Obsolete Communism

The Left-Wi ng Alternative

Obsolete Communism
The Left-Wing Alternative
Daniel Cohn-Bendit
and
Gabriel Cohn-Bendit
Translated by
Arnold Pomerans
McGraw-Hill Book Company
New York St. Louis Sail Frallcisco
Obsolete Communism: The Left-Wing Alternative
First published 1968 by Andre Deutsch Limited
105 Great Russell Street, London WC1
Copyright I 1968 English Translation by Andre Deutsch Ltd.
Originally published in German under the title of
Linksradikalismus-Gewaltkur gegen die Alterskrankheit des Kommunismus
Copyright I Rowohlt Taschenbuch
Verlag GMBH, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1968
and in French under the title of
Le gauchisme-remede {) Ia ma/adie seniale du C0/11/Illll!isme
Copyright I Rowohlt Taschenbuch
Verlag GMBH, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1968
All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,
without the prior written permission of the publisher.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 69-18158
First Edition 11595
Author's Note
The author woul d l i ke to stress that whereas he h imself has
been given VI P treatment by his generous publ i shers, no
doubt i n recogni ti on of hi s help i n greasi ng the wheels of
capital i st producti on, his poor underpai d translator* has had
to l abour far beyond his normal call of duty. Not only has he
had to read the author's i l legi ble scrawl, to fl l i n the gaps and
to make expl i ci t what thi s text, written i n such a hurry, has
fai led to do, but he must slave away day and night to meet the
publ ishers' preci pi tate deadl i ne. Perhaps he is consoled by the
fact that, i n this way, he i s carrying the message r ight through
the publ i shers' doors.
"The transl ator sal utes the author. He would also like to express hi s deep
appreciation of al l those who have worked with him -day and ni ght- on
the English edition, and quite particularly of Rodney Strulo, Bi l l i e Peiser,
Jean-Paul Yil lechaize and Michael George.
Publisher's Note
The publisher congratulates the translator, Arnold Pomerans,
on the magnifcent job he has done in translating this work i n
so short a time. He would also l i ke to poi nt out that whi l e
there are parts of thi s book whi ch relate particularly to Dani el
Cohn-Bendi t's experiences and are therefore written i n the frst
person the book, as a whole, is the resul t of the combined
labours of Daniel and hi s brother Gabri el Cohn- Bendi t.
'Literary rogues great and small, have struck gold
with the Commune, and have exploited it to the full.
There is not a hack who has not churned out his
slapdash pamphlet, book, or History . . .
'There is a huge pile of Paris Burs, Paris in Flames,
Red Books, Black Books ...
'Publishers are interested in nothing but the
Communards these days ... Their writings titillate the
minds of the bourgeoisie.'
Lissagaray: Histoire de Ia Commune de 1871
Contents
Introduction
I. THE STRATEGY AND NATURE OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT
11
I . The Student Revolt 23
From Berkeley to Berlin 23
The 'Strasbourg Scandal' 25
Libre Circulation- The Battle of the Dormitories 29
The Boycott at Nantes 30
The Protest Grows 32
Agitation at Nanterre 34
Why Sociologists? 35
Students and Society 41
The 22 March Movement 48
The Battle of the Streets 57
The Action Committees 80
2. The Workers
91
The Case of the AGF 93
The TSF Works at Brest 97
The Atomic Energy Centre at Saclay 99
The Rhone- Poulenc Works 10
The Shop Floor Committees 101
The Pattern for the Future 103
II. THE STRATEGY OF THE STATE
I . Introduction
2. The State and the University
115
116
Contents
3. The Authority of the State and the Vulnerability of
Society 119
4. The Gaullist Phenomenon
III. STALINIST BUREAUCRACY AND THE
CLASS STRUGGLE IN FRANCE
1 .
Introduction
1 33
1 45
2. The French Communist Party and the C G T during
May and June 1 47
The Communist Party and the Revolutionary
Movement in the Universities 147
The Communist Analysis of the General Strike 152
The Communist Party in Search of Voters 1 63
General Analysis
168
3. The Nature of the Communist Bureaucracy 1 70
IV. THE STRATEGY AND NATURE OF
BOLSHEVISM
1 . Introduction 199
2. The Role of the Bolshevik Party during the Russian
Revolution 202
3. The Makhno Movement and Opposition within the


4. Kronstadt 234
V. BY WAY OF CONCLUSION
C'est pour toi que tu fais Ia revolution 249
Introduction
'A writer is a productive worker not onl y because he
produces ideas but al so because he enriches the
publisher of hi s books, in other words because he
works for a capitalist.'
Karl Marx: Theory of Surplus Value
Had I decided to write a book on the French pol i tical scene
and on the chances of a revolutionary upri si ng only two or
three months ago, no publ isher would have taken the sl i ghtest
notice of me. But such was the impact of the events of May
and June and so wi l dl y has the name of Cohn- Bendi t been
bandied about that, far from my havi ng to go down on my
knees to them, the publ ishers now come chasing after me,
begging me to write about anything I choose, good or bad,
exciting or dull; all they want i s somethi ng they can sell - a
revolutionary gadget wi th marketable quali ti es.
Strange, i sn' t i t, this Cohn-Bendi t myth, this legend of the
' cherubi c Danton' . Strange that a movement opposed to al l
leaders should have ended up wi th one al l the same, that those
who shun the l imeli ght should be si ngled out for the ful l glare
of publicity.
In any case, all self-respecting publ ishers are fal l i ng over
themselves to cash in on the May events. In our commerci al
world, i ndi vi dual capital ists are perfectly wi l l i ng to pave the
way for their own destruction, to broadcast revolutionary
ideas, provi ded only that these help to fl l their pockets. So
anxi ous are they, in fact, that they are prepared to pay for the
pri vi lege through the nose in the short run (ofering me a vast
sum of money before I have written a si ngl e l i ne). They do
not even seem to be bothered by the fact that their cash wi l l
be used for the next round of Molotov cocktai l s. They hope,
11
Introduction
perhaps, that the revolution wi l l be abortive - my readers
may be among those to prove them wrong.
Why, then, did I decide to write thi s book? Who was I to
refuse this golden opportunity of taki ng aim against our whol e
society, of saying what no one has been able to say for so l ong,
of expl aining the full importance of the French revoluti onary
movement, not only in the i mmediate past, but also i n the
future? For, as far as I am concerned, the revolution i s not
yet over. 'Ce n'est qu'un debut, continuons le combat!'
I must also make clear what this book i s not. It does not
pretend to be an historical treatise, i f only because the events
are too recent for anyone to reconstruct them objectively. In
particular, a true hi story of our movement cannot be based
si mply on the ofcial statements of the authori ti es, of the
opposi ti on, the Trade Unions, or even of the revolutionari es
themselves, as they were proclaimed from a thousand
placards, wall-slogans and tracts, but must be a runni ng com
mentary on the day-to-day practical and theoretical activi
ti es of the students and workers - of al l those who bel ieved
our slogan 'Sous le pave, Ia plage' - beneath the paving stones,
the beach. Thi s ki nd of history cannot be wri tten i n a coupl e
of weeks (supposing i t could be written at all).
Nor does thi s book pretend to give a simpl ifed theoretical
account of the events. Having participated in them and ob
served them at close quarters, I am unable to stand aside and
take a detached vi ew of the overall si tuati on. The movement
wi l l have need of such a detached observer, there wi l l no
doubt be theoretical books and I do not wish to deny thei r
necessity, but I, for my part, do not feel capable of produci ng
one, and certainly not at thi s moment. Others wi l l do i t and no
doubt far better than I could mysel f. Thi s book claims to be
no more than an attempt to participate i n a continui ng scene,
wi th al l i ts remarkable spontanei ty. From the very outset,
the movement succeeded in l i berating our language from i ts
bourgeois strait-jacket, and my book i s but an echo of the great
dialogue that was begun in the forum of the Lati n Quarter .
Both i n form and content, i t wi l l try faithful l y to refect the
mood of the movement. Finally, I look upon this book as a
1 2
Introducti on
propaganda pamphlet, one that, thanks to the hel p of my
benevol ent publ ishers, wi l l reach a far wi der audi ence than
it could in any other form.
The worl d i denti fes the recent revol uti onary movement
wi th the student struggle, the barricades, the occupati on of
the universi ti es, and fnally the general str i ke and the occu
pati on of the factori es by the workers. For me, the revoluti on
ary movement was born much earl ier and took the form of
unofci al stri kes, student unrest, the acti vi ty of ti ny l eft-wi ng
spli nter groups, the so-cal l ed groupusclcs. The events of May
and June were merel y an i ntensifcation of what went before,
albeit on so vast a scal e that they opened up an undreamt-of
possi bi l ity : the prospect of a revoluti on. Thi s book might,
perhaps, be a brief moment of refecti on i n thi s great hi storical
process.
That is why I do not address myself to a 'reader' or to the
'publ ic', but only to those who were with us, mi ght have been
wi th us, or may be wi th us i n the future, and quite parti cul arly
to the workers and peasants from whom the Establ ishment
tried to separate us so assiduousl y. I know that the onl y
chance of resumi ng the struggle i s to put an end to the di vi si on
between i ntel lectual s, workers and peasants. Every revol uti on,
every radi cal transformati on of society, needs the consci ous
and creati ve parti ci pati on of the worki ng and peasant classes,
and not si mpl y their participation as a mal l eable mass whose
only useful ness is their strength and numerical wei ght.
I know that there are many other ways of endi ng our
di vi si on. However, si nce I happen to be wri ti ng a book, I shal l
try to use thi s parti cular method. Here, the probl em of l an
guage becomes fundamental . The works of phi losophers,
soci ologists, and professional pol i ti ci ans (sometimes quite out
spoken, parti cularly after the el ections . . . ) are wri tten i n a
style whi ch i s not i ntended for the workers and peasants and
which, i n any case, they cannot understand. Thi s i s a danger I
shall do my best to avoi d.
Sti lted language i s not, moreover, a monopoly of t he bour
geoi si e; i t al so creeps i nto the writi ngs of those Lefti sts who
see themselves as the leaders, the self-appoi nted vanguard, of
13
Introduction
a worki ng-class movement whose language they have ceased
to speak and which, once i t has become revolutionary as it
did in May and June, is only too happy to dispense with
leaders and a vanguard altogether.
I know that a theoretical language i s necessary, and regret
that the wri ti ngs of Marx are, at least in part, hard going even
for scholars and, in their present form, a closed book to most
of the working class - which does not mean that they cannot
be understood, once they are translated into si mple language.
But as it is, they are accessible only to the bourgeoi s i ntel lec
tual - cultural inequal ity is no accident, but part and parcel of
the oppressive structure of both capi tali st and 'communi st'
societies and in fact ensures their survival. This is precisely
what the revol uti onary students were tryine to say when they
decried the uni versi ti es and schools as 'factories of pri vi lege':
the present educational structure ensures that the majority
of worki ng-class chi ldren are barred not only from the bour
geoi s society we are trying to overthrow, but also from the
intellectual means of seeing through it. No wonder that the
bourgeois directors of education are so hosti l e to university
and school reform.
True, we hear a great deal of tal k about the subject today,
but the real purpose of the Fouchet plan* i s clear : to turn
people into ever more proftable pack-horses.
'The ideas of the rul ing class are in every epoch the rul i ng
i dea : i .e. the class which i s the rul ing materi al force of society
is at the same time the rul ing intellectual force. The
c
lass
whi ch has the means of materi al production at its disposal,
has control at the same ti me over the means of mental pro
duction . . . ' ( Karl Marx: The German Ideology.)
The divi si on of society into manual and intel lectual workers
i s a fundamental aspect of all expl oi tati ve societies. Every
revolutionary movement must try by i ts actions and also by
its very structure to narrow this gulf, whi l e remembering that
only a social ist society can fnally end it. It i s only by worki ng
for a soci al ist revoluti on that the exploited masses can take
* A government plan for transforing the educational system into a
technocratic one better adapted to the 'needs' of a modern society.
14
Introduction
control of their own future and that of society at large. No
book can help them to achieve this; they can only learn by
thei r own revoluti onary endeavours. ' In a revol uti on, when
the masses erupt on to the pol itical stage, thei r class-consci ous
ness becomes practical and active. Hence one year of revol u
tion gave the Russi an proletariat the ki nd of education that
thirty years of parl iamentary and trade union struggle fai l ed
to gi ve the German proletari at. ' ( Rosa Luxemburg: The
General Strike.)
Thi s book wi l l be divi ded into four mai n parts : ( 1 ) an
analysi s of t he pri nci pal factors of the May I June struggle
(this for the foreign reader); (2) an attempt to show how the
French State dealt wi th the upri si ng and to analyse the
phenomenon of Gaul l i sm; (3) an analysi s of the role of the
French Communist party and its essenti ally bureaucrati c
nature; and (4) a study of the fai l ure of the revol uti on i n
Russi a under the leadershi p of Leni n and Trotsky.
True, no one wri ti ng about the French Revol uti on can ex
pl ai n why the explosion came i n May 1 968 rather than i n
Apri l : ' It [world hi story] would be of a very mystical nature
i f "accidents" pl ayed no part i n it. These accidents themselves
fall natural l y into the general course of development and are
compensated agai n by other accidents. ' (Karl Marx, Letter to
Kugelmann, 1 7 Apri l 1 871.)
For three or four years, the student movement has been
recognized as a revolutionary force by all pol it ical observers,
and i t wi l l therefore be part of my task to expl ai n the hi story
of this movement, to recount the major ideas procl ai med for
more than ten years i n the revol uti onary study groups of
Pari s and elsewhere. These 'clubs', which were derided as
' spl inter groups' by the ofci al and patented representatives
of the revol uti on (their letters patent were deposited by
Maurice Thorez, the Son of the French People, with Joseph
Stal i n, the Father of all the Russi as) - these groups, of whi ch
no one took the sl ightest notice, were nevertheless so efective
that their ideas and revol utionary experience eventual l y spi l led
over i nto the streets and factories, and so helped to wri te a
new chapter in the history of the revolutionary movement -
1 5
Introduction
the permanent struggle to end the exploitation of man by
man.
Thi s brings me to the question of the organization not onl y
of capital ist or bureaucratic society - for this must be the
starting poi nt i n any discussion of 'productive relationships' -
but also of a non-authoritarian and non-hierarchical soci al ist
society : should the new society be organized along Bolshevi k
l ines or along the non-Bolshevik l i nes of the 22 March Move
ment?
This introduces the larger problem of the relationship be
tween the revolutionary minority and the so-cal led 'masses' .
What precisely are these masses, and why are there masses
in the frst place? How can the masses transform themselves
i nto somethi ng more than an amorphous mass? And what
sort of mi nority organization i s capable of challenging an
exploitative society and unmasking its real nature? To that
end, I shall try to show how the 'masses' discovered the means
of taking their own destiny in their hands, for example during
the Pari s Commune of 1 871 , during the Russian Revoluti ons
of 1 905 and 1 9 1 7, duri ng the Spanish Revol uti on of 1 936, and
fnally duri ng the Hungari an Revoluti on of 1 956. These mo
ments in the revolutionary struggle of the working class are
more important than all the treatises that have been and wi l l
be written on this subject. This book, for one, does not try
to do more than hold up to the worki ng class the mirror of
its own revolutionary experience, an experience that ran
counter to al l the tenets and practices of its woul d- be leaders.
This experience and the chance that i t may be wi dely copied
are perhaps the most positive aspects of the May events as
wel l . Thus whi le Lefort, Morin and Coudray are r ight to clai m
(Mai 1968: fa breche) that the month of May saw a breach of
modern capital ist society and also of the ol d authority of the
Left, it did far more than that : it represented a return to a
revolutionary tradition these parties have betrayed. Hence
the 22 March Movement was no ' bri l l iant i nvention' of a
group of 'nai ve prodi gies', but the result of arduous research
i nto revolutionary theory and practice.
It would be wrong to think that what happened in France
1 6
Introducti on
coul d onl y have happened there, just as i t i s a mistaken i dea
that concentrati on camps could only have occurred i n Hi tler's
Germany or in Stal i n's Russi a. Revoluti on as well as counter
revol uti on are i nternati onal, and much as the student move
ments in Spai n, Ameri ca, Japan, Italy, etcetera i nfuenced the
French student movement, so the French student movement,
which was the frst to spill out from the universi ty i nto the
factori es, can serve as an example elsewhere.
The events in France have proved that revol uti on is possi bl e
i n even a highl y i ndustri al ized capital ist soci ety. Those who
argued that the worki ng class had outgrown revoluti on stood
convicted of theoretical and practical i ncompetence, a fact
that suggests i t i s high time to di scover why the worki ng class
has remai ned so passive for so l ong.
In conclusi on, this book wi l l necessari l y interpret the events
i n the l ight of the author's 'Leftist' convi cti ons - hence i ts
ti tl e. The history of 'Leftism' i s, in fact, the hi story of al l
that i s truly revol utionary i n the worki ng class movement.
Marx was to the left of Proudhon and Bakuni n to the left of
Marx. Leni n was a Leftist when he opposed soci al democrati c
reformi sm, and agai n when he opposed hi s own Central Com
mittee and Pol itburo duri ng the 1 9 1 7 Revol uti on. After the
Revol ut i on, the 'Workers' Opposi ti on' , a group of left- wi ng
' devi ati onists' among the Bolshevi ks, became the most
revol utionary element i nsi de the party, whi le the Ukrai nian
anarchi st Makhno represented the most revol ut ionary move
ment outsi de. Thi s struggle between i ts 'Left' and ' Ri ght' wi ngs
conti nues to di vi de the worki ng-class movement to this day.
'As Leni n never tired of repeati ng, the masses are greatly to
the l eft of the Party, just as the Party i s to the l eft of i ts Cen
tral Commi ttee. ' (Trotsky: History of the RuJsian Revolution. )
The questi on of 'Leftism' became a major i ssue duri ng the
events of May and June. Who i s the authentic representative
of the Left today : the Fourth Internati onal, the Si tuati oni st
Internati onal or the Anarchi st Federati on? Lefti sm i s every
thi ng that i s new i n Revolut ionary history, and is forever
bei ng chal lenged by the ol d. This new factor is what we must
frml y defend i n the present, lest i t be crushed by what IS
1 7
Introducti on
obsolete i n Leftism itself. Let the dead bury their dead.
The transformation and development of Leftist ideas re
fect not onl y the transformation and development of capi tal ist
society, but also the transformation and development of the
Russian Revoluti on i nto a bureaucratic counter-revoluti on,
sustained and defended by Communi st parties througho. ut the
worl d. I, for one, do not think that the French Communist
Party betrayed its own principles during May and June; i t
si mply acted i n defence of its bureaucratic i nterests as a party,
and of the bureaucratic i nterests of the USSR as a state.
No doubt this last remark wi l l strike many people as a
mere commonplace, but it is not yet, unfortunately, a com
monplace among all sections of the people. Now, since I frmly
believe that unti l they appreciate the true nature of Com
munist bureaucracy they wi ll never be able to arrive at a
revolutionary spiri t, I think that it is essential to drive thi s
'commonplace' home. To that end, I could simply have com
pi l ed an anthology of the most i nci si ve articles to have ap
peared i n such radical journals as Socialisme ou Barbarie,
1'/nterationa/e situationniste, Information et correspondance
ouvrihe, Noir et ruge, Recherches lihertaires and to a lesser
extent in Trotskyist publ icati ons. But such an anthology
would be of no i nterest to a publishing house that i nsi sts on a
book si gned by Cohn-Bendit. I fnd it most i roni cal that
Lefort, i n hi s book, should have seen ft to write: 'For my
part, what I fnd i n the speeches of some of the more rabid
students and particularly of Cohn- Bendit, i s a pi nch of real
ism and a large dose of i mpudence. ' Now, I have been hearing
thi s sort of remark for many years, and can only say that the
' i mpudence' and the 'real ism' are based, inter alia, on the
theses whi ch Lefort ( among others) publ i shed i n Socialisme ou
Barbarie. The readers, unfortunately far too few in number,
of thi s and other Leftist reviews, will appreciate how much
thi s book owes to them. As for the rest, they ought to be
tol d that 'Cohn-Bendit' i s simply the anonymous author of al l
these reviews, and perhaps the journals Action and the Cahiers
de mai as wel l . I am not, and do not want to be, anything but
a plagiarist when i t comes to the preachi ng of revolutionary
1 8
Introduction
theory and pract i ce. I have si mply had the good fortune to be
around when the 'force of cri ti ci sm was transformed i nto
cri ti ci sm by force' .
Postscript to the introduction
Thi s book was wri tten in fve weeks and bears the marks of
thi s scrambl e. I had intended to examine to what extent
workers' control , as i t has been appl ied in Spain i n 1 936, i n
Algeri a, and today i n Jugoslavia, could serve as a model for a
new soci al ist society. It was also my intention to descri be the
di rect acti on and forms of organizati on developed by the
Russi an workers in 1 905 and 1 917, by the German workers i n
1 918, by the Itali ans i n 1 920, and by the Hungarians i n 1956.
In the event, I have only had time to look at Russi a. I have
used thi s example to demonstrate the counter-revol utionary
nature of the Bolshevi k Party. As I wrote, I began to feel
that my chief task must be to expose all those forces that
stand i n the way of revoluti on - from the State, the Trade
unions and the Stal i nists down to all the far- left spl inter
groups wi th a Bolshevi k outlook. Once this was done I coul d
proceed to exami ne the basi c problems faci ng the modern
revoluti onary, and these, for Jack of ti me, I could onl y out
l i ne i n bri ef. Those who wish to be shown the royal road to
soci ali sm, or have a clear bluepr int for the future, may take
comfort from the words of Commandant Gaveau's i ndict
ment of the Internati onal Association in 1 87 1 , words whi ch
perfectly summarize my own poi nt of view: 'To raze the ol d
and bui l d the new from scratch that i s how the supporters
of the International Association intend to construct a state
that recognizes nei ther the government nor the army nor re
l i gi on; that bel ieves in legislation by the peopl e for the people,
in the col lective ownershi p of al l thi ngs, in the abol i ti on of
the right of i nheri tance and marriage; wants to disband the
permanent army, and by breaki ng down al l frontiers, to re
place the Fatherland wi th the idea of internati onal soli dari ty. '
I
The Strategy and Nature of the
Revolutionary Movement
'The accused who have been brought before you today
have all taken a leading part in the insurrectionary
movement that swept Paris from 1 8 March until 28 May,
threatening to plunge the whole of France into the
abyss of Civil War. Before determining the
responsibility of each of the accused for this evil crime,
we must frst look at the origins of their movement,
seek its causes . . .
Indictment of the Communards by Commandant Gaveau
1. The Student Revolt
From Berkeley to Berlin
A spectre is haunti ng Europe - the spectre of student revol t.
Al l the powers of ol d Europe have entered i nto a hol y al l iance
to exorcize thi s spectre : Pope and Central Commi ttee,
Ki esi nger and de Gaul l e, French Communists and German
pol ice-spi es.
But now i t has become world-wi de : Berkeley, Berl i n, Tokyo,
Madri d, Warsaw - the student rebel l i on i s spreadi ng like wi l d
fre, and authori ti es everywhere are franti cal ly asking them
selves what has hit them. The answer is really qui te simpl e.
Let us take j ust one exampl e : the student struggle at
Berkeley i n 1 964 - four years before the events i n Pari s. How
much just readi ng the newspapers might have hel ped the
French authori ti es!
At Berkeley in 1 964 - well in advance of Berli n or Pari s -
the students defended thei r r ight to parti cipate i n pol itics,
and i n particular to protest against the war i n Vi etnam, u n
hampered by internal rules and regulations.
It started wi th a decision by the admi nistrati on to ban al l
fund-rai si ng and propaganda for any pol itical or social idas
of which they did not approve.
This i nept move by the bureaucrats stung a smal l group of
students into acti on, and thei r numbers rapi dly increased as
the admi nistration tri ed wi th typical bluster to assert its
authority. The students put their poi nt of view in the bi
monthly Free-Speech Movement News Letters; whi ch brought
hundreds, and later thousands, of students without previ ous
pol i t ical exper ience i nto the movement. The ensuing struggle
taught them a few fundamental truths about the nature of the
State, and in particular about the relati onship of the univer
si ty with the worl d of busi ness, local poli tics and the pol i ce.
23
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
This student struggle at Berkeley was si gnifcant in that
it helped to underline the dilemma of a rich but increasingly
bureaucratic society.
The Berkeley model was copied at Berl i n university a few
years later, with Paris following suit soon afterwards. Here
we shall look, therefore, not so much at the specifc causes of
the violent protest of the SDS (the left-wing German student
Union) but at the way it infuenced events i n France.
In Germany, the cal l for university reform became a rally
ing cry for students and a strong one in the absence of an
efective parliamentary opposition to West German capital
ism. As a result, the German student movement became the
standard bearer of resistance to both the German state and
also to American atrocities i n Vietnam.
While the German students were challenging the system,
their French colleagues were becoming increasingly alive to
the total failure of the reformist pol icies advocated by the
UNEF (National Union of French Students). Unfortunately,
the extreme Left was devoting all its energies to making scien
tifc, Marxist analyses of the situation, which, despite their
learned character, di d little to mobilize the students for their
own struggle.
However, as opposition to the Vietnam war assumed i nter
national proportions, French students, particularly in Paris,
were i ncreasingly i nvolved in campus demonstrations, the
more so as their hatred of this war went hand i n hand with the
dawning realization that their own universities were nothi ng
but cogs i n the capital ist machine.
'These students now insult

their professors. They shoul d be
locked up . . . For the moment this i llegal agitation i s bei ng
closely watched by the Mi nistry of the Interior' (L' Aurore,
26 November 1966).
This particular broadside was fred, not at the 'notorious'
students of Nanterre, but at those of Strasbourg who, in 1966,
had got themselves onto the local UNEF committee. Their
unexpected election, though perfectly regular, was only pos
sible because the majority of students were completely unin
terested i n the platitudes of student politics, and because the
24
The Student Revolt
bureaucratic machi nery of the ol d UNEF had broken down.
The new committee decided t o expose university l i fe for
what i t real l y was. The resul t was what the press and UNEF
call ed the 'Strasbourg scandal ' .
The 'Strasbourg Scandal'
To begi n wi th, the committee used a number of unorthodox
methods to draw the students' attention to a pamphlet they
were produci ng in col laborati on with the Si tuati oni st Inter
nati onal, a pamphlet that marked a great step forward i n
French student afairs. On 26 October 1 966, A. Moles, Pro
fessor of psycho-soci ol ogy in the University of Strasbourg,
was bombarded wi th tomatoes duri ng his i naugural lecture.
Soon afterwards, members of the AFGES (Federal Associ a
ti on of Strasbourg Students) started a bi l l-sticki ng campai gn,
partly to adverti se their new pamphlet. They plastered the
walls with a comic strip cal led 'The Return of the Durutti
Column', in which they took a swipe at the old Communist
student ' leaders' .
The pamphlet, ' On the poverty of student l ife considered i n
its economi c, pol itical, psychol ogical , sexual and intellectual
aspects and some means of remedying it' was handed out at
the ofci al ceremony marki ng the beginning of the academi c
year; si multaneously the new AFGES let i t be known that i ts
onl y 'student' programme was the i mmediate dissol uti on of
the union. Thi s prospect struck many people as horri fyi ng;
the Dernieres nouvelles called i t ' the frst real si gn of a revolt'
(4 December 1 966). L'Aurore ( 1 6 November) had this to say :
'The Situationist Internati onal, wi th a handful of supporters
in al l the chi ef capitals of Europe, anarchists playi ng at revo
luti on, tal k of "sei zi ng power", not so as to take i t, but si mpl y
to destroy it, and wi th i t even thei r own authori ty. ' And the
good citizens, appal l ed that thei r own dear sons and
daughters might keep company with thi s scum, qui ckl y set
i ts judi ci al machi nery i n moti on, and proceeded agai nst the
students on a set of trumped-up charges.
25
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
'The accused have never denied the charge of misappropri a
ti ng the funds of the students' uni on. Indeed they freely admit
havi ng made AFGES pay some 5,000 francs for the cost of
printi ng and distributing 1 0,000 pamphlets, not to mention
other l iterature inspired by the Situationist Internati onal.
These publ ications express ideas and aspirations which, to
put i t mi ldly, have nothing to do wi th the ai ms of a student
uni on. One has only to read their publications for it to be
obvious that these fve students, scarcely more than adoles
cents, lacking any experience of real life, their minds con
fused with i l l -digested phi losophical, soci al, pol i ti cal, and
economi c theories, and bored by the drab monotony of their
everyday l i fe, make the empty, arrogant and pathetic cl ai m to
pass judgement and even to heap abuse upon their fellow
students, their professors, God, rel i gion, the clergy, the
government and poli tical and social systems of the entire
worl d. Rejecting all morality and restraint, their cynicism does
not hesitate to preach theft, an end to all studies, the suspen
sion of work, total subversion and world revoluti on wi th un
licensed pleasure as i ts only goal . In vi ew of their basically
anarchistic character, these theories and propaganda are
social l y noxious. Their wide dissemination in both student
circles and among the general publi c, by the local, nati onal
and forei gn press, is a threat to the morali ty, the studies and
the good name of the University, and thus the very future of
the students of Strasbourg.'
These remarks taken from the summing-up by the learned
judge are extremely i nteresting. They substantiate the charge
made by the pamphleteers themselves that students have been
turned into mere spectators of social events, consumers of
what scraps the system cares to throw their way. Moreover,
the pamphlet shows clearly that in our 'wealthy' society, the
student i s forced to l ive a life of extreme emotional poverty.
The writers have nothing but contempt for that class of
students who take no interest in any problems except their
own, who revel i n their alienation whi ch they vainly hope wi ll
attract the sympathy of a society indiferent to much more
poignant sufering throughout the world.
26
The Student Revolt
The l i beral university al lows its students a measure of l ib
erty, but only so long as they do not challenge the basi s of
universi ty educati on : the preparation of a pri vi leged mi nor
ity for a return to the ranks of the rul i ng cl ass from whi ch
they have taken temporary leave of absence. The university
has, i n fact, become a sausage-machi ne which turns out people
wi thout any real culture, and incapable of thi nki ng for them
selves, but trai ned to ft i nto the economic system of a hi ghl y
i ndustri al i zed soci ety. The student may glory i n the renown
of hi s uni versity status, but i n fact he i s bei ng fed 'cul ture' as a
goose is fed grai n - to be sacrifced on the altar of bourgeoi s
appetites.
After maki ng all these poi nts, the Strasbourg pamphlet goes
on to exami ne the current wave of student unrest. It is not
si mpl y the perenni al revolt of youth, but a revolt against the
specifc horrors of modern soci ety. As products of that
society, the students have but two alternatives : they can em
brace i t, or reject i t totally - there i s no mi ddl e way. An ex
treme exampl e of the second alternative i s the behavi our of
the blousons noirs, who run ri ot i n the streets wi thout any
apparent moti ve or object. They hi t out wi ldly at modern ci ty
l i fe, agai nst the plethora of equally steri le choi ces of enter
tai nment, the straitjacket of petty restricti ons and pol i ce con
trol . The blouson noir refuses to conform and yet expects al l
the goodi es of capi tal i st society to fal l i nto his l ap : cars, elec
tri c gui tars, clothes and records. But even if his way of acqui r
i ng these treasures - theft - i s one that strikes at the very roots
of soci ety, once he begins to enjoy their comforts, the blouson
nair is only too happy to settle down to a l i fe of humdrum
conformi sm.
The revolt of the Dutch Provos took place on a consi der
ably hi gher plane, though they, too, fai led to real i ze that the
proletari at alone i s capabl e of changi ng soci ety. Al l the Provos
are, i n fact, opposed to is the i ncreasi ng monotony of l i fe in a
capi tal ist country. They want to make l i fe more colourful, but
do not real i ze that whi l e the system remai ns as i t i s any i m
provements can, at best, be onl y ti nkeri ng wi th the machi nery,
benefti ng some secti ons but never the whole of society. Hence
27
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
the Provos can only succeed once they i ntegrate their struggl e
i nto the general fght against oppressi on.
The Strasbourg pamphlet then takes a bri ef l ook at the
Berkeley student revolt against the social system as such,
a system run by a hi erarchy which is a tool of the economy
and the State. The American students, they contend, made the
fundamental mi stake of considering themselves the spokes
men of the most exploited stratum of society.
Fi nally, the pamphlet mentions the Zengakuren (Uni on of
Revolutionary Japanese Students), and the Japanese League
of Young Marxi st Workers (the only organization i n which
young students and workers had begun to fght for common
objectives), two groups wi th no i l lusi ons, and determined to
fght against Western capitalism and Eastern bureaucracy
al i ke.
The Strasbourg pamphlet i s a radical cri ti que of the French
far-Left, i ncapable of any real action because it keeps rum
magi ng i n the dustbins of history. It was accorded a very
mi xed reception :
'This paper, wi th its high tone, must be considered a system
atic rejection of al l social and poli ti cal organizations as we
know them i n the West and the East, and of al l the groups
that are currently trying to transform them. ' (Le Monde,
9 December, 1 966.)
Other papers were far less friendly and objective, the more
so as the pamphlet brought student di scontent i nto the open :
i t acted as a ki nd of detonator. And although we, i n Nanterre,
di d not accept the Strasbourg i nterpretati on of the rol e of
mi nori ty groups, i . e. university students, in the soci al revol u
ti on, we di d al l we coul d i n hel pi ng to di stribute the pamphlet.
Moreover, si nce many students were delighted to fnd thei r
mi serable condition brought to publi c notice at l ast, and si nce
many lecturers were stricken wi th a bad conscience, we were
able to air the whole matter i n a number of sociology courses
and elsewhere. As a result, an i ncreasing number of students
became aware of the existence of the journal Interationale
situatiunniste and began to come to grips wi th the radi cal ideas
expressed in i t.
28
The Student Revol t
Libre Circulation The Battle ofthe Dormitories
Hand i n hand wi th thi s i deological break- through went an
i ntensifed attack on monastic uni versity regulati ons and par
ti cul arly on the prudi sh i ntervention i n the personal afai rs of
students l i vi ng i n the universi ti es. Thi s struggle was, i n fact,
only the begi nni ng of a general ofensive agai nst the uni versi ty
i nsti tuti on.
In 1 967, there were constant clashes between the admi ni
stration and a group of students who were determi ned to un
mask the repressive structure of what goes by the name of a
uni versity but i s, i n fact, nothi ng but a mi re of i ntel l ectual
corrupti on. To begi n wi th, the students call ed i n fami ly plan
ni ng experts and, wi th thei r help and by drawi ng on the pol i ti
cal, soci al and revol uti onary theories of Wi lhelm Rei ch,
started a sex-education campai gn on the campus. Thi s cul
mi nated i n male students forci bly entering the women's hostels
and after thi s many of the petty restrictions surroundi ng these
basti ons of French puri ty and chastity were repealed. There
the matter mi ght well have ended, had it not been for the
French scandal sheets which, having l i ed for so long about
rape, hashi sh and hard drugs on the campus, now thought
they had more tangi bl e evidence agai nst the students, and
threw out hi nts of an even greater sensati on. Twenty-ni ne
students were arrested and threatened wi th expul si on from the
uni versi ty. Unfortunately for the authori ti es, two of those
arrested, members of extreme left- wi ng groups, had been
away duri ng the 'scandal', and this attempt to di scredi t the
Left merely served to spread the struggle to uni versities
throughout France.
As a resu It, the restri cti ve hostel rules were repealed on 5
December i n Clermont- Ferrand, on 21 December i n Nantes,
and by 14 February 1 968 i n most other resi denti al universi ti es.
29
The Strategy and Nature of the Revol uti onary Movement
The Boycot t at Nantes
The fght at Nantes, in particular, revealed that the Rector
is j ust another part in the repressive state machi nery : when
the students assembled outside his oflce on 1 4 February, hi s
onl y answer was to call i n the police, who i mmedi ately set
about the student leaders. By behaving i n thi s way, the Rector
played directly i nto the students' hands : he demonstrated that
the university was not only a dispensary of dead knowledge
and routine i nformation on a conveyor bel t system - whi ch
most perceptive students knew anyway - but that it was ul ti
mately prepared to use violent repressi on. And why? Si mply
because its only function is to condi ti on students so that they
wi l l ft i nto the economic and social system, as mere puppets
dancing to the tune of technocrats, of men busi l y organi zing
the mi sery of the underdeveloped countries and the afuence
of the rest. And so di sgusted were the students of Nantes when
this point was at long last driven home to them that they
decided to boycott their psychology lectures, on the grounds
that though thi s di sci pl i ne l i kes to call itself a science, it i s
si mply another means of suppressing cri ti cal thought and i n
di vi dual i ty. The following rejection of contemporary psych
ology was plastered all over the walls of Nantes:
NOTICE
CONS I DER I NG
that psychology as such ai ms at the systematic subordination
of i ndi vi dual behaviour to false social norms;
CONSI DERING
that psychology i s i ncreasingly bei ng forced i nto the mould
of American psycho-sociology, ai med at perfecting the system
by condi tioni ng the workers to consume more and more rub
bi sh whi l e acquiescing i n economic exploi tation;
CONS! DER I NG
that psycho-sociology is nothing but the justi fcati on of ' i deal'
norms and a means of concealing the monstrous di screpancy
between the i deal and the real;
30
The Student Revol t
CONS! DER I NG
that thi s type of psychology is being used on the one hand to
subvert the workers' struggle and on the other hand i s bei ng
di ssemi nated by means of the uni versi ti es, the professi onal
classes, and the adverti si ng medi a;
CONSI DER I NG
that many students have embraced psychology in ignorance of
i ts true nature, and because they are seduced by i ts profes
sional gl amour;
CONSI DE R I NG
that they have been deceived by a form of obscurantism hi di ng
under a ri di culous pseudo-sci enti fc cloak, and representing
a vi ci ous assaul t upon li berty;
CONSI DER I N G
that the total rejection of modern psychology i s a reafrma
tion of PERSONA L LIBERTY, of the I NNOCE NCE O F DESI RE,
of the forgotten JOYS of CREATIVI TY, PLA Y, I RONY, and
H APPI NESS . . .
T H E AGEN-UNE F TH EREFORE CALLS ON A L L STUDENTS OF
PSYCHOLOGY TO ABANDON THEIR STUDI ES.
Thi s proclamati on bore a remarkable resemblance to that
of the ' rabi d' students of Strasbourg. But the 'extremists' of
Nantes refused to act as a closed group and called at al l ti mes
for mass parti cipati on. Their agitation cul mi nati ng i n the
occupation of the Rector's ofce, thi s was agai n copi ed by
students throughout France.
But already people had begun to speak of Nanterre, and al most
overni ght thi s charmi ng and ugly concrete annexe of Pari s
Uni versity, thi s ' model uni versity' became a hotbed of di ssent.
Agitati on at Nanterre had become a semi - permanent feature
of university l i fe, di fcul t to describe to anyone who di d not
actual l y experi ence it. Its chi ef purpose was to galvanize a
conformi st i nsti tuti on whi ch, because of its fear of transfor
mati on, tried to protect i tself by i deological and, when neces
sary, by physical repressi on. 'The uni versity i s tradi ti onally a
peaceful i nstitution whose smooth working depends on the
rejection of viol ence by all who attend i t and on the collective
*The Nantes branch of UN E F.
3 1
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
acceptance of regulations' - so said the heads of the vari ous
faculties at Nanterre.
But, i n fact, these regulations are si mpl y means whereby
the ofcial di spensers of 'knowledge' consoli date their place
i n the hi erarchy, and repel every attack on their own medi
ocrity.
The smooth runni ng of a university presupposes acqui esence
in its ideology and structure, i . e. acceptance of the part i t plays
in churni ng out trained recruits for the rul i ng class. But whi l e
the smug admi ni strators and reactionaries of tomorrow eke
out thei r boring days on the campus, many students resent the
futi l i ty of l i fe i n what i s at best a mi ddl e class ghetto. The
more revolutionary among them are particularly resentful of
the fact that their voice counts for nothi ng among the real
poli cy-makers. Hence the sporadic outbursts by di ferent
student organizations throughout the worl d.
The Protest Groll's
This process has been greatly accelerated by the war in Viet
nam, which struck many students and i ntel lectuals as utterly
scandalous, not only because i t represents an attempt by the
Americans to di ctate to the rest of the worl d, but al so because
the 'soci al i st' bureaucracies are prepared to stand by and let
it happen. At frst, student protest against the war was spon
taneous and di sorganized but as the United States became
more blatantly and unashamedly aggressive, the CVB (Comite
Vietnam de Base) was formed and helped to consol i date
student opi ni on at large. Soon afterwards, students began to
take direct action against the representatives of U.S. i mperi al
i sm i n France and organized ral l i es i n support of the Vi et
namese, l i ke the one on 7 February 1 968. Thi s showed that
French students were no longer prepared to stop at mere ver
bal protest . Then came the Tet ofensive and with it a growing
sense of frustrati on. In Vietnam, a smal l peasant country was
wi thstandi ng the aggression of the greatest mi l itary power
on earth, and here were we, unable to do anythi ng to help. As
32
The Student Revol t
resentment and gui l t mounted, more and more students threw
themselves wholeheartedly i nto the Vi etnamese campaign.
Though there was much to cri ti ci ze in the Nati onal Li beration
Front and in the regime of North Vi etnam and, for that matter
in Castro's Cuba, the defant and unshakeabl e resi stance of
ordi nary Vi etnamese and Cubans al i ke had proved that a
super-organized and super- armed capi tal i st soci ety is not i n
vi nci bl e.
The hard facts were thrust under the noses of students :
repressi ve soci eti es can onl y be chal lenged by revoluti onary
means. The response was world-wi de.
Tokyo: The students and the young workers i n the Zenga
kuren refused to countenance government compl i ci ty i n the
i mperi al i st aggressi on agai nst Vi etnam. Battles wi th the pol ice
prevented Japanese ports from bei ng turned i nto major
Ameri can bases.
Madrid: Students openly challenged Franco's Fascism in
the uni versi ti es. Faced wi th vi olent repressi on, they made com
mon cause wi th workers' commi ttees in the fght for a soci al
revol uti on.
Rome: By vi olent clashes wi th the uni versity authori ti es
and the pol i ce, I tal ian students demonstrated thei r contempt
for a uni versi ty that does not chal lenge capi tali st soci ety. The
result was complete paralysis of the uni versity system.
Warsaw: Students made common cause wi th i ntellectual s
i n an open chal l enge of the i deological and pol i ti cal di ctator
shi p of a bureaucratic party.
Berkeley - Columbia - New York: Students, si ckened by
the i mperi al i st poli ci es of thei r country, especi al l y i n Vi etnam,
showed thei r sol i dari ty with the Vi etnamese peasants and
workers and wi th the oppressed raci al and economi c mi nori
ti es i n thei r own country. They made known thei r refusal to
become pri vi leged members of the American bourgeoi si e.
33
The Strategy and Nature of the Revoluti onary Movement
Agitation at Nanterre
So much for the events outside France. In Nanterre, the frst
term of the 'hi storic' year of 1 967/68 saw a student stri ke
whi ch went far beyond the traditi onal political and union
framework. Some 1 0,000 to 1 2,000 of us boycotted al l lec
tures in order to force the authorities to i mprove our worki ng
conditions. Thi s 'model strike' as Le Figaro called i t, was not,
in efect, anything but a protest agai nst overcrowdi ng, whi ch
had been exacerbated by the recent Fouchet reforms and the
consequent re- organization of lecture halls. As a result of thi s
stri ke, a seri es of departmental commi ssi ons was set up but
these proved completely unproductive because of the authori
tari an approach of the professors i nvolved.
Let us note in parentheses that the UNEF committee i n
Nanterre di d l i ttle more than try to l ead the strike once i t was
already in full swi ng. The refusal by the ul tra-Leftists to
acknowledge the authority of this so-cal led student union,
mor ibund throughout the country and a complete farce i n
Nanterre, si mply refected our determination to reject al l
bureaucracy. And, indeed, i n thi s we were entirely successful .
The second term brought a series of i ncidents, most of
them the spontaneous expressi on of wi despread student di s
satisfacti on. The ' Missofe afair' duri ng the openi ng of the
swi mming pool at the end of January 1 968 wi l l long be re
membered, because this banal incident had wide repercus
sions. An exceedingly stupi d mi nor police ofcial (whom we
salute in passing) started extradi ti on proceedings agai nst
D. Cohn-Bendi t, who had accused Mi ssofe, the Mi nister for
Youth, of talking l i ke a Hitler Youth. By way of retal iation,
the students stuck up photographs of pl ai n-clothes poli cemen
mingl ing wi th members of the faculty, and also denounced
the admi nistration and the Dtan as so many 'tools of the pre
fecture'. A convincing demonstration of soli dari ty and of pro
test against the proposed expulsion of Cohn- Bendi t ended i n
scumes wi th the r iot pol ice whom the Dean had cal led i n. A
short battle, in which students bombarded the pol ice wi th
34
The Student Revolt
anythi ng handy, ended i n victory : the police beat a hasty
retreat. But the students had felt the iron fst under the l i beral
glove of the universi ty.
In fact, M. Grappi n, the Dean, was not the ' Nazi ' people
made hi m out to be but a 'good' man of the Left. Our struggle
was not one agai nst Fascism as such but against bourgeois
authori tari ani sm. The medi ocri ty of university teachi ng is iw
accident, but refects the l i fe style of a ci vi l izati on in whi ch
culture i tself has become a marketable commodi ty and i n
which the absence of al l cri tical faculties i s the safest guaran
tee of 'proftable speci al ization of university studi es' . The only
way to oppose thi s type of stupi di ty i s to attack al l those
academic restri cti ons whose only justifcation i s that they
exi st : curri cul a; tests; set lectures and competi ti ve entrance
examinati ons.
Why Sociologists ?
It was agai nst thi s background that the events of 22 March
1968 must be v iewed. Towards the middle of March, students
in the department of social psychology, fndi ng their courses
too academi c, decided to boycott the exami nati ons and they
sealed thei r deci si on by si ngi ng the Internati onal e. At the same
t i me, a leafet was distri buted on the campus. It was cal led :
'Why do we need sociologists ? '
'Students often ask themselves what jobs there are i n soci
ology and psychol ogy.
'The facts are clear to one and al l : there are many more
students of soci al science than there are jobs wai ti ng outsi de,
and thi s even after el i mi nation by the exami nati ons. The con
cern whi ch students feel about thei r future goes hand i n hand
wi th the concern which they feel about the theoretical posi ti on
taken up by their lecturers, whose constant appeals to sci ence
only emphasize the confusion of their vari ous doctri nes.
' Moreover, student agi tati on si nce 1 960, abroad as i n
France, has been ri fe among sociologi sts far more than among
other soci al scienti sts and phi losophers. Students from other
35
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
faculties have been remarkably passive. As a result, university
and general soci al problems were aired i n only one depart
ment, numeri cally weak and of fai rly recent ori gi n.
'The case was si mi lar i n the U.S. A. , i n France, i n Germany,
and also in Poland and in Czechoslovaki a.
'Why was student dissatisfaction i n al l these countri es ex
pressed predominantly by social psychologi sts? Why did they
act whi l e the rest fol lowed at a distance?
'Why this theoretical questioning and why so much anxiety
about our future?
SHORT HI STORY OF S OCI AL PS YCHOLOGY
'We can only outli ne what a more detai led study wi l l no
doubt fll i n one day. Meanwhile students are invited to boy
cot t all sociology lectures.
'We must re-examine the whole problem in its hi stor ical
perspecti ve. The frst important date i s 1 930 wi th research at
the Mayo Foundation and at Hawthorne.
' In drawi ng attention to the importance of group psy
chology and by developing new methods of adapting the worker
to the i ndustrial machi ne and thereby increasing his output,
Mayo di d more than open new vistas to sociology - i t put an
end to speculati on and i naugurated the glori ous new era of
empi ri ci sm and of scientifc method.
'Si mi larly, by lendi ng its services to business management,
i ndustri al psychology opened the way for large-scale collabor
ati on wi th the world bourgeoi si e, thus helpi ng to underpi n a
system whi ch was sti ll shaking from the crash of 1 929.
'The transformation of academic sociology, a branch of
philoJophy, into an independent study with scientifc preten
sions, corresponds to the transformation of competitive
capitalism into a state-controlled economy.
'From that point, the new social psychology has increas
i ngl y been used by the bourgeoi si e to help rati onal ize society
wi thout jeopardizing either profts or stabi l ity.
The evidence i s al l around us. Industri al soci ology i s
chiefy concerned with ftting the man to the job; the converse
need to ft the job to the man i s neglected. Soci ologists are
36
The Student Revolt
pai d by the employers and must therefore work for the ai ms
of our economi c system : maxi mum producti on for maxi mum
proft.
' Pol i t ical soci ology, with i ts opi nion polls, i ni ti ates vast i n
qui ri es, whose results are misleadi ng i n that they suggest that
electoral choices are the only val i d ones. Stoufer has pro
posed methods of i mproving American army morale wi thout
any concern for the basi c problem: the role of the army i n
modern soci ety. Adverti si ng soci ologists develop thousands of
ways of condi ti oni ng the consumer, once agai n i gnori ng the
soci al functi on of thi s adverti si ng.
' Moreover, i n deal i ng with the cl ass probl em i n the U.S. A. ,
Ameri can soci ologists have discarded the very concepts of
classes and the class struggle, substi tuti ng the theory of a
conti nuous scal e of i ncreasing status. They assume that each
i ndi vi dual starts of with the same chance of reachi ng the
top - for, after al l , America is a democratic country!
'Qui te apart from the theoreti cal refutations of Mi l ls and
D. Riesman, the practi cal refutation by the exi stence i n
America of a sub-proletariat (e. g. the Negroes and the ethni c
minori ti es) , and by the struggle of groups of i ndustri al
workers agai nst thei r trade uni on machi ne, clearly dispels thi s
dream of successful soci al i ntegrati on.
' Qui te recently, the Ameri can Negro Rebel l ion has created
such a pani c that Congress has voted extra subsi dies for re
search i nto "the problem of the ci ti es and the suppressi on of
the forces of Revolt" ( quoted i n Le Mondc) .
'Last but not least, we shoul d menti on that, when the U.S.
Secretary for Defence launched his "anti -subversi ve" cam
paign i n Lati n America ( the famous Camelot pl an) he coul d
thi nk of no better way of disgui si ng hi s real i ntenti ons than
cal l i ng i t a soci ological study project.
'So much for the United States. In France the rati onal iza
tion of capi tali sm was ushered in wi th the advent of the post
war plans, but did not become a seri ous busi ness unti l the
rise of Gaul l i sm with its authori tari an structures. Now it i s not
by chance that Soci ology degrees were frst i ntroduced i n 1 958.
The fact that French capi tali sm lags behi nd U.S. capi tali sm
37
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
has necessari ly had repercussions on the academi c l evel . Al l
modern French sociology i s a belated import from across the
Atlantic, and as everyone knows, the best trai ni ng for a socio
logist is to read all the American pamphlets and magazines.
S OCI OLOGI CAL ' THEORY'
'We have seen what close links there are between soci ological
theory and the social needs of the bourgeoi si e. The practi cal
organization of capitalism produces a host of contradictions,
which various branches of sociology are expected to remove.
Some are set to study juveni le delinquency, others racism, yet
others slums. Each group seeks solutions of its particular
problem and leaves it at that, thus addi ng its bit to the j ig-saw
puzzle of "sociological theories".
The resulting confusion i s refected in the interdi scipl i nary
fragmentation of the social sciences, so wi despread today
(cf. Althusser) . The incomprehension of each speci al ist when
confronted with the research of his fellows makes them col
lecti vely incapable of any general statement beyond mere
plati tude.
' And underneath i t all i s the conveniently forgotten absence
of theoretical framework common to sociology and the other
human sciences. Social psychologists are agreed on only one
poi nt : the need to develop technical methods of soci al adap
tati on and re-adaptation and of resolvi ng social conficts.
Just look at the concepts which are currently popular : hier
archy, r itual, adaptation, social function, social control,
equi l i brium, etc.
The "theorist" i s expected to expl ai n the nature of local
conficts removed from their social context, in which, alone,
their cause can be understood.
Thi s al legedly impartial procedure is, in fact, thoroughly
partial and biased: phenomena are studied i n i solation
whereas i n fact they are i nter-related (e. g. racism, unemploy
ment, del i nquency and slums), and the rational nature of the
present economic system i s taken for granted. Si nce the word
"proft" has lost its respectabi l i ty, sociologists now speak of
"growth". But how does thi s "growth" arise i n the frst place,
38
The Student Revol t
who organizes it, whom does i t proft? These questions are
apparently too speculative to i nterest a "pure" sci ence.
'It fol lows that the disquiet of soci ology students cannot be
understood wi thout looki ng at the relati onshi p between
sociology and soci ety. In our day, sociologists have chosen
thei r side: that of management and the State. What, i n thi s
case, i s the poi nt of defending sociology, as some have
recommended us to do? '
Thi s general anal ysis explai ns the particular case o f Nan
terre. Here, too, the general cri sis i n soci ology, anxiety about
jobs, anger about teaching methods and the i mportation of
doctri nes made i n the U.S. A. , were the basi s of student agi
tat i on. Those who remained outsi de the empi ri ci st-posi ti vi st
mai nstream found themselves isolated and impotent.
The two great 'hopes' of French sociology are the jargon of
Parsons (author of 'The place of ulti mate val ues i n soci ologi cal
theory') and the cul t of statistics (at least a bi t of real sci ence,
this); these are the keys to every problem. In short, soci
ologi sts by a tour de force have succeeded in taki ng out the
pol i ti cal sting from their doctrines, which i s equivalent to
sancti fying the status quo. Sociology professors l i ke to pass
for Leftists, in contrast to the heads of other departments
who apparently sti l l hanker after the good old ti mes. Whi l e
the latter try to cl ing to thei r crumbl ing i vory tower, soci olo
gi sts welcome 'moderni zation' : planning, rationalization and
production of consumer goods in accordance with the eco
nomic needs of organized capitalism.
In thi s connexi on, it is important to refute the i deas of
Crozier ( Esprit, January 1 967) and Tourai ne (series of arti cles
i n Le Monde), two professors of soci ology at Nanterre. Ac
cordi ng to Crozier, the troubles i n America are not, as i s
naively bel ieved, due to the violence of the blacks dri ven to
desperati on by their l ivi ng condi t ions, nor to the horrors of
the i mperi al ist war i n Vi etnam (thi s ' acci dent' , thi s pi ece of
'fol ly', as Crozier calls i t) . Such explanations, he claims, are
magi cal rather than sci enti fc. Nor are the troubl es the resul t
of the moral vacuum i n American soci ety, where cash
39
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
i s the only thi ng that counts. In fact, si nce violence has always
taken place in the U.S. A. , the only thing that is new i n the
present situation, according to Crozier, is the spread of ration
al izati on, and the need for people to adjust to i t. So the pro
fessor's U.S. A. i s not the scene of a real struggle between
social groups fghting for diferent materi al i nterests and soci o
economic priori ti es, but a sort of puppet show where
Punch, representing Anarchy, tries to get the better of the
Pol iceman, representing A Rational Society! Thi s sociological
'analysis' would not be worth the trouble of a refutation, were
it not for the practical advice which Crozier ofers to the
Negroes - not to seek power, but to change their attitude
(sic! ) and soon all wi l l realize the great American dream of a
country peopled with dynamic personaliti es.
Touraine, for his part, has put forward the fol lowing thesis :
the function of the university is to foster knowledge i n the
service of growth (once again!) and i n so doi ng i t necessarily
challenges old ideas and produces conficts that are frui tful to
both students and professors. In fulfl l ing its function of stimu
lating society the uni versity thus parallels the 'healthy com
petition of ni neteenth-century private enterpri se' . Of course
thi s analysis by Touraine is so much hot air. It i s qui te untrue
to say, for i nstance, that 'knowledge and technical progress
are the mai nsprings of the new society'. In fact, knowledge
and technical progress come bottom of the list in order of i m
portance - far below competition for a l ion's share in the
profts ( i . e. for a monopoly), or the mi l itary and economi c
confrontation between East and West. Sociologists are not the
disi nterested spectators they claim to be, nor i s sci ence a glori
ous pursui t that seeks nothing beyond pure knowledge. If our
analysis has shown anything, i t i s that the modern university
is not the place for solving social contradictions, which can
only be removed by the transformation of that society i n
whi ch the university plays an integral part.
40
The Student Revolt
Students and Society
There are 600,000 of us; sometimes treated as mere chi ldren,
someti mes as adul ts. We work, but produce nothi ng. Often we
have no money, but few of us are really poor. Although most
of us come from the bourgeoi si e, we do not always behave
l i ke them. The gi rl s among us look l i ke boys but are not sure
whether they really want to be boys. We look upon our pro
fessors as part father, part boss and part teacher, and can' t
quite make up our mi nds about them. Some of us are des
t i ned to control the nati on, others wi l l become poorl y pai d
i ntel lectual hacks - but every one of us i s pri vi leged for all
that. There are 600,000 of us - the so-cal led 'students' of the
mi l i tary academy at St Cyr, the arti sts and the 'arti es', the
technocrats of the faculty of pol it ical science ( the Ecole
Nationale d' Admi nistrati on), and the ri gi d Marxist ' i ntellec
tuals' of the Sorbonne, of Nanterre and elsewhere. We i ncl ude
followers of L' Humanite and ' mi l itant' journals, assi duous
readers of Le Monde, and devotees of the sporti ng press or
the ci nema, beatniks, crammers, spoi lt rich ki ds who never
graduate, girls who wi l l marry duri ng their frst year, but
meanwhi l e study law, languages and even psychology, dunces,
duds, future mathematicians and doctors. How can one ' un
derstand' modern students? Onl y by trying to understand thei r
place i n soci ety.
A modern uni versi ty has two contradictory roles. To begi n
with, a universi ty must churn out the trai ned personnel that i s
so essenti al for bureaucratic capital i sm. The system needs an
ever increasi ng number of engi neers, techni ci ans, sci enti sts,
teachers, admi nistrators and sociologists to organize produc
tion, to 'rational ize' i ndustri al methods, to run the giganti c state
machi ne, 'to adjust the psychology of i ndi viduals and groups'
and to preserve thei r sanity, even to 'organize' leisure activi ti es.
Now, si nce the bourgeoi si e itself cannot provide enough stu
dent mater ial from among its own ranks, increasi ng numbers
of bri ght lads are recruited from the lower mi ddl e classes
and even the proletariat and the peasantry. The ' ri ght-thi nk-
41
The Strategy and Nature of the Revoluti onary Movement
i ng' Left concentrates i ts fre on the class structure of French
higher education, but stressing that only 6 per cent of the
students are the sons of workers, when, in fact, they should be
attacking the social function of the university : the producti on
of a managerial el ite. If some self-destructive ft should seize
the bourgeoi si e overnight and persuade i t to recrui t students
exclusively from among the sons of manual workers, the uni
versity woul d become more democratic only in its composi
ti on. To the extent that the development of new manufacturing
techniques is i ncreasingly el i mi nating the need for unski lled
labour, it i s i nevitable that pseudo-democratization by the
recruitment of working class chi ldren to the universi ti es wi l l
increase. In the past, the economic depression of the worki ng
and lower middle classes meant that sendi ng one chi l d, let
alone several chi l dren, to the university, imposed an i ntoler
able fnancial burden on the family, but higher wages and
government grants now make i t more and more possi bl e. And
what al l the reformi sts - be they Communists, Soci al Demo
crats or left-wing Gaull ists - really mean when they cry for
the 'democratization' of the universities, i s that thi s process
be speeded up.
But i n any case i t i s obvious that, as capital ism increases its
demands for graduates, not only the prize pigs, but more and
more horses, sheep, even chickens, will all be pressed into the
sausage machi ne. Now this is precisely where the contradiction
i n the system l ies. The production of the maxi mum number of
graduate workers in the mi nimum ti me cal l s for increasi ngly
closer contacts between the universities and industry, for the
ever greater adaptati on of education to specifc industrial
needs. But at the same ti me, the university i s supposed to be the
supreme guardian of 'culture', human reason and disinter
ested research, of unalloyed truth and objecti vi ty. In brief, the
university i s supposed to be the temple and eternal repository
of the spiritual values of society. Now i f, for 'spiritual values'
we read the ' i deology and values of the rul ing class', we are
left wi th the role the university has played from the Middle
Ages down to the First World War. We mi ght say that duri ng
thi s period the 'social' and 'cultural' role of the universi ties
42
The Student Revol t
more or less overlapped. Society needed a relati vely smal l
number of lawyers, doctors, philosophers and professors, and
chose them al most exclusively from among the sons of the
rul ing class. These enjoyed a humani sti c and l i beral education
and were prepared to condone the most glari ng soci al contra
di ctions, whi l e comforting themselves with the thought that
the bourgeoi si e was a champi on of l i berali zati on, democracy,
universal education, etcetera. Later, a measure of petty
bourgeois radicalism began to fl ter into the university, but
was contai ned at a purely theoretical level : the crisis of society
had not yet real l y occupied the academies.
Today, it i s the economi c rather than the theoret i cal role of
the university which is predomi nant. This explai ns why the uni
versit ies have been spl i t up into a set of technical hi gh schools,
so many appendages to the major industri es. But the system
is i nternally i nconsistent - it can only functi on by tryi ng to
suppress its own logi c. The 'cultural ' functi on of the university
i s constantl y assai led and has constantly to be re- afrmed.
After al l , even an al i enated society cannot al low itself to be
come al i enated to the poi nt of psychosi s. Even a total i tari an
soci ety, wi th i ts determi nation to subjugate every part of l ife
to the will of the rul ing class, group or party, cannot in the
long run aford to suppress sci enti fc ohjectivity, and wi thout
it, woul d quickly peri sh. For the strictest uti l itari an reasons,
modern soci eti es need fundamental and ' di si nterested' research
- because advances in appl ied technology depend on them. Thi s
the Ameri can bourgeoi si e has come to real ize more and more
clearl y.
Hence the basi c problem of higher education is, then, that,
whi l e i t cannot completely ignore the old humanisti c val ues,
si nce, after al l , sci ent ists and research workers must be pro
duced, only the fragmentation of knowledge can supply al l
the faceless managers and techni cians that are needed.
We have seen that the students are a soci ally heterogeneous
group. They are also a transitory one, and their vari ety of so
cial expectati ons i ncreases their heterogenei ty. Dependi ng on
his subj ect and the i mportance of his fami l y connexi ons,
a student may end up wi th a j ob worth 30,000 francs a
43
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
month, and quite a few students want nothing better than that .
Their studies take from three to seven years. Hence whi l e
the younger students are sti l l irresponsible adolescents, their
older col leagues are men wi th a professi on. Nor do these ex
tremes always understand one another.
And yet i t was these very students, the most heterogeneous
of all soci al groups, who succeeded i n banding together for
collective pol itical action, as witness thei r resistance to war
i n Algeria and the events of May 1 968. The student move
ment was, i n fact, the only 'hard' reaction agai nst the war i n
Algeria, what wi th vi olent demonstrati ons, and constant
propaganda campaigns during the later years. It was always
given out that 'only a mi nority' participated in these student
protests, but this minority represented at least 25 per cent
of the French student populati on. As for the rest of the
country, their protests remained largely verbal. The absence of
organized protest outside of the universities can be lai d
squarely at the door of the Communist Party - i t was both
unwi l l i ng and unable to organize efective opposi ti on to the
war and support for the Algerian revoluti onari es. Only to
wards the very end, did the Communist Party see ft to hol d a
few demonstrations, includi ng the one at Charonne Metro
Station (Paris) where eight people were ki l led by the poli ce.
The remarkable phenomenon of student opposi ti on was
due to several factors, chi ef among them what so many
people call sneer ingly ' the revolt of modern youth'. Now thi s
revolt, whi ch involves ever larger numbers of young people
throughout the worl d, must not be confused wi th the old 'con
fict between the generations'. The latter, as we know i t, parti c
ularly i n earlier forms of bourgeois society, refected the i m
patience of the young to step into the shoes of the ol d. This
i mpatience often took the form of an attack on the fossi l ized
thi nki ng of the older generation and sometimes crystal lized
into a l i beral , radical or a reformist attitude. In the current
revolt of youth, however, very much more i s being questioned
- the distaste is for the system itself. Modern youth is not so
much envious of, as disgusted with, the dead, empty lives of
their parents. This feeling began among bourgeois chi ldren
44
The Student Revolt
but has now spread through al l levels of soci ety. Dani el
Mothe (Socialisme ou Barbaric No. 33) has shown clearly how
opposed young workers are to both the 'values' that capital
ist society has to ofer them and also to worki ng class values
and traditional forms of organization (pol itical parties and
trade unions) . Factory work, trade union ' mi l itancy', verbose
party programmes, and the sad, colourless l ife of their elders
are subjects only for their sarcasm and contempt.
The same sort of disdain i s the reason why so many students
have taken a radical stand, and have made common cause
wi th young workers i n the struggle against a repressive society.
Another factor i n the student revol t was their own posi
ti on in the system and the special probl ems i t brings to l ight.
A mi nori ty of students accept the culture which i s bei ng dis
pensed to them, and the knowledge whi ch is bei ng l adl ed out,
wi th the trust of smal l chi ldren. They have been completely
taken i n by what we have cal led the mythical secondary func
ti on of the modern university as the templ e of values. They
duti ful l y attend al l their lectures, and try above al l to pass off
as their own their professor's ideas; their ambi ti ons stop short
at the coveted degree, or perhaps to become, i f they are worthy
of i t, professors themselves. However, this fraction of student
opi ni on i s fast dwi ndl i ng away - for reasons we shal l exami ne
below. Another fracti on can see through the system, but keep
their eyes frmly on the mai n chance : they are the opportunists,
only concerned with their professional future. They real ize
that much of what they are taught is false, or at least i nade
quate, they have no i l lusions about the purely uti l i tarian func
t ion of thei r education, know that they wi ll be ftted to hold
down a 'good' job, and are wi l l i ng to accept the ofcial bri bes
of privi lege, a car, hol idays abroad, money, a house i n the
country.
Thi s section can always be mobi l ized in defence of the
system. More often, however, they simply si t back and watch
their more mi l i tant col leagues fght battles from whi ch all
students wi ll beneft : for less overcrowding, better faci l i ti es,
etcetera.
But for a third and constantly growi ng group, university
45
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
l i fe itself raises a series of fundamental questi ons. And once
they start to analyse their own problems, the logic of their
conclusions drives them on ultimately to reject the whole of
contemporary society. This i s because, as an essential part of
the social system, the university necessari l y contains all the
contradictions, conficts and paradoxes that characterize soci
ety itself.
We have said a uni versity i s supposed to be a seat of learn
i ng and rational i nquiry. Now what young economist, for i n
stance, can seriously beli eve i n the rati onal character of the
contemporary economic scene, whether planned or not? And
only a few diehards among their teachers sti ll pretend that
the system is even capable of rati onali zation. How can an
economi st talk seri ously about the rational di stri buti on of
goods i n view of the glari ng contradiction between the afu
ence of the highly i ndustrialized countries and the misery of
the Thi rd Worl d? How can a young i ndustri al psychologist
hel p bei ng lead to self-questi oni ng when he sees that the object
of his di sci pli ne is to 'ft the man to the job' and that the job
itsel f is deadly and qui te futi l e? How can a young physi cist i g
nore the theoretical cri si s that i s shaking the very foundations
of contemporary physics and wi th it all its cl aims to be an
exact science; how can he tell hi msel f that his research is of
beneft to humanity, in an age whi ch has produced the
H- bomb? Can he really avoid wondering about hi s personal re
sponsi bi l ity when the greatest atomi c scientists themselves
are begi nning to question the function of science and its rol e
i n society?
And how can students of social psychology possibly shut
their eyes to their professional role : to help in the sacred i nter
est of proft, to break in more workers to the conveyor belt,
or to launch yet another useless product on the market?
If these doubts about the value of one's studies are exam
i ned, i nevitably the system whi ch organizes i t i s brought i nto
question as wel l . Subjects for courses are pi cked out of the
hat; there i s no logic in the curricul um, other than keeping re
search subservient to the demands of i ndustry or, perhaps, the
professor's next book.
46
The Student Revol t
These lectures reduce the student to the rol e of a l i stener;
he is there to record, to remember, to reproduce in his exam
the lecturer's threadbare arguments, opi ni ons and style. The
more opportuni st a student is, the more he wi l l try to ape hi s
teacher's every word, i n the certain knowledge that hi s fnal
marks wi l l be hi gh. However, many students are becomi ng i n
creasingly di sgusted and sickened not onl y by thi s system but
by the very culture that produces and fosters i t.
There i s one last element which shoul d be menti oned i n the
students' situation : i t i s the explanation both of the relati ve
ease wi th whi ch they become involved i n pol iti cal activity and
of the often superfcial nature of this i nvolvement.
The student, at least, in the modern system of hi gher educa
ti on, still preserves a considerable degree of personal free
dom, if he chooses to exercise i t. He does not have to earn his
own l i vi ng, his studies do not occupy al l hi s ti me and he has
no foreman on his back. He rarel y has a wi fe and chi ldren to
feed. He can, if he so chooses, take extreme pol i ti cal posi ti ons
wi thout any personal danger; in general , he is not subjected
to formal sanctions or even repri mands. Now, these very fac
tors have an i n bui l t i nhi bit ing mechani sm: they far too often
cause hi s engagement to lack consistency and force.
However, when a minority of students takes conscious
advantage of their freedom to attack the establ ished order,
they can become a catalyst activating a larger section of the
student popul ati on. It i s at thi s stage, and onl y at thi s stage, that
the struggle becomes transformed qual itati vely, and the uni
versity authori ti es feel compelled to cal l in the pol i ce.
The ensui ng struggle i s especi ally threatening to the author
i ties as the student population keeps goi ng up by leaps and
bounds . It constantly exceeds the ofcial estimates ( the Fourth
Plan foresaw 500,000 students for 1 97 1 ; there were al ready
more than 600,000 by 1 968) . Pressure i s continual l y increas
ing : the ti me-and-moti on study boys have al ready got out their
stop watches to cal culate how long i t takes to teach the Theory
of Rel ati vi ty. Most students wi l l end up as managers and ad
mi ni strators, toi l i ng away amid mi l li ons of other workers at
their narrow l i ttle tasks, wi thout any chance of deci di ng their
47
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
place in society, their work, in short, the pattern of their lives.
The so-cal led ' l iberal' professions wi ll become less and less l i b
eral as the values on which they are ostensibly based are
i ncreasi ngly perverted by the State.
For al l that, we are not so much protesting that our educa
tion i s out of touch with the needs of the future, nor compl ai n
i ng about the shortage of jobs, we totally reject the entire
system. Our protest only turns i nto vi olent acti on because the
structure of society cannot be smashed by talk or ballot papers.
To dream of turni ng the uni versity i nto an ' i sland unto i t
self', where every man wi ll be able to work i n i ndependence and
peace, i s in any case an empty dream because the future ' i n
tel lectual worker' wi l l not be abl e to accept the fragmented
and al ienated life which this dream entai l s.
As a result, the student movement has become revolution
ary and not simply a university protest. It does not rule out
reforms ( i ts actions, i n fact, provoke them) but i t tri es beyond
i ts immediate aims to elaborate a strategy that will radically
change the whole of society. This strategy will carry the stu
dent movement through success and failure, through periods
of open confict and apparent i nacti on, but as every year
passes, and the educational system shows ever more clearly
its ideological loyalties and its repressive nature, the student
wi l l fnd hi mself as al ienated from the society i n which he l ives
as the lowest wage earner.
The 22 March Movement
On Friday, 22 March, following the arrest of six mi l itants of
the National Vi etnam Committee, a crowd of students
assembled qui te spontaneously for a protest at Nanterre. At
the end of the meeting, it was decided to occupy the admi ni s
trative bui l di ng. That eveni ng, more than 1 50 students, of
whom at least 50 per cent were poli tical l y uncommi tted, met
in the Staf Common Room and carried on a heated debate
unti l two in the morni ng (The Uni on of Communi st Students
natural l y washed i ts hands of the whole afai r) . The results of
48
The Student Revol t
the di scussi on were summarized i n a statement, 5, 000 copi es
of whi ch were di stri buted the next day.
'
A CT I ON AND RE ACTI ON
' Fol l owi ng a demonstrati on organized by the Nati onal Vi et
nam Commi ttee, several demonstrators have been arrested i n
the street or i n thei r homes, and charged wi th organizi ng
attacks on Ameri can bui ldi ngs i n Pari s. Once agai n we have
come face to face wi th the usual police repressi on. After the
i nvasi on of Nanterre and Nantes by pl ai n-clothes cops -
'
THE BL A CK L I STS;
' After the arrest and i mpri sonment of thi rty workers and
students i n Caen;
' After conti nuous rai ds, searches and arrests of students
i nsi de the uni versity, a further step -
the arrest of militants no longer stops with the end of dem
onstration, but is continued by house arrests.
' For us this is no mere coi nci dence. The authori ti es have been
dri ven i nto a corner; capi tal i sm i s badl y i n need of repai r. To
achi eve thi s end, the rul i ng class has seen ft to ti ghten up the
rei ns. It now:
- challenges the workers' r ight of associ ati on
- ni bbles away at soci al secur ity
- tri es to run soci ety l i ke an army
- i ntroduces psychosoci ol ogical techni ques i nto i ndustry in a
desperate attempt to play down class conf icts (some of us arc
bei ng trai ned for thi s very task) .
'
CAP I T AL I S M CAN NO L ONGE R CONCE AL I TS HA ND
' We must stop chal l engi ng capi tal i sm by means of outdated
techni ques .
'The Soci al i st Wi l son has clamped down on Engl and and
now de Gaul l e i s clampi ng down on us. I t i s too late for the
ki nd of peaceful procession organi zed by the SNESUP ( Uni
versity Teachers' Uni on) for next Thursday.
'We have to thrash out the problems i nsi de the uni versi ty
and act ri ght where we work.
49
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
'We call on you to transform the 29th into a vast debate on
Capitalism in 1968 and the workers' struggles
- University and Anti-University
- The Anti-Imperialist Struggle
- The Workers' and Students' Struggle in the East and the
West.
'We shall accordi ngly occupy Block C and divi de for di s
cussi ons i n the various lecture hal l s.
'As the authorities are becoming more and more brazenly
brutal we are forced to become i ncreasingly mi l itant our
selves. We shal l demonstrate our determination not to be
cowed by holding a demonstration outside the Prefecture of
H auts-de-Seine.
'Resoluti on passed by 1 42 students, occupying the Admi ni s
trative Block of Nanterre wi th 2 agai nst and 3 abstentions.'
On readi ng this proclamation, the university authorities
took fright and their fright turned i nto pani c when, by way of
preparing for the 29th, we plastered the wal l s wi th tracts,
placards and slogans, some of which caused a real sensati on.
'Professors, you are past i t and so i s your culture! '
'When exami ned, answer with questi ons! '
' Pl ease leave the Communist Party as cl ean on leaving as you
woul d l i ke to fnd it on enteri ng. '
The challenge of these slogans was one which forced peopl e
to take a stand. The authorities, no less than the Stal i nists, were
furious and tried to i nci te the staf of the faculty against the
'terrorist mi nority'. The li brary was closed in order to stop
al leged thefts; there was a stay-i n stri ke by the mai ntenance
staf.
Under pressure from above, from neo- Fascist groups who
had sworn to exterminate the revolutionary 'rabble', and from
reactionary lectures, the Dean, on Thursday, 28 March, one
week after the closure of the University of Warsaw, ordered
the suspension of lectures and of laboratory work unti l the
fol l owi ng Monday. Three hundred students assembled immed
iately after thi s announcement and decided not to leave but to
spend the next day drafting a pol i tical mani festo to be pub
l i shed on 2 Apri l . Having made up our mi nds to introduce
50
The Student Revol t
pol i ti cs i nto the campus, we were not goi ng to retreat l i ke a
fock of fri ghtened sheep at a bark from the sheepdog.
The weather helped us - the 29 March was a gl ori ous and
sunny day. A l arge poli ce guard ri nged the campus, whi l e fve
hundred students di vi ded i nto di scussi on groups on the lawn
i n front of the cl osed faculty doors. The gentl emen of the press
were completely at a loss to understand what was goi ng on; they
had been led to expect a smal l band of anarchi st bomb
throwers wi th l ong hai r, and what they found i nstead was more
than fve hundred students seri ously di scussi ng the fundamental
problems of our age.
On Monday, I Apri l , second year soci ology students deci ded,
after a vote, to boycott their current exami nati ons. Then they
passed a resol uti on condemni ng soci ology as a capi tal i st fraud.
Meanwhi l e the professors themselves were at loggerheads, for
whi l e some (parti cul arly i n the Faculty of Letters and Soci al
Sci ence) were i n favour of openi ng one of the lecture hal l s for
pol i ti cal di scussi ons, others ( Faculty of Hi story) wanted the
' ri ngl eaders' arrested.
Tuesday, 2 Apri l , was a great day for the students. We
turned down the smal l room put at our di sposal by the Dean
and faced the admi nistration with a fait accompli : we took over
the large lecture theatre for our i naugural meeting, whi ch was
attended by more than 1 ,200 students i ncl udi ng Karl - Di etri ch
Wol f representi ng the German SDS.
' On 22 March, when there were onl y 1 42 of them, they
symbol i cal l y "took power" by occupyi ng the lecture hal l . After
this event, whi ch caused qui te a stir, the authori ti es took a
"l i beral " deci si on : they ofci al l y al located a lecture hal l wi th
four hundred seats to the students. But meanwhi l e the ori gi nal
1 42 had swel led to more than a thousand and thei r ranks were
sti l l i ncreasi ng. The si tuati on became explosive when the
students conti nued to be barred from using the larger lecture
theatre. Thus whi le pretendi ng to be l i beral, the authori ti es
tri ed to constri ct the movement, and merely succeeded i n
acce!erati ng i ts growth . . . ' (Guy Michaud, Professor of French
Li terature at the Faculty of Nanterre i n Nouvel Ohscr vatcur,
1 5 May 1 968).
51
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
The students' commi ttees continued their deli berations for
the whole of that day, and eight hundred of them and several
assistant lecturers assembled in the evening to hear the vari ous
reports. After thi s they decided to publ i sh a mani festo.
The Easter holi days i ntervened, but as soon as the uni versity
reassembled i n mi d-Apri l , the struggle was resumed. It al l
started wi th a meeting i n support of the German student
attack on the Spri nger trust, that mi ni - Fascist publ i shi ng
empire whose newspapers were pul l i ng the wool over the eyes
of the German workers. At about the same ti me we heard that
an attempt had been made on the life of Rudi Dutschke, the
spokesman of German revolutionary youth.
The students immediately publ i shed a pamphlet i n which
they sai d, inter alia, that the Fascist who was arrested for
shooting at Dutschke was surely not the only culpri t . ' Directly
responsi bl e for this assassi nation are all those in Germany who
for months have been carrying on a monstrous slander
campai gn against students fghting in support of the Vi et
namese revol uti on. The German bourgeoi si e is scared to death
of thi s movement. It has done al l it can to suppress it, and i n
parti cular to prevent three thousand young people from demon
strating i n Berl i n on 1 8 February for vi ctory in Vi etnam.'
Only too happy to see student agitation develop outside i ts
own frontiers, the Gaul l i st authori ties made the mi stake of
gi vi ng i t extensive coverage, particularly on televi si on. Thus
Peyreftte, the Mi nister of Education, declared over the ai r that
the i nsignifcant demonstrations at Nanterre were in no way
comparable to the student troubles abroad. And thi s at the very
time that fve thousand French students were declari ng thei r
sol i dari ty wi th the SDS and Rudi Dutschke! !
In fact, the action of the German students had reper
cussions far beyond the borders of the Federal Republ i c. One
resul t was the '22 March Movement' - for the frst ti me French
students found a common platform and forgot thei r factional
diferences. They ceased hurli ng invective at one another, and
tackled the serious busi ness of bui ldi ng a common front, for
testing thei r theories i n practi ce. And when they di d so, i t i m
mediately became clear to them that all the ol d verbiage had
52
The Student Revol t
done was to i mpose fetters on thei r thi nki ng rather than help
serious di scussi on of actual poli ti cal issues.
Meeti ngs were hel d al most dai ly, commi ttees were constantly
i n sessi on, there were heated debates on the workers' and
students' struggl es. Our posters were the focus of attenti on
throughout the university. Moreover, the boycott of the exam
i nati ons became an i ncreasi ngl y i mportant i ssue. It was talked
about everywhere; discussed, explai ned, and i ts chances of
success evaluated. We felt that the exami nati ons were si mpl y a
means of perpetuati ng a system of selecti ng new captai ns of
i ndustry and that i t was our duty t o reject t he degree, that
badge of hol y ofce i n the hi erarchy.
On 2 Apri l , we decided t o set aside 2 and 3 May for the
study of i mperi al i sm, wi th special flm shows, di scussions i n
commi ttee and i n general assembly, etc. But i t di d not work out
l i ke that . Threatened by an attack from such semi - Fasci st
groups as Occident, we had i nstead to see to our defences, and
arm ourselves wi th stones and other i mprovi sed weapons.
Pani c-stri cken, mi si nformed and above al l under pressure
from some of the professors, the Dean ordered Nanterre to
be cl osed once agai n. Moreover, seven of the most mi l itant
students of the 22 March Movement together wi th a promi nent
member of the Trotskyist Federati on of Revol uti onary Students
were ordered to appear on the followi ng Monday, 6 May,
before a di sci pl i nary board at the Sorbonne. We deci ded to go
along to the heari ng en masse, and cal l ed on al l students to
assembl e on that Monday at 9 o'clock to march on the
Sorbonne.
By thei r di scipl i nary acti on the universi ty admi ni stration
had hoped to stri ke our movement a fatal blow. They had
calculated that student agitation must surely subsi de i n the
thi rd term, what wi th the crucial exami nati ons only four weeks
away. As the Rector hi mself put i t on 9 May :
'The systematic di sturbances brought about by a smal l gang
of students who have been tryi ng, on thei r own admi ssi on, for
some ti me to paralyze our lectures, and now threaten to stop
the exami nati ons, have forced us to take strong measures . We
i ntend to preserve the freedom of al l to si t for thei r
53
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
exami nations in order that the vast majority of students can
derive legi timate recogni ti on for their work. '
Now, at the time, the politically consci ous students were, i n
fact, sti l l a mi nority, and they knew i t. Hence they never set
themselves up as champions of the 'common i nterest of al l
students', but si mpl y demanded the ri ght to express poli ti cal
opi ni ons wi thi n the campus and wi thout poli ce i nterference.
They realized full well that the main body of students were
far more i nterested in furthering their careers than in soci al
justi ce.
It was because of this that the Communist Party has accused
us of despising the students. In fact, we only despise the sons
of the bourgeoi si e who, not only content wi th bel ongi ng to a
privi leged class, clamour for i ts pri vi l eges and are ready to
defend them. Students difer i. n their poli ti cal opi ni ons as i n
everything el se. Moreover, they are not a class, and they have
no objective i nterests to defend. In a truly democratic society,
hi gher education will be open to all, and students wi l l cease
to be a group apart. We do not, therefore, despise students as
such but only those who applaud the men wi th the whi p, who
move in against every revolution.
But let us return to the events themselves. I t was the action
of the authorities that opened the eyes of many previ ously
uncommi tted students. Our 'provocation' dai l y brought the
latent authoritariani sm of the bureaucracy i nto the open. As
soon as any real problems were brought up, dial ogue g
a
ve
place to the policeman's baton : i n Berkeley and Berl i n no
less than in Paris. The pathetic excuses put forward by the
university di gni tari es, who thought every pussy cat was a
tiger, have left many a l i beral observer perplexed.
'Was i t really necessary, on account of a handful of trouble
makers, to suspend all lectures in two faculti es? It seems that
the authori ti es lacked sang-froi d. It i s certai nly true that small
groups of the extreme Left, or at least several among them,
have turned provocation into a weapon of war. Lovi ng
absolute truths and even more the fear they arouse i n the
"bourgeoi si e", they claim that examinations help to perpetuate
an archai c and meaningless system of educati on. But do we
54
The Student Revol t
real l y have to take them so seriously? ' ( B. Girod de l ' Ai n i n Le
Munde, 6 May 1 968.)
If we i gnore the paternal i stic tone of thi s and si mi lar arti cl es
in the l i beral press, we must admi t that there is a great deal of
truth i n them. In real i ty, everything hangs on the use of
provocation i n the crystal l i zation of thought and latent emoti on.
Provocation is not a 'weapon of war' except in speci al ci rcum
stances. It can only be used to arouse feel i ngs that are al ready
present, al bei t submerged. I n our case we expl oi ted student
i nsecuri ty and di sgust wi th l i fe i n an al i enated world where
human relati onshi ps are so much merchandi se to be used,
bought and sold i n the market place. Al l we di d therefore was
to 'provoke' students to express thei r passive di scontent, frst
by demonstrations for thei r own sake, and then by pol i tical
acti ons di rectly chal lengi ng modern society. The j ustifcation
for thi s type of provocation i s i ts abi l i ty to arouse people who
have been crushed under the wei ght of repression. Now, to
speak of 'repressi on' i n the case of an i nsti tuti on such as a
university whi ch has no physi cal means of repressi on may seem
ri di cul ous. But repressi on l ies in the very functi on of that
i nsti tuti on, in i ts bl i ndi ng of the student to the fact that he i s
dai ly bei ng spoon- fed wi th poi sonous rubbi sh. Most students,
as we saw, are wi l l i ng to swal low it all, for the sake of a pri vi
leged posi ti on i n the future, and because they bel i eve that a
ri gi d hi erarchy is necessary for the efcient functi oni ng of
soci ety. As a resul t, they l ose al l real desire, every ounce of
creative spi ri t, al l expressi on of l i fe. The use of provocation i s
to dri ve thi s poi nt home to them and to show how empty thei r
l ives have become.
We show them frst of al l that the petty hostel regulati ons
are an impertinent i nfri ngement of their personal l i berty, that
learni ng i s no substitute for the warmth of human compani on
shi p. In learni ng to questi on these regulations, the student i s
forced to explore repressi on i n general and the forms i t takes
i n the modern worl d. Open physi cal repression wi th the poi nt
of a bayonet, as i t was seen i n the ni neteenth century, i s now
reserved stri ctly for the suppression of the Thi rd World. A
complex and sophi sticated i ndustri al bureaucracy cannot
5 5
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
functi on efci ently wi th a resentful proletariat. What it needs
i s apathy - just thi s apathy against which we are agi tati ng. If
we i n the universities can show factory workers how authori
tari ani sm and the ofci al hi erarchy can be overthrown i n our
own i nstitutions, they wi l l not be slow in applyi ng si mi lar
methods to thei rs. Hence the panic of the authori ties - they do
not mi nd cri ti ci sm, however radical, but they cannot aford to
let us express our di sgust i n acti on. Our threat is that we ofer
students real li berty by overthrowing, not only i n theory, but
i n practice, the class-based university system. We do thi s by
our boycott of lectures di spensi ng 'pure' and 'objecti ve' know
ledge and, worst of al l , by our determi nati on to carry the debate
from the lecture hall i nto the streets and the factori es. Our
frst task is to make the students themselves more pol i ti cal ly
consci ous. In practice, thi s means developing new ways of
communi cati on : i mprovi si ng meetings i n the vari ous faculty
common rooms, occupying lecture halls, i nterrupting lectures
wi th denunci ati ons of their ideologi cal basis, boycotting the
exami nati ons, sticki ng up posters and slogans, taking over the
publ i c address system - in short taki ng any action that openly
chal lenges the authori ties.
The uni versity bureaucracy cannot real l y cope wi th student
power. True, i t made an attempt to let the movement run i ts
course for a whi le, but soon afterwards Rector Roche or,
rather, the government felt impelled to take a strong l i ne.
Fol l owi ng our distri buti on of a pamphlet cal l i ng for the
boycott of exami nations, the Dean put out the followi ng notice :
'The Dean and Professors of the Faculty of Letters of Pari s
woul d l i ke to remind students that the exami nations (May and
October) wi l l take place on the usual days, and state categor
i cally that no supplementary arrangements can be made under
any ci rcumstances.'
The Dean, moreover, proscribed the di stri buti on of our
pamphlet which sai d, among other things :
' In the present ci rcumstances . . . any attempt to test the
qual ifcations of students by competitive exams i s l ittle more
than a sham. All candi dates ought therefore to be consi dered
as havi ng passed the exami nations.'
56
The Student Revol t
Monday, 6 May, was the ofci al day for the competi tive
exami nati ons. It i s at thi s poi nt that the Rector's ' l ack of sang
froi d' seems to have degenerated i nto complete pani c. I nstead
of proceedi ng wi th his 'sacrosanct exami nati ons' , he deci ded to
cl ose the Sorbonne and to put i t under the protecti on of the
pol i ce.
Part of the expl anati on for his actions was that, whereas the
most mi li tant students were at the Sorbonne, the vast majori ty
of 'good' students were at home feveri shly prepari ng for thei r
exami nati ons, so that this seemed a golden opportuni ty for
crushi ng the enemy's ' shock troops' . How badly he mi scal
culated was shown by subsequent events .
The Bat tle of the Streets
Pari s had known many recent demonstrations at the Place de
Ia Basti l l e and Place de Ia Republ i que - some for hi gher wages,
others agai nst Ameri can aggression in North Vi etnam. The
authori ti es knew the strategy of the tradi ti onal Left and felt
confdent that, if they could deal wi th mi l i tant workers, they
woul d have li ttl e troubl e wi th a lot of ' mere chi l dren' .
The pol ice were i n ful l control of the streets, and the
pol i ti cal battles were being safely fought in the mi ni stri es, and
i n parl i amentary commi ttees . Hence i t seemed a very si mpl e
matter to send the forces of l aw and order i nto the Sorbonne,
occupy al l the facul ti es and arrest four hundred students.
Emergi ng from thei r l i braries, from thei r lectures or si mpl y
strol l i ng back to col lege along the Lati n Quarter, students
suddenly found themselves face to face wi th riot police (CRS)
blocki ng the gates of the Sorbonne. Their reply was immedi ate,
spontaneous and quite unequi vocal , and i t was not even the
students wi th the strongest poli tical convi cti ons who were the
frst to expl ode. Suddenly the wal l s were covered wi th such
slogans as 'Stop the repressi on', 'CRS " SS', whi le the ranks of
demonstrators swelled to unprecedented proporti ons. Al l hel l
broke l oose when the frst poli ce vans left the Sorbonne fl led
wi th students bei ng taken of for questi oni ng.
57
The Strategy and Nature of the Revoluti onary Movement
'In the Latin Quarter at about 6 p. m. , vi olent i nci dents
occurred as students joi ned battle wi th poli ce contingents'
(Le Monde, 5-6 May 1 968) .
Al l ni ght, speci al police squads poured i nto the di strict, every
ci vi l i an was stopped, and anyone who even vaguely resembled
a student was clubbed down mercilessly. More than one passer
by who had nothi ng whatever to do wi th the \demonstration
spent an uncomfortable ni ght in the police cells.
Hence the 'riotous scenes' everyone tal ked about that ni ght.
What was so remarkable about the events of 3 May was the
spontaneity of the resistance - a clear sign that our movement
does not need leaders to di rect i t; that it can perfectly well
express i tself wi thout the help of a 'vanguard' . It was this day
that really mobi l i zed student opi ni on; the frst great ri pple
of a swel li ng ti de. And not unexpectedly, the Communi st
students, bound to their party, l ike Oedipus to hi s fate, di d
their utmost to stem that tide :
'Irresponsi ble Leftists use the pretext of government i n
efciency and student unrest i n order to subvert the work of
the facul ti es and to i mpede the mass of students from si tting
for their exami nations. These false revoluti onari es behave,
objectively, as al lies of the Gaulli st authori ti es and represent a
pol i cy that i s objectionable to the majority of students, above
all to the sons and daughters of the worki ng class.' Clearly the
Communi sts would do anything rather than try and under
stand the real issues.
I have sai d that the events of the day brought about an
awakeni ng of poli tical awareness i n many students. Take this
eye-wi tness account publi shed i n the June i ssue of L' Evenement :
"Are you a member of the 22 March Movement? " they
asked me.
'I was sti l l a l ittle embarrassed, the speakers had tal ked of
Marx and someone called Marcuse, of whom I had never even
heard. The frst time they mentioned that name I asked them
to spell i t for me. I looked him up i n Larousse, but I could not
fnd him there.
'I was told : 'The movement has proved its strength by
boycotting the examinations. '' But to boycott parti al exami n-
58
The Student Revolt
ati ons i s somethi ng anyone can do - you can always si t them
agai n. And i n any case, I was qui te happy to gi ve mi ne a mi ss
for personal reasons. And then one day, qui te suddenly, I felt
l i ke j umpi ng on to the platform and shouti ng : "I have been an
i mbeci le. I al ways thought that personal revolt was the only
way of telling the authori ti es to go and jump in the lake. But
you have shown me that we can all stick together i n Nanterrc,
that we need no longer be alone, and that no one has to wi el d
the bi g sti ck to make us act i n uni son. "
There were no membershi p cards, no fol lowers and no
leaders. From then on everythi ng went l i ke greased l i ghtni ng.
Meetings, leafets, and then we went out among the workers i n
Nanterre . . .
The unwelcome presence of the poli ce on the campus gai ned
the students the support of the Uni versity Teachers' Assoc
i ati on (SNESUP), and also of four professors i n Nan terre :
Messrs. Lefevre, Mi chaud, Tourai ne and Ri crur, who
declared themselves wi l l ing to undertake the defence of those
students who had been summoned to appear before the
Di sci pl i nary Commi ttee i n the Sorbonne on the followi ng
Monday. Thei r moral support took the press completely by
surpri se and di d much to gai n the students fresh sympathizers.
On Saturday, 4 May, the police swooped agai n, and on
Sunday, 5 May, an emergency court sent six student demon
strators to gaol . Proclamations i n the press and over the radi o
then made i t known that the demonstrations i n support of the
condemned students whi ch had been cal led for Monday at 9
o' clock were ofci ally banned.
' On Monday, Pari s saw i ts most i mpressi ve and threateni ng
demonstrat i on for many years. Even duri ng the Algeri an war
there has never been a movement of such breadth and above
al l of such staying power .' Le Monde, 8 May 1 968.
' We cannot al low those who are openly opposed to the
universi ty to seize that i nstituti on. We cannot tolerate vi olence
in the streets, for vi olence i s no way of starting any ki nd of
dialogue. ' Charles de Gaul l e, 7 May 1 968.
Many people have asked themselves how i t was possi bl e that
59
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
so vast a movement should have erupted from what was
apparently so uni mportant an event as the closure of a uni ver
sity and the i ntervention of the poli ce in student afairs. It i s
therefore important t o explai n how a relatively small number
of students succeeded in broadening the struggle agai nst poli ce
repressi on to such an extent that i t culmi nated i n the occupation
of the universities and the total rejection of its function in
capi tal i st society. Learning through acti on plays a basi c part i n
the genesis and growth of all revolutionary movements. From
analyzing what is closest at hand, we can come to understand
society at
'
large.
The complexity of modern l i fe and the frustration i t bri ngs
in i ts wake are such that we are forced most of the time to
submerge our deepest aspirations. Students, who have to
swallow humi l i ation every day, are particularly subject to these
frustrations, and so react all the more vi olently once they are
aroused. Lul l them wi th sweet promises about the future and
they may be prepared to put up wi th petty restrictions, false
values, hypocri ti cal doctrines and the lot, but bring out the
police against them and you will fnd that you have stirred up
a hornets' nest . The students started demonstrating at 9 a.m.
and by the ti me they di spersed fourteen hours later, a mere
trickle had swelled i nto a torrent, and 'barricades' had sprung
up i n the streets. The students' determi nati on, and above al l
their wi l l i ngness to take on the police, were trul y astoni shi ng.
They asserted their ri ght to enter thei r own uni versity, and to
run it themselves for the beneft of al l . The almost conti nuous
confrontati on wi th the police merely hardened thei r deter
mi nati on not to go back on their frst claims : the rel ease of al l
the i mprisoned demonstrators, withdrawal of the pol i ce and
re-openi ng of the faculti es. I must add in parentheses that
duri ng the 'Long March' of 7 May, and duri ng the demon
strations at the university annexe at the Halle aux vi ns, the
various factions of the Left tried desperately to i nsi nuate thei r
own marshals i n the vai n hope of taking control . There were
some 35,000 demonstrators present i n the Champs Elysees alone
and mira!ile dictu they managed wi thout any leaders at al l .
Unfortunately, the bureaucratic ofcials of UNEF, that
60
The Student Revolt
mori bund Student Uni on, who had been frustrated i n thei r
earl i er attempts to take over the movement, now cal led i n the
help of the trade uni on bureaucrats who, at the Hal l e aux vi ns
and i n the demonstrati ons that followed, were abl e to di vert
the movement away from i ts ori gi nal ai m: the recapture of the
Sorbonne. I do not want to pass an opi ni on on the strategic and
tacti cal possi bi l i ti es of capturing the Sorbonne at thi s poi nt,
but merely to show that al l hi erarchi cal and bureaucratic
organizations must necessari l y pervert al l acti vi ti es in which
they parti ci pate to their own ends. Thus Al ai n Gei smar ex
pl ai ned to the General Assembly of the 22 March Movement
on 8 May how trade uni on ofcials had used every tri ck i n the
book to force the student movement to opt for a programme
that woul d divert the struggle i nto purely reformist channel s.
In thi s they were greatly helped by Communi st students and
lecturers, who played a particularly treacherous part on 8 May
at the Pl ace du Luxembourg, when they cal l ed upon the
students to di sperse. Thi s mi ght well have spel led the end of
the movement, l ong before i t had a chance to express i ts real
demands : the overthrow of repressive soci ety. Lucki ly the
revol uti onary students were not taken in; they realized that
they themselves had the power to beat repressi on, even in the
face of Communi st Party and other bureaucratic obstructi on.
Indeed, UNEF, by launchi ng appeals to ' reason' and i ssui ng
communi ques through the press, merel y mobi l i zed an ever
larger number of demonstrators. And so when Roche
announced he would re-open the Sorbonne under police
protecti on, the students repl ied wi th an i mprovi sed 'teach-out',
assembled i n their thousands and completel y stopped the
trafc i n the Boulevard St Michel. Thi s teach-out was the frst
attempt to turn the Lati n Quarter i nto a ' publ i c forum' . Those
responsi ble for the dispersal of the students i n the Place du
Luxembourg duri ng the previous night were severely taken to
task and asked to explai n thei r acti ons. Direct democracy was
bei ng put i nto efect - under the very noses of the pol i ce. Al l
the poli ti cal and strategic problems of the past few days were
brought up for discussion and thrashed out, not least among
them the rol e of the universi ty of the future. As the students
61
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
stood talki ng they were joi ned by scores of passers-by, among
them Loui s Aragon, that venerable bard and prophet of the
Communi st Party, the man who had sung paeans of praise to
OGPU and Stal i ni sm, and who had come to take hi s place
among those who 'remind me so movi ngly of my own youth' .
A group of students recognized hi m and greeted hi m with cri es
of 'Long l ive OGPU! Long li ve Stali n, the father of al l the
people! '
The Aragon episode, i n itself banal and wi thout political
importance, nevertheless shows how poli ti cally aware the young
demonstrators had become. They would have no truck wi th
members of a party whose ofcial organ, L'Humanite, had
launched what could only be called a smear campai gn agai nst
French youth. The revolutionary movement did not deny the
i mportance, and even the necessity, of a dialogue wi th the
rank and fle of the Communist Party, but it did try to unmask
the opportuni st strategy and counter-revolutionary attitude of
its leaders, i ncl udi ng Louis Aragon, the poet laureate of the
personality cult. He could not make hi msel f heard simply
because those participating i n the 'teach-out' knew that he had
nothing in common wi th them. Hi s bold assertion that he was
i n the Party 'precisely because he was on the si de of youth'
merely turned him into a laughi ng

stock. By refusing to act

honestly for once in his l i fe, and to denounce the machi nations
of hi s Party, he threw away his chance to j oi n the student
movement, and incidentally saved his leaders a great deal of
embarrassment.
Lucki l y the dialectic of events di d not have to wai t on an
Aragon : we knew that the issue would be deci ded by the
demonstrations called for next day and not by some Party
demagogue or other. The people were clearly sympathetic,
the Nati onal Assembly was di vi ded, and we saw our chance to
prove that the power of General de Gaul l e would collapse
l i ke a house of cards if we went about i t the right way. And here
the police force itself came to our ai d : by barring the route we
had planned to take, they forced us i nto the Lati n Quarter.
Once there, we were determined not to disperse unti l all our
demands had been met . And so we found ourselves drawn up
62
The Student Revolt
i n front of the CRS, faci ng thei r cl ubs, 30,000 of us standi ng
united and ready for acti on, but wi th no defni te plan. No one
ser iously envi saged attacking the Sorbonne, no one wanted a
massacre. Al l we knew was that we had to defend ourselves
where we stood ; we split up into small groups, so that the
pol ice services were unable to launch a si ngle, di rected attack.
Every barricade became a centre of action and of discussi on,
every group of demonstrators a squad acti ng on its own
i ni ti ati ve. Barricades sprang up everywhere; no one felt the
l ack of a general in charge of overal l strategy; messengers kept
everyone i nformed of what was happening on the other bar
ri cades and passed on col lective deci si ons for discussi on. In our
new-found sol i dari ty our spi ri ts began to soar . For the frst
ti me i n l ivi ng memory, young workers, young students,
apprentices and high school pupils were acting i n uni son. We
coul d not guess what turn the events were goi ng to take, but
that di d not bother us - al l that mattered was that, at long last,
we were all uni ted i n acti on. The Gaul l i st regime proved
compl etely hel pless in the face of this youthful demon
strati on of strength, and thi s was only a begi nni ng! None of the
l i es that have been told si nce, nor yet the fnal sel l - out by the
CGT, can detract from thi s achi evement. In a society whi ch
seeks to crush the i ndivi dual, forcing hi m to swal low the same
l ies, a deep feel i ng of collective strength had surged up and
people refused to be browbeaten. We were no longer thousands
of l ittle atoms squashed together but a solid mass of determi ned
i ndivi duals . We who had known the nagging ache of frustra
tion were not afrai d of physical hurt. Thi s ' rashness of youth'
di d not spri ng from despair, the cynicism of impotence, but on
the contrary from the di scovery of our col lective strength. It
was thi s feel i ng of strength and unity whi ch rei gned on the
barricades. In such moments of col lective enthusiasm, when
everything seems possi ble, nothing could be more natural and
si mple than a warm relationshi p between al l demonstrators and
quite parti cul arl y between the boys and the gi rl s. Everything
was easy and uncomplicated. The barricades were no longer
simply a means of self- defence, they became a symbol of i n
di vi dual l i berty. Thi s i s why the ni ght of 1 0 May can never be
63
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
forgotten by those who were 'there' . For bourgeois historians
the barri cades wi II doubtless become symbols of senseless
vi ol ence, but for the students themselves they represented a
turni ng poi nt that should have its place among the great
moments of history. The memory of the rai ds, the gas grenades,
the wounds and the i njuries will surely remai n, but we wi l l also
remember that night for the exemplary bravery of the
'communards' or 'sans culottes' of the rue Gay- Lussac, of
young men and women who opened a new and cleaner page i n
the history of France.
So great was their i mpact, i n fact, that the trade uni ons and
parties of the Left were forced, wi l l y ni l ly, to cal l a general
str i ke for 1 3 May 1 968, in an attempt to take the pol i tical sti ng
out of the student movement. But, havi ng demonstrated thei r
soli dari ty wi th the worki ng class throughout the day, the
students di d not meekly disperse - that very ni ght they took the
Sorbonne. Students were suddenly freed from thei r i ntellectual
impri sonment, and communication, di scussi on, explanation
were, all at once, easy and meaningful . The Sorbonne became
a spectacular focus of intellectual l i berati on, and one that,
unl ike the Li beration of 1 945, refused to be gagged by the
authori ti es. Moreover, something quite unprecedented had
happened : the science faculties had declared thei r sol i dari ty
wi th the revolutionary students and joi ned i n the general
debate. Now, unl ike Nanterre, the Faculty of Sci ence (36,000
students) had never been a centre of protest, though students
there, too, had been perturbed when Dean Zamansky proposed
to i ntroduce a more competitive system, and when the Fouchet
reforms threatened to make the curri culum even more arduous
than it already was. Sti l l , their reacti on had always been
l i mi ted to pressing for purely i nternal reforms. Si nce 3 May,
however, lectures had been cancelled i n a few departments at
the di rection of some of the more decent professors, i ncl udi ng
Professor Monod, the Nobel Prize winner, i n protest agai nst
the pol i ce brutali ti es. The students used the opportunity for
hol ding meetings wi th thei r teachers, many of which were
attended by more than 600 people. It must be sai d that these
discussions dealt pri mari l y wi th the problem of the exami n-
64
The Student Revolt
ations which were to begi n on 1 5 May, but they very qui ckl y
ran on to questi ons of general pol i cy. In other departments run
by reactionary professors, attempts were made to conti nue the
normal lectures, but students kept interrupting the lecturers
and provoked discussions to be pursued elsewhere. Whi le,
previ ously, i t had been i mpossible to fl l a lecture hall for a
seri ous debate of any ki nd, and anyone who spoke of poli ti cs,
capitalism, etcetera was whistled at, the majori ty of students
now l istened and participated even if only to express their
opposi ti on to the movement.
On 1 0 May, a stri ke commi ttee consi sting of a few dozen
students met and decided to take over the entire science faculty,
and to stop all the ofci al lectures that were sti l l goi ng on. The
committee was formed qui te spontaneously, and grew rapi dly
i n strength, whi l e most of the ofcial poli ti cal organizations
stood to one si de or even put up obstructi ons.
After the ni ght at the barricades, members of SNESUP
formed a stri ke committee of their own, whi ch qui ckl y fused
with the students' committee.
The followi ng paral l el ' lines of power' now existed wi thi n
the u ni versi ty : ( l ) laboratory committees answerable to the
laboratory staf; (2) general student committees charged wi th
carryi ng out decisions taken by a general assembly i n the
lecture theatres and answerable to the assembly; (3) staf com
mi ttees made u r chi efy of lecturers but also i ncludi ng several
professors; ( 4) the strike committee; (5) the provisional
commission compri si ng student and teachers' delegates (the
Dean hi mself appointed a number of professors to si t on this
commission) and (6) the regular university authorities. Al l
these powers more or less co-existed as the movement grew,
and there was l i ttle the Dean or his friends coul d do about
i t. It was not a coi nci dence that, after the speech by de
Gaulle on 30 May, the atti tude of the reactionary professors
hardened, and they refused to continue to serve on the com
mi ssion.
This deci si on helped to cement the unity between the re
mai ni ng students, research assistants and assistant lecturers,
who i n their place el ected new members to the commi ssi on. The
65
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
entry of the police into the faculty is probably not unrelated to
this new situati on.
The stri ke committee also decided to follow the example of
other faculties and set up a 'summer university'. The more
radical members felt that thi s university should be open to all,
and that workers i n particular shoul d be invited to attend. A
Central Bureau of the Summer Uni versity was elected and
g iven the task of (a) developing new teachi ng methods; (b)
runni ng political seminars, and (c) organizing art exhibitions,
ci nema shows, book sales, etcetera.
The creation of the summer university, which tried to bring
knowledge down to earth from its academic ivory tower, was,
without doubt, one of the greatest achievements of the student
movement. But it proved extremely difcult to arrange, the
more so as the strike committee had to waste most of i ts energy
on keeping the lecture rooms open in the face of increasing
pressure by the authorities. It goes without saying that the
government could not l et things like this continue i n Gaul l ist
France for long, and one of the frst policemen who invaded
the faculty on 5 July admitted quite frankly that his job was to
'put a stop to al l thi s nonsense'. In any case, the summer univer
sity provided concrete proof of the movement's strength of
purpose : the ofcial hierarchy was simply ignored and replaced
by col lective effort, in accordance with the needs and wishes
of the students. Undergraduates i n the science faculty had been
much slower to question the value of their studies than those
from other derartments, but once they began to ask the right
questions, they were i nexorably led to a radical critique of the
aims and objects of modern science. And since this inquiry
went hand in hand with an attempt to open the university
to the people, it also forced them to question the entire social
system and to make common cause with the worki ng cl ass.
This must have been the real 'danger' the authorities referred
to when they attacked the students for occupying the univer
sity.
Not a train was running on the main l i nes or underground,
not a letter, not a telegram could be sent, not a car or a ton of
coal was being produced, workers i n every i ndustry, from every
66
The Student Revolt
branch of the state, had joi ned the students. Even the football
cl ubs were taken over by their players! Just as the stri ke i tself
came about spontaneously, without specifc grievances, in the
wake of the student revolt, so, now, new forms of organization
of society were being discussed everywhere. Passionate and
entirely novel i deas were bei ng mooted throughout France.
It was at Charlety Stadi um on Monday, 27 May, that
Barjonet, recently resigned from the CGT, openl y confessed
that a revol uti on was possible after al l . Barjonet only expressed
what hundreds of other trade union mi l i tants had suddenly
come to r eali ze.
Perhaps the most concrete expression of thi s new sense of
purpose was the occupation of the Sud-Avi ati on works i n
Nantes. The workers, by ' i mi tating the students', were re
di scoveri ng a form of action that they had far too l ong
discarded whi l e playing the parliamentary game of the re
formists and Stal i ni sts. The applied psychoanalysis of the
revol uti onary students was clearly bri ngi ng on a general cure;
on 20 May, even the most apathetic joined in, the Citroen works
were occupied and a host of others followed sui t soon after
wards.
Recourse to di rect action changed the whole tenor of the
struggle, for the workers' self-confdence i s enormously i n
creased once they act wi thout delegating any of thei r power to
pol itical parties or trade unions., 'The factory is ours, so do we
need to start worki ng for the bosses again? ' Thi s i dea arose
quite spontaneously, not by command, or under the aegis of
the so-called vanguard of the proletariat, but si mply as a
natural response to a concrete situation.
Di scussi ons took place everywhere - there was hardl y a
factory where the question of 'workers' control ' was not rai sed
and debated, so much so that, on Tuesday, 21 May, Seguy,
speaki ng ofci al ly for the CGT, felt impelled to i nform a press
conference that 'sel f-management is a hol low formul a; what
the workers really want i s immediate satisfaction of thei r
clai ms'.
The revoluti on burst the ol d dams, its force took the entire
world by surprise, and, of course, no one more so than the
67
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
French authori ties and bureaucracy of the CGT. The CGT
real ized that it was no longer sufcient to fght Leftism wi th
invective in L' Humanite and a bi t of character assassination i n
the factories. It had somehow t o intervene on the shop foor i f
i t was t o stop the rot. And i n this feld the CGT was a past
master - it had played the same part i n I 936 and I 945 and, in
a smaller way, i n dai ly practi ce.
On 22 May, the government, i n a desperate attempt to quieten
things down, voted a general amnesty. But if they hoped to
stop the movement i n that way, they were badly mistaken. The
movement was no longer restricted to the students, it had
assumed wi der proportions.
Duri ng this period everything was still possi ble, authori ty
no longer existed except as a threat, and even part of the
professional army was known to be sympathetic to the strikers.
Moreover, the government no longer enjoyed the confdence of
the publ i c and fnally i t could not count on enough genui ne,
si ck Fascists to carry out a counter-revol uti onary coup.
The vari ous pol ice forces were di spersed i n the streets,
in the factories and even in the felds, si nce even the peasants
had begun talki ng soci al ism and revoluti on. As a result, the
poli ce stations were unmanned and the admi ni stration left
to i ts own, di mi ni shing, devices. At this moment, I repeat,
everything was sti ll possi ble.
It was against thi s background that de Gaul l e del ivered his
speech on 24 May. After blackmail ing us wi th the threat of
ci vi l war (by whom against whom?) the Head of State graci
ously gave us permission to vote for a new set of laws and to
give hi m a new mandate.
Thi s generous ofer fell spectacularly fat. Moreover, two
hundred thousand peasants downed tools in various parts of
France, blocki ng the roads and organizing mass meetings.
Then came the night of the 24th, which could have spelled
the end of de Gaulle, but merely revealed a lack of pol itical
awareness among the masses and the narrowness of outlook
of the diferent left-wing spli nter groups who, instead of mak
i ng common cause, tried to bend the situati on to their own
petty ends.
68
The Student Revol t
That day the CGT organized two marches i n support of
the str i kers i n diferent parts of Pari s. These marches were
restrai ned and hi ghl y organized - they were meant to pass of
' i n calm and di gnity' and not to provoke the poli ce. The whole
i dea was out of touch wi th the spi ri t of the more mi li tant
workers, and also wi th the advanced stage we had reached i n
our struggl e : we were on the br i nk of overthrowi ng the
government, and felt no need for appeasement.
And so we decided to let the processi on take thei r peaceful
course, whi l e we ourselves would spi l l out of the Lati n Quarter
and plant the banner of revolution over the rest of Paris. Un
fortunately the way we of the 22 March Movement saw thi ngs
was not the way the other student groups saw them. UNEF
and PSU (United Soci al ist Party) were opposed to the whole
i dea, whi l e the Trotskyists felt that no fnal push coul d be
made before a revol utionary party was ready to step into the
shoes of the bourgeoi si e. As far as they were concerned we
were simply a 'band of irresponsible adventuri sts'.
Nevertheless, they joi ned our appeal for a massed assembl y
at the Gare de Lyons . Wi th the hel p of scores of acti on com
mittees, i n which hi gh- school pupi l s played an i mportant part,
we organized fve assembly poi nts from whi ch we would con
verge at 5 p. m. on the Gare de Lyons.
Dur ing the day, we got the Action Committees to distri bute
the fol lowi ng pamphlet :
Toi l ers, it i s ti me we looked after ourselves! To ten mi l l ion
stri kers! To all workers!
- No to al l parliamentary soluti ons! De Gaulle may go but
the bosses wi l l stay!
- No to negotiations whi ch only prop up capi tal i sm!
- Enough referendums, no more circuses!
No one can speak for us. We ourselves must remain masters
of our factor ies! The struggle must go on! The factories must
support all those who are now engaged i n battle.
Thi s is the ti me to plan our rul e of tomorrow -
Di rect suppli es of food, organizati on of publ i c services,
transport, i nformation, housi ng, etcetera.
In the street, i n the commi ttees, wherever you may be!
69
The Strategy and Nature of the Revol utionary Movement
Workers! Peasants! Students! Teachers! School boys! Let us
organize and coordinate our struggl e : For the abol i ti on of
Bosses! Al l power t o the Workers!
The campaign had been launched. The CGT demonstration
i n the afternoon col lected more than 200,000 workers, that of
the 22 March Movement and the Acti on Commi ttees started
wi th far less but very quickly grew in number, for as we
marched through the various quarters, the peopl e fell in be
hi nd us. At the Place de Ia Basti l le and elsewhere, many from
the CGT demonstration who had refused to disperse joi ned
us as wel l . In the end, more than 1 00,000 people assembled at
the Gare de Lyons, whi l e several thousand others were demon
strating in other parts of Pari s. The atmosphere was electri c.
We then marched on the Stock Exchange as we had planned
(the Hotel de vi l l e, another objective, was . too well defended by
the CRS and the army), captured i t wi th remarkable ease and
set i t on fre. Paris was i n the hands of the demonstrators, the
Revolution had started i n earnest! The pol i ce could not pos
sibl y guard all the public bui l di ngs and all the strategic points :
the Elysee, the Hotel de vi l le, the bridges, the ORTF (the
French Broadcasting Service) . . . Everyone felt it and wanted
to go on. But then the political boys stepped i n. It was a leader
of the far- left JCR (Revolutionary Communi st Youth) who,
i n the Place de !'Opera, took charge and turned us back towards
the Latin Quarter - when most of us thought we had done
wi th the fatal attraction of the Sorbonne. It was ofcers of
UNEF and PSU who stopped us taki ng the Mi ni stry of Finance
and the Mi nistry of Justice. These 'revolutionaries' were qui te
incapable of grasping the potential of a movement that had
left them far behi nd and was still gai ni ng momentum. As for
us, we fai led to realize how easy it would have been to sweep
all these nobodies away. We shoul d never have al lowed them
to divert us, should have occupied the Mi nistries and public
bui l dings, not to put i n a new lot of 'revolutionary' bureau
crats, but to smash the entire state apparatus, to show the
people how well they could get on wi thout it, and how the
whole of society had to be reconstructed afresh on the basis
of workers' control.
70
The Student Revolt
It is now clear that i f, on 25 May, Pari s had woken to fnd
the most i mportant Mi ni stries occupied, Gaul l ism would have
caved in at once - the more so as si mi lar actions woul d have
taken place all over the country.
It has been said, and ri ghtly so, that for the frst time i n
history a revol uti on could have been made wi thout recourse
to arms. And people have pointed out that one of the frst
steps we should have taken, and failed to take, was to capture
the radi o stations.
Even i f the OR TF i n Pari s was well guarded, the authori ti es
coul d not have defended or re-occupi ed the radi o stati ons of
Li l l e, Strasbourg, Nantes, Li moges and elsewhere.
It i s clear that control of the communications medi a i s of
vi tal importance i n any revolution : thus when one stati on
announced a demonstration at 3 p.m. , 20,000 people gathered
in the appoi nted place two hours later . The broadcasting of
newsfashes direct from the 'barricade units' was responsi bl e
for much of the cohesion of our forces. Moreover, the authori
t ies real ized thi s danger and, from the next day, the 24th, for
bade any l ive broadcasting of news, only to re-authorize i t
agai n duri ng the Gaul l ist demonstrati ons.
Here i s a poi nt to remember for the future and one that we
wi l l be sure to take care of.
When the 24 May drew to a close, a revol uti on was sti l l on
the cards - nothi ng seemed settled ei ther way. But by the 25th,
our failure to take the M inistries enabled the state and the trade
uni on bureaucrats to rally from the blows they had been dealt
the night before.
Pompidou declared that henceforth demonstrations woul d
be more energet i cally di spersed. At 3 o'clock, representatives
of the State. the employers and the trade uni ons met at the
Mi ni stry of Soci al Afairs in the rue de Grenelle, to thrash
out what became known as the Grenelle agreement. Those
present knew full well that the alarm had been sounded and
that i t woul d take very l ittle more for everythi ng they hel d
dear to be swept away - hence the speed wi th which they
struck their bargai n (guaranteed mi ni mum wage, trade union
ri ghts, i mproved soci al securi ty benefts, etcetera) .
7 1
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
The pol itical top brass, too, came out of hiding, and the
Communi st Party proposed to the Social Democrats and the
the trade uni ons that they launch a joint campaign against -
the monopolies.
On Monday, 27 May, the CGT called twelve meetings in
Paris to render an account of the state of the Grenelle negotia
tions. One of the speakers was Seguy, who declared :
' Much remains to be done, but our most essential claims
have been met and we will not go back on what we have
agreed . . .
At the same ti me the mass meeting in Charlety Stadium, to
which we have already referred, gathered to express i ts deter
mination not to be put of wi th what sops the CGT and the
bosses were graciously prepared to throw their way. Fifty
thousand people pi led up the stadium steps, when the CGT
had been unable to attract more than a handful of the faithful
to their own meetings.
Alas, the Charlety meeting, too, ended in a complete fasco.
It was turned into a great salvage operation by the ofcial
parties of the Left, and ended with the sanctifcation of
Mendes-France, the ex-Stalinist Barjonet and the reformist
Astre.
Each one i n turn went up to the platform to harangue the
crowd, which had become sullen; each delivered an ultra left
wing speech, and each repeated the perennial call for the uni on
of al l progressive forces. The crowd had been cowed at the
beginning of the meeting with an impressive show of force
by the marshals of the PSU and UNEF (the very ones
who had tried all along to shackle the movement . . . ), then
bludgeoned by National Assemly-style speeches, and fnally
bedazzled by the revolutionary slogan-mongering of the new
'leaders' .
Worst of al l was the cowardice of the various left-wing
spli nter groups (JCR, Fourth International, FER and OCI),
who no longer felt the urge to explain themselves in front of
the masses.
And so, instead of voting in favour of conti nui ng the
struggle, the crowd dispersed and left the future i n the hands
72
The Student Revolt
of a Mendes-France, a Barjonet and a Sauvageot. No wonder
that the latter proclai med proudly i n an arti cle :
'After the rue Gay-Lussac, our greatest hour was at Char
lety! Not a pol iceman was i n sight anywhere, and so there was
no vi olence. If the pol ice had been there thi ngs might have
turned out diferently. As i t was, the marshal s helped to di s
perse the crowds by gui di ng them al ong diferent routes away
from the stadi um, and so everything passed of qui etl y. This
was because, at Charlety, people had come to reali ze that
something new was happeni ng, that thi s demonstration had
achieved much more than the barricades . . . '
How ri ght he was - things would i ndeed have been diferent
i f the pol ice had been there! It would have provoked a battle
we might easily have won. And so the bourgeoi sie rel ied i n
stead on thei r Trojan horse - they would no more have
dreamed of usi ng the pol ice to prevent the Charlety meeting
than they would of proscri bi ng the CGT.
Next day, Mi tterand ofered himself as candidate for the
Presi dency of the Republ i c, and at the same time Barjonet,
Vigier, Mury, the JCR, et a/. made an attempt to turn the
revoluti onary student movement i nto a more 'respectable'
body - under their leadershi p. The resul ting MUR (Revolu
ti onary Union) carri ed no convi cti on at al l ; the masses dis
owned an organization that had been bui l t up over thei r heads,
and that, when all was sai d and done, was the ol d Bolshevi sm
adorned wi th a l i beral sash. Perhaps I should have sai d a black
sash, for thei r machi nations put paid to the promi se of 24 and
27 May, and gave the government and the trade uni ons a much
needed breathi ng space. The CGT cal l ed for an end of the
stri kes, the acceptance of the Grenelle agreement, and elec
ti on of a 'popular government' . De Gaul l e di sappeared for the
enti re afternoon of 29 May to confer wi th his army chi efs.
Then, on Thursday, 30 May, he del ivered a speech that woul d
have been unthi nkable only a week before. In efect, he bran
di shed the spectre of Stal i nism and Soviet concentrati on camps
whi ch would have carried no wei ght at a ti me when the Com
munist Party was known to be bi tterly hosti le to the student
struggle. But the very moment the Communist Party ofcial l y
73
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
entered the arena with the call for a 'popular government', the
struggle became one between Stal inism and Gaul l ism, and few
Frenchmen wanted to have any truck wi th the former. And
so de Gaulle's blackmail took efect - shortly after his speech
hundreds of thousands of Gaulli sts assembled in the Champs
Elysees and demonstrated against the alleged threat of a Com
munist di ctatorship.
The CGT hastened to take up the General' s chal lenge, and
at once publ ished the following declaration : ' The CGT wi l l
i n no way obstruct the course of the forthcomi ng referendum.
It i s i n the i nterest of al l workers to express thei r desire for a
change of government.' (Seguy)
And the bourgeoisie took a deep breath of reli ef. . . . Petrol,
which had been almost unobtainable, now fowed abundantly
from the pumps. Thousands of Parisians recovered their
serenity i n the countryside that Whitsun week-end, as they
made their usual mass exodus from the capital.
On their return, they started slowly to drift back to work,
not en masse, but sector by industrial sector . We decided to
take what counter-measure we coul d.
The situation was as follows: the general stri ke was collaps
i ng but a host of factories were sti ll holding out and were
faced with concerted attacks by organized blacklegs and
special pol i ce contingents. For instance, at Rennes, the Post
Ofce workers were engaged in a two-hour long battle with the
CRS.
The 22 March Movement accordingly decided to render
active help to the workers in their factories. By means of
Student-Worker and 'Support and Solidarity' committees we
were abl e to mobilize permanent squads to rei nforce strike
pickets and also to get supplies through to the stri ki ng workers.
We had at al l costs to prevent the factories from bei ng picked
of one by one. Permanent liaison groups enabled us to circu
late news and information from factory to factory, and thus
to keep the workers i nformed of what was happening i n the
many remai ning 'islands of resistance' .
We could not do al l we wanted because there were not
enough of us to go round. Even so, our achievements were
74
The Student Revolt
not negl igi ble, and we certai nl y helped to hold the fort i n
a large number of postal and iransport depots and i n several
big stores. Above al l , our i ntervention helped to prepare for
our last great efort : the defence of the Renaul t workers i n
Fl i ns agai nst a concerted attack by the CRS. On 7 June, at
3 a. m. , Fli ns was occupied by the pol i ce. Thi s parti cular objec
tive had been chosen by the government because i t seemed to
ofer two advantages : frst of all it was a large and promi nent
factory of some strategic i mportance, and secondly it had a
small CGT membershi p and a hi gh proporti on of foreign
workers. Moreover, only 250 out of a total 1 0,000 employees
were hol di ng the factory. Some thirty l i ght armoured cars
and half-tracks drove at the factory gates at high speed and
qui ckl y smashed through the barri ers. The CRS foll owed close
behi nd and drove out the pi ckets by threatening them with
machi ne guns. The state had decided to show its hand and
now wanted everyone to know who was master.
The only reply by the trade uni ons was to call a protest
meeting at Mureaux, six ki lometres from the factory, for 8
o'clock next morni ng. Now, by that ti me, two shi fts of 1 ,500
and 6,000 workers woul d have clocked in under the protection
of the pol ice, and the protest meet ing would have been so
much hot ai r. It was in these circumstances that we called for
a show of force outside the factory gates at 5 a.m. Twelve
hundred students turned up, stopped cars, and explai ned to as
many workers as possible that to go back to work under these
ci rcumstances was an act of rank betrayal . Whi l e no more
than 40 workers showed up at the CGT meeti ng in Mureaux,
hundreds of workers gathered outside the factory. The CGT
accordi ngl y deci ded to abandon its own meeti ng and to
harangue the larger crowd. By then some three to four thou
sand people had col lected only a few yards away from the
CRS. The temperature rose rapi dl y and several young workers
who had been there si nce the earl y morni ng now demanded
that the CGT ofci al s shut up and that a student be al lowed
to speak. The workers then started to move against the factory
gates despi te desperate appeals by the CGT delegates; the fi rst
grenades burst, and fghti ng started i n earnest. For the next
75
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
three days, young students and workers kept up a running
battle wi th the CRS in al l the surrounding felds and woods.
The CGT tried to cal l them back, but i n vai n. The local popu
lati on were cl early on the side of the young, gave them shelter,
fed them and looked after them in every way they coul d. A
shopkeeper who denounced a student to the pol i ce had hi s
busi ness smashed up and was afterwards boycotted by most of
hi s ol d customers.
The resi stance at Flins rai sed the faggi ng courage of
workers throughout France. The metal i ndustry as a whole
refused to gi ve i n, the ORTF decided to stay out on strike,
whi l e practically everywhere barriers were bei ng put up, not
ably at Renault-Bi l lancourt and at Citroen. Unfortunately
these defences were never used - the trade uni ons had them
di smantled just before the general return to work.
On Monday, 1 0 June, the students once agai n mobi l ized i n
response to a call from the factory. At 6 . 30 a.m. a hundred or
so of us were arrested whi le assembli ng i n the ofces of the
CFDT, the only Trade Union that di d not bar students, and
there was a veritable 'rat hunt' in the enti re neighbourhood
whi ch, in the evening, ended in the death of Gi lles Tauti n, a
schoolboy.
Thi s is how the CGT later spoke of the students' attempts
to help the workers' struggle :
' Ri gorously oppose every attempt to mi slead the workers'
movement.
'Whi l e negotiations are proceeding in the metal i ndustry,
and whi le consultations prior to a return to work conti nue i n
vari ous other branches, dangerous attempts at provocation are
clearly bei ng made. These take the form of questioni ng our
undoubted achi evements and misleading the workers i nto
adventurist escapades.
'It was at Fli ns that the most recent attempt of this nature
took place this morning. After the government had decided
on the occupation of the factory by the CRS, and whi l e the
workers were assembled in perfect calm, groups who are
strangers to the working class, led by Geismar, whom we can
see more and more clearly as a speci alist i n provocation, i n-
76
The Student Revolt
si nuated themselves i nto the meeti ng and tri ed to i nci te the
workers to re-occupy the factory.
'These squads, trai ned in para-mi l i tary fashion, who have
already appeared i n operations of a si mi lar nature i n the Paris
regi on, act vi si bl y as agents of the worst enemi es of the work
i ng classes. It is di fcul t to bel i eve that the arrogance of the
employers i n the metal i ndustry, the support whi ch they enjoy
from the government, the police brutal i ti es agai nst the
workers, and these attempts at provocation are not al l of the
same ki nd. ' (CGT, Pari s Region, 7 June)
On the ni ght following the death of Gi l l es Tauti n, a demon
strati on, qui te spontaneously, spi l led into the Lati n Quarter,
attacked the Pol i ce Commi ssari at of the Fifth Arrondissement
and conti nued to remai n in the streets unti l 2 o'clock i n the
morni ng.
But that was not the end of the story. The next act was
played out near the Swiss border. On Tuesday 1 1 June at
Sochaux round the Peugeot factories, whi ch the CRS wanted
to occupy, there took place what were probably the most
violent scufes of all i n those months of May and June. They
clai med the l i ves of two vi cti ms.
But whi le we struggled on, factory after factory returned to
work and we real i zed that the frst round had to be conceded.
Even so, Fl i ns and Sochaux remai n two shi ni ng monuments
to real, l i vi ng sol i dari ty, rays of light in the dark betrayal of the
worki ng class.
Another resul t of our sol idari ty, perhaps less spectacular but
even more i mportant, was the spontaneous emergence of
Action Commi ttees.
Whereas for decades the 'Left' had lamented the lethargy
of the masses, whi le spli nter groups had vainly kept drummi ng
on the factory gates, harangui ng the crowd outsi de the Metro,
or i n uni versity cafes, here we suddenly saw thousands of
mi l i tants j oi ni ng together wi thout any outside prompti ng, al l
of them active, i nformed, aware and responsi bl e. Thousands of
people di scussed democracy, t he class struggle, t he next acti on,
and al l thi s wi thout havi ng learned to reci te the magi c spells
put out by the Central Committee of the Communi st Party;
77
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
wi thout even knowing that there are fve diferent wings to the
Fourth International, or whether the PCMLF or the
UJC(M-L) support Mao Tse Tung. They refused to admi t
that they were as nothi ng wi thout the bri l l i ant leadershi p of
that great revol uti onary vanguard of the proletariat which
woul d one day seize the rei ns on thei r behalf, much as it had
already seized the rei ns i n the 'Workers' Fatherland' . Nor did
they appreciate that every spli nter group expresses at the top
what the gagged proletariat thi nks at the bottom. A profusi on
of journals, of pamphlets, of reviews, poured from the private
presses proclai mi ng the word : Truth', The Way', The Pro
letari an', ' Revolt', 'Workers' Struggle', 'Communi st Struggle',
'People's Struggle', 'Workers' Power', 'Workers' News', or
sometimes To Serve the People'. _Before sJ much good wi l l
and so many good ofces, i t i s indeed astoni shi ng that the
working class shoul d have chosen to take i ts own desti ny i n
i ts hands rather that acclaim any o f the great messiahs com
peti ng for their favour .
I f lack of pol i ti cal understanding means the rejecti on of
bureaucracies bi g (e. g. the Communi sts and the Soci al Demo
crats) and smal l (e. g. the Trotskyist spli nter groups), and the
deni al that the workers must be l ed by a revol uti onary el i te;
i f lack of poli tical i nterest means bei ng bored wi th platform
rhetori c, with theories that have no practical appli cati on, wi th
resolutions, petitions, marches, congresses and annual di nners;
i f lack of poli ti cal i nterest i s the rejection of all the phoney
al ternatives (Communists vs. Soci al Democrats; London vs.
Paris; Mendes-France vs. Mi tterand; Mali vs. Gui nea; gi n and
toni c vs. toni c and gi n; the Ki ng i n hi s palace vs. the palace
i n Ki ng Street; the Si x vs. the Common Market) - if lack of
pol i ti cal i nterest means all this, then i ndeed most young
workers and worki ng i ntellectuals have become emi nently
apol i ti cal . The ori gi ns of our movement, the absence of
ofcials in the di stri ct and factory Action Commi ttees al one
demonstrate that no professional agi tator or theoretician was
ever seen or ever needed. Better sti l l , the Action Committees
stopped such people meddl i ng i n practi ce. All that was most
efective at Nanterre and i n the fghti ng - our abi l i ty to ral l y
78
The Student Revolt
where the acti on was hottest, and to take common deci si ons
wi thout consulti ng the ' leadership' of the spli nter groups - al l
thi s went i nto the creati on of Action Commi ttees. They were
born for the purpose of solvi ng concrete common problems
and shari ng li fe in battle, renderi ng aid to the strikers, and
helpi ng wherever help was most needed. All i ndivi dual s and
spli nter groups i nvolved in the student struggle or the stri ke
movement felt the urgent need to unite for the sake of greater
efci ency. Soli darity became not an i deological slogan but a
necessi ty. Almost overnight, atomized i ndividuals turned i nto
vi tal groups, i nto genui ne communi ti es ( for several weeks i n
Sorbonne, and at the new annexe i n the rue de Censi er, members
of vari ous Action Commi ttees li ved together al most conti nu
ously) .
The petty l i fe of yesterday was left behi nd; gone the di ngy
ofce, the boredom i n a ti ny fat, wi th a ti ny televi si on and,
outsi de; a ti ny road wi th a tiny car; gone the repeti ti on, the
studi ed gestures, the regimentation and the Jack of joy and
desi re.
The organi zation of the local Acti on Commi ttees di d not
precede the events but fol lowed them step by step. New forms
were evolved as we went along and as we found the old forms
inadequate and paralyzing. Organization i s not an end in itself,
but an evolvi ng means of coping wi th specifc si tuati ons.
When we di scovered that i t was impossi ble to get any real
i dea of what was happeni ng from the radio, the press, and
the televi si on, or rather from thei r deli berate si l ence concern
ing the course of the student struggle and the gradual spread
of the strikes, our spontaneous answer was the publ i cati on of
wall newspapers. They were stuck up i n the street, i n squares,
in the markets, and in the Metro: parti cularly at Gobeli ns
Stati on i n the Thi rteenth Arrondissement and at Chateau
Rouge in the Eighteenth. Thi s col lective experience of movi ng
i nto the streets and squares was a new one, and no precon
cei ved i dea, however bri l l i ant or 'correct', had any part i n i t.
In fact, i n our experience of occupying the streets we over
stepped al l theories, just as we thrust asi de the ofcial pro
hi bi ti on of meetings and also the machinations of the
79
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
Communist Party, which failed completely in i ts attempts to
divert us by creating stil l - born action committees of its own.
Moreover, the large crowds that gathered permanently
round our wall newspapers, the physical presence of hundreds
of people i n the street, made the i mpact of our movement felt
as never before. People frst of all exchanged i nformation on
what was happening i n the universities or i n the factori es, but
soon they would get i nvolved i n deeper questions and explana
ti ons. What do the students want? Do they all want the same
thi ng? Why the revolt? In whose interest? And who started al l
the vi olence? And what do the strikers want? A real debate was
begun, and gone was the habi t of accepting bi ased i nformation
from a si ngl e source. People began to take a cool look at the
monopoly of news and the speci ali sts of i nformati on. Nor
would they any longer accept the threadbare explanations of
the offcial party theorists who know everythi ng, predict every
thi ng, and must needs organize everythi ng. The spli nter groups
di ssolved in the mass; they were clearly seen to be directing
nothi ng at al l . The hi gh pri ests of the revoluti on barely knew
on what page to open their Holy Bible (who had the ti me to
wai t for them to fni sh their logic-choppi ng?) , or what par
ticular verse to apply to the changing situati on. They no longer
even dared show thei r badge of ofce - they hi d thei r revol u
ti onary dog-collars under a pullover. The ti me for maki ng fne
Marxist poi nts was clearly over.
The Action Committees
Never before had the local population been so actively i n
volved i n real poli ti cal decisions; never before were thei r
voi ces heard so clearly i n the publi c forum. Democracy sprang
from di scussion of our i mmediate needs and the exigencies of
the situati on which demanded acti on.
What di d the Action Committees do? And precisely how di d
they functi on?
Among the hundreds of such commi ttees formed al l over
Paris, we shal l choose those of the Thirteenth and Eighteenth
80
The Student Revolt
Arrondissements as parti cul arly good examples of what went
on.
To begi n wi th the acti vi ti es of these commi ttees had to be
geared to the vagari es of the battles raging in Pari s i tself and
sometimes as far away as Fl i ns. To that end, we had to make
sure that i nformati on was passed on qui ckl y and efci ently.
The onl y way i n whi ch the students i nvolved i n the struggle
could spread thei r message and break out of thei r i solati on
was to communicate wi th as many of the local people as pos
si ble. Now, once the people had seen the pol i ce at work, they
were onl y too anxi ous to express thei r sol i dari ty, and to par
ti cipate i n future acti ons. To begi n wi th, they helped to tend
the wounded, col l ected funds, and above all saw to the pro
vi si oni ng of the stay- i n stri kers: i n the Thi rteenth Arrondisse
ment alone, al most two tons of frui t and vegetables were
distri buted each week. We also ran soli dari ty meetings and
gave di rect support to the stri kers, by rei nforci ng thei r pi ckets,
and by pri nti ng posters for them.
At the local level, we carri ed on wi th permanent i nforma
tion and di scussi on centres in well- known places . Every day,
people who had been out on demonstrations gave an account
of what had happened to them personally, of what was goi ng
on i n the rest of Pari s, and of how the strikers were fari ng.
There were announcements of soli dari ty meeti ngs, of publ i c
di scussi ons on vari ous topical subjects, and of the work of
other Acti on Commi ttees. Pamphlets were wri tten and di s
tri buted, techni cal tasks al located (typi ng, dupl icating, pri nt
i ng, etc. ), l i sts of factories to be contacted were compi l ed,
food di stri buti on teams set up and sent out, etc.
The Acti on Commi ttee usual l y met once a day at a fxed
hour and pl ace, and i ts deli berations were open to all. Each
local Acti on Commi ttee was in contact wi th the wi der
Arrondissement Commi ttee, whi ch i n turn was in contact wi th
the Pari s Acti on Commi ttee. However, the local Acti on Com
mi ttees consistently refused to al low this coordi nati on to
degenerate i nto a ki nd of pol i ti cal di recti on. They reserved
the right to take whatever steps they saw ft on both the local
and al so the nati onal level, and rotated thei r del egates, who
81
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
had no mandate and merely acted as go-betweens. At the
central meetings, two major trends emerged : whi l e the
majority contended that they should concern themselves ex
clusi vely with the coordination of the day-to-day struggle
rather than work out a political programme, the mi nori ty felt
that only such a programme and a centralized leadershi p coul d
carry the struggle to i ts successful concl usi on.
The supple structure of the Action Committees favoured the
formation of horizontal relationships, whose power of united
acti on was in no way di mi ni shed by the absence of leaders at
the top. When necessary, several thousand mi l i tants could be
assembled wi thi n an hour (between 2,800 and 3,500 were called
out by the Permanent Factory Mobi lization Committee at 9
a. m. on Monday, 3 June, and stayed unti l 1 p.m. on Wednes
day, 5 June) . The basic working uni t, however, remained the
local Action Committee - in the Eighteenth Arrondissement
for i nstance, there were fve such groups, each wi th a specifc
geographi cal area of responsibi l i ty. It was these whi ch di d
most of the real work, the Arrondissement Acti on Commi ttee
itsel f acting chi efy in a coordinating capacity (relaying i nform
ation, etc.) . The di vi si on into geographi cal sectors was often
arbi trary and provi si onal, and had to be modifed from time
to ti me according to the specifc task on which we were en
gaged. Moreover, the i nternal organization of the local groups
also varied according to the role they were playing at a gi ven
moment. There was one thing, however, on whi ch everyone
was agreed : the preservation of autonomy.
Duri ng lulls in the struggle, the Action Commi ttees organ
i zed publ i c discussions and study commi ssions on such themes
as the economic si tuation, the pol i ti cal si tuati on, workers'
control, etc. To that purpose they made use of large publ i c
hal l s, and i f none such were to be had i n the i mmediate vi ci nity,
of schools, col leges, and ofice bui ldi ngs. Most Action Com
mittees had their peri od of keenest di scussi on duri ng the
power-vacuum which occurred from 24 to 30 May. Unfortun
ately, the rubli c debates that went on almost conti nuall y at
the time showed that the majority were not yet ready to
manage their own afai rs. The most frequent question asked was
82
The Student Revol t
'What i s going to happen? ' and not 'What are we goi ng to do? '
Then as pol i ce repressi on was stepped up, as the problem
of taki ng food to the workers and thei r fami l i es became more
acute, and as protest grew, the 'they' of resignation gave place
to the T of responsi bi l i ty. Thi s was demonstrated most cl early
at the Lebrun Depot, and again at Fli ns, where, by uni ted
acti on, the young workers, students and teachers won a victory
over the poli ce, the state and the bosses. Acti ons of thi s type
helped to bri dge the gap between di ferent sectors of soci ety,
and threw people of al l ki nds together in a common struggl e.
But i t must be frankly admi tted that these remai ned i solated
i nci dents, although thi s was surely not for lack of courage on
the part of the workers, or from fear of the CRS. The authori
ti es had been reduced to utter helplessness, the workers knew
i t, and yet fai led to seize their opportuni ty, overwhelmed no
doubt by the unexpected vi stas that had suddenly opened up
before them. Sti l l , they di d make a begi nni ng by posi ng the
real problems i nstead of being diverted i nto i dle parli amentary
debates, and they di d have a foretaste of what self-government
can achi eve i n practi ce.
Today, the workers are back i n the factories, and the
struggle has ceased - for a ti me, at least. Once agai n, the bands
of hope stand at the corners chanti ng their old l i tani es, telling
the workers that only by heedi ng the call of the 'vanguard' wi l l
they ever achi eve thei r emancipati on. Words are apparently
more i mportant than deeds once agai n.
But the message of the Acti on Commi ttees wi l l surely drown
these di scordant voi ces, once the workers begi n to fex thei r
muscles agai n. Let us therefore see what preci sel y thi s message
was.
ACTI ON COMMI TTEE OF
THE THI RTEENTH ARRONDI S S E ME NT
Political programme adopted by tlte General Assembly
o/25 May
We are not a poli ti cal party, but a group of mi l i tants wi th
vari ous poli ti cal and trade uni on backgrounds. Our i deal i s a
uni ted movement i n whi ch sectari ani sm and bureaucracy are
83
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
replaced by the greatest possible measure of democracy. The
Acti on Commi ttees are the poli ti cal expressi on of the funda
mental democratic needs of the masses. The commi ttee can
only take deci si ons on specifc political and organizational
i ssues and i s answerable to the general membershi p. The Com
mi ttee of the Thirteenth Arrondissement i s a part of the Com
bi ned Action Commi ttee Movement; the assembly therefore
can deci de to associate i tself with any Pari si an or nati onal
poli ti cal i ni tiative.
Why have we combined into Action Committees?
Because we whol eheartedly endorse the struggle, waged frst
by the students and, today, by the workers as wel l .
Because we feel i t i s not enough merely t o support thi s
struggle, but that we must ensure i ts maximum extensi on, and
further the poli ti cal expressi on of i ts revolutionary message.
Because we thi nk that we have much to learn from the
students and workers whose courageous struggle ofers new
prospects of overturning the bourgeois order. The students
have shown that i t i s possible to send the government packi ng
i n the streets; the workers must now show that they can fush
i t out of ofce.
The students, by their direct confrontation of the authori
ti es, have shown the futi li ty of the tradi ti onal poli ci es and
parl i amentary procedures with their marches, petiti ons, cen
sure motions and election campai gns.
But the struggle of the students against repression is only one
aspect of the frontal attack by the whole of the worki ng class
on the soci al and economic structures of capi tal i st soci ety.
It is not by poi ntless negotiations that the students have
succeeded in paralyzi ng the university system and in throwing
out the Fouchet plan, but by fghti ng for, and taking over,
thei r own i nstituti ons.
It i s not by means of Toutee or Gregoi re commissi ons, or
with the help of (conomic and social counci ls, that the workers
launched their battle, but by occupying the factories, by di rect
acti on, by meeting violence wi th vi olence, and by fghti ng
agai nst all forms of repression, conscri pti on and col laborati on
wi th the bourgeoi si e.
84
The Student Revolt
These struggles have opened up new hori zons to workers
throughout the world - the bourgeoi si e can be beaten provided
we are prepared to do battle rather than shout the old slogans . . .
The struggles have shown that when they begi n to questi on
the very basis of the bourgeois order, students and workers
speak a common language. By themselves, the students, how
ever resolute, can never hope to topple the Gaul l i st regi me.
Onl y the proletari at can bri ng thi s about, by sei zi ng power
from the bourgeoi sie, a class that is, by its very nature, i n
capable of granti ng the workers a decent l i fe or the students
a decent educati on.
In the present si tuati on, the authori ti es can try to under
mine the movement wi th l i mi ted economi c concessions and
promises to di scuss all outstanding claims at board meetings,
or else wi th vi ci ous attacks on the most dynami c and radi cal
elements i n the movement. It can also combi ne these two forms
of attack and use the good ofces of pol i ti cal parti es ready to
accept mi nor reforms, but basically in agreement wi th
capi tal i sm i tsel f.
What unites the revoluti onary mi l itants of the Acti on Com
mi ttee i s thei r refusal to be cowed by the authoriti es, and thei r
determi nati on to eschew al l forms of cl ass col laborati on. What
unites them is their wi l l to pose the question of power, and
develop the struggle in action, by confrontation in the street,
and in the factori es.
Acti on Commi ttees should be created wherever they are
needed to advance the struggle.
It i s because we bel i eve that a revol utionary reapprai sal of
French soci ety is possi bl e today, that we thi nk that these com
mi ttees should be set up everywhere wi th the express purpose
of i nvolvi ng the masses in political and active struggle, of sup
porti ng the workers, and of rendering aid to all those who are
fghti ng at this very hour.
F R I E ND, WI L L YOU BE WI T H US T OMOR R OW?
For a month and a hal f we have been battling i n the uni ver
si ti es and factori es, in the streets and the squares. We have a
short respite now, let us proft from i t.
85
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
When the workers realize that they are bei ng swi ndled out
of thei r wage i ncreases by ri si ng prices, when they see that
the same doci l e parli amentarians cannot stop playing their
game of endl essly discussing decisions they themselves have
never taken, when the top brass get round to i mposi ng on
students the educational reforms that have been worked out
by some ofci al i n the Mi ni stry of Education to ensure ever
better NCO's for the future :
WE M UST BE R EADY WITH T H E A NS WE R
The Acti on Commi ttees propose :
- to i nform the population of the real pol i ti cal and social
si tuati on and the prospects opened up by the May cri si s :
- to expl ai n that the elections merely divert the struggle
of the masses i nto the parl i amentary feld, mi ned by the enemy,
and in whi ch the poli tical parties wi l l once agai n prove their
i nefectual ity;
- to help the people to organize themselves, to construct
a pol i ti cal system in which they themselves wi l l take charge
of the management and admi ni stration of their own afai rs;
- to participate i n al l the struggles whi ch are bei ng waged
and to support the factory strikes by fghting the repressive
measures of the authorities (expulsion of forei 3ners, Gestapo
style raids, banning of revolutionary groups, etc- . . . ) and by
organi zi ng for self-defence.
The Action Commi ttee want :
- to oppose the creation of any new poli ti cal party on the
l i nes of those we know already, all of which must sooner or
later ft i nto the existing system;
- to unite in the streets, in the factories, and in the suburban
communes, all those who agree wi th the above analysis and
who realize that the struggle begun on 3 May can end in the
overthrow of the capitalist system and the i nstal lati on of a
soci al ist state;
- to coordinate resistance at the Paris level and then at
the national one, to fght in the front l i nes of the revolutionary
movement.
86
The Student Revolt
This, then, i s the current posi ti on of the Acti on Committees.
It i s on this basis that they wi l l i ntervene duri ng and after
the electi on campai gn.
N O W MOR E THA N E VE R
THE STRUGGLE CONT I N UE S
Today the Acti on Commi ttees have to l i e low, but i n May
and June they were the highest expressi on of our movement.
They showed how si mple it is to bypass the trade uni on and
pol i ti cal bosses, how workers can spontaneously unite i n
acti on, wi thout a 'vanguard' or a party.
Speci al menti on should here be made of CLEOP (Com
mi ttee for Student-Worker-Peasant Li ai son) which saw to
the provi si oni ng of the strikers, above al l in the smaller fac
tori es. One of the frst of these commi ttees ori gi nated in the
Agri cultural School of Nantes, most of the others, too, were
started in Bri ttany. They made contact wi th agri cultural co
operatives and uni ons, and bought di rectly from the farmers
and smallholders who were only too glad to cock a snook at
the hated government. CLEOP also organized publ i c di scus
si ons and publ i shed bulleti ns to fll in the gaps which were
deli beratel y left in the ofci al communiques - i n short,
CLEOP played much the same part in the countrysi de that the
Acti on Commi ttees played i n Pari s. Meeti ng places sprang
up, the commi ttees became a network for di ssemi nati ng
i nformati on and i deas, and helped to cement sol i dari ty be
tween town and country workers i n battles wi th the pol i ce
and i n organi zi ng food transports.
At the end of the day, CLEOP, l i ke the rest of the revol u
ti onary student movement, became exhausted by ffty days
of constant ski rmishes wi th the poli ce, and as the workers'
struggle abated in i ts turn, the authori ti es moved i n qui ckl y
to crush the l ast pockets of resistance.
But our temporary defeat i s only the end of a chapter.
When the movement takes the ofensive agai n, i ts dynami sm
wi l l return, and thi s ti me the battle wi l l be on a feld chosen
by the students and workers themselves. The days of May and
June wi l l never be forgotten, and one day the barricades wi l l
87
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
surely be raised agai n. There is no better way to end this
chapter than with the mani festo put out by one of that group
of revolutionary students, known as the Enrages de Caen.
( 1 ) The students have ushered i n a university revoluti on. By
thei r acti on they have made clear to one and al l how basi cally
repressive our educational i nstituti ons real l y are. They began
by questioning the authority of their professors and the
university admi ni stration and pretty soon they found them
selves face to face with the CRS. They have proved that their
Rector derives his powers from the Prefect of Poli ce. Their
acti on at the same time revealed the uni ty of i nterest of al l
the exploi ted and oppressed classes. It i s i n response to the
movement born at Nanterre and continued at the Sorbonne
i n the face of poli ce aggressi on, that the workers, the ordi
nary soldi ers, the journalists, the research workers and the
writers, have joi ned the battle.
(2) However, as soon as the workers came out on stri ke and
the students tried to show their active soli dari ty with them,
they came up against the CGT, which asked them not to i nter
fere. While many studens tel l themselves that thi s i s not the
attitude of the majority of workers, they nevertheless feel
rejected as ' mi ddl e class'. Qui te a few students who were only
too anxi ous to follow the lead of the working class are becom
ing di senchanted as the workers scorn them and refuse to take
them seriously. Di senchantment is particularly strong among
those students who were last to j oi n the movement, and are
really more i nterested i n achieving a few concessions than i n
changing society as a whole. The more progressive students,
by contrast, real i ze that, unless the revolution fnishes of
capitalism and the old universities wi th it, there can be no
real change for the better. Hence they persist, often without
hope, in ofering their services to the workers, begi nni ng to
feel ashamed of bei ng students.
(3) Students must ri d themselves of these false feelings of
gui l t. Although their action sprang from the u niversi ty, it has
a vali di ty that far transcends the narrow academic walls.
Fi rst of all, and most important, students must reali ze
that the problems of the university are not i rrelevant to the
88
The Student Revol t
problems of i ndustry. True, i n i ndustry, the workers carry
the main weight of exploitation, the ownershi p of the means
of producti on i s i n the hands of a hosti l e class, and the deci sive
struggle i s played out wi thi n the productive process. But a
mere change of ownership, such as the transfer of economi c
power from private to State enterprise, wi l l i n no way put an
end to exploi tati on. What characterizes the structure of
modern i ndustry i s not only the di vi si on between capi tal and
l abour, but al so the di vi si on between supervisors and super
vi sed, the ski l l ed and the unski l l ed. The workers are exploi ted
economi cal l y but also they are reduced to the role of mere
pawns, by having no say in the runni ng of thei r factories, no
part in deci si ons that afect thei r own fate.
The monopoly of capi tal i nvari ably goes hand i n hand
wi th a monopoly of power and knowledge.
Now, thi s i s preci sely where the students can show the way.
They attack the sel f-styled custodi ans of authority and of
wi sdom; those who, on the pretext of dispensi ng knowledge,
preach obedi ence and conformi sm.
Rather than waste thei r ti me analyzi ng the connexi on be
tween the university and other soci al sectors, students must
proclai m that the same repressive structures are wei ghi ng
down on them and the workers al i ke, that the same mental i ty
thwarts the creative intel l i gence of i ndi vi dual s and groups
everywhere. It i s in the universi ti es that thi s mental i ty struc
ture is elaborated and mai ntai ned, and to shake i t, we must
shake the enti re soci ety - even though we sti l l do not know
the qui ckest path to that goal .
That shaki ng wi l l surely come : we can al ready see its si gns
i n the protests which are ri si ng now, not only from the work
ing but al so from the middle class, from the press, radi o and
televi si on, from artists and writers, and from Cathol i c, Jewi sh
and Protestant youth who have suddenly rebelled agai nst an
oppressive theology.
The struggle of the students has opened the foodgates; i t
matters l i ttle that thi s struggle was born i n a petty bourgeoi s
envi ronment - i ts efects involve the whole of soci ety.
Moreover, i t i s a far too l i teral and i l l - digested Marxi sm
89
The Strategy and Nature of the Revoluti onary Movement
that tries to expl ai n everything in terms of the antagonism
between the workers and the mi ddle class. This antagonism
i tself springs from an economic, soci al and poli tical basi s .
Every attack against this basis, no matter from what source,
has a revolutionary beari ng.
(4) Students must not fear to make themselves heard and
instead of searching for leaders where none can be found,
boldly proclai m thei r pri nciples - principles that are val i d for
al l i ndustri al societies, and for al l the oppressed of our ti me.
These pri nciples are :
To take col lective responsi bi l ity for one's own afai rs, that
is, self-government;
To destroy all hi erarchies which merely serve to paralyze
the i ni ti ative of groups and i ndividuals;
To make all those i n whom any authority i s vested per
manently responsible to the people;
To spread i nformation and ideas throughout the move
ment;
To put an end to the divisi on of labour and of knowledge,
whi ch only serves to i solate people one from the others;
To open the university to all who are at present excluded;
To defend maximum pol i tical and i ntel lectual freedom as
a basic democratic right.
In afrming these principles, the students are in no way
opposing themselves to the workers. They do not pretend
that theirs is a blueprint for the reconstruction of society,
even less a pol i tical programme, in the conventi onal sense of
the word. They do not set themselves up as teachers. They
recognize that each group has the right to lay down i ts own
cl ai ms and its own methods of struggle. The students speak i n
the universal language o f revol uti on. They do not deny that
they have learned much of i t from the workers; but they can
also make a contri buti on of their own.
2. The Workers
We have seen that the students' movement triggered of that
of the workers. The students went into the streets and, by
their courage, they brought out the people, took the uni ver
si ti es, and attacked the Stock Exchange. Faced wi th the com
bi ned forces of the government, the educati onal authori ties,
the police, and the trade uni on bureaucracies, they showed
their abi l i ty to provoke errors and to expl oi t them. More
over, they proved that i t i s possi bl e to occupy factories -
would the workers but realize i t - wi thout runni ng the
sl ightest risks. The student movement developed its radi cal
cri ti que of the authori ti es to a fne poi nt but, i n the absence of
mass support, i t was bound to fai l i n the l ong run.
The students were deeply disappoi nted when, on the morn
i ng after the ' ni ght of the barri cades' , the workers di d not take
to the streets, but l i mi ted thei r sympathy to goi ng on a
twenty-four-hour general stri ke, which had been cal l ed by
the trade uni ons and was poli ti cal only i n its choi ce of date :
1 3 May - the day on whi ch de Gaulle had assumed rower i n
1 958. Then, on Tuesday, 1 4th, late i n the eveni ng, the stu
dents hol di ng the Sorbonne learned that some workers had
gone much further than their trade union bosses i ntended :
they occupi ed the Sud-Avi ation works in Nantes. This move
ment spread rapi dly and spontaneously - from 1 4 to 1 7 May,
a host of other factor ies fel l to the workers.
In thi s wave of strikes, which were i l legal because no ad
vance notice was given, i t was the young workers, most of
whom were not members of the trade unions, who proved
the most mi l i tant and tenaci ous. These strikes, unl i ke the of
ci al ones, were not for any precise wage clai ms, but si mply,
as several stri kers put i t, because 'we've had a bellyful ' . A
91
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
bellyful of low wages, true, but beyond that, a bellyful of
futi l ity and the boredom of the daily round, of a l i fe that
stamped them, like everyone else, a hol low replica of thei r
fathers and grandfathers, perhaps sl ightly more comfortable,
but no less vacuous. What they felt was somethi ng they had
not learned from any books, something so pri mi ti ve and
deep that it di d not give way before the power of the state or
the threats of the bosses, or even before the cajol i ng of the
uni ons.
To accuse the CGT of treachery i n May and June i s non
sense - i t had shown i ts hand long before. The trade uni ons,
i n France as elsewhere i n the West, play the part of the
' Joyal opposi tion', and in May 1 968, the workers simply
turned down their thumbs not only on the contestants out
also on the game itself.
Unfortunately most of them fai led to take that fnal and
decisive step beyond bourgeois legality : the actual running
of the factories by and for themselves. The extraordinary
scope of the movement i s not any the less remarkable; it was
both i mmense and spontaneous and it produced a degree of
awareness and di scussion that was often extremely high, and
sometimes exemplary. The workers had no ti me for abstract
theories; at the beginning especially they were gropi ng their
way, and would sometimes, particularly when frustrated, turn
back to their old ways of thi nki ng. They acted often for the
sake of action alone, with no conscious goal, nei ther knowi ng
nor caring where their actions woul d lead. Thei r feelings are
hard to expl ai n to anyone who has not, l i ke them, been left
to his own devices at a time of crisis, and found i t necessary
to act frst and look for what theories can be deduced from
the practice afterwards. But from their experiences perhaps
we can learn something of the forces which are already con
structing the future. Hence i t i s worth trying to understand,
for example, the workers' feelings about the Grenelle agree
ment and other i ndustrial negotiations by the trade unions.
Most of them realized, albeit di mly, that they were bei ng sold
down the river once agai n. It was this very feel i ng that one
worker expressed to his astoni shed trade union leaders, when
92
The Workers
he sai d : 'It's not you who started the stri ke. It was the ones
who were wi l l i ng to use force. Afterwards you tried to take
charge and fob us of with the usual clai ms. You threw a
spanner i n the works, and that's why we have washed our
hands of you. ' What had emerged at last, and had hi therto
been no more than the pi ous hope of some of the extreme
left groups, was the expl i ci t demand for responsi bi l i ty and
control over producti on, and i t sprang from the sense of
brotherhood that had developed i n the struggle i tself, and
poi nted towards a new and better soci ety. It was thi s that
made our movement so truly revol utionary, i t i s because of
this that we can be sure it wi l l spri ng up agai n. Moreover, i n
several cases stri kers di d, i n fact, start runni ng the factori es
on thei r own account. In thi s acti on can be seen the essence,
the highest achi evement, of the movement. Elsewhere the
stri kers organi zed their own food suppl ies wi th the help of
students, smal l farmers and lorry dri vers. Others agai n
di d try to apply radi cal soluti ons but grew more and more
frightened as the general return to work speeded up and the
tradi ti onal forces re-establ i shed thei r hold. The vi si on of the
bolder among them acted as a leaven i n the passi ve mass of the
general consci ousness, and deserves credi t for that fact al one.
Perhaps we had best look at some concrete examples.
The Case of the AGF
The AGF (Assurance Generale de France) i s the second
largest French i nsurance company, a national i zed i ndustry
and one which in four years has twice been amalgamated,
frst wi th six other compani es into a new combine, and then
wi th three more. This 'take-over' went hand in hand wi th the
i ntroducti on of a hi gh degree of automati on and central iza
ti on. The trade uni ons never even rai sed the questi on of
workers' parti cipation in thi s 'great' State enterpri se, and con
fned themselves to denounci ng the arbi trary way i n whi ch the
management (whom they accused of bei ng a Gaul l i st cl i que)
i gnored the uni ons.
93
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
On Friday, 1 7 May, a small group of employees raised the
question of management, bluntly and clearly, in a pamphlet
di stributed by students of the 22 March Movement :
' Fol lowi ng the example of the students, we herewith sub
mi t a number of proposals to be debated i n the general staf
assembly of the AGF.
' ( I ) The AGF should be run by all those working in i t.
' (2) The present management should be relieved of their posts.
Every branch should appoint a delegate, chosen solely for
hi s personal qual ities and merits.
' ( 3) Those responsible for a particular branch wi l l have a
double function - to coordinate the runni ng of the branch
under the control of the employees, and to organize, with
the delegates from other branches, a counci l which, agai n
under the control of the employees, wi ll run the enterprise as
a whole.
'(4) Those responsible for their branch will at al l times be
accountable for thei r actions to the enti re staf and can be
di smi ssed at any moment by those who have appoi nted
them.
' (5) The internal hi erarchy i s to be aboli shed. Every employee,
no matter what his job, wi ll receive the same pay, based pro
vi si onally on the mean wage bi l l for May ( i .e. the sum of all
wages di vi ded by the number of workers).
' (6) The personal fles of employees wi ll be returned to them
so that they can remove any item that is not of purely admi ni
strative interest.
'(7) All property and stock of the AGF wi l l become the pro
perty of all, managed by al l , and safeguarded by al l at al l times.
'( 8) In the case of any outside threat, a voluntary guard under
the control of the counci l wi l l provide protection for the enter
pri se day and ni ght. '
On Monday, 20 May, a new pamphlet was distributed mak
i ng the following poi nts :
'As the fruits of soci al progress are in danger of being
snatched back, we must :
- Beware of false friends and have confdence only i n our
selves.
94
The Workers
- Elect stri ke commi ttees.
- Take over control on the li nes of the earl i er pamphlet.
'The stri ke has been won. Now we must start thi ngs up
agai n by ourselves and for ourselves, wi thout any authori ty
other than the counci l we have elected. Who wi l l then be the
forces of di sorder? Onl y those who seek to defend pri vate
property, thei r pri vi lege and jobs as managers, and who
stand for oppressi on, violence, mi sery and war . . . Where you
work i s where the action i s. There, with al l the workers, you
can choose to rebui l d a new worl d, a worl d that wi l l belong to
al l .'
At the begi nni ng, only a relatively smal l proportion of the
employees (500 out of 3,000) participated i n the occupation
of the AGT Head Ofce, mainly because of the transport
stri ke. The stay- i n was started by a number of young workers,
many of whom were not trade uni on members. Later, the
trade unions took over, or rather tried to slow thi ngs down.
The staf, however, was ful l y determined not to lose what had
already been won. The l i st of ori gi nal demands was i mpressive,
and i ncl uded four condi ti ons, chi ef among them ful l stri ke
pay, the r ight of the stri ke commi ttee to introduce structural
reforms, and worker participation in the deci si on-maki ng
machi nery. When the admi ni strative staf joi ned the stri ke on
22 May ( 1 30 voti ng i n favour, 1 20 against, wi th 250 absent) the
nature of the stri ke changed radical ly. The young technocrats
and admi ni strators and the trade union leaders were now i n a
domi nant positi on on the stri ke committee. Thi s 'take-over'
did not pass u nchal lenged : among other i nci dents there was
a violent row over the functi on of trade union ofci als, whi ch
l ed to the break-up of the so-cal l ed structural commissi on,
charged wi th handl i ng the question of workers' management .
Some of t he young technocrats on thi s commi ssi on, mostly
members of the CGC (Confederation of Admi ni strative Staf)
had tri ed to use their vote to force their own concepti on of
management on the workers, to wi t the modernizati on, and
not the destructi on, of the exi sti ng hi erarchi cal structure.
Other members of the commission, by contrast, put forward
95
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
the principle of workers' direct participation in management,
on Yugoslav l ines.
The i nterest of these proposals is that they forced the
workers to take a very hard look at the possible forms of
direct participation i n i ndustry. Qui te a few of them rea
l i zed that the so-called co-management proposal of the tech
nocrats was merely a bl i nd that allowed them to strengthen
their grip over the rest. In particular, by retai ni ng the system
of 'points' and promotion, confdential i nformation, and by
making proftabi lity the chief criteri on, 'co-management' must
rapi dly degenerate into the old system. By contrast, real
workers' participation at the deci si on-maki ng level i s bound
to weaken the power of the trade uni on bureaucrats and the
technical experts. No wonder then, that the trade unions were
so hostile to the following proposals submi tted by the more
radical members of the structural commissi on :
( 1 ) Every decision, without excepti on, must be taken
joi ntly by a rank and fle committee consisting of twelve
workers and the departmental chief.
(2) If they agree, the decision will be put i nto force i mme
diately. If there i s disagreement, the matter is brought be
fore a works counci l, on which workers and management
have equal representation. The workers' representatives are not
permanent, but are appointed for a particular counci l meeting,
and can be recalled at any ti me. The works counci l has no
power to make decisions, i ts job is to re-exami ne the problem,
suggest solutions, and refer them back for deci si on to the par
ticular rank and fle commi ttee in which the confict originated.
(3) If the confict continues, the whole matter wi l l be brought
before a standing committee deal i ng with departmental
afairs in general . Thi s committee too has equal worker
management representation and is elected for a maximum of
one year, whi le subject to immediate di smissal . It decides the
issue by a majority, with the head of the department havi ng
the casting vote. The decision is then enforced wi thout right of
appeal.
Two things are clear: that the experts are reduced to a tech-
96
The Workers
ni cal rather than manageri al function and that the trade
uni on del egates have no say in departmental afai rs. Thi s
explains the posi ti on of the management and trade unions
quoted in Le Monde on 2 / 3 June, 1 968 : 'We must know
exactly what, in practical terms, thi s i nvolves for us. We are
not yet ready for acti on, but we are keepi ng an open mi nd. '
In fact, the trade unions and techni cal staf made no attempt
at al l to apply these principles, but simply promi sed to enter
into negoti ati on with the management once the stri ke was
over. The habi t of leaving decisions to the management dies
hard! The pri nci pl e of co-management was not even men
ti oned directly, onl y the creati on of a commi ssi on to inqui re
i nto new methods of organization. It is evident that, at best,
there woul d have emerged a consultative body, an unhol y
al l i ance between the trade uni ons, admi nistrators, and bosses,
who would share out the jobs between them, and agree to
preserve the status quo.
Thi s whol e si tuati on utterly di sgusted the young workers
who had thought all along that the strike was for greater
thi ngs than that. They now had to li sten to intermi nable di s
cussi ons, to fatul ent and hackneyed phrases i nstead of con
crete proposals. And so the strike degenerated and the stri ke
committee, whose ! 50 members had planned to work without
a permanent secretariat, and to al locate their diferent tasks
to a number of autonomous sub-commi ttees, was suborned by
the bureaucrats. The lesson is clear : once the workers stop
fghti ng their own battles, they have lost the war.
The TSF Works at Brest
Another attempt to achi eve workers' control was made duri ng
the general stri ke at the TSF (Wireless Telegraphy) works i n
Brest ( Bri ttany) .
Some years ago, the TSF opened a factory there as part of
the State pl an to develop the depressed areas. Techni cal and
admi ni strative experts were brought i n from Pari s and
97
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
eleven hundred workers were recruited on the spot, mostly
unskil led. The central board, no doubt in order to receive fur
ther State subsidies for the Brest factory, onl y gave i t the most
unproftable contracts. As a result, they were able to oppose
al l wage claims on the grounds that the factory was runni ng
at a loss. This caused a great deal of anxiety, particularly
among the technical staf who were afraid that the factory
might close down and that they would be thrown out of work.
On 20 May, groups representing various branches of the
factory (workshops, ofces, laboratories) elected a stri ke
committee and then set up 'workers' tribunals' which con
cluded that the administrative staf was i ncompetent, and
i nsolent i n i ts dealings wi th subordinates.
A report to that efect was sent out to the management
board, and a pamphlet calling for the democratization of
the factory was printed and widely distri buted. It called for
workers' control over training courses, a guaranteed pro
motions scheme, defnition of jobs and responsibi l i ties, and
control over the fnances of the factory.
On 1 8 June, after si x days of fruitless discussion on various
topics, including the setting up of worker-management coun
ci ls, the workers decided to down tools by 607 to 357 against.
The management continued in its refusal to admit workers'
delegates to the board, and even the ofcial CFC represen
tatives were unable to make them change their mi nds.
Work was restarted on Friday, 21 June (551 for and 1 52
against), after discussions between local trade union repre
sentatives and the Pari s Board had led to the creation of a
'works counci l' consisting of fve members appointed by the
management and twelve appointed by the staf. This was
charged with studying 'changes in structure' and improvement
of working conditions. The works council had no more than
an advisory capacity and was expected to submit its sugges
tions towards the end of the year.
This progressive nibbling away of the claims was very si gni
fcant! At the beginning, the call was for direct workers' par
ticipation in management, then it was workers' councils and
fnally these became a mere study commission. Once again a
98
The Workers
real attempt to achi eve a workers' democracy had been smartly
outwitted.
The Atomic Energy Centre at Saclay
Let us now look at what happened at CEA ( Atomic Energy
Centre) .
Of the 6 to 7,000 employees at the CEA (Saclay), some
4, 500, i ncl udi ng 25 per cent of the engi neering staf, were
covered by collective agreements. The rest were not members
of the i ndustry proper; they i ncluded charwomen, secretaries,
draughtsmen, techni ci ans and maintenance men brought i n from
outside. There were also a number of French and foreign
students studyi ng at the CEA.
During the strike, the CEA works were occupied : 83 per
cent of the staf stayed in during the entire strike - and even
over the Ascension and Whi tsun week-ends at least 500 people
remai ned in the Centre. Duri ng this time, long discussions were
held on the subj ect of works reorganization and al l ied topics.
The strike itself had been started by a small nucleus of re
search workers (practi cal and theoretical physi ci sts) most of
whom were extremely well pai d. Not di rectly concerned
wi th producti on, young, and i n touch wi th the universities,
these men acted in disregard, and often against the wi shes, of
the trade uni ons. The stri ke lasted for no more than ffteen
days, and stopped when the admi nistration promi sed to
i ntroduce a number of structural reforms and to make good
all wages and salaries lost during the stri ke.
As a resul t of these reforms, a veritable pyramid of works
counci ls was set up, wi th a consultative counci l , presi ded
over by a chai rman, right on top. In the constitution of the
works counci ls, the trade union machinery was completely
by-passed, groups of the workers electing one delegate each.
Al l the delegates were subject to immedi ate di smi ssal and, at
frst, there was a demand that the chairman hi mself shoul d be
answerable to the whole staf. Needless to say, thi s demand
was never met.
99
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
It is therefore true to say that, as far as givi ng the workers
a say in management, the famous 'pyramid of committees'
was completely irrelevant; its only usefulness was to keep the
staf i nformed of what was happening at the top, but even
here its work was severely restricted. The old strike com
mittee, which had been formed spontaneously, was re-elected
almost to a man, but i t was now reduced to a ki nd of i nferior
i ntelligence service; and, moreover, was impeded at every
point by the various committee chairmen.
The Rlune-Poulenc Works
It might also be interesting to examine the case of the
Workers' Committees i n the Rhone-Poulenc works in Vitry.
For years before the strike, the workers here had taken
little interest i n politics or in trade uni on activities. But once
the student movement started, the young workers in particu
lar suddenly turned mi l itant, so much so that some. of them
even helped to man the barricades.
The big twenty-four hour strike of 1 3 May, with its 'parlia
mentary' aims, was joi ned by about 50 per cent of the workers.
The staf grades di d not take part and the foremen di d so re
luctantly. From 1 3 to 20 May, the factory kept runni ng, but
there was a growing sense of unrest among the workers.
On Friday, I 7 May, the management decided to stop al l
assembly l ines, probably with the intention of staging a lock
out. On that evening, the trade union l iaison committee called
a general meeting (from 50 to 60 per cent attended) . The
majority of those present (60 per cent) voted for an immediate
stay-i n, but since the trade unions insisted on a clear two-thirds
majority, the factory was not occupied that week-end.
On Saturday, the 1 8th, the trade uni on l i aison committee
decided to stage a stay- i n strike on Monday, 20th. The CGT
then proposed the formation of Shop Floor Commi ttees, and
thi s was accepted for various reasons by the CFDT and the FO.
This extraordinary proposal was probably a manoeuvre by
the CGT to outwit the other two trade unions.
100
The Workers
The stay- i n stri ke began and, from the start, about 2,000
workers occupi ed the factory. At the end of the week, some
ffteen staf-grades also decided to joi n the strike, after many
votes and despite the opposition of their own trade uni on (the
CTC) .
The Shop Foor Committees
The Shop Floor Commi ttees, as we saw, were formed at the
suggestion of the trade unions, but were quickly swamped by
non-union members.
There were thirty-ni ne Shop Floor Committees i n al l . They
elected four delegates each to a central commi ttee whose 1 56
members were subject to immediate recal l . Meetings of the
central committee were public and coul d be reported. Shop
Floor Commi ttees were organized in each bui lding, so that
while some combi ned various categories of workers - from
unskilled to staf grades, others, for instance i n the research
bui l di ngs, were made up enti rely of techni cians .
On Sunday, 1 9 May, the CGT proposed the creation of an
executi ve committee at a general meeting of al l trade union
ists, in whi ch i t hel d a majority. No member of this executive
ommittee was al lowed to serve on the central committee.
There were two ostensible reasons for forming a separate
executive committee :
( 1 ) The management was only prepared to discuss matters
wi th trade uni on members;
(2) Trade union members were the only ones who were
legal l y enti tled to go on stri ke.
After a week of argument, the Shop Fl oor Committees fn
ally succeeded i n getting a non-trade union member i nto the
executive committee.
During the fortnight preceding the Whitsun week-end, the
Shop Floor Commi ttees reached the highest peak of thei r act
i vi ti es. At the ti me, the workers all thought this was the obvi ous
way to organize: al l propositions were l i stened to and di scussed
whi l e the better ones were put to the vote, for i nstance the
101
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
entry of non-trade union members into the executive com
mittee. Duri ng this entire period, the trade union members col
laborated with the Shop Floor Commi ttees wi thout any
trouble - all of them were simply comrades on stri ke. The ex
ecutive committee li mi ted i tself to carrying out the decisions
of the central committee.
The subject uppermost in all these discussions was direct
control of the factory. At the same time, smaller committees of
a dozen or so workers discussed such poli tical subjects as the
present strategy of the Communist Party, workers' rights, and
the role of the trade uni ons.
By the beginning of the month, all the subjects had been
talked out and a certai n lassitude set i n, although de Gaul le's
speech on 30th gave the discussions a shot in the arm. Even so,
on 1 June, there was a noisy meeting of the central committee
devoted exclusively to the subject of al locating petrol for the
Whitsun week-end!
When the factory was re-occupied after Whi tsun, the spiri t
was no longer the same. Serious discussions gave way to card
playi ng, bowling and volley-bal l . The trade unions began to
peddle thei r wares again, sapping the strength of the movement.
It was during this second period that the trade unions started
negotiations with the management, and needless to say, their
frst claims concerned the status of the trade unions i n the
works.
After the Grenelle agreement, the CGT di d not lose any time
calli ng on everybody to go back to work ('the elections . . .', 'we
can obtain no more . . .') , and despite very strong resistance
from those occupying the factory, pulled out its own mi l i tants
on Monday, 1 Oth.
After this, a number of CGT membership cards were torn
up, which did not stop the CFDT from associ ating itself with
the CGT call for a general return to work on 1 2 May, nor di d
the fact that the vote for a continued stay-i n was 580 against
470.
The Shop Floor Committees at Rhone-Poulenc-Vitry were
set up, as we have seen, on a rather unusual work-uni t basis,
which, in some cases, tended to separate techni cians and
1 02
The Workers
workers i nto separate committees. One fact sticks out: although
there was some cooperation between the workers and tech
nici ans, there was no real fusi on between the diferent com
mi ttees. Clearly, the di vi sion of labour introduced by the
capi tal ists is hard to ki l l .
Contact with outside strikers was mai ntained by a small
group of radi cals, whose example helped to start Workers'
Commi ttees i n other factories, such as Hi spano-Sui za, Thom
son- Bagneux, etc. Most workers, however, tried to run their
own pri vate l i ttle semi -detached stri ke, just as they tri ed to lead
thei r own private l ittle semi - detached li ves.
What happened at Rh6ne-Poulenc-Vitry shows cl early why
workers as a whole are so apathetic and apol i tical : when they
took responsi bi l ity, they came al ive and took an acti ve part i n
making important deci sions, when matters were taken out of
thei r hands and delegated to the unions, they lost interest and
went back to pl ayi ng solo.
The Pattern for the Future
A society wi thout exploitation i s inconceivable where the
management of producti on i s controlled by one social class,
i n other words where the di vi sion of society into managers
and workers is not totally aboli shed. Now, the workers are
told day after day that they are i ncapable of managing thei r
own factory, let alone society, and they have come to beli eve
this fairy tale. Thi s is precisely what leads to their al i ena
t
ion in
a capi tal ist society, and this is precisely why soci al i sts must do
thei r utmost to restore the people's autonomy and not just
doctor the economi c ills of the West.
It is not by accident that l i berals, Stali ni st bureaucrats and
reformi sts al i ke, all reduce the evi ls of capital i sm to economi c
inj ustice, and exploitati on to the unequal distri buti on of the
nati onal i ncome. And when they extend thei r cri ti ci sm of
capi tal i sm to other felds, they sti l l i mply that everythi ng
woul d be solved by a fai rer di stri bution of wealth. The sexual
problems of youth and the di fculties of fami l y l i fe are
103
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
ignored - all that apparently needs to be solved is the problem
of prostitution. Problems of culture come down to the mater
ial cost of dispensing it. Of course, this aspect is important,
but a man is more than a mere consumer, he can not only get
fed, he can get fed up as well. While most of man's problems
are admittedly economic, man also demands the right to
fnd fulflment on every other possible level . If a social organ
ization is repressive i t will be so on the sexual and cultural no
l ess than on the economic planes.
As our society becomes more highly industrialized, the
workers' passive alienation turns into active hosti lity. To
prevent this happening, there have been many attempts to
'adapt the workers', 'give them a stake in society', and quite a
few technocrats now think this is the only hope of salvaging
'the democratic way of l ife'.
But however comfortable they may make the treadmi l l ,
they are determined never to gi ve the worker control of the
wheel . Hence many mi li tants have come to ask themselves
how they can teach the workers that their only hope l i es in
revolution. Now, this merely reintroduces the old concept of
the vanguard of the proletariat, and so threatens to create a
new division withi n society. The workers need no teachers;
they wi l l learn the correct tactics from the class struggl e. And
the class struggle is not an abstract confict of i deas, it is people
fighting in the street. Direct control can only be gai ned
through the struggle itself. Any form of class struggle, over
wages, hours, hol idays, retirement, if it is pushed through to
the end, wi l l lead to a general strike, which in turn i ntroduces
a host of new organizational and soci al problems. For i n
stance, there cannot be a total stoppage of hospitals, trans
port, provisions, etcetera, and the responsi bi l ity for organizing
these falls on the strikers. The longer the stri ke conti nues, the
greater the number of factories that have to be got going again.
Finally the strikers wi l l fnd themselves runni ng the entire
country.
This gradual restoration of the economy is not without i ts
dangers, for a new managerial class may emerge to take over
the factories i f the workers are not constantly on their guard.
104
The Workers
They must ensure that they retain control over their dele
gated authorities at all times. Every function of soci al l i fe -
planni ng, li ai son and coordination - must be taken up by the
producers themselves, as and when the need arises.
It i s certain that the managerial class will do everythi ng they
can to prevent a real revol uti on. There wi l l be i nti mi dati on
and vi olent repression, prophets both new and ol d of every
shape and form wi l l be held up to bamboozle the workers.
There will be electi on campaigns, referenda, changes in the
cabi net, el ectoral reforms, red herrings, bomb plots and what
have you . At the same time, the experts will preach about the
di re threat to the national economy and i nternational pres
tige of the country. And should the workers turn a deaf ear to
them, and persist i n restarting production under their di rect
control, the managerial class will end up, as always, by cal l i ng
i n the army and pol i ce. Thi s i s precisely what happened i n
France i n 1 968, and not for the frst ti me either.
What of the future? We cannot produce a blueprint - the
future alone can evolve that. What we must agree on, rather,
are the general principles of the society we want to create.
The politicians tell us we live i n an age of technological
miracles. But i t i s up to us to apply them to a new society, to
use the new media so as to gain greater mastery over the en
vironment. Whi le people today simply watch televi si on as a
surrogate for the lives they have ceased to li ve, in the new
society they will use it as a means of widening their experi
ence, of mastering the environment and of keeping in touch
with the real lives of other peopl e. If television programmes
were to be put on for their soci al value and not solely because
they i nduce the maximum hypnosis i n the greatest numbers,
they would enable us to extend the real democracy to the
entire populati on.
Just i magi ne the preliminary Grenelle talks transmitted as a
whole; j ust i magine the 'dialogues' between the bosses and the
professi onal trade union pundits transmitted strai ght to the
workshops. The workers would j ust laugh themselves sick,
and throw the lot out of ofce.
Or take the question of planni ng the economy. Clearly,
105
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolut ionary Movement
even in the future, planning will have to be done, but not just
for the sake of proft or balancing the books. Once the workers
have learned to manage their own afairs, in ful l equal i ty and
col lective efort, they wi l l try qui te naturally to place the
whole system of production and di stri buti on on an entirely new
basis. As Vaneighem has put i t: 'For my part, the only
equal i ty that really matters i s that which gives free rei n to my
desires whi le recognizing me as a man among men. ' (Traite de
savoir-vivre a /'usage des jeunes generations, Paris, 1 947. )
Contemporary hi story has shown that the abol i ti on of the
private ownershi p of the means of production, essential
though i t is, does not necessarily mean the end of exploi tati on.
Under capitalism, wages and prices fuctuate more or less wi th
the law of supply and demand. Hence we are led to bel i eve
that the amel ioration of the workers' lot i s a si mpl e mar
keti ng (or planni ng) problem, and that al l our pressing soci al
questions can be solved by ' di alogues' between ofci als or par
l i amentary representatives.
Si mi larly the wage system hi des the real i ty of exploi ta
tion by suggesting that pay is simply a matter of productive
capacity - but how do you evaluate the productive capacity
of, say, a schoolteacher?
In the capital ist system, the only standard of value i s money,
hence the worker hi mself has a price tag that fts him neatly
i nto a soci al pigeon-hole and i s set apart from the rest . He
has become just another commodity, not a man but an eco
nomic abstraction, whose relationshi p wi th other men i s gov
erned by arbitrary laws over which he has no control . The
time each worker spends on a particular job i s expressed in
worki ng hours; i t i s only when the workers themselves take
control , and appropriate the frui ts, of their own production,
that work wi l l be determined by real needs and not by bl i nd
and arbi trary market forces. Social relationshi ps wi l l no
longer be verti cal - from top to bottom, from di rector to
worker - but horizontal, between equal producers worki ng
i n harmony. And the product of their toi l wi l l no longer be
appropriated by parasitic organisms, but shared out fai rly
between one and al l .
106
The Workers
Al l thi s i s doubtless a far cry from the general stri ke of May
and June whi ch, though i t gave spontaneous expressi on to
popular di sgust at the present system and showed the workers
their real power on a scale unprecedented in recent French
hi story, fai led precisely because the workers themselves fai led
to take the next logi cal step : to run the economy by them
selves as free and equal partners. As Coudray puts i t i n La
breche : ' It shoul d be sai d frmly and calmly : i n May, 1 968,
i n France, the i ndustri al proletariat, far from bei ng the revo
l uti onary vanguard of soci ety, was i ts dumb rcarguard. In
May, 1 968, the most conservative, the most mystifed stratum
of society, the one most deeply ensnared in the traps of
bureaucratic capital ism, was the worki ng cl ass, and more par
ti cul arl y that fracti on of the worki ng class whi ch belongs to
the Communi st Party and the CGT. '
Now thi s fai l ure cannot be explai ned si mply i n terms of
treachery by the worki ng-class organizations, for i t i s basi c
ally due to the erosion of i ni tiative wi thi n the capital i st system.
The i deologi cal submi ssiveness and servi l i ty of the wage
slaves must not be condemned, whi ch serves no purpose, nor
deplored, which helps to engender a moral superiority, nor
accepted, whi ch can onl y l ead to complete i naction - i t must
be fought by an acti ve and consci ous assault, i f necessary by a
mi nori ty, on the system in every sphere of dai l y l i fe.
The diferences between t he revoluti onary students and the
workers spri ng di rectly from their di sti nct soci al posi ti ons.
Thus few students have had real experi ence of gri ndi ng
poverty - thei r struggle i s about the hi erarchi cal structure of
soci ety, about oppressi on i n comfort. They do not so much
have to contend wi th a lack of materi al goods as wi th unful
fl led desi res and aspi rati ons. The workers on the other hand
sufer from di rect economi c oppression and mi sery - earni ng
wages of less than 500 francs per month, i n poorly venti lated,
di rty and noisy factories, where the foreman, the chief engi neer
and the manager al l throw their weight about and conspi re to
keep those under them in their place.
French soci ety i n general, and Gaul l i st society i n parti cular,
i s but the expressi on of modern bureaucratic capi tal i sm, whi ch
1 07
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
must constantly expand or disintegrate. Hence the State must
increasingly i ntervene to prevent stagnati on. This in no way
removes the inner contradictions of capitalism, or stops i t
from wasting resources on a gigantic scal e. True, capitalism
has been able to raise real wages, i ndeed it must do so if i t is to
foist i ts mass-produced rubbish on the worki ng class, but it i s
quite i ncapable of harnessing the forces of production to
rational goals - only socialism can do that.
Meanwhi le, the increasing bureaucratization and automa
tion of the economy i s helping to spl i t the producing class
more and more i nto distinct strata : unski lled workers who
serve as mere robots, ski l led craftsmen, staf grades, technical
experts, scientists and so on, each with special i nterests and
grievances of their own. As a result, workers in the lowest and
hi ghest categories do not seem to have any common i nterests
- other than unmasking the trickery of a system that robs
Peter to pay Paul, and going on to see that the only solution
to their individual problems is a joint one - revolution and
a new soci ety, in which objective logic and necessity wi l l
decide the claims of al l .
Thi s solution can onl y be reached by the association of al l the
non-exploi tative categories of i ndustry : manual workers as
well as i ntellectuals, ofce workers and techni cians. Every
attempt to achieve workers' management by excluding any
one category is bound to fai l , and will merely help to re-i ntro
duce bureaucratic methods of control . Modern society has
become 'proletarianized' to the extent that the old 'petty
bourgeois' class is disappearing, that most peopl e have been
transformed i nto wage earners and have been subjected to
the capitalist division of labour. However, this proletarian
i zation in no way represents the classical Marxist image of a
society moving towards two poles, a vast mass of increasingly
impoverished workers and a handful of immensely rich and
powerful capitalists. Rather has society been transformed
i nto a pyramid, or, more correctly, i nto a complex set of
bureaucratic pyramids. As a result, there are not the two poles
of Marx but a whole Jacob's ladder, and there are no signs
that thi s wi l l be reversed. Hence the revolutionary movement
108
The Workers
must learn to translate the language of yesterday i nto the lan
guage of today. Just as i t was di fcu I t to expl ai n col lectiviza
tion to the peasantry in the unmechanized Russi a at the time
of the Revol uti on, so it i s di fcul t in the modern world of i n
creasi ngl y speci al i zed ski l l s t o put across t o t he workers the
idea of di rect control . Now this speci al i zati on i s, in fact, j ust
another aspect of the capital ist pri nci pl e of di vi de and rul e,
si nce most ski l l s can be taught much more wi dely than they
are today, and there i s no reason why the workers should
not pool their i nformati on.
Capi tal i sts, on the other hand, cannot do thi s because they
work in competi ti on. Moreover, few of them can even pro
duce their own bluepri nts, and thi s appl i es equal l y wel l to
al l the mi nisters and permanent secretaries, who onl y endorse
the reports of their experts. And even these work in separate
groups, each concentrati ng on a speci al fel d and each usi ng
jargon appropri ate to that feld. The rul i ng class del iber
ately fosters thi s prol i feration of tongues, and as l ong as they
are al lowed to have their way, the workers wi l l conti nue to
be kept in i gnorance, and hence remai n l i ke sai lors who dare
not muti ny because the art of navi gati on i s kept a secret from
them.
The revol uti onary students can play a very i mportant part
i n changi ng this picture. Havi ng been trai ned as future man
agers, they are in a posi ti on to make thei r knowledge avai l
abl e to al l . To that end, the ' critical universi ty' must be
transformed i nto a people's universi ty. If only a handful of
'technocrats' procl ai m l oudl y enough that the monopoly of
knowledge i s a capi tal i st myth, the workers wi l l not be l ong i n
real i zi ng that they are bei ng led by the nose, and that know
l edge is thei rs for the aski ng.
The events of May and June have demonstrated that when
dri ven i nto a corner, the capi tali sts wi l l use vi olence to defend
their bureaucrati c hold on society. Part of the hi erarchy i s
concerned wi th mai ntai ning pol i tical domi nation, another
wi th admi ni strati ve domi nati on, a thi rd with economi c domi
nati on, but all are agreed to preserve the system. Or rather, al l
were agreed unti l the spontaneity and freedom released by the
109
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
student movement blew like a breath of fresh ai r through al l
the petrifed i nstitutions, organizations and professional
bodies of France, and forced many who had been among the
staunchest defenders of the system to question i ts basi s for the
frst time. A case i n point i s the action of schoolteachers, who
came from far and wide to joi n in the deliberation of the far
left mi l i tants of the Federation of National Education when,
only two months earlier, the Federation had found it qui te
i mpossi bl e to interest them i n even the most tempting peda
gogical debates. Now, teachers appeared i n their thousands to
discuss such fundamental problems as pupi l parti cipation, the
dangers of a repressive environment, the fostering of the
chi l d's imagination, and alli ed topics.
It is difcul t not to adopt a paternalistic tone when speak
i ng of the struggle of hi gh school boys and girls, whose re
fusal to be cowed often expressed itself i n chi ldish ways, al l
the more touching for that. As they occupied thei r schools,
forced thei r teachers to enter into a di alogue wi th them, and
joi ned the students on the barricades, often without fully ap
preciating what the struggle was about, they matured almost
overnight. They had been spoon-fed on Rousseau and Emile
for years, and at last they realized that i t is not enough just to
read about freedom in educati on.
Moreover, as they came home at night and were faced with
utter lack of understanding by their parents, were threatened
and locked up, they began to question the whole basis of
French family l i fe. Having once tasted freedom i n action,
they woul d not submit to the authority of those who had
never dared to question the power of the State, and had meekl y
become conscripts at the age of eighteen, to be sent of to fght
i n the coloni es. The liberty these parents refused to give to
their children, the children now took for themselves.
The same kind of courage and determination was also
shown by many technicians and staf of the OR TF (French
Radi o and Television) . True, the majority of them were not
'revolutionaries' but they nevertheless chal lenged the authori
ties, i f only by refusing to continue as slavish dispensers of
State-doctored i nformation. In so doing, they sabotaged the
1 10
The Workers
system at i ts moment of greatest danger, and robbed it of
one of i ts chief i deological weapons. The ORTF stri ke hi gh
l i ghted how much can be achi eved i f just a handful of tech
ni ci ans begi n to questi on soci ety, and showed that what had
previ ousl y passed as objectivity of i nformati on and l i berty of
expression was no more than a farce.
The 'premature' Revoluti on of 1 968 has introduced an en
ti rely new factor i nto the revolutionary process : the entry
i nto the struggle of youth, often privi l eged, but i n any case
di sgusted wi th present society and thus acting as ral l yi ng
poi nts for the toi l ing masses. The cri si s of our culture, the
break-up of al l true values and the crushi ng of i ndi vi dual i ty
wi l l continue for as long as capitalism and i ts basi c contra
di cti ons are al lowed to persi st. We have just l ived through a
major tremor
;
a 'cultural cri si s' of capital i st ' l i fe', a cri si s i n
whi ch the exploi ted themselves not only transformed society
but also transformed themselves, so much so that when the
struggle starts up agai n i t is bound to be carri ed to a higher
stage. The maturati on of soci ali st thought can never be a
purely objective process (because no soci al progress i s pos
sible without human activity, and because the i dea that the
revol uti on is preordai ned by the logic of events is no less ri di
culous than tryi ng to forecast i t from the stars) . Nor i s i t purel y
subjecti ve i n the psychological sense. It i s a hi stori cal process
which can only be realized in acti on, in the class struggl e. It
is not guaranteed by any law, and though probabl e, it is by no
means i nevi tabl e. The bureaucratization of soci ety expl i citly
poses the problem of management, by whom, for whom and
by what means. As bureaucratic capital i sm i mproves the
general standard of l i vi ng, i t becomes possi bl e to turn the
workers' attenti on to the vacui ty of their present l ives (as seen,
for i nstance, i n thei r sexual, fami l y, soci al and work relati on
shi ps) . Indi vi duals fnd i t i ncreasi ngly di fcul t to sol ve thi s
problem by applyi ng the norms they have been taught, and
even when they do conform they do so wi thout any real con
vi cti on. Many wi l l go on to i nvent new responses to thei r
si tuati on, and i n so doi ng they assert their ri ght to li ve as free
1 1 1
The Strategy and Nature of the Revolutionary Movement
men i n a vi tal community. The real meani ng of revolution
i s not a change in management, but a change in man. This
change we must make in our own l i fetime and not for our
chi ldren's sake, for the revolution must be born of joy and not
of sacrifce.
II
The Strategy of the State
I . Introduction
'The Empire, with the coup d' etat for its certifcate of
bi rth, universal sufrage for its sanction, and the sword for
its sceptre, professed to rest upon the peasantry, the large
mass of producers not directly involved i n the struggle of
capital and l abour. It professed to save the working class
by breaking down Parli amentarism and, with it, the
undisguised subserviency of Government to the
propertied cl asses. It professed to save the propertied
classes. It professed to save the propertied classes by
upholding their economic supremacy over the working
class ; and, finally, it professed to unite all classes by
reviving for all the chimera of national glory.'
(Karl Marx: The Civil War in France)
Al l 'democrati c' bourgeoi s authority is supposed to represent
the i nterests of the nation as a whole. Since i t ostensi bl y places
i tself above the conficts wi thi n soci ety, i t can use the 'wi l l of
t he majori ty' t o remove the cause of these confi cts. It i s i n the
name of thi s pri nci pl e that i t justi fes i ts actions during periods
of overt class struggl e. At ti mes of crisis, the machi nery, stra
tegy and true nature of authori ty are brought i nto the open.
Indeed, to provoke thi s i s one of the pri mary and funda
mental tasks of the revoluti onary movement. To make the
workers accept the i deology of, and repression by, the State
the bourgeoi si e has brought in a whole system of control and
enslavement - a system that becomes more and more complex
wi th i ncreased i ndustri al i zati on and automati on. Now, thi s
very complexi ty renders the State less and less capabl e of
deci si ve acti on i n an emergency. I t must therefore do i ts ut
most to stop such emergencies from ari si ng in the frst place.
The French cri si s was, at frst, a cri si s wi thi n a si ngl e i nsti
tuti on - the universi ty. We shal l therefore begi n by looki ng at
the strategy of the State, or rather i ts non strategy, agai nst
the revolutionary student movement.
1 1 5
2. The State and the University
Nanterre is a college with a li beral admi ni stration, and i ts
Dean, M. Grappi n, wanted hi s institution to be 'one bi g, happy
fami l y' . But though Nanterre i s anything but a barracks, it
remai ns an i nsti tution whose authority derives from the State,
an i nstitution which i s controlled by the State, and whose
chi ef function i s to serve the State. All the important de
ci si ons concerning Nanterre are taken at the Mi ni stry of Edu
cation, and the Mi nistry sufers from a basic lack of hi storical
understandi ng, or else they would have learned from Karl
Marx that 'men make their own hi story, but they do not make
i t just as they please; they do not make i t under ci rcumstances
chosen by themselves, but under ci rcumstances di rectly
found, gi ven and transmitted from the past' . (The Eighteenth
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.)
Thus, when the authorities claimed that at the core of the
student demonstrations was a small number of mi l i tants, they
were ri ght i n a way, but di d not realize that thi s mi nori ty could
only make itself felt because i t expressed the feelings, and had
the support, of the mass of students.
All institutions have the necessary machinery for deali ng
wi th clai ms for mi nor reforms wi thi n the framework of the
system. But what can they do when faced wi th a movement
that denies authority as such and refuses to enter into spuri
ous di alogues? The power of the Head, the Dean i n thi s case,
rests ul timately on the power of the bureaucratic state. Now
that state i s only powerful if i t i s recognized; when i t i s ignored
it can do nothi ng. If i t i s li beral, i t cannot consistently oppose
the wishes of the majority, and must i nstead try to get ri d
of the ' troublemakers' . And i t is typical of Nanterre that i t tried
both courses, and fai led.
1 1 6
The State and the Uni versity
'For the shoemaker there i s nothi ng like leather', and the
authori ti es were only able to understand opposi ti on i n
terms of thei r own power structure. We know we are ni ce
chaps, we know the students are ni ce chaps : hence the
trouble must si mply be thei r leaders. Once we have got ri d of
them, everythi ng wi l l be smooth sai l i ng agai n. Here i s Dean
Grappi n explai ni ng the closure of Nanterre on 3 May :
'Thi s excepti onal measure is one whose extreme gravi ty I
appreci ate, but the excesses of a few have rendered it unavoi d
abl e. I appeal to al l of you, and particularly to the students,
to show by your work and by your atti tude, that our college
has not lost i ts true spi ri t. '
The techni que i s si mpl e and, of course, underestimates the
strength of the movement. As Professor Tourai ne explai ned .
i n an i nterview, it was the worst possi bl e sol uti on. It rel i ed
largely on the fact that, at exami nati on ti me, the students
would be only too anxi ous to get back to thei r swatti ng. But
in fact, the maj ori ty was ready to sacrifce a year of their ti me
for the sake of hi tti ng out at ' the true col lege spi ri t', and al l
the Dean' s calculati ons mi sfred.
On 8 Apri l , the admi ni strati on stage-managed a meeti ng
duri ng whi ch the ' good students' were given the opportuni ty
to protest agai nst the ' lunati c fri nge' . Imagi ne the dismay of
the authori ti es when they could drum up no more than 400
such paragons of student vi rtue!
The admi ni strati on now began to pani c, and deci ded to
summon the ' leaders' to appear before a di sci pl i nary counci l .
Thi s deci si on proved thei r downfall, for i nstead of i solati ng
these ' leaders' i t brought about a mass demonstration by the
students.
'The Dean and the professorial body had tried to i ni ti ate a
permanent di al ogue at al l levels, but thi s was not crowned by
success . What were these dai ly agi tati ons al l about? In the
name of a "university cri tique" the most stupi d rhetori c was
poured out in lecture theatres which, for the ni ght, had been
chri stened : Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Mao Tse Tung, or
Leon Trotsky. ' (Peyreftte i n the Nati onal Assembly on 9
May.)
1 1 7
The Strategy of the State
What precisely was this outburst about ? We had, in fact,
decided to set up a parallel 'critical university' to attack the
ideological content of the lecture courses. Most of the
academic staf were unwi l li ng to have their authority and their
i deas chal lenged in this way, particularly as the 'critical uni
versity' became the centre of pol itical ferment, a strategical
base for the anti -system. It was the critical university that
gave a dissertation on Rimbaud and his love for the Com
mune, and forced a professor to cry out 'Gentlemen, we are
writers and poets and not politicians. Art i s above the
sordi d level of politics. '
Faced with the spread of a rival ideology, the university
authorities reacted like any political power. That excep
tional professor Touraine summed up the position i n an i n
terview he gave after the events of May : 'Politics has entered
the university, never agai n to leave. The more modern and
scientifc a university becomes, the stronger grows its political
and i deological commitment.The more young people are taught
to think for themselves, the more they will challenge, criticize,
and protest. The university continually creates its own oppo
sition. The ferment is bound to develop. The movement of Nan
terre was only the beginning. Personally I think that the prob
lems of the professors have only just started . . . But if politics
must needs be thrown out of the university, then I myself wi l l
get out as wel l .'
3. The Authority of the State
and the Vulnerability of Society
The State has an army, a police force, and j udges, to fght i ts
battles. The State i s above the law because it makes the law,
and it wi l l not hesi tate to use all i ts power to defend i tself.
Thi s coul d be seen i n its reactions to the demonstrations at the
Place de I a Concorde and !'Etoi l e - when pai ned i ncompre
hensi on gave way to pani c. The l i beral mask was dropped, and
overni ght the State resorted to naked force. The authori ti es
had no overal l strategy but acted pragmati cal ly from day to
day, i ssui ng order after contradictory order. And, of course,
neither the pol i ce, universi ti es nor judi ci ary could take any
action wi thout a decision at mi nisteri al level - an i roni c
example of the spl i t between the executive and admi ni strative
arms.
The i ni ti al strategy of the authori ti es was to try i nti mi da
ti on. Mani pulati ng j ustice and the parliamentary machi ne, they
went i nto busi ness on a grand scal e. There were sermons and
sentences i n the courts (and they even managed to stage a
heari ng on a Sunday! ) ; the law played i ts part as obediently as
any poli ceman. Those who were suspected of having partici
pated i n the demonstrations were held up t o publi c ri di cul e,
l i ke so many drunkards i n the stocks. But i n fact the victims
attracted more sympathy than di sgust. It i s general l y agreed
now that most of the police evi dence was trumped up. Sen
tence did not depend on the part played by the accused, but
on the vi ol ence of the general demonstrati on.
' At a ti me when Pari s has been chosen as the si te for nego
ti ations on Vi etnam, and is showing the whole world that i t
has no peer as a capi tal of peace, we cannot allow a handful of
agi tators to abuse the tradi ti on of French hospital i ty, to com
mi t acts of viol ence i n the pl ai n li ght of day, not even sparing
1 1 9
The Strategy of the State
passers-by. These acts call down severe punishment upon the
heads of those responsible, the more so as all of us know
that the great majority of young people have no desi re
to cause trouble. ' (M. Caldaques, Chairman of the Paris
Counci l.)
'What do they study, these young students? They would
be more at home in gaol than i n a universi ty. It is disappoint
i ng to discover that a handful of young people i n revolt can
stop the entire university system.' (Figaro, 4 May.)
But hard though they tried to slander the movement, to
put it outsi de of the law - they even went to the length of
sentencing the noted Catholi c student leader M. Clement
(President of the Richelieu Student Centre) - thei r eforts
all came to nothi ng. No one in his right senses paid the slight
est attention to, for instance, such diatribes as the one mouthed
by M. Peyreftte on 6 May : 'What right does a uni on have to
launch a strike which does not respect the legal formalities
and, moreover, calls airi l y on teachers to abandon their
mission, their students and their university tradi ti on? ' (Peyre
ftte, 6 May. )
At thi s stage, as we saw, the authorities brought in the
police and the army. It should be said i n all fairness that the
police were not ordered to shoot, but they nevertheless went
i nto action wi th considerable reli sh. Their brutality is well
documented : houses were broken i nto; young people rounded
up at gunpoint; and afterwards i n the cells, there were beat
i ngs and sadistic tortures. It should also be noted that the
authoriti es called i n the police well before the students had
taken to the streets - as soon as the admi ni stration fel t they
had lost the argument - and that once unleashed the police
behaved in a manner that di sgusted even their masters. Thus
Pompidou felt impelled to disavow their atrocities, and hi s
speech on 1 1 May brought a sharp reaction from the police :
on 1 3 May, the Federal Police Uni on issued a press communi
que, the l ast l ines of which ran: The Uni on considers the
declaration of the Prime Mi ni ster an endorsement of student
vi olence and an attempt to disassociate hi mself from police
actions the government itself had ordered. We fnd i t astonish-
1 20
The Authority of the State and the Vul nerabil i ty of Soci ety
i ng that, i n these ci rcumstances, a di alogue with the students
was not started before these regrettable ri ots occurred.'
On 14 May, a peti ti on was circulated among the Pari s Pol ice
Force : ' . . . We may belong to the folk- lore of this great
ci ty but we wi l l not al low ourselves to be turned i nto a laugh
ing stock . . . . ' Rumour had it that the police (and parti cu
larly the mobi le squads) were about to cal l a stri ke.
The pol i ce traditionally hate French students, whom they
see as the pampered ofspring of the bourgeoisie - i ndeed, i n
their own Fascist way, they live out their part o f the class
struggle. But this time the new tactics and extreme mobi l i ty
of the demonstrators took them completely by surpri se. More
over, in their hunt for students, the police had cordoned of
certai n districts at ni ght, and then carried out house-to
house searches that antagonized the local populati on. In
doctri nated, regimented, bribed with speci al pri vi leges and
bonuses, they had undeni abl y developed a certai n ' fi c' men
tal i ty. Usual l y, when cal l ed on, they respond wi th vi olence -
but not always. In ordinary times, they are tolerated by the
people, i t i s on this toleration that thei r power depends,
and it only lasts so long as they are believed to be preservi ng
the publ i c peace. The Prime Mi nister's disavowal came when
the country was i n the throes of a crisis - the worki ng class
had entered the struggle. In these circumstances even the bul l
dogs i n the pol ice force began to wonder where thei r true
loyalti es lay. On 22 May, they issued what amounted to an
ultimatum:
'We hope that the public authorities wi l l bear i n mi nd
what we have sai d (wage claims for the whole force, a denun
ciation of the Pri me Mi nister's speech, and expressions of regret
that the pol ice could not parti cipate i n the general protests) ,
and that they wi l l not try to use the police systematically to
oppose the workers' demands for better condi ti ons, l est the
pol ice fnd the performance of certain of their duties in con
fict wi th their conscience.'
When the repressive measures were seen to be fai l i ng on al l
fronts, t he authorities at long last decided t o abandon the
121
The Strategy of the State
colleges to the students. Having done so, they tried to recover
lost ground by again preaching about the importance of the
impending examinations. All good chi ldren who knew where
their real interest lay were called on tq show up and over
whelm our l i ttle display of bad manners.
And so, whi l e we in the 22 March Movement wanted to
deal as quickly as possible wi th the purely internal i ssues and
pass on to the more basic problems, the authorities tried to
befog the i ssue and launched a large-scale press campaign on
the subject of the examinations. Every interview wi th students
was restricted to opinions on this problem. The movement
was i nveigled into grand debates on the necessity for new
techniques of assessing progress, which i n any case would
only amount to a modifed form of the ol d exami nation system.
Thi s debate went on for the entire second week of May, and
I must say that i t brought home to the more revolutionary
among us how l i ttle can be achieved if the struggle is con
fned to university issues. But, many students became con
vinced that an improvement of the examination system was al l
we ought to be fghting about, and once again began to turn
a deaf ear to our vi ews on the enslavement of knowledge and
the uselessness of the examination system as such.
The most radical of us thus found ourselves isolated. Nor
could we have ever broken out, had not the occupation of
the factories forced the government to turn away from the
examination problem.
Thi s new and aggressive move was made by the younger
workers, trade union members or not, but in any case over the
heads of the trade union leaders. They had watched the stu
dents, many of them had helped at the barricades, and now
they were trying to stand up for themselves. The scope and
vigour of the stay- i n movement surprised even the workers'
own leaders and the trade uni on bureaucracy. As for the autho
ri ti es, they col lapsed i n the face of combined onslaughts by
the students, young workers and apprentices who were now
standing shoulder to shoulder before them.
They quickly promised the students al l they had asked for,
even participation i n working out the reforms, but instead of
1 22
The Authori ty of the State and the Vulnerabi l ity of Soci ety
spli tti ng the movement, they merely encouraged the young
workers to press thei r own clai ms wi th even greater vi gour.
And although these cl ai ms were economi c, the movement i tself
was pol i ti cal , for i t broke the bourgeois laws - the workers
struck wi thout gi vi ng noti ce, locked up some of their bosses,
and turned a deaf ear to trade uni on appeal s.
And so, because i n i ts frst phase the workers i gnored the
law, the government could not use its l egal machi ne to stop
them. Whom could they ask to sit opposi te authori ty on
arbi trati on boards, whom could they negotiate with?
The young workers had launched thei r frst attack on
the power of t he State, and though some of thei r number
lost thei r l ives on the barricades i n Pari s, Caen, Redon and
Rennes, they learned that the State has a soft belly. In fact,
the State was completely i mpotent, it had been momentari l y
by-passed, and whi le i t wai ted, i t trembled.
It i s physi cal ly i mpossi ble to crush a stri ke when there are
ten mi l l i on determi ned stri kers. The authori ti es could nei ther
muster enough men i n uni form to storm the factori es nor
mani pul ate sufci ent blacklegs to do the job for them.
They ordered the arrest of all the well-known mi l i tants
but these had gone to ground and thei r place was taken by
acti ve and capable men completely unknown to the secret
pol i ce. The best strategy was therefore to sit and wai t whi le
the Communi st leaders regai ned control of thei r trade uni on
membershi p and meekl y sued for peace.
Meanwhi le, even the more conformi st uni versity students
had a change of heart and took a cri ti cal look at the pro
mi sed reforms . Thus whi l e the stri ke extended to Rhodi aceta,
Berli et, Renaults and to ci vi l avi ati on, 300 students of the Ecol e
Polytechni que threatened to take over thi s bast i on of French
educati on. And so the government ofered further conces
si ons all round - wi th the same result. The Grenelle agreement
was si gned and del i vered to the trade uni ons, and the workers
turned up thei r noses at i t and stayed i n thei r factori es. At
thi s poi nt, the presi dent of the CNPF (Federation of Indus
tri es) telephoned the CGT to make sure they would not be
taki ng advantage of the si tuati on. The capi tal i sts had found
1 23
The Strategy of the State
their mouthpi ece : responsible, serious trade uni on leaders,
ready to listen to them, and to counsel moderation. Two days
later Seguy was rebufed by the workers of Renaults, and the
employers began to tremble agai n. The unholy al liance of Gre
nelle represents the most treacherous pi ece of pol i tics of thi s
century. Al l the bureaucrats, Ri ght, Left and Centre, sank
their diferences to save their own power. It was no longer a
question of terminating a strike but of ki l l ing a movement
which by its very growth had become a danger to them all -
Pompi dou saving the Communist party and the CGT, Seguy
shoring up the government before it crumbled; that was the
sordid deal fxed up that week-end at Grenel l e. But its mas
sive rejection by the workers pushed the authorities into what
Coudray has called the 'void of i ncomprehensi on' and
ushered in the third stage of the struggle. This phase, short
though it was, showed up the political vacuum i n French
society and created a new historical phenomenon : a duality
of non-authority. From 27 to 30 May nobody had any power
i n France. The government was breaking up, de Gaulle and
Pompi dou were isolated. The police, i ntimidated by the size
of the strike, and exhausted by two weeks of fghting in the
streets, were incapable of maintaining public order. The Army
was out of sight, conscripts could not have been used for a
cause i n which few of them believed. There only remained
the regulars, the veterans of Indo-China and Algeria, who were
sti l l smarting from the defeats the colonial liberation move
ment had i nficted on them.
The French Army, for all its technological hardware, has
only a small force of foot-soldiers. The French Ai r Force,
with its atom bomb, the Navy with its submarines, aircraft
carriers and other Gaul l ist chimeras coul d not intervene in
this confict; al l they could muster woul d be a scratch team.
No stratum of the population was reliable enough, or strong
enough, to oppose the strike. Pompidou's press statement on
Friday, 24 May, is signifcant i n this respect - it shows that
the government was still trying to present itself as the supreme
arbiter of all the various interests in soci ety, while trying to
keep private property, and the means of production, in the
1 24
The Authority of the State and the Vul nerabi l i ty of Soci ety
hands of the bourgeoisie. In hi s speeches, Pompidou attempted
to reassure the workers, the peasants, the teachers, and stu
dents; he also tried to set one against the other, to break the
sol idarity they had forged in action (see I : The Workers) .
For a short ti me, the State had vi rtually 'withered away' .
A vast new network was being bui l t to exhange i nformation
(posters, tracts, visi ts, personal contacts) and goods. The new
system had sprung up by the si de, and i ndependent of, the
old. Above al l , a new type of relationship between i ndi vi duals
and groups was begun, confoundi ng the hi erarchies and soci al
divisions of work.
The way i n whi ch the trade union bureaucrats (those stal
wart supporters of the old order) leapt i nto the open arms
of the 'responsi bl e authoriti es' shows both that they were
unft to represent the workers, and also that the government,
deserted by its own supporters, was wi l l ing to grab any hand
that was ofered.
The long-term planni ng needed to run a modern economy
necessari l y i nvolves a progressive attack on the ol d
fashi oned rel i cs of capi tali sm: smal l busi nesses, small trades
men, and smallholdi ngs. These victims of 'rational i zati on' are
normal ly more conservative than the more dynami c and
advanced captains of i ndustry. They put forward thei r own
specifc clai ms, but cl i ng to what smal l pri vi l eges they sti l l
enjoy, t he more so as the government tri es t o protect them
artifci al l y agai nst the full efects of competi ti on from super
markets and the l i ke.
However, at a ti me of poli ti cal cri si s when stabi lity can no
longer be assured, the smal l busi nessman is the hardest hi t of
all, what wi th hi s lack of reserves and his absolute depen
dence on a conti nuous turnover. Moreover, while h itting him
economically, the crisis also leads hi m to press hi s own cl ai ms
more vi gorously and to defend hi s own i nterests. An overt
attack upon the system by the students and workers, there
fore, wi dens the ri ft between the bi g and the small fry in the
capi tal i st camp.
Thi s leaves the authori ties i n a quandary: either they must
yi el d to the pressure of the 'small fry' and act as the champi on
1 25
The Strategy of the State
of al l that is most backward in capitalism, or else they wi l l
drive the petty bourgeoisie into the workers' camp and so
hasten a real .change in society. True, the petty bourgeoi si e
mi ght have been l ed to Fascism, but Sal an was sti l l kissing
his wife after being let out of prison, Bi dault was fnish
i ng hi s memoirs, and Tixier-Vignancourt was busy reci ti ng the
Gaulli st credo of national unity. In short, there was no one
to turn the petty bourgeoisie, fl l ed though i t was wi th
nostalgia for the Empire, i nto Storm Troopers. Nor can you
nowadays fnd the kind of i l l iterate peasants who marched
wi th such enthusiasm against the Commune in 1871. In efect,
before de Gaul le raised the spectre of Civil War, no one
had even thought of thi s possi bi li ty: there was no counter
revolutionary force strong enough to be mobi lized for the
job.
Unfortunately, the forces of the Left failed to exploit the
existing power vacuum, to take full advantage of thi s novel,
if not revolutionary, situation. The pol i ticians of the FGDS
(Soci al Democrats) and the CPF (Communists) never even
thought of ofering solutions which went beyond the old Par
liamentary games.
It remai ns for us to explai n why the workers themselves
fai led to realize and use their new-found strength. They re
j ected the agreement signed by thei r so-called representatives
but for the most part made no move towards more positive
acti on. The slogan of 'a popular government' acted li ke a
damper for many, and their dreams and hopes escaped with
their passion, into thin ai r. De Gaul l e, with his promise of
elections, gave al l the politicians a new lease of l ife, and sud
denly people began to fal l for the ol d fairy tale that al l their
problems would be taken care of by the experts, i n that en
chanted castle - the Chamber of Deputi es. The General's army
rallied round hi m, after promises to free al l the ex-generals of
the OAS, and this was enough to squash what fghti ng spi rit
remained in the ofcial Left. With the Communists in the bag,
de Gaulle hastened to guarantee fair play, and as proof of
hi s goodwi l l, he endorsed one of the chief Communi st de
mands : the repeal of the hated social security restri ctions. At
1 26
The Authori ty of the State and the Vulnerabi l i ty of Soci ety
thi s, everyone heaved a sigh of rel i ef, al l the pol i ti ci ans, al l
the admirers of the General, no less than the fri ends of Kosy
gi n and Johnson. And what made it all possi bl e was, we can
not stress i t enough, that the organizati ons of the Left were
unwi l l i ng for the masses to take power. In short, once the call
for a general el ecti on was accepted, the revol uti onary ti de
began to ebb.
To begi n wi th, stri ki ng became i ncreasi ngl y hazardous, what
with pol i ce i nti mi dati on of pi ckets, and threats and sancti ons
agai nst the Lefti sts, endorsed by the Communi st Party and
the CGT. The dri ft back to work started, accompani ed by
sweet musi c from the radi o, televi si on and press (thank you,
Le Monde, for those fnal howls that shattered your last
pretence of objecti vi ty! ) . A return to work i n one sector
favoured a return in the other sectors, whi l e those who fought
on (parti cularl y i n the automobi l e and electroni cs i ndustri es)
had to face mounti ng pressure, not least from the CGT, whi ch
presented the meagre economi c concessions i t had obtai ned
as a great victory. The full power of the State was restored,
and i ndustri al arguments returned from the streets and
factori es i nto the hands of the 'experts' - the professi onal
trade uni on leaders. These coul d hardl y wai t to set up shop
agai n, to barter i n al l i ances and secret pacts, and to play the
ol d mani pulati ve games they know so well. Thei r rol e begins
where the struggle for workers' autonomy stops - behi nd
closed doors.
And once these men were back i n busi ness, the small shop
keepers and the small bureaucrats deserted the workers and
crawl ed back to thei r ol d masters, whi l e rel i shi ng the extra
benefts they had gai ned by the struggle of the worki ng
class.
At the same ti me, al l the pol i ti cal parti es thankful l y took to
the husti ngs and restored poli ti cs to i ts exalted functi on i n the
rarefed atmosphere of i deologi es, declarati ons of i ntent, pro
grammes and promi ses. They again started monopol i zi ng all
di scussi on, excl udi ng the masses, and speaki ng i n order to
di ssembl e. Pol i ti cs bei ng the busi ness of the State and the
government, the working class was told to get back to the
1 27
The Strategy of the State
factory bench and to put their corporate clai ms through the
appropriate agency. Politics for the pol i ti ci ans and drudgery
for the worki ng class!
Then petty bourgeois, racist, nati onalist, reactionary, Fas
ci st, reli gi ous, Catholic, Protestant or Jewish, France gradu
al l y shook of the dust and marched sprucely down the
Champs Elysees, shouting support for the old general .
Was thi s rebirth of hypocrisy i nevi table? The clearest answer
was given in St Nazai re. There, the local trade uni ons, far
more Leftist than their national leaders, called for a counter
demonstration against the Gaulli sts, and more than 1 50,000
workers, teachers, students and pupi ls made l i ght work of
the 300 to 400 reactionaries. By refusing to call for a si mi lar
counter-demonstration i n the rest of the country, the trade
uni ons all owed the bourgeoi si e to settle back in peace and
comfort and to begi n unpacking the cash and valuables they
had crammed i nto trunks and sui tcases in readi ness for re
treat to the green hi l l s of Switzerland. The blackmail of the
CDR (the Gaul l i st strong-arm detachment) and other para
mi l i tary organizations could only work in an atmosphere of
worki ng-class demobil ization and apathy.
To sustai n the power of a modern society therefore two
thi ngs are necessary : the force of the police, and the apathy
of the workers. The collapse of state power cannot be ex
plai ned by the mere i nadequacy of some Dean, Rector orl
Mini ster; it was due to the action of a determined group of
people who challenged i ts very basis, who ignored the l aw i n
order t o found a new order, based on common consent. When
they did so the conscious or unconscious supporters of the
system fell back, simply because they could not ri se to the
challenge. The students knew that they must bring poli tics
down i nto the streets, fght for concrete objectives, and not
for hi gh-fown abstractions. They did, i n the universi ti es, what
the workers fai l ed to do i n the factori es : they ran them by and
for themselves. We are not trying to si t in moral judgement
on anybody, we are merely recording a fact revolutionaries
would do well to remember in the future. If a relatively small
number of students could succeed, it is doubly i mportant to
1 28
The Authori ty of the State and the Vulnerabi l ity of Society
understand why the workers stopped dead i n thei r tracks
when they had the power to go on.
The structural reforms proposed by de Gaul l e lit i nto the
i deologi cal attempts by all the authori ti es, from the State to
the worki ng-class bureaucracy, to render the masses more
doci l e and easy to handle. 'Soci ety must be made less ri gi d' ,
i s what a high State ofci al declared, and thi s i s preci sely
what the President of the Republ i c i n hi s message of 7 June
1 968 procl ai med he would do. De Gaul le i mpl i ed that the
law woul d grant every worker a share i n the profts, that al l
would be kept adequately i nformed about progress i n thei r
i ndustry and that al l could, by means of their freely el ected
representatives, defend their own i nterests, thei r own points
of vi ew and thei r own (si c! ) proposal s. In a soci ety guarantee
i ng workers' parti ci pati on, i n whi ch everyone has a stake in
the future, there is surely no good reason for objecting to
commands from the top. ' Deci si ons can be arrived at by many,
but must be i mplemented by one man alone. ' And i n fact,
for al most a quarter of a century, the State has been setting
up ofci al bodi es to look after the interests of the workers,
to wit, the works commi ttees, which have i n most cases only
two functions : to reli eve the bosses of the troubl e of man
agi ng welfare schemes, and of having to i mpart unwelcome
news to the workers in person. As for the new bi t about
workers' parti cipati on, it was just another sop, as the workers
themselves knew onl y too wel l . Even so, many employers,
and most particularly those runni ng smal l businesses, obj ected
to the new proposal s : they refused to countenance workers'
participation i n any shape or form. As for the bi g bosses, they
argued that no new legislati on was needed, si nce workers'
parti cipation was al ready a fact.
'Our French system al lows consi derable parti ci pati on on the
national economi c level, particularly i n the planni ng com
missions wi thi n the framework of the economi c councils,
where the di ferent requi rements of all secti ons of soci ety are
brought together, and most often harmoni zed, i n accord with
our pri nci pl e of social partnershi p (si c! ) . Parti ci pation in busi
ness can onl y increase efci ency i f i t rei nforces the existent
1 29
The Strategy of the State
structures. It must help to share out responsi bi li ti es but i t
must not sap authority (si c! ) . It i s essential that the representa
tives of the staf grades and workers prove themselves trust
worthy in thi s respect, that they do not forget the economi c
facts of l i fe. ' (General Assembly of the CNPF, as reported i n
Le Monde, 1 0 August 1 968.)
What thi s means, when it is stripped of al l the verbi age, i s
that the Employers' Federati on expected their 'valuable go
betweens', the trade uni on leaders, to put economi c 'growth'
before the i nterests of the workers. Thi s leads to a system of
arbi trati on i n whi ch, although the workers have a say, the
government has the last word. In short, de Gaul le's 'parti ci pa
ti on' i s just another verbal fetish t o take i ts place on the shelf
besi de 'La Patrie' and ' the fami ly vi rtues', and one that could
be taken up by al l the distingui shed professors and retired
di gni tari es, all the earnest young Christi an employers and the
'progressive' trade uni onists.
Now all modern capital i st societies sufer from a funda
mental contradiction which springs from the class struggl e.
The exploi tati on of the workers must conti nually aggravate
the opposi ti on of i nterests between the classes, and result i n
overt resistance or else the apathy and i ndiference of the
worki ng class. Al l industries, poli ti cal parti es, systems of
government, and the very i deology of capi tal i sm, are there
fore shaken by cri si s after cri sis, confi ct after confi ct. The
'anti -soci al attitudes' of the workers and their famous 'blow
you, Jack, I' m al l ri ght', are di rect results of this si tuati on,
natural reactions agai nst a system that turns the enti re pro
letari at i nto 'outsiders' . Reduced to a passive consumer,
i solated from his fellows, the worker bui lds a wall round hi s
fami l y and sets hi mself to defend i t.
At the same ti me, capitalism must carry the working class
wi th i t, for i ts smooth runni ng depends upon i ndustri al
'peace'. Now, duri ng i ts ten years i n ofce, the Gaul l i st regi me
has changed France very l i ttle, wi th the resul t that we now
have, existing si de by si de, an advanced technology and an
archaic, ni neteenth-century power structure. Overwhelmed by
a constant stream of crises, e. g. the aftermath of the Algeri an
130
The Authori ty of the State and the Vul nerabi l ity of Society
war, Gaul l ism has not even tri ed to deal wi th the permanent
problems of the French economy.
Let us look more closely at the hi stori cal background.
After a l ong peri od of sluggish progress i n whi ch i t lagged
behi nd the other i ndustri al powers, French capi tal i sm, after
the Second World War, taki ng advantage of a boom in the
world economy, suddenly took a gi ganti c leap forward.
Despi te the vaci l l ati ons of its poli ti cal leaders, i nternal con
fi cts, col oni al adventures, and even the tremendous subsi di es
whi ch the State was forced to pay to uncompeti ti ve sectors
of i ndustry, French capi tal i sm fnal l y caught up wi th i ts com
petitors . To make good the losses she had sufered duri ng the
war, France was forced between 1 948 and 1 957 to i ncrease
i ndustri al producti on by 75 per cent. From 1 953 to the frst
quarter of 1 958, the i ncrease was 57 per cent as against 53 per
cent in Western Germany, and 33 per cent in Western Europe
as a whol e. Thi s fantastic development went hand i n hand
wi th a hi gh degree of modernization whi ch not onl y changed
i ndustri al techni ques and producti ve relati onshi ps, but al so
the atti tude of bi g busi ness. More and more i ndustri es be
came amalgamated, and backward regi ons of the country
were i ndustri al i zed. The most 'advanced' sectors of French
busi ness adopted an American outlook : on the wages front
they tri ed to avoi d confict wi th the workers by maki ng un
precedented concessi ons.
But at every stage, the process of expansi on, modernizati on,
take-overs and nati onal izati on came up agai nst the ' other
France', whi ch saw i n it a threat to i ts very exi stence. For
rapi d economi c expansi on tends to destroy whole sectors
of i ndustry (smal l farmers, smal l traders, and smal l i n
dustri es) .
Thi s economic confict is refected on the pol i ti cal plane,
and tends to render French capi tal i sm poli ti cally unstabl e -
the survi val of these backward strata, and thei r excepti onal
numeri cal wei ght, has served to choke the parl iamentary
system. It has mai ntai ned and accentuated the fragmenta
tion of the bourgeoi s poli ti cal parties, each of which i s clam
ouri ng for speci al pri vi leges and protection on behal f of its
1 3 1
The Strategy of the State
particular electors. As a result, the government, far from being
able, as i t claims, to control individual groups for the good of
all, is forced to grant special favours to speci al groups as the
hour dictates.
4. The Gaullist Phenomenon
The vi ews we have been presenting are those of P. Chaul i eu
(Socialisme ou Barbarie, 1 958) . We must now add an explana
ti on of de Gaul le's ri se to power i n 1 958, and the nature of
the Gaul li st regi me. Accordi ng to Claude Lefort, French
society has undergone two major changes. The frst i s the ex
tensi on of the acti viti es of the State, which has come to con
trol an i mmense sector of the economy, i ntervening ceaselessly
in all i ts afairs and even playing a control l i ng part in pri
v
ate
enterpri se. The second i s the new i ndustri al revol uti on which
has completely modernized and ' rationalized' the old methods
of production and di stri bution. Thi s process was not j ust
quanti tative, it also changed the very quali ty of capital i st ex
ploi tati on - in France no less than in other i ndustri al countri es.
The result has been a shi ft of emphasis from laissez-faire
methods to sci enti fc techniques for i ncreasi ng producti vi ty,
and conveyor-belt methods call for a stable labour force and
a more efci ent negoti ati on machi nery.
These two processes - greater productivi ty and better
labour relati ons - demand a new pol i ti cal power structure and
a re-ali gnment of the poli tical, economic and soci al forces
of capital i sm. In other words, they call for a poli ti cal and
soci al system of the Anglo-Saxon type, in whi ch cooperati on
between the poli ti cal bureaucracy (the two-party system) and
the trade uni on bureaucracy has reached a hi gh degree of
perfecti on.
A move towards thi s ' i deal' is characteristic of develop
ments in post-war France. It was the very basis of the 'three
party system' (Communi st, Soci al ist and Popular Republ i can),
and underlay the pol i ci es of the RPF (Rassemblement du
Peuple Fram;ais), the party founded by de Gaul l e, after the
133
The Strategy of the State
war, and also of the party of Mendes-France. It was respon
si bl e for t he growth and participation i n t he state apparatus
of the Social i st Party and the MRP (Mouvement Republicain
Populaire) . The major parties between them shared a number
of i mportant posts not only in the government, but also in the
provi ncial admi ni stration and the national i zed i ndustri es. They
commanded the al legiance of a large part of the population,
and turned themselves into hi ghly bureaucratic and di scipl i ned
organizations.
However, this development was only the frst stage - far
from leadi ng on to higher things, the process of political uni
fcation eventually collapsed. After the failure of the three
party system there came the resurrection of the Radical Party
and the formation of a traditional Right, then the emergence
of Poujadi sm and the split withi n the Radi cals. The country
re'turned to the old pre-war proliferation of parties, a state
of afairs that was quite out of tune with the needs of modern
capi talism: while the economic structure was tending towards
i ncreasing concentration, the political superstructure was
becoming increasingly fragmented. Now whereas this state of
afairs coul d be tolerated in the past, today i t has more
serious consequences - the major parties have become so i m
portant i n running the admi nistration that their disintegration
paralyzes the state.
The old distinction between structure and superstructure
has become i ncreasingly blurred: the State now has a grip on
every aspect of economic l i fe and, conversely, its own steps
are dogged by pressure groups of every shape and size. Every
department of a Mi nistry, each parliamentary commission,
is shadowed by one or more groups wi th their own organiza
tion, ofces, research boards, public relations consultants,
publ ications, and their own, often considerable, fnancial re
sources. The role of these organizations i s often misunder
stood, and some people sti l l believe that they operate by cloak
and dagger methods : spies i n the Mi nistry and bribes of highly
placed ofcial s. But this is only a mi nor aspect of thei r activity.
Much more i mportant than those 'machi nations of Capi tal '
that were the subject of so many pre-war Left-wi ng thri l l ers
1 34
The Gaul l i st Phenomenon
i s the overt and qui te legal method of ' lobbying' Deputies .
Whom do these lobbies really represent? On the one hand,
they speak for those unwi el dy associations covering wide
felds of interests, such as the General Confederation of Smal l
Traders, and the National Federation of Agri cultural Syndi
cates. On the other hand they are the mouthpieces of smal ler
groups which are the more efective in that thei r i nterests
are more specifc, for instance the Sugar-Beet Producers'
Association, the Vi neyard Owners, the Wheat Farmers, etc.
At times they form such coalitions as the alcohol lobby, the
road-planni ng lobby, etc. Agai n, when i t comes to defendi ng
a group l i ke the colons, coalitions of a dozen or more groups
combine into such powerful pressure groups as the Indo
Chinese l obby, or the Algeri an l obby.
Al l these groups try, by vari ous means, to push the par
ticular i nterests they represent and exercise a constant pressure
on the centres of deci si on. Moreover, they are not simply con
tent to leave it at that, but can rely on agents in all the major
organizations, and often they even control deputies, whose
election may depend on their support. With the help of these
straw men, the pressure groups keep themselves i nformed of
every plan and proposal of the State.
Before these groups, the State is reduced to helplessness. It
hardly knows which agents are i ts own. Its everyday activity
is i nextricably ti ed up wi th these parasites, men who block its
every step. This is refected notably in the fai lure of every
attempt to i ntroduce fscal reforms, or to control pri ces.
The resul t might be cal led a return to feudalism: a new ki nd
of gui ld system seems to be developing hand i n hand wi th
greater economi c concentration. In fact, this growth of pres
sure groups did not spring up by acci dent, but i s the natural
response to i ndustri al 'rational izati on' . These groups form
what i s essenti al l y a defensi ve counterweight to the power of
the bureaucrats, who would otherwi se expropriate all the
small traders and farmers. Now, these are the very peopl e who,
by their sheer number, are particularly i mportant at election
ti me. Neither the fact that they are scattered all over the coun
try nor the nature of their work predisposes them to play an
1 35
The Strategy of the State
active soci al role - they only organize themselves in defence
of their own small privileges.
Pol i tical fragmentation and private pressure groups rei n
force each other i n practice; the latter can operate more
efectively the wi der the range of parties competing for their
favours. However, as we saw, this process completely under
mi nes the authority of the State, and, in parti cular, hampers
its every efort to introduce the kind of social reform French
i ndustry needs so badly.
But why do the leaders of French industry allow this un
sati sfactory situation to continue? One reason, and perhaps
the most difcult to understand, i s the mentality of the French
bourgeoi si e. They tend to al low their ideology to override
their self -i nterest. For i nstance, those among them who call
themselves progressives or conservatives often merel y copy
their parents instead of responding to the needs of the hour.
In particular, certai n sections of bi g busi ness have been unable
to shed their outworn Malthusi an attitudes, and del i berately
encourage the most regressive tendencies of the most back
ward sections of the populati on.
Finally, and this i s the crucial factor, the need to keep the
Communi st Party out of the government renders the authori
ti es extremely vulnerable to every pressure from the Right,
whose antics take on an i nfated importance. But by keeping
the Communists out, the State is deprived of support from
those who would most readily accept i ts intervention in the
economy. The anomalous position of the French Communist
Party, whi ch would be only too pleased to play the parl ia
mentary game, is due to international rather than national
considerations, and must therefore be seen agai nst the back
ground of the Cold War.
As a result of al l the factors we have listed, the State can
not make any serious decisions at the national level, or upset
the existing balance of parties. Hence the continued existence
of the State itself is jeopardized.
The advent of Gaulli sm can only be understood as a re
sponse to the crisis of the State, in a specifc si tuati on. De
Gaulle came to power to the acclaim of the colons and the
1 36
The Gaul li st Phenomenon
Army. In fact, thei r choice of this parti cular leader showed up
t he weakness of those who talked of marching on Paris, their
guns at the ready. Nei ther de Gaulle's record nor hi s speeches
made him the kind of Fascist hero they needed, or, for that
matter, a dedi cated fghter against Communism.
Be that as i t may, the white settlers i n Algeria saw one side
of Gaul li sm - the other si de was turned towards the metro
pol i s.
To the colons, or at least to the most mi l itant and dynamic
among them, de Gaul l e alone seemed capable of creating a
sufciently strong government to si lence the r ival factions,
whi l e keeping a watchful eye on the interests of the rul i ng
class.
The metropol is, on the other hand, saw in de Gaulle the man
who coul d impose the soci al reforms recommended by
Mendes-France - reforms that could onl y be i ntroduced
by an authori tari an regime that had the full support of the
Right. This may seem paradoxical, but i f the nature of
Gaul l ism is ambivalent, i t is only because the objective situa
tion was ambivalent. There were, in fact, two crises to be
overcome : a pol itical one i n Algeria and an economic one
i n metropolitan France. If one looks only at the events i n
Algeria: the insurrection of the Army and the colons, the ad
vent of Gaulli sm appears as the frst phase in an attempt to i n
stal l a Fascist regi me. But important as the i nsurrecti on i n
Algeria was, i t was onl y one aspect of the situation. As soon
as one looks at events in metropolitan France as well, the pic
ture i s changed, for here, the situation was not at al l such as
to call for a Fascist dictator .
In fact, as we have tried to show, the fundamental objec
tives of the employers had for years been not to repress
the working class by Fascist methods, but rather to achieve
economic expansion through soci al peace. These objectives
have never changed. They grow even more necessary as foreign
competition and the Common Market make i t certai n that
any economi c recession i n France would be a major disaster.
Now, economic expansion entails ful l employment, and
social peace means 'acceptable' wages - and in fact the stan-
1 37
The Strategy of the State
dard of l i ving has been kept sufciently high to avoid conficts.
In short, the factors making for Fascism (widespread un
employment and poverty) were completely lacking at the time
de Gaul l e was called to power.
True, as we have shown, large sections of the petty bour
geoisie felt threatened by industrial expansion, and tried des
perately to defend their privileges. Their resentment attracted
them to the most reactionary political forces, but si nce no
one had as yet deprived them of their place within the system
of production and distribution and, indeed, since they sti l l
enjoyed (and continue to enjoy) special subsidies, they were
not ready for civil war. They may have applauded Poujade
at meetings, but they were by no means prepared to act as
hi s shock troops. If Fascism means anything at all, it means at
the very least : dictatorship based on a mass movement; forced
exploitation of the working class; and putting the economy
on a war footing. And France, as we have tried to show, was
not movi ng in this direction. This was as true in 1 958 as it was
i n June 1 968, when de Gaulle was once again acclaimed as
the saviour of France. On both occasions he tried to reform the
State and to reorganize society, i n the i nterests of the mana
gerial classes. De Gaul le is a kind of economic Bonaparte -
apparently above al l classes he can manipulate the various
political forces who woul d col lapse without hi m. And once
he has got the bureaucrats of the Right, Left and Centre to
accept that all problems are political problems and cannot be
solved on the Stock Exchange or i n the trade uni on ofce, he
can agai n appear as the champion of national unity.
And so, in June 1 968, after promising new elections,
de Gaul l e once again got down to the business of re- establ i shi ng
order. With the help of the CGT, he gave the workers to
understand that their essential clai ms would be satisfed and
that, for the rest, he woul d let them elect a popular govern
ment. The parl iamentary Left for its part promised a splendid
future for al l : there would be new youth centres and palaces
of culture, stadia, and swimming pools, cut-price cinemas and
a democratic radio and televi sion service, a democratic
university and to top it all, for all the good l ittle workers,
1 38
The Gaull i st Phenomenon
a choice of ski ing in the mountai ns or a hol iday in the U.S.S. R.
Whi l e t he demagogues promised joy and freedom i n the
future, the pol ice moved i n to guarantee the freedom of ex
ploitation here and now. At Flins and at Sochaux they used
grenades and left three dead behi nd.
In order to ease the work of the CRS, the CGT dismantled
the defences at Renault and Bi llancourt, and at Mureaux re
proved the mi l itants who refused to give in. As for the
students, the layabouts and foreigners who, more and more
isolated, conti nued the struggle in the universities, supported
the stri ke pickets, and denounced the elections as sheer treason,
a single tactic was used - systematic repression. All meetings
were roughl y broken up, the ' l eaders' were expelled, i ncl ud
i ng some who were handed over to Franco and Salazar. Clearly,
everyone benefts from the fruits of progress.
We know the results of the electi on: sweeping victory for
de Gaul l e, crushi ng defeat for the Communist Party. A l esson
to be remembered - i f the bourgeoisie i s al lowed to choose the
arena, i t wi l l always cut the workers down to size.
And even i f the Left had won the elections, we know per
fectly well that diferent men would have promoted the same
policies, plus or minus one or two nati onal izations, pl us or
minus a few i nfationary measures. Essenti ally, the capita
l i st system woul d have been preserved.
Today, the government must do its utmost to regain what
ground i t lost during the recent revolutionary upheavals. It
has realized that the universities must be reformed i f they are
to help modernize and reform the economy, and turn out
more organizati on men who know the art of compromi se;
it appreciates the value of associating students wi th progress
withi n i ndustry, of creating conditions which give more play
to personal i nitiative and responsi bi l ity.
That is why the authorities now favour some system of
student participation, greater freedom for lecturers, and even
a measure of pol i ti cal l i fe for the students.
If this new freedom can be contained within the university,
the danger of wi despread i nfection is contained. This no
doubt will be the task of the more reactionary professors
1 39
The Strategy of the State
who are only too happy to preserve the monopoly of know
ledge. They can count on the services of the Minister of the
Interior and of his admi nistrative staf to make sure that
the faculties never agai n become the red bases of a new radi cal
confrontati on.
But next ti me we wi l l understand that the enemy i s onl y as
strong as we are weak : when we can unmask hi m as the re
pressive agent of only one class of society, we bri ng the work
ing class into the struggle.
Because they can only act wi thi n the l i mits of 'bourgeois
democracy' neither the police, nor the Army, nor the law are
powerful enough to contain the revolutionary process, once
i t takes the form of a multi pli ci ty of autonomous groups.
In the police, only the 1 3,500 CRS and the 2,000 to 3,000
men of the special branches represent a really dangerous force.
They l ive in barracks, are given special trai ni ng and a highly
developed form of brai n- washing. As a result, they can be used
as shock troops agai nst almost any i nsurrecti on. Because of
their uni form, thei r reputation and their SS tactics (at
Charonne and the raids of May and June) they are detested by
the population. All thi s helps to cement the soli darity between
demonstrators, strikers, and even occasi onal wi tnesses of
pol i ce brutal i ty.
When there are onl y a few poi nts of struggle, these shock
troops are able to intervene i n strength, as they did for example
at Fl i ns and in the Latin Quarter on the nights of 1 0 and 24
May. If we had dispersed at 1 0 p. m. , i f the struggle had spread
to other suburbs and quarters of Paris and to the provi nci al
towns, these troops would have been impotent to deal wi th us.
For i nstance by our tactics duri ng the afternoon and evening
of 24 May, we completely outwi tted the CRS - i t took them
twenty mi nutes to reach the Stock Exchange after the demon
strators had forced their way i n.
These remarks apply equally to the gendarmerie. They are
rarely stati oned where they are needed, and to call them i n
poses a particularly delicate problem for the authori ti es. They
are mostly the sons of poor peasants, they have few scruples
about breaki ng the heads of 'privi leged' students, or even of
140
The Gaullist Phenomenon
a few ' city slickers' . But at Flins we could see in their eyes
that some of them were unhappy and ashamed to be fghti ng
on the wrong side.
We have already mentioned that before calling in the Army,
the government must apply a measure of blackmai l and
i nti mi dati on. In fact, so fearful were the authori ties that they
took considerable precautions i n dealing wi th the Army. The
conscripts (260,000 men) were kept on permanent stand-by,
their camps were cordoned of and al l access to newspapers
and radi os was stopped. All ex-students among them were, on
vari ous pretexts, either sent abroad or otherwise segregated.
Action committees were formed spontaneously i n the ranks to
organize a break-out from these concentration camps run by
the ofcers. The measures taken against them show clearly how
much the authorities feared that the conscripts might join the
student movement.
Massive i ntervention by all the armed forces i s certai nl y a
possibi li ty to reckon wi th in the future, but this would i nvolve
turning the country i nto a Fascist state, and such thi ngs cannot
be done overni ght. Moreover, there are risks to the State i tself
in letting loose some of the special uni ts (tanks, aviation,
mari nes, commandos) who might very wel l start fghting for
their own interests.
Furthermore, i ntervention on thi s scale woul d necessarily
enlarge the struggle : i t would bring out all the workers.
Admi ttedly i f, during the power vacuum that existed i n the
months of May and June, Action Committees had started
runni ng the post ofces, the social security centres, and other
publi c services, it is possible that the Army might have been
cal l ed in to i ntervene.
But i n that case, an important fraction of the population
would already have made up its mind to run i ts own afairs,
and would have repel led violence wi th vi olence. The i nevi t
abi l i ty of this escalation acts as a strong deterrent upon those
who would not otherwise scruple to crush the workers wi th al l
the weapons at their command. Moreover, whi l e the special
units of the Army can be used to drive the workers out of the
factories, they cannot replace them at the bench or the ofce.
1 41
The Strategy of the State
The legal apparatus ground to a halt during the months of
May and June. What few measures were taken Pompidou
i mmediately declared nul l and void, and in any case far from
appeasing the revolutionari es, these measures merely served to
swel l their ranks. Only wi th the elections, when bourgeois
legality was re-established, could Justice once agai n pi ck up her
heavi l y weighted scales. 'The bureaucratic machine had seized
up and began to disintegrate from wi thin, so much so that i t
ofered the gorgeous spectacle of a Minister responsi bl e for
maintaining public order unable to get through to his own
department, because hi s own communication system had gone
on stri ke.
'At l ast we could see clearly whi ch were the useful cel l s
wi thi n the State, and whi ch were repressive or merely parasitic
- all those who served a vi tal function deserted the mori bund
state to form the body of a new Society.' (A. Glucksmann :
Strategic et Revolution en France 1968.)
III
Stalinist Bureaucracy and the
Class Struggle in F ranee
I . Introduction
'The theoretical and practical exposure of Stali nism must
be a basic functi on of all future revolutionary
organizations.'
De Ia misere en milieu etudiant
' During these events . . . the Communist Party appeared
as the party of order and political wisdom. '
Wal deck- Rochet, Secretary of the French Communist Party
The rebi rth of the revoluti onary movement in France cannot
be grasped wi thout an analysi s of the role of the French
Communi st Party, j ust as the revolutionary movement after
the First World War cannot be understood without an analysis
of the nature of the Social Democratic Party. Today, for the
vast majority of workers, the rol e of the Soci al Democrats i n
France i s clear : thei r parti cipati on i n the vari ous governments
duri ng the Fourth Republic, thei r overtly counter-revoluti onary
acti vi t ies duri ng the Algeri an war, thei r permanent compromise
with the bourgeoisie, for whom they acted as 'loyal stewards'
(Leon Blum) - have utterly estranged them from the large mass
of the exploi ted. If soci al democracy i s not dead, this is largely
due to Stal i ni sm which has thrown so many workers i nto i ts
arms.
If the workers were simi larly aware of the true nature and
rol e of the French Communi st Party and of the CGT whi ch it
controls, they would break with i t almost to a man, and thi s
would be entirely t o t he good i f only i t led t o t he emergence of
a truly revol uti onary movement. As it i s, the break which
started many long years ago has been passive and pre
dominantly negati ve i n i ts results - the workers have voted
wi th thei r feet . The May cri sis di d a great deal to change thi s
145
Stal i ni st Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle in France
picture : it not only helped to deplete the ranks of party
members even further, but it also provided the more class
conscious among them with a new, revolutionary, platform.
If this book contributes to thi s process i t wi l l not have been
written in vai n.
2. The French Communist Party and the CGT
during May and June
If we exami ne the hi story of the French Communi st Party, we
shal l fnd that the unsavoury rol e i t played i n 1 968 was not a
new one : i t behaved i n a very si mi lar, i f not i dentical, fashi on
(though i n a di ferent hi stori cal context) on two previ ous
occasi ons : in 1 93 6 and agai n i n 1 945. Nor i s thi s a coi nci dence.
Now, though the French Communi st Party general l y speaks
wi th two voices, combi ni ng Leni ni st i deological phrases wi th
electoral and reformi st practices, during May and June i ts
practice and language became as one. This is perhaps best
i l lustrated by its attitude to the three mai n facets of the
revol uti onary movement - the universi ti es, the general stay-i n
stri kes and the cal l for new elections - as refected respectively
i n (a) Georges Marchai s's article in L'Humanite of 3 May;
(b) the reports by Seguy on 1 4 and 1 5 June; and (c) the
electoral address by Waldeck-Rochet on televi si on on 21 June.
The Communist Party and the Revolutionary Movement
in the Universities
For some years past, the French Communist Party had been
busily denouncing the activi ty of 'Leftist spli nter groups' but
wi thout attaching any great i mportance to them. Thus, in
January 1 967, Georges Marchais, second in command of the
French Communist Party, told the 28th Congress of the Com
munist Party that 'the press and other propaganda medi a keep
referri ng to these spl i nter groups in an attempt to bui ld them
up, whereas in fact they represent nothi ng. '
From ti me to ti me the Communi st press woul d publ i sh
arti cles on the numerical weakness of these groups. Then, on
1 47
Stal i nist Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle in France
3 May 1 968, the tone suddenly changed, and this at a time when
the revolutionary movement in the universi ti es was still in i ts
i nfancy.
' Despite thei r contradictions,' Marchais proclaimed, 'these
spl i nter groups - some hundreds of students - have united i n
what they call the 22 March Movement . . . led by the German
anarchist Cohn-Bendi t. '
Marchai s had clearly become al i ve to the potenti al threat
posed by the unani mi ty of the 22 March Movement, to the fact
that i ts nature had undergone a qual itative transformati on.
Hence the smear that the movement was ' led' by 'a German
anarchi st', a line the authori ti es took up with gratitude. In fact,
our movement holds the fundamental beli ef that the revoluti on
needs no leaders, an assumption that i s anathema to Marchai s
and al l other bureaucrats. So not onl y does our movement have
a leader foisted upon i t, but one who, i n contrast to the true
Frenchmen of the Communist Party, is a foreigner. Minute,
the journal of the extreme Ri ght, would be more preci se when
i t spoke of a 'German Jew' . In any case, the Communi st Party
bears part responsi bi lity for the xenophobic wi tch hunt that
cul mi nated i n the expulsi on from France of al l foreigners -
i ntellectuals and workers al i ke - who had taken part i n the
revolutionary movement or were suspected of havi ng done
so.
'Not satisfed wi th agi tating the students - to the detriment of
t he i nterests of the mass of the students themselves and t o the
deli ght of Fasci st provocateurs - these pseudo-revoluti onari es
now have the impertinence to thi nk that they can gi ve lessons to
the working class. More and more of them have penetrated our
factori es or the hostels for foreign workers, di stri buti ng tracts
and other propaganda materi al . '
The true danger had been spotted, a danger agai nst whi ch the
Communist Party and the CGT would now mobi li ze al l their
forces : an al l i ance between the revoluti onary students and the
working class. Thi s alli ance Marchai s coul d only envisage i n
the form of 'lessons', because that i s precisely the type of
relationshi p the Communi st Party has wi th the worki ng class.
The Party was grudgingly prepared to turn a blind eye to the
148
The French Communist Party and the CGT
activi ti es of the revoluti onary groups i n the universi ti es them
selves, i n any case it was unabl e to stop them. The UEC, the
Communi st Student Uni on, was mori bund, i ts numbers
dwi ndl i ng and i ts i nfuence over ' non-organized' students
practical l y ni l , and thi s despite conti nued Communist eforts
to gai n support. The revoluti onary groups, for thei r part, had
no wi sh to represent the mass of 'uncommi tted' students - al l
those who slog away at thei r exami nati ons si mpl y i n order to
become economic, poli ti cal and i deological leaders i n the ser
vice of the State and of the bourgeoi si e from whi ch they have
sprung and to whose ranks they are so anxi ous to return. The
object of the revoluti onary groups was rather to unmask the
university as a bourgeois i nstitution both i n its composi ti on and
i ts functi on. Marchai s uses much the same argument, but stands
it on i ts head, by sayi ng that 'the i deas and the acti vi ti es of
these "revol uti onari es" are enough t o make us laugh once we
reali ze that most of them are the sons of captains of i ndustry
contemptuous of students of worki ng-class ori gi n - and that
they wi l l qui ckly snuf out thei r revoluti onary fames to become
di rectors in Papa's busi ness, and then expl oi t the workers in the
best tradi ti ons of capi tali sm' .
Marchai s thus reali zes that the university i s a centre of
pri vi lege, and plays on the fact that i ts class structure neces
sari l y produces a ri ft between workers and students_ Thi s does
not, however, stop hi m and his Party from defendi ng 'the mass
of students' - i .e. those who wi l l , in efect, be runni ng ' Papa's
busi nesses' - against the revolutionary students who have
broken wi th thei r own class. Now, i t i s qui te possi bl e that a l arge
number of revoluti onary students wi l l come to terms wi th the
bourgeoi si e, parti cularly if thei r revolutionary message goes
unheard. Thi s merely refects the weakness of a revolutionary
movement l i mi ted to the universi ti es. In any case, the chi ef
functi on of the modern uni versity is to ft the student for a place
i n the soci al hi erarchy, and only a radi cal transformati on of
soci ety can alter thi s. Thi s i s fully reali zed by al l revol uti onary
students and so is the i mportance of an all iance wi th the work
ing class; what diferences there are between us concern onl y
the best ways of reachi ng that al l i ance.
1 49
Stali ni st Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle in France
'Nevertheless we must not underestimate thei r perni ci ous
endeavour to spread di ssension, doubt and scepticism among
the workers, and particularly among the young workers. '
Marchai s has realized that the workers and students are
drawi ng closer together, and thi s, as we have stressed, as early
as 3 May! So great in fact was the danger, that he went on to
warn : 'These false revolutionaries must be unmasked com
pl etely, because, objectively, they serve the i nterests of the
Gaul l i st authorities and the big capitalist monopoli es; it i s our
duty to fght and i solate al l those Leftist groups who are trying
to harm the democratic movement while coveri ng thei r tracks
wi th revolutionary phrases.'
Yet try as they might, the Communi st students were unable
to i solate the Leftists; rather di d they themselves become
completely isolated in the uni versities. In the few ci ti es where,
on the eve of the uprising, the UNEF (Nati onal Uni on of
French Students) was sti l l controlled by the UEC (Communi st
Student Uni on) the UEC lost i ts hold over them al most
overni ght. At Rauen, for example, after the national commi t
tees of SNESUP (University Staf Association) and the UNEF
called for a general strike, i n answer to the closure of the
Sorbonne, AGER, the local section of SNESUP, refused to
endorse this deci si on. The revolutionary students (SCR, ESU,
etc.), together with non-Communi st lecturers, then called for
the election of strike commi ttees, whi ch roundly attacked the
Communi sts. After the occupation of the Renault factory in
nearby Clean, workers came across to attend lectures, and
afterwards they loudly booed the ofci als of the CGT. In i ts
attempt to i solate the revolutionary students, the French Com
muni st Party thus sufered a resoundi ng defeat. Its courtshi p
of the 'mass of students' fel l on deaf ears : the uncommi tted
ei ther joi ned the revolutionaries in the course of the struggle,
or else, as convinced reactionaries, went anywhere but to the
Communi st Party. The UEC acted as a repel lent - for some
because they were afraid of i ts revolutionary claims, for others
because they knew i t had none. All along, the UEC tried to
divert the students from the struggle and to check their revo
l utionary tendencies. To that efect i t joined the authori ti es
1 50
The French Communi st Party and the CGT
i n rai si ng the spectre of the exami nations - as a proven sti ck
wi th whi ch to beat the students.
The slander that the Leftists were playi ng i nto the hands of
the Gaul l i sts and Fascists by givi ng them cause for retali ati on
was one that was constantly repeated. Now, as every worker
knows, all revoluti onary movements meet resistance from the
authori ti es, from the State, and from the employers, who may
feel so threatened that i n addi ti on to the ofcial organs of
repressi on, they call in the Fascists as wel l . There is only one
certai n way of avoi di ng any possi bi l i ty of a clash wi th the
Fascists and that i s not to attack the capi tali st system i n the
frst place. As for the lower mi ddle classes whom the Com
muni st Party graces wi th the name of the 'democrati c forces',
they wi l l always take the stronger si de. Though perhaps at frst
repelled by some of the revoluti onari es' methods, they become
revoluti onary as soon as the revoluti on tri umphs and counter
revol uti onary as soon as reaction wi ns the upper hand. In ei ther
case they wi l l not play an active part - except during severe
economi c crises when desperation may dri ve tem i nto the
streets. However, i t should be remembered that economi c cri ses
never afect the lower mi ddle classes alone but hi t the worki ng
class even harder. And i t i s on the success or fai l ure of the
worki ng-class upri si ng that the reaction of the lower mi ddle
classes i nvari ably depends.
In Germany, where i nconsistent pol i ci es by the Stal i ni sts and
Reformi sts al i ke led to the di vi si on and ultimate destructi on of
the working-class movement, and wi th it of any trul y revo
l uti onary al ternative, the lower mi ddl e classes were thrown
strai ght i nto the arms of Hi t
f
er.
In May 1 968, i n France, on the other hand, the revoluti onary
opti on was sti l l open, and as the student revolt became more
wi despread, those workers who did not take thei r opi ni ons
straight from L' Humanire followed the events wi th attenti on
and sympathy. They di d not need the Communi st Mani festo to
tell them that ' fnally, i n times when the class struggle nears the
decisive hour, the process of di ssoluti on goi ng on i n the rul i ng
class, i n fact wi thi n the whole range of ol d society, assumes such
a vi ol ent gl ari ng character that a small secti on of the rul i ng
1 5 1
Stal i ni st Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle in France
class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class
that holds the future in its hands' (Karl Marx).
The Communist analysis ofthe general strike
With the general strike of 1 3 May began the second phase of
the movement : the entry of the working class i nto the struggl e.
The Communist answer was gi ven by the CGT, whose general
secretary Seguy is a member of the Poli tburo of the French
Communi st Party. It is his report to the National Executive of
the CGT on 1 3 and 1 4 June which we shall be exami ni ng
now.
Seguy's argument i s i nteresting both i n what i t expli ci tly
afrms and in what it glosses over. His report begins wi th a
pi ece of i nformation that came as no news to anyone, but from
which few people would have drawn the same conclusion :
'We have just wi tnessed unprecedented events in the social
hi story of France: a general stay-in strike by nearly ten mi l l i on
workers.'
Now the events were not, i n fact, entirely wi thout precedent,
si nce a si mi lar stri ke had taken place in May-June 1 936 and
again i n August 1 953, though i t is true that never before had so
many workers been i nvolved. And lest the glaring di screpancy
between the great strength of the movement and the puny results
the Party was prepared to accept recoi l ed upon i ts head, Seguy
deci ded to cover up his tracks with the clai m that: 'we foresaw
i t al l ' i n that 'penetrating analysis we presented to the 36th
Federal Congress on the subject of the economic and social
si tuati on in France'. Now that Congress merely repeated what
all such congresses always say, namely that capi talism oppres
ses the working class : Their economic and social pol i cy arouses
i ncreasing discontent and hence increasing opposi ti on. As a
result, the workers become more and more conscious of their
common i nterests, coordinate their struggle and so open up
wi der perspectives.' Krasucki, secretary of the CGT, had tol d
the 34th Federal Congress some years earlier much the same
thi ng : The growth of the opposition and the progress of the
1 52
The French Communi st Party and the CGT
uni on have created a new si tuati on and have opened up favour
able and encouragi ng perspectives for al l workers and demo
crats. ' Thus every Congress sees 'the openi ng of greater
perspectives for a greater struggle', not so much agai nst the
bourgeoi si e and the capi tal i st State, as agai nst ' monopol i es'
and 'personal power'. In short, Seguy may wel l have 'foreseen
i t al l ' - al l , that is, except the general stri ke (that great anarcho
syndi cal i st myth whi ch as 'everyone knows' di ed a long time
ago). Seguy recal ls the wave of twenty- four hour stri kes agai nst
the arbi trary laws promulgated by the government, and the
more ' vi gorous' acti ons at the Dassault Avi ati on Factory i n
Bordeaux, at Rhodi aceta i n Lyons, and at the Atlanti que works
in Sai nt- Nazai re - 'al l evidence of the general unrest and cl ear
i ndi cati ons of what was to follow'. He conveni ently forgets to
menti on that duri ng each one of these acti ons, Lefti st voi ces
were rai sed to demand that it be extended i nto a general stri ke,
to proclai m that the worki ng class was ready to do battle
agai nst the authori ti es. The ofci al Communi st answer was
always the same : you take your wi shes for facts; the worki ng
cl ass i s utterl y unprepared. The basi c strategy of the CGT was
to oppose any cal l for a general stri ke, and to keep the struggle
at the local level . Hence when any pol i ti cal novi ce coul d have
' foreseen' that a general strike was i n the air, the CGT did al l
i t coul d to 'foresee' that i t di d not take place. Nor was that the
frst ti me they had acted in thi s way. In I 953, for i nstance, when
the mi ners struck for more than a month (from I March
_
to 4
Apri l ) and workers throughout France declared thei r sol i dari ty
wi th them, al l the CGT di d was to steer the struggle from the
pol i ti cal i nto the purely fnanci al plane, once agai n on the
grounds that the workers were unprepared for battl e. And so
the workers went back to work, loudly protesting at turbulent
meeti ng after turbulent meeting that their leaders had sold them
down the ri ver. Delfosse, secretary of the Mi ners' Secti on of the
CGT, rounded on them wi th: 'You are an ungrateful lot of
fool s. We have stood by you all along.' Berthel i n, of the FO
(Force Ouvri ere), also added hi s voice: ' Qui te a few of those
di sturbi ng the meetings are in the pay of the UNR' (the
Gaul l i sts) . Sauty of the CFTC told the men : 'Even if everyone
1 53
Stal i ni st Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle i n France
stops work tomorrow, the day after tomorrow the numbers
wi l l dwi ndl e, and the day after that there won't be anyone left. '
However, the prize must surely go to Berthelin for his further
comment: 'The malcontents i nclude a lot of young people who
have never been in a strike and who i magi ne that by stri ki ng
they can get everythi ng they want.' In other words, the mi l i
tancy of the young workers was nothing but ignorance and i n
experience - smal l wonder they turned thei r backs on the trade
uni on movement!
For years, uni on leaders had done nothing but use the
workers' struggle for their own bureaucratic advantage. There
was nothi ng spontaneous about the events,' Seguy boasted i n
hi s 1 968 report, and spontaneity i s the chi ef enemy of al l
bureaucrats - i t chal lenges their very existence. True, no one has
ever pretended that a particular struggle has no l i nks wi th
previous struggles, and to that extent no movement has ever
been spontaneous, i .e. unhistori cal . By the spontaneity of the
working class we simply refer to i ts abi l i ty to take direct action
and to develop its own methods of struggle i rrespective of,
or even against, the wishes of all those great or petty 'vanguards'
who proclaim themselves leaders of the proletariat. The
reason why spontaneity is so i mportant in the struggle of the
Russian masses i s not that the Russian proletariat is "un
educated", but rather that revolutions cannot be run by
schoolmasters' (Rosa Luxemburg: The General Strike) .
By 'spontaneous' we do not, therefore, mean 'without pre
cedent', but simply 'without ofcial blessing' and in thi s sense
the recent French strike wave was completely spontaneous.
It spread l i ke wi ldfre wi thout the trade uni ons bei ng able to
stop i t. As for the 'ofcial ' strike whi ch the trade uni ons them
selves called on 1 3 May, Seguy explained its real purpose when
he declared: ' At the same time, 1 3 May delivered a seri ous
blow to the anarchist groups, those provocateurs who
entertained the mistaken hope of being abl e to lead the
movement.' The shoe was in fact on the other foot, for the
COT, unable to beat the movement, tried i nstead to head i t,
or rather to head i t of. Two days later [ 1 5 May], fully conscious
1 54
The French Communi st Party and the CGT
of the newly created possi bi liti es of enteri ng i nto a more
deci si ve phase of the battle' (opened up by the students whom
he conveni ently forgot to mention), 'we sent recommendations
to our (hi s mi l i tants, to assume full responsi bi l i ty for the
organizati on of the struggle, thus ensuri ng i ts coordination and
efectiveness. ' These vague phrases di d not deceive anyone,
for only a day earli er, on 1 4 May, when the workers occupied
Sud-Aviation i n Nantes and confned the manager to hi s
ofce, Seguy had publicly denounced the real mi li tants over
the radio (Europe No. 1 ) . In fact, the idea of a stay- i n stri ke di d
not come from the CGT itself, and so, of course, they opposed
it bi tterly.
The stay- i n stri ke di d, however, have the blessi ng of the local
FO* branch, whi ch had for years been renowned for i ts oppo
sition to the Reformist leaders. It was therefore not by chance
that Sud- Avi ati on in Nantes was the frst factory to hold a
stay- i n stri ke. The CGT di d not call a meeting of i ts Federal
Commi ttee unti l 1 7 May, but by the 1 5th, the Renaul t factory
i n Clean had been occupied, by the 1 6th it was the turn of
Renault at Flins and Boulogne- Bi llancourt, and by the 1 7th
Rhodiaceta had joined i n as well - al l of them wi thout the
encouragement of the CGT. The only one of these stri kes
Seguy mentioned in hi s report was the one in Bi llancourt, and
this i s what he had to say about i t: 'Those of Boul ogne
Bi l lancourt, under the experienced leadershi p of their CGT
ofci al s, have j ust given us an excel lent exampl e of the
efecti ve applicati on of the CGT recommendati ons. '
Thi s was, of course, sheer fabrication : al l the workers i n the
factory and all outside observers are agreed that the young
workers struck spontaneously. Seguy knew this perfectly wel l ,
the more so as many of hi s own stalwarts di d not hi de thei r
surpri se at bei ng swept up i nto the front l i ne, with never an
order for a general attack.
'The Trade Uni ons were overrun from below. This is what
various observers have claimed, mani festly i gnorant of what
has really happened, or else enraged by the success of our
Force Ouvriere, third most powerful trade union ; split of from CGT
when latter fel l under Communi st control.
1 55
Stal i ni st Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle in France
tactics (sic! ) and fl led with envy (sic! ) . ' Now, 'envy of the
success of the CGT tactics' i s the last thi ng anyone in hi s ri ght
senses could have felt, and nobody i s decei ved by Seguy's
laborious reconstruction after the event. The facts, and I thi nk
I have demonstrated thi s at some length, are that the CGT never
foresaw, let alone helped to launch, the workers' movement,
that the tail never wagged the dog. In the uni versities, the
Communi st Party tried to stop al l direct action and paid the
price of destroying its own student organi zati on; when the CGT
used the same tactics i n the factories, it signed i ts own death
warrant as well, for thousands of CGT members began to ask
themselves what was the good of having permanent ofci als who
keep in the background whenever they are most needed.
But Seguy had not yet done; he sti l l had to explain why a
general strike was called over the head of the Party : 'As the
class struggle has entered a more cri ti cal phase, certai n doubtful
elements, most of them renegades, have felt free to i nsult us by
suggesting that we let the hour pass when the worki ng class
coul d have assumed power.' Thus, even Seguy was forced to
recognize that the class struggle had become more acute, though
it was, of course, unfortunate for him that his detractors should
have posed the question of the revolutionary potenti al i ties of
that situati on. Workers everywhere were, in fact, asking them
selves what, precisely, they were wai ting for, when students and
lecturers everywhere were successfully chal lenging the power
of the State - they knew that the students and the lecturers, and
not some mi nisterial commission, had reformed the universities
and had created new centres of deci si on-maki ng. The State
representatives in the uni versities, that is the admi ni strators,
had been swept away; the Rectors no longer enjoyed the
support of anyone other than the poli ce.
The State was thus reduced to what i t essenti al l y i s, a poli ce
job, but Seguy refused to see even that :
'To tell the truth,. the question of whether the hour of
insurrection had struck or not has never even been posed,
neither in the Federal Committee nor in the Admini strative
Commi ttee which, as everyone knows, consists of serious
and hi ghl y responsible mi l i tants, men who are not in the
1 56
The French Communi st Party and the CGT
habi t of permi tti ng themselves to mi stake thei r desires for
real i ty. '
Now real i ty i s the very l ast thi ng these 'seri ous and hi ghly
responsi bl e mi l i tants' desi red. The whole problem had, i n fact,
greatly taxed the i ngenui ty of the Federal Commi ttee, and
Seguy was hard put to i t to convince them that, revol uti onary
though it may have been, the situati on was not propi ti ous for a
general i nsurrection : ' No, the ten mi l l i on stri kers di d not seek
power, all they wanted was better conditions of l i fe and of
work. '
But then, no revol uti on - nei ther the French nor the Russi an
began wi th a call for power or a radical transformati on of
society. Al l the Russi an workers demanded i n February I 9 1 7
was bread and peace. However, at the same ti me they set up
workers' counci l s whi ch, for more than ei ght months, co
exi sted wi th the machi nery of the State and the capitalist class.
The i nsurrecti onal phase di d not really begi n unti l October
I 9I 7, that i s

ei ght
1
monthsi after thelbegi nni nglof the Revol uti on.
But, for t he CGT, there are apparently no i ntermediate steps
between wage clai ms and the full assumpti on of power. We do
not deny that the problem of power would have had to be
rai sed (soci al i sm i s not bui l t i n a day), but what we do i nsi st on
i s that the creati on of workers' commi ttees on the shop foor,
commi ttees that made deci si ons on the spot i nstead of wai ti ng
for trade uni ons or employers to approve them, was the frst
step on a road that might have Jed to workers' control of the
enti re economy.
I n any case, renounci ng a revoluti onary pol icy under the
pretext that there is an army and a pol i ce force is to renounce
any attempt at a radi cal transformation of soci ety, even by
l egal and parl i amentary means, for cl early the bosses wi ll cal l
on the Army to defend them even agai nst defeat i n the pol l i ng
booths. Was i t not because they feared a mi li tary putsch i n
1 958 that a Chamber wi th a Leftist majori ty cal l ed i n de
Gaul l e? If the Army i s ready to fre at mi l l i ons of stri ki ng
workers, we do not thi nk i t woul d hesi tate to fre at some four
hundred heroi c deputies of the Left (and when we say four
hundred that i s the very maxi mum).
1 57
Stal i nist Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle in France
'If, to make an absurd assumption, we had abandoned our
Trade Uni on rol e and had dropped what our detractors so dis
dainful ly cal l our "alimentary claims" and had become the
generals of a revolution, we should at one stroke have lost the
preci ous confdence of the workers.'
The only di sdain we feel is for the CGT in thei r role of
generals of a counter-revolution; the only absurd assumption
is that the CGT has retained the 'precious confdence of the
workers' . There was never any question of our despising the
' alimentary claims' of the workers, only of deciding whether
the time was ripe for attacking its causes, the capital i st system
itself, or only its effects - whether our movement coul d lead to
the abol i ti on of wage-slavery, or whether that abol i ti on must
continue to be one of the pious phrases dished up at every May
Day celebrati on. Let Seguy read the followi ng quotation :
'Trade Unions work well as centres of resistance against the en
croachments of capi tal . They fai l partially from an i njudi cious
use of thei r power. They fai l generally from l i miting them
selves to a gueri lla war against the efects of the existent
system, i nstead of simultaneously trying to change i t, i nstead of
usi ng thei r organized forces as a lever for the fnal emancipation
of the working class, that is to say, the ultimate abolition of the
wages system. Instead of the conservative motto : "A fai r day's
wage for a fair day's work! " they ought to i nscri be on their
banner the revolutionary watchword : "Abol i tion of the wages
system! " ' (Marx: Value, Price and Proft.) Yet another de
tractor who despises the workers' 'ali mentary claims'!
Not only di d the CGT fai l to go beyond its 'ali mentary
claims', but it went back even on these, for the Grenelle agree
ment they signed compromised on the original clai m for a
forty-hour week, retirement at sixty, and a change in the labour
laws. And thi s was the agreement that Seguy ful ly expected
the strikers to greet with enthusiasm - or so his speeches i n the
Renault works suggested. These speeches were, however,
greeted wi th catcalls - the workers were al most unani mous i n
rejecting what the bureaucrats had so readily accepted. And so
the stri ke continued - as Thorez has pointed out in 1 936, 'you
have to know how to stop a strike'. To that end, the bureau-
1 58
The French Communist Party and the CGT
crats now tried to take the pol itical heat out of the movement
which from the very start had been political in the sense that i t
challenged t he entire system, both by i ts spontaneity and also
by i ts scope; they called for new general elections. The stri kes,
they proclai med loUdly at a demonstration held by the CGT
and the Communist Party on 29 May, had always been
about wage claims and not about the overthrow of capitalist
society, as the workers' desire for a peaceful parl i amentary
deci si on clearly proved. The bourgeoisie very happi ly accepted
this doubl e package, signed the Grenelle agreement and dis
solved the Chamber. But the workers themselves conti nued to
stri ke, and no elections could be hel d under these conditions.
And so the CGT got down to the business of breaking the stri ke.
'Since the elections open up concrete perspectives i n our
perennial struggle for democracy i t i s i n the workers' own
i nterests that we l ead them to vi ctory by frst settl i ng thei r
claims so that the electi ons can take place normally. In that
spi ri t the Federal Committee has i ncluded a paragraph of the
utmost i mportance in i ts declaration of 5 June, namel y :
' Wherever the essential claims have been satisfed i t i s i n the
workers' i nterest to pronounce themselves overwhelmingly i n
favour of a r etur n t o work. " ' Si nce the CGT had gone back on
even t he ori gi nal claims, i .e. t he reduction of t he worki ng week,
the loweri ng of the age of retirement, the change in the l abour
l aws, the new poli cy of the CGT amounted, i n fact, to a cal l for
a return to work at any pri ce. And as, i n these conditions, it was
extremely di fcult to persuade ten mi l l i on strikers to heed the
call en masse, the CGT deci ded to demoralize each i ndustry i n
turn.
' The others have left us in the lurch,' said those who con
ti nued. 'I am ashamed to have gone back while my mates are
sti l l fghti ng, ' said thousands of others. The 'massive pro
nouncement in favour of a return to work' was nowhere forth
comi ng; i n many factories the vote was just over 50 per cent.
The fol lowi ng passage is reveal i ng :
' "Well, let me tel l you - and I am no student - how they got
us to go back to work. " The speaker wore the uni form of the
RATP (Regie Autonome des Transports Parisiens) . "I was
1 59
Stali ni st Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle i n France
working i n the Lebrun Depot, in the Thirteenth Arrondissement;
i t was the twentieth day of the strike, 4 June, when the CGT
leaders gave the order to go back to work. None of our clai ms
had been met and even i f they had we, on Paris Transport,
ought not to have gone back before the rest. It was only ri ght
we shoul d have stood by them. Seeing that we were 90 per cent
for the strike - as a vote showed - do you know what the CGT
leadership di
d
? They went to see the boys one by one, telli ng
them that all the other depots had gone back. They i nvented
voting results when nobody had voted, and they did this i n
every depot, telling each one that the others were i n favour of
goi ng back. Some of us went up to the ofce to ask for an ex
planation; unfortunately we weren't enough, so the ofci als
pi tched i nto us. On the 5th, we posted pi ckets as usual, but, as if
by chance, si x bi g police vans had drawn up outside early i n
the morni ng, Paris police and the Garde Mobile, bristling wi th
guns. We were prepared to stick i t out al l the same, what with
the local peopl e and the students behi nd us, but the CGT
offci als tol d us another pack of l i es, made false promises, and
the l ot. After having divi ded the movement, they got the other
depots to pack i t i n and they demoralized us as wel l . And so we,
too, went back - wi th tears i n our eyes. So i f some of the boys
turn i n their cards, who can really blame them? But I've kept
mine, and not for nothing either. There are qui te a few accounts
I'd l i ke to settle with RATP. ' " (L'Evenement, Jul y-August
1 968.)
And sti l l the struggle continued. Entire sectors of, for i n
stance, the metal i ndustry remained on stri ke. But al l the CGT
now had to do was to sit back and wait for the i solated pockets
to grow tired of going i t alone. The government, too, now had
a chance to show that i t sti l l existed - i t had been forgotten for
such a long ti me! . . . What i t had been unable to do for weeks
to send the hated CRS against the factories - i t could now do
almost wi th i mpunity. True, i t di d not try i t at Bi llancourt, so
near Paris, wi th its 30,000 workers, but at remote l i ttle Fli ns,
and at Sochaux. 'Leftist groups, often complete strangers to
the workers, pretending that the struggle for wage claims was
of no i mportance, vi olently opposed the wishes of those
1 60
The French Communist Party and the CGT
workers whose claims had been satisfed, and who wanted to
return to work' (CGT) .
The truth i s al together diferent. For as soon as they heard
what was happening, the students rushed to Fl ins, not to
oppose the wi shes of the workers, but to express their sol i
darity with them and to do battle wi th the CRS. One of the
students was ki l led. There was also a fght at Sochaux where
two people died. To prevent a spontneous new fare-up of the
struggle, the CGT felt impelled to call for a one-hour stri ke, no
more, against this triple assassi nation. 'How many dead do we
need for a twenty- four hour stri ke? ' the Leftist press asked.
The CGT itself publi shed the following communique: ' When
the government had ordered the CRS into the [Fli ns] factory
and whi l e the workers were peacefully assembled, strangers to
the working class, led by Geismar, who i s increasi ngly proving
hi mself an expert on provocation, insinuated themselves i nto
the meeting and i ncited the workers to re-occupy the factory.
These groups, drawn up i n para-mi li tary fashion, had pre
viously appeared duri ng similar operations i n Paris, and were
quite blatantly acting in the servi ce of the worst enemies of the
working class. ' And the CGT, as a fai r reward for al l the
stri ke- breaking services it had rendered to that true friend of
t he working class, t he Gaullist government, now demanded that
all groups of the extreme left be outlawed.
After Daniel Cohn-Bendit's residence permit had already
been withdrawn, Seguy sti l l saw ft to declare : ' It would seem
that the warnings we issued, even before the Prime Mi nister
hi nted that this i ndi vi dual was a member of an i nternational
organization, are about to be confrmed.' For the frst time, the
CGT had, in fact, foreseen something, i ndeed done something
about i ts forecasts. In hi s report, Seguy does not bother to
hi de the role of the CGT in the government ban of all extreme
left-wing groups : ' But by exposing the government as an ac
compl i ce of these provocateurs . . . we forced them to make a
show of their i nnocence and to remove the troubl emakers on
the eve of the elections. '
A far cry, this, from Lenin's: 'The government has thrown
down the gauntlet to anyone with the least shred of honour, by
1 61
Stalinist Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle i n France
descri bi ng as troublemakers the students who protested against
arbitrary forces . . . . Just cast your eye over the government
proclamation; it is ful l of such words as disorder, commotion,
excess, efrontery, licence. On the one hand, they speak of
crimi nal political aims, of political protests, and on the other
they treat students as simple troublemakers who need to be
taught a lesson in disci pline . . . . The government needs an
answer, and not from the students alone . . . . It addresses i t
sel f to public opinion, boasting of i ts repressive energy, mock
ing at all l iberal aspirations. Al l thi nking people ought to take
up this challenge. . . . The working class constantly sufers
oppression and outrages on an infnitely greater scale from the
same arbi trary forces which are now embattled with the
students. The working class has already begun the struggle
for its l i beration; let i t remember that this great battle
i mposes great obligations, that i t cannot l iberate itself from
despotism without l i berating all the people . . . . No worker i s
worthy of the title of socialist, i f he can l ook on indiferently
whi l e the government sends its troops against young students.
The students have helped the workers; let the workers now come
to the ai d of the students' (Leni n: Complete Works, Vol . IV).
What, we wonder, would Leni n have made of those trade
union bureaucrats who not only looked on i ndiferently whil e
revolutionary students were being shot, but even cal l ed for re
pressive measures against them? In any case, the bourgeoisie
was quick to applaud these honourable gentlemen :
'The CGT has thus defnitely taken a stand against the i nsur
rectionary student movement, and yesterday's declarations by
M. Seguy also represent the opinion of the Communist Party.
The tone has changed : for the class diatribes of yesteryear, the
CGT of M. Georges Seguy has substituted the cold and frm
language of men of authority who know their business . . .
Sang-froid and responsibility are words that recur constantly
in his statement . . . The strikes wi l l be extended and wi l l prob
ably reach their height at the beginning of next week. It i s by
paying this price that the Trade Unions hope to defate the i n
surrectionist student movement and the irresponsible groups
behi nd it' (Hamelet in Le Figaro).
1 62
The French Communi st Party and the CGT
And there is l ittle doubt that when Seguy went on to speak
of 'publ i c opi ni on' it was, in fact, the bourgeoi s press he had i n
mi nd : ' Publ i c opi nion, deeply upset by al l the troubl e and
violence, confused by the equivocal positi on and the free and
easy atti tude of the State, has come to l ook upon the CGT as
a great force for peace and order. '
The bourgeois order, let it be understood!
The Communist Party in search of voters
Let us now leave the CGT, and go on to the French Communi st
Party, or rather i ts spokesman Waldeck-Rochet. He i s on
record as 'vigorously protesting against the substituti on of
poli ce repression for peaceful negotiati on' . For the party, as
for the CGT, the whole struggle was apparently ai med at noth
i ng more than negotiation wi th the State, wi th the bourgeoi si e,
and i t was wi thi n the framework of the capi talist system that i t
had t o remai n confned :
'In the i mpressi ve movement we have just wi tnessed, the
attitude of the Communi st Party has been perfectly clear : i t
has defended and conti nues unreservedly to defend the clai ms
of thi nki ng and worki ng France.' The termi nology i s reveali ng,
it is g lori ous France that the Communi st Party i s defending -
not the exploited masses. True, France al so i ncl udes the
workers, and the Communi st Party 'has done i ts utmost to
obtai n the legitimate satisfaction of clai ms that have been
neglected for far too l ong. It [the Communi st Party] has
proved to be a great party of progress. ' The term ' legitimate'
in thi s passage shoul d be underlined - the legitimate struggle
for satisfaction within the l egi timate framework of the system,
that i s, of capitali sm.
In other words, the Communist Party i s fghting for cl ai ms
that are compati bl e wi th the conti nued existence of the bour
geoi si e - only i n this sense i s i t 'progressive', much as the
'Centrists' cal l themselves a 'Party of Progress and Demo
cracy' . And on the very day that Waldeck-Rochet made hi s
speech, t he Centri st leader, Duhamel, declared that 'economi c
progress i s hampered by soci al i nj usti ce' .
1 63
Stalinist Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle in France
To make it doubly clear that the Communi st Party is a
stickler for legality and has never looked beyond it, Waldeck
Rochet conti nued:
'The Communi st Party has appeared as a party of order and
pol itical wisdom, appealing to working-class discipline, freely
accepted (sic) .' Now we have seen just how freely the working
class accepts the di sci pli ne i mposed upon it by political and
i ndustrial leaders. Yet no one wi l l challenge hi s cl ai m that the
Communist Party i s 'a party of order', and that i t, together wi th
the CGT, which it controls, has been i nstrumental i n re
establishing order in France - bourgeois order, to be sure. To
that end i t waged a bitter fght, frst against the Leftists, that
'group of troublemakers', and then against thousands of
workers. 'Communist mi l i tants, as befts men of experience
and good sense, have done their utmost to avoid every provoca
tion.'
Now, this fght against the Left was in fact the only one the
Party ever engaged i n - the better to compromise with the bosses
and the state.
'By denouncing provocation no matter from what quarter,
we have acted with great discernment.' What wonderful di s
cernment, that can lump the students together with the CRS!
Sti l l, there i s no doubt that the Party was alive to the real i ssues,
and that it di d i ts utmost to sow confusion among the ranks of
the working class. To what extent i t succeeded only the future
can tel l . As for the 'men of experience and good sense' they
deserve credit, not for seizing the creaking machi nery of the
state, not for fghting the authorities and the bourgeoisie, not
for organizing the defence of the working class agai nst pol i ce
brutal i ty, not for exploding the myth of parliamentarianism, of
legality and of partial concessions that the authorities can re
tract at wi l l , but for fghting the Leftists. In this feld, in efect,
the Communi st Party has a long and unenviable record of
successes.
'The u ltra-Leftist groups attack and insult us because, from
the very start, we have refused to have recourse to provocation
and ugly vi olence.'
I have tri ed to explain at some length the nature of the
1 64
The French Communi st Party and the CGT
Lefti st 'provocati on' : all the student movement tri ed to do was
unmask the true nature of the State, in practice rather than by
means of theoreti cal analyses the State can safely i gnore.
To provoke the bourgeois State means forci ng i t to show i ts
claws; to di sprove i ts cl ai m that i t is essenti ally diferent from
Franco or the Eastern bureaucraci es. Now these claws exi st no
matter what the majori ty i n Parli ament, and this i s what the
Communist Party is tryi ng to di sgui se. Hence i t blames all the
vi ol ence on those who are i ncapable of i t, because they lack
the means. But there i s l i ttle poi nt i n unleashi ng the ti gers only
to run away when they pounce : self-defence is a major task of
any revol uti onary movement. The Communist Party, on the
other hand, argues that 'we have acted and conti nue to act
wi th a sense of responsibi lity when we guard agai nst givi ng
the government any excuse to smash the workers' .
Now, the government has i ts own means - the televi si on and
also the pol i ce - of obstructing the workers, and wi l l use them
no matter whether the Communist Party i s on i ts guard or not.
The only thi ng the Communist Party can do and does do i s
divert the workers' movement by gi vi ng i t the ki nd of obj ec
t ives that threaten nei ther the government nor the bourgeoi si e.
The strategy of the Communist Party, whi ch, accordi ng to
Waldeck- Rochet, was to 'bar the path to bloody adventurism,
to prevent a mi l i tary di ctatorship' - i s one that could be i n
voked to frustrate al l revolutions, for i t tacitly grants that the
State alone can lay down when and at what point it may be
challenged. The revol utionary is far more concerned about
what forces he has to overcome, to what extent the State can
really rely on the army, for exampl e. Now thi s is the analysis
the Party ' mi l itants' forgot to make; they never asked whether
de Gaul l e could, in fact, have called i n the army to mow down
French workers. We shall return to this problem in the chapter
on the strategy of the State. Sufce it to say at this poi nt that
de Gaulle and the Communi st Party both made use of this
argument; de Gaul le uttering it by way of a threat and the
Communi st Party accepting it at face value and wi thout
di scussi on. The mere hi nt of a putsch should the electoral
alternative be rejected had the Communists hopping wi th
1 65
Stal i ni st Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle in France
ballot fever, just as the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies
set the CGT itching to call of the strike.
'The Gaul lists keep waving the Tri colour, but the Tri
colour i s not the exclusive property of anyone, least of al l
those who have sacrifced the i nterests of t he mass of French
men on the altar of a handful of multimi l l ionai res. ' Now to des
cribe the Gaul lists as representatives of ' a handful of mul ti
mi llionaires' i s to mask the reality of contemporary capi
talism, utterly to mistake the real nature of the modern state.
And so the mass of Frenchmen - workers, peasants, bour
geois (not multimi l l i onaires but perhaps all those who have not
yet gone beyond their frst mi llion), soldiers, policemen and
clergymen, are enjoined by the Communist Party to rally against
the multi mi ll i onaires, behind - of al l things - the Tricol our.
' In al l our demonstrations, we Communists scorn the black
fag of anarchy, but march frmly under the tricolour banner
of the nation and the red fag of social ism.'
Apparently, some Communist leaders must have thought
that there were far too many of the latter, for in their later
demonstrations only the Tricolour appeared; had not Lamar
tine, that well-known theorist of revoluti onary social ism,
said that 'while the Tricolour was borne through the whole
world, the Red Flag went no further than the Champs de Mars' ?
True, nowadays the Red Flag fies over many ministries and
embassies and it, too, has become a hi ghl y respectable patri o
tic emblem. There was a time when the Communist Party,
even under Stali n, used rather to look down on al l forms of
nationalism and patriotism. But that was before 1 936, the year
the Soviet Uni on became the Soviet Fatherland . . .
Just l isten to Waldeck-Rochet : 'We Communists have
always fought and shal l continue to fght remorselessly the lack
of national feeling that certain anarchist elements vaunt as a
si gn of thei r revolutionary ardour. We, for our part, are proud
to have restored to the working class what Aragon so nobly
cal led THE COLOURS OF FR ANCE! ' ( 1 0 June 1 968.)
Nobly indeed! For what Aragon had done was to consign
the 'colours of France' to the rubbish dump, and to extol the
Red Flag :
1 66
The French Communist Party and the CGT
'Les trois couleurs a la voirie!
Le drapeau rouge est le mei/leur!' ( 1 932)
Or compare Waldeck-Rochet's : The Communists love thei r
country passi onately . . . and because they love it, they want to
see it free, prosperous and peaceful . . . a good place for al l
the peopl e . . . who are the l i vi ng real ity of France' (I 0 June
1 968), with Aragon' s : ' I detest my country; the more French
things are, the more they revolt me. A Frenchman! You take
me for a Frenchman . . . but I have resolutely turned away
from a country that has produced nothi ng but a bi t of bad
verse and assassins in bl ue uni forms . . . ' ( 1 8 Apri l 1 925) .
Or, fnal l y, compare Waldeck-Rochet's: 'That i s why we
have denounced and fought demagogy, the l i es and provoca
tions of the "ul tra-Leftists", supported as they are by the PSU,
vaunting thei r Maoism, their anarchi sm, their Trotskyi sm.
By thei r methods, thei r recourse to ugly vi olence and to hyste
r ical declamations, these groups have done their utmost to
besmi rch and discredi t that great popular movement whi ch is
now drawn up before the Gaul li st threat' (I 0 June 1 968), with
Aragon's
'Comrades
Lay l ow the cops . . .
Fi re on Leon Blum . . .
Fi re on the pontifs of soci al democracy . . .
Fire, I say, under the leadership of the Com-
muni st Party. '
( Quoted by L' Enrage, 1 7 June 1 968.)
And after declari ng that the Communist Party is the most
seri ous opponent of Gaull ist rule (a highly questionable
clai m) Waldeck-Rochet goes on to say: ' However, the choi ce
today is not between Gaul l i st rul e and the establi shment of
Communi sm i n France, but between personal power that can
onl y lead to mi l itary di ctatorshi p and a democratic regi me
founded on the uni on of al l democratic forces . . . ' Thus,
havi ng frst characterized Gaul l i sm economi cally as the regi me
of a handful of mul ti mi l l ionaires, the Communi st Party now
1 67
Stal i ni st Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle in France
goes on to characterize i t politically as a party of personal
power - so that once agai n Waldeck-Rochet has opened hi s
mouth and sai d nothing at al l . As for the threat of a mi l i tary
dictatorshi p, it could apparently be averted by hol di ng elec
tions, and no doubt, even more surely, if the Gaul li sts won
at the pol l s. In any case, even i f they di d not, the Communist
Party, and the rest of the ofci al Left, was not prepared to
ofer the el ectors a social i st alternative - small wonder that
so many of them voted as they di d.
General Analysis
To sum up, during the months of May and June, the Com
munist Party and the CGT played the game of the State and
the bourgeoi si e in theory no less than in practice. When we
speak of the Communist Party and the CGT we are, of course,
referring to the bureaucrats running them both, and not to
the membershi p - there is a wide gulf and a clash of i nterests
between the rank and fle and their leaders. The rank and fl e
has, i n fact, problems that are quite di stinct from those of the
bureaucracy. Thus duri ng the period immediately prior to
the May events, the Communist bureaucrats di d their utmost
to prevent the workers from cal l i ng a general stri ke. In the
universities, the Party opposed every radical chal lenge to
the authorities even on the theoretical plane, let alone i n prac
tice, and had onl y this complaint : the universities were cram
med and understafed and di d not admit enough worki ng- cl ass
chi ldren - there was no attempt at an analysis of the real
function of a university i n a hi erarchic society, namely its
support of the hi erarchy. Now such an analysis woul d have
shown precisely why there are so few working-class chi l dren
i n the universities - the men at the top try to ensure the best
places for thei r own sons and daughters. It is only to the extent
that the privi leged classes themselves cannot supply all the
needs of the hierarchy that they are forced to draw on other
strata of society - their idea of the ' democratizati on' of educa
ti on. Now, the Party is not opposed to a social hi erarchy as
1 68
The French Communist Party and the CGT
such; it si mpl y wants to change its composition, and that i s
preci sel y why i t objects to the Left i st analysi s. As i t was, the
mass of students was not deceived, wi th the result that our
movement greatly i ncreased in strength, parti cularly from 3 to
1 3 May. Duri ng thi s, the frst period of the struggle, the rol e of
the Communi st Party was si mply to prevent workers and
students al i ke from i ssui ng a radical chal l enge to their common
exploi ters.
During the second phase, when thi s confrontati on never
theless took place - in the form of the general stri ke whi ch
the CGT so strongly opposed and whi ch i t tried to sabotage,
i ni ti al l y by fai l i ng to issue di rectives - the Party di d i ts utmost
to steer the struggle i nto the 'safe' channels of industri al cl ai ms
so as to prevent the workers from quest ioning pri vate pro
perty as such or bureaucratic meddl i ng wi th national ized enter
prises. And in the end it was even prepared to compromi se on
i ts i ndustri al cl ai ms, settl ing for less than a forty- hour week
and forgetti ng the pension at the age of sixty. This package, the
CGT rightly felt, could only be sold to the workers if they were
strictly segregated from the ' vi olent' and ' i rresponsi ble'
students, and this the bureaucrats tri ed to achi eve by hook or
by crook.
Duri ng the thi rd phase, the Party di d i ts utmost to bri ng
the stri kes to an end by getting the workers to accept the terms
of the Grenel le agreement. However, when the workers re
fused and continued to stri ke, the Party tried to divert the
struggle i nto the parli amentary feld by ofering them nw
elections. De Gaulle readi ly accepted this vi ew and di ssolved
the Chamber. The bureaucracy now redoubled its eforts to
stop the str ike, sector by sector . And to prevent any mi l itant
opposition or renewed stri ke action, the Party intensi fed
its campaign agai nst Lefti sm, a campaign that cul mi nated i n
the government ban on al l extreme left-wing organizati ons.
Onl y then di d the Party feel free to enter the electi on cam
pai gn, whi ch it fought i n the name of order, legal i ty and bour
geois democracy, al l symbolized by the Tricolour.
3. The Nature of the Communist Bureaucracy
The behaviour of the Communist Party throughout these cri ti
cal months can only be understood i n the context of inter
national politics and the historical background. The present
phase of capitalism is characterized by the concentration of
economic and political power in the hands of the State, and by
the parallel growth of a 'workers' ' bureaucracy i n the i ndus
trial and political feld. Now this bureaucracy, far from try
i ng to represent the workers, endeavours to persuade them of
the general benefts of capitalist producti on, while staking its
own claim to a managerial say in the runni ng of i ndustry
and the State. Internally, it is organized very much as is the
capitalist system: i t has a hierarchical structure in which the
top becomes increasingly remote from the bottom. And as
i ndustries are becoming ever more complex and gigantic, the
bourgeoi si e and the capitalist State have discovered that they
are qui te unable to manage the vast problem of labour rela
tions, and more than welcome the help of the new bureau
cracy. In particular, they are quite wil l ing to grant these
bureaucrats privi leges, to consult them during moments of
cri si s, or even to charge them with the conduct of public afairs,
for only in that way are they able to fnd wil l i ng helpers i n
imposing their vital demands - greater productivity, wage
freezes, no strikes - on the mass of the workers, who would
otherwise turn a deaf ear to them. But not content with this
subservient role, the 'workers' ' bureaucracy has been try
ing to wrest a seat i n the very centres of economic power, on
the boards of the increasingly important State i ndustries,
the latest ofspring of the capitalist system. As a result, the
workers' bureaucracy now consists of two strata : trade uni on
ists and managers of industry. Their short-term interests do
1 70
The Nature of the Communi st Bureaucracy
not always coi nci de : the trade uni oni sts, unl i ke the managers,
must preserve a semblance of concern wi tt, the proletariat, for
it i s onl y i nasmuch as they can cl ai m to be 'representati ve' of
the workers that they have any power. However, thei r model
of society - State, property, planni ng, speci ali st control of
the economy, a soci al hi erarchy based on abi l i ty, the subordi na
ti on of man to the i ndustri al machi ne, the i mprovement of
l i vi ng condi ti ons through the production of more consumer
goods, State control of al l social and cultural activi ti es - does
not difer essenti al l y from that of the economi c bureaucracy.
And that is preci sely why both branches of the bureaucracy,
i n France no less than abroad, have the same long-term i n
terests as the bourgeoi si e, and why the Communist Party of
France i s so concerned with what i t chooses to cal l the
'nati onal interest' .
Thi s expl ai ns why the Communist Party i s unable to come
out wi th a real anal ysi s of modern French capital i sm, why
i t di sguises the real issue wi th such red herri ngs as 'personal
power', ' a handful of mul ti mi l l i onai res' and other twaddle -
which onl y serves to disguise thei r community of i nterest wi th
thei r so-called adversar i es. In point of fact, there i s nothi ng
to di sti ngui sh the theses of the Communist Party from, say,
those of the Gaul l ist Left, al bei t the Party di smisses them as
utopian and confused. It does not fght them as such, but
si mpl y argues that the Gaul l ist movement i s incapable of i m
plementi ng them, si nce i t i s the Gaul l ists' ri ght and not the left
wi ng that has the greatest electoral appeal and hence the major
say.
But thi s i s onl y part of the picture. The Communi st Party,
whi ch once represented the revolutionary consci ousness of
the proletari at, has been subject to yet another process of de
generati on : it has become a mere appendage of the Sovi et
bureaucracy. In that rol e i t often comes i nto open confict
wi th the Social Democrati c or Gaulli st bureaucraci es. Thus
when the interests of the Soviet bureaucrats clash wi th those
of thei r capital ist counterparts, the Communi st Party wi l l i n
vari ably mobi l ize the workers agai nst the latter . Conversely,
once the Sovi et bureaucracy has come to terms wi th the
1 71
Stali nist Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle in France
capital ists, the Party wi l l go out of its way to cement thi s
agreement, and stop any working-class acti vi ty that might
jeopardize i t. Duri ng periods of confict the Communi st bureau
crats bandy about revolutionary phrases; duri ng l ul ls they
invariably adopt a patriotic and reactionary tone. It i s only by
grasping these two aspects of the Communist bureaucracy -
self-i nterest and subservience to the Soviet bureaucracy - that
we can hope to understand the pol itical vagaries of the French
Communi st Party from its begi nni ngs to our day.
It i s its attachment to the Sovi et bureaucracy that causes
the Communi st Party of France to adopt an ultra-nati onali st
stance every so often, to be more patri oti c than the patriots,
more fag-wavi ng than even the Gaull ists, the better to defect
the worki ng class from its true objective - the struggle agai nst
the bourgeoi si e and all forms of authority - and to mobi l ize
them against the Soviet bugbear of the moment, be i t ' Revan
chist' Germany, American Imper ial ism, or 'personal power' .
It i s thi s double rol e that dictates thei r day-to- day attitudes
and language, and not some temporary aberration or
treachery, as so many good socialists sti l l l i ke to believe. The
Communist Party of France defends its own interests and only
betrays those who fai l to understand that these interests are
not so much unpatriotic - and who could blame them for
that when the workers have no country? - as unsoci al ist.
Unfortunately, the Party's l i nks wi th the Soviet bureau
cracy have yet another untoward resul t : they play di rectly
i nto the hands of bourgeois propagandists. When deal i ng wi th
Stali nist Russi a, the capitali sts do not have to resort to l ies or
slander - they need only describe the 'soci al ist paradi se' as i t
real l y was : a country of purges, concentration camps, forced
col lectivization and pol ice terror (Cheka, OGPU, NKVD,
or whatever the successive names of thi s permanent i nstitu
ti on may be). There is not a Gaulli st candidate, particularly i f
he is on the left o f the Party or even an ex-Trotskyist mi l itant
l i ke David Roussct, who does not labour this poi nt. As a result,
the bourgeoi si e has an easy time i n dismissing al l working-class
demands as so many attempts to set up a total itarian di ctator
shi p. Thi s i s precisely what the Gaul l ists tri ed to do through-
1 72
The Nature of the Communi st Bureaucracy
out the electoral campai gn. The Communi st Party therefore
al l i ed itsel f with the authori ties in two ways, frstly by prevent
ing the struggl e from assuming revoluti onary di mensi ons,
and secondly by permitti ng the capital ists to raise the bug
bear of Stal i ni sm.
It i s only because of i ts authentic revoluti onary ori gi ns,
because of memori es of what the Russi an Revoluti on was be
fore it became transformed i nto a hi deous bureaucracy, that
the Communist Party of France has been able to keep i ts hol d
on the French worki ng cl ass. Even today the Party conti nues
to publ i sh the works of Marx and of Leni n and of other revo
l uti onari es, even though these wri ti ngs have ceased to have
any beari ng on the Party's practical pol i ci es. It behaves l i ke al l
reformi st bodi es, pl ays the electoral game, adopts the practices
of bourgeoi s democracy, i s deeply i nvolved in the system, and
makes pacts of all sorts wi th capital i sts. It parti ci pates i n
local government whi l e obeyi ng the laws and pri nci ples of
i ts class enemi es; duri ng electi ons, i t speaks wi th a thousand
voices, defendi ng small holdi ngs when i t addresses the pea
sants, petty trade when i t speaks to the shopkeepers, and call
i ng for better condi ti ons i n the army when i t speaks to the
sol di ers . In short, the Party has a theory for purely i nternal
consumpti on, and an electoral pol i cy for external use, and
the two cannot possi bly be reconci led. Now, whi le the electoral
policy has turned the Party into a 'big party', the theory helps
to provi de Party acti vists wi th an i deology - thi s i s i mportant
to them, for in that way alone can they feel superi or to the
Social Democrats who difer from them only in overtly re
ject ing the Marxist-Leni nist l i ne. In short, thi s unsavoury
mi xture of theoreti cal rectitude and electoral compromise
provi des the Party i tself wi th mi l lions of voters, and its mi l i
tants wi th a sense of purpose. Thi s i s the enti re di ference be
tween Stal i nist and Reformist organizati ons, and explai ns why
Communist mi l itants can defend the same pol i cies as the Soci al
Democrats, but wi th the added conviction that they alone are
worki ng for the revoluti on. Thi s fact alone explai ns why the
Party was so vi ol ently hosti l e to the student movement, be
cause the May events brought the profound contradicti ons
173
Stali nist Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle in France
between the conviction of the mi li tants and the poli cy of the
bureaucrats into the open. During relatively peaceful periods
deli berately fostered by the Party - reformist practices can
be justi fed by pointing to the impossi bi l i ty of a truly revol u
tionary alternative, but how can thi s be done duri ng
revolutionary periods? That is why the Party does its utmost to
ensure that no such situation arises, for only thus can it prevent
i ts own mi l i tants from becoming ' i nfected' with the Leftist
virus. Duri ng peaceful periods, the Party bureaucrats can aford
to dismiss Leftist propaganda as the ravings of spli nter groups
with no i nfuence over the masses of workers. In other words
they can claim that the workers wi l l not heed the revolu
ti onary message and that the Party therefore has every ri ght
to disguise i ts 'true' revolutionary intenti ons. But this argu
ment no longer holds during general strikes, when the Leftist
message begins to 'bite' and rank-and-fle Party mi litants
begin to realize that the workers are respondi ng to the very
truths the Party has been at such pai ns to conceal from them.
No wonder then, that, in May 1 968 for i nstance, the Party
leaders were so bitter in their denunciations of Lefti sm! It also
explai ns their peculiar tactics against the Left; ostensibly sti l l
members of a revolutionary and Leninist Party, they could
not attack Leftism for what i t was, and so had perforce to re
sort to l i es and calumny.
In fact, these calumnies were but weak echoes of what they
used to be only a few years ago. Indeed, the language of Mar
chai s was so 'mild' that we wonder why Leon Mauvais, that
great expert on Left-wing deviationi sm, di d not demand hi s
expulsion from the Party, just as he di d i n the case of Andre
Marty, in 1 952. One of the complaints he voiced on that
occasion was that 'Andre Marty's attitude to the Party may be
gauged from the fact that, in the last report he sent to the
Politburo, he referred to Trotskyites not as "Trotskyite rabble"
or as "Trotskyite police spies", which i s our habitual and natural
manner of referring to these individuals, but as the "Trotskyist
International" or even as a "Trotskyist party".' In other words,
the Communist Party 'habitually' smears Leftists (here Trot
skyists) as enemies of the working class. This smear woul d
1 74
The Nature of the Communi st Bureaucracy
never stick were it not that the Communi st rank and fle, accus
tomed as they are to follow orders from the top, have gradually
been robbed of their criti cal faculties. Let us see how thi s hap
pens in practice, particularly i n the Communi st trade uni ons.
The Communist trade uni on bureacracy cannot, of course,
aford to use open vi olence against the workers whom, after
all, they are supposed to represent, but must wheedle them
i nto acti ng agai nst their own i nterests, for i nstance in cal l i ng
of a stri ke.
There are, admi ttedly, occasions when the trade uni on
bosses throw thei r normal caution to the wi nd and try to i m
pose thei r wi l l by force, but these are the excepti on: such
methods i nvariably recoi l and lose them the support of large
numbers of mi l i tants. Hence the bureaucrats prefer to save
their vi olence for i ndi vi duals whom they frst isolate from the
mass of workers. For the rest they try to cow al l opposi ti on
wi th a whol e armoury of tri cks and ruses. These they can play
the more easi ly, as the workers are kept i n complete ignorance
of what i s happeni ng at the top.
Not that t he workers themselves fully accept this si tuation.
In periods of i ndustri al peace, they simply stay away from
uni on meeti ngs and take no i nterest in a pol i cy that i s obvi ously
not tai lored to their needs, but duri ng crises, they come up
di rectly agai nst the wi ll of the bureaucracy. In fact, the class
struggle conti nues at al l ti mes and expresses i tself i n a vari ety
of forms rangi ng from passive resistance to wi ldcat strikes
either against a particular employer or in sol idarity wi th other
workers. Now, once a group of workers wants to go on strike
they are expected to pass through the normal trade uni on
channels, and i f the trade uni on does not approve - and i t
rarel y approves of any stri ke that i t has not called i tself - i t
wi l l try t o put up every possi ble obstacle, wi th the result that,
unless mi l l i ons of workers are determi ned to stri ke at one
ti me, the struggle remai ns purel y l ocal and generally fzzles out.
To frustrate a stri ke, al l the bureaucracy need normally do i s
to refuse to i ssue di rectives, and then si t back and watch i t di e.
In a factory, the shop-steward faced wi th a demand for stri ke
action wi l l accordi ngl y do nothi ng at al l , hoping for the pres-
1 75
Stal i nist Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle i n France
sure to subsi de. If it does not, he will eventual ly call a meeti ng
and adopt a completely passive attitude. Thi s takes the
workers, who are accustomed to i nstructions from above, com
pletely by surprise and helps to shake those who are sti l l un
decided. ('The shop-steward i s obviously not i nterested, so we
are bound to fai l .') If the 'rabid' elements sti l l persist, a secret
vote is called for, and such votes i nvariably favour the most
conservative elements. True, i n a police state, the secret vote
i s a guarantee of democracy, but among comrades all i t
guarantees i s anonymity for the weakl i ngs.
Generally, at this stage, the bureaucracy carri es the day -
the workers do not feel strong enough to start a stri ke wi thout
the support of thei r union. But i f even this tactic fai ls, the
bureaucrats have yet another card up their sleeve : they preach
defeatism and try to undermine the workers' morale.
To begi n wi th, they wi l l try the trusted ol d policy of di vi de
and rule: 'You may go on strike, but the rest won' t fol low
you, despite al l their promises. They are sure to leave you i n
the lurch.' Or : 'It's easy for you to go on stri ke, but then you
don't have any chi ldren to feed . . . .' Or agai n: ' If you're so
keen on this strike, why weren't you i n the last one? ' One group
of workers is tol d that the rest have already gone back to
work when, in fact, they have not - a tactic that, as we saw,
proved most efective in breaking the stri ke of the Paris trans
port workers in June 1 968. And what real chance have the
workers of catching them out in time, when only the ofcials
have the right to enter other factories, to see for themselves?
Financial pressure i s brought to bear on the workers as well
- everyone knows that, just when they are most needed, the
soli darity funds are i nvariably at their lowest.
And once the workers have been brought to their knees by
al l these manoeuvres, the blame is thrown on them.
In fact, their demoralization is mai ntained by the bureau
crats who have a vested i nterest i n relegating the workers to
the role of mere puppets, a fock of trained sheep who bleat
when they are tol d to do so, and at no other ti me. Under no
circumstances must they be al lowed to have any say i n the
afairs of 'thei r' trade unions.
1 76
The Nature of the Communi st Bureaucracy
The shop- stewards, for example, who, in pri ncipl e, are sup
posed to be l i nks not only between workers and management
but also between workers and thei r trade uni ons, are, i n fact,
so many mouthpi eces for the bureaucracy. In thei r deali ngs
wi th thei r workers or the management, the shop-stewards never
take their orders di rectly from the workers but from thei r
trade uni on bosses. They are not chosen freely by the workers
from the most mi l i tant among thei r own ranks, but from a l i st
of names submi tted by the uni on. It goes wi thout sayi ng that
those on the list are never put there for thei r revol uti onary
ardour or for the trust thei r fellow-workers have i n them. Nor
do the candi dates necessari ly come from the shop foor they
are supposed to represent; some shops may have several shop
stewards whi l e others have complete strangers or none at al l .
Thi s si tuati on
.
gi ves the trade uni on the strictest control over
the shop-stewards, and prevents the workers from pressi ng
thei r own cl ai ms. In efect, the shop-stewards represent thei r
union rather than the workers.
Si nce he does not represent them, and does not have to be
thei r spokesman, the shop-steward does not have to tel l them
what has been agreed in the manager's ofce, let alone ask
thei r opi ni on before he goes up.
And shoul d he be fool i sh enough to go agai nst the wi shes
of the bureaucrats and consult the workers al l the same, hi s
name i s certai n to be absent from the l i st of candi dates at
the next electi on.
The trade uni on bureaucrats take a si mi larly hi gh- handed
atti tude when i t comes to the publi cati on of factory magazi nes.
Most of the arti cles are general propaganda for the current
pol i ci es of the CGT; for the rest they consi st of ti tbits, i nter
uni on di sputes, and personal recri mi nati ons. These papers i n
no way represent the i nterests or refect the preoccupations
of the workers; at best they refect the quarrels of their self
appoi nted leaders. Thus, whenever the workers take i ndepen
dent acti on, for example by stri ki ng, hol di ng spontaneous
meetings, or by el ecti ng action committees, the factory press
passes over the matter in complete si lence. That is why a
revoluti onary movement must do everythi ng i t can to en-
1 77
Stali nist Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle in France
courage the workers to express their own views on their own
struggle and their own problems. We must create a workers'
press that wi l l be something more than a mouthpiece of the
trade union bureaucracy.
It is during shop and factory meetings that the workers
make their wishes known most clearly, especially when such
meetings are called for the purpose of taking concrete acti on.
Now si nce such meetings often arrive at conclusions that are
opposed to trade union policy, and since the shop-stewards
can rarely prevent them from being called, the leaders keep i n
reserve for such occasions a whole battery o f outsi de speakers
and demagogues, trade uni on specialists. Some of these men
are well-known publi c fgures (which di d not prevent the
Renaul t workers from booing Seguy), others are ski lled pol i
ti ci ans who know how to 'handle the masses', that is, to brow
beat them. In the presence of such men, the workers generally
refuse to say anything; the meeting turns from a discussion
i nto a monologue, the more so as the hall is generally arranged
i n such a way as to make it more difcult for anyone but the
ofcial speaker to make himself heard. The other 'ofcials' on
the platform can add their bit whenever they feel l ike it, but
the worker i n the body of the hall must frst get up and move
conspicuously and laboriously across the foor, before he can
have his say - if the chairman lets him, that i s. If he is known
as a 'trouble-maker' he wil l generally be called right at the
end or ri ght at the beginning of the meeting, only to be cut
down by the professionals, and thi s in such scathing terms that
few others wi l l care to carry on where he left of. And at the
earliest opportunity, the platform wi l l generally see to it that
the ori gi nal purpose of the meeting is forgotten and treat the
audience to a homily on general trade union policy.
But i t may happen that the speaker, eloquent though he i s,
fai l s to carry the men wi th hi m. In that case, the bureaucrats
wi l l cal l for another meeting, thi s time at Uni on headquarters.
Now if the workers fnd it difcult enough to make themselves
heard on the shop foor, they get no chance at al l when faced
wi th a whol e bevy of yes-men, loudly applauding the ofcial
view, and shouting down any opposi ti on. These meetings, more-
1 78
The Nature of the Communi st Bureaucracy
over, take place after worki ng hours, and many workers who
l i ve far away, or have fami l i es, cannot attend.
Wi th such tactics i t i s not very di fcult to engi neer
majori ties, so it is imperative that the workers i nsist on hol d
i ng al l meetings at thei r place of work and preferably duri ng
worki ng hours. Here the workers must feel free to speak thei r
mi nds, and the ti me al located to outsiders must be strictly
l i mi ted. As it i s, at the least sign of trouble, trade uni on pon
tifs i nvade the factory and monopolize the ti me by mouthi ng
the same ol d plati tudes, wi th the result that the workers get
utterly bored and stay away - they have heard i t al l before. To
preserve a semblance of democracy, the workers are often
asked to vote on moti ons hasti ly read out after the meeti ng.
Now this they shoul d never permit; they must i nsist that every
vote be preceded by a debate and that sufci ent advance noti ce
be gi ven to al low them to di scuss i t between themsel ves. More
over, they must be at l i berty to scruti nize the results, and also
see to it that resolutions runni ng counter to the bureaucrats'
wi shes do not get conveni ently forgotten, as happens only too
often. Thus, i n Apri l 1 953, when the 4CV assembly shop at
Renault's went on strike, and al l the other branches wanted
to come out in sympathy, the bureaucrats held a referendum
but kept the results to themselves. The i nference i s obvi ous.
In short, the trade uni ons have become completely al ienated
from the workers. As a result, the workers have also lost faith
not onl y in the trade uni ons, whi ch they are ful l y justifed to
do, but have grown sceptical of all worki ng-cl ass movements.
Now thi s si tuation wi l l continue unti l such ti me as the
workers decide to take charge of their own destiny, unti l they
refuse to delegate their powers to any set of bureaucrats. The
workers' struggle agai nst the exploi ters is automatically a
struggle agai nst the trade uni on bureaucracy, si nce the two i n
vari ably work hand i n glove - thi s, as I have tri ed to show,
became particularly obvi ous duri ng May and June 1 968. Inas
much as the struggle against capital ism and the State is a
struggl e for freedom and self-government, i ts objectives can
clearly not be achi eved wi th the hel p of organizati ons whose
very structure is designed to thwart them. Hence, i f the workers
1 79
Stal i nist Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle in France
want to run society, they must frst learn to fght their own
battles.
What happens if they do not is best shown by the role of the
French Communist Party and the CGT during these past thirty
years.
A particularly good i l lustration i s the Popular Front, an
al l i ance between Communists, Soci al Democrats and Radicals
in the name of anti-Fascism. It was under the Popular Front
that the Tricolour frst made its appearance at Communist
demonstrations. In 1 934, the Soviet bureaucracy suddenly
realized that its sectarian disdain of 'other progressives' over
the past six years had been a serious error . Hi tler' s ri se to
power posed a direct threat to the Soviet Union, and to avert
i t, Stali n decided to al l y hi mself with the Western democracies.
Accordingly, men who had been described as 'social traitors',
worse enemies of the working class than even the Fascists,
overnight became comrades, true friends who must not be
cri ticized under any ci rcumstances. And i n fact, so successful
was this policy that the 'Left' won the French elections of
3 May 1 936. Trade union unity was also achi eved i n that year:
at the Congress of Toulouse hel d i n March. Hence al l the con
di tions the Communist Party thinks necessary for revolutionary
action even today were realized i n 1 936: pol i tical uni ty of the
Left, unity of the trade unions, electoral victory.
Simultaneously strikes broke out all over the country, and
i t was once agai n an aeroplane factory that the workers frst
occupied: Breguet i n Le Havre. This particular stay- i n was
in protest against the dismissal of workers who had partici
pated i n the May Day demonstrati on. The strikes spread
rapidly to Toulouse and Paris, and on 28 May, the entire car
i ndustry came out. The strength of the movement may be
gathered from the fact that, on Whit-Sunday, 600,000 people
marched to the Mur des Federes, to pay homage to the heroes
of the 1 871 Commune. More and more workers now joi ned
the strike movement. On 4 June, the Left formed a new govern
ment under Leon Blum, leader of the Socialists. The Commu
ni st Party itself did not join the government but gave it ful l
support. As for their attitude to the strikes, we can do no
1 80
The Nature of the Communi st Bureaucracy
better than quote Montreui l : ' Di rect observation enables me
to defne the part played by the trade uni ons i n thi s stri ke.
Most of them neither desired nor called thi s stri ke, i n ful l
accord wi th the deci si ons taken at the recent Congress of
Toulouse. It would seem that the leadi ng mi l i tants mi sjudged
the strength of the ri si ng ti de. This movement was born i n the
mysteri ous depths of the l abouri ng masses.'
' Mysteri ous' only to the Soci al Democratic hi stori an Lefranc,
alias Montreui l . In any case, there was no mystery as to the
manner i n which the trade uni ons once agai n tri ed to steer
the stri ke i nto safer channels.
'We have seen,' wrote Marchai s, 'how the trade uni on
leaders, more prudent than thei r men, were abl e to restrai n
them duri ng the turbulent days of 1 936. ' And Lefranc once
more: ' The Trade Uni on Movement was a powerful force for
order. ' How ri ght he was i s borne out by the fact that the
largest number of workers came out in those i ndustri es where
trade uni on membership was lowest: foundri es, 4 per cent
membershi p; texti les, 5 per cent; food i ndustry, 3 per cent. By
contrast, the rai lways, wi th a 22 per cent trade uni on member
shi p; the Post Ofce, wi th 44 per cent; the ci vi l servi ce, wi th
36 per cent; and the teachers, wi th 44 per cent, played a very
small part i n the stri kes. On 7 June, the employers, the govern
ment and the trade uni ons met and si gned the Mati gnon agree
ment. It provi ded for ( I ) wage i ncreases of from 7 per cent to
1 5 per cent; ( 2) col l ective bargai ni ng; ( 3) trade uni on repre
sentati on in all factories; ( 4) the election of shop-stewards.
The government added two weeks of hol iday with pay and a
forty- hour week.
But, as i n 1 968, the stri kes di d not stop, and the CGT began
to cajol e the workers. 'The CGT representati ves explai ned to
Richemond, representi ng the employers: "We promi se to do
al l we can, but faced wi th a ti de l i ke the present, the best
thi ng we can do i s to gi ve it ti me to subsi de. Perhaps now you
wi l l real i ze your mistake i n r i ddi ng your factories of trade
uni on mi l itants duri ng the years of depressi on and unemploy
ment. There is no one left wi th enough authori ty to get the
comrades to take orders. " And I can sti ll see Ri chemond, who
1 81
Stali ni st Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle i n France
was sitti ng on my left, lower hi s head and say: "I agree, we've
made a terri bl e mistake" ' (Leon Blum) .
From the begi nni ng of the 1 936 stri ke wave, the Trotskyists,
the Anarchists, the Revolutionary Syndicali sts, and Marceau
Pivert's Soci al Revolutionaries, grasped the revolutionary
potenti al of the si tuati on. ' Everything i s possible,' Marceau
Pivert wrote on 24 May. 'What the collective consciousness of
mi l l ions and mi l l ions of men and women cries out for i s a
radical and speedy transformation of the poli ti cal and
economic situation . . . The masses are much more advanced
than people think . . . They expect a great deal; they are not
content wi th the i nsipid brew as of camomi l e tea whi ch i s
being dished up to them . . . No, what they want i s deep sur
gery, for they know that capitalist society is mortally sick . . .'
No wonder that the Communi sts denounced the Left as the
worst enemy of the worki ng class, and that the government,
with the full support of the Party, banned the Trotskyist Lutte
communiste.
On 1 1 June, Maurice Thorez told a meeting i n the Jean Jaures
High School: 'You have to know how to stop a stri ke once al l
the claims have been met. You must even know how to com
promi se over some of the less essential claims which have not
yet been met. You can't always have your cake and eat i t. '
And from the moment they entered the Popular Front, the
Communists even di scouraged all attempts to broach the sub
ject of nationalization; i ndeed they opposed Leon Bl um's
SFIO, which i ncluded nationalization i n i ts election pro
gramme, on the grounds that the conditions were not yet ri pe.
Frachon had this to say i n L'Humanite of 1 7 January 1 936:
'To clai m that i t [nationalization] i s a simple matter, a basic
demand that must be met, is merely to raise false hopes among
the workers.' In fact, the only concern of the Communi st Party
was not to annoy the bourgeoi sie, lest i t jeopardize the Laval
Stal i n pact of 1 935. The i nterests of the Soviet bureaucracy
come before the i nterests of the workers at al l times. Hence
the address sent by the Central Committee of the Party to Presi
dent Daladier on the eve of the Radical Congress at Bi arri tz
i n October 1 936: ' Your great party, which has played so i m-
1 82
The Nature of the Communi st Bureaucracy
portant a rol e i n the hi story of the Third Republic, can rightly
pri de itsel f on i ts close li nks with the French mi ddl e classes
. . . The workers, so proud of their ski l l s and so magnifcent
i n their professi onal dignity, have every desire to make com
mon cause wi th the peasants, whose rude l abour has done so
much to make France the great country she i s, and with the
middle classes, whi ch embody the magnifcent qual i ti es of
labour and thrift. Li ke you, we thi nk that public order is i n
dispensabl e . . . Publi c order demands respect for the law, and
that is why we are al l agreed in i nsisting that the laws be
respected by all, no l ess than private property, the frui t of
labour and of thri ft . . . Al l we desire for our country i s order
and prosperity . . . We want a future i nspired by the glorious
traditions of the past and we are in no way upset when we are
reproached for . . . havi ng restored the Marsei l lai se to i ts ol d
popularity.'
The same i nsi stence on order, respect for private property
and nati onal i sm was persistently sounded in L' Humanite,
which kept congratulati ng i tself on its part in cementing
nati onal uni ty. Thus Paul Vai llant-Couturier wrote i n the i ssue
of I I Jul y I 936: ' Our party has not fallen from the sky, but
stands frmly rooted i n the soi l of France. The names of our
leadi ng fghters have strong and deep l i nks with our land; we
follow i n the footsteps of hi story. The reason why our mes
sage i s so well received by the people . . . i s because i t cal ls to
something deep within them, something specifcally French . . .
I n a
.
country so strongly, and sometimes so dangerously, i n
di vi duali sti c as ours, a sense of discipline and love of order are
badly needed to restore balance and proporti on. Our party,
by i ts deep attachment to moral and cul tural values . . . by its
good sense, i ts exaltati on of labour, and its love of cl arity, has
earned i ts r ightful place i n the eternal l ife of France. '
No journal of the Ri ght, or even of the extreme Ri ght, could
have sai d i t better. And thi s is the kind of prose a 'proletari an'
Party sees ft to hurl at the worki ng class, this i s the Leni ni sm
of Stal i n and Thorez!
And what was the upshot of al l their collaboration wi th the
class enemy? In June I 937, Bl um resigned. On I January I 938,
1 83
Stal i nist Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle i n France
prices went up by 50 per cent (index based on 1 3 household
articles) or 48 per cent (i ndex based on 29 food products).
Moreover, by i ts poli cy of non-i ntervention, the French
Popular Front had allowed the Spanish Revolution to be
crushed. Strikes broke out almost everywhere, once agai n
agai nst the wi shes of the CGT, but thi s ti me wi thout thei r old
defant spiri t . As an observer, J. P. Maxence, put i t: ' They no
longer had the same drive [as in 1 936], no longer the same sense
of purpose. Gone was the old unanimity, the old elan, the good
humour, the readiness to brave all legal sancti ons. In a space
of si x months, the spi ri t of the working class had been weak
ened, and crushed.'
And so the Chamber, which sti ll had a Leftist majority of
thi rty-si x, went on to approve of the Muni ch agreement and,
i n 1 940, meekly handed itself over to Marshal Petai n. That i s
what happens when the working class i s diverted from its true
path, when it is forced to make 'reasonable' compromises, when
i t is mi sled i nto thinking that capitalism is a reli abl e al ly
against, and not the mainspring of, Fascism and war. In 1 936,
before the strikes, the Metal Workers' Uni on had a member
ship of only 50,000 and the stri ke was general . Afterwards, the
membership rose to 775,000, but four years later, in May 1 940,
it dropped to a mere 30,000. This refects the ri se and fall of
just one working-class organization under the tutelage of
Social Democratic and Communi st bureaucrats.
As for the Communists, their polici es, or rather their tech
nique of blowing hot and cold by turns, continue to this day.
Much as the Popular Front policy was determined by the
Laval - Stalin pact, and the consequent rapprochement between
the Soviet and the Western bourgeois democracies, so Com
munist policy i n 1 939-1 was determi ned by the Hi tler-Stali n
pact whi ch came l i ke a thunderbol t from out of the blue. For
years, the Party had inveighed against Germany wi th chauvi n
i sti c ardour; now the declared enemy was once agai n the
French bourgeoisie and Anglo-Saxon imperi ali sm. The war
whi ch had been brewing for years was no longer the battle of
democracy against Fascism, but an imperialist war i n whi ch
the workers had no stake. If this had been the language i n
1 84
The Nature of the Communi st Bureaucracy
1 936, at a ti me when the workers held the factori es, then, yes,
it woul d have been revolutionary, and the whol e history, not
only of France, but of Europe, might have taken a diferent
course. But coming when it did, it was merely a cheap means
of whi tewashi ng the Hi tl er pact, and anything but revoluti onary.
Not surpri si ngly, the very nati onali sm the Party had
preached so enthusi asti cally now rebounded on i ts own head.
In 1 939, the CGT, or rather what was l eft of i t, once agai n
spli t i nto two, one section rallying to the support of the bour
geoisi e as it had done in 1 9 1 4, the other to the support of the
Sovi et bureaucracy. Then, after the collapse of France, when
the bourgeoi si e i tself split i nto two factions, one behi nd Petai n
and Germany, and the other behi nd General de Gaul l e and
French nationali sm, the Communists concentrated all thei r fre
on de Gaulle, that ' agent of the London Bankers' . Accordi ng
to a Party proclamati on: 'The nati on does not wi sh to see
France a slave of Bri ti sh Imperi al i sm. ' In January 1 941 , de
Gaul l e was sti l l 'the al ly of the reactionary Engl i sh government
of lords and bankers' . I do not quote these attacks on de Gaul l e
wi th i ndignati on, because they were perfectly correct i n them
selves, but si mply to show that, i nstead of directing i ts venom
at the bourgeoisie as a whol e, i .e. against Petain and de Gaul l e,
the Party si ngl ed out one and conveni entl y forgot the other and,
i nci dental ly, the horrors of German Fasci sm. Indeed, such was
the logic of thei r positi on that they felt entitled to peti tion
the German authori ti es for permi SSI On to re-publ i sh
L' Humanite. And i t was not unti l after June 1 941 , i .e. after
Hi tler attacked the U.S.S. R., that the Communi sts joi ned the
French Resi stance. Then, suddenly, de Gaul l e was no longer
an agent of AngloSaxon i mperi al i sm, but an ally in the great
struggle of Democracy (with a capital D) agai nst Fasci sm
(with a capital F). Once agai n chauvi nism was the order of the
day, wi th such slogans as ' Ki l l yourself a Bache today' . Thi s
was a ti me when the Party denounced, even deli vered over to
the Gestapo, a host of Leftists who refused to be drawn i nto
the struggl e. Thi s was also the epoch when numerous French
i ntel lectual s joi ned the Communi st Party, and when thousands
of workers who refused to do labour servi ce i n Germany
1 85
Stal i ni st Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle i n France
joined the Communist Resistance, so that the Party recovered
part of the strength it had lost i n 1 939-41 . Moreover, the
prestige of the Communist Resistance, the title of 'Party of
Martyrs', the renown of the 'glorious Soviet armies' brought
the Communists hundreds of thousands of new sympathizers,
who hoped not only to see the end of the war but also a radical
change i n society. The strength of the Party was refected by
the slogan 'Towards the Mil l i onth Member' . In 1 945, the Party
received fve mi l l ion votes and could send 1 6 1 deputies to the
Chamber; the bourgeoi si e, compromised by i ts collaboration
with the enemy, was weak as never before
.
Moreover, the
workers were armed, and ready to impose their wi l l . But noth
i ng at all happened, nothi ng changed, except that the Com
muni st Party was i n the government, that Thorez was Vice
Premier, Croizat Mi ni ster of Labour, Till on Mi ni ster of Avi a
tion. A coalition government with the SFIO, the MRP, and
General de Gaulle! The explanati on of this new bit of class
col laboration was found in the Yalta and Potsdam agreements
by which the world had been shared out between the Ameri
cans, now the dominant capitalist country, and the Stali nist
bureaucracy. Al l Communi st parties in the West were ex
pected to ensure that nothi ng happened to upset the new apple
cart. Thorez disarmed the workers' mi li ti a and tol d the Ivry
Central Commi ttee on 21 January 1 945 that the Party favoured
' one state, one army, one police'. This was the time when the
notorious CRS frst saw the light of day, fathered by a
Socialist Mi ni ster, blessed by a Communist Vice-Premier, and
hugged to the bosom of General de Gaul l e. The reconstruc
ti on of the national (read capitali st) economy became the chi ef
plank i n the new Communist platform, and the call for social
ism was whi ttled down i nto a cal l for the nationalization of
i solated sectors of the economy. 'Productivi ty, higher produc
ti vi ty and stil l hi gher productivity, that is your highest class
duty,' Thorez told a miners' meeting in Waziers on 21 July
1 945. In the same speech he also sai d : 'It is quite true that we
alone, we Communists, had the authority to end the strikes i n
June 1 936, that we alone had the authority to say fve months
ago : "Let us put an end to the si l ly ci vi l-war game! " ' It was
1 86
The Nature of the Communist Bureaucracy
a Communi st Mi ni ster who i ntroduced all sorts of i ncentives
to force the workers to i ncrease producti on. And Comrade
Duguet told the 1 946 CGT Congress that stri kes were of
beneft onl y t o t he trusts - t he latest theoretical di scovery of
Marxi sm-Leni ni sm-Stal i ni sm! Fraternally uni ted wi th the
Soci al Democrats, the Communists put all the pressure they
could on the prol etariat.
The year 1 945 al so saw the begi nni ng of the col oni al
struggl e. On the subject of the uprising i n Seti f (Algeria) Leon
Fai x, the great Party speci al ist on coloni al questi ons, came
out wi th the fol lowi ng pronouncement : ' It i s hi ghl y si gnifcant
that the chief tool s of the coloni al oppressors should be the
MTLD ( Movement for the Tri umph of Democratic Li berti es)
and the PPA (Al geri an Popular Party) under Messal i Hadj and
hi s thugs, who now cl amour so loudly for i ndependence but
di d nothi ng and sai d nothing when France was under the heel
of the Nazi s. These troubl emakers ought to be taught a l esson
they wi l l not forget' (L'Humanite, 1 2 May 1 945) . Faix's voi ce
was heard : 40,000 Algeri ans died under the bombs of the
French Ai r Force on the orders of the Communi st Charles
Ti l l on.
But even whi l e the Communists were abl e to teach the
Algeri an workers a lesson, the French workers, exhausted by
their producti ve efort and lack of food, and di si l lusi oned by
the whole post-war pol i tical scene, dri fted away i n increasing
numbers, not only from the Party but also from the CGT.
The year 1 947 hastened thi s process even further. In Apri l, a
strike broke out i n the very basti on of the Uni ted Metal
Workers, in Renault- Bi l lancourt, and hard though the Stal i n
i st bureaucracy tri ed to break the stri ke by cal umni es and
vi olence, the workers stood frm. Then, on the ni ght of 30
Apri l , the Party bosses di d one of their perenni al qui ck change
acts : unabl e to smash the stri ke from without, they decided
to lead it and exhaust i t from wi thi n. They were even pre
pared to pay a high pri ce : they left the government and cal led
for an end to the wage freeze. But thei r basic purpose was
still to end the stri ke and, above all, to stop i t from spreadi ng
further. On 26 November, whi l e the Cold War had al ready
1 87
Stal i nist Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle in France
begun, La Vie Ouvriere, the organ of the CGT, sti l l saw ft to
proclai m: 'It is a fact that for the past two and a hal f years,
France has been the capitalist country with the least number
of strikes. The reason is quite simple. The workers don't
stri ke for fun. When their clai ms are met, they are quite con
tent to go on working. That i s precisely what happened i n
1 945-1 946, when Croizat and other Communists were Mi n
isters.'
And si nce the capitalist system is able to meet all the cl ai ms
of the working class (another great Marxist-Leni ni st dis
covery, thi s! ), provided only a handful of Communi sts are i n
the Cabinet, why bother about soci alism? And what was i t but
sheer ingratitude that could have made the Renault workers
go on strike under these ci rcumstances? Clearly they had been
egged on by Left adventurists, the same people who were
causing so much trouble i n Algeria, no doubt on the orders
of the white reactionaries, the colons.
But i t was once again a change i n the international situation,
and not the discontent of the workers, that caused the Com
muni st Party to change its strategy. On 1 2 March 1 947, Presi
dent Truman presented the U.S. Congress with the famous
doctrine that bears hi s name. The Uni ted States would help
all countries threatened by and anxious to resist armed
mi norities. On 5 June 1 947, General Marshal l , speaking at
Harvard, put forward hi s plan for the rehabi l i tation of war
shattered Europe. On 27 June, Bevi n, Bidot and Molotov
met in Paris to decide what precisely Europe was in need of.
Molotov warned - as Bevi n dul y reported to the House of
Commons whi le Bi dot sai d nothing at all - that i f American
aid were accepted there would be a complete spl i t between
East and West. In September of that year, Communi st parties
from all over Europe assembled in Warsaw, founded the
Cominform, a bastardized substitute for the Third Inter
national which had been dissolved by Moscow during the war.
Zhdanov used the opportunity to present the assembled dele
gates with a new Tables of the Law, appropriate to a world
divided i nto two blocs. He rounded on the French Com
munist Party for its participation in the government when i n
1 88
The Nature of the Communi st Bureaucracy
fact it had done no more than apply the old Moscow l i ne. On
thei r return home, the French delegates i mmediately tri ed to
repai r the damage. They not only produced a new i deology
but, what was far more di fcult, wi thdrew from the govern
ment, nati onal and provi nci al , and from thei r cushy jobs i n
the nati onal ized i ndustri es, whi ch they had enjoyed si n
c
e 1 945 .
In thi s, they were greatly helped by the new wave of stri kes that
swept France i n November-December 1 947. On 1 0 November,
the Marsei l l es branch of the Communi st Party organi zed a
demonstrati on agai nst the rise i n tram fares. Fi ve demon
strators were arrested, and sentenced to twelve months' i m
pri sonment each. The enraged workers massed outsi de the
court, smashed through the barriers, and were pl ai nl y in an
ugl y mood. The CRS was called i n but refused to march
agai nst the demonstrators (present-day members of the CRS
please note) .
The Mayor, a member of the RPF (a precursor of the Gaul
l i st Party), was wounded. Throughout the ni ght there were
fghts between RPF supporters and the workers, in the course
of which one young Communi st was ki l l ed. Clearly, when i t
comes t o acti ng i n the i nterests of the Sovi et bureaucracy, the
Communi st Party fears nei ther vi olence nor 'provocati on' . By
next morni ng Marsei l les was i n the throes of a general stri ke.
Worki ng- class resentment was al so i ntense i n the Northern
col l i eri es. Driven l i ke slaves by the Germans and their
French henchmen throughout the war, the mi ners had hoped
that after the Li berati on, conditions would greatly i mprove
and, i n particul ar, that they woul d be al lowed to return to
their old custom of worki ng col lectively and shari ng their pay.
Thei r tradi ti on was one of mutual ai d, soci al justi ce and sol i
dari ty. But not onl y had the French slave dri vers been kept on,
but Thorez hi mself had come t o address t he mi ners on the
advantages of ' i ndi vi dual work' , and of competi ng wi th one
another i n separate seams i n the mi nes. Al l thi s had del i ghted
the former managers, who had been shaki ng i n thei r boots,
certai n that the day of retri buti on was near. Hence the man
agers went out of thei r way to please thei r new masters :
trade uni onists and pol i ti ci ans who had j umped up from no-
1 89
Stal i nist Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle in France
where after the nationalization of the mines. Now it was only
when one of these newcomers, the Communist boss of the
Mi neworkers' Union, Delfosse, was di smissed by Pi erre
Lacoste, the new Mi ni ster of Production, from his post in the
Mi ne Board - to which he had been appointed by the former
Mi ni ster - that the Communist Party saw ft to do what it had
not done on behalf of the sorely oppressed mi ners - it called
for a strike. By 1 7 November one-third of the workers was
out.
In Paris, some hundred-thousand metal-workers came out
on 19 November. In the CGT, Communists and Reformists
were at loggerheads. The latter fought against the 'pol iticiza
tion' of the trade unions, i .e. against thei r being made i nstru
ments of Communist policy, and when the Communi sts used
the twenty trade uni ons under their control to form a nat
ional strike committee, led by Frachon, the Social Democrats
thought it was hi gh time to break away.
From 29 November to 9 December, the strikes became more
and more violent. During the night of 2 December, the Paris
Arras train was derailed - the rails had been torn up over a
distance of some twenty-fve yards, ald sixteen people were
ki ll ed. 'Fascist provocation', L'Jumanite wrote; 'Communist
sabotage', repl ied the Right. The government prepared to
clear the mi ners out of the northern coll ieries, and the workers
put up a bi tter resistance. Then, quite suddenly, on 9 Decem
ber, the National Strike Committee ordered the str ike to end.
Why had they called i t i n the frst i nstance? Some have alleged
that i t was part of a serious attempt to seize power, but one
who ought to know best, Jules Mach, the then Mi nister of
the Interior, told British and American journal ists on
1 8 February: ' Were the strikes a sign of an i nsurrectionist
movement? I, for one, do not thi nk so. The documents i n our
possession show that the Communi st tactics were much more
subtle than that. They had orders to cause trouble in all areas
benefting from American ai d, but not to prepare for a Revo
luti on. ' In efect, as Frachon declared in L'Humanite on
7 December, 'the CGT never gave the order for a general
stri ke'. And, i ndeed, they pi tched their demands very low. In
190
The Nature of the Communi st Bureaucracy
short, they did not so much want to embarrass the govern
ment, as simply to show that no government could function
without them. At the same ti me they tried to ti p of the Am
eri can senators, who had come to study condi t ions on the
spot, that they were about to waste their preci ous ai d on a
country that was i n danger of becomi ng Communist . The
Soci al Democrats, for thei r part, stepped up repressive
measures against the workers to show the Ameri cans that
no such danger existed, and there was, i n fact, a power
ful 'third force' - neither Communi st nor Gaul l ist. In the
event, Jules Moch and the Atlantic al l iance tri umphed. As
for the workers, they had once agai n been pawns i n a power
struggle between East and West - nobody gave a damn
for their real i nterests. And when, in 1 948, the trade-uni on
movement spl i t up i nto the pro-Ameri can FO and the pro
Sovi et CGT, the workers withdrew from both in i ncreasing
numbers.
On the i nternational scene, the years 1 947 and 1 948 saw the
consol i dati on of capital ist power in the West and of bureau
cratic power i n the East. Much as the Communi sts were
thrown out of the French government, so the Soci al Demo
crats were ki cked out of Prague (i n March 1 948) . At about the
same ti me the Greek partisans were subdued wi th American
help. The ri ft between the two blocs was practically com
plete, and although the Sovi et bureaucracy had powerful
al l ies i n the Communist parties of the West, it was harassed by
di visions and spl i ts among its own satel li tes, which cul mi nated
i n Stal i n' s open break wi th Tito. After Germany Korea was
cut r ight through the middle. The Cold War had begun to hot
up. From 1 947 to 1 952, the French Communi st Party led
the nati on i nto a host of anti - American battles, but si nce i t
tri ed to carry a l l sections of the population wi th i t and
fought under the banner of 'national i ndependence', i t avoi ded
causi ng any embarrassment to the patriotic bosses. In other
words, the Communist Party took a very hard line on i nter
national politics and a very soft one when i t came to the
demands of the worki ng class. As a result, i ts numbers
dwi ndl ed even further, so much so that when Duclos was
1 9 1
Stal i nist Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle in France
arrested during demonstrations against U.S. i nterventi on i n
Korea, the workers barely raised a voice i n protest.
Yet as the Cold War continued, both sides realized that the
workers woul d not stand for another world war and the i n
creased exploitation i t woul d have entai l ed, and accordi ngl y
tried to arrive at some sort of settlement. The 'thaw' began
with the end of the Korean confi ct. The year 1 953 brought
the uprising of the workers i n East Berl i n, and a new, al most
general , wave of strikes in France - workers i n the East and
i n the West al ike were afrming their i ndependence. In France,
the 1 953 strikes were quite spontaneous and, once agai n, had
the trade-uni on bureaucrats hopping mad. And once agai n
they succeeded in squashing them. But what they fai l ed to
squash was the workers' growing consciousness of their own
strength, a consciousness that cul mi nated in the explosive
events of May I June 1 968.
In 1 956, the ri ft between the workers and the Party bureau
cracy was widened sti l l further. The year had begun wi th the
election victory of the Left, which had promised to put an end
to the Algerian war. But the war not only continued; it was i n
tensifed. Guy Mol l et was greeted with a shower of tomatoes
in Algeria and capitulated to the colons. The Communist
Party nevertheless saw ft to vote him special powers, i n order
to strengthen his hand against - the Right (sic! ) . As a result,
opposition to the war, ri fe throughout France, had to be or
ganized by the people themselves, and came to a head when a
group of conscripts about to be packed of to Algeria barri
caded themselves i n, and later stopped the trains by constantly
pul l i ng the communication cords. The Communi st Party
washed its hands of the whole issue. On the one hand it did
not want to break wi th the Soci al Democrats and so was pre
pared to sacrifce the Algerians together with the rebel l i ous
conscripts; on the other hand i t was sti l l opposed to the i n
dependence of Algeria and called for a 'true partnership wi th
France' as a means of preventing Algeria from fal l i ng i nto the
hands of the American Imperial ists. Needless to say, al l this
di d was to strengthen the hand of French imperial ism, so
much so that even the ' old guard' Communists began to
1 92
The Nature of the Communi st Bureaucracy
grumbl e. Communist students, teachers, and workers em
braced the cause of Algeri an freedom - and not j ust the sham
peace propagated by the Party leadership - i n i ncreasi ng
numbers.
The war in Al geria was thus not only a factor i n increasing
political consciousness in general , but i t also convi nced the
mil itant Left that it could not rely on either the Communist
or the Soci al Democrat bureaucracy. This point was dri ven
further home to them by the Suez adventure and the Hun
garian upri si ng -both i n 1 956. At thi s, yet another crisis
gripped the French Communi st Party, and a new wave of
mi litants broke away. The Party sank to a new low i n other
ways as wel l ; a case in point was Andre Still's editorial in
L'Hwnanite entitled ' Budapest smiles'.
The revolutionary Left was greatly strengthened by these
events; thei r attacks on Stal i ni sm helped to 'resuscitate'
Trotsky, so much so that French publ ishers suddenly fell over
themselves to publ ish his wri ti ngs.
From 1 956 to 1 968, these Leftist groups conti nuousl y grew
in strength and, in parti cul ar, succeeded in capturi ng the i m
agi nati on of uni versity students . For some years the Com
muni st Student Uni on ( UEC) had been torn by bi tter struggles
between those toei ng the ofcial Party l i ne, the pro-Ital i ans,
the pro- Chi nese and the Trotskyists. The Central Executi ve
of the Party reali zed that i f these arguments were al lowed to
go on, the general membership might become contami nated,
and so ki cked out all opposition in the UEC, reduci ng "i t to
a corpse. As a result, the Lefti sts grew considerably i n
strength. Thi s trend was refected wi thin t he Party i tself,
which lost a great deal of its national i nfuence to the Lefti st
opposi ti on. In fact, both the students and the workers bene
fted i n equal measure, for the wani ng of bureaucrati c control
i s a necessary (though not a sufci ent) condi ti on for all revo
l uti onary acti vi ty. The i nfuence and power of the Communist
Party are i nversely proportional to the i nfuence and force of
a trul y revol uti onary movement. The Party i tsel f, of course,
refused to admi t all this, the more so as i t could sti l l rely on
mi l l ions of votes at the polls. It forgot that these votes were
1 93
Stali nist Bureaucracy and the Class Struggle i n France
only on paper, and that it no longer enjoyed the active support
of the workers. They had ceased to believe that anyone the
Party described as an Anarcho-Hi tl ero-Trotskyite was an
enemy of the worki ng class, and no longer hounded him as
they had done in 1 945. Nor di d they any longer assemble i n
their thousands as soon as some Fascist smashed a window of
L'Humanite.
Today the workers feel free to challenge the bureaucracy
openly i n thei r factori es, and though they may meet violent
resistance from the bureaucrats themselves, they need no
longer fear that their own comrades wi ll cold-shoulder them.
They now realize that there i s l i ttl e to choose between the
Communists and the Soci al Democrats or the Gaullists -
which i s why they were so apathetic when General de Gaul l e
took power i n 1 958. Aware that the leaders i n whom they had
trusted for so long had led them up the garden path, the
workers had no wish to defend a sham Republ i c that had
served them so badly. Hence they left it to the bureaucrats to
bemoan the death of 'true parliamentary democracy'.
For the next ten years, from 1 958 to 1 968, the Gaull i st and
Communi st bureaucracies put up a pretence of bei ng op
posed to each other; the May events forced them to drop even
that. True, in their joi nt eforts to stop the stri ke and to hol d
elections, they agai n tri ed to present themselves as real alter
natives to the voters. At the time they succeeded, but how
much longer wi l l the masses allow the wool to be pulled over
thei r eyes?
In May, the French workers briefy defeated the authoriti es,
by-passing their political and trade-uni on bureaucracies, much
as the Russian workers by-passed the Menshevi ks i n 1 9 1 7.
Thi s took the Russians six months, from February to Octo
ber, duri ng all of which time they had thei r own sovi ets and,
unli ke the French, were not hel d back by Party and trade
union bosses. The enemy today i s much stronger, not because
of hi s tanks and guns, but because he has powerful al l i es i n
the workers' own camp. This was proved i n Pari s i n 1 968 no
l ess cl early than i n Budapest i n 1 956.
The realization that hundreds of thousands of others have
1 94
The Nature of the Communi st Bureaucracy
had i dentical experi ences may help to overcome the apathy of
the many workers who have begun to see through thei r
bureaucratic ' l eaders', but, feeli ng isolated, dare not oppose
them. Moreover, many who have felt i t beyond their power to
do battle against the bourgeoi si e as well as agai nst their own
bureaucrats, now realize that they are stronger than they
thought.
Channel l i ng the new-found strength i nto a trul y revol u
t i'onary movement call s for a re-exami nati on of the funda
mental goals of soci ali sm and for a re-ali gnment of the forces
capabl e of achi evi ng them.
IV
The Strategy and Nature
of Bolshevisn1
1 . Introducti on
Of the many characteristic features of the events of May and
June, one, I thi nk, deserves particular attention : the structure
of the revol uti onary student and workers' organizati ons, or
rather organi sms. From the very start, the 22 March Move
ment made no disti ncti on between l eaders and led - al l deci
si ons were taken i n general assembly, and al l reports by the
various study commi ssi ons had to be referred back to i t as
wel l . Thi s not onl y set a val uabl e example for the rank and fl e
committees i n the factories and Action Committees i n the
streets, but poi nted the way to the future, showi ng how society
can be run by al l and for the beneft of al l . In particular, the end
of the di vi si on between leaders and led i n our movement
refected the wi sh to aboli sh this di vi si on i n the process of pro
duction. Di rect democracy i mpl i es direct management. Hence,
though the 22 March Movement at frst included a number
of convi nced Bol shevi ks, Trotskyists and Maoi sts, its very
structure was opposed to the Bolshevi k concepti on of a pro
letari an vanguard. Smal l wonder then that qui te a few Trot
skyist groups such as the FER, eventual l y left the movement,
whi l e those who stayed behind di d so as an expedient, in the
hope of usi ng the movement to strengthen their own organi za
tion. In May and June, there were several attempts to establ i sh
the ' true revol uti onary party', whi ch the worki ng cl ass ' so sadly
lacked' , and when all of them came to nothi ng the i nevi table
cry went up from the far- l eft press that the workers' struggl e was
doomed to fai l ure - onl y an authentic Bolshevi k party coul d
l ead it to vi ctory. Thus the Lulie ouvriere drew thi s l esson i n i ts
speci al August issue: 'Everyone knows it, and the revoluti onari es
among us say so confdently to the Gaul lists: despite your
el ectoral vi ctory, May and June were onl y a begi nni ng.
1 99
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
'But i t i s not enough simply to proclaim our determi nation
to continue the struggle; to bring i t to a successful conclusi on,
we must draw the lessons of the past, and one of the chi ef les
sons this spring has taught us i s the need for a revolutionary
party. Now thi s i s no new di scovery, and revoluti onaries who
have remained fai thful to the Bolshevik tradi ti on have been
proclai mi ng it for decades. But during the past few months,
this problem has been posed in an i nfni tely more urgent and
concrete manner. '
Now si nce these good Bolsheviks al so realized that the be
haviour of the French Communist Party has caused many good
revolutionaries to turn their backs on every type of central
ized and discipl ined organizati on, they went on to declare :
'The Communist Party of France is a centralized and di sci
pl i nary party. Its centralism and disci pline are precisely what
makes it so efcient . Young revolutionaries are gravely mis
taken i n thi nki ng that, because the Communist Party i s cen
tralized, it must necessari ly play a counter-revolutionary rol e. '
And further on : 'Because the mai n movement has been spon
taneous and because i ts pri ncipal adversary has been a central
ized party, one must not draw any rash conclusions, throwi ng
out the baby wi th the bath-water, and claim that spontaneity
alone i s capable of advancing the workers' movement.' And
after an analysis of all the possi bi li ti es that the events of May
and June opened up, La Lutte ouvriere conti nued: 'Two fac
tors would have permi tted the accomplishment of our task.
The frst is a hi gher degree of spontaneous class consciousness
. . . the second is a revolutionary party . . . The rol e of the
party . . . is to guide the struggle of the workers not only by
defning their correct objectives but also, and above all, by
showing at each stage of the struggle, at each new step for
ward, the path that leads straight to that objective. The need
for a revolutionary party i s not a new lesson we have to learn.
The entire hi story of the workers' movement, of its victories
and defeats, from the Paris Commune to the October Revolu
tion, bear wi tness to this need. ' Now this has been the constant
theme of al l Bolshevik writers. Thus Trotsky i n his preface to
a hi story of the 1 871 Commune wrote : 'Once i n power, the
200
Introduction
Commune should have completely reorganized the Nati onal
Guard, put rel i able men i n charge and imposed stri ct disci
pl i ne. The Commune fai l ed to do so because i t was itself i n
need of a strong revol utionary leadershi p. Hence i t was crushed.
In fact, as we page through the hi story of the Commune, one
concl usi on i s i nescapabl e : the party needed a frm command.
Those who fought i n 1 871 di d not lack heroi sm; what they
lacked was si ngl eness of purpose and a centralized leadershi p
- and that i s precisely why they were beaten. ' The same atti
tude was adopted by Trotsky's disciples after the Hungari an
Revol uti on of 1 956 and, as we shal l see, al so i n connexi on wi th
the events of May-June 1 968. Conversely, they argue that
the Russi an Revol uti on succeeded because i t had a strong
Bolshevi k party.
Hence any attempt to understand the present strategy of
the Communi sts and Trotskyists and to prescri be the neces
sary anti dote must necessari ly i nvolve an analysi s of the Rus
si an Revol uti on, the major attempt to translate thei r i deology
i nto practi ce.
Now, i n what follows we shal l try to show that, far from
l eadi ng the Russi an Revol uti on forwards, the Bolshevi ks were
responsi bl e for hol di ng back the struggle of the masses be
tween February and October 1 9 1 7, and later for turning the
revol uti on i nto a bureaucratic counter-revol uti on - i n both
cases because of the party's very nature, structure and i deology.
For the rol e of the Bolsheviks duri ng the Russi an Revol u
ti on, I shal l largely rely on Yvon Bourdet's excell ent anal ysi s :
'The Revol utionary Party and the Spontaneity of the Masses'
as publ i shed in the journal Noir et rouge; for its role duri ng
1 91 7-1 92 1 , I shal l refer to the notes compi led by the Bri ti sh
Sol i dari ty Movement and accompanying thei r translation of
Alexandra Kol lontai 's The Roots of the Workers' Opposition . *
* Published by Sol idarity, c jo H. Russel l , 53 a Westmoreland Road
Bromley, Kent.
201
2. The Role of the Bo1shevik Party
during the Russian Revolution
On reading Trotsky's History of the Russian Revolution we
are struck by a fundamental contradicti on : as an honest hi s
tori an he shows us j ust how much the Party lagged behind
the masses, and as a Bolshevik theorist he must reafrm that
the Party was necessary for the success of the revoluti on. Thus
he writes : 'The soldi ers lagged behind the shop committees.
The committees lagged behind the masses . . . The party also
lagged behind the revolutionary dynamic - an organizati on
which had the least right to lag, especially i n a ti me of revol u
ti on . . . The most revolutionary party which human hi story
unti l thi s time had ever known was nevertheless caught un
awares by the events of hi story. It reconstructed i tself i n the
fres, and straightened out i ts ranks under the onslaught of
events . The masses at the turning poi nt were a hundred times
to the left of the extreme left party. ' (History of the
Russian Revolution, * Volume I, 403f .)
Thi s passage alone should sufce to destroy the myth of the
Bolshevi k Party as the revolutionary vanguard of the prole
tari at. Its ' lagging behind' was patent even duri ng the frst
days of February I 9 1 7 the overthrow of the Czar and the
creation of workers' councils, were the work of the masses
themselves. In this connexion Trotsky quotes Mstislavsky (a
leader of the left wing of the Social Revolutionaries who sub
sequently went over to the Bolsheviks) as sayi ng: 'The revolu
ti on caught us napping, the party people of those days, l i ke
the foolish vi rgins of the Bi bl e. ' To whi ch Trotsky hi mself
adds: 'It does not matter how much they resembled the vi rgi ns,
Gol lancz and Sphere Books, London. Al l page references are to the
Sphere edition.
202
The Rol e of the Bolshevik Party duri ng the Russi an Revoluti on
but i t is true they were all fast asleep. ' (op. cit. Vol ume I, 1 47.)
Thi s was as true of the Bolshevi k Party as of al l other left
wi ng organi zati ons. In efect: ' Up to the very last hour, these
leaders thought i t was a question of a revoluti onary mani fes
tati on, one among many, and not at all an armed i nsurrection
. . . The Central Committee was unable to give any di rectives
for the comi ng day. ' (op. cit. Volume I , 1 47. ) In short, the
Bolshevi ks were anythi ng but leaders of the masses i n Feb
ruary, and subsequently they lagged behind both the action of
t he masses and al so their revolutionary spi ri t. Thus i n Jul y
1 9 1 7, when ' about 1 0,000 men assembled, to shouts of encour
agement, the machine-gunners told how they had received an
order to go to the Front on 4 Jul y, but they had decided not to
go to the German Front against the German proletari at but
against their own capi tali st mi ni sters. Feeli ng ran hi gh. "Let's
get movi ng! " cri ed the workers. The secretary of the factory
commi ttee, a Bolshevi k, objected, suggesting that they ask
instructions from the party. Protests from al l si des: "Down
wi th it. Agai n you want to postpone thi ngs . We can't l i ve
that way any longer. " Towards si x o'clock came representa
tives from the Executive Committee, but they succeeded sti ll
less wi th the workers. ' (op. cit . Volume 11, 1 27. )
The Bolshevi ks not only played no part i n thi s struggle but
tri ed to squash i t; they wanted to refer the whole matter
back to Party Headquarters, and when their leaders arri ved
these were shouted down. A wi de gulf had opened up between
the Party and the 'masses' who had a dynamic of their own
and, from the start, set up their own soldiers' and workers'
soviets . It was here and nowhere else that the real decisi ons
were taken. In the workers' soviets, each member, Bolshevi k
or not, coul d make hi s voi ce heard and hence i nfuence events .
No pol i ti cal group as such had the right to deci de any issues,
even though the delegates were ori gi nal l y chosen from among
Party mi l i tants ( Menshevi ks frst, and then Bolshevi ks) . How
ever, these men were pi cked not for their pol itical orthodoxy
but because of their active partici pation i n the workers'
struggle, and when they tri ed to act as dampers they were gen
erally dismi ssed very qui ckly - at least whi le Soviet democracy
203
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
sti l l existed. Trotsky has described the role of the Bolshevi ks
in July 1 9 1 7, as follows : 'The Bolsheviks were caught up by
the movement and dragged i nto i t, looking around the whi l e
for some j ustifcation for an action whi ch fatly contravened
the ofcial deci sion of the party. (op. cit . Volume II, 30.) And,
so as not to lose face, rank and fl e Bolsheviks were forced to
go fatly against the decisions of their leaders : 'Their Central
Committee addressed an appeal to the workers and soldiers :
"Unknown persons . . . are summoning you i nto the streets
under arms, and that proves that the summons does not come
from any of the Soviet parties . . . " Thus the Central Committee
- both of the
P
arty and the Soviet - proposed, but the masses
disposed.' (op. cit. Volume II, 33.)
Here we are not so much i nterested i n whether or not the
Bolsheviks had good reasons for opposing these demonstra
tions as in the fact that they had no sway over the masses.
Clearly, fve months after the Revolution and three months
after the October upri sing, the masses were sti l l governing
themselves, and the Bolshevik vanguard simply had to toe the
l i ne. ' Popular Bolsheviks - Nevsky, Lashevich, Padvoisky
speaking from the balcony, tried to send the regiments home.
They were answered from below : "Go to hell ! Go to hel l ! "
Such cries the Bolshevik balcony had never yet heard from the
soldi ers, it was an alarming sign . . . What was to be done?
Could the Bolsheviks possibly stand aside? The members of
the Petrograd Committee together wi th the del egates of the
Conference and representatives from the regiments and fac
tories, passed a resolution : To end all frui tless attempts to res
trai n the masses and gui de the developing movement in such a
way that the government crisis may be decided in the i nter
ests of the people (sic! ) . . . ' (op. cit. Volume II, 33 f.) The fction
of the proletarian vanguard had to be maintained at any
pri ce!
Trotsky hi mself added : 'The members of the Central Com
mi ttee who were present sanctioned this change of tacti cs. '
(op. cit . Volume II, 34.) As i f they had had any choice in the
matter! (At least before 1 921 , by which date the secret poli ce
and the army coul d be mustered against the masses.)
204
The Rol e of the Bolshevi k Party duri ng the Russi an Revoluti on
But the Party coul d not just si t by wi th folded arms. Speak
i ng for the Party leadershi p, Kamenev sai d :
' "We di d not summon the mani festati on, the popular masses
themselves came i nto the street . . . but once the masses have
come out, our place is among them . . . Our present task is to
give the movement an organized character." ' (op. cit . Vol ume
II, 37.) Kamenev therefore admi tted that the Party was no
l onger at the head, that i t was no l onger di recti ng anythi ng,
that all i t could do was to organize post facto. And how? 'The
afternoon summons from the Central Committee to stop the
demonstrati on was torn from the presses - but too l ate to
replace it with a new text.' (op. cit. Volume II, 42.)
Pravda accordi ngly appeared wi th a blank page, and this i s
what t he Bolshevi ks cal l organi zi ng a movement! And despite
al l thei r eforts, the demonstration di d take place, and attrac
ted 'at least 500,000 persons' .
The conclusi on i s obvi ous : 'The movement had begun from
below i rrespective of the Bolshevi ks - to a certai n extent
agai nst their wi l l . ' (op. cit . Volume II, 7 1 . )
Trotsky, moreover, declared i n a speech at about that ti me :
'They accuse us of creating the mood of the masses; that i s
wrong, we onl y try to formulate i t . ' (op. cit . Vol ume II, 7A.)
In short, the great vanguard was reduced to the rol e of mere
mouthpi ece, and fai l ed even in this. Still, it might be argued
that though the Party was sleeping i n February, and though i t
lagged behi nd the masses i n July, i t nevertheless has the Octo
ber Revoluti on to its credi t. Nothing could be further from the
truth.
From Apri l to October, Leni n had to fght a constant battle
to keep the Party leadershi p in tune with the masses : 'Even
the victory of the insurrection in Petrograd was far from
breaki ng everywhere the i nertia of the waiting pol i cy and the
di rect resi stance of the ri ght wing. The waveri ng of the leaders
subsequentl y al most shipwrecked the i nsurrecti on i n Moscow.
In Kiev, the commi ttee, headed by Piatakov, whi ch had been
conducting a purely defensive poli cy, turned over the i ni ti a
ti ve i n the long run - and also the power - to the Rada . . . The
actual overturn i n Voronezh . . . was carri ed out not by a com-
205
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
mi ttee of the party but by its active mi nority . . . In a whole
series of provi nci al ci ties, the Bolsheviks formed in October a
bloc with the Compromisers "agai nst the counter-revoluti on"
. + In spite of the vast work that has been done i n recent years
towards conceali ng these facts . . . plenty of testimony has
been preserved in the newspapers, memoirs and hi stori c jour
nals of the time, to prove that on the eve of the overturn of the
ofci al machine even the most revolutionary party put up a
bi g resistance.' (op. cit. Volume III, 1 45 f .)
Early i n October, Leni n could only i mpose hi s vi ew by go
i ng over the head of hi s Central Committee : 'Hi s letter to the
Central Commi ttee he not only sent to the Petrograd and
Moscow Commi ttees, but he al so saw to i t that copi es fell i nto
the hands of the more reli able party workers of the district
locals. ' (op. cit. Volume III, 1 93 1 . )
And again : 'Leni n appealed to a Petrograd party confer
ence to speak a frm word i n favour of i nsurrecti on. Upon hi s
i ni ti ative, the conference i nsistently requested the Central
Committee to take all measures for the leadership of the i n
evitable i nsurrection of the workers, soldiers and peasant .'
(op. cit. Volume II, 1 32.)
Thus Lenin, aware that the glorious vanguard was again
laggi ng behi nd the masses, tried desperately to preserve i ts
prophetic role and, i n so doi ng, had to break the very rules of
democratic centralism he himsel f had formulated.
'In the upper ci rcles of the party,' he wrote, 'a wavering is
to be observed, a sort of dread of the struggle for power, an
i ncl ination to replace the struggle wi th resoluti ons, protests
and conferences.' And this is what Trotsky had to say about
i t: 'Thi s i s al ready almost a di rect pitting of the party agai nst
the Central Committee. Lenin di d not decide l i ghtly upon
such steps, but it was a question of the fate of the revoluti on and
all other considerations fell away. ' (op. cit . Volume I I I , 1 32 f.)
In short, the success of the revoluti on cal led for action
against the 'highest ci rcles of the party', who, from February
to October, utterly fai led to play the revolutionary rol e they
ought to have taken in theory. The masses themselves made
the revoluti on, with or even against the party - this much at
206
The Rol e of the Bolshevi k Party during the Russi an Revol uti on
least was cl ear to Trotsky the hi storian. But far from drawing
the correct concl usi on, Trotsky the theorist continued to argue
that the masses are incapable of making a revol uti on wi thout
a leader. To begin wi th he admits that 'Tugan- Baranovsky is
right when he says that the February revolution was accom
pli shed by workers and peasants - the latter i n the person of
the sol di ers. But there sti ll remai ns the great questi on : who
l ed the revol uti on, who l ed the workers to thei r feet? . . . It
was solved most si mply by the universal formul a : nobody led
the revol uti on, i t happened of itsel f. ' (op. cit. Vol ume I, 1 45.)
Trotsky not only put the question very wel l but also gave a
cl ear answer : the Revolution was the spontaneous expression
of the wi l l of the masses - not just in theory but in actual
practice. But Trotsky the theorist coul d not accept the obvi
ous answer : he had to refute it si nce the idea of a centralized
leadershi p i s the crux of his dogma and must be uphel d at al l
costs. Hence he quoted with approval Zavadsky's di ctum that
'spontaneous concepti on i s sti l l more out of place in sociology
than i n natural science. Owi ng to the fact that none of the
revol uti onary leaders with a name was able to hang his label
on the movement, i t becomes not i mpersonal but merely
nameless. ' (op. cit . Volume I, 1 5 1 .)
We wish to say no more. Anonymity i s precisely what char
acterizes a spontaneous movement, i . e. one that di sdai ns the
tutelage of ofci al organizations, that wi l l have no ofcial
name. Trotsky's argument i s qui te diferent : there can be no
revol uti on wi thout leadership and i f no leaders can be poi nted
out, it is si mpl y because the leaders are anonymous. Thus,
after recal li ng that the 'Uni on of Ofcers of February 27',
formed just after the revol uti on, tried to determi ne wi th a
questi onnai re who frst led out the Volynsky Regi ment, Trot
sky expl ai ns: "They received seven answers naming seven i ni ti a
tors of thi s decisive acti on. It i s very l i kely, we may add, that
a part of the i ni ti ati ve really di d belong to several sol di ers. '
(op. cit. Vol ume I, 1 50.) Why then wi l l he not admi t that the
soldiers took more than ' part' of the i nitiative? Because Trot
sky prefers another explanation : 'It i s not i mpossible that the
chi ef i ni tiator fell in the street fghting carrying his name wi th
207
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
hi m into obl ivion. ' Thus Trotsky, the historian, doctors the
hi storical evidence to i ntroduce a mythical leader, whose
existence cannot be verifed because he i s dead! Another ex
ample quoted by Trotsky highl ights the absurdity of this l i ne
of argument : ' On Friday, 24 February, nobody i n the upper
ci rcles as yet expected a revolution . . . a tram car in whi ch a
senator was ri di ng turned of quite unexpectedly with such a
jar that the windows rattled and one was broken . . . Its con
ductor tol d everybody to get of : "The car i sn't going any
further" . . . The movement of the tramways stopped every
where as far as the eye could see.' (op. cit . Volume I, 1 5 1 .)
Trotsky makes the following comment : 'That resolute con
ductor, i n whom the liberal ofcials could already catch a
gl impse of the "wol f- l ook" must have been dominated by a
hi gh sense of duty i n order al l by hi msel f to stop a car con
tai ni ng ofci als on the streets of i mperial Petersburg in ti me
of war. It was just such conductors who stopped the car of the
monarchy and with practically the same words - Thi s car
does not go any further! . . . The conductor on the Liteiny
boulevard was a conscious factor of history. It had been
necessary to educate hi m i n advance.' (iJp. cit . Volume I, 1 5 1 f .)
And a few li nes further down he repeats the same refrai n
'Those nameless, austere statesmen of the factory and street
did not fal l out of the sky: they had to be educated.' (op. cit.
Volume I, 1 52.)
The Party as such played no role in these decisive days, but
those who were the real actors, 'the conscious i nstruments of
hi story , had needs to be educated. and by whom if not by the
Party? In short, the past action of the Party justify its present
inactivity. There are but two alternatives for Trotsky : either
people have fal l en out of the sky or else they must have been
educated by the Party. The frst hypothesis being absurd, the
second i s the only possible answer. But as the Jewish father
said to his son : 'My boy, whenever there are two al ternatives,
choose the third.' Now that alternative is simply that the wor
kers coul d have managed without a Party, just as they do i n
their everyday l i fe. Let us see what Trotsky himself has to say
on this subject : The anaemic and pretentious i ntel l igentsia . . .
208
The Rol e of the Bolshevi k Party duri ng the Russi an Revol uti on
was burni ng wi th desi re to teach the popular masses . . . but
was absol utely i ncapable of understanding them and of learn
ing anythi ng from them. Now, fai l i ng thi s, there can be no
revol uti onary pol i tics. ' Thi s j udgement appl i es equal l y wel l to
Trotsky hi mself, who was responsi ble for the regi mentati on
of l abour and for shooti ng the Kronstadt rebel s. But Trotsky
i s not aware of this fact, and his History is so val uable pre
ci sely because he is honest, or stupi d, enough to l i st the facts
that contradi ct hi s every concl usi on. Forgetti ng what he has
.wri tten on page 1 5 1 , he notes that ' one of the factories carri ed
thi s placard : ' The Right to Li fe i s Hi gher than the Rights of
Pri vate Property". Thi s slogan had not been suggested by the
party. ' (op. cit . Vol ume I , 41 9.)
No one woul d wi sh to chal l enge hi s cl ai m that 'the thought
of the worker has become more scientifc . . . because it was
ferti l i zed to a large extent by the methods of Marxi sm. ' True,
the use of the term 'scientifc thought' i s questi onable, but
there i s no doubt that scientifc Marxism has played a large
part i n the educati on of bot. Menshevi ks and Bol shevi ks. It
shoul d be added that other trends - anarcho-syndi cal i st, anar
chi st, soci al revolutionary - made thei r contri buti on too. And
as Trotsky hi mself admits when di scussi ng worki ng class
thought, i ts development was chi efy due to ' the l i vi ng experi
ence of t he masses' .
It was thi s l ivi ng experience which went into the creati on of
the soviets i n 1 905, soviets whi ch the Bolshevi k Party largely
i gnored, a fact for whi ch Trotsky himsel f severely cri ti ci zed
the Party at the ti me. But as soon as he himsel f turned Bol
shevi k theori st, he had perforce to di smi ss the whol e i dea of
workers' spontanei ty. Thus whi l e he says i n Vol ume II, page
72, that the masses were complai ni ng that 'even the Bolshevi ks
are dawdl i ng and hol di ng us back, ' he goes on to say on page
88 : 'What they (the German Spartacists) lacked was a Bol
shevi k party. '
The absurdi ty of hi s hypotheses - al l due to the fact that he
cannot admi t the i dea of a spontaneous revol uti on - becomes
even cl earer in the fol l owi ng passage : 'A careful study of the
materi al s characteri zi ng the party l i fe during the war and the
209
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
begi nni ng of the revolution . . . reveals more clearly every
day the i mmense i ntel l ectual backsl i di ng of the upper stratum
of the Bolsheviks during the war when the proper l i fe of the
party practi cally came to an end. The cause of this backsl i di ng
i s twofold : isolation from the masses and isolation from those
abroad, that i s primarily from Leni n. ' (op. cit. Volume III,
1 34.) Thi s 'twofold backsl iding' i s nothing l ess than an i ndict
ment of the Bolshevi k Party : by stressing the importance of
Leni n i n the way he does, Trotsky is, i n fact, depreciating the
val ue of the Party. And Lenin, far from being the i nfal l i ble
revolutionary Trotsky makes hi m out to be, between February
and October 1 91 7, went back on a good many positions he had
earl i er defended. Thus whi le he had stressed the i mportance
of soviets i n 1 905, in January 1 91 7, when he gave a lecture to
Swiss workers, he merely mentioned the soviets i n passi ng.
Thi s di d not prevent hi m, a few months later, to the di smay of
the majority of the Party, from once agai n adopting the anar
chi st slogan : All power to the soviets! The Party, fai thful and
disci pl i ned though i t was, coul d not perform these gyrations
with the same speed. The break between Leni n and the Party
may prove Lenin's genius when i t comes to changing the pol i
ti cal l i ne, but i t also proves how i l l -ftted a Party of the Bol
shevi k type i s to deal wi th a revolutionary si tuati on. Hence
Trotsky's claim that 'the March leadershi p of Kamenev and
Stal i n lagged behind the gigantic hi storic tasks. ' (op. cit .
Volume I, 403.)
However, Trotsky was qui ck to refute this line of reasoni ng
when i t was di shed up to explain the fai lure of the Whi te
Guards. Thus he had this to say about the abortive Korni lov
putsch : 'The sums of money set aside for organization were,
according to Vi nberg, appropriated by the pri nci pal parti ci
pants and squandered on di nner parties . . . One of the secret
contributors, who was to deliver to some ofcers a consider
abl e sum of money, upon arrival at the designated place found
the conspirators i n such a state of i nebriation that he could
not deliver the goods. Vinberg himself thi nks that if it had
not been for these truly vexatious "accidents", the plan might
have been crowned wi th complete success. But the questi on
21 0
The Role of the Bolshevi k Party duri ng the Russi an Revol uti on
remai ns : Why was a patr iotic enterprise entered i nto and sur
rounded, for the most part, by drunkards, spendthri fts and
traitors? Is i t not because every hi stori c task mobi l i zes the
cadres that are adequate to i t? ' (op. cit. Vol ume II, 21 9 f .)
Now if every hi stori cal task i ndeed mobi l izes the necessary
cadres, i t wi l l do this for the revol uti on no less than for the
counter-revol uti on. Hence Trotsky should not real l y bl ame
the Bolshevi k leaders for the fai lure of the Party to ri se to its
' hi stori c task' . The reason Stal i n and Kamenev found them
selves at the head of the Party was because they were el ected
by the whol e of that Party, and i t i s therefore the Party as such
that is to blame and not x or y. Agai n, if the presence or ab
sence of Leni n explai ns the success or fai lure of the Party, the
Party reduces to Leni n and becomes superfuous.
As for the gap between the Party and the masses, i t can have
two causes : ei ther the masses are too apathetic for revol uti on
or el se, as happened i n 1 9 1 7, the masses are onl y too anxi ous to
carry the revol uti on a step further, and the Party i tsel f i s apa
thetic. In the second case i t is not the masses who cannot 'rise'
to its hi stori c task but the Party. Thi s rupture between the
Party and the masses i s due to the Party's very nature : a smal l ,
cl osed group of professional revol uti onari es, sure of bei ng the
reposi tory of truth and i ncapable of adapting themselves to any
i ndependent i ni ti ative of the masses. A case i n point was their
attitude to the soviets, or workers' counci l s, whi ch gave the
atomized masses their own centres for acti on and col l ective
deci si ons. The soviets sprang up qui te spontaneously i n 1 905
and di d not fgure i n any party programme. It was onl y i n re
trospect that they were analyzed by variousi wri ters of the Left.
Some of these - particularly the anarchists, the extreme left
Social Revol uti onari es and mi nori ty groups wi thi n the Soci al
Democrati c Party, were frankly i n favour of the sovi ets - and
so, i n 1 905, was Leon Trotsky. Anton Pannekoek was another
and his movement for workers' control was attacked by Leni n
in 'Left- wing' Communism: An Infantile Disorder . Al l the
Bolshevi ks were frankly hosti l e. Those i n St Petersburg were
convi nced that 'only a party based on class conceptions can
di rect the pol i ti cal movement of the proletariat and preserve
21 1
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
the purity of i ts intentions, whereas the workers' counci ls are
so many heterogeneous and i ndecisive bodi es'. (Quoted by
Oscar Auwei ler i n The Workers' Councils in Russia 1905-
1929.) At the same time, P. Mendeleev declared i n the name of
the Bolsheviks : 'The counci l of workers' deputies is a pol i tical
organization and Social Democrats (Bolshevi ks and Menshe
vi ks) must leave it because its very existence impedes the de
velopment of the social democratic movement. The workers'
counci l may exist as a trade union or not at al l . ' Whence Men
deleev concluded that the Bolsheviks should use the followi ng
strategy : 'First of all we must try to get the workers' counci l
to l i mi t i tself to i ts trade uni on tasks, and secondly, i n case thi s
attempt fai ls, the workers' counci l must be made to acknow
ledge the leadershi p of the Social Democratic Party, and
thi rdly, thi s having been done, i t must be di ssolved as quickly
as possi ble, seei ng that its parallel existence with other soci al
democratic organizations serves no purpose. ' And this at a
time when workers were begi nni ng to form workers' counci l s
i n al l the factori es, and workers' 'parliaments' i n al l the major
towns! The Social Democrats di d not even think ft to i nvi te
the workers to participate in their party's august deli berations,
but expected them to carry out bli ndly what the proletarian
vanguard ordered from on high, and then to declare themselves
redundant. That the workers' counci ls ' i mpeded' this sort of
development is a truism - they chal lenged the wi sdom of the
Party leaders in practice and not simply i n theory. This was
more than our professional revolutionaries were prepared to
swal low. In 1 907, Leni n got the Fifth Congress of the Soci al
Democratic Workers' Party to pass a resolution whose subject
was highly reveal i ng : 'On the independent workers' organiza
tion and the anarcho-syndicalist currents wi th i n the prole
tari at. ' He condemned al l these 'currents', and declared : 'The
participation of Social Democratic organizations i n councils
composed of delegates and workers' deputies wi thout disti nc
tion of party . . . or the creation of such counci ls, cannot be
countenanced unless we can be sure that the party can beneft
and that its i nterests are ful ly protected. ' (Quoted by Oscar
Auweiler, page I 03 .)
21 2
The Rol e of the Bol shevi k Party duri ng the Russi an Revol uti on
In deal i ng wi th workers' organizations, the Bolshevi ks had
but one major concern : to strengthen thei r own organizat i on.
Si nce the Party was the sol e guardi an of the proletari at and the
revol uti on, any attempt by the workers to make a revol uti on
without the Party must clearly be wrong or i ndeed i mpossi ble,
as Trotsky argues i n hi s History of the Russian Revolution .
When the workers di savow the Party i n practi ce, the Party
simply di savows the practi ce of the workers.
Thi s di sdai n for the working cl ass and i ts capaci ty for self
emancipati on can be heard most cl early i n Leni n's What is to be
done?, a theoretical justifcation of the leadershi p pri nci pl e. I n
i t , Leni n si mpl y repeats t he words of Karl Kautsky, whom he
sti l l admi red at the ti me : 'The workers, we have sai d, sti l l
lacked a Soci al -Democrati c consci ousness; i t coul d onl y come to
them from the outsi de. Hi story in al l countri es attests that, on
i ts own, the worki ng class cannot go beyond the level of trade
uni on consci ousness, the realization that they must combi ne
i nto trade uni ons, fght agai nst the employers, force the
government to pass such l aws as beneft the condi ti on of the
workers . . . As for the Soci al ist doctri ne, it was constructed out
of phi losophi cal , hi storical and economic theori es elaborated
by educated members of the rul i ng class, by i ntel l ectual s. Thus
Marx and Engels, the founders of modern scientifc soci al i sm,
were bourgeoi s i ntel lectual s. Si mi larly i n Russi a, the soci al
democrati c doctrine sprang up al most i ndependently of the
spontaneous development of the worki ng class move
ment . . .
Leni n summed i t al l up by saying : 'The workers can acquire
class pol i ti cal consciousness only from without, that i s, onl y
outsi de of the economi c struggle, outside of the sphere of the
relati on between workers and employers. '
Now t hi s cl ai m that class poli ti cal consciousness can onl y
reach the worki ng class from the outside, has been refuted i n
practice, and ought to cease bei ng part of any soci al i st's stock
of i deas. The hi story of French trade uni onism before 1 9 1 4 i n
i tsel f i s sufci ent proof that the workers can transcend what
Leni n cal l s thei r ' trade uni on consciousness' . The Charter of
Ami ens adopted i n 1 906 makes thi s quite expl ici t : ' The CGT i s
21 3
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
afliated to no pol i tical party, but i s a uni on of class-consci ous
workers fghti ng for the abol i ti on of wage-slaves and em
ployers. The Congress pledges itself to support the workers i n
their class struggle against al l forms of capital i st exploitati on
and oppressi on, both material and moral . Accordi ngly the
Congress sets itself the following tasks : i n the short term, trade
uni onists wi l l try to i mprove the workers' lot by cal l i ng for such
i mmediate reforms as i ncreases in wages, a shorter worki ng
week, etc. But thi s i s only one aspect of our work. The trade
unions also pave the way for the complete emancipation of the
worki ng class, whi ch cannot be achi eved except by expropri a
ti on of the capi tal ists. To that end, they wi ll cal l general
strikes, so that those resisting capital i sm on the wages front
today may tomorrow take charge of production and di stri
bution and so usher i n a completely new era . . .
This text shows clearly that the working class can ri se a great
deal beyond the 'trade union consciousness', and precisely in a
country where the i nfuence of the Soci al Democrats was ex
tremely tenuous. Conversely it was when Social Democrats
started to gain infuence i n France that the trade unions reverted
to their role of economic i ntermediaries, and changed i nto the
bureaucratic machines of today, machi nes that form an
integral part of capitalist society. The Leninist i deology, i n
postulating the incapacity of the working class to make a
revoluti on, or, as we shal l see, to manage production i n post
revolutionary society, i s in direct conf ict wi th the i naugural
declaration of the First International : The emanci pati on of
the workers must be brought about by the workers themselves'.
The fact that 'sci entifc soci al ism' was the creation of bourgeois
i ntellectuals i s undeniable, and, indeed, i t bears the unmistak
able marks of this : i t i s ali en to the proletariat and perhaps i t
ought not to be qui te so proud of this al ienation as i t obviously
is. Moreover, Bolshevi k organizations were born in an i n
dustri ally backward country (which expl ains rather than justi
fes thei r own backward nature) . Thi s type of organization,
and the ideology that went hand in hand wi th it, would, after
1 9 1 7, seize upon the backwardness of Russi a and also on the
lack of revolutionary spi ri t among the workers outside, as a
21 4
The Rol e of the Bolshevi k Party duri ng the Russi an Revol uti on
pretext for bri nging to frui t the counter-revol uti onary germs
it contai ned from the very begi nni ng.
The Leni ni st bel i ef that the workers cannot spontaneously
go beyond the level of trade uni on consciousness i s tantamount
to beheadi ng the proletariat, and then i nsi nuati ng the Party as
the head. The ori gi nal ai ms of French trade unioni sm, and the
creati on of sovi ets show that Leni n was wrong, and, i n fact, i n
Russi a the Party was forced to decapitate the workers' move
ment with the hel p of the political police and the Red Army
under the bri l l iant l eadershi p of Trotsky and Leni n. Moreover,
the decapi tati on was not enough, the body, too, had to be de
stroyed, and si nce thi s task required less fnesse and revol u
ti onary educati on, the honour of fni shi ng the work so
bri l l i antly begun by Leni n and Trotsky, fell to the uncultured
Stal i n.
However, i n fairness to Trotsky, i t must be sai d that, i n 1 902,
when Lenin wrote What is to be done?, Trotsky not only op
posed i t vi ol ently but had the wit to foresee its worst dangers :
that the Party woul d substitute i tsel f for the worki ng cl ass,
the Central Commi ttee for the party, the Pol i tburo for the
Central Commi ttee, and fnal l y the General Secretary for the
Pol itburo. I t i s to be hoped that Trotsky's critique may one day
be publ i shed in ful l , for it, better than anythi ng else, woul d
provi de us wi th a cri ti que of modern Trotskyism. Leni n' s
vi ews were also chal lenged by Rosa Luxemburg, representing
the far- left wi ng of the German Social Democratic Movement.
Whi l e she shared Leni n's di sgust wi th the reformi st and parl i a
mentary German Soci al Democratic Party, she al so attacked
his own central i sm and his i deas of di sci pl i ne.
I n hi s ' One step forward and two steps back' , Leni n
glorifed the educati onal efect of factory l i fe whi ch 'accustoms
the prol etariat to di sci pl i ne and organizati on' . To thi s Rosa
Luxemburg repl i ed : 'The disci pl i ne which Leni n has in mi nd i s
dri ven home t o the prol etariat not onl y i n the factory but al so
in the barracks and by al l sorts of bureaucrats, i n short by the
whole power machi ne of the central ized bourgeoi s state . . . It
i s an abuse of words to apply the same term "di scipl i ne" to two
such unrelated concepts as the mi ndl ess refex moti ons of a
21 5
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
body with a thousand hands and a thousand legs, and the
spontaneous coordination of the conscious political acts of a
group of men. What can the wel l -ordered doci l i ty of the former
have i n common wi th the aspirations of a class struggl i ng for
i ts total emancipation? ' (The Organization of the Social Demo
cratic Party in Russia.)
In fact, it was Lenin's own consciousness whi ch fai led to
transcend the organizational level of the bourgeoi si e. Speaki ng
of the revolutionary movement that, at the turn of the century,
shook the autocratic Russian Empire and later culminated i n
t he Russian Revolution of 1 905, Rosa Luxemburg wrote ( i n
1 904) : 'Our cause ( i .e. Socialism) has made immense progress.
However, i n this, the i nitiative and conscious direction of the
Social Democratic organization played no more than an i n
signifcant part . This fact cannot be explained away by arguing
that our organization was not prepared for such great events
(although this was true), and even less by the absence of the al l
powerful central apparatus Leni n has recommended. On the
contrary, it i s more than l ikely that such an apparatus would
simply have i ncreased the confusi on of the local committees,
stressing the gulf between the i mpetuous masses and the
cautious attitude of the Social Democratic Party. ' (The
Organization of the Social Democratic Party in Russia.)
'The ultra-centralization advocated by Leni n, ' Rosa Luxem
burg continued, ' i s fl led, not with a posi tive and creative spirit,
but wi th the sterile spi ri t of the ni ght watchman. ' Prophetic
words these, for wi thi n a few months the Party became i n
capable of understanding, and even fought, the establi shment
of workers' counci l s. Prophetic also for what happened in 1 9 1 7,
when the Party proved quite incapable of playing the leadi ng
part for whi ch i t had been prepared so long, and left the enti re
job to a Leni n (quod Jovi lice! non bovi licet) . Rosa Luxemburg
had cl early foreseen all this, and had accordi ngl y advocated
the 'tearing down of that barbed wire fence whi ch prevents the
Party from accomplishing the formidable task of the hour' .
In fact, far from dismantling the fence, the Party eventual ly put
the entire Russian proletariat behi nd i t.
Rosa Luxemburg's conclusions are no less relevant today
21 6
The Rol e of the Bolshevi k Party duri ng the Russi an Revoluti on
than they were at the ti me they were written : 'Fi nal ly we saw
the bi rth of a far more legitimate ofspring of the hi stori cal
process : the Russi an workers' movement, whi ch, for the frst
time, gave expression to the real wi l l of the popul ar masses.
Then the leadershi p of the Russi an revol uti on leapt up to
balance on their shoulders, and once more appoi nted i tsel f the
al l - powerful di rector of hi story, thi s time in the person of His
Highness the Central Commi ttee of the Soci al Democrati c
Workers' Party. Thi s ski l ful acrobat di d not even reali ze that the
only one capable of playi ng the part of director i s the "col
lecti ve" ego of the worki ng class, whi ch has a soverei gn ri ght to
make mi stakes and to learn the dialectics of hi story by i tself.
Let us put i t qui te bluntly : the errors committed by a truly
revolutionary workers' movement are hi stori cally far more
frui tful and val uabl e than the i nfal l i bi l i ty of even the best
Central Committee. ' (Organization of Social Democratic Party
in Russia.)
The value of these remarks i s i n no way di mi ni shed by the
fact that, today, we have dozens of Central Commi ttees each
i nsi sti ng on i ts own i nfal l i bi l ity, and all al i ke unabl e to learn
the lessons of the Russi an Revoluti on on whi ch they base most
of their self-justificati ons.
I n February 1 9 1 7, we have said, the Party l i ne and dynami c
was opposed to that of the masses organized i n sovi ets. Leni n
had to l abour hard, not to convi nce the masses of the need to
seize power i n the factories and towns, but to convi nce hi s own
party that the masses were ready for thi s step. It was the party
that had to ri se to the level of the masses, not the other way
round. Leni n had to turn 'anarchist', and to carry an i ncredu
lous party wi th hi m. October thus represents the poi nt where
the acti on and aspi rati on of the masses coi nci ded wi th those of
the temporari l y de- Bolshevized Bolshevik Party, and thi s
happy state persisted unti l the spring of 1 9 1 8. The Bolshevi k
Party coul d not, moreover, behave otherwise, because i t was sti l l
tryi ng to wi n the support of the workers. The previ ous ei ght
months ( i .e. February to October 1 9 1 7) had brought on an
extraordi nary prol i ferati on of factory and workshop com-
217
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
mittees. In April 1 9 1 7 a conference of factory committees at
Petrograd had declared: 'All decisions afecti ng the i nternal
management of factories, such as the length of the working
day, wages, hi ri ng and dismissing of workers, etc. must come
from the factory committee.' Another conference of factory
committees held in June 1 9 1 7 demanded 'the organization of
complete control by the workers of producti on and distri
bution' and 'a proletarian majority i n al l institutions wi eldi ng
executive power' . Sti l l another congress, after the seizure of
power, declared : 'The workers' control commissions must
not merely be used to check production . . . but must prepare
for the transfer of production i nto the hands of the workers. '
The January 1 9 1 8 i ssue of Vestni k Metalista (Metal
workers' News) contained an arti cl e by the worker N. Fi l i pov
which said, inter alia : 'The working class, by its very nature,
must hold a central place in the productive process. In the
future, all production must refect the spirit and the wi l l of the
proletariat.'
In this truly revolutionary peri od, Lenin tol d the Third Con
gress of Soviets hel d at the beginning of 1 9 1 8 : 'Anarchist ideas
have assumed vi rulent forms.'
A. Pantakrava wrote : 'On the morrow of the October
Revolution, these anarchist tendencies have become preva
lent, precisely because the capitalists have increased thei r
resistance to the application of the Decree on Workers' Control
and continue to oppose the workers' management of pro
ducti on. '
We shal l see that from the spring of 1 9 1 8 i t was the Bol
shevi st-Leninists themselves who opposed workers' manage
ment. Before that happened, the anarchosyndicalist Maximov
could still write : 'The Bolsheviks have abandoned not only
their theory of the withering away of the state, but Marxist
ideology as a whole. They have become anarchists of a sort. '
However, the anarchist Voline, writing in Golas Truda (The
Voice of Labour) at the end of 1 9 1 7, had this to say : 'Once
their power has been consoli dated and legalized, the Bolsheviks,
as state socialists, that i s as men who believe in centralized and
authoritarian leadershi p - will start runni ng the l i fe of the
21 8
The Rol e of the Bolshevi k Party duri ng the Russi an Revoluti on
country and of the people from the top. Your soviets . . . wi l l
gradually become si mple tools of t he central government . . .
You wi l l soon see the inauguration of an authoritarian poli ti cal
and state apparatus that wi l l crush al l opposi ti on wi th an i ron
fst . . . "Al l power to the soviets" wi l l become "al l power to the
leaders of the party". '
And thi s i s precisely what happened i n 1 9 1 8 . To achieve
their ends, the Bolshevi ks had to smash all opposi ti on and the
anarchists in particular. Thi s pol itical repression went hand in
hand wi th the repressi on of the workers i n the factory.
Thus Captain Jacques Sadaul wrote : 'The anarchist party
i s the most active and mi l itant and probably the most popular
opposi ti on group of all . . . The Bolshevi ks are greatly di s
turbed.'
Val i ne confrmed this account : 'To tolerate anarchi st
propaganda woul d have been sui ci de for Leni n. I t (the Bolshe
vi k authority) di d everything possi ble to impede and then for
bid and repress by brute force, all mani festati ons of l i bertari an
ideas. '
Thi s repressi on began wi th a change of attitude on the
questi on of workers' management. From 1 9 1 8 onwards,
opposi ti on was kept within the Bolshevi k party - outside al l
cri ti ci sm was suppressed. Hence i t i s by looki ng at developments
i nside the Bolshevi k Party that we can best follow the process
of repressi on, which culminated in the si lencing, even wi thi n
the party, of anyone who spoke up for t he crushed proletari at.
The Tenth Congress of the Bolshevi k Party, i n March 1 92 1
dissolved a l l Party fractions, whi l e outside, the Party
was busy fring on the workers and sailors at Kronstadt, and on
what pockets of resi stance there sti l l were i n the rest of the
country. In particular, the Ukrai ni an Makhno Movement was
a force the Bolshevi ks had to destroy at al l costs .
3. The Makhno Movement and Opposition
within the Party
The Makhnovchi na, better perhaps than any other movement,
shows that the Russian Revolution could have become a great
l i berating force. It was i nspired by Makhno, a young Ukrai n
i an anarchist, and has been almost totally i gnored by bourgeoi s
hi storians no less than by Stali nist and Trotskyist apologists -
and for good reason. It shows the Bolsheviks stifi ng workers
and peasants wi th l i es and calumnies, and then crushi ng them
in a bloody massacre.
Geographically, the Makhno movement covered a region
inhabited by seven million people and measuring some 1 50
mi l es in diameter. Its centre was the small Ukrai ni an town of
Gulye Polye with 30,000 inhabitants.
The movement fourished from 1 9 1 8 unti l the summer of
1 921 , when it was fnally crushed by the Red Army.
From 1 9 1 8 to 1 921 , armed Makhnovite groups fought the
White Guards and later the Red Army without respite. They
were responsible for holdi ng the Ukrai ni an front against the
White general Deniki n, whose armies Makhno defeated in 1 91 9,
and then against General Wrangel. The best way of showing
who they were and what they stood for is to quote from the
mani festo published by the Cultural and Educational Section
of the Insurrectional Makhnovite Army. It was widely distri
buted among the peasants and workers.
'(i) Who are the Makhnovites and what are they fghting for ?
The Makhnovi tes are peasants and workers who i n 1 9 1 8 rose
up against the brutality of the German, Hungarian and Aust
rian interventionists and against the Hetman of the Ukrai ne.
220
The Makhno Movement
'The Makhnovi tes are workers who have carried the battle
standard against Deni ki n and agai nst every form of oppressi on
and vi olence, who have rejected l i es from whatever source.
'The Makhnovi tes are the workers who by thei r li fe's l abour
have enri ched and fattened the bourgeoi si e i n the past, and are
today enrichi ng new masters.
'(ii) Why are they called Makhnovites ?
" Because duri ng the greatest and most pai nful days of reacti on
ary i nterventi on i n the Ukrai ne, they had wi thi n their ranks the
staunch friend and comrade, Makhno, whose voi ce was heard
across the enti re Ukraine, chal l engi ng every act of vi olence
agai nst the workers, cal l i ng for struggle against the oppressors,
the thi eves, the usurpers and those charlatans who were de
cei vi ng the workers. That voi ce sti l l ri ngs among us today,
and unwaveri ngl y calls for the l i beration and emancipation of
the workers from al l oppressi on.
'(iii) Ho1 v do you think you wil obtain this liberation ?
' By overthrowing the coal i ti on of monarchists, republ i cans,
soci al democrats, communists and Bolshevi ks. In its place we
call for the free el ection of workers' councils which wi l l not
rule by arbi trary laws because no true sovi et system can
be authori tari an. Ours i s the purest form of social ism,
anti - authori tari an and anti -government, i t calls for the free organ
izati on of the soci al l i fe of the workers, independent of author
ity, a l i fe i n whi ch each worker, i n a free associ ati on wi th hi s
brothers, can bui ld hi s own happi ness and wel l - being i n ac
cordance wi th the principles of sol idarity, ami ty and equal i ty.
221
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
'(iv) What do the Makhnovites think ofthe Soviet regime ?
'The workers themselves must choose thei r own counci l s
(soviets), to express the wi l l and carry out the orders of these
self-same workers. The soviets will be executive organs of, and
not authori ti es over, the workers. The land, the factories, the
busi nesses, the mi nes, transport, etc. must belong to those who
work i n them. Al l that the people i nheri t must be soci ali zed.
'(v) What are the paths that will lead to the final goals of the
Makhnovites ?
' A consistent and implacable revolutionary battle agai nst al l
false theories, against al l arbitrary power and vi olence, no
matter from what quarter, a struggle to the death. Free speech,
justice, honest battle wi th guns in our hands .
' Onl y by overthrowing al l governments, every representative
of authori ty, by destroying all pol i tical, economi c and authori
tari an l i es, wherever they are found, by destroyi ng the state, by
a soci al revolution, can we i ntroduce a true system of workers'
and peasants' soviets and advance towards soci al i sm. '
Trotsky was one of Makhno's bi tterest adversaries among
the Bolshevi ks, and never forgave Makhno for refusi ng to
serve under hi s supreme command in the Red Army. On 4 June
1 9 1 9, Trotsky began hi s frst campaign of calumny and mi l i tary
i nti mi dati on, by publ i shi ng the notori ous order No. 1 824. It
forbade the hol di ng of a congress in the Ukrai ne, and accused
Makhno of delivering this front over to the enemy. 'The
Makhno brigade has constantly retreated before the Whi te
Guards, owi ng to the i ncapacity, cri mi nal tendencies, and the
treachery of i ts leaders. '
Trotsky's order stipulated, inter alia :
' ( I ) I is forbidden to hold this congress, which must not take
place under any ci rcumstances;
' (2) Participation i n the congress by any worker or peasant
wi l l be deemed to constitute an act of hi gh treason;
222
The Makhno Movement
'(3) All delegates to the said congress must be apprehended
and brought before the revolutionary tri bunal of the Four
teenth Army of the Ukrai ne. '
So much for Trotsky's respect for the workers' ri ght of free
assembl y!
The accusation that Makhno had retreated before the Whi te
Guards, when i n fact he defeated them, was repeated by the
enti re Soviet press. But for the time bei ng, conti nued attacks
by the Whi te Guards prevented Trotsky from i mplementing hi s
Order 1 824 he shelved i t but di d not forget i t. I n November
I 920, the Sovi et authori ti es i nvi ted several ofcers of Makhno's
army to a mi l itary counci l meeti ng, and shot them. The ensui ng
battle raged for ni ne long months. At the end, Trotsky's troops,
who were superi or in number and i n arms and had constant
replacements, won the day. lt was in the course of the last battle
that the Makhnovi tes i ssued the following appeal to thei r
brethren in the Red Army :
'
S TOP, RE AD AND T HI NK !
'
'Comrades of the Red Army!
'You have been sent out by your commissars to fght the re
voluti onary Makhnovites.
'On the orders of your commander you rui n peaceful
vi ll ages, you wi l l raid, arrest, and ki l l men and women whom
you do not know but who have been presented to you as
enemies of the people, bandi ts and counter- revoluti onary. You
wi l l be told to ki ll us, you wi l l not be asked. You wi l l be
made to march l i ke slaves. You wi l l arrest and you wi ll mur
der . Why? For what cause?
'Thi nk, comrades of the Red Army; thi nk, workers, peasants
sufering under the lash of new masters who bear the hi gh
soundi ng name of "worker-peasant authori ti es"! We are
revol uti onary Makhnovi tes. The same peasants and workers
as you, our brethren i n the Red Army. We have risen up
agai nst oppressi on and slavery, we fght for a better l i fe and a
more enli ghtened one. Our ideal is to bui ld a communi ty of
workers wi thout authori ti es, wi thout parasites, and wi thout
commi ssars. Our i mmediate aim i s to establ i sh a free Sovi et
223
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
regime, not controlled by the Bolsheviks, without the pressure
of any party.
'The government of the Bolsheviks and Communists has sent
you out on a punitive expedition. It hastens to make peace
with Deni ki n and with the rich Poles and other rabble of the
Whi te Army, the better to suppress the popular movement of
the revolutionary i nsurgents, of the oppressed, of the rebels
against the yoke of all authority.
'But the threats of the White and Red commanders do not
frighten us. We shal l reply to vi olence wi th vi ol ence. If neces
sary, we, a smal l handful of people shal l put to fi ght the
divisions of the Red Army because we are free and love our
l i berty. We are revol utionaries who have risen up i n a just cause.
'Comrades, think for whom you are fghti ng and against
whom! Throw of your shackles, you are free men!
'The Revolutionary Makhnovites. '
Let us hope that one day some publ i sher wi l l see ft to trans
late Arshi nov's History of the Makhno Movement which is
unobtainable today but i s fundamental to any true understand
ing of the hi story of the Russian Revol uti on. Makhno's defeat
spelled the defeat of the Revolution; Trotsky's vi ctory, the
victory of the bureaucratic counter-revol uti on.
Even whi l e the struggle for Soviet democracy was sti l l being
carried on under a black banner in the Ukraine, elsewhere the
Bolsheviks had succeeded i n crushing every form of resistance.
Inside the party, a bi tter controversy on the question of 'one
man management' was started i n the spring of 1 9 1 8. The del i
berate policy of the Bolshevik leaders to run al l factories by
State-appointed managers was not onl y a fagrant breach of
Bolshevi k promises but al so led t o the demoralization of the
most advanced sectors of the Russian prol etari at. This develop
ment was a strong contributive factor to the bureaucratic
degeneration of the Bolshevi k party. Lenin's 'The immediate
tasks of the Soviet Government', published in Izvestia on 28
Apri l 1 9 1 8, explained the stand of the Party leadership i n quite
unambiguous terms : i t emphasized di sci pli ne, obedience and
224
The Makhno Movement
the need for i ndi vi dual rather than collecti ve management.
' Di sci pl i ne i s a prerequisite of economi c renewal . . . Greater
output is essenti al . . . The class-consci ous vanguard of the
Russi an proletari at has al ready tackled the task of enforci ng
di sci pl i ne at work, for example, the Central Committee of the
Metal Workers Uni on and the Central Counci l of the Trade
Unions, have begun to draft the necessary measures and
decrees. '
These 'measures and decrees' whereby ' l abour di sci pl i ne' was
to be enforced make tragic reading in the l i ght of subsequent
events . They start by bemoani ng the 'absence of al l i ndustri al
discipl i ne' . They then prescri be measures 'for the purpose of
i mprovi ng l abour disci pl i ne such as : the i ntroducti on of a card
system for registeri ng the productivity of each worker, the
i ntroducti on of factory regul ati ons i n every enterprise, the
establ i shment of rate of output bureaux for the purpose of
fxi ng the output of each worker and the payment of bonuses
for i ncreased producti vi ty. ' (Leni n : Selected Works, Vol . VII,
page 504.)
It requi res no great imagi nati on to see in the pen- pushers
recordi ng the 'producti vi ty of each worker' and i n the cl erks
manni ng 'the rate of output bureaux' the as yet amorphous
elements of the new bureaucracy.
But Leni n went much further. He qui te expl i citl y came out,
as early as 1 9 1 8, i n favour of the i ndividual management of
i ndustri al enterpri ses. 'The struggle that i s developing around
the recent decree on the management of the rai l ways, the
decree which grants individual leaders dictatorial powers (or
"unl i mi ted powers") is characteristic,' he wrote. Only the 'con
sci ous representatives of petty-bourgeoi s laxity' coul d see 'in
thi s granti ng of unl i mi ted ( i .e. di ctatorial) powers to i ndi vi dual
persons a departure from the col legi um pri nci ple, a departure
from democracy and from other pri nci ples of Sovi et govern
ment'. 'Large scal e machi ne i ndustry,' he went on, '- whi ch is
the materi al producti ve source and foundati on of soci al i sm -
cal l s for absol ute and stri ct unity of wi l l . . . How can strict
uni ty of wi l l be ensured? By thousands subordi nating their wi l l
to the wi l l of one. '
225
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
What of discussion and i ni tiative at shop foor level ? The
i dea was summari l y dismissed. 'The revol uti on demands,' Leni n
wrote, ' i n the i nterests of soci al i sm that the masses unquestion
ingly obey the si ngle will of the leaders of the labour process.'
No nonsense here about workers' management of production,
about col lective decisions, about government from below. Nor
are we left in any doubt as to who the 'leaders of the labour
process' were to be. There was, Lenin sai d, to be 'unquesti oni ng
obedience to the orders of i ndi vi dual representatives of the
Soviet government during work time' - ' iron di sci pl i ne while at
work, wi th unquestioning obedience to the wi l l of a si ngl e
person, the Soviet leader. '
Leni n's oft- repeated views on labour di sci pl i ne di d not go
unchallenged. Opposition developed withi n the Party itself.
Early i n I 9 1 8, the Leningrad Di strict Committee publ i shed
the frst issue of the ' left' Communi st paper Kommunist. This
was edited by Bukhari n, Radek and Ossinsky (Obolonsky
and Smirnov were later to joi n the edi torial board). The jour
nal issued a far-sighted warning : 'The i ntroduction of labour
di sci pli ne i n connexion with the restoration of capital i st man
agement of i ndustry cannot really increase the productivity of
labour, but it will di mi nish the class i ni ti ative, activi ty and
organization of the proletariat. It threatens to enslave the
working class. It will rouse discontent among the backward
elements as well as among the vanguard of the proletari at. In
order t o i ntroduce this system i n t he face of the hatred prevai l
i ng at present among the proletariat for the "capitali st
saboteurs", the Communist Party would have to rely on the
petty- bourgeoisie, as against the workers, and i n thi s way i t
would rui n i tself as the party of the proletari at. '
Leni n reacted vi olently. He called such vi ews 'a di sgrace', 'a
complete renunciation of communi sm in practice', 'a complete
desertion to the camp of the petty-bourgeoi si e' . (' Left-wing
Chi l di shness and Petty-bourgeoi s Mental i ty', Selected Works
Vol . VII, p. 374_ ) The Left were being 'provoked by the lsuvs
(Mensheviks) ana other Judases of capi tali sm'. He lumped
together leaders of the ' l eft' and open enemies of the revol u
ti on, thus i ni ti ati ng the technique of the pol i tical smear whi ch
226
The Makhno Movement
was to be used so successful ly by Stal i n i n later years. A cam
paign was whi pped up i n Leni ngrad which compel led the Kom
munist to transfer publ ication to Moscow, where the paper
reappeared in Apri l 1 9 1 8, frst under the auspi ces of the Mos
cow regional organization of the Party, later as the ' unofci al '
mouthpi ece of a group of comrades.
The controversy smouldered on throughout 1 9 1 8. Kom
munist repeatedly denounced the replacement of workers'
control by ' labour di sci pli ne', the i ncreasing tendency for i n
dustr i al management to be placed i n the hands of non-Com
munist 'speci al i sts' and the conclusion of al l sorts of unofci al
deals wi th previous owners 'to ensure their cooperati on' . It
poi nted out that 'the logical outcome of management based
on the parti ci pation of capi tal i sts and on the pri nci pl e of bur
eaucratic central izati on was the i nstitution of a labour policy
whi ch would seek to re- establish regimentation of workers on
the pretext of vol untary disci pl i ne. Governmental forms would
then evolve towards bureaucratic centralization, the rule of a11
sorts of commi ssars, loss of i ndependence for local Soviets
and. i n practice, the abandonment of government from bel ow' .
' It was al l very wel l , ' Bukhar in poi nted out, 'to say as Leni n
had (i n State and Revolution) that "each cook shoul d learn to
manage the State". But what happened when each cook had a
commi ssar appoi nted to order hi m about ? '
The confict between the Leni ni sts and the ' left' Communists
came to a head during May and June 1 9 1 8, duri ng the First
Congress of Economic Counci l s. Lenin spoke out strongly i n
favour of 'labour disci pl i ne' , of 'one-man managemtnl' and
of the need to use bourgeois speci ali sts. Ossinsky, Smi rnov and
Obol ensky, supported by numerous provi nci al delegates, de
manded 'a workers' admi ni stration . . . not onl y from above
but from bel ow' . They urged that two thi rds of the represen
tatives on the management boards of i ndustri al enterprises
should be el ected from among the workers. They succeeded i n
getting a Congress sub-commi ttee t o accept this resol uti on.
Leni n was furi ous at thi s 'stupi d deci si on' . Under hi s gui dance
a pl enary session of the Congress 'corrected' the resoluti on,
decreed that no more than one-thi rd of the manageri al per-
227
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
sonnel shoul d be elected, and set up a complex hi erarchi cal
structure vesting veto ri ghts i n a Supreme Economic Counci l ,
at the apex of an admini strative pyrami d.
A spli t occurred at this time among the ' left' Communi sts.
Radek was wi l l i ng to make a deal with the Leni ni sts. He was
prepared to accept the 'one-man management' pri nci ple i n ex
change for the extensive nationalization decrees of June 1 9 1 8,
whi ch heralded the period of War Communism, and whi ch i n
hi s opi ni on would ensure the proletarian basi s of the regime.
Bukhari n also broke wi th Ossinsky and rejoined the fol d. The
ideas developed by the left Communists conti nued to fnd an
echo, however, despite the defection of most of those who had
frst advocated them. Ossinsky and hi s supporters formed the
new opposition group of 'Democratic Central ists' . Thei r i deas
on workers' management of production (and those of the ori gi
nal group of ' l eft' Communi sts) were to play an i mportant
part i n the development, two years later, of the Workers'
Oppositi on.
Wri ti ng i n the second issue of the Kommunist, Ossinsky was
to issue a prophetic warning : 'We stand,' he wrote, 'for the
construction of a proletarian society by the class creativity of
the workers themselves, not by ukases from the "captains of
i ndustry" . . . We proceed from trust i n the class i nstinct, and
i n the active class i ni tiative of the proletarai t. It cannot be
otherwi se. If the workers themselves do not know how to
create the necessary prerequisites for the soci al i st organiza
tion of labour - no one can do thi s for them, nor can the wor
kers be forced to do it. The stick, i f rai sed agai nst the workers,
wi l l fnd i tself either i n the hands of another soci al force . . . or
i n the hands of the sovi et power. But then the soviet power wi l l
be forced to seek support against the proletariat from another
class (e.g. the peasantry), and by thi s it wi l l destroy i tself as
the dictatorship of the proletariat. Soci al i sm and soci ali st
organization must be set up by the proletariat i tself, or they
wi l l not be set up at al l ; something else wi l l be set up : state
capital i sm. '
These prophetic phrases, and the reception they were given
by Lenin and Trotsky, should put an end to all the 'revol u-
228
The Makhno Movement
ti onary' arguments that it was Stal i n the Terri bl e alone who
perverted soci al i sm into a bureaucratic di ctatorshi p.
Thus i t was Trotsky, not Stal i n, who, towards the end of
1 9 1 9, submi tted to the Central Committee the famous thesis
'transi ti on from war to peace' . The most i mportant of his pro
posi ti ons was the call for the 'mi l i tarization of the proletar
i at' .
Trotsky di d not bel i eve that these proposi ti ons woul d go
further than the Central Committee; l i ke al l good bureaucrats
he l i ked to take the most i mportant decisions behi nd closed
doors. But by ' mi stake' , Bukharin publ i shed its text in Pravda
of 1 7 December 1 91 9. Accordi ng to Isaac Deutscher, thi s i n
di screti on caused an extremely tense publi c controversy and
one that conti nued for more than a year, as the worki ng class
sei zed on thi s unexpected opportunity of di scussi ng its own
fate. Trotsky defended hi s vi ews before the Ni nth Congress of
the Bolshevi k Party in 1 920 : The workers must not be al lowed
to roam al l over Russi a. They must be sent where they are
needed, called up and di rected l i ke soldi ers. Labour must be
di rected most i ntensely duri ng the transi ti on of capi tal i sm to
soci al i sm. ' We mi ght add, i n parenthesis, that si nce thi s transi
ti on has not yet been made, and never wi l l be made unl ess
there is another revol uti on, Soviet workers must prepare to
settle down to a further spell of forced labour. ' I t is essenti al , '
Trotsky went on, 'to form puni ti ve conti ngents and to put al l
those who shi rk work i nto concentration camps . '
Stal i n, who as Trotsky himself has repeatedly poi nted out,
lacked theoreti cal i magi nati on, di d i n fact very li ttle more than
pursue the theoretical and practical path opened up by Trot
sky. In particular, Trotsky i ntroduced Stakhanovi sm when he
ofered speci al bonuses for extra efort 'worthy of soci al i st
emul ati on' ; he al so spoke of the need to adopt the 'progressi ve
essence of Taylori sm' - at that ti me the most extreme form of
capi tal ist exploi tati on. Leni n's thesis of one- man management
and 'work di sci pl i ne' were adopted at this Congress.
After the Ni nth Congress, Trotsky wrote : The young
workers' state requi res trade uni ons not for a struggle for
better condi ti ons of labour . . . but to organi ze the worki ng
229
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
class for the ends of production, to educate, to di scipl i ne the
workers . . . to exerci se thei r authority hand in hand wi th the
State, to lead the workers i nto the framework of a si ngle eco
nomi c plan . . . ' (Trotsky: Dictat orship vs. Democracy, page 1 4.)
The uni ons shoul d disci pl i ne the workers and teach them to
place the i nterests of production above thei r own needs and
demands. ' Of the mi l i tarization of labour Trotsky sai d: Thi s
term at once brings us i nto the region of the greatest possi bl e
superst itions and outcri es from the opposi ti on. ' (ibid. , page 1 4.)
He denounced hi s opponents as Menshevi ks, and 'people ful l
of trade unioni st prej udices'.
The mi l i tarization of labour, ' he declared at the Thi rd Con
gress of Trade Unions, ' . . . i s the i ndi spensabl e basic method
for the organization of our labour forces. ' This use of the
word 'our' when referring to the labour forces of the working
c lass ful l y justifes Debord' s remark : 'Its cl ai m to a mono
poly of the representati on and defence of the workers, turned
the Bolshevi k Party into what i t i s today : the masters of the
proletariat . . .' (La Societe du Spectacle. )
'Was i t true,' Trotsky asked, 'that compul sory labour was
always unproductive? ' He denounced thi s view as 'wretched
and miserable l iberal prejudice', learnedly poi nti ng out
that 'chattel slavery, too, was productive' - and that compul
sory serf labour was i n its ti mes 'a progressive phenomenon' .
He tol d the uni ons that 'coercion, regimentati on and mi l i tari
zati on of labour were no mere emergency measures and that
the workers' State normally had the right to coerce any ci ti
zen to perform any work at any place of i ts choosing'. A l ittle
later he proclaimed that the 'mi l itarization of the trade unions
and the mi l itarization of transport requi red an interal, ideo
logical mi l i tari zati on' .
And this was precisely what Stalin achi eved, when he
stepped i nto the shoes of that great strategist who later be
came hi s bi tterest opponent. Trotsky, who had al ready 'dis
cipl i ned' the army by aboli shi ng the soldi ers' sovi ets, early i n
1 920 took over the Commissariat of Transport, i n addi ti on to
hi s defence post. The Politburo ofered to back hi m to the
hi lt, i n any course of action he might take, no matter how
230
The Makhno Movement
severe. Once in charge of Transport, Trotsky was i mmediately
to i mpl ement his pet ideas on the ' mi l i tarization of l abour'.
The rai lwaymen and the personnel of the repai r workshops
were put under martial law. There was a major outcry. To
si lence his cri tics, and wi th the ful l endorsement of the Party
leadershi p, Trotsky ousted the el ected leaders of the uni on
and appointed others who were wi l l i ng to do hi s bi dding. He
repeated the procedure i n other uni ons of transport workers.
Perhaps i t i s of these men he was thi nking when he wrote :
'It i s a general rul e that man wi l l try to get out of work. Man
i s a lazy ani mal . ' And i n hi s 'Terrorism and Communism', a
pi ece of Trotskyist wri ti ng i f ever there was one, he pro
clai med : 'Those workers who contri bute more than the rest to
the general good have every right to receive a larger share of
the soci alist product than layabouts, i dlers and the undi sci
pl i ned. '
The last battl e over the mi l itarization of work was fought
inside the party i n 1 920-21 . Those opposed to Trotsky's
i deas formed the 'Workers' Opposition' , whose hi story has
been recorded by Alexandra Kol lontai . A Party conference
held in Moscow in November 1 920 showed that the 'Workers'
Opposition' was growi ng rapi dly i n strength. 'They, the Cen
tralist Democrats and the l gnatov group (closely associated
wi th the "Workers' Opposition") obtai ned 1 24 seats as agai nst
the 1 54 obtai ned by the supporters of the Central Commi ttee. '
(Daniels : The Conscience of the Revolution.)
The Party leadership took fright and i ntroduced a whole
seri es of counter-measures, some of which were so scandalous
that the Moscow Committee passed a resol uti on publ i cl y cen
sori ng the Petrograd Party ' for not observing the rul es of cor
rect di scussi on' . The Central Committee, too, was cri ti ci zed
and i nstructed to 'ensure that the allocation of pri nted matter
and speakers was such that all poi nts of vi ew can be honestly
represented'. At the Tenth Congress, Alexandra Kollontai
nevertheless felt i mpelled to protest that the distri buti on of
her pamphlet, The Workers' Opposition, had been del i berately
sabotaged.
Leni n denounced the Workers' Opposi ti on at the very
231
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
begi nni ng of the Congress, cal l i ng it 'a menace to the Revoluti on. '
The atmosphere of the Congress was electri c, parti cularly when
Kollontai, lgnatov and many others attacked the bureaucracy,
i ts class character, and the transformation of the Party i nto a
non-proletarian one by the i nfux of new elements. What the
'Leftist' Communists had foreseen i n 1 9 1 8, what Vol i ne and
the anarchists had prophesied al l along, had become real ity :
The party had become the springboard for bureaucratic
careeri sts. ' Lenin and Trotsky were to triumph over the Wor
kers' Opposi ti on, and when they had done so, the last voice to
speak up for the Soviet working class was si lenced. The Con
gress ordered the di ssoluti on of all factions wi thi n the Party
- havi ng squashed freedom of expression outside the Party
leaders now fni shed of the opposition wi thi n. Nor was i t
simply a struggle of ideas - it was the very fate of the working
class that was at stake i n this battle. Whi le ostensibly attack
i ng the Left-wing Communists, the Centrist Democrats and
the Workers' Opposi ti on, i t was i n fact the worki ng cl ass i tself
that was bei ng clubbed down, that lost every ri ght to manage
i ts own desti ny.
At the Congress, Trotsky accused the Workers' Opposi ti on
of putti ng forward dangerous slogans. They turn democratic
pri nci ples i nto a feti sh. They put the right of the workers to
elect their own representatives above the Party, thus challeng
i ng the ri ght of the Party to afrm i ts dictatorship, even when
thi s di ctatorship comes i nto confict wi th the evanescent mood
of the workers' democracy. We must bear i n mi nd the hi stori
cal mi ssi on of our Party. The Party i s forced to mai ntai n i ts
dictatorship wi thout stopping for these vaci l lations, nor even
the momentary falterings of the worki ng class. This realiza
ti on is the mortar which cements our uni ty. The dictatorship
of the proletariat does not always have to conform to formal
pri nciples of democracy.'
And Leni n mocked at the Workers' Opposition : ' A produ
cers' Congress! What precisely does that mean? It is di fcult
to fnd words to describe this folly. I keep asking myself, can
they be joki ng? Can one really take these people seri ously?
Whi le production i s always necessary, democracy i s not.
232
The Makhno Movement
Democracy of production engenders a series of radically false
i deas. '
Lenin should not have laughed quite so loudly at al l this
' fol ly' , for it was precisely what he himself had written in 1 9 1 7,
i n hi s State and Revolution. Every phrase of that book is a
denunci ati on of the Bolshevik poli cy i n 1 920-2 1 , for i t was
written at a time when the masses forced Leni n to be an anar
chist rather than a Bolshevi k. When it sui ted him, Lenin buri ed
the State and Revolution. And even whi l e Trotsky was still
thunderi ng on about the Workers' Opposition, Leni n was
forced, and not by words only, to correct 'the temporary
falterings of the working class' . This he did at Kronstadt,
where the bullets of the Party fnally settled 'the confict be
tween its dictatorship and the evanescent moods of the workers'
democracy .
4. Kronstadt
At the end of February, 1 921 , the workers of Petro grad, who
had been making an enormous productive efort despite the
short rati ons they were all owed, went on stri ke agai nst their
i ntolerable condi tions. The Party and Zinoviev, who was re
sponsi bl e for the defence of Petrograd, could thi nk of only one
answer : to send a detachment of the Koursanty (cadet ofcers)
against the strikers, and to proclaim a state of siege in Petro
grad. In The Kronstadt Commune*, Ida Mett tells what hap
pened next .
On 26 February the Kronstadt sailors, naturally i nterested
in all that was goi ng on i n Petrograd, sent delegates to fnd out
about the stri kes. The delegation vi si ted a number of factories.
It returned to Kronstadt on the 28th. That same day, the crew
of the battleshi p Petropavlovsk, having di scussed the si tua
ti on, voted the followi ng resolution :
'Having heard the reports of the representatives sent by the
General Assembly of the Fleet to fnd out about the si tuati on
i n Petrograd, the sai lors demand :
' ( I ) Immediate new elections to the Soviets. The present So
v

iets no longer express the wi shes of the workers and peasants.

The new elections should be by secret ballot, and should be
preceded by free electoral propaganda.
'(2) Freedom of speech and of the press for workers and
peasants, for the anarchists, and for the Left Soci al i st parties.
(3) The right of assembly, and freedom for trade union and
peasant organizations.
'(4) The organization, at the latest on 1 0 March 1 921 , of
* Ida Mett : The Kronstadt Commune, Solidarity Pamphl et No 27 pub
lished by Sol i darity, 53a Westmoreland Road, Bromley, Kent, November,
1 967.
234
Kronstadt
a Conference of non-Party workers, soldi ers and sai lors of
Petrograd, Kronstadt and the Petrograd Distri ct.
' (5) The l i beration of all pol i ti cal prisoners of the Soci al ist
parties, and of all i mpri soned workers and peasants, soldi ers
and sai lors belongi ng to worki ng class and peasant organiza
ti ons.
'(6) The electi on of a commissi on to look i nto the dossi ers of
al l those detai ned i n pr isons and concentration camps.
'(7) The abol i ti on of al l pol i tical sections i n the armed forces.
No pol i tical party should have pr ivi leges for the propagation
of i ts ideas, or recei ve State subsi di es to thi s end. In the place
of the pol itical sections, various cultural groups should be set
up, deri ving resources from the State.
'(8) The i mmedi ate abol i ti on of the mi l iti a detachments set
up between towns and countrysi de.
' (9) The equal i zation of rations for al l workers, except those
engaged i n dangerous or unhealthy jobs.
'( 1 0) The abol i ti on of Party combat detachments i n all
mi l itary groups. The aboli ti on of Party guards i n factori es and
enterpri ses. If guards are requi red, they should be nomi nated,
taki ng i nto account the views of the workers.
' ( 1 1 ) The granting to the peasants of freedom of action on
thei r own soi l , and of the right to own cattle, provi ded they
look after them themselves and do not employ hi red labour.
' ( 1 2) We request that al l mi l itary units and ofcer trai nee
groups associ ate themselves wi th this resoluti on.
' ( 1 3) We demand that the Press gi ve proper publ icity to thi s
resoluti on.
' ( 1 4) We demand the i nstituti on of mobi l e workers control
groups.
' ( 1 5) We demand that handicraft production be authorized
provi ded i t does not uti l ize wage labour. '
The workers and sai lors of Kronstadt were, i n fact, defend
i ng the power of the soviets agai nst the power of the Party.
The Kronstadt resoluti on had the mer it of stati ng thi ngs
openly and clearl y. But i t was breaki ng no new ground. Its
mai n i deas were being discussed everywhere. For havi ng, in
one way or another, put forward precisely such ideas, workers
235
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
and peasants were already fll ing the prisons and the recently
set up concentration camps.
And whi l e all this was going on, Radio Moscow kept
spreading l i es and calumnies against the workers. Thus when
Stal i n accused Trotsky a few years later of conspi ri ng with a
Whi te Guard ofcer of the Wrangel Army, he was merely
usi ng the same smear campaign Trotsky had used agai nst the
Kronstadt sailors.
On 3 March, for instance, Radio Moscow launched the
fol lowing appeal : 'Struggle against the White Guard Pl ot . . .
Just l i ke other White Guard insurrections, the muti ny of ex
General Kozlovsky and the crew of the battleship Petro
pavlovsk has been organized by Entente spies. This is clear
from the fact that the French paper Le Monde published the
following message from Helsingfors two weeks before the
revol t of General Kozlovsky : "We are i nformed from Petro
grad that as the result of the recent Kronstadt revolt, the Bol
shevi k mi l itary authorities have taken a whole series of
measures t o isolate the town and t o prevent t he soldiers and
sailors of Kronstadt from entering Petrograd."
'It is therefore clear that the Kronstadt revolt is being led
from Paris. The French counter espionage is mi xed up in the
whole afai r. Hi story i s repeating itsel f. The Social i st Revol u
t ionaries, who have their headquarters i n Paris, are preparing
the ground for an i nsurrection against the Sovi et power. The
ground prepared, their real master the Tsarist general
appeared. The hi story of Koltchak, instal l ing his power i n
the wake of that of the Socialist Revolutionaries, i s being
repeated. '
Faced wi th al l these l i es and al so wi th an i mminent attack
by the Central Government, local Bolsheviks deserted their
party en masse. To appreciate just how strongly they felt, we
need only read some of the letters they sent to the Kronstadt
Izvestia. The teacher Denissov wrote : 'I openly declare to the
Provi sional Revolutionary Committee that as from gunfre
directed at Kronstadt, I no longer consider myself a member
of the Party. I support the call issued by the workers of Kron
stadt. Al l power to the Soviets, not to the Party! '
236
Kronstadt
A mi l i tary group assigned to the speci al company deal i ng
with di sci pl i ne also issued a declaration : 'We the undersigned
j oi ned the Party bel ievi ng i t to express the wi shes of the work
i ng masses. In fact the Party has proved itself an execut ioner
of workers and peasants. This i s revealed quite clearly by re
cent events in Petrograd. These events show up the face of the
Party leaders. The recent broadcasts from Moscow show
clearly that the Party leaders are prepared to resort to any
means i n order to retai n power.
'We ask that henceforth, we no longer be considered Party
members. We rally to the call issued by the Kronstadt gar
ri son in i ts resol uti on of 2 March. We i nvi te other comrades
who have become aware of the error of their ways, publ ical ly
to recognize the fact.
' Si gned: G U T MA N, YE F I MOV, K OUDR I ATZEV, A N DREEV.
'
(Izvestia of the Provi si onal Revoluti onary Committee, 7
March 1 921 .)
Every attempt to settle matters peacefully was rejected out
of hand by the government; Trotsky ordered hi s troops 'to
shoot the Kronstadt "rebels" down like partri dges', and en
trusted the task to Toukhatchevsky, a mi l itary expert taken
over from the Old Regi me. On 6 March, Trotsky addressed
the following radi o appeal to the Kronstadt garri son over the
radi o :
The Workers' and Peasants' Government has deci ded to
reassert its authori ty without delay, both over Kronstadt and
over the muti nous battleships, and to put them at the disposal
of the Sovi et Republ i c. I therefore order al l those who have
raised a hand against the Soci al ist Fatherland, i mmediately to
l ay down thei r weapons. Those who resist will be di sarmed and
put at the disposal of the Sovi et Command. The arrested com
missars and other representatives of the Government must be
freed i mmedi ately. Only those who surrender uncondi ti onally
wi ll be abl e to count on the clemency of the Sovi et Republ i c. I
am meanwhi l e gi vi ng orders that everything be prepared to
smash the revolt and the rebels by force of arms. The res
ponsi bi l i ty for the di sasters whi ch will afect the ci vi l ian popu-
237
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
lati on must fall squarely on the heads of the Whi te Guard
i nsurgents.
'Signed : TROTSKY, President of the Mi l i tary Revoluti onary
Counci l of the Sovi et Republ i c.
tKAMENEV, * Gl avkom (Commanding Ollicer) .'
No matter how often the workers of Kronstadt afrmed
their loyalty to Sovi et Socialism, Kronstadt, l i ke Carthage, was
destroyed; its appeal to the truth went unheard :
'
TO ALL, TO ALL, TO AL L
'
'Comrades, workers, red soldiers and sai l ors! Here i n Kron
stadt we know full well how much you and your wives and
your chi ldren are sufering under the iron rule of the Party. We
have overthrown the Party-dominated Soviet. The Provisi onal
Revolutionary Committee i s today starting electi ons to a new
Sovi et. It wi ll be freely elected, and i t wi l l refect the wi shes of
the whole working population, and of the garri son - and not
j ust those of a handful of Party members.
' Our cause is just. We stand for the power of the soviets,
not for that of the Party. We stand for freely elected repre
sentatives of the toi l ing masses. Deformed soviets, dominated
by the Party, have remained deaf to our pleas. Our appeals
have been answered with bullets.
'The workers' pati ence i s becoming exhausted. So now they
are seeki ng to pacify you with crumbs. On Zi noviev's orders
the mi l itia barrages have been wi thdrawn. Moscow has al lo
cated ten mi l l i on gold roubles for the puchase of foodstufTs
and other articles of frst necessity. But we know that the
Pctrograd proletariat wi l l not be bought over in this way. Over
the heads of the Party, we hold out to you the fraternal hand
of revolutionary Kronstadt.
'Comrades, you are being deceived. And truth i s bei ng di s
torted by the basest of calumnies.
'Comrades, don't al low yourselves to be misled.
'In Kronstadt, power i s i n the hands of the sai lors, of the
+ This Kamenev was an ex-Tsarist ofcer, now collaborat i ng wi th the
Sovi et Goverment. He was a di fferent Kamenev from the one shot by
the Stal i nists in 1 936.
238
Kronstadt
red soldi ers and of the revoluti onary workers. It i s not in the
hands of Whi te Guards commanded by General Kozlovsky,
as Moscow Radio lyi ngly asserts.
' Si gned : The Provi si onal Revolutionary Commi ttee. '
Kronstadt, as Vol i ne has ri ghtly poi nted out, was a genui ne
attempt by the workers to run thei r own l ives, without the
help of pol i ti cal leaders, tutors, or shepherds. And Alexander
Berkmann added : ' Kronstadt destroyed the myth of the
workers' state; i t provided the proof of an i ncompati bi l ity
between the dictatorshi p of the Communi st Party and the
Revolut ion. '
The Kronstadt iz vestia had thi s to say : ' Be careful , Trot
sky! You may escape the j udgement of the people, you may
shoot down i nnocent men and women by the score, but even
you cannot ki l l the truth. '
And on 8 March, the rebels wrote : 'At Kronstadt the foun
dation stone has been lai d of the Thi rd Revoluti on. Thi s wi l l
break the fnal chai ns whi ch sti l l bi nd the worki ng masses and
wi l l open up new paths of soci al i st creation. '
I t i s in the l ight of the events of February I 9 I 7, and March
I 92I , that we must read the followi ng text by Trotsky : 'It has
been sai d more than once that we have substituted the di c
tatorshi p of the Party for the dictatorshi p of the sovi ets. How
ever, we can cl ai m wi thout fear of contradi cti on that the
dictatorshi p of the soviets was onl y made possi bl e by the dic
tatorshi p of the Party . . . I n fact there has been no substi tuti on
at al l , si nce the Communists express the fundamental i nterests
of the worki ng class . . . (In a revolutionary period) the Com
munists become t he true representatives of t he worki ng class
as a whol e. '
Now thi s i s the very essence of Bolshevism: the worki ng
cl ass i s i ncapabl e of soci ali st consciousness, of maki ng a revo
l uti on, of runni ng soci al i st society - hence the Party must step
i n on i ts behalf and, i f necessary, ignore the 'temporary aber
rati ons' of the proletariat. What then i s the meani ng of the
phrase ' the emancipation of the workers can only be achieved
by the workers themselves' ? Leni n's answer was that the 'domi -
239
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
nati on by the worki ng class rests on the Constituti on, i n the
new property system'. De Gaulle ought to take a leaf out of his
book: enshrine workers' control in the French Consti tuti on but
leave the real power wi th the bourgeoi si e as heretofore, si nce
runni ng soci ety, according to Leni n, requires a ki nd of ski l l the
worki ng class does not have. Fancy a cook runni ng a mi nistry!
And so, when the party robbed the workers and the sovi ets
of their powers, they were obviously acting i n the best i nterests
of what was no more than an ignorant and i l literate mass.
And if only the Party can wi eld power for them, only the
Party must be allowed to wield power. Let us l i sten to Trotsky
agai n : \ ' But \ whol wi l l lguarant\ee, l some
l
evi l tongues have asked,
that your party alone represents the cause of historical devel
opment? In suppressing or overshadowing the other parties,
they say, you have rid yourself of pol i ti cal r ivals, and hence
prevented any chance of evaluating the correctness of your
own l i ne of conduct. ' Before looki ng at Trotsky's reply to hi s
own rhetorical question, we must repeat that not only had
the Bolshevi k leaders squashed al l opposition outsi de the
Party, but that they had al so outlawed al l opposi ti on within
the Party - as Trotsky hi mself was to di scover when hi s turn
came to challenge the authority of Stal i n. But let us hear what
he said at the time : 'Thi s question refects purely l i beral ideas
on the progress of the revoluti on. At a period when all antago
ni sts came out into the open and when the poli ti cal struggle
becomes transformed into Civi l War, the party in power has
other statistics for evaluating the correctness of its l i ne of con
duct than the circulation fgures of Menshevi k journals . . .
Noske tried to squash the Communi sts but their numbers kept
growing, whereas we succeeded i n demol ishing the Menshe
vi ks and the Social Revolutionaries unti l nothi ng remai ned of
them. This criteri on sufces us.'
It sufces us as well. The German Soci al Democrat Noske
did smash the German Revolution whi l e the number of Com
muni sts kept i ncreasing, but all this proves is that Trotsky was
good at fgures and not necessari ly at pol itical analysi s. In fact,
the German Communist Party enjoyed full parl i amentary i m
munity i n the Weimar Republi c. However, as soon as Hitfer
240
Kronstadt
took power in 1 933, not only the number of Jews but also that
of German Communi sts di mi ni shed by l eaps and bounds. Is
thi s a j usti fcati on of Hi tlerism? Agai n, the number of Trot
skyists in Russi a dwi ndled to al most nothing from 1 923 to
1 940. Is this a Trotskyist justifcation of Stali ni sm? Al l it proves
is the power of the repressive system.
In 1 92 1 , the fate of the Russi an Revoluti on was fnal l y sealed
and the bureaucracy tri umphed. Henceforth it would grow
daily in strength. It i s not surpri si ng that the working class,
having been weakened by years of civil war and fami ne and
then by the destructi on of the soviets, shoul d have stood by
passi vel y whi l e Trotsky himself was ' li qui dated'. Stal i n could
even permi t himself the i ndulgence of call i ng Trotsky 'the
patriarch of all bureaucrats'.
As far as we are concerned there i s no break between the
i deology of the ol d Bolshevi k Party and that of the new
bureaucracy.
'The di rection of the proletariat, acting through a cl andes
tine and di sci pl i ned party, and run by i ntellectuals turned pro
fessi onal revoluti onari es, had no need to come to terms with
other manageri al classes, and so became the absolute dictator
of soci ety. ' (Guy Debord : La Societe du Spectacle .)
Now, whi l e i t is undeni able that the Russi an Revol uti on took
place in a backward country - one in whi ch the peasantry was
predomi nant, that it was isolated, largely due to the fai l ure of
the German revol uti on, and that i t was severely weakened by
the Ci vi l War, these general factors can i n no way expl ai n the
speci fc turn i t took. For i nstance, l i ke the Commune of 1 871
or l i ke the German revoluti on, i t mi ght have been smashed
from wi thout and replaced by the old capital ist system. Even
the i ntroducti on of state capital i sm might have taken qui te di f
ferent forms than i t di d, i n fact, take in the Sovi et Union. More
over, backwardness and isolat ion have long been overcome :
today the Sovi et Uni on is a powerful i ndustri al gi ant with an
empi re that covers more than hal f of Europe. No, t he speci fc
fai l ure of the Russi an Revoluti on must be l ai d squarely at the
door of the Bolshevi k party. That fai lure was far more si gni f
cant even than the defeat of the French Commune at the hands
241
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
of reaction, of the Spanish Revolution at the hands of Franco,
or the Hungarian uprising by Krushchev's tanks - si mply be
cause the Russian Revolution had triumphed over the forces
of external reaction only to succumb to the bureaucracy the
Revoluti on i tself had engendered. It forces us to refect on the
nature of workers' powers and on what we mean by socialism.
What i s specifc i n the degeneration of the Russian Revoluti on
i s that, whi l e the 'revolutionary' party retai ned power, the
worki ng class itself lost i t; that i t was their own party that
defeated the workers, and not the classical forces of the
counter-revoluti on. What Rosa Luxemburg had to say about
the German revol ution, just before her death, appli es i n full to
the Russian Revolution as wel l : 'In al l previous revolutions,
the contenders were ranged on two clear si des, class against
class, programme against programme. In the present revolu
tion, the defenders of the old order do not fght under the
banner of the rul i ng class, but under the social democratic
banner. '
The onl y diference i s that i n Germany, the Soci al Demo
crats served as a front for the bourgeoi si e, while i n Russia, the
Bolshevi k wi ng of the Social Democratic Party took the place
of the bourgeoisie. From 1 9 1 8 to 1 921 , the Bolsheviks were
concerned to give Russia a well-organized economy based on
the then capi tali st model, i .e. State capital ism. This i s a term
that kept recurring in Lenin's writings. And what he and Trot
sky said time and again was that Russia must learn from the
advanced capitalist countries, that there is only one way of
developing production : the application of capitalist ideas on
management and industrial rationalization. Trotsky, for ex
ample, beli eved that the actual organization of the army di d
not matter so l ong as i t fought on the ri ght si de. Thus an army
i s not bourgeois because of its structure (e.g. hi erarchy and
discipline) but only i f i t serves the bourgeoi si e. Si mi larl y an
industrial system is not considered bourgeois because i ts disci
pl i ne, hierarchy, and i ncentives (bonuses, pi ece work, etc.) are
those used by the bourgeois system. Al l that matters, appar
ently, is whose power is enshrined i n what Lenin so proudly re
ferred to as his 'consti tution'. The i dea that the same means
242
Kronstadt
cannot serve di ferent ends, that neither the army nor a factory
are si mpl e ' i nstruments' but soci al i st structures embodyi ng
producti ve relati onships and hence the real power - thi s i dea,
so obvi ous to Marxists, was completely 'forgotten'. True, the
Bol shevi ks abol i shed private property, and 'the anarchy of
the market', but the practical reorgani zati on of capitalist pro
ducti on when i t came, took none of the forms the Russi an
Soci al Democrats had envisaged duri ng twenty years of de
bate. The revol utionary bureaucracy whi ch di rected the pro
letari at and sei zed the State machi ne imposed a new form of
cl ass domi nati on on society. ' (Guy Debord : La Societe du
Spectacle.)
The most unshakeable beli ef of the Communi st Party, i n
deed of every party of the Bolshevi k type, i s precisely that i t
must di rect t he Revoluti on as wel l as the economy . The only
Communi sts to challenge thi s view at the t ime were a handful
of clear- sighted comrades, i ncludi ng Rosa Luxemburg, Anton
Pannekoek and the far- l eft German KAPD who, before and
after the Revol uti on, stressed the fact that central izati on was
bound to dampen the spontaneity and self-confdence of the
masses. The reason why the Bolshevi k Party was abl e to usher
i n a counter-revoluti on, is because i t has crushed, rather than
led, the proletari at; because no organization can represent the
proletariat; whenever a minori ty acts i n the name of the pro
letari at i t acts onl y to betray them in the end. The defeat of al l
the opposi ti on groups i nsi de the Party - t he Left- wi ng Com
muni sts i n 1 9 1 8, the Central ist Democrats i n 1 9 1 9 and fnal l y
the Workers Opposi ti on in 1 921 - are so many nai l s i n the
coffin of the Russi an proletari at. The Workers' Opposi ti on,
despite i ts theoreti cal confusi on and weakness, was neverthe
less r ight to assert that the workers must rebui l d the soci al
edi fce from top to bottom. The Workers' Opposi ti on was the
last voi ce i nsi de the ofcial Marxist movement to call for di rect
control , to express confdence i n the creative capacity of the
proletari at, to proclai m that the socialist revoluti on must usher
in a new peri od i n human history. Thi s was the voice of the
Kronstadt workers and so clear and loud was their message
that it coul d onl y be si lenced wi th cannon.
243
The Strategy and Nature of Bolshevism
No matter what Trotskyist historiographers may tell us to
day, it was not i n 1 927 nor in 1 923 nor even in 1 920, but i n 1 9 1 8
and under the personal leadership of Trotsky and Leni n that
the social revolution became perverted - a fact Trotsky could
never understand - si mply because he himsel f was one of i ts
prime architects. Thus twenty years later, when Trotsky
founded the Fourth Internati onal in opposi ti on to Stal i ni sm,
he conveniently forgot that he himself had fred on those who
grasped its horrors as early as 1 920. At that stage he still saw
ft to assert :
'There is good reason for bel i eving that the KAPD (German
Communi st Workers' Party) under its present adventurist and
anarchist leadership, wi l l not submit to the deci sions of the
International, and fndi ng itself out in the cold, wi l l probably
try to form a Fourth Internati onal . In the course of this Con
gress, Comrade Kol lontai has sounded this very note, although
rather muted. It i s no secret to anyone that our Party alone i s
the true mainspring of the Communist Internati onal. However,
Comrade Kol lontai has depicted conditi ons i n our party i n
such a way that, i f she were right, the workers, wi th Comrade
Kol lontai at the head, must sooner of later start a 'third revo
lution' and establish a true soviet system. But why the third
revoluti on and not the fourth, since the thi rd revolution in the
name of the 'true' soviet system has already been made i n
Kronstadt, duri ng February? There are qui te a few left-wi ng
extremists left i n Holland, and perhaps i n other countries as
well. I cannot tell i f all of them have been taken into con
si deration; what I do know is that their number i s not very
great, and they are unli kely to swel l into a torrent i nsi de a
Fourth International, if perchance i t shoul d ever be estab
l ished. ' (Trotsky, quoted in Nouvelle Etape.)
If we have tried to show how stuck the Bolshevi k Party
was in the old rut, and how mired down, i t was only to stress
that, for this reason alone, it was incapable of emancipating
the workers. 'Forty years of consi stent counter-revolution go
to make up the hi story of modern Bolshevi sm. The Bolsheviks
are wrong because i t is no longer 1 920, and even in 1 920 they
were wrong. ' (De Ia misere en milieu etudiant.)
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Kronstadt
We have digressed at such length on the Russian Revolu
ti on because it highl ights al l the problems and conficts be
setting the worki ng-class movement even i n our day. It i s
highly important not onl y because i t shows how a revolution
was made, but also what a revol uti on should not be.
v
By Way of Conclusion
C' est pour toi que tu fais la revolution
There is no such thi ng as an isolated revolutionary act. Acts
that can transform society take place i n associati on wi th
others, and form part of a general movement that follows i ts
own laws of growth. Al l revol utionary act ivi ty is coll ecti ve,
and hence i nvolves a degree of organizati on. What we chal
lenge i s not the need for thi s but the need for a revoluti onary
leadership, the need for a party.
Central to my thesis is an analysis of the bureaucratic pheno
menon, whi ch I have exami ned from vari ous viewpoi nts. For
example, I have looked at the French workers' unions and
parti es and shown that what is wrong with them i s not so
much their rigi dity and treachery as the fact that they have
become i ntegrated i nto the overal l bureaucratic system of the
capi tal i st state.
The emergence of bureaucratic tendencies on a world scale,
the conti nuous concentrati on of capital, and the i ncreasing
i nterventi on of the State in economic and soci al matters, have
produced a new manageri al class whose fate i s no longer bound
up wi th that of the private ownershi p of the means of pro
ducti on.
It i s i n the l ight of thi s bureaucratization that the Bolshevi k
Party has been studi ed. Although i ts bureaucratic nature i s
not, of course, i ts onl y characteristic, i t i s true t o say that Com
munists, and also Trotskyists, Maoi sts and the rest, no less than
the capi tali st State, all look upon the proletariat as a mass that
needs to be di rected from above. As a resul t, democracy
degenerates i nto the ratifcation at the bottom of deci si ons
taken at the top, and the class struggle i s forgotten whi le the
leaders jockey for power wi thi n the pol itical hi erarchy.
The objecti ons t o Bolshevism are not so much moral as
249
By Way of Conclusi on
soci ologi cal; what we attack i s not the evi l conduct of some
of i ts leaders but an organizational set-up that has become its
one and only justi fcati on.
The most forceful champion of a revolutionary party was
Leni n, who in his What is to be done? argued that the prol e
tariat i s unable by i tsel f to reach a 'scientifc' understandi ng of
society, that i t tends to adopt the prevai l ing, i. e. the bourgeois,
i deology.
Hence it was the essential task of the P1arty to rid the workers
of thi s i deology by a process of poli ti cal educati on which
could only come to them from without. Moreover, Leni n tri ed
to show that the Party can onl y overcome the class enemy by
turni ng itself i nto a professional revolutionary body i n which
everyone i s allocated a fxed task. Certain of i ts i nfall i bi l i ty,
a Party appoints itself the natural spokesman and sole defender
of the i nterests of the working class, and as such wi elds power
on their behal f - i .e. acts as a bureaucracy.
We take qui te a diferent view: far from havi ng to teach the
masses, the revolutionary's job is to try to understand and ex
press their common aspirations; far from bei ng Leni n's ' tri bune
of the people who uses every manifestation of tyranny and
oppressi on . . . to explai n hi s Soci al i st convi cti ons and his
Social Democratic demands', the real mi l itant must encourage
the workers to struggle on thei r own behalf, and show how
their every struggle can be used to drive a wedge into capi tali st
society. If he does so, the mi l itant acts as an agent of the
people and no longer as their leader.
The setting up of any party i nevitably reduces freedom of the
people to freedom to agree wi th the party.
In other words, democracy is not suborned by bad leader
ship but by the very exi stence of leadershi p. Democracy can
not even exist within the Party, because the Party itself is not a
democratic organization, i .e. i t is based upon authority and not
on representati on. Leni n realized full well that the Party is an
artifci al creation, that it was imposed upon the worki ng class
'from wi thout'. Moral scruples have been swept aside: the l Party
is 'right' if i t can impose i ts views upon the masses and wroni
i f i t fai ls to do so. For Leni n, the whole matter ends there. In
250
C'est pour toi que tu fai s Ia revol uti on
hi s State and Revolution, Leni n di d not even rai se the probl em
of the rel ati onshi p between the people and the Party Revol u
ti onary power was a matter of fact, based upon peopl e who
are prepared to fght for i t; the paradox i s that the Party's
programme, endorsed by these people, was preci sel y : Al l
power to the Sovi ets! But whatever i ts programme, i n retro
spect we can see that the Party, because of i ts basi c concepti on,
i s bound to bri ng i n pri vi l ege and bureaucracy, and we must
wash our hands of al l organizations of thi s sort. To try and
pretend that the Bolshevi k Party i s truly democratic i s to
decei ve oneself, and thi s, at least, i s an error that Leni n hi mself
never commi tted.
What then i s our concept ion of the role of the revol u
ti onary? To begi n wi th, we are convinced that the revol u
t ionary cannot and must not be a leader. Revol utionari es are
a mi l i tant mi nori ty drawn from vari ous soci al strata, people
who band together because they share an i deology, and who
pl edge themselves to struggle agai nst oppressi on, to di spel the
mystifcati on of the rul i ng classes and the bureaucrats, to pro
clai m that the workers can onl y defend themselves and bui l d
a soci ali st soci ety by taki ng thei r fate i nto thei r own hands,
bel i evi ng that pol i ti cal maturity comes only from revol uti onary
struggle and di rect action.
By thei r acti on, mi l itant minori ti es can do no more than
support, encourage, and cl ari fy the struggl e. They must always
guard against any tendency to become a pressure group out
side the revol uti onary movement of the masses. When they
act, it must al ways be wi th the masses, and not as a facti on.
For some ti me, the 22 March Movement was remarkable
onl y for i ts radi cal pol iti cal li ne, for i ts methods of attack -
often spontaneous - and for its non-bureaucratic structure. Its
objectives and the rol e it coul d pl ay became clear onl y duri ng
the events of May and June, when i t attracted the support of
the worki ng class. These mi l itant students whose dynami c
theori es emerged from thei r practi ce, were i mitated by others,
who developed new forms of action appropriate to thei r own
si tuati on. The resul t was a mass movement unencumbered by
the usual chai ns of command. By challengi ng the repressive
251
By Way of Conclusi on
nature of their own i nstitution - the uni versity - the revol u
tionary students forced the state to show i ts hand, and the
brutality wi th which i t did so caused a general revulsion and
led to the occupation of the factori es and the general stri ke.
The mass intervention of the working class was the greatest
achi evement of our struggle; it was the frst step on the path
to a better society, a path that, alas, was not followed to the
end. The mi litant mi norities fai led to get the masses to follow
their exampl e : to take collective charge of the runni ng of
society. We do not believe for a single moment that the
workers are i ncapable of taki ng the next logi cal step beyond
occupying the factories - which is to run them on their own.
We are sure that they can do what we ourselves have done
in the universities. The mi litant mi nori ti es must continue to
wage their revolutionary struggle, to show the workers what
their trade unions try to make them forget : their own gigantic
strength. The distribution of petrol by the workers i n the re
fneries and the local strike committees shows clearl y what
the worki ng class i s capable of doing once it puts its mind to
it.
During the recent struggle, many student mi l itants became
hero-worshi ppers of the working class, forgetting that every
group has its own part to play in defending its own i nterests,
and that, during a period of total confrontation, these i nterests
converge.
The student movement must follow its own road - only
thus can it contribute to the growth of mi l itant mi norities in
the factories and workshops. We do not pretend that we can
be leaders in the struggle, but i t i s a fact that small revol u
tionary groups can, at the right ti me and place, rupture the
system decisively and irreversibly.
Duri ng May and June, 1 968, the emergence of a vast chai n
of workers' committees and sub-committees by-passed the
calcifed structure of the trade unions, and tried to call to
gether al l workers i n a struggle that was their own and not
that of the various trade union bureaucracies. It was because
of this that the struggle was carried to a hi gher stage. It i s
absurd and romantic to speak of revolution wi th a capital R
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C'est pour toi que tu fai s Ia revol uti on
and to thi nk of i t as resulti ng from a si ngle, deci sive acti on.
The revoluti onary process grows and i s strengthened dai l y not
onl y i n revolt agai nst the boredom of a system that prevents
people from seei ng the 'beach under the pavi ng stones' but
also i n our determi nati on to make the beach open to al l .
If a revolutionary movement i s to succeed, no form of
organizati on whatever must be al lowed to dam i ts spontaneous
fow. It must evolve i ts own forms and structures.
In May and June, many groups wi th these i deas came i nto
bei ng; here is a pamphlet put out by the ICO, not as a pl at
form or programme for action, but as a basis for discussion
by the workers :
'The ai m of thi s group is to uni te those workers who have
lost confdence i n the traditi onal labour organizations - part ies
and trade unions.
'Our own experi ences have shown us that modern trade
uni ons contri bute towards stabi l i zi ng and preservi ng the ex
ploi tati ve system.
'They serve as regulators of the labour market, they use
the workers' struggle for pol itical ends, they are the hand
mai dens of the rul ing class i n the modern state.
'It is up to the workers to defend their own i nterests and to
struggle for their own emanci pation.
'Workers, we must try to understand what i s bei ng done to
us al l , and denounce the trade unions wi th thei r spurious cl ai ms
that they al one can hel p us to hel p ourselves.
' In the class struggle we i ntervene as workers together, and
not on the basis of our job, which can only spl i t our ranks. We
are in favour of setting up commi ttees in which the greatest
number of workers can play an active part. We defend every
non-sectari an and non- secti onal claim of the worki ng class,
every cl ai m that is in the declared interest of al l . We support
everythi ng that widens the struggle and we oppose everythi ng
that tends to weaken i t . We are in favour of internati onal con
tacts, so that we may also get i n touch wi th workers i n other
parts of the world and discuss our common problems with
them.
'We have been led to question al l exploitative soci eti es, al l
253
By Way of Conclusi on
organizations, and tackle such general problems as state capital
ism, bureaucratic management, the abolition of the state and of
wage-slavery, war, racism, "Social ism", etc_ Each of us is entitled
to present his own point of vi ew and remains enti rely free to
act i n whatever way he thinks best i n hi s own factory_ We be
l ieve i n spontaneous resistance to al l forms of domination, not
i n representation through the trade unions and pol iti cal
parties_
'The workers' movement forms a part of the class struggle
because i t promotes practical confrontations between workers
and exploiters. It i s for the workers alone to say how, why
and where we are al l to struggle. We cannot in any way fght
for them; they alone can do the job. All we can do i s give them
i nformation, and learn from them i n return. We can contri bute
to discussions, so as to clari fy our common experience, and
we can also help to make their problems and struggle known
to others.
'We bel ieve that our struggles are mi lestones on the road to
a society that wi l l be run by the workers themselves. ' (Infor
mation et Correspondance Ouvrieres) .
From the vi ews expressed by this and other groups, we can
get some idea of the form that the movement of the future
must take. Every smal l action committee no l ess than every
mass movement which seeks to improve the l ives of all men
must resolve :
( I ) to respect and guarantee the plural ity and diversity of
pol itical currents wi thi n the revolutionary mainstream. It must
accordingly grant minority groups the ri ght of independent
action - only i f the plurality of ideas i s al lowed to express
itself in social practice does this idea have any real meaning;
(2) to ensure that al l delegates are accountabl e to, and sub
ject to immediate recal l by, those who have elected them, and
to oppose the i ntroduction of specialists and specialization at
every step by widening the skill and knowledge of al l ;
(3) to ensure a continuous exchange of i deas, and to oppose
any control of i nformation and knowledge;
(4) to struggle against the formation of any kind of
hierarchy;
254
C'est pour toi que tu fai s Ia revol uti on
(5) to abol i sh al l artifci al distinctions wi thi n l abour, i n par
ticular between manual and intel lectual work, and discri mi na
ti on on grounds of sex;
(6) to ensure that all factories and businesses are run by
those who work in them;
( 7) to rid ourselves, i n practi ce, of the Judaeo-Chri sti an
ethi c, wi th its call for renunci ati on and sacri fce. There i s only
one reason for bei ng a revolutionary - because i t i s the best
way to l i ve.
Reacti on, which i s bound to become more and more vi ol ent
as the revol uti onary movement increases its i mpact on society,
forces us to look to our defences. But our mai n task i s to keep
on challengi ng the tradi ti onal bureaucratic structures both i n
the government and also i n the working- class movements.
How can anyone represent anyone else? Al l we can do i s to
i nvol ve them. We can try and get a few movements goi ng,
i nject pol i ti cs i nto al l the structures of society, i nto the Youth
Clubs, Youth Hostels, the YMCA and the Saturday Night
dance, get out on to the streets, out on to al l the streets of al l
t he towns. To bri ng real pol i tics i nto everyday l i fe i s t o get r id
of the pol i ti ci ans. We must pass from a critique of the univer
si ty to the anti - universi ty, open to al l . Our challenge of the
col lective control of knowledge by the bourgeoi si e must be
radical and intransi gent.
The mul ti pl ication of nucl ei of confrontati on decentralizes
poli ti cal l i fe and neutral izes the repressive i nfuence of the
radi o, televi sion and party politics. Every time we beat back
i nti mi dati on on the spot, we are stri king a blow for freedom.
To break out from i solati on, we must carry the struggl e to
every market place and not create Messi ani c organi zati ons
to do the job for us. We reject the poli cy commi ttee and the
editorial board.
In the event, the students were defeated i n thei r own
struggle. The weakness of our movement i s shown by the fact
that we were unable to hol d on to a single faculty - the re
capture of the factori es by the CRS (wi th the help of the
CGT) might well have been halted by the worki ng class, had
there been a determined defence of a si ngl e ' red base' . But
255
By Way of Concl usi on
thi s i s mere speculati on. What i s certai n i s that the movement
must look carefull y at its actions in May and June and draw
the correct lessons for the future. The type of organization we
must bui l d can neither be a vanguard nor a rearguard, but
must be right in the thick of the fght. What we need is not
organization with a capital 0, but a host of i nsurrectional cell s,
be they i deological groups, study groups - we can even use
street gangs.
Efective revol utionary action does not spri ng from ' i ndi
vi dual' or 'external' needs - i t can only occur when the two
coi nci de so that the distinction itself breaks down. Every group
must fnd its own form, take its own acti on, and speak i ts own
language. When all have learnt to express themselves, in har
mony with the rest, we shall have a free society.
Reader, you have come to the end of this book, a book that
wants to say only one thing : between us we can change this
rotten society. Now, put on your coat and make for the nearest
ci nema. Look at their deadly love-making on the screen. Isn't
it better i n real l ife? Make up your mi nd to learn to love. Then,
during the i nterval, when the frst advertisements come on, pi ck
ur your tomatoes or, i f you prefer, your eggs, and chuck them.
Then get out into the street, and peel of al l the latest govern
ment proclamations unti l underneath you di scover the message
of the days of May and June.
Stay awhi l e i n the street. Look at the passers-by and remi nd
yourself : the last word has not yet been sai d. Then act. Act
wi th others, not for them. Make the revoluti on here and now.
It is your own. C' est pour toi que tu fais Ia revolut ion.