Spring 2013

The Great Democratic Experiment: Two American Republics Guided by Montesquieu and Hume
Luke Maier Duke University
Abstract In the infancy of democratic regime theory, David Hume and le Barron de Montesquieu offered two conflicting blueprints for how republics should be constructed. While Montesquieus thesis pervaded democratic theory for most of the 18th century, it was swiftly and thoroughly overthrown by Humes thesis when bold American statesmen established the worlds most experimental regime: a broad federalist republic. Historians have largely overlooked the profound influence Montesquieu and Hume exerted on the development of the republican structure of the United States. Drawing from primary sources and prominent relevant literature, this paper offers a novel analysis of why the revolutionary framers initially clung to Montesquieus thesis, and why, later, the constitutional framers embraced Humes alternative. The paper traces artifacts of these influences in various times of American History and how they demonstrate the resilience of the federalist republic. This shift in democratic regime theory should be analyzed in order to better understand the origins of the adventurous and wide-reaching federalism of United States.

Introduction Background Americas unique form of republican federalism is an enduring constellation of political philosophies that aligned under unusual circumstances. Political historians often overlook two of democratic political theorys brightest stars, Montesquieu and Hume. Drawing from the work of these and other guiding lights, the framers of Americas two regime structures, the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, sought to chart a course for their nations government that gingerly navigated the tension between empowering negative liberties while operating within the constraints of political reality. Each framing of the American republic struggled with where to anchor the nations regime on the governance continuum between decentralization and federalism. Following the American Revolution, the framers favored decentralization. But, as the efficacy of the Articles of Confederation faded in the late 1780s, statesmen

recast their searched for guidance on how to salvage the fledgling democracy. In the era of the American Revolution, most political theorists in particular Montesquieu argued that a republican regime was limited by insurmountable structural and philosophical flaws. Some skeptics of representative layering in government believed all republican regimes were structurally doomed to dissolution. For example, Rousseau dispelled the notion of representative government all together, arguing that direct democracy was the only way to ensure citizens interests determined government action (Pateman, 1975). To this end, Montesquieu offered his then widely accepted thesis on the rpublique federative, which asserted that only confederations of small and local republics could pass the test of time (C. Montesquieu, Cohler, Miller, & Stone, 1989). The histories of many democratic experiments before the rise of the US seemed to support this thesis, and the Revolutionary framers treated 1

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it paradigmatically. Yet as the silent canons of time wore on, the decentralization Montesquieu advocated seemed to be the root of the problems undermining governance under Articles of Confederation. In contrast to Montesquieus theory on small republics, David Hume asserted republics can be stably and fruitfully constructed to unite vast, diverse lands under a central federalist-republican regime (D. Hume & Haakonssen, 1994). In his seminal work on this subject, Idea on the Perfect Commonwealth, Hume wrote that republican regimes should be divided into a hundred counties, and that each county in turn be divided into one hundred parishes, making in all ten thousand minor districts in the state in order to protect from internal divisions (Ibid). This paper argues federalism in the United States began as a great and adventurous experiment in political thought that was guided by Humes thesis on broad federalist republics. Purpose Volumes of analysis have been written about the philosophical forces that provoked the Founding Fathers to adopt sweeping constitutional federalism (e.g., see (Cohen, 1995; Eidelberg, 1968; McGuire & Ohsfeldt, 1984), so this paper shall not attempt to contribute to that extent. However, as of this writing, there seems to be no explicit analysis of how early American political theory interacted with Montesquieu and Humes theses as practical theories of regime structure. Thus, this paper will analyze why and to what extent Humes thesis on the broad republic thoroughly eclipsed Montesquieus rpublique fdrative in American regime theory and early political thought. This paper examines: first, an overview of Montesquieu and Humes ideas on democracy; second, why Montesquieus thesis dominated republican thought; third, what factors provoked Humes thesis to eclipse Montesquieus; and finally, how Montesquieus thesis in the American context faired over time.

Definitions In this paper, federalism will refer to a structure of government whereby there is a division of sovereign power between state and federal authorities, with local sovereignty inferior to centralized, federal authority and regulation. Confederalism will refer to a structure of government whereby state sovereignties possess sovereign power superior to that of federal authorities. Republicanism will refer to a structure of democracy whereby citizens wills are embodied and acted upon by representatives they elect to a central government. And finally, federalist-republicanism (or republican federalism) will refer to a tiered structure of representative government whereby there is a centralized republican regime that reigns over lesser state republics. Experimental Beginnings Though Montesquieu and Hume were most notably philosophers, they both offered complex rationally and empirically based theories of republican regime structure. Hume was particularly noteworthy in 18th century political philosophy for his belief in political empiricism, which, he claimed, allowed one to understand the applicability of political principles. In line with Scottish Enlightenments tenets of realism but in contrast to most Enlightenment philosophies, Hume argued empirical lenses of impressions and ideas should be used to derive rationalist regime theories that find the elusive balance between efficacy and morality (Werner, 1972). Montesquieu also believed empirical and historical considerations should be considered when discerning constrains on the nature of law (C. Montesquieu & Richter, 1977). However, Hume and Montesquieu similarly believed regimes should not be institutors of morality in their societies, for inherent structural constraints limited the viability of philosophy, religion, and natural law in governmental activity. The American framers presupposed the desirability of democracy. Their main debates were over

Spring 2013 democratic mechanisms. This allowed them to consult political theories that held democracy was undesirable, yet feasible; both Hume and Montesquieu had certain protests with democracy (Adair, 1951), and Hume argued democracies and republics were not suitable everywhere, especially Britain which he wrote should cherish and improve ancient government avoiding dangerous novelties (David Hume, 1910). Efficacy breaks down when democracies give people of one locale too much influence over vast swaths of other locales; such is the case, Hume argued, when pure democracies are implemented. Early on, the founders looked to this argument and others to conclude a republican government was more desirable than democratic constructs argued for by Rousseau. Yet the extent to which American republicanism was federalist remained in question amongst political theorists long after ratification. Starting after ratification of the new constitution, Americas foray into the political unknown marked the first instance any republican and federalist government planted its flag across such a vast territory. Many contemporary political theorists embraced Montesquieus concept of the rpublique fdrative as political reality (Bruno, 2010). The strong deference to Montesquieus republican structure discouraged further contemplation of creating immense republics. At that time, the scant examples of instituted democracy, including cantonal Switzerland and pastoral Poland, all followed Montesquieus rpublique fdrative, such that large federations only existed as figments of America and Humes imaginations. In his long unpublished 1943 thesis for Yale University (which was one of the first analyses to document the relationship between the Scottish Enlightenment and the American Revolution), Douglas Adair summated this sentiment, writing:
To both Adams and Hamilton, history proved that eventually the American people would have to return to a system of mixed or limited monarchy-so great was the size of the country, so diverse were the interests to be reconciled that no other system could be adequate in securing both liberty and justice. (Adair, 1957)

Hume is not often credited with providing a significant impetus to federalisms victory in Americas constitutional construction, but his influence cannot be underestimated once one examines his linkage to Americas constitutional founders. Humes thesis gave a vital basis for Americas political transition away from Montesquieuian republic. Although Montesquieus thesis was periodically cited to defend states rights or support devolution of federal power, Humes stance that a large republic is possible proved both more influential in federalisms adoption and truthful in Americas history. Montesquieus Sway and the Articles of Confederation Before the Constitution, most political theorists held Montesquieus rpublique federative as political truth, or as Patrick Henry said, a political axiom (Ibid). Existing evidence, simple logic, and ingrained presumption all garnered widespread credence in Montesquieus thesis. To build a vast democracy seemed far beyond what the newly re-emerging values of liberty and individual rational equality could logistically handle and morally uphold in government. Until the Articles of Confederation were pronounced dead by American political framers, Montesquieus republican theory made America hesitant to espouse a federalist republic. Americas jejunely united states feared treading too far off the beaten path, in terms of the extent to which federalism housed the internal republican structure. Montesquieu claimed there is an inverse relationship between a republics virtue and its scale, such that increases in one forsake the other (C. Montesquieu, 1999). A rpublique federative, Montesquieu 3

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argued, enjoys the interior advantages of republican government and the exterior force of Monarchy (Ibid). As to the domestic advantages, Montesquieu embodied many contemporary political philosophies, which reasoned republican government makes representative government feasible and satisfactory to society. He concluded monarchys greatest societal benefit is its ability to effectively maintain its nations military, which he described as the only universally shared interest one which monarchies pursued to spring their pride (Bruno, 2010). Drawing from Hobbes social contract, Montesquieu thought monarchies could be tyrannical since citizens interest in safety normally outweighs their need for social contentment (C. Montesquieu & Richter, 1977). Thus, Montesquieu asserted republics gain the normative benefit of monarchies while avoiding monarchical tyranny. The revolutionary framers (here referring to the framers of the Articles of Confederation who zealously held to revolutionary ideas) chose to incorporate Montesquieus beliefs in the Articles of Confederation, for a primary role of its central authority was to maintain a defense alliance between the several states. Beyond appealing to reticence of military defense, Montesquieu, in large part, persuaded the revolutionary framers that small confederated republics maximized governments connection to the public good, which he framed as an aggregation of localized interests (Bruno, 2010). Although the concept of the public good was revised later after Montesquieus republicanism lost its primacy, American revolutionaries adopted Montesquieus notion that the public good was better felt, better known and lies nearer each citizen when republics encompassed societies of naturally small scale (C. Montesquieu et al., 1989). This, he argued, allowed authorities to experience local hardship themselves, and thus actualize the origin and solution of the impediments to public good. Revolutionaries further beheld his belief that this political closeness supported greater accountability, for there

were less government layers to hide governmental failures (Bruno, 2010). On a national level, since the single universal interest of defense and all local interests were being satisfied, the holistic picture of the general public good seemed almost ideal. Montesquieus rpublique federative seemed to answer the considerable diversity of the states with adequate political flexibility to fulfill regional interests. Sectarian disparities between the states further belied centralization and served to preclude consideration of substantial centralization, and this friction continued to bubble up even after Montesquieuian republicanism was no longer heeded. Regional economies and localized political concerns, such as slavery, seemed impossible to politically generalize, as was necessary under any federalist unity. Democracies contemporary with the Articles of Confederation gave ample evidence to early American political theoreticians that a confederated republic was the ceiling of functional democracy. San Marino, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Venice (Levy, 2006) and to some extent Poland and Denmark were the only extant democracies; this instigated a presumption, that since democracy had not naturally spread beyond the limits of rpublique federative it most likely could not do so stably (Levy, 2006). Additionally solidifying Montesquieus claim before the Constitution, the Greek city-states flirtations with democracies seemed to fail to mature into large representative systems once their boarders were lengthened. If Germany and Italy could not centralize their states under strong authoritarian regimes, which were widely known as most effective at political consolidation, it seemed implausible the 13 states could under more volatile republican principles. Yet perhaps the greatest ammunition for rpublique federative historical arguments laid in ancient Rome, where broad-based republican authority had been attempted disastrously. The relatively swift withering of the republic into the Caesars correlated closely with Romes republican expansion; as such, Montesquieu

Spring 2013 and others perceived the failure of Roman republicanism as a twofold warning for 18th century republican ambitions (Levy, 2006). First, it led the revolutionary framers to believe that expanded republics do not structurally last due to inherent administrative and defense logistics. Second, it ominously suggested that such systems were vulnerable to usurpation stemming from over-centralization and megalomania, as Julius Caesars authoritarian reign and the ensuing centuries of dictatorship seemed to foreshadow. Hence, the revolutionary framers found history substantiated Montesquieus rpublique federative concept. However, the nation began to question the formerly unquestioned Montesquieuian rpublique federative concept once the Union under the Articles of Confederation weakened. Although states discovered modest success in their independent republican structures, factionalism began to gouge a rift between the states; the lack of central executive power also proved fatal. Toward the close of the decade, consensus was building that Montesquieus thesis was needlessly limiting, and that America could not subsist without a realignment of the sovereignty structures. This is when the American political theory plunged into uncharted waters. American Republicanism Turns to Hume As the confederated states became restless to expand and rule of law received declining respect as Shays Rebellion illustrates, Montesquieus thesis on the rpublique federative soon lost its persuasiveness. After living under a Montesquieuian style republic for a mere six years, political thought quickly sought new inspiration for a national regime. In the mid-1780s, American political theorists increasingly found their questions concerning where to take American republicanism answered by David Hume. There were several evolutions in Americas political atmosphere that lifted the founders philosophical stricture on considering Humes republican structure. First, as revolutionary fervor receded, American political leaders became less idealistic and more pragmatic about government (Smith, 2011). Second, the publics fear of tyranny, although equally as strong as during the revolution, had shifted from fearing monarchial and minority tyrants to fearing faction and majority tyrants (Ibid). Third, states were already establishing tiered republican institutions, which created governance layers within each state republic that utilized representation from the county to the state level. Along with other forces, these internal developments set the political environment under which the founders became willing to deliberate on Humes concept of republicanism. As the revolutionary fervor that deterred the revolutionary framers from considering Humean structure was calmed by time, the door opened for the constitutional framers (i.e., not the revolutionary framers but rather those who framed the Constitution) to contemplate democratic structures beyond that which Montesquieu offered. Naturally, Humes realist and empirical approach to structuring republics did not initially elicit support from American revolutionaries eager to establish a republican structure as idyllic and ideally democratic as possible. As Montesquieu gave credence to mans virtue, his republican philosophy was more appealing to idealistically driven revolutions than Humes empiricism, which seemed stodgily skeptical of human virtue and pure rationalism. Although the Articles perhaps did achieve an idealistic respect for local interests, the Articles lack of coordinated rule of law on the national level rendered the government, as Hume predicted, impossibly pursuant of philosophies that were impractical (Werner, 1972). After the Articles more idealistic republic had not produced the accord Montesquieu suggested it would, the founders became hesitant to again enshrine virtuous principles in government (Smith, 2011). By the late 1780s, the Constitutional framers constellation of political vision had become increasingly aligned with 5

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Humes prophetic republican thesis. One founder pointedly illuminates this alignment: James Madison, Americas foremost disciple of Humes federalist-republican arrangement (Adair, 1957; Spencer, 2002). Renown as a most vociferous federalist and realist, Madison was greatly inspired by the Scottish Enlightenments embrace of empirical perception (Adair, 1957; Branson, 1979). Along with many of the Constitutions founders, Madison was familiar with the eras avant-garde realist, whose scientific political approach rejected political rationalism and upset Lockes social contract. Madison observed with great interest Scotlands schism with the Crown; the schism historically paralleled the American Revolution, and it was philosophically sped by empiricist, disparate with Americas largely idealist revolutionary framers. Hume was so decisive in the Scottish movement, modern historians of philosophy brand Scotland during this time as living in the Age of Hume (Werner, 1972). Madisons warmth toward Humes federalist-republic was stoked further by Humes strong enthusiasm towards constitutional governments, in which, Hume argued, nations could best typify their empirical and operational principles (Branson, 1987). This made Humes regime structures seem compatible with Americas avid constitutionalism. Madisons keen attention to Humes political ideas led Madison to apply Humes thesis as an integral guide to create the new American regime. Humes essay Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth stimulated Madison, where he extracted two central justifications for why America should embrace Humes federalist format (Hume, 1910). Madison perceived: that first, Americas condition was ideal for creating a federalist republic; and second, the federalist-republic solved for destructive political factionalism, a fundamental national impasse. Madison convinced the framers Americas political conditions were unusually opportune to institute Humes federalist-republicanism. Hume wrote:

If this controversy were fixed by the universal consent of the wise and learned, in some future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a dissolution of some old government, or by the combination of men to form a new one, in some distant part of the world? (Ibid.)

Humes suggested conditions for a federalist republic could not have been more similar to Americas situation in 1787: America was witnessing the dissolution of its revolutionary regime and conducting a gathering of minds to form a new constitution. Moreover, Humes suggestion of a distant part of the world heralded to Madison that the New World was a prime location to launch a Humean regime (Capaldi and Livingston, 1990). Hume explained novel republics needed time to solidify their governance mechanisms and internal civil unification in order to withstand later foreign pressures (Hume, 1910). The geographic isolation of the US from contemporary superpowers gave America some short term solace from constant foreign harassment. Hence, Madison pointedly argued that Americas conditions were ideally suited to build Humes republican regime. Furthermore, Madison shrouded several of his arguments as Publius in Humes logic. Madison persuaded the framers Humes theory that a federalistrepublic would structurally allay a persistent national problem the governments internal factionalization. Humes Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth equipped Madison with one of his most persuasive and prophetic justifications for an American federalist republic (Adair, 1957). In this essay, Hume casually disposed of Montesquieus limits on the republic, writing,
The falsehood of the common opinion, that no large state could ever be modeled into a commonwealth, but that such a form of government can only take place in a city or small territory. Though it is more difficult to form a

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republican government in an extensive country than in a city; there is more facility, when once it is formed, of preserving it steady and uniform, without tumult and faction! In a large government, which is modelled with masterly skill, there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into the first elections or first concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher magistrates, who direct all the movements. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measures against the public interest? (David Hume, 1910)

Comparing Madisons Notes on the Confederacy and famed Federalist Paper 10 to Humes excerpt above illuminates the great degree to which Hume spurred Madisons reasoning. In Federalist Paper 10 Madison wrote:
The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, havebeen the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations. (Publius, 1787-1788)

speculation that federalist republics can absorb factions influence helped Madison defeat the Anti-Federalists Montesquieuian accusations (Flaumenhaft, 1992), which held vast republican governments are uncooperative and either stagnate or destabilize or both (Levy, 2006). Republics of scale, Hume argued, create salubrious and probable schisms; splintering the power locus amongst myriad interest blocs impairs radical or minority cabals ability to dominate national politics (David Hume, 1910). Supplemented with the Constitutions separations of powers, the new federalist-republic sheltered the public against majority tyranny. The Constitutions original removal of Senate elections from the general electorate was also a suggestion from Hume. Humes specific suggestion for a territory-based, more elite and executive Senate was embraced by Madison as an additional check against the popular currents and tides (D. Hume & Haakonssen, 1994); while not wholly attributable to Hume, Humes Senate construction certainly forwarded support for a indirectly elected upper house that could declare war and peace and approve executive appointees. As Madison argued, a federalist-republic structurally quelled factions through a multi-layered protection from radical, minority, and majority rule (Hamilton, Madison, & Jay, 1787). Yet Humes republican theory touched more framers than just James Madison. Werner (1972) traces Humes interest in support from Americas political theorists to as early as 1768, when Hume said he longed to see America in full revolt. In 1775, Hume even declared himself an American in his principles, and he had expressed opposition to King George III (Werner, 1972). As a rationalist and empiricist, Hume enjoyed a philosophical camaraderie with American political theorists who elevated the equality of human reason and praised realism. This connection is distinguishable in his relationship with several towering figures of the Revolution. 7

He continued, observing that: first, larger republics embrace a proportionally diminished representation of factions; and second, the representatives will be chosen from a greater number of citizens, and thus the adopted representation will be less likely to have been selected by harmful minority factions (Ibid). Humes

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Thomas Paines concept of the origins of government perfectly mimicked that described in Humes Of the Origins of Government. Both identically claimed government arose out of moral virtues inability to govern humanity (Ibid). Paine also drew a degree of his anti-monarchial rhetoric verbatim from Hume. Moreover, Franklin, whose political writings scarcely relied on Montesquieu (Stourzh, 1969), had an extensive personal relationship with Hume, in which Franklin visited Humes Edinburgh home frequently and the two maintained an extensive correspondence; Franklin believed Humes ideas were engendered in thought and reason (Werner, 1972). Humes political thought is easily visible in Hamiltons writings, in which Hamilton called Hume a [political] writer equally solid and ingenious (Flaumenhaft, 1992). Hamilton directly incorporated arguments Hume made in Of the Progress of the Arts and Sciences in the apical Federalist Paper No. 85 (Ibid and Werner, 1972). The constitutional framers experience governing a democracy further sprung their caution for philosophically fashioned structure. When the idealistic government outlined by the Articles of Confederation failed, the framers became more philosophically tempered, wearier of the pragmatist necessity in government. The framers found in federalism a pragmatic governance structure that did not host fractious movements. Because Humes republican construct did not attempt to incorporate higher law or morality, his republic was essentially more apt to unite factions and regions. Although still passionate about their state identities, the framers were provoked to reconsider the extent to which state interests were critically interconnected. It was realized that the United States was more sociologically compatible with Humes concepts of faction than with Montesquieus ideas of hegemonic enthusiasm for virtue. Soon after ratification, observing the virtual anarchic and overtly violent French Revolution, the framers fear of a radically philosophical democracy

deepened (Adair, 1951). That if the government was handed over to radical idealists, functional construction wasted either into a moral chaos, subject to will of zealots like those of La Terreur, or a radicalized regime whose mechanisms were impractically abstract (Ibid). Although one could interpret Americas adoption of the unprecedented federalist-republican arrangement as a radical revolution itself, its novelty was less philosophical. Hume himself warned that political conflicts suffered from imprudent vehemence, which results from ideological stubbornness and obfuscates pursuits of clear objectives and rational timelines (Hume, 1987). However, the framers chose to overlook this aspect of Humean conservatism in favor of promoting a Humean republican federation. Vestiges of Montesquieus Republicanism Although Humes concept of a republic was clearly victorious in displacing Montesquieus rpublique federative in the Constitution, resurgences of Montesquieus influence persisted throughout later political thought. Anti-federalist arguments are visible at almost every point in America history, but only several prominent instances will be highlighted below. States rights advocates, omnipresent in American history, are artifacts of Montesquieus thesis. Montesquieu gave South Carolinas nullification arguments significant firepower, for South Carolina used (perhaps inadvertently) reasoning very parallel to Montesquieus logic that large republics fail to maintain legislative flexibility to meet region-specific needs. Interplay between Hume and Montesquieus positions during the Age of Jackson is easily found in arguments against national banks, where Jackson vigorously believed these national institutions were institutions of fiscal tyranny reigning down from the federal level. Later, states rights advocates assumed Montesquieus position on smaller constituencies to argue slavery should be dealt with on the state level. The debate over slavery is a significant instance in

Spring 2013 which Humes arguments did not seem to overcome Montesquieus strong idea of regional rights until the Civil War. Perhaps the most dramatic reentrance of Montesquieus arguments into political thought was during the Second Revolution, where the South asserted strongly that the Union had failed due to impossible divides, which legislatively deadlocked the northern region against the South. The Civil War represents a tumultuous rejection of Humes republican theory. The Second Revolution was eventually decided by military force; it is crucial to note, that unlike the framers debates over Hume and Montesquieu, the Civil War was not decided by pure political re-evaluation. Thus, although Humes thesis that large republics could remain undivided from faction might have miscalculated the impacts of divisions over slavery, Hume was still correct in predicting that a federalist government was more capable of maintaining internal military superiority. Even after the Civil Wars end demonstrated the strong efficacy of Humes republican principles, followers of Montesquieus small republic continued to advocate more rpublique federative-like construction. Montesquieu and Hume seemed to touch, if tacitly, Roosevelts New Nationalism and Wilsons New Freedom. Later, ironically, conservatives began to embrace Montesquieus concepts of decentralization despite the conservative nature of Humes republican concepts. As the nation grew well beyond its size during ratification, factions grew more enormous, which represents a slight flaw in Humes prediction that factions would not proportionally grow when republics expanded. Indeed, modern factions that are arising from divergent political rivers are carving a political canyon among citizens that Hume did not completely prophesize. The nature of party politics along with other factors resulted in a consolidation of political platforms along party lines, which served to broaden and deepen political factionalism, equipping Montesquieuian believers with an empirically based rebuttal to Humes ideas on faction and federalist-republics. Thus, several wavelengths of republican argument have used Montesquieus logic throughout American political development even until today. Humes Enduring Federalist-Republican Victory The tug of war between states and federal authorities persists to this day. States still draw from Hume in arguing that federal authorities are ideologically distant and logistically out of touch with local interests, where federal laws lack regional elasticity. To this extent, the Tea Party movement has clearly favored Montesquieus principles; libertarian movements are similarly disillusioned with federal authority on the basis that is gratuitously encroaches on individual positive liberties. Yet despite these movements, centralized republicanism as Hume saw it held strong against these conservative factions. Indeed, these groups power to enact regime change is severely diminished by the necessity of broad support and inability to surmount national opposition. Although states regarded their distinct sovereignties as cornerstones legitimizing federal power, the implementation of Humes democratic ideas, particularly though Madisons initiative, resulted in lasting permanent establishment of federalism. In a globalizing world, America is uniting under its federalist structure even more than it has in the past. Highly centralized nations are highly competitive with American interests, whether economic, cultural, political, or combinations thereof. Federalist construction has given America the framework to compete with powerful external forces that have achieved robust military power and internal political and economic efficiency. Now, rarely do many argue that, for instance, California can compete with China or Florida can compete with South America. Because national unity is more crucial than ever to Americas success, Montesquieus adherents have virtually dis9

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appeared in their staunchest form. The globalist age is perhaps the apex realization of Humes assertion that large republics will foster stable and prosperous states. Hence, adherence to Humes style of republic is likely to strengthen as history unravels further. Hume remains one of the great political theorists silently at play in American republican structure. Although many modern political mechanics do not bear Humes name or directly reference his ideas, their influence is clear and widespread. Enshrined by the Constitution, Americas federalist republic has been unwaveringly resilient to internal divisions and foreign challenges. In the days to come, Montesquieus influence will only live on as periodic glimmers of belief in a decentralized, limited republic. In contrast, Humes republican theory will endure as a foundation to the American Republic far into posterity.

Works Cited Adair, Douglass. The Tenth Federalist Revisited. The William and Mary Quarterly 8, no. 1 (1951): 48-67. Adair, Douglass. That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist. Huntington Library Quarterly 20, no. 4 (1957): 343-60. Branson, Roy. James Madison and the Scottish Enlightenment. Journal of the History of Ideas 40, no. 2 (1979): 235-50. Bruno, Jonathan. Montesquieu and Early American Political Thought. Harvard University, 2010. Capaldi, N., and D. Livingston. Liberty in Humes History of England. Springer, 1990. Cohen, I.B. Science and the Founding Fathers: Science in the Political Thought of Jefferson, Franklin, Adams and Madison. WW Norton & Company, 1995. 10

Eidelberg, P. The Philosophy of the American Constitution: A Reinterpretation of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers. New York: Free Press 1968. Flaumenhaft, H. The Effective Republic: Administration and Constitution in the Thought of Alexander Hamilton. Duke University Press, 1992. Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. The Federalist Papers. In Electronic Classics Series, edited by Jim Manis: Pennsylvania State University, 1787. Hume, David. Of the Balance of Power. Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. edited by E. F. Miller Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1987. 1742. Hume, David and K. Haakonssen. Hume: Political Essays. Cambridge University Press, 1994. Hume, David. An Equality Concerning Human Understanding: Chapter 8 and 11. In The Harvard Classics, 91. New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1910. Levy, Jacob T. Beyond Publius: Montesquieu, Liberal Republicanism and the Small-Republic Thesis. History of Political Thought 27, no. 1 (// 2006): 50-90. McGuire, R.A., and R.L. Ohsfeldt. Economic Interests and the American Constitution: A Quantitative Rehabilitation of Charles A. Beard. Journal of Economic History 44, no. 2 (1984): 509-19. Montesquieu, C. . Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline. Trans. David Lowelthal. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett (1999). Montesquieu, C. , and M. Richter. The Political Theory of Montesquieu. Cambridge University Press, 1977. Montesquieu, C., A.M. Cohler, B.C. Miller, and H.S. Stone. Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws.

Spring 2013 Cambridge University Press, 1989. Pateman, C. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge University Press, 1975. Publius. Federalist Papers. Vol. Number 10, New Uork1787-1788. Smith, Steven. The Federalists and Anti-Federalists. Yale University, 2011. Spencer, Mark G. Hume and Madison on Faction. The William and Mary Quarterly 59, no. 4 (2002): 869-96. Stourzh, G. Banjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy. University of Chicago Press, 1969. Werner, John M. David Hume and America. Journal of the History of Ideas 33, no. 3 (1972): 439-56.

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VOLUME III ISSUE 1 Justin Zhao Editor-in-Chief David Nordlinger Senior Editor Michael Shammas Senior Editor David Watson Senior Editor Kyle Shohfi Editor Chad Vincente Editor, Layout and Design Daniel Dorchuck Editor Allison Candal Editor Advisors Professor Abdeslam Maghraoui Professor Erik Wibbels Suzanne Pierce Special thanks to Emily Schon for contributing to the cover design and the Duke Political Science faculty for their generous support. Copyright 2013 by Duke Political Science Standard (DPSS) at Duke University The Duke Political Science Standard publishes full-length academic papers related to the study of political science. All essays that appear in this issue will also be available for viewing on the DPSS website: http://polisci.duke.edu/undergraduate/opportunities/duke-political-science-standard

D P S S

Duke Political Science Standard

VolumeIII Issue1 Spring2013

The Great Democratic Experiment:

Two American Republics Guided by Montesquieu and Hume
Luke Maier

Let Loose the Drones of War:

A Place for Drones in Just War Theory
Margaret Bice

Assessing Security Sector Reform:

Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Development Strategy Targeting SecurityApparatuses Based on National Indicators
Ryan Boone

A Democratic Union in the Making:

An Assessment of the European Parliaments Evolution in Relation to Narrowing the Democratic Deficit
Marcus Granlund

Deference for the Divine:

The Court and the Church
Reed McGinley-Stempel