Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs.

COMELEC CITATION: 248 SCRA 300 FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. Aquino v. COMELEC Facts: Petitioner Agapito Aquino was disqualified from being proclaimed as the winner of the Makati City Congressional elections because his opponents were questioning his residency requirements. Comelec contend that in order that he could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, Aquino must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. To prove his residence at Makati, petitioner presented an alleged lease agreement of a condominium in the area.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte. HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons: 1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte; 2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

Issue: WON leasing a condominium unit is enough to prove residence, for election purposes. Ruling: Residence, as used in election laws, always mean domicile. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondents intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year because he has other residences in Manila or Quezon City. While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile in Tarlac) indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence 27 is not to acquires new residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. 28 The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification sentimental, actual or otherwise with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioners claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati.

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Petitioner challenged a resolution issued by the COMELEC.Petitioner seeks the disqualification of certain major political parties inthe 2001 party-list elections arguing that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented and notthe mainstream political parties, the nonmarginalized or overrepresented. Issues: (1) Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections (2) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations Held: Under the Constitution and RA 7941, major political parties cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections merely on theground that they are political parties. But while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with thedeclared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. Banat v. COMELEC Facts: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats." BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88. On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.

declareunconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.

Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling. In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the partylist system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

Issue: Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008: 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling? 2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? 3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional? 4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated? 5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.) The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC with regard to the computation of seat allotments and the participation of major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for the formula propounded by the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that my interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major political parties in the election of party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear

Held: WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We

expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political parties made it to the top 50. These seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties (including those whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of the major parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat their members as party-list representatives. In contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of the 155 parties garnered more than 2%. In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system. IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political parties into the party-list system.

the elected representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the Philippines; 6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and 7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented. However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative. It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending condition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional provisions remain effective at all times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular legislative enactment that renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual. Lidasan v Comelec G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967 Sanchez, J.: Facts: 1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces. 2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. 3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation." 4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the

In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.) However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible 2% threshold vote required for entitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the House of Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This minimum vote requirement fixed at 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party list system presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared constitutional policy, as well as the legislative objective expressed in the enabling law, to allow the peoples broadest representation in Congress,the raison detre for the adoption of the party-list system. Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Courts decision in Veterans Federation Party, we see that in the 14th Congress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list representatives, using the Veterans formula. But that figure (of 55) can never be realized, because the 2% threshold vote requirement makes it mathematically impossible to have more than 50 seats. After all, the total number of votes cast for the party-list system can never exceed 100%. Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold vote requirement. The need for such a minimum vote requirement was explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a minimum vote requirement is needed -1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position; 2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very low, from participating in the elections; 3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system; 4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the system; 5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of

Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes

barrios located in another province Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title YES. RA 4790 is null and void

. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated.

. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.