PRIMARY QUESTIONS FOR

PANEL THREE: THE CHALLENGE WITHIN THE MUSLIM WORLD

Designated Commissioners: Hamilton, Cleland, Fielding

Panel Three has been asked to describe societal factors in the Muslim World that are exploited by
terrorist organizations to justify their cause and actions, and ways that this exploitation of
religious faith can be thwarted.

Questions for Panelists

1. What do you see as the respective successes and failures of the US in the war against
terrorism? What should the US be doing that it is not already doing to hasten the demise of
Al Qaeda and its affiliated organizations? How should our policies change?

2. Dr. Kepel has stated that the Jihadists are losing the battle for popular support in the Islamic
world. Do you believe this is still the case? What is the basis for this conclusion? What—if
anything—can the US do to accentuate this process?

3. Although Bin Laden has now added the Palestinian cause to his list of grievances, he rarely
mentioned it in his pre-9/11 days. How do you explain this change? Do we see any signs that
he is moving beyond rhetoric on this issue?

4. How would you describe current public attitudes in the Arab world and, more generally, the
Muslim world towards Bin Laden? Does public opinion distinguish between Bin Laden and
al Qaeda? In what ways? Do you see a trend? Is support growing? Falling? Where? Why?

5. What can—and should—the US do to shape public opinion in the Arab and Muslim world?
What difference will this make in the war against al Qaeda?

6. We asked Panel H's opinion of the following statement: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
appears to be pursuing a policy that seeks to have it both ways. On the one hand, the
Kingdom insists that it is supporting the war on terrorism, while at the same time it is
supporting and in fact financing the centers of Islamic extremism that serve as recruiting
grounds for the foot soldiers of terrorism. What is your view of this description?

7. Although Bin Laden couches his arguments in religious language, he has no real credentials
for issuing such judgments. Have Muslim scholars challenged either his statements or his
implicit claims to religious authority? How would you categorize those challenges —
forceful, reluctant? Have they weakened his appeal? Could they be more effectively used to
counter him? What, if anything, is the impact of critiques of his religious pretensions by non-
Muslim scholars?

8. Some argue Bin Laden is simply advocating an extreme form of views widely held in Saudi
society. Others believe that Saudi support to Islamic religious activities contributed, at least
 indirectly, to Al Qaeda's rise. How closely do Bin Laden ideas resemble those of his society?
Where, other than in the use of violence, does he differ from that broader consensus? Does
Wahabi Islam provide an ideological or cultural underpinning or context for Al Qaeda or
similar groups?

9. Withdrawal of US forces from Saudi Arabia would appear to meet one of Bin Laden's
fundamental goals. How will this withdrawal affect his support? How might he alter his
rhetoric and actions to accommodate this change?

10. Most revolutionary movements offer their picture of the glorious future to follow their
victory. Bin Laden appears not to do this, focusing instead on the struggle itself. Is that a fair
assessment? Why has he chosen this approach? What is his vision of what the world should
look like, and how important is this to his appeal in the Muslim world?