Page 1 of 1

Steve Dunne

From: Kevin Scheid

Sent: Monday, January 12, 2004 7:05 PM
To: Front Office
Cc: Team 2; Team 3
Subject: Suggested Intel-related questions for Secretary Rumsfeld

Front Office:

The following suggested questions are for Secretary Rumsfeld from Team 2. They seek to provide some insights
into Intel-related Commission issues:

• Who is responsible for the search for UBL? CIA? Defense Special Forces? How's it going?
• Are you confident that Pakistan and Afghanistan are willing to make the tough choices to fight al
Qa'ida in the months and years ahead? Are they too fragile to rely upon?
• On what basis have you supported increased funding for intelligence? What's the strategy? How
does this strategy fit into the larger Government-wide efforts to fight the war on terrorism?
• Are you satisfied with the quality of the intelligence you receive? Is the quality of the analysis up to
your standards? Are you satisfied with the quality of the national intelligence support the Department
receives from the DCI?
• What problem were you trying to solve by establishing the new position of Undersecretary of Defense
for Intelligence? What role does his office play in the management and oversight of Defense
intelligence?
• How do you judge the effectiveness of the Department's counter-terrorism efforts?

KJS

1/13/2004
January 12, 2004

MEETING MEMORANDUM

To: Commissioners

From: Chris Kojm

Re: Luncheon Meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld

Tuesday, January 13, 2004, Noon to 1 p.m., The Pentagon

I. Attendees

• We believe Secretary Rumsfeld will be accompanied by Deputy Secretary

Paul Wolfowitz, JCS Vice Chair General Peter Pace, Under Secretary for
Policy Douglas Feith, Under Secretary for Intelligence Stephen Cambone, and
Deputy General Counsel Daniel Dell 'Orto.

• Commissioners in attendance include Vice Chair Hamilton and

Commissioners Ben-Veniste, Fielding, Gorelick, Lehman, Roemer, and
Thompson; Staff includes Philip Zelikow, Chris Kojm and Steve Dunne.

II. Agenda

• The Secretary has invited the Commission, but he has no specific agenda for
the meeting. He may mention the attached letter he sent to Chairman Kean
about his remarks that the 9/11 attacks could have been prevented, "but
officials in Washington 'simply failed' in their vigilance."

• The Commission agenda includes 3 items (in addition to any additional items
Commissioners wish to raise). They are:

o The status of document requests;

o The conduct of the war on terrorism; and

o The Secretary's advice as to what the Commission should recommend.

III. Talking Points

Mr. Secretary, first of all thank you for hosting this lunch. You are generous
with your time. We appreciate you taking the time out of your busy schedule
to meet with us.

Second, I want to turn briefly to the question of document requests: You and
your staff worked hard to meet the schedules you outlined for us on document
production two months ago. We have no significant outstanding request
except for some relating to a late November request for NORAD documents.
We are working with you to ensure that NORAD has produced all responsive
documents. We need your help here, because of our recent history with
NORAD.

Third, I want to acknowledge that you and senior officials of the Department
have worked cooperatively with our staff to schedule interviews. We have
you scheduled for 2 p.m. on Friday, January 30, and we look forward to
asking you at that time about the period up through 9/11, the events of that
day and their immediate aftermath. We will want to get your important
perspective as we put together, as our statute requires, a "full and complete
account" of the events of 9/11.

What we would like to explore with you today are your views on the global
war on terrorism: What is most important for us to know, and what are your
views as to what is most important for the Commission should recommend?
We will have a number of questions for you.

IV. Questions

1. Mr. Secretary, I would like to spend some time on the questions you raised in a
memo you wrote that later became public. You asked some superlative questions,
and we would like to explore with you what you believe the answers should be.

o Does the Defense Department need to think through new ways to organize
train, equip and focus to deal with the global war on terrorism?
o Are the changes we have made and making too modest and incremental?
o How do we know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror?

2. Do we need a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists?

o What should be its main elements, and what is the role of the military in
that integrated plan?
o Do we need a new organization?
o If so, what should that organization look like?
3. Is it still your expectation that winning in Afghanistan will be "a long hard slog"?

o What are the most important steps we need to take to secure victory?
o Are many, and possibly most, of those steps outside the scope of
traditional military activities—i.e., schools, roads, electricity, economic
development, and institution-building so that the new government can gain
some legitimacy?
o What do we need to do to create a secure environment so that these other
activities can occur?

4. Who is responsible for the search for UBL? CIA? Defense Special Forces?

o How is it going?

5. Are you confident that Pakistan and Afghanistan are willing to make the tough
choices to fight al Qaeda in the months and years ahead?

o Are they too fragile to rely upon?

6. Are you satisfied with the quality of intelligence you receive?

o Is the quality up to your standards?

o Are you satisfied with the quality of the national intelligence support the
Department receives from the DCI?

7. What problem were you trying to resolve by establishing the new position of
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence?

o What role does this office play in the management and oversight of
Defense intelligence?

8. One of the questions you have raised Mr. Secretary is the role of madrassahs. We
are killing or capturing al Qaeda leadership, but young people keep coming out
the madrassahs and are willing to take up the terrorist struggle.

o How do we change the education of tens of millions of young Muslims?

o How we change their perspective on the United States and its policies and
actions?

9. As you assess the overall effort since 9/11, what is working well and what is not
in the war on terrorism, and what do you think should be our most important
recommendations?

o Do you also have recommendations in addition to those strictly in the

Defense Department area of responsibility?