THE CONCEPT OF TIME IN THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY (1915)

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into one the points of time that have until then flowed by. We as it were make a cut in the time scale, thereby destroying authentic time in its flow and allowing it to harden. The flow freezes, becomes a flat surface, and only as a flat surface can it be measured. Time becomes a homogeneous arrangement of places, a scale, a parameter. Before we conclude our examination of the concept of time in the natural sciences, an objection still needs to be considered. One could point out that in the discussion so far the newest theory in physicsthe theory of relativityhas not been taken into account. The conception of time resulting from it surpasses in boldness everything previously achieved in speculative natural science and even in philosophical theories of knowledge.6 But we usually overlook the following: As a theory in physics, the theory of relativity is concerned with the problem of measuring time, not with time itself. The theory of relativity leaves the concept of time untouched and in fact only confirms to a greater extent the character of the concept of time in the natural sciences which was brought into relief above, i.e., its homogeneous, quantitatively determinable character. Nothing more clearly expresses the mathematical character of the concept of time in physics than the fact that it can be placed alongside threedimensional space as a fourth dimension and can, along with this space, be treated with non-Euclidean geometry, i.e., one with more than three dimensions. If we now wish to proceed to a description of the structure of the concept of time in the science of history, it at first glance seems quite doubtful whether a new problem can in any way be formulated here. For in the science of history, time is likewise an arrangement of places in relation to which the events in question are assigned their particular places in time and thereby historically established. Frischeisen-Khler has recently written that in certain circumstances it is sufficient to record an event in time to turn a concept formed on principles in the natural sciences into a historical one.7 Thus the concept of the famine in Fulda in the year 750 designates a quite definite individual event and is accordinglya a historical concept. Here we face an alternative: either the above-mentioned concept is not a historical concept insofar as it is not understandable why the mere determination of the time should turn a universal concept into a historical one, since even processes of motion in physics are determined as to their time; or, we do have before us a historical conceptwhich is in fact the case. But then the determination of time found in it must be a quite peculiar one that can be understood only from out of the essence of the science of history. At least this much has become clear: a problem lies hidden in the concept of time used by the science of history. It thus makes sense and is legitimate for us to question after the structure of the historical concept of time. This structure can only be read off from its function in the science of history, and in turn this function can only be understood on the basis of the goal and object of the science of history.