LABOR RELATIONS 2AA

Collective Bargaining Agreement Cases

1. University of San Agustin, Inc. v. University of San Agustin Employees Union-FWW G.R. No. 177594, July 23, 2009 Facts: On July 2000, petitioner entered into a CBA with the union effective for five (5) years or until July 2005. One of the provisions agreed upon was to include a provision on salary increase based on the incremental tuition fee increases or tuition incremental proceeds (TIP) and pursuant to RA 6728, Tuition Fee Law. The union refused to accept the proposed across-the-board salary increase of P1,500.00 per month. Likewise, union rejected petitioners interpretation of term salary increase as referring not only to the increase in salary but also to corresponding increases in other benefits. Parties agreed to submit the case to voluntary arbitration (VA). By decision, the VA held that the salary increase shall be paid out of 80% of the TIP should be same be higher than P1,500.00. On appeal, CA sustained the VAs interpretation of the questioned CBA but reversed its finding on the TIP computation. Hence, the present petition seeks only the review of the appellate court s interpretation of the questioned provision of CBA. Issue: Was the appellate court correctly interpreted the questioned provision of the CBA? Law: Art. 252 of the Labor Code and Sec. 5 of R.A. 6728 Ruling: It is familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. If the terms of a contract, in this case the CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control. It is axiomatic that labor laws setting employees benefits only mandate the minimum that an employer must comply with, but the latter is not proscribed from granting higher or additional benefits if it so desires, whether as an act of generosity or by virtue of company policy or a CBA, as it would appear in this case. While, in following to the letter the subject CBA provision petitioner will, in effect, be giving more than 80% of the TIP as its personnels share in the tuition fee increase, petitioners remedy lies not in the Courts invalidating the provision, but in the parties clarifying the same in the subsequent CBA negotiations. Opinion: I agree with the Supreme Court. The CBA is the law between the parties. Prior to the procurement of the CBA, both the employers as well as the employees were give the opportunity to lay down their cards, to negotiate and to bargain. The product of which is the CBA, freely entered into by the parties after negotiations. The same shall bind both the parties. Hence, one cannot remiss to his obligations under the CBA. In the event of unforeseen circumstances that will cause detriment to one parties, the proper action is not to ask for the invalidation of said CBA but the same shall be subject of subsequent CBA negotiations.

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2. A. Soriano Aviation v. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation Cooperative G.R. No. 166879, August 14, 2009 Facts: On May 1997, petitioner and respondent entered into a CBA effective until December 1999. The CBA included No-Strike, No-Lock-out clause. On several dates, which were legal holidays and peak season, some of the members of the union refused to rendered overtime work. Petitioner treated the refusal as a concerted action which is a violation of the No-Strike, No-Lock-out Clause. Thus, it meted the workers 30-day suspension and filed an illegal strike against them. The attempted settlement having been futile, the union filed a Notice of Strike. Despite the conciliation no amicable settlement of the dispute was arrived, the union went on strike. The company filed a motion to re-open the case which was granted by LA. In its decision, LA declared that the strike is illegal. On appeal, the NLRC dismissed it in per curiam decision. In the interim, into the second strike, petitioner filed a complaint before LA for illegal strike on the ground of alleged force and violence. In its decision, LA declare the second strike illegal. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed in toto the LAs decision. On appeal to CA, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling. Hence, the present position. Issue: Was the strike staged by respondent illegal due to the alleged commission of illegal acts and violation of the No-Strike, No-Lockout clause of the CBA? Law: Article 264 of the Labor Code Ruling: Yes, the strike is illegal. While the strike is the most preeminent weapon of workers to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital, it exerts some disquieting effects not only the relationship between labor and management, but also on the general peace and progress of society and economic well-being of the State. If such weapon has to be used at all, it must be used sparingly and within the bounds of law in the interest of industrial peace and public welfare. Opinion: I agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court. The Constitution grants the employees the right to strike, but it does not grant absolute freedom to do so. The same shall be done in accordance with law. The employees are not give unbridled discretion as to when, how and why a strike may be done. The same must not be whimsical or arbitrary. Again, everything must be done in the right way, and ate the right time, with the proper parties and in the proper place. 3. Patrcia Halaguea et,al. v. PAL G.R. No. 172013, October 2, 2009. Facts: Petitioners were employed as flight attendants of respondent on different dates prior to November 1996. They are members of FASAP union exclusive bargaining organization of the flight attendants, flight stewards and pursers. On July 2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a CBA incorporating the terms and conditions of their agreement for the years 2000 to 2005 (compulsory retirement of 55 for female and 60 for males). In July 2003, petitioner and several female cabin crews, in a letter, manifested that the provision in CBA on compulsory retirement is discriminatory. On July 2004, FASAP president submitted their willingness to commence the collective bargaining negotiations at the soonest possible time. On the same month, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief

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with issuance of TRO with the RTC Makati. The RTC issued a TRO. After the denial of the respondent on its motion for reconsideration for the TRO, it filed a Petition with the CA. CA granted respondents petition and ordered lower court to dismiss the case. Hence, this petition. Issue: Was the provision on compulsory retirement in CBA is unlawful and unconstitutional. Law: Article 217 of the Labor Code Ruling: The petitioners primary relief in Civil Case No. 04-886 is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, which allegedly discriminates against them for being female flight attendants. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exlusively cognizable by the RTC, pursuant to Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals. The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction. In Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani, this Court held that not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to dispute arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement. Opinion: I agree with the Supreme Court that there are issues arising from CBA that cannot be resolved by the mere application of the Labor Code. Especially issues brought about by the exigencies of time and loophole issues wherein the Labor Code is silent on the matter at hand. Resort to other pertinent laws such as the Constitution, other labor laws as well as the CBA itself will help in resolving the issue. 4. Continental Steel V. Mariano G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009 Facts: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. Petitioner immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits.

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It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel contended that only one with civil personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code which provides: Hence according to the oetitioner, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. Labor arbiter Montao argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiters resolution. Hence this petition. Issue: Should any ambiguity in CBA provisions shall be settled in favor of the employee? Law: Art. 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code. Ruling: Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. As decided by this Court, any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy. (Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)]) Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently. Opinion: I agree with the Supreme Court that any doubt arising from the CBA should be resolved in favor of labor. Since the employers are definitely of better position than the employees and to really enforce the constitutions mandate to afford full protection to labor, doubts arising from the interpretation of the CBA as well as other labor laws should be resolved in favor of labor.

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5. Faculty Association of Mapua v. CA 524 SCRA 709

Facts: On January 2001, in the 5th CBA negotiation meeting, MIT presented the new faculty ranking instrument developed by Andersen to Faculty Assoc. of Mapua. They agreed to the adoption of the same with the reservation that there should be no diminution in rank and pay. FAMIT and MIT entered into a new CBA. It incorporated the new ranking for the alleged faculty, however, there shall be no diminution in the existing rank and the policy same rank, same pay shall apply. After a month, MIT called FAMIT attention to what it perceived to be flows or omissions in the CBA signed by the parties. It argued that the CBA failed to include the faculty ranking point range sheet of the new faculty ranking instrument. FAMIT rejected the proposal. Meanwhile, MIT adopted a new formula for determining the pay rates of the high school faculty. Upon learning the changes, FAMIT opposed the formula. It averred that MIT had not been implementing the relevant provisions of the 2001 CBA, particularly the general welfare clause. The parties then met to settle the issue but were unable to reach a settlement. FAMIT brought the matter to the NCMB for mediation and ruled in favor of FAMIT. appeal, the CA reversed the decision. On

Issue: Is the MITs new proposal, regarding faculty ranking and evaluation, lawful and consistent with the ratified CBA? Law: CBA Ruling: The SC held that the new point range system proposed by MIT was an unauthorized modification of Annex C of the 2001 CBA. It was made up of a faculty classification that was substantially different from the one originally incorporated in the current CBA between the parties. Thus, the proposed system contravene the existing provisions of the CBA, hence, violative of the law between the parties. Until the new CBA is executed by and between the parties, they are duty bound to keep the status quo & to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement. The law does not provide for any exception nor qualification on which economic provisions of the existing agreements are to retain its force and effect. Therefore, it must understood as encompassing all the terms and conditions in the said agreement. Opinion: I agree with the Supreme Court. Modifications of the CBA means altering the right and obligations of both parties in the CBA. It is in effect modifying a contract, which governs the relations between the parties. Such is not allowed, much more if done without the consent of the other party. Be as it may that such modification is for the good of everyone or would even be beneficial to the other party, the same cannot be allowed to prosper as the CBA is binding to the parties.

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UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES 1. General Santos Coca-Cola Plant Free Workers Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phls., Inc. (General Santos City) G.R. No. Facts: In 1990, the Company experienced a significant decline in profitability due to the Asian economic crisis. To curve the negative effect, it implemented three (3) waves of an Early Retirement Program (ERP). Meanwhile, there was a memorandum issued mandating to put on hold all requests for hiring to fill in vacancies in both regular and temporary positions. Because several availed of the ERP, vacancies were created. This prompted the Union to negotiate with the Labor Management Committee (LMC) for filing up of the vacancies. No resolution was reached on the matter. Faced with the freeze hiring, the company engaged the services of JLBP Services Corporation that provides manpower services. Union filed in 2002 with the Natl Conciliation and Mediation Board (MCMB) a Notice of Strike on the ground of ULP for contracting-out services regularly performed by union members. Parties failed to file an amicable settlement. The Company filed a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction with DOLE. On 2003, the NLRC ruled that the Company is not guilty of ULP. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision and found that contract out jobs was a valid exercise of management prerogative to meet exigent circumstances. Hence, this petition. Issue: Was the contracting-out of jobs to JLBP amounted to ULP? Law: Art. 249 of Labor Code. Ruling: Unfair Labor Practice refers to acts that violate the workers right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are not unfair labor practice. Both the NLRC and the CA found that petitioner was unable to prove its charge of unfair labor practices. It was the Union that had the burden of adducing substantial evidence to support its allegations of unfair labor practice, which burden it failed to discharge. Wherefore, petition is denied. Opinion: I agree with the Supreme Court. Acts violative of the employees right to organize constitutute ULP. Without such act violative of right to self-organization, there is no ULP to speak of. Hence, failure to prove such, the ULP charge will not stand. 2. De La Salle University v. De La Salle University Employees Association (DLSUEA-NAFTEU) G.R. No. 177283, April 7, 2009 Facts : In 2001, a splinter group of respondent filed a petition for conduct of elections with the DOLE alleging that the then incumbent officers of respondent had failed to call for a regular election since 1985. Respondents officers claimed that by virtue of RA 6715, which amended the Labor Code, the term of office of its officers was extended to five years or until 1992 during which a

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general assembly was held affirming their hold-over tenure until the termination of collective bargaining negotiations. Acting on the petitioner, the DOLE-NCR held that the holdover authority of respondents incumbent set of officers had been extinguished by virtue of the execution of the CBA and ordered the conduct of elections subject to pre-election conferences. Respondent wrote a letter to DLSU President to put on escrow all union dues/agency fees and whatever money considerations deducted from salaries of concerned co-academic personnel until the election of union officials has been scheduled and been held. Petitioner in response, to do the following: (1) establish a savings account for the Union where all collected union dues and agency will be deposited and held in trust; and (2) discontinue normal relations with any group within the Union including the incumbent set of officers. Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) claiming that petitioner unduly interfered with its internal affairs. During the pendency of this complaint, respondent file a notice of strike. LA dismissed the respondent ULP complaint. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of LA. On respondents petition for certiorari before the CA, the Court set aside the decision of NLRC. Hence, petitioners petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Did the NLRC gravely abuse its discretion when it held that petitioner were not guilty of ULP considering that the temporary measures implemented by the University were undertaken in good faith and only to maintain its neutrality amid the intra-union dispute? Law: Art. 249 and 263 and 264 of the Labor Code. Ruling: It bears noting that at the time petitioners questioned moves were adopted, a valid and existing CBA had been entered between the parties. It thus behooved petitioners to observe the terms and conditions thereof bearing on union dues and representation. It is axiomatic in labor relations that a CBA entered into by a legitimate labor organization and an employer become the law between the parties, compliance with which is mandated by express policy of the law. Opinion: I agree with the Supreme Court that the CBA will govern. There is no ULP when there is a CBA which governs the relations between the employer and employees.

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3. UST Faculty Union v. University of Sto. Tomas G.R. No. 180892, April 7, 2009. Facts : The UST Faculty Union (USTFU) informed its members of a General Assembly. One of its agenda is the election of officers. The Secretary General of UST issued a Memorandum allowing the request of Faculty Clubs to hold a convocation which the members of the faculty including members of USTFU attended without the participation of UST administration. Also, an election of USTFU was conducted by a group called Reformist Alliance. Learning that the convocation was intended for election, some members walked out but the election was conducted among those present (Gamilla Group). Thus, two (2) groups claim to be USTFU namely; (1) Marino Group; and (2) Gamilla Group. Marino group filed a compliant for ULP against UST with the Arbitration Branch. It also filed a complaint before Med-Arbiter praying for the nullification of the election of the Gamilla Group. A CBA was entered between Gamilla Group and UST superseding the existing CBA of UST and USTFU. The Med-Arbiter declared the election of Gamilla Group as null and void. On appeal, the BLR affirmed the decision of Med-Arbiter. On appeal before this Court, the Court upheld the ruling of BLR. With the decision of this Court, the case before the Arbitration Branch of NLRC was dismissed for lack of merit. USTFU appeal to the NLRC, the NLRC affirmed the decision of LA. When the case is elevated to CA, the Court affirmed the decision of NLRC. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether CA committed serious and reversible error when it dismissed the Petition despite abundance of evidence showing that Unfair Labor Practices were indeed committed. Law: Art. 249 of Labor Code Ruling: The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has the burden of proving it. While, there are exceptions to this general rule, in the case of ULP, the alleging party has the burden of proving such ULP. Thus, we ruled in De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor v. NLRC that a party alleging a critical fact must support his allegation with substantial evidence. Any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend due processs. In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

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4. Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc. v. Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa HyattNational Union of Workers in the Hotel and Restaurant and Allied Industries G.R. No. 165756, June 5, 2009 Facts : The respondent union is a certified collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the Hyatt Regency Manila (HRM), a hotel owned by petitioner (Company). In 2001, the company suffered a slump due to the local and international economic slowdown aggravated by the 9/11 incident in the USA. The company decided to cost-cut by implementing among others reducing work weeks in some hotel departments. In August 2001, the union filed a notice of strike due to a bargaining deadlock before the Natl Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB). In the course of the proceedings, the union accepted the economic proposal. Hence, a new CBA was signed. Subsequently, the company decided to implement a downsizing scheme which the union opposed. Despite the opposition, a list of the position declared redundant and to be contracted out was given to the union. A notice of termination was also committed by the company to the DOLE. Thereafter, the company engaged the services of independent job contractors. The union filed a notice of strike. A conciliation proceeding was again conducted but to no avail. The union went on strike. The Secretary certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. The NLRC orders the suspension of the conciliation proceedings. However, the LA already issued decision declaring the strike legal. On appeal by the company, the NLRC reversed the LA decision and declared the strike to be illegal. On petition, the CA reversed the decision of the NLRC and declared the strike legal. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the CAs decision declaring the strike legal is accordance with law and established facts. Ruling: A valid and legal strike must be based on strikeable grounds, because if it is ba sed on a non-strikeable ground, it is generally deemed an illegal strike. Corollarily, a strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no acts constituting ULP actually exist. As an exception, even if no such acts are committed by the employer, if the employees believe in good faith that ULP actually exists, then the strike held pursuant to such belief may be legal. As a general rule, therefore, where a union believes that an employer committed ULP and the surrounding circumstances warranted such belief in good faith, the resulting strike may be considered legal although, subsequently, such allegations of unfair labor practices were found to be groundless. Here, the union went on strike in the honest belief that petitioner was committing ULP after the latter decided to downsize its workforce contrary to the staffing/manning standards adopted by both parties under a CBA. Indeed, those circumstances showed prima facie that the hotel committed ULP. Thus, even if technically there was no legal ground to stage a strike based on ULP, since the

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attendant circumstances support the belief in good faith that petitioners retrenchment scheme was structured to weaken the bargaining power of the union, the strike, by exception, may be considered legal. 5. Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) vs. NLRC Facts: Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association (Union) and its dismissed officers and members seek to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), declaring illegal the strikes staged by the Union and upholding the dismissal of the 227 Union officers and members. On the other hand, in the related cases docketed as G.R. Nos. 158798-99, Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation (Toyota) prays for the recall of the award of severance compensation to the 227 dismissed employees, which was granted. In view of the fact that the parties are petitioner/s and respondent/s and vice-versa in the four (4) interrelated cases, they will be referred to as simply the Union and Toyota hereafter. Issue: (1) Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal strikes; and (2) Whether separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who participated in the illegal strikes. Law: Art. 263 of the Labor Code Ruling: We rule that the protest actions undertaken by the Union officials and members on February 21 to 23, 2001 are not valid and proper exercises of their right to assemble and ask government for redress of their complaints, but are illegal strikes in breach of the Labor Code. The Unions position is weakened by the lack of permit from the City of Manila to hold rallies. Shrouded as demonstrations, they were in reality temporary stoppages of work perpetrated through the concerted action of the employees who deliberately failed to report for work on the convenient excuse that they will hold a rally at the BLR and DOLE offices in Intramuros, Manila, on February 21 to 23, 2001. The purported reason for these protest actions was to safeguard their rights against any abuse which the med-arbiter may commit against their cause. However, the Union failed to advance convincing proof that the med-arbiter was biased against them. The acts of the med-arbiter in the performance of his duties are presumed regular. Sans ample evidence to the contrary, the Union was unable to justify the February 2001 mass actions. What comes to the fore is that the decision not to work for two days was designed and calculated to cripple the manufacturing arm of Toyota. It becomes obvious that the real and ultimate goal of the Union is to coerce Toyota to finally acknowledge the Union as the sole bargaining agent of the company. This is not a legal and valid exercise of the right of assembly and to demand redress of grievance. It is obvious that the February 21 to 23, 2001 concerted actions were undertaken without satisfying the prerequisites for a valid strike under Art. 263 of the Labor Code. The Union failed to comply with the following requirements: (1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of strike, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (2) strike vote approved by a

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1 1

majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply with them renders the strike illegal. The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and the strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. As they failed to conform to the law, the strikes on February 21, 22, and 23, 2001 were illegal. The Court declined to grant termination pay because the causes for dismissal recognized under Art. 282 of the Labor Code were serious or grave in nature and attended by willful or wrongful intent or they reflected adversely on the moral character of the employees. We therefore find that in addition to serious misconduct, in dismissals based on other grounds under Art. 282 like willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime against the employer or his family, separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed employee. Based on existing jurisprudence, the award of separation pay to the Union officials and members in the instant petitions cannot be sustained. Opinion: I agree with the Supreme Court. The right to strike is not absolute. The Constitution is clear to that effect as it expressly provides that the right to strike may only be exercised in accordance with law. In this case, there is no permit to strike, which is fatal to the employees cause. Moreover, the strike was conducted for the alleged abuse that the med-arb will commit against their case. In this case, such allegation is not proven. Also, those concerted actions were undertaken without satisfying the prerequisites for a valid strike under Art. 263 of the Labor Code. The Union failed to comply with the following requirements: (1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of strike, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. Submitted by: April V. Enrile 2005-001330 2AA July 26, 2012

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