ONG CHIA V.

REPUBLIC Facts: Ong Chia filed for Filipino citizenship in 1989, which was granted by the Trial Court (Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato) but on appeal by the State in the CA, was reversed, hence this petition for review to the SC. The state contends, on evidence presented for the 1st time on appeal, that Ong Chia failed to 1) Declare names in which he has been known 2) Declare his former residence, 3) Lived a irreproachable life, 3) Had lucrative income, and 5) failed to support his petition with appropriate documentary evidence In contention is C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner stated his qualifications as required in section 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in section 3 of the law Issues/HELD: DECISION OF CA AFFIRMED 1) WoN CA can deny citizenship based on evidence not forming parts of the case. YES 2) WoN Ong Chia stated the names he is known in his petition. NO 3) WoN former places of residence were mentioned. NO 4) WoN his income was lucrative. NO Ratio: 1) Although Rule 132, section 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states that, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered, however, Rule 143 of the same code states that: These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. a. Naturalization is strictly construed against the applicant and rigidly enforced. The State may use the same documents to revoke citizenship later on. b. Reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. 2) It was included in a petition in 1977, but for his petition in question in 1989, his name Loreto Ong Chia was not

mentioned. 3) As required by Section 7, such former place of residence must be mentioned. Inclusion of the same in the Certificate of Immigration is not sufficient nor substantial compliance. 4) His income was only P5,000 and thus a charity or a public charge. PEOPLE V. ADOR Facts: On March 10, 1997, in Pacol, Naga City, Rodolfo Ompong Chavez and Abe Cuya were killed by gunshot wounds; the latter dying instantly, while the former died en route to the hospital. Chavezs dying declaration pointed to the Adors as assailants. The trial Court initially acquitted Diosdado Sr., Reynaldo, Allan, and Rosalino Ador(s), but later on convicted Godofredo Ador and Diosdado Ador III of Murder, acquitting further Diosdado Ador, Jr. Issues/Held: ADORS ACQUITTED 1) WoN the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the accused. NO 2) WoN the custodial investigation admissions were admissible. NO Ratio: 1) The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. It may be the basis of a conviction so long as the combination of all the circumstances proven produces a logical conclusion, which suffices to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the theory that all the accused are guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that they are innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Thus, for circumstantial evidence to suffice, (1) there should be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances provided by the prosecution are doubtful as to the guilt of the Adors, thereby not sufficient to be a basis for conviction. a. The testimony of Calsis and failure to identify the Adors

in open court. b. The recovered bullet slug form Chavezs head is confused between a .357 Magnum or a .38 caliber paltik. c. The dying declaration not identifying clearly the assailant, only stated Ador. d. 2) Unless assisted by counsel, or a written waiver from the accused is secured to do so without counsel, confessions and admissions in custodial investigation are barred from admissibility as evidence: Art. III, Sec. 12(1) and (3), 1987 Constitution, any waiver of these rights should be in writing and undertaken with the assistance of counsel (Aballe v. People). PEOPLE V. DOMNGCIL Facts: On August 12, 1994, in Laoag City, Belray Oliver, an employee of Ferds upholstery store was asked by Manny Domingcil if he knew anyone who wanted to buy 1 Kilo of Marijuana for P500. Oliver went to the police to report and on the same day, a buy-bust operation was conducted and Domingcil was arrested for delivery/sale of Marijuana under Section 2, Article II of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act) in which he was convicted. Issue/Held: DOMINGCIL IS GUILTY 1) WoN Domingcils testimony has any value. NO 2) WoN receipt of the P500 bill was material. NO Ratio: 1) Domingcils alibi is of no moment. It is axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself such that common experience and observation of mankind lead to the inference of its probability under the circumstances. In criminal prosecution, the court is always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable and in harmony with the usual course of human experience and not by mere conjecture or speculation. Testimonies that do not adhere to this standard are necessarily accorded little weight or credence. a. Domingcil stated that it was Oliver who told him to buy Marijuana in order to help some policemen get promoted is preposterous. b. It is unnatural for someone (Oliver) to induce a stranger

(Domingcil) to purchase Marijuana or perform a crime since they only met for the 1st time. 2) The law defines deliver as a persons act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another with or without consideration. Considering that the appellant was charged with the sale and the delivery of prohibited drugs, the consummation of the crime of delivery of marijuana may be sufficiently established even in the absence of the marked money. CUSTODIO V. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: This is a Motion To Re-Open Case With Leave Of Court filed by petitioners who were convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 (September 28, 1990) for the double murder of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983 based on newly discovered evidence, failure to choose counsel, testimony under duress, and willful suppression of evidence, among other things. In 2004, The petitioners, assisted by the Public Attorneys Office, now want to present the findings of the forensic group to this Court and ask the Court to allow the re-opening of the cases and the holding of a third trial to determine the circumstances surrounding the death of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman. Issue/Held: MOTION DISMISSED CASE; NOT REOPENED. 1) WoN there is newly discovered evidence to merit re-opening of the case. NO 2) WoN Failure to choose counsel is tantamount to re-opening the case. NO Ratio: 1) According to the code: a. Section 1. New Trial or reconsideration. At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration. b. Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds: i. (a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed during the trial; ii. (b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which

the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. Since the evidence to be introduced is not new (only a re-hash of the ones discussed in the case) and that it was not obtained with reasonable diligence (acting reasonably and in good faith), the same cannot be used to re-open the case. The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly discovered evidence as petitioners failed to show that it was impossible for them to secure an independent forensic study of the physical evidence during the trial of the double murder case. It appears from their report that the forensic group used the same physical and testimonial evidence proferred during the trial, but made their own analysis and interpretation of said evidence. The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence. The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. Berry Rule: before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly discovered evidence could have been very well presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered newly discovered. 2) In criminal as well as civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact that blunders and mistakes may have been made in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court, as a result of the ignorance, inexperience, or incompetence of counsel, does not furnish a ground for a new trial (People v. Umali).