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Distribution o f TV rights reven ue in E nglish f ootball: Eq uitability for all? Abstract


In this study, I investigate the potential financial effects on English football following the Premier Leagues broadcasting rights sale for the three seasons from 2013/14 to 2015/16. The sale of domestic broadcasting rights has alone topped over 3bn resulting in an exponential increase in income for each club. I am interested to discover how this income is distributed around a) the Premier League itself, b) the Football League, comprising of the Championship and Leagues 1 and 2 and c) to grass roots football and good causes in England in short, how equitable is the distribution of the Premier Leagues TV revenue and revenue as a whole? I compare these figures to the data available from the other four major European football leagues and find that, through use of a simple ratio, the Premier League is the most equitable in terms of distributing revenue around the league itself. However, looking closer at the figure, I find that some of the lower ranked Premier League teams rely almost entirely on income from broadcasting and loss of this through relegation or other means could be catastrophic for the future of the clubs.

Introduction
The early history of televised football In September 1937, a 15 minute broadcast of a specially-arranged friendly between Arsenals first and reserve teams was selected by the BBC as a technical exhibition, showcasing their abilities to broadcast live sport. It wasnt until April 1938 that an entire match would be broadcast with the Scotlands victory at Wembley in the British Home Championship televised this was followed by the first televised FA Cup final - between Preston North End and Huddersfield Town, some three weeks later. The outbreak of World War 2 in 1939 resulted in the indefinite suspension of top level football including the Football League and the FA Cup and the creation of the Wartime League as well as the suspension of all TV broadcasts. Football on television resumed with the 1947 FA Cup Final.

HUBS Coursework Submission

1950s-Early 1980s It was not until the 1950s that sufficient households owned sets for television to play a significant part in national culture. In 1950, there were 340,000 license holders, yet by the end of the decade this figure had grown exponentially to 10.5million license holders and only the majority of the country being covered, partly a response to the televising of the Queens Coronation in 1953. The formation of the Independent Television Network in 1955, in response to the 1947 Broadcasting Act, heralded the first competition for the monopolistic BBC. In 1952, the Government ruled that sports could be covered by TV if the broadcaster agreed to pay compensation for loss of revenue to the corresponding sport. (Exall, 2007) Highlights of league matches were broadcast intermittently through the Soccer Special programme from 1955 onwards up until the BBC launched the perennial, cultural institution that is Match of the Day in 1964. The launch of Match of the Day was followed by ITVs own regional highlights programmes in the late 1960s. From then until the late 1970s, as buyers of broadcasting rights the BBC appeared to have operated an informal cartel. (Dobson, 2011: 171) The duopsony on television broadcasting limited the fees paid to football by the television companies. All 92 Football League clubs received an equal share of the 120,000 paid during the 1968 season, just 1,300 per club. The total payment had increased to 5,800 per club, an aggregate of roughly 530,000 by the 1979 season. (Goldberg, 1991) In 1978, London Weekend Television independently attempted to negotiate exclusive rights to distribute televised football to the rest of the ITV network. The Office of Fair trading put a stop to the deal however, and in a renegotiated contract, the amount received by each club rose to 23,900. The first live league match did not air until 1983 and regular live coverage did not begin until the following season, with ten matches per season shared between BBC and ITV at a cost of 2.6million. Footballs administrators were initially not interested in TV coverage and had been fearful of the effect on match day attendances ever since the 1930s when the Football League imposed a ban on broadcasting. However, in 1985, due to a stall in contract negotiations, live coverage was temporarily suspended. A contract was eventually settled at the start of 1986, reinstating live coverage for the remainder of the season and for the following two seasons at an annual amount of 3.1million for fourteen matches. The 1986 contract was also the first to breach the principle of equal distribution of revenues between all ninety-two Football League clubs (Dobson, 2001: 81). Instead, Division 1 clubs received 50 percent, Division 2 clubs 25 percent and 12.5 percent to Division 3 and 4 clubs. Despite European success throughout the 1970s, the late 80s was a low point for English football. English teams had been banned from European competition in the mid-1980s due to the Heysel disaster and, domestically, levels of hooliganism and violence were increasing. Furthermore, stadiums and facilities were deemed to be in poor conditions, ultimately culminating in the Hillsborough tragedy in 1989. The release of the Taylor Report on the Hillsborough disaster recommended that all top-tier stadiums (at the time Divisions 1 and 2) be converted to all-seater models. HUBS Coursework Submission 3

Emergence of BSkyB as a football powerhouse Under the load of huge financial losses, struggling satellite broadcasters BSB and Sky merged in 1990, although Brown (2009) states that the merger was effectively a takeover by Murdoch's News Corp. The implications of the breakup of the BBC-ITV duopsony were apparent early on, even as ITV secured 18 matches per season over the next four seasons. The new contract came at a price though, as the cost to ITV surged to 44m. (Dobson, 2001: 81) Subsequently, rumblings of discontent from the larger clubs regarding the distribution of television income it was still being distributed around all four divisions at this point - and threats from them to withdraw from the Football League secured a contract where roughly 75% of the ITV fee went to Division 1, with more than 40% shared between the top five clubs. The Football Association announced in their Blueprint for the Future of Football their intentions to form a breakaway league from the Football League, with all revenue from television broadcasting only to be distributed between the clubs in the breakaway league. This came about after pressure from Greg Dyke, at the time head of LWT, and the top 5 clubs. Eventually all twenty two Division 1 clubs committed to resign en masse from the Football League to form the autonomous Premier League. Dyke and ITV were confident that football would remain on their channels, also potentially ending the presence of Sky in the UK. However, in an Alan Sugar-influenced dramatic twist, Sky blew ITVs deal out of the water. (Conn, 2001: 23) The deal, valued at 304m over five years, was over five times larger per season (60.6m compared to 11m) than the deal negotiated for the 1988-1991 seasons. Since then, BSkyB has succeeded along with other satellite broadcasters that have come and gone such as ITV Digital, Setanta and ESPN in every rights auction, with each deal being significantly larger than the last. Televised football today BSkyB continues to maintain a stranglehold on live Premier League coverage, attracting several European Commission antitrust proceedings in the past decade. (European Commission, 2006) The result of which is that no one broadcaster can purchase all packages that are available for purchase. The emergence of BT as a competitor at the 2013/14-2016 rights auction signaled an escalation in the price paid for the seven available packages, culminating in a deal worth 3.018bn. (BBC, 2012; Guardian, 2012) Overseas television rights are expected to surge past 2bn.

Investigation
The ultimate aim of my investigation is to determine how equitable the distribution of income from television revenue is in English football and investigate the potential financial impacts . I will compare the data of the Premier League to that of the other four major European football leagues, the top level leagues from Spain, Germany, Italy and France. These leagues will be referred to by the nation rather than their official title due to varying sponsorship deals and name changed. These five leagues, collectively referred to as the Big 5 have been selected through use of the official UEFA Country Coefficient Rankings.

HUBS Coursework Submission

The UEFA Country Coefficient rankings are based on the results of each associations clubs who are competing in European competition so is therefore a measure of the teams competing from each country as opposed to the strength of the national team. An example of disparity between strength of national team and strength of top level league this would be The Netherlands. The Dutch are frequently ranked amongst the elite of international football, but a relatively weak top league in comparison to other nations means that they rarely appear in the upper reaches of the coefficient. The rankings determine the number of places in allocated to each association in the following seasons Champions League and Europa League competitions. As of April 4th 2013, the country coefficients are as follows: Country 1 Spain 2 England 3 Germany 4 Italy 5 France 6 Portugal 7 Ukraine 8 Russia
Source: UEFA (1)

08/09 13.312 15.000 12.687 11.375 11.000 6.785 16.625 9.750

09/10 17.928 17.928 18.083 15.428 15.000 10.000 5.800 6.166

10/11 18.214 18.357 15.666 11.571 10.750 18.800 10.083 10.916

11/12 20.857 15.250 15.250 11.357 10.500 11.833 7.750 9.750

12/13 17.000 14.571 15.642 14.250 11.583 10.583 9.500 9.416

Total 87.311 81.106 77.328 63.981 58.833 58.001 49.758 45.998

The three countries at the top of the list: Spain, England and Germany, have been in the top 5 ranked nations for each of the five seasons listed. There have been some limited fluctuations in ranking between the other five nations listed, however. Due to successful seasons for Portugal in 2010/11 where three of the four Europa League semi-finalists, and ultimately both finalists were Portuguese; and Ukraine in 2008/09 where Shakhtar Donetsk won the competition, both nations placed in the top 5 during these respective seasons. However, as the coefficient takes into consideration the season at present (at time of writing) and the previous four seasons, we see France positioned in fifth place based upon its current coefficient. Previous literature has also referred to France as a Big 5 nation. (Dobson, 2011: 14; Szymanski, 2010: 21; Pawlowski, 2010: 188) So for the purpose of this investigation, France will be selected. The selection of Frances top league will allow for continuation with previous literature. To calculate equitability, or how fairly revenue is distributed around the Premier League, I will produce a simple ratio using the clubs that received the highest and lowest amounts directly from TV revenue and then the same for each of the other four leagues. For example, if the highest earners generate 2m, and the lowest earners generate 1m directly from television revenue, the ratio will be 2:1. Complete equitability will be a ratio of 1:1 or both of the aforementioned teams (and therefore every other team in the league) will earn 1m. Information regarding how money from television rights is distributed is generally available from press releases of the relevant associations and appropriate authorities of each league. Otherwise, information could be obtained from multiple, reputable sources such as articles to HUBS Coursework Submission 5

ensure accuracy. I will collect data regarding how much each club generated from broadcasting income from, where available, the annual reports and financial accounts of clubs, as well as other reputable sources such as the Deloitte Football Money League. The figures produced, where available or if calculable, will be less revenue from continental competition. This is to ensure comparability between the clubs within their respective leagues, specifically between those that have and those that havent competed in Europe in the 2011/12 season. Furthermore, I am interested to find out whether any of the Premier Leagues income is distributed to the Football League and to the lower echelons of English football. I am already aware of relegated teams receiving parachute payments to cushion the blow of dramatic revenue losses as a result of relegation, however, to how much of a further extent does the Premier League support English football as a whole? There have been many reports since the Premier Leagues inception about the widening gap between the Premier League and the Championship, both financially and competitively. (James, 2006; Miller, 2011; Buraimo, 2006: 34)

Findings
The sale of domestic rights for the 2013-2016 inclusive seasons to BSkyB and new entrant BT has alone topped over 3bn and been well-documented, whilst the burgeoning international appeal of the Premier League will mean the sale of rights to overseas broadcasters is likely to surge past the 2bn in value, (Harris, 2012) resulting in a further exponential income for each club. The distribution of money to Premier League clubs The FA Premier League Founder Members Agreement states that: (e) revenue from domestic television contracts would be shared as follows: 50% would be equally divided amongst the member clubs; 25% would be shared on the basis of the league position of each member club at the end of the season; 25% would be allocated as facility fees to be divided equally between the home and visiting team, the intention that each club would appear in at least one televised match each season; (f) revenues from sponsorship and overseas television contracts would be shared equally amongst the clubs. Revenue 2011/12 A breakdown of the individual payments made to every team from the 2011/12 Premier League season is available in the End of Season Review 2011/12. Merit payments are an extra 755,062 for every position upwards, i.e. Wolves earned 755,062 for finishing 20th, and Manchester City earned 15,101,240 for finishing 1st. Each team is guaranteed at least 10 facility payments. For the 2011/2012 season, teams placed in final league position order:
Live Manchester City 25 Equal share 13,788,093 Facility 12,948,312 Merit 15,101,240 Overseas 18,764,644 Total 60,602,289

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Manchester United Arsenal Tottenham Hotspur Newcastle United Chelsea Everton Liverpool Fulham West Brom Swansea City Norwich City Sunderland Stoke City Wigan Athletic Aston Villa QPR Bolton Wanderers Blackburn Rovers Wolves Totals

26 19 23 18 20 10 23 10 10 10 11 10 10 10 10 14 10 11 10 290

13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 13,788,093 275,761,860

13,426,422 10,079,652 11,992,092 9,601,542 10,557,762 5,776,662 11,992,092 5,776,662 5,776,662 5,776,662 6,254,772 5,776,662 5,776,662 5,776,662 5,776,662 7,689,102 5,776,662 6,254,772 5,776,662 158,563,140

14,346,178 13,591,116 12,836,054 12,080,992 11,325,930 10,570,868 9,815,806 9,060,744 8,305,682 7,550,620 6,795,558 6,040,496 5,285,434 4,530,372 3,775,310 3,020,248 2,265,186 1,510,124 755,062 158,563,020

18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 18,764,644 375,292,880

60,325,337 56,223,505 57,380,883 54,235,271 54,436,429 48,900,267 54,360,635 47,390,143 46,635,081 45,880,019 45,603,067 44,369,895 43,614,833 42,859,771 42,104,709 43,262,087 40,317,633 40,594,585 39,084,161 968,180,900

Championship teams receiving parachute payments: Birmingham City, Blackpool and West Ham: 15,475,000; Burnley, Hull City and Portsmouth: 12,219,732; Middlesbrough: 4,081,548; Total: 87,165,759 Source: PremierLeague (2)

From this table, we can see that the team who earned the highest and lowest revenues are coincidentally those that appear at the top and bottom of the league: Manchester City and Wolverhampton Wanderers, respectively. Total Our Equitableness ratio is therefore 1.55:1. Potential Revenue 2013/14-2016 As previously mentioned, the latest domestic television rights deal agreed by the Premier League is worth 3.018bn. This figure is applicable to the 154 games purchased by Sky and BT. Further to this, the growing global attraction of the Premier League means that there is likely to be a further substantial increase in excess of 2bn. Until all overseas deals are finalised and reported, we cannot be certain of the total figures so growth estimations are the most appropriate manner of investigating the potential impact.

HUBS Coursework Submission

Club Manchester City Manchester United Arsenal Tottenham Newcastle United Chelsea Everton Liverpool Fulham West Brom Swansea City Norwich City Sunderland Stoke City Wigan Athletic Aston Villa QPR Bolton Wanderers Blackburn Rovers Wolves

Equal 70% 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758 23,439,758

Facility 70% 22,012,130 22,824,917 17,135,408 20,386,556 16,322,621 17,948,195 9,820,325 20,386,556 9,820,325 9,820,325 9,820,325 10,633,112 9,820,325 9,820,325 9,820,325 9,820,325 13,071,473 9,820,325 10,633,112 9,820,325

Merit 70% 25,672,108 24,388,503 23,104,897 21,821,292 20,537,686 19,254,081 17,970,476 16,686,870 15,403,265 14,119,659 12,836,054 11,552,449 10,269,013 8,985,238 7,701,632 6,418,027 5,134,422 3,850,816 2,582,511 1,283,605

Overseas Total Total if Total if Total if 0% (If O/S is Flat) (O/S up 30%) (O/S up 50%) (O/S up 70%) 18,764,644 89,888,641 95,518,034 99,270,963 103,023,891 18,764,644 89,417,822 95,047,215 98,800,144 102,553,073 18,764,644 82,444,708 88,074,101 91,827,030 95,579,959 18,764,644 84,412,250 90,041,644 93,794,572 97,547,501 18,764,644 79,064,710 84,694,103 88,447,032 92,199,961 18,764,644 79,406,679 85,036,072 88,789,001 92,541,929 18,764,644 69,995,203 75,624,596 79,377,525 83,130,454 18,764,644 79,277,829 84,907,222 88,660,151 92,413,080 18,764,644 67,427,992 73,057,386 76,810,314 80,563,243 18,764,644 66,144,387 71,773,780 75,526,709 79,279,638 18,764,644 64,860,782 70,490,175 74,243,104 77,996,032 18,764,644 64,389,963 70,019,356 73,772,285 77,525,214 18,764,644 62,293,741 67,923,134 71,676,063 75,428,992 18,764,644 61,009,965 66,639,359 70,392,287 74,145,216 18,764,644 59,726,360 65,355,753 69,108,682 72,861,611 18,764,644 58,442,755 64,072,148 67,825,077 71,578,005 18,764,644 60,410,297 66,039,690 69,792,619 73,545,548 18,764,644 55,875,544 61,504,937 65,257,866 69,010,795 18,764,644 55,420,025 61,049,419 64,802,347 68,555,276 18,764,644 53,308,333 58,937,726 62,690,655 66,443,584

In the table above I propose four different scenarios with regards to growth of revenue from overseas broadcasting: Flat or zero growth, 30% growth, 50% growth and 70% growth the latter being the level that domestic revenue has increased by. From the table above, we see that even a 50%, let alone 70%, growth in revenue from overseas broadcasting would mean that the bottom side, Wolves, would receive more revenue from broadcasting than the champions of the 2011/12 season (62.7m - 60.6m) It must be further noted that growth of zero, 30 or 50 per cent of revenue from overseas broadcasting will result in a small increase in our equitability ratio to 1.68, 1.62 and 1.58 respectively.

HUBS Coursework Submission

In comparison to Europes four other major leagues Germany Licensed leagues, Bundesliga 1 & 2 run by DFL. 79:21 split. Germanys top division, the Bundesliga, operates a different organizational structure to the other four major European leagues. Two eighteen-team divisions are governed by three associations in a licensing system. Clubs are required to submit economic data seasonally for scrutiny by the authorities, demonstrating liquidity, in order to be licensed to play. (Muller, 2011) The Bundesligas television broadcasting revenues are considerably more modest, in fact the weakest, of the five major European leagues, with current broadcasting revenues of 326m per season (Fernsehgelder.de, 2012), almost a third of the Premier Leagues annual media revenue. This is partly due to the collapse of the Kirch empire, and also possibly due to a highly competitive free-to-air market with 12 channels. Yet in terms of revenues excluding transfers, the Bundesliga ranks second only behind the Premier League (Bundesliga, 2013), which of course contains two more teams. Additionally, according to the Bundesliga (2013), 14 of the 18 teams achieved a positive result [were profitable]. Club Bayern Munich FC Augsburg
Source: Fernsehgelder.de (2012)

Domestic TV payment (in Euros) 24,156,000 12,078,000

(in GBP) 20,500,000 (@0.85) aprox 10,250,000 (@0.85) aprox

The distribution of domestic television money is formalised at a ratio of 2:1. As is the difference in organizational structure, 21% is distributed to Bundesliga 2, with the remaining percentage being given to the top division. (Bundesliga, 2009) However, the German system of distribution is different to the rest of the Big 5. A weighted points system is applied based upon each sides performance in the present and previous three seasons. The collapse of the Kirch media empire in 2002 set German football back (Frick, 2006: 63) including the insolvency of 32 lower league clubs in divisions equivalent to the Football League and Conference in the four years from 2008 to 2012 and the near misses of Borussia Dortmund and 1860 Munich, both effectively saved by loans from Bayern Munich. (Samuel, 2012) Similar effects on the Football League can be seen due to the collapse of the ITVDigital/OnDigital package in 2002.

HUBS Coursework Submission

Source: Deloitte (2013)

Since then TV broadcasting deals have remained around the same level up until the most recent rights sale which has generated 6 In response to this, German clubs were forced to alter their business strategies. The illustration above highlights the differing business models between the German and other Big 5 nations clubs. Over half of each of Bayern Munich, Borussia Dortmund and Schalkes revenues can be attributed to the commercial areas of business. These proportions would be higher as the illustration above also includes European competition television contribution. Bayern Munichs run to the Champions League final in 2011/12 contributed over 60m of its 81m total from broadcasting. The news is the same for each of the other clubs including Hamburg who despite having a miserable Bundesliga season, still managed to make it into Deloittes Football Money League for 2013, generating 18.6m from broadcasting. The Bundesligas revenue mix is clearly more balanced than any other major nation, as well as there being a lower level of dependency on television income. (Bundesliga, 2013: 7) As with all major leagues, the majority of revenue is concentrated at the biggest clubs, particularly Bayern Munich who have been profitable for 20 consecutive years at time of writing. So whilst German football has lagged behind in terms of television income, it has generally managed to adapt. The cause, or perhaps effect of this, has been a fan-focused league with, on average, the cheapest ticket prices (Guardian, 2013) and highest average attendances in Europe. France From an aggregate league revenue of 518m (SwissRamble (1)), the income is distributed as follows: - 49.3% of aggregate amount shared equally (approx. 12.7m) fixed equaly - 24.6% of the aggregate amount depending on the season ranking - proportional - 4.9% of the aggregate amount ranking based on the last five seasons proportional - 21.2% of the aggregate amount for the number of times club has been broadcast over past 5 seasons.
Source: EPFL (2010)

Club Lyon Dijon FCO


Source: SwissRamble (1)

Domestic TV payment () 43,900,000 13,800,000

() 37,300,000 (@0.85) aprox 11,720,000 (@0.85) aprox

A ratio of 3.18:1 separates Lyon, who finishing second in 2011/12 have not won a title since 2008, yet won seven straight titles from the turn of the century; and newly promoted Dijon, who were immediately relegated back to Ligue 2.

HUBS Coursework Submission

10

The curious cases of Spain and Italy Spain Unlike the other nations from the Big 5, Spain does not sell its television broadcasting rights collectively. In other words, the league does not have central authority over the sale and distribution of media revenue streams. The onus is on each club to negotiate its individual broadcasting revenue to one of the two main TV platforms, Mediapro and PrisaTV. The undisputed top two clubs in Spain, Real Madrid and Barcelona, both signed huge individual rights deals with Mediapro, each 7 years in length and worth an estimated 1.1bn. (SportBusiness, 2006) Official figures are hard to come by, but estimations range from 150m (BBC, 2010) to 160m (SportsProMedia, 2011) per year for each club, equating to roughly half of the total television income from the league. (Independent, 2011) Club Real Madrid Real Sociedad Domestic TV payment () (Estimated) 160,800,000 13,000,000 Domestic TV payment () 136,000,000 11,050,000

Sources: UEFA (2), Swiss Ramble (2), Deloitte (2013)

A ratio of 12.3:1 is by far the largest ratio between two clubs in the Big 5. The disparity between Barcelona, Real Madrid and the rest of the league has caused tensions amongst clubs and owners, with threats to strike from the smaller clubs affecting the start of the 2012/13 La Liga season. Real Madrids contract is due for renewal but there is likely to be sufficient pressure from other parties for an overhaul of the revenue system in order to narrow the gap to Barcelona and Real Madrid. The vast amounts of total debt currently in La Liga (estimated to be 3.5bn) could be catastrophic for some clubs in the near future, with Spanish football economist Jose Maria Gay de Liebana stating that La Liga could kill itself within 5 years. Italy The breakdown of television revenue in Italy is very rarely published, unlike the Premier League where it is freely available. Italy had, like Spain, previously sold television rights individually, on a club-by-club basis. However, for the 2010/11 and 2011/12 seasons, the domestic rights were sold to Sky Italia for a total of 1.149bn, (Reuters, 2010) approximately 575m euros per season. They are distributed as follows: - 40% in equal parts among all Serie A TIM clubs; - 25% according to the number of fans in each club and 5% according to the population of every team city - 30% based on sporting results following these criteria: - i) 5% according to results of current season - ii) 15% according to results of the previous 5 seasons - iii) 10% according to the historical results since season 46/47
Source: EPFL (2010)

HUBS Coursework Submission

11

Club AC Milan Cesena A ratio of 4.11:1.

Domestic TV payment () 86,400,000 21,000,000

() 73,420,000 (@0.85) apprx 17,845,000 (@0.85) apprx

The distribution of money to the Football League and grass roots The Premier League distributed 189.4m outside of the league in 2011/12, accounting for roughly 15% of its turnover. (Premier League (2)) However, half (90.9m) of this was in the form of parachute payments, and only 49m in solidarity payments. Parachute payments are payments offered to teams relegated from the Premier League to the Championship. The payments are designed to help teams soften the blow of losing out on the Premier Leagues commercial and television windfall. Payments of 48m are made over 4 years, equating to an average of 12m per year, although in reality they are staggered. Solidarity payments are payments made to the remainder of the Football League directly from the Premier League, Championship clubs receive 2.3m. The Parachute Payment system has come under criticism from some circles, as in theory it imbalances the Championship to those teams who have already been promoted and then relegated. However, we have seen many former Premier League teams slip further and further away from the Premiership with sides such as Coventry, Portsmouth and Bradford who have failed to adapt.

Conclusions
Nation England (,000) Highest Lowest Ratio 60,600 (Man C) 39,080 (Wolves) 1.55:1 Germany (,000) 20,500 (Bayern) 10,250 (Agsbrg) 2:1 France (,000) 37,300 (Lyon) 11,720 (Dijon) 3.18:1 Italy (,000) 73,420 (AC M) 17,845 (Cesena) 4.11:1 Spain (,000) 136,000 (Real M) 11,050 (Real S) 12.3:1

From the table above, we can see that in a simple ratio format, the Premier League seems to be the most fair and equitable league of the Big 5, with a ratio of 1.55:1. Whilst this may be equitable in terms of television distribution currently, the vast increase in revenue from the most recent sale of television broadcasting rights means that clubs are likely to become more and more reliant on television money. This is a problem also highlighted in France, Italy and Spain. Overdependence on television income is a high-risk business strategy, as seen previously with Kirch Media and OnDigital collapsing and leaving the respective leagues that they had signed deals with in trouble. German football seems to have learned its lessons and is committed to a commercial-based business model with over fifty per cent of revenue from the three clubs aforementioned coming from this area, and with a strict licensing system, threatened clubs can generally be dealt with earlier on. After all, there will always be fans to go to matches, even if attendances do fall dramatically due to relegation or other events. The cutting off of one single revenue stream for some clubs would be catastrophic. HUBS Coursework Submission

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Spanish football at the lower end seems in dire straits, and unless there are dramatic changes to the distribution of revenue perhaps through a return to collective bargaining as has occurred in Italy it is likely that smaller clubs will be struggle. What we do see is, from the estimation of future Premier League TV income, is an increase in disparity. Effectively therefore, I can say that the rich clubs are likely to get richer, and the smaller clubs likely to be less competitive. In my initial plan, I intended to canvas opinion from fans of domestic English football with regards to whether they thought that the distribution of income to in English football was fair. Eventually I thought against this as the results would have been perhaps self-explanatory, i.e. those of fans from the Football League (Championship, League 1 and 2) would prefer more money to be given to the Football League, and those of fans from the Premier League believe that they should not. I believe that this would not have contributed greatly to my report so elected not to continue with it. Additionally, I do believe that the accuracy of some data may not be correct. Having to collect data from multiple sources if theyre not available may mean there are some tolerances in the data, particularly with regards to the Italian and Spanish leagues, where data is not as freely available as that from England and Germany.

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Bibliography, References & Further Reading


BBC (2010): Why TV is the key to Real success, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8545202.stm [accessed online 4/3/2013] BBC (2012): Premier League rights sold to BT and Sky for 3bn, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18430036 [accessed online 5/12/2013] Brown, M. (2009): Sky TVs launch: A wing and a prayer, The Guardin, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/organgrinder/2009/feb/04/sky-tv-early-years [accessed online 5/3/2013] Bundesliga (2009) (in German): Ligavorstand beschliet Verteilung der Medien-Einnahmen, http://www.bundesliga.de/de/liga/news/2008/index.php?f=0000118197.php [accessed online 1/4/2013] Bundesliga (2013) Report 2013: The economic state of German professional football [accessed online 1/4/2013] Buraimo, B., Simmons, R. and Szymanski, S. (2006) English football, Journal of Sports Economics, 7(1), http://jse.sagepub.com [accessed online: 2/2/2013] Conn, D. (2001), The football business, Mainstream Publishing Projects, Edinburgh Court judgement: http://web.archive.org/web/20070927222536/http://www.hmcourtsservice.gov.uk/judgmentsfiles/j9/pljmtint.htm Deloitte (2013), Deloitte Football Money League 2013 Dobson, S., Goddard, J. (2001) The Economics of Football, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Dobson, S., Goddard, J. (2011) The Economics of Football (2nd ed), Cambridge University Press, New York EPFL (2010), Financial solidarity at leagues and European level, http://www.epfleuropeanleagues.com/files/EPFL_Financial_Solidarity_at_Leagues_and_European_Level.pdf [accessed online 7/3/2013] European Commission (2006), Commitments of the FAPL, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38173/38173_132_7.pdf [accessed online 6/3/2013] Exall, K.P.C, (2007) Who killed English football?: An analysis of the state of English football, Authorhouse, Milton Keynes Frick, B. and Prinz, J. (2006) Crisis? What crisis?: Football in Germany, Journal of Sports Economics, 7(1) Gay de Liebana, J. M. in report by Dermot Corrigan, ESPN Soccernet, http://espnfc.com/news/story/_/id/1166215/spanish-football-could-kill-itself-in-fiveyears?cc=5739#

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Goldberg, A. and Wragg, S., (1991) Its Not a Knockout: English football and globalisation, In: Williams, J. and Wragg, S. (eds), British Football and Social Change, Leicester University Press, Leicester Guardian (2012): Premier League sells domestic TV rights to Sky and BT for 3.018bn, Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2012/jun/13/premier-league-tv-sky-bt [accessed online 5/12/2013] Guardian (2013): How do ticket prices for the Premier League compare with Europe?, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2013/jan/17/football-ticket-pricespremier-league-europe Harris, N (2012) 5.5bn: The staggering sum TV companies around the world will pay to screen the Premier League, The Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article2237955/Nick-Harris--5-5bn-TV-pays-screen-Premier-League.html [accessed online 3/2/2013] Independent (2011): Barcelona against sharing TV revenue, http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/european/barcelona-against-sharing-tvrevenue-2373927.html [accessed online 4/3/2013] James, S. (2006) Why clubs may risk millions for riches at the end of the rainbow, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2006/aug/05/championship200607 [accessed online 3/2/2013] Miller, A. (2011), Exclusive: Official figures show top-flight wages are now FIVE times more than in Championship, Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article2055140/Premier-League-wages-FIVE-times-Championship.html [accessed online 3/2/2013] Muller, C. (2011) Football governance: Written submission by Christian Muller to Parliamentary committee looking into football governance, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmcumeds/writev/792/fg84. htm Pawlowski, T., Breuer, C. and Hovemann, A., (2010) Top Clubs Performance and the Competitive Situation in European Domestic Football Competitions, Journal of Sports Economics, 11(2), http://jse.sagepub.com [accessed online: 2/2/2013] Premier League (1), How does the Premier League sell its TV rights? http://www.premierleague.com/en-gb/fans/faqs/how-does-the-premier-league-sell-its-tvrights.html [accessed online 4/3/2013] Premier League (2), Season Review 2011/12 http://addison.ceros.com/premier-league/seasonreview-2011-12/page/1 [accessed online 4/3/2013] Reuters (2010): Soccer-Conto TV boss denies he could kill Italian game, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/05/17/soccer-italy-contotv-idUKLDE64G11S20100517 Samuel, M. (2012): German football efficiency? Its not all it seems Bayern exposed, Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/article-2143867/German-football-efficiency-TheBundesliga-Martin-Samuel.html

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SportBusiness (2006): Real Madrid sign massive TV rights deal, http://www.sportbusiness.com/news/160807/real-madrid-sign-massive-tv-rights-deal SportsProMedia (2011): Mediapro extends major Barcelona deal, http://www.sportspromedia.com/news/mediapro_extends_major_barcelona_deal/ Swiss Ramble (1): Paris Saint-Germain Dream Into Action, http://swissramble.blogspot.co.uk/2012/07/paris-saint-germain-dream-into-action.html Swiss Ramble (2): Real Madrid and Barcelona Leaders of the Pack http://swissramble.blogspot.co.uk/2012/10/real-madrid-and-barcelona-leaders-of.html Szymanski, S., (2010) Football Economics and Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke UEFA (1) Country Coefficient Rankings 2012/2013, http://www.uefa.com/memberassociations/uefarankings/country/index.html [accessed online: 2/2/2013 and again on 4/4/2013] UEFA (2) Clubs get share of Champions League revenue http://www.uefa.com/uefa/management/finance/news/newsid=1676422.html#clubs+share+r evenue

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