Dickie on Artifactuality Author(s): Thomas C. Ryckman Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 47, No.

2 (Spring, 1989), pp. 175-177 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/431830 Accessed: 01/04/2009 15:32
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Discussion

Dickie on Artifactuality
In The Art Circle,' George Dickie offers the following institutionaltheory of art: AC: x is a workof art if and only if (i) x is an artifact, and (ii) x is of a kind created to be presented to an artworldpublic. (p. 80) In what follows, I shall show that there is a problem with what Dickie says aboutartifactuality.Given the role that artifactuality plays in AC, AC should not be accepted until the problem is solved. posed an institutional theory which, like AC, lists artifactualityas a necessary feature of art.2 There, Dickie treated artifactualityas a property an object could acquire by mere conferral. As the following passage makes clear, in The Art Circle, conferred artifactualityhas been abandoned:
In Artand the Aestheticand elsewhere I maintainedthatthe artifacts which are art become so in two distinct ways: by being made (painted, sculpted, composed, and the like) or by having artifactuality conferred on them. I maintained that art such as the Night Watchis made, but that some works of art had artifactuality conferred on them. This second notion was an attempt to show how such things as unaltereddriftwood hung on walls and the urinalDuchamp used fall within the limits of artifactualityof artists. I now believe it was a mistake to think that artifactuality can be conferred: an artifact must be made in some way. (p. 44) In his earlier Art and the Aesthetic, Dickie prohangingon a wall is quiteeasy to do. Pickingup andhanging and similar actions are ways of achieving (not conferring) artifactuality.Of course, it is not just the motion of lifting and affixing or the like which makessomethingan artifact, it is lifting and affixing or the like plus somethingelse. (p. 44) Of course, to say that x is an artifact if and only if x has been lifted and affixed or the like plus something else is not to analyze artifactuality.

Presumably,to help sharpenour understanding of

"lifting and affixing or the like plus something else," Dickie presents a series of examples. In some, but not all, of the examples an artifact is produced from a

non-artifact.The examples follow Dickie's order of presentation:3 El: One picks up a piece of driftwoodandmoves it to anotherpartof the beach merely to get it out of the way.
E2: One picks up a piece of driftwood and with a

is understood Clearly,as artifactuality in AC, it is nota propertyan objectacquiresvia mereconferral.

If not in virtue of mere conferral, in virtue of what is something an artifact? Dickie writes: I wrote of picking up and hanging on a wall and of conferring artifactualityas if they were one and the same thing; that is, I thoughtof picking up and hangingon a wall as a way of conferring artifactuality.But while conferring artifactualityis impossible(as it now seems), pickingup and

knife whittles a handleon one end and a point on the other with the intention of using it to spearflounderson the surf. E3: One picks up a piece of driftwoodand without alteringit in any way digs a hole in the sand. E4: One picks up a piece of driftwoodand without altering it in any way brandishesit at a threatening dog. E5: A piece of driftwoodis picked up by someone who is familiarwith the worldof art and taken home and hung on a wall, unaltered,with the intention to display its characteristicsas the characteristics of a paintingare displayed. E6: A piece of driftwoodis picked up and hung on a wall withoutany artistic context and just to
get it out of the way (the wall being a convenient place to put it). E7: A world famous artist points to a piece of driftwood, calls it art (with the intention of getting others to attend to its characteristics as they would to the characteristics of a sculpture), and claims it is art. According to Dickie, in each of E2, E3, E4 and E5, a piece of driftwood became an artifact, whereas in

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism47:2 Spring 1989

176 El, E6 and E7 no artifact was produced. In E3, E4 and E5 the driftwood became an artifact without in virtue of being used being altered,but, apparently, to serve a purpose. In E2 the driftwood became an artifact without being used to serve a purpose, but, apparently,in virtue of being alteredwith the intention that it might be fit for such use. Apparently,in El, E6 and E7, where no artifactwas produced,the driftwood is neither used to serve a purpose nor alteredso that it mightbe so used. All of this suggests thatDickie thinksthatan objectbecomes an artifactif and only if it is used to serve a purposeor it is altered with the intentionthat it mightbe so used. The above suggestion seems even more credible in light of Dickie's havingwritten:
The driftwood[of E3 and E4] has been made into a tool or a weaponby the use to which it is put. These cases differfrom the driftwood-spear case [E2] in that the tool or weapon is not made priorto an intendeduse and the piece of wood is not alteredin any way.But whatexactly has been madeif the piece of driftwood has not been altered?In the driftwoodspear case what is made is the complex object: the wood carved in a certain way for use as a spear. In the other two cases what has been made are also complex objects: the wood used as a digging tool andthe wood used as a weapon. In neithercase is the driftwoodalone the artifact;the artifact is the driftwoodmanipulated and used in a certain way. For the purposes of the immediate discussion the driftwood alone (unaltered and unused) is a simple object and the driftwoodalteredor used is a complexobject. The complex objects are complex because their original (simple) objects haveundergonea change at the handsof an agent. (p. 45)

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism around a piece of driftwood located as in NE1 in a way thatframesthe driftwood. NE4: An artist constructsa frame arounda piece of driftwoodfoundon a beach. NE5: Walkingin the sand, an artisttraces a frame around a piece of driftwood found on a beach. NE6: An artist points to a piece of driftwoodon a beach anddescribes its frameas a circle with a radius of ten meters and mid-point at the driftwood'scenterof gravity. NE7: An artistpointsto a piece of driftwoodfound on a beach and describes its frame as the worldexternalto it. Dickie holds thatthe object in E5 is an artifactand thatthe objectin E7 is not. The new examples suggest that he is mistaken about E5 or about E7. For E5's object is no more of an artifact than are some of the new examples' objects; if any of the new examples' objects are artifacts, then all of the new examples' objects are artifacts;and if all of the new examples' objects are artifacts, then the object in E7 is an artifact. Therefore, if E5's object is an artifact, then E7's object is an artifact. Dickie cannot say that because the objects in the new examples have not been altered to serve a purpose they are not artifacts. For, accordingto analysis A, having been altered to serve a purpose is a nonnecessary, sufficientconditionfor being an artifact. If Dickie is to rejectthe claim thatthe objectsin the new examples are artifacts, he must argue that they have not been, or are not being, used to serve a purpose. Recall the following:
it is not just the notion of lifting and affixing or the like which makes somethingan artifact, it is lifting and affixing or the like plus somethingelse. (p. 44) the artifactis the driftwoodmanipulated.(p. 45) The objects are complex because their original (simple) objects haveundergone a changeat the handsof an agent. (p. 45)

On the basis of this passageand Dickie's examples, we may concludethatthe following is Dickie's analysis of artifactuality:

A: x is an artifactif andonly if eitherx has been (or is being) used to serve a purposeor x has been alteredwith the intentionthatit mightbe used to serve a purpose. Analysis A will now be tested against a series of new examples. The artist of each new example does what he does so that the artist and other membersof the artworldmight considerthe characteristics of the driftwood involved as they would the characteristics of a sculpture.Thatis, the artistof each new example does whathe does for roughlythe same reasonsas the person in Dickie's E5. Here are the new examples. NE1: An artist builds his home (or gallery of art) so as to incorporate as one of its walls a cliff side containing a ledge upon which rests a piece of driftwood(droppedby an ambitious gull). NE2: An artist constructsa large frame arounda piece of driftwoodlocatedas in NE 1. NE3: An artist describes the rock formations

In E3, E4 and E5, Dickie's examples of driftwood become artifacts without being altered, rather the objects were just touched and moved. According to Dickie, in E7, where despite the artist's intentionto make art out of driftwood no artifactwas produced, the driftwood was neither touched nor moved, nor lifted. All of this suggests that Dickie's analysis of artifactualityis infected by a principle entailing that an object is not used to serve a purpose unless and until it has been touched, or touchedand moved. Such a principleis incorrect.Unmoved, untouched objects can and sometimes are used to serve a purpose. It is possible to use an object to serve a purpose withoutchanging its internalstate, changing its spatial location, or touching it. This should be apparent from the new examples;however,if it is not, it is easy

Discussion to conceive of examples outside the realm of art whereunmoved,untouchedobjectsareused to servea purpose. Here are three such examples. NE8: A says to B, "Note that piece of driftwood. If, when you returnlatertodayit is gone, I've gone to town, and if not, then I've gone sailing." When B returnsto find the driftwood wherehe andA last saw it, he will have been informedthatA has gone sailing. NE9: A uses the cliff in NE1 as a markerso that she knows whatpartof the beachto returnto when her sailing is over. NE10: B uses a large maple tree nearthe beach as shade so that he can wait for A without getting even more sunburnedthan he alreadyis. In each of NE8, NE9 and NE10 an untouched, unmovedobject is used to serve a purpose. Of course, since I contend that the objects in NE1 throughNE7 and the object in E7 are being used to serve a purpose, I should be ready to specify that purpose. Dickie has made this an easy task; for, where P is the purposefor which the object in E5 was used, P will do as the purposefor which the objectsin the new examples and the object in E7 were used. Assuming, of course, thatthe object in E5 was used to serve a purpose. Finally, since I hold thatthe objects in E7 and NE1 as throughNE7 arejust as qualified for artifactuality the object in E5, Dickie mightdemandthatI say what "complex object" they became as a result of the artists' behavior. Anyone of the following three "complexobject"types will do: 1. Workof art. 2. Objectregarded(or used) as a workof art. 3. Objectused to distractor worry philosophersof art. It seems likely that if the object in E5 is now a "complex object," then it too is a "complex object" of one of the above "complexobject" types. One mightobject that a crucialelementof Dickie's analysis of artifactualityis absent from A, that it is not simply in virtue of being used but in virtue of fies as an artifactand complex object. This objection seems wide of the mark; for Dickie has not told us what this special way of using might be, and careful
being used in some special way that an object quali-

177 reflectionon E5, E7, and NE1 throughNE7 suggests that any attempt to do so would not save Dickie's analysis. Even if there is a special way of using, the object in E5 is not used in this special way until it is resting on the wall. It is not at all unreasonableto claim that the objects in E7 and NE1 through NE7 may be used in exactly the same special way even thoughthey are not transported.Moving and hanging on a wall are not necessary to using in whatever special way Dickie might have in mind. Moving and hanging are merely ways of making such use more convenientandpractical. I have not arguedthatthe object in E7 or any of the objects in NE1 through NE7 are artifacts, but only thatthey havejust as much a claim to artifactualityas the object in E5. Unless I am mistaken, Dickie's views about artifactuality are problematic and we shouldrefrainfrom acceptingAC.4
THOMAS C. RYCKMAN

LawrenceUniversity
1. George Dickie, The Art Circle (New York: Haven, 1984). All quotationsare from this work. 2. George Dickie, Artand the Aesthetic(Cornell University Press, 1974). 3. E7 is my own summaryof an examplethatDickie cites throughoutthe chapterwhere he gives El through E6. El throughE6 are presentedon pages 44 through46. 4. I wish to thankan anonymousJAAC referee for helpful commentson an earlierdraft.

Reply to Ryckman
1. I did not give an analysis of artifactuality. 2. I did not speak in a general way of "used to serve a purpose" or "the intention that it might be used to serve a purpose." I spoke in a specific way of Dali's rocks: "The rocks are not altered in any way by the 'pointing and calling.' Nor are the rocks used in any way similar to the way in which driftwood may be used to dig a hole in the sand or the like or the way in which Duchampused the famous urinal."
GEORGE DICKIE

University of Illinois, Chicago

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