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N E X T G E N E R AT I O N C O G N I T I V E C E L L U L A R N E T W O R K S

SIMPLE RULES FOR MOBILE NETWORK OPERATORS STRATEGIC CHOICES IN FUTURE COGNITIVE SPECTRUM SHARING NETWORKS
PETRI AHOKANGAS, OULU BUSINESS SCHOOL MARJA MATINMIKKO, VTT TECHNICAL RESEARCH CENTRE OF FINLAND SEPPO YRJL, NOKIA SIEMENS NETWORKS HANNA OKKONEN, OULU BUSINESS SCHOOL THOMAS CASEY, AALTO UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT
Spectrum sharing is becoming a necessity in future cellular networks due to the increasing traffic demand and challenges of getting exclusive spectrum. This article reviews the spectrum sharing framework that consists of regulatory, technology, and business domains. For future mobile network operators, sharing of spectrum with other operators or with other radiocommunication services especially when using cognitive radio system technologies is a disruptive change. Building on alternative spectrum sharing scenarios, this article discusses a set of Simple Rules for mobile network operators, both dominators and challengers, regarding spectrum sharing in future cognitive cellular networks. The Simple Rules provide a dynamic framework for both dominating and challenger mobile network operators for developing their sharing-based business models.

INTRODUCTION
In the timeframe of the next five years, future cellular networks will face a severe shortage of spectrum, especially in dense hotspot deployments in urban environments. Availability of spectrum is a key factor for the successful deployment of mobile cellular networks. Global plans for the provisioning of mobile broadband services have and will lead to increasing data traffic [1], resulting in increasing spectrum demand for next generation cellular networks. Traditional auctioning of spectrum bands has increased the prices paid for spectrum, leading to a situation where the scarce resource has become controlled by the dominating mobile network operators (MNOs) while leaving other challenger operators to struggle with little or no spectrum. The dominating operators are assumed to own exclusive spectrum licenses for large portions of the spectrum for mobile sys-

tems, while challenger operators have only restricted amounts of exclusive spectrum licenses or none at all. The limited availability of exclusive spectrum through auctions has been detrimental for competition, but even the dominating operators face the risk of running out of spectrum in the future provided that the predicted data rate growth continues as estimated. Making new exclusive spectrum available for cellular networks is challenging due to the lack of unallocated spectrum, and the costly and time consuming refarming process where a spectrum band is cleared from its current use and reallocated to mobile service. It is well known that some spectrum bands are only lightly occupied. The regulators are planning to make those bands accessible for other use while protecting the original usage rights. According to [2], shared use of spectrum refers to situations in which a number of independent users and/or devices are allowed to access the same range of frequencies under certain conditions. Spectrum sharing could allow several systems to operate in the same spectrum band with band-specific conditions, thus improving the overall spectrum occupancy and making new spectrum available for those urgently needing it. The recently developed cognitive radio system (CRS) technology has been identified as a key enabler for spectrum sharing [2]. The CRS technology is a toolbox of techniques to obtain knowledge of spectrum availability, adjust operations accordingly, and learn from the results [3]. Research on CRS technology has developed a wide set of techniques to allow spectrum sharing between different wireless systems in different situations. Currently regulation can be regarded as the key driver for speeding up spectrum sharing (e.g., [2, 4]). On one hand, the key drivers as to why MNOs could become pro-sharing include increased need for new spectrum to provide mobile broadband services, lack of available spectrum, and increased spectrum price, provid-

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ed that the sharing technology in itself is mature enough and harmonization across different countries creates a big enough market size to obtain economies of scale. For MNOs spectrum sharing offers benefits in the form of increased and faster access to spectrum that is typically constrained by the outcomes of the spectrum band auctions. Spectrum sharing could also offer a possibility to dynamically balance the spectrum assets of an MNO according to local and temporary situations. It can be argued that for dominating MNOs spectrum sharing is a disruptive change for example, due to its threat to obtaining exclusive spectrum rights and potential interference from other systems whereas for challenger MNOs sharing may open up new opportunities. Assuming that spectrum sharing has a major impact and role in future next generation cognitive cellular networks, this article investigates: What are the strategic challenges MNOs face regarding CRS in general and spectrum sharing in particular? What kind of factors affect MNOs CRS/spectrum sharing strategy? What kind of strategic choices do MNOs have to make regarding CRS and spectrum sharing? The discussion is organized as follows. First, an overview of the spectrum sharing framework is given covering the regulatory, technical, and business domains. The concluding discussion on MNOs strategic choices is then formulated into the format of Simple Rules for both dominating and challenger MNOs.

Opportunity How-to Business Boundary Priority Timing Exit Harmonization

Innovation Maturity Standardization Technology Accessibility Scale Replacement Reallocation Pragmatism

Availability

Flexibility

Regulation

Figure 1. Spectrum sharing analysis framework. certain frequency bands to create an interference-free environment for the specific service. Some parts of the spectrum have been designated to unlicensed access where several radio systems have used the same spectrum band with low transmission power levels to share the spectrum. Spectrum decisions are in principle national matters, but globally harmonized spectrum bands with primary allocation to mobile service have been vital for the success of cellular networks by allowing global roaming of mobile devices and enabling economies of scale. Moreover, making a sufficient amount of spectrum available in time for the new generations of cellular networks has guaranteed fast deployment for the new generations of networks that have emerged to offer new services with increasing data rate requirements. Cellular networks have traditionally been granted exclusive licenses where the MNOs have governed the spectrum use in their bands, thus enabling the provisioning of guaranteed quality of service (QoS). Unlicensed spectrum access has not attracted the interest of MNOs since it does not guarantee a coordinated interference situation, resulting in non-guaranteed given QoS. In addition, the transmission power limits in the current unlicensed spectrum access support only short-range deployments. Since the availability of exclusive spectrum is severely restricted, recent regulatory developments (e.g., in the United States and Europe) are moving toward spectrum sharing [2, 4]. Along this path, the natural steps include identification of beneficial sharing opportunities (BSOs) and determination of sharing rules. According to [2], BSOs can be identified, in both licensed and license-exempt frequency bands, wherever the combined net socio-economic benefit of multiple applications sharing a band is

OVERVIEW OF THE SPECTRUM SHARING FRAMEWORK


To capture and understand the consequences of future cognitive spectrum sharing networks for MNOs, three domains of change need to be taken into account: regulatory, technology, and business [5]. Figure 1 depicts these three elements of the spectrum sharing framework. From the regulation perspective, we argue that factors related to the rules, conditions and opportunities for making spectrum available for different systems influence the possible business opportunities that can be identified and built around spectrum sharing. From the technology perspective, the adoption of innovation is related to several issues arising from the different phases of the technology life cycle of cellular networks. The business perspective is specifically related to the nature of opportunities, and it is strongly influenced by regulatory and technological developments.

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK


Regulation plays a key role in the spectrum sharing framework by determining the availability of spectrum and its accessibility. In essence, regulation decides who is allowed to use the spectrum bands, and under which conditions and rules. The Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunication Union Radiocommunication Sector are the internationally binding treaty that governs the use of spectrum. Traditionally, regulators have granted exclusive licenses to deploy certain radiocommunication services in

Rapidity

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Spectrum

Unlicensed Sharing Vertical sharing Horizontal sharing

Licensing Licensed

Sharing with higher priority (and equal priority systems) Example: TV white spaces in some countries

Sharing with equal priority systems Example: ISM bands No Sharing Yes

No

Tradeability

Yes

No

Tradeability

Yes

Technology neutrality No Static exclusive spectrum Example: IMT bands in some countries Yes Intraoperator spectrum Example: IMT bands in some countries No Secondary market for single RAT

Technology neutrality Yes Secondary market for multi-RAT Example: Auctioned IMT bands in some countries No Static shared spectrum

Technology neutrality Yes Shared intraoperator spectrum No Secondary market for single RAT

Technology neutrality Yes Secondary market for multi-RAT Example: Potential bands for licensed shared access

Figure 2. Taxonomy of regulatory approaches for spectrum bands used for mobile communications.

greater than the net socio-economic benefit of a single application, taking into account additional costs resulting from shared use. A starting point for the identification of spectrum sharing opportunities could be to assess the current usage of the spectrum bands. Since the cellular networks prefer licensing that can offer QoS guarantees, spectrum sharing with conditions that resemble exclusive licensing are attractive for next generation cellular networks compared to sharing arrangements without a controlled interference environment. To accomplish this, authorized shared access (ASA) was introduced in [6] as a concept to allow a local solution to spectrum sharing between a mobile communication system and a primary system. The ASA concept is an industry-driven approach that allows spectrum sharing with predetermined rules and conditions, and agreed license fees for local and temporary deployment. The ASA licensee can build its cellular network with legal certainty similar to exclusive licensing with most likely lower fees. For creating a successful spectrum sharing framework for cellular networks, there is also a need to develop a functioning spectrum marketplace for exchanging the ASA licenses. Recently, the ASA concept has been generalized from the original idea of sharing between a mobile system and another type of wireless system to also cover other sharing scenarios between different types of systems in the licensed shared access (LSA) concept [2]. As summarized in Fig. 1, the spectrum sharing regulatory framework needs to consider topics related to the availability of spectrum, flexibility in responding to requests of different

radiocommunication services, pragmatism in terms of ensuring the rights of the primary systems and particularly the dominating MNOs, and harmonization of spectrum allocations globally for allowing roaming and large markets. Moreover, rapidity in the response times to changing demand and supply of wireless systems spectrum demand, and reallocation issues related to, say, termination of license agreements are also important factors to be considered. Extending the scenarios from [7], Fig. 2 presents a taxonomy of the currently envisaged spectrum regulatory approaches for cellular networks. The taxonomy covers different licensing approaches and spectrum sharing scenarios while taking into account tradability of the band and technology neutrality. Spectrum can first be divided into unlicensed and licensed approaches based on the ownership of the usage rights of the given spectrum band. Then the band can be shared with other systems, where horizontal sharing corresponds to sharing with equal rights, while vertical sharing refers to systems having unequal status and access rights. The band can be tradable if the MNO can resell the usage rights of the spectrum band for which it has acquired a license. While in the past the reselling of the usage rights of a band was often restricted, currently it is possible in some countries in the new bands for international mobile telecommunication (IMT) systems that are auctioned to MNOs. Technology neutrality refers to the situation where the operator can decide which radio access technology (RAT) it wishes to deploy in the given band. For example, the MNO could deploy a cellular network with, say, Long-Term Evolu-

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tion (LTE) RAT in a band that previously accommodated a Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) network, which allows flexibility for the operator. Cellular networks are typically deployed in licensed bands without sharing and with/without tradability and technology neutrality depending on national decisions. Future regulatory directions are toward spectrum sharing, tradability, and technology neutrality, as shown in [2].

technology becomes widespread and eventually replaced by new technology.

THE BUSINESS FRAMEWORK


Scenarios, value networks, or ecosystems that describe the logic and relationships of the players participating in value creation and capture, and business models have widely been utilized in capturing and describing the content and context of telecommunications businesses as well as anticipating future developments [9]. However, business research focusing on CRS or spectrum sharing is scarce [7, 10]. Within converging mobile ecosystems, several segments have been identified: silicon vendors, device and infrastructure manufacturers, platform providers, application software providers, service and billing providers, system integrators, MNOs, Internet service providers, as well as various content providers [11]. Within the CRS domain, five key ecosystem roles can be identified: those of the regulators, MNOs (dominating and challenger ones), content providers, equipment vendors, and infrastructure vendors [10]. Regarding spectrum sharing, it can be argued that the roles of the regulator and the MNOs are central in the adoption of CRS technologies. Moreover, the role of the MNO has very distinct features depending on whether the MNO has a dominant market position (i.e., dominating operator) or a challenger role, leading to six key ecosystem roles to be considered. Reference [12] has analyzed value network configurations of wireless local area access and identified seven different configurations of value networks: venue-driven, MNO-driven, broadband-access-operator driven, fixed-mobile-operator-driven, access-aggregator-driven, serviceprovider-driven, and device-driven value network. As a summary of their analysis, the authors in [12] conclude that there are two dimensions, industry structure (horizontal and vertical) and access (integrated or fragmented), which can be used to create future scenarios regarding the value network configurations. These value network configurations have several consequences for future cognitive spectrum sharing networks. Four key scenarios were identified for future CRSs by using value creation and capture as key drivers instead of focusing on industry structure and access in [10] and are depicted in Fig. 3. Six different key ecosystem players are considered, as shown in the circles in the figure. The circles depict the interrelations of the different ecosystem players, but in reality all key players are connected. In the Cruella de Vil scenario, the regulator plays the key role and allocates based on preselected criteria the available spectrum mostly to dominating MNOs, and thus does not enforce spectrum sharing. MNOs can act as a smart bitpipe that exploits its vast spectrum resources to offer mobile services and connectivity to its wide customer base. In the Snow White scenario, the role of the regulator remains enabling, and spectrum is allocated to both challenger and dominating MNOs, thus enforcing sharing indirectly. This leaves the operators to compete with more diverse strategies as they have to become an efficient bit-pipe in order to exploit their limited spectrum resources more efficiently in the growing competition.

THE TECHNICAL FRAMEWORK


Cellular network technology has been designed to exploit its allocated spectrum bands efficiently, resulting in high frequency reuse and spectral efficiency due to efficient interference coordination. Cellular technology can offer very high throughput per spectrum bandwidth and very high occupancy of the spectrum bands allocated to it. While the exclusive licensing approach has guaranteed good QoS for the cellular networks, next generation networks could be deployed in the future on shared spectrum bands due to the challenges of getting enough new exclusive spectrum. Recent technology development of cellular networks, such as LTE, already includes features that are paving the way toward spectrum sharing in new settings. These new features go beyond the traditional exclusive licensing where the cellular system only had to consider system-internal interference considerations. For example, carrier aggregation, scalable bandwidth, and self-organizing network (SON) features of the next generation cellular networks are important technical building blocks to facilitate sharing [8]. CRS technology offers the potential to share spectrum in situations which were not considered to be feasible in traditional wireless systems. The CRS is a toolbox of techniques to facilitate spectrum sharing including, e.g., databases, control channels, and spectrum sensing techniques to obtain knowledge of spectrum availability [3]. While the theoretical background for CRS technology is already strong, however, the maturity of CRS technology is still a challenge as the practical real-life deployments of CRS technology today are limited. From the different methods to obtain knowledge of spectrum availability for sharing, the most promising approach for real-life deployments is the database, which can implement rules and conditions that guarantee primary systems free from harmful interference. An example of this is the so-called TV white space spectrum recently treated in regulation and standardization. Spectrum sensing technologies that allow more dynamic and autonomous operations are considered to be deployed later in the future. In the technology domain topics related to innovation, maturity of technology, stage of standardization, accessibility of solutions, scale of use, and speed of replacement of earlier installed technology require consideration, as summarized in Fig. 1. Innovation to provide new technical features into cellular technology is an important starting point, and depending on the technologys maturity, some of the new features are fed into standardization to become part of real-life network deployments. Accessibility to the new technology is needed for MNOs to benefit from the new technology. Global harmonization to create economies of scale can ensure that the

Accessibility to the new technology is needed for MNOs to benefit from the new technology. Global harmonization to create economies of scale can ensure that the technology becomes widespread and eventually replaced by new technology.

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All dominating MNOs investments should be made to strengthen customer lock-in and dominant market position. This could be reached by acquiring, if possible, all available spectrum and by combining existing and new spectrum assets to deliver high enough data rates.

Equipment vendors Content providers Gyro Gearloose Value creation driven Customer attraction and lock-in by Service UE/devices Dominating operators Challenger operators Regulators Dominating operators Infrastructure vendors Content providers

Equipment vendors Infrastructure vendors Snow White Regulators

Challenger operators Ecosystem transformation

Next scenario

Equipment vendors Content providers The Cheshire Cat Dominating operators Challenger operators Regulators Dominating operators Infrastructure vendors Content providers

Equipment vendors

Current scenario Infrastructure vendors

Cruella De Vil Regulators

Challenger operators

Unlicensed Licensed Competition in heterogeneous access service Value capture driven

Figure 3. Scenarios for cognitive radio system utilizing businesses.

In the Cheshire Cat scenario, non-MNO service providers utilizing newly opened unlicensed spectrum opportunities may enter the field currently dominated by MNOs and reshape the dynamics, especially of dominating MNOs business. In this scenario regulators are directly promoting sharing. In the Gyro Gearloose scenario, the MNOs business is affected by new innovative and focused devices that directly connect to specified services. Also, there are cases where device vendors and platform providers are merging to create Gyro Cats, such as Nokia-Microsoft or GoogleMotorola. As in the Cheshire Cat scenario , in this scenario regulators are also promoting spectrum sharing. Since the two previous scenarios include the regulators indirect role in defining and influencing the scope and degree of sharing, leaving the operators with higher degrees of freedom, we have decided to focus on them rather than the two latter scenarios. The two latter scenarios can be considered unfavorable for the MNOs. The choice of business model by MNOs in the context of future cognitive spectrum sharing networks stll remains an open question. Rare attempts have been made to identify the elements of such business models as well as variables affecting business modeling in the MNO context (e.g., [13, 14]), but regarding spectrum sharing, this research remains unsatisfactory. In unpredictable and dynamic environments strategies and business models can be approached from a Simple Rules [15] perspective. Under-

standing the nature of opportunities in future cognitive spectrum sharing networks is crucial for MNOs, as the aforementioned scenarios indicate. In this, the Simple Rules approach to strategy enables the MNOs to plan the strategic logic, steps and advantages for their action.

SIMPLE RULES FOR MOBILE NETWORK OPERATORS


Building on the three domains discussed, regulatory, technology, and business, we propose a Simple Rules framework regarding MNOs cognitive spectrum sharing networks following the generic framework from [15]. The proposed framework consists of six themes: Nature of opportunity rule How-to rules for conducting business Boundary rules for defining the boundaries of the business Priority rules that help to identify and rank the criteria for decision making Timing rules that help in identifying, synchronizing and pacing things Exit rules that help in identifying the basis for exit or selecting things to be stopped or given up Also, regarding the Simple Rules proposed, we assume the transition from the Cruella de Vil scenario to the Snow White scenario to take place as both dominating and challenger MNOs really start to build their spectrum-sharing-based business models.

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Opportunity

How-to Invest to maintain customer lock-in and dominant market position Buy all exclusive spectrum available Combine spectrum assets to deliver higher data rates Become cognitive platform service provider in the future

Boundary

Priority Retain control over spectrum and cognitivity in the network (no sensing) Share from others first (non-MNOs) Acquire challenger MNOs to gain spectrum Appreciate ARPU over efficiency

Timing

Exit

Utilize existing customer base and growing demand Get faster access to new lower-cost spectrum without coverage obligations Utilize local areas with enhanced small cells for QoS and offloading

Leverage installed base, sites and 3GPP evolution Maintain direct contacts to Regulator Turn challengers (operators) virtual

Build in-house intersystem sharing first, then share from others Then consider sharing between MNOs locally

Never give up spectrum Never give up customer data

Table 1. Simple Rules for dominating MNOs.

Opportunity

How-to Think and act locally

Boundary

Priority

Timing

Exit

Utilize new, local, or specialized demand Challenge dominators in local areas with enhanced small cells/rural broadband Leverage internet services and new devices for differentiation

Promote spectrum sharing and national roaming in all their forms Utilize lowest cost available spectrum and infrastructure Complement dominating MNOs service

See regulation as an opportunity Complain over dominators spectrum hoarding Turn service fragmentation a source of competitive advantage

Value of services and QoE Enhance customer turnover Appreciate efficiency and minimize investments

Make business where and when low-cost spectrum is available Share spectrum first from others (e.g., MNOs) Then utilize dominators available infrastructure

Consider becoming a MVNO Consider becoming an dominating MNO through merging with other challenger MNOs

Table 2. Simple Rules for challenger MNOs.

SIMPLE RULES FOR DOMINATING MNOS SPECTRUM SHARING BUSINESSES


For dominating MNOs (Table 1), the opportunity for spectrum-sharing-based businesses can simply be seen to lie in the utilization of their wide existing customer base with growing demand for spectrum. Fast access to new lowcost spectrum, preferably avoiding coverage obligations, enables the utilization of the dominant position in the markets. In some locations, enhanced small cell deployments can be used for providing good QoS and traffic offloading. All dominating MNOs investments should be made to strengthen customer lock-in and dominant market position. This could be reached by acquiring, if possible, all available spectrum, and by combining existing and new spectrum assets to deliver high enough data rates. Also, becoming a cognitive platform provider for other operators could enhance utilization of the dominant market position. To strengthen market boundaries, dominators could leverage their installed base, exiting sites, and Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) evolution in the build-up of spectrum-sharing-based businesses. Dominators could also try to turn challengers into mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs). Direct contact with the regulator is needed to remind the regulator that earlier investments in the networks have long enough payback periods. Regarding decision priorities, for dominating MNOs, retaining control over the spectrum and keeping cognitivity in the network and not in sensing devices is important. Spectrum sharing could start first from spectrum bands other than

the operators, and second from other MNOs through acquisitions. At the early stages of spectrum sharing businesses, dominators could value average revenue per user (ARPU) over operational efficiency to utilize their customer base. Inhouse intersystem sharing (in line with combining spectrum assets) could be implemented first in order to optimize the use of the existing resource base including the different cellular networks and spectrum assets. Local sharing with other MNOs could follow after the potential for internal asset leverage has been reached. Regardless of the business model utilized in spectrum sharing, dominators should never give up spectrum even if not fully utilized and customer data.

SIMPLE RULES FOR CHALLENGER MNOS SPECTRUM SHARING BUSINESSES


For challenger MNOs (Table 2), the opportunities for spectrum-sharing-based businesses are quite different from those for the dominating MNOs. The very existence, let alone the business opportunities of the challengers, lie in maintaining appropriate levels of competition in spectrum utilization. For challengers the opportunity most likely is in the utilization of new, local, and specialized demand. Most likely, challengers can really challenge the dominators only in narrow segments such as rural areas or white spaces, where the dominators are not as likely to react to direct competition. For example, specializing in governmental, municipal, machine-to-machine, or enterprise customers, or differentiation with special mobile devices or Internet/cloud-based services may provide challengers an opportunity.

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Simple rules for strategic choices can help mobile network operators to explore and exploit opportunities, respond to the changing environment, and develop sharing-based business models to get true benefits from the new spectrum access approaches.

Thinking and acting locally, close to the customer, and promoting spectrum sharing and national roaming as well as utilizing lowest-acost spectrum and infrastructure may open up a clear role for challenger operators. Challengers could also take a complementary role to the dominators service, thus retaining a semi-independent position in the markets. The challengers could also adopt a boundary-reinforcing role by seeing the regulation as an opportunity, by monitoring and complaining about dominating MNOs spectrum hoarding where appropriate, and trying to turn service fragmentation into a source of competitive advantage. Regarding priorities in decision making, challenger MNOs most likely must pay attention to customer value and quality of experience (QoE), and they could try to enhance customer turnover. By focusing on operational efficiency and investment minimization, they could try to do business where and when low-cost spectrum is available. Starting by trying to share spectrum from other MNOs and utilizing dominators or other challengers available infrastructure might be a possible mode of operation. As an exit plan, challengers could consider becoming virtual MNOs or dominating MNOs through mergers with other challengers.

[7] M. Barrie, S. Delaere, and P. Ballon Classification of Business Scenarios for Spectrum Sensing, Proc. 21st Intl. Symp. Personal Indoor and Mobile Radio Commun., Instanbul, Turkey, Sept. 2010, pp. 262631. [8] S. Hmlinen, H. Sanneck, and C. Sartori, LTE SelfOrganizing Networks (SON), Wiley, 2012. [9] M. Pagani and C. H. Fine, Value Network Dynamics in 3G-4G Wireless Communications: A Systems Thinking Approach to Strategic Value Assessment, J. Business Research, vol. 61, 2008, pp. 110212. [10] P. Ahokangas et al., 2012. Future Scenarios, Ecosystems and Business Models for Cognitive Radio Systems, VTT Technology 55. [11] R. C. Basole, Visualization of Interfirm Relations in A Converging Mobile Ecosystem, J. Information Technology, 2009, pp. 116. [12] T. Casey, T. Smura, and A. Sorri Value Network Configurations in Wireless Local Area Access, Proc. 9th Conf. Telecommun., Media and Internet Techno-Economics, Ghent, Belgium, June 2010. [13] P. Ballon and S. Delaere, Flexible Spectrum and Future Business Models for the Mobile Industry, Telematics and Informatics, vol. 26, no. 3, 2009, pp. 24958. [14] J. M. Chapin, and W.H. Lehr, Cognitive Radios for Dynamic Spectrum Access The Path to Market Success for Dynamic Spectrum Access Technology, IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 45, no. 5, 2007, pp. 96103. [15] K. M. Eisenhardt and D. N. Sull, Strategy as Simple Rules, Harvard Business Rev., vol. 79, no. 1, 2001, pp. 10716.

BIOGRAPHIES
P ETRI A HOKANGAS (petri.ahokangas@oulu.fi) received his M.Sc. (1992) and D.Sc. (1998) degrees from the University Vaasa, Finland. He is currently a professor and head of the Department of Management and International Business of Oulu Business School at the University of Oulu, Finland. He is also an adjunct professor (2002) of international software entrepreneurship at the University of Oulu. His research interests are in how innovation and technological change affect international business creation, transformation, and strategies in highly technology-intensive or software-intensive business domains. He has about 50 publications in scientific journals, books, conference proceedings, and other reports. He is actively working in several ICT-focused research consortia leading the business-related research streams. MARJA MATINMIKKO (Marja.Matinmikko@vtt.fi) received her M.Sc. degree in industrial engineering and management and D.Sc. degree in telecommunications from the University of Oulu in 2001 and 2012, respectively. She is currently working as senior scientist and project manager in cognitive radio systems (CRS) at VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland in Oulu. She is Chairman of CRS studies at ITU-R WP5A. She is leading a national project consortium on a Cognitive Radio Trial Environment (CORE). Her current research interests include technical, regulatory, and technoeconomic aspects of CRS. SEPPO YRJL (Seppo.Yrjola@nsn.com) is currently a principal innovator at the CTO office of Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN). Prior to joining Innovations in 2007, he headed wireless technology research at NSN. He holds an M.Sc. degree in electrical engineering from the University of Oulu and has done his postgraduate studies in the area of telecommunication and radio technology. His current focus is innovating in the area of future radios with cognitive radio business opportunities and potential disruptions as an important aspect to scout. H ANNA O KKONEN (hanna.okkonen@oulu.fi) received her M.Sc. degree in economics and business administration from Oulu Business School in 2005. She is currently a Ph.D. student at Oulu Business School in the Department of Management and International Business. Her research interests include various issues of international business, competition, and value creation. THOMAS CASEY (Thomas.Casey@aalto.fi) is a researcher and doctoral student in the Department of Communications and Networking at Aalto University. He has been involved in various wireless communications related R&D activities in both industry and the academic world. His current research interests include the industry dynamics of mobile networks, and the strategic management of technology platforms and business models.

CONCLUSIONS
This article highlights the disruptive role of spectrum sharing in future cognitive cellular networks as an attempt to satisfy the growing traffic demand of mobile network operators customers. We propose a framework for understanding and discussing mobile network operators strategic choices from regulation, technology, and business perspectives in future cognitive spectrum sharing networks. We argue that regulation will play a key role in the path toward spectrum sharing, especially in the first steps of that path, and recent technology development is supporting this development. We present and discuss future scenarios and Simple Rules for both dominating and challenger mobile network operators, and conclude that these two different types of operators face different challenges and opportunities when planning, implementing, and running spectrumsharing-based businesses. Simple rules for strategic choices can help mobile network operators explore and exploit opportunities, respond to the changing environment, and develop sharingbased business models to get true benefits from the new spectrum access approaches.

REFERENCES
[1] ITU-R Report M.2243, Assessment of the Global Mobile Broadband Deployments and Forecasts for International Mobile Telecommunications, 2011. [2] European Commission, Promoting the Shared Use of Radio Spectrum Resources in the Internal Market, COM (2012) 478, 3 Sept. 2012. [3] ITU-R Report M.2225, Introduction to Cognitive Radio Systems in the Land Mobile Service, 2011. [4] Presidents Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Report to the President: Realizing the Full Potential of Government-Held Spectrum to Spur Economic Growth, 2012. [5] V. Fomin, D. Vitkute-Adzgauskiene, and M. Vytautas, Co-Evolutionary Development of Cognitive Radio Systems, 2010. [6] Working Group Frequency Management, CEPT, Report on ASA Concept, CEPT FM(12)084 Annex 47, 2012.

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