SOLIVEN, PETITIONER VS.

JUDGE MAKASIAR,RESPONDENT

167 SCRA 393

FACTS:
This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioners were lump together considering that the same character.

1. 2. 3.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently by the President Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were violatedwhen respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable clause Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit

DECISION:
Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc is LIFTED.

RATIO: Background of the first issue

MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion for reconsideration APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law. -This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed, in effect, waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

Second issue
This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest: Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests. -However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witness. Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall: (1) Personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause (and on the basis, thereof, issue a warrant of arrest); or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the evidence of probable cause.

Third issue

Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the Presidents filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial courts jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat herprivilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. -This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office andmay be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. -The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person (And there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege).

Additional Issue:

Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a chilling effect on press freedom. -Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the chilling effect point.

Valmonte v. De Villa, 170 SCRA 256 (1989) F: On 1/20/87, the NCRDC was activated w/ the mission of conducting security operations w/in its area or responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political dev''t of the NCR. As part of its duty to maitain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and MM. Petitioners aver that, bec. of the institution of said checkpoints, the Valenzuela residents are worried of being harassed and of their sarety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, w/o a SW and/ or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin Parpon, was gaunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC for ignoring and/ or continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air.

HELD: Petitioner''s concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se , illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Source: http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/1767286-case-digest-valmonte-villa-170/#ixzz2ac172QqB

Valmonte v De Villa G.R. No. 83988 May 24, 1990 RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLES'S RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners, vs.GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents. Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and co-petitioners.

PADILLA, J.: In the Court's decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners' petition for prohibition seeking the declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed. Petitioners have filed the instant motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision. Before submission of the incident for resolution, the Solicitor General, for the respondents, filed his comment, to which petitioners filed a reply. It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the questioned decision did this Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain. Recent and on-going events have pointed to the continuing validity and need for checkpoints manned by either military or police forces. The sixth (6th) attempted coup d' etat (stronger than all previous ones) was staged only last 1 December 1989. Another attempt at a coup d' etat is taken almost for granted. The NPA, through its sparrow units, has not relented but instead accelerated its liquidation of armed forces and police personnel. Murders, sex crimes, hold-ups and drug abuse have become daily occurrences. Unlicensed firearms and ammunition have become favorite objects of trade. Smuggling is at an all time high. Whether or not effective as expected, checkpoints have been regarded by the authorities as a security measure designed to entrap criminals and insurgents and to constitute a dragnet for all types of articles in illegal trade. No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present government its ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and economic policies or performance. But, at least, one must concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected. Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. 1 For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. As held by the U.S. Supreme Court: Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class, and since field officers may stop only those cars passing the

checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to poststop judicial review. 2 The checkpoints are nonetheless attacked by the movants as a warrantless search and seizure and, therefore, violative of the Constitution. 3 As already stated, vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Again, as held by the U.S. Supreme Court Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying a warrantless search of a residence or office. Brinegar v. United States, 338 US 160, 93 L Ed 1879, 69 S Ct 1302 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 69 L Ed 543,45 S Ct 280, 39 ALR 790 (1925). The cases so holding have, however, always insisted that the officers conducting the search have 'reasonable or probable cause to believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless search. ... 4 Besides these warrantless searches and seizures at the checkpoints are quite similar to searches and seizures accompanying warrantless arrests during the commission of a crime, or immediately thereafter. In People vs. Kagui Malasuqui it was held To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances. 5 By the same token, a warrantless search of incoming and outgoing passengers, at the arrival and departure areas of an international airport, is a practice not constitutionally objectionable because it is founded on public interest, safety, and necessity. Lastly, the Court's decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor condone abuses committed by the military manning the checkpoints. The Court's decision was concerned with power, i.e. whether the government employing the military has the power to install said checkpoints. Once that power is acknowledged, the Court's inquiry ceases. True, power implies the possibility of its abuse. But whether there is abuse in a particular situation is a different "ball game" to be resolved in the constitutional arena. The Court, like all other concerned members of the community, has become aware of how some checkpoints have been used as points of thievery and extortion practiced upon innocent civilians. Even the increased prices of foodstuffs coming from the provinces, entering the Metro Manila area and other urban centers, are largely blamed on the checkpoints, because the men manning them have reportedly become "experts" in mulcting travelling traders. This, of course, is a national tragedy . But the Court could not a priori regard in its now assailed decision that the men in uniform are rascals or thieves. The Court had to assume that the men in uniform live and act by the code of honor and they are assigned to the checkpoints to protect, and not to abuse, the citizenry. 6 The checkpoint is a military "concoction." It behooves the military to improve the QUALITY of their men assigned to these checkpoints. For no system or institution will succeed unless the men behind it are honest, noble and dedicated. In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not helpless. For the military is not above but subject to the law. And the courts exist to see that the law is supreme. Soldiers, including those who man checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the scope of their authority and are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly for their abusive acts; 7 This tenet should be ingrained in the soldiery in the clearest of terms by higher military authorities. ACCORDINGLY, the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are DENIED. This denial is FINAL. SO ORDERED. Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Alvarez vs. CFI

Posted on April 2, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard 64 Phil. 33 (1937) ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didnt say that the infor mation was based on his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latters motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void. Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person whom he considered reliable. Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicants knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts