POLITICAL LAW CASES M.

ESTACS
Issue: a.) Whether or not the trail court has the jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari filed by the students 1. Miriam College Foundation vs CA Facts: Miriam college has found its school paper (Chi-Rho), and magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho) contents of the September-October 1994 issue Obscene, vulgar, indecent, gross, sexually explicit, injurious to young readers, and devoid of all moral values. Following the publication of the paper and the magazine, the members of the editorial board, author, all students of Miriam College, received a letter signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College Discipline Committee to inform them that there are letters of complaint filed against them by members of the Miriam Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five student that had been forwarded to the Discipline Committee for inquiry and investigation and required them submit a written statement in answer to the charge/s on or before the initial date of hearing, but none of the students submitted their respective answers. They instead requested Dr. Sevilla to transfer the case to the Regional Office of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), which they contested, that had jurisdiction over the case. Dr. Sevilla again required the students to file their written answers. In response, the lawyer for the students submitted a letter to the Discipline Committee reiterating his clients position that said Committee had no jurisdiction over them. The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte. Thereafter, the Discipline Board, after a review of the Discipline Committees report, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the students. The students were suspended, expelled, dismissed, and one was not allowed to attend her graduation. The students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction/restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City questioning the jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam College over them. The RTC issued an order denying the plaintiffs prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order. The students thereafter filed a Supplemental Petition and Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC issued an Order granting the writ of preliminary injunction. Both parties moved for a reconsideration of the order. On the matter raised by both parties that it is the DECS which has jurisdiction, the RTC DISMISSED the case and all orders it issued are recalled and set aside. The CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Miriam College from enforcing letters of dismissal/suspension, but it eventually declared the RTC Order, as well as the students suspension and dismissal, void. b.) Whether or not Miriam College has the jurisdiction over the complaints against the students. Held: a.) YES, the grounds invoked by the students in their refusal to answer the charges against them were limited to the question of jurisdiction a question purely legal in nature and well within the competence and the jurisdiction of the trial court, not the DECS Regional Office. This is an exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. As the Court held in Phil. Global Communications, Inc. vs. Relova : Absent such clarity as to the scope and coverage of its franchise, a legal question arises which is more appropriate for the judiciary than for an administrative agency to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction calls for application when there is such competence to act on the part of an administrative body. A court having jurisdiction of a case has not only the right and the power or authority, but also the duty, to exercise that jurisdiction and to render a decision in a case properly submitted to it. b.) YES, Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act should be read in a manner as not to infringe upon the school's right to discipline its students. At the same time, however, we should not construe said provision as to unduly restrict the right of the students to free speech. Consistent with jurisprudence, we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such articles materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. SC rule that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against students.

POLITICAL LAW CASES

2. UP vs Civil Service Commission Facts: Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is a Professor of the UPLB who went on a vacation leave of absence without pay from September 1, 1986 to August 30, 1989. During this period, he served as the Philippine Government official representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific (CIRDAP).When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an extension of said leave, but was denied. He was advised to report for duty and that if he failed to report within 30 days he would be dropped from the rolls of personnel. Dr. De Torres did not report to work. After almost five years of absence without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the Chancellor of UPLB that he was reporting back to duty. However De Torres was informed that in the absence of any approved application for leave of absence, he was considered to be on AWOL. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with UPLB. Dr. De Torres then sought for reconsideration with regard to said decision. Chancellor Villareal reversed his earlier stand and notified De Torres that since records at UPLB did not show that he had been officially dropped from the rolls he may report for duty. Members of Academic Personnel Committee, ACCI-UPLB, requested the Civil Service Commission regarding the employment status of Dr. De Torres. The Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 stating that De Torres was already on AWOL beginning September 1, 1989 since his request for extension of leave of absence for one year was denied. The CA upheld the decision of the CSC. Issue: WON the automatic separation of Dr. Alfredo de Torres from the civil service due to his prolonged absence without official leave is valid. Held: The CSC predicated its ruling on Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which was in effect at the time. The provision states: "Under no circumstances shall leave without pay be granted for more than one year. If an employee who is on leave without pay for any reason fails to return to duty at the expiration of one year from the effective date of such leave, he shall be considered automatically separated from the service; Provided, that he shall, within a reasonable time before the expiration of his one year leave of absence without pay, be notified in writing of the expiration thereof with a warning that if he fails to report for duty on said date, he will be dropped from the service." UPLB Chancellor had advised petitioner of the possibility of being dropped from the service, if he failed to return and report for duty. This action constituted sufficient notice. The pivotal issue herein, however, is whether petitioner was indeed dropped from the service by the University. In the case at bar, however, Petitioner De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP. He remained in the UPLB's roll of academic personnel, even after he had been warned of the possibility of being dropped from the service if he failed to return to work within a stated period. UPLB records show that no notice or order of dropping Dr. de Torres from the rolls was ever issued by the UPLB Chancellor. On the contrary, UPLB records show Private petitioner was not only retained in the roll of personnel; his salary was even increased three times. Moreover, he was promoted in rank with the explicit approval of the Board of Regents, the highest governing body of UP. All these circumstances indubitably demonstrate that the University has chosen not to exercise its prerogative of dismissing petitioner from its employ. Thus, we hold that by opting to retain private petitioner and even promoting him despite his absence without leave, the University was exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or, more precisely, who may continue to teach in its faculty. Even in the light of the provision of the Revised Civil Service Law, the Respondent CSC had no authority to dictate to UP the outright dismissal of its personnel. The former could not have done so without trampling upon the latter's constitutionally enshrined academic freedom. Moreover, in Chang v. Civil Service Commission, the Court stressed that "the CSC is not a co-manager, or surrogate administrator of government offices and agencies. Its functions and authority are limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine their concordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Law." In short, on its own, the CSC does not have the power to terminate employment or to drop workers from the rolls. Consequently, there is no need for the issuance of a new appointment in favor of Dr. De Torres. His service in UP is deemed uninterrupted during his tenure at CIRDAP.

POLITICAL LAW CASES

3. Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague Facts: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education. Issue: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education. Held: No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to 4. Republic Act No. 8371 October 29, 1997 education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

AN ACT TO RECOGNIZE, PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES/INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, CREATING A NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, ESTABLISHING IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES ***ISAGANI CRUZ vs SEC of the DENR Facts: In 1997, RA 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act/IPRA) was passed. Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, questioning the constitutionality of certain provisions of IPRA: a) It allows the indigenous people/cultural community to OWN NATURAL RESOURCES; b) It defines ancestral lands and ancestral domains in such a way that it may include private lands owned by other individuals; c) It categorizes ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land; d) It violates due process in allowing NCIP (National Commission on Indigenous Peoples) to take jurisdiction over IP land disputes and making customary law apply to these. In the first deliberation of the SC, the votes were 77, so the case was redeliberated upon. Issue: Did the IPRA violate the Regalian Theory? A. IPRA: Under the IPRA law, lands which have not been registered before, if granted with a CADT/CALT, will be recognized as privately owned by the IPs from the beginning thus, has never been part of public domain. B. Regalian Theory: Lands which has not been recognized as privately owned belongs to the State Held:

POLITICAL LAW CASES

No Final Decision. Petition dismissed due to lack of votes; Law remained valid and constitutional (7 to grant 7 to dismiss).

Back then, the Spanish Government distributed the lands by issuing royal
grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian B. ValentonvsMurciano Case (1904, American Regime) Longtime occupation will not necessarily lead to ownership of the land "While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner." C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System 1903: 1st Public Land Act (Act No. 926) 34 Provides rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands 1919: 2nd Public Land Act (Act 2874) 34 more comprehensive but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos, Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges 1936: Present Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act No. 141) 34 Almost the same as Act 2874, except that it gave the Filipino citizens and corporations which were previously only granted to Americans **1903: Land Registration Law (Act 496) 34 It placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system 34 almost a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898 II. TORRENS SYSTEM Origin: Patterned after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens Governments Role: The government must issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves Certificate of Title: The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate.

became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown

5. Justice Punos Separate Opinion: The IPRA Law DID NOT VIOLATE the Regalian Theory
1. These lands claimed by the IPs have long been theirs BY VIRTUE OF NATIVE TITLE; they have lived there even before the Spanish colonization. Native title refers to ICCs/IPs preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputable presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. 2. AND Native Title is an Exception to the Regalian Doctrine: ... Oh Cho vs Director of Lands: This exception would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessorsininterest since time immemorial 3. Native Titles provide a different Type of Private Ownership Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership. Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights. 4. It complies with Regalian Doctrine: Natural Sources within ancestral domains are not owned by the IPs * The IPs claims are limited to lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains; * IPRA did not mention that the IPs also own all the other natural resources found within the ancestral domains Discussion related to the topic of the Torrens System and Mode of Acquiring Ownership (land): I. HISTORY ON THE MODE OF ACQUIRING LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES: A. Laws of the Indies The Regalian Theory is a Western legal concept first introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. By virtue of Spains "discovery" and conquest of the Philippines, its lands

POLITICAL LAW CASES

III. REGALIAN DOCTRINE Despite of several legal developments on land distribution, the Regalian doctrine is still retained in our Constitution. Under this concept, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the State. Held: Power of Administrative Control NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President. SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power of control means the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute thejudgment of the former with that of the latter. It is said to be at the very heart of the meaning of Chief Executive. As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Thus, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies. Power of Executive Control

N. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. Republic Act No. 6975

December 13, 1990

AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 2. Carpio vs. Executive Secretary Facts: Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition, questioning theconstitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO. RA 6875, entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution: The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law. Issues: a.) Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution b.) Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers

POLITICAL LAW CASES

Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature. His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. by the fundamental law. When it does the courts will not hesitate to strike down such unconstitutionality. 4. Ishmael Himagan vs People of the Philippines & Judge Hilario Mapayo

Facts: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. Issue: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution. Held: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the

3. Manalo vs Sistoza

Facts: Petitioner, Jesulito Sistoza question the constitutionality and legality of the appointments issued by former Pres. Corazon Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the PNP who were promoted to the rank of Chief Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. The said police officers tool their Oath of Offices and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments. The petitioner brought before this petition for prohibition, as a tax payer suit to the SC to assail the legality of subject appointment and disbursement thereof. Issue: Whether or not the appointment of the senior officers of the PNP is valid even without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Held: The SC held that the appointments are valid. The court has the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit alienated

POLITICAL LAW CASES

badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the phrase be terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus. 2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to saidConstitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in thegeneral elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and 3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the sameConstitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

Issue: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the Constitution. Held:

O. AMENDMENTS and REVISIONS 1. Gonzales vs Comelec Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction. The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions: 1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member;

Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned. "The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof."

POLITICAL LAW CASES

Article XV of the Constitution provides: . . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to thisConstitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention. (1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a selfexecuting provision. (2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. (3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Held: Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic. 3. Lambino vs Comelec Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed apetition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that thepetition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by

2. Defensor-Santiago vs Comelec Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, DemokrasyaIpagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention. Issues:

POLITICAL LAW CASES

adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the presentbicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions. Issues: (1) Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petitioncomplies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative; (2)Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiagodeclaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; (3) Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition. Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition. 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735 Petition is dismissed.

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void. 2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the ConstitutionDisallowing Revision through Initiatives The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore constitutes a revision. 3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary