mentioned in FHE6, the irony oI Hill
accusing Coughlin oI stalking him would be terribly evident).
As to the allegation Coughlin Iailed to respond to FHE6, King was reduced
to attempting to, basically say, 'hey, my letter in FHE6 is dated 2/14/12, and
requests a response within 10 days...and since FHE7 is Coughlin's letter, dated
3/9/12 (nevermind all the details expressly stated within FHE7 supporting
Coughlin sworn contention that he only received King's letter that day, 3/9/12, or
the Iact that Coughlin, obviously was in fail between 2/27/12 to 3/2/12, incident to
FHE4, Judge Holmes' 2/28/12 Order Iinding Coughlin in 'direct contempt (NRS
22.010)(much less the reIerence to Coughlin's 2/22/12 written correspondence to
two other bar counsel (at that point, Coughlin did not even know there was a bar
counsel stationed in Reno, and indeed, King had apparently only just started
working Ior the Bar that very month, having just Iinished his two litigations with
Hill in the Milsner v. Carstarphen cases), Clark and Machado, wherein, get this,
Coughlin actually speciIically requests the bar email or Iax him anything related to
disciplinary matters given the exigent circumstances attendant to his mail being
interIered with)) (bonus points iI any such letter Irom King or the OBC contained
a deadline date, which what may or may not be King's 3/16/12 letter to Coughlin
did not manage to do (but King did include such a deadline in his 2/14/12 letter to
Coughlin...only problem is, Coughlin proved he didn't get that letter until 3/9/12
through absolutely no Iault oI his own).This is especially true as to, apparently,
NG12-0204 (the Hill grievance? Who really knows which number goes with
which greivance, much less grievant) King Iailed to get anything into the record to
provide anything in the way oI speciIics as to just what it was Coughlin was
supposed to respond to...besides the vague allusions to some letter Irom Hill made
in FHE6 (and so embarrassed, apparently, by Hill's 'letter to the OBC (or was it
an unsigned email...certainly lacking any oI the 'veriIied quality so demanded oI
the Respondent apparently (which is not how they do it in Baker's new state oI
practice, Kentucky...and, on that note, Nevada's approach is arguably
unconstitutional) that King was reduced to oIIering FHE7 as some meek support
what just what is was Coughlin Iailed to respond to.) As to King oIIering FHE7
to provide 'evidence oI some Iailure to respond or cooperate with some
investigation by the OBC, that's just sad. First, FHE7 itselI sets out all the
USPS/domestic violence victim whose mail was being interIerred with, victim oI
wrongIul eviction circumstances that prevented Coughlin Irom even receiving the
OBC's 2/14/12 mailing (certainly the OBC didn't put on any evidence oI certiIied
mailing or slip into the ROA some little CertiIied Mail Receipt slip...telling...).
Additionally, Coughlin has the very envelope that 2/14/12 Iirst class mailing by
the bar was contained in, replete with a yellow USPS sticker that demonstrates
(which one did Coughlin get? The certiIied one or the Iirst class one?) that
Coughlin could not have received any such 2/14/12 mailing Irom the bar any
earlier than he testiIied to having received such under oath at the hearing.
Additionally, Coughlin attached to his pleadings the OIIicial USPS Change oI
Address he Iiled on 3/14/12, in addition to a multitude oI materials supporting his
contention that his mail was interIerred with and that he was extremely
concientious and proactive in addressing such circumstances (and the dv by the
housemates angle as well, in addition to the Gayle Kern, Esq. PTTHOA, UPL Sue
King, Western Nevada Management, Sunset Station Buck Hyde Terri Passot
interIerence aspects thereto).
And its just so patently clear how much OBC King wants to show out Ior
his boy Richard G. Hill. Look at the connections. Coughlin submits mad Richard
G. Hill, Esq., disparaing (and deservedly so) materials on 3/16/12...what does
King do? He decides to make a grievance out oI Judge Nash Holme's 3/14/12
submissions and mails something out that day (only problem Ior King is he was
too embarassed by his own 3/16/12 letter to Coughlin to actually seek to have it
admitted into evidence, which throats his whole allegation that Coughlin Iailed to
respond to any such greivance? Heck, King couldn't even show he ever askea or
requestea Ior Coughlin to speak to those matters mentioned in FHE6 (and the
OBC is stuck with that now). Consider, King's emeshment with NNDB Hill and
the knee-jerk retaliatory responses (to go along with the ridiculous tack-on at the
very end oI the transcript where King speciIically, the the exclusion oI such
amounts he knows Coughlin owes equally to others, speciIically requests any
reinstatement oI Coughlin be contingent upon making sure hIll gets paid his Iees
incident to FHE2).
'Contact From: Patrick King (Pa1rickKnvbar.org) Sent: Fri 3/16/12 9:09 AM
To: zachcoughlinhottnaicom (:zachcoughlinhottnaicom) March 16/2012
Zachary Coughlin Dear Zachl Thank you Ior sending me your reply to the
grievance Iiled by Richard Hill. From your explanation it is clear that things are
not as they should be. Please call me ASAP so that we can take the appropriate
action to help you and to stop these types oI disturbing complaints. Patrick King,
Assistant Bar Counsel (775) 328-1384
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
U.S. Patent & Trademark OIIice; OIIice oI Enrollment & Discipline
Post OIIice Box 1450; Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
Tel: (571) 272-4097 Fax: (703) 273-0074 Website: www.uspto.gov/index.html
OIIice oI Bar Counsel, State Bar oI Nevada
600 East Charleston Blvd.
Las Vegas, NV 89104
Tel: (800) 254-2797 (702) 382-2200 Fax: (702) 382-8747 Website:
www.nvbar.org
I,lk,27
'SCR Rule102.Types of discipline.Misconduct is grounds for:
(d)The attorney may request dissolution or amendment of the temporary
order of suspension by petition filed with the supreme court, a copy of which
shall be served on bar counsel. The petition may be set for immediate hearing
before a hearing panel, to hear the petition and submit its report and
recommendation to the court within 7 days oI the conclusion oI the hearing. Upon
receipt oI the report and recommendation, the court may modiIy its order, iI
appropriate, and continue such provisions oI it as may be appropriate until the
Iinal disposition oI all pending disciplinary charges against the attorney.
SCR Rule105.Procedure on receipt of complaint...
'2.Commencement of formal proceedings.Formal disciplinary
proceedings are commenced by bar counsel Iiling a written complaint in the name
oI the state bar. The complaint shall be suIIiciently clear and speciIic to inIorm the
attorney oI the charges against him or her and the underlying conduct supporting
the charges. A copy oI the complaint shall be served on the attorney and it shall
direct that a veriIied response or answer be served on bar counsel within 20 days
oI service; the original shall be Iiled with bar counsel`s oIIice. The time to
respond may be extended once by the chair for not more than 20 days for
good cause or upon stipulation oI the parties. In the event the attorney fails to
plead, the charges shall be deemed admitted; provided, however, that an
attorney who fails to respond within the time provided may thereafter obtain
permission of the appropriate disciplinary board chair to do so, if failure to
file is attributable to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
(d)Quorum; time Ior decision oI panel; votes required to impose discipline.
Any Iive members oI the panel shall be a quorum. The hearing panel shall
render a written decision within 30 days of the conclusion of the hearing,
unless post-hearing briefs are requested by either bar counsel or the attorney
and allowed by the panel or requested by the chair, in which event the decision
shall be rendered within 60 days oI the conclusion oI the hearing.
The decision shall be served pursuant to Rule 109(1), accompanied by the panel`s
Iindings and recommendation, all of which shall be Iiled with bar counsel`s oIIice.
A decision to impose or recommend discipline requires the concurrence oI Iour
members oI the panel.
I am writing to request, pursuant to SCR 105, Ior the "time to respond" to
be "extended" Ior "20 days" to any SCR 105 Complaint that has been Iiled. I do
not believe one has been served on me, still. To whatever extent one has been
served on me, I am writing to "obtain permission oI the appropriate disciplinary
board chair" to so respond where any such "Iailure to Iile" by myselI was, indeed,
"attributable to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect".
Challenges to any member Ior cause under Rule 103(7) shall be made as soon
as possible aIter receiving either actual or constructive notice oI the grounds Ior
disqualiIication, and shall be made by motion to the chair in accordance with these
rules. In no event will a motion seeking the disqualiIication oI a member be timely
iI the member has already heard, considered or ruled upon any contested matter,
except as to grounds based on Iraud or like illegal conduct oI which the
challenging party had no notice until aIter the contested matter was considered.
Any challenge that is not raised in a timely manner shall be deemed waived.
The chair may make ad hoc appointments to replace designated panel members
in the event challenges or disqualiIication reduce the number to less than the
number required Ior the hearing panel. Ad hoc appointees shall be subject to
disqualiIication under Rule 103(7) and any remaining peremptory challenges
unexercised by either the attorney(s) or bar counsel. A hearing panel as Iinally
constituted shall include a non-lawyer.
(b)Assignment Ior hearing; venue.Following service oI a responsive
pleading, or upon Iailure to plead, the matter shall be assigned by the chair oI the
disciplinary board to a hearing panel. Venue shall be the county in which the
attorney resides or maintains his or her principal oIIice Ior the practice oI law,
where the alleged oIIense was committed or where the parties have stipulated. II
the attorney neither resides nor maintains his or her principal oIIice in Nevada, or
has leIt the state to avoid proceedings under these rules, the hearing may be
conducted in any county designated by the chair oI the disciplinary board.
(c)Time to conduct hearing; notice oI hearing; discovery oI evidence against
attorney.The hearing panel shall conduct a hearing within 45 days of
assignment and give the attorney at least 30 days` written notice of its time
and place. The notice shall be served in the same manner as the complaint, and
shall inIorm the attorney that he or she is entitled to be represented by counsel, to
cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence. The notice shall be
accompanied by a summary prepared by bar counsel oI the evidence against the
attorney, and the names oI the witnesses bar counsel intends to call Ior other than
impeachment, together with a brieI statement oI the Iacts to which each will
testiIy, all oI which may be inspected up to 3 days prior to the hearing. Witnesses
or evidence, other than Ior impeachment, which became known to bar counsel
thereaIter, and which bar counsel intends to use at the hearing, shall be promptly
disclosed to the attorney. For good cause shown, the chair may allow additional
time, not to exceed 90 days, to conduct the hearing.
EVIDENCE OF PANEL'S EVIDENT PARTIALITY:
Bar Counsel was permitted to seek to have FHE 3 (4/13/09 L. Gardner
OAT) admitted aIter he had concluded his examination oI Elcano. However,
Coughlin was reIused the opportunity to ask one more question oI Judge Nash
Holmes or Elcano upon the Panel indicating his time was up or Coughlin making
an indication similar to King's where, with Elcano, King 'pass(ed) the witness.
'... MR. KING: I very much appreciate your testimony and candor. I'll pass the
witness.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Thank you, Mr. King. Mr. Coughlin, it's now 11:31.
You have 15 minutes. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. Thank you. MR. KING: I
apologize. I meant to have this admitted. Did I lay a proper Ioundation? I would
move Ior Exhibit 3 to be admitted. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Any objection now, sir?
MR. COUGHLIN: I didn't hear the Ioundation. I'm sorry. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The Ioundation was Mr. Elcano attended the hearing, reviewed this order, and
determined it to be -- This is a true and correct copy oI the order that you looked at
Iollowing the hearing? Page 113 THE WITNESS: Yes. The one that was
transmitted to us by the judge....Page 114 MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm Iocused on
whether or not this is a true and correct copy oI the order issued by Judge Gardner.
And have you determined this to be the true and correct copy? THE WITNESS:
Yes. It's the order I relied on. MR. ECHEVERRIA: It will be admitted. (Exhibit 3
admitted.)MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, Mr. Coughlin.
'Q Did you have a communication with me incident to some oI these
complaints or a complaint, I don't know iI it was the Tahoe one or CAAW one or
iI it was Rhonda or something, in about January-February 2009, wherein you
said, you know what? I asked Master Edmondson about you, and I asked 1udge
Gardner -- might have been it was 1udge Gardner by that point -- and they
both gave you thumbs up, or something similar to that? A No. I don't think
you're characterizing what I said correctly. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Your time has
expired, Mr. Coughlin. Do you want to ask one more question? MR.
COUGHLIN: Yes. I would like him to clarify as to where I'm amiss there.
What it is that he might have said. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, iI you can,
Mr. Elcano. THE WITNESS: Periodically I ask judges how our employees are
doing, and especially iI there's a complaint. And somewhere early on or to the
middle of Mr. Coughlin's employment I asked one or two judges if he was
doing okay, and they said he was doing okay. So as a result, I did not pursue
the complaint oI the two shelter organizations. So I stood by my employee at that
time MR. ECHEVERRIA: Anything Iurther, Mr. King? MR. COUGHLIN:
Was one of those judges, 1udge Gardner? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
Coughlin, your time has expired. MR. KING: I don't know iI the panel has any
questions, but I don't. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Any questions Irom the panel
members? May Mr. Elcano be excused? MR. KING: Thank you Ior your time
today. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Call your next witness. MR. KING: I'm going to
see iI I can get Judge Holmes on the phone.
Coughlin was aIIoreded not opportunity to call Judge Beesley as a witness
in his case in chieI, despite his express desire to do so, given, as bar counsel
indicated, Judge Beesley was only available between 9:00-9:30 am and the Panel's
avowed, expressed indication that the Iormal hearing would conclude by 5:30 pm
that day, regardless oI whether Coughlin was done with his case in chieI or still
had relevant, material, admissible evidence he sought to put on.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 299:3 to 301:8) 'MR. KING: Mr. Coughlin --
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, answer the question. We're running out of
time. MR. KING: -- explain why he didn't avail himselI oI Rule 117. We have
encouraged him up the ying-yang to get treatment, taking advantage oI that
rule -- MR. COUGHLIN: I don't trust Pat King at all. MR. KING: Would you
mind iI I asked a Iollow-up question? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Pardon me? MR.
KING: May I ask a Iollow-up question? MR. ECHEVERRIA: In a minute. Have
you Iinished your questions? MS. PEARL: Yes. And I thank you Ior the answers.
MR. COUGHLIN: Thank you. I appreciate it. MR. KING: Mr. Coughlin, did I
on many occasions, including with David Clark, encourage you to read and take
advantage oI Rule 117? MR. COUGHLIN: Pat, I just don't trust you at all. MR.
KING: The question is did we encourage you to? MR. COUGHLIN: II you did,
Pat, it came as nothing more than, hey, make my job easy. Sign on this deal. Oh, it
pauses everything, it pauses everything. It will all come out in the wash when you
come back. And, Pat, I just don't trust you, man. I don't. MR. KING: That's okay.
But was what was said, that it would pause everything -- MR. COUGHLIN: No, I
didn't say that either, Pat. You had your time to prove that, and you didn't use your
case Ior it, and now you're not going to use my case to prove that. MR. KING:
Mr. Coughlin, I get to cross-examine you. Did I ask you to get treatment -- MR.
COUGHLIN: Can I just finish my testimony quickly before -- there's just a
couple things. MR. ECHEVERRIA: We're running out of time. I afforded
you in excess of 20 minutes. I cautioned you when you were getting close. I
tried to redirect your issue as to how you felt about the supreme court's
directive for this panel to determine the nature and extent of punishment, if
any. We Iocused on that. It's now 4:31, according to the State Bar clock. I
would like to give everybody an opportunity to give us a final argument. I'm
going to give Mr. King another two minutes to finish questioning you, and
then we'll start final argument. MR. KENT: Can we take a real quick break?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Pardon me? I think we can if we're willing to go beyond
5:00 o'clock to whatever break it is. I'm prepared to stay here until 5:30 or so,
is that okay? MR. VELLIS: Yeah. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have any more
questions? MR. VELLIS: Do you want to finish your cross-examination, or are
you done? MR. KING: I'm probably done. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Let's take a
quick break. Let's come back at 20 minutes to 5:00, and we'll go until 5:15 with
Iinal argument. (Recess taken.) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Back on the record. The
time is now 4:40. I'd like to now provide both sides 15 minutes Ior Iinal
argument.
Further, Couglhin was not aIIorded an opportunity to cross-examine
himselI. So, the SBN was aIIorded two diIIerent 15 minutes segments in which to
ask questions oI Coughlin under oath (in the SBN's calling Coughlin on direct in
its case in chieI, and in the SBN being aIIorded the opportunity to cross-examine
Coughlin Iollowing Coughlin's direct examination oI himselI upon calling himselI
in his own case in chieI.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 301:8) 'MR. KING: -- explain why he didn't
avail himself of Rule 117. We have encouraged him up the ying-yang to get
treatment, taking aavantage of that rule --
What King really means there is he and the OBC continually sought to
leverage seeking permanent disbarment oI Coughlin via a SCR 105 Complaint and
FH Ior alleged RPC violations and a SCR 111(6) conviction both Clark and King
admit are insuIIicient to support such a request in order to Iorce Couglin into
'agreeing to a joint SCR 117 Petition. They enlisted Coe Swobe in the scheme,
too, just like WLS's Elcano did in having Swobe call up Coughlin and his Iamily
(including his Iather) on several occasions between April 2009 and the present
(including a 4/27/09 email Irom Elcano simply indicating: 'Zach, Call Coe.).
Bar Counsel continually leveraged the threat oI disbarment via a SCR 105
Complaint to Iorce Coughlin into a joint SCR 117 Petition to achieve their avowed
and expressly stated goal oI shiIting the burden oI prooI onto Coughlin (where any
reinstatement Coughlin would later seek ('aIter three or Iour years, suggested
King...even though, Ior Laub/SCR 123 comparision purposes, a Vegas attorney
convicted in a sting operation involving his knowingly engaging in electronic
communications oI a sexual nature with someone he believe to be a 15 year old
girl, and then arranging to and going to meet with her, received only a 6 month
suspension).
Coughlin's 11/30/11 'MOTION TO VACATA AND OR SET ASIDE
AND OR MOTION TO STAY/MOTION FOR SANCTIONS Iiling in RJC
Rev2011-1708 reads:
'http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/viewdocumentsandIorms/Iunc-
startdown/5158/ That is a link to the Nevada Supreme Court's website's "Landlord
Tenant Handbook". It spells out the prohibition on the use oI summary eviction
proceedings against commercials tenants where an eviction is not based on the non
payment oI rent. In this case, REV2011-001708, HIll and Baker made very clear
they were not alleging any rent was owed, and the No Cause Eviction Notice made
that clear as well. It is not up to the court to plead Ior Baker and Hill what JCRCP
11 prevents them Irom pleading themselves. As such, the Summary Eviction
ORder in this matter is void Ior lack oI jurisdiction, under JCRCP 59 and 60, ans
possession oI the premises should be restored to Coughlin immediately, and
damages Ior thsi wronIul eviction should be awarded to Coughlin, Iurther, that
SchiII case in the Nevada Supreme Court (seaIood distributor, wrongIull eviction,
value oI the business as damages, punitives, $300K, etc...may prove rather
instructive). The Lease Agreement anticipates and allows such a commercial use,
and to whatever extent the law practice doesn't cut it, the mattress business does.
Furhter, a Howard Patrick Jackson has recently alleged that the "owner oI the
house" was giving away a mattress Irom the house, a Ioam mattress.
Anyways, the "Landlord Tenant Handbook" linked to above contains the
Iollowing: (Page 2) "LANDLORD-TENANT M EVICTIONS Table oI Contents
Overview oI the Eviction Process:
(Landlord) Choosing Whether to File A Summary Or "Formal" Eviction
Action ...... 3
How to File A: Summary Eviction Action .. 6 "Formal" Eviction Action ........ 9"
Maybe some "inIormed consent" time Ior the neurosurgeon landlord would have
been a good idea to prevent this "wrong site legal surgery" which excised the
patent attorney (who is really more oI a gp trying to pay the bills type attorney)
our oI his home law oIIice/mattress business. And the neurosurgeon actually
reIerred to the tenant as "malignant", and "nettlesome" to boot.
The "Handbook" (and the Las Vegas Justice Court's website) goes on to say:
"Choosing Whether to File A Summary or "Formal" Eviction Action In most
cases, the landlord can choose whether to Iile a summary or Iormal eviction action.
However, there are circumstances under which summary eviction cannot be
used. For instance, summary eviction is not available Ior:
2) Eviction oI commercial tenants Ior other than nonpayment oI rent (page 3)(See
NRS 40.254)
3) Eviction oI a tenant oI a mobile home park Irom the park (See NRS 40.253(10)
and NRS Chapter 118B) The beneIits oI summary eviction are:
2. You are likely to get the tenant out oI your property in a shorter time period
than with the
Iormal eviction process. The drawbacks to summary eviction are:
separate action);
2. II there is a genuine dispute over material Iacts, the court must dismiss the
action (although you can re-Iile a Iormal eviction action); and
3. The tenant may be able to Iile an appeal, and remain in the unit until the appeal
is heard by posting a bond with the court that may be cheaper than that required in
the Iormal eviction process."
I kind oI got the best oI all world's, the RJC kept my $2,275, then made a "money
judgment" to the Landlord out oI it (lucky me, I got to put in a 40 hour unpaid
work week getting that set aside, all while being locked out oI my oIIice and home
and having an unlawIul rent distraint thrown at me and my clients), then, instead
oI getting to pay the customary $250 Ior a stay oI execution Io the Summary
Eviction Order, the court decided to make my NRS 40.385 bond be about 10 times
that amount), and on top oI that, still DID NOT GRANT ME A STAYO THEN
THE COURT DENIED A MOTION TO HAVE THE TRANSCRIPTION DONE
AT PUBLICE EPPENSE, CITING THE (Page 4) FACT THAT THE COURT
FINALLY GAVE ME BACK THE $2,275 RENT ESCROW DEPOSIT IT
INSISTED UPON, IN CONTRAVENTION OF NRS 40.253(6), EVEN
THOUGH THE COURT WAS INFORMED WHEN IT TOOK THAT $2,275
THAT IS WAS PRETTY MUCH ALL THE MONEY I HAD IN THE WORLD,
FINALLY THE COURT BASED ITS DENIAL OF THE PUBLIC EPPENSE
TRANSCRIPT MOTION ON THE IDEA THAT THE TRANSCRIPTION OF
THE 5 HOURS OF "TRIAL"/SUMMARY EVICTION PROCEEDING COULD
BE PAID FOR OUT OF THE $2,275, DESPITE THE COURT'S
TRANSCRIBER LIST YIELDING ESTIMATES OF $1,000 FOR THE
TRANSCRIPTION (WHICH WOULD AMOUNT TO ABOUT $80 AN HOUR
GIVEN THE TYPICAL 2.5 WORK HOURS TO TRANSCRIBE FOR HOUR OF
COURT PROCEEDINGS THAT IS THE INDUSTRY STANDARD).
I am taking a page out oI the Richard G. Hill/Casey Baker, Esq. playbook
(please see the attached Iaxed letter to Judge CliIton Irom Casey Baker requesting
and "emergency" inspection, replete with Iactual inaccuracies about reIusal to
allow "inspection", etc., etc...Why Baker chose Judge CliIton to write to is not
clear, or why Baker and Hill Ieel so at home in the RJC, what with the Iax requests
to get orders Ior emergency inspectiosn oI law oIIices, is similarly a mystery to
me. I am writing to inquire whether any hearing is, has, or will be set in relation to
my Motion to Return Personal Property and Contest Landlord's Lien. The NV S.
Ct. Iorm and, perhaps, NRS requires a hearing within 10 days oI the Iiling oI that
Motion. It is an extremely exigent situation, my law practice equipment,
equipment incident to my other business, and my client's Iiles are being withheld
Irom me, much to the peril oI the legal proIession's reputation and with great
prejudice potentially to my clients. Further, Irom what I have gleaned Irom NRS
and Nevada Law, a Summary Eviction Proceeding that is not based on the non-
payment oI rent, is impermissible Ior a tenant under a commercial lease. My Lease
Agreement allowed Ior my using the property Ior a variety oI purposes, (Page 5)
including commercial purposes, and Ior the property, I had multiple commercials
uses. Not only did I have a law practice at the property, I also ran another business
at 121 River Rock St. and, apparently, some oI the inventory is being given away
by the owner oI the real property or his agents, allegedly.
Regardless, in Nevada, the law provides that there are summary eviction
processes Ior the Iailure to pay rent and nonmonetary tenant deIault when
commercial leases are at issue. A review oI the Lease Agreement on Iile with the
Court in this matter and my pleadings, wherein a commercial use oI the premises
is clearly alleged and supported by evidence, when combined with the Iact that a
No Cause Notice oI Eviction is the only basis Ior Rev2011-001708, and opposing
counsel indicated on numerous occasions that "no back rent is alleged due or
sought", certainly would seem to auger towards vacating the Summary Eviction
Order and, perhaps, some damages owed to me.
Further "This sentence states that your landlord has renewed the lease. II
your lease expired, but the landlord accepted rent or entered into a new agreement
aIter it expired, then your lease may have been renewed or extended as a matter oI
law. II you checked Number 7, Iill in the date." Certainly, the Lease Agreement
did not call Ior an 18 month lease, as such, I argue that the Lease was not
terminated or expired, and that the Landlord's conduct, and perhaps, the language
in the lease, renewed the lease or augers towards a Iinding that the lease was till in
eIIect, ie, not terminated or expired. II Iact, in the No Caucse notice, Mr. Baker or
Nevada Legal Services, or whoever Iilled out the Iorm, seems to have scratched
out the word "expired" Iorm the Iorm....Why Mr. Hill's Law OIIice chose to use
Iorms Irom the Nevada Supreme Court's website that indicate they are Ior
"apartments" in not quite clear, nor is Mr. Baker's admonishing Mr. Coughlin in
open court during the hearings Ior Coughlin's Iiling a Tenant's Answer/AIIidavit
and other pleadings that Coughlin himselI constructed, (Page 6) rather than using
"Iorms". Mr. Baker actually chastised Mr. Coughlin in open Court Ior Coughlin's
Iailin got to use a Iorm (much less the wrong "Iorm" as Mr. Baker and Mr. Hill
appear to have done in seeking to Iile a No Cause Summary Eviction Proceeding
against a commercial tennant, under a Lease Agreement that allows Ior such a
commercial use, where no Iailure to pay rent or other breach oI the lease was
alleged, pled, or subsequently argued beIore the court, and where no non-monetary
deIault by the Tenant was alleged either. As such, a Summary Eviction Proceeding
was impermissible here, to say nothing oI the rent escrow the undersigned was
Iorced to deposit. JCRCP 59 and 60 allow my Iiling this Motion to Vacata, and
JCRCP 83 prevents the RJC Irom, in Judge SFerrazza's words, having a rule
preventing tenants Irom Iiling more than one Motion to Vacate, like JCRLV has.
I am not attempting to delay the proceedings by Iiling this motion, nor am I
Iiling it Ior Irivolous reasons.My rent is not subsidized by a Public Housing
Authority. 15. I also request that the Court Stay the pending eviction until a
decision is made on the Motion to Vacate.I believe in good Iaith that I have a
meritorious deIense to the eviction, namely: I am not sure I was "served" an
Eviction Order, or that such service was appropriately made, nor that "receipt" oI
any such Order was made or shown or that days Irom mailing under NRCP are not
required, non judicial days, that is, and as such, any lockout occuring on
November 1, 2011, would have come beIore the allotted and required time Ior
mailing in the abscence oI personal service or "receipt" oI any Summary Eviction
ORder. JCRRT 2 makes inapplicable to landlrod tenant matters all oI the JCRRT,
as such, I believe the time, manner, and service rules in NRCP apply, ie, non
judicial 3 days Ior mailing, etc...
49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant 855 ; 855. Attorney's fees ; West's Key
Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant 291(14), 310(1)
(1) In General
(d) Landlord's Right to Damages
A "prevailing party" is one in whose Iavor the decision or verdict is rendered and
the judgment entered.|1|
A party who prevails on a summary-eviction claim is not entitled to an award
oI attorney's Iees where there is neither contractual nor statutory authority Ior an
award.|2| In a number oI jurisdictions, statutes provide that the prevailing party is
entitled to attorney's Iees in evictions or summary-possessory actions.|5| An
award oI attorney's Iees is also appropriate where there has been a willIul breach
oI contract and where a lessor is Iorced to take legal action against its lessee to
recover possession when the lessee improperly holds the lease over aIter
termination.|6|
Both the landlord and the tenant are "prevailing parties," Ior the purposes oI a
statute that provides Ior an award oI attorney's Iees to the prevailing party, where
the trial court Iinds Ior the tenant on the landlord's ejectment claim and Ior the
landlord on the tenant's retaliation claim.|7| Similarly, a trial court may award Iees
to both parties where the landlord received a judgment Ior possession but the
tenant prevailed in part by obtaining a reduction in the amount oI a utility bill due
the landlord.|8| However, courts have denied attorney's Iees
1.where the landlord cancels the lease and brings an action under the unlawIul-
detainer statutes, notwithstanding that the lease provided Ior the recovery oI Iees.
|9|
2.where the parties entered into a settlement agreement with the trial court's
assistance.| 10|
|FN1| Keal v. Day, 164 Ohio App. 3d 21, 2005-Ohio-5551, 840 N.E.2d 1139
(1st Dist. Hamilton County 2005).
|FN2| Hamilton v. William Calomiris Inv. Corp., Inc., 461 A.2d 466 (D.C. 1983);
Satellite Gateway Communications, Inc. v. Musi Dining Car Co., Inc., 110 N.J.
280, 540 A.2d 1267 (1988); H-T Enterprises v. Antelope Creek Bison Ranch,
2005 ND 71, 694 N.W.2d 691 (N.D. 2005); City oI Gahanna v. Eastgate
Properties, Inc., 36 Ohio St. 3d 65, 521 N.E.2d 814 (1988).
|FN3| TuIco, Inc. v. PaciIic Environmental Corp., 113 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2005);
North Associates v. Bell, 184 Cal. App. 3d 860, 229 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1st Dist.
1986); Integra Financial, Inc. v. Grynberg Petroleum Co., 74 P.3d 347 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2002) (recognizing the rule); Hardwick, Cook & Co. v. 3379 Peachtree, Ltd.,
184 Ga. App. 822, 363 S.E.2d 31 (1987); Shipka v. Inserra, 211 Ill. App. 3d 735,
156 Ill. Dec. 128, 570 N.E.2d 604 (1st Dist. 1991); Borne v. Wilander, 509 So. 2d
572 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987); Bay Park One Co. v. Crosby, 109 Misc. 2d 47,
442 N.Y.S.2d 837 (App. Term 1981); Keal v. Day, 164 Ohio App. 3d 21, 2005-
Ohio-5551, 840 N.E.2d 1139 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 2005); Desmarais v. The
Stayers, Inc., 182 Or. App. 338, 51 P.3d 1 (2002); M H 2 Co. v. Hwang, 104
Wash. App. 680, 16 P.3d 1272 (Div. 3 2001).
|FN4| Camelback Plaza Development, L.C. v. Hard Rock CaIe Intern. (Phoenix),
Inc., 200 Ariz. 206, 25 P.3d 8 (Ct. App. Div. 1 2001).
|FN5| Stokus v. Marsh, 217 Cal. App. 3d 647, 266 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1st Dist. 1990);
Integra Financial, Inc. v. Grynberg Petroleum Co., 74 P.3d 347 (Colo. Ct. App.
2002); Matusko v. Gourlay, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 966, 560 N.E.2d 724 (1990);
T.W.I.W., Inc. v. Rhudy, 96 N.M. 354, 630 P.2d 753 (1981); Haberman v.
Wassberg, 131 A.D.2d 331, 516 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1st Dep't 1987); IwenoIu v.
Consolidated Management, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 3d 33, 550 N.E.2d 505 (8th Dist.
Cuyahoga County 1988); OakleaI Mobile Home Park v. Mancilla, 189 Or. App.
458, 75 P.3d 908 (2003), review denied, 336 Or. 376, 84 P.3d 1080 (2004);
Phillips v. Hardwick, 29 Wash. App. 382, 628 P.2d 506 (Div. 1 1981).
|FN6| Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc., 210 W. Va. 200, 557 S.E.2d 254
(2001).
|FN7| Barlow Trail Mobile Home Park v. Dunham, 189 Or. App. 513, 76 P.3d
1146 (2003).
|FN8| Chang v. Louis & Alexander, Inc., 645 A.2d 1110 (D.C. 1994) (the lease
entitled the prevailing party to recovery oI any and all reasonable expenses in the
event
oI any breach or threatened breach.) |FN9| Lincoln Financial Corp. v. Ferrier,
567 P.2d 1102 (Utah 1977). |FN10| Boxer Max Corp. v. Cane A. Sucre, Inc., 905
So. 2d 916 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
3d Dist. 2005) (court had awarded $1,800 in damages).
|FN11| Housing Authority oI City oI Pasco and Franklin County v.
Pleasant, 126 Wash. App. 382, 109 P.3d 422 (Div. 3 2005). |FN12| OakleaI
Mobile Home Park v. Mancilla, 189 Or. App. 458, 75 P.3d 908 (2003)
, review denied, 336 Or. 376, 84 P.3d 1080 (2004).
|FN13| OakleaI Mobile Home Park v. Mancilla, 189 Or. App. 458, 75 P.3d
908 (2003) , review denied, 336 Or. 376, 84 P.3d 1080 (2004). |FN14|
Shipley v. Major, 44 A.2d 540 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1945) (the lease
provides
Ior the tenant's payment oI attorney's Iees in the event oI the
tenant's deIault). |FN15| Dawson v. Temanson, 107 P.3d 892
(Alaska 2005).
1681. Attorney's fees; 52B C.1.S. Landlord & Tenant 1681 An outcome
not substantially Iavorable to either side precludes awarding attorney's Iees to
either side.|7|
Consideration oI an attorney's Iees award may be deemed inappropriate by the
nature oI a summary possessory proceeding that is designed to achieve expedited
results, particularly in the Iace oI complex Iactual inquiries needed to resolve the
Iee matter.|8| (NOTE: page 37 oI 7 31 12 NRCP60(b)(4) Set Aside Motion by
Coughlin)
Basis of litigation on lease is determinative
The relieI awarded is not determinative oI whether Iees are proper, as the
question turns on whether the summary proceedings involve a breach oI the
lease, under the applicable statute.
N.Y.Jerulee Co. v. Sanchez, 43 A.D.3d 328, 841 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1st Dep't
2007).
|FN6| N.Y.Fragiacomo v. Pugliese, 11 Misc. 3d 96, 816 N.Y.S.2d 826
(App. Term 2006).
Requires prevailing judgment on merits
N.Y.Acierno v. Faldich, 4 Misc. 3d 98, 782 N.Y.S.2d 509 (App. Term
2004).
|FN7| N.Y. 339-347 E. 12th St. LLC v. Ling, 31 Misc. 3d 48, 921
N.Y.S.2d 781 (App. Term 2011). |FN8| Md.Law OIIices oI Taiwo
Agbaje, P.C. v. JLH Properties, II, LLC, 169 Md.
App. 355, 901 A.2d 249 (2006). |FN9| N.Y.Stakser v. Rodriquez, 23
Misc. 2d 954, 200 N.Y.S.2d 475 (App. Term
1960).
No statute for fees in summary eviction
N.D.H-T Enterprises v. Antelope Creek Bison Ranch, 2005 ND 71, 694 N.W.2d
691
(N.D. 2005).
|FN3| Cal.Carter v. Cohen, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1038, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303 (2d
Dist. 2010).
Dist. 2010).
Conn. Carabetta Management Co. v. Martin, 50 Conn. L. Rptr. 801, 2010 WL
3194740 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2010) (Iees to prevailing tenant).
Win on technicality is not prevailing
N.Y. Beach Haven Apartments No. 1 Inc. v. Cheseborough, 2 Misc. 3d 33, 773
N.Y.S.2d 775 (App. Term 2003)
No statute for fees in summary eviction
N.D.H-T Enterprises v. Antelope Creek Bison Ranch, 2005 ND 71, 694 N.W.2d
691
(N.D. 2005).
Dist. 2010).
Dist. 2010).
Conn. Carabetta Management Co. v. Martin, 50 Conn. L. Rptr. 801, 2010 WL
3194740 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2010) (Iees to prevailing tenant).
Win on technicality is not prevailing
N.Y. Beach Haven Apartments No. 1 Inc. v. Cheseborough, 2 Misc. 3d 33, 773
N.Y.S.2d 775 (App. Term 2003)
LCL advertisement with Coe Swobe's name and telephone number that regularly
runs in the Nevada Lawyer: 'II you want to stop drinking... you will FIND A
WAY. II not...you will FIND AN EXCUSE. ALL COMMUNICATIONS
CONFIDENTIAL. Tell that to NVB Judge Beesley aIter considering his
quoting Coe Swobe regarding Coughlin during the 11/14/12 FDH.
Supplemental authorities may now be Iiled within 10 days, rather than 15
days, oI the date set Ior oral argument (NRAP 31(e)). Any response must be
made 'promptly.
CRoSS-APPEALS
NRAP 28.1: This new rule provides that the appellant in a cross-appeal is always
the party to Iirst Iile a notice oI appeal (NRAP 28.1(b)). Previously, the plaintiII
in the district court was always the appellant in a case involving a cross-appeal.
As previously, the Supreme Court may change the designation oI the parties by
order. This change conIorms with FRAP 28.1. The change creates a potential
incentive, in a case with a basis Ior a cross-appeal, to be the Iirst to Iile a notice
oI appeal so as to be designated the appellant. The cover color oI appellant`s
combined reply
Find some authority that allows Ior treating a Motion to Dismiss that may
have waived or Iailed to preserve certain deIense pursuant to NRCP 12(h),
assuming such is applicable under SCR 105(4), and SCR 119(3) (not that NNDB
publishes any such rules or responds to inquiries Ior the same by Coughlin).
FOR MOTION TO STRIKE RECORD ON APPEAL:
Included in (but by no means a complete recounting) oI those documents
submitted Ior Iiling by Coughlin that are curiously and dubiously missing Irom
both versions oI the ROA Iiled by the SBN in 62337 are the Iollowing:
-10/31/12 Iile name: Pre-Hearing Motion to Dismiss and Ior Summary
Judgment and Memorandum oI Law (42 pages long with Exhibit 1 in disc Iorm)
10 31 12 0204 Pre Hearing Motion to Dismiss and Ior Summary Judgement and
Memorandum oI Law (Responsive Pleading).pdI (10.4 MB)
~FW:
From: Zach Coughlin
(zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent: Sun 11/11/12 7:50 AM
To: skentskentlaw.com
(skentskentlaw.com);
miketahoelawyer.com
(miketahoelawyer.com);
nevtelassnsbcglobal.net
(nevtelassnsbcglobal.net);
patrickknvbar.org
(patrickknvbar.org);
IIlahertydlpId.com
(IIlahertydlpId.com);
davidcnvbar.org (davidcnvbar.org);
complaintsnvbar.org
(complaintsnvbar.org);
tsusichnvdetr.org (tsusichnvdetr.org);
jeeloreno.com (jeeloreno.com);
cvellisbhIs.com (cvellisbhIs.com)
3 attachments
10 31 12 0204 Pre Hearing Motion to
Dismiss and for Summary 1udgement
and Memorandum of Law (Responsive
Pleading).pdf (10.4 MB) , 10 31 12
subpoena on peters and waiver oI
service.pdI (541.5 KB) , ex x harris
silverman coughlin garin 0204 11 11
12.pdI (9.8 MB)
Nice to see my Iriend Steve back in the
game. And the SBN stipping to a
dismissal oI its SCR 116 appeal rights...
Please Iind attached the Iile stamped
versions oI the 10 31 12 subpoena duces
tecum Ior which SBN Laura Peters signed
a waiver oI service or similar
and the 10 31 12 Pre Hearing Motion to
Dismiss Summary
Judgment/Memorandum oI Law
(Response)
Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2012 11:28:12 -0700
From: silvermansilverman-decaria.com
Subject: re: FW: please Iind enclosed my
Petition under SCR 102(4)(d) and
SCR111(7)
I think this is waaaaay too complex and
detailed. Give them a procedural history
and whether there is a Iinal judgment in
the crim case and point out that your
temporary suspension is akin to a
permanent death oI your practice. Or, iI
true, say you Iucked up and/or were
Iucked up Irom lack oI drugs and you are
sorry and you now have access to your
meds and are ok. I can't think this
pleading is going to help you much...it is
too long, repetitive and does not seem to
deal with why the temp suspension is
sijmply wrong or harsh. II you can't make
your case in 3-5 pp, you can't make your
case in 35. You do seem to be a good
lawyer, however. At bottom, Steve Harris
took hundreds oI thousands oI dollars and
had no temp suspension; you stole a
candy bar (at worst). WTF.
Zach Coughlin
-11/9/12 Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss or Quash or Otherwise
Challenge Sufficiency of Service and of Process, of Complaint and Notice of
Intent to Take Default and DoWSoE; and Preserving for Appeal Objection
to All other Due Process Violations; and UNDER PROTEST...RESPONSE
TO COMPLAINT (digital Iile Iaxed and emailed to SBN was titled '11 9 12
response under protest 0204 and various motions and notices 0204 etc.pdI; 88
page document submitted Ior Iiling (index to exhibits: 1. exhibit 1: cd with
relevant materials copied via digital transmission as well) Photographs and other
evidence detailing the personal delivery oI this document and Coughlin's
presenting such Ior Iiling and Iile stamping to the SBN shortly beIore 5 pm (the
SBN had its doors locked and a sign on the Iront door indicating the Iollowing
Monday, 11/12/12, being a holiday, would see the SBN closed, to reopen on
11/13/12 (relevant to any 'less than 11 days NRCP 6 analysis given that
Monday was a non-judicial day (SCR 105(2)(c) provides Ior access 'up to within
3 days oI the Iormal hearing) on 11/9/12 were gathered and are now presented
Iollowing the ProoI oI Service to that Iiling. Even where the SBN may dispute
whether or not its doors (and thereIore the doors to the 'court and 'Iiling oIIice
(ie, the Iile stampe that apparently only SBN Clerk oI Court Peters is able to
utilize) were closer prior to 5 pm on 11/9/12, the Iailure to included or
memorialize the 88 page document Coughlin submitted Ior Iiling and the Exhibit
1 on a disc attached thereto in either oI the ROA's submitted to this Court by the
SBN is troubling, unexplained, and unjustiIiable.
Besides personally delivering the 88 page (with disc attachment) 11/9/12
Emergency Mtn...to the SBN minutes prior to 5 pm on 11/9/12, Coughlin also
Iaxed and emailed the same:
'Emergency Ex Parte Motion NG12-0204, 0434,0435
From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent: Sun 11/11/12 4:13 AM
To: (skentskentlaw.com) (skentskentlaw.com); (miketahoelawyer.com)
(miketahoelawyer.com); (nevtelassnsbcglobal.net)
(nevtelassnsbcglobal.net); (patrickknvbar.org) (patrickknvbar.org);
(IIlahertydlpId.com) (IIlahertydlpId.com); (davidcnvbar.org)
(davidcnvbar.org); (complaintsnvbar.org) (complaintsnvbar.org);
(tsusichnvdetr.org) (tsusichnvdetr.org); (jeeloreno.com) (jeeloreno.com);
(cvellisbhIs.com (cvellisbhIs.com)
Irom:
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
tel and Iax 949 667 7402
I do not consent to service or notice oI anything electronically in this proceeding,
but I do appreciate being copied on such things via email and Iax)
Emergency Ex Parte Motion NG12-0204, 0434,0435
please Iind attached 88 page Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss or Quash or
Otherwise Challenge SuIIiciency oI Service
and oI Process, oI Complaint and Notice oI Intent to Take DeIault and DoWSoE;
and Preserving Ior Appeal Objection to All other Due Process Violations; and
UNDER PROTEST...RESPONSE TO COMPLAINT
submitted Ior Iiling with the State Bar oI Nevada on November 9th, 2012
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
Zach has a Iile to share with you on SkyDrive. To view it, click the link below.
11 9 12 response under protest 0204 and various motions and notices 0204
etc.pdI
'
Coughlin submitted Ior Iiling minutes prior to 5 pm on 11/9/12 a Iiling
suIIicient to meet any non-void Order oI 11/2/12 or 11/7/12 or otherwise by the
Panel Chair in this matter, though, curiously, that 88 page Iiling (with a
voluminous attached Exhibit 1, including the submission oI a Iorm thereoI on
digital disc with vast hyperlinking and Skydrive access) is not to be Iound in
either oI the versions oI the ROA submitted Ior Iiling in 62337 by the SBN. OI
course, this is oI material relevance to the FOFCOL's Iinding and conclusion that
some purported Iailure on Coughlin's part to so comply with those Orders (which
impermissibly depart Irom NRCP 12's dictates vis a vis aIIording a party at least
10 judicial days to Iile an Answer upon such party's Motion to Dismiss being
Denied, with NRCP made applicable via SCR 119(3). It sure is curious how the
documents submitted Ior Iiling by Coughlin that are the most damaging to the
SBN and various greivant's cases, and which containing the most inIlammatory
(though, completely true) inIormation continually seem to be 'lost or otherwise
not included in the ROA by the SBN, even where, say,
11/30/12 amended MOTION FOR FURTHER RECOGNITION OF IN FORMA
PAUPERIS STATUS AND FOR PUBLICATION OF TRANSCRIPT AT BAR'S
EXPENSE OR WITHOUT PAYMENT UP FRONT OR FOR RELEASE OF
RECORDINGS AND OR ROUGH DRAFT OF DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDING AND FOR COPY OF ALL FILINGS SUBMITTED WHETHER
FILE STAMPED OR NOT AND FOR FILE STAMP TO BE APPLIED TO ALL
SUBMISSION PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE GIVEN PERMISSION TO
FILE BY FAX WAS PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED ON SEPTEMBER 11TH,
2012; and MOTION FOR MISTRAIL DUE TO SBN KING'S PATENT
DRUMMING UP OF GRIEVANCES AGAINST COUGHLIN IN AN EFFORT
TO MAKE A SPLASH AT HIS NEW JOB AND WIN POINTS WITH HIS
FELLOW PROSECUTORS BY TAKIN' OUT ONE OF THE FEW, ONE OF
THE VERY FEW TO PRACTICE WHO HAS EVER DEIGNED TO BELIEVE
THAT PUBLIC DEFENDERS AND PROSECUTORS MUST ABIDE BY THE
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT TOO (16 pages with a Disc Ior
Exhibit 1; 'index to exhibits: 1. exhibit 1: cd with relevant materials copied via
digital transmission as well Iilename Ior that copied by Iax, and email in
addition to personal delivery to SBN and NNDB: '11 30 12 0204 amended
motion Ior Iurther recognition oI iIp.pdI).
Further, the extent to which the SBN has manipulated the settings on the
scanner utilized to creat copies Ior the ROA oI the documents Coughlin submitted
Ior Iiling is now bordering on the absurdly Iraudulent. What else explains the Iact
that all the instances oI Coughlin attaching USPS Track & ConIirm printouts Ior
the various CertiIied Mailings and Receipts that became oI material relevance in
this matter. Such issues resulted in the inclusion, by the SBN, at page 216 oI the
ROA, oI such a printout, which appears to border on proIessional misconduct
where such printout was clearly placed in the SBN Iiled only aIter Coughlin's
11/8/12 'Well Would you Look at that Filing and Coughlin's 11/8/12 'Notice oI
Non-Service oI Notice oI Intent to Take DeIault oI 10/9/12 placed the SBN on
notice as to the Iact that the SBN's own error (placing an insuIIicient amount oI
postage on the 10/9/12 NOITTD, and thereaIter only mailing such Iiling via one
method (certiIied mail) prevented Coughlin Irom receiving that 10/9/11
NOITTD, which, obviously, had a material eIIect on the legitimacy oI the Notice
oI Formal Hearing and the continued holdering thereoI in consideration oI the
dictates oI SCR 105(2)(c) and the required number oI days aIIorded Coughlin
thereoI to provide suIIicient notice and time to prepare Ior his opportunity to be
heard.
cid43084638I32I5I28&pageselI&resid43084638F32F5F28214689&parid
43084638F32F5F2821121&authkey21AOivj-
WACR61EcE&BpubSDX.SkyDrive&BsrcSkyMail
DUE PROCESS VIOLATION WHERE PANEL FAILED TO GRANT
CONTINUANCE:
Commission on Lawyer Conduct abused its discretion in denying
request oI OIIice oI Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) for a continuance to obtain
and present evidence to rebut surprise evidence of lack of harm to clients
presented by attorney at hearing to determine appropriate sanction to be
imposed on him Ior his misconduct in connection with eight criminal client
matters, as mitigating testimony regarding ultimate outcome oI clients' cases
touched on more substantive matters than the usual mitigation testimony
regarding an attorney's character and personal situation, such that it should have
been considered in conjunction with rebuttal evidence showing actual harm to
clients. In re Sturkey, 376 S.C. 286, 657 S.E.2d 465 (2008).
The SBN's 8/23/12 Complaint reads:
'6. During the trial (in 22176 beIore RMC Judge Howard) Respondent's
conduct was so disruptive that Judge Howard Iound Respondent in direct
contempt of Court and sentenced him to serve three (3) days in See
Exhibit 2...
27. In light of the forgoing Respondent violated RPC 1.1 (Competence);
RPC 1.2 (Diligence); RPC 3. 1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions): RPC
3.3 (Candor to the Tribunal): RPC 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and
Counsel); RPC 3.5 (Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal); RPC 4. 1
(TruthIulness in Statements to Others): RPC 4.4 (Respect Ior the Rights oI
Third Persons); RPC 5A (sic) (Relations with Opposing Counsel); RPC 8.1
(Disciplinary Matters); RPC 8.2 (1udicial and Legal Officials); and RPC
8.4 (Misconduct).
Bar Counsel King's Complaint, in alleging an unenumerated number oI
violations oI 12 diIIerent RPC's (and, to whatever extent the various subsections oI
those RPC's is considered to evoke a diIIerent allegation, one may arguably bring
that count up 15 aifferent RPC's considering that King's Complaint at para. 16
therein quotes Irom the 3/12/12 Order by Judge Holmes that misstates the
subsection number oI RPC 3.4 to which the language theraIter quoted is Irom
(3.4(c) versus 3.4(e); and Iurther, that quote alleges a violation oI RPC 3.2
(though, arguably, King's para 27 in his 8/23/12 Complaint should estop him Irom
asserting such an allegations and the 12/14/12 FOFCOL Iails to identiIy RPC 3.2
(Expediting Litigation) as an allegation to which it attach its trier oI Iact role,
thereby supporting the position that such quoting oI that 3/12/12 Order by Judge
Holmes in King's Complaint is not tantamount to putting Coughlin on notice that
such is being plead, but rather, that Coughlin is entitled to rely upon those
allegations speciIically set Iorth in para. 27 oI King's Complaint (though the lack
oI any identiIcation oI which subsections oI each RPC cited therein is supportive
oI Coughlin's contentions within his Motion's to Dismiss, which arguably may be
viewed to be tantamount to a Motion Ior More DeIinite Statement); Iurther,
whereas both the quotation Irom Judge Holmes Order (FHE5) at para 16 oI King's
Complaint and para 27 therein invoke RPC 1.2 (Diligence), Coughlin was
Iurther prejudiced by being Iorced to prepare Ior and deIend against allegations oI
violating both RPC 1.2 and 1.3 (RPC 1.2 is 'Scope oI Representation and
Allocation oI Authority Between Client and Lawyer, and RPC 1.3 is
'Diligence), and King's own FHE1 contains the entire text oI RPC 1.2 and Iails to
contain any oI RPC 1.3, whereas the FOFCOL continues on with King and Judge
Holmes mismatching RPC 1.2 by Iailing to identiIy such correctly, where the
FOFCOL reads: '(2) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 1.2 (Diligence).
Chairman Susich's 7/27/12 written correspondence to Coughlin and the
response Irom Panel Chair Echeverria upon Coughlin seeking a Pre-Hearing
ConIerence such as that expressed in SCR 111(6) ('SCR 111(6).Prehearing
conIerence.At the discretion of the chair, a prehearing conference may be
ordered for the purpose of obtaining admissions or otherwise narrowing the
issues presented by the pleadings. The conIerence may be held beIore the chair
or the chair`s designee.)
'Subject: RE: reIerral to Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board
From: Tom Susich (tsusichnvdetr.org) Sent: Fri 7/27/12
8:58 AM To: 'Zach Coughlin' (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Cc: 'PatrickKnvbar.org' (PatrickKnvbar.org)
Dear M. Coughlin: I am in receipt oI your request Ior a
hearing beIore the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board. I
have Iorwarded your request to the Nevada State Bar's
Northern OIIice Ior processing. Please communicate
directly with the State Bar concerning your case. They are
the ones who will process your request and set up any
appropriate hearings. If you have questions you can contact
Pat King, the Northern Nevada Bar Counsel. Sincerely, J.
Thomas Susich, Esq.
Further, upon Coughlin Iollowing Bar Counsel King's direction on 11/2/12
and placing a call to Chair Echeverria seeking such a SCR 111(6) Pre-Hearing
ConIerence and to inquire regarding other issues, Coughlin rebuIIed by
Echeverria's OIIice and told not to communicate with them in an 11/2/12
voicemail. So, Bar Counsel King necessarily was able to achieve an
impermissible advantage by taking his 'kitchen sink pleading approach to the
rather slapdash craIting oI his 8/23/12 Complaint (the paragraph numbering
therein skips Irom 19 to 25, para 27 mentions a non-existent RPC ('RPC 5A);
and that is to say nothing oI all the prejudicial, irrelevant, unsupported, material
contained in Bar Counsel's DowSoE, including mentions oI the SBN's Custodian
oI Records where Coughlin had no disciplinary history whatsoever, mentions oI
Competency Evaluations (and really, the entire 11/14/12 FH seemed to suIIer
Irom an identity crisis, believing itselI to be an SCR 117 Hearing, though such
was not noticed, with RPC 1.1 being mistaken as a stand in Ior an SCR 117
analysis, with all oI the Bar's Iour witnesses oIIering testimony that clearly
conIuses the two, with little help Irom King in making the distinction given the
imprecise questions asked, and where, in some instances, King's own questions
were phrased in a manner that clearly invoked an SCR 117 analysis to the
exclusion oI any RPC 1.1 inquiry. This 'kitchen sink pleading style
prosecutorial largesse must not stand, and itselI evidences a disregard Ior RPC
3.1 and 3.8, 8.1. Indeed, RPC 8.1 applies to Bar Counsel's condut as well where
it reads:
'Rule8.1.Bar Admission and Disciplinary
Matters.... a lawyer in connection with ... a disciplinary
matter, shall not: (a)Knowingly make a Ialse statement oI
material Iact; or (b)Fail to disclose a fact necessary to
correct a misapprehension known by the person to have
arisen in the matter...
How it is King could possibly be said to have not violated those portions
RPC 8.1 himselI, particularly with regard to his asserting that FHE3 was a
certiIied copy when it was not, his oIIering the very 8/23/12 AIIidavit oI Mailing
that he knows Clerk oI Court Peters communicated to Coughlin would never be
held out as eIIecting service under SCR 109 given Peters express indications to
Coughlin on 9/11/12; that Peters would mail out another certiIied mailing oI the
Complaint on 9/12/12, that no Notice oI Intent to take DeIault would be sent until
such second certiIied mailing oI the 8/23/12 Complaint was returned to sender
unclaimed (and that such a NOITTD as a mandatory part oI the procedures
attendant to any deIault being entered), that Coughlin would not be required to
pay subpoena Iees in light oI his indigency (where Peters held herselI out as
having the authority to communicate such pronouncements and procedural rules
to Coughlin, and Coughlin reasonably relied thereupon
i
); and where King Iailed
to own up to the Iact that the 10/9/12 NOITPDB was not 'served on Coughlin,
as King, Clerk oI Court Peters, and the SBNs own negligence in placing
insuIIicient postage on that Iiling (and the CertiIicate oI Service by Mail attached
thereto 'certiIies was 'deposited postage fully pre-paid by certifiea mail,
addressed to...), which was sent via only one method (despite Coughlin's
numerous requests that the SBN copy him on such by Iax and or email, and the
legitimate rationale Coughlin proIerred in support oI such a request), especially
where King continued to hold out the . his Iailing to disclose to the Panel the
express pronouncement oI NNDB Susich's ruling (by way oI ChieI Bar Counsel
Clark in light oI Susich's 7/27/12 email and the various tactics by Bar
Counsel/NNDB/Panel to dissuade Coughlin Irom accessing the procedural
protections aIIorded him under the law in such matters) under SCR 110, assisting
Panel Chair Echeverria and other Panel Members in violating the law incident to
Echeverria's Iailing to Iollow SCR 110(3),(4):
'...3.Attachment of person for failure to obey subpoena
or produce documents.Whenever any person subpoenaed
to appear and give testimony or to produce books, papers, or
other documents as required by subpoena, or requested to
provide documents pursuant to Rule 78.5(1)(b), reIuses to
appear or testiIy beIore a hearing panel, or to answer any
pertinent or proper questions, or to provide the requested
documents, that person shall be deemed in contempt oI the
disciplinary board, and the chair oI the disciplinary board
shall report the Iact to a district judge oI the county in which
the hearing is being held or the investigation conducted. The
district court shall promptly issue an attachment in the Iorm
usual in the court, directed to the sheriII oI the county,
commanding the sheriII to attach such person and bring such
person Iorthwith beIore the court. On the return oI the
attachment, and the production oI the person attached, the
district court shall have jurisdiction oI the matter; and the
person charged may purge himselI or herselI oI the contempt
in the same way, and the same proceedings shall be had, and
the same penalties may be imposed, and the same punishment
inIlicted as in the case oI a witness subpoenaed to appear and
give evidence on the trial oI a civil cause beIore a district
court oI the State oI Nevada.
4.Contest of subpoena.A contest oI a subpoena shall
be heard and determined by the chair oI the appropriate
disciplinary board.
And how is it the very same arguments and citations that Chair Echeverria
relied on in granting King's two 11/2/12 Motions to Quash Coughlin's Subpoenas
(such Order is void under NRCP 60(b)(4) Ior lack oI jurisdiction where NNDB
Chair Susich has jurisdiction under SCR 111(4) to hear such 'contest oI a
subpoena.
Lehman v. State,727 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex.App. Houston |1st Dist.|
1987), aII'd,792 S.W.2d 82 (Tex.Crim.App.1990): 'A prosecutor is not Iree to put
unIounded allegations in an indictment in the hope that a plenitude oI accusations
will make the deIendant look like a criminal. Rule 3.09 oI the Texas Disciplinary
Rules oI ProIessional Conduct require |sic| him to "reIrain Irom prosecuting or
threatening to prosecute a charge that |he| knows is not supported by probable
cause." See Nevada RPC 3.8.
The 12/14/12 FOFCOL reads: 'August 23, 2012).
4. Coughlin's c onduct during the trial oI the petit larceny case
(22716) on November 30, 2011, in which Coughlin appeared in propria persona,
was so disruptive that Judge Howard Iound Coughlin in direct contempt oI court
and sentenced him to jail that same day to be released on December 3, 2011 at
8:00 PM. 1udge Howard specifically found Coughlin's conduct to be
disorderly and was either contemptuous or behavior insolent toward the
judge in that Coughlin reIused:
"... to obey directives oI the Judge, continuing lines oI inquiry aIter
being advised by the Court to reIrain Irom doing so; demeaning the
Court with statements such as "WOW" in response to court rulings;
laughing during testimony and Iurther questioning the court and its
authority."
See Hearing Exhibit 11 ORDER FOR SUMMARY PUNISHMENT OF
OF THE COURT, November 30, 2011 (NOTE: that OSPCCIVPC was attachd as
Exhibit 2 to the 8/23/12 Complaint, though that Complaint lacks any oI the
language this Court relied upon Irom the Mirch Complaint in 49212, suIIicient to
Iind that the 8/23/12 Complaint by King IulIilled the requirements oI SCR 105(2)
(c) as to any alleged RPC violation by Coughlin incident to RMC Judge Howard's
11/30/12 OSPCCIVPC, particularly where such Complaint Iailed to quote any
speciIic language Irom that Order, while, as to other Orders at issue in this matter
(such as the 4/13/09 OAT in 01168), the 8/23/12 did, in Iact, speciIically quote
langauge thereIrom therein.
Laub allows Ior pointing to SBN Bar Counsel Clark's Reply BrieI in 49212
at page 7: "Respondent's Iirst issue is that the State Bar Iailed to give Respondent
clear notice of the conduct which constituted a violation oI SCR 170, the
Complaint simply incorporating the Findings and Order ... the Complaint is
"clear and specific" in that it alleges that Respondent violated SCR 170
(Meritorious claims and contentions)"...(page 7, line 20-23): "Further, the
Complaint notifies Respondent that the State Bar is adopting and
incorporating the factual and legal findings made ... in his Order... in that
case".
Further, another salient diIIerence distinguishing this matter even Iurther is
that, in 49212, the Respondent was accused oI violating one RPC (RPC 3.1), and
the Complaint therein speciIically attached the rule alleged violated to the speciIic
'Iactual and legal Iindings that such Complaint actually ana expressly indicated
it was 'adopting and incorporating. Additionally, that 11/30/11 OSPC here is a
scant one and halI pages oI 'check the box style jurisprudence, that Iailed to
identiIy anything more that a handwritten 'see Court record in the blank lines
the Iorm Order provided in Ior a response to the Iollowing: 'The Contemnor,
when asked iI he had anythign to say as to why sentence should not be
pronounce, replied: see Court Record. Actually, Coughlin made an elegant,
respectIul, and thoughIul plea to Judge Howard at such time, Iocusing mostly on
Coughlin's desire to obtain at least a minor stay oI the imposition oI such
summary punishment to aIIord Coughlin a legitimate opprotunity to arrange Ior
the avoidance oI any prejudice to Coughlin's client's aIIairs due to such rather
unexpected summary incarceration, particularly where Judge Howard has
previously justiIied his Iailure to accord Coughlin court appointed counsel,
despite Coughlin's submitting a sworn Declaration oI Indigency and Application
Ior Counsel in a timely Iashion which attested that Coughlin's income levels
were, per se, low enough to qualiIy Ior such appointed counsel, pursuant to this
Court's Indigent DeIense Order oI 2008.
Additionally, it is oI note that the 11/30/11 OSPC identiIies Coughlin as
Iollows: 'WHEREAS, on the 30
th
day oI November, 2011, the above named
deIendant appeared beIore this court. NAME: ZACHERY (sic) COUGHLIN,
who is a DEFENDANT. As such, Judge Howard speciIically and expressly
ruled that his OSPC applied to Coughlin as a aefenaant rather than in any
proIessional capacity invoking the RPC, or as an attorney whom had never tried a
single criminal case or even worked on one Iorced to selI represent in a petty
larceny prosecution, especially where even a single continuance was granted to
such deIendant and where a multitude oI ancillary consideration augered strongly
to granting such, including the application oI an unlawIul rent distraint by Hill as
to exculpatory materials (like the receipt Ior the $83.82 worth oI groceries
Coughlin purchased immediately beIore Wal-Mart's Loss Prevention Associate
asked Coughlin iI he could ask him some question (ie, as testiIied to under oath
by that Associate and both RSIC OIIicers, there was no 'citizen's arrest
conducted upon Coughlin, and, thereIore, the RSIC violated NRS 171.1255 in
subjecting Coughlin to a custodial arrest and search incident thereto in connection
with an alleged misdemeanor violation). Such receipt, as later shown in 60838,
clearly established that the UPC Ior the Duract Cough Melts Coughlin is accused
oI having ingested lethal levals oI (containing Dextromethorphan, a potent
dissociative at such levels) was, in Iact, included on that receipt, thereby
expressly contradicting the express testimony by both Wal-Mart's AP Associate
and the RSIC OIIicers):
Further, Hill's application oI such a unlawIul rent distraint makes RMC
Judge Howard's reIusal to grant a continuance reversible error (and indicative oI a
patent lack oI due process incident to that proceeding suIIicient to invoke
Claiborne, and, by analogy, SCR 114 and 37 CFR 11.25(c)) videos and audio
withheld by Hill (revealing an express threat to abuse process by Wal-Mart's AP
StaII made to Coughlin on 7/10/11 incident to Coughlin's involvement in the
production oI a documentary Iilm detailing the extent to which mega-retailer
Wal-Mart has been able to establish a near monopoly in its market segment, in
large part, due to the application oI an extremely liberal Return Policy, which
Wal-Mart's personnel and managers convieniently seem to 'Iorget or 'get
conIused about in those instances where it would be advantageous Ior them to do
so (ie, large ticket items, etc.) incident to a then stale eviction order where the
lockout was conducted too early in light oI the 'within 24 hours requirement oI
NRS 40.253 (which, every County in Nevada other than Washoe, it seems, it
interpreted to mean the SheriII or Constable must post the 24 hour lock-out Order
on the tenant's door, and return to eIIectuate the lockout no Iewer than 24 hours
later., Canon 2.15, or otherwise (indeed, the RMC Iailed to even report the petty
larceny conviction or the 11/30/11 OSPC to the SBN).
While Nevada is a notice-pleading state and pleadings should be liberally
construed to allow issues that are Iairly noticed to the adverse party, a party is
entitled to rely upon a demonstrated narrowing oI the allegations and issues in
dispute where, as here, the Complaint does just that. Langevin v. York, 111 Nev.
1481, 1483, 907 P.2d 981, 982 (1995); Nevada State Bank v. Jamison Family
Partnership, 106 Nev. 792, 801, 801 P.2d 1377, 1383 (1990). T
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/ :TABLE OF TITLES AND CHAPTERS;
NEVADA REVISED STATUTES; TITLE 2CIVIL PRACTICE; CHAPTER
22 - CONTEMPTS
'NRS22.030Summary punishment oI contempt committed in
immediate view and presence oI court; aIIidavit or statement to be Iiled
when contempt committed outside immediate view and presence oI court;
disqualiIication oI judge.
1.II a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence oI
the court or judge at chambers, the contempt may be punished summarily.
II the court or judge summarily punishes a person Ior a contempt pursuant
to this subsection, the court or judge shall enter an order that:
(a)Recites the Iacts constituting the contempt in the immediate view
and presence oI the court or judge;
(b)Finds the person guilty oI the contempt; and
(c)Prescribes the punishment Ior the contempt...
The 11/30/11 'ORDER FOR SUMMARY PUNISHMENT OF
OF THE COURT in 22176 by RMC Judge Howard reads:
'WHEREAS NRS 22.030 declares that when a contempt is committed in
the immediate view and presence oI the Court or judge at chambers, it may be
punished summarily, Ior which an order shall be made, reciting the Iacts as
occurring in such immediate view and presence, adjudging that the person
proceeded against is thereby guilty oI a contempt and that he/she be punished as
therein prescribed, and WHEREAS, on the 30th day oI November, 2011, the
above named deIendant appeared beIore this court. NAME: ZACHERY
COUGHLIN, who is a DEFENDANT
Party; Witness; Spectator, and
WHEREAS such individual committed the Iollowing act(s) in the
immediate view and presence oI the Court:
(CHECKED) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior
toward the judge while he is holding court, or engaged in his judicial duties
at chambers,
A breach oI the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance in the
presence oI the Court, or in its immediate vicinity, tending to interrupt due to the
course oI the trial or other judicial proceeding,
(NOT CHECKED) ReIusing to be sworn or answer as a witness
(NOT CHECKED) Disobeying a lawIul writ/order/rule/process issued by
the Court/judge at chambers, and WHEREAS such conduct:
(NOT CHECKED) Demeaned the Court
(NOT CHECKED) Derogated the authority oI the Court
(CHECKED) InterIered with the orderly administration oI justice and
required immediate vindication by the Court to preserve order and respect.
Based upon the above Iinding ZACHARYCOUGHLIN is Guilty oI Direct
Contempt. The Contemnor, when asked iI he had anything to say as to why
sentence should not be pronounced, replied: (in handwriting) See Court Record.
ThereIore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the
contemnor is hereby sentenced to the Iollowing punishment:
(NOT CHECKED) A Iine in the amount oI ($500 or less).
(CHECKED) Imprisonment Ior (25 days or less), NO
ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING...
DEFENDANT TO BE RELEASED on 12/3/11 at 8 pm DATED this 30th day oI
November, 2011 KENNETH R. HOWARD, JUDGE, Reno Municipal Court"
I t is
very important to note the colon in the Iollowing Irom that OSPC and the Iact that
the blank Ior the designation immediately preeeding it is not checked. Especially
where a Municipal Court Order is now being asserted as conclusive prooI oI
multiple violations oI the Rules oI ProIessional Conduct suIIicient to justiIy
permanently disbarring an attorney and thereIore taking Irom him his protected,
Fourteenth Amendment property right, such Order must be taken as it is, Ior what
it indicates, expressly and speciIically, good or bad, and be subject to any
inadvertence or carelessness that may have attached to the judicial assistant, er,
Judge's rendering oI the Order as entered. As such, the Iailure to check the blank
in this Order Form preceding the Iollowing phrase:
'(NOT CHECKED) Disobeying a lawful writ/oraer/rule/process issuea by
the Court/fuage at chambers, ana WHEREAS such conduct:
(this blank, noticeably and importantly, was NOT CHECKED) Demeaned the
Court
Now, ironically, it is the SBN's King whom must have applied to him the
very authority accepted by Panel Chair Echeverria in Granting King's 11/2/12
Motion to Quash the Supoenas Upon RMC Judges where Judge Howard may not
now (especially do to principles oI double jeopardy and laches) seek to modiIy his
11/30/11 OSPC by inserting a check in a blank where previously there was none.
The Order must stand as it is, and, as such, that OPSC provides Coughlin
conclusive prooI (res judicata, collateral estoppel) that Coughlin aia not
'Derogated the authority oI the Court or 'InterIered with the orderly
administration oI justice and required immediate vindication by the Court to
preserve order and respect suIIicient Ior RMC Judge Howard to make a Iinding
oI Iact or conclusion oI law, much less and order, that Coughlin can be said to
have been adjudged to have been adjudged to have violated NRS 22.010(2) (all oI
NRS 22 relates to civil contempt statutes, and thereIore no order related thereto
comes within the purview oI SCR 111(5) (despite Bar Counsel King's constant
assertions and pleading to the contrary, which, itselI, is arguably a violation oI
RPC 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, 4.1 (the RMC Judges and RCA), 8.1, 8.2, and 8.4...and
also, perhaps, RPC 4.2 to the extent In Re SchaeIer would have a pro se attorney
have RPC 4.2 applied against him where such pro se attorney contacts a
represented party, turnabout being Iairplay, King's contacting a selI representing
Coughlin here, then, arguably is tantamount to King violating RPC 4.2 where
King communicated with Coughlin in Coughlin's role as a client to himselI.
Otherwise, DDA Watts-Vial's interpretation oI things, in his 11/13/12 Iaxed
objections to Coughlin's subpoena, wherein he asserts that Coughlin's 'admission
that his law license in Nevada is suspended (though, it may be that, given
Coughlin's USPTO law license is not presently suspended, Coughlin is entitled to
issue subpoenas to whomever he chooses incident thereto) necessarily means that,
under NRCP 45(a)(3), the subpoenas Coughlin had served that were not issued by
the SBN's Clerk oI Court need not be obeyed or responded to. This, despite the
Iact that it is not at all clear that NRCP 45 is even applicable in disciplinary
matters, nor that, even were it applicable, the Iacts oI these particular
circumstances auger Ior an application such as the one suggested by WCDA DDA
Watts-Vial, particularly given Chairman Susich's 7/27/12 written correspondence
to Coughlin, and the import oI such communication when considering the express
declaration made by Bar Counsel King to Coughlin on 10/15/12 that King had
conIirmed with ChieI Bar Counsel David Clark that Coughlin, as a Respondent,
even where temporarily suspended, may, in Iact, issue his own subpoenas, and
Iurther where considering that the SBN/NNDB/Panel/SBN Clerk oI Court had
communicated to Coughlin that he was not required to pay subpoena or witness
Iees, both in light oI his inidgent status, and under the rules applicable to this
particular disciplinary matter under SCR 105(4) and SCR 119(3).
'NRS22.010Acts or omissions constituting contempts.The
Iollowing acts or omissions shall be deemed contempts:
1.Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge
while the judge is holding court, or engaged in judicial duties at chambers,
or toward masters or arbitrators while sitting on a reIerence or arbitration,
or other judicial proceeding.
2.A breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent
disturbance in the presence of the court, or in its immediate vicinity,
tending to interrupt the due course of the trial or other judicial
proceeding.
3.Disobedience or resistance to any lawIul writ, order, rule or
process issued by the court or judge at chambers.
4.Disobedience oI a subpoena duly served, or reIusing to be sworn
or answer as a witness.
5.Rescuing any person or property in the custody oI an oIIicer by
virtue oI an order or process oI such court or judge at chambers.
6.Disobedience oI the order or direction oI the court made pending
the trial oI an action, in speaking to or in the presence oI a juror concerning
an action in which the juror has been impaneled to determine, or in any
manner approaching or interIering with such juror with the intent to
inIluence the verdict.
7.Abusing the process or proceedings of the court or Ialsely
pretending to act under the authority oI an order or process oI the court.
And, actually, it is WCDA DDA Watts-Vial, and, arguably the Second
Judicial District Court Judges and Clerk oI Court and Assistant Clerk oI Court,
and Custodian oI Records whom should be subject to a Iinding that they have
violated NRS 22.030(4). Further, Reno City Attorney Christensen and the Reno
Muncipal Court Judges, Court Administrator, Custodian oI Record, and those
City oI Reno Marshal's whom disobey such 'subpoena duly served upon them
have similarly committed a violation oI NRS 22.030(4) where SCR 110(4) aoes
not entitle any oI those individuals or entities to rely upon the 11/7/12 Order by
Chair Echeverria purporting to quash such subpoenas where SCR 110(4) is quite
clear that it is NNDB Chairman Susich, only, whom has jurisdiction to make such
an Order and where there is no indication that any oI those subpoened
communicated an 'open reIusal under RPC 3.4 suIIicient to prevent a Iinding
that a violation oI such was committed by all those subpoened whom are licensed
attorneys (which, would included those RMC Judges subpoened). Similarly, the
Reno Justice Court's Custodian oI Records and Court Administrator Steven Tuttle
and ChieI Civil Clerk Karen Stancil could be said to have violated NRS 22.030(4)
as well. Interestingly, neither DDA Watts-Vial nor any other attorney Irom the
WCDA's OIIice communicated any objection to the subpoen Coughlin had served
a non-party over 18 years oI age on Stancil, Tuttle, and the RJC's Custodian oI
Records by one Nicholas Hassett oI Reno, Nevada, a 20 year old at the time.

'SCR Rule114.Reciprocal discipline.
4.Identical discipline to be imposed; exceptions.AIter
the time Ior the attorney to respond has expired, the supreme
court shall impose the identical discipline unless the attorney
demonstrates, or the supreme court finds, that on the face of
the record upon which the discipline is predicated it clearly
appears:
(a)That the procedure in the other jurisdiction was so
lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a
deprivation of due process; or
(b)That there was such an infirmity of proof establishing
the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the
court could not, consistent with its duty, accept the decision
of the other jurisdiction as fairly reached; or
(c)That the misconduct established w arrants substantially
different discipline in this state; or
(d)That the misconduct established does not constitute
misconduct under any Nevada Rule oI ProIessional Conduct.
II the court determines that any oI the preceding Iactors exist,
it shall enter an appropriate order.
5.Discipline elsewhere res judicata .In all other
respects, a final adjudication in another jurisdiction that an
attorney has engaged in misconduct conclusively establishes
the misconduct for the purposes of a disciplinary proceeding
in this state.
The converse oI SCR Rule 114(5) (applied here by analogy) is that the
Iailure oI the various Order's involved here to make a 'Iinal
adjudication...that..attorney (Coughlin, and the 6/26/12 Order in FHE 2 was
entered while Coughlin's law license was temporarily suspended, which,
assuredly, WCDA DDA Watts-Vial would agree, means such Order can in no
way be asserted as any sort oI prooI, conclusive or otherwise, oI any sort oI
proIessional misconduct on Coughlin's part, right, DDA Watts? Also, consider
RMC Judge W. Gardner repeatedly reIerring to Coughlin as 'an attorney during
the 6/18/12 Trial in 26405, which, again, occurred while Coughlin's law license in
Nevada was temporarily suspended). Further, the language in SCR 114(5)
reIerring to 'another jurisdiction does not necessarily require such 'Iinal
adjudication occur in by 'the imposition oI disciplinary sanctions in another
jurisdiction outsiae the State oI Nevada. Such use oI the term 'jurisdiction in
the phrase 'another jurisdiction may be taken to mean another court within
Nevaaa, especially considering the wording oI SCR Rule 99.
'SCR Rule99.Jurisdiction.
1.Every attorney admitted to practice law in Nevada, specially admitted by a
court oI this state Ior a particular proceeding, practicing law here, whether
specially admitted or not, or whose advertising Ior legal services regularly appears
in Nevada is subject to the exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction oI the supreme court
and the disciplinary boards and hearing panels created by these rules.
2.Nothing contained in these rules denies any court the power to maintain
control over proceedings conducted beIore it, such as the power oI contempt, nor
do these rules prohibit any association Irom censuring, suspending, or expelling its
members.
'SCR Rule110.Subpoena power, production of documents, witnesses, and
pretrial proceedings.
1.Issuance of subpoenas by hearing panels and bar counsel.Bar counsel
and a member oI a hearing panel who is also a state bar member, in matters under
investigation by either, may administer oaths and aIIirmations and issue and
compel by subpoena the attendance oI witnesses and the production oI pertinent
books, papers, and documents. The attorney may also compel by subpoena the
attendance of witnesses and the production of pertinent books, papers, and
other documents before a hearing panel. Subpoena ana witness fees ana
mileage shall be the same as in a aistrict court.
2.ConIidentiality stated on subpoena.Subject to the provisions oI Rule
121, subpoenas shall clearly indicate on their Iace that they are issued in
connection with a conIidential investigation under these rules and that it is
regarded as contempt oI the supreme court or grounds Ior discipline under these
rules Ior a person subpoenaed to in any way breach the conIidentiality oI the
investigation. It shall not be regarded as a breach oI conIidentiality Ior a person
subpoenaed to consult with counsel or to answer questions asked by bar counsel
or the attorney to determine the facts known by the witness.
3.Attachment of person for failure to obey subpoena or produce
documents.Whenever any person subpoenaed to appear and give testimony or
to produce books, papers, or other documents as required by subpoena, or
requested to provide documents pursuant to Rule 78.5(1)(b), refuses to appear or
testify before a hearing panel, or to answer any pertinent or proper questions,
or to provide the requested documents, that person shall be deemed in
contempt of the disciplinary board, and the chair oI the disciplinary board
shall report the fact to a district judge of the county in which the hearing is
being held or the investigation conducted. The district court shal l promptly
issue an attachment in the Iorm usual in the court, directed to the sheriII oI the
county, commanding the sheriff to attach such person and bring such person
forthwith before the court. On the return oI the attachment, and the production
oI the person attached, the district court shall have jurisdiction of the matter; and
the person charged may purge himself or herself of the contempt in the same
way, and the same proceedings shall be had, and the same penalties may be
imposed, and the same punishment inflicted as in the case oI a witness
subpoenaed to appear and give evidence on the trial oI a civil cause beIore a
district court oI the State oI Nevada.
4.Contest of subpoena.A contest oI a subpoena shall be heard and
determined by the chair of the appropriate disciplinary board.
5.Restriction on discovery.Discovery by the attorney, other than under
Rule 105(2)(c), is not permitted prior to hearing, except by the order of the
chair for good cause upon motion under Rule 103(5) or Rule 103(6).
6.Prehearing conference.At the discretion oI the chair, a prehearing
conference may be ordered Ior the purpose oI obtaining admissions or
otherwise narrowing the issues presented by the pleadings. The conIerence
may be held beIore the chair or the chair`s designee.
There is nothing in the record to indicate the NNDB Chairman Susich
identiIied any 'designee Ior the purpose oI carrying out all the matters with
which the 'chair (in all instances in SCR 110 the term 'chair is used with
respect to the 'chair oI the 'disciplinary board or 'board and the term 'panel
is nowhere to be Iound therein. This makes good sense, as the Chair oI the
Disciplinary Board is a continuing position wherein such Chair, presumably, given
the prestige and power attendant to such a position, would be someone possessing
suIIicient, particularized knowledge oI the substantive and procedural issues
typically arising in a disciplinary matter context suIIicient to make sure that the
various powers accorded to such 'disciplinary board chair within SCR 110 (and,
also, under , is not permitted prior to hearing, except by the order oI the chair Ior
good cause upon motion under Rule 103(5) or Rule 103(6)) to so entrust with such
authority. While NNDB Chair Susich's 7/27/12 writing to Coughlin directs
Coughlin to coordinate and inquire as to certain matters with the SBN's OBC and
SBN Clerk oI Court Laura Peters, it in now way, authorizes or identiIies the SBN,
OBC, or SBN Clerk oI Court as a SCR 110(6) 'designee. Further, the use oI the
term 'conIerence in SCR 110(6) necessarily requires Coughlin's participation, or,
at least, an opportunity to participate in such a conIerence be given to Coughlin,
and notice thereoI. Instead, the NNDB, Panel, and OBC continually treated
Coughlin like the Elephant Man. Coughlin is not an animal. He is a human being.
Further, King likely violated RPC 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.8, 8.1, 8.2, and
8.4 where he admitted to Coughlin, on 10/15/12 that he Iully intended to have such
a conIerence in Coughlin's absence (and apparently did so) an an eIIort to achieve
his stated goal oI skirting the express dictates in this Court's 6/7/12 Order in 60838
and SCR 111(8) and thereby 'consolidate the requirement stemming Irom this
Court's Order (which expressly incorporates the dictate Iound within SCR 111(8))
that 'reIer(red) the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board Ior the institution
of a formal hearing beIore a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be
determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed) into
'SCR Rule104.State bar counsel. 1.State bar counsel shall: ... 'b)
Subject to Rule 105(1), dispose oI all matters involving allegea misconduct by
dismissal oI the allegation(s) or by the filing of a written complaint. Ironically,
it is the OBC's King's beloved SCR 111(5) that nows turns on him here. 'SCR
111(5).CertiIied document conclusive.A certiIied copy oI prooI oI a
conviction is conclusive evidence of the commission of the crime stated in it in
any disciplinary proceeding instituted against an attorney based on the
conviction. An 'allegation` (under SCR 104(1)(b)) necessarily excludes a
'conviction given such, under SCR 111(5) provides 'conclusive evidence oI the
commission oI the crime, thereby removing Irom the power granted Bar Counsel
under SCR 104 the right to 'consolidate the 'Iormal hearing required by SCR
111(8) with the SCR 105(2) 'Commencement oI Iormal proceedings Iollowing
the 'or the filing of a written complaint by Bar Counsel under SCR 105(1).
Thus, the Bar Counsel had not authority to so consolidate the 'Iormal hearing
required by SCR 111(8) and this Court's 6/7/12 Order in 60838. The distinction
between 'Iormal disciplinary proceedings...commenced by bar counsel Iiling a
written complaint and that required where an Order stemming Irom an SCR
111(6) Petition in 60838 IulIilled this Court's duty, under SCR 111(8) to ''reIer
the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board Ior the institution of a formal
hearing beIore a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be
the extent of the discipline to be imposed is so obvious ('proceedings is
plural, whereas 'hearing is singular; 'commencement oI Iormal proceedings
necessarily implicates the double jeopardy issues attendnat to King seeking to
consolidate the matters involved in the 'hearing which SCR 111(8) requires the
'institution oI (ie, 'commencement and 'insitution connote entirely diIIerent
grants oI authority and jurisdiciton, in addition to distinct purposes and limitations,
particularly relevant to the particular processes involved) as to make the SBN's
OBC's King conduct here, arguably, misconduct violative oI RPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.2,
3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 3.8, 8.1, 8.2, and 8.4 and Coughlin herein points this out
in an eIIort o IulIill his duty undr RPC 3.8.
(SCR 105(2): 'Commencement oI formal proceedings.Formal disciplinary
proceedings are commenced by bar counsel filing a written complaint in the
name of the state bar...), Note, SCR 105(2) decidedly DOES AO1 say that
'Iormal disciplinary proceedings are commenced by bar counsel doing that which
SCR 104(d) calls Ior (SCR 104(1)(d) reads:'(1) State bar counsel shall:...(d) File
with the supreme court petitions with certiIied copies oI prooI oI conviction
demonstrating that attorneys have been convicted oI serious crimes, as deIined in
Rule 111. Where SCR 105(2) provides that as to the: 'Commencement oI formal
proceedings.Formal disciplinary proceedings are commenced by bar counsel
filing a written complaint in the name of the state bar... and such Complaints
are always Iiled beIore the appropriate Disciplinary Board in the State Bar oI
Nevada (that is to say that the name oI the court listed above the caption oI such
Complaints always indicates:
'STATE BAR OF NEVADA
NORTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD
To be sure, nothing in the SCR's indicate expressly what court such Iormal
disciplinary proceedings are to occur in, and the text above the caption in such
matters does depart Irom, say WDCR 10, where it Iails to include 'IN THE
immediately beIore the contents therein, and where the word 'court is not
present. However, the SBN has held Laura Peters out as the SBN's 'Clerk oI
Court, indicating, similar to the set up in CaliIornia, that the State oI Nevada has
a 'State Bar Court. Why the above is relevant is that SCR 111(4) provides:
4.Bar counsel`s responsibility.Upon being advised that an attorney subject to
the disciplinary jurisdiction oI the supreme court has been convicted oI a crime,
other than a misdemeanor traIIic violation not involving the use oI alcohol or a
controlled substance, bar counsel shall obtain a certiIied copy oI prooI oI the
conviction and shall Iile a petition with the supreme court, attaching the certiIied
copy. Upon being advised that an attorney subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction
oI the supreme court has been convicted oI a misdemeanor involving the use oI
alcohol or a controlled substance and the oIIense is not the attorney`s Iirst such
oIIense, bar counsel shall investigate and present the matter to the appropriate
panel oI the disciplinary board prior to the Iiling oI the petition. The petition shall
be accompanied by the panel`s recommendation regarding the appropriate
disciplinary action, iI any, to be imposed under these or any other rules oI the
supreme court that pertain to the conduct oI attorneys.
5.CertiIied document conclusive.A certiIied copy oI prooI oI a conviction
is conclusive evidence oI the commission oI the crime stated in it in any
disciplinary proceeding instituted against an attorney based on the conviction....
7.Suspension on certiIication.Upon the filing with the supreme court of
a petition with a certiIied copy oI prooI oI the conviction, demonstrating that an
suspending the attorney, regardless oI the pendency oI an appeal, penaing final
disposition of a ~disciplinary proceeding, which shall be commenced by the
appropriate disciplinary board upon referral by the supreme court. For good
cause, the court may set aside its order suspending the attorney from the
practice of law. (NOTE: the phrase 'pending Iinal disposition in SCR 111(7)
expresses a Iar diIIerent approach than does the phrases Iound in SCR 105(2)
('commencement oI Iormal proceedings and 'Iormal disciplinary
proceedings). (NOTE: the phrase ~disciplinary proceeding used in SCR
111(7) differs from the phrase ~formal disciplinary proceedings (the
singular ~proceeding in SCR 111(7) implies nond of the extended
involvement inherent to where ~formal disciplinary proceedings are
commenced under SCR 105(2) and plural ~formal disciplinary
proceedings, and the presence of the qualifier ~formal) found in SCR
105(2)). Further, the approach taken by the SBN's OBC here, where the
Complaint contains three grievance case numbers, none oI which represents an
identiIier or case number (why no appearance oI the SCR 111 Petition's number,
60838?). The OBC oIIered nothing in its Iilings to marry any oI the three
grievance numbers to this Court's 6/7/12 mandate in 60838 or that required under
SCR 111(8).
and SCR 104(1)(d) reads:'(1) State bar counsel shall:...(d) File with the supreme
court petitions with certiIied copies oI prooI oI conviction demonstrating that
attorneys have been convicted oI serious crimes, as deIined in Rule 111. Where
SCR 105(2) provides that as to the: 'Commencement oI formal proceedings.
Formal disciplinary proceedings are commenced by bar counsel filing a written
complaint in the name of the state bar... and the Complaint here bares three
'case numbers (NG12-0204, NG12-0434, NG12-0435), while, noticeably, the
SCR 105(3)(a) 'review by supreme court and SCR 105(3)(a) 'appeal is
accorded a aifferent case number (here, 62337)
SCR 111(8): 'ReIerral to disciplinary board.Upon receipt oI a petition Iiled
under subsection 4 oI this rule, demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted
oI a serious crime, the supreme court shall, in addition to suspending the attorney
in accordance with the provisions oI subsection 7 oI this rule, reIer the matter to
the appropriate disciplinary board Ior the institution oI a formal hearing beIore a
Notice SCR 111(8) D OES NOT READ 'Ior the institution oI Iormal
disciplinary proceedings aIter Bar Counsel Iollows th 'procedure on receipt oI
complaint set out in SCR Rule 105(1)(a) and a 'investigations shall be initiated
and conducted by bar counsel or bar counsel`s staII or other investigative
personnel at bar counsel`s direction prior or pursuant to the opening of a
grievance file... whereupon at 'the conclusion oI an investigation oI a grievance
Iile, bar counsel King makes the decision to 'recommend in writing the filing of
a written complaint where such 'recommendation shall be promptly reviewed
by a screening panel... NOTICE THAT SCR 111(8) SIMPLY DOES NOT
SAY ANYTHING OF THE SORT, DESPITE WHATEVER PERVISION
THEREOF THE OBC'S KING PURPORTS TO BE CONTROLLING HERE.
Rule111.Attorneys convicted oI crimes.
1.'Conviction deIined.For purposes oI this rule, in addition to a Iinal
judgment oI conviction, a 'conviction shall include a plea oI guilty or nolo
contendere, a plea under North Carolina v. AlIord, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), or a guilty
verdict Iollowing either a bench or a jury trial, regardless oI whether a sentence is
suspended or deIerred or whether a Iinal judgment oI conviction has been entered,
and regardless oI any pending appeals.
2.Duty to inIorm bar counsel.Upon being convicted oI a crime by a court
oI competent jurisdiction, other than a misdemeanor traIIic violation not involving
the use oI alcohol or a controlled substance, an attorney subject to these rules shall
inIorm bar counsel within 30 days.
3.Court clerks to transmit prooI oI conviction.The clerk oI any court in
this state in which an attorney is convicted oI a crime, other than a misdemeanor
traIIic violation not involving the use oI alcohol or a controlled substance, shall
transmit a certiIied copy oI prooI oI the conviction to the supreme court and bar
counsel within 10 days aIter its entry.
4.Bar counsel`s responsibility.Upon being advised that an attorney subject
to the disciplinary jurisdiction oI the supreme court has been convicted oI a crime,
other than a misdemeanor traIIic violation not involving the use oI alcohol or a
controlled substance, bar counsel shall obtain a certiIied copy oI prooI oI the
conviction and shall Iile a petition with the supreme court, attaching the certiIied
copy. Upon being advised that an attorney subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction
oI the supreme court has been convicted oI a misdemeanor involving the use oI
alcohol or a controlled substance and the oIIense is not the attorney`s Iirst such
oIIense, bar counsel shall investigate and present the matter to the appropriate
panel oI the disciplinary board prior to the Iiling oI the petition. The petition shall
be accompanied by the panel`s recommendation regarding the appropriate
disciplinary action, iI any, to be imposed under these or any other rules oI the
supreme court that pertain to the conduct oI attorneys.
5.CertiIied document conclusive.A certiIied copy oI prooI oI a conviction
is conclusive evidence oI the commission oI the crime stated in it in any
disciplinary proceeding instituted against an attorney based on the conviction.
6.DeIinition oI 'serious crime.The term 'serious crime means (1) a
Ielony and (2) any crime less than a Ielony a necessary element oI which is, as
determined by the statutory or common-law deIinition oI the crime, improper
conduct as an attorney, interIerence with the administration oI justice, Ialse
swearing, misrepresentation, Iraud, willIul Iailure to Iile an income tax return,
deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, theIt, or an attempt or a conspiracy or
solicitation oI another to commit a 'serious crime.
7.Suspension on certiIication.Upon the Iiling with the supreme court oI a
petition with a certiIied copy oI prooI oI the conviction, demonstrating that an
suspending the attorney, regardless oI the pendency oI an appeal, pending Iinal
disposition oI a disciplinary proceeding, which shall be commenced by the
appropriate disciplinary board upon reIerral by the supreme court. For good cause,
the court may set aside its order suspending the attorney Irom the practice oI law.
8.ReIerral to disciplinary board.Upon receipt oI a petition Iiled under
subsection 4 oI this rule, demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted oI a
serious crime, the supreme court shall, in addition to suspending the attorney in
accordance with the provisions oI subsection 7 oI this rule, reIer the matter to the
appropriate disciplinary board Ior the institution oI a Iormal hearing beIore a
9.Conviction Ior other than a serious crime.Upon receipt oI a petition
demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted oI a crime which is not a
serious crime, the supreme court may reIer the matter to the appropriate
disciplinary board Ior any action it may deem warranted under these or any other
rules oI the supreme court that pertain to the conduct oI attorneys, provided,
however, that the supreme court may decline to reIer a conviction Ior a minor
oIIense to the board. II the conviction adversely reIlects on the attorney`s Iitness to
practice law, the supreme court may issue an order to show cause, requiring the
attorney to demonstrate why an immediate temporary suspension should not be
imposed.
10.Reinstatement.An attorney suspended under the provisions oI
subsection 7 or 9 oI this rule may be reinstated by Iiling a certiIicate with the
supreme court demonstrating that the underlying conviction has been reversed, but
reinstatement will not terminate any Iormal proceeding pending against the
attorney, the disposition oI which shall be determined by the hearing panel on the
basis oI the available evidence.
11.Conviction oI attorney who is prohibited Irom practicing.II an attorney
convicted oI a crime is at that time prohibited Irom practicing due to a disciplinary
suspension or transIer to disability inactive status under Rule 117, then the petition
Iiled under subsection 7 or 9 oI this rule shall state that the attorney is prohibited
Irom practicing and under what provision. II the attorney has been suspended as
discipline, then the petition shall indicate the suspension`s length and whether the
attorney must Iile a reinstatement petition under Rule 116 to regain active status.
The supreme court shall then enter an appropriate order directing how the
conviction shall be addressed.
AMJUR PLEADING 590, In determining which sanctions should be
imposed Ior violations oI Rule 11, the court must consider the purposes to be
served by the imposition oI sanctions.|FN1| Because the primary purpose oI Rule
11 is to deter Iuture litigation abuse, the court is required to impose the least
severe sanction that IulIills the Rule's purpose.|FN2| II a court decides to impose
sanctions under Rule 11, it may choose Irom a wide range oI nonmonetary
sanctions or, in limited circumstances, monetary sanctions.|FN3| Any sanction
must be limited to what is suIIicient to deter repetition oI the violation or
comparable conduct by others similarly situated.|FN4| In determining an
appropriate sanction under Rule 11, the court should consider:|FN5| (1) the
nature oI the violation committed; (2) the circumstances in which it was
committed; (3) the circumstances including the Iinancial state oI the individual to
be sanctioned; and (4) those sanctioning measures that would suIIice to deter that
individual Irom similar violations in the Iuture. The sanction may include
directives oI a nonmonetary nature.|FN6| Although the Rule itselI does not
enumerate the types oI nonmonetary sanctions that may be imposed, courts have
held that they may include issuing a reprimand|FN7| or requiring the oIIending
counsel to undertake the representation oI a pro se plaintiII.|FN8| The public
Iiling oI a document Iinding that attorneys had violated Rule 11 has been deemed
a suIIicient sanction.|FN9| |FN9| Gary v. Braddock Cemetery and Consol
Energy, 334 Fed. Appx. 465, 73 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1139 (3d Cir. 2009) A
nonmonetary sanction may also include requiring participation in seminars or
other educational programs|FN10| or reIerring the matter to disciplinary
authorities.|FN11| |FN11| Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendments to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
II, as in Mirch 49212, RPC 3.1 is essentially equated with NRCP 11, then
Judge Nash's 'Iindings in her 3/14/12 Order in 26800 is violative oI the above
restrictions in that it is wholly overbroad and excessive in a manner that cannot be
said to be limited to the above goals. It is the equivalent oI taking a bazooka to
some weeds in one's Iront lawn.
Further, Judge Flanagan's 6/25/12 Order in 063628 is not a sanction, was
made at a time when Coughlin was already suspended, was not attached to the
Complaint, and King himselI violates RPC 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, and NRCP 11 where he
purports that anything in his 8/23/12 Complaint (wherein King clearly appears to
have attempted to distance his prosecution Irom Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s name as
much as possible, going so Iar as to pled the 1/12/13 jaywalking arrest, and
11/15/11 traIIic citations outside Hill's oIIice (Irom which all matters associated
with Judge Nash's 2/28/12 and 3/12/12 Orders in 26800 stem and are intimately
connected, as is also the case with her mailing to the SBN her 3/14/12 written
grievance against Coughlin, which included the 3/5/12 Motion to Dismiss in
26405 that King's Complaint pled (at para 12 page 3 therein) thusly: '12.
Respondent, representing himselI as co-counsel, Iiled a 36-page motion to
dismiss on March 5, 2012. The motion was denied by Judge William Gardner and
was determined to be without merit. The motion, on its Iace, demonstrates that
Respondent lacks competence to practice law. (However, such 3/5/12 Iiling in
26405 by Coughlin was never attached to anything Iiled by King nor introduced
into evidence at the FH, and thereIore, King's bare, conclusory allegation, can in
no way meet the 'clear and convicing evidence burden oI prooI. Further, where
King's Complaint indicates :. Respondent, representing himselI as co-counsel,
Iiled a 36-page motion to dismiss on March 5, 2012. The motion was denied by
Judge William Gardner and was determined to be without merit. The motion, on
its Iace, demonstrates that Respondent lacks competence to practice law....
(Iind citation that says such an Order indicating a motion is 'without merit is not
tantamount to a Iinding that it was vexatious or sanctionable).
Further, 26405 was a criminal prosecution and, as such NRCP Rule 11 in
inapplicable, and Judge Gardner's Iailure to adhere to Canon 2.15 or otherwise
sanction or report Coughlin to any authorities is dispositive as to any claim that
King may have plead (and, noticeably, King's Complaint stears away Irom
alleging any such Order by Judge Gardner (which was never attached to any oI
King's Iilings and was not even inlcuded in the 11/7/12 production oI some 3,200
pages oI documents by the SBN) is pled as a basis to support an allegation that
Coughlin violated RPC 3.1, but rather, King speciIically limits his pleading therto
to an allegation that 'the motion, on its Iace, demonstrates that Respondnet lacks
competence to practice law. And, even that attempt by King to Iollow the
dictates oI SCR 105(2) is muddled, as it is not clear whether King is therein
pursuing a competency determination under SCR 117 or attempting to proved a
violation oI RPC 1.1.
It seems apparent that RJC Pearson's EPO has the added beneIit to the
SBN oI making it impossible Ior Coughlin to have the SBN served, suIIicient to
satisIy any SCR 109 (what service does SCR 110 require?) or other personal
service requirements attendant to any action or Iiling by Coughlin, where
Coughlin was arrested on 3/8/13 Ior an alleged violation oI that the TPO and
EPO in RJC RCP12-607 Ior allegedly having a courier deliver a last minute
Iiling to the SBN on 1/3/13 (the deadline or day prior thereto, to Iile an NRCP
52, 59 and DCR 13(7) Reconsideration Motion), and again on 1/23/13 (also a
deadline as to the Iiling oI Coughlin's BrieI in 62337, necessitating, in
accordance with the rules, that Coughlin seeking a stipulation to any such
extension prior to Iiling a motion seeking such.
(E) Coughlin was aIIorded ample opportunity to prepare a veriIied answer or
response to the allegations oI the Complaint and Iailed to timely do so. See
Findings oI Fact 34, 35 and 36. Accordingly, the matter could proceed on a
deIault basis and the allegations oI the Complaint deemed admitted. SCR 105(2)
Notwithstanding the Iact that the matter could have been decided on a deIault
basis, the Panel permitted the State Bar and Coughlin to present evidence.
62B Am. Jur. 2d Process 42 II. AMENABILITY TO SERVICE OF
PROCESS B. Persons Immune to Service oI Process 3. Other Particular Persons,
Conditions, or Situations Topic Summary Correlation Table ReIerences 42.
Nature oI proceeding attended by nonresident West's Key Number Digest West's
Key Number Digest, Federal Civil Procedure k415, 416 West's Key Number
Digest, Process k117 to 120 The rule oI immunity Irom the service oI civil
process oI a nonresident while attending court in an action in which he or she is a
party or a witness extends to every proceeding oI a judicial nature|FN1| taken in
or emanating Irom a duly constituted judicial tribunal, which directly relates to
the trial oI the issues involved.|FN2| It extends not only to people who are in the
immediate presence oI the judges oI the courts oI record, but to those also who
attend the subordinate tribunals and oIIicers appointed by those courts to assist
them in the discharge oI their duties.|FN3| Hearings beIore arbitrators, legislative
committees, trustees in bankruptcy, examiners, masters in chancery, and
commissioners to take depositions have all been included within the scope oI its
application.|FN4||FN4| In re Equitable Plan Company, 277 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.
1960); Durst v. Tautges, Wilder & McDonald, 44 F.2d 507, 71 A.L.R. 1394
(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1930); Velkov v. Superior Court in and Ior Los Angeles County,
40 Cal. 2d 289, 253 P.2d 25, 35 A.L.R.2d 1348 (1953) (disciplinary proceedings
before state bar; recognizing rule); St. John v. Superior Court In and For Los
Angeles County, 178 Cal. App. 2d 794, 3 Cal. Rptr. 535, 84 A.L.R.2d 415 (2d
Dist. 1960) (license revocation hearing); 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process 42 |1|
While the general rule protects the nonresident "during a period reasonably
necessary to the giving oI testimony in a judicial proceeding" when he enters the
state primarily Ior that purpose, the recognized exception to the rule permits
service iI the later action "arises out oI or involves the same subject matter as the
one in which the nonresident has made a voluntary appearance." (Velkov v.
Superior Court (1953), 40 Cal. 2d 289, 291, 292 |253 P.2d 25, 35 A.L.R.2d
1348|.) In the Velkov case, a New York resident appeared beIore a local
administrative committee oI The CaliIornia State Bar, at their request, to testiIy in
a disciplinary proceeding, instituted by Mrs. Velkov, against attorneys to whom
Mrs. Velkov had transIerred 25 per cent oI certain properties as a Iee Ior services.
Mrs. Velkov alleged the transIer illegal and predicated |187 Cal. App. 2d 211| the
institution oI disciplinary proceedings upon that basis. When Mrs. Velkov "came
to CaliIornia ... to testiIy in a disciplinary proceeding beIore that body, she was
served with summons." (P. 290.) The summons emanated Irom an action brought
by the attorneys Ior declaratory relieI as to the transIer.'
Hill himselI violates RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 incident to his allegation, in his
pleadings that he allowed Coughlin additional time to remove his persontly
during late December 2011, which, apparently Judge Flanagan Iound to have
been an agreement Coughlin entered into with Hill, somehow, but then that
Coughlin Iailed to live up to? This is thoroughly disproven by the emails
between Hill and Coughlin on and around 12/24/11, where Coughlin requests
additional time to remove his remaining property (and sets Iorth a basis Ior
Iinding that Hill's interIerence and obstructionist tactics caused such a need)
Iollow by Hill's 12/24/11 email to Coughlin
Why wasn't Coughlin's 12/14/11 submission to the RJC included in the Vol 4 or
other ROA transmitted by the RJC on 12/21/11 in 1708? ThereaIter, the 1/4/12
Supplemental Iilign in 03628 was merely 3 pages and Iailed to include the lion's
share oI Coughlin's claims and contentions, includign those made in what he
submitted Ior Iiling on 12/14/11, 12/26/11 (37 page submission by Iax), a 15 page
12/26/11 submission that is Iile stamped 12/27/11, and other materials. RJC
Clerk Christine Erickson was evasive when questioned by Coughlin as to her
previous statements that Iax Iiling was not permitted t the RJC when Coughlin
began to become aware that, at least some litigants, were permitted to Iile by Iax.
How is it permissible Ior the RJC to deny Coughlin's 12/14/11 Iiling yet allow
Hill to Iile a Notice oI Entry oI Order in 1708 on 12/29/11? The 'Appeal
Receipt in the 1/4/12 Supplemental is deeply Ilawed? To what do entries 9-15
relate? Are those Hearing Exhibits Irom the 12/20/11 Contest Personal Property
Lien Hearing? Why is everything this Supplemental and the Iour volume ROA
by RJC Clerk Erickson in backwards order Irom how all other ROA's are
presented? This persistes even where in the 'Appeal Receipt those seven
exhibits are listed in reverse order. It gives the reviewer a headache trying to
review such a presentation.
From Flanagan's 4/20/12 Order in Carpentier v. Aames, QLS, and RCS in
CV08-01709: 'Finally, this Court makes the Iollowing observations. The
arguments raised by the parties in their pleadings generally circumscribe the
adjudicatory boundaries oI this Court. See ..,Breliant v. PreIerred Equities
Corp., 109 Nev. 842, 847, 858 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1993 (stating a district court
generally may not consider matters outside oI the pleadings when reviewing a
motion to dismiss). As such, this Court takes no position on whether the Iinancial
institutions in this case Iollowed the law when they were lining up the documents
to Ioreclose on the Property. Nonetheless, the manner and timing in which these
institutions-particularl Aames, Deutsche,and Quality-recorded the assignment,
Iied the Substitution oI Trustee, and Iiled the Notice oI DeIault, is suspicious and
troubling to this Court.
In his 12/28/11 email to the parties, RJC Judge SIerrazza Irom 1708 again
misapplies JCRRT to landlord tenant matters despite JCRRT 2 indicating such
rules do not apply there,
Merliss never had any Landlord's AIIidavit Iiled in 1708 (Baker apparently
Iiled a Declaration on Merliss's behalI on 10/19/11, but that was aIter the Iirst
hearing oI 10/13/11). Any purported such AIIidavit oI UnlawIul Detainer that
Baker attempted to hand Coughlin, in violation oI both courthouse sanctuary
doctrine and an attorney's (Coughlin's) immunity against service oI process when
appearing in court (particularly in the very case to which such attempted service
is related), as well as the duty to withdraw as counsel where, by so doing, Baker
necessarily makes himselI a likely witness, makes insuIIicient any such purporte
service. Further, any such AIIidavit by Merliss Iails to contain the Iollowing
required language: 'That the termination and surrender oI the rental unit was to
have taken place on
or beIore , 20. That legal Notice has been served upon
the tenant pursuant to the provisions oI NRS 40.280, on ,
20. A copy oI the Notice is attached hereto and incorporated by this
reIerence NRS 40.253. As such any hearing or Order based upon and
proceeding held thereIrom is void Ior lack oI jurisdiction. NRCP 60(b)(4) and
Aikin requires strict adherence to procedural and statutory rules. Additionally, no
such service in compliance oI with NRS 40.280 was done as to any such Notice
purported to be served on Coughlin on 9/27/11 in 1708. Further, particularly
where no such: 'CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby
certiIy that I am an employee oI RICHARD G. HILL, . CHARTERED, and that
on the 27th day oI September, 2011, I personally handed at the hearing in the
above-reIerenced matter, a true and correct copy oI the Ioregoing Five Day
Notice oI UnlawIul Detainer Ior Failure to Vacate Rental Unit - NRS 40.251 ( No
-Cause . Termination) and Notice oI Summary Eviction - NRS 40.254 to: Zachary
Coughlin 121 River Rock Street Reno, Nevada 89503 BY /s/ Casey D. Baker,
Esq..
Baker and Merliss Iailed to comply with the requirements oI NRS 40.280
(speciIically as to a witness and more) Ior the alleged service oI a 5 day UD
Notice on 9/27/11.
Form #9 'AIIidavit/Declaration oI Landlord Ior Summary Eviction Ior
Breach contains the Iollowing language: '7. AIIiant requests that the court enter
an order Ior the summary eviction oI the
tenant Irom the premises and the sheriII/constable be ordered to remove the
tenant within twenty-Iour (24) hours aIter receipt oI the court order.
There is a great deal oI conIusion as to the law in Nevada vis a vis 24 hour
lock-out notices and how soon aIter posting one the constable or SheriII may
eIIectuate the lock-out: 'http://www.lpsnv.com/EvictionFAQ.pdI: "7. DOES MY
TENANT HAVE RIGHTS? Yes they do. When the notice is served, your
tenant`s rights state that they can contest the notice with the justice court Irom the
moment that they receive the notice. Their reasons can vary, but they must get
their Tenant`s Response Iiled with the court oI jurisdiction. It will then be
approved or denied by the judge. II it is approved, then a hearing will be
scheduled. Your tenant can also contest the 24 Hour Lock-out Notice, which is
posted by the Constable. This notice is posted 24 hours beIore the Constable
returns to the property to do the lock change."
Gayle Kern, Esq., ought to have been made to Iollow RPC 3.5A, but
regardless, she should not have been granted any Writ oI Restitution or Lockout
Order on 3/15/12 merely upon a 'deIault basis Coughlin Iiled a detailed
Tenant's AIIidavit that could speak Ior him at the hearing, and the initial burden is
on the landlord (ie, the party moving Ior summary judgment under Anvui), and
Kern Iailed to even Iile a Landlord's AIIidavit.
Regardless, in both 1708 and 374, NRS 40.253 does not allow Ior the
Washoe County SheriII to conduct evictions in the manner in which is currently
does. Hill's Iilings claim that the WCSO's procedures, by being the 'usual and
customary practices oI the WCSO, somehow become black letter law in Nevada,
even where a statutory remedy is in place, one that the legislature worked hard on
(despite RJC Judge Pearson, in 1048, ignoring AB226's minor tenant's rights
victory where it required the landlord to, under NRS 40.253(3)(a) 'identiIy the
court that has jurisdiction over the matter... and 3(b)(1)'s dctate that such notice
advise the tenant: '(1)OI the tenant`s right to contest the matter by Iiling,... an
affidavit with the court that has jurisdiction over the matter..., in the Iace oI
the unauthorized practice oI law on behalI oI out oI state corporation no less,
Northwinds Apartments Assoc., LLC oI Washington state.
NRS 40.253(6) provides...'6.Upon the Iiling by the tenant oI the aIIidavit
permitted in subsection 3, regardless oI the inIormation contained in the aIIidavit,
and the filing by the landlord of the affidavit permitted by subsection 5 (note,
both in 1708 and 374, neither landlord Iiled such a Landlord's AIIidavit in a
timely manner, and Merliss in 1708 never Iiled one at all. II Baker and Hill want
big boy attorney's Iees, they should be required to get those sorts oI things right to
justiIy such exorbinant Iees, or even begin to), the justice court or the district
court shall hold a hearing, aIter service oI notice oI the hearing upon the parties,
to determine the truthIulness and suIIiciency oI any aIIidavit or notice (Baker
continually maintained that it was only Coughlin's AIIidavit which was up Ior
inspection, in violation oI RPC 3.1) provided Ior in this section. If the court
determines that there is no legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer
and the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer, the court may issue a summary
order for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance
of the tenant.
So, really, especially in 1708, all the debate about the import and
application of the ~within 24 hours language is inapplicable anyways, as
that phrase is only applicable to a situation where the tenant does not file a
Tenant's Answer in respose to a 5 day UD Notice being posted.
NRS 40.253(5):.Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(a)The landlord or the landlord`s agent may apply by aIIidavit oI complaint
(note, there is nothing in Ch. 40 that allows for a ~landlord's agent to draft
pleadings or appear on behalf of an out of state corporation, cross the bar,
and practice law on its behalf, as WNM's Sue Kign did in 074408 and 374,
and as NCS's 1eff Chandler did in 1048) for eviction to the justice court of
the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial
premises are located or to the district court of the county in which the
dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located,
whichever has jurisdiction over the matter (in 374, R1C 1udge Schroeder
issued such an Order prior to Kern even filing a Landlord's Answer). The
court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the
county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order.
But, again, where Coughlin did comply with the 5 day notice, in both 1048,
374, and 1708, NRS 40.253(5) language is inapplicable ('The court may
thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the county to
remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order.) Rather, it is
NRS 40.253(6)'s language that controls: ~If the court determines that there is
no legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer and the tenant is guilty of
an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of
the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant.
There being nothing thereing speaking to some ~within 24 hours
dicate, the default application in civil law requires that such an an Order be
served under NRCP 6(e) where personal service is not accorded, thus
requiring 3 days for mailing. Further, NRAP 8 and some 5 day stay
suggested in Anvui, is arguably applicable. There is little indication in Ch.
40 or elsehwhere to provide some explanation of just how and in what
manner such a ~summary order would be carried out and whether it would
allow for the approach taken by the WCSO in such situations. While NRS
40.253(3)(b)(2) does contain the term ~summary order, the appearance
therein of the ~within 24 hours language, combined with the non-
appearance of such ~within 24 hours language in NRS 40.253(6), under
traditional principles of statutory construction, actually augers for an
interpretation of subsection 6 that would require more time for a tenant than
is provided for under NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2):That if the court determines
that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a
summary order for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the
nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the county
to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order...
It seems rather implausible to suggest that the ~within 24 hours
language is some dictate to the Sheriff or constable requiring such lockouts
be effectuated in some narrow window of time. Rather, particularly given
the primacy to individual's and businesses inherent to their uses as
residences of places of business (or, in 1708, as both) it would seem entirely
more likely, and reasonable, to conclude that the legislature intended for the
~within 24 hours language to afford tenant's ~at least 24 hours from the
posting (if not the constructive receipt in the mail under NRCP 6(e) if no
personal service was to be had) of such a lock-out Order to remove those
items they find absolutely essential (see Coughlin's difficulties in 1048 where
deprived of his medications, eyeglasses, contacts, some important legal files,
etc, not to mention the RPC 3.5A violation attendant to the default on 7/5/12,
especially where the R1C and NCS's Chandler knew Coughlin was in jail
incident to a 7/3/12 arrest stemming from Northwind's handyman Kreb's
falacious accusation of Coughlin ~disturbing the peace.
the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant
Also, the R1C may need to explain why it failed to file in fax filings by
Coughlin where it either did file in some by Hill and Baker in 1708 (or
consider any failure to file any 10/13/11 Affidavit of Unlawful Detainer by
landlord Merliss).
The SBN is likely resting upon some theory that the TPO and EPO granted it
by RJC Judge Pearson, which indicates that Coughlin may . First, the 1/ 114/13
EPO granted the SBN indicates that Patrick Owen King, Esq., appeared at the
Extension Hearing to represent the SBN. As such, King, knowing he was
extremely likely to be a witness in such an action, had a duty to withdraw Irom
representation, and thereIore himselI violated a RPC 1.16 requir he so withdraw
where his being a witness was a virtual certainty. Further, King's TPO
application rests almost entirely on unsworn hearsay, Ior which King makes no
indication with regard to Irom whom or how he became aware oI such hearsay
detailing such purported 'Iacts. For instance, the magic oI hearsay may allow a
comment like 'its not Iair that Bar Counsel King gets all this ex parte Iace time
with Panel Chair Echeverria that may have been said to Dena Echeverria on the
telephone to become, according to King, a statement by Coughlin to Echeverria's
staII that he was coming down to the Panel Chair's OIIice, threatening to get
some 'Iace time. Coughlin's 1996 Honda Accord's electrical problems (an
electrical short caused problems with Coughlin's headlights requiring a primitive
workaround requiring Coughlin to braids Iive elecrical wires together to turn his
vehicle's headlights on...something King alleges, through unattributed hearsay,
was a case oI Coughlin malingering around the SBN's Northern OIIice aIter 5 pm
Ilashing his headlights at the one or two women whom were working late
(because, one can be absolutely sure, Asst. Bar Counsel King has never worked
late a day in his liIe, and certainly not while employed by the SBN, thanks to
SCR 106, natch), in an attempt to Irighten and harass them. Then there is the
curiosu allegation by King in his TPO application that Coughlin called the SBN
ahead to announce he would be there in IiIteen minutes to Iile something. King
somehow alleges that is threatening behavior even where he subsequently
indicates that he had sent Coughlin a letter demanding that Coughlin do just that
prior to appearing at the SBN Ior any reason, including to Iile documents.
At the 3/15/12 summary eviction hearing wherein Gayle Kern, Esq., violate
RPC 3.5A (probably why RJC Judge Schroeder asked, upon the topic oI taking a
deIault against Coughlin coming up: 'Is that Iair?), Kern Iurther stated that she
was seeking 'a Writ granting possession. Such Writ oI Restitution must Iollow
NRS 118A.360, which requires putting up a bond Iirst, which Kern Iailed to do:
NRS40.300Contents of complaint; issuance and
service of summons; temporary writ of restitution;
notice, hearing and bond.
1.The plaintiII in his or her complaint, which shall be
in writing, must set Iorth the Iacts on which the plaintiII
seeks to recover, and describe the premises with reasonable
certainty and may set Iorth therein any circumstances oI
Iraud, Iorce or violence which may have accompanied the
alleged Iorcible entry, or Iorcible or unlawIul detainer, and
claim damages thereIor, or compensation Ior the occupation
oI the premises or both. In case the unlawIul detainer
charged be aIter deIault in the payment oI rent, the
complaint must state the amount oI such rent.
2.The summons shall be issued and served as in other
cases, but the court, judge or justice oI the peace may
shorten the time within which the deIendant shall be
required to appear and deIend the action, in which case the
oIIicer or person serving the summons shall change the
prescribed Iorm thereoI to conIorm to the time oI service as
ordered; but where publication is necessary the court shall
direct publication Ior a period oI not less than 1 week.
3.At any time aIter the Iiling oI the complaint and
issuance oI summons, the court, upon application thereIor,
may issue a temporary writ oI restitution; provided:
(a)That the temporary writ oI restitution shall not issue
ex parte but only aIter the issuance and service oI an order
to show cause why a temporary writ oI restitution shall not
be issued and aIter the deIendant has been given an
opportunity to oppose the issuance oI the temporary writ oI
restitution.
(b)That the temporary writ of restitution shall not
issue until the court has had an opportunity to ascertain
the facts sufficiently to enable it to estimate the probable
loss to the defendant and fix the amount of a bond to
indemnify the party or parties against whom the
temporary writ may be issued.
(c)That the temporary writ oI restitution shall not issue
until there has been Iiled with the approval oI the court a
good and suIIicient bond oI indemniIication in the amount
Iixed by the court.
As such, Kern requested the wrong relieI Irom Judge
Schroeder, and the court lacked jurisdiction to then issue a
Lockout Order where a Writ oI Restitution oI Possession
was requested, particularly where the Lockout Order Iails to
conIorm to the Iollowing statute:
'NRS40.420Form of writ oI restitution; execution.
1.The writ oI restitution issued by a justice oI the peace
must be substantially in the Iollowing Iorm:
The State oI Nevada to the sheriII or constable oI the county
oI ................, greeting: Whereas, A.B., oI the county
oI ................, at a court oI inquiry oI an unlawIul holding over
oI (lands) (tenements) (a mobile home), and other possessions,
held at my oIIice (stating the place), in the county aIoresaid,
on the ........ day oI .............., A.D. ....., beIore me, a justice oI
the peace Ior the county aIoresaid, by the consideration oI the
court, has recovered judgment against C.D., to have restitution
oI (here describe the premises as in the complaint). You are
thereIore commanded, that taking with you the Iorce oI the
county, iI necessary, you cause C.D. to be immediately
removed Irom the premises, and A.B. to have peaceable
restitution oI the premises. You are also commanded that oI
the goods and chattels oI C.D., within said county, which are
not exempt Irom execution, you cause to be made the sum
oI ........ dollars Ior the plaintiII, together with the costs oI suit
endorsed hereon, and make return oI this writ within 30 days
aIter this date. Given under my hand, this ........ day oI ........,
A.D. ..... E.F., justice oI the peace.
2.The sheriII or constable shall execute the writ in the
same manner as required by the provisions oI chapter 21 oI
NRS Ior writs oI execution.
|1911 CPA 663; RL 5605; NCL 9152|(NRS A
1969, 264; 1989, 1144)
NRS40.425Notice of execution on writ oI restitution.
1.Execution on the writ oI restitution may occur only iI
the sheriII serves the judgment debtor with notice oI the
execution and a copy oI the writ in the manner described
in NRS 21.076. The notice must describe the types oI property
exempt Irom execution and explain the procedure Ior claiming
those exemptions. The clerk oI the court shall attach the notice
to the writ at the time the writ is issued.
2.The notice required pursuant to subsection 1 must be
in the Iorm and served in the manner provided Ior execution
on judgments pursuant to NRS 21.075 and 21.076
NRS40.400 Rules of practice .The provisions oI NRS,
Nevada Rules oI Civil Procedure and Nevada Rules oI
Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new
trials, so Iar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions
oI NRS 40.220 to40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings
mentioned in those sections.
|1911 CPA 661; RL 5603; NCL 9150|
NRS40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction
and exclusion of tenant for default in payment of rent.
1.Except as otherwise provided in subsection 10, in addition to the remedy
provided in NRS 40.2512 and 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when the tenant oI any
dwelling, apartment, mobile home, recreational vehicle or commercial premises
with periodic rent reserved by the month or any shorter period is in deIault in
payment oI the rent, the landlord or the landlord`s agent, unless otherwise agreed
in writing, may serve or have served a notice in writing, requiring in the
alternative the payment oI the rent or the surrender oI the premises:
(a)At or beIore noon oI the IiIth Iull day Iollowing the day oI service; or
(b)II the landlord chooses not to proceed in the manner set Iorth in paragraph
(a) and the rent is reserved by a period oI 1 week or less and the tenancy has not
continued Ior more than 45 days, at or beIore noon oI the Iourth Iull day Iollowing
the day oI service.
As used in this subsection, 'day oI service means the day the landlord or the
landlord`s agent personally delivers the notice to the tenant. II personal service
was not so delivered, the 'day oI service means the day the notice is delivered,
aIter posting and mailing pursuant to subsection 2, to the sheriII or constable Ior
service iI the request Ior service is made beIore noon. II the request Ior service by
the sheriII or constable is made aIter noon, the 'day oI service shall be deemed to
be the day next Iollowing the day that the request is made Ior service by the sheriII
or constable.
2.A landlord or the landlord`s agent who serves a notice to a tenant pursuant
to paragraph (b) oI subsection 1 shall attempt to deliver the notice in person in the
manner set Iorth in paragraph (a) oI subsection 1 oI NRS 40.280. II the notice
cannot be delivered in person, the landlord or the landlord`s agent:
(a)Shall post a copy oI the notice in a conspicuous place on the premises and
mail the notice by overnight mail; and
(b)AIter the notice has been posted and mailed, may deliver the notice to the
sheriII or constable Ior service in the manner set Iorth in subsection 1 oI NRS
40.280. The sheriII or constable shall not accept the notice Ior service unless it is
accompanied by written evidence, signed by the tenant when the tenant took
possession oI the premises, that the landlord or the landlord`s agent inIormed the
tenant oI the provisions oI this section which set Iorth the lawIul procedures Ior
eviction Irom a short-term tenancy. Upon acceptance, the sheriII or constable shall
serve the notice within 48 hours aIter the request Ior service was made by the
landlord or the landlord`s agent.
3.A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must:
(a)IdentiIy the court that has jurisdiction over the matter; and
(b)Advise the tenant:
(1)OI the tenant`s right to contest the matter by Iiling, within the time
speciIied in subsection 1 Ior the payment oI the rent or surrender oI the premises,
an aIIidavit with the court that has jurisdiction over the matter stating that the
tenant has tendered payment or is not in deIault in the payment oI the rent;
(2)That iI the court determines that the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul
detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an
order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or
constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of
the order; and
(3)That, pursuant to NRS 118A.390, a tenant may seek relieI iI a
landlord unlawIully removes the tenant Irom the premises or excludes the tenant
by blocking or attempting to block the tenant`s entry upon the premises or
willIully interrupts or causes or permits the interruption oI an essential service
required by the rental agreement or chapter 118A oI NRS.
4.II the tenant Iiles such an aIIidavit at or beIore the time stated in the
notice, the landlord or the landlord`s agent, after receipt of a file-stamped copy
oI the aIIidavit which was Iiled, shall not provide Ior the nonadmittance oI the
tenant to the premises by locking or otherwise.
5.Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(a)The landlord or the landlord`s agent may apply by aIIidavit oI complaint
Ior eviction to the justice court oI the township in which the dwelling, apartment,
mobile home or commercial premises are located or to the district court oI the
county in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are
located, whichever has jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon issue
an order directing the sheriII or constable oI the county to remove the tenant
within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order. The aIIidavit must state or contain:
(3)The amounts oI any cleaning, security or rent deposits paid in
advance, in excess oI the Iirst month`s rent, by the tenant.
(5)The length oI time the tenant has remained in possession without
paying rent.
(7)A statement that the written notice was served on the tenant in
accordance with NRS 40.280.
(b)Except when the tenant has timely Iiled the aIIidavit described in
subsection 3 and a Iile-stamped copy oI it has been received by the landlord or the
landlord`s agent, and except when the landlord is prohibited pursuant to NRS
118A.480, the landlord or the landlord`s agent may, in a peaceable manner,
provide Ior the nonadmittance oI the tenant to the premises by locking or
otherwise.
6.Upon the Iiling by the tenant oI the aIIidavit permitted in subsection 3,
regardless oI the inIormation contained in the aIIidavit, and the Iiling by the
landlord oI the aIIidavit permitted by subsection 5, the justice court or the district
court shall hold a hearing, aIter service oI notice oI the hearing upon the parties, to
determine the truthIulness and suIIiciency oI any aIIidavit or notice provided Ior
in this section. II the court determines that there is no legal deIense as to the
alleged unlawIul detainer and the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer, the court
may issue a summary order Ior removal oI the tenant or an order providing Ior the
nonadmittance oI the tenant. II the court determines that there is a legal deIense as
to the alleged unlawIul detainer, the court shall reIuse to grant either party any
relieI, and, except as otherwise provided in this subsection, shall require that any
Iurther proceedings be conducted pursuant to NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive.
The issuance oI a summary order Ior removal oI the tenant does not preclude an
action by the tenant Ior any damages or other relieI to which the tenant may be
entitled. II the alleged unlawIul detainer was based upon subsection 5 oI NRS
40.2514, the reIusal by the court to grant relieI does not preclude the landlord
thereaIter Irom pursuing an action Ior unlawIul detainer in accordance with NRS
40.251.
7.The tenant may, upon payment oI the appropriate Iees relating to the Iiling
and service oI a motion, Iile a motion with the court, on a Iorm provided by the
clerk oI the court, to dispute the amount oI the costs, iI any, claimed by the
landlord pursuant toNRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 Ior the inventory, moving and
storage oI personal property leIt on the premises. The motion must be Iiled within
20 days aIter the summary order Ior removal oI the tenant or the abandonment oI
the premises by the tenant, or within 20 days aIter:
(a)The tenant has vacated or been removed Irom the premises; and
(b)A copy oI those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant,
whichever is later.
8.Upon the Iiling oI a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall
schedule a hearing on the motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days aIter
the Iiling oI the motion. The court shall aIIix the date oI the hearing to the motion
and order a copy served upon the landlord by the sheriII, constable or other
(a)Determine the costs, iI any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS
determined to be due or iI no charges are determined to be due.
9.A landlord shall not reIuse to accept rent Irom a tenant that is submitted
aIter the landlord or the landlord`s agent has served or had served a notice
pursuant to subsection 1 iI the reIusal is based on the Iact that the tenant has not
paid collection Iees, attorney`s Iees or other costs other than rent, a reasonable
charge Ior late payments oI rent or dishonored checks, or a security. As used in
this subsection, 'security has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 118A.240.
10.This section does not apply to the tenant oI a mobile home lot in a mobile
home park or to the tenant oI a recreational vehicle lot in an area oI a mobile home
park in this State other than an area designated as a recreational vehicle lot
pursuant to the provisions oI subsection 6 oI NRS 40.215.
(Added to NRS by 1967, 195; A 1969, 263, 575; 1973, 1085; 1975, 1202;
1977, 418, 1346; 1979, 1398, 1879; 1985, 229; 1987, 1239; 1989, 1082,
1232; 1991, 113; 1995, 1851; 1997, 3511; 1999, 981; 2009, 1966; 2011,
235, 1489)
"
Further, Kern failed to file in a Landlord's Affidavit prior to the 3/15/12
summary eviction proceeding, which was noticed for 8:30 am, but to which the
Kockout Order had a Iax header indicated the Order was Iaxed to the WCSO Civil
Division at 8:24 am. As such, in consideration oI the dictates oI NRS 40.253(5)-
(6), the 3/15/12 Lockout Order is void pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(4) Ior lack oI
jurisdiction given that the summary eviction hearing was held prior to Kern Iiling
a Landlord's AIIidavit :
'NRS 40.253(5).Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(a)The landlord or the landlord`s agent may apply by
affidavit of complaint for eviction to the justice court oI the
township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or
commercial premises are located or to the district court oI the
county in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or
commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction
over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order
directing the sheriff or constable of the county to remove
the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order. The
affidavit must state or contain:
(3)The amounts oI any cleaning, security or rent
deposits paid in advance, in excess oI the Iirst month`s rent, by
the tenant.
(5)The length oI time the tenant has remained in
possession without paying rent.
(7)A statement that the written notice was served on
the tenant in accordance with NRS 40.280.
(9)A copy oI the signed written rental agreement, iI
any....
...6.Upon the filing by the tenant oI the aIIidavit
permitted in subsection 3, regardless oI the inIormation
contained in the aIIidavit, and the filing by the landlord of
the affidavit permitted by subsection 5, the justice court or
the district court shall hold a hearing, aIter service oI notice
oI the hearing upon the parties, to determine the truthIulness
and suIIiciency oI any aIIidavit or notice provided Ior in this
section... II the court determines that there is a legal deIense as
to the alleged unlawIul detainer, the court shall reIuse to grant
either party any relieI, and, except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, shall require that any further proceedings be
conducted pursuant to NRS 40.290 to 40.420 , inclusive...
The RJC impermissibly held the 3/15/12 summary eviction proceeding in
375 before Kern Iiled a Lanlord's AIIidavit in violation oI NRS 40.253(6)'s
dicates: '... 6.Upon the filing by the tenant oI the aIIidavit permitted in
subsection 3, regardless oI the inIormation contained in the aIIidavit, and the
filing by the landlord of the affidavit permitted by subsection 5, the justice
court or the district court shall hold a hearing, aIter service oI notice oI the
hearing upon the parties, to determine the truthIulness and suIIiciency oI any
aIIidavit or notice provided Ior in this section...
(never mind that the one Kern had Iiled after the summary eviction proceeding
conveniently managed to change the basis Ior seeking eviction to one based upon
non-payment oI rent, rather than the 'No Cause Termination Notice posted on the
door oI Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice on 2/13/12 in 374, which indicated that
Coughlin had 5 days to leave and was entitled to no more Notice give his was a
'Tenancy At-Will...this remixing oI the basis Ior seeking and Eviction and
recharacterization oI the type oI Notice served on Coughlin is especially dubious
given the authority and argument cited in Coughlin's 3/8/12 Iiled Tenant's Answer,
which points out that the landlord is prevented Irom utilizing a summary eviction
proceeding to evict a commercial tenant such as Coughlin (whom pled a
commercial tenancy therein) where the non-payment or rent is not alleged, pled, or
noticed (as there, given the No Cause Termination Notice oI 2/13/12 in 374).
Further, Kern's Landlord's AIIidavit is Iurther suspect where, all oI the sudden
Iollowing Coughlin's 3/8/12 Tenant's Answer pointing such out, Kern switches
gears and attempts to stear clear oI the problems to her cause presented by the
citation to the Glazier decision in consideration oI the sworn testimony by WNM's
Sue King and PTTHOA Board Secretary Sheila Lester that the Board approved oI
the arrangement with Coughlin's housemates (and arguably, the sublessor there),
Christopher Allaback and Laura Foreshee (ne Harrison) (against whom, on
1/23/12, Couglin was awarded TPO's in FV12-000187 and 188), though Allaback
and Foreshee were the parties Couglhin called 911 to complain about and seek
protection Irom incident to the 1/14/12 arrest Ior 'misuse oI emergency
communciations when no actual or perceived emergency exists oI Coughlin
ordered by the same RPD Sargent SiIre whom ordered Coughlin arrested Ior
jaywalking just 48 hours previously at the other Iormer home law oIIice Irom
which Coughlin was wrongIully evicted in 03628.
ORDER DENYING ZACHARY COUGHLIN'S NOTICE OF
CLERK'S OFFICE AND COURT'S FAILURE TO FILE COUGHLIN'S
NOTICE OF APPEAL, REQUEST THAT IT DO SO NOW"AND MOTION
FOR RELIEF FROM 1UDGMENT OF 3/15/12 AND ORDER OF 5/15/12 IN
LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD AND NRCP
60(B)(4) AND WAIVING THE REQUIREMENT FOR PARK TERRACE
TOWNHOMES ASSOCIATION TO FILE AN OPPOSITION TO
ZACHARY COUGHLIN'S NOTICE
On or about November 5, 2012, Pro Se Attorney Litigant/tenant, Zach
Coughlin ("Coughlin") Iiled a Notice oI Clerk's OIIice and Court's Failure to File
Coughlin's Notice oI Appeal, Request That it Do So Now, and Motion Ior RelieI
Irom Judgment iI 3/15/12 and Order oI 5/15/12 in Light oI Newly Discovered
Evidence and Fraud and NRCP 60(B)(4) ("Notice/Motion"). Although
Coughlin's Proof of Service indicates that Park Terrace Townhomes'
management company and attorney were served, the Court has discovered
that, in fact, neither was served.
The Court has reviewed Coughlin's Notice/Motion. The Court has Iurther
considered the papers and pleadings on Iile herein, together with any attached
exhibits, and the applicable law.
Based upon its review, the Court Iinds that there is no legal or Iactual basis
Ior Coughlin's Notice/Motion. GOOD CAUSE APPEARING THEREFORE, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that Coughlin's Notice Motion is DENIED. IT IS
FURTHER ORDERED that Park Terrace Townhomes Association is released
Irom any requirement to respond to Coughlin's NoticelMotion. DATED this 14th
day oI November, 2012. /s/ Jack Schroeder, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
The approach by RJC Judge Schroeder and opposing counsel Gayle Kern,
Esq., in 375 is interesting. Couglin receives Judge Shroeder's Order only Irom
Kern, along with her Notice oI Entry oI Order. That is, the RJC and or Judge
Schroeder do not mail Coughlin Judge Schroeder's Order, but rather, provide them
to only Kern, whom then serves them to Coughlin only with a Notice oI Entry oI
Order, thereby depriving Couglin oI, potentially, a Iew days or so to review such
an Order prior to the deadlines that begin running upon service oI a Notice oI
Entry oI Order beginning to run.
Additionally, Judge Schroeder's Order oI 11/14/12, very curiously reads: '
Although Coughlin's Proof of Service indicates that Park Terrace
Townhomes' management company and attorney were served, the Court has
discovered that, in fact, neither was served. One can only wonder just Judge
Schroeder and 'the Court has discover that, in Iact neither opposing counsel
Gayle Kern, Esq., nor her unauthorized practitioner oI law/propery manager,
Western Nevada Managment's Sue King 'wer served iI not by having
impermissible ex parte communications with King or Kern and or otherwise
engaging in extra-judicial discussion and Iailing to abide by the established
precedent in Nevada that a court's adjuciatory boundaries are limited to those
matters presented to it by the litigants, rather than what 'the Court has discovered
through some unnamed methodology. Judge Schroeder has a duty to avoid the
appearance oI bias or impropriety.
The RJC Iile in 374 also contains a Post-It Note Order by Judge Schroeder
oI 3/27/12 in response to Couglin's 3/23/12 Motion to Set Aside the 3/15/12
Lockout Order that reads Clerks, Please see iI Atty Ior LL is going to Iile a
response. Send the Iile back to me in 13 days. JS. Couglin has never received
an inquiry or remind Irom any RJC Judge as to whether he is going to respond to
some Iiling by an opposing counsel. Such a Note Order may be interpreted to
create an appearance oI impropriety, particularly given the subsequent 11/14/12
Order by Judge SIerrazza summarily disposing oI Couglin's 11/5/12 NRCP 60(b)
(4) Motion/Notice and absoliving Kern oI even having to Iile an Opposition
thereto or otherwise address Couglin's allegations oI Iraud on Kern's part.
Additionally, Coughlin notes another appearance oI the curious practice oI
the RJC and WCDA's OIIice characterizing Coughlin as 'an attorney when it
would seem to suit what some might say is their agenda, and 'not an
attorney/suspended Irom the practice oI law, when it so suits the same to do so
(ie, WCDA DDA Watts-Vial's 11/13/12 objection to Coughlin's 10/30/12
subpoenas on the 2JDC
ii
(... By your own admission at the top oI the subpoena.,
you are temporarily suspended Irom the practice oI law. It Iollows that you have
no authority to issue subpoenas, and that there is no duty to comply with the same.
NRCP 45(3)...), WCDA DDA Kandaras's 11/14/12 Motion to Quash Couglin's
subpoenas/duces tecums in 063341 Iiled in 063341, though also attaching
associated supboenas in 0204 ('The parties request that all subpoenas and
subpoenas duces tecum issued by deIendant Zach Coughlin be quashed because
they were not issued and served in accordance with NRS 174.305...With respect to
Exhibits A and B, those subpoenas were not properly issued...The parties request
that the Court's order issued November 8, 2012 (Exhibit D) be extended to the
reIerenced subpoenas in Exhibits A and B. SpeciIically, paragraph 2 oI that order
states that "any subpoena not properly issued by the clerk or otherwise in
accordance with NRS 174.305 is hereby quashed." Subpoena in Exhibit A was not
issued by the court...), RJC Judge SIerrazza's 11/8/12, 11/16/12, and 11/19/12
Orders Quashing Coughlin's Subpoenas and granting the Reno City Attorney
Skau's Motion Ior a Temporary Protective Order preventing Coughlin Irom being
able to even have any new subpoenas issued by the RJC.
RJC Judges CliIton and SIerrazza have indicated they view it as Coughlin's
Iault that he issued and or had issued and or had served so many subpoenas on or
around October 30
th
, 2012 in both 063341 and 0204. They do not view the 15
diIIerent arrests oI Couglin this year as overkill by the local judiciary and law
enIorcement/prosecutors as having some role in attempted utilization Io such
subpoenas, the obstructionist approach by the Washoe County Public DeIender's
OIIice in Iighting to stay on as attorney oI record in Coughlin's cases in 063341
and 065630 as long as possible, only to, at the last minuted (usually at the 15 day
deadline prior to Trial to Iile a Pre-Trial Motion, obtain and Order allowing the
withdrawal oI WCPD Jim Leslie, Esq., or Biray Dogan, Esq., leaving Coughlin to
make up Ior lost time in terms oI using subpoenas Ior his deIense), or the as a
mitigating Iactor Judge SIerrazza's express indication, on the record on 10/22/12 in
063341 that he absolutely would not grant Coughlin a continuance oI the
continuation oI Trial in 063341 he then set Ior 11/19/12 despite Couglin indicating
that the State Bar oI Nevada was to hold Coughlin's Iormal disciplinary hearing on
11/14/12. At that same hearing, shortly aIter announcing that he had reIused the
SBN's request to testiIy at that 11/14/12 Iormal disciplinary hearing, Judge
SIerrazza Iailed to disclose the 4/11/12 written correspondence and voluntary
submission oI Coughlin's 2/21/12 Iiling in 065630, the dockets in 065630 and
063341, and the oIIer to send Couglin's 2/15/12 Pre-Trial Motion in 063341 to the
SBN to Coughlin. Such a Iailure to disclose his Judicial Secretarie's submission to
the SBN by Judge SIerrazza arguably creates the appearance oI impropriety and or
an inIerence supporting oI a Iinding oI evident impartiality or bias.
The RJC Iile in 374 contains another curiousity where, upon Couglin
Couglin was charged with a gross misdemeanor necessitating a $300 bail
expenditure, and to which Couglin was entitled to representation 'at all stages oI
the proceedings, despite his WCPD Biray Dogan Iailing to appear on his behalI
(as had been agreed to upon Couglin and Dogan discussing the matter on 2/8/12 in
person) at the 2/14/12 arraignment (which the RJC has not characterized in its
docket as 'cancelled, apparently to protect Dogan Irom a potential RPC
violation...though RJC Judicial Secretary Lori Townsend did manage to
voluntarily send the SBN, in her 4/11/12 email to Asst. Bar Counsel King,
Coughlin's 2/21/12 Iile stamped Notice oI Appearance, etc. in that matter, RJC
RCR2012-065630, along with the dockets in that case and another retaliatory
prosecution oI Coughlin in 063341, in addition to oIIering to send Coughlin's
2/15/12 Pre-Trial Motion in 063341 as well in an attempt to cause Coughlin
diIIiculties with the SBN, in an apparent retaliatory move in connection with
Coughlin's summary eviction in 1708, issues with RJC BailiIIs, and the criticisms
oI the process one might read into Coughlin's 2/21/12 Iilign in 065630, which is
cited in Bar Counsel's 8/23/12 Complaint thusly:
'9. On February 21. 2012. Respondent Iiled a document
entitled, Notice oI Appearance Entry oI Plea oI Not Guilty,
Waiver oI Arraignment, Motion to Dismiss, etc. in one oI his
pending criminal matters, Case No. RCR-2012 065630, City
oI Reno v. Zachary Coughlin. The document clearly shows
Respondent's unproIessional, disruptive conduct, and lack oI
respect Ior the court and opposing counsel. '
Coughlin subsequently Iiled a grievance against Dogan which Asst. Bar
Counsel King promptly Iailed to investigate in any discernible manner and
dismissed without assisgning it a grievance number, alleging an inability to prove
by the 'clear and convicing evidence standard any ethicial or RPC violation by
Dogan, despite Dogan's Iailure to appear at the 2/14/12 gross misdemeanor
arraignment being required by statute.
King similarly issued a dismissal letter to Couglin oI a grievance Couglin
Iiled against his then RMC court appointed deIender Keith Loomis, which
alleged, amongst other things, a lack oI zealous advocacy, competence, diligence,
and a Iailure by Loomis to adhere to the dictates oI RPC 3.1 in reIusing to assert
a claim oI right deIense on Coughlin's behalI to the criminal trespass prosecution
where Hill and Baker admitted verbally and in writing that they were charging
Coughlin the same $900 previously charged Ior Iull use and occupancy oI his
Iormer home law oIIice at 121 River Rock during the month oI November 2011,
where Couglin as arrested at his Iormer home law oIIice on 11/13/11 Ior criminal
trespass.
King's Complaint also goes on to allege:
'10. Respondent was arrested on November 13, 2011
by Reno Police Department and charged with trespassing, a
misdemeanor, Ior which he was later convicted.
11. The circumstances leading to the above-mentioned
arrest are as Iollows: at an hearing Justice oI the Peace Peter
SIerrazza ordered that Respondent vacate the home he was
renting eIIective November 1, 2011. AIter the locks were
changed and the notice was posted on the Iront door the
owner, Dr. Merliss, discovered that someone had broken into
the home and was barricaded in the basement. The Reno
Police tried to coax whoever was in the basement to open the
door. Dr. Merliss was Iorced to kick open the door where the
Reno Police Iound Respondent. Respondent had broken into
the home and living in the basement. Respondent was arrested
Ior criminal trespass and was subsequently convicted oI that
charge.
12. Respondent, representing himselI as co-counsel,
Iiled a 36-page motion to dismiss on March 5, 2012. The
motion was denied by Judge William Gardner and was
determined to be without merit. The motion, on its Iace,
demonstrates that Respondent lacks competence to practice
law.
Further, King's reIusal to allow Coughlin to even see or review the
materials submitted along with Judge Holmes' 3/14/12 grievance and any other
materials submitted by the RMC (including the 23 Exhibit submission oI 4/16/12,
that did include Coughlin's 3/5/12 Motion to Dismiss in the criminal trespass
matter beIore Judge W. Gardner in 26405) hampered the conIlict/judicial
disqualiIication analysis attendant to a number oI cases, including that criminal
trespass prosecution.
Coughlin believes he was on time Ior the 8:30 am hearing on 3/15/12,
though the JAVS audio recording/video Couglin paid the RJC $35 Ior (it is only 2
minutes 12 seconds long) has a visual time stamping indicating a start time oI the
recording the RJC provided to Couglhin oI 8:33:35 am on 3/15/12 (the RJC hrlI
itselI out to the public at all relevant times as starting such hearings and stacked
dockets at 8:30 am). Regardless, the Landlord's AIIidavit that Kern Iiled after
that summary eviction hearing is Iile stamped as being Iiled at 9:24 am. The
audio transcript oI that 3/15/12 summary eviction hearing reveals RJC Judge
Schroeders judicial assistant prompting him to go out oI the Order he had planned
to hear the cases on his stacked docket in in order to, hopeIully, speed through a
deIault against Coughlin, whom the Clerk notes on the audio transcript, had yet to
show up that morning. Subsequently, Coughlin has received Order Irom Judge
Schroeder only by their being attached to Notice oI Entry mailed out by Kern,
curiously. Further, a recent Order by Judge Schroeder curiously absolves Kern
Irom needing to respond to Coughlin's Motion to Set Aside the summary eviction,
noting that Judge Schroeder 'has learned that Kern and King ...
The 3/15/12 Lockout Order by RJC Judge Schroeder in 374 not only
contains the wrong aaaress oI the building Irom which Coughlin was actually
evicted later that day, but Iurther was signed and Iile stamped in priory to Kern
Iiling a sworn Lanldord's AIIidavit as required by law, containing the assertions
and inIormation required by NRS 40.253. That 3/15/12 Lockout Order reads:
'UPON APPLICATION duly and regularly made by
Park Terrace Townhornes, Landlord, and prooI therein,
supported by a sworn Affidavit on the date hereinaIter
mentioned, and good causing appearing thereIore, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
AS FOLLOWS: That the SheriII oI Washoe County, or
one oI their duly authorized agent, are hereby directed
to remove each and every person Iound upon and within
those certain premises located at 1442 E 9th ST Reno
NV 89512, Reno Washoe County, Nevada within 24
hours aIter receipt oI this order .
The 3/15/12 RJC Rev2012-000374 Lockout Order taped to door by WCSO
with Iax header Irom RJC timed 8:24 am though Iile stamped 9:33 am PTTHOA
wcso 0204. The WCSO Civil Division has indicated to Coughlin, both through
Liz Stuchell, Roxy Silva, and Maureen, that the RJC Iaxes Lockout Orders to the
WCSO Civil Division, and the WCSO takes the Iax, inputs by hand into a
soItware program the time oI 'receipt oI such Order (which is not necessarily the
same as the time oI receipt oI the Iax as indicated by the time stamping and Iax
number received Irom shown in the Iax header as printed onto the Lockout Orders
by the WCSO Civil Division Iax machine), whereupon no copy oI such Iax is
made or maintained by the WCSO Civil Division, but rather, that Iaxed Lockout
Order is then given to the Deputies whom will perIorm the lockout 'within 24
hours oI receipt oI that Lockout Order, and that such lockout procedure includes
taping that Iaxed Lockout Order to the tenant's door. Coughlin maintained the
exact Iaxed Lockout Order that WCSO Deputies Cannizaro and Durben taped to
his door on 3/15/12 at approximately 1:45 pm at 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2 (shortly beIore
the 3/15/12 hearing beIore NVB Judge Bessley in Cadle Co. v. Keller that Judge
Beesley testiIied to at the 11/14/12 Hearing, at Iirst indicating that Coughlin did
not have a jacket on when appearing at the hearing, but then later admitting on
cross examination that Couglhin, in Iact, was wearing a suit jacket during that
appearance.
The Lockout Order in 374 is like most every Lockout Order issued by an
RJC Judge, even though the landlord had an attorney representing it. The RJC
has indicated to Coughlin (through ChieI Civil Clerk Karen Stancil and Clerk
Bonnie Cooper) that, when an attorney is representing the landlord, the attorneys
will typically prepare their own Orders, and that the attorneys will then arrange
Ior such Orders to be delivered or transmitted to the WCSO Civil Division. That
assertion runs counter to the sworn testimony by Hill's associate Casey D. Baker,
Esq., at the criminal trespass prosecution trial oI Couglhin on 6/18/12 in RMC
26405, where Baker swears:
Regardless, neither the 10/25/11 Eviction Decision and Order, nor the
10/27/11 FOFCOL and Order oI Summary Eviction in 1708 contains the
language required by NRS 40.253 Iound above in the Lockout Order by Judge
Schroeder in 374 (' That the SheriII oI Washoe County, or one oI their duly
authorized agent, are hereby directed to remove each and every person found
upon and within those certain premises located at (insert address oI rental
here), Reno Washoe County, Nevada within 24 hours after receipt of this
order.
Further, with respect to the criminal trespass prosecution oI Coughlin in
26405 based upon an arrest on 11/13/11 oI Coughlin at his Iormer home law
oIIice at 121 River Rock St., 89512, no language in either the 10/25/11 Eviction
Decision and Order, nor the 10/27/11 FOFCOL and Order oI Summary Eviction
in 1708 could reasonably be said to be tantamount to a warning suIIicient to
support a Iinding that Coughlin's presence at the location alone (without any
Iurther warning, request that he leave, or signage warning against trespassing)
would suIIice to support a conviction Ior criminal trespass. Where RCA Hazlett-
Steven's suggestion that State v. McNichols supported such a Iinding was
expressly cited by RMC Judge L. Gardner, a lack oI due process is evident,
particularly where Judge Gardner ruled as 'irrelevant Coughlin's contentions
that neither oI those Orders in 1708 were appropriately served (never mind the
Iact that the Orders were stale in one respect, and the lockout was eIIectuated too
early in other respects, much less that voidness Ior lack oI jurisdiction oI the
Orders themselves in light oI NRS 40.253(6)'s dicates
It is rather curious that it was on that same 2/27/12 date as the 'simple
traIIic citation trial in RMC 26800 beIore Judge Nash Holmes resulting in an
SCR 105 Complaint against Coughlin and a 5 day summary incarceration and
conIiscating without a warrant an not pursuant to a search incident to arrest oI
Coughlin's HTC G2 smart phone, Iree standing 32 GB micro SD data card,
Samsung Ilip phone, and Braun electric shaver Ior 37 days, at which point the
items were returned to Coughlin with all data thereon wiped, damaging Couglin's
law practice, making it overly diIIicult to compensate Ior the sudden 5 day
summary incarceration and imprudent denial oI a stay by Judge Holmes on
2/27/12, or to know oI or attend the 3/12/12 continuation oI the trial beIore her in
26800, which was improperly held given the competency issues Judge Nash
Holmes herselI Iound to be in question as to Coughlin in both her 2/28/12 Order
(which Coughlin did not receive until Iinding it attached to a Iiling in 60975 in
mid June 2012, given the RMC mailed it to the 121 River Rock address that it
knew was no longer good Ior Coughlin, and where the RMC had been provided
Coughlin's then current 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2 address on multiple occassions,
including in a 2/23/12 Iiled Motion to Set Aside the 'candy bar and cough drops
conviction in 22176 in the matter beIore RMC Judge Howard, which was the
subject oI a RMC Judge meeting discussing the strategy the RMC would take
with Coughlin prior to the 2/27/12 trial date. So, Judge Holmes' contention, in
her 3/14/12 'Iormal written complaint against Coughlin to the RMC that she was
having such diIIiculty contacting Coughlin given the Iour or so diIIerent
addresses the RMC had Ior him (noting that she had 'heard he may be living in
his car...which indicates, along with the premature Lockout Order entered at
8:24 am, per the time stamped Iax header in 374, by RJC Judge Schroeder the
very next day, 3/15/12, that RMC Judge Nash Holmes, and RJC Judge Schroeder
had extra-judicial discussions related to Coughlin (perhaps that is where Judge
Holmes was between 1:30 pm and 3:00pm when her Judicial Assistant can be
heard on the record remarking as to how strange it was that no one could Iigure
out where Judge Nash Holmes was exactly, indicating Holmes may have, by that
point, ventured over the RJC Ior a little strategizing as to the approach with
Coughlin). What is strange is that the Iax header on the 3/8/12 Iile stamped
TENANT'S ANSWER AND TENANTS AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION TO 30
DAY NOTICE TO QUIT; MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES indicates that that Iiling was received by the RJC on 2/27/12...Iurther, a Iile
stamping oI 3/5/12 can be seen on that Iiling, though it is crossed out and marked
as 'Iiled in error. Most likely, the 3/8/12 Iile stamping, compared to the 2/27/12
Iax header date stamping oI receipt by the RJC is owing to the RJC not Iiling in
the Tenant's Answer where the IFP submitted along with was denied, until
Coughlin paid the $33 Iiling Iee, which he ultimately did, likely on 3/8/12.
Couglin's 3/8/12 Tenant's Answer in 374 contains, in part, the Iollowing
argument and citation:
'...COMES NOW, the undersigned Tenant and states: 1. I am the
tenant oI a rental united located at 1422 E. 9th St. #2, Reno 89512.
2. my rent is not subsidized by public housing authority or other
governmental agency. Glazier v. Justice Court oI Smith Valley Tp.,
111 Nev. 864, 899 P.2d 1105 (Nev. Jul 27, 1995): "Summary
eviction statute allowing landlord to apply to justice's court Ior
eviction order based on deIault in payment oI rent did not apply to
unlawIul detainer action against tenant who never paid any rent nor
was required to pay any and, thus, summary eviction order was
outside jurisdiction oI justice's court. N.R.S. 40.253..On March 1,
1993, Richard Fulstone, president oI Fulstone, served Glazier with a
thirty-day notice to quit the property. Glazier Iailed to vacate the
premises,and on April 2, 1993, Fulstone served Glazier with a Iive-
day notice. This notice expressly threatened an action in justice's
court Ior eviction, pursuant to NRS 40.253,FN1 the summary
eviction statute. FN1. NRS 40.253 allows a landlord to apply to the
justice's court Ior an eviction order based on deIault in payment oI
rent. II the tenant can show, by aIIidavit, a legal deIense to the
alleged unlawIul detainer, Iurther proceedings must be conducted
pursuant to the more Iormal eviction procedures in NRS 40.290 to
40.420. II, on the other hand, the tenant Iails to show a legal deIense
to the alleged unlawIul detainer, then the justice's court may issue a
summary order Ior removal oI the tenant. The justice's court held a
hearing pursuant to the provisions oI NRS 40.253 and ordered that
Glazier vacate the property within thirty days. Glazier then Iiled a
petition Ior a writ oI certiorari beIore the district court, alleging that
the justice's court exceeded its jurisdiction under the 'summary
eviction provisions oI the statute by, inter alia, inquiring into
matters beyond the truthIulness and suIIiciency oI the aIIidavits,
and Iailing to dismiss the 'summary eviction proceeding once a
legal deIense had been raised. The district court held a hearing on
the writ petition and denied the petition. On appeal to this court,
Glazier argues that, pursuant to NRS 40.253, once he raised the
legal deIense that he was a liIe tenant under the grant oI a liIe
estate, the justice's court was obligated to dismiss the 'summary
proceeding and to require that the landlord prosecute his unlawIul
detainer action under the 'plenary eviction proceedings provided
Ior in NRS 40.290 to 40.420. **1106 Although Glazier's argument
is logically sound, it is simply irrelevant. It is clear that, despite all
the proceedings below and the arguments oI the parties beIore this
court, NRS 40.253 does not apply to this case. The statute is
applicable 'when the tenant oI any dwelling | | with periodic rent
reserved by the month or any shorter period, is in deIault in
payment oI the rent. (Emphasis *866 added.) All parties to this
action concede that Glazier never paid any rent, nor was he required
to pay any. It may be that Fulstone is entitled to have Glazier
removed Irom the property, but not pursuant to NRS 40.253. There
was no case or controversy beIore the justice's court based on NRS
40.253, and accordingly, the justice's court exceeded its jurisdiction
by issuing the summary eviction order. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment oI the district court and remand to the district court with
directions to grant the writ. Further, we order that the eviction order
entered by the justice's court be vacated. Nev.,1995. Glazier v.
Justice Court oI Smith Valley Tp. 111 Nev. 864, 899 P.2d 1105,
See, also, Nev.,1996. Lippis v. Peters 112 Nev. 1008, 921 P.2d
1248..." (page 4)...I have a lease which has not expired and the
landlord has not given me notice that they/she is terminating my
lease. My lease allows me to use the premises Ior a hybrid purpose
oI a home law oIIice, ie a commercial lease, as such the No Cause
type oI eviction is not available here, especially where, as her, my
lease has not terminated by its terms as oI yet. I have not received a
notice Irom the landlord telling me to leave the premises. they can
talk about what they told "John Doe" to do, but...Aitken requires
they change any "John Doe" notices to reIlect my actual name one
they were apprised oI it. The were as early as January 5th, 2011
according to Sue King, yet they Iailed to serve appropriate notice..
II I have ever owed the landlord any rent, I have paid it all or have
paid it within the time required by law. Association's negligence vis
a vis Laura and Chris's negligent andintentional torts committed
against me, which have resulted in thousands oI dollars oI damages.
Please copy me on any and all correspondence via Iax or email as
the landlords and or their argents have been or arewithholding my
mail or otherwise interIerring with my acces to it, and they have
also done with respect to the essential service oI electricity..
Association's negligence vis a vis Laura and Chris's negligent
andintentional torts committed against me, which have resulted in
thousands oI dollars oI damages. Please copy me on any and all
correspondence via Iax or email as the landlords and or their argents
have been or arewithholding my mail or otherwise interIerring with
my acces to it, and they have also d Written complaint to PTHOA'a
employees or agents, causing PTHOA to retaliate against Coughlin
was provide on January 8, 2012 in two separate writings, which
alleged: "Pursuant to NRS 118A and NRS 40, I am hereby
complaining in writing oI yours and Laura Harrison's violation oI
the Iollowing criminal laws: A Ielony conviction Ior malicious
destruction oI private property under NRS 206.310 and 193.155
must be CIVIL LIABILITY FOR LOSS OR DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY NRS 205.980 Determination oI value oI loss Irom
crime; notice to victim; order oI restitution deemed judgment to
collect damages. CHAPTER 206 - MALICIOUS MISCHIEF NRS
206.005 'GraIIiti deIined. NRS 206.010 Destruction or damage oI
property by unlawIul assembly. NRS 206.015 Destruction or
damage oI crops, gardens, trees or shrubs. NRS 206.040 Entering
property with intention to damage or destroy property. NRS
206.125 Damage oI property used Ior purpose oI religion, Ior burial
or memorializing oI dead, Ior education, as transportation Iacility,
as public transportation vehicle or as community center; damage oI
personal property contained therein; penalties; restitution. NRS
206.140 Nuisance in building; trespass upon grounds; disturbing
assembly. NRS 206.150 Killing, maiming, disIiguring or poisoning
animal oI another person; killing estray or livestock. NRS 206.160
Leading or driving horse away without authority. NRS 206.200
Posting oI bills, signs or posters unlawIul. NRS 206.220 Removal,
alteration or destruction oI monuments or landmarks designating
boundaries. NRS 206.260 Fraudulent and malicious destruction oI
writings. NRS 206.270 DeIacing proclamations and notices. NRS
206.280 Tampering with papers. NRS 206.290 Opening or
publishing sealed letter or telegram. NRS 206.300 False signals
endangering cars, vessels or motors. NRS 206.310 Injury to other
property. NRS 206.320 UnlawIul removal oI petriIied wood Irom
posted or designated sites; duties oI certain oIIicers. NRS 206.330
Placing graIIiti on or otherwise deIacing property: Fines and
penalties; parent or guardian responsible Ior Iines and penalties iI
person violating section is under age oI 18 years; suspension oI
driver`s license. NRS 206.335 Carrying graIIiti implement at certain
locations with intent to vandalize, place graIIiti on or deIace
property. NRS 206.340 GraIIiti Reward Fund created;
administrative assessment to be imposed Ior certain violations; use
oI money in Fund. NRS 206.345 Person or entity to be paid iI
restitution is ordered Ior violation oI NRS 206.125 or 206.330. Zach
Coughlin, Esq." The second writing: "This is additional written
notice pursuant to NRS 118A and NRS 40 complaining oI and
requesting repairs and reimbursement Ior the Iollowing: no cgIi
outlet near sink in upstairs bathroom. you broke the door to my
room and the lock and Iailed to provide a key laura harrison slashed
two oI my tires, necessitating $150 in repairs. You threw hot coIIee
on me and ruined my htc G2 smartphone, a $400 phone you have
breached are deal with respect to my being allowed to be new carpet
over the very dirty carpet downstairs. You have repeatedly used
Iorce and threat oI Iorce to prevent me Irom accessing the washing
machine downstairs Ior doing laundry and prevented my use oI the
kitchen You admitted to changing the deadbolts on the Iront and
back door's on New Years day at 12:30 am, locking me outside on a
night with Ireezing temperatures, necessitating an expense oI $60
Ior alternate lodging that night. Further, you and Laura Harrison
have unlawIully interrupted an essential service, my electricity,
repeatedly. NRS 118A.390. Please cure these issues or I intend to
deduct them Irom any Iuture rent. I am complaining oI yours and
Laura Harrison's violations oI criminal law statutes My dog had
chewing gum stuck in its hair in several places, in a manner that
suggests it was purposeIully done. I will remind you that abuse to
animals is included in the Protection Order Statutes. Further, you
and Ms. Harrison are in violation oI Iederal law in preventing my
access to the mailbox included in our agreement, as it was agreed
that I would be aIIorded the opportunity to receive mail at the 1422
E. 9th ST. #2 Address and use oI the mailbox. Sincerely, Zach
Coughlin, Esq." (pages 18-20)......
...The landlord's Complaint Iails to state Iacts which would allow
him/her to evict me, Iurther King and Western Nevada Management
and Shiela Lester have admitted they received nothing pursuant to
their arrangement with Allaback and Foreshee, as such the Nevada
Supreme Court holding in Glazier makes inapplicable a summary
eviction proceeding. Further, where, as here, my lease allows me to
use the premises Ior a home law oIIice, and the non-payment oI rent
has not been alleged, NRS 40.253 makes inapplicable a summary
eviction procedure under those circumstances, rather, a plenary
procedure is required. Regardless, a proper jury trial demand is
hereby made. There is perhaps another person against whom this
action should be brought, namely Erin Allaback and Laure Forshee.
I have not been properly named in the notices. Rather, the Notice
purportedly posed on January 10th, 2012 only names a "John Doe"
despite my numerous writings to Western Nevada wherein my
name was madse clear. The Aitken case makes clear that the
procedural and notice requirements oI summary eviction matters
must be stricly adhered to, as such this "John Doe" notice is
ineIIective. I have other deIenses as Iollows: retaliation,
discrimination, lack oI allegation oI nonpayment oI rent, HOA
admitted tenants were not obligated to pay rent, as such, under
Glazier, summary eviction procedures unavailable. IMPORTANT:
In some cases, the Court has the power to give you time to Iind a
new place to live even iI you do not have any oI the listed deIenses.
II you wish the Court to determine whether you are entitled to it,
please check below: I have provided written request to landlord Ior
an extension oI 30 days in light oI my disability. I am writing to
request the 30 days extension based upon disability. I am invoking
my HIPAA and other privacy rights with respect to divulging
anythign Iurther about my disability. COUNTERCLAIM II you
believe that you are entitled to a return oI part oI your rent payment
or other damages Irom the landlord, complete the statement below:
I here by counterclaim in excess oI $10,000 in damages. I Ieel that I
am entitled to this amount Ior the Iollowing reasons: damages to
myselI, my clients, and my practice in light oI landlord's and
landlord's agents actions. Laura and Chris being the Associations
employees and thereIore you guys or them wanted to settle with me
on account oI a respondeat superior theory oI liability making your
exposure signiIicant enough to justiIy doing so. Association's
negligence vis a vis Laura and Chris's negligent andintentional torts
committed against me, which have resulted in thousands oI dollars
oI damages. Please copy me on any and all correspondence via Iax
or email as the landlords and or their argents have been or
arewithholding my mail or otherwise interIerring with my acces to
it, and they have also done with respect to the essential service oI
electricity. (pages 26-28)///Being an attorney is hard enough
without dealing with all oI Park Terrace's malIeasance." Coughlin
also, within that 3/8/12 Iile stamped Iiling, sought sanctions:
Awarding Attorney's Fees to Pro Se Litigants Under Rule 11, June,
1997, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2308, Jeremy D. Spector....WHEREFORE,
tenant, Zach Coughlin, prays that this Court rule that a summary
eviction proceeding is unavailable to landlord here and award in
excess oI $10,000 damages to Tenant/Counterclaimant. (page
31)...
Also, the 3/8/12 Case Appeal Statement Couglhin Iiled in the appeal oI the
Iirst summary eviction Irom Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice, beIore Judge
Flanagan, contains a great deal oI inIlammatory inIormation related to RMC,
RPD, Reno City Attorney, RJC, WCSO, and others that ought be considered in
evaluating the events, orders, and grievances that ensued on 3/12/12 (Order by
RMC Holmes in 26800), 3/14/12 (greivance by Holmes to the SBN against
Coughlin and submission by Holmes oI 4/13/09 Order AIter Trial oI Judge L.
Gardner, which WLS (see 60302 and 60317) cited, in Exec. Director Elcano's
5/1/09 and 5/7/09 letters to Coughlin explaining his suspension and termination
as the sole reason Ior both (that 4/13/09 OAT resulted in Coughlin Iilign 53833
and 54844, which Elcano, whom testiIied to being 'very protective oI my
employees claime, in his sworn testimony, to have either not been aware oI or to
not have reviewed at all...somehow Elcano decided not to even wait Ior Judge L.
Gardner to rule on Coughlin's 4/27/09 or 4/30/09 Motion Ior Reconsideration
beIore deciding to Iire Coughlin, though Elcano's testimony on 11/14/12 revealed
the extent to which Elcano has a complete lack oI knowledge with respect to the
substantive issues involved in 01168...Elcano just knows he wants to do whatever
the Judge wants, despite Elcano admitting to having 'mentored and 'trained
Coughlin with such advice as 'when you walk into that courtroom, its not the
opposing counsel's courtroom, its not the judges courtroom....its YOUR
courtroom!.
Regardless, the SBN was provided the 2/23/12 Iiling by Coughlin in 22176
(it was included in the 11/8/12 3,200 page document production to Coughlin by
the SBN), which contained argument critical oI the handling oI the prosecution oI
Coughlin incident to the 11/30/11 Trial, and immediate, stay denied, 3 day
summary contempt incarceration oI Couglin by RMC Judge Howard, whom had
denied Coughlin both court appointed Counsel (despite Iailing to speciIically rule
that jail time was not a possibility and the mandatory authority Iound in the 2008
Nevada Courts oI Limited Jurisdiction Bench Book 'known to all judges in
Nevada by the Aigersinger U.S. Supreme Court case). Regardless, the RMC
received as 'undeliverable the 2/28/12 Order in 26800 that it mailed Coughlin,
then proceeded to Iail to remail it to any oI the other addresses it had Ior
Coughlin, much less the most current one indicated on Coughlin's 2/23/12 Iiling
in 22176, or even on Coughlin's 3/7/12 or 3/12/12 Iilings in 26800, much less Iax
or email it to the number and address held out by Coughlin on his Iilings and at
www.nvbar.org.
That 2/27/12 traIIic citation trial in the RMC resulted in Holmes sending a
written grievance against Coughlin to the SBN, NG12-0434, apparently (the SBN
has been very evasive about which greivance number belongs to which greivance
or grievant, making it diIIicult to Iollow RPC 4.2 with much certainty, to the
beneIit oI the SBN, which has managed to enjoy much synergy with the WCDA
(particularly TPO/EPO Application suggester DDA Mary Kandaras and DDA
David Watts-Vial (relation oI 2JDC Administrative Assistant, Laura Watts-Vial,
Esq., beIore whom Coughlin as a UIFSA case that threatened the hegemony oI
the WCDA Family Support Division's hegemony in FV11-03379, G. Jones v. D.
Harris) a companion case to the FV05 custody matter Ior which Coughlin did an
enormous amount oI work but was only paid about $100.00 oI the agreed upon
$1,500, so the whole AIIidavit oI Poverty with the RMC and King, Holmes, and
RMC Judge Howard (in his 12/16/11 Order in 22176) taking issue with Coughlin
being 'a licensed attorney while also claiming poverty, where also claiming his
'incarceration would prejudice his client's cases is not all that non-sensical.
One must give King and the RMC Judges some latitude there, though, as,
being government employes and or elected oIIicials, it must be awIully hard Ior
them to imagine someone working without getting paid. For King, it is probably
diIIicult Ior him to imagine someone working to get paia, and similarly, King
must have an inordinately diIIicult time imagining practicing law without the
beneIit oI SCR 106 immunity. Pretty charmed liIe that Pat King lives. Gets to
bring his Great Dane to work at the Double R oIIice oI the SBN. Leaves prior to
5 pm according to Nevada Lawyer contributor Paula Campbell (the SBN's 'Iiling
oIIice occasionally closes in the middle oI the day or prior to 5 pm, which,
Couglhin can attest, makes securing a Iiling date and or Iile stamped copy rather
problematic at times, as does being subject to TPOs or EPOs, purportedly served
by Reno Justice Court BailiIIs in either the RJC Filing OIIice or the Department
oI Alternative Sentencing (DAS) kiosk/closet with a window located within the
RJC Filing OIIice, adorned with signage pointing out the separateness oI the DAS
kiosk/program Irom the RJC's Filing OIIice. Courthouse sanctuary doctrine and
the general prohibition against serving attorney's process where they are
accessing a court or Iiling oIIice makes void both the TPO and EPO Ior both
Washoe County in 599 and the SBN in 607, nevermind the Iact that the
'workplace protection order application and Orders are void Ior lack oI the
posting oI the $100.00 bond required by statute.
Further, an email Couglin allegedly sent to his WCPD, that inlcuded
three diIIerent SBN employees in the list oI recipients, the alleged implied threat
contained therein being nothign more than a url being cited to that led to an auaio
clip only (ie, contrary to King and Leslie's contentions, there was no 'violent
video or 'scene Irom movie`) that in no way could reasonably be interpreted to
be a threat oI any sort suIIicient to meet the requirement Ior a Workplance
Protection Order, much less an 'Institutional Workplace Protection Order. Both
599 and 607 are egregious abuses oI process and the pointing oI gun at Coughlin's
head Irom 4 Ieet away by RPD OIIicer Waddle, in Couglin's back yard, upon
Waddle jumping out Irom behind a backyard shed at Couglin, without so much as
a single instance oI the RPD announcing themselves as law enIorcement or
otherwise issuing sort oI order or request to Couglin oI any type, and thereupon
arresting Couglin and charging him with both a Ielony and a gross misdemeanor
(in an obvious attempt by the SBN, WCPD, RJC, and WCDA, RPD, RMC, and
RCA, some might say, to prevent Couglin Irom being able to timely Iile his brieI
in 62337 and or in retaliation Ior the 2/7/13 Order by ChieI Justice Pickering ('iI
you like it then you oughta put Pickering on it) striking the extremely negligent
and deIicient (and soon to be proven Iraudulent) 12/24/12 ROA Iiled by the SBN
(which, curiously, lacks the 10/31/12 Iiling by Couglin that Coughlin has a Iile
stamped copy oI (heck, the 11/14/12 Hearing Exhibit #14 provides a good hint to
the SBN that such a Iiling exists, and its contained an Exhibit attached as disc, and
the content oI that Iiling is so incredibly damaging to everything Hill, the SBN,
RPD, WCSO, WCDA, RMC, RCA, and RJC are attempting to accomplish, some
might say, that is no wonder the SBN apparently 'lost that Iiling or otherwise
managed to Iail to include it in the ROA (or any oI the discs attached as Exhibits
containing certiIied copies oI the relevant audio transcripts Irom the key hearings,
and videos Irom all the arrests mentioned in the 8/23/12 Complaint and oI nearly
all other incidents at issue in the 8/23/12 Complaint and associated cases,
particularly those wherein some RPC 3.1 violation by Coughlin is alleged.
Nobody expected Couglin to be able to bail out on the bondable $5,000 bail
incident to the 2/8/12 arrest by the RPD. It didn't help that the jail continued to
deprive Couglin oI one oI his psychiatric medications and insisted upon providing
Coughlin one medication, Wellbutrin, at beatime (Wellbutrin will keep you awake
iI taken at bedtime) where Coughlin slept through two alarm clocks upon taking a
break Irom cramming Ior the 2/12/12 continuation oI the Trial in 065630 to take a
30 minute nap at 5:30 am. Judge CliIton (aIter managing to get an unnoticed,
'emergency Ex Parte Hearing recalling Judge Pearson back to the Bench brieIly
aIter tagging out with his Iorm WCDA DDA Criminal Division coworker CliIton
on 2/13/12 to alter or withdraw the 2/12/13 Order Ior Competency Evaluation that
Person had just entered an hour beIore incident to an unnoticed 'emergency
Order to Show Cause Hearing held at 8:30 am on 2/12/12 in 063341 stemming
Irom a 2/2/13 custodial arrest oI Coughlin by DAS OIIicer Ramos at 7:02 pm (in
violation oI NRS 171.136's prohibition against misdemeanor arrests aIter 7 pm
where no warrant present where Ramos Order Couglin out oI the 5
th
wheel trailer
he currently rents) based upon an allegation that Coughlin violated the terms oI his
probation where it was alleged Couglin Iailed to check in with DAS on 1/23/13,
despite DAS OIIicer Celeste Brown writing Couglin, on 1/24/13 to admit that the
'video at the courthouse showed and proved that Couglin presented to the
security check in no later than 2:56 pm in an attempt to check in with DAS by
their 3 pm closing time, but that Coughlin was prevented Irom doing so due to
security and the RJC, and Judge SIerrazza's 12/20/12 Administrative Order 12-01,
and security personnel verbal orders that day, and RJC BailiII Augustin Medina
taking just long enough to appear at the security check in point where Coughlin
was ordered to wait Ior an BailiII to escort him the 30 yards to the DAS check in.
So, that is three custodial arrests oI Coughlin in 10 days, between 2/2/13 and
2/12/13. Judge CliIton ordered Couglin remanded into custody (despite Couglin
being out on an OR release, no on bail) at the conclusion oI Coughlin's cross-
examination oI ECOMM's Carthen on 2/12/13 at noon Ior a Contempt Show
Cause Hearing to be held the Iollowing day at 9 am based upon CliIton's
contention that he had warned Coughlin previously about being 'late to Court,
despite Coughlin's contention that he had not previously been late, but rather had
been told by RJC ChieI Criminal Division Filing OIIice Clerk Robbin Baker that
CliIton had moved the start time Ior the Trial in 065630 on 12/11/12 to 1:30 pm
Irom a 9 am start time (which would make sense considering the Trial Tom
Viloria, Esq., respresented a deIendant in that morning as Couglin witnessed, upon
Coughlin calling the RJC to inquire about something and being told that the Trial
in 065630 was, in Iact, starting at 9 am that morning, at which point Coughlin
hurriedly traversed to the RJC, arriving by 10 am. Despite Robbin Baker,
curiously being absent Irom work that day, Judge CliIton sua sponte indicated that
Coughlin was 'wrong with regard to his contention that Baker had inIormed him
oI the start time Ior the 12/11/12 Trial being moved to 1:30 pm. Coughlin was
prevented Irom subpoening or calling Baker at the 2/15/12 Contempt Show Cause
Hearing in 065630 to rebut Judge CliIton's contention that Coughlin had been
'warned against being late 'again. ON 2/15/13 Judge CliIton summarily
sentenced Couglhin to 5 days incarceration to begin immediately where he also
denied Coughlin's Motion Ior even a brieI Stay (Iollowing his setting Coughlin's
bail at a ridiculous $10,000 on 2/14/13, some might say) with no possibility oI
paying a Iine in lieu oI serving said 5 days. Judge CliIton somehow managed to
Iind Couglhin's sleeping through two alarm clocks upon attempting to take a 30
minute nap at 5:30 am on 2/14/13 aIter being Iorced to cram Ior the continuation
oI trial in 065630 due to the two wrongIul arrests oI Coughlin (on 2/2/13 and
2/8/13) as 'volitional. Coughlin''s suddenly court appointed deIender, Bruce
Lindsay, Esq. (how is it Couglin gets court appointed counsel Ior a civil contempt
hearing on 2/14/13 in 065630 where he was denied such at the 3/23/12 Show
Cause Hearing in 03628 and on 11/30/12 in 22176 upon Judge Howard
announcing he may Iind Couglin in Contempt, then Iinding Coughlin in Contempt,
but insisting Coughlin continue on in selI representing himselI through the
remainder oI that criminal prosecution where the possibility 6 months jail time
existed and Coughlin was denied court appointed counsel by RMC Judge
Howard?). RJC ChieI BailiII Sexton indicated to Couglin, in a holding cell that
Couglin had 'Iive diIIerent violations oI Judge SIerrazza's Administrative Order
hanging over your head, each one carrying a possible3 25 day jail sentence where
such violations, allegedly, include calling the Iiling oIIice to conIirm the start time
oI a hearing or other alleged de minimis infractions.
OI course, the WCDA and the RJC Judges (particularly the second and
third most recently elected Justice oI the Peace, Iormer WCDA Criminal Division
prosecutors, CliIton and Pearson) have been particularly keen to inIorm Coughlin
that he 'is an attorney and thereIore 'expected to know the rules and Iollow
other Rules oI ProIessional Conduct and duties attendant to being an attorney,
even where Coughlin is Iunctioning as no more than a selI representing criminal
deIendant in the various retaliatory prosecutions he has Iaced Ior pointing out the
inequities attendant to the manner in which landlord tenant law is currently
applied in Washoe County and other civil rights violations by local law
enIorcement. OI course, that did not stop WCDA DDA Watts-Vial Irom
asserting, in a strategically last minute, Iaxed, objection to Coughlin's 10/30/12
SCR 110 Subpoenas and Subpoena Duces Tecums (Watts-Vial alleged that
NRCP 45's requirement that such subpoenas either be issued by a court or a
'licensed attorney made those subpoenas issued by Coughlin (per the express
permission to so issue his own subpoenas communicated to Coughlin on 10/15/12
by the SBN, in line with NNDB's Chairman Susich's 7/27/12 written
communication to Coughlin that such SCR 105(4) inquiries and matter be made
to the SBN, and not he, the NNDB Chairman, and that the SBN OBC possessed
the power and authority to so communicate such SCR 105(4) matters to
Coughlin) he had served by an appropriate non-party on 2JDC Clerk oI Court
Hastings and the 2JDC Custodian oI Records, that, due to Couglhin's being
'suspended Irom the practice oI law (as Ior Couglin not being an 'attorney
given the temporary suspension oI his law license in the State oI Nevada per
60838, that is not the case as Iar as the USPTO is concerned, and there is
authority to support the contention that a suspended attorney is still an attorney
anyways, though, and there is an entire ALR pointing out the Iact that the
suspension oI one's law license by a State Bar does not necessarily preclude an
attorney Irom appearing beIore Federal Courts, such as the NVB, or the USPTO,
etc..., and where NVB Judge Beesley's testiIying that a mitigating Iactor in
Stephen R. Harris, Esq.'s disciplinary matter exists where Mr. Harris is one oI the
Iew Chapter 11 bankruptcy attorney's in town, the District oI Nevada's
participation (amongst 14 other selected Iederal courts) in a Patent Litigation Pilot
Program, combined with Coughlin's license to practice patent law beIore the
USPTO, presents a similar mitigating Iactor in Coughlin's case, though Panel
Chair Echeverria roundly rejected Coughlin's right to put on such evidence at the
11/14/12 hearing, Ior some reason...).
Kern's misconduct resulted in proIound damage to Coughlin's proIessional
reputation and, may potentiallly lead to Coughlin being disbarred considering the
testimony oI NVB Judge Beesley at the 11/14/12 Formal Disciplinary Hearing
regarding Coughlin's appearance beIore him in the NVB on 3/15/12 shortly aIter
the WCSO Deputies broke into Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice at 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2, with guns drawn, handcuIIing Coughlin, aIter Iailing to identiIy
themselves as law enIorcement and barely knocking beIore entering the building.
The WCSO Deputies allowed Couglhin a scant Iew minutes to grab a Iew
personal items (Coughlin chose to use the time to grab his hard drives and client's
Iiles, resulting in his not having a tie to go with the suit jacket, shirt, and dress
slacks and shoes that he wore while appearing beIore Judge Beesley less than 30
minutes aIter the Deputies made Coughlin leave not only his Iormer home law
oIIice (reIusing to allow him to grab even his medications or eye
glasses/contacts), but where they also threatened to arrest Coughlin Ior
'distrubing the peace or 'trespassing or 'obstruction where Coughlin was
asking them questions related to the procedures under which they were carrying
out the Lockout Order, with the Deputies then threatening to move the personalty
Coughlin had Ierried out oI the building to the outside oI the building in Iront oI
his car back into the builaing. The Deputies Iailed to Iollow through on that
threat, but Coughlin was Iorced to hurriedly gather up that property under their
menacing glares and threats oI abuse oI process while a cackling Western Nevada
Management's Sue King and Jared Scalise watched on, soon to move in to the
building and, as Kern's 4/9/12 Opposition notes, immediately begin the process oI
having all oI Coughlin's property recklessly moved into a storage unit that day
and the next.
Kern's 4/9/12 Opposition itselI clearly violates RPC 3.1 where it alleges
Coughlin no more than 'a squatter with no right to possession oI the rental, even
where Kern's own client, Park Terrace Townhomes HOA, through a Secretary oI
the HOA Board, appearing with WNM's King (whom was 'allowed to practice
law without a license at a 2/23/12 hearing beIore Judge SIerrazza held in response
to Coughlin's Iiling, on 2/10/12 VeriIied Complaint Ior Illegal Lockout and or
Interruption oI Essential Services (NV Energy, Allaback, Foreshee, Kern, and
WNM's King all conspired to one degree or another to deprive Coughlin oI
electricity to the building Ior over 7 days in February 2012 (see attached emails
between Coughlin, NV Energy's Ron Jones, WNM's King, and HOA attorney
Kern). At the 2/23/12 hearing, Kern's client admitted, under oath, that the
individuals whom placed an advertisement on Craigslist to which Coughlin
responded on 12/27/11 Ior a room Ior rent with shared area privileges Ior $200
per month, were lawIully occupying the building at 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2, perhaps
even under some work in exchange Ior occupancy/lower insurance premiums
arrangement with the blessing oI the HOA upon WNM's then Assistant Manager
Robyn Batalado bringing such a proposed arrangement beIore the HOA Board.
How Kern can then, on 4/9/09, in her Opposition, not violate RPC 3.1 where she
alleges Coughlin 'no more than a squatter is not clear, especially where WNM's
King and the HOA Board's Secretary Iailed to oppose Coughlin's sworn
contention that Allaback and Foreshee rented him the room with shared area
privileges on 12/27/11, under periodic monthly tenancy. As such, the 2/13/12 5
Day UnlawIul Detainer No Cause Termination Notice King had posted to
Coughlin's door is deIicient where is relies upon a contention that Coughlin's was
an at will tenancy. Further, such a written admission is counter to Kern's 4/9/12
contentions in her Opposition that Coughlin had no legal right to ever possess any
part oI the structure at 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2.
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, OR PLED IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND OR MOTION
TO ALTER OR AMEND THE SUMMARY EVICTION ORDER AND THE
ORDER FOLLOWING HEARING ON MOTION TO CONTEST
PERSONAL PROPERTY LIEN, TOLLING THE DEADLINE TO FILE A
NOTICE OF APPEAL FOR ALL ORDERS
Park Terrace Townhomes Association ("Park Terrace") by and through its
attorneys Kern & Associates, Ltd., hereby opposes DeIendant Zachary Coughlin's
("Coughlin") Motion Reconsideration, or Pled in the Alternative, Motion Ior New
Trial and or Motion to Alter or,Amend the Summary Eviction Order and the
Order Following Hearing on Motion to Contest, Ior Personal Property Lien,
Tolling the Deadline to File a Notice oI Appeal Ior All Orders (hereinaIter the
"Motion"). As established herein. no legal or Iactual basis exists Ior Coughlin's
Motion. He was never lawIully on the premises, and since his eviction thereIrom,
he has been provided the opportunity by Park Terrace to retrieve all oI his
personal property -at no cost Ior storage. Accordingly, nothing in this case
warrants reconsideration oI this Court's March 15, 2012 Summary Eviction Order
("Eviction Order"), the March 22, 2012 Order ("Retrieval Order") concerning
retrieval oI Coughlin ' s personal property, a "new trial," or amendment oI either
oI the Orders. Coughlin's Motion should be denied.
This Opposition is made and based on the accompanying Memorandum oI
Points and Authorities, all papers and pleadings on Iile here, and any argument
the Court may deem necessary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Though rambling, lacking cohesion, and including continuous reIerences to
matters wholly irrelevant to the instant case, Coughlin's Motion appears to seek
reconsideration oI this Court's Eviction Order oI Coughlin Irom the address
located within the Park Terrace common interest community at 1422 E. 9th
Street, #2, Reno, NY 89512 (the "premises"), as well as the Retrieval Order that
speciIically addresses the retrieval oI Coughlin's personal property. Alternatively,
a "new trial" is requested, or amendment oI the Orders respectively.
As established herein, there is no legal or Iactual basis to grant any oI the
relieI sought in Coughlin's Motion. Park Terrace and Coughlin had no
landlord/tenant relationship. Coughlin had no lease agreement with Park Terrace,
and Coughlin never paid any rent to Park Terrace Ior his use oI the premises. In
Iact, Coughlin unlawIully inhabited the premises without Park Terrace's
knowledge or permission, Ior an estimated, several months beginning last Iall.
More particularly, Park Terrace did not even know that it was Coughlin,
speciIically, who was living on the premises until aIter it had served and posted a
30 Day Notice to Quit on the premises on January 10, 2012. Park Terrace had
become aware that an unidentiIied person( s) was unlawIully inhabiting the
premises, and thus posted the 30 Day Notice, but did not become aware oI
Coughlin's speciIic identity until he subsequently complained to Park Terrace
about the Iact that NY Energy had turned oII power to the premises. Despite the
Iact that Coughlin was wrongIully on the premises and had no lease with Park
Terrace, Coughlin Iurther demanded that Park Terrace pay to have NY Energy
restore power.
When it came to Park Terrace's attention that Coughlin was unlawIully
inhabiting the premises, Park Terrace exercised its right under the law and took
Iurther action to have Coughlin removed Irom the premises. Indeed, Park Terrace
did not simply call the sheriII or police to have (page 2) Coughlin removed or
arrested as an unlawIul trespasser, which would have been well within Park
Terrace's rights as owner oI the premises. Rather, Park Terrace went beyond
whatNevada law requires, or even permits, in such situations and utilized
Nevada's'summary eviction process to obtain an order oI eviction. Following the
expiration oI the 30 day Notice and because Coughlin had not leIt, on or about
February 13, 2012, ParkTerrace served on Coughlin a Five Day Notice oI
UnlawIul Detainer. ThereaIter, Coughlin Iiled his "Tenant's Answer and Tenant's
AIIidavit/Declaration to 30 DayNotice to Quit; Motion Ior Sanctions and
Attorney's Fees." The matter came beIore theCourt Ior hearing onMarch15, 2012,
at which time the Court entered an EvictionOrder evictingCoughlinIrom the
premises. Subsequently, onMarch22, 2012, theCourt entered a Retrieval Order
which allowed Coughlin to obtain his essential personal property at 3 :00 p.m. on
March 22, 2012, and to make arrangements to obtain his remaining property by
5:00 p.m. on March 27,2012. Park Terrace had agreed not to charge Coughlin Ior
the storage oI his personal belongings during that time, and the no charge Ior
storage and moving costs was so noted in the Court's Retrieval Order.
It is against this Iactual and procedural background that Coughlin Iiled' this
instant Motion. Fn1. None oI the extraneous, irrelevant, Iactually inaccurate, and
even inIlamm atory arguments made in Coughlin's Motion change the Iact that he
was lawIully and appropriately removedIrom the premises. There is no basis Ior
reconsideration, newtrial, or amendment to this Court's prior Orders. Coughlin's
Motion must be denied. Fn2.
In1: Coughlin's Motion improperly names Western Nevada Management, Sue
King, and Gayle Kern as parties in this matter. The only parties named in this
matter are Park Terrace Townhomes Association and Zachary Coughlin.
In2: To the extent Coughlin's Motion seeks reconsideration oI any prior motion
Iiled by Coughlin, e.g. Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien and Ior Return
oI Personal Property, Local Rule JCRRT 11 (g) provides "|n)o motion once heard
and disposed oI shall be renewed in the same cause, nor shall the same matters
therein embraced be reheard, unless by leave oI court." In the instant matter, any
issues beIore the Court concerning the Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien
have already been heard. ThereIore, under JCRRT 11 (g), such matters cannot be
heard again unless leave is granted by the Court. It is respectIully requested that
leave Ior reconsideration be denied. Moreover, as explained Iully herein, the
Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien is moot due to the Iact Coughlin has
retrieved most oI his personal property -at no cost. (page 3).
II. ARGUMENT
A. The March 15, 2012 Summary Eviction Order was Properly
Elltered by the Court.
With respect to the Court's March 15,2012 eviction Order, Coughlin
appears to argue that he received insuIIicient notice oI the March 151h hearing
date at the time oI8: 15 a.m. RJCRP 104 sets Iorth the requirements Ior providing
notice oI a summary eviction proceeding as Iollows:
'Prior to the holding oI a summary eviction,
the justice shall determine the method oI
service and notice oI the hearing on both
parties. The date oI service oI the notice
shall be calculated to aIIord the parties
suIIicient opportunity to prepare their case
and be present Ior the hearing ...
Under this Rule, the Court determines the method Ior service. In this case, Park
Terrace's undersigned counsel received notice oI the hearing date and time by
phone call Irom the Court clerk. Coughlin himselI admits in his Motion that he
received a call Irom the Court concerning the March 15, 2012 hearing and had
actual notice thereoI ( Motion, p. 5,11.25-26), but proceeds to make excuses as to
why he was not in attendance at the 8:15 a. m. hearing. The Iact oI the matter is
Coughlin received the same phone call and notice as Park Terrace, and yet
Coughlin was late. No excuse or attempt to blame others changes this Iact.
Moreover, even iI Coughlin had attended the hearin g on time, the outcome
would have been the same, i.e. an Order Ior eviction would have issued. Again,
ParkTerrace and Coughlindo not have, and never had, a landlord/tenant
relationship. No lease exists. Coughlin has not paid Park Terrace any rent
whatsoever Ior the months he unlawIully inhabited the premises. In other words,
Coughlin was nothing more than a squatter, and Park Terrace was entitled to an
order oI summary eviction even iI Coughlin had shown up Ior the hearing. These
undisputed Iacts clearly establish there is no basis Ior reconsideration, "new trial,"
or amendment to the Order and, thereIore, Coughlin'sMotion should be denied.
(page 4).
B. The March 22, 2012 Order Allowing Coughlin to Obtain Personal
Properly was Properly Entered; No Personal Properly Lien Exists.
Following entry oI the March 15,2012 eviction order, Park Terrace took
possession oI the premises. AIter the lock out oI Coughlin and upon investigation
oI the premises, it was determined that Coughlin's personal property needed to be
removed. Photographs were taken oI the premises aIter the eviction Order was
entered On March 15, 2012. Copies oI those photographs are attached hereto and
made a part hereoI as Exhibit "A." These photographs generally depict the
condition oI the premises and the personal property oI the Coughlin that remained.
Coughlin's personal property was removed Irom the premises and placed in
storage.
Following Coughlin's eviction, he again began sending various, belligerent
emails to Park Terrace's community manager, Sue King, regarding the personal
property he leIt behind at the premises. Ms. King promptly responded to
Coughlin's emails, and advised him oI the location oI the storage unit where his
property had been taken, requested that he provide aJime to meet Ior him to pick
up the belongings, and Iurther advised oI the storage and moving Iees Ior the
property as provided Ior under Nevada law. Additional, vitriolic emails Irom
Coughlin ensued (see the emails between Coughlin and Ms. King datedMarch 16-
19,2012, which are attached hereto and made a part hereoI as Exhibit "B") and on
or about March 19, 2012 Coughlin Iiled his Motion to Contest
PersonalPropertyLien and IorReturn oIPersonal Property. On March 20,
2012,ParkTerrace's community managerSueKing sent an email toCoughlin
advising him that theBoard oIDirectors had agreed to waive storage and removal
Iees Ior his personal property iI the property could be retrieved by the Iollowing
Thursday morning. Despite the attempt to resolve the matter with the waiver oI
storage and moving Iees, Coughlin persisted inIighting this matter through the
hearing on March 22,2012.
As a result oI the hearing, the Court ordered a speciIic time Irame in which
Coughlin was to obtain his personal property at no charge. Coughlin did obtain
most oI his personal property Irom storage, and that which he did not retrieve
remains in Park Terrace's storage unit. To date, Coughlin still has not retrieved his
remaining personal property, and Park Terrace is still not charging Coughlin a
storage Iee at this time. As such, there is no personal property lien, as (page 5)
asserted by Coughlin. All Coughlin need do is schedule a time to retrieve his
property. He simply has not done so. 2012 Order provided suIIicient time Ior
Coughlin to retrieve all oI his personal property Irom.
In short, Park Terrace has made more than suIIicient accommodation to
Coughlin throughout this matter despite his status as nothing more than a squatter
on the premises. He was removed thereIrom in strict conIormity with Nevada law
and procedure (even though his squatter status did not require such) and, yet he
continues to Iile meritless pleadings and inundate Ms. King with hostile,
inIlammatory, and Iactually and legally inaccurate emails. (See Exhibit "C"
attached hereto which are copies oI additional emails between Coughlin and Ms.
King subsequent to the March22nd hearing.) No legal or Iactual basis exists Ior
reconsideration oI either oI the Court's March 15th or March 22nd Order, nor is
there any such basis Ior a new trial andlor amendment to either Order .
Accordingly, Coughlin's Motion must be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
The Iacts oI this matter clearly establish Coughlin was properly evicted
Irom the Park Terrace premises by virtue oI this Court's March 15, 2012 Order.
The subsequent March 22 , storage (Ior which Park Terrace did not charge him).
To date, Coughlin's property still remains in storage, and Park Terrace is still not
charging him Ior storage oI his personal property at this time. No personal
property lien currently exists. ThereIore, all Coughlin need do is make prompt
arrangements to retrieve the remainder oI his personal property. It is respectIully
requested, thereIore, that this Court enter its Order denying Coughlin's Motion. It
is Iurther requested that the Court also order Coughlin to make arrangements to
retrieve his personal property Irom Park Terrace's storage within ten (10) days oI
the date oI (page 6) entry oI this Order. Otherwise, Park Terrace may, at its
option, charge a reasonable storage Iee Ior each day thereaIter, as allowed Ior
under Nevada law.
The undersigned, pursuant to NRS 239B.030, hereby aIIirms that this
document does not contain the social security number oI any person, DATED this
day oI April, 201 2. KERN&ASSOCIATES, LTD, GA . KERN, ESQ. Neva a
B No. 1620 5421 . zke Lane, Ste. 200 Reno, Nevada 89511 Tel: (775) 32 4-5930
Fax: (775) 324-6173 Email: gaylekernkernltd.com Attorneys Ior PlaintiII Park
Terrace Townhomes Association
The ROA in 62337 has had a very troubled history. Now, the second
version oI the ROA, Iile stamped 2/13/13 (though the SBN has continued
misaddressing the ROA is sends to Coughlin (which, this time, aia include the
Transcript Irom the Iormal hearing and Hearing Exhibits, unlike what the SBN
mailed to Coughlin in connection with the ROA Iiled on 12/24/12...(page 1098 oI
the 12/24/12 ROA contains a CertiIicate oI Service By Mail wherein the SBN's
Laura Peters wrote: 'I hereby certiIy that I served a copy oI the attached Record
on Appeal, Vol. 1&2, by placing a copy in an envelope addressed to Zachary....
That 12/20/12 CertiIicate oI Service By Mail contains nothing indicating that
there existed a Vol. 3 in said ROA Iile stamped 12/24/12 upon all three volumes
being submitted to the Clerk oI Court oI the Nevada Supreme Court).
Now, in the 2/13/13 ROA, the order oI presentation oI the 10/9/12 AIIidavit
oI Laura Peters, and the 10/12/12 Notice oI Formal Hearing; Designation oI
Witnesses and Summary oI Evidence is switchea Irom the order those 'Iilings
appeared in in the 12/24/12 ROA, in an attempt by the SBN to ameliorate the
impropriety apparent in the 12/24/12 ROA where the 10/9/12 AIIidavit oI Laura
Peters appeared at bates stamp pages 33-34, immediately before the appearance,
at pages 35-39 oI the 10/12/12 Notice oI Formal Hearing; Designation oI
Witnesses and Summary oI Evidence by the SBN's King, where the bates
stamping in that ROA and order oI pleadings on Iile is chronologically arranged
Irom earliest (beginning with the 8/23/12 Complaint) to most recent (ending, in
contrast to the 2/13/13 ROA, on page 1098 with a CertiIicate oI Service By
Mailing by Peters oI only Vol 1&2 oI the ROA (ie, missing the Formal Hearing
Transcript and Hearing Exhibits).
Obviously, the SBN Iinally Iigured out that it looks suspicious to suddenly
depart Irom the placement oI the 10/9/12 AOLP as appearing in the 11/8/12 3,200
page bates stampe production as the last entry most recent Iiling in the
chronologically arranged 'Formal Hearing Pleadings Iolder and the immediately
preceeding entry being bates stamped 02797 being the Panel Chair Echeverria's
10/31/12 Order.. That is, the 10/9/12 AOLP appeared at bates stamp page 02795,
and the 10/12/12 Notice oI Formal Hearing; DoWSoE appeared at 02716, with a
multitude oI Iilings in between, including Coughlin's 10/15/12 Motion to Dismiss
at 02911, which the SBN had yet to put a Iile stamp on at that point (where 'the
Iile was sent to the printers on 11/1/12 according to Peters and King's email oI
11/1/12 inIorming Coughlin that he would not be permitted his rights to inspect
the Iile 'up to within 3 days oI the hearing as required by SCR 105(2)(c). In the
12/24/12 ROA, however, that 10/15/12 Motion to Dismiss is Iinally Iile stamped,
appearing at bates stamp page 40. Couglin's 10/15/12 Motion Ior Order To Show
Cause in 0204 remains without a Iile stamp in both version so Ithe ROA, despite
it being ruled on in the 10/31/12 Order by Chair Echverria? King's Iailure to
oppose Coughlin's argument that the 8/23/12 Complaint should be dismissed
along lines similar to those Couglin's wrongIul termination Complaint against
WLS was dismissed under a NRCP 12(b)(3)-(5) line oI argument given how
blurry and illegible the Complaint and Exhibits thereto actually are (versus in
60302 and 60317 (a case Ieaturing Judge Elliott Iailing to disqualiIy himselI or
disclose he Presidency on the opposing side, CAAW's Excecutive Board, then
going on to sanction Coughlin under NRS 7.085 and or 18.010(2)(b) despite a
12(b)(5) dismissal necessarily meaning the Court never got to the merits oI the
Complaint, no 21 day saIe harbor motion being served, and no actual hearing ever
being held to satisIy the requirement Ior one in NRS 18.010(2)(b), oh, and Judge
Elliot managed to get all oI Couglhin's criminal appeals (5!) where the actual
process Couglin had served the deIendnats was exponentially more legible than
the 'Iiddle with the scanner dpi settings and other contrast, obIuscation settings in
Acrobat or other scanning application approach taken by Gonsalves, Garin, et
al....(it really is remarkable how scandalous the approach was there when viewing
the actual 9 page per page printed on a 1200 dpi laser printer version oI the
attached Exhibit in those cases compared to the completely illegible and blurry
doctored versions attached as Exhibits to the various Motions to Dismiss...an
approach absolutely implemented by the SBN in Iraudulently making as many oI
Couglin's Iilings in the representations thereoI in the ROA's in 62337 be similarly
doctored up to be so blurry as to lack an utility whatsoever).
SpeciIically, the 10/9/12 AIIidavit oI Laura Peters (a very material
document that goes to whether the SBN Clerk oI Court/OBC/NNDB/Panel
provided Coughlin an indication that he was permitted to submit Iilings via Iax
(considering NNDB Chairman Susich's 7/27/12 written instruction to Coughlin
(see below) and King's numerous instances oI directing Coughlin to communicate
with SBN 'Clerk oI Court Laura Peters (including an instruction to Coughlin by
King to do so made during the 3/26/12 appearance by Coughlin at the SBN
Double R OIIice where Coughlin presented to take King up on his oIIer to allow
Coughlin to review the grievances and materials submitted in connection
therewith...at which time King reIused to allow Coughlin to review any such
materials and only brieIly allowed Coughlin to read the two page 2/14/12 written
grievance letter to the SBN regarding Coughlin by RMC Judge Nash Holmes.
At that time, King indicated that Coughlin should have that 2/14/12 Nash Holmes
letter, to which Coughlin protested that he had not received any such letter (to be
expected considering the well documented problems Coughlin was experiencing
during that period oI time in accessing mail addressed to him at the 1422 E. 9
th
St.
#2 address). Peters express indications to Coughlin on 9/11/12 were expression
oI the policies and procedures in play in light oI SCR 105(4) and Susich and
King's representations to Coughlin (combined with Peters own express
representations that she was the 'SBN Clerk oI Court and entitled to make the
calls on matters such as when and under what circumstances a DeIault would be
taken (she indicated several things in this respect to Coughlin). To whatever
extent Peters 9/11/12 express indications to Coughlin that she would Iile stamp in
an Iilings he Iaxed to the SBN are considered to not be expressions oI the rules
and policies in play under SCR 105(4), Coughlin entitled to rely upon such
indications, and reasonably did so, considering the totality oI the circumstances.
Especially with respect to the 12/14/12 FOFCOL's express recommendation that
'as a matter oI deIault the alleged violation may be deemed admitted... with
respect to numerous alleged violations oI Rules oI ProIessional Conduct, even
those Ior which the FOFCOL Iound the SBN put on no evidence whatsoever or or
those
So, the 10/9/12 AIIidavit oI Laura Peters becomes a very important
'Iiling. Such 'Iiling (it is Iile stamped 10/9/12, and notarized no less, with a
date oI 10/9/12) was never sent to Coughlin until it was included in the 3,200
page box oI documents provided on 11/8/12 as a consolation by the SBN Ior
reIusing to Iollow SCR 105(2)(c). That 10/9/12 AIIidavit oI Laura Peters
appearaed within the bates stamped 3,200 page document production by the SBN
within a section labeled 'Formal Hearing Pleadings, and appeared numerically
after King's 10/24/12 Opposition and before NNDB Chairman Susich's 10/30/12
Order Appointing Formal Hearing Panel. This indicates that either Peters and the
SBN back dated the Iile stamping on some 'AIIidavit oI Laura Peters to indicate
it was Iiled in on 10/9/12, or, that Peters and or the SBN Iile stamped such an
AIIidavit oI Laura Peters on 10/9/12, but did not place it in the 'Formal Pleadings
File at that time. Regardless, there is no indication that such 10/9/12 AIIidavit
oI Laura Peters was ever mailed to Coughlin, as there exists no dedicated
CertiIicate oI Service Ior it, nor is said 10/9/12 AOLP identiIied in any Index to
Exhibits or otherwise reIerenced in any other Iiling by the SBN. The Iact that
that 10/9/12 AOLP contains numerous easily disproven misstatements in more
troubling, particularly where such misstatements relate to just when and how the
SBN and or Peters had one oI Coughlin's Motions to Dismiss submitted Ior Iiling.
Coughlin had digitally veriIiable prooI conIirming he submitted Ior Iiling to the
SBN his initial Motion to Dismiss the 8/23/12 Iile stamped Complaint on 9/17/12
by both Iax and email.
Peters absolutely indicated to Couglin that he was permitted to Iile be Iax in
a 9/11/12 communication with Coughlin, and that she would Iile stamp any
Iilings that Coughlin submitted via Iax. Both Peters and King have been dancing
around this Iact. This is especially clear where the 10/9/12 AOLP only
'Subject: RE: Motion to Dismiss SBN v. Coughlin From: Laura Peters
(LauraPnvbar.org) Sent: Wed 9/26/12 11:54 AM To: 'Zach Coughlin'
(zachcoughlinhotmail.com) I never said that you could Iile items via e-mail...
The 10/9/12 AOLP reads:
AFFIDAVIT OF LAURA PETERS
CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS
LAURA PETERS, under penalty oI perjury, being Iirst duly sworn,
deposes and says as Iollows:
That AIIiant is employed as a paralegal Ior the discipline department oI the
State Bar oI Nevada and in such capacity is the custodian of records for the
State Bar of Nevada ;
That on September 11, 2012, at approximately 4:45 p.m., Zachary Coughlin
called AIIiant to conIirm that a hearing was still scheduled to take place on
September 25, 2012. AIIiant explained that the hearing would not take place on
September 25th and that date had been scheduled prior to the Iiling oI a Iormal
Complaint.
Mr. Coughlin reacted as if he had no knowledge of a Complaint.
AIIiant then explained that, in Iact, a copy oI the Complaint, sent via certiIied mail
on August 23,2012, Irom the Reno oIIice oI the State Bar, had been returned and
marked "unclaimed".
AIIiant Iurther explained that since service had not been aIIected, a new
certiIied copy would go out the next day . AIIiant requested that when Mr.
Coughlin received said copy, he should return the postcard attached to the mailing
and his twenty (20) day period in which to answer the Complaint would start
running at that point.
However, in speaking to Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King, it was
determined that personal service should be aIIected upon Mr. Coughlin. Reno
Carson messenger service was engaged to attempt personal service despite Mr.
Coughlin not providing the State Bar with a physical address.
On September 25, 2012, Mr. Coughlin arrived at the Reno oIIice oI the
State Bar allegedly expecting a hearing to take place. At that time, Mr. Coughlin
was again told, both by AIIiant and Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King, that no
hearing would be taking place that day and that an answer to the State Bar's
Complaint had not been received.
AIIiant personally served Mr. Coughlin with a copy oI the Complaint on his
visit to the Bar oIIice on September 25th as witnessed by Paula Campbell, an
employee oI the State Bar. Mr. Coughlin insisted that the hearing which had been
previously scheduled Ior that day should be taking place because he needed to be
removed Irom temporary suspension.
Mr. Coughlin has also been instructed by Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick
King that he cannot Iile pleadings with the State Bar via e-mail, which he
continues to attempt. The Motion to Dismiss, which Mr. Coughlin now insists
should be granted as it has gone unopposed by the State Bar, was never presented
to AIIiant Ior Iiling but was rather emailed prior to AIIiant's conversation with
Mr. Coughlin on September 11th when Mr. Coughlin under no uncertain terms
told AIIiant that he had not yet received the Complaint.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
Dated this 9th day oI October, 2012: Laura Peters, Paralegal,
OIIice oI Bar Counsel (notarized as 'SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
BEFORE ME THIS 9TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2012 by
Notary Public Angeline A. Radley and aIIixed with her Notary Seal).
In consideration oI the representations and indications made to Coughlin by
NNDB Chairman Susich (especially his 7/27/12 email to Coughlin and his
assistant Sherri Hornsbey's indications to Coughlin), Asst. Bar Counsel King, and
'SBN Clerk oI Court Laura Peters (a title that both Peters and King had reIerred
to Peters as being bestowed with on numerous occasions, including by Peters
during a 9/11/12 telephone conversation with Coughlin and by King on 9/25/12 in
person, upon Coughlin appearing at the SBN's Double R OIIice on 9/25/12 at 9
am Ior the hearing Peters had conIirmed in writing to Coughlin and to which
Susich's 7/27/12 email to Couglin indicated the SBN was in charge oI scheduling.
King curiously Iailed to oIIer into evidence that 3/16/12 letter by King to
Coughlin (to which was attached, as indicated by a 3/19/12 email to Coughlin
Irom SBN Clerk oI Court Laura Peters, which Coughlin only Iound in his junk
email Iolder aIter King indicated during the 3/26/12 interaction with Coughlin at
the SBN Double R OIIice was provided to Coughlin by email as well...leading to
an exchange between King and Coughlin wherein King admitted that he did not
email Coughlin a copy oI the 3/16/12 mailing (despite his 3/16/12 letter
indicating he was so copying Couglin on via email, but, strangely, not Iax), but,
rather, King indicated he had Laura Peters email Couglin a copy oI that mailing.
During the 3/26/12 in person interaction with King Coughlin was surprised to
hear that the SBN had sent Coughlin anything relating to any grievances other
than the 2/14/12 mailing to Coughlin by King (which included King's one page
letter to Coughlin and Hill's Iive page 1/14/12 grievance against Coughlin), which
Coughlin only recieved on 3/16/12 due to no Iault oI Coughlin's own, but rather,
to malIeasance by Coughlin's housemates, and perhaps, the USPS, and or the
USPS's response to the malIeasance oI Coughlin's housemates, as conIirmed by
the yellow stickers aIIixed to envelopes mailed to Couglhin (such as those by the
SBN on 2/14/12 and 3/16/12 and numerous mailings by the RMC to Couglhin
between February-April 2012). Coughlin was Iurther surprised to hear Irom King
that the SBN had copied Couglhin on a 3/16/12 mailing to Coughlin oI an
additional grievance by a fuage by also sending it to Coughlin via email.
Coughlin querried King as to what email account such an email would have
emanated Irom. King, lacking an understanding that emails are sent Irom
accounts rather than 'Irom the State Bar's website, ultimately indicated to
Coughlin that he delegated the copying to Couglin by email oI the 3/16/12
mailing to Laura Peters. From that Coughlin deduced such an email was likely
sent Irom Peter's email account, and, sure enough, in Coughlin's junk mail Iolder,
checked subsequent to the 3/26/12 in person interaction with King, was a 3/19/12
email to Coughlin containing a 17 page pdI (King's one page 3/16/12 letter,
Holme's two page 3/14/12 letter, and L. Gardner's 14 page OAT oI 4/13/09).
That 3/16/12 mailing to Coughlin by the SBN included a one page letter to
Coughlin Irom King oI 3/16/12, to which was attached Judge Nash Holmes
3/14/12 two page grievance against Coughlin, and the 4/13/09 Order AIter Trial
by Judge Linda Gardner Irom 01168. In that mailing, the Judge Nash Holmes
letter is stamped by the SBN as received on 3/14/12, and, curiously, the 4/13/09
Order AIter Trial by Judge L. Gardner is stamped as received by the SBN on
3/15/12, with the '5 in the '15 being drawn in by hand...which is even more
curious given King's repeated obstructionist and evasive, even misleading,
attempts to avoid admitting that Judge Nash Holmes and the RMC included that
4/13/09 Judge L. Gardner Order AIter Trial in the materials submitted on 3/14/12
along with Holmes' 3/14/12 letter to the SBN).
Holmes admitted to so including in the OAT in her 3/14/12 submission to
the SBN during the Iormal hearing on 11/14/12. On the certiIied audio transcript
oI a 4/10/12 trial date in the criminal trespass trial against Coughlin stemming
Irom Hill's Iraudulent 11/13/12 criminal Complaint, L. Gardner's brother, Judge
Nash Holmes' Iellow RMC Judge, RMC Administrative Judge William Gardner,
admitted to having received that 4/13/09 Order AIter Trial by his sister, from his
sister, and then having passed that Order AIter Trial received Irom his sister
around to his Iellow RMC Judges, though the timing oI W. Gardner's receipt oI
the 4/13/09 OAT Irom his sister was something W. Gardner oIIered particularly
strange and evasive commentary to on that 4/10/12 audio transcript, as was also
the case with respect to the time oI his passing on that 4/13/09 OAT to his Iellow
RMC Judges) at the 11/14/12 hearing, unlike his 2/14/12 letter to Coughlin (Ior
which King Iailed to included the 5 page 1/14/12 written emailed grievance
against Coughlin by Hill, wherein Hill purports to be satisIying his and 'his
associates RPC 8.3 duty in accusing Couglin oI ghostwriting Ior John Gessin,
whom Hill was still listed as Attorney oI Record Ior in at least one matter at the
time, despite Hill disparaging Gessin and betraying attorney-client conIidences,
apparently, with respect to Gessin, in his 1/14/12 grievance against Coughlin,
more on that later).
'Subject: RE: reIerral to Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board
From: Tom Susich (tsusichnvdetr.org) Sent: Fri 7/27/12
8:58 AM To: 'Zach Coughlin' (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Cc: 'PatrickKnvbar.org' (PatrickKnvbar.org)
Dear M. Coughlin: I am in receipt oI your request Ior a
hearing beIore the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board. I
have Iorwarded your request to the Nevada State Bar's
Northern OIIice Ior processing. Please communicate directly
with the State Bar concerning your case. They are the ones
who will process your request and set up any appropriate
hearings. II you have questions you can contact Pat King, the
Northern Nevada Bar Counsel. Sincerely, J. Thomas Susich,
Esq.
Also, consider:
'ZachCoughlinhotmail.com
From: PatrickKnvbar.org
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to Iile a
grievance
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 17:57:26 0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
Please come to see me and I will show you the letter and
documents Irom the Court.
Patrick King
From: Zach Coughlin
|mailto:zachcoughlinhotmail.com|
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2012 10:39 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to Iile a
grievance
Mr. King,
This is the very Iirst time you allege anyone other than
Mr. King Iiled or alleged a grievance. Please provide
any documentation or prooI related to these apparent
communications Irom judges that you are only now
bringing up. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX
60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, Iax: 949
667 7402; ZachCoughlinhotmail.com Nevada Bar
No: 9473
From: PatrickKnvbar.org
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to
Iile a grievance
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 17:18:34 0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
I have repeatedly expressed my interest
in having a meeting with you to discuss the
grievances against you. You claim to be too busy
to meet with me, yet you have time to write
lengthy e-mails and apparently to do legal
research.
You asked iI Mr. Hill has standing to
Iile a grievance against you. Not only does he
have standing to Iile a grievance, as a lawyer in
Nevada he may have an ethical obligation to
report to the State Bar. As I have explained to
you, the grievances against you came not only
Irom Mr. Hill but also Irom Judges Irom diIIerent
Courts. These grievances, and the evidence
attached with them, rather clearly puts into
question your competence to practice law. As I
have explained to you, I will make the evidence
and exhibits available to you when you come to
inspect them at my oIIice. I will not send you
reports or document, especially since you claim
your mail is being compromised.
As Ior the grievances you have made,
nothing that you have submitted appears to show
an ethical violation that could be proved by clear
and convincing evidence, which is the standard oI
prooI required in disciplinary matters. As such,
at this time we have not opened any Iiles based
on the inIormation you have submitted. Sincerely,
Patrick King
From: Zach Coughlin
|mailto:zachcoughlinhotmail.com|
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2012 9:12 AM
To: Patrick King;
cdbakerrichardhillaw.com
Subject: does Richard Hill have
standing to Iile a grievance
American Jurisprudence Trials
Database updated April 2011
DeIending Lawyers in Disciplinary
Proceedings
31 Am. Jur. Trials 633 (Originally
published in 1984)...
'Listen up What's the time said today I'm gonna speak my mind Take me up to the
top oI the world I want to see my crime Day by
day There's a man in a suit Who's gonna make you pay For the thoughts that you
think And the words they won't let you say
One Iine day gonna leave you all behind It wouldn't be so bad II I had more time
Sailing down a river alone I've been tryin' to find my way back home But I
don't believe in magic
LiIe is automatic But I don't mind being on my own No I don't mind being on my
own -
V DeIense oI Formal Charges
A Pleading and Prehearing Procedures
26 In general
27 Complaints; Iorm
28 Formal charges
29 Response; Iorm
30 Motion to dismiss; illustrative Iorms
31 Discovery
32 DeIenses; in general
33 DeIenses; in generalEntrapment
34 DeIenses; in generalLaches and limitations
35 DeIenses; in generalMitigation; checklist
36 Aggravation; checklist
B Witnesses
37 In general
38 Investigation
39 Former clients
40 Locating and interviewing witnesses
41 Expert witnesses; in general
42 Expert witnesses; in generalLegal expert; illustrative testimony
43 Expert witnesses; in generalPsychiatric expert; illustrative testimony
44 Lawyer-client as
witness VI The Hearing
45 In general
46 Selecting the goal
47 Prehearing conIerence
48 Evidentiary considerations
49 Composition oI the committee
50 Physical layout oI the hearing room
51 Format oI the hearing; checklist
52 Testimony oI client and client's witnesses
53 Cross-examination
54 Expert witnesses
55 Decision oI the hearing committee
VII Imposition oI Sanctions
56 In general
57 Conviction oI crime
58 Diversion-type programs
59 Reprimand
60 Suspension
61 Disbarment
62 Resignation
63 Reinstatement
VIII Post-Hearing Procedures
64 In general
65 Administrative review
66 Judicial review
'Initially, Mirch claims that the state bar and the disciplinary
panel committed several procedural errors that necessitate either a Iinding oI no
misconduct or a remand Ior a new hearing. These contentions lack merit.
Due Process
Mirch argues that his due process rights were violated because the complaint
insuIIiciently alleged what actions constituted a violation oI SCR 170, he received
no notice that the state bar would rely on prior uncharged bad acts as aggravating
Iactors, he was not notiIied that the state bar would argue that serving the
complaint within three days oI NRCP 4(i)'s 120-day limit was a violation oI SCR
170, and he was not inIormed that the state bar would argue that a Iailure to
investigate was a violation oI SCR 170.
1. InsuIIicient
The state bar's disciplinary complaint incorporated the district court's order
dismissing the state court action and alleged that the conduct described in the
district court order violated SCR 170. Mirch argues that this was insuIIicient
notice oI the charges against him because the order addressed NRCP 11, not SCR
170.
SCR 105(2) requires that the state bar's complaint "be suIIiciently clear and
speciIic to inIorm the attorney oI the charges against him or her and the underlying
conduct supporting the charges." Mirch provides no legal support Ior his argument
that the
state bar cannot incorporate the district court order to set Iorth the conduct that
supports the charges. The complaint stated what the charge was, and by
incorporating the detailed order, provided an explanation oI the actions uncharged
120-day 2People Corbin, Farmer,
that supported the charge. Both NRCP 11 and SCR 170 prohibit Irivolous claims.
The district court order was 12 pages long and provided a detailed explanation oI
why the complaint was Irivolous and improper. An attorney is expected to
understand the ethical rules and how those rules apply to his actions.2 As a result,
Mirch received adequate notice oI the wrongdoing alleged.
2. Prior bad acts
Mirch's assertion that he was not provided suIIicient notice oI the use oI prior bad
acts is inaccurate. The state bar is required under SCR 105(2)(c) to provide to the
attorney a list oI witnesses and evidence it plans to introduce at the disciplinary
hearing. The state bar Iollowed this procedure in this case. It speciIically listed
some prior cases that it would introduce, along with a general statement that it
would introduce other court actions Iiled by Mirch that had been dismissed as
Irivolous Ior the purpose oI demonstrating aggravating Iactors.
3. rule
Mirch claims that he did not have adequate notice oI the state bar's intent to argue
that his service oI the complaint within three days oI NRCP 4(i)'s 120-day limit
was a violation oI SCR 170. This claim lacks merit. The state bar did not argue
that the delayed service violated SCR
170. Rather, the state bar introduced this conduct as part oI its eIIort to show
Mirch's intent, which was relevant to the panel's determination oI the appropriate
discipline to impose.
2. People v. Corbin, 82 P.3d 373, 376 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2003); Matter oI Farmer,
747 P.2d 97, 99-100 (Kan. 1987). investigate Duty investigate hearing
4. Failure to Investigate
Mirch' Iinal due process argument is that he did not receive adequate notice
that the state bar would argue that a Iailure to investigate was a violation oI SCR
170. Most oI the testimony adduced and the arguments made by Mirch at the
disciplinary hearing, however, attempted to prove that he conducted a suIIicient
investigation. ThereIore, his actions reIute his argument that he was unaware that
the adequacy oI his pre complaint investigation would be at issue during the
disciplinary hearing. Additionally, Mirch provides no legal authority that requires
the state bar to outline all the arguments it may present as to why an attorney's
actions violated a proIessional conduct rule. Regardless, Mirch is expected to
know the rules and what they require,3 so he cannot argue that he was unaware
that a Iailure to investigate the Iacts prior to Iiling a lawsuit was a violation.
Finally, Mirch's own expert stated that SCR 170 imposes a duty to investigate.
Duty to investigate under SCR 170 (RPC 3.1)
Mirch asserts that SCR 170 imposes no duty to investigate. However,
Mirch's own expert witness testiIied that, under the rule, a lawyer must research
the applicable law and investigate the Iacts oI the case to determine iI a cause oI
action could be brought in good Iaith. We thereIore reject Mirch's argument.
3. Bifurcated Hearing
Mirch asserts that the panel erred by allowing prior bad acts and victim impact
testimony beIore a violation was Iound because this (3 Id.)
evidence improperly inIluenced the panel. Mirch Iailed to request a biIurcated
disciplinary hearing, however, and thus he waived this argument.
4, Right to confront accuser
The disciplinary complaint against Mirch was based on then District Judge
Hardesty's order granting summary judgment in the state court action. Mirch
attempted to subpoena Judge Hardesty to testiIy at the disciplinary hearing, but the
state bar successIully moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that a judge is
protected Irom inquiry into his thought processes when ruling on a case. Mirch
contends that his inability to question Judge Hardesty violated his constitutional
right to conIront his accuser.
Mirch's argument is based on the Sixth Amendment, which provides the
deIendant in a criminal case the right to conIront his accuser.
While the United States Supreme Court has stated that attorney discipline is
a quasi-criminal proceeding, and thereIore due process rights apply,5 a
disciplinary hearing is not the same as a criminal trial and not all oI the
constitutional guarantees aIIorded a criminal deIendant apply.6 SCR 107 states
that a disciplinary proceeding may proceed even iI the complainant reIuses to
participate. In addition, other states have held that a lawyer has no right to
conIront a disciplinary complainant.
4. See Diamond Enters, Inc. v. Lau, 113 Nev. 1376, 1378,951 P.2d 73, 74 (1997).
5. In re RuIIalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968).
6. See Matter oI Jacobs, 44 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Dasent, 845 N.E.2d
1133, 1135 (Mass. 2006); People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1, 3 (Colo. 1996); State v.
Scott, 639 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Kan. 1982).
SpeciIically, these courts concluded that the complainant in an attorney
discipline situation is diIIerent Irom an accuser in a criminal proceeding, and
thereIore the right does not apply. 7
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that a judge cannot
be questioned concerning his thought processes in reaching a decision in a case.8
Mirch Iailed to indicate what inIormation, other than Judge Hardesty's
thought processes in the case, he would have sought. (NOTE: would have
questioned Gardner as to whether she herselI reIerred matter and 4/13/09 Order to
'appropriate authority, ie, the State Bar, and iI not, whether that was dispotive as
to whether she considered Coughlin's conduct in the Joshi matter and Trial therein
to be tantamount to any violation oI any RPC). ThereIore, Mirch Iailed to
demonstrate that he was harmed by the decision to quash the subpoena. As a
result, we conclude that no constitutional violation occurred.
Mirch's claim that Laxalt's testimony was unsworn
Mirch claims that the hearing panel allowed the unsworn testimony oI
witness Bruce Laxalt and that the panel erred by not striking the testimony.
However, the disciplinary hearing transcript shows that Laxalt was sworn prior to
his testimony. ThereIore, Mirch's argument is reIuted by the record and lacks
merit. SCR 170 violation
While a disciplinary panel's Iindings are persuasive, we review the record
de novo to determine whether discipline is proper. 9 Our de novo review extends
to the credibility oI the witnesses that testiIy at the
7. Daniels v. Commission Ior Lawyer Discipline, 142 S.W.3d 565, 571 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2004); State v. Turner, 538 P.2d 966,974 (Kan. 1975).
8. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
9. In re Discipline oI SchaeIer, 117 Nev. 496, 25 P.3d 191, as modiIied by 31 P.3d
365 (2001).
disciplinary hearing.1o In disciplinary matters, the Iindings oI Iact must be
"supported by clear and convincing evidence."ll Clear and convincing evidence
requires "evidence oI tangible Iacts Irom which a legitimate inIerence may be
drawn."12
AIter reviewing the entire record and the parties' brieIs, we agree with the panel's
Iinding that Mirch violated SCR 170. The pertinent part oI SCR 170 stated the
Iollowing:
A lawyer shall not bring or deIend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue
therein, unless there is a basis in law and Iact Ior doing so that is not Irivolous,
which includes a good Iaith argument Ior an extension, modiIication or reversal oI
existing law.
The state lawsuit Iiled by Mirch was Irivolous and lacked any basis in law or Iact.
As a result, a violation occurred and discipline is proper.
Appropriate discipline.
The disciplinary panel recommended that Mirch be disbarred Ior his
misconduct. Based on the circumstances surrounding Mirch's Iiling oI the lawsuit,
in connection with evidence that this action represented only one instance in a
pattern oI similar conduct by Mirch, we approve the disciplinary panel's
recommendation and disbar Mirch.13 Additionally, Mirch is responsible Ior the
payment oI the disciplinary proceeding's costs.
10. See In re Drakulich, 111 Nev. 1556, 1569, 908 P.2d 709, 717 (1995).
11. In re StuhII, 108 Nev. 629, 635, 837 P.2d 853, 856 (1992).
12. quoting Gruber v. Baker, 20 Nev. 453, 477, 23 P. 858, 865 (1890).
13. See Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, 756 A.2d 526, 545 (Md. 2000).
We note that this disbarment is imposed according to the Iormer version oI SCR
102, under which Mirch may petition Ior reinstatement aIter three years. The
Iormal complaint against Mirch was Iiled on June 15,2004, when the Iormer rule
was in eIIect. See SCR 122 (2007).
(Please note, in the vast majority oI quotations herein emphasis is added...so much
so that the opposite oI the typical practice oI indicating when emphasis was added
will be done, ie, the writer will only indicated when a situation arises where
emphasis already existed, and thereIore, was not added).
Ilanagan only entered 6/25/12 Order against coughlin as a litigant not as an
attorney he did not speciIically adopt nrs 7.085 argument set Iorth
Position that Ulloa did not steal rent, but rather she made a deal with Merliss upon
his bringing it up, however, Merliss, Hill, and Baker persisted in pursuing the rent
portions to which a deal had been made between Merliss and Ulloa that absolved
Coughlin oI any joint liability Ior what, between Coughlin and Ulloa, was always
Ulloa's contribution towards the rent.
11/8/12 SCR 105(2)(c) consolation at bates 02792 contains a USPS Track &
ConIirm that proves King knew his certiIied mailing to Coughlin oI his 3/14/12
Letter (attached as Exhibit X at the Iormal hearing, though missing the two items
attached to it (Nash letter letter to SBN oI 3/1in Laura Peters 3/19/12 email to
Coughlin, which resided in Coughlin's junk Iolder unbeknownst to him until it was
later discovered there:
'Subject: RE: pending Iinal disposition oI disciplinary
proceedings....language SCR 111(7) versus SCR 111(8) and the June 7th,
2012 Order oI the NV. S. Ct.
From: Laura Peters (LauraPnvbar.org)
Sent: Wed 10/10/12 6:01 PM
To: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Please don't put words in my mouth, Zach. You are the one that indicated
that you had not received the Complaint when we talked on the phone.
Why, then, would I file in a Motion to Dismiss? I am responsible Ior my
own actions.
- Laura (aka Clerk Peters)
-----
From: Zach Coughlin |zachcoughlinhotmail.com| Sent:
Wednesday, October 10, 2012 11:51 AM
To: tsusichnvdetr.org; Laura Peters; David Clark; Patrick King;
nvscclerknvcourts.nv.gov
Subject: FW: pending Iinal disposition oI disciplinary
proceedings....language SCR 111(7) versus SCR 111(8) and the June
7th, 2012 Order oI the NV. S. Ct.
Dear Chairman Susich and Clerk Peters, Bar Counsel King sees
himselI as a the Director oI this movie, placing you two in the scenes
where he sees Iit. Chairman Susich, it is your responsibility to
comply with the Court's Order and the Supreme Court Rules, and at
this point, you need to send a clear message to Bar Counsel that "the
kid stays in the picture", and inIorm Mr. King that he is not to
attempt to take your job or duties Irom you. Same goes Ior Clerk
Peters, especially vis a vis her admission that King told her not to
Iile Coughlin's Motion to Dismiss in SBN v Coughlin on September
17th, 2012, which has now gone unopposed, and thereIore, shall be
granted. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin PO BOX 3961...
CliIton's 10 17 11 Order in 1708 states 10/25/11 is a Trial date and misses on Two
Roads mandatory supersedeas stay aspect.
Watts AIIidavit in 12 18 12 TPO application at para 4. evasive on whether Leslie
is normally an authorized agent or even an employee oI the County (independent
contractor PD oIIice) : '4. Mr . Leslie , as a ChieI Deputy Public DeIender, a
County
employee who supervises other County employees in the Washoe County Public
DeIender 's OI Iice , is an authorized agent oI the
County Ior the purposes o I this Applicat ion .
Sierra Glass & Mirror v. Viking Industries, Inc., 808 P.2d 5 1 2 Nev. , 1 99
1 Attorney has no obligation to proIIer evidence that helps opponent but iI
attorney represents that he is proIIering entire document, omitting pertinent
portions oI document is blatant Iraud on the court. Sup.Ct. Rules, Rules 1 72 , 1 72
, subd. I (a, d). King attempted to do this momentarily with respect to his 3/14/12
letter to Coughlin and his 2/14/12 letter to Coughlin as well.
Propriety oI attorney's surreptitious sound recording oI statements by others
who are or may become involved in litigation 32 American Law Reports 5th 715
(1995).
THE TRUTH ABOUT ETHICS AND ETHICS ABOUT THE TRUTH :
AN OPEN LETTER TO TRIAL ATTORNEYS 33 Gonzaga Law Review 463
(1998).
Coughlin's pending suit against WLS prejudiced him where Elcano
was a witness and SCR 110(2) (It shall not be regarded as a breach oI
conIidentiality Ior a person subpoenaed to consult with counsel or to answer
questions asked by bar counsel or the attorney to determine the facts known
by the witness.) clearly allows for Coughlin to ask questions (presumably
prior to the hearing) during an investigatory phase that Coughlin would
nevertheless not have had given Elcano's inclusion in the witness list was
noticed to Coughlin the day before the hearing, same with 1udge Beesley's.
By subverting this Court's 6/7/11 Order and the express dictates in
SCR 111(8) and SCR 102(4)(a) by effectively extending the temporary
suspension in 60838 (killing Coughlin's law practice for the time being and
making it overly difficult for Coughlin to earn a living while also defending
against an inordinately overbroad SCR 105 Complaint and impresive, if not
rather questionable displays of teamwork between the SBN, R1C, WCDA,
RPD, WCSO, RMC, and Reno City Attorney's Office...(including two more
recent arrests of Coughlin, bringing the total since 8/20/11 to 13, with an
arrest on 2/2/13 for an alleged violation of his Dept. of Alternative Sentencing
probation requirement to check in by 3 pm on Wednesdays, where Coughlin
presented at 2:54pm but was detained by security (pursuant to an R1C
Administrative Order 12-01) sufficiently long enough to result in the DAS
office closing prior to Coughlin being permitted to access it for a check in
(also, DAS Officer Brown, in an email the next day, excused such
circumstances, and it was not until a 2/1/13 email to WCDA ADA Helzer
seemed to wrankle, that, suddenly, DAS arrested Coughlin has his residence
after 7 pm, in violation of NRS 171.136. A week later, on 2/8/12, Coughlin
was treated to have a gun pointed at his head by the RPD upon Offficer
Waddle departing from procedure and entering the back yard of Coughlin's
residence, failing to announce themselves as law enforcement (a voice called
to Coughlin while he was walking in his back yard, saying only ~Zach
Coughlin? to which Coughlin did not turn around or respond but rather
walked to the corner of the back yard and stood behind a shed...only to have
Officer Waddle jump out moments later from behind the shed's wall pointing
a 45 a Coughlin's head, his partner, Officer Wilson asking, ~are you Zach
Coughlin to which Coughlin said something, and Waddle, who had called
out to the back of Coughlin's head moments before, was only then able to
announce ~that's him upon hearing Coughlin's voice and recognizing it from
a previous conversation with Coughlin on the telephone, thereby indicating
the RPD lacked probable cause to pull their guns and inch around back yard
sheds without so much as announcing the presence of law enforcement and or
issuing a single lawful order.
Coughlin was charged with violating a TPO granted to, apparently,
and entire County, Washoe County for his email to his DAS Officer
explaining the detention by security on 1/23/13 in a 1/24/13 email to his DAS
probation officer (and, apparently, the ~institutional TPO application and
subsequent TPO are being read by the RPD to apply to any employe off
Washoe County, not just those in the WC Public Defenders Office, much less
just to 1im Leslie, Esq., whom did not seem all that fearful of Coughlin on the
numerous occasions when he smugly, and purposefully, an callow callous
manner sought to deprive Coughlin of each and every inviolable right of a
criminal defendant, and also refused to providee 911 audio cd discovery
discs...Also, Coughlin moved for a TPO against Leslie on 9/5/12, well before
the application on Leslie's behalf by WCDA DDA Watts-Vial (whose 11/13/12
4:41 pm last minute fax to Coughlin represented an apparent attempt to
Object to the SCR 110 subpoenas Coughlin had served by an appropriate
non-party on 10/30/12 upon 21DC 1udges, Administrators, and the Custodian
of Records, none of which appeared or propounded for the 11/14/12 formal
hearing, to which Panel Chair Echeverria failed to hold them in contempt or
grant a continuance despite Coughlin's express request that he do so, and
despite the fact that it is the Board Chair, Susich, not the Panel Chair,
Echeverria, whom has jurisdiction to rule on Motions to Quash Subpoenas
(even, one would think, the impermissible sua sponte one's that Panel Chair
Echeverria made on 11/14/12, in yet another in a exceedingly long line of
examples of Echeverria displaying evident and marked impartiality against
Coughlin, and particularly, in favor of WLS's Elcano and local law
enforcement entitites). resulting from a petty theft conviction of $14.00 worth
of ~a candy bar and some cough drops into what has now become and 8
month suspension (particularly curious given the lack of even a temporary
suspension in In Re Stephen R. Harris, Esq. 57507, and the eventual three
month suspension Ordered therein, where Harris was actually suspending
from late February 2012 to November 8
th
, 2012, around 9 months. Coughlin's
temporary suspension for 0.0000018543 the amount of money Harris
admitted to misappropriating from a client versus where Coughlin disputes
the legitimacy of his conviction of a de minimis amoutn of food from Wal-
Mart. To punish Coughlin for defending himself or failing to provide a false
coerced confession just seems wrong.
SCR 102(4) Temporary suspension by the supreme court: (a)
On the petition of a disciplinary board, signed by its chair
or vice chair, supported by an affidavit alleging Iacts
personally known to the aIIiant, which shows that an attorney
appears to be posing a substantial threat of serious harm to
the public, the supreme court may order, with notice as the
court may prescribe, the attorney`s immediate temporary
suspension or may impose other conditions upon the
attorney`s practice. II a petition is Iiled under subsection 3 oI
this rule, a separate petition under this subsection must be Iiled
with the supreme court as soon thereaIter as possible...
(d)The attorney may request dissolution or
amendment of the temporary order of suspension by
petition Iiled with the supreme court, a copy oI which shall be
served on bar counsel. The petition may be set for
immediate hearing before a hearing panel, to hear the
petition and submit its report and recommendation to the court
within 7 days of the conclusion of the hearing. Upon receipt
oI the report and recommendation, the court may modiIy its
order, iI appropriate, and continue such provisions oI it as may
be appropriate until the Iinal disposition oI all pending
disciplinary charges against the attorney.
Basically, Coughlin was prejudiced by Bar Counsel's end run around the
requirements in SCR 102(4)(a), where the 8/23/12 SCR 105 Complaint avoided
the requirements oI SCR 102(4)(a) in that it was not on a petition oI the
disciplinary board and signed by its chair, but rather was upon a Complaint by Bar
Counsel, and it was not 'supported by an affidavit alleging Iacts personally
known to the aIIiant, which shows that an attorney appears to be posing a
substantial threat of serious harm to the public... That is important. Rather,
King's 8/23/12 Complaint contains a multitude oI unsworn, oIten unattributed
hearsay lacking in Ioundation, including:
SCR 105(2) (which King and Chair Echeverria were so keen to prevent
Coughlin from reading into the record or otherwise explicating to the Panel,
was violated in a multitude of ways causing substantial prejudice to
Coughlin's defense and a deprivation of due process
iii
:
~...2.Commencement oI Iormal proceedings.Formal
disciplinary proceedings are commenced by bar counsel
filing a written complaint in the name of the state bar. The
complaint shall be suIIiciently clear and speciIic to inIorm the
attorney oI the charges against him or her and the underlying
conduct supporting the charges. A copy of the complaint
shall be served on the attorney and it shall direct that a
veriIied response or answer be served on bar counsel within
20 days of service; the original shall be filed with bar
counsel`s office. The time to respond may be extended once
by the chair Ior not more than 20 days Ior good cause or upon
stipulation of the parties. In the event the attorney fails to
plead, the charges shall be deemed admitted; provided,
however, that an attorney who fails to respond within the
time provided may thereaIter obtain permission oI the
appropriate disciplinary board chair to do so, iI Iailure to Iile
is attributable to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect....
(c)Time to conduct hearing; notice of hearing;
discovery of evidence against attorney.The hearing panel
shall conduct a hearing within 45 days oI assignment and give
the attorney at least 30 days` written notice of its time and
place. The notice shall be served in the same manner as the
complaint, and shall inIorm the attorney that he or she is
entitled to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine
witnesses, and to present evidence. The notice shall be
accompanied by a summary prepared by bar counsel oI the
evidence against the attorney, and the names of the
witnesses bar counsel intends to call Ior other than
impeachment, together with a brief statement of the facts to
which each will testify, all oI which may be inspected up to
3 days prior to the hearing. Witnesses or evidence, other
than Ior impeachment, which became known to bar counsel
thereafter, and which bar counsel intends to use at the
hearing, shall be promptly disclosed to the attorney. For good
cause shown, the chair may allow additional time, not to
exceed 90 days, to conduct the hearing...
(e)Rules of evidence; support of panel`s decision.
The rules applicable to the admission oI evidence in the
district courts of Nevada govern admission oI evidence
beIore a hearing panel. Evidentiary rulings shall be made
by the chair of the panel, if one has been designated, or by
the chair of the appropriate disciplinary board prior to
such a designation. The Iindings oI the panel must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence...
(d)Quorum; time for decision of panel; votes required to
impose discipline.....The hearing panel shall render a written
decision within 30 days oI the conclusion oI the hearing,
unless post-hearing briefs are requested by either bar
counsel or the attorney and allowed by the panel or
requested by the chair, in which event the decision shall be
rendered within 60 days of the conclusion of the hearing....
3.Review by supreme court.
(a)Time and manner of appeal.... To the extent not
inconsistent with these rules, an appeal Irom a decision oI a
hearing panel shall be treated as would an appeal from a civil
judgment of a district court and is governed by the
Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(b)De novo review oI public discipline....II an opening
brieI is Iiled, brieIing shall thereaIter proceed in accordance
with NRAP 31(a). Extensions of time to file briefs are
disfavored and will only be granted upon a showing of
good cause. The parties shall not be required to prepare an
appendix, but rather shall cite to the record oI the disciplinary
proceedings. II no opening brieI is Iiled, the matter will be
submitted Ior decision on the record without brieIing or oral
argument.
4.Rules of procedure.The chairs, aIter consulting
with their respective disciplinary boards, may adopt rules oI
procedure, subject to approval by the board oI governors.
NNDB Chair Susich's insistence in not speaking with Coughlin prior to
the Panel being designated likely speaks to the conflict inherent to Coughlin's
dealings with Maureen Cole and NERC, which should have resulted in Susich
recusing himself in compliance with SCR 103(7) ( ~...7. Hearing panel
members shall not participate in any proceeding in which a judge similarly
situated would be required to abstain.).
That extreme laissez faire, and even obstructionist approach by Susich
severely prejudiced Coughlin's case, depriving him of the following
procedural protections in SCR 110: ~
'4.Contest of subpoena.A contest oI a subpoena shall
be heard and determined by the chair oI the appropriate
disciplinary board.
5.Restriction on discovery.Discovery by the attorney,
other than under Rule 105(2)(c), is not permitted prior to
hearing, except by the order of the chair for good cause
upon motion under Rule 103(5) or Rule 103(6).
6.Prehearing conference.At the discretion oI the chair,
a prehearing conIerence may be ordered Ior the purpose oI
obtaining admissions or otherwise.
'RE: reIerral to Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board? From: Tom Susich
(tsusichnvdetr.org) Sent:Fri 7/27/12 8:58 AM To: 'Zach Coughlin'
(zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Cc:'PatrickKnvbar.org' (PatrickKnvbar.org)
Dear M. Coughlin: I am in receipt of your request for a hearing before the
Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board. I have forwarded your request to the
Nevada State Bar's Northern Office for processing. Please communicate
directly with the State Bar concerning your case. They are the ones who will
process your request and set up any appropriate hearings. If you have
questions you can contact Pat King, the Northern Nevada Bar Counsel.
Sincerely, 1. Thomas Susich, Esq. From: Zach Coughlin
|mailto:zachcoughlinhotmail.com| Sent: Thursday, July 26, 2012 10:30 AM
To: Tom Susich Subject: reIerral to Northen Nevada Disciplinary Board Dear
Mr. Susich, I am writing to request a hearing beIore the Northern Nevada
Disciplinary Board and to make sure the Board has the correct contact
inIormation Ior me. I am representing myselI. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin
SCR 103(5): 'The chair oI each disciplinary board shall preside over all
motions or other requests relating to pending proceedings until such time as a
hearing panel is designated to preside over the proceeding, as provided in Rule
103(6). Further SCR 103(7) required Panel Chair Echeverria, to avoid any
appearance oI bias or impropriety alone given his connection to Elcano and Judge
Elliott, to disqualiIy himselI Irom presiding over this matter: ' 7.Hearing panel
members shall not participate in any proceeding in which a judge similarly
situated would be required to abstain. Any member whose term expires while the
member`s panel is considering a complaint shall remain a member until its
disposition. '
MOTIONS
NRAP 27: A response to a motion may request affirmative relief (NRAP
27(a)(3)(B)). There is thus no need to file a separate motion seeking
affirmative relief, as a countermotion is now acceptable. The length of a
motion or a response is now limited to 10 pages (NRAP 27(d)(2)). All
motions, responses and replies must comply with the typeface requirements
of NRAP 32(a). A reply now may be filed without requesting leave to file
(NRAP 27(a)(4)). The reply must be filed within five days of service of the
response and is limited to five pages (NRAP 27(d)(2)). The following
requirements now govern emergency motions: (1) counsel must notify the
Supreme Court clerk and opposing counsel that an emergency motion is
being filed; (2) the document must be titled ~Emergency Motion Under
NRAP 27(e); (3) counsel must include a certificate of counsel with addresses
and telephone numbers of all counsel, facts demonstrating an emergency
and proof of service on the other counsel; and (4) counsel must certify that
all grounds upon which relief is requested in the Supreme Court were raised
in the District Court (NRAP 27(e)). This new requirement closely mirrors
Ninth Circuit Rule 27-3. BRiEFS nRap 28: Opening briefs now must
include a jurisdictional statement at the beginning of the opening brief that
establishes the timeliness of the appeal and the basis for the court`s appellate
jurisdiction (NRAP 28(a)). The opening brief must also contain a summary
of the argument that does not merely repeat the argument headings (NRAP
28(a)(7)). Finally, the brief must provide a standard of review within each
issue section of the argument or in a separate section preceding discussion of
the issues (NRAP 28(a)(8)(B)). Citation to the volume number of the
appendix as well as the page number is now required (NRAP 28(e)(1)). This
change is reflected in the new language of the certificate of compliance
(NRAP 28.2(a)(3)). Any footnotes must be the same size and typeface as the
body of the brief (NRAP 32(a)(5)). The length of the reply brief is now
limited to 15 pages (NRAP 32(a)(7)). The rules now provide that motions for
extensions of time beyond that to which the parties are permitted to stipulate
under Rule 31(b)(2) ~are not favored. The Supreme Court will grant such a
motion for extension of time ~only upon a clear showing of good cause.
Additional extensions of time will be granted ~upon a showing of
extraordinary circumstances and extreme need (NRAP 31(b)(3)(B)). The
revised rule appears to conform to present Supreme Court practice with
regard to motions for extension of time. Supplemental authorities may now
be filed within 10 days, rather than 15 days, of the date set for oral argument
(NRAP 31(e)). Any response must be made ~promptly.
SUMMARY OF FACTS
Panel Chair John Echeverria, Esq., signed and Iiled in his FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW oI 12/14/12
"THIS MATTER came beIore a Formal Hearing Panel on 12/14/12 that
was only designated by NNDB Chairman Susich's Order oI 10/30/12 (and
interestingly, all the Orders in this matter, whether by Panel Chair Echeverria or
NNDBoard Chair Susich (SCR 110(4)...'4.Contest of subpoena.A contest oI a
subpoena shall be heard and determined by the chair of the appropriate
disciplinary board.) Somehow, that Order got to the designated Panel Chair,
John Echeverria quickly enough (despite the CertiIicates oI Service oI the
Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board (the "Panel") Ior hearing on Wednesday,
November 14, 2012.
'SCR Rule103(5).Disciplinary boa rds and hearing
panels...5.The chair oI each disciplinary board shall preside
over all motions or other requests relating to pending
proceedings until such time as a hearing panel is designated to
preside over the proceeding, as provided in Rule 103(6).
Susich directed Coughlin to bother the SBN with such matters.
1. Coughlin is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State oI
Nevada. Chair Echeverria's FOFCOL demonstrates an unnervingly tenous grasp
oI the Iacts in this matter where it Iound that at 'all relevant times prior to and at
the time oI the Iiling oI the Complaint in this matter, the Respondent's principle
oIIice, as Iiled with the State Bar oI Nevada in accordance with the Rule oI
ProIessional Conduct ("RPC") 79(1)(a), was Post OIIice Box 3961, Reno, NV
89505.... This oI course, is Iar Irom true, as Coughlin changed his SCR 79(1)(a)
address 5 times since August 2011, and speciIically requested oI the SBN on
numerous occasions, to copy Coughlin via Iax or email on any mailings, due in
large part to his domestic violence victime status, especially where USPS lack oI
cooperation at the 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2 address caused additional obstacles to
receiving Coughlin's mail.
2. Coughlin was admitted as a member oI the State Bar oI Nevada on
March 25, 2005 but could hardly be said to have 7 years oI experience in the Iull
time practice oI law. Since becoming licensed to practice, the longest and most
signIicant law related employment Ior Coughlin was Iour and a halI month stint
as an associate at the Iormer Hale Lane (now Holland and Hart) Irom July 2005 to
December 2005, and an 18 month tenure at Washoe Legal Services Irom August
2007 to May 2009. Besides that, Coughlin's law related work has included only
his starting private practice in July 2011 and whatever 'research and development
thereto occurred in the two years between the end oI Coughlin's employment with
WLS and his starting in private practice.. See Hearing Exhibit 1 at 0001, lines 7-
8.
3. Coughlin had been in a domestic partnership with Melissa Ulloa Ior nearly
Iour and a halI years when she broke up with him and moved out oI their shared
residence 2 days aIter graduating Irom UNR with a degree in journalism. Coughlin
had Ior the preceding Iour years given Ulloa his share oI the rental obligations,
which she would Iorward on with her own to their landlord. Ms. Ulloa Iailed to so
Iorward on Coughlin rental shares Ior May and June oI 2011, though Coughlin
became aware oI this via an August 11
th
, 2011 email Irom the landlord Merliss.
Coughlin was low on money in late July 2011 and contacted NNAMHS to inquire
again about assistance in paying Ior his mental health medications, whereupon he
was told that NNAMHS did not cover that speciIic medication. Coughlin, in an
eIIort to address exigent Iinancial concerns went oII his medications on or about
August 2
nd
, 2011, and cancelled an oIIice visit with his regular psychiatrist, Dr.
Yassar.
Coughlin was arrested less than three weeks later on August 20
th
, 2011 aIter
having ingested a large quantity oI DXM in an attempt to cope with the severe
physical and psychological eIIects oI suddenly ceasing to take Wellbutrin and
Adderall. Coughlin vehemently disputes guilt incident to that curious petty
larceny arrest which has been detailed previously and involves a twist on a typical
Iinding oI lost, mislaid, or abandoned property as larceny scenario, and where
witness testimony has provided at least an inIerence that police misconduct
occurr.ed in the Iorm oI an unlawIul search in violation oI the Fourth Amendment.
Coughlin was retaliatorily arrested Ior raising the possibility that the Fourth
Amendment might be applicable to those events, and the hostile group aggression
oI a group oI early twenty-something skateboarders, and the arrest and smug,
retaliatory commentary and coercive threats by the oIIicers involved were
captured on a smart phone recording in Coughlin's short's pocket, Coughlin was
subject to a custodial arrest dispute the dictates oI NRS 178.136.
Coughlin was curiously denied an OR release despite scoring high on all oI
the elements oI that analysis, until one was granted on August 26
th
, 2011. A
combination oI the Iailure oI anyone in Coughlin's Iamily or social circle being
willing to sign the bail sheet, and diIIiculties in successIully connecting via
telephone with those outside oI the jail resulted in the extened jail stay, during
which time Coughlin alerted jail deputies that he was due in court beIore Master
Edmonson and Judge Weller and arranged Ior the jail to notiIy their respective
departments.
Coughlin's Iamily had largely taken sympathetic stance towards Ulloa
(whom upon leaving Coughlin, caused nearly irrevocable damage to Coughlin's
Iamilial relationships by announcing to Coughlin's ultra traditional Iamily
physician with an empashsis in addiction medicine Iather (he oI a conservative
Twelve Step approach to treating just about any mental health issue (including
ADHD/MDD and treatment resistant depression) that Coughlin was taking
Adderall Ior the treatement oI ADHD and treatment-resistant depression (despite
Coughlin having previously proIusely warning her not to due given the extremely
likely Iallout that would and did ensue). While doing so may have made Ms.
Ulloa's breaking up with 2 days aIter graduating college and moving out seem less
caddish to the extent some inIerence be made oI Coughlin's medication
contributing to their break up or relationship striIe.
However, such could rather also be said to coincide Iairly proportionally to
Coughlin being terminated Irom Washoe Legal Services, or the Iour straight years
oI 15 unemployment rates in Washoe County, or the stresses associated with
Ms. Ulloa working Iull time (Iinishing her Iinal 3 years oI college credits in the
Iour years she and Coughlin were domestic partners), or Ms. Ulloa's daily
struggles associate with beign a type-1 insulin dependant diabetic and or some
associated signiIicant thyroid medical issues she was addressing with medication
therapy.
Upon being released Irom jail on August 26
th
, 2011, Coughlin returned to
his 121 River Rock St. Iormer home law oIIice to Iind a No Cause Eviction 30
Day Notice posted on his door. Within 12 days Coughlin would be arrested, in
violation oI NRS 171.1255, by tribal police oIIicers at a Wal-Mart on Indian
Colony land. During the summer oI 2011 Coughlin had several disagreements
with Wal-Mart customer service personnel respecting the curious applications oI
the store's Return Policy, which resulted, on July 7
th
, 2011 in an unidentiIied AP
Associate Irom Wal-Mart, standing with ASM John Ellis (whom Coughlin had
gotten into a disagreement with regarding Ellis, a ten year store ASM, not quite
remembering the store's stated, posted Return Policy, whereupon the unidentiIied
ASM told Coughlin they would abuse process in some manner resulting in
Couglin being banned Irom all Wal-Mart Stores. Wal-Marts admission respecting
these Iacts are detailed Iurther in 60838. Coughlin was arrested on September 9
th
,
2011 at Wal-Mart and charge with petty larceny oI 'a candy bar and Duract
Cough Melts (which contain dextromethorphan (DXM) as well).
Coughlin bailed out within 24 hours and proceeded to deIend against the
summary eviction. Coughlin was talked into bailing a young man out oI jail Ior
$700 just prior to that point, on the condition that the man work oI what part oI
that debt would not be returned by the Reno Justice Court upon the young man's
assertion that he would be able to 'work out a payment plan with the Judge and
'get most oI the $700 back right away. Yes, Coughlin as that naive. OI course,
the Judge kept all oI the $700, and the young man only managed to work Ior about
one hour at Coughlin's oIIice beIore he continued on in an unIortunate addiction to
methamphetamine, seemingly compouned by what that young man's mother
subsequently told Coughlin is essentially the personlity oI a skilled compusive liar.
In the petty larceny prosecution that Iollowed Coughlin was subject to a
multitude oI due process violations, including deprivation oI his right to counsel,
right to testiIy on his own behalI, and denied even a single continuance, and,
seemingly retaliated against Ior making a motion Ior disqualiIication where the
Judge sentenced Coughlin to three days in jail (no Stay despite Coughlin citing
concern Ior prejudice to his client's aIIairs) citing to a civil summary contempt
statute NRS 22.030. The appeal oI that conviction was denied incident to a
citation to a civil statute seemingly set Iorth to excuse the trial court's Iailure to
Iollow NRS 189.030's dictates regarding preparation oI the transcript and a Iinding
that Coughlin Iailed to cite to the record or transcript with suIIicient particularlity
to support the argument set out in his BrieI.
The judge Iound Coughlin's conduct to be disorderly and was either
contemptuous or behavior insolent toward the judge in that Coughlin reIused:
"... to obey directives oI the Judge, continuing lines oI
inquiry aIter being advised by the Court to reIrain Irom
doing so; demeaning the Court with statements such as
"WOW" in response to court rulings; laughing during
testimony and Iurther questioning the court and its
authority."
The FOFCOL attempts to characterize a civil summary contempt Iinding by
Judge Howard as clear and convincing evidence oI a violation oI various RPC's;
however, Judge Howard assessment that nothing Coughlin did during that Trial
invoked a duty to report under judicial canons must be viewed as creating, at the
very least, a presumption (iI not res judicata on the issue) that no such proIessional
misconduct occurred. 'Initially, the Court believes Mirch has committed a
violation oI the Rules oI ProIessional Conduct. See SCR 170. Pursuant to the
Nevada Code oI Judicial Conduct, Canon D(2), the Court reIers this matter to the
Nevada State Bar Counsel Ior disciplinary investigation. DeIendants' counsel is
ordered to send a copy oI this Order and all pleading in this case to Bar Counsel
within 10 days oI the date oI this Order. See, In Re Mirch, 49212 p.9 Opening
BrieI. Nevada Code oI Judicial Conduct, Canon 3D(2) in the Code's incarnation
circa 2007, and more recently, according to the 2009 Amendment:
Nevada's Code of 1udicial Conduct (NC1C): TERMINOLOGY...
'Appropriate authority means the authority having responsibility Ior initiation
oI disciplinary process in connection with the violation to be reported. See Rules
2.14 and 2.15.
.Rule2.14.Disability and Impairment.A judge having a reasonable belieI
that the perIormance oI a lawyer or another judge is impaired by drugs or alcohol,
or by a mental, emotional, or physical condition, shall take appropriate action,
which may include a confidential reIerral to a lawyer or judicial assistance
program.
COMMENT
|1|'Appropriate action means action intended and reasonably likely to
help the judge or lawyer in question address the problem and prevent harm to the
justice system. Depending upon the circumstances, appropriate action may include
but is not limited to speaking directly to the impaired person, notiIying an
individual with supervisory responsibility over the impaired person, or making a
referral to an assistance program.
|2|Taking or initiating corrective action by way of referral to an
assistance program may satisfy a judge`s responsibility under this Rule.
Assistance programs have many approaches Ior oIIering help to impaired judges
and lawyers, such as intervention, counseling, or reIerral to appropriate health care
proIessionals. Depending upon the gravity of the conduct that has come to the
judge`s attention, however, the judge may be required to take other action,
such as reporting the impaired judge or lawyer to the appropriate authority,
agency, or body. See Rule 2.15.

NCJC Rule2.15.Responding to Judicial and Lawyer Misconduct.
(B)A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of
the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question
regarding the lawyer`s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects shall inform the appropriate authority....
(D)A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood
that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Nevada Rules of Professional
Conduct shall take appropriate action.
COMMENT
|1|Taking action to address known misconduct is a judge`s obligation.
Paragraphs (A) and (B) impose an obligation on the judge to report to the
appropriate disciplinary authority the known misconduct of another judge or
a lawyer that raises a substantial question regarding the honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness of that judge or lawyer. Ignoring or denying known
misconduct among one`s judicial colleagues or members oI the legal proIession
undermines a judge`s responsibility to participate in eIIorts to ensure public
respect Ior the justice system. This Rule limits the reporting obligation to those
offenses that an independent judiciary must vigorously endeavor to prevent.
|2|A judge who does not have actual knowledge that another judge or a
lawyer may have committed misconduct but receives information indicating a
substantial likelihood of such misconduct, is required to take appropriate action
under paragraphs (C) and (D). Appropriate action may include, but is not limited
to, communicating directly with the judge who may have violated this Code,
communicating with a supervising judge, or reporting the suspected violation to
the appropriate authority or other agency or body. Similarly, actions to be
taken in response to information indicating that a lawyer has committed a
violation of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct may include but are
not limited to communicating directly with the lawyer who may have
committed the violation or reporting the suspected violation to the
appropriate authority or other agency or body.

Rule2.16.Cooperation With Disciplinary Authorities.
(A)A judge shall cooperate and be candid and honest with judicial and
lawyer disciplinary agencies.
(B)A judge shall not retaliate, directly or indirectly, against a person known
or suspected to have assisted or cooperated with an investigation oI a judge or a
lawyer. (Judges W. and L. Gardner as to the Mandamus Peition in 54844 and the
associated appeal in 53833).
COMMENT
|1|Cooperation with investigations and proceedings oI judicial and lawyer
discipline agencies, as required in paragraph (A), instills conIidence in judges`
commitment to the integrity oI the judicial system and the protection oI the public.
Not much room to express anything under Judge Howard's summary
contempt standard. Kind oI a walking on eggshells Ieel to it, with Marshal Menzel
menacingly standing by, though Menzel is Iree to express himselI what with
numerous tattoos on his always in short sleeves with muscular biceps and Iorearms
prominently displayed, usually attendant to some hostile and aggresive tone oI
voice delivering an 'order to submit to personal service oI some setting or notice
or Order to save the RMC the cost oI a stamp, apparently (though the RMC
certainly approves oI electronic mail service between itselI and the RCA and some
other parties, entities, and advocates) and at the time oI Coughlin's Iiling his
Motion Ior New Trial on 12/12/11 Coughlin had been given permission to Iile by
email by Donna Ballard, Senior Filing OIIicer Supervisor Ior the RMC.
'Nevada Code oI Judicial Conduct, Canon 3D(2), indicates that a judge
who receives inIormation indicating that there is a substantial likelihood that a
lawyer has committed a violation oI the Rules oI ProIessional Conduct has a duty
to report the inIormation to the appropriate authorities.' Nowhere in Judge
Hardesty's Order does Judge Hardesty anticipate that this Order will act as the
Iormal complaint at a potential bar proceeding. The purpose oI Judge Hardesty
Order in relation to the State Bar was only to serve to inIorm the State Bar oI the
matter. The State Bar improperly relied upon Judge Hardesty's Order. The Order
Iinds a violation oI NRCP 11, not a violation oI SCR 170. The State Bar
acknowledges that there are diIIerences in the elements oI NRCP 11 and SCR 170.
Further, the State Bar acknowledges the diIIerences in the standard oI prooI
required to Iind a violation oI NRCP 11 and SCR 170. The
Canon 3D(2) states as Iollows: A judge who receives inIormation indicating a
substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation oI the Rules oI
ProIessional Conduct should take appropriate action. A judge having knowledge
that a lawyer has committed a violation oI the Rules oI ProIessional Conduct that
raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or Iitness
as a lawyer in other respects shall inIorm the appropriate authority.
'Bar's sole reliance upon an order in a civil proceeding was improper and
prejudiced Appellant Mirch. Without speciIic allegations regarding ethical
violations , Appellant Mirch was not prepared to adequately deIend himselI
against the allegations and arguments made by the Bar at the hearing . Indeed,
Mrs. Mirch perhaps said it best when she argued that her deIense reminded her oI
her children' s video game, "where all these things are coming out and you just
have to shoot at them randomly because you don't know what' s coming at you.
What is it that Mr. Mirch did wrong? Was it in the Iacts oI the case ? Was it in the
legal basis Ior the case? Is it Doe plaintiIIs? Is it because he didn't bring suit in
Iederal court? Or is it because he didn't serve it until even within the rules oI the
120 days ?"
Gardner, Flanagan, Drake tennis analogy to Brandon Kramer re solo sports
mentality (Elcano the golIer, skeet shooter, etc.) versus teamsport oI basketball,
Bill Simmons, the secret, Bill Walton, etc....master oI disaster as Dos Equis 'Most
Interesting Man in the World guy...RGJ tennis clippings..Sara Perry/Springgate
Iencers...solo sports versus team sports/ PM and John Baseball/Ganzel and Dogan
'not white RHS 1963/SheriII Joe
Coughlin deIended against the summary eviction proceeding on 10/13/11,
and was doing well enough in the practice oI law to manage to post the $2,275 in
rent escrow required by the Order Iollowing that summary eviction hearing
(which, was violative oI NRS 40.253(6) in that the RJC has not a corollary to, say,
JCRLV 44). Despite the hearing on 10/25/11 being noticed in writing as a 'Trial
and reIerred to as such on numerous instances, even on 10/25/11, Coughlin was
prevented Irom bring cross or counterclaims, conducting discovery, and was
ordered evicted at the conclusion oI the day on 10/25/11 where the Judge called
Ior a Proposed Order to be submitted by 10/27/11 at noon, and Ior such Order to
allow Coughlin until October 31st, 2011 at 5 pm beIore any lockout would be
eIIectuated. The Order did not warn Coughlin that any continued presence therein
would be tantamount to trespass or otherwise provide a trespass warning. While
there is an Eviction Decision and Order oI 10/25/11, there is also a
FOFCOL&OSE oI 10/27/11, which Hill's associate Baker testiIied that his oIIice
relied upon the RJC's standard policies and procedures oI Iaxing such orders to the
WCSO OIIice, as well as Baker indicating he met with the SheriII's OIIice on
10/28/11.
5. On June 7, 2012 the Supreme Court oI the State oI Nevada upon
petition oI Bar Counsel pursuant to SCR 111, ordered Coughlin temporarily
suspended Irom the practice oI law in Nevada. The Order Iuther directed that the
matter be reIerrred to the Appropriate disciplinary board, as mandated by SCR
111 (8), with directions for the board to institute a Iormal hearing "before a
hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent of
the discipline to be imposed." No. 60838, June 7, 2012.
6. On November 15, 2011 Coughlin was merely cited (contrary to the
FOFCOL indicating an arrest was made) with a violation oI the Reno Municipal
Code. On February 27, 2012 a trial was held in Reno Municipal Court beIore the
Honorable Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes on the charge oI a 'rolling stop/CaliIornia
roll/Right oI Way Stop Sign violation at an intersection (a violation oI RMC
6.06.170(a)). Coughlin again appeared in propria persona. The trial commenced at
3 p.m. and was concluded by the Court at 4:30 p.m., upon the matter being stayed
pending either or both Coughlin's competency being brought into question or his
being Iound in summary contempt oI Court (civil statutes would be cited to, NRS
22.010, and 22.100, though curiosly, the summary contempt statute and its
concomitant AIIidavit Requirement in NRS 22.030 was to invokved. See Hearing
Exhibit 4 (2/28/12 Order...). Judge Nash Holmes never did notiIy any oI the other
RMC Departments in writing oI what was ultimately categorized as a NRS
178.405 stay oI proceedings.
Judge Nash Holmes ordered Coughlin into custody Ior the term oI Iive (5)
days. Coughlin never received the 2/28/12 Order or even became aware oI its
existence until Iinding it attached to the 6/18/12 SCR 117 Petition.
"The court Iinds that deIendant's contemptuous conduct
consisted oI his rude, sarcastic, inappropriate,
insubordinate, disrespectful, antagonistic, deceitIul,
aisruptive, argumentative and childish behavior during trial,
all oI which appeared to be done to vex and annoy the
court, the witness, and the opposing party, and to disrupt
the trial process. The court finds that the Iollowing
occurred, and constitute contempt
iv
:
1) deIendant's mimelike, clownish antics oI making Iaces at
the court; sagging down into his seat and hanging his head;
looking behind himselI and inside his coat as iI searching
Ior a better way to ask a question; rolling his eyes; and
mimicking others words;
2) deIendant's incessant arguing with the court, talking over
the court, and interrupting the court;
3) deIendant's repeatedly restating matters aIter being told
by the court to "move on" or "ask the next question;"
4) deIendant's repeatedly injecting allegations oI bribery,
perjury, and police retaliation into the matter aIter the court
instructed him not to, and directed him to limit himselI to
issues pertaining to the Iacts oI the "Boulevard Stop;"
5) deIendant's repeatedly trying to insert" Richard Hill" into
his questions and statements when such person was not
relevant to the proceeding and the deIendant had been
ordered to stop discussing that;
6) deIendant's disregarding the rules oI evidence and court
procedure by continually posing improper questions aIter
being directed by the court to properly phrase his questions
7) deIendant's continually accusing the court oI denying him
the right or ability to ask questions and telling the court to
"give me a list oI questions you want me to ask;"
8) deIendant's suggesting that the court "tell me what would
make you happy;"
9) deIendant's lying to the court in response to direct
questions posed by the court with regard to his recording the
proceedings; and
10) deIendant's Iailing and reIusing to properly examine the
witness, despite numerous admonitions by the court to stop
repeating questions, misstating answers, injecting irrelevant
material, arguing with the witness and mischaracterizing the
testimony." Vol. 3 P. X

The Panel's FOFCOL dances around whether that traIIic trial was
suspended pursuant to a stay under NRS 178.405 or Ior some other reason: '8. The
trial oI the matter was continued to March 12, 2012. Coughlin failed to appear
and Iailed to contact the court to explain or excuse his absence. However, aIter
serving the Iive-day Contempt oI Court sanction and aIter being released Irom
custody, Coughlin Iax-Iiled a 224-page document
v
(NB: that Iiling was 54 pages
with a 166 page attachment. Hill made several filings (the use oI the term
'document is somewhat misleading, as teh entitled "Notice oI Appeal oI
Summary Contempt Order; Motion to Return Personal Property ConIiscated by
Reno Municipal Courts and Its Marshalls; Motion Ior New Trial and to Alter or
Amend Summary Contempt Order." See Hearing Exhibit 5, ORDER, P 2, lines 1-
6.
9. Judge Nash Holmes observed that the pleading Iiled by Coughlin
Iailed to address
most oI the topics listed in the caption. Rather, she observed, the document
contained rambling
reIerences to Coughlin's personal liIe, his Iather's Iootball career in college; dozens
oI pages oI
string citations taken Irom the internet and other unrelated reIerences. Judge Nash
Holmes Iound
the pleading to be disjointed and incoherent and a "pathetic demonstration oI what
might once have
been legal and academic prowess that appears to now be greatly damaged." See
Hearing Exhibit 5,
ORDER, P2, lines 9-15; P2, lines 16-20.
10. Judge Nash Holmes also Iound that Coughlin, aIter being released
Irom custody
Iollowing the February 27, 2012 Contempt oI Court incarceration, Iiled other
nonsensical pleadings
including a 218 page document:
"...purported to be yet another motion in this case entitled
"Motion to Return Cell Phones; Motion to Set Aside Summary
Contempt Order; and Notice oI Appeal oI Summary Contempt
Order." With scant discussion oI, or relevance to, the above
captioned matter, said document mostly argues against Judge
Howard in a Department 4 case and again contains more than 200
pages oI string legal citations; lyrics to rocks (sic) songs; Mr.
Coughlin's personal Iamily history; discussion oI an eviction case
and another contempt case; disjointed legal citations and other
nonsensical matters that have no apparent relevance to his traIIic
citation case.
11. AIter observing that Coughlin's conduct had been inappropriate, bizarre,
dishonest, irrational and disruptive, Judge Nash Holmes concluded, by clear and
convincing evidence, that Coughlin had committed numerous acts oI attorney
misconduct, including, but not limited to, violating Rules oI ProIessional Conduct
8.4(c), 8.4(d), 3.3(a), 3.1, 3.2, 3.4(c), 1.3 and 1.1. See Hearing Exhibit 5, ORDER,
P,3, lines 25-26; P4, lines 5-23.
12. Judge Nash Holmes also concluded that Coughlin violated Nevada
Supreme Court Rule 229, section 2(b), as amended by ADKT 449 on August 1,
2011 by surreptitiously recording the traIIic court proceedings without advance
permission and lying to the court when questioned regarding the matter by
denying that he had done so. See Hearing Exhibits, ORDER, P,4, lines 24-28.
13. Judge Nash Holmes ordered, among other orders, that the traIIic court
matter be continued and all proceedings relating to the traIIic court matter be
tolled pending reIerral oI the matter to the State Bar oI Nevada. See Hearing
Exhibit 5, ORDER, P,4, lines 7- 18,
14. On March 14, 2012, Judge Nash Holmes reIerred the matter oI
Coughlin to State Bar Counsel David Clark and suggested the matter had some
urgency. See Hearing Exhibit 8, Letter dated March 14, 2012 Irom Reno
Municipal Court Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes to OIIice oI State Bar Counsel,
Nevada State Bar.
15. Judge Holmes testiIied at the hearing oI this disciplinary matter that one
oI the purposes oI her March 14, 2012 Order was to provide the panel to hear this
matter with clear and convincing evidence, based on her experience and
background as an attorney, prosecutor and judge that Coughlin had violated
numerous provisions oI the Nevada Rules oI ProIessional Conduct. See
Transcript oI Proceedings oI Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 137, L 22 -P 138,
L 9.
16. U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Bruce Beesley was called to testiIy at the
hearing oI this matter. During the time Irame 2011 to 2012, Coughlin appeared
beIore Judge Beesley two or three times as an attorney representing clients in a
bankruptcy matter. On one occasion Coughlin appeared wearing a T-shirt and a tie
and no jacket. See Transcript oI Proceedings oI Wednesday, November 14, 2012,
P 10, L 10-16. Coughlin had Iiled a pleading in the bankruptcy matter, on behalI
oI his client. Judge Beesley testiIied that the pleading was "lengthy, didn't make
any sense, and just sort oI rambled through a great deal oI irrelevant stuII." See
Transcript oI Proceedings oI Wednesday, November 14,2012, P 10, L 24 -P 11, L
1. On other occasions, although Coughlin appeared polite and intelligent, his
pleadings and arguments didn't make any sense. See Transcript oI Proceedings oI
Wednesday, November 14,2012, P 11, L2-7
17. Judge Beesley became concerned, wrote a letter to the State Bar
explaining his experience with Coughlin and indicated that he did not believe
Coughlin, in his current state, was able to adequately represent his clients. See
Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012,P 13, L 24 -P 14, L 7.
18. In Judge Beesley's opinion, Coughlin is not competent to practice
law. See Transcript oI Proceedings oI Wednesday, November 14,2012,PIS, L 11 -
15.
19. State Bar Counsel called attorney Richard Hill to testiIy at the
hearing oI this matter: Mr. Hill has been a member in good standing with the
State Bar oI Nevada Ior 33 years. See Transcript oI Proceedings oI Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 36, L 22 P 37 L 4. Mr. Hill was retained by Dr. Merliss to
assist Dr. Merliss in a landlord tenant dispute with his tenant Coughlin. See
Transcript oI Proceedings oI Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 37, L14 -20.
Mr. Hill represented Dr. Merliss in Reno Justice Court and Washoe County
District Court and two appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court in the matters
involving Dr. Merliss and Coughlin. See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday,
November 14,2012,P 39, L 13 -24. Mr. Hill has also reviewed Iilings in oI a case
in which Coughlin is involved with Washoe Legal Services. See Transcript oI
Proceedings Wednesday, November 14,2012, P 39, L 25 P 40, L 3.
20. In the eviction proceeding between Dr. Meriiss and Coughlin, Mr.
Hill's Iirm obtained an eviction order allowing Coughlin one week to vacate the
premises. Ultimately, Coughlin Iailed to comply with the eviction order and was
convicted oI criminal trespass. See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November
14, 2012, P 41, L 18 -P 44, L 12.
21. On behalI oI his client Dr. Merliss, Mr. Hill sought and obtained an
order in Iavor oI Dr. Merliss and against Coughlin awarding Dr. Merliss attorney's
Iees in the amount oI $42,065.50. Washoe District Court Judge Patrick Flanagan
entered the order on June 25, 2012. See Transcript oI Proceedings oI Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 47, L 3-7. -See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 3, L 10-11. The
motion seeking attorney's Iees was based on Coughlin's conduct in the deIense oI
the eviction matter, which conduct was characterized as Irivolous and vexatious
and presumably so Iound by Judge Flanagan. See Hearing Exhibit P 2, L 8-13; P
3, L 4-11.
22. Based on Mr. Hill's experience and background, his review oI the
pleadings in the litigation between Dr. Merliss and Coughlin and his review oI the
pleadings in Coughlin's litigation with Washoe Legal Services, Mr. Hill is oI the
opinion that Coughlin is not competent to practice law. See Transcript oI Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 39, L 1 -12.
23. Based on Mr. Hill's experience in litigating with Coughlin,
Coughlin was not truthIul with either counsel or the court. See Transcript oI
Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012,P 53, L 6 -16. Mr. Hill Ielt that
Coughlin's Iilings were abusive, at one point calling Mr. Hill's associate a lichen.
Coughlin has accused Mr. Hill oI bribing the Reno Police Department to have
Coughlin arrested. Mr. Hill's staII is terrorized by Coughlin. See Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 54, L 4 -15.
24. State Bar Counsel called attorney Paul Elcano to testiIy at the
hearing oI this matter. Mr. Elcano is the executive director oI Washoe Legal
Services that provides legal services to indigents. See Transcript oI Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 88, L 25 -P 89, L 14. Coughlin was employed
by Washoe Legal Services Irom August 29, 2007 to May 11, 2009. See Transcript
oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 93, L 17 -20. Mr. EJcano became
aware oI an order entered by Judge Gardner on April 10, 2009 in the matter oI
Joshi v Joshi and, as a result, reviewed the taped transcript oI the hearing. See
Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14,2012, P 94, L 22 -P 95, L 6.
25. Judge Gardner's order in the Joshi matter indicated that Coughlin
had conducted no discovery in the case and Iailed to present any documentary
evidence at the trial oI the matter on behalI oI his client Mrs. Joshi. See Hearing
Exhibit P 12, L 4 -6. AIter commenting on various negative aspects oI Coughlin's
representation oI his client Mrs. Joshi, (See Hearing Exhibit P 12, L 9 -P 13, L 40)
Judge Gardner speciIically held:
"The most troubling aspect oI this case was Mr. Coughlin's rude,
sarcastic and disrespectIul presentation at trial; Mr. Coughlin's
inability to understand a balance sheet; his Iailure to conduct
discovery; and his lack oI knowledge with regard to the rules oI
evidence and trial procedure. All oI this was compounded with a
continuously antagonistic presentation oI the case that resulted in a
shiIt Irom a Iairly simple divorce case to a contentious divorce trial
lasting an excessive amount oI time. "
See Hearing Exhibit P 13, L 5 -10
26. Judge Gardner sanctioned Coughlin personally and awarded attorney's
Iees to Mr. Joshi in the amount oI $934 to be paid personally by Coughlin within
30 days oI the order. See Hearing Exhibit P 13, L 14 -17
27. Based on the order and Coughlin's conduct in the Joshi matter,
Coughlin was terminated by Washoe Legal Services. See Transcript oI Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 110, L7-8 28, In Mr. Elcano's opinion,
Coughlin is not competent to practice law. See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 94, L 3 -8.
29. State Bar Counsel called Coughlin to testiIy at the hearing oI the matter.
Coughlin was questioned with regard to a letter dated February 14, 2012 Irom
Assistant Bar Counsel King to Coughlin in which Bar Counsel Iorwarded to
Coughlin correspondence received Irom Richard G. Hill. See Transcript oI
Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 163, L 13 -P 164, L 23. See Hearing
Exhibit 6. Coughlin's response, dated March 9, 2012, asked Ior additional time in
which to respond. See Hearing Exhibit 7. No evidence was presented that
Coughlin substantively responded to Bar Counsel's letter oI February 14, 2012
prior to the Iiling oI the Complaint in this matter. Coughlin Iailed to directly
respond to Bar Counsel's questions inquiring iI Coughlin ever subsequently
responded to Bar Counsel's letter oI February 14, 2012. See Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 169, L 13 -P 172, L 16.
30. Coughlin also Iailed to directly respond to questioning regarding
whether or not he had substantively responded, prior to the Iiling oI the Complaint
in this matter, to a letter Iorwarded to him Irom Bar Counsel regarding the letter
received by the Nevada State Bar Irom Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes and dated
March 14, 2012. See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P
174, L 13 -P 180, L 4. See Hearing Exhibit 8.
31. On March 7,2012 Coughlin caused to be Iiled an "AIIidavit oI
Poverty in Support oI Motion to Proceed InIorma Pauperis." See Hearing Exhibit
9. In his AIIidavit, Coughlin represented that he was selI-employed as a "Jack oI
all Trades." See Hearing Exhibit 9. The AIIidavit does not identiIy Mr. Coughlin
as a lawyer or identity any income Irom the practice oI law. See Hearing Exhibit 9.
32. The record also indicates that Coughlin had also Iiled a motion on
November 14, 2011 to proceed In Forma Pauperis in case number I1CR 22176
pending in the Reno Municipal Court beIore Judge Kenneth R. Howard. See
Hearing Exhibit 10. Judge Howard's Order denying Coughlin's motion speciIically
noted that Coughlin's "aIIidavit oI poverty" did not identiIy any income Irom the
practice oI law yet Coughlin had implied to the court when sentenced to
incarceration Ior contempt that his incarceration would adversely aIIect his clients.
See Hearing Exhibit 10, P 2, L 19 -23.
33. Although Coughlin claims to suIIer the impairment oI attention deIicit
disorder, Ior which he is prescribed medication and which medication he took on
the day oI his hearing, he does not Ieel he needs any additional help. See
Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 199, L 13 -P 204, L 9.
34. On August 23, 2012, the State Bar oI Nevada Iiled its Complaint in this
matter and served it upon Respondent Coughlin by CertiIied Mail to his address
then registered with the State Bar oI Nevada. See Docket. Complaint.
35. Not having received a response to the Complaint, on October 9, 2012
the State Bar oI Nevada Iiled and served on Respondent Coughlin, by certiIied
mail, a "Notice oI Intent to Proceed on a DeIault Basis." The Notice attached an
additional copy oI the Complaint and indicated that unless a responsive pleading
to the Complaint was received by the State Bar by October 24, 2012, the matter
would proceed on a deIault basis. See Docket, Notice oI Intent to Proceed on a
DeIault Basis.
36. On October 31, 2012 Panel Chair Echeverria issued the Panel's Order
denying Coughlin's "Motion to Dismiss" Iiled October 16, 2012; Denying
Coughlin's "Motion Ior Order to Show Cause Regarding Improper Attempt by Bar
Counsel and, Possibly, NNDB to Delay and Obstruct Hearing Required by Courts
(sic) June 7, 2012 Order in Case No. 60838 and Coughlin's SCR 102(4)(d) Petition
in Case 61426 Iiled October 2, 2012; Granting Coughlin's Motion to Review and
Inspect Bar Records Iiled October 16, 2012 and Denying Coughlin's Motion to
BiIurcate Hearing and Motion to Dismiss Ior (sic) Complaint (sic) Failure to
SuIIiciently State the Charges with SpeciIicity and Support and Ior Utter Failure
oI Bar Counsel to PerIorm Reasonable Investigation." See Order Dated October
31, 2012. In that Order, Chairman Echeverria Iurther ordered that the Formal
Hearing would proceed on a deIault basis unless Coughlin Iiled a VeriIied Answer
to the Complaint by November 9, 20 12. See Order Dated October 31,2012, P 2, L
7-10.
37. Again on November 7, 20 12, Chairman Echeverria, in an Order
Granting the State Bar's Motion to Quash certain Subpoenas reminded Coughlin
that unless a VeriIied Answer to the Complaint was Iiled by 5:00 p.m. on
November 9,20 12 the panel would proceed on a deIault basis. See Pleadings
Docket Order Dated November 7, 2012, P 2, L 8 -13.
38. Following a lengthy attempt to determine whether or not Coughlin
believed he had
Iiled a timely veriIied answer or response to the State Bar's Complaint, Coughlin
attempted, at the hearing oI the matter, to transIorm a pleading previously Iiled in
the Reno Municipal Court into a "New VeriIied Response (sic) Pre-Hearing
Motion to Dismiss/Summary Judgment, Memorandum oI Law (See Hearing
Exhibit 14) and to transIorm an "Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss ... "
previously dated November 12, 20 12 and altered at the hearing to reIlect a date oI
November 14, 2012 into a "Declaration and VeriIied Response." See Hearing
Exhibits 15 and 16. See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14,2012, P
244, L 16 -P 270, L II.
vi
39. During the course oI the hearing oI this matter Coughlin continued to
demonstrate a pattern oI conduct similar to, iI not identical to, conduct in other
Iorums Ior which he had repeatedly been sanctioned. See Transcript oI Hearing
Wednesday, November 14,2012. Pleadings in this matter Iiled by Coughlin were
exceedingly lengthy, demonstrated a lack oI Iocus and understanding oI the issues
involved, were rambling and incoherent and contained discussion oI irrelevant
issues. See, e.g Hearing Exhibits 14, 15, 16. See also, Pleadings Docket Motion
Ior Order to Show Cause ... " dated October 2,2012; "Motion to Review and
Inspect Bar Records ... " Filed October 16, 2012; Pleading entitled "Well Would
You Look at That ... " dated November 7,2012; "Emergency Ex Parte Motion To
Dismiss or Quash ... " Filed November 13,2012.
40. Coughlin's conduct at the hearing included conduct not reIlected in the
transcript oI
the proceedings by way oI Iacial gestures, body language, voice intonation and
volume. See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 181, L 19-
P 182, L 1.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the Ioregoing Findings oI Fact,the Panel hereby issues the
Iollowing Conclusions
oI Law:
(A) The Panel was designated by the northern Nevada Disciplinary Board
Chair to
adjudicate the Comp
laint Iiled by the State Bar oI Nevada against
Zachary B. Coughlin,Case Nos. NGI2-0204, NG12-0435 and NG12-0434 and to
determine the extent oI the discipline to be imposed pursuant to

the Nevada
Supreme Court Order oI Temporary Suspension and ReIerral to Disciplinary
Board entered in Case No. 60838, In the Matter oI Discipline oI Zachary B.
Coughlin, Esq., Bar No. 9473, entered June 7,2012.
(B) The Panel has jurisdiction over the Respondent and the subject matter
oI these
proceedings. See Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 99.
(C) Venue in this matter is properly with the Northern Nevada Disciplinary
Board and
in
the County oI Washoe, State oINevada. Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 105.
(D) Coughlin received notice and a copy oI the Complaint, notice oI his
right to respond, as well as notice oI the evidence and witnesses upon which the
State Bar intended to rely at a Iormal hearing. Notice oI the Iormal hearing was
served on Coughlin. Coughlin appeared in the matter, Iiled numerous motions,
appeared at the hearing oI the matter, cross-examined witnesses and testiIied on
behalI oI the State Bar and on his own behalI. Accordingly, the State Bar complied
with the procedural requirements oI SCR 105.
(E) Coughlin was aIIorded ample opportunity to prepare a veriIied answer
or response to the allegations oI the Complaint and Iailed to timely do so. See
Findings oI Fact 34, 35 and 36. Accordingly, the matter could proceed on a deIault
basis and the allegations oI the Complaint deemed admitted. SCR 105(2)
Notwithstanding the Iact that the matter could have been decided on a deIault
basis, the Panel permitted the State Bar and Coughlin to present evidence.
(F) Submitted to the panel Ior decision are the Iollowing issues:
(1) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 1.1 (Competence).
(2) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 1.2 (Diligence). (NOTE:
actually, RPC 1.2 is 'Scope oI Representation and Allocation
oI Authority Between Client and Lawyer, and RPC 1.3 is
'Diligence.
(3) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 3.1 (Meritorious Claims
and Contentions)
(4) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 3.3 (Candor to the
Tribunal).
(5) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 3.4 (Fairness to
Opposing Party and Counsel)
(6) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 3.5 (Impartiality and
Decorum oI the Tribunal)
(7) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 3.5A (Relations with
Opposing Counsel)
(8) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 4.1 (TruthIulness in
Statements to Others)
(9) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 4.4 (Respect Ior the
Rights oI Third Persons)
(10) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 8.1 (Disciplinary
Matters)
(11) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 8.2 (Judicial and Legal
OIIicials)
(12) Whether Coughlin violated RPC 8.4 (Misconduct)
(13) The extent oI the discipline to be imposed pursuant to
SCR 111 as a result oI
Coughlin's conviction oI the "serious" crime oI Petit Larceny.
(G) The State Bar must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
Coughlin violated RPC 1.1,'
1.2,3.1, 3.3, 3.4,3.5,4.1,4.4, 5A (sic),8.1,8.2,and 8.4. See Nev Sup. Ct. R. 105(2)
(e); In re StuhII, 108 Nev. at 633-634, 837 P.2d at 856; Gentile v State Bar, 106
Nev. 60, 62, 787 P.2d 386,387 (1990).
Competence
(H) RPC 1.1 states "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary Ior the representation."
(I) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin lacks the
competency to represent clients, including himselI.
(J) First, the record demonstrates severe criticism by the trial court in the
handling oI the Joshi matter, including Coughlin's lack oI understanding oI a
balance sheet, his Iailure to conduct discovery, his lack oI knowledge oI the rules
oI evidence and trial procedure. Supra' 25
(K) Second, Judge Beesley testiIied that the pleadings Iiled by Coughlin on
behalI oI his client in a bankruptcy case were "lengthy, didn't make any sense, and
just sort oI rambled through a great deal oI irrelevant stuII." Judge Beesley also
testiIied that Coughlin's pleadings and arguments on behalI oI his client "didn't
make any sense." Supra ' 16 Judge Beesley became concerned enough about
Coughlin's competency as a lawyer that he contacted the State Bar. Supra' 17
(L) Third, Judge Nash Holmes questioned Coughlin's competency as a
lawyer and in her Order Imding Coughlin in Contempt oI Court noted that
Coughlin disregarded the rules oI evidence, continually imposed improper
questions, Iailed to properly examine witnesses, repeatedly asked the question,
misstated answers, injected irrelevant material, argued with witnesses and
mischaracterized testimony. Supra' 7
(M) Fourth, Judge Nash Holmes Iound that Coughlin's pleadings Iailed to
address topics listed 'in the caption, contained rambling reIerences to Coughlin's
personal liIe and other irrelevant material, were overly lengthy, disjointed and
incoherent. Supra' 9 & 10
(N) FiIth, the State Bar called two judges and two practicing attorneys
(Elcano is not listed as an "active attorney" at www.nvbar.org, nor has he been Ior
over 5 years), each with signiIicant experience with Coughlin and each oI whom
rendered an expert opinion regarding Coughlin's competency as a lawyer. Judge
Beesley testiIied that in his opinion, Coughlin was not competent to practice law.
Supra 18. Judge Nash Holmes testiIied that in her opinion, Coughlin violated
numerous Rules oI ProIessional Conduct including his lack oI competency to
practice law. Supra 15. Attorney Richard Hill also testiIied that in his opinion
Coughlin is not competent to practice law. Supra 22 Attorney Paul Elcano, who
once supervised Coughlin as a lawyer and ultimately terminated him Irom Washoe
Legal Services, also testiIied that, in his opinion, Coughlin is not competent to
practice law. Supra 28
Diligence
(O) Sixth, the record establishes that Coughlin oIIered no expert opinion or
evidence as to his competency.
(P) RPC 1.2 states "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in
representing a client." The record is less clear as to whether or not Coughlin
violated RPC 1.2 on more than on occasion.
(R) Judge Howard, in the Joshi case, certainly Iound that Coughlin Iailed to
conduct discovery on behalI oI his client in that matter. Supra 25
(S) The record and Pleading Docket in this case establish that Coughlin
Iailed to provide a veriIied responsive pleading even in the deIense oI his own
disciplinary action. Supra 38
(T) The record and Pleading Docket in this case establish that Coughlin
habitually Iiles numerous, untimely and repetitive motions.
Meritorious Claims and Contentions
(U) RPC 3.1 in pertinent part states "A lawyer shall not bring or deIend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in .law
and Iact Ior doing so that is not Irivolous, which includes a good Iaith argument
Ior an extension, modiIication or reversal oI existing law."
(V) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin
continuously and repetitively Iiles irrelevant pleadings. pleadings unrelated to the
issue at hand and continuously and repetitively injects irrelevant matters into
proceedings.
(W) Judge Nash Holmes Iound, Ior example, that Coughlin repeatedly
injected allegations oI bribery, perjury and police retaliation in a simple traIIic
case involving the Iailure to stop at a stop sign. Supra 7 She also Iound that
Coughlin repeatedly injected attorney Richard Hill into questions and statements
when Mr. Hill was in no way involved in the traIIic citation trial. Supra 7 She
also Iound that pleadings Iiled subsequent to Coughlin's incarceration were
lengthy (more than 200 pages) contained scant discussion oI, or relevance to, the
matter and contained irrelevant discussion oI Iacts unrelated to the proceedings at
hand. Supra. 10
(X) The record establishes that in the Merliss eviction action, Coughlin's
conduct was so vexatious and frivolous as to result in substantial sanction of
attorney's fees. Supra 21 See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 2, L 8 -13; P3, L 4 -11.
Actually, that is completely untrue. Beyond the Iact that Judge Flanagan's
6/25/12 Order awarding the attorney's Iees sought by Hill and Baker in their Post-
judgment attorney Iee motion oI 4/19/09 speciIically noted that Coughlin Iailed to
Iile an opposition (to which Coughlin has show good cause explaining, and where
Coughlin Iiled a preemptive opposition on 1/19/12 in 03628), and thereIore, under
DCR 13(3), Judge Flanagan was Iorced to take such a lack oI an opposition being
Iiled as a basis Ior granting the attorney Iee motion, particularly in light oI past
ruling by Judge Flanagan in other matters wherein, despite the discretionary
language ('may) in DCR 13(3), such a practice has become Judge Flanagan's
established custom. That 6/25/12 Order, Iurther, aia not contain any specific
finaing that Coughlin had asserted non-meritorious claims, deIenses, or
contentions, Judge Flanagan did not Ieel compelled to report Coughlin to the SBN,
despite the improt oI NCJC Canon 2.15's dicate, and a subsquent Order by Judge
Flanagan on 8/28/12 in 03628 makes explicilty clear that Judge Flanagan aia not
award the attorney's Iees in his 6/25/12 Order upon any alleged Iinding oI Irivolity
or other santionable conduct by Coughlin. Further, the 3/30/12 Order Denying
Coughlin's appeal is noticeably absent oI any sort oI remonstrative tone or
language with respect to Coughlin's case, but actually seems to suggest that, had
Coughlin had the beneIit oI a certiIied transcript and been able to put Iorward
citation to speciIic instances oI testimony supporting the arguments set out in his
Appeal BrieI, Coughlin's own contentions may well have been meritorious.
At page 2 oI a 8/28/12 Order in 03628, Judge Flanagan himselI attempts to
'relitigate or redo (outside the 10 days under NRCP 59(a) wherein such a sua
sponte alteration oI one's ruling may be permissible) his previous Orders
(including the Order oI 3/30/12, which he characterizes as a 'Iinal
judgment...which brings up the problematic aspect oI the voidness oI any
sanctions based attorney Iee award based upon a Baker and Hill's post-judgment
motion Ior attorney Iees sanctions oI 4/19/09), where that Order reads:
'Again, as was the case in Coughlin's attempt to set aside
Merliss's award oI costs Coughlin's Motions here attempts to
re-litigate substantive issues this Court has already
decided, or frivolous claims this Court has previously
ignored. This Court has entered Iinal judgment on the merits
oI Coughlin's underlying claim and awarded attorney's Iees
and costs to Merliss. Thi Court will not revisit those decisions
here, particularly when Coughlin alleges nothing that would
satisIy the requirements oI NRCP 59 or NRCP 60.
It is not at all clear how Coughlin could be said to be attempting 'to re-
litigate substantive issues when the 6/25/12 Order itselI notes that Coughlin did
not Iile an Opposition to Hill's 4/19/12 Motion Ior Attorney Fees. Particularly
where 'substantive issues would, necessarily be intimately intertwined with any
attempt to have any the legitimacy oI such an outrageous $42,050 attorney Iee
award Ior just the appeal (ie, not tedious trial court Iact Iinding sorts oI attorney
work involved, but the mere Iiling oI a legal brieI speaking to rather dry legal
issues only...so, just who is 'attempting to re-ligitate(or re-adjudicate, rather)
things here?
Would that not be Hill and Baker seeking to relitigate their humiliating
deIeat in the 'trial court in 1708 where, at Iirst, Baker sought a ridiculous
$18,060 in attorney Iees Ior representing the landlord in a No Cause Summary
Eviction Proceeaing (a whoopsie posture, Casey D. Baker, Esq., sheepishly had to
adopt upon being Iorced to admit that there exists no basis Ior awarding attorney's
Iees (certainly not the statute Baker cited to allow such Iees where no such
'manuIacture oI controlled substances exception had been alleged or broached in
any way whatsoever by the landlord at any point in this matter, though Hill did
manage to cook up an particularly suspect allegation oI having Iound a 'crack pipe
and bag oI weed...large quantity oI pills and a 'vial oI something shortly aIter
Coughlin merely restated, verbatim, what RPD OIIicer Carter had said to
Coughlin shortly aIter arresting him in response to Coughlin asking him iI he 'was
on Richard G. Hill's payroll) under Nevada law incident to a summary eviction
proceeding (NRS 69.030, in light oI JCRCP 2 (which characterizes 'landlord
tenant matters as outside the purview oI those 'civil actions to which such Iee
awards may issued).
So, to recap, Baker moved Ior $18,050 in attorney's Iees Ior the summary
eviction...which Judge SIerrazza downsized to a mere $1,500, until, ultimately,
Baker and Hill were Iorced to admit that Coughlin was absolutely correct in
asserting that there moving Ior any attorney's Iees at all was, itselI, a Iine example
oI a violation oI RPC 3.1's Meritorious Claims requirement...and that Iee award
was set aside (though, oI course, Coughlin, as a practical matter, was treated to
being ordered, by Judge Flanagan, to pay a Iee award, a relevant portion oI which
was well in excess oI that amount in consideration oI the Iees Hill and Baker
racked up in aefenaing against Coughlin pointing out the RPC 3.1 violation they
themselves ultimately were Iorced to admit in foining Coughlin in seeking to have
that $1,500 attorney Iee award set aside (how Iees related to such matters could
reasonably be said to relate to the appeal in 03628, is not clear, nor is how such
does not present yet another RPC 3.1 violation by these two 'lycans (ie, not
'lichens as Chair Echeverria incorrectly noted, a distinction which would have
been clear to him had he bothered to read any oI the materials Coughlin provided
in his Iilings and Exhibits attached thereto beIore plunging headlong into a
particularly odious attempt to take away one's law license under the most
illegitimate oI circumstances.)
Its really not at all clear just how Judge Flanagn could Iind an assertion that
$42,050 in attorney's Iees were reasonably incurred in relation to the appeal oI this
summary eviction. Regardless, Nevada law does not seem to hold that JCRCP
73(b) is applicable to an appeal oI such an 'inIormal summary proceeding, but
rather, is only applicable to a 'Iormal eviction (ie, a plenary unlawIul detainer
'civil action, particularly given the explicit language oI JCRCP Rule 2).
''Nevada JCRCP RULE 2: 'THREE FORMS OF ACTIONS
There shall be three Iorms oI action in justice courts to be
known as 'civil actions, 'small claims actions and
'summary eviction actions. Rules 3 through 87 govern civil
actions. Rules governing small claims actions begin with Rule
88 and end with Rule 100. Rules governing summary evictions
commence with Rule 101.
II. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; SERVICE OF
PROCESS, PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND ORDERS
RULE 3. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION A civil action
is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.
It was Hill's associate Baker, whom Hill alternately alleges to have spent
an inordinate amount oI time reviewing, only to then seek to allege that he 'wasn't
there Ior the trial court proceedings, so he can't be held accountable Ior his
repeated baseless, sworn assertions that Coughlin 'Iailed to raise the matter oI his
being a commercial tenancy (home law oIIice, and or mattress business)
impermissibly subject to a No Cause Summary Eviction where the non-payment
oI rent was neither pled nor alleged, in violation oI the explicit prohibition against
the utlization oI such a No Cause summary proceeding against a commercial
tenant under NRS 40.253. Further, JCRCP 73 has no application to the appeal oI a
summary eviction. Rather, as the Two Roads v. Venetian case and trial court
transcript therein makes clear (or at least makes ridiculous any claim that the
position Coughlin took at various points, including on 12/22/12, as Hill, asserted,
in his testimony was somehow, demonstrative oI violations oI various RPC's or
indicative oI a lack oI candor or Iairness to opposing counsel by Coughlin), the
supersedeas bond
vii
, particularly where the rent is under $1,000, is statutorily set at
$250, and the RJC's 'threes times the rent approach is not permissible. Nor is
characterizing the 10/25/11 court date as a Trial, only to assert that JCRCP 19
(requiring 20 days to respond to a Complaint Ior UnlawIul Detainer in such a
plenary matter) is inapplicable to a summary eviction).
Further, it is not at all clear why Coughlin should pick up the tab Ior the
conIusion and Iallout inevitable given the then state oI the law in Nevada and the
consequences oI Judge SIerrazza's 10/13/11 Order requiring the 'rent escrow
deposit and Judge CliIton's response to Coughlin's 10/17/11 Iiling seeking a stay,
continuance, and or relieI thereIrom:
RJC Judge CliIton's 10/17/11 Order in 1708
reads:
'ORDER This matter has come beIore the Court
upon DeIendant's Emergency Motion to Stay,
Set Aside, Vacate Eviction Hearing Order Iiled
on today's date. An Opposition by PlaintiII was
also Iiled today. These pleadings Iollow a
Summary Eviction hearing held October 13,
2011, beIore Judge SIerrazza. The court's
minutes indicate that DeIendant's eviction Irom
the premises would only occur on today's date iI
he Iailed to post the rental amount oI $2,275.00
by October 17, 2011 with the court. A trial date
was then set Ior October 25, 2011. DeIendant
has tendered $2,275.00 to the court on loday's
date. ThereIore, the instant motion is now moot
and the trial date oI October 25,2011 stands. Is it
thereIore HEREBY ORDERED that DeIendant's
Emergency Motion, Stay, Set Aside, Vacate
Eviction Hearing Order is DENIED. DATED
this 17
th
day oI October, 2011.
'Alongside the numerous procedural violations Coughlin has committed
in filing his papers (ignoring page limits, missing deadlines, etc.), Merliss
contends Coughlin's litigation tactics-including Coughlin's instant attempt to set
aside the attorney's fees award-have been employed not to pursue arguments in
good Iaith but to delay and harass him. Merliss contends Coughlin's behavior has
been not only abusive but costly, requiring Merliss to contest each an every
allegation Coughlin makes no matter how meritless. page 2 oI 8/28/12 Order
in 03628.
Speaking oI Iollowing rules, how about the 21 day saIe harbor in NRCP
11? Hill never did serve Coughlin a 'Iiling ready sanction motion. Coughlin,
however, did serve Hill at least one such 21 day saIe harbor motion. Hill and
Flanagan seem to run the ol' Irivolous Iee sanction pick and roll with at least an
equal elan as that demonstrated by Judge L. Gardner and opposing counsel
Springgate (also, not a Ian oI 21 day saIe harbor 'Iiling ready sanction Motions,
even where invoking NRS 7.085, which itselI invokes NRCP 11, which so
requires service oI just such a 21 day saIe harbor motion...) in the Joshi Divorce
Trial in 01168.
Further, neither Judge Flanagan, his then law clerk Zelalem Bogale, Esq.,
Hill, nor Baker managed to ever cite to any authority supporting the apparent sua
sponte (contrary to the 4/19/12 Order in Carpentier by Flanagan speaking to the
adjudicatory boundaries limitations placed upon courts respecting the arguments
put Iorward and citations in support thereto by the parties) contention that
Coughlins' alleged Iailure to Iile a timely Opposition to Baker's 4/19/12 Motion
Ior Attorney's Fees is a 'procedural violation. Further, there is not 'procedural
rule setting page limits in the 2JDC. Sure, there was an Order setting a page limit
oI 5 pages (which Baker himselI exceeded), but Couglhin did not 'ignore such
Order. Rather, Coughlin addressed the Iact that his BrieI was in excess oI said
page limitation ordered, and argued a basis showing good cause Ior why is ought
be permissible to exceed it. Certainly, no citation has ever been provided by
Baker, Hill, or Judge Flanagan to support a Iinding that Coughlin somehow was
able to manuIacture a set oI circumstances ' requiring Merliss to contest each
an every allegation Coughlin makes no matter how meritless. Certainly, a
more conservative approach could have been taken by Hill or Baker, such as
filing a 5 page Answering Brief addressing the main points at issue, with a
request for leave to later exceed any such page limitation, which is essentially
what they did anyways...so where is all this $42,050 in attorney's fees being
rung up, if not in impermissible areas no the appropriate subject matter of
such an attorney fee award motion...ie, filings related to the supersedeas
bond/stay on appeal issue arguably do not come within the purview of NRS
69.050, nor do those (and the associated court time and preparation) related
to the 11/7/11 hearing on Couglin's Motion to Set Aside, etc., in 1708, or the
12/20/11 Hearing on Coughlin's 11/16/12 Motion to Contest Personal
Property Lien.
Certainly, Baker and Hill never presented any citation to support a
contention that such matters fall within the language of NRS 69.050. Further,
with respect to all fees incurred in relation to the personal property lien issue,
1udge Flanagan's Order denying Coughlin's appeal of 3/30/12 makes clear
that such matters (including the Order Resolving Defendant's Motion to
Contest Personal Property Lien by 1udge Sferrazza of 12/21/11...which was
definitely not a 'consent Order' and which the transcript and record make
clear Coughlin in no way ~consented to) were not included in the appeal in
03628. As such, the voluminous attorney fee billing entries related thereto
(impermissibly obscured somewhat by the excessive redacting of entries in the
allegedely ~detailed bills, where no legitimate privilege was ever asserted or
proved to justify such obstructionist tactics...which now become of material
relevance to the extent that Baker, in his sworn testimony on 6/18/12 admitted
to interactions with the WCSO Civil Division on 10/28/11, and that Hill's law
office definitely relied upon the Reno 1ustice Court to transmit the various
eviction Orders to the Sheriff's Office for processing. The specter of both the
10/25/11 and 10/27/11 Eviction Orders here being void or stale where
violative of the statutory dictate that such an Order included language (and
neither Order herein did) ordering the Sheriff to ~remove from the premises
~within 24 hours or receipt (apparently the Sheriff's receipt oI such
Order...though several counties in Nevada apparently view the relevant language
in NRS 40.253 as applying to the tenants receipt, and, accordingly, have policies
which require the SheriII or constable to post to a tenant's door such an Order, then
allow 'at least 24 hours to pass beIore conducting any such lockout.
One thing that certainly is interesting is that the Eviction Order the
WCSO posted to the door of Coughlin's former home law office on 11/1/11
lacked any fax header (in contrast to all other such eviction orders Coughlin
had seen posted and Baker's testimony on 6/18/12 that the R1C was
responsible for transmitting such an eviction Order, though its not clear that
Baker did not first fax the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE that the R1C faxed to him
(as shown in the attachments to Hill's TPO application of 1/12/12 against
Coughlin) at 4:41pm to the WCSO along with the Order of 10/27/11 granting
Baker's unnoticed Emergency Motion to Inspect Coughlin's former home law
office during the weekend during which, apparently, Coughlin was expected
to recover for a grueling six weeks of litigating, and hire movers and rent
trucks to move both a home and a law office, even where the R1C was still
retaining the $2,275 in ~rent escrow that it demanded from Coughlin in the
10/13/11 Order in violation of Nevada law? Posted with the 10/27/11
FOFCOLOSE on 11/1/11 by WCSO Deputy Machen was just that 10/27/11
Order allowing such an inspection, though that Order, curiously, did have
two fax headers atop it (one indicating the R1C faxed Hill's law office that
~inspection Order at 4:39 pm on 10/27/11), and a second header indicating
the WCSO Civil Division received a fax nearly immediately thereafter from
Hill's office that transmitted the inspection Order (with R1C fax header
freshly printed thereon) to the WCSO Civil Division....What it not clear is
why the R1C, WCDA, WCSO Civil Division, Hill, and Baker are so reticient,
and, some might say obstructionist about responding to Coughlin's various
requests (including NRS 239 Open Records Requests) seeking documentation
related to and copies oI the Iax logs oI the RJC Ior the relevant time period
involved here, especially considering Baker's sworn testimony at the criminal
trespass trial oI Coughlin on 6/18/12 relative to just how such Eviction Orders
were 'received by the WCSO Civil Division, and just what means oI transmitting
those Orders was utilized.
The law is unclear in Nevada and this is a matter oI legitimate public
concern involving both the saIety oI law enIorcement and tenants, but also the
enormous social costs oI ill advisedly carried out summary eviction lockouts that
are bound to resultin consequential damages Iar exceeded the relatively small sum
oI money landlord's would save by having such lockouts done even one day earlier
than current 'usual custom and practices (to quote Hill's statement oI the state oI
the law therein) oI the 'Washoe County SheriII's OIIice. The judiciary has an
obligation here as well as nearly all judicial campaigns in Washoe County
(particulary those at the Justice Court level) openly tout the endorsement oI a
myriad oI local law enIorcement organizations (though, never, any that espouse
tenants rights or civil rights in general). Is there a 'Lawyer's Protection
Association to mirror the 'Police Protective Association that nearly all
successIul judicial candidates in Washoe County so openly Ilaunt having the
endorsement oI? Does that encourage the rampant Soldal v. Cook Co., style
deprivation oI 42 USC Sec. 1983 rights that is evinced in the 15 or so wrongIul
summary eviction Coughlin has been subjected to since the initial wrongIul
8/20/11 arrest and seven day incarceration occurring while an eviction notice was
placed on his Iormer home law oIIice's door just two months aIter his domestic
partner oI Iour years absconded with two months oI his rental contributions,
secretely, Iailed to pay one month oI her own (though she did obtain, arguably,
assent Irom the landlord to an 'arrangement whereby any joint obligation thereto
oI Coughlin's was absolved with respect to one to two months Ulloa's rental
shares...), where Coughlin then could not aIIord his anti-depressants or ADHD
medications starting on or about August 2nd, 2011 (an also where an appointment
with his pyschiatrist, Dr. Yasar, had to be cancelled due to his not being able to
aIIord the oIIice visit, and where NNAHMS indicated it would never cover
ADHD medications, and that Coughlin would not be permitted to have MDD
medications covered where taking such ADHD medications, upon Coughlin
conIidentially inquiring as to such matters with NNAHMS).
In contrast to allegedly billing up $42,050 in 'addressing Coughlin's
'allegations (its not clear that the misconduct oI Hill and Baker and their
damage self interested damage control instincts are an appropriate basis for
racking of billable hours to charge Merliss or to later seek (in a ~procedural
violation of their own, given the dictates against seeking post-judgment
attorney fee sanctions, particularly where no attempt to comply with the 21
day safe harbor requirements in NRCP 11 where ever made by Hill or Baker)
an award of such attorney's fees
What is most striking is the utter lack oI speciIics Irom either Baker, Hill,
or Judge Flanagan as to just which positions taken or arguments made by
Coughlin evince any sort oI Irivolity or why...Further, Hill and Baker themselves
clearly conducted no novel legal research in this matter, aside Irom citing to Anvui
and the then recent CG Wallace case, and they demonstrate any utter paucity oI
insight into landlord tenant law and summary evictions in particular, which are, as
the CG Wallace case points out, truly rare species in the law, having unto
themselves and entirely unique set oI considerations and procedures.
(Y) The Pleading Docket in this matter establishes also that Coughlin's
Iilings, even in his own deIense oI the disciplinary matter, inject lengthy,
irrelevant Iacts and legal issues into this proceeding.
Candor to the Tribunal
(Z) RPC 3.3(a)(1) states "A lawyer shall not knowingly: (m)ake a Ialse
statement oI Iact or law to a tribunal or Iail to correct a Ialse statement .oI material
Iact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer."
(AA) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin
violated RPC 3.3(a)(l) when he lied to Judge Nash Holmes as to whether or not he
was surreptitiously and without permission to record the proceeding. Supra 7 OI
note, Coughlin did not deny that he had lied to Judge Nash Holmes. Instead, his
cross examination oI Judge Nash Holmes Iocused on how she had learned oI the
true Iacts. See Transcript oI Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 139, L
(BB) Attorney Richard Hill testiIied that based on his experience in
litigating with Coughlin, Coughlin was not truthIul with either counsel or the
Court. Supra Paragraph 23.
(CC) The record also establishes that Coughlin was less than candid with
the Court in two separate applications to proceed in Iorma pauperis, when he
Iailed to disclose his true occupation as an attorney and instead indicated he was
selI-employed as a "Jack oI all Trades"
Iailed to identiIy any income Irom the practice oI law aIter having represented to
the court that his incarceration would adversely aIIect his clients. Supra 31 &
32
Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel
(DD) RPC 3.4(c) states "A lawyer shall not: (k)nowingly disobey an
obligation under the
rules oI a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no
valid obligation exists."
The certiIied audio transcript Coughlin purchased Irom the RMC oI the
Trial reveals Coughlin openly declaring to Judge Howard, Iollowing the Court
issuing Coughlin a contempt warning a scan Iive minutes into the trial, just such
an 'open reIusal where Coughlin is heard addressing the Court as Iollows: 'I am
not going to be bullied out oI my rights. 7:24 mark.
viii
'(EE) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin
has a clear and
continuing pattern of knowingly ignoring and disobeying instructions from
the Court. Instructions or 'suggestions like those made on 3/12/09 by Judge L.
Gardner are diIIerent than obligations. Further, Coughlin's Iormer supervisor at
WLS, Elcano, admitted to having instilled Coughlin with the teaching that 'when
you walk into that courtroom, its not the judges courtroom, its not opposing
counsel's courtroom, its YOUR courtroom.
ix
T115:22
'(FF) In his Order oI Contempt, Judge Howard Iound that Coughlin reIused
to obey directives oI the Judge and continued lines oI questioning aIter being
instructed to reIrain Irom doing so. Supra 4 There is a material misstatement oI
Howard's Order in the FOFCOL where it reads: 'The judge Iound Coughlin's
conduct to be disorderly and was either contemptuous or behavior insolent
toward the judge in that Coughlin reIused:
"... to obey directives oI the Judge, continuing lines oI
inquiry aIter being advised by the Court to reIrain Irom
doing so; demeaning the Court with statements such as
"WOW" in response to court rulings; laughing during
testimony and Iurther questioning the court and its
authority."
Howard's Order actually reads 'WHEREAS such individual committed the
Iollowing act(s) in the immediate view and presence oI the Court: (blank with
check mark) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge
while he is holding court, or engaged in his judicial duties at chambers,
Also, the ROA in the appeal oI 22176 demonstrates no legally suIIicient
service oI the 11/15/11 Notice oI Setting Bench Trial date oI November 30, 2011.
Further, two non-judicial court holidays days (Thanksgiving and Family Day)
occurred between the Iiling oI that 11/15/11 Notice and the 11/30/11 Trial,
thereIore, a jurisdictional bar makes void the 11/30/11 Order.
Additionally, the ROA in 2064 is deIicient where Coughlin was given
permission to and did submit Ior Iiling on 12/12/11 his Motion Ior New Trial and
served it upon the RCA in compliance with all applicable rules, despite whatever
sua sponte, too early, objections Judge Howard made on 12/16/11 on the RCA's
behalI, and the RCA's Iailure to oppose such motion should taken as an admission
under Polk v. State that the Motion should be granted.
Similar the the argument that a judges decision that any conduct did not rise
to the level to require reporting under Canon 3d is the Iact that that there are some
blanks the the Iorm order used to prepare the 11/30/11 JCCO that lack check
marks, and what important blanks those turn out to be given the conclusiveness
that bar counsel so enjoys under SCR 111(5) now operates to deIeat the
Complaints allegations respecting a violation oI ANY RPC in connection with
22176, where the JCCO reads (and this is where the rubber stamp signature :
'A breach oI the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance in the presence
oI the Court, or in its immediate vicinity, tending to interrupt due to the course oI
the trial or other judicial proceeding,
ReIusing to be sworn or answer as a witness,
Disobeying a lawIul writ/order/rule/process issued by the Court/judge at
chambers, and WHEREAS such conduct:
Demeaned the Court...
A Marshal writing 'reIused an initialing the 11/30/11 Judgment oI
Conviction and Court Order does not meet the service requirements to start the
running oI the deadlines to Iile a Motion Ior New Trial and or Notice oI Appeal,
especially where the Iinal key three minutes oI Judge Howard's Order as rendered
were made in absentia with respect to RCA Roberts, whom had leIt the building
by that point. The RMC's Iailure to mail Coughlin that JCCO (reIerence emails
and calls between Veronica Lopez and Coughlin wherein RMC admits to not
doing so) makes the Order AIIirming Ruling oI RMC (attached as Exhibit 1 to
Complaint) void Ior lack oI jurisdiction as well. That's where the Marshals getting
angry with Coughlin and taking away the Order was attempting to discern prior to
considering signing the blank aIter 'I UNDERSTAND AN PROMISE TO OBEY
THIS ORDER. DEFENDANT: , and then rippign it away Irom Coughlin in
an awesome display oI authority and dominance, and then Iailing to put said Order
in Coughlin's laptop case, reIusing to allow Coughlin to hit 'save on his netbook
to retain his trial notes prior to the Marshal powering it down and packing it in
Coughlin's bag, and Judicial Assistant Lopez reIusing to provide Coughlin
'another copy oI said Order, the Iailing to Iollow through on her representation
that she would Iax it to Coughlin necessarily makes the JCCO stale or Coughlin's
subsequent motions victorious under Polk.
ROA in 22176 at page 13 missing page thereaIter with 'not a jailable
oIIense interlineation by Judge Howard.
Similar to the argument that the various Judges decision not to make any
report to disciplinary authorities regarding Coughlin (and Beesley's testimony that
he 'wrote a letter should be stricken where such letter was never produced to
Coughlin or oIIered into evidence, nor was the date oI receipt oI such a letter by
the SBN revealed upon questioning, though Beesley's answer the he Iirst spoke
with King either 'a Iew days ago or a Iew weeks ago itselI sounds like to sort oI
thing Beesley might call Lawyers Concerned Ior Lawyers (which eIIectively is
also Lawyers Concerned Ior Judges given the tight knit supportive group oI
proIessionals and raconteurs that that ol' gadIly Chester Coe Swobe assembles
every Thursday at a top secret location, which Coughlin has attended since
approximately March 2003 with regular irregularity, having been 98 on time,
present, and participating 54 oI the time to enjoy seeing what having a stocked
chip tackle box to assist in speciIically memorializing and celebrating each
building block along the way does Ior Tom (though 'its not a competition), to see
that one crazy kid with the pink toenail polish, an executive Irom one oI Nevada's
own Fortune 500 companies, an engineer wrestling his way through each
transportation project, a point guard now law student once ranked right in Iront oI
Rajon Rondo by the 9
th
grade scouting services, a devilishly handsome student
body president son oI a student body president at UNR, a Vietnam veteran whose
most meaningIul opinions arguably only came through a journey through
ignominy, a Iormer West Point cadet turned Dirty Harry style District Attorney's
OIIice investigator, Smiley Face on occasion, Paul (but not Paul Against the Wall
Paul), a Dutch Indian ChieI on a Harley, a guy with way too many vowels all
bunched together in his name, a nurse who multi-tasks by crocheting, a red-headed
pistol veteran oI drug court's genesis, Ron Burgandy, a Reagan Commendation
recipient, Iormer President's oI arms oI selI policing branches (maybe that is why
it's 'oh, I see, we're playing rules, huh? in disciplinary proceedings, ie, SCR
105(2)(c) is an aspirational goal, kinda like a New Year's resolution that SCR 106
always gets in the way oI). http://www.youtube.com/watch?vg16IV1ZyRC4
Coughlin had 18 years oI sobriety at one point...but then he graduated Irom Reno
High and started drinking. Master oI Disaster (inside joke).
As Ior any SCR 102.5 analysis, can Coughlin meet a 'clear and convicing
evidence standard by merely placing check marks aIter each subsection on
mitigation and ceasing to check all subsections addressing aggravation? Can
Coughlin say 'yes in response to a SBN King style regurgitation oI the language
oI a rule or statue Iollowed by a generalized, circular prompt? II so, then 'yes
and check all blanks Ior mitigation and leave uncheck those Ior aggravation. Prior
to his current temporary suspension Coughlin had been a member in good standing
with both the United States Patent and Trademark OIIice (USPTO) (since May
2003) and State Bar oI Nevada (since 3/29/05) with absolutely no disciplinary
history whatsoever. So...speaking oI that, how does King's DowSoE not violate
8.1, 1.1, 1.3, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.8, and, uh, oh, hang on my RPC Uzi jammed Ior a
sec...where was I?
The FOFCOL attempts to characterize a civil summary contempt Iinding by
Judge Howard as clear and convincing evidence oI a violation oI various RPC's;
however, Judge Howard assessment that nothing Coughlin did during that Trial
invoked a duty to report under judicial canons must be viewed as creating, at the
very least, a presumption (iI not res judicata on the issue) that no such proIessional
misconduct occurred. Further, Judge Howard speciIically delineated his Order, at
1:16 as applying to Coughlin in his role as a 'DEFENDANT and not in any
proIessional capacity such that the Rules oI ProIessional Conduct would apply to
any such Iinding or ruling. Actually, its interesting, that Order reads: 'NAME:
ZACHERY COUGHLIN, who is a DEFENDANT Party; Witness;
Spectator.
Granted, its basically a Iorm order with scantly Iilled in blanks mentioning
Coughlin 'laughing during testimony, saying 'WOW Iollowing Howard
reIusing to grant a continuance (even where so very many Iactor weighed in Iavor
oI doing so (RCA Roberts had stipulated to one in writing; Judge W. Gardner
granted one that same day to the RCA due to Hill's going on vacation in 26405,
Coughlin had not previously sought nor received a continuance, the Iirst
continuance was a result oI no Iault oI Coughlin's (and Howard admitted in the last
2 minutes oI the transcript to having been 'mistaken about that); Coughlin
alleged Hill was withholding exculpatory materials supportive oI Coughlin's
contention that Wal-Mart has previous to the 9/9/11 arrest threatened to abuse
process against Coughlin in retaliatory Ior his exposing and criticizing Wal-Mart's
suspect practices with respect to honoring its stated, written Return Policy, the
RCA cited no prejudice it would endure as a result oI a continuance, all three
witnesses were likely be receive compensation Irom their employers Ior attending
the trial, and all three witness stayed until the conclusion oI the trial at 8:20 pm,
where they had been there prior to the start of the 1:00 pm stacked docket, so
their 'time was obviously not being taken Irom them or preventing them Irom
doing anything else oI their choosing).
(GG) Judge Nash Holmes, in her Order oI Contempt, Iound that Coughlin
incessantly argued with the Court, interrupted the Court, repeatedly restated
matters aIter having been admonished to reIrain Irom doing so, disregarded
directives to ask properly phrased questions and disobeyed numerous admonitions
by the court to stop repeating questions, misstating answers, injecting irrelevant
material, arguing with the witness and mischaracterizing testimony. Supra 7
tribunal."
repeatedly conducts himselI in a manner that is disruptive oI the tribunal while in
the courtroom.
(HH) The transcript oI the hearing in this matter clearly demonstrates that
Coughlin repeatedly and incessantly interrupts witnesses, counsel, Panel members
and Panel Chairman and reIuses to heed admonitions to reIrain Irom doing so. See
generally oI Wednesday, November 14, 2012.
Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal
(II) RPC 3.5(d) states "A lawyer shall not engage in conduct intended to
disrupt a
(JJ) The disruption must have occurred in the courtroom. One cannot
disrupt a tribunal with conduct outside oI the courtroom. In re Michael StuhII, 108
Nev. 629, 837P.2d 853 (1992)
(KK) The record overwhelmingly, clearly and convincingly establishes that
Coughlin repeatedly conducts himselI in a manner that is disruptive oI the tribunal
while in the courtroom.
(LL) The various orders oI contempt or imposing sanctions issued by
Judges Kenneth Gardner, Linda Gardner, Dorothy Nash Holmes and Patrick
Flanagan each describe a similar pattern oI conduct and behavior that is
intentionally disruptive oI the tribunal. Supra 4,7, 10, 21 and 25
(MM) The transcript oI the proceedings in this matter reveal a continuation oI a
similar pattern oI conduct by Coughlin despite his having been sanctioned twice
with an adverse award oI attorney's Iees and twice by incarceration. See generally
oI Wednesday, November 14,2012.
Relations with Opposing Counsel
(NN) RPC 3.5A states "When a lawyer knows or reasonably should know the
identity oI a lawyer representing an opposing party, he or she should not take
advantage oI the lawyer by causing any default or dismissal to be entered
without first inquiring about the opposing lawyer's intention to proceed." (?
Judge Linda Gardner's Iormer employer Gayle Kern, Esq. in RJC Rev2012-
000374, perhaps? "It is absolutely Iair, Your Honor..." to RJC Judge Jack
Schroeder when he entered a deIault summary eviction on 3/15/12 against
Coughlin despite Coughlin having Iiled a Tenant's Answer oI substantial length
and substance and Coughlin appearing, perhaps even on time, on 3/15/12 Ior the
Hearing (and an unlawIul interruption oI essential services hearing had already
taken place against Kern's client, though only the property manager showed up to
play lawyer Ior PTTHHOA).
(OO) Although the State Bar pled a violation oI RPC 3.5A in its Complaint, no
evidence was presented that Coughlin ever violated the rule. Accordingly, the
Panel Iinds that the State Bar Iailed to meet its burden oI prooI on this issue as an
evidentiary matter but Iinds that as a matter oI deIault the violation may be
deemed admitted.
Truthfulness in Statements to Others
(PP) RPC 4.1 (a) states "In the course oI representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly: (a) (m)ake a Ialse statement oI material Iact or law to a third person."
(QQ) Although the evidence established that Coughlin knowingly made Ialse
statements to Court and Counsel (See (AA), (BB) and (CC no evidence was
presented that Coughlin knowingly made Ialse statements oI material Iact or law
to a third person. Accordingly, the Panel Iinds that the State Bar Iailed to meet its
burden oI prooI on this issue as an evidentiary matter but Imds that as a matter oI
deIault the violation may be deemed admitted. (this is a nonsense argument,
especially where the Panel and SBN pat themselves on the back Ior, allegedly,
providing suIIicient due process to Coughlin/IulIilling SCR 105...its one or the
other...but the Panel doesn't get to purport that Coughlin deIaulte where it is also
trumpeting the Ieats oI due process it enabled....).
Respect for the Rights of Third Persons
(RR) RPC 4.4(a) states '"In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use
means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a
third person... " (uh...like Hill's allegations oI Iinding a "crack pipe and a bag oI
weed" or a "vial oI something" and "a large quantity oI pills"?).
(SS) The record establishes clearly and convincingly that in the Merliss
eviction action,
Coughlin conducted himselI in a manner that was abusive, vexatious and Ior
purposes oI delay. The matter was a simple eviction action that apparently lasted
through several proceedings at the Municipal Court level, an appeal to the District
Court and two appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court and which also resulted in
Coughlin's conviction Ior criminal trespass. Supra 19 and 20 Coughlin's
conduct in the proceedings was so egregious that Judge Flanagan ordered
Coughlin to pay Dr. Merliss $42,065.50, an amount that is still unpaid. Supra 21
(TT) The record also establishes that Coughlin habitually prolongs
proceedings unnecessarily; Iiles lengthy, irrelevant, nonsensical pleadings
requiring court, staII and counsel to spend unnecessary eIIort in evaluating and/or
responding to the pleadings. Supra 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 21, 23, 25, 27, 39 and
40
Disciplinary Matters
(UU) RPC 8.1(b) provides, in pertinent part, " ... a lawyer ... in connection
with a disciplinary shall not: (b) ... knowingly Iail to respond to a lawIul demand
Ior inIormation Irom an admissions or disciplinary authority...
(VV) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin
knowingly failed to respond to the State Bar's request for information in the
disciplinary proceeding and Iailed to timely file a required verified responsive
answer or pleading to the Complaint. (Why the strange use oI the term 'pleading
when that is not what SCR 105 calls Ior, but rather a
(WW) First, Coughlin asked Ior an extension oI time to respond to the letter
oI February 14,
(XX) Second, Coughlin Iailed to respond to a subsequent letter Irom the
State Bar regarding the Complaint Iiled with the Bar by Judge Nash Holmes.
Supra 30
(YY) Third, Coughlin ignored SCR 105(2) when he Iailed to timely Iile a
veriIied response or answer to the Complaint, despite several warnings to do so.
Supra 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 Coughlin compounded this violation when he
attempted, during the course oI the hearing in this matter, to transIorm a pleading
previously Iiled in Reno Municipal Court into a "New VeriIied Response (sic) Pre-
Hearing Motion to Dismiss/Summary Judgment, Memorandum oI Law by
crossing out the original caption and handwriting the "new" caption. Supra 38.
Coughlin also attempted, during the hearing, to transIorm a pleading he had
Iiled the day beIore the hearing entitled "Emergency Ex Parte Motion to
Dismiss ... " by handwriting the words "Declaration and VeriIied Response ... "
onto the caption oI the pleading. Supra 38
(ZZ) The conduct described herein not only demonstrates a lack oI
cooperation with the State Bar
x
, but a lack oI competency as well.
1udicial and Legal Officials
(AAA) RPC 8.2(a) states "A lawyer shall not make a statement that the
lawyer knows to be Ialse or with reckless disregard as to its truth or Ialsity
concerning the qualiIications or integrity oI a judge, adjudicatory oIIicer or public
legal oIIicer. ..
(BBB) During the course oI the hearing, Coughlin accused Judge Nash
Holmes oI lying during her testimony. Coughlin has expressed similar views
concerning Judge Nash Holmes in various pleadings Iiled in this proceeding as
well as others. Coughlin has also uttered other derogatory remarks about various
judges with whom he has interacted.
(CCC) The State Bar presented scant evidence on this issue and no
evidence Irom which the panel could conclude that the expressions were
knowingly Ialse as opposed to an expression oI opinion. While the conduct
displayed is, in the view oI the Panel reprehensible, the Panel concludes that the
State Bar Iailed to meet its burden oI prooI on the issue as an evidentiary matter
but Imds that as a matter oI deIault the violation may be deemed admitted.
Misconduct
(b) Commit a criminal act that reIlects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or Iitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, Iraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration oI
justice.
overwhelmingly, clearly and convincingly establish a repeated, unrelenting and
obstinate pattern oI misconduct by Respondent Coughlin evincing numerous and
repeated violations oI several provisions oI RPC 8.4 in violation oI RPC 8.4(a).
(So, would that not be something not noticed or plead in the Complaint, and
thereIore, only appropriate in some Iuture disciplinary hearing, iI any? Otherwise,
is that not transmogriIying what is required to be a plenary hearing into one oI a
summary nature?).
(FFF) Coughlin was convicted oI petit larceny on November 30, 2011, a
violation oI RPC 8.4(b). Such violation is suIIicient alone to trigger application oI
SCR 111 . The Nevada Supreme Court reIerred the matter to the appropriate
disciplinary panel Ior a determination oI the extent oI punishment that should
Iollow Irom the conviction. Supra para. 5,
xi
(GGG) The record also establishes that Coughlin was convicted oI criminal
trespass in the prolonged eviction proceedings involving Dr. Merliss, a violation
oI RPC 8.4(b). Supra 20
(HHH) The Complaint in this matter alleges that Coughlin has been
arrested and is awaiting trial on . a larceny charge involving a cell phone and on a
charge oI abusing 911 emergency procedures. However, no evidence was
presented on these charges but as a matter oI deIault the allegations may be
deemed admitted and would constitute additional violations oI RPC 8.4(b).
(JJJ) The record, as described at length above, establishes several violations
oIRPC 8.4(c).
See (AA), (BB), (CC), (AAA), (BBB) and (CCC).
(KKK) The entire record in this matter is replete with instances
demonstrating that Coughlin's conduct is prejudicial to the administration oI
justice. Coughlin has been repeatedly sanctioned monetarily and by way oI
incarceration Ior his conduct, has repeatedly Iiled lengthy, irrelevant and
nonsensical pleadings requiring staIIs, courts and counsel to expend needless and
unnecessary time in responding to such pleadings, has repeatedly disrupted
proceedings and Iailed to Iollow instructions and admonitions oI the courts. The
record establishes that the pattern oI conduct continues despite the severe
sanctions administered and continues up to and during the disciplinary process and
hearing oI this matter.
The Extent of the to be imposed pursuant to SCR 111 As a Result of
Conviction of the "Serious" Crime of Petit Larceny.
(LLL) The matter oI the reIerral Irom the Supreme Court was considered in
conjunction with the allegations in the Complaint Iiled by the State Bar. While the
conviction at issue in the Supreme Court Order oI June 7, 2012 may not alone
warrant the discipline recommended in this Panel's recommendations, taken as a
whole and in conjunction with the numerous and repeated other violations oI the
Rules oI ProIessional Conduct, warrant, in this Panel's view, the discipline
recommended herein.
DECISION AND RECOMMENDATION
In assessing the Ionn oI discipline to recommend, the Panel has accounted
Ior a number oI aggravating and mitigating Iactors that must be considered. The
Panel Iinds that the State Bar has shown by clear and convincing evidence the
presence oI at least eight oI the eleven aggravating circumstances to be considered
in accordance with the provisions oI SCR 102.5(1).
xii
First, while there have been no formal prior disciplinary proceedings by
the State Bar, the record establishes that Coughlin has been disciplined by way oI
sanctions on at least Iour prior occasions.
Any such sanctions rendered against Coughlin are void: 10. 3.61]
Postjudgment Motion for Sanctions A judge lacks authority to grant a party`s
postjudgment motion Ior sanctions. Such a motion does not comply with the saIe
harbor provision oI CCP 128.7(c)(1). Barnes v Department of Corrections (1999)
74 CA4th 126, 129135, 87 CR2d 594. A sanctions motion that is served and Iiled
aIter the action has been dismissed is also untimely. Hart v Avetoom (2002) 95
CA4th 410, 413415, 115 CR2d 511. A party must serve any motion Ior
sanctions beIore the Iinal disposition oI the claimed sanctionable conduct in order
to give the opposing party an opportunity to correct the allegedly oIIending
conduct and avoid sanctions. 74 CA4th at 130, 132133, 135. For example, an
order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend does not bar a motion Ior CCP
128.7 sanctions unless the order is reduced to a judgment beIore the sanctions
motion is served and Iiled. Banks v Hathaway, Perrett, Webster, Powers &
Chrisman (2002) 97 CA4th 949, 954, 118 CR2d 803. II the motion is served
beIore the entry oI judgment, and the saIe harbor time expires beIore judgment is
entered, the motion can be Iiled aIter the judgment is entered. Day v Collingwooa
(2006) 144 CA4th 1116, 1124, 50 CR3d 903.
In the summary eviction appeal in 03628, a 3/30/12 Order by Judge
Flanagan Denied Coughlin's appeal, and it was not until Hill's associate Baker, on
4/19/12 Iiled a Motion Ior Attorney's Fees, wherein only then a request Ior
sanctions and citation to NRS 7.085 was made, that the landlord sought sanctions.
Such a Postjudgment Motion Ior Sanctions may not be a basis Ior awarding an
attorney Iee sanctions.
Further, to the extent Sellers would prohibit Coughlin Irom being awarded
his own attorney Iees as a selI represented attorney litigant in 1708, it would be
impermissible to allow the counter oI that, were it even the case that any such
sanctions that might have issued were awarded against Coughlin as his own
attorney versus against Coughlin as a litigant or appellant.
CaliIornia Judges Benchguide 366 3.60] Attorney`s Fees
The award oI sanctions may include attorney`s Iees to the movant. CCP
128.7(d). However, a selI-represented attorney who responds to a Iiling abuse
may not recover sanctions under CCP 128.7 in the Iorm oI attorney`s Iees.
Musaelian v Aaams (2009) 45 C4th 512, 516520, 87 CR3d 475 (expressly
disapproves Laborae v Aronson (2001) 92 CA4th 459, 112 CR2d 119 and
Abanaonato v Colaren (1995) 41 CA4th 264, 48 CR2d 429, to the extent that they
are inconsistent).
Further, as set Iorth in exquisite detail in Coughlin's 11/19/12 Iiling in
61383 and a 10/31/12 Iiling in the instant matter (which is curiously absent Irom
the ROA and the SBN's Alphabetical Inaex of Documents, particularly suspect
given it is perhaps the singularly most damaging Iiling by Coughlin to Hill and the
SBN's approach and contentions in this matter...and Coughlin had a Iile stamped
copy oI that Iiling, so...). NRCP 56(j).
xiii
Second, the record reIlects, at least with respect to the Merliss matter and
the two criminal trials, that the pattern oI conduct was Ior selIish reasons: to
preserve an unlawIul tenancy and to delay and prolong criminal convictions.
Third, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that the pattern oI
misconduct is consistent and includes, without limitation: the disruption oI the
proceedings; the reIusal to heed the directions and admonitions oI the court; the
injection oI irrelevant material and matters; the Iiling oI lengthy, irrelevant and
nonsensical pleadings; the willingness to lie to court and counsel and the inability
to understand and Iollow the rules oI evidence and procedure.
xiv
Fourth, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin has
committed multiple violations oI the Rules oI ProIessional conduct, as more Iully
discussed above.
FiIth, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin
engaged in a bad Iaith obstruction oI the disciplinary process by Iailing to Iile the
pleading required by SCR 105(2) and instead Iiling several lengthy, irrelevant and
nonsensical pleadings, mostly pleadings Iiled in other matters, and reIiled in the
disciplinary action under a similar but diIIerent caption. In some instances,
Coughlin simply crossed out the case name and hand wrote the names oI the
parties in the disciplinary proceeding.
Sixth, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin has
reIused to acknowledge the wrongIul nature oI his conduct despite having been
sanctioned on at least Iour prior occasions.
Seventh, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin has
shown a complete indiIIerence to making restitution and has so Iar ignored orders
to do so.
Eighth, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that some oI Coughlin's
misconduct involves illegal conduct that evinces Iraud and dishonesty. For
example, he was convicted oI one instance oI petit larceny and is awaiting trial on
a second.
The Panel Iinds Iew potentially mitigating Iactors to be present. While the
Panel Iinds that there is a lack of prior public discipline by the State Bar, the
Panel notes that Coughlin has been publicly criticized in the Joshi matter, has been
heavily sanctioned with an adverse award oI substantial attorney's Iees in the
Merliss matter, and has been incarcerated at least twice Ior criminal contempt oI
court.
xv
Although there has been an absence oI prior public discipline by the State
Bar, there have been multiple instances oI judicial censure and sanction.
Although Coughlin suggested at the hearing that he may have personal or
emotional problems or a mental disability, he denied that he needed Iurther help.
Furthermore, no medical evidence was presented regarding the potential impact oI
a mental disability, no evidence that the disability was the cause oI the
misconduct, no evidence oI recovery by rehabilitation and no evidence that a
recovery has arrested the misconduct and that a recurrence is unlikely to occur.
These potentially mitigating Iactors are weak at best and do not excuse the
well established numerous and repeated violations oI the Rules oI ProIessional
Conduct and do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances established
overwhelmingly by the State Bar.
Mental or Emotional Disturbance As DeIense or Mitigating Factor In Attorney
Disciplinary Proceeding, 46 AMJUR POF 2d 563:
4. Nature of disturbance-Neuroses
|Cumulative Supplement|
Literally meaning "abnormal or diseased condition oI the nerves," the term
"neurosis" has
historically been used to represent a group oI Iunctional disorders|50| having
in common the presence oI, or an ineIIectual deIense against, anxiety. In
contrast to psychotics,|51| neurotics maintain insight and are less aIIected in
their day-to-day living.|52|
Observation:
The American Psychiatric Association's latest diagnostic and statistical manual
("DSM-III") has omitted the Iormer major class oI "Neuroses,"|53| replacing it
with several categories: aIIective, anxiety, somatoIorm, dissociative, and
psychosexual disorders.|54| The rationale Ior this signiIicant change was that no
consensus presently exists in the psychiatric Iield as to how to deIine the term
"neurosis," with some clinicians conIining the term to its descriptive meaning (as
indicating a painIul symptom in someone with intact reality-testing) and others
employing it to include also the concept oI a speciIic etiological process (an
unconscious conIlict arousing anxiety, leading to the maladaptive use oI deIense
mechanisms, and resulting in symptom Iormation).|55| The guide does give
"neurotic disorders" as an alternative descriptive term Ior several oI the aIIective
and other disorders mentioned above; Ior instance, hypochondriasis, one oI the
somatoIorm disorders, is reIerred to parenthetically as "hypochondriacal
neurosis."|56|
Historically, the neuroses have been named according to their predominant
symptom patterns, having names such as anxiety neurosis, hysterical neurosis,
phobic neurosis, obsessive-compulsive neurosis, depressive neurosis (dysthymic
reaction), and hypochondriacal neurosis. For instance, the depressive neurosis has
been said to be characterized by excessive and prolonged despondency coupled
with Ieelings oI incapacity and helplessness, usually Iollowing some real or
symbolic loss, and unresolved internal conIlict, or a drop in selI-esteem.|57|
Several oI the Ioregoing neuroses have been redeIined by DSM-III as anxiety
disorders. For example, one oI the anxiety disorders Ialling within the subcategory
oI anxiety states (or anxiety neuroses) is the obsessive-compulsive disorder
(reIerred to parenthetically as the obsessive-compulsive neurosis).|58| According
to the manual, this disorder's essential Ieatures are enduring obsessions or
compulsions. Obsessions are deIined as recurrent and persistent ideas, thoughts,
images, or impulses which are ego-dystonic (experienced not as voluntarily
produced, but rather as senseless or repugnant invasions oI consciousness);
compulsions are deIined as repetitive and ostensibly purposeIul behavior which is
perIormed according to various rules or in stereotyped Iashion.|59| The
compulsive behavior is said not to be an end in itselI, but is designed to produce or
to prevent some Iuture event or situation; however, either the behavior is not tied
in a realistic way to what it is designed to bring about or prevent, or it may be
clearly excessive. Depression and anxiety are common with the obsessive-
compulsive disorder; oIten there is phobic avoidance oI situations which involve
the subject oI the obsessions, such as dirt or contamination. Although the
obsessive-compulsive disorder ordinarily begins in adolescence or early
adulthood, it may begin in childhood; its course is typically chronic, with waxing
and waning oI symptoms. Impairment oI the individual is generally moderate to
severe, although in some instances compulsions may become a major liIe activity.
|60|
Diagnostically neurotic lawyers, deIending charges or proIIering mitigating
Iactors at disciplinary proceedings on the basis oI the reported neuroses, have been
disbarred,|61| suspen
ded Ior a Iixed period oI time,|62| suspended Ior a deIinite period oI time and
thereaIter until rehabilitated,|63| and indeIinitely suspended.|64| In one case the
court dismissed the disciplinary proceeding against an obsessive-compulsive
attorney who had been convicted oI Iailing to Iile Iederal income tax returns on the
ground that (1) counsel was subject to discipline only iI he had committed a crime
involving moral turpitude or an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or
corruption; (2) the Iederal conviction was not predicated on and did not require
any intent to deIraud since it rested on a Iinding oI "bad purpose" inIerred Irom his
voluntary deliberate Iailure to Iile the tax returns with knowledge that there was no
reasonable justiIication Ior his not doing so; and (3) his psychiatric problems were
not considered as justiIying any acts oI moral turpitude, but rather as tending to
negate any Iraudulent intenta state oI mind on which a Iinding oI moral
turpitude might be based.|65|
Cases:
Depression and anxiety disorder: Attorney who was suspended Ior making
Ialse statements to client and Ior Iailing to act with diligence would be reinstated
subject to a three year period oI probation with certain conditions, including the
conditions oI malpractice insurance and attorney's Iormal agreement to repay debt;
doctor diagnosed attorney as suIIering Irom proIound major depression and
anxiety disorder with severe phobia and stated that attorney had made excellent
progress, and doctor opined that attorney presented a very low risk Ior recidivism
and that he did not represent a danger to the public. In re Sullivan, 801 A.2d 933
(Del. 2002); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client k61.
Attorney's misappropriation oI client Iunds, through six separate deposits into
his law oIIice's operating account, which account was overdrawn during periods oI
commingling oI operating Iunds with client Iunds, was negligent rather than
intentional, and thus, suspension rather than disbarment was appropriate
disciplinary sanction; when attorney discovered that a check to client exceeded the
balance in operating account, he promptly covered the shortage, and when the
misconduct occurred during one-year period, attorney had been undergoing
psychotherapy. West's F.S.A. Bar Rules 5-1.1(a, b), (g)(2), 5-1.2(b, c); Bar Rules
4-1.15(a, b, d), 5-1.1(a, d), (e)(2) (2001). The Florida Bar v. WolI, 930 So. 2d 574
(Fla. 2006); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client k59.5(5).
A 2-year suspension and probationary terms were imposed on attorney
convicted oI making obscene phone calls, where the reIeree, aIter considering
attorney's chemical and alcohol dependency, his diagnosed sexual disorder, and a
previous criminal conviction Ior the same oIIense, as well as attorney's enrollment
in counseling and therapy programs and the absence oI previous bar discipline,
recommended a 90-day suspension along with probation Ior an indeIinite time,
while the Bar recommended a 3-year suspension even though attorney's oIIense
did not relate to the practice oI law. The Florida Bar v Helinger (1993, Fla) 620 So
2d 993, 18 FLW S 347.
Bipolar disorder: Attorney's disability Ior practice oI law, occasioned by his
diagnosed bipolar disorder, warranted acceptance oI his petition Ior voluntary
discipline, which petition called Ior Iive-year removal Irom practice oI law, in
light oI attorney's lack oI prior disciplinary record, lack oI dishonest or selIish
motive, existence oI personal and emotional problems, timely good Iaith eIIort to
make restitution and rectiIy consequences oI misconduct, Iull and
Iree disclosure to disciplinary board and cooperative attitude toward
proceedings, good character and reputation, mental disability or impairment,
interim rehabilitation, and remorse. State Bar Rules and Regulations, Rule 4-
104(a). In re Rand, 279 Ga. 555, 616 S.E.2d 452 (2005); West's Key Number
Digest, Attorney and Client 58.
Depression: Evidence was suIIicient to support Iinding that attorney's
unethical conduct was not solely related to onset oI his undiagnosed major
depression and was otherwise uncharacteristic oI his manner oI practice, yet,
growing state oI attorney's depression played some role in attorney's misconduct in
varying degrees, so as to be considered as a mitigating Iactor in the imposition oI
discipline; attorney testiIied he would go to work and be unable to meaningIully
perIorm any tasks Ior weeks at a time, and was unable to even go to work at times,
which explained his neglect oI client matters, although evidence did not similarly
explain the same relationship between the depression and attorney's
misrepresentations, even though it was apparent the two circumstances were co-
existent. I.C.A. Rule 32.DR 1-102(A)(4-6), DR 6-101(A)(3), DR 7-101(A). Iowa
Supreme Court Bd. oI ProIessional Ethics and Conduct v. Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d
288 (Iowa 2002); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client k53(2).
Six-month suspension Irom the practice oI law, with attorney's reinstatement
conditioned on demonstrating that he was Iit to resume practice oI law, was the
appropriate sanction Ior attorney's misconduct in Iailing to complete his
representation oI estate, as attorney's depression continued to impact attorney and
his ability to practice law, attorney's misconduct caused actual serious injury to
estate oI $37,659.56, and attorney Iailed to diligently represent estate Ior an 11-
year period. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 226, Rules oI ProI.Conduct, Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a),
3.2. In re Foster, 258 P.3d 375 (Kan. 2011).
Significant depression, personality disorder, and mood disorder did not
render attorney utterly unable to conIorm his conduct in accordance with the law
and the rules oI proIessional conduct so as to mitigate punishment Ior his
intentional dishonesty and misappropriation oI client Iunds, where attorney
maintained a successIul law practice during the relevant period oI time, and he
worked 70 to 80 hours per week. Attorney Grievance Com'n oI Maryland v.
ZakroII, 387 Md. 603, 876 A.2d 664 (2005); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney
and Client 58.
When an attorney raises psychological disability as a mitigating Iactor
contributing to misconduct, the attorney must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he or she has a severe psychological problem, that the psychological
problem was the cause oI the misconduct, that he or she is undergoing treatment
and is making progress to recover, that the recovery has arrested the misconduct,
and that the misconduct is not apt to recur. In re Disciplinary Action Against Otis,
1998 WL 469820 (Minn. 1998).
Bipolar disorder: Attorney showed that recovery Irom his bipolar disorder
arrested his misconduct oI misappropriating client Iunds and that a recurrence oI
his misconduct was unlikely, as required Ior attorney's bipolar disorder to
constitute mitigating Iactor in attorney disciplinary proceeding; physician stated
that attorney was compliant with his medication and that iI he continued taking it,
a recurrence was unlikely, and physician stated that he would continue to monitor
attorney, and attorney agreed in his brieI to continued monitoring oI his condition
Ior a Iive-year probationary period. In re Belz, 258 S.W.3d 38 (Mo. 2008); West's
Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client k59.5(5).
Mental disability can be considered in mitigation oI discipline only iI attorney's
recovery
Irom his condition can be demonstrated by "a meaningIul and sustained period
oI successIul rehabilitation." Accordingly, attorney's "chronic depression" could
not be considered as mitigating Iactor in imposing discipline on attorney Ior
Iailure to act diligently on behalI oI his clients and his Iailure to communicate with
them, where attorney admitted he still suIIered Irom his mental disability, chronic
depression, and that his counselor had concluded that practicing law aggravated
his depression. In re Smith (1993) 115 NM 769, 858 P2d 857.
Attorney convicted oI petit larceny was suIIiciently impaired to cause her
aberrational conduct, and since she sought and obtained appropriate psychological
help Ior her problem, censure Ior misconduct was proper. In re Mongioi (1995, 2d
Dept) 213 App Div 2d 107, 631 NYS2d 77.
Public censure was proper discipline Ior attorney who neglected several estate
matters and had prior admonitions, but who had psychological condition during
relevant period, sought treatment, and tried to hire additional personnel to avoid
placing her in jeopardy oI repeating conduct which precipitated disciplinary
proceeding. In re Erda (1995, 1st Dept) 209 App Div 2d 147, 625 NYS2d 165.
Highly compensated partner in major law Iirm who overcharged clients to pay
Ior luxury purchases would be disbarred, despite repayment oI converted Iunds,
since repayment was made only aIter misconduct was disclosed and he Iailed to
establish causal connection between alleged psychological problems he was
undergoing and conversions. Re Gieger (1991, 1st Dept) 170 App Div 2d 134, 572
NYS2d 11, app den 79 NY2d 755, 581 NYS2d 665, 590 NE2d 250.
Attorney's health conditions would not be considered as a mitigating Iactor in
disciplinary proceeding, since attorney Iailed to demonstrate that his traumatic
head injury, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, diabetes, and anxiety was
linked to his conduct in neglecting client matters, Iailing to maintain a record
documenting his receipt oI a client's Iee, Iailing to promptly comply with a
reasonable client requests Ior inIormation, Iailing to keep a client reasonably
inIormed about the status oI the client's legal matter. Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn.
v. Kaplan, 124 Ohio St. 3d 278, 2010-Ohio-167, 921 N.E.2d 645 (2010).
While Board oI Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline oI the Supreme
Court may properly consider attorney's mental illness at the time oI alleged
misconduct as a mitigating Iactor in determining what sanction should be imposed,
the mental illness provisions Ior summary suspension are not intended to be used
by attorney in a disciplinary action to avoid suspension Ior violations. Government
oI the Bar Rule V, 7. Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Komarek, 84 Ohio St. 3d 90, 702
N.E.2d 62 (1998).
Where an attorney had Iailed to disclose on her bar application her shopliIting
incidents and psychological counseling Ior bulimia, mild anxiety, and depression,
the attorney was suspended Ior an indeIinite period oI practice oI law; this
suspension is to terminate upon a showing oI her compliance with a thorough
psychological evaluation and, iI necessary, treatment, Iollowed by Iurther review
by the board oI her character, Iitness, and moral qualiIications Ior admission to the
practice oI law. In re Salisbury, 69 Ohio St 3d 403, 632 NE2d 1288.
Mitigating Iactor to be considered in determining sanction Ior attorney who
Iailed to make numerous Iilings and made Ialse Iilings while representing
bankruptcy clients, Iailed to communicate with clients, Iailed to determine eIIect
oI bankruptcy Iilings on clients' property transIers, and Iailed to cooperate with
disciplinary investigation, was that attorney suIIered Irom depression during the
relevant time periods, but subsequently obtained treatment Ior that
condition. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Merriam, 2010 WI 21, 780
N.W.2d 150 (Wis. 2010).
Emotional stress: Attorney's eventually admitting to using client's $3000
cashier's check to purchase a television Ior her Iamily and claim that her Iailure to
have made admission timely was result oI emotional stress were insuIIicient to
render improper conclusion that she engaged in dishonesty, Iraud, deceit or
misrepresentation in the matter, given attorney's misrepresentations to client's
successor attorney regarding Iunds and accounting methods used to explain how
check was used. Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules 20:8.4(c). In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Gilbert, 227 Wis. 2d 444, 595 N.W.2d 715 (1999); West's
Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client k44(2).
Section 4 Footnotes: |FN50| A Iunctional disorder is a disturbance aIIecting
Iunction but not structureone largely originating in the mind or the emotions. In
contrast, an organic mental disorder is a transient or permanent dysIunction oI the
brain caused by a disturbance oI the physiologic Iunctioning oI brain tissue at any
level oI organizationstructural, hormonal, biochemical, or electrical. Blinder,
Psychiatry in the Everyday Practice oI Law: A Lawyer's Manual Ior Case
Preparation and Trial (2d ed.) 621, 628 |hereaIter reIerred to as Blinder,
Psychiatry in Practice oI Law|. |FN51| See 5. |FN52| White & Watt, Abnormal
Personality 751. |FN53| American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual oI Mental Disorders 9 (3d ed 1980) |hereaIter reIerred to as
DSM-III|. |FN54| Id., p 10. |FN55| Id., p 9.
Note: To avoid this ambiguity, the association has recommended that the term
"neurotic disorder" be used only descriptively, whereas the term "neurotic
process" should be employed whenever the clinician desires to designate the
concept oI a speciIic etiological process involving the Iollowing sequence:
unconscious conIlicts between opposing wishes or between wishes and
prohibitions, which causes unconscious perception oI anticipated danger oI
dysphoria, which leads in turn to use oI deIense mechanisms that result in either
symptoms, personality disturbance, or both. Id.
|FN56| Id., pp 18, 249. |FN57| Blinder, Psychiatry in the Everyday Practice oI
Law: A Lawyer's Manual Ior Case Preparation and Trial (2d ed.) 2.1. |FN58|
DSM-III, 18, 234. |FN59| Id., p 234. |FN60| Id. |FN61| Re Freiburghouse (1959)
52 Cal 2d 514, 342 P2d 1 (compulsive-obsessive neurosis); Re Burka (1980, Dist
Col App) 423 A2d 181 (anxiety neurosis with associated depression); Attorney
Grievance Com. v Burka (1981) 292 Md 221, 438 A2d 514 (identical diagnosis).
26 A.L.R. 4th 995 6|a|. |FN62| Re Satta (1979, 1st Dept) 71 App Div 2d 292,
422 NYS2d 418. 26 A.L.R. 4th 995 6|b|. |FN63| Louisiana State Bar Asso. v
Stevenson (1978, La) 356 So 2d 408. 26 A.L.R. 4th 995 6|b|. |FN64| Re Cohen
(1983, 1st Dept) 92 App Div 2d 139, 459 NYS2d 434 (indeIinitely suspending
attorney who, diagnosed as having "adjustment disorder with mixed emotional
Ieatures," was suIIering Irom anxiety, paranoia, depression, and Iantasies); State v
Ledvina (1976) 71 Wis 2d 195, 237 NW2d 683. 26 A.L.R. 4th 995 6|b|. |FN65|
Re Fahey (1973) 8 Cal 3d 842, 106 Cal Rptr 313, 505 P2d 1369, 63 ALR3d 465.
As to the propriety oI disciplining counsel Ior tax-related misconduct, see A.L.R.
Library Federal income tax conviction as involving moral turpitude warranting
disciplinary action against attorney, 63 A.L.R. 3d 476; Federal income tax
conviction as constituting nonproIessional misconduct warranting disciplinary
action against attorney, 63 A.L.R. 3D 512.
6. Nature of disturbance-Other disorders77]
Like their alcoholic, drug-dependent, neurotic, and psychotic counterparts,|78|
attorneys with other mental and emotional maladies have claimed, with diIIerent
degrees oI success, that their disturbance should qualiIy as a deIense to charges oI
unethical conduct or as a Iactor mitigating the extent oI discipline to be imposed.
|79| These other types oI disturbances will be discussed in the Iollowing order:
amnesia, epilepsy, the so-called "burned out" syndrome, and generic disorders.
|FN77| For consideration oI character or personality disorders, such as Type
"A" personality and narcissistic personality, see Blinder, Psychiatry in the
Everyday Practice oI Law: A Lawyer's Manual Ior Case Preparation and Trial (2d
ed.) 2.1|d|; American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
oI Mental Disorders 19, 305 (3d ed 1980); T. Millon, Disorders oI Personality,
DSM-III: Axis II (1981). |FN78| See 2 5, supra. |FN79| See, Ior example, Re
Fitz Gibbons (1931) 182 Minn 373, 234 NW 637 (disbarring epileptic attorney);
Re Fallick (1936) 247 App Div 176, 286 NYS 581 (suspending amnesiac lawyer);
Re Conduct oI Loew (1982) 292 Or 806, 642 P2d 1171, 26 ALR4th 987
(suspending counsel with "burn out syndrome"); Re Crist (1971) 258 Or 88, 481
P2d 74, (probating psychiatrically troubled deputy district attorney); Re Rosenblatt
(1972) 60 NJ 505, 291 A2d 369 (reprimanding attorney allegedly suIIering Irom
psychological block). A.L.R. Library: Mental or emotional disturbance as deIense
to or mitigation oI charges against attorney in disciplinary proceeding, 26 A.L.R.
4th 995 10.
|FN80| Dissociation is the term commonly used to deIine the phenomenon by
which a group oI mental processes splits oII Irom the mainstream oI
consciousness, or by which behavior loses its relationship to the rest oI the
personality. Dissociative disorders are disturbances in which the normal
integration oI consciousness, memory, or identity is abruptly and temporarily
altered. G. Davison & J. Neale, Abnormal Psychology: An Experimental Clinical
Approach 771 (3d ed 1982) |hereaIter reIerred to as Davison & Neale, Abnormal
Psychology|. |FN81| American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical
Attention deficit disorder: Attorney who negligently commingled client and
personal Iunds would be publicly censured, where attorney had not acted with
dishonest motive, clients had not suIIered actual harm, and physician testiIied that
attorney's attention deIicit disorder, which was currently being successIully treated
with medication, was major cause oI mishandling oI Iunds. People v Shidler
(1995, Colo) 901 P2d 477.
Passive-Agressive Personality Disorder: A psychiatrist's opinion that an
attorney suIIered Irom a "Passive-Agressive Personality Disorder," and a
"Dysthymic Disorder," although indicating that the attorney may have suIIered
Irom the disorders, would not alone constitute a deIense to charges oI misconduct
on grounds oI mental incompetence, and would not serve to mitigate the
disbarment. Although the attorney may have suIIered Irom the disorders, the
psychiatrist testiIied that the disorders were not oI such magnitude as to render
him totally incompetent to practice law, or unable to understand the nature oI the
disciplinary charges against him. In addition, because the violations were
numerous, diverse, and serious (multiple violations oI six rules oI proIessional
conduct), the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.
Re Rich (1989, Del Sup) 559 A2d 1251.
Domestic emotional distress: Suspension oI attorney Irom practice oI law Ior
30 days, Iollowed by 18-month period oI probation, was appropriate discipline,
though attorney gave Ialse statement to police oIIicer in connection with incident
that resulted in attorney's being arrested Ior stealing automobile (charges that were
later not pursued), since attorney had not been subject oI prior disciplinary action,
and there was mitigating evidence showing that he acted under emotional distress
oI broken marriage. Additionally, many witnesses oIIered their opinion that
attorney had begun signiIicant rehabilitation. The Florida Bar v Poplack (1992,
Fla) 599 So 2d 116, 17 FLW S 565.
Domestic emotional distress: An attorney would be suspended Ior two years
aIter he improperly signed his name and that oI his client to a settlement check and
withheld payment to the client Ior more than three months while using the Iunds
Ior his own purposes. The attorney's claim that he had no recollection oI the events
during this three month period due to extreme emotional distress brought on by his
wiIe and children leaving him and in-laws harassing him, would not mitigate the
discipline where the attorney, despite the alleged distress, was able to write
numerous checks payable to himselI and other payees indicating that he was able
to transact business and conduct his practice. Re Altman (1989) 128 Ill 2d 206,
131 Ill Dec 549, 538 NE2d 1105.
Attorney's depression and Iinancial diIIiculties were not mitigating Iactors Ior
disciplinary purposes, given that attorney did not comply with American Bar
Association (ABA) Standard setting Iorth Iour Iactors that must be shown in order
Ior mental disability to qualiIy as a mitigating Iactor; attorney Iailed to make a
showing as to any oI these elements, and he had ample notice and opportunity
to submit evidence about his condition, but came to the disciplinary hearing
unprepared to do so. In re Woodring, 210 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2009).
Serious emotional and physical problems: Attorney who was guilty oI
Iailing to keep one client reasonably inIormed about status oI matter and to
promptly comply with reasonable requests Ior inIormation and, with respect to
another client, to respond to motion Ior summary judgment and to inIorm client oI
dismissal, and to comply with client's requests Ior inIormation, would only be
publicly reprimanded where there were signiIicant mitigating circumstances.
Attorney suIIered Irom serious emotional and physical problems; premature child,
death oI second newly born child, divorce, temporary sole custody oI child;
pulmonary blood clot, diabetes, kidney stones and corneal abrasions. Kentucky
Bar Ass'n v Starnes (1993, Ky) 864 SW2d 907.
Impulse control disorder: Record did not establish that there was any
signiIicant causal connection between attorney's impulse control disorder and his
misappropriation oI Iunds Irom law Iirms, and thus Supreme Court would give
little weight to the alleged mental disability in determining the appropriate
sanction Ior attorney's misconduct; although psychiatrist testiIied attorney was not
motivated by greed, the testimony oI attorney's law partners uniIormly established
that it appeared attorney was living beyond his means, attorney's methods oI
misappropriating Iunds evolved over time in order to allow him to avoid detection,
suggesting his actions were not purely impulsive, and attorney admitted that he
knew his actions were wrong. In re Bernstein, 966 So. 2d 537 (La. 2007); West's
Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client k59.5(5).
Fugue or dissociative state: Attorney's long-standing Iinancial problems,
exacerbated by gambling large sums oI money over a substantial period oI time,
rather than a medical or psychological disability, caused her to misappropriate
client Iunds, and thus no mitigating Iactors warranted a reduction oI the
presumptive sanction oI indeIinite suspension; although attorney claimed that she
suIIered Irom a Iugue or dissociative state during the period oI misappropriation,
attorney's methodical and systematic misuse oI Iunds Ior personal purposes was
inconsistent with any conclusion that attorney was operating under a cognitive
disability. In re Johnson, 452 Mass. 1010, 893 N.E.2d 783 (2008); West's Key
Number Digest, Attorney and Client k59.5(5). DXM is a potent dissociative in
the dosages Wal-Mart accused Coughlin of consuming on 9/9/11 in connection
with 60838.
Dysthymia with secondary anxiety: Disbarment was proper discipline Ior
attorney who misappropriated Iunds belonging to clients and law Iirm over period
oI time, despite Iact that he suIIered Irom dysthymia with secondary anxiety ,
where record suggested that attorney's dysthymia was not severe psychological
problem and only vaguely contributed to misconduct. In re Petition Ior
Disciplinary Action against Shoemaker (1994, Minn) 518 NW2d 552.
Clinical depression: Attorney who, in handling estate, converted estate's
Iunds, Iiled inaccurate accounting, and Iailed to respond to client's repeated
requests to close estate would be suspended Irom practice oI law Ior 2 years, given
mitigating Iactors oI attorney's prior unblemished record and his suIIering Irom
clinical depression. In re Bennett (1995, 4th Dept) 214 App Div 2d 206, 632
NYS2d 737.
Attorney's alleged depression and poor overall poor physical health were not
mitigating Iactors to be considered in determining sanction Ior attorney who Iailed
to Iile documents necessary to close estates in multiple probate cases, Iailed to Iile
accounting in guardianship matter, and Iailed to submit settlement entry Ior
approval in bankruptcy adversary proceeding; attorney's medical records showed
sporadic visits Ior assorted ailments and general malaise over the years, but did not
substantiate an ongoing chronic condition, and Ohio Lawyers Assistance
Program (OLAP) counselor stated that while attorney suffered from depression
and anxiety, she did not render an opinion as to whether attorney's depression and
anxiety actually contributed to his neglect oI the legal matters entrusted to him
over the time period in question. Erie-Huron Grievance Commt. v. Stoll, 2010-
Ohio-5985, 939 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio 2010).
Mitigating Iactors to be considered in determining sanction Ior attorney who
misappropriated over $7,000 from his employer law firm, resulting in theft
conviction, were attorney's lack oI a prior disciplinary record, payment oI
restitution, cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, imposition oI
other penalties or sanctions, good character and reputation, diagnosis of
adjustment disorder with mixed conduct and emotion, cessation oI criminal
activity beIore he was caught, and expression oI sincere remorse at disciplinary
hearing. Disciplinary Counsel v. Kraemer, 2010-Ohio-3300, 931 N.E.2d 571
(Ohio 2010).
Conditionally stayed two-year suspension Irom practice was appropriate
sanction Ior attorney who Iailed to do any work on case and to return unearned Iee
to client, Iailed to return money to another client when directed to do so by bar
association aIter arbitration oI Iee dispute, and Iailed to respond to a certiIied letter
oI inquiry Irom bar association concerning issues raised during arbitration
proceeding; Iactors in mitigation included that attorney practiced law Ior 35 years
without disciplinary incident and had distinguished career that included ten years
in state Attorney General's oIIice, was diagnosed with major depression Ior
which he was receiving treatment, and had shown much remorse Ior his
misconduct. Disciplinary Counsel v. McShane, 121 Ohio St. 3d 169, 2009-Ohio-
746, 902 N.E.2d 980 (2009).
Major depressive disorder : Two-year suspension, with one year stayed on
conditions that attorney continue his psychiatric treatment Ior major depressive
order and that attorney successIully complete two years oI conditional probation iI
he attains reinstatement, was appropriate disciplinary sanction Ior attorney's
misconduct, which included neglect oI multiple
clients' legal matters, where attorney, despite taking a series oI antidepressant
medications including a prescription regulated Ior its addictive qualities, persisted
in drinking beer, wine, and perhaps even more potent alcoholic beverages that also
acted as depressants, and attorney appeared largely unconcerned about the perils
his drug and alcohol use potentially posed to eIIective representation oI clients.
Code oI ProI.Resp., DR 6-101(A)(3). Disciplinary Counsel v. Shaw, 110 Ohio St.
3d 122, 2006-Ohio-3821, 851 N.E.2d 487 (2006); West's Key Number Digest,
Attorney and Client k59.13(3).
Depression: Attorney's mishandling oI his personal injury client's Iunds
warranted suspension Irom the practice oI law Ior one year with entire year stayed,
conditioned upon his continued treatment Ior depression due to his Iather's death
by a psychologist/psychiatrist Ior duration oI suspension, where misconduct was
an isolated incident in his nineteen years oI practice and attorney settled accounts
oI client's medical bills, showed remorse, and cooperated Iully with investigation.
New York DR 9-102(A), (B)(3, 4). Toledo Bar Assn. v. Kramer, 89 Ohio St. 3d
321, 731 N.E.2d 643 (2000); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client
58.
Depression: An attorney's alleged severe state oI depression at the time oI his
misconduct would not serve as a shield Irom amenability to disciplinary sanction,
nor would it serve to mitigate against his disbarment. A clinical psychologist
Iound that the attorney suIIered this depression and subsequent lack oI recollection
as a result oI job-related stress Irom assuming an excessive responsibility Ior
work. The attorney's workaholic behavior was allegedly due to a personality type
that was very conscientious and sensitive to guilt leading to an inability to reIuse
added responsibility. Although the court considered the attorney's emotional and
mental state oI mind as a mitigating Iactor, disbarment would still be imposed
given the attorney's Iive-year pattern oI highly deceptive practices that caused
serious Iinancial consequences to his clients and others. The attorney had Iorged
adverse parties' appearances, Iraudulently obtained the signatures oI public
oIIicials, neglected clients' legal matters, and had made Ialse representations about
the status oI cases. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assn. v Colston (1989, Okla) 777
P2d 920.
Emotional response to two family deaths: Attorney who inexplicably began
to overlook scheduled appearances and to Iail to communicate with clients aIter 30
years' unblemished service would be suspended Irom practice oI law Ior 2 years,
despite attorney's claim that misconduct occurred due to his emotional response to
deaths oI two Iamily members. In re Discipline oI Wehde (1994, SD) 517 NW2d
132.
ADD: Psychiatrist's prescription oI psychostimulant to attorney Ior attention
deIicit disorder (ADD) was not a cause-in-Iact or a Ioreseeable cause oI attorney's
impulsive and manic behavior that led to misappropriation oI client Iunds while on
gambling spree, though attorney's expert-psychiatrists testiIied that attorney
should not have been prescribed the psychostimulant because oI his history oI
abuse oI addictive drugs and psychiatrist acknowledged that the use oI prescribed
psychostimulant would result in destructive consequences iI attorney was using
amphetamines and other drugs, where attorney had scored high on ADD
diagnostic test, attorney did not disclose to psychiatrist his current abuse oI
amphetamines and other drugs and instead told psychiatrist that he had eight years
oI sobriety with one relapse, and psychiatrist believed that the prescribed
psychostimulant was the only psychostimulant that attorney was taking. V.T.C.A.,
Civil Practice & Remedies Code 74.001(a)(13). Price v. Divita, 224 S.W.3d 331
(Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2006), reh'g overruled, (Sept. 26, 2006) and review
denied, (Jan. 12, 2007); West's Key Number Digest, Health k823(13).
Attention deficit disorder: Attorney Iailed to show a direct causation between
attention deIicit disorder (ADD) and his misuse oI client Iunds, as was required
beIore the mental disability could be considered as a mitigating Iactor in imposing
disciple; attorney's ADD did not explain his loaning client Iunds to other clients
without permission, lying to clients, attorneys, and a judge about client Iunds, or
using client Iunds to make loans and payments Ior his personal beneIit. ABA Code
oI ProI. Resp., DR 1-102(A)(3). In re Hunter, 769 A.2d 1286 (Vt. 2000); West's
Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client k53(2).
Depression and anxiety: Medical evidence presented by attorney in
disciplinary matter concerning her depression, anxiety, and unresolved medical
condition did not demonstrate that attorney's medical condition caused her to
commit misconduct, and thus imposition oI lesser penalty Ior misconduct was not
warranted, where psychologist never oIIered clear opinion oI causality with
respect to majority oI misconduct issues, and attorney had been able to maintain
and represent other clients during period when she was purportedly suIIering Irom
anxiety and depression. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Karlsson, 2001 WI
126, 635 N.W.2d 771 (Wis. 2001); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and
Client k53(2).
For the Reno City Attorney OIIice Prosecutor, Bar Counsel, and various
WCDA DDAs: Disciplinary action against attorney Ior misconduct related to
perIormance oI oIIicial duties as prosecuting attorney, 10 A.L.R. 4th 605.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Panel recommends that the Respondent be ordered:
(1) Irrevocably disbarred by the Supreme Court. While irrevocable
disbarment is clearly the harshest Iorm oI discipline, the unusual circumstances
here, compounded by the repetitive nature oI the misconduct prior . to and even
during the disciplinary process and hearing, clearly warrant the level oI
punishment recommended.
(2) That his temporary suspension be continued pending Iinal resolution oI
this matter.
(3) Within three (3) days oI the eIIective date oI disbarment, to demonstrate
to Bar that he has placed all his Nevada clients with other counsel, otherwise
concluded the representation, or with the assistance oI Bar Counsel thereaIter
attempted to expeditiously aid any
remaining client in Iinding new counsel.
(4) To pay the costs associated with these proceedings pursuant to SCR
120. "
INDEX OF HEARING EXHIBITS (SBN 'S 1 TO 13) Coughin's 14-15
Chair's 16
1 -Index of Documents Selected for Hearing Packet by SBN's Pat King in
attempt to skirt his lie that he lacked a certiIied copy oI every Order attached to
Iilings contained therein and containing numerous Iraudulent ProoIs oI Service
by the SBN page 333
- p. 336 5 pages oI what King purports RPC excerpts (1.2, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5,
3.5A, 4.1, 4.4, 8.1, 8.2, 8.4)
- p. 341 8/23/12 Complaint SBN v. Coughlin:
-Exhibit 1: 11/30/11 RMC Judge Howard Judgment oI Conviction and Court
Order in 22176 candy bar 3/15/12 Judge Elliott Order AIIirming Ruling oI the
RMC in appeal CR11-2064
-Exhibit 2: 11/30/11 RMC Judge Howard Order Ior Summary Punishment oI
Contempt Committed in View and Presence oI the Court in 11 CR 22176
-Exhibit 3: 3/12/12 RMC Judge Nash Holmes Order oI 3/14/12 with "clear and
convincing" language.
2 -Attorney Fees Order of $42,050 by 1udge Flanagan in CV11-03628 6/28/12
pursuant to 4/19/12 Motion Ior Attorney's Fees by Richard G. HIll, Esq., within
appeal oI summary eviction in RJC rev2011-001708 by Judge SIerrazza page 387
3 -Order After Trial by 1udge Linda Gardner oI 4/10/09 in DV08-01168 that
WLS cited as the sole reason Ior Iiring Coughlin Irom domestic violence attorney
position page 392
4 -Contempt Order 2 28 12 Judge Holmes 26800 Order Finding DeIendant in
Contempt and Imposing Sanctions, page 407
5 -Order attached to Complaint 3 12 12 Judge Holmes attached to Complaint
Order 26800 Ied clear and convincing burden Ior RPC standard by SBN page 412
6 -Letter dated February 14, 2012 to Mr. Coughlin from Mr. King 2 14 12
partial letter Irom SBN King excised Hill's 1 14 12 ng12-0204 grievance, so no
notice oI it, not pled page 419
7 -Two-page letter dated March 9, 2011 from Mr. Coughlin to State Bar
Coughlin's 3 9 12 Iax to SBN regarding delayed receipt oI 2 14 12 letter Irom
King re Hill's grievance page 421
8 -Two page letter dated March 14, 2012 from 1udge Holmes to SBN
Northern Office 3 14 12 complaint against Coughlin to SBN North page 424
9 -Affidavit of Poverty 3 7 12 AIIidavit oI Poverty lacking caption or
certiIication by RMC D3 page 427
10-Order in Case 11 CR 22176 RMC Judge Howard 12 15 11 Order denying
IFP Ior Transcript Preparation and New Trial and Recusal page 431
11- Order for Summary Punishment RMC Judge Howard 11 30 11 Order Ior
Summary Contempt incident to deIense oI 60838 conviction page 543
12-Order Affirming Ruling of RMC Judge Elliott 3 15 12 Order AIIirming
RMC Judge Howard's conviction in candy bar petty larceny CR11-2064 page 439
13-Order Granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal Judge Elliott 8 27
12 CR12-1262 Order Dismissing Appeal oI Trespass Conviction by Judge
William Gardner in RMC 11 CR 26405 page 444
14-New Verified Response Coughlin 11 14 12 New VeriIied Response aIter
Chair Echeverria's threatening misstatements oI the law re deIault page 448
15-Declaration Verified Response with two DVD discs Coughlin's 11 15 12
Declaration and VeriIied Response page 509
16-Emergency Ex Parte Motion Chair Echeverria's 11 14 12 incomplete and
secretive exhibit entered sua sponte, in his attempt to one up Judge Nash Holmes
as to transmogriIying a plenary Iormal disciplinary hearing into a summary
contempt/disciplinary hearing, where no copy oI Exhibit 16 was presented to
Coughlin at the time Exhibit 16's admission, and copy incomplete lacking discs
page 543 and where that which is represented in Exhibit 16 is an incomplete copy
oI the Iiling itselI (an "edit", Bar Counsel King might say, iI Coughlin was seeking
it's admission, where the Exhibits that were attached to what Exhibit 16 purports to
be, are not present (because neither the SBN nor the Panel Chair (and Panel
Member Kent indicated he wouldn't care to review any materials on an
attachments in cd/dvd Iorm ever submitted by Coughlin anyways) seem to be able
to burn a cd/dvd very easily, much less review the materials collected therein and
presented by Coughlin in various Iilings),
Coughlin's citations to Transcript and dictated notes thereto:
8/23/12 SBN V. Z. COUGHLIN SCR 105 COMPLAINT, NG12-0204, 0434,
0435:
"PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
("SCR)105(2) a VERIFIED RESPONSE OR ANSWER to this Complaint must be
Iiled with the OIIice oI Bar Counsel, State Bar oI Nevada, 9456 Double R
Boulevard, Ste. B, Reno, Nevada, 89521, within twenty (20) days oI service oI
this Complaint. Procedure regarding service is addressed in SCR 109.
Complainant, State Bar oI Nevada ("State Bar"), by and through its Assistant Bar
Counsel Patrick O. King, is inIormed and believes as Iollows:
Zachery Coughlin ("Respondent"), Bar number 9473, is a member oI the
State Bar oI Nevada admitted on March 25, 2005. Respondent's date oI birth is
September 27, 1976. The address that Respondent has on Iile with the State Bar oI
Nevada, in accordance with Rule oI ProIessional Conduct ("RPC") 79(1 )(a) is
Post OIIice Box 3961, Reno NV 89505. Respondent engaged in acts oI
misconduct warranting the imposition oI proIessional discipline. The State Bar
alleges as Iollows:
1. Multiple grievances were received by the OIIice oI Bar Counsel between
the period oI January 14 and March 15, 2012, concerning Respondent. Due to the
serious allegations oI misconduct, grievance Iiles were opened and an
investigation was initiated by Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King. 2.
Respondent was advised oI the grievances via U.S. mail, e-mail and by a brieI
meeting with Mr. King at the State Bar OIIice in Reno. Respondent did not
cooperate with the investigation and rather than respond to the grievances as
requested, Respondent sent non-responsive and disparaging e-mails.
3. Respondent has not made a request to be placed on disability status, nor
has he acknowledged that he may have mental inIirmity, illness, or addiction.
4. The investigation oI the grievances against Respondent shows a serious
pattern oI misconduct.
5. On September 9, 2011, Respondent shopliIted a candy bar and cough
drops a Wal-Mart store with an approximate value oI Iourteen dollars ($14.00). On
November 30, 2011, Municipal Court Judge Kenneth R. Howard Iound
Respondent guilty oI the oIIense Petit Larceny, a violation oI RMC 8.10.040.
Respondent appealed the judgment oI conviction. The judgment oI conviction
was aIIirmed on appeal. See Exhibit 1.
6. During the trial Respondent's conduct was so disruptive that Judge
Howard Respondent in direct contempt oI Court and sentenced him to serve three
(3) days in See Exhibit 2.
7. On August 20, 2011, Respondent was arrested on a second larceny
charge Ior stealing a cell phone. Those charges are currently pending in Reno
Justice Court.
8. Respondent was again arrested on January 13, 2012, Ior allegedly
abusing 911 services, a gross misdemeanor.
9. On February 21. 2012. Respondent Iiled a document entitled, Notice oI
Appearance Entry oI Plea oI Not Guilty, Waiver oI Arraignment, Motion to
Dismiss, etc. in one oI his pending criminal matters, Case No. RCR-2012 065630,
City oI Reno v. Zachary Coughlin. The document clearly shows Respondent's
unproIessional, disruptive conduct, and lack oI respect Ior the court and opposing
counsel.
10. Respondent was arrested on November 13, 2011 by Reno Police
Department and charged with trespassing, a misdemeanor, Ior which he was later
convicted.
11. The circumstances leading to the above-mentioned arrest are as Iollows:
at an hearing Justice oI the Peace Peter SIerrazza ordered that Respondent vacate
the home he was renting eIIective November 1, 2011. AIter the locks were
changed and the notice was posted on the Iront door the owner, Dr. Merliss,
discovered that someone had broken into the home and was barricaded in the
basement. The Reno Police tried to coax whoever was in the basement to open the
door. Dr. Merliss was Iorced to kick open the door where the Reno Police Iound
Respondent. Respondent had broken into the home and living in the basement.
Respondent was arrested Ior criminal trespass and was subsequently convicted oI
that charge.
12. Respondent, representing himselI as co-counsel, Iiled a 36-page motion
to dismiss on March 5, 2012. The motion was denied by Judge William Gardner
and was determined to be without merit. The motion, on its Iace, demonstrates that
Respondent lacks competence to practice law.
13. Once Respondent was evicted, an order was obtained to remove his
belongings Irom the home. Respondent interIered with the contractor who was
hired to remove Respondent's personal belongings. The police were called and
aIter talking with Respondent they recommended that he Iind something else to
do. Respondent reIused to their advice and was subsequently arrested by the Reno
police.
14. In the case oI City oI Reno vs. Zachary Barker Coughlin, Case No. 11
TR 26800 21, a trial was held on a traIIic citation issued to Respondent. The
matter was called at approximately 3:00 p.m. and concluded without a verdict at
about 4:30 p.m. aIter the court held Respondent in criminal contempt oI court Ior
his behavior and activities committed in the direct presence oI the court during
trial.
15. In a March 12, 2012 Order, Municipal Court Judge Dorothy Nash
Homes Iound by "clear and convincing evidence" that Mr. Coughlin committed
numerous acts oI attorney misconduct. See Exhibit 3. Judge Holmes explained in
her Order that aIter Respondent served his Iive-day contempt oI court sanction
imposed by the court on February 27, 2012, Respondent Iax-Iiled to the court a
224-page document. Judge Holmes Iound that the document contained rambling
reIerences to his personal liIe and was incoherent.
16. In her Order, Judge Homes Iound by clear and convincing evidence that
Respondent violated Rule oI ProIessional Conduct ("RPC") 1.1 (Competence),
RPC 1.3 (Diligence), RPC 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), RPC 3.2
(Expediting Litigation), RPC 3.3(a) (Candor toward the Tribunal), RPC 3A(e)
(Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel). RPC 8.4 (c) (Engaging in Dishonesty.
Fraud. Deceit or Misrepresentation) and RPC BA(d) Engage in conduct that is
Prejudicial to the Administration oI Justice).
17. Respondent Iiled AIIidavits oI Poverty in Support oI his Motion to
Proceed InIorma Pauperis, wherein he Iails to disclose that he is a licensed
attorney and instead under Employment and SelI-Employment he identiIies
himselI as a "Jack oI All Trades".
18. Despite a claim oI poverty in the above mentioned aIIidavits,
Respondent told the Court that his incarceration Ior contempt would adversely
aIIect his clients.
19. On March 22, 2012, Respondent appeared at the Reno Municipal Court
wearing (smiley Iace) Ilannel pajamas. Respondent became argumentative and
Marshals were called to were called to ask him to leave.
25. On April 10, 2009, District Judge Linda Gardner oI the Second Judicial
District Court executed an "Order AIter Trial," in case No. DV08-01168. In that
case, Respondent represented the DeIendant/Counter Claimant. In her Order Judge
Gardner explained Respondent's inappropriate behavior in part as Iollows: The
most troubling aspect oI this case was Mr. Coughlin's rude, sarcastic and
disrespectIul presentation at trial; Mr. Coughlin's inability to understand a balance
sheet; his Iailure to conduct discovery and his lack oI knowledge with regard to
the rules oI evidence and trial procedure. All oI this was compounded with a
continuously antagonistic presentation oI the case that resulted in a shiIt Irom a
Iairly simple divorce case to a contentious divorce trial lasting an excessive
amount oI time.
27. In light oI the Iorgoing Respondent violated RPC 1.1 (Competence);
RPC 1.2 (Diligence); RPC 3. 1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions): RPC 3.3
(Candor to the Tribunal): RPC 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel); RPC
3.S (Impartiality and Decorum oI the Tribunal); RPC 4. 1 (TruthIulness in
Statements to Others): RPC 4.4 (Respect Ior the Rights oI Third Persons); RPC
SA (Relations with Opposing Counsel); RPC 8.1 (Disciplinary Matters); RPC 8.2
(Judicial and Legal OIIicials); and RPC 8.4 (Misconduct).
WHEREFORE, Complainant prays as Iollows:
1. That a hearing be held pursuant to Nevada Supreme Court Rule 105:
2. That Respondent be assessed the costs oI the disciplinary proceeding
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 120(1); and
3.That pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 102, such disciplinary action be
taken by Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board against Respondent as may be
deemed appropriate the circumstances."
INDEX TO EXHIBITS 8/23/12 Complaint SBN v. Coughlin, NG12-0204, NG12-
0434, NG12-0435:
1. Exhibit 1 : -11/30/11 RMC Judge Howard Judgment oI Conviction and Court
Order in 22176 candy bar; -3/15/12 Judge Elliott Order AIIirming Ruling oI the
RMC in appeal CR11-2064
2. Exhibit 2: 11/30/11 RMC Judge Howard Order Ior Summary Punishment oI
Contempt Committed in View and Presence oI the Court in 11 CR 22176
3. Exhibit 3: 3/12/12 RMC Judge Nash Holmes Order oI 3/12/12 with "clear and
convincing" language.
Watts-Vial 12/18/12AIIidavit oI Attempted Service in 599: to a court act ion in the
Reno Justice Court , at pproximately 8 : 3 0 a . m . 7. AI ter the Applicat ion was
signed, I ret rned to my oIIice , dr aIted the instant aIIidavi t, and gave he Ap plicat
ion to my staII Ior Iinalization , and then Ior 8. Prior to Iiling , my As sistant ,
Cynthia endoza, provided a copy o I the instant App l i cat i on and a 1
attachments to the email address and Iax numb ers used and pr vided by Mr .
Coughlin in his correspondence with Mr . Leslie , zachcoughl inhotmail . com ,
Iax numb er (949) 667-74 2. 9 . Given Mr . Coughl i n ' s repeated ins tances o I
haras sment and int imidat ion as des c ribed by Mr . Le s l i e i n t e App l i
cation , it is very like ly that Mr . Coughlin wi ll react dly to any dec i s ion to
remove Mr . Les l ie as couns e l Ior Mr . Coughlin , and wi l l engage in Iurther
acts o I haras sment and in imidat ion against Mr . Lesl ie . 1 0 . Mr . Les l i e ' s
des cription o I Mr . Coughl n ' s his tory o I unannounc ed appearance s a t the
Pub l i c D e I ender ' s O I I i c e , de spite repeated ins truc t i ons by Mr . Le s l i
e that he i s 0 ly to appear with prior not i c e and at a set t ime , and his imp ied
threat to harm Mr . Les l i e , paired with Mr . Le s l i e ' s e I I ort to withdraw I
rom Iurther repre s entat ion o I Mr . Coughl i n , dem ns trate that the County and
i t s Pub l i c DeI ender ' s O I I i c e and mp l oyees wi l l suI I er immediate and i
rreparable inj ury , l o s s o r damage , and that Mr . Coughlin wi l l engage in
Iurther acts o I haras sment and int imidat ion against the County and i t s emp
loyee be Iore Mr . Coughlin can be heard in oppos ition to this Appl ' cation, and
the Court is there Iore reque sted to grant the temp or set a hearing in the near
Iuture on the tempora orders Ior protection as indi cated by the County Fur ther
aIIiant sayeth...
CliIton's 10/17/11 Order in 1708 reads:
'ORDER This matter has come beIore the Court upon DeIendant's Emergency
Motion to Stay, Set Aside, Vacate Eviction Hearing Order Iiled on today's date.
An Opposition by PlaintiII was also Iiled today. These pleadings Iollow a
Summary Eviction hearing held October 13, 2011, beIore Judge SIerrazza. The
court's minutes indicate that DeIendant's eviction Irom the premises would only
occur on today's date iI he Iailed to post the rental amount oI $2,275.00 by
October 17, 2011 with the court. A trial date was then set Ior October 25, 2011.
DeIendant has tendered $2,275.00 to the court on loday's date. ThereIore, the
instant motion is now moot and the trial date oI October 25,2011 stands. Is it
thereIore HEREBY ORDERED that DeIendant's Emergency Motion, Stay, Set
Aside, Vacate Eviction Hearing Order is DENIED. DATED this 17
th
day oI
October, 2011.
I declare under penalty oI perjury the Ioregoing is true and correct to the best oI
my knowledge and that all oI the orders and pleadings,motions,
oppositions/notices I quote or excerpt herein are true and correct copies oI such
though the emphasis (italics, bold, underline, etc) is typically my own, in most
instances.
DATED this 7/14/13
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Appellant
ProoI oI Service:
On this date, I, Zach Coughlin electronically served a true and correct copy oI the
Ioregoing document to all registered electronic Iilers or those otherwise consenting
to electronic service in a waiver oI the application oI NRCP as set Iorth in SCR
109, and to those whom are not I placed a true and correct copy oI the Ioregoing
document in the USPS mail on this date and or complied with all service
requirements set Iorth in SCR 109:
iI Iiled in 61383
Reno Justice Court/ WCDA whatever eIilers are associated with whichever case
this is Iiled in
Richard G. Hill, Esq.
attorney Ior Matt Merliss
iI Iile in 62337:
Patrick O. King, Esq. Assistant Bar Counsel
9456 Double R. Blvd Suite B
Reno, NV 89521
David A Clark, Esq., Bar Counsel
State Bar oI Nevada
Address: 600 East Charleston Blvd.
Las Vegas , NV 89104
Phone Number: 702-382-2200
Fax number: 702-385-2878
cc:
J. Thomas Susich, Esq., Chairman NNDB
Nevada Employment Security Division
Address: 1675 E. Prater Way, Suite 103
Sparks , NV 89434
Phone Number: 775-284-9533
Fax number: 775-284-9513
or tsusichnvdetr.org
Dated this 7/8/13
; /s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Pro Per Attorney
i 23 Filing oI papers: It is the oIIicial duty oI the clerk oI a court to Iile all papers in a cause
presented by the parties, and to indorse the correct date oI the Iiling thereon. 16 It is the duty oI
the clerk oI court, in the absence oI instructions Irom the court to the contrary, to accept Ior
Iiling any paper presented to him, provided such paper is not scurrilous or obscene, is properly
prepared, and is accompanied by the requisite Iiling Iee. 17 Unless otherwise speciIically
authorized by statute, the duty oI the clerk oI court to Iile papers presented to him is purely
ministerial 18 and he may not reIuse to perIorm such duty except upon order oI the court. 19
When the statute requires the clerk oI court to Iile all papers delivered to him to be Iiled, he is
not concerned with the merit oI the papers nor with their eIIect and interpretation. 20 The clerk
has no discretion in the matter oI Iiling papers recognized by law as properly belonging in the
record oI causes. 21 It is not Ior the clerk to inquire into the purposes or contents oI such
papers, or into the circumstances giving rise to them or attending their preparation. 22 The
power to make any decision as to the propriety oI any paper submitted, or as to the right oI a
person to Iile such paper, is vested in the court, not the clerk. 23 However, where a statute
makes it the duty oI the clerk oI court to Iile a particular document, a judge is without authority
to interIere with such Iiling. 24 To Iile an instrument, it must be delivered to the clerk at the
oIIice where it is required to be Iiled; delivery to the clerk at any other place, even though he
endorses it "Iiled," is not suIIicient. 25 The mere Iact that the clerk used superIluous words in
Iiling papers would not render his acts void. 26 23 ----Filing oI papers |SUPPLEMENT| Case
authorities: Arrestee's police brutality claim will not be dismissed as time barred, where her
counsel intended to Iile complaint early on last day beIore statute oI limitations ran but, due to
printer malIunction, he was unable to Iile it beIore clerk's oIIice was closed so he caused it to
be deposited in clerk's post oIIice box at 11:30 p.m., because Sixth Circuit rule, supported by
liberal construction oI FRCP 5(e) and 77(a) and (c), seems to be that document is deemed Iiled
when it is in actual or constructive possession oI clerk. Turner v City oI Newport (1995, ED
Ky) 887 F Supp 149. See Nix v Fraze (1988, Tex App Dallas) 752 SW2d 118, 28. Footnotes
Footnote 16. Brinson v Georgia R. Bank & Trust Co., 45 Ga App 459, 165 SE 321. Under the
statute, the clerk's duties include the obligation to Iile all papers properly beIore him. Hamilton
v Department oI Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 56 Wis 2d 673, 203 NW2d 7 (ovrld on
other grounds Re Pewaukee (Wis) 241 NW2d 603). The acceptance oI the Iiling oI a complaint
is a mere ministerial act, and the oIIicer charged with the responsibility oI receiving the same is
required to accept what is tendered to him iI it is accompanied by the proper Iee. State ex rel.
KauIman v Sutton (Fla App) 231 So 2d 874. As a ministerial oIIicer, it is the mandatory duty
oI the clerk oI the Court oI Civil Appeals to Iile and Iorward to the Supreme Court any
document tendered to him appertaining to an appeal in any cause pending in that court which is
addressed to the Supreme Court. Wagner v Garrett, 114 Tex 362, 269 SW 1030. A paper is
Iiled with the clerk oI court when it is delivered to him Ior that purpose. Morthland v Lincoln
Nat. LiIe Ins. Co., 220 Ind 692, 42 NE2d 41, reh den 220 Ind 734, 46 NE2d 203. Footnote 17.
State ex rel. Wanamaker v Miller, 164 Ohio St 174, 57 Ohio Ops 151, 128 NE2d 108. The
clerk may reIuse to accept any paper Ior Iiling until the appropriate Iee is paid. Poetz v Mix, 7
NJ 436, 81 A2d 741; Hamilton v Department oI Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 56 Wis
2d 673, 203 NW2d 7 (ovrld on other grounds Re Pewaukee (Wis) 241 NW2d 603). As to
prepayment oI Iees, generally, see 19, supra. Footnote 18. State ex rel. Dawson v Roberts,
165 Ohio St 341, 59 Ohio Ops 436, 135 NE2d 409; Malinou v McElroy, 99 RI 277, 207 A2d
44. Footnote 19. Malinou v McElroy, 99 RI 277, 207 A2d 44. Footnote 20. Corey v Carback,
201 Md 389, 94 A2d 629. It is not incumbent upon one who has the ministerial Iunction oI
accepting the Iiling oI a complaint to judicially determine the legal signiIicance oI the tendered
document. State ex rel. KauIman v Sutton (Fla App) 231 So 2d 874. Clerks oI Iederal courts
may not reIuse to Iile naturalization petitions which contain all the proper allegations, because
I ask that ChieI Marshal Roper, Marshal Harley, and Marshal Coppa correct the
misrepresentations made by Judge Nash Holmes (whether or not they were purposeIul or where
something was lost in translation and the aIIidavit requirement oI NRS 22.030 Ior "contempt
not in the immediate presence oI the Court" was not Iollowed by Judge Nash Holmes incident
to her 2/28/12 Order, wherein Judge Nash Holmes writes, on page 2 oI her 2/28/12 Order
Finding the DeIendnat in Contempt oI Court and Imposing Sanctions: "The matter was called
at apprxoimately 3:00p.m. and concluded withoua verdict about 4:30 p.m. aIter the court held
the deIendnat in criminal contempt oI court Ior his behavior and activites committed in the
direct presence oI this court during the trial. The court Iinds that deIendant's contemptuous
conduct conside oI his ....deceitIul...behavior during trial, all oI which appeard to be done to
vex an annoy the court, the witness, and the opposing party, and to disrupt the trial process.
The court Iinds that the Iollowing occurred, and constitute contempt...."9) deIendant's lying to
the court in response to direct questions posed by the court with regard to his recording the
proceedings...(page 3)...The court Iinds that the deIendnat's actions were intentional and done
in utter disregard and contempt Ior the court, an in the presence oI the cour, Ior purposes oI
disrupting and delaying the proceedins and dishonoring the rule oI law and this court, and
constitute the misdemeanor oI criminal contempt, a violation oI NRS 22.010. Good cause
appearing thereIore, the Iollowing sanctions are imposed: IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to NRS
22.100, that the deIendant be incarcerated at the Wahoe County Regional Detnetion Facility Ior
the term oI Iive (5) days, Irom the time he was taken into custody on this court's order on
February 27, 2012, and that sentence shall not be reduced Ior any reason..." The time stamping
on that 2/28/12 Order Finding the DeIendant in Contempt oI Court and Imposing Sanctions
indicate "3:47". Washoe County SheriII's OIIice personnel Deputy Hodge, Patricia Beckman,
RMC
Somehow, in her 2/28/12 Order (and during the Trial) Judge Nash Holmes Iound it relevant
that, allegedly, the RPD "gave Coughlin a break" over his driver's license being expired
(actually, Coughlin's then valid, current, driver's license was being withheld by Richard G. Hill,
Esq., as Coughlin reported to Sargent Tarter...and it was likely an old DL that the RPD is
reIerring to as "expired" when mentioning the "break", which, again, was somehow relevant
enough to Iind its way into the Order, but the withholding oI Coughlin's then current, valid DL
by Hill was sustained as irrelevant during the Trial (and in Iact seems to have been one oI a
myriad oI vague basis Ior issuing a summary criminal contempt Order requiring then licensed
attorney with client's depending upon him, Coughlin, immediately being taken to the WCDC
Ior 5 days in jail...).
Coughlin hereby requests the RMC, WCDA, and WCDC to indicate the extent to which his
property was booked into his personal property at the WCDC, only to have the WCDC and or
WCDA release the property to the City oI Reno Marshals the Iollowing day, well aIter any
timeIrame to conduct a search incident to arrest (NNDB Member Mary Kandaras was involved
in this matter, and in Iact, despite Judge Nash Holmes ordering the property released on
3/30/12, it took until 4/7/12 and approval by Mary Kandaras beIore the property was so
released. wcso12-1805 c-47951.
With local attorney Pam Wilmore standing, watching, and or hearing/participating in the
ti b t M h 21 t 2012 WCSO' P B k h d d C hli t th t

7 15 13 0204 61383 Declaration Coughlin Support Motion To HOld in Contempt All Those Herein Detailed WCSO Burglaries Per Within 24 Hours Summary Eviction Lockout Horders NRS 40.253 (5) (A) 13-20581

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7 15 13 0204 61383 Declaration Coughlin Support Motion To HOld in Contempt All Those Herein Detailed WCSO Burglaries Per Within 24 Hours Summary Eviction Lockout Horders NRS 40.253 (5) (A) 13-20581

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1

It is entirely unclear why Judge Flanagan's Order indicates:

C. Statutory Dispossession Proceedings; Summary Proceedings 3. DeIenses 1547. Payment

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