PANEL ONE

The Border Security System Prior to September 11

1) Suggested Questions for Panel One

2) Prepared Testimony
• Mary A. Ryan
• Doris Meissner

3) Witness Biographies
• Mary A. Ryan
• Doris Meissner

4) Background Materials
• Ryan MFR
• Meissner MFR
• Summary of the Conspirator Visas: Who, When, and Where
• Joint Inquiry Excerpts on Hijacker Entry
• Hijacker Visa Applications Containing Fraudulent Responses
• Visa Express Cable
• Excerpt from Terrorist Training Manual
• Select Border Security-Related Legal Authorities
 SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR PANEL ONE
The Border Security System Prior to September 11

Designated Commissioner: John Lehman

For Ambassador Ryan and Ms. Meissner:

1) Border management role in countering terrorism

a. How did each of you in your capacities view the role of the consular
officer and the INS border inspector or Border Patrol in countering
terrorism?
b. What happened to the Red Book outlined in the video we just saw? Why
was production stopped and never taken up again after the 1993 WTC
bombing?
c. How well trained and how well informed were border officers for tasks
involving national security in 2000 and 2001?

2) Government organization on border management. Both of you were

responsible for key aspects of border management, Ambassador Ryan for the
consular offices overseas, and Ms. Meissner for admission through ports of entry
and preventing illegal entry along our borders, as well as both enforcing and
providing benefits under our immigration laws.

a. To what degree did the White House insist upon cohesive strategies in
border management between the State Department and the INS?
b. Should the border management functions be elevated to a cabinet level
position?

3) Border management information interdependency. You have both discussed

your efforts to support each other in the development and sharing of information
relevant to preventing entry by terrorists. Would each of you explain for us today
what type of information your counterpart had that was a priority for your
mission, and the success or failures of your efforts to share this information?
(For example, INS sought and received TIPOFF. DOS sought INS refusals at
ports of entry and benefits adjudication results, but received these types of
information inconsistently.)

For Ms. Meissner:

4) Student tracking. As stated in the staff statement this morning, the INS did not
fund its student tracking pilot with the $800 million technology monies
appropriated by Congress, and ultimately deferred launching of a biometric
student identification card and developing the pilot program nationally.
 a. Why did you not use the significant funding from Congress for technology
improvements to develop and launch the student tracking program?
b. Considering the widespread and known fraud that existed throughout the
student visa process, why was development and testing of the biometric
student identification card deferred from 1998 on? What was your view of
the use of biometrics for foreign students?
c. In your conversation with White House counterterrorism advisor Dick
Clarke about student tracking, what were his interests and how did you
respond?

5) Entry-exit. Prior to September 11, 2001, Congress twice mandated that INS
automate arrival and departure information for all aliens. The first time was in
1996. Congress appropriated about $40 million over three years to get the
project done. It did not get done.

a. Please tell us what action you did take to get the program developed.
b. Why did you decide to only automate entry and not exit? Overstays of
legal entrants were estimated to be in the millions.
c. You told us during the course of Commission staff interviews that you, as
well as key constituencies on the northern and southern borders, opposed
an entry-exit program on the land borders. Why?

6) Intelligence access. You stated during your interviews with Commission staff
that you did not require staff to provide you with regular intelligence briefings,
and therefore had no knowledge of the activities ofal Qaeda during your tenure
as INS Commissioner. You also told us that you did not have regular intelligence
briefings because they weren't of good enough quality to inform your day-to-day
decisions. You stated that the poor quality was due to a number of reasons,
including the INS' limited access to timely intelligence from the intelligence
community.

a. If you had had access to timely intelligence on al Qaeda activities, how

would this information have informed INS strategy on the border (ports of
entry and Border Patrol), in the interior, and in benefits adjudications?

b. Both interior enforcement policy planners and the National Security Unit,
which was created in 1997, prepared and submitted counterterrorism
strategies to their senior managers. However, these senior managers
never responded. Several INS personnel interviewed by the Commission
have stated that, in fact, you were generally anti-enforcement and that
therefore such documents would not have received your attention or
approval. Please respond.

7) Length of permitted stay for B2 tourists. Seventeen of the 19 hijackers were

admitted for six months. This allowed them to enter in the spring of 2001 and
remain legal through the hijackings. One hijacker only requested 20 days, but

Suggested Questions for Panel One

 -was still authorized for a six month stay. Our understanding is that the length of
permitted stay of six months for B2 tourists dated back to the 1980s, before you
became Commissioner.

a. What was the reasoning behind establishing a six month length of stay rule
for a tourist?
b. The Visa Waiver Pilot Program included a review process for countries
that sought to be brought into that program. National security was
considered. Did you or anyone with whom you worked ever raise the
issue of the six month tourist length of stay being too long? Did you or
anyone with whom you worked ever consider a rigorous country-by-
country review process for length of stay, similar to that used for visa
waiver decisions?

8) Use of immigration law to remove terrorists pre-9-11. Much has been made
since September 11 about the use of immigration law in the war on terror.
However, not much has been discussed publicly about the role of the INS in
removing terrorists via the use of immigration law prior to September 11.

a. Would you outline for us how immigration law was used to remove
terrorists prior to September 11, and any special problems posed by
terrorist cases?
b. What is your view of how immigration law was used post-9/11 in the war
on terror?

Suggested Questions for Panel One