I. The Theory of Ideology The systematic thematization of the concept of ideology is a relatively recent development in the social sciences.

1 In its contemporary usage in the social sciences, its roots trace back only to the early writings of Karl Marx. In this section, we will examine the development of the idea of ideology as a background to an examination of come of the ideological distortions of religion and in particular, of the relationship of religion and socio-political structures - regnant in the social sciences. A. Karl Marx and The German Ideology Karl Marx first analyzed the concept of ideology as part of his critique of German idealist philosophy, The German Ideology (1845). The basic premise of the work was that the philosophy of German idealism, while purporting radically to reinterpret the foundations of experience, merely addressed the conceptual basis of experience, thus leaving the material basis untouched. History is the story of changes in material relations, not in ideas.

Mannheim traces the concept to historical incidents in which the source of the untruthfulness of adversaries is sought in the social situation: We began to treat our adversarys views as ideologies only when we no longer consider them as calculated lies, and instead due to the social situation (p. 61). Mannheim cites Bacons interpretation of idols as sources of error rooted in society and tradition as an example (albeit an example that does not have a direct historical connection to the later thematization of ideology; see pp. 61-62). Other examples include the Renaissance distinction of the thought of the palace and the thought of the public square, in which awareness of and mistrust of political processes and the social basis of political thought arose; and Humes concept of feigning in his History of England. The modern thematization of the concept of ideology begins with Karl Marx. See Mannheim, Karl, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1936).

In contrast, Marx put forth the materialist conception of history, in which, he wrote, The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the the material intercourse of men, the language of real life Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. 2 Ideas are not only an epiphenomenon of material history, they are the production of the ruling class, which utilizes ideas in order to maintain their dominance: The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas.3 Each new class that takes the reins of power establishes that power by expressing its interest as the common interest of society, i.e., by idealizing and universalizing their right to rule. For Marx, ideology is a tool of state power utilized to legitimize the social relations favored by that state. As Louis Althusser would show, while Marx theory was essentially correct, it is limited. Still, all subsequent theorists would based themselves on Marx theories, in particular in his theory of the social determination of ideas. B. Karl Mannheim and Ideology and Utopia Marx theory of the material basis of ideology was expanded by Karl Mannheim to include all conditions of social relations. Mannheim accomplishes this expansion of the concept of ideology by means of his distinction of particular and total ideology, 4 and his emphasis of the
2 3 4

Marx, Karl, and Engels, Friedrich, The German Ideology (NY: Progress Publishers, 1968): p. 8. Ibid., p. 26. Mannheim, op. cit., pp. 56-59.

latter, to the virtual exclusion of the former. Particular ideology consists of an individuals distortions or disguising of the real situation, which, based on a pre-existing shared basis of understanding, can be seen as specific erroneous assertions attributable to a specific interest. Total ideology, in contrast, is a group product, the total structure of the mind of an historical epoch or historico-social group.5 Within the category of total ideology, the attribution of ideology to a person or a group implies their adherence to a different thought-system than ones own. As the ideation of the individual is determined by social conditions, Mannheims concern is almost wholly total ideology. Mannheim traces the historical movement of total ideology, which eventuates in the development of the concept of ideology itself. This movement was a move from the particular to the total conception of ideology. No longer is an adversaries claims regarded and analyzed as merely errors due to psychological or experiential conditions; now, the analysis subjects the adversary to a sociological analysis. This analysis is so broad that it takes into account ALL perspectives, not only the adversaries, but the analysts own, as well.6 At the same time, Mannheim contends that the analysis of ideology should not be just the intellectual armament of a party; rather, it becomes the task of the sociological history of thought to analyze without regard fro party biases all the factors in the actually existing social situation which may influence thought.7

5 6 7

Ibid., p. 56. Ibid., pp. 76-77. Ibid., p. 78.

However, this raises a problem: if all knowledge is socially determined, and every individuals knowledge including that of the analyst - is determined by the complex forces of complex social conditions, than how is the analyst supposed to be exempt from party biases? Clifford Geertz labeled this conceptual conflict Mannheims Paradox: the realization (or perhaps it was only an admission) that sociopolitical thought does not grow out of disembodied reflection but is always bound up with the existing life situation of the thinker seemed to taint thought with the vulgar struggle for advantage it had professed to rise above. But what is of even more immediate importance is the question of whether or not this absorption into its own referent has destroyed its scientific utility altogether, whether or not having become an accusation, it can remain an analytic concept. 8 Mannheim attempts to rescue his theory of ideology, first by presenting a possible means of establishing a non-evaluative theory of ideology, and then analyzing this theory by means of its own techniques. Mannheim thinks that it is self-delusional to attempt to make a nonevaluative analysis of an ideological position, because the analysts very pretension to impartiality forces the analyst to assume an imposture of infallibility. Rather than this, Mannheim thinks that if the non-evaluative approach is associated with a definite epistemology, the pretension to infallibility can be avoided. This, then, will lead to two possible solutions to the problem of what constitutes reliable knowledge: relativism and relationism.

Geertz, Clifford, The Interpretation of Cultures (NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1973): p. 194. Geertz thinks that Mannheims attempt to resolve the paradox led him to a position of ethical and epistemological relativism which was unsatisfactory, even to Mannheim himself.

Relativism, Mannheim says, begins from the insight that says that all knowledge is socially determined, but then combines this with an older epistemology which assumes that all real knowledge is objective. Relativism, then, owes its existence to the discrepancy between this newly won insight into the actual processes of thought and a theory of knowledge which had not yet taken account of this new insight. 9 Relational knowledge, in contrast, accepts the relational nature of all knowledge, i.e., that all knowledge relates to a specific social and historical situation. The non-evaluative approach points out that the socially embedded nature of all knowledge does not invalidate or indeed, imply anything of an evaluative nature about knowledge. Mannheim realized that the explication of the social situation of each intellectual standpoint, because it also assumes the implication of the analyst in a social process, is endless. That social thought has reached a point of perspicuity of its own social conditions is itself a condition of social and historical development! In response to this, Mannheim offers the unsatisfying palliative: It is precisely our uncertainty which brings us a good deal closer to reality than was possible in former periods which had faith in the absolute. 10 In order to evaluate the social and historical conditions which gives rise to the theory of ideology (his own included), Mannheim analyses the metaphysical and ontological judgments inherent in the non-evaluative conception of ideology. Mannheim is sanguine about the existence of presuppositions in thinking; as one becomes aware that such presuppositions
9 10

Ibid., p. 79. Ibid., p. 84.

always exist, the more one realizes the inevitability of ontological and metaphysical judgments.11 For Mannheim, what is dangerous in this situation is not these judgments, but the uncritical acceptance of such judgments from tradition. Clarification of ones assumptions is the only means to theoretical advance. This makes way for an evaluative theory of ideology. Mannheims evaluative theory of ideology is based on the presupposition of a certain view of reality, the reality of ideas, and the structure of consciousness. 12 In this conception of ideology, the assertion of ideology is a charge placed against assertions that purport to address a reality which, due to the dynamic nature of social reality, has changed. Mannheim believes that society is intrinsically dynamic, and that changes in society bring changes in interpretation. An ideology is an interpretation that asserts a value that, while at one time it may be applicable, becomes irrelevant and even regressive under new conditions. This leads Mannheim to the conclusion that the differing ontological judgments of various groups of people are the result of their moving in separate worlds of ideas, and these are different modes of experiencing the same reality. 13 Valid judgments that can make some claim to crossing the gap between epistemological worlds necessitate a means of transcending this gap. This transcendence is made possible by the continuous process of the expansion of knowledge. 14 Mannheims solution to Mannheims Paradox, therefore, is to continue the same process of historical, social, and intellectual development that gave rise to the paradox in the first place. This impasse is reminiscent of
11 12

Ibid., Ibid., 13 Ibid., 14 Ibid.,

p. p. p. p.

89. 97. 99. 106.

the sterility of the German idealist movement as critiqued by Marx: it is an intellectual solution to a social, and more particularly economic, problem. This, at least, is implied by the position of Louis Althusser, in his famous article on ideology,15 which we will consider next.

C. Louis Althusser and RSAs and ISAs Louis Althusser places ideology within Marx economic analysis, as an important part of the cycle of the reproduction of the means of production. Just as the material conditions of a society must be reproduced in order to continue in existence, so the ideological conditions must also be reproduced. As for Marx ideology was the product of the ruling class to legitimize their power and repression of the ruled, so Althusser views ideology as part of the conditions of production which must be reproduced in order to ensure the continuation of the society: The reproduction of labour power thus reveals as its sine qua non not only the reproduction of its skills but also the reproduction of its subjection to the ruling ideology or of the practice of that ideology. 16 Utilizing Marx representation of society as an edifice, Althusser distinguishes between the infrastructure, or the material conditions, the economic base, of society; and the superstructure, which consists of the
15

Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation), in Althusser, Louis, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. by Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971): pp. 127-186. 16 Ibid., p. 133.

churches, educational institutions, family, law, political systems, trade unions, communications media, and culture.17 Althusser argues that while Marx edifice picture is essentially correct, it needs to be developed. Thus, Althusser distinguishes within the social edifice as described by Marx two separate, but mutual, apparatuses: the repressive state apparatuses (RSAs) and the ideological state apparatuses (ISAs). The former are the infrastructure of society: its government, administration, armed forces, police, courts, and prisons. In a society, there is only one RSA, but many ISAs; also, RSAs function by violence, ISAs by ideology.18 There is no such things as a purely repressive RSA, or a purely ideological ISA, and each function primarily through their own mode (an ISA ideologically, and RSA repressively), but secondarily through the contrasting mode (an ISA operates, in part, through repression, e.g., corporal punishment in schools; an RSA operates, in part, through ideology, e.g., political advertisements). 19 According to Althusser, the dominant ISA in capitalist society is the educational system; but all ISAs contribute to the reproductions exploitative relations of production, each in its own proper way. Ideologies operate in society as imaginary allusions to reality, or transpositions of reality: ideology is the representation of the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live.20 Because they relate to reality, however, they can be deconstructed, and reality found behind them. Althusser believes that all existence is comprised of modalities of physical matter; the existence of ideology is material in a different modality
17 18

Ibid., Ibid., 19 Ibid., 20 Ibid.,

p. 143. pp. 142-144. pp. 145-147. p. 165.

than the existence of a rock. He defends this by the contention that all beliefs are real only insofar as they are expressed in material practice. 21 Our immersion in ideological rituals results in our unconscious assimilation of ideology, wherein, through these rituals, we recognize each other as subjects. This process of assimilation ideology and recognition as subjects Althusser calls interpellation. Ideology itself effectively denegates the ideological nature of ideology. Thus, we think that we are outside ideology, when in fact we are immersed in it, from birth. This submersion in ideology is the reciprocally reinforced unconsciousness of the process of social and economic reproduction. The reproduction of the means of production relies on the subjects willingness to work by themselves.22 Thus, Althusser has provided a theory of ideology that builds on Marx idea of ideology as the weapon of the ruling class. Not only is ideology the weapon of the ruling class, Althusser argues, but it is a weapon which is intrinsic to the process of reproduction of the means of production; it is a weapon which the subjected classes willing wield against themselves; and it is a weapon that is present in all social relations and institutions. D. Clifford Geertz and Ideology as Metaphor The willingness of the subjected classes to participate in the ideology of the ruling class is understandable by means of Clifford Geertz metaphorical interpretation of ideology. After pointing out that the concept of ideology which is most common in sociological studies is a highly evaluative
21 22

Ibid., pp. 166-168. Ibid., p. 182.

indeed, pejorative one, Geertz reintroduces the question of whether a nonevaluative conception of ideology is possible. He analyses two attempts to provide such a non-evaluative conception: strain theory and interest theory. In strain theory, ideology serves the social function of providing an outlet for the pressures, social and individual, which arise due to the chronic malintegration of society.23 Societies are inevitably afflicted with insoluble antinomies, such as the conflict of social ideals and realities; class divisions, and the goals and realizations of goals proper to different classes; and the friction between different social roles. Geertz analyses four different solutions that strain theorists have offered for social friction: in the cathartic solution, the tensions arising from social conflicts are projected onto a symbolic enemy; in the morale solution, ideology is interpreted as the means for giving an explanation of social conflicts which sustains a group within society in the face of those conflicts; in the solidarity solution, ideology serves the function of providing a group identity; and, in the advocatory solution, ideology and ideologists are advocates for the rest of society or a group within society. Geertz has specific criticisms of each of these interpretations of ideology, but more importantly he believes that they all fail because they lack even the most rudimentary conception of the processes of symbolic formulation.24 Thus, there remains an aporia between the impulse to ideology and the actual process of turning that impulse into ideological expressions: The link between the causes of ideology and its effects
23 24

Geertz, op. cit., pp. 203-204. Ibid., p. 207.

seems adventitious because the connecting element the autonomous process of symbolic formulation is passed over in virtual silence. Both interest theory and strain theory go directly from source analysis to consequence analysis without ever seriously examining ideologies as systems of interacting symbols, as patterns of interworking meanings. 25 Geertz argues that the sociological analysis of ideology suffers from a lack of any theory of symbols and symbolic action. Instead, sociology has viewed ideology entirely evaluatively, as deception (interest theory) or delusion (strain theory). Geertz complains that sociology has not even seriously considered the possibility that ideology serves a positive social function, and therefore has not even attempted to analyze the means by which ideology operates. Geertz offers the suggestion that ideology is metaphor. Metaphor, according to Geertz, is characterized by a stratification of meaning, in which an incongruity of sense on one level produces an influx of significance on another.26 Thus, a metaphor is, in one sense, wrong, but in its very misrepresentation of reality, unifies a set of meanings into a charge. These meanings are themselves rooted in social relations. Thus, to interpret an ideological statement requires an analysis of the vehicles of conception: Not only is the semantic structure of the figure a good deal more complex than it appears on the surface, but an analysis of that structure forces one into tracing a multiplicity of referential connections between it and social reality, so that the final picture is one of a configuration of dissimilar meanings out of whose interworking both the expressive power and the rhetorical force of the final symbol derive.27

25 26

Ibid., p. 207. Ibid., p. 210. 27 Ibid., p. 213.

Geertz attempts to give this symbolic interpretation of ideology an epistemological basis. He sees symbols as means of establishing patterns of life: extrapersonal mechanisms for the perceptions, understanding, judgment, and manipulation of the world. 28 Humans, according to Geertz, require such mechanisms to create order in the world; thus, these mechanisms are usually employed in situations where such order is lacking. Here, Geertz harkens back to Mannheim: ideologies arise in social situations in which a political system begins to free itself from the immediate governance of received tradition.29 Ideology is a response to a loss of orientation at the social, cultural, and political levels; it is an attempt to give a symbolic unity to a society lost in the confusion wrought by social change. The concept of ideology is of utmost importance in understanding how and why theories of religion have resorted to fallacious claims of causal priority. In the following section, we will critique the previous theories of ideology. This critique will demonstrate that these theories assume an ontology that they do not themselves clarify. Rather than attempt to subvert the effects of Mannheims Paradox, our attempt is to clarify the ontological basis of this paradox, and to build on the ground cleared by this clarification.

28 29

Ibid., p. 216. Ibid., p. 219. In Marx, ideology arises as once class assumes ascendance from the ruling class.