QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEW OF GEN.

JOHN GORDON

WHITE HOUSE SERVICE/HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL

1. Based on your experience, what do you think is the appropriate role for the White
House in coordinating efforts to protect against threats to the homeland? Have
your views changed since you were at the Department of Energy or the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence?
2. A March 2004 RAND paper, "Coordinating the War on Terrorism," argues that
the existence of the NSC, HSC and their supporting interagency committees leads
to "complex interactions and a blurring of lines of responsibility." Do you agree?
Does it make sense to have both a Homeland Security Council and a National
Security Council? What is right and wrong with this two-council structure?
3. How do you (and the HSC) interact with the National Director for Combating
Terrorism (Townsend), the NSC (Rice), the DHS (Ridge) and the rest of the
counterterrorism apparatus? Are you making any recommendations for structural
changes upon your departure?
4. Who has the lead during an alert? Please explain the interagency process leading
up to a decision to elevate the threat level or alert the public to a threat. Who does
what? How has the process evolved from 9/11 (or over your tenure)? During the
New Year holiday, the federal government appeared to be on a heightened threat
level but not the country as a whole. Will this become the norm?
5. Where are interagency connections and coordination processes working well?
Where do stovepipes and problems persist?
6. Do you agree with the recent National Journal article that reported the
Administration sees terrorism as a problem to be fought "over there" and is giving
insufficient attention to readiness and defense against terrorism at home? Why or
why not?
7. How do you receive, consume, analyze and use intelligence? Who is your
primary intelligence advisor? What are the best sources of intelligence you
receive each day? Specifically, how do you grade intelligence you receive from
the FBI, the CIA, and the various elements of the Department of Homeland
Security?

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY/OTHER CT ENTITIES

1. The Bureau of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Analysis was considered

by many in the Congress to be the most innovative and important entity
authorized within the new department - yet it is widely regarded to have been one
of the weakest aspects of DHS so far: short-staffed; high turnover of leadership;
unable to make a comprehensive assessment of infrastructure vulnerabilities; its
function usurped in part by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. What is your
assessment of the IA/IP today? What do you see it realistically achieving in five
years?
2. DHS has its own intelligence centers (e.g., IA/IP, Coast Guard, and Secret
Service) and participates in TTIC and the Terrorist Screening Center. FBI has a
Counterterrorism Division. NORTHCOM has a fusion center in Colorado. Who
sees to it that all these centers work together? Is this the right amount of centers
or do we need to consolidate intelligence functions and centers to avoid
duplication and stove-piping?
3. Are the roles and missions of these entities - the DCI's CTC, TTIC, IA/IP,
NORTHCOM, FBI's CTD -- sufficiently well defined and rationalized? What
more should be done? Are there enough analysts to go around?
4. Is the FBI on the right path with its transformation? If not, why not?
5. What is your view of FBI's efforts in going after terrorist financing?
6. Will the DHS succeed as it is presently structured, resourced and equipped? What
changes are necessary? What is not getting done?
7. How is the DHS integrating outside of Washington? What advantages have come
about through the merger (establishment of DHS) that would not have otherwise
occurred?
8. Do you think the Department is too big to succeed? Do you believe a case can be
made for spinning off some of the entities that are part of this unprecedented
merger? What would be gained or lost?
9. In May 6 testimony before the Select Committee on Homeland Security, Deputy
Secretary Loy mentioned his concern whether "high-consequence areas like
nuclear, biological and cyber are properly organized and recognized in the
department." Do you agree with Admiral Loy? Who in DHS is worrying about
catastrophic and "high consequence" attacks? What are they doing about them?
10. Are the most urgent problems in homeland security and homeland defense being
solved? **—
11. Given that many of the security measures of the future, including a new CAPPS II
program, depend on proper identification, what is your view on whether we are
doing enough to tighten the process for acquiring government-issued ID's,
including breeder documents such as birth certificates, social security cards,
driver's licenses?
12. A psychological study of the aftermath of September 11 performed by researchers
at Carnegie Mellon University found that Americans vastly overestimated the risk
of terrorism during that period. Professor Jennifer Lerner said that, "There was an
overwhelming overestimation of risk." She went on to indicate that the
government and media can unwittingly alter risk perception by making people
either fearful or angry, and that, if used responsibly, information could be used to
better communicate the actual degree of risk.
• Given that the primary goal of terrorists is to create terror, could the
government have done a better job in communicating with the public
about terrorist threats before, during and after September 11, 2001?
• How should the federal government try to balance the need to promote
continued vigilance, with the need to combat the "terror" of terrorism?
• What more could or should be done in this respect?
 13. What are your views on the Congressional oversight? Where is oversight being
conducted constructively? Do you have specific views on the oversight of the
Department of Homeland Security or the intelligence community?
14. There are many issues related to homeland security that involve borders and
immigration. [Placeholder for Team 5]

OTHER TOPICS

1. What are the problems in homeland security that no one is thinking about or
talking about right now?
2. Are there any other issues we should discuss?
3. What recommendations should the 9-11 Commission make to have the greatest
impact on homeland security?
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Warren Bass

Sent: Wednesday, May 05, 2004 5:30 PM
To: Christine Healey
Cc: Team 4; Mike Hurley
Subject: RE: Topics for John Gordon interview

I'd suggest adding terrorist financing. I've given Serena and Doug a document about T/4 issues that mentions
Gordon by name; they can clue you if you need more specifics. For the pre-meeting, we could probably get away
with saying something like, "His involvement in TF issues, his view of CIA performance" etc.
Beyond that, we're curious about much the same things as we were with Ridge:
How does HSC lash up with NSC, DHS, and the rest of the CT apparatus?
Does this work? Is this a smart structure, or just what we improvised and are now stuck with?
Who has the lead on alerts? How do they coordinate with NSC?
What's the intel take?
Why can't they keep anyone in these jobs?
OK, the last one you may not want to ask quite that bluntly...

Original Message—
From: Christine Healey
Sent: Wednesday, May 05, 2004 5:25 PM
To: Kevin Scheid; Mike Hurley; Susan Ginsburg; Emily Walker; Warren Bass
Subject: Topics for John Gordon interview

Dan Marcus is going to do the Gordon interview and he is going to try to do the pre-interview meeting via
telephone tomorrow.

I am going to send him this list of topics before I leave for the night (later, much later than now). If you
have any classified additions, please give them to him directly. If you want me to add anything to this list,
please let me know.

Thanks.

5/6/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Dan Marcus

From: Janice Kephart-Roberts

Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2004 3:45 PM
To: Dan Marcus
Cc: Susan Ginsburg
Subject: John Gordon

Dan,

Please ask Gordon whether he sees border security, including immigration services, travel intelligence, and
document fraud, as integral to national security. What we are seeing is that even at the White House, there is a
relatively limited view of the definition of border security, and mostly viewed as a US Visit/border issue, with
immigration enforcement and immigration benefits not being seen as having key roles in border and national
security.

Great job today with the secretary. Thanks for asking so many of our questions!

Janice Kephart-Roberts
National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States
301 7th Street, SW, Room 5125
Washington, DC 20407
Tel.: 202.401.1705
Fax: 202.358.3124

5/12/2004
 WITH DRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148
Box: 00002 Folder: 0001 Document: 9
Series: Dan Marcus Files

Copies: 1 Pages: 2

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: [John] Gordon/[Tom] Ridge

Document Date: 05-06-2004
Document Type: Briefing Paper
From: Mike Hurley
To: Dan Marcus

Subject: Topics for John Gordon from his time as DDCI

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.

NND: 221
Withdrawn: 02-25-2008 by:

RETRIEVAL #: 221 00002 0001 9

 TOPICS FOR THE INTERVIEW OF JOHN GORDON

Homeland Security Council

1. The strengths and weaknesses of the current structure within the Executive Office
of the President; should it be maintained; how does it lash up with NSC, DHS and
the rest of the CT apparatus; why has the turnover been so quick for his position.
2. Obstacles to coordination of homeland security strategy among the various the
departments and intelligence community agencies.
3. His relationship with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General,
the Director of Central Intelligence and other cabinet secretaries; his visibility into
these programs and agencies.
4. The Department of Homeland Security: its strengths and weaknesses.
5. The Intelligence Community agencies (including FBI): their strengths and
weaknesses; the quality and quantity of intelligence they produce.
6. The process for issuing alerts; who has the lead; how are they coordinated with
the NSC.
7. The reasons for the failure of the DHS to integrate legacy agencies and functions
within the Department; what is the status of its information sharing and enterprise
architecture efforts.
8. The reasons for the failure of the DHS to issue an assessment of the nation's most
serious vulnerabilities.
9. The reasons for various homeland security functions (e.g., terrorist screening
center at FBI: threat integration center under DCI) to be established outside of
DHS. " ~
10. Terrorist financing: what has been his involvement in these issues; his view of
the performance of the CIA in this area.
11. Where there has been the greatest progress in the development and coordination
of homeland security policy, procedures and programs; where more work needs to
be done.
12. Where there is unnecessary redundancy among the various entities involved in
homeland security; where there is confusion about who is in charge; where there
are insufficient resources devoted to the mission.
13. Congressional oversight of homeland security issues in general and the DHS in
particular.
14. Whether the budget needed to build full-scale border screening and to deal with
unpatrolled borders in really available.
15. Whether there is an adequate international and USG structure for conducting
international negotiations on border security issues.

Intelligence Community Issues

1. Strengths and weaknesses of the current structure.

2. Strengths and weaknesses in the authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. The appropriate role of the Secretary of Defense in U.S. intelligence activities.
4. How intelligence sharing and intelligence operations can be made seamless in the
effort to prevent terrorist attacks.
5. What structures are needed so that terrorist intelligence drives the development of
homeland security systems and operations like border security screening and
enforcement?
6. His role in the nation's counterterrorism strategy and program while DDCI.
7. Congressional oversight of U.S. intelligence agencies and programs.