5 10 13 0204 CR12-2025 Motion For Extension of Time To File Brief and To Strike RJC's ROA and Quasi Transcripts and Exceed Page Limitations A9

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!66334$ >hich it has yet to pro:ide directly to Coughlin, including any sealed portions o;
such matters, including the ;ollo>ing *rial dates:
)A7A$ (including the sealed portion thereo;#, 7A$6A$, "A9A$ (including the sealed
portion thereo;#, 9A)A$ (including the sealed portion thereo;#, $$A$9A$, and $$A!A$&
+urther, the entirety o; the "A7A$ 1earing >herein Coughlin :oluntarily accepted the
plea ?argain o;;ered ?y the 'tate should ?e transcri?ed and the sealed portions thereo;
pro:ided to Coughlin&
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Coughlin here?y respect;ully seeCs (a;ter maCing ?est e;;orts to timely o?tain a
stipulation to such ;rom opposing counsel# an e,tension o; time ;or ;iling my opening
?rie; in C($<!) and ;or %;le, access or some other digital copy o; the materials on ;ile
in C($<!) and C($3<!6$) (the (4C, much liCe the (2/ o; $A6A$ in C($<!),
;ailed to pro:ide me a copy o; the 4A$6A$ (2/ in C($3<!6$)#& *he transcripts are not
done yet& +urther, 0 am not an e;iler in the 43C, 33/ 7oung is, as such, an un;air
ad:antage has ?een a;;orded him >here he has recei:ed electronic notices regarding ;iling
in C($<!), and 0 ha:e not, especially >ith respect to the spate o; recent ;ilings ?y the
(4C, including the 'upplementals o; 4A$6A$3 and the 4A6A$3 D*ranscriptsD (0 do not
?elie:e it is appropriate to seeC to ?urden me, my ;amily, and my career >ith a 'C(
$$$(6# con:iction, a real one, i; the County or (4C cannot manage to comply >ith the
$A9A$3 2rder ;or .reparation o; *ranscripts at .u?lic %,pense and actually produce
legitimate, certi;ied ?y a CC(, transcripts, >ith actual certi;ications s>orn to therein&
*he sealed transcripts that the (4C re;uses to release are integral to a num?er o;
appeala?le issues in this matter:
2rder o; hearing during insanity motions
8hen an attorney maCes a motion ;or determination as to >hether or not a criminal
de;endant is insane, a =arsden =otion must ?e heard ?e;ore the insanity hearing, Cno>n
as a section $36" hearing& .eople :& 'tanCe>itE held that although criminal proceedings
must ?e halted during a hearing ;or competency, a =arsden =otion is not a criminal
proceeding and must ?e heard ;irst& D1earing a =arsden motion during a competency
hearing does not reinstate criminal proceedings against the de;endant&DF$!G +rom .eople :&
'tanCe>itE&DF$$G <
D(8#hile the trial court may not proceed >ith the case against the de;endant ?e;ore it
determines his competence in a section $36" hearing, it may and indeed must promptly
consider a motion ;or su?stitution o; counsel >hen the right to e;;ecti:e assistance H>ould
?e su?stantially impaired@ i; his reBuest >ere ignored&
/ court re;using a =arsden =otion prior to a $36" hearing is a Iudicial error according to
.eople :& 'olorEano,
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*he $A9A$3 2(3%( J(/N*0NJ 0N +2(=/ ./5.%(0' ?y 4udge %lliott in
C($<!), Coughlin su?mits, does include %;le, accessA;ee >ai:er, at least to that
criminal prosecution, and, as such, should e,tend to all other criminal matters >herein
Coughlin is an /ppellant or party ?e;ore 3epartment $!& Coughlin here?y seeC an 2rder
maCing that more clear to the %;le, sta;; and /ssistant ClerC o; Corut 8ise& +urther,
Coughlin reBuests some compensation at pu?lic e,pense ;or sel; representing, and or some
assignment o; co<counsel (not Bruce 6indsay#, ?ut Coughlin chooses to remain, at the
e,pense o; no such assignement o; co<counsel, his primary representati:e& *he $A9A$3
2rder, ;urther, allo>ed ;or Coughlin to utiliEe a court reporter o; his choosing, and he
con;irmed such >ith =rs& 1o>den o; 3epartment $!, and so directed 'unshine 6itigation
to undertaCe the preparation o; such transcripts, >hich it has ?een doing and remains
doing, ?ut the progress thereo; has ?een slo>ed ?y the (4C re;using to release the sealed
portions o; such transcripts, >hich is particularly pro?lematic since the sealed portions
in:ol:ing matters a?solutely essential to the appeal o; this case (ine;;ecti:e assistance o;
counsel, =ardsen =otion, competency issues, :iolations o; N(' $7"&4!) stay, 'tanCe>itE
considerations, etc&#& /dditionally, the (4C, despite an 0+. ?eing long on ;ile in the matter
in $$<!6334$, is no> re;using to release to Couglin the A4A$3 and A)A$3 hearing in $$<
!6334$, >here are o; essentail importance :is a :is appeala?le issues in ?oth C($<!)
and C($3<!6$4, ?ased upon some contention that the 0+. does not e,tend to such hearings
(there is an 0+. in ?oth the appeal and the trial court matter in $$<!6334$, and the (4C
ClerC@s ha:e taCen to typing out such re;usals to pro:ided such, lea:ing them unsigned and
unattri?uted#&
Coughlin here?y demonstrates that his motion ;or lea:e to ;ile an o:ersiEed ?rie;
demonstrate that the comple,ity o; the issues on appeal Iusti;y the reBuest& 'tate :& 8est,
$76 /riE& 43, "6 .&d $9 ($993# (o:erruled on other grounds ?y, 'tate :& (odrigueE,
$9 /riE& )", 96$ .&d $!!6 ($99"## (death penalty case#& ) +ed& (& 'er:& 3d )74 (9th
Cir& !!#& +leming :& County o; Kane, 'tate o; 0ll&, ")) +&d 496, $ +ed& (& 'er:& 3d
364 (7th Cir& $9""#&
*he issues in the instant appeal are Buite comple,, and e:en the incomplete Buasi<
transcript (uncerti;ied, etc# recently ;iled ?y the Iustice court is 6!! pages, and that ;ails to
inlcude Cey sealed protions o; the transcript a?solutely necessary to the =ardsen,
'tanCe>itE, and N(' $7"&4!) competency issues and ine;;ecti:e assistance o; counsel
analysis at issue here&
=atters at issue in those A4A$3 (a D>arrant arraignmentD ;or a >arrantless arrest
>here the docCet re:eals no acti:ely issued >arrant connected to such arrest or
araingmentD#, and the 2rder ;or Competency %:aluation and impermissi?le %, .arte
(econsideration =otion 1earing 'etting and accompanying :iolations o; the mandatory
stay under N(' $7"&4!) attendant thereto o; A)A$3 in ?oth $<!6)63! and $$<!6334$&
5pon consideration o; 3e;endant@s 3ecem?er $9, !$ /pplication to .roceed 0n
+orma .auperis, this Court ?elie:es that 3e;endant does not ha:e su;;icient income,
property or resources >ith >hich to commence and maintain the action& .ursuant to
Ne:ada 'upreme Court@s 2rder /3K* No&41, a person >ill ?e deemed indigent >ho is
una?le, >ithout su?stantial hardship to himsel; or his dependents, to o?tain competent
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Buali;ied legal counsel on his o>n& *he Court ;inds that pursuant to N(' $7$&$"",
de;endant has insu;;icient assets andAor 0ncome to proceed a?sent a grant o; ;orma
pauperis status& /ccordingly, this =otion is granted& N28, *1%(% +2(%, 0* 0'
1%(%B7 2(3%(%3 that pursuant to N(' $7$&$"" de;endant is granted lea:e to proceed
in ;orma pauperis& 0* 0' +5(*1%( 2(3%(%3 that the Court allo> de;endant to ?ring
such action >ithout costs and ;ile or issue any necessary >rit, process, pleading or paper
>ithout
charge, >ith the e,ception o; Iury ;ees& 0* 0' +5(*1%( 2(3%(%3 that the 'heri;; or
any other appropriate o;;icer >ithin the state maCe personal ser:ice o; any necessary >rit,
process, pleading or paper >ithout charge ;or de;endant& 0* 0' +0N/667 2(3%(%3 that
the preparation o; the transcript ?e pro:ided at the pu?lic@s e,pense& 3/*%3 this 6 day o;
4anuary !$3&
0@ll trade the Buasi<transcripts ;or a Buasi<con:iction, dealL 2r, >e could ;ind a
>ay to get the deal 0 accepted on "A7A$ in court that disposed o; all three prosecutions
($$<!6334$, $<!6)63!, $<!679"!#& 0 realiEe 33/ 7oung gre> annoyed >ith >hat he
interpreted to ?e a lacC o; gratitude ;or >hat >as, admittedly, a :ery reasona?le plea deal&
0 apologiEe ;or that& =y only mitigating ;actor to assert relates to some o; the ;riction
?et>een my pu?lic de;ender and mysel;, >hich >as compounded ?y some issues >ith an
(4C Baili;;, >hom has ?een going through some tri?ulations o; his o>n since 'eptem?er
!$$, including a +V *.2, ?anCruptcy, and di:orce >ith children&&&D0@ll put my ?oot up
your assD he said to me on $!A"A$ >hile 0 >as seated ne,t to 8C.3 6eslie&&&he has on
numerous occasions re;used to accept my ;ilings ;or incredi?ly du?ious reasons
(presenting si, minutes prior to ) pm, 0 do not ?elie:e, entitles a Baili;; to unilaterally alter
the terms o; the $A!A$ D/dministrati:e 2rder !$<!$&&&see >hat some might :ie> as
an encroachment upon your e,ecuti:e ;unction ?y the Iudiciary in (C(!$3<
!7$437#&&&especially on dates >here N(' $7)&)$) or $"9&!$! deadlines are ;alling&
+urther, 0 don@t ?elie:e it is appropriate ;or such Baili;; to ?e e,orting me, sarcastically, to
DtaCe your medicationD, or to sho:e his ;orearm in my midsection in the 3/' cu?icle in
some attempted to more authoritati:ely :iolate the courthouse sanctuary ruleAimmunity
a;;orded to litigants and attorney@s ;rom ser:ice >hile attending court, >here attempting to
ser:e a 'BN *.2 that is inordinately suspect, especially >hen :ie>ed in conIunction >ith
33/ 8atts<Vial@s $$A$3A$ ;a, regarding the su?poenas that the 43C 4udges and
Custodians o; (ecords ;ailed to respond to incident to 33/ 8atts<Vial@s instructions&
*his is especially true >here 'C( $$! is controlling, not N(C. 4) (and regardless,
Coughlin is and >as DauthoriEed to practiceD in the disciplinary hearing setting, and >as
and is Dan attorneyD#, and >here 'C( $$!(3#<(4# maCe clear that Iurisdiction to rule on
=otions to Muash such su?poenas resides only >ith the NN3B Chairman, not the .anel
Chair (see 33/ 8atts<Vial@s reliance upon such a :oid ;or lacC o; Iurisdiction $$A7A$
2rder ?y .anel Chair %che:erria that did not e:en mention the 43C su?poenas&
+urther, it is not entirely clear >hy 33/ 8atts<Vial >as apparently the attorney
assigned to respond to the su?poenas o; $!A3$A$ on the 43C 4udges and Custodian o;
(ecords, ?ut, apparently, not ;or the $!A3!A$ su?poenas on (4C Court /dminstrator
'te:e *uttle and Chie; Ci:il ClerC Karen 'tancil, and the (4C Custodian o; (ecords&
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.erhaps the (4C ;ailed to in;orm the e,ecuti:e ?ranch o; such mattersL 2r, perhaps, the
Iudicial ?ranch has autonomy to handle such matters as it sees ;it&
/dditionally, the e,tremely close temporal connection ?et>een Couglhin@s A$A$3
email to the 8C3/@s 2;;ice and the N(' $7$&$36 :iolating >arrantless arrest a;ter 7 pm
in Coughlin@s o>n home ?y the 3epartment o; /lternati:e 'entencing, is trou?ling&
Coughlin appealed the 3A$$A$3 2rder in (C(!$3<!7$437, and (C($$<!6334$
(+urther, the A$A$3 arrest >as not, contrary to a su?seBuent assertion, ?ased upon some
;ailure to get a mental health e:aluation done, and there >as no acti:e >arrant incident to
any such allegation at the time o; the A$A$3 arrest#&
8hether the Ddistur?ancesD in the (4C Criminal 3i:ision +iling 2;;ice o;;ered as a
?asis ;or depri:ing Coughlin, >ith no notice or opportunity to ?e heard, o; his li?erty right
to access the ;iling o;;ice >as connected to some allegations in:ol:ing the same (4C
Baili;; re;erenced a?o:e purporting to ser:e Coughlin the a 2rder or *.2, is unclear, as
the (4C ;ailed to comply >ith N(' &!3!(#@s reBuirement that any such conduct not
occurring in the Dimmediate :ie> and presence o; the courtD ?e set out in an a;;ida:it&
+urther, some glo?al resolution >ould certainly resol:e some o; the issues related
to the alternate court appointed la>yer, Bruce 6indsay@s representations to Coughlin that
all three criminal prosecutions (the pro?ation :iolation in $$<!6334$, the appeal in C($<
!), and (C($<!679"!, and (C($<!6)63!# as >ell as >hiche:er case num?er the
D/dministrati:e 2rder !$<!$D and accompanying A)A$3 2rder to 'ho> Cause therein
had ?een met >ith an agreement ?y the 8C3/@s 2;;ice to glo?ally resol:e all such in a
manner >herein Coughlin >ould ha:e no 'C( $$$(6# con:ictions in the (4C& /s it stands
no>, Coughlin >as sold a certain ?ill o; goods >hich has not materialiEed, particularly
>ith respect to the t>o 'C( $$$(6# con:ictions (o; $$A!A$ in (C($$<!6334$, no> on
appeal in C($<!), and on, apparently, o; 4A3A$3 in (C($<!6)63! (Couglhin has not
?een ser:ed any such D4udgment o; Con:ictionD listed on the docCet therein#, no> on
appeal in C($3<!6$4#&
+urther, >ith respect to the N(C. 7&!")AN(C. $$ implication in the *.2A%.2
o?tained in D8ashoe County : Zachary CoughlinD, (C.!$<!!!)99, there are a num?er
o; Iurisdictional prereBuisites that >ere not su;;icient to support such an application& 2ne,
6eslie is the one >hom signed the :eri;ication on page " o; the mandatory ;orm& 'uch is
not allo>a?le under N(' 33&7! >here 6eslie, necessarily, is one o; those the orders seeC
to protect& 0t must ?e one@s employer, >hich means (to >hate:er e,tent the 8C.3 is an
Dindependent contractor, not>ithstanding# 8ashoe County >ould ?e reBuired to ;ile such
application, >hich means the 8C3/@s 2;;ice >as reBuired to ;ile such& 0ts
understanda?le, gi:en the con;lict analysis sure to ensue, >hy 8C3/ 33/ 8atts<Vial
chose not to sign the :eri;ication or ;ile the pleading as an attorney representing a client&
1o>e:er, >here such *.2 application in )99 seeCs an order o; protection as to
(the caption listing D8ashoe CountyD, rather than the 8C.3, not>ithstanding# an entity
(>hich is not actually permissi?le under N(' 33&)!&&&# the DemployerD o; said entity is
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not as listed in the application, D8ashoe County .u?lic 3e;ender@s 2;;iceD, ?ut rather, the
8C.3@s 2;;ice@s DemployerD is D8ashoe CountyD&
/dditionally, the ;ailure o; 8C.3 6eslie to accurately ans>er the Buestions o;
.age 4 o; 6 in that $A$"A$ *.2 /pplication are trou?ling, particularly >here 6eslie and
the 8C.3 >here a?solutely a>are (made so in >riting, as >as the 8C3/@s 2;;ice# o;
(ichard J& 1ill, %sB&@s *.2 against Coughlin on $A$A$ in (C.$<!!!!$" (such
?ecoming an issue in the Dmisuse o; 9$$ ser:icesD trial in (C($<!6)63!#, and the =ilan
Kre?s *.2 against Coughlin (the (.3 certainly >as ?usy sho:ing *.2 applications
against Coughlin in a :ariety o; ;aces these past couple years# (C.!$<!!!"7 (such
;ailure ?y 6eslie to procure and pro:ide to Coughlin the 4/V' recording o; the hearing o;
"A)A$ therein ?ecoming a real point o; contention&&&>hich is all the more connected to the
8C3/@s 2;;ice, 8C'2@s, (4C, and 8C.3 gi:en the >rong;ul e:iction in (4C$<
!!$!4", and concomitant arrest on the same date as the locCout order >as ?eing
>rong;ully e;;ected, in :iolation o; 'oldal, on 6A"A$ in (C($<!679"!#&
+urther, ?oth 6eslie and the 8C3/@s 2;;icer >ere made a>are, in >riting, o; the
*.2 Couglin ;iled against an (4C Baili;; in !$, and that Couglin mo:ed ;or one in
Court against 8C.3 6eslie himsel; on 9A)A$&
+urther, 6eslie@s ans>er to the ;irst Buestion on page 6 o that $A$"A$ application is
pro?lematic, especially considering the caption in that case (C.$<)99&&&its as i; the
8C.3 and 8C3/@s 2;;ice and D8ashoe CountyD Ceep picCing and choosing >hich
entity is the DemployerD :ersus the party seeCing protection, and
*hat Buestion reads: D1a:e there ?een any other court actions or any other relationship
?et>een the employer and the /d:erse .artyLD 6eslie@s ans>er is completely misleading
and unaccepta?le >here the DemployerD (see the caption listing D8ashoe CountyD rather
than D8ashoe County .u?lic 3e;enderD# is D8ashoe CountyD, >hich has, ?een in:ol:ed in
a :erirty o; other Dcourt actionsD in:ol:ing the D/d:erse .artyD, >ell ?eyond 6eslie@s
misleading indication o;: D/ttorney<cleint see %,h& $D& 'uch a misleading ans>er is
particularly :iolati:e o; (.C 3&$, 3&3, and 3&4 >here the D(elie; (eBuestD >as so
completely onerous and o:er<reaching >here these DpartiesD necessarily still had Buite a
?it o; ?usiness le;t ?et>een each other (including a multitude o; disco:ery issues and other
matters addressing the apparent contempt incident to the 43C, 8C.3@s 2;;ice, 8C'2,
(4C, and 8C3/@s 2;;ice ;ailure to comply >ith Coughlin@s Dla>;ully issuedD su?poenas
in NJ$<!!4, etc&, not to mention the ;act that 8C.3@s 6eslie idea o; turning o:er a
Dclient@s ;ileD is >oe;ully inadeBuate, etc&D
8C.3 6eslie@s D3eclarationD on page 6 o; 6 o; that $A$"A$ *.2 /pplication is ;urther
demonstrati:e o; his o>n pro;essional misconduct >here he purports to ?e Dthe employerD
o; D8ashoe CountyD or the DauthoriEed agentD, especially >here N(' 33&7! prohi?its the
person seeCing the 8orCplace 1arassment order o; protection ;rom ;iling ;or such on his
o>n ?ehal;& /dd to this the ;act that the Iurisdictional prereBuisite o; a security ?ond >as
not posted (the docCet is prima ;acie e:idence o; ;act, there >as no >ai:er thereo;, such is
statutorily (per the /2C# at a minimum N$!! (and the A"A$3 arrest ?y (.3 3etecti:e
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7tru?ide and su?seBuent negligent in incorrect o:ercharging o; a N(' !!&)9$ D'talCingD
*.2 ()99 is a di;;erent ?reed, the D8orCplace 1arassmentD :ariety, >ith a :iolation
thereo; in:ol:ing a DmisdemeanorD under N(' $93, as clearly indicated in ?old on page $
o; such $A$"A$ 2rder, maCing the ;act that 7tru?id@s >i;e, 4ody, and another 7tru?ide
>orC ;or %C2==A9$$ 3ispatch particularly trou?ling considering the ?ene;it inuring to
the 'tate@s prosecution in (C($<!6)63! (the misuse o; 9$$ case# upon Coughlin ?eing
arrested on A"A$3 (the (.3 came out to Coughlin@s home o;;ice, and trespassed into the
?acC yard >ith their guns dro>n, pointing such as Coughlin@s head ;rom ;our ;eet a>ay
prior to issuing e:en a single command or >arning# >here the trial in !6)63! >as set to
continue, and perhaps conclude on A)A$3 (>ait, that >as made more disorienting ?y the
suspicious A$A$3 3/' summary >arrantless pro?ation :iolation arrest incident to the
du?ious allegation that the (4C Baili;;@s >aiting Iust long enough, on $A3A$3 ?e;ore
DescortingD Coughlin to the 3/' checC<in, ;or 3/' to close its doors, despite such posted
hours ending at 3 pm and Coughlin presenting to security at :)4 pm (made all the more
pro?lematic ?y the ;act that the $A!A$ /dministrati:e 2rder !$<!$ ?y 4udge
';erraEEa does not apply to areas, such as the 3/' checC in cu?icle (there are a separate
department 4udge .earson ultimately concluded# not under the De,clusi:e controlD o; the
(4C#&&&especially >here 8C'2 'argent Jreg 1errera has sent >ritten correspondence to
Cmmeyer->ashoecounty&us and others (including the 2lympiC 'ecurity courthouse
detail# that ha:e order the 2lympiC 'ecurity personnel to announce to Couglin an DorderD
that he must >ait ;or an DescortD e:en >here :enturing to areas not under the De,culsi:e
controlD o; either the (=C or (4C, and as such, not >ithin the pur:ie> o; either o; the
D/dministrati:e 2rdersD entered in those courts >ith respect to Coughlin&
*hen there is >itness (.3 NicC 3uralde@s >i;e, 4essica 3uralde also ?eing an %C2==
dispatcher&&&%C2== 3ispatcher 4odi 7tru?ide@s hus?and (.3 3etecti:e 7tur?ide
ordering Coughlin@s arrest on A"A$3 on the e:en o; the A$A$3 trial date in (C(!$<
!6)63!&&&Coughlin@s ?eing taCen o;; his medication ?y Iail sta;; incident to the A$A$3 to
A)A$3 incarceration resulting ;rom the e,tremely du?ious and N(' $7$&$36 :iolating
3/' >arrantless pro?ation :iolation arrest a;ter 7 pm o; A$A$3 (around $ hours a;ter
Coughlin@s email to the 8C3/@s 2;;ice#, and again ?et>een A"A$3 and A9A$3&&&then
Coughlin ?eing sentenced summarily to ) days incarceration on A$3A$3 ?y ;ormer
8C3/@s 2;;ice prosecutor no> (4C 4udge Cli;ton in $<!6)63! ;or ?eing thirty minutes
late to court (oddly, 6indsay ?eing t>enty minutes late to court on 3A$$A$3 did not result in
his incarceration in $$<!6334$, $3<!7$437#, >here the (4Carranged to ha:e, >ho else,
Bruce 6indsay purport to pro:ide Coughlin some representation at the summary criminal
contempt hearing on A$3A$3 ;or >hich Coughlin >as pro:ided no notice o;, no
consultation >ith 6indsay ?e;ore hand, etc& etc&&#&
+urther, the *.2 /pplication in )99 ;ails to Dincorporate ?y re;erenceD the D'ummaryD
(>hich is unsigned, and argua?ly not e:en attri?uted# in D%,hi?it $D (especially >here
+orm 4<Continuation .age is reBuired to ?e utiliEed and >here the %,hi?it 6eslie did
attach ;ails to contain any o; the reBuired language therein speci;ically asserting that such
matters attested therein are Dto ?e incorporated ?y re;erenceD into the 6 page D+orm B<3
/pplication ;or *emporary 2rder ;or .rotection /gainst harassment in the 8orCplaceD in
(4C (C.$<)99&
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6astly, it is not appropriate ;or the (4C@s Cathy 8ood to ?e transcri?ing the 4/V'
recordings, much less DsigningD them DCathy 8&D& 0ts a transcript in a court o; la>, not a
*<=o?ile representati:e notation on one@s cell phone accounts records&

8C'2 'argent 1errera sent, in an email o; 4A$)A$3 at $:3" .= a message >hich included
the ;ollo>ing:
*2: Cmmeyer->ashoecounty&us,>mullen->ashoecounty&us,
Ialgeo->ashoecounty&us, Cseely->ashoecounty&us
D=r& Coughlin needs to ?e stopped at screening at ?oth ?uildings and escorted to his
destination due to his current ?eha:ior& Court control needs to ?e noti;ied so they can
attempt to monitor his presence and maCe noti;ications& 8e >ill continue the practice o;
noti;ying the (eno 4ustice Court Baili;;@s, the (eno =unicipal Court =arshals, 3/
0n:estigators, and 3epartment o; /lternati:e 'entencing so that they &&&&D&
'argent 1errera ordered the 2lympiC 'ecurity court house security detail to carry out the
a?o:e directi:es, and so communicate such to Coughlin&
0 respect;ully reBuest that this Cour consider >hether there ha:e ?een some
unCno>n ;actors at play in some o; the less than smooth sailing seen at times, and >hether
there might ?e some opportunity to amica?ly resol:e these matters&
/dditionally, 3epartment $! should not ha:e ?een assigned this case ?y >ay o; an
incorrect assignement o; C($$<!64, gi:en that 6C(:
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(uleO&OOCase assignment&OO%ach criminal action shall ?e randomly assigned to a
department o; the court and shall remain in such department until ;inal disposition o; the
action, unless:
(a#Othe action is ?rought against a de;endant >ho is the su?Iect o; another pending or
prior action in this court, in >hich case the action shall ?e assigned to the department o;
the most recent other action9 or
(?#Oas other>ise ordered ?y the chie; Iudge consistent >ith a plan o; court>ide case
management
Comment:OO*o the e,tent possi?le, cases in:ol:ing a de;endant >ho is the su?Iect o;
another case in this district shall ?e assigned to the department o; the other case&
2ther>ise, cases shall ?e randomly assigned&
CV$$<!3$6 >as a prior acting Pin this courtQ, meaning 3epartement 4 >as Pthe most
recentQ, and gi:en not contrary order >as e:er made ?y the chie; Iudge (com?ined >ith
the con;lict inherent to 4udge %lliott sitting on C//8@s %,ecuti:e Board and presiding
o:er CV$$<!$9))&
6C( (uleO$!&OOContinuances&
(a#O*he timing o; proceedings as directed ?y the court at the initial appearance shall
not ?e enlarged e,cept upon a sho>ing o; good cause&
(?#O'tipulations or reBuests ;or the continuance o; any proceeding shall ?e in >riting,
signed ?y counsel and the de;endant, and su?mitted to the court as soon as practica?le ?ut
in no e:ent later than 4:!! p&m& on the Iudicial day immediately preceding the e:ent& *he
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court may >ai:e the signature o; the de;endant pro:ided counsel certi;ies he or she has
o?tained the consent o; the de;endant to the continuance&
Comment:OOContinuances o; any criminal proceeding are not ;a:ored, ?ut, i; reBuested,
shall ?e presented to the court under the terms o; this rule
/ =arsden motion is the only means ?y >hich a criminal de;endant can ;ire a court<
appointed attorney or communicate directly >ith a Iudge in a Cali;ornia state court&F$G 0t is
?ased on a de;endant@s claim that the attorney is pro:iding ine;;ecti:e assistance or has a
con;lict >ith the de;endant& *he name comes ;rom the case .eople :& =arsden& /
de;endant is reBuired to Cno> to maCe a challenge o; ine;;ecti:e assistance o; counsel, and
maCe one, or the claim o; ine;;ecti:e assistance o; counsel or the issue cannot ?e raised on
appeal& *here is no reBuirement to noti;y a de;endant o; such a reBuirement& / criminal
de;endant cannot simply ;ire a court<appointed attorney& *he trial Iudge has discretion
>hether or not to appoint ne> counsel on reBuest o; the de;endant& / =arsden motion is a
uniBue means ?y >hich a criminal de;endant can communicate >ith the court& 'ince a
criminal de;endant is represented ?y counsel, he or she cannot other>ise communicate
>ith the court e,cept through his or her counsel& 'ince that counsel@s competency or a?ility
to >orC >ith the de;endant is ?eing challenged, the attorney cannot at the same time
de;end against and represent the de;endant@s claims o; incompetency or con;lict& 'o the
Cali;ornia courts allo> a de;endant represented ?y court<appointed counsel to directly
communicate >ith the trial Iudge in the conte,t o; a =arsden motion, and only in such a
conte,t& / =arsden motion is a ;ormal reBuest made ?y a criminal de;endant to the court&
*he court hears arguments on the motion ;rom the de;endant and the attorney, >ithout the
presence o; the prosecutor& *he ?asis ;or maCing the motion may ?e inadeBuate or
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incompetent assistance o; counsel, legal malpractice, or ?ecause there is a con;lict ?et>een
attorney and client that su?stantially inter;eres >ith the attorney representing the client&
*he de;endant must esta?lish either that the representation has ?een inadeBuate, or that a
con;lict maCes it liCely that it >ill ?e inadeBuate&FGF3G 0n the case o; a denial o; the
motion, the standard o; re:ie> is a?use o; discretion& Contents FhideG $ %ssential
%lements $&$ Con;lict ?et>een client and attorney $& 0nadeBuacy o; representation
=arsden case 3 /ssociated cases 3&$ (ight to Counsel 3& 0ncompetent assistance o;
counsel 3&3 Con;lict >ith attorney 4 .rocedure o; hearing =arsden =otion 4&$ .resence o;
prosecutor 4& 1o> a criminal de;endant can ;ile a =arsden =otion 4&3 2rder o; hearing
during insanity motions 4&4 .resentation o; e:idence 4&4&$ 8itnesses 4&4& 3ocument
su?poenas 4&) .aper trail ) (e;erences FeditG%ssential %lements FeditGCon;lict ?et>een
client and attorney *he language o; the =arsden decision contains the su;;icient criterion
that attorney and de;endant are Dem?roiled in such an irreconcila?le con;lict that
ine;;ecti:e representation@ is liCely to result&DF4G FeditG0nadeBuacy o; representation
FeditG=arsden case 0n $96", 3e;endant =ichael 4ohn =arsden >as charged and con:icted
o; crimes in Cali;ornia& =arsden appealed the con:iction& *he only stated ?asis o; the
appeal >as that he >as denied his constitutional right to counsel ?ecause o; his counsel
>as ine;;ecti:e& /t trial, =arsden complained that his attorney >as not adeBuately
representing him ?e;ore his trial& =arsden asCed the court to appoint another attorney& *he
Iudge re;used to listen to the speci;ic e,amples =arsden tried to tell the Iudge& =arsden
>as con:icted& =arsden appealed& *he appeals court ;ound that the Iudge must consider
speci;ic e,amples o; inadeBuate representation ?e;ore deciding >hether or not to appoint a
ne> attorney ;or a criminal de;endant& =arsden reBuested that his attorney ?e remo:ed
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?e;ore his trial& =arsden told the trial Iudge that he >as recei:ing inadeBuate
representation ;rom the attorney& =arsden o;;ered to gi:e the court speci;ic e,amples& *he
court >ould not let =arsden gi:e the speci;ic e,amples& *he court denied the motion to
ha:e =arsdenRs attorney remo:ed& 0n his appeal, =arsden contended that this denial
>ithout gi:ing him an opportunity to list speci;ic e,amples o; inadeBuate representation
depri:ed him o; a ;air trial& 0n its opinion, the appellate court cited the case o; Jideon :&
8ainright as esta?lishing that criminal de;endants >ho cannot a;;ord counsel are entitled
under the constitution to ha:e the court appoint an attorney to ?e paid ;or ?y the
go:ernment&F)G 0t held that this did not gi:e a de;endant the right to hire and ;ire attorneys
?eyond this appointment, and le;t it >ith the trial court to esta?lish >hether or not there is
adeBuate assistance& 0n other >ords, the court has discretion as to >hether to remo:e an
attorney, not the de;endant& 1o>e:er, the appellate court ;ound that in =arsdenRs case, the
trial court could not ha:e properly e,ercised its discretion >ithout allo>ing =arsden to
speci;y instances o; inadeBuate representation& *he court ;ound that critical in;ormation
a?out the adeBuacy o; representation may not ?e in the court records ?ecause o; that
inadeBuacy, so a de;endant must ha:e a right to speci;y them, and they must ?e inBuired
into ?y the court& FeditG/ssociated cases =arsden =otion appeals ha:e cited associated
cases rele:ant to application o; the =arsden decision& FeditG(ight to Counsel 0n Jideon :&
8ainright, it >as determined that a criminal de;endant >ho cannot a;;ord an attorney is
entitled to ha:e a court appoint an attorney, and the go:ernment must pay ;or the attorney&
Jedeon >as one o; the ?ases ;or the =arsden decision& FeditG0ncompetent assistance o;
counsel FeditGCon;lict >ith attorney 0n 'chell :& 8iteC, 0t >as ;ound that ;orcing a
criminal de;endant to go to trial >ith an irreconcila?le con;lict >ith his or her attorney
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>ould depri:e them o; the e;;ecti:e assistance o; counsel&F6GF7G %:en >hen counsel is
;ound to ?e competent, it has ?een ;ound that a con;lict ?et>een counsel and de;endant
that cannot ?e resol:ed >ould create a situation >here the de;endant is ?eing denied the
right to counsel& 0n 3aniels V& 8ood;ord, it >as ;ound that >hen a court re;uses to appoint
ne> counsel a;ter a de;endant has completely lost trust in their attorney, that de;endant is
there?y e;;ecti:ely there?y constructi:ely denied any counsel >hatsoe:er, D%:en i; trial
counsel is competent, a serious ?reaCdo>n in communications can result in an inadeBuate
de;ense&D F"GF9G FeditG.rocedure o; hearing =arsden =otion FeditG.resence o; prosecutor
/ prosecutor may not ?e present during a court hearing on a =arsden =otion& FeditG1o> a
criminal de;endant can ;ile a =arsden =otion Because a criminal de;endant ;iling a
=arsden =otion is represented ?y counsel, he or she cannot directly communicate >ith
the court& FeditG2rder o; hearing during insanity motions 8hen an attorney maCes a
motion ;or determination as to >hether or not a criminal de;endant is insane, a =arsden
=otion must ?e heard ?e;ore the insanity hearing, Cno>n as a section $36" hearing&
.eople :& 'tanCe>itE held that although criminal proceedings must ?e halted during a
hearing ;or competency, a =arsden =otion is not a criminal proceeding and must ?e heard
;irst& D1earing a =arsden motion during a competency hearing does not reinstate criminal
proceedings against the de;endant&DF$!G +rom .eople :& 'tanCe>itE&DF$$G < D(8#hile the
trial court may not proceed >ith the case against the de;endant ?e;ore it determines his
competence in a section $36" hearing, it may and indeed must promptly consider a motion
;or su?stitution o; counsel >hen the right to e;;ecti:e assistance H>ould ?e su?stantially
impaired@ i; his reBuest >ere ignored& / court re;using a =arsden =otion prior to a $36"
hearing is a Iudicial error according to .eople :& 'olorEano, ho>e:er, a su?seBuent appeal
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court decision in .eople :& Jo:ea did not consider such error to ?e preIudicial, and did not
re:erse a con:iction, ;inding that Dthere >as no preIudicial =arsden errorD&F$G
FeditG.resentation o; e:idence / de;endant may present e:idence in support o; his or her
=arsden =otion& FeditG8itnesses FeditG3ocument su?poenas FeditG.aper trail 3e;endants
maCing =arsden =otions are o;ten ad:ised ?y ad:ocates to create a clear paper trail& *his
is ?ecause the court o;ten gi:es more credi?ility to attorneys than to criminal de;endants,
and a success;ul =arsden =otion automatically triggersFcitation neededG a state Bar
in:estigtion& /ram 4ames, a ;ormer pu?lic de;ender and >atchdog o; a?uses ?y the pu?lic
de;ender, >ho teaches de;endants and their ;amilies ho> to ;ile a =arsden =otion,
emphasises creation o; a paper trail as essential to the success o; the motion prior to trial,
or to ?asing an appeal on the denial o; the motion& FeditG(e;erences S P&&& a =arsden
motion, >hich is the o;;icial >ay to ;ire an attorney& /lthough a Iudge can deny the
motion, and chances are he >ould, this >ould in e;;ect, allo> Karim to address the court
and get 6o;tus@ alleged comment on record&Q, *ales +rom / *rial, (aI 4ayade:, 'an 4ose
=etro, $<$6<!" S .eople :& Barnett ($99"# $7 Cal& 4th $!44, $!") S .eople :& =ay;ield
($997# $4 Cal&4th 66", 79) S .eople :& =arsden, supra, Cal&3d at p& $3& S Jideon :&
8ain>right ($963# 37 5&'& 33), 9 6&%d&d 799, "3 '&Ct& 79, 93 /&6&(&d 733 S .eople
o; the 'tate o; Cali;ornia Vs& Brandon /rnae *aylor, Case No& '!6)&6, No& Cali;ornia
'uperior Court T'C3$$$3"$), /ppelantRs (eply Brie; as secondary source on 'chell :&
8iteC and and Bro>n :& Cra:en, p&7 S 'chell :& 8iteC (9th Cir& !!!# $" +&3d $!$7,
$!), Buoting Bro>n :& Cra:en (9th Cir& $97!# 44 +&d $$66, $$7!& S .eople o; the 'tate
o; Cali;ornia Vs& Brandon /rnae *aylor, Case No& '!6)&6, No& Cali;ornia 'uperior
Court T'C3$$$3"$), /ppelantRs (eply Brie; as secondary source on 3aniels V&
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8ood;ord, p&7 S 3aniels :, 8ood;ord (9th Cir& !!)# 4"& +4d $$"$,$$9", citing 5nited
'tates :& Nguyen (9th Cir& !!$# 6 +&3d 99", $!!3<$!!4& S +2(%N'0C =%N*/6
1%/6*1 6%J/6
0''5%', Chapter $, 0ncompetent to 'tand *rial (0'*# Commitment,
F>>>&disa?ilityrightsca&orgApu?sA)!77!$U!ChU!$&rt;G S .eople :& 'tanCe>itE ($99!#
)$ Cal&3d 7, "" F7! Cal&(ptr& "$7, 793 .&d 3G S *he .%2.6%, .lainti;; and
(espondent, :& (ay (onnie J2V%/, 3e;endant and /ppellant, No& B!)7$), 4une ,
!!9, F$G
3C( (uleO$3&OOContinuances&
$&OONo continuance o; a trial in a ci:il or criminal case shall ?e granted e,cept ;or
good cause& / motion or stipulation ;or continuance shall state the reason there;or and
>hether or not any pre:ious reBuest ;or continuance had ?een either sought or granted&
*he motion or stipulation must certi;y that the party or parties ha:e ?een ad:ised that a
motion or stipulation ;or continuance is to ?e su?mitted in their ?ehal; and must state any
o?Iection the parties may ha:e thereto&
&OO0; a continuance o; any trial is granted, the parties must appear in the indi:idual
court department >ithin ) days and reset the case, unless the court >ai:es this
reBuirement& +ailure to ;ollo> this rule may result in the court setting the trial date&
83C( (uleO$7&OO%, parte orders&
$&OONo proposed e, parte order, e,cept an order to allo> an indigent to ;ile a
complaint >ithout payment o; ;ees, shall ?e presented to a Iudge ;or signing ?e;ore the
case has ?een ;iled >ith the ;iling o;;ice, gi:en a case num?er, and assigned to a
department&
&OO.roposed e, parte orders, orders ?ased upon >ritten stipulation o; counsel, and
orders in uncontested matters shall ?e presented only to the Iudge o; the department in
>hich the case is pending, unless such Iudge designates another Iudge to consider the
order& 0; there is no designation, and the Iudge o; the department in >hich the case is
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pending is not in the courthouse during regular Iudicial hours, a proposed e, parte order
may ?e presented to a Iudge on the same ;loor or to the chie; Iudge&
3C( (uleO$"&OO
3C( (uleO$9($# reBuires a setting that 3$!@s =rs& 1o>den indicated >ould ?e stayed&
4udge %lliott@s )A7A$3 2rder Jranting %,tenstion o; *ime, read:
P2(3%( J(/N*0NJ %V*%N'02N 2+ *0=% /N3 '*(0K0NJ 3%+%N3/N*@'
=2*02N' .resently ?e;ore the Court are numerous =otions ;iled ?y 3e;endant Z/C1
C25J160N (D3e;endant@@#& No 2pposition has ?een ;iled& *he motions ho>e:er, do not
;ollo> the rules and the arguments are illegi?le& 6ocal (ule $!($# states that all papers
must ?e type>ritten or prepared ?y some other duplicating process that >ill produce clear
and permanent copies eBually legi?le to printing& +urther, Rule 10(1) states that the ;ont
siEe shall not ?e more than $ points& A 3e;endant is in clear :iolation o; this rule, as his
hand>ritten motions cannot ?e read& +urther, the motion 3e;endant typed maCes little
sense and many o; the same arguments are repeated throughout the document&
/ccordingly, the Court must striCe the motions on ;ile herein that ha:e ?een su?mitted to
the Court& 1o>e:er, this Court is gi:ing 3e;endant an e,tension o; si,ty (6!# days ;rom
the date o; this 2rder to ;ile an 2pening Brie; due to the 4ustice Court@s ;ailure to pro:ide
the <$<& necessary transcript to 3e;endant, as ordered ?y this Court& N28, *1%(%+2(%,
0* 0' 1%(%B7 2(3%(%3 that 3e;endant@s =otions on ;ile herein are '*(0CK%N& 0* 0'
+5(*1%( 2(3%(%3 that 3e;endant ?e gi:en si,ty (6!# days ;rom the date o; this
2rder to ;ile his 2pening Brie;& 3/*%3 this "
th
day o; =arch !$3&Q
83C( (ule $!($# does not apply in light o; 83C( (ule $" >here this is a
criminal appeal& /s such, Coughlin@s $A$"A$3 =otion to 'tay .ro?ation should ?e
reinstated and the lacC o; opposition result in an application o; 3C( $3(3#, and granting
such motion& *here has ?een no Brie;ing 2rder in this matter, not setting o; a hearing
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despite ?est e;;orts ?y Coughlin& 3epartment $!@s ;ormer /dministrati:e /ssistant
1o>den indicated such issues >ould ?e stayed pending the change o:er to 4udge 'attler
taCing the ?ench&
=otions to e,tend the time ;or ;iling ?rie;s are care;ully scrutiniEedF+N$G and
typically >ill ?e granted ?y the court only upon a sho>ing o; good cause&F+NG PJood
causeQ reBuires that the mo:ant a:er something more than the normal, or e:en the
reasona?ly anticipated ?ut a?normal, :icissitudes inherent in the practice o; la>&F+N3G *he
consent o; opposing counsel to e,tend the time ;or ;iling ?rie;s does not play a decisi:e
role in the court@s treatment o; such a motion&F+N4G / motion ;or e,tension o; time should
?e ;iled ?e;ore the ?rie; is due&F+N)G %,cessi:e reBuests ;or e,tensions may result in
sanctions&F+N6G *he appellate rule pro:isions relating to additional time a;ter ser:ice ?y
mail usually apply to the ;iling o; ?rie;s&F+N7G F+N$G 5&'& :& (aimondi, 76! +&d 46! (d
Cir& $9")#& F+NG +ed& (& /pp& .& 6(?#& F+N3G Nor:elle :& City o; 1o?art, $993 2K C0V
/.. $3), "6 .&d " (Ct& /pp& 3i:& $ $993#& F+N4G 5&'& :& (aimondi, 76! +&d 46! (d
Cir& $9")#9 Bar?er :& /merican 'ec& BanC, "4$ +&d $$)9 (3&C& Cir& $9""#& /s to the
conseBuences o; an appellant@s or an appellee@s ;ailure to ;ile a timely ?rie;, see WW )36 to
)3"& F+N)G +ricC :& VeaEey, $$6 N&=& 46, "6$ .&d "7 (Ct& /pp& $993#& F+N6G Bro>n
:& Bro>n, ")4 .&d 73 (/lasCa $993#& F+N7G Bro>ning :& 8alters, 6! N&%&d " (0nd&
Ct& /pp& $st 3ist& $993#& / motion to dismiss ;or late ;iling o; a ?rie; >as denied, a;ter the
?rie; had ?een timely ;iled ?y mail and the postal clerC inad:ertently ;ailed to postmarC
the en:elope& /ndre>s :& City o; =acon, $9$ Ja& /pp& 74), 3" '&%&d 739 ($9"9#&W )36&
+ailure o; appellant to ;ile or timely ;ile ?rie; 8est@s Key Num?er 3igest 8est@s Key
Num?er 3igest, /ppeal and %rror C769&$ to 773()# 8est@s Key Num?er 3igest, Criminal
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6a> C$$3!(4# 8est@s Key Num?er 3igest, +ederal Courts C7$6 *rial 'trategy
Considering /ppeals, 6$ /m& 4ur& *rials $, W 64 +orms /m& 4ur& .leading and .ractice
+orms, /ppeal and %rror W 7)$ (=otionX*o a;;irm Iudgment ;or ;ailure to ;ile proper
?rie;XJeneral ;orm# /m& 4ur& .leading and .ractice +orms, /ppeal and %rror W 773
(/;;ida:it in support o; motion to dismiss appeal ;or ;ailure to ;ile ?rie;# /m& 4ur& .leading
and .ractice +orms, /ppeal and %rror W 776 (2rderX3ismissing appealXJeneral ;orm#
+ederal .rocedural +orms W 3:34) (=otionX*o dismiss appeal ;or ;ailure o; appellant to
;ile ?rie;# 0; an appellant ;ails to ;ile the ?rie; >ithin the time pro:ided ?y the appellate
rules or >ithin the time as e,tended, the appellant may mo:e that the appeal ?e dismissed&
F+N$G *hus, upon the appellant@s une,cused ;ailure to ;ile a ?rie; >ithin the time ;i,ed ?y
the rule o; court and >ithout an e,tension o; time, the appeal may ?e dismissed or the
Iudgment a;;irmed&F+NG 8hen the appellant ;ails to timely ;ile the ?rie;, the court also
may treat the appeal as a?andoned,F+N3G striCe the ?rie;,F+N4G impose costs,F+N)G or
sanction the attorney&F +N6G 0n determining the appropriate sanction ;or the late ;iling,
courts >ill e:aluate >hether the appellee has ?een preIudiced&F+N7G 5nless the appellate
court rules reBuire dismissal o; the appeal ;or ;ailure to ;ile a ?rie; >ithin the speci;ied
time period, the late ;iling o; an appellant@s ?rie; does not al>ays result in dismissal,F+N"G
particularly i; it appears that such a party is attempting to prosecute the appeal diligently&
F+N9G *he result may also ?e di;;erent ;or an appeal ?rought ?y a pro se or indigent party&
F+N$!G 8hile some courts may dismiss an appeal >hen a pro se appellant ;ails to ;ile an
appellate ?rie;,F+N$$G others may re:ie> the record ;or ;undamental error in such
circumstances&F+N$G / pro se prisoner@s appeal may also ?e disposed o; ?y summary
decision, rather than ?y dismissal o; the appeal, >hen the prisoner ;ails to ;ile a ?rie;&
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F+N$3G .ractice *ip: 3ismissal o; an appeal ;or ;ailure to ;ile a timely ?rie; is >ithout
preIudice to a motion to reinstate made ?y the appellant@s counsel& *he motion esta?lishes
the client@s lacC o; responsi?ility ;or the untimely ?rie; and proposes an appropriate
sanction to ?e directed against the attorney personally&F+N$4G C5=56/*0V%
'5..6%=%N* Cases: Chapter 7 trustee@s disregard ;or district court@s orders regarding
;iling o; appellate ?rie;s ;or trustee@s appeals ;rom dismissal o; her ad:ersary proceedings
against municipality and ;or rules go:erning ;iling o; appellate ?rie;s e,cessi:ely delayed
proceedings ?e;ore district court and >as ine,cusa?le, >arranting e,ercise o; court@s
discretion to dismiss appeals ;or ;ailure to prosecute and to comply >ith court orders&
=a,on %ngineering :& =unicipality o; /i?onito, 397 B&(& 63 (3&.&(& !!"#& F%N3 2+
'5..6%=%N*G F+N$G +ed& (& /pp& .& 3$(c#& F+NG Jreens?oro 6um?er Co& :& +&%&(&C&,
") +&d )$" (3&C& Cir& $9"7#9 'tate :& 'proul, )44 /&d 743 (=e& $9""#& /s to the
timeliness o; ;iling ?rie;s and e,tensions o; time, see WW )3, )33& F+N3G City o; /l?ia :&
'tephens, 46$ N&8&d 36 (0o>a $99!#9 'tate :& 'utherland, ")9 '&8&d "!$ (=o& Ct&
/pp& %&3& $993#& F+N4G Nor:elle :& City o; 1o?art, $993 2K C0V /.. $3), "6 .&d "
(Ct& /pp& 3i:& $ $993#& F+N)G Blount :& 'tate BanC Y *rust Co&, 4) +&d 66 (4th Cir&
$97!#& F+N6G =atute :& .rocoast Na:& 6td&, 9" +&d 67, $" +ed& (& 'er:& 3d $)$! (3d
Cir& $99$# (o:erruled on other grounds ?y, Neely :& Clu? =ed =anagement 'er:ices, 0nc&,
63 +&3d $66 (3d Cir& $99)##& F+N7G Camoscio :& 'mith, 6 =ass& /pp& Ct& 9, ))
N&%&d 4$ ($9""#9 'mith :& =errill 6ynch .ierce +enner Y 'mith, $)) =ich& /pp& 3!,
399 N&8&d 4"$ ($9"6#& F+N"G King :& 6a?orers 0ntern& 5nion o; North /merica, 5nion
6ocal No& "$", 443 +&d 73 (6th Cir& $97$#9 'tate :& 6aperche, 6$7 /&d $37$ ((&0& $99#
(>here the court considered the hea:y >orCload o; the appellate di:ision o; the attorney
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general@s o;;ice#9 8ade :& 'tate, 3$ '&8&3d 73 (*e,& /pp& 1ouston $st 3ist& !!!#,
petition ;or discretionary re:ie> re;used, (+e?& ", !!$#& F+N9G King :& 6a?orers 0ntern&
5nion o; North /merica, 5nion 6ocal No& "$", 443 +&d 73 (6th Cir& $97$#& F+N$!G
King :& 6a?orers 0ntern& 5nion o; North /merica, 5nion 6ocal No& "$", 443 +&d 73
(6th Cir& $97$#& F+N$$G CooC :& 'tate, 63! 'o& d 49 (/la& Crim& /pp& $993#& F+N$G W
)$)& F+N$3G BaCer :& 5&'&, 494 +&d )!" ()th Cir& $974#& F+N$4G 'totler and Co& :& /?le,
"37 +&d $4), $! +ed& (& 'er:& 3d ))7 (7th Cir& $9""#& W )3"& +ailure o; appellee to ;ile
or timely ;ile ?rie;X0n criminal case 8est@s Key Num?er 3igest 8est@s Key Num?er
3igest, Criminal 6a> C$$3!(4# 8est@s Key Num?er 3igest, +ederal Courts C7$6 /&6&(&
6i?rary ConseBuences o; prosecution@s ;ailure to ;ile timely ?rie; in appeal ?y accused, 7
/&6&(&4th $3 *rial 'trategy Considering /ppeals, 6$ /m& 4ur& *rials $, W 64 0;, >hen a
de;endant appeals ;rom a criminal con:iction, the prosecutor ;ails to ;ile a timely
appellee@s ?rie;, the ;ailure to timely ;ile the appellee@s ?rie; may ?e treated as grounds ;or
the pro ;orma re:ersal o; the con:iction that >as appealed&F+N$G *he state@s ;ailure to ;ile
a response ?rie; upon a de;endant@s appeal may ?e considered a con;ession o; errorF+NG
or an indication that the state has elected not to prosecute a criminal charge&F+N3G 0; the
prosecutor ;ails to ;ile an appellee@s ?rie;, the statement o; ;acts contained in the
de;endant@s ?rie; may ?e deemed to ha:e ?een admitted&F+N4G *he court can accept the
appellant@s statement o; ;acts and issues as correct and re:erse the Iudgment i; the
appellant@s ?rie; reasona?ly appears to sustain such action&F+N)G *he court also has the
option to assess costs ;or ;ailure to ;ile an appellee ?rie;&F+N6G Jross noncompliance >ith
the rules o; court, such as the state@s une,cused ;ailure to respond to the de;endant@s
opening appeal ?rie;, may ?e su;;icient cause ;or the entry o; a de;ault decree, disciplinary
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action against o;;ending counsel, or other proper relie; under the circumstances&F+N7G 0n
determining the appropriate sanction ;or the appellee@s ;ailure to ;ile a timely ?rie;, courts
>ill consider >hether there has ?een any preIudice to the de;endant<appellant&F+N"G 0n
some appellate courts, the ;ailure o; an appellee to ;ile a responsi:e ?rie; may not properly
?e considered a con;ession o; su?stanti:e error,F+N9G and else>here an automatic re:ersal
may not ?e an appropriate sanction under the applica?le state rule o; appellate proced<ure&
F+N$!G *here is also authority that >hen the prosecution does not ;ile a ?rie; on appeal,
the de;endant may pre:ail ?y maCing a prima ;acie sho>ing o; re:ersi?le error, although
this rela,ed standard does not allo> the appellate court to >eigh e:idence or to assess
>itness credi?ility >hen the con:iction is challenged as unsupported ?y su;;icient
e:idence9 the court must still :ie> the e:idence in the light most ;a:ora?le to the
prosecution, and re:ersal is >arranted only i; the error is demonstrated in the record and
?y the de;endant@s ?rie;&F+N$$G F+N$G 'tate :& +iles, $"3 Conn& )"6, 44$ /&d 7, 7
/&6&(&4th !" ($9"$#9 'pears :& 'tate, 6$ N&%&d 366 (0nd& Ct& /pp& 4th 3ist& $993#&
F+NG 3ias :& 'tate, 9) Ne:& 7$!, 6!$ .&d 7!6 ($979#& F+N3G Com& :& .aasche, 39$ =ass&
$", 4)9 N&%&d $3 ($9"4#& F+N4G =ont;ord :& 'tate, $64 Ja& /pp& 67, 9" '&%&d 3$9
($9"#9 'tate :& Jrimes, $7 2hio /pp& 3d 7$, 477 N&%&d $$9 ($th 3ist& Clermont
County $9"4#& F+N)G 'tate :& =iddleton, ") 2hio /pp& 3d 4!3, 6$9 N&%&d $$$3 (4th
3ist& Vinton County $993#& F+N6G 'tate :& =orrissey, 9) N&8&d 3!) (N&3& $9"!#&
F+N7G 'mith :& 'tate, 36$ /&d 37 (3el& $976#& F+N"G 'mith :& 'tate, 36$ /&d 37 (3el&
$976#9 3ias :& 'tate, 9) Ne:& 7$!, 6!$ .&d 7!6 ($979#9 'tate :& =orrissey, 9) N&8&d
3!) (N&3& $9"!#& F+N9G .eople :& 'mith, 439 =ich& 9)4, 4"! N&8&d 9!" ($99#& F+N$!G
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'tate :& Justa;son, 7" N&8&d 3)" (N&3& $979#& F+N$$G 8oods :& 'tate, )7) N&%&d
$!7) (0nd& Ct& /pp& 3d 3ist& $99$#&
AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
*he undersigned does here?y a;;irm that the preceding document does not contain the
social security num?er o; any person&
DECLARATION
*he assertions herein are made, pursuant to N(' )3&!4) under penalty o; perIury that the
assertions made herein are true and correct to the ?est o; my Cno>ledge and that /ppellant
has a good ;aith, good cause ?asis ;or seeCing this e,tension and that it is not interposed
;or purposes o; delay&
3ated this =arch 7th, !$3,
AsA Zach Coughlin, signed electronically
Zach Coughlin
/ppellant&
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
0, Zach Coughlin, on this date, emailed the %, .arte =otion and ;a,ed it to 8C3/
33/ 7oung@s ;a, num?er as then listed at >>>&n:?ar&org and deposited a true and
correct copy thereo; in the 5' mail address to:
Z/C1/(7 N& 725NJ, %'M&
8ashoe County 3/ 2;;ice
/ddress: $ 'outh 'ierra
.&2& Bo, 3!!"3
(eno, NV "9)!
.hone Num?er: 77)<3"<3!!
+a, num?er: 77)<3)<67!3
%mail: Eyoung-da&>ashoecounty&us
3/*%3 *10': 3ated this =arch, 7th, !$3
AsA Zach Coughlin
Zah Coughlin
/ppellant
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0N3%V *2 %V10B0*':
$& %V10B0* $ .(2.2'%3 2(3%(
& %V10B0* V/(025' (%6%V/N* =/*%(0/6'&
- 4A4 -
EXHIBIT 1
EXHIBIT 1
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE; STATE OF NEVADA
Zach Coughlin,
A!llan"
#$%
S"a"! o& N!#a'a
R!$on'!n"
(
(
(
(
(
(
CR)*+*,*-
DE.T ),
ORDER
/oo' cau$! 0!ing $ho1n, inclu'ing "h! &ac" "ha" "h! 2!a2a"ion o& "h!
"2an$c2i" ha$ 3!" "o 0! co4l!"! "h2ough no &aul" o& A!llan"5$ "h! '!a'lin! "o &il! "h!
O!ning 62i!& in "hi$ 4a""!2 $hall 0! !7"!n'!' ou" 8, 'a3$ &2o4 "h! cu22!n" '!a'lin! o&
9a3 :, *,);, o2 ;, 'a3$ &2o4 $uch "i4! a$ "h! c!2"i&i!' "2an$c2i"$ &2o4 Sun$hin!
Li"iga"ion o& all "h! "2ial cou2" 2oc!!'ing$ a2! 2!c!i#!' 03 A!llan", 1hich!#!2 i$ la"!2,
an' Coughlin5$ 2o0a"ion in RCR*,))+,8;;<) $hall 0! $"a3!' !n'ing $uch "i4!%
IT IS SO ORDERED%
=======================
DISTRICT COURT JUD/E
- )>) -
EXHIBIT 2
EXHIBIT 2
Review Report
file:///D|/...20on%20superior%20and%20complaint%20regarding%20officer%20weaver%20rpd%20sargent%20miller.htm[9/23/2012 12:07:46 PM]
Trespassing: Start Yourself Incident Person Review Finish
Canc el Repor t Submi t Repor t
Review Report
Please review the report. If all the information is correct, click the Submit button to submit the report. If you need to modify some
information, click the desired modify link. This will be your last chance to change information for this report.
General Information
Incident Type Trespassing
Person Type Individual
Reporting Person Information modify
Last Name Coughlin
First Name Zach
Home Address 3961 POBOX, 3961, Reno, NV 89505, US
Home Phone 949-667-7402
Email zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Work Address
Work Phone
Race
Ethnicity
Sex Male
DOB 09/27/1976
SSN
Driver License No
Licensing State
Incident Information modify
Incident Location 7750 West 4th Street, 431, Reno, NV 89523
Incident Time (start) 09/21/2012 10:55 AM
Incident Time (end) 09/21/2012 07:55 PM
Location Type Storage Shed
Incident Description
Please place a copy of this complaint of police harrassment by Officer Alan Weaver
in his personnel file. I already spent 18 days in jail incident to his wrongful July 3rd,
2012 arrest in 12 cr 12420, and his and Sargent Dye's fraudulent and succesful to
have my bail raised impermissbly on July 5th, 2012. Further, please do the same for
Sargent Oliver Miller and Ltn. Kevin Brown as they threatened me with criminal
trespass where I still had a valid lease at 1680 Sky Mountain Drive, Northwinds
Apartments. Now today, they are up to it again at Superior Mini Storage. Pursuant
to an agreement of August 28th, 2012, I am a sublesse to Derek Swanson, some
might say, and have 30 days thereunder to use the facility, whereupon contractual
interpretation need be done as to whether that is a reoccuring monthly
agreement/obligation. See Soldal v Cook County for the proposition that it is a 42
USC Sec 1983 violation for OFficer Weaver to seek to play landlord tenant Judge.
Weaver was harrassing me again today and threatened to make another baseless
custodial arrest of me, then subsequently returned to Superior Storage in an
attempt to influence another private citizens, similar to the Milan Krebs "distrubing
the peace" arrest of July 3rd, 2012, to sign another baseless criminal complaint at
Weaver's urging. His lack of professionalism is appalling. Further, he an Sargent
Dye attempted to intimidate me as a witness, Dye finding me thirty minutes after
midnight in a parking lot the night before trial, Weaver by making menacing
jestures in court the mornign of Trial. Superior and Matt and Ken Grant admit to
Review Report
file:///D|/...20on%20superior%20and%20complaint%20regarding%20officer%20weaver%20rpd%20sargent%20miller.htm[9/23/2012 12:07:46 PM]
illegally locking out tenants for 14 years by disablign the gate code if rent not paid
by the 10th day of the month, which violates NRS 108, further if the disagree to the
arrangment I have with Swanson, they need pursue a civil rememdy, not have
Officer Weaver embarass the force some more.
Person Information modify
Person 1 modify delete
Last Name grant
First Name matt
Middle Name
Employer Name Marvin Dye Jr
Work Address
Work Phone
Home Address 7750 West 4th Street, reno, NV 89523, US
Home Phone 775-746-4322
Mobile Phone
Email superior.storage@yahoo.com
Race
Ethnicity
Sex
DOB
Age
Age Low
Age High
Height
Height Low
Height High
Weight
Weight Low
Weight High
Eye Color
Hair Color
Driver License No
Licensing State
Copyright 2012 Coplogic, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Review Report
file:///D|/...7980%20rmc%2012%20cr%2012420/supplement%20to%20rpd%209%2021%2012%20report%20superior.htm[9/23/2012 12:07:49 PM]
Trespassing: Start Yourself Incident Review Finish
Review Report
Please review the report. If all the information is correct, click the Submit button to submit the report. If you need to modify some
information, click the desired modify link. This will be your last chance to change information for this report.
General Information
Incident Type Trespassing
Person Type Individual
Reporting Person Information modify
Last Name coughlin
First Name zach
Home Address 3961 pobox, Reno, NV 89505, US
Home Phone 949-667-7402
Email zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Work Address
Work Phone
Race
Ethnicity
Sex Male
DOB 09/27/1976
SSN
Driver License No
Licensing State
Incident Information modify
Incident Location 7750 West 4th Street, 431, RENO, NV 89505
Incident Time (start) 09/21/2012 08:45 PM
Incident Time (end) 09/21/2012 08:45 PM
Location Type Storage Shed
Incident Description
Matt Grant opened up my box of personal property and filmed it with her video
camera despite my expressing my refusal to allow her permission to do so. Violation
of privacy, reported to RPD, did nothing but allow Alan Weaver and O. Miller to
harrass me some more and Welch to threaten to arrest me if I didn't not move my
stuff right then.
Person Information modify
Copyright 2012 Coplogic, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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(FAX) 77 5 786 9658

P.005/025
1 011 0/2012 11 :29 Mark Mausert ,ESQ
CA>F
JMU!CEAICOUTOFTCHOF RO
COUTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NYAA
CIY OF RO,
Plantff, CRIAL COMPLAJ
Y. (GF)
Defen
L
!, | hereby complan and say tat
^
38 committed te crime
l0wit:
Tat said deendant OR01about ZU_ U0City of Reno,
^CW0J0 is in violation ofNS adoptcdby8c0Ou
1.04.015 of the Reno Municipal U0t.
All of which is ill vcla0ono{ l. C
0Reno Muncpa
Codc.
therefore request that said Defendant be dealt w th according to law.
herey declar upon information and belief under penaty ofpcljury pursuant to NRS
171.102, that the !orcong!rtue and correct I0 m0008|of my kOWlege .
(|mpIinapt) (Da!ed)
1/0
3
-
1 011 0/2012 11 :30 Mark Mausert ,ESQ (FAX) 77 5 786 9658 P.006/025
CASE # 1212728
THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE C!TYOF RNO
COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NFVAIA
ClTYOF RENO,
Plaintiff, CRL^ICUMFl^!NT
V. (GENERAL)
Coughlin, Zachary
Defendant
W
DOB SSN
!, P.J. 0aYer Badge #9469, hereby complain and say tat Zachary Coughlin ha
0CmP00 ccrime of nsccwcdlOto WI.
That said defendant on or about July 3, 2012, mthe City of Reno, Stte of Nevada, nthe
vicinity of Summit Rdge Drive and te McCaa ovg=:
Operateq mOtOIV0bl00 with a plastc storage tub resting on U0Ic0t 0m lid unsecured while
driving eastbound on Summit Ridge Te storage tub fell of the rear of te vehicle landing in
the middle of Summit Ridge causing 8small SUV to brake and 5Y00 around it.
o All of which 80viola|onofNK ddoptedbysection
1.04.015 of the Reno Municipal Code.
All of whiohis in violation of6.14.130.B of the Reno Mmicipm
Code.
!\00I0010 request that said Defendant be dealt wth according to law.
I hereby decIe ugun n3H8|on 8q belief Ider penalty of petjur pusuant to NR

W/MV/J
~
CASE 12-12728
THE MICIAL COURT OF THE CITY OF RNO
COUJYUF WA5HOE,STATFOF NEVADA
CITY 0RNO,
Plaintif CRIMINAL COMPLAIT
v. (GENERAL)
Coughin, Zachary
Defendat
SSN
.A.I.Weaver, Badge #9469. borebycomplain and say that Zachary Coughlin N
committed the 0Im0of 100000required (ower) to wit:
J|said defendant on or about July 3. 2012, in the LI!j oReno, State of Nevada, in the
vicinity of 8umiIRld:Drive 80 Ih0 McCarran BI. overpass:
Operated a motor vehiql\ without cuent proof of valid vehicle insutrnoo.
_ Al of which I8 IBviolation ofNRS B 8dopIed bysection
1.04.015 of the Reno Municipal Code.
g AIIof wbcbsnviolation of6.06.S5S.A ofthe Reno Municipal
Code.
rrc!croqucsttbatsaid D|cudalbrdcNlWlh8000I0mg!0law.
1 hereby doIsr: upon inf!lation m0 belief under penalty of perury pursuant to NRS
171,102, that the foregoing is tue ad corect to Ih0best of my knowledge.
1-- |
(Dtc)

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OSFENOANT QRDERED ReLEAS.D, DATE
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1 011 0/2012 11 :31 Mark Mausert ,ESQ

(FAX) 77 5 786 9658 P.009/025
LLLAHA1PbU1%
lACL CAS: -I1
Details:
LnJuly 3, 2012, at approximately V2J h0W3, the defendant identifed as ?s|coupln
followed VI0llmMiKrebs 8 he cOppletedlsdaily tasks as a maintenance worker at the
Norwlnd Aparents.
Te nrn!0OW00 the victim for 0ggmXma|cyS-minutes. During the time Ihclndul
followed victim, he 0OB0uOuS!yyelled at m. P000t0g to the victim, the defendant yelled
bim_ "youm08wthmy sses_s|a,you will be sor." h0defendant also yelled at the
victim it would be "a mis|ae IO "mess" wthhi. The victim believed the defendt was
threatening him 0!attempting !0 b8t him into D0l. The defendant's conduct and words were
calculated lO QrOVOK0violence or a v|O)a|)Onof te law by the victim
Tbi|imbelieved the defendant was threatenin
g
him v
p
hysicdl harm. The victim |oldme
0\8 familiar WU the defendt and believes he regularly disglays unstable behavior.
Ily~, 2012, at approximately 1041 hours, |defendant was >:ondriVng vehicle on a
public steet toward te !or|hwndApartments. The defendant had two large plastic mb>
(epproxmeIyJ-! by 1.S-feet) riding 0B the top OJI8vehicle's tram. ToIubs were
unsecured and fell of the vehicle into croadway h0droVe The tubs p0sed 8 immediate
trafc hazard ad oau>odC\0 drivers l0 swerve to avoid colliding WUthem.
When the defendant was stopped fOr his tafic violation, he was notable to provide current
|I0Of 0in:mano
Te defendant was arrested for disturbing Ibpe4ce beclme he used 0OB0u0I!0provoke !00
victim I0 figt and caused the ictim to feel threatened. He W080|Sq c8gcd Wmunsecured
load because he drove hiS vehicle on dpublic street Wit11 cargo that was unsecured and actually
f:!into te roadway. He b charged \vith insurance required be0aUse he did not have proof of
insurance inside his
Ov
er
te past few weeks, the dcf:nd1jtmsbeen ipvoIvcdInmul!ipIe contattwith the victim.
J0000|0l3have aIl bcn5D8nB0lR0I0 !0cOU0 the defendant and the victim 0BU8date.
Te defendant W8 8ll08l0d booked for Ihe 8I00 charges becaUse he was likely to
l0 commit acts of disturbing the peace upon the V0ltm.
. .
.
WOR,DomtI0qWmUl0| 00rd|ogbtmaar0raglt|rttc|Ia|prccabr.|:rxl:!0 holosm{fO0Bmr
9.|Imlriry(ithergrI5 0@JO0yUzmisdip)p)0lB u|al(iidmgoI5 0mlr4rruot)
RV!85DP0k PkDBA98CAUSE(PC)
P0F0UD L L!U
PAQ!J..OF
DEFENDANT ORDERED RELEASBD. DATE:
. + w |.' =+.
~
.

(FAX)77 5 786 9658 P.Ol0/025
1 011 0/2012 11 :31 Mark Mausert ,ESQ
6(p|emenIN
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RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT
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Narrative written by Officer B. Dye
DETAILS:
@upp'-mon!NO
ORIG
Officer WEAVER and I are Oware of recent problems Ot the aparment complex located at 1680 Sky Mountain Dr.
because of someone living in oneof the storage garages.
Management had received calls of suspicious activity and a possible garage burglar from the residents, As
employees investigated these calls they discovered garage #45 was locked from the inside, indicating someone
was inside,
Residents could hear a swamp cooler running inside the closed garage, Staf was unable to make contact with
anyone at the garage when it was locked from the inside. Eventually the circuit breaker tripped and power was
turned of to this storage garage.
Storage garage #5 was rented to Zachary COUGHLIN. It was suspected at this time COUGHLIN was living
inside the storage garage, COUGHLIN was registered to three storage units at this apartment complex, #'$ 45,
29, and 71, Without power in #45, COUGHLIN moved into storage garage #29,
Staf would periodically see COUGHLIN near the garages then he would disappear. Upon looking for him they
would discover #29 would be locked from the inside, They were unable to make cntactor get inside the garage,
This continued for a few weeks and management noticed COUGHLIN watching the office staf, He would watch
the office until the last employee left work, Office staff suspected COUGHLIN did this so he could go into his
storage garage without them seeing him enter it.
The apartment manager Duane JAKOB gave COUGHLIN H notice informing him the storage garages were not fit
Icrhuman habitation, After receipt oIthis notice COUGHLIN became antagonistic tOward staff, COUGHLIN
would yell and make indirect threats to JAKOB and the maintenance worker, Milan KREBS
,
for gOing near his
storage garage. COUGHLIN would follow KREBS around the grounds, yell at him, and video him working,
At one point other workers witnessed COUGHLIN tampering with the tool box in the bed of KREBS' truck This
was on 6122/12. KREBS filed a report for this incident. See case #12-1 0967 for additional information,
City of Reno Code Enforcement posted each of COUGHLIN's storage garages S6 unlawful to OCcupy and
photographed the notice, This took place on June 21st at approximately 1137 hours,
JAKOB flied for eViction on the storage garages, COUGHLIN was evicted from unit #29 on June 28th, The
eviction paperork was inaccurate on units #45 and #71 and |BS been re-filed, COUGHLIN was locked inside
unit #29 during the eviction and refused to come out WCeo Deputies had to cut the door open to get
COUGHLIN out.
Over the course of the last month RPO has responded to this location in relation to COUGHLIN ten times. The
dBICSOIU6/4/12,6/5112,616/12,6119112,6/21/12,6/22112, 6/29/12 (O different calls), and 713/12. This does not
include the eviction and lockout performed by WCSO on OlOlJ
On JUIy3,2012 at approximately 1041 hours Officer Weaver and I were headed to 1bU Sky Mountain Dr. to
meet with the manager Duane JAKOB. He called Officer Weaver and indicated COUGHLIN was following his
employee KREBS around the complex threatening him,
JAKOB repored that COUGHLIN told KREBS (maintenance employee), "If [he] went HL=l his garage again [he'd]
be sorr" and continuing to do so would be 8 "mistake," COUGHUN said this while following KREBS and was
video recording, KREBS interpreted these statements as threats to his safety, The threats were made around
0925 hours this morning, 7/3/12.
KREBS has had multiple interactions with COUGHLIN throughout the last few weeks, He describes COUGH LIN
as unstable, agitated, and angry. KREBS admitted being fearful for what COUGHLIN is capable of doing based
on lerratic behavior. We were responding to this address to meet with KREBS and JAKOB due to these
threats.
8-^.`:
R9469/WAVR J
AMENDED OR SUPPLEMENTAL
DATED 5/1/13 ZACH COUGHLIN
DEFENDANT
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I, ZACH COUGLIN DECLARE THE VARIOUS RELEIF SOUGHT HEREIN IS NOT REQUESTED FOR PURPOSES OF
DELAY AND THAT THERE IS A GOOD FAITH BASIS FOR SO SEEKING, AND THAT I BELIEVE THE RMC, AS A
WHOLE, AND RCA, AS A WHOLE, SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED FROM PROSECUTING ME ON THE BASIS OF
THERE BEING A CONFLICT AND BIAS AND PENDING LITIGATION IN 62337 AND NG12-0434, 0435 (RPC
4.2 BECOMES A PROBLEM AS WELL) THAT CALLS FOR SUCH ACTION.
FACTS, LAWANDARGUMENT
1.
As to the terms of Couglhins probation, the docket in RCR11-063341 (under NRS 4.240
docket entires are prima face evidence of fact) have been and or were and or now consist of only the
following:
1. Abstain from illegal drugs, take only medications for which have a valid prescription. There
is no requirement to abstain from alcohol or to take a weekly PBT test. Additionally, Cough-
lin is not subject to random search and seizure under the terms of the only probation cur-
rently in effect (the probation ordered in RCR12-065630 runs consecutively, not concurrent-
ly, to that ordered first in RCR11-063341. Judge Sferrazza specifically ruled on 11/20/12 that
Couglhin was not subject to random search and seizure. Coughlin is informed that DAS
Officer were at his residence/office yesterday, 4/30/13 loudly banging on the walls of it (it be-
ing a fifth wheel trailer). Given the descriptions provided to Coughlin of the DAS Officers
actions at that time, Coughlin believes that DAS may seek to allege some violation of the
terms of Coughlins probation in RCR11-063341 (the fact that Coughlin is also in the CCP
program in that matter dictates approval by Judge Pearson prior to any arrest incident to an al-
legation of a probation violation, preventing any custodial arrest similar to that made after 7
pm (Inmate Booking Information Sheet list time of arrest at 7:02 pm, in violation of NRS
171.136). The docket in 063341 states:
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Disposition (Judicial Officer: Sferrazza, Peter)
1. PETIT LARCENY
FOUND GUILTY
2. POSSESSIONOF STOLENPROPERTY
FOUND GUILTY
SENTENEE (JUDICIAL OFFICER: SFELTLLZ1..A, PETER)
1. PETIT LARCENY
SUSPENDED
SCNLENCE 10 CONFINEMENL
AGENCY: WASHOE COUNTY JAIL
RENN: 180 DAYS
ERS: 7 DAYS
COMMENT: NOLLO EXCEED ONE (I) TO TWO(2) YEARS.
AMENDED SENTENCE (JUDICIAL OFFICER: SFERRAZZA, PELER)
1. PETIT LARCENY
IMPOSED
CONDITION - ADULT:
I. DEPARTMENT OF ALLEMATIVE SENTENCING. SUPERVISION FOR 1-2 YEARS. ALL SUPERVI-
SION
fees are WAIVED. 1112012012, Active 11120120 14
2. Abstain from Drugs and Alcohol, 1112012012, Closed 1112012012
J. No Further Violations, 1112012012, Closed 1112012012
4. Proof of Evaluation and to Follow Evaluatioo Recommendations, To obtain a
MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION AND PROVIDE PROOF TO THE COURT. 1112012012, ACTIVE
12120120 12
5. OTHER, DEFENDANT IS TO TAKE ALL PRESCRIBED MEDICATIONS. 1112012012, CLOSED
1112012012
THE TERM OF PROBATION OF THE SENTENCE JUDGE CLIFTON IMPOSED ON 4/2/13 IN
RCR12-065630 RUNS CONSECUTIVELYTO THE PROBATION IMPOSED FIRST IN RCR11-
063341. ANYCONDITION OF THE PROBATION IN RCR12-065630 THAT ALLOWS FOR
SEARCH AND SEIZURE DOES NOT TAKE EFFECT UNTIL THE CONCLUSION OF THE PROBA-
TIONARY PERIOD IN RCR11-063341.
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Please take note that the the Docket in 11 -063341 also indicates all DAS supervi-
sion fees are waived.
As such, no summary custodial arrest of Coughlin would be lawful at this time based
upon an allegation that Coughlin violated a nonexistent condition of the only probation cur-
rently in effect, that of 11-063341, and Coughlin respectfully requests that DAS refrain from
effecting any summary custodial arrest similar to that made on 2/1/13. Additionaly, Coughlin
has never been provided a copy of the 4/2/13 Judgment of Conviction listed on the docket in
RCR12-065630, and thus may not be held subject to any such terms to which he was never pro-
vided notice, especially where any such amendments were made outside of court, after the con-
clusion of the trial.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
NRS 176A.310Conditions; duties of surety; probationer to report to and pay surety.
1. The court shall set the conditions of a program of probation secured by a surety
bond. The conditions must be appended to and made part of the bond. The conditions
may include, but are not limited to, any one or more of the following:
(a) Submission to periodic tests to determine whether the probationer is using any
controlled substance or alcohol.
(b) Participation in a program for the treatment of the abuse of a controlled substance
or alcohol or a program for the treatment of any other impairment.
(c) Participation in a program of professional counseling, including, but not limited to,
counseling for the family of the probationer.
(d) Restrictions or a prohibition on contact or communication with witnesses or victims
of the crime committed by the probationer.
(e) A requirement to obtain and keep employment.
(f) Submission to a Program of Intensive Supervision.
(g) Restrictions on travel by the probationer outside the jurisdiction of the court.
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a failure to fulfill a condition of the program of probation.
3. A probationer participating in a program of probation secured by a surety bond
shall:
(a) Report regularly to the surety; and
(b) Pay the fee charged by the surety for the execution of the bond.
e jury, and the time appointed for the return of the jury and for the trial.... (this is
somewhat is dispute in 1708, though the title of Coughlin's 10/11/11 filing therein does
contain the words Demand for Jury Trial...which is problematic considering that
Judge Sferrazza denied Couglin a jury trial, despite Couglin timely makign such a de-
mand under NRCP 38 (see NRS 40.400), which was prior to the 10/13/11 Eviction Deci-
sion and Order setting the matter over for Trial on 10/25/11 should Couglin deposit
some $2,275 in rent escrow pursuant to NRS 118A.355(5), even though Couglin always
maintained he was entitled to an application of NRS 118A.360's fix and deduct dictates,
in additon to the set offs inuring to Coughlin under NRS 118A.390, 118A.510, NRS
118A.290, and NRS 118A.355(2).
(i) The judgment of the court, specifying the costs included, and the time when rendered.
(j) The issuing of the execution, when issued and to whom; the renewals thereof, if any, and
when made, and a statement of any money paid to the justice, when and by whom.
(k) The receipt of a notice of appeal, if any be given, and of the appeal bond, if any be filed.
(this is a bit of an issue in RCR11-063341 and RCR13-071437 as to the filings and order of and
around 3/11/13).
Nevada Probation Rules
Probation is a type of penalty wherein the court imposes an officer to record all the things that
you may do. An agreement between you and the court pertaining to probation should be fol-
lowed.
Below are rules of probations according to Nevada Revised Statutes:
NRS 176A.310 Conditions; duties of surety; probationer to report to and pay surety.
1. The court shall set the conditions of a program of probation secured by a surety bond. The
conditions must be appended to and made part of the bond. The conditions may include, but
are not limited to, any one or more of the following:
(a) Submission to periodic tests to determine whether the probationer is using any controlled
substance or alcohol.
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(b) Participation in a program for the treatment of the abuse of a controlled substance or alco-
hol or a program for the treatment of any other impairment.
(c) Participation in a program of professional counseling, including, but not limited to, counsel-
ing for the family of the probationer.
(d) Restrictions or a prohibition on contact or communication with witnesses or victims of the
crime committed by the probationer.
(h) Payment of restitution.
(i) Payment of fines and court costs.
(j) Supervised community service.
(k) Participation in educational courses.
2. A surety shall:
(a) Provide the facilities or equipment necessary to:
(1) Perform tests to determine whether the probationer is using any controlled substance or al-
cohol, if the court requires such tests as a condition of probation;
(2) Carry out a Program of Intensive Supervision, if the court requires such a Program as a
condition of probation; and
(3) Enable the probationer to report regularly to the surety.
(b) Notify the court within 24 hours after the surety has knowledge of a violation of or a failure
to fulfill a condition of the program of probation.
3. A probationer participating in a program of probation secured by a surety bond shall:
(Added to NRS by 1995, 1245; A 2001 Special Session, 133)
http://www.washoecounty.us/defender/duisent.html That link contains the following, which
provides support (in addition to NRS 176A.310) that the terms of Couglin's probation in
063341 (which is the only probation Couglin is currently subject to given Judge Clifton made
Coughlin's sentence in 065630 run consecutive to Coughlin's sentence in 063341, meaning,
Coughlin's probation incident to the conviction in 065630 (now on appeal in CR13-0614) has
yet to even begin) do not include being Subject To Random Search and Seizure by a Peace Of-
ficer anymore than the do not require Publice Defender Reimbursement.
Upon complying with Judge Sferrazza's 11/20/12 Order to Attend in 063341, which
reads: YOU ARE ORDERED to attend and complete the following: (NOTE: there are box
that are not check for the following: Dui School, Victim Impact Panel, Domestic Violence Pro-
gram, Anger Counseling Program, Self Help Meetings, To appaer for Courts Counesling Com-
pliance Program (CCP), Public Defender Reimbursement, Evaluation, Parenting Class, Resti-
tution) (NOTE: there is a check in the boxes for the following): Due by; 1-2 years; Alterna-
tive Sentencing Division...Report for Probation by 11/21/2012. Hours Mon.-Thurs. 9:00 AM
3:00 P.M.; Due by; 12/20/2012; Other: To obtain a Mental Health Evaluation and provide
proof to the Court. YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THE COURT WITH
YOUR CURRENT ADDRESS WITHIN 10 DAYS OF ANY CHANGE. YOU ARE FURTHER
ORDERED to enroll within 10 days and appear alcohol free.
Upon successful completion, you are responsible for producing a completion certificate
to the Court on or before the due date. Failure to comply with any requirement of your coun-
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seling program(s) may result in the issuance of a bench warrant for your arrest (A $25.00 late
fee will be assessed eo each programs(s) not complete on the due date). DATE this 20th day of
November, 2012 /s/s PETER J. SFERRAZZA, Justice of the Peace, Department #2.
The sentence imposed upon Couglin by Judge Sferrazza in 063341 not only waived all of
the fees associated with DAS, it did not impose any fine on Couglin either, and gave him credit
for all the time he served in connection with the charge levied (which is difficult to actually dis-
cern given the 15 custodial arrests and the various intricacies of which bail applied to what
charge, and the 52 days of incarceration Couglin has been subject to since the 8/20/11 arrest in
063341, incident to which he was given 8 days credit for his incarceration between 8/20/11
8/26/11 whereupon he was released on his own recognizance upon the charge being lessened
from ooh thats a felony grand larceny (as said RPD Officer Duralde to Couglin shortly after
effecting a custodial arrest at 11 pm in violation of NRS 171.136) alleging Coughlin larcenized a
$80 used iPhone, but still charging Couglin with felony grand larceny in retaliatoin for
Coughlin inquiring about the Hiibel case, Terry Stops, reasonable suspicion and probable
cause, etc., and taking issue with the fact that Duralde (by all indications, accidentally) touched
Coughlin's penis during one of the many Terry Stop weapons check pat downs that he con-
ducted that night.). Anyways, Judge Sferrazza did not order, as a condition of Coughlin's pro-
bation, that he be subject ot random search and seizure by a peace officer.
The Judgment of Conviction rendered by Judge Sferrazza pursuant to NRS 189.010
from the bench at the conclusion of the trial in 063341 on 11/20/12 follows, verbatim, in its en-
tirety:
http://www.washoecounty.us/defender/duisent.html The preceding link includes the following:

DUI Sentencing Outline
If the defendant enters a guilty plea to a DUI First or Second offense they will be sentenced by
the court. Generally, for a DUI 1st offense, if the person is over the age of 21 and their BACis
not over a 0.18%, then that person will likely be sentenced to court standards for a DUI 1st of-
fense.1 However, if a person's BACis over a 0.18%, and/or it is their Second DUI, then the
court may include or the District Attorney may request that the defendant be sentenced to oth-
er requirements, some of which are required by law. What follows is an extensive, yet not ex-
haustive, list of the potential possibilities that the judge may sentence the defendant to and an
explanation of those possibilities.
Suspended Jail Sentence both 1st DUI & 2nd DUI
As a part of the defendant's sentence, the court will suspend a jail sentence ranging from 30
days Washoe County Jail up to 180 days. As long as the defendant complies with all the court's
requirements they will not have to serve any portion of the suspended jail sentence. However,
should a person violate the terms and conditions of his or her sentence then that person's sen-
tence will likely be revoked. Once revoked, the person must serve the suspended jail sentence.
The suspended jail sentence is always ordered by the court.
Washoe County Jail
The Court always has the discretion to sentence a person up to 6 months to the Washoe County
Jail for all misdemeanor offenses including DUI. Although no guarantees are made, it is not
likely that the Court would sentence a person to jail as long as there are no aggravating factors.
Community Service - 1st DUI Only
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B. Workplace Violence
1. [20.4] Checklist: Issuing Temporary Restraining Order
2. [20.5] Checklist: Conducting Hearing on and Issuing Injunction
C. Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction Prohibiting Workplace Violence (CCP 527.8)
1. [20.31] Who May Seek Relief
2. [20.32] Potential Respondents
3. [20.33] Unlawful Violence and Credible Threat of Violence Defined
4. [20.34] Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
5. Subsequent Hearing
a. [20.35] Time for Hearing
b. [20.36] Service on Respondent
c. [20.37] Respondents Response
d. [20.38] Continuance
e. [20.39] Reissuance of Temporary Restraining Order
f. [20.40] Evidence
6. Issuance of Injunction
a. [20.41] Findings
b. [20.42] Duration of Injunction
c. [20.43] Modification or Termination of Injunction
d. [20.44] Renewal of Injunction
e. [20.45] Persons Covered
7. [20.46] Transmission of Order to Law Enforcement Agencies
8. [20.47] Violation of Injunction
9. [20.48] Statutes Effect on Other Remedies
THE LAWPROHIBITS THIS COURT FROM USING A CIVIL HARASSMENT SUIT TO
RESOLVE A PROPERTY DISPUTE
Code of Civil Procedure 527.6, the harassment statute, serves a very limited purpose. It
was enacted only to supplement existing invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of
emotional distress law where the victim is threatened with great and irreparable
ry. Nebel v. Sulk, 73 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1369 (1999). It was not intended to supplant the
normal procedures for obtaining injunctions against non-harassing, albeit otherwise actiona-
ble, conduct, such as defamation or interference with prospective advantage. Byers v.
Cathcart, 57 Cal.App.4th 805, 811-12 (1997). It was designed solely to prevent severe emo-
tional distress;it was not designed to forestall economic losses or protect property
ests. Marquez-Luque v. Marquez, 192 Cal.App.3d 1513, 1517 (1987). Nor, because it lacks the
opportunity for full research and pleading, was it designed as a forum for resolving complex, disputed
legal issues. Byers, 57 Cal.App.4th at 808.
Consistent with this narrow purpose, injunctions prohibiting harassment pursuant to 527.6 may
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be issued in only very limited circumstances:
In order to obtain an injunction, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidencethat
unlawful harassment exists. Code of Civil Proc. 527.6(d). Nebel, 73 Cal.App.4th at 1370 (empha-
sizing the need for substantial evidence of harassment); Schild v. Rubin, 232 Cal.App.3d 755,
761 (1991) (same); Compare Code of Civil Proc. 527.6(c) (requiring only a showing of reasonable
proof of harassment).
Harassment is defined as unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and
willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the
person, and serves no legitimate purpose. Code of Civil Proc. 527.6(b) (emphasis added). If the
conduct serves a legitimate purpose, it cannot be the basis for this type of injunction regardless of
how annoying or harassing it might be. Byers, 57 Cal.App.4th at 812 (holding that legitimacy of
purpose negates harassment); Schild, 232 Cal.App.3d at 762. This is true even if the conduct may be
enjoined following the full development of the facts and law in another legal proceeding in which
purpose is not a relevant consideration. Byers, 57 Cal.App.4th at 812.
The course of conduct must be directed at a specific person, must seriously alarm, harass or
annoy that person, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff. Code of
Civil Proc. 527.6(b). Thus it is clear that the course of conduct must be directed at the plain-
tiff. Schild, 232 Cal.App.3d at 762. See also Diamond View Ltd. v. Herz, 180 Cal.App.3d 612,
618-19 (1986) (holding that the purpose of 527.6 was to provide a remedy to a specific individual
who was himself harassed). This individual must be the recipient of harassing communications, not
merely the subject of them. Code of Civil Proc. 527.6(b)(3) (defining course of conduct as specif-
ic communications to an individual). And that specific person, not someone else, must suffer sub-
stantial emotional distress. Schild, 232 Cal.App.3d at 762.1
Moreover, the course of conduct must (1) be such as would cause a reasonable person to
suffersubstantial emotional distress, and (2) actually causesubstantial emotional distress to the plain-
tiff. Code of Civil Proc. 527.6(b). This requirement is demanding. It is not enough to demonstrate
mere discomfort or annoyance. Rather the plaintiff must prove that the emotional impact of the
course of conduct was such that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Schild, 232
Cal.App.3d at 762-63. And the plaintiff must prove that he in fact did not endure it. Indeed, a court
may require the plaintiff to submit medical or psychological evidence to prove that he actually suf-
fered substantial emotional distress. Id.
The breadth of an actionable course of conduct is expressly and substantially limited by the
statute. Code of Civ. Proc. 527.6(b)(3). Most significantly, a course of conduct may not include
any constitutionally protected activity. Code of Civil Proc. 527.6(b)(3); Nebel, 73 Cal.App.4th at
1370;Byers, 57 Cal.App.4th at 809; Leydon v. Alexander, 212 Cal.App.3d 1,5 (1989); Schraer v.
Berkeley Property Owners Assoc., 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 723 (1989). Smith v. Silvey, 149
Cal.App.3d 400, 405-07 (1983). This limitation is essential. Without it the statute would be patently
unconstitutional. See Smith, 149 Cal.App.3d at 407.2 The statute cannot apply even if the conduct
was intended to harass and annoy and causes the victim to suffer actual emotional distress.Id. at 406.
If the goal of the Plaintiff is to stop public speech, or access to government,
an anti-SLAPP motion can be used.
Puthukkeril v. Allen - CH appeal
NRS 33.280(2) declares that a court may not issue a Temporary or Extended Order for Protec-
tion Against Harassment in the Workplace that is against more than one person. Arguably, RPD De-
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tective and RMC Judge W. Gardner's interpretation of the language in both the TPO and the EPO
which purport to limit Coughlin's ability to have a filing, subpoena, or some other legal document
served or delivered to or on the SBN or its Clerk of Court in any manner other than through the
United States Mail is violative of such a statutory prohibition where such a restriction in those Pro-
tection Orders essentially amounts to the orders being against more than one person.
M. DE FACTO EVICTIONS, TERMINATIONS, AND EXPULSIONS BY FAR, THE MOST COMMON, AND
SERIOUS, COMPLAINT FROMADVERSE PARTIES IS THAT THE APPLICANT WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN AN
EXPARTE PROTECTION ORDER THAT HAD A DEVASTATING EFFECT ON THE ADVERSE PARTYS PER-
SONAL LIFE. EXAMPLES IN THIS RESPECT INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: (1) IN A DISPUTE BETWEEN
TWO STUDENTS, THE APPLICANT OBTAINED A PROTECTION ORDER WHICH PROHIBITS THE AD-
VERSE PARTY FROM ATTENDING HIS OWN SCHOOL.265 (2) IN A DISPUTE BETWEEN COWORKERS,
THE APPLICANT OBTAINED A PROTECTION ORDER WHICH PROHIBITED THE ADVERSE PARTY FROM
GOING TO HIS OWN PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT.266 (3) IN A DISPUTE BETWEEN AN EX-WIFE AND THE
EX-HUSBANDS NEWGIRLFRIEND, THE EX-WIFE OBTAINED AN ORDER WHICH PROHIBITED THE AD-
VERSE PARTY (THE NEWGIRLFRIEND) FROM GOING TO THE HOME WHERE THE CHILDREN LIVE
WITH THE EX-HUSBAND AND THE ADVERSE PARTY.267 THE AOCTPOFORMS COMMITTEE IS
AWARE OF THIS GENERAL PROBLEM WITHNEVADAS TPO FORMS AND IS ALREADY WORKING ON
MODIFIED FORMS WHICH REQUIRE THE APPLICANT TO ANSWER AFFIRMATIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT
WHETHER A PROTECTION ORDER WOULD CAUSE THESE TYPES OF HORRIFIC OUTCOMES FOR THE
ADVERSE PARTY.268265 ARELATED FACT PATTERN INVOLVED AN ADVERSE PARTYTEACHER
WHO WAS PROHIBITED FROM ATTENDING HIS OWN SCHOOL MERELY BECAUSE THE CHILD OF THE
APPLICANT ATTENDED THE SAME SCHOOL BUT HAD A DIFFERENT TEACHER. IN HIS MOTION TO
DISSOLVE THE TPO, THE TEACHER WROTE THAT BEING OUT OF WORK FOR 30 DAYS WITHOUT
PAYWILL PUT ME ON THE VERGE OF FINANCIAL RUIN AND BANKRUPTCY. THE TEACHER ARGUED
PERSUASIVELYTHAT HIS RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING WAS A PROTECTED LIBERTY INTEREST, AND
THAT NRS 200.575(6)(G)(3) IS MEANT TO PROTECT [T]HE ACTIVITIES OF A PERSON THAT ARE
CARRIED OUT IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF HIS OR HER LAWFUL EMPLOYMENT. 266 THIS FACT
PATTERN OCCURRED ON REPEATED OCCASIONS. ONE ADVERSE PARTYINDICATED THAT HE WAS
GIVEN THE CHOICE OF EITHER USING EARNED PERSONAL LEAVE OR TAKING LEAVE WITHOUT PAY.
ANOTHER ADVERSE PARTY WAS GIVEN A SPECIFIC DATE BY HIS EMPLOYER (A HOTEL/CASINO) TO
EITHER HAVE THE PROTECTION ORDER RESCINDED OR MODIFIED, OR ELSE HE WOULD BE TERMI-
NATED. 267 ONE ADVERSE PARTY IN THIS SITUATION DECRIED THE TPOAS CREATING AN IMPOS-
SIBLE BURDEN.
268 Questions to be added include the following: Are you and the Adverse Party currently em-
ployed in the same location ? Does the Adverse Party own or lease any of the locations listed
above? Does the Adverse Party work at or attend any of the schools listed above? Does the Ad-
verse Party live at any of the above locations?
Further, RJCBailiff English's purported PROOF OF SERVICE UPON ADVERSE
PARTY fails to satisfy the NRCP 4 requirements in that it fails to that that English is over 18
years of age and fails to indicate that he is a 'non-paty. Whomsoever may think that be an
ultra technical approach might review Judge Elliott's and Adam's work in disposing of Cough-
lin's lawsuits against Washoe Legal Services in CV11-01896, and against Washoe Legal Ser-
vices, CAAW, and TWS in CV11-01955, referencing Garin's citation to actual service does not
excuse the failure to technically comply with service rules approach. At least Coughlin was
not having court staff, Marshals, and Bailiff's jabbing there forearms into WLS's Elcano's ab-
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domen and thrusting this or that document attempted served into his face, inside the court-
house, while he was at the courthouse to attend court, in a matter substantially connected to the
subject matter from which the document purported to be then served stemmed.
Further, Reyes Affidavit in the companion Washoe County v Coughlin Workplace Har-
assment TPO/EPO was filed free standing, lacking any specific indication as to what it was
Reyes was purpoting to serve Coughlin while doing his forearm shiver routine, and Coughlin's
indicating, at the time, on 12/19/12 to Reyes, that it might be a bit untoward for a Washoe
County employee (ie, Reyes, ie, not a non-party) to be purporting to serve Coughlin the TPO
baring the caption Washoe County v Zach Coughlin, especially where Couglhin had filed a
denied TPO Applciation against Reyes himself in February 2012 incident to Reyes menacingly
stating to a seated Couglin (seated right next to the very WCPD Jim Leslie, on October 9
th
,
2012, whom signed the declaration in that Washoe County v Couglin 'institutional protection
order in RJC RCP12-599) that he would put my boot up your ass if Coughlin continued to
query Leslie as to why he was so obviously attempting to torpedo the defense of Coughlin's case
(and how odd that the Chief Deputy Public Defender, Leslie, would all the sudden be as-
signed to three different misdemeanor cases maintained against Couglhin by WCDA DDA
Zachary Norman Young, Esq...especially considering how clueless Leslie was as to the criminal
law and procedure as it relates to misdemeanors, versus the felonies that Jim Leslie regularly
handles for the WCPD.
Interestingly, speaking of retaliation, every time Coughlin has sent a written complaint
of some kind to local law enforcement entities or figures, he has been retaliated against
quickly and severly. Couglin sends the RPD a written complaint about Officer Duralde's
fraudulent conduct during the 8/20/11 arrest in 063341 on 9/7/11 and he is arrest in RMC11
CR 22176 two days later, in violation of NRS 171.1255, where his Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel was denied, and where the failure to grant a continuance where Hill was applying an
unlawful rent distraint pursuant to NRS 118A.520 to excuplatory materials presented clearly
reversible error were such obviously greatly prejudiced Coughlin's defense therein.
The very email King and Leslie purport Coughlin to have sent them and others (all at
the same time) on 12/12/12 is also addressed to the email address the SBN holds out to the pub-
lic as that avaible for submitting grievances against attorneys (Hill's 1/12/12 grievanace against
Coughlin was email directly to King, on the very same day that Hill obtained in a scant 40
minutes a TPO against Coughlin while Coughlin was simultaneously being subject to a custodi-
al arrest for jaywalking (though the RPD would not indicate why Coughlin was being arrested
for hours) incident to Hill calling 911 and lying to Officer Hollingsworth, (as capture in the vid-
eos Coughlin took at the time and transcribed and provided to the SBN's King, whom, amaz-
ingly, somehow still managed to include in his 8/23/12 Complaint, essentially, verbatim, the lies
Hill was alleging to the RPD that day that purportedly resulted in his arrest. The Panel refused
to even consider, much less admit such videos. King's 8/23/12 Complaint, however, in an effort
to distance itself from the tawdry, tacky veneer applied where NNDB Hill's name would be at-
tached, in one way or another, to each and every allegation in the Complaint, fails to include
any specifics where it apparently is referencing the events of 1/12/12, as such Complaint does
not include the case number for the eviction (Coughlin was evicted by the RJCa record 12
times between 11/1/11 and 10/2/12, to go along with the 15 custodial arrests he has been subject
to since 8/21/11...though Coughlin hasn't filed a single lawsuit against the RPD, the WCSO,
RSIC, RJC, RMC, etc., etc.).
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Interstingly, RJCJudge Clifton refused to allow Coughlin, an attorney, authorized to
practice in the RJCwhere representing himself (as he was forced to due to the malevolence
and incompetence of Biray Dogan and Jim Leslie) in RCR12-065630, to issue his own subpoe-
nas, but on top of that, sua sponte, entered an illegal order requiring Coughlin to obtain Judge
Clifton's permission for any subpoenas he wished to utilize. Amongst those were subpoenas on
the RPD and ECOMM for the recording of Hill's calls to dispatch on 1/12/12 (and 11/13/11),
the dates of the two custodial arrest that were effect upon Couglin by the RPD incident to dis-
patch or 911 calls by Hill. Given the Complaint in that prosecution in 065630 alleged Coughlin
obstructed a public officer (it was originally a gross misdemeanor misuse of 911 system of
emergency communications charge, hence, the requirement that Dogan appear at the 2/14/12
arraignment where Couglhin was arrest on 1/12/12, bailed out late that day, and received an
engagement letter from the WCPD announcing Dogan was his attorney of record on approxi-
mately 1/28/12, and on 2/6/12 received another letter from WCPD Chris Fortier confirming
this, and met with Dogan on 2/8/12 for over 90 minutes wherein it was agreed Dogan would en-
ter a not guilty plea for Coughlin at the 2/14/12 arraignment...only problem is, Dogan failed to
appear, and a warrant was actually issued for Coughlin's arrest, but Coughlin's taking the ini-
tiative to quickly attend another arragnment calendar and file a 2/21/12 (actually faxed to the
RJCon 2/17/12...which goes to the fact that the RJC, including Robbin Baker of the criminal
Division (whom appeared to start crying on 11/27/12 or so when Coughlin confronted her about
the fact that she had previously indicated she specifically remembered dics being attached to
those filings Coughlin submitt in 063341 and 065630 on 11/15/12, only to suddenly appear to be
forced to change her story by the RJC powers that be, which appeared to make her so uncom-
fortable that she started to cry...also civil division Clerk Christine Erickson (whom regularly
refuse to file tenant's affidavits presented by poor people whom took the bus or walked a long
way to present their Tenant's Answer for filing to the RJC, where Erickson, incorrectly, indi-
cates to such tenants that they are required to attach a copy of the notice that was posted on
there door or served on them, as a requirement of having their Tenant's Answer accepted for
filing...which is exactly what she said to Coughlin way back in September 2011 in 1492 and
1708, and it was Coughlin's insouciance in merely pointing out the departure from the law in
that regard that apparently has resulted in such a reliatory animus being applied to him by
some, not all in the RJC)....So, somehow, Judge Clifton ruled Couglin could not subpoena from
ECOMM the recordings of Hil's calls to the RPD/Dispatch/Ecomm on 1/12/12 and those be-
tween the RPD and ECOMM connected thereto, even where the prosecution focused on Cough-
lin's alleged misuse of 911 at a payphone outside of Parr Jail upon Couglin posting bail for
the custodial jaywalking arrest charge premised upon Hill's lies to the RPD that very
day...immediately after being released at around 10:30 pm on 1/12/12 (where the temperature,
even without windchill being accounted for, and its was exceedingly windy) was 20 degrees, and
the last bus for the night had left, and Couglin residence was 4 miles away).
In the magnificent fabric of connections weaved throughout this ordeal, it was that very
prosecution in 065630, that spawned Coughlin's 2/21/12 filed Notice of Appearance, Motion to
Dismiss, Waiver of Right to Arraignment, Plea of Not Guilty that RJCJudicial Secretary Lori
Townsend voluntarily sent to the SBN on 4/11/12, along with the dockets in that case and in
063341 (funny, the Screening Panel was on 4/10/12, right Mr. King...well, it was around that
time according to Susich in 60975)...in retaliation for Coughlin pointing out Dogan's failure to
appear where his presence was required under Nevada law, at an arraignment on a gross mis-
demeanor charge, especially where the WCPD holds this out to the public:
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http://www.washoecounty.us/defender/felonycase1.html Arraignment:
Once you are arrested, you will have an initial arraignment hearing within 48 hours. You
will be read the charges against you and have the opportunity to enter a plea. You can request
a Public Defender at this time. Court Serviceswill makethedeterminationof your indigency.
OnceyouareappointedtotheWashoeCountyPublicDefender'sOffice, it cantake7-10daysfor
thepaperwork tobeprocessed. Youwill receivealetter fromusnotifyingyouof your DeputyPub-
licDefender andcontact information. Pleasebeassured, if youareappointedaPublicDefender,
youWI LL haverepresentationfor your hearing.
NRS 178.397 Assignment of counsel. Every defendant accused of a grossmisdemean-
or or felony who is financially unable to obtain counsel is entitledtohavecounsel assignedto
represent thedefendant at everystageof theproceedingsfromthedefendantsinitial appearance
beforeamagistrateor thecourt throughappeal, unless the defendant waives such appointment.
Couglin has not been provided any counsel in any of his appeals (CR12-2025, CR12
4/16/13 Appeal from Justice's Court JUSTICE COURT CRIMINAL APPEAL PRO-
CEEDINGS (SCANNED IMAGE REFLECTS MANNER IN WHICH DOCUMENT WAS
RECEIVED - 4/17/13 I.FLORES) CR13-0614 - ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN VS. ST.
OF NV. (D10). 2JDC Chief Judge Hardy denied Couglin's IFP request to be afforded Eflex ac-
cess to even see what the ROA the RJCfiled contains, where DDA Young, and Efiler with
Eflex, was provided access immediately on 4/16/13, and the RJCfailed to provide Couglhin a
copy of the ROA...much as was the case incident to the ROA of 12/6/12 being filed in CR12-
2025.
That is fitting though, as in both trial court matters in those appeals, Judges Sferrazza
and Clifton violated the following as well, with their willing accomplice, DDA Young:
NRS 178.394 No person to be compelled to be witness against himself or herself in criminal
action, or to be unnecessarily restrained. No person can be compelled, in a criminal action, to
be a witness against himself or herself, nor shall a person charged with a public offense be sub-
jected, before conviction, to any more restraint than is necessary for the persons detention to
answer the charge.
As to the agreement Couglin had with Dogan that he would enter a not guilty plea for
Couglin on 2/14/12:
NRS 178.388 Presence of defendant...3. In prosecutions for offenses punishable by fine or by
imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both, the court, with the written consent of the defendant,
may permit arraignment, plea, trial and imposition of sentence inthedefendantsabsence, if the
court determines that the defendant was fully aware of the applicable constitutional rights when the
defendant gave consent.
Also, Couglin cannot even risk going to his former classmates
Then there is the inequity attendant to Couglin being summarily removed from the Mental
Health Court in MH12-0032 on 5/17/12 by Judge Peter Breen, for reasons that are not even all that
clear (WCSO's Officer were quick to interrogate Couglin after the hearing as to whether he recorded
it or had any recording devices), though the gist of Judge Breen's sua sponte, summary removal of
Coughlin from the MHC was that Coughlin inquired as to how it could be just for the MHC to hold
out a contract to participants along with statements by it, NNAHMS, and the WCPD, resulting in
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Couglin entering that contract with the express agreement that he was allowed to take a certain medi-
cation for ADHD/MDD/Treatment Resistant Depression (Couglhin has never been suidical and if he
is to die anytime soon, it was murder, regardless of any attempts anyone may undertake to make it
look like suicide in their bloodlust pursuit of retaliation and continuing to maintain an atomosphere
where local members of law enforcement are free to arrest attorneys for any reason whatsoever, and
where Judges are seemingly able to have attorneys summarily disbarred for the most vague, unsup-
portable, unverified, accusations premised upon double unattributed hearsay that the judge thinks
probably occurred, uh, by clear and convincing evidence.
http://www.washoecounty.us/defender/mhcgeninfo.html which includes the following: NO al-
cohol NO narcotic pain medication NO opiates NO methadone NO benzodiazepines NO prod-
ucts containing Sudafed NONE! (Even with a prescription) is consistent with the contract and
supporting materials the WCPD and MHCprovided to Coughlin prior to his signing the con-
tract on 5/9/12...one does not find any stimulant class medication used for
ADHD/MDD/Treatment Resistant Depression therein, yet the MHC's Biondo, and Dollarhide
decided that they would unilaterally amend the material terms of such contract, with Judge
Breen co-signing such an approach, absent any notice or opportunity to be heard whatsoever
provided to Couglin prior to his removal from the MHC and remand to the RJC and RMCto
stand trial in the criminal trespass case in the RMC, petty larcey/receiving stolen property case
(063341, as though Shepp v. State never happened) in the RJC, and the 911 case amended
down to an SCR 111(6) invoking (perhaps) NRS 199.280 obstructing a public officer
charge...So, Coughlin got to devote an entire week to jumping through MHCintake hoops, then
gets booted out of the MHC on 5/17/12 (so much for we'll get you an apartment and pay for it
and your medications and psychiatrist and counseling appointments too! as the MCH tells
everyone, including Coughlin's puzzled family), then Couglin is wrongfully arrested on 6/28/12
in RJCrcr12-067980 while being wrongfully evicted in RJCRev12-1048 where Northwinds
Apartments Milan Krebs, Duane Jakob, Nevada Court Services, and Washoe County Sheriff's
Office Deputies John Machen and Deputy Gomez conspired to charge Couglin with obstruct-
ing a public officer (well, Machen actually list the NRS 197 resisting an officer charge
intially, but DDA Young was ordered to leverage the placement of NRS 199.280 within the
Administration of Justice chapter in NRS in light of NRS 111(6)...which would have been fine
had such leverage resulted in Couglhin accepting the plea bargain of two disturbing the peace
charges and dismiss 067980 (the RJCand Washoe County were always going to dismiss that
one given the RJC's complicity/error incident to the Eviction Order of 6/28/12 being premised
upon the fraudulent declaration of service on 6/14/12 of a 5 day notice that instructed Couglin
to file his Tenant's Answer in Sparks Justice Court, which he did...). Anyways, Coughlin did
accept that plea bargain disposing of the 8/20/11 petty larceny arrest in 063341 with a disturb-
ing the peace conviction, the 1/12/12 obstructing a public office charge in 065630 with another
DTP conviction, and the dismissal of the 6/28/12 obstructing a public office charge in 067980.
Only problem is that WCPD Defender Jim Leslie just couldn't stand there being one inviolable
right of a criminal defendant possessed by Couglin that Leslie had not desecrated as fully as he
possibly could...and, some might say, RJC Judge Sferrazza was a bit willing to go along with
Leslie's approach in refusing to accept Coughlin's plea (just because an atmosphere has coer-
cive elements to it should not automatically operate to deprive a criminal defendant of their in-
violable right to decide whether or not to go to trial).
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The EPO in 607 is void for King and the SBN's failure to meet a variety of jurisdictional pre-
requisites, including the failure to file an EPO Application as required by NRS 33.270. As such, the
alleged violations by Couglin in the EPO Complaint in 3914 should fail (beyond the fact that the
allged activity, faxing a filing (likely a post-hearing or post-FOFCOL/quasi- Decision Motion) to
the SBN's Clerk of Court where SCR 105(4), NNDB Susich's 7/27/12 email to Coughlin, and SBN
Clerk of Court Peters express indications to Couglin on 9/11/12 (which were never countered or dis-
puted, whether in Peters 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters, any of her emails to Coughlin, or any
statements by King or the SBN or OBC or NNDB/Panel, though, upon information and belief, the
SBN/OBC's Rose Cota has admitted that the SBN/OBC has accepted filings by fax in disciplinary
matters as well. Further, King and the SBN failed to file the required security:
Workplace Harassment TPOsThe Security Requirement NRS 33.270(2) declares that a
Temporary Order for protection against harassment in the workplace must not be issued without the
giving of security by the employer in an amount determined by the court to be sufficient to pay for
such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by the person who allegedly committed the
harassment if the person who allegedly committed the harassment is found to have been wrongfully
enjoined or restrained. The AOC TPO Forms Committee set the amount of the security as $100.00
cash.
Also, King is not able to sign the declaration or verify either a TPO or EPO application, it
must be an officer of the SBN.
Only in the context of Workplace TPOs is one specific interpretation explicit. See NRS
33.270(5) (A temporary order for protection against harassment in the workplace that is granted,
with or without notice, must expire not later than 15 days after the date on which the order is issued. .
. .). [Emphasis added].
Anti-SLAPP suit against the SBN, Peters, King, and Echeverria.
over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. CCP 527.6(b)(1); see
Leydon v Alexander (1989) 212 CA3d 1, 4, 260 CR 253 (single incident of harassment is insufficient;
potential different result in case involving verbal abuse amounting to credible threat of violence). It
includes following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls, or sending harassing
correspondence by any means including mail, fax, or e-mail. CCP 527.6(b)(1). See Brekke v Wills
(2005) 125 CA4th 1400, 14121414, 23 CR3d 609 (teenage boyfriends conduct constituted course
of conduct against minor girlfriends parents; boyfriend sent three vitriolic letters to girlfriend know-
ing her mother would read them, he had earlier sent letters instructing girlfriend on retaliatory
measures she could take against her parents for their restrictions on her, and he taunted mother on
telephone). Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the term course of con-
duct. CCP 527.6(b)(1). For example, filing a legal action does not constitute harassment be-
cause an individual has a constitutional right to petition for redress of grievances. See Byersv
Cathcart (1997) 57 CA4th 805, 809, 67 CR2d 398; LeydonvAlexander, supra, 212 CA3d at 5; see
also SmithvSilvey(1983) 149 CA3d 400, 406, 197 CR 15 (respondent could not be enjoined
from initiating complaints about petitioner with public agencies). The course of conduct must
by its nature cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actu-
ally cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner. CCP 527.6(b)(3); BrekkevWills, su-
pra, 125 CA4th at 14141415.
For example, the court may not grant a TRO and preliminary injunction under CCP 527.6,
enjoining a nuisance such as the noise from the use of a basketball court, without proof that the noise
caused substantial emotional distress to the petitioner. See Schild v Rubin (1991) 232 CA3d 755,
761765, 283 CR 533. The phrase substantial emotional distress is not defined by CCP 527.6. But
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in the analogous context of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the similar phrase
severe emotional distress has been defined to mean highly unpleasant mental suffering or anguish
from socially unacceptable conduct, that entails such intense, enduring, and nontrivial emotional
distress that no reasonable [person] in a civilized society should be expected to endure it. 232
CA3d at 762763.
Code of Civil Procedure 527.6 is not intended to supplant normal injunctive procedures applicable
to cases concerning issues other than harassment as defined in the statute. Byers v Cathcart, supra, 57
CA4th at 811. Conduct that is outside the definition of harassment cannot be enjoined under the
summary procedures of CCP 527.6, even if it might ultimately be enjoined under normal injunctive
procedures after full development of the facts and law. Byers v Cathcart, supra, 57 CA4th at 812. For
example, without substantial evidence of harassing conduct, a court may not use CCP 527.6 to order
a respondent to stay 25 feet away from the petitioner who was conducting judgment debtor examina-
tions in court. Nebel v Sulak (1999) 73 CA4th 1363, 1370, 87 CR2d 385.
Service must be made in the manner provided by law for personal service of the summons in a
civil action. Cal Rules of Ct 3.1152(c).
B. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE
1. [20.4] Checklist: Issuing Temporary Restraining Order
(1) Review the petitioners petition and application. The petitioner must use Judicial Council form
WV-100. Judges who hear these cases should make sure that their courts have Judicial Council form
WV-100-INFO, How Do I Get an Order To Prohibit Workplace Violence?, available to petitioners.
This form, among other things, provides specific instructions for completing the petition. The peti-
tioner must also provide to the court a Judicial Council form CLETS-001, Confidential CLETS In-
formation. This form is confidential and private, and does not become part of the public court file.
See Cal Rules of Ct 1.51.
(2) Determine that the petitioner is a proper party to seek relief under CCP 527.8. The petitioner
must be the employer of a person who has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence.
CCP 527.8(a). See 20.31.
(3) If the petitioner is seeking a temporary restraining order, determine whether the petitioner has
shown reasonable proof that the employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of vio-
lence by the respondent and that the employee will suffer great or irreparable harm if the TRO is not
granted. CCP 527.8(e). See 20.34. The unlawful violence must be assault, battery, or stalking.
The credible threat of violence must be a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that
would place a reasonable person in fear of his or her safety, or the safety or his or her immediate fam-
ily, and that serves no legitimate purpose. CCP 527.8(b). See 20.33; see also item (7) in 20.5. If
the conduct about which the petitioner is complaining does not meet this statutory definition, the
court may not provide relief, temporary or otherwise.
(4) Issue a TRO if the petitioner has made the required showings. Courts must use the Judicial Coun-
cil form WV-110, Temporary Restraining Order. If the petitioner shows good cause, the court has the
discretion to issue a TRO that includes other named family or household members. CCP 527.8(d).
(5) Set hearing on the petition for an injunction. Set the matter for hearing within 21 days or, if good
cause appears, 25 days, from the date that the petition for the TRO is granted or denied. CCP
527.8(h). If no request for temporary orders is made, the court must set the hearing within 21 days
or, if good cause appears, 25 days, from the date that the petition is filed. CCP 527.8(h). Courts
must use the Judicial Council form WV-109, Notice of Court Hearing.
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20.5 California Judges Benchguide 208
2. [20.5] Checklist: Conducting Hearing on and Issuing Injunction
(1) Before the hearing on the petitioners petition for an injunction, determine that the respondent was
properly served with a copy of the petition, the TRO, and notice of hearing on the petition. Personal
service is required in the manner provided for service of summons, at least five days before the hear-
ing, unless the court has shortened the time for service for good cause. CCP 527.8(m). See 20.36.
The proof of service should be made on Judicial Council form WV-200.
(2) Before the hearing, determine that the petitioner was properly served with the respondents re-
sponse to the petition. The response may be written or oral, or both. See Cal Rules of Ct 3.1152(d). If
a written response is served on the petitioner or the petitioners attorney at least two days before the
hearing, the petitioner may not request a continuance on an account of the response. See Cal Rules of
Ct 3.1152(d); 20.37. The proof of service should be made on Judicial Council form WV-250.
(3) Review the response to the petition filed by the respondent. If the response is written, the re-
spondent must use Judicial Council form WV-120. The respondent may file a response that explains,
excuses, justifies, or denies the alleged unlawful violence or credible threats of violence. CCP
527.8(i). See 20.37.
(4) Ask the parties if they might be willing to consider mediation of their dispute. If so, refer the case
to mediation, and advise the parties that what happens during mediation is not admissible in any sub-
sequent court proceeding. See Evid C 1119.
(5) If the parties wish to proceed to hearing, advise them that they have the right to present any rele-
vant testimony, including oral testimony. Also advise the parties that the court may make an inde-
pendent inquiry, i.e., the court may question the parties and their witnesses. CCP 527.8(j). See
20.40.
(6) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in unlawful vio-
lence or made a credible threat of violence, it should issue the requested injunction prohibiting further
unlawful violence or threats of violence. The petitioner must also establish that great or irreparable
harm would result to the employee if an injunction is not issued because of the reasonable probability
that unlawful violence will occur in the future. See 20.41. The court must use Judicial Council form
WV-130 to issue the injunction. If the petitioner shows good cause, the court has the discretion to is-
sue an injunction that includes other named family or household members, or other persons employed
at any of employees workplaces. CCP 527.8(d).
(7) Advise the parties of the duration of the injunction (maximum of three years). Also advise the pe-
titioner that he or she may apply for
209 Civil Harassment and Workplace/Postsecondary School Violence 20.6
renewal of the injunction by filing a new petition at any time within three months before the injunc-
tion expires. See
20.42, 20.44.
(8) Advise the respondent that he or she may not own, possess, purchase, receive, or attempt to pur-
chase or receive a firearm for the duration of the injunction. Order the respondent to sell to a licensed
gun dealer or turn in to the police any firearms that he possesses or controls within 24 hours of re-
ceiving the order. See 20.65.
(9) Advise the respondent that he or she must file proof of sale or surrender of any firearm with the
court within 48 hours of receiving the order. See 20.65.
(10) Advise the petitioner that he or she must deliver a copy of the order to the law enforcement
agencies specified in the order by the close of the business day on which the order is granted. See
20.46.
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B. Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction Prohibiting Harassment (CCP 527.6)
A person who has suffered harassment (see 20.10) may seek a TRO and an injunction prohibiting
harassment. CCP 527.6(a)(1). The term person is limited to natural persons and does not include
artificial entities such as corporations, partnerships, or associations. Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 CA4th 1228, 1258, 29 CR3d 521 (animal
testing laboratory cannot maintain cause of action against organization and individuals protesting la-
boratorys activities); Diamond View Ltd. v Herz (1986) 180 CA3d 612, 618V619, 225 CR 651
(limited partnership not entitled to injunctive relief).
The petitioner may appear in the proceeding by counsel or in pro per. CCP 527.6(k).
20V13 Civil Harassment and Workplace/Postsecondary School Violence 20.10
2. [20.10] Harassment Defined
Harassment means unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful
course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person,
and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasona-
ble person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional dis-
tress to the petitioner. CCP 527.6(b)(3).
Unlawful violence is any assault, battery, or stalking, but does not include lawful acts of self-
defense or defense of others. CCP 527.6(b)(7).
Credible threat of violence is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would
place a reasonable person in fear of his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, and
that serves no legitimate purpose. CCP 527.6(b)(2). The intent requirement for a true threat is that
the respondent intentionally or knowingly communicates the threat; it is not necessary that the re-
spondent intends to, or is able to carry out the threat. Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v Stop Hunting-
don Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 CA4th 1228, 1255V1256, 29 CR3d 521.
Course of conduct is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, how-
ever short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. CCP 527.6(b)(1); see Leydon v Alexander (1989)
212 CA3d 1, 4, 260 CR 253 (single incident of harassment is insufficient; potential different result in
case involving verbal abuse amounting to credible threat of violence). It includes following or stalk-
ing an individual, making harassing telephone calls, or sending harassing correspondence by any
means including mail, fax, or e-mail. CCP 527.6(b)(1). See Brekke v Wills (2005) 125 CA4th 1400,
1412V1414, 23 CR3d 609 (teenage boyfriends conduct constituted course of conduct against
minor girlfriends parents; boyfriend sent three vitriolic letters to girlfriend knowing her mother
would read them, he had earlier sent letters instructing girlfriend on retaliatory measures she could
take against her parents for their restrictions on her, and he taunted mother on telephone). Constitu-
tionally protected activity is not included within the term course of conduct. CCP 527.6(b)(1).
For example, filing a legal action does not constitute harassment because an individual has a constitu-
tional right to petition for redress of grievances. See Byers v Cathcart (1997) 57 CA4th 805, 809, 67
CR2d 398; Leydon v Alexander, supra, 212 CA3d at 5; see also Smith v Silvey (1983) 149 CA3d
400, 406, 197 CR 15 (respondent could not be enjoined from initiating complaints about petitioner
with public agencies). The course of conduct must by its nature cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.
CCP 527.6(b)(3); Brekke v Wills, supra, 125 CA4th at 1414V1415. For
20.11 California Judges Benchguide 20V14
example, the court may not grant a TRO and preliminary injunction under CCP 527.6, enjoining a
nuisance such as the noise from the use of a basketball court, without proof that the noise caused sub-
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stantial emotional distress to the petitioner. See Schild v Rubin (1991) 232 CA3d 755, 761V765, 283
CR 533. The phrase substantial emotional distress is not defined by CCP 527.6. But in the anal-
ogous context of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the similar phrase severe
emotional distress has been defined to mean highly unpleasant mental suffering or anguish from
socially unacceptable conduct, that entails such intense, enduring, and nontrivial emotional distress
that no reasonable [person] in a civilized society should be expected to endure it. 232 CA3d at
762V763.
Code of Civil Procedure 527.6 is not intended to supplant normal injunctive procedures applicable
to cases concerning issues other than harassment as defined in the statute. Byers v Cathcart, supra, 57
CA4th at 811. Conduct that is outside the definition of harassment cannot be enjoined under the
summary procedures of CCP 527.6, even if it might ultimately be enjoined under normal injunctive
procedures after full development of the facts and law. Byers v Cathcart, supra, 57 CA4th at 812. For
example, without substantial evidence of harassing conduct, a court may not use CCP 527.6 to order
a respondent to stay 25 feet away from the petitioner who was conducting judgment debtor examina-
tions in court. Nebel v Sulak (1999) 73 CA4th 1363, 1370, 87 CR2d 385.
3. [20.11] Issuing a Temporary Restraining Order
The court may grant a TRO on the petitioners petition and application, with or without notice, based
on a declaration that, to the satisfaction of the court, shows reasonable proof of harassment by the re-
spondent, and that the petitioner will suffer great or irreparable harm if the TRO is not granted. CCP
527.6(d); see CCP 527.6(v)(1) (petitioner must use Judicial Council form CH-100 for petition;
court must use Judicial Council form CH-110 to issue TRO). Unless ordered by the court, no support-
ing memorandum is required. Cal Rules of Ct 3.1152(b). No filing fee may be charged for a petition
that alleges that the respondent has inflicted or threatened violence against the petitioner, stalked the
petitioner, or acted or spoken in any other manner that has placed the petitioner in reasonable fear of
violence, and that seeks a restraining order or injunction restraining stalking, future violence, or
threats of violence. CCP 527.6(w). And no fee may be charged for a subpoena filed in connection
with a petition alleging these acts. CCP 527.6(w).
A TRO may include any of the following (CCP 527.6(b)(6), (d)):
E An order enjoining a party from harassing, intimidating, molesting, attacking, striking, stalking,
threatening, sexually assaulting,
battering, abusing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying telephone calls, as
described in Pen C 653m, destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by
mail or otherwise, or coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the petitioner.
E An order enjoining a party from specified behavior that the court determines is necessary to effec-
tuate orders described above.
A request for the issuance of a temporary restraining order without notice must be granted or denied
on the same day that the petition is submitted to the court, unless the petition is filed too late in the
day to permit effective review, in which case the order must be granted or denied on the next day of
judicial business in sufficient time for the order to be filed that day with the clerk of the court. CCP
527.6(e).
On a showing of good cause, the court has the discretion to issue a TRO that includes other named
family or household members. CCP 527.6(c). The TRO remains in effect, at the courts discretion,
for up to 21 days or, if the court extends the time for hearing, for up to 25 days, unless otherwise
modified or terminated by the court. CCP 527.6(f).
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A hearing must be held within 21 days or, if good cause appears, 25 days from the date that the peti-
tion for a temporary order is granted or denied. CCP 527.6(g). If no request for temporary orders is
made, the hearing must be held within 21 days, or if good cause appears, 25 days, from the date that
the petition is filed. CCP 527.6(g).
The respondent must be personally served with a copy of the petition for an injunction, TRO, and no-
tice of hearing on the petition at least five days before the hearing. CCP 527.6(m); Cal Rules of Ct
3.1152(c). Service must be made in the manner provided by law for personal service of the summons
in a civil action. Cal Rules of Ct 3.1152(c). For good cause, the court may shorten the time for ser-
vice. CCP 527.6(m); Cal Rules of Ct 3.1152(c).
The notice of hearing must notify the respondent that if he or she does not attend the hearing, the
court may make orders against him or her that could last up to three years. CCP 527.6(n).
If a respondent, named in a restraining order issued after a hearing, has not been served personally
with the order but has received actual notice of the existence and substance of the order through per-
sonal appearance in court to hear the terms of the order from the court, no
additional proof of service is required to enforce the order. CCP 527.6(p)(1).
If the respondent named in a temporary restraining order is personally served with the order and no-
tice of hearing with respect to a restraining order or protective order based on the temporary restrain-
ing order, but the respondent does not appear at the hearing, either personally or by an attorney, and
the terms and conditions of the restraining order or protective order issued at the hearing are identical
to the temporary restraining order, except for the duration of the order, then the restraining order or
protective order issued at the hearing may be served on the respondent by mail. CCP 527.6(p)(2).
Petitioners may use Judicial Council form CH-260, Proof of Service of Order After Hearing by Mail,
when service of the order is authorized CCP 527.6(p)(2).
The respondent may file a response that explains, excuses, justifies, or denies the alleged harassment,
or may file a cross-petition for an injunction prohibiting harassment. CCP 527.6(h); see CCP
527.6(v)(1) (respondent must use Judicial Council form CH-120); see also CCP 527.6(w) (when
filing fee is not required). If a written response is served on the petitioner or the petitioners attorney
at least two days before the hearing, the petitioner is not entitled to a continuance on account of the
response Cal Rules of Ct 3.1152(d). The respondent may appear in the proceeding by counsel or in
pro per. CCP 527.6(k). In addition to, or in lieu of a written response, the petitioner can challenge
the issuance of a permanent order through oral testimony at the hearing. Cal Rules of Ct 3.1152(d).
A respondent may request a continuance of the hearing on a showing of good cause. Cal Rules of Ct
3.1152(e). If the court in its discretion grants the continuance, any temporary restraining order that
has been granted remains in effect until the end of the continued hearing unless otherwise ordered by
the court. Cal Rules of Ct 3.1152(e). An error in failing to grant a request for a continuance is re-
versible only if the denial results in a denial of a fair hearing, or otherwise prejudices the requesting
party. Freeman v Sullivant (2011) 192 CA4th 523, 527V528, 120 CR3d 693.
The court may, on the filing of a declaration by the petitioner that the respondent could not be served
within the time required by statute, reissue an order previously issued and dissolved by the court for
failure to serve
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the respondent. CCP 527.6(o)(1). The petitioner must use Judicial Council form CH-115 to request
to continue the hearing and to reissue the order. The court must use Judicial Council form CH-116,
Notice of New Hearing Date and Order on Reissuance, to order reissuance. The reissued order re-
mains in effect until the date set for the hearing. CCP 527.6(o)(1). The order must state on its face
the expiration date of the order. CCP 527.6(o)(2).
f. [20.17] Evidence
At the hearing, the court must consider any relevant evidence, including hearsay evidence, when de-
ciding whether to issue an injunction prohibiting the harassment. CCP 527.6(i); Kaiser Found.
Hosps. v Wilson (2011) 201 CA4th 550, 555V558, 133 CR3d 830. The court may also make an in-
dependent inquiry. CCP 527.6(i). The court may not deny a party the opportunity to present oral tes-
timony. Schraer v Berkeley Prop. Owners Assn (1989) 207 CA3d 719, 730V733, 255 CR 453
(court should not have refused introduction of oral testimony and should not have based its decision
entirely on written declarations, documentary evidence, and arguments of counsel). However, it is the
parties obligation to ensure that their witnesses are present at the hearing and ready to testify. 207
CA3d at 732 n5. Both sides may offer evidence by deposition, affidavit, or oral testimony, and the
court must receive this evidence, subject only to reasonable limitations necessary to preserve the ex-
peditious nature of the harassment procedure. A full-fledged evidentiary hearing with oral testimony
is not necessary, unless requested by a party. See Ensworth v Mullvain (1990) 224 CA3d 1105,
1110V1111, 274 CR 447; Schraer v Berkeley Prop. Owners Assn, supra, 207 CA3d at 733 n6.
Direct testimony from the petitioner that he or she suffered substantial emotional distress is not re-
quired for the court to issue an injunction; the petitioners declaration may be sufficient. Ensworth v
Mullvain, supra, 224 CA3d at 1110V1111.
Testimony of mental health practitioner. Although communications between a patient and a psycho-
therapist are confidential and privileged under Evid C 1012, the dangerous patient exception to
the psychotherapist-patient privilege permits disclosure of any threatening communications of the
patient if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or
emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or herself or to the person or property of another
and that disclosure of the communications are necessary to prevent the threatened harm. Evid C
1024.
g. [20.18] Presence of Support Person at Hearing
If there are allegations of unlawful violence or credible threats of violence, a support person may ac-
company the petitioner in court. CCP 527.6(l). If the petitioner is appearing in pro per, the support
person may sit with the petitioner at the counsel table. CCP 527.6(l). The support person may not
provide legal advice, but is allowed to be present to provide moral and emotional support to the peti-
tioner. CCP 527.6(l). The court has the discretion to remove the support person from the courtroom
if the court believes that the support person is prompting, swaying, or influencing the petitioner. CCP
527.6(l).
a. [20.19] Findings
If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, it must issue an
injunction prohibiting the harassment. CCP 527.6(i); see Judicial Council form CH-130. The peti-
tioner must also establish that great or irreparable harm would result to the petitioner if an injunction
is not issued because of the reasonable probability that unlawful violence will occur in the future.
Russell v Douvan (2003) 112 CA4th 399, 401V404, 5 CR3d 137 (trial court erred in issuing injunc-
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tion based on a single act of violence without finding threat of future harm). When read literally, the
language of CCP 527.6(i) appears to provide that once the petitioner establishes by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the respondent has engaged in a single act of harassment, the court must issue
an injunction. But CCP 527.6(i) must be read to include the requirement that the petitioner show
that great or irreparable harm is likely to occur absent the injunction because the petitioner is required
to make such a showing under CCP 527.6(d) to obtain a TRO. 112 CA4th at 402V404.
The court is not required to make a specific finding on the record that harassment exists, or to cite the
statutory elements of the harassment. Although there must be evidence to support the required ele-
ments of harassment and substantial emotional distress, direct testimony by the petitioner is not re-
quired to establish or support those elements. See Ensworth v Mullvain (1990) 224 CA3d 1105,
1112, 274 CR 447.
b. [20.20] Award of Costs and Fees
The court may award the prevailing party court costs and attorneys fees. CCP 527.6(r). See Leydon
v Alexander (1989) 212 CA3d 1, 5, 260 CR 253 (award is discretionary); see also 20.14. Because
CCP 527.6(r) does not define prevailing party, the court may use the general definition of
prevailing party in CCP 1032. Adler v Vaicius (1993) 21 CA4th 1770, 1777, 27 CR2d 32; Elster
v Friedman (1989) 211 CA3d 1439,
1443V1444, 260 CR 148 (court properly awarded fees and costs to petitioners even though terms of
injunction entered under stipulated settlement applied to them as well as to respondents, because peti-
tioners obtained the precise relief they had sought). Attorney fees, as well as costs, may be awarded
to a prevailing respondent even if the action was brought in good faith and is not frivolous. Krug v
Maschmeier (2009) 172 CA4th 796, 800V803, 91 CR3d 452.
c. [20.21] Duration of Injunction
In the discretion of the court, an order issued after notice and hearing may have a duration of up to
three years. CCP 527.6(j)(1). However, these orders are subject to modification or termination (see
20.22), and renewal (see 20.23).
d. [20.22] Modification or Termination of Injunction
An order issued after notice and hearing may be terminated or modified by order of the court either
on written stipulation filed with the court or on the motion of a party. CCP 527.6(j)(1).
If an action is filed for the purpose of terminating or modifying a protective order before the expira-
tion date specified in the order by a party other than the protected party, the party who is protected by
the order must be given notice of the hearing for modification or termination by personal service (see
CCP 1005(b)) or, under specified circumstances, by service on the Secretary of State. CCP
527.6(j)(3). If the party who is protected by the order cannot be notified prior to the expiration date,
the court must deny the motion to modify or terminate the order without prejudice or continue the
hearing until the party who is protected can be properly noticed and may, on a showing of good
cause, specify another method for service of process that is reasonably designed to afford actual no-
tice to the protected party. CCP 527.6(j)(3). The protected party may waive his or her right to notice
if he or she is physically present in court and does not challenge the sufficiency of the notice. CCP
527.6(j)(3).
e. [20.23] Renewal of Injunction
An order issued after notice and hearing may be renewed, on the request of a party, for a duration of
not more than three years, without a showing of any further harassment since the issuance of the orig-
inal order, subject to termination or modification by further order of the court either on written stipu-
lation filed with the court or on the motion of a party. CCP 527.6(j)(1). The request for renewal may
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be brought at any time within the three months before the orders expiration. CCP 527.6(j)(1). If no
expiration date is indicated on the order, the order has a duration of three years from the date of issu-
ance. CCP 527.6(j)(2).
The petitioner must use Judicial Council form CH-700 to request a renewal of the order. The court
must use CH-710 to issue a notice of a hearing to renew the restraining order. If the respondent wish-
es to make a written response to the request to renew the restraining order, he or she must use Judicial
Council form CH-720. And the courts grant or denial of a renewal request must be made on Judicial
Council form CH-730.
f. [20.24] Persons Covered
On a showing of good cause, the court has the discretion to issue an injunction that includes other
named family or household members. CCP 527.6(c); 20.11.
g. [20.25] Mutual Injunctions
The court may not grant mutual injunctions, absent express consent by the petitioner, against both the
petitioner and the respondent at a hearing on the petitioners petition for an injunction against the re-
spondent, unless the respondent has filed a cross-petition, as permitted by CCP 527.6(h), and the
petitioner is given notice of the cross-petition and an opportunity to respond to it. Kobey v Morton
(1991) 228 CA3d 1055, 1058V1060, 278 CR 530. See also Nora v Kaddo (2004) 116 CA4th 1026,
1029, 10 CR3d 862 (trial court erred in issuing mutual injunctive relief when court refused to hear
witnesses offered by both parties, and respondent did not file a cross-complaint but merely requested
mutual injunctions at the close of the proceedings).
The court must order the petitioner or the petitioners attorney to deliver a copy of an order issued
under CCP 527.6, or reissuance, extension, modification, or termination of the order, and any sub-
sequent proof of service, by the close of the business day on which the order, reissuance, extension,
modification, or termination was made, to each law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the
residence of the petitioner and to any additional law enforcement agencies within the courts discre-
tion as are requested by the petitioner. CCP 527.6(q)(2).
Alternatively, the court or its designee must transmit, within one business day, to law enforcement
personnel all information required under Fam C 6380(b) regarding any order issued under CCP
527.6, or a reissuance, extension, modification, or termination of the order, and any subsequent
proof of service. CCP 527.6(q)(3).
Information on any TRO or injunction relating to civil harassment issued by a court under CCP
527.6 must be transmitted to the
Department of Justice in accordance with CCP 527.6(q)(2) or (3). CCP 527.6(q)(1).
7. [20.27] Subsequent Award of Fees and Costs
On the expiration of the TRO or the petitioners dismissal of the action, the court retains jurisdiction
to grant the respondents motion for attorneys fees and costs as the prevailing party. Adler v
Vaicius (1993) 21 CA4th 1770, 1774V1777, 27 CR2d 32.
8. [20.28] Effect of Respondents Bankruptcy Petition
When the petitioner files a petition for an injunction under CCP 527.6 and the respondent subse-
quently files a petition in bankruptcy, the automatic stay provisions of federal bankruptcy law (11
USC 362(a)) do not apply to the petitioners petition unless the injunction interferes with the bank-
ruptcy case. An action to enjoin harassment will not generally interfere with a bankrupt debtors es-
tate or threaten the role of the automatic stay in protecting both the debtor and the debtors creditors.
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Grant v Clampitt (1997) 56 CA4th 586, 590V592, 65 CR2d 727. However, any award of costs and
fees to the petitioner as the prevailing party is required to be stayed under 11 USC 362(a). 56 CA4th
at 593.
Any willful disobedience of any TRO or injunction granted under CCP 527.6 is punishable under
Pen C 273.6. CCP 527.6(s). Penal Code 273.6 provides that any intentional and knowing viola-
tion of an order issued under CCP 527.6 is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $1000
and/or by imprisonment in the county jail for up to one year. Pen C 273.6(a). Any violation of the
order that results in physical injury is punishable by a fine of up to $2000 and/or by imprisonment in
the county jail for not less than 30 days nor more than one year. Pen C 273.6(b). However, if a re-
spondent is imprisoned in county jail for at least 48 hours, the court may, in the interest of justice,
reduce or eliminate the 30-day minimum imprisonment. Pen C 273.6(b).
A subsequent conviction for violation of Pen C 273.6(a), occurring within seven years of a prior
conviction and involving an act of violence or a credible threat of violence, is punishable by impris-
onment in the county jail for up to one year or in state prison. Pen C 273.6(d). A subsequent convic-
tion occurring within one year of a prior conviction that results in physical injury is punishable by a
fine of up to $2000 and/or by imprisonment in county jail for not less than six months nor more than
one year, or by imprisonment in state prison. Pen C 273.6(e). However, if a respondent is impris-
oned in county jail for at least 30 days, the court may,
in the interest of justice, reduce or eliminate the six-month minimum imprisonment. Pen C 273.6(e).
A respondent who is convicted of owning, possessing, purchasing, or receiving a firearm when pro-
hibited from doing so by an order under CCP 527.6 may be imprisoned in the county jail for up to
one year or in state prison and may be subject to a fine of up to $1000. Pen C 273.6(g), 29825.
The provisions of CCP 527.6 do not apply to any action or proceeding under the Domestic Violence
Prevention Act (Fam C 6200V6389) or under the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(CC 1788V1788.33). CCP 527.6(u). The statute does not preclude a petitioner from using other
civil remedies. CCP 527.6(u).
C. Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction Prohibiting Workplace Violence (CCP 527.8)
Any employer, whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from
any individual, which can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the
workplace, may seek a TRO and an injunction on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the
court, on behalf of any number of other employees at the workplace and, if appropriate, other em-
ployees at other workplaces of the employer. CCP 527.8(a). The provisions of the statute apply to
public and private employers. CCP 527.8(b)(3). The term employee includes volunteers and in-
dependent contractors performing services for the employer at the employers workplace, members
of corporate boards of directors, and elected or appointed public officers. CCP 527.8(b)(3). The pe-
titioner (employer) may appear in the proceeding by counsel or in pro per. CCP 527.8(l). A petition-
er that is a corporation may only appear through counsel. Merco Constr. Engrs v Mun. Court (1978)
21 C3d 724, 731, 147 CR 631. See Scripps Health v Marin (1999) 72 CA4th 324, 333, 85 CR2d 86
(corporate employer is allowed to seek injunction on behalf of employee).
An injunction may issue under CCP 527.8 in a dependency case. In re M.B. (2011) 201 CA4th
1057, 134 CR3d 45. In In re M.B., a party in a dependency proceeding made harassing phone calls to
the department of child and family services and physically obstructed department offices. The Fourth
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District Court of Appeal found that an injunction issued by the trial court prohibiting the party from
contacting any employee of the department was authorized under CCP 527.8. 201 CA4th at
1062V1064.
By its terms, CCP 527.8 is applicable only to actions at the employees workplace, not his or her
home. City of Los Angeles v Animal Defense League (2006) 135 CA4th 606, 625V627, 37 CR3d
632 (noting that employee could seek his or her own injunction against harassment at his or her home
under CCP 527.6).
An employer subjected to generalized threats of workplace violence may obtain relief under CCP
527.8 on behalf of an employee who is a logical target of the threats, even if the employee was not
specifically identified by the harasser. USS-Posco Indus. v Edwards (2003) 111 CA4th 436,
442V444, 4 CR3d 54.
Labor Code 6400 et seq (employers duties and responsibilities regarding safety in employment)
and CCP 527.8, when read together, establish an explicit public policy requiring employers to pro-
vide a safe and secure workplace, including a requirement that an employer take reasonable steps to
address credible threats of violence in the workplace. Franklin v Monadnock Co. (2007) 151 CA4th
252, 258V263, 59 CR3d 692 (terminated employees allegations regarding threats of violence made
by co-worker were sufficient to state claim of wrongful termination based on public policies that re-
quire employers to provide a safe and secure workplace and encourage employees to report credible
threats of violence in the workplace); City of Palo Alto v Service Employees Intl Union (2000) 77
CA4th 327, 336V337, 91 CR2d 500.
2. [20.32] Potential Respondents
A TRO or injunction prohibiting workplace violence may only be issued against natural persons, and
not against groups, associations, or corporate entities. City of Los Angeles v Animal Defense League
(2006) 135 CA4th 606, 622V625, 37 CR3d 632.
3. [20.33] Unlawful Violence and Credible Threat of Violence Defined
Unlawful violence is any assault or battery, or stalking under Pen C 646.9. CCP 527.8(b)(7). It
does not include lawful acts of self-defense or defense of others. CCP 527.8(b)(7).
A credible threat of violence is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would
place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family,
and that serves no legitimate purpose. CCP 527.8(b)(2). The intent requirement for a true threat is
that the respondent intentionally or knowingly communicates the threat; it is not necessary that the
respondent intends to, or is able to carry out the threat. Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v Stop Hun-
tingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 CA4th 1228, 1255V1256, 29 CR3d 521.
x JUDICIAL TIP: Courts should be leery of finding that there has been a credible threat of violence
when the respondent has not directly conveyed the threatening words. For example, the Third District
Court of Appeal, in an employment retaliation case, acknowledged a lower courts finding that there
was insufficient evidence of a threat for purposes of issuing injunctive relief under CCP 527.8 when
the respondent did not convey a threat but merely answered questions put to him by an investigator,
and the investigator interpreted his responses as constituting a threat. Brown v Department of Correc-
tions (2005) 132 CA4th 520, 524V525, 33 CR3d 754.
Course of conduct is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, how-
ever short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. CCP 527.8(b)(1);[ see Scripps Health v Marin
(1999) 72 CA4th 324, 336, 85 CR2d 86 (injunction not warranted based on single threat of violence
when there was no evidence respondent was likely to commit further acts of violence). It includes
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following or stalking the employee to or from the workplace, entering the workplace, following the
employee during employment hours, making telephone calls to the employee, or sending correspond-
ence to the employee by any means including mail, fax, or e-mail. CCP 527.8(b)(1).
The threat of violence need not be directed at a particular employee. An employer may seek injunc-
tive relief under CCP 527.8 on behalf of any employee who is credibly threatened with unlawful
violence, whether or not the respondent identifies the employee. USS-Posco Indus. v Edwards (2003)
111 CA4th 436, 442V444, 4 CR3d 54 (evidence of employees threats to bring a gun into the work-
place and shoot employees against whom he harbored a grudge was sufficient for his former manager
to fear for her own safety for purposes of issuing injunction when that manager instigated disciplinary
action that led to the employees suspension and termination). The court may not issue a TRO or an
injunction prohibiting speech or other activities that are constitutionally protected, or protected by
CCP 527.3 (specified acts relating to labor disputes) or any other provision of law. CCP 527.8(c).
4. [20.34] Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
The court may grant a TRO on the petitioners petition and application, with or without notice, based
on a declaration that, to the satisfaction of the court, shows reasonable proof that the employee has
suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence by the respondent, and that great or irrepa-
rable harm would result to the employee. CCP 527.8(e); see CCP 527.8(u) (petitioner must use Ju-
dicial Council form WV-100). Unless ordered by the court, no
supporting memorandum is required. Cal Rules of Ct 3.1152(b). No filing fee may be charged for a
petition that alleges the respondent has inflicted or threatened violence against the employee, stalked
the employee, or acted or spoken in any other manner that has placed the employee in reasonable fear
of violence, and that seeks a restraining order or injunction restraining stalking, future violence, or
threats of violence. CCP 527.8(v). And no fee may be charged for a subpoena filed in connection
with a petition alleging these acts. CCP 527.8(p).
A TRO may include any of the following (CCP 527.8(b)(6), (d)):
E An order enjoining a party from harassing, intimidating, molesting, attacking, striking, stalking,
threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, abusing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making
annoying telephone calls, as described in Pen C 653m, destroying personal property, contacting, ei-
ther directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, or coming within a specified distance of, or disturb-
ing the peace of the employee.
E An order enjoining a party from specified behavior that the court determines is necessary to effec-
tuate orders described above.
A request for the issuance of a temporary restraining order without notice must be granted or denied
on the same day that the petition is submitted to the court, unless the petition is filed too late in the
day to permit effective review, in which case the order must be granted or denied on the next day of
judicial business in sufficient time for the order to be filed that day with the clerk of the court. CCP
527.8(f).
On a showing of good cause, the court has the discretion to issue a TRO that includes other named
family or household members, or other persons employed at any of the employees workplaces. CCP
527.8(e). The duration of the TRO may not exceed 15 days, unless otherwise modified or terminated
by the court. CCP 527.8(d).
A hearing must be held within 21 days or, if good cause appears, 25 days from the date that the peti-
tion for a temporary order is granted or denied. CCP 527.8(h). If no request for temporary orders is
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made, the hearing must be held within 21 days, or if good cause appears, 25 days, from the date that
the petition is filed. CCP 527.8(h).
The respondent must be personally served with a copy of the employers petition for an injunction,
any TRO, and notice of hearing of the petition at least five days before the hearing. CCP 527.8(m);
Cal
Rules of Ct 3.1152(c). Service must be made in the manner provided by law for personal service of
the summons in a civil action. Cal Rules of Ct 3.1152(c). For good cause, the court may shorten the
time for service. CCP 527.8(m); Cal Rules of Ct 3.1152(c).
The notice of hearing must notify the respondent that if he or she does not attend the hearing, the
court may make orders against him or her that could last up to three years. CCP 527.8(n).
If a respondent, named in a restraining order issued after a hearing, has not been served personally
with the order but has received actual notice of the existence and substance of the order through per-
sonal appearance in court to hear the terms of the order from the court, no additional proof of service
is required to enforce the order. CCP 527.8(p)(1).
If the respondent named in a temporary restraining order is personally served with the order and no-
tice of hearing with respect to a restraining order or protective order based on the temporary restrain-
ing order, but the respondent does not appear at the hearing, either personally or by an attorney, and
the terms and conditions of the restraining order or protective order issued at the hearing are identical
to the temporary restraining order, except for the duration of the order, then the restraining order or
protective order issued at the hearing may be served on the respondent by mail. CCP 527.8(p)(2).
Petitioners may use Judicial Council form WV-260, Proof of Service of Order After Hearing by Mail,
when service of the order is authorized CCP 527.8(p)(2).
The respondent may file a response that explains, excuses, justifies, or denies the alleged unlawful
violence or credible threats of violence. CCP 527.8(i); see CCP 527.8(u) (respondent must use Ju-
dicial Council form WV-120); see also CCP 527.8(v) (when filing fee is not required). If a written
response is served on the petitioner or the petitioners attorney at least two days before the hearing,
the petitioner is not entitled to a continuance on account of the response. Cal Rules of Ct 3.1152(d).
The respondent may appear in the proceeding by counsel or in pro per. CCP 527.8(l). In addition to,
or in lieu of, a written response, the petitioner can challenge the issuance of a permanent order
through oral testimony at the hearing. Cal Rules of Ct 3.1152(d).
A respondent may request a continuance of the hearing on a showing of good cause. Cal Rules of Ct
3.1152(e). If the court in its discretion grants the continuance, any temporary restraining order that
has been granted remains in effect until the end of the continued hearing unless
otherwise ordered by the court. Cal Rules of Ct 3.1152(e). An error in failing to grant a request for a
continuance is reversible only if the denial results in a denial of a fair hearing, or otherwise prejudices
the requesting party. Freeman v Sullivant (2011) 192 CA4th 523, 527V528, 120 CR3d 693.
The court may, on the filing of a declaration by the petitioner that the respondent could not be served
within the time required by statute, reissue an order previously issued and dissolved by the court for
failure to serve the respondent. CCP 527.8(o)(1). The petitioner must use Judicial Council form
WV-115 to request to continue the hearing and to reissue the order. The court must use Judicial
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Council form WV-116, Notice of New Hearing Date and Order on Reissuance, to order reissuance.
The reissued order remains in effect until the date set for the hearing. CCP 527.8(o)(1). The order
must state on its face the expiration date of the order. CCP 527.8(o)(2).
f. [20.40] Evidence
At the hearing, the court must consider any relevant evidence, including hearsay evidence, when de-
ciding whether to issue an injunction. CCP 527.8(j); Kaiser Found. Hosps. v Wilson (2011) 201
CA4th 550, 555V558, 133 CR3d 830 (interpreting identical language contained in CCP 527.6(i)).
The court may also make an independent inquiry. CCP 527.8(j). Moreover, if the respondent is a
current employee of the petitioner-employer, the court must receive evidence concerning the employ-
ers decision to retain, terminate, or otherwise discipline the respondent. CCP 527.8(j).
Testimony of mental health practitioner. Although communications between a patient and a psycho-
therapist are confidential and privileged under Evid C 1012, the dangerous patient exception to
the psychotherapist-patient privilege permits disclosure of any threatening communications of the
patient if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or
emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or herself or to the person or property of another
and that disclosure of the communications are necessary to prevent the threatened harm. Evid C
1024.
a. [20.41] Findings
If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in unlawful violence
or made a credible threat of violence, the court must issue an injunction prohibiting further unlawful
violence or threats of violence. CCP 527.8(j); see Judicial Council form WV-130. The petitioner
must also establish that great or irreparable harm would result to the employee if an injunction is not
issued because of the reasonable probability that unlawful violence will occur in the future. City of
Los Angeles v Animal Defense League (2006) 135 CA4th 606, 615, 625, 37 CR3d 632; Scripps
Health v Marin (1999) 72 CA4th 324, 332, 335, 85 CR2d 86. Read literally, the language of CCP
527.8(j) appears to provide that once the petitioner establishes by clear and convincing evidence that
the respondent has engaged in violence or made a credible threat of violence, the court must issue an
injunction. 72 CA4th at 332. But CCP 527.8(j) must be read to include the requirement that the peti-
tioner show that great or irreparable harm is likely to occur absent the injunction because the peti-
tioner is required to make such a showing under CCP 527.8(e) to obtain a TRO. 72 CA4th at
334V335.
A single credible threat of violence may be sufficient to establish a likelihood of future harm. City of
San Jose v Garbett (2010) 190 CA4th 526, 542V543, 118 CR3d 420 (respondent unsuccessfully ar-
gued that he did not repeat any alarming conduct or make any threatening statement . . . to anyone
after the statement to the employee, and therefore, the evidence of future harm was insufficient).
b. [20.42] Duration of Injunction
In the discretion of the court, an order issued after notice and hearing may have a duration of up to
three years. CCP 527.8(k)(1). However, these orders are subject to modification or termination (see
20.43), and renewal (see 20.44).
c. [20.43] Modification or Termination of Injunction
An order issued after notice and hearing may be terminated or modified by order of the court either
on written stipulation filed with the court or on the motion of a party. CCP 527.8(k)(1).
If an action is filed for the purpose of terminating or modifying a protective order before the expira-
tion date specified in the order by a party other than the protected party, the party who is protected by
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the order must be given notice of the hearing for modification or termination by personal service (see
CCP 1005(b)) or, under specified circumstances, by service on the Secretary of State. CCP
527.8(k)(3). If the party who is protected by the order cannot be notified prior to the expiration date,
the court must deny the motion to modify or terminate the order without prejudice or continue the
hearing until the party who is protected can be properly noticed and may, on a showing of good
cause, specify another method for service of process that is reasonably designed to afford actual no-
tice to the protected party. CCP 527.8(k)(3). The protected party may waive his or
her right to notice if he or she is physically present in court and does not challenge the sufficiency of
the notice. CCP 527.8(k)(3).
d. [20.44] Renewal of Injunction
An order issued after notice and hearing may be renewed, on the request of a party, for a duration of
not more than three years, without a showing of any further harassment since the issuance of the orig-
inal order, subject to termination or modification by further order of the court either on written stipu-
lation filed with the court or on the motion of a party. CCP 527.8(k)(1). The request for renewal
may be brought at any time within the three months before the orders expiration. CCP 527.8(k)(1).
If no expiration date is indicated on the order, the order has a duration of three years from the date of
issuance. CCP 527.8(k)(2).
The petitioner must use Judicial Council form WV-700 to request a renewal of the order. The court
must use WV-710 to issue a notice of a hearing to renew the restraining order. If the respondent
wishes to make a written response to the request to renew the restraining order, he or she must use
Judicial Council form WV-720. And the courts grant or denial of a renewal request must be made
on Judicial Council form WV-730.
e. [20.45] Persons Covered
On a showing of good cause, the court has the discretion to issue an injunction that includes other
named family or household members, or other persons employed at any of the employees workplac-
es. CCP 527.8(d).
The court must order the petitioner or the petitioners attorney to deliver a copy of an order issued
under CCP 527.8, or reissuance, extension, modification, or termination of the order, and any sub-
sequent proof of service, by the close of the business day on which the order, reissuance, extension,
modification, or termination was made, to each law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the
residence of the petitioner and to any additional law enforcement agencies within the courts discre-
tion as are requested by the petitioner. CCP 527.8(q)(2).
Alternatively, the court or its designee must transmit, within one business day, to law enforcement
personnel all information required under Fam C 6380(b) regarding any order issued under CCP
527.8, or a reissuance, extension, modification, or termination of the order, and any subsequent
proof of service. CCP 527.8(q)(3).
The penalties for any intentional disobedience of any TRO or injunction granted under CCP 527.8
are the same as for any willful disobedience of a TRO or an injunction granted under CCP 527.6.
See CCP 527.8(s); discussion in 20.29.
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The TRO and injunction available under CCP 527.8 are in addition to whatever other remedies the
employer or affected employee may have against workplace violence. City of Palo Alto v Service
Employees Intl Union (2000) 77 CA4th 327, 336, 91 CR2d 500.
USING FORMB-3 APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HAR-
ASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE FROM THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT'S SELECTION OF MANDATORY
FORMS AVAILABLE ONLINE, KING FILED A 12/20/12 ON APPLICATION WHICH READ:
APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARYORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN
THE WORKPLACE (NRS 33.250)
HARASSMENTIN THE WORKPLACE UNDER NRS 33.240, HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
OCCURS WHEN:
1. A person knowingly threatens to cause or commits an act that causes:
(A) BODILY INJURYTO HIMSELF OR ANOTHER PERSON;
(B) DAMAGE TO THE PROPERTYOF ANOTHER PERSON; OR
(C) SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO THE PHYSICAL OR MENTAL HEALTH OR SAFETY OF A PERSON;
2. The threat is made or the act is committed against an employer, an employee of the em-
ployer while the employee performs his duties of employment or a person present at the
workplace of the employer; and
3. The threat would cause a reasonable person to fear that the threat will be carried out or
the act would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated or har-
assed
COMPLETE THE APPLICATION TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE.
I state the following facts under penalty of perjury: (box is checked) I am the authorized
agent of the employer.
I reasonably believe that the Adverse Party has threat-
ened or committed an act or act(s) of harassment in the
workplace as defined above. The event(s) occurred as
follows: NOTE: BE SPECIFIC AS TO WHO THREAT-
ENED OR COMMITTED WHAT ACT OR ACTS AND
AGAINST WHOM. INDICATE APPROXIMATE
DATE(S) AND LOCATION(S). ALSOLI ST SPECI FI C
EMPLOYEE(S)/PERSON(S) PRESENT AT THE WORK-
PLACE WHOARE THE FOCUSOF THE HARASSMENT
OR WHOM THE ADVERSE PARTY SHOULDBE DI -
RECTEDNOT TOCONTACT. THIS FORM IS A PUBLIC
RECORD (in the blanks thereafter following King has hand-
written in):
SeeSummarycontainedinExhibit 1includingexhibits1A- 1D.)
NOTE: PLEASE DO NOT WRITE ON THE BACKS OF
ANY PAGES; CHECK BOX I F YOU ARE USI NG ADDI -
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TI ONAL PAGES. Check if you usea continuation page(to
beincorporatedbyreference) (SeeExhibit)
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS I HAVE GIVEN NOTICE OF THIS APPLICATION TO THE ADVERSE
PARTY BY THE FOLLOWING METHOD(S): E-MAIL. DATE: DECEMBER 19
TH
, 2012. TIME: 3:30. I HAVE
NOT RECEIVED CONFIRMATION.
GENERAL INFORMATION
1. a) This matter does not have to be reported to law enforcement; however, has a related
report ever been filed? (there is a check in the No box. (Please complete information, if
known. You may attach available copies) Approximate date of report(s): ___Name(s)
of law enforcement agencies:___ Case number(s):___
b) For purposes of this form, a TPO Action is defined to include the following Justice
Court actions:
(1) An Order for Protection Against Stalking and Harassment (NRS 200.591);
(2) An Order for Protection of Children (NRS 33.400);
(3) An Order for Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace (NRS 33.270). A TPO
Action is also defined to include the following Justice/Family/District action:
(a) An Order for Protection Against Domestic Violence (NRS 33.020)
Please Check the Appropriate Box Below:
(this box is checked by King) In the last 2 years, Applicant or any party seeking pro-
tection has not filed a TPO action against the Adverse Party anywhere in the State of Nevada,
and the Adverse Party has not filed a TPO action against Applicant or any party seeking pro-
tection anywhere in the State of Nevada. against Applicant or any party seeking protection
anywhere in the State of Nevada.
(this box isnot checked by King) In the last 2 years, the following TPO action(s) in
the State of Nevada have been filed involving Applicant and the Adverse Party: Case # (if
known)___ Court (Justice/Family) ____Place of Filing ___Approx. Date Filed___ Outcome
(TPO granted, denied, rescinded, etc.)___
2. a) Employers name (if applicable, d/b/a): State Bar of Nevadab) The workplace is located in, and
the employees primarily perform their duties at the following address: 9456 Double R Blvd. , St. B,
Town/City of Reno, County of Washoe, State of Nevada Phone #:775-329-4100, 775-328,1382,775-
328-1384.
3. . PLEASE CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX(ES) BELOW, IF APPLICABLE. (this
box is left unchecked) Employee(s) also work at the additional specific locations that need to
be enumerated in the Order: Street Address: Town/City of , County of __, State of ___ Phone
#:___ Street Address:___ Town/City of ___, County of __, State of __ Phone #:___ (If you
wish to designate more specific addresses, please list them in this format on a separate sheet.)
(box is left unchecked) The employees perform their duties statewide. (box is left unchecked)
Other comments on locations where protection is needed:
4. Authorized agent for employer: Patrick O. King 5. Phone number for authorized agent: 775-328-
1383
6. Is employer represented by an attorney? Yes. Attorney name: Patrick O. King Bar #: 5035
9456 Double R Blvd. , St. B, Town/City of Reno. Phone # for attorney: 775-328-1384 Fax # for at-
torney: 775-329-4100.
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7. Are there additional safety concerns that the Court should know (i.e., firearms, dangerous condi-
tions, hazardous premises, nature of business, etc.)? Yes No (neither box is checked by
King)
If yes, please briefly explain: ___.
8. Have there been any other Court actions or any other relationships between the employer
and the Adverse Party? Yes.
If yes, please describe: Discipline Hearing held 11/14/2012.
RELIEF REQUESTED
I THEREFORE REQUEST that a Temporary Order for Protection Against Harassment in the
Workplace be issued against the Adverse Party so that the Adverse Party will be prohibited from con-
tacting, intimidating, threatening, or otherwise interfering with the employers business and/or its
employees and/or any person present at the workplace, and that the Adverse Party will be ordered to
stay away from the employers workplace. I also request that the Court prohibit the Adverse Party
from violating this Order via e-mail, correspondence, telephone, or by an agent.
I FURTHER REQUEST the following other conditions:____(left blank). I FURTHER RE-
QUEST that this Court set a hearing date for an Extended Order as soon as possible. Yes No
(NOTE: neither box was checked on the copy of the application Laura Peters emailed to Coughlin on
12/19/12, however, the version the SBN filed did check the Yes box requesting a hearing date for
an Extended Order as soon as possible)
I f yes, completetheApplicationfor ExtendedOrder
for ProtectionAgainst Harassment intheWork-
place. NOTE: THIS HEARING WILL BE HELD
WITHIN TEN (10) JUDICIAL DAYS PURSU-
ANT TO NRS 33.270(6)(c), UNLESS COMPEL-
LING REASONS REQUIRE OTHERWISE..
DECLARATION (NRS 53.045)
I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWOF THE STATE OF
NEVADA THAT: (1) I AM THE EMPLOYER OR AUTHORIZED AGENT HEREIN, (2) I
HAVE READ THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED HEREIN OR HAVE HAD THEM READ
TO ME, (3) I BELIEVE THESE STATEMENTS TO BE TRUE, AND (4) THE REQUESTED
ORDER IS NEEDED.
Dated: December 19, 2012. /s/ Patrick O. King
(SIGNATURE). Patrick O. King (PRINT NAME)
It is important to note that the SBN's Laura Pe-
ters emailed Couglin a version of the TPO Applica-
tion that was materially different than the one it
utlimately filed in that on page 6 of 6 of Form B-3
(the 12/20/12 TPO Application), the version Peters
emailed Coughlin did not check the I FURTHER
REQUEST that this Court set a hearing date for an
Extended Order as soon as possible. Yes No
(NOTE: neither box was checked on the copy of the
application Laura Peters emailed to Coughlin on
12/19/12, however, the version the SBN filed did
check the Yes box requesting a hearing date for
an Extended Order as soon as possible). Further, the
SBN never actually filed the EPO Application that
one is directed to (by the form) and required to (un-
der the statute)
Further, King's DECLARATION on page 6
thereof fails to actually identify just whom it is that
King is apparently the AUTHORIZE AGENT of,
ie, whether it be he is the SBN's authorized agent or,
perhaps, the authorized agent of some particular em-
ployee (even himself) for which he seeks to file such
application. Such lack of specificity fails to satisfy
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the jurisdictional prerequisite presented in NRS
33.250(1) where such requires King specify that he
is the authorized agent of the employer.
Perhaps the biggest failure of King's TPO ap-
plication resides where it completely fails to iden-
tify anything sufficient to meet the requirements
of NRS 33.250(2)(c), which requires that such
verified application must included, without limi-
tation: (c) A detaileddescriptionof theevents
that allegedly constituted harassment in the work-
place and the dates on which these events oc-
curred.
A few glaring problems with King's application appear where he fails to list any other loca-
tion for the SBN beyond its Reno office. As such, would that not imply Coughlin is permitted to call,
email, fax, or venture to the Las Vegas main office of the SBN? Further, King lists the main phone
number of the SBN under the fax number section, and completely fails to list the Northern Office
of the SBN's fax number at all, which could be taken as an exclusion thereof from those numbers to
which Coughlin was, apparently not to contact the SBN by fax...However, given that Chair Eche-
verria's own use of the term contact in his 11/16/12 Order would, to be legal, necessarily need to at
least allow for Coughlin to obtain a transcript of the 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing under the
procedures set out in SCR 119, which require Coughlin to
SCR Rule 119. Additional rules of procedure.
1. Record. The recordof ahearingshall bemadeavailabletotheattorneyat theattor-
neysexpenseonrequest madetobar counsel...
3. Other rules of procedure. Except as
otherwise provided in these rules, the Nevada
Rulesof Civil Procedureand the NevadaRulesof
AppellateProcedureapplyin disciplinary cases.
Perhaps Clerk of Court/Paralegal/Investigator
Laura Peters is not aware of NRCP 52, or NRCP 59,
or NRCP 60, or DCR 13(7), etc., etc., or NRAP 10,
and NRAP 11, or all the other various reasons why
opposing counsel and the filing office of the SBN
would necessarily continue to havebusiness
(which would, obviously, involve Coughlin con-
tacting the SBN, the Clerk of Court of the Northern
Office of the SBN, and the Office of Bar Counsel, in
addition to the NNDB and Panel) to conduct even af-
ter the 11/14/12 hearing, and even after the 12/14/12
entry of the Panel's Findings of Fact; Conclusions
of Law which lacks any indication in the title there-
of that it is a decision sufficient to invoke SCR
105(3)'s procedural mechanisms. (It is ironic, that
lack of congruity between the title of the 12/14/12
FOFCOL and the FOFCOL citing to Hill and Judge
Holmes criticisms of Coughlin's work to the effect
that the titles of his filings, at times, bore little to no
relation to the content therein). Further, the tran-
script of the 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing it-
self establishes that Chair Echeverria granted
Coughlin his request to file post-hearing briefs on
various issues.
SCR 105...(3). Review by supreme court.
(A) TIME AND MANNER OF APPEAL. A DECI SI ONOF A HEARING PANEL SHALL BE SERVED ON THE AT-
TORNEY, AND SERVICE SHALL BE DEEMED NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DECI SI ONFOR APPEAL PURPOSES.
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN RULE 105(3)(B), A DECI SI ONIS FINAL AND EFFECTIVE 30 DAYS FROM SER-
VICE, UNLESS AN APPEAL IS TAKEN WITHIN THAT TIME. TO THE EXTENT NOT INCONSISTENT WITH
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THESE RULES, AN APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF A HEARING PANEL SHALL BE TREATEDASWOULD
ANAPPEAL FROM A CI VI L J UDGMENT OF A DI STRI CT COURT AND IS GOVERNEDBY THE NEVADA
RULESOF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
(b) De novo review of public discipline.
...a decisionrecommending... disbarment shall be
automatically reviewed by the supreme court. Re-
view under this paragraph shall be commenced by
bar counsel forwarding therecordof thehearing
panel proceedingsto the court within 30 days of en-
try of the decision...
The attorney and bar counsel shall have30
daysfromthedatethesupremecourt acknowledges
receipt of therecordwithinwhichtofileanopen-
ingbrief or otherwise advise the court of any intent
to contest the hearing panels findings and recom-
mendations. If an opening brief is filed, briefing
shall thereafter proceed in accordance with NRAP
31(a). Extensionsof timetofilebriefsaredisfa-
voredandwill onlybegranteduponashowingof
goodcause. The parties shall not be required to pre-
pare an appendix, but rather shall citetotherecord
of thedisciplinaryproceedings...
4. Rulesof procedure. The chairs, after
consulting with their respective disciplinary boards,
may adopt rules of procedure, subject to approval by
the board of governors.
SCR Rule 120. Costs; bar counsel conflict or disqualification....
2. If, for any reason, bar counsel is dis-
qualified or has a conflict of interest, the board of
governors shall appoint an attorney, ad hoc, to
act in the place of bar counsel.
Further, King clearly needs to be removed from 62337 and 607 in light of not only SCR Rule
120, but also in light of the dictates of RPC 3.7:
Rule 3.7. Lawyer as Witness.
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a
trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary
witness unless:
(1) The testimony relates to an un-
contested issue;...
King's testimony absolutely does relate to a contested issue, many of them, as further de-
tailed herein, including, but not limited to, the insufficiency of postage the SBN affixed to the 10/9/12
Notice of Intent to Take Default in the SCR 105 disciplinary matter wherein the SBN and NNDB so
egregiously overstepped to jurisdiction accorded it by SCR 111(8) and the Court's 6/7/12 Order in
60838.
Thereafter, as is King's consistent practice, he fails to attach an Index to Exhibits or any cover
pages to his various exhibits. Further, while the first page following the last page of the From B-
3 12/20/12 TPO Application bares a heading of Exhibit 1, it is not clear whether Exhibit 1 is a
broad heading encompassing the 39 pages therafter or some lesser portion thereof. There is nothing
to indicated any particular aspect of the exhibits following the application is a Summary as refer-
enced on page 2 of the application. The first two pages of the 39 page Exhibit 1 consists of just over
one page of an unsworn, unattributed, recounting of mostly irrelevant (relating largely to non-SBN
employee's of the Washoe County Public Defender or of the Panel Chair assigned to Coughlin's for-
mal disciplinary hearing by the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board, which is not a part of the SBN)
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details largely consisting of unattributed hearsay and double unattributed double hearsay, which re-
fers to King in the third person...leading one to wonder just whom wrote such statement. Further,
while King's application fails to satisfy NRS 33.250(2)(c)'s requirements, its failure to come any
where near to satisfy any reasonable burden of proof divined from a reading of NRS 33.270(1) in a
free and just society makes void both the TPO and EPO issued herein. (NRS 33.270(1), which re-
quires: The court may issue a temporary order for protection against harassment in the workplace if
it appears to the satisfaction of the court from specific facts shown by a verified application filed pur-
suant to NRS 33.250 that harassment in the workplace has occurred. Such a showing that harass-
ment in the workplace has occurred requires an application and analysis of:
NRS 33.240 ACTS THAT CONSTITUTE HARASSMENT IN WORKPLACE. HARASSMENT
IN THE WORKPLACE OCCURS WHEN:
1. A person knowinglythreatens to cause or commits an act that causes:
(a) Bodily injury to the person or another person;
(B) DAMAGE TO THE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER PERSON; OR
2. THE THREAT IS MADE OR THE ACT IS COMMITTED AGAI NST AN EMPLOYER, AN EM-
PLOYEE OF THE EMPLOYER WHILE THE EMPLOYEE PERFORMS THE EMPLOYEES DUTIES OF EMPLOYMENT
OR A PERSON PRESENT AT THE WORKPLACE OF THE EMPLOYER; AND
3. The threat would cause a reasonablepersonto fear that the threat will be carried out or
the act would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated or harassed.
Even if a court were to view all of that which is contained in the 39 page Exhibit 1 to King's
12/20/12 TPO application as verified (which, clearly, it is not), nothing asserted therein suffices to
constitute harassment in the workplace under NRS 33.240 for a multitude of reasons. One, nothing
contained therein provides any support for the view that Coughlin knowingly did anything that
could be said to threaten to cause or or commit and act that causes any of the ills detailed in NRS
33.240(a)-(b), and neither the 12/20/12 TPO Order or the 1/4/13 EPO Order specify in any way what-
soever just which, if any, of those subsections the court found to have been dispositive as to. There
has been absolutely no assertion by anyone that Coughlin actually committed any act which cause
any bodily injury to anyone or damage to anyone's property. Only to most attenuated hypchondriac,
histrionic fit thrower would assert Coughlin committed any act sufficient to have already caused
substantial harm to the physical or mental health or safety of a person.
SO, ONE MUST ASSUME THAT THE COURT'S JUSTIFICATION FOR ISSUING BOTH THE TPOAND EPO
WAS BASED UPON A FINDING THAT COUGLIN THREATENED TO CAUSE: BODILY INJURY TO THE PERSON
OR ANOTHER PERSON, OR, DAMAGE TO THE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER PERSON; OR, SUBSTANTIAL HARM
TO THE PHYSICAL OR MENTAL HEALTH OR SAFETY OF A PERSON
Neither TPOs nor EPOs may be granted on a default basis. Even if an adverse party fails to
oppose any such application or attend any such hearing, the court is still required to evaluate whether
the requirements of NRS 33.240, 33.250, and 33.270 are met.
SO, JUST WHAT, IF ANYTHING IN KING'S TPO APPLICATION MAY SUFFICE TO MEET THOSE
STANDARDS? AGAIN, NOTHING, AS THE 8 PAGE APPLICATION IS COMPLETELY DEVOID OF ANY FACTUAL
ASSERTIONS, MUCH LESS ANY WITH ANY DEGREE OF SPECIFICITY, AND NOTHING IN ANY PART OF THE 39
PAGE EXHIBIT IS VERIFIED SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY NRS 33.250. EVEN HAD SUCH EXHIBIT 1 IN ITS
ENTIRETY BEEN SUFFICIENTLY VERIFIED, NOTHING THEREIN SATISFIES THOSE STANDARDS EITHER.
WHAT POSSIBLY COULD? HTTP://EN.WIKIPEDIA.ORG/WIKI/CAPE_FEAR_(1991_FILM)
King's 39 page Exhibit 1, including Exhibit 1A-1D follows:
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"Exhibit 1
On November 14, 2012, the Office of Bar Counsel held a disciplinary hear-
ing at its Reno office with two sheriff personnel in attendanceas a measureof pro-
tection. As a result of the hearing thepanel unanimouslyagreedtopermanentlydis-
bar Mr. Coughlin from the practice of law. On Friday, December 14, 2012 the Panel's
Order was filed and copies were mailed to Mr. Coughlin both by regular and certified
mail.
Mr. Coughlin continuestomakerepeatedcallstotheStateBar demanding
copiesandinformation. He is getting increasinglyantagonisticand will not listento
our attempts to reason with him. This morning he announced that he "would be
there in 15 minutes" It is our fear that if he shows up we won't be able to get ridof
him- we are not able to satisfy his demands and that just seems to aggravate the situ-
ation. He has shownupafter hourspresumablytofiledocuments; eventuallyhehas
used themail slot for thedocuments but has sat in his car in front of theoffice
flashinghis lights toget attention. Employees have been afraid to leave and, on a
couple of occasions, the police have been called - we don't know if they have
shown up because once he leaves, we leave. On one particular occasion, a female
employee was in the office alone. Mr. Coughlin knocked on her windowand ges-
tured to the front door so hecould gain access to thebuilding. Eventually the em-
ployee was able to get himto leaveandthepolicewerecalledbut didnot arrivebe-
fore Mr. Coughlin left the premises.
This past Monday Assistant Bar Counsel Pat King did dispatch the police
because Mr. Coughlin again announcedthat hewas comingto theoffice- two of-
ficers did show up and onewas dispatchedto thePanel Chair's office(9432 Dou-
ble R Blvd.) because Coughlin has also threatened and intimidated John Eche-
verria's office staff. When Coughlin called the Echeverria law firm that particu-
lar day he stated that he needed some "face time" with John. Mr. King has re-
ceived numerous e-mails detailing what Mr. Coughlin perceives to be a miscarriage
of justice in his discipline matter and has indicated that he will "exposehimas a liar
and a fraud".
In a letter dated November 7, 2012, prior to the discipline hearing, the
Office of Bar Counsel sent Mr. Coughlin a letter asking that he refrain from
coming to the State Bar offices without calling beforehand. On November 17,
2012, after the discipline hearing, the Panel Chair issued an Order instructing
Mr. Coughlin to refrain from contacting any member of the Panel, the Court
Reporter (whomMr. Coughlin had contacted by phoneat her residence), any of
the Panel Chair's office staff, or either office of the State Bar of Nevada.
On one occasion, an e-mail was sent to several recipients, including
four (4) employees of the State Bar, which included a link to a violent scene from
the movie "Cape Fear". The StateBar feels that this is a direct suggestivethreat
to officestaff and Bar personnel. Therefore, the State Bar requests that a Protective
Order be and that Mr. Coughlin be prohibited from contactingthe Bar's Reno and/or
Las Vegas Officeby telephone, bye-mail or byfax. Because he is currently tempo-
rarily suspended from the practice of law andhisdisciplinaryhearinghasconcluded
Mr. CoughlinhasnobusinessonStateBar property(9456 Double R Blvd or 600 E.
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Charleston Blvd., Las Vegas, NV). The record of his disciplinarymatter will soon
be submitted to the Nevada Supreme Court for a denovoreviewat which time he
will receive a complete set of all of thepleadings, both filed and unfiled, in this
matter.
It should be noted that the State Bar and its Reno staff findit verydif-
ficult to work under theseconditions. Mr. Coughlin continues to monopolizeour
time and resources and is causing an unnecessary amount of stress."
(NOTE: the above Summary fails to indicate Coughlin is causing fear of that re-
quired by NRS 33.240, but rather that the State Bar and its renot staf find it very dif-
ficult to work under these conditions (such as Coughlin requesting copies of docu-
ments, seeking the copy of the record/transcript of the 11/14/12 proceeding that he is
entitled to under SCR 119, which requires that he contact Bar Counsel to obtain
such, which Coughlin attempted to do on numerous occasions immediately after the
11/14/12 disciplinary hearing both by telephone and in writing, which the Bar and
King failed to respond to until 12/19/12, with Chair Echeverria's 11/17/12 Order
seemingly void in that it, depending on one's interpretation of contact or contact-
ing would have precluded Coughlin from so seeking a copy of the transcript pursu-
ant to SCR 119 where such 11/17/12 Order reads. Further, it appears that Laura Pe-
ters herself from the Summary which would not only vitiate any first hand
knowledge requirement being met even assuming the illogical leap to incorporate by
reference that contained in Exhibit 1 is made, despite the failure of King's Declaration
on page 8 of his TPO Application to so incorporate or even reference such materials,
and the failure of King to check the box on page 2 (applicants are directed to do so if
the wish to incorporate by reference that contained in the mandatory Form B-4
Continuation Page, which itself contains language specifically incorporating by
reference that which is contained therein on such Continuation Page into the Ap-
plication itself sufficient to make the contents of such Continuation Page verified
in compliance with NRS 33.250.
THIS IS NOT A CASE OF A PROS SE NON-ATTORNEY FILLING OUT THE APPLICATION, OR
PRESUMABLY, EVEN, THE SUMMARY INCLUDED IN IN EXHIBIT 1 OF KING'S APPLICATION. AS SUCH,
KING MUST BE HELD TO THE TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATUTES, INCLUDE NRS 33.250 AND
NRS 15
EXHIBIT 1ACONSISTS OF AN 11/7/12 LETTER FROMKING TO COUGHLIN, WHICH READS:
DEAR MR. COUGHLIN: YESTERDAY YOU ARRIVED AT THE STATE BAR OFFICE
AFTER 5:00 P.M. TO FILE SEVERAL DOCUMENTS. WHEN YOU DISCOVERED THAT THE
FRONT DOOR WAS LOCKED, AND ALTHOUGH THERE IS A MAIL SLOT IN THE DOOR, YOU
ELECTED TO WALK AROUND THE OUTSIDE OF THE BUILDING UNTIL YOU FOUND SOME-
ONE INSIDE. YOU STOOD OUTSIDE AN EMPLOYEE'S WINDOW, GOT HER ATTENTION AND
ASKED TO HE LET IN. THIS EMPLOYEE UNLOCKED THE DOOR AND TOOK RECEIPT OF
YOUR DOCUMENTS AFTER WHICH YOU CONTINUED TO ASK FURTHER ASSISTANCE.
Your behavior is becoming increasingly disturbing and harassing. Therefore,
except for your formal hearing, which will take place on November 14, 2012, begin-
ning at 8:45 a.m., you are not to arrive at the Reno Office of the State Bar unan-
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nounced. If you have papers or pleadings to present tor filing, you are hereby in-
structed to either mail them or to call the office (329-4100) prior to your arrival.
Please be advised that if you appear at the State Bar in the future, except for the No-
vember 14, 2012, hearing or in the case of your need to liIe a document (fOf which
you must call ahead), the police wilt be summoned immediately. Sincerely, /s/ Pat-
rick O. King, Esq. Asst Bar Counsel
Exhibit 1B consists of NNDB Panel Chair John Echeverria's 11/16/12 Order in Case No: NG12-
0204, NG12-0434, and NG12-0435, which reads:
It has come to the attention of the Panel Chair that Zachary B. Coughlin ("Respond-
ent") has been contacting the Reno and Las Vegas Offices of Bar Counsel, the Panel Chair's law of-
fice and the Court Reporter who recorded the disciplinary proceedings at the State Bar office.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
That Respondent immediately cease and desist contacting anyone at the
State , Bar offices, the Panel Chair, the panel chair's staff, any of the Panel Members
or their staffs, or the Court Reporter including her employer, Sunshine Reporting
while this matter IS pending decision Respondent is hereby reminded that the Panel
will be deliberating at a future date and may take this conduct into consideration.
DATED this 16
th
day of November, 2012. by John P. Echeverria, Esq., Chair, Formal
Hearing Panel. (The Certificate of Service attached thereto is signed by Laura Peters, an employee
of the State Bar of Nevada
Exhibit 1C consists of the twenty-four page 12/14/12 FOFCOL in Case No:
NG12-0204, NG12-0434, and NG12-0435. It does not contain a single assertion of any
threatening on Coughlin's part, so it is rather unclear why King felt it appropriate to attach it
to his 12/20/12 TPO Application in 607. Similarly, King and Peters felt it appropriate to at-
tach filings in 607 to their initial attempt at an Record on Appeal in 62337 of 12/24/12, but
apparently were either scolded for doing so or thought better of it (likely the former) and re-
frained from including any such materials in their second attempt to file a somewhat profes-
sional, competent, and ethical ROA on 2/13/13.
Exhibit 1D consists of a printout of a webpage at www.harm.com (ie, not even the
url linked to in the email King alleges Coughlin sent to various individuals (including some,
like Coughlin's then Washoe County Public Defender, Jim Leslie, whom then forward that
same email to individuals listed amongst the recipients of the original email itself (ie, the
SBN's King), in a class Leslie-style bit of pointless, insipid melodrama, along the lines of his
adorable jibberish stylings such as the phrase hand-off transmittal, which he originally
fashioned in his resistance to being stuck with the digital accountability attendant to email a
client their discovery, versus, what Leslie and his junior associate WCPD Biray Dogan, are
wont to do, which is have Dogan he himself handed the client his discovery several weeks
prior, only to change his story a couple minutes later to say he saw Leslie hand it to the cli-
ent, only to have Leslie then idiotically email the client and indicate that the client failed to
ever pick it up, and identifying such as discovery of a 7/27/12 date, while failing to explain
why neither Leslie nor Dogan released to there then former client Coughlin the 8/13/12 and
8/17/12 updated 911 call discovery discs propounded to them by WCDA Zach Young while
Dogan and Leslie were still representing Coughlin (ie, Leslie taking over Goodnight and
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Dogan's cases, and in an attempt to get a raise, setting out to purposefully deliver the cheap-
est, quickest, convictions of Coughlin in all three of the baseless, retaliatory prosecutions
brought by the WCDA's Office after Leslie had succeeded in depriving Coughlin of his right
to accept a plea bargain disposing of all three matters then pending on 8/27/12, which would
have resulted in no SCR 111(6) convictions in any of those matters.
Getting beyond the fact that the printout of a page with an audio clip only (played over a still
frame photo of actor Robert De Niro in a placid stance) comes from a different url than the one in-
cluded in the 12/12/12 email King largely basis his decision to seek a TPO and an EPO on, such au-
dio only file and the quotation transcribed beneath it contain the following bit of dialogue from the
1991 remake by Martin Scorsese of the film Cape Fear:
I ain't no white trash piece of sh*t. I'm better than you all. I can out leam you. I can out read
you. I can outthink you, and I can out philosophize you. And I'm going to outlast you. You
think a couple of whacks to my good old boy guts gonna get me down? Ifs going to take a
hell of a lot more than that, Counselor, to prove you're better than me! Max looks around in
an attempt to find where Sam is hiding. (the web page is adorned with a number of links to
other materials and advertisements as well).
Exhibit 1D continues on with a 12/13/12 email from Pat King to obc; Kimberly
Farmer; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; David Clark printed from Laura Peters email account as,
apparently, King's forwarding an email he received from Couglin's then WCPD Jim Leslie
(which itself forwards to King and email Leslie alleges Coughlin sent to Leslie, which, as
Leslie would necessarily be able to discern from reading a list of the recipients such email
purports to be addressed to, was also addressed to Pat King, making Leslie forwarding such
to King rather redundant, apparently). The email from King that Peters printed out via her
Microsoft Outlook utility reads:
Subject: FW: The Three E's;wcpd failure to provide essential 91 call cd discovery of 8/13/
and 8/17, 2012 to Coguhlin in rcr2012-065630
This attorney feels that his law firm staff was threatened by Zach Coughlin. I am
concerned for our staff. Please advise. Patrick King
Thereafter, King's email forwards or contains what purports to be an email to King from
Coughlin's then WCPD Jim Leslie, of 12/12/12, addressed only to King, which reads:
Mr. King: The below email from Mr. Cogulhin contains a reference at the end of the first paragraph
to a website containing a video clip from the movie Cape Fear. Please advise whether any action is
required of our office or yours regarding this possible veiled or indirect threat of violence against at-
torneys in this office by Mr. Coughlin.
THANK YOU, JAMES B. LESLIE, ESQ., CHIEF DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER, WASHOE COUNTY PUBLIC
DEFENDERS OFFICE
THE TRIAL YESTERDAY IN RCR2012-065630 FEATURED EXTENDED DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE
FAILURE OF THE WCPD, DOGAN, AND LESLIE, TO TURN OVER DISCOVERY PROPOUNDED BY DDA
YOUNG IN THE FORM OF CD'S FEATURING 911 CALLS DDA YOUNG PROVIDED TO THE WCPDON
8/13/12 AND 8/17/12... AND THE HEAVY HITTERS WERE THERE, TOO (ELLIOT SATTLER).....DESPITE NU-
MEROUS WRITTEN REQUESTS FROMCOUGHLIN THAT THE WCPDDO SO, AND MULTIPLE TRIPS TO THE
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WCPDPERSONALLY BY COUGHLIN TO PICK SUCH MATERIALS UP, AND DESPITE MORE FLIP FLOPPING ON
THEIR STORY BY LESLIE AND DOGAN REGARDING WHETHER THEY EVER GAVE COUGHLIN SOME PACK-
AGE OF MATERIALS RESPONSIVE TO COUGHLIN'S REQUEST FOR HIS "FILE"...BUT, JIMLESLIE IS STUCK
WITH THE 7/27/12 DATE HE MENTIONS IN HIS EMAIL, THEN HE IS STUCK WITH WHAT HIS RECENT EMAIL
WHEREIN HE PURPORTS TO HAVE THEREIN DIGITALLY TRANSMITTED COUGHLIN HIS "FILE", WHICH OB-
VIOUSLY DOES NOT INCLUDE THE CD'S OF 911 CALLS (THE ONE'S DDA YOUNG TOOK UP AN ENORMOUS
AMOUNT OF COURT TIME PLAYING, OVER AND OVER (WELL, YOUNG ONLY PLAYED OVER AND OVER THE
PARTICULAR CALLS HE FELT WERE STRONGEST FOR HIS CASE AND MOST PREJUDICIAL, CLAIMING SOME
"CUTTING ROOM FLOOR MISHAP" FOR THE REOCCURRENCE OF CERTAIN CALLS, ARGUING THAT SUCH A
"HAPPY ACCIDENT" JUSTIFIED PLAYING THEM AGAIN AND AGAIN, AT EVER INCREASING VOLUMES, ETC.,
ETC.). APPARENTLY, I AM HERE TO SUBSIDIZE YOUNG'S BABY MAKING, JUST LIKE I WAS WITH MS.
GORMAN, AS A CONTINUANCE OF PREJUDICIAL LENGTH OF AFFORDED TO THE STATE WHERE NONE WAS
FORTHCOMING TO COUGHLIN, DESPITE LESLIE AND DOGAN'S OBSTRUCTIONIST TANTRUMS, ONES OF A
QUALITY THAT WOULD. I REMEMBER WHEN MY LIFE FEATURED HAPPY MOMENTS LIKE THE BIRTH OF
TWINS...BUT THAT WAS BEFORE YOUR LEVIATHAN LEGAL SYSTEM WRECKED SHOP ON MY EXISTENCE.
WHAT, SIR, SHALL BE MY COMPENSATION? DO YOU MIND IF I PUT MY ARM
AROUND....HTTP://TINYURL.COM/BGMLFDR
THIS IS A FORMAL GRIEVANCE AGAINST DOGAN, LESLIE, BOSLER, YOUNG...ETC.
IF SVENGALI/DIANN ROSS DIVA JIMLESLIE IS GOING TO MICROMANAGE DOGAN AND GOODNIGHT'S
CASES, AND GAG ORDER THEM, HE BETTER BE SURE NOT TO SCREW UP THE CASES REQUIRING A MISTRI-
AL BY FAILING TO PROVIDE THE CLIENT THE CD'S OF 911 CALLS DDA YOUNG GAVE THE WCPD ON 8/13
AND 8/17/12 IN RJC REV2011-065630, AND CLEARLY, ANY PACKET FROM7/27/12 WOULDN'T HAVE
THEM(NOT TO EVEN GET INTO THE FLIP FLOPPING CONTRADICTORY ACCOUNTS BY LESLIE AND DOGAN
AS TO WHO GAVE COUGHLIN THE PACKET, OR WHO DIDN'T OR BLAH BLAH BLAH)...AND CERTAINLY
LESLIE EMAIL BELOW ONLY CONTAINED A 57 PAGE PDF...WAY TO CLOSE TO THE 12/11/12 TRIAL DATE,
AND CONTAINING MATERIALS COUGHLIN HAD NEVER BEEN GIVEN BEFORE....SO MUCH EASIER, JIMMY
SLEAZY TO EMAIL THE CLIENT A "DIGITAL TRANSMITTAL" PROVING WHAT YOUGAVE AND
WHEN"....BUT, NO, THAT WOULD MAKE IT SO HARD TO FUDGE THE ACCOUNTS OF WHAT WAS CONTAINED
THEREIN, OR WHO HANDED WHAT TO WHOM, OR WHO FAILED TO PICK UP THIS OR THAT, OR DOGAN'S
SLIPPERY NONSENSE:
"FROM: JLESLIE@WASHOECOUNTY.US
TO: ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM
CC: BDOGAN@WASHOECOUNTY.US
SUBJECT: 911 CASE
DATE: FRI, 7 DEC 2012 17:09:08 +0000
MR. COUGHLIN:
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Attached are the discovery materials in the above-referenced case that you had requested and we had
made an additional copy of for you in response to your request. Please note that the July 27, 2012,
cover letter was for your pick up and you never picked it up. Note also that the July 27, 2012, packet
encloses a copy of the April 17, 2012, hand delivery transmittal of the very same documents which
you received.
Since we have been removed from the 911 case, we are closing our file. The attached materials were
sitting at our front desk. Since you failed to retrieve them, we provide the attached courtesy copy be-
fore final closure of our file.
No response to this transmittal is required from you.
James B. Leslie, Esq."
SO, WHILE DOGAN STATES ON 7/27/12 IN 65630 "YOUR HONOR, I HAVE NEVER EVEN SPOKEN WITH
JUDGE DOROTHY NASH HOLMES"...HE COYLY FAILS TO INDICATE WHETHER HE SPOKE WITH ANYONE
WITH THE RMC, MARILYN TOGNONI, INCLUDED, OR WHY HIS 2/28/12 FAX TO COUGHLIN WAS SO IN-
SISTENT THAT IT WAS "LAKE'S CROSSING'S BILL DAVIS, PH.D." WHO MUST CONDUCT THE "COMPETEN-
CY EVALUATION", OR HOW IT WAS JUDGE CLIFTON'S 2/27/12 ORDER FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION
COULD HAVE POSSIBLY KNOWN AND INCLUDED JUDGE ELLIOTT AS THE "RANDOMLY ASSIGNED JUDGE"
TO THAT COMPETENCY CASE IN CR12-0376 (JUDGE ELLIOTT ON COMMITTEE TO AID ABUSED WOM-
EN'S BOARD, (CAAW)...JUDGE ELLIOTT PRESIDING OVER COUGHLIN'S WRONGFUL TERMINATION LAW-
SUIT AGAINST WCDA'S OFFICE ECR PARTNER, WASHOE LEGAL SERVICES, ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
PAUL ELCANO, AND CAAW, IN CV11-01955...JUDGE ELLIOTT FAILS TO DISCLOSE CONFLICT OR RECU-
SE HIMSELF, JUDGE ELLIOTT MANAGES TO "RANDOMLY" BE ASSIGNED COUGHLIN'S TWO CRIMINAL AP-
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PEALS FROMRMC CONVICTIONS (THE WAL-MART "CANDY BAR" PETTY LARCENY LEADING TO A 6
MONTHS, SO FAR, TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF COUGHLIN'S LAW LICENSE IN 11 CR 22176 IN THE RMC,
THEN CR11-2064 IN THE APPEAL JUDGE ELLIOTT CANNED BASED UPON A CIVIL STATUTE REQUIRING A
DOWN PAYMENT FOR THE PREPARATION OF TRANSCRIPTS AND ELLIOTT'S CONTENTION THAT HE NEED
NOT ADDRESS THE MERITS OF COUGHLIN'S APPEAL GIVEN THE LACK OF A WRITTEN TRANSCRIPT
(COUGHLIN PAID FOR THE AUDIO CD, AND ITS NOT EVEN CLEAR THAT THE RMC IS A COURT OF RECORD
ANYWAYS, AND THE RMC DISTRIBUTES TO DEFENDANTS INSTRUCTIONS SHEETS AND ENFORCES "HOUSE
RULES" REGARDING THE PREPARATION OF TRANSCRIPTS THAT REQUIRE ONE UTILIZING THE SERVICES OF
RMC "OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPTIONIST PAM LONGONI (WHOM HUNG UP ON COUGHLIN TWICE, AND RE-
FUSED TO PREPARE THE TRANSCRIPT IN 11 CR 22176/CR11-2064, FAILED TO RETURN EMAILS/FAXES,
ETC.)" AND WHERE THE RMC REFUSED TO EVEN GIVE COUGHLIN THE AUDIO RECORDING FOR SOME
TIME, INSISTING COUGHLIN COULD MERELY HAVE IT MADE AVAILABLE TO LONGONI....OH, COUGHLIN
DIDN'T GET NO CONTINUANCE FROMJUDGE HOWARD IN THAT 11 CR 22176 (EVEN WHERE HE WAS
WRONGFULLY EVICTED IN REV2011-001708 (NOW ON APPEAL IN 60331 AND 61383) ON 11/1/11, THEN
WRONGFULLY ARRESTED ON 11/13/12 IN 11 CR 26405 (NOW FEATURE IN 61901, 62104, 54844, 60302,
60317, ETC..) AND INCARCERATED BETWEEN 11/13/12 AND 11/15/12, NO CONTINUANCE FOR THE
11/30/12 TRIAL IN 11 CR 22176, DESPITE AN AGREEMENT IN WRITING WITH CITY ATTORNEY PAMELA
ROBERTS (WHOM PUT ON PERJURED TESTIMONY BY THREE WITNESSES WHERE SHE POSSESS A VIDEO
AND OTHER EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY PROVING THAT COUGHLIN DID PROVIDE HIS DRIVER'S LICENSE TO
RSIC OFFICER CRAWFORD...AND WHERE ROBERT'S PROSECUTED BASED ON AN ARREST FOR A MISDE-
MEANOR BY TRIBAL OFFICERS WHERE NRS 178.1255 BARS SUCH AN ARREST, AND WHERE WAL-MART'S
THOMAS FRONTINO AND ROBERTS HERSELF ADMIT NO CITIZEN'S ARREST WAS EFFECTUATED....SO,
ABOUT THAT RPC 3.8 VIOLATION...). THEN THERE IS THE APPEAL IN CR12-1262 THAT JUDGE ELLIOTT,
AGAIN, WAS "RANDOMLY" ASSIGNED FROM THE CONVICTION BY RMC JUDGE WILLIAMGARDNER IN 11
CR 26405 BASED UPON THE CRIMINAL TRESPASS COMPLAINT SIGNED BY RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ. (OPPOS-
ING COUNSEL IN THE SUMMARY EVICTION FROMCOUGHLIN'S FORMER HOME LAW OFFICE IN RJC
REV2011-001708, PRESIDED OVER BY JUDGE SFERRAZZA, THOUGH HILL AND HIS ASSOCIATE CASEY D.
BAKER, ESQ. FAX, ON OCTOBER 17TH, 2011 TO JUDGE CLIFTON (WHO WAS NOT CHIEF JUDGE AT THE
TIME, OR ANYTHING) AN EMERGENCY EX PARTE MOTION FOR INSPECTION OF COUGHLIN'S LAWOF-
FICE, AND WHERE IN HIS OCTOBER 19TH, 2011 ORDER IN THAT MATTER 001708, JUDGE CLIFTON RULED
AS "MOOT" COUGHLIN' 11/17/12 MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE 11/13/12 ORDER FOLLOWING SUMMARY
EVICTION PROCEEDING BY JUDGE SFERRAZZA SETTING THE MATTER FOR "TRIAL" ON 10/25/12, ON THE
CONDITION THAT COUGHLIN DEPOSIT A RENT ESCROW OF $2,275 WITH THE RJC (THOUGH JUDGE
SFERRAZZA ADMITTED LATER ON THE RECORD ON 11/7/12 THAT THE RJC JUDGES HAD A MEETING
WHEREIN THEY ALL HAD TO AGREE THAT COUGHLIN WAS ABSOLUTELY CORRECT THAT THE RJC WAS
VIOLATING NEVADA LAW IN HAVING AN UNPUBLISHED "HOUSE RULE" COROLLARY TO JCRLV44 RE-
QUIRING SUCH RENT ESCROW DEPOSITS IN LANDLORD TENANTS MATTER HERE JCRCP 83 HAD NOT BEEN
FOLLOWED IN THAT THE RJC HAD NOT PUBLISHED AND HAD APPROVED BY THE N. S. CT. ANY SUCH DE-
VIATION FROM THE STATUTORY REMEDIES SET FORTH IN NRS 40 AND 118A. JUDGE ELLIOTT MANAGED
TO TORPEDO THAT APPEAL OF THE CRIMINAL TRESPASS CONVICTION STEMMING FROM THE CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT AND CUSTODIAL ARREST AT COUGHLIN'S FORMER HOME LAW OFFICE BY CO-SIGNING RMC
JUDICIAL ASSISTANT LISA WAGNER'S AND THE RMC'S NONSENSE ABOUT NOT HAVING RECEIVED
COUGHLIN'S NOTICE OF APPEAL TIMELY UNDER NRS 189.010. THE PROOF OF DELIVERY FAX CONFIR-
MATION INDICATES OTHERWISE, LISA. AND REGARDLESS. THE CONVENIENTLY TIMED ARREST OF
COUGHLIN ON 6/28/12, AND THE TOLLING NATURE OF COUGHLIN'S 6/26/12 MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN
THAT MATTER, AND THE KITED, DATED 7/10/12 JAILHOUSE NOTICE OF APPEAL BY COUGHLIN, AND THE
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CURIOUSLY FAILURE TO GRANT COUGHLIN TIER TIME IN THE INTERIM WHILE JUDGE GARDNER
MANAGEED TO PUSH THROUGH HIS 7/11/12 ORDER DENYING COUGHLIN'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, IS
ALL THE MORE REASON TO APPLY CONSTERNATION TO JUDGE ELLIOTT'S WORK ON THE APPEAL ON
CR12-01262.. THEN THERE IS JUDGE LINDA GARDNER BEING JUDGE PETER BREEN, MD'S LAW CLERK,
AND BREEN KICKING COUGHLIN OUT OF THE MENTAL HEALTH COURT BASED UPON SHARON
DOLLARHID, RENE BIONDO, AND BREEN AND THE MHC'S OWN BREACH OF CONTRACT (IF THEY PRO-
VIDE PROGRAM MATERIALS, ACCEPTANCE, AND A CONTRACT THAT LIST CERTAIN MEDICATIONS AS DIS-
ALLOWED, HOW IS IT THEY CAN CLAIM NON-COMPLIANCE OR "FAILURE TO ABIDE" BY THE RULES FOR
TAKING A MEDICATION NOT LISTED THEREIN? DON'T ASK WCPDJOE GOODNIGHT OR JENNIFER
RAINS...THEY KNOW WHAT SIDE THEIR BREAD IS BUTTERED ON....MH12-0032...SO DDA YOUNG TRIES
TO JAM THROUGH A TRIAL IN 063341 ON MAY 7TH, 2012, DESPITE THE MANDATORY STAY IN NRS
178.405 AND THE THEN STILL PENDING ORDER FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION IN RJC 2012-065630
FROM THE CLANDESTINE STATUS CONFERENCE DOGAN AND YOUNG NEVER QUITE SEEM TO REFUTE
HAPPENING ON 2/27/12...OH, AND JUDGE CLIFTON, THEN DADOROTHY NASH HOLMES, AND JUDGE
LINDA GARDNER WERE ALL CO-WORKERS ONCE UPON A TIME, WORKING CLOSELY WITH THEN SPARKS
CITY ATTORNEY/PROSECUTOR STEVEN ELLIOTT, WHOM WORKED FOR THE LAW FIRM OF THE FATHER OF
THE PANEL CHAIR FOR COUGHLIN'S 11/14/12 SBN V. COUGHLIN FORMAL DISCIPLINARY HEARING IN
NG12-0204, 0434, 0435 (THE LAST TWO BEING GRIEVANCES AGAINST COUGHLIN FILED, IN PART, BY
RMC JUDGE WILLIAMGARDNER, PRIOR TO GARDNER FAILING TO RECUSE HIMSELF FROM THE CRIMI-
NAL TRESPASS CASE AGAINST COUGHLIN BEFORE HIM IN 11 CR 26405...EVEN WHERE JUDGE
GARDNER'S SISTER JUDGE LINDA GARDNER'S APRIL 2009 ORDER SANCTIONING COUGHLIN WAS CITED
BY WLS'S ELCANO AS THE SOLE BASIS FOR FIRING COUGHLIN, AND WHERE COUGHLIN FILED A MAN-
DAMUS PETITION IN 54844 CHALLENGING THOSE SANCTIONS, AND WHERE NG12-0435 WAS ONE OF
THREE GRIEVANCES FORMING THE 8/23/12 SCR 105 COMPLAINT AGAINST COUGHLIN (STRANGE-
LY...THE WAL-MAR "CANDY BAR" PETTY LARCENY CONVICTION AND THE FORMAL HEARING FOR THE
"SOLE PURPOSE" OF DETERMINING COUGHLIN'S PUNISHMENT FOR SUCH REQUIRED BY SCR 111(8) AND
THE COURT'S 6/7/12 ORDER GOT PARTICULARLY SHORT SHRIFT IN THE 8/23/12 TRIPLE GRIEVANCE
NUMBERED SCR 105 COMPLAINT BY BAR COUNSEL PAT "PATTY ICE" KING, A/K/A PAT SALIERI, WHOM
WANTS NO PART OF EXPLAINING HIS STATEMENTS TO COUGHLIN DURING THE 3/26/12 APPEARANCE AT
THE SBNBY COUGHLIN, FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF TAKING KING UP ON HIS OFFER TO LET COUGHLIN
REVIEW THE MATERIALS SUBMITTED ALONG WITH THE GRIEVANCES (THEREIN KING CLAIMED TO HAVE
RECEIVED GRIEVANCES AGAINST COUGHLIN FROM THREE DIFFERENT JUDGES....THOUGH, BY 3/26/12, IT
COULDN'T HAVE BEEN BEESLEY, AS COUGHLIN ONLY FILED THE EXHIBITS DETAILING JUDGE NASH
HOLMES AND THE WCSOAND WCDAIMPERMISSIBLY CONFISCATING COUGHLIN'S SMART PHONE
WITHOUT A WARRANT OR COURT ORDER AND WELL AFTER THE END OF THE PERIOD TO DO A SEARCH IN-
CIDENT TO ARREST (THE ARREST WAS 2/27/12 FOR SOME PASTICHE OF SUMMARY PLENARY CIVIL CRIMI-
NAL CONTEMPTS STATUTS THAT JUDGE NASH HOLMES WHIPPED UP...THOUGH SHE AVOID NRS 22.030
AND DEFINITELY THERE WASN'T NO AFFIDAVIT SIGNIN' BY OL' RMC MARSHAL HARLEY FOR ALLEGED
CONDUCT IN A RESTROOM OR RESTROOM STALL, WHICH ASSUREDLY WAS NOT "UNDER THE WATCHFUL
EYE OF THE COURT" OR "IN THE IMMEDIATE PRESENCE" OF THE COURT....SO MUCH EASIER FOR BAR
COUNSEL TO FEED JUDGE NASH HOLMES THE "CLEAR AND CONVICING EVIDENCE" STANDARD FROM
SCHAEFER REQUIRED TO PROVE AN ETHICAL VIOLATION, HAVE HERE COPY AND PASTE SOME RPC'S IN-
TO A SECOND BITE AT THE APPLE AND MORE THAN 10 DAYS LATER (CIVIL STATUTE, NRS 22.010, NRCP
AND JCRCP 59 ALLOW SUA SPONTE AMENDING WITHIN 10 DAYS, NO 12 DAYS...2/27/12 TO
3/12/12....VOID ORDER OF 3/12/12 BY JUDGE NASH HOLMES, SO, SORRY PATTY ICE, NICE TRY, NO SCR
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111(5) "AN ORDER OR CONVICTION IS CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF GUILT AND I DON'T RECOGNIZE
CLAIBORNE AS BINDING AUTHORITY BECAUSE IT MAKES MY JOB HARDER...."....
THANK YOUJIM FOR CONTINUING TO PREVARICATE IN WRITING, YOUR RECENT EMAIL COMBINED WITH
SOME, UH, OTHER MATERIALS THAT HAVE BEEN CULLED, WILL SURELY BE HELPFUL IN EXPOSING YOU
FOR THE FRAUD THAT YOU ARE. AND BIRAY DOGAN TOO...OH, BY THE WAY, THAT 11/7/12 FAX CON-
FIRMATION PAGE OR PROOF OF FAXING? HOW IS THAT COMING ALONG, BECAUSE I NEED TO SEE IT FROM
YOU. MY RECORDS SHOW ABSOLUTELY NO RECEIPT OF ANY FAX OF THAT SORT, NOT ON THAT DAY, NOT
ON ANY DAY...WHICH MEANS THE BALL IS IN YOUR COURT TO SHOW HOWDOGAN'S REPRESENTATIONS
TO JUDGE SFERRAZZA ON 11/19/12 IN COURT WERE NOT DISPLAYING A LACK OF CANDOR TO THE TRI-
BUNAL AND HOWLESLIE TIBBALS' CERTIFICATE ON SERVICE THEREIN IS NOT FRAUD.
OH, ATTACHED IS GOODNIGHT'S 12 19 11 REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY, WHICH INCLUDES:
"REQUESTFOR DISCOVERY
COMES NOW, THE DEFENDANT, ZACHARYBARKER COUGHLIN, BY AND THROUGH HIS ATTOR-
NEY OF RECORD, JOSEPH W. GOODNIGHT, DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER, AND HEREBY REQUESTS THE
FOLLOWING DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO NRS 174.235 TO NRS 174.295, INCLUSIVE. 1. INSPECT AND RE-
CEIVE COPIES OR PHOTOGRAPH ANY WRITTEN OR RECORDED STATEMENTS OR CONFESSIONS MADE BY
THE DEFENDANT OR ANY WITNESS, OR COPIES THEREOF, WITHIN THE POSSESSION, CUSTODY OR CON-
TROL OF THE STATE, THE EXISTENCE OF WHICH IS KNOWN OR BY THE EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE MAY
BECOME KNOWN TO THE PROSECUTOR. NRS 174.235(1)(A). THIS REQUEST INCLUDES ANY VIDEO AND
AUDIO RECORDINGS, INCLUDING THOSE PRESERVED ON POCKET RECORDING DEVICES, 9-1-1 EMERGEN-
CY CALLS, AND ANY DISPATCH LOGS, WRITTEN OR RECORDED, GENERATED IN CONNECTION WITH THIS
CASE."
JIM, THEN THERE IS YOUCHIMING IN, IN YOUR ROLE AS "STANDBY COUNSEL", ATTEMPTING TO AID THE
COURT AND DDA YOUNG IN COERCING FROM ME MY FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AT THE 9:06 AM
MARK ON THE TRANSCRIPT FROM 11/20/12 ("YOUR HONOR, I'LL REMIND THE COURT THAT I AM HERE
TO JUMP IN IN MY ROLE AS STANDBY COUNSEL ANYTIME THE COURT'S FEELS HE IS DRAGGING HIS
FEET....HE IS WASTING COUNTY ASSETS!"...VERY ATTICUS FINCH, JIM).
SO, THEN THERE IS JIM'S 10/3/12 SUBPOENA TO ECOMM/KELLEY WOOD...AND GIVEN HE WAS COUNSEL
OF RECORD UNTIL 10/22/12, YET COMPLETELY FAILED TO TURN OVER ANYTHING (RESPONSIVE OR NOT)
IN RELATION TO THAT SUBPOENA, AND THE FACT THAT THE ENTIRE SUPPRESSION MOTION TURNED ON
"WHAT INFORMATION THE RPDRECEIVED FROM DISPATCH", AND THE FACT THAT THE AUDIO OF THE
"RADIO TRAFFIC" BETWEEN THE RPDAND DISPATCH ON THAT NIGHT (OR AT LEAST THE PORTIONS OF IT
I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO EXTRACT FROM THE POWERS THAT BE) REVEAL, ONE, NO REPORT OF A POSSIBLE
FIGHT WAS RECEIVED BY RPD(THEY WERE ON THE SCENE BY THE TIME THE 11:27:11 PM TEXT WAS
SENT TO THE DISPLAYS IN THEIR VEHICLES, AND THE ONE AUDIBLE "RADIO TRAFFIC" RECORDING CON-
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TAINS NO MENTION OF ANYTHING BEYOND "CHECK FOR POSSIBLE LARCENY OF A CELL PHONE THAT JUST
OCCURRED, SUSPECT STILL ON THE SCENE, ALSO REPORTS OF A LOUD VERBAL DISTURBANCE...". THEN
THERE IS JIM AND GOODNIGHT COMPLETELY WHIFFING ON THE DETAINING ARGUMENT, IN ADDITION TO
THE WHOLE "ASSUMING WE WIN ON THE PAT DOWN, MAKE SURE TO OPPOSE THE NOTATION THAT THERE
WAS SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE FOR AN ARREST AND SEARCH INCIDENT THERETO....", NOT TO MEN-
TION THAT IT WAS COUGHLIN (WHOSE FILINGS JIM MANAGED TO CHEERFULLY ANNOUNCE "THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER'S OFFICE IS NOT JOINING IN ON THOSE FUGITIVE DOCUMENTS...", DESPITE THE 2/21/12 FIL-
INGS BY GOODNIGHT THAT DO JUST THAT....) THAT POINTED OUT THE WHOLE NRS 171.360 BASIS FOR
THROWING OUT THE SEARCH (WHICH JIM MANAGED TO NOT CITE TO OR QUOTE FROM IN HIS CLOSING
ARGUMENT AS THE SUPPRESSION HEARING...WHERE JIM DID MANAGE TO ASK CORY GOBLE QUESTIONS
ON CROSS THAT WERE DESIGNED TO DO NOTHING MORE THAN ESTABLISH A CITIZEN'S ARREST SUFFI-
CIENT TO REBUT THE NRS 171.360 BASIS FOR THROWING OUT THE ARREST AND FRUITS CULLED THERE-
FROM...).
OH, THEN THERE IS YOUR OFFICE BLACKING OUT THE NUMBERS OF THE CALLERS ON THE DISPATCH
LOGS AND REFUSING TO TURN OVER EVEN A REDACTED VERSION OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S CALL REC-
ORDS FOR THE TIME IN QUESTION, THEREBY COMPLETELY OBSTRUCTING THE DEFENDANT'S ABILITY TO
IMPEACH THE VARIOUS LIES TESTIFIED TO BY ALL THE WITNESSES. AND "COACH" DDA YOUNG CAN
TELL YOUALL ABOUT HIS 40 MINUTES COACHING SESSIONS VISIBLE THROUGH THE PLEXIGLASS IN THE
JUSTICE COURT LOBBY WITH ZARATE, GOBLE, LICHTY, AND TEMPLETON, AND THEIR CONSTANT PAR-
ROTING (ALONG WITH RPDDURALDE) OF "PROSECUTOR BUZZWORDS" ("WILLFULLY WITHHELD", "RE-
PORT FROM DISPATCH OF A POSSIBLE FIGHT", "MY TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE", "DETAINED", "I DON'T
REMEMBER WHO MADE THE CALL", "I CAN'T REMEMBER WHICH ONE OF MY FRIENDS IT WAS WHO WAS
WITH ME", ETC., ETC.) ALSO, THE WCPDPRACTICE OF BLACKING OUT LOCATIONS AND ADDRESSES
SURE MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN TESTIMONY AND THE RE-
PORTS/WITNESS STATEMENTS OR OTHERWISE UTILIZE THEM FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES.
SO, NOW TODAY, WE GET THIS JIMLESLIE EMAIL WITH ALL IT'S REVISIONIST HISTORY...WHICH ONLY
CONTRADICTS THE POSITION LESLIE AND DOGAN HAVE TAKEN THAT COUGHLIN ALREADY PICKED UP
THIS 7/27/12 PACKET (AT FIRST DOGAN CLAIMED TO HAVE PERSONALLY HANDED IT TO COUGHLIN,
THEN CHANGED HIS STORY 2 MINUTES LATER AND SAID HE SAWLESLIE PERSONALLY HAND IT TO
COUGHLIN....AND DOGAN ASSERTS TO THE COURT AT THE 11/27/12 HEARING IN RCR2012-065630
THAT HE HAS NEVER SPOKEN WITH JUDGE DOROTHY NASH HOLMES (SEE MATERIALS REGARDING
CLANDESTINE STATUS CONFERENCE OF 2/27/12 AND SUBSEQUENT FALLOUT WITH JUDGE NASH HOLMES
OF 2/27/12 A COUPLE HOURS AFTER DOGAN SECURED HIS 2/27/12 1:31 PMORDER FOR COMPETENY
EVALUATION IN 065630 FROMJUDGE CLIFTON).
THE SBN V. COUGHLIN COMPLAINT OF 8/23/12 SPECIFICALLY MENTIONS THE ARREST OF 1/14/12 THAT
THEIS 065630 CASE IS BASED ON, IN ADDITION TO THE 063341 IPHONE ARREST, AND RJC JUDICIAL
SECRETARY LORI TOWNSEND SENT COUGHLIN'S 2/21/12 IN 065630 TO THE SBN, AND OFFERED TO
SEND COUGHLIN'S 2/15/12 FILING IN 063341 TO THE SBN...AND JUDGE NASH HOLME'S 3/12/12 ORDER
IN 11 TR 26800 MENTIONS COUGHLIN QUOTING "ROCK LYRICS" IN A FILING AS A BASIS FOR HER
TRANSMOGRIFYING A "SIMPLE TRAFFIC CITATION" TO A "FORMAL DISCIPLINARY HEARING ON AN ETHICS
VIOLATION" WHEREIN SHE QUOTES THE SCHAEFER STANDARD FOR AN ETHICAL VIOLATION THAT BAR
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COUNSEL HAD FED HER EARLIER IN THE DAY...AND THAT WINDOW BETWEEN THE 1:00 PM NOTICED
START TIME OF THE TRAFFIC CITATION TRIAL IN 11 TR 26800 AND THE 3:30 PM EVENTUAL START TIME
INCLUDES THE 1:25 PM COURTHOUSE SANCTUARY DOCTRINE VIOLATING SERVICE UPON COUGHLIN (BY
RMC MARSHAL JOEL HARLEY, ON BEHALF OF WCSODEPUTY MACHEN, HIRED BY RICHARD G. HILL,
ESQ., AT WHOSE OFFICE COUGHLIN WAS RETALIATED AGAINST BY RPDSARGENT TARTER WITH THE
THREE TRAFFIC CITATIONS SHORTLY AFTER COUGHLIN REPORTED TO TARTER THE ADMISSIONS RE-
GARDING BRIBERY BY RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ. BY RPDOFFICER CHRIS CARTER, JR....AND MARSHAL
HARLEY WAS SERVING THE ORDER TO SHOWCAUSE FOR THE 3/23/12 HEARING IN THE APPEAL OF THE
SUMMARY EVICTION FROMCOUGHLIN'S FORMER LAW OFFICE (WHERE RPDCARTER MADE THE TRES-
PASS ARREST NOW DETAILED IN N. S. CT. CASE 61901), ON BEHALF OF DEPUTY MACHEN, IN THE CON-
FERENCE ROOM WITHIN THE COURTROOM BOF THE RMC, DESPITE COUGHLIN, AN EFILER, HAVING AL-
READY BEEN SERVED IT). HOWEVER, THE ONLY FILING BY COUGHLIN THAT COULD BE SAID TO QUOTE
"ROCK LYRICS" IS THE 2/21/12 FILING IN DOGAN'S CASE 065630 (THE ONE WHERE DOGAN HAD AP-
PEARED AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD THEN FAILED TO SHOW UP FOR A HEARING ON 2/13/12, THEN RETALI-
ATED AGAINST COUGHLIN FOR COUGHLIN'S 2/21/12 FILING IN 065630 BY MOVING FOR A COMPETENCY
EVALUATION AND BASICALLY DOING ABSOLUTELY NOTHING ON THE CASE FOR THE NEXT 9 MONTHS BE-
SIDES RAPING FROMCOUGHLIN HIS MEDICAL PRIVACY RIGHTS ALONG WITH JUDGE STEVEN ELLIOT AND
DDAZACH YOUNG AT THE 4/19/12 HEARING IN CR12-0376 (ONE OF 3 CRIMINAL APPEALS JUDGE
ELLIOT WAS "RANDOMLY" ASSIGNED IN WHICH COUGHLIN IS A PARTY...TO GO ALONG WITH THE
WRONGFUL TERMINATION SUIT BY COUGHLIN THAT JUDGE ELLIOT PRESIDED OVER IN CV11-01955
WHEREIN COUGHLIN SUED CAAW AND WLS, DESPITE JUDGE ELLIOT SITTING ON CAAW'S BOARD,
AND WHERE JUDGE ELLIOT, THE PANEL CHAIR AT COUGHLIN'S FORMAL DISCIPLINARY HEARING OF
11/14/12, AND WASHOE LEGAL SERVICE'S PAUL ELCANO ALL WENT TO STANFORD TOGETHER, AND
WHERE JUDGE ELLIOT WORKED FOR PANEL CHAIR JOHN ECHEVERRIA'S FATHER'S LAW FIRM,
ECHEVERRIA AND OSBORNE). THEN THERE IS LINDA GARDNER BEING JUDGE BREEN'S LAW CLERK,
AND JUDGE BREEN REMOVING COUGHLIN FROM MENTAL HEALTH COURT IN MH12-0032, WHERE THE
MHC'S RENE BIONDO AND SHARON DOLLARHIDE LIED ABOUT WHAT MEDICATIONS WERE LISTED AS
ACCEPTED OR NOT IN THE MATERIALS PROVIDED BY GOODNIGHT AND OR THE MHC ALONG WITH THE
CONTRACT ENTERED INTO WITH COUGHLIN, WHOM WAS ACCEPTED INTO THE MHC. THEN THERE IS
WCPDJOE GOODNIGHT AND JENNIFER RAINS REFUSAL TO FILE ANYTHING DIRECTED TOWARDS EN-
FORCING THE MHC'S CONTRACT WITH COUGHLIN, WHEREIN THEY BOTH DEMONSTRATED THEY KNOW
WHAT SIDE THEIR BREAD IS BUTTERED ON AND INDICATED "THERE JUST ISN'T A BASIS FOR SEEKING RE-
CONSIDERATION OF JUDGE BREEN'S ORDER". JUDGE PETER BREEN, MD.
FUNNY HOWDOGAN DID NOT STATE TO JUDGE CLIFTON THAT HE NEVER SPOKE WITH ANYONE ELSE AT
THE RENO MUNICIPAL COURT ABOUT COUGHLIN....INCLUDING MARILYN TOGNONI...BUT, RATHER
DOGAN JUST INDICATED HE NEVER SPOKE WITH JUDGE NASH HOLMES, IN HIS BEST INNOCENT LITTLE
BOY VOICE THAT HE COPS WHEN HE ISN'T BUSY TITTERING AWAY WITH JIMLESLIE IN THE SPECTATOR
AREA DURING THE 11/19 AND 11/20 TRIAL IN 063341 (WHERE HE FAILED TO APPRISE JUDGE SFERRAZZA
OF THE FRAUD ATTENDANT TO HIS EARLIER ATTESTATIONS REGARDING PROOF OF SERVICE (BY FAX NO
LESS) OF HIS 11/7/12 MOTION TO QUASH COUGHLIN'S SUBPOENA....
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ALSO, ITS A BIT STRANGE HOWDOGAN AND THE WCPDREDACT OR BLACK OUT THE NAMES OF THE
RPDOFFICERS AND DISPATCH OPERATORS BEGINNING ON PAGE 16 OF THE 56 PAGE FILE JIM LESLIE
FINALLY EMAILED ME TODAY TITLED "COUGHLIN DISCOVERY 911 CASE", WHICH, AS IS THEIR WONT, HE
AND DOGAN HAVE CONTINUED TO CHANGE THEIR STORIES ABOUT WHETHER THEY HAD OR HAD NOT
PROVIDED TO ME ALREADY UNTIL THE LAST POSSIBLE MINUTE BEFORE TRIAL, WHEREUPON, WITH A
TRIAL DATE OF DECEMBER 11TH, 2012 IN RCR2012-065630, JIM LESLIE FINALLY EMAILS ME A 56 PAGE
PDF PURPORTING IT TO BE MY "FILE". ONE WONDERS WHERE ANY AUDIO RECORDINGS, DISPATCH RE-
CORDINGS, 911 CALL RECORDINGS OR OTHER MEDIA ARE ANY WHY LESLIE AND DOGAN DID NOT PRO-
VIDE THEM. COUGHLIN APPEARED AT THE WCPD'S OFFICE TODAY AND ASKED FOR THE HARD COPY OF
HIS FILE, YET WAS TOLD BY FRONT DESK RECEPTIONIST "PAULA" (OF COURSE, NO LAST NAME PROVID-
ED) THAT SHE "SPOKE WITH AN ASSOCIATE" AND THEY TOLD HER THAT JIM LESLIE HAD ALREADY PRO-
VIDED COUGHLIN HIS FILE AND THAT HE, THEREFORE, WOULD NOT BE GIVEN THE HARD COPY. "PAULA"
EVENTUALLY SEEMED TO HAVE TO ADMIT THAT THE MISLEADING USE OF THE TERM"ASSOCIATE" AC-
TUALLY DID NOT CONNOTE HER HAVING SPOKEN WITH AN ATTORNEY ABOUT THE MATTER...BUT RA-
THER LINDA GRAY, WHOM HAS BEEN CURIOUSLY SILENT AS TO THE APPARENT MISCONDUCT AT-
TENDANT TO HER ADMITTING THAT SHE DID NOT MAIL OUT ANY WRITTEN NOTICE TO COUGHLIN OF THE
AUGUST 6TH, 2012 "COMBO-HEARING" IN RCR2012-067980 OR RCR2012-065630 (LESLIE GLOSSED
OVER THAT FACT BY SENDING COUGHLIN A NOTE ABOUT HOW HE "SAVED THE DAY" WITH HIS "ADVO-
CACY"...SKIPPING PAST THE PART ABOUT HOW THE CLIENT, COUGHLIN, WAS NOT NOTICED ON THE
HEARING IN ANY MATTER, MUCH LESS IN WRITING....LESLIE LATER REFUSED TO INDICATE WITH ANY
SPECIFICITY WHATSOEVER HOW HE "KNEW" COUGHLIN HAD BEEN NOTICED ON THE 8/6/12 HEARING IN
WRITING...AND RJC JUDGES ARE ONLY TOO WILLING TO "BELIEVE" JIMLESLIE, ESQ. WHEN HE EX-
PLAINS AWAY VAGUELY SUCH THINGS...
MR. LESLIE, THE THING IS, I HAVE A TRIAL IN THIS CASE RCR2012-065630. YOU HAVE CONTINUED IN
YOUR WAY (SIMILAR TO HOW YOU APPROACHED THE RCR2011-063341 CASE WHERE JOE GOODNIGHT,
ESQ. WAS COUNSEL OF RECORD UNTIL YOU HAD HIM REMOVED ON 7/16/12, THE MORNING OF TRI-
AL...AFTER MR. GOODNIGHT AND I HAVE COMPLETED A VIDEO CONFERENCE FINAL TRIAL PREPARATION
AT 4:30 PM ON FRIDAY, JULY 13TH, 2012 WHILE I WAS IN CUSTODY (PURSUANT TO AN ARREST ON JULY
3RD, 2012, ORDERED BY RPDSARGENT KIM BRADSHAW, SHE OF THE 1/12/12 CUSTODIAL JAYWALKING
ARREST ALONG WITH RPDSARGENT PAUL SIFRE)....THINGS FALL THROUGH THE CRACKS, MR. LESLIE,
WHEN YOUPLACE A GAG ORDER ON THE ASSOCIATES YOU CLAIM TO SUPERVISE, THEN STUBBORNLY,
PETULANTLY, AND RETALIATORILY REFUSE TO WORK THE CASES YOUHAVE SNATCHED BACK FROM
YOUR ASSOCIATES....SIMILARLY, WCPDFORTIER'S EMAIL TO ME OF FEBRUARY 6TH, 2012 MAY HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TO MR. DOGAN'S CONFUSION IN FAILING TO ATTEND THE HEARING ON FEBURARY 13TH,
2012, WHICH BEGAT MY FILING OF FEBRUARY 21ST, 2012, WHICH BEGAT MR. DOGAN'S PROCURRING
THE FEBRUARY 27TH, 2012 ORDER FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION, WHICH BEGAT THE 5 DAY SUM-
MARY INCARCERATION FOR SUMMARY/PLENARY/CRIMINAL/CIVIL/TRANSMOGRIFIED DISCIPLINARY
HEARING ON AN ETHICS VIOLATION/WHAT IS JURISDICTION? ORDER BY RMC JUDGE NASH HOLMES ON
2/27/12 AT 4:40 PM...WHICH BEGAT NG12-0434, AND PROBABLY 0435 (THE SBN V. COUGHLIN SCR
105 COMPLAINT OF 8/23/12).
HOWEVER, MR. DOGAN, YOUARE NOT OFF THE HOOK JUST BECAUSE JIMLESLIE PLACES A GAG ORDER
ON YOU. MR. LESLIE SENT THIS EMAIL TODAY WITH A 56 PAGE PDF FILE PURPORTING TO BE MY "FILE".
I, AS NOW A FORMER CLIENT, HAVE RIGHTS TO "MY FILE". I HAVE REQUESTED MY FILE IN WRITING
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FROM YOUR OFFICE ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, AND GIVEN YOUR REMOVAL AS COUNSEL OF RECORD ON
11/22/12 (AMAZINGLY MR. DOGAN PROBABLY MANAGED TO SAY 200 WORDS ON A CASE THAT HE HAD
BEEN COUNSEL OF RECORD ON FOR NEARLY A YEAR, AND HAD NOT MANAGED TO FILE A SINGLE DOCU-
MENT IN THAT CASE, RCR2012-065630, AND HAD MANAGED TO GET UPSET THAT A CLIENT WOULD
TAKE ISSUE WITH HIS MISSING THE 2/13/12 HEARING, EVEN THOUGH WCPDFORTIER'S 2/6/12 EMAIL
MAKES CLEAR, THE MATTER WAS ASSIGNED TO MR. DOGAN AT THAT POINT, AND HE HAD ALREADY SAT
DOWN AND DISCUSSED THE CASE WITH COUGHLIN FOR OVER ONE HOUR ON OR ABOUT FEBRUARY 8TH,
2012, WHERE COUGHLIN WENT TO CHECK IN WITH MARY WATSON, WHOM WAS THEN REPRESENTED BY
WCPDBRANZELL, WHO DRAGGED WATSON OVER TO THE SPARKS JUSTICE COURT BAILIFF AND DE-
MANDED THEY BREATHALYZE HER CLIENT. THEY DID, SHE WAS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY.
SO, AFTER SITTING DOWN WITH DOGAN FOR AT LEAST AN HOUR AND DISCUSSING VARIOUS THINGS,
SOME INCLUDING MATTERS RELATED TO THE CASE HE WAS THEN ATTORNEY OF RECORD ON RCR2012-
065630, THE FEBRUARY 13TH, 2012 COURT DATE (DOGAN AND COUGHLIN HAVE CONFLICTING VIEWS
AS TO WHAT WAS AGREED UPON AND THE APPLICATIONS OF NRS 178.388).
NRS 178.388 PROVIDES THAT THE DEFENDANT MUST BE PRESENT AT ARRAIGNMENT, TRIAL, AND SEN-
TENCING AND PROVIDES THAT THE DEFENDANT MAY WAIVE HIS APPEARANCE WHEN CERTAIN CONDI-
TIONS ARE MET.
ITS KIND OF ODD HOWJUDGE CLIFTON (WHOSE ATTACHED BIO INDICATES HE HAS DEEP AND
LONGSTANDING TIES TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INDUSTRY INFRASTRUCTURE) KNEW INSTANTANEOUS
TO SIGNING THE ORDER FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION OF 2/27/12 AT 1:31 PM THAT THE MATTER
WOULD BE RANDOMLY ASSIGNED TO DISTRICT COURT JUDGE STEVEN ELLIOT (ALSO A LIFELONG PROS-
ECUTOR WITH DEEP AND LONGSTANDING TIES TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, AND
A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE TO AID ABUSED WOMEN'S (CAAW, ONE OF THE NAMED DEFENDANTS
IN THE WRONGFUL TERMINATION LAWSUIT COUGHLIN BROUGHT AND OVER WHICH JUDGE STEVEN
ELLIOT PRESIDED IN CV11-01955, WHERE HE FAILED TO POINT OUT HIS PER SE CONFLICT OF INTEREST
TO PLAINTIFF COUGHLIN AT ANY TIME, AND WHERE HE ULTIMATELY PULLED OUT JUST ABOUT EVERY
WRINKLE IN THE INSUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE AND OR PROCESS AND OR SERVICE OF PROCESS (A MOVIE
SHOWING A NON PARTY OVER 18 YEARS OF AGE SERVING A SENIOR PARALEGAL AT WASHOE LEGAL
SERVICES, WHOSE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR PAUL ELCANO WENT TO STANFORD WITH JUDGE ELLIOT AND
THE PANEL CHAIR OF COUGHLIN'S 11/14/12 FORMAL DISCIPLINARY HEARING BEFORE THE STATE BAR
OF NEVADA, JOHN ECHEVERRIA IN THE LATE 1960S...AND JUDGE ELLIOT WORKED AT JOHN
ECHEVERRIA'S FATHER'S LAW FIRM, ECHEVERRIA AND OSBORNE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, IN ADDITION
TO BEING A FORMER ASS
IN CV11-01955, COUGHLIN SUED HIS FORMER EMPLOYER WASHOE LEGAL SERVICES, WHOSE EXECU-
TIVE DIRECTOR PAUL ELCANO WENT TO STANFORD IN THE LATE 1960S WITH JUDGE STEVEN ELLIOT
AND JOHN ECHEVERRIA, THE PANEL CHAIR OF COUGHLIN'S 11/14/12 FORMAL DISCIPLINARY HEARING
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BEFORE THE STATE BAR OF NEVADA..AND JUDGE ELLIOT WORKED AT JOHN ECHEVERRIA'S FATHER'S
LAW FIRM, ECHEVERRIA AND OSBORNE, AND JUDGE ELLIOT SERVED ON THE BOARD FOR CAAW, AND
WAS A PROSECUTOR AS THE SPARKS CITY ATTORNEY.
ALSO, MR. LESLIE, WHILE THE 56 PAGE PDF YOU FINALLY SENT ME (GOSH, WAS IT THAT HARD TO CLICK
"ATTACH", LOAD A 2 MB PDF FILE AND HIT "SEND" ON AN EMAIL TO ME? NO DEBATIN', NO ARGUING
ABOUT WHETHER LESLIE AND DOGAN LEFT THE PACKAGE AT THE DESK, WHETHER DOGAN ALREADY
GAVE IT TO COUGHLIN, OR WHETHER DOGAN THEN CHANGED HIS STORY AND SAID LESLIE GAVE IT TO
COUGHLIN, WHETHER COUGHLIN ALREADY PICKED IT UP, NO CLAIMS BY JESSICA THE RECEPTIONIST OF
ANYONE KICKIN' FURNITURE...NOTHING LIKE THAT, JUST A DIGITALLY VERIFIABLE MEANS OF ASCER-
TAINING WHAT YOU TRANSMITTED AND WHEN...WAS THAT SO HARD? HECK, JIM, YOUCOULD PROBA-
BLY JUST EMAIL THOSE ECOMM RECORDINGS TOO...AND IF ATTACHMENT SIZE IS AN ISSUE, SIGN UP
FOR A WWW.OUTLOOK.COM(THE NEWHOTMAIL, ALLOWING UP TO 300 MB ATTACHMENTS VIA THE
SKYDRIVE FUNCTIONALITY, AND UP TO 100 MB ATTACHMENTS VIA PLAN EMAIL, AND OVER 25 FREE GB
OF STORAGE ON THE SKYDRIVE, ETC., ETC...). BUT ITS LESLIE FINALLY SENT THE 56 PAGE "CLIENT'S
FILE" ON OR ABOUT 12/7/12, YET HE FAILED TO INCLUDE THE INSIPID MOTION OF 11/26/12 BY DDA
YOUNG (WHEREIN, JUST AFTER JUDGE CLIFTON FINISHES TELLING COUGHLIN AT THE 11/27/12 HEAR-
ING THAT COUGHLIN IS NOT ALLOWED TO EVEN THINK ABOUT THE OTHER TWO RJC SHOTGUNNIN'
STYLE SPLATTER PAINT PROSECUTIONS BY DDA YOUNG, AS "THEY ARE JUST NOT RELEVANT TO THIS
PROCEEDING"...AND ANYTIME COUGHLIN WOULD POINT OUT SPECIFIC BASIS FOR UNDERTAKING A
RECUSAL OR CONFLICT ANALYSIS VIS A VIS EITHER JUDGE CLIFTON, THE RJC, DDAYOUNG, THE
WCPD, OR THE WCDA, JUDGE CLIFTON WOULD SAY "YOUR'RE LOSING ME...YOUR'RE LOSING ME..."
AS IF COUGHLIN WAS SPEAKING IN TONGUES ALL THE SUDDEN...
SO, WHILE COUGHLIN IS REPORTEDLY NOT EVEN ALLOWED TO EMAIL DDA YOUNG ABOUT CASES NOT
EVEN BEFORE JUDGE CLIFTON, OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT...DDA YOUNG IS ABLE TO GET AN UNNO-
TICED, EX PARTE, EMERGENCY MOTION TO PRHO
SINCERELY,
ZACH COUGHLIN
1471 E. 9TH ST.
RENO, NV89512
TEL AND FAX: 949 667 7402
ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM
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FROM: JLESLIE@WASHOECOUNTY.US
CC: BDOGAN@WASHOECOUNTY.US
SUBJECT: 911 CASE
DATE: FRI, 7 DEC 2012 17:09:08 +0000
MR. COUGHLIN:
Attached are the discovery materials in the above-referenced case that you had requested and we had
made an additional copy of for you in response to your request. Please note that the July 27, 2012,
cover letter was for your pick up and you never picked it up. Note also that the July 27, 2012, packet
encloses a copy of the April 17, 2012, hand delivery transmittal of the very same documents which
you received.
Since we have been removed from the 911 case, we are closing our file. The attached materials were
sitting at our front desk. Since you failed to retrieve them, we provide the attached courtesy copy be-
fore final closure of our file.
No response to this transmittal is required from you.
James B. Leslie, Esq.
CHIEF DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
(NOTE: THAT CONCLUDES THE 39 PAGE EXHIBIT 1 TO KING'S 12/20/12 TPOAPPLICATIO IN
607).
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IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT NONE OF THE ATTACHMENTS TO KING'S 607 APPLICATION HAVE
BEEN VERIFIED, THERE IS NOTHING FROMKING ATTESTING TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE TRUE AND
CORRECT COPIES OF WHAT THEY PURPORT TO BE, AND, IN FACT, THE WCPD, WCDA, AND SBN NEED-
ED TO PAY A BIT MORE ATTENTION TO DETAIL IN THEIR CONCERTED ASSAULT UPON COUGHLIN STEM-
MING FROM THE EMAILS BETWEEN WCDADDAKANDARAS, WCPDLESLIE, AND THE SBN'S KING
BEGINNING ON 12/12/12, AS EXHIBIT 1A TO THE NRS 33.240 WORKPLACE HARASSMENT TPOAP-
PLICATION FILED ON BEHALF OF (WHO KNOWS? THE APPLICATION, LIKE KING'S, FAILS TO MEET THE RE-
QUIREMENT THAT IT SPECIFICALLY SET FORTH WHICH EMPLOYE OR EMPLOYEES IT IS BEING SOUGHT TO
PROTECT), MOST LIKELY, LESLIE HIMSELF, BY WAY OF HUSBAND TO 2JDC LAWYER/LEGAL ASSISTANT
TO A FAMILY COURT JUDGE LAURA WATTS-VIAL, WCPDDDADAVID WATTS-VIAL, ESQ., IN THEIR
12/18/12 TPOAPPLICATION IN RJC RCP12-599, FILED IN RETALIATION ABOUT AN HOUR AFTER
COUGLIN FILED HIS OWN APPLICATION FOR A TPO AGAINST JIMLESLIE IN RCP12-598, WHICH WAS IN
ADDITION TO COUGHLIN MOVING FOR SUCH A PROTECTION ORDER AGAINST LESLIE ON 11/19/12 WHERE
LESLIE WAS MOCKING, HECKLING, AND HARASSING COUGLIN MENACINGLY IN OPEN COURT WHILE PUR-
PORTING TO ACT IN HIS ROLE AS STANDBY COUNSEL IN 063341). AREVIEW OF THAT EXHIBIT 1A
TO THE TPOAPPLICATION FOR LESLIE AND, AS LISTED IN THE APPLICANTS SECTION, APPARENTLY,
WASHOE COUNTY (AS OPPOSED TO JUST THE WCPD), REVEALS THAT THE PURPORTED 12/12/12
COUGLIN EMAIL TO VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS (INCLUDING LESLIE AND KING) PURPORTEDLY FORWARD TO
KING BY LESLIE HAS EXCISED THEREFROM APPROXIMATELY 29 ATTACHMENTS IN PDF FORM THAT COM-
PLETELY RECONTEXTUALIZE ALL COMMUNICATED IN THAT 12/12/12 EMAIL LESLIE PURPORTS
COUGHLIN SENT HIM. THOSE ATTACHMENTS ARE CLEARLY DISPLAYED IN THE VERSION OF THAT PUR-
PORTED 12/12/12 EMAIL FROMCOUGHLIN TO KING AND LESLIE (AMONGST MANY OTHERS, INCLUDING
COMPLAINTS@NVBAR.ORG, WCDAKANDARAS AND YOUNG, RENO CITY ATTORNEY'S PROSECU-
TORS, SBNPRESIDENT FLAHERTY, ALL FIVE MEMBERS OF THE PANEL IN COUGHLIN'S FORMAL DISCI-
PLINARY MATTER, ETC., ETC.) THAT LESLIE/WATTS-VIAL ATTACHED TO THE TPOAPPLICATION IN 599,
BEGGING THE QUESTION: WHY ARE THOSE ATTACHMENTS MISSING FROM THE VERSION KING PURPORTS
LESLIE FORWARDED HIM THAT KING ATTACHED AS EXHIBIT 1ATO HIS OWN TPOAPPLICATION IN 607?
Upon Coughlin being assigned an alternate defender (aside from the also conflicted out APD)
in privated defense attorney Bruce Lindsay, Esq., Couglin was able to obtain documents from Mr.
Lindsay that Lindsay was later castigated for turning over to Coughlin by the WCPD, WCDA's Of-
fice, and RJC which include the following correspondence between Coughlin's then WCPD James
Briand Leslie and WCDA DDA of the Civil Division Mary Kandaras. The following email exchange
between WCPD Leslie and WCDA DDA Kandaras reveals that Kandaras is confused...where she in-
dicates I believe you should send this (to the State Bar) on 12/13/12 at 10:20 am, despite the fact
that Leslie had already forwarded her the email wherein he did just (in Leslie's 12/12/12 2:59 pm
email to DDA Kandaras) that in writing to the SBN's King and forwarding what he purports to be
Coughlin's email to Leslie of 12/12/12 along therewith:
From: Kandaras, Mary Sent: Thursday, December 13, 2012 10:20 AM To:
Leslie, Jim Subject: RE: The Three E's; wcpd failure to provide essential 911
call cd discovery of 8/13 and 8/17, 2012 to Coughlin in rcr2012-065630 Im-
portance:
High
Jim:
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I believe that you should send this. Supreme Court Rule 104(a) authorizes State
bar counsel to investigate all matters involving possible attorney misconduct or
incapacity called to bar counsel's attention, whether by grievance or both. This
potentially involves misconduct (violation of law) and incapacity.
Mary Kandaras Deputy District Attorney Civil Division Washoe County
775 -337 -5723 DIRECT PHONE
-----ORIGINAL MESSAGE----FROM: LESLIE, JIM SENT: WEDNESDAY,
DECEMBER 12, 2012 5:11 PM TO: KANDARAS, MARY SUBJECT: RE: THE
THREE E'S; WCPD FAILURE TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL 911 CALL CD DISCOV-
ERY OF 8/13 AND 8/17, 2012 TO COUGHLIN IN RCR2012 -065630
THANKS, PLEASE DO. HE CAME TO OUR OFFICE AFTER MY EMAIL TO YOUAND CAUSED A DISTURBANCE.
WE CALLED THE POLICE, BUT HE FLED BEFORE THEY ARRIVED. JIM
-----ORIGINAL MESSAGE----FROM: KANDARAS, MARY SENT: WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2012 3:17
PMTO: LESLIE, JIMSUBJECT: RE: THE THREE E'S; WCPD FAILURE TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL 911 CALL CD
DISCOVERY OF 8/13 AND 8/17, 2012 TO COUGHLIN IN RCR2012-065630
I WILL HAVE TO REVIEW THIS TOMORROW AND GET BACK TO YOU.
MARY KANDARAS DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY CIVIL DIVISION WASHOE COUNTY
-----ORIGINAL MESSAGE----FROM: LESLIE, JIM
THE BELOW EMAIL FROM MR. COUGHLIN CON-
TAINS A REFERENCE AT THE END OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH TO A WEBSITE
CONTAINING A VIDEO CLIP FROM THE MOVIE CAPE FEAR. PLEASE ADVISE
WHETHER ANY ACTION IS REQUIRED OF OUR OFFICE OR YOURS REGARDING
THI S POSSI BLE VEI LED OR I NDI RECT THREAT OF VI OLENCE AGAI NST AT-
TORNEYSI NTHI SOFFI CE BY MR. COUGHLI N.
Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2012 2:59 PM To: Kandaras, Mary
Subject: FW: The Three E's; wcpd failure to provide essential 911 call cd
discovery of 8/13 and 8/17, 2012 to Coughlin in rcr2012-065630
MARY:
PLEASE REVIEW MY TRANSMITTAL TO PATRICK KING AT THE BAR, BE-
LOW, AND LET ME KNOW IF I SHOULD DO ANYTHING ELSE FROM A CIVIL
PERSPECTIVE.
Thanks,
Chief Deputy Public Defender
-----Original Message----From: Leslie, Jim Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2012 2:49 PM To:
'patrickk@nvbar.org' Subject: FW: The Three E's; wcpd failure to provide essential 911 call cd dis-
covery of 8/13 and 8/17, 2012 to Coughlin in rcr2012 -065630
Mr. King:
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The below email from Mr. Coughlin contains a reference at the end of the first paragraph to a website
containing a video clip from the movie Cape Fear. Please advise whether any action is required of our
office or yours regarding this possible veiled or indirect threat of violence against attorneys in this
office by Mr. Coughlin.
Thank you,
James B. Leslie, Esq. Chief Deputy Public Defender Washoe County Public Defender's Office
-----Original Message----From:
Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2012 2:35 PM
To: Leslie, Jim; Bosler, Jeremy; Dogan, Biray; Goodnight, Joseph W; Fortier, Chris; Tuttle, Steve;
Kandaras, Mary; Young, Zach; skauc@reno.gov; wongd@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov; com-
plaints@nvbar.org; cvellis@bhfs.com; je@eloreno.com; patrickk@nvbar.org; davidc@nvbar.org;
rosec@nvbar.org; laurap@nvbar.org; skent@skentlaw.com; mike@tahoelawyer.com;
eifert.nta@att.net; nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; fflaherty@dyerlawrence.com
Subject: The Three E's; wcpd failure to provide essential 911 call cd discovery of 8/13 and 8/17, 2012
to Coughlin in
rcr2012 -065630
The Trial yesterday in RCR2012-065630 featured extended discussions
regarding the failure of the WCPD, Dogan, and Leslie, to turn over dis-
covery propounded by DDA Young in the form of cd's featuring 911
calls DDA Young provided to the WCPD on 8/13/12 and 8/17/12 ... And
the heavy hitters were there, too (Elliot Sattler) ..... despite numerous
written requests from Coughlin that the WCPD do so, and multiple trips
to the WCPD personally by Coughlin to pick such materials up, and de-
spite more flip flopping on their story by Leslie and Dogan regarding
whether they ever gave Coughlin some package of materials responsive
to Coughlin's request for his "file" ... But, Jim Leslie is stuck with the
7/27/12 date he mentions in his email, then he is stuck with what his re-
cent email wherein he purports to have therein digitally transmitted
Coughlin his "file", which obviously does not include the cd's of 911
calls (the one's DDA Young took up an enormous amount of court time
playing, over and over (well, Young only played over and over the par-
ticular calls he felt were strongest for his case and most prejudicial,
claiming some "cutting room floor mishap" for the reoccurrence of cer-
tain calls, arguing that such a "happy accident" justified playing them
again and again, at ever increasing volumes, etc., etc.). Apparently, I am
here to subsidize Young's baby making, just like I was with Ms. Gorman,
as a continuance of prejudicial length of afforded to the State where none
was forthcoming to Coughlin, despite Leslie and Dogan's obstructionist
tantrums, ones of a quality that would. I remember when my life featured
happy moments like the birth of twins ... but that was before your levia-
than legal system wrecked shop on my existence. What, sir, shall be my
compensation? Do you mind if I put my arm around ....
http://tinyurl.com/bgmlfdr
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THIS IS A FORMAL GRIEVANCE AGAINST DOGAN, LESLIE, BOSLER, YOUNG
... ETC....
THE LINK THAT LESLIE REFERS TO AS CONTAINING A VIDEO CLIP FROM THE MOVIE CAPE FEAR
ACTUALLY CONTAINS ONLY AN AUDIO CLIP OF A SHORT QUOTE FROM CAPE FEAR (THE 1991 SCORSESE
VERSION).
IT WAS ARGUABLY AN ABUSE OF PROCESS BY BAR COUNSEL PATRICK KING. HOWEVER,
COUGHLIN'S RECOLLECTION OF THE NOVEMBER 6TH, 2012 (THE NIGHT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELEC-
TION...COUGHLIN ASKED NEVADA LAWYER EMPLOYEE PAULA CAMPBELL IF SHE KNEW WHO WAS
WINNING IN THE POLLS...ETC.,) BRIEF ENCOUNTER BETWEEN SHE AND COUGHLIN WAS OF ONE OF AN
ENTIRELY CORDIAL, PROFESSIONAL NATURE.
AT THAT TIME, CAMPBELL MENTIONED SHE WAS THE ONLY ONE THERE (WORKING LATE),
AND THAT ASST. BAR COUNSEL KING HAD LEFT A FEW MINUTES PRIOR TO FIVE PM. COUGHLIN INDI-
CATED THAT HE HAD PRESENTED A COUPLE MINUTES PRIOR TO 5 PM TO FILE A DOCUMENT WHERE TIME
WAS OF THE ESSENCE AND INQUIRED AS TO THE POSTED CLOSING TIME OF THE SBNAND POLICIES RE-
SPECTING WHAT FILE STAMPED DATE SUCH A SUBMISSION WOULD BE GIVEN UNDER THOSE CIRCUM-
STANCES.
COUGLIN DID NOT ASK CAMPBELL IF HE MAY VENTURE INSIDE THE SBN'S OFFICES AT THAT
TIME, NOR DID HE EVER FLASH HIS 1996 HONDA'S HEADLIGHTS TO GAIN ATTENTION. THERE WAS AN
ISSUE WITH THE ELECTRICAL WIRING TO COUGHLIN'S HEADLIGHTS (THE TAILIGHTS WENT OUT DUE TO A
SHORT SOMEWHERE IN THE SYSTEM, AND DUE TO HIS POVERTY, COUGHLINHAD TO MAKE DO WITHOUT A
TRIP TO THE MECHANIC AND SIMPLY SPLICE IN SOME SPEAKER WIRES FROM THE HEADLIGHTS TO THE
TAIL LIGHTS, AND PROCRASTINATED IN AFFIXING AN ON/OFF SWITCH IN THERE, SO COUGHLIN HAS TO,
BASICALLY , BRAID THE WIRES TOGETHER EVERY TIME HE DRIVES AT NIGHT AND IN TURNING THE
LIGHTS UON AND OFF (WHAT A PAIN)..
..
EXHIBIT 1 TO MR. KING'S TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER APPLICATION IN RCP12-607 CONTIANS
MOSTLY UNATTRIBUTED UNSWORN HEARSAY AND IS MISLEADING AT BEST.
THE SUBSTANTIVE SECTION CONTAINING THE ALLEGATIONS IN BAR COUNSEL KING'S TPO
APPLICATION OF 12/20/12 IN RJC RCP2012-000607 IS PASTED BELOW. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT
COUGHLIN HAS BEEN THROUGH QUITE A LOT THIS YEAR, BEING WRONGFULLY INCARCERATED OVER 10
TIMES AND WRONGFULLY EVICTED 6 TIMES, AND AS SUCH, HE IS SEVERELY INDIGENT, SOMETHING BAR
COUNSEL KING IS ATTEMPTING TO TAKE FURTHER ADVANTAGE OF BY INCREASING COUGHLIN'S POST-
AGE COSTS AND DECREASING THE TIME HE WOULD HAVE TO DRAFT FILINGS GIVEN THE TRANSPORT TIME
SUCH AN EPOWOULD ADD TO THE SERVICE THEREOF....MR. KING RELIED EXCLUSIVELY ON HEARSAY,
CONJECTURE, AND INFERENCE IN HIS ACCOUNT BELOW IN THOSE RARE INSTANCES WHEN HE IS NOT JUST
OUTRIGHT LYING. THE "VIOLENT SCEN FROM THE MOVIE "CAPE FEAR" WAS ACTUALLY AN AUDIO CLIP
FROM THE POPULAR WEBSITE WWW.HARM.COM CONTAINING AN AUDIO ONLY QUOTATION BY ROBERT
DENIRO WHERE HE CONFRONTS OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT PERPETRATED AGAINST HIM BY HIS PUBLIC DE-
FENDER BY INVOKING POWER OF READING, LEARNING, AND PHILOSOPHY...THINGS MR. KING OBVIOUS-
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LY FINDS LITTTLE UTILITY IN:
The email of Coughlin's copied above goes on for several more pages detailign the prejudice
to his defense in 12-065630 inherent to WCPD Leslie refusing to turn over the 8/13/12 and 8/17/12
production of two discs of ECOMM 911 calls by the WCDA to Coughlin. Where Leslie attests that
he had turned over a collection of materials on 7/27/12, he necessarily admits to having failed to
turned over the discs only propounded after that point. Further Leslie subpoened recordings from
ECOMM on 10/3/12 in 11-063341 but never turned them over to Couglhin, despite only being re-
moved as counsel of record well over 15 days thereafter, on 10/22/12.
It's not at all clear how a request and subsequent Order apparently prohibiting Cough-
lin from calling, emailing or faxing the SBN would address the alleged threat of physical harm. One
cannot be physically harmed by a fax, email, or phone call. Further, phone calls, faxes, and emails
are common in pending litigations, even one's where post-judgment motions are being sought and
where Coughlin has a duty to seek a stipulated continuance of, say, the deadline to file an appeal brief
in 62337 prior to filing a motion seeking one. The EPO apparently would perhaps even forbid
Coughlin from utilizing a messenger service to deliver a filing to the SBN's Clerk of Court's Office
for the securing of a file stamp to beat a deadline, such as the 1/3/13, or 1/4/13 (depending upon
whether holidays are included in the 3 days for mailing calculus under NRCP 6(e) and the Deboer
decision), for Coughlin to file a NRCP 52 or 59 Motion as to the 12/14/12 NNDB Panel Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, which recommends that Coughlin be irrevocably disbarred (disbarments
became irrevocable in 2008). To curtail the time Coughlin had to prepare such a motion, which was
scant to begin with, by applying an onerous EPO application, or the threat of arrest for anything argu-
ably violative of it, would work and injustice, and has here, as Coughlin was arrested and charged
with a felony EPO violation for some alleged violation in connection with his seeking from the SBN
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a stipulation to an extension of time to file his appeal brief in 62337 on or around the deadlien to do
so of 1/23/13. The SBN has failed to respond to Coughlin's reasonable inquiries in that regard, as has
the WCDA DDA Young (rather, Coughlin is funneled to an Inspector Covington, whom is arguably
committing the unauthorized practice of law, and such circumstances only further underscore the ex-
tent to which the WCDA Office should be disqualified form prosecuting Coughlin, particularly where
DDA Kandaras' above email admits to feeling Coughlin's competency is brought into question, the
events involving two former WCDA Criminal Division prosecutor's turned RJC Judges on 2/13/13 in
(an Order for Competency Evaluation signed and entered by Judge Pearson at an 8:30 am hearing in
11-063341 was provided, in writing, to Judge Clifton in 12-065630, with shall language, and DDA
Young's willingness to go along with Judge Clifton in refusing to follow NRS 178.405's mandatory
stay is arguably impermissible. To have RJC Bailliff's then Order Coughlin to remain at the RJC,
then go into a hearing brought on an Emergency Basis upon DDA Young making an Ex Parte Re-
quest for Judge Clifton to resconsider his Order for Competency Evaluation
To wit
NRS 33.240 Acts that constitute harassment in workplace. Harassment in the workplace
occurs when:
(a) Bodily injury to the person or another person;
(b) Damage to the property of another person; or
(c) Substantial harm to the physical or mental health or safety of a person;
2. The threat is made or the act is committed against an employer, an employee of the employer
while the employee performs the employees duties of employment or a person present at the work-
place of the employer; and
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3. The threat would cause a reasonable person to fear that the threat will be carried out or the
act would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated or harassed.
An employer or an authorized agent of an employer who reasonably believes that harassment
in the workplace has occurred may file a verified application for a Temporary Order for protection
against harassment in the workplace against the person who allegedly committed the harassment.
NRS 33.250(1). King offers no proof that he is an authorized agent of the SBN or that he has been
given authority to file his self serving TPO Application in 607. Further, King's application is not ver-
ified. The declaration King signed on the last page of his application fails to indicate that the un-
signed, unattributed summary referenced on page 2 of 8 of King's 12/20/12 APPLICATION FOR
TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
(NRS 33.250) is incorporated by reference. Further, neither in that Application or any of the Ex-
hibits 1A-1D attached thereto, is there any indication as to who wrote the Summary in Exhibit 1,
which consists almost entirely of unattributed hearsay. There is a burden of proof that must be met.
Its not entirely clear just what that is in Nevada, but unattributed, unverified hearsay could hardly be
said to satisfy any standard. As such, the Summary contained in Exhibit 1 to King's 12/20/12
Application is less than evidence. Its nothing. Its certainly not verified, which is required. By fail-
ing to utilize From B4-Continuation Page King failed to include that which is found in Form B4,
which reads: CONTINUATION PAGE APPLICANTS NAME: ___(NOTE: BE SPECIFIC AS TO
WHO COMMITTED WHAT ACT OR ACT(S), AGAINST WHOM, WHEN, WHERE, WHETHER
COMMITTED OR THREATENED; INDICATE APPROXIMATE DATE(S) AND LOCA-
TION(S).) CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2: THE ATTACHEDAPPLI CATI ONI NCORPORATES
THE CONTI NUATI ONPAGE BY REFERENCE. Form B-4 Continuation Page. Further, even if
one where to accept the summary attached to King's TPO Application of 12/20/12 as satisfying the
verified requirement (ie, that which is contained in the unattributed, unsigned, unincorporated by
reference summary attached at Exhibit 1A to King's 12/20/12 TPO Application fails to be incor-
porated by reference into King's Form B3 TPO Application, therefore, the declaration by King on
page 8 of 8 of his TPO Application fails to apply to the unsigned, unattributed, largely irrelevant (it
focuses on NNDB Panel Chair Echeverria's unnamed employees, mostly...if Echeverria wants to get
his employees an NRS 33.240 TPO or EPO, he is free to apply for one, but it makes little sense for
King's TPO Application to rest largely on accusations involving conduct by Coughlin toward non-
SBN employees, like those in Echeverria's office.).
Page 2 of 6 of the Form B-3 used by King in his 12/20/12 TPO Application in 607 reads:
I reasonably believe that the Adverse Party has threat-
ened or committed an act or act(s) of harassment in the
workplace as defined above. The event(s) occurred as
follows: NOTE: BE SPECIFIC AS TO WHO THREAT-
ENED OR COMMITTED WHAT ACT OR ACTS AND
AGAINST WHOM. INDICATE APPROXIMATE
DATE(S) AND LOCATION(S). ALSOLI ST SPECI FI C
EMPLOYEE(S)/PERSON(S) PRESENT AT THE WORK-
PLACE WHOARE THE FOCUSOF THE HARASSMENT
OR WHOM THE ADVERSE PARTY SHOULDBE DI -
RECTEDNOT TOCONTACT. THIS FORM IS A PUBLIC
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RECORD (in the blanks thereafter following King has hand-
written in):
See Summary contained in Exhibit 1 including exhibits
1A- 1D.)
NOTE: PLEASE DO NOT WRITE ON THE BACKS OF
ANYPAGES; CHECK BOX I F YOU ARE USI NGADDI -
TI ONAL PAGES. Check if youuseacontinuationpage(to
beincorporatedbyreference) (SeeExhibit 1
(not only did king fail to check the preceding box, he made a handwritten notation that is vague at
best and of little value, particularly where is appears to begin with an unmatched parentheses fol-
lowed by Exhibit 1, considering that King's 12/20/12 TPO Application consists of Exhibit 1A-1D
according to the handwritten notation by King at page 2 of 8 on his From B-3 TPO Application of
12/20/12...as such, one is left to wonder what, if any, of the materials comprising Exhibit 1 are pur-
ported to be verified. Of course, none of them are. King wants it both ways, he wants to take ad-
vantage of the power of having a TPO/EPO issued, subjecting Coughlin to arbitary restraints in the
middle of a contentious, serious litigation (such as no telephone calls, emails, faxes, or even, appar-
ently, courier delivered filings where time is of the essence).
(See, Standardized Forms for Mandatory Use in Stalking and Harassment, Workplace Harassment
and Harm to Minors at:
http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/viewdocumentsandforms/SelfHelpProSe/Standardized-
Forms-for-Mandatory-Use-in-Stalking-and-Harassment-Workplace-Harassment-and-Harm-to-
Minors/orderby,1/page,1/
Form B3 - Application for Temporary Order for Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace
Download Date Posted: 11 Mar 2009 File Size: 109.12 Kb Downloads: 116 Form B4 - Continuation
Page Download Date Posted: 11 Mar 2009 File Size: 14.84 Kb Downloads: 70
KING UTILIZED FORM B3 IN HIS 12/20/12 APPLICATION, HOWEVER, HE FAILED TO UTILIZED
FORMB4-CONTINUATION PAGE, AND INSTEAD APPARENTLY DECIDED TO INCLUDED INFORMATION IN
THE FORM OF A SUMMARY ATTACHED AS EXHIBIT 1ATO HIS TPOAPPLICATION. HOWEVER, THE
SUMMARY HAS LESS THAN NO EVIDENTIARY VALUE AND CANNOT BE SAID TO CONTRIBUTE ANYTHING
TOWARDS KING MEETING THE BURDEN OF PROOF NECESSARY TO PROVE COUGLIN COMMITTED AN AC-
TION UNDER NRS 33.240 SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY ISSUING A TPOPURSUANT TO NRS 33.270 IN LIGHT
OF THE UTTER FAILURE BY KING TO INCLUDED A SINGLE VERIFIED FACT WITHIN HIS ANY TPOOR
EPOAPPLICATION IN 607 SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF NRS 33.250(2)(C).
SERVICE OF AN APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER, THE NOTICE OF HEARING THEREON AND THE ORDER
MUST BE SERVED UPON THE PERSON WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HARASSMENT PURSUANT TO THE
NEVADA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. NRS 33.300(2).
THE VERIFIED APPLICATION MUST INCLUDE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE WORKPLACE, AS WELL
AS A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS THAT ALLEGEDLY CONSTITUTED HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE AND THE DATES ON WHICH THESE EVENTS OCCURRED. NRS 33.250(2). THE COURT MAY
ISSUE A TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE IF IT APPEARS
TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE COURT FROM SPECIFIC FACTS SHOWN BY A VERIFIED APPLICATION FILED
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PURSUANT TO NRS 33.250 THAT HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE HAS OCCURRED. NRS 33.270(1)A
TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE MUST NOT BE ISSUED
WITHOUT THE GIVING OF SECURITY BY THE EMPLOYER IN AN AMOUNT DETERMINED BY THE COURT TO
BE SUFFICIENT TO PAY FOR SUCH COSTS AND DAMAGES AS MAY BE INCURRED OR SUFFERED BY THE PER-
SON WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HARASSMENT IF THE PERSON WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE
HARASSMENT IS FOUND TO HAVE BEEN WRONGFULLY ENJOINED OR RESTRAINED. NRS 33.270(2).
AFFIDAVIT AS BASIS FOR ARREST OR PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION, SEE 5 AM. JUR. 2D,
ARREST 02, 25; 21 AM. JUR. 2D, CRIMINAL LAW
Affidavits in federal court proceedings, use of, see 32 Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Courts
Civil or criminal liability in connection with making of false or defamatory affidavit, see 50 Am.
Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander 550; 60A Am. Jur. 2d, Perjury 44 to 48
DEFECTS IN AFFIDAVIT AS RENDERING JUDGMENT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK, SEE 47 AM. JUR.
2D, JUDGMENTS 916 TO 943
Depositions, see 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Depositions and Discovery
Liability of notary public for taking false affidavit, see 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Notaries Public 60 to
64
Oaths and affirmations generally, see 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Oath and Affirmation
Verification of pleading or written accusations in civil and criminal cases, see 41 Am. Jur. 2d, In-
dictments and Informations 86 to 89; 61B Am. Jur. 2d, Pleading 888 to 898
PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS FOR A WARRANT WHEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE A
REASONABLY CAUTIOUS PERSON TO BELIEVE THAT THE PERSON ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED.FERNANDER V. BONIS, 947 SO. 2D 584 (FLA. DIST. CT. APP. 4TH DIST. 2007).
IN DETERMINING WHETHER PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS TO ISSUE AN ARREST WARRANT, A MAGISTRATE IS
NOT REQUIRED TO FIND A SHOWING OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, AS THE MERE PROBABILITY OF SUCH CRIMI-
NAL ACTIVITY IS SUFFICIENT FOR PROBABLE CAUSE, AND FURTHERMORE, THE INFORMATION OFFERED
TO DEMONSTRATE PROBABLE CAUSE MUST BE VIEWED IN A COMMON SENSE, NONTECHNICAL, UNGRUDG-
ING AND POSITIVE MANNER.[FN12] ACOURT MUST LIMIT ITS INQUIRY TO THE INFORMATION WITHIN
THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE AFFIDAVIT SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF PROBABLE CAUSE WHEN DETERMIN-
ING WHETHER THE ARREST WARRANT WAS ISSUED UPON PROBABLE CAUSE.[FN13] THUS, THE DETER-
MINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR AN ARREST WARRANT IS MADE FROM THE FACTS AS KNOWN AT THE
MOMENT THE WARRANT IS REQUESTED AND IS UNAFFECTED BY FACTS LATER DISCOVERED.[FN14]
[FN12] COM. V. TAYLOR, 2004 PASUPER 162, 850 A.2D 684 (2004). [FN13] COM. V. TAYLOR, 2004
PASUPER 162, 850 A.2D 684 (2004). [FN14] BUSICK V. STATE, 906 SO. 2D 846 (MISS. CT. APP. 2005),
CERT. DENIED, (JUNE 23, 2005).
AMJUR ARRESTS 15. DISCRETION OF COURT WEST'S KEY NUMBER DIGEST WEST'S KEY NUMBER DI-
GEST, CRIMINAL LAW K217, 218(1) THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE VALID ARREST WARRANT LIES WITH THE
ISSUING MAGISTRATE, WHO IS CHARGED UNDER THE LAW WITH MAKING THE DETERMINATION AS TO
WHETHER PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS.[FN1] UPON RETURN OF AN INDICTMENT, OR UPON A FINDING OF
PROBABLE CAUSE, THE ISSUANCE OF A SUMMONS OR AN ARREST WARRANT IS A MATTER LEFT WITHIN
THE DISCRETION OF THE ISSUING JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE.[FN2] THE ISSUANCE OF A CRIMINAL WAR-
RANT IS A JUDICIAL ACT,[FN3] AND THE DETERMINATION OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE
MADE ONLY BY A JUDICIAL OFFICER.[FN4] THE MAGISTRATE MUST USE HIS OR HER OWN JUDGMENT AS
TO THE PERSUASIVENESS OF THE FACTS,[FN5] AND NOT ACT AS A RUBBER STAMP FOR POLICE DECISIONS
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ON WHOM TO ARREST.[FN6] [FN1] CLEVELAND V. STATE, 801 SO. 2D 812 (MISS. CT. APP. 2001).
[FN2] HUNTER V. STATE, 867 SO. 2D 361 (ALA. CRIM. APP. 2003). [FN3] THORNTON V. STATE, 157
GA. APP. 75, 276 S.E.2D 125 (1981). [FN4] CITY OF BIRMINGHAM V. 48TH DIST. COURT JUDGE, 76
MICH. APP. 33, 255 N.W.2D 760 (1977). AS TO WHO MAY ISSUE AN ARREST WARRANT, SEE 13. [FN5]
U.S. V. EVANS, 574 F.2D 352 (6TH CIR. 1978). [FN6] MOREAU V. STATE, 588 P.2D 275 (ALASKA
1978).
COUGHLIN OBJECTS TO THE LACK OF A SUFFICIENT OATH OR AFFIRMATION IN THE AFFIDAVITS SUBMIT-
TED IN SUPPORT OF THE RCA'S REQUESTS THAT THE RMC ISSUE A SUMMONS, AND FURTHER OBJECTS
TO JUDGE W. GARDNER DECIDING SUCH MATTER GIVEN THE MULTITUDE OF A BASIS FOR DISQUALIFY-
ING HIM FROM RULING ON ANYTHING RELATED TO COUGHLIN, BUT PARTICULARLY THESE TWO PROSE-
CUTIONS WHERE THE SBNAND RMC'S COMPLICITY IN ATTACKING COUGHLIN IS SO AT ISSUE IN
COUGHLIN'S FORMAL DISCIPLINARY MATTER AND THE APPEAL THEREOF IN 62337.
II. IN CRIMINAL CASES
B. WITH WARRANT
2. ISSUANCE OF WARRANT
B. OATH OR AFFIRMATION
PAGE 5 OF THE 12/20/12 TPO ORDER IN 607 INSTRUCTED RPD DETECTIVE YTRUBIDE: NO-
TICE TOLAW ENFORCEMENT
ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, WITH OR WITHOUT A WARRANT, AND WHETHER OR NOT A VIOLATION
OCCURS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE OFFICER, MAY ARREST AND TAKE INTO CUSTODY THE ADVERSE PAR-
TY, WHEN THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER HAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT (A) AN ORDER HAS
BEEN ISSUED PURSUANT TO NRS 33.270 AGAINST THE ADVERSE PARTY; (B) THE ADVERSE PARTY HAS
BEEN SERVED WITH A COPY OF THE ORDER; AND (C) THE ADVERSE PARTY IS ACTING OR HAS ACTED IN
VIOLATION OF THE ORDER.
ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY IN NEVADA MAY ENFORCE A COURT ORDER ISSUED PURSUANT TO
NRS 33.270 WITHOUT REGARD TO THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE ORDER WAS ISSUED.
IF A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER CANNOT VERIFY THAT THE ADVERSE PARTY WAS SERVED WITH A
COPY OF THIS ORDER, THE OFFICER SHALL SERVE THE ADVERSE PARTY WITH A COPY OF THE ORDER IF
A COPY IS AVAILABLE.
THERE IS NO INDICATION WITHIN THE FOUR CORNERS OF YTURBIDE'S 2/22/13 AFFIDAVIT IN-
CLUDED WITH RCASOOUDI'S REQUEST TO THE RMC TO ISSUE A SUMMONS AS TO WHY DETECTIVE
YTRUBIDE FELT COUGHLIN HAD BEEN SERVED EITHER THE TPOAPPLICATION, THE TPOORDER, OR
THE EPOAPPLICATION (FOR WHICH THERE WAS NONE) OR THE EPOORDER. AS SUCH, DETECTIVE
YTRUBIDE'S AFFIDAVIT IS ENTIRELY CURSORY AND CONCLUSORY AND FAILES TO EVEN SPECIFY WHY HE
FELT THAT COUGHLIN HAD BEEN SERVED, OR WHOM MADE ANY SUCH INDICATION TO HIM.
THAT SAME SLAPDASH, ARROGANT, ENTITLED, RETALIATORY (HIS WIFE, JODY YTURBIDE, AND
APPARENTLY ANOTHER RELATIVE AS WELL, IS A 911 DISPATCHER FOR ECOMM ALONGSIDE RPD OF-
FICER NICHOLAS DURALDE'S WIFE, JESSICA DURALDE) APPROACH EVINCED IN DETECTIVE YTRUBIDE'S
AFFIDAVIT IS ALSO ON DISPLAY WHERE THE VERY TPO ORDER OF 12/20/12 WHICH HE PURPORTS TO
HAVE REVIEWED, STATES, IN BOLD TYPE, ON THE FIRST PAGE, THAT A VIOLATION OF THAT TEMPO-
RARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (NRS
33.270) I S A MI SDEMEANOR: UNDER NRS 193.150, A MISDEMEANOR IS PUNISHABLE BY IMPRISON-
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MENT IN THE COUNTY JAIL FOR NOT MORE THAN 6 MONTHS, OR BY A FINE OF NOT MORE THAN
$1,000.00, OR BY BOTH FINE AND IMPRISONMENT. SO, BEYOND THE FACT THAT ON ITS FACE, IN BOLD,
ON PAGE ONE OF BOTH THE 12/20/12 TPO AND THE 1/4/13 EPO, DETECTIVE YTURBIDE WAS NOTICED,
IN WRITING, THAT A VIOLATION OF EITHER WAS A MERE MISDEMEANOR, SPECIFICALLY CITING TO NRS
193.150, DETECTIVE YTRUBIDE, IN HIS RETALIATORY APPROACH, MANAGED TO CHARGE COUGHLIN
WITH THE WRONG STATUTE (NRS 200.591), AND OVERCHARGE COUGHLIN BY LISTING A GROSS MISDE-
MEANOR AND A FELONY AS THE ARREST REPORT. GIVEN THAT EVENA BROKEN CLOCK IS RIGHT TWICE
A DAY, DETECTIVE YTURBIDE'S RETALIATORY ANIMUS (TO SEEK THAT COUGHLIN WOULD BE INCAR-
CERATED FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME GIVEN COUGHLIN'S INDIGENCY AND THE $5,000 IN BAIL
REQUIRED OF COUGLIN TO BE RELEASE FROM JAIL PURSUANT TO SUCH OVERCHARGING BY YTURBIDE).
Great prejudice inured to the already indigent Coughlin, whom was at the time of the 2/8/13
arrest facing enormously overarching and pressing deadlines in the appeal of the 12/14/12 FOFCOL
by the NNDB Panel in 62337, which purports to be a decision sufficient to invoke the 30 days to
file Coughlih's Opening Brief under SCR 105(3).
In order to conduct any sort of probable cause analysis sufficient to make the 2/8/13 arrest
Detective Ytrubide alleges he made, or the 3/6/13 issuance of a Summons by RMC Judge W. Gard-
ner, either would have, necessarily, needed to review and analyze the alleged facts (only those in
Yturbide's affidavit in the case of the analysis for the issuance of the 3/6/13 Summons) in light of the
requirements of NRS 33.270, including:
NRS 33.3270(6). If a temporary order for protection against harassment in the workplace
is granted, ... the employer or the employers authorized agent may apply for an extendedor-
der for protection against harassment in the workplace by filing a verifiedapplication for an extend-
edorder for protectionagainst harassment in the workplace... The application must:
(a) In addition to the information required by subsection 2 of NRS 33.250, ((c) A detailed
description of theevents that allegedlyconstituted harassment in theworkplaceand thedates on
which theseevents occurred) set forth thefacts that providethebasis for granting an extended
order for protectionagainst harassment in the workplace;...
7. At the hearing on an application filed pursuant to subsection 6, the employer must present
evidence sufficient to support the granting of the application for an extended order for protection
against harassment in the workplace.
19. Requisites and sufficiency of affidavit or complaint Criminal Law k217, 218(1) to
218(5)
An affidavit supporting an arrest warrant must provide the magistrate with sufficient information
to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists to believe that the accused has com-
mitted an offense, and mere conclusions in the affidavit are not sufficient.[FN1] It is clearly estab-
lished that the Fourth Amendment requires a truthful showing of sufficient facts which amount to
probable cause before an arrest warrant can issue.[FN2] Truthful is defined as believed or appropri-
ately accepted by the affiant as true.[FN3] Falsehoods in a probable-cause affidavit in support of an
arrest warrant are deemed to be material to a finding of probable cause only if the affidavit, with
the false material set to one side, is insufficient to establish probable cause.[FN4]
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Caution:
An affiant is not required to include in an affidavit of probable cause supporting an arrest warrant
every piece of information gathered in the course of investigation that might prove exculpatory, due
to feasibility constraints and the fact that probable cause is a lower standard than the beyond a rea-
sonable doubt standard required at trial.[FN5]
The sufficiency of the affidavit underlying an arrest warrant may be challenged in a hear-
ing.[FN6] If a defendant wishes a hearing to challenge the truthfulness of an affidavit underlying an
arrest warrant, the defendant must (1) make a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in
the warrant affidavit; and (2) show that the allegedly false statement was necessary to the finding of
probable cause.[FN7] Any fair doubt arising from the testimony at the suppression hearing as to
whether the affidavit's allegations were perjurious should be resolved in favor of the warrant, since
those allegations have already been examined by a judicial officer in issuing a warrant.[FN8] Howev-
er, the arrest may still be upheld if,
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after the offending material is disregarded, probable cause sufficient to support the arrest remains
in the affidavit.[FN9] If insufficient probable cause remains in the affidavit, the arrest was unlaw-
ful.[FN10]
Where omissions are the basis for a challenge to an affidavit of probable cause in an arrest war-
rant, an appellate court applies the following test: (1) whether the officer withheld a highly relevant
fact within his or her knowledge, where any reasonable person would have known that this was the
kind of thing the judge would wish to know; and (2) whether the affidavit would have provided prob-
able cause if it had contained a disclosure of the omitted information.[FN11]
Affidavits in support of arrest warrants are liberally construed and are not subject to evidentiary tech-
nicalities.[FN12] Affidavits should be interpreted in a common-sense manner and resolution of
doubtful or marginal cases should be determined for the most part by preference to the war-
rant.[FN13]
Caution:
In appraising the adequacy of a warrant application, neither a reviewing trial court nor a reviewing
appellate court is permitted to make its own independent determination as to probable cause.[FN14]
The basis for a finding of probable cause must appear on the face of the complaint.[FN15] A
complaint which states as a mere conclusion that the accused has committed a specified crime, with-
out alleging that the affiant speaks from personal knowledge, indicating any sources for his or her
belief, or setting forth any other sufficient basis on which a finding of probable cause could be made,
is an insufficient basis for the issuance of an arrest warrant, since it does not permit the magistrate to
make any independent assessment of the probability that the accused committed the crime
charged.[FN16]
Common rumor or report, suspicion, or even strong reason to suspect, is not adequate to support a
warrant for arrest,[FN17] although hearsay may be the basis of the affidavit if the magistrate is pro-
vided with some of the underlying circumstances indicating the statements are reliable.[FN18]
An affidavit that merely states belief in the guilt of the accused is insufficient to support a warrant of
arrest.[FN19]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
An arrest-warrant affiant violates the Fourth Amendment when he or she knowingly or with reck-
less disregard for the truth, includes false statements in the affidavit, or knowingly or recklessly omits
from an arrest affidavit information which, if included, would have vitiated probable cause. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4. Kerns v. Board of Com'rs of Bernalillo County, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D.N.M.
2010).
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Affidavit in support of arrest warrant established probable cause for arrest of defendant for deal-
ing in methamphetamine; police detective testified that he searched confidential informant
(CI) and his vehicle prior to giving the CI photocopied buy money and sending him to make drug
purchase from defendant, detective placed an audio video recording device on the CI that recorded
the transaction, detective and a second detective followed the CI to defendant's known residence, dur-
ing entire drug buy, the CI was under audio video surveillance, after controlled buy, the CI did not
make contact with anyone else, went back to his car and met detectives at a staging location, where
he was found to be in possession of a plastic bag with a white substance in it. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; West's A.I.C. Const. Art. 1, 11; West's
A.I.C. 353351, 353352. Heyen v. State, 936 N.E.2d 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] Bell v. State, 169 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2005), petition for discre
tionary review refused, (Nov. 9, 2005). A finding of probable cause for an arrest warrant under the
Fourth Amendment by a neutral judicial officer must be supported by sufficient reliable information,
and a judicial officer may not base his or her finding of probable cause upon a mere ratification of the
bare conclusions of others. Gibson v. Sain, 979 F. Supp. 557 (W.D. Mich. 1997), rev'd, 159 F.3d 230,
1998 FED App. 0315P (6th Cir. 1998).
[FN2] Moody v. St. Charles County, 23 F.3d 1410 (8th Cir. 1994). [FN3] Franks v. Dela-
ware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978). [FN4] DiNicola v. DiPaolo, 25
F. Supp. 2d 630 (W.D. Pa. 1998). [FN5] DiNicola v. DiPaolo, 25 F. Supp. 2d 630 (W.D. Pa.
1998). [FN6] Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978).
[FN7] State v. Bangulescu, 80 Conn. App. 26, 832 A.2d 1187 (2003). [FN8] People v.
Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243, 211 N.E.2d 644 (1965). [FN9] State v. Cortis,
237 Neb. 97, 465 N.W.2d 132 (1991). [FN10] Debord v. State, 422 So. 2d 881 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2d Dist. 1982). [FN11] Com. v. Taylor, 2004 PA Super 162, 850 A.2d 684 (2004).
[FN12] Banks v. People, 696 P.2d 293 (Colo. 1985); State v. Jones, 233 Kan. 170, 660
P.2d 965 (1983); Buzbee v. State, 58 Md. App. 599, 473 A.2d 1315 (1984). [FN13] U.S. v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1965).
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[FN14] Fitzgerald v. State, 153 Md. App. 601, 837 A.2d 989 (2003), judgment aff'd, 384 Md.
484, 864 A.2d 1006 (2004). [FN15] Giordenello v. U.S., 357 U.S. 480, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 2 L.
Ed. 2d 1503 (1958). [FN16] Giordenello v. U.S., 357 U.S. 480, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 2 L. Ed. 2d
1503 (1958). [FN17] Henry v. U.S., 361 U.S. 98, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1959).
[FN18] State v. Vinal, 205 Conn. 507, 534 A.2d 613 (1987); Corey v. Com., 8 Va. App. 281,
381 S.E.2d 19 (1989). [FN19] Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 91
S. Ct. 1031, 28
L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971). . AMJUR ARREST 19
Coughlin hereby moves to vacate, or set aside the intial probable cause determination made incident
to Judge W. Gardner issuing a Summons in both 3913 and 3914 (and to whatever extent Judge How-
ard so ruled on 4/17/13 at what Coughlin believes was an inappropriate arraignment where the ser-
vice of the summons was ineffective and the return of service by the RMC's Lisa Gardner fails to in-
dicate whether she sent the Summons and Complaint by certified mail only and the RMC has failed
to file (or at least serve on Coughlin) and update return of service of either the Complaints or
Amended Criminal Complaints sufficient to address the dictate that where, under NRCP 4 (made ap-
plicable in these criminal matters by statute) the server has reason to believe the certified mailing was
not received by the intended recipient (such as the RMC recieving as unclaimed any certified mailing
it sent Coughlin of such), particularly where the RMC failed to copy such mailing to Coughlin via
first class mail, that the RMC then has a duty to update the Return of Service and service must be
quashed, as Coughlin is so hereby seeking. Further, any deadline for Coughlin to challenege the ini-
tial 3/6/13 Summons must be tolled until, at the earliest, the 4/17/13 date when the RMC purports its
Marshal handed Coughlin various document at the arraignment.
The 3/6/12 Summons in RMC 13 CR 3913 reads: YOU ARE HEREBYNOTIFIED that a Com-
plaint charging the offense(s) of VIOLATION OF A TEMPORARYOR EXTENDED ORDER FOR
PROTECTION AnATN..T , HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, a violation of Nevada Re-
vised Statue 300.350 as incorporated through Reno Municipal Code 1.04.015, has been filed against
you in the Municipal Court of the City of Reno.
FURTHER, YOUARE HEREBYSUMMONED to appear in Courtroom A of the Reno Mu-
nicipal Court for the purpose of arraignment on the 17
th
day of April, 2013, at 2:00 p.m.
FAILURE TO APPEAR FOR ARR AIGNMENT ON THE ABOVE DATE WILL RESULT IN THE
ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST ON THE ABOVE-LISTED CHARGE(S).
Reno Municipal Court is located at 1 South Sierra Street, Reno, Nevada. DATED thiS 6
th
day of
March, 2013. /s/ JUDGE WILLIAM L. GARDNER, Reno Municipal Court.
The Summons follows the insufficiency of the original Complaint itself in listing the
violation of a non-existent statute (a violation of Nevada Revised Statute 300.350)...Its funny, the
copy of the original purportedly provided to Couglin upon his arriving at the 4/17/13 arraignment in
both case has a visible bit of white-out above the error as to the number of the statute (300.350
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with such number have a line through it, along with that crossed-out 300.350 has been retraced
in pen by hand...revealing the fact that someone (perhaps Lisa Wagner or Veronica Lopez?) had
crossed out the error in the citation (the subsequent Amended Criminal Complaint changes the cita-
tion to NRS 33.350) then interlineated the correct statutory citation thereabove, then realized that
it is inappropriate for employees or Judges of the RMC to be fixing the prosecutors errors, particular-
ly where Judges Howard, W. Gardner, and Holmes took an overly rigid and formulaic approach in
applying procedural rules to pro se indigent criminal defendants like Coughlin (in 22176, 26405,
26800, etc.; and where Judge Dilworth, on 12/3/12 in 12 CR 12420 may have allow RCA Sooudi to
amend his criminal complaint more than once without seeking leave of court, and where further, the
10/11/12 Amended Criminal Complaint fails to contain the RMC case number anywhere in or near
the caption, but rather contains some RPD number, and where Coughlin asserted he did not received
such mailing from Sooudi (entirely possible given Couglin filed a USPS change of address on
10/5/12 from his then 3961 post office box, and typically 'government mail' mail does not get for-
warded by the USPS for some reason..
21. Description of offense
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law k218(5)
A warrant for an arrest must contain a statement of the crime of which the person to be arrested is
accused.[FN1] However, a warrant does not require the same particularity which is demanded in in-
dictments.[FN2] Inaccuracies and imperfections do not vitiate a warrant that does not wholly fail to
charge an offense.[FN3] The purpose of stating the offense on an arrest warrant is to provide notice
to the person being taken into custody of the charges alleged against him or her.[FN4]
Where an affidavit on which a warrant is based sets out the charge in full and the magistrate
appends the warrant thereto, this incorporates the charge, and the warrant and affidavit must be con-
strued together.[FN5] However, where a complaint, recited in substance in a warrant, is verified
merely on information and belief and does not state facts sufficient to constitute an offense, the
warrant must be held to have been improvidently issued and to be invalid on its face.[FN6] Go-
Bart Importing Co. v. U.S., 282 U.S. 344, 51 S. Ct. 153, 75 L. Ed. 374 (1931).
Generally, an arrest warrant which substantially follows the words of a statute is sufficient as
a criminal pleading when it charges the essentials of the offense in a plain, intelligible, and explicit
manner.[FN7] For the purpose of an arrest warrant which uses statutory language to describe the
crime, if the statutory language fails to set forth the essentials of the offense, then the statutory lan-
guage must be supplemented by other allegations which plainly, intelligibly, and explicitly set forth
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every essential element of the offense as to leave no doubt in the mind of the defendant and the court
as to the offense intended to be charged.[FN8]
[FN1] State v. Garcia, 146 N.C. App. 745, 553 S.E.2d 914 (2001).
A description of the offense charged is also required in warrants issued pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(b)(1)(B).
[FN2] Hopper v. City of Prattville, 781 So. 2d 346 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). [FN3] Williams v. State,
97 Fla. 401, 121 So. 462 (1929). [FN4] Castelan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi
2001). [FN5] Moser v. Fulk, 237 N.C. 302, 74 S.E.2d 729 (1953). [FN6] Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
U.S., 282 U.S. 344, 51 S. Ct. 153, 75 L. Ed. 374 (1931). [FN7] State v. Garcia, 146 N.C. App. 745,
553 S.E.2d 914 (2001). [FN8] State v. Garcia, 146 N.C. App. 745, 553 S.E.2d 914 (2001).
When the defendant has not been arrested or cited, probable cause must be judicially found before
issuance of a summons or arrest warrant.{6} The probable cause finding is indicated by the judge's
signature on the information.{7}
The probable cause showing is almost always made in the form of an affidavit or affidavits filed with
the information. Usually the affiant is a police officer.{8} The affidavits must demonstrate "substan-
tial evidence" which may be partly or entirely hearsay, "provided there is a substantial basis for be-
lieving the source of the hearsay to be credible and for believing that there is a factual basis for the
information furnished."{9} 6. V.R.Cr.P. 4(a),(b).
7. V.R.Cr.P. 4(a). 8. The rules also permit a sworn recorded statement before the judicial officer in
lieu of an affidavit, V.R.Cr.P. 4(a), but the procedure is hardly ever used. 9. V.R.Cr.P. 4(b); 5(c). The
language codifies the so-called Aguilar-Spinelli test of probable cause. See 2.16, supra.
Formal Requisites
V.R.Cr.P. 7(b) dispenses with most of the common law pleading formalities, but a charge of crime by
indictment or information must still "be signed by the prosecuting officer on his oath of office"; and it
must "commence with the words `By the authority of the State of Vermont' and conclude with the
words `against the peace and dignity of the state[.]'" The requirement of an oath is intended to verify
the prosecutor's probable cause finding.{28} The formal commencement and conclusion are constitu-
tional requirements.{29} The "against peace and dignity" allegation, however, is only a formality and
does not imply a substantive element of the offense charged; the state has no duty to prove that a vic-
timless crime like private marijuana possession actually offends the public peace and dignity.{30}
The charge must also give an "official or customary citation" of the statute or other provision alleged-
ly violated, and of any penalty section, but errors in these citations will not make the charge defective
"if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice."{31}
5.04
Sufficiency - Providing Notice of the Crime Charged
V.R.Cr.P. 7, modeled after the federal rule, is intended to avoid the rigid pleading technicalities with
which the common law was sometimes obsessed. Its basic requirement is that the information or in-
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dictment set forth "a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting
the offense charged."{32} The principal constitutional purpose to be served under both the sixth
amendment and chapter I, article 10{33} is providing fair notice of the "exact offense charged" so
that the defendant can make "intelligent preparation for his defense."{34} The information must also
be specific enough to "permit a plea in bar to a subsequent prosecution" for the same crime or
crimes.{35}
The Vermont Supreme Court has adopted what it calls a "common sense approach,"{36} but the case
law has generated its own anomalies and rigidities.
5.05
- Time, Place, and Name
The charge must allege jurisdiction in Vermont,{37} venue in the county,{38} and a date within the
applicable statute of limitations.{39} The identity of the defendant is also a required component of
the pleading, but its omission is only a technical defect when the target of the pleading is identified in
the affidavit.{40} All three items are invariably pleaded in some form in the information itself.{41}
5.06
- Pleading Statutory and Implicit Elements
Stating "the essential facts constituting the offense charged" is said to require, as a constitutional min-
imum, a statement of the essential elements of criminal liability.{42} The practice in many counties
has been to stick to the minimum, although the Vermont court has sometimes strongly encouraged a
fleshing out of barebones charges.{43} But whatever fleshing-out may be required,{44} "[a]n infor-
mation which omits an essential element of the crime charged is defective and cannot serve as the
basis of a conviction."{45} The same is true when an information fails to allege an aggravating ele-
ment allowing enhanced punishment,{46} or facts which would warrant recidivist penalties at sen-
tencing.{47} In such cases, the information will support conviction of only the lesser offense.{48}
The statutory elements need not be pleaded in the exact language of the statute, so long as they are
alleged in substance. A charge that the defendant attempted "sexual assault" against the victim by (in-
ter alia) "forcibly restraining" her and "attempting to engage in sexual intercourse" was sufficient
even though it did not allege the particular "sexual act" attempted{49} or explicitly allege the element
of compulsion.{50}
But even this minimum requirement may not be enforced as to "implicit" elements of liability. Crim-
inal statutes, especially older ones, often do not explicitly state all elements held to be essential for
conviction. In particular, the required mental state is often left unstated in the statutory language and
the court has defined the culpable mens rea by case law.{51} The Vermont Supreme Court has made
a sharp distinction between these implicit elements and explicit "statutory" elements.
An information that omits an implicit element is not "jurisdictionally" defective. Absent a showing of
prejudice, the court wrote in State v. Roy,{52} "where the relevant statute does not specify a
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knowledge or intent element, . . . the omission of such an implied element is not fatal, especially
where the defendant has failed to object below."{53} On a narrow reading of these cases, the distinc-
tion between implicit and statutory elements relates less to the sufficiency of the charge than to coun-
sel's duty to preserve an objection. Omission of a statutory element need not be objected to before
trial and can be properly raised for the first time on appeal,{54} although when the claim is made for
the first time in a collateral postconviction proceeding the defendant must demonstrate preju-
dice.{55} Roy holds that omissions of implicit elements must be objected to in a timely fashion but
leaves ambiguous whether a timely objection should be sustained.{56} Subsequent cases give
grounds to argue that the state may not have a duty to plead implicit elements. In State v. Stani-
slaw,{57} an information charged involuntary manslaughter without alleging any mental element.
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss (for failure to state an offense) but allowed
an interlocutory appeal. Agreeing that criminal negligence was an implicit element of the offense, the
supreme court nevertheless held that the information (which failed to charge it) was not defective,
inasmuch as it "set out the offense in the language of the statute" and "adequately informed defendant
of both the charge against him and his alleged acts giving rise to that charge."{58}
Informations that omit implicit elements are relatively common while it is much rarer for a charge to
drop a statutory element. The difference in treatment seems to be motivated by this difference in fre-
quency. At any rate, the court has stated no principled basis for the distinction. Because the basic goal
is to provide full and fair notice of the charge, a charge that omits an implicit case law element is no
less dangerous than a charge that merely omits statutory language. Nor can the distinction be squared
with the principle that an information "which omits an essential element of the crime charged . . .
cannot serve as the basis of a conviction"{59} inasmuch as implicit elements are every bit as "essen-
tial" as statutory ones.
It is not always obvious whether an essential element is a "statutory" element or merely an implicit
one. In State v. Francis{60} the defendant was charged with assault and robbery.{61} The "assault"
element of this offense, the court held, incorporated the simple assault statutes,{62} which in turn
spelled out various species of misdemeanor assault and their accompanying mental states. The statu-
tory elements of the assault statute, the court held, are merely implied elements of the robbery statute,
and so failure to plead them in a robbery prosecution does not fall within the rule of Kreth.{63} Simi-
larly, an allegation of an attempt need not specifically allege the statutory elements of the attempt
statute,{64} for example, that the defendant failed to complete the crime "by reason of being inter-
rupted or prevented[,]" so long as the charge, read in connection with the affidavit of probable cause,
gives fair notice of the crime.{65}
5.07
- Negating Exceptions
Its pretty appallign to review the SBN's TPO application of 12/20/12 when considering it
knew full well it had an ongoing litigation with Couglin in NG12-0204 and an impending appeal in
62337 wherein Coughlin was both the party and the attorney therein (representing himself), further,
the coy approach in Exhibit 1 therein where King is referred to in the third person, and there is no at-
tribution as to authorship, and King failed to incorporate by reference such Exhibit 1 Summary into
the verifcation or declaration he wasn't even permitted to make anyways (one, for a corporation such
as the SBN, it must be an officer, two, King was seeking the TPO, in part, for himself, and that is not
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permitted under NRS 33.270...). Further, the statement in the SBN's 12/20/12 TPO Applciation Ex-
hibit 1 Summary that Coughlin no longer has any business on the State Bar's property or with the
State Bar that might involve needing to contact the SBN or submit papers for filing or otherwise
(perhaps incident to a pressing and short deadline, especially where King, cheatin' again, failed to
comply with SCR 119 upon Coughlin seeking to obtain a copy of the transcript of the 11/14/12 hear-
ing, even, as Couglin expressed, where the SBN may attempt to require payment up font, as Kign
waited over a month to even respond to Couglin's queries in that regard, and in the meantime had ex
part communications with the Chair and the court reporter firm resulting in the equally appalign
11/16/12 Order by Chair Echeverria, whom couldn't judge his way out of a paper bag, some might
say, so devoid of any sort of appearance of neutrality or judicial temperment as to render the idea of
him being a judge a truly frightening proposition, some might say.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 179:16 to 180:22) MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is a preliminary in-
vestigation. Bar rules require attorneys to cooperate with the preliminary investigation. As I under-
stand, Mr. King is trying to establish whether or not you did so. That's an issue that I believe is rele-
vant to the determination of the degree of punishment, if any, that should flow to you as a result of
your conduct. So, Mr. King, move on, please. MR. KING: Thank you. THE WITNESS: Your Hon-
or, can I just quickly attempt to more thoroughly address that issue? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I think
you've been afforded adequate opportunity to do so. Howyou choose to respond is up to you. Mr.
King, next question, please. MR. KING: Thank you. THE WITNESS: That's the whole notice thing.
You're asking me to answer a question based upon a two-page letter where I haven't been noticed on
the idea that I will be asked to. And then if I don't -- if I'm working through it, you're cutting me off,
not letting me put it in the record. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King, you cited in one of your pleadings
a request that all issues pending before you be heard at one hearing. There was a letter you sent to the
state Bar that you quote in one of your pleadings. THE WITNESS: I requested that? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Yes, sir. THE WITNESS: You haven't read my pleadings. My whole point was
bifurcating, how ridiculous it is to glom all these together. I 'msogladyoujust saidthat ontherec-
ord.
A review of the ROA of 2/13/13 reveals no such thing as that Echeverria refers to where he
states HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 180:13 to 180:16) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King, you cited in
one of your pleadings a request that all issues pending before you be heard at one hearing. There was
a letter you sent to the state Bar that you quote in one of your pleadings.
What is really revealed in that slip of Echeverria's tongue is the extent to which followed
through on his threat to Couglin of 10/15/12 to have numerous ex part communications with the Pan-
el and Chair wherein he would have great opportunity to push his slanted agenda on them, which, as
Couglin could have easily predicted, King seeking to obfuscate the issues by managing to convince
the Panel and Chair that Couglin actually didn't want a bifirucated disciplinary hearing (ie, one to ad-
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dress that which the panel had jurisdiction to address pursuant to 60838...the petty larceny candy bar
conviction; and then two, or maybe three or four (its not necessarily Coughlin's fault that cops and
judges and prosecutors are handing out arrests, convictions, and prosecutions like candy...additionaly
hearings...the number largely depends on the Orders by the Court stemming from SCR 111 Petitions
that King gets paid rather well to file.
NRS 33.360 Limitations on effect of provisions. The provisions of NRS
33.200 to 33.360, inclusive, do not:
1. Modify the duty of an employer to provide a safe workplace for the employees of the em-
ployer and other persons present at the workplace of the employer;
2. Prohibit a person from engaging in any constitutionally protected exercise of free
speech, including, without limitation, speech involving labor disputes concerning organized labor; or
3. Prohibit a person from engaging in any activity which is part of a labor dispute.
The SBN/OBC versus attorney thing is kind of a labor dispute too...essentially a top heavy
bar insists on leveraging long standing relationships, juice, connections, and cronyism sufficiently to
allow someone as lazy and dishonest as, say, Pat King, to be able to keep on truckin'...though he may
have to do a hit piece or two for this or that judge or lycan attorney, some migh say (not lichen,
which Echeverria would know if he actually read anything in this, utilized any of the disc exhibits,
etc., etc....but clearly, he did not, as he even indicate at one point to Couglin that he understood that
Couglin had himself requested that everyting be taken care of immediately in one hearing, which, ob-
viously, would, sort of, go against Couglin's whole motion to bifurcate and arguments that the
SBN/OBC/NNDB/Panel (its impossible to tell them apart) lack jurisdiction and or authority to con-
solidate all the various allegations King sought to cram into his 5 page complaint (huh? A 5 page
SCR 105 complaint (which mostly seeks to avoid complying with King's duties to file Petitions under
104 and 111, yet still seeks to levarage the SCR 111(5) a conviction is conclusive proof ap-
proach...all of which skips the part where the Supreme Court enters and orders bestowing what juris-
diction it sees fit the the NNDB and Panel, limited in purpose and scope)..
Criminal statutes sometimes state a general prohibition and then allow exceptions. Early cases made a
difficult distinction, for pleading purposes, between exceptions that were "part of the definition of the
offense" and those that were "matters of excuse." {66} More recently the court has avoided such dis-
tinctions, stressing its "common sense approach" to matters of pleading and treating statutory excep-
tions in much the same way as it treats nonelement allegations.{67} Thus, in State v.
DeLaBruere{68} defendants charged with violating the truancy statutes argued that the information
was insufficient because it did not negate four statutory exceptions to the compulsory attendance law.
The court rejected the challenge on the ground that the information had pleaded all statutory elements
and sufficiently apprised the defense of the charge. The prosecution "does not have to make allega-
tions of everything it will prove. Normally it is sufficient to allege the statutory elements without
more, as long as the defendants are sufficiently apprised of the charges against them."{69} The
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charge must be read "in conjunction with the accompanying affidavit" which in this case provided all
necessary detail, and "none of the statutory exceptions were involved in the case."{70}
(NOTE: The various iterations of the Complaints herein fail to sufficiently identify, allege, and sup-
port with reasonable specificity the alleged facts support such violations of the crime charge, which
would entail that RCA Sooudi had done what RPD Detective Ytrubide so obviously did not do (by
virtue of his listing NRS 200.591 as the crime chargeThe RCA failed to negate the statutory excep-
tion so obvious in this matter, ie that found in NRS 33.
ating, how ridiculous it is to glom all these together. I'm so glad you just said that on the record. BY
MR. KING: Q Could you please take a look at this document that's been marked as Exhibit No. 9,
and tell me if you recognize that? A You actually just said that. My whole point was -- Q Mr.
Coughlin, there is a question pending -- A -- separate hearing. The sole purpose of the 60838 sus-
pension, on a candy bar. That was my whole point. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, those issues
have been resolved. Mr. King has asked you a question. THE WITNESS: By an order you entered
the day after you were empaneled. BY MR. KING: Q I don't have that much time, Mr. Coughlin.
Would you please answer the question I asked, which is if you recognize -- MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Excuse me. I'm going to make a comment for the record. MR. KING: Yes. Thank you. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Repeatedly this morning, and I haven't put on the record yet, Mr. Coughlin is mak-
ing faces, rolling his eyes, expressing exacerbation, the conduct of which does not appear directly on
the record, and I want the record to reflect. And if the panel members disagree with me, they are free
to say so. MR. VELLIS: I would join in what the chairman sai
Its telling that Echeverria and Vellis's little retaliatory comments about Couglin's rolling his
eyes making faces (lifting the exact language from Judge Holmes's 3/12/12 Order in FHE5, so de-
rivative...) immediately after Coughlin's I'm so glad you just said that on the record comment to
Echeverria regarding the Panel's utter failure to grasp the essential due process concerns attendant to
the Panel not only violating SCR 111(8), but also, co-signing King's fraudulent approach...lets see,
there is a 5 page complaint, that alleges and unenumerated numbers of violations of twelve different
RPC's (and tack on the whole purpose of the hearing as order in 60838 on 6/7/12 as a thirteenth after-
thought thereto) which spawned a sprawling 24 page FOFCOL of 12/14/12, yet, somehow, only
managed to required a formal disciplinary hearing of less than one 8 hour day (lots of smoke breaks
for cigars and to watch King play with the Great Dane he brings with him to work, even on days
where he wears cargo pants to a formal disciplinary hearing where he asks the panel to permanently
disbar a Nevada Lawyer (and not like, one living in San Francisco running for some elected office
whom already got several continuances, etc., etc), one raised in Nevada, whom attended Reno High,
UNR for college, UNLV for Law School, etc., etc. and is livign and working in Reno, even during a
miserable five year run of economic downturn...this San Diego transplant Pat King, co-signing all the
ego driven fraudulent baseless arrests by all the California transplant law enforcement officers harass-
ing Coughlin this year (Duralde, Sifre, Dye, Weaver, Reyes, etc., etc):
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HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 189:5 to 189:20) BY MR. KING: Q If you will look at the second
to the last paragraph on Page 2. It reads, "Mr. Coughlin is a licensed attorney at law who implied dur-
ing trial that his incarceration for contempt would adversely affect his clients. Yet, Mr. Coughlin, in
his 'affidavit of poverty' does not indicate any" -- A Are you wearing cargo pants at a bar hearing? Q
-- "from his practice of law." MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Did you just interrupt again? Sir?
THE WITNESS: I thought he was done. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No, you didn't. You couldn't have.
Please, sir -- THE WITNESS: I was taken aback by the fact that he's wearing cargo pants to a Bar
hearing. Sorry.
Page 5 of the 12/20/12 TPO Order states: NOTICE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT Any law en-
forcement officer, with or without a warrant, and whether or not a violation occurs in the presence of
the officer, may arrest and take into custody the Adverse Party, when the law enforcement officer has
probable cause to believe that (a) an Order has been issued pursuant to NRS 33.270 against the Ad-
verse Party; (b) the Adverse Party has been served with a copy of the Order; and (c) the Adverse Par-
ty is acting or has acted in violation of the Order.
The Arrest Report for both the TPO and EPO custodial arrests of Coughlin in 3913 and 3914 in-
dicate that such arrests were made without a warrant, indicating that RPD Detective Yturbide found
there was probable cause to so order a custodial arrest of Coughlin. To do so, Detective Yturbide
had to ignore an awful lot of holes in the NRS 33.370 analysis, which was probably pretty easy for
him to do considering he charged Coughlin with violations of the wrong statute anyways, NRS
200.591 (the Harassment/Stalking Protection Order Statute, compared to the far less common Work-
place Harassment Protectio Order Statute in NRS 33.240...however, RPD Detective Yturbide was
provided both the TPO and EPO, and both state in bold on their respective page 1's that a violation
thereof is a misdemeanor while providing a specific statutory citation to NRS 33.240 and reproduc-
tion of the elements of such a violation.
NRS 15.010 Verification of pleadings.
1. In all cases of the verification of a pleading, the affidavit of the party shall state that the
same is true of the partys ownknowledge, except as to the matters which are therein stated on the
partys information and belief, and as to those matters that the party believes it to be true. And where
a pleading is verified, it shall be by the affidavit of the party, unless the party is absent from the coun-
ty where the attorneys reside, or from some cause unable to verify it, or the facts are within the
knowledge of the partys attorney or other person verifying the same.
2. When the pleading is verified by the attorney, or any other person except the party, the
attorneyor other personshall set forthintheaffidavit thereasonswhyit isnot madebytheparty.
3. When a corporation is a party, the verification may be made by any officer thereof...
4. In all cases where, by the foregoing provisions, the verification may be made by the attorney,
such verification may be by the attorney made on information and belief if the facts are not within the
attorneys knowledge.
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5. The affidavit may be in substantially the following form and need not be subscribed before a
notary public:
Under penalties of perjury, the undersigned declares that he or she is the ................................
(plaintiff, defendant) named in the foregoing ................................ (complaint, answer) and knows the
contents thereof; that the pleading is true of his or her own knowledge, except as to those matters
stated on information and belief, and that as to such matters he or she believes it to be true.
Thereafter, on page 3 of his 12/20/12 TPO Application King lies in alleging I have given no-
tice of this Application to the Adverse Party by the following method(s): E-mail. Date: December
19
th
, 2012. Time: 3:30. I have not received confirmation.
King did not E-mail Coughlin any such TPO Application. Whether King has SBN Clerk of
Court/Investigator/Paralegal Laura Peters email Coughlin any such Application is not indicated, nor
is whether the 3:30 listed for the Time am or pm. What is clear is that RJC Chief Judge Scott
Pearsons'
THERE IS PUBLISHED SUPPORT FOR DENYING, VACATING, OR DISSOLVING TPO/EPO'S SUCH AS
THOSE IN 607 IN LIGHT OF DEFICIENCIES IN THE FILINGS SUCH AS THOSE CONTAINED IN KING'S TPOAP-
PLICATION (A DEFICIENCY IN KING'S EPO APPLICATION IS THAT THERE ISN'T AN EPOAPPLICATION, AND
KING HAD TO OF FILED ONE BY THE EXPIRATION OF THE TPOIN 607, A JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITE),
WHICH INCLUDE THE FACT THAT HIS 12/20/12 IS NOT VERIFIED (OR RATHER, THE PART THAT IS VERI-
FIED, IE, PAGES 1 TO 8 OF FROM B-3 CONTAIN ABSOLUTELY NO SUBSTANTIVE FACTS WHATSOEVER, AS
KING PLACED WHAT LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE FACTS HE DID INCLUDED IN HIS TPOAPPLICATION (MOST
OF WHICH ARE IRRELEVANT TO THE STANDARD AND PARTIES INVOLVED IN AN NRS 33.240 OR NRS
33.270 ANALYSIS
b. Denials Based on Some Perceived Deficiency in the Filing (1) Incompleteness In 17% of the 2008
TPO cases, judges denied a TPO request because the Application was deemed incomplete. For exam-
ple, the Applicant may have alluded to an included police report or other exhibit that was not actually
included as part of the filing. Alternatively, the Applicant may have omitted a procedural step in the
TPO filing process, such as failing to include a Confidential Information Sheet, failing to post securi-
ty or pay filing fees in a Workplace TPO case, failing to sign and date an Application, or failing to
complete a certain section of the Application. Finally, the Applicant may have said something in the
Application that triggered a query in the mind of the reviewing judge, such as the need to clarify the
relationship of the parties.161161 One judge commonly uses language like this: Applicant must
provide detailed account of actions of Adverse Party, including dates, times, places, what was said or
threatened, etc. (page 60) Protection Order or Chaos? The TPO Processing Experience in the Las
Vegas Justice Court and Its Larger Implications for Nevada Law Institute for Court Management
Court Executive Development Program 2009-2010 Phase III Project May 2010 Joe Tommasino Staff
Attorney Las Vegas Justice Court:
HTTP://WWW.NCSC.ORG/~/MEDIA/FILES/PDF/EDUCATION%20AND%20CAREERS/CEDP%20PAPERS/2010/
TPO%20PROCESSING%20EXPERIENCE%20AND%20IMPLICATIONS.ASHX
Moreover, the court may require the employer or the person who allegedly committed the
harassment, or both, to appear before the court before determining whether to issue the Temporary
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Order for protection against harassment in the workplace. NRS 33.270(3). In general, a Temporary
Order for protection against harassment in the workplace must not be issued without notice to the
person who allegedly committed the harassment. NRS 33.270(2)However, a court may issue a Tem-
porary Order for protection against harassment in the workplace without written or oral notice to the
person who allegedly committed the harassment or the persons attorney only under the following
conditions: (a) A verified application is accompanied by an affidavit that contains specific facts
which clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the employer,
an employee of the employer while the employee performs the duties of the employees employment
or a person who is present at the workplace of the employer before the person who allegedly commit-
ted the harassment or the persons attorney can be heard in opposition; and (b) The employer and the
employer's attorney, if any, set forth in the affidavit: (1) The efforts, if any, that have been made to
give notice to the person who allegedly committed the harassment; and (2) The facts supporting
waiver of notice requirements. NRS 33.270(4).A Temporary Order for protection against harassment
in the workplace that is granted, with or without notice, must expire not later than 15 days after the
date on which the order is issued, unless the order is extended. NRS 33.270(5); The Temporary Order
for Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace is the only TPO in Nevada that cannot exceed
15 days. This specific TPO also cannot be construed as being effective for 15 days from the date of
service, which is the standard approach that is otherwise applicable in the Reno Justice Court.
If a Temporary Order for protection against harassment in the workplace is granted, with or
without notice, the employer or his authorized agent may apply for an Extended Order for protection
against harassment in the workplace by filing a verified application for an Extended Order for protec-
tion against harassment in the workplace. NRS 33.270(6). Neither King nor the SBN filed the juris-
dictional prerequisite for the issuance of an EPO presented in the mandatory form to be used From
B13: ( Form B13 - Application for Extended Order for Protection Against Harassment in the Work-
place). If such an application is filed, the Temporary Order remains in effect until the hearing on the
application for an Extended Order is held. Id.Additional requirements apply to an application for an
Extended Order. For example, [t]he application must be heard as soon as reasonably possible and
not later than 10 days after the date on which the application is filed with the court unless the court
determines that there are compelling reasons to hold the hearing at a later date. NRS 33.270(6)(c).At
the hearing on an application for an Extended Order, the employer must present evidence sufficient to
support the granting of the request. NRS 33.270(7). At the hearing, the court may dissolve or modify
the Temporary Order for protection against harassment in the workplace, or the court may grant an
Extended Order for protection against harassment in the workplace. Id. If granted, an Extended Order
for protection against harassment in the workplace expires within such time, not to exceed 1 year, as
the court fixes. NRS 33.270(8). Upon two days' notice to an employer who obtained a Temporary
Order for protection against harassment in the workplace without notice or on such shorter notice to
the employer as the court may prescribe, the person who allegedly committed the harassment may
appear and move the dissolution or modification of the Temporary Order for protection against har-
assment in the workplace. NRS 33.270(9). Upon the filing of such a motion, the court must proceed
to hear and determine the motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require. Id.
At the hearing, the court may dissolve, modify or extend the order. Id. The court may award
costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party in an action for the issuance of an Order
for Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace. NRS 33.270(10). If a court issues an Extended
Order for protection against harassment in the workplace, an interlocutory appeal lies to the district
court, which may affirm, modify or vacate the order in question. NRS 33.270(11). The appeal may be
taken without bond, but its taking does not stay the effect or enforcement of the order. Id. A Tempo-
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rary or Extended Order for protection against harassment in the workplace may do any or all of the
following: (a) Enjoin the person who allegedly committed the harassment from contacting the em-
ployer, an employee of the employer while the employee is performing the employees duties of em-
ployment, and any person while the person is present at the workplace of the employer; (b) Order the
person who allegedly committed the harassment to stay away from the workplace of the employer;
and (c) Order such other relief as the court deems necessary to protect the employer, the workplace of
the employer, the employees of the employer while performing their duties of employment and any
other persons who are present at the workplace. NRS 33.280(1).However, a court may not issue a
Temporary or Extended Order for protection against harassment in the workplace that is against more
than one person.NRS 33.280(2). A Temporary or Extended Order for protection against harassment
in the workplace is in addition to and not in lieu of any other available civil or criminal action.119 An
employer is not barred from seeking an order because of other pending proceedings. Id. This re-
striction is not explicit in any of the other TPO types.
A person who intentionally violates a Temporary or Extended Order for protection against
harassment in the workplace is guilty of a misdemeanor, unless a more severe penalty is prescribed
by law for the act that constitutes the violation of the order. NRS 33.350. Finally, the Legislature has
clarified that the provisions relating to Orders for Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace do
not: (a) Modify the duty of an employer to provide a safe workplace for the employees of the em-
ployer and other persons present at the workplace of the employer; (b) Prohibit a person from engag-
ing in any constitutionally protected exercise of free speech, including, without limitation, speech in-
volving labor disputes concerning organized labor; or (c) Prohibit a person from engaging in any ac-
tivity which is part of a labor dispute. NRS 33.360.
King's petition, allegedly for the SBN, contains no proof that King was given any authority by
anyone possessing the authority to give it, to file his TPO/EPO Applicaiton in 607. Further, while
King attaches and email from himself the the President of the State Bar, Francis Flaherty, Kimberly
Farmer, and Bar Counsel David Clark, he fails to attach any sort of response from any of those fig-
ures. Further, it would seem the SBN Board of Governors would need to vote on such a thing. Addi-
tionally, the Office of Bar Counsel (OBC) should be considered a distinct, separate office or entity,
apart from the SBN. Without more, King fails to prove that he has any standing to file his petition,
particularly where the evidence strongly suggest that King filed it for his own benefit, which violates
the requirement that the employer file such application for the employee, a requirement which pre-
cludes the employee, King, from filing it for himself under the guise of doing so for his employer.
Probably the most important fact of all here is that the SBNs Clerk of Court (as both she
and Asst. Bar Counsel King have referred to her and held her out to Coughlin and the public as) had
added Coughlin's email address to her blocked senders list by the time of the alleged emailing b y
Coughlin of 12/12/12. Therefore, Peters did not received such email from Coughlin, and Coughlin
was well aware at that time (Peters had notified him and he was receiving failure messages for emails
he sent to Peters) that she could and would no longer receive any emails from him (this became a
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point of criticism by Coughlin as it underscores the SBN's failure to investigate, and Peters and the
SBN also hold her out as an Investigator). Regardless, even if it is proven that such an email was
sent by Coughlin, there is simply no credible basis for finding that such is a threat to the SBN, Peters,
or King (the SBN's TPO/EPO application in 607 fails to identify just which employee it seeks to pro-
tect, as such, the failure to meet such jurisdicitonal prerequisite renders it void), and further, such
purported correspondence must be seen as constitutionally protected excercise of free speech.
Coughlin has already been subject to severe consequences of the OBC's abuse of process
here, including being subject to $5,000 bondable bail upon his custodial arrest of 2/8/13 (and con-
comitant damage to his ability to defend his 14
th
Amendment protected property right, his law li-
cense, in the appeal of the NNDB Panel's recommendation that he be permanently disbarred (now on
appeal in 62337).
Further, King really applied for the TPO/EPO for himself, and is merely masquerading as the
agent of the SBN sufficient to attempt to get around his lack of standing to so file for himself (to
make his job easier, to intimidate or obstruct Coughlin out of exposing King's fraudulent approach as
a bar counsel, etc.). The application can only be filed by the employer or its agent, pursuant to NRS
33.250. An employee has no standing to file this type of protection order. This application will con-
tain the facts the applicant wants the court to consider in determining whether a protection order
against harassment in the workplace shall be issued. King's application contains nothing Pursuant to
NRS 33.240, in order for the court to grant an application against harassment in the workplace, some
or all of the following acts or threats to commit the
FURTHER, ITS TROUBLING THE RPDDETECTIVE YTRUBIDE WAS REFERRED THIS MATTER IN HIS
ROLE IN THE MISDEMEANOR INVESTIGATIONS DEPARTMENT, YET MANAGE TO INCORRECTLY AND MA-
LICIOUSLY OVERCHARGE COUGHLIN WITH BOTH A GROSS MISDEMEANOR AND A FELONY, ESPECIALLY
WHERE THE SBNFAILED TO EVEN PUT UP THE $100 SECURITY BOND REQUIRED FOR ITS APPLICATION IN
607, ANOTHER JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITE.
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THE FAX HEADER ON THE SBN'S 12/20/12 APPLICATION IN 607 REVEAL THAT THE RJC ITSELF
FAXED THE SBNTHE APPLICATION FORM FOR THE TPO. THAT IS INAPPROPRIATE, MUCH LIKE THE
4/11/12 EMAIL FROMRJC JUDICIAL SECRETARY LORI TOWNSEND TO THE SBN'S KING (ESPECIALLY
WHERE THE RJC HAS STEADFASTLY REFUSED TO EVEN COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT IT RE-
SPOND, BY AFFIDAVIT, WITIHIN 5 DAYS TO THE VARIOUS MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY VARIOUS RJC JUDGES
INCIDENT TO THE FOUR RETALIATORY PROSECUTIONS UNDERTAKEN AGAINST COUGHLIN IN THE RJC
SINCE AUGUST 2011.
ON THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT'S WEB SITE THERE IS LISTED MANDATORY FORMS FOR USE
IN WORKPLACE HARASSMENT PROTECTION ORDER CASES, ONE OF WHICH IS FORM B-1 INFORMATION
ABOUT ORDERS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT, WHICH INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:
(2) WHAT IS THE DEFINITION OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE? UNDER NRS 33.240, HARASS-
MENT IN THE WORKPLACE OCCURS WHEN: 1. APERSON KNOWINGLY THREATENS TO CAUSE OR COMMITS
AN ACT THAT CAUSES: (A) BODILY INJURY TO HIMSELF OR ANOTHER PERSON; (B) DAMAGE TO THE
PROPERTY OF ANOTHER PERSON; OR (C) SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO THE PHYSICAL OR MENTAL HEALTH OR
SAFETY OF A PERSON; 2. THE THREAT IS MADE OR THE ACT IS COMMITTED AGAINST AN EMPLOYER, AN
EMPLOYEE OF THE EMPLOYER WHILE THE EMPLOYEE PERFORMS HIS DUTIES OF EMPLOYMENT OR A PER-
SON PRESENT AT THE WORKPLACE OF THE EMPLOYER; AND 3. THE THREAT WOULD CAUSE A REASONA-
BLE PERSON TO FEAR THAT THE THREAT WILL BE CARRIED OUT OR THE ACT WOULD CAUSE A REASONA-
BLE PERSON TO FEEL TERRORIZED, FRIGHTENED, INTIMIDATED OR HARASSED....
AS YOUARE FILLING OUT THE APPLICATION, YOUSHOULD KEEP THE FOLLOWING THINGS IN MIND:
(1) UNDER NRS 200.581, HARASSMENT IS DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED WHERE THE CONDUCT
OCCURRED OR WHERE THE PERSON WHO WAS AFFECTED BY THE CONDUCT WAS LOCATED AT THE TIME
THAT THE CONDUCT OCCURRED. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE ADVERSE PARTY CAUSES PHYSICAL DAMAGE
TO A BUSINESS IN THIS TOWNSHIP, OR THREATENS EMPLOYEES IN THIS TOWNSHIP, YOUMAY FILE HERE.
IF THE ADVERSE PARTY IS MAKING
THE EMPLOYER MAY NOT SEEK AN IAWHPRIMARILY TO ACCOMPLISH A PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT
WAS NOT DESIGNED SUCH AS PROHIBITING FREE SPEECH OR OTHER ACTIVITIES THAT ARE CONSTITU-
TIONALLY PROTECTED OR OTHERWISE PROTECTED BY LAW. THE TPOAND EPOOBTAINED BY THE
OBC FROM THE RJC IS A BIG AN ABUSE OF PROCESS AS CAN BE. SIMPLY PUT, THE OBCS CLERK OF
COURT, LAURA PETERS, AND ASST. BAR COUNSEL PATRICK KING GREW TIRED OF COUGHLIN DISCOV-
ERING AND POINTING OUT THE NUMEROUS EGREGIOUS INSTANCES OF MISCONDUCT AND FRAUD ON
THEIR PART, AND LEVERAGED THAT PROTECTION ORDER AGAINST WORKPLACE HARASSMENT AT THE
FIRST MOMENT THEY (UNDER THEIR COMPLETELY UNREASONABLE VIEWPOINT) FELT THERE WAS EVEN A
SCINTILLA OF SOMETHING TO HANG THEIR HAT ON, NEVERMIND THAT SUCH CONSISTED OF A PROTECTED
WRITTEN GRIEVANCE TO THE SBNABOUT COUGHLIN'S WCPD'S PATENT, PER SE PROFESSIONAL MIS-
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CONDUCT, OR THAT THE ALLEGED IMPLIED THREAT IN NO WAY RELATED TO THE SBN (THE SBNIS
NOT AND NEVER WAS COUGHLIN'S PUBLIC DEFENDER, AND EVEN IF IT WAS, NOTHING IN THE EMAIL
COUGHLIN IS ALLEGED TO HAVE SENT THE WCPDON 12/12/12 (COPIED TO
COMPLAINTS@NVBAR.ORG AS A WRITTEN GRIEVANCE AGAINST LESLIE) COULD REASONABLY BE IN-
TERPRETED TO BE A THREAT, MUCH LESS SOMETHING WORTHY OF A YEARLONG PROTECTION ORDER.
FURTHER, THE OBC AND CLERK OF COURT LAURA PETERS WISHED TO AVOID BEING PLACED ON NO-
TICE OF THE WRONGDOING OF RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., AND OTHERS BY COUGHLIN'S FAXES AND EMAILS
(MANY OF WHICH CONTAINED AUDIO AND VIDEO FILES DEMONSTRATING THAT HILL HAS LIED CONTIN-
UOUSLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO HAVE COUGHLIN DISBARRED), IN ADDITION TO SHORTENING THE TIME
COUGHLIN WOULD HAVE TO PREPARE AND FILE POST-HEARING MOTIONS, AND MOTIOSN TO ALTER,
AMEND, VACATE, OR OTHERWISE CHALLENGE THE 12/14/12 FINDINGS OF FACT; CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
OF THE NNDBPANEL IN THE FORMAL DISCIPLINARY MATTER HELD ON 11/14/12, WHICH THE OBC AND
NNDBALLEGE WAS COMPRISED OF THE DICTATE TO DECIDE COUGHLIN'S NATURE AND EXTENT OF
COUGHLIN'S PUNISHMENT FOR HIS CONVICTION OF PETTY LARCENY IN RMC 11 CR 22176 (SEE 60838),
ALONG WITH THREE GRIEVANCES (NG12-0204 BY RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ.; NG12-0434 BY RMC
JUDGES (ACCORDING TO JUDGE HOLMES, SEE JUDGE DILWORTH'S DISPUTING JUDGE HOLMES' ASSER-
TIONS IN HER 3/14/12 WRITTEN GRIEVANCE TO THE OBC AS TO HER ACTING ON BEHALF OF ALL OF THE
RMC, INCLUDING HER FELLOW JUDGES; AND NG12-0435, THE GRIEVANCE, APPARENTLY, CONSISTING
OF THE 4/13/09 ORDER AFTER TRIAL BY RMC ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE WILLIAMGARDNER'S SISTER,
2JDC JUDGE LINDA GARDNER, WHICH SANCTIONED COUGHLIN $934 UNDER NRS 7.085 INCIDENT TO A
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS MADE DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT BY SPRINGGATE IN A DIVORCE CASE (IE,
NO COMPLIANCE BY SPRINGGATE WITH NRCP'S PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT THAT A FILING READY
SANCTIONS MOTION BE SERVED ON COUGHLIN 21 DAYS PRIOR TO MAKING SUCH A MOTION FOR AN AT-
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TORNEY'S FEE SANCTION...WHICH WAS LARGELY PREMISED ON THE ASSERTION THAT COUGHLIN FAILED
TO FOLLOW PROCEDURAL RULES, EVEN WHERE IT WAS SPRINGGATE WHOSE TRIAL STATEMENT WAS
FILED LATE AND SPRINGGATE WHOM FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER IN FAILING TO
HAVE, WHERE HE SOUGHT THE INTRODUCTION OF MORE THAN TEN EXHIBITS, THOSE EXHIBITS INDEXED,
BOUND, AND TABBED, AND FAILED TO PROVIDE A COPY OF SUCH TO OPPOSING COUNSEL AT THE TIME OF
TRIAL, AS REQUIRED BY JUDGE L. GARDNER'S 2/25/09 PRE-TRIAL ORDER. THE SAME FAILURE TO COM-
PLY WITH THE 21 DAY SAFE HARBOR JURISDICITONAL PREREQUISITE BY RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ.'S AS-
SOCIATE, BAKER, WOULD RENDER JUDGE FLANAGAN'S $42,065.00 SANCTION AWARD OF 6/25/12 (FOR-
MAL HEARING EXHIBIT 2 AT THE 11/14/12 DISCIPLINARY HEARING) VOID AS WELL, EXCEPT FOR THE
FACT THAT NRAP 38 ACTUALLY APPLIES, RATHER THAN NRS 7.085 (WHICH INVOKES NRCP 11, IE,
NOT APPLICABLE TO APPEALS, AND NRAP 38 MUST BE MADE ON A COURT'S OWN MOTION, AND THE AP-
PLICATION OF DCR 13(3) THAT JUDGE FLANAGAN ADMITS TO IN HIS 6/25/12 ORDER IN 03628 (JUDGE
FLANAGAN WROTE: AFTER REVIEWING MERLISS'S MOVING PAPERS-INCLUDING THE DETAILED AND
THOROUGH SUMMARY OF FEES AND HIS COUNSELS' ACCOMPANYING DECLARATIONS-ANDAFTER CON-
SI DERI NGALL OF THE PARTI ES' ARGUMENTS, THIS COURT CONCLUDES MERLISS'S ATTORNEY'S FEES
REQUEST IS AUTHORIZED BY NEVADA LAW. THIS COURT ALSO HAS CONSIDERED THE FACTORS SET
FORTH IN BRUNZELL, SUPRA. AFTER ANALYZING THOSE FACTORS, ANDGI VENTHE UNI QUE FEATURES
OF THI SCASE, THIS COURT CONCLUDES MERLISS'S FEE REQUEST IS REASONABLE. P3:13.. WHERE
JUDGE FLANAGAN SPECIFICALLY MENTIONS ONLY THE LANDLORD'S MOVING PAPERS AND WHERE HE
PREVIOUSLY NOTES (INCORRECTLY) IN THE ORDER THAT COUGHLIN FAILED TO FILE ANY OPPOSITION
(I NTHE ABSENCE OF ANY OPPOSI TI ONFROMAPPELLANT ZACHARYBARKER COUGHLIN
("COUGHLIN"), MERLISS SUBMITTED THIS MATTER FOR DECISION ON MAY 9, 2012. HOWEVER, ON JUNE
9, 2012, COUGHLIN FILED A SUPPLEMENT TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES. IN RE-
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SPONSE, MERLISS FILED A REPLY TO SUPPLEMENT TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES ON
JUNE 14, 2012, AND SUBMITTED THE MATTER-AGAIN-THAT SAME DAY. MERLISS REQUESTS THIS COURT
TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF $42,065.50 AGAINST COUGHLIN IN THE UNDERLYING
SUMMARY EVICTION MATTER PURSUANT TO NRS 69.050 AND NRS 7.085 P1:5-16; BUT NOTE,
COUGHLIN'S LAW LICENSE WAS SUSPENDED IN 60838 PURSUANT TO HIS CONVICTION OF PETTY LAR-
CENY IN THE RMC OF A CANDY BAR AND SOME COUGH DROPS , A SUSPENSION NOW LASTING NEARLY
ONE YEAR (11/30/11 CONVICTION BY JUDGE HOWARD IN 11 CR 22176, WHERE A THREE DAY INCAR-
CERATION WAS ALSO ORDERED INCIDENT TO AN ORDER PUNISHING SUMMARY CONTEMPT INCIDENT TO
COUGHLIN'S BEING FORCED TO SELF REPRESENT WHERE DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
COUNSEL BY THE RMC), (COMPARE TO STEPHEN R. HARRIS, ESQ'S MISAPPROPRIATING $755,000 FROM
CLIENTS, ADMITTING TO USING IT ON PROSTITUTES AND DESIGNER GOOD RECEIVING ONLY A THREE
MONTHS ACTUAL SUSPENSION, NO TEMPORARY SUSPENSION, ETC., ETC., AND NO CRIMINAL PROSECU-
TION INCIDENT THERETO) ( FURTHER, IN HIS 8/28/12 ORDER IN 03628, JUDGE FLANAGAN FURTHER
DROVE HOME THE POINT THAT HIS 6/25/12 ORDER WAS NOT AN ATTORNEY FEES SANCTION, WHEREIN
JUDGE FLANAGAN WROTE: AGAIN, AS WAS THE CASE IN COUGHLIN'S ATTEMPT TO SET ASIDE
MERLISS'S AWARD OF COSTS COUGHLIN'S MOTIONS HERE ATTEMPT TO RE-LITIGATE SUBSTANTIVE IS-
SUES THIS COURT HAS ALREADY DECIDED, OR FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY IG-
NORED. P2:6-10; FURTHER THE OBC'S KING EMAIL COUGHLIN A COPY OF THAT 8/28/12 ORDER BY
JUDGE FLANAGAN, PROVIDING CONCLUSIVE PROOF THAT KING WAS AWARE OF IT, AND YET PERSISTED
IN HIS VIOLATING OF RPC 3.1, AND 3.3 IN SEEKING TO HAVE COUGHLIN DISBARRED INCIDENT TO THE
FRAUDULENT ASSERTION HE AND HILL MAINTAINED AT THE 11/14/12 HEARING THAT JUDGE
FLANAGAN'S ATTORNEY FEE AWARD OF 6/25/12 WAS A SANCTION.
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Peters and King are basically afraid of a few things they did wrong, and which are perhaps
fraudulent, causing consequences to their careers...and, accordingly, the began to threaten to abuse
the protection order process in early November 2012 (shortly after Coughlin pointed out that the SBN
put insufficient postage on the only copy of the Notice of Intent To Take Default is mail to Coughlin
on 10/9/12, causing the USPS to refuse to release it to Coughlin, requiring a continuance of the
11/14/12 formal hearing, which the SBN did not want to see happen, so the cover up began in more
ernest. Also, Peters and King are seeking to hide the fact that Peters announced to Coughlin on
9/11/12 that his filing would be accepted and filed in were submitted BYFAX (something which the
SBN/NNDB has never disputed...but which they now wish to work an end run around by leveraging
the RJC's TPO/EPO process). Peters 11/9/12 Affidavit is integral in that regard, especially with re-
spect to her then newly made contention that Coughlin told her he never received the Complaint
(which is not true, Coughlin did not indicate one way or the other whether he actually received the
8/23/12 Complaint in the mail, but regardless, that does not matter, and does not excuse Peters fraud-
ulent failure to file in Coughlin's 9/17/12 Motion to Dismiss and the extent to which Bar Counsel
King excercises an impermissible level of control over disciplinary proceedings where the NNDB is
negligent in absconding from its duties. The SBN also seeks to intimidate Coughlin out of pointing
out the many fraudulent attempts by the OBC and Clerk of Court to excise from the record key filings
by Coughlin, whilst adding materials the OBC wants in the record that are not proper to include with-
in such.
RE: PENDING FINAL DISPOSITION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS....LANGUAGE SCR 111(7)
VERSUS SCR 111(8) AND THE JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER OF THE NV. S. CT.? FROM: ZACH COUGHLIN
(ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM) SENT: THU10/11/12 4:56 PM TO: LAURAP@NVBAR.ORG 1
ATTACHMENT 1 29 2012 LETTER TO CLERK OF COURT ORDUNA HASTINGS REGARDING EFLEX REJEC-
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TIONS WITH ATTACHMENTS 41 PAGES TOTAL.PDF (957.8 KB) DEAR CLERK OF COURT PETERS, ARE YOU
SURE I INDICATED ONE WAY OR THE OTHER WHETHER I RECEIVED THE COMPLAINT? WAS THERE SOME
MENTION OF AUGUST 23RD, 2012? CAN BAR COUNSEL KING ACTUALLY DO SOME LEGAL RESEARCH
FOR ONCE, EVER? DOES HE HAVE A CITATION TO ANY AUTHORITY OR CASES THAT SAYS A MOTION TO
DISMSS MAY NOT BE FILED UNLESS THE RESPONDENT MAKES SOME AFFIRMATIVE INDCATION TO THE
CLERK OF COURT AS TO WHETHER HE ACTUALLY RECEIVED A COMPLAINT? NRCP 5(E) MAKES CLEAR
THE CLERK OF COURT AND FILING OFFICE OF THE SBNARE NOT PERMITTED TO REFUSE FILINGS. SO,
THE SEPTEMBER 17TH, 2012 MOTION TO DISMISS MUST BE FILED BY CLERK OF COURT PETERS, OR MIS-
CONDUCT EXISTS. FACTS FURTHER, NRCP 5(E) HOLDS THAT: "(E) FILING WITH THE COURT DEFINED.
THE FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS WITH THE COURT AS REQUIRED BY THESE RULES SHALL
BE MADE BY FILING THEM WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT, EXCEPT THAT THE JUDGE MAY PERMIT THE
PAPERS TO BE FILED WITH THE JUDGE, IN WHICH EVENT THE JUDGE SHALL NOTE THEREON THE FILING
DATE AND FORTHWITH TRANSMIT THEM TO THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK. ACOURT MAY BY LOCAL RULE
PERMIT PAPERS TO BE FILED, SIGNED OR VERIFIED BY ELECTRONIC MEANS THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH
TECHNICAL STANDARDS, IF ANY, THAT THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ESTABLISH-
ES. APAPER SIGNED BY ELECTRONIC MEANS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE LOCAL RULE CONSTITUTES A
WRITTEN PAPER PRESENTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF APPLYING THESE RULES. THE CLERK SHALL NOT RE-
FUSE TO ACCEPT FOR FILING ANY PAPER PRESENTED FOR THAT PURPOSE SOLELY BECAUSE IT IS NOT PRE-
SENTED IN PROPER FORM AS REQUIRED BY THESE RULES OR ANY LOCAL RULES OR PRACTICES." THE FIL-
ING OFFICER CLERK'S IN THE 2ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WASHOE COUNTY, AND THE MANAG-
ERS, SUPERVISORS, AND ADMINISTRATORS REGULARLY REFUSE FILING IN CONTRAVENTION OF NRCP
5(E). FURTHER, THE DROP BOX REQUIRED BY WDCR 12(10) IS NO MORE. THE DROP BOX WAS REMOVED
ABOUT 6 MONTHS AGO. THE EFILING FEE TRIPLED, ABOUT SIX MONTHS AGO, ON JULY 1, 2011. THE
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CONNECTION IS HARD TO IGNORE. I SERIOUSLY, SERIOUSLY DOUBT THE DROP BOX WAS AS UNDERUTI-
LIZED AS I HAVE HEARD SUGGESTED. I WOULD IMAGINE THE HARD WORKING, DEDICATED FILING OFFICE
STAFF MAY ACTUALLY PREFER HAVING THE DROP BOX TO CUT DOWN ON THE LINES. NONETHELESS, I
WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THE DICTATES OF WDCR 12(10) WERE RENDERED NULL BY ANY UNDER USE....
SBN v. Zachary Coughlin? From: Laura Peters (LauraP@nvbar.org) This sender is in your safe
list. Sent: Thu 7/26/12 3:08 PM To: 'zachcoughlin@hotmail.com'
(zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) Cc: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org) Mr. Coughlin: I have been
contacted by Tom Susich of the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board. I understand that you would
like to schedule a formal hearing in your matter. I have gathered some available dates in September
and October let me know what will work for you: September 25, 26 or 27 October 15, 16, 17, 18,
30 or 31 Thank you, Laura Peters Paralegal State Bar of Nevada RE: Hearing date? From:
Laura Peters (LauraP@nvbar.org) This sender is in your safe list. Sent: Fri 8/17/12 2:54
PM To: 'Zach Coughlin' (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) Zach: How about September 25th,
work for you? - Laura -----Original Message----- From: Zach Coughlin [mail-
to:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com] Sent: Friday, August 17, 2012 2:26 PM To: Laura Peters Subject:
Hearing date Dear Ms. Peters, Please set the hearing date as soon as possible for any matter involving
me that has been referred to the bar or the disciplinary panel. thanks Zach Coughlin RE: Motion to
Dismiss SBN v. Coughlin? From: Laura Peters (LauraP@nvbar.org) This sender is in your safe
list. Sent: Wed 9/26/12 11:54 AM To: 'Zach Coughlin' (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) I never
said that you could file items via e-mail I dont make those calls. I have to file documents in so you
have to serve them here. I want to cooperate with you but I cant change the procedural requirements.
- Laura From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com] Sent: Monday, September
24, 2012 2:50 PM To: Laura Peters; Patrick King; David Clark; tsusich@nvdetr.org Subject: FW:
Motion to Dismiss SBN v. Coughlin Dear Clerk of the Court of the State Bar of Nevada Peters,
Please note the forwarded Motion to Dismiss SBN v Coughlin filed on September 17th, 2012 (I also
will forward the one I sent just prior to midnight of the 17th, of Setpember 2012. Please let me know
anything I should know about the Hearing tomorrow, September 25th, 2012 on and only on the mat-
ters limited to those set forth in the N,. S. Ct ORder of june 7th, 212 in 60383 and pursuant to my
SCR102(4)(3) Petition 61426. Please make sure Bar counsel is aware of the extent to which you pre-
viously guaranteed me that no service of any Complaint in SBN V Coughlin sent by certified mail
would be deemed effectuated by the SBN where based merely upon the return to sender of the first
attempt to so serve me under SCR 109 such a Complaint, which you indicated you had just received
as returned to sender on September 10th, 2012, and where you further indicated that I could serve any
filings on my behalf thereafter upon the SBN via electronic means including fax or email. Sincerley,
Zach Coughlin PO BOX 3961 Reno, NV 89505 Tel 775 338 8118 Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com To: tsusich@nvdetr.org;
patrickk@nvbar.org; davidc@nvbar.org Subject: Motion to Dismiss SBN v. Coughlin Date: Tue, 18
Sep 2012 00:02:54 -0700 Zach Coughlin PO BOX 3961 Reno, NV 89505 Tel 775 338 8118 Fax 949
667 7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com RE: pending final disposition of disciplinary proceed-
ings....language SCR 111(7) versus SCR 111(8) and the June 7th, 2012 Order of the NV. S. Ct.?
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From: Laura Peters (LauraP@nvbar.org) This sender is in your safe list. Sent: Wed 10/10/12 6:01
PM To: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) Please don't put words in my mouth,
Zach. You are the one that indicated that you had not received the Complaint when we talked on the
phone. Why, then, would I file in a Motion to Dismiss? I am responsible for my own actions. - Laura
(aka Clerk Peters) From: Zach Coughlin [zachcoughlin@hotmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, October 10,
2012 11:51 AM To: tsusich@nvdetr.org; Laura Peters; David Clark; Patrick King;
nvscclerk@nvcourts.nv.gov Subject: FW: pending final disposition of disciplinary proceed-
ings....language SCR 111(7) versus SCR 111(8) and the June 7th, 2012 Order of the NV. S. Ct. Dear
Chairman Susich and Clerk Peters, Bar Counsel King sees himself as a the Director of this movie,
placing you two in the scenes where he sees fit. Chairman Susich, it is your responsibility to comply
with the Court's Order and the Supreme Court Rules, and at this point, you need to send a clear mes-
sage to Bar Counsel that "the kid stays in the picture", and inform Mr. King that he is not to attempt
to take your job or duties from you. Same goes for Clerk Peters, especially vis a vis her admission
that King told her not to file Coughlin's Motion to Dismiss in SBN v Coughlin on September 17th,
2012, which has now gone unopposed, and therefore, shall be granted. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin PO
BOX 3961 Reno, NV 89505 Tel 775 338 8118 Fax 949 667 7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com CC: DavidC@nvbar.org Subject: RE:
pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings....language SCR 111(7) versus SCR 111(8) and
the June 7th, 2012 Order of the NV. S. Ct. Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2012 16:44:27 +0000 Dear Mr. Cough-
lin, When you met with me and David Clark to discuss the Complaint and the process. Mr. Clark ex-
plained that since there was a conviction, the sole issue to be determined was the extent of the disci-
pline. Not if you committed the crime, since that was already determined beyond a reasonable
doubt. It is that context that we are reading the rule. Not that the state bar is precluded from bringing
additional allegations against you. Any additional allegations that have not already resulted in crimi-
nal convictions will need to be proved by clear and convincing evidence. As such, at the hearing,
on the issue of your criminal convictions, the only issue for the panel to decide is the appropriate dis-
cipline. However, I will be providing evidence as to the other allegations in the Complaint. The Panel
will decide if the state bar has met its burden of proof as to those allegations in the complaint, other
than the criminal convictions, and will decide the appropriate discipline on the totality of the case,
including mitigating and aggravating factors that may be presented at the hearing. As such, I do not
intend bifurcate these proceedings. I think to do so would cause unnecessary confusion, undue time
and expense and would be prejudicial to the administration of justice. I am advised that you have
not yet filed an Answer to the Complaint. I have sent you a notice of intent to proceed on a default
basis. The hearing date is expected to be Wednesday November 14, 2012. I will be sending you a no-
tice of hearing, along with a list of witness, and evidence that I intend to introduce at the hearing. Pat-
rick King, Assistant Bar Counsel. From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com] Sent:
Wednesday, October 10, 2012 6:18 AM To: tsusich@nvdetr.org; David Clark; Laura Peters; Patrick
King Subject: pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings....language SCR 111(7) versus
SCR 111(8) and the June 7th, 2012 Order of the NV. S. Ct. Dear Chairman Susich, Bar Counsel, and
Clerk Peters, I am writing formally request a bifurcation of sorts, consiering: SCR 111(7). Suspension
on certification. Upon the filing with the supreme court of a petition with a certified copy of proof of
the conviction, demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted of a serious crime, the court shall
enter an order suspending the attorney, regardless of the pendency of an appeal, pending final dispo-
sition of a disciplinary proceeding, which shall be commenced by the appropriate disciplinary board
upon referral by the supreme court. For good cause, the court may set aside its order suspending the
attorney from the practice of law. I think Bar Counsel's argument that the "proceeding" call for in the
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Court's June 7th, 2012 Order (which quotes SCR 111(7) may include some SCR 105 Complaint (ie,
a SBN v. Zachary B. Coughlin Complaints bringin in all sorts of matters, including pending criminal
actions, and wearing pajamas, and Orders by Judges purporting to take away this or that right of
Coughlin's to practice this or that in some court (an Order which Patrick King reference to me and
Chief Bar Counsel Clark, and, apparently, to a client of mine in early May 2012 (the client is the only
other place I have ever heard of such an unpublished "Order" purporting to have said effect) despite
the dictate against Bar Counsel's doign so in SCR 121 (the SCR 11 Petition was not even filed at that
point, and one has to wonder if some deal between that client, Bar Counsel, and the new attorney that
client can now magically afford was worked out, with nothing said of any torts that client committed
against Coughin, etc., etc., much less criminal law violations, which Coughlin just put up with). But
my point is, Bar Counsel King points ot the "pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding"
language of SCR 111(7)...which is quoted in the Court's June 7th, 2012 ORder (though I feel Bar
Counsel is taking the quote out of context and ignoring the express language of SCR 111(7) in mak-
ing this argument that the "pending final disposition of the disciplinary proceedings" language in the
Court's June 7th, 2012 Order entitles Bar Counsel to file a SBN v. Coughlin Complaint deny Cough-
lin that afforded under SCR 111(8) (which the JUne 7th, 2012 Order cites to as well), and, given
Coughlin's Petition in 61426, filed and served on August 13th, 2012 (the service of which was con-
sented to or waived by Bar Counsel King and Clark where they directed Clerk Laura Peters to sign
"Proof of Receipt" thereof on August 13th, 2012...), Coughlin is now entitled to an "immediate hear-
ing" pursuant to SCR 102(4)(d), and SCR 111(10). The Court's June 7th, 2012 Order reads, in rele-
vant part: "Pursuant to SCR 111, temporary suspension and referral
to the appropriate disciplinary board are mandatory when an attorney has been convicted of a
"serious" crime, which includes theft. SCR 111 (6)-(8). Accordingly, pursuant to SCR 111
(8), we refer this matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal
hearing before a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent of
the discipline to be imposed. Furthermore, pursuant to SCR 111(7), we hereby temporarily
suspend Zachary B. Coughlin from the practice of law in Nevada, pending final disposition of
the disciplinary proceedings." Note that the Order says "pending final disposition of the dis-
ciplinary proceedings" . It does not say "pending final disposition of an SCR 105 Complaint
filed by SBN as the complainant (see Ching). And, in fact, SCR 111(8) clear that up further, I
give Patrick King credit for making a crafty argument, but its just not colorable. I am so used
to this with Pat by now, he plays dumb in a way that screw one out of their due process, but it
is clear he knows exactly what he is doing, that crafty sum'itch. SCR 111(8): "8. Referral to
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disciplinary board. Upon receipt of a petition filed under subsection 4 of this rule, demon-
strating that an attorney has been convicted of a serious crime, the supreme court shall, in ad-
dition to suspending the attorney in accordance with the provisions of subsection 7 of this
rule, refer the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hear-
ing before a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent of the
discipline to be imposed." But the clearest expression of authority to defeat Bar Counsels
stated goal of "combining" the Hearing required by the Court's June 7th, 2012 Order and the
Supreme Court Rules with some SCR 105 (or SCR 102, natch) style SBN v. Coughlin Com-
plaint that Bar Counsel wishes to file is found in SCR 111(7): "the court shall enter an order
suspending the attorney...pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding, which shall
be commenced by the appropriate disciplinary board upon referral by the supreme court."
And, right there, Bar Counsel's attempt to combine these affairs must fail. That's the thing,
though...the phrase "commenced by the appropriate disciplinary board". It does not say
"commenced by the State Bar of Nevada as a complainant, under Ching, filing an SCR 105
Complaint...It just does not say that. SCR 111(7), rather, reads "which shall e commenced by
the appropriate disciplinary board". So, to sum it up Bar Counsel's attempts combine these
must fail in light of the following: "SCR 111(8): "the supreme court shall...refer the matter to
the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hearing before a hearing pan-
el in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be im-
posed." SCR 111(7): "the court shall enter an order suspending the attorney...pending final
disposition of a disciplinary proceeding, which shall be commenced by the appropriate disci-
plinary board upon referral by the supreme court." However, Bar Counsel and the Discipli-
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nary Board should recognize the import of SCR 111(7)-(8) and refuse to allow Bar Counsel
to "combine" or consolidate, or "fail to bifurcate. What Bar Counsel is thinking of is SCR
105(2):. "Commencement of formal proceedings. Formal disciplinary proceedings are com-
menced by bar counsel filing a written complaint in the name of the state bar. The complaint
shall be sufficiently clear and specific to inform the attorney of the charges against him or her
and the underlying conduct supporting the charges." However, SCR 111(7) and SCR 105(2)
are entirely different animals. In one, SCR 111(7) calls for: "the court shall enter an order
suspending the attorney...pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding, which shall
be commenced by the appropriate disciplinary board..." In the other, it is Bar Counsel doing
the "commencing" of SCR 105(2):. "Commencement of formal proceedings. Formal disci-
plinary proceedings are commenced by bar counsel filing a written complaint in the name of
the state bar...." The distiction and diferences are revealed in the Supreme Court Rules by
whom is doing the "commencing" and just what it is they are "commencing", ie, a "formal
proceeding (in the case of SCR 105(2), or a "dsiciplinary proceeding", There is a difference,
and that difference entails bifurcating things or refusing to consolidate these affairs, and I am
formally making that request upon the Board here now. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin 23 Filing
of papers: It is the official duty of the clerk of a court to file all papers in a cause presented by
the parties, and to indorse the correct date of the filing thereon. 16 It is the duty of the clerk of
court, in the absence of instructions from the court to the contrary, to accept for filing any pa-
per presented to him, provided such paper is not scurrilous or obscene, is properly prepared,
and is accompanied by the requisite filing fee. 17 Unless otherwise specifically authorized by
statute, the duty of the clerk of court to file papers presented to him is purely ministerial 18
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and he may not refuse to perform such duty except upon order of the court. 19 When the stat-
ute requires the clerk of court to file all papers delivered to him to be filed, he is not con-
cerned with the merit of the papers nor with their effect and interpretation. 20 The clerk has
no discretion in the matter of filing papers recognized by law as properly belonging in the
record of causes. 21 It is not for the clerk to inquire into the purposes or contents of such pa-
pers, or into the circumstances giving rise to them or attending their preparation. 22 The pow-
er to make any decision as to the propriety of any paper submitted, or as to the right of a per-
son to file such paper, is vested in the court, not the clerk. 23 However, where a statute makes
it the duty of the clerk of court to file a particular document, a judge is without authority to
interfere with such filing. 24 To file an instrument, it must be delivered to the clerk at the of-
fice where it is required to be filed; delivery to the clerk at any other place, even though he
endorses it "filed," is not sufficient. 25 The mere fact that the clerk used superfluous words in
filing papers would not render his acts void. 26 23 ----Filing of papers [SUPPLEMENT]
Case authorities: Arrestee's police brutality claim will not be dismissed as time barred, where
her counsel intended to file complaint early on last day before statute of limitations ran but,
due to printer malfunction, he was unable to file it before clerk's office was closed so he
caused it to be deposited in clerk's post office box at 11:30 p.m., because Sixth Circuit rule,
supported by liberal construction of FRCP 5(e) and 77(a) and (c), seems to be that document
is deemed filed when it is in actual or constructive possession of clerk. Turner v City of New-
port (1995, ED Ky) 887 F Supp 149. See Nix v Fraze (1988, Tex App Dallas) 752 SW2d 118,
28. Footnotes Footnote 16. Brinson v Georgia R. Bank & Trust Co., 45 Ga App 459, 165
SE 321. Under the statute, the clerk's duties include the obligation to file all papers properly
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before him. Hamilton v Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 56 Wis 2d 673,
203 NW2d 7 (ovrld on other grounds Re Pewaukee (Wis) 241 NW2d 603). The acceptance of
the filing of a complaint is a mere ministerial act, and the officer charged with the responsi-
bility of receiving the same is required to accept what is tendered to him if it is accompanied
by the proper fee. State ex rel. Kaufman v Sutton (Fla App) 231 So 2d 874. As a ministerial
officer, it is the mandatory duty of the clerk of the Court of Civil Appeals to file and forward
to the Supreme Court any document tendered to him appertaining to an appeal in any cause
pending in that court which is addressed to the Supreme Court. Wagner v Garrett, 114 Tex
362, 269 SW 1030. A paper is filed with the clerk of court when it is delivered to him for that
purpose. Morthland v Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 220 Ind 692, 42 NE2d 41, reh den 220 Ind
734, 46 NE2d 203. Footnote 17. State ex rel. Wanamaker v Miller, 164 Ohio St 174, 57 Ohio
Ops 151, 128 NE2d 108. The clerk may refuse to accept any paper for filing until the appro-
priate fee is paid. Poetz v Mix, 7 NJ 436, 81 A2d 741; Hamilton v Department of Industry,
Labor & Human Relations, 56 Wis 2d 673, 203 NW2d 7 (ovrld on other grounds Re
Pewaukee (Wis) 241 NW2d 603). As to prepayment of fees, generally, see 19, supra. Foot-
note 18. State ex rel. Dawson v Roberts, 165 Ohio St 341, 59 Ohio Ops 436, 135 NE2d 409;
Malinou v McElroy, 99 RI 277, 207 A2d 44. Footnote 19. Malinou v McElroy, 99 RI 277,
207 A2d 44. Footnote 20. Corey v Carback, 201 Md 389, 94 A2d 629. It is not incumbent
upon one who has the ministerial function of accepting the filing of a complaint to judicially
determine the legal significance of the tendered document. State ex rel. Kaufman v Sutton
(Fla App) 231 So 2d 874. Clerks of federal courts may not refuse to file naturalization peti-
tions which contain all the proper allegations, because of their judgment of color, race, or
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other qualification that the applicant may not be entitled to citizenship. Re Halladjian (CC
Mass) 174 F 834. It is not the duty of the clerk of court to give notice that a bill of exceptions
was not signed by the judge or to find the absent judge and lay the bill before him for signing.
Haven v Ward's Estate, 118 Vt 499, 114 A2d 413. Footnote 21. Bernard v Crowell (Tex Civ
App) 38 SW2d 912. Footnote 22. Bernard v Crowell (Tex Civ App) 38 SW2d 912 (bystand-
er's bill of exceptions). Footnote 23. State ex rel. Wanamaker v Miller, 164 Ohio St 176, 57
Ohio Ops 151, 128 NE2d 108. It is the duty of the clerk of the municipal court to file notice
of appeal whether
presented in time or not; the determination of the question whether the appeal was properly taken is
the province of the Appellate Term on motion to dismiss. People ex rel. Trost v Bird, 184 App Div
779, 172 NYS 412. Footnote 24. Alexandria Naval Stores Co. v J. F. Ball Bro. Lumber Co., 128 La
632, 54 So 1035. Footnote 25. Brelsford v Community High School Dist., 328 Ill 27, 159 NE 237.
Footnote 26. State v Gillette's Estate (Tex Com App) 10 SW2d 984 (use of words "at law"). 27 Ef-
fect of breach of duty on rights of litigants View Entire Section Go to Parallel Reference Table Those
dealing with the clerk of a court concerning an action or matter then pending have a right to expect
that he will perform the ministerial duties connected with his office, and his neglect or failure to do so
should not prejudice their rights. 75 This principle has been frequently applied in cases where a party
seeks relief from a judgment rendered against him by reason of some mistake or default of the clerk.
76 However, where no duty exists, 77 or where the negligence of the attorney or suitor intervenes, 78
relief will be denied them, even where they relied on promises or statements of the clerk, 79 or where
the clerk failed to answer letters of inquiry about the status of the case and judgment was rendered
without their knowledge. 80 It may be noted here that the improvident exercise of authority by the
clerk, as where an order of sale is issued by him without the direction of the party entitled thereto,
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may not prejudice the rights of innocent purchasers. 81 But where a writ of assistance is granted by
the clerk, without action of the court, to the holder of a sheriff's deed on a mortgage foreclosure, the
writ is void and should be vacated on direct attack. 82 A clerk of court is, generally speaking, liable
personally and on his official bond to a litigant injured as a result of his negligence or misconduct. 83
Footnotes Footnote 75. Williams v Tyler, 14 Ala App 591, 71 So 51, cert den 198 Ala 696, 73 So
1002; Hogs Back Consol. Mining Co. v New Basil Consol. Gravel Mining Co. 65 Cal 22, 2 P 489;
Silverman v Childs, 107 Ill App 522; May v Wolvington, 69 Md 117, 14 A 706; Thompson v Sharp,
17 Neb 69, 22 NW 78; Hopkins v Niggli (Tex) 6 SW 625; Black v Hurlbut, 73 Wis 126, 40 NW 673.
Footnote 76. Ivester v Mozeley, 89 Ga App 578, 80 SE2d 197. Annotation: 164 ALR 552 et seq.,
III. Failure of the clerk to notify an appellant of completion of the transcript is good cause for refus-
ing to dismiss an appeal on the ground that a certified copy of the judgment and the granting of the
appeal was not filed in the appellate court by the clerk, in the time required by statute, particularly
where the clerk affirmatively stated that illness of a deputy and rush of business had prevented him
from completing the transcript in time to file it. Parks v Marshall, 322 Mo 218, 14 SW2d 590, 62
ALR 835. Footnote 77. Trala v Melmar Industries, Inc. (Del) 254 A2d 249; Western Union Tel. Co. v
Griffin, 1 Ind App 46, 27 NE 113; Jackson v Jones (Ky) 336 SW2d 565; Valley Finance Co. v
Campana, 112 Ohio App 405, 13 Ohio Ops 2d 472, 83 Ohio L Abs 577, 167 NE2d 654, motion
overr. Footnote 78. Western Union Tel. Co. v Griffin, 1 Ind App 46, 27 NE 113. Footnote 79. Bernier
v Schaefer, 11 Ill 2d 525, 144 NE2d 577; Libert v Turzynski, 129 Ill App 2d 146, 262 NE2d 741
(deputy clerk); Western Union Tel. Co. v Griffin, supra. A clerk of court is not liable, because a party
relied upon his gratuitous advice on a matter having no relation to the duties of his office. Trala v
Melmar Industries, Inc. (Del) 254 A2d 249. Footnote 80. Williams v Wescott, 77 Iowa 332, 42 NW
314; First Nat. Bank v Wentworth, 28 Kan 183; Ganzer v Schiffbauer, 40 Neb 633, 59 NW 98; Pu-
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laski Oil Co. v Conner, 62 Okla 211, 162 P 464. Footnote 81. Sowles v Harvey, 20 Ind 217, plaintiff
obtaining judgment in mortgage foreclosure proceeding may not set aside sheriff's sale by reason of
clerk's unauthorized issue of order of sale on judgment. Footnote 82. Williams v Sherman, 35 Idaho
169, 205 P 259, 21 ALR 353, wherein a motion to vacate writ on the ground that it was granted by
the clerk without notice was held to be a direct, not a collateral, attack. Footnote 83. 28 et seq.,
infra. VI. LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES 28 Negligence or misconduct View Entire Section Go
to Parallel Reference Table Go to Supplement The principle that a public officer should be held to a
faithful performance of his official duties and made to answer in damages to all persons who may
have been injured through his malfeasance, omission, or neglect 84 applies to the negligence, care-
lessness, or misconduct of a clerk of court. 85 As a public ministerial officer, the clerk is answerable
Copyright 1998, West Group for any act of negligence or misconduct in office resulting in injury
to the complaining party. 86 In order to render the clerk of court and the sureties on his official bond
liable for the clerk's misfeasance, both a breach of duty and consequent damage must be shown. 87
Moreover, to warrant relief, the wrong and the resulting injury must concur; the clerk's misconduct or
negligence must be the direct and proximate cause of the injury. 88 If the injury would have followed
notwithstanding the misconduct, or if the injured party contributed to the result in any degree by his
own fault or neglect or that of his attorney, he has no legal ground of complaint and the clerk cannot
be held responsible. 89 Under applicable statutory provisions, a clerk of court may be held liable on
his bond for failure to issue a writ, citation, or process; 90 for the improper issuance of letters of
guardianship whereby an unauthorized person was able legally to procure funds of another and
squander them; 91 for negligence or misconduct in issuing a warrant of arrest; 92 for failure properly
to docket a judgment; 93 for failure to properly index a judgment; 94 for failure to enter an attach-
ment within the time fixed by law; 95 for failure to tax costs; 96 for failure to include a judgment on a
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mortgage certificate furnished in connection with a partition sale; 97 for failure to reject a surety
bond executed by a person ineligible to act as surety under the statute; 98 for not requiring a surety to
qualify upon a bond executed by him as such surety; 99 or for failure properly to keep records of a
case and for informing the court inaccurately of its status. 1 In those jurisdictions where a clerk of
court serves also as recorder of deeds and mortgages, breach of his duties as a recording officer may
give rise to an action on his official bond as clerk, 2 such as his failure to record an instrument lodged
with him for recording. 3 On the other hand, the principle of judicial immunity from liability extends
to a clerk of court in the performance of his judicial or quasi-judicial functions, 4 as distinguished
from his ministerial functions. 5 He may not be held liable for errors of judgment committed by him
while acting lawfully in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, 6 whether in or out of term time. 7
Moreover, a clerk of court is not liable where he is acting pursuant to an order of the court. 8 The
clerk cannot be held liable when acting in a ministerial capacity for errors made in spite of the exer-
cise of reasonable care and skill in an effort to avoid them. 9 Nor is he liable in his official capacity
for error of judgment or want of skill in matters disconnected with the duties of his office. 10 28 ----
Negligence or misconduct [SUPPLEMENT] Practice Aids: Applicability of judicial immunity to acts
of clerk of court under state law, 34 ALR4th 1186. Case authorities: A county clerk of court did not
have sovereign immunity against an action for indemnity by a title insurance company where the an
employee of the clerk's office improperly indexed a document which affected the title to a parcel of
real estate because the clerk had a statutory duty to properly record and index documents in the public
records and public policy considerations favor accountability by the clerk for negligence. First Amer-
ican Title Ins. Co. v Dixon (1992, Fla App D4) 603 So 2d 562, 17 FLW D 1708, Copyright 1998,
West Group review den (Fla) 613 So 2d 3. Sovereign immunity did not protect state from liability for
failure of county clerk to timely docket judgment since act of recording judgment was not discretion-
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ary. National Westminster Bank v State (1989, 1st Dept) 155 AD2d 261, 546 NYS2d 864, app gr 75
NY2d 706, 552 NYS2d 929, 552 NE2d 177 and affd 76 NY2d 507, 561 NYS2d 541, 562 NE2d 866.
A clerk of court is liable in a civil action for a negligent omission to perform a statutory duty which
proximately causes injury to another, unless the injured party was contributorily negligent. Maddox v
Astro Invest., 45 Ohio App 2d 203, 74 Ohio Ops 2d 312, 343 NE2d 133. The failure of the clerk of
the Court of Common Pleas to docket and index a certificate of judgment for several days after it is
delivered and filed constitutes negligence. Maddox v Astro Invest., 45 Ohio App 2d 203, 74 Ohio
Ops 2d 312, 343 NE2d 133. Summary judgment was properly granted the district clerk in a suit seek-
ing to hold her liable in damages for the dismissal of plaintiff's appeal from a summary judgment en-
tered against him in a prior cause though plaintiff had requested that the clerk forward the transcript
relating to that cause to the court of appeals on three occasions and there was nothing in the record to
show why she failed to transmit the record until over five months after plaintiff first requested her to
do so, since even if the district clerk failed to transmit the record within the proper time period, the
primary responsibility to place the record before the court of appeals nonetheless remained with
plaintiff, and it was his failure to request an extension of time from the court of appeals
pursuant to RCP Rule 21c that rendered the filing of the transcript untimely. Nix v Fraze (1988, Tex
App Dallas) 752 SW2d 118. Footnotes Footnote 84. See 63 Am Jur 2d, Public Officers and Employ-
ees 287 et seq. Footnote 85. Lick v Madden, 36 Cal 208. A conviction for misconduct in office in
the illegal appropriation of public funds and the clerk's removal from office are equivalent to an adju-
dication that the clerk is ineligible to hold the office for the remainder of the term. McCellan v Pear-
son, 163 Ga 492, 136 SE 429. Footnote 86. Eslava v Jones, 83 Ala 139, 3 So 317; Stewart v Sholl, 99
Ga 534, 26 SE 757; Stine v Shuttle, 134 Ind App 67, 186 NE2d 168; Selover v Sheardown, 73 Minn
393, 76 NW 50; State ex rel. St. Louis v Priest, 348 Mo 37, 152 SW2d 109. Clerks of the Superior
Court are no less liable for the negligent performance of their official duties than for a failure to per-
form such duties. Touchton v Echols County, 211 Ga 85, 84 SE2d 81. Footnote 87. Neal-Blun Co. v
Rogers, 141 Ga 808, 82 SE 280. Copyright 1998, West Group There is no liability if the clerk's
failure to perform his duty resulted in no injury or loss. Installment Plan, Inc. v Justice (La App) 209
So 2d 68. Footnote 88. Eslava v Jones, 83 Ala 139, 3 So 317; Installment Plan, Inc. v Justice (La
App) 209 So 2d 68; Selover v Sheardown, 73 Minn 393, 76 NW 50; State ex rel. St. Louis v Priest,
348 Mo 37, 152 SW2d 109. Footnote 89. Lick v Madden, 36 Cal 208; Installment Plan, Inc. v Justice
(La App) 209 So 2d 68. Footnote 90. Steele v Thompson, 62 Ala 323; Kimsey v Hall, 68 Ga App
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409, 23 SE2d 196. The failure of the clerk of court to sign the process attached to the petition, and the
copy of the process, authorized recovery of nominal damages where the claim sued on became barred
because of the clerk's negligence. Hall v Kimsey, 48 Ga App 605, 173 SE 437. Footnote 91. State ex
rel. Cecil v Christian, 13 Ind App 308, 41 NE 603. Where letters of guardianship confer no power on
the guardian until a bond is given, the issuance by a clerk of such letters before the guardian gives
bond does not constitute a breach of the clerk's bond. State use of Carpenter v Sloane, 20 Ohio 327.
Footnote 92. Stine v Shuttle, 134 Ind App 67, 186 NE2d 168, holding that the clerk of court was lia-
ble in damages for false arrest based on his negligence or misconduct in issuing a warrant of arrest.
Footnote 93. Ryan v State Bank of Nebraska, 10 Neb 524, 7 NW 276; Charco, Inc. v Cohn, 242 Or
566, 411 P2d 264 (failure to enter order vacating award for damages); Strain v Babb, 30 SC 342, 9
SE 271. Failure of a former county clerk to docket a divorce decree so as to impose a lien on the hus-
band's real estate gave rise to a cause of action against the clerk on the ground that such failure was
the proximate cause of the wife's loss occasioned when the husband mortgaged the real estate.
Esselstyn v Casteel, 205 Or 344, 286 P2d 665, mod on other grounds 205 Or 369, 288 P2d 214, and
reh den 205 Or 371, 288 P2d 215. Specific statutory provision is sometimes made under which a
clerk neglecting to enter any judgment on the judgment docket is liable personally on his official
bond for the amount of damages sustained by such neglect. See, for example, provisions set out in
Johnson v Schloesser, 146 Ind 509, 45 NE 702. Footnote 94. Shackelford v Staton, 117 NC 73, 23 SE
101. A prothonotary has an absolute statutory duty to properly index all judgments and his failure to
do so renders him liable on his bond. Commonwealth use of Orris v Roberts, 183 Pa Super 204, 130
A2d 226, revd on other grounds 392 Pa 572, 141 A2d 393, 71 ALR2d 1124. Footnote 95. Stewart v
Sholl, 99 Ga 534, 26 SE 757. Footnote 96. State ex rel. Christian County v Gideon, 158 Mo 327, 59
SW 99. Copyright 1998, West Group Footnote 97. Landreneau v Ceasar (La App) 153 So 2d 145,
cert den 244 La 901, 154 So 2d 769, and (disapproved on other grounds United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v Green, 252 La 227, 210 So 2d 328, ovrld on other grounds Creech v Capitol Mack,
Inc. (La) 287 So 2d 497, later app (La App) 296 So 2d 387, cert den (La) 299 So 2d 802). Footnote
98. People v May, 251 Ill 54, 95 NE 999, error dismd 232 US 720, 58 L Ed 814, 34 S Ct 602. Foot-
note 99. People use of Gobin v May, 133 Ill App 139, holding that clerk's act in accepting insufficient
surety was judicial or quasi-judicial where court referred question of approval of sureties on appeal
bond to clerk. Footnote 1. McKay v Coolidge, 218 Mass 65, 105 NE 455. Footnote 2. Luther v
Banks, 111 Ga 374, 36 SE 826; Fisher v Levy, 180 La 195, 156 So 220, 94 ALR 1297 (wrongful is-
suance of mortgage certificate). Annotation: 94 ALR 1303, I. Footnote 3. Neal-Blum Co. v Rogers,
141 Ga 808, 82 SE 280 (materialman's claim of lien); Cain v Gray, 146 Ky 402, 142 SW 715 (deed).
Footnote 4. Davis v McAteer (CA8 Mo) 431 F2d 81; Lockhart v Hoenstine (CA3 Pa) 411 F2d 455,
cert den 396 US 941, 24 L Ed 2d 244, 90 S Ct 378; Brown v Dunne (CA7 Ill) 409 F2d 341; Niklaus v
Simmons (DC Neb) 196 F Supp 691. Court clerk refusing to give the plaintiff a transcript of record
was acting in discharge of his official duties and immune from liability under the doctrine of judicial
immunity. Dieu v Norton (CA7 Ill) 411 F2d 761. Charge that clerk of court refused to furnish the
plaintiff with a portion of the state criminal trial transcript involved an act performed in his capacity
as a quasi-judicial officer and clothed him with judicial immunity. Stewart v Minnick (CA9 Cal) 409
F2d 826. See, however, Stephen v Drew (DC Va) 359 F Supp 746, involving an action against a clerk
of court and others for wrongful commitment of the plaintiff for mental illness, wherein the court
stated that, although some decisions have articulated a "quasi-judicial" immunity of clerks of court,
clerks of court enjoy no immunity at all. Footnote 5. There is no immunity from suit for clerks of
court in the performance of their ministerial duties, such as the filing of papers. McCray v Maryland
(CA4 Md) 456 F2d 1. Footnote 6. Commonwealth use of Green v Johnson, 123 Ky 437, 96 SW 801.
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A county clerk of court is protected =from the consequences of his acts which are quasi-judicial in
nature and require the exercise of judgment or discretion. Rodriguez v State, 55 Misc 2d 669, 285
NYS2d 896. Footnote 7. McAlister's Admrs. v Scrice, 15 Tenn 276. Footnote 8. Prothonotary was
not liable to prisoner under the Civil Rights Act for refusing to accept certain appeal papers for filing
where action of the prothonotary was pursuant to order of the superior court. Lockhart v Hoenstine
(CA3 Pa) 411 F2d 455, cert den 396 US 941, 24 L Ed 2d 244, 90 S Ct 378. Acting pursuant to order
of court as defense to action, see 38, infra. Footnote 9. Commonwealth use of Green v Johnson, 123
Ky 437, 96 SW 801. Footnote 10. It is no part of the official duties of a clerk to search the records of
his office for judgments, liens, or suits pending, affecting title to real property, and to certify the re-
sult. A party relying on such certificate, in absence of a special agreement by the clerk to make a spe-
cial search and certify as to the condition of the title, must himself bear whatever loss ensues from
want of skill or honest errors on the part of the clerk. Mallory v Ferguson, 50 Kan 685, 32 P 410.
From: LauraP@nvbar.org To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com Subject: RE: pending final disposition of
disciplinary proceedings....language SCR 111(7) versus SCR 111(8) and the June 7th, 2012 Order of
the NV. S. Ct. Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2012 00:58:57 +0000 Please don't put words in my mouth, Zach.
You are the one that indicated that you had not received the Complaint when we talked on the phone.
Why, then, would I file in a Motion to Dismiss? I am responsible for my own actions. - Laura (aka
Clerk Peters) From: Zach Coughlin [zachcoughlin@hotmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, October 10,
2012 11:51 AM To: tsusich@nvdetr.org; Laura Peters; David Clark; Patrick King;
nvscclerk@nvcourts.nv.gov Subject: FW: pending final disposition of disciplinary proceed-
ings....language SCR 111(7) versus SCR 111(8) and the June 7th, 2012 Order of the NV. S. Ct. Dear
Chairman Susich and Clerk Peters, Bar Counsel King sees himself as a the Director of this movie,
placing you two in the scenes where he sees fit. Chairman Susich, it is your responsibility to comply
with the Court's Order and the Supreme Court Rules, and at this point, you need to send a clear mes-
sage to Bar Counsel that "the kid stays in the picture", and inform Mr. King that he is not to attempt
to take your job or duties from you. Same goes for Clerk Peters, especially vis a vis her admission
that King told her not to file Coughlin's Motion to Dismiss in SBN v Coughlin on September 17th,
2012, which has now gone unopposed, and therefore, shall be granted. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin PO
BOX 3961 Reno, NV 89505 Tel 775 338 8118 Fax 949 667 7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: PatrickK@nvbar.org To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com CC: DavidC@nvbar.org Subject: RE:
pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings....language SCR 111(7) versus SCR 111(8) and
the June 7th, 2012 Order of the NV. S. Ct. Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2012 16:44:27 +0000 Dear Mr. Cough-
lin, When you met with me and David Clark to discuss the Complaint and the process. Mr. Clark ex-
plained that since there was a conviction, the sole issue to be determined was the extent of the disci-
pline. Not if you committed the crime, since that was already determined beyond a reasonable
doubt. It is that context that we are reading the rule. Not that the state bar is precluded from bringing
additional allegations against you. Any additional allegations that have not already resulted in crimi-
nal convictions will need to be proved by clear and convincing evidence. As such, at the hearing,
on the issue of your criminal convictions, the only issue for the panel to decide is the appropriate dis-
cipline. However, I will be providing evidence as to the other allegations in the Complaint. The Panel
will decide if the state bar has met its burden of proof as to those allegations in the complaint, other
than the criminal convictions, and will decide the appropriate discipline on the totality of the case,
including mitigating and aggravating factors that may be presented at the hearing. As such, I do not
intend bifurcate these proceedings. I think to do so would cause unnecessary confusion, undue time
and expense and would be prejudicial to the administration of justice. I am advised that you have
not yet filed an Answer to the Complaint. I have sent you a notice of intent to proceed on a default
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basis. The hearing date is expected to be Wednesday November 14, 2012. I will be sending you a no-
tice of hearing, along with a list of witness, and evidence that I intend to introduce at the hearing. Pat-
rick King, Assistant Bar Counsel. From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com] Sent:
Wednesday, October 10, 2012 6:18 AM To: tsusich@nvdetr.org; David Clark; Laura Peters; Patrick
King Subject: pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings....language SCR 111(7) versus
SCR 111(8) and the June 7th, 2012 Order of the NV. S. Ct. Dear Chairman Susich, Bar Counsel, and
Clerk Peters, I am writing formally request a bifurcation of sorts, consiering:...(truncated email)
RJC Judge's Secretary Lori Townsend's 4/11/12 letter to SBN Bar Counsel King (at least the one
King finally turned over two judicial days before the 11/14/12 hearing, hidden within 3,000 pages of
documentation in a box) reads:
"From: Townsend, Lori < LTownsend@washoecounty.us> Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 11:34
AM To: Patrick King Subject: Zachary Coughlin Attachments: RCR2011-065630.pdf; RCR2011-
065630-Motion.pdf; RCR2011-063341.pdf
Hi Patrick-
Here are the two outstanding criminal cases against Mr. Coughlin in Reno Justice Court. Case
number RCR 2011-063341 is set for trial on May 7th at 9:00 am; Case RCR 2011-065630 is the one
awaiting the results of the competency evaluation. I also included a notice/motion that he filed in the
gross misdemeanor case. I did not include a pleading entitled "Pre Trial Motions" he filed in the mis-
demeanor case (it is in excess of 200 pages), but if you would like to see that, I can send you a copy.
He is also emailing staff members with links to his YouTube pages. Please let me know if you need
anything else. RCR2011-065630.pdf RCR2011-065630-Motion.pdf RCR2011-063341.pdf
Lori Lori 7'ownsend Judges' Secretary ..eno Justice Court P. O. Box 30083 Reno, NV 89520 775-
325-6550" (emphasis added).
Beyond representing an impermissible attempt by the RJC and its judges to influence a disci-
plinary matter through the volunteering of information and documentation outside filing their own
formal complaints or grievances through established channels and practices, the above written corre-
spondence from the RJC further underscores the extent to which the RJC, its staff, and its judges are
simply unaware of, do not comprehend, or plainly refuse to follow the law in Nevada on competency
determinations and issues as set forth in NRS 178.405. Townsend admits that "063341 is set for trial
on May 7th at 9:00 am; Case RCR 2011-065630 is the one awaiting the results of the competency
evaluation..." and therein reveals (as does the audio transcript of the Trial Judge Sferrazza called on
5/7/12 in 063341 (during the pendency of the 2/27/12 Order for Competency Evaluation by his fellow
RJC Judge in Department 5, Judge Clifton following the still unexplained transferring of that 065630
case from Judge Lynch to Judge Clifton (Similar themes were set out in a Petition for Writ of Man-
damus filed by County Clerk Amy Harvey against the 2JDC fairly recently, alleging an impermissi-
ble level of control exerted by the District Court over the Clerk of Court...which echoes some of the
themes set out in a letters from Couglin to RJC Court Administrator Steve Tuttle on 2/15/12, 2/16/12
regarding the curious "transferring" of an eviction matter "randomly assigned" (in compliance with a
JCRRT, Rule 2, that seems to be very little followed and or enforced, unless, of course, it operates to
delay a hearing on Coughlin's Motion to Extinguish the vexatious and baseless, and civil eviction
process subverting, Temporary Protection Order the RPD and Northwind's Aparments Assoc., LLC
were able to provide sufficient encouragement to result in maintenance man Milan Krebs applying
for on 7/5/12 in RJC RCP2012-000287.
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Incident to Northwind's Kreb's successfully helping his bosses to subvert the lawful eviction
process, a great deal of Coughlin's personal property and materials necessary to the defense of allega-
tions of vexatiousness of baseless claims in the summary eviction appeal in 03628, the SCR 111(6)
Petition and temporary suspension in 60838, and the defense of the various other retaliatory criminal
prosecutions Coughlin has faced this last 18 months was withheld from Coughlin (as was the ability
to file a Tenant's Answer and Motion for Relief from or Verified Complaint regarding the Illegal
Lockout attendant to NCS recognizing the viability of Coughlin's claims as to the deficiency of the
6/14/12 5 day Notice where NCS's Chandler posted an "amended" notice on 6/29/12 on all three of
Coughlin's Northwind's rentals (the Washoe County jail and or RJC refused to file the Tenant's An-
swers Coughlin submitted via "kites" from his jail cell and refused to transport Coughlin to the 7/5/12
hearing on Coughlin's 6/28/12 filed Motion to Set Aside the void 6/27/12 Lockout Order in 1048 (the
jail even refused to inform the RJC that Coughlin was in custody or otherwise afford Coughlin any
access to justice in that regard whatsoever, though the jail readily participated in transporting Cough-
lin to an unnoticed bail increase hearing later that morning, some might say, to the benefit of the RJC,
RMC, WCSO, and RPD.
It is far from clear (given the SBN and King's failure to comply with Coughlin's 4/16/12
FOIA/NRS Open Records Request to be provided documentation and materials in any way related to
any grievances or allegations of misconduct against Coughlin) that the one 4/11/12 email from the
RJC's Townsend represents the only such "input" by the RJC or, for that matter, the RMC or 2JDC to
which Couglin has been denied information or documentation related thereto. King and the SBN
have admitted to refusing to provide a number of materials, including the letter to Bar Counsel that
NVB Judge Beesley testified to at the 11/14/12 disciplinary hearing for which Judge Beesley's testi-
mony was only constructively noticed to Coughlin on the day before the hearing itself and wher the
8/23/12 Complaint in no way pleads or even mentions anything related to Judge Beesley, the NVB,
or Coughlin's representation of client's therein and where the SBN has not received a single grievance
or complaint from any of Coughlin's clients, in the NVB or otherwise. If there is anybody or any-
thing being "threatened" here or whose "affairs may be damaged" it is a tight knit collective of life-
long prosecutors turned judges (Judges Linda M. Gardner, William L. Gardner, Steven P. Elliott,
Dorothy Nash Holmes, David Clifton, Kenneth R. Howard) and the Judge and opposing counsel in-
volved in a summary eviction of a commercial tenant based only upon a No Cause Notice (ie where
the non-payment of rent was not pled or noticed) that could potentially subject the RJC and Richard
G. Hill, Esq. to some liability for such a "wrong site surgery", to analogize to landlord Merliss's line
of work) and the prosecutors and court appointed defendners (many of whom, particularly where the
RMC is concerned, were all prosecutors for many years themselves (Loomis, Taitel, Sotelo, and
Puentes) or who clearly want to be a prosecutor (Leslie)
That 8/20/11 arrest in 063341 was the first of ten incarcerations of Coughlin (whom
had previously never been convicted of any crime other than the a misdemeanor traffic citation).
That arrest occurred incident to the misconduct of RPD Officer Nick Duralde and Officer Ron Rosa
and the lies of alleged victim Cory Goble and material witness Nate Zarate in connection with the
8/20/11 "ooooh, thats a felony" (to quote a smug, reckless, and thoroughly dishonest Officer Duralde
shortly after he announced to Coughlin his annoyance with Coughlin being a lawyer by saying "I
don't respect you at all" and telling Coughlin "just don't talk anymore" shortly before Duralde would,
according to witnesses Cory Goble and Colton Templeton, retrieve a phone from Coughlin's left front
shorts pocket prior to conducting what he would later characterize as a "search incident to arrest",
only to misrepresent later that he only searched Coughlin's pocket after hurdling over the dictate
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against a custodial arrest (and therefore conducting a search incident thereto) presented by NRS
171.136 (which prohibits custodial arrests after 7 pm for alleged misdemeanor not committed in the
officer's presence, especially where DDA Young conceded that a citizen's arrest did not occur, as
made abundantly clear by Coughlin himself calling 911 upon being attacked by a group of some 20
skateboarder types in their late teens and early twenties at approximately 11:25 pm in a well lit down-
town Reno skating plaza alongside the Truckee River where a still unidentified man, according to eye
witness Nicole Watson held the iPhone in question aloft and loudly indicated to all in the skating
plaze, after no one approached him following his initially asking someone to claim it, that he would
take the phone and "throw it in the river" if someone did not immediately claim it. Such a circum-
stance at best amounts to a very tenuous lost, mislaid, abandoned/"rescued from being thrown away
into the Truckee River" as petty larceny charge, especially where allege victim Goble himself testi-
fied at Trial that the iPhone in question was, at that time, worth only "about $80" (far from the then
over $250 required for felony grand larceny). (Nicole Watson's admission to Coughlin was captured
on a video interview one week after the arrest at the same location where the arrest occurred shortly
before the State's material witness, Nate Zarate, openly attempted to dissuade and intimidate her from
testifying and or participating any further in the interview which all involved admit to being aware
was being recorded) in relied on by the SBN at the 11/14/12 hearing (despite not pleading it in any
way in the 8/23/12 Complaint or specifying
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IV. METHODOLOGY................................. 27
A. The Nevada Court System........... 27
B. The Las Vegas Justice Court....... 29
C. TPO Jurisdiction in the Las Vegas Justice Court.......................................... 31
2. Orders for Protection Against Workplace Harassment..................... 40
a. The Substantive Offense Involved.......................................... 40
b. The Protection Order Process.................................................. 41
D. Specific TPO Case Statistics for the Las Vegas Justice Court...................... 47
E. Review of 2008 TPO Files............ 48
H. Current Limitations..................... 55
V. FINDINGS AND DATA ANALYSIS.... 56
A. The Five Most Common Dispositions.............................................................. 57
1. The Order Denying........... 57
a. Substantive Denials..........................
(1) Not Stalking or Harassment..................................... 58
(2) Denied--File in Family Court................................... 58
(3) Denied--This is a Landlord/Tenant matter. 59
(4) Denied--This is a Criminal matter........................... 59
(5) Denial for Lack of Jurisdiction.................................... 59
b. Denials Based upon Some Perceived Deficiency
in the Filing................. 60
(1) Incompleteness............................................................... 60
(2) John Doe Defendants................................................ 61
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5. Setting an Extended TPO Request for Hearing.................................. 65
B. The Most Common Relationships Between Applicants and
Adverse Parties................................... 66
7. Miscellaneous Categories of Relationships.......................................... 72
8. Relationships That Are Not Defined or Otherwise
Discernible.............................. 74
F. Time to Disposition by Department........... 82
1. Orders Processed Without Hearing..................................................... 85
2. Dispositions After Hearing.............. 86
a. Continuances........................ 86
b. Hybrid Dispositions......... 86
c. The Deal with It Later Disposition....................................... 87
G. Motions.. 87
1. Motions to Dissolve and Orders to Show Cause................................. 87
2. Motions to Modify............................ 89
b. Other Specific Locations Frequented ..................... 96
c. Other Conditions.................. 97
d. The Reverse Halo Effect.. 102
5. The Extended Order for Protection............................... 110
a. Costs............................................................................................ 110
b. The Presence of the Parties....................................................... 111
c. One Judges Inconsistency........................................................ 113
d. Preparing Extended Orders in Open Court........................... 113
66. Other Issues Regarding Judicial Orders....... 114
a. The Notice of Hearing Dilemma........................................... 114
b. Spatial Limitations.............. 115
c. Working Hours Only....... 116
d. Property Damage................. 117
e. Definitional Issues................ 117
f. Checkboxes........................... 118
g. Confidential Locations........ 119
h. Course of Conduct............... 120
i. Mixing Judicial Departments.................................................... 120
j. Recusals................................. 121
k. Mixing Lengths.................... 121
m. De Facto Evictions, Terminations, and
Expulsions................................. 122
n. Bail........................................ 123
o. Proof of Service.................... 124
p. Mootness............................... 125
q. Control over Third Parties. 125
r. Referrals to Mediation......... 125
s. The Dangling Protection Order............................................ 126
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7. Motions.............................................. 126
a. Attorneys Fees.................... 126
7b. The Multiple Motion Problem.............................................. 128
c. Remaining in Effect......... 128
d. Orders to Show Cause........ 129
8. Service Issues................................... 129
a. When Service Must Be Arranged by the Applicant............... 129
b. ServicebyCourt Staff........ 131
9. WorkplaceHarassment TPOs--TheSecurityRequirement 131
1. Public Access to TPO Files............ 146
2. Decisions on Temporary Orders... 147
4. Delivery of Paperwork for Service 148
5. Service of TPO Applications.......... 148
7. Recommendations from Other Courts for the AOC
TPO Forms Committee....................... 149
a. Requestsfor ExtendedOrder Hearings................................. 149
b. Information Regarding Incarceration................................... 150
c. CombiningForms.............. 150
REFERENCE 183
LIST OF CASES. 184
Judge Flanagan's 8/28/12 Order in 03628 reads:
ORDER
Currently before this Court are two matters initiated by Appellant ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN but submitted-and opposed-by Respondent MATT MERLISS. The first is Motion to
Alter or Amend Order, or Pled in Alternalid [sic] Motion to Set Aside Attorney Fee Award and Mo-
tion for Order Shortening Time and Notice of Appeal of Atty [sic] Fee Award a 6/25/12 filed on July
24,2012. Merliss filed an Opposition to "A Motion to Alter or Amend Order, or Pled in the Alternatid
(sic), Motion to Set Aside Attorney Fee Award and Motion for Orde Shortening Time and Notice of
Appeal of A tty (sic) Fee Award of 6/25/12" on July 31, 2012. Coughlin filed no Reply Brief and the
matter was submitted for decision on August 10, 2012.
The second is a NRCP 60(b)(4) Motion to Set Aside Attorney's Fees filed on July 31 2012.
Merliss filed an Opposition to NRCP 60(b)(4) Motion to Set Aside Attorney's Fees on August 10,
2012. Coughlin filed no Reply Brief and this matter was submitted for decision 0 August 22, 2012.
Essentially, both Motions seek to set aside this Court's June 25, 2012 Order granting attor-
ney's fees to Merliss. Having reviewed both of Coughlin's Motions and the relevant law applicable to
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each one, this Court finds each Motion is devoid of any facts or legal arguments sufficient to require
or justify setting aside the attorney's fees award. And this is aside from th myriad procedural and sub-
stantive deficiencies contained in each Motion.
Again, as was the case in Coughlin's attempt to set aside Merliss's award of costs Coughlin's
Motions here attempts to re-litigate substantive issues this Court has already decided, or frivolous
claims this Court has previously ignored. This Court has entered final judgment on the merits of
Coughlin's underlying claim and awarded attorney's fees and costs to Merliss. Thi Court will not re-
visit those decisions here, particularly when Coughlin alleges nothing that would satisfy the require-
ments of NRCP 59 or NRCP 60. Accordingly, Coughlin's Motion to Alter or Amend Order, or Pled
in Alternatid [sic] Motion to Set Aside Attorney Fee Award and Motion for Order Shortening Time
and Notice of Appeal of Atly [sic] Fee Award of 6/25/12 and NRCP 60(b)(4) Motion to Set Aside At-
torney's Fees are DENIED.
In addition, Merliss requests this Court to sanction Coughlin for his repeated violations of the
local rules of procedure. Merliss requests this Court to sanction Coughlin under WDCR 21 such that
Merliss and his counsel need not oppose or reply to any further filings by Coughlin in this case absent
an Order to that effect from this Court.
ALONGSIDE THE NUMEROUS PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS COUGHLIN HAS COMMITTED IN FILING
HIS PAPERS (IGNORING PAGE LIMITS, MISSING DEADLINES, ETC.), MERLISS CONTENDS COUGHLIN'S LITI-
GATION TACTICS-INCLUDING COUGHLIN'S INSTANT ATTEMPT TO SET ASIDE THE ATTORNEY'S FEES
AWARD-HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED NOT TO PURSUE ARGUMENTS IN GOOD FAITH BUT TO DELAY AND HAR-
ASS HIM. MERLISS CONTEND COUGHLIN'S BEHAVIOR HAS BEEN NOT ONLY ABUSIVE BUT COSTLY, RE-
QUIRING MERLISS TO CONTEST EACH AN EVERY ALLEGATION COUGHLIN MAKES NO MATTER HOW MER-
ITLESS. THIS COURT AGREES.
IN ADDITION TO THIS COURT'S POWER UNDER NRCP 11 TO ISSUE SANCTIONS TO DETER ABUSIVE
LITIGATION PRACTICES AND FRIVOLOUS FILINGS, "NEVADA COURTS ... POSSESS INHERENT POWERS OF
EQUITY AND OF CONTROL OVER THE EXERCISE OF THEIR JURISDICTION." JORDAN V. STATE DEPT. OF
MOTOR VEHICLE &PUBLIC SAFETY, 121 NEV. 44, 59, 110 P.3D 30,41 (2005), ABROGATED ON OTHER
GROUNDS BY BUZZ STEW, LLC V. CITY VEGAS OF NORTH LAS VEGAS, 124 NEV. 224, 228, 181 P.3D
670, 672 (2008). COUGHLIN'S ABERRANT BEHAVIOR HAS BECOME, UNFORTUNATELY, COMMON IN THIS
CASE. HIS FAILURE TO FOLLOW BASIC RULES OF PRACTICE AND THE ABSENCE IN HIS NUMEROUS FILINGS
OF ANY ARGUABLE BASIS EITHER IN LAW OR FACT TO SUPPORT HIS VARIOUS CLAIMS HAS LED MERLISS
TO NEEDLESSLY INCUR COSTS OTHERWISE COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED HAD COUGHLIN SIMPLY FOL-
LOWED THE RULES. CONSEQUENTLY, THIS COURT FINDS SANCTIONS ARE APPROPRIATE UNDER WDCR
21. ACCORDINGLY, THIS COURT ORDER MERLISS AND HIS COUNSEL MAY BUT ARE NOT REQUIRED TO
OPPOSE OR REPLY TO ANY FURTHER FILINGS BY COUGHLIN IN THIS CASE ABSENT AN ORDER TO THAT
EFFECT FROM THIS COURT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 28
th
day of August, 2012. Patrick Flanagan, District Judge
At page 2 of a 8/28/12 Order in 03628, Judge Flanagan himself attempts to relitigate or redo
(outside the 10 days under NRCP 59(a) wherein such a sua sponte alteration of one's ruling may be
permissible) his previous Orders (including the Order of 3/30/12, which he characterizes as a final
judgment...which brings up the problematic aspect of the voidness of any sanctions based attorney
fee award based upon a Baker and Hill's post-judgment motion for attorney fees sanctions of
4/19/09), where that Order reads:
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Again, as was the case in Coughlin's attempt to set aside Merliss's award
of costs Coughlin's Motions here attempts to re-litigate substantive issues
this Court has already decided, or frivolous claims this Court has previous-
ly ignored. This Court has entered final judgment on the merits of Coughlin's
underlying claim and awarded attorney's fees and costs to Merliss. Thi Court
will not revisit those decisions here, particularly when Coughlin alleges nothing
that would satisfy the requirements of NRCP 59 or NRCP 60.
It is not at all clear how Coughlin could be said to be attempting to re-litigate substantive is-
sues when the 6/25/12 Order itself notes that Coughlin did not file an Opposition to Hill's 4/19/12
Motion for Attorney Fees. Particularly where substantive issues would, necessarily be intimately
intertwined with any attempt to have any the legitimacy of such an outrageous $42,050 attorney fee
award for just the appeal (ie, not tedious trial court fact finding sorts of attorney work involved, but
the mere filing of a legal brief speaking to rather dry legal issues only...so, just who is attempting to
re-ligitate(or re-adjudicate, rather) things here?
Would that not be Hill and Baker seeking to relitigate their humiliating defeat in the trial
court in 1708 where, at first, Baker sought a ridiculous $18,060 in attorney fees for representing the
landlord in a No Cause Summary Eviction Proceeding (a whoopsie posture, Casey D. Baker, Esq.,
sheepishly had to adopt upon being forced to admit that there exists no basis for awarding attorney's
fees (certainly not the statute Baker cited to allow such fees where no such manufacture of con-
trolled substances exception had been alleged or broached in any way whatsoever by the landlord at
any point in this matter, though Hill did manage to cook up an particularly suspect allegation of hav-
ing found a crack pipe and bag of weed...large quantity of pills and a vial of something shortly
after Coughlin merely restated, verbatim, what RPD Officer Carter had said to Coughlin shortly after
arresting him in response to Coughlin asking him if he was on Richard G. Hill's payroll) under Ne-
vada law incident to a summary eviction proceeding (NRS 69.030, in light of JCRCP 2 (which char-
acterizes landlord tenant matters as outside the purview of those civil actions to which such fee
awards may issued).
So, to recap, Baker moved for $18,050 in attorney's fees for the summary eviction...which
Judge Sferrazza downsized to a mere $1,500, until, ultimately, Baker and Hill were forced to admit
that Coughlin was absolutely correct in asserting that there moving for any attorney's fees at all was,
itself, a fine example of a violation of RPC 3.1's Meritorious Claims requirement...and that fee award
was set aside (though, of course, Coughlin, as a practical matter, was treated to being ordered, by
Judge Flanagan, to pay a fee award, a relevant portion of which was well in excess of that amount in
consideration of the fees Hill and Baker racked up in defending against Coughlin pointing out the
RPC 3.1 violation they themselves ultimately were forced to admit in joining Coughlin in seeking to
have that $1,500 attorney fee award set aside (how fees related to such matters could reasonably be
said to relate to the appeal in 03628, is not clear, nor is how such does not present yet another RPC
3.1 violation by these two lycans (ie, not lichens as Chair Echeverria incorrectly noted, a distinc-
tion which would have been clear to him had he bothered to read any of the materials Coughlin pro-
vided in his filings and Exhibits attached thereto before plunging headlong into a particularly odious
attempt to take away one's law license under the most illegitimate of circumstances.)
Its really not at all clear just how Judge Flanagn could find an assertion that $42,050 in attor-
ney's fees were reasonably incurred in relation to the appeal of this summary eviction. Regardless,
Nevada law does not seem to hold that JCRCP 73(b) is applicable to an appeal of such an informal
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summary proceeding, but rather, is only applicable to a formal eviction (ie, a plenary unlawful de-
tainer civil action, particularly given the explicit language of JCRCP Rule 2).
NEVADA JCRCP RULE 2: THREE FORMS OF ACTIONS THERE
SHALL BE THREE FORMS OF ACTION IN JUSTICE COURTS TO BE KNOWN AS
CIVIL ACTIONS, SMALL CLAIMS ACTIONS AND SUMMARYEVICTION AC-
TIONS. RULES 3 THROUGH 87 GOVERN CIVIL ACTIONS. RULES GOVERNING SMALL
CLAIMS ACTIONS BEGIN WITH RULE 88 AND END WITH RULE 100. RULES GOVERN-
ING SUMMARY EVICTIONS COMMENCE WITH RULE 101.
II. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; SERVICE OF PROCESS,
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND ORDERS
RULE 3. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION A civil action is commenced
by filing a complaint with the court.
It was Hill's associate Baker, whom Hill alternately alleges to have spent an inordinate
amount of time reviewing, only to then seek to allege that he wasn't there for the trial court pro-
ceedings, so he can't be held accountable for his repeated baseless, sworn assertions that Coughlin
failed to raise the matter of his being a commercial tenancy (home law office, and or mattress busi-
ness) impermissibly subject to a No Cause Summary Eviction where the non-payment of rent was
neither pled nor alleged, in violation of the explicit prohibition against the utlization of such a No
Cause summary proceeding against a commercial tenant under NRS 40.253. Further, JCRCP 73 has
no application to the appeal of a summary eviction. Rather, as the Two Roads v. Venetian case and
trial court transcript therein makes clear (or at least makes ridiculous any claim that the position
Coughlin took at various points, including on 12/22/12, as Hill, asserted, in his testimony was some-
how, demonstrative of violations of various RPC's or indicative of a lack of candor or fairness to op-
posing counsel by Coughlin), the supersedeas bond, particularly where the rent is under $1,000, is
statutorily set at $250, and the RJC's threes times the rent approach is not permissible. Nor is char-
acterizing the 10/25/11 court date as a Trial, only to assert that JCRCP 19 (requiring 20 days to re-
spond to a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer in such a plenary matter) is inapplicable to a summary
eviction).
Alongside the numerous procedural violations Coughlin has committed in filing his pa-
pers (ignoring page limits, missing deadlines, etc.), Merliss contends Coughlin's litigation tactics-
including Coughlin's instant attempt to set aside the attorney's fees award-have been employed
not to pursue arguments in good faith but to delay and harass him. Merliss contends Coughlin's be-
havior has been not only abusive but costly, requiring Merliss to contest each an every allegation
Coughlin makes no matter how meritless. page 2 of 8/28/12 Order in 03628.
Speaking of following rules, how about the 21 day safe harbor in NRCP 11? Hill never did
serve Coughlin a filing ready sanction motion. Coughlin, however, did serve Hill at least one such
21 day safe harbor motion. Hill and Flanagan seem to run the ol' frivolous fee sanction pick and roll
with at least an equal elan as that demonstrated by Judge L. Gardner and opposing counsel Springgate
(also, not a fan of 21 day safe harbor filing ready sanction Motions, even where invoking NRS
7.085, which itself invokes NRCP 11, which so requires service of just such a 21 day safe harbor mo-
tion...) in the Joshi Divorce Trial in 01168.
FURTHER, NEITHER JUDGE FLANAGAN, HIS THEN LAW CLERK ZELALEMBOGALE, ESQ., HILL,
NOR BAKER MANAGED TO EVER CITE TO ANY AUTHORITY SUPPORTING THE APPARENT SUA SPONTE
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(CONTRARY TO THE 4/19/12 ORDER IN CARPENTIER BY FLANAGAN SPEAKING TO THE ADJUDICATORY
BOUNDARIES LIMITATIONS PLACED UPON COURTS RESPECTING THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD AND CI-
TATIONS IN SUPPORT THERETO BY THE PARTIES) CONTENTION THAT COUGHLINS' ALLEGED FAILURE TO
FILE A TIMELY OPPOSITION TO BAKER'S 4/19/12 MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IS A PROCEDURAL
VIOLATION. FURTHER, THERE IS NOT PROCEDURAL RULE SETTING PAGE LIMITS IN THE 2JDC. SURE,
THERE WAS AN ORDER SETTING A PAGE LIMIT OF 5 PAGES (WHICH BAKER HIMSELF EXCEEDED), BUT
COUGLHIN DID NOT IGNORE SUCH ORDER. RATHER, COUGHLIN ADDRESSED THE FACT THAT HIS
BRIEF WAS IN EXCESS OF SAID PAGE LIMITATION ORDERED, AND ARGUED A BASIS SHOWING GOOD
CAUSE FOR WHY IS OUGHT BE PERMISSIBLE TO EXCEED IT. CERTAINLY, NO CITATION HAS EVER BEEN
PROVIDED BY BAKER, HILL, OR JUDGE FLANAGAN TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT COUGHLIN SOMEHOW
WAS ABLE TO MANUFACTURE A SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING MERLISS TO CONTEST EACH AN
EVERY ALLEGATION COUGHLIN MAKES NO MATTER HOWMERITLESS. CERTAINLY, A MORE CON-
SERVATIVE APPROACH COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY HILL OR BAKER, SUCH AS FILING A 5 PAGE
ANSWERING BRIEF ADDRESSING THE MAIN POINTS AT ISSUE, WITH A REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO LAT-
ER EXCEED ANYSUCH PAGE LIMITATION, WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY WHAT THEYDID ANYWAYS...SO
WHERE IS ALL THIS $42,050 IN ATTORNEY'S FEES BEING RUNG UP, IF NOT IN IMPERMISSIBLE AREAS
NO THE APPROPRIATE SUBJECT MATTER OF SUCH AN ATTORNEY FEE AWARD MOTION...IE, FILINGS
RELATED TO THE SUPERSEDEAS BOND/STAYON APPEAL ISSUE ARGUABLYDO NOT COME WITHIN
THE PURVIEWOF NRS 69.050, NOR DO THOSE (AND THE ASSOCIATED COURT TIME AND PREPARA-
TION) RELATED TO THE 11/7/11 HEARING ON COUGLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, ETC., IN 1708, OR
THE 12/20/11 HEARING ON COUGHLIN'S 11/16/12 MOTION TO CONTEST PERSONAL PROPERTY
LIEN. CERTAINLY, BAKER AND HILL NEVER PRESENTED ANYCITATION TO SUPPORT A CONTEN-
TION THAT SUCH MATTERS FALL WITHIN THE LANGUAGE OF NRS 69.050. FURTHER, WITH RE-
SPECT TO ALL FEES INCURRED IN RELATION TO THE PERSONAL PROPERTY LIEN ISSUE, JUDGE
FLANAGAN'S ORDER DENYING COUGHLIN'S APPEAL OF 3/30/12 MAKES CLEAR THAT SUCH MAT-
TERS (INCLUDING THE ORDER RESOLVI NGDEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CONTEST PERSONAL PROP-
ERTYLIEN BYJUDGE SFERRAZZA OF 12/21/11...WHICH WAS DEFINITELY NOT A 'CONSENT ORDER'
AND WHICH THE TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD MAKE CLEAR COUGHLIN IN NO WAYCONSENTED TO)
WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE APPEAL IN 03628. AS SUCH, THE VOLUMINOUS ATTORNEY FEE BILL-
ING ENTRIES RELATED THERETO (IMPERMISSIBLYOBSCURED SOMEWHAT BYTHE EXCESSIVE RE-
DACTING OF ENTRIES IN THE ALLEGEDELYDETAILED BILLS, WHERE NO LEGITIMATE PRIVILEGE
WAS EVER ASSERTED OR PROVED TO JUSTIFY SUCH OBSTRUCTIONIST TACTICS...WHICH NOWBE-
COME OF MATERIAL RELEVANCE TO THE EXTENT THAT BAKER, IN HIS SWORN TESTIMONYON
6/18/12 ADMITTED TO INTERACTIONS WITH THE WCSO CIVIL DIVISION ON 10/28/11, AND THAT
HILL'S LAWOFFICE DEFINITELY RELI EDUPON THE RENO JUSTICE COURT TO TRANSMIT THE VARI-
OUS EVICTION ORDERS TO THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE FOR PROCESSING. THE SPECTER OF BOTH THE
10/25/11 AND 10/27/11 EVICTION ORDERS HERE BEING VOID OR STALE WHERE VIOLATIVE OF THE
STATUTORYDICTATE THAT SUCH AN ORDER INCLUDED LANGUAGE (AND NEITHER ORDER HEREIN
DID) ORDERING THE SHERIFF TO REMOVE FROM THE PREMISES WITHIN 24 HOURS OR RECEIPT
(APPARENTLY THE SHERI FF'SRECEIPT OF SUCH ORDER...THOUGH SEVERAL COUNTIES IN NEVADA AP-
PARENTLY VIEW THE RELEVANT LANGUAGE IN NRS 40.253 AS APPLYING TO THE TENANT'S RECEIPT,
AND, ACCORDINGLY, HAVE POLICIES WHICH REQUIRE THE SHERIFF OR CONSTABLE TO POST TO A TEN-
ANT'S DOOR SUCH AN ORDER, THEN ALLOWAT LEAST 24 HOURS TO PASS BEFORE CONDUCTING ANY
SUCH LOCKOUT. ONE THING THAT CERTAINLY IS INTERESTING IS THAT THE EVICTION ORDER THE
WCSOPOSTED TO THE DOOR OF COUGHLIN'S FORMER HOME LAWOFFICE ON 11/1/11 LACKED
ANY FAX HEADER (IN CONTRAST TO ALL OTHER SUCH EVICTION ORDERS COUGHLIN HAD SEEN
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POSTED AND BAKER'S TESTIMONYON 6/18/12 THAT THE RJCWAS RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSMIT-
TING SUCH AN EVICTION ORDER, THOUGH ITS NOT CLEAR THAT BAKER DID NOT FIRST FAXTHE
10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE THAT THE RJCFAXED TO HIM(AS SHOWN IN THE ATTACHMENTS TO
HILL'S TPOAPPLICATION OF 1/12/12 AGAINST COUGHLIN) AT 4:41PM TO THE WCSOALONG
WITH THE ORDER OF 10/27/11 GRANTING BAKER'S UNNOTICED EMERGENCY MOTION TO INSPECT
COUGHLIN'S FORMER HOME LAWOFFICE DURING THE WEEKEND DURING WHICH, APPARENTLY,
COUGHLIN WAS EXPECTED TO RECOVER FOR A GRUELING SIX WEEKS OF LITIGATING, AND HIRE
MOVERS AND RENT TRUCKS TO MOVE BOTH A HOME AND A LAWOFFICE, EVEN WHERE THE RJC
WAS STILL RETAINING THE $2,275 IN RENT ESCROW THAT IT DEMANDED FROM COUGHLIN IN THE
10/13/11 ORDER IN VIOLATION OF NEVADA LAW? POSTED WITH THE 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE ON
11/1/11 BY WCSODEPUTYMACHEN WAS JUST THAT 10/27/11 ORDER ALLOWING SUCH AN IN-
SPECTION, THOUGH THAT ORDER, CURIOUSLY, DID HAVE TWO FAX HEADERS ATOP IT (ONE INDI-
CATING THE RJCFAXED HILL'S LAWOFFICE THAT INSPECTION ORDER AT 4:39 PM ON 10/27/11),
AND A SECOND HEADER INDICATING THE WCSO CIVIL DIVISION RECEIVED A FAXNEARLY IMME-
DIATELYTHEREAFTER FROM HILL'S OFFICE THAT TRANSMITTED THE INSPECTION ORDER (WITH
RJCFAX HEADER FRESHLYPRINTED THEREON) TO THE WCSO CIVIL DIVISION....WHAT IT NOT
CLEAR IS WHY THE RJC, WCDA, WCSO CIVIL DIVISION, HILL, AND BAKER ARE SO RETICIENT,
AND, SOME MIGHT SAY OBSTRUCTIONIST ABOUT RESPONDING TO COUGHLIN'S VARIOUS REQUESTS (IN-
CLUDING NRS 239 OPEN RECORDS REQUESTS) SEEKING DOCUMENTATION RELATED TO AND COPIES OF
THE FAX LOGS OF THE RJC FOR THE RELEVANT TIME PERIOD INVOLVED HERE, ESPECIALLY CONSIDER-
ING BAKER'S SWORN TESTIMONY AT THE CRIMINAL TRESPASS TRIAL OF COUGHLIN ON 6/18/12 RELA-
TIVE TO JUST HOW SUCH EVICTION ORDERS WERE RECEIVED BY THE WCSOCIVIL DIVISION, AND
JUST WHAT MEANS OF TRANSMITTING THOSE ORDERS WAS UTILIZED.
The law is unclear in Nevada and this is a matter of legitimate public concern involving both
the safety of law enforcement and tenants, but also the enormous social costs of ill advisedly carried
out summary eviction lockouts that are bound to resultin consequential damages far exceeded the rel-
atively small sum of money landlord's would save by having such lockouts done even one day earlier
than current usual custom and practices (to quote Hill's statement of the state of the law therein) of
the Washoe County Sheriff's Office. The judiciary has an obligation here as well as nearly all judi-
cial campaigns in Washoe County (particulary those at the Justice Court level) openly tout the en-
dorsement of a myriad of local law enforcement organizations (though, never, any that espouse ten-
ants rights or civil rights in general). Is there a Lawyer's Protection Association to mirror the Po-
lice Protective Association that nearly all successful judicial candidates in Washoe County so openly
flaunt having the endorsement of? Does that encourage the rampant Soldal v. Cook Co., style depri-
vation of 42 USC Sec. 1983 rights that is evinced in the 15 or so wrongful summary eviction Cough-
lin has been subjected to since the initial wrongful 8/20/11 arrest and seven day incarceration occur-
ring while an eviction notice was placed on his former home law office's door just two months after
his domestic partner of four years absconded with two months of his rental contributions, secretely,
failed to pay one month of her own (though she did obtain, arguably, assent from the landlord to an
arrangement whereby any joint obligation thereto of Coughlin's was absolved with respect to one to
two months Ulloa's rental shares...), where Coughlin then could not afford his anti-depressants or
ADHD medications starting on or about August 2
nd
, 2011 (an also where an appointment with his
pyschiatrist, Dr. Yasar, had to be cancelled due to his not being able to afford the office visit, and
where NNAHMS indicated it would never cover ADHD medications, and that Coughlin would not be
permitted to have MDD medications covered where taking such ADHD medications, upon Coughlin
confidentially inquiring as to such matters with NNAHMS).
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In contrast to allegedly billing up $42,050 in addressing Coughlin's allegations (its
not clear that the misconduct of Hill and Baker and their damage self interested damage con-
trol instincts are an appropriate basis for racking of billable hours to charge Merliss or to later
seek (in a procedural violation of their own, given the dictates against seeking post-judgment
attorney fee sanctions, particularly where no attempt to comply with the 21 day safe harbor re-
quirements in NRCP 11 where ever made by Hill or Baker) an award of such attorney's fees
WHAT IS MOST STRIKING IS THE UTTER LACK OF SPECIFICS FROM EITHER BAKER, HILL, OR
JUDGE FLANAGAN AS TO JUST WHICH POSITIONS TAKEN OR ARGUMENTS MADE BY COUGHLIN EVINCE
ANY SORT OF FRIVOLITY OR WHY...FURTHER, HILL AND BAKER THEMSELVES CLEARLY CONDUCTED NO
NOVEL LEGAL RESEARCH IN THIS MATTER, ASIDE FROM CITING TO ANVUI AND THE THEN RECENT CG
WALLACE CASE, AND THEY DEMONSTRATE ANY UTTER PAUCITY OF INSIGHT INTO LANDLORD TENANT
LAW AND SUMMARY EVICTIONS IN PARTICULAR, WHICH ARE, AS THE CGWALLACE CASE POINTS OUT,
TRULY RARE SPECIES IN THE LAW, HAVING UNTO THEMSELVES AND ENTIRELY UNIQUE SET OF CONSID-
ERATIONS AND PROCEDURES.
FIRST BANK OF MARIETTA V. HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INS. CO., 307 F.3D 501, 51011 (6TH
CIR.2002) (COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION IS MANDATORY); LINDNER V. AMERICAN
EXP. CORP., 2009 WL 54493, AT 2 (S.D.N.Y. JAN. 8, 2009) (THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SAFE
HARBOR PROVISION RESULTS IN A DENIAL OF SANCTIONS); DALTON V. FLEMING, 2008 WL 4571509, AT
*3 (S.D.ALA. OCT. 14, 2008) (THE REQUIREMENT IS JURISDICTIONAL, WAS NOT WAIVED, AND THE
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION RESULTED IN DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS); OLSON V. AT& TCORP., 2008 WL 2967167, AT *1 (D.KAN. JULY 31, 2008) (MOTION
FOR SANCTIONS DENIED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SAFE HARBOR PROVISION).
X. LIMITATIONOF PROSECUTIONS, 145 .5-160.
XIV, ARRAIGNMENT, >261-266,
SEE ALSO CONSTITUTIONAL LAWE=>4459.
83. Nature and scope of criminal jurisdiction.
84. Constitutional and statutory provisions.
(1). In general.
(2). Right to confer and limit jurisdiction.
(3). Conferring extraterritorial jurisdiction.
(4). Creating local and special courts.
(5). Impairing or enlarging jurisdiction
conferred by Constitution.
(6). EFFECT OF STATUTE CONFERRING JURISDICTION
on another court.
85. COURTS INVESTED WITH CRIMINAL JURISDICTION.
86. -- In general.
87. --' Limited or inferior jurisdiction.
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88. -- Municipal and other local courts.
89. -- United States courts.
90. Jurisdiction of justices of the peace, police
justices, and other officers.
(1). IN GENERAL.
(2). Jurisdiction of offense.
(3). Extent of punishment.
(4). Territorial extent.
(5). Concurrent jurisdiction.
(6). Effect of conferring jurisdiction
on other courts of same grade.
91. JURISDICTION OF OFFENSE.
92. -- In general.
93. -- Nature or grade of offense.
94. -- Extent of penalty.
(5). INFERIOR AND MUNICIPAL COURTS.
.:13.' Jurisdiction of the person.
99. Mode of acquiring jurisdiction.
100. Exercise of jurisdittion in general.
(1). In general.
(2). Different departments of same
court.
(3). PRIORITY OF JURISDICTION.
101. Transfer of causes.
(.5). In general. .
(1). Between federal courts.
(2). Between state courts in general.
(3). Grounds for transfer between
state courts.
(4). PROCEEDINGS FOR TRANSFER BETWEEN
state courts.
(5). PROCEEDINGS AFTER TRANSFER BETWEEN
state courts.
(6). BETWEEN JUSTICES' COURTS.
102. Loss or divestiture of jurisdiction.
103. Jurisdiction to be shown by record.
104. Presumptions as to jurisdiction.
105. Waiver of objections.
IX. VENUE.
See also CONSTITUTIONAL LA We=>4459.
106. NATURE AND NECESSITY OF VENUE IN PROSECUTION.
107. Constitutional and statutory provisions.
108. Locality of offense in general.
(1). In general.
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(2). Organization of new county.
109. Offenses committed without presence of
accused.
110. PRINCIPALS AND ACCESSORIES.
110. CRIMINAL LAW
99. MODE OF ACQUIRING JURISDICTION.
100. EXERCISE OF JURISDITTION IN GENERAL.
(1). IN GENERAL.
(2). DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS OF SAME
COURT.
(3). PRIORITY OF JURISDICTION.
101. TRANSFER OF CAUSES.
(.5). IN GENERAL. .
(1). BETWEEN FEDERAL COURTS.
(2). BETWEEN STATE COURTS IN GENERAL.
(3). GROUNDS FOR TRANSFER BETWEEN
STATE COURTS.
(4). PROCEEDINGS FOR TRANSFER BETWEEN
STATE COURTS.
(5). PROCEEDINGS AFTER TRANSFER BETWEEN
STATE COURTS.
(6). BETWEEN JUSTICES' COURTS.
102. LOSS OR DIVESTITURE OF JURISDICTION.
103. JURISDICTION TO BE SHOWN BY RECORD.
104. PRESUMPTIONS AS TO JURISDICTION.
105. WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS
146. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS.
147. LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE.
148. COMMENCEMENT OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION.
148.1. -- IN GENERAL.
149. -- Commission of offense in general.
150. -- Continuing offenses.
151. Exceptions and suspension.
151.1. -- IN GENERAL.
152. -- Absence, nonresidence, or concealment
of accused.
153. -- FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE.
154. -- Concealed or unknown offense.
155. Computation of time.
156. COMMENCEMENT OF PROSECUTION.
157. -- IN GENERAL.
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158. -- Continuance or delay in prosecution.
159. -- AMENDMENT OF PROCEEDINGS.
160. -- New proceedings after dismissal or
failure of original prosecution
XIV. ,ARRAIGNMENT.
SEE ALSO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW <SZ>4584.
261. NECESSITY OF ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA.
(1). IN GENERAL.
(2). FURTHER ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA.
262. WAIVER OF ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA.
263. BENCH WARRANT OR OTHER PROCESS AFTER
INDICTMENT.
264. REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY OF L;LRRAIGNMENT.
26S. TIME TO PLEAD IN GENERAL.
TIME OF ARRAIGNMENT, SEE <SZ> 264.
266. REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO PLEAD.
(A) PLACE OF BRINGINGPROSECUTION THE DISCOVERY PROVIDED BY RCACHIEF WONG
FOR THE TPOCASE, (3913), CURIOUSLY IS MISSING ANY SIGNATURE OR IDENTIFYING AND SUPPORT-
ING INFORMATION AS TO THE PROOF OF SERVICE OF THE TPO. WHILE PAGE 23 OF THE 36 PAGE PRO-
DUCTION FOR 3913 HAS HAD THE PHRASE PROOF OF SERVICE INTERLINEATED ATOP IT, THE 12/26/12
QUASI-PROOF OF SERVICE FOUND ON PAGE 5 OF THE FIVE PAGE TPOORDER IN 607, SHOULD ONE MAN-
AGE TO GET A COPY OF IT (WHICH, AGAIN, SUCH PAGE IS CURIOUSLY MISSING FROM THE PRODUCTION BY
THE RCA) WOULD REVEAL THAT IT WAS NOT EVEN ATTEMPTED SERVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
ORDER ITSELF, WHICH, AT PAGE 4 OF 5 ORDERS: ITIS FURTHER ORDEREDTHAT THE APPROPRIATE
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY/PROCESS SERVER PROMPTLY ATTEMPT TO SERVE THIS ORDER, TOGETHER
WITH A COPY OF THE APPLICATION UPON THE ADVERSE PARTY, AND UPON SERVICE, FILE PROOF OF
SERVICE WITH THE COURT BY THE END OF THE NEXT BUSINESS DAY AFTER SERVICE IS MADE. SERVICE
MUST BE MADE PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. PAGE 4:23-5:2 OF 12/20/12 TPOIN
RJC RCP12-607.
Coughlin has obtained that missing page 5 of 5 of the 12/20/12 TPO in 607, which contains
a file stamp of 12/26/12 at 4:34pm next to Reno Justice Court Bailiff Anthony English's Proof of
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Service Upon the Adverse Party. Accordingly, the RJC took the Order of 12/20/12 in 607 and inter-
lineated Proof of Service atop of page 1 of 5, then had RJC Bailiff Tony English sign and date the
Proof of Service Upon the Adverse Party form therein that had previously been left blank. As
such, has not the RJC and its Bailiff's altered a legal document. See Judge Nash Holmes' allega-
tions as to Coughlin's filign in 11 TR 26800 being errant and altered. See NNDB Panel Chair
Echeverria and OBC's King's allegation in the transcript of the 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing
that Coughlin was altering a previously filed document. See the RJC refusing to file in Coughlin's
handwritten filings in a landlord tenant matter by having RJC Bailiff deliver to Coughlin RJC Civil
Division Clerk's Christine Erickson's unsigned (initially) note and supporting documentation to
Coughlin purporting to have authority to demand type written filings from Coughlin by citing to
JCRRT, despite JCRRT Rule 2 making clear that such rules do not apply to landlord tenant mat-
ters. Then see 2JDC Judge Elliott's dismissing Coughlin's wrongful termination case in CV11-
01955 against Washoe Legal Services and the very CAAW whose Executive Board Judge Elliott sits
on (which he failed to disclose), of 12/8/11, wherein the failure to list the place of service resulting
in vitiating.
Further, RJC Bailiff English's Proof of Service fails to meet even the NRS 54.045 Declara-
tion under penalty of perjury requirements, fails to speicify that it was a true and correct copy of
this Temporary Order for Protection Against Harassment in the Wrokplace, together with a copy of
the Application. That 12/26/12 Proof of Service does have English's signature, the his handwrit-
ten name underneath, with 12-26-12 listed in the blank for Date of Service and 1458 hrs listed
in the blank for Time of Service with an interlineation on the left next thereto of Served by Bail-
iff. Such Proof of Service fails to mention that such was attempted served upon Coughlin in the
RJC Courthouse while Coughlin was attending court, in violation of courthouse sanctuary rule, the
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privilege and immunity against service of process accorded attorney's and litigants where attending
court and in the courthouse, and agains very jurisdictional prerequisite terms of the 12/20/12 Order in
607 itself in that an RJC Bailiff is not listed amongst those appropriate law enforcement agen-
cy/process server ORDERED to attempt to serve this Order, which, again, reads:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the appropriate law enforcement agency/process server promptly
attempt to serve this Order, together with a copy of the Application upon the Adverse Party, and upon
service, file proof of service with the Court by the end of the next business day after service is made.
Service must be made pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure. page 4:23-5:2 of 12/20/12 TPO in
RJC RCP12-607.
RJC BAILIFF ENGLISH'S PROOF OF SERVICE IS FURTHER DEFICIENT UNDER NRCP 5 (WHICH
THE ORDER ITSELF REQUIRES SERVICE BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORD WITH) IN THAT IT FAILS TO SPECIFY
THAT ENGLISH IS OVER 18 YEARS OF AGE AND NOT A PARTY TO CASE, IN ADDITION TO FAILING TO
INDICATE WHERE SUCH PURPORTED SERVICE WAS CONDUCTED.
CHIEF WONG'S FAILURE TO TURN OVER THE BRADY MATERIAL PRESENTED BY THE PATENTLY
DEFICIENT PROOF OF SERVICE OF THE 12/20/12 TPOAPPLICATION 607 REQUIRES A MISTRIALL AND
DISMISSAL OF BOTH OF THESE PROSECUTIONS GIVEN A JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITE FOR THE EPOIN
607 IS EFFECTIVE SERVICE OF NOTICE OF THE 1/4/13 HEARING AND WITHOUT SUCH, NO OPPORTUNITY
TO BE HEARD COULD BE SAID TO BE AFFORDED TO COUGHLIN. COUGHLIN HAS REPEATEDLY NOTIFIED
TO RJC AND ITS BAILIFFS VERBALLY AND IN WRITING THAT HE DOES NOT CONSENT TO OR WAIVER THE
RIGHTS HE HAS AGAINST BEING SERVED ANYTHING IN THE RJC COURTHOUSE, ESPECIALLY BY THE
RJC'S OWN BAILIFF'S OR PERSONNEL (IT GOES AGAINST THE PRESTIGE AND NEUTRALITY THAT THE
RJC JUDICIARY, POPULATED BY LIFELONG PROSECUTORS, SOME MIGHT SAY, PERHAPS OUGHT ATTEMPT
TO EVINCE IN A BIT MORE PRONOUNCED A FASHION.
Similarly, the Affidavit of Service in the EPO case (3914) is defective as well, making
such EPO in 607 void as well. While the 1/14/13 Affidavit of Service by Clint Player does spec-
ify that Player is over 18 years of age and not a party to case, and that such purported service
took place (on a Saturday, which the WCSO does not serve orders on normally), at Location: 1471
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E. 9
th
Street Reno, NV 89505 (which is the wrong zip code, given such address falls in the 89512
designation) in the County of Washoe, State of Nevada. Further, while such indicates it was per-
sonally served, the 2/7/12 written admission by WCSO Civil Division Supervisor Liz Stuchell that
her office considers a document personally served even where it is merely posted on one's front
door when the WCSO admits no one is home, vitiates any compliance with the requirements of
NRCP 5 that may appear attendant thereto. Player failed to comply with the 1/4/13 EPO where such
required, at page 4 of 4 line 20-22 that IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the appropriate law en-
forcement agency/process server promptly attempt to serve this Order, together with a copy of the
Application upon the Adverse Party, anduponservice, fileproof of servicewiththeCourtbythe
endof thenext businessdayafter serviceismade. Service must be made pursuant to the Rules of
Civil Procedure. Player's Affidavit of Service purports to have effected service on a Saturday,
1/5/13, yet was not even signed by Player until 1/7/13, and not file stamped by the RJC until 1/14/13,
such failure by Player to comply with the Order (and the WCSO fails to comply with Nevada law in-
cident to NRS 40.253 and 24 hour lock-out orders (see Anvui) in taking a very deleterious shortcut
to Nevadan's in failing to accord tenant's 24 hours from the time of the WCSO posting a lockout or-
der to when the lockout is effected. Rather, as they did on 3/15/12 to Couglin RJC Rev12-374, the
WCSO has been known to race over to a tenant's house shortly after a summary eviction hearing and
break and enter, without knocking or identifying themselves as law enforcement first, with there
guns draw, only to point them at the tenant and demand they submit to handcuffing (your being de-
tained) whereup the tenant is afforded a scant 'five minutes to grab some things. to Further,
Player's Affidavit of Service fails to identify the case number of the documents Player purports to
have served Coughlin in that 1/14/13 Affidavit of Service (which fails to meet the requirements of
NRCP 5 and runs counter to the established practice of the WCSO as to such Affidavits of Services
(reportedly after jabbing his forearm into Coughlin's midsection on Coughlin's drive way, in an dis-
play of excessive force similar to that demonstrated by RJC Bailiff John Reyes on 12/19/12 when
himself violating Courthouse sanctuary doctrine and attorney litigant immunity from such service in
the courthouse (where Reyes also shoved his forearm into Coughlin's midsection;.. Additionally in
4/24/13 Reyes loudly exclaimed to Couglin, upon his checking in with the courthouse security pursu-
ant to theirs and the WCSO Office's contention that the 12/20/12 Administrative Order 2012-01 in
The Administrative Matter of Zachary Coughlin requires Couglhin to do so, and wait for an RJC
Bailiff to appear to escort Coughlin to the Department of Alternative sentencing so Coughlin can
complete his required once weekly for two years probation ordered by Judge Sferrazza for a convic-
tion of a crime with a fine/bail schedule set at $500, and where Coughlin had served over 12 days in
jail thereon (meaning, giving Couglin a suspended 180 day is entirely overreachign and inappropri-
ate, some might say, and further evidence of the extent to which the RJC judiciary impermissibly lev-
erages such minor charges in an effort to mitigate civil liability of the RJC and Washoe County itself
through coercive application of probation (and such probation led to Coughlin spending 5 days in jail
incident to a fraudulent arrest by DAS on 2/1/13 connected to RJC Bailiff Medina and courthouse
security, and DAS worker Sabrina conspiring to detain Coughlin, whom presented at the security
check in point at 2:54 pm (where DAS closes at 3:00 pm) and confirmed again with courthouse secu-
rity (a private firm directed by the WCSO) that he would be arrested if he attempted to go to the DAS
window to check in without and RJC Bailiff, despite the fact that DAS is a separate department
from the RJC and therefore Couglhin's checking in with DAS does not come within the purview of
the suspect 12/20/12 Administrative Order 2012-01 in that the DAS area is not under the exclu-
sive control of the RJC, and as such, no RJC Bailiff escort is required.
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On 2/24/13, Coughlin was again asking the courthouse security personnel about this when
RJC Bailiff John Reyes, carrying a gun (and against whom Coughlin was denied a TPO in February
2012 where the RJC transferred such the the Sparks Justice Court) loudly exlcaimed what the FUCK
are you bothering them for, to which Coughlin indicated that he was doing no such thing, to which
Reyes responded that he knew Coughlin was, despite Reyes being entirely unable to quote anything
Coughlin had just said in response to Coughlin asking him what in particular about the conversation
Coughlin was having with courthouse security Bailiff Reyes found so to be bothering, whereupon
Reyes invaded Coughlin's personal space and loud exlaimed I am not in the mood for your fucking
shit. Do you want me to send you back out that front door or do you want to take care of business.
Couglin indicated he wished to check in with DAS and was escorted there by Reyes. While heading
out of the shared courthouse Couglin indicated again, as he has previously to the RJC Bailiffs, Reyes
and Medina included, that the 12/20/12 Administrative Order 2012-01 does not, in Coughlin's
opinion, require such RJC Bailiff escorts where Coughlin is checking in with DAS, which RJC Judge
Pearson has admitted is separate from the RJC and not under its umbrella. So, the RJC Bailiffs
purported to serve Coughlin a TPO in RCP12-599 on 12/19/12, Judge Sferrazza's Adminsitrative
Order 2012-01 on 12/19/12, and the TPO in 607 on 12/26/12, in addition to, on 2/28/13 a 2/25/13
Order to Show Cause stemming from that Administrative Order 2012-01 (which lacked a case
number until the RJC altered such Order on 3/14/13 by affixing the case number RCR2013-071437
thereto, though there remains no opposing party therein and such Order was not made in any case
and there was no opposing party, nor any properly made motion sufficient to invest the RJC with
jurisdiction to make such Order. A verbatim copy of such Administrative Order was purported
served by RMC Chief Marshal Roper on Coughlin on 1/16/13 in the courthouse as well in violation
of the dictates against such set forth herein.
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Additional basis for dismissing this prosecution arises from the apparent retaliatory acci-
dental charging by RPD Detective Yturbide of the wrong offense, as detailed in DDA Young's
District Attorney No-Issue Memorandum as to RPD 13-2445 (EPO in 3914) and RPD 13-100306
(TPO in 3913) for DA Case NO: 447140.
WCDA DDA Young's District Attorney No-Issue Memorandum 13-2445 of 2/28/13 reads
Prosecution of this case has been declined for the following reasons: G. Refer to City Attorney in
Reno/Sparks. Remarks: You booked for vilation of Orders Against Stalking/Harassment per NRS
200.591. However, Orders are against Harassment In the Workplace, per NRS 33.270 and 33.350.
This is only a misdemeanor offense. Seems to be a righteous charge and case, but should be prose-
cuted by Reno City Attorney's Office. Please forward case to that office. Date 2/28/13 Deputy DA:
/s/ Zach Young, Esq.
The problem is that RCA Sooudi's Memorandum to the RMC seeking a Summons and includ-
ing the Criminal Complaint and RPD Ytrubide's Declaration is dated 2/22/13, while WCDA DDA
Young's No-Issue Memorandum is dated 2/28/13.
Furhter RPD Detective Ytrubide's charging decision reveals a clear cut retaliatory animus or
total incompetence, which would be plainly unacceptable for one as well compensated and entrusted
with as much authority as Yturbide is. And one really does not have to look too far to discern where
Detective Ytrubide's retaliatory animus arises from (lending more credence to the view that the
charging decisions he made of 2/8/13 were less the result of total incompetence and more embued
with a malice seeking to make Coughlin's bail and the attendant consequences of such charges (pro-
fessional reputational damage, suspicously close in time the arrest on 2/8/13 incident to SBN/OBC
allegations where Coughlin's brief in 62337 was due on 2/13/13.
The initial in a line of 15 wrongful arrests of Coughlin since August 2011 was made by RPD
Officer Nick Duralde (whom sworn witnesses in the trial in RJC RCR11-1708 have indicated lied
during his testimony in a manner that indicates the order of his makign an arrest and conducting a
search of Coughlin's short's pockets on 8/20/11 was purposefully rearranged by Duralde incident to
the fact that there was no vibrating sound emitted from the iPhone in question upon Duralde alleg-
edly calling it, where witness testimony indicated that the phone merely had a screen light up in-
coming call notification and not an sound emitted, and that such lighting up of the screen, allegedly,
was no longer visible due to the phone's screen being turned to face Coughlin's body, and therefore,
no longer be viewable, allegedly, through his short's fabric.). That prosecution involved emergency
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911 dispatch ECOMM matters significantly, as what dispatch communicated to the RPD and what
was received by Duralde and the RPD became of material relevance with respect to the probable
cause and reasonable suspicion analysis, particularly with respect to the exclusionary rule and hearing
on Coughlin's Motion to Supress, with Duralde lying about what dispatch told him where Duralde
was not able to see the text view screen in his vehicle at the only point during the relevant time in
question where Ecomm gave any indication to Duralde and his fellow officers that there was anything
remotely similar to a possible fight, which is the pretexutal exigent officer safety assertion that
Coach Young, er, WCDA DDA Young taught Durale to sprinkle his testimony with in hopes that
such would yield sufficient evidence to defeat Coughlin's Supression Motion vis a vis whether
there was sufficient basis for Duralde to conduct the multiple terry stop pat downs that he did that
night and or a search incident to arrest for an alleged misdemeanor that Duralde admits was alleged to
have occurred outside his presence, between 7pm and 7am, where Duralde lied about what witnesses
on scene told him the present value of the phone was in an attempt to (like Yturbide) overcharge
Couglin with felony grand larceny sufficient to defeat the dictate against making a custodial arrest
under those circumstances for a misdemeanor (such as petty larceny which is, at best, the only al-
leged misdemeanor that Duralde could have possibly had a basis to charge Coughlin with) in light of
NRS 171.136. Now, Duralde, and his wife, Jessica Duralde, whom is a 911 dispatcher with
ECOMM, are furious at Coughlin for exposing RPD Officer Duralde's malevolent, fraudulent ap-
proach to police work (including where Duralde taunted Couglin smugly, and openly, about his
fraudulent intent in overcharging Coughlin with a felony in light of the certain advantages of doing
so, as Duralde indicated to Coughlin shortly after effecting a custodial arrest on 8/20/11). RPD
Duralde's wife Ecomm's Jessica Duralde took calls in connection with that arrest from her husband
on 8/20/11. Further, another retaliatory, shameful prosecution of Coughlin this year in the RJC by
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DDA Young involved Duralde and Ecomm yet again, where the WCPD got in on the act in blacking
out information from the ECOMM text logs that demonstrate the extent to which Duralde and the
same Sargent Macaulay whom (along with three other officers) pulled Coughlin over on 1/13/12 at
1 am after tailign Coughlin upon his release at 10:30pm from the Washoe County jail upon bailing
out incident to a custodial jaywalking arrest of 1/12/12. The problem is that the ECOMM logs reveal
that Duralde was staking out Coughlin's vehicle and identified it by the one license plate it ever had
thereon, only for Duralde to then later allege he and his four, super busy, well compensated, lavished
with benefits and pensions that bankrupt Washoe County schools fellow officers had a basis to pull
Couglin over (outside of Duralde being upset about Coughlin emailing the RPD on 1/8/12 to com-
plain about Duralde's conduct during the 8/20/11 arrest (which report Ecomm's supervisor Beechler
reported to RPD Sargent Medina on 1/12/12 in describing Coughlin's reporting 911 his fear for his
safety incident to the retaliation he was being subjected to by local law enforcement, eliciting a men-
acing laugh from Sargent Medina that DDA Young, in violation of Brady, his speciality, failed to
turn over for entirely too long, and only upon Coughlin subpoenaing such materials, which were not
turned over in anywhere near to volume or scope required.
So, what does all of that have to do with RPD Detective Yturbide? RPD Detective Yturbide's
wife is ECOMM Public Safety Dispatcher Jody Yturbide, whom is best friends with and works
alongside RPD Nick Duralde's wife, ECOMM Public Safety Dispatcher Jessica Duralde:
HTTP://WWW.URBANSPOON.COM/U/PROFILE/809578
Thomas Yturbide III wrote: June 27, 2010 Likes it 775 Gastropub Phone.30d81a0 Mobile
review by Thomas Yturbide III (1 review) Excellent brunch at the 775. You choose omelet with ham,
cheddar, and asparagus. Kids had blueberry sourdough pancakes. Jody had the hangover panini.
There's also a make it yourself Bloody Mary Bar. Have to try everything.
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Name Position
Base
Pay
Over-
time/
Callback
Pay
Other
Pay
Benefits
Total Pay &
Benefits
Jurisdic-
tion
Yea
r
THOMAS
YTURBIDE
III
Police Officer
$73,834.
43
$13,310.8
2
$8,044.
85
$44,201.
38
$139,391.48 Reno
201
1
DOMINICA
YTURBIDE
Public Safety
Dispatcher
$67,524.
00
$27,835.8
9
$5,417.
61
$26,597.
11
$127,374.61 RENO
201
1
JODY
YTURBIDE
Public Safety
Dispatcher
$67,524.
07
$6,793.89
$3,219.
58
$27,696.
56
$105,234.10 Reno
201
1
THOMAS
YTURBIDE
III
7551 - Police Of-
ficer
$74,058.
01
$12,491.5
8
$8,204.
33
N/A $122,155.38 RENO
201
0
DOMINICA
YTURBIDE
1127 - Public
Safety Dispatch-
er
$64,871.
30
$22,574.5
8
$5,657.
69
N/A $107,050.90 Reno
201
0
JODY
YTURBIDE
1127 - Public
Safety Dispatch-
er
$65,748.
08
$1,821.45
$3,113.
25
N/A $84,818.62 RENO
201
0
THOMAS
YTURBIDE
III
Police Officer
$71,403.
01
$11,572.9
2
N/A
$26,419.
11
$118,640.10 Reno
200
9
DOMINICA
YTURBIDE
Public Safety
Dispatcher
$58,705.
30
$31,625.1
7
N/A
$12,621.
64
$109,543.47 RENO
200
9
JODY
YTURBIDE
Public Safety
Dispatcher
$62,761.
61
$14,241.1
3
N/A
$13,493.
75
$93,179.61 Reno
200
9
ECOMMEMPLOYES PUBLIC SAFETY DISPATCHER, ALSO KNOWN AS 911 OPERATORS, LIKE
RPDOFFICER NICK DURALDE'S WIFE, JESSICA DURALDE, AN ECOMMPUBLIC SAFETY DISPATCHER,
911 OPERATOR.
NICHOLAS
DURALDE
Police Officer
$66,157.
18
$3,424.7
9
$9,462.
33
$38,159.
33
$117,203.
63
REN
O
201
1
JESSICA
DURALDE
Public Safety Dispatch-
er
$63,030.
40
$12,680.
57
$3,381.
84
$27,769.
99
$106,862.
80
Re-
no
201
1
NICHOLAS
DURALDE
7551 - Police Officer
$62,402.
82
$6,328.2
2
$8,861.
93
N/A
$100,682.
01
REN
O
201
0
JESSICA
DURALDE
1127 - Public Safety
Dispatcher
$58,476.
50
$7,339.6
6
$4,111.
85
N/A
$82,500.4
6
Re-
no
201
0
NICHOLAS
DURALDE
Police Officer
$56,541.
43
$4,111.7
4
N/A
$20,920.
33
$90,665.6
0
REN
O
200
9
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$140K a year is kind of a lot for RPD Detective Yturbide to be making such sloppy, patently
retaliatory charging decisions such as those he made on 2/8/13 (the second offense language in
NRS 200.591 only applies to where a conviction for a first offense was present, so Yturbide's
charging Couglhin with a gross misdemeanor where the statute makes clear that even a violation of
the charge Yturbide put down on Coughlin's Arrest Report (a violation of a Stalking and Harassment
Protection Order, which was, obviously, the wrong charge, something Yturbide knew full well given
the TPO and EPOs provided to him by the SBN listed in numerous occasions that NRS 33.270. Also,
Coughlin's 11/8/12 Designation Witness and Summary of Evidence in the formal dispicplinary matter
was critical of 2002 SBN Character and Fitness Committee Chairman, Michael Smiley Rowe, Esq.,
and Coughlin has requested an indication from Panel member Stephen Smiley Kent, Esq., if they are
related, and Michael Smiley Rowe's law firm, Rowe & Hales employes an attorney whose last name
is Yturbide and SBN OBC Pat King, whom filed the TPO/EPO Application in 607 and indicated he
was acting as the attorney for the employer (despite such obviously requiring him to withdraw from
62337 RPC 3.7 given the overwhelming likelihood he will be called as a witness in various actions)
was previously based near Rowe in Minden, Nevada, alongside the same RMC defender Keith
Loomis, Esq., a grievance against by Coughlin King summarily dispensed with in October
2012.:http://www.rowehales.com/JenniferYturbide.html
http://www.rowehales.com/Attorneys.html
Further the RJC never even attempted to serve, much less provide in any manner the follow-
ing required NOTICE, see Form C15 on Nevada Supreme Court's website:
NOTICE
If the Temporary Order is granted, and if the Applicant is requesting a hearing on the Extended Or-
der, the Court will contact the applicant approximately seven (7) days prior to the scheduled hearing
to confirm that the Applicant will attend. If the Applicant does not confirm that he/she will attend the
scheduled hearing, the hearing will be vacated and the Adverse Party will be notified.
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From: Kandaras, Mary
Sent: Thursday, December 13, 2012 10:20 AM
To: Leslie, Jim
Subject: RE: The Three E's; wcpd failure to provide essential 911 call cd discovery of 8/13 and
8/17, 2012 to Coughlin in rcr2012-065630
Importance: High
Jim:
I believe that you should send this. Supreme Court Rule 104(a) authorizes State bar counsel to inves-
tigate all matters
involving possible attorney misconduct or incapacity called to bar counsel's attention, whether by
grievance or both.
This potentially involves misconduct (violation of law) and incapacity.
Mary Kandaras
Deputy District Attorney Civil Division
Washoe County
775 - 337 - 5723 direct phone
From:Leslie, Jim
Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2012 2:59 PM
To: Kandaras, Mary
Subject: FW: The Three E's; wcpd failure to provide essential 911 call cd discovery of 8/13 and 8/17,
2012 to Coughlin in
rcr2012-065630
Mary:
Please review my transmittal to Patrick King at the bar, below, and let me know if I should do any-
thing else from a civil
perspective.
Thanks,
From:
Leslie, Jim
To: 'patrickk@nvbar.org'
2012 to Coughlin in
rcr2012 -065630
Mr. King:
From:Leslie, Jim
To: 'patrickk@nvbar.org'
2012 to Coughlin in
rcr2012 -065630
Mr. King:
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The below email from Mr. Coughlin contains a reference at the end of the first paragraph to a website
containing a video
clip from the movie Cape Fear. Please advise whether any action is required of our office or yours
regarding this
possible veiled or indirect threat of violence against attorneys in this office by Mr. Coughlin.
Thank you,
HARASSMENT AND -TALKING
NRS 200.571 Harassment: Definition; penalties.
1. A person is guilty of harassment if:
(A) WITHOUT LAWFUL AUTHORITY, THE PERSON KNOWINGLY THREATENS:
(1) TO CAUSE BODILY INJURY IN THE FUTURE TO THE PERSON THREATENED OR TO ANY OTHER
PERSON;
(2) TO CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER PERSON;
(3) TO SUBJECT THE PERSON THREATENED OR ANY OTHER PERSON TO PHYSICAL CONFINEMENT
OR RESTRAINT; OR
(4) TO DO ANY ACT WHICH IS INTENDED TO SUBSTANTIALLY HARM THE PERSON THREATENED
OR ANY OTHER PERSON WITH RESPECT TO HIS OR HER PHYSICAL OR MENTAL HEALTH OR SAFETY; AND
(B) THE PERSON BY WORDS OR CONDUCT PLACES THE PERSON RECEIVING THE THREAT IN REASON-
ABLE FEAR THAT THE THREAT WILL BE CARRIED OUT.
2. EXCEPT WHERE THE PROVISIONS OF SUBSECTION 2 OR 3 OF NRS 200.575 ARE APPLICABLE, A
PERSON WHO IS GUILTY OF HARASSMENT:
(A) FORTHE FIRST OFFENSE, IS GUILTY OF A MISDEMEANOR.
(b) For the second or any subsequent offense, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
3. The penalties provided in this section do not preclude the victim from seeking any other
legal remedy available.
(Added to NRS by 1989, 897; A 1993, 510; 2001, 2785)
NRS 200.575 Stalking: Definitions; penalties.
1. A person who, without lawful authority, willfully or maliciously engages in a course of con-
duct that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, harassed or fear-
ful for the immediate safety of a family or household member, and that actually causes the victim to
feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, harassed or fearful for the immediate safety of a family or
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household member, commits the crime of stalking. Except where the provisions of subsection 2 or 3
are applicable, a person who commits the crime of stalking:
(A) FORTHE FIRST OFFENSE, IS GUILTY OF A MISDEMEANOR.
(b) For any subsequent offense, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
2. A person who commits the crime of stalking and in conjunction therewith threatens the per-
son with the intent to cause the person to be placed in reasonable fear of death or substantial bodily
harm commits the crime of aggravated stalking. A person who commits the crime of aggravated
stalking shall be punished for a category B felony by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum
term of not less than 2 years and a maximum term of not more than 15 years, and may be further pun-
ished by a fine of not more than $5,000.
3. APERSON WHO COMMITS THE CRIME OF STALKING WITH THE USE OF AN INTERNET OR NET-
WORK SITE, ELECTRONIC MAIL, TEXT MESSAGING OR ANY OTHER SIMILAR MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
TO PUBLISH, DISPLAY OR DISTRIBUTE INFORMATION IN A MANNER THAT SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASES
THE RISK OF HARM OR VIOLENCE TO THE VICTIM SHALL BE PUNISHED FOR A CATEGORY C FELONY AS
PROVIDED IN NRS 193.130.
4. EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION 2 OF NRS 200.571, A CRIMINAL
PENALTY PROVIDED FOR IN THIS SECTION MAY BE IMPOSED IN ADDITION TO ANY PENALTYTHAT MAY
BE IMPOSED FOR ANY OTHER CRIMINAL OFFENSE ARISING FROM THE SAME CONDUCT OR FOR ANY CON-
TEMPT OF COURT ARISING FROM THE SAME CONDUCT.
5. The penalties provided in this section do not preclude the victim from seeking any other
legal remedy available.
6. As used in this section:
(A) COURSE OF CONDUCT MEANS A PATTERN OF CONDUCT WHICH CONSISTS OF A SERIES OF ACTS
OVER TIME THAT EVIDENCES A CONTINUITY OF PURPOSE DIRECTED AT A SPECIFIC PERSON.
(B) FAMILY OR HOUSEHOLD MEMBER MEANS A SPOUSE, A FORMER SPOUSE, A PARENT OR OTHER
PERSON WHO IS RELATED BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE OR IS OR WAS ACTUALLY RESIDING WITH THE PER-
SON.
(C) INTERNET OR NETWORK SITE HAS THE MEANING ASCRIBED TO IT IN NRS 205.4744.
(D) NETWORK HAS THE MEANING ASCRIBED TO IT IN NRS 205.4745.
(E) PROVIDER OF INTERNET SERVICE HAS THE MEANING ASCRIBED TO IT IN NRS 205.4758.
(F) TEXT MESSAGING MEANS A COMMUNICATION IN THE FORM OF ELECTRONIC TEXT OR ONE OR
MORE ELECTRONIC IMAGES SENT FROM A TELEPHONE OR COMPUTER TO ANOTHER PERSONS TELEPHONE
OR COMPUTER BY ADDRESSING THE COMMUNICATION TO THE RECIPIENTS TELEPHONE NUMBER.
(G) WITHOUT LAWFUL AUTHORITY INCLUDES ACTS WHICH ARE INITIATED OR CONTINUED WITH-
OUT THE VICTIMS CONSENT. THE TERM DOES NOT INCLUDE ACTS WHICH ARE OTHERWISE PROTECTED
OR AUTHORIZED BY CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY LAW, REGULATION OR ORDER OF A COURT OF
COMPETENT JURISDICTION, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO:
(1) PICKETING WHICH OCCURS DURING A STRIKE, WORK STOPPAGE OR ANY OTHER LABOR DIS-
PUTE.
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(2) THE ACTIVITIES OF A REPORTER, PHOTOGRAPHER, CAMERA OPERATOR OR OTHER PERSON
WHILE GATHERING INFORMATION FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE PUBLIC IF THAT PERSON IS EMPLOYED
OR ENGAGED BY OR HAS CONTRACTED WITH A NEWSPAPER, PERIODICAL, PRESS ASSOCIATION OR RADIO
OR TELEVISION STATION AND IS ACTING SOLELY WITHIN THAT PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY.
(3) THE ACTIVITIES OF A PERSON THAT ARE CARRIED OUT IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF HIS OR
HER LAWFUL EMPLOYMENT.
(4) ANY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT IN THE EXERCISE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
RIGHTS OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY.
(ADDED TO NRS BY 1993, 509; A1995, 59, 1195, 1324; 1999, 1377; 2001, 665, 2785, 2800; 2003,
198; 2009, 3006)
NRS 200.581 WHERE OFFENSE COMMITTED. HARASSMENT, STALKING OR AGGRAVATED
STALKING SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED WHERE THE CONDUCT OCCURRED OR WHERE
THE PERSON WHO WAS AFFECTED BY THE CONDUCT WAS LOCATED AT THE TIME THAT THE CONDUCT
OCCURRED.
(Added to NRS by 1989, 897; A 1993, 510; 1995, 60; 2001, 666)
NRS 200.591 Court may impose temporary or extended order to restrict conduct of al-
leged perpetrator, defendant or convicted person; penalty for violation of order; dissemination of
order; notice provided in order.
1. In addition to any other remedy provided by law, a person who reasonably believes that the
crime of stalking, aggravated stalking or harassment is being committed against him or her by anoth-
er person may petition any court of competent jurisdiction for a temporary or extended order direct-
ing the person who is allegedly committing the crime to:
(A) STAY AWAY FROM THE HOME, SCHOOL, BUSINESS OR PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE VICTIM OF
THE ALLEGED CRIME AND ANY OTHER LOCATION SPECIFICALLY NAMED BY THE COURT.
(B) REFRAIN FROM CONTACTING, INTIMIDATING, THREATENING OR OTHERWISE INTERFERING WITH
THE VICTIM OF THE ALLEGED CRIME AND ANY OTHER PERSON NAMED IN THE ORDER, INCLUDING, WITH-
OUT LIMITATION, A MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OR THE HOUSEHOLD OF THE VICTIM OF THE ALLEGED
CRIME.
(C) COMPLY WITH ANY OTHER RESTRICTION WHICH THE COURT DEEMS NECESSARY TO PROTECT
THE VICTIM OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OR TO PROTECT ANY OTHER PERSON NAMED IN THE ORDER, INCLUD-
ING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, A MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OR THE HOUSEHOLD OF THE VICTIM OF THE AL-
LEGED CRIME.
2. IF A DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH A CRIME INVOLVING HARASSMENT, STALKING OR AGGRAVAT-
ED STALKING IS RELEASED FROM CUSTODY BEFORE TRIAL OR IS FOUND GUILTY AT THE TRIAL, THE
COURT MAY ISSUE A TEMPORARY OR EXTENDED ORDER OR PROVIDE AS A CONDITION OF THE RELEASE
OR SENTENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT:
(A) STAY AWAY FROM THE HOME, SCHOOL, BUSINESS OR PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE VICTIM OF
THE ALLEGED CRIME AND ANY OTHER LOCATION SPECIFICALLY NAMED BY THE COURT.
(B) REFRAIN FROM CONTACTING, INTIMIDATING, THREATENING OR OTHERWISE INTERFERING WITH
THE VICTIM OF THE ALLEGED CRIME AND ANY OTHER PERSON NAMED IN THE ORDER, INCLUDING, WITH-
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OUT LIMITATION, A MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OR THE HOUSEHOLD OF THE VICTIM OF THE ALLEGED
CRIME.
(C) COMPLY WITH ANY OTHER RESTRICTION WHICH THE COURT DEEMS NECESSARY TO PROTECT
THE VICTIM OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OR TO PROTECT ANY OTHER PERSON NAMED IN THE ORDER, INCLUD-
ING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, A MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OR THE HOUSEHOLD OF THE VICTIM OF THE AL-
LEGED CRIME.
3. ATEMPORARY ORDER MAY BE GRANTED WITH OR WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE ADVERSE PARTY.
AN EXTENDED ORDER MAY BE GRANTED ONLY AFTER:
(A) NOTICE OF THE PETITION FOR THE ORDER AND OF THE HEARING THEREON IS SERVED UPON THE
ADVERSE PARTY PURSUANT TO THE NEVADA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE; AND
(B) AHEARING IS HELD ON THE PETITION.
4. IF AN EXTENDED ORDER IS ISSUED BY A JUSTICE COURT, AN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL LIES TO
THE DISTRICT COURT, WHICH MAY AFFIRM, MODIFY OR VACATE THE ORDER IN QUESTION. THE APPEAL
MAY BE TAKEN WITHOUT BOND, BUT ITS TAKING DOES NOT STAY THE EFFECT OR ENFORCEMENT OF THE
ORDER.
5. UNLESS A MORE SEVERE PENALTY IS PRESCRIBED BY LAW FOR THE ACT THAT CONSTITUTES
THE VIOLATION OF THE ORDER, ANY PERSON WHO INTENTIONALLY VIOLATES:
(a) A temporary order is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
(b) An extended order is guilty of a category felony and shall be punished as provided in NRS
193.130.
6. ANY COURT ORDER ISSUED PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION MUST:
(A) BE IN WRITING;
(B) BE PERSONALLY SERVED ON THE PERSON TO WHOM IT IS DIRECTED; AND
(C) CONTAIN THE WARNING THAT VIOLATION OF THE ORDER:
(1) SUBJECTS THE PERSON TO IMMEDIATE ARREST.
(2) IS A GROSS MISDEMEANOR IF THE ORDER IS A TEMPORARY ORDER.
(3) Is a category C felony if the order is an extended order.
7. A temporary or extended order issued pursuant to this section must provide notice that a per-
son who is arrested for violating the order will not be admitted to bail sooner than 12 hours after the
persons arrest if:
(a) The arresting officer determines that such a violation is accompanied by a direct or indirect
threat of harm;
(b) The person has previously violated a temporary or extended order for protection; or
(c) At the time of the violation or within 2 hours after the violation, the person has:
(1) A concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in his or her blood or breath; or
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(2) An amount of a prohibited substance in his or her blood or urine that is equal to or great-
er than the amount set forth in subsection 3 of NRS 484C.110.
(Added to NRS by 1989, 897; A 1993, 510; 1995, 61, 1324; 2005, 953; 2007, 1020)
NRS 200.592 Petitioner for order: Deferment of costs and fees; free information concerning
order; no fee for serving order.
1. The payment of all costs and official fees must be deferred for any person who petitions a
court for a temporary or extended order pursuant to NRS 200.591. After any hearing and not later
than final disposition of such an application or order, the court shall assess the costs and fees against
the adverse party, except that the court may reduce them or waive them, as justice may require.
2. The clerk of the court shall provide a person who petitions the court for a temporary or ex-
tended order pursuant to NRS 200.591 and the adverse party, free of cost, with information about the:
(a) Availability of temporary and extended orders pursuant to NRS 200.591;
(b) Procedure for filing an application for such an order; and
(c) Right to proceed without legal counsel.
3. A person who obtains an order pursuant to NRS 200.591 must not be charged any fee to have
the order served in this State.
(Added to NRS by 2001, 1671)
NRS 200.594 Duration of orders; dissolution or modification of temporary order.
1. A temporary order issued pursuant to NRS 200.591 expires within such time, not to exceed
30 days, as the court fixes. If a petition for an extended order is filed within the period of a temporary
order, the temporary order remains in effect until the hearing on the extended order is held.
2. On 2 days notice to the party who obtained the temporary order, the adverse party may ap-
pear and move its dissolution or modification, and in that event the court shall proceed to hear and
determine such motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require.
3. An extended order expires within such time, not to exceed 1 year, as the court fixes. A tem-
porary order may be converted by the court, upon notice to the adverse party and a hearing, into an
extended order effective for no more than 1 year.
(Added to NRS by 1995, 59)
NRS 200.597 Order to be transmitted to law enforcement agencies; enforcement.
1. Each court that issues an order pursuant to NRS 200.591 shall transmit, as soon as practica-
ble, a copy of the order to all law enforcement agencies within its jurisdiction. The copy must include
a notation of the date on which the order was personally served upon the person to whom it is di-
rected.
2. A peace officer, without a warrant, may arrest and take into custody a person when the peace
officer has probable cause to believe that:
(a) An order has been issued pursuant to NRS 200.591 to the person to be arrested;
(b) The person to be arrested has been served with a copy of the order; and
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(c) The person to be arrested is acting in violation of the order.
3. Any law enforcement agency in this State may enforce a court order issued pursuant to NRS
200.591.
(Added to NRS by 1995, 59; A 2005, 955)
NRS 200.601 Victim to be given certain information and documents concerning case; clerk to
keep record of order or condition restricting conduct of defendant.
1. The prosecuting attorney in any trial brought against a person on a charge of harassment,
stalking or aggravated stalking shall inform the alleged victim of the final disposition of the case.
2. If the defendant is found guilty and the court issues an order or provides a condition of the
sentence restricting the ability of the defendant to have contact with the victim or witnesses, the clerk
of the court shall:
(a) Keep a record of the order or condition of the sentence; and
(b) Provide a certified copy of the order or condition of the sentence to the victim and other per-
sons named in the order.
HARASSMENT AND STALKING
NRS 200.571 Harassment: Definition; penalties.
NRS 200.575 Stalking: Definitions; penalties.
NRS 200.581 Where offense committed.
NRS 200.591 Court may impose temporary or extended order to restrict conduct of alleged
perpetrator, defendant or convicted person; penalty for violation of order; dissemination of order;
notice provided in order.
NRS 200.592 Petitioner for order: Deferment of costs and fees; free information concerning
order; no fee for serving order.
NRS 200.594 Duration of orders; dissolution or modification of temporary order.
NRS 200.597 Order to be transmitted to law enforcement agencies; enforcement.
NRS 200.601 Victim to be given certain information and documents concerning case; clerk to
keep record of order or condition restricting conduct of defendant.
to Ytrubide, where the Arrest Report charges Coughlin with a gross misdemeanor and felony viola-
tion of NRS 200.591(5), despite the fact that Yturbide had both the TPO and EPO's in question for
weeks prior to the 2/8/12 arrest, and his being paid to be a Detective with the RPD, whom, alleged-
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ly, failed to detect that both Orders were not sufficiently served. Further, the police report indicates
the investigation was transferred to Yturbide for mi
OF THE COUGHLIN HEREBY DECLARES THAT HE IS INDIGENT. HE HAS ONE BANK ACCOUNT WITH $50
IN IT. HE OWNS NO REAL PROPERTY, NO STOCKS OR BOND, HAS NEARLY NO INCOME CURRENTLY, HIS
RENT IS $150 PER MONTH TO LIVE IN A FIFTH WHEEL TRAILER, HE EATS FREE FOOD FROM FOOD PAN-
TRIES, AND NEARLY ALL OF HIS TIME IS SPENT IN PURSUING HIS OWN SELF REPRESENTATION IN THE VAR-
IOUS CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND LAW LICENSE MATTER AND APPEAL THEREON IN 62337. HE OWNS A
HONDA ACCORD 1996 110K MILES WORTH ABOUT $500 AND MINOR PERSONAL PROPERTY NOT EASILY
LIQUIDATED, HE RECEIVES SOME FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM HIS MOTHER, AROUND $100 PER MONTH,
AND THAT IS IT, HE HAS NO SAVINGS, ETC. HIS EXPENSES ARE AROUDN $50 OF GAS A MONTH AND PAPER
AND STAMPES, INK, ETC. OF AROUDN $50 PER MONTH. HIS YEARLY INCOMED IS LESS THAN $10,000
WHICH PER SE QUALIFIES HIM FOR IFP STATUS UNDER THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT'S 2009 INDIGENT
DEFENSE ORDER AND HE SEEKS COMPENSATION FO RUNDERTAKING HIS OWN REPRESENTAITON AND,
FAILING THAT, APPOINTED OF CO COUNSEL ONLY WITH FINAL CONTROL BEING AFFORDED TO COUGHLIN
OF ANY AND ALL MEANS, TACTICS, OBJETIVES AND ALL OTHER DECISIONS INCIDENT TO REPRESENTAION.
COUGHLIN SEEKS A WAIVER OF SUBPOENA FEES AND SERVICE FEES AND IFP ORDER IN THAT REGARD
AND ASK THAT JUDICIAL NOTICE BE TAKE OF THE IFP GRANTED COUGHLIN ON 1/9/13 IN CR12-2025 BY
JUDGE ELLIOTT OF THE 2JDC>
IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE COMPLAINT IS ALLEGING ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ., AS A BUSI-
NESS PRACTICING LAW IN NEVADA HAS VIOLATED THE TPOOR EPO, OR WHETHER ZACH COUGHLIN,
PERSONALLY, VIOLATED SUCH. AS SUCH, AN ALTER EGO ANALYSIS MAY BE IN ORDER, BUT THE COM-
PLAINT SIMPLY DOES NOT SPECIFY, AND THEREFORE IS IMPERMISSIBLY VAGUE.
THE 1/5/13 AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY THE WCSOFILED IN RCP12-607 FAILS TO IDENTIFY THE
CASE NUMBER FOR THE DOCUMENT WHICH IT ALLEGES WAS SERVED ON COUGHLIN. SUCH LACK OF
SPECIFICITY MAKES SUCH AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE INSUFFICIENT. ONE MUST NOT NECESSARILY ASSUME
THE CASE NUMBER OF THE EPOTHE AFFIDAVIT ALLEGES WAS SERVED IS THE SAME CASE AS THE ONE
IN WHICH THE AFFIDAVIT WAS FILED.
THE VARIOUS ITERATIONS OF THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT ARE NOT EVEN SIGNED, OR RATHER,
THEY ARE SIGNED, BUT THERE IS NO INDICATION TO WHOM THE SIGNATURE BELONGS TO, WHICH VIO-
LATES NRCP 11 AND NRS 174. FURTHER, THE SUMMONS ALLEGES A VIOLATION OF A STATUTE (LIST-
ING THE NUMBER THERETO) THAT DOES NOT EXIST.
2. NEITHER OF THE COMPLAINTS OR AMENDED COMPLAINTS IN 3913 AND 3914 STATE WHERE THE AL-
LEGED CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS TOOK PLACE, ESPECIALLY IN 3914 VIS A VIS THE ALLEGED FAXING.
THE CRIMINAL SUMMONS AND ATTEMPTED SERVICE THEREOF, AND ALL OTHER PROCESS IN THIS
MATTER IS INSUFFICIENT. 151 F. 2D 299, WINDELS, 603 NW 2D 834, 903 P.2D 628, NOW WAIVER ON
COUGHLIN'S PART, RICHARDS 793 P.2D 590, KENLER 204 NYS 2D 758, 170 NE 2D 291, 577 P.2D 803,
SNOW 903 P.2D 628, AMJUR CRIMINAL LAWSECTIONS 408-432, 836 P.2D 212.
CLEARLY, THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE IN EITHER 3913 OR 3914 TO SUPPORT
ISSUING A SUMMONS AND COUGHLIN
DEFENDANTS MOVE TO QUASH SERVICE OF THE SUMMONS ON THE BASIS THAT THE GOVERNMENT
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 4(C)
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(CRIMINAL RULE 4). THE GOVERNMENT AGREES THAT IT BEARS THE BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING
THAT SERVICE WAS PROPER. SEE, E.G., UNITED STATES V. ALFRED L. WOLFF GMBH, 2011 WL 4471383,
AT *4, *8 (N.D. ILL. SEPT. 26, 2011) (ALFRED L. WOLFF) (PLACING BURDEN ON GOVERNMENT TO
SHOW IT PROPERLY EFFECTED SERVICE).
B. The Requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.
Pursuant to Criminal Rule 4, if a complaint or affidavits filed with a complaint establish probable
cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it, and at the
request of an attorney for the government, a judge may issue a summons instead of a warrant. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 4(a). A summons may be served within the jurisdiction of the United States or anywhere
else a federal statute authorizes an arrest. Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(c)(2).
Under Criminal Rule 4(c)(3), a summons may be served on an organization by delivering a copy to
an officer, to a managing or general agent, or to another agent appointed or legally authorized to re-
ceive service of process (hereinafter the delivery requirement). Fed.R. Crim. P. 4(c)(3)(C). The
summons also must be mailed to the organizations last known
1. COUGHLIN HAS NOT BEEN SERVED THE SUMMONS IN THIS MATTER. IT IS BELIEVE SERVICE OF A
CRIMINAL SUMMONS BY MAIL IN NEVADA REQUIRES MAILING SUCH BOTH BY CERTIFIED MAIL AND FIRST
CLASS MAIL IN TANDEM AND THAT ANY SUCH SUMMONS IN THESE MATTERS MAY HAVE ONLY BEEN
MAILED BY CERTIFIED MAIL.
2. THE STATE BAR OF NEVADA FAILED TO MEET A JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITE TO RECEIVING ANY
SUCH WORKPLACE HARASSMENT PROTECTION ORDER IN THAT NO BOND WAS POSTED WITH THE
12/20/12 TPOAPPLICATION IN RJC RCP12-607 OR AT ANY TIME THEREAFTER.
The interplay between personal jurisdiction, sufficiency of service, agency, and alter-
EGO HAS BEEN ADDRESSED FREQUENTLY IN CIVIL CASES. SEE, E.G,. BAUMAN V.
DAIMLER CHRYSLER CORP.,
644 F.3d 909, 920-921 (9th Cir. 2011) (motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction);
HICKORY TRAVEL SYSTEMS, INC. V. TUI A.G., 213 F.R.D. 547, 553 (N.D. CAL. 2003)
(MOTION TO
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quash service). However, there appear to be only four criminal cases on point, which will be
DISCUSSED IN MORE DETAIL LATER IN THIS ORDER. TWO DISTRICT COURTS HAVE GRANTED MOTIONS TO
QUASH.
ALFRED L. WOLFF, 2011 WL 4471383; UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON MATTHEY PLC, 2007
WL 2254676
(D. Utah Aug. 2, 2007) (Johnson Matthey). In the other two cases, the district courts denied
the motions. United States v. The Public Warehousing Company, 2011 WL 1126333 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 28, 2011) (Public Warehousing); United States v. Chitron Electronics Co., Ltd.,
668 F. Supp. 2d 298 (D. Mass. 2009) (Chitron Electronics).
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3. COUGHLIN HAS WORKED DILIGENTLY TO ATTAIN A COPY OF THE COMPLETE POLICE REPORT INCIDENT
TO BOTH 3913 AND 3914, REQUESTING SUCH IN WRITING FROM THE RMC (OR ATTEMPTING TO), THE
RENO CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE AND THE RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT BUT HAS BEEN DENIED ACCESS
TO ANYTHIGN BEYOND THE PC SHEET AND ARREST REPORT AND DECLARATIO OF PROBABLE CAUSE
(IE, NO WITNESS STATEMENTS, NO NARRATIVE, ETC.).
4. COUGHLIN WAS NEVER APPROPRIATELY SERVED EITHER THE 12/20/12 TPO/EPOAPPLCIATION BY
PAT KING (AND ITS INAPPROPRIATE FOR KING TO CONTINUE AS COUNSEL ON 62337, THE APPEAL OF THE
12/14/12 FOFCOL RECOMMENDING PERMANENT DISBARMENT, WHILE APPLYING FOR A TPO/EPOON
HIS OWN BEHALF (HIS EMPLOYER MUST DO IT FOR HIM), OR FEIGNING TO ON BEHALF OF SOME UNNAMED
OTHERS AT THE SBN (AND THERE IS NO JURISDICTION TO GRANT AN INSITUTIONAL PROTECTION OR-
DER, SUCH ORDER MUST BE ASSIGNED TO ONE PERSON IN PARTICULAR PER ORDER, NOT AN ENTIRE
INTITUTION..
COUGHLIN HEREBY RESERVES ANY RIGHTS OR ARGUMENTS AS TO THE INSUFFICIENCY OF SER-
VICE OF PROCESS, FAILURE TO STATE A CRIME, INSUFFICIENCY OF PROCESS, ETC., ETC.
DO TO THE IMPORTANT, ESPECIALLY AS TO THE BAIL ANALYSIS, OF COUGHLIN BEING PERMIT-
TED TO VIEW THE ENTIRE POLICE REPORT, COUGHLIN REQUESTS A CONTINUANCE OF THE 4/17/13 AR-
RAIGNMENT IN BOTH 3913 AND 3914. COUGHLIN WAS ALREADY SUBJECT TO A $5,000 BAIL INCIDENT
TO THE 2/8/13 ARREST FOR GROSS MISDEMEANOR TPO VIOLATION AND FELONY EPO VIOLATION REQUIR-
ING $750 CASH TO BAIL OUT.
The criminal complaints and amended in this matter do not accurately state that rationale of-
fered by the WCDA's Office for deciding that no crimina lcomplaint will issue incident to the
2/8/13 arrest, as detailed in the 3/1/13 letter from DDA Zach Young to RPD Yturbide. Further, the
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locus of the alleged violation seems to be outside Reno city limits proper, and therefore not within
any concurrent jurisdiction argument sufficient to invoke the RMC's jurisdiciton over the decision
by the WCDA's Office not to press charges.
Coughlin requests proof to support RCA Soodui's statments in the complaints that Court.
The Washoe County District Attorney's Office indicated that the violation
is misdemeanor and since it occurred within city limits the proper court of jurisdiction is the Reno
Municipal Court.
: THE NEVADA CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES THE PEOPLE OF NEVADA THE RIGHT TO BAIL IN NON-
CAPITAL OFFENSES AND PROHIBITS THE DISTRICT COURT FROM IMPOSING EXCESSIVE BAIL. SEE NEV.
CONST. ART. 1, 6 AND 7; SEE ALSO NRS 178.484(1) ([A] PERSON ARRESTED FOR AN OFFENSE OTH-
ER THAN MURDER OF THE FIRST DEGREE MUST BE ADMITTED TO BAIL. (EMPHASIS ADDED)); ST. PIERRE
V. SHERIFF, 90 NEV. 282, 286, 524 P.2D 1278, 1280 (1974) ([O]UR CONSTITUTION DOES NOT ENCOM-
PASS INCLUSION OF A NON-CAPITAL OFFENSE AS NON-BAILABLE.). THIS TRADITIONAL RIGHT TO
FREEDOM BEFORE CONVICTION PERMITS THE UNHAMPERED PREPARATION OF A DEFENSE, AND SERVES
TO PREVENT THE INFLICTION OF PUNISHMENT PRIOR TO CONVICTION. STACK V. BOYLE, 342 U.S. 1, 4
(1951). IN DECIDING A REASONABLE AMOUNT FOR BAIL THE DISTRICT COURT MAY CONSIDER THE NA-
TURE OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED, THE PENALTY WHICH MAY BE INFLICTED, THE PROBABILITY OF THE
APPEARANCE OF THE ACCUSED, HIS PECUNIARY CONDITION, HIS CHARACTER AND REPUTATION, AND THE
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CASE RELATIVE TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONVICTION. EX PARTE
JAGLES AND VARNES, 44 NEV. 370, 195 P. 808 (1921); SEE ALSO NRS 178.498; NRS 178.4853. HOW-
EVER, BAIL MUST NOT BE. . . MORE THAN THE ACCUSED CAN REASONABLY BE EXPECTED UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES TO GIVE, FOR IF SO IT IS SUBSTANTIALLY A DENIAL OF BAIL. EX PARTE MALLEY, 50
NEV. 248, 253, 256 P. 512, 514 (1927). OUR REVIEW OF THE RECORD REVEALS THAT THE DISTRICT
COURT VIOLATED THE NEVADA CONSTITUTION IN TWO WAYS. IT DENIED THE PETITIONER BAIL FOR FIF-
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TEEN DAYS AND THEN IMPOSED A BAIL AMOUNT WHICH GREATLY EXCEEDED THE AMOUNT THE PETI-
TIONER COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO PAY. AS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST NOTES IN ITS AN-
SWERING BRIEF, THE DISTRICT COURT IMPOSED A BAIL AMOUNT THAT WAS FIFTY TIMES GREATER THAN
THE CLARK COUNTY STANDARD BAIL SCHEDULE FOR CATEGORY BFELONIES. IN LIGHT OF THE DISTRICT
COURTS FAILURE TO CONSIDER ALL OF THE RELEVANT FACTORS, SEE NRS 178.498, ITS STATED REA-
SON FOR REMANDING PETITIONER TO CUSTODY, PETITIONERS INDIGENT STATUS, AND THE AMOUNT OF
BAIL, WE CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT THE DISTRICT COURT WAS ATTEMPTING TO PUNISH PETITIONER
FOR HIS ATTITUDE WITHOUT UTILIZING THE PROCEDURES PROVIDED FOR IN NEVADA LAW. SEE NRS
22.030(1) (EXPLAINING WHEN A PERSON MAY BE PUNISHED SUMMARILY FOR CONTEMPT); NRS 22.010
(DEFINING CONTEMPT). FOR THESE REASONS, WE CONCLUDE THAT THE DISTRICT COURT MANIFESTLY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REMANDING PETITIONER TO CUSTODYWITHOUT BAIL FOR FIFTEEN DAYS
AND IMPOSING EXCESSIVE BAIL. SEE STATE V.DIST. CT. (ARMSTRONG), 127 NEV. , 267 P.3D 777, 779-
80 (2011) (DISCUSSING WHEN A WRIT OF MANDAMUS WILL ISSUE).
Under NRS 33.240, harassment in the workplace occurs when:
(a) Bodily injury to himself or another person;
(b) Damage to the property of another person; or
(c) Substantial harm to the physical or mental health or safety of a person;
2. The threat is made or the act is committed against an employer, an employee of the em-
ployer while the employee performs his duties of employment or a person present at the
workplace of the employer; and
3. The threat would cause a reasonable person to fear that the threat will be carried out or the
act would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated or harassed.
The Complaints in both case fail to state any facts that would amount to a violation. Coughlin
is and has been involved in a litigation with the SBN, in the trial court formal disciplinary matter and
on appeal. Both require Coughlin to file documents, and serve them and the SBN expressly consent-
ed to service of such by fax and has never, at any point, disputed that fact, but rather, has coyly skirt-
ed acknowledging it beyond the intial expressions and subsequent ratifications thereof, especially
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considering NNDB Susich's 7/27/12 letter to Coughlin directing him to pusue SCR 105(4) inquiries
with the SBN, rather than the NNDB.
The ROA in 62337 has had a very troubled history. Now, the second version of the ROA,
file stamped 2/13/13 (though the SBN has continued misaddressing the ROA is sends to
Coughlin (which, this time, did include the Transcript from the formal hearing and Hearing Exhib-
its, unlike what the SBN mailed to Coughlin in connection with the ROA filed on 12/24/12...(page
1098 of the 12/24/12 ROA contains a Certificate of Service By Mail wherein the SBN's Laura Peters
wrote: I hereby certify that I served a copy of the attached Record on Appeal, Vol. 1&2, by placing
a copy in an envelope addressed to Zachary.... That 12/20/12 Certificate of Service By Mail con-
tains nothing indicating that there existed a Vol. 3 in said ROA file stamped 12/24/12 upon all three
volumes being submitted to the Clerk of Court of the Nevada Supreme Court).
Now, in the 2/13/13 ROA, the order of presentation of the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters,
and the 10/12/12 Notice of Formal Hearing; Designation of Witnesses and Summary of Evidence is
switched from the order those filings appeared in in the 12/24/12 ROA, in an attempt by the SBN
to ameliorate the impropriety apparent in the 12/24/12 ROA where the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura
Peters appeared at bates stamp pages 33-34, immediately before the appearance, at pages 35-39 of
the 10/12/12 Notice of Formal Hearing; Designation of Witnesses and Summary of Evidence by the
SBN's King, where the bates stamping in that ROA and order of pleadings on file is chronologically
arranged from earliest (beginning with the 8/23/12 Complaint) to most recent (ending, in contrast to
the 2/13/13 ROA, on page 1098 with a Certificate of Service By Mailing by Peters of only Vol 1&2
of the ROA (ie, missing the Formal Hearing Transcript and Hearing Exhibits).
Obviously, the SBN finally figured out that it looks suspicious to suddenly depart
from the placement of the 10/9/12 AOLP as appearing in the 11/8/12 3,200 page bates stampe pro-
duction as the last entry most recent filing in the chronologically arranged Formal Hearing Plead-
ings folder and the immediately preceeding entry being bates stamped 02797 being the Panel Chair
Echeverria's 10/31/12 Order.. That is, the 10/9/12 AOLP appeared at bates stamp page 02795, and
the 10/12/12 Notice of Formal Hearing; DoWSoE appeared at 02716, with a multitude of filings in
between, including Coughlin's 10/15/12 Motion to Dismiss at 02911, which the SBN had yet to put a
file stamp on at that point (where the file was sent to the printers on 11/1/12 according to Peters
and King's email of 11/1/12 informing Coughlin that he would not be permitted his rights to inspect
the file up to within 3 days of the hearing as required by SCR 105(2)(c). In the 12/24/12 ROA,
however, that 10/15/12 Motion to Dismiss is finally file stamped, appearing at bates stamp page 40.
Couglin's 10/15/12 Motion for Order To Show Cause in 0204 remains without a file stamp in both
version so fthe ROA, despite it being ruled on in the 10/31/12 Order by Chair Echverria? King's fail-
ure to oppose Coughlin's argument that the 8/23/12 Complaint should be dismissed along lines simi-
lar to those Couglin's wrongful termination Complaint against WLS was dismissed under a NRCP
12(b)(3)-(5) line of argument given how blurry and illegible the Complaint and Exhibits thereto actu-
ally are (versus in 60302 and 60317 (a case featuring Judge Elliott failing to disqualify himself or
disclose he Presidency on the opposing side, CAAW's Excecutive Board, then going on to sanction
Coughlin under NRS 7.085 and or 18.010(2)(b) despite a 12(b)(5) dismissal necessarily meaning the
Court never got to the merits of the Complaint, no 21 day safe harbor motion being served, and no
actual hearing ever being held to satisfy the requirement for one in NRS 18.010(2)(b), oh, and Judge
Elliot managed to get all of Couglhin's criminal appeals (5!) where the actual process Couglin had
served the defendnats was exponentially more legible than the fiddle with the scanner dpi settings
and other contrast, obfuscation settings in Acrobat or other scanning application approach taken by
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Gonsalves, Garin, et al....(it really is remarkable how scandalous the approach was there when view-
ing the actual 9 page per page printed on a 1200 dpi laser printer version of the attached Exhibit in
those cases compared to the completely illegible and blurry doctored versions attached as Exhibits to
the various Motions to Dismiss...an approach absolutely implemented by the SBN in fraudulently
making as many of Couglin's filings in the representations thereof in the ROA's in 62337 be similarly
doctored up to be so blurry as to lack an utility whatsoever).
Specifically, the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters (a very material document that goes
to whether the SBN Clerk of Court/OBC/NNDB/Panel provided Coughlin an indication that he was
permitted to submit filings via fax (considering NNDB Chairman Susich's 7/27/12 written instruction
to Coughlin (see below) and King's numerous instances of directing Coughlin to communicate with
SBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters (including an instruction to Coughlin by King to do so made dur-
ing the 3/26/12 appearance by Coughlin at the SBN Double R Office where Coughlin presented to
take King up on his offer to allow Coughlin to review the grievances and materials submitted in con-
nection therewith...at which time King refused to allow Coughlin to review any such materials and
only briefly allowed Coughlin to read the two page 2/14/12 written grievance letter to the SBN re-
garding Coughlin by RMC Judge Nash Holmes. At that time, King indicated that Coughlin should
have that 2/14/12 Nash Holmes letter, to which Coughlin protested that he had not received any such
letter (to be expected considering the well documented problems Coughlin was experiencing during
that period of time in accessing mail addressed to him at the 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2 address). Peters ex-
press indications to Coughlin on 9/11/12 were expression of the policies and procedures in play in
light of SCR 105(4) and Susich and King's representations to Coughlin (combined with Peters own
express representations that she was the SBN Clerk of Court and entitled to make the calls on mat-
ters such as when and under what circumstances a Default would be taken (she indicated several
things in this respect to Coughlin). To whatever extent Peters 9/11/12 express indications to Cough-
lin that she would file stamp in an filings he faxed to the SBN are considered to not be expressions of
the rules and policies in play under SCR 105(4), Coughlin entitled to rely upon such indications, and
reasonably did so, considering the totality of the circumstances. Especially with respect to the
12/14/12 FOFCOL's express recommendation that as a matter of default the alleged violation may
be deemed admitted... with respect to numerous alleged violations of Rules of Professional Conduct,
even those for which the FOFCOL found the SBN put on no evidence whatsoever or or those
So, the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters becomes a very important filing. Such
filing (it is file stamped 10/9/12, and notarized no less, with a date of 10/9/12) was never sent to
Coughlin until it was included in the 3,200 page box of documents provided on 11/8/12 as a consola-
tion by the SBN for refusing to follow SCR 105(2)(c). That 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters
appearaed within the bates stamped 3,200 page document production by the SBN within a section
labeled Formal Hearing Pleadings, and appeared numerically after King's 10/24/12 Opposition and
before NNDB Chairman Susich's 10/30/12 Order Appointing Formal Hearing Panel. This indicates
that either Peters and the SBN back dated the file stamping on some Affidavit of Laura Peters to
indicate it was filed in on 10/9/12, or, that Peters and or the SBN file stamped such an Affidavit of
Laura Peters on 10/9/12, but did not place it in the Formal Pleadings File at that time. Regardless,
there is no indication that such 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters was ever mailed to Coughlin, as
there exists no dedicated Certificate of Service for it, nor is said 10/9/12 AOLP identified in any In-
dex to Exhibits or otherwise referenced in any other filing by the SBN. The fact that that 10/9/12
AOLP contains numerous easily disproven misstatements in more troubling, particularly where such
misstatements relate to just when and how the SBN and or Peters had one of Coughlin's Motions to
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Dismiss submitted for filing. Coughlin had digitally verifiable proof confirming he submitted for fil-
ing to the SBN his initial Motion to Dismiss the 8/23/12 file stamped Complaint on 9/17/12 by both
fax and email.
Peters absolutely indicated to Couglin that he was permitted to file be fax in a 9/11/12 com-
munication with Coughlin, and that she would file stamp any filings that Coughlin submitted via fax.
Both Peters and King have been dancing around this fact. This is especially clear where the 10/9/12
AOLP only
SUBJECT: RE: MOTION TO DISMISS SBN V. COUGHLIN FROM: LAURA PETERS
(LAURAP@NVBAR.ORG) SENT: WED 9/26/12 11:54 AM TO: 'ZACH COUGHLIN'
(ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM) I NEVER SAID THAT YOU COULD FILE ITEMS VIA E-MAIL...
THE 10/9/12 AOLP READS:
CUSTODIANOF RECORDS
LAURAPETERS, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, DEPOSES AND SAYS
AS FOLLOWS:
That Affiant is employed as a paralegal for the discipline department of the State Bar
of Nevada and in such capacity is the custodian of records for the State Bar of Nevada;
That on September 11, 2012, at approximately 4:45 p.m., Zachary Coughlin called Af-
fiant to confirm that a hearing was still scheduled to take place on September 25, 2012. Affiant ex-
plained that the hearing would not take place on September 25th and that date had been scheduled
prior to the filing of a formal Complaint.
Mr. Coughlin reacted as if he had no knowledge of a Complaint. Affiant then ex-
plained that, in fact, a copy of the Complaint, sent via certified mail on August 23,2012, from the Re-
no office of the State Bar, had been returned and marked "unclaimed".
Affiant further explained that since service had not been affected, a new certified copy would
go out the next day. Affiant requested that when Mr. Coughlin received said copy, he should return
the postcard attached to the mailing and his twenty (20) day period in which to answer the Com-
plaint would start running at that point.
However, in speaking to Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King, it was determined that
personal service should be affected upon Mr. Coughlin. Reno Carson messenger service was engaged
to attempt personal service despite Mr. Coughlin not providing the State Bar with a physical address.
On September 25, 2012, Mr. Coughlin arrived at the Reno office of the State Bar al-
legedly expecting a hearing to take place. At that time, Mr. Coughlin was again told, both by Affiant
and Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King, that no hearing would be taking place that day and that an
answer to the State Bar's Complaint had not been received.
Affiant personally served Mr. Coughlin with a copy of the Complaint on his visit to
the Bar office on September 25th as witnessed by Paula Campbell, an employee of the State Bar. Mr.
Coughlin insisted that the hearing which had been previously scheduled for that day should be taking
place because he needed to be removed from temporary suspension.
Mr. Coughlin has also been instructed by Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King that he
cannot file pleadings with the State Bar via e-mail, which he continues to attempt. The Motion to
Dismiss, which Mr. Coughlin now insists should be granted as it has gone unopposed by the State
Bar, was never presented to Affiant for filing but was rather emailed prior to Affiant's conversation
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with Mr. Coughlin on September 11th when Mr. Coughlin under no uncertain terms told Affiant that
he had not yet received the Complaint.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
Dated this 9th day of October, 2012: Laura Peters, Paralegal, Office of
Bar Counsel (notarized as SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 9TH
DAYOF OCTOBER, 2012 by Notary Public Angeline A. Radley and af-
fixed with her Notary Seal).
IN CONSIDERATION OF THE REPRESENTATIONS AND INDICATIONS MADE TO COUGHLIN BY
NNDBCHAIRMAN SUSICH (ESPECIALLY HIS 7/27/12 EMAIL TO COUGHLIN AND HIS ASSISTANT SHERRI
HORNSBEY'S INDICATIONS TO COUGHLIN), ASST. BAR COUNSEL KING, AND SBNCLERK OF COURT
LAURA PETERS (A TITLE THAT BOTH PETERS AND KING HAD REFERRED TO PETERS AS BEING BESTOWED
WITH ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, INCLUDING BY PETERS DURING A 9/11/12 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH COUGHLIN AND BY KING ON 9/25/12 IN PERSON, UPON COUGHLIN APPEARING AT THE SBN'S
DOUBLE R OFFICE ON 9/25/12 AT 9 AM FOR THE HEARING PETERS HAD CONFIRMED IN WRITING TO
COUGHLIN AND TO WHICH SUSICH'S 7/27/12 EMAIL TO COUGLIN INDICATED THE SBN WAS IN CHARGE
OF SCHEDULING.
KING CURIOUSLY FAILED TO OFFER INTO EVIDENCE THAT 3/16/12 LETTER BY KING TO
COUGHLIN (TO WHICH WAS ATTACHED, AS INDICATED BY A 3/19/12 EMAIL TO COUGHLIN FROMSBN
CLERK OF COURT LAURA PETERS, WHICH COUGHLIN ONLY FOUND IN HIS JUNK EMAIL FOLDER AFTER
KING INDICATED DURING THE 3/26/12 INTERACTION WITH COUGHLIN AT THE SBNDOUBLE R OFFICE
WAS PROVIDED TO COUGHLIN BY EMAIL AS WELL...LEADING TO AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN KING AND
COUGHLIN WHEREIN KING ADMITTED THAT HE DID NOT EMAIL COUGHLIN A COPY OF THE 3/16/12
MAILING (DESPITE HIS 3/16/12 LETTER INDICATING HE WAS SO COPYING COUGLIN ON VIA EMAIL, BUT,
STRANGELY, NOT FAX), BUT, RATHER, KING INDICATED HE HAD LAURA PETERS EMAIL COUGLIN A
COPY OF THAT MAILING. DURING THE 3/26/12 IN PERSON INTERACTION WITH KING COUGHLIN WAS
SURPRISED TO HEAR THAT THE SBNHAD SENT COUGHLIN ANYTHING RELATING TO ANY GRIEVANCES
OTHER THAN THE 2/14/12 MAILING TO COUGHLIN BY KING (WHICH INCLUDED KING'S ONE PAGE LET-
TER TO COUGHLIN AND HILL'S FIVE PAGE 1/14/12 GRIEVANCE AGAINST COUGHLIN), WHICH COUGHLIN
ONLY RECIEVED ON 3/16/12 DUE TO NO FAULT OF COUGHLIN'S OWN, BUT RATHER, TO MALFEASANCE
BY COUGHLIN'S HOUSEMATES, AND PERHAPS, THE USPS, AND OR THE USPS'S RESPONSE TO THE MAL-
FEASANCE OF COUGHLIN'S HOUSEMATES, AS CONFIRMED BY THE YELLOW STICKERS AFFIXED TO ENVE-
LOPES MAILED TO COUGLHIN (SUCH AS THOSE BY THE SBNON 2/14/12 AND 3/16/12 AND NUMEROUS
MAILINGS BY THE RMC TO COUGLHIN BETWEEN FEBRUARY-APRIL 2012). COUGHLIN WAS FURTHER
SURPRISED TO HEAR FROMKING THAT THE SBNHAD COPIED COUGLHIN ON A 3/16/12 MAILING TO
COUGHLIN OF AN ADDITIONAL GRIEVANCE BY A JUDGE BY ALSO SENDING IT TO COUGHLIN VIA EMAIL.
COUGHLIN QUERRIED KING AS TO WHAT EMAIL ACCOUNT SUCH AN EMAIL WOULD HAVE EMANATED
FROM. KING, LACKING AN UNDERSTANDING THAT EMAILS ARE SENT FROM ACCOUNTS RATHER THAN
FROM THE STATE BAR'S WEBSITE, ULTIMATELY INDICATED TO COUGHLIN THAT HE DELEGATED THE
COPYING TO COUGLIN BY EMAIL OF THE 3/16/12 MAILING TO LAURA PETERS. FROM THAT COUGHLIN
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DEDUCED SUCH AN EMAIL WAS LIKELY SENT FROMPETER'S EMAIL ACCOUNT, AND, SURE ENOUGH, IN
COUGHLIN'S JUNK MAIL FOLDER, CHECKED SUBSEQUENT TO THE 3/26/12 IN PERSON INTERACTION WITH
KING, WAS A 3/19/12 EMAIL TO COUGHLIN CONTAINING A 17 PAGE PDF (KING'S ONE PAGE 3/16/12
LETTER, HOLME'S TWO PAGE 3/14/12 LETTER, AND L. GARDNER'S 14 PAGE OAT OF 4/13/09).
That 3/16/12 mailing to Coughlin by the SBN included a one page letter to Coughlin from
King of 3/16/12, to which was attached Judge Nash Holmes 3/14/12 two page grievance against
Coughlin, and the 4/13/09 Order After Trial by Judge Linda Gardner from 01168. In that mailing,
the Judge Nash Holmes letter is stamped by the SBN as received on 3/14/12, and, curiously, the
4/13/09 Order After Trial by Judge L. Gardner is stamped as received by the SBN on 3/15/12, with
the 5 in the 15 being drawn in by hand...which is even more curious given King's repeated ob-
structionist and evasive, even misleading, attempts to avoid admitting that Judge Nash Holmes and
the RMC included that 4/13/09 Judge L. Gardner Order After Trial in the materials submitted on
3/14/12 along with Holmes' 3/14/12 letter to the SBN).
HOLMES ADMITTED TO SO INCLUDING IN THE OAT IN HER 3/14/12 SUBMISSION TO THE SBN
DURING THE FORMAL HEARING ON 11/14/12. ON THE CERTIFIED AUDIO TRANSCRIPT OF A 4/10/12 TRI-
AL DATE IN THE CRIMINAL TRESPASS TRIAL AGAINST COUGHLIN STEMMING FROMHILL'S FRAUDULENT
11/13/12 CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, L. GARDNER'S BROTHER, JUDGE NASH HOLMES' FELLOWRMC
JUDGE, RMC ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE WILLIAMGARDNER, ADMITTED TO HAVING RECEIVED THAT
4/13/09 ORDER AFTER TRIAL BY HIS SISTER, FROM HI SSI STER, AND THEN HAVING PASSED THAT OR-
DER AFTER TRIAL RECEIVED FROM HIS SISTER AROUND TO HIS FELLOWRMC JUDGES, THOUGH THE
TIMING OF W. GARDNER'S RECEIPT OF THE 4/13/09 OATFROM HIS SISTER WAS SOMETHING W.
GARDNER OFFERED PARTICULARLY STRANGE AND EVASIVE COMMENTARY TO ON THAT 4/10/12 AUDIO
TRANSCRIPT, AS WAS ALSO THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO THE TIME OF HIS PASSING ON THAT 4/13/09
OATTO HIS FELLOWRMC JUDGES) AT THE 11/14/12 HEARING, UNLIKE HIS 2/14/12 LETTER TO
COUGHLIN (FOR WHICH KING FAILED TO INCLUDED THE 5 PAGE 1/14/12 WRITTEN EMAILED GRIEVANCE
AGAINST COUGHLIN BY HILL, WHEREIN HILL PURPORTS TO BE SATISFYING HIS AND HIS ASSOCIATES
RPC 8.3 DUTY IN ACCUSING COUGLIN OF GHOSTWRITING FOR JOHN GESSIN, WHOMHILL WAS STILL
LISTED AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD FOR IN AT LEAST ONE MATTER AT THE TIME, DESPITE HILL DISPAR-
AGING GESSIN AND BETRAYING ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENCES, APPARENTLY, WITH RESPECT TO
GESSIN, IN HIS 1/14/12 GRIEVANCE AGAINST COUGHLIN, MORE ON THAT LATER).
Subject: RE: referral to Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board From: Tom
Susich (tsusich@nvdetr.org) Sent: Fri 7/27/12 8:58 AM To: 'Zach Coughlin'
(zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) Cc: 'PatrickK@nvbar.org'
(PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Dear M. Coughlin: I am in receipt of your request for a hearing before the
Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board. I have forwarded your request to the Ne-
vada State Bar's Northern Office for processing. Please communicate directly
with the State Bar concerning your case. They are the ones who will process
your request and set up any appropriate hearings. If you have questions you
can contact Pat King, the Northern Nevada Bar Counsel. Sincerely, J. Thomas
Susich, Esq.
ALSO, CONSIDER:
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FROM: PATRICKK@NVBAR.ORG
SUBJECT: RE: DOES RICHARD HILL HAVE STANDING TO FILE A GRIEVANCE
DATE: FRI, 23 MAR 2012 17:57:26 +0000
DEAR MR. COUGHLIN,
PLEASE COME TO SEE ME AND I WILL SHOW YOUTHE LETTER AND DOCUMENTS FROM THE COURT.
PATRICK KING
FROM: ZACH COUGHLIN [MAILTO:ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM]
SENT: FRIDAY, MARCH 23, 2012 10:39 AM
TO: PATRICK KING
MR. KING,
THIS IS THE VERY FIRST TIME YOUALLEGE ANYONE OTHER THAN MR.
KING FILED OR ALLEGED A GRIEVANCE. PLEASE PROVIDE ANY DOCUMEN-
TATION OR PROOF RELATED TO THESE APPARENT COMMUNICATIONS FROM
JUDGES THAT YOU ARE ONLY NOW BRINGING UP. SINCERELY, ZACH
COUGHLIN, ESQ., POBOX60952, RENO, NV, 89506, TEL: 775 338
8118, FAX: 949 667 7402; ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM NEVADA
BAR NO: 9473
DATE: FRI, 23 MAR 2012 17:18:34 +0000
DEAR MR. COUGHLIN,
I HAVE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED MY INTEREST IN HAVING A MEETING WITH YOU TO DISCUSS
THE GRIEVANCES AGAINST YOU. YOUCLAIM TO BE TOO BUSY TO MEET WITH ME, YET YOUHAVE TIME
TO WRITE LENGTHY E-MAILS AND APPARENTLY TO DO LEGAL RESEARCH.
YOUASKED IF MR. HILL HAS STANDING TO FILE A GRIEVANCE AGAINST YOU. NOT ONLY DOES
HE HAVE STANDING TO FILE A GRIEVANCE, AS A LAWYER IN NEVADA HE MAY HAVE AN ETHICAL OBLI-
GATION TO REPORT TO THE STATE BAR. AS I HAVE EXPLAINED TO YOU, THE GRIEVANCES AGAINST YOU
CAME NOT ONLY FROMMR. HILL BUT ALSO FROMJUDGES FROM DIFFERENT COURTS. THESE GRIEV-
ANCES, AND THE EVIDENCE ATTACHED WITH THEM, RATHER CLEARLY PUTS INTO QUESTION YOUR COM-
PETENCE TO PRACTICE LAW. AS I HAVE EXPLAINED TO YOU, I WILL MAKE THE EVIDENCE AND EXHIBITS
AVAILABLE TO YOU WHEN YOU COME TO INSPECT THEM AT MY OFFICE. I WILL NOT SEND YOUREPORTS
OR DOCUMENT, ESPECIALLY SINCE YOU CLAIM YOUR MAIL IS BEING COMPROMISED.
AS FOR THE GRIEVANCES YOUHAVE MADE, NOTHING THAT YOU HAVE SUBMITTED APPEARS TO
SHOW AN ETHICAL VIOLATION THAT COULD BE PROVED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, WHICH
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IS THE STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED IN DISCIPLINARY MATTERS. AS SUCH, AT THIS TIME WE HAVE
NOT OPENED ANY FILES BASED ON THE INFORMATION YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. SINCERELY, PATRICK
KING
FROM: ZACH COUGHLIN [MAIL-
TO:ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM]
TO: PATRICK KING; CDBAKER@RICHARDHILLAW.COM
SUBJECT: DOES RICHARD HILL HAVE STANDING TO FILE A GRIEVANCE
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE TRIALS
DATABASE UPDATED APRIL 2011
DEFENDING LAWYERS IN DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
31 AM. JUR. TRIALS 633 (ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN 1984)...
(8) HOW MUCH DOES IT COST TOFILE FOR A PROTECTION ORDER AGAINST HARASSMENT
IN THE WORKPLACE?
Unlike other types of protection orders there is a filing fee to obtain a protection order against
harassment in the workplace. The amount of the filing fee varies by jurisdiction. However, in
this court, the filing fee is $46.00.
IN ADDITION, THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL $100.00 (CASH OR EQUIVALENT) THAT MUST BE POST-
ED AS SECURITY. UNDER NRS 33.270, A TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE CANNOT BE ISSUED UNLESS THE APPLICANT POSTS THIS
AMOUNT. THE PURPOSE OF THIS SECURITY IS TO COMPENSATE THE ADVERSE PARTY FOR
SUCH COSTS AND DAMAGES AS MAY BE INCURRED OR SUFFERED BY THE ADVERSE PARTY IF
THAT PERSON IS FOUND TO HAVE BEEN WRONGFULLY ENJOINED OR RESTRAINED.
An Adverse Party may file a Motion to increase the amount of security if that person feels he
may be subject to excessive damages. However, an Applicant may not file a Motion to de-
crease the amount to less than $100
courthouse sanctuary rule and litigant attorney immunity from service in the courthouse were
violated by the attempts to served coughlin the tpo and excessive force by the WCSO on 1/5/13 viti-
ates any attempted service there.
THE SBN FAILED TO MEET JURISDICITONAL PREREQUISITS (AND THE RJC) AND SUCH ORDERS ARE VOID
WHERE NONE OF THE FOLLOWING WERE MET OR DONE
(9) ARE THERE UNIQUE RULES FOR THIS TYPE OF PROTECTION ORDER THAT DO NOT AP-
PLY
to the other types of protection orders?
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YES. SOME OF THESE UNIQUE RULES ARE HIGHLIGHTED BELOW:
(A) An Order for Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace cannot be issued
against more than one person.
(B) Under NRS 33.260, if an employer has knowledge that a specific person is the target of
harassment in the workplace and the employer intends to seek a temporary or extended order
for protection against such harassment, the employer must make a good faith effort to notify
the person who is the target of the harassment that the employer intends to seek such an order.
(C) Under NRS 33.310, an employer or an authorized agent of an employer may register a
temporary or extended Order for Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace issued by
the court of another state by presenting a certified copy of the order to the clerk of the court in
a judicial district in which the employer believes that enforcement may be necessary. A tem-
porary or extended Order for Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace that is regis-
tered has the same effect and must be enforced as if it were issued in Nevada. Moreover, the
clerk of the court will maintain a record of all orders that are registered.
(D) The court may award costs and reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing party in this
type of case.
(E) Under NRS 33.330, any person who enforces an Order for Protection Against Harassment
in the Workplace based upon a reasonable belief that the order is valid is immune from civil
and criminal liability for any action taken based upon that belief.
(F) Under NRS 33.330, any person who refuses to enforce an Order for Protection Against
Harassment in the Workplace based upon a reasonable belief that the order is not valid is
immune from civil and criminal liability for any action taken or not taken based upon that be-
lief.
(G) Under NRS 33.340, an Employer is immune from civil liability for:
(a) Seeking a temporary or extended Order for Protection Against Harassment
in the Workplace, if the employer acts in good faith in seeking the order; or
(H) UNDER NRS 33.340, AN ACTION TAKEN OR A STATEMENT MADE BY AN EMPLOYER
PURSUANT TO NRS 33.200 TO 33.260, INCLUSIVE (THE STATUTES ADDRESSING ORDERS
FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE):
(a) Shall not be deemed an admission by the employer of any fact; and
(B) MAY BE USED FOR THE PURPOSES OF IMPEACHMENT.
(B) PROHIBIT A PERSON FROM ENGAGING IN ANY CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED EXERCISE
OF FREE SPEECH, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, SPEECH INVOLVING LABOR DISPUTES
CONCERNING ORGANIZED LABOR; OR
(C) PROHIBIT A PERSON FROM ENGAGING IN ANY ACTIVITY THAT IS PART OF A LABOR DISPUTE.
(10) WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE FOR FILING FOR A PROTECTION ORDER?
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You must fill out two different types of documents and submit them to the court. All docu-
ments must be completed LEGIBLY. If you need additional pages because you need more
space to write, you may request a CONTINUATION PAGE in order to continue writing.
The first document to be completed is called an APPLICATION. Please refer to the courts
LINE-BY-LINE INSTRUCTION SHEET for detailed instructions in completing the AP-
PLICATION.
As you are filling out the APPLICATION, you should keep the following things in mind:
(1) Under NRS 200.581, harassment is deemed to have been committed where the conduct
occurred or where the person who was affected by the conduct was located at the time that
the conduct occurred.
For example, if the Adverse Party causes physical damage to a business in this township, or
threatens employees in this township, you may file here. If the Adverse Party is making
threatening phone calls to your business or its employees, and you received those phone calls
in this township, you may file here.
IF ANOTHER COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER YOUR PROTECTION ORDER FILING, YOU WILL
NEED TO CONTACT THAT COURT IN ORDER TO APPLY FOR A PROTECTION ORDER.
(2) YOU NEED TO BE AS SPECIFIC AS POSSIBLE. FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO INCLUDE
ALL RELEVANT DATES, LOCATIONS, WITNESSES, ETC., SO THAT THE REVIEWING JUSTICE OF
THE PEACE WILL HAVE THE MOST COMPLETE INFORMATION TO CONSIDER. IT IS ALSO HELPFUL
TO PRESENT YOUR STORY IN A CHRONOLOGICAL FASHION SO THAT THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
WILL UNDERSTAND A CLEAR SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.
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(3) YOU MAY INCLUDE ANY SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS THAT YOU HAVE GATHERED, SUCH AS:
* Documentation of phone calls by the Adverse Party
* NOTES/WRITTEN THREATS LEFT BY THE ADVERSE PARTY
* PICTURES OF PROPERTY DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE ADVERSE PARTY
* ANY OTHER WRITTEN DOCUMENTS THAT HELP TO SUBSTANTIATE YOUR ALLEGATIONS.
(4) ALTHOUGH YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE A POLICE REPORT PRIOR TO SEEKING A PRO-
TECTION ORDER, IF YOU HAVE FILED A POLICE REPORT, YOU MAY ATTACH A COPY OF THE PO-
LICE REPORT ALONG WITH YOUR APPLICATION. ADDITIONALLY, IF THERE ARE OTHER
PROTECTION ORDERS BETWEEN THESE PARTIES, PLEASE ATTACH COPIES, IF AVAILABLE.
(5) To apply for a protection order, you must be at least 18 years of age. However, the pro-
tection order may be issued against someone who is under 18 years of age.
(6) The APPLICATION and any supporting documents that you provide are public records
and may be viewed by any member of the public, including the Adverse Party, except as
specified in these instructions.
(7) The APPLICATION asks you to list specific locations where you are seeking protection.
If you are afraid to divulge that information to the Adverse Party, you may indicate that such
information is CONFIDENTIAL and should not appear on the protection order. However,
please be advised that this may limit the ability of law enforcement to enforce your order ef-
fectively. For example, if the court orders the Adverse Party to stay away from your busi-
ness, with no specific business addresses listed in the protection order, police may be reluc-
tant to arrest the Adverse Party if that person shows up at a specific business location. Alt-
hough this order of protection applies statewide, you are strongly encouraged to list the
specific business addresses where protection will most likely be needed.
(8) As part of the APPLICATION, you will be asked if you would like the court to set a
hearing date for an extended order. If you check the yes box, you will be asked to file a sepa-
rate application for an extended order along with your application for the temporary order. If
you check the no box, you may apply for an extended order later, but the extended order can
only be requested while the temporary order is still in effect.
For either option, the temporary order will remain in effect until the hearing on the extended
order is held.
(9) YOU ARE SIGNING THE APPLICATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, SO YOU MUST RE-
MEMBER THAT INTENTIONALLY FALSE OR MISLEADING STATEMENTS MAY SUBJECT YOU TO
CRIMINAL PENALTIES.
The second document to be completed is called a CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
SHEET. This document is not available to the general public or to the Adverse Party.
For several reasons, it is critical that you fill out this document as completely as possible:
(1) THIS DOCUMENT WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE COURT SO THAT THE COURT CAN
CONTACT YOU AND PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT UPCOMING HEARINGS OR ACTIVITIES IN
YOUR CASE.
(2) THIS INFORMATION IS NEEDED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES FOR PURPOSES OF SER-
VICE. PROTECTION ORDERS MUST BE SERVED PURSUANT TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
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6 After you have completed the APPLICATION and the CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
SHEET, your paperwork will be assigned a case number, and the case will be assigned to a justice of
the peace who will review your information.
If the justice of the peace denies your request for a protection order, the justice of the peace
will sign a written order denying your request and explaining why the protection order is not
warranted.
If the justice of the peace grants your request, a written protection order will be prepared, and
the parties will each receive a free copy of the order. The order will also be forwarded to the
appropriate law enforcement agencies for service upon the Adverse Party. Unlike other types
of protection orders, there isa fee for having law enforcement agencies serve this type of pro-
tection order in Nevada.
Neither King nor the SBN paid a fee to have either the TPO or EPO served, which on-
ly further underscores the conflict of interest in having the RPD, RJC, and SBN tag teaming
on Coughlin here, as, some might say, the appearance thereof is created considering all the
various interconnections between the three, which only gets more interconnected now that the
RCA and RMC has been added to the mix.
Please note that if the Adverse Party resides outside this County or in another state, it
will be your responsibility to contact the proper law enforcement agencies where the Adverse
Party resides, in order to have the protection order served. Under NRS 33.300, a law en-
forcement agency must enforce an Order for Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace
without regard to the county in which the order was issued.
NOT ONLY DID THE SBN'S OBC FAIL TO PAY SUCH SERVICE FEE (VITIATING FURTHER THE LE-
GITIMACY OF ANY ATTEMPTED SERVICE), BUT IT FAILED TO PAY THE BOND REQUIRED WITH SUCH TPO
APPLICATION FROM WHICH BOTH THE TPO AND EPOSPRING.
IF YOU ARE A PARTY TO A TPO ACTION, YOU, MAY NOT SERVE THAT TPO YOURSELF
ON THE ADVERSE PARTY. INSTEAD, THE TPO MUST BE SERVED BY A DEPUTY CONSTABLE,
DEPUTY SHERIFF, OR PERSON WHO IS NOT A PARTY AND WHO IS OVER 18 YEARS OF AGE.
YOU MAY ALSO USE A PRIVATE PROCESS SERVER TO SERVE THE ADVERSE PARTY AT YOUR
OWN EXPENSE. IF YOU CHOOSE TO DO SO, YOU MUST FILE WITH THE COURT A DOCUMENT
CALLED A RETURN OF SERVICE WHICH SHOWS THAT THE ADVERSE PARTY WAS PROPERLY
SERVED.
ANOTHER ATTACKABLE ASPECT OF THE 1/4/13 EPOIS REVEALED IN REVIEWING THE 1/4/13
STALKING/HARASSMENT ORDER BY JUDGE PEARSON IN RCP2012-00607, WHICH IS A ONE PAGE OR-
DER, SIGNED BY JUDGE PEARSON AND FILE STAMPED 1/4/13, WHICH READS: APPLICANT REPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL PATRICK OWEN KING, ESQ. ADVERSE PARTY DID NOT APPEAR. EXTENDED ORDER
GRANTED TO EXPIRE ON JANUARY4, 2014 AT 11:59 P.M.
THE TITLING OF SUCH ORDER OF AS STALKING/HARASSMENT UNDERSCORES THE LACK OF AT-
TENTION TO DETAIL THE RJC MIRRORS WITH RESPECT TO THAT DEMONSTRATED BY KING AND THE SBN
IN ITS TPOAPPLICATION (AND CONCOMITANT FAILURE TO PAY INTO THE RJC EVEN THE MINIMUM SE-
CURITY REQUIRED OF $100.00), THE PURPORTED NOTICING BY EMAIL TO COUGLIN KING REFERENCES
IN HIS 12/20/12 TPOAPPLICATION CONSISTING ON AN EMAILED PDF VERSION OF KING'S APPLICATION
AT 3:30 PM (WHERE THE TPOWAS ISSUED AT 8:40 A.M THE FOLLOWING MORNING) WHICH FAILS TO
CHECK THE BOX INDICATED FOR WHETHER OR NOT THE PARTY IS SEEKING AN EXTENSION HEARING AND
EPO, WHEREAS, APPARENTLY, THE VERSION OF THE TPOAPPLICATION THE SBNACTUALLY FILED DID
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CHECK SUCH BOX...UNLESS SUCH BOX WAS CHECKED LATER...PERHAPS BY SOMEONE ELSE? NO WHIT-
ED-OUT INTERLINATEATION ABOVE A LINE STRUCK THROUGH SOME INTERLINEATION A LA THE 3/6/13
SUMMONS IN RMC 13 CR 3913, AND 3914, BUT STILL...THEN THE SUBSEQUENT FAILURE TO ACTUALLY
FILE AN EPOAPPLICATION, FAILURE TO PAY TO HAVE EITHER THE TPOOR EPOSERVED, ETC., ETC.
IN TITLING THE 1/4/13 STALKING/HARASSMENT ORDER THUSLY, JUDGE PEARSON MAY
HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE MISTAKEN LISTING OF NRS 200.591 BY RPDDETECTIVE YTURBIDE (TO
WHATEVER EXTENT HIS SO WRONGFULLY CHARGING AND OVERCHARGING COUGLIN WAS NOT WILLFUL
RETALIATORY MISCONDUCT, AND IT DOES NOT SEEM SUCH ONE PAGE 1/4/13 STALKING/HARASSMENT
ORDER WAS EVER PROVIDED TO RPDYTRUBIDE) IN HIS 2/8/13 ARREST REPORT WHEREIN HE CHARGED
COUGLIN WITH A GROSS MISDEMEANOR TPO VIOLATION WITH A $2,500 BAIL, AND A FELONY EPO VIO-
LATION WITH A $2,500 BAIL (THE DISORIENTING EFFECT OF COUGLIN'S BEING ARRESTED WRONGFULLY,
AFTER 7 PM, IN HIS OWN HOME, BY THE RJC'S DAS, IN VIOLATION OF NRS 171.136 (THE RJC SUBSE-
QUENTLY SOUGHT TO, SOME MIGHT SAY, OBVIATE THE PROBLEM OF SUCH A WARRANTLESS ARREST
HAVING AN ARREST TIME ON THE INMATE BOOKING INFORMATION SHEET LISTED AT 7:02 PM BY
SUDDENLY ISSUING A WARRANT ON 2/4/13 (A WARRANT WHICH JUDGE SFERRAZZA HAD ISSUED ON
1/9/13, DESPITE THE FACT THAT JUDGE PEARSON HAD APPARENTLY TAKEN OVER THAT CASE RCR11-
063341 BY THAT POINT, OR...MAYBE NOT...MAYBE THAT ISSUING OF A WARRANT BY JUDGE SFERRAZZA
(IN COMBINATION WITH SOME ASSERTIONS IN HIS FILINGS BY COUGHLIN RELATED TO AN APPARENT
FORMER TRIBAL COURT BAILIFF OF JUDGE SFERRAZZA'S WHOM WAS AT ONE TIME A CLIENT OF
COUGHLIN'S, PETER EASTMAN, INFORMING COUGHLIN ON APPROXIMATELY 11/8/12 THAT HE HAD BEEN
TOLD BY FRIENDS IN THE COURTHOUSE (EASTMAN IS A FORMER WCSODEPUTY AS WELL) THAT
JUDGE SFERRAZZA AND THE RJC IN GENERAL HAVE IT OUT FOR (COUGHLIN). WHO KNOWS
WHETHER THAT IS TRUE OR NOT AND JUDGE SFERRAZZA CERTAINLY DESERVES THE BENEFIT OF THE
DOUBT, BUT EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF BIAS CREATED THEREBY APPEARS TO HAVE RESULTED IN JUDGE
PEARSON FOR THAT, OR SOME OTHER REASON, PERHAPS, TAKING OVER THE MATTER OF 063341 (ON AP-
PEAL IN CR12-2025) FROMJUDGE SFERRAZZA...WHETHER THAT WAS DONE BEFORE OR AFTER THE IS-
SUANCE OF A WARRANT ON 1/9/13 IN 063341 FOR COUGHLIN'S ARREST BASED UPON SOME ALLEGED
FTC FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF HIS PROBATION IS NOT YET CLEAR, BUT THE DOCKET IN
THAT MATTER CONTAINS AN ENTRY (AND DOCKET ENTRIES IN JUSTICE COURT CASE ARE STATUTORILY
DECLARED TO BE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF FACTS PURSUANT TO NRS 4.240.
NRS 4.240 Entries in docket prima facie evidence of facts. The several particulars of
NRS 4.230 specified must be entered under the title of the action to which they relate, and (unless
otherwise in this chapter provided) at the time when they occur. Such entries in a justices docket, or
a transcript thereof, certified by the justice, or the justices successor in office, are prima facie evi-
dence of the facts so stated.
Further, as to the ordered rendered by Judge Sferrazza on 10/25/11, wherein he again utilized
the term judgment despite having previously recharacterized his ruling of 10/13/11 sufficient to
make the 10/25/11 court date not a trial, but a continuation of the summary eviction proceeding of
10/13/11, JCRRT 2 makes inapplicable JCRRT 17, though Couglin should have been afforded the
five days after service to review and comment on the propsed document. On 10/25/11 Judge
Sferrazza stated to Baker: you can prepare a findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, if
you wish... further evincing the extent to which the distinctions between a summary proceeding and
plenary trial were not maintained, to much prejudice to Couglin and damage to his affairs.
JCRRTRULE 17. PREPARATION OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND JUDGMENT. IN A CIVIL
CASE, WHERE A JUDGE DIRECTS AN ATTORNEY TO PREPARE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND JUDGMENT, THE ATTORNEY SHALL SERVE A COPY OF THE PROPOSED DOCUMENT UPON COUNSEL
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FOR ALL PARTIES WHO HAVE APPEARED, OR UPON THE PARTY IF A PARTY HAS APPEARED IN PROPER PER-
SON AT THE TRIAL AND ARE AFFECTED BY THE JUDGMENT. FIVE DAYS AFTER SERVICE COUNSEL SHALL
SUBMIT THE SAME TO THE COURT FOR SIGNATURE TOGETHER WITH PROOF OF SUCH SERVICE.
As to Marshals Harley and Coppa and Bailiffs Reyes, English serving process:
JCRRTRULE 8. DUTIES OF BAILIFF, SHERIFF. DURING THE TIME THE COURT REMAINS IN
SESSION, THE BAILIFF, IF THERE IS ONE, OR THE SHERIFF OR HIS DEPUTY IN ATTENDANCE PURSUANT TO
LAW IF THERE IS NO BAILIFF, SHALL: ...(F) PERFORM SUCH OTHER DUTIES AS ARE REQUIRED BY THE
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.
RJC BAILIFF'S MEDINA AND REYES IN SUA SPONTE AMENDING THE 12/20/12 ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER AND THEREBY REFUSING TO ACCEPT FROMCOUGHLIN DOCUMENTS HE PRESENTS FOR FILING
MORE THAN ONCE A DAY (EVEN, SAY, ON A DAY WHERE THE DEADLINE UNER NRS 189.010 OR NRS
175.515 RUNS, EVEN WHERE NO PRIOR NOTICE OF SUCH AMENDEDMENT BY BAILIFF TO A JUDGES ORDER
WAS PROVIDED COUGHLIN) ARE LIKELY IN VIOLATION NRS 4.353(C) PERFORM OTHER SUCH DUTIES
AS MAY BE REQUIRED OF THE DEPUTY MARSHAL BY THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF THE COURT...
WHERE THE 12/20/12 ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER READS:
a. If ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN wishes to file a document with the Reno Justice
Court or attend a hearing in the Reno Justice Court he must notify the security personnel at
the main security entrance located at the east entrance of One South Sierra Street and wait for
a bailiff of the Reno justice Court to respond to his location.
B. IF ZACHARYBARKER COUGHLIN WISHES TO MAKE A REQUEST OF THE RENO JUSTICE
COURT FOR COPIES, TRANSCRIPTS, ACCESS TO A COURT FILE OR TO ASK A QUESTION HE SHALL DO SO IN
WRITING AND EITHER MAIL THE REQUEST TO THE RENO JUSTICE COURT OR DELIVER THE WRITTEN RE-
QUEST TO A BAILIFF OF THE RENO JUSTICE COURT BY FIRST CONTACTING THE BAILIFF THROUGH COURT
SECURITY AS DETAILED ABOVE. THE BAILIFF WILL THEN FILE THE DOCUMENT FOR MR. COUGHLIN AND
PROVIDE HIM A FILE STAMPED COPY IN RETURN.
THERE IS NOTHING IN THAT ORDER ALLOWING BAILIFF'S MEDINA AND REYES TO REFUSE TO
ACCEPT DOCUMENTS COUGLIN PRESENTS FOR FILING AT SAY, 4 PM, BECAUSE COUGLIN PRESENTED
SOMETHING EARLIER IN THE DAY AT, SAY, 9 AM. REGARDLESS, THE ENTIRETY OF JUDGE SFERRAZZA'S
12/20/12 ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 2012-01 IS OF AN DISTURBINGLY DUBIOUS NATURE.
NRS 4.353 DEPUTY MARSHAL: APPOINTMENT; DUTIES; QUALIFICATIONS; COMPENSA-
TION....
3. Each deputy marshal shall:...(c) Perform other such duties as may be required of the
deputy marshal by the justice of the peace of the court...
7. The provisions of this section donot authorizethedeputymarshal toserveanycivil or
criminal process, except suchordersof thecourt whicharespeciallydirectedbythecourt or the
presidingjusticeof thepeacethereof tothedeputymarshal for service.
JUDGE SFERRAZZA'S ORDER OF 11/28/12 IN "CASE NO.: ALL CASES DEPT. NO.: ALL DEPART-
MENTS" READS:
"ORDER Pursuant to Justice Court Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 84(b)(1) as Chief Justice of
the Reno Justice Court I am responsible for the administration of court rules and regulations.
PURSUANT TO RULE 84(B)(5), THE CHIEF JUDGE OVERSEES ALL ADMINISTRATIVE AND CLERICAL
WORK AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COURT.
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PURSUANT TO RULE 5(E) OF THE JUSTICE COURT RULES OF CI VI L PROCEDURE, A COURT MAY
BY LOCAL RULE PERMIT PAPERS TO BE FILED, SIGNED OR VERIFIED BY ELECTRONIC MEANS THAT ARE
CONSISTENT WITH TECHNICAL STANDARDS, IF ANY, THAT THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES ESTABLISHES. CURRENTLY, RENOJ USTI CE COURT HASNOT ADOPTEDA RULE PERMI TTI NGPA-
PERSTOBE FI LEDELECTRONI CALLY.
Justice Court Rules of Reno Township Rule 10(f) provides that the clerk must not accept for
filing any pleading or documents which do not comply with thisrule, but for good cause shown, the
Court may permit the filing of noncomplying pleadings and documents. Henceforth,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, Zachary Coughlin, shall not be permitted to
file any further documents in any and all departments of Reno Justice Court by electronic
means including, but not limited to, fax or email. In the event he violates this Order, he will be
in contempt of court and subject to twenty-five (25) days imprisonment for each violation."
Further, as to Judge Sferrazza finding authority for makign his 11/28/12 Order in NJCRCP,
Rules 1 and 2 therein may quite clear that (similar to JCRRT Rule 2) NJCRCP Rule 5(e) does not ap-
ply to criminal case in the RJC, and does not apply to summary evictions.
NJCRCPRULE 1. SCOPE ANDAPPLICATIONOF RULES: THESE RULES GOVERN
THE PROCEDURE IN THE JUSTICE COURTS IN ALL SUITS OF A CI VI L NATURE, WITH THE EXCEPTIONS STAT-
ED IN RULE 81.
NJCRCP RULE 2. THREE FORMS OF ACTION: There shall be three forms of action
in justice courts to be known as civil actions, small claims actions and summary eviction ac-
tions. Rules 3 through 87 govern civil actions. Rules governing small claims actions begin with Rule
88 and end with Rule 100. Rules governing summary evictions commence with Rule 101.
JCRRTRULE 10. FORM OF PLEADINGS.... (F) THE CLERK MUST NOT ACCEPT FOR FIL-
ING ANYPLEADING OR DOCUMENTS THAT DO NOT COMPLY WITH THIS RULE, BUT FOR GOOD CAUSE
SHOWN, THE COURT MAY PERMIT THE FILING OF NONCOMPLYING PLEADINGS AND DOCUMENTS.
PARAGRAPH(1), EXCEPT AS TO THE SIZE OF PAPER, AND PARAGRAPH(3) OF THIS RULE DO NOT AP-
PLYTO PRINTED FORMS FURNISHED BY THE CLERK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OR PUBLIC DEFENDER.
Despite it patent inapplicability to landlord tenant matters as indicated in JCRRT Rule
2, Judge Sferrazza continually applied, in the summary eviction case in 1708 the following rule to
Coughlin's various Motions to Alter, Amend, Stay, etc.: JCRRT Rule 11. Motions: Procedure
for making motions; affidavits; renewal, rehearing of motions....(g) No motion once heard and
disposed of shall be renewed in the same cause, nor shall the same matters therein embraced be re-
heard, unless by leave of the court.
So, Judge Sferrazza manages to base his 11/28/12 Order entirely upon rules that are inappli-
cable to ALL of the case Couglin has ever had in the RJC. Coughlin has never once been a party to a
civil action in the RJC. Regardless, clearly, the RJC accepts filings by facsimile from some parties
and their attorneys, whereas it does not from others...This was the case throughout September 2011
until Couglin caught on to the fact that, despite RJC Clerk Christine Erickson and others indicating
that filing by fax was not permitted, Richard G. Hill's associate, Casey D. Baker, was able to file
some things by fax, including his 10/19/11 Request for an Order Shortening Time, etc., etc. Upon
discovering this, Coughlin confronted Erickson about her previous apparently incorrect assertions to
him vis a vis fax filing and Erickson said no comment. Similarly, in the criminal division, Chief
Criminal Filing Officer Clerk Robbin Baker continually maintained to Coughlin that filing by fax
was not permitted, until she changed her tune in mid-February 2012, whereupon Coughlin's filings in
criminal cases in the RJC were accepted for filing, with Baker indicating a fax is an original under
the approach taken by the RJC.
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JCRRT Rule 10.(a) All pleadings and papers presented for filing must be flat, unfolded, firm-
ly bound together at the top, on white paper of standard quality, not less than 16-lb. weight and 8 1/2
by 11 inches in size. All papers shall be typewritten or prepared by some other process that will pro-
duce clear and permanent copies equally legible to printing. The print size shall not be more than 12
points. Carbon or photocopies may not be filed. Only one side of the paper may be used.....
There is, or should be, a pretty big difference between being a politician (or, for that matter, a
member of the executive branch) and being a member of the judicial branch. Whereas those in the
executive branch are permitted to utilize influence, bargaining, and leverage to further their objecties,
those in the judicial branch must dispense justice based on law and fact alone in a neutral manner de-
void of bias or agenda.
Judge Sferrazza continually abuses his contempt power...well, actually, he more threatens to
abuse it (which is still arguably abusing it) versus actually following through and abusing in the way
Judge Holmes did on on 2/27/12 in summarily incarcerating then practicing attorney with client's
Couglin for five days while denying any stay whatsoever (which is what Judge Howard did on
11/30/11, although, ordering a mere 3 days incarceration).
The Justice Court Rules of Reno Township do not apply to criminal case or to landlord
tenant matters, yet in his 11/28/12 Order in ALL CASES and in ALL DEPARTMENTS then
Chief Judge Sferrazza ordered just that. Couglin has and hereby again communicates on open re-
fusal pursuant to RPC 3.4(c) as to the illegality of Judge Sferrazza's 11/28/12 Order (the enforce-
ment of which by criminal division clerks Robbin Baker and Cathy Wood has materially prejudiced
Coughlin's defense in various criminal prosecutions, including 11-063341 and 12-065630).
RPC Rule 3.4. Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel. A lawyer shall not: ... (c)
Knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an
assertion that no valid obligation exists
JCRRT Rule 2. Application of rules. Except as otherwise provided by statute, these
rules apply to all civil proceedings filed in Reno Township except small claims and landlord ten-
ant matters.
Further, it is completely untrue or erroneous for the RJC Docket in RCR13-071437 to purport
that a criminal complaint was filed therein on 12/20/12 in the form of the Administrative Order of
12/20/12, and further, at the OSC Hearing on 3/5/13, Couglin did not consent to Bruce Linsday doing
anything more than appearing as co-counsel, subject to Coughlin having final say in RCR11-063341
as to the allegation of Couglin having violated his probation incident to the warrantless after 7pm
NRS 171.136 violating arrest by the Department of Alternative Sentencing on 2/1/13...it seems Lind-
say wins because he gets another check from the Bob Bell group, and the RJC wins because it gets to
claim Couglin was given his day in court as to the 2/25/13 Order To Show Cause that alleged Cough-
lin had violated the 12/20/12 Administrative Order some five times...its really appalling, first to enter
that Administrative Order, as lacking in jurisdiction or anything in the way of actual precedent to
support what it purports to order, but to then seek to leverage every alleged violation no matter how
de minimis, all without complying with NRS 22.030(2) affiedavit requirement as to the alleged
distrubances Coughlin caused in the RJC filing office (there's cameras everywhere, so...if there is
something so dramatic, it should be produced...). So, it is really inappropriate for Bruce Lindsay to
be getting multiple checks from the Bob Bell Group incident to the WCPD and APD being conflicted
out of representing Couglin by virtue of Leslie's TPO/EPO where the same subject matter/ case/
Administrative Order is being rebranded with a different case number three and four times, particu-
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larly where Lindsay showed up twenty minutes late on 3/11/13 (something Judge Clifton gave
Coughlin five days in jail for on 2/13/12 incident to Coughlin being less than an hour late to court on
2/12/12, which was the result of the disorienting effect of attempting to prepare and file the ROA and
Brief in 62337 whilst being wrongfully arrest on 2/1/13 by DAS, incarcerated until 1 am on 2/5/13
(requiring $500 bail that still has not been returned by the RJC), then arreste again on 2/8/13 by the
RPD and overcharged by Detective Yturbide (citing to the wrong statute, NRS 200.591, rather than
NRS 33.350, resulting in Couglin being subject to a $5,000 bail), Couglin bailing out at 2 am on
2/9/13, with the combined effect of those arrest and the concomitant forced immediate no titration
cessation of two psychoactive medications (Wellbutrin and Adderall...unless one want to comply
with the Washoe County Jail's insistence on dosing Wellbutrin at bedtime...where such medication is
known for causing sleeplessness and as such would necessarily disturb one's circadian rhythmns...)
and somehow, whereas Lindsay gets a pass for being 20 minutes late (not to mention completely un-
prepared and clueless as to the merits, fact, and law, at issue in the various cases he was triple dipping
on (getting paid for two or three different cases by attending one combo hearing)..and somehow
Judge Clifton issues a warrant for Coughlin's arrest (he alleges he did so at 9:36 am, but the docket
indicates it was at noon) where Couglin arrived just before 10:00 am for the continuation of the trial
in 065630 that was set to start at 9 am (and which should have never taken place at all given the plea
deal accepted on 8/27/12, Judge Clifton's failure to abide by NRS 1.230, .235 upon Couglin filing and
having served on his chambers a Motion to Disqualify (Clifton ignored NRS 53.045 and Buckwalter
in insisting that the fact that Coughlin had not presented a notarized affidavit the judge was not
then compelled to follow the procedures (5 days to file a responsive affidavit/declaration, etc., etc.)
upon Couglin filing prior to the start of trial (it matters not the argument that, ignoring the fact that
RJC Clerk Robbin Baker told Couglin the trial's start time was moved to 1:30 pm on 12/11/12, re-
gardless, Couglin filed the Motion to Disqualify of 12/11/12 prior to the start of trial (and Tom
Viloria's case was taken up the morning in the RJC anyways, which is why Baker told Couglin the
start time was moved. Regardless refusing to allow Couglhin to query Baker or subpoena here with
respect to that, such an incident being Couglin's one warning not to be late, and Judge Clifton's du-
bious insistence that he knew Baker did not tell Couglin that even where Baker was absent from work
on 12/11/12 and Cathy Wood later told Coughlin that day that no one from the RJC had called Baker
for any reason (that and Baker's verge of tears flip flopping to Coughlin on 11/27/12 respecting the
fact that she originally said that she clearly remembered the filigns Coughlin personally gave her for
filing on 11/15/12 both having discs attached to them...only to minutes later tearfully exclaim I'm
not talking to you Zach! upon Couglin confronting her about the curious about face Baker demon-
strated after a quick talking to by Cathy Wood and some stern looks (some might say, all of which
resulted in the 12/20/12 Administrative Order...along with, perhaps, Coughlin's asking Bailiff Reyes
if, perhaps, there was a bit of an appearance of bias incident to Reyes serving Couglin the TPO
Washoe County obtained on behalf of Reyes's fellow Washoe County employee Leslie, on
12/19/12....
NRS 33.350 Penalty for intentional violation of order. A person who intentionally violates a
temporary or extended order for protection against harassment in the workplace is guilty of a misde-
meanor, unless a more severe penalty is prescribed by law for the act that constitutes the violation of
the order.
The docket in 071437 claims something that just did not happen...Couglin never asked to have
Lindsay appear on his behalf in the Administrative Order matter...and at that 3/5/13 OSC Hearing,
Judge Pearson indicated that the Order to Show Cause on the Administrative Matter is being put into
the probation violation case in 11-063341..., which makes no sense given the subject matter in-
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volved in the two have no connection whatsoever, and what really appears to be the case is that the
RJC is unable to control, some might say, the DAS Officers, like Ramos, from, ever so suspiciously,
summarily arresting Coughlin, every time Couglin sends an email to the WCDA's Office like that of
the very early morning hours of 2/1/13, resulting in his arrest by DAS less than 24 hours later. But
the RJC is clever, as such it recently in 11-063341 (actually, the docket therein indicates Judge
Sferrazza vacated his judgment as rendered almost immediately after making it where the obey all
laws requirement was closed etc. further, both Judges Clifton in 065630 (the probation for which
doesn't even start for at least one, if not two years given the consecutive nature of the sentence) and
Judge Pearson eliminated the no alcohol term of Couglin's sentence in 063341, and as there never
was any be subject to search and seizure (and Coughlin indicated to DAS at the outset that such
was his position and that he was not waiving any of his rights in that regard...), so DAS perhaps
should cease descending upon Coughlin's home and office and banging on every wall thereof for
twenty minutes at a time, angrily shouting invective in menacing tones, then unplugging the electrici-
ty to Coughlin's home and office, apparently, when finally deciding to leave, as was apparently the
case on 4/30/13 according to those living near Coughlin.
Judge Sferrazza's Administrative Order 2012-01, of 12/20/12 (lacking any case number),
reads:
"ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 2012-01 .
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has been the subject of disciplinary hear-
ings before the State Bar of Nevada Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board wherein the Board found
Mr. Coughlin "committed mUltiple violations of the Rules of Professional conduct" and that Mr.
Coughlin "engaged in bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process"; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has been a party in cases before the Reno
Municipal Court including cases before the Honorable Dorothy Nash Holmes and the Honorable
Kenneth Howard wherein Mr. Coughlin was held in contempt of court for failing to follow the
Court's orders and directives; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has been a party in both civil and criminal
matters before this Court including cases before the Honorable Peter Sferrazza, the Honorable Scott
Pearson, and the Honorable David Clifton wherein Mr. Coughlin has been admonished for failing to
follow the Court's orders and directive; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is currently the subject of a Temporary Or-
der for Protection against Harassment in the Workplace requested by the Washoe County Public De-
fender's Office, his counsel in several cases before this Court; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is currently the subject of a Temporary Or-
der for Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace requested by the State Bar of Nevada based
upon Mr. Coughlin's harassing and disruptive behavior with employees and officers of the State Bar;
and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is currently a party in cases before this
court; and
WHEREAS, citizens, whether or not indigent, have a constitutional right to access to the
courts with the protection of due process of law; and WHEREAS, frivolous or vexatious claims and
defenses overburden limited judicial resources, hinder the timely resolution of meritorious claims and
increase the costs of engaging in business and providing professional services to the public; and
WHEREAS, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN has repeatedly caused a disturbance in the
filing office of the Reno Justice Court, disrupted the orderly business of the Court and overburdened
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the limited judicial resources of this Court thereby hindering the timely resolution of meritorious
claims and increasing the costs of engaging in business and providing professional services to the
public; and
WHEREAS, "a breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance in the presence
of the court, or in its immediate vicinity, tending to interrupt the due course of the trial or other judi-
cial proceeding" constitutes contempt of court in the State of Nevada; and
WHEREAS, "disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, order, rule or process issued by
the court or judge at chambers" constitutes contempt of court in the State of Nevada; and WHERE-
AS, Nevada's courts are constitutionally authorized to issue all writs "proper and necessary to the
complete exercise of their jurisdiction." Nev. Const. art. 6, 6(1); and WHEREAS, to protect the
peaceful and effective operation of this Court,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not enter the premises of the Reno Justice Court
at One South Sierra Street except as follows:
a. If ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN wishes to file a document with the Reno Justice
Court or attend a hearing in the Reno Justice Court he must notify the security personnel at the main
security entrance located at the east entrance of One South Sierra Street and wait for a bailiff of the
Reno justice Court to respond to his location.
b. If ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN wishes to make a request of the Reno Justice Court
for copies, transcripts, access to a court file or to ask a question he shall do so in writing and either
mail the request to the Reno Justice Court or deliver the written request to a bailiff of the Reno Jus-
tice Court by first contacting the bailiff through court security as detailed above. The bailiff will then
file the document for Mr. Coughlin and provide him a file stamped copy in return.
c. If ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN wishes to attend a Court hearing in the Reno Justice
Court he shall be escorted by a bailiff of this Court.
2. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN shall not be present in the exclusive premises of the
Reno Justice Court including the criminal, civil, citation, or administrative facilities located on the
first floor of the North Tower of One South Sierra Street and the entire area located on the second
floor of the North Tower of One South Sierra Street without the escort of a bailiff of this Court and
without first following the procedures outlined above.
3. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is not allowed to contact any member of this Court
other than a uniformed bailiff.
4. If ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN is a party to a case he may address the Court during
the Court proceedings.
5. Any violation of this Order may be considered contempt of court and punished pursuant to
NRS Chapter 22 by a fine of up to $500 and/or incarceration for up to 25 days in the Washoe County
Detention Facility.
6. This Order is effective upon personal service upon Mr. Coughlin."
Of course, the RJC had a party purport to serve that 12/20/12 Administrative Order where
Bailiff English purports to have attempted or effected service thereof on 12/20/12 within the court-
house at the Reno Justice Court.
Further, all of the Proof of Service/Return of Service in 599, 607, 3913, 3914, etc. all fail un-
der the requirements of NRCP 4(c),(d),(g):
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(c) By Whom Served. Process shall be served by the sheriff of the county where the defendant is
found, or by a deputy, or by any person who is not a party and who is over 18 years of age, except
that a subpoena may be served as provided in Rule 45; where the service of process is made outside
of the United States, after an order of publication, it may be served either by any person who is not a
party and who is over 18 years of age or by any resident of the country, territory, colony or province,
who is not a party and who is over 18 years of age.
(d) Summons: Personal Service. The summons and complaint shall be served together. The
plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be
made by delivering a copy of the summons attached to a copy of the complaint as follows:... (6) Ser-
vice Upon Individuals. In all other cases to the defendant personally, or by leaving copies thereof
at the defendants dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and dis-
cretion then residing therein, or by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to an agent au-
thorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.
... (g) Return. The person serving the process shall make proof of service thereof to the court
promptly and in any event within the time during which the person served must respond to the pro-
cess. Proof of service shall be as follows:...(4) The written admission of the defendant....In case of
service otherwise than by publication, the certificate or affidavit shall state the date, place and
manner of service. Failure to make proof of service shall not affect the validity of the service.
See 60302 and Garins' 11/15/12 Motion to Dismiss therein: 4. Defendants Actual Notice
Does Not Constitute Service Any assertion by Plaintiff that Defendant has actual notice of this law-
suit, and knowledge of this case excuses service of the summons and complaint, misses the point. The
Nevada Supreme Court has long acknowledged that notice of a litigation is not a substitute for proper
service of process. C.H.A Venture v. G.C. Wallace Consulting Engineers, Inc., 794 P.2d 707, 709
(Nev. 1990). In effect, Defendant's notice of this litigation does not excuse Plaintiff's non-service on
Defendant.
Note that the Proof of Service for the 1/12/12 NRS 200.591 Stalking/Harassment TPO
Richard G. Hill, Esq., obtained from the RJC is signed by RJC Bailiff Plamondon.
NRS 4.230 Docket: Entries; form.
1. Every justice must keep a docket, in which the justice must enter:
(A) THE TITLE OF EVERY ACTION OR PROCEEDING.
(B) THE OBJECT OF THE ACTION OR PROCEEDING; AND IF A SUM OF MONEY BE CLAIMED, THE
AMOUNT THEREOF.
(C) THE DATE OF THE SUMMONS, AND THE TIME OF ITS RETURN; AND IF AN ORDER TO ARREST THE
DEFENDANT BE MADE, OR A WRIT OF ATTACHMENT BE ISSUED, A STATEMENT OF THE FACT.
(D) THE TIME WHEN THE PARTIES, OR EITHER OF THEM, APPEAR, OR THEIR NONAPPEAR-
ANCE, IF DEFAULT BE MADE; A MINUTE OF THE PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS; IF IN WRITING, REFERRING
TO THEM; IF NOT IN WRITING, A CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE MATERIAL PARTS OF THE PLEADING. THE
RJC'S BAILIFF REYES AND CHIEF CIVIL CLERK CHRISTINE ERICKSON HAVE REFUSED TO PROVIDE
COUGHLIN A DOCKET IN REV11-1492 AND REV11-1708, CITING TO JCRRT RULE REQUIRING TYPE-
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WRITTEN PLEADINGS, DESPITE THE INAPPLICABILITY OF JCRRT TO LANDLORD TENANT MATTERS AS
INDICATE IN JCRRT RULE 3. FURTHER, COUGHLIN HAS HAD REYES REFUSE TO TAKE REQUESTS
COUGLIN HAS SUBMITTED FOR FILING FOR DOCKETS AND COPIES OF THE JAVS AUDIO OF THE 1/4/13
HEARING IN RCP12-607, AND WHETHER DEFAULT BE MADE THEREIN IS KEY...PARTICULARLY GIVEN
THAT NRS 33.270 REQUIRES MORE THAN A DEFAULT, IT REQUIRES TO APPLICANT PROVE (PROBABLY BY
THE SAME CLEAR AND CONVICING EVIDENCE STANDARD CALIFORNIA USES, THAT SET FORTH THERE-
IN...NOT SIMPLY ENTER A DEFAULT UPON SOME ALLEGED FAILURE TO APPEAR BY COUGHLIN, ESPE-
CIALLY WHERE TEH 12/26/12 PROOF OF SERVICE BY RJC BAILIFF ENGLISH IS DEFICIENT AND VIOLA-
TIVE OF COURTHOUSE SANCTUARY AND ATTORNEY LITIGANT PRIVILEGE/IMMUNITY FROM SERVICE OF
PROCESS IN THE COURTHOUSE (THE SAME DEFICIENY WHICH BEFALLS BAKER'S ATTEMPTS TO PERSON-
ALLY SERVE COUGLHIN ON 9/27/11 THE 5 DAY UNLAWFUL DETAINER NOTICE IN 1708.
(e) Every adjournment, stating on whose application and to what time.
(F) THE DEMAND FOR A TRIAL BY JURY, WHEN THE SAME IS MADE, AND BY WHOM MADE, THE
ORDER FOR THE JURY, AND THE TIME APPOINTED FOR THE RETURN OF THE JURY AND FOR THE TRIAL....
(THIS IS SOMEWHAT IS DISPUTE IN 1708, THOUGH THE TITLE OF COUGHLIN'S 10/11/11 FILING THEREIN
DOES CONTAIN THE WORDS DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL...WHICH IS PROBLEMATIC CONSIDERING THAT
JUDGE SFERRAZZA DENIED COUGLIN A JURY TRIAL, DESPITE COUGLIN TIMELY MAKIGN SUCH A DE-
MAND UNDER NRCP 38 (SEE NRS 40.400), WHICH WAS PRIOR TO THE 10/13/11 EVICTION DECISION
AND ORDER SETTING THE MATTER OVER FOR TRIAL ON 10/25/11 SHOULD COUGLIN DEPOSIT SOME
$2,275 IN RENT ESCROW PURSUANT TO NRS 118A.355(5), EVEN THOUGH COUGLIN ALWAYS MAIN-
TAINED HE WAS ENTITLED TO AN APPLICATION OF NRS 118A.360'S FIX AND DEDUCT DICTATES, IN
ADDITON TO THE SET OFFS INURING TO COUGHLIN UNDER NRS 118A.390, 118A.510, NRS 118A.290,
AND NRS 118A.355(2).
(i) The judgment of the court, specifying the costs included, and the time when rendered.
(j) The issuing of the execution, when issued and to whom; the renewals thereof, if any, and
when made, and a statement of any money paid to the justice, when and by whom.
(k) The receipt of a notice of appeal, if any be given, and of the appeal bond, if any be filed.
(this is a bit of an issue in RCR11-063341 and RCR13-071437 as to the filings and order of and
around 3/11/13).
NEVADA PROBATION RULES
Probation is a type of penalty wherein the court imposes an officer to record all the things that you
may do. An agreement between you and the court pertaining to probation should be followed.
Below are rules of probations according to Nevada Revised Statutes:
NRS 176A.310 Conditions; duties of surety; probationer to report to and pay surety.
1. The court shall set the conditions of a program of probation secured by a surety bond. The condi-
tions must be appended to and made part of the bond. The conditions may include, but are not limited
to, any one or more of the following:
(a) Submission to periodic tests to determine whether the probationer is using any controlled sub-
stance or alcohol.
(b) Participation in a program for the treatment of the abuse of a controlled substance or alcohol or a
program for the treatment of any other impairment.
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(c) Participation in a program of professional counseling, including, but not limited to, counseling for
the family of the probationer.
(d) Restrictions or a prohibition on contact or communication with witnesses or victims of the crime
committed by the probationer.
(h) Payment of restitution.
(i) Payment of fines and court costs.
(j) Supervised community service.
(k) Participation in educational courses.
2. A surety shall:
(a) Provide the facilities or equipment necessary to:
(1) Perform tests to determine whether the probationer is using any controlled substance or alcohol, if
the court requires such tests as a condition of probation;
(2) Carry out a Program of Intensive Supervision, if the court requires such a Program as a condition
of probation; and
(3) Enable the probationer to report regularly to the surety.
(b) Notify the court within 24 hours after the surety has knowledge of a violation of or a failure to
fulfill a condition of the program of probation.
3. A probationer participating in a program of probation secured by a surety bond shall:
(Added to NRS by 1995, 1245; A 2001 Special Session, 133)
http://www.washoecounty.us/defender/duisent.html That link contains the following, which
provides support (in addition to NRS 176A.310) that the terms of Couglin's probation in
063341 (which is the only probation Couglin is currently subject to given Judge Clifton made
Coughlin's sentence in 065630 run consecutive to Coughlin's sentence in 063341, meaning,
Coughlin's probation incident to the conviction in 065630 (now on appeal in CR13-0614) has yet to
even begin) do not include being Subject To Random Search and Seizure by a Peace Officer any-
more than the do not require Publice Defender Reimbursement.
Upon complying with Judge Sferrazza's 11/20/12 Order to Attend in 063341, which reads:
YOU ARE ORDERED to attend and complete the following: (NOTE: there are box that are not
check for the following: Dui School, Victim Impact Panel, Domestic Violence Program, Anger
Counseling Program, Self Help Meetings, To appaer for Courts Counesling Compliance Program
(CCP), Public Defender Reimbursement, Evaluation, Parenting Class, Restitution) (NOTE: there is a
check in the boxes for the following): Due by; 1-2 years; Alternative Sentencing Division...Report
for Probation by 11/21/2012. Hours Mon.-Thurs. 9:00 AM 3:00 P.M.; Due by; 12/20/2012;
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Other: To obtain a Mental Health Evaluation and provide proof to the Court. YOUARE RESPON-
SIBLE FOR PROVIDING THE COURT WITH YOUR CURRENT ADDRESS WITHIN 10 DAYS
OF ANY CHANGE. YOUARE FURTHER ORDERED to enroll within 10 days and appear alcohol
free.
Upon successful completion, you are responsible for producing a completion certificate to the
Court on or before the due date. Failure to comply with any requirement of your counseling pro-
gram(s) may result in the issuance of a bench warrant for your arrest (A $25.00 late fee will be as-
sessed eo each programs(s) not complete on the due date). DATE this 20
th
day of November, 2012
/s/s PETER J. SFERRAZZA, Justice of the Peace, Department #2.
The sentence imposed upon Couglin by Judge Sferrazza in 063341 not only waived all of the
fees associated with DAS, it did not impose any fine on Couglin either, and gave him credit for all the
time he served in connection with the charge levied (which is difficult to actually discern given the 15
custodial arrests and the various intricacies of which bail applied to what charge, and the 52 days of
incarceration Couglin has been subject to since the 8/20/11 arrest in 063341, incident to which he was
given 8 days credit for his incarceration between 8/20/11 8/26/11 whereupon he was released on his
own recognizance upon the charge being lessened from ooh thats a felony grand larceny (as said
RPD Officer Duralde to Couglin shortly after effecting a custodial arrest at 11 pm in violation of
NRS 171.136) alleging Coughlin larcenized a $80 used iPhone, but still charging Couglin with fel-
ony grand larceny in retaliatoin for Coughlin inquiring about the Hiibel case, Terry Stops, reasonable
suspicion and probable cause, etc., and taking issue with the fact that Duralde (by all indications, ac-
cidentally) touched Coughlin's penis during one of the many Terry Stop weapons check pat downs
that he conducted that night.). Anyways, Judge Sferrazza did not order, as a condition of Coughlin's
probation, that he be subject ot random search and seizure by a peace officer.
The Judgment of Conviction rendered by Judge Sferrazza pursuant to NRS 189.010 from the
bench at the conclusion of the trial in 063341 on 11/20/12 follows, verbatim, in its entirety:
http://www.washoecounty.us/defender/duisent.html The preceding link includes the following:

DUI Sentencing Outline
IF THE DEFENDANT ENTERS A GUILTY PLEA TO A DUI FIRST OR SECOND OFFENSE THEY WILL BE SEN-
TENCED BY THE COURT. GENERALLY, FOR A DUI 1ST OFFENSE, IF THE PERSON IS OVER THE AGE OF 21
AND THEIR BAC IS NOT OVER A 0.18%, THEN THAT PERSON WILL LIKELY BE SENTENCED TO COURT
STANDARDS FOR A DUI 1ST OFFENSE.1 HOWEVER, IF A PERSON'S BAC IS OVER A 0.18%, AND/OR IT IS
THEIR SECOND DUI, THEN THE COURT MAY INCLUDE OR THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY MAY REQUEST THAT
THE DEFENDANT BE SENTENCED TO OTHER REQUIREMENTS, SOME OF WHICH ARE REQUIRED BY LAW.
WHAT FOLLOWS IS AN EXTENSIVE, YET NOT EXHAUSTIVE, LIST OF THE POTENTIAL POSSIBILITIES THAT
THE JUDGE MAY SENTENCE THE DEFENDANT TO AND AN EXPLANATION OF THOSE POSSIBILITIES.
SUSPENDED JAIL SENTENCE BOTH 1ST DUI & 2ND DUI
AS A PART OF THE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE, THE COURT WILL SUSPEND A JAIL SENTENCE RANGING
FROM 30 DAYS WASHOE COUNTY JAIL UP TO 180 DAYS. AS LONG AS THE DEFENDANT COMPLIES WITH
ALL THE COURT'S REQUIREMENTS THEY WILL NOT HAVE TO SERVE ANY PORTION OF THE SUSPENDED
JAIL SENTENCE. HOWEVER, SHOULD A PERSON VIOLATE THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF HIS OR HER
SENTENCE THEN THAT PERSON'S SENTENCE WILL LIKELY BE REVOKED. ONCE REVOKED, THE PERSON
MUST SERVE THE SUSPENDED JAIL SENTENCE. THE SUSPENDED JAIL SENTENCE IS ALWAYS ORDERED BY
THE COURT.
WASHOE COUNTY JAIL
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THE COURT ALWAYS HAS THE DISCRETION TO SENTENCE A PERSON UP TO 6 MONTHS TO THE WASHOE
COUNTY JAIL FOR ALL MISDEMEANOR OFFENSES INCLUDING DUI. ALTHOUGH NO GUARANTEES ARE
MADE, IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT THE COURT WOULD SENTENCE A PERSON TO JAIL AS LONG AS THERE ARE
NO AGGRAVATING FACTORS.
COMMUNITY SERVICE - 1ST DUI ONLY
FOR A FIRST TIME DUI THE DEFENDANT MUST SERVE AT LEAST 48 HOURS COMMUNITY SERVICE. MOST
OF THE TIME, BUT NOT ALWAYS, JUDGES WILL GIVE A PERSON CREDIT TOWARDS COMMUNITY SERVICE IF
TIME WAS SPENT IN JAIL. THERE IS A $25 SIGN UP FEE FOR THE COMMUNITY SERVICE.
JAIL OR HOUSE ARREST - 2ND DUI ONLY
IF THE DEFENDANT IS CONVICTED OR ENTERS A GUILTY PLEA TO A DUI SECOND OFFENSE, THEN HE OR
SHE MUST SERVE AT LEAST 10 DAYS WASHOE COUNTY JAIL OR 20 DAYS HOUSE ARREST. IF THE DE-
FENDANT IS ALLOWED TO DO HOUSE ARREST, THEN HE OR SHE MUST ENSURE THAT A LANDLINE IS IN-
STALLED AT THEIR RESIDENCE. HOUSE ARREST IS SETUP THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF ALTERNATIVE
SENTENCING, DESCRIBED BELOW.
FINES AND COSTS - 1ST DUI ONLY
THE MINIMUM FINES AND COSTS FOR A DUI 1ST OFFENSE RANGE FROM $400 UP TO A MAXIMUM FINE OF
$1,000. THE FINES AND COSTS ALSO INCLUDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE ASSESSMENTS AND CHEMICAL
ANALYSIS FEE OF $115 + $10 + $7 + 60. THE STANDARD FINES AND COSTS FOR A DUI 1ST OFFENSE TO-
TALS $695. IF THE DEFENDANT CANNOT PAY THE TOTAL AMOUNT IN ONE LUMP SUM, THEN HE/SHE MAY
BE ABLE TO GET ON A PAYMENT PLAN COSTING AN ADDITIONAL $50.
FINES AND COSTS - 2ND DUI ONLY
THE MINIMUM FINES AND COSTS FOR A DUI 2ND OFFENSE RANGE FROM$750 UP TO A MAXIMUM OF
$1000. THE FINES AND COSTS ALSO INCLUDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE ASSESSMENTS AND CHEMICAL
ANALYSIS FEE OF $115 + $10 + $7 + 60. THE STANDARD FINES AND COSTS FOR A DUI 2ND OFFENSE TO-
TALS $945. IF THE DEFENDANT CANNOT PAY THE TOTAL AMOUNT IN ONE LUMP SUM, THEN HE/SHE MAY
BE ABLE TO GET ON A PAYMENT PLAN COSTING AN ADDITIONAL $50.
VICTIMIMPACT PANEL - 1ST AND 2ND DUI
UNDER ORDER OF THE COURT, THE DEFENDANT MUST ATTEND ONE VICTIM IMPACT PANEL. THE VIC-
TIM IMPACT PANEL IS DESIGNED TO SHOW HOWDUI'S IMPACT PEOPLES LIVES.
THE VICTIMIMPACT PANEL COSTS ABOUT $40 AND IS GIVEN ONCE A MONTH AT THE LAWLOR EVENTS
CENTER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, RENO. EVERY PERSON IN ATTENDANCE MUST BE DRUG AND
ALCOHOL FREE. FURTHER, IF YOUR DRIVER'S LICENSE WAS REVOKED, DO NOT DRIVE TO THE VICTIMIM-
PACT PANEL.
484 ELECTION - 2ND DUI ONLY
THE 484 PROGRAM HAS BENEFITS AND DISADVANTAGES. THE BENEFIT TO THE 484 ELECTION IS THAT IT
WILL REDUCE THE DEFENDANT'S CONFINEMENT TIME IN HALF. FOR EXAMPLE, IF A PERSON IS SEN-
TENCED TO JAIL HE OR SHE WILL ONLY BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SERVING 5 DAYS WASHOE COUNTY JAIL
INSTEAD OF 10. IF A PERSON IS SENTENCED TO HOUSE ARREST THEN HE OR SHE WILL ONLY BE RESPON-
SIBLE FOR SERVING 10 DAYS HOUSE ARREST INSTEAD OF 20.
THE DISADVANTAGE TO THE 484 ELECTION IS THAT THE COURT WILL HAVE AN ADDITIONAL ONE YEAR
OF JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT. THEREFORE, THE COUNSELING AND ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF
THE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE MAY BE EXTENDED FOR A TOTAL OF 3 YEARS. IF THE PERSON DOES NOT
ELECT UNDER THIS PROGRAM, THEN THE COURT'S JURISDICTION REMAINS AT 2 YEARS. THE 484 ELEC-
TION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ONLY FOR A DUI 2ND OFFENSE, AND BOTH THE COURT AND DISTRICT AT-
TORNEY MUST AGREE TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO ELECT UNDER THE PROGRAM.
COURT COMPLIANCE PROGRAM (ALSO KNOWN AS CCP)
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THIS PROGRAM IS OFFERED ONLY IN RENO JUSTICE COURT. UNDER THE COURT COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
THE DEFENDANT MUST CHECK IN WITH THE COURT EVERY FRIDAY MORNING. IF THE DEFENDANT
DEMONSTRATES TO THE COURT THAT THEY ARE MAKING PROGRESS AND ARE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THEIR SENTENCE THEN THE COURT WILL SIMPLY GIVE THAT PERSON AN
EARLY OUT. HOWEVER, SHOULD A PERSON MISS A COURT APPEARANCE, NOT ATTEND A COUNSELING
SESSION, HAVE A DIRTY TEST, OR VIOLATE THE TERMS OF THEIR SENTENCE, THEN THEY MUST APPEAR
BEFORE THE JUDGE AND EXPLAIN WHY THEIR SENTENCE SHOULD NOT BE REVOKED.
DEPARTMENT OF ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING (ALSO KNOWN AS DAS)
DAS IS A MISDEMEANOR PROBATIONARY AGENCY CHARGED WITH SUPERVISING THOSE WHO ARE SEN-
TENCED BY THE COURT. IF THE COURT ORDERS A PERSON TO BE SUPERVISED BY DAS, THEY WILL BE
REQUIRED TO SUBJECT THEMSELVES TO THE CONDITIONS OF HIS OR HER PROBATION, BE REQUIRED TO
CHECK IN, AND PROVIDE DAILY DRUG TESTS. THE DEFENDANT WILL BE REQUIRED TO REPORT IN PERSON,
ALCOHOL AND DRUG FREE, TO DAS THE NEXT WORKING DAY AFTER HIS OR HER CONVICTION, BETWEEN
THE HOURS OF 8:30 A.M. AND 4:00 P.M. DAS IS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HOUSE ARREST PROGRAM.
THE DEFENDANT WILL ALSO BE REQUIRED TO PAY SUPERVISION FEES AND WILL BE SUBJECT TO WAR-
RANTLESS SEARCH/SEIZURE OF HIS OR HER PERSON, VEHICLE, AND/OR RESIDENCE. FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH ANY OF THE DAS PROVISIONS MAY RESULT IN A WARRANT OF ARREST.
DAS IS LOCATED AT:
350 SOUTH CENTER STREET, FIRST FLOOR
RENO, NV89501
OFFICE: (775) 325-6883
FAX: (775) 325-6850
IGNITION INTERLOCK DEVICE
AN IGNITION INTERLOCK DEVICE IS AN IN-CAR ALCOHOL BREATH SCREENING DEVICE THAT IS WIRED
INTO THE VEHICLE'S IGNITION. IT WILL PREVENT A VEHICLE FROM STARTING IF ALCOHOL IS DETECTED
IN A BREATH SAMPLE PROVIDED BY THE DRIVER. THE DEVICE IS LOCATED INSIDE THE VEHICLE, NEAR
THE DRIVER'S SEAT. BEFORE STARTING THE VEHICLE, THE DRIVER MUST BLOW INTO THE DEVICE. IF THE
DEVICE DETECTS ALCOHOL, THE VEHICLE WILL NOT START. THE DRIVER WILL BEAR ALL COSTS OF THE
IGNITION INTERLOCK UNIT. THE COST TO HAVE THE DEVICE INSTALLED ALONG WITH INSPECTION AND
MAINTENANCE FEES ARE DETERMINED BY THE VENDOR.
COURTS WILL ORDER THE DEFENDANT TO INSTALL THE IGNITION INTERLOCK DEVICE WHERE THE DE-
FENDANT'S BREATH OR BLOOD ALCOHOL LEVEL IS ABOVE A 0.18. THE DEFENDANT WILL BE REQUIRED
TO INSTALL THE IGNITION INTERLOCK DEVICE UPON OBTAINING THEIR NEVADA DRIVER'S LICENSE.
IGNITION INTERLOCK SERVICE PROVIDERS:
ALCOHOL DETECTION SYSTEM, INC. 1-888-786-7384
CONSUMER SAFETY TECHNOLOGY, INC. 1-877-777-5020
DRAEGER SAFETY 1-800-332-6858
SMART START OF NEVADA 1-800-880-3394
VIOLATE NO LAWS
SHOULD THE DEFENDANT GET CHARGED WITH A NEW CRIMINAL OFFENSE THEY WILL BE SUBJECT TO
HAVING THEIR SENTENCE REVOKED. THEREFORE, THE DEFENDANT MUST STAY OUT OF TROUBLE AND
OBEY ALL LAWS.
NOT CONSUME OR POSSESS ALCOHOL OR UNAUTHORIZED DRUGS
THE JUDGE CAN ORDER THE DEFENDANT NOT TO POSSES OR CONSUME ALCOHOL AND/OR NON-
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS. THEREFORE, SHOULD THE DEFENDANT PROVIDE A DIRTY TEST TO HIS COUNSELOR
OR DAS THEN HIS OR HER SENTENCE MAY BE REVOKED.
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SUBJECT TO RANDOMSEARCH AND SEIZURE BY A PEACE OFFICER
THE DEFENDANT'S SUSPENDED SENTENCE MAY BE CONDITIONED UPON THE DEFENDANT GIVING UP CER-
TAIN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. SPECIFICALLY, THE DEFENDANT MAY BE SUBJECT TO SUBMIT HIS OR HER
PERSON, VEHICLE AND RESIDENCE TO SEARCH AND SEIZURE BY ANY PEACE OFFICER ANY TIME OF DAY
OR NIGHT WITHOUT BENEFIT OF WARRANT OR PROBABLE CAUSE.
SUBJECT TO RANDOM TESTING BY PEACE OFFICER
THE DEFENDANT'S SUSPENDED SENTENCE MAY BE CONDITIONED UPON A PEACE OFFICER REQUESTING
THAT THE DEFENDANT SUBMIT TO RANDOM DRUG TESTING ANY TIME OF THE DAY OR NIGHT, WITH OR
WITHOUT A WARRANT, AT THE REQUEST OF ANY PEACE OFFICER.
FOLLOWSUBSTANCE ABUSE COUNSELOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS
WHILE ATTENDING COUNSELING, THE DEFENDANT MAY BE REQUIRED TO FOLLOW THE SUBSTANCE
ABUSE COUNSELOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE COUNSELOR REQUIRES THE DEFEND-
ANT TO ATTEND ALCOHOLIC ANONYMOUS ("AA") CLASSES, THEN THE DEFENDANT MUST ATTEND AA
CLASSES.
SCRAM
THE SCRAMIS AN ANKLE BRACELET WHICH MONITORS A PERSON'S ALCOHOL CONTENT 24 HOURS A
DAY. THE SCRAMNOT ONLY HAS THE ABILITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER A PERSON HAS CONSUMED
ALCOHOL, BUT WHETHER A PERSON HAS TAMPERED WITH THE DEVICE. IF EITHER OF THESE THINGS OC-
CURS, THEN IT COULD BE A POTENTIAL VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE AND HE OR SHE MAY
GET REVOKED. QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SCRAMSHOULD BE DIRECTED TO INTERCEPT AT (775)
323-8273, 501 CASAZZA DR, RENO, NV 89502 OR CONTACT DAS.
PUBLIC DEFENDER REIMBURSEMENT
THE COURT MAY ORDER A DEFENDANT TO PAY ALL OR ANY PART OF THE EXPENSES INCURRED BY THE
COUNTY. GENERALLY, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER REIMBURSEMENT FEE RANGES FROM $0 TO $250 OR
MORE. THE DEFENDANT MUST CONTACT WASHOE COUNTY COLLECTION DIVISION, (77) 328-2552, P.O.
BOX 11130/1001 E 9TH ST. ROOMD-120, RENO, NV89512. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE, A PERSON CAN
NOT BE CRIMINALLY PENALIZED FOR NOT PAYING THEIR PUBLIC DEFENDER FEE. HOWEVER, THE COUN-
TY MAY PURSUE PAYMENT IN A CIVIL COURT OF LAW.
1COURT STANDARDS FOR DUI 1ST OFFENSE: 30 TO 90 DAYS WASHOE COUNTY JAIL SUSPENDED;
FINES AND COSTS TOTALING $695; 48 HOURS OF JAIL OR COMMUNITY SERVICE; VICTIM IMPACT PANEL;
DUI CLASSES; AND REVOCATION OF DRIVER'S LICENSE FOR 90 DAYS. COURT STANDARDS FOR DUI 2ND
OFFENSE: 180 DAYS WASHOE COUNTY JAIL SUSPENDED; FINES AND COSTS TOTALING $945; 10 DAYS
JAIL OR 20 DAYS HOUSE ARREST; DUI CLASSES DEPENDING ON EVALUATION; VICTIMIMPACT PANEL;
OTHER POSSIBILITIES INCLUDE DEPARTMENT OF ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING/COURT COMPLIANCE
PROGRAM; AND THE INTERLOCK DEVICE.
THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO EXERCISE REASONABLE DILIGENCE IN ATTEMPTING TO SERVE A SUM-
MONS ON A DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH OBTAINING UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS WHILE EMPLOYED, AND
THUS THE ACTION WAS BARRED BY THE TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; THE ONLY ATTEMPT TO
SERVE THE DEFENDANT WAS AT AN ADDRESS WHERE SHE RECEIVED HER UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS BUT
AT WHICH SHE NO LONGER RESIDED, AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT CONCEALED
HER WHEREABOUTS, WHICH COULD EASILY HAVE BEEN ASCERTAINED. STATE V. KING, 103 OHIO APP.
3D 210, 658 N.E.2D 1138 (10TH DIST. FRANKLIN COUNTY 1995).
THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO EXERCISE REASONABLE DILIGENCE IN ATTEMPTING TO SERVE
A SUMMONS ON A DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH OBTAINING UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS WHILE
EMPLOYED, AND THUS THE ACTION WAS BARRED BY THE TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITA-
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TIONS; THE ONLY ATTEMPT TO SERVE THE DEFENDANT WAS AT AN ADDRESS WHERE SHE RE-
CEIVED HER UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS BUT AT WHICH SHE NO LONGER RESIDED, AND THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT CONCEALED HER WHEREABOUTS, WHICH COULD
EASILY HAVE BEEN ASCERTAINED. STATE V. KING, 103 OHIO APP. 3D 210, 658 N.E.2D 1138
(10TH DIST. FRANKLIN COUNTY 1995). DUE DILIGENCE 1 1. DUE DILIGENCE STATE DID NOT
ACT WITH DUE DILIGENCE OR IN GOOD FAITH TO OBTAIN PRESENCE AT TRIAL OF CASINO SE-
CURITY OFFICER WHO WAS ON VACATION AT TIME OF TRIAL, THUS RENDERING OFFICER'S PRE-
LIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY INADMISSIBLE UNDER RELEVANT STATUTES IN GRAND LAR-
CENY AND DRUG POSSESSION PROSECUTION, WHERE STATE NEVER SERVED OFFICER WITH A
SUBPOENA, BUT MERELY SENT SEVERAL SUBPOENAS TO CASINO FOR DISTRIBUTION TO EM-
PLOYEES, AND PROVIDED NO INDICATION THAT IT HAD CALLED OFFICER AT HOME, CALLED HIS
FAMILY OR FRIENDS, OR OTHERWISE ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT HIM TO ENSURE HIS AVAILABIL-
ITY. GRANT V. STATE, 2001, 24 P.3D 761, 117 NEV. 427. CRIMINAL LAW543(2) UNDER
STATUTE GOVERNING ADMISSION OF A WITNESS' PRIOR TESTIMONY, STATE'S ATTEMPTS TO
OBTAIN THE WITNESS'S PRESENCE, FOR PURPOSES OF MEETING GENERAL REQUIREMENT OF FIL-
ING MOTION REQUESTING ADMISSION OF PRIOR TESTIMONY WITHIN 15 DAYS BEFORE TRIAL,
MUST BE IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH DUE DILIGENCE. GRANT V. STATE, 2001, 24 P.3D 761, 117
NEV. 427. CRIMINAL LAW543(1) N. R. S. 174.345, NV ST 174.345(
3914:
THE RMC'S VERONICA LOPEZ (SEE ISSUES RESPECTING THE NON-SERVICE OF THE 11/30/11 OR-
DER PUNISHING SUMMARY CONTEMPT IN RMC 11 CR 22176, AND THE LACK OF ANY CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE THERETO IN THE ROAIN ITS APPEAL CR11-2064) CERTIFIES SOMETHING WHICH IS PATENT-
LY NOT TRUE AND WHICH SHE FAILED TO CORRECT IN THE FILE STAMPED 3/19/13 CERTIFICATE OF
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, WHICH READS:
I, VERONICA LOPEZ, CERTIFY THAT I AM AN EMPLOYEE OF THE RENO MUNICIPAL COURT, DEPARTMENT
FOUR AND HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I PROVIDED THE DOCUMENTS LISTED BELOW TO DEFENDANT
ZACHARYCOUGHLIN. I FURTHER CERTIFY THE DOCUMENTS LISTED BELOW ARE TRUE AND COR-
RECT COPIES OF THE ORIGINAL COURT CASE FILE. THEREAFTER THERE IS NO CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
OR RETURN OF PROCESS OR SUMMONS TO INDICATE IN WHAT MANNER AND WHEN THE RMC'S LOPES
PROVIDED THE DOCUMENTS (SHE FAILS TO SWEAR TO HAVE SERVED SUCH DOCUMENTS AS RE-
QUIRED, AND MENTIONS NOT WHETHER THE RMC MAILED SUCH DOCUMENTS TO COUGHLIN BY BOTH
USPS CERTIFIED MAIL AND BY COPYING SUCH MAILING VIA USPS FIRST CLASS MAIL AS WELL, WHICH
IS REQUIRED, ESPECIALLY GIVEN COUGHLIN'S PREVIOUS NOTICES TO THE RMC AND RCATHAT, FOR A
VARIETY OF REASONS, INCLUDING HIS SHARED MAILBOX, HISTORY OF BEING A VICTIM OF DOMESTIC VI-
OLENCE WHOSE MAILS WHERE INTERFERRED WITH, AND INDIGENCY (RECEIPT OF ONLY A CERTIFIED
MAILING SLIP REQUIRING COUGHLIN TO JOURNEY TO SUNSET STATION POST OFFICE WOULD BE UNDU-
LY BURDENSOME, PARTICULARLY WHERE THERE EXISTS AN A 1/16/13 ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 2013-
01 IN THE ADMINSTRATIVE MATTER OF ZACHARY COUGHLIN WHICH ARGUABLY IS UNLAWFUL AND
WHICH WAS NOT PROPERLY SERVED WHICH PURPORTS TO SUBJECT COUGHLIN TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY
OR INCARCERATION FOR UTILIZING MEANS OF FILING (INCLUDING RMC RULE 5 PERMITTING FAX FILING
AND FAX SERVICE ON GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS) THAT ARE AVAILING TO ALL OTHER LITIGANTS, A
DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS ABSENT NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, AND WHERE NO
NRS 22.030(2) AFFIDAVIT FOR ALLEGED DISTRUBANCES OUTSIDE THE IMMEDIATE PRESENCE OF THE
COURT HAVE EVER BEEN PROVIDED, SIMILAR TO THE 2/27/12 CIRCUMSTANCES WITH THE ALLEGATIONS
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BY MARSHAL HARLEY AS TO DISASSEMBLING A RECORDING DEVICE IN THE RESTROOM VIS A VIS THE
2/28/12 AND 3/12/12 ORDERS IN 11 TR 26800 BY JUDGE HOLMES.
A note affixed to the Certificate of Production of Documents by RMC's Lopez (and the case
is listed as in Department 4, however, it is now in Department 1, and the rationale for such a transfer
need be disclosed to Coughlin, particularly where a conflict or bias, or Judge Howard's standing as a
grievant in NG12-0434,0435 is the basis behind such transfer...further, Coughlin requests an explana-
tion as to the 2/27/12 transfer from Department 1 to Department 3 of the custodial jaywalking arrest
by the RPDupon Richard G. Hill, Esq., complaining in 12 CR 00696).
The production of documents of 3/19/13 is deficient in that is fails to include any of the wit-
ness statements and the Declaration of RPD Yturbide is made without any first hand knowledge on
his part, violating both the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of one's accuser's and NRS
53.045.
The 3/6/13 Summons indicates Coughlin is being charge with a violation of Nevada Revised
Statue 300.350. There is no such statute in NRS. As such, and amending of the Summons and or
Complaint requires a new arraignment, and the 5/25/13 Trial date must be vacated, further, Coughlin
hereby seeks a bifurcation of the TPO and EPO prosecutions in 3913 and 3914 with separate trial
dates, etc.
The Criminal Complaint is contradictory to the Declaration purporting to provide probable
cause by RPD Yturbide. The Complaint alleges:
I, Brian Sooudi, Deputy City Attorney, hereby complain that on or about January 17, 2013,
at or near 9456 Double R. Blvd, City of Reno, State of Nevada, the above named defendant
did violate Nevada Revised Statute 300.350 V iolation of a Temporary or Extended Order for
Protection Against Harassment In the Workplace as incorporated through Reno Municipal
Code 1.04.015 to wit: The Reno Justice Court issue an Extended Order for the Protection
Against Harassment in the Workplace on January 4, 2013, with an expiration date of January
4, 2014. The Defendant was served this Order on January 5, 2013, This Order prohibited the
Defendant or an agent of the Defendant from contacting the State Bar of Nevada by any
means including facsimile (fax). On January 17, 2013, the Nevada State Bar received a 371
page fax with a cover page documenting it coming from "zachcoughlin." The City is request-
ing this Court to issue a summons for the above count. The . Defendant was originally arrest-
ed on February 8, 2013, and charged with a gross misdemeanor in Reno Justice Court. The
Washoe County District Attorney's Office indicated that the violation is misdemeanor and since it
occurred within city limits the proper court of jurisdiction is the Reno Municipal Court. Pursuant to
NRS 171.102, I hereby declare upon information and belief and under penalty of perjury that the
foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
The signature below fails to have any identify notation as to whom it belongs to beyond indi-
cating underneath (Complainant).
NRS 171.186 RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT BEFORE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.
NRS 171.188 PROCEDURE FOR APPOINTMENT OF ATTORNEY FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANT.
NRS 171.196 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION: WAIVER; TIME FOR CONDUCTING; POSTPONEMENT;
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES BY DEFENDANT.
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NRS 171.1965 DISCOVERY BY DEFENDANT BEFORE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION; MATERIAL SUB-
JECT TO DISCOVERY; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PERMIT DISCOVERY.
NRS 171.197 USE OF AFFIDAVIT AT PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION: WHEN PERMITTED; NOTICE BY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY; CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH DISTRICT ATTORNEY MUST PRODUCE PERSON WHO
SIGNED AFFIDAVIT; CONTINUANCES.
WARRANTOR SUMMONS UPONCOMPLAINT
NRS 171.102 COMPLAINT DEFINED; OATH OR DECLARATION REQUIRED.
NRS 171.106 ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OR SUMMONS UPON COMPLAINT OR CITATION.
NRS 171.112 CONTENTS OF SUMMONS.
NRS 171.114 EXECUTION OF WARRANT AND SERVICE OF SUMMONS: BY WHOM.
NRS 171.116 WHEN MAGISTRATE MAY DEPUTE PERSON TO ACT AS CONSTABLE.
NRS 171.118 EXECUTION OF WARRANT AND SERVICE OF SUMMONS: TERRITORIAL LIMITS.
NRS 171.122 MANNER IN WHICH EXECUTION OF WARRANT AND SERVICE OF SUMMONS ARE
MADE; I
NOTHING IN THE COMPLAINTS SUFFICES TO ALLEGE THE JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITES NECES-
SARY TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUMMONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS PROSECUTION IN LGIHT OF:
NRS 171.010 JURISDICTION OF OFFENSE COMMITTED IN STATE.
NRS 171.015 Jurisdiction of offense commenced without, but consummated within, this State;
consummation through agent.
NRS 171.108 CONTENTS OF WARRANT OF ARREST. THE WARRANT OF ARREST IS AN OR-
DER IN WRITING IN THE NAME OF THE STATE OF NEVADA WHICH SHALL:
1. BE SIGNED BY THE MAGISTRATE WITH THE MAGISTRATES NAME OF OFFICE;
2. CONTAIN THE NAME OF THE DEFENDANT OR, IF THE DEFENDANTS NAME IS UNKNOWN, ANY
NAME OR DESCRIPTION BY WHICH THE DEFENDANT CAN BE IDENTIFIED WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY;
3. STATE THE DATE OF ITS ISSUANCE, AND THE COUNTY, CITY OR TOWN WHERE IT WAS ISSUED;
4. DESCRIBE THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE COMPLAINT; AND
5. Command that the defendant be arrested and brought before the nearest available magis-
trate.
Further, pursuant to Judge Nash Holmes 3/14/12 formal written grievance against Coughlin
mail by the RMC to the SBN
Judge Holmes' 3/14/12 greivance against Coughlin hand delivered to the SBN along with a box of
materials reads:
...This letter constitutes a formal complaint of attorney misconduct and/or disability against
Zachary Barker Coughlin. The accompanying box of materials demonstrates some of the problems
with the practice of this attorney being experienced by myself and the other three judges in Reno
Municipal Court. My two most recent Orders in what should be a simple traffic citation case are self-
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explanatory and are included, together with copies of massive documents Mr. Coughlin has faxfiled
to our court in this case. Audio recordings of two of my hearings in this matter are also included. He
failed to appear for the second one this past Monday.
I have another traffic case pending trial with him that was re-assigned to me based on our De-
partment 1 judge being out for surgery. We have multiple addresses for Mr. Coughlin and can't seem
to locate him between cases very easily. We are setting that case for trial and attempting to serve him
at the most recent address we have (1422 E. 9th St. #2 Reno NY 89512), although I heard today he
may be living in his vehicle somewhere. We do have an address for his mother, however, as she re-
cently posted part of a fine for him.
Judge Ken Howard, Department 4, had a case on Mr. Coughlin late last year that is now on
appeal to the Second Judicial District Court. Judge Bill Gardner, Department 2, also has a matter cur-
rently pending in his court with Mr. Coughlin as the defendant. I have enclosed some copies of doc-
uments from those matters, in chronological order, simply because they appear to demonstrate that he
is quickly decompensating in his mental status. Our staff also made you some audio tapes of Cough-
lin in the matters in Departments 2 and 4 so you can hear for yourself how this attorney acts in court.
You can see his behavior in my traffic citation case does not appear to be an isolated incident.
It is my understanding that Reno Justice Court also has a matter pending on this attorney. My
Judicial Assistant was contacted by the Washoe Public Defender in February when I had Mr. Cough-
lin jailed for Contempt of Court and they stated that they represent him in a Gross misdemeanor
matter in RJC. I have no other information on that.
You will have the full cooperation of myself, the other judges, and the staff of Reno Munici-
pal Court in your pursuit of this matter. Mr. Coughlin has positioned himself as a vexatious litigant in
our court, antagonizing the staff and even our pro temp judges on the most simple traffic and misde-
meanor matters. I do think this is a case of some urgency, and I apologize for taking two days to get
this package to you; our IT person was ill and could not make the copies of the audios of Mr. Cough-
lin's hearings until today, and I felt it was important that the audios be included in the materials to be
considered by the State Bar. On February 27, 2012, Mr. Coughlin told me he was actively practicing
law and had appointments with clients. I do not know if that was true, but if so, he could be causing
serious harm to the practice of law in Northern Nevada and could be jeopardizing someone's freedom
or property interests. "
For all of King and the Panel's wasting of Coughlin's time to put on his case, making specious
arguments about the certification of the audio recordings (whether those Coughlin was forced to
have his mother buy after Judge Holmes' struck from the record Coughlin's 3/7/12 IFP (and the
SBN's FHE 9 (1784-86) is amongst the most fraudulent pieces of work by any attorney in the State of
Nevada in quite some time, which, obviously, is especially troubling considering it was done by an
Assistant Bar Counsel in conspiracy with one or more judges of a municipal court. The big deal is
that page 1 of 3 of that fax filed document (Coughlin's
The Complaint, at R3, really does not provide anywhere near enough specifics regardign facts
or legal basis or theories in support thereof sufficient to support the Panel's FOFCOL's in that regard,
where the Complaitns reads:
17. Respondent filed Affidavits of Poverty in Support of his Motion to Proceed Informa
Pauperis, wherein he fails to disclose that he is a licensed attorney and instead under Employment
and Self-Employment he identifies himself as a "Jack of All Trades".
18. Despite a claim of poverty in the above mentioned affidavits, Respondent told the Court that his
incarceration for contempt would adversely affect his clients.
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However, at the Hearing of 11/14/12, King evinced a complete lack of candor to the tribunal
and fairness to opposing party where he offered as an Exhibit a partial document as best, that was a
combination of two different filings. The page 1 of 3 that King omitted therefrom not only evinces
the extent to which Coughlin attempted to obtain a copy of the audio transcript of the 2/27/12 Hear-
ing in which Judge Holmes found him in direct contempt and summarily sentenced him to 5 days in-
carceration, but also, as indicated in the third page of R1784-86. The Certificate of Service on r1784
reveals that FH9 at 1786 is an impartial version of an Order by Judge Nash Holmes and a Motion to
Proceed on Appeal IFP and Request for Audio by Coughlin that Judge Holmes attached to her Order
String the same.
Further, the Summons in 3913 and 3914 was issued by Department 2 Administrative Judge
William Gardner, whom is disqualified from makign such a rulign given his grievant statuts against
Couglin in SBN v. Coughlin NG12-0434, and NG12-0435 and the various NRS 1.230 disqualifica-
tions motions to which no responding affidavit has been filed, despite the requirement for such. The
evident partiality demonstrated on 2/2/12 in Judge W. Gardner failign to disclose his brother sister
familial relations in RMC 11 CR 26405 with 2JDC Judge Linda Gardner or his having been passed
her 4/13/09 Order After Trial in DV08-01168 calls for setting aside the summons and disqualifying
the RMC in toto, as does Washoe Legal Services's Director Paul Elcano's close relationship with both
Linda and William Garnder, and Coughlin's suing WLS in CV11-01955.
37. MANDAMUS
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF IS AVAILABLE TO CHALLENGE AN ORDER DENYING MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE
OF PROCESS.
RULES APP.PROC., RULE 21(B). CARIAGA V. EIGHTH JUDICIAL DIST. COURT OF STATE, 1988, 762
P.2D 886, 104 NEV. 544
ALL REPRODUCTIONS OF LETTERS OR FILINGS HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT COPIES THEREON, SUCH
AS THE FOLLOWING 1/14/12 WRITEN GRIEVANCE NG12-0204 BY RICHARD HILL TO THE SBN'S OBC.
FURTHER, JUDGE W. GARDNER CONVICTIO OF COUGLIN 26405 SHOULD BE SET ASIDE GIVEN THE MAN-
DATORY STAY REQUIRED BY NRS 40.384 AND THE VOIDNESS OF THE VARIOUS EVICTION ORDERS IN
RJC REV11-001708 IN LIGHT OF COUGHLIN'S SO FILING AND DEPOSITING THE REQUISITE $250 PRIOR TO
SUCH LOCKOUT.
Void judgment
For judgment to be void, there must be defect in court's authority to enter judgment through
either lack of personal jurisdiction or jurisdiction over subject matter in suit. Gassett v.
Snappy Car Rental, 1995, 906 P.2d 258, 111 Nev. 1416.
In criminal matters, personal jurisdiction is the authority of the court to proceed against a particular
defendant in a criminal action.[FN1] Without personal jurisdiction, the court has no person to hold
accountable.[FN2] If the accused is in a court's jurisdiction, the court has jurisdiction to try the ac-
cused regardless of how the accused was brought into the jurisdiction,[ FN3] except under certain
circumstances.[FN4] The insufficiency of the evidence presented at a probable cause hearing de-
prives a trial court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, rendering moot any subsequent
prosecution and conviction.[FN5] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: Defendant's deportation
or cooperative transfer, but not extradition, from Panama to United States to face indictment charges
for tax fraud did not violate Extradition Treaty to which United States and Panama were signatories,
precluding dismissal of indictment for lack of personal jurisdiction over defendant, under Ker/Frisbie
doctrine, since treaty did not mandate extradition as exclusive means for one signatory to obtain
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criminal defendant or fugitive from territory of other signatory, did not curtail prerogative of Panama
to deport United States citizens, and did not bar signatories from informally cooperating with each
other. U.S. v. Struckman, 611 F.3d 560 (9th Cir. 2010). A court obtains personal jurisdiction over a
criminal defendant by the service of a sum-mons and complaint or by arrest. Rules Crim.Proc. Rule
4. State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752 (Alaska 2011). [END OF SUPPLEMENT] [FN1] People v. Posey, 32
Cal. 4th 193, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 551, 82 P.3d 755 (2004). [FN2] State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 91 P.3d
1127 (2004). [FN3] U.S. v. Lussier, 929 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1991); Morrison v. State, 280 Ga. 222, 626
S.E.2d 500 (2006) (trial court has jurisdiction to oversee criminal prosecution of even those defend-
ants who were forcibly removed from another state and brought into Georgia court, who were illegal-
ly arrested or detained without a showing of probable cause, and who were unlawfully or irregularly
extradited by the state). As to waiver of jurisdiction, see 437. [FN4] State v. Miller, 257 Kan. 844,
896 P.2d 1069 (1995) (accused was tortured by law enforcement personnel). As to the right to try
person brought within jurisdiction illegally, see 440. [FN5] State v. Boyd, 214 Conn. 132, 570 A.2d
1125 (1990).
NRS CHAPTER 33 - INJUNCTIONSNR
ORDERS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN WORKPLACE
NRS 33.200 Definitions.
NRS 33.210 Employee defined.
NRS 33.220 Employer defined.
NRS 33.230 Order for protection against harassment in the workplace defined.
NRS 33.240 Acts that constitute harassment in workplace.
NRS 33.250 Verified application for temporary order; contents of application.
NRS 33.260 Notice of intent to seek order to be provided to known target of harassment.
NRS 33.270 Requirements for issuance of temporary or extended order; expiration; right to
challenge temporary order; award of costs and attorneys fees to prevailing party; interlocutory ap-
peal of extended order.
NRS 33.280 Effect of temporary or extended order; court may not issue order against more
than one person; contents of order.
NRS 33.290 Order does not preclude other action.
NRS 33.300 Transmittal of copy of order to law enforcement agency; service and enforce-
ment of order; issuance of copies of order.
NRS 33.310 Registration of order; effect of registration; duty of court clerk to maintain rec-
ord of registered order.
NRS 33.320 Arrest of person who violates order; service of order; duty to note date and time
of service on copy of order issued to employer.
NRS 33.330 Immunity for certain persons who enforce or refuse to enforce order.
NRS 33.340 Employer immune from civil liability under certain circumstances; use of ac-
tions taken and statements made by employer.
NRS 33.350 penalty for intentional violation of order.
NRS 33.360 Limitations on effect of provisions.
F
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For some reason, WCDA DDA Young felt the need to creat his 3/4/13 Amended Memoran-
dum addressed to RPD Detective Ytrubide as to the TPO and EPO charge. Of course Young took a
see no evil, hear no evil approach to the ridiculous overcharging by Yturbide, or the fact that
Young was prosecuting Coughlin and in trial at that very time in RJC RCR12-065630, a matter that
involved extensively the interplay between the RPD and their wives working as 911 operations or
Emergency Dispatch at ECOMM, and the fact that RPD Detective Yturbide's wife is an ECOMM
Emergency Dispatcher (similar to RPD Stegmaier and ECOMM's Stegmaier). Young's 3/4/13
Amended Memorandum softens up the statements, though, made in his 2/28/13 No-Issue Memoran-
dum indicating: Please be advised that no criminal complaint will issue in the above referenced
case. Refer to the Reno City Attorney. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact
me. Sincerely...By /s/ Zach Young Deputy District Attorney. Atop that Amended Memorandum is
interlineated RPC2013-4580.
THE LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR RPDDETECTIVE YTURBIDE TO HAVE COUGHLIN ARRESTED
IS FURTHER EVIDENCED WHERE ON PAGE 2 OF 4 OF THE 1/4/13 EPO, THE VERSION FAXED TO RPD
YTURBIDE, WHICH HE THEN PROVIDED TO THE RCA, WHICH THEN, IN A 2/21/13 MEMORANDUM BY
RCASOOUDI (WHO LATER CLAIMED TO COUGHLIN THAT HE DIDN'T FEEL THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE
TO FILE THE CASE, BUT THAT HIS SUPERIOR, CHIEF DANIEL WONG, ESQ., WAS MAKING HIM DO SO)
SENT TO THE RMC REQUESTED A SUMMONS. THAT MEMORANDUM READS: FROM: BRIAN SOOUDI,
DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY...ATTACHED PLEASE FIND THE ORIGINAL CRIMINAL COMPLAINT(S), ARREST
WARRANT/SUMMONS
AND AN UNSWORN DECLARATION. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE CONTACT ME.THANK YOU FOR
YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER.
COUGHLIN HAS A RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSER'S AN NOTHING IN KING'S TPOAPPLICATION
SPECIFIES JUST WHICH EMPLOYEES OF THE SBNSUCH PROTECTION ORDERS WERE DESIGNED TO PRO-
TECT, AND FURTHER, KING SHOWED UP AS COUNSEL SO AS TO KING, AND AS TO THE FAILURE TO AP-
PEAR OF THOSE THE SBNFAILED TO LIST AS THE PARTIES TO BE PROTECTED, THE EPOIS VOID.
KING'S 12/20/12 TPOAPPLICATION IN 607 IS LESS THAN TRUTHFUL. ONE, AT PAGE 4 OF 6, IT
FAILS TO IDENTIFY A TPOAPPLCIATION BY RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., AGAINST COUGHLIN WHERE KING,
PETERS, AND THE SBNWERE MADE WELL AWARE OF SUCH BY COUGHLIN, AND EVEN PROVIDED BOTH
THE ORDER IN RCP 2012-000018 AND HILL'S LIED FILLED 1/12/12 TPOAPPLICATION THEREIN, WHERE
SUCH INFORMATION IS REQUIRED TO BE INCLUDED PURSUANT TO QUESTION 1(B). THE COMPLICITY BE-
TWEEN NNDBMEMBER HILL AND KING RUNS THROUGHOUT COUGHLIN'S FORMAL DISCIPLINARY MAT-
TER, AND KING'S FAILURE TO DIVULGE THIS INFORMATION, ESPECIALLY AS IT RELATES TO HILL, IS
TROUBLING.
ADDITIONALLY (AND THIS IS IRONIC CONSIDERING KING HAS ATTEMPTED TO HAVE COUGHLIN
PERMANENTLY DISBARRED INCIDENT TO HIS OWN FRAUDULENT ALLEGATION THAT COUGHLIN FILED
IFP'S IN THE RMC WITHOUT IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS AN ATTORNEY), AT PAGE 5 OF 6 KING FAILS TO
TRUTHFULLY AND COMPLETELY ANSWER QUESTION 8 THEREIN, WHICH READS: 8. HAVE THERE BEEN
ANY OTHER COURT ACTIONS OR ANY OTHER RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE EMPLOYER AND THE AD-
VERSE PARTY? KING CHECK THE 'YES BOX. IN THE BLANK FOLLOWING IF YES, PLEASE DESCRIBE:
KING WROTE DISCIPLINE HEARING HELD 11/14/2012. KING COMPLETELY FAILS TO INDICATE THAT
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THERE IS ANOTHER ACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THAT THE APPEAL OF THE 12/14/12 FOFCOL IS
NOW BEFORE THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT IN 62337 (WHICH WOULD NECESSARILY, AND OBVIOUSLY
INVOLVE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THESE TWO PARTIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNSEL, MAKING
RJC JUDGE PEARSON'S TPOA DISTRUBINGLY OVERBROAD ORDER THAT HAS VERY TROUBLING LACK OF
REGARD FOR COUGHLIN'S RIGHTS AS A LITIGANT IN TWO DIFFERENT CASES WHEREIN THE SBNIS THE
OPPOSING PARTY, BOTH OF WHICH IMPLICATE AN EXTREMELY VALUABLE AND PRIMARY PROPERTY
RIGHT TO COUGHLIN, HIS LAW LICENSE. FURTHER, KING'S SIMPLY NATING DISCIPLINE HEARING HELD
11/14/2012 COMPETELY FAILS TO INFORM THE COURT AS TO THE FACT THAT THERE WAS AN ONGOING
TRIAL COURT CASE BETWEEN THESE TWO PARTIES, WITH THE SBNOPERATING IN AT LEAST A DUAL
ROLE AS BOTH THE PROSECUTOR AND THE SITUS OF THE COURT, AND THE CLERK OF COURT'S LOCA-
TION. THIS GOES TO THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM CURRENTLY IN NEVADA WHERE THE SBNCANNOT BE
TRUSTED TO WEAR SO MANY HATS, WHERE KING AND PETERS HAVE BLATANTLY ABUSED THE PUBLIC'S
TRUST IN THAT REGARD AND SOUGHT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CURRENT STRUCTURE AT EVERY
POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY, SOMETHING THE NNDBAND PANEL HERE HAVE BEEN ENTIRELY TOO PERMIS-
SIVE WITH REGARD TO, WHICH IS TROUBLING CONSIDERING ALL THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE
GRIEVANTS IN THE THREE GREIVANCES NUMBER LISTED ON THE 8/23/12 COMPLAINT BY THE SBNAND
THE MEMBERS OF THE PANEL (HILL IS ON THE CITY OF RENO'S CITIZEN'S ADVISORY BOARD, JUDGE
NASH HOLMES WENT TO LAW SCHOOL WITH WASHOE LEGAL SERVICES PAUL ELCANO (WHOM ALLEGES
THAT HE IS CLOSE PERSONAL FRIENDS WITH 2JDC JUDGE LINDA GARDNER, ORLICH, AND RMC JUDGE
W. GARDNER IS DIVORCED FROMORLICH AND THE BROTHER OF LINDA GARDNER) AND PANEL MEM-
BER KENT, ALONG WITH RMC JUDGE HOWARD, CHIEF RCAWONG, ELCANO AND PANEL CHAIR
ECHEVERRIA WENT TO STANFORD AND RENO HIGH TOGETHER AND ADMIT TO BEING BOYHOOD
CHUMS
The 12/20/12 TPO in 607 (the alleged violation of which became 13 CR 3913 in the RMC)
reads:
TEMPORARYORDER FOR PROTECTIONAGAINSTHARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
(NRS 33.270) DATE ISSUED: 12/20/12 EXPIRATION DATE: 1/4/13
WARNING: THIS IS AN OFFICIAL COURT ORDER. IF YOU DISOBEY THIS ORDER, YOU MAY BE
ARRESTED AND PROSECUTED FOR THE CRIME OF VIOLATING AN ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE AND ANY OTHER CRIME THAT YOU MAY HAVE COMMITTED IN DISO-
BEYING THIS ORDER. AN INTENTIONAL VIOLATION OF A TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION
AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE IS A MISDEMEANOR, UNLESS A MORE SEVERE PENALTY IS
PRESCRIBED BY LAW FOR THE ACT THAT CONSTITUTES THE VIOLATION OF THE ORDER. UNDER NRS
193.150, A MISDEMEANOR IS PUNISHABLE BY IMPRISONMENT IN THE COUNTY JAIL FOR NOT MORE THAN
6 MONTHS, OR BY A FINE OF NOT MORE THAN $1,000.00, OR BY BOTH FINE AND IMPRISONMENT.
PURSUANT TONRS 193.166, IF THE ACT THAT CONSTITUTES THE VIOLATION OF A PROTEC-
TION ORDER IS ITSELF A FELONY, THE VIOLATOR SHALL, IN ADDITION TO THE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT
PRESCRIBED BY STATUTE FOR THE CRIME, BE PUNISHED BY IMPRISONMENT IN THE STATE PRISON FOR A
MINIMUM TERM OF NOT LESS THAN 1 YEAR AND A MAXIMUM TERM OF NOT MORE THAN 20 YEARS.
YOUARE FURTHER NOTIFIEDTHAT YOUCANBE ARRESTEDEVEN IF THE PERSON WHO
OBTAINED THE ORDER INVITES OR ALLOWS YOUTO CONTACT THEM. YOU HAVE THE SOLE RESPONSIBIL-
ITY TO AVOID OR REFRAIN FROM VIOLATING THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER. ONLY THE COURT CAN
CHANGE THE ORDER UPON WRITTEN APPLICATION.
AN APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT TO NRS 33.270 HAVING BEEN FILED BY, OR ON BE-
HALF OF, THE ABOVE-NAMED EMPLOYER, AND THE COURT HAVING REVIEWED SAID APPLICATION, AND
HAVING REVIEWED FACTS AND ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE COURT, AND THE
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COURT HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES AND THE SUBJECT MATTER, AND SUFFICIENT REPRE-
SENTATIONS HAVING BEEN MADE THAT YOU, THE ADVERSE PARTY, HAVE THREATENED AND/OR COM-
MITTED HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, AND GOOD CAUSE APPEARING THEREFORE, THE COURT
HEREBY FINDS:
NOTICE FINDINGS
(A CHECK OR X WAS PLACED IN THIS BOX) THE ADVERSE PARTY HAD ADVANCE NOTICE
ABOUT THE APPLICATION FOR THIS TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN
THE WORKPLACE.
ITIS HEREBYORDEREDTHAT THE TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HAR-
ASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE IS GRANTED.
ITIS FURTHER ORDEREDTHAT YOU, THE ADVERSE PARTY, ARE PROHIBITED, EITHER DI-
RECTLY OR THROUGH AN AGENT, FROM CONTACTING, INTIMIDATING, USING, ATTEMPTING TO USE, OR
THREATENING THE USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE, OR OTHERWISE INTERFERING IN ANY WAY WITH THE EM-
PLOYER, AN EMPLOYEE OF THE EMPLOYER WHILE THE EMPLOYEE IS PERFORMING HIS DUTIES OF EM-
PLOYMENT, AND ANY PERSON WHILE THE PERSON IS PRESENT AT THE WORKPLACE OF THE EMPLOYER,
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, IN PERSON, BY TELEPHONE, THROUGH THE MAIL, THROUGH ELEC-
TRONIC MAIL (E-MAIL), FACSIMILE (FAX), OR THROUGH ANOTHER PERSON.
ITIS FURTHER ORDEREDTHAT YOUSTAY AWAY FROM THE WORKPLACE OF THE EMPLOY-
ER, WHEREVER SITUATED WITHIN THE STATE, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING SPE-
CIFIC WORKPLACE ADDRESS(ES): 9456 DOUBLE R BLVD, CITY OF RENO, COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE
OF NEVADA.
ITIS FURTHER ORDEREDTHAT THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS APPLY:
ITIS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS TEMPORARYORDER WILL REMAININEF-
FECT UNTIL 11:59 PMON THE DATE SET FORTHONPAGE 1 UNLESS THE COURTOR-
DERS OTHERWISE. IF AN APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENDED ORDER IS FILED, THIS TEMPORARY OR-
DER WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL THE HEARING ON AN EXTENDED ORDER IS HELD. ITIS FURTHER
ORDEREDTHAT THE CLERK OF THE COURT SHALL TRANSMIT, BY THE END OF THE NEXT BUSINESS
DAY AFTER THIS TEMPORARY ORDER IS ISSUED, A COPY OF THE ORDER, TOGETHER WITH A COPY OF THE
APPLICATION, TO THE FOLLOWING LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES: WASHOE COUNTYSHERIFF,
SPARKS POLICE DEPARTMENT, NEVADAHIGHWAYPATROL, RENOPOLICE DEPART-
MENT, UNR POLICE, &RENO/SPARKS TRIBAL POLICE.
ITIS FURTHER ORDEREDTHAT THE APPROPRIATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY/PROCESS
SERVER PROMPTLY ATTEMPT TO SERVE THIS ORDER, TOGETHER WITH A COPY OF THE APPLICATION UP-
ON THE ADVERSE PARTY, AND UPON SERVICE, FILE PROOF OF SERVICE WITH THE COURT BY THE END OF
THE NEXT BUSINESS DAY AFTER SERVICE IS MADE. SERVICE MUST BE MADE PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.
IF AN APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENDED ORDER HAS BEEN FILED: (THERE IS A CHECK OR X IN
THIS BOX) IT IS FURTHER ORDEREDTHAT A HEARING ON THE ISSUANCE OF AN EXTENDED ORDER
IS SET IN DEPARTMENT 4 AT 8:15 A.M. ON THE 4
TH
DAY OF JANUARY, 2013. THIS TEMPORARYOR-
DER REMAINS INEFFECT UNTIL THE HEARINGON THE EXTENDEDORDER HAS BEEN
HELD. (NOTE: THIS HEARINGWILL BE HELDWITHIN TEN(10) JUDICIAL DAYS PURSU-
ANT TONRS 33.270(6)(C), UNLESS COMPELLINGREASONS REQUIRE OTHERWISE.)
YOU and YOUR witnesses may approach and enter the Courthouse to attend the hearing but
must stay away from Applicant and Applicants witnesses while approaching, leaving, and within the
Courthouse.
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IF AN EARLIER HEARING DATE IS REQUIRED, THE ADVERSE PARTY MAYAP-
PLY TO THE ABOVE COURT FOR RELIEF. NOTICE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT Any law en-
forcement officer, with or without a warrant, and whether or not a violation occurs in the presence of
the officer, may arrest and take into custody the Adverse Party, when the law enforcement officer has
probable cause to believe that (a) an Order has been issued pursuant to NRS 33.270 against the Ad-
verse Party; (b) the Adverse Party has been served with a copy of the Order; and (c) the Adverse Par-
ty is acting or has acted in violation of the Order. Any law enforcement agency in Nevada may en-
force a Court Order issued pursuant to NRS 33.270 without regard to the county in which the Order
was issued. If a law enforcement officer cannot verify that the Adverse Party was served with a copy
of this Order, the officer shall serve the Adverse Party with a copy of the Order if a copy is available.
IT IS SO ORDERED this ________________ day of ________________________, 20___.
_______________________________________ JUDGE PROOF OF SERVICE UPON THE AD-
VERSE PARTY I, the undersigned, personally served the Adverse Party named above with a copy of
this Temporary Order for Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace, together with a copy of
the Application. ___________________________________________ Signature
___________________________________________ Print Name
___________________________________________ Date of Service
___________________________________________ Time of Service
The 1/4/13 EPO in 607 reads:
EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
(NRS 33.270)
STATE BAR OF NEVADA, Employer vs. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, Adverse Party.
Date Issued January 4
th
2013 Time: 8:30 am Expiration Date: January 4, 2014 Time: 11:59 p.m.
WARNING: This is an official Court Order. If you disobey this Order, you may be arrested and pros-
ecuted for the crime of violating an Order for Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace and
any other crime that you may have committed in disobeying this Order. An intentional violation of an
Extended Order for Protection Against Harassment in the Workplace is a misdemeanor, unless a
more severe penalty is prescribed by law for the act that constitutes the violation of the Order. Under
NRS 193.150, a misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 6
months, or by a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or by both fine and imprisonment.
PURSUANT TONRS 193.166, IF THE ACT THAT CONSTITUTES THE VIOLATION OF A PROTECTION OR-
DER IS ITSELF A FELONY, THE VIOLATOR SHALL, IN ADDITION TO THE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT PRE-
SCRIBED BY STATUTE FOR THE CRIME, BE PUNISHED BY IMPRISONMENT IN THE STATE PRISON FOR A MIN-
IMUM TERM OF NOT LESS THAN 1 YEAR AND A MAXIMUM TERM OF NOT MORE THAN 20 YEARS.
YOUARE FURTHER NOTIFIEDTHAT YOUCAN BE ARRESTEDEVEN IF THE PERSON WHO OB-
TAINED THE ORDER INVITES OR ALLOWS YOU TO CONTACT THEM. YOUHAVE THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY
TO AVOID OR REFRAIN FROM VIOLATING THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER. ONLY THE COURT CAN CHANGE
THE ORDER UPON WRITTEN APPLICATION.
THE COURT HAVING CONSIDERED THE FILINGS, TESTIMONY (IF APPLICABLE) AND EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AT HEARING, AND THE COURT HAVING FOUND THAT THE ADVERSE PARTY RECEIVED NO-
TICE OF HEARING AT WHICH SUCH PERSON HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE AND BE HEARD, AND
THE ADVERSE PARTY WAS NOT PRESENT, AND THE APPLICANT WAS PRESENT, AND WAS REPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL PATRICK OWEN KING AND THE COURT HAVING PROPER JURISDICTION OVER THE PAR-
TIES AND THIS SUBJECT MATTER, AND IT APPEARING TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE COURT THAT
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THE ADVERSE PARTY HAS COMMITTED AND/OR IS COMMITTING OR REMAINS A THREAT TO COMMIT
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE AND GOOD CAUSE APPEARING,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Extended Order for Protection Against Harassment in the
Workplace is granted for the following reasons:
THE COURT HAS FOUND THAT THE EMPLOYERHASPRESENTEDEVI DENCE SUFFI CI ENT TO SUP-
PORT THE GRANTING OF THE APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENDED ORDER OF PROTECTION AGAINST HAR-
ASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE; AND
The Court has found that the Adverse Party knowinglythreatenedtocauseor committedan
act causingbodilyinjurytohimself or another person; and/or damagetothepropertyof another
person; and/or substantial harmtothephysical or mental healthor safetyof aperson.
Other: ______________________________________________________________
ITIS FURTHER ORDEREDTHAT YOU, THE ADVERSE PARTY, ARE PROHIBITED, EITHER DIRECTLY OR
THROUGH AN AGENT, FROM CONTACTING, INTIMIDATING, USING, ATTEMPTING TO USE, OR THREATEN-
ING THE USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE, OR OTHERWISE INTERFERING IN ANY WAY WITH THE EMPLOYER, ANY
EMPLOYEE OF THE EMPLOYER WHILE THE EMPLOYEE IS PERFORMING HIS DUTIES OF EMPLOYMENT, AND
ANY PERSON WHILE THE PERSON IS PRESENT AT THE WORKPLACE OF THE EMPLOYER, INCLUDING, BUT
NOT LIMITED TO, IN PERSON, BY TELEPHONE, THROUGH THE MAIL, THROUGH ELECTRONIC MAIL (E-
MAIL), FACSIMILE (FAX), OR THROUGH ANOTHER PERSON.
ITIS FURTHER ORDEREDTHAT YOUSTAY AWAY FROM THE WORKPLACE OF THE EMPLOYER,
WHEREVER SITUATED WITHIN THE STATE, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING
SPECIFIC WORKPLACE ADDRESS(ES): _________________________________________________
TOWN/CITY OF __________________, COUNTY OF ________________, STATE OF _____________
OTHER: _____________________________________________________________________
ITIS FURTHER ORDEREDTHAT THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS APPLY:
ITIS FURTHER ORDEREDTHAT THE CLERK OF THE COURT SHALL TRANSMIT, BY THE END OF THE
NEXT BUSINESS DAY AFTER THIS EXTENDED ORDER IS ISSUED, A COPY OF THE ORDER, TOGETHER WITH
A COPY OF THE APPLICATION, TO THE FOLLOWING LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES:
ITIS FURTHER ORDEREDTHAT THE APPROPRIATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY/PROCESS SERVER
PROMPTLY ATTEMPT TO SERVE THIS ORDER UPON THE ADVERSE PARTY, AND TO FILE WITH OR MAIL TO
THE CLERK OF THE COURT PROOF OF SERVICE BY THE END OF THE NEXT BUSINESS DAY AFTER SERVICE
IS MADE. SERVICE MUST BE MADE PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
NOTICE TOLAW ENFORCEMENT
ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, WITH OR WITHOUT A WARRANT, AND WHETHER OR NOT A VIOLATION
OCCURS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE OFFICER, MAY ARREST AND TAKE INTO CUSTODY THE ADVERSE PAR-
TY, WHEN THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER HAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT (A)
AN ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUED PURSUANT TO NRS 33.270 AGAINST THE ADVERSE PARTY; (B) THE AD-
VERSE PARTY HAS BEEN SERVED WITH A COPY OF THE ORDER; AND (C) THE ADVERSE PARTY IS ACTING
OR HAS ACTED IN VIOLATION OF THE ORDER.
ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY IN NEVADA MAY ENFORCE A COURT ORDER ISSUED PURSUANT TO
NRS 33.270 WITHOUT REGARD TO THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE ORDER WAS ISSUED.
IF A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER CANNOT VERIFY THAT THE ADVERSE PARTY WAS SERVED WITH A
COPY OF THIS ORDER, THE OFFICER SHALL SERVE THE ADVERSE PARTY WITH A COPY OF THE ORDER IF
A COPY IS AVAILABLE.
ITIS SOORDEREDTHIS ________ DAY OF ________________________, 20___.
___________________________________________
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JUDGE
PROOF OF SERVICE UPONADVERSE PARTY
I, THE UNDERSIGNED, PERSONALLY SERVED THE ADVERSE PARTY NAMED ABOVE WITH A COPY OF THIS
EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE.
___________________________________________
SIGNATURE
___________________________________________
PRINT NAME
___________________________________________
DATE OF SERVICE
___________________________________________
TIME OF SERVICE
EXTENDEDORDER FOR PROTECTIONAGAINSTHARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
(NRS 33.270) THE 12/20/12 EPO IN 607 EXTENDEDORDER FOR PROTECTIONAGAINST
HARASSMENTIN THE WORKPLACE (NRS 33.270
ORDERS FOR PROTECTIONAGAINST HARASSMENTINWORKPLACE
NRS 33.200 DEFINITIONS. AS USED IN NRS 33.200 TO 33.360, INCLUSIVE, UNLESS THE CON-
TEXT OTHERWISE REQUIRES, THE WORDS AND TERMS DEFINED IN NRS 33.210, 33.220 AND 33.230
HAVE THE MEANINGS ASCRIBED TO THEM IN THOSE SECTIONS.
(ADDED TO NRS BY 2001, 2843)
NRS 33.210 EMPLOYEE DEFINED. EMPLOYEE MEANS A PERSON WHO IS EMPLOYED BY AN
EMPLOYER, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
NRS 33.220 EMPLOYER DEFINED. EMPLOYER MEANS A PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYER IN
THIS STATE, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE STATE OF NEVADA, AN AGENCY OF THIS STATE AND
A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THIS STATE.
NRS 33.230 ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE DEFINED.
ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE MEANS AN ORDER ISSUED PUR-
SUANT TO NRS 33.270.
NRS 33.240 ACTS THAT CONSTITUTE HARASSMENT IN WORKPLACE. HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE OCCURS WHEN:
1. APERSON KNOWINGLY THREATENS TO CAUSE OR COMMITS AN ACT THAT CAUSES:
(A) BODILY INJURY TO THE PERSON OR ANOTHER PERSON;
(B) DAMAGE TO THE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER PERSON; OR
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2. THE THREAT IS MADE OR THE ACT IS COMMITTED AGAINST AN EMPLOYER, AN EMPLOYEE OF
THE EMPLOYER WHILE THE EMPLOYEE PERFORMS THE EMPLOYEES DUTIES OF EMPLOYMENT OR A PER-
SON PRESENT AT THE WORKPLACE OF THE EMPLOYER; AND
3. THE THREAT WOULD CAUSE A REASONABLE PERSON TO FEAR THAT THE THREAT WILL BE CAR-
RIED OUT OR THE ACT WOULD CAUSE A REASONABLE PERSON TO FEEL TERRORIZED, FRIGHTENED, INTIM-
IDATED OR HARASSED.
NRS 33.250 VERIFIED APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY ORDER; CONTENTS OF APPLICATION.
1. AN EMPLOYER OR AN AUTHORIZED AGENT OF AN EMPLOYER WHO REASONABLY BELIEVES THAT
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE HAS OCCURRED MAY FILE A VERIFIED APPLICATION FOR A TEMPO-
RARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE AGAINST THE PERSON WHO
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HARASSMENT.
2. THE VERIFIED APPLICATION MUST INCLUDE, WITHOUT LIMITATION:
(A) THE NAME OF THE EMPLOYER SEEKING THE ORDER;
(B) THE NAME AND ADDRESS, IF KNOWN, OF THE PERSON WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HAR-
ASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE; AND
(C) ADETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS THAT ALLEGEDLY CONSTITUTED HARASSMENT IN
THE WORKPLACE AND THE DATES ON WHICH THESE EVENTS OCCURRED.
NRS 33.260 NOTICE OF INTENT TO SEEK ORDER TO BE PROVIDED TO KNOWN TARGET OF HAR-
ASSMENT. IF AN EMPLOYER HAS KNOWLEDGE THAT A SPECIFIC PERSON IS THE TARGET OF HARASS-
MENT IN THE WORKPLACE AND THE EMPLOYER INTENDS TO SEEK A TEMPORARY OR EXTENDED ORDER
FOR PROTECTION AGAINST SUCH HARASSMENT, THE EMPLOYER SHALL MAKE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO
NOTIFY THE PERSON WHO IS THE TARGET OF THE HARASSMENT THAT THE EMPLOYER INTENDS TO SEEK
SUCH AN ORDER.
NRS 33.270 REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY OR EXTENDED ORDER; EXPIRATION;
RIGHT TO CHALLENGE TEMPORARY ORDER; AWARD OF COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES TO PREVAILING
PARTY; INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL OF EXTENDED ORDER.
1. THE COURT MAY ISSUE A TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE IF IT APPEARS TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE COURT FROM SPECIFIC FACTS SHOWN BY A
VERIFIED APPLICATION FILED PURSUANT TO NRS 33.250 THAT HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE HAS
OCCURRED.
2. EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION 4, A TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION
AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE MUST NOT BE ISSUED WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE PERSON WHO
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HARASSMENT. ATEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASS-
MENT IN THE WORKPLACE MUST NOT BE ISSUED WITHOUT THE GIVING OF SECURITY BY THE EMPLOYER
IN AN AMOUNT DETERMINED BY THE COURT TO BE SUFFICIENT TO PAY FOR SUCH COSTS AND DAMAGES
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AS MAY BE INCURRED OR SUFFERED BY THE PERSON WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HARASSMENT IF
THE PERSON WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HARASSMENT IS FOUND TO HAVE BEEN WRONGFULLY
ENJOINED OR RESTRAINED.
3. THE COURT MAY REQUIRE THE EMPLOYER OR THE PERSON WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE
HARASSMENT, OR BOTH, TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COURT BEFORE DETERMINING WHETHER TO ISSUE THE
TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE.
4. ACOURT MAY ISSUE A TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE WITHOUT WRITTEN OR ORAL NOTICE TO THE PERSON WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE
HARASSMENT OR THE PERSONS ATTORNEY ONLY IF:
(A) AVERIFIED APPLICATION IS ACCOMPANIED BY AN AFFIDAVIT THAT CONTAINS SPECIFIC FACTS
WHICH CLEARLY SHOW THAT IMMEDIATE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY, LOSS OR DAMAGE WILL RESULT TO
THE EMPLOYER, AN EMPLOYEE OF THE EMPLOYER WHILE THE EMPLOYEE PERFORMS THE DUTIES OF THE
EMPLOYEES EMPLOYMENT OR A PERSON WHO IS PRESENT AT THE WORKPLACE OF THE EMPLOYER BE-
FORE THE PERSON WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HARASSMENT OR THE PERSONS ATTORNEY CAN
BE HEARD IN OPPOSITION; AND
(B) THE EMPLOYER AND THE EMPLOYERS ATTORNEY, IF ANY, SET FORTH IN THE AFFIDAVIT:
(1) THE EFFORTS, IF ANY, THAT HAVE BEEN MADE TO GIVE NOTICE TO THE PERSON WHO AL-
LEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HARASSMENT; AND
(2) THE FACTS SUPPORTING WAIVER OF NOTICE REQUIREMENTS.
5. ATEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE THAT IS
GRANTED, WITH OR WITHOUT NOTICE, MUST EXPIRE NOT LATER THAN 15 DAYS AFTER THE DATE ON
WHICH THE ORDER IS ISSUED, UNLESS EXTENDED PURSUANT TO SUBSECTIONS 6 AND 7.
6. IF A TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE IS
GRANTED, WITH OR WITHOUT NOTICE, THE EMPLOYER OR THE EMPLOYERS AUTHORIZED AGENT MAY
APPLY FOR AN EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE BY FIL-
ING A VERIFIED APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE. IF SUCH AN APPLICATION IS FILED, THE TEMPORARY ORDER REMAINS IN EFFECT UNTIL THE
HEARING ON THE APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENDED ORDER IS HELD. THE APPLICATION MUST:
(A) IN ADDITION TO THE INFORMATION REQUIRED BY SUBSECTION 2 OF NRS 33.250, SET FORTH
THE FACTS THAT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR GRANTING AN EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE;
(B) BE FILED BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HAR-
ASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE;
(C) BE HEARD AS SOON AS REASONABLY POSSIBLE AND NOT LATER THAN 10 DAYS AFTER THE DATE
ON WHICH THE APPLICATION IS FILED WITH THE COURT UNLESS THE COURT DETERMINES THAT THERE
ARE COMPELLING REASONS TO HOLD THE HEARING AT A LATER DATE; AND
(D) BE DISMISSED IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THE TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE WHICH IS THE BASIS OF THE APPLICATION HAS BEEN DISSOLVED OR
HAS EXPIRED.
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7. AT THE HEARING ON AN APPLICATION FILED PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION 6, THE EMPLOYER MUST
PRESENT EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE GRANTING OF THE APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENDED
ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE. AT THE HEARING, THE COURT
MAY:
(A) DISSOLVE OR MODIFY THE TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE; OR
(B) GRANT AN EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE.
8. IF GRANTED, AN EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORK-
PLACE EXPIRES WITHIN SUCH TIME, NOT TO EXCEED 1 YEAR, AS THE COURT FIXES.
9. UPON 2 DAYS NOTICE TO AN EMPLOYER WHO OBTAINED A TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTEC-
TION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE WITHOUT NOTICE OR ON SUCH SHORTER NOTICE TO
THE EMPLOYER AS THE COURT MAY PRESCRIBE, THE PERSON WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HAR-
ASSMENT MAY APPEAR AND MOVE THE DISSOLUTION OR MODIFICATION OF THE TEMPORARY ORDER FOR
PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE. UPON THE FILING OF SUCH A MOTION, THE
COURT SHALL PROCEED TO HEAR AND DETERMINE THE MOTION AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS THE ENDS OF JUS-
TICE REQUIRE. AT THE HEARING, THE COURT MAY DISSOLVE, MODIFY OR EXTEND THE ORDER.
10. THE COURT MAY AWARD COSTS AND REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE PREVAILING
PARTY IN A MATTER BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION.
11. IF A COURT ISSUES AN EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE, AN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL LIES TO THE DISTRICT COURT, WHICH MAY AFFIRM, MODIFY
OR VACATE THE ORDER IN QUESTION. THE APPEAL MAY BE TAKEN WITHOUT BOND, BUT ITS TAKING
DOES NOT STAY THE EFFECT OR ENFORCEMENT OF THE ORDER.
(ADDED TO NRS BY 2001, 2844; A 2005, 955)
NRS 33.280 EFFECT OF TEMPORARY OR EXTENDED ORDER; COURT MAY NOT ISSUE ORDER
AGAINST MORE THAN ONE PERSON; CONTENTS OF ORDER.
1. ATEMPORARY OR EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORK-
PLACE MAY:
(A) ENJOIN THE PERSON WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HARASSMENT FROM CONTACTING THE
EMPLOYER, AN EMPLOYEE OF THE EMPLOYER WHILE THE EMPLOYEE IS PERFORMING THE EMPLOYEES
DUTIES OF EMPLOYMENT AND ANY PERSON WHILE THE PERSON IS PRESENT AT THE WORKPLACE OF THE
EMPLOYER;
(B) ORDER THE PERSON WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HARASSMENT TO STAY AWAY FROM THE
WORKPLACE OF THE EMPLOYER; AND
(C) ORDER SUCH OTHER RELIEF AS THE COURT DEEMS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE EMPLOYER,
THE WORKPLACE OF THE EMPLOYER, THE EMPLOYEES OF THE EMPLOYER WHILE PERFORMING THEIR DU-
TIES OF EMPLOYMENT AND ANY OTHER PERSONS WHO ARE PRESENT AT THE WORKPLACE.
2. ACOURT MAY NOT ISSUE A TEMPORARY OR EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HAR-
ASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE THAT IS AGAINST MORE THAN ONE PERSON.
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PLACE MUST:
(A) SPECIFY, AS APPLICABLE, THE COUNTY AND CITY, IF ANY, IN WHICH THE WORKPLACE OF THE
EMPLOYER IS LOCATED AND IN WHICH THE EMPLOYEES OF THE EMPLOYER PERFORM THEIR DUTIES OF
EMPLOYMENT;
(B) INCLUDE A PROVISION ORDERING ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER TO ARREST THE PERSON
WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HARASSMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT A WARRANT, IF THE OFFICER HAS
PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE PERSON HAS BEEN SERVED WITH A COPY OF THE ORDER AND
HAS VIOLATED A PROVISION OF THE ORDER;
(C) STATE THE REASONS FOR GRANTING THE ORDER; AND
(D) INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:
WARNING
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL COURT ORDER. IF YOUDISOBEY THIS ORDER, YOU MAY BE ARRESTED AND PROSE-
CUTED FOR THE CRIME OF VIOLATING AN ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORK-
PLACE AND ANY OTHER CRIME THAT YOU MAY HAVE COMMITTED IN DISOBEYING THIS ORDER.
4. In addition to the requirements of subsection 3, if the court granted a temporary order for pro-
tection against harassment in the workplace without notice, the order must:
(A) INCLUDE A STATEMENT THAT THE PERSON WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HARASSMENT IS
ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON THE ORDER PURSUANT TO NRS 33.270;
(B) INCLUDE THE NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE COURT IN WHICH THE PETITION FOR A HEARING MAY
BE FILED;
(C) CONTAIN THE DATE AND HOUR OF ISSUANCE;
(D) BE IMMEDIATELY FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT;
(E) DEFINE THE IRREPARABLE INJURY, LOSS OR DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE HARASSMENT AND
STATE WHY IT IS IRREPARABLE; AND
(F) SET FORTH THE REASONS FOR GRANTING THE ORDER WITHOUT NOTICE.
NRS 33.290 ORDER DOES NOT PRECLUDE OTHER ACTION. ATEMPORARY OR EXTENDED ORDER
FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE IS IN ADDITION TO AND NOT IN LIEUOF
ANY OTHER AVAILABLE CIVIL OR CRIMINAL ACTION. AN EMPLOYER IS NOT BARRED FROM SEEKING AN
ORDER BECAUSE OF OTHER PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
NRS 33.300 TRANSMITTAL OF COPY OF ORDER TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY; SERVICE AND
ENFORCEMENT OF ORDER; ISSUANCE OF COPIES OF ORDER.
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1. ACOURT SHALL TRANSMIT, BY THE END OF THE NEXT BUSINESS DAY AFTER A TEMPORARY OR
EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE IS ISSUED, A COPY OF
THE ORDER TO THE APPROPRIATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY THAT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
WORKPLACE OF THE EMPLOYER OR THE AREAS IN WHICH THE EMPLOYEES OF THE EMPLOYER PERFORM
THEIR DUTIES OF EMPLOYMENT.
2. THE COURT MAY ORDER THE APPROPRIATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY TO SERVE THE PERSON
WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HARASSMENT PERSONALLY WITH THE ORDER IF IT FINDS THAT SUCH
SERVICE IS NECESSARY TO AVOID AN ACT OF VIOLENCE AND TO FILE WITH OR MAIL TO THE CLERK OF
THE COURT PROOF OF SERVICE BY THE END OF THE NEXT BUSINESS DAY AFTER SERVICE IS MADE. SER-
VICE OF AN APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER, THE NOTICE OF HEARING THEREON AND THE ORDER MUST BE
SERVED UPON THE PERSON WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HARASSMENT PURSUANT TO THE NEVADA
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
3. ALAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY SHALL ENFORCE A TEMPORARY OR EXTENDED ORDER FOR PRO-
TECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE WITHOUT REGARD TO THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE
ORDER WAS ISSUED.
4. THE CLERK OF THE COURT THAT ISSUED A TEMPORARY OR EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION
AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE SHALL ISSUE A COPY OF THE ORDER TO THE EMPLOYER WHO
REQUESTED THE ORDER AND THE PERSON WHO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE HARASSMENT.
NRS 33.310 REGISTRATION OF ORDER; EFFECT OF REGISTRATION; DUTY OF COURT CLERK TO
MAINTAIN RECORD OF REGISTERED ORDER.
1. AN EMPLOYER OR AN AUTHORIZED AGENT OF AN EMPLOYER MAY REGISTER A TEMPORARY OR
EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE ISSUED BY THE COURT
OF ANOTHER STATE BY PRESENTING A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE ORDER TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT IN A
JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN WHICH THE EMPLOYER BELIEVES THAT ENFORCEMENT MAY BE NECESSARY.
PLACE THAT IS REGISTERED HAS THE SAME EFFECT AND MUST BE ENFORCED IN LIKE MANNER AS SUCH
AN ORDER ISSUED BY A COURT OF THIS STATE.
3. THE CLERK OF THE COURT SHALL MAINTAIN A RECORD OF EACH ORDER REGISTERED PURSUANT
TO THIS SECTION.
NRS 33.320 ARREST OF PERSON WHO VIOLATES ORDER; SERVICE OF ORDER; DUTY TO NOTE
DATE AND TIME OF SERVICE ON COPY OF ORDER ISSUED TO EMPLOYER.
1. WHETHER OR NOT A VIOLATION OCCURS IN THE PRESENCE OF A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER,
THE OFFICER MAY, WITH OR WITHOUT A WARRANT, ARREST AND TAKE INTO CUSTODY A PERSON IF THE
OFFICER HAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT:
(A) AN ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUED PURSUANT TO NRS 33.270 AGAINST THE PERSON;
(B) THE PERSON HAS BEEN SERVED WITH A COPY OF THE ORDER; AND
(C) THE PERSON IS ACTING IN VIOLATION OF THE ORDER.
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2. IF A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER CANNOT VERIFY THAT THE PERSON WAS SERVED WITH A COPY
OF THE ORDER AND THE OFFICER IS AT THE WORKPLACE OF THE EMPLOYER, THE OFFICER SHALL SERVE
THE PERSON WITH A COPY OF THE ORDER IF A COPY IS AVAILABLE.
3. ALAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WHO SERVES A PERSON WITH A COPY OF AN ORDER PURSUANT
TO SUBSECTION 2 SHALL NOTE THE DATE AND TIME OF SUCH SERVICE ON THE COPY OF THE ORDER THAT
WAS ISSUED TO THE EMPLOYER.
NRS 33.330 IMMUNITY FOR CERTAIN PERSONS WHO ENFORCE OR REFUSE TO ENFORCE ORDER.
1. ACOURT, A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR ANY OTHER PERSON WHO ENFORCES A TEMPO-
RARY OR EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE BASED UPON A
REASONABLE BELIEF THAT THE ORDER IS VALID IS IMMUNE FROM CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR
ANY ACTION TAKEN BASED UPON THAT BELIEF.
2. ACOURT, A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR ANY OTHER PERSON WHO REFUSES TO ENFORCE A
TEMPORARY OR EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE BASED
UPON A REASONABLE BELIEF THAT THE ORDER IS NOT VALID IS IMMUNE FROM CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIA-
BILITY FOR ANY ACTION TAKEN OR NOT TAKEN BASED UPON THAT BELIEF.
3. THE EMPLOYER OF A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WHO ENFORCES A TEMPORARY OR EXTEND-
ED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE BASED UPON A REASONABLE
BELIEF THAT THE ORDER IS VALID OR WHO REFUSES TO ENFORCE SUCH AN ORDER BASED UPON A REA-
SONABLE BELIEF THAT THE ORDER IS NOT VALID IS IMMUNE FROM CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR
ANY ACTION TAKEN OR NOT TAKEN BY THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER BASED UPON THAT BELIEF.
NRS 33.340 EMPLOYER IMMUNE FROM CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES; USE
OF ACTIONS TAKEN AND STATEMENTS MADE BY EMPLOYER.
1. AN EMPLOYER IS IMMUNE FROM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR:
(A) SEEKING A TEMPORARY OR EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE, IF THE EMPLOYER ACTS IN GOOD FAITH IN SEEKING THE ORDER; OR
(B) FAILING TO SEEK A TEMPORARY OR EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT
IN THE WORKPLACE.
2. AN ACTION TAKEN OR A STATEMENT MADE BY AN EMPLOYER PURSUANT TO NRS 33.200 TO
33.360, INCLUSIVE:
(A) SHALL NOT BE DEEMED AN ADMISSION BY THE EMPLOYER OF ANY FACT; AND
(B) MAY BE USED FOR THE PURPOSES OF IMPEACHMENT.
NRS 33.350 PENALTY FOR INTENTIONAL VIOLATION OF ORDER. APERSON WHO INTENTIONAL-
LY VIOLATES A TEMPORARY OR EXTENDED ORDER FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE IS GUILTY OF A MISDEMEANOR, UNLESS A MORE SEVERE PENALTY IS PRESCRIBED BY LAW
FOR THE ACT THAT CONSTITUTES THE VIOLATION OF THE ORDER.
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(ADDED TO NRS BY 2001, 2848; A 2005, 956)
NRS 33.360 LIMITATIONS ON EFFECT OF PROVISIONS. THE PROVISIONS OF NRS 33.200 TO
33.360, INCLUSIVE, DO NOT:
1. MODIFY THE DUTY OF AN EMPLOYER TO PROVIDE A SAFE WORKPLACE FOR THE EMPLOYEES OF
THE EMPLOYER AND OTHER PERSONS PRESENT AT THE WORKPLACE OF THE EMPLOYER;
2. PROHIBIT A PERSON FROM ENGAGING IN ANY CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED EXERCISE OF
FREE SPEECH, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, SPEECH INVOLVING LABOR DISPUTES CONCERNING
ORGANIZED LABOR; OR
3. PROHIBIT A PERSON FROM ENGAGING IN ANY ACTIVITY WHICH IS PART OF A LABOR DISPUTE.
COUGHLIN FURTHER MOVES TO QUASH OR DISMISS THE COMPLAINTS IN LIGHT OF THE LACK OF
SUBJECT MATTER AND PERSONAL JURSIDICTION AND AUTHORITY TO HEAR THIS MATTER GIVEN THE
RENO JUSTICE COURT AND WCDA'S OFFICE HAS JURSIDICTION, IT WAS PROPERLY ATTACHED, AND NOT
DIVESTED, AND THE RMC PICKIGN THIS UP NOW IS TANTAMOUTN TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY:
434. JURISDICTION, PROPERLY ATTACHED, NOT DIVESTED WEST'S KEY NUMBER DIGEST WEST'S KEY
NUMBER DIGEST, CRIMINAL LAW K83, 84, 98 TO 100, 102 TO 105, 207 THERE IS A PRESUMPTION
AGAINST DIVESTING A COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION ONCE IT HAS PROPERLY ATTACHED, AND ANY DOUBT
IS RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF RETAINING JURISDICTION.[FN1] ONCE A COURT HAS ACQUIRED JURISDIC-
TION, NO SUBSEQUENT ERROR OR IRREGULARITY WILL REMOVE THAT JURISDICTION, SO THAT A COURT
MAY NOT LOSE JURISDICTION BECAUSE IT MAKES A MISTAKE IN DETERMINING EITHER THE FACTS, THE
LAW, OR BOTH.[FN2] SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION FOLLOWS THE DEFENDANT THROUGH THE ISSU-
ANCE OF THE COMPLAINT, ARREST PURSUANT TO THE WARRANT, THE INITIAL APPEARANCE, THE SET-
TING OR DENIAL OF BOND AT A BOND HEARING, AND THE PRELIMINARY HEARING, ARRAIGNMENT, AND
TRIAL.[FN3] WHERE A COURT DETERMINES THAT A DEFENDANT IS UNFIT TO STAND TRIAL AND SUS-
PENDS PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM OR HER, THE COURT DOES NOT LOSE JURISDICTION.[FN4] [FN1]
PEOPLE V. VELING, 443 MICH. 23, 504 N.W.2D 456 (1993). [FN2] PEOPLE V. DAVIS, 156 ILL. 2D 149,
189 ILL. DEC. 49, 619 N.E.2D 750 (1993). [FN3] FERGUSON V. STATE, 276 KAN. 428, 78 P.3D 40
(2003), AS MODIFIED, (NOV. 12, 2003). [FN4] MAUPPIN V. STATE, 309 ARK. 235, 831 S.W.2D 104
(1992).
FROM2008 NEVADA COURT'S OF LIMITED JURISDICTION BENCH BOOK (WITH 2010 SUPPLE-
MENT):
SECTION 2 PROTECTIVE ORDERS
CHAPTER 6 PROTECTIVE ORDERS
...
6-1
INTRODUCTION
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6-2
ELEMENTS ANDPROCEDURE FOR ISSUANCE OF APROTECTIONORDER AGAINST
ELEMENTS ANDPROCEDURE FOR ORDERS AGAINSTSTALKINGANDHARASSMENT
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ELEMENTS ANDPROCEDURE FOR ISSUANCE OF APROTECTIONORDER
ELEMENTS ANDPROCEDURE FOR ISSUANCE OF APROTECTIONORDER AGAINST
APPLICABLE STATUTES ANDCASE LAW
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6-3
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
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JURISDICTION
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APPLICATION
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ISSUING THE ORDER
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6-4
POWER OF THE COURT
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6-5
ENFORCEMENT OF A PROTECTION ORDER AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
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6-6
DISSOLVING OR MODIFYING A PROTECTION ORDER
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APPLICATION AND PROCEDURE
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EXTENDING THE ORDER
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THE ORDER
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PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
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6-8
PETITIONEDBYAPARENTAGAINSTHARM TOACHILD
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APPROPRIATE PARTIES
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6-9
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POWER OF THE COURT
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6-9
NOTICE TO ADVERSE PARTY
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6-9
THE ORDER ITSELF MUST
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PENALTIES FOR VIOLATING AN ORDER AGAINST HARM TO MINORS
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6-10
HARASSMENTIN THE WORKPLACE
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APPLICATION
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ISSUANCE OF ORDER
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6-11
ISSUING AN EXTENDED ORDER OF PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 6-11
III
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ADDITIONAL PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONOF ALL PROTECTIONORDERS
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JURISDICTION
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6-12
FULL FAITHANDCREDIT
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6-13
PROTECTIONORDERS ANDFIREARMS/AMMUNITION
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6-13
FORMS
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6-14
COMPARISONOF PROTECTIONORDERS INNEVADA
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6-15
NOTE: AWORKPLACE VIOLENCE PROTECTION ORDER MAY NOT BE ISSUED IF RESPONDENT IS ENGAGED
IN A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITY OR LEGITIMATE LABOR DISPUTE. CCP 527.8(C)
CHAPTER 7 WORKPLACE VIOLENCE PROTECTIVE ORDER (CCP 527.8)
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I. [7.1] APPLICABILITY
II. [7.2] PARTIES PROTECTED
III. [7.3] APPLICANTS IV. [7.4] REQUIREMENTS
V. [7.5] STANDARD OF PROOF
VI. [7.6] TIME OF AVAILABILITY
VII. [7.7] ORDERS INCLUDABLE IN WORKPLACE VIOLENCE PROTECTIVE ORDER
VIII. [7.8] DURATION OF ORDER
IX. [7.9] SERVICE OF ORDER X. [7.10] DELIVERY OF COPY OF ORDER; COURTS RESPONSIBILITY
XI. [7.11] FIREARMS RESTRICTIONS
. [7.12] ENFORCEMENT OF WORKPLACE VIOLENCE PROTECTIVE ORDER XIII. [7.13] OTHER LEGAL
AND PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ.
652 FORREST ST.
RENO, NV89503
TEL: 775 348 0888
FAX: 775 348 0858
JANUARY 14, 2012
VIAEMAIL ONLYPATRICKK@NVBAR.ORG
PATRICK KING, ESQ.
ASSISTANT BAR COUNSEL
STATE BAR OF NEVADA
9456 DOUBLE R. BLVD.
RENO, NEVADA 89521
RE: ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN, ESQ.
NEVADA BAR NO. 9473
MR. KING:
YOU AND I HAVE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED MR. COUGHLIN. MR. COUGHLIN, DUE TO HIS
MENTAL INSTABILITY, LACK OF INTEGRITY, AND COMPLETE INCOMPETENCE, CONSTITUTES A DANGER TO
THE PUBLIC IF HE IS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE TO PRACTICE LAW. THIS LETTER IS WRITTEN TO DISCHARGE
MY AND MY ASSOCIATE'S REPORTING OBLIGATIONS UNDER RPC 8.3. PLEASE CONSIDER THE FOLLOW-
ING:
1. RISSONE V. GESSIN, CVIO-01341. ALTHOUGH NOT AMONG MR. COUGHLIN'S MOST
SIGNIFICANT ETHICAL VIOLATIONS, IT PRESENTS A GOOD MICROCOSM OF HIS DERELICTIONS. MR.
GESSIN WAS A CLIENT OF OUR OFFICE. HE DEFRAUDED THE PLAINTIFF, AS IS HIS MODUS OPERANDI IN
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DEALING WITH WOMEN. APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AFTER JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED AND THE CASE
CONCLUDED, MR. COUGHLIN INTERJECTED HIMSELF IN THE CASE ON BEHALF OF GESSIN, TRYING TO
COLLECT ON A SANCTION AWARD AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL. IT TURNS OUT THAT BECAUSE HE HAD
FILED BANKRUPTCY, GESSIN NO LONGER OWNS THIS CLAIM. IF YOU LOOK AT THE FILE, YOU WILL SEE
THAT COUGHLIN APPEARED AND THEN FILED A BIZARRE "PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL" DOCUMENT ON
DECEMBER 8, 2011.
SUBSEQUENT TO THAT TIME, COUGHLIN HAS BEEN GHOSTWRITING DOCUMENTS THAT
PURPORT TO BE FROMGESSIN, INDIVIDUALLY, AND E-FILING THEM FOR GESSIN. HE IS USING THE "/S/"
FOR GESSIN'S SIGNATURE. THESE ARE CLEARLY NOT DOCUNLENTS THAT ARE SIGNED OR PREPARED BY
MR. GESSIN, AND THE FACT THAT SOMEBODY (COUGHLIN) E-FILES THEM CONFIRMS HE IS GHOSTWRIT-
ING WITHOUT THE REQUIRED DISCLOSURE. IN ADDITION, IT APPEARS THAT COUGHLIN HAS FACILITATED
THE OF WHAT NLAY BE A FRAUDULENT BANKRUPTCY ON BEHALF OF GESSIN. COUGHLIN'S LACK IS
DEMONSTRATED IN THE GESSIN CASE BY THE FACT THAT HE DOES NOT EFFECT ON THE OWNERSHIP OF
GESSIN'S POTENTIAL CLAIMS FROMGESSIN HAVING FILED A BANKRUPTCY, (LE., THE CLAIMS NOW BE-
LONG TO THE BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE, NOT GESSIN.)
AS WITH ALL OF THE MATTERS REFERENCED BELOW, I STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT YOU CONTACT
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT AND GET E-FILING ACCESS TO THE CASES MENTIONED SO YOU
CAN LOOK AT THE DOCUMENTS YOURSELF. GLADE HALL, ESQ., IS OPPOSING COUNSEL IN THAT CASE
AND MAY BE OF HELP TO YOU.
2. I AM INFORMED AND BELIEVE THAT MR. COUGHLIN WAS RECENTLY CONVICTED OF A THEFT CRIME IN
RENO MUNICIPAL COURT. I AM FURTHER INFORMED THAT THE MATTER ARISES OUT OF SHOPLIFTING AT
WALMART. THAT CASE IS PRESENTLY ON APPEAL TO THE DISTRICT COURT IN CASE NUMBER CR11-
2064. MR. COUGHLIN IS REPRESENTING HIMSELF.
'3. MR. COUGHLIN IS PRESENTLY FACING CRIMINAL CHARGES REGARDING THE THEFT OF AN IPOD. THAT
IS PENDING IN RENO JUSTICE COURT AS CASE NUMBER RCR2011-063341. I HAVE REVIEWED THE FILE.
MR. COUGHLIN GOT INTO SOME SORT OF ARGUMENT WITH HIS PUBLIC DEFENDER. AS A RESULT, HE WAS
REFERRED OUT FOR A COMPETENCY EVALUATION.
4. WE REPRESENT DR. MATTHEWMERLISS, A PHYSICIAN FROMCHICO, CALIFORNIA. DR. MERLISS
OWNS THE PROPERTY AT 121 RIVER ROCK STREET, RENO, NEVADA. BEGINNING IN MARCH 2010, THE
PROPERTY WAS LEASED TO MR. COUGHLIN AND HIS THEN-GIRLFRIEND. THE LEASE EXPIRED IN
FEBRUARY 2011. THE GIRLFRIEND LEFT THE COMMUNITY IN APPROXIMATELY MAY 2011. DR. MERLISS
CONTACTED US IN APPROXIMATELY AUGUST 2011 TO ASSIST IN EVICTING MR. COUGHLIN. COUGHLIN
HAD NOT PAID RENT OR UTILITIES SINCE MAY. HE CONTENDED THAT THERE WERE HABITABILITY ISSUES
WITH THE PROPERTY THAT JUSTIFIED HIS WITHHOLDING RENT. ALL OF HIS CLAIMS WERE DECIDED AD-
VERSELY TO HIS POSITION AT THE EVICTION HEARING. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE PETER SFERAZZA OR-
DERED COUGHLIN EVICTED FROM THE PREMISES EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 1, 2011. ON THAT DATE, THE
WASHOE COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT PERFORMED THEIR NORMAL EVICTION PROCEDURE: LOCKS
WERE CHANGED AND THE EVICTION NOTICE WAS POSTED ON THE FRONT DOOR. WE VIDEOTAPED THE
HOME AND ITS CONTENTS AT THAT TIME. UPON INSPECTION OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS, IT BECAME AP-
PARENT THAT "SOMEBODY" WAS BREAKING INTO THE HOME ON A REGULAR BASIS.
On Sunday, November 13, 20 11, Dr. Merliss came to town, and I met him at the home on
River Rock Street. As we walked through the home, it was obvious that someone had been in there
since I had last been in several days before. Dr. Merliss discovered that the basement door was barri-
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caded (not locked) from the inside. The Reno Police Department was summoned. They tried to coax
whoever was in the basement out, without success. After Dr. Merliss had to kick the door down, it
"was discovered that Mr. Coughlin had broken in and was in the basement. He was arrested and is
presently facing criminal trespass charges in Reno Municipal Court. See case no. 11 CR 26405 21.
He is also facing a contempt motion in front of Judge Sferazza in the eviction case. Judge Sferazza
has stayed that matter pending the resolution of the criminal trial. That was scheduled for January 10,
2012, but was continued at the request of Mr. Coughlin's new attorney.
5. THE EVICTION ORDER IS NOW ON APPEAL TO THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. SEE CASE
CVL1-O3628, PENDING IN DEPARTMENT 7. AS PART OF THE EVICTION PROCESS, A LIEN WAS ASSERTED
AGAINST THE PERSONAL PROPERTY THAT COUGHLIN LEFT BEHIND AT THE HOME. ON NOVEMBER 16,
2011, COUGHLIN FILED A MOTION TO CONTEST THE LANDLORD'S LIEN IN THE RENO JUSTICE COURT.
THE COURT TRIED TO PROMPTLY SET A HEARING, BUT COUGHLIN REFUSED TO COOPERATE IN SETTING
THE MATTER, AND THE COURT TOOK IT OFF CALENDAR. COUGHLIN THEN REINITIATED THAT PROCESS
AND A HEARING WAS HELD IN DECEMBER, AT WHICH TIME THE COURT HEARD EVIDENCE OF COUGHLIN'S
LACK OF COOPERATION IN SETTING THE NOVEMBER HEARING. YOU MAY ALSO WANT TO CONTACT
RENO JUSTICE COURT STAFF, AND IN PARTICULAR, CHIEF CLERK KAREN STANCIL, ABOUT MR.
COUGHLIN'S ABUSIVE TREATMENT OF HER AND HER STAFF. AFTER THE HEARING, THE COURT ISSUED AN
ORDER GRANTING COUGHLIN A TWO-DAY TIME WINDOW TO REMOVE HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY. THE
FIRST DAY WAS THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 20 11. AFTER COUGHLIN WAS ALLOWED INTO THE HOME
THAT FIRST DAY, HE SENT OUT AN E-MAIL TO THE EFFECT THAT BECAUSE HE HAD APPEALED JUDGE
SFERAZZA'S ORDER, HE WAS ENTITLED TO A STAY OF PROCEEDINGS AND WAS TO RESUME IN THE HOME.
AS A RESULT, HE DID VERY LITTLE TO REMOVE ANY OF HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY THAT DAY. ON
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 23, 2011, AFTER HE LEARNED, AGAIN, THAT HIS STAY HAD BEEN DENIED,
COUGHLIN ASSEMBLED A SMALL CREW AND THEY WERE ABLE TO REMOVE A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF
HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY. (YOU NEED TO UNDERSTAND THAT MR. COUGHLIN IS A HOARDER. WE HAVE
THE PHOTOS AND VIDEOS IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO SEE THEM.) HOWEVER, MR. COUGHLIN DID NOT GET
ALL OF HIS PROPERTY OUT. FOR EXAMPLE, I COUNTED 13 CAR SEATS THAT HE HAD SOMEHOW MANAGED
TO GET DOWN INTO THE BASEMENT.
Having failed to remove all of his belongings, Mr. Coughlin then moved before Judge Flana-
gan for a temporary restraining order to prevent the disposal of his abandoned property in accordance
with Judge Sferazza's order. Attached is Mr. Coughlin's motion, my office's opposition, and Mr.
Coughlin's reply. These documents demonstrate Mr. Coughlin's complete and utter incompetence as
an attorney. On January 11, 2012, Judge Flanagan denied Mr. Coughlin's request for a temporary re-
straining order. On January 12, 2011, the contractor hired to clean the house commenced work. Mr.
Coughlin flagged the contractor down in traffic when he (the contractor) was on his way to the dump
with the abandoned property from the home. Coughlin called the police, who arrived at the transfer
station. Coughlin was falsely asserting that the contractor had tried to run hin1 over. He also told the
police that the contractor had stolen his possessions. After I presented the court orders to the police,
the contractor was allowed to proceed. At their instruction, I have now had a TPO issued against
Coughlin by Reno Justice Court.
However, before the contractor could get back to the River Rock house, Coughlin was there.
He had his video camera and was walking up and down the street screaming and yelling at police, at
the contractor, and at me, when I arrived. Mr. Coughlin ended up bemg arrested and taken to jail. The
police informed me that because of the number and types of contacts they have had with him, he is no
longer eligible for citations in the event of infractions.
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Enclosed you will find a copy of a supplemental document filed by Mr. Coughlin on January
13, 2012, and sent to my staff and I by email from Coughlin that morning. Please note that the attor-
ney designation on the first page indicates that it is being filed by Coughlin as appellant. You will
note that the caption is from a different case. It is unclear in which case Mr. Coughlin intended to file
this document, although, because of the case number and the caption, it appears to have ultimately
been routed to the Carpentier case (CVOB-01709) and not the eviction appeal case (CV11-0362B). I
am told that counsel in the captioned case may also be in the process of filing a bar complaint against
Coughlin.
6. WHEN THE HOUSE WAS SECURED AFTER COUGHLIN'S ARREST, WE FOUND A CRACK PIPE AND A BAG OF
WHAT APPEARED TO BE MARIJUANA. THE CONTRACTOR ALSO REPORTED FINDING A BOX OF PILLS AND A
VIAL OF SOME SORT. WE UNDERSTAND COUGHLIN HAS UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIED THE LAWYERS CON-
CERNED FOR LAWYERS PROGRAM, AND THAT HE HAS A HISTORY OF SUBSTANCE PROBLEMS.
7. MR. COUGHLIN HAS FILED TWO LAWSUITS AGAINST HIS FORMER EMPLOYER, WASHOE LEGAL SER-
VICES. HE HAS SUED ALL OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE COMPANY.
BOTH CASES HAVE NOW BEEN DISMISSED. BOTH CASES DEMONSTRATE HIS LACK OF COMPETENCE. I
SUGGEST YOUCONTACT JOSEPH GARIN, ESQ., IN LAS VEGAS, AS HE WAS COUNSEL FOR THE DEFEND-
ANTS IN THAT CASE. YOU MAY WANT TO CONTACT PAUL E1CANO, ESQ., THE DIRECTOR OF WASHOE
LEGAL SERVICES.
8. MR. COUGHLIN HAS A HABIT OF INITIATING CASES AND ASKING TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS. HE
HAS DONE SO IN CASES AGAINST ME, MY OFFICE, MY CLIENT, AND WASHOE LEGAL SERVICES. YOU WILL
FIND THEM IF YOU RUN A SEARCH FOR COUGHLIN ZON THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT WEB-
SITE. THE COURTS THAT HAVE REVIEWED THE DOCUMENTS HAVE GENERALLY DENIED HIS REQUESTS.
WHAT IS OF NOTE IS THAT HIS REPRESENTATIONS IN THE APPLICATIONS TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS ARE INCONSISTENT \VITH AND CONTRARY TO THE REPRESENTATIONS THAT HE HAS MADE TO
JUDGE FLANAGAN IN THE CONTEXT OF SEEKING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER. ON THE ONE
HAND, HE TELLS THE COURT HE IS BROKE AND HAS NO PROPERTY, AND ON THE OTHER HAND, HE IS TELL-
ING THE COURT THAT HE HAS A GREAT DEAL OF VALUABLE PROPERTY AT THE HOME THAT NEEDS TO BE
PROTECTED. THIS DEMONSTRATES A GROSS LACK OF CANDOR WITH THE TRIBUNALS WITH WHICH HE
DEALS.
9. COUGHLIN HAS ALSO TRIED TO FILE A CASE AGAINST ME, INY ASSOCIATE, MY CLIENT, AND OTHERS,
INCLUDING THE RENO JUSTICE COURT. IT IS ALSO TO BE FOUND ON THE WEBSITE. JUDGE STEINHEIMER
HAS RULED THAT HE DID NOT COMPLY WITH NRCP 8.
10. COUGHLIN'S BEHAVIOR WAS UNUSUAL TO START, AND HAS BECOME MORE AND MORE BIZARRE DUR-
ING THE WE HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH HIM. HE SERVES PAPERS HE DOES NOT FILE, AND FILES DOES NOT
SERVE. HE CONSISTENTLY SIGNS CERTIFICATES OF SERVICE THAT HE HAS MAILED TO US, BUT WE HAVE
NEVER RECEIVED FROM HIM BY MAI1. HE HAS POSTED VIDEOS OF THE EVICTION SERVICE ATTEMPTS
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AND PARTS OF THE TRIAL ON YOUTUBE, INCLUDING SOME RECORDINGS HE SECRETLY MADE IN COURT
WITH HIS CELLPHONE.
11. Another example of his incompetence is that he does not understand what orders are, and are not,
appealable. He does not understand that filing a notice of appeal divests the lower court of jurisdic-
tion. I am confident that once you look into this matter, you will agree that Mr. Coughlin should not
be practicing law. He is a danger to the community. Sincerely, /S/ Richard G. Hill
RGH:kn
Enclosures:
-Coughlin Amended Emergency Motion for Restraining Order
-Merliss Opposition to Motion for TRO
-Coughlin Reply to Opposition to Motion for TRO
-Suppleinental Reply to Opposition dated 1/13/12
Richard G. Hill has served on the City of Reno's Citizen's Advisory Board and may still be
doing so.
NRS 171.112 Contentsof summons. Thesummonsshall beinthesameformasthewar-
rant except that it shall summonthedefendant toappear beforeamagistrateat astatedtimeand
place.
The Summons in both 3913 and 3914 fail to comply with the above two statutes in that they
fail to conform to the the requirement that such be in the same form as the warrant and is not in
the name of the State of Nevada, but rather the City of Reno, as such the issuance of such sum-
mons is not even jurisdictionally authorized.
ORDERS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN WORKPLACE
NRS 33.200 Definitions.
NRS 33.210 Employee defined.
NRS 33.220 Employer defined.
NRS 33.230 Order for protection against harassment in the workplace defined.
NRS 33.240 Acts that constitute harassment in workplace.
NRS 33.250 Verified application for temporary order; contents of application.
NRS 33.260 Notice of intent to seek order to be provided to known target of harassment.
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NRS 33.270 Requirements for issuance of temporary or extended order; expiration; right to
challenge temporary order; award of costs and attorneys fees to prevailing party; interlocutory ap-
peal of extended order.
NRS 33.280 Effect of temporary or extended order; court may not issue order against more
than one person; contents of order.
NRS 33.290 Order does not preclude other action.
NRS 33.300 Transmittal of copy of order to law enforcement agency; service and enforce-
ment of order; issuance of copies of order.
NRS 33.310 Registration of order; effect of registration; duty of court clerk to maintain rec-
ord of registered order.
NRS 33.320 Arrest of person who violates order; service of order; duty to note date and time
of service on copy of order issued to employer.
NRS 33.330 Immunity for certain persons who enforce or refuse to enforce order.
NRS 33.340 Employer immune from civil liability under certain circumstances; use of ac-
tions taken and statements made by employer.
NRS 33.350 penalty for intentional violation of order.
NRS 33.360 LIMITATIONS ON EFFECT OF PROVISIONS.
NRS 171.114 EXECUTION OF WARRANT AND SERVICE OF SUMMONS: BY WHOM. THE
WARRANT SHALL BE DI RECTEDTOANDEXECUTEDBY A PEACE OFFI CER. THE SUMMONSMAY BE
SERVEDBY ANY PERSONAUTHORI ZEDTOSERVE A SUMMONSI NA CI VI L ACTI ON.
City of Reno Marshal Coppa indicated he intended to file a return of service of the summons
upon allegedly handing the Certificate of Production of Documents to Coughlin in both 3913 and
3914 just after Coughlin submitted for filing his 4/17/13 filing in both cases. City of Reno Marshal
Coppa is a party or otherwise not an appropriate person to serve such summons as he would not be
authorized to do so in a civil action incident to the courthouse sanctuary rule and the immunity af-
forded to litigants and attorneys (Coughlin qualifies as both) while attending court, and the privlege
against arrest afforded attorney's while going to and from court, which Coughlin has on numerous
occasions placed the RMC on notice of his assertions thereof in a blanket manner and manifest a non-
waiver thereto in all regards.
NRS 171.116 When magistrate may depute person to act as constable. A magistrate may de-
pute in writing any suitable and discreet person to act as constable when no constable is at hand and
the nature of the business requires immediate action.
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The RMC may not depute its own Marshals to serve summons for the same Municipality for
which it serves as a court, especially where such purported service takes place within the very court-
room and at the same time, as the arraignment on such matter.
NRS 171.122 Manner in which execution of warrant and service of summons are made; issu-
ance of citation in lieu of execution of warrant of arrest.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, the warrant must be executed by the
arrest of the defendant. The officer need not have the warrant in the officers possession at the
time of the arrest, but upon request the officer must show the warrant to the defendant as soon
as possible. If the officer does not have a warrant in the officers possession at the time of the
arrest, the officer shall then inform the defendant of the officers intention to arrest the defend-
ant, of the offense charged, the authority to make it and of the fact that a warrant has or has
not been issued. The defendant must not be subjected to any more restraint than is necessary
for the defendants arrest and detention. If the defendant either flees or forcibly resists, the officer
may, except as otherwise provided in NRS 171.1455, use all necessary means to effect the arrest.
Absolutely no reason for RPD Waddel to point a gun at Coughlin's head from four feet away
prior to even announcing his presence as a law enforcement officer or making any command, order,
or request to Coughlin.
Neither the complaint nor summons state any facts or allegations sufficient to make any find-
ing with respect to whether the individual mentioned as providing the SBN a purported filing of
1/3/13 was an agent of Coughlins (the make of the vehicle mentioned is not even specific, nor any
identifying characteristics or descriptives) nor any allegation as to where any such fax of 1/17/13 em-
anated from (inside or outside the state, etc) or why a fax allegedly On January 17, 2013, the Nevada
State Bar received a 371 page fax with a cover page documenting
it coming from "zachcoughlin." Thefaxwasstoppedprior tocompletion, without more, and with-
out any indication as to the investigation undertaken to reveal whether or not such was indeed sent by
Coughlin.
The 3/7/13 Amended Criminal Complaint (apparently by Brian Sooudi though not such
type or handwritten indication is present next to the signature thereon...though Sooudi did state to
Coughlin that he did not want to file such Complaints but that Chief Deputy RCA Wong made him
do it even though a patent RPC 3.8 violation is evinced by his so doing) contradicts RPD Yturbide's
Declaration as to howmuch of said 371 page fax was received, where the Amended Criminal
Complaint reads:On January 17, 2013, the Nevada State Bar received a 371 page fax with a cover
page documentingit comingfrom"zachcoughlin.
Further, RPD Yturbide's Declaration is disturbing on a number of levels where it indicates:
On January 17, 2013, the Nevada State Bar received a 371 page fax with a cover page documenting
it coming from "zachcoughlin." Thefaxwasstoppedprior tocompletion in that it alternately indi-
cates such 371 page fax was received only to then, apparently, announce that the SBN/OBC
interferred with a criminal investigation by ensuring that the fax was stopped prior to completion
over and above any violation of RPC 3.4 attendant to Pat King's involvement in such obstructionist
tactics and the failure to abide by the duties and responsibilities place upon her as to Clerk of Court
Laura Peters where the OBC/SBN alleges they believe such fax was from Coughlin.
To maintain a 1983 false arrest claim for judicial deception, a plaintiff must show that an
officer who applied for an arrest warrant deliberately or recklessly made false statements or omis-
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sions that were material to the finding of probable cause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 42 U.S.C.A.
1983. Smith v. Almada, 623 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2010).
AS IT STAND, ANYTIME ANYONE SENDS THE SBNA FAX WITH THE WORDS: FROM:
ZACHCOUGHLIN COUGHLIN CAN BE ARRESTED BY THE RPD(AFTER THEY POINT A GUN AT HIS HEAD
FOR NO GOOD REASON) AND CHARGED WITH A FELONY EPO VIOLATION REQUIRING A SUBSTANTIAL
AMOUNT OF BAIL? SUCH IS NOT JUST.
FURTHER, IT IS TROUBLING THAT THE SBNSEES FIT TO UNDERTAKE THAT WHICH WILL ENSURE
THAT THE FAX WAS STOPPED PRIOR TO COMPLETION, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE DUTIES AND RESPON-
SIBILITY PLACE UPON CLERK OF COURT LAURA PETERS AND THAT FACT THAT SHE HAS HELD OUT THE
SBN'S FAX NUMBER AS THAT TO WHICH FILINGS MAY BE TRANSMITTED, AND THAT SUCH FILINGS
WOULD BE FILE STAMPED IN BY THE SBN/OBC.
IT IS RES JUDICATA OR LAW OF THE CASE THAT RPD YTRUBIDE'S 2/22/13 DECLARATIONIN
SUPPORTOF ARRESTWARRANT/SUMMONS DID NOT SATISFY TO ISSUE A WARRANT (AS THE
2/8/13 ARREST REPORT INDICATES NO WARRANT WAS INVOLVED IN THE ARREST. AS SUCH, AND PUR-
PORTED FINDING BY JUDGE HOWARD (WHOM CONTINUED HIS 11/30/11 ABUSE OF THE CONTEMPT POW-
ER AT THE 4/17/13 ARRAIGNMENT IN 3913 AND 3914, REFUSIGN TO ALLOWCOUGHLIN TO PRESERVE
FOR THE RECORD THE FACT THAT HE WAS NOT WAIVING ANY OF HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE VARIOUS BASIS
FOR HIS MOTION TO QUASH, DISMISS, FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, LACK OF PERSONAL AND SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION, FAILURE TO ALLEGE SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SUPPORT SUCH A CHARGING, FAILURE
TO ALLEGE FACTS AMOUNTING TO A CRIME, ETC..
NRS 171.102 COMPLAINT DEFINED; OATH OR DECLARATION REQUIRED. THE COMPLAINT IS A
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS CONSTITUTING THE PUBLIC OFFENSE CHARGED. IT MUST
BE MADE UPON:
1. Oath before a magistrate or a notary public; or
2. Declaration which is made subject to the penalty for perjury
NRS 53.045 USE OF UNSWORN DECLARATION IN LIEUOF AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER SWORN DECLARA-
TION; EXCEPTION. ANY MATTER WHOSE EXISTENCE OR TRUTH MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY AN AFFIDAVIT
OR OTHER SWORN DECLARATION MAY BE ESTABLISHED WITH THE SAME EFFECT BY AN UNSWORN DEC-
LARATION OF ITS EXISTENCE OR TRUTH SIGNED BY THE DECLARANT UNDER PENALTYOF PERJURY, AND
DATED, IN SUBSTANTIALLY THE FOLLOWING FORM:
1. If executed in this State: I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
and correct.
EXECUTED ON....
(DATE) (SIGNATURE)
WHOEVER SIGNED THE COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE THE NECESSARY LANGUAGE THAT THE
DECLARANT BELIEVES THEM TO BE TRUE AS TO THOSE MATTERS STATED UPON INFORMATION AND
BELIEF:
I HAVE READ THE FOREGOING _________, AND THE FACTUAL AVERMENTS CONTAINED
THEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, EXCEPT AS TO THOSE
MATTERS BASED ON INFORMATION AND BELIEF, AND AS TO THOSE MATTERS, I BELI EVE THEM
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TOBE TRUE. APPEARS TO BE REQUIRED. SEE AWAD V. WRIGHT, 106. THE AMENDED CRIMINAL COM-
PLAINT SUFFERS TO SAME DEFICIENCY..
The issuance of the summons and any finding or ruling by Judge Howard that it appears
from the complaint or a citation issued pursuant to NRS 484A.730, 488.920 or 501.386, or from an
affidavit or affidavits filed with the complaint or citation that there is probable cause to believe that
an offense, triable within the county, has been committed and that the defendant has committed it
must be set aside given the apparent disqualification of Judge Howard resulting in both matters,
which were originally assigned to Department 4, being transferred to Department 1. Further, there is
simply not enough averred to support a finding of probable cause, and even if everything averred
were true, such fails to state a criminal violation, particularly where Coughlin was at all relevant
times engaged in litigation with the State Bar of Nevada, and in NG12-0204,0434,0435, where post-
hearing Motions and filings were permitted expressly by Chair Echeverria, narrow deadlines involved
incident to the 12/14/12 FOFCOL, and express permission to fax file pursuant to SCR 105(4), NNDB
Chairman Susich's 7/27/12 written indication to Coughlin, and the OBCs Laura Peters Clerk of
Courts express declaration to Coughlin that he was permitted to so fax file, which neither the
NNDB, Panel, or SBN ever retracted or otherwise disputed. The RCA provides absolutely no sup-
port for the implicit contention that contacting includes doing that which one has a lawful claim of
right to do, ie, file documents in judicial proceedings or administrative licensure hearings before in
the SBN pursuant to SCR 99, effectively functioning as the court and office of the prosecutor.
Coughlin hereby requests copies of any warrant and application and supporting materials
thereto connected to the 2/22/13:
DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF ARREST WARRANT/SUMMONS 1. THAT DECLAR-
ANT IS A DETECTIVE WITH THE RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT. 2. THAT THIS UNSWORN DECLA-
RATION IN LIEU OF AN AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER SWORN DECLARATION IS MADE PURSUANT TO
NRS 53.045. 3. THAT ONORABOUT J ANUARY 17, 2013, AT ORNEAR9456DOUBLE RBLVD., WI THI N
THE CI TY OF RENO, STATE OF NEVADA, THE DEFENDANT, ZACHARY COUGHLI N, DI DUNLAWFULLY
COMMI T THE CRI ME OF VI OLATI ONOF PROTECTI ONORDER FORHARASSMENT I NTHE WORKPLACE:
THE RENO JUSTICE COURT ISSUE AN EXTENDED ORDER FOR THE PROTECTION AGAINST HARASSMENT
IN THE WORKPLACE ON JANUARY 4, 2013, WITH AN EXPIRATION DATE OF JANUARY 4, 2014. THE DE-
FENDANT WASSERVEDTHI SORDERONJ ANUARY 5, 2013. THI SORDERPROHI BI TEDTHE DEFENDANT
ORANAGENT OF THE DEFENDANT FROM CONTACTI NGTHE STATE BAROF NEVADA BY ANY MEANSI N-
CLUDI NGFACSI MI LE (FAX). ONJ ANUARY 17,2013, THE NEVADA STATE BARRECEI VEDA 371PAGE
FAX WI TH A COVERPAGE DOCUMENTI NGI T COMI NGFROM "ZACHCOUGHLI N." THE FAX WASSTOPPED
PRI ORTOCOMPLETI ON. ON FEBRUARY 8, 2013, I CONTACTED AND ARRESTED THE DEFENDANT FOR
THE ABOVE VIOLATION ASA FELONY I NRENO JUSTICE COURT. THE WASHOE COUNTY DI STRI CT AT-
TORNEY'SOFFI CE REVI EWEDTHE CASE ANDSTATEDTHAT THE VI OLATI ONI SA MI SDEMEANORAND
THE PROPERCOURT OF J URI SDI CTI ONI STHE RENOMUNI CI PAL COURT. 4. I HEREBY REQUEST THAT A
WARRANT/SUMMONS BE ISSUED FOR THE ARREST OR COURT APPEARANCE OF ZACHARY COUGHLIN TO
ANSWER TO THE CHARGE. I DECLARE UNDER PENALTYOF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND
CORRECT. DATED THIS 22
ND
DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2013 /S/ TOM YTRUBIDE.
The Above Declaration fails to identify Mr. Yturbide as a law enforcement officer or someone
with the requisite authority to so seek such a warrant/summons. It is similarly deficient with regard
to its failure to include to belief them to be true language. Awad.
FURTHER, THE 2/8/13 ARREST REPORT AND DECLARATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE INDICATES
THAT NO WARRANT WAS INVOLVED IN MAKING THE 2/8/13 ARREST, DURING WHICH THE RPDTRES-
PASSED THROUGH A CLOSED BACK YARD GATE AT COUGHLIN'S RESIDENCE WITH GUNS DRAWN AND
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POINTED SUCH GUNS AT COUGHLIN HEAD, ONE AT A DISTANCE OF NO MORE THAN FOUR FEET, PRIOR TO
ISSUING ANY IDENTIFICATION OF THEMSELVES AS POLICE OFFICERS OR OTHERWISE REQUESTING
COUGHLIN TO COMPLY WITH AN ORDER. RPDOFFICER WADDEL FAILE TO DISPUTE ANY ALLEGATIO
THAT HE DID NOT KNOW IF THE PERSON WHOSE HEAD HE WAS POINTING A GUN AT FROM FOUR FEET
AWAY WAS COUGHLIN OR NOT UNTIL HE HEARD COUGHLIN'S VOICE, WHICH HE RECALLED FROM A PRE-
VIOUS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH COUGHLIN. THE RPDTHEN FAILED TO LIST RPDWADDEL AS
ONE OF THE ARRESTING OFFICERS, AND DETECTIVE YTURBIDE IS HARDLY THE ARRESTING OFFICER.
THE 2/8/13 ARREST REPORT LISTS THE CHARGED OFFENSE AS NRS 200.591.5, THOUGH IT
ONLY LISTS AND OFFENSE DATE OF 1/3/13 AND A CASE # OF 13-100306 WHICH IS THE NUMBER FOR
THE ONLINE POLICE REPORT BY THE SBNALLEGING A VIOLATION OF THE TPO, WHICH THE RMC, RENO
CITY ATTORNEY, WCDA'S OFFICE, RJC, AND RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT HAVE ALL REFUSED TO PRO-
VIDE COUGHLIN, AS HAS BEEN THE CASE WITH THE POLICE REPORT, INCLUDIGN WITNESS STATEMENTS
AND THE NARRATIVE FOR BOTH THE TPOAND EPOARREST. SO FAR, COUGHLIN HAS ONLY BEEN
PROVIDED THE ARREST REPORT AND DECLARATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE GROSS MISDE-
MEANOR TPO ARREST, WHICH CONTAINS ABSOLUTELY NO ALLEGATION SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
GROSS MISDEMEANOR CHARGE INCIDENT TO THE ALLEGATIONS LISTED THEREIN OF A VIOLATION OF A
WORKPLACE HARASSMENT TPO, ESPECIALLY WHERE THE ARREST REPORT LISTS THE WRONG OFFENSE
FOR THAT CHARGED, LISTING A STALKING AND HARASSMENT STATUTORY PROTECTION ORDER PROVI-
SION IN NRS 200.591.5 INSTEAD OF NRS 33.050, THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE WORKPLACE HAR-
ASSMENT PROTECTION ORDER ISSUED IN RCP12-607, AS TO EITHER THE 12/20/12 TPOOR THE 1/4/13
EPO.
Acts that constitute harassment in the workplace (NRS 33.240) ; the SBN and OBC failed to put up
the security/ bond required pursuant to NRS 33.270, the penalty for a violation of such a "workplace
harrassment" TPO or EPO is a misdemeanor unless more severe penalty is provided by law, NRS
33.350, and no facts or law had been cited to support any such "more sever penalty" to support the
charging of a gross misdemeanor for the alleged TPO violation and a felony for the alleged EPO
violation. Coughlin seeks his costs and attorney's fees incident to challengign such pursuant to NRS
33.270.
NRS 171.106 ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OR SUMMONS UPON COMPLAINT OR CITATION. IF
IT APPEARS FROM THE COMPLAINT OR A CITATION ISSUED PURSUANT TO NRS 484A.730,
488.920 OR 501.386, OR FROM AN AFFIDAVIT OR AFFIDAVITS FILED WITH THE COMPLAINT OR
CITATION THAT THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT AN OFFENSE, TRIABLE WITHIN THE
COUNTY, HAS BEEN COMMITTED AND THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS COMMITTED IT, A WARRANT FOR THE
ARREST OF THE DEFENDANT SHALL BE ISSUED BY THE MAGISTRATE TO ANY PEACE OFFICER. UPON THE
REQUEST OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY A SUMMONS INSTEAD OF A WARRANT SHALL ISSUE. MORE THAN
ONE WARRANT OR SUMMONS MAY ISSUE ON THE SAME COMPLAINT OR CITATION. IF A DEFENDANT FAILS
TO APPEAR IN RESPONSE TO THE SUMMONS, A WARRANT SHALL ISSUE
The purported service of both the TPO (a 12/26/12 Certificate of Service by RJC Bailiff Eng-
lish which fails to indicate where such attempted service occurred, in an attempt to
IN 3914, CURIOUSLY, THE COMPLAINT IS DATED 2/22/13, WHICH WAS PRIOR TO THE WCDA'S
OFFICE ANNOUNCING ITS DECISION BY WAY OF 3/6/13 LETTER TO THE RPDTHAT IT WOULD NOT PROSE-
CUTE COUGHLIN FOR EITHER THE GROSS MISDEMEANOR OR FELONY CHARGES FOR WHICH HE WAS AR-
RESTED AND FOR WHICH THE BAIL WAS A BONDABLE $5,000 AT A TIME JUST PRIOR THE DUE DATE FOR
HIS BRIEF IN 62337 BECOMING DUE, HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE 2/7/13 ORDER STRIKING THE ROA
THEREIN. NO EXPLANATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO COUGHLIN AS TO WHY THE ARREST CHARGED HIM
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WITH A GROSS MISDEMEANOR AND A FELONY WHEN VIOLATION OF WORKPLACE HARRASSMENT PRO-
TECTION ORDERS ARE MERE MISDEMEANORS. THE ARREST REPORT NOTES THAT CHARGE AS NRS
DECLARATION IN LIEU OF AFFIDAVIT OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN MADE UN-
DER penalty OF PERJURY PURSUANT TO NRS 53.045
Zach Coughlin submits this on his own behalf and or provided it to the Law Office of Robert
Bruce Lindsay, Esq., to use as he sees fit within the context of Coughlin consenting to his acting on
Coughlin's behalf for the limited purpose (until further agreement) of pursuing a global resolution of
the various matters involving Coughlin, the Reno Justice Court, the Reno Municipal Court, the Se-
cond Judicial District Court, the State Bar of Nevada, the City of Reno, Washoe County District At-
torney's Office, Reno City Attorney's Office, Washoe County, Washoe County District Attorney's
Office, Reno Police Department, Washoe County Sheriff's Office (both Civil and Criminal Divi-
sions), Reno Justice Court Bailiffs, and City of Reno Marshals, though at this time Mr. Lindsay has
been listed by the RJC as Coughlin's attorney of record, as far as Coughlin knows, in only one matter
(RCR2012-067980), though Mr. Lindsay was present on 2/13/13 at a hearing related to Coughlin's
summary incarceration the day previous in RCR2012-065630 (wherein Judge Clifton indicated some-
thing to the effect that Mr. Lindsay's presence had been arranged for by the RJC in recognition of
Coughlin's Right to Counsel even at a civil contempt hearing, which, apparently, was the 2/13/13
hearing therein was (Coughlin filed a Notice of Appeal of any Order therein that resulted in a finding
of contempt and the summary 5 day incarceration incident thereto wherein Coughlin was incarcerated
from 2/12/13 to 2/16/13).
The assertions herein are made, pursuant to NRS 53.045 under penalty of perjury and based
upon my first hand knowledge of these matters, except to those matters stated upon information and
belief, AND THE REQUESTS MADE HEREIN ARE MADE IN GOOD FAITH AND NOT FOR
PURPOSES OF DELAY Defendant hereby requests a continuance of the 3/11/ 13 Show Cause Hear-
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ing in this matter and herein offers good cause for why he does so. Coughlin swears such a request is
not done for purposes of delay and that there is a good faith basis for seeking such.
FACTS, POINTS AND AUTHORITIES:
At the outset, please allow Couglin herein to state his profound regret for how matters have
gone since his intial 8/20/11 arrest in 11-063341 and the summary eviction notice served on 8/22/11
in RJC Rev2011-00-1708. (please see Coughlin's 5/21/12 email to the SBN including proof of his
prescription history and the fact that Coughlin went off two pyschoactive, psychotropic medications
in the first week of August 2011, pretty much overnight with no titration, that would seem to estab-
lish a per se basis for finding a causal connection between such and the ensuing events. Coughlin had
attempted to mitigate such occurence prior thereto by reaching out for help paying for his medica-
tions to his family and NNAHMS, but NNAHMS refused to pay for Adderall (Couglhin called in-
quiring confidentially on several occassions prior thereto) and refused to pay for Wellbutrin if
Coughlin continued taking Adderall. From then on out it was just trying to stay afloat for Couglin,
and that include the denial of his Sixth Amendment rights incident to a 9/9/11 arrest for petty larceny
of a candy bar and some cough melts (with an allegation that Coughlin consumed while shopping for
and paying for some $83.82 in other grocers, a dosage of Duract Cough Melts (which contain a pow-
erful dissaociative, Dextromethorphan, (DXM) to incapacitate or even result in death by overdoes).
See 60838. Couglin was denied counsel and any continuance in the trial of that wal-mart arrest on
11/30/11, and sentenced to 3 days in jail incident to a summary contempt ruling that the RMC Judge
made 10 minutes into the Trial. The arriagment in that case, on 10/11/11, occurred during the pen-
dency of the 9/8/11 Order for Competency Evaluation in 11-063341, arguably violative of NRS
178.405's stay under NRS 5.073. There have been a great deal of stay violations incident to questions
involving Coughlin's competency, some that would seemingly play a large role in Coughlin currently
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facing disbarment, including the holding of a trial in 11-063341 on 5/7/11, the day Coughlin's opposi-
tion was due to an impermissible post judgment motion for atty fee sanctions on 4/19/12 (the day
coughlin was incarcerated in cR12-0376 incident to an inaccurate 4/17/12 letter by Lake's Crossing)
by the opposing counsel in the evictio in 11-001708. However, Judge Flanagan's 8/28/12 order in
06328 will, hopefully, make clear that his 6/25/12 award of $42K in attorney's fees was in light of an
alleged failure by Coughlin to file any opposition to the 4/19/12 Motion for Fees, under DCR 13(3),
rather than any finding that such fees were awarded as a sanction pursuant to NRS 7.085 (and, like
the sanction that resulte in Coughlin's firing from WLS in 2009, also a basis for Coughlin currently
facing disbarment, neither opposing counsel ever served a filign ready sanctions motion as required
by the incorporation of NRCP 11 within NRS 7.085, thereby committing there own RPC 3.1 viola-
tions...). Additionally, the attach Venetian v. Two Roads transcripts provides support to rebut any
contention of vexatiousness by Coughlin incident ot his various motions for stay and depositing of
supersedeas bond (or the RJC retaining ten times that amount incident to a rent escrow deposit Order
that was violative of Nevada law in that the RJC's JCRRT do not apply to landlord tenant matters
(and therefore JudgeSferrazza's assertion that only one motion to set aside or stay could be filed mo-
tions one made may not properly be made again and that JCRRT allowed for escrow deposits is
misplaced given the statutory restrictions an inapplicability of JCRRT (that is why JCRLV 44 and a
rule allowing only one motion to stay or set aside eviciton orders was promulgated and approved by
the N. S. Ct, incidnet to JCRCP 83 for the Justice Court of Las Vegas Township)...Judge Clifton's
10/17/11 Order denying Coughlin's Motion for stay in 11-001708 is arguably violative of a mandato-
ry stay upon the despoting of $250 under NRS 40.385 (see Two Roads transcript and fact that Cough-
lin had deposited ten times that amount that morning, as Judge Clifton's Order notes). Further, the
RJC was arguably divested of jurisdiction to even hold the 10/25/11 Trial/continuation of a sum-
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mary eviction proceeding incident to Coughlin filing a Notice of Appeal on 10/18/11. Another basis
for Coughlin facing disbarment is NVB Judge Beesley's testimony as to Coughlin's appearance in his
court on 3/15/12 just minutes after being evicted earlier that day in cident to a lockout Order in 12-
375 by Judge Schroeder, where Gayle Kern, Esq., arguably violated RPC 3.5A in taking a default
where Coughlin filed a Pre-Hearing brief on 3/8/12, and where Kern had failed to file a Landlord's
Affidavit prior to that hearing, a jurisdictional bar to holdign the hearing under NRS 40.253(6).
Regardless, Coughlin just wants to move on, offers sincere apologies for everything, and ask
for some help in getting there and saving his law license. Recently, due to a 2/8/13 arrest alleging
felony and gross violations of the SBN EPO and TPO, coughlin has been forced to pay $800 in bail,
further makign difficult his saving his law license.
plea deal that I voluntarily accepted on 8/27/12 put back on the record and accepted by the RJC, even
disposing of the appeal of the convictions in 11-063341 (now on appeal in CR12-2025):
From: Leslie, Jim
Sent: Friday, August 24, 2012 11:17 AM
To: 'Zach Coughlin'
Subject: Coughlin: Settlement of RCR11-063341, RCR12-065630 and RCR12-067980
Mr. Coughlin:
As I had noted earlier, I had relayed the offer you had sent for a settlement. You had sent it to Zach
Young directly, as well as me and other recipients. I then forwarded your email offer to Mr. Young
and asked him to reply.
Mr. Young took the position that any prior State offers had been rejected by you or had expired by
their terms or by virtue of lapse of reasonable time. Nevertheless, he has replied indicating willing-
ness to settle as follows:
The entry of plea pursuant to this settlement must occur in Reno Justice Court no later than Monday
August 27, 2012.
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The plea would be to two misdemeanor disturbing the peace charges, one such
charge in RCR11-063341 (the iPhone case) and once such charge in RCR12-065630
(the 911 case);
Sentence would be 90 days jail on each charge, suspended and concurrent to each
other, with the following conditions: (1) obey all laws (except that the parties agree
that traffic violations do not constitute violation of this condition), (2) mental health
counseling as recommended by your psychiatrist or mental health treatment provider,
with regular reports every 60 days for a period of one year, (3) take medications and
engage in counseling as recommended by said psychiatrist or mental health treatment
provider.
IN EXCHANGE FOR THIS PLEA SETTLEMENT, THE STATE WILL DISMISS RCR12-067980 (RESISTING
CASE).
PLEASE NOTE THAT MR. YOUNG WAS EMPHATIC THAT THIS PLEA SETTLEMENT MUST BE ENTERED BY
THE AUGUST 27, 2012, EXPIRATION DATE OR IT IS RESCINDED. THE AUGUST 29 TRIAL IN RCR11-
063341 WILL NOT BE VACATED UNTIL THE SETTLEMENT PLEA IS ENTERED ON MONDAY.
TIME IS OF THE ESSENSE, SINCE ANY SETTLEMENT MUST BE ENTERED AT RJC BY MONDAY, SO PLEASE
REPLY VIA EMAIL WITH YOUR ACCEPTANCE AND I WILL SET UP A HEARING FOR MONDAY.
THANK YOU,
JAMES B. LESLIE, ESQ.
WASHOE COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
I WOULD ABSOLUTELY VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO THAT PLEA DEAL RIGHT NOW, ESPECIALLY IF IT COULD
DISPOSE OF THE APPEARL IN CR12-2025 IN A MANNER THAT WOULD ALLOW FOR A SCR 111(10) APPLI-
CATION LIKE THAT IN THE SETTING ASIDE OF THE CONVICTION OF FORMER PAHRUMP DABECKETT IN IN
RE BECKETT.
PERHAPS A SOLUTION RESIDES IN REVIEWING THE IN RE BECKETT CASE, INVOLVING A FORMER
PAHRUMP DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S TEMPORARY SUSPENSION FOR THE VERY CHARGE, NRS 199.280,
THAT COUGHLIN FACES IN BOTH 12-065630 AND 12-067980. THE FOLLOWING IS FROM NSCT CASE
57763. HTTP://CASEINFO.NVSUPREMECOURT.US/PUBLIC/CASEVIEW.DO?CSIID=259100
THE RELEVANT PORTION OF SCR 111 STATES: 10. REINSTATEMENT. AN ATTORNEY SUSPENDED UN-
DER THE PROVISIONS OF SUBSECTION 7 OR 9 OF THIS RULE MAY BE REINSTATED BY FILING A CERTIFI-
CATE WITH THE SUPREME COURT DEMONSTRATING THAT THE UNDERLYING CONVICTION HAS BEEN RE-
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VERSED, BUT REINSTATEMENT WILL NOT TERMINATE ANY FORMAL PROCEEDING PENDING AGAINST THE
ATTORNEY, THE DISPOSITION OF WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED BY THE HEARING PANEL ON THE BASIS
OF THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE. ON DECEMBER 30TH, 2011, MR. BECKETT WAS TEMPORARY SUSPENDED
FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR ENTERING INTO A PLEA AGREEMENT OF "OBSTRUCTING A PUBLIC OF-
FICER," IN VIOLATION OF NRS 199.280. SEE ATTACHED GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT, FILE DATED
NOVEMBER 2ND, 2010, EXHIBIT A. ON JANUARY 21ST, 2011, THE JUSTICE COURT OF NYE COUNTY EN-
TERED AN ORDER, SIGNED BY THE RESPECTIVE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE ON JANUARY 21ST, 2011 AND
FILED WITH THE NYE COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE ON FEBRUARY 2ND, 2011. EXHIBIT 1 HAS ATTACH THE
COPY OF SAID ORDER DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE THE CASE PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT GUILTY PLEA
AGREEMENT. ACCORDINGLY, MR. BECKETT HEREBY RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS THAT HIS SCR 111 SUS-
PENSION BE LIFTED SO THAT HE MAY BE REINSTATED TO PRACTICE OF LAW IN NEVADA AS CONTEM-
PLATED BY SCR 111(10). MR. BECKETT UNDERSTANDS THAT THE OPERATION OF SCR 111 DOES NOT
TERMINATE ANY FORMAL PROCEEDINGS PENDING AGAINST HIM. ALTERNATIVELY, MR. BECKETT RE-
QUESTS THAT GOOD CAUSE ALSO EXISTS UNDER SCR 111(7) TO LIFT HIS TEMPORARY SUSPENSION ON
THE GROUND THAT NOT ONLY HAS THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, BUT MR.
BECKETT HAS ALSO ADDRESSED AND CONTINUES TO ADDRESS HIS ALCOHOL ISSUES. THIS IS EVIDENCED
BY THE ATTACHED EXHIBIT C, WHICH CONTAINS TWO LETTERS INDICATING HIS REHABILITATION.
BASED ON THIS REHABILITATION, MR. BECKETT RESPECTFULLY ASSERTS THAT HE SHOULD FURTHER
QUALIFY FOR REINSTATEMENT TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN NEVADA. FINALLY, MR. BECKETT IS THE
SOLE SOURCE OF SUPPORT FROM HIS FOUR (4) CHILDREN AND HIS WIFE WHO IS TOTALLY DEAF AND DOES
NOT WORK. DATEDTHIS 7TH, DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2011. MICHAEL J. WARHOLA, ESQ." WARHOLA IS A
FORMER SBN BAR COUNSEL.
THE NSCTTHEN ORDER:
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR REINSTATEM. THIS IS A
PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT PURSUANT TO SCR 111(10) FILED
BY ATTORNEY ROBERT S. BECKETT. ON DECEMBER 30, 2010, THIS
COURT TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED BECKETT FROM THE PRACTICE
OF LAW AND REFERRED HIM TO THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD BASED
ON HIS PLEA OF NO CONTEST TO A CHARGE OF OBSTRUCTING A
PUBLIC OFFICER. OUR ORDER WAS PREMISED ON THE FACT THAT
BECKETT'S OFFENSE CONSTITUTED A "SERIOUS" CRIME UNDER SCR
111(6), FOR WHICH TEMPORARY SUSPENSION AND REFERRAL TO THE AP-
PROPRIATE DISCIPLINARY BOARD ARE MANDATORY UNDER SCR 111(7)
AND (8).1 BECKETT CONTENDS THAT HE SHOULD BE REINSTATED TO THE
PRACTICE OF LAW DURING THE PENDENCY OF HIS DISCIPLINARY PROCEED-
INGS BECAUSE THE CRIMINAL CASE UNDERLYING OUR DECEMBER 30,
2010, ORDER HAS BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.... SCR 111(10)
GIVES US DISCRETION TO REINSTATE AN ATTORNEY WHOSE UNDERLY-
ING CONVICTION HAS BEEN REVERSED. THE PETITION IS ACCOMPANIED
BY A CERTIFIED COPY OF A FEBRUARY 2, 2011, ORDER FROM THE
PAHRUMP TOWNSHIP JUSTICE COURT DISMISSING CASE NO. 10CR01587
WITH PREJUDICE. IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE CHARGE UNDERLYING
OUR ORDER OF TEMPORARY SUSPENSION HAS BEEN DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE, AND OUR PREVIOUS DETERMINATION THAT BECKETT'S
CALIFORNIA MISDEMEANOR CONVICTION DID NOT WARRANT IMPOSITION
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OF A TEMPORARY SUSPENSION, WE CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS NO LONG-
ER A BASIS FOR BECKETT BEING TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED PENDING
THE OUTCOME OF HIS DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS. WE THEREFORE
GRANT THE PETITION. ATTORNEY ROBERT S. BECKETT, BAR NO. 3383, IS
HEREBY REINSTATED TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW PENDING THE OUTCOME OF
HIS DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Right to Counsel
HERE IS NO ABSOLUTE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN PROBATION REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS.
(GAGNON, SUPRA, 411 U.S. AT 790.) ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE "CASES IN WHICH FUNDA-
MENTAL FAIRNESS - THE TOUCHSTONE OF DUE PROCESS - WILL REQUIRE THAT THE STATE PROVIDE
AT ITS EXPENSE COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT PROBATIONERS OR PAROLEES." (IBID.) ALTHOUGH THERE
ARE NO RIGID GUIDELINES, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS SUGGESTED THAT COUNSEL
SHOULD BE PROVIDED ANYTIME THE DEFENDANT MAKES A TIMELY AND COLORABLE CLAIM (I) THAT HE
HAS NOT COMMITTED THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE CONDITIONS UPON WHICH HE IS AT LIBERTY; OR
(II) THAT, EVEN IF THE VIOLATION IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD OR IS UNCONTESTED, THERE ARE
SUBSTANTIAL REASONS WHICH JUSTIFIED OR MITIGATED THE VIOLATION AND MAKE REVOCATION INAP-
PROPRIATE, AND THAT THE REASONS ARE COMPLEX OR OTHERWISE DIFFICULT TO DEVELOP OR PRE-
SENT.(IBID.) IN CALIFORNIA, HOWEVER, THE SUPREME COURT HAS PROCLAIMED A RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN PROBATION REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS AS A JUDICIALLY DECLARED RULE OF PROCEDURE. (VICKERS,
SUPRA, 8 CAL.3D AT 461-462.)
The totality of the circumstances, including the DAS materials Coughlin was provided, ex-
treme health problems (including a reaction preventing Couglin from appearing at a 1/3/13 EPO hear-
ing in 12-599 and 12-607, even to contest service, process, or juridiction, includign to assert an attor-
ney's (even a suspended attorney appearing pro se) immunity from service of process at the court-
house, (RJC Bailiff's apparently attempte to serve Coughlin 607 and 599 while in the RJC filign of-
fice/DAS Office...As to an attorney's exemption from service of process, see Am. Jur. 2d, Process
35.
[FN2] Kelly v. Clark, 192 Wis. 2d 633, 531 N.W.2d 455 (Ct. App. 1995). 2012 ).including
under courthouse sanctuary doctrine, situational stress incident to Coughlin's formal disciplinary
hearing regarding the irrevocable revocation of his law license, misleading sworn statements by both
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SBN Bar Counsel Pat King and WCPD Jim Leslie, and verbal statements and writings to Cougeffect
of unlawful arresthlin by DAS staff, including Officer Celeste Brown, support this colorable claim by
Coughlin that he has not violated the terms of his probation , much less in a manner sufficient to sup-
port a summary arrest. Coughlin has received indications from DAS staff including Officer Brown
that, in exigent circumstances calling or writing, especially ahead of time, may provide a basis for not
finding a probation violatin, and Coughlin submits that both alleged probation violation (incident to
DAS Officer Ramos's PC sheet of 2/1/13, which indicate such violation occured on 1/3/13 and
1/24/13...which just happend to be days where Coughlin had deadlines in 62337 and where Couglin
now faces felony and gross charges upon allegations of TPO and EPO violations occuring on those
dates) auguers towards either dismissing the charge of an alleged probation violation or affording
Coughlin representation at publice expense, especially where, apparently B. Lindsay, Esq. Showed up
to the 12-067980 contempt hearing on 2/13/13 as a freebie, upbenownst to Coughlin and counter to
at least the implicit representation made to him by the Court and Lindsay upon being led into court in
restraints that morning, absent any consultations with Lindsay beforehand whatsoever..
Such a basis to preclude a probable cause finding includes:
RE: Update Brown, Celeste (CBrown@washoecounty.us)Add to con-
tacts 1/24/13 To: 'Zach Coughlin' From: Brown, Celeste
(CBrown@washoecounty.us) This sender is in your safe list. Sent:
Thu 1/24/13 3:10 PM To: 'Zach Coughlin'
(zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) Per the video, you showed up at 2:56 p.m
From here on out Zach, you need to check in between 9:45 and 2:00 p.m.
Lets see if we can fix the problem ok? Sgt. CJ Brown WC Dept. Of Alter-
native Sentencing 1 South Sierra St. Reno, Nv 89501 desk 775)327-8384 fax
775)327-8383 From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2013 2:42 PM To: Brown, Celeste Subject: Up-
date Dear Officer Brown, I appreciate your recent note. Thank you. It meant a
lot. I came in yesterday well more than 5 minutes prior to 3 pm, but was de-
tained too long at the security station for Bailiff Medina to escort me to the
DAS Office (then Chief Judge Sferrazza's Administrative Order 12-01 of De-
cember 20th, 2012 requires as much). I saw Judge Linda Gardner's bailiff,
Deputy Kirkham milling about with four or five other deputies near the court-
house exit performing a pbc test on a man, and requested permission to wait
my turn and take one as well. I memorialized this in a note that I gave to Bail-
iff Medina for which he agreed to provide to DAS. Deputy Kirkham made
some sneering commentary about alcoholism and dependency issues in gen-
eral (I cannot recall specifically whether or not she then "high-fived" one of
her fellow deputies) as they relate to me, and perhaps the Irish race and my
ancestry in general, then refused to allow me to take a pbc test and document
it on the note I left with Bailiff Medina for DAS. Deputy Kirkham decided
against assisting in a pbc test. Deputy Kirkham, the SBN arranged, was pre-
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sent for my 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing at the State Bar of Nevada,
despite the involvement of 2JDC Family Court Judge Linda Gardner (the
SBN has been purposefully vague and obstructionist as to whether ng12-0435
is a grievance with a grievant of Linda Gardner given some of the ethical
problems associated with Judges writing letters whether of recommendation
or condemnation (or Orders After Trial) and submitting them voluntarily (or
having their brother RMC Judge William Gardner do so by way of taking the
4/13/09 Order After Trial by his sister and passing it to RMC Judge Nash
Holmes, then having her include that in the 3/14/09 grievance she herself filed
on behalf of RMC Judge William Gardner and all other RMC Judg-
es....especially where RMC Judge W. Gardner refused to recuse himself from
the criminal trespass prosecution of Coughlin from his former home law of-
fice incident to the summary eviction from it presided over by RJC Judge
Sferrazza (where a $2,275 rent escrow deposit was ordered by the RJC in vio-
lation of Nevada law and still not returned to Coughlin by the time of the tres-
passing arrest or during any period in which Coughlin was expected to hire
movers and rent a uhaul and arrange for an alternate location to place such
personalty). Further RMC Judge Garder failed to disclose that his sister is
2JDC Family Court Judge Linda Gardner during the audio record of the
2/2/12 hearing in 11 CR 26405 wherein Coughlin prompted Judge Gardner to
disclose any such matters that would tend to create an appearance of impro-
priety or a basis for a conflict or bias, whether or not such did, in fact exist,
and whether the judge himself thought such did in fact exist.... (NOTE:
Coughlin email goes on and on and is truncated here).
As to the RCA prosecuting Coughlin and introducing evidence (which, given the $83.82
receipt for the items Coughlin had just purchase included an entry with the very UPC of the Duract
Cough Melt item Coughlin is alleged to have consumed while shopping or stolen, and that half a
package of such was allegedly recovered upon the search incident to arrest conducted once the RSIC
made the decision to effect a custodial arrest upon Coughlin (which took them 7 minutes to decide to
do from the time stamping indicated on the video of their interrogation of Coughlin in Wal-Mart's
Loss Prevention room), and the prohibition in Nevada, under NRS 171.1255 against tribal police
making custodial arrests for misdemeanors, period (ie, whether committed in their presence or not):
The usual sanction for an illegal arrest is not dismissal of charges against the accused, but suppres-
sion of statements or physical evidence discovered as a result of the arrest or detention.[FN4] [FN4]
Biggers v. State, 317 Ark. 414, 878 S.W.2d 717 (1994); State v. Miller, 257 Kan. 844, 896 P.2d 1069
(1995); City of Fargo v. Stutlien, 505 N.W.2d 738 (N.D. 1993); State v. Henderson, 51 Ohio St. 3d
54, 554 N.E.2d 104 (1990). Regarding the effect of the illegality of an arrest, see Am. Jur. 2d, Arrest
129, 130.
One. General Principles VII. Personal and Subject Matter Jurisdiction A. In General
Topic Summary Correlation Table References
439. Effect of unlawful arrest
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West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law k99
Treatises and Practice Aids
Ringel, Searches & Seizures Arrests and Confessions 23:27
Jurisdiction obtained by means of an unlawful arrest or seizure is valid.[FN1] Generally, if a defend-
ant physically appears before a court, either because he or she is held in custody after an arrest or be-
cause he or she has appeared in person after giving bail, the invalidity or illegality of the original ar-
rest does not preclude a court from trying a defendant.[FN2] The illegality of the defendant's deten-
tion does not deprive the government of the opportunity to prove the defendant's guilt through the
introduction of evidence wholly untainted by police misconduct.[FN3] The usual sanction for an ille-
gal arrest is not dismissal of charges against the accused, but suppression of statements or physical
evidence discovered as a result of the arrest or detention.[FN4]
Observation:
While an illegal arrest is a violation of the Fourth Amendment,[FN5] a conviction of the defendant
will not be overturned on the basis of an illegal arrest alone. Mere irregularities in the manner in
which one is brought into custody of the law do not entitle one to say that he or she should not be
tried at all for the crime for which charged in a regular indictment.[FN6]
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[FN1] Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980);
U.S. v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2002); Winston v. State, 355 Ark. 11, 131
S.W.3d 333 (2003); State v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 957 P.2d 1095 (1998); State ex rel. Jack-
son v. Brigano, 88 Ohio St. 3d 180, 2000-Ohio-292, 724 N.E.2d 424 (2000).
[FN2] Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980);
U. S. v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1980); Higgins v. State, 317
Ark. 555, 879 S.W.2d 424 (1994); State v. Johnson, 227 Conn. 534, 630 A.2d 1059 (1993);
State v. Miller, 257 Kan. 844, 896 P.2d 1069 (1995); Com. v. Carter, 537 Pa. 233, 643 A.2d
61 (1994); State v. Crow, 504 N.W.2d 336 (S.D. 1993); State v. Farmer, 193 W. Va. 84, 454
S.E.2d 378 (1994).
[FN3] U. S. v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1980); U.S. v. Sitton, 968
F.2d 947, 36 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 282 (9th Cir. 1992); State v. Johnson, 227 Conn. 534, 630 A.2d
1059 (1993); State v. Hendrickson, 283 Mont. 105, 939 P.2d 985 (1997); State v. Masat, 239 Neb.
849, 479 N.W.2d 131 (1992); Graves v. State, 112 Nev. 118, 912 P.2d 234 (1996).
[FN4] Biggers v. State, 317 Ark. 414, 878 S.W.2d 717 (1994); State v. Miller, 257 Kan. 844, 896
P.2d 1069 (1995); City of Fargo v. Stutlien, 505 N.W.2d 738 (N.D. 1993); State v. Henderson, 51
Ohio St. 3d 54, 554 N.E.2d 104 (1990).
Regarding the effect of the illegality of an arrest, see Am. Jur. 2d, Arrest 129, 130.
Regarding searches and seizures, generally, see Am. Jur. 2d, Searches and Seizures 1 et seq.
[FN5] U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
[FN6] Ker v. People of State of Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S. Ct. 225, 30 L. Ed. 421 (1886).
VII. Effect of Illegality of Arrest
Topic Summary Correlation Table
Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Arrest k58, 63.1, 63.3, 63.4(4) 63.4(7.1), 63.4(15), 63.4(18)
West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law k99, 394.4(9), 519(8)
West's Key Number Digest, False Imprisonment k7(6)
West's Key Number Digest, Indictment and Information k144.1
Primary Authority
42 U.S.C.A. 1983
VII. Effect of Illegality of Arrest
Topic Summary Correlation Table
Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Arrest k58, 63.1, 63.3, 63.4(4) 63.4(7.1), 63.4(15), 63.4(18)
West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law k99, 394.4(9), 519(8)
West's Key Number Digest, False Imprisonment k7(6)
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West's Key Number Digest, Indictment and Information k144.1
Primary Authority
42 U.S.C.A. 1983
Also, relevant in 067980 and 26405 knock and talk analysis:
Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964). "Thus, '[o]fficers are allowed to knock on
a residence's door or otherwise approach the residence seeking to speak to the inhabitants just a[s]
any private citizen may.'" United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006) (first altera-
tion in original) (quoting Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 519 (3d Cir. 2003)). The circuit
court's ruling conflicts with the proposition that police officers may approach a residence and speak
to the residents just as any private citizen may. Thus the circuit court fell into error when it ruled that
the knock-and-talk encounter at issue in this case amounted to illegal police conduct.
Our conclusion about the legality of the knock-and-talk encounter brings us to the question of the
standard of proof applicable to the determination of the voluntariness of the consent search:
Where the state asserts it had the right to search ... despite the absence of a warrant because the
defendant consented to the search, the state has the burden to prove that consent was freely and vol-
untarily given. The burden of proof in these cases depends on whether there is invalid police conduct
prior to obtaining the consent. "Under ordinary circumstances the voluntariness of the consent to
search must be established by preponderance of the evidence." With invalid police conduct like pro-
longed detention, threats to obtain a warrant, or repeated requests for consent, the burden of proof is
elevated to the clear and convincing standard.
Dormezil v. State, 754 So. 2d 168, 169 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (citations omitted) (quoting Denehy v.
State, 400 So. 2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 1980)). Here, the circuit court applied the clear and convincing
evidence standard of proof because it found illegal police conduct based on its erroneous interpreta-
tion of the law concerning knock-and-talk encounters. But based on our conclusion above and be-
cause the knock and talk was not otherwise illegal, the appropriate standard of proof was preponder-
ance of the evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's order and remand for reconsideration
of the motion to suppress under the proper standard of proof. See State v. T.L.W., 783 So. 2d 314,
317 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
The illegality of the arrest does not affect the introduction and admissibility of evidence wholly un-
tainted by the police misconduct.[FN7] [FN7] U. S. v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 63 L.
Ed. 2d 537 (1980).Yet, in some circumstances, suppression of evidence may be a proper remedy
when it can be proven that the evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal arrest.[FN8] [FN8]
Com. v. Jacobsen, 419 Mass. 269, 644 N.E.2d 213 (1995)
Compare to Coughlin's arrest in RMC 11 CR 22176 (60838) vis a vis NRS 171.1255's prohi-
bition against misdemeanor arrests by tribal police officers and the primacy to the burden of proof
analysis (beyond a reasonable doubt) of the fruit of the poisonous tree as to the one half of one box of
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Duract Cough Melts the RSIC Officer's alleged was recovered from Coughlin's short's pockets upon
conducting a search incident to arrest (where those tribal officers deliberated for seven minutes from
their initial questioning of Coughlin to decide to effect a custodial arrest, as indicated by the sworn
testimony of both RSIC Officers and the Walmart associate). Further, the illegality of the arrest in
RJC RCR11-063341 incident to the police misconduct RPD Officer Duralde admitted to (there is
certain benefits to charging you with a felony) where RPD Officer Duralde overcharged Coughlin
with malice with felony grand larceny, despite witness testimony indicating that Duralde was in-
formed the value of the phone was substantially less than the then $250 jurisdictional prerequisite for
such a felony charge (oooh, that's a felony Duralde said to Coughlin shortly after making the arrest)
for the purposes over overcoming the prohibition, under NRS 171.136 against a police officer making
a custodial arrest between the hours of 7 pm and 7 am for an alleged misdemeanor occurring outside
his presence. In the present case, it is our conclusion that none of (the fruit of the poisonous tree)
"has been come at by exploitation" of the violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
Wong Sun, supra, at 371 U. S. 488. Crews.
Additionally, the custodial trespass arrest of Coughlin on 11/13/11 invokes the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine as well, as the RPD trespassed onto Coughlin's property, in violation of the
Fourth Amendment (whether or not the landlord kick down the door to the crawlspace/quasi-
basement under the house, and Hill testified that the Officer entered the quasi-basement, but regard-
less, the property was completely fenced and the officers entered the quasi-basement by a route
through the house, where such was trespassing in light of NRS 40.385 and NRS 40.360(3) and the
fact that any eviction order in RJC Rev2011-001708 was void in light of the lack of presence of a va-
riety of jurisdictional prerequisites (no landlord's affidavit filed, no twenty days to file an answer
after being served a summons and complaint a la NJCRCP Rule 109, anything purported to satisfy
the requirements of NRS 40.254 being deficient, particularly in light of the verification requirement
in NRS 40.XX, and the patent inconsistency between Baker's arguments and assertions and landlord
Merliss's testimony with respect to what the lease indicated with respect to the term of the tenancy
and the patent incongruities reveal by an inspection of paragraphs 2, 3, and 20 therein in comparision
to the 8/22/11 and 9/27/11 Notices posted on Coughlin's door admitted at the 10/25/11 hearing as ex-
hibits.
C. Standing
State v. Dennis, 182 Ohio App. 3d 674, 2009-Ohio-2173 Police responded to the report of a tres-
passer at an apartment complex. Believing apartment had been abandoned, officer entered and found
the defendant in a recliner and a crack pipe in a potato chip bag. (1) Defendant had standing to assert
a Fourth Amendment violation. While trespassing for purposes of criminal law does not strictly fol-
low civil law, he retained an expectation of privacy in the premises even though he had received evic-
tion notices. Though he had been gone for a while, he was present when the officers entered and the
state failed to prove the eviction process had been completed. (2) Good faith does not save the search.
Good faith mainly applies in warrant cases. Court does not reach whether it should be extended here.
The officers could not have reasonably believed the apartment was vacant based on the information
they had.
Similarly, on search and seizure issues involving law enforcement access to a premises, the
power to consent or object depends on who has privacy rights. In Vincennes v. Emmons,
#42S02-0504-CV-131, 817 N.E. 2
nd
155 (Ind. 2006), the court stated that a city's ordinance authoriz-
ing warrantless inspections of rental units unless tenants object did not violate the constitutional
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rights of landlords, as landlords had no reasonable expectation of privacy in units rented to either res-
idential or commercial tenants. In instances where the landlords are themselves the tenants, the ordi-
nance would be interpreted as also requiring their consent or a warrant.
In Harvey v. Plains Township, #04-1148, 421 F. 3rd 185 (3d Cir. 2005), the court held that
a police officer who ordered a landlord to open a door to an apartment so that a woman's ex-
boyfriend could retrieve his possessions was not entitled to qualified immunity on a woman's
claim that he violated her Fourth Amendment rights by becoming actively involved in an ex
parte private repossession.
In this case, after a woman's relationship with her boyfriend deteriorated, she obtained an order of
protection granting her exclusive right of possession of their apartment. Pursuant to that order, the
boyfriend was required to immediately retrieve all of his belongings. The trial court denied a request
that he be allowed to return to pick up furnishings and other items that would be difficult to remove
during his first trip.
The man's attorney sent a letter to the woman informing her that he would go to the apartment at a
particular time to retrieve his remaining belongings. A copy of the letter was sent to the woman's
landlord and to the local police department. A police officer was sent to the apartment at the time des-
ignated in the letter in order to keep the peace at the repossession, and the landlord was also present
at that time. The woman, who claimed never to have received the letter, was not there.
The officer allegedly directed the landlord to unlock the door so that the man could retrieve his
property. After this was done, and when the woman returned, she found the apartment in disar-
ray, and claimed that many items were missing, including some not included in the ex-boyfriend's
list of his property.
On appeal, the federal appeals court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the
officer, holding that a police officer actively involved in an ex parte private repossession
of property may be engaged in state action in violation of the Fourth Amendment. It
agreed, however, that the landlord, who opened the door at the direction of the officer, was
not engaged in state action, and upheld the result as to the remaining defendants.
The appeals court rejected the officer's argument that his conduct was not state action and that he
was merely present at a private repossession. There was evidence, including the testimony of the
landlord, that the officer directed the opening of the door, and that she never would have opened it
without the officer's instructions. If this was true, the officer played a principal role in the entry and
seizure of the property, and a reasonable jury could conclude that he used his public authority to help
the ex-boyfriend gain entry and take the property from the apartment. The record supported a finding
that he was not a mere spectator.
Additionally, the law was unquestionably clear at the date of the incident, September 1999, that the
Fourth Amendment prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures of a person's home by the police
without a warrant. The court also found that if the officer concluded that the woman had consented to
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the repossession merely on the basis of a copy of the letter, to which the woman did not respond (and
which she claimed she never got) that was not reasonable. A reasonable officer at least would have
refused to assist with opening the door until he was satisfied that consent was given.
from AELE article attached as Exhibit 1 to Coughlin's 6/5/12 Motion to Dismiss/Suppress in
26405:
When officers respond to a complaint about the presence of a trespasser, they should inquire
as to the reason the person is there. The answer to that question may provide probable grounds for an
arrest. Many laws concerning trespass, however, require that, prior to an arrest, a person is asked to
leave and is given an opportunity to comply. Make sure officers are familiar with state statutes and/or
local ordinances bearing on this question.
It is very telling that RCA Hazlett-Stevens, despite sending Coughlin notice of the subpoena
on WCSO Machen (which shoudl have then been filed within 2 days in the ROA, yet was not) failed
to put into evidence the 11/7/11 Affidavit of Service by WCSO Machen in rev11-1708, the eviction
matter connected to the tresppas case in 26405. Further, Hill did not, and did not testify that he at any
point provided the RPD with an proof of service of the eviction order upon Coughlin, neither by way
of a mailed Notice of Entry to Coughlin from Hill's Officer, or anything from the RJC, much less the
WCSO 11/7/11 Affidavit of Service. That is telling, adn goes to whether the RPD had a reasonable
basis for believing the reports of trespassing and or probable cause to make the arrest, and to enter the
building in any event. Further, the fact that so much of Coughlin's property remained at his former
home law office certainly weighs against the abandonment analysis that arose in Dennis. Coughlin
cited to Higgins v Penobscot at the 6/18/12 Trial in 26405. State v. Dennis, 182 Ohio App. 3D 674 is
perhaps the most applicable case:
{ 17} Denniss first assignment of error states:
{ 18} The trial court erred in determining that appellant was a trespasser and lacked
standing to suppress the entry into his apartment and subsequent search of the premises.
{ 19} Dennis claims that the trial court erred in determining that he was a trespasser and in
concluding that he lacked standing to challenge the entry into the apartment. He argues that he
could
not be considered a trespasser at his apartment until a court entered an order of restitution of
the
PREMISES TO THE LANDLORD IN A CIVIL ACTION, PURSUANT TO R.C. CHAPTER 1923. DENNIS FUR-
THER ASSERTS THAT
the circumstances of this case are distinguishable from State v. Little, Montgomery App. No. 19976,
2004-Ohio-1814, and State v. Fleming, Clark App. No. 2003 CA 71, 2004-Ohio-5278, upon which
the trial court relied to support its conclusion that Dennis was a trespasser and lacked standing to
object to the officers entry into the apartment.
{ 20} In reviewing the trial courts ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, this court must
accept the findings of fact made by the trial court if they are supported by competent, credible
evidence. See also State v. Morgan (Jan. 18, 2002), Montgomery App. No. 18985, 2002 WL 63196.
However, the reviewing court must independently determine, as a matter of law, whether the facts
meet the appropriate legal standard. Id.
///The individual must have a subjective expectation of privacy in the placed searche, and that
expectation must be objectively reasonable and justifiable. Rakas at 143; State v. Buzzard, 112 Ohio
St.3d 451, 2007-Ohio-373, 14.
{ 22} It is well established that a tenant has an expectation of privacy in his or her rented
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apartment. Because the right to exclude others is one of the main rights attaching to property,
TENANTS IN LAWFUL POSSESSION OF A HOME OR APARTMENT GENERALLY HAVE A LEGITIMATE EX-
PECTATION OF
PRIVACYBY VIRTUE OF HAVING A PROPERTY INTEREST IN A SPECIFIC PIECE OF REAL ESTATE.
HIGGINS V.
Penobscot Cty.. Sheriffs Dept. (June 2, 2005), D.Maine No. 04-157-B-W. See also Copley v.
Voorhies (Aug. 27, 2007), S.D.Ohio No. 2:06-cv-847, 2007 WL 2462651, citing Rakas, 439 U.S.
at
143, 99 S.CT. 421, 58 L.ED.2D387, FN.12 (AN INDIVIDUAL HAS A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY
AND, THEREFORE, STANDING TO CHALLENGE LAW ENFORCEMENTS WARRANTLESS SEARCH ON
PROPERTYTHAT THE
INDIVIDUAL LAWFULLYPOSSESSES).
{ 23} IN EVALUATING WHETHER DENNIS HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE
APARTMENT,
THE TRIAL COURT RELIED UPON LITTLE AND FLEMING, IN WHICH WE HELD THAT THE DEFENDANTS
HAD NO LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE PREMISES, BECAUSE THEY WERE TRESPASSERS AT THE TIME OF
THE OFFICERS
ENTRY. ...
{ 25} Although the defendants in Little and Fleming were not former or current tenants of
an apartment, such as Dennis, both cases instruct that once an individual becomes a trespasser, the
individual loses any legitimate expectation of privacy that he once had in the premises. However, as
neither a social guest nor a hotel guest has the statutory protections against eviction that a tenant has,
Little and Fleming are not controlling for determining whether Dennis had become a trespasser.
{ 26} WE THEREFORE TURN TO WHETHER DENNIS RETAINED A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVA-
CY IN
APARTMENT F WHEN THE OFFICERS ENTERED WITHOUT A WARRANT ON AUGUST 17, 2007. DENNIS
CLAIMS THAT THE
evidence was insufficient to establish that he was a trespasser and, consequently, that he no
longer
had a reasonable expectation of privacy because he was still in lawful possession of the
apartment since there was no evidence that the proper legal procedures for eviction had been
completed under R.C. Chapter 1923.
{ 27} [C]oncepts of state property law are relevant, but not necessarily dispositive, for
deciding the question whether there was a legitimate privacy interest for [F]ourth
[A]mendment
PURPOSES. UNITED STATES V. SLEDGE (C.A.9, 1981), 650 F.2D 1075, 1082.
{ 28} [I]T IS UNNECESSARY AND ILL-ADVISED TO IMPORT INTO THE LAWSURROUNDING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES SUBTLE DIS-
TINCTIONS, DEVELOPED
AND REFINED BY THE COMMON LAW IN EVOLVING THE BODYOF PRIVATE PROPERTYLAW WHICH,
MORE THAN
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ALMOST ANY OTHER BRANCH OF LAW, HAS BEEN SHAPED BYDISTINCTIONS WHOSE VALIDITYIS
LARGELYHISTORICAL.
9
JONES V. UNITED STATES (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 266, 80 S.CT. 725, 4 L.ED.2D 697, OVERRULED ON
OTHER
GROUNDS BYUNITED STATES V. SALVUCCI (1980), 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.CT. 2547, 65 L.ED.2D 619.
SEE ALSO
GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH (2006), 547 U.S. 103, 110, 126 S.CT. 1515, 164 L.ED.2D 208 (STATING
THAT
FOURTHAMENDMENT RIGHTS ARE NOT LIMITED BYTHE LAWOF PROPERTY).
{ 29} AT THE SAME TIME, [A]LTHOUGH PROPERTY[LAW] CONCEPTS ARE NOT NECESSARILY
DETERMINATIVE OF FOURTHAMENDMENT RIGHTS, THEYARE NONETHELESS HELPFUL IN AS-
SESSING WHICH
EXPECTATIONS SOCIETY IS PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE AS LEGITIMATE. IN PARTICULAR, A TENANTS
EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN HIS APARTMENT CEASES TO BE OBJECTIVELYJUSTIFIABLE WHEN HIS OCCUPANCY
CEASES TO BE
LAWFUL, AS DETERMINED BYTHE TERMS OF HIS LEASE AND THE PROVISIONS OF HIS STATES LAND-
LORD-TENANT LAW.
(CITATIONS OMITTED.) UNITED STATES V. ROSS (C.A.6, 2002), 43 FED.APPX. 751, 757.
{ 30} UNDER OHIO LAW, A LANDLORD MUST FOLLOW A THREE-STEP PROCESS TO EVICT A TENANT.
FIRST,
the landlord must serve the tenant with a notice to terminate the tenancy. R.C. 5321.17. Second,
a
TIMELY NOTICE TO VACATE THE PREMISES MUST BE SERVED ON THE TENANT. R.C. 1923.04. THIRD,
THE LANDLORD
must file a complaint in forcible entry and detainer. R.C. 1923.05. Steiner v. Minkowski
(1991), 72
OHIO APP.3D 754, 761.
{ 31} IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT DENNIS HAD BEEN A TENANT OF 1719 RADIO ROAD, APARTMENT F,
AND
HE WAS FOUND AT THE APARTMENT ON AUGUST 17, 2007. THE RECORD ESTABLISHED, HOWEVER,
THAT DENNIS
HAD RECEIVED TWO EVICTION NOTICES, ONE OF WHICH(THE THREE-DAY NOTICE) HAD BEEN SEEN
BYKINSTLE IN
the apartment. Dennis acknowledged that he had received both a 30-day eviction notice and a
threeday
eviction notice, and he stated to the officers that he had been evicted. According to Denniss
landlord, the apartment had not been cleaned and the locks had not been changed simply be-
cause the
LANDLORD WAS ON VACATION. THE UNOFFICIAL CARETAKER HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CALL
THE POLICE IF DENNIS
RETURNED.
10
{ 32} IN OUR VIEW, DENNIS MET HIS BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THAT HE HAD LAWFUL POSSESSION OF
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THE APARTMENT. WHILE THE EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT DENNIS WAS A TENANT OF APARTMENT F
AND THAT HE
HAD BEEN ORDERED TO LEAVE THE APARTMENT BY THE LANDLORD, HE DIDNT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT
WHEN HE WAS
SUPPOSED TO LEAVE. DENNISS STATEMENT THAT HE HAD BEEN EVICTED IS SIMPLY HIS VERNACU-
LAR
acknowledgment that he had been served with eviction notices. There was no evidence before the
court demonstrating that his tenancy had expired. The fact that Dennis had a tenancy interest in the
APARTMENT WAS SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE HAD LAWFUL POSSESSION OF THE APARTMENT
AND, THUS, A
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY.
{ 33} ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT DENNIS HAD BEEN SERVED WITH EVICTION NOTICES,
THIS
evidence was insufficient to rebut the evidence that Dennis had lawful possession of the apartment
and retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. Ohio landlord-tenant law does not
allow for self-help by a landlord. As stated above, a landlord is required to successfully bring a
forcible entry and detainer action against Dennis in order to effectuate an eviction. Without a
judgment of restitution in the landlords favor, Dennis could continue to lawfully possess the
PREMISES. SEE STATE EX REL. JENKINS V. HAMILTON CTY. COURT, AREA NO. EIGHT (1961), 114 OHIO
APP.
231, 233 (FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER ACTION DETERMINES THE RIGHT TO IMMEDIATE POSSESSION
OF THE
PROPERTY); R.C. 1923.09, 1923.11, 1923.13, AND 1923.14.
{ 34} THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT A TENANT HAS THE RIGHT IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES TO REMAIN IN AN
APARTMENT AND TO ENJOY A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY THAT SOCIETY IS PREPARED TO
RECOGNIZE
ONCE HE HAS BEEN SERVED WITH THE REQUIRED NOTICES AND PAPERS. RATHER, ALTHOUGH THERE IS A
PAUCITY OF
OHIO LAW ON THIS SUBJECT, IT IS TO HOLD THAT IT IS CERTAINLY NOT THE PREROGATIVE OF A LAND-
LORD, UNILATERALLY,
BY THE SIMPLE DELIVERY OF CIVIL NOTICES AVAILABLE AT ANY CONVENIENCE STORE OR OVER THE IN-
TERNET, TO
REMOVE A TENANTS REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY. ATENANT, HAVING RECEIVED SUCH PA-
PERS, MAY
11
THINK THAT HE CAN PAY BACK RENT (IF THAT IS THE REASON FOR THE NOTICES) AND STAY, MAY REAL-
IZE THAT HIS
LAWFUL PRESENCE IN THE APARTMENT WILL SOON BE TERMINATED, OR MAY DECIDE JUST TO LEAVE ON
HIS OWN, BUT
HE DOES NOT REASONABLY EXPECT THAT HE HAS IMMEDIATELY BEEN TRANSFORMED INTO A TRESPASS-
ER AND THAT THE
LANDLORD OR THE POLICE OR ANYONE ELSE CAN ENTER HIS APARTMENT. ACCORDINGLY, IN ORDER TO
REFUTE
EVIDENCE THAT DENNIS WAS A LAWFUL TENANT, THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO PRESENT SOME EVI-
DENCE THAT
DENNIS WAS LEGALLY A TRESPASSER. NO SUCH EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED.
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{ 35} WHILE DENNISS PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE NOT DETERMINATIVE OF HIS FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS,
WE CONCLUDE THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT HE HAD BEEN LAWFULLY EJECTED FROM THE
APARTMENT,
DENNIS COULD NOT PROPERLY BE CONSIDERED A TRESPASSER IN HIS APARTMENT SOLELY DUE TO HIS
RECEIPT OF
EVICTION NOTICES. SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, SCHNEIDER V. STATE (SEPT. 3, 2003), ARK.APP. NO. CACR
02-771,
2003 WL 22052832 (holding that under state law, the defendant-tenant retained an expectation of
PRIVACY IN THE RESIDENCE, EVEN THOUGH LEASE HAD EXPIRED, WHEN LANDLORD HAD NOT EVICTED
THE TENANT BY
the statutorily required legal process subsequent to the expiration of the lease).
{ 36} Moreover, the facts that Dennis had some possessions in the apartment and he was
found sitting there indicate that Dennis also subjectively retained an interest in the apartment.
{ 37} The state asserts that Dennis nevertheless had no legitimate expectation of privacy in
this apartment, because he abandoned the property prior to August 17, 2007. As we stated in State
v. Russell, Montgomery App. No. 21458, 2007-Ohio-137:
{ 38} It has long been settled that [a] defendant has no standing under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution to object to a search and seizure of property that he has
voluntarily abandoned. State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044, paragraph
two of the syllabus. As the Ohio Supreme Court has reiterated:
{ 39} Abandonment is primarily a question of intent, and intent may be inferred from
12
words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts. United States v. Cowan (C.A.2, 1968), 396 F.2d
83, 87. All relevant circumstances existing at the time of the alleged abandonment should be
considered. United States v. Manning (C.A.5, 1971), 440 F.2d 1105, 1111. The issue is not
abandonment in the strict property-right sense, but whether the person prejudiced by the search had
voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property in question so
that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the
search. United States v. Edwards, supra, 441 F.2d at 753; Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S.
347, 83 S.Ct. 507. Id. at 297, quoting United States v. Colbert (C.A.5, 1973), 474 F.2d 174, 176.
Russell, 2007-Ohio-137, at 21-22.
{ 40} Stated simply, once a tenant has surrendered or abandoned his or her apartment, the
tenant no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. See Russell. If the tenant
subsequently returned, his status would be that of a trespasser.
{ 41} The government bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the defendant abandoned the property at issue. State v. Dubose, 164 Ohio App.3d 698, 2005-
Ohio-6602, 43.
{ 42} At the suppression hearing, the state presented the landlords statements, through
Officer Kinstle, that Dennis had cleaned out the apartment and had not been seen at the apartment for
a week. Kinstle had also testified that the apartment was typical of what youd expect in a vacant
apartment. No moving boxes were present and a few random pieces of furniture remained. The
landlord assumed that all remaining property had been abandoned.
{ 43} We do not find that the facts support the conclusion that Dennis abandoned the
apartment. Significantly, Dennis was found inside the apartment sitting in a La-Z-Boy chair. This
fact alone suggests that Dennis did not intend to abandon the apartment and the property within it.
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13
Even accepting that Dennis had not been seen at Apartment F for a week, a brief absence from a
residence does not constitute abandonment, particularly when the resident returns. Moreover, the
fact that Dennis had moved most of his possessions to another apartment did not establish that he no
longer had an expectation of privacy in the apartment, particularly when he continued to have a
lawful possessory interest in the property.
{ 44} The trial court erred in concluding that Dennis was a trespasser in his apartment when
the officers entered on August 17, 2007. Accordingly, Dennis was entitled to contest the officers
entrance into and search of the apartment under the Fourth Amendment.
{ 45} Denniss first assignment of error is sustained.
III
{ 46} Denniss second assignment of error states:
{ 47} The opening of appellants door and entrance into his apartment violated his Fourth
Amendment constitutional rights.
{ 48} In his second assignment of error, Dennis claims that the officers entry into his
apartment violated his Fourth Amendment rights, because the officers lacked a justifiable basis for
entering the apartment without a warrant. The state responds that the officers entry into the
apartment was based on an objectively reasonable belief that the apartment was vacant and, thus, the
evidence seized did not need to be suppressed.
{ 49} The trial courts decision dealt mainly with standing and with the officers actions
once they entered the apartment, but the question of the lawfulness of the entry was clearly before the
court by way of the original motion, the evidence, and the arguments. For example, the defense
counsel stated that even if the court finds they had reason to enter the apartment and the prosecutor
argued that these officers acted reasonably in entering that apartment to pursue the trespass
14
complaint.
Woods v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1115 Ind.App.,1998 Evidence that health club member remained on club
premises after being informed by manager, based on erroneous computer records, that her member-
ship had expired, and after being asked to leave, was insufficient to support conviction for criminal
trespass, where member had fair and reasonable belief that she was entitled to be present on club
property and in fact had undisputed bona fide contractual interest in being present on club property,
evidenced by her membership contract. West's A.I.C. 35-43-2-2(a)(2).
{ 17} Denniss first assignment of error states:
{ 18} The trial court erred in determining that appellant was a trespasser and lacked
6
standing to suppress the entry into his apartment and subsequent search of the premises.
{ 19} Dennis claims that the trial court erred in determining that he was a trespasser and in
concluding that he lacked standing to challenge the entry into the apartment. He argues that he could
not be considered a trespasser at his apartment until a court entered an order of restitution of the
premises to the landlord in a civil action, pursuant to R.C. Chapter 1923. Dennis further asserts that
the circumstances of this case are distinguishable from State v. Little, Montgomery App. No. 19976,
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2004-Ohio-1814, and State v. Fleming, Clark App. No. 2003 CA 71, 2004-Ohio-5278, upon which
the trial court relied to support its conclusion that Dennis was a trespasser and lacked standing to
object to the officers entry into the apartment.
{ 20} In reviewing the trial courts ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, this court must
accept the findings of fact made by the trial court if they are supported by competent, credible
evidence. See also State v. Morgan (Jan. 18, 2002), Montgomery App. No. 18985, 2002 WL 63196.
However, the reviewing court must independently determine, as a matter of law, whether the facts
meet the appropriate legal standard. Id.
{ 21} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution secures an individuals right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature,
and they may not be asserted vicariously by third parties. Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128,
133-134, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387. A person aggrieved by the introduction of evidence secured
by an illegal search of a third persons premises or property has not suffered any infringement upon
his Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Henderson, Montgomery App. No. 22062, 2008-Ohio-1160,
9, citing Rakas at 134. Consequently, the person challenging the legality of a search bears the
burden of proving that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Rakas at 143; State v. Williams (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 153, 166.
7
The individual must have a subjective expectation of privacy in the placed searche, and that
expectation must be objectively reasonable and justifiable. Rakas at 143; State v. Buzzard, 112 Ohio
St.3d 451, 2007-Ohio-373, 14.
{ 22} It is well established that a tenant has an expectation of privacy in his or her rented
apartment. Because the right to exclude others is one of the main rights attaching to property,
TENANTS IN LAWFUL POSSESSION OF A HOME OR APARTMENT GENERALLY HAVE A LEGITIMATE EX-
PECTATION OF
PRIVACYBY VIRTUE OF HAVING A PROPERTY INTEREST IN A SPECIFIC PIECE OF REAL ESTATE.
HIGGINS V.
PENOBSCOT CTY.. SHERIFFS DEPT. (JUNE 2, 2005), D.MAINE NO. 04-157-B-W. SEE ALSO COPLEY
V.
VOORHIES (AUG. 27, 2007), S.D.OHIO NO. 2:06-CV-847, 2007 WL 2462651, CITING RAKAS, 439
U.S. AT
143, 99 S.CT. 421, 58 L.ED.2D387, FN.12 (AN INDIVIDUAL HAS A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY
AND, THEREFORE, STANDING TO CHALLENGE LAW ENFORCEMENTS WARRANTLESS SEARCH ON
PROPERTYTHAT THE
INDIVIDUAL LAWFULLYPOSSESSES).
{ 23} IN EVALUATING WHETHER DENNIS HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE
APARTMENT,
THE TRIAL COURT RELIED UPON LITTLE AND FLEMING, IN WHICH WE HELD THAT THE DEFENDANTS
HAD NO LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE PREMISES, BECAUSE THEY WERE TRESPASSERS AT THE TIME OF
THE OFFICERS
ENTRY.
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IN LITTLE, THE DEFENDANT, IN THE PAST, HAD BEEN AN OVERNIGHT GUEST IN HIS GIRLFRIENDS
APARTMENT.
HOWEVER, AT THE TIME OFFICERS ENTERED THE APARTMENT, THE GIRLFRIEND HAD VACATED THE
APARTMENT AND HAD
TOLD THE LANDLORD THAT SHE HAD TRIED TO REMOVE HER BOYFRIEND FROM THE APARTMENT. WE
AFFIRMED THE
TRIAL COURTS CONCLUSION THAT LITTLE LACKED STANDING TO BRING A FOURTH AMENDMENT CHAL-
LENGE, BECAUSE
HIS STATUS WAS SIMPLY THAT OF A TRESPASSER WHEN THE OFFICERS ENTERED THE APARTMENT.
{ 24} IN FLEMING, THE DEFENDANT WAS A PAYING HOTEL GUEST AT THE TIME OF THE SEARCH.
HOWEVER, PRIOR TO THE OFFICERS ENTRY INTO THE HOTEL ROOM, THE HOTEL MANAGER HAD TWICE
ASKED FLEMING
AND THE OTHER OCCUPANTS TO VACATE THE PREMISES. WE CONCLUDED THAT THE MANAGERS RE-
QUEST CONSTITUTED
8
AN EVICTION FROM THE HOTEL ROOM AND THAT FLEMING LOST HIS POSSESSORY INTEREST IN THE
ROOM.
Accordingly, when the officers entered the room, Flemings status was that of a trespasser with no
legitimate expectation of privacy. See also United States v. Allen (C.A.6, 1997), 106 F.3d 695
(stating that a motel occupants reasonable expectation of privacy in his motel room ended when the
rental period expired or the motel manager otherwise took possession of the room).
{ 25} Although the defendants in Little and Fleming were not former or current tenants of
an apartment, such as Dennis, both cases instruct that once an individual becomes a trespasser, the
individual loses any legitimate expectation of privacy that he once had in the premises. However, as
neither a social guest nor a hotel guest has the statutory protections against eviction that a tenant has,
Little and Fleming are not controlling for determining whether Dennis had become a trespasser.
{ 26} WE THEREFORE TURN TO WHETHER DENNIS RETAINED A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVA-
CY IN
APARTMENT F WHEN THE OFFICERS ENTERED WITHOUT A WARRANT ON AUGUST 17, 2007. DENNIS
CLAIMS THAT THE
EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WAS A TRESPASSER AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THAT
HE NO LONGER
HAD A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY BECAUSE HE WAS STILL IN LAWFUL POSSESSION OF
THE
APARTMENT SINCE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PROPER LEGAL PROCEDURES FOR EVICTION HAD
BEEN
completed under R.C. Chapter 1923.
{ 27} [C]oncepts of state property law are relevant, but not necessarily dispositive, for
deciding the question whether there was a legitimate privacy interest for [F]ourth [A]mendment
purposes. United States v. Sledge (C.A.9, 1981), 650 F.2d 1075, 1082.
{ 28} [I]t is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed
and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than
almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical.
9
Jones v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 266, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, overruled on other
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grounds by United States v. Salvucci (1980), 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619. See also
Georgia v. Randolph (2006), 547 U.S. 103, 110, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (stating that
Fourth Amendment rights are not limited by the law of property).
{ 29} At the same time, [a]lthough property [law] concepts are not necessarily
determinative of Fourth Amendment rights, they are nonetheless helpful in assessing which
expectations society is prepared to recognize as legitimate. In particular, a tenants expectation of
privacy in his apartment ceases to be objectively justifiable when his occupancy ceases to be
lawful, as determined by the terms of his lease and the provisions of his states landlord-tenant law.
(Citations omitted.) United States v. Ross (C.A.6, 2002), 43 Fed.Appx. 751, 757.
{ 30} Under Ohio law, a landlord must follow a three-step process to evict a tenant. First,
the landlord must serve the tenant with a notice to terminate the tenancy. R.C. 5321.17. Second, a
TIMELY NOTICE TO VACATE THE PREMISES MUST BE SERVED ON THE TENANT. R.C. 1923.04. THIRD, THE
LANDLORD
MUST FILE A COMPLAINT IN FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER. R.C. 1923.05. STEINER V. MINKOWSKI
(1991), 72
OHIO APP.3D 754, 761.
{ 31} IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT DENNIS HAD BEEN A TENANT OF 1719 RADIO ROAD, APARTMENT F, AND
HE WAS FOUND AT THE APARTMENT ON AUGUST 17, 2007. THE RECORD ESTABLISHED, HOWEVER, THAT
DENNIS
HAD RECEIVED TWO EVICTION NOTICES, ONE OF WHICH (THE THREE-DAY NOTICE) HAD BEEN SEEN BY
KINSTLE IN
the apartment. Dennis acknowledged that he had received both a 30-day eviction notice and a
threeday
eviction notice, and he stated to the officers that he had been evicted. According to Denniss
landlord, the apartment had not been cleaned and the locks had not been changed simply because the
LANDLORD WAS ON VACATION. THE UNOFFICIAL CARETAKER HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CALL THE
POLICE IF DENNIS
RETURNED.
10
{ 32} IN OUR VIEW, DENNIS MET HIS BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THAT HE HAD LAWFUL POSSESSION OF
THE APARTMENT. WHILE THE EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT DENNIS WAS A TENANT OF APARTMENT F
AND THAT HE
HAD BEEN ORDERED TO LEAVE THE APARTMENT BY THE LANDLORD, HE DIDNT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT
WHEN HE WAS
SUPPOSED TO LEAVE. DENNISS STATEMENT THAT HE HAD BEEN EVICTED IS SIMPLY HIS VERNACU-
LAR
acknowledgment that he had been served with eviction notices. There was no evidence before the
court demonstrating that his tenancy had expired. The fact that Dennis had a tenancy interest in the
APARTMENT WAS SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE HAD LAWFUL POSSESSION OF THE APARTMENT
AND, THUS, A
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY.
{ 33} ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT DENNIS HAD BEEN SERVED WITH EVICTION NOTICES,
THIS
evidence was insufficient to rebut the evidence that Dennis had lawful possession of the apartment
and retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. Ohio landlord-tenant law does not
allow for self-help by a landlord. As stated above, a landlord is required to successfully bring a
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forcible entry and detainer action against Dennis in order to effectuate an eviction. Without a
judgment of restitution in the landlords favor, Dennis could continue to lawfully possess the
PREMISES. SEE STATE EX REL. JENKINS V. HAMILTON CTY. COURT, AREA NO. EIGHT (1961), 114 OHIO
APP.
231, 233 (FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER ACTION DETERMINES THE RIGHT TO IMMEDIATE POSSESSION
OF THE
PROPERTY); R.C. 1923.09, 1923.11, 1923.13, AND 1923.14.
{ 34} THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT A TENANT HAS THE RIGHT IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES TO REMAIN IN AN
APARTMENT AND TO ENJOY A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY THAT SOCIETY IS PREPARED TO
RECOGNIZE
ONCE HE HAS BEEN SERVED WITH THE REQUIRED NOTICES AND PAPERS. RATHER, ALTHOUGH THERE IS A
PAUCITY OF
OHIO LAW ON THIS SUBJECT, IT IS TO HOLD THAT IT IS CERTAINLY NOT THE PREROGATIVE OF A LAND-
LORD, UNILATERALLY,
BY THE SIMPLE DELIVERY OF CIVIL NOTICES AVAILABLE AT ANY CONVENIENCE STORE OR OVER THE IN-
TERNET, TO
REMOVE A TENANTS REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY. ATENANT, HAVING RECEIVED SUCH PA-
PERS, MAY
11
THINK THAT HE CAN PAY BACK RENT (IF THAT IS THE REASON FOR THE NOTICES) AND STAY, MAY REAL-
IZE THAT HIS
LAWFUL PRESENCE IN THE APARTMENT WILL SOON BE TERMINATED, OR MAY DECIDE JUST TO LEAVE ON
HIS OWN, BUT
HE DOES NOT REASONABLY EXPECT THAT HE HAS IMMEDIATELY BEEN TRANSFORMED INTO A TRESPASS-
ER AND THAT THE
LANDLORD OR THE POLICE OR ANYONE ELSE CAN ENTER HIS APARTMENT. ACCORDINGLY, IN ORDER TO
REFUTE
EVIDENCE THAT DENNIS WAS A LAWFUL TENANT, THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO PRESENT SOME EVI-
DENCE THAT
DENNIS WAS LEGALLY A TRESPASSER. NO SUCH EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED.
{ 35} WHILE DENNISS PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE NOT DETERMINATIVE OF HIS FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS,
WE CONCLUDE THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT HE HAD BEEN LAWFULLY EJECTED FROM THE
APARTMENT,
DENNIS COULD NOT PROPERLY BE CONSIDERED A TRESPASSER IN HIS APARTMENT SOLELY DUE TO HIS
RECEIPT OF
EVICTION NOTICES. SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, SCHNEIDER V. STATE (SEPT. 3, 2003), ARK.APP. NO. CACR
02-771,
2003 WL 22052832 (holding that under state law, the defendant-tenant retained an expectation of
PRIVACY IN THE RESIDENCE, EVEN THOUGH LEASE HAD EXPIRED, WHEN LANDLORD HAD NOT EVICTED
THE TENANT BY
the statutorily required legal process subsequent to the expiration of the lease).
{ 36} Moreover, the facts that Dennis had some possessions in the apartment and he was
found sitting there indicate that Dennis also subjectively retained an interest in the apartment.
{ 37} The state asserts that Dennis nevertheless had no legitimate expectation of privacy in
this apartment, because he abandoned the property prior to August 17, 2007. As we stated in State
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v. Russell, Montgomery App. No. 21458, 2007-Ohio-137:
{ 38} It has long been settled that [a] defendant has no standing under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution to object to a search and seizure of property that he has
voluntarily abandoned. State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044, paragraph
two of the syllabus. As the Ohio Supreme Court has reiterated:
{ 39} Abandonment is primarily a question of intent, and intent may be inferred from
12
words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts. United States v. Cowan (C.A.2, 1968), 396 F.2d
83, 87. All relevant circumstances existing at the time of the alleged abandonment should be
considered. United States v. Manning (C.A.5, 1971), 440 F.2d 1105, 1111. The issue is not
abandonment in the strict property-right sense, but whether the person prejudiced by the search had
voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property in question so
that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the
search. United States v. Edwards, supra, 441 F.2d at 753; Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S.
347, 83 S.Ct. 507. Id. at 297, quoting United States v. Colbert (C.A.5, 1973), 474 F.2d 174, 176.
Russell, 2007-Ohio-137, at 21-22.
{ 40} Stated simply, once a tenant has surrendered or abandoned his or her apartment, the
tenant no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. See Russell. If the tenant
subsequently returned, his status would be that of a trespasser.
{ 41} The government bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the defendant abandoned the property at issue. State v. Dubose, 164 Ohio App.3d 698, 2005-
Ohio-6602, 43.
{ 42} At the suppression hearing, the state presented the landlords statements, through
Officer Kinstle, that Dennis had cleaned out the apartment and had not been seen at the apartment for
a week. Kinstle had also testified that the apartment was typical of what youd expect in a vacant
apartment. No moving boxes were present and a few random pieces of furniture remained. The
landlord assumed that all remaining property had been abandoned.
{ 43} We do not find that the facts support the conclusion that Dennis abandoned the
apartment. Significantly, Dennis was found inside the apartment sitting in a La-Z-Boy chair. This
fact alone suggests that Dennis did not intend to abandon the apartment and the property within it.
13
Even accepting that Dennis had not been seen at Apartment F for a week, a brief absence from a
residence does not constitute abandonment, particularly when the resident returns. Moreover, the
fact that Dennis had moved most of his possessions to another apartment did not establish that he no
longer had an expectation of privacy in the apartment, particularly when he continued to have a
lawful possessory interest in the property.
{ 44} The trial court erred in concluding that Dennis was a trespasser in his apartment when
the officers entered on August 17, 2007. Accordingly, Dennis was entitled to contest the officers
entrance into and search of the apartment under the Fourth Amendment.
{ 45} Denniss first assignment of error is sustained.
III
{ 46} Denniss second assignment of error states:
{ 47} The opening of appellants door and entrance into his apartment violated his Fourth
Amendment constitutional rights.
{ 48} In his second assignment of error, Dennis claims that the officers entry into his
apartment violated his Fourth Amendment rights, because the officers lacked a justifiable basis for
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entering the apartment without a warrant. The state responds that the officers entry into the
apartment was based on an objectively reasonable belief that the apartment was vacant and, thus, the
evidence seized did not need to be suppressed.
{ 49} The trial courts decision dealt mainly with standing and with the officers actions
once they entered the apartment, but the question of the lawfulness of the entry was clearly before the
court by way of the original motion, the evidence, and the arguments. For example, the defense
counsel stated that even if the court finds they had reason to enter the apartment and the prosecutor
argued that these officers acted reasonably in entering that apartment to pursue the trespass
14
complaint.
{ 50} The states argument is based on the reasonable belief portion of the consent
exception to the warrant requirement, which was first articulated in Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990), 497
U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148. Rodriguez held that the police officers warrantless
search of a residence was valid when the consent to search was given by the defendants girlfriend,
whom the police reasonably but erroneously believed had common authority to give consent. In
reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that the essence of the Fourth Amendment is to
protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 183. The court continued:
{ 51} It is apparent that in order to satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be
made by agents of the government whether the magistrate issuing a warrant, the police officer
executing a warrant, or the police officer conducting a search or seizure under one of the exceptions
to the warrant requirement is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.
Id. at 185.
{ 52} The court therefore concluded that so long as the police reasonably believed that the
defendants girlfriend had the authority to consent to the search, no Fourth Amendment violation had
occurred.
{ 53} The state asserts that we applied Rodriguez in State v. McKinley, Montgomery App.
No. 21668, 2007-Ohio-3705, in which, according to the state, we upheld the police officers
warrantless entry into a house under circumstances similar to those presented in this case. In
McKinley, Dayton police officers responded to a burglary in progress call and were met by a
woman who claimed to own the property. The woman indicated that the house was supposed to be
vacant, but a white male had broken in and entered through the rear of the house. The officers
15
walked around the back and noticed that the exterior door on the second floor was open. Upon going
inside, one officer observed a large marijuana-growing operation, and he encountered a man in an
office chair who claimed to live there. The man provided identification that indicated that his
residence was at that address.
{ 54} We affirmed that trial courts denial of McKinleys motion to suppress based on his
assertion that the officers lacked exigent circumstances to enter the home. Citing Rodriguez, we
stated that the police acted reasonably in relying on the womans representation. We reasoned:
{ 55} There was nothing in the surrounding circumstances that suggested that the officers
should have doubted the womans assertions that she owned the property, that it was supposed to be
vacant and that an intruder was on the premises. In short, it was objectively reasonable for the
officers to rely on her permission to enter the house to capture the suspected intruder. (Emphasis
added.)
{ 56} The present case is not directly analogous to McKinley because, as in Rodriguez, the
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police officers in McKinley had a reasonable, good-faith belief that they had received consent to en-
ter
the premises from a person with apparent authority to give such consent. That is not the case here.
{ 57} The Supreme Court has set forth a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and
has repeatedly held in warrant situations that the exclusionary rule does not apply when, viewing the
circumstances objectively, the police officers reasonably relied on mistaken information. See, e.g.,
United States v. Leon (1984), 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (holding that the
exclusionary rule did not bar evidence obtained in accordance with a facially valid search warrant
that was later invalidated); Arizona v. Evans (1995), 514 U.S. 1, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34
(holding that the exclusionary rule did not apply when officers reasonably relied on an arrest warrant
that was later determined to be erroneous due to mistakes by court employees); Herring v. United
16
States (2009), __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 695 (holding that exclusionary rule did not apply when the arrest
was based on a mistaken belief that an arrest warrant was outstanding, when another officer had
negligently failed to update records). However, the good-faith exception has been applied almost
exclusively in the context of a search pursuant to a search or arrest warrant that is later found
defective. State v. Simon (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 484, 488.
{ 58} We need not resolve whether Rodriguez should be extended or the good-faith
exception should apply when police officers reasonably, but mistakenly, believe that a residence is
vacant and thus no one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Even assuming, arguendo, that
an exception allowed the officers to reasonably rely on information that Denniss apartment was
vacant, the facts of this case also do not support applying any such exception.
{ 59} Here, the officers responded to 1719 Radio Road on an anonymous call that a female
was inside a vacant apartment in the building. Upon arriving, the officers met a woman who claimed
to be a resident of the building. Kinstle testified to their conversation as follows:
{ 60} And we asked her if there were any vacant, recently evicted apartments in the
building. She stated there was only one and it was Apartment F. And she even said that the guys
NAME WAS DENNIS IS WHAT SHE SAID IT. SHE SAID, AND HES BEEN EVICTED SO THE APARTMENT IS
SUPPOSED
to be vacant, is what she told us.
{ 61} Although the dispatch informed the officers that a female trespasser was located in a
vacant apartment, the officers had no information about the individual who called them.
Consequently, the police had no way to assess the reliability of the information contained in the
dispatch. The woman who let the officers into the building with her key appeared to substantiate the
information that there was a vacant apartment. However, the woman was not the landlord, the
officers did not know her, and she did not tell the officers how she knew that Dennis had been
17
evicted and that the apartment was supposed to be vacant.
{ 62} The officers received an anonymous call about a female trespasser inside a vacant unit
at an apartment building; upon arrival, an unknown woman who appeared to be a resident of the
building told them there was only one vacant unit and that the former occupant had been evicted.
The officers knocked on the door, and no one immediately answered. Without more information
ABOUT THE SOURCE OF THE UNKNOWN RESIDENTS INFORMATION OR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO
SUBSTANTIATE THE
REPORT THAT THE APARTMENT WAS VACANT, THE OFFICERS COULD NOT REASONABLY CONCLUDE THAT
APARTMENT F
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WAS VACANT.
{ 63} THE CORE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IS THAT AN INFRINGEMENT OF AN INDIVIDUALS
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY REQUIRES A WARRANT OR, AT LEAST, PROBABLE CAUSE OR A
RECOGNIZED
EXCEPTION TO THIS REQUIREMENT. WHILE THESE EXCEPTIONS ARE NEITHER FEW NOR WELL-
DELINEATED,
BRADLEY, TWO MODELS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1985), 83 MICH.L.REV. 1468, 1473, CITED IN
CALIFORNIA V. ACEVEDO (1991), 500 U.S. 565, 582, 111 S.CT. 1982, 114 L.ED.2D 619 (SCALIA, J.,
CONCURRING), THEY ARE STILL JUST THAT EXCEPTIONS. THE OFFICERS ENTRY INTO THE APARTMENT
DID NOT FALL
UNDER ANY EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OR ITS REMEDY, THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE.
{ 64} DENNISS SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IS SUSTAINED.
IV
{ 65} HAVING SUSTAINED BOTH ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR, WE WILL REVERSE THE TRIAL COURTS
JUDGMENT, AND THE MATTER WILL BE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY.
DONOVAN, P.J., CONCURS.
GRADY, J., DISSENTS.
18
__________________
GRADY, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
{ 66} THE MAJORITYS DECISION SUSTAINING THE FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IS BASED ON A
MISREADING OF THE RECORD AND THE LAW APPLICABLE TO IT.
{ 67} THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIND THAT DEFENDANT DENNIS WAS A TRESPASSER AND THEREFORE
LACKS
STANDING TO PROSECUTE HIS MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BECAUSE HED BEEN EVICTED. RA-
THER, THE COURT
found that Dennis was a trespasser because he had received two eviction notices prior to the
(officers) entry into the apartment.
{ 68} THE FINDING THE TRIAL COURT MADE ASSUMES THE APPLICATION OF R.C. 1923.02(B) AND
5321.17(B) TO THE EFFECT THAT THE NOTICES DENNIS RECEIVED HAD ON HIS TENANCY. THOSE SEC-
TIONS PROVIDE
THAT SUCH NOTICES TERMINATE AN ORAL, MONTH-TO-MONTH TENANCY. DENNISS LANDLORD COULD
THEN ELECT TO
TREAT DENNIS AS A TRESPASSER. JOHNSON V. BROWN, CLARK APP. NO. 2002-CA-76, 2003-OHIO-
1257, 12.
IT IS CLEAR FROM THIS RECORD THAT HIS LANDLORD DID.
{ 69} THE MAJORITY HOLDS THAT A JUDGMENT ENTERED PURSUANT TO R.C. 1923.09(A) WAS IN-
STEAD
NECESSARY IN ORDER TO TERMINATE DENNISS TENANCY. THE MAJORITY RELIES ON STEINER V.
MINKOWSKI (1991), 72 OHIO APP.3D 754, AND STATE EX REL. JENKINS V. HAMILTON CTY. COURT
(1961), 114
OHIO APP. 231. NEITHER CASE INVOLVED AN ORAL TENANCY, HOWEVER.
{ 70} THE RECORD DOES NOT REFLECT WHETHER DENNISS TENANCY WAS ORAL OR WRITTEN OR INDI-
CATE
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ITS DURATION. IT WAS DENNISS BURDEN TO OFFER EVIDENCE ON THE TERMS OF HIS TENANCY FOLLOW-
ING THE
STATES OBJECTION THAT HE LACKS STANDING. ANY ABUSE OF DISCRETION THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT-
TED IN
ASSUMING AN ORAL, MONTH-TO-MONTH TENANCY IS THEREFORE CHARGEABLE TO DENNIS.
{ 71} NEVERTHELESS, EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THE COURT MADE, DENNIS DEMONSTRATED THAT HE
19
WAS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTIONS AFFORDED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WHEN OFFICERS OPENED
THE DOOR TO
HIS APARTMENT AND ENTERED ON AUGUST 17, 2007.
{ 72} THE DEADLINES THE LANDLORDS TWO NOTICES PRESENTED HAD NOT YET PASSED ON THE DATE
POLICE ENTERED, ACCORDING TO DENNISS UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY, AND HE WAS USING THE
TIME REMAINING
TO MOVE OUT. HIS LANDLORD THEREFORE SUFFERED DENNISS PRESENCE ON THE PREMISES FOR
THAT LIMITED
TIME AND PURPOSE, JOHNSON V. BROWN, WHICH BY REFERENCE TO BOTH LAWS OF PROPERTY AND UN-
DERSTANDINGS
THAT SOCIETY RECOGNIZES CONFERRED A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY ON DENNIS. RAKAS
V. ILLINOIS
(1978), 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.CT. 421, 58 L.ED.2D 387. DENNIS THEREFORE HAD A REASONABLE EXPEC-
TATION
OF FREEDOM FROM THE GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSION THAT OCCURRED NECESSARY TO CONFER STAND-
ING TO COMPLAIN
OF A FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION. MANCUSI V. DEFORTE (1968), 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.CT. 2120, 20
L.ED.2D 1154.
{ 73} I WOULD SUSTAIN THE FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ON THE FOREGOING ANALYSIS. I DO NOT
AGREE
WITH THE MAJORITYS VIEW THAT A JUDGMENT AUTHORIZED BY R.C. 1923.09(A) IS ALWAYS NECES-
SARY ON FACTS
OF THIS KIND.
{ 74} MY DISSENT IS FROM THE MAJORITYS DECISION SUSTAINING THE SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ER-
ROR,
WHICH IS NOT AN ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR AT ALL BUT IS INSTEAD A PROPOSITION OF LAW THAT [T]HE
OPENING OF
APPELLANTS DOOR AND ENTRANCE INTO HIS APARTMENT VIOLATED HIS FOURTH AMENDMENT CON-
STITUTIONAL
RIGHTS.
{ 75} HAVING FOUND THAT DEFENDANT LACKS STANDING, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REACH THE IS-
SUE OF
WHETHER THE OFFICERS VIOLATED DEFENDANTS FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WHEN THEY OPENED
THE DOOR OF HIS
APARTMENT. THE COURT INSTEAD FOUND THAT HAVING DONE THAT, THE OFFICERS HAD PROBABLE
CAUSE TO ARREST
DEFENDANT AS A TRESPASSER AND TO SEIZE THE CONTRABAND THEY SAW HIM DISCARD.
{ 76} THE MAJORITY NEVERTHELESS SUSTAINS THE SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ON A FINDING
THAT
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DEFENDANTS FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN OFFICERS OPENED THE DOOR TO
HIS APARTMENT
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT REASONABLE FOR THEM TO DO THAT. HAD THE TRIAL COURT SO FOUND, WE
COULD REVIEW THE
QUESTION DE NOVO. HOWEVER, NOT HAVING MADE ANY FINDING IN THAT REGARD, THE TRIAL COURT
COMMITTED NO
ERROR IN THAT REGARD FOR US TO REVIEW. THE MAJORITYS DECISION SUSTAINING THE SECOND AS-
SIGNMENT IS
THEREFORE NO MORE THAN A GRATUITOUS EXPRESSION OF A LEGAL OPINION BY A COURT LACKING A
JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY TO DETERMINE. IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS AN ADVISORY OPINION, OFFERED PROSPECTIVELY
AND
GRANTING NO RELIEF.
{ 77} AN APPELLATE COURT MAY AFFIRM AN ERRONEOUS JUDGMENT ON OTHER GROUNDS, SO LONG
AS
THOSE GROUNDS WERE FULLY ADDUCED IN THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. STATE V.
PEAGLER (1996),
76 OHIO ST.3D 496. THERE IS NO COROLLARY TO THAT RULE THAT PERMITS AN APPELLATE COURT TO
REVERSE A
JUDGMENT ON GROUNDS THAT WERE FULLY ADDUCED BUT ON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT RENDERED NO
JUDGMENT. THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT DECIDE WHETHER OPENING DEFENDANTS DOOR VIOLATED HIS FOURTH AMEND-
MENT RIGHTS. I
WOULD REMAND THE CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT TO RULE ON THAT ISSUE.
It was clearly reversible error for RMC Judge Gardner to deny Coughlin's motion to suppress
the knowledge of his presence within the quasi-basement on 11/13/11 (regardless of the fact that
Coughlin's presence therein was lawful given the, at worst, claim of right defense that Loomis re-
fused to assert on Coughlin's behalf negating the intent requirement found in RMC 8.10.010).
DESPITE COUGHLIN'S WCPDLESLIE'S MALEVOLENT ATTEMPTS TO ELICIT TESTIMONY TO SUP-
PORT AND EXCEPTION TO NRS 171.136 (IE, THAT A CITIZEN'S ARREST WAS MADE), EVEN WHERE THE
WCDADDAYOUNG FAILED TO MAKE SUCH ARGUMENT OR PUT ANYTHING INTO EVIDENCE TO SUP-
PORT SUCH A CONTENTION, IT IS CLEAR NO CITIZEN'S ARREST WAS EFFECTED ON 8/20/11 OF COUGHLIN
BY THE SKATEBOARDERS. IN FACT, A VIDEO WAS OFFERED INTO EVIDENCE (WHICH JUDGE SFERRAZZA
EXCLUDED IN CLEARLY REVERSIBLE ERROR) THAT SHOWS COUGHLIN EXTOLLING THE YOUTHS TO BE
PEACEFUL AND WAIT FOR THE POLICE TO ARRIVE SO THE DISPUTE COULD BE HANDLED IN A CIVIL MAN-
NER WHERE COUGHLIN HIMSELF CALLED 911 AND REPORTED THAT HE WAS BEING ATTACKED BY THE
YOUTHS AND THAT THEY WERE ATTEMPTING TO STEAL HIS BICYCLE AND DOG. IN FACT, IN ONE OF THE
911 CALLS BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM, GOBLE, GOBLE INDICATES THAT COUGHLIN WAS GIVING US A
HARD TIME, WHICH IS HARDLY CONSISTENT WITH THE YOUTHS DETAINING COUGHLIN OR OTHERWISE
HAVING MADE SOME CITIZEN'S ARREST. FURTHER, ANY SUGGESTION THAT COUGHLIN WAS TRYING
TO GET AWAY FROM THE YOUTHS IS THOROUGHLY DISPROVEN BY THE VERY VIDEOS COUGLHIN HIM-
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SELF FILMED OF THE MOMENTS PRIOR TO THE RPDARRIVING AND THE AUDIO OF THE THREE DIFFERENT
911 CALLS IN QUESTION.
129. GENERALLY
WEST'S KEY NUMBER DIGEST
WEST'S KEY NUMBER DIGEST, ARREST K58, 63.3 WEST'S KEY NUMBER DIGEST, CRIMINAL LAW K99,
394.4(9), 519(8) WEST'S KEY NUMBER DIGEST, INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION K144.1
THE FACT THAT AN ORIGINAL ARREST MAY HAVE BEEN UNLAWFUL DOES NOT AFFECT THE JURISDICTION
OF THE COURT,[FN1] NOR IS IT A GROUND FOR QUASHING THE INFORMATION.[FN2] ALSO, THE ILLE-
GALITY OF AN ARREST DOES NOT PRECLUDE TRIAL OF THE ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENSE,[FN3] EVEN
WHERE THE ARREST VIOLATES THE ARRESTEE'S RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES CONSTITUTION.[FN4] ACRIMINAL COMPLAINT NEED NOT BE DISMISSED AS A RESULT OF AN
ILLEGAL ARREST WHERE THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL DELAY IN THE PROCEEDINGS AND THE DEFENDANT
IS NOT PREJUDICED IN HIS OR HER DEFENSE,[FN5] OR WHERE THE ILLEGAL ARREST DOES NOT IMPAIR
THE SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION.[FN6]
THE ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST DOES NOT AFFECT THE INTRODUCTION AND ADMISSIBILITY OF EVI-
DENCE WHOLLY UNTAINTED BY THE POLICE MISCONDUCT.[FN7] [FN7] U. S. V. CREWS, 445 U.S. 463,
100 S. CT. 1244, 63 L. ED. 2D 537 (1980).YET, IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE
MAY BE A PROPER REMEDY WHEN IT CAN BE PROVEN THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED AS A RESULT
OF AN ILLEGAL ARREST.[FN8] [FN8] COM. V. JACOBSEN, 419 MASS. 269, 644 N.E.2D 213 (1995). A
CONFESSION OBTAINED BY EXPLOITATION OF AN ILLEGAL ARREST MAY NOT BE USED AGAINST A CRIMI-
NAL DEFENDANT UNLESS SUCH CONFESSION RESULTS FROM AN INTERVENING INDEPENDENT ACT OF A
FREE WILL SUFFICIENT TO PURGE THE PRIMARY TAINT OF THE UNLAWFUL INVASION.[FN9] ADDITION-
ALLY, SUBSEQUENT AND INTERVENING EVENTS CAN REMOVE THE TAINT OF AN ILLEGAL CONFESSION
AND ARREST, SUCH AS DISCOVERING ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.[FN10]
CASES:
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF UNIFORM TRAFFIC TICKET AND COMPLAINT
(UTTC), WHICH CHARGED DEFENDANT WITH DRIVING UNDER THE COMBINED INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL
AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, EVEN IF ARRESTING OFFICER LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO EFFECT AR-
REST AND EVEN IF ARREST WARRANT SEPARATE FROM UTTC SHOULD HAVE BEEN OBTAINED; REMEDY
WOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE, NOT DISMISSAL OF CHARGE. MULDOON V. STATE, 959
SO. 2D 698 (ALA. CRIM. APP. 2006).
[ENDOF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] AM. JUR. 2D, CRIMINAL LAW 213.
[FN2] AM. JUR. 2D, INDICTMENTS AND INFORMATIONS 22.
[FN3] MCDONALD V. STATE, 10 MD. APP. 258, 269 A.2D 193 (1970).
[FN4] PAYTON V. NEW YORK, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. CT. 1371, 63 L. ED. 2D 639 (1980).
[FN5] COM. V. JACOBSEN, 419 MASS. 269, 644 N.E.2D 213 (1995).
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[FN6] STATE V. GRAHAM, 200 CONN. 9, 509 A.2D 493 (1986).
[FN7] U. S. V. CREWS, 445 U.S. 463, 100 S. CT. 1244, 63 L. ED. 2D 537 (1980).
[FN8] COM. V. JACOBSEN, 419 MASS. 269, 644 N.E.2D 213 (1995).
[FN9] TAYLOR V. ALABAMA, 457 U.S. 687, 102 S. CT. 2664, 73 L. ED. 2D 314 (1982);
U.S. V. SHAW, 464 F.3D 615, 2006 FEDAPP. 0364P (6TH CIR. 2006); MOORE V. STATE,
933 SO. 2D 910 (MISS. 2006).
[FN10] JACKSON V. STATE, 33 S.W.3D 828 (TEX. CRIM. APP. 2000).
130. WAIVER OF ILLEGALITY
WEST'S KEY NUMBER DIGEST, ARREST K63.1, 63.4(4) 63.4(7.1), 63.4(15), 63.4(18) WEST'S KEY
NUMBER DIGEST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT K7(6)
APERSON DOES NOT, IN EVERY INSTANCE, CONSENT TO A FALSE ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT BY MERE-
LY ACCOMPANYING AN OFFICER PEACEFULLY WITHOUT RESISTING ARREST.[FN1] IN SOME INSTANCES,
HOWEVER, COOPERATION WITH A POLICE OFFICER, SUCH AS VOLUNTARILY ANSWERING A POLICE OF-
FICER'S QUESTIONS,[FN2] OR READILY SUBMITTING TO ARREST,[FN3] WILL WAIVE AN INDIVIDUAL'S
CLAIM TO AN ILLEGAL ARREST.
AN ARRESTEE'S WAIVER OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT, SUCH AS THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, MAY BE
CONSIDERED AS A FACTOR IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE TAINT OF THE INITIAL ARREST IS
PURGED,[FN4] IF THE ARRESTEE'S WAIVER IS KNOWING, AND NOT THE RESULT OF COERCION.[FN5] AD-
DITIONALLY, EVEN THOUGH AN ARRESTEE WAIVES A RIGHT LEADING TO AN ILLEGAL ARREST, THE INDI-
VIDUAL'S ARREST IS NONETHELESS VALID WHERE OTHER EVIDENCE THAT IS NOT FRUIT OF THE POISON-
OUS TREE SUBSTANTIATES THE ARREST.[FN6] HOWEVER, A SUSPECT'S REFUSAL TO WAIVE HIS OR HER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED SUSPICIOUS CONDUCT TO VALIDATE AN ILLEGAL
ARREST.[FN7] A DEFENDANT WAIVES A CLAIM THAT AN ARREST IS ILLEGAL IF THE DEFENDANT FAILS
TO RAISE IT BEFORE TRIAL[FN8] OR PLEA.[FN9] THE ISSUE MAY ALSO NOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL.[FN10]
APERSON WHO WAIVES HIS OR HER RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION,[FN11] OR GIVES BAIL
BONDS,[FN12] DOES NOT WAIVE THE ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST, ALTHOUGH A PERSON'S WAIVER OF
HIS OR HER PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION MAY BE CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE AS TO WHETHER AN INDI-
VIDUAL'S ARREST IS SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE.[FN13] ADDITIONALLY, A DEFENDANT WAIVES A
CLAIM THAT ARREST WARRANTS ARE IMPROPERLY VERIFIED WHEN HE OR SHE FAILS TO QUASH THE
WARRANTS BEFORE NEW WARRANTS HAVE BEEN PROPERLY FILED.[FN14]
IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT A DEFENDANT DOES NOT WAIVE HIS OR HER RIGHT TO CLAIM CIVIL LIABILITY
OR AN ILLEGAL ARREST BY PLEADING GUILTY TO A CHARGE UPON WHICH THE ARREST WAS
MADE.[FN15] HOWEVER, IT HAS ALSO BEEN HELD THAT AN ARRESTEE WAIVES HIS OR HER CIVIL
CLAIMS, INCLUDING A 42
U.S.C.A. 1983 CAUSE OF ACTION, WHEN THE ARRESTEE ACCEPTS ADJOURNMENT IN CONTEMPLATION
OF DISMISSAL IN SATISFACTION OF UNDERLYING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE ARRESTEE
STEMMING
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FROM HIS OR HER ARREST.[FN16] ADDITIONALLY, A DEFENDANT MAY NOT PURSUE A U.S.C.A. 1983
CLAIM IN SOME INSTANCES IF HIS OR HER CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IS NOT RESOLVED IN HIS OR HER FA-
VOR.[FN17]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENTCASES:
EVEN IF POLICE OFFICERS ILLEGALLY STOP AN AUTOMOBILE, THEY CAN ARREST AN OCCUPANT WHO IS
FOUND TO BE WANTED ON A WARRANT. JOHNSON V. PHILLIPS, 664 F.3D 232 (8TH CIR. 2011).
[ENDOF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] MARACLE V. STATE, 50 MISC. 2D 348, 270 N.Y.S.2D 439 (CT. CL. 1966).
[FN2] STATE V. DALY, 35 S.W.3D 237 (TEX. APP. AUSTIN 2000).
[FN3] NICKELL V. COM., 285 S.W.2D 495 (KY. 1955).
[FN4] U.S. V. ADAMS, 137 F. SUPP. 2D 240 (W.D. N.Y. 2001).
[FN5] STATE V. DALY, 35 S.W.3D 237 (TEX. APP. AUSTIN 2000).
AS TO AN ARRESTEE'S CONSENT FOR A POLICE OFFICER TO ENTER A HOME WITHOUT A WARRANT, SEE
102.
[FN6] PATTERSON V. STATE, 1977 OKCR 221, 566 P.2D 855 (OKLA. CRIM. APP. 1977).
[FN7] STATE V. MORENO, 619 SO. 2D 62 (LA. 1993).
[FN8] U.S. V. LEWIS, 24 F.3D 79 (10TH CIR. 1994); ORR V. STATE, 256 ARK. 547, 508
S.W.2D 731 (1974).
[FN9] PEOPLE V. STEWART, 189 CAL. APP. 2D 176, 10 CAL. RPTR. 879 (2D DIST. 1961)
(FAILURE TO SHOW ARRESTEE WARRANT); MCKAY V. CITY OF TULSA, 1988 OKCR 238, 763 P.2D
703 (OKLA. CRIM. APP. 1988).
[FN10] HODGE V. STATE, 756 S.W.2D 353 (TEX. APP. DALLAS 1988).
[FN11] GIORDENELLO V. U.S., 357 U.S. 480, 78 S. CT. 1245, 2 L. ED. 2D 1503 (1958).
[FN12] ALBRECHT V. U.S., 273 U.S. 1, 47 S. CT. 250, 71 L. ED. 505 (1927).
[FN13] SMITH V. TRUST CO. BANK, 215 GA. APP. 413, 450 S.E.2D 866 (1994).
[FN14] ALBRECHT V. U.S., 273 U.S. 1, 47 S. CT. 250, 71 L. ED. 505 (1927).
[FN15] HOTZEL V. SIMMONS, 258 WIS. 234, 45 N.W.2D 683 (1951).
[FN16] HOCK V. KLINE, 304 A.D.2D 477, 758 N.Y.S.2D 640 (1ST DEP'T 2003). [FN17] AS TO FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS, GENERALLY 122.
AS TO CIVIL REMEDIES FOR AN ILLEGAL ARREST, SEE 120 ET SEQ.
122. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS, GENERALLY
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WEST'S KEY NUMBER DIGEST, ARREST K63.4 WEST'S KEY NUMBER DIGEST, CIVIL RIGHTS K1037,
1376 WEST'S KEY NUMBER DIGEST, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW K4544 WEST'S KEY NUMBER DIGEST,
FALSE IMPRISONMENT K7
TRIAL STRATEGY
EXCESSIVE FORCE BY POLICE OFFICER, 21 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 685
POLICE MISCONDUCT LITIGATIONPLAINTIFF'S REMEDIES, 15 AM. JUR. TRIALS 555
ALAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER MAY BE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES UNDER 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 FOR FALSE
ARREST,[FN1] FALSE IMPRISONMENT,[FN2] MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,[FN3] MALICIOUS ABUSE OF
PROCESS,[FN4] OR EXCESSIVE FORCE.[FN5] ALTHOUGH SUCH SECTION 1983 CLAIMS ARE EVALUATED
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S RIGHT TO REMAIN FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEIZURES, A FEDER-
AL COURT WILL ALSO LOOK TO THE LAW OF THE STATE IN WHICH THE ARREST OCCURRED TO ANALYZE
SUCH CLAIMS.[FN6] A MUNICIPALITY CAN ALSO BE LIABLE UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE WHEN IT,
THROUGH ITS POLICE DEPARTMENT, TOLERATES AND PERMITS A PATTERN OF POLICE HARASSMENT,
FALSE ARREST AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.[FN7] TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR AN ALLEGEDLY UN-
CONSTITUTIONAL ARREST, SUCH AS MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, OR FOR OTHER HARM CAUSED BY AC-
TIONS WHOSE UNLAWFULNESS WOULD RENDER THE CONVICTION OR SENTENCE INVALID IN A SECTION
1983 CLAIM, THE PLAINTIFF MUST PROVE THAT THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING HAS BEEN TERMINATED IN A
PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR.[FN8] HOWEVER, A PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS RELATING TO ILLEGAL SEARCH AND IM-
PROPER ARREST ARE NOT FORECLOSED WHEN, IF SUCCESSFUL, THEY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY UNDER-
MINE THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS.[FN9]
CASES:
ARRESTEE'S CONVICTION HAD TO BE INVALIDATED BEFORE HE COULD BRING 1983 ACTION ON CLAIM
THAT ARREST WAS UNLAWFUL. U.S.C.A. CONST.AMEND. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. 1983. FIFIELD V.
BARRANCOTTA, 353 FED. APPX. 479 (2D CIR. 2009).
TO MAINTAIN A 1983 FALSE ARREST CLAIM FOR JUDICIAL DECEPTION, A PLAINTIFF MUST SHOW THAT
AN OFFICER WHO APPLIED FOR AN ARREST WARRANT DELIBERATELY OR RECKLESSLY MADE FALSE
STATEMENTS OR OMISSIONS THAT WERE MATERIAL TO THE FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE. U.S.C.A.
CONST.AMEND. 4; 42
U.S.C.A. 1983. SMITH V. ALMADA, 623 F.3D 1078 (9TH CIR. 2010).
AWARRANTLESS ARREST WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION AND PROVIDES A
BASIS FOR A 1983 CLAIM, BUT THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE AT THE TIME OF THE ARREST CON-
STITUTES AN ABSOLUTE BAR TO A 1983 ACTION FOR FALSE ARREST. U.S.C.A. CONST.AMEND. 4; 42
U.S.C.A. 1983. FRIAS V. DEMINGS, 823 F. SUPP. 2D 1279 (M.D. FLA. 2011).
WARRANTLESS ARREST WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE VIOLATES FOURTH AMENDMENT AND FORMS BASIS
FOR 1983 CLAIM. U.S.C.A. CONST.AMEND. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. 1983. BLACKSHEAR V. CITY OF MIAMI
BEACH,, 799 F. SUPP. 2D 1338 (S.D. FLA. 2011).
OFFICER WHO TRANSPORTED ARRESTEE FROM SCENE OF ARREST TO POLICE STATION, WHERE HE WAS
SHOWN A FACIALLY VALID ARREST WARRANT, WAS NOT LIABLE FOR FALSE ARREST UNDER 1983; OF-
FICER RESPONDED TO REQUEST TO TRANSPORT PRISONER FOR DETECTIVE, ARRESTEE WAS HANDCUFFED
BY DETECTIVE BEFORE OFFICER ARRIVED ON SCENE, DETECTIVE SECURED ARRESTEE IN REAR OF OF-
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FICER'S SQUAD CAR, OFFICER TRANSPORTED ARRESTEE TO THE POLICE STATION, AND OFFICER WAS MET
IN BOOKING ROOM BY DETECTIVE, WHO PROVIDED OFFICER WITH COPIES OF COMPLAINT AND WARRANT
FOR TELEPHONE HARASSMENT.
U.S.C.A.
CONST.AMEND. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. 1983. ZITZKA V. VILLAGE OF WESTMONT, 743 F. SUPP.
2D 887 (N.D. ILL. 2010). PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST IS AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE AGAINST 1983
FALSE ARREST CLAIM. 42
U.S.C.A.
1983. MCCOMAS V. BRICKLEY, 819 F. SUPP. 2D 852 (S.D. IND. 2011), REV'D AND REMANDED, 2012
WL 807145 (7TH CIR. 2012).
HECK V. HUMPHREY DID NOT BAR ARRESTEE'S FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS AGAINST POLICE OFFIC-
ERS BASED ON UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED BLOOD AND URINE SAMPLES SINCE JUDGMENT FOR ARRESTEE
ON HER 1983 CLAIMS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY THAT HER DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
(DUI) CONVICTION, OR HER STATE CONVICTION FOR BATTERY ON A POLICE OFFICER, WAS INVALID.
U.S.C.A. CONST.AMEND. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. 1983. COOK V. OLATHE MEDICAL CENTER, INC., 773 F.
SUPP. 2D 990 (D. KAN. 2011).
BECAUSE PROBABLE CAUSE, AS ELEMENT OF 1983 FALSE ARREST AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
CLAIMS, IS SO FACT-SPECIFIC, IT IS NOT READILY REDUCED TO NEAT SET OF LEGAL RULES. 42 U.S.C.A.
1983. ISLAM V. CITY OF BRIDGETON, 804 F. SUPP. 2D 190 (D.N.J. 2011).
ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT WERE SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT COUNTY POLICE OFFICERS ARRESTED
PLAINTIFF WITHOUT WARRANT OR PROBABLE CAUSE, IN SUPPORT OF 1983 CLAIM ALLEGING FALSE
ARREST AT ANTI-WAR PROTEST; ALTHOUGH COMPLAINT ADMITTED TO POSSIBILITY THAT PLAINTIFF
WAS ILLEGALLY IN STREET PRIOR TO HIS ARREST, IT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE ANY ILLEGAL
ACTS, AND FACT THAT OTHER PROTESTERS ENGAGED IN "CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE" DID NOT NECESSARILY
INDICATE THAT ANY ILLEGAL ACTIVITY OCCURRED OR AFFECT WHETHER OFFICERS HAD PROBABLE
CAUSE TO ARREST PLAINTIFF. U.S.C.A. CONST.AMEND. 4; 42
U.S.C.A. 1983. MORGAN V. COUNTY OF NASSAU, 720 F. SUPP. 2D 229 (E.D. N.Y. 2010).
A 1983 CLAIM FOR FALSE ARREST REQUIRES PROOF THAT: (1) THE DEFENDANT INTENDED TO CONFINE
THE PLAINTIFF, (2) THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONSCIOUS OF THE CONFINEMENT, (3) THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT
CONSENT TO CONFINEMENT, AND (4) THE CONFINEMENT WAS NOT OTHERWISE PRIVILEGED. U.S.C.A.
CONST.AMEND. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. 1983. BRITT V. BUFFALO MUNICIPAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, 827
F.SUPP.2D 198 (W.D. N.Y. 2011).
[ENDOF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] LARSON V. NEIMI, 9 F.3D 1397 (9TH CIR. 1993); MARTINEZ V. GONZALEZ, 152 F. SUPP. 2D 1050
(N.D. ILL. 2001).
[FN2] PRICE V. COCHRAN, 205 F. SUPP. 2D 1241 (D. KAN. 2002), AFF'D, 66 FED. APPX. 781 (10TH CIR.
2003) (WIFE OF ARRESTEE WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO FALSE IMPRISONMENT, UNDER KANSAS LAW, PRE-
CLUDING CLAIM UNDER 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 WHEN SHE WAS PRECLUDED FROM REENTERING HER HOUSE
FOR TWO HOURS WHILE POLICE SOUGHT A WARRANT TO SEARCH THE HOUSE FOR THE PRESENCE OF EVI-
DENCE FOLLOWING VALID ARREST OF HER HUSBAND); GROMAN V. TOWNSHIP OF MANALAPAN, 47 F.3D
628 (3D CIR. 1995).
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[FN3] THACKER V. CITY OF COLUMBUS, 328 F.3D 244, 2003 FEDAPP. 0127P (6TH CIR. 2003).
[FN4] SAVINO V. CITY OF NEW YORK, 331 F.3D 63 (2D CIR. 2003).
[FN5] 123, 124.
[FN6] JAEGLY V. COUCH, 439 F.3D 149 (2D CIR. 2006); BROWN V. AYBAR, 451 F. SUPP. 2D 374, 213
ED. LAWREP. 990 (D. CONN. 2006).
[FN7] AMONS V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 231 F. SUPP. 2D 109 (D.D.C. 2002).
[FN8] HECK V. HUMPHREY, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. CT. 2364, 129 L. ED. 2D 383 (1994); CLARK V.
KENTUCKY, 229 F. SUPP. 2D 718 (E.D. KY. 2002) (CLAIMS OF UNLAWFUL SEIZURE AND LACK OF PROB-
ABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST COULD NOT GO FORWARD, ALTHOUGH EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIM COULD GO
FORWARD).
[FN9] SIMPSON V. ROWAN, 73 F.3D 134 (7TH CIR. 1995).
FURTHER, THE PROXIMITY OF COUGHLIN'S ARREST ON 2/1/13 AFTER 7 PM CONSIDERING
COUGHLIN EMAIL TO WCDA CRIMINAL DIVISION EARLY MORNING 2/1/13 IS TROUBLING. ADDITION-
ALLY, WCDA DDA WATTS-VIAL'S REFUSAL TO RESPOND TO COUGHLIN'S PROPERLY ISSUED SUBPOE-
NAS IN HIS FORMAL DISCIPLINARY HEARING (SEE WATTS LAST MINUTE 11/13/12 FAX TO COUGHLIN RE-
FUSING TO HAVE 2JDC JUDGES AND ADMINISTRATORS APPEAR OR TO PRODUCED MATERIALS REQURED
BY COUGHLIN'S SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM, ALL PROPERLY ISSUED UNDER SCR 110, AND WHERE NO
FEES WERE REQUIRED GIVE SCR 105(4) AND SCR 119(3), AND WHERE THE PANEL CHAIR'S 11/7/12
ORDER QUASHING SUBPOENAS ON RMC JUDGES IS VOID ANYWAYS GIVEN JURISDICTION TO SO RULE,
UNDER SCR 111(4) RESIDES WITH NNDB BOARD CHAIR SUSICH, NOT PANEL CHAIR ECHEVERRIA, AND
WHERE SUCH DOES NOT APPLY TO SUPBOENAS ISSUED TO 2JDC JUDGES AND PERSONNEL. COUGHLIN
SOUGHT TO HAVE 2JDC AND OR WATTS-VIAL COMPELLED TO SO PRODUCED SUCH AT THE PERIL OF
CONTEMPT AT THE 11/14/12 FORMAL HEARING. FURTHER, EVEN IF NRCP 45 WAS APPLICABLE, AS
DDA WATTS-VIAL'S 11/13/12 FAX INDICATES, COUGHLIN HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED AS AN ATTOR-
NEY AND COUGHLIN WAS AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE AND APPEAR PRO SE IN THAT MATTER IN STATE
BAR COURT OF THE SBN, INCLUDING BY EXPRESS ASSERTION MADE TO COUGLIN ON 10/15/12 BY ASST.
BAR COUNSEL KING, RELAYING CHIEF BAR COUNSEL'S DAVID CLARK'S DECISION VIS A VIS
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COUGHLIN'S RIGHT TO ISSUE HIS OWN SUBPOENAS (VERSUS GOIGN TO THE SBN AND HAVE CLERK PE-
TERS DO SO), AND FURTHER IN CONSIDERATION OF THE 7/27/12 WRITING TO COUGHLIN BY NNDB
CHAIR SUSICH DIRECTING COUGHLIN TO CONFER WITH AND OBTAIN ANY SUCH INDICATIONS FROM BAR
COUNSEL, VERSUS THE NNDB.
(a) This Courts precedents provide no definitive answer to the question whether counsel
must be provided. The Sixth Amendment grants an indigent criminal defendant the right to counsel,
see, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688, 696, but does not govern civil cases. Civil and crimi-
nal contempt differ. A court may not impose punishment in a civil contempt proceeding when it is
clearly established that the alleged contemnor is unable to comply with the terms of the order. Hicks
v. Feiock, 485 U. S. 624, 638, n. 9. And once a civil contemnor complies with the underlying order,
he is purged of the contempt and is free. Id., at 633. The Due Process Clause allows a State to provide
fewer procedural protections in civil contempt proceedings than in a criminal case. Id., at 637641.
Cases directly concerning a right to counsel in civil cases have found a presumption of such a right
only in cases involving incarceration, but have not held that a right to counsel exists in all such cas-
es. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1; Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480; and Lassiter v. Department of Social
Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U. S. 18. Pp. 710 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973); Impact of
the Gagnon decision All probationers in the United States who incur a violation or multiple violations
are guaranteed certain hearings before any permanent, punitive action is taken. A Gagnon I hearing
occurs when a probationer is taken into custody for an alleged violation hearing; this first hearing de-
termines if the probation should remain in custody or be released back into the community. A Gag-
non II hearing is the final revocation procedure. A determination on the status of the probation is
made, and if the probationer is found in violation, a sentence for the violation is handed down by the
Judge. Even if Couglhin may not have a right to representation paid by the state at either the 2/13/13
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Contempt Hearing in 12-065630 (that's not clear) or in the upcoming 3/11/13 Probation Violation
Hearing (though, arguably, a Gagnon I hearing is still required to determine if the $500 cash bail is
still properly held by the Court in 11-063341), Coughlin hereby requests this Court take judicial no-
tice of D10 Judge Elliot's 1/9/13 Order granting Coughlin in forma pauperis status, in addition to
Judge Clifton granting Coughlin such status as well in 12-065630 on 11/27/12.
FURTHER, COUGHLIN'S SUSPENDED SENTENCE IN 11-063341 WAS UNCONSITUTIONAL IN THAT
COUGHLIN ACTUALLY WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL (INCLUDING TO BE HIS OWN COUNSEL
WHERE COUGHLIN FILED A NOTICE OF APPEARANCE AND AUTHORIZATION TO REPRESENT ON 2/15/12
IN 11-063341, WHILE HE WAS STILL A LICENSED ATTORNEY NO LESS, BUT WAS STILL REFUSED TO RIGHT
TO PROCEED AS HIS OWN COUNSEL UNTIL FINALLY, ON 10/22/12, UPON JIMLESLIE PURPOSEFULLY SAB-
OTAGING COUGHLIN'S CASE AS MUCH AS HE POSSIBLY COULD, JUDGE SFERRAZZA FINALLY RECOGNIZED
COUGHLIN'S ARGUMENT THAT HE WAS BEING FORCED TO PROCEED WITHOUT ANY ASSISTANCE FROM
THE STATE INCIDENT TO THE SIXTH AMENDMENT (COUGHLIN WAS CONTINUOUSLY FACED WITH A
DOUBLE EDGE SWORD...BE HIS OWN COUNSEL (EXCEPT FOR THE FACT THAT JUDGE SFERRAZZA RULED
COUGHLIN NOT COMPETENT TO BE HIS OWN COUNSEL ON 8/29/12, THOUGH COMPETENT TO STAND TRI-
AL, CURIOUSLY, ALSO CURIOSU IS HOWCOUGHLIN COULD BE CONVICTED IN 11-063341 AND THEN OR-
DER TO GET A MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION....):
B. MISDEMEANORS SENTENCE OF ACTUAL OR SUSPENDED IMPRISONMENT. AN INDI-
GENT PERSON HAS A SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN ALL MISDEMEANOR
CASES IN WHICH ACTUAL IMPRISONMENT OR A SUSPENDED SENTENCE OF IMPRISON-
MENT IS IMPOSED. SEE ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); SCOTT V.
ILLINOIS, 440 U.S. 367, 37374 (1979) (IN MISDEMEANOR CASES, THE SIXTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION REQUIRE ONLY
THAT NO INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANT BE SENTENCED TO A TERM OF IMPRISON-
MENT UNLESS THE STATE HAS AFFORDED HIM THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF AP-
POINTED COUNSEL); ALABAMA V. SHELTON, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (INDIGENT DE-
FENDANT HAS RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL IN MISDEMEANOR CASE IF COURT IM-
POSES SUSPENDED SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT); SEE ALSO NORTH V. RUSSELL, 427
U.S. 328 (1975) (RECOGNIZING THAT IN TWO-TIERED COURT SYSTEM, SUCH AS NORTH
CAROLINAS DISTRICT AND SUPERIOR COURT SYSTEM, JUDGE AT EACH LEVEL MUST IN-
FORM INDIGENT DEFENDANT OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL IF SENTENCE OF CONFINEMENT IS
TO BE IMPOSED). THIS RULE HAS THREE EFFECTS. FIRST, IF THE COURT HAS NOT AP-
POINTED COUNSEL FOR AN INDIGENT DEFENDANT AND THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT HAS
NOT WAIVED COUNSEL, THE COURT IS PROHIBITED FROM IMPOSING AN ACTIVE OR SUS-
PENDED SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, SUPPOSE A DISTRICT COURT
JUDGE REFUSES TO APPOINT COUNSEL IN A MISDEMEANOR CASE AND CONTINUES THE
CASE TO ANOTHER DATE, WHEN IT WILL BE HEARD BY A SECOND DISTRICT COURT
JUDGE. IF THE SECOND JUDGE DOES NOT REVISIT THE EARLIER REFUSAL TO APPOINT
COUNSEL AND THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT WAIVE COUNSEL, THE SECOND JUDGE MAY
NOT SENTENCE THE DEFENDANT TO AN ACTIVE OR SUSPENDED TERM OF IMPRISON-
MENT REGARDLESS OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL OR SENTENCING. SECOND,
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IF THE COURT IMPOSES A SUSPENDED SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN VIOLATION OF
THE DEFENDANTS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, THE COURT IN A LATER PROCEEDING MAY NOT
REVOKE THE DEFENDANTS PROBATION AND ACTIVATE THE SENTENCE. THIS PROHIBI-
TION APPLIES EVEN IF THE DEFENDANT IS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL AT THE PROBA-
TION REVOCATION HEARING. SEE SHELTON, SUPRA; STATE V. NEELEY, 307 N.C. 247,
297 S.E.2D 389 (1982) (TRIAL JUDGE MAY NOT ACTIVATE SUSPENDED SENTENCE IF, IN
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN WHICH SUSPENDED SENTENCE WAS IMPOSED, DEFENDANT
DID NOT HAVE COUNSEL AND HAD NOT WAIVED COUNSEL); ACCORD STATE V. BARNES,
65 N.C. APP. 426, 310 S.E.2D 30 (1983) (APPLYING NEELEY TO DISTRICT COURT
CASE); STATE V. BLACK, 51 N.C. APP. 687, 277 S.E.2D 584 (1981) (TO SAME EFFECT
AS NEELEY). THIRD, IF THE COURT IMPOSED AN ACTIVE OR SUSPENDED TERM OF IM-
PRISONMENT FOR A MISDEMEANOR DESPITE THE FAILURE TO APPOINT COUNSEL, THE
CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE IN A SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDING TO IMPEACH,
ENHANCE A SENTENCE, OR INCREASE THE LEVEL OF AN OFFENSE. THE REASON IS THAT
WHEN A SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENTACTUAL OR SUSPENDEDIS IMPOSED FOR A
MISDEMEANOR, THE CASE IS CONSIDERED SERIOUS ENOUGH TO REQUIRE THE PROTEC-
TION OF COUNSEL. AS IN A FELONY CASE, IF A CONVICTION IS OBTAINED WITHOUT
COUNSEL HAVING BEEN AFFORDED TO THE DEFENDANT, THE CONVICTION SHOULD BE
SUBJECT TO SUPPRESSION. IN THIS RESPECT, THE U.S. SUPREME COURTS DECISION IN
SHELTON, SUPRA, WHICH HELD THAT AN INDIGENT DEFENDANT HAS A RIGHT TO COUN-
SEL IF A SUSPENDED SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IS IMPOSED, APPEARS TO MODIFY OR
AT LEAST CLARIFY NICHOLS V. UNITED STATES, 511 U.S. 738 (1994). NICHOLS HELD
THAT A PRIOR UNCOUNSELED CONVICTION COULD BE USED TO ENHANCE A DEFEND-
ANTS SENTENCE IN A SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDING IF THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE A
RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT THE PRIOR PROCEEDING. AFTER SHELTON, A PRIOR CONVICTION
SHOULD NOT BE USEABLE IN A SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDING IF THE PRIOR CONVICTION
RESULTED IN AN ACTIVE OR SUSPENDED SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT
Please find in Exhibit 1 various relevant materials showing good cause why judicial economy
woudl be best served to continue the 3/11/13 Show Cause Hearing. Coughlin has recently completed
an intake with NNAHMS and did in fact appear for a DAS check on the date he is alleged to have
failed to do so, 1/23/13, at approximately 2:54 pm, though in complying with the 12/5/12 Administra-
tive Order 12-01 of Judge Sferrazza requiring Coughlin check in and wait for an RJC Bailiff to escort
him (even to DAS, as Coughlin reads it) Coughlin was, unfortunately, unable to make it to the DAS
window to complete a PBC test by 3:00 pm. Coughlin attempted to take a PBC with a WCSO Depu-
ty Kirkam in a good faith effort to demonstrate compliance with the sobriety requirement, but was
unable to have such a test administered. Coughlin timely checked in with DAS yesterday and is tak-
ing active steps to participate in a meaningful and successful probation experience, though complica-
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tions related to going to jail, being forced of one medication, forced to take the other (Wellbutrin) at
bedtime in jail, despite it being known to cause sleeplessness, then a 5 day contempt incarceration
beginning on 2/12/13 incidnet to Coughlin's sleeping through two alarm clocks and being late to
court (though not given any opportunity at Contempt hearing the next day to question RJC's Robbin
Baker as to whether Coughlin's alleged reason for previously being late to a hearing in that matter
negated any finding or import of Coughlin's being warned against being late again. Again implies
the the warning relates to a previous occurrence. Coughlin was told by Baker that the 12/11/12 Trial
date start time had been moved to 1:30 pm. Apparently, only the witness subpoenas were intended to
be moved. Coughlin swears it was his understanding the trial time had been moved and maintains
that he should not be held to a warning and the consquences of violating such given those circum-
stances. Further basis for continuance related to the primacy to Coughlin's life and career of complet-
ing the Appellant's Brief in 62337 challenging Recommendation to disbar him. Scattershot SBN
Complaint alleging 12 different RPC's violated and SCR 105(2)(c) rampant violations makes Brief's
Preparation inordinately difficult, on top of three arrests between 2/2/13 and 2/13/13. Also, WCPD
Dogan failed to appear at Couglin's arraignment on the gross misdemeanor charge on 2/14/12 in 12-
065630, and Coughlin had a right to counsel at all stages for such a gross misdemeanor charge,
instead, the RJC's Judicial Secretary Townsend send Coughlin's 2/21/12 filing in that case to the SBN
as evidence of Coughlin's lack of competency, in addition to voluntarily offering to send Coughlin's
2/15/12 Pre-Trial Motion in 11-063341 to the SBN as well.
Stages of Criminal Case in which Right to Counsel Applies The right to counsel in a
criminal case encompasses various proceedings. The Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel attaches once adversarial judicial proceedings have commenced and applies to any
critical stage thereafter. Other constitutional provisions and state statutes afford the
defendant the right to counsel at additional proceedings, both before and after the ini-
tiation of judicial proceedings. A. When Right to Counsel Attaches Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel after Commencement of Judicial Proceedings. The Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel attaches upon commencement of adversarial judicial proceed-
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ings against the defendant, whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972);
accord State v. Tucker, 331 N.C. 12, 33, 414 S.E.2d 548, 560 (1992). The question of
when judicial proceedings commence is generally a matter of concern in assessing the
lawfulness of police proceduresfor example, whether the defendant had a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel during interrogation or at a lineup. Generally, when a
defendant is arrested for a felony (with or without a warrant) before being indicted,
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at first appearance. See State v. Tuck-
er, supra (taking of statement by police after first appearance violated Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel; statement suppressed); State v. Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 304
S.E.2d 579 (1983) (taking of statement after arrest and before first appearance did not
violate Sixth Amendment); State v. Detter, 298 N.C. 604, 260 S.E.2d 567 (1979)
(first appearance itself not critical stage). If the defendant is indicted before being ar-
rested, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches on return of the indictment.
See Kirby, supra. In misdemeanor cases, judicial proceedings probably commence
upon the defendants first appearance in district court. See 3 LAFAVE 11.2(b), at
498; ROBERT L.FARB, ARREST,SEARCH &INVESTIGATION 207 (Institute of
Government, 3d ed. 2003).
A defendant has a right to counsel in misdemeanor prosecutions if the court imposes
an active or suspended sentence of imprisonment. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S.
654 (2002). Accordingly, if the defendant is improperly denied counsel, the court is
precluded from imposing either an active or suspended sentence of imprisonment.
Further, if the court imposes a suspended sentence of imprisonment in violation of the
defendants right to counsel, the court may not activate the defendants sentence at a
probation revocation proceeding regardless of whether the defendant is represented at
the revocation proceeding. See infra 12.3B. Civil Contempt. In McBride v.
McBride, 334 N.C. 124, 431 S.E.2d 14 (1993), the state supreme court held that an
indigent defendant charged with civil contempt for failing to pay child support may
not be incarcerated unless he or she has been appointed counsel or has waived coun-
sel. The court rejected the argument that the right to counsel depends on whether the
case is considered civil or criminal, stating that jail is just as bleak no matter which
label is used. 334 N.C. at 130, 431 S.E.2d at 19. Although McBride concerned a
child support contempt case, its reasoning applies equally to any contempt proceeding
in which the defendant is incarcerated. See John L. Saxon, McBride v. McBride:
Implementing the Supreme Courts Decision Requiring Appointment of Counsel in
Civil Contempt Proceedings, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM
No. 94/05 at 1 n.3 (Institute of Government, May 1994)
FROM: KANDARAS, MARY SENT: THURSDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2012 10:20 AM
TO: LESLIE, JIMSUBJECT: RE: THE THREE E'S; WCPD FAILURE TO PROVIDE ES-
SENTIAL 911 CALL CD DISCOVERY OF 8/13 AND 8/17, 2012 TO COUGHLIN IN
RCR2012-065630 IMPORTANCE:
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HIGH
JIM:
I BELIEVE THAT YOUSHOULD SEND THIS. SUPREME COURT RULE 104(A) AUTHOR-
IZES STATE BAR COUNSEL TO INVESTIGATE ALL MATTERS INVOLVING POSSIBLE
ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT OR INCAPACITY CALLED TO BAR COUNSEL'S ATTENTION,
WHETHER BY GRIEVANCE OR BOTH. THIS POTENTIALLY INVOLVES MISCON-
DUCT (VIOLATION OF LAW) AND INCAPACITY.
775 -337 -5723 direct phone
-----Original Message----From: Leslie, Jim Sent: Wednesday, December
12, 2012 5:11 PM To: Kandaras, Mary Subject: RE: The Three E's; wcpd
failure to provide essential 911 call cd discovery of 8/13 and 8/17, 2012
to Coughlin in rcr2012 -065630
Thanks, please do. He came to our office after my email to you and caused a disturbance. We called
the police, but he fled before they arrived. jim
-----Original Message----From: Kandaras, Mary Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2012 3:17 PM To:
Leslie, Jim Subject: RE: The Three E's; wcpd failure to provide essential 911 call cd discovery of
8/13 and 8/17, 2012 to Coughlin in rcr2012-065630
I will have to review this tomorrow and get back to you.
-----Original Message----From: Leslie, Jim
The below email from Mr. Coughlin contains a reference at the end of the first paragraph to a
website containing a video clip from the movie Cape Fear. Please advise whether any action is re-
quired of our office or yours regarding this possible veiled or indirect threat of violence against attor-
neys in this office by Mr. Coughlin.
Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2012 2:59 PM To: Kandaras, Mary Subject: FW: The Three E's;
wcpd failure to provide essential 911 call cd discovery of 8/13 and 8/17, 2012 to Coughlin in
rcr2012-065630
Mary:
Please review my transmittal to Patrick King at the bar, below, and
let me know if I should do anything else from a civil perspective.
Thanks,
-----ORIGINAL MESSAGE----FROM: LESLIE, JIMSENT: WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2012 2:49 PM TO:
'PATRICKK@NVBAR.ORG' SUBJECT: FW: THE THREE E'S; WCPD FAILURE TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL 911
CALL CD DISCOVERY OF 8/13 AND 8/17, 2012 TO COUGHLIN IN RCR2012 -065630
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MR. KING:
THANK YOU,
JAMES B. LESLIE, ESQ. CHIEF DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER WASHOE COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OF-
FICE
-----ORIGINAL MESSAGE----FROM:
ZACH COUGHLIN [MAILTO:ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM] SENT: WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2012
2:35 PM TO: LESLIE, JIM; BOSLER, JEREMY; DOGAN, BIRAY; GOODNIGHT, JOSEPH W; FORTIER, CHRIS;
TUTTLE, STEVE; KANDARAS, MARY; YOUNG, ZACH; SKAUC@RENO.GOV; WONGD@RENO.GOV;
KADLICJ@RENO.GOV; COMPLAINTS@NVBAR.ORG; CVELLIS@BHFS.COM; JE@ELORENO.COM;
PATRICKK@NVBAR.ORG; DAVIDC@NVBAR.ORG; ROSEC@NVBAR.ORG; LAURAP@NVBAR.ORG;
SKENT@SKENTLAW.COM; MIKE@TAHOELAWYER.COM; EIFERT.NTA@ATT.NET;
NEVTELASSN@SBCGLOBAL.NET; FFLAHERTY@DLPFD.COM; FFLAHERTY@DYERLAWRENCE.COM
SUBJECT: THE THREE E'S; WCPD FAILURE TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL 911 CALL CD DISCOVERY OF 8/13 AND
8/17, 2012 TO COUGHLIN IN
RCR2012 -065630
THE TRIAL YESTERDAY IN RCR2012-065630 FEATURED EXTENDED DIS-
CUSSIONS REGARDING THE FAILURE OF THE WCPD, DOGAN, AND LESLIE,
TO TURN OVER DISCOVERY PROPOUNDED BY DDA YOUNG IN THE FORM OF
CD'S FEATURING 911 CALLS DDA YOUNG PROVIDED TO THE WCPD ON
8/13/12 AND 8/17/12 ... AND THE HEAVY HITTERS WERE THERE, TOO
(ELLIOT SATTLER) ..... DESPITE NUMEROUS WRITTEN REQUESTS FROM
COUGHLIN THAT THE WCPD DO SO, AND MULTIPLE TRIPS TO THE WCPD
PERSONALLY BY COUGHLIN TO PICK SUCH MATERIALS UP, AND DESPITE
MORE FLIP FLOPPING ON THEIR STORY BY LESLIE AND DOGAN REGARDING
WHETHER THEY EVER GAVE COUGHLIN SOME PACKAGE OF MATERIALS RE-
SPONSIVE TO COUGHLIN'S REQUEST FOR HIS "FILE" ... BUT, JIM LESLIE IS
STUCK WITH THE 7/27/12 DATE HE MENTIONS IN HIS EMAIL, THEN HE IS
STUCK WITH WHAT HIS RECENT EMAIL WHEREIN HE PURPORTS TO HAVE
THEREIN DIGITALLY TRANSMITTED COUGHLIN HIS "FILE", WHICH OBVI-
OUSLY DOES NOT INCLUDE THE CD'S OF 911 CALLS (THE ONE'S DDA
YOUNG TOOK UP AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF COURT TIME PLAYING, OVER
AND OVER (WELL, YOUNG ONLY PLAYED OVER AND OVER THE PARTICU-
LAR CALLS HE FELT WERE STRONGEST FOR HIS CASE AND MOST PREJUDI-
CIAL, CLAIMING SOME "CUTTING ROOM FLOOR MISHAP" FOR THE REOC-
CURRENCE OF CERTAIN CALLS, ARGUING THAT SUCH A "HAPPY ACCIDENT"
JUSTIFIED PLAYING THEM AGAIN AND AGAIN, AT EVER INCREASING VOL-
UMES, ETC., ETC.). APPARENTLY, I AM HERE TO SUBSIDIZE YOUNG'S BABY
MAKING, JUST LIKE I WAS WITH MS. GORMAN, AS A CONTINUANCE OF
PREJUDICIAL LENGTH OF AFFORDED TO THE STATE WHERE NONE WAS
FORTHCOMING TO COUGHLIN, DESPITE LESLIE AND DOGAN'S OBSTRUC-
TIONIST TANTRUMS, ONES OF A QUALITY THAT WOULD. I REMEMBER WHEN
MY LIFE FEATURED HAPPY MOMENTS LIKE THE BIRTH OF TWINS ... BUT
THAT WAS BEFORE YOUR LEVIATHAN LEGAL SYSTEM WRECKED SHOP ON
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MY EXISTENCE. WHAT, SIR, SHALL BE MY COMPENSATION? DO YOU MIND
IF I PUT MY ARM AROUND .... HTTP://TINYURL.COM/BGMLFDR
This is a formal grievance against Dogan, Leslie, Bosler, Young ...
etc....
The link that Leslie refers to as containing a video clip from the movie Cape Fear actually
contains only an audio clip of a short quote from Cape Fear (the 1991 Scorsese version).
It was arguably an abuse of process by Bar Counsel Patrick King. However, Coughlin's rec-
ollection of the November 6th, 2012 (the night of the Presidential Election...Coughlin asked Nevada
Lawyer employee Paula Campbell if she knew who was winning in the polls...etc.,) brief encounter
between she and Coughlin was of one of an entirely cordial, professional nature.
At that time, Campbell mentioned she was the only one there (working late), and that Asst.
Bar Counsel King had left a few minutes prior to five pm. Coughlin indicated that he had presented a
couple minutes prior to 5 pm to file a document where time was of the essence and inquired as to the
posted closing time of the SBN and policies respecting what file stamped date such a submission
would be given under those circumstances.
Couglin did not ask Campbell if he may venture inside the SBN's Offices at that time, nor
did he ever flash his 1996 Honda's headlights to gain attention. There was an issue with the electrical
wiring to Coughlin's headlights (the tailights went out due to a short somewhere in the system, and
due to his poverty, Coughlinhad to make do without a trip to the mechanic and simply splice in some
speaker wires from the headlights to the tail lights, and procrastinated in affixing an on/off switch in
there, so Coughlin has to, basically , braid the wires together every time he drives at night and in
turning the lights uon and off (what a pain)..
..
Exhibit 1 to Mr. King's Temporary Protection Order Application in rcp12-607 contians mostly
unattributed unsworn hearsay and is misleading at best.
The substantive section containing the allegations in Bar Counsel King's TPO applica-
tion of 12/20/12 in RJC RCP2012-000607 is pasted below. It should be noted that Coughlin has
been through quite a lot this year, being wrongfully incarcerated over 10 times and wrongfully evict-
ed 6 times, and as such, he is severely indigent, something Bar Counsel King is attempting to take
further advantage of by increasing Coughlin's postage costs and decreasing the time he would have to
draft filings given the transport time such an EPO would add to the service thereof....Mr. King relied
exclusively on hearsay, conjecture, and inference in his account below in those rare instances when
he is not just outright lying. The "violent scen from the movie "Cape Fear" was actually an audio clip
from the popular website www.harm.com containing an audio only quotation by Robert Deniro
where he confronts official misconduct perpetrated against him by his public defender by invoking
power of reading, learning, and philosophy...things Mr. King obviously finds litttle utility in:
"Exhibit 1
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On November 14, 2012, the Office of Bar Counsel held a disciplinary hearing at its Reno
office with two sheriff personnel in attendance as a measure of protection. As a result of the hearing
the panel unanimously agreed to permanently disbar Mr. Coughlin from the practice of law. On Fri-
day, December 14, 2012 the Panel's Order was filed and copies were mailed to Mr. Coughlin both by
regular and certified mail.
Mr. Coughlin continues to make repeated calls to the State Bar demanding copies and in-
formation. He is getting increasingly antagonistic and will not listen to our attempts to reason with
him. This morning he announced that he "would be there in 15 minutes" It is our fear that if he shows
up we won't be able to get rid of him - we are not able to satisfy his demands and that just seems to
aggravate the situation. He has shown up after hours presumably to file documents; eventually he has
used the mail slot for the documents but has sat in his car in front of the office flashing his lights to
get attention. Employees have been afraid to leave and, on a couple of occasions, the police have
been called - we don't know if they have shown up because once he leaves, we leave. On one particu-
lar occasion, a female employee was in the office alone. Mr. Coughlin knocked on her window and
gestured to the front door so he could gain access to the building. Eventually the employee was able
to get him to leave and the police were called but did not arrive before Mr. Coughlin left the premis-
es.
This past Monday Assistant Bar Counsel Pat King did dispatch the police because Mr.
Coughlin again announced that he was coming to the office - two officers did show up and one was
dispatched to the Panel Chair's office (9432 Double R Blvd.) because Coughlin has also threatened
and intimidated John Echeverria's office staff. When Coughlin called the Echeverria law firm that
particular day he stated that he needed some "face time" with John. Mr. King has received numerous
e-mails detailing what Mr. Coughlin perceives to be a miscarriage of justice in his discipline matter
and has indicated that he will "expose him as a liar and a fraud".
In a letter dated November 7, 2012, prior to the discipline hearing, the Office of Bar Coun-
sel sent Mr. Coughlin a letter asking that he refrain from coming to the State Bar offices without call-
ing beforehand. On November 17, 2012, after the discipline hearing, the Panel Chair issued an Order
instructing Mr. Coughlin to refrain from contacting any member of the Panel, the Court Reporter
(whom Mr. Coughlin had contacted by phone at her residence), any of the Panel Chair's office staff,
or either office of the State Bar of Nevada.
On one occasion, an e-mail was sent to several recipients, including four (4) employees of
the State Bar, which included a link to a violent scene from the movie "Cape Fear" . The State Bar
feels that this is a direct suggestive threat to office staff and Bar personnel. Therefore, the State Bar
requests that a Protective Order be and that Mr. Coughlin be prohibited from the Bar's Reno and/or
Las Vegas Office by telephone, by e-mail or by fax. Because he is currently temporarily suspended
from the practice of law and his disciplinary hearing has concluded Mr. Coughlin has no business on
State Bar Double R Blvd or 600 E. Charleston Blvd., Las Vegas, NV)., of Exhibit 1 disciplinary mat-
ter will soon submitted to the Nevada Supreme Court for a de novo review at which time he will re-
ceive a complete set of all of the pleadings, both filed and unfiled,, in this matter.
It should be noted that the State Bar and its Reno staff find it very difficult to work under
these conditions. Mr. Coughlin continues to monopolize our time and resources and is causing an un-
necessary amount of stress."
The email of Coughlin's copied above goes on for several more pages detailign the prejudice
to his defense in 12-065630 inherent to WCPD Leslie refusing to turn over the 8/13/12 and 8/17/12
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production of two discs of ECOMM 911 calls by the WCDA to Coughlin. Where Leslie attests that
he had turned over a collection of materials on 7/27/12, he necessarily admits to having failed to
turned over the discs only propounded after that point. Further Leslie subpoened recordings from
ECOMM on 10/3/12 in 11-063341 but never turned them over to Couglhin, despite only being re-
moved as counsel of record well over 15 days thereafter, on 10/22/12.
It's not at all clear how a request and subsequent Order apparently prohibiting Coughlin from
calling, emailing or faxing the SBN would address the alleged threat of physical harm. One cannot
be physically harmed by a fax, email, or phone call. Further, phone calls, faxes, and emails are
common in pending litigations, even one's where post-judgment motions are being sought and where
Coughlin has a duty to seek a stipulated continuance of, say, the deadline to file an appeal brief in
62337 prior to filing a motion seeking one. The EPO apparently would perhaps even forbid Coughlin
from utilizing a messenger service to deliver a filing to the SBN's Clerk of Court's Office for the se-
curing of a file stamp to beat a deadline, such as the 1/3/13, or 1/4/13 (depending upon whether holi-
days are included in the 3 days for mailing calculus under NRCP 6(e) and the Deboer decision), for
Coughlin to file a NRCP 52 or 59 Motion as to the 12/14/12 NNDB Panel Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law, which recommends that Coughlin be irrevocably disbarred (disbarments became irrev-
ocable in 2008). To curtail the time Coughlin had to prepare such a motion, which was scant to begin
with, by applying an onerous EPO application, or the threat of arrest for anything arguably violative
of it, would work and injustice, and has here, as Coughlin was arrested and charged with a felony
EPO violation for some alleged violation in connection with his seeking from the SBN a stipulation
to an extension of time to file his appeal brief in 62337 on or around the deadlien to do so of 1/23/13.
The SBN has failed to respond to Coughlin's reasonable inquiries in that regard, as has the WCDA
DDA Young (rather, Coughlin is funneled to an Inspector Covington, whom is arguably committing
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the unauthorized practice of law, and such circumstances only further underscore the extent to which
the WCDA Office should be disqualified form prosecuting Coughlin, particularly where DDA
Kandaras' above email admits to feeling Coughlin's competency is brought into question, the events
involving two former WCDA Criminal Division prosecutor's turned RJC Judges on 2/13/13 in (an
Order for Competency Evaluation signed and entered by Judge Pearson at an 8:30 am hearing in 11-
063341 was provided, in writing, to Judge Clifton in 12-065630, with shall language, and DDA
Young's willingness to go along with Judge Clifton in refusing to follow NRS 178.405's mandatory
stay is arguably impermissible. To have RJC Bailliff's then Order Coughlin to remain at the RJC,
then go into a hearing brought on an Emergency Basis upon DDA Young making an Ex Parte Re-
quest for Judge Clifton to resconsider his Order for Competency Evaluation all has a rather fox in
the hen house quality to it when it comes to the WCDA's Office, and now RJC Judges whom had
previously spent the majority of their career's in the WCDA's Office-Criminal Division, having things
a certain way an awful lot of the time.).
That's the hearing I really wanted continued because, as specifically mentioned by Judge Pearson at a
2/2/13 Show Cause hearing on the morning of 2/2/13 (I was bailed out at 1:45 am (after the last bus
had left 911 Parr Blvd, requiring I walk 3.5 miles to my 1471 E. 9
th
St. location, at which I rent a
fifth wheel trailer for $75 a month, a rent I can barely make each month) and Coughlin was only
around to attend that 11-063341 unnoticed (or improperly noticed Gagnon 1 hearing considering his
WC Inmate Release information indicated such hearing would be on 2/5/13, and now Coughlin ap-
parently is facing a Show Cause Hearing on 3/5/13 over some allegation that Coughlin called the
RJC, allegedly in violation of Judge Sferrazza's 12/20/12 Administrative Order 12-01 (no case num-
ber indicated in the caption thereinm and arguably, the service of process of that Administrative Or-
der was insufficient, and such Order extinguished upon the calendaring year changing to 2013, and
the seating of a new Chief Judge to replace then Chief Judge Sferrazza), to see if that Hearing in 11-
063341 indicated as set for 2/5/13 was, in fact, still on calendar, or whether the Hearing held at 8:30
am on 2/2/13 replaced such Hearing) 12-065630...that DAS hearing in 063341 was incorrectly no-
ticed on my Jail Release papers for 2/5/13 or something...At that 2/3/13 Hearing I got an Order for
Competency Evaluation from Pearson, then went and provided that to Judge Clifton at the resumption
of the 065630 trial immediately thereafter, which, under NRS 178.405, required Clifton to suspend
the trial in 11-065630. Of course, he did not. He has demonstrated a willingness to fail to apply the
law as written in certain instances, invariably to the benefit of the State, often with the encourage-
ment of DDA Young (though, to be fair, at the 2/13/13 Trial, DDA Young did point out to Judge
Clifton the shall language in NRS 178.405, to which Judge Clifton made, admittedly, an inventive,
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argument that some failure to make specific findings of fact or something along those lines in Judge
Pearsons just minted Order For Competency Evaluation in 11-063341 of 2/13/13 made inapplicable
the mandatory stay under NRS 178.405. Even if one were to overlook in possible impropriety of
Judge Clifton suspending that Trial, starting at 9 am in 12-065630 long enough for DDA Young to go
to the RJC counter and make and ex parte request for an emergency reconsideration hearing before
Judge Pearson, including the evident partiality revelaed by failing to apply procedural rules to the
State in the same rigid and overly formulaic manner to which the RJC has applied them to Coughlin
(including the 10 days Coughlin should have to respond to such a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order for Competency Evaluation of 2/13/13 in 11-063341), there still exists the fact that Judge Clif-
ton failed to follow NRS 178.405 and immediately Stay all proceedings in all departments, but rather,
allowed DDA Young a recess to go and make his ex parte communications to the RJC Bailiff counter
seeking an Emergency Hearing before Judge Pearson to reconsider his 2/13/13 Order for Competency
Evaluation. DDA Young's making such Motion violated the mandatory automatic stay required by
NRS 178.405 leaving the RJC to rely upon some dubious assertion that Jduge Pearson just happened
to continue mulling his decision to enter the Order For Competency Evaluation he entered in 11-
063441 at approximately 8:45 am, sua sponte, without any prompting or extra judicial communica-
tions with Judge Clifton, DDA Young, or anyone else...something Judge Pearson refused to refute the
allegation of upon Coughlin putting it before him during the brief Emergency Reconsideration Hear-
ing Judge Clifton left the bench long enough in 12-065630 on 2/13/13 to allow Judge Pearson to take
it an vacate or otherwise amend his Order for Competency Evaluation, at which point Judge Pearson
did render a rulign that he would enter an Order having the State pay for a mental health evaluation
for the indigent Coughlin, that, to this date, still has not been entered and Coughlin has been unable to
have such done due to the failure to issue a check to him made out to his pyschiatrist, Dr. Suat Yasar,
MD (the State, DDA Young, and Richard G. Hill, Esq., have all been able to get Emergency Ex Parte
Motions granted against Coughlin, whereas, DDA Young's failure to oppose Coughlin's 2/21/12 Mo-
tion to Dismiss in 12-065630 (which, arguably under Polk v. State and DCR 13(3) may required such
Motion to Dismiss be granted) resulted in Judge Clifton, almost reflexively by instinct, sua sponte,
making an argument on the State's behalf that DDA Young had implicilty opposed such Motion to
Dismiss, thereby revealing further the evident partiality against Coughlin by the RJC judiciary per-
vading all of the various prosecutions and evictions/landlord tenant matters therein).
The motion pending before this Court asks that the district court judge who heard the
case be disqualified. A motion.to disqualify a judge must set forth facts and reasons sufficient
to cause a reasonable person to question the judge's impartiality, and the challenged judge may
contradict the motion's allegation. The motion must be referred to another judge for adjudica-
tion. Towbin Dodge, LLC v. Dist. Ct. 121 Nev. 251,260, 112 P.3d 1063 (2005).
Coughlin filed and had a copy served on Judge Clifton's chambers prior to the commencement
of trial on 12/12/12 in 12-065630 (in accordance with the express language of NRS 1.235(2)(b), to
which Judge Clifton made a non-sequitur argument related to the time set for start of trial where
such statutory dictate actually requires making a Motion to Disqualify such as Couglin's of 12/11/12
in 12-065630 not later than the commencement of trial or hearing of the case where the facts upon
which disqualification of the judge is sought are not known to the party before the party is notified of
the assignment of the judge or beofre any pretrial hearing is held. Coughlin was not notified of the
transfer of 12-065630 to Judge Clifton, from Judge Lynch until a time to close in proximity to the
commencement of trial on 12/11/13 in 12-065630 and still has not been told why the matter was ap-
parently transferred, curiously, on 2/27/12 (same day as trial before Judge Nash Holmes in 11 TR
26800 resulting in 5 day summary contempt incarceration and a 3/14/12 written grievance to the SBN
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wherein Judge Nash Holmes indicates she had heard he (Coughlin) may be living in his car some-
where, which is rather troubling (especially consdiering RJC Judge Schroeder would issue a default
summary eviction lockout Order the following day in 12-374 to Gayle Kern, Esq., where Kern her-
self violated RPC 3.5A, especially considerin the lengthy Tenant's Answer and Pre-Hearing Brief
Coughlin filed on 3/8/12 in 12-374 and the jurisdictional bar in NRS 40.253(6) requiring that Kern
file a Landlord's Affidavit PRIOR to the holding of any such summary eviction hearing (Coughlin
allegedly appeared a couple minutes lat to that 3/15/12 hearing, where NV Energey and Kern, and her
unauthorized practitioner of law non attorney associate/property manager Western Nevada Manage-
ment's Sue King allegedly conspired to deprive Coughlin of electricity to his then home law office at
1422 E. 9
th
ST. #2 for over one week), making Judge Schroeder's 3/15/12 Lockout Order voide for
lack of jurisdiction (see NRS 40.400 and NRC 60(b)(4), though, extra-judicial sua sponte investiga-
tion, apparently, by RJC Judge Schroeder resulted in a rather curious Order on 11/14/12 disposing of
any need for Kern to addresss such serious allegations of professional misconduct.
This is especially true if one consider Marshal Menzel used to be a RJC Bailiff and RJC Bail-
iff Reyes had interrogated Coughlin as to whether he was recording the summary eviction trial (it is
not clear that SCR Rules related to members of the media apply to pro se attorney litigants in Justice
Court, regardless, even had Coughlin been aware of them at the time) in 11-1708 before Judge
Sferrazza and Judge Nash Holmes testimony on 11/14/12 at Coughlin's SBN formal disciplinary
hearing that she had heard you like to record things. Put together, the infrence is that RJC Bailiff
Reyes and Marshal Menzel (Coughlin filed a TPO Against Reyes in February 2012 and Menzel sent
a report to the SBN detailing issues he takes with Coughlin in April 2012) do a lot of gossiping while
at work. Menzel has followed Couglin into the RJC Criminal Division filing and castigated Coughlin
for not having a job. Reyes has issued invective to Coughlin regarding Coughlin taking mental
medication. RJC Bailiff Reyes admits to telling Coughlin, with WCPD Leslie and Goodnight seated
beside a seated Coughlin that Reyes would put my boot up your ass, though Reyes, shortly after
mistating Coughlin's citation to Shepp (Reyes accused Coughlin of lying to Judge Sferrazza about the
import of Shepp, then proceeded to provide his butchered interpreation of the exclusionary rule to the
Fourth Amendment, during a conversation with Coughlin the day after Judge Sferrazza convicted
Coughlin of BOTH petty larceny and receiving stolen property where Coughlin was alleged to have
recieved the very property he allegedly stole, FROM HIMSELF). Reyes went on to chide Coughlin
for allegedly stealing some lost, mislaid, or abandoned property from a 24 year old skateboard whom
allegedly had set his iPhone down on the concrete at 11:15pm at night in the downtown Reno skate
plaze then venture to the opposite side of the plaze, far enough away to fail to hear a still unidentified
man (as confirmed by a video taped admission that Judge Sferrazza ruled irrelevant and hearsay, of
Nicole Watson) hold the iPhone aloft, offer it up, then proceed to threaten to throw it in the river if
someone did not claim it immediately). Reyes characterized the 24 year old skateboard to Coughlin
as just a kid. Reyes excused his own threat to Coughlin to put my boot up your ass of October
9
th
, 2011 as a subterfuge that was permissible given Reyes status as a member of law enforcement.
Further, upon Judge Clifton having Coughlin taken into custody on 2/13/13 in 12-065630, Chief
Bailiff Sexton reminded Coughlin that he still have hanging over your head five different extreme-
ly de minimis alleged violations of Judge Sferrazza's 12/20/12 Administrative Order 12-01, which
threat apparently was put into play by the 2/25/13 Order To Show Cause AO 12-01, file stamped
3:45pm, upon Coughlin filing a Notice of Appeal to the 2/13/13 Order by Judge Clifton in 12-065630
sentencing Coughlin, summarily, and denying any stay thereto despite good cause show, especially
relating to 62337 and the jail depriving Coughlin of his medications during two of the three question-
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able incarcerations the RJC had subjected Coughlin to between 2/1/13 and 2/12/13, and Coughlin's
established suffering from clinical Major Depressive Disorder , Treatment Resistant Depression, and
ADD/ADHD. The causal connection between Coughlin's early mornign email of 2/1/13 to WCDA
Inspector Covington (the only person ADA Helzer is allowing Coughlin to communicate with in ref-
erence to CR12-2025 and RJC 11-0633341) and the NRS 171.136 violating summary arrest for an
alleged probation violation disproven by DAS Officer Ramos' own Coworker, DAS Officer Brown's
1/24/13 email to Coughlin, where such arrest is notated at occuring AFTER 7 pm (7:02 pm) on the
PC Sheet and Inmate Booking papers from 2/1/13, is obvious, and troubling. A similar casual con-
nection seems apparent between a 2/6/13 email to WCDA DDA-Civil Division Watts-Vial objecting
to his 11/13/12 faxed objections ot Coughlin's SCR 110 subpoenas on Washoe County and 2JDC per-
sonnel and the 2/8/13 point a gun at Coughlin's head from five feet away for no good reason by RPD
Waddle arrest and charge of a gross misdemeanor violation of the SBN TPO over some alleged vio-
lation on 1/3/13 and a felony charge for some alleged violation of the SBN EPO in 12-607 over some
alleged conduct on 1/23/13 or thereabouts (the purported service of the TPO in 12-599 by Bailiff
Reyes on 12/19/12 involved Reyes following Coughlin into the tiny DAS check in closet and shoving
his forearm into Coughlin's midsection in insisting Coughlin was being detained sufficiently long
enough to serve Coughlin the TPO Order in 12-599...similarly shoving of a forearm into Coughlin's
midsection occurred during an attempted service of an EPO in either both 12-599 and 12-6087 by
WCSO Deputy Courteney, on 1/4/13. Such apparent misconduct further vitiates the viability of such
attempts at service, especially where Deputy Courteney utilized force in attempting to prevent
Coughlin from walking on his drive way towards his fifth wheel. Next in the apparent retaliatory
causal connection parade is Coughlin's inquiring with WCDA DDA Watts-Vial on 2/25/13 about
those SCR 110 Supboenas again, at approximately 2pm, just before former WCDA Office-Criminal
Division prosecutor turne RJC Judge Pearson entered his 2/25/13 Show Cause Order setting for hear-
ing such matter on 3/5/13, based upon some unsworn, unattributed, allegations that Coughlin had
made various contacts with non-RJC Bailiff personnel, though the complete lack of specificity, the
violation of the requirement for such out of the presence of the court alleged conduct constituting
contempt under NRS 22.030(3), and the general lack of notice as to the charges against him (what did
such contacts entail? Who exactly would the witnesses of such contacts be? How can Coughlin sub-
poena them without sufficiently detailed notice thereof? Why is Couglhin not afforded at least the 10
judicial days seemingly required to prepare for any such Show Cause Hearing. Is not the purported
service of such Show Cause Order incident to Coughlin checkign in with DAS insufficient service of
process for the same reasons other such service attempts in 12-607, 12-599, RJC AO 12-01, etc.,
should fail? Do not the TPO's and EPO's in 12-607 and 12-599 exceed the jurisdiction to make such
orders where they impinge upon Coughlin's first Amendment Rights and rights as a litigatin in his
formal disciplinary hearing and the appeal thereof, and where such orders are in now way reasonably
or narrowly tailore to achieve the purported safety goals to which they address?
NRS 1.235 Procedure for disqualifying judges other than Supreme
Court justices.
1. Any party to an action or proceeding pending in any court other than the Supreme Court,
who seeks to disqualify a judge for actual or implied bias or prejudice must file an affidavit specify-
ing the facts upon which the disqualification is sought. The affidavit of a party represented by an at-
torney must be accompanied by a certificate of the attorney of record that the affidavit is filed in good
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faith and not interposed for delay. Except as otherwise provided in subsections 2 and 3, the affidavit
must be filed:
(a) Not less than 20 days before the date set for trial or hearing of the case; or
(b) Not less than 3 days before the date set for the hearing of any pretrial matter.
2. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection and subsection 3, if a case is not assigned to
a judge before the time required under subsection 1 for filing the affidavit, the affidavit must be filed:
(a) Within 10 days after the party or the partys attorney is notified that the case has been as-
signed to a judge;
(b) Before the hearing of any pretrial matter; or
(c) Before the jury is empaneled, evidence taken or any ruling made in the trial or hearing,
whichever occurs first. If the facts upon which disqualification of
the judge is sought are not known to the party before the party is
notified of the assignment of the judge or before any pretrial hear-
ing is held, the affidavit may be filed not later than the commence-
ment of the trial or hearing of the case.
3. If a case is reassigned to a new judge and the time for filing the
affidavit under subsection 1 and paragraph (a) of subsection 2 has ex-
pired, the parties have 10 days after notice of the new assignment within
which to file the affidavit, and the trial or hearing of the case must be re-
scheduled for a date after the expiration of the 10-day period unless the
parties stipulate to an earlier date.
4. AT THE TIME THE AFFIDAVIT IS FILED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED UPON THE JUDGE SOUGHT TO BE
DISQUALIFIED. SERVICE MUST BE MADE BY DELIVERING THE COPY TO THE JUDGE PERSONALLY OR BY
LEAVING IT AT THE JUDGES CHAMBERS WITH SOME PERSON OF SUITABLE AGE AND DISCRETION EM-
PLOYED THEREIN.
5. THE JUDGE AGAINST WHOM AN AFFIDAVIT ALLEGING BIAS OR PREJUDICE IS FILED SHALL PRO-
CEED NO FURTHER WITH THE MATTER AND SHALL:
(A) IMMEDIATELY TRANSFER THE CASE TO ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OF THE COURT, IF THERE IS MORE
THAN ONE DEPARTMENT OF THE COURT IN THE DISTRICT, OR REQUEST THE JUDGE OF ANOTHER DISTRICT
COURT TO PRESIDE AT THE TRIAL OR HEARING OF THE MATTER; OR
(B) FILE A WRITTEN ANSWER WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT WITHIN 5 JUDICIAL DAYS AFTER THE
AFFIDAVIT IS FILED, ADMITTING OR DENYING ANY OR ALL OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE AF-
FIDAVIT AND SETTING FORTH ANY ADDITIONAL FACTS WHICH BEAR ON THE QUESTION OF THE JUDGES
DISQUALIFICATION. THE QUESTION OF THE JUDGES DISQUALIFICATION MUST THEREUPON BE HEARD
AND DETERMINED BY ANOTHER JUDGE AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES OR, IF THEY ARE UNABLE TO
AGREE, BY A JUDGE APPOINTED:
(1) BY THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN JUDICIAL DISTRICTS HAVING MORE
THAN ONE JUDGE, OR IF THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT IS SOUGHT TO BE DISQUALI-
FIED, BY THE JUDGE HAVING THE GREATEST NUMBER OF YEARS OF SERVICE.
(2) BY THE SUPREME COURT IN JUDICIAL DISTRICTS HAVING ONLY ONE JUDGE.
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A MULTITUDE OF SUCH FACTS WERE NOT KNOWN TO COUGHLIN, AND NECESSARILY
COULD NOT BE KNOWN AS INDICATED IN NRS 1.235(2)(B), AS COUGHLIN DETAILED IN HIS
12/11/12 MOTION TO DISQUALIFY AND IN A 1/7/13 MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE CLIFTON
AS WELL IN 12-067980. SOMEHOW, JUDGE CLIFTON THEN ALLOWED DDA A RECESS TO GO TO
THE COUNTER AND REQUEST AND EMERGENCY HEARING BEFORE JUDGE PEARSON TO HAVE
THAT ORDER FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION ENTERED AN HOUR BEFORE IN 063341 VACAT-
ED. DDA YOUNG WAS SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING A HEARING AND HAVING THAT ORDER VA-
CATED. JUDGE PEARSON WAS, SOME MIGHT SAY, EVASIVE DURING THAT HEARING WHEN
QUESTIONED AS TO WHETHER HE HAD EXTRA-JUDICIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH CLIFTON (WHOM
HAD JUST EXITED THE BENCH IN COURTROOM D WHERE THE CONTINUATION OF THE TRIAL IN
12-065630 WAS BEING HELD ON 2/13/13 DESPITE COUGHLIN'S 1/22/13 MOTION FOR ORDER
FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION, AND DESPITE JUDGE CLIFTON JUSTIFYING HIS FAILURE TO
FOLLOW THE REQUIREMENT IN NRS 1.235 THAT HE RESPOND, IN AFFIDAVIT, TO COUGHLIN'S
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF 12/11/12 BASED UPON AN INDICATION THAT COUGHLIN'S
USE OF A DECLARATION ONLY FAILED TO MEET THE CALL FOR AN AFFIDAVIT IN THAT STAT-
UTE, DESPITE THE IMPORT OF NRS 53.045 AND THE COURT'S HOLDING IN BUCKWALTER WHICH
CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH AS MANDATORY AUTHORITY THAT A DECLARATION WILL ABSOLUTELY SUF-
FICE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, PARTICULARLY WHERE COUGHLIN HAD ALREADY BEEN ACCORDED IN
FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS BY JUDGE CLIFTON AND COULD NOT AFFORD A NOTARY, AND THE SELF HELP
CENTER AT 1 S. SIERRA ST. ONLY PROVIDES FREE NOTARY SERVICE IN FAMILY LAW CASES) LONG
ENOUGH FOR JUDGE PEARSON TO HOLD THE EMERGENCY HEARING TO VACATE HIS JUST ENTERED OR-
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DER FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION IN 11-063341, WHICH HE CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN REVIEWING,
UNPROMPTED, FOLLOWING HIS ENTRY OF THAT ORDER, IN HIS CHAMBERS, UNPROMPTED...).
It has also become even further apparent that the RJC Bailiff are or may be engaging in a co-
ordinated effort (further suggested by the apparent dictate in Judge Sferrazza's Administrative Order
12-01 that Coughlin : inser language where on 2/21/13 Couglin appeared at the RJC to take the
PBC test and check in with DAS as required by his probation in 11-063341 (in part based upon a
conviction for possessing or receiving stolen property that is clearly violative of Nevada law:
((A) Count 3 charged Shepp with having received property stolen by him during
the commission of the burglary charged in Count 2. Since a thief cannot receive
from himself the fruits of his larceny, the jury must be instructed that it
could convict of either burglary or receiving, [ 484 P.2d 565 ] but not of both.
People v. Taylor, 4 Cal.App.2d 214, 40 P.2d 870 (Cal. 1935); People v. Morales,
263 Cal.App.2d 211, 69 Cal.Rptr. 553 (1968); Milanovich v. United States, 365
U.S. 551, 81 S.Ct. 728, 5 L.Ed.2d 773 (1961); Thomas v. United States, 418 F.2d
567 (5 Cir.1969); Baker v. United States, 357 F.2d 11 (5 Cir.1966). Such an in-
struction was requested but the court declined to give it. This was error, and later
acknowledged by the court to be such when it set aside the receiving conviction
and ordered a new trial on that charge. The appellate issue is whether that manner
of handling the error effectively cured it. The error was not cured by the setting
aside of the receiving conviction since there is no way of knowing whether a
properly instructed jury would have found the defendant guilty of burglary, Count
2, or receiving, Count 3. Milanovich v. United States, supra. Both convictions
should have been set aside and a new trial ordered. SHEPP v. STATE 484 P.2d
563 (1971))
Add to that the efforts of the WCPD's Leslie in working with SBN King in a Memorandum
found in the file Leslie provided to Lindsay, Esq., upon the WCPD and APD being conflicted out of
representing Coughlin (and Leslie clearly violates his duty of confidentiality to Coughlin under RPC
1.16 in the following and beyond):
Memorandum
To: Zach Coughlin file, RCR12-067980, PD number 144825 From: Jim
Leslie Chief Deputy Public Defender Re: Threat Date: 12/13/12
On the above date, I received a return call from Patrick King and David Clark at the State Bar.
They were responding to my email to King yesterday regarding possible threat by Coughlin as con-
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tained in an email Coughlin had sent to me, other attorneys in this office, and several other recipients.
Copy of that email is attached hereto as Exhibit "1" and copy of the website that the end of the first
paragraph of the email leads to is attached hereto as Exhibit "2".
King and Clark both agreed that the email from Coughlin, in context and with the reference to
the website with the video clip and other materials from "Cape Fear", constitutes a threat of vio-
lence against me and other attorneys in our office. They disclosed that they had had their own prob-
lems with Coughlin, including having to have armed security at his State Bar hearing and that they
each had considered obtaining restraining orders against him and probably will do so upon comple-
tion of the Bar proceeding. They both stated that "heightened alert" is appropriate in light of the
email he sent and generally when dealing with Mr. Coughlin.
They told me that if I refer the email in question to law enforcement they would not consider
it a breach of attorney client confidentiality under Rule 1.6(c) and also because Mr. Coughlin in-
cludes so many recipients in the email that he has waived confidentiality. J indicated I was intended
to ask to be relieved of the remaining case our office has with Coughlin, and they agreed I could and
should do so. I am moving forward with asking to be relieved from Coughlin's case in RCR12-
067980 and am also considering possible referral of the email to law enforcement. END
Even if one accepts Leslie's waiver of confidentiality argument where he writes : They told
me that if I refer the email in question to law enforcement they would not consider it a breach of
attorney client confidentiality under Rule 1.6(c) and also because Mr. Coughlin includes so many
recipients in the email that he has waived confidentiality, that still does not excuse the extent to
which Leslie then refers to matters outside such email in violating his duty of confidentiality. Fur-
ther, again, Leslie, like the SBN's King, and like RMC Judge Nash Holmes, relies heavily upon un-
sworn, often unattributed hearsay.
The only reason I went into court is because I am self representing on 063341. Bruce Lindsay is not
my attorney of record on that case, nor have I ever consented to his becoming my attorney of record
therein at this point, though would consider it if the State were to provide for Lindsay to be paid to do
so.
I am asking in writing if Bruce Lindsay, Esq. was appointed as my counsel of record in 2012-
065630 for the 2/13/13 Contempt Hearing, at which I received 5 days in jail for being late, wherein
Judge Clifton alleged I had already had the benefit of a warning, yet I maintain that Robbin Baker
told me the start time of the trial in that matter on 12/11/11 had been moved from 9 am to 1:30
pm. Judge Clifton maintained that he did not change the start time, then insisted Robbin Baker did
not tell me that, then refused to indicate just how he could possibly know what Robbin Baker had told
me. Subsequently it was learned that Robbin Baker was not even at work that day, and that no one
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had called her that day to inquire as to whether I was correct in my assertion as to her having com-
municated the start time of the trial as having changed. I believe it is situations like that that resulted
in the current Administrative Order 12-01 (which may not even still be binding considering it was
from 2012 and by former Chief Judge Sferrazza) wherein I seemingly am prevented from communi-
cating with any court personnel besides the Bailiff's, based upon some unnoticed finding that I had
caused distruptions in the filing office, an accusation to which I was never provided an opportunity to
be heard on.
Previously, Judge Sferrazza refused to allow me to appear on my own behalf, despite my having been
a licensed attorney in Nevada at the time in 11-063341, and despite my having filed a Notice of Ap-
pearance therein, and an Authorization to represent. Then Judge Sferrazza, at trial on 8/27/12 and
8/29/12 refused to allow me to self represent still. Then he refused to accept the plea agreement that
would have disposed of all three matters to which I am a defendant in the RJC (11-063341, which is
now on appeal in CR12-2025, with the Appeal Brief, per the attached Briefing Schedule, on March
9th, 2013, and where Judge Elliott entered an Order granting my IFP on 1/9/13 providing for the
preparation of the transcript at public expense; 11-065630, which stemmed form a 1/14/12 "misuse of
emergency communications" gross misdemeanor arrest, that had the trial start on 12/11/12, where
the WCPD was releived on 11/27/12 (the day pre-trial motions were due, I maintain I was forced to
proceed pro se due to Biray Dogan's complete lack of representation, including failing to appear
where required at the 2/14/12 arraignment on a gross misdemeanor (indigent defendnans entitled to
representation on gross misdo and felonies "at all stages"...); and the matter wherein Bruce is counsel
of record, 12-067980, where Bruce has stipulated to several continuances...and now today apparently
DDA Young tried to pull something where he failed to stip to the continuance in 11-063341, refuses
to take my calls or respond to any written communications. Further WCDA Legal Assistant Tina
Galli informed me today that I am not to call their office on 11-063341 and that "Diana from Bruce
Lindsay's Office is handling it". That is not true. I am self representing in 11-063341 at this point.
Further, I never expressly consented to Lindsay appearing in 11-065630 at the 2/13/13 Con-
tempt Hearing, wherein I was brought in upon being summarily taken into custody the day before,
and without consulting with Lindsay at all or ever consenting to his appearing on my behalf, Lindsay
was seated at the defendants desk.
LINDSAY THEN PROCEEDED TO DISPARAGE MY ABILITY TO REPRESENT CLIENTS CURRENTLY ON THE
RECORD, STATING "YOUR HONOR, CAN YOU IMAGINE HIM TRYING TO REPRESENT CLIENTS IN HIS CUR-
RENT STATE?" AS THOUGH I WAS SO INCOMPETENT THAT DOING SO WOULD SURELY PRODUCE POOR RE-
SULTS. JUDGE CLIFTON QUICKLY POINTED OUT MY COMPETENCY TO BE AN ATTORNEY WAS NOT THE
RELEVANT INQUIRY. LINDSAY REFUSED TO SEEK TO EXAMINED ROBBIN BAKER OR CALL HER AS A WIT-
NESS IN LINE WITH MY ARGUMENT THAT I HAD NOT ACTUALLY EVER BEEN GIVEN A "WARNING"
AGAINST MY BEING LATE TO COURT "HAPPENING AGAIN" (AS JUDGE CLIFTON INDICATED I HAD). FUR-
THER, LINDSAY ASK ME, IN OPEN COURT, IN FRONT OF JUDGE CLIFTON, "SO WHAT HAPPENED, WHY
WERE YOU LATE". DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY.
A member of Washoe County law enforcement stated to me at some point while in custody
on 2/12/13 that he expected I would be released the following day with credit for time served. In-
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stead, I received 5 days incarceration. Another member of washoe county law enforcement subse-
quently expressed to me that he was surprised by such an long sentence.
I have been told that Lindsay's appeared on 2/13/13 in 12-065630 "free of charge" despite my
indigent status and the fact that the State is required to provide me an attorney at any hearing, even a
civil contempt hearing, wherein there is even a possibility of any jail time, much less 5 days of jail
time...Lindsay still has not filed an SB89 form or Proposed Order (though he seemed to orally make
such motion on 2/13/13) requiring that I be evaluated for competency or fitness to stand trial, despite
his repeatedly indicating he believes my competency is seriously in question. I believe he is obligat-
ed to file such a Propose Order and or Motion for an Order for Competency Evaluation Immediately,
pursuant to NRS 178.405. Further, even at the Contempt Hearing on 2/13/13, in 12-067980, the State
was required to provide me counsel, and given the conflict present with the WCPD and APD, private
counsel was required. Additionally, I believe it is extremely bad faith for the State and RJC to re-
fused to provide me private counsel for the 12/11/12 Trial in 12-065630, only to then allow WCPD
Leslie to abuse process with his 12/18/12 TPO Application, therein bringing about the current ar-
rangement with court appointed private counsel. Please indicate in writing whether Lindsay was paid
to appear on my behalf on 2/13/13 in 12-065630 at the Contempt Hearing.
The DAS arrest on 2/2/13 was after 7pm in violation of NRS 171.136. Further, the attached emails
below support a finding that there did not exist probable cause to make such an arrest. Additionally,
please find below the Plea Deal that I voluntarily accepted, on the record in 11-063341, 12-065630,
and 12-067980 that should dispose of all three of these matters.
Further, please indicate in writing whether Mr. Lindsay has been assigned to represent me in the mat-
ter stemming from the 2/8/13 arrest for a gross misdemeanor TPO violation alleged to have occurred
on 1/3/13, and a felony EPO violation alleged to have occurred on or about 1/23/13. Please provide
any documentation your office has received with respect to that case and an written indication of
whether your office will be appearing at the arraignment on 3/6/13.
I WOULD PREFER THAT ALL THREE MATTERS BE RESOLVED (AND HOPEFULLY THE APPEAL OF 11-063341
IN CR12-2025 BEFORE JUDGE ELLIOTT CAN BE INCLUDED IN SUCH A GLOBAL RESOLUTION) IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH THE TERMS I AGREED TO ON THE RECORD ON 8/27/13 IN 11-063341 (A HEARING WHICH AR-
GUABLY WAS COMBINED WITH THE OTHER TWO MATTERS).
MATTERS? FROM: DOGAN, BIRAY (BDOGAN@WASHOECOUNTY.US) THIS SENDER IS IN YOUR SAFE
LIST. SENT: WED 6/27/12 9:04 AM TO: ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COMCC: GOODNIGHT, JO-
SEPH W (JGOODNIGHT@WASHOECOUNTY.US) ZACH, ON JUNE 13TH, I SENT TO YOU VIA EMAIL (SEE
BELOW) AN OFFER NEGOTIATED W/ THE STATE. I HAVE NOT HEARD BACK FROM YOU REGARDING THE
OFFER. THE DAIS REQUESTING AN ANSWER TO WHETHER YOU ARE GOING TO ACCEPT / REJECT THE
RESOLUTION BY JULY 10. YOUARE CURRENTLY SCHEDULED FOR TRIAL IN JOE GOODNIGHT'S CASE ON
JULY 16, AND AN MSC ON THE SAME DAY FOR MY CASE. PLEASE LET US KNOW BEFORE JULY 10
WHETHER YOU WANT TO GO FORWARD WITH TRIAL OR OTHERWISE. IN THE CASE YOUHAVE W/ ME.
PLEAD GUILTY TO AN AMENDED COUNT OF DISTURBING THE PEACE. SERVE 90 DAYS JAIL (CONCUR-
RENT TO THE CASE YOUHAVE W/ GOODNIGHT) "SUSPENDED," ON CONDITION YOU CONTINUE TO SEE
YOUR PSYCHOLOGIST OR PSYCHIATRIST, PROVIDE MONTHLY REPORTS OF THIS TO THE JUSTICE COURT,
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MAINTAIN ANY RX REGIMEN PRESCRIBED BY YOUR DOCTOR, AND OBEY ALL LAWS. IN THE CASE YOU
HAVE JOE GOODNIGHT. PLEAD GUILTY TO AN AMENDED COUNT OF DISTURBING THE PEACE. SERVE 90
DAYS JAIL (CONCURRENT TO THE CASE YOUHAVE W/ ME) "SUSPENDED," ON THE SAME CONDITIONS
STATED ABOVE.
THERE TERMS OF MY PROBATION UNDER RCR2011-063341 REQUIRE ME TO CHECK IN WITH
"DAS"...THE SECURITY PERSONNEL WHOM I CHECKED IN WITH (JUDGE SFERRAZZA ENTERED AND AD-
MINISTRATIVE ORDER REQUIRING ME TO BE ESCORTED BY A RJC BAILIFF ANYTIME I GO TO AREAS UN-
DER THE CONTROL OF THE RJC, DUE TO, BASICALLY, FROM WHAT I UNDERSTANDING, PAST "DISRUP-
TIONS"...SO I CHECK IN WITH THE FRONT DOOR SECURITY STAFF WHENEVER I GO TO 1 S. SIERRA ST FOR
ANYTHING RELATED TO DAS (DEPARTMENT OF ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING) OR THE RJC, AND THEN
WAIT FOR AN RJC BAILIFF TO APPEAR TO ESCORT ME TO, SAY, THE DAS CHECK IN AREA IN THE RJC
FILING OFFICE.
THE DAY OF ONE OF THE ALLEGE EPO VIOLATION 1/23/13 WAS ALSO THE DAY MY APPELLANT'S
BRIEF WAS DUE IN THE N. S. CT. CASE INVOLVING THE STATE BAR OF NEVADA'S ATTEMPT TO HAVE ME
DISBARRED IRREVOCABLY. I WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN A TELEPHONIC 5 DAY EXTENSION, ULTIMATELY,
MAKING MY BRIEF DUE ON 1/30/13 (ULTIMATELY THE RECORD ON APPEAL IN THAT MATTER WAS
STRUCK FROM THE RECORD DUE TO SOME THINGS LIKE THE STATE BAR PUTTING MORE THAN 250 PAGES
PER BOUND VOLUME, PRINTING ON BOTH SIDES OF THE PAPER, FAILING TO BATES STAMP CERTAIN
THINGS, ETC., SO MY BRIEF IS NOW DUE FURTHER OUT, BUT AT THE TIME, I DID NOT KNOW WHETHER OR
NOT THE COURT WOULD GRANT MY MOTION TO EXTEND THE DEADLINE TO FILE MY BRIEF, ETC...SO,
BASICALLY, IS WAS A STRESSFUL SITUATION..
ALSO, THE NORTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD ISSUES ITS FINDINGS ON 12/14/12 RECOMMEND-
ING TO THE COURT THAT I BE FOREVER DISBARRED. I ATTEMPTED TO FILE A POST-FINDINGS MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL OR TO ALTER OR AMEND THE FINDINGS...UNDER NRCP 52 AND OR 59, AND MAYBE
DCR13(7), THAT WAS DUE 10 JUDICIAL DAYS FROM THAT 12/14/12 MAILING OF THE FINDINGS...WHICH
WOULD HAVE BEEN 1/3/13...I DON'T WISH TO VIOLATE THE EPOOR FILE A BRIEF THAT DISPARAGES AN-
YONE. RATHER, I HOPE TO BE ABLE TO PULL TOGETHER THE ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF MATERIAL IN-
VOLVED IN DEFENDING AGAINST THE SBN'S COMPLAINT, WHICH ALLEGED I VIOLATED SOME 12 RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND UNTOLD NUMBER OF TIMES, IN A PROFESSIONAL AND FAIR MANNER,
WITH A FOCUS ON MITIGATING FACTORS INVOLVED IN WHAT HAS OCCURRED IN MY LIFE SINCE AUGUST
2011, SHOULD AN OUTRIGHT AGREEMENT RELATED TO SOME SCR 117 DISABILITY ARRANGEMENT NOT
BE AVAILABLE WITH THE SBN.
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I HAVE RECENTLY COMPLETE AN INTAKE WITH NORTHERN NEVADA ADULT MENTAL HEALTH SER-
VICES AND START COUNSELING AND HOPEFULLY THAT WILL RESULT IN AN ARRANGEMENT WHERE, EVEN
IF I CANNOT AFFORD THEM MYSELF, I WILL BE ABLE TO GET MY WELLBUTRIN ANTIDEPRESSANT AND
AVOID SOME OF THE THINGS THAT MAY, IN PART HAPPEN WHEN I RUN OUT OF IT AND CAN'T AFFORD A
REFILL. I HAVE SENT THE WCDA'S OFFICE SOME ILL ADVISED EMAILS AND OR WRITINGS IN THE LAST
MONTH OR SO (AND PROBABLY BEYOND THAT), AND BELIEVE THAT WAS AT LEAST IN PART A RESULT OF
NOT BEING ABLE TO AFFORD MY MEDICATION.
HOWEVER, THE TPO/EPOS MAY BE VOID GIVEN THE PURPORTED SERVICE OF THE TPO AND
NOTICE OF THE EPOHEARING APPEARS TO VIOLATE COURTHOUSE SANCTUARY DOCTRINE, ON TOP OF
THE DICTATE AGAINST SERVING ATTORNEY'S PROCESS WHILE THEY ACCESS THE COURTS.
ADDITIONALLY, NEITHER WCNOR SBNPUT UP THE BOND STATUTORILYREQUIRED FOR A
WORKPLACE TPO, AND EXHIBITS ON THEIR FACE DEMONSTRATE THAT THE LINK IN THE EMAIL
COUGHLIN ALLEGED TO HAVE SENT ON OR ABOUT 12/12/12 WAS TO A HARK.COMAUDI OCLI P ONLY
NOT A MOVIE. NRCP 56(G), BAD FAITH AFFIDAVITS, UNTENABLE, PARTICULARY WHERE WCPD
JIMLESLIES ADMITS TO FAILING TO PROVIDE COUGHLIN 911 AUDIO FILES ON TWO DICS PROPOUND-
ED BY THE WCDAON 8/13 AND 8/17/12. FURTHER, AUDIO CLIP SPEAKS TO LEARNING, READING, AND
PHILOSOPHY, WHICH WOULD NOT SEEM TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF THE SORT OF CONDUCT REQUIRED TO
SUPPORT SUCH AN ORDER. ADDITIONALLY, FREE SPEACH AND ACCESS TO SBNFILING OFFICE PROCE-
DURES, INCLUDING THOSE UNDER SCR 105(4), INCLUDING THOSE EXPRESSED BY THE SBN AND ITS
CLERK OF COURT AND FAX FILING (SOME AUTHORITY EQUATES EMAIL WITH FAX AS WELL) MAY PRE-
SENT CLAIM OF RIGHT DEFENSE TO ANY ALLEGED EPO VIOLATION.
AS SUCH, THE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH BEING ARRESTED ON 2/8/13 AND CHARGED WITH A FEL-
ONY AND GROSS MISDEMEANOR INCIDENT TO ALLEGED EPOAND TPO VIOLATIONS OCCURING ON DAY
OF DEADLINES TO FILE NRCP 52 AND OR 59 MOTIONS AS TO 12/14/12 NNDBPANEL FINDINGS AND
MOTION FOR EXTENSION FO TIME FOR APPEAL BRIEF IN 62337, HAVE MADE IT INORDINATELY DIFFI-
CULT TO PREPARE FOR 2/25/13 SHOWCAUSE HEARING. ADDITIONALLY, IT MAY HAVE BEEN IMPROPER
TO APPLY RIGID AND FORMULAIC IN RE ERICKSON APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL RULES TO PRO SE DE-
FENDANT IN VARIOUS RJC MATTERS, WHERE DDA YOUNG HAS OBTAINED SEVERAL EMERGENCY EX
PARTE ORDERS AND OR MOTIONS SETTINGS (11/27/12 NO FAXING IN 065630...THE APPROACH TO THE
ORDER FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION IN 063341 AS IT RELATES TO THE STAY REQUIRED ON 2/12/13
IN 065630 (SHALL...NRS 178.405). MAY BE IMPERMISSIBLE FOR RJC BAILIFFS AND OR JUDGE
CLIFTON TO REQUIRED COUGHLIN, ESSENTIALLY TO WAIVE ANY NOTICE OR SERVICE REQUIREMENT FOR
IMPROPTURECONSIDERATION HEARING PRESIDED OVER BY CHIEF JUDGE PEARSON SETTING ASIDE THE
ORDER FOR COMPETENCY EVAL MADE JUST AN HOUR PREVIOUS, AND SUCH MAY HAVE BEEN THE RE-
SULT OF EXTRAJUDICIAL COMMUNICATIONS WHICH MAY NOT BE A PERMISSIBLE BASIS FOR SUCH ACTION
(ADJUDICATORY BOUNDARIES LIMITED TO WHAT PARTIES APPROPRIATELY PUT FORTH TO THE
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COURT...EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS BY DDA YOUNG AT RJC COUNTER AND OR ANYTHIGN COMMU-
NICATED TO JUDGE PEARSON ON 2/12/13 MAY NOT BE APPROPRIATE BASIS FOR SETTING ASIDE ORDER
FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION). LASTLY, DAS OFFICER CELESTE BROWN EMAIL TO COUGHLIN OF
1/24/13 INDICATES THE VIDEO SHOWED COUGHLIN PRESENTED TO THE SECURITY CHECK IN ARGUA-
BLY A TIMELY MANNER ON 1/23/13 SUFFICIENT TO REBUT A FINDING OF A VIOLATION, OR AT LEAST
DEMONSTRATE A GOOD FAITH ATTEMPT TO COMPLY. FURTHER, ARREST REPORT/BOOKING SHEET FOR
2/2/13 ARREST BY DAS INDICATES TIME OF ARREST 7:02 PM, WHICH MAY VIOLATE NRS 171.136
DICATE AGAINST MISDEMEANOR ARREST BETWEEN 7PM AND 7AM WITHOUT A WARRANT. COUGHLIN
ORDERED TO EXIT HIS RESIDENCE AFTER 7PM BY DAS OFFICER.
Further, as to WCPD Jim Leslies's TPO application it is telling he mistates the 12/12/12 email
as continaing a link to a violent video clip when in fact the link is to nothing more than an audio clip
that relates to learning, reading, and philosophy (the verbatim transcript of the entirety of the audio
only clip linked to in the 12/12/12 email is as follows:
I ain't no white trash piece of shit. I'm better than you all. I can out learn you. I can out
read you. I can outthink you, and I can out philosophize you. And I'm going to outlast
you. You think a couple of whacks to my good old boy gut's gonna get me down? It's
going to take a hell of a lot more than that, Counselor, to prove you're better than me!
(Max looks around in an attempt to find where Sam is hiding)
The link to this in the 12/12/12 email does not contain a single violent statement or image. If
the link had been to a clip of Max Cady's Your going to learn about loss... speach, fine, that may
amount to an implied threat. But it wasn't. It was to a short audio clip of Cady making the above
statement. Leslie is adding his own remembrances of Cape Fear where he alleges that such quota-
tions occurs after Cady has beaten two men. Actually, if one went and view that whole scene from
the movie, it shows Cady being attacked by about six men that his public defender, played by Nick
Nolte, had hired to go and attack and beat Cady with baseball bats and bicycle chains. Cady fought
them off, then delivered a speach to a trash dumpster that he figured his former counselor Nolte
was hiding behind when he heard a rustling emanate from behind it following his successfully ward-
ing off the attack by the six hired thugs. Leslie demonstrates a complete lack of candor to the tribu-
nal in his application (as does WCDA DDA Watts-Vial, whose 11/13/12 last minuted faxed objec-
tions to Coughlin's SCR 110 Subpoenas upon 2JDC Judges Flanagan and Elliot, Clerk of Court Has-
tings and the 2JDC Custodian of Records, where Watts-Vial admits to extended discussions with the
very Bar Counsel whom confirmed to Coughlin that he, as a respondent suspended attorney appear-
ing pro se in his formal disciplinary matter, may, in fact, issue his own subpoenas (and, given NNDB
Susich's 7/27/12 email to Coughlin, Coughlin was entitled to rely upon such express indications by
Bar Counsel King, provided as a message confirming such King was relaying to Coughlin upon con-
firming such with his supervisor, Chief Bar Counsel David Clark. nstead, leslie chooses to focus on
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a tertiary aspect of some description of the film incident to a link to buy the film where he writes
(NOTE: ONE RATHER IMPORTANT THING LESLIE GETS WRONG IS THE DATE SENT
FOR THE EMAIL LESLIE ALLEGES COUGHLIN SENT HIM WITH A LINK TO THE AUDIO
ONLY CLIP OF A SPEECH FROM THE MOVIE CAPE FEAR THE DATING ON THAT
EMAIL, AS EVINCED BY THE ATTACHMENT'S TO DDA WATTS-VIAL AND LESLIE TPO
APPLICATION, INDICATES THAT EMAIL WAS SENT ON 12/13/12, RATHER THAN, AS
LESLIE INDICATES BELOW, ON 12/12/12) Also, a lot of Leslie's allegation (most of them are
actually inaccurate anyways, but..) need to be taken in the context or with the knowledge that Cough-
lin grew up in Reno, attending Swope and Reno High with both of his WCPD on these cases (Joe
Goodnight in 11-063341 was a classmate for 6 years and part of similar circles of friends as Coughlin
throughout those years) and Biray Dogan in 12-065630 (Dogan and Coughlin went through school
together from 7
th
through 12
th
grade, both graduating with the Reno High School class of 1995) and
Coughlin and those two have much more of an easy ready faimilarity with each other and their
respectivie senses of humor. Then, all the sudden, Jim Leslie, Esq., who moved to Washoe County in
the early nineties from Missouri, barges in and takes over all the cases in a belligerent arrogant man-
ner, and ultimately winds up getting a TPO against Coughlin and encourageing the SBN to do so as
well, which now has Coughlin facing felony charges, disbarment, etc., etc.. Further Coughlin
coached Judge Hascheff's son in Basketball when he was a 9
th
grader at Reno HS in 2008, went to
school sandwiched between the graduating class containing both of WLS's Paul Elcano's sons (PM in
1994 and John in 1996) and Judge Albright's children (Erin in '94 and Ross in '96). The point being
that Couglin has lived in this commuity for a long time and has an established track record of being
non-violent (as is often the case with individuals of Coughlin's size (6 foot 4, 250 pounds) Coughlin
has been socialized to be docile and gentile to whatever extent he was not already. Leslie and the
SBN (again, via Pat King, someone whom did not grow up here, has little history her, moved here
from San Diego in the mid 90's) would have the RJC view Coughlin as some unknown violent drifter
type not to be trusted, but rather feared, with little to no track record of civilized behavior, which is
hardly the case. Coughlin was twice a team captain for the Reno High School basektball team in the
mid 1990's, a National Merit Finalist in 1995, has volunteered for local non-profits like Very Special
Arts Nevada, and has been a participating member of the SBN's Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers
since 2003, and formerly worked for legal aid provider Washoe Legal Services as a domestic vio-
lence attorney, and before that local law firm Hale Lane. He went to Swope, Reno High, then UNR,
then UNLV's Boyd School of Law with WCDA DDA Chris Hicks and Jen Christie, and worked at
Hale Lane with DDA Patricia Halstead.
Any alleged linking to a short audio clip from a mainstream movie like Cape Fear, espe-
cially where the clip speaks only to learning, and does not contain any of the violent imagery
or other contextual references that Leslie cites to (Leslie's TPO application Statement in Ex-
hibit assumes a great deal of information and context about the audio clip in question that one
would only be aware of from watching the entire move, and in no way would be aware of
from simply listening to a paragraph worht of an audio clip such as that allegedly linked to,
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found at a mainstream website like www.Hark.com...and Leslie fails to actually get into what
the audio clip actually says, rather, he focuses on matters in no way depicted in the audio clip
(allegations that the former client just beat several men, that he utilized a weapon or blunt in-
strument to do so, that he had theirs and his blood on his (therre is a still image depicted in
the clip, but Coughlin has an add-on in his browser that blocks such image, so even if it is
proven that Couglin sent such an email, he would not have been aware of the still image de-
picted upon clickin on such link, and regardless, that image is of a mainstream actor, Robert
Deniro, and it is not clear what he is holding or what he has been doing or why, or whether or
not it is in fact blood on his shirt...further in that still image, Deniro has his hand in a placid,
resting position as though balancing his weight on a golf putter or something, hardly a menac-
ing stance. The audio clip is 28 seconds long. Regardless, to whatever exten Leslie, the
WCPD, King or the SBN felt threatened or actually fearful (which is highly unlikely given all
their associated bluster and purposeful aggravation and taunting of Coughlin for a sustained
period of time and groupthink, belligerent, pack-like, institutionalized bullying behavior in
some, but not all, instances (David Clark menacingly commented to Coughlin about being
sad that he didn't get a chance to prosecute that one attorney before the schmuck committed
suicied...Pat King faux expressing sadness in an ultra condescending tone when mentioning
the high likelihood of Coughlin being disbarred, Jim Leslie's histrionics and Scrappy-Do-
like behavior (Scrappy-Do (Jim Leslie is a Scrappy Dude reference sounds like something
a taller person might make up on the spot in an attempt to obfuscate a reference that might
come across as hurtful to a shorter person whom had finally aggravated the taller person
enough to make an arguably hurtful comment based upon one's short statute. Couglin has
been tall most all of his life. Its not all its cracked up to be...however, Coughlin has felt em-
pathy towards shorter men, has always attempted to and managed to make personal invective
based upon other's physical appearances, etc., and if Coughlin did make a reference to Jim
Leslie being like the character Scrappy-Do from the children's cartoon series Scooby-Do it
was only after being aggravated endlessly by a mean spirited, at times, but not always, Jim
Leslie, whom is likely stressed out at times from handling a large case-load, and having peo-
ple's freedom in his hands day after day (somethign for which Coughlin had a great deal of
respect for the fact that such is the case incident to Leslie's job and position...For background,
the cartoon character Scrappy-Do is a diminutive canine friend of Scooby-Do whom oftens
picks fights with much large opponents, only to then have his large friends, like Shaggy and
Scooby come in and either do the fighting for him, or, more typically, dispell the situation
created by Scrappy-Do's antagonizing bluster...fairly similar to what occurred on October 9
th
,
2011 when RJC Bailiff Reyes was called in (as Leslie has done with RJC Bailiff's time and again) to
crack down on or intimidate Coughlin or other Leslie client's whom have finally started to broach at
Leslie's treatement of them and refusal to advocate on their behalf. And while Leslie alleges Cough-
lin to have seemingly mostly complaints against other attorney's in our office, by far, Coughlin's
frustration has related to Leslie the overwhelming majority of the time, though at times Coughlin and
Leslie have had a rapport and Coughlin wishes Leslie no ill will, hopes to look back at all this as
friends someday, etc..)..:
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Exhibit 1 to Application for Temporary Order for Protection Against
Harassment in the Workplace
Zachary Coughlin is a client of the Washoe County Public Defender, and I
have been assigned to one or more of his criminal cases, It is anticipated that by
Tuesday, December 18, 2012, our office will be relieved as counsel on Mr,
Coughlin's single remaining case with this office. Mr. Coughlin is an attorney on
suspended status with the Nevada State Bar arising from a conviction for
misdemeanor shoplifting which has been publicized in the press. Mr.
Coughlin represented himself in that criminal proceeding.
On December 12, 2012, I received an email from Zachary Coughlin, a copy of which is at-
tached hereto as Exhibit" IA" . The email pertains to a misdemeanor petit larceny case of Mr.
Coughlin's involving theft or unlawful retention of an iPhone, on which I and other attorneys in our
office previously represented him, During the course of the bench trial, our office was relieved as
counsel upon Mr. Coughlin's request to represent himself. Throughout the email. Mr. Coughlin
makes various derogatory complaints about and references to me and other attorneys in our office.
At the end of the first paragraph of the email. Mr. Coughlin complains that his various attor-
neys and others in the local criminal justice system have ruined his life and he writes I remember
when my life featured happy moments like the birth of twins . , . but that was before your leviathan
legal system wrecked shop on my existence. What, sir, shall be my compensation ?" The email then
references the website http://tinyurl.com/bgmlfdr When that address is cut and pasted into a web
browser, it directs the reader to a website containing a video segment from the movie "Cape Fear",
which the website summarizes as a film that "tells the story of a convicted rapist who
seeks vengeance against a former public defender whom he blames for his 14-year im-
prisonment .... " In the movie, the client, played by Robert Di Nero, carries out that
vengeance by stalking and trying to kill his former public defender, played by Nick
Nolte. A copy of the print out of the website is attached hereto as Exhibit I B", The vid-
eo segment on the website is a scene in the movie where the client of the public defender
has just beaten two men. The client is wearing a shirt bloodied with his blood and the
blood of the men he just beat, and he is holding a blunt instrumcnt weapon or a chain in
his hand. He vows to continue his harassment of his former public defender, who is hid-
ing nearby behind a garbage dumpster.
The email from Mr. Coughlin is addressed to several attorneys in the office of the Washoe
County Public Defender, including attorneys Jim Leslie, Jeremy Bosler, Biray Dogan, Joseph Good-
night, and Chris Fortier. Mr, Coughlin has previously and repeatedly expressed significant dissatis-
faction with his various attorneys in our office and has almost continuosly, as he does throughout the
email attachted hereto, blamed them for his current legal problems, his recent criminal convictions,
and his suspension from active attorney licensure with the Nevada State Bar. The email is also ad-
dressed to several other persons outside our office, including but not limited to Steve Tuttle of
the Reno Justice Court, John Kadlic, and Daniel Wong of the Reno City Attorney's Office, Mary
Kandaras of the Washoe County District Attorney's Office-Divil Division, and David Clark and Pat-
rick King of the Office of Bar Counsel of the Nevada State Bar.
Based on Mr. Coughlin having included the various recipients to the email
who are not his attomeys, Mr. Coughlin has waived attomey-c1ient confidentiali-
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ty. Additionally, based upon the nature of the references made in the first para-
graph of the email to Mr. Coughlin's legal problems and reference to the "Cape
Fear" regarding violence and harassment against former puhlic defender,
Mr, Coughlin has waived attorney-client confidentiality as per Nevada Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.6(c).
Later the same day as the emailn December 12, 2012. Mr. Coughlin showed up at the offices of
the Washoe County Public Defender without an appointment, I and an investigator went to the lobby
to see him, since we had decided based on previous encounters with Mr. Coughlin that it is best not
to meet with him alone, With the investigator present in the lobby, I asked Mr. Coughlin what he
needed. He said he wanted his discovery documents. Since we have had prior incidents where
Mr. Coughlin received documents from us and later claimed we did not provide them, I asked
him to email me with his request and that I would respond to the email. During our discussion I
informed him that I would be asking that our oflicc be relieved from his pending misdemeanor Ob-
structing and Resisting criminal case. He became agitated and upset and I asked him to leave and to
schedule an appointment if he thought he needed one and to send me his email request. He re-
fused to leave, stating he was writing a note. I asked what the note was and he became loud and ver-
bally aggressive and said "None of your goddamncd business..." His demeanor was visibly belliger-
ent I asked him again several times to leave and he rose to his feet (he is approximately 6'3" and I am
5'4") and went on a verbal rant against me. I continued to tell him to leave while I turned to the
front desk staff and asked them to call the police, He tried handing me the note, and in response
I held out my hand to receive it from him, but then he pulled the note back from me several
times in a taunting manner while smiling. As we waited for the elevator, he kept saying he was
"chipping" at me. As he left in the elevator, he kept saying "chip, chip, chip .... , in a taunting manner.
I asked my investigator to summarize the encounter in writing. A copy of that written summary is
hereto attached as Exhibit "]-C".
Given Mr. Coughlin's demeanor and behavior, and given the "Cape Fear" reference in the email earli-
er that day, I felt it appropriate to call the police as result of Mr. Coughlin's refusal to leave, aggres-
sive and hostile demeanor and statements, and the concern that he might get physically violent. He
left the building before the police arrived.
As a result of the email and the encounter with Mr. Coughlin in our lobby we have notified him via
email that he is not to come to our offices without prior confirmation of an appointment with his as-
signed attorney. See Exhibit" I-D" attached hereto. We also advised the front desk for the building,
located on the first floor, of that limitation on his access to our office. See Exhibit "1-E" attached
hereto.
Based on what appears to be Mr. Coughlin's escalating animosity toward out office and staff as re-
flected in the email reference to "Cape Fear", Mr. Coughlin's expressionsintheemail of hostility
towardseveral of theattorneysinour officeand his apparently bleaming of them for his legal prob-
lems and criminal convictions, and his demonstrated aggressiveness toward our staff, we are ap-
plying for the restraining order to which this Exhibit "1" is attached.
Noticeably, WCPD Leslie's own Investigator, Evo Novak's statement that DDA Watts-
Vial attached to the very same TPO Application in 12-599 itself contradicts Leslie's accounts
(and Leslie contradicts himself and reveals his own professional misconduct upon a review of the
emails between Coughlin's then WCPD Leslie and WCDA DDA Kandaras of 12/12/12 and
12/13/12...and upon a thorough review of those emails and Coughlin's sent messages folder it is
revealed that Couglin did not send Leslie any email on 12/12/12 (which makes it apparent that the
12/12/12 email Coughlin sent to the SBN and others was forwarded to Leslie by one of it's recipi-
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ents, at which point Leslie forwarded the same to WCDA DDA Kandaras, makingly particularly
suspect the dubious mistatements of the dates involved in Leslie's Ex.1 statement attached to the
Workplace Harrassment TPO filed on Leslie's behalf by DDA Watts-Vial (he of the dubious
11/13/12 faxed objections to Coughlin's SCR 110 subpoenas in this matter) and reveals the ex-
tent to which Leslie engages in violations of RPC 3.1, 3.3, 1.6, and, possibly, 3.4, NRS 178.405,
and RPC 1.14. Novak wrote:
LESLIE, JIM FROM: SENT: TO: SUBJECT: NOVAK, EVA WEDNESDAY,
DECEMBER 12, 2012 4:51 PM LESLIE, JIM COUGHLIN OFFICE VISIT
12 12 12 11:58:11 AM, 12-21-2012 23/32 KNOWING MR COUGHLIN'S
VOLATILE PAST BEHAVIOR I WAS ASKED TO ACCOMPANY JIM LESLIE TO
THE LOBBY TO ASSIST COUGHLIN, HE WAS SEATED IN A CHAIR WRITING A
NOTE, JIM LESLIE ASKED COUGHLIN WHAT HE NEEDED, COUGHLIN MENTIONED
HE NEEDED SOME DISCOVERY FROM A CASE . JIM LESLIE ADVISED HIM MAKE
ANY COMMUNICATIONS BY WAY OF EMAIL, HE WOULD HANDLE THAT WAY,
COUGHLIN ASKED IF I WAS PRESENT AS WITNESS, JIMLESLIE CONFIRMED
THAT, JIM STATED THAT HE WAS GOING TO ASK TO BE RELIEVED FROM THE CUR-
RENT COUGHLIN CASE, COUGHLIN'S DEMEANOR BECAME BELLIGERENT. JIM
LESLIE ASKED COUGHLIN TO LEAVE THE OFFICE, COUGHLIN REFUSED
CLAIMING HE WAS WRITING A NOTE, JIMLESLIE ASKED WHAT THE NOTE
WAS. COUGHLIN SAID " IT'S NONE OF YOUR GODDAMN BUSINESS AND
WALKED PAST JIM AND LEFT THE NOTE AT THE RECEPTION DESK, COUGHLIN
WAS ADVISED SEVERAL TIMES BYJIMLESLIE TO LEAVE THE OFFICE. JIM
LESLIE ADVISED HIM THAT THE POLICE WERE GOING TO BE CALLED. AT THAT
POI NT THE ELEVATOR ARRIVED, PRIOR TO THE ELEVATOR DOOR CLOSING HE
CONTI NUEDHI SRANT TOWARD JIMLESLIE UNTI L THE DOOR CLOSED, EVO
NOVAK
Additionally, WCPD and WCDA DDA-Civil Division DDA Mary Kandaras
may have violated NRS 178.405, Coughlin's rights incident to Leslie's repre-
sentation in RJC RCR2012-067980, and 11-063341, 12-065630 in light of
RPC 1.16(c) in, but not limited to, the following (an in consideration of
WCDA DDA Watts-Vial's and Leslie's subsequent TPO Application in RJC
RCP2012-000699, both appear to have violated RPC 1.1, 1.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.2, 3.4,
3.4, 3.5A, 3.7, 4.3, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.5, 8.1, 8.3, and 8.4 (especially considering
Leslie's continuing to maintain that he knows that his office sent Coughlin
written notice of the 8/6/12 combination hearing in 12-067980 and 12-065630
when his legal assistant, Linda Gray, admitted to Coughlin on 8/8/12 that she
failed to mail out the written notice to Coughlin in light of her belief that
Coughlin's then PO Box 3961, Reno, NV 89505 mailing address was no
longer good (where Gray was presumably unaware that Coughlin bailed out
of jail on 7/21/12, upon the ridiculous Order following the unnoticed 7/5/12
bail increase hearing incident to the fraudulent testimony by RPD Officers
Weaver and or Dye, and the advocacy by RMC court appointed counsel
Keith Loomis (which was anything but) resulting in RMC Judge W. Gardner
raising Coughlin's then bondable $1,415 bail to a cash only $3,000 (based upon
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three charges that were completely phoney, drummed up, and spurious to begin
with.
TITLE 14PROCEDURE INCRIMINAL CASES;
CHAPTER 178 GENERAL PROVISIONS:
INQUIRYINTO COMPETENCE OF DEFEND-
ANTANDPROCEDURE FOLLOWINGFIND-
INGOF INCOMPETENCE...
NRS 178.405 SUSPENSION OF TRIAL OR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT WHEN DOUBT ARIS-
ES AS TO COMPETENCE OF DEFENDANT; NOTICE OF
SUSPENSION TO BE PROVIDED TO OTHER DEPART-
MENTS.
1. ANY TIME AFTER THE ARREST OF A DEFENDANT,
INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, PROCEEDINGS BE-
FORE TRIAL, DURING TRIAL, WHEN UPON CONVICTION
THE DEFENDANT IS BROUGHT UP FOR JUDGMENT OR
WHEN A DEFENDANT WHO HAS BEEN PLACED ON
PROBATION OR WHOSE SENTENCE HAS BEEN SUS-
PENDED IS BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT, IF DOUBT
ARISES AS TO THE COMPETENCE OF THE DEFENDANT,
THE COURT SHALL SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS, THE
TRIAL OR THE PRONOUNCING OF THE JUDGMENT, AS
THE CASE MAYBE, UNTI L THE QUESTION OF COMPE-
TENCE IS DETERMINED.
2. If the proceedings, the trial or the pronouncing of the judgment are suspended, the
court must notifyany other departments of the court of the suspension inwriting. Upon receiv-
ing such notice, the other departments of the court shall suspend any other proceedings relating to
the defendant until the defendant is determined to be competent.
Further, the OBC's King backing out on his express agreement to provide Coughlin the
names of the attorney's on the Screening Panel assigned to each of the grievances resulting in
the formal disciplinary hearing held on 11/14/12 is telling, as is the includion of WCDA DDA
Bruce C. Hahn, Esq. and DDA Mary Kandaras in the OBC's 8/23/12 First Designation of
Hearing Panel Members and Mr. Hahn's inclusion amongst the Washoe Legal Services Board
of Directors at the time in March 2009 when Coughlin quickly returned to Elcano an emergen-
cy assignment due, two days before the start of the Joshi Trial in DV08-01168 (from which the
4/13/09 Order After Trial by 2JDC Judge L. Gardner became NG12-0435, the third grievance
in listed in the caption of the OBC's 8/23/12 Complaint, which Judge Nash Holmes admits
(contrary to the misleading, evasive, and arguably duplicitous statements in that regard by the
OBC's King as to the actual genesis of that greivance and the identify of the greivant (relevant
to any RPC 4.2 compliance required of Coughlin). Couglin performed ghostwriting for Elcano
in preparing the exact, verbatim version of the Taxpayer Petition for Appeal from the Deci-
sion of the County Board of Equalization that Coughlin had filed for Washoe Legal Services
(the cover form therein contains Coughlin's handwriting, with a markedly different handwrit-
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ing for Elcano's signature, as Elcano changed not a single character in the four page Petition
Coughlin finished in time to timely submit for filing on the statutory deadline to do so on
3/10/09.
Coughlin was assigned that project by Elcano less than 5 calendar days before the dead-
line was to run, with the Joshi Trial in DV08-01168 set for 3/12/09. The project involved an
attempt by WLS to get out of being stuck with the property taxes for the real estate upon which
it operates and leases from a private, for profit landlord. Coughlin returned an excellent Peti-
tion to Elcano in an exceedingly short time frame. For Elcano to then appear at Coughlin's
11/14/12 formal hearing and question Coughlin's competency is ridiculous and pathetic, es-
pecially considering the inordinate effort Elcano expends in trying to pass himself off as some
Atticus Finch type. In March 2009 Coughlin actually met with Elcano and a WLS Board
Member that may have been Hahn (its not clear, and WLS and then it's counsel has refused to
identify those who were board members at the time of Coughlin's summary suspension and
subsequent firing) (now a member of the SBN's Board of Govenors, and WLS's then Board
President, Kathleen Breckenridge, Esq., is also amongst those identified in the OBC's 8/23 Ini-
tial Designation, and the RJC's newest Justice of the Peace, Hon. Pierre Hascheff was also on
WLS's Board at the time of Coughlin's summary suspension on 4/20/09 and subsequent firing
during the time period to file a Motion for Reconsideration or otherwise challenge the 4/13/09
OAT (FHE 3); and Elliott Sattler, Esq., Washoe County District Attorney's Office Deputy Dis-
trict Attorney, Criminal Division Term began: November 2009, expires: November 2013 is
listed as a WLS Board Member during the period of the wrongful termination litigation involv-
ing Coughlin and WLS, as is Suzanne Ramos, Reno City Attorney's Office Tern began: Feb-
ruary 2013, Expires, February 2015, as is grievant 2JDC Judge Linda Gardner's fellow 2JDC
Judge, Hon. Bridget Robb Peck, Second Judicial District Court Judicial Board Position Term
Began: December 2008, expires: December 2013, and NNDB Member Kathleen T. Brecken-
ridge, Esq., Kathleen T. Breckenridge, Ltd. Board Term Began: September 2007, expires Sep-
tember 2013, here: http://washoelegalservices.org/index.php/board-members ) to review
that Petition Coughlin prepared for WLS by the 3/10/09 deadline. That Coughlin prepared Pe-
tition includes the following analysis (somehow, the ability to find a needle in a haystack of le-
gal authority in a very scant amount of time had not translated to an ability to make much of a
living in Washoe County, where, it seems, some other qualifications are rather necessary):
...This Appeal is meant to demonstrate that a
leasehold with an option to buy for the building and
land at issue in this Appeal (and for which the lease
involved specifies that WLS shall be responsible for
the taxes associated with), should be included in the
property to which the language of NRS 361.140(2)
applies. The building and land at issue in this Appeal
should thus receive an exemption from taxation. There
exists a wealth of support for the contention that the
language in NRS 361.140(2) allows an exemption to
WLS where it holds a leasehold with an option to buy
in the property at issue. Cases interpreting statutory
sections with language very similar to, or in some cas-
es, nearly verbatim to NRS 361.140(2) have held that
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"belonging to" does, in fact, include situations where a
party has a leasehold in the building and land at issue.
One case is particularly instructive. "The Board concedes that the property is actually and ex-
clusively occupied and used by the Hospital Corporation for a hospital conducted not for profit, but
exclusively as a charity, but it contends that since the property is owned by the Foundation it is not
real estate "belonging to" a hospital and is not exempt from taxation. Thus we must first decide
whether the hospital property belongs to the Hospital Corporation within the meaning of 183( e) of
the Constitution and its legislative construction, Code 58-12(5), so as to exempt it from taxation,
even though the bare legal title is in the Foundation. Board of Supervisors v. Medical Group Founda-
tion, Inc., 134 S.E.2d 258,261 (Va. 1964). It is instructive to note that ""belonging to" may mean less
than an absolute and unqualified title, such as the absolute right of use. Sisters of Charity v. City of
Detroit, 9 Mich. 94,98; City of Jackson v. Preston, 93 Miss. 366,47 So. 547, 549, 21 L.R.A. N.S. 164;
Shewell v. Board of Ed. of Goshen Union Local School Dist. 88 Ohio App. 1,96 N.E.2d 323, 324;
Black's Law Dictionary, 3d ed., Belong, p. 205." Id.
"From the context of 183( e) and its statutory interpretation, when construed in the light of
other subsections and the policy of the State as to exempted property, we hold that "belonging to"
includes, but is not limited to, an absolute and unqualified title. Cf. Annotation, 157 A.L.R. 860, 862,
863." Id. "In (e), the property is exempt if it is "real estate belonging to, actually and exclusively oc-
cupied and used by" a hospital "conducted not for profit, but exclusively as" a charity ... we must
conclude from this that they intended that the words "belonging to" require only that the hospital
have some interest or estate in the land it occupies and uses, not necessarily absolute ownership, as
the words "owned by" would import. In this sense the real estate here in question "belongs to" the
Hospital Corporation, so long as it has the exclusive right to its possession under the lease." Board of
v. Medical Inc., 134 S.E.2d 258, 262 (Va. 1964).
Several other cases argue for a similar interpretation. "Under Art XIII 1, property rented or
leased to a school district and used by the district exclusively for public school purposes is exempt
from taxation, notwithstanding the fact that such property is owned by a private individual and not by
the district." Ross v. 24 Cal 2d 258, 148 P2d 649 (1944).
"To hold, however, with the appellant and follow the authorities cited by it and amici curiae,
it would be necessary for us to construe the constitutional section of our state as requiring property
used by a school district for public school purposes not only to be solely used by the district but also
to be owned by the district before it would be exempt from taxation. As previously stated in this opin-
ion, we are not able to so construe the applicable section of our Constitution. On the other hand, we
are in accord with the decisions of those courts in other jurisdictions, as well as in our own, which
hold that it is the use and not the ownership of the property in the possession of a school district and
used by it for public school purposes that determines its status as property exempt from taxation." 24
Cal. 2d 258, 265 (Cal. 1944).
"In Ross the property leased to a school district by a private owner was used exclusively for
public school purposes and was held tax exempt on that ground. In explaining why a sheer usage of
property without a concomittant ownership should entitle the school district to a tax exemption, the
Supreme Court pointed out that the exemption of property used for public school purposes is not for
the benefit of the private owner who may rent them his property for said purpose, but for the ad-
vantage of the school district which may be compelled to rent property rather than to buy land and
erect buildings thereon to be used for the maintenance of its school. With this advantage the school
district is able to rent property for a lower rental than the owner of the same property wouid be will-
ing to accept from a private individual, for the reason that if rented to a school district the owner is
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relieved from the payment of taxes thereon." Honeywell Information Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 44
Cal. App. 3d 23,30 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1974). See also, Regents of University of California v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 73 Cal.App.3d 660, 666, 140 Cal.Rptr. 857 (1977)["The purpose of the exemp-
tion here is to obtain lower rentals for the educational institutions."].
One California case is instructive in considering the curious paucity of appearances of the
phrase "belonging to" in NRS 361 when compared to the many instances of the use of the word
"owner", or some derivation thereof. ""Since other governmentally owned property was also exempt,
the inclusion in the 1879 Constitution of an express exemption of "property used exclusively for pub-
lic schools" necessarily had another purpose. That purpose was to create a new exemption, one for
property "used for," but not "owned by" a public school." v. of 824 P.2d 663, 675 (Cal. 1992).
NRS 361 is similar to the portion of the California Constitution at issue in in that the phrase
"belonging to" only makes one appearance in the entirety of NRS 361 for exemption purposes at
NRS 361.140(2) (the "belonging to" language also occurs at NRS 361.075(2) and NRS 361.745(2),
though both other instances do not seem to be relevant to the way the phrase is used in NRS
361.140(2)). In contrast, many, many times in the text of NRS 361 does the word "owned" or some
derivation thereof appear, strongly suggesting that ownership in a fee simple or title sense was not
meant to be a requirement to be read into NRS 361.140(2).
It is solely the use of the property which determines whether the property is exempt or not."
Washburn v. Comm'rs of Shawnee Co., 8 Kan. 344 (Kan. 1871). "It makes no difference who owns
the property, nor who uses it. Property used exclusively for educational purposes is exempt, whoever
may own it, or whoever may use it." Anniston Land Co. v. 160 Ala. 253, 260 (Ala. 1909). The "court,
in both, brought pointedly into view the principle that "exclusive use," irrespective of ownership, was
the test of the right of exemption. We do not stand alone in this construction of these decisions." Id.
Similarly, "under the act "all buildings belonging to institutions of purely public charity, and
all buildings belonging to public hospitals, shall be exempt." ... Under this construction no regard
need be had to the manner in which the title is held. v. Grand Forks 10 N.D. 54 (N.D. 1900).
For the reasons set forth above we respectfully request that the State Board of Equalization
grant a property tax exemption to the building and land that currently houses WLS's efforts to bring
legal services to needy and deserving individuals.
From: Kandaras, Mary Sent: Thursday, December 13, 2012 10:20 AM To:
Leslie, Jim Subject: RE: The Three E's; wcpd failure to provide essential 911
call cd discovery of 8/13 and 8/17, 2012 to Coughlin in rcr2012-065630 Im-
portance:
High
Jim:
I believe that you should send this. Supreme Court Rule 104(a) authorizes State
bar counsel to investigate all matters involving possible attorney misconduct or
incapacity called to bar counsel's attention, whether by grievance or both. This
potentially involves misconduct (violation of law) and incapacity.
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-----ORIGINAL MESSAGE----FROM: LESLIE, JIM SENT: WEDNESDAY,
DECEMBER 12, 2012 5:11 PM TO: KANDARAS, MARY SUBJECT: RE: THE
THREE E'S; WCPD FAILURE TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL 911 CALL CD DISCOV-
ERY OF 8/13 AND 8/17, 2012 TO COUGHLIN IN RCR2012 -065630
THANKS, PLEASE DO. HE CAME TO OUR OFFICE AFTER MY EMAIL TO YOU
AND CAUSED A DISTURBANCE. WE CALLED THE POLICE, BUT HE FLED
BEFORE THEY ARRIVED. JIM
-----Original Message----From: Kandaras, Mary Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2012 3:17 PM To:
Leslie, Jim Subject: RE: The Three E's; wcpd failure to provide essential 911 call cd discovery of
8/13 and 8/17, 2012 to Coughlin in rcr2012-065630
I will have to review this tomorrow and get back to you.
MARY KANDARAS DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY CIVIL DIVISION WASHOE COUNTY
-----ORIGINAL MESSAGE----FROM: LESLIE, JIM
THE BELOW EMAIL FROM MR. COUGHLIN CON-
TAINS A REFERENCE AT THE END OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH TO A WEBSITE
CONTAINING A VIDEO CLIP FROM THE MOVIE CAPE FEAR. PLEASE ADVISE
WHETHER ANY ACTION IS REQUIRED OF OUR OFFICE OR YOURS REGARDING
THIS POSSIBLE VEILED OR INDIRECT THREAT OF VIOLENCE AGAINST AT-
TORNEYS IN THIS OFFICE BY MR. COUGHLIN.
Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2012 2:59 PM To: Kandaras, Mary
Subject: FW: The Three E's; wcpd failure to provide essential 911 call cd
discovery of 8/13 and 8/17, 2012 to Coughlin in rcr2012-065630
Mary:
Please review my transmittal to Patrick King at the bar, below, and
let me know if I should do anything else from a civil perspective.
Thanks,
-----ORIGINAL MESSAGE----
FROM: LESLIE, JIMSENT: WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2012 2:49 PM TO: 'PATRICKK@NVBAR.ORG'
SUBJECT: FW: THE THREE E'S; WCPD FAILURE TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL 911 CALL CD DISCOVERY OF 8/13
AND 8/17, 2012 TO COUGHLIN IN RCR2012 -065630
MR. KING:
THANK YOU,
JAMES B. LESLIE, ESQ. CHIEF DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER WASHOE COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OF-
FICE
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-----ORIGINAL MESSAGE----
FROM: ZACH COUGHLIN [MAILTO:ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM] SENT: WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER
12, 2012 2:35 PM TO: LESLIE, JIM; BOSLER, JEREMY; DOGAN, BIRAY; GOODNIGHT, JOSEPH W;
FORTIER, CHRIS; TUTTLE, STEVE; KANDARAS, MARY; YOUNG, ZACH; SKAUC@RENO.GOV;
WONGD@RENO.GOV; KADLICJ@RENO.GOV; COMPLAINTS@NVBAR.ORG; CVELLIS@BHFS.COM;
JE@ELORENO.COM; PATRICKK@NVBAR.ORG; DAVIDC@NVBAR.ORG; ROSEC@NVBAR.ORG;
LAURAP@NVBAR.ORG; SKENT@SKENTLAW.COM; MIKE@TAHOELAWYER.COM; EIFERT.NTA@ATT.NET;
NEVTELASSN@SBCGLOBAL.NET; FFLAHERTY@DLPFD.COM; FFLAHERTY@DYERLAWRENCE.COM
SUBJECT: THE THREE E'S; WCPD FAILURE TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL 911 CALL CD DISCOVERY OF 8/13 AND
8/17, 2012 TO COUGHLIN IN
RCR2012 -065630
THE TRIAL YESTERDAY IN RCR2012-065630 FEATURED EXTENDED DIS-
CUSSIONS REGARDING THE FAILURE OF THE WCPD, DOGAN, AND LESLIE,
TO TURN OVER DISCOVERY PROPOUNDED BY DDA YOUNG IN THE FORM OF
CD'S FEATURING 911 CALLS DDA YOUNG PROVIDED TO THE WCPD ON
8/13/12 AND 8/17/12 ... AND THE HEAVY HITTERS WERE THERE, TOO
(ELLIOT SATTLER) ..... DESPITE NUMEROUS WRITTEN REQUESTS FROM
COUGHLIN THAT THE WCPD DO SO, AND MULTIPLE TRIPS TO THE WCPD
PERSONALLY BY COUGHLIN TO PICK SUCH MATERIALS UP, AND DESPITE
MORE FLIP FLOPPING ON THEIR STORY BY LESLIE AND DOGAN REGARDING
WHETHER THEY EVER GAVE COUGHLIN SOME PACKAGE OF MATERIALS RE-
SPONSIVE TO COUGHLIN'S REQUEST FOR HIS "FILE" ... BUT, JIM LESLIE IS
STUCK WITH THE 7/27/12 DATE HE MENTIONS IN HIS EMAIL, THEN HE IS
STUCK WITH WHAT HIS RECENT EMAIL WHEREIN HE PURPORTS TO HAVE
THEREIN DIGITALLY TRANSMITTED COUGHLIN HIS "FILE", WHICH OBVI-
OUSLY DOES NOT INCLUDE THE CD'S OF 911 CALLS (THE ONE'S DDA
YOUNG TOOK UP AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF COURT TIME PLAYING, OVER
AND OVER (WELL, YOUNG ONLY PLAYED OVER AND OVER THE PARTICU-
LAR CALLS HE FELT WERE STRONGEST FOR HIS CASE AND MOST PREJUDI-
CIAL, CLAIMING SOME "CUTTING ROOM FLOOR MISHAP" FOR THE REOC-
CURRENCE OF CERTAIN CALLS, ARGUING THAT SUCH A "HAPPY ACCIDENT"
JUSTIFIED PLAYING THEM AGAIN AND AGAIN, AT EVER INCREASING VOL-
UMES, ETC., ETC.). APPARENTLY, I AM HERE TO SUBSIDIZE YOUNG'S BABY
MAKING, JUST LIKE I WAS WITH MS. GORMAN, AS A CONTINUANCE OF
PREJUDICIAL LENGTH OF AFFORDED TO THE STATE WHERE NONE WAS
FORTHCOMING TO COUGHLIN, DESPITE LESLIE AND DOGAN'S OBSTRUC-
TIONIST TANTRUMS, ONES OF A QUALITY THAT WOULD. I REMEMBER WHEN
MY LIFE FEATURED HAPPY MOMENTS LIKE THE BIRTH OF TWINS ... BUT
THAT WAS BEFORE YOUR LEVIATHAN LEGAL SYSTEM WRECKED SHOP ON
MY EXISTENCE. WHAT, SIR, SHALL BE MY COMPENSATION? DO YOU MIND
IF I PUT MY ARM AROUND .... HTTP://TINYURL.COM/BGMLFDR
This is a formal grievance against Dogan, Leslie, Bosler, Young ...
etc....
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The link that Leslie refers to as containing a video clip from the movie
Cape Fear actually contains only an audio clip of a short quote from Cape
Fear (the 1991 Scorsese version).
THERE ARE A NUMBER OF MATERIAL INCONSISTIENCIES AND CONTRADIC-
TIONS BETWEEN THE EVEN JUST LESLIE AND EVO NOVAK'S ACCOUNTS, MUST LESS
LESLIES MISTATING THE DATE OF THE THREE E'S EMAIL TO ADD EFFECT, INCLUD-
ING LESLIE MISLEADING STATEMENTS (SHOWN BY THE LACK THEREOF IN NOVAK'S
ACCOUNTS) OF WHETHER COUGHLIN ATTEMPTED TO HAND LESLIE THE NOTE
(COUGHLIN DID, THEN LESLIE PUT HIS HAND FAR OUT TO EACH SIDE AS IF TO SAY
HE WOULDN'T TAKE IT, AT WHICH POINT COUGHLIN, DISTRUSTING LESLIE TO TAKE
THE NOTE ANYWAYS, PLACED IT AT THE RECEPTIONISTS TABLE IN FRONT OF HER
WINDOW...NOVAKS FAILURE TO COORBORATE LESLIE'S ALLEGATION THAT HE BE-
GAN THREATENING TO CALL THE POLICE RIGHT AWAY, THE INABILITYOF
COUGHLIN TO LEAVE UNTIL THE ELEVATOR ARRIVED REGARDLESS, AND THE FACT
THAT COUGHLIN WAS SAYING SCRAP, SCRAP, SCRAP, NOT CHIP, CHIP, CHIP
LIKELY IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISGUISE ANY ILL-ADVISED STATEMENT'S REFERENC-
ING SCRAPPY-DO, WHERE COUGHLIN ALSO SAID AT THAT TIME JIM, YOUARE A
SCRAPPYDUDE.
EXHIBIT 1 TO APPLICATIONFOR TEMPORARY ORDER FOR PROTEC-
TION AGAINST HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
...
ON DECEMBER 12, 2012, I RECEIVED AN EMAIL FROM ZACHARY COUGHLIN, A COPY OF
WHICH IS ATTACHED HERETO AS EXHIBIT" IA" . THE EMAIL PERTAINS TO A MISDEMEANORPETIT
LARCENY CASE OF MR. COUGHLIN'S INVOLVING THEFT OR UNLAWFUL RETENTION OF AN IPHONE, ON
WHICH I AND OTHER ATTORNEYS IN OUR OFFICE PREVIOUSLY REPRESENTED HIM, DURING THE COURSE
OF THE BENCH TRIAL, OUR OFFICE WAS RELIEVED AS COUNSEL UPON MR. COUGHLIN'S REQUEST TO REP-
RESENT HIMSELF. THROUGHOUT THE EMAIL. MR. COUGHLIN MAKES VARIOUS DEROGATORY COM-
PLAINTS ABOUT AND REFERENCES TO ME AND OTHER ATTORNEYS IN OUR OFFICE.
At the end of the first paragraph of the email. Mr. Coughlin complains that his various attor-
neys and others in the local criminal justice system have ruined his life and he writes I remember
when my life featured happy moments like the birth of twins . , . but that was before your leviathan
legal system wrecked shop on my existence. What, sir, shall be my compensation ?" The email then
references the website http://tinyurl.com/bgmlfdr When that address is cut and pasted into a web
browser, it directs the reader to a website containing a video segment from the movie "Cape Fear",
which the website summarizes as a film that "tells the story of a convicted rapist who
seeks vengeance against a former public defender whom he blames for his 14-year im-
prisonment .... " In the movie, the client, played by Robert Di Nero, carries out that
vengeance by stalking and trying to kill his former public defender, played by Nick
Nolte. A copy of the print out of the website is attached hereto as Exhibit I B", The vid-
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eo segment on the website is a scene in the movie where the client of the public defender
has just beaten two men. The client is wearing a shirt bloodied with his blood and the
blood of the men he just beat, and he is holding a blunt instrumcnt weapon or a chain in
his hand. He vows to continue his harassment of his former public defender, who is hid-
ing nearby behind a garbage dumpster.
The email from Mr. Coughlin is addressed to several attorneys in the office of the Washoe
County Public Defender, including attorneys Jim Leslie, Jeremy Bosler, Biray Dogan, Joseph Good-
night, and Chris Fortier. Mr, Coughlin has previously and repeatedly expressed significant dissatis-
faction with his various attorneys in our office and has almost continuosly, as he does throughout the
email attachted hereto, blamed them for his current legal problems, his recent criminal convictions,
and his suspension from active attorney licensure with the Nevada State Bar. The email is also ad-
dressed to several other persons outside our office, including but not limited to Steve Tuttle of
the Reno Justice Court, John Kadlic, and Daniel Wong of the Reno City Attorney's Office, Mary
Kandaras of the Washoe County District Attorney's Office-Divil Division, and David Clark and Pat-
rick King of the Office of Bar Counsel of the Nevada State Bar.
Based on Mr. Coughlin having included the various recipients to the email
who are not his attomeys, Mr. Coughlin has waived attomey-c1ient confidentiali-
ty. Additionally, based upon the nature of the references made in the first para-
graph of the email to Mr. Coughlin's legal problems and reference to the "Cape
Fear" regarding violence and harassment against former puhlic defender,
Mr, Coughlin has waived attorney-client confidentiality as per Nevada Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.6(c).
Later the same day as the emailn December 12, 2012. Mr. Coughlin showed up at the offices of
the Washoe County Public Defender without an appointment, I and an investigator went to the lobby
to see him, since we had decided based on previous encounters with Mr. Coughlin that it is best not
to meet with him alone, With the investigator present in the lobby, I asked Mr. Coughlin what he
needed. He said he wanted his discovery documents. Since we have had prior incidents where
Mr. Coughlin received documents from us and later claimed we did not provide them, I asked
him to email me with his request and that I would respond to the email. During our discussion I
informed him that I would be asking that our oflicc be relieved from his pending misdemeanor Ob-
structing and Resisting criminal case. He became agitated and upset and I asked him to leave and to
schedule an appointment if he thought he needed one and to send me his email request. He re-
fused to leave, stating he was writing a note. I asked what the note was and he became loud and ver-
bally aggressive and said "None of your goddamncd business..." His demeanor was visibly belliger-
ent I asked him again several times to leave and he rose to his feet (he is approximately 6'3" and I am
5'4") and went on a verbal rant against me. I continued to tell him to leave while I turned to the
front desk staff and asked them to call the police, He tried handing me the note, and in response
I held out my hand to receive it from him, but then he pulled the note back from me several
times in a taunting manner while smiling. As we waited for the elevator, he kept saying he was
"chipping" at me. As he left in the elevator, he kept saying "chip, chip, chip .... , in a taunting manner.
I asked my investigator to summarize the encounter in writing. A copy of that written summary is
hereto attached as Exhibit "]-C".
Given Mr. Coughlin's demeanor and behavior, and given the "Cape Fear" reference in the email earli-
er that day, I felt it appropriate to call the police as result of Mr. Coughlin's refusal to leave, aggres-
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sive and hostile demeanor and statements, and the concern that he might get physically violent. He
left the building before the police arrived.
As a result of the email and the encounter with Mr. Coughlin in our lobby we have notified him via
email that he is not to come to our offices without prior confirmation of an appointment with his as-
signed attorney. See Exhibit" I-D" attached hereto. We also advised the front desk for the building,
located on the first floor, of that limitation on his access to our office. See Exhibit "1-E" attached
hereto.
Based on what appears to be Mr. Coughlin's escalating animosity toward out office and staff as re-
flected in the email reference to "Cape Fear", Mr. Coughlin's expressionsintheemail of hostility
towardseveral of theattorneysinour officeand his apparently bleaming of them for his legal prob-
lems and criminal convictions, and his demonstrated aggressiveness toward our staff, we are ap-
plying for the restraining order to which this Exhibit "1" is attached.
Noticeably, WCPD Leslie's own Investigator, Evo Novak's statement that DDA Watts-
Vial attached to the very same TPO Application in 12-599 itself contradicts Leslie's accounts and
reveals the extent to which Leslie engages in violations of RPC 3.1, 3.3, 1.6, and, possibly, 3.4,
NRS 178.405, and RPC 1.14. Novak wrote:
Leslie, Jim From: Sent: To: Subject: Novak, Eva Wednesday, Decem-
ber 12, 2012 4:51 PM leslie, Jim Coughlin office visit 12 1212 11:58:11
am, 12-21-2012 23/32 Knowing Mr Coughlin's volatile past behavior I
was asked to accompany Jim leslie to the lobby to assist Coughlin, He
was seated in a chair writing a note, Jim leslie asked Coughlin what he
needed, Coughlin mentioned he needed some discovery from a case . Jim
Leslie advised him make any communications by way of email, he would han-
dle that way, Coughlin asked if I was present as witness, Jim Leslie con-
firmed that, Jim stated that he was going to ask to be relieved from the current
Coughlin case, Coughlin's demeanor became belligerent. Jim Leslie asked
Coughlin to leave the office, Coughlin refused claiming he was writing a
note, Jim Leslie asked what the note was. Coughlin said " it's none of your
goddamn business and walked past Jim and left the note at the reception
desk, Coughlin was advised several times by Jim Leslie to leave the office.
Jim Leslie advised him that the police were going to be called. At that point
the elevator arrived, Prior to the elevator door closing he continuedhis
rant toward Jim Leslie until thedoor closed, Evo Novak
Leslie's TPO Application in 12-599 seems to clearly be in retaliation for Coughlin filing a grievance
(SEE RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., 1/14/12 GRIEVANCE TO THE SBN AGAINST COUGHLIN
AND RMC JUDGE NASH HOLMES 3/14/12 GRIEVANCE TO THE SBN AGAINST
COUGHLIN, WHICH ATTACHED A 3 YEAR OLD SANCTION ORDER THAT BECAME A
GRIEVANCE BY HOLME'S FELLOW RMC JUDGE W. GARDNER THAT HE RECIEVED
FROM HIS SISTER, 2JDC FAMILYCOURT JUDGE L. GARDNER WHEREIN SHE SANC-
TIONED COUGHLIN RESULTING IN HIS FIRING FROM WLS IN 2009, AND 53833 AND
54844 AND 60303 AND 60317...) against Leslie with the SBN, including the following:
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formal written grievance against Skau, Young, Leslie, Dogan, etc. FW: 911 calls missing from what
was produced by City Attorney Skau? 12/04/12
To: ... zyoung@da.washoecounty.us, complaints@nvbar.org, patrickk@nvbar.org,
davidc@nvbar.org, ...bdogan@washoecounty.us, jleslie@washoecounty.us
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 12/04/12 2:07 PM
Outlook Active View 12 attachments (total 16.1 MB) CR11-2064-2676094 (Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss CR11-2064-2676094.pdf).pdfDownload 11 7 12 subpoenas 063341 gricela alvarez and
hassett proof of service or waivers.pdfDownload CR11-2064 MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF
TIME (Mtn for Extension of Time).pdfDownload CR11-2064-2655401 (Mtn to Dismiss
...).pdfDownload CR11-2064-2676094 (Exhibit 2).pdfDownload Download all as zip
Dear Office of Bar Counsel, This is a formal grievance against City Attorney
Skau, Public Defender Jim Leslie and Biray Dogan, and DDA Zach Young.
A portion of a recent email from City Attorney Skau reads: "Fwd: FW: Case No. RCR2011-063341?
From: Creighton C. Skau (skauc@reno.gov) Sent: Fri 11/09/12 11:45 AM To:
zachcoughlin@hotmail.com Cc: Jeannie Homer (HomerJ@reno.gov) 1 attachment pho-
to[1].JPG (181.2 KB) Dear Mr. Coughlin, Please be advised that Judge Sferaza authorized service
upon you by email in an Order. Accordingly, authorized service has already been effected... Set
forth below is the language of Judge Sferaza's Order and the language of the City's Motion. ...
But, a listen to around the 9:25 am mark on the audio transcript form the RJC Javs recording
of the 11/8/12 hearing in rcr2011-063341 reveals Mr. Skau fraudulently procurred Couglin's at-
tendance at the 11/13/12 Hearing (and considering 11/12/12 was a holiday, Skau would have been
prevented from effecting contstructive service prior to the 11/13/12 hearing date set...This prejudiced
not only Coughlin's formal disciplinary hearing but also the petty larceny trial of 11/19 and 11/20 and
is a straight scum bag move by Creig Skau. Judge Sferrazza granted Coughlin a waiver of witness
fees for subpoenas and subpoena duces tecums at the 48 minute mark of the second wmv file from
the JAVS audio transwcript of the 10/22/12 Hearing in RCR2012-063341. Regardless, City Attorney
Skau not only doesn't know who Jeremy Bosler, Esq. is, but he cites to a JCRCP 45 to challenge a
subpoena in a criminal misdemeanor case and he fails to inform the court of the waiver of service
signed by an individual who indicated she had authority to do so, Gricela Alvarez (whom, somehow,
Judge Sferrazza was apparently aware of and had opinions on....curiously). Speaking of scum bag
moves, there's is Jim Leslie jumping in at the 9:06 am mark on the 11/20/12 javs recording
112012coughlin1 for rcr2011-063341 (really, everything Jim Leslie did in this case or any other
in "representing" Coughlin is hall of fame sleazy) "I can jump in as stand by counsel if you
feels he is dragging his feet, your honor...He's wasting county assets."...Really, Jim, this is a
grievance against you for seeking to coerce a waiver of Coughlin's fifth amendment rights inci-
dent to your refusal to utilize any of the exculpatory media Coughlin provided you at either the
Supression Hearing or the Trial..and a greivance against DDA Young for similarly coercing a
waiver of Coughlin's Fifth Amendment rights (you really need to listent to the last file for 11/19 and
the first for 11/20 to get an idea of the hysterics DDA Young engages in, getting Coughlin taken into
custody, wherein the RJC Bailiffs asked if they could keep Coughlin's laptops over night...but there is
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some really bad audio on there ... DDA Young getting completely coercive with respect to a waiv-
er of Coughlin's Fifth Amendment rights and "you can't put on anything else or any evidence,
YOU NEED TO TESTIFY!" and Young "you Honor, it was my understanding that you let mr.
Coughlin out of custody on the condition that he testify! If he won't do it TAKE HIM BACK
INTO CUSTODY!" add to the grievance against young the fraudulent testimony and argument
he put on where he knows or should have know that the rpd duralde did not receive any reports
from dispatch of "a possible fight" where Duralde had left his vehicle and the text screen therein
prior to the 11:27:11 pm text from dispatch, and therefore, such allegations of a report from dispatch
of "a possible fight" did not bare on Duralde's probable cause/reasonable suspicion analysis. further
young put on perured testimony by Zarate about how Zarate "personally eye witnessed Coughlin re-
ceiving the phone" when Young was provide a video wherein Zarate admits he only inferred that. Oh,
and Coughlin hereby swears he never received any such 11/7/12 motion, faxed or otherwise from
Dogan or his assitant Tibbals or anyone with the WCPD. And then there is Jim Leslie failing to make
a hearsay objection when DDA Young asks Officer Duralde what some unnamed bystanders told him
upon arriving...yet, every bit of video evidence and or testimony that Coughlin sought to have Leslie
introduce regarding Nicole Watson admitting to hearing "the man with the six pack" threaten to
throw the iPhone "in the river if someone doesn't claim it right now" was continually excluded as
"hearsay"...Between the following two timestamped recordings finally provided by City Attorney
Skau (WCPD Jim Leslie is too busy whistling during trail at Coughlin's pointing out how he cau-
tioned the youths prior to the arrival of the peace to stay peaceful in Coughlin's references the then
recent murder of Stephen Gale just blocks away approximately two months prior to the 8/20/11
arrest, incident to the theft of a purse, and Lelise prefers to spend his time chiming in, un-
prompted, on the regard, arrogantly enough, that he can assist the court if it feels Coughlin is
"draggin' his feet" incident to the inappropriat placement by Judge Sferrazza of Leslie as "stanby
counsel" which really amounted to no more than yet another coercive practice...In RCR2011-063341,
Coughlin's then WCPD Joe Goodnight, Esq (who was removed from representing Coughlin by Jim
Leslie and Jeremy Bosler the Washoe County public defender applying good nicely peers decid-
ing that the night was doing too much to assist Coughlin in defending himself and or otherwise
zealously advocating on call Pat good night in Coughlin had a trial prep strategy session while
Coughlin was in custody on July Friday, July 13 at approximately 430 man and you good night
reiterating the extent to which he would be appearing on Coughlin's to have to try the case at trial on
July 16, 2012 Monday morning at 9 AM and it was only upon Coughlin arriving and being brought to
the court in custody seeded Jeremy Bosler was suddenly filling in for Goodnight with and indication
Goodnight's December 19, 2011 file stamp discovery requests served upon the stay and district
attorney Zach young reads at page 1 therein: "REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY COMES NOW,
the Defendant, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, by and through his attorney of record, Jo-
seph W. Goodnight, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby requests the following discovery pur-
suant to NRS 174.235 to NRS 174.295, inclusive. 1. Inspect and receive copies or photograph any
written or recorded statements or confessions made by the Defendant or any witness, or copies there-
of, within the possession, custody or control of the State, the existence of which is known or by the
exercise of due diligence may become known to the prosecutor. NRS 174.235(1)(a). This request in-
cludes any video and audio recordings, including those preserved on pocket recording devices, 9-1-1
emergency calls, and any dispatch logs, written or recorded, generated in connection with this case."
It is telling the extent to which on the record at that July 16 trial date Washoe County public defender
Jeremy Bosler indicated that Jim Leslie would immediately be rounding you a replacement role pret-
ty suddenly disappearing Goodnight. And that Leslie would be prepared to try the case by Friday and
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that the court could step matter for trial on Friday it is witness. Perhaps what Mr. Bosler meant was
that Jim Leslie would, by that Friday, have completed all the trial prep Jim Leslie would be doing on
this case by Friday, and that that would be the case whether or not that evinced any sort of concern
for his client, ability to zealously advocate on his client behalf or willingness to do so, or indication
that Jim Leslie felt that the judges of the Reno Justice Court would hold him to a standard of care at
all tending to indicate that Mr. Leslie has any skin in this game whatsoever. Clearly there is a bases
for mistrial here were Jim Leslie's entire contribution to the representation of Mr. Coughlin is drip-
ping in every way with misconduct and malpractice and apparently willing disregard for the rules of
professional conduct an intentional manifestation of Leslie's desire to secure a conviction the Washoe
County District Attorney's Office and therein secure added boys from local law enforcement District
Attorney's Office and perhaps the Reno justice court itself. Further Reno Municipal Court judge Nash
Holmes's admonition as to communications with the Washoe County public defenders office in con-
nection with February 27, 2012 clandestine status conference between Biray Dogan and Zach Young
which neither Dogan nor Young has ever refuted whether they they have been sworn prior thereto or
not an especially where Dogan's coworker down the hall civil division deputy Dist. Atty. Mary has
been involved throughout the confiscation without a search warrant or court order of any kind (or at
least one ever served on Coughlin in any manner) of Coughlin smart phone and micro SD card inci-
dent Judy impermissible summary contempt finding by judge Nash Holmes just two hours after the
clandestine status conference between Dogan young on February 27, 2012 in RMC case 11 TR 26800
for which Dogan and Young stipulated to a continu...n compliance with Judge Sferrazza Order of
9/5/12 FW: Zach Coughlin has shared a folder with you? From: Zach Coughlin
(zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) Sent: Tue 11/27/12 8:26 AM To: psferrazza@washoecounty.us
(psferrazza@washoecounty.us); zyoung@da.washoecounty.us (zyoung@da.washoecounty.us)
re:rcr2011-063341 Dear Judge Sferrazza and DDA Young, I am sending this in compliance with
Judge Sferrazza's indication that I should send him materials after the trial the bare on the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim and or the coerced waiver of my Fifth Amendment rights, especially inci-
dent to the representation by WCPD Jim Leslie. Please note the email of 11/5/2012 from Court Ad-
ministrator Mr. Tuttle and the inadvertent faxing of numerous filings to the wrong fax number by
myself.
https://skydrive.live.com/redir?resid=43084638F32F5F28!5141&authkey=!APibWiVXTMS
Wkw0 .(NOTE, THAT EMAILED GRIEVANCE TO THE SBN CONTINUES ON FOR QUITE
SOME TIME, AND THIS IS A TRUNCATED, EXCERPTED VERSION HERE...).
911 Case? Leslie, Jim (Jleslie@washoecounty.us)Add to contacts12/07/12 To:
'zachcoughlin@hotmail.com' Cc: Dogan, Biray Outlook Active View 1 attachment (2.2 MB) Cough-
lin Discovery 911 Case.pdfDownload Download as zip Mr. Coughlin: Attached are the discovery ma-
terials in the above-referenced case that you had requested and we had made an additional copy of for
you in response to your request. Please note that the July 27, 2012, cover letter was for your pick up
and you never picked it up. Note also that the July 27, 2012, packet encloses a copy of the April 17,
2012, hand delivery transmittal of the very same documents which you received. Since we have been
removed from the 911 case, we are closing our file. The attached materials were sitting at our front
desk. Since you failed to retrieve them, we provide the attached courtesy copy before final closure of
our file. No response to this transmittal is required from you. James B. Leslie, Esq.
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From: Jleslie@washoecounty.us To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com Subject: Coughlin Date: Thu, 13
Dec 2012 00:22:01 +0000 Mr. Coughlin: Based on your behavior at our offices on several past occa-
sions, including today where we had to call the police due to you engaging in behavior constituting
disturbing the peace, you are hereby directed NOT to come to our offices without first having con-
firmed in writing an appointment with your assigned attorney. If you violate this email notification,
we will contact law enforcement.
James B. Leslie, Esq. Chief Deputy Public Defender
The Three E's; wcpd failure to provide essential 911 call cd discovery of 8/13 and 8/17, 2012 to
Coughlin in rcr2012-065630?
Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)12/13/12 To:
jleslie@washoecounty.us...28 attachments (total 20.0 MB) Download all
as zip THIS REPRESENTS A VERY TRUNCATED VERSION OF THE
12/13/12 EMAIL LESLIE ATTACHED TO HIS TPO APPLICATION,
WHICH LESLIE MISLEADINGLY AND INCORRECTLY INDICATES
WAS SENT AND RECEIVED ON 12/12/12, INSTEAD OF 12/13/12.
COUGHLIN? LESLIE, JIM (JLESLIE@WASHOECOUNTY.US)ADD TO CON-
TACTS 12/12/12 TO: 'ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM' FROM: LESLIE, JIM
(JLESLIE@WASHOECOUNTY.US) THIS SENDER IS IN YOUR SAFE LIST. SENT: WED
12/12/12 4:22 PM TO:'ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM'
(ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM) MR. COUGHLIN: BASED ON YOUR BEHAVIOR
AT OUR OFFICES ON SEVERAL PAST OCCASIONS, INCLUDING TODAY WHERE WE
HAD TO CALL THE POLICE DUE TO YOUENGAGING IN BEHAVIOR CONSTITUTING
DISTURBING THE PEACE, YOUARE HEREBY DIRECTED NOTTO COME TO OUR OF-
FICES WITHOUT FIRST HAVING CONFIRMED IN WRITING AN APPOINTMENT WITH
YOUR ASSIGNED ATTORNEY. IF YOU VIOLATE THIS EMAIL NOTIFICATION, WE
WILL CONTACT LAW ENFORCEMENT. JAMES B. LESLIE, ESQ. CHIEF DEPUTY PUB-
LIC DEFENDER
JIMLESLIE IS A SCRAPPY DUDE RE: COUGHLIN? FROM: ZACH COUGHLIN
(ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM) SENT: FRI 12/14/12 1:24 AM TO:
LESLIE, JIM (JLESLIE@WASHOECOUNTY.US);
JBOSLER@WASHOECOUNTY.US (JBOSLER@WASHOECOUNTY.US);
FFLAHERTY@DLPFD.COM (FFLAHERTY@DLPFD.COM);
FFLAHERTY@DYERLAWRENCE.COM(FFLAHERTY@DYERLAWRENCE.COM);
DAVIDC@NVBAR.ORG (DAVIDC@NVBAR.ORG); MPICKESQ@MSN.COM
(MPICKESQ@MSN.COM) DEAR JIMLESLIE, ESQ., JIM, I NEED TO GET MY DISCOV-
ERY FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE TRIAL IN RJC RCR2012-065630...DESPITE
YOUR CRIES OF "WASTING COUNTY ASSETS" AT 9:05AM ON 11/20/12 WHEN, IN
YOUR STANDBY COUNSEL ROLE, YOU ATTEMPTED TO ASSIST DDA YOUNG AND
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JUDGE SFERRAZZA IN FURTHER COERCING FROM ME MY FIFTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS...YOUSEEM INTENT ON WASTING COUNTY ASSETS, AS YOUR FAILURE TO
TURN OVER THE DISCOVERY (THE CD RECORDINGS OF 911 CALLS DDA YOUNG
ALLEGES HE PRODUCED TO MY WCPDON 8/13/12 AND 8/17/12 HAS NOT MATE-
RIALLY PREJUDICED MY DEFENSE IN RCR2012-065630, IN MUCH THE SAME WAY
YOUR FAILURE TO TIMELY TRANSMIT MY FILE IN RCR2011-063341 DID, INCLUD-
ING YOUR FAILURE TO PRODUCE THE RESULTS AND RESPONSE AND PRODUCTION
IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUBPOENA OF 10/3/12, AND GIVEN YOU WERE NOTE
REMOVED AS COUNSEL OF RECORD UNTIL AT THE EARLIEST 10/22/12...KELLEY
DODMA, ECOMM, AND YOUHAVE SOME 'SPLAININ' TO DO. NOW YOUALLEGE
THAT YOU FILED A FALSE POLICE REPORT. JIM, PLEASE KEEP A COPY OF ANY
COMMUNICATIONS YOU HAVE MADE TO THE RPD, AND OF COURSE THE CALL
YOUREFERENCE WILL BE SUBPOENAED, AND IF THERE EXISTS ANY RECORDINGS
(VIDEO/AUDIO, WHATEVER) OF THE "INCIDENTS" YOU DESCRIBE (NOT SURE
DROPPING OF A WRITTEN REQUEST FOR ONE'S FILE/DISCOVERY TO YOUR RECEP-
TIONIST GIVEN THE FACT THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE HERE IS "DISTRUBING
THE PEACE", BUT, TO EACH HIS ONE, I GUESS...HOWEVER, ITS CURIOUS YOU NEV-
ER SEEM TO PLACE ANY RESTRICTIONS ON YOUR CONTINUING TO CASH YOUR
SWEET PAYCHECKS WEEK AFTER WEEK, JIM...NOW YOUSEEM TO BE SEEKING
SOME SORT OF PROTECTION AGAINST BEING SERVED WRITTEN NOTICES OR HAV-
ING THEM DELIVERED, OR MAKING MY ABILITY TO DO SOME CONTINGENT UPON
YOUR SCHEDULING A MEETING (ANY SUCH MEETING WOULD LIKELY TERMINATE
AFTER FIVE MINUTES, AS THEY HAVE IN THE PAST, WITH YOUPULLING YOUR
DIANA ROSS-DIVA ACT....DDA YOUNG GOT A GOOD KNOWING LAUGH OUT OF
THAT ONE ON 12/11/12.....). JIM, PLEASE DO ME A FAVOR AND REPLY TO THIS
EMAIL, COPYING THE SBNAND PRESIDENT OF THE STATE BAR AND DESCRIBE
JUST EXACTLY WHAT OCCURRED DURING THESE RECENT "PAST SEVERAL OCCA-
SIONS"...AND PUT IT IN AN AFFIDAVIT...ALSO, WILL YOUFINALLY PUT IN AN AFFI-
DAVIT YOUR CONTENTIONS THAT YOU "KNOW" YOUR OFFICE SENT ME NOTICE IN
WRITING OF THE 8/6/12 COMBO-HEARING DATE IN 065630 AND 067980 (PLEASE
ALSO PUT IN WRITING YOUR REFUSAL TO SEND OUT SUBPOENAS (EASY UNDER
NRS 174.345) TO ECOMMFOR ANY CALLS TO 911 OR DISPATCH RELATED TO ME
IN ANY WAY SINCE 8/20/12) AND ANY DISPATCH TO LAW ENFORCEMENTS RE-
CORDINGS, AND RECORDINGS MADE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OR SUBMITTED TO
LAW ENFORCEMENT BY PRIVATE PARTIES, SINCE THAT DATE AS WELL. PLEASE
FURTHER INDICATE IN WRITING WHY YOUARE REFUSING TO SEND THE WCSOA
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM FOR ANY MATERIALS RELATED TO ME IN ANY WAY
FROM THEIR CIVIL DIVISION (THAT SERVED PROCESS OF THE ITEMS DETAILED IN
THE VARIOSU AFFIDAVITS OF SERVICES BY MACHEN ET AL THAT HAVE BECOME
OF ISSUE IN 11 TR 26800, 067980, ETC., ETC., SUBPOENA NORTHWINDS LOU
CADIA AND DUANE JAKOB...)....SEE, JIM, YOUARE STILL GETTING PAID, YOU
NEED TO DO SOME WORK HERE, GUY... SO CUTE HOWBIRAY DOGAN, IN THE
8/21/12 HEARING IN 065630 MENTIONED HOW HE "LEFT A VOICE MAIL" FOR
LINDA GRAY, BUT JUST COULDN'T, GOSH DARN IT, GET AN ANSWER FROM HER
ABOUT WHETHER SHE DID SEND OUT WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE 8/6/12 COMBO
HEARING...(YOUKNOW, THE ONE YOU TESTIFIED ABOUT DURING OUR CLOSED
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MARDSEN-LITE CONFLICT HEARING IN 063341...WHERE YOUALLEGED YOU
"KNEW" FOR SURE THAT NOTICE WAS SENT, BUT THEN REFUSED TO PROVIDE ANY
SPECIFICS AS TO HOW YOU 'KNEW" OR WHAT YOUDID TO MAKE SURE OF THAT..."
GRAY ADMITTED TO COUGHLIN ON THE PHONE THAT SHE DID NOT MAIL OUT ANY
WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE 8/6/12 HEARING TO COUGHLIN BECAUSE YOUR OFFICE
HAD MARKED HIS "POBOX 3961" ADDRESS AS "NO LONGER GOOD" AT THAT
TIME (AND THE AUDIO OF THE 7/16/12 ABORTED TRIAL DATE CLEARLYE ESTAB-
LISHES COUGHLIN WAS NOT PROVIDED THE 8/6/12 DATE AT THAT TIME, BECAUSE
THE TEMPORARY REPLACEMENT FOR THE SUDDENLY DISAPPEARED WCPD
GOODNIGHT, AND DDA YOUNG WERE DIRECTED TO MEET IN THE
HALL/COUNTER AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE PROCEEDING ON 7/16/12 AND
PICK A DATE AND TIME, BY WHICH TIME COUGHLIN WAS TAKEN BACK INTO CUS-
TODY (WHERE HE WAS SERVING 18 DAYS IN JAIL DUE TO THE FRAUDULENT BAIL
INCREASE IN RMC 12 CR1240 (ANOTHER BOGUS "DISTURBING THE PEACE
CHARGE" BY THE RPD...THAT EVEN THE CITY OF RENO PROSECUTORS HAD TO
DROP (AND WE ALL KNOW HOW ADVERSE THEY ARE TO DROPPING ANY CHARGES,
EVER). JIM, WHY DON'T YOUJUST GO WASH THE RPD'S CARS OR SOMETHING IF
YOU WANT TO SUCK UP TO THEM SO BAD? PLEASE THEN EXPLAIN TO THOSE
LISTED ABOVE WHY YOUR CROSS EXAMINATION OF CORY GOBLE ON 8/29/12 IN
063341 SEEMED TO CONSIST SOLELY OF AN ATTEMPT ON YOUR PART TO DEFEAT
THE NRS 171.136 PROBLEM THE STATE FACED, INCLUDING THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE APPLICATION, WHERE THE TESTIMONY AS TO THE VALUE OF THE PHONE BY
THE "VICTIM" GOBLE WAS "ABOUT $80" VALUATION...WELL UNDER THE $250
NEEDED AT THE TIME TO SUPPORT A "OOOH, THATS A FELONY" GRAND LARCENY
CHARGE (TO QUOTE OFFICER DURALDE), AND THEREIN VITIATE THE LEGITIMACY
OF ANY SUCH ARREST OR SEARCH INCIDENT THERETO (UNLESS A CITIZEN'S AR-
REST COULD BE ESTABLISHED....WHICH IS WHAT YOU SPENT YOUR ENTIRE CROSS
OF GOBLE TRYING TO ESTABLISH, FOR THE STATE'S BENEFIT...BECAUSE YOUARE
A SLEAZY, SPITEFUL, LAZY, MEAN SPIRITED, PETTY, HATEFUL INDIVIDUAL WHOM
THE DAWANTS ON THE CASE ANYTIME IT REALLY, REALLY NEEDS A WIN. JUST
BECAUSE YOUHAVE ASCENDED TO CHIEF DEPUTY STATUS DOESN'T MEAN YOU
ARE ANY GOOD AT WHAT YOUDO, JIM, NOR DOES IT, IN MY OPINION, PROVIDE
SOME SHEEN OF INTEGRITY TO YOUR ACT). NRS 171.136 WHEN ARREST MAY BE
MADE. 1. IF THE OFFENSE CHARGED IS A FELONY OR GROSS MISDEMEANOR, THE
ARREST MAY BE MADE ON ANY DAY, AND AT ANY TIME OF DAY OR NIGHT. 2. IF IT
IS A MISDEMEANOR, THE ARREST CANNOT BE MADE BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 7
P.M. AND 7 A.M., EXCEPT: (A) UPON THE DIRECTION OF A MAGISTRATE, EN-
DORSED UPON THE WARRANT; (B) WHEN THE OFFENSE IS COMMITTED IN THE
PRESENCE OF THE ARRESTING OFFICER; (C) WHEN THE PERSON IS FOUND AND
THE ARREST IS MADE IN A PUBLIC PLACE OR A PLACE THAT IS OPEN TO THE PUB-
LIC AND: (1) THERE IS A WARRANT OF ARREST AGAINST THE PERSON; AND (2)
THE MISDEMEANOR IS DISCOVERED BECAUSE THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
THE ARRESTING OFFICER TO STOP, DETAIN OR ARREST THE PERSON FOR ANOTHER
ALLEGED VIOLATION OR OFFENSE; (D) WHEN THE OFFENSE IS COMMITTED IN
THE PRESENCE OF A PRIVATE PERSON AND THE PERSON MAKES AN ARREST IMME-
DIATELY AFTER THE OFFENSE IS COMMITTED; (E) WHEN THE OFFENSE CHARGED
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IS BATTERY THAT CONSTITUTES DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PURSUANT TO NRS 33.018
AND THE ARREST IS MADE IN THE MANNER PROVIDED IN NRS 171.137; (F) WHEN
THE OFFENSE CHARGED IS A VIOLATION OF A TEMPORARY OR EXTENDED ORDER
FOR PROTECTION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ISSUED PURSUANT TO NRS
33.017 TO 33.100, INCLUSIVE; (G) WHEN THE PERSON IS ALREADY IN CUSTODY
AS A RESULT OF ANOTHER LAWFUL ARREST; OR (H) WHEN THE PERSON VOLUN-
TARILY SURRENDERS HIMSELF OR HERSELF IN RESPONSE TO AN OUTSTANDING
WARRANT OF ARREST.
Sincerely, Zach Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949
667 7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
RE: Jim Leslie is a scrappy dude RE: Coughlin? Leslie, Jim (Jleslie@washoecounty.us)Add to con-
tacts 12/14/12 To: Zach Coughlin From: Leslie, Jim (Jleslie@washoecounty.us) This sender is in
your safe list. Sent: Fri 12/14/12 9:45 AM To: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Mr. Coughlin: A hearing has been set for Tuesday December 18, 2013, at 8:30 am in Reno Justice
Court, at which we will ask to be relieved as counsel in the remaining case you have with this office,
RCR12-067980, based on, among other things, (1) your prior expressed desire to represent yourself
and (2) your email to myself and several other recipients, including state bar attorneys, which con-
tains an express or implied threat of violence. If you fail to appear at the hearing, the relief will be
requested in your absence upon the grounds stated above. If you choose to agree to self-
representation without argument, the second above-noted reason may or may not rise to the point of
discussion, although I would note that the email you sent with the express or implied threat was dis-
seminated by you to several recipients including representatives of the Nevada State Bar, thereby
breaching confidentiality by your own action. Pending the hearing, there is no reason for us to meet
in person or communicate by any means. Any communications from you pending the hearing will be
deemed to be made in waiver of attorney-client privilege and are subject to forwarding to the Nevada
State Bar and/or law enforcement as appropriate pursuant to Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct
1.6(c). James B. Leslie, Esq. Chief Deputy Public Defender
Leslie's RPC vioaltions extend to continuing to maintain the WCPD sent Coughlin written
notice of the 8/6/12 combination hearing in the RJC in 12-067980 and 12-065630 when his legal as-
sistant, Linda Gray, admitted to Coughlin on 8/8/12 that she failed to mail out the written notice to
Coughlin in light of her belief that Coughlin's then PO Box 3961, Reno, NV 89505 mailing address
was no longer good (where Gray was presumably unaware that Coughlin bailed out of jail on
7/21/12, upon the ridiculous Order following the unnoticed 7/5/12 bail increase hearing incident to
the fraudulent testimony by RPD Officers Weaver and or Dye, and the advocacy by RMC court
appointed counsel Keith Loomis (which was anything but) resulting in RMC Judge W. Gardner rais-
ing Coughlin's then bondable $1,415 bail to a cash only $3,000 (based upon three charges that were
completely phoney, drummed up, and spurious to begin with, so much so that the RCAdropped the
charge underlying the custodial arrest (disturbing the peace), dismissed the failure to provide proof
of insurance charge (Coughlin provided such on the scene just prior to arrest, but the fraud of Of-
ficer Weaver ignored that), leaving only a failure to secure a load on one's truck charge, the
Amended Complaint of 10/11/12 Coughlin did not receive, but for which he subsequently learned
contained in incorrect case number therein. Further, RCA Sooudi actually went against the RPD's
own decision making in, on 8/16/12, filing an Amended Complaint charging Coughlin with trespass-
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ing (which was, of course, subsequently dropped in light of the fact that, one, Coughlin did not cave
to Sooudi's attempt to gain leverage by impermissibly overcharging, and two, the fact that Coughlin,
at the time of arrest, still had at least one, if not three, valid leases at the address to which such tres-
passing charge was directed, providing a claim of right defense to any criminal trespass charge, espe-
cially where no protection order was in effect at such time Instead, the RCA and RPD conspired with
Bellevue, Washington's Northwinds Apartments Associates, LLC to violat Soldal v. Cook Co, and
deprive Coughlin of his 42 USC Sec. 1983 rights and his rights under the three different lease agree-
ments he had with Northwinds (to which the RJC subsquently, sua sponte, essentially filed and grant-
ed Motions to Consolidate such three (or more) different case on behalf of the unauthorized practi-
tioner of law (Nevada Court Services CEO, Jeff Chandler) representing Northwinds in RJC Rev2012-
001048 (which resulted in Coughlin's custodial arrest on 6/8/12 in RCR2012-067980, and being
charged with a SCR 111(6) serious crime under NRS 199.280 where DDA Young continues to vio-
late RPC 3.8 in maintaining such charge where he has been provided proof that the WCSO's Deputies
there refused to identify themselves prior to Northwind's Apartments maintenance man Milan Krebs
(whom was apparently so afraid of Coughlin that he filed a TPO on 7/5/12 (whether he received a
raise for doing so has yet to be determined) in RJC RCP2012-000287), yet not so afraid as the fail to
present to the WCSO Deputies on 6/28/12 offering to utilize a Saw-z-All to cut open the metal over-
head door to Coughlin's Unit 29 at 1680 Sky Mountain Dr., Northwind's Apartments (later that day,
following the arrest, Nevada Court Services' Jeff Chandler posted on that Unit 29 an Amended 5
Day Notice of Unlawful Detainer correcting the jurisdictional bar error Coughlin pointed out under
NRS 40.253(6) where the initial 5 day Unlawful Detainer Notice listed the wrong court to file a Ten-
ant's Answer in (it listed Sparks Justice Court, where Coughlin did timely submit for filing such a
Tenant's Answer) where the 6/14/12 Declaration of Personal Service by NCS's Ryan Wray (one can-
not personally served a closed, locked door where entreaties made by a process service are not met
with so much as a single human voice responding...(see NRCP 4, applicable via NRS 40.400) :
Additionaly basis for Disqualification based upon the mere APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPERITYOR BIAS OR POSSIBILITIY THEREOF (THAT IS TO SAY, COUGHLIN IS
NOT NECESSARILYACCUSING ANYOF THE FINE JUDGES OF THE RJC OF DOING
ANYTHING WRONG, AND IN FACT, COUGHLIN IS FOND OF AND HAS GREAT RE-
SPECT FOR EACH OF THOSE JUDGES, AND WISHES HE COULD HAVE HAD MORE
INTERACTION WITH JUDGE SCHROEDER AND JUDGE LYNCH. FULL DISCLOSURE,
COUGHLIN WAS A 9TH GRADE BASKETBALL COACHFOR RENO HIGHSCHOOL
IN 2007-08, COACHING NOWRJCJUSTIC OF THE PEACE HASCHEFF'S VERY
TALENTED AND ENGAGING SON ANTHONY HASCHEFF. ADDITIONALLY
COUGHLIN HAS SUED HIS FORMER EMPLOYER, WASHOE LEGAL SERVICES IN
CV11-01955, AND CV11-01896, AND ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, WHICH AT THEY
TIME APPARENTLY INCLUDED NOW RJCJUDGE HASCHEFF, AND WASHOE
LEGAL SERVICES IS NOWPARTNERED WITH THE WCDA'S OFFICE AND CO-
DEFENDANTS IN A CASE INVOLVING THE PARTNERSHIP IN THE ECR PRO-
GRAM, WHEREIN WLS APPARENTLY EMPLOYEES RMCDEFENDER LEW
TAITEL, WHOM WAS BRIEFLY COUGHLIN'S ATTORNEY IN THE CRIMINAL
TRESPASS CASES STEMMING FROM COUGHLIN'S ARREST AT HIS FORMER
HOMWLAWOFFICE IN RJC11-1708 evictION MATTER.).
TERMINOLOGY
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Appropriate authority means the authority having responsibility for initiation of disciplinary
process in connection with the violation to be reported. See Rules 2.14 and 2.15.
I am not longer and efiler, but was between 1/4/12 until deactivation in mid November of 2012. All
during that time the only pdf available for the 1/4/12 Supplemental in CV11-03628 was the attached
3 page version, which fails to include the actual documents or filings listed in the "Appeal Re-
ceipt". Such a failure to include those filed, especially one that is characterized as "Emergency Letter
to Court from Zach Coughlin, Esq" (which is not a "letter" but rather my submission for filing of a
"Notice of Appeal" of the 12/21/11 Order Resolving Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien by
RJC Judge Sferrazza. The failure to include such items in what was provided to Judge Flanagan for
review in the ROA became very deleterious to my case in a number of ways, including as mentioned
in Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order denying my appeal, and now, arguably in the 12/14/12 Findings
and Conclusions and Recommendation to disbar me permanently from the practice of law in Nevada
incident to opposing counsel Hill's allegation that my pursuing a stay, on or around December 22nd
2011, under NRS 40.385 was vexatious or otherwise violative of RPC 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and
Contentions) (which I believe the attached transcript from Venetian v. Two Roads disproves).
I am writing to request the 2JDC email me or provide an electronic copy (or, a hard copy) of the en-
tirety of what it received, at any point, from the RJC in connection with the 1/4/12 Supplemental fil-
ing in CV11-03628.
I believe it would appropriate not to charge me for this given anything beyond the intial 3 page ver-
sion of that 1/4/12 filing was never available during an 11 month period wherein I did have an eFlex
subscription.
A footnote on page 5 of Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order in CV11-03628 indicates: "... In addition,
because Coughlin failed to timely file his notice of appeal regarding the personal property lien,
see NRS 40.253(8), and because Coughlin's notice of appeal fails to identify an error regarding
the court's procedure in setting a hearing on this issue, this Court will no consider this issue."
THE TESTIMONY AT COUGHLIN'S FORMAL DISCIPLINARY HEARING ON 11/14/12 INCLUDED THE FOLLOW-
ING:
HEARING11/14/12 AT SBN IN NG12-0204,0434,0435- VOL. I, (PAGES 51:10 TO 54:17):
Q MR. HILL, I APPRECIATE YOUR TIME TODAY.
THANKS FOR YOUR PATIENCE.
WAS MR. COUGHLIN, IN HIS DEALINGS WITH YOU AS
AN ATTORNEY, WAS HE TRUTHFUL OR DID HE SHOW CANDOR IN HIS
DEALINGS WITH YOU AS A LAWYER?
MR. COUGHLIN: I'M SORRY, YOUR HONOR. IF I
CAN INTERJECT. IT'S BEEN WELL OVER 15 MINUTES.
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MR. ECHEVERRIA: THAT'S TRUE. DO YOU WANT TO
WRAP IT UP, MR. KING?
MR. KING: YES.
BYMR. KING:
Q WITH THAT SAID, DID HE SHOW CANDOR TO YOU?
A IN OUR DEALINGS WITH MR. COUGHLIN, YOUCOULD
NOT TRUST HIM AT ALL. NO AGREEMENT EVER MADE WITH
MR. COUGHLIN WAS HONORED BY HIM.
FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN JUDGE SFERRAZZA ORDERED THAT
MR. COUGHLIN COULD HAVE TWO DAYS -- HE WAS ORIGINALLY
GIVEN A WEEK TO MOVE HIS STUFF OUT BEFORE THE EVICTION
ORDER WAS SERVED. THEREAFTER THERE WAS A HEARING. THE
JUDGE GAVE MR. COUGHLIN TWO DAYS TO GO IN AND REMOVE HIS
POSSESSIONS.
MR. COUGHLIN -- WE WENT OVER THERE, OPENED THE
DOORS ABOUT 8:00 O'CLOCK. HE WASN'T THERE. ABOUT 11:00
O'CLOCK WE GET AN E-MAIL FROMMR. COUGHLIN SAYING I HAVE
APPEALED JUDGE SFERRAZZA'S RULING. THAT MEANS HIS RULING
IS STAYED. THAT MEANS I CAN GO BACK INTO THE HOUSE. I'M
STAYING IN THE HOUSE, AND THERE'S NOTHING YOU CAN DO ABOUT
IT.
MR. COUGHLIN: OBJECTION, HEARSAY.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: OVERRULED.
THE WITNESS: SOMETIME LATER THAT DAY WE GOT
AN ORDER FROMJUDGE SFERRAZZA SAYING THAT THE REQUEST FOR
A STAY HAD BEEN DENIED. MR. COUGHLIN HAD BURNED BASICALLY
A WHOLE DAY DOING NOTHING TRYING TO GET HIS STUFF OUT.
THAT WAS TYPICAL.
HE REPEATEDLY HAS SIGNED CERTIFICATES OF
MAILING THAT HE MAILED THUS AND SO TO US. WE HAVE NEVER,
EVER GOTTEN ANYTHING BY MAIL FROMMR. COUGHLIN. IN THE
JUSTICE'S COURT HE WOULD SERVE THINGS THAT HE DIDN'T FILE.
HE WOULD FILE THINGS THAT HE DIDN'T SERVE. WE WOULD HAVE
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TO CALL THE CLERK ON AN EVERY OTHER DAY BASIS TO STAY ON
TOP OF WHAT WAS GOING ON.
FINALLY, WHEN WE GOT IN THE DISTRICT COURT, WE
WERE ABLE TO USE THE E-FLEX SYSTEM, AND WE WERE ABLE TO
KEEP TRACK OF WHAT WAS GOING ON.
BYMR. KING:
Q LET ME RESTATE THE QUESTION. THE QUESTION IS:
AS AN ATTORNEY, HAVING A RESPONSIBILITY TO BE TRUTHFUL AND
TO HAVE CANDOR WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL, WAS MR. COUGHLIN
TRUTHFUL, AND DID HE USE CANDOR WITH YOU?
A NO.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: MR. KING, WRAP IT UP, PLEASE.
YOU'RE LIMITED TO 15 MINUTES.
BYMR. KING:
Q SPECIFICALLY RELATING TO MR. COUGHLIN'S CANDOR
TO THE COURT, DID HE SHOW CANDOR TO THE COURTS?
A NO.
Q IN HIS DEMEANOR --
MR. COUGHLIN: OBJECTION. LACK OF FOUNDATION.
MR. KING: MY LAST QUESTION.
MR. COUGHLIN: PRETTY DAMMING STATEMENT TO
HAVE NO FOUNDATION.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: PLEASE DON'T INTERRUPT. WE
HAVEN'T HEARD THE QUESTION YET TO WHICH YOU'VE OBJECTED.
MR. COUGHLIN: THE LAST ONE, WHETHER I SHOWED
CANDOR TO THE COURT, AND HE SAID NO.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: YOU OBJECT TO THAT ONE? IT'S
OVERRULED. GO AHEAD.
BYMR. KING:
Q WITH REGARD TO A PERSON PERHAPS -- TO THE
EXTENT THAT MR. COUGHLIN MAY HAVE EXHIBITED THESE BAD
BEHAVIORS, WAS HE OTHERWISE KIND IN HIS DEALINGS WITH YOU
AND DR. MERLISS? COULD YOUEXPLAIN, JUST BRIEFLY, TO THE
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PANEL HIS ACTUAL DEMEANOR WITH REGARD TO HIS DEALINGS WITH
YOUAND YOUR CLIENT?
A HIS E-MAILS, HIS FILINGS WERE ABUSIVE, TO SAY
THE LEAST. CALLING MY -- HE CALLED MY ASSOCIATE A LICHEN.
I'LL ADMIT WE ALL HAD TO RETREAT TO THE DICTIONARY ON THAT
ONE. NAME CALLING. HE'S ACCUSED ME OF BRIBING THE RENO
POLICE DEPARTMENT TO HAVE HIM ARRESTED. MY STAFF IS
ABSOLUTELY TERRORIZED BY THIS MAN.
MR. KING: THANK YOU. I HAVE NO FURTHER
QUESTIONS
WITH RESPECT TO THE NRS 40.385 MOTION FOR STAY ISSUES, I BELIEVE IT MAY ALSO BE REL-
EVANT THE EXTENT TO WHICH MY ATTEMPTED FILINGS WERE REFUSED BY THE 2JDC FROM THAT TIME,
ESPECIALLY GIVEN NRAP 8. PLEASE SEE ATTACHED EMAILS AND CV11-03051.
BEYOND THE FAILURE OF THE SBNTO TIMELY OPPOSE COUGHLIN'S 9/17/12 MOTION TO DISMISS, (THE
ALPHABETICAL INDEX NOTATES THE OBC'S OPPOSITION THERETO AS FILED ON 10/21/12, DESPITE THE
ACTUAL FILE STAMP THEREON INDICATING 10/24/12, WHICH IS EVEN MORE CURIOUS GIVEN KING'S SIG-
NATURE THEREIN IS DATED 10/25/12), A CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OR PLEADINGS DOCKETS WOULD RE-
VEAL THE OVERLY QUICK RULINGS BY CHAIR ECHEVERRIA AND THE COMPLETELY LAISSEZ FAIRE AP-
PROACH TAKEN BY CHAIRMAN SUSICH, WHOM CLEARLY DOES NOT TAKE HIS OBLIGATION SERIOUSLY
AT ALL (SEE HIS 7/27/12 LETTER TO COUGHLIN, THE FACT THAT THIS WHOLE PROCEEDING MUST BE VA-
CATED GIVEN THE ENTIRELY PREJUDICIAL NATURE OF THE PANEL CHAIR MAKING A VOID FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION RULING (SUCH IS ONLY PROPERLY BEFORE THE NNDBBOARD CHAIR, NOT THE PANEL
CHAIR, UNDER SCR 110, PRESUMABLY SO ONE PERSON COULD CONSISTENTLY RULE ON SUCH IM-
PORTANT MATTERS AND, HOPEFULLY, HAVE SOME FUND OF KNOWLEDGE OR TRAINING TO BRING TO
BARE THEREON, RATHER THAN THE SLAPDASH CO-SIGNING OF THE OBC'S CONTRADICTORY NON-SENSE
EVINCE IN THE PANEL CHAIR'S RULINGS HEREIN (11/7/12 ORDER AGREES WITH BAR COUNSEL IN
QUASHING COUGHLIN'S SUBPOENAS ON JUDGES, BAR COUNSEL, AND THE SBNCLERK OF COURT, AND
OTHERS, ONLY TO THEN ALLOWKING TO ASK QUESTIONS OF THOSE JUDGES ABOUT THEIR MENTAL PRO-
CESSES (THE EXACT BASIS FOR KING'S MOTION TO QUASH), AND ALLOW KING TO TESTIFY AT THE HEAR-
ING (APPARENTLY SCR 106 IMMUNITY EXTENDS TO CHARACTERIZING AN ACTION IN THE BROADES
SENSE IMAGINABLE...WHICH LEADS TO THE QUESTION OF HOW DEFENDING ONE'S SELF AT ALL IN THESE
PROCEEDINGS IS NOT SUCH AN ACTION, WHERE THE 11/7/12 PANEL CHAIR ORDER CONSIDERS
SUBPOENING BAR COUNSEL AN ACTION, SUFFICIENT TO INVOKE SCR 106 IMMUNITY...BUT THAT RE-
ALLY DOES NOT EXPLAIN WHY THE CLERK OF COURT COULD NOT BE SUBPOENED, ESPECIALLY WHERE
SHE KNOWINGLY SIGNED A WAIVER OF SERVICE THEREOF). ADDITIONALLY, A CHRONOLOGICAL PLEAD-
INGS DOCKET WOULD DEMONSTRATE THE LACK OF TIME FOR A REGULAR MOTION CYCLE, ATTENDANT
TO THE MOTIONS TO QUASH BROUGHT BY KING ON 11/2/12 (AND GIVEN THE OBC'S CONTINUAL REFUS-
ING TO COPY COUGLIN ON SUCH FILINGS BY FAX AND OR EMAIL, COMBINED WITH THE CURIOUS EXCLU-
SION OF ANY USPS CERTIFICATE OF CERTIFIED MAILING OR TRACKING NUMBER SUFFICIENT TO CON-
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DUCT A USPS TRACK &CONFIRM-THE OBC OMITS THOSE WHERE IT FAILED TO PLACE SUCH A MAILING
IN THE OUTGOING MAIL BOX PRIOR TO THE LAST PICKUP OF THAT DAY, TYPICALLY ON A FRIDAY, MEAN-
ING THAT THE 11/2/12 MOTIONS TO QUASH DID NOT EVEN GET PICKED UP BY THE USPS FOR MAILING
UNTIL MONDAY, AND WHERE ONLY DELIVERED TO COUGHLIN ON NOVEMBER 6
TH
, 2012, THE DAY PRI-
OR TO THE PANEL CHAIR RULING TO QUASH SUCH SUBPOENAS (DESPITE NOT HAVING JURISDICTION TO
DO SO UNDER SCR 110(4). TO CLAIM THAT ANY FAILURE ON COUGHLIN'S PART, PURSUANT TO LAU TO
PRESERVE SOME OBJECTION THERETO OR ARGUMENTS FOR APPEAL IS UNTENABLE, ESPECIALLY WHERE
COUGHLIN WAS SHORTLY TO BE SUBJECT TO THE SUDDEN, INJECTION OF NVBJUDGE BEESLEY AND
WLS'S ELCANO AS SURPRISE, NON-IMPEACHMENT WITNESSES THAT KING HAD KNOWN ABOUT FOR
OVER SIX MONTHS, AND WHERE NOTHING NEW EXISTED TO JUSTIFY SUCH A LATE DISCLOSURE THEREOF
BY KING, AND WHERE KING OFFERED NO ARGUMENT, EVEN, TO CLAIM SUCH A JUSTIFICATION OR EX-
CUSE UNDER SCR 105(2)(C)'S WITNESSES OR EVIDENCE, OTHER THAN FOR IMPEACHMENT, WHICH
BECAME KNOWN TO BAR COUNSEL THEREAFTER, AND WHICH BAR COUNSEL INTENDS TO USE AT
THE HEARING, SHALL BE PROMPTLY DISCLOSED TO THE ATTORNEY. FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, THE
CHAIR MAY ALLOW ADDITIONAL TIME, NOT TO EXCEED 90 DAYS, TO CONDUCT THE HEARING.
COUGHLIN PUT TOGETHER A FILING (AGAIN COUGHLIN'S VERIFIED RESPONSE FROM 11/9/12, AN 88
PAGE FILING WITH VOLUMINOUS ATTACHED EXHIBITS IS COMPLETELY MISSING FROM THE ROA, INDI-
CATING IT WAS NOT PROVIDED TO THE PANEL, AND THE OBC/SBNHAS OFFERED NO JUSTIFICATION FOR
FAILING TO SO INCLUDED SUCH FILING), SHOWING JUST SUCH GOOD CAUSE FOR JUST SUCH ADDITIONAL
TIME TO CONDUCT THE HEARING (ITS NOT COUGHLIN'S FAULT KING LEAVES EVERYTHING UNTIL THE
ELEVENTH HOUR IN A CHEATER'S ATTEMPT TO JAM THROUGH HIS AMBUSH SCENARIOS)IN HIS 11/13/12
EMERGENCY EX PART MOTION SHOWING GOOD CAUSE FOR SUCH (AND THE ROA IS MISSING ANOTHER
ONE OF COUGHLIN'S FILING OF 11/13/12, FOR NO GOOD REASON).
Additionally, the SBN essentially admits a basis for declaring a mistrail in this matter where
King stupidly not only moved for a TPO and EPO in RJC Rev2012-00607 based upon a damn email
allegedly sent directed to Coughlin's public defender's patent misconduct, but then compound that
error (which resulted in the Reno Police Department coming out to Coughlin's home and, without so
much as announcing there presence, walking up on Coughlin with loaded guns drawn and pointing
them at Coughlin's head from four feet away, arresting Couglin on 2/8/12 and charging him with a
gross misdemeanor violation (wherein an allegation of Coughlin having a courier deliver to the SBN
a 1/3/13 tolling motion on the ninth or tenth judicial day from the 12/14/12 FOFCOL allegedly being
constructively served upon Coughlin), as well as a felony EPO violation (wherein an allegation of
Couglhin fax filing an amended or supplemental filing in connection with his alleged 1/13/13 filing
was made, despite the SBN having admitted Coughlin was permitted to fax file and having never re-
voked such, and where the SBN failed to post the jurisdictional bond required for such a workplace
protection order from 'harassment', and where a litigant whose Fourteenth Amendment property right
necessarily has a right to communicate with opposing counsel by such means, including under the
First Amendment. Obviously, if the SBN's King is so afraid of Coughlin, he ought disqualify or
recuse himself from the appeal herein and let an actual professional continue in his stead. Certainly
Couglin could follow King's approach and seek to have King charged with sexual assault from walk-
ing up to Couglhin while he was using a urinal during the 11/14/ formal hearing, and with both men
stationed at adjoining urinals, their penises in their hands where engaged in the act of urinating, King
exlcaimed to Couglin pretty good grub, huh, Zach?. Whether King was referring to the urine, his
or Coughlin's penis, or the tepid sandwich and deli tray arrangement he arranged to be provided as a
lunch to the Respondent, Panel, and our good security is not entirely clear, though the inappropriate
nature of any one such subjects for such commentary, all things considered, is (in a godawful display
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of grandstanding and poor judgment, King arranged to have one of the grievant's (Judge Linda
Gardner's in NG12-0435) own courtroom bailiff work the 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing as
security. Another subsequent contact between that Bailiff, WCSO Deputy Kirkham and Couglin
occurred on 1/24/13 as detaile din the attached written correspondence of that date between Coughlin
and DAS Officer Brown.
SCR 105(2)(C)'S JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS THAT THE RESPONDENT BE PROVID-
ED AT LEAST 30 DAYS PRIOR TO THE HEARING A SUMMARY PREPARED BY BAR COUNSEL OF THE
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ATTORNEY, AND THE NAMES OF THE WITNESSES BAR COUNSEL INTENDS TO
CALL FOR OTHER THAN IMPEACHMENT, TOGETHER WITH A BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS TO WHICH
EACH WILL TESTIFY:
2. Commencement of formal proceedings. Formal disciplinary proceedings are commenced
by bar counsel filing a written complaint in the name of the state bar. The complaint shall be suffi-
cientlyclear andspecifictoinformtheattorneyof thechargesagainst himor her and the underly-
ingconduct supportingthecharges. A copy of the complaint shall be served on the attorney and it
shall direct that a verified response or answer be served on bar counsel within 20 days of service; the
original shall be filed with bar counsels office. The time to respond may be extended once by the
chair for not more than 20 days for good cause or upon stipulation of the parties. In the event the at-
torney fails to plead, the charges shall be deemed admitted; provided, however, that an attorney who
fails to respond within the time provided may thereafter obtain permission of the appropriate discipli-
nary board chair to do so, if failure to file is attributable to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusa-
ble neglect...
(C) TIME TO CONDUCT HEARING; NOTICE OF HEARING; DISCOVERY OF EVIDENCE AGAINST AT-
TORNEY. THE HEARING PANEL SHALL CONDUCT A HEARING WITHIN 45 DAYS OF ASSIGNMENT AND
GIVE THE ATTORNEY AT LEAST 30 DAYS WRITTEN NOTICE OF ITS TIME AND PLACE. THE NOTICE SHALL
BE SERVED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE COMPLAINT, AND SHALL INFORM THE ATTORNEY THAT HE OR
SHE IS ENTITLED TO BE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES, AND TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE. THE NOTICE SHALL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A SUMMARY PREPARED BY BAR COUNSEL OF THE
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ATTORNEY, AND THE NAMES OF THE WITNESSES BAR COUNSEL INTENDS TO
CALL FOR OTHER THAN IMPEACHMENT, TOGETHER WITH A BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS TO WHICH
EACH WILL TESTIFY, ALL OF WHICH MAY BE INSPECTED UP TO 3 DAYS PRIOR TO THE HEARING. WIT-
NESSES OR EVIDENCE, OTHER THAN FOR IMPEACHMENT, WHICH BECAME KNOWN TO BAR COUNSEL
THEREAFTER, AND WHICH BAR COUNSEL INTENDS TO USE AT THE HEARING, SHALL BE PROMPTLY
DISCLOSED TO THE ATTORNEY. FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, THE CHAIR MAY ALLOW ADDITIONAL TIME,
NOT TO EXCEED 90 DAYS, TO CONDUCT THE HEARING.
ALSO, I AM REQUESTING AN ELECTRONIC COPY OF THE ENTIRE FILE IN DV08-01168 GIVEN I BELIEVE I
WAS WRONGFULLY WITHHELD ACCESS THERETO DURING TIMES OF EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN 2009
(PLEASE SEE ATTACHED EMAILS AND NOTE THE 5/20/09 FILING BY MYSELF COULD NOT HAVE BEEN CON-
SIDER IN JUDGE GARDNER'S 5/21/09 ORDER GIVEN SUCH 5/20/09 FILING WAS NOT ENTERED UNTIL AT
LEAST 5/24/09, DESPITE WHAT THE FILE STAMPING THEREON MAY INDICATED.
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PLEASE NOTE WLS THEN BOARD PRESIDENT BRECKENRIDGE REQUESTING AND PICKING UP THE AUDIO
CD OF THE URIBE TPO HEARING FROM3/12/09 AT WHICH THE 2JDC CAAW RUN TPOOFFICE ADVO-
CATE, ROXANNE EXPRESS AGHAST HORROR AT COUGHLIN'S REPRESENTATION OF A MALE DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE VICTIM IN FV09-00886. FURTHER ELCANO'S REPRESENTATIONS VIS A VIS COUGHLIN'S
COMPETENCY ARE NOT EXACTLY BOURNE OUT BY COUGHLIN'S FILING IN THE DAVENPORT TPO AND
DIVORCE CASE UPON HIS TAKING OVER FOR THEN WLS BOARD PRESIDENT BRECKENRIDGE, WHOM
MISSED THE I-864 AFFIDAVIT OF SUPPORT ISSUE. NOTE, COUGHLIN, JUDGE FLANAGAN, AND WCDA
DDAHALSTEAD ALL WORKED TOGETHER AT HALE LANE.
LASTLY, PLEASE CONSIDER THAT, AS CURRENTLY CARRIED OUT BY THE WCSOCIVIL DIVISION,
WASHOE COUNTY TAKES THE ABSOLUTELY MOST BRUTAL APPROACH TO CONDUCTING EVICTION LOCK-
OUTS, ESSENTIALLY READING NRS 40.253 TO ALLOW THE WCSOCIVIL DIVISION RACE OVER TO A
TENANT'S RENTAL MINUTES AFTER THE SUMMARY EVICTION PROCEEDING, AND GAIN ACCESS WITH THE
HELP OF A LOCKSMITH, AND IMMEDIATELY BEGIN GOING THROUGH SUCH A TENANT'S PERSONALTY,
THEN LOCKING THEM OUT (EVEN WITHOUT THEIR MEDICATIONS OR EYEGLASSES OR STATE ISSUED
IDENTIFCATION) WHEREUPON THE TENANT IS THEN SUBJECTED TO THE FRAUDULENT APPROACH TAKEN
BY SOME ATTORNEY'S, SUCH AS RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ. (SEE HIS 12/2/11 COERCIVE LETTER TO
COUGHLIN) IN APPLYING NRS 118A.460 IN THE MOST SPECIOUS MANNER IMAGINABLE.
There is a great deal of confusion as to the law in Nevada vis a vis 24 hour lock-out notices and how
soon after posting one the constable or Sheriff may effectuate the lock-out:
http://www.lpsnv.com/evictionFAQ.pdf: "7. DOES MY TENANT HAVE RIGHTS? Yes they do.
When the notice is served, your tenants rights state that they can contest the notice with the justice
court from the moment that they receive the notice. Their reasons can vary, but they must get their
Tenants Response filed with the court of jurisdiction. It will then be approved or denied by the
judge. If it is approved, then a hearing will be scheduled. Your tenant can also contest the 24 Hour
Lock-out Notice, which is posted by the Constable. This notice is posted 24 hours before the Consta-
ble returns to the property to do the lock change."
GAYLE KERN, ESQ., OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN MADE TO FOLLOWRPC 3.5A, BUT REGARDLESS, SHE
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED ANY WRIT OF RESTITUTION OR LOCKOUT ORDER ON 3/15/12 MERE-
LY UPON A DEFAULT BASIS COUGHLIN FILED A DETAILED TENANT'S AFFIDAVIT THAT COULD SPEAK
FOR HIM AT THE HEARING, AND THE INITIAL BURDEN IS ON THE LANDLORD (IE, THE PARTY MOVING FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER ANVUI), AND KERN FAILED TO EVEN FILE A LANDLORD'S
VIT. KERN OBTAINED A DEFAULT SUMMARY EVICTION AGAINST COUGHLIN ON 3/15/12 (DESPITE
COUGHLIN'S DETAILED 3/8/12 FILING OF A TENANT'S ANSWER AND PRE-HEARING BRIEF), RESULTING
IN COUGLHIN BEING SUMMARILY EVICTED AT GUNPOINT HOURS LATER (DESPITE KERN HAVING FAILED
TO FIRST FILE A LANDLORD'S AFFIDAVIT AS REQUIRED BY NRS 40.253(6) (SO IF COUGHLIN WAS TWO
MINUTES LATE TO THAT 3/15/12 HEARING, WHY NO OVERLY RIGID AND FORMULAIC APPLICATION OF
PROCEDURAL RULES AGAINST KERN?). CONSEQUENTLY, AT COUGHLIN'S 11/14/12 FORMAL DISCIPLI-
NARY HEARING, NVBJUDGE BEESLEY TESTIFIED AS TO COUGHLIN'S APPEARANCE BEFORE HIM
MINUTES AFTER BEING EVICTED AT GUNPOINT BY THE WCSO(WHOM WERE VIOLATING NRS 40.253(6)
IN FAILING TO POST A LOCKOUT ORDER, THEN WAIT 24 HOURS BEFORE BARGING IN WITH GUNS
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DRAWN). SOMEHOW, JUDGE BEESLEY NEVER CONSIDERED THAT SHERIFF MISCONDUCT MIGHT HAVE
AN EFFECT ON COUGHLIN'S LAW PRACTICE, NOR, CURIOUSLY, DID JUDGE BEESLEY MANAGE TO MEN-
TION THAT COUGHLIN'S 3/30/12 FILING BEFORE HIM IN NVB 10-05104 CADLE CO. V. KELLER DE-
TAILED JUDGE BEESLEY'S 1977 MCGEORGE SCHOOL OF LAW CLASSMATE NOWRMC JUDGE NASH
HOLMES CONFISCATING COUGHLIN'S SMARTPHONE AND MICRO SD CARD AFTER SUMMARILY INCAR-
CERATING HIM FOR 5 DAYS ON 2/27/12, THOUGH SUCH CONFISCATION OCCURRED AFTER COUGHLIN'S
PERSONATLY HAD BEEN BOOK IN AT THE WASHOE COUNTY JAIL, AND THEREFORE WAS NOT DONE INCI-
DENT TO A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST, AND THEREFORE REQUIRED A WARRANT OR ORDER TO SO
TAKE OUT OF WHERE IT WAS BOOKED INTO COUGHLIN'S PERSONAL PROPERTY AT THE JAIL AND RELEASE
TO THE CITY OF RENO MARSHALS A DAY LATER, AS WCSODEPUTY HODGE ADMITTED TO COUGHLIN,
WITH LOCAL ATTORNEY PAMWILLMORE STANDING BY, ON MARCH 19TH, 2012. FOLLOWING THE
3/30/12 FILING BY COUGHLIN DETAILING THIS BEFORE JUDGE BEESLEY, JUDGE NASH HOLMES EN-
TERED AN ORDER RELEASING COUGHLIN'S PROPERTY ENTERED 3/30/12. WCDADDAKANDARAS FI-
NALLY SIGNED OFF ON THAT ORDER AND COUGHLIN'S WAS ONLY THEN PERMITTED TO RETRIEVE HIS
PROPERTY ON 4/7/12, THOUGH ALL THE DATA THEREON WAS WIPED PRIOR TO IT BEING RETURNED TO
COUGHLIN. COUGHLIN DID NOT LIE TO JUDGE NASH HOLMES IN COURT ON 2/27/12 IN 11 TR 26800,
AND JUDGE NASH HOLMES HAS OFFERED NOTHING IN THE WAY OF FACTUAL SUPPORT FOR HER INITIAL
CONTENTION THAT COUGHLIN HAD LIED TO HER THAT DAY, WHICH, DURING COUGHLIN'S CROSS EXAM-
INATION OF HER AT HIS FORMAL DISCIPLINARY HEARING ON 11/14/12, RESULTED IN THE BASIS PROF-
FERED BY JUDGE NASH HOLMES FOR HER SUSPICION THAT COUGHLIN HAD LIED TO HER BEING THOR-
OUGHLY AND EASILY DISPROVEN GIVEN THE PATENT INACCURACIES INHERENT TO JUDGE NASH
HOLMES CONTENTION THAT SHE HAD INTERROGATED COUGHLIN ABOUT RECORDING AND RECORDING
DEVICES PRIOR TO HIS REQUESTING TO BE PERMITTED TO USE THE RESTROOM, WHEN, IN FACT, SUCH IN-
TERROGATION ONLY OCCURRED AFTER THE ONE AND ONLY RESTROOM BREAK IN THAT "SIMPLE TRAFFIC
CITATION".
Further, Judge Nash Holmes consistently alternates between finding something occurred by "clear
and convincing evidence" only to alternately characterize her findings as indicated such was "proba-
ble" or that she believes something "probably occurred":
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 139:11 to 157:2)
139
11 ut a bathroom break?
12 A I'm sorry. What marshals when?
13 Q Well, the ones you reference on the audio from
14 the March 12th hearing?
15 A Well, again, which -- my marshals. Could you
16 be more specific, please, in your question?
17 Q How much have they told you about the
18 hearing --
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19 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you interrupted
20 the judge. She asked you a question. Do you want to be
21 specific as to a particular conversation?
22 BY MR. COUGHLIN:
23 Q Yeah. There was one bathroom break in the
24 hearing. What were you told during the bathroom break by
25 either a marshal or the city attorney?
140
1 MR. ECHEVERRIA: With respect to any
2 particular issue, Mr. Coughlin?
3 BYMR. COUGHLIN:
4 Q No. Just anything. Anything connected to me?
5 MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's what I'm asking. Is
6 it involving you, sir?
7 MR. COUGHLIN: Yes.
8 MR. ECHEVERRIA: All right.
9 THE WITNESS: Mr. Coughlin asked for a
10 bathroom break. I originally said I would not give the
11 break. And then I said that I would, but he had to leave
12 all his materials in the courtroom. And I said that
13 because I suspected that he was tape-recording the court
14 proceedings without my permission, and without asking
15 permission first. Because he's apparently been known to
16 do that.
17 MR. COUGHLIN: Objection, hearsay. Lack of
18 foundation.
19 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled.
20 THE WITNESS: So I required one of my marshals
21 to accompany him to the restroom.
22 MR. COUGHLIN: She just gets to say a bunch of
23 hearsay?
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24 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, she is
25 responding to your question.
141
1 Go ahead, Judge.
2 THE WITNESS: When the marshals came back from
3 the restroom, they told me that Mr. Coughlin had, in fact,
4 been recording the proceedings because he had disassembled
5 a device and left parts of it in the bathroom. Or left --
6 disassembled parts of it, and then they discovered parts
7 of it.
8 In any case, when he was taken into custody
9 and held in contempt of court at the jail, he had
10 physically two recording devices on him, a cell phone --
11 either two cell phones or a cell phone and some other
12 recording device. I assumed that was pieces of which he
13 was messing with in the bathroom.
14 BY MR. COUGHLIN:
15 Q Which marshal told you that?
16 A I'm sorry? I can't hear that.
17 Q Which marshal --
18 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you don't need
19 to yell.
20 THE WITNESS: It was Marshal Harley that told
21 me that, Joel Harley, H-a-r-l-e-y. He said when they went
22 in and checked the bathroom after Mr. Coughlin left, and
23 he had found evidence that he had disassembled some object
24 or something in there.
25 BY MR. COUGHLIN:
142
1 Q What evidence, and what object?
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2 A I just described it as some sort of a
3 recording device. Whether it was a cell phone and he took
4 the SIM card out or whatever it was, I wasn't sure. But I
5 had asked you, Mr. Coughlin, point blank in court if you
6 were recording, and you told me no. And then you asked
7 immediately to go to the bathroom, and I said no. And
8 then you begged and squirmed and said you had to relieve
9 yourself, and I had to let you go to the bathroom. And
10 then when you did that, you went into the bathroom --
11 BY MR. COUGHLIN:
12 Q Really?
13 A Took apart and disassembled a recording
14 device.
15 Q Really? Would audio show that, Judge?
16 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. I've asked you
17 repeatedly to please not interrupt people.
18 MR. COUGHLIN: I thought she was done.
19 MR. ECHEVERRIA: It was clear she wasn't when
20 you were interrupting her.
21 MR. COUGHLIN: All right.
22 MR. ECHEVERRIA: You will cease that conduct.
23 MR. COUGHLIN: Okay.
24 MR. ECHEVERRIA: You've asked a question of
25 the judge. She answered it. Do you have a question?
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1 BYMR. COUGHLIN:
2 Q Judge, was there one bathroom break during the
3 trial?
4 A I'm sorry. The crowd has recessed here, and
5 let me move across the hallway, because I can't hear
6 anything right now, there's a big crowd.
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7 Q Don't worry. Just my law license, Judge. No
8 biggie.
9 Was there one bathroom break?
10 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I for one do
11 not appreciate your side comments. I think you should
12 focus seriously on the issues to be addressed here. The
13 judge simply asked for accommodation so she could hear.
14 MR. COUGHLIN: I only have so much time, your
15 Honor.
16 MR. ECHEVERRIA: I know. Quit wasting it.
17 BY MR. COUGHLIN:
18 Q Was there one bathroom break during the trial?
19 A There was one bathroom break.
20 Q Have you reviewed the audio of that trial?
21 A I'm sorry, I can't hear you again. Say it
22 again.
23 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Did you review the audio of
24 the trial?
25 THE WITNESS: I have not reviewed them
144
1 recently, no. I did at the time. I did when I entered my
2 contempt order and sent my package to the discipline
3 board.
4 BYMR. COUGHLIN:
5 Q Why does the audio of the trial indicate that
6 you did not ask any questions about recording until after
7 the one bathroom break?
8 A I'm not sure that's the case. I don't know.
9 Q That is the case.
10 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin --
11 BY MR. COUGHLIN:
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12 Q Yet you testified today that Mr. Coughlin
13 asked to use the bathroom right after I asked him about
14 recording. How do you explain that?
15 A I don't know the sequence of events. I don't
16 recall --
17 Q You just said you --
18 A I listened to the audio at the time when
19 things happened. And when you came back from the
20 bathroom, either way I determined from -- I concluded that
21 you were most likely recording without my permission.
22 Q Earlier your testimony was that you asked
23 Mr. Coughlin if he was recording, and he got real squirmy
24 and asked to use the bathroom. Is that correct?
25 A Yes.
145
1 Q Now are you remixing that testimony?
2 A No.
3 Q You just said, I don't know the sequence of
4 events.
5 A Well, I don't recall the sequence of events.
6 I know that I asked you if you were recording. You denied
7 you were. I asked you a couple times if you were
8 recording, if you had gotten permission to record, what
9 you were doing. And at some point it was determined that
10 you most likely were.
11 Q You know there is an audio of these things
12 you're testifying to, right, that we can like compare to
13 what you're saying; right, Judge?
14 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, please exhibit
15 a civilized tone.
16 BY MR. COUGHLIN:
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17 Q You're aware there's an audio?
18 A Yes, there's an audio. I have not --
19 Q That we can compare --
20 A -- I'm giving you my best recollection at this
21 time.
22 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you're trying
23 my patience with your continuing interruptions. That's
24 not evincing the conduct of a competent lawyer. You
25 should wait until the witness finishes before interrupting
146
1 her.
2 MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir.
3 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead. Ask your next
4 question.
5 BYMR. COUGHLIN:
6 Q So the marshals said Mr. Coughlin left some
7 disassembled part of a recording device in the bathroom,
8 and they retrieved it from there; is that correct?
9 A I don't recall the exact words. The
10 impression I got from what the marshal said is that you
11 had gone into the bathroom, disassembled some sort of
12 recording device, and they went in the bathroom after you
13 and checked that and determined that. That's my
14 recollection of the events.
15 Q Is that murky recollection of yours maybe the
16 reason why the law requires, in a contempt not occurring
17 in the immediate presence of a judge, that somebody
18 actually put their name on an affidavit and sign it?
19 MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, as Bar counsel, a
20 member for Bar Counsel office, I find --
21 THE WITNESS: Mr. Coughlin, you were not found
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22 in contempt on that reason alone. You were found in
23 contempt for engaging in behavior of the same kind it
24 appears that you're doing now, and much more than that.
25 And you were found in contempt for your entire conduct
147
1 throughout the course of the proceedings, including
2 repeatedly asking questions I ordered you not to ask,
3 delving into areas I had ruled were inadmissible, being
4 disrespectful, making faces, pretending like you were a
5 mime, sitting down, slumping down, standing up, walking
6 around, and doing a number of other things that were
7 completely improper in the manner of conducting a trial.
8 BYMR. COUGHLIN:
9 Q Is it proper procedure for you to --
10 A -- among one of the many reason why I found
11 you in contempt of court, sir.
12 Q Is it proper for you to call something summary
13 criminal contempt when you cite to a civil contempt
14 statute?
15 A I don't know what is proper in your book,
16 Mr. Coughlin. I know that the behavior that I saw, I know
17 that I held you in contempt, I held a precise -- you
18 committed direct contempt in front of me in my court --
19 Q Criminal contempt or civil contempt?
20 A -- I held you in contempt on the spot, and
21 then I went and wrote the order.
22 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you continue to
23 interrupt. I'm getting very tired of it. That's improper
24 behavior. As you said, your law license is at stake here.
25 You should exhibit behavior that would justify you keeping
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1 it. Have I made myself clear?
2 MR. COUGHLIN: Yes.
3 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Thank you.
4 Go ahead, Judge. Had you finished?
5 THE WITNESS: I finished with that answer,
6 yes.
7 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, Mr. Coughlin.
8 BYMR. COUGHLIN:
9 Q Judge, did your order characterize it as
10 misdemeanor criminal contempt?
11 A I do not have my order in front of me, so you
12 CAN CONSULT MY ORDER. I BELIEVE IT WAS MISDEMEANOR
13 contempt. I believe it was criminal, direct criminal
14 CONTEMPT.
15 MR. COUGHLIN: I'LL NOTE ON PAGE 3 AT LINE 14
16 IT SAYS, MISDEMEANOR OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT, A VIOLATION OF
17 NRS 22.010.
18 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Which order are you referring
19 to, Mr. Coughlin?
20 MR. COUGHLIN: February 28th order. Page 3,
21 line 14.
22 MR. KING: I think it's Exhibit No. 4.
23 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Okay.
24 BY MR. COUGHLIN:
25 Q Judge, is NRS 22.010 a civil contempt statute?
149
1 MR. KING: Objection.
2 THE WITNESS: Mr. Coughlin, you can consult
3 the statutes. I don't have my books right in front of me.
4 NRS identifies in Chapter 22 contempt. And the Reno
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5 Municipal Code has sections relating that or incorporating
6 those sections into the Reno Municipal Code.
7 Either way, what you did in front of me was
8 direct contempt, and I held you in direct contempt, and
9 you went to jail for five days because of it.
10 BY MR. COUGHLIN:
11 Q Is it permissible for a judge to call a civil
12 contempt statute a criminal contempt statute, vis-a-vis --
13 this is 22.010, a civil contempt statute. And the law in
14 Nevada does have NRS 199 -- I believe it's 240 -- which is
15 the criminal contempt statute. Is it permissible for you
16 to cite to a -- easier to meet civil contempt statute, and
17 then recharacterize it as criminal contempt?
18 MR. KING: Objection.
19 THE WITNESS: Mr. Coughlin, I'm not going to
20 argue the law with you. You have the statutes there. You
21 can consult them yourself.
22 BY MR. COUGHLIN:
23 Q On Page 3 at line 4, sub .9 --
24 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Which exhibit, sir?
25 MR. COUGHLIN: Exhibit 4, your Honor.
150
1 BYMR. COUGHLIN:
2 Q You wrote, defendant lying to the court in
3 response to direct questions posed by the court.
4 What were the lies in your vague order that
5 lacks any specificity to support a summary contempt
6 finding, what were those lies that you failed to elucidate
7 in your order?
8 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, that question
9 is argumentative. Do you want to rephrase it?
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10 MR. COUGHLIN: Sure.
11 BY MR. COUGHLIN:
12 Q What were you referring to when you wrote,
13 "Defendant lying to the court in response to direct
14 questions"?
15 A Well, it would be explained in the order
16 there. I don't remember everything at this time because I
17 don't have it in front of me. But I do believe that you
18 lied about or misrepresented that you were not recording,
19 because I believe you probably were. I don't know. I
20 believe you probably were.
21 At the same time there were things that you
22 and the prosecutor were arguing about with regard to
23 discovery. And she disagreed with you and said you were
24 lying to her about that. And there were other items that
25 you went back and forth about that appeared to me that you
151
1 were not totally honest about.
2 Q So when --
3 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Mr. Coughlin, let
4 the record reflect that it's 12:18. I'll afford you two
5 more minutes.
6 MR. COUGHLIN: Thank you, sir.
7 BYMR. COUGHLIN:
8 Q When you say, alternately you were probably
9 lying. And then you put in your order, "I find by clear
10 and convincing evidence that he lied," is that ambiguous
11 there? How do you reconcile that?
12 A How do I reconcile what?
13 Q The fact that your order says you find by
14 clear and convincing evidence?
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15 A Because that's what I wrote. I did find by
16 clear and convincing evidence. I found by absolutely
17 convincing evidence that you were behaving improperly in
18 court, as you are now, apparently.
19 Q You're saying you found by clear and
20 convincing evidence that a licensed attorney lied to the
21 court. And then you characterize that as probably, well,
22 I kind of think he was. I think he was, because I know
23 some unattributed hearsay that I'm going to base it on.
24 I'm going to get the order I think is wrong about the
25 bathroom break. I'm not going to have a marshal sign an
152
1 affidavit. Then I'm going to remix a criminal contempt
2 statute with a summary contempt statute and pick and
3 choose and make it as retaliatory as I possibly can.
4 Isn't that a fair characterization of your approach as a
5 judge?
6 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Judge, you don't need to
7 answer that question. That was way out of line, and
8 extremely argumentative.
9 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
10 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you want to ask a
11 legitimate question, Mr. Coughlin?
12 BY MR. COUGHLIN:
13 Q What basis do you have to assert in your order
14 that defendant lying to the court in response to direct
15 questions posed by the court with regard to his recording
16 the proceedings?
17 A The opinion is self-explanatory. I do not
18 have it in front of me, Mr. Coughlin. You have access to
19 the tapes and the opinion. And I stand by what I wrote,
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20 and I stand by the proceedings that day.
21 Q But it's kind of hard to pick inconsistencies
22 in your testimony today and those materials when you
23 refuse to testify now, isn't it?
24 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Argumentative, Mr. Coughlin.
25 You are not assisting yourself here.
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1 MR. COUGHLIN: I'm asking her. It's a
2 question.
3 MR. ECHEVERRIA: No.
4 MR. COUGHLIN: Is that not true that she is
5 subverting the legal process by refusing to testify
6 instead of saying, well, read the order and read -- listen
7 to the recording, and therefore she is not subjecting
8 herself to putting forth any further inconsistencies.
9 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, the time for
10 argument is later, not now.
11 MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. So I'm objecting. It's
12 nonresponsive.
13 BY MR. COUGHLIN:
14 Q What was your basis --
15 MR. ECHEVERRIA: That objection is overruled.
16 Now it's 12:20. If you have anything further of
17 significance that's relevant to the issues in this case,
18 please ask that question, I'll allow you one more.
19 BY MR. COUGHLIN:
20 Q What was communicated to you during the
21 bathroom break, and by whom?
22 MR. KING: Asked and answered.
23 MR. ECHEVERRIA: I think you've asked that.
24 MR. COUGHLIN: I don't think she answered it.
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25 MR. ECHEVERRIA: She did. Do you have another
154
1 question, Mr. Coughlin?
2 MR. COUGHLIN: Sure.
3 BYMR. COUGHLIN:
4 Q Did you or anyone with the Reno Municipal
5 Court transmit or otherwise deliver Judge Linda Gardner's
6 order for sanctions to the State Bar of Nevada?
7 A I'm sorry. I didn't hear all that. Did I
8 what? You'll have to repeat the question.
9 Q Did you or anybody with your court, the Reno
10 Municipal Court, transmit or otherwise deliver Judge Linda
11 Gardner's April 2009 order sanctioning me to the State Bar
12 of Nevada?
13 A I'm sorry. Deliver to whom?
14 MR. ECHEVERRIA: The State Bar, Judge.
15 THE WITNESS: Oh. After -- let me explain
16 quickly. My trial was my first experience in exposure to
17 Mr. Coughlin. After everything happened, and I held him
18 in contempt, then Judge Gardner told me that his sister,
19 Judge Gardner, has a life experience with Mr. Coughlin,
20 and he provided me a copy of her opinion from a couple
21 years earlier. And that may have been in the package I
22 forwarded to the court. I forwarded everything I could
23 possibly include that would show Mr. Coughlin's ability to
24 practice law. Including Mr. Coughlin's 200-page motion
25 that he faxed to the court.
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1 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Thank you, Judge. It's now
2 12:22, and we'll excuse you. And we appreciate you taking
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3 the time --
4 MR. COUGHLIN: Can I ask one more question
5 about the pending --
6 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin --
7 MR. COUGHLIN: -- competency evaluation or --
8 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin.
9 MR. COUGHLIN: -- with the trial? It's a good
10 question.
11 MR. ECHEVERRIA: It's an interruptive
12 question, and it's improper conduct.
13 MR. COUGHLIN: You're not going to let her
14 answer that, huh? You are not going to make her answer
15 that?
16 MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sorry. I continue to
17 talk while you're trying to interrupt.
18 Judge, thank you for your testimony.
19 MR. COUGHLIN: She held a trial with a pending
20 competency evaluation in violation of law.
21 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Quit interrupting,
22 Mr. Coughlin.
23 MR. COUGHLIN: I just got it on the record.
24 MR. ECHEVERRIA: Thank you, Judge. We
25 appreciate you taking your time into the lunch hour.
156
1 THE WITNESS: Thank you. I'll hang up now.
2 MR. KING: Thank you, Judge.
3 MR. ECHEVERRIA: It's now 12:23. Mr. King, do
4 you have additional witnesses?
5 MR. KING: I have -- my understanding is I'll
6 have two additional witnesses. I'm not certain that I
7 will be able to reach them, but Judge Howard and Judge
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8 Elliott.
9 MR. COUGHLIN: I'd like to call Judge Nash
10 Holmes in my case in chief and ask her why she persists in
11 holding trial if she was aware of a pending competency
12 order.
13 MR. ECHEVERRIA: You had the opportunity to
14 ask her those questions.
15 MR. COUGHLIN: No, I didn't. You just refused
16 it to me.
17 MR. ECHEVERRIA: No, I gave you --
18 MR. COUGHLIN: You did another basis for an
19 impartiality finding.
20 MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sorry. I have this
21 terrible habit of continually talking while you're trying
22 to --
23 MR. COUGHLIN: You're not letting me ask any
24 question that would tend to implicate impropriety on the
25 part of a judge.
157
1 MR. ECHEVERRIA: You can characterize the
2 rulings as you wish. I have made the rulings."
Regardless, in both 1708 and 374, NRS 40.253 does not allow for the Washoe County Sheriff to con-
duct evictions in the manner in which is currently does. Hill's filings claim that the WCSO's proce-
dures, by being the usual and customary practices of the WCSO, somehow become black letter law
in Nevada, even where a statutory remedy is in place, one that the legislature worked hard on (despite
RJC Judge Pearson, in 1048, ignoring AB226's minor tenant's rights victory where it required the
landlord to, under NRS 40.253(3)(a) identify the court that has jurisdiction over the matter... and
3(b)(1)'s dctate that such notice advise the tenant: (1) Of the tenants right to contest the matter by
filing,... an affidavit with the court that has jurisdiction over the matter..., in the face of the un-
authorized practice of law on behalf of out of state corporation no less, Northwinds Apartments
Assoc., LLC of Washington state.
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NRS 40.253(6) provides...6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection
3, regardless of the information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the affi-
davit permitted by subsection 5 (note, both in 1708 and 374, neither landlord filed such a Land-
lord's Affidavit in a timely manner, and Merliss in 1708 never filed one at all. If Baker and Hill want
big boy attorney's fees, they should be required to get those sorts of things right to justify such
exorbinant fees, or even begin to), the justice court or the district court shall hold a hearing, after ser-
vice of notice of the hearing upon the parties, todetermine the truthfulness and sufficiency of any af-
fidavit or notice (Baker continually maintained that it was only Coughlin's Affidavit which was up
for inspection, in violation of RPC 3.1) provided for in this section. If the court determines that
there is no legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer and the tenant is guilty of an unlawful
detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order providing
for the nonadmittance of the tenant.
So, really, especially in 1708, all the debate about the import and application of the within 24
hours language is inapplicable anyways, as that phrase is only applicable to a situation where
the tenant does not file a Tenant's Answer in respose to a 5 day UD Notice being posted.
NRS 40.253(5):. Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(a) The landlord or the landlords agent may apply by affidavit of complaint (note, there is nothing
in Ch. 40 that allows for a landlord's agent to draft pleadings or appear on behalf of an out of
state corporation, cross the bar, and practice law on its behalf, as WNM's Sue Kign did in
074408 and 374, and as NCS's Jeff Chandler did in 1048) for eviction to the justice court of the
township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located
or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or com-
mercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction over the matter (in 374, RJCJudge
Schroeder issued such an Order prior to Kern even filing a Landlord's Answer). The court
may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the
tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order.
But, again, where Coughlin did comply with the 5 day notice, in both 1048, 374, and 1708, NRS
40.253(5) language is inapplicable (The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff
or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order.) Ra-
ther, it is NRS 40.253(6)'s language that controls: If the court determines that there is no legal
defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer and the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the
court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the
nonadmittance of the tenant.
There being nothing thereing speaking to some within 24 hours dicate, the default applica-
tion in civil law requires that such an an Order be served under NRCP 6(e) where personal
service is not accorded, thus requiring 3 days for mailing. Further, NRAP 8 and some 5 day
stay suggested in Anvui, is arguably applicable. There is little indication in Ch. 40 or
elsehwhere to provide some explanation of just how and in what manner such a summary or-
der would be carried out and whether it would allow for the approach taken by the WCSO in
such situations. While NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2) does contain the term summary order, the ap-
pearance therein of the within 24 hours language, combined with the non-appearance of such
within 24 hours language in NRS 40.253(6), under traditional principles of statutory con-
struction, actually augers for an interpretation of subsection 6 that would require moretime for
a tenant than is provided for under NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2): That if the court determines that the
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tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of
the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or
constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order...
It seems rather implausible to suggest that the within 24 hours language is some dictate to the
Sheriff or constable requiring such lockouts be effectuated in some narrow window of time. Ra-
ther, particularly given the primacy to individual's and businesses inherent to their uses as res-
idences of places of business (or, in 1708, as both) it would seem entirely more likely, and rea-
sonable, to conclude that the legislature intended for the within 24 hours language to afford
tenant's at least 24 hours from the posting (if not the constructive receipt in the mail under
NRCP 6(e) if no personal service was to be had) of such a lock-out Order to remove those items
they find absolutely essential (see Coughlin's difficulties in 1048 where deprived of his medica-
tions, eyeglasses, contacts, some important legal files, etc, not to mention the RPC3.5A viola-
tion attendant to the default on 7/5/12, especially where the RJC and NCS's Chandler knew
Coughlin was in jail incident to a 7/3/12 arrest stemming from Northwind's handyman Kreb's
falacious accusation of Coughlin disturbing the peace.
THE COURT MAY ISSUE A SUMMARYORDER FOR REMOVAL OF THE TENANT
ALSO, THE RJCMAY NEED TO EXPLAIN WHY IT FAILED TO FILE IN FAX FILINGS BY COUGHLIN
WHERE IT EITHER DID FILE IN SOME BY HILL AND BAKER IN 1708 (OR CONSIDER ANY FAILURE TO
FILE ANY10/13/11 AFFIDAVIT OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER BYLANDLORD MERLISS).
THE SBN IS LIKELY RESTING UPON SOME THEORY THAT THE TPOAND EPOGRANTED IT BY RJC
JUDGE PEARSON, WHICH INDICATES THAT COUGHLIN MAY . FIRST, THE 1/4/13 EPOGRANTED THE SBN
INDICATES THAT PATRICK OWEN KING, ESQ., APPEARED AT THE EXTENSION HEARING TO REPRESENT
THE SBN. AS SUCH, KING, KNOWING HE WAS EXTREMELY LIKELY TO BE A WITNESS IN SUCH AN ACTION,
HAD A DUTY TO WITHDRAW FROM REPRESENTATION, AND THEREFORE HIMSELF VIOLATED A RPC 1.16
REQUIR HE SO WITHDRAW WHERE HIS BEING A WITNESS WAS A VIRTUAL CERTAINTY. FURTHER, KING'S
TPOAPPLICATION RESTS ALMOST ENTIRELY ON UNSWORN HEARSAY, FOR WHICH KING MAKES NO INDI-
CATION WITH REGARD TO FROM WHOM OR HOW HE BECAME AWARE OF SUCH HEARSAY DETAILING SUCH
PURPORTED FACTS. FOR INSTANCE, THE MAGIC OF HEARSAY MAY ALLOW A COMMENT LIKE ITS NOT
FAIR THAT BAR COUNSEL KING GETS ALL THIS EX PARTE FACE TIME WITH PANEL CHAIR ECHEVERRIA
THAT MAY HAVE BEEN SAID TO DENA ECHEVERRIA ON THE TELEPHONE TO BECOME, ACCORDING TO
KING, A STATEMENT BY COUGHLIN TO ECHEVERRIA'S STAFF THAT HE WAS COMING DOWN TO THE PAN-
EL CHAIR'S OFFICE, THREATENING TO GET SOME FACE TIME. COUGHLIN'S 1996 HONDA ACCORD'S
ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS (AN ELECTRICAL SHORT CAUSED PROBLEMS WITH COUGHLIN'S HEADLIGHTS
REQUIRING A PRIMITIVE WORKAROUND REQUIRING COUGHLIN TO BRAIDS FIVE ELECRICAL WIRES TO-
GETHER TO TURN HIS VEHICLE'S HEADLIGHTS ON...SOMETHING KING ALLEGES, THROUGH UNATTRIBUT-
ED HEARSAY, WAS A CASE OF COUGHLIN MALINGERING AROUND THE SBN'S NORTHERN OFFICE AFTER
5 PM FLASHING HIS HEADLIGHTS AT THE ONE OR TWO WOMEN WHOM WERE WORKING LATE (BECAUSE,
ONE CAN BE ABSOLUTELY SURE, ASST. BAR COUNSEL KING HAS NEVER WORKED LATE A DAY IN HIS
LIFE, AND CERTAINLY NOT WHILE EMPLOYED BY THE SBN, THANKS TO SCR 106, NATCH), IN AN AT-
TEMPT TO FRIGHTEN AND HARASS THEM. THEN THERE IS THE CURIOSU ALLEGATION BY KING IN HIS
TPOAPPLICATION THAT COUGHLIN CALLED THE SBNAHEAD TO ANNOUNCE HE WOULD BE THERE IN
FIFTEEN MINUTES TO FILE SOMETHING. KING SOMEHOW ALLEGES THAT IS THREATENING BEHAVIOR
EVEN WHERE HE SUBSEQUENTLY INDICATES THAT HE HAD SENT COUGHLIN A LETTER DEMANDING THAT
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COUGHLIN DO JUST THAT PRIOR TO APPEARING AT THE SBNFOR ANY REASON, INCLUDING TO FILE
DOCUMENTS.
VIOLATIONS OF NRS 178.405 ANDNRS 5.010 BYRENOCITYATTORNEYANDWASHOE
COUNTYPROSECUTORS ANDRMC ANDWCPDCOURTAPPOINTEDDEFENDERS
SEPTEMBER 8TH, 2011 ORDER FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION BY JUDGE SCHROEDER IN RCR2011-
063341
SEPTEMBER 9TH, 2011: COUGHLIN ARRESTED AT WAL-MART IN RMC 11 CR 22176 FOR PETTY LAR-
CENY OCTOBER 10TH, 2011: COUGHLIN ARRAIGNED IN RMC 11 CR 22176 FOR PETTY LARCENY
CHARGE
OCTOBER 26TH, 2011 (OR A SHORT TIME AFTER DEPENDING UPON ENTRY OF ORDER) JUDGE SFERRAZZA
DECLARES COUGHLIN COMPETENT IN RCR2011-063341
FEBRUARY 27TH, 2012: FILE STAMPED AT 1:31PM IN RCR2012-065630 JUDGE CLIFTON SIGNS AN OR-
DER FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION OF COUGHLIN
-FEBRUARY 27TH, 2012: DESPITE BEING PRESENT AT THE "CLANDESTINE STATUS CONFERENCE"
(DOGAN'S CLIENT COUGHLIN WAS NOTICED, IN WRITING, THAT IT HAD BEEN RESET TO MARCH 29TH,
2012) DDA YOUNG FILED AN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE AND MOTION TO AP-
POINT CO-COUNSEL ON 2/27/12 AT 2:55 PM IN A COMPANION CASE THAT HE WAS ALSO PROSECUTING,
RCR2011-063341 IN VIOLATION OF NRS 178.405. IN HER MARCH 13TH, 2012 GRIEVANCE AGAINST
COUGHLIN, JUDGE NASH HOLMES ADMITS TO COMMUNICATIONS IN THIS REGARD BETWEEN HER AND
THE WASHOE COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE. -FEBRUARY 27TH, 2012: AT 3:00 PM, DESPITE THE
COMMUNICATIONS SHE ADMITS TO WITH THE WCPD, JUDGE NASH HOLMES HOLDS A TRIAL WHERE
COUGHLIN IS FORCED TO APPEAR AS AN INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANT PROCEEDING WITH SELF REP-
RESENTATION IN 11 TR 26800, WHICH IS SUSPENED UPON JUDGE NASH HOLMES FINDING COUGHLIN IN
"SUMMARY CRIMINAL CONTEMPT" SECONDS AFTER HE TESTIFIES THAT RPDSARGETN TARTER LIED IN
CONNECTION WITH A RETALIATORY TRAFFIC CITATIONS INCIDENT TO TARTER TELLING COUGHLIN TO
LEAVE THE LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ. ON NOVEMBER 15TH, 2012 AFTER COUGHLIN WAS
RELEASED FROM 3 DAYS IN JAIL INCIDENT TO A CRIMINAL TRESPASS CUSTODIAL ARREST UPON HILL LY-
ING TO OFFICERS AND SIGNING A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT IN 11 CR 26405 FOR CRIMINAL TRESPASS ON
NOVEMBER 13TH, 2012. TARTER ORDERED COUGHLIN TO LEAVE AFTER HILL REFUSED TO GIVE
COUGHLIN HIS STATE ISSUED DRIVERS LICENSE OR IDENTIFICATION, HIS HARD DRIVES/CLIENT'S FILES,
HIS KEYS, OR HIS WALLET. -JUDGE NASH HOLMES PROCEEDS TO FILE NUMEROUS ORDERS -MARCH 5TH,
2012: IN RMC 11 CR 26405, THE CRIMINAL TRESPASS CASE FROMCOUGHLIN'S FORMER HOME LAW OF-
FICE THE CERTIFIED COPY OF DOCKET DONE BY THE JUDICIAL ASSISTANT, D2'S LISA WAGNER, WHO
COULDN'T QUITE SEEM TO FIND OR REMEMBER THE FACT THAT COUGHLIN FAXED IN A NOTICE OF AP-
PEAL ON JUNE 28TH, 2012, AND HER FAILURE TO DOCKET THAT LED TO THE DISMISSAL OF COUGHLIN'S
APPEAL IN CR12-1262, DESPITE COUGHLIN HAVING ELECTRONIC CONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT OF THAT
FAX DELIVERING HIS NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE RMC AND TO CITY ATTORNEY HAZLETT-STEVENS
(WHOM COYLY TRIES TO ASSERT HE DIDN'T GET IT OR THE PAPER COPY COUGHLIN PERSONALLY DELIV-
ERED TO THE OFFICES OF THE CITY ATTORNEY WITHIN THE 10 DAYS SET FORTH IN NRS 189.010) TRIAL
DATE SET FOR APRIL 10, 2012 BY COURT. -05 MARCH 2012: NOTICE OF APPEARACE AS CO-COUNSEL
AND MOTION TO DISMISS FILED DEFENDANT. 20 MARCH 2012: ORDER #1 DENYING DEFENDANT'S MO-
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TION FILED 13,FEBRUARY 2012 SIGNED JUDGE WILLIAMGARDNER. RMC 11 CR 26405 -21 MARCH
2012: ORDER #2 DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FILED 5, MARCH 2012 SIGNED BY JUDGE WILLIAM
GARDNER. RMC 11 CR 26405 -21 MARCH 2012: MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DIS-
MISS COMPLAINT FILED BY DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY CHRISTOPHER HAZLETT-STEVENS. RMC 11 CR
26405 -10 APRIL 2012: DEFENDANT APPEARED FOR TRIAL WITH COUNSEL KEITH LOOMIS, JUDGE
WILLIAMGARDNER
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PRESIDING. PRESENT ON BEHALF OF THE CITY WAS CHRISTOPHER HAZLETT-STEVENS. SEVERAL PRE-
TRIAL MOTIONS WERE HEARD. AN ORDER SUSPENDING PROCEEDINGS WAS SIGNED. ALL PROCEEDINGS
SUSPENDED UNTIL THE QUESTION OF COMPETENCE IS DETERMINED. CASE STATUS HEARING SCHEDULED
FOR 8, MAY 2012. RMC 11 CR 26405. SEE ATTACHED EMAILS DEMONSTRATING THE KNOWLEDGE OF
AND COMPLICITY BETWEEN THE WASHOE COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS, THE COURT APPOINTED RENO
MUNICIPAL COURT DEFENDERS, THE CITY OF RENO PROSECUTORS, WASHOE COUNTY DISTRICT AT-
TORNEY'S OFFICE, RMC, RJC, AND BOTH COURT'S FILING OFFICE'S STAFF AND ADMINISTRATORS RE-
SPECTING THE EXISTENCE OF THESE ORDERS FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION AND THE BRAZEN VIOLA-
TION OF NRS 178.405 AND NRS 5.010 BY THESE INDIVIDUALS. FURTHER, ON
-APRIL 19TH, 2012, DDA YOUNG AGAIN VIOLATED NRS 178.405 WHERE HE MOVED TO HAVE
COUGHLIN REMANDED TO CUSTODY (WHEREUPON COUGHLIN COULD AGAIN HAVE HIS MEDICATION
SUDDENLY WITHHELD FROM HIM, ALL WHILE RMC JUDGE NASH HOLMES SEEKS TO LEVERAGE JAIL
STAFF TO GET COUGHLIN TO SIGN SOME WAIVER OF HIS MEDICAL RECORDS PRIVACY RIGHTS AND
WHERE WCPDBIRAY DOGAN ANNOUNCES CONFIDENTIAL HIPAAPROTECTED MEDICAL INFORMATION
RELATING TO HIS CLIENT COUGHLIN INTO THE PUBLIC RECORD, IN FRONT OF 40 MEMBERS OF THE PUB-
LIC GATHERED IN D10, A TRANSGRESSION WHICH WCPDJEREMY BOSLER LATER REFUSED TO SEEK TO
AMELIORATE OR STRIKE FROM THE RECORD IN ANY MANNER WHATSOEVER).
-MAY 7TH, 2012 (THE DAY COUGHLIN'S OPPOSITION TO HILL AND BAKER'S 4/19/12 IMPERMISSI-
BLE POST-JUDGMENT ATTORNEY FEE SANCTIONS MOTION IN CV11-03628 (NO21 DAY FILING
READYSAFE HARBOR MOTION SERVED EITHER, MUCH LIKE THE APPROACH BYSPRINGGATE AP-
PROVED OF BYJUDGE L. GARDNER INCIDENT TO HERE 4/13/09 ORDER AFTER TRIAL IN DV08-
01168, WHICH BECAME THE THIRD GRIEVANCE AGAINST COUGHLIN UNDERPINNING THE APPEAL IN
62337 OF THE RECOMMENDATION TO PERMANENTLY DISBAR HIM...SO, JUST WHO IS IT WHO IS AS-
SERTING NON-MERITORIOUS CONTENTIONS?). FURTHER, JUDGE FLANAGAN'S 8/28/12 ORDER IN
CV11-03628 MAKES CLEAR THAT HIS 6/25/12 ORDER AWARDING LANDLORD MERLISS (INCIDENT
TO HILL AND BAKER'S ATTORNEY FEE SANCTION MOTION) WAS ONLYENTERED IN VIEWOF JUDGE
FLANAGAN'S OPINION THAT COUGHLIN FAILED TO OPPOSE THEIR 4/19/12 MOTION FOR ATTORNEY
FEE'S SANCTIONS IN LIGHT OF DCR13(3). APPARENTLYTHE WASHOE COUNTYJAIL RIPPING
COUGHLIN OF PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATIONS AND REFUSING HIM ANY ABILITYTO FILE COURT
DOCUMENTS, PAPER, ENVELOPES, OR EVEN MAKE PHONE CALLS DID NOT PROVIDE "GOOD CAUSE"
FOR RECONSIDERING THAT MONUMENTAL FEE AWARD. COUGHLIN, OR THOSE ATTORNEY'S SEEKING
SANCTIONS UNDER NRS 7.085 WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH THE DICTATES OF NRCP 11? IN RCR2011-
063341 WCPDGOODNIGHT AND DDA YOUNG VIOLATE NRS 178.405 BY ATTEMPTING TOHOLDA
TRIAL IN THAT MATTER DURING THE PENDENCY OF AN ORDER FOR COMPETENCY DIRECTORED TO-
WARDS GOODNIGHT'S CLIENT, COUGHLIN. GOODNIGHT MANAGES TO JAMCOUGHLIN INTO AN ILL-
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ADVISED MENTAL HEALTH COURT SIGN-UP IN MH12-0032, WHICH ENDS BADLY WHEN THE MHC'S
RENO BIONDO COMMITS FRAUD IN ASSERTING THAT COUGHLIN WAS REMOVED FROM THE MHC FOR
"FAILING TO FOLLOWING MHC POLICIES" SIMILAR TO THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORTH BY SHARON
DOLLARHIDE, DESPITE THE MHC, AND PERHAPS GOODNIGHT TOO, HAVING GIVEN COUGHLIN A LIST OF
MEDICATIONS IT PROHIBITS, AND A CONTRACT FOR ENTRY INTO THE MCH, AFTER HAVING INFORMED
COUGHLIN HE WAS ACCEPTED INTO THE MCH UPON ENTERING THE CONTRACT. THE MCHSUBSE-
QUENTLY THREATENED COUGHLIN WITH INCARCERATION FOR TAKING A MEDICATION IS ONLY AFTER
THE FACT OBJECTED TO, THEN, UPON HAVING THE BARGAINED FOR CONSIERATION, OFFER AND AC-
CEPTANCE POINTED OUT TO IT, THE MCH LIED AND DISPARAGED COUGHLIN TO THE RJC AND OTHERS,
CAUSING COUGHLIN REPUTATIONAL DAMAGE, AND COUGHLIN'S CASE WAS REMANDED TO THE RJC AT
A LATER DATE. DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME, D10 JUDGE ELLIOT FORCED COUGHLIN BACK INTO CUS-
TODY AT THE WCDC, WHERE COUGHLIN HAS BEEN DENIED HIS MEDICATION EVERY SINGLE ONE OF HIS
10 TRIPS TO JAIL THIS YEAR, WITH NO TITRATION DOWN OF DOSING WHATSOEVER, EVEN WHERE
COUGHLIN WAS WILLING AND ABLE TO ARRANGE FOR DELIVERY OF THE MEDICATION AT HIS OWN EX-
PENSE, ETC.
-08 May 2012: Case Status hearing held before Judge William Gardner. Present on behalf of the City
was Deputy City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, for the defense Keith Loomis and defendant
Zachary Coughlin. Defendant was found to be competent. Defendant's motion to remove Keith
Loomis as counsel granted. Trial date set by the court for June 18,2012. RMC 11 CR 26405. Strange-
ly, despite Coughlin still being subject to an as yet to be ruled upon Order For Competency evalua-
tion and despite Coughlin having just the previous day been accepted into Mental Health Court and
the RJC case RCR2011-063341 transferred there, RMC Judge William Gardner jammed Coughlin
both into proceeding without the Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel and into some trial setting,
even though NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 forbids it, and even though Judge Gardner admitted to be-
ing aware of Judge Nash Holmes, his fellow RMC Judge, seeking to have Coughlin's law license tak-
en away based upon a SCR 117 Disability Petition (Judge Nash Holmes, in her March 14th, 2012 let-
ter/grievance to the State Bar of Nevada, wherein she purports to speak for Judge William Gardner
and managed to pass on to the SBN the April 2009 Order For Sanctions by Judge William Gardner's
sister Family Court Judge Linda Gardner, that Judge William Gardner passed to Judge Nash Holmes
after receiving from his sister sometime in
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the first quarter of 2012). Incidentally, Coughlin was previously a domestic violence attorney at
Washoe Legal Services until Family Court Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning
Coughlin $1,000 personally for the arguments he made in representing a domestic violence victim in
a divorce trial were cited by WLS Executive Director Paul Elcano as the "sole reason" for Coughlin
being fired. Coughlin filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in respone to that Order with the Nevada
Supreme Court in 54844. Coughlin filed a Notice of Appeal of the dismissal for insufficient service
of process of his wrongful termination case against Washoe Legal Services on February 27th, 2012,
and that matter is currently on appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court in 60302. Oh, and Reno City
Attorney John Kadlic is a patient of Zach Coughlin's father, Dr. Timothy Coughlin, and the City of
Reno and or the RPD have sought to pressure Coughlin's parents into having him "committed", de-
spite the fact that the numerous (about 8-10 ish) wrongful arrests Coughlin has been subjected to this
year (most of which violate Soldal v. Cook County and have been captured on video tape, amazingly)
all kind of give Mr. Kadlic a bit motivation to quiet and or discredit Coughlin (and and arrest on June
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28th, 2012 by the WCSO and various instances this year where fraudulent Affidavits of Service by
the WCSO have been involved in arrests of Coughlin give the WCDA Office its own motivations).
Given that this trial setting and denial of Coughlin's Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel occurred
during the pendency of an Order for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin that the RMC, Judge Wil-
liam Gardner, court appointed defender Keith Loomis, Esq. and City Attorney's Christopher Hazlett-
Stevens, Esq. were well aware of, the following are void: O5 June 2012: Notice Of Appearance As
Counsel ; Motion To Dismiss; Motion To Suppress; Motion For A Continuance Of Trial And Trans-
fer To Mental Health Court filed by defendant. 18 June 2012: Defendant appeared for trial pro-per,
Judge William Gardner presiding. Present on behalf of the City was Christopher Hazlett-Stevens.
Several pre-trial motions were heard. Motion to Continue filed by defendant denied. Motion to Dis-
miss filed by defendant denied. Motion to Suppress denied. Motion to Recuse denied. Motion to
Transfer to Mental Health Court denied. Case tried on its merits and the Defendant was found guilty
of the charge of Trespass, a violation of R.M.C 08.10.010. .."'Y25'2012 The Defendant was sen-
tenced as follows: Trespass, a violation of R.M.C 08.10.0 10. : Time Served (3 days at usual $100 a
day, and a $310.00 fine for a total of $610 raked in by the RMC on a first offense trespass charge
where typically the fine is $305. Also, Richard G. Hill, Esq. lied under oath at that June 18th, 2012
criminal trespass Trial where he testified that the RPD identified themselves as law enforcement and
issued a lawful order or warning for Coughlin to leave the premises prior to the landlord kicking
down a door to a quasi "basement" under the former law office. The videos of the arrest filmed by
Hill demonstrate that Coughlin was never given an opportunity to heed any warning to leave given
that day prior to a custodial arrest being effectuated, contrary to the Supplemental Declaration by
RPD Officer Chris Carter, Jr. RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez subsequently admitted that the RPD neither
identified themselves as law enforcement nor issued a lawful order to emerge from the basement pri-
or to landlord Merliss kicking down the basement door on November 13th, 2012. WCSO Civil Su-
pervisor Liz Stuchell has admitted in an email to Coughlin that Deputy Machen's November 7th,
2011 Affidavit of Service swearing to have "personally served" the RJC REV2011-001708 Summary
eviction Order on November 1st, 2011 was "incorrect" in that to Machen "personally served" means
"posting it to the door when no one is home. However, given NRS 40.400 makes applicable NRCP
5(b)(2) and 6(e) to summary evictions (even those that are noticed by the RJC, in writing, as a "Trial"
and even where, at the October 13th, 2011 "summary eviction proceeding" the RJC ruled that Cough-
lin "had met his burden of establishing there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning his retalia-
tory eviction defense" and the matter was then "set for trial on October 25th, 2011 provided Coughlin
deposits $2,275 into the court's rent escrow account", all of which violates JCRCP Rule 109 and NRS
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40.253(6)) THE LOCKOUT DEPUTY MACHEN OVERSAW ON NOVEMBER 1ST, 2011 WAS BASED UPON A
VOID EVICTION ORDER AND DECISION OF OCTOBER 25TH, 2011 AND AN OCTOBER 27TH, 2011 FIND-
INGS OF FACT...THAT HILL'S ASSOCIATE BAKER TESTIFIED AS TO HAVING APPARENTLY PROVIDED RE-
CEIPT THEREOF TO THE WCSOON OCTOBER 28TH, 2011, AND WHICH RJC CHIEF CIVIL CLERK KAREN
STANCIL INDICATES WERE TRANSMITTED TO THE WCSO VIA FAX ACCORDING TO THE USUAL CUSTOM
AND PRACTICE OF THE RJC...MEANING, THE WCSOFAILED TO EFFECTUATE A LOCKOUT "WITHIN 24
HOURS" OF "RECEIPT" OF EITHER OF THOSE ORDERS...MEANING HILL AND MERLISS WERE TRESPASSING
ON NOVEMBER 13TH, 2011, NOT COUGHLIN, AND THEY BROUGHT THE RPDALONG FOR THE RIDE,
WHEREUPON THE RPDEFFECTED A WRONGFUL ARREST (BASED UPON LIES BY NEUROLOGIST MERLISS
AND HIS ATTORNEY HILL TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY WARNED COUGHLIN TO LEAVE THAT DAY PRIOR TO
THE RPDSHOWING UP, WHICH IS CLEARLY SHOW TO BE FALSE BY THE VIDEOS FILMED BY HILL AND
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MERLISS THEMSELVES AND HILL'S SUBSEQUENT TESTIMONY AT THE JUNE 18TH, 2012 CRIMINAL TRES-
PASS TRIAL IN 11 CR 26405).
May 9th, 2012: Order finding Coughlin competent in CR12-0376, by Judge Elliot of Department 10
resolving the February 27th, 2012 Order for Competency Evaluation signed by RJC Judge Clifton
and file stamped at 1:31 pm on that date.
September 5th, 2012: Order for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin by Judge Sferrazza in
RCR2011-063341
October 2, 2012: WCPD Leslie and Dogan and DDA Young violate NRS 178.405 by swapping the
October 15th, 2012 Trial continuation/Competency Hearing Date in RCR2011-063341 with
RCR2012065630, and setting/stipulating to a new hearing on October 22nd, 2012, and resetting the
Trial date to November 19th, 2012, but not before attempting to cram RCR2012-067980 onto the cal-
endar with RCR2012-063341 for October 22nd, 2012 (and Leslie and Dogan lied to Coughlin about
whether "mandatory status conference" was held on August 6th, 2012 in RCR2012-065630, and
RCR2012067980, the latter at which Leslie set a Trial date of September 18th, 2012 despite his legal
assistant Linda Gray admitting to Coughlin that Coughlin was provided no notice whatsoever of the
August 6th, 2012 hearing date in those cases. Also, Dogan and Leslie again violated NRS 178.405 on
October 2nd, 2012 where tehy reset for October 30th, 2012 a Motion Hearing on DDA Young's im-
permissible Motion to Amend the Complaint in RCR2012-065630 (six months after the arrest, no
specific facts pled in either to support either charge, really). Further, Dogan failed to alert Coughlin in
any way to the fact that, in his July 31st, 2012 Motion to Amend Criminal Complaint, DDA Young
attempted to, in violation of RPC 3.8, amend the "misue of emergency services" charge (where
Coughlin is accused of using 911 to report police misconduct) to a charge that would provide the Dis-
trict Attorney more leverage against Coughlin, a retaliatory prosecution, for a crime that would dam-
age Coughlin's law license given the import of SCR 111(6), despite DDA Young lacking probable
cause to so amend his charge. Dogan and Young previously conspired to retaliate against Coughlin
incident to their "clandestine status conference" of February 27th, 2012, which just so happened to be
the date that Coughlin filed a Notice of Appeal in his case against Washoe Legal Services 60302 and
the date that Judge William Gardner transferred jurisdiction from RMC D1 Judge Dilworth to RMC
D3 Judge Nash Holmes in 12 CR 000696, a case where Coughlin was subject to a custodial arrest for
jaywalkign on January 12th, 2012 incident to Coughli's peacefully filming Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s
contractor's crew from a public sidewalk, disposing of property left at Coughlin's former home law
office due to Hill locking a gate thereto during the time Coughlin was afforded to remove such prop-
erty and where Hill had boarded up on of the entrances to the property as well, in addition to remove
the only ladder to the
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upstairs attic/storage space at the property. On February 27th, 2012 in 11 TR 26800 Judge Nash
Holmes told Coughlin she would have him thrown in jail if he mentioned Richard G. Hill's name one
more time. On January 31st, 2012, at an extension hearing on the TPO Richard Hill received against
Coughlinf or Coughlin's alleged jaywalking on January 12th, 2012, RJC Judge Schroeder roared at
Coughlin "do you want to go to jail!" when Coughlin broached the subject of Hill's abuse of process.
Judge Schroeder is listed in the RJC docket as presiding over the February 27th, 2012 "clandestine
status conference" that ultimately resulted in Judge Clifton signing the Order for Competency Eval-
uation. It is unclear if any actual hearing before a judge even took place that day, however.
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Local judges seem to dutifully report some far flung applications alleged violations of SCR's related
to the media and reporters vis a vis hunches they have about whether an attorney is recording the
proceeding (which is in the public record) or has "recording devices" in his pocket, yet violations of
NRS 178.405 seem to receive scant application of Canon 2.15.
Zach has 76 files to share with you on SkyDrive. To view them, click the links below.
1 4 12 0204 1708 03628 Appeal Receipt tiff and Supplemental Justice Court Proceedings.pdf
12 21 11 1708 03628 Order Resolving Contest Property Lien NO NUMBERS.pdf
3 30 12 0204 03628 Order Denying Coughlin's Appeal of Summary HYPERLINK
"https://skydrive.live.com/redir.aspx?cid=43084638f32f5f28&page=view&resid=43084638F32F5F
28!7387" \t "_top" evictHYPERLINK
28!7387" \t "_top" ion Order.pdf
10 13 10 transcript of Motion to Stay execution of summary HYPERLINK
28!7388" \t "_top" ion order Venetian v Two Roads compare to 60331 0204.pdf
8 23 12 0204 Complaint SBN v Coughlin stamped bf.pdf
11 14 12 0204 Transcript of Hearing with Index 170008ch-Full.pdf
12 14 12 stamped 0204 Order by Chair Echeverria Findings of Fact Conclusion of Law seeking to
disbar Coughlin bz no line numbers.pdf
10 17 11 emergency motion to stay summary HYPERLINK
28!7395" \t "_top" ion 1708 etc. 60331 AND 61383 COUGHLIN V MERLISS 26406 1708 26800
0204.pdf
10 17 12 Coughlin's Emergenc Motion commercial tenant no cause forbidden 0204 1708 60331
61383 0204-3.pdf
10 18 11 0204 1708 marked received by RJC Dreme Smith Coughlin's NOtice of Appeal of 10 13
11 Sferrazza Order after summary HYPERLINK
28!7392" \t "_top" ion hearing 03628 divests RJC jurisdiction.pdf
10 18 11 Notice of Appeal divesting RJC of jurisdiction CV11-03628 ENTIRE EFLEX COM-
BINED FOR APPENDIX IN 60331 AND 61383 COUGHLIN V MERLISS 26406 1708 26800
NG12-0204 BF.pdf
10 19 11 baker letter to clifton emergency inspection with 10 20 11 sferrazza note order have p draft
order will isgn it 1708 0204.pdf
10 19 11 Justice Court Civil Appeal cv11-03051 couglhin v merliss 1708 0204 .pdf
10 26 11 0204 03051 1708 03528 Purdy marked as received by M. Purdy Mtn and Affid proceed on
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appeal IFP Merliss v Coughlin HYPERLINK
28!7398" \t "_top" ion.pdf
10 27 11 to 11 2 11 Motion to Stay CV11-03051 03126 1708 emails to eflex purdee 26405 60331
purdee.pdf
10 27 12 emails on 03051 emergency appeal maybe a motion for stay 1708 26405 03126 conyers
orduna wdc 0204 purdy.pdf
10 27 12 emails on 03051 emergency appeal maybe a motion for stay 1708 26405.pdf
10 28 11 1048 am email to Purdy mpurdy@washoecourts.us 03051 appeal motion for stay compare
03126 0204 60331 61383.pdf
10 28 11 1054pm email to eflex and courtadmin@washoecourts.us 03051 03126 0204 10 PAG-
ES.pdf
10 28 11 03126 motion and affidavit for ifp attached to from 10 26 11 civil suit merliss marked as
received by M. Purdy Mtn and Affid proceed on appeal IFP Merliss v Coughlin HYPERLINK
28!7405" \t "_top" ion.pdf
Download all
ALSO, AS TO THE SUMMARILY DENIED APPLCIATIONS FOR TPO'S BY COUGHLIN (ONE ON 2/10/12
OR THEREABOUTS AGAINST RJC BAILIFF REYES, TRANSFERRED TO SPARKS JUSTICE COURT (WHICH
BEGS THE QUESTION WHY 12-599 WASHOE COUNTY V COUGHLIN WAS NOT TRANSFERRED TO SJC, OR
TO A COURT OUTSIDE WASHOE COUNTY) AND THE TWO DIFFERENT TPO'S COUGHLIN REQUESTED
AGAINST LESLIE (IN, IN COURT ON 8/29/12 IN 11-063341 TO WHICH JUDGE SFERRAZZA ANGRILY RE-
BUKED COUGHLIN) AND ANOTHER, FILED STAMPED 12/18/12 AN HOUR BEFORE THE TPOAPPLICATION
FOR LESLIE BY DDAWATTS OF 12/18/12, IN 12-598, WHICH JUDGE SCHROEDER SUMMARILY DENIED
(ODD THAT JUDGE PEARSON RULES ON 12-599, WHILE JUDGE SCHROEDER RULES ON 12-598, WHERE
SUCH APPLICATIONS WHERE FILED WITHIN AN HOUR OF EACH OTHER).
LESLIE HAS OFTEN THREATENED COUGHLIN WITH ABUSE OF PROCESS, IN VIOLATION OF HIS DU-
TY TO HIS THEN CLIENT COUGHLIN, SOMETIMES IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISSUADE COUGHLIN FROM SEEKING
TO INTRODUCED EXCULPATORY VIDEO EVIDENCE IN 11-063341 (OFTEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH LESLIE
ATTEMPTING TO DEPRIVE COUGHLIN OF HIS INVOLABLE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DECIDE WHETH-
ER OR NOT TO TESTIFY, TAKE A PLEA, SUBPOENA WITNESSES, ETC.). THIS QUESTIONABLE PRACTICE BY
LESLIE ALSO INCLUDED LESLIE TELLING COUGHLIN JUDGE SFERRAZZA WOULD PUNISH COUGLHIN FOR
POINTING OUT APPARENT RPD MISCONDUCT IN 11-063341 ON 8/29/12 DURING THE SUPRESSION MO-
TION HEARING, AND IN THE FOLLOWING EMAILS:
RE: JIM LESLIE IS A SCRAPPY DUDE RE: COUGHLIN
From: Leslie, Jim (Jleslie@washoecounty.us) This sender is in your safe list.
Sent: Fri 12/14/12 9:45 AM
To: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Mr. Coughlin:
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A hearing has been set for Tuesday December 18, 2013, at 8:30 am in Reno Jus-
tice Court, at which we will ask to be relieved as counsel in the remaining case
you have with this office, RCR12-067980, based on, among other things, (1) your
prior expressed desire to represent yourself and (2) your email to myself and sev-
eral other recipients, including state bar attorneys, which contains an express or
implied threat of violence. If you fail to appear at the hearing, the relief will be
requested in your absence upon the grounds stated above. If you choose to agree
to self-representation without argument, the second above-noted reason may
or may not rise to the point of discussion, although I would note that the
email you sent with the express or implied threat was disseminated by you to
several recipients including representatives of the Nevada State Bar, thereby
breaching confidentiality by your own action.
Pending the hearing, there is no reason for us to meet in person or communicate
by any means. Any communications from you pending the hearing will be
deemed to be made in waiver of attorney-client privilege and are subject to
forwarding to the Nevada State Bar and/or law enforcement as appropriate
pursuant to Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(c).
James B. Leslie, Esq., Chief Deputy Public Defender
Consider also, as attached in Ex 1 to the TPO application of 12/18/12 in 12-599:
From: Leslie, Jim (Jleslie@washoecounty.us) This sender is in
your safe list. Sent: Wed 12/12/12 4:22 PM To:
'zachcoughlin@hotmail.com' (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) Mr.
Coughlin: Based on your behavior at our offices on several past occa-
sions, including today where we had to call the police due to you en-
gaging in behavior constituting disturbing the peace, you are hereby di-
rected NOT to come to our offices without first having confirmed in writing
an appointment with your assigned attorney. If you violate this email notifi-
cation, we will contact law enforcement. James B. Leslie, Esq. Chief Depu-
ty Public Defender
Download as zip
911 CASE LESLIE, JIM(JLESLIE@WASHOECOUNTY.US)12/07/12 TO: 'ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM'
CC: DOGAN, BIRAY FROM: LESLIE, JIM (JLESLIE@WASHOECOUNTY.US) THIS SENDER IS IN YOUR
SAFE LIST. SENT: FRI 12/07/12 9:18 AM TO: 'ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM'
(ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM) CC:DOGAN, BIRAY (BDOGAN@WASHOECOUNTY.US) OUTLOOK
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ACTIVE VIEW1 ATTACHMENT (2.2 MB) COUGHLIN DISCOVERY 911 CASE.PDFDOWNLOAD DOWNLOAD
AS ZIP
Mr. Coughlin: Attached are the discovery materials in the above-referenced case that you had
requested and we had made an additional copy of for you in response to your request. HYPERLINK
"https://bay002.mail.live.com/mail/" \t "_top" Please note that the July 27, 2012, cover letter
was for your pick up and you never picked it up. Note also that the July 27, 2012, packet
encloses a copy of the April 17, 2012, hand delivery HYPERLINK
"https://bay002.mail.live.com/mail/" \t "_top" transmittal of the very same documents which
you received. Since we have been removed from the 911 case, we are closing our file. The
attached materials were sitting at our front desk. Since you failed to retrieve
themHYPERLINK "https://bay002.mail.live.com/mail/" \t "_top" , we provide the attached
courtesy copy before final closure of our file. No response to this transmittal is required from
you. James B. Leslie, Esq. Chief Deputy Public Defender
IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT WASHOE COUNTY PUT A CHIEF DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ON
THREE OF COUGHLIN'S HYPERLINK"HTTPS://BAY002.MAIL.LIVE.COM/MAIL/" \T "_TOP"
MI SDEMEANORHYPERLINK"HTTPS://BAY002.MAIL.LIVE.COM/MAIL/" \T "_TOP" HYPERLINK
"HTTPS://BAY002.MAIL.LIVE.COM/MAIL/" \T "_TOP" CASE TO LIMIT POTENTIAL COUNTY LIABILITY
RATHER THAN ACTUALLY DEFEND COUGHLIN. COUGHLIN HAS NEVER BEEN PROVIDE A REASON FOR
GOODNIGHT BEING SUDDENLY TAKEN OFF HIS CASE MINUTES BEFORE THE 7/16/12 TRIAL IN 11-063341.
FURTHER, THE HEARING IN 12-067980 WAS NOT PROPERLY NOTICED, COUGHLIN'S SHOWING UP TO IT
FAILS TO EXCUSE THAT FACT, COUGHLIN DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHTS AS TO THOSE INSUFFICIENCIES, BUT
RATHER ASSERTED THEM, AND THEREFORE LESLIE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED AN ORDER
ALLOWIGN HIS WITHDRAWAL (WHICH HE ATTEMPTED TO COERCE A CONSENT TO FROM COUGHLIN, AND
ALL OF THIS IS RATHER SUPSECT CONSIDERING THE HYPERLINK
"HTTPS://BAY002.MAIL.LIVE.COM/MAIL/" \T "_TOP" TIMING....THE COUNTY GETS TO FORCE
COUGHLIN TO SELF REPRESENT AFTER THE WCPD SABOTAGED HIS CASE IN 11-063341 AND
12-065630 JUST AS MUCH AS IT POSSIBLY COULD, AND ONLY THEN, ON 12/18/12 IN AN
UNNOTICED (NO 10 DAYS TO RESPONDE FOR COUGHLIN, AND WCDA DDA YOUNG WASN'T
EVEN THERE) HEARING BEFORE, AGAIN, JUDGE CLIFTON, LESLIE IS PERMITTED TO
WITHDRAW...VERY SIMILAR TO CLIFTON, ON 11/20/12, JUST BEFORE A SHORT HEARING IN 12-
065630, WHILE COUGHLIN WAS VIEWING LESLIE TESTIFY IN SOME INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL DMAGE TO FORMER CLIENT'S IMMIGRATION STATUS HEARING ALSO BEFORE JUDGE
CLIFTON...JUDGE CLIFTON ACTUALLY SAID THAT HE FOUND LESLIE'S INITIAL LACK OF
CERTAINTY DURING HIS INITIAL TESTIMONY AS TO WHETHER HE INFORMED HIS CLIENT OF THE
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT CONSEQUENCES OF HER CHARGE PRIOR TO HER ENTERING A PLEA
AGREEMENT STEMMING FROM UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ-PASTRANA, 244 F.3D 1025, 1027 (9TH
CIR.2001), COMBINED WITH LESLIE'S SUDDENLY BECOMING MORE CERTAIN THAT HE DID, IN
FACT SO WARN HIS FORMER CLIENT THEREOF UPON IT BECOMING MORE OBVIOUS THE
MALPRACTICE POSSIBILITIES ATTENDANT TO HIS FAILING TO DO SO, AS A BASIS FOR FINDING
LESLIE'S TESTIMONY TO BE HYPERLINK"HTTPS://BAY002.MAIL.LIVE.COM/MAIL/" \T "_TOP"
MORE CREDIBLE THAN HIS FORMER CLIENT'S, RATHER THAN PROVIDING AN INFERENCE THAT LESLIE'S
SUDDEN REMEBERING THAT HE SO WARNED HIS CLIENT OF THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES TO BE RA-
THER SUSPECT GIVEN THE OBVIOUS SELF PROTECTION UTLIITY INHERENT TO HIS DOING SO.
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IN FACT, UPON BEING REMOVED AS COUNSEL IN 11-063341, LESLIE APPARENTLY ATTEMPTED
TO HIDE FROMCOUGHLIN THE FACT THAT THE ECOMMRECORDINGS BETWEEN THE RPDAND
ECOMMDISPATCH ACTUALLY REVEALED A FAILURE TO PROPOUND BRADY MATERIAL AND FAILURE
TO APPROPRIATELY RESPONDE TO GOODNGITHS 12/19/11 DISCOVERY REQUESTS FOR SUCH RECORDS
(RPDHARRIET TRUMAN'S WRITTEN RESPONSE FAILED TO ADDRESS ECOMMRECORDINGS OF WHAT
DISPATCH TOLD THE RPD, WHICH BECAMSE OF SALIENT RELEVANT IN 11-063341, AND ULTIMATELY
SHOWED THAT RPDDURALDE'S AND DDA YOUNG ARGUMENT AND TESTIMONY AS TO THE RE-
PORTS FROM DISPATCH OF A POSSIBLE FIGHT ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED BY DURALDE AND HIS TWO
FELLOW OFFICERS THAT NIGHT (SUCH REPORTS WERE NOT RECEIVED BY THE RPDAS THE OFFICER
WERE OUT OF THEIR VEHICELS AND ON SCENED AT THE TIME THE ONE TEXT ECOMM LOG WAS SENT
TO THEIR IN CAR SCREENS ONLY) WERE NOT KNOWN TO DURALDE ET AL, AND THEREFORE, A FRAUD-
ULENT ASSERTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE THEREOF WAS MADE TO BUTTRESS THE REASONABLE SUSPICION
AND PROBABLE CAUSE ANALYSIS INTEGRAL TO THE STATE'S PROSECUTION THEREIN. LESLIE
SUBPOENED ECOMM'S KELLEY WOOD ON 10/3/12 FOR SUCH RECORDINGS, AND MORE THAN THE 15
DAYS BY WHICH SHE WAS REQUIRED TO RESPOND PASSED BEFORE LESLIE WAS GRANTED HIS WITH-
DRAWAL ON 10/22/12, HOWEVER, LESLIE PERSISTED, AS EVINCED IN THE EMAIL BELOW, IN REFUSING
TO TURN OVER THE ECOMMDISPATCH TO AND FROMRPDRECORDINGS REQUIRED TO BE PRO-
DUCED BY SUCH SUBPOENA. LESLIE CONTINUOUSLY REVEALED A VINDICTIVE, SELF INTERESTED
STREAK A MILE LONG IN HIS DEALINGS WITH COUGHLIN.
RE: KELLY ODOM/ECOMM SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM, PLEASE EMAIL MATERIALS PRO-
DUCED AND OTHER MATERIALS? LESLIE, JIM (JLESLIE@WASHOECOUNTY.US) 11/01/12 TO:
ZACH COUGHLIN FROM: LESLIE, JIM (JLESLIE@WASHOECOUNTY.US)
Sent: Thu 11/01/12 12:00 PM To: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Mr. Coughlin: As indicated in the transmittal I sent with the PDF attachments, I attached the writ-
ten documentation in PDF format. Thats your digital transmittal. The other materials are
disks and color photographs in tangible form. James B. Leslie, Esq. Chief Deputy Public De-
fender
None of the discs Leslie ultimately turned over contained any ECOMM recordings beyond
the 911 calls (ie, none of the recordings between the RPD and dispatch/ECOMM that would reveal
one way or another when and what the RPD was informed of in responding to the scene on
8/20/11 incident to Coughlin's defense in 11-063341). It was only upon the State turning over
such recordings (way too late in the game to avoid prejudicing Coughlin's defense, where such
was turned over by the WCDA's Office on 11/5/12 (RCA Skau turned over some recording that
contained material ommission on 11/13/12...and see the impermissible, insufficieny notices, per-
haps fraudulent assert of Skau's incident to the 11/8/12 ex part hearin in 11-063341 and Judge
Sferrazza'a 11/8/12 TRO (to be fair to Skau, Judge Sferrazza's 11/8/12 Order does seem to allow
for service on Coughlin by email of a motion to contest to sufficiency of Coughlin's own service of
subpoenas....though Judge Sferrazza, on 11/19/12 rejected any assertion that he had made such an
order allowing emailed service upon Couglin...but pointed out that it was a good thing Coughlin
had shown up anyways to the 11/13/12 hearing, as Judge Sferrazza would have ruled against
Coughlin without Coughlin's having had an opportunity to be heard had he not shown up, in an
echo to Judge Clifton's but your're here! argument upon Coughlin pointing out the insufficiency
of notice as to Leslie's Emergency Motion to Withdrawal as counsel on 12/18/12 in 12-065630
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(which, by the way failed to addres the Motion Coughlin filed therein, unopposed by either Leslie
or DDA Young, on 12/3/12, which should under DCR 13(3) and or Polk v. State result in a dis-
missal of 12-067980 as well.
Leslie's coercive threats of abuse of process to Coughlin is further evinced
in the following, which provides support for Coughlin's own application for
a TPO against Leslie:
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, November 01, 2012 3:14 AM
To: Leslie,
Jim; davidc@nvbar.org; patrickk@nvbar.org; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; compl
aints@nvbar.org
Subject: RE: Coughlin: Petit Larceny case -- Hand-Off Transmittal Jim, I
will give you an opportunity to retract or fully explain your statement in
your last correspondence to me, wherein you wrote: "Given your past
statements to me, I believe I should also warn you of the possibility of ap-
plicability of Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3. In that regard,
please recall that during a meeting between you and I in one of the inter-
view rooms at Reno Justice Court during trial on 9/5/12, you suggested to
me that I alter the video recording of your interaction with the police offic-
ers in the petit larceny case. I told you I cannot do that. You became irate
and argumentative and asked why I could not do it, and I told you it would
be unethical. I raise this issue in this email transmittal to reiterate what I
have had to tell you more than once in this case, that is, I cannot and will
not assist you in alteration of evidence or other commission or attempted
commission of fraud upon the court. Should I observe you attempting to do
so during the resumed trial, currently set for November 19, 2012, as noted
above, I believe I would be required under Nevada Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.3 to advise the Court." I don't know what is funnier, Jim, the
accusation that I would somehow view you as tech savvy enough to whip
up some video editing on the spot with "the county laptop" which "takes a
little while to boot up", or the suggestion that I would be stupid and reck-
less enough to attempt to encourage you to commit some vague miscon-
duct, you whom I cannot stand and whom clearly wants nothing but the
worst for me. Sure, Jim, sure. I get it Jim, you have had a chance to read
the Memorandum I submitted, which painstakingly dissects your miscon-
duct, and you are panicking, doing damage control, reverting to your tried
and true threatening of your indigent criminal client's routine....next, you
will attempt to have a bailiff lean on your client with some intimidation tac-
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tics, probably have him threaten to "put my foot up your ass" as you did
with Bailiff Reyes on October 8th, 2011 at the RJC. I consider your
above writing to be an inappropriate threat, and beyond inaccurate. Jim, if
there was a transcript of these conversations you refer to, and one compared
them to your above statements, would your conduct be ethical or even le-
gal? By "alter", what exactly do you mean, Jim? Are you referring to the
"10 minute break" where you need to "boot up the county laptop" 10
minutes before lunch, which Judge Sferrazza granted you so you could "do
some trial prep" (mid-way through the trial, whereupon you were going to
view, for the first time, apparently, the video of the arrest, especially given
your early foul ups on the record wherein you failed to recognize the differ-
ence between the extortionate threats made by Officer Rosa from those
made by Officer Duralde...then, during that "10 minute break" you proceed
to do something other than what you told Judge Sferrazza the break was
for...instead of reviewing the exculpatory video, you talked to the State Bar
of Nevada on the phone and received confidential information related to
Keith Loomis's representation or lack thereof of myself...I asked you
whether you had any authority for your position that the videos of the ar-
rest, and other investigatory videos I capture had to be submitted or pre-
sented to the court in their entirety (some of the videos are quite long...you
wouldn't know Jim, because you have not viewed them....). You, of course,
because you never have any citation for anything, instead proceeded to at-
tempt to make some lame threat accusing me of some gibberish, in that
classic Jim Leslie, CYA, faux sincere, hyperpretentious delivery of yours
that is so very grating.... Don't have time to go into all the misrepresenta-
tions you make in your email below. Jim, why don't you just email me the
dispatch tapes, you know, as that is a very material issue in this mat-
ter. This is especially true where the RPD and DDA Young have seeming-
ly come up with this "dispatch reported to the officers a possible fight" de-
spite the fact that the dispatch logs mention only a "disturbance" at first,
then Further, Duralde's Supplemental Declaration (the one he filed the day
after the arrest, not the Narrative he filed 3 months later when the RPD
found out the arrest had been captured on tape by Coughlin...its a great vid-
eo, Jim, you should watch it sometime....): "report of a larceny of a cell
phone at that location. Dispatch relayed information that the victim had set
his phone down and that he was now calling the phone and It was lighting
up In the suspecfs pocket. The suspect was described as a white male adult,
35 years of age, 6'02",210 Iba, wearing a red Chicago hat and a white or
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yellow shirt and plaid shorts. Dispatch also relayed that the suspect was still
on scene." Then, on page two of DDA Young Opposition to the Motion to
Suppress (the one where you guys failed to preserve arguments related to
the impermissiblity of a search incident to arrest based upon what remained
of the facts should your suppression motion be granted as it related to the
pat-down alone), DDA Young seems to come out of nowhere with this "re-
port of a possible fight" stuff, which, conveniently, really helps in the
whole "need for articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion/pat
down or probable cause/search incident to arrest analysis...On page 5 of his
Opposition, DDA Young drives the point home: "In the instant case, the
pat-down search of the Defendant was proper under the totality of the cir-
cumstances. 3 Prior to arriving, Officer Duralde learned that the scene in-
volved a loud disturbance with possible fight, thereby immediately raising
the concern of weapons and the safety of all those present . This is just one
factor for this Court to consider. Upon contacting the Defendant, he became
uncooperative and challenged Officer Duralde that there was not enough in-
formation for a detention. This is just one factor for this Court to consider.
Upon contacting the Defendant, he became uncooperative and challenged
Officer Duralde that there was not enough information for a detention .
Thereafter , in response to Officer Duralde's inquiry whether the Defendant
had Mr. Goble's phone, the Defendant asked if he had the right not to an-
swer the question. While the Defendant arguably can choose not to answer
such a question, this response, along with his general attitude, demeanor,
and reaction, certainly can be considered by this Court when addressing the
reasonableness of Officer Duralde 1s concern for his and others l safety . It
is important to note that there were multiple people on 2 scene, any of
which could be subjected to injury or death if the 3 Defendant had a weap-
on . Upon arrival , the Defendant and a group of 4 people (including Mr.
Goble) were on scene, and with the allegation that the Defendant had stolen
a phone belonging to a person of said 6 group, emotions were high and a
physical fight could have erupted. Again, such factors should be consid-
ered by this Court when 8 determining the reasonableness of the pat-down
search." But where is the support for this "a possible fight" sugges-
tion? Its not in the discovery produced to me. So, how about those dis-
patch tapes, huh, Jim. Kelly Odom? Please email them to me, I don't want
you trying to jam me up so close to trial with some non-sense about how
some blank or scratched cd you gave me was the "only copy" your office
had. I know you well, Jim. So, seeing as how you finally served a sub-
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poena duces tecum on Kelly Odom/Ecomm/ 911 dispatchers, so we can fi-
nally hear the dispatch tapes, and see if any "possible fight" was mentioned,
why don't you go ahead and email me those audio files (and audio files are
mercifully small compared to video files, Jim, yet I have managed to send
you reams of video files via email...). Also, I need the audio of the aborted
Trial in this matter that was held on May 7th, 2012 (despite the fact that
Judge Elliot did not sign the Order finding Coughlin Competent, and there-
fore ending the period in which "all proceedings must be stayed" required
by NRS 178.405, until two days later, on May 9th, 2012. So you guys were
going to jam me into a Trial while there was a pending Order for Compe-
tency Evaluation, just days after my getting out of jail, where my medica-
tion was wrongfully withheld from me (and some medications should not
be ceased or started to abruptly), where I spent 8 days due to the lies of the
Lakes Crossing evaluators and the misconduct and malpratice of your
protege, Biray Dogan, whom proceeded to read my confidential medical in-
formation into the open, public record, in front of 40 or so members of the
public....a transgression which Mr. Bosler saw no need to attempt to have
stricken or corrected. BUT TO ME CLEAR, JIM...I know Goodnight
orderd a copy of the May 7th, 2012 aborted Trial, that occurred during the
pendency of an Order for Competency Evaluation. I do not have a copy of
that JAVS audio, nor do I have a copy of my arraignment in rcr2011-
063341. You guys don't even get billed for these and yet you have denied
them to me, until you got wind of the fact that I went and got my own, then
you come up with you faux offers to provide me copies....Very clever. Jim,
the RJC severely limits my access to the files, so you are not entitled to
make any assumptions that alleviate your duty to provide me copies of fil-
ings, access to my file, etc. Further, I see that Linda Gray filed a request for
the audio of the October 22nd, 2012 Hearing, and I want a copy of it, so
please email it to me, and
also provide a hard copy. Its not rocket science copying a CD, Jim,
and it doesn't take ages, either. You remember the October 22nd,
2012 Hearing, right, Jim...the one where you can be heard on the rec-
ord telling me "you are going to fail" and "your're disintegrating" and
making more of your threats about how I attempt to advocate on my
own behalf the Judge will put me in jail, etc.,etc.? Yeah, I need a
copy of the copy your office got of that hearing. With the bits where
you tell the Judge "he (Coughlin) doesn't get to dip into our money,
no one cent" in your explaining your refusal to subpoena material
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witnesses or send out subpoena duces tecums (odd, because the RPD
doesn't seem to charge you guys for those....yet you never sent one to
ECOMM until well over midway through the trial, why is that, Jim?).
See, Jim, it was professional misconduct for you to spend your entire
cross-examination of Cory Goble trying to establish a citizen's arrest
was effectuated, and therefore help the police and the State overcome
the fact that Officer Duralde cleary overcharged the crime as a felony
in an attempt to game the system and get around the whole statutory
dictate against officer's making custodial arrest (and therefore being
permitted to conduct searches incident thereto) for misdemeanors, al-
legedly committed after 7 pm and outside the officer's presence (unless a
citizen's arrest is immediately effected). Your cross was pretty good work
for a prosecutor, but you get paid to fulfill the Sixth Amendment Jim, not
throw retaliatory tizzy fits. Your failure to in any way utilize the 911 call
tapes and videos Coughlin took of the moments prior to arrest (where the
youths admit they are trying to steal Coughlin's bike and his dog, to teach
him a lesson...not to "detain" him or effect a "citizens arrest" (it almost
seemed like DDA Young had you make the arguments he wanted to make,
but knew would be unethical for him to make, or would expose other glar-
ing weaknesses in his case, and in that way, you two really make beautiful
music together, Jim). Then there is the fact that Coughlin himself called
911, and that Coughlin is heard on the video's prior to the police arriving
encouraging the hostile gang of late teens, early twenties skateboarders to
remain peaceful, and wait for the police to arrive, so the matter could be
handled civily (and not lead to anyone dying, as Coughlin referenced the
tragic death of a 25 year old man intervening in a purse snatching of that
was in the news just months prior to the August 20th, 2011 arrest in this
matter RCR2011-063341...really, Jim, you should join us at the November
14th,2 011 bar hearing in NG12-0204, as the SCR 105 Complaint saw fit to
make this pending criminal charge a basis for a professional misconduct
hearing. In the meantime, why don't you send me the digital transmis-
sions that Judge Sferrazza ordered, and not hide behind some "there's not
enough time to make copies" non-sense. Right, Jim, you are really going to
give me your only copies of things. Uh-huh. You? Jim, you? Jim, you
spend all day covering your ass, so please. Besides, the Judge did not rule
that I have to pick up some box of stuff, and sign some document while be-
ing harassed by you, attesting to the contents of long pieces of digital media
(which I am sure you will object to me watching right there in your of-
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fice). That is the beauty of the digital transmission, Jim. Maybe the
WCPD will need to get itself a Skydrive, they are free, who knows? All I
know is I have made far less money than you this year Jim, and done the li-
on's share of work on this case (with lots of extra work added by your mis-
conduct), and I have found your work on this matter to be amongst the most
distasteful I have ever seen by an attorney. So, now that I know that your
office did subpoena Kelly Odom (she showed up to Trial, yet you kept that
secret from me, in addition to the subpoena duces tecum you sent her, real-
ly late in the game, on October 3, 2012. Also, you do realize that RPD Of-
ficer Duralde's wife was on duty that night working as a dispatcher for
ECOMM, right? Jessica Duralde, and what dispatch told the RPD that
night has become a material issue in this case. Yet, the WCPD was satis-
fied with was the RPD gave them and didn't send a subpoena duces tecume
out to ECOMM until after the Trial would have been over already, had it
not been for how tenacious that Coughlin is. Finally, Jim, you might
want to reconsider your analysis respecting your purported failure to sub-
poena witnesses after reviewing the attached, as you wrote: "I have not
subpoenaed witnesses to the November 19, 2012, resumption of trial be-
cause (1) contrary to your assertions, no witnesses appear to have credible
and persuasive prospective testimony to help your case, in fact most of the
witnesses you have insisted on calling at trial appear to have prospective
testimony harmful, not helpful, to your defense, (2) the witnesses you have
demanded we subpoena and have testify appear to actually have prospec-
tive testimony contra to a finding of not-guilty, and (3) I already obtained
several points through cross examination of Zurate, Duralde, and Goble that
you requested and that are credible and potentially persuasive points in fa-
vor of your defense (please recall your comments to me during the first day
of trial, I like where you are going with this . . . . )."
THAT COERCIVE THREAT BY LESLIE TO ALLEGED TO THE SBNSOME PHONEY ACCUSATION
AGAINST COUGHLIN SUGGESTING COUGHLIN TOLD LESLIE TO ALTER VIDEO EVIDENCE (LESLIE IN-
DICATED ANY SUCH THING WAS EVIDENCE OF COUGHLIN'S LACK OF FITNESS TO PRACTICE LAW IN AN
APPARENT MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPORT OF THE DECISION IN SIERRA GLASS (CONDUCT OF
COUNSEL IN OMITTING PORTION OF DEPOSITION WHEN DEPOSITION IS READ INTO RECORD, AND
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giving impression that entire document is being proffered, resulting in buttressing of his
party's position is fraud on the court warranting the imposition of sanctions. Sup.Ct.Rules,
Rules 172, 172, subd. 1(a, d). Sierra Glass & Mirror v. Viking Industries, Inc., 1991, 808 P.2d
512, 107 Nev. 119, rehearing denied)) Leslie misstament and confusion of the interaction between
the excuplatory video evidence Coughlin wish to have Leslie introduce or utlize in some way (in-
cluding to impeach all of the State's witnesses in 11-063341) prior to being forced to make his deci-
sion whether to invoke his Fifth Amendment Rights or Not (and really, also incident to the decision
of whether to accept the plea or go to trial) is contained in the following email from Leslie to
Coughlin (to be clear, a criminal defendant has not duty to offer any incriminating evidence, and
regardless, Coughlin ultimately sought to introduce the entirely of all videos, without any editing,
but Judge Sferrazza largely refused to so admit such materials based on either relevancy or hearsay
grounds, but the Sierra Glass case should have indicated to Leslie that a criminal defendant attorney
does not have some obligation to play the entire video, under RPC 3.3, if he feels some portions of
it are not useful, or even if they would be prejudicial or incriminating, where such criminal defend-
ant attorney (or his counsel, as they case was there) did not give the impression that the entire
document is being proferred):
FROM: LESLIE, JIM SENT: MONDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2012 2:17 PM TO:
ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM SUBJECT: COUGHLIN: PETIT LARCENY
CASE -- HAND-OFF TRANSMITTAL IMPORTANCE: HIGH MR. COUGHLIN:
THIS TRANSMITTAL IS PROTECTED BY ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALI-
TY. HOWEVER, DISSEMINATION OF ANY KIND OF THE CONTENTS HEREOF OR
OF ANY OF THE ATTACHMENTS HERETO MAY EFFECT A WAIVER OF SUCH
CONFIDENTIALITY, AS YOU HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED IN PRIOR
EMAILS AND AS YOU KNOW FROM YOUR LEGAL TRAINING. TRANSMITTED
HEREWITH AS ATTACHMENTS ARE FILE MATERIALS WHICH ARE TRANSMIT-
TED AS COURTESY HAND-OFF TRANSMITTAL FROM US AS ASSIGNED
COUNSEL OF RECORD TO YOU AS COURT-PERMITTED SELF-REPRESENTING
DEFENDANT, FOR PURPOSE OF ASSISTING YOU IN YOUR PREPARATION FOR
RESUMPTION OF TRIAL IN THE PETIT LARCENY CASE CURRENTLY SCHED-
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ULED FOR NOVEMBER 19, 2012, AT 8:30 A.M., AND AS TO WHICH DATE YOU
HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED VIA US MAIL, EMAIL NOTICE, VERBAL
NOTICE, AND AS YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY ACKNOWLEDGED BEING ADVISED
OF IN PRIOR PROCEEDINGS IN OPEN COURT. THE ATTACHMENTS THEM-
SELVES SHALL SERVE AS INVENTORY OF THE MATERIALS TRANSMITTED
HEREWITH. ADDITIONALLY, AS COURTESY AND AS MEMORIALIZATION OF
VARIOUS ISSUES, PLEASE NOTE THE FOLLOWING: PLEASE NOTE THAT THERE
ARE ALSO SEVERAL COMPUTER DISCS/DVDS CONTAINING VIDEO AND/OR
AUDIO ON THEM, AS WELL AS A SET OF COLOR-PRINTED PHOTOGRAPHS
WHICH WE HAD PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO YOUR SEPTEMBER 20, 2012,
EMAIL TO US, THAT WE WILL PRODUCE IN TANGIBLE FORM SEPARATE AND
APART AND IN ADDITION TO THIS EMAIL TRANSMITTAL. YOU WILL NEED TO
PICK THOSE ITEMS UP FROM OUR OFFICE AND SIGN A RECEIPT. A COPY OF
THAT RECEIPT IS ATTACHED HERETO AS A PDF ATTACHMENT, TITLED RE-
CEIPT OF DOCUMENTS. PLEASE EMAIL ME WHETHER YOU ARE AVAILABLE
10/29/12 OR10/30/12 FOR PICK-UP OF THE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS AND I
WILL ARRANGE TO BE PRESENT WITH AN EXECUTABLE RECEIPT FOR YOUR
SIGNATURE. SAID RECEIPT IS NECESSARY IN PART BECAUSE THE MATERIALS
LISTED IN THE RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS CANNOT BE REPRODUCED ON
SHORT NOTICE, IN AN EFFORT TO ENSURE YOU RECEIVE THEM WELL BEFORE
THE RESUMPTION OF TRIAL, AND TO AVOID DISPUTE AS TO WHAT MATERI-
ALS WERE HANDED OVER TO YOU. I NOTE THAT YOU AND THE COURT CON-
FIRMED AT THE LAST HEARING THAT YOU HAVE ALREADY DIRECTLY RE-
CEIVED COPIES OF THE JAVS AUDIO RECORDINGS OF PROCEEDINGS FROM
THE COURT, SO WE ARE NOT PRODUCING THOSE IN DUPLICATE. INCLUDED
IN THE ATTACHED PDF TRANSMITTALS ARE COPIES OF CLEAN,
UNREDACTED DISCOVERY MATERIALS FROM THE STATE, COPIES OF THOSE
MATERIALS WITH REDACTIONS, AND OUR TRANSMITTAL LETTER TO YOU
INCLUDING REDACTED COPIES OF THE DISCOVERY MATERIALS DATED
DECEMBER 1, 2011. WE HAVE ALSO PROVIDED YOU VIA EMAIL OTHER COP-
IES OF THOSE SAME DISCOVERY MATERIALS ON PRIOR OCCASIONS. ADDI-
TIONALLY, I RECALL PERSONALLY TRYING TO PROVIDE YOU ADDITIONAL
COURTESY COPY OF THOSE MATERIALS ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION WHEN
YOU CAME TO THE OFFICE WITHOUT AN APPOINTMENT AND MADE LOUD
VERBAL DEMANDS FOR ANOTHER COPY OF YOUR DISCOVERY BECAUSE YOU
HAD LOST YOUR PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED COPIES, HOWEVER, YOU THEN
LEFT THE OFFICE WHEN WE TRIED TO PROVIDE YOU THAT ADDITIONAL
COPY. ALTHOUGH WE ARE HEREBY PRODUCING VARIOUS PLEADINGS AS
PDF ATTACHMENTS TO THIS EMAIL, AS LISTED HEREIN, MY UNDERSTAND-
ING FROM YOU IS THAT YOU ALREADY HAVE COPIES OF ALL FILED PLEAD-
INGS, ORDERS, ETC., FROM YOUR DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE RENO JUS-
TICE COURT. NEVERTHELESS, THE PLEADINGS LISTED HEREIN ARE PRO-
DUCED AS PDF ATTACHMENTS AS A COURTESY. WE ARE NOT PRODUCING
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YOU COPIES OF THE VOLUMINOUS EMAILS AND EMAIL ATTACHMENTS YOU
HAVE PREVIOUSLY SENT US, SINCE BY BEING THE TRANSMITTING PARTY OF
THOSE EMAILS AND ATTACHMENTS YOU OBVIOUSLY HAVE THEM YOUR-
SELF. PLEASE ALSO NOTE THAT YOU ARE NOW OPERATING AS YOUR OWN
SELF-REPRESENTING COUNSEL, BY WAY OF THE SELF-REPRESENTATION
GRANTED YOU BY THE COURT ON 10/22/12, IN THE PETIT LARCENY CASE. IF
YOU REPRESENT TO ANYONE THAT YOU ARE OPERATING IN THAT CASE IN
CONJUNCTION WITH OR AS CO-COUNSEL WITH OUR OFFICE OR ANY ATTOR-
NEY THEREIN, OTHER THAN IN OUR CAPACITY AS STAND-BY COUNSEL, WE
WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER REPORTING YOU TO THE STATE BAR FOR FRAUD-
ULENT MISREPRESENTATION. ADDITIONALLY, AS YOU WERE WARNED BY
THE COURT ON 10/22/12, YOU CANNOT USE ANY OF THE MATERIALS WE
ARE TRANSMITTING OR THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THOSE MATERI-
ALS TO HARASS ANY PERSON OR OTHERWISE PUT THE MATERIALS OR IN-
FORMATION THEREIN TO ANY OTHER IMPROPER USE. THESE CAUTIONARY
NOTES INCLUDE BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE
CELL PHONE RECORDS OF MR. GOBLE AND THE ADDRESSES, PHONE NUM-
BERS, AND OTHER CONTACT INFORMATION OF ANY PERSONS IDENTIFIED IN
THE TRANSMITTED MATERIALS, INCLUDING THOSE ATTACHED TO THIS
EMAIL TRANSMITTAL AND THOSE CONTAINED IN THE RECEIPT OF DOCU-
MENTS. GIVEN YOUR PAST STATEMENTS TO ME, I BELIEVE I SHOULD ALSO
WARN YOU OF THE POSSIBILITYOF APPLICABILITYOF NEVADA RULE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.3. IN THAT REGARD, PLEASE RECALL THAT DURING A
MEETING BETWEEN YOU AND I IN ONE OF THE INTERVIEWROOMS AT RENO
JUSTICE COURT DURING TRIAL ON 9/5/12, YOU SUGGESTED TO ME THAT I AL-
TER THE VIDEO RECORDING OF YOUR INTERACTION WITH THE POLICE OFFIC-
ERS IN THE PETIT LARCENY CASE. I TOLD YOU I CANNOT DO THAT. YOU BE-
CAME IRATE AND ARGUMENTATIVE AND ASKED WHY I COULD NOT DO IT, AND I
TOLD YOU IT WOULD BE UNETHICAL. I RAISE THIS ISSUE IN THIS EMAIL TRANSMIT-
TAL TO REITERATE WHAT I HAVE HAD TO TELL YOU MORE THAN ONCE IN THIS CASE,
THAT IS, I CANNOT AND WILL NOT ASSIST YOU IN ALTERATION OF EVIDENCE OR
OTHER COMMISSION OR ATTEMPTED COMMISSION OF FRAUD UPON THE COURT.
SHOULD I OBSERVE YOU ATTEMPTING TO DO SO DURING THE RESUMED TRIAL, CUR-
RENTLY SET FOR NOVEMBER 19, 2012, AS NOTED ABOVE, I BELIEVE I WOULD BE
REQUIRED UNDER NEVADA RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.3 TO ADVISE THE
COURT. I HAVE NOT SUBPOENAED WITNESSES TO THE NOVEMBER 19, 2012, RE-
SUMPTION OF TRIAL BECAUSE (1) CONTRARY TO YOUR ASSERTIONS, NO WITNESSES
APPEAR TO HAVE CREDIBLE AND PERSUASIVE PROSPECTIVE TESTIMONY TO HELP
YOUR CASE, IN FACT MOST OF THE WITNESSES YOU HAVE INSISTED ON CALLING AT
TRIAL APPEAR TO HAVE PROSPECTIVE TESTIMONY HARMFUL, NOT HELPFUL, TO
YOUR DEFENSE, (2) THE WITNESSES YOU HAVE DEMANDED WE SUBPOENA AND
HAVE TESTIFY APPEAR TO ACTUALLY HAVE PROSPECTIVE TESTIMONY CONTRA TO A
FINDING OF NOT-GUILTY, AND (3) I ALREADY OBTAINED SEVERAL POINTS THROUGH
CROSS EXAMINATION OF ZURATE, DURALDE, AND GOBLE THAT YOUREQUESTED
AND THAT ARE CREDIBLE AND POTENTIALLY PERSUASIVE POINTS IN FAVOR OF
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YOUR DEFENSE (PLEASE RECALL YOUR COMMENTS TO ME DURING THE FIRST DAY
OF TRIAL, I LIKE WHERE YOU ARE GOING WITH THIS . . . . ). ADDITIONALLY, THE
COURT ADVISED YOUON 10/22/12 THAT IF YOU BELIEVE YOUREQUIRE SUBPOENAS,
YOUMAY CONTACT THE COURT DIRECTLY AND OBTAIN SUBPOENAS WITH WAIVER
OF FEES. AS DIRECTLY BY THE COURT ON 10/22/12, I WILL BE PRESENT AT THE TRI-
AL ON NOVEMBER 19, 2012, AT 8:30 A.M. AS STAND-BY COUNSEL. IF DURING THE
RESUMED TRIAL YOU BELIEVE YOUARE UNABLE, AFTER ALL, TO ADEQUATELY
HANDLE THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS YOURSELF, I WILL BE AVAILABLE TO TAKE OVER
REPRESENTATION, AT WHICH POINT I WOULD DO MY BEST TO CORRECT ANY ERRORS
OR TACTICAL MISTAKES YOU MIGHT HAVE COMMITTED AS WELL AS OTHERWISE
TRY TO WIN THE CASE FOR YOU. THANK YOU, JAMES B. LESLIE, ESQ.
1. THE 2/13/13 ROAIN 62337 BEFORE THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT IS MATERIAL DEFI-
CIENT IN A MULTITUDE OF RESPECTS, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING DOCU-
MENTS COUGHLIN SUBMITTED FOR FILING BEING MISSING FROM THE RECORD ON APPEAL: 1) A
10/31/12 FILING TITLE PRE-HEARING MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEM-
ORANDUM OF LAW (42 PAGES LONG WITH EXHIBIT 1 IN DISC FORM) 10 31 12 0204 PRE HEARING MO-
TION TO DISMISS AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW(RESPONSIVE PLEAD-
ING).PDF (10.4 MB)
FW:
FROM: ZACH COUGHLIN
(ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM)
SENT: SUN 11/11/12 7:50 AM
TO: SKENT@SKENTLAW.COM(SKENT@SKENTLAW.COM); MIKE@TAHOELAWYER.COM
(MIKE@TAHOELAWYER.COM); NEVTELASSN@SBCGLOBAL.NET (NEVTELASSN@SBCGLOBAL.NET);
PATRICKK@NVBAR.ORG (PATRICKK@NVBAR.ORG); FFLAHERTY@DLPFD.COM
(FFLAHERTY@DLPFD.COM); DAVIDC@NVBAR.ORG (DAVIDC@NVBAR.ORG); COMPLAINTS@NVBAR.ORG
(COMPLAINTS@NVBAR.ORG); TSUSICH@NVDETR.ORG (TSUSICH@NVDETR.ORG); JE@ELORENO.COM
(JE@ELORENO.COM); CVELLIS@BHFS.COM (CVELLIS@BHFS.COM)
3 ATTACHMENTS
10 31 12 0204 PRE HEARING MOTION TO DISMISS AND
FOR SUMMARYJUDGEMENT AND MEMORANDUM OF
LAW(RESPONSIVE PLEADING).PDF (10.4 MB) , 10 31 12
SUBPOENA ON PETERS AND WAIVER OF SERVICE.PDF (541.5
KB) , EX X HARRIS SILVERMAN COUGHLIN GARIN 0204 11
11 12.PDF (9.8 MB)
...
Please find attached the file stamped versions of the 10 31 12 subpoena duces tecum for which SBN
Laura Peters signed a waiver of service or similar
and the 10 31 12 Pre Hearing Motion to Dismiss Summary Judgment/Memorandum of Law (Re-
sponse)...
-11/9/12 Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss or Quash or Otherwise Challenge Sufficiency
of Service and of Process, of Complaint and Notice of Intent to Take Default and DoWSoE;
and Preserving for Appeal Objection to All other Due Process Violations; and UNDER PRO-
TEST...RESPONSE TO COMPLAINT (digital file faxed and emailed to SBN was titled 11 9 12
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response under protest 0204 and various motions and notices 0204 etc.pdf; 88 page document sub-
mitted for filing (index to exhibits: 1. exhibit 1: cd with relevant materials copied via digital trans-
mission as well) Photographs and other evidence detailing the personal delivery of this document
and Coughlin's presenting such for filing and file stamping to the SBN shortly before 5 pm (the SBN
had its doors locked and a sign on the front door indicating the following Monday, 11/12/12, being a
holiday, would see the SBN closed, to reopen on 11/13/12 (relevant to any less than 11 days
NRCP 6 analysis given that Monday was a non-judicial day (SCR 105(2)(c) provides for access up
to within 3 days of the formal hearing) on 11/9/12 were gathered and are now presented following
the Proof of Service to that filing. Even where the SBN may dispute whether or not its doors (and
therefore the doors to the court and filing office (ie, the file stampe that apparently only SBN
Clerk of Court Peters is able to utilize) were closer prior to 5 pm on 11/9/12, the failure to included
or memorialize the 88 page document Coughlin submitted for filing and the Exhibit 1 on a disc at-
tached thereto in either of the ROA's submitted to this Court by the SBN is troubling, unexplained,
and unjustifiable.
While Bar Counsel asserted some timeliness deficiency with respect to various documents
submitted for filign by Coughlin, any such contention does not justify King unilaterally controlling
the Clerk of Court and enjoying the advantage of excising from the record those filings by Coughlin
that are particularly destructive to the OBC's Complaint. Further, the applicability of NRCP Rule
12(a)(4)(A) (...if the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the mer-
its, a responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days after notice of the courts action...) in light
of SCR 119(3) and SCR 105(4) makes the overly narrow time for response set out in Chair Echever-
ria's 11/7/12 Order (which Couglin would not even have had, under NRCP 6(e), constructive notice
of by the 11/9/12 deadline set out therein).
Besides personally delivering the 88 page (with disc attachment) 11/9/12 Emergency Mtn...to
the SBN minutes prior to 5 pm on 11/9/12, Coughlin also faxed and emailed the same:
EMERGENCY EX PARTE MOTION NG12-0204, 0434,0435
FROM: ZACH COUGHLIN (ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM) SENT: SUN 11/11/12 4:13 AM
To: (skent@skentlaw.com) (skent@skentlaw.com); (mike@tahoelawyer.com)
(mike@tahoelawyer.com); (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net) (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net);
(patrickk@nvbar.org) (patrickk@nvbar.org); (fflaherty@dlpfd.com) (fflaherty@dlpfd.com);
(davidc@nvbar.org) (davidc@nvbar.org); (complaints@nvbar.org) (complaints@nvbar.org);
(tsusich@nvdetr.org) (tsusich@nvdetr.org); (je@eloreno.com) (je@eloreno.com);
(cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com)
...Emergency Ex Parte Motion NG12-0204, 0434,0435
please find attached 88 page Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss or Quash or Otherwise Chal-
lenge Sufficiency of Service
and of Process, of Complaint and Notice of Intent to Take Default and DoWSoE; and Preserving for
Appeal Objection to All other Due Process Violations; and UNDER PROTEST...RESPONSE TO
COMPLAINT
submitted for filing with the State Bar of Nevada on November 9th, 2012...
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11 9 12 response under protest 0204 and various motions and notices 0204 etc.pdf
Coughlin submitted for filing minutes prior to 5 pm on 11/9/12 a filing sufficient to

meet any non-void Order of 11/2/12 or 11/7/12 or otherwise by the Panel Chair in this matter, though,
curiously, that 88 page filing (with a voluminous attached Exhibit 1, including the submission of a
form thereof on digital disc with vast hyperlinking and Skydrive access) is not to be found in either of
the versions of the ROA submitted for filing in 62337 by the SBN. Of course, this is of material rel-
evance to the FOFCOL's finding and conclusion that some purported failure on Coughlin's part to so
comply with those Orders (which impermissibly depart from NRCP 12's dictates vis a vis affording a
party at least 10 judicial days to file an Answer upon such party's Motion to Dismiss being Denied,
with NRCP made applicable via SCR 119(3). It sure is curious how the documents submitted for fil-
ing by Coughlin that are the most damaging to the SBN and various greivant's cases, and which con-
taining the most inflammatory (though, completely true) information continually seem to be lost or
otherwise not included in the ROA by the SBN, even where, say,
11/30/12 AMENDED MOTIONFOR FURTHER RECOGNITIONOF INFORMAPAUPERIS STA-
TUS ANDFOR PUBLICATIONOF TRANSCRIPTAT BAR'S EXPENSE OR WITHOUTPAY-
MENT UP FRONTOR FOR RELEASE OF RECORDINGS ANDOR ROUGHDRAFTOF DISCI-
PLINARYPROCEEDINGANDFOR COPYOF ALL FILINGS SUBMITTEDWHETHER FILE
STAMPEDOR NOTANDFOR FILE STAMP TOBE APPLIED TOALL SUBMISSIONPAST,
PRESENT, ANDFUTURE GIVENPERMISSION TOFILE BYFAXWAS PREVIOUSLYPRO-
VIDEDONSEPTEMBER 11TH, 2012; AND MOTIONFOR MISTRAIL DUE TO... (16 PAGES
WITH A DISC FOR EXHIBIT 1; INDEX TO EXHIBITS: 1. EXHIBIT 1: CD WITH RELEVANT MATERIALS COP-
IED VIA DIGITAL TRANSMISSION AS WELL FILENAME FOR THAT COPIED BY FAX, AND EMAIL IN ADDI-
TION TO PERSONAL DELIVERY TO SBNAND NNDB: 11 30 12 0204 AMENDED MOTION FOR FURTHER
RECOGNITION OF IFP.PDF).
Further, the extent to which the SBN has manipulated the settings on the scanner utilized to
creat copies for the ROA of the documents Coughlin submitted for filing is now bordering on the
absurdly fraudulent. What else explains the fact that all the instances of Coughlin attaching USPS
Track & Confirm printouts for the various Certified Mailings and Receipts that became of material
relevance in this matter. Such issues resulted in the inclusion, by the SBN, at page 216 of the ROA,
of such a printout, which appears to border on professional misconduct where such printout was
clearly placed in the SBN filed only after Coughlin's 11/8/12 Well Would you Look at that Filing
and Coughlin's 11/8/12 Notice of Non-Service of Notice of Intent to Take Default of 10/9/12
placed the SBN on notice as to the fact that the SBN's own error (placing an insufficient amount of
postage on the 10/9/12 NOITTD, and thereafter only mailing such filing via one method (certified
mail) prevented Coughlin from receiving that 10/9/11 NOITTD, which, obviously, had a material
effect on the legitimacy of the Notice of Formal Hearing and the continued holdering thereof in con-
sideration of the dictates of SCR 105(2)(c) and the required number of days afforded Coughlin
thereof to provide sufficient notice and time to prepare for his opportunity to be heard.
HTTPS://SKYDRIVE.LIVE.COM/REDIR.ASPX?CID=43084638F32F5F28&PAGE=SELF&RESID=43084638F3
2F5F28%214689&PARID=43084638F32F5F28%21121&AUTHKEY=%21AOIVJ-
WACR61ECE&BPUB=SDX.SKYDRIVE&BSRC=SKYMAIL
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2. Further, the SBN, NNDB, and Panel have been particularly obstructionist with regard to
allowing Coughlin any access to any docket in the matter appealed in 62337 (even where the
12/14/12 FOFCOL repeatedly refers the reading to See Pleadings Docket
6. Coughlin appropriately submitted a request for the Transcript of the 11/14/12 Hearing and
even where offerring to pay for it, under protect, the SBN,NNDB, and Panel failed to allow
Coughlin to procure such a transcript (despite long prior therto having it themselves) until
King sent Coughlin, on December 18
th
, 2012 information in that regard. Furhter, the ROA 's
Hearing Exhibits (one of which, Exhibit 16, was created sua sponte by Chair Echeverria and
not provided to Coughlin, and is not a complete copy of what the Chair Purports it to be, and
furhter, a multitude of cd/dvd disc attachments to Coughlin's various filings have not been sent
by the SBN/Clerk of Corut to the Nevada Supreme Court Clerk's Office, on top of the SBN/its
Clerk of Court failing to file stamp in a number of Coughlin's filings, for no apparent reason,
which is particularly troubling where the Notice that Laura Peters Affidavit of 10/9/12 is
Whopper Chocked makes some extremely damning allegations with respect to fraudulent con-
duct by Peters and the SBN in failing to file in Coughlin's filings.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
SCR Rule 105(3). Review by supreme court....(a) Time and manner of appeal.
A decision of a hearing panel shall be served on the attorney, and service shall be
deemed Notice of Entry of Decision for appeal purposes. Except as provided in Rule
105(3)(b), a decision is final and effective 30 days from service, unless an appeal is
taken within that time. To the extent not inconsistent with these rules, an appeal
from a decision of a hearing panel shall be treated as would an appeal from a civil
judgment of a district court and is governed by the Nevada Rules of Appellate
Procedure....(b) De novo review of public discipline.... Review under this paragraph
shall be commenced by bar counsel forwarding the record of the hearing panel
proceedings to the court within 30 days of entry of the decision..
The 12/14/12 FOFCOL by the Panel is just that, a Findings of Fact; Conclusions of
Law...not a decision sufficient to invoked SCR 105(3), just yet. The use of the term record in
SCR 105(3)(b), along with SCR 119(3), arguably makes applicable NRAP 10 and 11.
SCR 105(4): 4. RULES OF PROCEDURE. THE CHAIRS, AFTER CONSULTING WITH THEIR RE-
SPECTIVE DISCIPLINARY BOARDS, MAY ADOPT RULES OF PROCEDURE, SUBJECT TO APPROVAL BY THE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS. DESPITE NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS BY COUGHLIN TO BE AFFORDED, IN WRITING,
ANY SUCH RULES ADOPTED BY THE NNDB, COUGHLIN HAS BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY SUCH EX-
PRESSION, AND, DESPITE LOOKING FOR QUITE SOME TIME, UNABLE TO FIND ANY PUBLISHED ADOPTED
RULES.
SCR Rule 109. Service.. 2. Other papers. Service of other papers or notices required
by these rules shall be made in accordance with Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 5, unless otherwise
provided by these rules. Bar Counsel David Clark is a registered electronic filer with with Nevada
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Supreme Court, as such, he, and thefore the SBNs OBC have consented to electronic service (in-
cluding fax), in writing...to go along with the express indications that Coughlin was permitted to do
so made by Laura Peters, whom both Peters and Bar Counsel Clark have held out to Coughlin, ver-
bally and in writing, as the SBN's Clerk of Court, and to go along with numerous other instances
wherein the SBN'c OBC has permitted other Respondents to file by fax. Further, it is a reprehensible
waste of the Bar's and the Nevada Supreme Court's resources that Pat King is not a registered efiler,
and given Mr. King's track record of extremely dubious attempts to gain a head start on Respond-
ent's and otherwise manipulate the playing field, the infusion of some digital accountability into
King's professional life is sorely needed. And Mr. King should go easy on the SCR 106 at every turn
approach.
Rule 119. Additional rules of procedure.... 1. Record. The record of a hearing shall be
made available to the attorney at the attorneys expense on request made to bar counsel....ard or hear-
ing panel having jurisdiction, but will not justify abatement of any disciplinary investigation or pro-
ceeding....3. Other rules of procedure. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, the Nevada
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure apply in disciplinary cases.
Couglin has previously, verbally and in writing, made a request for the record of the hear-
ing to bar counsel. Just what is included within the purview of those two terms is not clear (argua-
bly is should extend beyond the transcript and Hearing Exhibits to all pleadings on file, and all corre-
spondence (including faxes and emails between the Respondent, Bar Counsel, NNDB, Panel, and
SBN Clerk of Court), and all documents submitted for filing, even where such were not actually filed
in by the SBN's Clerk of Court (or, like with Coughlin's 10/31/12 Pre-Hearing MTD, MSJ, Memo-
randum of Law, those that were filed in by the Clerk, but which, mysteriously, are absent from the
ROA), and certainly all exhibits attached to any filings or documents submitted for filings (King
made embarassingly contradictory statements at the formal hearing with regard to his contention that
he copied each member of the Panel on all of Coughlin's filing in their entirety (many of which in-
cluded cd/dvd discs attached as exhibits containing pdfs, videos, audio transcripts etc., which strongly
disprove the many spurious claims made against Coughlin, all of which seem to lead, in one way or
another, back to one Richard G. Hill, Esq.), and to then be forced to admit that he had not copied the
Panel members on the discs Coughlin attached as Exhibits (Panel member Kent had a particularly
suspect offering in that regard, arguably justying a mistrial), indicating that neither he, nor, apparent-
ly, anyone at the SBN or OBC was equipped with the knowledge of how or ability to copy a cd/dvd
disc, a fact misleadingly hidden from Coughlin throughout the proceedings. NRCP 59, 52, and 60
are not inconsistent with these rules (a la SCR 119(3)), therefore, King and Clerk of Court Peters
ought be required to explain why they have failed to file in Coughlin's various post-Hearing Motions,
including those following the 12/14/12 FOFCOL by the Panel (and an allegation that Coughlin vio-
lated an EPO granted the SBN by allegedly having a courier deliver a Rule 59 and or 52, etc. Motion
on the last, or next to last day to file such, is particularly offensive, as were the statements King made
during the formal hearing with respect to the extent to which he blatantly attempts to rig entire pro-
ceedings and records on appeal, and the appendix to make up for his lack of ethics, industry, or skill.
See, In Re Boles (61170, especially the 8/10/12 Opening Brief, pretty much captures the Pat King
way of doings things to a t.).
With deference to Chief Justice Pickering's indication in her 2/7/13 Order (Our preliminary
review of the record in this case reveals that the record is not submitted in the proper format. The
three-volume record contains double-sided pages, each volume exceeds 250 pages, and not all pages
are consecutively numbered. The rules of appellate procedure require that only one side of the paper
may be used; moreover, each volume of the appendix is not to contain more than 250 pages, and
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each page is to be numbered consecutively in the lower right corner. NRAP 30(c)(1), 30(c)(2),
32(a)(1)(A), 32(b). Accordingly, we direct the clerk of this court to strike the three-volume record
filed December 24, 2012, and we order the State Bar of Nevada to re-submit the record in the proper
format.)
NRAP RULE 10. THE RECORD
(a) The Trial Court Record. The trial court record consists of the papers and exhibits
filed in the district court, the transcript of the proceedings, if any, the district court minutes,
and the docket entries made by the district court clerk.
(1) Retention of Record. The district court clerk shall retain the trial court record. When the
Supreme Court deems it necessary to review the trial court record, the district court clerk shall
assemble and transmit the portions of the record designated by the Supreme Court to the clerk
of the Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Rule 11. Any costs associated with the
preparation and transmission of the record shall be paid initially by the appellant, unless otherwise
ordered.
(b) The Appellate Court Record.
(1) The Appendix. For the purposes of appeal, the parties shall submit to the Supreme
Court copies of the portions of the trial court record to be used on appeal, including all tran-
scripts necessary to the Supreme Courts review, as appendices to their briefs. Under Rule 30(a), a
joint appendix is preferred.
(2) Exhibits. If exhibits cannot be copied to be included in the appendix, the parties may
request transmittal of the original exhibits to the Supreme Court under Rule 30(d).
(c) Correction or Modification of the Record. If any difference arises about whether the
trial court record truly discloses what occurred in the district court, the difference shall be
submitted to and settled by that court and the record conformed accordingly. Questions as to
the form and content of the appellate court record shall be presented to the Supreme Court.
Under Waters the SBN is an arm of the Court, the Nevada Supreme Court, and it is
not clear that the SBN is a district court a la NRAP 10...However, Coughlin has attempted to
seek correction or modification of the record in line with NRAP 10(2)(c), but given the SBN's
propensity for baseless histrionics (stay away letters, calling the police upon a Respondent
complying with an SBN Order to call ahead 15 minutes if they are headed to the SBN to file
something with Clerk of Court Peters, filing for workplace harassment protection orders,
though failing to put up the statutorily required bond and failing to withdrawal upon King be-
coming a witness where previously he was, allegedly, only counsel, having indigent Coughlin
arrest upon some specious allegation of his violating a TPO and the subsequent EPO (both of
which are subject to attack on numerous grounds and where obtained on a questionable default
basis where service of the TPO and notice of the extension hearing may have been deficient, vi-
olative of both the courthouse sanctuary rule, and the immunity often accorded to attorney's
and litigants when accessing justice in court and filing offices. Coughlin has been declared in-
digent as recently as in a 1/9/13 Order by a Second Judicial District Court Judge, and such ar-
rest required some $750 cash to bail Coughlin out, and seemed to be little more than an attempt
to obstruct Coughlin's ability to pursue this appeal and or intimidate him out of pointing out
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that which has necessarily prejudiced Coughlin's ability to do so, and were such was a mitigat-
ing factor attendant to all the various allegations against Coughlin, none of which actually have
merit.
NRAP RULE 11. PREPARING AND FORWARDING THE RECORD
(a) Preparation of the Record. Upon written direction from the Supreme Court, the district
court clerk shall provide the Supreme Court with the papers or exhibits comprising the trial court rec-
ord. The record shall be assembled, paginated, and indexed in the same manner as an appendix to the
briefs under Rule 30. If the Supreme Court determines that its review of original papers or exhibits is
necessary, the district court clerk shall forward the original trial court record in lieu of copies.
(1) Exhibits. If the Supreme Court directs transmittal of exhibits, the exhibits shall not be in-
cluded with the documents comprising the record. The district court clerk shall place exhibits in an
envelope or other appropriate container, so far as practicable. The title of the case, the Supreme Court
docket number, and the number and description of all exhibits shall be listed on the envelope, or if no
envelope is used, then on a separate list.
(2) Record in Proper Person Cases. When the Supreme Court directs transmission of the
complete record in cases in which the appellant is proceeding in proper person, the record shall con-
tain each and every paper, pleading and other document filed, or submitted for filing, in the
district court. The record shall also include any previously prepared transcripts of the proceedings in
the district court. If the Supreme Court should determine that additional transcripts are neces-
sary to its review, the court may order the reporter or recorder who recorded the proceedings
to prepare and file the transcripts....
Coughlin is temporarily suspended (as WCDA DDA Watts-Vial pointed out in his last minute
11/13/12 faxed objection to Coughlin's subpoenas upon 2JDC Judges and personnel), and, as such,
should be accord pro per status hearing, as he was in 60302 (which, along with 60317 (a matter pre-
sided over by a Judge who was on the Executive Board of the entity Coughlin had joined as a defend-
ant in the wrongful termination suit against WLS and Paul Elcano, whom the Bar called as a witness
at Coughlin's formal disciplinary hearing, despite constructive notice thereof only being provided to
Coughlin the day prior to the hearing, and where the Bar sought to have Hill provide expert testi-
mony thereto. Coughlin hereby request this Court Order the preparation of additional transcripts, at
public expense, that are necessary to its review (including the transcript of both hearings in 11 TR
26800, that resulted in NG12-0434 and arguably were required to have already been prepared upon
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indigent Coughlin filing (since stricken) multiple Notices of Appeal of such final appealable Orders
as those of 2/28/12 and 3/12/12 in that matter, RMC 11 CR 26405 (which became 61901, and is at
issue in 60331 and 61383). Further, the summary eviction proceeding involving Richard G. Hill,
Esq., (the grievant in NG12-0204, outside of whose office the traffic citations the subject of the trial
in 11 TR 26800 that begat NG12-0434 (and therefore NG12-0435 considering the fact that Bar Coun-
sel obtained the Formal Hearing Exhibit 3 via it being passed from the judge to her brother, whom
was the judge on the criminal trespass trial in 11 CR 26405, where Hill signed the criminal complaint
therein, upon his lying to the police resulting in the wrongful arrest of Coughlin (and there is a multi-
tude of videos of these various arrests of an exculpatory nature that Bar Counsel King and the Panel
have curiously avoided like the plague, sufficient to justify this Court requiring the SBN to transmit
copies of all the Exhibits in this matter, including those attached to documents Coughlin submitted
for filing, but, for whatever reason, the SBN chose not to file, curiously, including all the audio tran-
scripts of the various hearings at issue in King's 8/23/12 Complaint and the multitude of insufficiently
notice subject matter not included therein that found its way into the 12/14/12 FOFCOL). That sum-
mary eviction from Coughlin's former home law office in RJC Rev2011-001708, and the appeal
thereof (Hearing Exhibit 1 emanates from that appeal in CV11-03628, though not plead in the Com-
plaint in any way...whereas the jaywalking arrest that Hill succeeded in subjecting Coughlin to on
1/12/12 was pled in the Complaint, though the Panel refused to admit a video thereof....including
footage of Hill's prevarications to the police). The dates of the summary court eviction that are nec-
essary and should be transcribed are 10/13/11, 10/25/11, 11/7/11, 12/20/11, and the Show Cause
hearing in the appeal thereof on 3/23/12 and 3/26/12. Further, given the primacy accorded to a bank-
ruptcy Judges testimony, especially where such was only constructively noticed to Coughlin the day
before the hearing, the scant appearances before that Judge ought be transcribed, or at least the audio
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transcripts furnished and transmitted at public expense (NVB 10-05104, 11-05077 and 11-05078), or,
such testimony stricken, given the enormously prejudicial nature thereof, the violations of SCR 105.5
and gratituitous Coe Swobe name dropping therein, and the utter paucity of specifics provided or op-
portunity to cross-examine given the enormously overreaching nature of the testimony, and curious
peripheral coincidences attendant thereto. Additionally, the Trial from which NG12-0435 springs, in
DV08-01168 is necessary and should be transcribed as well. Coughlin provided the audio transcripts
of all of these matters as Exhibits to his various documents submitted for filing.
Additionally, the matter resulting in Couglin's now nine month long temporary suspension,
the 11/30/11 Trial in RMC 11 CR 22176 (and the 10/10/11 arraignment) ought be transcribed (in-
volving an allegation of Coughlin consuming $14.00 worth of a candy bar and cough drops while
shopping for an paying for $83.82 worth of groceries at and Indian Colony owned Wal-Mart, where
an arrest was made by tribal police that violated NRS 171.1255, and Coughlin was denied his Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel, and the RMC failed to adhere to this Court's 2008 Indigent Defense
Order and order the preparation of the transcript at public expense pursuant to NRS 189.030, denied
Coughlin a single continuance despite a multitude of factors weighing in favor of such, likely violate
NRS 1.235 in finding Couglin in direct contempt following his making a motion to disqualify the
Judge therein, and where Couglhin was summarily incarcerated, prejudice to his client's be what it
may, for three days, despite being denied counsel for both the underyling petty larceny charge
(Aigersinger requires such) and the civil contempt charge that the Judge indicated would issue ten
minutes into the Trial (indicating such would issue at the Trial's conclusion, whereupon Coughlin re-
quested to be appointed counsel in that context as well, Feiock). Additionally, incident to the crimi-
nal trespass matter in 61901, there is a transcript of the 6/18/12 Trial in 11 CR 26405, however, this
matter would benefit greatly by the transcription of the hearings therein on 2/2/12, 4/10/12, and
5/8/12, especially where the matters addressed on the record therein are so pertinent to the allegation
of numerous violations of the mandatory stay in NRS 178.405, recusal and disqualification motions,
right to counsel, and RPC 1.2 issues related to court appointed defenders, and more).
SCR 105(3)(b): The parties shall not be required to prepare an appendix, but rather shall cite
to the record of the disciplinary proceedings. If no opening brief is filed, the matter will be submitted
for decision on the record without briefing or oral argument.
Couglin requests leave to submit such an appendix, and an extension of time to do so, espe-
cially given the lack of communication or cooperation in creating a joint appendix on Bar Counsel
and the SBN's part. NRAP 30
NRAP RULE 30. APPENDIX TO THE BRIEFS
(a) Joint Appendix; Duty of the Parties. Counsel have a duty to confer and attempt to reach
an agreement concerning a possible joint appendix. In the absence of an agreement, the parties may
file separate appendices to their briefs.
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(b) Contents of the Appendix...(1) Transcripts. Copies of all transcripts that are necessary to
the Supreme Courts review of the issues presented on appeal shall be included in the appendix.
(2) Documents Required for Inclusion in Joint Appendix. In addition to the transcripts re-
quired by Rule 30(b)(1), the joint appendix shall contain:
(A) Complaint, indictment, information or petition (including all amendments);
(B) All answers, counterclaims, cross-claims and replies, and all amendments thereto;
(C) Pretrial orders;
(D) All jury instructions given to which exceptions were taken, and excluded when offered;
(E) Verdict or findings of fact and conclusions of law with direction for entry of judgment
thereon;
(F) Masters report, if any, in nonjury cases;
(G) Opinion;
(H) All judgments or orders appealed from;
(I) All notices of appeal; and
(J) Proof of service, if any, of:
(i) the summons and complaint;
(ii) written notice of entry of the judgment or order appealed from;
(iii) post-judgment motions enumerated in Rule 4(a); and
(iv) written notice of entry of an order resolving any post-judgment motions enumerated in
Rule 4(a).
(3) Appellants Appendix. If a joint appendix is not prepared, appellants appendix to the
opening brief shall include those documents required for inclusion in the joint appendix under this
Rule, and any other portions of the record essential to determination of issues raised in appellants
appeal.
(4) Respondents Appendix. If a joint appendix is not prepared, respondents appendix to the
answering brief may contain any transcripts or documents which should have been but were not in-
cluded in the appellants appendix, and shall otherwise be limited to those documents necessary to
rebut appellants position on appeal which are not already included in appellants appendix.
(5) Reply Appendix. Appellant may file an appendix to the reply brief which shall include on-
ly those documents necessary to reply to respondents position on appeal.
(6) Presentence Investigation Report. If a copy of appellants presentence investigation re-
port is necessary for the Supreme Courts review in a criminal case and a copy of the report cannot be
included in the appendix, appellant shall file a motion with the clerk of the Supreme Court within the
time period for filing an opening brief or fast track statement that the court direct the district court
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clerk to transmit the report to the clerk of the Supreme Court in a sealed envelope. The motion must
demonstrate that the report is necessary for the appeal.
(c) Arrangement and Form of Appendix. The appendix shall be in the form required by Rule
32(b), shall be bound separately from the briefs, and shall be arranged as set forth in this Rule.
(1) Order and Numbering of Documents. All documents included in the appendix shall be
placed in chronological order by the dates of filing beginning with the first document filed, and shall
bear the file-stamp of the district court clerk, clearly showing the date the document was filed in the
proceedings below. Transcripts that are included in the appendix shall be placed in chronological or-
der by date of the hearing or trial. Each page of the appendix shall be numbered consecutively in the
lower right corner of the document.
(2) Page Limits; Index of Appendix. Each volume of the appendix shall contain no more than
250 pages. The appendix shall contain an alphabetical index identifying each document with reason-
able definiteness, and indicating the volume and page of the appendix where the document is located.
The index shall preface the documents comprising the appendix. If the appendix is comprised of
more than one volume, one alphabetical index for all documents shall be prepared and shall be placed
in each volume of the appendix.
(3) Cover. The cover of an appendix shall be white and shall contain the same information as
the cover of a brief under Rule 32(a), but shall be prominently entitled JOINT APPENDIX, or
APPELLANTS APPENDIX, or RESPONDENTS APPENDIX or APPELLANTS REPLY
APPENDIX.
(d) Exhibits. Copies of relevant and necessary exhibits shall be clearly identified, and
shall be included in the appendix as far as practicable. If the exhibits are too large or otherwise
incapable of being reproduced in the appendix, the parties may file a motion requesting the Su-
preme Court to direct the district court clerk to transmit the original exhibits. The Supreme
Court will not permit the transmittal of original exhibits except upon a showing that the exhib-
its are relevant to the issues raised on appeal, and that the Supreme Courts review of the orig-
inal exhibits is necessary to the determination of the issues.
(e) Time for Service and Filing of Appendix. A joint appendix shall be filed and served no
later than the filing of appellants opening brief. An appellants appendix shall be served and filed
with appellants opening brief. A respondents appendix shall be served and filed with respondents
answering brief. If a reply brief is filed, any reply appendix shall be served and filed with the reply
brief.
(g) Filing as Certification; Sanctions for Nonconforming Copies or for Substantial
Underinclusion.
(1) Filing an appendix constitutes a representation by counsel that the appendix consists
of true and correct copies of the papers in the district court file. Willful or grossly negligent
filing of an appendix containing nonconforming copies is an unlawful interference with the
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proceedings of the Supreme Court, and subjects counsel, and the party represented, to mone-
tary and any other appropriate sanctions.
(2) If an appellants appendix is so inadequate that justice cannot be done without requir-
ing inclusion of documents in the respondents appendix which should have been in the ap-
pellants appendix, or without the courts independent examination of portions of the original
record which should have been in the appellants appendix, the court may impose monetary
sanctions...
The ROA filed by the SBN is materially deficient given the applicability of NRAP 32 (see
2/7/13 Order in this matter): NRAP RULE 32. FORM OF BRIEFS, THE APPENDIXAND
OTHER PAPERS
(a) Form of a Brief....
(1) Reproduction.
(A) A brief shall be reproduced by any process that yields a clear black image of letter
quality. The paper must be opaque and unglazed. Only one side of the paper may be used.
(B) Text must be reproduced with a clarity that equals or exceeds the output of a laser
printer...
(4) Paper Size, Line Spacing, Margins, and Page Numbers... Margins must be at least 1 inch
on all four sides.
COUGHLIN REQUESTS PERMISSION TO FILE AN ADDITIONAL FEW PAGES TO SUPPLEMENT THIS
MOTION BEYOND THE 10 PAGE LIMIT.
SCR105(4). RULES OF PROCEDURE. THE CHAIRS, AFTER CONSULTING WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE
DISCIPLINARY BOARDS, MAY ADOPT RULES OF PROCEDURE, SUBJECT TO APPROVAL BY THE BOARD OF
GOVERNORS.
Coughlin diligently attempted to obtain express indications from the Clerk of
Court/sbn/nndb/and paenl respective the applicable rules of procedure in this matter incident to the
dicdtates of scr 105(4), but was given the runaround or had the rug pulled out from under him by all
involved:
COUGHLIN HAS BEEN MET WITH SILENCE IN HIS ATTEMPTS TO HAVE THE NNDB/PANEL/OBC
PROVIDE HIM SOMETHING IN WRITING OR DIRECTIONS AS TO HOW I MAY OBTAIN A COPY OF ANY RULES
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SCR 105(4) PR ANY OTHER PROCEDURAL POLICES, RULES, OR PROCEDURES?
DOES THE NNDBHAVE A POSITION RESPECTING THE MISREPRESENTATIONS MADE BY KING AND CLERK
OF COURT PETERS VIS A VIS THE SBNASSERTING THE 8/23/12 MAILING AS A BASIS FOR A FINDING OF
SCR 109 COMPLIANCE? IS IT THE POSITION OF THE SBNAND NNDBTHAT ASST. BAR COUNSEL KING
MAY COMMUNICATE WITH THE PANEL OUTSIDE OF COUGHLIN'S PRESENCE AS TO SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL MATTERS?
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FROM: TSUSICH@NVDETR.ORG TO: ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COMCC:
PATRICKK@NVBAR.ORG DATE: FRI, 27 JUL 2012 08:58:01 -0700 SUBJECT: RE: RE-
FERRAL TO NORTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD DEAR M. COUGHLIN: I AM IN
RECEIPT OF YOUR REQUEST FOR A HEARING BEFORE THE NORTHERN NEVADA DISCI-
PLINARY BOARD. I HAVE FORWARDED YOUR REQUEST TO THE NEVADA STATE BAR'S
NORTHERN OFFICE FOR PROCESSING. PLEASE COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE
STATE BAR CONCERNING YOUR CASE. THEY ARE THE ONES WHO WILL PROCESS YOUR
REQUEST AND SET UP ANY APPROPRIATE HEARINGS. IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS YOU CAN
CONTACT PAT KING, THE NORTHERN NEVADA BAR COUNSEL. SINCERELY, J. THOMAS
SUSICH, ESQ. FROM: ZACH COUGHLIN [MAILTO:ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM]
SENT: THURSDAY, JULY 26, 2012 10:30 AM TO: TOMSUSICH SUBJECT: REFERRAL TO
NORTHEN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD DEAR MR. SUSICH, I AM WRITING TO RE-
QUEST A HEARING BEFORE THE NORTHEN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD AND TO
MAKE SURE THE BOARD HAS THE CORRECT CONTACT INFORMATION FOR ME. I AM REP-
RESENTING MYSELF. SINCERELY, ZACH COUGHLIN PO BOX3961.
23 ----FILING OF PAPERS: UNDER THE STATUTE, THE CLERK'S DUTIES INCLUDE THE OBLIGA-
TION TO FILE ALL PAPERS PROPERLY BEFORE HIM. HAMILTON V DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY, LABOR &
HUMAN RELATIONS, 56 WIS 2D 673, 203 NW2D 7 (OVRLD ON OTHER GROUNDS RE PEWAUKEE (WIS)
241 NW2D 603). THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE FILING OF A COMPLAINT IS A MERE MINISTERIAL ACT, AND
THE OFFICER CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF RECEIVING THE SAME IS REQUIRED TO ACCEPT
WHAT IS TENDERED TO HIM IF IT IS ACCOMPANIED BY THE PROPER FEE. STATE EX REL. KAUFMAN V
SUTTON (FLA APP) 231 SO 2D 874. AS A MINISTERIAL OFFICER, IT IS THE MANDATORY DUTY OF THE
CLERK OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS TO FILE AND FORWARD TO THE SUPREME COURT ANY DOCU-
MENT TENDERED TO HIM APPERTAINING TO AN APPEAL IN ANY CAUSE PENDING IN THAT COURT WHICH IS
ADDRESSED TO THE SUPREME COURT. WAGNER VGARRETT, 114 TEX 362, 269 SW 1030. APAPER IS
FILED WITH THE CLERK OF COURT WHEN IT IS DELIVERED TO HIM FOR THAT PURPOSE. MORTHLAND V
LINCOLN NAT. LIFE INS. CO., 220 IND 692, 42 NE2D 41, REH DEN 220 IND 734, 46 NE2D 203. FOOT-
NOTE 17. STATE EX REL. WANAMAKER V MILLER, 164 OHIO ST 174, 57 OHIO OPS 151, 128 NE2D 108.
It is not incumbent upon one who has the ministerial function of accepting the filing of a
complaint to judicially determine the legal significance of the tendered document. State ex rel. Kauf-
man v Sutton (Fla App) 231 So 2d 874.
At the 11/14/12 Formal Hearing, Bar Counsel King set out his curious take on just what is to
be included in the ROA, and under just what circumstances the documents Coughlin submits for fil-
ing will actually be filed (and, in the case of the 10/31/12 Pre-Hearing Motion to Dismiss, and for
Summary Judgment, and Memorandum of Law that Coughlin has a file stamped copy of (and see
Exhibit 14 from the 11/14/12 formal hearing for a pretty darn good idea of just what that 10/31/12
file stamped filing missing from the ROA looks like, with special attention on the file stamping that
is obscured through being scratched out, noting the curious choice of Chair Echeverria in copying
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the more legible of the the two choices (between Exhibit 14 and 15) from which to draw his choice
for Exhibit 16. Further, King's Exhibit 12 and 13 were not admitted.
It is the duty of the clerk of the municipal court to file notice of appeal whether presented in
time or not; the determination of the question whether the appeal was properly taken is the province
of the Appellate Term on motion to dismiss. People ex rel. Trost v Bird, 184 App Div 779, 172 NYS
412. Footnote 24. Alexandria Naval Stores Co. v J. F. Ball Bro. Lumber Co., 128 La 632, 54 So
1035. Footnote 25. Brelsford v Community High School Dist., 328 Ill 27, 159 NE 237. Footnote 26.
State v Gillette's Estate (Tex Com App) 10 SW2d 984 (use of words "at law").
24 Custody and care of records: It is the duty or function of a clerk of court to make and keep an
accurate record 27 of the proceedings in his court 28 and of what the court orders and adjudges. 29
In the performance of these duties the clerk acts ministerially 30 and under the exclusive jurisdiction
and direction of the court, 31 and has no power to pass on or contest the validity of any act of the
court which purports to have been done in the performance of its judicial function. 32 Where re-
quired by statute the clerk must make some record of the filing of a paper presented to him, 33 keep
a current general index of recorded instruments, 34 and keep a trial 35 or special proceeding docket.
36 It is the clerk's duty to carefully preserve in his office papers filed with him and not to permit their
withdrawal or removal, 37 except with leave of court. 38 A retiring clerk of court must turn over to
his successor in office all records, books, and property of his office. 39 While it is recognized that a
clerk of court may maintain mandamus proceedings to obtain from his predecessor in office books
and papers in the latter's possession belonging to the office, 40 it has been held that mandamus will
not lie against a private individual acquiring possession of the records sought to be recovered, though
possession was obtained under a pretended claim to the office of clerk, where no de jure or de facto
status was accorded to the claimant. 41 It is the ordinary duty of the clerk of a court of record to ex-
tend the records of the court from the processes and pleadings on file, and he cannot resort to extrin-
sic evidence for that purpose. 42 He has the right to regard as correct, the entries made and the pro-
cesses issued by his predecessors, and if, from the inaccuracy of his predecessors, errors are found in
the records as extended by the incumbent clerk, the fault is not his. 43 He has only the powers inci-
dent to his duties as custodian of the records, and consequently he has no authority to make altera-
tions therein. 44 In fact, he cannot alter the record of his own acts, since the making of the record
has exhausted his authority, and his only remaining powers are to keep and preserve the record safe-
ly. 45 It is the province of the court alone to correct clerical errors, to effect the restoration of papers
which have been improperly altered or defaced, and to provide for the substitution of new ones when
the originals are lost or stolen. 46 The clerk, as custodian of the records, is subject to the general rules
governing custodians of public records with respect to the rights of abstracters and members of the
public generally to inspect or copy. 47 Footnotes Footnote 27. State v Rockerfeller, 9 Ariz App 265,
451 P2d 623, cert den 396 US 920, 24 L Ed 2d 199, 90 S Ct 247; Long v Sphaler, 89 Fla 499, 105
So 101; Brelsford v Community High School Dist., 328 Ill 27, 159 NE 237; State v Furry, 252 Ind
486, 250 NE2d 590; Bush v Bush, 158 Kan 760, 150 P2d 168; McKay v Coolidge, 218 Mass 65, 105
NE 455; State ex rel. Caldwell v Cockrell, 280 Mo 269, 217 SW 524; People ex rel. Harris v Lindsay,
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21 App Div 2d 102, 248 NYS2d 691, affd 15 NY2d 751, 257 NYS2d 176, 205 NE2d 312; State ex
rel. Journal Co. v County Court for Racine County, 43 Wis 2d 297, 168 NW2d 836. The court will
take judicial notice that the clerk of court is the legal custodian of the records in his office. Maroon v
Immigration & Naturalization Service (CA8) 364 F2d 982, 2 ALR Fed 292. Footnote 28. State v
Rockerfeller, 9 Ariz App 265, 451 P2d 623, cert den 396 US 920, 24 L Ed 2d 199, 90 S Ct 247;
Robertson & Wilson Scale & Supply Co. v Richman, 212 Mich 334, 180 NW 470; State ex rel. Mor-
ris Bldg. & Inv. Co. v Brown, 228 Mo App 760, 72 SW2d 859; Foglio v Alvis (CP) 75 Ohio L Abs
228, 143 NE2d 641. Footnote 29. State v Rockerfeller, 9 Ariz App 265, 451 P2d 623, cert den 396
US 920, 24 L Ed 2d 199, 90 S Ct 247; Henderson v Freeman, 205 Ark 856, 171 SW2d 66; Stanton v
Arkansas Democrat Co., 194 Ark 135, 106 SW2d 584; Bush v Bush, 158 Kan 760, 150 P2d 168;
Foglio v Alvis (CP) 75 Ohio L Abs 228, 143 NE2d 641; Commonwealth use of Orris v Roberts, 183
Pa Super 204, 130 A2d 226, revd on other grounds 392 Pa 572, 141 A2d 393, 71 ALR2d 1124;
Humphrey v Mauzy, 155 W Va 89, 181 SE2d 329. A prothonotary has an absolute statutory duty to
properly index all judgments and his failure to do so renders him liable on his bond. Commonwealth
use of Orris v Roberts, supra. Footnote 30. State ex rel. Druissi v Almand (Fla) 75 So 2d 905; People
ex rel. Pardridge v Windes, 275 Ill 108, 113 NE 949; State ex rel. Caldwell v Cockrell, 280 Mo 269,
217 SW 524; Barrett v Barrett, 207 Okla 234, 249 P2d 88. Footnote 31. People ex rel. Pardridge v
Windes, 275 Ill 108, 113 NE 949; Barrett v Barrett, 207 Okla 234, 249 P2d 88. Footnote 32. State ex
rel. Druissi v Almand (Fla) 75 So 2d 905. Footnote 33. State v Brubaker, 352 Mo 414, 177 SW2d
623. Footnote 34. Land v Lewis, 299 Ky 866, 186 SW2d 803, 159 ALR 601 (clerk not required to go
back prior to his term of office and make up general index which should have been but was not kept
up currently). Footnote 35. Little v Employer's Casualty Co. 180 Okla 628, 71 P2d 687. Footnote 36.
State Trust Co. v Toms, 244 NC 645, 94 SE2d 806. Footnote 37. Brelsford v Community High
School Dist., 328 Ill 27, 159 NE 237; Ohio Farmers Co-op. Milk Ass'n v Davis, 59 Ohio App 329, 13
Ohio Ops 116, 25 Ohio L Abs 551, 17 NE2d 924. Footnote 38. All papers in a cause should be pre-
served by the clerk and should not be taken from the office except with leave of court. Brelsford v
Community High School Dist., supra. Footnote 39. Underwood v Watson, 223 NC 437, 27 SE2d 144.
Footnote 40. See State ex rel. Wells v Cline, 29 Okla 157, 116 P 767 (by implication). Footnote 41.
State ex rel. Wells v Cline, 29 Okla 157, 116 P 767, where the relator alleged that ever since the or-
ganization of the court he had been the de jure and de facto clerk. Footnote 42. Frink v Frink, 43 NH
508. Footnote 43. Frink v Frink, supra. Footnote 44. Frink v Frink, 43 NH 508. The duties of a clerk
will vary with the nature of the court and its requirements; thus, in the Supreme Court of the United
States, which exercises an almost entirely appellate jurisdiction, the copies of the record of the case
are an essential part of the procedure, and the clerk is responsible to the court for the correct-
ness and proper indexing of the printed copies of the record, for their presentation to the jus-
tices in the form and size prescribed by the rules, and for their delivery to the parties entitled
thereto. Bean v Patterson, 110 US 401, 28 L Ed 190, 4 S Ct 23. Such a duty would rarely be per-
formed by the clerk of a trial court. Footnote 45. Elliott v Lessee of Peirsol, 26 US 328, 7 L Ed 164.
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Footnote 46. Lewis v Ross, 37 Me 230; Frink v Frink, 43 NH 508; Remick v Butterfield, 31 NH 70;
Chichester v Cande (NY) 3 Cow 39; Hollister v Judges of Dist. Court, 8 Ohio St 201. Even the court
cannot direct the alteration of a true record of what has been said or done, even though perjured tes-
timony is a part thereof. Coppock v Reed, 189 Iowa 581, 178 NW 382, 10 ALR 1407. Footnote 47.
See 1 Am Jur 2d, Abstracts of Title 8-11; 66 Am Jur 2d, Records and Recording Laws 19 et
seq. Enforcement of right of inspection by mandamus, see 37, infra.
27 Effect of breach of duty on rights of litigants:
Those dealing with the clerk of a court concerning an action or matter then pending have a
right to expect that he will perform the ministerial duties connected with his office, and his neglect or
failure to do so should not prejudice their rights. 75 This principle has been frequently applied in
cases where a party seeks relief from a judgment rendered against him by reason of some mistake or
default of the clerk. 76 However, where no duty exists, 77 or where the negligence of the attorney
or suitor intervenes, 78 relief will be denied them, even where they relied on promises or statements
of the clerk, 79 or where the clerk failed to answer letters of inquiry about the status of the case and
judgment was rendered without their knowledge. 80 It may be noted here that the improvident exer-
cise of authority by the clerk, as where an order of sale is issued by him without the direction of the
party entitled thereto, may not prejudice the rights of innocent purchasers. 81 But where a writ of
assistance is granted by the clerk, without action of the court, to the holder of a sheriff's deed on a
mortgage foreclosure, the writ is void and should be vacated on direct attack. 82 A clerk of court is,
generally speaking, liable personally and on his official bond to a litigant injured as a result of his
negligence or misconduct. 83 Footnotes Footnote 75. Williams v Tyler, 14 Ala App 591, 71 So 51,
cert den 198 Ala 696, 73 So 1002; Hogs Back Consol. Mining Co. v New Basil Consol. Gravel Min-
ing Co. 65 Cal 22, 2 P 489; Silverman v Childs, 107 Ill App 522; May v Wolvington, 69 Md 117, 14
A 706; Thompson v Sharp, 17 Neb 69, 22 NW 78; Hopkins v Niggli (Tex) 6 SW 625; Black v
Hurlbut, 73 Wis 126, 40 NW 673. Footnote 76. Ivester v Mozeley, 89 Ga App 578, 80 SE2d 197.
Annotation: 164 ALR 552 et seq., III. Failure of the clerk to notify an appellant of completion of
the transcript is good cause for refusing to dismiss an appeal on the ground that a certified copy of
the judgment and the granting of the appeal was not filed in the appellate court by the clerk, in the
time required by statute, particularly where the clerk affirmatively stated that illness of a deputy and
rush of business had prevented him from completing the transcript in time to file it. Parks v Marshall,
322 Mo 218, 14 SW2d 590, 62 ALR 835. Footnote 77. Trala v Melmar Industries, Inc. (Del) 254
A2d 249; Western Union Tel. Co. v Griffin, 1 Ind App 46, 27 NE 113; Jackson v Jones (Ky) 336
SW2d 565; Valley Finance Co. v Campana, 112 Ohio App 405, 13 Ohio Ops 2d 472, 83 Ohio L Abs
577, 167 NE2d 654, motion overr. Footnote 78. Western Union Tel. Co. v Griffin, 1 Ind App 46, 27
NE 113. Footnote 79. Bernier v Schaefer, 11 Ill 2d 525, 144 NE2d 577; Libert v Turzynski, 129 Ill
App 2d 146, 262 NE2d 741 (deputy clerk); Western Union Tel. Co. v Griffin, supra. A clerk of court
is not liable, because a party relied upon his gratuitous advice on a matter having no relation to the
duties of his office. Trala v Melmar Industries, Inc. (Del) 254 A2d 249. Footnote 80. Williams v
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Wescott, 77 Iowa 332, 42 NW 314; First Nat. Bank v Wentworth, 28 Kan 183; Ganzer v Schiffbauer,
40 Neb 633, 59 NW 98; Pulaski Oil Co. v Conner, 62 Okla 211, 162 P 464. Footnote 81. Sowles v
Harvey, 20 Ind 217, plaintiff obtaining judgment in mortgage foreclosure proceeding may not set
aside sheriff's sale by reason of clerk's unauthorized issue of order of sale on judgment. Footnote 82.
Williams v Sherman, 35 Idaho 169, 205 P 259, 21 ALR 353, wherein a motion to vacate writ on the
ground that it was granted by the clerk without notice was held to be a direct, not a collateral, attack.
Footnote 83. 28 et seq., infra.
28 Negligence or misconduct:
The principle that a public officer should be held to a faithful performance of his official duties and
made to answer in damages to all persons who may have been injured through his malfeasance, omis-
sion, or neglect 84 applies to the negligence, carelessness, or misconduct of a clerk of court. 85 As
a public ministerial officer, the clerk is answerable for any act of negligence or misconduct in office
resulting in injury to the complaining party. 86 In order to render the clerk of court and the sureties
on his official bond liable for the clerk's misfeasance, both a breach of duty and consequent damage
must be shown. 87 Moreover, to warrant relief, the wrong and the resulting injury must concur; the
clerk's misconduct or negligence must be the direct and proximate cause of the injury. 88 If the injury
would have followed notwithstanding the misconduct, or if the injured party contributed to the result
in any degree by his own fault or neglect or that of his attorney, he has no legal ground of complaint
and the clerk cannot be held responsible. 89 Under applicable statutory provisions, a clerk of court
may be held liable on his bond for failure to issue a writ, citation, or process; 90 for the improper is-
suance of letters of guardianship whereby an unauthorized person was able legally to procure funds
of another and squander them; 91 for negligence or misconduct in issuing a warrant of arrest; 92 for
failure properly to docket a judgment; 93 for failure to properly index a judgment; 94 for failure to
enter an attachment within the time fixed by law; 95 for failure to tax costs; 96 for failure to include
a judgment on a mortgage certificate furnished in connection with a partition sale; 97 for failure to
reject a surety bond executed by a person ineligible to act as surety under the statute; 98 for not re-
quiring a surety to qualify upon a bond executed by him as such surety; 99 or for failure properly to
keep records of a case and for informing the court inaccurately of its status. 1 In those jurisdictions
where a clerk of court serves also as recorder of deeds and mortgages, breach of his duties as a re-
cording officer may give rise to an action on his official bond as clerk, 2 such as his failure to rec-
ord an instrument lodged with him for recording.
28 ----Negligence or misconduct Applicability of judicial immunity to acts of clerk of court under
state law, 34 ALR4th 1186. Case authorities: A county clerk of court did not have sovereign im-
munity against an action for indemnity by a title insurance company where the an employee of the
clerk's office improperly indexed a document which affected the title to a parcel of real estate because
the clerk had a statutory duty to properly record and index documents in the public records and public
policy considerations favor accountability by the clerk for negligence. First American Title Ins. Co. v
Dixon (1992, Fla App D4) 603 So 2d 562, 17 FLW D 1708, review den (Fla) 613 So 2d 3. Sovereign
immunity did not protect state from liability for failure of county clerk to timely docket judgment
since act of recording judgment was not discretionary. National Westminster Bank v State (1989, 1st
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Dept) 155 AD2d 261, 546 NYS2d 864, app gr 75 NY2d 706, 552 NYS2d 929, 552 NE2d 177 and
affd 76 NY2d 507, 561 NYS2d 541, 562 NE2d 866. A clerk of court is liable in a civil action for a
negligent omission to perform a statutory duty which proximately causes injury to another, unless the
injured party was contributorily negligent. Maddox v Astro Invest., 45 Ohio App 2d 203, 74 Ohio
Ops 2d 312, 343 NE2d 133. The failure of the clerk of the Court of Common Pleas to docket and in-
dex a certificate of judgment for several days after it is delivered and filed constitutes negligence.
Maddox v Astro Invest., 45 Ohio App 2d 203, 74 Ohio Ops 2d 312, 343 NE2d 133. 752 SW2d 118.
Footnotes Footnote 84. See 63 Am Jur 2d, Public Officers and Employees 287 et seq. Footnote
85. Lick v Madden, 36 Cal 208. Footnote 86. Eslava v Jones, 83 Ala 139, 3 So 317; Clerks of the Su-
perior Court are no less liable for the negligent performance of their official duties than for a failure
to perform such duties. Touchton v Echols County, 211 Ga 85, 84 SE2d 81. Footnote 87. Neal-Blun
Co. v Rogers, 141 Ga 808, 82 SE 280. Footnote 92. Stine v Shuttle, 134 Ind App 67, 186 NE2d 168,
holding that the clerk of court was liable in damages for false arrest based on his negligence or mis-
conduct in issuing a warrant of arrest. . Footnote 94. Shackelford v Staton, 117 NC 73, 23 SE 101. A
prothonotary has an absolute statutory duty to properly index all judgments and his failure to do so
renders him liable on his bond. Commonwealth use of Orris v Roberts, 183 Pa Super 204, 130 A2d
226, revd on other grounds 392 Pa 572, 141 A2d 393, 71 ALR2d 1124. Footnote 98. People v May,
251 Ill 54, 95 NE 999, error dismd 232 US 720, 58 L Ed 814, 34 S Ct 602.See, Stephen v Drew
(DC Va) 359 F Supp 746, involving an action against a clerk of court and others for wrongful com-
mitment of the plaintiff for mental illness, wherein the court stated that, although some decisions
have articulated a "quasi-judicial" immunity of clerks of court, clerks of court enjoy no immunity at
all. There is no immunity from suit for clerks of court in the performance of their ministerial duties,
such as the filing of papers. McCray v Maryland (CA4 Md) 456 F2d 1.
As such, Bar Counsel 11/2/12 argument within his Ex Parte Emergency Motion to Quash
Coughlin's subpoena on Clerk of Court Peters should not benefit from an SCR 106 application (nor
should a subpoena on bar counsel, really, especially where Coughlin was repeatedly forced to testify,
while acting as his own counsel in self representing, to the very sorts of matters to which Coughlin
sought to question King and Peters, including whether they received this or that, what the envelope
on the 10/9/12 filed Notice of Intent To Take Default indicated (Coughlin witnessed downtown
USPS Clerk Tim make a handwritten notation thereon upon refusing to provide such certified mail-
ing to Coughlin due to the insufficient postage the SBN had affixed to mailing, one for which the
SBN sent to Coughlin by one, and only one method, a single certified mailing (in steadfastly refusing
to acquiesce to Coughlin's requests that the OBC/Clerk of Court/NNDB/Panel copy Coughlin on eve-
ry such filing or communication via fax or email or both (domestic violence victim issues, USPS Of-
ficial Change of Address Issues, Coughlin essentially being to scared of local law enforcement for
some time to make his physical address public, etc.).
PETERS AND THE sbn violate whitman, sullivan, donoho, barnes and their progeny where
refusing to file coughlin's submission and NRCP 5(e).
SCR 105(2)(f) does note permit the SBN to fail to transmit the Respondnet the ROA's volume 3:
(f) Court reporter. All formal hearings shall be reported by a certified court reporter, which
cost may be assessed against the attorney pursuant to Rule 120. Any party desiring to have any other
disciplinary proceedings reported must arrange in advance for a certified court reporter at the partys
own expense.
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scr 105(3). Review by supreme court.
(a) Time and manner of appeal. A decision of a hearing panel shall be served on the at-
torney, and service shall be deemed Notice of Entry of Decision for appeal purposes. Except
as provided in Rule 105(3)(b), a decision is final and effective 30 days from service, unless an
appeal is taken within that time. To the extent not inconsistent with these rules, an appeal from a
decision of a hearing panel shall be treated as would an appeal from a civil judgment of a district
court and is governed by the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure
In titling the 12/14/12 FOFCOL as it did (the title of the filing under the caption indicates it to
be a Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law...failing to identify such, in any way, as a Recommenda-
tion, Decision, Ruling, Order, or any other similar designation sufficent to invoke SCR 105(3), the
Panel has failed to enter a decision sufficient to satisfy SCR 105(3), making the SBN's filing of ei-
ther version of the ROA premature, as, also, is the issuance of any Briefing Schedule. Further, Chair
Echeverria clearly provided for, on the record, during the 11/14/12 formal hearing, for the submission
of post-hearing briefs, and King, and SBN Clerk of Court Peters have failed to faithfully included
such and the exhibits attached thereto in the ROAs that they have submitted to this Court.
Is it that NNDB/panel/ and obc's psoition that motions for new trial are impermissible? does
the sbn /clerk of court have the authority to unilaterally not filethem in? (scr
oh, and there is definitely a part to the conversation with Laura Peters of 9/11/12 where Couglin
expessly, specifically makes clear to her that he is not indicating one way or the other whether he re-
ceived the Complaint (that that actual receipt of the Complaint mattered much in 60302 when it came
to Elcano and Washoe Legal Services...parties are entitled to demand strict and actual compliance
with service rules vis a vis complaints.
will you please stipulate to the 5 day extension at least, and more preferably the 30 day extension?
Couglin has sought to finally be provided something in writing from each the SBN, SBN Clerk
of Court, Panel Chair and Chair of the NNDB representing the actual state of the law in this Discipli-
nary District under SCR 105(5), please? i don't think it is acceptable to go inserting in page 216 in
the ROA, nor is it acceptable only mail Appellant two of the three volumes.. How is it permissible to
just place an RJC TPO/EPO in RJC RCP2012-000607 into the ROA in 62337 disciplinary matter, not
even as an attachment to some filing in 62337, but just as some odd stand alone fixture placed into
the ROA? How is it okay to suddenly decide to put a 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters in the file
where reodering the Alphabetical index according to chronology reveals that Affidavit (which lacks a
caption, and a proof of service, etc., etc)...there is no division between the
NNDBPANELSBNCLERKOFCOURTOBC....May I please have a file stamped copy of the cover
page and of the cd/dvds attached to the motion for new trial and the supplment/amended mtn for new
trial, etc.?
Is it that NNDB/panel/ and obc's psoition that motions for new trial are impermissible? does the
sbn /clerk of court have the authority to unilaterally not filethem in? The SBN is apparently resting
upon some contention that Coughlin violated a TPO and EPO in RJC RCP2012-000607 in the al-
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leged manner in which he submitted for filing on 1/3/13 a Motion for New Trial, etc. and an amended
or supplemental version thereof (in compliance with NRCP 15) on 1/17/13 or thereabouts (and prior
to any Opposition thereto being filed by the SBN or the expiration of the time period in which such
was permitted). Even if Coughlin's allegedly submitting a filing by fax on 1/17/13 (and, to be clear,
the SBN/Panel/NNDB/OBC had previously communicated to Coughlin that such was a permissible
method of submitting filings, and at no point was it ever communicated to Coughlin that such proce-
dure had been altered or any permission to do so withdrawn...and the curious and unexplained ap-
pearance of the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters, and the shuffling of the positioning thereof in con-
sidering its placement in the 11/8/12 delivered 3,200 page production to Coughlin of a sort of conso-
lation for the the SBN violation SCR 105(2)(c) in forbidding Coughlin the access he was entitled to
(allegedly, pursuant to Chair Echeverria's 10/31/12 Order), then in the first ROA filed herein on
12/24/12, then, again, in a third different position in the second ROA filed on 2/13/12. That 10/9/12
Affidavit of Laura Peters is an unique thing indeed. How it got in the file is unexplained. To what
filing it belongs or was attached is never made clear, nor is the matter of why it lacks a caption or
Proof of Service on Coughlin.
Almost as troubling as Judge Gardner's failure to disclose that L. gardner is hsi sister incident to the
2/2/12 hearing in the criminal trespass case upon Coughlin's prompting in 26405.
http://www.law.indiana.edu/instruction/pmpurcel/vault/In_Re_Beckner.pdf
778 ne 2d 806. motion for new trials, alter amend reconsider, etc. are accepted in disciplinary mat-
ters.
SCR RULE 119. ADDITIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE.... 3. OTHER RULES OF PROCEDURE.
EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THESE RULES, THE NEVADA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND THE NEVADA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE APPLY IN DISCIPLINARYCASES.
COUGHLIN FILED SEVERAL TOLLING MOTIONS A ALA NRCP 59(A)-(E) SUFFICINET TO AUGUER
TOWARDS STRIKING THE 12/24/12 FILINGS AND BRIEFING SCHEDULE IN 62337. POST-JUDGMENT TOLL-
ING MOTIONS NRAP 4(A)(4) SHOULD APPLY TO SCR 105 IDENTIFIES THE FOUR RECOGNIZED TYPES OF
TOLLING MOTIONS: 1. AMOTION FOR JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 50(B); 2. AMOTION UNDER RULE 52(B)
TO AMEND OR MAKE ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT 3. AMOTION UNDER RULE 59 TO ALTER OR AMEND
THE JUDGMENT; AND 4. AMOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNDER RULE 59. ACCORDING TO NRCP 50(B),
52(B) AND 59, THESE TOLLING MOTIONS MUST BE FILED WITHIN 10 DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF THE WRIT-
TEN NOTICE OF ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT OR ORDER. ASIDE FROM TIMELY FILING A TOLLING MOTION,
THE FILING PARTY MUST ALSO SERVE THE MOTION WITHIN THE 10-DAY PERIOD. 7 OTHERWISE, THE
TOLLING MOTION IS NOT TIMELY, AND THE TRIAL COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER AN
UNTIMELY TOLLING MOTION. 8 TOLLING EFFECT OF SOME POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS JUST BECAUSE
POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS HAVE BEEN FILED DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE TIME TO APPEAL THE PRINCIPAL
JUDGMENT IS AUTOMATICALLY TOLLED. RATHER, ONLY SOME POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS HAVE A TOLL-
ING EFFECT AND OTHER MOTIONS, WHICH ARE NOT INDEPENDENTLY TOLLING, HAVE A TOLLING EFFECT
ONLY WHEN COMBINED WITH OTHER PENDING TOLLING MOTIONS. FOR THE MOST PART, HOWEVER, THE
ONLY TOLLING MOTIONS ARE THE FOUR LISTED IN NRAP 4(A)(4). MOTION FOR RELIEF FROMJUDG-
MENT A MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT FILED ACCORDING TO NRCP 60(B) MUST BE FILED WITH-
IN SIX MONTHS UNLESS SOME EXCEPTION TO THE RULE APPLIES, SUCH AS: (1) THE ACT COMPLAINED OF
CONSTITUTES FRAUD UPON THE COURT, IN WHICH CASE THERE IS NO SIX-MONTH DEADLINE; 4 (2) THE
JUDGMENT IS VOID; 5 OR (3) THE JUDGMENT HAS BEEN SATISFIED, RELEASED, DISCHARGED OR A PRIOR
JUDGMENT UPON WHICH IT IS BASED HAS BEEN REVERSED OR OTHERWISE VACATED, OR IT IS NO LONGER
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EQUITABLE THAT AN INJUNCTION SHOULD HAVE PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION. 6 AS LONG AS A MOTION
UNDER NRCP 50(B), 52(B) OR 59 HAS BEEN PROPERLY AND TIMELY FILED AND SERVED, IT HAS A TOLL-
ING EFFECT UNDER NRCP 50(B), 52(B) AND 59. HOWEVER, AN UNTIMELY TOLLING MOTION HAS NO
TOLLING EFFECT UPON THE TIME TO APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT. IF THERE IS ANY DOUBT ON
WHETHER THE POSTJUDGMENT MOTION WILL HAVE A TOLLING EFFECT, IT IS BEST TO FILE A NOTICE OF
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT SO AS TO NOT POTENTIALLY WAIVE APPEAL RIGHTS. MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION/REHEARING HISTORICALLY, MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION HAVE BEEN CATE-
GORICALLY TREATED AS NOT HAVING A TOLLING EFFECT UPON A FINAL JUDGMENT. IN FACT, EDCR
2.24(B), AND OTHER SIMILAR LOCAL RULES, STATE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DOES NOT TOLL
THE 30- DAY PERIOD FOR FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OR JUDGMENT. HOWEVER,
THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT HAS RECENTLY TAKEN A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO DETERMINE
WHETHER A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR REHEARING SHOULD BE TREATED AS TOLLING: [W]E
HOLD THAT SO LONG AS A POST-JUDGMENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS IN WRITING, TIMELY
FILED, STATES ITS GROUNDS WITH PARTICULARITY, AND REQUEST[S] A SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATION OF
THE JUDGMENT, NOT MERELY THE CORRECTION OF A CLERICAL ERROR, OR RELIEF OF A TYPE WHOLLY
COLLATERAL TO THE JUDGMENT, ... THERE IS NO REASON TO DENY IT NRCP 59(E) STATUS, WITH TOLL-
ING EFFECT UNDER NRAP 4(A)(4)(C). 12 AS LONG AS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR REHEAR-
ING MEETS THESE CONDITIONS, IT DOES HAVE A OTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN EARLIER CASE LAW,
THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THERE CAN BE NO APPEAL FROM A POST-JUDGMENT ORDER
DENYING RECONSIDERATION BECAUSE NO STATUTE OR COURT RULE EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED SUCH AN
APPEAL. 17 HOWEVER, MORE RECENT CASE LAW HOLDS THAT THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT WILL RE-
VIEW AN ORDER DENYING A POST-JUDGMENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN THE COURSE OF AN AP-
PEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT WHEN (1) THE DISTRICT COURT ELECTS TO DECIDE THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION ON ITS MERITS; AND (2) THE NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT IS FILED
AFTER THE ORDER RESOLVING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 18 POST-JUDGMENT TOLLING MO-
TIONS OF THE FOUR TOLLING MOTIONS LISTED IN NRAP 4(A)(4), NOT ALL ARE INDEPENDENTLY AP-
PEALABLE. AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION FILED UNDER NRCP 50(B) IS NOT INDEPENDENTLY APPEAL-
ABLE, BUT SINCE THE MOTION IS TOLLING, THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT WILL CONSIDER THE 50(B)
PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT. 20 THE SAME HOLDS TRUE
FOR AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND FILED UNDER NRCP 59(E). 21 HOWEVER, AN
ORDER RESOLVING A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS INDEPENDENTLY APPEALABLE, 22 BUT ONLY IF THE
ORDER IS ENTERED POST-JUDGMENT. 23 WHEN IN DOUBT OF WHICH ORDER TO NAME IN THE NOTICE OF
APPEAL, IT IS BEST TO NAME ADDITIONAL ORDERS THAT MAY NOT BE APPEALABLE INSTEAD OF FAILING
TO IDENTIFY THE PROPER ORDERS. AND IF A SEPARATE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS REQUIRED BY THE RULES,
IT SHOULD BE A NEW AND SEPARATE NOTICE OF APPEAL INSTEAD OF AN AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL.
24 IN CONCLUSION, FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE RULES GOVERNING POST-JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS CAN BE
POTENTIALLY FATAL TO A CASE. HOWEVER, A PROPER UNDERSTANDING OF THESE RULES WILL ENSURE
THAT POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS ARE TIMELY FILED, HAVE THE DESIRED TOLLING EFFECT AND ARE
PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR NEVADA SUPREME COURT REVIEW IF AN APPEAL IS NECESSARY 1 NRS
18.110(1). 2 SEE EBERLE V. STATE EX REL. NELL J. REDFIELD TRUST, 108 NEV. 587, 836 P.2D 67
(1992). 3 WINSTON PRODS. CO. V. DEBOER, 122 NEV. 517, 134 P.3D 726 (2006). 4 NC-DSH,
INC. V. GARNER, 218 P.3D 853 (NEV. 2009). 5 NRCP 60(B)(4). 6 NRCP 60(B)(5). 7
MORRELL V. EDWARDS, 98 NEV. 91, 640 P.2D 1322 (1982); SEE ALSO DRAFTERS NOTE FOR NRCP 59,
2004 AMENDMENT: SUBDIVISION (E) IS AMENDED TO PROVIDE THAT A MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND A
JUDGMENT MUST BE FILED, NOT JUST SERVED, WITHIN THE SPECIFIED TIME PERIOD. (EMPHASIS ADDED).
8 OELSNER V. CHARLES C. MEEK LUMBER CO., 92 NEV. 576, 555 P.2D 217 (1976) (STATING
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THAT THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER AN UNTIMELY TOLLING MOTION
FILED UNDER NRCP 59(E)). 9 DEBOER, 122 NEV. AT 526, 134 P.3D AT 732. 10 ID. 11 ID. 12 AA
PRIMO BUILDERS, LLC V. WASHINGTON, 245 P.3D 1190, 1195 (NEV. 2010) (CITATION OMITTED). 13
CONSUL. GENERATOR-NEVADA, INC. V. CUMMINS ENGINE CO., INC., 114 NEV. 1304, 1312,
971 P.2D 1251, 1256 (1998). 14 GUMM V. MAINOR, 118 NEV. 912, 59 P.3D 1220 (2002). 15 SEE
DEBOER. 16 SEE THOMAS V. CITY OF N. LAS VEGAS, 122 NEV. 82, 90, 127 P.3D 1057, 1063 (2006);
SEE ALSO LEE V. GNLVCORP., 116 NEV. 424, 426, 996 P.2D 416, 417 (2000) (HOLDING THAT A POST-
JUDGMENT ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS MAY BE APPEALED AS A SPECIAL ORDER
MADE AFTER FINAL JUDGMENT). 17 PHELPS V. STATE, 111 NEV. 1021, 900 P.2D 344 (1995). 18 SEE
ARNOLD V. KIP, 123 NEV. 410, 168 P.3D 1050 (2007). 19 BRUNZELL CONSTR. CO., INC., OF
NEVADA V. HARRAHS CLUB, 404 P.2D 902, 81 NEV. 414 (1965), SUPERSEDED BY STATUTE ON OTHER
GROUNDS BY, CASINO OPERATIONS, INC. V. GRAHAM, 86 NEV. 764, 476 P.2D 953 (1965). 20 KRAUSE
INC. V. LITTLE, 117 NEV. 929, 34 P.3D 566 (2001). 21 SEE AAPRIMO BUILDERS, 245 P.3D AT
1197. 22 NRAP 3A(B)(2). 23 RENO HILTON RESORT CORP. V. VERDERBER, 121 NEV. 1, 106
P.3D 134 (2005). 24 WEDDELL V. STEWART, 261 P.3D 1080 (2011)
CONCLUSION
PLEASE GRANT THIS MOTION TO STRIKE THE DEFECTIVE AND DEFICIENT, AND CURIOUSLY SO,
2/13/13 RECORD ON APPEAL IN 62337.
DATED THIS 3/19/13
__/s/ Zach Coughlin_____
Zachary Barker Coughlin
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE
FOREGOINGMOTION TOSTRIKE 2/13/13 RECORDONAPPEAL WAS PLACED IN A SEALED EN-
VELOPE AND SENT BY U.S. REGULAR MAIL AND CERTIFIED MAIL, POSTAGE FULLY PREPAID THEREON,
TO:
Patrick O. King, Esq.
Nevada Bar No 5035
9456 Double R BLVD
Reno, NV 89421
Tel: 775 329 4100
patrickk@nvbar.org
and was electronically served through the Nevada Supreme Court's eflex system on:
David Clark, Esq., Bar Counsel, State Bar of Nevada, registered on this Court's eFlex system
However, pursuant to the 1/4/13 EPO issued to the SBN in SBN v Zach Coughlin by the Reno Justice
Court in RJC RCP2012-000607, it is possible that Coughlin will again be arrested following having
Reno PD Officers track unannounced into his back yard with guns drawn, soon to be pointed at
Coughlin's head from four feet away, incident to some rather dubious allegation that such electronic
service through the Eflex system somehow amounts to a contact violative of the 1/4/13 EPO in
607...
Dated 4/25/13
____________
ZACH COUGHLIN
APPELLANT
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INDEXTO EXHIBITS:
1. EXHIBIT 1: DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN
2. EXHIBIT 2: VARIOUS OTHER RELEVANT MATERIALS
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DECLARATIONOF ZACHARYBARKERCOUGHLIN:
I, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, SWEAR UNDER PENALTYOF PERJURY, NRS 53.045 THAT THE FOL-
LOWING IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE:
1. The ROA in 62337 has had a very troubled history. Now, the second version of the ROA, file
stamped 2/13/13 (though the SBN has continued misaddressing the ROA is sends to Coughlin
(which, this time, did include the Transcript from the formal hearing and Hearing Exhibits, unlike
what the SBN mailed to Coughlin in connection with the ROA filed on 12/24/12...(page 1098 of the
12/24/12 ROA contains a Certificate of Service By Mail wherein the SBN's Laura Peters wrote: I
hereby certify that I served a copy of the attached Record on Appeal, Vol. 1&2, by placing a copy in
an envelope addressed to Zachary.... That 12/20/12 Certificate of Service By Mail contains nothing
indicating that there existed a Vol. 3 in said ROA file stamped 12/24/12 upon all three volumes being
submitted to the Clerk of Court of the Nevada Supreme Court).
Now, in the 2/13/13 ROA, the order of presentation of the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters,
and the 10/12/12 Notice of Formal Hearing; Designation of Witnesses and Summary of Evidence is
switched from the order those filings appeared in in the 12/24/12 ROA, in an attempt by the SBN
to ameliorate the impropriety apparent in the 12/24/12 ROA where the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura
Peters appeared at bates stamp pages 33-34, immediately before the appearance, at pages 35-39 of
the 10/12/12 Notice of Formal Hearing; Designation of Witnesses and Summary of Evidence by the
SBN's King, where the bates stamping in that ROA and order of pleadings on file is chronologically
arranged from earliest (beginning with the 8/23/12 Complaint) to most recent (ending, in contrast to
the 2/13/13 ROA, on page 1098 with a Certificate of Service By Mailing by Peters of only Vol 1&2
of the ROA (ie, missing the Formal Hearing Transcript and Hearing Exhibits).
Obviously, the SBN finally figured out that it looks suspicious to suddenly depart
from the placement of the 10/9/12 AOLP as appearing in the 11/8/12 3,200 page bates stampe pro-
duction as the last entry most recent filing in the chronologically arranged Formal Hearing Plead-
ings folder and the immediately preceeding entry being bates stamped 02797 being the Panel Chair
Echeverria's 10/31/12 Order.. That is, the 10/9/12 AOLP appeared at bates stamp page 02795, and
the 10/12/12 Notice of Formal Hearing; DoWSoE appeared at 02716, with a multitude of filings in
between, including Coughlin's 10/15/12 Motion to Dismiss at 02911, which the SBN had yet to put a
file stamp on at that point (where the file was sent to the printers on 11/1/12 according to Peters
and King's email of 11/1/12 informing Coughlin that he would not be permitted his rights to inspect
the file up to within 3 days of the hearing as required by SCR 105(2)(c). In the 12/24/12 ROA,
however, that 10/15/12 Motion to Dismiss is finally file stamped, appearing at bates stamp page 40.
Couglin's 10/15/12 Motion for Order To Show Cause in 0204 remains without a file stamp in both
version so fthe ROA, despite it being ruled on in the 10/31/12 Order by Chair Echverria? King's fail-
ure to oppose Coughlin's argument that the 8/23/12 Complaint should be dismissed along lines simi-
lar to those Couglin's wrongful termination Complaint against WLS was dismissed under a NRCP
12(b)(3)-(5) line of argument given how blurry and illegible the Complaint and Exhibits thereto actu-
ally are (versus in 60302 and 60317 (a case featuring Judge Elliott failing to disqualify himself or
disclose his Board Presidency for one of Hearing Witness Elcano's co-defendants (Judge Elliott was
then assigned Coughlin's criminal appeal in of the matter underlying 60838, in CR11-2064, and
thereafter was assigned numerous other competency evaluation and or criminal appeal matters where-
in Coughlin is a party (with the transcripts from teh 4/19/12 and 4/26/12 competency hearings being
particularly relevant to the NRS 178.405 stay violations (and effect thereof upon Coughlin's ability to
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avoid a DCR 13(3) application in connection with Hill's 4/19/12 post-judgment Motion to For Attor-
ney Fee sanctions (especially where NRCP 11's safe harbor procedural requisites had not been fol-
lowed...to say nothing of Bar Counsel possessing the 8/28/12 Order by Judge Flanagan in that matter
that conclusively proves the 6/25/12 attorney fee award the subject of Hearing Exhibit 2 was not a
sanction, but rather an application of DCR 13(3), thereby evincing some RPC violations of his own
by King...NRCP 11 was not followed incident to the closing argument Motion for Sanctions by
Springgate in DV08-01168, leading to the 4/13/09 Order (subsequently subsumed by a 6/19/09 Final
Decree that vitiates any suggestion that Coughlin's contentions therein lacked merit where alimony
was, in fact, awarded...and where that Hearing Exhibit 3 applies NRS 7.085 where it would seem the
Judge would have rather made a contempt finding, but didn't, as such, the lack therof is conclusive
proof that Coughlin's conduct therein was not misconduct) the opposing side, CAAW's Excecutive
Board, then going on to sanction Coughlin under NRS 7.085 and or 18.010(2)(b) despite a 12(b)(5)
dismissal necessarily meaning the Court never got to the merits of the Complaint, no 21 day safe har-
bor motion being served, and no actual hearing ever being held to satisfy the requirement for one in
NRS 18.010(2)(b), oh, and Judge Elliot managed to get all of Couglhin's criminal appeals (5!) where
the actual process Couglin had served the defendnats was exponentially more legible than the fiddle
with the scanner dpi settings and other contrast, obfuscation settings in Acrobat or other scanning ap-
plication approach taken by Gonsalves, Garin, et al....(it really is remarkable how scandalous the
approach was there when viewing the actual 9 page per page printed on a 1200 dpi laser printer ver-
sion of the attached Exhibit in those cases compared to the completely illegible and blurry doctored
versions attached as Exhibits to the various Motions to Dismiss...an approach absolutely implemented
by the SBN in fraudulently making as many of Couglin's filings in the representations thereof in the
ROA's in 62337 be similarly doctored up to be so blurry as to lack an utility whatsoever). Judge El-
liott's 1/9/13 Order granting Coughlin IFP status in CR12-2025 and for the preparation of the Tran-
script of the matter, RJC RCR2011-063341 mentioned in King's 8/23/12 Complaint and so connected
to this matter given the extreme proximity of that 11/19/12 trial date therein, the questionable in the
extreme 11/13/12 Emergency Hearing involving the Reno City Attorney the day before the formal
hearing in this matter, and the cumulative prejudice to Coughlin and SCR 102.5 mitigation support
attendant to the arrest therein, on 8/20/11, which was the first of 15 incarcerations of Coughlin since,
along with approximately 11 different No-Cause evictions of rather dubious jurisdictional prerequi-
sites, with all the attendant conflicts of interest and basis for disqualification one might expect to arise
therein (see King's 11/2/12 Motion to Quash Coughlin's RMC Subpoenas, RCA Christensen's letter,
the 11/13/12 objection by WCDA DDA Watts-Vial, etc., etc.. An extension of time to file Coughlin's
Opening Brief would allow for the transcript in CR12-2025 (RJC RCR11-063341) to be finished, and
such is necessary to this matter.
Specifically, the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters (a very material document that goes
to whether the SBN Clerk of Court/OBC/NNDB/Panel provided Coughlin an indication that he was
permitted to submit filings via fax (considering NNDB Chairman Susich's 7/27/12 written instruction
to Coughlin (see below) and King's numerous instances of directing Coughlin to communicate with
SBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters (including an instruction to Coughlin by King to do so made dur-
ing the 3/26/12 appearance by Coughlin at the SBN Double R Office where Coughlin presented to
take King up on his offer to allow Coughlin to review the grievances and materials submitted in con-
nection therewith...at which time King refused to allow Coughlin to review any such materials and
only briefly allowed Coughlin to read the two page 2/14/12 written grievance letter to the SBN re-
garding Coughlin by RMC Judge Nash Holmes. At that time, King indicated that Coughlin should
have that 2/14/12 Nash Holmes letter, to which Coughlin protested that he had not received any such
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letter (to be expected considering the well documented problems Coughlin was experiencing during
that period of time in accessing mail addressed to him at the 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2 address). Peters ex-
press indications to Coughlin on 9/11/12 were expression of the policies and procedures in play in
light of SCR 105(4) and Susich and King's representations to Coughlin (combined with Peters own
express representations that she was the SBN Clerk of Court and entitled to make the calls on mat-
ters such as when and under what circumstances a Default would be taken (she indicated several
things in this respect to Coughlin). To whatever extent Peters 9/11/12 express indications to Cough-
lin that she would file stamp in an filings he faxed to the SBN are considered to not be expressions of
the rules and policies in play under SCR 105(4), Coughlin entitled to rely upon such indications, and
reasonably did so, considering the totality of the circumstances. Especially with respect to the
12/14/12 FOFCOL's express recommendation that as a matter of default the alleged violation may
be deemed admitted... with respect to numerous alleged violations of Rules of Professional Conduct,
even those for which the FOFCOL found the SBN put on no evidence whatsoever or or those
So, the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters becomes a very important filing. Such
filing (it is file stamped 10/9/12, and notarized no less, with a date of 10/9/12) was never sent to
Coughlin until it was included in the 3,200 page box of documents provided on 11/8/12 as a consola-
tion by the SBN for refusing to follow SCR 105(2)(c). That 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters
appearaed within the bates stamped 3,200 page document production by the SBN within a section
labeled Formal Hearing Pleadings, and appeared numerically after King's 10/24/12 Opposition and
before NNDB Chairman Susich's 10/30/12 Order Appointing Formal Hearing Panel. This indicates
that either Peters and the SBN back dated the file stamping on some Affidavit of Laura Peters to
indicate it was filed in on 10/9/12, or, that Peters and or the SBN file stamped such an Affidavit of
Laura Peters on 10/9/12, but did not place it in the Formal Pleadings File at that time. Regardless,
there is no indication that such 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters was ever mailed to Coughlin, as
there exists no dedicated Certificate of Service for it, nor is said 10/9/12 AOLP identified in any In-
dex to Exhibits or otherwise referenced in any other filing by the SBN. The fact that that 10/9/12
AOLP contains numerous easily disproven misstatements in more troubling, particularly where such
misstatements relate to just when and how the SBN and or Peters had one of Coughlin's Motions to
Dismiss submitted for filing. Coughlin had digitally verifiable proof confirming he submitted for fil-
ing to the SBN his initial Motion to Dismiss the 8/23/12 file stamped Complaint on 9/17/12 by both
fax and email.
Peters absolutely indicated to Couglin that he was permitted to file be fax in a 9/11/12 com-
munication with Coughlin, and that she would file stamp any filings that Coughlin submitted via fax.
Both Peters and King have been dancing around this fact. This is especially clear where the 10/9/12
AOLP only
SUBJECT: RE: MOTION TO DISMISS SBN V. COUGHLIN FROM: LAURA PETERS
(LAURAP@NVBAR.ORG) SENT: WED 9/26/12 11:54 AM TO: 'ZACH COUGHLIN'
(ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM) I NEVER SAID THAT YOU COULD FILE ITEMS VIA E-MAIL...
THE 10/9/12 AOLP READS:
CUSTODIANOF RECORDS
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LAURAPETERS, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, DEPOSES AND
SAYS AS FOLLOWS:
That Affiant is employed as a paralegal for the discipline department of the State Bar
of Nevada and in such capacity is the custodian of records for the State Bar of Nevada;
That on September 11, 2012, at approximately 4:45 p.m., Zachary Coughlin called Af-
fiant to confirm that a hearing was still scheduled to take place on September 25, 2012. Affiant ex-
plained that the hearing would not take place on September 25th and that date had been scheduled
prior to the filing of a formal Complaint.
Mr. Coughlin reacted as if he had no knowledge of a Complaint. Affiant then ex-
plained that, in fact, a copy of the Complaint, sent via certified mail on August 23,2012, from the Re-
no office of the State Bar, had been returned and marked "unclaimed".
Affiant further explained that since service had not been affected, a new certified copy would
go out the next day. Affiant requested that when Mr. Coughlin received said copy, he should return
the postcard attached to the mailing and his twenty (20) day period in which to answer the Com-
plaint would start running at that point.
However, in speaking to Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King, it was determined that
personal service should be affected upon Mr. Coughlin. Reno Carson messenger service was engaged
to attempt personal service despite Mr. Coughlin not providing the State Bar with a physical address.
On September 25, 2012, Mr. Coughlin arrived at the Reno office of the State Bar al-
legedly expecting a hearing to take place. At that time, Mr. Coughlin was again told, both by Affiant
and Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King, that no hearing would be taking place that day and that an
answer to the State Bar's Complaint had not been received.
Affiant personally served Mr. Coughlin with a copy of the Complaint on his visit to
the Bar office on September 25th as witnessed by Paula Campbell, an employee of the State Bar. Mr.
Coughlin insisted that the hearing which had been previously scheduled for that day should be taking
place because he needed to be removed from temporary suspension.
Mr. Coughlin has also been instructed by Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King that he
cannot file pleadings with the State Bar via e-mail, which he continues to attempt. The Motion to
Dismiss, which Mr. Coughlin now insists should be granted as it has gone unopposed by the State
Bar, was never presented to Affiant for filing but was rather emailed prior to Affiant's conversation
with Mr. Coughlin on September 11th when Mr. Coughlin under no uncertain terms told Affiant that
he had not yet received the Complaint.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
Dated this 9th day of October, 2012: Laura Peters, Paralegal, Office of
Bar Counsel (notarized as SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 9TH
DAYOF OCTOBER, 2012 by Notary Public Angeline A. Radley and af-
fixed with her Notary Seal).
In consideration of the representations and indications made to Coughlin by NNDB Chairman
Susich (especially his 7/27/12 email to Coughlin and his assistant Sherri Hornsbey's indications to
Coughlin), Asst. Bar Counsel King, and SBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters (a title that both Peters
and King had referred to Peters as being bestowed with on numerous occasions, including by Peters
during a 9/11/12 telephone conversation with Coughlin and by King on 9/25/12 in person, upon
Coughlin appearing at the SBN's Double R Office on 9/25/12 at 9 am for the hearing Peters had con-
firmed in writing to Coughlin and to which Susich's 7/27/12 email to Couglin indicated the SBN was
in charge of scheduling.
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KING CURIOUSLY FAILED TO OFFER INTO EVIDENCE THAT 3/16/12 LETTER BY KING TO
COUGHLIN (TO WHICH WAS ATTACHED, AS INDICATED BY A 3/19/12 EMAIL TO COUGHLIN FROMSBN
CLERK OF COURT LAURA PETERS, WHICH COUGHLIN ONLY FOUND IN HIS JUNK EMAIL FOLDER AFTER
KING INDICATED DURING THE 3/26/12 INTERACTION WITH COUGHLIN AT THE SBNDOUBLE R OFFICE
WAS PROVIDED TO COUGHLIN BY EMAIL AS WELL...LEADING TO AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN KING AND
COUGHLIN WHEREIN KING ADMITTED THAT HE DID NOT EMAIL COUGHLIN A COPY OF THE 3/16/12
MAILING (DESPITE HIS 3/16/12 LETTER INDICATING HE WAS SO COPYING COUGLIN ON VIA EMAIL, BUT,
STRANGELY, NOT FAX), BUT, RATHER, KING INDICATED HE HAD LAURA PETERS EMAIL COUGLIN A
COPY OF THAT MAILING. DURING THE 3/26/12 IN PERSON INTERACTION WITH KING COUGHLIN WAS
SURPRISED TO HEAR THAT THE SBNHAD SENT COUGHLIN ANYTHING RELATING TO ANY GRIEVANCES
OTHER THAN THE 2/14/12 MAILING TO COUGHLIN BY KING (WHICH INCLUDED KING'S ONE PAGE LET-
TER TO COUGHLIN AND HILL'S FIVE PAGE 1/14/12 GRIEVANCE AGAINST COUGHLIN), WHICH COUGHLIN
ONLY RECIEVED ON 3/16/12 DUE TO NO FAULT OF COUGHLIN'S OWN, BUT RATHER, TO MALFEASANCE
BY COUGHLIN'S HOUSEMATES, AND PERHAPS, THE USPS, AND OR THE USPS'S RESPONSE TO THE MAL-
FEASANCE OF COUGHLIN'S HOUSEMATES, AS CONFIRMED BY THE YELLOW STICKERS AFFIXED TO ENVE-
LOPES MAILED TO COUGLHIN (SUCH AS THOSE BY THE SBNON 2/14/12 AND 3/16/12 AND NUMEROUS
MAILINGS BY THE RMC TO COUGLHIN BETWEEN FEBRUARY-APRIL 2012). COUGHLIN WAS FURTHER
SURPRISED TO HEAR FROMKING THAT THE SBNHAD COPIED COUGLHIN ON A 3/16/12 MAILING TO
COUGHLIN OF AN ADDITIONAL GRIEVANCE BY A JUDGE BY ALSO SENDING IT TO COUGHLIN VIA EMAIL.
COUGHLIN QUERRIED KING AS TO WHAT EMAIL ACCOUNT SUCH AN EMAIL WOULD HAVE EMANATED
FROM. KING, LACKING AN UNDERSTANDING THAT EMAILS ARE SENT FROM ACCOUNTS RATHER THAN
FROM THE STATE BAR'S WEBSITE, ULTIMATELY INDICATED TO COUGHLIN THAT HE DELEGATED THE
COPYING TO COUGLIN BY EMAIL OF THE 3/16/12 MAILING TO LAURA PETERS. FROM THAT COUGHLIN
DEDUCED SUCH AN EMAIL WAS LIKELY SENT FROMPETER'S EMAIL ACCOUNT, AND, SURE ENOUGH, IN
COUGHLIN'S JUNK MAIL FOLDER, CHECKED SUBSEQUENT TO THE 3/26/12 IN PERSON INTERACTION WITH
KING, WAS A 3/19/12 EMAIL TO COUGHLIN CONTAINING A 17 PAGE PDF (KING'S ONE PAGE 3/16/12
LETTER, HOLME'S TWO PAGE 3/14/12 LETTER, AND L. GARDNER'S 14 PAGE OAT OF 4/13/09).
That 3/16/12 mailing to Coughlin by the SBN included a one page letter to Coughlin from
King of 3/16/12, to which was attached Judge Nash Holmes 3/14/12 two page grievance against
Coughlin, and the 4/13/09 Order After Trial by Judge Linda Gardner from 01168. In that mailing,
the Judge Nash Holmes letter is stamped by the SBN as received on 3/14/12, and, curiously, the
4/13/09 Order After Trial by Judge L. Gardner is stamped as received by the SBN on 3/15/12, with
the 5 in the 15 being drawn in by hand...which is even more curious given King's repeated ob-
structionist and evasive, even misleading, attempts to avoid admitting that Judge Nash Holmes and
the RMC included that 4/13/09 Judge L. Gardner Order After Trial in the materials submitted on
3/14/12 along with Holmes' 3/14/12 letter to the SBN).
HOLMES ADMITTED TO SO INCLUDING IN THE OAT IN HER 3/14/12 SUBMISSION TO THE SBN
DURING THE FORMAL HEARING ON 11/14/12. ON THE CERTIFIED AUDIO TRANSCRIPT OF A 4/10/12 TRI-
AL DATE IN THE CRIMINAL TRESPASS TRIAL AGAINST COUGHLIN STEMMING FROMHILL'S FRAUDULENT
11/13/12 CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, L. GARDNER'S BROTHER, JUDGE NASH HOLMES' FELLOWRMC
JUDGE, RMC ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE WILLIAMGARDNER, ADMITTED TO HAVING RECEIVED THAT
4/13/09 ORDER AFTER TRIAL BY HIS SISTER, FROM HI SSI STER, AND THEN HAVING PASSED THAT OR-
DER AFTER TRIAL RECEIVED FROM HIS SISTER AROUND TO HIS FELLOWRMC JUDGES, THOUGH THE
TIMING OF W. GARDNER'S RECEIPT OF THE 4/13/09 OATFROM HIS SISTER WAS SOMETHING W.
GARDNER OFFERED PARTICULARLY STRANGE AND EVASIVE COMMENTARY TO ON THAT 4/10/12 AUDIO
TRANSCRIPT, AS WAS ALSO THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO THE TIME OF HIS PASSING ON THAT 4/13/09
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OATTO HIS FELLOWRMC JUDGES) AT THE 11/14/12 HEARING, UNLIKE HIS 2/14/12 LETTER TO
COUGHLIN (FOR WHICH KING FAILED TO INCLUDED THE 5 PAGE 1/14/12 WRITTEN EMAILED GRIEVANCE
AGAINST COUGHLIN BY HILL, WHEREIN HILL PURPORTS TO BE SATISFYING HIS AND HIS ASSOCIATES
RPC 8.3 DUTY IN ACCUSING COUGLIN OF GHOSTWRITING FOR JOHN GESSIN, WHOMHILL WAS STILL
LISTED AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD FOR IN AT LEAST ONE MATTER AT THE TIME, DESPITE HILL DISPAR-
AGING GESSIN AND BETRAYING ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENCES, APPARENTLY, WITH RESPECT TO
GESSIN, IN HIS 1/14/12 GRIEVANCE AGAINST COUGHLIN, MORE ON THAT LATER).
Dear M. Coughlin: I am in receipt of your request for a hearing before the
Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board. I have forwarded your request to the Ne-
vada State Bar's Northern Office for processing. Please communicate directly
with the State Bar concerning your case. They are the ones who will process
your request and set up any appropriate hearings. If you have questions you
can contact Pat King, the Northern Nevada Bar Counsel. Sincerely, J. Thomas
Susich, Esq.
ALSO, CONSIDER:
DATE: FRI, 23 MAR 2012 17:57:26 +0000
DEAR MR. COUGHLIN,
PLEASE COME TO SEE ME AND I WILL SHOW YOUTHE LETTER AND DOCUMENTS FROM THE COURT.
PATRICK KING
FROM: ZACH COUGHLIN [MAILTO:ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM]
TO: PATRICK KING
MR. KING,
THIS IS THE VERY FIRST TIME YOUALLEGE ANYONE OTHER THAN MR.
KING FILED OR ALLEGED A GRIEVANCE. PLEASE PROVIDE ANY DOCUMEN-
TATION OR PROOF RELATED TO THESE APPARENT COMMUNICATIONS FROM
JUDGES THAT YOU ARE ONLY NOW BRINGING UP. SINCERELY, ZACH
COUGHLIN, ESQ., POBOX60952, RENO, NV, 89506, TEL: 775 338
8118, FAX: 949 667 7402; ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM NEVADA
BAR NO: 9473
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DATE: FRI, 23 MAR 2012 17:18:34 +0000
DEAR MR. COUGHLIN,
I HAVE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED MY INTEREST IN HAVING A MEETING WITH YOU TO DISCUSS
THE GRIEVANCES AGAINST YOU. YOUCLAIM TO BE TOO BUSY TO MEET WITH ME, YET YOUHAVE TIME
TO WRITE LENGTHY E-MAILS AND APPARENTLY TO DO LEGAL RESEARCH.
YOUASKED IF MR. HILL HAS STANDING TO FILE A GRIEVANCE AGAINST YOU. NOT ONLY DOES
HE HAVE STANDING TO FILE A GRIEVANCE, AS A LAWYER IN NEVADA HE MAY HAVE AN ETHICAL OBLI-
GATION TO REPORT TO THE STATE BAR. AS I HAVE EXPLAINED TO YOU, THE GRIEVANCES AGAINST YOU
CAME NOT ONLY FROMMR. HILL BUT ALSO FROMJUDGES FROM DIFFERENT COURTS. THESE GRIEV-
ANCES, AND THE EVIDENCE ATTACHED WITH THEM, RATHER CLEARLY PUTS INTO QUESTION YOUR COM-
PETENCE TO PRACTICE LAW. AS I HAVE EXPLAINED TO YOU, I WILL MAKE THE EVIDENCE AND EXHIBITS
AVAILABLE TO YOU WHEN YOU COME TO INSPECT THEM AT MY OFFICE. I WILL NOT SEND YOUREPORTS
OR DOCUMENT, ESPECIALLY SINCE YOU CLAIM YOUR MAIL IS BEING COMPROMISED.
AS FOR THE GRIEVANCES YOU HAVE MADE, NOTHING THAT YOU HAVE SUBMITTED APPEARS
TO SHOW AN ETHICAL VIOLATION THAT COULD BE PROVED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE,
WHICH IS THE STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED IN DISCIPLINARY MATTERS. AS SUCH, AT THIS TIME
WE HAVE NOT OPENED ANY FILES BASED ON THE INFORMATION YOUHAVE SUBMITTED. SINCERELY,
PATRICK KING
JUDGE FLANAGAN ONLY ENTERED 6/25/12 ORDER AGAINST COUGHLIN AS A LITIGANT NOT AS
AN ATTORNEY HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ADOPT NRS 7.085 ARGUMENT SET FORTH. POSITION
THAT ULLOA DID NOT STEAL RENT, BUT RATHER SHE MADE A DEAL WITH MERLISS UPON HIS BRING-
ING IT UP, HOWEVER, MERLISS, HILL, AND BAKER PERSISTED IN PURSUING THE RENT PORTIONS TO
WHICH A DEAL HAD BEEN MADE BETWEEN MERLISS AND ULLOA THAT ABSOLVED COUGHLIN OF ANY
JOINT LIABILITY FOR WHAT, BETWEEN COUGHLIN AND ULLOA, WAS ALWAYS ULLOA'S CONTRIBUTION
TOWARDS THE RENT.
11/8/12 SCR 105(2)(c) consolation at bates 02792 contains a USPS Track & Confirm that proves
King knew his certified mailing to Coughlin of his 3/14/12 Letter (attached as Exhibit X at the formal
hearing, though missing the two items attached to it (Nash letter letter to SBN of 3/1in Laura Peters
3/19/12 email to Coughlin, which resided in Coughlin's junk folder unbeknownst to him until it was
later discovered there:
Subject: RE: pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings....language SCR 111(7)
versus SCR 111(8) and the June 7th, 2012 Order of the NV. S. Ct.
From: Laura Peters (LauraP@nvbar.org)
Sent: Wed 10/10/12 6:01 PM
To: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
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Please don't put words in my mouth, Zach. You are the one that indicated that you had not re-
ceived the Complaint when we talked on the phone. Why, then, would I file in a Motion to
Dismiss? I am responsible for my own actions.
- Laura (aka Clerk Peters)
-----
From: Zach Coughlin [zachcoughlin@hotmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, October 10,
2012 11:51 AM
To: tsusich@nvdetr.org; Laura Peters; David Clark; Patrick King;
nvscclerk@nvcourts.nv.gov
Subject: FW: pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings....language SCR 111(7) versus
SCR 111(8) and the June 7th, 2012 Order of the NV. S. Ct.
Dear Chairman Susich and Clerk Peters, Bar Counsel King sees himself as a the Director of this
movie, placing you two in the scenes where he sees fit. Chairman Susich, it is your responsibility to
comply with the Court's Order and the Supreme Court Rules, and at this point, you need to send a
clear message to Bar Counsel that "the kid stays in the picture", and inform Mr. King that he is not
to attempt to take your job or duties from you. Same goes for Clerk Peters, especially vis a vis her
admission that King told her not to file Coughlin's Motion to Dismiss in SBN v Coughlin on Sep-
tember 17th, 2012, which has now gone unopposed, and therefore, shall be granted. Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin PO BOX 3961...
By subverting this Court's 6/7/11 Order and the express dictates in SCR 111(8) and
SCR 102(4)(a) by effectively extending the temporary suspension in 60838 (killing Coughlin's
law practice for the time being and making it overly difficult for Coughlin to earn a living while
also defending against an inordinately overbroad SCR 105 Complaint and impresive, if not ra-
ther questionable displays of teamwork between the SBN, RJC, WCDA, RPD, WCSO, RMC,
and Reno City Attorney's Office...(including two more recent arrests of Coughlin, bringing the
total since 8/20/11 to 13, with an arrest on 2/2/13 for an alleged violation of his Dept. of Alterna-
tive Sentencing probation requirement to check in by 3 pm on Wednesdays, where Coughlin
presented at 2:54pm but was detained by security (pursuant to an RJCAdministrative Order
12-01) sufficiently long enough to result in the DAS office closing prior to Coughlin being per-
mitted to access it for a check in (also, DAS Officer Brown, in an email the next day, excused
such circumstances, and it was not until a 2/1/13 email to WCDA ADA Helzer seemed to
wrankle, that, suddenly, DAS arrested Coughlin has his residence after 7 pm, in violation of
NRS 171.136. A week later, on 2/8/12, Coughlin was treated to have a gun pointed at his head
by the RPD upon Offficer Waddle departing from procedure and entering the back yard of
Coughlin's residence, failing to announce themselves as law enforcement (a voice called to
Coughlin while he was walking in his back yard, saying only Zach Coughlin? to which
Coughlin did not turn around or respond but rather walked to the corner of the back yard and
stood behind a shed...only to have Officer Waddle jump out moments later from behind the
shed's wall pointing a 45 a Coughlin's head, his partner, Officer Wilson asking, are you Zach
Coughlin to which Coughlin said something, and Waddle, who had called out to the back of
Coughlin's head moments before, was only then able to announce that's him upon hearing
Coughlin's voice and recognizing it from a previous conversation with Coughlin on the tele-
phone, thereby indicating the RPD lacked probable cause to pull their guns and inch around
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back yard sheds without so much as announcing the presence of law enforcement and or issu-
ing a single lawful order.
Now, the RMC has picked up the EPO/TPO SBN violation prosecution where the
WCDA's Office chose not to....Coughlin was charged with violating a TPO granted to, appar-
ently, and entire County, Washoe County for his email to his DAS Officer explaining the de-
tention by security on 1/23/13 in a 1/24/13 email to his DAS probation officer (and, apparently,
the institutional TPO application and subsequent TPO are being read by the RPD to apply to
any employe off Washoe County, not just those in the WC Public Defenders Office, much less
just to Jim Leslie, Esq., whom did not seem all that fearful of Coughlin on the numerous occa-
sions when he smugly, and purposefully, an callow callous manner sought to deprive Coughlin
of each and every inviolable right of a criminal defendant, and also refused to providee 911 au-
dio cd discovery discs...Also, Coughlin moved for a TPO against Leslie on 9/5/12, well before
the application on Leslie's behalf by WCDA DDA Watts-Vial (whose 11/13/12 4:41 pm last mi-
nute fax to Coughlin represented an apparent attempt to Object to the SCR 110 subpoenas
Coughlin had served by an appropriate non-party on 10/30/12 upon 2JDCJudges, Administra-
tors, and the Custodian of Records, none of which appeared or propounded for the 11/14/12
formal hearing, to which Panel Chair Echeverria failed to hold them in contempt or grant a
continuance despite Coughlin's express request that he do so, and despite the fact that it is the
Board Chair, Susich, not the Panel Chair, Echeverria, whom has jurisdiction to rule on Mo-
tions to Quash Subpoenas (even, one would think, the impermissible sua sponte one's that Panel
Chair Echeverria made on 11/14/12, in yet another in a exceedingly long line of examples of
Echeverria displaying evident and marked impartiality against Coughlin, and particularly, in
favor of WLS's Elcano and local law enforcement entitites). resulting from a petty theft convic-
tion of $14.00 worth of a candy bar and some cough drops into what has now become and 8
month suspension (particularly curious given the lack of even a temporary suspension in In Re
Stephen R. Harris, Esq. 57507, and the eventual three month suspension Ordered therein,
where Harris was actually suspending from late February 2012 to November 8
th
, 2012, around
9 months. Coughlin's temporary suspension for 0.0000018543%the amount of money Harris
admittedto misappropriating from a client versus where Coughlin disputes the legitimacy of his
conviction of a de minimis amoutn of foodfromWal-Mart. To punish Coughlin for defending
himself or failing to provide a false coerced confession just seems wrong.
SCR 102(4) Temporary suspension by the supreme court: (a) On the petition
of a disciplinary board, signed by its chair or vice chair, supported by an af-
fidavit alleging facts personally known to the affiant, which shows that an at-
torney appears to be posing a substantial threat of serious harm to the pub-
lic, the supreme court may order, with notice as the court may prescribe, the
attorneys immediate temporary suspension or may impose other conditions
upon the attorneys practice. If a petition is filed under subsection 3 of this rule,
a separate petition under this subsection must be filed with the supreme court as
soon thereafter as possible...
(d) The attorney may request dissolution or amendment of the tempo-
rary order of suspension by petition filed with the supreme court, a copy of
which shall be served on bar counsel. The petition may be set for immediate
hearing before a hearing panel, to hear the petition and submit its report and
recommendation to the court within 7 days of the conclusion of the hearing.
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Upon receipt of the report and recommendation, the court may modify its order,
if appropriate, and continue such provisions of it as may be appropriate until the
final disposition of all pending disciplinary charges against the attorney.
Basically, Coughlin was prejudiced by Bar Counsel's end run around the requirements in SCR
102(4)(a), where the 8/23/12 SCR 105 Complaint avoided the requirements of SCR 102(4)(a) in that
it was not on a petition of the disciplinary board and signed by its chair, but rather was upon a Com-
plaint by Bar Counsel, and it was not supported by an affidavit alleging facts personally known to
the affiant, which shows that an attorney appears to be posing a substantial threat of serious harm
to the public... That is important. Rather, King's 8/23/12 Complaint contains a multitude of
unsworn, often unattributed hearsay lacking in foundation.
(X) THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT IN THE MERLISS EVICTION ACTION, COUGHLIN'S CONDUCT
WAS SO VEXATIOUS AND FRIVOLOUS AS TO RESULT IN SUBSTANTIAL SANCTION OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES. SUPRA 21 SEE HEARING EXHIBIT 2, P 2, L 8 -13; P3, L4 -11. ACTUALLY, THAT IS COM-
PLETELY UNTRUE. BEYOND THE FACT THAT JUDGE FLANAGAN'S 6/25/12 ORDER AWARDING THE AT-
TORNEY'S FEES SOUGHT BY HILL AND BAKER IN THEIR POST-JUDGMENT ATTORNEY FEE MOTION OF
4/19/09 SPECIFICALLY NOTED THAT COUGHLIN FAILED TO FILE AN OPPOSITION (TO WHICH COUGHLIN
HAS SHOW GOOD CAUSE EXPLAINING, AND WHERE COUGHLIN FILED A PREEMPTIVE OPPOSITION ON
1/19/12 IN 03628), AND THEREFORE, UNDER DCR 13(3), JUDGE FLANAGAN WAS FORCED TO TAKE SUCH
A LACK OF AN OPPOSITION BEING FILED AS A BASIS FOR GRANTING THE ATTORNEY FEE MOTION, PAR-
TICULARLY IN LIGHT OF PAST RULING BY JUDGE FLANAGAN IN OTHER MATTERS WHEREIN, DESPITE THE
DISCRETIONARY LANGUAGE (MAY) IN DCR 13(3), SUCH A PRACTICE HAS BECOME JUDGE
FLANAGAN'S ESTABLISHED CUSTOM. THAT 6/25/12 ORDER, FURTHER, DID NOT CONTAIN ANY SPECIFIC
FINDING THAT COUGHLIN HAD ASSERTED NON-MERITORIOUS CLAIMS, DEFENSES, OR CONTENTIONS,
JUDGE FLANAGAN DID NOT FEEL COMPELLED TO REPORT COUGHLIN TO THE SBN, DESPITE THE IMPROT
OF NCJC CANON 2.15'S DICATE, AND A SUBSQUENT ORDER BY JUDGE FLANAGAN ON 8/28/12 IN 03628
MAKES EXPLICILTY CLEAR THAT JUDGE FLANAGAN DID NOT AWARD THE ATTORNEY'S FEES IN HIS
6/25/12 ORDER UPON ANY ALLEGED FINDING OF FRIVOLITY OR OTHER SANTIONABLE CONDUCT BY
COUGHLIN. FURTHER, THE 3/30/12 ORDER DENYING COUGHLIN'S APPEAL IS NOTICEABLY ABSENT OF
ANY SORT OF REMONSTRATIVE TONE OR LANGUAGE WITH RESPECT TO COUGHLIN'S CASE, BUT ACTUAL-
LY SEEMS TO SUGGEST THAT, HAD COUGHLIN HAD THE BENEFIT OF A CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT AND BEEN
ABLE TO PUT FORWARD CITATION TO SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF TESTIMONY SUPPORTING THE ARGUMENTS
SET OUT IN HIS APPEAL BRIEF, COUGHLIN'S OWN CONTENTIONS MAY WELL HAVE BEEN MERITORIOUS.
At page 2 of a 8/28/12 Order in 03628, Judge Flanagan himself attempts to relitigate or redo
(outside the 10 days under NRCP 59(a) wherein such a sua sponte alteration of one's ruling may be
permissible) his previous Orders (including the Order of 3/30/12, which he characterizes as a final
judgment...which brings up the problematic aspect of the voidness of any sanctions based attorney
fee award based upon a Baker and Hill's post-judgment motion for attorney fees sanctions of
4/19/09), where that Order reads:
Again, as was the case in Coughlin's attempt to set aside Merliss's award
of costs Coughlin's Motions here attempts to re-litigate substantive issues
this Court has already decided, or frivolous claims this Court has previous-
ly ignored. This Court has entered final judgment on the merits of Coughlin's
underlying claim and awarded attorney's fees and costs to Merliss. Thi Court
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will not revisit those decisions here, particularly when Coughlin alleges nothing
that would satisfy the requirements of NRCP 59 or NRCP 60.
It is not at all clear how Coughlin could be said to be attempting to re-litigate substantive is-
sues when the 6/25/12 Order itself notes that Coughlin did not file an Opposition to Hill's 4/19/12
Motion for Attorney Fees. Particularly where substantive issues would, necessarily be intimately
intertwined with any attempt to have any the legitimacy of such an outrageous $42,050 attorney fee
award for just the appeal (ie, not tedious trial court fact finding sorts of attorney work involved, but
the mere filing of a legal brief speaking to rather dry legal issues only...so, just who is attempting to
re-ligitate(or re-adjudicate, rather) things here?
Would that not be Hill and Baker seeking to relitigate their humiliating defeat in the trial
court in 1708 where, at first, Baker sought a ridiculous $18,060 in attorney fees for representing the
landlord in a No Cause Summary eviction Proceeding (a whoopsie posture, Casey D. Baker, Esq.,
sheepishly had to adopt upon being forced to admit that there exists no basis for awarding attorney's
fees (certainly not the statute Baker cited to allow such fees where no such manufacture of con-
trolled substances exception had been alleged or broached in any way whatsoever by the landlord at
any point in this matter, though Hill did manage to cook up an particularly suspect allegation of hav-
ing found a crack pipe and bag of weed...large quantity of pills and a vial of something shortly
after Coughlin merely restated, verbatim, what RPD Officer Carter had said to Coughlin shortly after
arresting him in response to Coughlin asking him if he was on Richard G. Hill's payroll) under Ne-
vada law incident to a summary eviction proceeding (NRS 69.030, in light of JCRCP 2 (which char-
acterizes landlord tenant matters as outside the purview of those civil actions to which such fee
awards may issued).
So, to recap, Baker moved for $18,050 in attorney's fees for the summary eviction...which
Judge Sferrazza downsized to a mere $1,500, until, ultimately, Baker and Hill were forced to admit
that Coughlin was absolutely correct in asserting that there moving for any attorney's fees at all was,
itself, a fine example of a violation of RPC 3.1's Meritorious Claims requirement...and that fee award
was set aside (though, of course, Coughlin, as a practical matter, was treated to being ordered, by
Judge Flanagan, to pay a fee award, a relevant portion of which was well in excess of that amount in
consideration of the fees Hill and Baker racked up in defending against Coughlin pointing out the
RPC 3.1 violation they themselves ultimately were forced to admit in joining Coughlin in seeking to
have that $1,500 attorney fee award set aside (how fees related to such matters could reasonably be
said to relate to the appeal in 03628, is not clear, nor is how such does not present yet another RPC
3.1 violation by these two lycans (ie, not lichens as Chair Echeverria incorrectly noted, a distinc-
tion which would have been clear to him had he bothered to read any of the materials Coughlin pro-
vided in his filings and Exhibits attached thereto before plunging headlong into a particularly odious
attempt to take away one's law license under the most illegitimate of circumstances.)
Its really not at all clear just how Judge Flanagn could find an assertion that $42,050 in attor-
ney's fees were reasonably incurred in relation to the appeal of this summary eviction. Regardless,
Nevada law does not seem to hold that JCRCP 73(b) is applicable to an appeal of such an informal
summary proceeding, but rather, is only applicable to a formal eviction (ie, a plenary unlawful de-
tainer civil action, particularly given the explicit language of JCRCP Rule 2).
NEVADA JCRCP RULE 2: THREE FORMS OF ACTIONS THERE
SHALL BE THREE FORMS OF ACTION IN JUSTICE COURTS TO BE KNOWN AS
CIVIL ACTIONS, SMALL CLAIMS ACTIONS AND SUMMARYEVICTION AC-
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TIONS. RULES 3 THROUGH 87 GOVERN CIVIL ACTIONS. RULES GOVERNING SMALL
CLAIMS ACTIONS BEGIN WITH RULE 88 AND END WITH RULE 100. RULES GOVERN-
ING SUMMARY EVICTIONS COMMENCE WITH RULE 101.
II. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; SERVICE OF PROCESS,
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND ORDERS
RULE 3. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION A civil action is commenced
by filing a complaint with the court.
It was Hill's associate Baker, whom Hill alternately alleges to have spent an inordinate
amount of time reviewing, only to then seek to allege that he wasn't there for the trial court pro-
ceedings, so he can't be held accountable for his repeated baseless, sworn assertions that Coughlin
failed to raise the matter of his being a commercial tenancy (home law office, and or mattress busi-
ness) impermissibly subject to a No Cause Summary eviction where the non-payment of rent was
neither pled nor alleged, in violation of the explicit prohibition against the utlization of such a No
Cause summary proceeding against a commercial tenant under NRS 40.253. Further, JCRCP 73 has
no application to the appeal of a summary eviction. Rather, as the Two Roads v. Venetian case and
trial court transcript therein makes clear (or at least makes ridiculous any claim that the position
Coughlin took at various points, including on 12/22/12, as Hill, asserted, in his testimony was some-
how, demonstrative of violations of various RPC's or indicative of a lack of candor or fairness to op-
posing counsel by Coughlin), the supersedeas bond
i
, particularly where the rent is under $1,000,
is statutorily set at $250, and the RJC's threes times the rent approach is not permissible.
Nor is characterizing the 10/25/11 court date as a Trial, only to assert that JCRCP 19 (requir-
ing 20 days to respond to a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer in such a plenary matter) is in-
applicable to a summary eviction).
Further, it is not at all clear why Coughlin should pick up the tab for the confusion and fallout
inevitable given the then state of the law in Nevada and the consequences of Judge Sferrazza's
10/13/11 Order requiring the rent escrow deposit and Judge Clifton's response to Coughlin's
10/17/11 filing seeking a stay, continuance, and or relief therefrom:
RJC Judge Clifton's 10/17/11 Order in 1708 reads:
ORDER This matter has come before the Court upon De-
fendant's Emergency Motion to Stay, Set Aside, Vacate
eviction Hearing Order filed on today's date. An Opposition by
Plaintiff was also filed today. These pleadings follow a Sum-
mary eviction hearing held October 13, 2011, before Judge
Sferrazza. The court's minutes indicate that Defendant's eviction
from the premises would only occur on today's date if he failed
to post the rental amount of $2,275.00 by October 17, 2011 with
the court. A trial date was then set for October 25, 2011. De-
fendant has tendered $2,275.00 to the court on loday's date.
Therefore, the instant motion is now moot and the trial date of
October 25,2011 stands. Is it therefore HEREBY ORDERED
that Defendant's Emergency Motion, Stay, Set Aside, Vacate
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eviction Hearing Order is DENIED. DATED this 17
th
day of
October, 2011.
Alongside the numerous procedural violations Coughlin has committed in filing his pa-
pers (ignoring page limits, missing deadlines, etc.), Merliss contends Coughlin's litigation tactics-
including Coughlin's instant attempt to set aside the attorney's fees award-have been employed
not to pursue arguments in good faith but to delay and harass him. Merliss contends Coughlin's be-
havior has been not only abusive but costly, requiring Merliss to contest each an every allegation
Coughlin makes no matter how meritless. page 2 of 8/28/12 Order in 03628.
Speaking of following rules, how about the 21 day safe harbor in NRCP 11? Hill never did
serve Coughlin a filing ready sanction motion. Coughlin, however, did serve Hill at least one such
21 day safe harbor motion. Hill and Flanagan seem to run the ol' frivolous fee sanction pick and roll
with at least an equal elan as that demonstrated by Judge L. Gardner and opposing counsel Springgate
(also, not a fan of 21 day safe harbor filing ready sanction Motions, even where invoking NRS
7.085, which itself invokes NRCP 11, which so requires service of just such a 21 day safe harbor mo-
tion...) in the Joshi Divorce Trial in 01168.
Further, neither Judge Flanagan, his then law clerk Zelalem Bogale, Esq., Hill, nor Baker
managed to ever cite to any authority supporting the apparent sua sponte (contrary to the 4/19/12 Or-
der in Carpentier by Flanagan speaking to the adjudicatory boundaries limitations placed upon courts
respecting the arguments put forward and citations in support thereto by the parties) contention that
Coughlins' alleged failure to file a timely Opposition to Baker's 4/19/12 Motion for Attorney's Fees is
a procedural violation. Further, there is not procedural rule setting page limits in the 2JDC.
Sure, there was an Order setting a page limit of 5 pages (which Baker himself exceeded), but
Couglhin did not ignore such Order. Rather, Coughlin addressed the fact that his Brief was in ex-
cess of said page limitation ordered, and argued a basis showing good cause for why is ought be per-
missible to exceed it. Certainly, no citation has ever been provided by Baker, Hill, or Judge Flanagan
to support a finding that Coughlin somehow was able to manufacture a set of circumstances requir-
ing Merliss to contest each an every allegation Coughlin makes no matter how meritless. Cer-
tainly, a more conservative approach could have been taken by Hill or Baker, such as filing a 5
page Answering Brief addressing the main points at issue, with a request for leave to later ex-
ceed any such page limitation, which is essentially what they did anyways...so where is all this
$42,050 in attorney's fees being rung up, if not in impermissible areas no the appropriate sub-
ject matter of such an attorney fee award motion...ie, filings related to the supersedeas
bond/stay on appeal issue arguably do not come within the purview of NRS 69.050, nor do those
(and the associated court time and preparation) related to the 11/7/11 hearing on Couglin's Mo-
tion to Set Aside, etc., in 1708, or the 12/20/11 Hearing on Coughlin's 11/16/12 Motion to Con-
test Personal Property Lien.
Certainly, Baker and Hill never presented any citation to support a contention that such
matters fall within the language of NRS 69.050. Further, with respect to all fees incurred in re-
lation to the personal property lien issue, Judge Flanagan's Order denying Coughlin's appeal of
3/30/12 makes clear that such matters (including the Order ResolvingDefendant's Motion to
Contest Personal Property Lien by Judge Sferrazza of 12/21/11...which was definitely not a
'consent Order' and which the transcript and record make clear Coughlin in no way consent-
ed to) were not included in the appeal in 03628. As such, the voluminous attorney fee billing
entries related thereto (impermissibly obscured somewhat by the excessive redacting of entries
in the allegedely detailed bills, where no legitimate privilege was ever asserted or proved to
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justify such obstructionist tactics...which now become of material relevance to the extent that
Baker, in his sworn testimony on 6/18/12 admitted to interactions with the WCSO Civil Divi-
sion on 10/28/11, and that Hill's law office definitely reliedupon the Reno Justice Court to
transmit the various eviction Orders to the Sheriff's Office for processing. The specter of both
the 10/25/11 and 10/27/11 eviction Orders here being void or stale where violative of the statu-
tory dictate that such an Order included language (and neither Order herein did) ordering the
Sheriff to remove from the premises within 24 hours or receipt (apparently the Sheriff's
receipt of such Order...though several counties in Nevada apparently view the relevant language in
NRS 40.253 as applying to the tenant's receipt, and, accordingly, have policies which require the
Sheriff or constable to post to a tenant's door such an Order, then allow at least 24 hours to pass
before conducting any such lockout.
One thing that certainly is interesting is that the eviction Order the WCSO posted to the
door of Coughlin's former home law office on 11/1/11 lacked any fax header (in contrast to all
other such eviction orders Coughlin had seen posted and Baker's testimony on 6/18/12 that the
RJCwas responsible for transmitting such an eviction Order, though its not clear that Baker
did not first fax the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE that the RJC faxed to him (as shown in the attach-
ments to Hill's TPO application of 1/12/12 against Coughlin) at 4:41pm to the WCSO along
with the Order of 10/27/11 granting Baker's unnoticed Emergency Motion to Inspect Cough-
lin's former home law office during the weekend during which, apparently, Coughlin was ex-
pected to recover for a grueling six weeks of litigating, and hire movers and rent trucks to move
both a home and a law office, even where the RJCwas still retaining the $2,275 in rent es-
crow that it demanded from Coughlin in the 10/13/11 Order in violation of Nevada law? Post-
ed with the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE on 11/1/11 by WCSO Deputy Machen was just that 10/27/11
Order allowing such an inspection, though that Order, curiously, did have two fax headers atop
it (one indicating the RJC faxed Hill's law office that inspection Order at 4:39 pm on
10/27/11), and a second header indicating the WCSO Civil Division received a fax nearly im-
mediately thereafter from Hill's office that transmitted the inspection Order (with RJCfax
header freshly printed thereon) to the WCSO Civil Division....What it not clear is why the RJC,
WCDA, WCSO Civil Division, Hill, and Baker are so reticient, and, some might say obstruction-
ist about responding to Coughlin's various requests (including NRS 239 Open Records Requests)
seeking documentation related to and copies of the fax logs of the RJC for the relevant time period
involved here, especially considering Baker's sworn testimony at the criminal trespass trial of Cough-
lin on 6/18/12 relative to just how such eviction Orders were received by the WCSO Civil Divi-
sion, and just what means of transmitting those Orders was utilized.
The law is unclear in Nevada and this is a matter of legitimate public concern involving both
the safety of law enforcement and tenants, but also the enormous social costs of ill advisedly carried
out summary eviction lockouts that are bound to resultin consequential damages far exceeded the rel-
atively small sum of money landlord's would save by having such lockouts done even one day earlier
than current usual custom and practices (to quote Hill's statement of the state of the law therein) of
the Washoe County Sheriff's Office. The judiciary has an obligation here as well as nearly all judi-
cial campaigns in Washoe County (particulary those at the Justice Court level) openly tout the en-
dorsement of a myriad of local law enforcement organizations (though, never, any that espouse ten-
ants rights or civil rights in general). Is there a Lawyer's Protection Association to mirror the Po-
lice Protective Association that nearly all successful judicial candidates in Washoe County so openly
flaunt having the endorsement of? Does that encourage the rampant Soldal v. Cook Co., style depri-
vation of 42 USC Sec. 1983 rights that is evinced in the 15 or so wrongful summary eviction Cough-
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lin has been subjected to since the initial wrongful 8/20/11 arrest and seven day incarceration occur-
ring while an eviction notice was placed on his former home law office's door just two months after
his domestic partner of four years absconded with two months of his rental contributions, secretely,
failed to pay one month of her own (though she did obtain, arguably, assent from the landlord to an
arrangement whereby any joint obligation thereto of Coughlin's was absolved with respect to one to
two months Ulloa's rental shares...), where Coughlin then could not afford his anti-depressants or
ADHD medications starting on or about August 2nd, 2011 (an also where an appointment with his
pyschiatrist, Dr. Yasar, had to be cancelled due to his not being able to afford the office visit, and
where NNAHMS indicated it would never cover ADHD medications, and that Coughlin would not be
permitted to have MDD medications covered where taking such ADHD medications, upon Coughlin
confidentially inquiring as to such matters with NNAHMS).
In contrast to allegedly billing up $42,050 in addressing Coughlin's allegations (its not
clear that the misconduct of Hill and Baker and their damage self interested damage control in-
stincts are an appropriate basis for racking of billable hours to charge Merliss or to later seek
(in a procedural violation of their own, given the dictates against seeking post-judgment at-
torney fee sanctions, particularly where no attempt to comply with the 21 day safe harbor re-
quirements in NRCP 11 where ever made by Hill or Baker) an award of such attorney's fees
What is most striking is the utter lack of specifics from either Baker, Hill, or Judge
Flanagan as to just which positions taken or arguments made by Coughlin evince any sort of
frivolity or why...Further, Hill and Baker themselves clearly conducted no novel legal research
in this matter, aside from citing to Anvui and the then recent CG Wallace case, and they
demonstrate any utter paucity of insight into landlord tenant law and summary evictions in
particular, which are, as the CG Wallace case points out, truly rare species in the law, having
unto themselves and entirely unique set of considerations and procedures.
DD) RPC 3.4(c) states "A lawyer shall not: (k)nowingly disobey an obligation under the
rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exists."
The certified audio transcript Coughlin purchased from the RMC of the Trial reveals Cough-
lin openly declaring to Judge Howard, following the Court issuing Coughlin a contempt warning a
scant five minutes into the trial, just such an open refusal where Coughlin is heard addressing the
Court as follows: I am not going to be bullied out of my rights. 7:24 mark.
ii
(EE) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin has a clear
and continuing pattern of knowingly ignoring and disobeying instructionsfrom the
Court. Instructions or suggestions like those made on 3/12/09 by Judge L. Gardner are different
than obligations. Further, Coughlin's former supervisor at WLS, Elcano, admitted to having instilled
Coughlin with the teaching that when you walk into that courtroom, its not the judges courtroom, its
not opposing counsel's courtroom, its YOUR courtroom.
iii
T115:22
(FF) IN HIS ORDER OF CONTEMPT, JUDGE HOWARD FOUND THAT COUGHLIN REFUSED TO OBEY
DIRECTIVES OF THE JUDGE AND CONTINUED LINES OF QUESTIONING AFTER BEING INSTRUCTED TO RE-
FRAIN FROM DOING SO. SUPRA 4 THERE IS A MATERIAL MISSTATEMENT OF HOWARD'S ORDER IN THE
FOFCOL WHERE IT READS: THE JUDGE FOUND COUGHLIN'S CONDUCT TO BE DISORDERLY AND
WAS EITHER CONTEMPTUOUS OR BEHAVIOR INSOLENT TOWARD THE JUDGE IN THAT
COUGHLIN REFUSED:
"... to obey directives of the Judge, continuing lines of inquiry after being
advised by the Court to refrain from doing so; demeaning the Court with
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statements such as "WOW" in response to court rulings; laughing during
testimony and further questioning the court and its authority."
Howard's Order actually reads WHEREAS such individual committed the following act(s)
in the immediate view and presence of the Court: (blank with check mark) Disorderly, contemptu-
ous or insolent behavior toward the judge while he is holding court, or engaged in his judicial duties
at chambers,
Also, the ROA in the appeal of 22176 demonstrates no legally sufficient service of the
11/15/11 Notice of Setting Bench Trial date of November 30, 2011. Further, two non-judicial court
holidays days (Thanksgiving and Family Day) occurred between the filing of that 11/15/11 Notice
and the 11/30/11 Trial, therefore, a jurisdictional bar makes void the 11/30/11 Order.
ADDITIONALLY, THE ROAIN 2064 IS DEFICIENT WHERE COUGHLIN WAS GIVEN PERMISSION TO
AND DID SUBMIT FOR FILING ON 12/12/11 HIS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND SERVED IT UPON THE RCA
IN COMPLIANCE WITH ALL APPLICABLE RULES, DESPITE WHATEVER SUA SPONTE, TOO EARLY, OBJEC-
TIONS JUDGE HOWARD MADE ON 12/16/11 ON THE RCA'S BEHALF, AND THE RCA'S FAILURE TO OPPOSE
SUCH MOTION SHOULD TAKEN AS AN ADMISSION UNDER POLK V. STATE THAT THE MOTION SHOULD BE
GRANTED.
Similar the the argument that a judges decision that any conduct did not rise to the level to
require reporting under Canon 3d is the fact that that there are some blanks the the form order used to
prepare the 11/30/11 JCCO that lack check marks, and what important blanks those turn out to be
given the conclusiveness that bar counsel so enjoys under SCR 111(5) now operates to defeat the
Complaints allegations respecting a violation of ANYRPC in connection with 22176, where the
JCCO reads (and this is where the rubber stamp signature :
A breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance in the presence of the Court, or in
its immediate vicinity, tending to interrupt due to the course of the trial or other judicial proceeding,
__ Refusing to be sworn or answer as a witness,
__ Disobeying a lawful writ/order/rule/process issued by the Court/judge at chambers, and
WHEREAS such conduct:
__ Demeaned the Court...
A Marshal writing refused an initialing the 11/30/11 Judgment of Conviction and Court
Order does not meet the service requirements to start the running of the deadlines to file a Motion for
New Trial and or Notice of Appeal, especially where the final key three minutes of Judge Howard's
Order as rendered were made in absentia with respect to RCA Roberts, whom had left the building by
that point. The RMC's failure to mail Coughlin that JCCO (reference emails and calls between Ve-
ronica Lopez and Coughlin wherein RMC admits to not doing so) makes the Order Affirming Ruling
of RMC (attached as Exhibit 1 to Complaint) void for lack of jurisdiction as well. That's where the
Marshals getting angry with Coughlin and taking away the Order was attempting to discern prior to
considering signing the blank after I UNDERSTAND AN PROMISE TO OBEY THIS ORDER.
DEFENDANT: ____, and then rippign it away from Coughlin in an awesome display of authority
and dominance, and then failing to put said Order in Coughlin's laptop case, refusing to allow Cough-
lin to hit save on his netbook to retain his trial notes prior to the Marshal powering it down and
packing it in Coughlin's bag, and Judicial Assistant Lopez refusing to provide Coughlin another
copy of said Order, the failing to follow through on her representation that she would fax it to Cough-
lin necessarily makes the JCCO stale or Coughlin's subsequent motions victorious under Polk.
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ROA in 22176 at page 13 missing page thereafter with not a jailable offense interlinea-
tion by Judge Howard.
As for any SCR 102.5 analysis, can Coughlin meet a clear and convicing evidence standard by
merely placing check marks after each subsection on mitigation and ceasing to check all subsections
addressing aggravation? Can Coughlin say yes in response to a SBN King style regurgitation of
the language of a rule or statue followed by a generalized, circular prompt? If so, then yes and
check all blanks for mitigation and leave uncheck those for aggravation. Prior to his current tempo-
rary suspension Coughlin had been a member in good standing with both the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) (since May 2003) and State Bar of Nevada (since 3/29/05) with abso-
lutely no disciplinary history whatsoever. So...speaking of that, how does King's DowSoE not violate
8.1, 1.1, 1.3, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.8, and, uh, oh, hang on my RPC Uzi jammed for a sec...where was I?
The FOFCOL attempts to characterize a civil summary contempt finding by Judge Howard as
clear and convincing evidence of a violation of various RPC's; however, Judge Howard assessment
that nothing Coughlin did during that Trial invoked a duty to report under judicial canons must be
viewed as creating, at the very least, a presumption (if not res judicata on the issue) that no such pro-
fessional misconduct occurred. Further, Judge Howard specifically delineated his Order, at 1:16 as
applying to Coughlin in his role as a DEFENDANT and not in any professional capacity such that
the Rules of Professional Conduct would apply to any such finding or ruling. Actually, its interest-
ing, that Order reads: NAME: ZACHERYCOUGHLIN, who is a DEFENDANT ______ Party;
_____ Witness; ______ Spectator.
Granted, its basically a form order with scantly filled in blanks mentioning Coughlin laugh-
ing during testimony, saying WOW following Howard refusing to grant a continuance (even
where so very many factor weighed in favor of doing so (RCA Roberts had stipulated to one in writ-
ing; Judge W. Gardner granted one that same day to the RCA due to Hill's going on vacation in
26405, Coughlin had not previously sought nor received a continuance, the first continuance was a
result of no fault of Coughlin's (and Howard admitted in the last 2 minutes of the transcript to having
been mistaken about that); Coughlin alleged Hill was withholding exculpatory materials supportive
of Coughlin's contention that Wal-Mart has previous to the 9/9/11 arrest threatened to abuse process
against Coughlin in retaliatory for his exposing and criticizing Wal-Mart's suspect practices with re-
spect to honoring its stated, written Return Policy, the RCA cited no prejudice it would endure as a
result of a continuance, all three witnesses were likely be receive compensation from their employers
for attending the trial, and all three witness stayed until the conclusion of the trial at 8:20 pm, where
they had been there prior to the start of the 1:00 pm stacked docket, so their time was obvious-
ly not being taken from them or preventing them from doing anything else of their choosing).
Relations with Opposing Counsel
(NN) RPC 3.5A states "When a lawyer knows or reasonably should know the identity of a lawyer
representing an opposing party, he or she should not take advantage of the lawyer by causing any
default or dismissal to be entered without first inquiring about the opposing lawyer's intention
to proceed." (?Judge Linda Gardner's former employer Gayle Kern, Esq. in RJC Rev2012-000374,
perhaps? "It is absolutely fair, Your Honor..." to RJC Judge Jack Schroeder when he entered a de-
fault summary eviction on 3/15/12 against Coughlin despite Coughlin having filed a Tenant's Answer
of substantial length and substance and Coughlin appearing, perhaps even on time, on 3/15/12 for the
Hearing (and an unlawful interruption of essential services hearing had already taken place against
Kern's client, though only the property manager showed up to play lawyer for PTTHHOA).
Accordingly, the Panel finds that the State Bar failed to meet its burden of proof on this issue as an
evidentiary matter but fmds that as a matter of default the violation may be deemed admitted. (this is
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a nonsense argument, especially where the Panel and SBN pat themselves on the back for, allegedly,
providing sufficient due process to Coughlin/fulfilling SCR 105...its one or the other...but the Panel
doesn't get to purport that Coughlin defaulte where it is also trumpeting the feats of due process it en-
abled....).
Respect for the Rights of Third Persons
(RR) RPC 4.4(a) states '"In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person... "
(uh...like Hill's allegations of finding a "crack pipe and a bag of weed" or a "vial of some-
thing" and "a large quantity of pills"?). However RPC 4.4 relates to third persons, not op-
posing parties or counsel, and a court itself has never been deemed a third person in a matter
it is presiding over.
irst, while there have been no formal prior disciplinary proceedings by the State Bar, the
record establishes that Coughlin has been disciplined by way of sanctions on at least four prior occa-
sions.
Any such sanctions rendered against Coughlin are void: 10. [3.61] Postjudgment Motion for
Sanctions A judge lacks authority to grant a partys postjudgment motion for sanctions. Such a mo-
tion does not comply with the safe harbor provision of CCP 128.7(c)(1). Barnes v Department of
Corrections (1999) 74 CA4th 126, 129135, 87 CR2d 594. A sanctions motion that is served and
filed after the action has been dismissed is also untimely. Hart v Avetoom (2002) 95 CA4th 410, 413
415, 115 CR2d 511. A party must serve any motion for sanctions before the final disposition of the
claimed sanctionable conduct in order to give the opposing party an opportunity to correct the alleg-
edly offending conduct and avoid sanctions. 74 CA4th at 130, 132133, 135. For example, an order
sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend does not bar a motion for CCP 128.7 sanctions unless
the order is reduced to a judgment before the sanctions motion is served and filed. Banks v Hathaway,
Perrett, Webster, Powers & Chrisman (2002) 97 CA4th 949, 954, 118 CR2d 803. If the motion is
served before the entry of judgment, and the safe harbor time expires before judgment is entered, the
motion can be filed after the judgment is entered. Day v Collingwood (2006) 144 CA4th 1116, 1124,
50 CR3d 903.
In the summary eviction appeal in 03628, a 3/30/12 Order by Judge Flanagan Denied Cough-
lin's appeal, and it was not until Hill's associate Baker, on 4/19/12 filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees,
wherein only then a request for sanctions and citation to NRS 7.085 was made, that the landlord
sought sanctions. Such a Postjudgment Motion for Sanctions may not be a basis for awarding an at-
torney fee sanctions.
Further, to the extent Sellers would prohibit Coughlin from being awarded his own attorney
fees as a self represented attorney litigant in 1708, it would be impermissible to allow the counter of
that, were it even the case that any such sanctions that might have issued were awarded against
Coughlin as his own attorney versus against Coughlin as a litigant or appellant.
California Judges Benchguide 366 [3.60] Attorneys Fees
The award of sanctions may include attorneys fees to the movant. CCP 128.7(d). However,
a self-represented attorney who responds to a filing abuse may not recover sanctions under CCP
128.7 in the form of attorneys fees. Musaelian v Adams (2009) 45 C4th 512, 516520, 87 CR3d
475 (expressly disapproves Laborde v Aronson (2001) 92 CA4th 459, 112 CR2d 119 and
Abandonato v Coldren (1995) 41 CA4th 264, 48 CR2d 429, to the extent that they are inconsistent).
As to SCR 102.5 mitigation respecting previous disciplinary record, Coughlin has none, peri-
od. Further, as set forth in exquisite detail in Coughlin's 11/19/12 filing in 61383 and a 10/31/12 fil-
ing in the instant matter (which is curiously absent from the ROA and the SBN's Alphabetical Index
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of Documents, particularly suspect given it is perhaps the singularly most damaging filing by Cough-
lin to Hill and the SBN's approach and contentions in this matter...and Coughlin had a file stamped
copy of that filing, so...). NRCP 56(j).
iv
Coughlin's case, had the Panel or Bar let him put on evidence related thereto, is actually quite
strong on an SCR 102.5 mitigation analysis:
MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE AS DEFENSE OR MITIGATING FACTOR IN ATTORNEY DISCIPLI-
NARY PROCEEDING, 46 AMJUR POF 2D 563:
4. Nature of disturbanceNeuroses
[Cumulative Supplement]
LITERALLY MEANING "ABNORMAL OR DISEASED CONDITION OF THE NERVES," THE TERM
"NEUROSIS" HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN USED TO REPRESENT A GROUP OF FUNCTIONAL DIS-
ORDERS[50] HAVING IN COMMON THE PRESENCE OF, OR AN INEFFECTUAL DEFENSE
AGAINST, ANXIETY. IN CONTRAST TO PSYCHOTICS,[51] NEUROTICS MAINTAIN INSIGHT AND
ARE LESS AFFECTED IN THEIR DAY-TO-DAY LIVING.[52]
Observation:
THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION'S LATEST DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
("DSM-III") HAS OMITTED THE FORMER MAJOR CLASS OF "NEUROSES,"[53] REPLACING IT
WITH SEVERAL CATEGORIES: AFFECTIVE, ANXIETY, SOMATOFORM, DISSOCIATIVE, AND PSY-
CHOSEXUAL DISORDERS.[54] THE RATIONALE FOR THIS SIGNIFICANT CHANGE WAS THAT NO
CONSENSUS PRESENTLY EXISTS IN THE PSYCHIATRIC FIELD AS TO HOW TO DEFINE THE TERM
"NEUROSIS," WITH SOME CLINICIANS CONFINING THE TERM TO ITS DESCRIPTIVE MEANING (AS
INDICATING A PAINFUL SYMPTOM IN SOMEONE WITH INTACT REALITY-TESTING) AND OTHERS
EMPLOYING IT TO INCLUDE ALSO THE CONCEPT OF A SPECIFIC ETIOLOGICAL PROCESS (AN UN-
CONSCIOUS CONFLICT AROUSING ANXIETY, LEADING TO THE MALADAPTIVE USE OF DEFENSE
MECHANISMS, AND RESULTING IN SYMPTOM FORMATION).[55] THE GUIDE DOES GIVE "NEU-
ROTIC DISORDERS" AS AN ALTERNATIVE DESCRIPTIVE TERM FOR SEVERAL OF THE AFFECTIVE
AND OTHER DISORDERS MENTIONED ABOVE; FOR INSTANCE, HYPOCHONDRIASIS, ONE OF THE
SOMATOFORM DISORDERS, IS REFERRED TO PARENTHETICALLY AS "HYPOCHONDRIACAL NEU-
ROSIS."[56]
Historically, the neuroses have been named according to their predominant symptom pat-
terns, having names such as anxiety neurosis, hysterical neurosis, phobic neurosis, obsessive-
compulsive neurosis, depressive neurosis (dysthymic reaction), and hypochondriacal neuro-
sis. For instance, the depressive neurosis has been said to be characterized by excessive and
prolonged despondency coupled with feelings of incapacity and helplessness, usually follow-
ing some real or symbolic loss, and unresolved internal conflict, or a drop in self-esteem.[57]
Several of the foregoing neuroses have been redefined by DSM-III as anxiety disorders. For
example, one of the anxiety disorders falling within the subcategory of anxiety states (or anx-
iety neuroses) is the obsessive-compulsive disorder (referred to parenthetically as the obses-
sive-compulsive neurosis).[58] According to the manual, this disorder's essential features are
enduring obsessions or compulsions. Obsessions are defined as recurrent and persistent ideas,
thoughts, images, or impulses which are ego-dystonic (experienced not as voluntarily pro-
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duced, but rather as senseless or repugnant invasions of consciousness); compulsions are de-
fined as repetitive and ostensibly purposeful behavior which is performed according to vari-
ous rules or in stereotyped fashion.[59] The compulsive behavior is said not to be an end in
itself, but is designed to produce or to prevent some future event or situation; however, either
the behavior is not tied in a realistic way to what it is designed to bring about or prevent, or it
may be clearly excessive. Depression and anxiety are common with the obsessive-compulsive
disorder; often there is phobic avoidance of situations which involve the subject of the obses-
sions, such as dirt or contamination. Although the obsessive-compulsive disorder ordinarily
begins in adolescence or early adulthood, it may begin in childhood; its course is typically
chronic, with waxing and waning of symptoms. Impairment of the individual is generally
moderate to severe, although in some instances compulsions may become a major life activi-
ty.[60]
Diagnostically neurotic lawyers, defending charges or proffering mitigating factors at disci-
plinary proceedings on the basis of the reported neuroses, have been disbarred,[61] suspended
for a fixed period of time,[62] suspended for a definite period of time and thereafter until re-
habilitated,[63] and indefinitely suspended.[64] In one case the court dismissed the discipli-
nary proceeding against an obsessive-compulsive attorney who had been convicted of failing
to file federal income tax returns on the ground that (1) counsel was subject to discipline only
if he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude or an act involving moral turpitude,
dishonesty, or corruption; (2) the federal conviction was not predicated on and did not require
any intent to defraud since it rested on a finding of "bad purpose" inferred from his voluntary
deliberate failure to file the tax returns with knowledge that there was no reasonable justifica-
tion for his not doing so; and (3) his psychiatric problems were not considered as justifying
any acts of moral turpitude, but rather as tending to negate any fraudulent intenta state of
mind on which a finding of moral turpitude might be based.[65]
Cases:
DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY DISORDER: ATTORNEY WHO WAS SUSPENDED FOR MAKING
FALSE STATEMENTS TO CLIENT AND FOR FAILING TO ACT WITH DILIGENCE WOULD BE REIN-
STATED SUBJECT TO A THREE YEAR PERIOD OF PROBATION WITH CERTAIN CONDITIONS, IN-
CLUDING THE CONDITIONS OF MALPRACTICE INSURANCE AND ATTORNEY'S FORMAL AGREE-
MENT TO REPAY DEBT; DOCTOR DIAGNOSED ATTORNEY AS SUFFERING FROM PROFOUND MA-
JOR DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY DISORDER WITH SEVERE PHOBIA AND STATED THAT ATTORNEY
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HAD MADE EXCELLENT PROGRESS, AND DOCTOR OPINED THAT ATTORNEY PRESENTED A VERY
LOW RISK FOR RECIDIVISM AND THAT HE DID NOT REPRESENT A DANGER TO THE PUBLIC. IN RE
SULLIVAN, 801 A.2D 933 (DEL. 2002); WEST'S KEY NUMBER DIGEST, ATTORNEY AND CLI-
ENT K61.
Attorney's misappropriation of client funds, through six separate deposits into his law office's
operating account, which account was overdrawn during periods of commingling of operating
funds with client funds, was negligent rather than intentional, and thus, suspension rather than
disbarment was appropriate disciplinary sanction; when attorney discovered that a check to
client exceeded the balance in operating account, he promptly covered the shortage, and when
the misconduct occurred during one-year period, attorney had been undergoing psychothera-
py. West's F.S.A. Bar Rules 5-1.1(a, b), (g)(2), 5-1.2(b, c); Bar Rules 4-1.15(a, b, d), 5-1.1(a,
d), (e)(2) (2001). The Florida Bar v. Wolf, 930 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 2006); West's Key Number
Digest, Attorney and Client k59.5(5).
A 2-year suspension and probationary terms were imposed on attorney convicted of making
obscene phone calls, where the referee, after considering attorney's chemical and alcohol de-
pendency, his diagnosed sexual disorder, and a previous criminal conviction for the same of-
fense, as well as attorney's enrollment in counseling and therapy programs and the absence of
previous bar discipline, recommended a 90-day suspension along with probation for an indef-
inite time, while the Bar recommended a 3-year suspension even though attorney's offense
did not relate to the practice of law. The Florida Bar v Helinger (1993, Fla) 620 So 2d 993, 18
FLW S 347.
Bipolar disorder: Attorney's disability for practice of law, occasioned by his diagnosed bipo-
lar disorder, warranted acceptance of his petition for voluntary discipline, which petition
called for five-year removal from practice of law, in light of attorney's lack of prior discipli-
nary record, lack of dishonest or selfish motive, existence of personal and emotional prob-
lems, timely good faith effort to make restitution and rectify consequences of misconduct, full
and
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free disclosure to disciplinary board and cooperative attitude toward proceedings, good character
and reputation, mental disability or impairment, interim rehabilitation, and remorse. State Bar Rules
and Regulations, Rule 4-104(a). In re Rand, 279 Ga. 555, 616 S.E.2d 452 (2005); West's Key Num-
ber Digest, Attorney and Client 58.
DEPRESSION: EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT FINDING THAT ATTORNEY'S UNETH-
ICAL CONDUCT WAS NOT SOLELY RELATED TO ONSET OF HIS UNDIAGNOSED MAJOR DEPRES-
SION AND WAS OTHERWISE UNCHARACTERISTIC OF HIS MANNER OF PRACTICE, YET, GROWING
STATE OF ATTORNEY'S DEPRESSION PLAYED SOME ROLE IN ATTORNEY'S MISCONDUCT IN VAR-
YING DEGREES, SO AS TO BE CONSIDERED AS A MITIGATING FACTOR IN THE IMPOSITION OF
DISCIPLINE; ATTORNEY TESTIFIED HE WOULD GO TO WORK AND BE UNABLE TO MEANINGFUL-
LY PERFORM ANY TASKS FOR WEEKS AT A TIME, AND WAS UNABLE TO EVEN GO TO WORK AT
TIMES, WHICH EXPLAINED HIS NEGLECT OF CLIENT MATTERS, ALTHOUGH EVIDENCE DID NOT
SIMILARLY EXPLAIN THE SAME RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEPRESSION AND ATTORNEY'S
MISREPRESENTATIONS, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS APPARENT THE TWO CIRCUMSTANCES WERE CO-
EXISTENT. I.C.A. RULE 32.DR 1-102(A)(4-6), DR 6-101(A)(3), DR 7-101(A). IOWA SUPREME
COURT BD. OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT V. GROTEWOLD, 642 N.W.2D 288
(IOWA 2002); WEST'S KEY NUMBER DIGEST, ATTORNEY AND CLIENT K53(2).
Six-month suspension from the practice of law, with attorney's reinstatement conditioned on
demonstrating that he was fit to resume practice of law, was the appropriate sanction for at-
torney's misconduct in failing to complete his representation of estate, as attorney's depres-
sion continued to impact attorney and his ability to practice law, attorney's misconduct caused
actual serious injury to estate of $37,659.56, and attorney failed to diligently represent estate
for an 11-year period. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 226, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a),
3.2. In re Foster, 258 P.3d 375 (Kan. 2011).
Significant depression, personality disorder, and mood disorder did not render attorney
utterly unable to conform his conduct in accordance with the law and the rules of professional
conduct so as to mitigate punishment for his intentional dishonesty and misappropriation of
client funds, where attorney maintained a successful law practice during the relevant period
of time, and he worked 70 to 80 hours per week. Attorney Grievance Com'n of Maryland v.
Zakroff, 387 Md. 603, 876 A.2d 664 (2005); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client
58.
When an attorney raises psychological disability as a mitigating factor contributing to mis-
conduct, the attorney must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has a severe
psychological problem, that the psychological problem was the cause of the misconduct, that
he or she is undergoing treatment and is making progress to recover, that the recovery has ar-
rested the misconduct, and that the misconduct is not apt to recur. In re Disciplinary Action
Against Otis, 1998 WL 469820 (Minn. 1998).
Bipolar disorder: Attorney showed that recovery from his bipolar disorder arrested his mis-
conduct of misappropriating client funds and that a recurrence of his misconduct was unlike-
ly, as required for attorney's bipolar disorder to constitute mitigating factor in attorney disci-
plinary proceeding; physician stated that attorney was compliant with his medication and that
if he continued taking it, a recurrence was unlikely, and physician stated that he would con-
tinue to monitor attorney, and attorney agreed in his brief to continued monitoring of his con-
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dition for a five-year probationary period. In re Belz, 258 S.W.3d 38 (Mo. 2008); West's Key
Number Digest, Attorney and Client k59.5(5).
Mental disability can be considered in mitigation of discipline only if attorney's recovery
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from his condition can be demonstrated by "a meaningful and sustained period of successful re-
habilitation." Accordingly, attorney's "chronic depression" could not be considered as mitigating fac-
tor in imposing discipline on attorney for failure to act diligently on behalf of his clients and his fail-
ure to communicate with them, where attorney admitted he still suffered from his mental disability,
chronic depression, and that his counselor had concluded that practicing law aggravated his depres-
sion. In re Smith (1993) 115 NM 769, 858 P2d 857.
ATTORNEY CONVICTED OF PETIT LARCENY WAS SUFFICIENTLY IMPAIRED TO CAUSE HER
ABERRATIONAL CONDUCT, AND SINCE SHE SOUGHT AND OBTAINED APPROPRIATE PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL HELP FOR HER PROBLEM, CENSURE FOR MISCONDUCT WAS PROPER. IN RE MONGIOI
(1995, 2D DEPT) 213 APP DIV 2D 107, 631 NYS2D 77.
Public censure was proper discipline for attorney who neglected several estate matters and
had prior admonitions, but who had psychological condition during relevant period, sought
treatment, and tried to hire additional personnel to avoid placing her in jeopardy of repeating
conduct which precipitated disciplinary proceeding. In re Erda (1995, 1st Dept) 209 App Div
2d 147, 625 NYS2d 165.
Highly compensated partner in major law firm who overcharged clients to pay for luxury pur-
chases would be disbarred, despite repayment of converted funds, since repayment was made
only after misconduct was disclosed and he failed to establish causal connection between al-
leged psychological problems he was undergoing and conversions. Re Gieger (1991, 1st
Dept) 170 App Div 2d 134, 572 NYS2d 11, app den 79 NY2d 755, 581 NYS2d 665, 590
NE2d 250.
Attorney's health conditions would not be considered as a mitigating factor in disciplinary
proceeding, since attorney failed to demonstrate that his traumatic head injury, chronic ob-
structive pulmonary disease, diabetes, and anxiety was linked to his conduct in neglecting cli-
ent matters, failing to maintain a record documenting his receipt of a client's fee, failing to
promptly comply with a reasonable client requests for information, failing to keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of the client's legal matter. Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn.
v. Kaplan, 124 Ohio St. 3d 278, 2010-Ohio-167, 921 N.E.2d 645 (2010).
While Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court may
properly consider attorney's mental illness at the time of alleged misconduct as a mitigating
factor in determining what sanction should be imposed, the mental illness provisions for
summary suspension are not intended to be used by attorney in a disciplinary action to avoid
suspension for violations. Government of the Bar Rule V, 7. Cincinnati Bar Assn. v.
Komarek, 84 Ohio St. 3d 90, 702 N.E.2d 62 (1998).
Where an attorney had failed to disclose on her bar application her shoplifting incidents and
psychological counseling for bulimia, mild anxiety, and depression, the attorney was sus-
pended for an indefinite period of practice of law; this suspension is to terminate upon a
showing of her compliance with a thorough psychological evaluation and, if necessary, treat-
ment, followed by further review by the board of her character, fitness, and moral qualifica-
tions for admission to the practice of law. In re Salisbury, 69 Ohio St 3d 403, 632 NE2d
1288.
Mitigating factor to be considered in determining sanction for attorney who failed to make nu-
merous filings and made false filings while representing bankruptcy clients, failed to communicate
with clients, failed to determine effect of bankruptcy filings on clients' property transfers, and failed
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to cooperate with disciplinary investigation, was that attorney suffered from depression during the
relevant time periods, but subsequently obtained treatment for that
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CONDITION. IN RE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MERRIAM, 2010 WI 21, 780
N.W.2D 150 (WIS. 2010).
Emotional stress: Attorney's eventually admitting to using client's $3000 cashier's check
to purchase a television for her family and claim that her failure to have made admission
timely was result of emotional stress were insufficient to render improper conclusion that she
engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in the matter, given attorney's mis-
representations to client's successor attorney regarding funds and accounting methods used to
explain how check was used. Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules 20:8.4(c). In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Gilbert, 227 Wis. 2d 444, 595 N.W.2d 715 (1999); West's Key Number
Digest, Attorney and Client k44(2).
Section 4 Footnotes: [FN50] A functional disorder is a disturbance affecting function but not
structureone largely originating in the mind or the emotions. In contrast, an organic mental disor-
der is a transient or permanent dysfunction of the brain caused by a disturbance of the physiologic
functioning of brain tissue at any level of organizationstructural, hormonal, biochemical, or electri-
cal. Blinder, Psychiatry in the Everyday Practice of Law: A Lawyer's Manual for Case Preparation
and Trial (2d ed.) 621, 628 [hereafter referred to as Blinder, Psychiatry in Practice of Law].
[FN51] See 5. [FN52] White & Watt, Abnormal Personality 751. [FN53] American Psychiatric As-
sociation, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 9 (3d ed 1980) [hereafter referred to
as DSM-III]. [FN54] Id., p 10. [FN55] Id., p 9.
NOTE: TO AVOID THIS AMBIGUITY, THE ASSOCIATION HAS RECOMMENDED THAT THE
TERM "NEUROTIC DISORDER" BE USED ONLY DESCRIPTIVELY, WHEREAS THE TERM "NEUROTIC
PROCESS" SHOULD BE EMPLOYED WHENEVER THE CLINICIAN DESIRES TO DESIGNATE THE
CONCEPT OF A SPECIFIC ETIOLOGICAL PROCESS INVOLVING THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE: UN-
CONSCIOUS CONFLICTS BETWEEN OPPOSING WISHES OR BETWEEN WISHES AND PROHIBITIONS,
WHICH CAUSES UNCONSCIOUS PERCEPTION OF ANTICIPATED DANGER OF DYSPHORIA, WHICH
LEADS IN TURN TO USE OF DEFENSE MECHANISMS THAT RESULT IN EITHER SYMPTOMS, PER-
SONALITY DISTURBANCE, OR BOTH. ID.
[FN56] Id., pp 18, 249. [FN57] Blinder, Psychiatry in the Everyday Practice of Law: A Lawyer's
Manual for Case Preparation and Trial (2d ed.) 2.1. [FN58] DSM-III, 18, 234. [FN59] Id., p 234.
[FN60] Id. [FN61] Re Freiburghouse (1959) 52 Cal 2d 514, 342 P2d 1 (compulsive-obsessive neuro-
sis); Re Burka (1980, Dist Col App) 423 A2d 181 (anxiety neurosis with associated depression); At-
torney Grievance Com. v Burka (1981) 292 Md 221, 438 A2d 514 (identical diagnosis). 26 A.L.R.
4th 995 6[a]. [FN62] Re Satta (1979, 1st Dept) 71 App Div 2d 292, 422 NYS2d 418. 26 A.L.R. 4th
995 6[b]. [FN63] Louisiana State Bar Asso. v Stevenson (1978, La) 356 So 2d 408. 26 A.L.R. 4th
995 6[b]. [FN64] Re Cohen (1983, 1st Dept) 92 App Div 2d 139, 459 NYS2d 434 (indefinitely
suspending attorney who, diagnosed as having "adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features,"
was suffering from anxiety, paranoia, depression, and fantasies); State v Ledvina (1976) 71 Wis 2d
195, 237 NW2d 683. 26 A.L.R. 4th 995 6[b]. [FN65] Re Fahey (1973) 8 Cal 3d 842, 106 Cal Rptr
313, 505 P2d 1369, 63 ALR3d 465. As to the propriety of disciplining counsel for tax-related mis-
conduct, see A.L.R. Library Federal income tax conviction as involving moral turpitude warranting
disciplinary action against attorney, 63 A.L.R. 3d 476; Federal income tax conviction as constituting
nonprofessional misconduct warranting disciplinary action against attorney, 63 A.L.R. 3D 512.
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6. NATURE OF DISTURBANCEOTHER DISORDERS[77]
Like their alcoholic, drug-dependent, neurotic, and psychotic counterparts,[78] attorneys
with other mental and emotional maladies have claimed, with different degrees of success,
that their disturbance should qualify as a defense to charges of unethical conduct or as a fac-
tor mitigating the extent of discipline to be imposed.[79] These other types of disturbances
will be discussed in the following order: amnesia, epilepsy, the so-called "burned out" syn-
drome, and generic disorders.
[FN77] For consideration of character or personality disorders, such as Type "A" personality
and narcissistic personality, see Blinder, Psychiatry in the Everyday Practice of Law: A Law-
yer's Manual for Case Preparation and Trial (2d ed.) 2.1[d]; American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 19, 305 (3d ed 1980); T. Millon,
Disorders of Personality, DSM-III: Axis II (1981). [FN78] See 2 5, supra. [FN79] See, for
example, Re Fitz Gibbons (1931) 182 Minn 373, 234 NW 637 (disbarring epileptic attorney); Re
Fallick (1936) 247 App Div 176, 286 NYS 581 (suspending amnesiac lawyer); Re Conduct of Loew
(1982) 292 Or 806, 642 P2d 1171, 26 ALR4th 987 (suspending counsel with "burn out syndrome");
Re Crist (1971) 258 Or 88, 481 P2d 74, (probating psychiatrically troubled deputy district attorney);
Re Rosenblatt (1972) 60 NJ 505, 291 A2d 369 (reprimanding attorney allegedly suffering from psy-
chological block). A.L.R. Library: Mental or emotional disturbance as defense to or mitigation of
charges against attorney in disciplinary proceeding, 26 A.L.R. 4th 995 10.
[FN80] DISSOCIATION IS THE TERM COMMONLY USED TO DEFINE THE PHENOMENON BY WHICH A GROUP
OF MENTAL PROCESSES SPLITS OFF FROM THE MAINSTREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS, OR BY WHICH BEHAV-
IOR LOSES ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE REST OF THE PERSONALITY. DISSOCIATIVE DISORDERS ARE DIS-
TURBANCES IN WHICH THE NORMAL INTEGRATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS, MEMORY, OR IDENTITY IS AB-
RUPTLY AND TEMPORARILY ALTERED. G. DAVISON &J. NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN EXPER-
IMENTAL CLINICAL APPROACH 771 (3D ED 1982) [HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS DAVISON &NEALE,
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY]. [FN81] AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATIS-
TICAL
ATTENTION DEFICIT DISORDER: ATTORNEY WHO NEGLIGENTLY COMMINGLED CLIENT
AND PERSONAL FUNDS WOULD BE PUBLICLY CENSURED, WHERE ATTORNEY HAD NOT ACTED
WITH DISHONEST MOTIVE, CLIENTS HAD NOT SUFFERED ACTUAL HARM, AND PHYSICIAN TESTI-
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FIED THAT ATTORNEY'S ATTENTION DEFICIT DISORDER, WHICH WAS CURRENTLY BEING SUC-
CESSFULLY TREATED WITH MEDICATION, WAS MAJOR CAUSE OF MISHANDLING OF FUNDS.
PEOPLE V SHIDLER (1995, COLO) 901 P2D 477.
Passive-Agressive Personality Disorder: A psychiatrist's opinion that an attorney suf-
fered from a "Passive-Agressive Personality Disorder," and a "Dysthymic Disorder," alt-
hough indicating that the attorney may have suffered from the disorders, would not alone
constitute a defense to charges of misconduct on grounds of mental incompetence, and would
not serve to mitigate the disbarment. Although the attorney may have suffered from the dis-
orders, the psychiatrist testified that the disorders were not of such magnitude as to render
him totally incompetent to practice law, or unable to understand the nature of the disciplinary
charges against him. In addition, because the violations were numerous, diverse, and serious
(multiple violations of six rules of professional conduct), the aggravating circumstances out-
weighed the mitigating circumstances. Re Rich (1989, Del Sup) 559 A2d 1251.
Domestic emotional distress: Suspension of attorney from practice of law for 30 days, fol-
lowed by 18-month period of probation, was appropriate discipline, though attorney gave
false statement to police officer in connection with incident that resulted in attorney's being
arrested for stealing automobile (charges that were later not pursued), since attorney had not
been subject of prior disciplinary action, and there was mitigating evidence showing that he
acted under emotional distress of broken marriage. Additionally, many witnesses offered their
opinion that attorney had begun significant rehabilitation. The Florida Bar v Poplack (1992,
Fla) 599 So 2d 116, 17 FLW S 565.
Domestic emotional distress: An attorney would be suspended for two years after he im-
properly signed his name and that of his client to a settlement check and withheld payment to
the client for more than three months while using the funds for his own purposes. The attor-
ney's claim that he had no recollection of the events during this three month period due to ex-
treme emotional distress brought on by his wife and children leaving him and in-laws harass-
ing him, would not mitigate the discipline where the attorney, despite the alleged distress,
was able to write numerous checks payable to himself and other payees indicating that he was
able to transact business and conduct his practice. Re Altman (1989) 128 Ill 2d 206, 131 Ill
Dec 549, 538 NE2d 1105.
Attorney's depression and financial difficulties were not mitigating factors for disciplinary
purposes, given that attorney did not comply with American Bar Association (ABA) Standard
setting forth four factors that must be shown in order for mental disability to qualify as a mit-
igating factor; attorney failed to make a showing as to any of these elements, and he had am-
ple notice and opportunity to submit evidence about his condition, but came to the disci-
plinary hearing unprepared to do so. In re Woodring, 210 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2009).
Serious emotional and physical problems: Attorney who was guilty of failing to keep one
client reasonably informed about status of matter and to promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information and, with respect to another client, to respond to motion for summary
judgment and to inform client of dismissal, and to comply with client's requests for infor-
mation, would only be publicly reprimanded where there were significant mitigating circum-
stances. Attorney suffered from serious emotional and physical problems; premature child,
death of second newly born child, divorce, temporary sole custody of child; pulmonary blood
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clot, diabetes, kidney stones and corneal abrasions. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v Starnes (1993, Ky)
864 SW2d 907.
Impulse control disorder: Record did not establish that there was any significant causal
connection between attorney's impulse control disorder and his misappropriation of funds
from law firms, and thus Supreme Court would give little weight to the alleged mental disa-
bility in determining the appropriate sanction for attorney's misconduct; although psychiatrist
testified attorney was not motivated by greed, the testimony of attorney's law partners uni-
formly established that it appeared attorney was living beyond his means, attorney's methods
of misappropriating funds evolved over time in order to allow him to avoid detection, sug-
gesting his actions were not purely impulsive, and attorney admitted that he knew his actions
were wrong. In re Bernstein, 966 So. 2d 537 (La. 2007); West's Key Number Digest, Attor-
ney and Client k59.5(5).
Fugue or dissociative state: Attorney's long-standing financial problems, exacerbated by
gambling large sums of money over a substantial period of time, rather than a medical or psy-
chological disability, caused her to misappropriate client funds, and thus no mitigating factors
warranted a reduction of the presumptive sanction of indefinite suspension; although attorney
claimed that she suffered from a fugue or dissociative state during the period of misappropria-
tion, attorney's methodical and systematic misuse of funds for personal purposes was incon-
sistent with any conclusion that attorney was operating under a cognitive disability. In re
Johnson, 452 Mass. 1010, 893 N.E.2d 783 (2008); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and
Client k59.5(5). DXM is a potent dissociative in the dosages Wal-Mart accused Coughlin
of consuming on 9/9/11 in connection with 60838.
Dysthymia with secondary anxiety: Disbarment was proper discipline for attorney who
misappropriated funds belonging to clients and law firm over period of time, despite fact that
he suffered from dysthymia with secondary anxiety, where record suggested that attorney's
dysthymia was not severe psychological problem and only vaguely contributed to miscon-
duct. In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Shoemaker (1994, Minn) 518 NW2d 552.
Clinical depression: Attorney who, in handling estate, converted estate's funds, filed inaccu-
rate accounting, and failed to respond to client's repeated requests to close estate would be
suspended from practice of law for 2 years, given mitigating factors of attorney's prior un-
blemished record and his suffering from clinical depression. In re Bennett (1995, 4th Dept)
214 App Div 2d 206, 632 NYS2d 737.
Attorney's alleged depression and poor overall poor physical health were not mitigating factors
to be considered in determining sanction for attorney who failed to file documents necessary
to close estates in multiple probate cases, failed to file accounting in guardianship matter, and
failed to submit settlement entry for approval in bankruptcy adversary proceeding; attorney's
medical records showed sporadic visits for assorted ailments and general malaise over the
years, but did not substantiate an ongoing chronic condition, and Ohio Lawyers Assistance
Program (OLAP) counselor stated that while attorney suffered from depression and anxie-
ty, she did not render an opinion as to whether attorney's depression and anxiety actually con-
tributed to his neglect of the legal matters entrusted to him over the time period in question.
Erie-Huron Grievance Commt. v. Stoll, 2010-Ohio-5985, 939 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio 2010).
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Mitigating factors to be considered in determining sanction for attorney who misappropri-
ated over $7,000 from his employer law firm, resulting in theft conviction, were attor-
ney's lack of a prior disciplinary record, payment of restitution, cooperative attitude toward
the disciplinary proceedings, imposition of other penalties or sanctions, good character and
reputation, diagnosis of adjustment disorder with mixed conduct and emotion, cessation
of criminal activity before he was caught, and expression of sincere remorse at disciplinary
hearing. Disciplinary Counsel v. Kraemer, 2010-Ohio-3300, 931 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio 2010).
Conditionally stayed two-year suspension from practice was appropriate sanction for attorney
who failed to do any work on case and to return unearned fee to client, failed to return money
to another client when directed to do so by bar association after arbitration of fee dispute, and
failed to respond to a certified letter of inquiry from bar association concerning issues raised
during arbitration proceeding; factors in mitigation included that attorney practiced law for 35
years without disciplinary incident and had distinguished career that included ten years in
state Attorney General's office, was diagnosed with major depression for which he was re-
ceiving treatment, and had shown much remorse for his misconduct. Disciplinary Counsel v.
McShane, 121 Ohio St. 3d 169, 2009-Ohio-746, 902 N.E.2d 980 (2009).
Major depressive disorder: Two-year suspension, with one year stayed on conditions that
attorney continue his psychiatric treatment for major depressive order and that attorney suc-
cessfully complete two years of conditional probation if he attains reinstatement, was appro-
priate disciplinary sanction for attorney's misconduct, which included neglect of multiple
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clients' legal matters, where attorney, despite taking a series of antidepressant medications
including a prescription regulated for its addictive qualities, persisted in drinking beer, wine,
and perhaps even more potent alcoholic beverages that also acted as depressants, and attorney
appeared largely unconcerned about the perils his drug and alcohol use potentially posed to
effective representation of clients. Code of Prof.Resp., DR 6-101(A)(3). Disciplinary Counsel
v. Shaw, 110 Ohio St. 3d 122, 2006-Ohio-3821, 851 N.E.2d 487 (2006); West's Key Number
Digest, Attorney and Client k59.13(3).
Depression: Attorney's mishandling of his personal injury client's funds warranted sus-
pension from the practice of law for one year with entire year stayed, conditioned upon his
continued treatment for depression due to his father's death by a psychologist/psychiatrist for
duration of suspension, where misconduct was an isolated incident in his nineteen years of
practice and attorney settled accounts of client's medical bills, showed remorse, and cooperat-
ed fully with investigation. New York DR 9-102(A), (B)(3, 4). Toledo Bar Assn. v. Kramer,
89 Ohio St. 3d 321, 731 N.E.2d 643 (2000); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client
58.
DEPRESSION: AN ATTORNEY'S ALLEGED SEVERE STATE OF DEPRESSION AT THE TIME OF
HIS MISCONDUCT WOULD NOT SERVE AS A SHIELD FROM AMENABILITY TO DISCIPLINARY
SANCTION, NOR WOULD IT SERVE TO MITIGATE AGAINST HIS DISBARMENT. A CLINICAL PSY-
CHOLOGIST FOUND THAT THE ATTORNEY SUFFERED THIS DEPRESSION AND SUBSEQUENT LACK
OF RECOLLECTION AS A RESULT OF JOB-RELATED STRESS FROM ASSUMING AN EXCESSIVE RE-
SPONSIBILITY FOR WORK. THE ATTORNEY'S WORKAHOLIC BEHAVIOR WAS ALLEGEDLY DUE TO
A PERSONALITY TYPE THAT WAS VERY CONSCIENTIOUS AND SENSITIVE TO GUILT LEADING TO
AN INABILITY TO REFUSE ADDED RESPONSIBILITY. ALTHOUGH THE COURT CONSIDERED THE
ATTORNEY'S EMOTIONAL AND MENTAL STATE OF MIND AS A MITIGATING FACTOR, DISBAR-
MENT WOULD STILL BE IMPOSED GIVEN THE ATTORNEY'S FIVE-YEAR PATTERN OF HIGHLY DE-
CEPTIVE PRACTICES THAT CAUSED SERIOUS FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES TO HIS CLIENTS AND
OTHERS. THE ATTORNEY HAD FORGED ADVERSE PARTIES' APPEARANCES, FRAUDULENTLY OB-
TAINED THE SIGNATURES OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS, NEGLECTED CLIENTS' LEGAL MATTERS, AND
HAD MADE FALSE REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT THE STATUS OF CASES. STATE EX REL.
OKLAHOMA BAR ASSN. V COLSTON (1989, OKLA) 777 P2D 920.
Emotional response to two family deaths: Attorney who inexplicably began to overlook
scheduled appearances and to fail to communicate with clients after 30 years' unblemished
service would be suspended from practice of law for 2 years, despite attorney's claim that
misconduct occurred due to his emotional response to deaths of two family members. In re
Discipline of Wehde (1994, SD) 517 NW2d 132.
ADD: Psychiatrist's prescription of psychostimulant to attorney for attention deficit disorder
(ADD) was not a cause-in-fact or a foreseeable cause of attorney's impulsive and manic be-
havior that led to misappropriation of client funds while on gambling spree, though attorney's
expert-psychiatrists testified that attorney should not have been prescribed the
psychostimulant because of his history of abuse of addictive drugs and psychiatrist acknowl-
edged that the use of prescribed psychostimulant would result in destructive consequences if
attorney was using amphetamines and other drugs, where attorney had scored high on ADD
diagnostic test, attorney did not disclose to psychiatrist his current abuse of amphetamines
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and other drugs and instead told psychiatrist that he had eight years of sobriety with one re-
lapse, and psychiatrist believed that the prescribed psychostimulant was the only
psychostimulant that attorney was taking. V.T.C.A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code
74.001(a)(13). Price v. Divita, 224 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2006), reh'g
overruled, (Sept. 26, 2006) and review denied, (Jan. 12, 2007); West's Key Number Digest,
Health k823(13).
Attention deficit disorder: Attorney failed to show a direct causation between attention def-
icit disorder (ADD) and his misuse of client funds, as was required before the mental disabil-
ity could be considered as a mitigating factor in imposing disciple; attorney's ADD did not
explain his loaning client funds to other clients without permission, lying to clients, attorneys,
and a judge about client funds, or using client funds to make loans and payments for his per-
sonal benefit. ABA Code of Prof. Resp., DR 1-102(A)(3). In re Hunter, 769 A.2d 1286 (Vt.
2000); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client k53(2).
Depression and anxiety: Medical evidence presented by attorney in disciplinary matter
concerning her depression, anxiety, and unresolved medical condition did not demonstrate
that attorney's medical condition caused her to commit misconduct, and thus imposition of
lesser penalty for misconduct was not warranted, where psychologist never offered clear
opinion of causality with respect to majority of misconduct issues, and attorney had been able
to maintain and represent other clients during period when she was purportedly suffering
from anxiety and depression. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Karlsson, 2001 WI 126,
635 N.W.2d 771 (Wis. 2001); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client k53(2).
For the Reno City Attorney Office Prosecutor, Bar Counsel, and various WCDA DDAs: Discipli-
nary action against attorney for misconduct related to performance of official duties as prosecuting
attorney, 10 A.L.R. 4th 605.
EVIDENCE OF PANEL'S EVIDENT PARTIALITY:
Bar Counsel was permitted to seek to have FHE 3 (4/13/09 L. Gardner OAT) admitted after
he had concluded his examination of Elcano. However, Coughlin was refused the opportunity to ask
one more question of Judge Nash Holmes or Elcano upon the Panel indicating his time was up or
Coughlin making an indication similar to King's where, with Elcano, King pass(ed) the witness.
... MR. KING: I very much appreciate your testimony and candor. I'll pass the witness.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Thank you, Mr. King. Mr. Coughlin, it's now 11:31. You have 15
minutes. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. Thank you. MR. KING: I apologize. I meant to have this
admitted. Did I lay a proper foundation? I would move for Exhibit 3 to be admitted. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Any objection now, sir? MR. COUGHLIN: I didn't hear the foundation. I'm sorry.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: The foundation was Mr. Elcano attended the hearing, reviewed this order, and
determined it to be -- This is a true and correct copy of the order that you looked at following the
hearing? Page 113 THE WITNESS: Yes. The one that was transmitted to us by the judge....Page 114
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm focused on whether or not this is a true and correct copy of the order issued
by Judge Gardner. And have you determined this to be the true and correct copy? THE WITNESS:
Yes. It's the order I relied on. MR. ECHEVERRIA: It will be admitted. (Exhibit 3 admitted.)MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, Mr. Coughlin.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 125:19 to 127:6)
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Q Did you have a communication with me incident to some of these complaints or a com-
plaint, I don't know if it was the Tahoe one or CAAW one or if it was Rhonda or something,
in about January-February 2009, wherein you said, you know what? I asked Master Ed-
mondson about you, and I asked Judge Gardner -- might have been it was Judge Gardner by
that point -- and they both gave you thumbs up, or something similar to that? A No. I don't think
you're characterizing what I said correctly. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Your time has expired, Mr.
Coughlin. Do you want to ask one more question? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. I would like him to
clarify as to where I'm amiss there. What it is that he might have said. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Go ahead, if you can, Mr. Elcano. THE WITNESS: Periodically I ask judges how our employees
are doing, and especially if there's a complaint. And somewhere early on or to the middle of Mr.
Coughlin's employment I asked one or two judges if he was doing okay, and they said he was
doing okay. So as a result, I did not pursue the complaint of the two shelter organizations. So I
stood by my employee at that time MR. ECHEVERRIA: Anything further, Mr. King? MR.
COUGHLIN: Was one of those judges, Judge Gardner? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin,
your time has expired. MR. KING: I don't know if the panel has any questions, but I don't. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Any questions from the panel members? May Mr. Elcano be excused? MR.
KING: Thank you for your time today. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Call your next witness. MR. KING:
I'm going to see if I can get Judge Holmes on the phone.
Coughlin was afforeded not opportunity to call Judge Beesley as a witness in his case in chief,
despite his express desire to do so, given, as bar counsel indicated, Judge Beesley was only available
between 9:00-9:30 am and the Panel's avowed, expressed indication that the formal hearing would
conclude by 5:30 pm that day, regardless of whether Coughlin was done with his case in chief or still
had relevant, material, admissible evidence he sought to put on.
HEARING- VOL. I, (PAGES 299:3 TO 301:8) MR. KING: MR. COUGHLIN -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: GO AHEAD, ANSWER THE QUESTION. WE'RE RUNNING OUT OF TIME. MR. KING: --
EXPLAIN WHY HE DIDN'T AVAIL HIMSELF OF RULE 117. WE HAVE ENCOURAGED HIM UP THE YING-
YANG TO GET TREATMENT, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THAT RULE -- MR. COUGHLIN: I DON'T TRUST
PAT KING AT ALL. MR. KING: WOULD YOU MIND IF I ASKED A FOLLOW-UP QUESTION? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: PARDON ME? MR. KING: MAY I ASK A FOLLOW-UP QUESTION? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: IN A MINUTE. HAVE YOUFINISHED YOUR QUESTIONS? MS. PEARL: YES. AND I
THANK YOUFOR THE ANSWERS. MR. COUGHLIN: THANK YOU. I APPRECIATE IT. MR. KING: MR.
COUGHLIN, DID I ON MANY OCCASIONS, INCLUDING WITH DAVID CLARK, ENCOURAGE YOU TO READ
AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF RULE 117? MR. COUGHLIN: PAT, I JUST DON'T TRUST YOUAT ALL. MR.
KING: THE QUESTION IS DID WE ENCOURAGE YOUTO? MR. COUGHLIN: IF YOU DID, PAT, IT CAME
AS NOTHING MORE THAN, HEY, MAKE MY JOB EASY. SIGN ON THIS DEAL. OH, IT PAUSES EVERYTHING, IT
PAUSES EVERYTHING. IT WILL ALL COME OUT IN THE WASH WHEN YOUCOME BACK. AND, PAT, I JUST
DON'T TRUST YOU, MAN. I DON'T. MR. KING: THAT'S OKAY. BUT WAS WHAT WAS SAID, THAT IT
WOULD PAUSE EVERYTHING -- MR. COUGHLIN: NO, I DIDN'T SAY THAT EITHER, PAT. YOUHAD YOUR
TIME TO PROVE THAT, AND YOUDIDN'T USE YOUR CASE FOR IT, AND NOW YOU'RE NOT GOING TO USE MY
CASE TO PROVE THAT. MR. KING: MR. COUGHLIN, I GET TO CROSS-EXAMINE YOU. DID I ASK YOUTO
GET TREATMENT -- MR. COUGHLIN: CAN I JUST FINISH MYTESTIMONYQUICKLY BEFORE --
THERE'S JUST A COUPLE THINGS. MR. ECHEVERRIA: WE'RE RUNNING OUT OF TIME. I AFFORD-
ED YOU IN EXCESS OF 20 MINUTES. I CAUTIONED YOU WHEN YOU WERE GETTING CLOSE. I TRIED TO
REDIRECT YOUR ISSUE AS TO HOW YOU FELT ABOUT THE SUPREME COURT'S DIRECTIVE FOR THIS
PANEL TO DETERMINE THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF PUNISHMENT, IF ANY. WE FOCUSED ON THAT.
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IT'S NOW4:31, ACCORDING TO THE STATE BAR CLOCK. I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE EVERYBODYAN OP-
PORTUNITY TO GIVE US A FINAL ARGUMENT. I'M GOING TO GIVE MR. KING ANOTHER TWO
MINUTES TO FINISH QUESTIONING YOU, AND THEN WE'LL START FINAL ARGUMENT. MR. KENT:
CAN WE TAKE A REAL QUICK BREAK? MR. ECHEVERRIA: PARDON ME? I THINK WE CAN IF WE'RE
WILLING TO GO BEYOND 5:00 O'CLOCKTO WHATEVER BREAK IT IS. I'M PREPARED TO STAY HERE
UNTIL 5:30 OR SO, IS THAT OKAY? MR. VELLIS: YEAH. MR. ECHEVERRIA: DO YOU HAVE ANY
MORE QUESTIONS? MR. VELLIS: DO YOU WANT TO FINISH YOUR CROSS-EXAMINATION, OR ARE
YOU DONE? MR. KING: I'M PROBABLY DONE. MR. ECHEVERRIA: LET'S TAKE A QUICK BREAK.
LET'S COME BACK AT 20 MINUTES TO 5:00, AND WE'LL GO UNTIL 5:15 WITH FINAL ARGUMENT. (RE-
CESS TAKEN.) MR. ECHEVERRIA: BACK ON THE RECORD. THE TIME IS NOW4:40. I'D LIKE TO NOW
PROVIDE BOTH SIDES 15 MINUTES FOR FINAL ARGUMENT.
Further, Couglhin was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine himself. So, the SBN
was afforded two different 15 minutes segments in which to ask questions of Coughlin under oath (in
the SBN's calling Coughlin on direct in its case in chief, and in the SBN being afforded the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine Coughlin following Coughlin's direct examination of himself upon calling
himself in his own case in chief.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 301:8) MR. KING: -- explain why he didn't avail himself of
Rule 117. We have encouraged him up the ying-yang to get treatment, taking advantage of that
rule --
What King really means there is he and the OBC continually sought to leverage seeking per-
manent disbarment of Coughlin via a SCR 105 Complaint and FH for alleged RPC violations and a
SCR 111(6) conviction both Clark and King admit are insufficient to support such a request in order
to force Couglin into agreeing to a joint SCR 117 Petition. They enlisted Coe Swobe in the
scheme, too, just like WLS's Elcano did in having Swobe call up Coughlin and his family (including
his father) on several occasions between April 2009 and the present (including a 4/27/09 email from
Elcano simply indicating: Zach, Call Coe.). Bar Counsel continually leveraged the threat of dis-
barment via a SCR 105 Complaint to force Coughlin into a joint SCR 117 Petition to achieve their
avowed and expressly stated goal of shifting the burden of proof onto Coughlin (where any rein-
statement Coughlin would later seek (after three or four years, suggested King...even though, for
Laub/SCR 123 comparision purposes, a Vegas attorney convicted in a sting operation involving his
knowingly engaging in electronic communications of a sexual nature with someone he believe to be a
15 year old girl, and then arranging to and going to meet with her, received only a 6 month suspen-
sion).
49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant 855 ; 855. Attorney's fees ; West's Key Number Digest,
Landlord and Tenant 291(14), 310(1)
6. Landlord's Possessory Remedies
b. Summary Possessory Actions
(1) In General
(d) Landlord's Right to Damages
A "prevailing party" is one in whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and the judg-
ment entered.[1]
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A party who prevails on a summary-eviction claim is not entitled to an award of attorney's
fees where there is neither contractual nor statutory authority for an award.[2] In a number of
jurisdictions, statutes provide that the prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees in evic-
tions or summary-possessory actions.[5] An award of attorney's fees is also appropriate
where there has been a willful breach of contract and where a lessor is forced to take legal ac-
tion against its lessee to recover possession when the lessee improperly holds the lease over
after termination.[6]
Both the landlord and the tenant are "prevailing parties," for the purposes of a statute that
provides for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party, where the trial court finds for
the tenant on the landlord's ejectment claim and for the landlord on the tenant's retaliation
claim.[7] Similarly, a trial court may award fees to both parties where the landlord received a
judgment for possession but the tenant prevailed in part by obtaining a reduction in the
amount of a utility bill due the landlord.[8] However, courts have denied attorney's fees
where the landlord cancels the lease and brings an action under the unlawful-detainer statutes,
notwithstanding that the lease provided for the recovery of fees.[9]
where the parties entered into a settlement agreement with the trial court's assistance.[ 10]
[FN1] Keal v. Day, 164 Ohio App. 3d 21, 2005-Ohio-5551, 840 N.E.2d 1139 (1st Dist.
Hamilton County 2005).
[FN2] Hamilton v. William Calomiris Inv. Corp., Inc., 461 A.2d 466 (D.C. 1983); Satellite
Gateway Communications, Inc. v. Musi Dining Car Co., Inc., 110 N.J. 280, 540 A.2d 1267
(1988); H-T Enterprises v. Antelope Creek Bison Ranch, 2005 ND 71, 694 N.W.2d 691
(N.D. 2005); City of Gahanna v. Eastgate Properties, Inc., 36 Ohio St. 3d 65, 521 N.E.2d 814
(1988).
[FN3] Tufco, Inc. v. Pacific Environmental Corp., 113 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2005); North Asso-
ciates v. Bell, 184 Cal. App. 3d 860, 229 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1st Dist. 1986); Integra Financial,
Inc. v. Grynberg Petroleum Co., 74 P.3d 347 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing the rule);
Hardwick, Cook & Co. v. 3379 Peachtree, Ltd., 184 Ga. App. 822, 363 S.E.2d 31 (1987);
Shipka v. Inserra, 211 Ill. App. 3d 735, 156 Ill. Dec. 128, 570 N.E.2d 604 (1st Dist. 1991);
Borne v. Wilander, 509 So. 2d 572 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987); Bay Park One Co. v. Crosby,
109 Misc. 2d 47, 442 N.Y.S.2d 837 (App. Term 1981); Keal v. Day, 164 Ohio App. 3d 21,
2005-Ohio-5551, 840 N.E.2d 1139 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 2005); Desmarais v. The
Stayers, Inc., 182 Or. App. 338, 51 P.3d 1 (2002); M H 2 Co. v. Hwang, 104 Wash. App.
680, 16 P.3d 1272 (Div. 3 2001).
[FN4] Camelback Plaza Development, L.C. v. Hard Rock Cafe Intern. (Phoenix), Inc., 200
Ariz. 206, 25 P.3d 8 (Ct. App. Div. 1 2001).
[FN5] Stokus v. Marsh, 217 Cal. App. 3d 647, 266 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1st Dist. 1990); Integra Fi-
nancial, Inc. v. Grynberg Petroleum Co., 74 P.3d 347 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); Matusko v.
Gourlay, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 966, 560 N.E.2d 724 (1990); T.W.I.W., Inc. v. Rhudy, 96 N.M.
354, 630 P.2d 753 (1981); Haberman v. Wassberg, 131 A.D.2d 331, 516 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1st
Dep't 1987); Iwenofu v. Consolidated Management, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 3d 33, 550 N.E.2d
505 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1988); Oakleaf Mobile Home Park v. Mancilla, 189 Or.
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App. 458, 75 P.3d 908 (2003), review denied, 336 Or. 376, 84 P.3d 1080 (2004); Phillips v.
Hardwick, 29 Wash. App. 382, 628 P.2d 506 (Div. 1 1981).
[FN6] Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc., 210 W. Va. 200, 557 S.E.2d 254 (2001).
[FN7] Barlow Trail Mobile Home Park v. Dunham, 189 Or. App. 513, 76 P.3d 1146 (2003).
[FN8] Chang v. Louis & Alexander, Inc., 645 A.2d 1110 (D.C. 1994) (the lease entitled the
prevailing party to recovery of any and all reasonable expenses in the event
of any breach or threatened breach.) [FN9] Lincoln Financial Corp. v. Ferrier, 567 P.2d
1102 (Utah 1977). [FN10] Boxer Max Corp. v. Cane A. Sucre, Inc., 905 So. 2d 916 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.
3d Dist. 2005) (court had awarded $1,800 in damages).
[FN11] Housing Authority of City of Pasco and Franklin County v. Pleasant, 126
Wash. App. 382, 109 P.3d 422 (Div. 3 2005). [FN12] Oakleaf Mobile Home Park v.
Mancilla, 189 Or. App. 458, 75 P.3d 908 (2003)
, review denied, 336 Or. 376, 84 P.3d 1080 (2004).
[FN13] Oakleaf Mobile Home Park v. Mancilla, 189 Or. App. 458, 75 P.3d 908 (2003)
, review denied, 336 Or. 376, 84 P.3d 1080 (2004). [FN14] Shipley v. Major, 44 A.2d
540 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1945) (the lease provides
for the tenant's payment of attorney's fees in the event of the tenant's default).
[FN15] Dawson v. Temanson, 107 P.3d 892 (Alaska 2005).
1681. Attorney's fees; 52B C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant 1681 An outcome not substantially fa-
vorable to either side precludes awarding attorney's fees to either side.[7]
Consideration of an attorney's fees award may be deemed inappropriate by the nature of a
summary possessory proceeding that is designed to achieve expedited results, particularly in
the face of complex factual inquiries needed to resolve the fee matter.[8] (NOTE: page 37 of
7 31 12 NRCP60(b)(4) Set Aside Motion by Coughlin)
Basis of litigation on lease is determinative
The relief awarded is not determinative of whether fees are proper, as the question turns on
whether the summary proceedings involve a breach of the lease, under the applicable statute.
N.Y.JERULEE CO. V. SANCHEZ, 43 A.D.3D 328, 841 N.Y.S.2D 242 (1ST DEP'T 2007).
[FN6] N.Y.Fragiacomo v. Pugliese, 11 Misc. 3d 96, 816 N.Y.S.2d 826 (App. Term 2006).
Requires prevailing judgment on merits
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N.Y.ACIERNO V. FALDICH, 4 MISC. 3D 98, 782 N.Y.S.2D 509 (APP. TERM 2004).
[FN7] N.Y. 339-347 E. 12th St. LLC v. Ling, 31 Misc. 3d 48, 921 N.Y.S.2d 781
(App. Term 2011). [FN8] Md.Law Offices of Taiwo Agbaje, P.C. v. JLH Properties,
II, LLC, 169 Md.
App. 355, 901 A.2d 249 (2006). [FN9] N.Y.Stakser v. Rodriquez, 23 Misc. 2d 954,
200 N.Y.S.2d 475 (App. Term
1960).
NO STATUTE FOR FEES IN SUMMARY EVICTION
N.D.H-T Enterprises v. Antelope Creek Bison Ranch, 2005 ND 71, 694 N.W.2d 691
(N.D. 2005).
[FN3] Cal.Carter v. Cohen, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1038, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303 (2d Dist. 2010).
Conn. Carabetta Management Co. v. Martin, 50 Conn. L. Rptr. 801, 2010 WL 3194740
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2010) (fees to prevailing tenant).
Win on technicality is not prevailing
N.Y. BEACH HAVEN APARTMENTS NO. 1 INC. V. CHESEBOROUGH, 2 MISC. 3D 33, 773
N.Y.S.2D 775 (APP. TERM 2003)
No statute for fees in summary eviction
N.D.H-T Enterprises v. Antelope Creek Bison Ranch, 2005 ND 71, 694 N.W.2d 691
(N.D. 2005).
Conn. Carabetta Management Co. v. Martin, 50 Conn. L. Rptr. 801, 2010 WL 3194740
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2010) (fees to prevailing tenant).
Win on technicality is not prevailing
N.Y. BEACH HAVEN APARTMENTS NO. 1 INC. V. CHESEBOROUGH, 2 MISC. 3D 33, 773
N.Y.S.2D 775 (APP. TERM 2003)
NRCP 15 allowed for Coughlin to file supplemental or amended Motions to Dismis, provid-
ing authority that allows for treating a Motion to Dismiss that may have waived or failed to preserve
certain defense pursuant to NRCP 12(h), assuming such is applicable under SCR 105(4), and SCR
119(3) (not that NNDB publishes any such rules or responds to inquiries for the same by Coughlin).
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COMMISSION ON LAWYER CONDUCT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING REQUEST OF OF-
FICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL (ODC) FOR A CONTINUANCE TO OBTAIN AND PRESENT EVIDENCE
TO REBUT SURPRISE EVIDENCE OF LACK OF HARM TO CLIENTS PRESENTED BY ATTORNEY AT HEAR-
ING TO DETERMINE APPROPRIATE SANCTION TO BE IMPOSED ON HIM FOR HIS MISCONDUCT IN CONNEC-
TION WITH EIGHT CRIMINAL CLIENT MATTERS, AS MITIGATING TESTIMONY REGARDING ULTIMATE OUT-
COME OF CLIENTS' CASES TOUCHED ON MORE SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS THAN THE USUAL MITIGATION
TESTIMONY REGARDING AN ATTORNEY'S CHARACTER AND PERSONAL SITUATION, SUCH THAT IT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH REBUTTAL EVIDENCE SHOWING ACTUAL
HARM TO CLIENTS. IN RE STURKEY, 376 S.C. 286, 657 S.E.2D 465 (2008).
The SBN's 8/23/12 Complaint reads:
6. DURING THE TRIAL (IN 22176 BEFORE RMC JUDGE HOWARD) RESPONDENT'S CON-
DUCT WAS SO DISRUPTIVE THAT JUDGE HOWARD FOUND RESPONDENT IN DIRECT CONTEMPT
OF COURT AND SENTENCED HIM TO SERVE THREE (3) DAYS IN SEE EXHIBIT 2...
27. In light of the forgoing Respondent violated RPC 1.1 (Competence); RPC 1.2 (Diligence); RPC
3. 1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions): RPC 3.3 (Candor to the Tribunal): RPC 3.4 (Fairness to
Opposing Party and Counsel); RPC 3.5 (Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal); RPC 4. 1
(Truthfulness in Statements to Others): RPC 4.4 (Respect for the Rights of Third Persons); RPC 5A
(sic) (Relations with Opposing Counsel); RPC 8.1 (Disciplinary Matters); RPC 8.2 (Judicial and
Legal Officials); and RPC 8.4 (Misconduct).
Bar Counsel King's Complaint, in alleging an unenumerated number of violations of 12 dif-
ferent RPC's (and, to whatever extent the various subsections of those RPC's is considered to evoke a
different allegation, one may arguably bring that count up 15 different RPC's considering that King's
Complaint at para. 16 therein quotes from the 3/12/12 Order by Judge Holmes that misstates the sub-
section number of RPC 3.4 to which the language therafter quoted is from (3.4(c) versus 3.4(e); and
further, that quote alleges a violation of RPC 3.2 (though, arguably, King's para 27 in his 8/23/12
Complaint should estop him from asserting such an allegations and the 12/14/12 FOFCOL fails to
identify RPC 3.2 (Expediting Litigation) as an allegation to which it attach its trier of fact role, there-
by supporting the position that such quoting of that 3/12/12 Order by Judge Holmes in King's Com-
plaint is not tantamount to putting Coughlin on notice that such is being plead, but rather, that Cough-
lin is entitled to rely upon those allegations specifically set forth in para. 27 of King's Complaint
(though the lack of any identifcation of which subsections of each RPC cited therein is supportive of
Coughlin's contentions within his Motion's to Dismiss, which arguably may be viewed to be tanta-
mount to a Motion for More Definite Statement); further, whereas both the quotation from Judge
Holmes Order (FHE5) at para 16 of King's Complaint and para 27 therein invoke RPC 1.2 (Dili-
gence), Coughlin was further prejudiced by being forced to prepare for and defend against allega-
tions of violating both RPC 1.2 and 1.3 (RPC 1.2 is Scope of Representation and Allocation of Au-
thority Between Client and Lawyer, and RPC 1.3 is Diligence), and King's own FHE1 contains
the entire text of RPC 1.2 and fails to contain any of RPC 1.3, whereas the FOFCOL continues on
with King and Judge Holmes mismatching RPC 1.2 by failing to identify such correctly, where the
FOFCOL reads: (2) Whether Coughlin violated RPC1.2 (Diligence).
Chairman Susich's 7/27/12 written correspondence to Coughlin and the response from Panel
Chair Echeverria upon Coughlin seeking a Pre-Hearing Conference such as that expressed in SCR
111(6) (SCR 111(6). Prehearing conference. At the discretion of the chair, a prehearing con-
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ference may be ordered for the purpose of obtaining admissions or otherwise narrowing the
issues presented by the pleadings. The conference may be held before the chair or the chairs de-
signee.)
Dear M. Coughlin: I am in receipt of your request for a hearing before
the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board. I have forwarded your request
to the Nevada State Bar's Northern Office for processing. Please com-
municate directly with the State Bar concerning your case. They are
the ones who will process your request and set up any appropriate hear-
ings. If you have questions you can contact Pat King, the Northern
Nevada Bar Counsel. Sincerely, J. Thomas Susich, Esq.
Further, upon Coughlin following Bar Counsel King's direction on 11/2/12 and placing a call
to Chair Echeverria seeking such a SCR 111(6) Pre-Hearing Conference and to inquire regarding
other issues, Coughlin rebuffed by Echeverria's Office and told not to communicate with them in an
11/2/12 voicemail. So, Bar Counsel King necessarily was able to achieve an impermissible ad-
vantage by taking his kitchen sink pleading approach to the rather slapdash crafting of his 8/23/12
Complaint (the paragraph numbering therein skips from 19 to 25, para 27 mentions a non-existent
RPC (RPC 5A); and that is to say nothing of all the prejudicial, irrelevant, unsupported, material
contained in Bar Counsel's DowSoE, including mentions of the SBN's Custodian of Records where
Coughlin had no disciplinary history whatsoever, mentions of Competency Evaluations (and really,
the entire 11/14/12 FH seemed to suffer from an identity crisis, believing itself to be an SCR 117
Hearing, though such was not noticed, with RPC 1.1 being mistaken as a stand in for an SCR 117
analysis, with all of the Bar's four witnesses offering testimony that clearly confuses the two, with
little help from King in making the distinction given the imprecise questions asked, and where, in
some instances, King's own questions were phrased in a manner that clearly invoked an SCR 117
analysis to the exclusion of any RPC 1.1 inquiry. This kitchen sink pleading style prosecutorial
largesse must not stand, and itself evidences a disregard for RPC 3.1 and 3.8, 8.1. Indeed, RPC 8.1
applies to Bar Counsel's condut as well where it reads:
Rule 8.1. Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters.... a lawyer in
connection with ... a disciplinary matter, shall not: (a) Knowingly make a
false statement of material fact; or (b) Fail to disclose a fact necessary to
correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the
matter...
How it is King could possibly be said to have not violated those portions RPC 8.1 himself,
particularly with regard to his asserting that FHE3 was a certified copy when it was not, his offering
the very 8/23/12 Affidavit of Mailing that he knows Clerk of Court Peters communicated to Cough-
lin would never be held out as effecting service under SCR 109 given Peters express indications to
Coughlin on 9/11/12; that Peters would mail out another certified mailing of the Complaint on
9/12/12, that no Notice of Intent to take Default would be sent until such second certified mailing of
the 8/23/12 Complaint was returned to sender unclaimed (and that such a NOITTD as a mandatory
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part of the procedures attendant to any default being entered), that Coughlin would not be required
to pay subpoena fees in light of his indigency (where Peters held herself out as having the authority
to communicate such pronouncements and procedural rules to Coughlin, and Coughlin reasonably
relied thereupon
v
); and where King failed to own up to the fact that the 10/9/12 NOITPDB was not
served on Coughlin, as King, Clerk of Court Peters, and the SBNs own negligence in placing in-
sufficient postage on that filing (and the Certificate of Service by Mail attached thereto certifies
was deposited postage fully pre-paid by certified mail, addressed to...), which was sent via only
one method (despite Coughlin's numerous requests that the SBN copy him on such by fax and or
email, and the legitimate rationale Coughlin proferred in support of such a request), especially where
King continued to hold out the . his failing to disclose to the Panel the express pronouncement of
NNDB Susich's ruling (by way of Chief Bar Counsel Clark in light of Susich's 7/27/12 email and the
various tactics by Bar Counsel/NNDB/Panel to dissuade Coughlin from accessing the procedural
protections afforded him under the law in such matters) under SCR 110, assisting Panel Chair Eche-
verria and other Panel Members in violating the law incident to Echeverria's failing to follow SCR
110(3),(4):
...3. Attachment of person for failure to obey subpoena or produce
documents. Whenever any person subpoenaed to appear and give testimony
or to produce books, papers, or other documents as required by subpoena, or
requested to provide documents pursuant to Rule 78.5(1)(b), refuses to appear
or testify before a hearing panel, or to answer any pertinent or proper ques-
tions, or to provide the requested documents, that person shall be deemed in
contempt of the disciplinary board, and the chair of the disciplinary board shall
report the fact to a district judge of the county in which the hearing is being
held or the investigation conducted. The district court shall promptly issue an
attachment in the form usual in the court, directed to the sheriff of the county,
commanding the sheriff to attach such person and bring such person forthwith
before the court. On the return of the attachment, and the production of the per-
son attached, the district court shall have jurisdiction of the matter; and the per-
son charged may purge himself or herself of the contempt in the same way, and
the same proceedings shall be had, and the same penalties may be imposed,
and the same punishment inflicted as in the case of a witness subpoenaed to
appear and give evidence on the trial of a civil cause before a district court of
the State of Nevada.
4. Contest of subpoena. A contest of a subpoena shall be heard and determined by the chair
of the appropriate disciplinary board.
And how is it the very same arguments and citations that Chair Echeverria relied on in grant-
ing King's two 11/2/12 Motions to Quash Coughlin's Subpoenas (such Order is void under NRCP
60(b)(4) for lack of jurisdiction where NNDB Chair Susich has jurisdiction under SCR 111(4) to
hear such contest of a subpoena.
Lehman v. State,727 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex.App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1987), aff'd,792
S.W.2d 82 (Tex.Crim.App.1990): A prosecutor is not free to put unfounded allegations in an in-
dictment in the hope that a plenitude of accusations will make the defendant look like a criminal.
Rule 3.09 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct require [sic] him to "refrain from
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prosecuting or threatening to prosecute a charge that [he] knows is not supported by probable
cause." See Nevada RPC 3.8.
The 12/14/12 FOFCOL reads: August 23, 2012).
4. Coughlin's conduct during the trial of the petit larceny case (22716) on November
30, 2011, in which Coughlin appeared in propria persona, was so disruptive that Judge Howard found
Coughlin in direct contempt of court and sentenced him to jail that same day to be relea
sed on December 3, 2011 at 8:00 PM. Judge Howard specifically found Coughlin's conduct to be
disorderly and was either contemptuous or behavior insolent toward the judge in that Coughlin
refused:
"... to obey directives of the Judge, continuing lines of inquiry after being advised by the Court to re-
frain from doing so; demeaning the Court with statements such as "WOW" in response to court rul-
ings; laughing during testimony and further questioning the court and its authority."
See Hearing Exhibit 11 ORDER FOR SUMMARY PUNISHMENT OF CONTEMPT
COMMITTED IN THE IMMEDIATE VIEW AND PRESENCE OF THE COURT, November 30,
2011 (NOTE: that OSPCCIVPC was attachd as Exhibit 2 to the 8/23/12 Complaint, though that
Complaint lacks any of the language this Court relied upon from the Mirch Complaint in 49212, suf-
ficient to find that the 8/23/12 Complaint by King fulfilled the requirements of SCR 105(2)(c) as to
any alleged RPC violation by Coughlin incident to RMC Judge Howard's 11/30/12 OSPCCIVPC,
particularly where such Complaint failed to quote any specific language from that Order, while, as to
other Orders at issue in this matter (such as the 4/13/09 OAT in 01168), the 8/23/12 did, in fact, spe-
cifically quote langauge therefrom therein.
Laub allows for pointing to SBN Bar Counsel Clark's Reply Brief in 49212 at page 7:
"Respondent's first issue is that the State Bar failed to give Respondent clear notice of the conduct
which constituted a violation of SCR 170, the Complaint simply incorporating the Findings and
Order ... the Complaint is "clear and specific" in that it alleges that Respondent violated SCR 170
(Meritorious claims and contentions)"...(page 7, line 20-23): "Further, the Complaint notifies Re-
spondent that the State Bar is adopting and incorporating the factual and legal findings made
... in his Order... in that case".
Further, another salient difference distinguishing this matter even further is that, in
49212, the Respondent was accused of violating one RPC (RPC 3.1), and the Complaint therein spe-
cifically attached the rule alleged violated to the specific factual and legal findings that such Com-
plaint actually and expressly indicated it was adopting and incorporating. Additionally, that
11/30/11 OSPC here is a scant one and half pages of check the box style jurisprudence, that failed
to identify anything more that a handwritten see Court record in the blank lines the form Order
provided in for a response to the following: The Contemnor, when asked if he had anythign to say as
to why sentence should not be pronounce, replied: see Court Record. Actually, Coughlin made an
elegant, respectful, and thoughful plea to Judge Howard at such time, focusing mostly on Coughlin's
desire to obtain at least a minor stay of the imposition of such summary punishment to afford Cough-
lin a legitimate opprotunity to arrange for the avoidance of any prejudice to Coughlin's client's affairs
due to such rather unexpected summary incarceration, particularly where Judge Howard has previ-
ously justified his failure to accord Coughlin court appointed counsel, despite Coughlin's submitting a
sworn Declaration of Indigency and Application for Counsel in a timely fashion which attested that
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Coughlin's income levels were, per se, low enough to qualify for such appointed counsel, pursuant to
this Court's Indigent Defense Order of 2008.
Additionally, it is of note that the 11/30/11 OSPC identifies Coughlin as follows:
WHEREAS, on the 30
th
day of November, 2011, the above named defendant appeared before this
court. NAME: ZACHERY (sic) COUGHLIN, who is a DEFENDANT. As such, Judge Howard
specifically and expressly ruled that his OSPC applied to Coughlin as a defendant rather than in any
professional capacity invoking the RPC, or as an attorney whom had never tried a single criminal
case or even worked on one forced to self represent in a petty larceny prosecution, especially where
even a single continuance was granted to such defendant and where a multitude of ancillary consider-
ation augered strongly to granting such, including the application of an unlawful rent distraint by Hill
as to exculpatory materials (like the receipt for the $83.82 worth of groceries Coughlin purchased
immediately before Wal-Mart's Loss Prevention Associate asked Coughlin if he could ask him some
question (ie, as testified to under oath by that Associate and both RSIC Officers, there was no citi-
zen's arrest conducted upon Coughlin, and, therefore, the RSIC violated NRS 171.1255 in subjecting
Coughlin to a custodial arrest and search incident thereto in connection with an alleged misdemean-
or violation). Such receipt, as later shown in 60838, clearly established that the UPC for the Duract
Cough Melts Coughlin is accused of having ingested lethal levals of (containing Dextromethorphan,
a potent dissociative at such levels) was, in fact, included on that receipt, thereby expressly contra-
dicting the express testimony by both Wal-Mart's AP Associate and the RSIC Officers):
Further, Hill's application of such a unlawful rent distraint makes RMC Judge Howard's re-
fusal to grant a continuance reversible error (and indicative of a patent lack of due process incident
to that proceeding sufficient to invoke Claiborne, and, by analogy, SCR 114 and 37 CFR 11.25(c))
videos and audio withheld by Hill (revealing an express threat to abuse process by Wal-Mart's AP
Staff made to Coughlin on 7/10/11 incident to Coughlin's involvement in the production of a docu-
mentary film detailing the extent to which mega-retailer Wal-Mart has been able to establish a near
monopoly in its market segment, in large part, due to the application of an extremely liberal Return
Policy, which Wal-Mart's personnel and managers convieniently seem to forget or get confused
about in those instances where it would be advantageous for them to do so (ie, large ticket items,
etc.) incident to a then stale eviction order where the lockout was conducted too early in light of the
within 24 hours requirement of NRS 40.253 (which, every County in Nevada other than Washoe,
it seems, it interpreted to mean the Sheriff or Constable must post the 24 hour lock-out Order on the
tenant's door, and return to effectuate the lockout no fewer than 24 hours later., Canon 2.15, or oth-
erwise (indeed, the RMC failed to even report the petty larceny conviction or the 11/30/11 OSPC to
the SBN).
While Nevada is a notice-pleading state and pleadings should be liberally construed to allow
issues that are fairly noticed to the adverse party, a party is entitled to rely upon a demonstrated nar-
rowing of the allegations and issues in dispute where, as here, the Complaint does just that.
Langevin v. York, 111 Nev. 1481, 1483, 907 P.2d 981, 982 (1995); Nevada State Bank v. Jamison
Family Partnership, 106 Nev. 792, 801, 801 P.2d 1377, 1383 (1990). T
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/ :TABLE OF TITLES AND CHAPTERS; NEVADA REVISED
STATUTES; TITLE 2CIVIL PRACTICE; CHAPTER 22 - CONTEMPTS
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NRS 22.030 Summary punishment of contempt committed in immediate view and pres-
ence of court; affidavit or statement to be filed when contempt committed outside immediate
view and presence of court; disqualification of judge.
1. IF A CONTEMPT IS COMMITTED IN THE IMMEDIATE VIEW AND PRESENCE OF THE COURT OR JUDGE
AT CHAMBERS, THE CONTEMPT MAY BE PUNISHED SUMMARILY. IF THE COURT OR JUDGE SUMMARILY
PUNISHES A PERSON FOR A CONTEMPT PURSUANT TO THIS SUBSECTION, THE COURT OR JUDGE SHALL EN-
TER AN ORDER THAT:
(A) RECITES THE FACTS CONSTITUTING THE CONTEMPT IN THE IMMEDIATE VIEW AND PRESENCE OF
THE COURT OR JUDGE;
(B) FINDS THE PERSON GUILTY OF THE CONTEMPT; AND
(C) PRESCRIBES THE PUNISHMENT FOR THE CONTEMPT...
WHEREAS NRS 22.030 DECLARES THAT WHEN A CONTEMPT IS COMMITTED IN THE IM-
MEDIATE VIEW AND PRESENCE OF THE COURT OR JUDGE AT CHAMBERS, IT MAY BE PUNISHED SUMMARI-
LY, FOR WHICH AN ORDER SHALL BE MADE, RECITING THE FACTS AS OCCURRING IN SUCH IMMEDIATE
VIEW AND PRESENCE, ADJUDGING THAT THE PERSON PROCEEDED AGAINST IS THEREBY GUILTY OF A
CONTEMPT AND THAT HE/SHE BE PUNISHED AS THEREIN PRESCRIBED, AND WHEREAS, ON THE 30TH
DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2011, THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT APPEARED BEFORE THIS COURT. NAME:
ZACHERYCOUGHLIN, WHO IS A DEFENDANT
__ PARTY; WITNESS; SPECTATOR, AND
WHEREAS SUCH INDIVIDUAL COMMITTED THE FOLLOWING ACT(S) IN THE IMMEDIATE
VIEW AND PRESENCE OF THE COURT:
__ (CHECKED) ______ DISORDERLY, CONTEMPTUOUS OR INSOLENT BEHAVIOR TOWARD THE
JUDGE WHILE HE IS HOLDING COURT, OR ENGAGED IN HIS JUDICIAL DUTIES AT CHAMBERS,
___(NOTCHECKED)___ REFUSING TO BE SWORN OR ANSWER AS A WITNESS
___(NOTCHECKED)___ DISOBEYING A LAWFUL WRIT/ORDER/RULE/PROCESS ISSUED BY THE
COURT/JUDGE AT CHAMBERS, AND WHEREAS SUCH CONDUCT:
__(NOT CHECKED) __ Demeaned the Court
__ (NOTCHECKED)__ DEROGATED THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT
__ (CHECKED) ______ INTERFERED WITH THE ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND REQUIRED
IMMEDIATE VINDICATION BY THE COURT TO PRESERVE ORDER AND RESPECT.
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__ (NOTCHECKED)__ AFINE IN THE AMOUNT OF ($500 OR LESS).
__ (CHECKED) ______ IMPRISONMENT FOR (25 DAYS OR LESS), NOALTERNATIVE SENTENC-
ING...
DEFENDANT TO BE RELEASEDON 12/3/11 AT 8 PMDATEDTHIS 30TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2011
KENNETHR. HOWARD, JUDGE, RENO MUNICIPAL COURT"
__(NOT CHECKED)___ DISOBEYING A LAWFUL WRIT/ORDER/RULE/PROCESS ISSUED BY THE
COURT/JUDGE AT CHAMBERS, AND WHEREASSUCH CONDUCT:
__(this blank, noticeably and importantly, was NOT CHECKED) _ Demeaned the Court
NOW, IRONICALLY, IT IS THE SBN'S KING WHOM MUST HAVE APPLIED TO HIM THE VERY
AUTHORITY ACCEPTED BY PANEL CHAIR ECHEVERRIA IN GRANTING KING'S 11/2/12 MOTION
TO QUASH THE SUPOENAS UPON RMC JUDGES WHERE JUDGE HOWARD MAY NOT NOW (ES-
PECIALLY DO TO PRINCIPLES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND LACHES) SEEK TO MODIFY HIS
11/30/11 OSPC BY INSERTING A CHECK IN A BLANK WHERE PREVIOUSLY THERE WAS NONE.
THE ORDER MUST STAND AS IT IS, AND, AS SUCH, THAT OPSC PROVIDES COUGHLIN CONCLUSIVE
PROOF (RES JUDICATA, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL) THAT COUGHLIN DID NOT DEROGATED THE AUTHORI-
TY OF THE COURT OR INTERFERED WITH THE ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND REQUIRED
IMMEDIATE VINDICATION BY THE COURT TO PRESERVE ORDER AND RESPECT SUFFICIENT FOR RMC
JUDGE HOWARD TO MAKE A FINDING OF FACT OR CONCLUSION OF LAW, MUCH LESS AND ORDER, THAT
COUGHLIN CAN BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN ADJUDGED TO HAVE BEEN ADJUDGED TO HAVE VIOLATED NRS
22.010(2) (ALL OF NRS 22 RELATES TO CIVIL CONTEMPT STATUTES, AND THEREFORE NO ORDER RELAT-
ED THERETO COMES WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF SCR 111(5) (DESPITE BAR COUNSEL KING'S CONSTANT
ASSERTIONS AND PLEADING TO THE CONTRARY, WHICH, ITSELF, IS ARGUABLY A VIOLATION OF RPC 3.1,
3.2, 3.3, AND 3.4, 4.1 (THE RMC JUDGES AND RCA), 8.1, 8.2, AND 8.4...AND ALSO, PERHAPS, RPC 4.2
TO THE EXTENT IN RE SCHAEFER WOULD HAVE A PRO SE ATTORNEY HAVE RPC 4.2 APPLIED AGAINST
HIM WHERE SUCH PRO SE ATTORNEY CONTACTS A REPRESENTED PARTY, TURNABOUT BEING FAIRPLAY,
KING'S CONTACTING A SELF REPRESENTING COUGHLIN HERE, THEN, ARGUABLY IS TANTAMOUNT TO
KING VIOLATING RPC 4.2 WHERE KING COMMUNICATED WITH COUGHLIN IN COUGHLIN'S ROLE AS A
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CLIENT TO HIMSELF. OTHERWISE, DDAWATTS-VIAL'S INTERPRETATION OF THINGS, IN HIS 11/13/12
FAXED OBJECTIONS TO COUGHLIN'S SUBPOENA, WHEREIN HE ASSERTS THAT COUGHLIN'S ADMISSION
THAT HIS LAW LICENSE IN NEVADA IS SUSPENDED (THOUGH, IT MAY BE THAT, GIVEN COUGHLIN'S
USPTO LAW LICENSE IS NOT PRESENTLY SUSPENDED, COUGHLIN IS ENTITLED TO ISSUE SUBPOENAS TO
WHOMEVER HE CHOOSES INCIDENT THERETO) NECESSARILY MEANS THAT, UNDER NRCP 45(A)(3), THE
SUBPOENAS COUGHLIN HAD SERVED THAT WERE NOT ISSUED BY THE SBN'S CLERK OF COURT NEED
NOT BE OBEYED OR RESPONDED TO. THIS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR THAT NRCP
45 IS EVEN APPLICABLE IN DISCIPLINARY MATTERS, NOR THAT, EVEN WERE IT APPLICABLE, THE FACTS
OF THESE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AUGER FOR AN APPLICATION SUCH AS THE ONE SUGGESTED BY
WCDADDAWATTS-VIAL, PARTICULARLY GIVEN CHAIRMAN SUSICH'S 7/27/12 WRITTEN CORRE-
SPONDENCE TO COUGHLIN, AND THE IMPORT OF SUCH COMMUNICATION WHEN CONSIDERING THE EX-
PRESS DECLARATION MADE BY BAR COUNSEL KING TO COUGHLIN ON 10/15/12 THAT KING HAD CON-
FIRMED WITH CHIEF BAR COUNSEL DAVID CLARK THAT COUGHLIN, AS A RESPONDENT, EVEN WHERE
TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED, MAY, IN FACT, ISSUE HIS OWN SUBPOENAS, AND FURTHER WHERE CONSIDER-
ING THAT THE SBN/NNDB/PANEL/SBNCLERK OF COURT HAD COMMUNICATED TO COUGHLIN THAT
HE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PAY SUBPOENA OR WITNESS FEES, BOTH IN LIGHT OF HIS INIDGENT STATUS,
AND UNDER THE RULES APPLICABLE TO THIS PARTICULAR DISCIPLINARY MATTER UNDER SCR 105(4)
AND SCR 119(3).
NRS 22.010 Acts or omissions constituting contempts. The following acts or omis-
sions shall be deemed contempts:
1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while the judge is holding
court, or engaged in judicial duties at chambers, or toward masters or arbitrators while sitting on a
reference or arbitration, or other judicial proceeding.
2. A breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance in the presence of the
court, or in its immediate vicinity, tending to interrupt the due course of the trial or other judi-
cial proceeding.
3. Disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, order, rule or process issued by the
court or judge at chambers.
4. DISOBEDIENCE OF A SUBPOENA DULY SERVED, OR REFUSING TO BE SWORN OR ANSWER AS A
WITNESS.
5. RESCUING ANY PERSON OR PROPERTY IN THE CUSTODY OF AN OFFICER BY VIRTUE OF AN ORDER
OR PROCESS OF SUCH COURT OR JUDGE AT CHAMBERS.
6. DISOBEDIENCE OF THE ORDER OR DIRECTION OF THE COURT MADE PENDING THE TRIAL OF AN
ACTION, IN SPEAKING TO OR IN THE PRESENCE OF A JUROR CONCERNING AN ACTION IN WHICH THE JU-
ROR HAS BEEN IMPANELED TO DETERMINE, OR IN ANY MANNER APPROACHING OR INTERFERING WITH
SUCH JUROR WITH THE INTENT TO INFLUENCE THE VERDICT.
7. ABUSING THE PROCESS OR PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT OR FALSELY PRETENDING
TO ACT UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF AN ORDER OR PROCESS OF THE COURT.
And, actually, it is WCDA DDA Watts-Vial, and, arguably the Second Judicial District Court
Judges and Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court, and Custodian of Records whom should be
subject to a finding that they have violated NRS 22.030(4). Further, Reno City Attorney Christensen
and the Reno Muncipal Court Judges, Court Administrator, Custodian of Record, and those City of
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Reno Marshal's whom disobey such subpoena duly served upon them have similarly committed a
violation of NRS 22.030(4) where SCR 110(4) does not entitle any of those individuals or entities to
rely upon the 11/7/12 Order by Chair Echeverria purporting to quash such subpoenas where SCR
110(4) is quite clear that it is NNDB Chairman Susich, only, whom has jurisdiction to make such an
Order and where there is no indication that any of those subpoened communicated an open refusal
under RPC 3.4 sufficient to prevent a finding that a violation of such was committed by all those
subpoened whom are licensed attorneys (which, would included those RMC Judges subpoened).
Similarly, the Reno Justice Court's Custodian of Records and Court Administrator Steven Tuttle and
Chief Civil Clerk Karen Stancil could be said to have violated NRS 22.030(4) as well. Interestingly,
neither DDA Watts-Vial nor any other attorney from the WCDA's Office communicated any objec-
tion to the subpoen Coughlin had served a non-party over 18 years of age on Stancil, Tuttle, and the
RJC's Custodian of Records by one Nicholas Hassett of Reno, Nevada, a 20 year old at the time.
SCR Rule 114. Reciprocal discipline.
4. IDENTICAL DISCIPLINE TO BE IMPOSED; EXCEPTIONS. AFTER THE
TIME FOR THE ATTORNEY TO RESPOND HAS EXPIRED, THE SUPREME COURT
SHALL IMPOSE THE IDENTICAL DISCIPLINE UNLESS THE ATTORNEY DEMON-
STRATES, OR THE SUPREME COURT FINDS, THAT ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD
UPON WHICH THE DISCIPLINE IS PREDICATED IT CLEARLYAPPEARS:
(a) That the procedure in the other jurisdiction was so lacking in notice or opportunity to
be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or
(b) That there was such an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to
the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept the decision of the
other jurisdiction as fairly reached; or
(c) That the misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in this state; or
(d) That the misconduct established does not constitute misconduct under any Nevada Rule
of Professional Conduct.
If the court determines that any of the preceding factors exist, it shall enter an appropriate
order.
5. Discipline elsewhere resjudicata. In all other respects, a final adjudication in another
jurisdiction that an attorney has engaged in misconduct conclusively establishes the misconduct
for the purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this state.
The converse of SCR Rule 114(5) (applied here by analogy) is that the failure of the various
Order's involved here to make a final adjudication...that..attorney (Coughlin, and the 6/26/12 Order
in FHE 2 was entered while Coughlin's law license was temporarily suspended, which, assuredly,
WCDA DDA Watts-Vial would agree, means such Order can in no way be asserted as any sort of
proof, conclusive or otherwise, of any sort of professional misconduct on Coughlin's part, right,
DDA Watts? Also, consider RMC Judge W. Gardner repeatedly referring to Coughlin as an attor-
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ney during the 6/18/12 Trial in 26405, which, again, occurred while Coughlin's law license in Ne-
vada was temporarily suspended). Further, the language in SCR 114(5) referring to another juris-
diction does not necessarily require such final adjudication occur in by the imposition of disci-
plinary sanctions in another jurisdiction outside the State of Nevada. Such use of the term juris-
diction in the phrase another jurisdiction may be taken to mean another court within Nevada, es-
pecially considering the wording of SCR Rule 99.
SCR Rule 99. Jurisdiction.
1. EVERY ATTORNEY ADMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW IN NEVADA, SPECIALLY ADMITTED BY A
COURT OF THIS STATE FOR A PARTICULAR PROCEEDING, PRACTICING LAW HERE, WHETHER SPECIALLY
ADMITTED OR NOT, OR WHOSE ADVERTISING FOR LEGAL SERVICES REGULARLY APPEARS IN NEVADA IS
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIVE DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DISCIPLI-
NARY BOARDS AND HEARING PANELS CREATED BY THESE RULES.
2. NOTHING CONTAINED IN THESE RULES DENIES ANY COURT THE POWER TO MAINTAIN CONTROL
OVER PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED BEFORE IT, SUCH AS THE POWER OF CONTEMPT, NOR DO THESE RULES
PROHIBIT ANY ASSOCIATION FROM CENSURING, SUSPENDING, OR EXPELLING ITS MEMBERS.
SCR RULE 110. SUBPOENA POWER, PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, WITNESSES, AND PRETRIAL
PROCEEDINGS.
1. Issuance of subpoenas by hearing panels and bar counsel. Bar counsel and a member of a
hearing panel who is also a state bar member, in matters under investigation by either, may adminis-
ter oaths and affirmations and issue and compel by subpoena the attendance of witnesses and the pro-
duction of pertinent books, papers, and documents. The attorney may also compel by subpoena the
attendance of witnesses and the production of pertinent books, papers, and other documents
before a hearing panel. Subpoena and witness fees and mileage shall be the same as in a district
court.
2. Confidentiality stated on subpoena. Subject to the provisions of Rule 121, subpoe-
nas shall clearly indicate on their face that they are issued in connection with a confidential
investigation under these rules and that it is regarded as contempt of the supreme court or
grounds for discipline under these rules for a person subpoenaed to in any way breach the
confidentiality of the investigation. It shall not be regarded as a breach of confidentiality for a
person subpoenaed to consult with counsel or to answer questions asked by bar counsel or the
attorney to determine the facts known by the witness.
3. Attachment of person for failure to obey subpoena or produce documents. Whenever
any person subpoenaed to appear and give testimony or to produce books, papers, or other documents
as required by subpoena, or requested to provide documents pursuant to Rule 78.5(1)(b), refuses to
appear or testify before a hearing panel, or to answer any pertinent or proper questions, or to
provide the requested documents, that person shall be deemed in contempt of the disciplinary
board, and the chair of the disciplinary board shall report the fact to a district judge of the coun-
ty in which the hearing is being held or the investigation conducted. The district court shall
promptly issue an attachment in the form usual in the court, directed to the sheriff of the county,
commanding the sheriff to attach such person and bring such person forthwith before the
court. On the return of the attachment, and the production of the person attached, the district court
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shall havejurisdictionof thematter; and the person charged may purge himself or herself of the
contempt in the same way, and the same proceedings shall be had, and thesamepenaltiesmaybe
imposed, and the samepunishment inflictedas in the case of a witness subpoenaed to appear and
give evidence on the trial of a civil cause before a district court of the State of Nevada.
4. Contest of subpoena. A contest of a subpoena shall be heard and determined by the
chair of the appropriate disciplinary board.
5. Restriction on discovery. Discovery by the attorney, other than under Rule
105(2)(c), is not permitted prior to hearing, except by the order of the chair for good cause up-
on motion under Rule 103(5) or Rule 103(6).
6. Prehearingconference. At the discretion of the chair, a prehearing conference may be
ordered for the purpose of obtaining admissions or otherwise narrowing the issues presented by
the pleadings. The conference may be held before the chair or the chairs designee.
There is nothing in the record to indicate the NNDB Chairman Susich identified any design-
ee for the purpose of carrying out all the matters with which the chair (in all instances in SCR 110
the term chair is used with respect to the chair of the disciplinary board or board and the
term panel is nowhere to be found therein. This makes good sense, as the Chair of the Disciplinary
Board is a continuing position wherein such Chair, presumably, given the prestige and power at-
tendant to such a position, would be someone possessing sufficient, particularized knowledge of the
substantive and procedural issues typically arising in a disciplinary matter context sufficient to make
sure that the various powers accorded to such disciplinary board chair within SCR 110 (and, also,
under , is not permitted prior to hearing, except by the order of the chair for good cause upon motion
under Rule 103(5) or Rule 103(6)) to so entrust with such authority. While NNDB Chair Susich's
7/27/12 writing to Coughlin directs Coughlin to coordinate and inquire as to certain matters with the
SBN's OBC and SBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters, it in now way, authorizes or identifies the SBN,
OBC, or SBN Clerk of Court as a SCR 110(6) designee. Further, the use of the term conference
in SCR 110(6) necessarily requires Coughlin's participation, or, at least, an opportunity to participate
in such a conference be given to Coughlin, and notice thereof. Instead, the NNDB, Panel, and OBC
continually treated Coughlin like the Elephant Man. Coughlin is not an animal. He is a human be-
ing.
Further, King likely violated RPC 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.8, 8.1, 8.2, and 8.4 where he admit-
ted to Coughlin, on 10/15/12 that he fully intended to have such a conference in Coughlin's absence
(and apparently did so) an an effort to achieve his stated goal of skirting the express dictates in this
Court's 6/7/12 Order in 60838 and SCR 111(8) and thereby consolidate the requirement stemming
from this Court's Order (which expressly incorporates the dictate found within SCR 111(8)) that re-
fer(red) the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hearingbe-
fore a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent of the discipline
to be imposed) into
SCR Rule 104. State bar counsel. 1. State bar counsel shall: ... b) Subject to Rule
105(1), dispose of all matters involving alleged misconduct by dismissal of the allegation(s) or by
the filingof awrittencomplaint. Ironically, it is the OBC's King's beloved SCR 111(5) that nows
turns on him here. SCR 111(5). Certified document conclusive. A certified copy of proof of a
conviction is conclusive evidence of the commission of the crime stated in it in any disciplinary
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proceeding instituted against an attorney based on the conviction. An allegation (under SCR
104(1)(b)) necessarily excludes a conviction given such, under SCR 111(5) provides conclusive
evidence of the commission of the crime, thereby removing from the power granted Bar Counsel
under SCR 104 the right to consolidate the formal hearing required by SCR 111(8) with the SCR
105(2) Commencement of formal proceedings following the or the filing of a written com-
plaint by Bar Counsel under SCR 105(1). Thus, the Bar Counsel had not authority to so consoli-
date the formal hearing required by SCR 111(8) and this Court's 6/7/12 Order in 60838. The dis-
tinction between formal disciplinary proceedings...commenced by bar counsel filing a written com-
plaint and that required where an Order stemming from an SCR 111(6) Petition in 60838 fulfilled
this Court's duty, under SCR 111(8) to refer the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the
institution of a formal hearingbefore a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined
shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed is so obvious (proceedings is plural, whereas
hearing is singular; commencement of formal proceedings necessarily implicates the double
jeopardy issues attendnat to King seeking to consolidate the matters involved in the hearing which
SCR 111(8) requires the institution of (ie, commencement and insitution connote entirely dif-
ferent grants of authority and jurisdiciton, in addition to distinct purposes and limitations, particularly
relevant to the particular processes involved) as to make the SBN's OBC's King conduct here, argua-
bly, misconduct violative of RPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 3.8, 8.1, 8.2, and 8.4 and
Coughlin herein points this out in an effort o fulfill his duty undr RPC 3.8.
(SCR 105(2): Commencement of formal proceedings. Formal disciplinary proceedingsare com-
menced by bar counsel filing a written complaint in the name of the state bar...), Note, SCR
105(2) decidedly DOESNOT say that formal disciplinary proceedings are commenced by bar
counsel doing that which SCR 104(d) calls for (SCR 104(1)(d) reads:(1) State bar counsel
shall:...(d) File withthesupremecourt petitions with certified copies of proof of conviction demon-
strating that attorneys have been convicted of serious crimes, as defined in Rule 111. Where SCR
105(2) provides that as to the: Commencement of formal proceedings. Formal disciplinary pro-
ceedingsare commenced by bar counsel filing a written complaint in the name of the state bar...
and such Complaints are always filed before the appropriate Disciplinary Board in the State Bar of
Nevada (that is to say that the name of the court listed above the caption of such Complaints always
indicates:
STATE BAR OF NEVADA
NORTHERNNEVADADISCIPLINARYBOARD
TO BE SURE, NOTHING IN THE SCR'S INDICATE EXPRESSLY WHAT COURT SUCH FORMAL DISCIPLI-
NARY PROCEEDINGS ARE TO OCCUR IN, AND THE TEXT ABOVE THE CAPTION IN SUCH MATTERS DOES DE-
PART FROM, SAY WDCR 10, WHERE IT FAILS TO INCLUDE INTHE IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE CON-
TENTS THEREIN, AND WHERE THE WORD COURT IS NOT PRESENT. HOWEVER, THE SBNHAS HELD
LAURA PETERS OUT AS THE SBN'S CLERK OF COURT, INDICATING, SIMILAR TO THE SET UP IN
CALIFORNIA, THAT THE STATE OF NEVADA HAS A STATE BAR COURT. WHY THE ABOVE IS RELE-
VANT IS THAT SCR 111(4) PROVIDES: 4. BAR COUNSELS RESPONSIBILITY. UPON BEING ADVISED
THAT AN ATTORNEY SUBJECT TO THE DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT HAS BEEN
CONVICTED OF A CRIME, OTHER THAN A MISDEMEANOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION NOT INVOLVING THE USE
OF ALCOHOL OR A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, BAR COUNSEL SHALL OBTAIN A CERTIFIED COPY OF PROOF
OF THE CONVICTION AND SHALL FILE A PETITION WITH THE SUPREME COURT, ATTACHING THE CERTIFIED
COPY. UPON BEING ADVISED THAT AN ATTORNEY SUBJECT TO THE DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION OF THE
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SUPREME COURT HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF A MISDEMEANOR INVOLVING THE USE OF ALCOHOL OR A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AND THE OFFENSE IS NOT THE ATTORNEYS FIRST SUCH OFFENSE, BAR COUN-
SEL SHALL INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT THE MATTER TO THE APPROPRIATE PANEL OF THE DISCIPLINARY
BOARD PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION. THE PETITION SHALL BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE PANELS
RECOMMENDATION REGARDING THE APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINARY ACTION, IF ANY, TO BE IMPOSED UN-
DER THESE OR ANY OTHER RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT PERTAIN TO THE CONDUCT OF ATTOR-
NEYS.
5. Certified document conclusive. A certified copy of proof of a conviction is conclusive evi-
dence of the commission of the crime stated in it in any disciplinary proceeding instituted against an
attorney based on the conviction....
7. Suspension on certification. Upon the filing with the supreme court of a petition with
a certified copy of proof of the conviction, demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted of a
serious crime, the court shall enter an order suspending the attorney, regardless of the pendency of an
appeal, pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding, which shall be commenced by
the appropriate disciplinary board uponreferral bythe supreme court. For good cause, the
court may set aside its order suspending the attorney from the practice of law. (NOTE: the
phrase pending final disposition in SCR 111(7) expresses a far different approach than does the
phrases found in SCR 105(2) (commencement of formal proceedings and formal disciplinary
proceedings). (NOTE: the phrase disciplinary proceeding used in SCR 111(7) differs from
the phrase formal disciplinary proceedings (the singular proceeding in SCR 111(7) implies
nond of the extended involvement inherent to where formal disciplinary proceedings are
commenced under SCR 105(2) and plural formal disciplinary proceedings, and the presence
of the qualifier formal) found in SCR 105(2)). Further, the approach taken by the SBN's OBC
here, where the Complaint contains three grievance case numbers, none of which represents an iden-
tifier or case number (why no appearance of the SCR 111 Petition's number, 60838?). The OBC of-
fered nothing in its filings to marry any of the three grievance numbers to this Court's 6/7/12 mandate
in 60838 or that required under SCR 111(8).
and SCR 104(1)(d) reads:(1) State bar counsel shall:...(d) File withthesupremecourt peti-
tions with certified copies of proof of conviction demonstrating that attorneys have been convicted of
serious crimes, as defined in Rule 111. Where SCR 105(2) provides that as to the: Commencement
of formal proceedings. Formal disciplinary proceedingsare commenced by bar counsel filing a
written complaint in the name of the state bar... and the Complaint here bares three case num-
bers (NG12-0204, NG12-0434, NG12-0435), while, noticeably, the SCR 105(3)(a) review by su-
preme court and SCR 105(3)(a) appeal is accorded a different case number (here, 62337)
SCR 111(8): Referral to disciplinary board. Upon receipt of a petition filed under sub-
section 4 of this rule, demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted of a serious crime, the
supreme court shall, in addition to suspending the attorney in accordance with the provisions of sub-
section 7 of this rule, refer the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a
formal hearingbefore a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent
of the discipline to be imposed. The panel may, for good cause, postpone the proceeding until all ap-
peals from the conviction have been concluded.
Notice SCR 111(8) DOES NOT READ for the institution of formal disciplinary proceed-
ings after Bar Counsel follows th procedure on receipt of complaint set out in SCR Rule 105(1)(a)
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and a investigations shall be initiated and conducted by bar counsel or bar counsels staff or other
investigative personnel at bar counsels direction prior or pursuantto the opening of a grievance
file... whereupon at the conclusion of an investigation of a grievance file, bar counsel King makes
the decision to recommend in writing the filing of a written complaint where such recommen-
dation shall be promptly reviewed by a screening panel... NOTICE THAT SCR 111(8) SIMPLY
DOES NOT SAY ANYTHING OF THE SORT, DESPITE WHATEVER PERVISION THEREOF
THE OBC'S KING PURPORTS TO BE CONTROLLING HERE.
AMJUR PLEADING 590, In determining which sanctions should be imposed for violations of
Rule 11, the court must consider the purposes to be served by the imposition of sanctions.[FN1] Be-
cause the primary purpose of Rule 11 is to deter future litigation abuse, the court is required to im-
pose the least severe sanction that fulfills the Rule's purpose.[FN2] If a court decides to impose sanc-
tions under Rule 11, it may choose from a wide range of nonmonetary sanctions or, in limited cir-
cumstances, monetary sanctions.[FN3] Any sanction must be limited to what is sufficient to deter
repetition of the violation or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.[FN4] In determining
an appropriate sanction under Rule 11, the court should consider:[FN5] (1) the nature of the viola-
tion committed; (2) the circumstances in which it was committed; (3) the circumstances including
the financial state of the individual to be sanctioned; and (4) those sanctioning measures that would
suffice to deter that individual from similar violations in the future. The sanction may include direc-
tives of a nonmonetary nature.[FN6] Although the Rule itself does not enumerate the types of non-
monetary sanctions that may be imposed, courts have held that they may include issuing a repri-
mand[FN7] or requiring the offending counsel to undertake the representation of a pro se plain-
tiff.[FN8] The public filing of a document finding that attorneys had violated Rule 11 has been
deemed a sufficient sanction.[FN9] [FN9] Gary v. Braddock Cemetery and Consol Energy, 334 Fed.
Appx. 465, 73 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1139 (3d Cir. 2009) A nonmonetary sanction may also include re-
quiring participation in seminars or other educational programs[FN10] or referring the matter to dis-
ciplinary authorities.[FN11] [FN11] Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendments to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11.
If, as in Mirch 49212, RPC 3.1 is essentially equated with NRCP 11, then Judge Nash's find-
ings in her 3/14/12 Order in 26800 is violative of the above restrictions in that it is wholly over-
broad and excessive in a manner that cannot be said to be limited to the above goals. It is the equiv-
alent of taking a bazooka to some weeds in one's front lawn.
Further, Judge Flanagan's 6/25/12 Order in 063628 is not a sanction, was made at a time
when Coughlin was already suspended, was not attached to the Complaint, and King himself violates
RPC 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, and NRCP 11 where he purports that anything in his 8/23/12 Complaint (wherein
King clearly appears to have attempted to distance his prosecution from Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s name
as much as possible, going so far as to pled the 1/12/13 jaywalking arrest, and 11/15/11 traffic cita-
tions outside Hill's office (from which all matters associated with Judge Nash's 2/28/12 and 3/12/12
Orders in 26800 stem and are intimately connected, as is also the case with her mailing to the SBN
her 3/14/12 written grievance against Coughlin, which included the 3/5/12 Motion to Dismiss in
26405 that King's Complaint pled (at para 12 page 3 therein) thusly: 12. Respondent, representing
himself as co-counsel, filed a 36-page motion to dismiss on March 5, 2012. The motion was denied
by Judge William Gardner and was determined to be without merit. The motion, on its face, demon-
strates that Respondent lacks competence to practice law. (However, such 3/5/12 filing in 26405 by
Coughlin was never attached to anything filed by King nor introduced into evidence at the FH, and
therefore, King's bare, conclusory allegation, can in no way meet the clear and convicing evidence
burden of proof. Further, where King's Complaint indicates :. Respondent, representing himself as
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co-counsel, filed a 36-page motion to dismiss on March 5, 2012. The motion was denied by Judge
William Gardner and was determined to be without merit. The motion, on its face, demonstrates that
Respondent lacks competence to practice law.... (find citation that says such an Order indicating a
motion is without merit is not tantamount to a finding that it was vexatious or sanctionable).
Further, 26405 was a criminal prosecution and, as such NRCP Rule 11 in inapplicable, and Judge
Gardner's failure to adhere to Canon 2.15 or otherwise sanction or report Coughlin to any authorities
is dispositive as to any claim that King may have plead (and, noticeably, King's Complaint stears
away from alleging any such Order by Judge Gardner (which was never attached to any of King's
filings and was not even inlcuded in the 11/7/12 production of some 3,200 pages of documents by
the SBN) is pled as a basis to support an allegation that Coughlin violated RPC 3.1, but rather, King
specifically limits his pleading therto to an allegation that the motion, on its face, demonstrates that
Respondnet lacks competence to practice law. And, even that attempt by King to follow the dic-
tates of SCR 105(2) is muddled, as it is not clear whether King is therein pursuing a competency de-
termination under SCR 117 or attempting to proved a violation of RPC 1.1.
It seems apparent that RJC Pearson's EPO has the added benefit to the SBN of making it
impossible for Coughlin to have the SBN served, sufficient to satisfy any SCR 109 (what service
does SCR 110 require?) or other personal service requirements attendant to any action or filing by
Coughlin, where Coughlin was arrested on 3/8/13 for an alleged violation of that the TPO and EPO
in RJC RCP12-607 for allegedly having a courier deliver a last minute filing to the SBN on 1/3/13
(the deadline or day prior thereto, to file an NRCP 52, 59 and DCR 13(7) Reconsideration Motion),
and again on 1/23/13 (also a deadline as to the filing of Coughlin's Brief in 62337, necessitating, in
accordance with the rules, that Coughlin seeking a stipulation to any such extension prior to filing a
motion seeking such.
(E) Coughlin was afforded ample opportunity to prepare a verified answer or response to the alle-
gations of the Complaint and failed to timely do so. See Findings of Fact 34, 35 and 36. According-
ly, the matter could proceed on a default basis and the allegations of the Complaint deemed admit-
ted. SCR 105(2) Notwithstanding the fact that the matter could have been decided on a default ba-
sis, the Panel permitted the State Bar and Coughlin to present evidence.
62B Am. J ur. 2dProcess 42II. AMENABILITY TOSERVICE OF PROCESSB. PersonsImmunetoServiceof Process3. Other
Particular Persons, Conditions, or SituationsTopicSummaryCorrelationTableReferences 42. Natureof proceedingattended
bynonresidentWest'sKeyNumber Digest West'sKeyNumber Digest, Federal Civil Procedurek415, 416West'sKeyNumber Di-
gest, Processk117to120Theruleof immunityfromtheserviceof civil processof anonresidentwhileattendingcourtinanaction
inwhichheor sheisapartyor awitnessextendstoeveryproceedingof ajudicial nature[FN1] takenin or emanatingfromaduly
constitutedjudicial tribunal, whichdirectlyrelatestothetrial of theissuesinvolved.[FN2] It extendsnot onlytopeoplewhoarein
theimmediatepresenceof thejudgesof thecourtsof record, but tothosealsowhoattendthesubordinatetribunalsandofficers
appointedbythosecourtstoassist theminthedischargeof their duties.[FN3] Hearingsbeforearbitrators, legislativecommittees,
trusteesin bankruptcy, examiners, mastersinchancery, andcommissionerstotakedepositionshaveall beenincludedwithin the
scopeof itsapplication.[FN4][FN4] InreEquitablePlanCompany, 277F.2d319(2dCir. 1960); Durst v. Tautges, Wilder &
McDonald, 44F.2d507, 71A.L.R. 1394(C.C.A. 7thCir. 1930); Velkovv. Superior Courtinandfor LosAngelesCounty, 40Cal.
2d289, 253P.2d25, 35A.L.R.2d1348(1953) (disciplinaryproceedingsbeforestatebar; recognizingrule);
St. J ohnv. Superior Court I nandFor LosAngelesCounty, 178Cal. App. 2d794, 3Cal. Rptr.
535, 84A.L.R.2d415(2dDist. 1960) (licenserevocationhearing); 62BAm. J ur. 2dProcess 42
[1] Whilethegeneral ruleprotectsthenonresident "duringaperiodreasonablynecessarytothe
givingof testimonyinajudicial proceeding" whenheentersthestateprimarilyfor that purpose,
therecognizedexceptiontotherulepermitsserviceif thelater action"arisesoutof or involves
thesamesubject matter astheoneinwhichthenonresident hasmadeavoluntaryappearance."
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(Velkovv. Superior Court (1953), 40Cal. 2d289, 291, 292[253P.2d25, 35A.L.R.2d1348].) I n
theVelkovcase, aNewYork resident appearedbeforealocal administrativecommitteeof The
CaliforniaStateBar, at their request, totestifyinadisciplinaryproceeding, institutedbyMrs.
Velkov, against attorneystowhomMrs. Velkovhadtransferred25per cent of certainproperties
asafeefor services. Mrs. Velkovallegedthetransfer illegal andpredicated[187Cal. App. 2d
211] theinstitutionof disciplinaryproceedingsuponthatbasis. WhenMrs. Velkov"cametoCali-
fornia... totestifyinadisciplinaryproceedingbeforethat body, shewasservedwithsummons."
(P. 290.) Thesummonsemanatedfromanactionbrought bytheattorneysfor declaratoryrelief as
tothetransfer.
HILLHIMSELF VIOLATES RPC3.1, 3.3, AND3.4 INCIDENT TO HIS ALLEGATION, IN HIS PLEADINGS THAT HE ALLOWED COUGHLIN ADDITIONAL
TIME TO REMOVE HIS PERSONTLY DURING LATE DECEMBER 2011, WHICH, APPARENTLY JUDGE FLANAGAN FOUND TO HAVE BEEN AN
AGREEMENT COUGHLIN ENTERED INTO WITH HILL, SOMEHOW, BUT THEN THAT COUGHLIN FAILED
TO LIVE UP TO? THIS IS THOROUGHLYDISPROVEN BYTHE EMAILS BETWEEN HILL AND COUGHLIN
ON AND AROUND 12/24/11, WHERE COUGHLIN REQUESTS ADDITIONAL TIME TO REMOVE HIS RE-
MAINING PROPERTY (AND SETS FORTH A BASIS FOR FINDING THAT HILL'S INTERFERENCE AND OB-
STRUCTIONIST TACTICS CAUSED SUCH A NEED) FOLLOW BY HILL'S 12/24/11 EMAIL TO COUGHLIN
WHY WASN'T COUGHLIN'S 12/14/11 SUBMISSION TO THE RJC INCLUDED IN THE VOL 4 OR OTHER ROA
TRANSMITTED BY THE RJC ON 12/21/11 IN 1708? THEREAFTER, THE 1/4/12 SUPPLEMENTAL FILIGN IN
03628 WAS MERELY 3 PAGES AND FAILED TO INCLUDE THE LION'S SHARE OF COUGHLIN'S CLAIMS AND
CONTENTIONS, INCLUDIGN THOSE MADE IN WHAT HE SUBMITTED FOR FILING ON 12/14/11, 12/26/11 (37
PAGE SUBMISSION BY FAX), A 15 PAGE 12/26/11 SUBMISSION THAT IS FILE STAMPED 12/27/11, AND
OTHER MATERIALS. RJC CLERK CHRISTINE ERICKSON WAS EVASIVE WHEN QUESTIONED BY COUGHLIN
AS TO HER PREVIOUS STATEMENTS THAT FAX FILING WAS NOT PERMITTED T THE RJC WHEN COUGHLIN
BEGAN TO BECOME AWARE THAT, AT LEAST SOME LITIGANTS, WERE PERMITTED TO FILE BY FAX.
HOW IS IT PERMISSIBLE FOR THE RJC TO DENY COUGHLIN'S 12/14/11 FILING YET ALLOWHILL TO
FILE A NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER IN 1708 ON 12/29/11? THE APPEAL RECEIPT IN THE 1/4/12 SUP-
PLEMENTAL IS DEEPLY FLAWED? TO WHAT DO ENTRIES 9-15 RELATE? ARE THOSE HEARING EXHIBITS
FROM THE 12/20/11 CONTEST PERSONAL PROPERTY LIEN HEARING? WHY IS EVERYTHING THIS SUP-
PLEMENTAL AND THE FOUR VOLUME ROABY RJC CLERK ERICKSON IN BACKWARDS ORDER FROM HOW
ALL OTHER ROA'S ARE PRESENTED? THIS PERSISTES EVEN WHERE IN THE APPEAL RECEIPT THOSE
SEVEN EXHIBITS ARE LISTED IN REVERSE ORDER. IT GIVES THE REVIEWER A HEADACHE TRYING TO RE-
VIEW SUCH A PRESENTATION.
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FROM FLANAGAN'S 4/20/12 ORDER IN CARPENTIER V. AAMES, QLS, ANDRCS INCV08-01709: FINALLY, THIS COURTMAKES THE
FOLLOWINGOBSERVATIONS. THE ARGUMENTS RAISED BYTH PARTIES IN THEIR PLEADINGS GENERALLY CIRCUMSCRIBE THE ADJU-
DICATORYBOUNDARIES OF THIS COURT. SEE ..,BRELIANT V. PREFERRED EQUITIES CORP., 109
NEV. 842, 847, 858 P.2D1258, 1261 (1993 (STATING A DISTRICT COURT GENERALLY MAYNOT
CONSIDER MATTERS OUTSIDE OF THE PLEADINGS WHEN REVIEWING A MOTION TO DISMISS). AS
SUCH, THIS COURT TAKES NO POSITION ON WHETHER THE FINANCIA INSTITUTIONS IN THIS CASE
FOLLOWED THE LAWWHEN THEY WERE LINING UP THE DOCUMENTS TO FORECLOSE 0 THE PROP-
ERTY. NONETHELESS, THE MANNER AND TIMING IN WHICH THESE INSTITUTIONS-PARTICULARL
AAMES, DEUTSCHE,AND QUALITY-RECORDED THE ASSIGNMENT,FI ED THE SUBSTITUTION OF
TRUSTEE,AN FILED THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT,I S SUSPICIOUS AND TROUBLING TO THIS COURT.
In his 12/28/11 email to the parties, RJC Judge Sferrazza from 1708 again misapplies JCRRT
to landlord tenant matters despite JCRRT 2 indicating such rules do not apply there,
Merliss never had any Landlord's Affidavit filed in 1708 (Baker apparently filed a
Declaration on Merliss's behalf on 10/19/11, but that was after the first hearing of 10/13/11). Any
purported such Affidavit of Unlawful Detainer that Baker attempted to hand Coughlin, in violation of
both courthouse sanctuary doctrine and an attorney's (Coughlin's) immunity against service of pro-
cess when appearing in court (particularly in the very case to which such attempted service is relat-
ed), as well as the duty to withdraw as counsel where, by so doing, Baker necessarily makes himself a
likely witness, makes insufficient any such purporte service. Further, any such Affidavit by Merliss
fails to contain the following required language: That the termination and surrender of the rental unit
was to have taken place on
or before _______________, 20____. That legal Notice has been served upon
the tenant pursuant to the provisions of NRS 40.280, on ________________,
20____. A copy of the Notice is attached hereto and incorporated by this
reference NRS 40.253. As such any hearing or Order based upon and proceeding held therefrom is
void for lack of jurisdiction. NRCP 60(b)(4) and Aikin requires strict adherence to procedural and
statutory rules. Additionally, no such service in compliance of with NRS 40.280 was done as to any
such Notice purported to be served on Coughlin on 9/27/11 in 1708. Further, particularly where no
such: CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employ-
ee of RICHARD G. HILL, . CHARTERED, and that on the 27th day of September, 2011, I per-
sonally handed at the hearing in the above-referenced matter, a true and correct copy of the forego-
ing Five Day Notice of Unlawful Detainer for Failure to Vacate Rental Unit - NRS 40.251 ( No -
Cause . Termination) and Notice of Summary eviction - NRS 40.254 to: Zachary Coughlin 121 Riv-
er Rock Street Reno, Nevada 89503 BY/s/ Casey D. Baker, Esq..
Baker and Merliss failed to comply with the requirements of NRS 40.280 (specifically as to a
witness and more) for the alleged service of a 5 day UD Notice on 9/27/11.
FORM#9 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION OF LANDLORD FOR SUMMARY EVICTION FOR BREACH
CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE: 7. AFFIANT REQUESTS THAT THE COURT ENTER AN ORDER FOR
THE SUMMARY EVICTION OF THE
tenant from the premises and the sheriff/constable be ordered to remove the
tenant within twenty-four (24) hours after receipt of the court order.
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There is a great deal of confusion as to the law in Nevada vis a vis 24 hour lock-out notices
and how soon after posting one the constable or Sheriff may effectuate the lock-out:
http://www.lpsnv.com/evictionFAQ.pdf: "7. DOES MY TENANT HAVE RIGHTS? Yes they do.
When the notice is served, your tenants rights state that they can contest the notice with the justice
court from the moment that they receive the notice. Their reasons can vary, but they must get their
Tenants Response filed with the court of jurisdiction. It will then be approved or denied by the
judge. If it is approved, then a hearing will be scheduled. Your tenant can also contest the 24 Hour
Lock-out Notice, which is posted by the Constable. This notice is posted 24 hours before the Con-
stable returns to the property to do the lock change."
GAYLE KERN, ESQ., OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN MADE TO FOLLOWRPC 3.5A, BUT REGARDLESS, SHE
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED ANY WRIT OF RESTITUTION OR LOCKOUT ORDER ON 3/15/12
MERELY UPON A DEFAULT BASIS COUGHLIN FILED A DETAILED TENANT'S AFFIDAVIT THAT COULD
SPEAK FOR HIM AT THE HEARING, AND THE INITIAL BURDEN IS ON THE LANDLORD (IE, THE PARTY MOV-
ING FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER ANVUI), AND KERN FAILED TO EVEN FILE A LANDLORD'S AFFI-
DAVIT.
Regardless, in both 1708 and 374, NRS 40.253 does not allow for the Washoe County
Sheriff to conduct evictions in the manner in which is currently does. Hill's filings claim that the
WCSO's procedures, by being the usual and customary practices of the WCSO, somehow become
black letter law in Nevada, even where a statutory remedy is in place, one that the legislature worked
hard on (despite RJC Judge Pearson, in 1048, ignoring AB226's minor tenant's rights victory where it
required the landlord to, under NRS 40.253(3)(a) identify the court that has jurisdiction over the
matter... and 3(b)(1)'s dctate that such notice advise the tenant: (1) Of the tenants right to contest
the matter by filing,... an affidavit with the court that has jurisdiction over the matter..., in the
face of the unauthorized practice of law on behalf of out of state corporation no less, Northwinds
Apartments Assoc., LLC of Washington state.
NRS 40.253(6) provides...6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in sub-
section 3, regardless of the information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of
the affidavit permitted by subsection 5 (note, both in 1708 and 374, neither landlord filed such a
Landlord's Affidavit in a timely manner, and Merliss in 1708 never filed one at all. If Baker and
Hill want big boy attorney's fees, they should be required to get those sorts of things right to justify
such exorbinant fees, or even begin to), the justice court or the district court shall hold a hearing, af-
ter service of notice of the hearing upon the parties, to determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of
any affidavit or notice (Baker continually maintained that it was only Coughlin's Affidavit which
was up for inspection, in violation of RPC 3.1) provided for in this section. If the court determines
that there is no legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer and the tenant is guilty of an un-
lawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant.
So, really, especially in 1708, all the debate about the import and application of
the within 24 hours language is inapplicable anyways, as that phrase is only applicable to a
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situation where the tenant does not file a Tenant's Answer in respose to a 5 day UD Notice be-
ing posted.
NRS 40.253(5):. Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(A) THE LANDLORD OR THE LANDLORDS AGENT MAY APPLY BY AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLAINT (NOTE,
THERE IS NOTHING IN CH. 40 THAT ALLOWS FOR A LANDLORD'S AGENT TO DRAFT PLEADINGS
OR APPEAR ON BEHALF OF AN OUT OF STATE CORPORATION, CROSS THE BAR, AND PRACTICE LAW
ON ITS BEHALF, AS WNM'S SUE KIGN DID IN 074408 AND 374, AND AS NCS'S JEFF CHANDLER DID
IN 1048) FOR EVICTION TO THE JUSTICE COURT OF THE TOWNSHIP IN WHICH THE DWELLING,
APARTMENT, MOBILE HOME OR COMMERCIAL PREMISES ARE LOCATED OR TO THE DISTRICT
COURT OF THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE DWELLING, APARTMENT, MOBILE HOME OR COMMERCIAL
PREMISES ARE LOCATED, WHICHEVER HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE MATTER (IN 374, RJCJUDGE
SCHROEDER ISSUED SUCH AN ORDER PRIOR TO KERN EVEN FILING A LANDLORD'S ANSWER). THE
COURT MAY THEREUPON ISSUE AN ORDER DIRECTING THE SHERIFF OR CONSTABLE OF THE COUN-
TYTO REMOVE THE TENANT WITHIN 24 HOURS AFTER RECEIPT OF THE ORDER.
But, again, where Coughlin did comply with the 5 day notice, in both 1048, 374, and
1708, NRS 40.253(5) language is inapplicable (The court may thereupon issue an order directing
the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the
order.) Rather, it is NRS 40.253(6)'s language that controls: If the court determines that
there is no legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer and the tenant is guilty of an unlaw-
ful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant.
There being nothing thereing speaking to some within 24 hours dicate, the de-
fault application in civil law requires that such an an Order be served under NRCP 6(e) where
personal service is not accorded, thus requiring 3 days for mailing. Further, NRAP 8 and some
5 day stay suggested in Anvui, is arguably applicable. There is little indication in Ch. 40 or
elsehwhere to provide some explanation of just how and in what manner such a summary or-
der would be carried out and whether it would allow for the approach taken by the WCSO in
such situations. While NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2) does contain the term summary order, the ap-
pearance therein of the within 24 hours language, combined with the non-appearance of such
within 24 hours language in NRS 40.253(6), under traditional principles of statutory con-
struction, actually augers for an interpretation of subsection 6 that would require moretime for
a tenant than is provided for under NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2): That if the court determines that the
tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of
the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or
constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order...
It seems rather implausible to suggest that the within 24 hours language is some dic-
tate to the Sheriff or constable requiring such lockouts be effectuated in some narrow window
of time. Rather, particularly given the primacy to individual's and businesses inherent to their
uses as residences of places of business (or, in 1708, as both) it would seem entirely more likely,
and reasonable, to conclude that the legislature intended for the within 24 hours language to
afford tenant's at least 24 hours from the posting (if not the constructive receipt in the mail
under NRCP 6(e) if no personal service was to be had) of such a lock-out Order to remove
those items they find absolutely essential (see Coughlin's difficulties in 1048 where deprived of
his medications, eyeglasses, contacts, some important legal files, etc, not to mention the RPC
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3.5A violation attendant to the default on 7/5/12, especially where the RJC and NCS's Chan-
dler knew Coughlin was in jail incident to a 7/3/12 arrest stemming from Northwind's handy-
man Kreb's falacious accusation of Coughlin disturbing the peace.
the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant
Also, the RJCmay need to explain why it failed to file in fax filings by Coughlin
where it either did file in some by Hill and Baker in 1708 (or consider any failure to file any
10/13/11 Affidavit of Unlawful Detainer by landlord Merliss).
The SBN is likely resting upon some theory that the TPO and EPO granted it by RJCJudge Pearson, which
indicates that Coughlin may . First, the 1/ 114/13 EPO granted the SBN indicates that Patrick
Owen King, Esq., appeared at the Extension Hearing to represent the SBN. As such, King,
knowing he was extremely likely to be a witness in such an action, had a duty to withdraw
from representation, and therefore himself violated a RPC1.16 requir he so withdraw where
his being a witness was a virtual certainty. Further, King's TPO application rests almost en-
tirely on unsworn hearsay, for which King makes no indication with regard to from whom or
how he became aware of such hearsay detailing such purported facts. For instance, the
magic of hearsay may allow a comment like its not fair that Bar Counsel King gets all this ex
parte face time with Panel Chair Echeverria that may have been said to Dena Echeverria on
the telephone to become, according to King, a statement by Coughlin to Echeverria's staff that
he was coming down to the Panel Chair's Office, threatening to get some face time. Cough-
lin's 1996 Honda Accord's electrical problems (an electrical short caused problems with
Coughlin's headlights requiring a primitive workaround requiring Coughlin to braids five
elecrical wires together to turn his vehicle's headlights on...something King alleges, through
unattributed hearsay, was a case of Coughlin malingering around the SBN's Northern Office
after 5 pm flashing his headlights at the one or two women whom were working late (because,
one can be absolutely sure, Asst. Bar Counsel King has never worked late a day in his life, and
certainly not while employed by the SBN, thanks to SCR 106, natch), in an attempt to frighten
and harass them. Then there is the curiosu allegation by King in his TPO application that
Coughlin called the SBN ahead to announce he would be there in fifteen minutes to file some-
thing. King somehow alleges that is threatening behavior even where he subsequently indi-
cates that he had sent Coughlin a letter demanding that Coughlin do just that prior to appear-
ing at the SBN for any reason, including to file documents.
At the 3/15/12 summary eviction hearing wherein Gayle Kern, Esq., violate RPC3.5A (probably why RJC
Judge Schroeder asked, upon the topic of taking a default against Coughlin coming up: Is
that fair?), Kern further stated that she was seeking a Writ granting possRestitution must
follow NRS 118A.360, which requires putting up a bond first, which Kern failed to do:
NRS 40.300 Contents of complaint; issuance and service of summons;
temporary writ of restitution; notice, hearing and bond....
3. At any time after the filing of the complaint and issuance of sum-
mons, the court, upon application therefor, may issue a temporary writ of
restitution; provided:...
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(B) THAT THE TEMPORARY WRIT OF RESTITUTION SHALL NOT ISSUE
UNTIL THE COURT HAS HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASCERTAIN THE FACTS
SUFFICIENTLY TO ENABLE IT TO ESTIMATE THE PROBABLE LOSS TO THE
DEFENDANT AND FIX THE AMOUNT OF A BOND TO INDEMNIFY THE PARTY
OR PARTIES AGAINST WHOM THE TEMPORARY WRIT MAY BE ISSUED.
(c) That the temporary writ of restitution shall not issue until there has been filed with the ap-
proval of the court a good and sufficient bond of indemnification in the amount fixed by the court.
As such, Kern requested the wrong relief from Judge Schroeder, and the
court lacked jurisdiction to then issue a Lockout Order where a Writ of Res-
titution of Possession was requested, particularly where the Lockout Order
fails to conform to the following statute:
NRS 40.420 Form of writ of restitution; execution.
Further, Kern failed to file in a Landlord's Affidavit prior to the 3/15/12 summary eviction pro-
ceeding, which was noticed for 8:30 am, but to which the Kockout Order had a fax header indicated
the Order was faxed to the WCSO Civil Division at 8:24 am. As such, in consideration of the dic-
tates of NRS 40.253(5)-(6), the 3/15/12 Lockout Order is void pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(4) for lack of
jurisdiction given that the summary eviction hearing was held prior to Kern filing a Landlord's Affi-
davit :
NRS 40.253(5). Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(a) The landlord or the landlords agent may apply by affidavit of
complaint for eviction to the justice court of the township in which the dwell-
ing, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located or to the dis-
trict court of the county in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or
commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction over the matter.
The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of
the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order.
The affidavit must state or contain:
(1) The date the tenancy commenced.
(2) The amount of periodic rent reserved.
(3) The amounts of any cleaning, security or rent deposits paid in advance, in excess of the
first months rent, by the tenant.
(4) The date the rental payments became delinquent.
(5) The length of time the tenant has remained in possession without paying rent.
(6) The amount of rent claimed due and delinquent.
(7) A statement that the written notice was served on the tenant in
accordance with NRS 40.280.
(8) A copy of the written notice served on the tenant.
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(9) ACOPY OF THE SIGNED WRITTEN RENTAL AGREEMENT, IF ANY....
...6. UPON THE FILING BY THE TENANT OF THE AFFIDAVIT PERMITTED IN
SUBSECTION 3, REGARDLESS OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE AFFIDAVIT,
AND THE FILING BY THE LANDLORD OF THE AFFIDAVIT PERMITTED BY SUBSEC-
TION 5, THE JUSTICE COURT OR THE DISTRICT COURT SHALL HOLD A HEARING,
AFTER SERVICE OF NOTICE OF THE HEARING UPON THE PARTIES, TO DETERMINE
THE TRUTHFULNESS AND SUFFICIENCY OF ANY AFFIDAVIT OR NOTICE PROVIDED
FOR IN THIS SECTION... IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT THERE IS A LEGAL DE-
FENSE AS TO THE ALLEGED UNLAWFUL DETAINER, THE COURT SHALL REFUSE TO
GRANT EITHER PARTY ANY RELIEF, AND, EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS
SUBSECTION, SHALL REQUIRE THAT ANY FURTHER PROCEEDINGS BE CONDUCT-
ED PURSUANT TO NRS 40.290 TO 40.420, INCLUSIVE...
The RJC impermissibly held the 3/15/12 summary eviction proceeding in 375 before Kern
filed a Lanlord's Affidavit in violation of NRS 40.253(6)'s dicates: ... 6. Upon the filing by the
tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless of the information contained in the
affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the affidavit permitted by subsection 5, the justice
court or the district court shall hold a hearing, after service of notice of the hearing upon the
parties, to determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided for in
this section...
(never mind that the one Kern had filed after the summary eviction proceeding conveniently managed
to change the basis for seeking eviction to one based upon non-payment of rent, rather than the No
Cause Termination Notice posted on the door of Coughlin's former home law office on 2/13/12 in
374, which indicated that Coughlin had 5 days to leave and was entitled to no more Notice give his
was a Tenancy At-Will...this remixing of the basis for seeking and eviction and recharacterization
of the type of Notice served on Coughlin is especially dubious given the authority and argument cited
in Coughlin's 3/8/12 filed Tenant's Answer, which points out that the landlord is prevented from uti-
lizing a summary eviction proceeding to evict a commercial tenant such as Coughlin (whom pled a
commercial tenancy therein) where the non-payment or rent is not alleged, pled, or noticed (as there,
given the No Cause Termination Notice of 2/13/12 in 374). Further, Kern's Landlord's Affidavit is
further suspect where, all of the sudden following Coughlin's 3/8/12 Tenant's Answer pointing such
out, Kern switches gears and attempts to stear clear of the problems to her cause presented by the ci-
tation to the Glazier decision in consideration of the sworn testimony by WNM's Sue King and
PTTHOA Board Secretary Sheila Lester that the Board approved of the arrangement with Coughlin's
housemates (and arguably, the sublessor there), Christopher Allaback and Laura Foreshee (ne Harri-
son) (against whom, on 1/23/12, Couglin was awarded TPO's in FV12-000187 and 188), though
Allaback and Foreshee were the parties Couglhin called 911 to complain about and seek protection
from incident to the 1/14/12 arrest for misuse of emergency communciations when no actual or per-
ceived emergency exists of Coughlin ordered by the same RPD Sargent Sifre whom ordered Cough-
lin arrested for jaywalking just 48 hours previously at the other former home law office from which
Coughlin was wrongfully evicted in 03628.
ORDER DENYING ZACHARY COUGHLIN'S NOTICE OF CLERK'S OFFICE AND
COURT'S FAILURE TO FILE COUGHLIN'S NOTICE OF APPEAL, REQUEST THAT IT
DO SO NOW"AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OF 3/15/12 AND ORDER
OF 5/15/12 IN LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD AND NRCP
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60(B)(4) AND WAIVING THE REQUIREMENT FOR PARK TERRACE TOWNHOMES
ASSOCIATION TO FILE AN OPPOSITION TO ZACHARY COUGHLIN'S NOTICE
ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER 5, 2012, PRO SE ATTORNEY LITIGANT/TENANT, ZACH COUGHLIN
("COUGHLIN") FILED A NOTICE OF CLERK'S OFFICE AND COURT'S FAILURE TO FILE COUGHLIN'S NO-
TICE OF APPEAL, REQUEST THAT IT DO SO NOW, AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROMJUDGMENT IF 3/15/12
AND ORDER OF 5/15/12 IN LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD AND NRCP 60(B)(4)
("NOTICE/MOTION"). ALTHOUGH COUGHLIN'S PROOF OF SERVICE INDICATES THAT PARKTER-
RACE TOWNHOMES' MANAGEMENT COMPANY AND ATTORNEY WERE SERVED, THE COURT HAS DIS-
COVERED THAT, IN FACT, NEITHER WAS SERVED.
The Court has reviewed Coughlin's Notice/Motion. The Court has further considered the pa-
pers and pleadings on file herein, together with any attached exhibits, and the applicable law.
BASED UPON ITS REVIEW, THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE IS NO LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS FOR
COUGHLIN'S NOTICE/MOTION. GOODCAUSE APPEARING THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBYOR-
DEREDTHAT COUGHLIN'S NOTICELMOTION IS DENIED. ITIS FURTHER ORDEREDTHAT PARK
TERRACE TOWNHOMES ASSOCIATION IS RELEASED FROM ANY REQUIREMENT TO RESPOND TO
COUGHLIN'S NOTICELMOTION. DATEDTHIS 14TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2012. /S/ JACK SCHROEDER,
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
THE APPROACH BY RJC JUDGE SCHROEDER AND OPPOSING COUNSEL GAYLE KERN, ESQ., IN 375
IS INTERESTING. COUGLIN RECEIVES JUDGE SHROEDER'S ORDER ONLY FROMKERN, ALONG WITH HER
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER. THAT IS, THE RJC AND OR JUDGE SCHROEDER DO NOT MAIL COUGHLIN
JUDGE SCHROEDER'S ORDER, BUT RATHER, PROVIDE THEM TO ONLY KERN, WHOM THEN SERVES THEM
TO COUGHLIN ONLY WITH A NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER, THEREBY DEPRIVING COUGLIN OF, POTEN-
TIALLY, A FEW DAYS OR SO TO REVIEW SUCH AN ORDER PRIOR TO THE DEADLINES THAT BEGIN RUNNING
UPON SERVICE OF A NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER BEGINNING TO RUN.
Additionally, Judge Schroeder's Order of 11/14/12, very curiously reads: Although Cough-
lin's Proof of Service indicates that Park Terrace Townhomes' management company and at-
torney were served, the Court has discovered that, in fact, neither was served. One can only
wonder just Judge Schroeder and the Court has discover that, in fact neither opposing counsel
Gayle Kern, Esq., nor her unauthorized practitioner of law/propery manager, Western Nevada
Managment's Sue King wer served if not by having impermissible ex parte communications with
King or Kern and or otherwise engaging in extra-judicial discussion and failing to abide by the estab-
lished precedent in Nevada that a court's adjuciatory boundaries are limited to those matters presented
to it by the litigants, rather than what the Court has discovered through some unnamed methodolo-
gy. Judge Schroeder has a duty to avoid the appearance of bias or impropriety.
The RJC file in 374 also contains a Post-It Note Order by Judge Schroeder of 3/27/12 in re-
sponse to Couglin's 3/23/12 Motion to Set Aside the 3/15/12 Lockout Order that reads Clerks,
Please see if Atty for LL is going to file a response. Send the file back to me in 13 days. JS.
Couglin has never received an inquiry or remind from any RJC Judge as to whether he is going to
respond to some filing by an opposing counsel. Such a Note Order may be interpreted to create an
appearance of impropriety, particularly given the subsequent 11/14/12 Order by Judge Sferrazza
summarily disposing of Couglin's 11/5/12 NRCP 60(b)(4) Motion/Notice and absoliving Kern of
even having to file an Opposition thereto or otherwise address Couglin's allegations of fraud on
Kern's part.
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ADDITIONALLY, COUGHLIN NOTES ANOTHER APPEARANCE OF THE CURIOUS PRACTICE OF THE
RJC AND WCDA'S OFFICE CHARACTERIZING COUGHLIN AS AN ATTORNEY WHEN IT WOULD SEEM TO
SUIT WHAT SOME MIGHT SAY IS THEIR AGENDA, AND NOT AN ATTORNEY/SUSPENDED FROM THE PRAC-
TICE OF LAW, WHEN IT SO SUITS THE SAME TO DO SO (IE, WCDADDAWATTS-VIAL'S 11/13/12 OBJEC-
TION TO COUGHLIN'S 10/30/12 SUBPOENAS ON THE 2JDC
vi
(... BY YOUR OWN ADMISSION AT THE TOP OF
THE SUBPOENA., YOU ARE TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW. IT FOLLOWS THAT
YOUHAVE NO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE SUBPOENAS, AND THAT THERE IS NO DUTY TO COMPLY WITH THE
SAME. NRCP 45(3)...), WCDADDAKANDARAS'S 11/14/12 MOTION TO QUASH COUGLIN'S SUBPOE-
NAS/DUCES TECUMS IN 063341 FILED IN 063341, THOUGH ALSO ATTACHING ASSOCIATED SUPBOENAS IN
0204 (THE PARTIES REQUEST THAT ALL SUBPOENAS AND SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM ISSUED BY DE-
FENDANT ZACH COUGHLIN BE QUASHED BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT ISSUED AND SERVED IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH NRS 174.305...WITH RESPECT TO EXHIBITS AAND B, THOSE SUBPOENAS WERE NOT
PROPERLY ISSUED...THE PARTIES REQUEST THAT THE COURT'S ORDER ISSUED NOVEMBER 8, 2012 (EX-
HIBIT D) BE EXTENDED TO THE REFERENCED SUBPOENAS IN EXHIBITS AAND B. SPECIFICALLY, PARA-
GRAPH 2 OF THAT ORDER STATES THAT "ANY SUBPOENA NOT PROPERLY ISSUED BY THE CLERK OR OTH-
ERWISE IN ACCORDANCE WITH NRS 174.305 IS HEREBY QUASHED." SUBPOENA IN EXHIBIT AWAS NOT
ISSUED BY THE COURT...), RJC JUDGE SFERRAZZA'S 11/8/12, 11/16/12, AND 11/19/12 ORDERS QUASH-
ING COUGHLIN'S SUBPOENAS AND GRANTING THE RENO CITY ATTORNEY SKAU'S MOTION FOR A TEM-
PORARY PROTECTIVE ORDER PREVENTING COUGHLIN FROM BEING ABLE TO EVEN HAVE ANY NEW SUB-
POENAS ISSUED BY THE RJC.
RJC Judges Clifton and Sferrazza have indicated they view it as Coughlin's fault that he is-
sued and or had issued and or had served so many subpoenas on or around October 30
th
, 2012 in
both 063341 and 0204. They do not view the 15 different arrests of Couglin this year as overkill by
the local judiciary and law enforcement/prosecutors as having some role in attempted utilization fo
such subpoenas, the obstructionist approach by the Washoe County Public Defender's Office in
fighting to stay on as attorney of record in Coughlin's cases in 063341 and 065630 as long as possi-
ble, only to, at the last minuted (usually at the 15 day deadline prior to Trial to file a Pre-Trial Mo-
tion, obtain and Order allowing the withdrawal of WCPD Jim Leslie, Esq., or Biray Dogan, Esq.,
leaving Coughlin to make up for lost time in terms of using subpoenas for his defense), or the as a
mitigating factor Judge Sferrazza's express indication, on the record on 10/22/12 in 063341 that he
absolutely would not grant Coughlin a continuance of the continuation of Trial in 063341 he then set
for 11/19/12 despite Couglin indicating that the State Bar of Nevada was to hold Coughlin's formal
disciplinary hearing on 11/14/12. At that same hearing, shortly after announcing that he had refused
the SBN's request to testify at that 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing, Judge Sferrazza failed to
disclose the 4/11/12 written correspondence and voluntary submission of Coughlin's 2/21/12 filing in
065630, the dockets in 065630 and 063341, and the offer to send Couglin's 2/15/12 Pre-Trial Motion
in 063341 to the SBN to Coughlin. Such a failure to disclose his Judicial Secretarie's submission to
the SBN by Judge Sferrazza arguably creates the appearance of impropriety and or an inference sup-
porting of a finding of evident impartiality or bias.
The RJC file in 374 contains another curiousity where, upon Couglin
COUGLIN WAS CHARGED WITH A GROSS MISDEMEANOR NECESSITATING A $300 BAIL EXPENDI-
TURE, AND TO WHICH COUGLIN WAS ENTITLED TO REPRESENTATION AT ALL STAGES OF THE PROCEED-
INGS, DESPITE HIS WCPDBIRAY DOGAN FAILING TO APPEAR ON HIS BEHALF (AS HAD BEEN AGREED TO
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UPON COUGLIN AND DOGAN DISCUSSING THE MATTER ON 2/8/12 IN PERSON) AT THE 2/14/12 ARRAIGN-
MENT (WHICH THE RJC HAS NOT CHARACTERIZED IN ITS DOCKET AS CANCELLED, APPARENTLY TO
PROTECT DOGAN FROM A POTENTIAL RPC VIOLATION...THOUGH RJC JUDICIAL SECRETARY LORI
TOWNSEND DID MANAGE TO VOLUNTARILY SEND THE SBN, IN HER 4/11/12 EMAIL TO ASST. BAR
COUNSEL KING, COUGHLIN'S 2/21/12 FILE STAMPED NOTICE OF APPEARANCE, ETC. IN THAT MATTER,
RJC RCR2012-065630, ALONG WITH THE DOCKETS IN THAT CASE AND ANOTHER RETALIATORY PROSE-
CUTION OF COUGHLIN IN 063341, IN ADDITION TO OFFERING TO SEND COUGHLIN'S 2/15/12 PRE-TRIAL
MOTION IN 063341 AS WELL IN AN ATTEMPT TO CAUSE COUGHLIN DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SBN, IN AN
APPARENT RETALIATORY MOVE IN CONNECTION WITH COUGHLIN'S SUMMARY EVICTION IN 1708, IS-
SUES WITH RJC BAILIFFS, AND THE CRITICISMS OF THE PROCESS ONE MIGHT READ INTO COUGHLIN'S
2/21/12 FILIGN IN 065630, WHICH IS CITED IN BAR COUNSEL'S 8/23/12 COMPLAINT THUSLY:
9. On February 21. 2012. Respondent filed a document entitled, Notice
of Appearance Entry of Plea of Not Guilty, Waiver of Arraignment, Motion to
Dismiss, etc. in one of his pending criminal matters, Case No. RCR-2012
065630, City of Reno v. Zachary Coughlin. The document clearly shows Re-
spondent's unprofessional, disruptive conduct, and lack of respect for the court
and opposing counsel.
Coughlin subsequently filed a grievance against Dogan which Asst. Bar Counsel King
promptly failed to investigate in any discernible manner and dismissed without assisgning it a griev-
ance number, alleging an inability to prove by the clear and convicing evidence standard any
ethicial or RPC violation by Dogan, despite Dogan's failure to appear at the 2/14/12 gross misde-
meanor arraignment being required by statute.
King similarly issued a dismissal letter to Couglin of a grievance Couglin filed against his
then RMC court appointed defender Keith Loomis, which alleged, amongst other things, a lack of
zealous advocacy, competence, diligence, and a failure by Loomis to adhere to the dictates of RPC
3.1 in refusing to assert a claim of right defense on Coughlin's behalf to the criminal trespass prose-
cution where Hill and Baker admitted verbally and in writing that they were charging Coughlin the
same $900 previously charged for full use and occupancy of his former home law office at 121 Riv-
er Rock during the month of November 2011, where Couglin as arrested at his former home law of-
fice on 11/13/11 for criminal trespass.
King's Complaint also goes on to allege:
10. Respondent was arrested on November 13, 2011 by Reno Police
Department and charged with trespassing, a misdemeanor, for which he was
later convicted.
11. The circumstances leading to the above-mentioned arrest are as fol-
lows: at an hearing Justice of the Peace Peter Sferrazza ordered that Respondent
vacate the home he was renting effective November 1, 2011. After the locks
were changed and the notice was posted on the front door the owner, Dr.
Merliss, discovered that someone had broken into the home and was barricaded
in the basement. The Reno Police tried to coax whoever was in the basement to
open the door. Dr. Merliss was forced to kick open the door where the Reno Po-
lice found Respondent. Respondent had broken into the home and living in the
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basement. Respondent was arrested for criminal trespass and was subsequently
convicted of that charge.
12. RESPONDENT, REPRESENTING HIMSELF AS CO-COUNSEL, FILED A 36-
PAGE MOTION TO DISMISS ON MARCH 5, 2012. THE MOTION WAS DENIED BY
JUDGE WILLIAM GARDNER AND WAS DETERMINED TO BE WITHOUT MERIT. THE
MOTION, ON ITS FACE, DEMONSTRATES THAT RESPONDENT LACKS COMPETENCE
TO PRACTICE LAW.
FURTHER, KING'S REFUSAL TO ALLOWCOUGHLIN TO EVEN SEE OR REVIEW THE MATERIALS
SUBMITTED ALONG WITH JUDGE HOLMES' 3/14/12 GRIEVANCE AND ANY OTHER MATERIALS SUBMIT-
TED BY THE RMC (INCLUDING THE 23 EXHIBIT SUBMISSION OF 4/16/12, THAT DID INCLUDE
COUGHLIN'S 3/5/12 MOTION TO DISMISS IN THE CRIMINAL TRESPASS MATTER BEFORE JUDGE W.
GARDNER IN 26405) HAMPERED THE CONFLICT/JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION ANALYSIS ATTENDANT TO
A NUMBER OF CASES, INCLUDING THAT CRIMINAL TRESPASS PROSECUTION.
COUGHLIN BELIEVES HE WAS ON TIME FOR THE 8:30 AMHEARING ON 3/15/12, THOUGH THE JAVS AUDIO RECORDING/VIDEO
COUGLIN PAID THE RJC$35 FOR(IT IS ONLY2 MINUTES 12 SECONDS LONG) HAS A VISUAL TIME STAMPING INDICATING A START TIME
OF THE RECORDING THE RJCPROVIDED TOCOUGLHIN OF 8:33:35 AMON3/15/12 (THE RJCHRLF ITSELF OUT TO THE PUBLIC AT ALL
RELEVANT TIMES AS STARTING SUCH HEARINGS AND STACKED DOCKETS AT 8:30 AM). REGARDLESS, THE LANDLORD'S AFFIDAVIT
THAT KERN FILED AFTERTHAT SUMMARY EVICTION HEARING IS FILE STAMPED AS BEING FILED AT 9:24
AM. THE AUDIO TRANSCRIPT OF THAT 3/15/12 SUMMARY EVICTION HEARING REVEALS RJC
JUDGE SCHROEDERS JUDICIAL ASSISTANT PROMPTING HIM TO GO OUT OF THE ORDER HE HAD
PLANNED TO HEAR THE CASES ON HIS STACKED DOCKET IN IN ORDER TO, HOPEFULLY, SPEED
THROUGH A DEFAULT AGAINST COUGHLIN, WHOM THE CLERK NOTES ON THE AUDIO TRANSCRIPT,
HAD YET TO SHOWUP THAT MORNING. SUBSEQUENTLY, COUGHLIN HAS RECEIVED ORDER FROM
JUDGE SCHROEDER ONLYBY THEIR BEING ATTACHED TO NOTICE OF ENTRY MAILED OUT BY
KERN, CURIOUSLY. FURTHER, A RECENT ORDER BYJUDGE SCHROEDER CURIOUSLYABSOLVES
KERN FROM NEEDING TO RESPOND TO COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE SUMMARYEVIC-
TION, NOTING THAT JUDGE SCHROEDER HAS LEARNED THAT KERN AND KING ...
The 3/15/12 Lockout Order by RJC Judge Schroeder in 374 not only contains the wrong ad-
dress of the building from which Coughlin was actually evicted later that day, but further was
signed and file stamped in priory to Kern filing a sworn Lanldord's Affidavit as required by law,
containing the assertions and information required by NRS 40.253. That 3/15/12 Lockout Order
reads:
UPON APPLICATION duly and regularly made by Park Terrace
Townhornes, Landlord, and proof therein, supported by a sworn
Affidavit on the date hereinafter mentioned, and good causing appearing
therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
AS FOLLOWS: That the Sheriff of Washoe County, or one of their duly
authorized agent, are hereby directed to remove each and every person
found upon and within those certain premises located at 1442 E 9th ST
Reno NV 89512, Reno Washoe County, Nevada within 24 hours after
receipt of this order .
The 3/15/12 RJC Rev2012-000374 Lockout Order taped to door by WCSO with fax header
from RJC timed 8:24 am though file stamped 9:33 am PTTHOA wcso 0204. The WCSO Civil Di-
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vision has indicated to Coughlin, both through Liz Stuchell, Roxy Silva, and Maureen, that the RJC
faxes Lockout Orders to the WCSO Civil Division, and the WCSO takes the fax, inputs by hand into
a software program the time of receipt of such Order (which is not necessarily the same as the
time of receipt of the fax as indicated by the time stamping and fax number received from shown in
the fax header as printed onto the Lockout Orders by the WCSO Civil Division fax machine),
whereupon no copy of such fax is made or maintained by the WCSO Civil Division, but rather, that
faxed Lockout Order is then given to the Deputies whom will perform the lockout within 24 hours
of receipt of that Lockout Order, and that such lockout procedure includes taping that faxed Lock-
out Order to the tenant's door. Coughlin maintained the exact faxed Lockout Order that WCSO
Deputies Cannizaro and Durben taped to his door on 3/15/12 at approximately 1:45 pm at 1422 E.
9
th
St. #2 (shortly before the 3/15/12 hearing before NVB Judge Bessley in Cadle Co. v. Keller that
Judge Beesley testified to at the 11/14/12 Hearing, at first indicating that Coughlin did not have a
jacket on when appearing at the hearing, but then later admitting on cross examination that
Couglhin, in fact, was wearing a suit jacket during that appearance.
The Lockout Order in 374 is like most every Lockout Order issued by an RJC Judge, even
though the landlord had an attorney representing it. The RJC has indicated to Coughlin (through
Chief Civil Clerk Karen Stancil and Clerk Bonnie Cooper) that, when an attorney is representing the
landlord, the attorneys will typically prepare their own Orders, and that the attorneys will then ar-
range for such Orders to be delivered or transmitted to the WCSO Civil Division. That assertion
runs counter to the sworn testimony by Hill's associate Casey D. Baker, Esq., at the criminal trespass
prosecution trial of Couglhin on 6/18/12 in RMC 26405, where Baker swears:
REGARDLESS, NEITHER THE 10/25/11 EVICTION DECISION AND ORDER, NOR THE 10/27/11
FOFCOL AND ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION IN 1708 CONTAINS THE LANGUAGE REQUIRED BY NRS
40.253 FOUND ABOVE IN THE LOCKOUT ORDER BY JUDGE SCHROEDER IN 374 ( THAT THE SHERIFF OF
WASHOE COUNTY, OR ONE OF THEIR DULY AUTHORIZED AGENT, ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO REMOVE
EACH AND EVERYPERSON FOUND UPON AND WITHIN THOSE CERTAIN PREMISES LOCATED AT (IN-
SERT ADDRESS OF RENTAL HERE), RENO WASHOE COUNTY, NEVADA WITHIN 24 HOURS AFTER RE-
CEIPT OF THIS ORDER.
Further, with respect to the criminal trespass prosecution of Coughlin in 26405 based
upon an arrest on 11/13/11 of Coughlin at his former home law office at 121 River Rock St., 89512,
no language in either the 10/25/11 eviction Decision and Order, nor the 10/27/11 FOFCOL and Order
of Summary eviction in 1708 could reasonably be said to be tantamount to a warning sufficient to
support a finding that Coughlin's presence at the location alone (without any further warning, request
that he leave, or signage warning against trespassing) would suffice to support a conviction for crimi-
nal trespass. Where RCA Hazlett-Steven's suggestion that State v. McNichols supported such a find-
ing was expressly cited by RMC Judge L. Gardner, a lack of due process is evident, particularly
where Judge Gardner ruled as irrelevant Coughlin's contentions that neither of those Orders in 1708
were appropriately served (never mind the fact that the Orders were stale in one respect, and the
lockout was effectuated too early in other respects, much less that voidness for lack of jurisdiction of
the Orders themselves in light of NRS 40.253(6)'s dicates
It is rather curious that it was on that same 2/27/12 date as the simple traffic citation
trial in RMC 26800 before Judge Nash Holmes resulting in an SCR 105 Complaint against Coughlin
and a 5 day summary incarceration and confiscating without a warrant an not pursuant to a search
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incident to arrest of Coughlin's HTC G2 smart phone, free standing 32 GB micro SD data card, Sam-
sung flip phone, and Braun electric shaver for 37 days, at which point the items were returned to
Coughlin with all data thereon wiped, damaging Couglin's law practice, making it overly difficult to
compensate for the sudden 5 day summary incarceration and imprudent denial of a stay by Judge
Holmes on 2/27/12, or to know of or attend the 3/12/12 continuation of the trial before her in 26800,
which was improperly held given the competency issues Judge Nash Holmes herself found to be in
question as to Coughlin in both her 2/28/12 Order (which Coughlin did not receive until finding it
attached to a filing in 60975 in mid June 2012, given the RMC mailed it to the 121 River Rock ad-
dress that it knew was no longer good for Coughlin, and where the RMC had been provided Cough-
lin's then current 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2 address on multiple occassions, including in a 2/23/12 filed Mo-
tion to Set Aside the candy bar and cough drops conviction in 22176 in the matter before RMC
Judge Howard, which was the subject of a RMC Judge meeting discussing the strategy the RMC
would take with Coughlin prior to the 2/27/12 trial date. So, Judge Holmes' contention, in her
3/14/12 formal written complaint against Coughlin to the RMC that she was having such difficulty
contacting Coughlin given the four or so different addresses the RMC had for him (noting that she
had heard he may be living in his car...which indicates, along with the premature Lockout Order
entered at 8:24 am, per the time stamped fax header in 374, by RJC Judge Schroeder the very next
day, 3/15/12, that RMC Judge Nash Holmes, and RJC Judge Schroeder had extra-judicial discussions
related to Coughlin (perhaps that is where Judge Holmes was between 1:30 pm and 3:00pm when her
Judicial Assistant can be heard on the record remarking as to how strange it was that no one could
figure out where Judge Nash Holmes was exactly, indicating Holmes may have, by that point, ven-
tured over the RJC for a little strategizing as to the approach with Coughlin). What is strange is that
the fax header on the 3/8/12 file stamped TENANT'S ANSWER AND TENANTS AFFIDA-
VIT/DECLARATION TO 30 DAYNOTICE TO QUIT; MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND AT-
TORNEY'S FEES indicates that that filing was received by the RJC on 2/27/12...further, a file stamp-
ing of 3/5/12 can be seen on that filing, though it is crossed out and marked as filed in error. Most
likely, the 3/8/12 file stamping, compared to the 2/27/12 fax header date stamping of receipt by the
RJC is owing to the RJC not filing in the Tenant's Answer where the IFP submitted along with was
denied, until Coughlin paid the $33 filing fee, which he ultimately did, likely on 3/8/12.
Couglin's 3/8/12 Tenant's Answer in 374 contains, in part, the following argument and cita-
tion:
...COMES NOW, THE UNDERSIGNED TENANT AND STATES: 1. I AM THE TEN-
ANT OF A RENTAL UNITED LOCATED AT 1422 E. 9TH ST. #2, RENO 89512. 2. MY
RENT IS NOT SUBSIDIZED BY PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITY OR OTHER GOVERN-
MENTAL AGENCY. GLAZIER V. JUSTICE COURT OF SMITH VALLEY TP., 111
NEV. 864, 899 P.2D 1105 (NEV. JUL 27, 1995): "SUMMARY EVICTION STATUTE
ALLOWING LANDLORD TO APPLY TO JUSTICE'S COURT FOR EVICTION ORDER BASED ON
DEFAULT IN PAYMENT OF RENT DID NOT APPLY TO UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION
AGAINST TENANT WHO NEVER PAID ANY RENT NOR WAS REQUIRED TO PAY ANY AND,
THUS, SUMMARY EVICTION ORDER WAS OUTSIDE JURISDICTION OF JUSTICE'S COURT.
N.R.S. 40.253..ON MARCH 1, 1993, RICHARD FULSTONE, PRESIDENT OF FULSTONE,
SERVED GLAZIER WITH A THIRTY-DAY NOTICE TO QUIT THE PROPERTY. GLAZIER FAILED
TO VACATE THE PREMISES,AND ON APRIL 2, 1993, FULSTONE SERVED GLAZIER WITH A
FIVE-DAY NOTICE. THIS NOTICE EXPRESSLY THREATENED AN ACTION IN JUSTICE'S
COURT FOR EVICTION, PURSUANT TO NRS 40.253,FN1 THE SUMMARY EVICTION STAT-
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UTE. FN1. NRS 40.253 ALLOWS A LANDLORD TO APPLY TO THE JUSTICE'S COURT FOR
AN EVICTION ORDER BASED ON DEFAULT IN PAYMENT OF RENT. IF THE TENANT CAN
SHOW, BY AFFIDAVIT, A LEGAL DEFENSE TO THE ALLEGED UNLAWFUL DETAINER, FUR-
THER PROCEEDINGS MUST BE CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO THE MORE FORMAL EVICTION
PROCEDURES IN NRS 40.290 TO 40.420. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE TENANT FAILS TO
SHOW A LEGAL DEFENSE TO THE ALLEGED UNLAWFUL DETAINER, THEN THE JUSTICE'S
COURT MAY ISSUE A SUMMARY ORDER FOR REMOVAL OF THE TENANT. THE JUSTICE'S
COURT HELD A HEARING PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF NRS 40.253 AND ORDERED
THAT GLAZIER VACATE THE PROPERTY WITHIN THIRTY DAYS. GLAZIER THEN FILED A
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT, ALLEGING THAT
THE JUSTICE'S COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION UNDER THE SUMMARY EVICTION
PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE BY, INTER ALIA, INQUIRING INTO MATTERS BEYOND THE
TRUTHFULNESS AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE AFFIDAVITS, AND FAILING TO DISMISS THE
SUMMARY EVICTION PROCEEDING ONCE A LEGAL DEFENSE HAD BEEN RAISED. THE
DISTRICT COURT HELD A HEARING ON THE WRIT PETITION AND DENIED THE PETITION.
ON APPEAL TO THIS COURT, GLAZIER ARGUES THAT, PURSUANT TO NRS 40.253, ONCE
HE RAISED THE LEGAL DEFENSE THAT HE WAS A LIFE TENANT UNDER THE GRANT OF A
LIFE ESTATE, THE JUSTICE'S COURT WAS OBLIGATED TO DISMISS THE SUMMARY PRO-
CEEDING AND TO REQUIRE THAT THE LANDLORD PROSECUTE HIS UNLAWFUL DETAINER
ACTION UNDER THE PLENARY EVICTION PROCEEDINGS PROVIDED FOR IN NRS 40.290
TO 40.420. **1106 ALTHOUGH GLAZIER'S ARGUMENT IS LOGICALLY SOUND, IT IS SIMP-
LY IRRELEVANT. IT IS CLEAR THAT, DESPITE ALL THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW AND THE
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES BEFORE THIS COURT, NRS 40.253 DOES NOT APPLY TO
THIS CASE. THE STATUTE IS APPLICABLE WHEN THE TENANT OF ANY DWELLING [ ]
WITH PERIODIC RENT RESERVED BY THE MONTH OR ANY SHORTER PERIOD, IS IN DE-
FAULT IN PAYMENT OF THE RENT. (EMPHASIS *866 ADDED.) ALL PARTIES TO THIS AC-
TION CONCEDE THAT GLAZIER NEVER PAID ANY RENT, NOR WAS HE REQUIRED TO PAY
ANY. IT MAY BE THAT FULSTONE IS ENTITLED TO HAVE GLAZIER REMOVED FROM THE
PROPERTY, BUT NOT PURSUANT TO NRS 40.253. THERE WAS NO CASE OR CONTROVER-
SY BEFORE THE JUSTICE'S COURT BASED ON NRS 40.253, AND ACCORDINGLY, THE JUS-
TICE'S COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION BY ISSUING THE SUMMARY EVICTION OR-
DER. ACCORDINGLY, WE REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT AND RE-
MAND TO THE DISTRICT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO GRANT THE WRIT. FURTHER, WE
ORDER THAT THE EVICTION ORDER ENTERED BY THE JUSTICE'S COURT BE VACATED.
NEV.,1995. GLAZIER V. JUSTICE COURT OF SMITH VALLEY TP. 111 NEV. 864, 899 P.2D
1105, SEE, ALSO, NEV.,1996. LIPPIS V. PETERS 112 NEV. 1008, 921 P.2D 1248..." (PAGE
4)...I HAVE A LEASE WHICH HAS NOT EXPIRED AND THE LANDLORD HAS NOT GIVEN ME
NOTICE THAT THEY/SHE IS TERMINATING MY LEASE. MY LEASE ALLOWS ME TO USE THE
PREMISES FOR A HYBRID PURPOSE OF A HOME LAW OFFICE, IE A COMMERCIAL LEASE, AS
SUCH THE NO CAUSE TYPE OF EVICTION IS NOT AVAILABLE HERE, ESPECIALLY WHERE,
AS HER, MY LEASE HAS NOT TERMINATED BY ITS TERMS AS OF YET. I HAVE NOT RE-
CEIVED A NOTICE FROM THE LANDLORD TELLING ME TO LEAVE THE PREMISES. THEY
CAN TALK ABOUT WHAT THEY TOLD "JOHN DOE" TO DO, BUT...AITKEN REQUIRES THEY
CHANGE ANY "JOHN DOE" NOTICES TO REFLECT MY ACTUAL NAME ONE THEY WERE AP-
PRISED OF IT. THE WERE AS EARLY AS JANUARY 5TH, 2011 ACCORDING TO SUE KING,
YET THEY FAILED TO SERVE APPROPRIATE NOTICE.. IF I HAVE EVER OWED THE LAND-
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LORD ANY RENT, I HAVE PAID IT ALL OR HAVE PAID IT WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED BY
LAW. ASSOCIATION'S NEGLIGENCE VIS A VIS LAURA AND CHRIS'S NEGLIGENT
ANDINTENTIONAL TORTS COMMITTED AGAINST ME, WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN THOU-
SANDS OF DOLLARS OF DAMAGES. PLEASE COPY ME ON ANY AND ALL CORRESPOND-
ENCE VIA FAX OR EMAIL AS THE LANDLORDS AND OR THEIR ARGENTS HAVE BEEN OR
AREWITHHOLDING MY MAIL OR OTHERWISE INTERFERRING WITH MY ACCES TO IT, AND
THEY HAVE ALSO DONE WITH RESPECT TO THE ESSENTIAL SERVICE OF ELECTRICITY..
ASSOCIATION'S NEGLIGENCE VIS A VIS LAURA AND CHRIS'S NEGLIGENT
ANDINTENTIONAL TORTS COMMITTED AGAINST ME, WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN THOU-
SANDS OF DOLLARS OF DAMAGES. PLEASE COPY ME ON ANY AND ALL CORRESPOND-
ENCE VIA FAX OR EMAIL AS THE LANDLORDS AND OR THEIR ARGENTS HAVE BEEN OR
AREWITHHOLDING MY MAIL OR OTHERWISE INTERFERRING WITH MY ACCES TO IT, AND
THEY HAVE ALSO D WRITTEN COMPLAINT TO PTHOA'A EMPLOYEES OR AGENTS, CAUS-
ING PTHOATO RETALIATE AGAINST COUGHLIN WAS PROVIDE ON JANUARY 8, 2012 IN
TWO SEPARATE WRITINGS, WHICH ALLEGED: "PURSUANT TO NRS 118A AND NRS 40, I
AM HEREBY COMPLAINING IN WRITING OF YOURS AND LAURA HARRISON'S VIOLATION
OF THE FOLLOWING CRIMINAL LAWS: AFELONY CONVICTION FOR MALICIOUS DESTRUC-
TION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY UNDER NRS 206.310 AND 193.155 MUST BE CIVIL LIA-
BILITYFOR LOSS OR DAMAGE TOPROPERTYNRS 205.980 DETERMINATION
OF VALUE OF LOSS FROM CRIME; NOTICE TO VICTIM; ORDER OF RESTITUTION DEEMED
JUDGMENT TO COLLECT DAMAGES. CHAPTER 206 - MALICIOUS MISCHIEF NRS
206.005 GRAFFITI DEFINED. NRS 206.010 DESTRUCTION OR DAMAGE OF PROPERTY
BY UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY. NRS 206.015 DESTRUCTION OR DAMAGE OF CROPS, GAR-
DENS, TREES OR SHRUBS. NRS 206.040 ENTERING PROPERTY WITH INTENTION TO
DAMAGE OR DESTROY PROPERTY. NRS 206.125 DAMAGE OF PROPERTY USED FOR PUR-
POSE OF RELIGION, FOR BURIAL OR MEMORIALIZING OF DEAD, FOR EDUCATION, AS
TRANSPORTATION FACILITY, AS PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION VEHICLE OR AS COMMUNITY
CENTER; DAMAGE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY CONTAINED THEREIN; PENALTIES; RESTITU-
TION. NRS 206.140 NUISANCE IN BUILDING; TRESPASS UPON GROUNDS; DISTURBING
ASSEMBLY. NRS 206.150 KILLING, MAIMING, DISFIGURING OR POISONING ANIMAL OF
ANOTHER PERSON; KILLING ESTRAY OR LIVESTOCK. NRS 206.160 LEADING OR DRIVING
HORSE AWAY WITHOUT AUTHORITY. NRS 206.200 POSTING OF BILLS, SIGNS OR POST-
ERS UNLAWFUL. NRS 206.220 REMOVAL, ALTERATION OR DESTRUCTION OF MONU-
MENTS OR LANDMARKS DESIGNATING BOUNDARIES. NRS 206.260 FRAUDULENT AND
MALICIOUS DESTRUCTION OF WRITINGS. NRS 206.270 DEFACING PROCLAMATIONS AND
NOTICES. NRS 206.280 TAMPERING WITH PAPERS. NRS 206.290 OPENING OR PUBLISH-
ING SEALED LETTER OR TELEGRAM. NRS 206.300 FALSE SIGNALS ENDANGERING CARS,
VESSELS OR MOTORS. NRS 206.310 INJURY TO OTHER PROPERTY. NRS 206.320 UN-
LAWFUL REMOVAL OF PETRIFIED WOOD FROM POSTED OR DESIGNATED SITES; DUTIES OF
CERTAIN OFFICERS. NRS 206.330 PLACING GRAFFITI ON OR OTHERWISE DEFACING
PROPERTY: FINES AND PENALTIES; PARENT OR GUARDIAN RESPONSIBLE FOR FINES AND
PENALTIES IF PERSON VIOLATING SECTION IS UNDER AGE OF 18 YEARS; SUSPENSION OF
DRIVERS LICENSE. NRS 206.335 CARRYING GRAFFITI IMPLEMENT AT CERTAIN LOCA-
TIONS WITH INTENT TO VANDALIZE, PLACE GRAFFITI ON OR DEFACE PROPERTY. NRS
206.340 GRAFFITI REWARD FUND CREATED; ADMINISTRATIVE ASSESSMENT TO BE IM-
POSED FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS; USE OF MONEY IN FUND. NRS 206.345 PERSON OR
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ENTITY TO BE PAID IF RESTITUTION IS ORDERED FOR VIOLATION OF NRS 206.125 OR
206.330. ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ." THE SECOND WRITING: "THIS IS ADDITIONAL WRIT-
TEN NOTICE PURSUANT TO NRS 118AAND NRS 40 COMPLAINING OF AND REQUESTING
REPAIRS AND REIMBURSEMENT FOR THE FOLLOWING: NO CGFI OUTLET NEAR SINK IN
UPSTAIRS BATHROOM. YOUBROKE THE DOOR TO MY ROOM AND THE LOCK AND FAILED
TO PROVIDE A KEY LAURA HARRISON SLASHED TWO OF MY TIRES, NECESSITATING $150
IN REPAIRS. YOUTHREW HOT COFFEE ON ME AND RUINED MY HTC G2 SMARTPHONE, A
$400 PHONE YOUHAVE BREACHED ARE DEAL WITH RESPECT TO MY BEING ALLOWED TO
BE NEW CARPET OVER THE VERY DIRTY CARPET DOWNSTAIRS. YOUHAVE REPEATEDLY
USED FORCE AND THREAT OF FORCE TO PREVENT ME FROM ACCESSING THE WASHING
MACHINE DOWNSTAIRS FOR DOING LAUNDRY AND PREVENTED MY USE OF THE KITCHEN
YOU ADMITTED TO CHANGING THE DEADBOLTS ON THE FRONT AND BACK DOOR'S ON
NEW YEARS DAY AT 12:30 AM, LOCKING ME OUTSIDE ON A NIGHT WITH FREEZING TEM-
PERATURES, NECESSITATING AN EXPENSE OF $60 FOR ALTERNATE LODGING THAT
NIGHT. FURTHER, YOUAND LAURA HARRISON HAVE UNLAWFULLY INTERRUPTED AN
ESSENTIAL SERVICE, MY ELECTRICITY, REPEATEDLY. NRS 118A.390. PLEASE CURE
THESE ISSUES OR I INTEND TO DEDUCT THEM FROM ANY FUTURE RENT. I AM COMPLAIN-
ING OF YOURS AND LAURA HARRISON'S VIOLATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW STATUTES MY
DOG HAD CHEWING GUM STUCK IN ITS HAIR IN SEVERAL PLACES, IN A MANNER THAT
SUGGESTS IT WAS PURPOSEFULLY DONE. I WILL REMIND YOUTHAT ABUSE TO ANIMALS
IS INCLUDED IN THE PROTECTION ORDER STATUTES. FURTHER, YOUAND MS.
HARRISON ARE IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW IN PREVENTING MY ACCESS TO THE
MAILBOX INCLUDED IN OUR AGREEMENT, AS IT WAS AGREED THAT I WOULD BE AF-
FORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO RECEIVE MAIL AT THE 1422 E. 9TH ST. #2 ADDRESS AND
USE OF THE MAILBOX. SINCERELY, ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ." (PAGES 18-20)......
...The landlord's Complaint fails to state facts which would allow him/her to evict me, further King
and Western Nevada Management and Shiela Lester have admitted they received nothing pursuant to
their arrangement with Allaback and Foreshee, as such the Nevada Supreme Court holding in Glazier
makes inapplicable a summary eviction proceeding. Further, where, as here, my lease allows me to
use the premises for a home law office, and the non-payment of rent has not been alleged, NRS
40.253 makes inapplicable a summary eviction procedure under those circumstances, rather, a plena-
ry procedure is required. Regardless, a proper jury trial demand is hereby made. There is perhaps an-
other person against whom this action should be brought, namely Erin Allaback and Laure Forshee. I
have not been properly named in the notices. Rather, the Notice purportedly posed on January 10th,
2012 only names a "John Doe" despite my numerous writings to Western Nevada wherein my name
was madse clear. The Aitken case makes clear that the procedural and notice requirements of sum-
mary eviction matters must be stricly adhered to, as such this "John Doe" notice is ineffective. I have
other defenses as follows: retaliation, discrimination, lack of allegation of nonpayment of rent, HOA
admitted tenants were not obligated to pay rent, as such, under Glazier, summary eviction procedures
unavailable. IMPORTANT: In some cases, the Court has the power to give you time to find a new
place to live even if you do not have any of the listed defenses. If you wish the Court to determine
whether you are entitled to it, please check below: I have provided written request to landlord for an
extension of 30 days in light of my disability. I am writing to request the 30 days extension based up-
on disability. I am invoking my HIPAA and other privacy rights with respect to divulging anythign
further about my disability. COUNTERCLAIM If you believe that you are entitled to a return of part
of your rent payment or other damages from the landlord, complete the statement below: I here by
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counterclaim in excess of $10,000 in damages. I feel that I am entitled to this amount for the follow-
ing reasons: damages to myself, my clients, and my practice in light of landlord's and landlord's
agents actions. Laura and Chris being the Associations employees and therefore you guys or them
wanted to settle with me on account of a respondeat superior theory of liability making your exposure
significant enough to justify doing so. Association's negligence vis a vis Laura and Chris's negligent
andintentional torts committed against me, which have resulted in thousands of dollars of damages.
Please copy me on any and all correspondence via fax or email as the landlords and or their argents
have been or arewithholding my mail or otherwise interferring with my acces to it, and they have also
done with respect to the essential service of electricity. (pages 26-28)///Being an attorney is hard
enough without dealing with all of Park Terrace's malfeasance." Coughlin also, within that 3/8/12
file stamped filing, sought sanctions: Awarding Attorney's Fees to Pro Se Litigants Under Rule 11,
June, 1997, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2308, Jeremy D. Spector....WHEREFORE, tenant, Zach Coughlin,
prays that this Court rule that a summary eviction proceeding is unavailable to landlord here and
award in excess of $10,000 damages to Tenant/Counterclaimant. (page 31)...
Also, the 3/8/12 Case Appeal Statement Couglhin filed in the appeal of the first summary
eviction from Coughlin's former home law office, before Judge Flanagan, contains a great deal of
inflammatory information related to RMC, RPD, Reno City Attorney, RJC, WCSO, and others that
ought be considered in evaluating the events, orders, and grievances that ensued on 3/12/12 (Order
by RMC Holmes in 26800), 3/14/12 (greivance by Holmes to the SBN against Coughlin and sub-
mission by Holmes of 4/13/09 Order After Trial of Judge L. Gardner, which WLS (see 60302 and
60317) cited, in Exec. Director Elcano's 5/1/09 and 5/7/09 letters to Coughlin explaining his suspen-
sion and termination as the sole reason for both (that 4/13/09 OAT resulted in Coughlin filign 53833
and 54844, which Elcano, whom testified to being very protective of my employees claime, in his
sworn testimony, to have either not been aware of or to not have reviewed at all...somehow Elcano
decided not to even wait for Judge L. Gardner to rule on Coughlin's 4/27/09 or 4/30/09 Motion for
Reconsideration before deciding to fire Coughlin, though Elcano's testimony on 11/14/12 revealed
the extent to which Elcano has a complete lack of knowledge with respect to the substantive issues
involved in 01168...Elcano just knows he wants to do whatever the Judge wants, despite Elcano ad-
mitting to having mentored and trained Coughlin with such advice as when you walk into that
courtroom, its not the opposing counsel's courtroom, its not the judges courtroom....its YOUR court-
room!.
Regardless, the SBN was provided the 2/23/12 filing by Coughlin in 22176 (it was
included in the 11/8/12 3,200 page document production to Coughlin by the SBN), which contained
argument critical of the handling of the prosecution of Coughlin incident to the 11/30/11 Trial, and
immediate, stay denied, 3 day summary contempt incarceration of Couglin by RMC Judge Howard,
whom had denied Coughlin both court appointed Counsel (despite failing to specifically rule that jail
time was not a possibility and the mandatory authority found in the 2008 Nevada Courts of Limited
Jurisdiction Bench Book known to all judges in Nevada by the Aigersinger U.S. Supreme Court
case). Regardless, the RMC received as undeliverable the 2/28/12 Order in 26800 that it mailed
Coughlin, then proceeded to fail to remail it to any of the other addresses it had for Coughlin, much
less the most current one indicated on Coughlin's 2/23/12 filing in 22176, or even on Coughlin's
3/7/12 or 3/12/12 filings in 26800, much less fax or email it to the number and address held out by
Coughlin on his filings and at www.nvbar.org.
That 2/27/12 traffic citation trial in the RMC resulted in Holmes sending a written grievance
against Coughlin to the SBN, NG12-0434, apparently (the SBN has been very evasive about which
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greivance number belongs to which greivance or grievant, making it difficult to follow RPC 4.2 with
much certainty, to the benefit of the SBN, which has managed to enjoy much synergy with the
WCDA (particularly TPO/EPO Application suggester DDA Mary Kandaras and DDA David Watts-
Vial (relation of 2JDC Administrative Assistant, Laura Watts-Vial, Esq., before whom Coughlin as a
UIFSA case that threatened the hegemony of the WCDA Family Support Division's hegemony in
FV11-03379, G. Jones v. D. Harris) a companion case to the FV05 custody matter for which Cough-
lin did an enormous amount of work but was only paid about $100.00 of the agreed upon $1,500, so
the whole Affidavit of Poverty with the RMC and King, Holmes, and RMC Judge Howard (in his
12/16/11 Order in 22176) taking issue with Coughlin being a licensed attorney while also claiming
poverty, where also claiming his incarceration would prejudice his client's cases is not all that non-
sensical.
One must give King and the RMC Judges some latitude there, though, as, being government
employes and or elected officials, it must be awfully hard for them to imagine someone working
without getting paid. For King, it is probably difficult for him to imagine someone working to get
paid, and similarly, King must have an inordinately difficult time imagining practicing law without
the benefit of SCR 106 immunity. Pretty charmed life that Pat King lives. Gets to bring his Great
Dane to work at the Double R office of the SBN. Leaves prior to 5 pm according to Nevada Lawyer
contributor Paula Campbell (the SBN's filing office occasionally closes in the middle of the day or
prior to 5 pm, which, Couglhin can attest, makes securing a filing date and or file stamped copy ra-
ther problematic at times, as does being subject to TPOs or EPOs, purportedly served by Reno Jus-
tice Court Bailiffs in either the RJC Filing Office or the Department of Alternative Sentencing
(DAS) kiosk/closet with a window located within the RJC Filing Office, adorned with signage point-
ing out the separateness of the DAS kiosk/program from the RJC's Filing Office. Courthouse sanc-
tuary doctrine and the general prohibition against serving attorney's process where they are access-
ing a court or filing office makes void both the TPO and EPO for both Washoe County in 599 and
the SBN in 607, nevermind the fact that the workplace protection order application and Orders are
void for lack of the posting of the $100.00 bond required by statute.
Further, an email Couglin allegedly sent to his WCPD, that inlcuded three different
SBN employees in the list of recipients, the alleged implied threat contained therein being nothign
more than a url being cited to that led to an audio clip only (ie, contrary to King and Leslie's conten-
tions, there was no violent video or scene from movie) that in no way could reasonably be inter-
preted to be a threat of any sort sufficient to meet the requirement for a Workplance Protection Order,
much less an Institutional Workplace Protection Order. Both 599 and 607 are egregious abuses of
process and the pointing of gun at Coughlin's head from 4 feet away by RPD Officer Waddle, in
Couglin's back yard, upon Waddle jumping out from behind a backyard shed at Couglin, without so
much as a single instance of the RPD announcing themselves as law enforcement or otherwise issu-
ing sort of order or request to Couglin of any type, and thereupon arresting Couglin and charging him
with both a felony and a gross misdemeanor (in an obvious attempt by the SBN, WCPD, RJC, and
WCDA, RPD, RMC, and RCA, some might say, to prevent Couglin from being able to timely file his
brief in 62337 and or in retaliation for the 2/7/13 Order by Chief Justice Pickering (if you like it then
you oughta put Pickering on it) striking the extremely negligent and deficient (and soon to be proven
fraudulent) 12/24/12 ROA filed by the SBN (which, curiously, lacks the 10/31/12 filing by Couglin
that Coughlin has a file stamped copy of (heck, the 11/14/12 Hearing Exhibit #14 provides a good
hint to the SBN that such a filing exists, and its contained an Exhibit attached as disc, and the content
of that filing is so incredibly damaging to everything Hill, the SBN, RPD, WCSO, WCDA, RMC,
RCA, and RJC are attempting to accomplish, some might say, that is no wonder the SBN apparently
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lost that filing or otherwise managed to fail to include it in the ROA (or any of the discs attached as
Exhibits containing certified copies of the relevant audio transcripts from the key hearings, and vide-
os from all the arrests mentioned in the 8/23/12 Complaint and of nearly all other incidents at issue in
the 8/23/12 Complaint and associated cases, particularly those wherein some RPC 3.1 violation by
Coughlin is alleged. Nobody expected Couglin to be able to bail out on the bondable $5,000 bail in-
cident to the 2/8/12 arrest by the RPD. It didn't help that the jail continued to deprive Couglin of one
of his psychiatric medications and insisted upon providing Coughlin one medication, Wellbutrin, at
bedtime (Wellbutrin will keep you awake if taken at bedtime) where Coughlin slept through two
alarm clocks upon taking a break from cramming for the 2/12/12 continuation of the Trial in 065630
to take a 30 minute nap at 5:30 am. Judge Clifton (after managing to get an unnoticed, emergency
Ex Parte Hearing recalling Judge Pearson back to the Bench briefly after tagging out with his form
WCDA DDA Criminal Division coworker Clifton on 2/13/12 to alter or withdraw the 2/12/13 Order
for Competency Evaluation that Person had just entered an hour before incident to an unnoticed
emergency Order to Show Cause Hearing held at 8:30 am on 2/12/12 in 063341 stemming from a
2/2/13 custodial arrest of Coughlin by DAS Officer Ramos at 7:02 pm (in violation of NRS 171.136's
prohibition against misdemeanor arrests after 7 pm where no warrant present where Ramos Order
Couglin out of the 5
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wheel trailer he currently rents) based upon an allegation that Coughlin violat-
ed the terms of his probation where it was alleged Couglin failed to check in with DAS on 1/23/13,
despite DAS Officer Celeste Brown writing Couglin, on 1/24/13 to admit that the video at the
courthouse showed and proved that Couglin presented to the security check in no later than 2:56 pm
in an attempt to check in with DAS by their 3 pm closing time, but that Coughlin was prevented from
doing so due to security and the RJC, and Judge Sferrazza's 12/20/12 Administrative Order 12-01,
and security personnel verbal orders that day, and RJC Bailiff Augustin Medina taking just long
enough to appear at the security check in point where Coughlin was ordered to wait for an Bailiff to
escort him the 30 yards to the DAS check in. So, that is three custodial arrests of Coughlin in 10
days, between 2/2/13 and 2/12/13. Judge Clifton ordered Couglin remanded into custody (despite
Couglin being out on an OR release, no on bail) at the conclusion of Coughlin's cross-examination of
ECOMM's Carthen on 2/12/13 at noon for a Contempt Show Cause Hearing to be held the following
day at 9 am based upon Clifton's contention that he had warned Coughlin previously about being
late to Court, despite Coughlin's contention that he had not previously been late, but rather had
been told by RJC Chief Criminal Division Filing Office Clerk Robbin Baker that Clifton had moved
the start time for the Trial in 065630 on 12/11/12 to 1:30 pm from a 9 am start time (which would
make sense considering the Trial Tom Viloria, Esq., respresented a defendant in that morning as
Couglin witnessed, upon Coughlin calling the RJC to inquire about something and being told that the
Trial in 065630 was, in fact, starting at 9 am that morning, at which point Coughlin hurriedly trav-
ersed to the RJC, arriving by 10 am. Despite Robbin Baker, curiously being absent from work that
day, Judge Clifton sua sponte indicated that Coughlin was wrong with regard to his contention that
Baker had informed him of the start time for the 12/11/12 Trial being moved to 1:30 pm. Coughlin
was prevented from subpoening or calling Baker at the 2/15/12 Contempt Show Cause Hearing in
065630 to rebut Judge Clifton's contention that Coughlin had been warned against being late
again. ON 2/15/13 Judge Clifton summarily sentenced Couglhin to 5 days incarceration to begin
immediately where he also denied Coughlin's Motion for even a brief Stay (following his setting
Coughlin's bail at a ridiculous $10,000 on 2/14/13, some might say) with no possibility of paying a
fine in lieu of serving said 5 days. Judge Clifton somehow managed to find Couglhin's sleeping
through two alarm clocks upon attempting to take a 30 minute nap at 5:30 am on 2/14/13 after being
forced to cram for the continuation of trial in 065630 due to the two wrongful arrests of Coughlin (on
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2/2/13 and 2/8/13) as volitional. Coughlin''s suddenly court appointed defender, Bruce Lindsay,
Esq. (how is it Couglin gets court appointed counsel for a civil contempt hearing on 2/14/13 in
065630 where he was denied such at the 3/23/12 Show Cause Hearing in 03628 and on 11/30/12 in
22176 upon Judge Howard announcing he may find Couglin in Contempt, then finding Coughlin in
Contempt, but insisting Coughlin continue on in self representing himself through the remainder of
that criminal prosecution where the possibility 6 months jail time existed and Coughlin was denied
court appointed counsel by RMC Judge Howard?). RJC Chief Bailiff Sexton indicated to Couglin, in
a holding cell that Couglin had five different violations of Judge Sferrazza's Administrative Order
hanging over your head, each one carrying a possible3 25 day jail sentence where such violations,
allegedly, include calling the filing office to confirm the start time of a hearing or other alleged de
minimis infractions.
Of course, the WCDA and the RJC Judges (particularly the second and third most recently
elected Justice of the Peace, former WCDA Criminal Division prosecutors, Clifton and Pearson)
have been particularly keen to inform Coughlin that he is an attorney and therefore expected to
know the rules and follow other Rules of Professional Conduct and duties attendant to being an at-
torney, even where Coughlin is functioning as no more than a self representing criminal defendant in
the various retaliatory prosecutions he has faced for pointing out the inequities attendant to the man-
ner in which landlord tenant law is currently applied in Washoe County and other civil rights viola-
tions by local law enforcement. Of course, that did not stop WCDA DDA Watts-Vial from assert-
ing, in a strategically last minute, faxed, objection to Coughlin's 10/30/12 SCR 110 Subpoenas and
Subpoena Duces Tecums (Watts-Vial alleged that NRCP 45's requirement that such subpoenas ei-
ther be issued by a court or a licensed attorney made those subpoenas issued by Coughlin (per the
express permission to so issue his own subpoenas communicated to Coughlin on 10/15/12 by the
SBN, in line with NNDB's Chairman Susich's 7/27/12 written communication to Coughlin that such
SCR 105(4) inquiries and matter be made to the SBN, and not he, the NNDB Chairman, and that the
SBN OBC possessed the power and authority to so communicate such SCR 105(4) matters to
Coughlin) he had served by an appropriate non-party on 2JDC Clerk of Court Hastings and the
2JDC Custodian of Records, that, due to Couglhin's being suspended from the practice of law (as
for Couglin not being an attorney given the temporary suspension of his law license in the State of
Nevada per 60838, that is not the case as far as the USPTO is concerned, and there is authority to
support the contention that a suspended attorney is still an attorney anyways, though, and there is an
entire ALR pointing out the fact that the suspension of one's law license by a State Bar does not nec-
essarily preclude an attorney from appearing before Federal Courts, such as the NVB, or the
USPTO, etc..., and where NVB Judge Beesley's testifying that a mitigating factor in Stephen R. Har-
ris, Esq.'s disciplinary matter exists where Mr. Harris is one of the few Chapter 11 bankruptcy attor-
ney's in town, the District of Nevada's participation (amongst 14 other selected federal courts) in a
Patent Litigation Pilot Program, combined with Coughlin's license to practice patent law before the
USPTO, presents a similar mitigating factor in Coughlin's case, though Panel Chair Echeverria
roundly rejected Coughlin's right to put on such evidence at the 11/14/12 hearing, for some rea-
son...).
Kern's misconduct resulted in profound damage to Coughlin's professional reputation and,
may potentiallly lead to Coughlin being disbarred considering the testimony of NVB Judge Beesley
at the 11/14/12 Formal Disciplinary Hearing regarding Coughlin's appearance before him in the
NVB on 3/15/12 shortly after the WCSO Deputies broke into Coughlin's former home law office at
1422 E. 9
th
St. #2, with guns drawn, handcuffing Coughlin, after failing to identify themselves as
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law enforcement and barely knocking before entering the building. The WCSO Deputies allowed
Couglhin a scant few minutes to grab a few personal items (Coughlin chose to use the time to grab
his hard drives and client's files, resulting in his not having a tie to go with the suit jacket, shirt, and
dress slacks and shoes that he wore while appearing before Judge Beesley less than 30 minutes after
the Deputies made Coughlin leave not only his former home law office (refusing to allow him to
grab even his medications or eye glasses/contacts), but where they also threatened to arrest Coughlin
for distrubing the peace or trespassing or obstruction where Coughlin was asking them ques-
tions related to the procedures under which they were carrying out the Lockout Order, with the Dep-
uties then threatening to move the personalty Coughlin had ferried out of the building to the outside
of the building in front of his car back into the building. The Deputies failed to follow through on
that threat, but Coughlin was forced to hurriedly gather up that property under their menacing glares
and threats of abuse of process while a cackling Western Nevada Management's Sue King and Jared
Scalise watched on, soon to move in to the building and, as Kern's 4/9/12 Opposition notes, immedi-
ately begin the process of having all of Coughlin's property recklessly moved into a storage unit that
day and the next.
Kern's 4/9/12 Opposition itself clearly violates RPC 3.1 where it alleges Coughlin no
more than a squatter with no right to possession of the rental, even where Kern's own client, Park
Terrace Townhomes HOA, through a Secretary of the HOA Board, appearing with WNM's King
(whom was allowed to practice law without a license at a 2/23/12 hearing before Judge Sferrazza
held in response to Coughlin's filing, on 2/10/12 Verified Complaint for Illegal Lockout and or Inter-
ruption of Essential Services (NV Energy, Allaback, Foreshee, Kern, and WNM's King all conspired
to one degree or another to deprive Coughlin of electricity to the building for over 7 days in February
2012 (see attached emails between Coughlin, NV Energy's Ron Jones, WNM's King, and HOA attor-
ney Kern). At the 2/23/12 hearing, Kern's client admitted, under oath, that the individuals whom
placed an advertisement on Craigslist to which Coughlin responded on 12/27/11 for a room for rent
with shared area privileges for $200 per month, were lawfully occupying the building at 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2, perhaps even under some work in exchange for occupancy/lower insurance premiums ar-
rangement with the blessing of the HOA upon WNM's then Assistant Manager Robyn Batalado
bringing such a proposed arrangement before the HOA Board. How Kern can then, on 4/9/09, in her
Opposition, not violate RPC 3.1 where she alleges Coughlin no more than a squatter is not clear,
especially where WNM's King and the HOA Board's Secretary failed to oppose Coughlin's sworn
contention that Allaback and Foreshee rented him the room with shared area privileges on 12/27/11,
under periodic monthly tenancy. As such, the 2/13/12 5 Day Unlawful Detainer No Cause Termina-
tion Notice King had posted to Coughlin's door is deficient where is relies upon a contention that
Coughlin's was an at will tenancy. Further, such a written admission is counter to Kern's 4/9/12 con-
tentions in her Opposition that Coughlin had no legal right to ever possess any part of the structure at
1422 E. 9
th
St. #2.
CONCLUSION
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING THE UNDERSIGNED RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS THAT THIS COURT
GRANT THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE TITLE OF THIS DOCUMENT AND ANY OTHER RELIEF THIS COURT
DEEMS JUST.
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AFFIRMATIONPURSUANTTONRS 239B.030
THE UNDERSIGNED DOES HEREBY AFFIRM THAT THE PRECEDING DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN
THE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER OF ANY PERSON.
DATED: 4/25/13
/S/ Zach Coughlin________
Zach Coughlin, Defendant
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PROOF OF SERVICE
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I served a copy of the foregoing document upon the fol-
lowing party by faxing, emailing, dropping if at their office, and placing a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document in the us mail addressed to:
Chief Daniel Wong, Es.q
Brian Sooudi Esq.
One East First Street, 3rd Floor
Fax number: 775-334-4226
dwong@reno.gov, bsooudi@reno.gov
Reno City Attorney's Office - Criminal Divison
P.O. BOX 1900 RENO , NV 89505
TEL: 775-334-2050 FAX: 775-334-2420
ATTORNEY FOR CITY OF RENO 775 334 3824
RENO MUNICIPAL COURT FILED BY FAX TO :
DATE THIS 4/25/13
/S/ ZACH COUGHLIN
Zach Coughlin, Defendant
RENOCML
CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. RCP2012-000607
State Bar of Nevada
vs.
Zachary Barker Coughlin
Statistical Closures
12/20/2012 Decision without TriallHearing
DATE
Applicant
Adverse Party
Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer
State Bar of Nevada
Coughlin, Zachary Barker

C\SE INFORMATION
~ S E ASSIGNMENT
RCP2012-000607
Reno Civil
12120/2012
Pearson, Scott
PARTY INf'ORMATfON
Location: Reno Civil
Judicial Officer: Pearson, Scott
Filed on: 12/20/2012
Case Type: Protection Order - Workplace
Case Status: 12/20/2012 Active
Lead Attorneys
King, Patrick Owen
Retained
EVEi'frS & OItlJERS OF TlU; COlJlU' INDEX
12/20/2012
12/20/2012
12/2012012
12126/2012
01104/2013
01104/2013
01110/2013
03/20/2013
bJ Application for Protection in the Workplace Filed
~ Order Granting Application for Protection Order Filed
9J Temporary Order for Protection Against Stalking Issued
Ql Affidavit of Service Filed
Adverse Party served by Bailiff 12/26/2012
BJ StalkinglHarassment (8: 15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Pearson, Scott)
.BJ Extended Order for Protection Against Stalking Work Issued
to expire 1-4-14
l Affidavit of Service Filed
Zachary Barker Coughlin served 1/5/13.
9J Motion Filed
PAGEl OF I
Printed on 05/0112013 at 1:07 PM
CJSCONTE,\1PT 24
17c.J.S.Contempl 24
Corpus Juris Sccundum
[)atabasc L!pdatedMan:h20]J
Page I
Contempt
John Glenn, J.D., Alan J. JBCObs, lD., Karl Oakes, lD.,and JeffJey J. Shampo, J.D.
II. Act'S or Conduct Constituling Contempt
8. Particular Acts or Conduct
2. Disobc:dience of Mandate, Order, or Judgment
TOPic Suntmary COfl"elation Table
24. V.lIdltyof m.nd.ta, order. or Judp .. f; fotlltfr.1 b.r raw
Wuf'. Kfy N.mMr Dlgnf
West's Key Number Digest, Contempt (::::>21
of mandate, order, or. decree ....hich is VQid or issued by a court
.... contcmpt, but disobe(hence of.n nTOoeoU5 order, if made by I
CllUrt ....'thm lIs JunsdK1JOO. constitute'! conlempL

mandate, order, Judgmc:nt, or de\.n:e rs not COIItempt.[FN2)1lOd. penon CIInnot be held
III cOnlempt of coW"! for 10 obey lin Of"der if the rsslliJ1g ooutt had no jurisdklionlo gi ...e
tItc .')rda, the order IS and unenfon:elble.IFN3J An order enlered wit.llo\J.l either
5ub)t matter jun sdktioo or Junsdktion over the parties is ...oid, and cannol pro... Kie Ihc basis
f:,,"' findmg ofcoo!empt.jFN41 Ho ....ever, the fact that In order is in part VQ)d doe$ not justify
of the v.lid parts thereof.IFN5] MOn:over,'D order is not rendered ...oid or unla.... ful
berng e.rronc:ollS or 10 rcvenal on appeaL[FN.61 ....hile the propriety of tbe:
gt'oeta!ly nOI Oft procdings to ""nash for COfItempt,IFN7) particularly 00
for cnrnrlllli coolempt,(FN8j a party being bound to obey '0 order of a
court WIth j.unsdrctmn even if the order is clearly incorrcct,tFN9j the judgment is generally
COocluslve as to the court's authority to render it,/FNIOJ and the question of the jurisdk.
l)On may be ralSed.IFNII. ] There ts authority, bo ....evu, that even l."Our!
o"'er at the lime an order is issued, defendant is bound to obey the
courts order un!llihe order t'S ...acaled through ajudkill procecding. IFNI2)
many jurisdictions. the prev.iling rule ., to contempt ror disobedience of an invalid 01"_
00 IS to ItS the .,. doctrine," which pro...ida thaI. pany may DOt chal_
. courts order by "'lOlatlOg 't.[FN1311n her wmds, indi... iduals cannot challenge lbc:
...alidlty ofa ooun Ord..T in cOGI,empl procecdinp arising from its m!ationtFNI4}-that is,
they may not coi latcnJ ly atla(:k 10 the conlempt pnxttdings III order,judgment, or dc1:ree of
Cl :roU Thomson Reuters. No Claim 1OOrig. US Gov. Works.
CJS CONTEMP'T 24
17 C.J.S. Contempt 24
RIM I. ch'il prOfHdl.p dislh.pl5l11ed'
Sinai Hospital, 111(: . v. Davis, IIA.D.2d 361,188 N.Y.S,2d 2911 (lSI Dcp't
IFN9) re Conlempi 282 Mkh. App. 656. 765 N.W.2d 44 (2009).
IFNIO) parte Annstron!. 110 Tex. Crim. 362. 8 S.W.2d 674 (1928)
IFNIIJ Del. - Mayer.... Mayer. 36 Del. Ch. 457,132 A.2d617 (1957).
Ga. - Bradley v. Simpson, 59 Ga. App. 844, 2 S.E.2d 238 (1939), judgmenl rev'd on
othergroolllls.189Ga. 316.5 S.E.2d S93 (1939).
CelialeralJlIfJlck
C?lia1eral alUH;k of previous order .is allowed in a contempt proceeding only if the
tnal coun lacked subJect matTer jurisdIction or personal jurisdktioo 10 cnler the ordeT.
.... TownorOaslon, 923 N.E.2d988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
IFNllJ ". Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161,98<,1 A,ld 256 (2010).
IFNlJ] U.S.- In re Cri minal Contempt Proceedings Against Gerold Cra ....ford, Mi-
chael Warren, 329 FJd 13 I, 55 Fed. R, Sen'. 3d 360 {2d (ir. 2003).
n: Dud,man, 179 VI. 467, 2006 VT 23, 898 A.2d 734 (20(6).
[FNI4) VI. - In re DuckmtlD, 179 VI. 467,2006 vr 23, 8911 A.2d 734 (2006).
Wnh.-:-State v. NOfIh, 103 Wash. App. 29, 9 PJd 1158 (Div. I 2000). as amcrxled on
rcconsu:lenrlion. (0..'1. 30,2000).
IFNI5] Neb. - Sid I>illon Che",roIel-Olmmobile-PoDtiac, 111(:. v. Sullivan, 251 Neb.
722, 559 N.W.2d 740(1997).
Vt.- State v. MOil. 166 VI. 188,692 A.2d 360 (1997).
Silllilarst.tt_nf
co/illeral bar rule precludes coll.leral cballcnge to II court order, based on its in-
"'alidlty, as a defel15C' to a ch.rgc ofmminal COiltempl brought agllinst ooe who has vi-
th61 order.
lJ.S. -- lo re Pmcecdings,.291 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.R.1. 2003), aft'd. 373 F.3d 37,
lI4l'cd. It hid. Scrv. 768 (IstCIf. 1(04).
IFNI6J U.S.- U.S. .... Unilcd Mine W"rkcn "r America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S. Ct. 677,
91 L. r::d. 884 ( 1947); Reliance Ins. Cn. v, Mtst Const. Co.. 84 F.3d n2. 34 Fed. R.
SeN. _'ld942 (10th Cir. 1996).
r. 2()1 I TII"mwn Reuters. No Claim toOrig. US Go.... WorJrs.
CJS CONTEMPT 24
17 C.J.s.Comcmpl24
Page 2
a court ba... ingjurisdiction of the partie5 and the sIIbject m.ttcrlFNl5J oolln orders
musl be oIx:yed by the parttcs until reversed. modified, or vacated by dirttt.. orderly, and
proper A contempl procccding not open to rcconsjdcralion the legal
or factUll basilO or the orderlUeged 10 have been d;soocyed"FNI7) and lherc: is no privilege w
disobey a COllrt'S order because the alleged 5ubjed belie"cs thai il is Thlls. dis-
obedience ofan in....lid COur1 order may be punished as criminal contempt,IFN 19) The: appro-
priate method to challenge a cOW"! order being 10 petition 10 have the order vlJCaled Of
.mended.IFN20) and this appJies to an order made hy a court within its jurisdictioll iilnd
power, e...en though the order may be clearly erron>e(lU!;.IFN21( Of defendant may sinccrely be-
lic"e that the ordeT is ineffective and will fillllily be vacated,I,,'N22) and even though the act
on ....hich the order is based is ...oid.(FN2J) The rule isjuslifled on the ground tbat il advances
imponant societal iDtercstli in an orderly system of government, respect for the judicial pro-
cess.nd the ru1e ofl ....., and the prcsc:rvation of civil order; IFN24] the rationale for Ihe rule is
to pn::>Iect the authority or lbe cowts when theyaddn:-ss dose: questions and 00 create a strong
ioccntive for parties to follow the orderly processofl,w.IF'N25)
UDder the colillteral bar rule, disobediencc ....iII oot be CllCUSed by the ract lhat the order
was granled.tFN261 or irregularly obtained, (FN27] or by the fact that the basic
Ictiot! becomes rnoot,IFN28J. llhough where the basic action has become moot. the court may
Kfuse to pllnish fQr the technical conternpl.IFN29) A party may be guilty of contempt for dis-
obeying an order which ...as fraudulently obtained.{FNJO)If the ooun reviewing the order
frnds the order to h.ve hid My pretense to v.lidity at the time: it was issued, the revie ....ing
CQw"! should enforce the coIlatera! bar rulc./FN31 J
EXCl'plilHfs.
E1lCepIioDS to the collateral bar rule wbcre adequate efTecti",e remedies do not
eliisl fur orderly re ... iew of the chlllhmged order, or where the order require5 an iJTClrievable
swreodeT or (;oostitutiooal guarantees.IFN32)
A limited 10 the collateral bar rule is DUlde in those elltremely rare (;ases .... here
!he order m.y be tr.ospolrently inv. lid.IFNJJ] The "transparently mvalid onSer" ellccptmn 11.1
the CC)iJlteral bar rule rests on the premise that a cowl issuing a tr.nsparently invalid o rder is
acting $0 flIT in C"ltcess of its lIuthority that il has no right to expect (;ompliance I nd no interest
is protected by requiring compliance.IFN34) A court order sbollid be: cOllSidered trllnsparently
invalid only if the oo\ln reviewing lhe ordu finds the order to h .... e bad no pretense 10 validity
al the time il was issued;/FN351 the exception d0C5 not apply 10 orders th.1 are arguably prop-
er.IFN36)"The tr.nsparently invalid order exception is available only 10 a party who has either
made I good faith effon 10 obtain emergency relief from the appellate court or ....bo shows
compelling circumstances cxC\lsing the decision not to seek some: kind of emergency re-
liefIFN37]
CUMULA TlVE SUPPLEMENT
C...... :
The only remedy from an erronwus order is appeal and disobedience thereto is conlempt.
0 2013 ThomsonReuters. No CI.im to Orig. US Oov. Works.
CJS CONTEMPT 14
17C.J.5.COIllempt24
v. Whinlesey. 126 Idaho 11118 P. 2d 804 (Ct. App. 1995).
",,5
Ncb.-S)d Dillon Chevn)lel-OIdsmobile-PonticH.:, Inc. v. Sullivan, 25 1 Neb. 722. 559
N.W,2d740(1997).
IFNI7) Kontntbccki , 30S B.R. 51O(N.D. Cal. 20(4).
Conn. - Stale v. Winter, 117 Conn. App. 493. 979 A.2d 608 (2(09), certiftcation
denied. 295 Conn. 922, 991 A,ld 569 (2010).
iFNI8J COIIn.- State "'. Winter, 117 Conn. App. 493, 979 A.2d 608 (2009), certifica-
lion denied. 295 Cooo. 922,99 1 A.ld 569 (2010).
IFNI9] U.S.- Walkcr v. City of Birmingham, U.S. 307, 87 S. CI. 1824, 18 LEd.
----- 2d 1210 (1%7); In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397.20 Fed. R. Servo 3d 10 (iltheir. 1991).
IFN20J U.S.-U.S. V . Mourad. 289 F.Jd 174 ( lSI CiT. 2002).
!FN21J Supremc Court /Jd. of Professional Ethks & Cl.lIldu<:t V. HllgheS,
557 N.W.2d 890 (lo ....a 1996).
v. Bennett, 228 Mich. App. 305, 577 N.W.2d 915 (1998)
IFN22J v. Dollar, 190 F.2d 366 (D.C. CiT. 1951).
U.S.-Black ....elder v. Crooks, 151 F. Supp. 26 (D. D.C. 1957).judllmcnt afl'd in part ,
rev'd inpll rt on othcr grounds, 2521".2d 854 (D.C. CiT. 1958).
lFN2J ) U.S.- U.S. V. United Workers Qf America. 330 U.S. 258, 67 S. Ct. 677.
9 1 L Ed. 884 {l947J.
U.S.-bpon v. U.S. Dept. o f J\lstke, 53 F.3d Ig3 (9th CiT. 1995); liyundai Merchant
Marine Co. Lid. V. U.S .. 159 F.R.D. 424 (S.D. N.Y. 1995).
fFN24J Conn.- Stile V. Winter. 117 Conn. App. 493, 979 A.2d 608 (2009), ca1ilica-
tion denied, 295 Conn. 922,991 A.2d 569 (2010).
[FN25] U.S.- In re Special Proceedi ngs, 291 F. Supp. 2d 44 (O.R.J. 20(3), all'd, 373
F.3d 31, 64 Fed. R, E ... id. Servo 768 (1st Cir. 20(4).
IFN16( CaL- Applkation of F.inn. 15S Cal. App. Id 705. 3 18 P.2d 816 {2d Dil't
1957}
N.J.-Cooper V. Coop<:T, 103 N.J. Eq. 416, 143 A . 559 (Ch. 1928).
IFN27] lo ....a- Ballani V. Grund, 244IowIl623. S6 N.W.2d 166 (1952).
N.J.-Cooper V. Cooper, 10.1 N.J. Eq. 416.143 A. 559 (Ch. 1928).
IFN28] U.S. - U.S. v. United Mine of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S. Ct. 677.
(0 1013 Thom!';on Rc:uter5. No Claim to Drill. US G\lV. Works
CJS CONTEMPT 24
17 C.l.S. Cootempl 24
Page 3
Win v. Jay Petroleum, Inc. , 964 N.E.2d evell if there IItC questions
4'!,d\1!c decree
If a ha.sjurisdjction over therO:!':ncomplying contempt
202 (2012).
ity. OregQn Educ. Ass'o V. Oregoll
lEND OF SUPPLEMENT]
. kI 195 2009-Ohio-2275, 919 RE.2d
IFNI) Ohio-Doss v .. Thomas. 183 Owo API" ,
219 (10th Franklin Counly 20(9).
(FN2] D.c. - Sbewareg. V. Yegzaw, 947 A.2d47 (D.C. 2008),
TCll.-ln re Slo.n, 214 S.WJd 217 (Tell. App. Eastland 2001).
V . V. Shenbar, 276 VI. 611,667S.E.2d 555 (20(18) 01" Cb rch 898 N.F..2d
IFN3jlDd.-MIrIon Counly .
437 (Ind. CL App. 200g). lr1Ins er n ,
Obllg.twil of contpll.lICf o. J.riJdkII
OIl
2d D .\ 2010) le ....e to
N.Y.- Aslradll v .. Archer, 71.A
d
%3d 125, 93't N.E.2d
appeal dismissed mpart,dcnJC va,
94 (2010) . . tllIIl a_Hamilton County Hosp. Authority. 249
IFN41 Tenn. _ Konvahnu V. ChII nos
S.W.3d 346 (fenn. 2(08).
122 Tex. 54,52 s .W.2d7J(l932)
tFN5] Tell. - Ex parte Mab!")',. . iIIis 91 Utah 65 P.2d 1136 (1937).
Utah- Uquor Control Commlsston v. Mru ' . H A thority 249
(FN61 Tenn. _ KonVlllink. v. County osp. u
S.W.3d 346 (Tenn. 2(03). Inc y ()celln Blue Pools, Inc., 28 2d 665,
tFN7J N.Y.-IkI-AqutI Pool Supply. ..
215N.Y.S.2d 637 (Sup 1961).
Wyo.-Begley V. Nan, 62 Wyo. 254. 166 P.2d 466 158.
Matlcrs determined on ror contempt. sec H
IFNg ( u.S. --Clielt "'. Hamrnonds, 305 F.2d 5M (5\11 Cir. 1962).
C1 2013 ""[ltotnson ReuteT5. NoClairn toOrig US Go .... Works.
CJS CONTEMPT 24
17C.1.S. Contempt 24
9 1 L. Ed. 884 (1947). see Vatley A\lthorily ... . Moody, 86 F. SlIp(l, 694
IFN291 U.S. - U.S. reI. TcnDe'l
(E.I.>. Tenn. 1949). 1854 WI- 5524 (N.Y. Sup 1854).
PT. 415, , "'
1102 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D. N.Y. 199_).
IFN311 U.S. - U.S. V. T.e
TTY
b
508 F 3d 1003 (11th Ci r. 2007). ccrt. denied. 129 S. CI.
[FN321 U.S.-U.S. V. Strau , .
40,172 L. Ed. 2d 20(2008). . S"'d 44 (D.R.I . 2003), !lITd. 373
(FN331
F .3d 37.64 F .. . er I t7 Conn. APr. 493, 979 A.2d 608 (2009), certiflC3-
A.2d 569 (2010)
, - U.S. "'. Moura4, 289 F.3d 174 (1st Cir. 2002).
S cial proecedinlEs, 291 F. Supp. 2d 44 (DK!. 2003). .tTd. 373
768 (IslCi r. 20(4). .
F.3d 37. 64 Fe . . . Proceedings Against Gerald Crawford, MI-
3d 360 (2d Cir. 2003).
westla:. " 2013 ThomsOIi Reuters. No Claim 11.1 Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
ClS CONTEMPT 24
END OF DOCUMENT
to 2013 Thornson RC\lI<!TS. :ow CI!lirn 10 Orig US Gov. Works.
__. ___ ._ __ _ ... ____ ___ __ _ -----
Custom Digest - 7 Headnotes
C [Cited 5 times for this legal issue)
Ex parte Gardner, 39 P. 570
=93CONTEMPT
=93IActs or Conduct Constituting Contempt of Court
=93kl9Disobedience to Mandate, Order, or Judgment
=93k 21k. Validity of mandate, order, or judgment.
Nev.,1895
Page I
It is not a contempt of court to fail to comply with an order which was void for want of juris-
diction.
p [Cited 3 times for this legal issue)
State Indus. Ins. System v. Sleeper, 679 P.2d 1273
Nev.,1984
One may not be held in contempt of a void order.
C [Cited 2 times for this legal issue)
Application of Havas, 371 P.2d 30
Nev. , 1962
Court was without jurisdiction to cite defendant in a replevin action for contempt for failure to
deliver an automobile, where court although having sufficient data for entry of a judgment re-
quiring in the alternative, delivery of the automobile, or its value in case delivery could not be
had, instead entered judgment requiring defendant to deliver the automobile to plaintiff with
no alternative. N.R.S. 17.120.
H [Cited I times for this legal issue)
Del Papa v. Steffen, 915 P.2d 245
Nev.,1996
Violation of Supreme Court orders issued in excess of jurisdiction could not produce valid
judgment of contempt.
C [Cited I times for this legal issue)
Daines v. Markoff, 555 P.2d 490
Nev. , 1976
Trial court was without power to order county comptroller to pay fees for appointed defense
counsel in excess of that allowed by statute and, hence, comptroller could not be held in con-
tempt of order. N.R.S. 7.260, St.J965, c. 279 .
... [Cited 1 times for this legal issue)
State e1 reI. Smith v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Humboldt County, 167 P.2d 648
Nev.,1946
Indefiniteness and uncertainty in a judgment or decree may constitute a good defense in con-
2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

I
I
Page 2 I
tempt proceedings.
p [Cited 0 times for this legal issue)
Whitehead v. Nevada Com'n On Judicial Discipline, 906 P.2d 230
Nev., 1994 . .
"Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction doctrine" relates to authority of courts to
orders while considering other questions (including determination of theIr own JunsdlctlOn)
and to punish as criminal contempt violations of such orders even though may later be JudI-
cially determined that court lacked jurisdiction over proceedmgs m whIch anCIllary orders
were issued.
References
Refusal to obey court order relating to proposed testimony as constituting criminal contempt
under 18 U.S.C.A. sec. 401(3) 63 American Law Reports, Federal 878 (1983)
Contempt based on violation of court order where another court has issued contrary order 36
American Law Reports 4th 978 (1985)
17 Am. JUT. 2d Contempt 130-164
A FIRST AMENDMENT EXCEPTION TO THE "COLLATERAL BAR" RULE: PROTECT-
ING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE LEGITIMACY OF COURTS 22 Pepperdine
Law Review 405 (1995)
END OF DOCUMENT
- --- - - - - - - - - - -
---
.. ..
Custom Digest - J Hcadnotes
H
In re Robertson. 19 A,3d 751
(:0=>3 I SPPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
t(;;:;::>3I 5PIISecurity or Order for Peace or Protection
=>315PII( E)Violations, Contempt. and Conviction
(:;;;;:>315Pk90k. Enforcement in general; police.
D.C..2011
Page I
Criminal contempt action, initiated in the Superior Court. an Article I court under the ConstI-
tution of the United States, by the Office of the Altomey General on behalf of alleged victim
based on defendant's alleged violation of a civil protection order (CPO), had to be brought in
the name and pursuant to the sovereign power of the United States. U.S.C. A. Canst. Art. I,
I; D.C. Official Code. 2001 Ed. 16-1 OOS(t) (2008).
END OF DOCUMENT
fd 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Custom Digest. 2 Headnotes
v Bentley, 678 So.2d 1265
=315PPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
(;;::::I315PIISecurity or Order for Peace or .
E)Yiolations, Contempt, and Conviction
lOOk. Nature or degree of violation; contempt.
Fla.,1996. .. .. , m t rna not be used to enfort:e with
Statute provirlmg that Imllrect cont.e p. I violates constitutional separatIOn of
injunctions for protection agamst 7412901(2).
powers. West's F.S.A. Consl. Art. 2, 3. ests . . . .
ex Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223
Mo.,1982 . 1 rohibition against imprisonment debt
Adult Abuse Ad .did .not VIOlate of which respondent of
where Act made VIOlation of ex parte 0
1
hut set forth no punishment for VIOlation of an-
violation of fuB or attorney fees. Y.A.M.S. 455.045,
ciliary orders dealing V.A.M.S.ConsLArt. I. II.
455.050. subtl,. 1-7.45. , .. .
END OF DOCUMENT
. 0 Orig US (jov. WorKs.
2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim t .
I
Custom Digest 2 Headnotes
,.
Statev. Ryan, 239 P.3d 1016
(:O=>31SPPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
or Order for Peace or Protection
C;;:>315PII( E)Violations, Contempt, and Conviction
::=315Pk9l Violations and Offenses
Anti-harassment orders in general.
Or.App.,2010
Page I
Prosecutions under statute criminalizing conduct in violation of a stalking protective order
(SPO), like prosecutions for crime of stalking, require a defendant's expressive "contacts" to
be evaluated in light of the constitutional protections for free speech. West's Or.Const. Art. I,
8; West's Or.Rev. Stat. Ann. 163.732, 163.750.
p-
Garcia v. State, 212 S.W.3d 877
Tex.App,Austio,2006
Statute which makes it an offense to violate protective order, prohibiting persons from com-
municating directly with a protected individual in a "threatening or harassing manner" or
from communicating a "threat through any person to a proteded indi vidual," was not vague
in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, even though term "harassing" was not
defined; statute contained a scienter requirement, and term "harass" was not impermissibly
vague when given a narrowing definition that saved the statute from constitutional infirmity.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. I, 14; V.T.C.A .. Penal Code 25.07.
END OF DOCUMENT
2013 Thomson Reuters, No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Custom Digest 6 Hcadnotes
,.
State v. Ryan, 239 PJd 1016
(:0=>3 I SPPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
or Order for Peace or .
:=315PIl( E)Yiolations, Contempt, and ConVIctIOn
E?315PkI01k. Defenses.
Or.App.,2010 . .' lkin roteeth'e order (SPO) to survive a free speech
For a prosecution for vlOlatmg a sta g p ... ohibited contact" must contain an un-
challenge under the .an personal violence: and is object-
equivocal threat that msulls a fear ,Imml W t' 0 Canst Art I 8' West's Or.Rev. Stat.
ively likely to be followed by unlaw u acts. es sr. ., ,
Ann. 163.7S0.
Davit v. Stogsdill, 371 Fed.Appx. 683
C.A,7.IU.,2010 .' rd f rotection even if the order of protection was
Prosecution of arrestee for vlolatmg er 0 p rt of typographical error, did not vi-
\
later determined to be Y C?U laws or Illinois common law. l8 U.S.C.A.
olate arrestee's constitutional fights, rae eteenng
1962; S.H.A. 720 lLCS 511 2-30.
\ v. Boyle, 771 N.W.2d 604
N 0 2009 . rotected speech when he the mother
did not engage 10 ct restraining order that prohibited defenda1t
of his child in violation of a dlsor er y. u than' communicating with the child. U.S.c. .
from contacting the mother for purposes ot er
Const.Amend. 1.
v Romine, 757 N.W.2d 884
Minn.APp.,2008 ..' . . I from the issuance of an order for

tion for violating it; OFP was '
stood as law of the case. M.S.A. .'
State v. Bohager, 168 P.3d 700 . ' d t order of protection is
Mont.,2007 . vailable civil remedies With reg
ar
.0 . I raceeding for de-
district court, during challenges to the
sued agalOst him f the order of protection, from conSI
fendant's alleged ViOlatiOn 0
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underlying order of protection based upon alleged constitutional due process violations.
U.S.c.A. Const_Amend. 14: MCA 45-5-626.
f>
State v. Norris-Romine. 894 P.2d 1221
Or_App" 1995
Protective order issuance statutes are in pari materia with protective order crimes statutes
and term "legitimate purpose" in issuance statutes is incorporated into crimes statutes and sub
ject to constitutional challcnges by defendants chargcd with protective order crimes. ORS
163.735,163.738, 163_747,163.750.
END OF DOCUMENT
Custom Digest - I Hcadnotcs
H
In re Robertson. 19 A.3d 751
OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
C=>315PIISecurity or Order for Peace or Protection
C;::;;;>315PII( E)Violations, Contempt, and Conviction
=3l5Pk I 02Proceedings in General
C=315PkI04k. PIC<jding, notice, and process.
D.C. ,2011
Page I
Criminal (,;ontcmpt action. initiated in the Superior Court. an Article I court undcr the Consti-
tution of the United States, by the Offi(';c of the Attorney General on behalf of allcged victim
based on defendant's alleged violation of a civil protection order (CPO), had to be brought in
the name and pursuant to the sovereign power of the United States. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. I,
I; D_C. Official Code, 2001 Ed_ 16-1005(1) (2008).
END OF DOCUMENT
I
I
Custom Digest - I Headnotes
f>
Grecn v. Grecn, 642 A.2d 1275
E)Violations, Contempt, and Conviction
C=315Pkl02Proceedings in General
C=>315PkI03k. In general.
D_C.,1994
Page I
fn intra family contempt proceeding involving civil protection order entered in domestic viol.
ence case, husband did not have "fundamental" constitutional right to public prosecutor, and
trial court could pennit wife's counsel to participate.
END OF DOCUMENT
Custom Digest - 1 Headnotcs
f>
State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223
=3 I 5PPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
C=;:>315PIISecurity or Order for Peace or Protection
E)Violations. Contempt, and Conviction
IOSk. Sentence and punishment.
Mo_,1982
PClge I
Adult Abuse Act did not violate constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt
where Act made violation of ex parte order of protection of which respondent has notice or of
violation of full order of protection criminal but set forth no punishment for violation of an
cillary orders dealing with child support, maintenance, or attorney fees. V.A.M.S. 455.045,
455.050, subds. IT7, 455.075, 455.085; V.A.M.S.Const.Art. I, II.
END OF DOCUMENT
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CJS INJUNCTION! 404 Page 2
\/\\:'-'::.tla/. I 43A C.J.S. Injunctions 404
CJS INJUNCTION 404
43A C.J.S. [njunctions 404
Corpus Juris Secundum
Database updated March 20 I 3
Injunctions
Page I I
By John Hourdeau, J.D., Nicole D. Fox, J.D . John R. Kennel , J.D., ofthe National Legal Re-
sean;h Group, Charles J. Nagy, J.D., Thomas Muskus. J.D .. Eric C. Surette, J.D.
VII. Violation and Punishment
B. Writ or Mandate Violated
Topic Summary References Correlation Table
404. ValIdity and regularIty
West's Kcy Number Digest, Injunction 1720. 1729. 1732
The fact that an injunction or restraining order is merely elToneous, or was improvidently
granted, or was granted or obtained itTegularly, docs not of itself excuse a violation of such in-
junction or order. but disobedience of a void injunction or restraining order is not a punishable
contempt of
Generally, a party may be held in contcmpt for violating an invalid injunction unless the
injunction is transparently invalid or has only a frivolous prctense to validity.[FNI]In a pro-
ceeding for violation of an injunction, the judgment or for injunction, if rendered by a
court having jurisdiction, is not subject to collateral at least for irregularit-
ies.[FN3] So, where the court has jurisdiction, the fact that the injunction or restraining order
is mercly en'oneous, or is improvidently granted or irregularl y obtained, is no excuse for viol-
ating il, [FN4] even if the claimed error constitutional issues,[FN5] or the injunction
is based on an invalid statute or regulation.[FN6] This rule applies with equal force to a pro-
secution for contempt instituted for the purpose of punishing a person for disobeying an order
of the court on the ground that its authority or dignity is in question, and onc which is insti-
tuted to cnforce the authority of the in the administration of justice between litig-
ants.[FN7]
Similarly, where the has jurisdiction, disobedience is not excused by the fact that the
bill or complaint on which the injunction or restraining order is issued is insufficicnt,[FN8]
that the injunction is broader than that authorized by the order for injunction,[FN9] or that the
injunction is broader than the statute authorizing the injunction.[FNIO] If an injunction or a
restraining order is issued for the purpose of maintaining status quo while the court determ-
ines its own jurisdiction or authority to grant relief, the violation of thc injunction or the re-
straining order may be punished as contempt. even if the court later dctcnnines that it has no
jurisdiction to grant the ultimate relief rcquested.[FN I I]
(:l 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Unless an injunction is void. its propriety must be tested by appeal and not by disobcdi-
ence.[FN 12] but where the injunction or restraining order is void and Dot merely voidable, dis-
obedience thereofis not a contempt of court and not punisbable as such.[FNI3] The fact that
r:7n
tempt.[FNI5]
In general, it is only when the court which grants or makes the or restraining or-
der does not have jurisdiction that such injunction or order may be dIsregarded and cannot be
made the basis of a contempt proceeding.[FN 16] So, where no bond has been given as re-
quired by statute, the court is without jurisdiction to for contempt.[FN 17J However, an
injunction is void and, therefore, insufficient as. the baSIS of punishment for co?tempt if it has
no support of any applicable law,[FNI8] or where the court IS withoutjurrsdicllOn to grant the
particular restraining order.[FNI9] When an injunction exceeds the jurisdiction of the issuing
court, a person affected by the injunction has the choice of complying with the order and
bringing a judicial challenge, or disobeying it and subsequently attacking its validity when the
person is charged with contempt.[FN20]
Record.
It has been held that one may not be held guilty of contempt on the basis of an order which
is not of record and which rests solely on a mere oral announcement of the eourt,[FN21} but
the order is not void merely because the minute entry by the clerk of court does not conform
to the oral decision by the trial judge.[FN22] However, it has been held that there may be a
contempt of court in disobeying the lenns of an injunction order which is neither entered nor
filed.[FN23]
[FNI ] Ohio-Natl. Equity Title Agency, Jnc. v. Rivera, 147 Ohio App. 3d 246. 2001 -
Ohio- 7095. 770 N.E.2d 76 (1st Dis!. Hamilton County 2001).
[FN2] U.S.-G. & c. Merriam Co. v. Webster Dictionary Co., Inc. , 639 F.2d 29 (1st
Cir.1980).
Mass.-Com. v. Wallace, 431 Mass. 705, 730 N.E.2d 275 (2000).
WiS.-State v. Bou7.ek, 168 Wis. 2d 642, 484 N.W.2d 362 (C1. App. 1992).
Disobedience of invalid or erroneous court order. generally. see C.J.S., Contempt 16.
[FN3] N.D. - State v. Simpson, 78 N.D. 360, 49 N.W.2d 777 (1951) (abrogated by,
Wallerv. Florida, 397 U.S. 387,90 S. Ct. 1184.25 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1970)).
Typographical error
An erroneous trial date recited in a temporary injunction order requiring enforcement
of an employment agreement's covenant not to compete was a typographical error cor-
rected by nunc pro tunc entry and did not prevent enforcement of the temporary in-
, 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
,
- - - .. _._- _.-
CJS INJUNCTION 404 Page 3
43A c.J.S. Injunctions 404
junction enforcing the covenant.
Tex.-Bertoui v. C.E. Shepherd Co., Inc., 752 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App. Houston 14th
Dis!. 1988),
[FN4]lIL- People v. Nance. 189111. 2d 142,244 Ill. Dec. 1,724 N.E.2d 889 (2000).
lowa-Opat v. Ludeking, 666 N.W.2d 597 (Iowa 2003).
W.Va. - Kessel v. Leavitt. 204 W. Va. 95, 51 I S.E.2d 720 (1998).
Lack or venue
Ga.-Rockwood Intern. Systems Supply, Inc. v. Rader Companies, Inc., 255 Ga. App.
881. 567 S.E.2d 104 (2002).
[FN5] U.S.-Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co. , 619 F.2d 459, 29 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 960 (5th Cir.
1980),j udgment aff'd, 452 U.S. 89, 101 S. Ct. 2193, 68 L. Ed. 2d 693 , 31 Fed. R. Servo
2d 509 (I981).
[FN6] Wis.- State ex reI. Atty. Gen. v. Fasekas. 223 Wis. 356, 269 N.W. 700 (1936).
[FN7] IlL-A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16,232 IlL 402,
83 N.E. 932 (1908).
Criminal or civil nature of contempt proceeding as affecting punishment, sec 435.
[FN8] N.Y.-Greco v. Winney, 176 A.D.2d 407,574 N.Y.S.2d 403 (31 Dep't 1991).
[FN9] U.S.-Sickels v. Borden, 22 F. Cas. 71. No. 12833 (C.C.SD. N.Y. 1857).
[FNIO] Miss.-Hanna v. State ex reI. Rice, 169 Miss. 314, 153 So. 371 (1934).
[FNIl] U.S.-Ford v. Boeger, 362 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1966).
W.Va.-Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Doc, 159 W. Va. 200, 220 S.E.2d 672
(1975).
(FNI2] U.S.- Walker v. City of Bilmingham, 381< U.S. 307, 87 S. C!. 1824, 181. Ed.
2d 1210 (1967); Nonnan Bridge Drug Co. v. Banner, 529 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1976).
Mo. - Mechanic v. Gruensfelder, 461 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
[FNI3] Hl.-Tri-Statc Coach Lines, Inc. v.lIlinois Commerce Com'n, 202 Ill. App. 3d
206,147111. Deo.529.559 N.E.2d 869 (1st Dist. 1990).
Miss.-Johnson v. Hinds County, 524 So. 2d 947 (Miss. 1988).
[FN 14] Ala.-Ex parte Connor, 240 Ala. 327, 198 So. 850 ( 1940).
1
CJS INJUNCTION 404
43A C.J.S. Injunctions 404
Page 4 I
[FNI5] Mo.-Fulton v. Fulton, 528 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
[FNI6] U.S.-Ex parte Geo'ge, 371 U.S. 72. 83 S. Ct. 178,9 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1962);
Petition of Green, 369 U.S. 689, 82 S. Ct. 1114,8 L. Ed. 2d 198,89 Ohio L. Abs. 214
(1962).
Fla.-Falls v. N.E.P. [ntern., tnc" 678 So. 2d 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1996).
N.Y.- Scholz v. State. 86 N.Y.2d 225, 630 N.Y.S.2d 978, 654 N.E.2d 1226, 103 Ed.
Law Rep. 361 ( 1995).
[FNI7] CaL-Condor Enterprises, Ltd. v. Valley View State Bank, 25 Cal. App. 4th
734,30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613 (2d Dist. 1994).
[FNI8] Colo.-People ex rel. Indus. Com'n of Colorado v. Aladdin Theatre Corp., 96
Colo. 527,44 P.2d 1022 (1935).
Mass.--City of Fitchburg v. 707 Main Corp . 369 Mass. 748,343 N.E.2d 149 (1976).
Okla.-Motor Lodges, Inc. v. Willingham, 1972 OK 149.509 P.2d 901 (Okla. 1972).
[FNI9] U.S.-Heyman v. Kline, 456 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1972).
[FN20] CaL-People v. Gonzalez, 12 Cal. 4th 804,50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74, 910 P.2d 1366
(1996).
[FN21 ] Cal.-Maier v. Luce, 61 Cal. App. 552. 215 P. 399 (2d Dist. 1923).
Tex.-Ex parte Conway, 419 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1967).
[FN22] CaL- Wutchumna Water Co. v. Superior Court in and for Tulare County, 215
Cal. 734, 12 P.2d 1033 (1932).
[FN23] U.S.-Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America. 476 F.2d
860. 17 Fed. R. Servo 2d 395 (3d Cir. 1973).
Wash. - State v. Erickson, 66 Wash. 639,120 P. 104 (1912), affd. 234 U.S. 103,34 S.
Ct. 717, 58 L. Ed. 1237 ( 1914).
Westlaw. 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
CJS lNJUNCTION 404
END OF DOCUMENT
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C)S CONTEMPT 31
17 C.J.S. Contempt 3 J
Corpus Juris Secundum
Database updated March 2013
Contempt
Page I
John Glenn, J.D., Alan J. Jacobs, J.D., Karl Oakes. J.D . and Jeffrey J. Sham po, J.D.
IT. Acts or Conduct Constituting Contempt
B. f'artil:ular Acts or Conduct
2. Disobedience of Mandate, Order. or Judgment
Topic Summary References Correlation Table
3). Stay or review of proceedings
West's Key Number Digest, Contempt (;;:;:::;>22
Refusal to obey it court order where steps taken to review the order amount to supersedeas
is not contempt, and any attempt to carry out the order during the proceedings for review is
contemptuous.
While violations of an order arc punishable as criminal contempt even though the order is
set aside on appeal or though the basic action hHs become moot,[FN I J exercising the right to
have an order on which contempt proceedings arc based revised is not contempt of
cOUlt,[FN2] and where steps taken to review an order, judgment, or deuee by appeal, writ of
enor, certiorari. or olher authorized proceeding amount to supersedeas, it is not contempt 10
refuse to act under the order of the trial court.{ FN3] On the other hand, any attempt to carry
out the order during the pendency of the proceedings for review will be adjudged con
tempt,[FN4] although a palty so acting with no knowledge of the appeal and supersedeas is
not in contempt.[FN5] Where a stay of proceedings on defendant's motion is granted until the
hearing and determination of the motion, plaintiff is not punishable for contempt in proceed
ing after denial of the motion, because he or she did not wait until a formal order on the de-
cision had been actually entered.[FN6] Where a commitment by a coul1 has been suspended in
other proceedings, one who acts in obedience to a writ in such proceedings is not ch::lrgeable
with contempt. [FN7]
If the action to review does not operate as a supersedeas, execution of the order of the
court of fil1!t instance is not suspended during the pendency of the proccedings,[FN8) and the
order must be obeyed even though it is actually sct aside on appeal.[FN9] If the order is dis
obeyed the trial court may punish for contempt notwithstanding the subsequent re
vcrsal.[FN I 0] One disobeying an order of court, pending appeal therefrom, may question such
order only insofar as he or she can show it to be absolutely void, and cannot be heard to say
that it is erroneous, however flagrant it may appear to be.[FNIl] Where an order of the trial
If) 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
- ------- - - - --- -- --- - - - - -- ---
C)S CONTEMPT 31
17 C.l.S. Conlempt 31
Page 3
[FN9] U.S,-U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 25!o: , 67 S. Ct. 677,
91 L, Ed. !o:g4 (1947): Land v. Dollar, 190 F.2d 366 (D.C. eir. 1951).
[FNIO] U.S,-Cliett v. Hammonds, 305 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 19(2).
Ga.-Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Cravey, 209 Ga. 274, 71 S.E.2d 659 (1952) .
[FN II] Tex.-Lytle v. Galveston. H. & S.A. Ry, Co., 41 Tex. Civ. App. 112,90 S, W.
316 (1905).
[FNI2] N.Y.-In re Jennings' Estate, 138 N.Y,S.2d621 (Sur. Ct. 1954).
Wesllaw. t"'i 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Gov!. Works.
C)S CONTEMPT 31
END OF DOCUMENT
201 3 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
C)S CONTEMPT 31
17 C.J .S, Contempt 31

Page 2 I
court is affirmed and the order of affirmance is made the order of the trial court, failurc to pay
costs imposed by the appellate court does not constitute contempt of the trial cOUlt.[FN 12]
[FNt]ldaho--In re Weick, 142 Idaho 275,127 P.3d 178 (2005).
re Contempt of Dudzinski, 257 Mich. App. 96,667 N.W.2d 68 (2003).
[FN2) Ala.-Piccolo v. Piccolo, 251 Ala. 483. 38 So. 2d 12 (1948).
Abatement of proceedings on reversal of decree on which contempt is based, see
110.
[FN3] U,S.-Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 927 F.2d 1014, 19 Fed. R. Servo 3d 332
(7thCir.1991).
Ala.-Piccolo v, Piccolo, 251 Ala, 483, 38 So. 2d 12 (1948).
[FN4J Ariz.-City of Phoenix v. Rodgers, 44 Ariz. 40, 34 P.2d 385 (1934).
IlI.-Gumberts v, East Oak St. Hotel Co., 404 Ill. 386, 88 N,E.2d 883 (1949).
Violation of supersedeas or stay as contempt of appellate or lower court, see c.J.S.,
Appeal and Error 553.
[FN5] U.S.-Wilson v. Slale, 169 U.S. 586,18 S. Ct. 435, 42 L. Ed. 865 (1898).
Person not served with writ
Ariz.--City of Phoenix v, Rodgers, 44 Ariz. 40, 34 P.2d 385 (1934),
[FN6] N.Y.-Dady v. O'Rourke, 71 A.D. 557, 75 N.Y.S. 821 (2d Dep't 1902).
Wis.-State ex reI. Reynolds v. County Court of Kenosha County, ! I Wis. 2d 560,105
N.W.2d 876 (1960).
[FN7]
Sheriff acting under writ of habeas corpus
Wis.-State ex reI. Reynolds v. County Court of Kenosha County, 11 Wis. 2d 560, 105
N.W.2d 876 (1960).
[FN8] N.Y.-Lefkowitz v. Grosswald, 33 Misc, 2d 905, 225 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Sup 19(2),
order affd, 16 A.D.2d 889, 229 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1st Dep't 1962).
Wash.-State v. Ralph Williams' N011h West Chrysler Plymouth. Inc., 87 Wash. 2d
327,553 P.2d 442 (1976).
20U Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov, Works,
I

Custom Digest - I Hcadnotes
C
Henley v. Iowa Dist. Court for Emmet County, 533 N.W.2d 199
=3I 5PPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
C;:;:;>315PlI( E)Vioiations, Contempt, and Conviction
C=315Pk90k. Enforcement in general; police.
iowa,1995
Page I
Summarily jailing domestic violence victim for violating no-contact provision of protective
order directed against her male companion did not violate due process, so as to deprive court
of jurisdiction to hold her in contempt; police officers took vktim into custody under sum-
mary contempt procedures iluthorizcd by Domestic Abuse Act, authorizing immediate cus-
todial arrest of person believed to have violated domestic violence protective order. U.S,C.A.
Const.Amend. 14; LC.A. 236.11. 236.14, 665.7.
END OF DOCUMENT
t'! 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

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State v. Stewart. 706 A.2d 171
::::;; 15PIISccurity or Order for Peace or Protection
C;..J315PIJ( E)Violations, Contempt, and Conviction
e=>315Pk91 Violations and Offenses
Anti-harassment orders in general.
N.H..1998
Page I
After New Hampshire court had issued protective order prohibiting defendant's harassment of
his sister, defendant's threatening and profane remarks directed toward his sister at courthouse
in Maine were intentional violation of New Hampshire court order, for which New Hampshire
courts had Jurisdiction to punish as criminal contempt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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_. ___ ________ _____ ... ________ __________ __ ___ L
H
In re RH., 904 N.Y.S.2d 653
::=>315PIISeeurity or Order for Peace or Protection
=315PIl( E)Violations, Contempt, and Conviction
c=>315Pk91 Violations and Offenses
==>315Pk94k. Notice or knowledge of order.
N.Y.Fam.,20JO
Page I
Father could not be held in contempt of temporary order of protection on behalf of employees
of a foster care agency where, at the time the aUeged violation occurred, agency had not
served a copy of the order upon the father, and court lacked jurisdiction to grant the tempor-
ary order of protection in the first place.
END OF DOCUMENT
Custom Digest - 2 Headootes
i>
State v. Gandhi, 989 A.2d 256
=3I 5PPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
;::;::>315PII( E)Violations, Contempt, and Conviction
Violations and Offenses
"No contact" orders.
NJ . 20lO
Page I
Even if defendant could have attacked the jurisdictional underpinning of municipal court
judge's no-contact order, defendant was obligated to abide by the terms of the order until it
was vacated and, thus, jury could have relied on the order to elevate both of defendanf's stalk-
ing convictions to the third degree. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-IO(b. c).
i>
State v. Snapp, 82 P.3d 252
Wash.App.Div.2,2004
State was not required to prove validity of no-contact order in prosecution for violating order
prohibiting contact with defendant's wife, where defendant did not assert substantive chal-
lenge to validity of order, defendant did not take e:\ception to jury instruction on specific is-
sue, and defendant did not challcnge jurisdiction of court that issued no-contact order. West's
RCWA 10,99.020, 10.99.040,26.50.110.
END OF DOCUMENT
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People Y. Perez, 734 N.Y.S.2d 398
c=>31 5PPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
(:;:::;>315PIISccurity or Order for Peace or Protection
C=31SPH( E)Violations. Contempt, and Conviction
=315Pkl OOk. Nature or degree contempt.
N.Y.Co .2001
Page I
Once "duly served," an individual violating an order of protection may be prosecuted for
criminal contempt, with jurisdiction vesting within any of the 62 counties of New York,
based upon the geographic location in which sw:h violation is committed. McKinney's CPL
530. 13.
H
!::Iatey v. Slate, 755 50.2d 593
Ala.Crim.App.,1999
Absent indictment or complaint gi ving former husband notice of criminal charges against him,
trial court did not have jurisdiction to render judgment of conviction for violation of protec-
tion-from-abuse order entered in connection with divorce proceeding. or to impose a
12-month sentence for that conviction; most that court could have done, absent an indictment
or a complaint, was to find former husband in contempt of court, for violating a court order,
and to sentence him to jail for five days lind fine him SIOO. Code 1975, 12-11-30(5),
30-5-9; Rules Crim. Proc., Rule 2.1.
C
State v. Stewart. 706 A.2d 171
N.H.,199S
After New Hampshire court had issued protective order prohibiting defendant's harassment of
his sister, defendant's threatening and profane remarks directed toward his sister at courthouse
in Maine were intentional violation of New Hampshire court order, for which Ncw Hampshire
courts had jurisdiction to punish as criminal contempt.
C
People v. Taylor, 670 N.Y.S.2d 732
N.Y.Co.,1998
County court had power to sanction with contempt charge defendant who violated temporary
order of protection previously issued in criminal action by a local criminal court; county court
assumed Jurisdiction over all conditions of defendant's release when it divested local criminal
court of jurisdiction, and local criminal court's protection order survived defendant's indict-
mcnt and arraignment in county court, such that its subsequcnt violation was a crime. McKin-
ney's CPL 530.13.
H
City ofSeaule v. May, 256 P.3d 1161
c=>315PPROTECTlON OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
(;;::;;>315PIISccurity or Order for Peace or Protection
E>315PII( E)Violations, Contempt, and Conviction
C=3l5PklQlk. Defenses.
Wash.,2011
Page I
The underlying domestic violence protection order was not void, and thus, the collateral bar
rule precluded defendant's challenge to the validity of the underlying protection order in pro-
sc(;ution of defendant for violating that order; superior court possessed jurisdiction to issue
permanent domestic violence protection order, any defects within the order simply went to
whether the order was merely erroneous, however flagrant, and could not be coJlatem(Jy at-
tacked. and defendant's assertion of factual inadequacy did not go to the superior court's juris-
diction to issue a penl1anent domestic violence protection order. West's RCWA 26.50.020(5).
H
In re S.H., 904 N.Y.S.2d 653
N.Y.Fam.,2010
Father could not be held in contempt of tempor.:uy order of protection on behalf of employees
of a foster f,.:are agency where, at the time the aIleged violation occurred, agency had not
served a copy of the order upon the father, and court lacked jurisdiction to grant the tempor-
ary order of protection in the first place.
H
State v. Winter, 979 A,2d 608
Conn.App.,2009
The defendant's assertion that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the protective order that
he or she is charged with violating is in actuality a challenge to the underlying factual findings
made by the court in issuing the protective order; substantively. it is not a challenge to the
court's Jurisdiction.
C
Shewarega v. Yegzaw, 947 A.2d 47
D.C.,2008
Defendant was not entitled to attack tbe validity of civil protection order (CPO) that had been
issued against him pursuant to the Intrafamily Offenses Act at trial in \\lhich he was charged
with criminal contempt of such order, on basis that the CPO wali void for want jurisdiction
; even if defendant's relationship with petitioner could not have supported the Issuance of a
CPO under the Act, defendant was still Obligated to obey the court order unless and until it
was reversed or vacated, on pain of being found in contempt. D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed.
16 1001(5).
:9 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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[0 re Sanderson. 286 N.W. 198
Mich.,1939
Page 2
Where a defendant found gUIlty or threatening to kill to \;.o;rt .. ;n pen-on fuilcd to p"y or
furnish a required recognizance to keep the peace, a justice of the peace had Jurisdiction, in
view of the common law and legislative history. to sentence defendant to the common jail for
nine months or until defendant entered into the recognizance and paid costs, notwithstanding
statute limiting jurisdiction of justices to offenses wherein punishment was by fine not ex-
ceeding $100 or imprisonment in county jail not exceeding three months or by both.
Comp.Gen,Laws 1929, 1738817393, 17396, 17397, 17426; Const. art. 7, I, 16, 18.
END OF DOCUMENT
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People v. Sylla, 792 N.Y.S.2d 764
N. Y.Sup.,2005
-:'-1
Language in statute defining offense of criminal contempt in the second degree which indic-
ated that proscribed conduct did not constitute offense in cases involving or growing out of
labor disputes created "proviso," to be raised by defendant as defense, rather than element of
offense to be aUeged and proved by state, and therefore information that charged defendant
with attempted criminal contempt in the second degree was not jurisdictionally defective due
to absence of allegation that underlying aUeged disobedience of order of protection did ?ot in-
volve or grow out of labor dispute. McKinney's Penal Law 215.50, subd. 3.See publICation
Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.
Turner v. State, 2003 WL 22240324
T ex.App, Tyler ,2003
Protective order, entered pursuant to family code, prohibiting defendant from going within
200 yards of complainant's residence, her place of employment or her location was not void
and thus trial court had jurisdiction to convict defendant of violation of the order, although a
subsequent order vacating the same was issued, where the protecti ve order declared that issu-
ing court had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, and vacating order did not al-
lege HOy jurisdictional defects in the protective order. V.T.C.A" Penal Code 25.07;
V.T.C.A., Family Code 85.009, 87.001.
H
Olson v, State, 77 P.3d 15
Alaska,App.,2003
Conviction for violating long-term domestic violence protective order was subject to collateral
attack, irrespective of whether defendant had notice of order's existence and tenns thereof,
where issuing court lacked jurisdiction to issue such order,
I>
State v. Noah, 9 P.3d 85&
Wash,App.Div. I ,2000
Father of psychotherapy patient, who was found in contempt for violating antiharassment or-
der regarding his opposition to psychotherapist's use of recovered memory therdpy, could not
collaterally attack thc constitutionality of the antiharassment order in the contempt proceed-
ings, where issuance of the antiharassment order was within the district court' s Jurisdiction.
West's RCWA 10. 14.150.
C
State v, Crown, 726 A.2d 493
Vt.,1999
Indefinite duration of protection-from-abuse order was not a jurisdictional defect. and could
not be raised as defense to criminal prosecution for violating the order. 13 V.S.A. 1030(a).
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State v. Mott, 692 A.2d 360
Yt. , 1997
Page 3
Trial court's failure to make findings of fact before issuing abuse order did not risc
to level of jurisdictional defect that permitted of order to col-
latcrally attack order to allege that it was issued In violatIOn of hIs due process nghts. even as-
suming that such findings were required. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; 13 V.S.A. 1030; 15
1103(c, h).
i>
State v. Mott, 692 A.2d 360
ge::rt,s treatment of judgment extending abuse prevention order as a judgmcnt issued by
default based on earlier affidavit of defendant's former wife did not fise to level of
tional defect t.hat convicted of order to collaterally attack order
to allege that It was Issued m violatIOn of his due process rights. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend 14;
15 1103(c, h).
H
U.S. v. Casciano, 927 F.Supp. 54
crime of crossing a state line. with to engage in conduct in violation of
protection order. if court issuing order faIled to obtam personal over defend-
ant by service of process, then order was iOvalid and prosecution cannot survive. 18 U.S.C.A.

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State v. Sundquist, 542 N.W.2d 90
N.D.,\996
State's failure to attach copy of statute defining stalking and its penalties to domcstic protec-
tion order did not justify dismissal of charges for violating order; requirement of attachment
was procedural. not jurisdictional. NDCC 12.1-17-07.1, 14-07. 1-03.1, 14-07.1-06.
i>
State v. Nodes, 538 N.W.2d 158
M inn.App., 1995
Guardian's purported lack of standing to obtain harassment restraining order for adult ward
was not jurisdictional defect that would make harassment restraining order unenforceable.
M.S.A. 609.784, subd. 2.
i>
State v. Andrasko. 454 N.W.2d 648
Minn.App.,1990
Vacation of domestic abuse protection order after husband violated it did not relieve husband
of consequences of his acts; although protective order was found by court of appeals to be
wrongfully issued, trial court had Jurisdiction to enter order in thc first instance.
'f:i 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. I
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In re Shirley, 28 A.3d 506
(;=3 I 5PPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
=315PIISecurity or Order for Pcace or Protection
E);;;.>31SPII( E)Violations. Contempt, and Conviction
=315Pk 102Proceedings in General
.='315Pk 1 03k. In general.
D.C.,2011
Page I
The State was not required to establish that fonner girlfriend was residing. working, or attend-
ing in district, or that the alleged violations of a civil protcctio.n order (CPO)
in dlstnct, for the court to have jurisdiction to hold defendant in crimmal contempt for VIOlat-
ing a CPO; statutory geographical limitations applied to the filing of a petition for a CPO, and
statutes placed no geographical limitations on where an alleged violation of a CPO by
the Superior Court must have occurred for the court to have the power to punish contempt of
the order. D.C. Official Code, 200 1 Ed. 16-1006.
H
Bergquist v. Cesario, 844 A.2d 100
R,I.,2004
The Superior Court had jurisdiction to hear the contempt motion filed by girlfriend's ex-
husband, which sought to have her boyfriend held in contempt for violating a restraining or-
der; action commenced when ex-husband sought injunctive relief, the general laws vested the
Superior Court with exclusive original jurisdiction over equitable matters, and boyfriend did
not contest the court's jurisdiction and obtained his own relief from the court. Gen.Laws
1956, I 3,
Turner v. State, 2003 WL 22240324
Tex.App.Tyler.2003
Protective order, entered pursuant to family code, prohibiting defendant fr?m going within
200 yards of complainant's residence, her place of employment or her location was not void
and thus trial court had jurisdiction to convict defendant of violation of the order, although a
subsequent order vacating the same was issued, where the protective order declared issu-
ing court had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter. and vacating order dId not al-
lege any Jurisdictional defects in the protective order. V.T.C.A., Penal Code 25.07;
V.T.C.A., Family Code 85.009,87.001.
C
People v. Perez. 734 N.Y.S.2d 398
N, Y.Co.,2001
Once "duly served," an individual violating an order of protection may be prosecuted for
criminal contempt. with jurisdiction vesting within any of the 62 counties of New York,
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END OF DOCUMENT
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Page 2
based upon the geographic location in which such violation is committed. McKinney's CPL
530.13.
C
People v. Taylor, 670 N.Y.S.2d 732
N,Y,Co.,1998
County court had power to sanction with contempt charge defendant who violated temporary
order of protection previously issued in criminal action by a local criminal court; county court
assumed Jurisdiction ovc:r all conditions of dcfendant's release when it divested local crimi?al
court of jurisdiction, and local criminal court's protection order survived defendant's indIct-
ment and arraignment in county court, such tbat its subsequent violation was a crime. McKin-
ney's CPL 530.13.
C
Henlcy v. Iowa Dist. Coun for Emmet County, 533 N.W.2d 199
lowa,1995
Summarily jailing domestic violence victim for violating no-contact provision of protective
order directed against ber male companion did not violate due process, so as to deprive court
of Jurisdiction to hold her in contempt; police officers took victim into custody under sum-
mary contempt procedures authorized by Domestic Abuse. Act. authorizing immediate cus-
todial arrest of person believed to have violated domestic Violence protective order. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amcnd. 14; LeA 236.11, 236.14, 665.7,
H
Wells v. State, 654 So.2d 145

Circuit court properly exercised its jurisdiction to bear contempt proceedings for alleged vi-
olation of injunction for protection against domestic violence; administrative order pursuant to
which county court was authorized to hear such proceedings could not deprive the circuit
court of its jurisdiction to enforce compliance with injunction against domestic violence
through civil or indirect criminal contempt proceedings. F.S.1993. 741.30(9)(a).
H
People v. Halper, 619 KY.S.2d 308
N.Y.App.Div.2.Dcpt., 1994
Court which entered tcmporary order of protection does not have exclusive jurisdiction in
prosecution for criminal contempt arising from violation of that order. McKinney's CPL
530.13.
C
Com. v. Burton, 624 A.2d I3R
Pa.Super.,1993
Specific provision of t.he Protection From Abuse Act, vesting in the court .of
common pleas to adjudIcate and impose punishment for indirect crimmal contempt of order IS-
sued pursuant thereto, takes precedence over broader and more general language of Phil-
adelphia municipal court statute and rules of criminal procedure which apply to commission
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__ ___ _____ _ __ _________ _____ _______ ___ ____ __ __ ____ l ____ __ _________________________________ __ _
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Page 3
of any criminal offense with penalty not exceeding five years; the criminal nile pr?v.ision ref-
erencing right to jury [fiul upon <lppo:al followins, sentence by mUOlCIpal court
judge is rendered nugatory by Legislature's abolitIOn of such right in Protection From Abuse
Act context. I Pa.C.S.A. 1933; 23 Pa.C.S.A. 6114(b); Const. Art. 5, 10; Rules
Crim.Proc., Rule 6006(a)(2), 42 Pa.C.S.A.; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
H
Hutcheson v. Iowa Dist. Court for Lee County, 480 N.W.2d 260
lowa,1992
District court has subject matter jurisdiction to find nonparty in contempt for aiding and abct
ting party in violating domestic abuse no-contact order. i.e.A. 236.14, 665.1 et seq.
C
People \1. J11oo, 570 N.Y.S.2d 427
N.Y.Chy.Crim.Ct.,1991 . ' .
Criminal court had e)(c1usivc jurisdiction to try charge of cnmmal contempt brought against
defendant for violation of earlier family court order of protection where complainant had e)(er-
cised her right to choose criminal court as forum for related "family fam-
ily court had power to enforce its own orders of protection issued in child protective proceed-
ings, it lacked contempt power where another statutory remedy was available. McKinney's
Penal Law 2[5.50, subd. 3; McKinney'S CPL 100.07,530.11, subd. \; McKinney'S Fam-
ily Court Act 156, RI2, subds. 1,3, I072(b).
END OF DOCUMENT
1(:, 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 2
tion of conduct of defendant that violated it could have comprised sufficient information for
jurlsdktlonal purposes. McKinney'S CPL 70.10(2), 100.15(3), I00.40(1)(b, c); McKin-
ney's Penal Law 215.50(3).
i>
People v. Boyce, 886 N.Y.S.2d 329
N.Y .City .Crim.Ct.,2009
Allegations by deponent police officer as stated in accusatory instrument, as to whether order
of protection had been issued and was in effect on day in question, without officer's firsthand
knowledge of order or proceeding at which it purportedly had been issued or explanation of
basis for allegations regarding order, such as informant showed copy to him, were hearsay that
made accusatory instrument deficient, but that deficiency did not implicate jurisdiction of
court at pleading stage. Mt.:Kinncy's CPL 70. 10(2), 100. 15(3), 100.40(1 )(b, c): McKinney'S
Penal Law 215.50(3).
p-
AIi)( A. v. Erika H., 845 N.Y,S.2d 306

Family Court exceeded irs authority in finding a violation of order of protection against moth
cr, extending that order for five years, and enlarging it to encompass the subject child, where
mother was not served with the petition until she was actually summoned into the courtroom
that very day, and, even had the petition requested an extension of the order of protection.
which it did not, the court lacked jurisdiction to act permanently on father's petition the day it
was filed, before proper service was made. McKinney's Family Court Act 826.
H
People v. McPherson, 819 N.Y.S.2d 366
N.Y.App.Div.3.Dept.,2006
Information charging defendant with second-degree criminal contempt premised on his viola-
tion of order of protection was not rendered jurisdictionally defective by prosecution's failure
to allege that incident underlying charge did not involve labor dispute. McKinney's Penal Law

H
People v. Sylla, 792 N.Y.S.2d 764
N.Y.Sup.,2005
Language in statute defining offense of criminal contempt in the second degree which
ated that proscribed conduct did not constitute offense in cases involving or growing out of
labor disputes created "proviso," to be raised by defendant as defense, rather than element of
offense to be alleged and proved by state, and therefore information that charged defendant
with attempted criminal contempt in the second degree was not jurisdictionally defective due
to absence of allegation that underl yi ng alleged disobedience of order of protection did not in-
volve or grow out of labor dispute. McKinney's Penal LilW 215.50, subd. 3.See publication
Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.
c
2013 Thomson Remers. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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Custom 10 Headnotes
C
People v. Starkweather, 919 N.Y.S.2d 749
(:=315PPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
;=3 I 5PIISecurity or Order for Peace or Protection
C=315PII( E)Violations, Contempt, and Conviction
=315Pk 102Proceedings in General
04k. Pleading, notice. and process.
Page I
N.Y.App.Div.4.0ept.,2011 . .
Superior court information (SCI) charging. defendant With counts of cnm-
inal contempt was jurisdictionally sufficient even It did not allege he had
knowledge of the order of protection when he violated It by having contact with vic-
tim; the language used in the SCI, stating that defendant "intentionally disobeyed a mandate
of a court.an Order of Protection," coofonned with the applicable statute. and, in any case, use
of the word "intentionally" was sufficient to aUege that defendant knew of the order's e)(ist-
eoce. McKinney's Penal Law 215.50(3).
H
People v. Harris, 899 N.Y.S.2d 519
attached mi:sdemean,or infonnations charging defend-
ant with criminal contempt were not certified did not render mformations jurisdictionally de-
fective. McKinney's Penal Law 215.50(3).
C
State v. Tower. 984 A.2d 40
each charging defendant with committing a felony by violating a no-
conlact order prohibiting him from having contact with his girlfriend until expiration
of sentence on conviction for domestic assault, were sufficient to mvoke the Superior Court's
subjeet.matter jurisdiction, despite defendant's contention that sentence 00 conviction f?r do-
mestic assault had expired; jury's determination as to the status of the no-contact order d!d not
impact the issue of whether the Superior Court was cloaked with subject-matter jurisdiction
to hear the action. Gen.Laws 1956, 8-2-15.
i>
People v. Boyce, 886 N.Y.S.2d 329
N.Y.City.Crim.Ct.,2009
Government's failure to submit copy of order of protection in support of allegations was not
jurisdictional defect in and of itself, as to eharge of criminal in the second degree,
particularly where valid order of protection could have been initIally issued verbally; suffi-
cient non-hearsay allegations as to its effectiveness, defendant's knowledge of it, and descrip-
---- -----i
People v. Frazier, 759 N.Y.S.2d 631
N.Y.City,200J
Page 3
Accusatory instrument charging criminal contempt in the second degree, based on an alleged
violation of a no contact order of protection, was not jurisdictionally defective in failing to
expressly state that underlying factual assertions did not involve a labor dispUle; reference to
labor disputes in statute under which defendant was charged was a proviso, rather than an ex-
ception, and thus did nOI have to be explicitly alleged in the indictment. McKinney's Penal
Law 215.50; McKinney's CPL 100.15.
H
Batey v. State, 755 So.2d 593
Ala.Crim.App., I 999
Absent indictment or complaint giving fonner husband notice of criminal charges against him,
trial court did not have jurisdiction to render judgment of conviction for violation of protec-
tion-from-abuse order entered in connection with divorce proceeding, or to impose Ii
12-month sentence for that conviction; most that court could have done, absent an indictment
or a complaint, was to find fonner husband in contempt of court, for violating a court order,
and to sentence him to jail for five days and fine him $100. Code 1975. 12-11 -30(5),
30-5-9; Rul es Crim.Proc., Rule 2.1.
END OF DOCUMENT
0 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

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